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K V KESAVAN

Japanese Defence Policy Since 1976: Latest Trends

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This study sets Japan's defence posture in the context of world politics, especially in regard to the Soviet Union and the United States. The different perceptions of defence by different groups of people in Japan (the man in the street, the political parties and business groups) are discussed. The gradual development from a heavy dependence on the United States for defence is slowly progressing towards a more equal sharing of defence responsibilities between the United States and Japan. The author points out the practical necessities for this change, the pressures that the United States is putting on Japan to carry out this change, and also the problems and fears that arise in Japan because of this pressure. Specific topics covered include the development of defence production industries in Japan, the exchange of weapons technology with the United States, Japan's ability to defend her sea lanes, the concept of collective defence responsibility and the diverse opinions aroused both in Japan itself and in neighbouring countries in regard to these developments.

The author has added an addendum since the publication of the 1983 Japanese Defence White Paper, the reaction to which again emphasises the difficulties Japanese defence planners and politicians face in trying to achieve a balanced defence policy.

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JAPANESE DEFENCE POLICY SINCE 1976: LATEST TRENDS

Since 1952, successive Japanese Governments have pursued a low-key defence policy meant primarily to ensure the security of the island country with minimal risk. This low-key policy, which has rested on the development of a moderate defence capability, and alliance relations with the United States, has remained by and large unchanged, despite several trends in recent years indicating, apparently, a bolder and more assertive Japanese defence policy. When, in 1957, Japan's basic defence policy was formulated, it was conditioned by factors such as the intense pacifism of the Japanese people, Article 9 of the Constitution, the weak economic base of the country, and US strategic considerations. All these conditions have now changed considerably. A new generation has come up in Japan which is less inhibited from examining defence issues on the basis of their merits. Article 9 of the Constitution, though not technically amended, has been substantially diluted to give room for the development of Japan's military capability within the framework of self-defence forces. The military and strategic environment of the Far Eastern region has drastically altered leading to a great degree of fluidity. The bi-polar cold war situation of the 1950s and the 1960s has been replaced by one which has tremendous bearing on Japan's defence priorities. Last, but not least, Japan's new economic and technological strength has become greatly relevant to its defence policy.

The basic National Defence Policy, adopted by the Japanese Government in May 1957, laid down that 'The objective of national defence is to prevent direct and indirect aggression, and once invaded, to repel such aggression, thereby preserving the independence and peace of Japan founded upon democratic principles'. In order to achieve this objective, the policy called upon the Government (a) to progressively build up defence capabilities with the nation's resources and (b) to

depend upon US military strength to deal with any large-scale external aggression.¹ The above policy statement has remained the guidepost of the Japanese Government until now.

The period covering the years 1958-76 witnessed several crucial developments in terms of both Japan's military capability, and US-Japan relations. Four defence build-up plans were formulated for augmenting Japan's military strength. As the Government said, the emphasis was on quantity rather than on quality of such strength. The goals of the Fourth Plan (1972-76) could not be attained due to the global energy crisis. These plans clarified that Japan's military capability was adequate only for coping with an external aggression using conventional weapons, which was on a scale smaller than localised warfare. Should the threat be on a higher scale, the United States was to come to the assistance of Japan immediately. In the event of a nuclear threat, Japan's dependence on the US was total.²

The year 1976 saw a change in the Government's approach as to how Japan's military capability should be developed. What should be the criteria for establishing a system for the most efficient operation of such defence capability? In that year, the Government adopted the National Defence Programme Outline. The Outline emphasised the need for Japan to maintain a defence capability within the scope permitted by the Constitution. It stated that its most appropriate defence goal was the maintenance of a full surveillance posture in peace time, and the ability to cope effectively with situations up to the point of a limited and small-scale aggression. A very important feature of the Outline was the introduction of a new concept called 'Standard defence forces concept', which stressed the importance of qualitatively improving the defence capability in maintenance and operation of defence functions.³

While the Outline rightly emphasised the significance of the qualitative aspect of Japan's future defence programmes, its basic assumption was that the balance of power situation particularly in the East

Asian region had become stable and that there was little prospect of a large-scale war. The Outline stated:


While the possibility of limited military conflict breaking out in Japan's neighbourhood cannot be dismissed, the equilibrium between the two Super Powers, and the existence of the Japan-US security arrangement seems to play a major role in maintaining international stability and in preventing full-scale aggression against Japan.⁴

The climate of global detente of the mid-1970s considerably influenced the Outline.

Another feature of the Outline lay in the fact that the Government abandoned the previous practice of formulating defence plans covering a period of five years. Now it was decided to formulate plans for each year taking into consideration changes in domestic and external situations. The Government had learnt from its own experience that it was difficult to foresee the expenditures covering a period of five years. The Defence Agency had run into serious difficulties with the Ministry of Finance in obtaining funds for a long period. It was thought that annual plans would give the Government a good deal of flexibility in the implementation of defence objectives. The Government, however, thought that for a proper execution of the annual plans, it would be better to chart a mid-term Defence Programme Estimate, which would act as a reference. Since 1976, two such Estimates have been formulated. The Estimate covers five years and comes into effect two years after its formulation. For instance, the Estimate covering the period 1983-87, was formulated in 1981.

Before we examine the progress of Japan's defence programmes under the 1976 Outline, it would be useful to note how changes in East-West relations soon after that year affected the Outline's basic assumptions, and in particular to examine the major developments having a bearing on Japan's security perceptions. One development which aroused Japanese security concerns after 1976 was the rapid Soviet

Figure 1. Outline of Soviet Naval Activities and Military Aircraft Movements Around Japan



Note: Number of ships and instances indicates average figures over the past five years.

Source: Defense Agency, Japan, *Defense of Japan 1982*, p.35.

military build-up in the region. From a Soviet perspective, there were reasons for an expanded military build-up. First, the Washington-Beijing rapprochement followed by the Tokyo-Beijing normalisation of relations and a peace treaty, created a great deal of uneasiness among the Soviets. Talks about a possible triangular Washington-Tokyo-Beijing understanding further deepened Moscow's suspicion that it was being encircled by 'hostile' forces. One Soviet response to this emerging pattern was seen in its efforts to quickly bolster its own military strength in the East Asian region. But the obvious fallacy in Soviet action was its assumption that political influence would automatically follow from military power.⁵ The speed with which it increased its military position in Vietnam in 1978, and in Afghanistan in 1979 demonstrated this mistaken notion. Whatever the reasons for Soviet policy in Vietnam and Afghanistan, it doubtless increased Japanese security concerns. Tokyo believed that the Soviet military build-up in East Asia had already tilted the balance against the United States. Considered in conjunction with the decline of American influence in the region after 1975, following the Vietnam debacle and the Nixon doctrine, the Japanese government was justified in believing so. Its sense of concern was expressed in 1980 when it considered the Soviet Union as posing a threat to Japan.⁶

A brief consideration of the Soviet position in the region would be in order. Though Soviet influence has been limited in economic and political terms, it has grown by leaps and bounds in the military sphere in the last few years. Until 1960, Soviet military forces, though nominal in size, were maintained in the area mainly to counter the United States. But with the worsening of the Moscow-Beijing rift, the Soviet Union felt it had to station ground forces along the sprawling Chinese border on a massive scale. Today a quarter of the entire Soviet ground forces or about 51 divisions are stationed along the border. The quality of these forces has improved vastly during recent years. The USSR has also deployed about a quarter of its entire air force strength in the area. The total number of

aircraft deployed is about 2,120 (420 bombers, 1,550 tactical fighters and 150 patrol planes). The introduction of several dozens of Backfire bombers and SS20 IRBMs in the region has given a new and wide thrust to the Soviet air strike power. Japan and the surrounding sea areas are within the striking distance of the Soviet air force. The Soviet naval strength in the area has also grown in size. More than a quarter of the entire Soviet sea power is in the region. The Soviet Far Eastern fleet has 120 submarines, one Kiev class aircraft carrier, several Kara class missile cruisers and Krivak class missile destroyers.

The Soviet nuclear arsenal in the region is also powerful. More than one third of all ICBMs and SLBMs are in the region. The US Defence Secretary Casper Weinberger in his 1982 Defence Report admitted that the nuclear balance in the region had shifted in favour of the Soviet Union.⁷

But what has irritated the Japanese is the pace at which Moscow has developed military bases in the disputed Kurile islands. The ground forces deployed in the islands have already reached the size of a division. In addition, the Soviet Union has deployed missiles, tanks, long-range 130 mm cannons, helicopters, etc.⁸. The growth of Soviet military strength, if seen in combination with its influence in Vietnam and the Gulf area, makes the Japanese very uneasy.

On the other hand, the credibility of the United States in the region has suffered somewhat seriously since 1975. The period following that year has been fraught with serious stresses and strains for US diplomacy in the East Asian region. The Vietnam debacle convinced a large number of Americans about the futility of fighting wars on alien soil. The Washington-Beijing rapprochement did not contribute very much to a relaxation of tensions in the area. Events in the Korean peninsula, Soviet control of Vietnam, and the Kampuchean question created new uncertainties in American policy. Further, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the Islamic revolution in Iran, and the Iran-Iraq War undermined the interests of the US in the vital West Asian region, calling for

the deployment of American naval and air strength from East Asia. President Carter's hasty announcement of the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea, though later abandoned, did great damage to security relations with the Pacific allies. They became very sceptical about the wisdom of their continued reliance on the US.

The Republican administration under President Ronald Reagan started with a keen desire to restore Allied confidence in US commitments. Its resolve to maintain global military stability was seen in enhanced military expenditures and weapons acquisition programmes. Despite its bias in favour of Europe-oriented policies, it emphasised very close ties with Japan, South Korea and the ASEAN group.

It sought to raise the credibility of the US for a moment when it adopted a tough policy towards Moscow. But instances like the absence of prior consultation with Tokyo on the restoration of the supply of grain to the Soviet Union undercut such efforts. Tokyo's scepticism on the current level of US military strength in East Asia continued to cast doubts on American credibility.

The US army in the region covering Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Guam and the Philippines comprises about 31,500 troops. The US Navy has some 60 vessels of about 650,000 tons, about 280 operational aircraft and 47,000 personnel. The Seventh Fleet is primarily maintaining its presence in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean areas to ensure the safety of the sea-lanes, and to protect, in times of emergency, the coastal areas. It has a strength of 70 units deployed on a routine basis. It includes 2 carriers, about 20 major surface combatants and 6 attack submarines and mobile logistic support ships. Though in recent years there has been a reduction in the number of units attached to the Seventh Fleet, the decrease has been more than made up by qualitative improvements. But, as has been noted, the Seventh Fleet is being increasingly called upon to cover a wider area in operations in view of political tensions in the West Asian region.⁹

The US air strength consists of F-15s, and F-16s in Japan, F-4s, and F-16s in South Korea and F-4s in the Philippines. The U.S. Strategic Command carries on its strategic mission in the region with B-52s and KC-135s in Guam and KC-135s and Rc-135s in Japan.¹⁰

The shifting East-West military balance in the region has had a great influence in shaping Japanese security perspectives. The majority of the Japanese people now think that it will be in their interest to continue their alliance with the US even though the age of American military superiority has come to an end. However, they tend to have very serious reservations on many aspects of American policy towards the Soviet Union. Several Japanese leaders share a general 'lack of confidence' in American leadership and a strong feeling that their country has been 'pulled to and fro by excessively wide swings in American Policy.'¹¹ The memories of Nixon's shocks are still fresh in their minds. The same wariness is seen in their anxious talks with American leaders to ensure that Washington's policy of zero option* does not ignore the security interests of Japan. When US Secretary of State George Shultz visited Tokyo on 31 January 1983, the Japanese leaders raised this question. Both Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro and Foreign Minister Abe Shintaro urged that the US should keep Japan informed of developments in the disarmament talks with the Soviet Union. Shultz assured that the US would provide information through various channels and that it would not sacrifice Japan's interests in the disarmament negotiations.¹²

Japan's true position was stated clearly by the Diplomatic Blue Book in 1981 as follows:

That Japan should have a common basic perception and strategy with advanced democracies, including the United States, does

* dismantling, or refraining from deploying, new IRBMs in Europe

not necessarily mean that this country's specific policies should be the same as those of other countries.

It further called the 'stabilisation of Japan-USSR relations as indispensable for Japan's security'.¹³ The prolonged reluctance of the Japanese Government to agree to include an anti-hegemony clause in the Japan-PRC peace treaty was one indication of Tokyo's unwillingness to offend the Soviet Union. Similarly, Japan, while promoting its relations with the PRC after 1978, carefully avoided giving an impression that it was forging a triangular understanding with Beijing and Washington in order to contain the influence of Moscow. Later, when US Defence Secretary Harold Brown toyed with the idea of Washington-Beijing-Tokyo united action, the attitude of Japan remained quite lukewarm.¹⁴ For one thing, Tokyo was not sure it could count on Beijing. Japan also carefully monitors developments in Sino-Soviet relations, lest any establishment of a working relationship between Moscow and Beijing should catch it napping. But more than that, it now believes that it would be wise to seek to solve its current problems with the Soviet Union within a bilateral framework, even if it takes a very long time. Despite the mounting Soviet military build-up in the region, not many in Japan now seriously fear a Soviet invasion of their country. The Japanese Government also knows that its interests would be best served by giving the Soviet Union sufficient indication that it still keeps its options open for better ties if Moscow should change its present rigid stand.¹⁵ This view, to be sure, does not overlook the complexity of the present Moscow-Tokyo relations. It only argues that Japan will probably respond if the Soviet Union shows substantial evidence of flexibility, in both style and substance, while approaching issues affecting its relations with Tokyo.

Has there has been any appreciable change in the thinking of the Japanese people and political parties on the question of defence? In a country like Japan, where crucial policy decisions are made by means of a

protracted process of consensus, it would be absurd to expect sweeping changes in the sensitive sphere of national defence policy. Given the peculiar Japanese situation, however, one does note a few changes in attitude. The taboos and inhibitions which discouraged discussions on Japan's defence policy in the 1950s and 1960s are now giving way to fairly objective analysis of issues involved.

In recent years, the degree of security consciousness among the Japanese people has been steadily growing. This has been borne out by several public opinion surveys conducted by the Government and the media. Though these surveys indicate overwhelming support for preserving the present Constitution intact, they also show increasing acceptance of and support for the Self Defence Forces. While general support for the security alliance with the US is consistently recorded, opinion on the people's perception of the Soviet threat is somewhat less pronounced than one would expect.¹⁶

Japanese political parties which formulated their respective policies on defence and security during the emotionally surcharged conditions of the 1950s, are now inclined to review their positions. Since 1975 the Democratic Socialist Party has markedly altered its stand on defence. In that year, it approved the legality of the Self Defence Forces and the need for maintaining the US-Japan alliance. It has increasingly stressed the importance of Japan's relations with the US, for effectively coping with external threats. It has also declared that the Government need not rigidly stick to the policy of allocating less than one per cent of the GNP to defence.¹⁷ The Komeito and the New Liberal Club have also come out with their support for the present official policy. Only the Japan Socialist Party and the Japan Communist Party are opposed to the maintenance of the JSDF. They are opposed to the military build-up plans as well as to the US-Japan military alliance.

Within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, there are different shades of opinion. Some people want Japan to develop its own autonomous defence in view

of the declining credibility of the US.¹⁸ But the group which is predominantly influential in the party is the one which sees security in the larger context to include the security of energy, food, raw materials supplies, etc. The LDP governments since the days of Ohira Masayoshi have harped on the concept of 'comprehensive security'. In December 1980, the Government set up the Ministerial Council on Comprehensive National Security to give importance to all aspects of security. Since the middle of 1980 following its victory in the double elections, the LDP has been showing some new interest in the defence sphere. In September 1980, it reactivated the Research Commission on the Constitution. LDP leaders including the present Prime Minister Nakasone are talking about the need for constitutional revision. But the revision of the Constitution is an extremely sensitive issue capable of producing a serious crisis in the country. Nakasone has said that he will not initiate action in the matter. The LDP has also set up a sub-committee on defence within the Security Affairs Research Council in order to examine the execution of the 1976 Defence Outline.

The powerful business group's interest in defence and defence-related industries will be considered in a different section. But suffice it to state here that the group has not lagged behind in its awareness of defence and security issues. It has strongly advocated a substantial increase in defence spending above 1 per cent of the GNP.¹⁹ It has always shown deep interest in defence build-up plans, and wants to play a key role in defence production and weapons technology export.

Lastly, it would be relevant to note that many delicate questions, which could not be discussed in public about a decade ago, are now heatedly debated in Japan. To mention one instance: in 1978 General Kurisu Hiroomi, Chief of the JSD Staff, referred to what he called a 'sad gap' in Japan's defence preparedness in the event of a sneak attack from an enemy country. Kurisu's point was that the Self Defence Forces should be given powers to retaliate on their own in such a situation instead of waiting for the

TABLE I

Comparison of Force Levels by the "Annexed Table" of the National Defense Program Outline

	Classification	National Defense Program Outline	At the completion of FY1982	At the completion of 1987	Remarks
GSDF	Authorized number of SDF personnel	180,000 Men	180,000 Men	180,000 Men	
	Basic Units				
	Units deployed regionally in peacetime	12 Divisions 2 Composite Brigades	12 2	12 2	Structural modernization to be examined and reorganization to be planned
	Mobile Operation Units	1 Armored Division 1 Artillery Brigade 1 Airborne Brigade 1 Training Brigade 1 Helicopter Brigade	1 1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1 1	
	Low-Altitude Surface-to-Air Missile Units	8 Anti-aircraft Artillery Groups	8	8	Renewal plan of 2 groups to be studied and the necessary measures to be taken
MSDF	Basic Units				
	Anti-submarine Surface-Ship Units (for mobile operations)	4 Escort Flotillas	4	4	
	Anti-submarine Surface-Ship Units (Regional District Units)	10 Divisions	9	10	
	Submarine Units	6 Divisions	6	6	
	Minesweeping Units	2 Flotillas	2	2	
	Land-based Anti-submarine Aircraft Units	16 Squadron	14	14	Two squadrons shortage (aircraft shortage)
	Main Equipment				
	Anti-submarine Surface-Ships	About 60 Ships	53	60	
	Submarines	16 Submarines	14	15	
	Operational Aircraft	About 220 Aircraft	164	About 190	About 30 aircraft shortage
ASDF	Basic Units				
	Aircraft Control and Warning Units	28 Groups	28	28	
	Interceptor Units	10 Squadrons	10	10	
	Support Fighter Units	3 Squadrons	3	3	
	Air Reconnaissance Units	1 Squadron	1	1	
	Air Transport Units	3 Squadrons	3	3	
	Early Warning Units	1 Squadron	1	1	
	High-Altitude Surface-to-Air Missile Units	6 Groups	6	6	Renewal plan to be studied and the necessary measures to be taken
	Main Equipment				
	Operational Aircraft	About 430 Aircraft	318	About 400	About 30 aircraft shortage

Source: Defense Agency, Japan, *Defense of Japan 1982*, p. 310.

TABLE II

Main equipment

(Ground Self-Defense Force)

Unit	1983-87	At the completion of 1987	Remarks
Type-74 tank	373	850	
Type-75 155mm self-propelled howitzer	50	201	
203mm self-propelled howitzer	72	91	
New 155mm howitzer	176	176	
Type-64 81mm mortar	56	816	
Type-73 armored personnel carrier	105	225	
Type-82 command communications vehicle	127	137	
Tracked armored vehicle (reconnaissance and warning vehicle)	8	8	
New anti-aircraft cannon	7	7	
Medium anti-tank guided missile	14	14	
Type-79 anti-craft ship anti-tank guided missile launcher	78	108	
84mm recoilless rifle	1,749	2,603	
Type-75 130mm self-propelled multiple surface to surface rocket launcher	16	66	
Anti-tank helicopter (AH-1S)	43	56	
Multi-purpose helicopter (HU-1H)	53	137	
Observation helicopter (OH-6D)	64	159	
CH-X	* 16	16	* Type of transport helicopter in the process of selection
Equipment for refitting of surface-to-air guided missile Hawk	1	6	
SAM-X	•	•	* Renewal plan to be studied and necessary measures to be taken.
Type-81 short-range surface-to-air guided missile	47	57	
Portable surface-to air guided missile	468	517	

Source: Defense Agency, Japan, *Defense of Japan 1982*, p.311.

TABLE III

Main equipment (Maritime Self-Defense Force)

Unit	1983-87 estimate	At the time of completion 1987	Remarks
Destroyer	14	60	* Including four DDHs. * Including one depth minesweeper. * Two transport ships and three transport boats
DDG	3	8	
DD	8	31	
DE	3	17	
Submarine	6	15	
Minesweeper	* 13	33	
Missile boat	6	6	
Ocean observation ship	2	5	
Supply ship	2	3	
Transport ship	* 5	13	
Training support ship	1	2	
Total of MSDF vessels built (tonnage)	49		
	(97,000 tons)		
FRAM	2	4	
Aircraft			
Operational aircraft	125	* 185	* Including 10 P-2Js.
Fixed-wing anti-submarine patrol plane (P-3C)	50	72	
Anti-submarine helicopter (land-based HSS-2B)	43	48	
Anti-submarine helicopter (ship-based)	* 20	43	* 18 HSS-2Bs and two SH-60Bs.
MH-X	* 12	12	* Type of next-generation minesweeping helicopter in the process of selection
Rescue helicopter (S-61A)	3	12	
Rescue seaplane (US-1A)	3	7	
Training support aircraft	3	3	
Liaison aircraft (TC-90)	4	4	
Training aircraft (TC-90)	6	23	
Training aircraft (KM-2)	4	31	
Training aircraft (OH-6D)	5	9	

Source: Defense Agency, Japan, *Defense of Japan 1982*, p. 312

TABLE IV

Main equipment

(Air Self-Defense Force)

Unit	1983-87 Estimate	At the time of completion 1987	Remarks
Operational aircraft	120	*395	*Including 103 F-4EJs, 13 RF-4Es, 27 C-1s and five YS-11s.
Interceptor (F-15)	75	138	* Selection of type of next-generation support fighters will be made in future.
Support fighter (F-1)	6	58	
Support fighter (FS-X)	* 24	24	
Transport aircraft (C-130H)	8	12	*Type of transport helicopters in the process of selection
CH-X	* 6	6	
Early warning aircraft (E-2C)	1	9	
Rescue helicopter (V-107)	17	30	*Type of next-generation rescue helicopters in the process of selection
HH-X	* 2	2	
Rescue reconnaissance aircraft (MU-2)	3	26	*One electronic support plane and one electron observation plane
EC-130H	* 2	2	
XT-4	45	49	
Advanced training aircraft (T-2)	7	85	
SAM-X	*	*	*Renewal plan to be studied and necessary measures to be taken.
Type-81 short-range surface-to-air guided missile	27	30	
Portable surface-to-air guided missile	372	408	
Anti-aircraft cannon	130	138	

Source: Defense Agency, Japan, *Defense of Japan 1982*, p. 313.

orders of the Prime Minister. Kurisu was removed from his official post for his 'indiscretion', but the issue did much to highlight an important snag in Japan's defence posture, and became a subject of study by the Government.²⁰

Since the announcement of the National Defence Programme Outline of 1976, the efforts of the Government have been directed towards two objectives. First, the Government has drawn up two mid-term defence programme estimates in order to attain sufficient defence capabilities. The first Estimate covered the years 1980-83. The second Estimate, which covers the period 1983-87, is now in progress. The details of the force levels of the Outline, and the capability that the JSDF is expected to attain by 1987 are given in Tables I to IV.

An examination of the progress of the Outline shows that at the end of the first Estimate, Japan has considerably modernised its forces and equipment. But much would depend on the implementation of the 1983-87 Estimate. Many critics point out that even assuming a smooth implementation of the 1983-87 Estimate, the JSDF capabilities will have tremendous inadequacies in certain areas like blockade capacity, sea-lane protection capability, etc.²¹

Second, the Government has directed its efforts towards ensuring greater understanding and cooperation with the US in security matters. Though many consultations had been held earlier, the Summit meeting between President Gerald Ford and Prime Minister Miki Takeo held in August 1975 was important in that both leaders expressed their strong desire for creating, within the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee, a body intended to discuss joint measures to be taken by the two countries. The meeting was followed by an agreement reached by the two countries for setting up a forum designed to conduct studies and consultations on defence cooperation. A sub-committee was set up in July 1976, and it held several sittings during the next two years. In November 1978, it

prepared a document called the Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation. This documents identifies three areas of bilateral cooperation:

1. **Action when an armed attack is imminent:** Japan will possess an appropriate degree of defence capability necessary for self-defence and ensure the effective use of facilities and areas in Japan by the US Forces. There will be joint exercises and training, development and exchange of intelligence, and close coordination in matters like supply, transportation, etc.
2. **Action when an armed attack has taken place:** As noted earlier, Japan's response will depend upon the scale of the threat. If it is a limited threat, Japan will cope with it on the basis of its own capability. But if it is a large-scale threat, the SDF and the US will make preparations in order to ensure coordinated joint action, including the setting up of a coordination centre between the two military forces. The functions of the two forces are clearly specified in ground, air and sea operations.
3. **US - Japan cooperation in dealing with changes in the Far Eastern situation:** Any change in the Far Eastern region outside of Japan will be a subject of discussion, because of its bearing on Japan. Both countries will make preparatory studies on the subject of assistance to be extended to the US Forces. Such studies will include joint use of the SDF bases by the US Forces.²²

The Guidelines have widened the area of joint cooperation. As one writer stated, 'In all thirty years of the joint arrangements, it was never really defined up to now to what extent Japan should offer facilities as set out in the treaty'.²³

Even prior to 1978, the Maritime Self-Defence Forces had conducted training with US Forces in anti-submarine and mine-sweeping operations. But more active cooperation followed after 1978. In 1980, the MSDF participated, for the first time, in the RIMPAC exercises which are conducted once in two years by the US Third Fleet along with New Zealand, Australian

and Canadian naval units. This was followed by Japan's participation in the second RIMPAC exercises in 1982. The MSDF has also been conducting extensive exercises with the U.S. Seventh Fleet on a regular basis. Similarly, the Air Self Defence Force and the U.S. Air Force in Japan have also regularly conducted combat training.

US Demands: The U.S. Government is still not satisfied with the efforts made by the Japanese Government in building up its military strength. For one thing, it feels strongly that the goals of the 1976 Defence Programme Outline were fixed at a time when the military balance in the Far Eastern situation had still not been upset by the 'massive' Soviet military build up. It therefore argues that the Outline needs to be seriously reviewed in the light of the present strategic situation. Casper Weinberger, US Defence Secretary, told his Japanese counterpart Omura Joji in June 1981 that Tokyo should scrap the Defence Outline and double its planned procurement by 1987.²⁴ He has since stressed the same point in all his official meetings with the Japanese leaders. This view has been fairly strongly held in US military circles. General William Ginn, commander of the US Forces in Japan, said in August 1981 that the Japanese military forces 'had very little capability to defend against even the most minimal type of conventional attack and that this made Japan vulnerable to intimidation even without conflict'.²⁵ The US Government is also disturbed by the wide gap that exists between what the Japanese leaders state in public and do in reality. At his summit meeting with President Reagan, Prime Minister Suzuki stated categorically that Japan would like to assume an appropriate role in the security sphere and make 'greater efforts' for improving its defence capabilities.²⁶ But no sooner had he returned to Japan than he made a volte face. Further, the intense domestic opposition to the use of the expression 'alliance' in the Suzuki-Reagan joint communique left the US Government perplexed as to the nature of the bilateral relations, especially when the Foreign Minister

resigned over this issue. When in January 1983 Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro referred to Japan as an 'unsinkable aircraft carrier', Washington was quite pleased. But once again, hostile public criticism compelled Nakasone to issue a disclaimer.²⁷ Such instances have created a good deal of confusion in the minds of American leaders. Two further developments have toughened Washington's attitude. One is the intense pressures building up within the US Congress for a better response from Tokyo. Congress criticism has stemmed from both political parties, and the personalities who have voiced such criticisms include influential men like Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Charles Percy, John Glenn, Carl Levin, and Clement Zablocki. In December 1982, the Senate Foreign Relations committee adopted a draft resolution calling upon Japan to further strengthen its defence efforts.²⁸ Secondly, Japan's bulging trade surplus has also contributed to the stiffening of American attitude. US-Japan trade friction is not a new phenomenon. But in recent years, it has assumed very serious dimensions. In 1981, Japan's trade surplus amounted to more than \$16 billion. The main grievance of the US is that Japan is not fair in its trade relations. While it has enjoyed unlimited access to the US market, it has not opened its market to the US. This has given rise to calls for protectionism in the US, and trade problems often spilled into other areas of bilateral relations.

The Japanese Government's position runs along the following lines. Given the difficult economic situation and the delicate nature of the defence question within Japanese domestic politics, any sudden rise in the country's defence spending would be counterproductive. Any undue pressure on the Government might cause tensions in domestic politics seriously affecting the fortunes of the Liberal Democratic Party. The Japanese Government is already making substantial budgetary allocations to defence. At the rate of current defence spending, it should be possible for Tokyo to implement the Defence Outline by 1987. Furthermore, the Government has also substantially increased the volume of economic assistance particularly to ASEAN countries. The economic stability of the

TABLE V

Changes in Defense Expenditures (Original Budget)

(Part 1)

(Unit: ¥1 billion. %)

Item FY	GNP (initial forecast) (A)	General account (original) (B)	Growth from previous year	Defense budget (original) (C)	Growth from previous year	Ratio of defense budget to GNP(C/A)	Ratio of defense budget to general account (C/B)
1955	7,559.0	991.5	-0.8	134.9	-3.3	1.78	13.61
1960	12,748.0	1,569.7	10.6	156.9	0.6	1.23	9.99
1965	28,160.0	3,658.1	12.4	301.4	9.6	1.07	8.24
1970	72,440.0	7,949.8	17.9	569.5	17.7	0.79	7.16
1971	84,320.0	9,414.3	18.4	670.9	17.8	0.80	7.13
1972	90,550.0	11,467.7	21.8	800.2	19.3	0.88	6.98
1973	109,800.0	14,284.1	24.6	935.5	16.9	0.85	6.55
1974	131,500.0	17,099.4	19.7	1,093.0	16.8	0.83	6.39
1975	158,500.0	21,288.8	24.5	1,327.3	21.4	0.84	6.23
1976	168,100.0	24,296.0	14.1	1,512.4	13.9	0.90	6.22
1977	192,850.0	28,514.3	17.4	1,690.6	11.8	0.88	5.93
1978	210,600.0	34,295.0	20.3	1,901.0	12.4	0.90	5.54
1979	232,000.0	38,600.1	12.6	2,094.5	10.2	0.90	5.43
1980	247,800.0	42,588.8	10.3	2,230.2	6.5	0.90	5.24
1981	264,800.0	46,988.1	9.9	2,400.0	7.6	0.91	5.13
1982	277,200.0	49,680.8	6.2	2,586.1	7.8	0.93	5.21

(Part 2)

Ratio of Defense Spending to GNP


Source: Defense Agency, Japan, *Defense of Japan 1982*, p. 329.

TABLE VI

**Changes in Composition of Defense Expenditures
(Original Budget)**

(Part 1)

(Unit: ¥1 billion, %)

FY	1978		1979		1980		1981		1982	
	Budget	Distribution rate	Budget	Distribution rate	Budget	Distribution rate	Budget	Distribution rate	Budget	Distribution rate
Personnel, provisions	1,034.5	54.4	1,076.5	51.4	1,100.0	49.3	1,144.4	47.7	1,205.3	46.6
Supplies	866.5	45.6	1,018.0	48.6	1,130.2	50.7	1,255.6	52.3	1,380.8	53.4
Equipment acquisition	325.8	17.1	392.5	18.7	460.9	20.7	539.9	22.5	580.3	22.4
R & D	17.4	0.9	20.4	1.0	22.5	1.0	25.0	1.0	28.5	1.1
Facility improvement	46.2	2.4	60.5	2.9	61.4	2.8	52.6	2.2	58.6	2.3
Maintenance	275.4	14.5	292.1	13.9	314.2	14.1	352.0	14.7	408.7	15.8
Base counter-measures	164.5	8.7	214.0	10.2	232.1	10.4	251.4	10.5	268.9	10.4
Others	37.2	2.0	38.5	1.8	39.2	1.8	34.8	1.5	35.8	1.4
Total	1,901.0	100.0	2,094.5	100.0	2,230.2	100.0	2,400.0	100.0	2,586.1	100.0

- Notes:**
1. Equipment acquisition expenditures include those for weapons, vehicles, aircraft and vessels.
 2. Maintenance expenditures include those for housing, clothing and training.
 3. The component ratio of the budget is below 100 percent, because fractions of breakdown figures are rounded.

Source: Defense Agency, Japan, *Defense of Japan 1982*, p. 330.

ASEAN has a bearing on the security of the region. In other words, defence spending should be seen in conjunction with the efforts that Japan is making in other allied spheres.²⁹

It is true that the volume of Japan's defence spending has grown appreciably. The ratio of the defence budget to the GNP has been officially kept below 1 per cent, and in 1982-83, it forms 0.93 per cent (see Table V). If calculated in terms of total defence outlays, Japan occupies the eighth position in the world. But in terms of per capita expenditure, it spends a mere \$98, occupying the twenty third position. In recent years, there has been a significant change in the pattern of defence expenditures. Budgetary allocation to equipment acquisition has consistently grown to mark 22.4 per cent of the total defence expenditure in 1982, whereas the percentage of expenditure on personnel and provisions has steadily decreased. (see Table VI). Thus the priorities and needs of the JSDF have somewhat changed in recent years.

Cooperation in weapons technology: Since the advent of Nakasone as the Prime Minister in November 1982, efforts have been made by Washington to obtain Japanese weapons technology in certain sophisticated areas where the Japanese have an edge over the Americans. After considerable vacillation, Tokyo has also now agreed to export its weapons technology to the US as an exception. Before we consider, in detail, the bilateral talks on the question, it would be useful to have an idea of the size and composition of the defence production industry in Japan. One significant development in recent years has been the growing interest evinced by the business people in the field of defence production. Various defence build-up programmes over the years have naturally opened up new prospects of business activity in defence procurement, and in weapons exports.

On the surface, it looks as if there is no powerful industrial sector specifically connected with defence production in Japan. The number of companies

dealing with defence procurements is quite limited. But Japan's defence industry 'overlaps' with many other industries. Further, a large number of industries do not depend on defence procurements despite the fact that their turn-over might account for some percentage of the military demands. This applies even to industries like shipbuilding, aircraft, telecommunication, electronics, etc. As one Japanese writer says, 'Defence items can be found in the books of a very wide range of companies and defence orders can be said to extend to every corner of Japanese industry'.³⁰ But one could certainly identify a number of companies involved in defence production, like Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Hitachi Shipbuilding, National Electronic, Toshiba, Shin Meiwa, Mitsubishi Electric, Fuji Heavy Industries, Japan Steel Works, etc. Though these form the main suppliers of items like aircraft, ships, jet engines, tanks, helicopters, etc, numerous other companies and firms help them at a lower level. Defence procurements involve, to a degree, the whole industrial structure of Japan.

Progress in the field of defence production had to be slow after 1952 in view of the memories of pre-war Japanese militarism. The Korean War provided some opportunities for the US to make certain purchases in Japan for the prosecution of war. They were, however, mostly confined to non-military items like textiles. But more opportunities started coming by after the establishment of the Defence Agency in 1954. The four defence plans, which followed, did give a fillip to defence production. The fields which benefited from these plans included tanks, other armoured vehicles, rocketry, radar, missile equipment, and transport planes. The Government still pursued a cautious policy in order not to provoke a domestic controversy, and the Defence Agency did not carry out much research and development work, but left it to private industry. This feature which still continues in Japan has led to the development of a 'military-industrial complex'.³¹ The Mid-Term Programme Estimates under the Defence outline of 1976 have

undoubtedly given a tremendous boost to private firms in defence production. But the position regarding R and D has not changed very much.

For quite some years, the US Government had been eager to have bilateral cooperation in the sphere of weapons technology. It felt that cooperation in the field had remained one-sided, with the United States transferring its know-how to Japan. This imbalance was considered appropriate to the initial post-war decades as Japan had still not made any great strides in the technological field. But after the mid-1970s, opinion in the US Government consistently swung in favour of obtaining some reciprocal responses from Tokyo. This period coincided with serious frictions in US-Japan bilateral relations as a result of Japan's increasing penetration of American markets in textiles, steel, colour TVs, and automobiles. The Japanese Government at that time maintained that it was not in a position to export weapons to any country, because of its strict adherence to the so-called three principles restricting such exports. The three principles, which had been adopted by the Japanese Government in 1967 during the Premiership of Sato Eisaku, laid down that Japan (a) would not export weapons to any Communist Country, (b) would not export to countries that did not adhere to the U.N. Charter, and (c) would not export to countries likely to be involved in an international dispute. Later, the Japanese Diet endorsed these principles by a resolution. The upshot was that it became virtually impossible for successive LDP Governments to permit any export of arms technology. The opposition political parties were very touchy on the question, and frequently raised a hue and cry even at the slightest suspicion of any relaxation of the three principles. During the mid-1970s, coincidental with the Fourth Defence Build-up Plan, there was a demand of considerable weight and influence for the export of Japanese arms technology. But the oil shocks and the accompanying economic difficulties not only compelled the Japanese Government to cut down the

size of the defence plan, but also to shift many major items of expenditure from the defence to civilian sectors.

Yet demands from the business circles for the easing of curbs were growing. In 1976, a report by the Keidanren's committee on defence production highlighted the depressing conditions of the industry, which had witnessed a 50 per cent fall in the annual output of military equipment in 1974-76 compared with 1972. It argued that armament production was in a state of total disarray, because of the non-availability of the Government's appropriations. It called upon the Government to modify its policy so as to help the armament industry to penetrate world markets.³²

In 1976, the Government tried to work out a compromise by which it was inclined to let industry export C-1 transport aircraft and US-1 rescue sea planes, if they were devoid of any combat equipment.³³ But the proposal could not be carried out as there was a strong public protest against it. The Diet had prolonged deliberations on the subject, and ultimately passed a resolution reiterating the three principles on arms exports.

But pressure for the export of arms technology has not ceased. On the contrary, several factors have recently contributed to renewing the demand for a flexible interpretation of the three principles. One factor has been the attitude of the US Government. Interested as it is in an expanded security role of Japan, Washington has been transferring arms technology to Japan on a liberal basis. Up to 1967, a considerable volume of equipment was given to Japan as outright grants under the Mutual Security Treaty, to help Japan to modernise its defence capabilities. After 1967, outright grants were replaced by government-to-government transactions under which the US Government sold defence items to Japan.³⁴

In recent years, the US Government has signed numerous licence production agreements with Tokyo. One indication of American liberal policy was seen in 1978 when Washington agreed to treat Japan on a par with NATO Countries in matters concerning the conditions for weapons transfer.³⁵ In the same year,

Mitsubishi signed a contract with McDonnell Douglas for jointly producing a hundred F-15 fighters. Similarly, Kawasaki signed an agreement with Lockheed for manufacturing forty five P3C Orion anti-submarine patrol aircraft. Japan's expenditure on armaments has been increasing since the mid-1970s. It was only 16.4 per cent of government expenditure in 1976, but rose to 22.4 per cent in 1982, and is likely to cross the 25 per cent mark shortly.³⁶

But opinion within the US Government started hardening on such one-sided transfer of weapons technology. This was noticeable during the closing stages of President Carter's term. The Republican administration under President Reagan made it clear from the beginning that it would vigorously pursue the question with Tokyo for the transfer of arms technology in the reverse direction.

When, in June 1981, Omura Joji, Director General of the Defence Agency, visited Washington, Casper Weinberger told him frankly that as both countries were bound together under an alliance system, it was essential that they should abide by the principle of reciprocal obligations. He not only expressed his disappointment at the slow increase in defence spending in Japan, but also urged the Japanese Government to initiate measures to facilitate the flow of its arms technology to the US.³⁷ In subsequent official talks, the US side harped on the same theme. For instance, in December 1981, Frank Carlucci, Deputy Secretary of Defence visited Tokyo to conduct further talks on the subject.³⁸ Soon after, in March 1982, Weinberger paid a visit to Tokyo and warned the Japanese Government that it should not shirk carrying its fair share of responsibilities.³⁹

In the following months, the US side kept up the tempo, and there were angry complaints made in the US Congressional hearings about Japan's indifference.⁴⁰ At the time of the transition of power from Suzuki to Nakasone in November 1982, the question loomed large before the new Government. But surprisingly, it did not take much time to formulate its policy on the question. In 31 December 1982, Nakasone

made a pointed reference to the question and stated, 'In regard to the problem of military technology exchange, we are seriously considering the fact that the US has supplied secrets to Japan to a considerable extent so far, and that Japan, on the other hand, has not supplied any. It is necessary, after all, to give thought to this point.'⁴¹ This was followed by serious inter-Ministry discussions within the Government, and things were moving rather fast as Nakasone was scheduled to make his official visit to Washington in the third week of January. The Government knew that the overall defence question would be a major subject of discussion between Nakasone and Reagan and that some concessions, made quite in time, would create a favourable atmosphere for the summit. That the US Government also attached great importance to Nakasone's visit was clear on 10 January when US Secretary of State Shultz met the Japanese ambassador Okawara Yoshio in Washington and expressed his hope that Japan would come forward with greater defence efforts from the standpoint of fulfilling its obligations.⁴²

On 14 January, the Government of Japan announced that it had decided to furnish weapons technology to the US in future. What was the modus operandi for such transfer? Would it not conflict with the three principles governing the export of arms technology? The Government clarified that the new policy would exclude the United States from the application of the three principles. It stated that the export of weapons technology would be facilitated in compliance with Article I of the Mutual Defence Agreement which restricted the recipient country from (a) using the technology in a manner inconsistent with the U.N. charter, (b) using it for purposes other than promoting peace and security, and (c) transferring it to a third country without the consent of the country which offered it.⁴³

The decision of the Government, which marked a significant departure, provoked a political controversy in Japan, and highlighted different and conflicting views on the subject. Nakasone sought to justify the policy decision of 14 January by explaining that it was

governed by compelling obligations under the US-Japan Security Pact. He told the Japanese Diet on 24 January 1983:

Because mutual exchanges of technology with the United States in the defence field have become extremely important to securing the effective operation of Japan-United States security arrangements, the Government has recently decided to open the way for the transfer of military technology to the United States consistent with mutuality within the framework of the relevant provisions of the Japan-United States Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement and decided that such transfer will not be subject to the three principles on arms export and the like. The provisions contain strict rules regarding the use of such technology in contravention of the U.N. Charter, its transfer to third countries and so forth. Consequently, this is in conformity with our basic ideal of a nation of peace seeking to prevent the spread of international conflict. The Government has no intention whatever of changing its standing policy of basically observing the three principles on arms export and respecting the spirit of the Diet resolution.⁴⁴

Within the LDP the issue caused some controversy, and Party Secretary General Nikaido Susumu explained the reasons for the policy change. He said that too many far-reaching changes had taken place in the security sphere since the days of Sato Eisaku, when the three principles were formulated. The thrust of his argument was that any blind adherence to the three principles would not serve the security interests of Japan.⁴⁵ Among the opposition political parties, the JSP and the JCP vehemently criticised the new policy

as grossly violating the wishes of the people. The opinion of the media was sharply divided on the question.⁴⁶

The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) had a few reservations on the new policy. It argued that the transfer of weapons technology should be seen not only from the security angle, but also from the viewpoint of Japan's overall industrial structure. It had favoured a policy of strictly regulating the outflow of Japanese technology on the basis of the Export Trade Control Law. It now feared that the change in Japan's arms export policy might invite the US to seek Japanese technology in sophisticated industries like electronics, optical fibres, new ceramics and semi-conductors, leading inevitably to a decline in the competitive power of Japan. It said that 'Unless the technology requested by the US is made clear first, there will be no way of concluding an agreement on particulars, and the furnishing of technology will not materialise'.⁴⁷

But in actual practice, MITI had often adopted a fairly flexible interpretation of the export regulations. One instance was in July 1982 when it permitted the export of radar-proof ferrite paint to the US Department of Defence in connection with the development of stealth bomber. MITI sought to justify its action by stating that it had a dual purpose-use. Obviously, MITI could not enquire into the ultimate use made of it by the US.⁴⁸

The January 14 decision will open up new possibilities of technology transfer in the most important fields of electronics, missiles, semi-conductors, optical fibres, and new ceramics. In the field of missile technology, the US has already approached the Kawasaki Heavy Industries for the transfer of its laser-guidance formula anti-tank missile technology. Though other countries like West Germany, Britain and France are also doing active research in the field, Japan is far more advanced in its technology. In the 1983-87 mid-term Estimate, the Defence Agency is scheduled to make 78 such missiles.⁴⁹

In particular, the US is interested in acquiring Japan's electronics-connected high technology including semi-conductors represented by very large-scale integrated circuits (VLSI), laser and robots. With the help of Japanese high technology, it should be possible for the US to make the size of weapons smaller and more efficient, and at the same time reduce the cost of production.

The electronics manufacturers of Japan are now passing through a period of 'boom', as the weapons system is becoming increasingly electronics-oriented. It is important to note that electronics companies like Mitsubishi Electric, Toshiba, and the NEC are challenging the supremacy of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ishikawajima-Harima, etc, in their participation in defence production.

Expecting a boom on account of the prospective flow of weapons technology, some firms have already initiated measures to take advantage of it. Nissho Iwai has, for instance, launched a new company called Nissho Iwai Aerospace, America, to specialise in business relating to defence, aeronautics and space. It has also decided to open a branch office at Osaka to improve its services to such defence equipment manufacturers like Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Shin Meiwa Industries, and Shimazu. Tsuchiya Takehiko, Director of the Aircraft and Electronic Machinery Headquarters, stated in early 1983:

The exchange of military technology between Japan and the US will become more and more brisk, and the age of joint development of military technology will come soon.⁵⁰

One reason for the current 'boom' is that the Mid-Term Procurement Programme (1983-87) envisages an outlay of 4.6 trillion yen for the procurement of defence equipment.⁵¹ Further, as we have already noted, the equipment component in the overall defence expenditure has been consistently increasing in recent years. The Japan Ordnance Association announced in March 1983 that ordnance production had reached for the first time the high level of \$2.52 billion in March

1982, 15 per cent more than the figure for the previous year. The production of aircraft and weapons rose by 20 per cent whereas the production of tanks and military trucks went up by 9.3 per cent.⁵² As more F-15 fighter planes and P-3C anti-submarine patrol planes are planned to be procured during 1983-87, defence production will go up markedly.

The enthusiasm of the big companies to take part in the 'boom' could be noticed in certain developments in 1982. The merger of Sumitomo Heavy Machinery Industries and Nittoku Metal Industry raised many eyebrows in Japan, because Nittoku was a leading manufacturer of guns. Sumitomo Heavy Industries which absorbed Nittoku, is now on its way to play an important role in the field of defence production. It set up a new defence production operation control office to streamline its expanded activities.

The Hitachi Shipbuilding which specialises in manufacturing escort ships, minesweepers, and mines, is also showing its interest in the weapons field. In July 1982, it established its warships and weapons headquarters with a view to cooperating with the Defence Agency in its weapons procurements during 1983-87.

It is also important to note that many firms, which have had little to do with defence production in the past, are now entering the field in order to diversify their business interests. They know that the armament field will offer continuous prospects for a long time, because any weapons system, however sophisticated, will become out of date over a period of ten to fifteen years, and would need to be updated periodically. The case of Nissan Motors provides a very good illustration of how a business firm wants to diversify its interests. Nissan feels that it has already reached saturation point in the automobile industry. It has now entered the field of missiles. To be sure, it has some links with the armament industry. It had absorbed the defunct Prince Motor Company which had played an important role in the field of rockets in Japan. But the space division of Nissan contributes less than 0.4 per cent of the company's sales, and recently Nissan has given a stimulus to its activities

by entering into a tie-up with Martin Marietta, a big American firm in the aero-space field. Nissan has been financially assisted in the project by Fuji Heavy Industries, Hitachi and Fuji Bank. The entry of Nissan has also been helped by MITI which is increasingly keen to stimulate business activity in the aerospace industry and to reduce the monopoly of Mitsubishi in the field.⁵³

Sea-lane defence: Another area where the US would like to see Japan assume some new responsibilities relates to the security of the surrounding seas. The bilateral security pact does not state or even hint at any obligation by Japan to safeguard the neighbouring seas. It only points out that both countries have a 'common concern' in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East. More recently, the definition of the region comprising 'the Far East' became controversial in Japan, and assurances were given by certain Japanese leaders that Japan would evince greater interest in the security of the surrounding seas.⁵⁴ The Sato-Nixon joint communique of 1969 stated that the region surrounding South Korea and Taiwan was crucial to the security of Japan. But it did not specify the actual measures which Japan would undertake to safeguard that region. Since the global energy crisis of 1973, Japan's dependence on the safety of the sea-lanes for the import of West Asian oil has been brought home to the Japanese people. Yet when, on certain occasions, Japanese leaders spoke of the need for keeping the sea-lanes safe, they did so in general and economic terms. This is not to say that they were not aware of the strategic importance of the sea-lanes. They were only underplaying the strategic aspect of the question in order not to provoke a political controversy at home.

But from the outset, the US Government had shown an inclination to highlight the strategic aspect, and increasingly during the late 1970s following the Afghanistan crisis and the Iranian Revolution. At a time when the role of the 7th Fleet was seen in a much wider strategic perspective, Washington naturally had

to adopt a tough policy with Tokyo to get it to take on a greater security role. It had done this even prior to 1980, but efforts to articulate it into a coherent shape were taken only after the advent of President Reagan in 1981. In March 1981, Mike Mansfield, the US Ambassador in Japan said, 'Japan should help to take up the slack in the defence of their home islands and territorial waters, because of the shifting of elements of the US Fleet to the Indian ocean, which is tied to the common security of both countries.'⁵⁵

In April, Omura Joji, the Director General of the Japan Defence Agency, gave a few more details about the area that Japan could safeguard. He said that it should be possible for Japan to include the seas between Guam and the Philippines in its defence area. Any action by Japan, he was careful to add, would be purely for its own self-defence.⁵⁶ Later Prime Minister Suzuki clarified in Washington in May that Japan would be able to defend the sea area to the extent of 1,000 nautical miles.⁵⁷ Appreciating America's security role in the Middle East from which 'Japan and other countries were benefiting', Suzuki promised to make 'even greater efforts' for improving Japan's defence 'capabilities in Japanese territories and its surrounding sea and air space'.⁵⁸

Later on, however, conflicting views were expressed by Japanese leaders on the issue. Suzuki himself tried to water down his Washington statement. But in most of the official bilateral meetings that followed, the US side continued to stick to Suzuki's Washington statement, and sought, in a way, to pin down Tokyo to the defence of 1,000 nautical miles.

Understandably, the sea defence question provoked a debate inside Japan, and the opposition political parties accused the Government of over-extending the scope of its security responsibilities. Though Suzuki tried to underplay the sea defence question in view of domestic criticism, preparations for concrete talks on the question were going on. At the Hawaii conference held in June 1981, both sides discussed the question, and the US wanted Japan to make efforts to possess 70 escort ships, 25 submarines, and 125 P3C anti-submarine patrol planes. It

also wanted an increase of 100 F15 class fighters for air defence on the seas.⁵⁹ The next round of talks between the two sides held in Hawaii in September 1982 at the US-Japan Administrative Level Consultations produced concrete results in that they agreed to conduct joint studies on the defence of the sea-lanes including the evaluation of the threat to them, the types of defence, the capacity of the US to assist and the nature of Japan's role.⁶⁰

At this juncture it is very difficult to speculate on the exact plans that the two sides have in mind, but it seems that there are some differences in their approaches to the question. The Government of Japan is inclined to see or define sea-defence in a narrow sense in that it would mean only the defence of the shipping lanes for the supply of raw materials. Suzuki told the Japanese Diet in April 1982 that one important goal of his Government was to ensure the smooth supply of at least one third of Japan's food requirements under any circumstances. It roughly amounted to between 200 and 300 million tons in volume.⁶¹ In other words, what Japan has in mind is to have the 'shipping routes' protected by the JSDF.

But what the US demands goes far beyond the Japanese definition. It wants Japan to play an important role in 'sea control', which includes the controlling of sea-lanes and marked sea-areas. It would urge the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Forces to engage in land attacks and landing operations. In other words, Japan would undertake 'sea control' covering the defence of sea areas around Japan and the sea routes up to 1,000 nautical miles. The American expectation of Suzuki's Washington statement was expressed by Mr Francis J. West, Jnr., Assistant Secretary of State for International Security Affairs at a congressional hearing in March 1982: 'If Japan becomes able to cope with the threat of Soviet submarines and the threat of Soviet bombers in the next eight years, they will be in conformity with what Prime Minister Suzuki said.'⁶² The U.S. Defence Report 1982-83 submitted by Weinberger said that Japan should contribute to the

regional stability by strengthening its air and sea defences and providing protection for the sea-lanes up to 1,000 miles.⁶³

The second difference in the US and Japanese approaches relates to the nature of the commitment that sea-defence would impose on Japan, and its implications for the Japanese Constitution. Many in Japan argue that if Japan is incorporated into the global military strategy of the United States, it will become necessary for Japan not only to drastically alter its defence policy, but also to accept the principle of collective self-defence. They point out that the Constitution does not accept the principle of collective self-defence. It only grants the right of individual self-defence. Nakasone stated on 1 February 1983 that 'Japan is different from NATO. In the case of Japan, there is the Japan-US Security Treaty, and it has the right of individual self-defence, which is different from collective defence.'⁶⁴

Responsible Japanese leaders who have questioned Japan's right to collective self-defence have also gone on record stating that Japan is entitled to block the Straits of Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima to the Soviet naval forces. Omura Joji put it mildly when he stated in March 1980, 'The blockade of the three Straits is an operation to defend our country in case of an emergency.'⁶⁵ Nakasone went a step further by saying that Japan would be entitled to block the sea lanes against the Soviet military forces even if Japan was not under attack.⁶⁶ Such contradictory statements create a good deal of ambivalence in Japan's defence policy and show a lack of coherence in its strategy. As Kaihara Osamu says, the Japanese leaders are often given to discussing various interpretations of the Constitution rather than to studying substantial matters of strategy, because the claim that Japan does not enjoy the right of collective self-defence can at best be a theoretical quibbling.⁶⁷

What is the ability of the MSDF to play a role in the defence of the seas? Several knowledgeable people are of the opinion that that MSDF is ill-equipped to deal with Soviet nuclear ships. They state that the Japanese naval ships lack surface-to-air and surface-

to-surface missiles. It is also said that the air protection to the surface ships is also inadequate. Kaihara says that safeguarding of the sea lanes is 'unnecessary in peace time and impossible in an emergency'.⁶⁸ With regard to the blockade of Straits, the minelaying capability of the MSDF is extremely limited, and the question of closing the Straits to the Soviet ships simply does not arise given the growth of Soviet military power.

Another factor restraining Japan's enhanced security role is the attitude of Southeast Asian countries. To what extent will they welcome it? Japan knows that any widening of its defence responsibilities to include the safeguarding of the sea lanes will have implications for Southeast Asian countries. Japan cannot take any bold initiative in that direction without obtaining their approval. An important aspect of Japan's foreign policy since 1952 has been its non-military approach to the Southeast Asian region. This approach has served Japan's interests well in that she has been able to build up strong economic relations with the region. Japan's Southeast Asian policy reached a high water mark in 1977 when it was invited to participate in the Kuala Lumpur Summit Meeting of the ASEAN countries. Successive Japanese Governments under Fukuda Takeo, Ohira Masayoshi, Suzuki Zenko and Nakasone Yasuhiro have underlined the paramount importance of Japan's ties with ASEAN.⁶⁹

In recent years, Tokyo has fully backed ASEAN in its stand on Kampuchea and extended greater economic assistance to it. Prime Minister Nakasone has taken prompt measures to maintain a close rapport with ASEAN. He urged Vietnam to withdraw its forces from Kampuchea and embark upon a new policy of peace with ASEAN.⁷⁰ Soon after Nakasone's visit to Washington in January 1983, he assured the ASEAN countries that his description of Japan as an 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' did not have any serious military implications.⁷¹ Later, he visited the ASEAN countries and explained that Japan had no desire to play a military role in international politics. He said:

In improving its self-defence capability, Japan is determined to commit itself solely and exclusively to self-defence, and not to become a military power threatening neighbouring countries.... I too shall make every effort to faithfully adhere to this basic defence policy which has been consistently upheld throughout Japan's post-war history. It is more than a matter of policy: it is deeply rooted in strong and unchanging Japanese national sentiments deriving from our sincere contrition at the past.⁷²

Tokyo understands that the ASEAN countries are very sensitive to any development pointing to the renewal of Japan's military role in the region. They have expressed their anxieties about the prospect of Japan defending the sea lanes beyond an appropriate point.⁷³

Conclusion

It may be stated that there is not likely to be a major shift in Japan's defence policy in the near future. We have noted certain significant trends having a bearing on Japan's defence policy - the growing security consciousness of the people, the shifting balance of power in East Asia, and the growth of Japan's economic and technological strength. But these will not at once presage a drastic alteration in Japan's defence policy. Any such change will be gradual and incremental. As we have noted, in the next several years the Japanese Government will direct its efforts towards modernising its military forces. Efforts in this direction could lead to military spending crossing the 1 per cent limit of the GNP. Secondly, the Japanese Government will try its best to respond to the US for sharing additional security responsibilities. This forms the most sensitive aspect of Japan's defence policy. In order to avoid serious crisis situations, both countries should understand each other's problems. The US should understand that the defence question forms a very delicate area in Japanese domestic politics and that any attempt to push its ideas overlooking the domestic constraints will only be

counterproductive. It should appreciate that the evolution of a consensus on the defence question will be gradual in Japan. The Japanese Government from its side, should make serious efforts to mould a consensus on the question instead of leaving it to the people. Given the present political environment in the East Asian region, Japan will continue to pursue a low profile in the defence sphere while seeking to emphasise its economic role.

Addendum

Since the completion of this paper, details of the 1983 Japanese Defence White Paper have been published. This is the first White Paper on defence published by the Nakasone Cabinet. Leaving aside the usual rhetoric that is found in such official papers, there are two or three points that deserve attention. First, it indicates a stronger inclination on the part of the Government to see Japan's defence role in the larger context of 'free world' defence against the Soviet Union. This is in contrast to the earlier assertions of the Japanese leaders, which have been examined, that Japan cannot constitutionally undertake collective defence responsibilities. As part of this, the White Paper also spells out for the first time Japan's concern for protecting the sea lanes extending to 1,000 nautical miles from its shores. Thirdly, it also talks about the importance of the transfer of arms technology between Japan and the United States.

The White paper has already been severely criticised by the Japanese opposition political parties and the Japanese press. They argue that Japan has no constitutional right to collective self-defence. Mainichi alleged that under the new White Paper, the Self Defence Forces would become 'the troops of the Western Camp'.⁷⁴ Further, the White Paper also does not clearly spell out the concrete measures contemplated by the Government for safeguarding the sea-lanes.

One will have to wait and see what follow-up measures will be adopted by the Japanese Government. A test case is going to be the defence expenditure for the next fiscal year, but it appears that there is not going to be a dramatic increase in the defence budget, despite Weinberger's pressure on Tanikawa Kazuo, the Japanese defence chief, at their meeting in Washington in August. Nakasone himself has, time and again, stated that he will not effect any major change in the current pattern of defence expenditure.

NOTES

1. Defense of Japan 1977 (Defense Agency, Tokyo), p.142.
2. For details see Asian Security 1981 (Research Institute For Peace and Security, Tokyo 1981), pp.159-160.
3. Defense of Japan, 1977, pp.74-75.
4. Ibid., p.145.
5. See Hiroshi Kimura, 'Soviet Security Policies and Roles in Northeast Asia' in Comprehensive Security: Japanese and U.S. Perspectives (Stanford, U.S. 1981) p.75; Also see Paul Dibb, 'Soviet Capabilities, Interests and Strategies in East Asia in the 1980s', Survival (London) July-August 1982, pp. 156-7; In the same issue see Robert A. Scalapino 'In U.S. and East Asia: views and policies in a Changing Era', pp.146-55.
6. Asian Security 1980, p.186.
7. Defense of Japan 1982 pp.30-32. See Casper W. Weinberger's Annual Report to the Congress (Fiscal year 1983), II-20-21.
8. Defense of Japan, 1982, p.30.
9. Ibid 36-38. Also see Japan's Contribution to Military Stability in Northeast Asia (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1980), pp.63-69.

10. Ibid. For a general idea of the relative military strength of the US and the Soviet Union see an unpublished paper by Hisashi Owada, 'Problems of Power Projection in East Asia: Japanese Perspectives on Asian Security' (Tufts University, 1980), pp.4-9.
11. Gerald L.Curtis, 'Japanese Security Policies and the United States', Foreign Affairs Spring, Vol. 59(4), 1981, p.856.
12. See U.S. Security of State George Shultz's talks with Nakasone Yasuhiro and Abe Shintaro in February 1983 in Tokyo. Japan Times Weekly, 5 February 1983. Also see Tokyo Shimbun's editorial 20 January 1983.
13. Diplomatic Blue Book 1981, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo) pp.26-27.
14. Harold Brown visited Tokyo in January 1980 and is reported to have expressed this view.
15. See Curtis, p.856.
16. See Hiroshi Ishihara, 'Prospects for U.S.-Japan Cooperation in Developing the Security Environment for the 1980s: A Japanese View', in Comprehensive Security: Japanese and U.S. Perspectives, p.56. See also 'A Public Opinion Survey on the Self-Defense Forces and Defense Issues', Defense Bulletin Vol.VI, No.1, September 1982, pp.1-34.
17. Tokyo Shimbun 25 February 1983. See also Masaru Ogawa 'DSP's Proposal on SDF', Japan Times, 1 February 1981.
18. Asian Wall Street Journal, 21 April 1982.
19. See for instance Hyuga Hosai, President of Kansai Federation of the Employer's Organization in Ishihara, p.52.
20. See Takuya Kubo, 'Defense Furore Should not lead to big SDF', Japan Times, 29 October 1978. Also see Japan Times 13 September 1978.
21. Larry A. Niksch, 'Japanese Defence Policy: Reaching a new Plateau', Pacific Defence Reporter, February 1983, p.32-36. Also Hideo Sekino and Sadao Seno, 'The Armed Forces of the Asian Pacific Region', Pacific Defence Reporter, March 1983, pp.15-23.

22. See Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, Defense of Japan 1982, pp. 346-350.
23. See Hamish McDonald, 'Playing the Japan Card', The Age, 3 August 1981.
24. International Herald Tribune, 10 July 1981; see also earlier discussion in the Japanese Diet, in Japan Times, 29 March 1981.
25. The Age, 3 August 1981.
26. See Joint Communique between Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko and President Reagan in Defence of Japan, 1982, p.292.
27. See Editorial 'Mr Nakasone's U.S. Visit', Japan Times Weekly, 29 January 1983.
28. See Yomiuri Shimbun (Evening), 15 December 1982. Also Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Evening), 15 December 1982.
29. See Suzuki's views, The Times (London), 13 May 1981.
30. Tomiyama Kazuo, 'The Future of Japan's Defense-Related Industries', Japan Quarterly (Tokyo), Oct.-Dec. 1978 p.409.
31. Ibid., p.410.
32. See Japan's Contribution to Military Stability in Northeast Asia, p.48.
33. Ibid.
34. Defense of Japan 1982, pp.241-42.
35. Kent E. Calder, 'The Rise of Japan's Military-Industrial Base', Asia-Pacific Community (Tokyo) No.17, summer 1982, p.26.
36. Defense of Japan, 1982 p.330.
37. See the views of Omura Joji in a panel discussion in 'Nichi-Bei Roei Masatsu no Shinso' ('The Truth of Japan-US defence friction'), Chuo Koron (Tokyo) September 1981, pp.87-90. Other participants are Sakate Michita and Sakanaka Tomohisa.
38. Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 December 1981, p.75.
39. International Herald Tribune, 29 March 1982.
40. Asian Wall Street Journal, 20 May 1982.
41. Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Evening), 1 January 1983.
42. Ibid (Evening), 11 January 1983.
43. Asahi Shimbun (Evening), 14 January 1983.

44. See Nakasone's Policy Speech to the 98th Session of the National Diet on 24 January 1983. Press Release (Embassy of Japan, Canberra) No. 1122, 25 January 1983, p.8.
45. Sankei Shimbun, 19 January 1983.
46. Tokyo Shimbun's criticism in an editorial 15 January 1983. For favourable comments see editorial Sankei Shimbun, 15 January 1983.
47. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 15 January 1983.
48. See Calder, p.35.
49. See Table II.
50. Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun, 28 January 1983.
51. Defense of Japan 1982, p.115.
52. Asia Research Bulletin (Singapore), Vol.12 No.10, 31 March 1983, p.1027.
53. Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun 16 March 1983. Also see Japan Times Weekly, 23 October 1982.
54. The controversy arose during 1964-65 soon after American involvement in the Vietnam War, when Japan's role in the war was heatedly discussed.
55. Japan Times, 10 March 1981.
56. Ibid., 8 April 1981.
57. Ibid., 10 May 1981.
58. Suzuki-Reagan joint statement, Defense of Japan 1982, p.292.
59. Asahi Shimbun, 19 January 1983.
60. Ibid.
61. Japan Times Weekly, 1 May 1982. See also Defense of Japan 1982. The White Paper said (p.58): 'Japan depends on imports for most of her raw materials, energy and food needs. Therefore, a nation attempting an aggression on Japan can achieve its objective by obstructing or destroying Japanese sea lanes. If ships carrying commodities for the Japanese, are prevented from reaching their destination, Japan's economic activities, and war sustaining capacity as well as the people's daily life would be seriously affectedJapan must protect her sea lanes to ensure the imports of essential commodities'.
62. Mainichi Shimbun, 3 March 1982.

63. See Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal year 1983, p.II-21.
64. Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Evening), 1 February 1983. The 1983-4 U.S. Defence Department report considers Japan as an integral part of the collective defence system. See Annual Report to the Congress 1984, p.32. See Mainichi's criticism, 2 February 1983.
65. See Osamu Kaihara, 'Japan's Defense Structure and Capability', Asia-Pacific Community (Tokyo), Spring 1981, p.55.
66. Michael Byrnes, 'Our vital stake in Japan's growing military debate', Financial Review (Sydney), 19 April 1983.
67. See Kaihara, p.55.
68. See Kiyoaki Murata, 'Is Sea Lane Defense Possible', Japan Times Weekly, 2 April 1983, p.5.
69. See a good unpublished paper by S. Nagai, Japanese Policies Towards Southeast Asia, (Canberra, 1982) pp.1-28. Also Reijiro Toba, 'Japan's Southeast Asia Policy', Asia-Pacific Community, Winter 1985, No.15, pp.30-43.
70. Address by Nakasone Yasuhiro in Kuala Lumpur on 9 May 1983, Press Release (Embassy of Japan, Canberra), 10 May 1982, No.1127, p.4.
71. See Abe Shintaro's meeting with ASEAN ambassadors in Tokyo. Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Evening), 26 January 1983.
72. See Address by Nakasone, p.5.
73. See Japan Times Weekly, 29 April 1983, p.1; and 2 April 1983, p.1.
74. Mainichi Daily News, editorial, 'Troops for West', 29 August 1983.

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