

Dear Author,

Here are the proofs of your article.

- You can submit your corrections **online**, via **e-mail** or by **fax**.
- For **online** submission please insert your corrections in the online correction form. Always indicate the line number to which the correction refers.
- You can also insert your corrections in the proof PDF and **email** the annotated PDF.
- For fax submission, please ensure that your corrections are clearly legible. Use a fine black pen and write the correction in the margin, not too close to the edge of the page.
- Remember to note the **journal title**, **article number**, and **your name** when sending your response via e-mail or fax.
- **Check** the metadata sheet to make sure that the header information, especially author names and the corresponding affiliations are correctly shown.
- **Check** the questions that may have arisen during copy editing and insert your answers/ corrections.
- **Check** that the text is complete and that all figures, tables and their legends are included. Also check the accuracy of special characters, equations, and electronic supplementary material if applicable. If necessary refer to the *Edited manuscript*.
- The publication of inaccurate data such as dosages and units can have serious consequences. Please take particular care that all such details are correct.
- Please **do not** make changes that involve only matters of style. We have generally introduced forms that follow the journal's style. Substantial changes in content, e.g., new results, corrected values, title and authorship are not allowed without the approval of the responsible editor. In such a case, please contact the Editorial Office and return his/her consent together with the proof.
- If we do not receive your corrections **within 48 hours**, we will send you a reminder.
- Your article will be published **Online First** approximately one week after receipt of your corrected proofs. This is the **official first publication** citable with the DOI. **Further changes are, therefore, not possible.**
- The **printed version** will follow in a forthcoming issue.

Please note

After online publication, subscribers (personal/institutional) to this journal will have access to the complete article via the DOI using the URL: [http://dx.doi.org/\[DOI\]](http://dx.doi.org/[DOI]).

If you would like to know when your article has been published online, take advantage of our free alert service. For registration and further information go to: <http://www.link.springer.com>.

Due to the electronic nature of the procedure, the manuscript and the original figures will only be returned to you on special request. When you return your corrections, please inform us if you would like to have these documents returned.

Metadata of the article that will be visualized in OnlineFirst

ArticleTitle	Voice, equality and education: the role of higher education in defining the political participation of young Europeans	
--------------	--	--

Article Sub-Title		
-------------------	--	--

Article CopyRight	The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Limited part of Springer Nature (This will be the copyright line in the final PDF)	
-------------------	---	--

Journal Name	Comparative European Politics	
--------------	-------------------------------	--

Corresponding Author	Family Name	Kisby
	Particle	
	Given Name	Ben
	Suffix	
	Division	School of Social and Political Sciences
	Organization	University of Lincoln
	Address	Brayford Pool, Lincoln, LN6 7TS, UK
	Phone	
	Fax	
	Email	bkisby@lincoln.ac.uk
	URL	
	ORCID	

Author	Family Name	Sloam
	Particle	
	Given Name	James
	Suffix	
	Division	Department of Politics and International Relations
	Organization	Royal Holloway, University of London
	Address	Egham Hill, Egham, TW20 0EX, Surrey, UK
	Phone	
	Fax	
	Email	james.sloam@rhul.ac.uk
	URL	
	ORCID	

Author	Family Name	Henn
	Particle	
	Given Name	Matt
	Suffix	
	Division	Department of Social and Political Sciences
	Organization	Nottingham Trent University
	Address	50 Shakespeare Street, Nottingham, NG1 4FQ, UK
	Phone	
	Fax	
	Email	matt.henn@ntu.ac.uk
	URL	

ORCID

Author	Family Name	Oldfield
	Particle	
	Given Name	Ben
	Suffix	
	Division	School of Social Sciences
	Organization	Nottingham Trent University
	Address	50 Shakespeare Street, Nottingham, NG1 4FQ, UK
	Phone	
	Fax	
	Email	ben.oldfield@ntu.ac.uk
	URL	
	ORCID	

	Received	
Schedule	Revised	
	Accepted	7 December 2020

Abstract Much attention has been paid by academics and policy-makers in recent decades to declining levels of voter turnout and engagement with traditional political and social institutions in established democracies. These trends are particularly marked amongst young people. Drawing on data from the European Social Survey, this article examines the role of higher education (HE) both as a source of unequal participation and as a means of fostering civic and political engagement amongst young Europeans. It uncovers two significant new findings. First, that being in education matters more than an individual's level of educational attainment for levels of civic and political participation, and second, that HE establishments play a key role as social levellers: being in education neutralises differences between young people from high-income and low-income backgrounds with regards to such participation. The article argues that this places added emphasis on the role of educational institutions in nurturing democratic engagement.

Keywords (separated by '-') Young people - Inequality - Higher education - Democratic engagement - Civic participation - Political participation

Footnote Information



2 **Voice, equality and education: the role of higher education**
3 **in defining the political participation of young Europeans**

4 James Sloam¹ · Ben Kisby² · Matt Henn³ · Ben Oldfield⁴

5 Accepted: 7 December 2020

6 © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Limited part of Springer Nature 2020

7 **Abstract**

8 Much attention has been paid by academics and policy-makers in recent decades
9 to declining levels of voter turnout and engagement with traditional political and
10 social institutions in established democracies. These trends are particularly marked
11 amongst young people. Drawing on data from the European Social Survey, this arti-
12 cle examines the role of higher education (HE) both as a source of unequal partici-
13 pation and as a means of fostering civic and political engagement amongst young
14 Europeans. It uncovers two significant new findings. First, that being in education
15 matters more than an individual's level of educational attainment for levels of civic
16 and political participation, and second, that HE establishments play a key role as
17 social levellers: being in education neutralises differences between young people
18 from high-income and low-income backgrounds with regards to such participation.
19 The article argues that this places added emphasis on the role of educational institu-
20 tions in nurturing democratic engagement.

21 **Keywords** Young people · Inequality · Higher education · Democratic engagement ·
22 Civic participation · Political participation

23 **Introduction**

24 The political participation of young people has become an important theme for
25 academics and policy-makers in recent decades (Cammaerts et al. 2016; European
26 Commission 2007, 2009; Hay 2007; House of Commons Political and Constitu-
27 tional Reform Committee 2014; Sloam 2016; Stoker 2006; Youth Citizenship Com-
28 mission 2009). Much attention has been paid to falling levels of voter turnout and
29 a decline in engagement with traditional political and social institutions in established
30 democracies—from political parties, to trade unions, to religious organisations
31 (Fieldhouse et al. 2007; Grasso 2016; Putnam 2000). These trends are particularly

A1 ✉ Ben Kisby
A2 bkisby@lincoln.ac.uk

A3 Extended author information available on the last page of the article



32 marked among young people. Nevertheless, a number of authors have, more posi-
33 tively, pointed to the proliferation of youth participation in a myriad of new forms of
34 engagement since the 2008 financial crisis (Busse et al. 2015; Norris 2011; Pickard
35 and Bessant 2018; Soler-i-Marti 2015). Indeed, if we take a broad look at political
36 participation—focussing on what young people are actually doing rather than what
37 they are not doing—it is possible to conclude that Millennials and Generation Z are
38 at least as politically active as previous generations. In this sense, they continue to
39 have a voice.

40 What is much more open to question, however, is the issue of equality in these
41 new repertoires of participation. What type of young person is most likely to take
42 advantage of this broad spectrum of participation? Voting is generally considered to
43 be a relatively socially equal political act. (This is still the case in many European
44 countries, although much less so in the USA.) The same, however, cannot be said for
45 alternative forms of engagement, such as signing a petition, joining a boycott, par-
46 ticipating in a demonstration, or using social media for political purposes (Marien
47 et al. 2010; Mossberger et al. 2007; Stolle and Hooghe 2011). Research (Schlozman
48 et al. 2010; Sloam 2013) suggests that the decline in youth participation in electoral
49 politics and the shift to alternative forms of engagement has contributed to grow-
50 ing inequalities of participation between young people with high and low socio-eco-
51 nomic status. Since young Europeans are more likely to engage in many of these
52 non-electoral forms of participation than older cohorts, our concern is whether this
53 translates into political participation that is less socially equal for young Europeans.
54 In particular, we are interested in the role higher education (HE) plays in addressing
55 these inequalities.

56 There is a large body of literature (both theoretical and empirical) that has drawn
57 connections between education and democracy (Dewey 1959; Galston 2001; Tor-
58 ney-Purta et al. 2001). The link between civic and political participation and educa-
59 tional attainment is well established in the literature (Nie et al. 1996). In this regard,
60 educational attainment (alongside age) has a more powerful influence upon citizens'
61 levels of political participation than wealth or class (Berinsky and Lenz 2011; Henn
62 and Foard 2014; Verba et al. 1995). However, education is not only important, in a
63 negative sense, for predicting social inequalities of participation; it has also been
64 praised for its capacity to foster civic and political engagement by increasing the
65 political knowledge and understanding (personal efficacy) and democratic skills of
66 young people, and providing the institutional support structures for their transition
67 into adulthood. Politically literate citizens are more likely to participate in democ-
68 racy, and schools and colleges can play a key role in preparing young people for
69 democratic life (Flanagan and Levine 2010; Nissen 2019; Torney-Purta et al. 2001).

70 Many studies have examined falling participation in electoral politics and the
71 emergence of new forms of democratic engagement. However, the real impor-
72 tance of the civic decline thesis may lie in the fact that some groups in society
73 have become less civically (and politically) active, and other groups have become



74 more active (Sander and Putnam 2010).¹ This trend has major implications for
75 political socialisation. Citizens in our advanced industrial democracies may be
76 more self-reflexive in their politics (Giddens 1991), and increasingly engage with
77 issues that have meaning for their everyday lives (Bang and Esmark 2009). They
78 may indeed engage politically through social networks across ‘hybrid media sys-
79 tems’ and ‘hybrid public spaces’ (Castells 2012; Chadwick 2013). But, as Flana-
80 gan (2013) demonstrates, institutions remain central for the socialisation of citizens
81 into practices of democracy, ‘scaffolding’ their transition from youth to adulthood.
82 If traditional institutions of political socialisation, such as political parties and trade
83 unions, are declining in importance, it follows that the remaining institutions (in this
84 case, universities and colleges) play an even more pivotal role. This is particularly
85 so given the massive expansion of HE in recent decades: the average percentage
86 of 25–34-year-olds with university education in the EU (countries that were mem-
87 bers before 2014) increased from around a quarter in 1995, to approximately 40% in
88 2011, to 45% in 2018 (European Commission 2019).

89 This article focuses on the influence of HE on the political participation of young
90 adults (defined here as 18–24-year-olds) in the 15 countries of the ‘old’ European
91 Union (before Eastern enlargement in 2004 and the UK’s withdrawal from the EU
92 in January 2020).² The article examines the impact of education both as a source
93 of unequal participation (between young people *in* and *out* of education) and as an
94 institutional support for students (from different backgrounds)—imparting skills and
95 political understanding and providing opportunities for civic and political engage-
96 ment in the key developmental stage of ‘emerging adulthood’ (Arnett 2004). Draw-
97 ing on data from waves 1–8 of the European Social Survey (ESS), which is under-
98 taken every 2 years, the article analyses these issues and reveals two significant new
99 findings. First, not only does education matter, but being in education matters more
100 than an individual’s level of educational attainment for levels of civic and political
101 participation. HE students (aged 18–24) are not only more politically active than
102 their peers but are also more engaged than the average adult (across all age groups).
103 Second, HE establishments seem to play an important role as social levellers: *being*
104 *in education* neutralises differences between young people from high-income and
105 low-income backgrounds with regards to such participation.

106 Inequalities of participation

107 Democracy is widely defined as a form of government in which every citizen’s
108 views should count in decisions that affect their lives. The political theorist Robert
109 Dahl (1971, p. 1), for example, wrote that ‘a key characteristic of a democracy is

1FL01 ¹ Sander and Putnam (2010) record the doubling of civic engagement amongst college students in the
1FL02 US between 2001 and 2010, but also a growing participation gap between college students and young
1FL03 people who do not go on to university.

2FL01 ² The ‘EU15’ countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
2FL02 Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and (until it left at 11 pm GMT on 31
2FL03 January 2020) the UK.



110 the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens,
111 considered as political equals'. Yet in contemporary liberal democracies, the evi-
112 dence clearly shows that wealthier and better-educated citizens are more likely than
113 less well-off and less well-educated citizens to have high levels of civic and political
114 understanding, to vote in elections, and to give time and money to political cam-
115 paigns (Grasso 2016; Marien et al. 2010; Sloam 2013).

116 A second key determinant of political engagement is age. Young people in
117 most Western liberal democracies are participating less than previous generations
118 of young people in electoral politics, in preference to alternative kinds of political
119 engagement: from the ballot box, to demonstrations, to consumer action (Kyroglou
120 and Henn 2017; Norris and Inglehart 2019; Stolle et al. 2005). The arenas for their
121 participation have also become more diverse: from political parties, to issue groups,
122 to social movements, to online social networks (Bennett and Segerberg 2013; Della
123 Porta and Tarrow 2005). As electoral forms of political engagement and political
124 structures are viewed as less appropriate for modern life, citizens have increasingly
125 turned their focus from politics to policy—away from engagement with traditional
126 political institutions and processes (such as political parties and elections), and
127 instead towards specific policy concerns. Thus, young people can be characterised
128 as 'standby citizens' who engage from time-to-time with political issues that hold
129 meaning for their everyday lives (Amnå and Ekman 2014). They are attracted to
130 intermittent, non-institutionalised, issue-based, horizontal forms of engagement
131 and repelled by the thought of long-term commitment through formal institutions
132 with broader policy goals and entrenched hierarchies (Bang and Esmark 2009; Henn
133 et al. 2018; Tormey 2015). The school climate strikes, inspired by the Swedish
134 activist Greta Thunberg, provided an optimal example of how a social movement
135 can spread, with immense speed and intensity if it resonates with a younger audi-
136 ence (Pickard 2019).

137 Young Europeans have turned towards non-electoral forms of political engage-
138 ment. But these forms of engagement are marked by large social inequalities based,
139 for instance, on social class, income and educational career and qualifications
140 (Marien et al. 2010; Norris et al. 2005; Sloam 2013). One explanation for these
141 uneven patterns of participation might be that many non-electoral forms of political
142 participation require a high degree of expertise and social connectedness (Dalton
143 2004). For example, not everyone would have the self-confidence or knowledge of
144 the system to speak to local officials about a failing school or to lobby their member
145 of parliament about a threat to the local environment. It is not only the alternative
146 modes of engagement that are marked by these inequalities, but also emerging *aren-*
147 *nas of engagement*. The 'digital divide' has received much attention in the academic
148 literature (Mossberger et al. 2007), and it is a divide that is particularly noticeable
149 between rich and poor, and between those with high and low levels of educational
150 achievement (Grasso et al. 2017; Schlozman et al. 2010). Socio-economic status is,
151 therefore, central in defining citizens' political participation. And educational attain-
152 ment is crucial, in this context, as a marker of socio-economic status. But is educa-
153 tion merely a proxy for socio-economic status? Or is there something more to the
154 relationship? The existing literature offers us key insights into the link between edu-
155 cation and political engagement.



156 **Education and political participation**

157 It has long been argued that education and educational establishments have an
158 important role to play in fostering civic and political participation. Perhaps the most
159 famous contribution to understanding the connection between education and democ-
160 cratic engagement was made by the American philosopher and educational reformer
161 John Dewey, especially in his book *Democracy and Education*, first published in
162 1916 (see Steiner 1994). Dewey viewed education as part of his bigger project that
163 included exploring the nature of experience, knowledge, society, ethics and aesthet-
164 ics. He argued for the renewal of public, democratic life and placed a great deal of
165 emphasis on the importance of deliberation, participation and communication. For
166 Dewey (1959, p. 7), it is through these processes that citizens learn about democ-
167 racy; by viewing themselves as social beings concerned with the common good—
168 ‘the very process of living together educates’. He argued that a desirable form of
169 society is one in which all members can participate and communicate on equal
170 terms, and where the education system facilitates such participation and promotes
171 intelligent inquiry.

172 For over 50 years, scholars have found that better-educated citizens are more
173 likely to vote in elections and participate in political campaigns (Parry et al. 1992;
174 Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1995), although some researchers view educational
175 attainment as a proxy for the social status, cognitive abilities and personality traits of
176 citizens (Berinsky and Lenz 2011). Others believe that education improves the rel-
177 evant skills of citizens, as well as increasing their interest in political issues and their
178 sense of civic duty (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; Verba et al. 1995; Wolfinger and Rosen-
179 stone 1980). Further recent research suggests, in support of Dewey, that it is not just
180 educational attainment levels that matter, but also the nature of an educational estab-
181 lishment, its ‘democratic ethos’, which has an important bearing on the likelihood of
182 future democratic engagement (Flanagan and Levine 2010; Kerr et al. 2007). It has,
183 thus, been persuasively argued that educational establishments play a crucial cogni-
184 tive and social role in the development of political understanding (Flanagan et al.
185 2007). They are sites of political and civic action, and arenas in which individuals
186 develop their own personal political biographies (Flanagan and Levine 2010; Keat-
187 ing 2014; Niemi and Junn 1998). In the past, institutions like churches, trade unions
188 and political parties provided opportunities for young people, in their transition to
189 early adulthood, to get engaged in politics and in their communities. Today, how-
190 ever, much of that *scaffolding* is gone. In this context, universities and colleges, with
191 their wide reach, play a more important role than ever (Goddard et al. 2016).

192 Although a considerable volume of literature exists on the development of citi-
193 zenship education and active citizens across the different school systems of Europe
194 (see, for example, Keating 2014; Schulz et al. 2010), hardly any attention has been
195 paid to the role of HE beyond work on student mobilisation in elections and social
196 movements (Sloam and Henn 2019). This contrasts sharply with the United States,
197 where the presence of ‘civic education’ programmes in universities and colleges—
198 where these are integrated into the curriculum through means such as service-learn-
199 ing (Gelmon et al. 2018; Longo et al. 2006)—increases volunteering on campuses



200 (Pryor et al. 2008), and institutional support for and concrete commitments to the
201 civic mission of HE are all well documented. Colby et al. (2003, p. 19) detail how
202 programmes have been developed in a number of US institutions to ‘build bridges to
203 students’ own conceptions of appropriate political analysis and action’, and to illus-
204 trate how political issues relate to public policy and electoral politics. We also know
205 from the US literature that it is not just citizenship education, volunteering and insti-
206 tutional support structures that foster student engagement, but also the existence of
207 a participatory culture (civic and political engagement as a cultural norm) that moti-
208 vates students to become politically active through a dense collection of social net-
209 works and student societies (Beaumont et al. 2006; Jacoby 2009).

210 Of course, not all young people go on to study at universities and colleges, but
211 with such a substantial number now passing through HE establishments, universi-
212 ties and colleges have the potential to promote political participation amongst a sig-
213 nificant proportion of citizens. They can act as ‘mini-polities’ (Flanagan et al. 2007),
214 formative arenas for expression and civic engagement, for practice in social relations
215 and in dealing with authority. This places great importance upon their democratic
216 nature and the opportunities they provide for student expression. If educational
217 establishments can help increase students’ levels of ‘personal efficacy’—their belief
218 that they can understand and influence political issues and events, of having con-
219 fidence in their democratic skills—it follows that this is likely to have a positive
220 future impact upon civic and political engagement. This article therefore not only
221 examines the advantages wealth and a good education give young people in terms of
222 their democratic engagement, but also explores whether educational institutions can
223 play a significant role in helping to reduce the disadvantages suffered in this regard
224 by less wealthy students.

225 **Methods**

226 The existing literature provides strong evidence to support three claims. First, that
227 young people are turning away from electoral forms of politics to new modes of
228 engagement. Second, while being more youth-oriented than voting, these alternative
229 modes of engagement tend to be dominated by the well-educated and the well-off.
230 Third, education and educational establishments can play a key role in shaping civic
231 and political engagement. Based on these claims, this article examines the influence
232 of HE on political participation amongst young Europeans (here, 18–24-year-olds).
233 The first part of the investigation leads us to consider the extent to which levels
234 of educational attainment³ and having experienced HE (either currently enrolled

³ The ‘High Education’ group includes those holding qualifications that are at least the minimum level necessary to gain admission to university-level study in each country (upper tier upper secondary and above). The Low Education group includes all others who did not achieve this level of educational attainment.



235 or previously completed) or not,⁴ both matter for civic and political participation
236 amongst young people and older adults (and in comparison with high-income and
237 low-income groups⁵—see Table 1). The second phase of the analysis contrasts the AQ1
238 political engagement of 18–24-year-olds who have experience of HE with those who
239 do not (see Table 2). The final part of the study uses stepwise regression to consider
240 young Europeans from low-income and from high-income households, and how
241 their political participation and political engagement may be impacted by their expe-
242 riences of HE (Tables 3, 4).

243 To investigate these issues, the article uses integrated data from waves 1–8⁶ of the
244 European Social Survey (ESS, 2002–2016) across the fifteen member states of the
245 old EU. The ESS is uniquely helpful in exploring youth participation in democracy
246 across national boundaries. Firstly, it includes samples from all 28 countries of the
247 EU, including the ‘EU15’ countries that form the focus of our analyses. Secondly,
248 the ESS provides data on a very high number of young (18–24-year-old) respon-
249 dents in the EU15 countries concerned ($N=16,646$). The large size of the ESS ena-
250 bles us to explore the political participation and political engagement of various sub-
251 groups of 18–24-year-olds (such as by household income, educational attainment
252 and status in education) without each of these falling to statistically insignificant
253 levels. And, thirdly, the waves of the survey (taking place every 2 years) within a
254 limited time frame cater for short-term distortions in the political environment, such
255 as the demonstrations against the Iraq War. Other international surveys either only
256 provide a one-off snapshot of youth participation (Van Deth et al. 2007) or provide
257 data on only small samples of young adults over waves that are too far apart (the
258 World Values Survey and European Values Study) or which focus on a very specific
259 age range (Schulz et al. 2010).

260 Given the increasing turn by young people to non-electoral forms of political
261 participation (described above), it would have been ideal to have analysed a wide
262 range of different types of civic and political participation (see Pattie et al. 2004
263 and Van Deth et al. 2007 for extensive batteries of political action). With the ESS
264 data, however, we were able to investigate seven forms of “political participation”.
265 Of these, three are classed as ‘electoral participation’ (‘Voted [in the] last national
266 election’, ‘Worked in a political party or action group’, ‘Contacted a politician or

4FL01 ⁴ This variable is a composite of the highest qualification achieved variable and the main activity variable,
4FL02 and includes categories of 18–24-year-olds who have experience of higher education (HE) and those
4FL03 who do not. The first group includes those who are either currently enrolled in HE or who have pre-
4FL04 viously completed HE studies, while the second group includes young Europeans who have completed
4FL05 their secondary education but did not then continue into HE.

5FL01 ⁵ ‘Low-income’ refers to the bottom quartile (the bottom three categories on a 12-point scale) of income
5FL02 in each country. ‘High-income’ refers to the top quartile (on the same scale) of income in each country.
5FL03 Focussing our analyses only on these particular highest and lowest income groups leads to low N for
5FL04 some sub-samples in the tables and in the analyses.

6FL01 ⁶ At the time of examining the data, only waves 1–8 were available for cumulative analysis.



Table 1 Political participation and political engagement of people aged 18 years and over in the European Union (EU15) (N = 197,924). Source: European Social Survey (waves 1–8)

	A: Not engaged with HE (all ages) N = 124,306	B: Involved HE (all ages) N = 55,710	C: Whether engaged with HE gap	D: High Income (all ages) N = 71,805	E: Low Income (all ages) N = 35,591	F: Income gap	G: High education qualifs (all ages) N = 127,620	H: Low education qualifs (all ages) N = 75,265	I: Qualifs gap	J: 18–24 year olds N = 18,052	K: Aged 25 plus N = 179,872	L: Age gap	M: All ages N = 197,924
Voted [in the] last national election	76.9	83.1	-6.2	81.0	71.3	9.7	81.6	73.9	7.7	60.3	80.3	-20	72.6
Worked in a political party or action group	3.1	6.2	-3.1	4.4	3.2	1.2	5.0	2.5	2.5	3.2	4.1	-1.1	4
Contacted a politician or government official	12.2	20.5	-8.3	16.1	11.9	4.2	17.8	9.6	8.2	8.4	15.5	-7.1	14.7
Worked in another organisation or association	13.1	25.4	-12.3	18.5	12.5	6.0	21.7	9.3	12.4	15.5	17.1	-1.6	16.9
Signed a petition	23.6	41.9	-18.3	30.7	23.1	7.6	36.1	18.7	17.4	29.3	29.6	-0.3	29.4
Taken part in a lawful public demonstration	7.5	15.9	-8.4	10.3	8.7	1.6	12.1	6.7	5.4	15.0	9.4	5.6	10



Voice, equality and education: the role of higher education...

Table 1 (continued)

	A: Not engaged with HE (all ages) N = 124,306	B: In/ completed HE (all ages) N = 55,710	C: Whether engaged with HE with HE gap	D: High Income (all ages) N = 71,805	E: Low Income (all ages) N = 35,591	F: Income gap	G: High education qualifies (all ages) N = 127,620	H: Low education qualifies (all ages) N = 75,265	I: Quailifs gap	J: 18-24 year olds N = 18,052	K: Aged 25 plus N = 179,872	L: Age gap	M: All ages N = 197,924
Boycotted certain products	17.5	31.2	-13.7	23.1	17.9	5.2	27.9	12.2	15.7	16.1	22.7	-6.6	21.9
Trust (social) 0-10 (0 least)	4.7	5.5	-0.8*	5.1	4.6	0.5*	5.2	4.5	0.7*	5.0	4.9	0.1*	5.0
Trust (politicians) 0-10 (0 least)	3.2	3.8	-0.6*	3.5	3.1	0.4*	3.6	3.2	0.4*	3.6	3.4	0.2*	3.4
Political interest 1-4 (1 Least)	2.7	2.9	-0.2*	2.8	2.7	0.1*	2.8	2.6	0.2*	2.6	2.8	-0.2*	2.8
Political understanding 1-5 (1 Least)	2.7	3.2	-0.5*	2.9	2.6	0.3*	3.1	2.5	0.6*	2.8	2.9	-0.1*	2.8

NB1 All table values are weighted percentages (up to 100%) with the exception of the two "Trust" variables as well as "Political interest" and "Political understanding" where mean ratings are included

NB2 All data are weighted. The ESS user guide states that unweighted N is an unreliable measure; therefore, percentages for all categories are reported but N is not reported (www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/methodology/ESS_weighting_data_1.pdf)

NB3 The analyses use the recommended combination of PSPWGHT and PWEIGHT as per the ESS guidelines (www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/methodology/ESS_weighting_data_1.pdf)

NB4 Standard errors are only viable for the two "Trust" variables as well as "Political interest" and "Political understanding" which use means. Significant differences are reported as *(p < .001)



Table 2 Political participation and political engagement of 18–24-year olds in the European Union (EU15) (N= 16,646). Source: European Social Survey (waves 1–8)

	A: In/ completed HE N= 10,159 [#]	B: Not engaged with HE N= 6487 [#]	C: Whether engaged with HE gap	D: In/ completed HE (low income) N= 302 [#]	E: Not engaged with HE (low income) N= 145 [#]	F: Low income gap—engaged/ not engaged with HE	G: In/ completed HE (high income) N= 1800 [#]	H: Not engaged with HE (high income) N= 1077 [#]	I: High income gap—engaged/ not engaged with HE	J: In/ completed HE (high qualifs) N= 7593 [#]	K: Not engaged with HE (high qualifs) N= 4313 [#]	L: High Qualifs gap—engaged/ not engaged with HE	M: 18–24's N= 16,646 [#]
Voted [in the] last national election	65.8	55.2	10.6	66.9	20.8	46.1	66.4	57.5	8.9	68.8	61.8	7.0	40.6
Worked in a political party or action group	3.9	2.3	1.6	6.1	0.0	6.1	3.5	2.8	0.7	4.1	2.5	1.6	3.2
Contacted a politician or government official	9.3	6.8	2.5	10.0	4.5	5.5	8.4	6.0	2.4	10.1	7.9	2.2	8.4
Worked in another organisation or association	19.2	10.6	8.6	15.6	5.1	10.5	16.0	7.5	8.5	19.3	12.8	6.5	15.5
Signed a petition	34.7	21.5	13.2	40.7	10.2	30.5	29.9	19.4	10.5	37.5	25.5	12.0	29.2



Voice, equality and education: the role of higher education...

Author Proof

Table 2 (continued)

	A: In/ completed HE N= 10,159 [#]	B: Not engaged with HE N= 6487 [#]	C: Whether engaged with HE gap	D: In/ completed HE (low income) N= 302 [#]	E: Not engaged with HE (low income) N= 145 [#]	F: Low income gap—engaged/ not engaged with HE	G: In/ completed HE (high income) N= 1800 [#]	H: Not engaged with HE (high income) N= 1077 [#]	I: High income gap—engaged/ not engaged with HE	J: In/ completed HE (high qualifs) N= 7593 [#]	K: Not engaged with HE (high qualifs) N= 4313 [#]	L: High Qualifs gap—engaged/ not engaged with HE	M: 18–24's N= 16,646 [#]
Taken part in a lawful public demonstration	19.4	9.3	10.1	27.7	7.6	20.1	20.4	8.6	11.7	19.6	10.9	8.7	15.0
Boycotted certain products	19.4	11.6	7.8	35.2	7.1	28.1	15.4	8.8	6.6	20.4	14.3	6.1	16.0
Trust (social) 0–10 (0 least)	5.3	4.7	0.6*	5.3	4.7	0.6*	5.3	4.7	0.6*	5.4	4.8	0.6*	5.0
Trust (politicians) 0–10 (0 least)	3.9	3.3	0.6*	3.9	3.3	0.6*	3.8	3.5	0.3*	3.9	3.4	0.5*	3.6
Political interest 1–4 (1 Least)	2.4	2.1	0.3*	2.4	2.1	0.3*	2.3	2.0	0.3*	2.4	2.2	0.2*	2.2



Table 2 (continued)

	A: In/ completed HE N = 10,159 [#]	B: Not engaged with HE N = 6487 [#]	C: Whether engaged with HE gap	D: In/ completed HE (low income) N = 302 [#]	E: Not engaged with HE (low income) N = 145 [#]	F: Low income gap—engaged/ not engaged with HE	G: In/ completed HE (high income) N = 1800 [#]	H: Not engaged with HE (high income) N = 1077 [#]	I: High income gap—engaged/ not engaged with HE	J: In/ completed HE (high qualifies) N = 7593 [#]	K: Not engaged with HE (high qualifies) N = 4313 [#]	L: High Qualifies gap—engaged/ not engaged with HE	M: 18–24's N = 16,646 [#]
Political	2.8	2.6	0.2*	2.8	2.6	0.2*	2.8	2.6	0.2*	2.9	2.7	0.2*	2.8
under-													
standing													
1–5 (1													
Least)													

NB1 All table values are weighted percentages (up to 100%) with the exception of the two “Trust” variables as well as “Political interest” and “Political understanding” where mean ratings are included

NB2 All data are weighted. The ESS user guide states that unweighted *N* is an unreliable measure; therefore, percentages for all categories are reported but *N* is not reported (www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/methodology/ESS_weighting_data_1.pdf)

NB3 The analyses use the recommended combination of PSPWGHT and PWEIGHT as per the ESS guidelines (www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/methodology/ESS_weighting_data_1.pdf)

NB4 Standard errors are only viable for the two “Trust” variables as well as “Political interest” and “Political understanding” which use means. Significant differences are reported as * ($p < .001$)

[#]*N* reflects sample composition and does not represent the actual figures for European countries

Table 3 Comparative results for 2 stepwise regression models for 18–24-year olds not progressing to Higher Education (HE)—the impact of income, educational attainment, gender and ethnicity on political participation and political engagement (N = 6487). Source: European Social Survey (waves 1–8)

	Vote last national election N=5043	Working for a party or action group N=6469	Contacting for politician or government official N=6460	Working for non-party political organisation N=6468	Signing a petition N=6460	Participation in lawful public demonstration N=6467	Joining a boycott N=6447	Trust (social) 0–10 (0 least) N=6469	Trust (political) 0–10 (0 least) N=6469	Personal efficacy N=3748
Model 1—Gender and Ethnicity not included										
Income	-.215 (2)***	-.056*	n.s.	n.s.	-.069 (2)**	n.s.	n.s.	.109***	.064 (2)**	n.s.
Educational attainment	-.217 (1)***	n.s.	-.065**	-.081 (1)***	-.081 (1)***	n.s.	-.067	n.s.	-.137 (1)***	.051*
	$R^2 = .104$	$R^2 = .003$	$R^2 = .004$	$R^2 = .004$	$R^2 = .013$	$R^2 =$	$R^2 = .005$	$R^2 = .012$	$R^2 = .025$	$R^2 = .003$
Model 2—All named variables included										
Income	-.219 (1)***	-.056 (2)*	n.s.	n.s.	-.070 (2)**	n.s.	n.s.	.105 (1)*	n.s.	n.s.
Educational attainment	-.196 (2)***	n.s.	-.068 (1)**	-.063**	-.075 (1)**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.135 (1)***	-.054 (3)*
Gender	n.s.	-.067 (1)**	n.s.	n.s.	-.075 (3)**	n.s.	-.078 (1)**	-.072 (2)**	-.076 (2)**	-.222 (1)***
Ethnicity	-.099 (3)***	n.s.	.064 (2)**	n.s.	-.059 (4)*	n.s.	-.064 (2)**	n.s.	.061 (3)*	.072 (2)**
	$R^2 = .109$	$R^2 = .008$	$R^2 = .008$	$R^2 = .004$	$R^2 = .018$	$R^2 =$	$R^2 = .010$	$R^2 = .016$	$R^2 = .029$	$R^2 = .061$

NB "n.s." indicates non-significant relationships

NB2 The analyses use the recommended combination of PSPWGHT and PWEIGHT as per the ESS guidelines (www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/methodology/ESS_weighting_data_1.pdf)

All values are Beta Coefficients and statistically significant *** $p \leq .001$; ** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$. Values in brackets are the predictor order



Table 4 Results for stepwise regression model for 18–24-year olds progressing to Higher Education (HE)—the impact of income, educational attainment, gender and ethnicity on political participation and political engagement (N = 10,159). Source: European Social Survey (waves 1–8)

	Vote last national election N = 6791	Working for a party or action group N = 10141	Contacting politician or government official N = 10,136	Working for non-party political organisation N = 10,132	Signing a petition N = 10,128	Participation in lawfull public demonstration N = 10,140	Joining a boycott N = 10,112	Trust (social) 0–10 (0 least) N = 10,143	Trust (political) 0–10 (0 least) N = 9,995	Political interest N = 10,134	Personal efficiency N = 5130
Model 1—Gender and ethnicity not included											
Income	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.060 (2)**	.050**	.150***	n.s.	-.062**	-.091 (1)***	n.s.
Educational attainment	-.160***	-.055**	n.s.	n.s.	-.081 (1)***	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.069 (2)***	.063***
	$R^2 = .026$	$R^2 = .003$	$R^2 =$	$R^2 =$	$R^2 = .011$	$R^2 = .003$	$R^2 = .022$	$R^2 =$	$R^2 = .004$	$R^2 = .014$	$R^2 = .004$
Model 2—All named variables included											
Income	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.060 (2)**	.055**	.152 (1)***	n.s.	-.073 (3)***	-.091 (2)***	n.s.
Educational attainment	-.160***	-.063 (2)***	n.s.	n.s.	-.082 (1)***	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.080 (3)***	.075 (2)***
Gender	n.s.	.063 (1)***	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.065 (2)***	-.054 (2)**	-.110 (2)***	-.109 (1)***	-.184 (1)***
Ethnicity	n.s.	n.s.	-.065***	-.066***	.040 (3)***	n.s.	n.s.	.177 (1)***	.142 (1)***	n.s.	n.s.
	$R^2 = .026$	$R^2 = .007$	$R^2 = .004$	$R^2 = .004$	$R^2 = .013$	$R^2 = .003$	$R^2 = .028$	$R^2 = .034$	$R^2 = .035$	$R^2 = .026$	$R^2 = .038$

NB “n.s.” indicates non-significant relationships

NB2 The analyses use the recommended combination of PSPWGHT and PWEIGHT as per the ESS guidelines (www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/methodology/ESS_weighting_data_1.pdf)

All values are Beta Coefficients and statistically significant *** $p \leq .001$; ** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$. Values in brackets are the predictor order



267 government official'). In addition, one can be considered an institutionalised, non-
268 electoral form of engagement ('Worked in another organisation or association' for a
269 political cause). Finally, three that can be broadly categorised as issue-based forms
270 of participation ('Signed a petition', 'Boycotted certain products', and 'Taken part
271 in a lawful public demonstration'). The recent literature, which refers to 'standby
272 citizens', 'engaged citizens' and 'critical citizens' (Amnå and Ekman 2014; Dalton
273 2009; Norris 2011) suggests that it is important to explore the underlying issues of
274 political interest, political understanding (personal efficacy), and social and political
275 trust. With this in mind, we have selected four indicators of "political engagement".
276 For the first of these, we recorded the percentage of (young) citizens who were 'very
277 interested' or 'quite interested' in politics. Secondly, we calculated personal efficacy
278 as the percentage of young Europeans who seldom or never found 'politics too com-
279 plicated to understand'. Finally, we studied levels of social trust ('Most people can
280 be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people') and political trust
281 ('how much you personally trust [...] politicians'), both on an 11-point scale of 0 to
282 10, where 0 was no trust and 10 was complete trust.

283 Results

284 Patterns of political participation and engagement

285 The data provide key insights into patterns of political participation and engagement
286 amongst citizens across Europe. Table 1 confirms that whether or not people have
287 opted to remain in education after reaching the age of 18 is the key predictor of
288 political participation and political engagement. However, other factors such as edu-
289 cational attainment, age, and household income each have a noticeable impact.

290 European citizens aged 18 years or over who have formally engaged with HE
291 (higher education), either as existing or previous students (column B), score con-
292 siderably more highly on each of the political participation and political engage-
293 ment items than the general adult population (M), or indeed any of the income, age
294 or educational qualification groups. The data indicate that 83.1% of those who had
295 experienced HE had voted. Four tenths had signed a petition (41.9%), nearly a third
296 had joined a boycott (31.2%), while about a quarter had either worked for a political
297 organisation or association *other* than a political party (25.4%) or had engaged in
298 contact activities with politicians or government officials (20.5%). They also scored
299 more highly than any of the other groups in terms of either participation in a lawful
300 public demonstration (15.9%) or in a political party or action group (6.2%). Further-
301 more, their mean political engagement scores for trust (social, 5.5 out of 11; politi-
302 cal 3.8 out of 11), political interest (2.9 out of 4) and political understanding (3.2
303 out of 5) are also higher than for the other groups listed in Table 1, and these mean



304 differences are statistically significant.⁷ Column C considers the differences between
305 people who have engaged with HE and those who have not. The data confirm that
306 experience of HE has a consistently positive impact on all of the seven political par-
307 ticipation items as well as all levels of political engagement—indicating that expo-
308 sure to HE appears to have a transformative effect on European adults in terms of
309 nurturing their democratic engagement.

310 Education is also important in terms of level of qualifications gained. Europeans
311 aged 18 and above who had gained a level of qualifications necessary to enrol for
312 HE study at some point in their lives (column G), were much more likely to partici-
313 pate in all seven political activities than those who had left school with lower level
314 qualifications (H). Their scores for the four political engagement items (social and
315 political trust, political interest and political understanding) were also considerably
316 higher, statistically significantly so. Column I records the scale of the political par-
317 ticipation and political engagement gaps between these two groups.

318 Those from high-income backgrounds (column D) are more active than low-
319 income groups (E) in terms of the various modes of political participation consid-
320 ered and also display statistically significantly higher levels of political engagement
321 (social and political trust, political interest and personal efficacy). Nonetheless, these
322 income variations (F) are less marked than are those differences observed for the
323 attended/not attended HE variable (C) and the educational qualifications variable (I).
324 The exception is voting, where the income-voting gap (F) is 9.7%, which is higher
325 for the HE-voting gap (C) and the qualifications-voting gap (I).

326 What is also apparent from these data is that young (18–24-year-old) adults (col-
327 umn J) are typically less active in different electoral and non-electoral/issue-based
328 forms of *participation* than are their older contemporaries (K). The only exceptions
329 are that they are only *marginally* less likely to have signed a petition, and they have
330 a noticeably *greater* likelihood to have joined lawful demonstrations in the past. Fur-
331 thermore, the age differences with respect to political engagement are statistically
332 significant. However, while younger citizens display less political interest and lower
333 levels of political understanding than their older counterparts, they have greater lev-
334 els of social and political trust.

335 The importance of an individual having engaged with HE (either as a current stu-
336 dent or as a previous student) is particularly obvious when we focus on young adults
337 aged 18–24. Table 2 explores in more detail the impact of this variable on youth
338 political participation and political engagement. Here, we can see that young Euro-
339 peans having engaged with HE (column A) are much more active across all (elec-
340 toral-institutional and non-institutional) forms of participation than their peers who
341 have successfully completed their secondary school education but are no longer in
342 education (B). Furthermore, engaging with HE seems to have a statistically signifi-
343 cant and positive impact in terms of their levels of political engagement—political
344 and social trust as well as political interest and personal efficacy. These results offer

⁷ Mean scores rather than percentages are reported for these four “political engagement” variables. Social trust and political trust are both 11 item variables, while there are four categories for political interest and five for political understanding (personal efficacy). See footnote 10 for coding details.



345 a clear indication that being in HE matters in terms of positively structuring young
346 people's political participation and political engagement, a finding which is consist-
347 ent with other recent research (Henn and Foard 2014).

348 Given the large *social* inequalities in many issue-based, non-electoral forms of
349 political participation (and in electoral participation in several countries), it is also
350 important to consider the extent to which being in education matters for young peo-
351 ple from low-income backgrounds. The sample sizes for these groups are relatively
352 small because household income is not tested in all waves or in all EU15 coun-
353 tries in the ESS data, and we are only focussing on the upper- and lower-quartile
354 income groups. As a consequence, the following results should be treated with some
355 degree of caution. Nevertheless, the findings are dramatic. Young low-income HE
356 students (past and present, column D) are significantly more politically active and
357 engaged than their low-income peers who have completed their secondary school-
358 ing but not progressed to HE (column E). This is the especially the case for voting
359 (66.9%–20.8%) but also for the other items including contact with politicians or gov-
360 ernment officials (10%–4.5%), working for a party (6.1–0),⁸ working with non-party
361 organisations (15.6%–5.1%), signing petitions (40.7%–10.2%), taking part in dem-
362 onstrations (27.7%–7.6%) and boycotting products for political ends (35.2%–7.1%).
363 There are statistically significant differences between the two groups in terms of
364 political engagement, with low-income students scoring considerably more highly
365 than low-income non-students in terms of social and political trust, levels of interest
366 in politics and political understanding.

367 Intriguingly, progressing to HE appears to have a more significant impact on
368 young people from low-income backgrounds than it does on high-income students
369 in terms of several aspects of political participation and political engagement. As we
370 might expect, the data indicates that young high-income HE college students (col-
371 umn G) were more likely to have taken part in various forms of political action than
372 were high-income youth who had left education after completing secondary school
373 (column H). This is the case for all of the seven modes of political participation con-
374 sidered in Table 2. Furthermore, all of the political engagement differences are sta-
375 tistically significant. However, the political participation and political engagement
376 gaps for low-income students and low-income non-students (column F) are in most
377 cases considerably higher than for the high-income students/non-students (column
378 I).

379 Interestingly, the relationship between income and political participation reported for
380 HE students (and past students) is the reverse of what is present in Table 1 for
381 the general adult population. For European citizens of all ages, high-income adults
382 have greater levels of political participation and political engagement (on all items)
383 than low-income citizens. However, the opposite is the case when considering the
384 findings in Table 2 for young people aged 18–24. The first point to make is that
385 in terms of the four political engagement variables, Table 2 offers no evidence of
386 any appreciable difference between the low-income student group (column D) and

⁸ However, numbers are very small, so caution should be exercised when interpreting the figures on party activism, given the rarity of this form of political participation across the EU15.



387 their high-income contemporaries (column G). However, low-income HE students
388 (column D) are generally *more* politically active than high-income HE students (G).
389 The only exception is for the ‘working with non-party organisations’ item, although
390 here the difference is marginal (low-income 15.6%: high-income 16%). This indi-
391 cates that experiencing HE has a higher positive impact on the political participation
392 of low-income youth than it does on high-income youth—it reverses the income gap
393 observed for the general European adult population.

394 We can explore the transformative power of being in HE on European
395 18–24-year-olds from different income groups by considering the *gaps* in political
396 participation and in political engagement between students and non-students from
397 low-income backgrounds (column F), and comparing those with the differences
398 between students and non-students with high-income circumstances (column I).
399 The findings indicate that the participation gap between students and non-students
400 is actually greater for low-income youth than it is for high-income youth for all of
401 the seven participation items. This suggests that for all forms of political participa-
402 tion considered in Table 2, progressing to HE after secondary schooling has a much
403 *larger* positive impact on young people from low-income backgrounds than it does
404 on their peers from high-income backgrounds. This pattern is not reproduced for the
405 political engagement items. The only political engagement gap is for the political
406 trust variable, with the difference in the mean trust score between low-income stu-
407 dents and non-students (see column F) marginally higher (mean=0.6) than for the
408 high-income student/non-student groups (column I, mean=0.3).

409 The data in Table 2 also allow us to consider the extent to which remaining in
410 education after secondary school impacts on the patterns of political participation
411 and political engagement for those young people holding high level qualifications.
412 The findings suggest that these highly qualified students will be slightly more likely
413 to participate in different forms of political activity if they choose to enter HE (col-
414 umn J) compared to similarly qualified youth who have left education (column K).
415 Furthermore, remaining in education has a statistically significant effect on politi-
416 cal engagement; highly qualified young people progressing to HE are considerably
417 more likely to report high levels of social and political trust, political interest and per-
418 sonal efficacy than are other highly qualified youth who do not enter HE. The scale
419 of the political participation and political engagement gaps between highly qualified
420 young people who have engaged with HE compared with those who have not, is
421 summarised in column L.

422 **The impact of progressing to higher education**

423 The analyses so far indicate that engaging with HE (as an existing or former stu-
424 dent) has a stronger and more transformative impact on the patterns of political
425 participation for low-income European youth than it does for young students from
426 high-income backgrounds. Using stepwise regression analyses, we are able to exam-
427 ine this effect further by testing for the impact of engaging with HE on the seven
428 selected political participation variables as well as the four political engagement var-
429 iables of social trust, political trust, political interest and personal efficacy (political



430 understanding).⁹ In doing so, we control for levels of educational attainment and
431 household income. Existing studies suggest that gender (Furlong and Cartmel 2012;
432 Norris and Inglehart 2009) and ethnicity (Heath et al. 2011) may also impact on
433 political participation and political engagement, and therefore we also control for
434 these two demographic characteristics.¹⁰

435 In Table 3, we consider European youth who left education after completing their
436 secondary school studies and who do not progress on to HE. With the exception of
437 the two items, “working for a party or action group”, and “participation in lawful
438 public demonstration”, Model 1 indicates that educational attainment has a statisti-
439 cally significant predictive relationship on the majority of the political participation
440 variables. Those with higher educational qualifications are more likely than their
441 less qualified counterparts to take part in those five political actions. The pattern
442 differs somewhat when it comes to the four political engagement variables; here,
443 statistically significant differences are evident only for political interest and personal
444 efficacy, with those holding higher level qualifications more likely to display lower
445 levels political interest but higher political understanding/personal efficacy than the
446 group of less qualified youth.

447 Income has less of a structuring predictive impact than does educational attain-
448 ment. However, those from the highest income band who have not engaged with HE
449 are more predisposed to vote, to work for a party or action group, to sign a petition
450 and to report higher social trust and interest in politics than is the case for non-stu-
451 dents from a low-income background.

452 Model 2 in Table 3 presents the more powerful full model for reported politi-
453 cal participation and political engagement, now including gender and ethnicity.
454 The data suggest that for these particular young people, both gender and eth-
455 nicity have a statistically significant predictive impact on many of the political
456 participation and political engagement variables. Even taking into account the
457 effects of these two demographic variables, the analyses reveal that household
458 income and especially educational attainment continue to remain statistically sig-
459 nificant predictors of several aspects of political engagement and political par-
460 ticipation. The only differences are that introducing gender and ethnicity into
461 the model have the following effects. Educational attainment no longer exerts a

9FL01 ⁹ The nature of the ESS data is not conducive to facilitating direct comparisons across the two regression
9FL02 analyses reported in Tables 3 and 4. The analyses therefore represent the predictive relationships between
9FL03 the variables for each individual group. The comparisons of the relationships between these groups there-
9FL04 fore only provide indirect differences between them.

10FL01 ¹⁰ The coding for these variables is as follows: Income = 1 Low Income, 2 High Income; Educational
10FL02 attainment = 1 Low Education, 2 High Education; Gender = 1 Male, 2 Female; Ethnicity = 1 Minority
10FL03 ethnic group, 2 Majority ethnic group; Voted [in the] last national election = 1 Yes, 2 No; Worked
10FL04 in a political party or action group = 1 Yes, 2 No; Worked in another organisation or association (for
10FL05 a political cause) = 1 Yes, 2 No; Contacted a politician or government official = 1 Yes, 2 No; Signed a
10FL06 petition = 1 Yes, 2 No; Taken part in a lawful public demonstration = 1 Yes, 2 No; Boycotted certain
10FL07 products = 1 Yes, 2 No; Trust (social) = 0 Cannot be trusted to 10 Can be trusted; Trust (politicians) = 0
10FL08 Cannot be trusted to 10 Can be trusted; Political interest = 1 Not at all interested to 4 Very interested;
10FL09 Political understanding/ Personal efficacy (Politics is too complicated to understand) = 1 Frequently to 5
10FL010 Never.



462 statistically significant impact on the boycotting variable. Additionally, a new
463 predictive impact is introduced in that those with higher qualifications have less
464 political trust than other youth, while the effects on levels of political interest and
465 personal efficacy are reversed from Model 1. The only changed relationship for
466 income is that high-income groups are now statistically significantly more likely
467 to express an interest in politics than are youth from comparatively lower income
468 backgrounds.

469 Table 4 focuses on those young people who have opted to continue beyond
470 secondary school and into HE. Continuing education seems to have an important
471 impact on those with different levels of educational attainment with respect to three
472 of the political participation variables—those with higher educational attainment
473 remain significantly more likely to vote, to work for a party or action group and also
474 to sign petitions on reaching HE. This same group is *more* likely to be interested in
475 politics and to have higher personal efficacy, statistically significantly so. The intro-
476 duction of gender and ethnicity does not impact on these relationships in any appre-
477 ciable ways.

478 Intriguingly, the findings in Model 1 indicate that *low*-income students are actu-
479 ally *more* likely than their high-income counterparts to sign a petition, join a boy-
480 cott and take part in a demonstration. In contrast, Model 1 of Table 3 (that includes
481 only young people who had left education), reveals no such predictive relationships.
482 Of additional importance, although Table 3 indicates that low-income youth leav-
483 ing education after secondary school vote, sign petitions and work for parties and
484 political action groups at considerably *lower* rates than high-income school leav-
485 ers, Table 4 indicates that these three political participation gaps—as well as their
486 depressed levels of social trust—disappear if low-income youths engage with HE.
487 Furthermore, new impacts are evident; unlike low-income school leavers, low-
488 income students have significantly higher levels of political interest and political
489 trust than do high-income students. Taken together, these results suggest that HE
490 has more of a transformational impact for low-income students in terms of several
491 of the political participation and political engagement variables than is the case for
492 students from high-income backgrounds.

493 Model 2 indicates that gender and ethnicity have a statistically strong bearing on
494 many aspects of students' political participation and political engagement. However,
495 even controlling for these two effects, there is no evidence of any diminishing effect
496 of income. Low-income HE students remain considerably more likely than their
497 high-income counterparts to take part in boycotting, demonstrating and petitioning
498 for political purposes. Such political activity is not evident within the low-income
499 non-HE youth group (Table 3). This suggests that joining HE is associated with an
500 upsurge in these political activities by low-income youth when compared with high-
501 income students. Furthermore, negating the findings in Table 3, these young stu-
502 dents from low-income households are no longer less likely to vote or to work for
503 a party or action group, and no longer more distrustful of politicians, than are high-
504 income students. Indeed, they actually express higher levels of political interest and
505 political trust than high-income students. In combination, these results suggest that
506 HE has the outcome of *reversing* the effect of household income on five of the seven
507 forms of political participation and on two of the four political engagement variables



508 as identified across the wider adult European population (Table 1) and for non-HE
509 young people (Table 3).

510 Discussion and conclusion

511 This research adds empirical weight to the theoretical arguments considered earlier
512 in the article linking education and democracy. Utilising the European Social Survey
513 (ESS), the research findings are significant in drawing attention to the importance of
514 HE, over and above social class, as a key determinant of civic and political par-
515 ticipation by young people. This calls into question a simple linking of educational
516 attainment and social status. Simply *being in HE* boosts young people's civic and
517 political participation, thereby helping to neutralise the differences between high-
518 income and low-income groups. The findings therefore run counter to the arguments
519 of those who have put forward the case that education does not have a direct causal
520 effect on political participation, being only a proxy for other factors, such as cogni-
521 tive ability and family socio-economic status (Berinsky and Lenz 2011; Campbell
522 2009; Kam and Palmer 2008).

523 The results from this study indicate that HE is particularly important in scaffold-
524 ing youth transition into adulthood through political socialisation, providing signifi-
525 cant opportunities for participation for young people, inculcating them into a culture
526 of participation through social networks. Young people in (or having completed)
527 HE are very engaged in each of the various forms of civic and political participa-
528 tion as compared to the general population, including voting. Present and former
529 HE students are also considerably more active than young people who do not pro-
530 gress to higher education. However, the findings also show that there are large social
531 inequalities of participation. For example, only a minority (20.8%) of young people
532 from low-income groups who do not go into HE turnout to vote in national elec-
533 tions, and they have low levels of participation across the board. HE establishments
534 seem to play an important role as social levellers. That is to say, experiencing higher
535 education counteracts differences between young people from high-income and low-
536 income backgrounds,¹¹ leading to a huge difference in levels of civic and political
537 participation between low-income young people in HE and low-income young peo-
538 ple not in HE.

539 These findings point to the pivotal role of higher educational establishments in
540 providing political socialisation for citizens in their transition to adulthood. Research
541 suggests that during this transition period, young people are particularly open to new
542 ideas, and that patterns of participation (or non-participation) established in these
543 years are likely to last for life (Franklin 2004). Moreover, as noted above, institutions

11FL01 ¹¹ One could make the point that college students—unlike those young people with secondary qualifica-
11FL02 tions who are not in education—are different in that they are clearly *on the pathway* to higher educational
11FL03 attainment, and thus are more motivated, efficacious individuals. This may well be true but is unlikely to
11FL04 account for such a large gap between young people from poorer backgrounds inside and outside HE (as
11FL05 our analysis demonstrates).



544 can play a vital role in fostering civic and political engagement by increasing the
545 knowledge and skills of the less privileged to enable them to participate. In par-
546 ticular, universities and HE colleges can help neutralise social disadvantage and
547 foster democratic engagement (Flanagan and Levine 2010; Jennings and Stoker
548 2004). Flanagan et al. (2012, p. 29) highlight the ‘institutional lacuna’ that exists
549 in established democracies; in other words, the gap that has opened up as a result
550 of the decline of political parties, trade unions and other traditional organisations of
551 political socialisation, particularly for young people who do not go on to HE. This
552 also helps to explain why educational achievement is so much more important than
553 household income in determining youth civic and political engagement.

554 Dewey’s arguments about the close links between education and democracy are
555 therefore more relevant than ever. What type of participation should universities
556 and colleges try to promote? Since young people are particularly attracted to non-
557 electoral forms of participation, the evidence suggests they are likely to be more
558 successful in promoting these forms of activity. On the other hand, if low levels of
559 youth electoral participation ought to be regarded as a significant concern (which
560 we think they should—not least because it leaves the way open for parties to neglect
561 issues of particular importance to young people), then HE establishments have a
562 part to play in encouraging formal participation, such as voting, too. Although the
563 public policy agenda is quite advanced in school systems—we have seen great pro-
564 gress in the development of citizenship education in Europe over the past two dec-
565 ades—there is little improvement in this regard in universities and colleges.

566 Personal efficacy plays a key role in actualizing young people’s politics. Here, the
567 political literacy, democratic skills, and self-confidence of young citizens are of fun-
568 damental importance. In this respect, education and schooling is an essential pre-
569 lude to participation (Pasek et al. 2008). Politically literate citizens are more likely
570 to participate in democracy, and schools and universities play an important role in
571 preparing young people for democratic life (Flanagan and Levine 2010; Levinson
572 2010). In order for citizenship education to be delivered effectively, the culture of
573 educational establishments—whether schools, colleges or universities—needs to
574 reflect a democratic ethos in which students are actively involved in decision-mak-
575 ing processes. HE institutions can and should (and many already do) allow students
576 to participate in making decisions that affect them. By doing so, not only can such
577 organisations enable students to develop decision-making skills, but also by partici-
578 pating in the life of the institution they can learn individual responsibility and gain
579 valuable experience of working with others with alternative perspectives, skills and
580 experiences, which is essential for democratic engagement. Moreover, our claim that
581 being in HE has an independent (positive) effect on civic and political engagement
582 through social networks and a culture of participation underpinned by a supportive
583 institutional culture, is consistent with other research. For example, the Citizenship
584 Education Longitudinal Study in England (Keating et al. 2010) and the International
585 Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement comparative studies
586 (Schulz et al. 2010) emphasise the importance of a school’s ‘democratic ethos’.

587 In summary, we draw two main conclusions from our analysis of the ESS data.
588 First, HE institutions play a vital role in scaffolding the transition of young people
589 into adulthood by providing them with opportunities to engage in forms of civic



590 and political activity and immersing them in a strong participatory culture. And sec-
591 ond, HE establishments can act as social levellers, as they are particularly effective
592 in providing a platform for civic and political engagement for young people from
593 deprived backgrounds. In our view, this places added emphasis on the role of HE in
594 nurturing such engagement. We strongly believe that more research is needed—of a
595 qualitative and longitudinal nature—to explore the mechanisms through which uni-
596 versities generate civic and political engagement amongst their students, and how
597 this might be replicated in other social institutions.

598 **Acknowledgements** We would like to thank the reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier ver-
599 sion of this article. Of course, responsibility is ours alone.

600 Compliance with ethical standards

601 **Conflict of interest** The authors report no declarations of interest and confirm that this paper is not under
602 consideration for publication elsewhere.

603 References

- 604 Amnå, E., and J. Ekman. 2014. Standby Citizens: Diverse Faces of Political Passivity. *European Political*
605 *Science Review* 6 (2): 261–281.
- 606 Arnett, J. 2004. *Emerging Adulthood: The Winding Road from Late Teens through the Twenties*. Oxford:
607 Oxford University Press.
- 608 Bang, H., and A. Esmark. 2009. Good Governance in the Network Society: Reconfiguring the Political
609 from Politics to Policy. *Administrative Theory and Praxis* 31 (1): 7–37.
- 610 Beaumont, E., A. Colby, T. Ehrlich, and J. Torney-Purta. 2006. Promoting Political Competence and
611 Engagement in College Students: An Empirical Study. *Journal of Political Science Education* 2 (3):
612 249–270.
- 613 Bennett, W., and A. Segerberg. 2013. *The Logic of Connective Action: Digital Media and the Personali-*
614 *zation of Contentious Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- 615 Berinsky, A., and G. Lenz. 2011. Education and Political Participation: Exploring the Causal Link. *Politi-*
616 *cal Behavior* 33 (3): 357–373.
- 617 Busse, B., A. Hashem-Wangler, and J. Tholen. 2015. Two Worlds of Participation: Young People and
618 Politics in Germany. *The Sociological Review* 63 (S2): 118–140.
- 619 Cammaerts, B., M. Bruter, S. Banaji, S. Harrison, and N. Anstead. 2016. *Youth Participation in Demo-*
620 *cratic Life: Stories of Hope and Disillusion*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- 621 Campbell, D. 2009. Civic Engagement and Education: An Empirical Test of the Sorting Model. *Ameri-*
622 *can Journal of Political Science* 53 (4): 771–786.
- 623 Castells, M. 2012. *Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age*. Cambridge:
624 Polity.
- 625 Chadwick, A. 2013. *The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 626 Colby, A., T. Ehrlich, E. Beaumont, and J. Stephens. 2003. *Educating Citizens: Preparing America's*
627 *Undergraduates for Lives of Moral and Civic Responsibility*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- 628 Dahl, R. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- 629 Dalton, R. 2004. *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in*
630 *Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 631 Dalton, R. 2009. *The Good Citizen: How a Younger Generation is Reshaping American Politics*. Wash-
632 ington, DC: CQ Press.
- 633 Della Porta, D., and S. Tarrow. 2005. *Transnational Protest and Global Activism*. Oxford: Rowman and
634 Littlefield.
- 635 Dewey, J. 1959. [1916] *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*. New
636 York: Macmillan.



- 637 European Commission. 2007. Young Europeans: Survey Among Young People Aged Between 15–30
638 in the European Union (Eurobarometer 202), European Commission: [http://ec.europa.eu/public](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_202_sum_en.pdf)
639 [c_opinion/flash/fl_202_sum_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_202_sum_en.pdf). Accessed 7 Sep 2020.
- 640 European Commission. 2009. Youth in Europe: A statistical portrait of the lifestyle of young people,
641 European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STAT_09_177.
642 Accessed 7 Sep 2020.
- 643 European Commission. 2019. Population with Tertiary Education. European Commission: [https://](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Tertiary_education_statistics)
644 ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Tertiary_education_statistics. Accessed 7
645 Sep 2020.
- 646 Fieldhouse, E., M. Tranmer, and A. Russell. 2007. Something About Young People or Something
647 About Elections? Electoral Participation of Young People in Europe: Evidence From a Multi-
648 level Analysis of the European Social Survey. *European Journal of Political Research* 46 (6):
649 797–822.
- 650 Flanagan, C. 2013. *Teenage Citizens: The Political Theories of the Young*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
651 University Press.
- 652 Flanagan, C., P. Cumsille, S. Gill, and L. Galloway. 2007. School and Community Climates and Civic
653 Commitments: Processes for Ethnic Minority and Majority Students. *Journal of Educational*
654 *Psychology* 99 (2): 421–431.
- 655 Flanagan, C., A. Finlay, L. Galloway, and T. Kim. 2012. Political Incorporation and the Protracted Transi-
656 tion to Adulthood: The Need for New Institutional Inventions. *Parliamentary Affairs* 65 (1):
657 29–46.
- 658 Flanagan, C., and P. Levine. 2010. Civic Engagement and the Transition to Adulthood. *The Future of*
659 *Children* 20 (1): 159–179.
- 660 Franklin, M. 2004. *Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition since 1945*. Cambridge:
661 Cambridge University Press.
- 662 Furlong, A., and F. Cartmel. 2012. Social Change and Political Engagement Among Young People: Gen-
663 eration and the 2009/2010 British Election Survey. *Parliamentary Affairs* 65 (1): 13–28.
- 664 Galston, W. 2001. Political Knowledge, Political Engagement, and Civic Education. *Annual Review of*
665 *Political Science* 4: 217–234.
- 666 Gelmon, S.B., B.A. Holland, and A. Spring. 2018. *Assessing Service-Learning And Civic Engagement:*
667 *Principles and Techniques*. Boston: Stylus.
- 668 Giddens, A. 1991. *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Cambridge:
669 Polity.
- 670 Goddard, J., E. Hazelkorn, and P. Vallance, eds. 2016. *The Civic University: The Policy and Leadership*
671 *Challenges*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- 672 Grasso, M.T. 2016. *Generations, Political Participation and Social Change in Western Europe*. London:
673 Routledge.
- 674 Grasso, M.T., B. Yoxon, S. Karampampas, and L. Temple. 2017. Relative Deprivation and Inequalities in
675 Social and Political Activism. *Acta Politica* 54: 1–32.
- 676 Hay, C. 2007. *Why We Hate Politics*. Cambridge: Polity.
- 677 Heath, A., S. Fisher, D. Sanders, and M. Sobolewska. 2011. Ethnic Heterogeneity in the Social Bases of
678 Voting at the 2010 British General Election. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 21
679 (2): 255–277.
- 680 Henn, M., and N. Foard. 2014. Social Differentiation in Young People’s Political Participation: The
681 Impact of Social and Educational Factors on Youth Political Engagement in Britain. *Journal of*
682 *Youth Studies* 17 (3): 360–380.
- 683 Henn, M., B. Oldfield, and J. Hart. 2018. Postmaterialism and Young People’s Political Participation in a
684 Time of Austerity. *British Journal of Sociology* 69 (3): 712–737.
- 685 House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee. 2014. *Voter Engagement in the UK,*
686 *Fourth Report of Session 2014–15*. London: The Stationery Office Limited.
- 687 Jacoby, B., et al. 2009. *Civic Engagement in Higher Education: Concepts and Practices*. San Francisco:
688 Jossey-Bass.
- 689 Jennings, M., and L. Stoker. 2004. Social Trust and Civic Engagement across Time and Generations. *Acta*
690 *Politica* 39 (4): 342–379.
- 691 Kam, C., and C. Palmer. 2008. Reconsidering the Effects of Education on Political Participation. *The*
692 *Journal of Politics* 70 (3): 612–631.
- 693 Keating, A. 2014. *Education for Citizenship in Europe: European Policies, National Adaptations, and*
694 *Young People’s Attitudes*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.



- 695 Keating, A., Kerr, D., Benton, T., Mundy, E. & Lopes, J. 2010. *Citizenship Education in England 2001–*
696 *2010: Young People's Practices and Prospects for the Future: The Eighth and Final Report from the*
697 *Citizenship Education Longitudinal Study*. London: DfE.
- 698 Kerr, D., J. Lopes, J. Nelson, K. White, E. Cleaver, and T. Benton. 2007. *Vision Versus Pragmatism: Citi-*
699 *zenship in the Secondary School Curriculum in England. Citizenship Education Longitudinal Study:*
700 *Fifth Annual Report*. Slough: NFER.
- 701 Kyroglou, G., and M. Henn. 2017. Political Consumerism as a Neoliberal Response to Contemporary
702 Youth Political Disengagement. *Societies* 7 (4): 34.
- 703 Levinson, M. 2010. The Civic Empowerment Gap: Defining the Problem and Locating Solutions. In
704 *Handbook of Research on Civic Engagement in Youth*, ed. L. Sherrod, J. Torney-Purta, and C. Fla-
705 nagan. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
- 706 Lewis-Beck, M., W. Jacoby, H. Norpoth, and H. Weisberg. 2008. *The American Voter Revisited*. Ann
707 Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- 708 Longo, N., C. Drury, and R. Battistoni. 2006. Catalyzing Political Engagement: Lessons for Civic Educa-
709 tors from the Voices of Students. *Journal of Political Science Education* 2 (3): 313–329.
- 710 Marien, S., M. Hooghe, and E. Quintelier. 2010. Inequalities in Non-institutionalised Forms of Political
711 Participation: A Multi-level Analysis of 25 Countries. *Political Studies* 58 (1): 187–213.
- 712 Mossberger, K., C. Tolbert, and R. McNeal. 2007. *Digital Citizenship: The Internet, Society and Partici-*
713 *pation*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- 714 Nie, N., J. Junn, and K. Stehlik-Barry. 1996. *Education and Democratic Citizenship in America*. Chicago:
715 University of Chicago Press.
- 716 Niemi, R., and J. Junn. 1998. *Civic Education: What Makes Students Learn*. New Haven: Yale University
717 Press.
- 718 Nissen, S. 2019. *Student debt and political participation*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- 719 Norris, P. 2011. *Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- 720 Norris, P., and R. Inglehart. 2009. *Cosmopolitan Communications: Cultural Diversity in a Globalised*
721 *World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 722 Norris, P., and R. Inglehart. 2019. *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism*. New
723 York: Cambridge University Press.
- 724 Norris, P., S. Walgrave, and P. Van Aelst. 2005. Who Demonstrates? Antistate Rebels, Conventional Par-
725 ticipants, or Everyone? *Comparative Politics* 37 (2): 189–205.
- 726 Parry, G., G. Moyser, and N. Day. 1992. *Political Participation and Democracy in Britain*. Cambridge:
727 Cambridge University Press.
- 728 Pasek, J., L. Feldman, D. Romer, and K. Jamieson. 2008. Schools as Incubators of Democratic Participa-
729 tion: Building Long-term Political Efficacy with Civic Education. *Applied Development Science* 12
730 (1): 26–37.
- 731 Pattie, C., P. Seyd, and P. Whiteley. 2004. *Citizenship in Britain: Values, Participation and Democracy*.
732 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 733 Pickard, S. 2019. *Young People and DIO Politics: Do-It-Ourselves Political Participation*. London:
734 Palgrave.
- 735 Pickard, S., and J. Bessant, eds. 2018. *Young People Re-Generating Politics in Times of Crises*. Basing-
736 stoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- 737 Pryor, J., Hurtado, S., DeAngelo, L., Sharkness, J., Romero, L., Korn, W. & Tran, S. 2008. *The Ameri-*
738 *can Freshman: National Norms Fall 2008*. Los Angeles: Higher Education Research Institute.
739 <https://www.heru.ucla.edu/PDFs/pubs/TFS/Norms/Monographs/TheAmericanFreshman2008.pdf>.
740 Accessed 23 Sep 2020.
- 741 Putnam, R. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon
742 and Schuster.
- 743 Sander, T., and R. Putnam. 2010. Still Bowling Alone? The Post-9/11 Split. *Journal of Democracy* 21 (1):
744 9–16.
- 745 Schlozman, K., S. Verba, and H. Brady. 2010. Weapon of the Strong? Participatory Inequality and the
746 Internet. *Perspectives on Politics* 8 (2): 487–509.
- 747 Schulz, W., J. Ainley, J. Fraillon, D. Kerr, and B. Losito. 2010. *ICCS 2009 International Report: Civic*
748 *Knowledge, Attitudes and Engagement Among Lower Secondary School Students in Thirty-eight*
749 *Countries*. Amsterdam: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement.
- 750 Sloam, J. 2013. 'Voice and equality': Young People's Politics in the European Union. *West European*
751 *Politics* 36 (4): 836–858.



- 752 Sloam, J. 2016. Diversity and voice: The political participation of young people in the European Union.
753 *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 18 (3): 521–537.
- 754 Sloam, J., and M. Henn. 2019. *Youthquake 2017: The Rise of Young Cosmopolitans in Britain*. Basing-
755 stoke: Palgrave.
- 756 Soler-i-Martí, R. 2015. Youth Political Involvement Update: Measuring the Role of Cause-orientated
757 Political Interest in Young People's Activism. *Journal of Youth Studies* 18 (3): 396–416.
- 758 Steiner, D. 1994. *Rethinking Democratic Education: The Politics of Reform*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hop-
759 kins University Press.
- 760 Stoker, G. 2006. *Why Politics Matters: Making Democracy Work*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- 761 Stolle, D., and M. Hooghe. 2011. Shifting Inequalities: Patterns of Exclusion and Inclusion in Emerging
762 Forms of Political Participation. *European Societies* 13 (1): 119–142.
- 763 Stolle, D., M. Hooghe, and M. Micheletti. 2005. Politics in the Supermarket: Political Consumerism as a
764 Form of Political Participation. *International Political Science Review* 26 (3): 245–269.
- 765 Torney, S. 2015. *The End of Representative Politics*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- 766 Torney-Purta, J., R. Lehmann, H. Oswald, and W. Schulz. 2001. *Citizenship and Education in Twenty-*
767 *eight Countries: Civic Knowledge and Engagement at Age Fourteen*. Amsterdam: IEA.
- 768 Van Deth, J., J. Ramón Montero, and A. Westholm. 2007. *Citizenship and Involvement in European*
769 *Democracies: A Comparative Analysis*. London: Routledge.
- 770 Verba, S., and N. Nie. 1972. *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality*. New
771 York: Harper and Row.
- 772 Verba, S., K. Schlozman, and H. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Poli-*
773 *tics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- 774 Wolfinger, R., and S. Rosenstone. 1980. *Who Votes?* New Haven: Yale University Press.
- 775 Youth Citizenship Commission. 2009. *Making the Connection: Building Youth Citizenship in the UK*.
776 London: Stationery Office.

777 **Publisher's Note** Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published
778 maps and institutional affiliations.
779

780 **James Sloam** is Professor of Politics at Royal Holloway, University of London. He has a wide range of
781 publications on youth, citizenship and politics in Europe and the United States. He co-founded the UK
782 Political Studies Association's Young People's Politics specialist research group with Ben Kisby.

783 **Ben Kisby** is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Lincoln. He has published widely on citi-
784 zenship education. His research interests include British politics, public policy and youth political
785 engagement.

786 **Matt Henn** is Professor of Social Research and Research lead in the Department of Social and Political
787 Sciences at Nottingham Trent University. He has published numerous journal articles on youth and politi-
788 cal participation, environmental activism, opinion polling in Eastern Europe, and political campaigning.
789 Matt is a member of both the Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, and Young People's Politics special-
790 ist groups of the UK Political Studies Association.

791 **Ben Oldfield** is Senior Lecturer in Psychology at Nottingham Trent University. He has particular exper-
792 tise on violence in video games, violence in films and television, video games and wellbeing and online
793 and mobile communications and wellbeing.



Affiliations

James Sloam¹ · Ben Kisby² · Matt Henn³ · Ben Oldfield⁴

James Sloam
james.sloam@rhul.ac.uk

Matt Henn
matt.henn@ntu.ac.uk

Ben Oldfield
ben.oldfield@ntu.ac.uk

- ¹ Department of Politics and International Relations, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham Hill, Egham TW20 0EX, Surrey, UK
- ² School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Lincoln, Brayford Pool, Lincoln LN6 7TS, UK
- ³ Department of Social and Political Sciences, Nottingham Trent University, 50 Shakespeare Street, Nottingham NG1 4FQ, UK
- ⁴ School of Social Sciences, Nottingham Trent University, 50 Shakespeare Street, Nottingham NG1 4FQ, UK

UNCORRECTED PROOF



Journal:	41295
Article:	228

Author Query Form

Please ensure you fill out your response to the queries raised below and return this form along with your corrections

Dear Author

During the process of typesetting your article, the following queries have arisen. Please check your typeset proof carefully against the queries listed below and mark the necessary changes either directly on the proof/online grid or in the 'Author's response' area provided below

Query	Details Required	Author's Response
AQ1	Tables: Please provide a definition for the significance of bold in Tables 1 and 2.	
AQ2	Kindly note that the values of R^2 are seems to be missing in some occurrences in Tables 4, 5. Kindly check and update if required.	