


South Pacific Security Project

The
Security
of
Oceania in the
1990s

Vol 1: Views from the region

 **David Hegarty and Peter Polomka**

Editors



Canberra Papers on
Strategy and Defence
No. 60

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THE SECURITY OF OCEANIA IN THE 1990s
VOL. 1: VIEWS FROM THE REGION

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ABSTRACT

The small island countries of the South Pacific region face a decisive decade in the 1990s. Reduction in strategic tensions at the global level and rapid growth in the economies of the Pacific Rim promise opportunities for small-state economic and political diplomacy. New generation Pacific Island leaders are determined to play a more influential role in international forums; to shed the 'back-water' image of the South Pacific region; and to sink the notion that the region is an 'ANZUS Lake'. Yet security - defined broadly with a small 's' - remains a constant preoccupation. To the on-going threats of economic vulnerability and resource protection have now been added those of environmental change and domestic political instability.

The essays in this monograph address these security concerns and raise many additional questions including the value of regionalism, the role of the 'big brothers' (Australia and New Zealand), and the impact on island polities of western ideas and values. They conclude that the prospects for a stable and secure regional order in the 1990s lie in the effective management of political and economic change and in the emergence of a coherent, 'Oceanic' view of security.

THE SOUTH PACIFIC SECURITY PROJECT

The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre began in 1989 a project focussing on the region encompassing members of the South Pacific Forum* - a region we call "Oceania". The project aims to analyse the ways the sovereignty and territorial integrity of South Pacific island states might be threatened in the 1990. It also examines the challenges to the ability of these states to govern, protect and advance the interests of their peoples. The prospects for a common South Pacific Forum perspective on the strategic and security interests of Oceania is also an integral part of the project.

The project seeks to build data bases and research resources for studying South Pacific security; develop discussion and exchange between the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre and other centres for regional defence and security analysis; and to assist in the development of defence and security analytical capabilities in South Pacific states.

As part of the South Pacific Security Project, the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre invited a number of present and former senior officials with expertise in South Pacific island countries' security matters to a *Workshop on The Security of Oceania in the 1990s* held in Canberra from 24 to 26 July 1989. Participants were asked to speak frankly as individuals rather than as representatives of their governments. Thus the views expressed in the following papers are personal ones and should not necessarily be taken to represent the official position of their governments.

A companion monograph, *The Security of Oceania in the 1990s: Vol. 2: Managing Change*, based on the workshop discussion, will also be published.

* Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Western Samoa, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, New Zealand and Australia.

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Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence are a series of monograph publications which arise out of the work of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University. Previous *Canberra Papers* have covered topics such as the relationship of the superpowers, arms control at both the superpower and South-east Asian regional level, regional strategic relationships and major aspects of Australian defence policy. For a list of those still available refer to the last pages of this volume.

Unless otherwise stated, publications of the Centre are presented without endorsement as contributions to the public record and debate. Authors are responsible for their own analysis and conclusions.

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
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PACIFIC OCEAN EXCLUSIVE



Note: Boundaries are either

ECONOMIC ZONES



agreed or hypothetical

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: NEW THINKING ON SECURITY

David Hegarty and Peter Polomka

For the South Pacific, the 1990s will be a decisive decade. Regional states will face the challenges of a changed global strategic environment as well as those of increasing domestic economic and social pressures. As the following papers underline, two broad streams of influence are shaping the way the region is thinking about its security.

What might be called traditional thinking was generally expressed by region's early generation of independence leaders. Almost instinctively, and reflecting the settled politics of the time, these leaders adopted a largely Western view of their own and the region's place in the world, what threatened the peace and how best to secure their future. Traditional thinking remains influential, though with some novel variations.

These views are now strongly challenged by a new, more self-assertive and self-confident generation of leaders. Just as their predecessors struck out against the existing power structure and initiated the Forum, for example, this new generation - perhaps more robustly - wants to put its own imprint clearly on a whole range of policies and institutions. Their influence, increasingly felt in recent years, is likely to dominate the 1990s.

'New Thinking'

'New thinking' seeks to revise the conventional wisdom and cast off vestiges of a colonial past. While continuing to stress indigenous values and attitudes, it is much more prepared to change its inheritance. In its search for a more distinctive self-identity, it looks especially for greater recognition and equality in its dealings with the outside world.

2 *The Security of Oceania in the 1990s*

In security affairs, 'new thinking' is taking shape only slowly and with a still far from certain outcome. It is clearer about what it questions than where it is going.

'New thinking' often finds itself on the horns of a dilemma. As this volume shows, it rejects analyses which pigeon-hole the region either as an irrelevant 'back-water' or as a play-ground for great powers. It wants to play a more influential role but acknowledges a lack of 'clout'. It is conscious that notions about a 'Pacific Way' are romantic and need to be given more substance, and it rejects futile posturing on the world stage. 'New thinking' is also aware that the security interests of the South Pacific states do not always coincide.

'New thinking' is suspicious of 'regionalism' as pursued under Australian and Western influence in recent decades. It wonders about whose interests are foremost in mind - whether those of the states of the region or of external powers. It is especially critical of the energy expended, the concessions made and the embarrassingly poor results of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. At the same time it is committed to professionalising regional services and ensuring that priorities are correct.

The South Pacific in the World

As peoples and communities, those of the South Pacific draw strength from long, remarkable histories, rich in a diversity of culture and tradition. As modern nation-states, navigating the often turbulent waters of world affairs, South Pacific states are among the smallest, least experienced and most vulnerable (see Table I).

Even the oldest South Pacific states will only enter their fourth decade of state-hood in the 1990s. Nine states have come into existence as independent entities since the early 1960s, some as recently as 1980; a further four are partly self-governing or autonomous in association with metropolitan powers; while nine territories remain colonies or dependencies.

The region is diverse in terms of its peoples and cultures (Melanesian, Polynesian and Micronesian) and political and social systems. Its basic orientation remains pro-Western but increasingly

TABLE I
SOUTH PACIFIC REGION: BASIC INDICATORS

Country	Land area (sq. km)	Sea area (¹ 000 sq. km)	Population 1986 Estimate	Annual Population Growth Rate(%) 1981-86	Adult Literacy rate (%) 1980	GDP (\$'000) 1986	GDP per capita (\$) 1986	Trend Annual % change in Real GDP/capita	Period
American Samoa	197	390	36 000	1.7	-	260 417 (a)	7 336 (a)	-	1976-82
Cook Islands	240	1 839	17 200	-0.3	91.8	31 339	1 822	1	1976-82
FSM	701	2 978	94 400	3.5	-	117 044 (c)	-	-	1976-85
Fiji	18 272	1 290	711 100	1.9	75.0	1 737 632	2 444	-1	1976-85
French Polynesia	3 265	5 030	176 100	3.3	94.5	3 023 256	17 168	-	1980-84
Guam	541	218	117 200	1.8	-	1 513 369	12 913	-	1980-84
Kiribati	690	3 550	65 300	2.0	95	31 928	489	-2	1980-84
Marshall Is	181	2 131	36 700	2.9	-	52 682 (c)	1 559 (c)	-	1980-84
Nauru	21	320	8 600	1.2	-	-	-	-	1976-82
New Caledonia	19 103	1 740	150 500	1.1	91.3	897 085 (b)	6 045 (b)	-	1976-82
Niue	259	390	2 500	-4.7	100.0	4 347 (b)	1 499 (c)	-	1976-82
Northern Mariana Is	471	777	20 200	2.8	-	-	-	-	1976-82
Palau	494	629	13 900	0.7	-	-	-	-	1976-82
Papua New Guinea	462 243	3 120	3 390 400	2.1	-	34 703 (c)	2 799 (c)	0.1	1975-87
Pitcairn	5	800	100	0.0	-	3 855 469	1 137	-	1975-87
Solomon Islands	27 556	1 340	282 100	3.7	51.0	224 727	797	-2	1977-85
Tokelau	10	290	1 600	0.1	97.2	-	-	-	1977-85
Tonga	699	700	94 500	0.2	99.6	-	-	-	1976-85
Tuvalu	26	900	8 400	1.8	98.0	81 643 (a)	865 (a)	2	1976-85
Vanuatu	11 880	680	140 200	3.3	-	3 888 (a)	452 (c)	-5	1979-85
Wallis and Futuna	255	300	14 300	5.0	-	177 500	1 266	-5	1979-85
Western Samoa	2 935	120	161 000	0.6	97.8	-	-	-	1979-85
South Pacific Region	550 044	29 523	5 542 400	2.1	-	145 116	901	-1	1980-85

(a)1985

(b)1984

(c)1983

Sources: ADAB, South Pacific Commission.

Table prepared by Stephen Bates

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'new thinking' is questioning the impact of Western values and attitudes.

All Pacific Island states depend heavily on foreign aid and investment capital and on the export of one or a few major commodities (see Tables II and III). Most are lacking in substantial natural resources and have limited potential for sustainable economic growth.

Only Papua New Guinea and Fiji have limited military capabilities. The internal security forces of other South Pacific states are small (see Table IV).

South Pacific states remain constrained by the tyranny of remoteness, inadequate and over-costly communications and a shortage of skills in developing analyses of world- and even regional-politics, and of what most threatens their national and regional interests.

Yet with the easing of superpower tensions, most South Pacific states are looking more critically at the actions and motives of their traditional allies and friends.

Security with a small 's'

For South Pacific Island states, national and regional security is defined broadly, with the threat of economic vulnerability, resource and environmental protection and national stability being foremost in mind - in short, security with a small 's' rather than the traditional, large 'S' military kind.

All regional states recognise the 'need to keep an eye on exactly whose sail is on the horizon' but for most, 'lofty, but not always demonstrably relevant concepts such as super-power competition or a power vacuum' are generally rejected.

No South Pacific state sees credible external military threats on the horizon. In short, military threats are less worrying than economic threats.

Small 's' security sounds two linked themes: first, a concern - an acutely conscious concern - with gaining respect for national sovereignty in dealing with the outside world; second, a growing

TABLE II
FOREIGN AID TO SOUTH PACIFIC REGION

Country	Total aid (A\$ '000)		Aid per capita (A\$)		Aid as % of GDP		Principal aid donors (% share of total) 1986
	1986	1986	1986	1986	1986	1986	
American Samoa	63 235	1 752		25(b)		USA (100)	
Cook Islands	16 821	978		53		NZ (65)	
Fiji	40 683	57		2		AUS (50) JAP (25)	
French Polynesia	325 830	1 850		10		FR (99)	
Guam	49 119	419		3		US (100)	
Kiribati	18 500	283		58		JAP (30) UK (30)	
Nauru		927		16(c)		FR (93)	
New Caledonia	139 442	2 660		84(c)		NZ (84)	
Niue	6 651	127		11		AUS (75)	
Papua New Guinea	431 500	2 980		23		UK (100)	
Pitcairn	298					EEC (35) AUS (30)	
Solomon Islands	51 363	182		23		NZ (98)	
Tokelau	1 845	1 153				AUS (30) NZ (24)	
Tonga	13 360	141		13(b)		JAP (23)	
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (a)	341 471	2 067		118(b)		UK (37) AUS (24)	
Tuvalu	5 758	685				NZ (20)	
Vanuatu	33 443	239		19		UK (28) AUS (24)	
Wallis and Futuna	26 012	1 819				EEC (8) FR (8)	
Western Samoa	25 343	157		17		FR (88)	
						JAP (35) AUS (20)	
						NZ (17)	

(a) Covers the Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Northern Mariana Islands and Palau. Separate figures are not available for individual countries.

(b) Calculated on 1985 figures; 1986 GDP figure not available.

(c) Calculated on 1984 figures.

Source: South Pacific Commission.
Table prepared by Stephen Bates.

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tendency to link threats to internal stability with the colonial past or with an 'intrusive' current external influences.

Security from this perspective lies in the creation of an environment in which external powers recognise and fully respect the sovereign rights of South Pacific states (e.g. by not threatening fisheries resources through driftnet fishing) and 'allow us to be ourselves' (e.g. by not criticising non-democratic practices).

Here again a dilemma: the desire for the benefits that greater involvement with the outside world can bring set against the apprehension of being overwhelmed by forces beyond the control of a young, vulnerable micro-state.

Nonetheless, 'new thinking' includes recognition of the importance of 'capacity building' and the need for greater 'self-reliance' and internal cohesion in grasping a better future in the decades ahead.

The 'Big Brother' Problem

Despite its protestations, New Zealand still tends to be linked with Australia by the 'inner circle' of South Pacific Forum member states as part of the region's 'Big Brother' problem. Both allegedly lack a genuine commitment to the interests and aspirations of 'inner circle' members, are over-pushy in the way they pursue their own interests and, by their over-dominant behaviour, constrain the sovereignty of the small island states and undermine their confidence.

The list of the 'Big Brother's' perceived sins of omission and commission is a long one. To touch on a few -

- failure to take other Forum members into their confidence in overall regional security planning;
- slow in acknowledging their geographic reality;
- unable to handle sensitively the disparity of power between themselves and the 'inner circle' members;
- all too ready to play the role of 'regional police-men', a tendency seen by most other Forum members as

TABLE III
TRADE IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC REGION

Country	Imports (A\$'000)		Exports (A\$'000)		Principal destination of exports (% share)	Principal source of imports (% share)	Leading exports (% share of total) 1986
	1986	1986	1986	1986			
American Samoa	460 666	372 971	US (99)	US (30)	Fish/Seafood (90)		
Cook Islands	39 928	4 766	NZ (87)		Fruit (21) Clothing (49)		
FSM (a)	60 178			US (41) JAPAN (30)			
Fiji	649 471	318 243	UK (34) A (17)	A (33) NZ (17)	sugar (58) gold (12)		
French Polynesia	1 077 507	16 640	FR (50)	FR (50)	pearls (70)		
Kiribati	21 452	2 294	EEC (95)	ANZ (47) JAPAN (19)	fish (78) copra (21)		
Nauru	15 819	81 637	A (80) NZ (20)	ANZ (100)	phosphate (99)		
New Caledonia	731 822	243 045	FR (52) JAPAN (21)	FR (50)	nickel (98)		
Niue		119	NZ (86)				
Papua New Guinea	1 409 486	1 528 181	WEST GER (35)	A (40) JAPAN (19)	Copper (34) gold (21)		
Solomon Islands	94 841	101 592	JAPAN (26)		coffee (20)		
Tonga	60 833	8 889	ASIA (70)	A (40) JAPAN (16)	fish (48) wood (32)		
Tuvalu	4 054	22	NZ (41) A (27)	NZ (38) A (28)	fruit (30) cocoa (23)		
Vanuatu	87 214	13 860			coconut oil (23)		
Western Samoa	15 294	15 294	EEC (33) US (14)	A (40)	copra (86)		
			NZ (30) EEC (24)	A (35) EEC (26)	copra (47) cocoa (20)		
			A (21)	NZ (33) A (20)	fruit (34) cocoa (14)		
				JAPAN (15)	coconut oil (30)		

(a) the Federated States of Micronesia.

Source: South Pacific Commission.
Table prepared by Stephen Bates.

TABLE IV
SECURITY PERSONNEL IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC REGION

Country	Military Personnel Nos	Police Personnel Nos	Para-military Personnel Nos	Total Security Personnel Nos	Security Personnel per 1 000 people
American Samoa		59		59	1.6
Cook Islands		63		63	3.7
FSM		60		60	0.6
Fiji	5 000 (b)	1 700		6 700	9.4
French Polynesia	7 500	400		7 900	11.1
Kiribati		234		234	3.6
Nauru		57		57	6.6
New Caledonia	7 500	2 200		9 700	64.5
Niue		14		14	5.6
Papua New Guinea	3 350	4 824		8 174	2.4
Solomon Islands		445	100 (c)	545	1.9
Tokelau		7		7	4.4
Tonga	350	282		632	6.7
Tuvalu		34		34	4.0
Vanuatu		250		520	3.7
Wallis and Futuna		2	270 (d)	272	0.1
Western Samoa		330		330	2.0

(a) The figures in the above table are approximate only.

(b) Figure includes 1 200 on duty in the Middle East as part of peace-keeping operations. It does not include the 1 500 reservists that can be called up at short notice.

(c) Known as the Field Force.

(d) Vanuatu Mobile Force.

Table prepared by Stephen Bates.

'non-partner-like', unwelcome and (by some) threatening;

- at times, hypocritical and paternal; e.g. over the Soviet-Kiribati fishing agreement;
- too inclined to exaggerate threats; e.g. the Soviet Union and, more recently, France and Japan;
- too impatient and pushy in pursuing security initiatives which some Forum members consider to be beyond their resources; e.g. the patrol boat program.

And here again a dilemma. Despite a litany of complaints, there remains an implicit acceptance and appreciation at a fundamental level of the support both Australia and New Zealand can provide, and the role they can play, in promoting South Pacific security.

A Forum (or Oceanic) security perspective?

South Pacific states generally consider the days of the region as an 'ANZUS lake' numbered, if not already over. But there is little consensus on what might be taking its place in regional security terms.

While both 'Big Brothers' are reasonably clear about their goals and strategies for the security of the region in the 1990s, most other Forum members are far from ready to salute as their flags go up.

For Australia, one clear message emerging from these viewpoints is the need to walk softly and learn to handle its size and weight in South Pacific affairs much more sensitively and skilfully.

Even so, the potential for developing a shared security perspective in the South Pacific remains. It is likely to emerge largely by pursuing a long-term commitment to South Pacific small 's' security concerns rather than concepts based on the large 'S' military kind.

CHAPTER 2

GLOBAL CHANGE AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM STATES

William Dihm

Analyses of the foreign relations of South Pacific island states tend to adopt one of two main approaches. Some regard island states as being essentially caught in a tide of events not of their own making - unable to get far ahead of waves caused by other actors in world affairs, to stand still in the current of events, or to resist the undertow. Others regard them as inhabitants of a quiet backwater, with the tide of global development generally passing them by. Both approaches are employed by observers of, and participants in, the conduct of foreign relations of countries in the region. Both are also characteristic of interested outsiders. and both are becoming increasingly inadequate guides to understanding.

The South Pacific Forum consists of nine independent and - uniquely among major, general-purpose, intergovernmental organisations - four self-governing or quasi-independent island states, as well as Australia and New Zealand. The focus of this paper is on the island states.

Island States and Global Issues

The first notion found in the analyses of foreign relations of South Pacific states, mentioned at the opening of this paper - that island states are caught up in an overwhelming tide of global change - has led both observers and policy-makers sometimes to underestimate, and sometimes to overestimate, the capacity of island governments to secure national interests. Officials of island governments who have held to the notion, have tended either to see themselves as essentially helpless and so sometimes turned away from issues which should have concerned them, or to speak out and posture, so to say, by preparing positions on issues which do not affect their countries directly and the outcomes of which their governments cannot affect. Officials and observers from metropolitan countries have tended to talk in vague generalisations (invoking such lofty, but not always

demonstrably relevant concepts as superpower competition or a power vacuum in support), or, to downgrade the capacity of island governments to identify and secure national interests. The debate over the threat posed by the presence of Soviet fishing vessels in the region is an example.

The second notion - that the South Pacific region is a backwater, isolated from global disturbances - has led the leaders of some island countries to focus attention on the region, without paying proper regard to the wider context of many events, or attempting to influence them. It has also led officials from metropolitan countries to ignore the region.

The two notions share a common disregard for the connections that exist - and for the connections which can be drawn - between global, regional and national issues. While both may have had a certain relevance during the colonial period, they are both now seriously out-of-date and becoming ever more so. Neither takes sufficient account of the means by which, or the commitment with which, the governments of South Pacific island countries try to monitor and to influence global events, or of the connections with global issues and major international actors which they are making.

Constraints on Monitoring the World

The means available to the governments of most South Pacific island countries to monitor the external world are very limited indeed. Even Papua New Guinea, which is by far the most populous and richly endowed country in the region, can afford only a small number of diplomatic and consular missions. Finance is a constraint. So is the availability of skilled and experienced personnel. Both are in very short supply not only because of externally imposed constraints but, even more importantly, because of self-restraint. Or, put another way, because successive Papua New Guinean governments have quite rightly given priority to welfare and development at home.

The view that overseas missions should serve domestic interests has been, and remains, not merely a matter of principle but of practice. It is one of the main criteria used to seek and to appropriate funds from the national budget. Shortage of resources makes it difficult for Papua New Guinea's Department of Foreign Affairs to

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follow, let alone to formulate detailed positions on, or to influence issues and events in, other part of the world. Their direct relevance to national interests has to be made clear before the resources required can be secured. It may seem ironic, but it can sometimes be harder to obtain reliable information about developments in other Pacific island countries than about developments in countries farther away, primarily because of the weakness of media flows which often go via Australia and/or New Zealand en route to or from other countries in the region.

Regional Cooperation and Innovation

Moves to strengthen the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC), both in staff numbers and in functions, have enhanced the exchanges of information and views within the region. Bodies like the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) and the Co-ordinating Committee for Mineral Prospecting in South Pacific offshore areas (CCOP/SOPAC) play a similar - and similarly invaluable - role in relation to more specialised issues. Other innovative forms of cooperation are also being explored. Examples include the Forum/Dialogue Partners meeting, the first of which was held in Tarawa (Kiribati) immediately after the Forum meeting on 10-11 July 1989, and was attended by representatives of Canada, France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. They also include the exchanges which occur as and when needed through face-to-face meetings, conventional diplomatic correspondence, and informal telephone calls between Heads of Government, ministers and officials from the Melanesian Spearhead states. But generally, governments and other actors from outside the region are often able to learn more about the South Pacific than their counterparts inside. The capacity of other governments, multi or transnational business firms, and international organisations to exercise influence within the region is accordingly enhanced.

Of course, not every form of cooperation is of equal benefit to every government in the region. Some arrangements are of no direct benefit to certain governments at all. But when taken together, the contribution which they make to securing shared interests through mutual self-reliance seems hard to dispute.

Influencing External Actors

When it comes to trying to resist or to influence external actors, the governments of South Pacific island countries have tried a number of different means. They have, for example, engaged in diplomatic cooperation in wider bodies, as with the re-inscription of New Caledonia on the United Nation's list of non-self-governing territories. The representatives of states which send delegations to the United Nations in New York take part in regular exchanges. Other arrangements have been extended: SPEC's enhancement in status and functions is an example. New arrangements, such as the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty with the United States, have been devised. Firmness and even diplomatic confrontation have also been used, for example, when the Papua New Guinea Government briefed other members of regional fora on issues to do with the common border with Indonesia, and when other governments have dealt with transgressions by foreign (including United States) owned fishing vessels. But even so, the island states of the South Pacific tend to find it hard to impress their views on external actors; they tend to be vulnerable to external pressures.

Tension and Harmony

The governments of all South Pacific island countries give the very highest priority to development and welfare at home. The importance which they attach to various areas of government activity is not the same. The details of their policies differ as do their fears and ambitions abroad. The uniquely difficult transition to independence in Vanuatu, for example, has probably made Ni-Vanuatu more sceptical of the motives and activities of one of the former colonial powers, France, than is common elsewhere in the region. But, except for some small islands on the border between Vanuatu and New Caledonia, there are no territorial disputes of any importance. Nor governments with the military capacity to pursue them.

Occasional tensions do arise between citizens - or descendants of immigrants - from one island country who are resident in another country, on the one hand, and residents of the host country, on the other. Resentment is sometimes felt and expressed against people

from countries which seem to benefit more than others from particular regional arrangements. Political leaders from different countries sometimes compete for status in regional affairs, or otherwise rival one another. The national interests and policies pursued by one government do not always coincide with others. But relations between island governments are generally very much more harmonious than relations between governments in other regions of the world. So are relations, so far as they have developed at all, with governments outside the region.

The Threat Spectrum

No South Pacific island country faces a short-term, external military threat. None has the military capacity for effective self-defence against a numerous, well-armed and determined foe. In fact, only Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Tonga have even a minimal ability to engage in military self-defence, let alone to project military power abroad. Though patrol boats and arms have been used to stop and arrest foreign fishing vessels, external conflicts involving governments in the region have, fortunately, not generally acquired a military dimension. Both intra-regional and extra-regional conflicts tend to be concerned with particular issues, and to be relatively short-lived. When they concern a greater power, they tend to seem much more important and contentious to actors within the region than to actors without.

But the absence of a proximate military threat in or to the region is the product of more than objective factors. It also results from government action. Thus, Papua New Guinea, which might be supposed, theoretically, to be the country most immediately exposed, at least potentially, to external threats, now has its security assured by the most comprehensive set of consultative, conflict resolution arrangements to be found in the South Pacific or Southeast Asia. They include the *Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship and Cooperation* with Indonesia, the *Joint Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations* with Australia, the *Agreed Principles Guiding Relations between independent states in Melanesia*, and the *Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia*.

None of the foregoing arrangements is concerned primarily with questions of military security. None guarantees the security of

Papua New Guinea from subversion or attack. All are only as strong as the signatory governments are willing and able to make them be, but all provide a framework for on-going consultation and peaceful resolution of any disputes. If diplomacy is Papua New Guinea's first line of defence, as the saying goes, then these arrangements should be seen as links in a chain designed to protect 'the garden of peace against the dogs of war'. Like links in a chain, they have been made through human action, in this case patient and determined action, undertaken by the government of Papua New Guinea in collaboration with various partners.

The low assessment generally accorded to the likelihood of military conflict in or directly affecting the South Pacific region does not mean that island countries face no threats to their security. In fact, they face many. The most likely threats of armed attack on states in the region are, almost without exception, internal. But, just as security itself has many facets, so have the most likely threats. Some cannot be met by governments in the region on their own. The threat to the very survival of Kiribati, Tuvalu and low-lying atolls in other states (including Papua New Guinea) posed by the hole in the ozone layer and the greenhouse effect is only one example. In fact, both the threat and the solution lie beyond the responsibility of any small group of nations. Other threats to the future well-being of people in island states, such as the destruction of fishery stocks caused by pelagic, drift-net fishing, can be met only with the cooperation of other states. In some cases, the only resources on which island states can draw are persuasion and domestic law - or, in essence, their independence.

South Pacific Foreign Policies

As colonial rule has come to an end, so the island states of the South Pacific have diversified their foreign relations. Some have done so more than others. Differences can be explained by reference to variations between governments' need and desire for formal recognition of national independence, the administrative and other resources available for the task, and requests and responsiveness from the governments of other countries. Willingness to resist pressures from foreign rivals, some of them reminiscent of the most frigid days of the cold war, has also been a factor - one which has suggested, on the one hand, just how much the region is caught up in the tide of

global affairs, and, on the other hand, just how much the superpowers and their allies treat the South Pacific as a backwater. But, for all the diversification that has occurred, only a few of each country's foreign relations have proceeded much beyond the formal. And, where they have, tradition (usually meaning ties with the former colonial power and allies) and nearness have been important factors. The driving force of diplomacy throughout the region, so far as change is concerned, has been mainly economic - trade, investment, fisheries and aid. Cooperation, even in meeting internal threats to national unity, law and order, has not developed even to the point of focussed discussion.

Foreign relations need to be more than a matter of form if they are to be meaningful or productive. A foreign policy needs to be more than a matter of words. Both form and words have to be connected to agreements or other activities which actually yield results. A new generation of island leaders, brought up after colonial rule had come to an end, are now assuming positions of responsibility in governments throughout the region and voicing new demands. Their counterparts in the public service are rising rapidly through the ranks. Changes in attitude and capacity are beginning to follow. More surely will and more will be needed, if the demands of succeeding generations of people in the region are to be expressed, let alone met. The full impact, even of the first truly post-independence generation, has yet to be felt. But even now, younger, more expert people, like the Papua New Guinea diplomats undergoing advanced, multi-disciplinary training at the University of Wollongong, are being educated and returning home as a result of governments emphasis on capacity building for the future. New techniques and methods of administration, including 'management by objectives' and new technology, including computers, are being employed in order to make foreign policy-making and implementation more effective. The effects on government, both at home and abroad, are only beginning to become apparent now. Some of the most important achievements of national, regional or global diplomacy are not, of course, easy to identify or to measure: an agreement which helps to avert or to reduce tension or war between states would be one example. But others are clear: aid, trade, investment, and commodity stabilisation agreements are examples.

Like the threats which face their people, the foreign policies of South Pacific countries have been concerned with very much more than questions of military security. They have involved a very high degree of regional and international co-operation. The result has been a measure of order. But order among sovereign states requires equity if it is to last (unless, of course, it is imposed) and equity can often be achieved only as a result of change. So lasting stability in the region is likely to involve a measure of interim instability so that equity can be attained.

Global Change and Regional Order

The wider world may be undergoing a process of multipolarisation. The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China (only perhaps, after the tragedy of Tienanmen Square) may be opening up. The United Nations seems, at last, to be playing a positive role in bringing and monitoring peace in places as far apart as southern Africa and Afghanistan and (dare one hope?) perhaps, even in the Middle-East and Southeast Asia. New issues and new forces are emerging. The world is becoming more complex.

The traditional horizons of diplomacy are broadening - both geographically (as exchanges between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and members of the South Pacific Forum, for example, grow in frequency and range of topics covered), and in subject-matter (as issues like the physical environment and international commodity trade, which have been on the agenda for South Pacific Forum meetings for a long time, are taken up with the seriousness they deserve in developed countries).

Connections between national, regional and global concerns are being developed, or (where or they did not exist before) created. National, regional and global order are becoming more interdependent. Pressure from within the region for SPEC and the South Pacific Forum to address questions of military security directly and in depth is growing. Thus, even as order being achieved within the region, change is occurring - and more is needed. A substantial redressing of the regional order (including both the order within, as well as those aspects of the global order directly affecting the region) is

likely and, almost certainly, has to occur, if lasting stability and security are to follow.

The apparent indifference to island countries' aspirations and needs, displayed by some proponents of new forms of Asian-Pacific co-operation will need to be overcome if the South Pacific is to be orderly, stable and secure. Global change must also be handled with sensitivity to regional and national needs and hopes, if mutual (national, regional and global) security is to be a realistic goal for the 1990's, and beyond.

CHAPTER 3

SMALL 'S' SECURITY FOR SMALL ISLAND STATES

Tony Siaguru

I would like to spend my time in two ways. First, I want to deal with what I see as becoming an increasingly weighty general consideration in the security concerns of Pacific island states. Secondly, and more briefly, I want to look at one specific area in the region which, for the security conscious, is presently causing some anxiety.

Big and Small 's' Security

I have always thought it to be a wise rule to follow - not to talk about anything without first being certain of what I was talking about. So I looked up the word 'security' in the dictionary and read the following definition:

the condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger; safety.

That of course is 'security' with a small 's'. There is also the security with a capital 'S' that the politicians, the generals and academics concern themselves with. Here we are in the realms of a much more specific referent relating to the capabilities of political entities - states, regions, alliances - to deter against threats of external aggression and internal dissolution, a world in which we deal with international strategic considerations, global implications, geo-political configurations and the like. You know - the old war and diplomacy games. Indeed several popular games have been produced on the theme, with the players seated around their board wearing relevant headgear; a German coal-scuttle or French kepi.

I have dwelt on this at a little length to make, of course, a point. It seems to me that in the past two years a highly significant shift has taken place in the concerns, or perhaps priorities might be a better term, of 'Security' with a capital 'S' towards the more generalised embrace of 'security' with a small 's'.

I was gratified, as you can imagine, therefore, to find when I read through the terms of reference for this present workshop, that the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, despite its boardgame title, was, by the wide list of themes which they thought relevant to discussion, on the way to thinking in the same vein as myself.

How real to us today, and I mean to Pacific islanders in particular, are the feuds of the greater and not-so-greater powers of West and East? We can nod our head sagely at Mrs Thatcher's warning that 'the future of freedom is uncertain' and in the interminable squabbles over missiles in Europe we can commiserate with those on the firing end of the conclusion 'the shorter the range the deader the Germans'.

But to what extent do these matters impinge upon the thoughts and national policies of Pacific island states? It is not simply that we know we are far too tiny to have any say in any outcome. It is also the rapidly growing realisation that there are other issues far closer to home which are of a far more immediate impact on and threat to our existence, but which are totally irrelevant to the polarised positions of the East/West boardgame players. What happens in our own districts and provinces is of far greater import.

Who are Our Friends?

I am talking here of concerns, economic and environmental. It is the very nations which would have us submissively follow their parental guidance as elder nations that are most involved in ripping us off economically and ripping us up environmentally. Clockwork-orange admirals from America visit us in PNG and warn us against Russians bearing gifts. But our experience is that it is our assumed friends and allies that we should be wary of: they are the ones destroying our forests and maritime environments, they are the ones exploding nuclear devices around us and trying to dump their nuclear wastes in our backyards. Those are the concerns we have to face.

The first great landmark in this move towards a new concept of security with a small 's', and here I am speaking of a political concept or a concept politically underpinned, and not simple environmentalism, was that of the Lange government when it boldly placed the actual security of New Zealand ahead of theoretical military

strategic suppositions. The significance of the Lange move in days which were yet pre-Perestroika was not widely perceived. It was still appraised in the context of existing notions of national security consciousness. A fairly typical Western reaction was the following under the coy title 'Trends that "bear" watching':

Meanwhile, the Western Alliance system in the Pacific has been weakened in some parts of the region where a weak undertow of neutralism is noticeable. This is prompted in part by a desire to avoid the consequences of a nuclear war in case of a major conflagration between the superpowers but also by doubts about relevance to local and regional security interests of the alliance system built by the U.S. in the early 1960s. The linkages between global and regional security is a subject which deserves much more concentrated attention by governments as well as by research institutes. (Admiral Vasey, President of Pacific Forum, February 1987.)

I emphasize pre-Perestroika days, because I believe the vast changes in official Russian attitudes and policies which Gorbachev has ushered in, has helped us in the small Pacific countries to clarify issues even further in determining where our real security lies. Namely that political overtures of friends, old and new, should carry a thorough-going commitment to environmental protection and commercial integrity. These are the criteria which I believe the small island nations, faced with all kinds of environmental and economic threats to their existence in the future, will be using to provide for their security, their 'safety'. Let us trust the larger powers will acquire enough insight not to assess our efforts as a 'weak undertow of neutralism', but I have my doubts.

I believe there will be a re-drawing of traditional alignments, consequent upon some 'friendly' nations continuing selfishly to pursue their own interests at the expense of our survival. I see no reason why we should not accept Mr Gorbachev's sincerity on a trial basis and ignore Western vested political and military interests whose ostensible altruism, our experience teaches us, we have, in fact, much greater reason to distrust.

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If Russia establishes that its offers of friendship and co-operation in the real interests of all Pacific peoples are genuine, I believe it has a golden opportunity, given Pacific islanders' present feelings of discontent, to greatly enhance its status in the region.

But I also believe most Pacific islanders trust that both Australia and New Zealand will continue to provide their proven leadership, support and protection in the new decade ahead. I hope they do not fail us. For I see the 1990s in the sombre light of a decade in which the term regional security is likely to have, for the island states, once more, the connotations of a fight, literally for survival, as they seek to combat the depredations on our environment of the industrialised vandal nations.

The Threat of Political Disorder

Finally, I should like to say a few words about a specific case of potential threat to regional security quite discrete from the general trend I have been discussing. I think the thoughts of most Australians today, if queried about the most immediate threat to their security, would dwell uneasily on my own country, Papua New Guinea. There is a disorder in our national scene that is spreading rapidly and is cause for great concern for responsible persons both inside and outside the country. It is a disorder that is reflected in the burgeoning law and order problem in our towns and our Highlands; in the readiness of local people to take the law into their own hands; in pressing for exaggerated and selfish compensation claims against the national interests of progress and development. It is reflected in the excesses and riots of our very forces of the maintenance of law and order; in the incompetency of our system of practice of criminal prosecution and the inability of our jails to hold hardened criminals.

It is especially reflected in the complete and utter disregard of personal credibility by the great majority of our politicians, national and provincial. And above all, it is reflected in conversations with decent, once proud Papua New Guineans, villager and townsman, private sector employee and public servant, who feel there is something wrong in the country, and dangerously start talking of the extra-constitutional ways in which the ills might be remedied.

The security threat to the nation itself is all too apparent as the very foundations of our national existence shake in the turbulence presently being created. Spectres of both populist demagoguery and military dictatorship are present, ever-ready to rear their frightening shapes at every rumour of new political alliances in the national parliamentary numbers game.

But the security threats do not stop there. Just as the thrashing of an agonised animal attracts the attentions of predators, so you can be sure our convulsions in Papua New Guinea are not going unnoticed. The susceptibility of so many of our so-called leaders to even quite blatant corruption, promises an easy foothold for the operations of internationally organised crime that Australia is already so desperately battling against. There are even more sinister threats of international terrorism. So far, our region has been happily free of this curse, but there is no reason why it should remain so. Innocents anywhere are the prey for terrorists and we in the South Pacific would serve equally well their evil purposes as those in the northern hemisphere.

And finally, of course, we have on our Western border, a giant neighbour of some 175 million people, whose autocratic, military influenced government has never, at the best of times, had any second thoughts at transgressing our borders whenever its own interests bade it to do so. A Papua New Guinea in civil strife, or worse, a government forced to pander to populist sentiments, could easily provide our neighbour with the sort of excuse it needs to present Australia with all kinds of *fait accompli* that would be too late to do anything about, except at a cost which Australia would not necessarily be prepared to pay.

Constitutional Reform

So I plead here what I have pleaded for in other forums over the past few years. But I plead now with a much greater sense of urgency. I plead for support from the people of Papua New Guinea and from the friends of the people of Papua New Guinea, for those few but decisive changes in our Constitution that can bring us responsible government, politicians concerned about their credibility, and political, social and economic stability.

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We have been very lucky with our leaders in Papua New Guinea: Michael Somare, Sir Julius Chan, Paias Wingti, and now Rabbie Namaliu. All good and competent leaders of my nation, men with a sense of responsibility and administrative acumen and feeling for the future to provide the nation with direction. But our constitutional system fails them. Rabbie and Paias alike, are as much in a jungle as Francis Ona and his militants. So long as we continue without constitutional reform, Papua New Guinea will be an increasing threat to the stability of the region and in particular to the security of Australia.

CHAPTER 4

TRENDS IN PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY

Jioji Kotobalavu

Speaking even as a private individual, it is extremely difficult to make generalisations on a subject such as security, as it is really a question of perceptions. From one perspective it is how Australia and New Zealand see their roles in terms of their security interests. From another perspective, it is how we in the islands perceive what we think are the interests of Australia and New Zealand in dealing with us as countries and individuals. Finally, it is our perception, within the islands, as to what really are the interests which we must safeguard to build a viable future economically and politically for our countries. Who would have thought in the 1880s, when the Indians were first brought to Fiji, that more than 100 years later their presence would lead to coups and revolutions in a country like Fiji. So in a sense, the question of perspective depends on where you stand and where you look.

Trends at the Forum: From Ideology to Pragmatism

I was very pleased to have attended the recent Forum meeting in Tarawa. I was there as an observer but it was interesting from the point of view of looking at trends in the issues given importance at the Forum. First from the point of view of Pacific island countries and then from the point of view of Australia over time. Ten or twelve years ago at the Forum meetings in Tonga and Niue, the discussions were based within the global framework of East/West relationships and what was considered to be good for the island countries in those terms. At the time it was known that for the island countries the critical issues were really their economic security but always the solution was discussed in terms of maintaining relationships within the East/West global framework and the need to resolve our differences with our so-called 'friends' in the West who pose, in fact, the economic threats to our countries. Paramount importance was placed on safe-guarding the overall identification of the island

countries with the West against a global framework of East/West confrontation.

The reaction from the United States, Australia and New Zealand to the fishing agreements, which the governments of Kiribati and Vanuatu concluded with the Soviet Union in 1985 and 1987 respectively, still reflected this kind of thinking on the security interests of the South Pacific region.

Exaggerated Threats

Today we hear that the Soviet presence in South Pacific should really not be regarded as something which should concern us. In fact, there was a total absence of any reference to the Soviet Union at the Forum meeting in Tarawa. I thought that was extremely significant in the sense that finally the countries, including Australia and New Zealand, are now totally focussing on the economic interests of the island countries, in terms of what seemed to be important to them. Nevertheless, I also thought that there were interesting implications in the shift in the framework within which the Forum countries were discussing their future interests. I think that within the framework of perceived reduction in the Soviet threat to the security interests of the countries in the region, there seems to be as a consequence, an exaggeration of the evils that our friends within the West are doing to us. For instance, there was a very clear focus on the bad things that the French and the Japanese were doing to the island countries. Of course everybody agreed that in terms of the island countries resource interests we must guard against the practise of gill net fishing. Consistently the Forum has been vociferous in its opposition to continued French nuclear testing.

Resource Protection Through Diversification

Over recent years, a number of island countries have been trying consciously to diversify their external relationships, not as a deliberate policy to move away from Australia and New Zealand because by the fact of geography we will always be close, but because of a conscious strategy to increase aid support and secure investment resources so as to broaden their economic bases. From Fiji's

experience that has proven to be successful, and it is Fiji's continuing policy to diversify as broadly as possible within the West, its external relationships. Therefore, in a situation where there is an exaggerated criticism of countries like France and Japan, countries like Fiji are placed in a dilemma. How strong and nasty can we be to these countries when at the same time we know that we are trying to woo them to support us economically. That to me was one of the significant trends in the discussions that emerged from the Forum.

Secondly, the approach taken by Australia and New Zealand on one or two issues sometimes leads to suspicions or feelings amongst one or two island leaders that Australia and New Zealand should be allowing the island countries to make decisions rather than to come in and say 'we think this particular approach is good for you'. Nevertheless, the fundamental point of the Tarawa meeting was the reaffirmation that for the island countries the protection of resource interests was the core issue. Protection not only in terms of safeguarding their interests vis-a-vis other countries that have an interest in commercially exploiting these resources, but in terms of maximising the benefits that flow to them from the commercial exploitation of these resources.

Achieving Economic Justice

If we look to the 1990s I assume that one of the trends that will appear is a dissatisfaction on the part of the island countries with respect to the Fisheries Treaty with the Americans. It is not enough to accept a payment and allow American fishing boats to take resources away from the region when in terms of island development strategies and the desire to create employment opportunities for their people, the sensible thing is to enter into an extended arrangement whereby the Americans themselves, with the support of the Western allies, should be encouraged to use facilities within the region. Such usage might include the crewing of their fishing vessels, the training of people from the islands, making use of transshipment facilities and of local fish processing facilities, as well, the US should be encouraged to open up their markets for canned tuna from the region on special entry terms. It is not enough to enter into a cash agreement and allow these resources to be taken away. It is estimated that the commercial value of the tuna resources exploited in the South Pacific is close to US \$700

million a year. How much of that actually is retained in the region? Less than US \$20 million. Now is that equity? Is that justice? If one is concerned about one's economic interests really one cannot continue to accept that situation.

In terms of our relationship with the Japanese and Taiwanese, I think that clearly it is in the island countries interests to find a resolution on gill net fishing - but within the framework that overall the island countries do value their relationship with these countries. Let us find a way to resolve a particular problem bearing in mind that overall there is importance attached to that relationship. I think this is why the head of the delegation of Fiji, suggested to the Forum the approach of sitting down with the Japanese and exploring workable arrangements rather than just to come in and say 'we think that the solution to this is a convention'. Have we not learnt from the Nuclear Free Zone Treaty where, on the initiative of one or two of the member countries we were all encouraged to proceed with the idea of an international legal sanction? We were all assured that the Americans and the French would be happy; the island countries were attracted by the idea of the convention, in the hope that an international convention would encourage the French to cease their nuclear testing. What has the convention achieved for the island countries? Only the embarrassment that the French and the Americans have refused to sign. So are we to be led again to try to resolve the Japanese and Taiwanese fishing problem with a convention, only to find eventually that the Japanese or Taiwanese are going to refuse to sign? What then? So these were the broader terms evident at the recent Forum. Hopefully future regional meetings will encourage an examination of the core interests of the island countries in terms of their resources, and seek to develop these resources for the maximum benefit of the Pacific people.

Western Ideas and Island Instability

The second point I'd like to make relates to what is perceived by the island countries as a potential threat to the unity of their country, stability of their nation and their overall interests. That is, the importance of ideas that are totally alien to the cultural makeup of the people of these island countries: the idea of Western style democracy, individual rights in the form of free association through trade unions,

and a free press. If we look at individual island countries in the region we can cite specific examples where the imposition of these ideas has actually led to instability because these ideas have been brought in and applied in a situation where the cultural makeup of the people is totally different. In a sense, the same situation happened with the African countries but over time they developed one party state systems, which are generally accepted today by the international community. One can only assume that these systems are in harmony with the cultural makeup of those peoples.

As we look to the 1990s, I feel as an individual, that this is a factor that will always be an element of instability and concern within each country and in terms of relationships between island countries and Australia and New Zealand. For instance at the Forum meeting in Tarawa, Papua New Guinea raised the question of the media, the principle of free press. The immediate response was that a free press was a fundamental right; but is that a sufficient answer? In the island societies freedom of expression is a totally alien concept within the community and the social fabric of society. Must we be compelled to accept that this is a fundamental right, a fundamental component of democracy that we cannot compromise, that we must apply if we are to behave according to your norms? How appropriate are western ideas and education to an island setting?

Sovereignty and Sensitivity

The last point I would like to make is the need to be aware of how Pacific island countries, or some of them, perceive or react to changes in the global external framework. We have mentioned the Soviet Union. Who should be telling the islands that a relationship with the Soviet Union is alright? In 1982 when the Soviet Union made an offer to do some marine surveys for the island countries in ESCAP there was an immediate response from Australia, New Zealand the US that this was not a good thing for the island countries. They decided do something themselves which they did and which they have done marvellously. I can speak on that with some authority because my organisation has benefited from that activity. Today we are told that the Soviet Union is no longer a concern and we have before us four separate offers from four different Soviet institutions. How are we to react? We hear from press statements from the Australian government

that it is alright for us to deal with the Soviet Union, given the new rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the United States. But sometimes we have the impression that it is somebody else who should tell you that it's alright, that the time is right for Pacific island countries to deal with the Soviet Union. There is a need for sensitivity and recognition of the sovereignty of the island countries to decide their own future.

The Threat of Intervention

Now that New Zealand is outside the ANZUS framework it is logical that it should focus on establishing a presence and capability within the region. To some extent this is welcome because in relation to the need to protect one's economic security interests, there is of course a corresponding need for effective surveillance of the activities of foreign fishing fleets. But the presence of that capability within the region by New Zealand raises concerns in one or two of the island countries. It raises fears that we can have here in the South Pacific what is now happening in the Indian Ocean where India, by invitation, helped militarily with the situation in the Maldives and is now involved in Sri Lanka. That, I imagine, would always be a reminder to the people of Fiji, that it could also happen in our own region. I was interested to hear the statement that there is no perceived military threat in the region. From the perspective of one or two island countries the threat of military intervention cannot be discounted in the light of what has occurred or is happening in other areas.

CHAPTER 5

MILITARY SECURITY IN OCEANIA

Taufa Vakatale

I will state from the outset that while I may hold a senior position in government, I am neither here to represent the views of my government nor to justify its policy. Therefore I do not apologise for any contradictions or any similarities I may have with my government's thinking. This is my own assessment and my own insight into what security of Oceania in the 1990's ought to be.

While I appreciate that most of our governments, especially those of the island states, see security more in terms of their national and economic security rather than the capital 'S' security of the region, I have chosen to focus on military security in regional terms. I take it that like the Pacific islands, both Australia and New Zealand, also do not see military security as their priority. Nevertheless, in view of the ease with which one can go from one country to another and the easy transits of vessels, ships and submarines from one ocean to another, we cannot bury our heads in the sand but make it our duty, even if it is not amongst our priorities, to discuss regional security with a capital 'S'.

An Island View on ANZ's Security Role

The military security of Oceania as a geographical area must obviously entail a regional security understanding or arrangement. None of the islands of Oceania have the military capacity to engage in defence or battle with any of the superpowers, great powers or third powers. In many cases I would say, or in all cases, they do not even have the military and weapon capacity to defend against an invasion by a well-armed, well-trained and well-mounted mercenary group. And it is not even considered by them as a priority. However, it is the tacit understanding and expectation of the small and developing island countries of the Pacific that the security of the region is a prime interest of Australia and New Zealand, if not, the United States of America. By this I mean that the security of Australia and New

Zealand encompasses as well the security of the smaller states of the region and any threat to one island, external or regional, has security implications for the two nations.

Having stated this general principle of security within the region, I should also say that there should be great concern among us over the future of ANZUS, a regional security arrangement involving Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America. I believe that ANZUS is central to the security of the region and that every effort should be made to promote dialogue and discussion among the parties concerned.

As was previously stated the security of Australia and New Zealand encompasses the security of the small island countries in the region. But for these island countries - especially those which already have a military presence as part of their national development - for them to contribute efficient, effective and competent support to any threat, perceived threat or conflict, the limited military and weapon capacity and capability must be enhanced and programmes of military training provided. For example, bearing in mind the small size of the military in our countries, their capability would be greatly enhanced if they received continuous training in military matters and their arsenals were modernised so that they could have a credible defence. This would require greater programmes of cooperation, assistance and training by Australia and New Zealand. A chain is only as strong as its weakest link, and the strength of regional security will only be as strong as the weakest of our states in the region.

Having just returned from Kiribati, the war relics on Betio have brought home to me the vulnerability of our small island states and how easily they can become victims of a conflict that has nothing to do with them. While they themselves may be vulnerable, they do, however, provide strategic positions for any extra-regional power that may wish to infiltrate into the Pacific. The scattered nature of the islands must be taken into account. In Kiribati if you want to go to Kiritimati Island you have to go through Fiji, up to Hawaii and then to Kiritimati Island. Therefore it is important in my view that defence cooperation programmes and military assistance be given to small island countries in the region to enable them to provide security both at the national and more importantly, for New Zealand and Australia, at the regional level.

Fiji's Strategic Importance

Fiji, as you are all aware, is strategically placed from the point of view of both New Zealand and Australia, particularly for Australian security. Yet because of the events of 1987, defence cooperation programmes and military assistance and training programmes are in a state of limbo due to the policies of the Australian and New Zealand governments. As far as Fiji is concerned, we have always had very strong historic links with Australia and New Zealand and it is in our interests to see these links strengthened and furthered. It was through this link that Fiji was able to effectively provide the additional manpower to Australia and New Zealand during World War II, and also to provide hundreds of trained men when the security of the Pacific was threatened by the communist insurgency in the Malaysian peninsula. Regional and national security should therefore not be pursued by political parties. The internal events of 1987 in Fiji should not have impaired the security relationships between Fiji and Australia and between Fiji and New Zealand because the training and assistance given to Fiji was, I believe, given basically for the security of the region and the two countries' own security.

There are those within Australia and New Zealand who argue that assistance provided to the Fiji military forces could or would be used for internal political activity. However, I believe that Australia and New Zealand should weigh this possibility up against the greater fear of Fiji's reliance on other extra-regional power to provide it with this kind of assistance, and the implications this will have on the military security of the region. Recently, when it was announced by the press that Mr Rocard, Prime Minister of France, was going to visit Fiji and negotiations were going to take place regarding the building of naval base in Fiji by the French, there was an outcry from New Zealand more particularly, not perhaps from the New Zealand government but from the New Zealand press. There was a perceived threat since Fiji was going to France, an extra-regional power, for military assistance. I think therefore that Australia and New Zealand, at least for Fiji, should recognise the important role that Fiji plays in regional security and should reinstate their programmes for defence cooperation, military assistance and military training programmes, not

only for the security of the region but also as buffers to their own security.

The political ideology of the government of Fiji is not distinctly different from those of Australia and New Zealand. The political perceptions of those two countries in so far as Fiji is concerned stems more from party political positions, rather than basic national security interest and to this end the security of the state is the prime national interest of any country in the region or the world. If we look at Southern Africa and Central America we can see the problems of security and continued hostilities due to the presence of extra-regional forces. The same view exists with regard to Asia participating in any form of regional security, except of course in the provision of military equipment and training.

Peacekeeping or Interference?

One of the questions asked in the agenda for this workshop is whether a regional peace keeping force is feasible? It is not for me to say, without any in-depth analysis or a structured examination of the matter, whether a regional peace-keeping force is feasible or desirable and of course any formal treaty relationship should be considered in the light of such examination. The role of a peace-keeping force however, as I see it, is when two warring factions need a kind of referee to keep the peace and allow negotiations to take place. Perhaps from my very naive perspective and naive understanding of military strategies, I find that our island nations have very natural boundaries except for PNG and Irian Jaya. I do not yet see the parallel of the Middle-East scenario happening in the Pacific. At this stage I can only see the purpose of having a regional peace-keeping force being used to solve internal problems and crises. I would see this as interference into the problems of the sovereign state. If there is a feeling of the need for such an arrangement, then the matter should be put to the South Pacific Forum for consideration and decision.

Non-alignment?

In my view non-alignment is not a useful strategy for the region. Non-alignment is a principle and strategy embraced by a

number of developing countries in the world for a specific purpose. Few members of our region, are, as I understand it, members of this movement. In fact, I find non-alignment is contradictory to regional security. Within the United Nations Charter there is a provision for regional security yet the principles of the non-aligned movement are against it, even though non-aligned countries are also members of the United Nations. What I think is needed is not non-alignment but a constructive understanding and approach to the security of the region with, of course, Australia and New Zealand playing a major role. I wish to emphasise that in mentioning that role, I am referring to the security and defence of countries of the region and not intervention. Among the countries of the region the international principle of non-intervention in the affairs of state must remain paramount and sacrosanct. We must exist as sovereign states and within a certain security environment.

The United Nations?

I am not very optimistic about the role of the UN which unfortunately, as I understand it, cannot, within its charter, guarantee the rights of small states. As I understand it the United Nations can only intervene in a situation where there is a threat to peace or actual conflict. It can only intervene also if it is authorised to do so by the security council and the decision of the security council would depend on the veto power of any member of the council, one of which, by the way, may be a party to the conflict.

A Regional Security Committee

Hence, I believe that the rights of small states in the Pacific, can only be guaranteed through regional security considerations. I believe there should be a regional committee discussing regional collaboration and pursuits for the security of states in the region collectively and individually although at this stage I do not see the merit of a regional peace-keeping force.

The general agreement, at least amongst the participants from the island nations, was that economic security was more important than military security and domestic security more important than

regional security. As I said earlier, I endorse this. But I think I would like to take this opportunity to also stress the importance of paying more importance to military security.

Economic Insecurity and the 'Big Brothers'

The Pacific island countries are small producers of primary products and their export incomes fluctuate with prices, weather and variations in market access. The slower world economic growth also affects the market for services offered by the Pacific island countries; these services include tourism and transport. Hence when countries like Fiji try to be innovative in their strategy for economic growth, and are quickly frustrated in their efforts by taxation policy changes in metropolitan countries like Australia and New Zealand and other limiting legislations, we then ask the question - what kind of security cooperation can we expect from our two big brothers? The economies of our island nations are so precarious and fragile that we would be tempted to go into partnership with any extra-regional power that offers us some hope of economic security even if this may threaten the military security of the region.

The security of our small and vulnerable states is also at risk if and when we cannot afford to spend money on military security and defence capability and capacity. Australia, New Zealand and other developed states with interest in the region, should, if they are genuinely interested in regional security, provide greater assistance to all countries to promote and facilitate economic development.

There is no sense in talking about economic cooperation with Asia/Pacific economies when the bulk of our trade is with Australia and New Zealand. Ever since Fiji created the trade free zones and attracted garment manufacturers to the trade free zones, there has been very strong protests amongst garment manufacturers in New Zealand that this was robbing them of their livelihood. Two weeks ago there was a very strong protest not only from the unions but from the manufacturers themselves trying to put pressure on the New Zealand government to ban or restrict the import of Fijian garments into New Zealand. Statistically, the import of garments from Fiji to New Zealand make up a very small percentage of the garment industry alone. Yet the trade unions and the manufacturers want to

impose restrictions. Where then is security cooperation for us in Fiji, regarding economic security?

The important issue here is for Australia and New Zealand to recognise our relative importance to them in a number of ways. We need more joint venture investments. We need greater liberalisation in trade, notwithstanding the present SPARTECA arrangements. We need a greater flow of tourists from Australia and New Zealand. We need the transfer of much more financial resources from them to our countries and we need many more programs of technical assistance. A weak body could hardly throw a punch, much less fire a weapon accurately. If there is anything that Australia and New Zealand can do - not to mention the United States - to help our small countries in Oceania play a meaningful and constructive role in regional security with a capital 's', it must be to facilitate and promote national economic development through the mechanisms I have listed.

Cooperation and Collaboration

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that the region is a geographical area comprising sovereign countries. The security of our region requires our full cooperation. That cooperation should not be pursued by narrow political parties but by genuine national interest considerations. I believe that national economic development is intrinsic and concomitant with any national security programme and that Australia and New Zealand should fully assist in this regard. I also submit that regional security cooperation, collaboration and arrangements should be addressed by the region as a whole, perhaps through the Forum meetings.

CHAPTER 6

REGIONAL SECURITY: IN HARMONY IF NOT IN UNISON

Henry Naisali

I will keep my comments rather general, as indeed is the suggested framework for this session but I hope I can provoke some discussion and that our few days together will lead to recommendations of a kind that can be fed into the Forum network, leading to constructive change.

Whose Sail on the Horizon?

As most of you will know, my birthplace is Tuvalu - one of the smallest and most resource-poor countries not only in the South Pacific, but in the world. For much of our history, our idea of security has, I suppose, been relatively straightforward. Ours was largely a struggle with the limitations of our environment - although once or twice we did need to keep an eye on exactly whose sail was on the horizon. Still, in this small, remote environment, most Tuvaluans felt themselves remarkably secure. Life was hard, but in a sense predictable. We had experienced the worst of weather, we knew the limitations of our islands, the ways of the surrounding seas.

It was not until the unwelcome arrival of the 'blackbirders' that we discovered the full extent to which forces from well beyond our world could do us harm. It was an unsettling experience and an indication of larger uncertainties of which we soon became aware. So it was with some realism and acceptance that we became part of the British global empire. But in time we found the limits of that arrangement too. In the conflict between Japan and the United States, we provided the battleground, and our islands were in one way or another rearranged. And as this happened, we were caught by the inescapable tides of global politics and in the tiniest of canoes.

The Value of Regionalism

Since the war, higher education, communications, air travel, visits and departures have all helped us to gain perspective. We have become acutely aware of the fragility and the vulnerability of smallness and of relative isolation. Around the region, other peoples have faced the same facts, and come to similar conclusions. The world of geopolitical and military affairs will always be well beyond the reach of nations like mine. For most South Pacific island countries, security problems are explicitly linked to our economic condition. Economic development is something we can at least try to deal with - the kind of problem we can get moving on, in search of solutions. We have done this individually - with varying approaches and results from one nation to another - and we have also discovered the benefits of 'singing in harmony if not in unison'. This discovery of the value of regional approaches is in my opinion a critical development. The great achievement of the Forum is that it has created regional networks in all key areas. Our Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, our energy planners, our transport officials and so on, all know each other, talk regularly and often agree on policies. This did not really happen twenty years ago. In this way, our region is closer and more integrated than before.

At the same time regionalism is always fragile and needs constant nurturing and attention. I hope our discussions suggest some further ways of achieving this. I have no doubt that there is a direct relationship between the extent to which we work together and the degree of our security. Incidentally, I do not think that working together should go as far as a regional peace-keeping force. The more I think about this, the more problems rather than advantages occur to me.

The Economic Imperative

Since the inception of the Forum regional leaders have given emphasis to economic development and technical cooperation. All small island states have had to seek continued aid to assist in the overall development of their economies. This process too, has linked them up with a wider world. For some, the aid experience has been more constructive than for others, but all now give much attention to their relations with a broadening range of donor nations. Often too,

our success in winning support for projects is related to the economic health of the donor nation itself. There is a growing interdependence, a growing interest amongst all involved, in achieving stable and prosperous relations between countries, large or small.

It is also worth keeping in mind that when Pacific island nations assert a modest independence in foreign policy, the motivations are almost always economic. The occasional playing of the Russian card - in relation to fishing rights - amounts to a direct attempt to obtain a better economic deal, and sometimes an indirect attempt to gain leverage through gently reminding donors that if certain security stances are to be guaranteed, aid should not fall below certain levels. I do not see this as blackmail or anything of that kind. It is simply an attempt by the weakest of nations to promote their interests before those who can all too easily take us for granted. In all this, it is important for larger nations to recognise just how limited the options of micro-states really are.

To return to Tuvalu for a moment, I believe that the establishment of the Tuvalu trust fund was in part achieved because of donor perceptions held at the time that it was better to look very seriously at the prospect of a trust fund, than for Tuvalu to follow its neighbour Kiribati into a fishing agreement with the Soviet Union. In fact, we in Tuvalu were not seriously considering the Russian offer - that is the inside information but thought that we might markedly increase our bargaining power with our good friends, the aid donors

Similarly, it is no secret that the United States Regional Fisheries Treaty was successfully concluded because of that government's interest in ensuring a constructive presence in the region. The treaty has brought with it an evident economic gain for our island states, security relationships have been maintained and so everybody is satisfied. I wish one or two other nations were as enlightened in their self-interest.

Forum Secretariat's Role

A few words now about my organisation, the Forum Secretariat, because it does carry both an economic and a political mandate and is concerned with doing what it can to improve regional economic security and the flow of security related information.

Obviously, there are various development programmes, which we are seeking to gear as closely as possible to country priorities using regional approaches to provide economies of scale. The Secretariat now has the capability to undertake more comprehensive economic analysis and planning as well as to support more effective regional aid programming.

One reason this capacity has been developed is because of a growing concern that despite the relatively high levels of assistance received by the region, our economies often perform short of expectations. In other words, aid is not being translated sufficiently into greater economic development through the establishment of productive activity, and of trade. This is a matter of concern to which we must all address ourselves. I would be very interested in your thoughts as to why we are not making more of the assistance we receive.

Then there is our ability to act as an information dissemination agency. We have not done enough of this to date, and I hope this workshop will give some further pointers as to exactly what kind of information countries would find it most useful to receive. In most cases, I suppose we are a post-office but there may also be more occasions where we can generate reporting ourselves. We are ready to have a go at this.

Managing Connections

I have already mentioned a few of the processes that have linked us up with the rest of the world and led to greater interdependence. It is also important that we are good managers of our connections with the wider world, and that as a region we set priorities for this interaction. No matter how seriously we might take ourselves as individual nations, we are still no more than micro-states and relatively poor ones at that. I firmly believe that it is in the interests of small states to gather together and wherever possible speak with one voice. This is why I am so pleased that we have managed to attach a dialogue to the annual Forum meeting. This year was something of a trial run, and we learned from it. In future, I would like to see us setting our agendas and priorities at longer range, fully

agreeing our positions, and briefing ourselves comprehensively before we meet our dialogue partners.

We have already achieved a most useful connection with key players in the region. Now let us set about using it to the greatest possible effect. Properly done, it will not detract from national positions, it will add strength to our voice. It was very clear in Tarawa that dialogue partners came to listen, and almost all of them to respond. This is good news for the future. We are certainly going to need these connections, as well as a loud voice, if we are to make an impression not least on post-1992 Europe, and on global trading arrangements.

In the coming year, we will also be trying to learn from our neighbour regional organisation ASEAN and to establish practical connections with its member countries. Looking further afield concerted regional action also encourages those who are not much interested in working with individual countries, to become more involved. To sum up, we are finding ways of talking as a region to those who are closest, most important, or who offer the potential of constructive relationships. Within all of this is the larger benefit of enhanced security.

Information Technology

A final thought. At the Secretariat in Suva and thanks largely to the Australian government, we are at present beginning the full computerisation of our operations. I cannot help but wonder what the implications of micro-chip and satellite technology are for small island countries, Tuvalu included. Are there special opportunities for us in all this? What skills will we need to cope with, and to take advantage of rapid technological change. There are computers in the offices of many of our officials - but have we yet thought through all of the possibilities and implications? After all, we did not benefit from the industrial revolution, indeed it could be agreed that we were amongst its victims.

Information technology is generating a revolution of similar size, and I would not like us to be losers again. I have no answers at all here, but I sense this massive technological shift around us, and I wonder what it means for developing micro-states. It is all a long way

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from checking sails on the horizon, but as with those sails we need to know what we are facing. Increasingly, it seems to me, security also lies in access to information.

CHAPTER 7

SECURITY THROUGH ECONOMIC REFORM AND REGIONAL COOPERATION: A VIEW FROM THE COOK ISLANDS

James Gosselin

One of the disadvantages of speaking after earlier papers is that much of what I wanted to say has already been said. I thought, therefore, that I would just say a few words about security from the perspective of an individual in one of the smaller members of the South Pacific Forum.

It was pointed out throughout various interventions made yesterday that security is a multifaceted concept. It must be considered by government officials in both an internal and external respect, and over the short, medium and longer term. Security is sometimes spelt with a big 'S' and sometimes with a small. In addition to the spatial and temporal dimension, therefore, it also embraces such different content elements of global and regional, political, strategic and economic relations; internal economic, political and cultural factors; as well as activities both national and international impacting on the environment.

Internal Security Concerns

Given what was said yesterday, it should come as no surprise that the present government considers the Cook Islands immediate security concerns as primarily internal, albeit with an important qualification. Briefly stated, its security strategy is aimed largely at increasing national economic independence and improving the quality of social services delivered by government, both on Rarotonga and in the outer islands. Particular attention is being paid to enhancing the local capabilities for export of Cook Islands' agricultural and other products, developing the tourism industry, promoting the exploitation of marine resources in the exclusive economic zone, and rejuvenating health and educational services throughout the country.

Is the focus on domestic and economic questions and less on those problems posed by external interference an appropriate mix? It was said yesterday that the identification of a country's security concerns is a matter for the country itself to determine. That being the case therefore, the security concerns identified by the government itself must be deemed appropriate. To go somewhat further, it is also reasonable to argue that you must extinguish the fire in your house before you consider putting on an extension. In January 1989, a general election was held in the Cook Islands, a major issue being the widely-perceived deterioration of the country's infrastructure and health and education services. The government changed on 1 February 1989 and the new administration is focussing its attention and resources in the short to medium term on redressing that deteriorating situation rather than on perhaps longer-term security concerns. That being said, however, a few selected initiatives are being undertaken in such areas as manpower training aimed at long-term security.

Another factor weighing heavily on government's decision to focus on internal economic and social security, as just stated, is that there is no external military interference, or known threat of such interference, to the Cook Islands. Until there is any positive indication of such interference, it must be considered that internal pressures for reform, the upgrading of services and stimulation of the domestic economy demand priority.

Coping With Secession

That strategy is all the more important in that, for example, there have already been aborted calls by the people on Manihiki, one of the Northern group of islands, some 650 miles from the main island, to secede from the Cook Islands. At first glance such action sounds ludicrous and, indeed, the demands for 'independence' were quickly withdrawn by the local island council when it was learned that the Government would immediately remove all public amenities from the island and prohibit any air and sea links between the main island and Manihiki. Nevertheless, a major initiative is now under way to develop the black pearl industry on that island, and within a few years the 800 or so people on Manihiki, may be earning more than \$1 million per annum in export revenue. It will also be necessary to ensure that

Manihikians enjoy a level of services significantly better than those they are provided with at present. At the same time it will be necessary for the central government to balance their demands with the needs of the country as a whole.

Modalities for Cooperation

I said earlier that there was an important qualification to the government's assessment of its security needs as being essentially internal at this stage. That is the not entirely unprecedented recognition by the Government that it is impossible to implement its domestic economic and social security strategies divorced from the outside world. Given its own negligible influences in the international community, particularly outside the South Pacific region, an important element of the Cook Island's domestic strategy to enhance national security is to develop appropriate modalities for cooperation in various spheres, some immediate and direct, others more indirect and longer-term.

Yesterday I referred to maritime surveillance as an example of more immediate and direct forms of cooperation. Sharing EEZ maritime boundaries with five of its neighbours (French Polynesia, Kiribati, New Zealand with respect to Tokelau, the United States with respect to American Samoa and Niue) the Cook Islands accords high priority to the detailed formulation and implementation of the Forum Fisheries Agency's (FFA) Integrated Programs of Regional Fisheries surveillance, through which governments might better protect the fishery resources in their own zones by working in conjunction with their neighbours. At the South Pacific Forum held in Tarawa, the Cook Islands' Prime Minister offered berthing facilities in one of its Northern Group islands closest to the maritime boundary of Kiribati for any Kiribati surveillance vessel. Government authorities have already begun to exchange information on the movements of foreign fishing vessels with authorities in French Polynesia.

Given our own geographical position, cooperation with France and French Polynesia, not only in fisheries surveillance but also other matters such as trade and transport, is very important. Such cooperation is facilitated by the fact that the Cook Islands and French Polynesians languages and culture are very similar and many Cook

Islanders can trace family ties to French Polynesia if not identify actual living relatives in Tahiti and nearby islands. In fact, the Vice-President of French Polynesia was born in the Cook Islands, where his relatives still reside.

Information Analysis and 'National' Assessment

Not all forms of cooperation are as direct as maritime surveillance. Another strategy that is being adopted involves information gathering and assessment in such areas of critical importance as trade and activities impacting on the environment. Based on such information, the Cook Islands is working with others in the Forum and elsewhere to devise appropriate strategies to meet common goals. In this regard I might offer a number of personal comments.

First, the question has been raised as to whether governments in this region *need* a shared view on security matters. May I suggest that in some cases at least, it is not a question of actively seeking a shared view. Faced with a number of common problems, a shared view sometimes arises naturally. A shared view facilitates the formulation of an appropriate strategy through which the interests of South Pacific states might be pursued with better effect.

Secondly, information gathering and assessment on security related matters concerns the small island countries. For one thing, manpower constraints, both in terms of actual bodies on the ground and time available, inhibit if not preclude, full time attention being paid to this activity. In the case of the Cook Islands, for example, there is only a handful of professionals within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Given the more mundane routine demands placed on the time of the officers involved, information gathering and assessment, on all but the most critical subjects is done as and when time permits. As well, the limited financial resources do not permit comprehensive data and background information to be compiled on the multifarious issues important to national security, particularly as it has come to be broadly defined by many countries in the region. It was for that reason the Cook Islands firmly supported the initiative taken by the Forum last year to establish a mechanism for a regional security information exchange.

Thirdly, and related to the last point, the Cook Islands has benefited greatly from security information and assessments made available by larger countries with a greater capacity for such activities, particularly New Zealand and Australia, and it is grateful for their assistance in that regard. With that said, I would associate myself with previous speakers who made the point that the interests of those who in this workshop have come to be called our 'bigger brothers' do not always coincide with our those of the Forum island countries. In fact, it would be very surprising if they did. At the same time, it is only fair to note the obvious fact that the views of island governments themselves are not always identical on every issue. That appears to me as a logical and healthy development as countries in the region gain more and more experience as international actors in their own right.

While we continue to welcome security information and assessment from any quarter, there is increasing need for appropriate training to be given to nationals of island countries on various aspects of security analysis, enabling each country to develop its own capacity of independent assessment. At the same time, given the resource constraints with which the Cook Islands will continue to be faced, I would personally welcome a strengthening of the legal and political division of the Forum Secretariat in regard to security items such as those I have just mentioned. Ideally, over time, the division might develop a capacity to provide Forum members with sufficient information and possible options on security related issues that would enable Forum leaders to identify not only shared security goals but also common security strategies that might be pursued for the benefit of the region as a whole.

Continuous Communication

It is in regard to the latter that I would like to make a final observation. Mention was made yesterday of some Forum governments perhaps feeling intimidated by strong initiatives taken by one or the other of the 'big brothers', particularly at annual meetings of the Forum. Such initiatives sometimes leave island governments with the impression that they are being forced or, at least, drawn into matters for which they are not prepared. This is particularly the case when those 'bigger brothers' have a phalanx of experts sitting behind

them, ready to give advice on a wide range of sometimes esoteric subjects, compared to the one or two advisers many Forum leaders can call upon during the meeting. There are a number of security related issues of common concern throughout the region, some of primary significance. In my view, the decision-making process might be facilitated with more continuous communication throughout the year at the highest level among all members of the Forum on such matters. This would alert Governments to developments of importance and better enable all concerned to give more detailed consideration on such issues, prior to annual meetings of leaders themselves. Coming prepared to consider the security matters of importance, there would seem to be a much better chance to arrive at the best decision in which all partake and all accept. After all, wisdom is not the prerogative of one or only a few.

CHAPTER 8

SECURITY GOALS AND STRATEGIES IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS

Francis Saemala

My presentation will focus on the Solomon Islands security goals and strategies as I have seen them in the past ten years since independence in 1978. Before venturing into this challenging but interesting situation, and being fully conscious of the danger of generalising and speculating, I wish to reflect on certain historical instances that pertain to military aspects of security.

I believe that what led to invasion and colonisation - in its broadest sense - since time immemorial, is the search for wealth and the control of wealth wherever it is found: whether it is on the moon, Mars, South Africa or the Solomon Islands. The fact that Alvaro de Mendana - the Spanish explorer that visited in 1568, what is now the Solomon Islands - ventured into that South Pacific region attests strongly to my assertion. Mendana was in search of the continent from which King Solomon obtained gold to have his temple built. He set up his colony in Graciosa Bay in what is now the Temotu Province of the Solomon Islands. In retaliation for his disturbing the tranquillity of the environment he wanted to acquire, mosquitos attacked him and he died of malaria.

The declaration of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate in 1893 was not for the protection of Solomon Islanders per se but for the safety and security of foreign commercial enterprises. The struggle for independence in New Caledonia rests largely on that territory's wealth of nickel. There are other examples but I do not wish to labour the point.

My contention simply is that we are in a different era - the era of recognising the dignity of humanity. Consequently, our approach for dealing with security questions should be based on the principle of the enhancement of that dignity. In our case, in the Pacific region, this would tend more towards economic and social development considerations rather than towards militaristic aspirations. Having said that, the note should be made that human nature being what is,

certain provisions, either collectively or individually, must necessarily be made for protection and self-defence.

With that understanding I would like to deal specifically with the security goals and strategies in the Solomon Islands, from personal observations over the last ten years. In the Solomons I believe that firstly the goals have been to:

- (a) maintain peace and security;
- (b) unite the people in their diversity. (The Solomon Islands is a very diverse country. We have not only Melanesians, we have Polynesians, Micronesians, you name it, we have them in all shapes and shades;
- (c) develop the economy and tap whatever resources there are in the country;
- (d) educate the people;
- (e) keep the people healthy and happy. (During the Kenilorea Administration, prior to independence and into the early independence years, the Minister for Health used the catchy phrase 'a healthy nation is a wealthy nation', so this, in my view, has been a consistent objective.)

Secondly, the strategies, I believe, have been:

- (a) the institution of a constitutional democracy which has the conventional three branches of government - the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary;
- (b) the development of a system of local administration which aims at the participation and involvement of the people at three levels of authority and responsibility - village administration, area council administration and provincial administration;
- (c) the promotion of an appreciation and understanding of the various diverse cultural and religious and denominational practices and traditions. (As you are well aware the Solomon Islands is about 93 percent

Christian but there are different Christian denominations.);

- (d) the development of legislative and political institutional arrangements as a unifying instrument. Here I have in mind the maintenance of political parties and bodies such as trade unions. I regard these as institutional arrangements and in an important way. Although they might be foreign concepts, for a place like the Solomon Islands, they bring a San Cristobal person, a Choiseul person and a Malaita person, into a category of interest, and so I see those as institutional arrangements for unifying our people.

A look at the policies of the Peoples Alliance Party (elected to office in 1989) might be interesting. Of course there is the maintenance of the police force; we do not have an army. The closest to it is what is called a mobile police force. In its manifesto, the Peoples Alliance has strong statements on the further development of the following in this order of priority: police, anti-corruption squad, special constabulary, army and navy and the development of the mobile force into the strength of an army battalion. The police force would include a special constabulary, marines, and scouts and guides who would undergo full military training. The statement goes on to encourage civilians to enrol for military training. The Marine/Naval College would introduce military training and air force training would be introduced to produce to produce pilots, engineers and navigators.

Threats

Now, my good friends I do not really know how effective this would be, except to say that, we have not had any real internal security problems in terms of disturbances that one can see as having military threats. We have had our share of constitutional crises. You might already know that the appointment of our Governor General was declared invalid by the High Court, but that the return to office was through constitutional means rather than through any other means. We have had, since independence, four administrations in the presence of three Prime Ministers - Peter Kenilorea, Solomon Mamaloni, Ezekiel Alebua - and changes of administration have always been through the

Constitutional arrangements that we have. So when looking at the effectiveness of policies being pursued in the Solomon Islands, I'm not really sure if they have been effective but what I sense is that our people are becoming more aware of the need to be unified. Certain movements prior to independence and even still now, might be interpreted as threats to the unity of the nation, but I believe this is a fact of life.

Repatriating the Constitution

To what extent can our situation be improved? I think one of the basic things we need to do, is to make our identity clearly known, both internally and externally. I am not lobbying for support in this gathering, but I might mention here that I was very interested in what Canada did in the repatriation of its constitution and I have personally put on notice for the forthcoming parliament, a resolution requesting our parliament to appoint a special select committee to look at the question of the repatriation of the Solomon Islands constitution. It is probably well known to everyone here, that the Solomon Islands constitution is the schedule to an orderly council. Technically, in my view it is a document of the British parliament. On the cover it says, '31 May 1978 - laid before Parliament 8 June 1978'. On that date the Solomon Islands did not have a parliament, so obviously the parliament in question is the British parliament. My view is that before we can review or amend our own constitution we need to repatriate it and detach it from being a schedule to the Solomon Island independence order of 1978. I believe that this is a fundamental question. Once the constitution is repatriated it can then contain or accommodate the type of changes that we would wish, to maintain and enhance security measures that we believe would be good for the maintenance of the Solomon Islands as a nation and for its contribution to the security of the region.

CHAPTER 9

NEW CALEDONIA: FROM ENFANT TERRIBLE TO OCEANIC PARTNER

Charles Pidjot*

The dispersion of our respective countries in the region in which we are situated demands the maximum number of meetings and contacts to maintain and re-inforce the ties that unite us. For the last few years Kanaky has been the *enfant terrible* of the region, the child which denied its legitimate right to grow up and to emancipate itself has no option but to revolt.

In 1988, the balance of power in New Caledonia, established by the statute of Chirac and Pons legalised the extinction of the Kanak people. With the election of a new government, Rocard took the initiative of organising a meeting with the FLNKS and the RPCR to reconsider the politics of France in our country.

The Matignon Accords

Our participation in the Matignon Accords constitutes a recentering of our strategy but this recentering does not signify the abandon of our ideals. Our final objective remains Kanak Socialist Independence. We have opted for a path which is planned and signposted for the ten years to come. This period seems necessary for the emergence of the conditions of a viable and acceptable independence from the political, economic and human point of view.

France, the cradle of universal human rights, whose fundamental democratic values were born of the revolution of 1789, remains for us a colonial power. Despite the efforts it makes to find an provisional solution to our demands for independence, in the end it will have to respect the provisions of resolutions 1514 5 (XV) and 2621 (XXV), of the United Nations, in particular, paragraph three of resolution 1514 (XV) stipulating that 'the lack of political, economic,

* Translated from the French by Rebecca Weisser.

social or educational preparation must never be taken as a pretext for delaying independence'.

The recognition of the FLNKS as the sole, legitimate representative of the Kanak people by the government of France constitutes a stage in the decolonisation process. Similarly, all of the measures foreshadowed in the law passed by national referendum in November 1988 are only significant inasmuch as they contribute to the creation of conditions for the restitution of our sovereignty in ten years. Hence, the Matignon Accords, far from being an end in themselves, must allow France to give substance to its motto of liberty, equality, fraternity, whose seeds are contained in its history.

The law 88-1028 of 9 November 1988, with statutory provisions for the self-determination of New Caledonia in 1998, was approved by a national referendum. Henceforth, for the nine years to come, our country will be governed according to the provisions of this law.

This law defines the conditions under which the ballot of self-determination will be held in 1998, in accordance with article 53 of the French constitution. All those electors registered on the Territorial electoral roll at the time of the November 1988 referendum and continuously resident in the Territory over the successive ten years will be entitled to vote. The current electoral patterns indicate that 37 percent of the Caledonian electorate are in favour of independence (of which 80 percent are Kanaks) and 63 percent are opposed to independence (of which 85 percent are recent or longtime immigrants). When the demographic increase of Kanaks is taken into account, the predicted result for 1998 would be 40 percent in favour of independence and 60 percent against. A majority in favour of independence presupposes therefore both the revision of the electoral lists that was planned in the Matignon Accords, in which only those persons whose primary residence has been in the Territory for more than ten years could participate in the ballot in 1998, and also the rallying of at least 7000 people to the independentist cause. If primary residence is the criteria for eligibility to participate in the 1998 referendum it is important to realise that in New Caledonia a significant number of recent and longterm immigrants have their primary residence outside the Territory.

Despite the uncertain outcome of the referendum of 1998, a certain amount of optimism is permissible given the political evolution of the Oceanian community observed at the Provincial elections of June 1989 and the attitude of the French government with regard to the management of Metropolitan public servants employed in the Territory.

System of Government

Moreover, the law of 1988 defines the respective areas of authority of the State, the three newly created provinces and the municipalities. The provinces have been given increased authority and are the driving force behind the new organisation of the Territory. The State retains all authority with regard to national sovereignty and the authority to participate in the process of decolonisation.

The Territory is responsible for the management of territorial infrastructure and services and is also responsible territorial regulations with respect to taxation.

The provinces will be administered by their elected assemblies and the President, the executive of the province and the head of administration. With respect to international investment, the Provinces will be able to suggest to the Metropolitan government negotiations leading to commercial and other agreements with states of the Pacific. By the same token the Provinces will be allowed to represent their constituents in regional organisations. During the provincial elections of 1989 the FLNKS obtained a majority in two of the three Provinces, the North and the Islands and is represented in the Southern province by four councillors out of 33 and three vice-presidents out of eight at the Territorial Congress. The Congress comprises the three provincial assemblies and is responsible for the administration of the Territory.

Eight customary councils, corresponding to eight cultural/linguistic groups have been created to take account of the the importance of custom in Kanak social organisation and to incorporate custom into the administrative organisation of the Territory. A territorial customary consultative council, which comprises the members of the local customary councils, advises the provinces and

the Territory particularly with respect to the special(Kanak) legal code and to land laws.

Development

The policy of economic, social and cultural development will be guaranteed by contracts drawn up between the French state and the provinces. The will be valid for the period 1990 - 1998 and will involve joint development projects. The principle objectives of the these contracts are the organisation of initial and continuous training programs, correcting the economic imbalance between developed and undeveloped areas, the improvement of infrastructure in inaccessible areas, the improvement of health and welfare facilities, the promotion of Kanak culture and the stimulation of productive activities. This development strategy must encourage the involvement of young people and make local finance available to Kanak communities. Moreover, an appropriate policy of land reform will give Kanaks the economic and cultural space necessary to allow them to enter into modern market circuits and to re-inforce and develop their culture.

The French state will make all the necessary budgetary finance available to put the law of November 1988 into action. Moreover, to be able to diminish the gap between the developed and undeveloped provinces of the territory only 20 percent of investment funds will be allocated to the wealthy Southern province while 40 percent will be given to the Northern province and the remainder to the Loyalty islands province.

Finally, the law provides for compensation for injuries sustained and damage incurred as a result of acts of violence linked to the political events of April/May 1988. Equally, a broad amnesty has been granted to political prisoners.

The Task Ahead

Our participation in the Matignon Accords is conditional on the French government making concrete its committment to decolonise New Caledonia. The process of decolonisation will be complete when the French government grants independence to the Kanak people in ten years. This ten year period is necessary not only for economic

decolonisation but for the decolonisation of minds. During this period, the Kanak people together with the other communities of the Territory must forge a common identity, a national consciousness within the Oceania of tomorrow.

But nothing has yet been won. The task ahead will be long and exacting, the road to be travelled is full of pitfalls. Already, the choice we have made has cost us very dearly with the assassination of our leaders, Jean-Marie Tjibaou and Yeiwene Yeiwene and the internal conflicts within the movement. The FLNKS will be extremely vigilant in requiring a strict adherence to the terms of the Accord and particularly, tangible steps to decolonise. Already, in August 1989 an advisory committee met to assess the period of direct rule from Paris (July 1988 to July 1989). A major mid-term assessment will be made in 1992 which will determine our action in the following years.

The FLNKS, aware both of the political importance of the Matignon Accords and of their fragility, has specifically requested the South Pacific Forum to scrutinize events in New Caledonia with the utmost care and attention and that the Forum both advise and support the FLNKS in its efforts to extricate Kanaky from the claws of colonialism.

Kanaky - an Oceanic Partner

The decolonisation and the eventual independence of Kanaky is an essential condition for peace and security in our region. Kanaky, as an integral part of the Oceanian region, must strengthen its inter-regional relations. In recognition of this, it must henceforth be considered as a regional partner and must participate in discussions and meetings which determine the future of the region

CHAPTER 10

NEW ZEALAND'S NON-NUCLEAR, REGIONAL APPROACH TO SECURITY

John Henderson

I wanted to spend some time looking at one of the particular roles that New Zealand has pursued, that is the non-nuclear policy position. But, there were two things I wanted to mention before I get on to that. The first is the tendency which we have seen in this workshop which we see frequently and which grates a bit on me and most Kiwis I think, to be automatically bracketed with Australia. I think that while there are many things that we do have in common, there are many others that we do not.

The second is the assumption that somehow New Zealand is not a Pacific island state. Well, that also grates a bit, but I think that it helps, in a way, to drive home the point about the difference between New Zealand and Australian perspectives of the region. It is partly a factor of size and of location. We are closer in size and our geography is that of an island nation. It is also the make-up of the population. A large and a very significant part of the New Zealand people are Polynesians and many others from the Pacific region, not only from Polynesia have chosen to make New Zealand their home. New Zealand is very much enriched by that. So we do have a Pacific island perspective.

To return to the Australian bracketing for a moment. I think, so that I am not misunderstood, it is important to acknowledge that we do share with Australia in the region the same broad strategic concerns. Indeed, from our perspective the region is a single strategic entity. By that I mean, it is inconceivable to us that a threat to the security of the region would not impinge on New Zealand's security interests. I hasten to add we do not currently see any direct security threats to the region, but should they emerge, New Zealand would certainly have to consider how it should respond.

Defence Interests

When we talk about our commitment to the region, we are talking about a vast area for a small country like New Zealand. This certainly came home to me when we were working on our 1987 Defence Review. The region that New Zealand defined as our area of direct strategic concern, stretched from the equator, from Kiribati, down to the Antarctic, incorporated Australia and across to the Cook Islands. Our military people calculated that the area was 16 percent of the globe, and most of it is water. That says a lot about why New Zealand must have an effective navy, which is very much a point of contention at this time. I am quite sure that we are going to have and maintain a frigate Navy. That is not the same thing as saying that it is certain that New Zealand will proceed with the ANZAC ship project. That question will no doubt be determined by the price.

When we undertook the 1987 Defence Review, we approached it in quite a different way from previous reviews that had been undertaken. We took a pretty selfish view and asked what is required to defend New Zealand. Previous defence reviews had been written with someone else's requirements primarily in mind. Not surprisingly, the earlier ones had the United Kingdom's interests in mind and more latterly, the United States' interests. They were written with New Zealand playing a small part in a much larger operation in a far distant conflict or land and our armed forces were arranged accordingly. They were devised and structured so that they would fit in with someone else's.

We came at it from a different view in 1987. We thought we would start by focussing on New Zealand's needs and then on its options. There seemed to be three options. One was just to stop literally at New Zealand territory and say that we had no interests beyond that in defence or security terms. The second was to take a regional view and the third was to remain with a global view and essentially a wider global alliance approach. As I have indicated, the regional perspective was chosen, I think reflecting the identity that New Zealand felt with the region and a commitment to play its part within our region.

A Non-Nuclear, Regional Security Policy

Here we see differences emerging with Australia. In security terms as traditionally defined, New Zealand decided that its basic defence interests would be within the region and not further afield. The non-nuclear policy was linked to that rationale. Within the region we could see no relevance for nuclear weapons and therefore the strong non-nuclear position that New Zealand took made eminent sense as a security policy with a regional focus. Australia takes a different view and its interests and concerns, while shared within the region, also stretch far beyond the South Pacific. We understand and respect each others' approach and work well within the region. We do not apologise for the position that we took on the non-nuclear position and indeed are proud of it.

In many ways as time passes, New Zealand will be seen to have been ahead of its times. Increasingly, in terms of security concerns and interests it no longer makes sense to work within an East/West framework and divide. From a New Zealand perspective, it was only within the global East/West approach that maintaining the old policy of an active involvement in a nuclear alliance made sense. The passing of time has underlined the relevance of the position New Zealand has taken and the relevance of that position to the region. Following the adoption of that policy, nuclear weapons were banned from New Zealand and we have no visits from nuclear vessels, whether they are ships or aircraft. It is important to understand it is New Zealand, like any other country, which makes the judgement about what enters and what does not enter New Zealand. We do not ask or seek disclosure of armaments from any country requesting a visit.

Our policy is frequently misrepresented as contravening a 'neither confirm nor deny' policy which we know the United States maintains. Our response is that we do not seek any disclosure about the presence or otherwise of nuclear weapons from the US, or indeed, any other nuclear power. We make our own judgement and if we are concerned that the vessel is nuclear-armed, then it will not be permitted to enter. The consequences have been that United States and United Kingdom ships no longer visit New Zealand, and David Lange no longer visits the White House!

The United States' response has been to end military cooperation with New Zealand and to end high level political-military contact. There is no ministerial contact at the head of government level or at ministerial level on security affairs with the US. So we have a rather absurd situation where we have a serious difference with the US but we are not allowed to talk to them about it where it matters. We don't expect the United States will change its position, at least not until after the June 1990 election and neither will New Zealand change its position under this government.

The non-nuclear policy is very popular within New Zealand. A poll taken as recently as June 1989 showed that there had been quite a marked increase in the approval of the government's policy of banning nuclear weapons. This policy had an 84 percent approval rating, up 17 percent since a similar poll was taken in 1985. Even more significant was the outcome of the question when respondents were asked to make a choice between breaking defence ties with the US or allowing ships which could be nuclear armed to enter New Zealand. When presented with this choice, 52 percent chose to break defence ties and 40 percent chose to allow nuclear armed ships to come in. This again was quite a change since 1985 when the policy was effectively brought in, when it went the other way: 47 percent preferred to allow ships to come in and 44 percent to ban such visits, when confronted with the choice of breaking defence ties.

So what we have now, is an entrenchment of the policy within New Zealand politics. While the government has generally been behind in the public opinion polls, on this issue it is seen to be pursuing something which is very much within the mainstream of New Zealand politics. Nuclear issues I am sure will feature very heavily in the general election which is scheduled probably for October next year. I think it goes much further than just defence issues when you talk about nuclear issues in New Zealand. It really gets into the whole set of environmental concerns.

Environmental Issues

I will deal with that environmental issue now, because it is not only within New Zealand, but within this workshop that we have gone well beyond the traditional definition of security and environmental

issues have been raised. The nuclear bomb, from the New Zealand perspective, and one I think most of you would share, is the ultimate environmental threat. It is what does threaten the existence of our planet. However seriously we regard concerns such as problems with the ozone layer, they are a concerns which are some distance away. The nuclear threat, the nuclear problem is with us now. The region certainly has taken a long and concerned view of the nuclear issue, and we heard comments earlier about the united position the region has taken against nuclear testing. We see that the problem is real. Not only Chernobyl-type problems, but accidents that can occur with nuclear ships as have been experienced with Soviet submarines in recent times.

Maintaining a Defence Capability

But it is not enough just to be against something. With the declaration that we were going to take a non-nuclear position and a regional focus, there has also been a commitment that we have to be prepared to do more in traditional defence terms. Without a doubt, being a member of a nuclear alliance did give you defence on the cheap, because there was that ultimate weapon which would supposedly provide you with security although from our point of view, it attracted the very danger that it purported to deflect.

Under the Labor government, a quite major re-equipment of the New Zealand armed forces has been undertaken. The army has been provided with new rifles, the air force had the Skyhawks updated, and the navy will be provided with a new frigate fleet. The focus in this re-equipment has been very much on the region. With that goes an understanding that has been constantly referred to here: that the needs are not those of traditional security but of promoting security in its widest sense. Our programs have reflected our concern to be able to respond quickly in the event of natural disasters within the region. This is a very important part of the reason why we maintain the capability to operate throughout the region.

Practical Measures?

In conclusion, I would like to return to focus on some of the other questions we were asked to direct ourselves to in this session. The question of whether in security terms the Forum countries have an appropriate mix of economic, environmental and domestic strategies, whether it is effective and what can be done to improve it. I was thinking of what practical things we can do here and reflecting on the recent Tarawa Forum. I think it is that constant theme that we keep returning to: it is right that the focus of the region is on economic and environmental concerns. An example of the practical things we can and should be doing will be the drift net fishing meeting which will be held in New Zealand in the next couple of months, where the technical experts can focus on what can actually be done to follow through the very strong stand which the Forum states took against drift net fishing at Kiribati. We need to consider how we can follow through on other economic security concerns.

New Zealand has since 1985 undertaken annual security consultations with the Forum states. It seems to me the time is overdue when those consultations broadened out from the security focus. I was involved in one round in connection with our 1987 Defence Review. That was more about explaining what New Zealand was doing than listening to security concerns. However, now I think there is a need for those consultations to broaden and encompass the economic, the environmental and the constitutional concerns that so many of you have spoken about during this meeting.

A Pacific Perspective Required

We need also to be looking ahead and to think about the sorts of outside countries which will be actively involved within our region as we move into the next century. We started to do that with the dialogue process at the Forum. That will need to be extended. What we need is a Pacific perspective, and I see that as the real value of this workshop, and this forum. Collectively but also individually, as we deal with these countries - whether it is Japan, the United States, the Soviet Union, China, India - we need to get across a Pacific perspective. That is what I see as the real value of this forum. We have been able to gather here a unique grouping, right from the middle-

powers of Australia to the small powers of New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Fiji and to the smaller island states and develop a truly Pacific focus. That is the value of this meeting and I thank you for the opportunity to join the dialogue.

CHAPTER 11

ONE STRATEGIC ENTITY: AN AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE PERSPECTIVE ON THE SOUTH PACIFIC

Paul Dibb

Let me say at the outset that for me this is a great education. With the formal papers and the comments, we are now starting to detect themes about the concerns of the island states with regard to security, which perhaps sometimes we define too conventionally. I will just pick up a few points, if I may, from the two main papers, then give an Australian defence perspective of some of the issues and finally suggest a conceptual approach to defence and security issues that you may find useful to debate.

First of all Tony Siaguru's paper. I for one accept that we must not focus too much on security in terms of the conventional defence and military aspects and I think that is a lesson well learnt not only from this workshop but other forums such as the Pacific forum. If I quote Mr. Siaguru correctly he said that nonetheless he trusted that Australia and New Zealand would continue to provide some sort of security and leadership in the region. Certainly from an Australian defence point of view, we have that very much in mind. Picking up some of the comments by Police Commissioner Soaki, I agree the Defence Cooperation Programme needs increasingly to focus on projects that are of direct assistance to the economic infrastructure of the island states. Of course we can only supply that sort of leadership if we are wanted - if we are not, Australian defence policies will naturally focus more on Australia's own defence. There has to be some sense of being required, as well as providing some sort of leadership.

Jioji Kotobalavu raised the factor of geography. I would accept as a criticism of Australian defence policy, that in the past, say ten years ago, we tended to focus very much to the north of Australia, to Southeast Asia, almost to the exclusion of our other concerns. In recent years, under the leadership of Minister Beazley, we are seeking to pay much more attention to the security of the South Pacific. Those are the areas where we do have very strong, common strategic interests, 'we' being the island states, Papua New Guinea, Australia

and New Zealand. We are one strategic entity - not a series of separate strategic entities.

I also learnt a lot from Mr. Kotobalavu's paper on the impact of western ideas and I think again it is important that we in Australia, not least we in the defence area, absorb those lessons.

A More Complex Region

If I could move on quickly to some Australian Department of Defence views, and I stress they are defence views, broadly interpreted however. I am convinced that the feeling of vulnerability with regard to the resources of the South Pacific is something that is absolutely at the centre of island security concerns. I accept it is the most serious security problem. It is one that is common to the whole region, it is a permanent feature throughout the region and it is one that - if I interpret what you are saying correctly - you fear you have no effective control over.

From an Australian defence point of view, whereas once it was possible to say that the South Pacific was a relatively quiet, if not benign, region there is no doubt, as the 1987 Defence White Paper noted, that the South Pacific is becoming more complex and less predictable. That is not to say that we perceive any military threat emerging from the South Pacific to Australia. There is none, and there is none that is foreseeable, though the Australian media consistently get that wrong. In what way, for instance, were the events in Fiji a military threat to Australia? How could they be? But if we are talking about change and unpredictability, we have to recognise, in terms of policy formulation, that change will become more frequent in our region. There is a dynamic, both social and economic, that will bring that about. That poses enormous dilemmas for Australian defence policy.

Australia's Dilemma

Australia is the dominant military power in the South Pacific region; that is a simple statement of fact. But, frankly, it creates a dilemma. In many ways I feel that Australian defence policy is 'damned if we do and damned if we don't', in terms of potential use of

military power in the region. By that I refer to the dilemma posed when a democratically elected government approaches us for assistance or standby assistance. If you read the Australian media, and indeed some parliamentary commentary, you will see that dilemma exposed. That is, if we go in, even under invitation, we are going to be criticised, as a former colonial power, as forces fighting in the local environment. What would it do in any case to long-term relationships with such countries? On the other hand, what is one expected to do in terms of responsible policy decision-making; not academic decision-making. What do you do when the phone rings and a request is made? If you reject it, you reject your primary responsibility to the region. So I talk about that as the dilemma for Australian defence policy.

Inimical Interests?

I think we should recognise that the South Pacific is relatively remote from the centres of major power rivalry. It is not a focus of major military confrontation and will not become one. But, as communications and multi-national companies extend their interest, the South Pacific, as is now happening, will be drawn into the focus of global economic and other contentions. The main Australian defence policy concern has been consistently to seek to limit opportunities for the involvement of external interests that are potentially inimical to regional countries. Now, what do I mean by potentially inimical? We have already had some discussion about the Soviet Union. It is true that the East-West conflict is not the only game in town, and indeed, it never has been. But, and I know some of you will disagree, there was no doubt, from my point of view, that what Libya was up to recently in the South Pacific was no good whatsoever. The smuggling into Fiji of arms supplies, not from Libya, but certainly from the Middle Eastern area, was also a matter for concern. Those are the sorts of potentially inimical external incidents that worry me.

Nuclear Issues

From a defence view, we share the regional concerns about the destabilising impact on the region of French nuclear testing policies. That is another example of the tension that exists between global issues

and regional issues. We in the region do not like French nuclear testing. The French argue it is a matter of their global security with regard to the Soviet Union. The French are supported by the United States and that has been a significant area of disagreement between Australia and the United States.

Concept of Regional Security

Finally, a few thoughts on the concept of regional security. The traditional way of looking at security issues is not entirely applicable to the South Pacific. There is no identifiable military threat to the South Pacific island countries, either now or in the foreseeable future. As I said earlier the South Pacific is geographically distant from the concentrations of major global military power. Developments in strategic weaponry have effectively removed the prospect of prolonged conventional war which would replicate the very intense military action that the South Pacific experienced in World War II - that will not occur again.

The analysis of security prospects in the South Pacific requires a different approach; a different methodology to that applied to the analysis of global strategy or even of security prospects in Southeast Asia, where there are concerns about the future projection of military power by China and India. The analysis that we should develop needs to be sophisticated but clearly adjusted to the local situation. Attempts have been made, mainly under the auspices of the Commonwealth Secretariat, to establish a separate discipline into the study of the security problems faced by small states. I think that has proved to be of extremely limited utility. The conclusions by the Commonwealth Secretariat about the vulnerability of small economies are useful but other assertions need to be tested against the specific political, social, demographic and geographic circumstances that apply quite specifically to the South Pacific countries. We should be careful not to exaggerate the vulnerabilities ascribed to the smaller states simply because of their smallness. For instance, the security prospects of Western Samoa, to pick one country, are not similar to those of the Maldives.

Issues for the 1990s

The most critical issue for individual island states over the next five to 10 years will be the management of change. By that I mean the management of the social adjustment that will be necessary as the inevitable opening up of the South Pacific to external contact continues. Secondly, the management of the political transition from the immediate post-colonial period, and the challenges this will pose for the institutions set up at the time of independence. These institutions are already under critical scrutiny and some are under pressure, witness, for instance, the threat to the central authority of the Papua New Guinea government caused by events in Bougainville. Some of the institutions set up in the colonial period have already failed, as in Fiji.

The way change is managed by the island states will obviously have implications for internal security, for economic prospects and for the potential for the involvement of external powers in domestic affairs. The challenge will be for the countries of the South Pacific, including Australia, to preserve an overarching strategic framework which allows individual countries to focus on the effective management of change as it relates to the particular circumstances of each country.

I would suggest in that context, that Australia has a primary role in regard to the management of the regional strategic framework, while the management of change is principally something that the island countries themselves are best placed to handle, with Australia's role, certainly from the defence view, being a secondary and supporting one.

CHAPTER 12

AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE COOPERATION PROGRAM AND REGIONAL SECURITY

Stephen Merchant

This paper addresses Australia's defence cooperation arrangements in the South Pacific and the activities that we pursue under those arrangements. Its focus is on our defence cooperation arrangements with Pacific island countries; I will not be addressing our defence relationship with Papua New Guinea in any depth. We have a very long-standing and substantial relationship with Papua New Guinea which is really deserving of study in its own right.

Background

It might be useful, at the start, to outline the historical background, particularly to the formation of defence cooperation because it helps to explain the basic impetus behind the activities that we are pursuing today. Australia's program of defence cooperation activities had its origins in the 1960s. At that time the international focus of the Australian Defence Force was very much on the United States, the United Kingdom and other Western countries. That is quite understandable as their sophisticated and fairly high technology defence forces presented a powerful attraction for Australian military planners. Particularly when they were involved in organising our combined exercise program, personnel exchanges and our overseas deployments.

It was also in the late 1960s that we first began the process of radical change in Australia's defence policies. By the end of that decade the policy of relying on our great and powerful friends for most of Australia's defence needs was coming under critical scrutiny. The sobering experience of Vietnam, British withdrawal east of Suez and the economic and defence of the nearer countries of South East Asia was gradually eroding the basis of that previous approach in meeting our defence needs. It was at that time, in the late 1960s, that the Australian Department of Defence started to think about the

requirements of the independent defence of Australia, oriented to our national requirements.

It was against this background that the Australian Government decided to establish a separate element in the Defence budget, controlled by the central policy area of the Department of Defence, to facilitate cooperative activities between the Australian defence force and regional security forces. Initially, the focus of activities funded under that program were on Southeast Asia - Malaysia in fact - but gradually the scope broadened and through the 1970s, particularly the second half of the 1970s activities with the then newly independent country of Papua New Guinea, assumed an increasingly important role in the program. Also in the late 1970s small steps were taken to establish a moderate program of naval cooperation with Fiji and some technical trade assistance for the Tongan Defence Service. I mention this historical context because it is important to understand the role and indeed, the limitations of defence cooperation activities.

Cooperation not Aid

One of the points that we are asked to address is the effectiveness of regional security programs. An assessment of defence cooperation must start from at least the understanding that it is not an aid program. It is a means of facilitating cooperative activities between the Australian Defence Force and regional security forces. There are no cash transfers under the program, program funds are committed to project activity, training and exercise programs and some consultancy assistance.

Also it is important to bear in mind that funds for defence cooperation come from Australia's defence budget and the purpose of the defence budget is to enhance Australia's security against external country pressure or the threat of such pressure. So expenditure on defence cooperation should be consistent with that very fundamental objective. But it is one of the benefits of our strategic environment, that in pursuing this objective it actually results in activities which also coincide with the ambitions and interests of a number of countries, in both Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, and their interests in improving their own security prospects.

These facts distinguish defence cooperation from Australia's civil aid program which is concerned principally with economic development and indeed it also distinguishes defence cooperation from standard military assistance programmes which generally do not place as much emphasis on the importance of cooperative activities.

Maritime Emphasis

Australia's contemporary approach to defence activities in the South Pacific was articulated in February 1987 by the Minister for Defence, Kim Beazley, in a Parliamentary statement on *Defence Initiatives in the South Pacific*. This speech contained the blue print, subsequently confirmed in the Defence White Paper, which we continue to follow. It was this speech which affirmed for the first the Australian government's intention to give activity with Pacific island countries the same priority the Australian government attached to its older and more substantial defence relations with the nations of Southeast Asia. So the broadening of Australia's regional security focus, which had been dominated very much through the 1960s and early 1970s by Southeast Asia, particularly the Vietnam commitment, was formally announced in the February 1987 statement by the Defence Minister.

At the practical level, the Minister's speech emphasised the important role which maritime activities were to play in our cooperative programs in the South Pacific. Australian defence support for the efforts of South Pacific countries to protect and manage their maritime resources meets most, if not all, of the criteria that I would apply in judging the appropriateness of our activities:

- it has the potential to make a significant contribution to the economic security of South Pacific countries, about which we have heard a lot today and yesterday;
- largely as a result of that relevance to economic security, our discussions with South Pacific countries confirm that the emphasis very much accords with their own priorities;
- the maritime surveillance emphasis also serves Australian defence interests, by contributing to our

knowledge of maritime activities in our region of primary strategic interest. We have never backed away from the fact that we do get returns out of that type of activity. But also the South Pacific countries themselves get returns;

- lastly, and this is an important point too I think, the emphasis on maritime surveillance and patrolling activities, is an area where there is expertise available from within the Australian Defence Force, which isn't readily available from outside the defence community.

Pacific Patrol Boat Project

The centre-piece of our efforts to date in the maritime surveillance field has been the Pacific patrol boat project. From our point of view, the project is successful and I think over time, the boat will prove its worth as it is relatively inexpensive to operate and maintain. In saying that I certainly do not seek to diminish the substantial impact that the South Pacific patrol boats operations can have on the small economies of South Pacific countries but it is a relatively inexpensive patrol boat. I think it is also relevant that Australia has agreed to provide, quite recently, further assistance in terms of funding for combined operations between the Pacific patrol boats that are now in service, our own RAAF aircraft deployments and our own navy ship deployments to the South Pacific. As well as this, there will be assistance for patrolling activities relating to the training and the continuation of training of the crews that are now operating the South Pacific patrol boats. So there is a mechanism for assistance available there and it is a mechanism which we hope that Pacific countries will fully utilise.

The South Pacific patrol boat project also needs to be looked at in terms of the revenue it can generate for island states. It is heartening to us, to see that Western Samoa's Pacific patrol boat has arrested two fishing vessels operating illegally within their Exclusive Economic Zone. An out-of-court settlement resulted in a fairly substantial return to government revenue in that country.

Our activities with the South Pacific patrol boat project are complemented by:

- regular pattern of deployments of RAAF, P3 Orion long range maritime patrol aircraft (a program developed in conjunction with New Zealand's own efforts in this field), and the deployment of our navy ships;
- the establishment of National Operations Centres in a number of countries in the region to coordinate these activities;
- engineering projects to develop wharves and other infrastructure relevant to maritime operations.

In conjunction with a reasonably extensive range of training and other project activities, the cumulative effect is greater than simply the sum total of the component parts. The activities are designed to support and reinforce the basic strategic integrity of the region by demonstrating in a very practical way the extent of shared defence and security interests between South Pacific Forum members.

Practical Approach Versus Formal Commitments

This practical approach, using cooperative activities to build the basis of a shared regional security outlook, has been followed by Australian governments in preference to an approach which would have emphasised formal security commitments. Given differences in attitude on particular issues of foreign policy, making such an approach would have been of dubious value in the South Pacific. The net effect of such an approach would have been to highlight differences whereas the emphasis on practical activity highlights similarities and shared interests.

Importantly, from our point of view, the practical approach to the development of defence relationships with the South Pacific has received bipartisan political support in Australia, most recently by the Joint Parliamentary Committee's report on *Australia's Relations with the South Pacific*, (AGPS, Canberra, March 1989). That Committee's report also addressed initiatives for the 1990's. In relation to that point the Parliamentary Committee's report was fairly clear, if somewhat unexciting, basically recommending more of the same. The report noted 'that the Committee strongly supports the continuation of the

program at, at least, its current level and recommends that the financial allocations of the program be increased'.

I think that prescription will probably be realised. There is a good deal of work still to be done in the field of maritime surveillance. The initial returns, as I have argued, have been promising but certainly greater rewards are attainable, particularly from improved coordination between the operation of the Pacific patrol boats and Australia and New Zealand's aerial surveillance patrols.

Issues for the 1990s

For the 1990s the South Pacific patrol boat project itself will continue to take up a good share of our resources. There has been some discussion about the possibility of a major follow-on project but this is simply speculation at this stage. The South Pacific patrol boat project has been a difficult one for us to manage. We would need time for serious reflection before we embarked on another major equipment program in the South Pacific.

At a policy level, Fiji's position will clearly need to be examined. All cooperative defence activities between Australia and Fiji have been suspended since May 1987. The possibility of their resumption has been linked to political progress in Fiji. There has been much discussion about the merits of the approach that the Australian Government has taken to the relationship with Fiji and the continued suspension of defence cooperation arrangements. Clearly, that issue will need to be addressed by the Australian Government. The decisions will require a careful assessment of Fiji's strategic importance and how it weighs up against the strong concern of the Australian Government to deter extra-constitutional involvement of security forces in the political processes of the South Pacific.

There are very difficult issues here. We realise that in assisting South Pacific countries to develop security forces we are developing forces that are capable of playing both a positive and negative role. I think it is valid to ask about the regional perceptions and the regional messages that would have been sent if Australia had taken no action, in terms of the defence relationship, after the military coups in Fiji. That is a difficult question, but as I say, it is inevitable, that at some

time the Australian Government will have to address the future position of Fiji, in relation to the defence cooperation arrangements.

Finally, the initiative that I would most like to see come to fruition in the 1990s is a broadening of defence relationships from the basis that has now been established through the defence cooperation arrangements. We still tend to focus very much on the practical activities and that is correct. But we need, I believe, a more cohesive framework for strategic dialogue and exchange of views and information on security interests. That would certainly benefit all countries in the region and compliment the activities which I think will continue under defence cooperation. I believe that would add an important dimension to what otherwise, I think, would be the continuation of a tried and tested formula, as far as defence cooperation is concerned.

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The small island countries of the South Pacific region face a decisive decade in the 1990s. Reduction in strategic tensions at the global level and rapid growth in the economies of the Pacific Rim promise opportunities for small-state economic and political diplomacy. New generation Pacific Island leaders are determined to play a more influential role in international forums; to shed the 'back-water' image of the South Pacific region; and to sink the notion that the region is an 'ANZUS Lake'. Yet security - defined broadly with a small 's' - remains a constant preoccupation. To the on-going threats of economic vulnerability and resource protection have now been added those of environmental change and domestic political instability.

The essays in this monograph address these security concerns and raise many additional questions including the value of regionalism, the role of the 'big brothers' (Australia and New Zealand), and the impact on island polities of western ideas and values. They conclude that the prospects for a stable and secure regional order in the 1990s lie in the effective management of political and economic change and in the emergence of a coherent, 'Oceanic' view of security.