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S D MUNI

Arms Build-up  
and Development:  
Linkages in  
the Third World





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In this monograph Dr S.D. Muni examines the linkages between arms build-up and development in the Third World. The linkages are very complex and the field of study is both vast and new. These linkages have, therefore, been viewed in this monograph from a broad perspective. The question of the interrelationship between development and armaments is vitally important for peace and security in the world. Though attention has been paid to this factor in the last few years, systematic and rigorous studies have yet to emerge. It is hoped that this monograph will stimulate thinking and further research in this vital field of both academic and policy interest.

ROBERT O'NEILL  
Editor, *Canberra Papers*  
and Head, SDSC

Dr S.D. Muni is Associate Professor of South Asian Studies at the School of International Studies of Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and was a Visiting Fellow in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, during the period in which this monograph was written. After completing his Ph.D on the foreign policy of Nepal at the University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, India, in 1971, Dr Muni became a Research Associate at the South Asia Studies Centre, University of Rajasthan, India, 1971-73, Assistant Professor of Diplomatic Studies at the School of International Studies, 1973-78, and Associate Professor of South Asian Studies from 1978 onwards. He was also a Parliamentary Fellow in the Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, New Delhi, India, 1969-70. He has published many articles related to South Asian and Third World affairs.



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# Introduction

Acquiring arms was one of man's highly valued endeavours even during the times of his most primitive existence. Arms seemed to assure him of his security and survival and also gave him the power and authority to influence and dominate others. Man's long-spread evolutionary transformation from his primitive state to a more cultured and civilised world, from a nomadic existence to organised social and communal living, has not brought about any fundamental changes, either in his instincts for security, survival and domination, or in the manifestation of such instincts through the endeavour to acquire arms.

Of course, the form and magnitude of this endeavour have undergone radical changes. The arms are now varied and better sharpened, thanks to the ongoing technological advances. The arsenals are huge and deadly. The expressed purpose is no longer individual safety alone but also 'national security' — a vague and somewhat mystical concept that is highly susceptible to various and subjective interpretations. And notwithstanding the well known saying: 'You can do anything with arms except sit on them', it is asserted that more and more and newer and newer arms are just for stockpiling, not for use, that they are the instruments of peace and preservation, not of war and destruction. That man has become more complex and cunning; more intelligent, articulate and unpredictable in his transformation from his primitive origins, is an undeniable fact.

This is not to say that the harmful consequences of the arms race were not understood long ago. Others before us have expressed the opinion that the rapid expansion in this activity was not only repugnant to the cultured and civilised conscience of mankind, but also counter-productive to its own aims. Voicing such concern as early as 1841 in this respect, the then British Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel, stated:

Is not the time come when the powerful countries of Europe should reduce their armaments which they have so sedulously raised? Is not the time come when they should be prepared to declare that there is no use in such overgrown establishments?

What is the advantage of one power greatly increasing its army and navy? Does it not see that other powers will follow its example? The consequence of this must be that no increase of relative strength will accrue to any one power; but there must be a universal consumption of the resources of every country in military preparation.

Concern against the growth of armaments continued to be expressed subsequently in the world's responsible circles. But this did not deter in any way, the

course of developments in the field of arms acquisition activity. The utter disregard of the arms racers towards the caution and concern voiced by the civilised conscience of Mankind was clearly witnessed in the outbreak and outcome of the First World War. The League of Nations then focussed the attention on the problems of armament in a more systematic and organised way. It got useful studies made on some of the important aspects of this problem.<sup>1</sup>

However, the result of the League's efforts in this field was no different from that of similar efforts made earlier: humanity suffered humiliation and even greater loss of life and property during the Second World War. The way in which the human race has been insulted and defied in the two wars makes one wonder whether the caution and concern expressed from time to time against the growing world arsenals had the necessary seriousness of purpose behind it. Perhaps such expression lacked the determined political will and support required. Perhaps it was backed more by intuitive impulses and normative preferences than by actual capabilities to take effective action in the desired direction. Or, one is even prompted to make the cynical observation that the concern expressed was a calculated rhetorical exercise, intended largely to camouflage rather than control the very activity of arms acquisition, for the dimensions of this activity have grown in leaps and bounds, in size, variety and sophistication — so much so that man's very search for survival and security that led him to acquire arms, stands seriously threatened.

The post-Second World War phenomenon of the highly abetted spread of armaments has added urgency and seriousness to the questions of disarmament and arms control, particularly in the United Nations. This was reflected in the deliberations of the Geneva Conferences, and also of the Committee on Disarmament.<sup>2</sup> The UN General Assembly even held a Special Session on Disarmament in July 1978, in pursuance of the objective to check the spread of weapons and its evil effects. The world organisation must tackle these questions firmly and quickly for failure to do so will place the very existence of the human race in jeopardy. Despite the risk involved, progress made in this field by the UN and the managers of the international political system is tardy, slow and far from effective.

The growth of armaments does not pose a threat merely in terms of the outbreak of a third world war and its devastating consequences. It also acts almost as a slow poison on the overall process of economic and social development of all peoples. Attention towards the economic disadvantages of arms acquisition was drawn long ago.<sup>3</sup> The League of Nations' studies on this subject, as mentioned above, brought significant facts to light, indicating that the arms race had serious adverse implications for economic development. Scholars and investigators have subsequently carried out their research along this line of enquiry. However, it is only very recently



that attention has been diverted to the consequences of weapons proliferation on the total socio-economic and political development of humanity. A firm step in this direction was taken at the Tenth Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament.<sup>4</sup> Besides the UN, various other official and non-official organisations and academic institutions have also joined in such efforts.<sup>5</sup> As a result of these efforts at different levels, the world's consciousness of the spread and growth of arms seems to have been sufficiently aroused to bring the question of linkages between disarmament and development into sharp focus. It remains to be seen, however, what concrete and effective steps will be initiated in this respect, and how.

The question of linkages between arms acquisition, which affects the totality of arms build-up on the one hand and development on the other, can be approached in three different ways. Or, in other words, three general propositions may be extended with regard to such linkages. They are:

- (i) There are no linkages, i.e. arms build-up and development are mutually unrelated activities;
- (ii) The linkages are negative, i.e. arms build-up hampers and distorts development;
- (iii) the linkages are positive, i.e. arms build-up contributes and encourages the process of development.

On the face of it, the first proposition looks untenable, since both the activities draw upon the same human and material resources, just as their respective consequences impinge upon the same social, economic and political structures. This general observation apart, anything that empirically and logically supports the remaining two propositions disproves the first. The amount of statistical data and analytical knowledge available in support of either of the last two propositions, even at the present initial stages of research in the field, are substantial enough to justify the outright rejection of the first proposition. Thus we may agree with Jonathan Steinberg's observation in *Yesterday's Deterrent* about the arms race:

An arms race is, after all, an immense social, political, legal and economic process. Its influences penetrate every corner of the societies involved and its attendant manifestations are simply too complex to fit the standard categorization of historical analysis. Even if the subject of analysis is only one of participants in such a race . . . the number of elements in that nation's social, cultural, economic and religious traditions which significantly affect the course of the arms race is very large.

The second and third propositions have their respective advocates. The present debate on the subject is centred on these two opposing positions. Going through the arguments extended respectively by the two sides, it appears that in each case there

are clear overtones of predetermined, intuitive assumptions, value preferences and ideological positions. At times they are couched in polemical and rhetorical expressions. Such arguments and explanations sound overstated and less persuasive for want of sufficient evidence, which is still in the process of being gathered and analysed.

There seems to be an urgent need to start a probe into the subject from a balanced perspective and with scientific discipline. Having said that, it must be admitted that a value neutral approach to a subject like the relationship between disarmament and development is both impossible and undesirable. Wherein lies the way out then? Perhaps in the fact that a dispassionate and careful diagnosis of a situation may be of greater use in advancing specific value goals as against predetermined and assumed conclusions about that situation. In the present case, one can take the evidence presented in support of each of the propositions described above, evaluate them as carefully as one can, and then weigh them against each other in order to identify the correct nature of the linkages.

In the light of the foregoing observations, it is proposed to study the question of linkages between arms build-up and development in the context of the Third World. The Third World has been selected as the focus of study for two specific reasons. One, the problem of development is acute and intricate in this area; and two, whereas the world has been conscious of the question of the growing arms build-up in Europe and America for a fairly long time (recall Sir Robert Peel's statement), the alarming growth of the phenomenon in the Third World was noticed only very recently, as late as the end of the 1960s.<sup>6</sup>

The study has been divided into three major sections. The first section has been devoted to a discussion of the three key concepts, arms build-up, development and the Third World, around which the whole study revolves. The trends and causes of development as well as arms build-up will be discussed in the second section. The third section will deal with the consequences of the arms build-up for development. This study is being carried out under the severe constraints of time, space and source material. The objective is to prepare a general, tentative and exploratory study and it would be less than fair to expect anything more than this.

# Three Concepts: Arms Build-Up, Development and the Third World

The three concepts of arms build-up, development and the Third World are basic to our study. Whereas our main concern is with the linkages between arms build-up and development generally, the political, economic and social contexts examined here in which such linkages evolve and unfold themselves, are those of the Third World countries. Academic concepts do not usually enjoy the universality of meaning, or the unanimity of support and acceptance for any length of time among scholars. Such is the case of the three concepts with which we are concerned here. Although these concepts have been in use extensively, both in intellectual exercises and diplomatic dealings for the past three decades, the manner in which they have been presented and received have differed, at times fairly widely. It is, therefore, not only desirable but essential that they be defined and discussed as understood here for the purpose of this study.

## Arms Build-Up

A vast body of arms control and disarmament literature revolves around the concepts of arms races and arms transfer (which includes arms trade). Both these terms suffer from two serious limitations and are therefore unfit for use in the present study. One limitation is that these terms are primarily oriented towards external policy and the international system. For instance, arms transfer and trade describe the transactions and movement of weapons between various countries either in the form of aid or trade. Accordingly the study of arms transfer and trade would cover in its scope such issues as related to the quantum and quality of weapons involved as well as the manner (i.e. terms, procedures, bargains, direction, etc.) in which the transactions take place.<sup>7</sup> This would cover a major part of arms acquisition process in the Third World, though not the *whole* of it. Three important sources of arms would be left out if we limited ourselves to the term arms trade or arms transfers. Firstly, weapons produced locally in a given country for its own use would not be included. And there is sufficient evidence to show that a large number of Third World countries are producing substantial quantities of not only small arms but also weapons that may be



described as major types. Secondly, since the considerations of arms transfers and trade are usually confined to official, government to government transactions, mostly in major weapons, the clandestine flows in small arms would be overlooked. The area of unofficial and clandestine flow in small and major arms has been quite an important source of arms build-up in the Third World. This area is an extremely difficult one to explore and therefore, is rarely attempted.<sup>8</sup> Thirdly, there is another, unusual, source of arms. This is the unexpected and *ad hoc* acquisition of arms such as 'left-overs' of a defeated party in an armed conflict. In recent history, Bangladesh, Vietnam and Angola are some of the notable theatres where the victorious parties have benefited from their respective enemies' stores in this way.

It is true that quantities of weapons acquired through such *ad hoc* acquisition, as also through the clandestine or regular flow of small arms, may not be very large in comparative and cost terms. However, these sources of arms transfers are gradually becoming significant in the Third World social processes and foreign policy considerations.

Arms races as a concept are relatively more comprehensive and broad-based. Any race involves a minimum of two parties. Hedley Bull, defining the arms race, wrote:

Arms races are intense competitions between opposed powers or groups of powers, each trying to achieve an advantage in military power by increasing the quantity or improving the quality of its armaments or armed forces.<sup>9</sup>

This type of competition underlines the external orientation of the concept. Some recent studies on the subject that have gone deeper into the domestic causes and dynamics of the arms races, as well as their theoretical models, have nonetheless ultimately related them to the foreign policy goals of the nations involved in the race and to the action-reaction phenomena in international politics.<sup>10</sup> Arms race studies have also tended to emphasise the race in major weapons and their latest designs and models. In the process, such studies have almost totally neglected the race in small arms.

The second limitation of the scope of the concepts of arms races and arms transfers is that they focus mainly on weapons. The non-weapon components of military strength which constitute the life and blood of the weapons systems, such as the armed forces, strategic doctrines and skills, and the level of scientific and technological competence, are largely ignored. It is the combination of arms and men that constitutes military power, and not one without the other.

The concept of arms build-up which we are using here as a synonym for military build-up includes both the arms races and arms transfers phenomena, as well as other aspects of military strength not covered under these two concepts. This new term also

carries a balanced meaning, as it includes both the domestic and the external aspects of arms in the Third World. In brief, the arms build-up stands for all that constitutes the coercive capacity and potential of the State, both in terms of its external manifestations in the form of foreign and strategic policies and its domestic uses as instruments of terror and repression. With respect to the latter, a problem arises in differentiating between police strength and military strength. Such differentiation is becoming increasingly difficult, particularly in the context of the Third World, because on the one hand police and civil control organisations are being armed more and more extensively and, on the other, regular troops are frequently put to internal uses for performing what may be described as police and law and order functions. However, we shall exclude police organisations and their strength from the scope of the term arms build-up for the purpose of this study. Accordingly, the level of arms build-up in a given country may be indicated by the quantum of military expenditure; the strength of its armed forces — including para-military and reserve forces; the nature and quantities of arms acquired through imports; its *ad hoc* haul; grants and domestic production, both of small and major arms; and finally, the stages of military research and development (R & D) and the development of nuclear and other sophisticated defence programmes.

There are obvious and inevitable problems of data collection on the above-mentioned indicators of arms build-up. For instance, military expenditure (MILEX) data gathered through national budgets do not include all that may be spent on maintaining and expanding the coercive capacity of the State. There is a growing tendency to work out the trend in MILEX by comparing it with gross national product (GNP). The reliance on MILEX/GNP ratio in this respect, however, is only of marginal utility, if that. A rise in GNP in a given country would accordingly result in a rise in MILEX, as the salaries of armed forces and military bureaucracy would go up and the cost structure for arms production, import and maintenance would register an increase.

But there is greater need for caution in depending heavily upon MILEX/GNP ratio. GNP, as noted above, may be an indicator of economic growth but not of economic development. There is no necessarily stable relationship between the growth of economy indicated through GNP and the growth registered as a consequence of this in the domestic cost of military strength. MILEX as well as GNP may register an increase solely on the basis of external factors. The GNP of the OPEC countries rose after the increase in oil income. Similarly, Burundi's coffee exports fetched higher prices in 1976, which increased its GNP. In both these cases even the rise in MILEX yielded a lower MILEX/GNP ratio which was, of course, misleading as a trend. In India, MILEX/GNP ratio has generally remained stable but the

military strength in its actual impact has grown over the years. In fact, there is a danger in using the GNP rise as a justification for a proportionate rise in MILEX, which the reliance on MILEX/GNP ratio tends to imply.<sup>11</sup>

There are also serious difficulties in the availability of data on military R & D; paramilitary and secret service organisations; *ad hoc* arms acquisition, etc. Official sources are reticent in giving information on these aspects and other information is both scarce and unreliable.

Huntington, in his well acknowledged study of arms races, said that 'talking of arms races is talking of matters of degree'.<sup>12</sup> This is equally true of the arms build-up, for the phenomenon and process of arms build-up are closely linked to the processes of social evolution. This is a subjective matter and in the present day reality, it is almost impossible to draw a line between defence preparedness and arms build-up. There is no mechanism to find out where the former ends and the latter starts. It may also not be a very satisfying exercise to compare arms build-up across nations on the basis of indicators outlined above, for the impact of arms build-up on the external and domestic *milieux* would be decisively influenced by the regional and global security environments for the particular country, along with its size, population, topography, social institutions, etc. In addition to this, in the Third World, the process of arms build-up as well as its domestic impact is conditioned by the nature and level of organisation in the society, particularly that of internal dissent and opposition. Wherever the internal dissent is small, disorganised and inadequately mobilised, say in countries like Bhutan, Togo or Botswana, even a small police force equipped with light arms may become an effective instrument of oppression and terror. On the other hand, an organised and skilled group of revolutionaries may force the State to develop very sophisticated and heavily armed counter-insurgency forces. Brazil may be mentioned here as an example.

Thus in addition to the quantifiable indicators, there is an essential and significant area of highly subjective assessment in the realm of arms build-up evaluation. There are no dependable and comparable cross-national indicators to measure the security requirements for a given population, territorial size and topography, external *milieux* and domestic dissent. And yet, the significance of this area of subjective assessment can be undermined only at the cost of proper and meaningful arms build-up evaluation.

## Development

Development has been an area of continuing concern and preoccupation of academics, statesmen and decision makers but only seldom has there existed a con-



sensus among them on its meaning and how it should be achieved. This is so because development is a value-laden concept, the meaning and definition of which is highly susceptible to such value preferences as where, how, for whom and by whom it is handled. Different aspects of this concept such as its goals, patterns and strategies have been, and shall always be, conditioned by the factors of time, space and culture. The parameters and thrust of development as we understand it, therefore, need to be outlined here.

Western scholars have viewed the question of development in the Third World as merely a post-colonial phenomenon. This is both incorrect and unhelpful, not only in terms of chronology and historical evolution but also in our effort to understand the present day problems of the Third World and find out ways and means to evolve effective responses to these problems. It is true that the Third World as a *political* entity is mainly a post-colonial creation; but that those societies which today constitute the Third World existed thousands of years ago cannot be denied. In terms of development, it is now widely acknowledged that Egypt, China and India flourished as highly developed societies much before either the American society came into existence, or Europe experienced the historical breakthrough in its developmental evolution in the form of the Renaissance and the Industrial Revolution. The question of the post-colonial process of development in the Third World must be approached while keeping this historical reality in mind.

Concerted attempts have been made with the beginning of the post-Second World War decolonization process, to think about the development of the newly independent countries. Such attempts have been dominated by two systematic and major approaches, namely the liberal or Western, and Marxist or Socialist. The debate between these two approaches has often reflected their respective ideological preferences and strategic considerations that emanated from the bi-polar nature of world politics. Both of these approaches seem to be inadequate and eventually irrelevant. Inadequate, because of their expressive preoccupation with the goal of ultimate material affluence; and irrelevant, because they essentially argue that the real salvation for the Third World lies in repeating and following their respective developmental experiences. The historical contexts, material reality and external *milieu* of the Third World countries that have so many unique features are not properly taken into account. Let us briefly discuss the major thrusts of these approaches.

Western scholars came up with the concepts of modernisation and development to underline their assumptions. Theories propounded to outline the course of development, even in its specific aspects of political institutions and norms as well as economic structures and capabilities, concentrated on how the developing countries would and should imitate the Western experience. Towards the end of the sixties,



however, it began to dawn upon the Western scholars that there was a big gap between their theories and the actual course of development in the Third World. The concept of modernisation was, therefore, revised to denote a zig-zag, complex and multilinear, instead of being a unilinear, gradual and smooth process of development. Lately, however, there has been a shift away from industrialization and rapid growth in devising a strategy for development in the Third World. Emphasis is increasingly being placed on agriculture, cottage and small scale industry and development of institutional structures at the grass-root level. The new slogan is: *Small is Beautiful*. This appears to be the end of the road for the moment, while the Western scholarship is trying its best to look for new openings and new directions. To a considerable extent the Western approach influenced the developmental strategies for the Third World adopted by the world organisations such as the United Nations and the World Bank. The first UN development decade accordingly emphasised import substitution industrialisation as the road to economic development. The second UN development decade stressed the importance of per capita income and GNP growth. Both the strategies have yielded disappointing results. Perhaps the strategy for the third decade will evolve along the theme of *Small is Beautiful*. But how far will that help?

Marxist scholarship has only been slightly more careful than its Western counterpart in its approach to the question of development in the Third World. The credit perhaps goes to Marx himself who viewed the 'Asiatic mode of Production' as a specific pattern of development in itself. However, his initial assumptions were not worked out any further by his successors and adherents who, by and large, viewed the problem of Third World development as mainly that of revolution against imperialism and colonialism, and the ultimate transformation of the feudal mode of production to socialism. The Marxist law of succession that describes the gradual stages of development as pre-feudal — feudal — capitalism — socialism, created problems for socialist foreign policy in the post-Second World War bipolar context. According to the 'law of succession', the Third World societies would be the first to become capitalist and thus to be conceded to the opposing bloc before socialist revolutions could succeed in them. This was strategically suicidal for Soviet foreign policy. To overcome this theoretical difficulty, the Soviet scholars formulated a new concept called 'non-capitalist path of development', in which it was envisaged that transition to socialism was possible even without going through the stage of capitalism. This could be achieved, amongst other things, through the adoption of anti-imperialist socialist allies.<sup>13</sup>

Another approach to the aspects of development that is generally associated with the Marxist framework is that of dependency. There are, however, various strands in

the *dependencia* school of theorists.<sup>14</sup> The main concern of this school has been to interpret and explain the phenomenon of underdevelopment. There is a broad consensus that unequal and imbalanced development is under-development which was caused by the exploitative penetration of the international system into a given society, as witnessed in colonialism and imperialism. Such under-development results in continuous dependence of the penetrated societies (of the Third World) upon the penetrating forces (the metropolitan powers), which in turn perpetuates under-development. Whereas the dependency approach has enriched our understanding of the consequences of colonialism for the present-day process of development in the Third World, it does not precisely define what development is, nor how or through what strategies, it can be achieved. The approach suggests only by implication that true development is an overall balanced development which should be independent and autonomous in relation to the metropolitan powers of the world. This understanding is helpful, if only in a limited way, in giving a proper direction to those searching for the meaning of development. At least it will be useful until new insight is developed by the advocates of this approach.

Learning from the impasse reached in the Western as well as the Socialist approaches to development in the Third World, some new efforts have been initiated to break fresh grounds. The new efforts have rejected the idea of viewing development only as a reflection of economic growth. Instead, it is emphasized that development is a broad-based, multi-dimensional and balanced phenomenon that means comprehensive progress in all walks of life — economic, political and social. The UN Asian Development Institute study of 1977 making a strong plea for reconsidering the concept of development afresh says:

. . . development is a process by which one's overall personality is enhanced . . . Development of collective personality requires physical (material, economic) development, but is above all the development and application of consciousness and faculties . . . Thus economic development, while it is vitally necessary cannot be treated as an independent question divorced from its social bearings. Development of a society is social development, a process in which economic and non-economic elements interact organically with each other. Attempts to isolate the 'economic' elements and fit them into any hypothetical model of 'economic development' are unscientific.

Most of the present attempts to conceptualize development are being made around this focus. The starting assumption is that development is development of 'people in society' and not simply 'as production of goods and services nor as their distribution'.<sup>15</sup> Under this assumption the satisfaction of basic needs and the building of a self-reliant society through balanced and comprehensive develop-



ment acquire major significance.<sup>16</sup> Basic needs have been defined as 'not only food, clothing, shelter and some education, health care and other social services, but also such fundamental rights as freedom of expression and safeguards against State tyranny', and self-reliance 'not as autarchy' but 'an end to a period of hopeless dependency'.<sup>17</sup> The existing social, economic and political power structures are viewed as hindrances to such need-based and self-reliant development. While accepting the main thrust of such an approach, it must be kept in mind that in the new-found enthusiasm for development from within, the international obstacles to such development should neither be ignored nor underestimated. For not only do there exist linkages between 'national inequality orders' and 'international inequality order'<sup>18</sup> but such linkages are mutually reinforcing and extremely powerful.

Thus, while considering the goals, strategies and patterns of development in the Third World, both the necessity for internal thrust and relevance, and the inevitability of external stimuli and constraints must be kept in view. As such, development in concrete terms would mean generating within a society those values and processes, as well as laying down institutions, that help create material and overall conditions for building up an egalitarian, participant and just social order. The external prerequisite for such development would be an international system that is based upon equal and co-operative relations among nations that ensure dignity, respect and prosperity for all.

Development defined as being need-based and self-reliant, poses serious difficulties of measurement. Galtung and his associates have made an attempt to evolve a matrix for this purpose, but we are still nowhere near to putting this matrix into application.<sup>19</sup> The kind of data needed for this application have not only to be computed and systematised but even generated and gathered. It may also be futile to indulge in empirical exercises to measure things like values, the understanding of which is crucial in the process of development. There is some truth in what the UN Asian Development Institute study said about measuring development:

It would be futile to attempt to measure any country's social development quantitatively and expect consensus about it; the world's richest society may be considered to be its sickest and hence not developed at all. Such positions can be understood but cannot be refuted; and yet scientific judgements may be given on such a basis. While scientific judgements about social development need to be reasoned, cardinal quantification has often served as a fetish that has distracted from rather than helped evaluate the more essential qualitative attributes.<sup>20</sup>

Accordingly, the nature and level of development can only partially be subjected to quantitative measurement. This may invite the charge that such a concept of, and approach to, development are both imprecise and subjective. The charge may be tenable and yet by adopting this concept we may be at least a few steps nearer the reality so far as development in the Third World is concerned.

## The Third World

In the study and conduct of international economic and political relations, the term 'Third World' has become an essential part of the idiom. It is used as a concept and a category. First coined by the French Scholars in the early fifties — they used the phrase *tiers monde* — it soon became fashionable with other scholars. Within a decade of its birth, by the beginning of the sixties, it was an acceptable and widely used term. Since then it has also been used frequently as a synonym for such phrases as 'underdeveloped world', 'developing countries', 'less developed countries', 'former colonies', 'Afro-Asian and Latin American countries', 'the South' (of the North-South division) and so on. Lately, in the past five or six years, however, the validity of the Third World as a concept and its utility as a tool of analysis in the study of international relations have been seriously questioned. Not only is the question being raised, 'The Third World: Does it exist?' and answered in the negative frequently, but even a 'Fourth World' has been carved out of the group of countries that were hitherto described as the Third World.

There are powerful diplomatic and strategic considerations that have influenced the new categorization of the Third World into the Third and the Fourth Worlds. We have discussed such considerations elsewhere.<sup>21</sup> These considerations apart, the main basis of the new categorization is national income and wealth indicated through GNP and per capita income.<sup>22</sup> It is widely acknowledged that GNP is a misleading indicator even of economic growth, let alone of economic development. It does not give us any idea either of the potential of the actual development, as it is a highly dependent variable. Further, the GNP differentiations do not in any case basically alter or disprove the comparative levels of overall poverty and underdevelopment of the Third World vis-a-vis the first two worlds. This can be clearly seen by a comprehensive reading of the world economic and social indicators.<sup>23</sup> The population affected by the new wealth in the Third World is extremely small. The rich OPEC nations do not and cannot consume even a fraction of the oil they produce, owing to the lack of industrialisation. They have only just started thinking along the lines of laying down an industrial infrastructure. The availability of skills, organisation and technology in these countries is very low. The distribution of income within the societies is extremely uneven — not to be confused with the per capita income or GNP. There are not enough roads, schools or hospitals. If these indicators are taken into account with due emphasis, the World Bank ranking of the Third World nations would be drastically reshuffled. The 'Fourth World' would then cease to exist as a category.

A more viable approach to the Third World concept should, therefore, be based upon the overall level of development viewed in a comprehensive sociological per-



spective as discussed earlier. Such a perspective has to be kept within the bounds of a comparative framework, for the Third World can exist only when there are the First and the Second Worlds. Viewed accordingly, the Third World includes nearly all the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.<sup>24</sup> All these countries are groping to evolve a viable approach to their respective social and economic development. The context of development in these countries in the present post-colonial phase has been conditioned by their pre-colonial evolution as well as colonial trauma. It is now becoming clear to many sensitive social scientists and statesmen that, in terms of goals, levels, patterns and strategies, the experience of either capitalist or socialist roads to development may not be fully applicable to the Third World countries. Therefore, it is on the basis of the contexts, goals, strategies and outcomes of development that the Third World is a distinct concept and a separate category by itself. Underlining this 'otherness of the Third World', Hensman wrote:

The Third World is outside Europe and North America, and it is not an extension of the power, values and interests of greater Europe (Europe, North America, Japan and Australia), given local colouring in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It is an authentically independent and original creation of the peoples of the southern continents, conscious of their pre-colonial past and identity, but open to a 'future without precedent'. It is a future in which the primitive, peripheral or subordinate role its peoples played as producers and consumers is ended.<sup>25</sup>

The difficulty in measuring development as discussed earlier also makes it difficult to define precisely the category of the Third World. But this is not an adequate reason for denuding the concept of the Third World of its development-based criteria, and adopting the more empirically oriented basis of GNP and *per capita* income instead. For despite this difficulty, we would surely not categorise any of the First or Second World countries as belonging to the Third World, since the differences between them are too glaring and substantial to be ignored. It may also be possible to evaluate some of the debatable cases on the basis of the development criteria. For instance, South Africa, irrespective of the political complexion and character of its present regime (which in any case is on its way out) on the one hand, and the build-up of State power on the other, belongs to the Third World. So do all the countries of Latin America.

The difficulty regarding the categorisation of China exists not because of its great power status and the level of social mobilisation that gives a different flavour to its economic system and political institution. The problem mainly arises from the fact that although the context and outcome of development in China give it an *appearance* of a Third World country, its successful attempts to operate the strategies of socialist

development and institutionalise goals of socialism make it *essentially* a part of the Second World. China's own claims to be categorised as a Third World country may not be of much help in this respect.<sup>26</sup>

Notwithstanding this difficulty of application involved in some specific cases, the Third World, viewed in an overall developmental perspective, appears to be a sound concept and a flexible, resilient category. The expression 'Third World' neither denotes an inferior value structure, nor a descending numerical order. It represents a set of specific characteristics of development that are unique in more than one way in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. It represents the broadly similar, although not exactly identical, nature of these countries' experiences in the processes of development. The processes that were arrested in the past are discouraging and uncertain at present and are likely to be unprecedented in the future.

## The Working of the Three Concepts

The three concepts of arms build-up, development and the Third World as described above constitutes the basic structure of our study's framework. As noted earlier, our main concern is with the linkages between arms build-up and development, and such linkages have to be viewed in the context of the Third World. Accordingly, the Third World defines the scope and the territorial boundaries of the region within which the linkages will be considered. It is neither possible nor desirable in this broad and exploratory study to identify and analyse the linkages in each and every country. We shall limit our observations to a group of countries in each of the Third World regions where the arms build-up and development linkages display significant characteristics.

The phenomena of arms build-up and development interact with each other in a two-way process, i.e. each of them has implications for the other. Thus a more comprehensive study of the subject should have two parts. In one, the development variable should be kept constant in order to work out the implications of arms build-up for various aspects of development. In the other, arms build-up should be kept constant in order to see how various aspects of development impinge upon arms build-up. The two parts should then be integrated to complete the picture of the linkages. However, it is not possible to make such a comprehensive study of the subject here. Thus it is proposed to limit this study to the first part identified above. Accordingly, we shall go into some details of the arms build-up phenomenon and see what its implications are for development (or rather, underdevelopment!) in the Third World. It will be useful to identify such points and areas within the realm of development as are

affected by arms build-up. For this purpose we have divided development into its *milieux* and components in the last section of our study. The *milieux* of development are comprised of domestic and external (or international) *milieux*; and the components of development are its values, structures and processes. Our objective in this study is to identify the possible implications of the nature and extent of arms build-up for the *milieux* and components of development in the Third World.

# Arms Build-Up and Development: Trends and Patterns

## Arms Build-Up

There are four categories under which the data on arms build-up are generally classified and evaluated. They are: military expenditures (MILEX); armed forces, transfer of arms and finally, arms production. Various institutions compile data on these categories in their own different ways but none of them take all the categories into account at the same time and with due emphasis, in comparative terms.

In this study we are depending upon three major sources, viz., the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London, to discover the trends and patterns of arms build-up in various regions of the Third World. All three of these institutions bring out their annual publications, respectively named: *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers* (comparative data for a ten-year period); *World Armaments and Disarmament* (SIPRI Year Book) and *The Military Balance* (Yearly figures). Of these, the ACDA publication may be considered to be the most comprehensive in its coverage, as it includes data on MILEX, armed personnel and arms transfers. The SIPRI data take into account MILEX and arms trade but not the armed forces. In addition, it also compiles a register of arms production and shows the spread of major and sophisticated weapons in the Third World. The IISS data is mainly concerned with the central strategic balance and offers yearly data on armed forces and military manpower for all the countries.

Since we are interested in all four categories of arms build-up data, it is advisable that instead of using any one of these sources alone and exclusively, all three of them should be used together. This creates a major problem. Owing to the significantly different concepts and ranges used, methods of data compilation and valuation techniques employed, and the forms of statistical presentations adopted in these sources their joint use and direct comparison become either impossible or misleading. In order to mitigate this difficulty, at least to some extent, care has been taken to rely upon one particular source while looking at one particular indicator of comparison. This by itself may not be an adequate device to overcome the difficulty, but there does not seem to be any other way. Keeping this limitation in mind, we may look



at the four categories of arms build-up data for the Third World. After underlining some of the trends within these categories, we shall discuss the factors that have contributed to the phenomenon of arms build-up in the Third World.

## Military Expenditures

The data on MILEX in the Third World are presented in Tables 1.1 to 1.3 at the end of this work. In gross terms at constant 1973 prices, the Third World MILEX shows a steady increase from \$6409 million in 1957 to \$41,762 million in 1976 (Table 1.1). This means an increase of 651.61 per cent in a period of two decades. The rise has been particularly rapid since the mid-sixties. Whereas between 1957 and 1967, the average annual rate of increase was 2.12 per cent, the comparative figure for the period 1967 to 1976 was 9.3 per cent. The figures for 1977 are tentative but they show a definite decline in absolute terms, as also in the rate of growth. This is only the second time in 21 years that the upward trend has been interrupted, and it is the first in which the decline in expenditure has been of any consequence; in the earlier instance, 1958-59, the decline was just \$34 million — well within the margin of statistical error.

Table 1.3 shows that, whereas all the Third World regions have maintained, by and large, a steady rise in their MILEX for the past twenty years, the yearly rises have been steep in the case of West Asia, particularly since 1972. This region took the lead in military spending in 1967 and has maintained that lead since then. In 1976, West Asian MILEX was more than 50 per cent of the entire Third World MILEX, and more than thrice that of any other Third World region. The three highest spenders in the region have been Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, (Table 1.2), followed closely by Iraq and Kuwait (not in the Table). All three top West Asian military spenders spent more than anyone else in the Third World and according to one analysis for 1975, Iran ranked seventh, Egypt eighth and Saudi Arabia eleventh as military spenders in the whole world.<sup>27</sup> They seem to have begun their declining trend in MILEX after 1975. After the events of early 1979 in Iran culminating in the downfall of the Shah, Iran will almost certainly cease to occupy its top position in the Third World MILEX and, in all probability, may not attain that position again in the foreseeable future.

Elsewhere in the Third World, the leading countries in MILEX were India and Pakistan in South Asia, the two Koreas and Vietnam in the Far East, Libya, South Africa and Nigeria in Africa and Argentina, Brazil and Chile in Latin America (Table 1.2). Most of these countries show a steady annual rise in MILEX and spend 2.3 to 7.8 times more than in 1957.

Cross-country comparisons of MILEX in gross terms are totally misleading. This is due to various factors such as the differences from one country to another in the scope and content of their respective national budgets, the definitions of MILEX, the size of economies and so on. It may, however, not be altogether futile to look at the comparative figures of MILEX in relation to other indicators such as GNP, total governmental spending and population. Of these, MILEX as a percentage of total government expenditure is perhaps the most directly useful, in that it indicates the priority accorded to the defence sector in national life. The other two have a more limited utility and are more likely to be misleading if interpreted without qualifications. They are directly conditioned by other variables, such as the complexity of economic activity, income variations and standards of living etc. in a given country. Such comparative ratios, though they do not eliminate the problems involved, at least marginally minimize them.

Table 1.3 shows MILEX in per capita terms and in relation to GNP and total governmental spending (both in percentages) for the leading spenders in the various Third World regions for the ten years 1967-1976. On these indicators, Oman appears as the most heavily militarised country not only in the West Asian region but the entire Third World. In 1976, Oman's MILEX was US.\$1,020 per capita (at 1975 prices), 40.1 per cent of its GNP and 46.7 per cent of its central government expenditure. Saudi Arabia, along with Iran and Syria, were other notable spenders in the region. Until 1974 Iran and Jordan spent a significant percentage of their GNP and total governmental expenditure on defence. In South Asia, Pakistan leads India in all three measures, almost throughout the ten year period. Singapore and Taiwan, along with the two Koreas and Vietnam, dominate the scene in the Far East. In Africa, South Africa heads the list in every respect. In 1976, however, Nigeria emerges as a strong contender if the whole period is taken into account. Peru leads Latin America in 1976 in MILEX/government expenditure ratio, but with respect to the GNP and per capita measures, Cuba has been spending consistently more. Brazil and Chile also occupy a significant place in this respect in the region.

A large majority of the Third World countries have a per capita GNP lower than \$500 and their MILEX accounted for less than five per cent of GNP in 1976 (Table 1.4). Of forty-three such countries, twenty spent 2 to 4.99 per cent of GNP on defence, thirteen spent 1 to 1.99 per cent and nine spent less than 1 per cent. There were three countries, Somalia, Yemen (sana) and Pakistan which, despite very low per capita GNP (less than \$200), spent between five and ten per cent of it on defence. Egypt's MILEX in 1976 was more than ten per cent of its GNP which was fairly low, i.e. between \$200 and \$499. Those with a comparatively higher rate of GNP as well as MILEX were all West Asian countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Iran and Iraq.

In terms of the percentage of central government expenditure, more than twenty Third World countries spent more than twenty per cent for military purposes and another ten were fairly close to that figure in 1976. Of those spending more than twenty per cent, nine were in West Asia, four in the Far East and three in Africa. It is interesting to note that in Africa, those countries spending a very high percentage of total government expenditure on MILEX, such as Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau and Mali, do not rank very high in other MILEX measures. The countries that show a high percentage of central government expenditure as MILEX are generally small in terms of GNP and population. For example, a very small African State, Equatorial Guinea's MILEX in 1975 was 61.8 per cent of its total budget. This proportion was nearly seven per cent higher than that of the Soviet Union for the same year.

Having reviewed these trends in the MILEX of Third World countries it may be recalled that caution should be observed when drawing inferences based on MILEX-GNP and MILEX-Central Government Expenditure ratios. The difficulty involved is amply demonstrated in some very small, militarily weak and inadequately organised African and West Asian countries, showing very high percentages on such ratios. Further, there is no particular limit or level of these ratios which may be treated as standard, or as minimum-desirable in this respect.

## The Armed Forces

Aggregate numbers of armed forces, even on a yearly basis, may not give a proper idea of the trend in their rise or decline. It is relatively more meaningful to look at the strength of the armed forces in relation to the overall size of population in a given country, say the number of soldiers per thousand people. It may also be useful in addition to this to compare the strength of armed forces with MILEX in order to find out what a particular country spends on one soldier. Tables 2.1 to 2.5 present data on different aspects of a Third World armed forces.

In general, the strength of armed forces in the Third World both in aggregate numbers and in terms of soldiers per thousand of population, increased gradually until 1974 and then declined through 1976, the latest year for which data was collected. Expenditure per soldier, however, does not reflect this trend; figures on this measure indicate a steady rise, except for a brief break in 1972. A single Third World soldier cost \$4814 in 1975 (1975 price). The general decline in the strength of Third World armed forces towards 1975-1976 is accounted for by the decline for those years in the East Asian and South Asian regions (Table 2.2). In East Asia this was the result of the elimination of the South Vietnamese armed forces in 1975 and cutbacks else-



where, particularly in Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand (Table 2.3). In South Asia, all the leading countries reduced their military manpower during the years 1974, 1975 and 1976.

The declining trend, however, should not be taken too literally for various reasons. The elimination of South Vietnam apparently reduced the number of armed forces in East Asia, but in effective terms it increased the efficiency and potential of the United Vietnam's armed forces. In the case of other countries in East and South Asia, according to *Military Balance 1970-79*, there has been no significant decline. Since the ACDA figures on which our Tables are based present the combined numbers of regular and paramilitary formations, the said decline might have resulted from some real cut-down on regular armed forces' strength on the one hand and reorganisation of paramilitary formations on the other. The latter was evidently the case in countries like Bangladesh, South Korea, North Korea and Taiwan (Table 2.4).

Of the various Third World regions, East Asia occupies the dominant position in aggregate numbers of military personnel, followed closely by South Asia (Table 2.2). These two obviously have been heavily populated regions. In the number of soldiers per thousand of population, however, West Asia exceeded all others. Comparatively speaking, therefore, West Asia is, in this sense, more militarised than East and South Asia and, since 1968, it has also been spending much more per soldier than any other region. In 1978, some of the West Asian countries — Israel, Syria, Jordan and Iraq — had the highest number of soldiers as the percentage of their military age population (18 to 45 years).<sup>28</sup> The leading country in 'expenditure per soldier' by 1975 was also a West Asian country, Oman (\$49,917 at constant 1975 price), followed by South Africa (\$27,800 at constant 1975 price).

The expenditure per soldier does not necessarily reflect fighting capacity, skill, or the quality and quantity of equipment. It may do so in cases like Israel and South Africa, but in other cases it may simply mean a well-paid soldier. It is not, therefore, a reliable indicator for cross-country comparisons. The real strength of armed forces can be assessed only through the comparison of force structures, level of training and experience, and the nature of strategic doctrines and warfare tactics adopted and pursued. Comparative data on all these indicators are almost impossible to obtain.

One notable aspect of the armed forces in the Third World during the last decade or so has been the rise in para-military formations and the Reserve forces (Table 2.4). Until the mid-sixties, this aspect does not seem to have received much attention, either from Third World regimes or military analysts. As a result, data on paramilitary forces and Reservists for the period before the mid-sixties are either not available at all or are scattered, inadequate and unreliable. Even today, information is not available in the case of some countries. Most of the countries in the Third World

have increased the strength of their para-military and Reserve forces. Ethiopia, South Africa, Argentina and Iraq are some of the leading states among those who have substantially increased the strength of their para-military forces in the last three years. In 1974, Ethiopia had para-military forces of 20.4 thousand; in 1978 the figure rose to 129.0 thousand — a more than six-fold increase in four years. Egypt, Taiwan, the two Koreas and Zambia stand out as countries that have reduced their para-military forces. Such declines at times are not very substantial; occasionally they have also been partly made up for by the rise in the strength of Reservists. The latter phenomenon is evident in the case of Taiwan and South Korea since 1976 and 1977 respectively.<sup>29</sup>

In addition to, and as part of, the well-structured para-military forces, a number of Third World countries also maintain a large body of what can be called a people's militia, which is well trained and well equipped. Though this phenomenon is generally observed in the case of Communist countries with a long tradition of fighting foreign forces at the mass level, it is not their exclusive preserve. Non-communist States with or without such tradition of perpetual fighting have also adopted the idea of having a people's militia force; Israel, Brazil, Burma, and Syria, may be mentioned in this respect. Even a small state like Nepal was toying with the idea of having a people's militia force as early as 1960, with Israel as the model.

Some of the very small states like Liberia and Haiti maintain a fair strength of para-military forces. In 1970, Liberia had regular armed forces of 5,250 and a para-military strength of 21,300 men, out of a population of 1,830,000. Haiti had 6,550 and 14,900 as regular and para-military forces respectively out of a total population of 4,820,000.<sup>30</sup> There are other small countries like Panama, Costa Rica and Botswana which maintain only para-military forces.

This points to an important characteristic of para-military forces. Their main utility in the Third World in recent years has been found in internal use, not for constructive purposes but mainly for preserving domestic stability and law and order. These forces have on several occasions become instruments of repression and terror in the hands of alienated, undemocratic and weak regimes. This is not to say that regular armed forces have not been used for internal purposes. They have been so used in almost all the Third World countries at one time or another and in one way or the other, most extensively, frequently and directly in Africa and Latin America. However, the para-military forces have the distinction of being mainly used for internal purposes.

In addition to the factors already mentioned, the data on armed forces and MILEX tend to be distorted by the nature of military service (i.e. conscription or voluntary) in a country. Conscription makes military personnel available at no or

comparatively lower cost. Thus it adds to the strength of effective armed forces, without reflecting this addition in the MILEX data. Table 2.5 shows the nature of military service in the Third World as of 1978. According to this Table, of the sixty-eight countries for which the nature of military service is known, forty-four, or 64.71 per cent, have conscription, and twenty-four, or 35.29 per cent have voluntary service; in twenty-seven of these countries the period of service is two or more years. An interesting aspect of this phenomenon is that most of the countries that have a system of voluntary military service were the British colonies, while many of those that have conscription were under French colonial control. The colonial tradition of raising armed forces may, therefore, help to explain the system adopted after independence. The nature of the political system (socialist or otherwise) and the experiences during national liberation and post-independence period are other factors that may explain the difference in systems of military service adopted in the Third World. This Table also identifies those countries that either do not have regular military service or have all the other services (e.g. Navy, Air Force), as part of their 'army service'.

## Arms Transfers

Arms transactions take place in the form of grants and aid as well as hard commercial sales. Together, they constitute arms transfers, or arms trade as it is generally called. Tables 3.1 to 3.5 present data on some aspects of arms trade with the Third World. This trade has shown a steady rise over the post-Second World War period, though its upward trend remained largely unnoticed until the late sixties. Since then, however, arms trade with the Third World has been a subject of great concern, which has resulted in careful and as thorough studies as possible on the subject.<sup>31</sup> Since it is a matter of wide and continuing intellectual and diplomatic effort, a brief description of the main trends may be sufficient here.

The value of arms imported by the Third World in 1977 was a little less than seven-fold of what it was in 1957 (Table 3.1). The imports have shown year-to-year fluctuations around this overall upward trend, although sustained increases occurred between 1966 and 1971, as again between 1974 and 1977. Among the regions of the Third World until 1966 competition for the position of the main recipient of arms lay between West Asia and the Far East, with South Asia figuring prominently in 1957, 1958, 1961 and 1971. (South Asia spent the most in 1950, \$639 million, when it ranked as a close second to the Far East, including Vietnam). Since 1966, however, West Asian imports have far exceeded those of others and, since 1973, this region has accounted for more than 50 per cent of total Third World arms imports. The Far East,



which has shown a declining trend for the past couple of years, may start showing a rise again as a consequence of the recent conflict in Indo-China.

Individually, Iran has topped the list of Third World arms importers (Table 3.2). In terms of cumulative imports over the period 1967-76, Iran was followed by Vietnam, Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Following the overthrow of the Shah, Iran will almost certainly lose its top rank among arms recipients. However, a militarily depleted Iran may provide accelerated arms build-ups elsewhere on the Gulf, notably in Saudi Arabia. If the arms imports are aggregated over a longer period, South Vietnam emerges as the largest single recipient, even though it ceased to exist 1975. In South Asia, India and Pakistan were the main arms recipients. In the Far East, South Korea and Taiwan were next only to Vietnam. In Africa, Libya, followed by South Africa, dominated the scene, and in Latin America, Brazil, Peru and Cuba ranked in that order. Angola, which came into existence only in 1975, received arms worth \$389 million (at 1975, constant price) up to 1976, which is more than the aggregate imports of many of the African countries for the ten years recorded in the Table.

Some of the Third World countries, while importing arms, also export them to other Third World countries. Table 3.3 shows this aspect. Here again, we find that West Asian countries dominate the scene. It is interesting to note that small countries like Singapore, the Ivory Coast, Malaysia and Abu D'habi figure in the Table as occasionally significant exporters of arms to Third World countries. The Third World exporters mainly supply arms to the countries within their own regions. Most of such supplies are re-exports, except in the case of Israel, Brazil, South Africa, India and Argentina which, as will be seen later, have considerable capacity for the local production of arms.

The arms trade within the Third World, however, constituted only two per cent of the world's total trade (Table 3.4). The bulk of supplies to the Third World between 1970-76, as also earlier, was made by the five nuclear powers and Italy.<sup>32</sup> The Soviet Union and China, in fact, were late-comers as arms suppliers, beginning in the late fifties and mid-sixties respectively. Until the end of the fifties, the Western powers had almost a complete monopoly in the supply of arms to the Third World. If the figures for the ten years between 1967 and 1976 are compared, we find that US supplies dominate West Asia, East Asia and Latin America, and in these regions they are followed by the Soviet Union (West Asia and East Asia) and France (Latin America).<sup>33</sup> For the same period, the Soviet Union emerges as the principal supplier to South Asia and Africa where it is followed by China and France respectively. This suggests that, whereas the US has reconciled itself to playing a docile role as a supplier in the regions dominated by Soviet supplies, the USSR shows a considerable

propensity to compete with the US in the regions where the latter is a principal supplier. France and China, on the other hand, show tendencies to compete with the super powers, though they are far behind, both in terms of quality and quantity of the arms supplied.

A very important aspect of the arms trade with the Third World is the spread of major weapons. Table 3.5 shows trends in this respect. It is clear from the table that the spread accelerated after 1960. It has been fastest in the supply of new combat aircraft, rising from one country in 1960 to forty-seven countries in 1977.<sup>34</sup> The availability of missile systems in the Third World countries has also increased rapidly; forty-two in 1977 against just two in 1955. A significant dimension of the spread of major weapons in the Third World has been the narrowing time gap, at least in some cases, between the first production of a weapons system and its transfer to a Third World country. For example, the Mirage 3E aircraft, manufactured in France in 1964, was introduced into South Africa in 1965. Similarly, the F-16, the US combat aircraft, manufactured in 1976, was on order from Iran and Israel in 1977. There are various other examples of this type for all the varieties of sophisticated weapons. A combination of factors such as commercial incentives, political preferences and strategic considerations account for this phenomenon.<sup>35</sup> The Western powers have shown the greatest propensity to transfer new systems, although the Soviet Union has not hesitated to provide its latest products to specially favoured Third World countries.

While considerable information is available on the transfer of major weapons, very little is known about the other vital aspect of arms trade in the Third World, namely, trade in small arms. A large number of Third World countries are far less dependent on the major world suppliers for small arms than they are for major weapons.<sup>36</sup> Neither is there any information on the clandestine flow of arms, which is probably not inconsequential in the context of the Third World.<sup>37</sup> Similarly, the *ad hoc* acquisition of arms, as mentioned under the concept of arms build-up earlier in this study, also needs to be taken into account. For instance, a large quantity of South Vietnamese arms, worth \$10,204 million (acquired between 1967 and 1976), fell into North Vietnamese hands. India acquired considerable quantities of arms following the fall of Dacca and the surrender of 90,000 Pakistani troops in December 1971. The revolutionary regime of Angola acquired all the stores of its contender UNITA, which were supplied by South Africa and Western powers. How much of the Iranian arsenal the new post-Shah regime will retain, and what it will do with any surpluses remains to be seen.

These are only some of the instances where the qualities and quantities involved are not negligible. However, insufficient data on this type of arms acquisition prevent us from doing more than recognising its existence.



## Arms Production

As compared to the arms trade, local production is a much less significant source of arms acquisition in the Third World. Nonetheless, it is gradually becoming important. Tables 4.1 to 4.3 show some of the notable features of arms production activity in the Third World.

According to these Tables, India, Brazil, South Africa, Israel, Argentina, Yugoslavia and Turkey emerge as the principal arms producers. They have capacities to assemble and/or manufacture major weapons as well as a wide range of small arms in substantial quantities. The production capacities of most of the remaining countries are confined to the part-manufacture and assembly of aircraft, warships and some types of small weapons. The types of weapons produced, in fact, depend upon the nature of the overall industrial infrastructure. For instance, production of armoured fighting vehicles needs a sound infrastructure of heavy industry, which only the leading producers have. Production of military electronics and chemical weapons, on the other hand, requires not a heavy, but an advanced industrial base with a high level of sophisticated technical know-how and substantial capital investment. Accordingly, small countries like Singapore and Taiwan also figure along with the leading producers in this field, since they have the necessary technological input and flow of capital made available by the multi-national corporations.<sup>38</sup>

A notable aspect of arms production data in the Third World is that West Asia, the region which has otherwise dominated in the various arms build-up indicators, appears very insignificant. Table 4.3 shows planned capacities for the production of several weapons by Iran, but it is now unlikely that many of these schemes will go ahead. In 1975, following the Egyptian initiative of 1972, four Arab States namely, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates jointly established the Arab Military Industrialisation Organisation (AMIO) to undertake co-production of defence equipment under licence, mainly from Western firms, on an ambitious scale. The representatives of these four countries met in Cairo in 1976 to identify priorities and work out the details of the production programme. It was decided to launch the programme with the production of guided missiles and military aircraft. Nothing substantial, however, seems to have come out of this venture so far. On a similar pattern, Pakistan, Turkey and Iran decided in early 1976 to undertake joint weapons production within the framework of CENTO regional development. It was proposed that Iran should provide financial support, while Pakistan and Turkey were to contribute technical expertise. The programme appears to have fizzled out as a result of the subsequent political changes in Pakistan and Iran.<sup>39</sup>

In most of the cases, the Third World has adopted two strategies of weapon production. The first has been that of indigenous design and development of weapons geared to the goal of complete self-sufficiency. Only a few countries which have comparatively better organised industrial sectors, far-sighted leadership and regional and global pressures to become self-sufficient have been able to pursue this strategy. India, South Africa, Israel, Yugoslavia, Argentina under Peron, and Egypt under Nasser may be mentioned in this respect. Pakistan and Brazil have also lately been making some efforts to establish indigenous defence industries. This strategy however, has not led the Third World countries any nearer to the goal of self-sufficiency since there are serious bottlenecks in developing military R & D, mobilising capital and technical know-how, and at the same time competing with the developed countries in these areas.<sup>40</sup>

The second strategy is that of weapons production under licence from, and co-production arrangements with private firms in developed countries, in the case of Western nations, and with governments in the case of socialist-bloc countries. This strategy is pursued most extensively, by almost all the weapons producers of the Third World, including those who pursue the first strategy of indigenous production. Table 4.3 indicates the extent of the two strategies as adopted by the Third World countries. The strategy of licensed production is geared to the goal of import substitution; the achievement of results, however, is dependent on many factors. Since the participation of the Third World countries in such collaborative ventures is through the government, the factors of low administrative efficiency, poor managerial skills, corruption, political changes, etc., impinge heavily upon the production processes. The external collaborator on the other hand, naturally gives priority to its own interests in the particular production arrangement. If the collaborator is a Western multinational corporation, as it is in most cases, it also exposes the Third World country and its weapons production programme to all the other advantages and disadvantages of working with such a corporation — something that has been widely debated in international academic and diplomatic circles for the past few years. However, the complexities and ramifications of weapons production in the Third World remain largely unexplored.

Collaborative ventures amongst the Third World countries themselves have occasionally been given a trial. In the late fifties, India and Egypt, with financial and technological backing from Yugoslavia, launched a programme to manufacture combat aircraft. This continued up to the mid-sixties, when it faded out without yielding any results, beyond some bad feeling between the collaborators. We have mentioned above the efforts of the AMIO and of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey in this field, the outcomes of which are not at all encouraging. The main hurdle in such schemes arises

from the lack of adequate capital and technical know-how, in the complex and rapidly changing field of weapon production. Continuation of political *entente* between the collaborating governments over a fairly long period of time is another crucial factor in the success of such ventures.

Despite the constraints under which local production of weapons operate in the Third World, some countries, such as India, Brazil, Yugoslavia, South Africa and Israel have made considerable progress and have emerged as important regional exporters also. Israel's export capacities have at times irritated even one of its principal benefactors, the United States. Brazil takes care of a good deal of its smaller neighbours' requirements in South America.<sup>41</sup> India and South Africa, besides consuming their products themselves, also supply to the Third World countries within their respective regions, as well as to neighbouring countries, as does Singapore.<sup>42</sup>

Besides the production of conventional weapons, some Third World countries also have a nuclear programme. Table 4.4 lists such countries. It is clear from the Table that only India, Israel, Taiwan, South Africa and possibly Brazil and Pakistan have viable nuclear weapons prospects. So far only India has carried out a successful nuclear explosion (May 1974), and then only once. It is difficult to say what stage their nuclear-weapons programmes, if any, have reached in these countries, although some of them, such as India, have repeatedly reiterated their intentions to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only.<sup>43</sup> It must, however, be kept in mind that the nuclear facilities of Egypt, India, Israel and South Africa are not subject to IAEA or bilateral safeguards, nor have these countries signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty.<sup>44</sup>

## Summary of Trends

All indicators of the armament process have shown a clear and strong upward trend in the period since the year 1950. The build-up has been particularly rapid with regard to arms trade and para-military forces. As for the span of time, if we take the mid-sixties as the dividing point, we find that the build-up has been comparatively greater during the latter period, both in terms of its rate of growth and its extent and quality. There have been yearly fluctuations, but they do not obscure the steady long-term trends. The decline in some indicators such as arms trade, and MILEX-GNP ratio has been noticed during the last couple of years, but how far or whether such a decline will be sustained remains to be seen.

The speed and extent of arms build-up has not been the same for all the regions of the Third World. The area that has undergone the fastest and most extensive build-up in the Third World is comprised of West Asian and North African (WANA) countries. Most of them incidentally are members of OPEC. It would be misleading to



assume, as is often done, that all the OPEC members have made equally fast strides in arms build-up. Countries like Venezuela, Indonesia and Nigeria stand at a much lower level of arms build-up as compared to some of the WANA countries. It is important to note, however, that WANA countries show significant rises in all the indicators of arms build-up except arms production, with Israel being a major exception to the latter qualification. The Far East stands next to WANA countries in arms build-up. The indications that the pace of the build-up in the Far East may slow down following the conclusion of the war in Vietnam in 1975 are no longer valid in the face of fresh turmoil in the region. Compared to these two regions the rate and scope of the arms build-up in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia have been moderate. Individually, Iran was classified as the top-ranking armed state in the Third World at the end of 1978.

It should, however, be kept in mind that the ranks and precedence of some countries and some regions within the Third World identified above are based upon quantifiable and quantified data. If the subjective area of assessment with respect to arms build-up as described in the previous section of this paper is taken into account, it may be observed that such ranking would not be of much help. For instance, countries like Brazil and Uganda have in the domestic context become considerably militarised, irrespective of the arms trade and MILEX figures. Vietnam has become militarily stronger in yet another sense since 1975, irrespective of the observable decline in arms build-up indicators. Angola is another new, up and coming country in the field of arms build-up. In Pakistan and Bangladesh, military regimes have staged a come-back and seem to be consolidating their positions.

The indicators of arms build-up have been studied over the period for the Third World alone. It would be worthwhile to compare them with similar indicators for the developed countries for a similar span of time. A comparative picture in this respect has therefore been presented in Table 5 for a ten-year period between 1967 and 1976 (both years included). This Table shows that, except in the cases of MILEX/Central Government Expenditure ratio and arms production, the Third World is ahead of the developed worlds. This in fact masks the actual level of arms build-up in the developed worlds, which is much higher still than in the Third World. This is explained by the 'Remarks' column in the Table. In terms of total outlays, the developed countries' MILEX is \$200 to \$250 billion more than that of the developing countries. The size of the developed countries' armed forces is smaller than that of the developing countries. This is despite the fact that the developed worlds have five to six persons more for every thousand of their population serving in their armed forces than the Third World. Clearly the huge difference in total population between the two groups is responsible for this. The value of arms imported by the Third World is much higher

than that of the developed worlds, but this merely reflects the fact that the developed countries meet most of their requirements through local production. They have, accordingly, a wider scale of better and more numerous arms than those possessed by the Third World countries. Lastly, the Third World's higher imports only reflect the extent of the developed worlds' exports and manufactures. Militarily, therefore, the Third World is no match for the First and Second Worlds. Thus, the World Military Order is no different from the World Economic Order.

## Development

It has been proposed to keep development as a constant factor in relation to arms build-up for the purpose of this study. It is not intended, therefore, to go into details of the patterns and directions of development in the Third World. And yet, its broad parameters need to be outlined. As noted earlier, the concept of development as it relates to the Third World, together with the practicalities of putting that concept into effect, are still in the process of being determined in academic exercises. The Third World ruling elites have not consciously pursued any policy of achieving a need-based and self-reliant development of their respective societies. Efforts directed either at conceptualising or evolving a relevant strategy of development have met with no success. Consequently there exists a wide consensus that, no matter which way one looks at the Third World, it emerges as the region which has experienced the 'development of underdevelopment'.

There is, however, no uniform pattern, or any single identifiable direction of underdevelopment in the Third World. On the contrary, there are numerous levels and patterns of underdevelopment. When we talk of underdevelopment of the Third World, it does not imply that all the possible indicators of development and growth have necessarily registered declining trends. In fact, it is quite easily possible to identify gains in many areas, such as the gradually increasing rate of growth, increase in per capita income and GNP, expansion of industrialization and growing modernization of the agricultural sector, growth in literacy and education, improvement in health consciousness and medical facilities, relatively better communication and transport facilities and so on. However, these gains have not been adequate and have been slow and tardy in coming. They fall much short of expectations and requirement and the sustenance of such gains in future is quite uncertain.

A further aspect of the phenomenon of development in the Third World should be considered. This relates to the development of such factors as have either neutralized or adversely affected the developmental gains referred to above. Mention may be

made in this respect of unexpected and enormous demographic expansion in some countries; highly unequal distribution of the gains achieved; the frequent breakdown of political institutions with the emergence of authoritarian and regimented orders in their place; substantial increase in social tensions, violence and insecurity; and, finally, an increasing dependence upon external powers. All these aspects of the developmental scene in the Third World combined give it an appearance of being haphazard, unbalanced and chaotic — not only in terms of the totality of the Third World, but also with respect to every individual country. This in effect is underdevelopment.

This makes the task of identifying definite patterns or categories of development (or underdevelopment!) in the Third World nearly impossible at the present stage. Such categorisation if and where attempted takes into account only a limited number of specific characteristics. For instance, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan are generally grouped in one category and marked as success stories in view of the impressive gains made in the field of industrialisation, rate of economic growth and per capita income. It is forgotten however, that the gains of these countries are entirely dependent upon Western capital and technology flowing in through the multinational corporations. In this respect these four Asian countries display many characteristics similar to those of the dependent Latin American countries. Further, these countries do not have much to claim in terms of the development of viable political, administrative and social institutions. This point is sharply underscored by the situation resulting from the South Korean President's assassination. Similarly, it may be possible to group India, Brazil and South Africa together, from the point of view of the sound industrial and technological infrastructure laid down in these countries. However, as soon as other socio-political indicators of development are taken into account, the categorisation falls apart.

We shall discuss more of these aspects subsequently. Here it is sufficient to note that it is possible to identify levels and patterns of development in the Third World only in terms of each of the indicators, and not in a co-ordinated and more composite manner. Furthermore, to attempt such identification along individual indicators of development would only complicate, rather than assist with the analysis and comprehension of the matter.



## Arms Build-Up Agents

A variety of factors and forces cause and contribute to the process of arms build-up in the Third World. Such factors and forces may be described as the agents of arms build-up. It may be extremely difficult to analyse comprehensively such combinations of these agents as have caused, stimulated, sustained and strengthened specific steps and decisions related to the arms build-up in the Third World. For such combinations have been extremely diverse and immensely complex. Nevertheless, an attempt to identify the major agents of arms build-up needs to be made.

### The International System: Its Instinctive Value-Base

Arms build-up in the Third World has not been an isolated, self-generated and self-contained process. It is an inherent part of the international system and as such, has been caused and conditioned by the ethics, values and impulses of the wider system. It is somewhat surprising that sufficient attention has not been paid to the role of these factors in international and national developments related to arms build-up. Lamenting this lack of attention, Nobel laureate Philip Noel-Baker once commented:

No one has made the link between national and international developments, between the lawlessness in international conduct, the lawlessness in domestic politics and the common habits of mind from which these lawlessnesses arise.<sup>45</sup>

The international system being a society of states, like any other society, has two sets of mutually diverse and interrelated value structures, viz. the instinctive values and the acquired values. Whereas the acquired values of the international system are those pertaining to peace, co-operation, progress, etc., the instinctive values underlying this very noble superstructure are reflected in the seemingly never ending 'struggle for Power' and dominance as Morgenthau put it more than thirty years ago in his book, *Politics Among Nations*. The theoretical constructs and their presentation in Morgenthau's thesis have subsequently come to be increasingly questioned and debated. However, his basic premise that the relentless pursuit of power and dominance characterises the principal aims of the society of states, remains as valid as ever.

The drive for arms build-up in the world as a whole, including that in the Third World, not only emanates but takes its strength and sustenance from this instinctive struggle for power and dominance. The roots of this struggle can be traced to the innate inequality and the hierarchial order of the international system. The 'haves' of



the system try to preserve and perpetuate a certain status quo favourable to them. As against this, the 'have-nots' endeavour to disturb and if possible, reverse the same status quo, so as to turn the situation to their own advantage. Both the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' are guided in their actions by different perceptions of the same basic feelings of insecurity and alienation. Such feelings eventually lead to arms build-up. The 'haves', possessing more of everything, feel insecure about their possessions in the face of possible widespread deprivation. The 'have-nots' having so little as compared to the affluents feel alienated and tend to rebel. The actors occupying the 'have' and 'have-not' positions have always been in a continuous process of slow and long drawn-out change but the basic unequal and hierarchical nature of the international system and the resulting struggle for power and dominance have remained unaltered.<sup>46</sup>

The structures of inequality and hierarchy are not simplified, bi-polar or unidimensional. Neither is the struggle for power a two party game played on one smooth, horizontal plane with universally applicable sets of rules. There are inequalities within the inequality, hierarchies within the hierarchy and struggles within the struggle. Their dynamics and different parameters in the now prevailing context may be broadly viewed at three levels namely: (i) the managers of the system, i.e. the Great Powers; (ii) the regional groupings; and (iii) within every single state. It is beyond the scope of this study to go into the various aspects of inequality, hierarchy and struggle for power at these levels. We are mainly concerned with the implications of the inequality, hierarchy and struggle for power at these three levels for the arms build-up process in the Third World.

## The Great Powers

More than any other single factor, the struggle for power and dominance amongst the Great Powers and their respective allies has had the most important, direct and far-reaching implications than any other single factor on the arms build-up in the Third World. Six of the Great Powers in general, and the two Super Powers in particular, have supplied nearly 95 per cent of the total arms supplied to the Third World. Most of the intra-Third World supplies resulting from re-exports from one Third World country to another, originated initially from the Great Power suppliers.

Third World arms production is also a result largely of licenced production or co-production arrangements between a given Third World country and one or more of the Great Powers. Nuclear technology and fuel have also come to the Third World from the Great Powers. And last, but not least, the Great Powers have contributed in

many diverse and diffuse ways to the organisation of armed forces, including those pertaining to counter-insurgency, civil defence and paramilitary forces, as well as to the strategic doctrines and methods of warfare in the Third World. Thus, the Third World has learned in all these areas of arms build-up by watching and experiencing the activities of the Great Powers. The Great Powers, for their part, have been only too willing to include the Third World in their own competitive global arms build-up activities.

The Great Powers' contribution to arms build-up in the Third World has resulted from the struggle for power and dominance between as well as within these powers. The struggle between them has been reflected in their foreign and strategic policies. And the struggle within them has generated domestic pressures in favour of arms build-up.

Two important factors related to the foreign and strategic policies of the Great Powers need to be considered seriously with regard to their impact on arms build-up in the Third World. They are: (i) the colonial connections of the Great Powers; and (ii) the consequences of the Cold War between them. The colonial connections were particularly important during the initial years of post-independence in the Third World. The defence establishments in the former colonies were the creation of the respective colonial authorities. Thus it was almost inevitable that the newly independent state should look towards the former metropolis for continuous guidance and support in the maintenance, management and organisation of its defence establishments, including weapons supplies.<sup>47</sup> The former metropolis, on the other hand, found it useful to preserve as much of the colonial connection as possible in the defence and other sectors of the previous colony, in order to protect its own residual interests in that country. The supply of weapons through military aid or sales became a convenient way of doing so. This explains the substantial supplies of British arms to the Commonwealth countries, particularly up to the mid-fifties, and the French supplies to African and some Latin American countries. By the end of the sixties, the British colonial connection in the defence field had considerably weakened. This is born out by the sharp decline in the supply of British weapons to South and South East Asia after the mid-sixties. One of the reasons behind this was the British decision to withdraw its strategic and political interests from these regions. The other, of course, was the general diversification in the suppliers' market.<sup>48</sup> The French supplies to its former colonies in Africa still remain important. In some respects the arms build-up of South Africa, Israel and Latin America reflects the logic of colonial interests in these regions.

The factor of colonial connection almost overlaps with that of the consequences of the Cold War, both chronologically as well as in content. The Cold War was the

result of the struggle for power and dominance between the two Super Powers and their respective associates following 1945. It has passed through various stages and, even under the present atmosphere of *detente*, the East West conflict and rivalry is a hard fact of international politics for the Third World. The consequences of the different stages of the Cold War have accordingly impinged differently on the process of arms build-up in the Third World. In the initial stages of the Cold War, the Western bloc not only tried to preserve its influence in its former colonies through the colonial connection but, by using that connection, lured many of the Third World countries into new military alliances and arrangements that were directed against the Soviet bloc. Where colonial connection did not work effectively, regimes were changed through covert operations in order to make a particular country receptive to Western strategic initiatives.<sup>49</sup> The emergence of Communist China in 1949 and the outbreak of conflict in Korea added urgency to the Western objective of forging military alliances with the Third World.

These alliances and arrangements were then consolidated through massive military assistance to the weaker and more dependent Third World allies. Not surprisingly, Asia in the Third World became the main focus of this exercise of forging and consolidating military alliances, since this vast landmass occupied strategically desirable positions around the Soviet Union, its East European allies and China. Latin America was integrated with the security structure of the USA through multilateral arrangements under the Alliance for Progress, Reciprocal Treaty Obligations and the Organisation of American States. Most of the Western military goods and services went to the various regions of Asia. Between 1952 and 1962, the US supplied greater 'defence support' and 'special assistance' under the mutual security programme to the Third World than to Europe. Most of it went to the Far East, South Asia and West Asia and very little indeed to Latin America and Africa.<sup>50</sup> The peaks reached in 1958 in the import of weapons by South Asia and the Far East, as noted under the trends in arms build-up in the Third World, were the result of the Western Powers' role in the Cold War. The UK, which had strong and extensive colonial connections in Asia, and the USA, which was the top-ranking military and economic power in the post-Second World War period, worked in close co-operation with each other in the Third World during this initial phase of the Cold War. It is not surprising then that they monopolised and controlled the weapons supplies and other military inputs into the arms build-up process in the Third World. Those countries like India, which did not accept the Western alliance system, but which nevertheless had strong colonial connections, also received considerable economic assistance from the USA which indirectly facilitated great defence allocations in their national budgets.

It is interesting to note that during this early phase of the Cold War, the Soviet



Union did not emerge as a serious contender to the Western bloc for arms and influence in the Third World. If at all, Soviet arms to North Korea and North Vietnam were an exception. The Soviet hesitation was due mainly to the fact that the USSR lacked the necessary capabilities (surplus of arms to be supplied, etc.) and confidence to approach the Third World politically, and to participate in its arms build-up as a Soviet foreign policy goal. The colonial connections of the Third World with the West and its consequent aversion to the communist system and the Soviet Union were powerful enough restraining factors to discourage any Soviet initiatives. Gradually, however, the Third World's reservations regarding closer interaction with the Soviet Union diminished and the incentive for the Soviet Union to secure new openings in the Third World increased.

This favourable change for the Soviet Union occurred as a result of the coincidence of several developments. With more countries becoming independent, the size of the Third World grew. Not only this, but powerful and militant anti-imperialist and revolutionary movements in the Third World came to the fore during the mid-fifties and the early sixties. The instances of Cuba in Latin America, Algeria in Africa and Vietnam in South-East Asia may be mentioned in this respect. These movements looked towards the Soviet Union for support. Yet another factor was the alienation of some important Third World countries from the Western powers as a result of the latter's parochial strategic policies. Countries like Egypt, India and Indonesia fall into this category. Their respective regional adversaries, i.e. Israel, Pakistan and Malaysia, had received and been assured of further substantial military support from Western powers. As against this, these non-aligned states had been denied some of the arms they wanted.<sup>51</sup> Almost about the same time, the Soviet Union had developed a limited capacity to produce surplus arms for export and external supplies.<sup>52</sup> And finally, by this time too the post-Stalin political structure had been consolidated in the Kremlin, and the Soviet Union could now afford to respond to the Western strategic moves with greater confidence and initiative.

The result was the beginning of keen competition between the two Super Powers in aiding and stimulating the process of arms build-up in the Third World. The first Soviet arms supplies went to Egypt (1955), followed by Afghanistan (1956); Syria, Iraq and Yemen in West Asia (all during 1957-1959); Indonesia in S.E. Asia (1959-60), Cuba in Latin America (1960), Algeria in North Africa and India in South Asia (both in 1962). Subsequently, the Soviet Union has emerged as a serious contender to the USA with regard to arms supplies and military support for the Third World.<sup>53</sup> Between 1970 and 1976, it supplied 34 per cent of the total major arms supplied to the Third World as against 38 per cent by the USA.<sup>54</sup> The ratio of Soviet economic aid to military aid which was 1:1 in the early sixties, had become approximately 1:4 in the early seventies.<sup>55</sup>



By the beginning of the sixties, the Cold War had become institutionalised and the emphasis in the Western Powers' approach to the Cold War issues in relation to the Third World shifted from forging alliances aimed at containing communism, to strengthening internal political structures against the danger of a communist take over. The Kennedy Administration's policy of 'flexible response' initiated in 1960-61, reflected this shift. This led to the Cold War affecting even domestic politics in the Third World, since the Western bloc, particularly the US, launched programmes to establish anti-communist regimes. They also sought to aid the non-communist regimes against the possible threat of communist-inspired domestic subversion and insurgency in the Third World. Accordingly, the counter-insurgency (COIN) weapons and 'special forces assistance' provided by the West registered a boom in the Third World. In the US schemes, particularly during and after the Kennedy Administration, this was seen as an essential part of the overall strategy of containing the global communist challenge.<sup>56</sup> This stimulated the growth of paramilitary and counter-insurgency forces within the Third World countries and made their respective states stronger and potentially more coercive. This was justified by the US on the basis that the Soviet Union and China were aiding guerillas and rebellious revolutionary groups in the Third World. Though we do not have adequate evidence to verify this US contention, the fact that a very strong possibility of such external communist support existed cannot be denied.

The US concern with internal political structures in the Third World countries was not new. It was already in evidence, in fact, in the post-Second World War period, and was clearly reflected in the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the Point Four Programme. George Kennon, who formulated plans of action to carry out the objectives of US foreign policy as the Director of Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, was quoted as saying:

It was perfectly clear to anyone with even a rudimentary knowledge of the Russia of that day that the Soviet leaders had no intention of attempting to advance their cause by launching military attacks with their own armed forces across frontiers. Such a procedure, he pointed out, 'fitted neither with the requirements of the Marxist Doctrine, nor with Russia's own urgent need for recovery from the devastations of a long and exhausting war, nor with what was known about the temperament of the Soviet dictator himself. The real threat was the threat of *revolution*, particularly in Europe, the conspiratorial action of communist-trained and inspired minorities, who hoped to seize and retain dictatorial power *within* their respective national orbits.'<sup>57</sup>

Thus, what was new in the US stress on COIN aid was the extension of this concern to include the Third World. Also new was the nature of weaponry now supplied, for,

in addition to the usual defence preparedness, it was now also geared to militarize the police forces and prepare the military to operate in domestic theatres of conflict.

In the latest phase of the Cold War, the Great Power competition and rivalry have been obscured by the seemingly relaxed atmosphere of *detente* between the two Super Powers. There are two significant ways in which the new situation has influenced the Great Powers' contribution to the process of arms build-up in the Third World. One is related to the weakening of the alliance structure created and nurtured in the Third World since the beginning of the 1950s. The relative autonomy acquired by the former allies of the Great Powers has prompted the latter to concentrate on selected and more reliable Third World allies, with a view to building them up militarily. The US-Iran alliance is a case in point.

Besides this, the Great Powers have also emphasized new forms of build-up linkages with the Third World that are subtle as well as lasting. Accordingly, the Great Powers, *in addition* to supplying weapons and giving military help to internal regimes and groups, have encouraged the establishment of weapons production units on a selected basis. We find, therefore, that in the last decade or so, arms industries in the Third World have registered an impressive expansion under the licence and co-production arrangements with the firms and governments of the Great Powers, mostly Western.<sup>58</sup> The strategy of encouraging weapons production programmes in the Third World has two advantages for the Great Powers. One, since it shows deference to the national sensitivities and urge for autonomy of the recipient country, it invokes less controversy and greater support. In many cases the Third World countries on their own have taken initiatives to seek the Great Powers' co-operation in setting up weapons production units. Secondly, in the context of unstable and inconsistent patterns of alliances and equations, the Great Powers have found that such arrangements for weapons production in the given Third World countries result in relatively more dependable and lasting channels of political and strategic influence. Describing this aspect, one analyst wrote:

The switch from direct arms sales to technology transfers enhances rather than diminishes the political influence of the traditional producers. By threatening to cut off supply of critical materials and components, they can imperil an entire production line representing many millions of dollars in initial investment — the mere availability of this option affords considerable leverage.<sup>59</sup>

The validity of this assumption is increasingly acknowledged in the case of Indo-Soviet relations.<sup>60</sup> Perhaps this is the reason why the USA is also trying to substitute its direct military presence with the establishment of defence production units in South Korea and Taiwan, while it plans its phased withdrawal.

The weakening of the alliance structures has also resulted in intra-bloc competition among the Great Powers for influence and presence in the Third World. Thus, Western Europe, particularly France and Germany, as well as China have emerged as new sources for the supply of weapons and their local production in Third World countries.<sup>61</sup> In some of these countries, for example, Brazil, Pakistan, South Africa and Israel, French and West German firms have even supplied nuclear technology and fuel, often in disregard of the Super Powers' stress on non-proliferation.

Another way in which the *detente* phase of the Cold War has affected the Great Powers' role in the Third World's arms build-up is related to the increasing concern on the part of the Super Powers to resist the dispersal of nuclear technology and its military uses to the Third World. The Super Powers, in order to dissuade the threshold Third World powers from disturbing the nuclear hierarchy, have supplied the latest conventional weapons as inducements.<sup>62</sup> There is also strong evidence that, since *detente* has induced strong pressures in favour of limitation of strategic arms (SALT I & II), the Super Powers' competition has become more extensive and intense at the lower levels. This is manifested in the form of proxy-wars fought between the Third World actors as local or regional conflicts, with modern conventional weapons.

Thus it is clear that the change in the character of the Cold War has in no way diminished the implications of the Great Powers' rivalry for the arms build-up in the Third World. Despite the significant changes in the form of such implications, their content and thrust have remained intact.<sup>63</sup> The lands and oceans of Asia, Africa and Latin America continue to be the main theatres of their interests and activities. And the Third World arms build-up continues to gain sustenance and strength as a consequence of the Great Powers' foreign policy goals and actions towards each other.

There is yet another aspect of the links between the Great Powers' foreign and strategic policies and the arms build-up in the Third World. Irrespective of the changes in the form and style of the rivalry and struggle amongst the Great Powers, some Third World countries and regions have always been the focus of the Great Powers' interests and attention. West Asia and the Far East may be mentioned in this respect. Besides their strategic significance, these regions are also vitally important to the economic development of the West. West Asia is rich in the strategically most important raw material, oil, and the Far East has been a major recipient of Western goods and capital investment. The repeated threats by the USA to resort to military action in West Asia to protect oil supplies to the Western world clearly underline the significance of strategic raw materials.<sup>64</sup> Since 1973, the Western powers have found it convenient to pay for oil with arms. The responsibility for such transactions did not



lie only with the oil-rich countries, as it usually alleged. Such were the two-way deals in which the parties on both sides had equal interests and stakes.<sup>65</sup> The USA in particular devised the strategy of exchanging arms with the oil-rich countries for the petro-dollars which had to be recycled into the Western economy (through the Banks) in order to save the dollar and the NATO economies. The point is beyond dispute that access to strategic resources constitutes a vital foreign policy objective of the Great Powers, and military presence through weapons supplies and aid to the countries rich in such resources is an accepted mode of behaviour.<sup>66</sup> The Great Powers' rivalry in the oceans represents the latest example of strategic deployment for economic objectives.

## Domestic Pressures

This leads us to the question of domestic pressures within the Great Powers acting as agents of arms build-up in the Third World. Such pressures have largely emanated from economic sources. The Western Powers were left with huge quantities of surplus weapons and inflated production capacities at the end of the Second World War. Before the defence industry in the West was able to adjust to the post-war situation, the surpluses and leftovers had to be disposed of without hurting the industrial activity. Otherwise unemployment and inflation would have resulted. The problem was particularly serious with regard to the USA and the UK. The solution to this economic problem was found in co-ordinating it with the then perceived strategic objectives. As a result, the surplus Anglo-American weapons found their way to the Third World in the form of military assistance provided under the policy of military alliances and pacts.<sup>67</sup>

Subsequently, however, the free grant of weapons made under Military Assistance Programmes began adding to the already speedily growing cost of what was called the 'free world's defence'. The balance of payments problems of both the USA and the UK forced them to transform their policies of military aid into that of military sales.<sup>68</sup> The USA set up a department known as International Logistic Negotiations within the Department of Defense, to promote the sale of US military equipment and services. This was followed by the UK in 1965. As a result, military exports went up. In the case of the USA, the increase went from \$500 million in 1959 to \$1.5 billion in 1962 to \$2 billion in 1966, and to between \$11 and \$12 billion in 1977.<sup>69</sup> In the UK, the receipts from arms sales which were to the value of £152 million in 1966/67 rose to £227 million in 1969/70, and to an estimated £901 million for the year 1978/79.<sup>70</sup> Other European powers such as France, Germany, Italy and

Scandinavian countries have also substantially increased their weapons sales. Though initially only a very small proportion of these sales was directed to the Third World markets (with the possible exception of Iran), subsequently, the Third World has now become an important market for Western weapons.

The idea of military sales naturally brought about competition amongst the Western Powers for the Third World markets. This was irrespective of the fact that it was the US aid given to European allies under the Marshall Plan that played a crucial role in rebuilding European defence industries. The French entered into tense competition with the USA and UK. They sold arms to Israel, Belgium and South Africa. Their sales also entered the traditionally British preserve of South Asia in the mid-fifties, when India was trying to diversify its sources of arms supplies and the Soviet Union was then not available for this purpose.<sup>71</sup> The USA and the UK co-ordinated their sales efforts but the competition continued simultaneously with co-ordination.<sup>72</sup> One such example of the competition/co-ordination link-up was witnessed when Saudia Arabia was persuaded by both the USA and the UK 'to buy British planes that they (the Saudis) did not want, to allow Britain to pay for American planes that they (the British) could not afford.'<sup>73</sup> It is the competition amongst the Great Powers for capturing weapons orders that has, in a very important way, accounted for the introduction of new weapons systems into the Third World, soon after the development and production of a specific weapons system. It seems that in the business of arms the Third World has paid to relieve economic pressures on the developed world; the OPEC nations through their oil, the Black Africans through their blood, and the rest of the Third World through its meagre foreign exchange earnings.

There have been various pressure groups within each of the Western powers to back up the export of weapons. The most important of them all are the companies and industrial groups producing weapons. Preferably, and as far as possible, they have worked in collaboration with the key civil and military bureaucratic sectors in their respective countries to promote their business, creating what is known as a military-industrial complex.<sup>74</sup> The companies have also worked frequently on their own, at times over the heads of their respective national governments. On other occasions, they have even undermined the national foreign policy goals in their drive to secure fat orders through all available means, fair or foul.<sup>75</sup> It is obviously beyond the scope of this study to go into the details of the activities of these 'merchants of death.'

The workers in arms industries, the politicians representing the constituencies where these industries and workers are located, and the scientists and technicians whose findings and skills have been paid for through the earnings from arms sales, have all had vested interests in the economic viability of the manufacturing firms and

sales organisations. They have accordingly acted as important factors in arms sales decisions. The technological advances in the conventional weapons systems have played a particularly powerful role in this respect. A UN report discussing the 'dynamics of the arms race' said:

The qualitative character of arms race at its Centre is thus one of the principal forces behind accelerating horizontal proliferation of 'conventional' weaponry. In addition to the constant pressure on importing countries to modernise their stocks of weapons and equipment, the qualitative character of arms race gives rise to various pressures in the main producing countries to raise exports, including the need to dispose of obsolete inventories, to achieve large scale economies and to lengthen production runs in order to lower unit costs and finance further research and development efforts.<sup>76</sup>

We therefore find a wide range of diverse economic, political, bureaucratic and scientific-technological pressures within any country that produces and exports weapons. It has led many analysts to conclude that the weapons business in the world is an essential consequence of the Western capitalist system.<sup>77</sup>

It is difficult to compare the role of domestic pressure groups in arms sales decisions of the Soviet Union, its socialist allies and China, with the role of similar groups in Western societies. The socialist economic and political systems do not operate on the basis of the principles of market forces and pluralist politics. Some studies have identified and analysed the existence of a Soviet Military Industrial complex.<sup>78</sup> The fact of a close interaction between economic/industrial sectors and military build-up in the Soviet Union cannot be denied, but it would be stretching the argument too far to compare it with the collaboration of private industrial firms and the military establishment that takes place in the USA or other Western countries.<sup>79</sup> The contention that there are domestic sectoral and sectional pressures from military leadership, bureaucracy, and industrial establishment on the Soviet Union's defence and strategic policies towards the Third World sounds tenable. However it is extremely difficult to say if these pressures have inflated and enhanced the sale and supply of weapons to the Third World on their own, disregarding overall Soviet political and strategic considerations. This is not to say that economic considerations have played no part in the supply of Soviet weapons to the Third World. The massive sales, though on convenient terms and without 'profit margins', have contributed to the management of the problem of balance of payments in the socialist countries.<sup>80</sup> The Soviet Union has, in most of the cases accepted repayments in commodities and raw materials. Such repayments in kind have fed the Soviet manufacturing sector on the one hand and on the other diverted and gradually consolidated the recipient Third World country's trade in favour of the Soviet Union.<sup>81</sup> India can be cited as an



important example of this phenomenon. There is also no denying the fact that a large number of workers in the socialist countries are engaged in defence industry and the factor of technological advances as an agent of arms build-up mentioned in the case of the Western Powers applies equally to the socialist world.

The foregoing discussion clearly underlines the vital contribution of both East and West to arms build-up in the Third World.<sup>82</sup> Thus, the apparently significant differences between them in structures, contents and extents are of little relevance. In their respective ways, through foreign policies *vis-a-vis* each other and towards the Third World, and in response to domestic pressures, their contribution to the arms build-up in the Third World has been the largest. In this context, the minor differences notwithstanding, there appears a general synchronisation in their respective foreign policy goals and domestic requirements.

### Third World Regional Conflicts

The Great Powers, though the most powerful, have not been the *only* agents of arms build-up in the Third World. The Third World countries have themselves made their own contribution to this process which is no less significant. In fact, without their receptive and willing participation along with the Great Powers, the arms build-up process in the Third World would have taken a feeble and much less noticeable course.

One simple factor behind the rise in the arms build-up indicators for the Third World has been the rapid expansion of the size of the Third World. The number of countries that have gained independence in the post-Second World War period in Asia and Africa has increased significantly from approximately twenty-five in the early fifties to more than a hundred at present. This has meant more nation-states in the Third World and hence, more units of armed forces, more expenditure for military purposes (MILEX), more weapons and so on. For, the attainment of independence by a country is more than a mere chronological fact or just a numerical extension of the Third World category. With independence comes an entirely new creation of a group of people who have aspirations and ambitions, who seek national prestige and preservation (security) as an independent, sovereign unit in the community of nations. The acquisition of armed strength spontaneously becomes an indispensable national goal for it is a symbol of national prestige and independence as well as a means to ensure preservation and protection. The latter particularly so, for a newly independent country in its perception of the world around itself may find the prevailing situation resembling the Hobbsian 'state of nature' in many respects. The instinctive

value base of the international system discussed earlier is as much relevant to a weak and new nation as to the Great Powers.

The motivations behind the Third World countries' arms build-up exercises have, however, been far more than a simple urge for prestige and status. For one thing, most of the Third World countries like the Great Powers, have been involved in almost perpetual, and occasionally intense, mutual conflicts and struggles for power and dominance within their respective regions. The dimensions of such conflicts and struggles have been as complex and varied as in the case of the Great Powers. One of the major sources of such intra-Third World conflicts has been the regional disparities and divisions, many of which, though deeply rooted in the historical evolution of the Third World countries have resulted from the withdrawal of the colonial umbrella. Not only this, but the process of decolonisation in many cases was so artificial and arbitrary, by design or default on the part of the withdrawing colonial authority, that traditional disparities and divisions were not only aggravated, but also led to greater conflicts and tensions. In all the Third World regions there have been conflicts and tensions between one country and the other, resulting from territorial disputes, ethnic divisions, clashes of economic interests, ideological cleavages and antagonistic power aspirations for a better place in the regional and global hierarchies. The process of arms build-up in the Third World countries has resulted from such intra-regional conflicts and struggles. As examples, to illustrate the point, we may mention India and Pakistan; Egypt, the Arab countries and Israel; Iran and Iraq; the two Koreas; the two Vietnams (until 1975); the two Chinas (particularly Taiwan); the two Yemens; Brazil and Argentina; Ethiopia and Somalia; Indonesia and Malaysia (until 1965-66); Uganda and Tanzania, and so on (the list is as long as the number of Third World countries).

The intra-regional conflicts have provided only the cause (at least ostensibly) though not the capabilities of the Third World countries to build-up their armed strength. The availability and mobilisation of internal resources to pay for expensive arms build-up activities have been rather meagre in the Third World. The only exception has been the oil-rich West Asian region. Oil wealth has played an important role — particularly in the cases of Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Egypt — in facilitating the huge quantities and high qualities of weapons acquired by these countries. However, the factor of wealth should not be unduly stressed in the overall context of arms build-up in the Third World. For instance, despite the relative richness of these countries, the dominating Third World regions in arms acquisition were the Far East and South Asia during the fifties and the early sixties, when the basis of arms transfer was aid and not sale. Again, for strategic reasons, many of the not-so-rich countries such as South Korea and North Korea, Taiwan and South Vietnam have also been

provided with substantial quantities of modern weapons. There are in fact very few instances where, both supplier and the recipient willing, lack of money has come in the way of arms deals as a decisive factor.

And so we see the vital role that external help from the Great Powers plays in arms build-up activities in the Third World. We may simply reiterate here that the Great Powers and global conflicts have a distinct bearing on the small powers and Third World regional conflicts. The two sets of conflicts and actors have been found seeking and securing support and sustenance from each other for divergent sets of strategic objectives and targets. In this relationship the greater part of discretion and initiative naturally lay with the more powerful actors, the Great Powers, but the mutual rivalries of the Great Powers have been so multi-faceted and intense that the Third World regional actors have also occasionally succeeded in manoeuvring the situation to their advantage.<sup>83</sup> The Great Powers' deep and direct involvement in regional conflicts has vitiated regional threat perceptions and accordingly conditioned the consequent arms build-up processes in the Third World. For instance, the arms build-up in the Soviet Union, which is a part of the Super Power rivalry, has induced China to speed up and justify its own arms build-up. This in turn has stimulated the Indian acquisition of arms which has prompted Pakistan to take similar steps. The Pakistani steps have further aggravated Afghanistan's security problems and induced reactions in India. This is how the arms build-up spiral works in an integrated manner between the Great Powers on the one hand, and regional adversaries in the Third World on the other. Though the bilateral action-reaction mechanism such as between India and Pakistan, or Pakistan and Afghanistan serves on its own as an agent of arms build-up, it would be impossible to draw a line between the bilateral and the integrated stimulations. This is true not only for South Asia but for other Third World regions as well.

## **National Security in the Third World: Domestic Factors**

Having identified the regional conflicts and concern for security in the Third World as agents of arms build-up, the most pertinent question that needs to be looked into is, 'Whose security and against whom?' The answer to this question can be sought in the domestic contexts of the Third World countries. Though there are specific and unique aspects of the security situation in each Third World country, some general observations regarding common factors may be made here.

When we talk of the national security of a given country, we are in fact referring to the perceptions of the ruling elites and key decision-makers of that country. Such per-



ceptions are apparently shaped by the major determinants of strategic policy in that country, for example, historical traditions, geo-political and geo-strategic context, economic forces, social institutions, political systems, etc. In reality, all these determinants are subject to interpretation and articulation by the immediate as well as the long-term interests and requirements of the ruling elite. There have been several instances where a radical change in the composition of the ruling elites has brought about a radical transformation in the strategic goals and security perceptions of a given Third World country, despite the so-called permanency of the determinants. And in the Third World, there have been any number of such transformations. To illustrate the point, the change in Indonesia from Sukarno to Suharto, in Egypt from Nasser to Sadat, in Cuba from pre-Castro to Castro, in Uganda from Obote to Amin, and lately in Iran from the Shah to Khomeini may be mentioned. To put this point in a different way, the ruling elites promote such foreign and strategic policies as sustain and consolidate their own positions within their respective domestic political systems. This preoccupation with perpetuating themselves in power thus conditions the way in which their country's security threat is defined, its place in a regional conflict is identified, and its regional adversary named.<sup>84</sup>

A very important aspect of national security in the Third World, particularly during the past two decades, has been the threat from internal sources. This threat has been a matter of increasing concern to the ruling elites in the Third World countries and a powerful agent of the arms build-up.<sup>85</sup> At the time of independence, almost every Third World country comes into being as an internally conflict-and tension-ridden society, owing to the serious inequalities of ethnic, cultural, political, and economic nature. These differences lead to the emergence of political dissent and revolt during the process of nation-building. The consequent internal conflicts have subsequently become frequent, widespread and intense, owing to the various developments at the international as well as local levels. The explosion of global communication and information has indeed brought the consciousness of the contrast between deprivation and affluence between various communities, groups and nations, to the mass level in the Third World. As a result, what was earlier identified as 'the revolution of rising expectations' has received a tremendous boost. This revolution, which then was more of an expression of intent and a factor to be taken into account, has gradually become a force of enormous dimensions to be reckoned with. The economic and social frustrations resulting from the gap between expectations and achievements have further complicated the task of national integration in the Third World, and have consequently strengthened the ethnic and ideological challenges to the political regimes and ruling elites there.<sup>86</sup> By the beginning of the 1970s the prospects of global instability emerging from such internal conflicts in the Third World had been clearly recognised.<sup>87</sup>

The Third World regimes and ruling elites on their part have shown a lack of competence to deal with the rising unrest and revolt. There are obviously powerful historical, demographic, technological and resource constraints built into the situation that militate against the speedy and effective response to this internal challenge, but the Third World rulers also on their own, have more often than not resorted to approaches that are based more on expediency and immediate objectives — ‘muddling through’ as it may be called — than on a concerted and earnest attack at the roots of the problems. An important result of this muddling through approach has been the two-pronged strategy of radical rhetorics and arms build-up pursued by the Third World regimes. The increasing emphasis upon North-South issues at the international level and concern for a faster rate of development at home on the one hand, and repression of internal dissent by augmenting the coercive capacity of the state apparatus on the other, are the manifestations of this strategy. Certainly, the Shah of Iran was not the only Third World campaigner for both modernisation and repression at the same time. Almost every one else is engaged in this exercise.<sup>88</sup> In a way, arms seem to have been used as effective instruments to fill the gap between expectations and achievements in a given society and are thus a convenient method of securing political survival, at least in the short term context.

The state-initiated arms build-up has led to the further, reactive arming of the internal protests and challenge. Whereas the external friends of the State have supported the state-initiated arms build-up, the external adversaries of the State have provided sustenance through moral support and even clandestine weapon supplies to the dissident groups and movements challenging State authority.<sup>89</sup> As a result, the aggregate levels of arms build-up, conflicts and violence in a given country, as in the Third World as a whole, have significantly increased. As a result also, the global, and regional conflicts and struggles for power have become entangled with those taking place within the Third World countries.

In addition to the ruling elites, various other domestic professional and bureaucratic interest groups in the Third World countries have acted as arms build-up agents. Of these, military establishments have exercised the most powerful influence. They have a natural interest in arms build-up which they have been able to pursue effectively, owing either to their being in power themselves, or to being the main source of sustenance to most of the authoritarian regimes in the Third World. Even in a democratic system like India, the military has gradually become an influential component in the process of arms build-up decision making. Besides the influence of the military as a group, intra-services rivalry and the bureaucracy and scientific organisations attached to the military establishments have also put pressures on political authority to increase demands for weapons and to stimulate expansion of the armed

forces. The data on these aspects, however, are very hard to obtain.<sup>90</sup> There has, however, been no powerful indigenous lobby for private arms-salesmen or weapon producers in the Third World, since there has been very little production and most of it has been confined to the state sector. In the cases of Brazil, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, the local production has been dominated by the multinational firms originating from the West, as mentioned earlier. These firms of course work in the Third World countries through their local agents and lobbies. India has a comparatively developed indigenous industrial sector and relatively independent bourgeoisie, which from time to time asserts itself to be given a greater share in defence production. There is a vast and promising scope for data collection and analysis regarding the role of domestic factors in the arms build-up process in the Third World which so far does not seem to have attracted adequate attention.

To sum up our discussion of the agents of arms build-up in the Third World, it may be observed that both the foreign policy goals and domestic forces in the Third World, as well as outside, constitute such agents. It is difficult to say which factor is more important in a specific situation, since all these factors are interrelated and work in various combinations from time to time and place to place. Yet it would not be an exaggeration to say that the Great Powers' foreign and strategic policies, as also their domestic compulsions, have played a far more effective and powerful role in initiating, encouraging and contributing to the arms build-up activities in the Third World.



# The Linkages between Arms Build-up and Development

The question of the linkages between arms build-up and developments in the Third World can be approached in many ways. As stated in the introduction to this study, we are approaching the subject in a general and limited way. It has been made clear towards the end of the second section that here we are concerned only to try to identify the implications of arms build-up for the phenomenon of development in the Third World. Towards this end, we have divided development along two axes, viz., *milieu* and components. Further, it has been noted that the *milieu* of development in a given society is comprised of domestic and external (or international) sectors, while the components of development are its values, structures and processes. The interaction between arms build-up and development can be seen and evaluated in terms of these three components and two *milieux*. The framework of linkages between development and arms build-up is identified below:

## Linkages between Arms Build-up and Development

|                   | EXTERNAL   | DOMESTIC   | ARMS BUILD-UP<br>CONSEQUENCES FOR<br>DEVELOPMENT   |
|-------------------|--|--|--|
| <i>Values</i>     | Global weapons culture. Reinforces the values of power and force in the international system. Creates insecurity and violence. | Domestic weapons culture. Reinforces the use of force in resolution of social issues. Aggravates insecurity and violence.  | 1. Does not create conducive atmosphere for need-based and self-reliant development in the Third World.<br>2. Perpetuates social status quo and results in the growth of militarisation and domestic conflict. |
| <i>Structures</i> | Dependence of North-South orientation in world military and economic orders. The two dependencies are mutually reinforcing.    | Strengthens the State and the vested interests around it. Strengthens military as a political force. Perpetuates inequality and status quo.  | 3. Growth without equity as a result of lopsided and dependent industrialisation.  |
| <i>Processes</i>  | 'Modernisation' through transfer of ideas and technology.  | Dependent industrialisation, urbanisation and westernisation. Results in unbalanced and lopsided growth and increased social tensions. Strengthens political corruption. Diversion of human and material resources from developmental sectors to arms build-up activities. | 4. Deployment of scarce resources in wasteful and destructive exercises.<br>5. Tremendous loss of opportunities for development.   |

## Values

The arms build-up in the Third World is part of the global arms build-up. The process of the global build-up has created and nurtured what may be described as the weapons culture. Within the ambit of this culture, values, specific skills, goods, institutions, ethos, idioms, and even academic disciplines related to weapons and their various aspects and consequences, have been created and encouraged.<sup>91</sup> This culture is not an entirely new creation of the post-Second World War developments. But as a result of these developments, and during this recent period, the weapons culture has grown in complexity and its impact has been increasingly felt on the much wider span of world politics. The constraints of time and space inhibit us from going into the various aspects of weapons culture in detail. However it is of important concern to us here that as a result of this weapons culture, the values of power, force, and dominance that constitute the instinctive value-base of the present day international system, have been reinforced. In the earlier section of this study, these values have been seen to be working as agents of arms build-up. Therefore, it seems clear that, by creating the weapons culture, arms build-up, has fed on itself and become self-perpetuating. The present-day international system and arms build-up within this system are caught in a vicious, mutually reinforcing relationship.

The weapons culture has definitely contributed to the increasing instances of conflict and violence at the regional and local levels, particularly in the Third World. Despite the absence of a direct clash between the Super Powers during the past thirty years (or because of this), such regional and local conflicts have significantly increased. Some estimates put the number of such wars at 125 between 1945 and 1976. In the domestic context of the Third World a greater propensity to resort to force to resolve social problems has been evident. This has presented an obstacle to the creation of a conducive atmosphere for developmental activities. It has also been mentioned earlier that the Third World regimes in order to deal with the increasing domestic violence and threats to their stability have used arms build-up to cover the developmental gap. As such, arms build-up has acted as an alternative to development in the context of the weapons-culture. They have, therefore, been mutually incompatible and linked in a negative relationship. The developmental process, which represents the evolutionary unfolding of social potential for constructive transformation, has accordingly been thwarted by arms build-up. The magnitude of damage would be much more, if we were to take into account the social costs of local and regional conflicts in the Third World.

## Structures

The arms build-up in the Third World has taken place within the North-South framework of global politics. Accordingly, the arms build-up in the South has been an integral part and an inevitable consequence of arms build-up in the North. The North has not only initiated and stimulated arms build-up processes in the South but contributed substantially in terms of inputs into and dynamics of such process. This has resulted in the North's dominance in the world military order. As a consequence, it has established a dependency relationship for the Third World *vis-a-vis* the dominant powers in the first and second worlds. The dependence of the Third World is not confined only to the supply of weapons, which nevertheless is the most important aspect of that dependency.<sup>92</sup> It is also evident with respect to strategic doctrines, weapons production arrangements, transfer of military technologies and skills, and bilateral and multilateral patterns of alliances.<sup>93</sup> These aspects of the Third World's dependence have been underlined in the previous sections.

Some of the recent studies on arms sales have argued that the dependence of the Third World recipients on arms supplies is no longer as severe as it used to be. Instances where countries like Iran have succeeded in almost dictating their terms to the suppliers and in securing 'better' and 'favourable' terms in arms purchases are frequently mentioned in this context.<sup>94</sup> The factor of phenomenal oil wealth which has enabled some of the OPEC countries to buy more weapons, including those of the latest designs, from whichever sources are available, is also mentioned in this respect. The factor of OPEC's new wealth, however, should not be allowed to obscure the basic fact of the Third World's dependence upon the North in the world military order. We have already noted in the previous section that the oil wealth of the OPEC nations does not adequately explain the extent and nature of arms proliferation in some of those countries, unless it is viewed along with the fact that they have always occupied a very significant place in the West's strategic considerations. Moreover, in the post-oil crisis phase, the West's drive for recycling the petro-dollars forced them to push arms in these countries. With respect to Iran in particular, it is more than clear now that the US stakes were very deep and extensive. Behind this, of course, was the desire to see Iran emerge as a regional power under American influence.<sup>95</sup> The US administration was more than willing to keep the Shah of Iran in good humour in every respect, including the supply of arms. Thus the lack of dependence evident in the case of Iran was more due to the dominant arms trade partner's (the USA in this case) calculated indulgence designed to serve the latter's own strategic and economic interests.



This is not to deny, however, that there are no variations in the patterns of the Third World's dependence in the field of arms trade. Owing to the increase in the number of major weapon suppliers and the divergence in their strategic, political and economic motives, there has been a gradual intensification of competition amongst them for markets, allies and clients. Some better placed and better equipped Third World countries have succeeded in taking advantage of this situation in the form of securing a marginally greater scope of manoeuvrability and bargaining in concluding arms deals. They have also been able to look for alternative sources of supplies and relatively better terms of trade. One study mentions that 42 per cent of the arms trade partnerships (between the Great Powers suppliers and the Third World recipients) underwent shifts and changes between 1950 and 1973.<sup>96</sup> But the study hastens to underline that, looking at the rate and dimension of changes taking place in the world since 1950, the arms trade patterns and partnerships 'exhibit a high degree of stability'. It also describes the dominance of the North over the South in the field of arms trade as 'monopolistic' and 'feudal' in character.<sup>97</sup>

Thus the overall pattern of the Third World's military dependence has not been altered by these developments. This is so mainly because it is both costly and inconvenient for the Third World country to change from one weapons system to another, one organisational/institutional pattern (force structure, weapon production, strategic doctrine) to another and hence one partner to another. Wherever this has happened some important features are noticed and they should be duly kept in mind while discussing the question of the Third World's military dependence. In a number of partnership changes, the direction of broader dependency, i.e. on the West or on the Soviet Union and its allies, has remained the same. This has important implications for the factor of economic dependence of the Third World which will be discussed in a short while. Then, in most of the cases, the partnership changes have been initiated not by the Third World recipient but by the developed weapon supplier. In the case of India, the shift from dependence on the West to dependence on the Soviet Union is an example in point. It was the continuous denial of adequate and desired weapon supplies from the US and the UK throughout the fifties and the mid-sixties that drove India gradually towards the Soviet Union. This was also true for Egypt during the early fifties. Such shifts were, therefore, the expression of helplessness rather than of an implied shift in policy initiated by the given Third World country, and as such supports the contention of dependency. Finally, the partnership changes have sometimes been preceded by changes in the regimes and ruling elites. Indonesia (1965-66) and Egypt (1971-72) may be mentioned as examples. This brings yet another aspect into the analysis of dependency structures, namely that those structures are related to the character of the regimes and not to the capacities of the dependent countries. The

shift from one arms trade partner to another, therefore, does not indicate negation or even weakening of the dependency.

The unequal military order has many adverse implications for development of the Third World. For one thing, it has reinforced the Third World's economic dependence on the West and it prevents the evolution of a New Economic Order through the North-South dialogue.<sup>98</sup> The mutually reinforcing character of the two dependencies — military and economic — can be discerned in many ways. In a simple way, purchase of weapons by the Third World which stands at nearly \$20 billion, has contributed to the increasingly deteriorating balance of payments problem for the Third World, and has also aggravated its indebtedness. Secondly, with regard to the production of weapons in the Third World, in most cases, such production arrangements have involved Western multinational firms. The operations of these firms have been a matter of continuous debate and disagreement between the Third World and the West, in North-South negotiations. It is also interesting to note that the pattern of capital investments by Western developed countries in the Third World bears a significant resemblance to the arms trade partnership between the two sides.<sup>99</sup>

The same is the case with the commercial trade patterns, i.e. arms trade partners are also important commercial trade partners. And if the composition of trade flows are analysed in depth, further insight may be offered. For instance, it may be found that the arms recipients supply raw materials and primary commodities to their weapons suppliers and in return receive weapons and other finished products.<sup>100</sup> The balance of trade is invariably adverse for the Third World country, which, while importing finished products, imports inflation. This pattern of economic transactions imposes other monetary constraints and difficulties. Even the favoured countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia were resentful in the North-South negotiations about the decline in purchasing power of their oil earnings as a result of inflation in the West, and the nature of the West-dominated international monetary institutions and system. It was not incidental that their resentment was directed against their weapons suppliers, since the quantum of such supplies had registered a significant increase in the wake of the oil crisis and a considerable portion of the oil earnings were being spent on weapons purchases. As regards the Soviet Union, we have already mentioned that they prefer payments for weapons in raw materials and primary commodities. It is interesting to note in this respect that the basic structure of Cuban foreign trade — exporting sugar for the import of manufactured goods — has not changed even twenty years after the victory of the anti-imperialist revolution and the establishment of close ties with the Soviet Union.

A more dangerous aspect of the mutually reinforcing military and economic dependencies of the Third World *vis-a-vis* the West is the clearly visible tendency on



the part of the latter to use its military dominance to subvert the evolution of a New International Economic Order. Recommendations of a specially commissioned Rand Corporation study are worth quoting at length to underline this point:

The North-South conflict should not be perceived as a temporary clash of interests produced by the fourfold increase in the price of oil since 1973, but as the expression of a much deeper conflict . . .

An increasingly determined campaign is being waged by the third world, through a variety of overlapping groupings, for the establishment of a 'New International Economic Order'. Although, its articulated demands are economic, the general thrust of the movement is political, aiming at a major modification of the power relations between the former colonial powers, which are at present the most advanced industrial societies, and the former colonies, which are still in the early stages of modernisation and industrialisation . . .

What the North-South conflict actually involves is a struggle for the world product, which is not likely to be resolved by a few brief summit meetings. The struggle will probably continue for a long time, with periods of negotiations interspersed with crises and confrontations. Nations, like individuals, do not divest themselves voluntarily of their accumulated wealth and of their sources of income merely in response to moral appeals. If they have the power to resist demands on their assets, the American people will probably expect their government to negotiate from a position of strength, and if they lack the power needed for the protection of their interests, they will hold their governments accountable for having failed to maintain its preparedness . . .

As a Super Power cast by history in a role of world leadership, the United States would be expected to use its military force to prevent the total collapse of the world order or, at least, to protect specific interests of American citizens in the absence of an international rule of law.

Such contingencies might generate military requirements without precedent in the experience of American military planners who may not yet fully comprehend the significance of events that are already happening, such as the intersection between the old East-West conflict, the new North-South conflict, and the accelerating consequences of planetary mismanagement.

More attention may have to be devoted to the development of doctrine, plans, weapons and force structures in anticipation of possible uses of military force in some novel crisis situations. The American people may demand that its national interests are protected by all available means if global turbulence prevails in the 1980s . . .

The military posture implications of such a situation are not self-evident. If a



harsh international environment were to develop in the 1980s, additional military capabilities might be required besides the forces directly dedicated to Soviet and other well-understood contingencies.<sup>101</sup>

One could ignore such recommendations if they were the result of an isolated academic, individual effort. The Rand Report was not so. The US military approach to economic and strategic issues in the Third World is already a well-acknowledged fact. The Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George S. Brown, identified this intermixture of US economic and military policies towards the Third World, thus:

*Africa:* Any large scale breach of peace could destroy capital investment of American firms and interrupt US access to important raw materials such as aluminium, chromium, oil, manganese, tin, tungsten, copper, iron and lead. The rising Black African demand for US military equipment and training offers the United States both political and economic opportunities that should be evaluated as they arise . . .

*Asia:* US security interests in this area continue to place a premium on stable, independent governments favourably disposed towards the US from the standpoint of naval operations, trade, access to raw materials, ports and military facilities; and of passage for maritime and airborne commerce, and the denial of political, economic and military advantages to major outside Communist powers.

*Latin America:* The nations of Latin America are of significant importance to the United States. Their raw materials and industrial potential . . . could become critical for US defence. The importance of Latin America as a market place for US products should not be overlooked. In addition to imports of substantial quantities for raw materials from the United States, such as wheat and coal, the increasing industrialisation drive in Latin America is creating new and enlarged opportunities for capital goods.<sup>102</sup>

It was perhaps an extension of this type of logic when the USA seriously considered resorting to military action in 1974-75, to ensure continuing supplies of oil from West Asia. The threat to take military action in this respect was reiterated in February 1979, in the aftermath of the Shah's fall in Iran, by the US Foreign and Defense Secretaries.<sup>103</sup> Subsequently there have been clear indications that not only the USA but NATO as a whole, perceived the question of oil and raw material supplies from the Third World as intimately linked to their security and strategic calculations.<sup>104</sup> Then, on 19 September, 1979, the US Defense Secretary Harold Brown revealed before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the USA proposed to organise a 110,000-man strong interventionist force (named Rapid Deployment Force) to be used in Asia and Africa to safeguard the Western economic and strategic interests.

This is how the Rand recommendations have been put into operation to seek military solutions to the North-South issues. The Third World is not at all equipped militarily to counteract such challenges from the West. The North-South military disparities thus have serious and far-reaching implications for North-South economic relations in general and consequently for the process of development in the Third World countries in particular.<sup>105</sup> It is amazing that whereas the Third World regimes have been protesting unanimously against the North's dominance in the world economic order, only a very few of them have raised a half-hearted protest against the North's dominance in the world military order.

This takes us to the question of structure of dependence in the Third World countries' domestic milieu. Along with creating and consolidating the Third World's military and economic dependence externally, the arms build-up process has strengthened the State and the regimes in the Third World countries, internally. Such strengthening has happened irrespective of the social bases and ideological characters of those who control the State in the Third World. Theoretically, it is possible to argue within the framework of both the liberal and the socialist theories — that the State can and does play a developmental role as an agent of change by creating a welfare/socialist society. In practice, however, it does not appear to be true that development is a principal preoccupation of the State in the Third World. Even in the case of pronouncedly anti-imperialist Third World states like Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, Algeria and others, it can be seriously debated whether socialist transformation has taken place internally. A separate, full-length study may have to be attempted to establish the reasons behind the lack of a developmental role played by the Third World state.

One important aspect of the strengthening of the State apparatus in the Third World has been the fortifying and consolidation of the military as a political institution and militarisation as a socio-political process. Consolidation of the military as a political institution is evident from the fact that, increasingly, either the military has assumed power directly, or has provided the main support and sustenance for a rapidly growing number of authoritarian regimes in the Third World.<sup>106</sup> The adverse implication of this phenomenon for the process of development has been that the use of force as an alternative to social, economic and political modes of action to resolve the problems of development has become more frequent and widespread. This is self-evident in those countries where the military is either directly in power, or is the main support behind the regimented and authoritarian systems. Brazil may be mentioned as one of the most obvious cases. Use of force to deal with socio-economic problems is becoming a frequent state activity even in those Third World societies under civilian governments. In India force was used during 1966-68 against the Naxalite move-



ment, and again in 1974 to break the railway strike (this was before the Emergency). In Sri Lanka, the post-1971 insurgency period was full of similar instances.

During the sixties, a very powerful case for using the military as a modernising force was advanced by academics as well as statesmen. The lead in this respect was taken by Western social scientists, particularly by persons like Lucian W. Pye, Janowitz and Huntington.<sup>107</sup> The Soviet social scientists in their conceptualisation of the 'non-capitalist path of development', extended a theoretical explanation to the effect that the military could play a 'progressive' role in the Third World societies. Whether it was so intended or not, the two theoretical approaches supporting the military take-over of power in the Third World provided an academic justification and rationalisation for the Soviet and Western strategic policies of backing up military regimes in the Third World. Intellectual enthusiasm in this respect seems to have declined considerably recently.<sup>108</sup>

The role of the military in development, however, needs to be looked at more closely and carefully.<sup>109</sup> The argument in support of the military's modernising role rests on three assumptions, namely, (i) the military, being an organised group, breeds coherence and integration and ensures stability; (ii) the military brings in foreign aid, and (iii) it encourages industrialisation. When we look at these assumptions one by one, we find that the military has not always brought about the so-called stability, even if we ignore the fact that stability does not necessarily induce or indicate development. African and Latin American politics, which are characterised by coups and counter-coups, underline the instability brought about by the military's involvement in politics. In Africa, the military's political role has sharpened ethnic and tribal cleavages rather than diffusing them and forging new symbols of national integration. In Pakistan, the military, far from ensuring stability, has bred chronic instability and chaos. The Indian Army still retains its caste-based organisational pattern that was evolved and fostered as a policy of colonial management by the British. Even the deployment of contingents for internal 'law and order' purposes, if not wholly based on caste, communal and regional considerations, takes these factors into account. Whereas the process of military organisation brings people of diverse loyalties together and facilitates interaction among them, the manner in which the military has exercised power to protect and consolidate the vested interests associated with the state has only resulted in the deepening of social cleavages.

It may be true that the military brings in foreign aid, as this aspect is related to the already noted connection between the Great Powers' strategic policies and military regimes in the Third World. However, development does not take place simply by securing more foreign aid.<sup>110</sup> Pakistan and Indonesia may be cited as two typical examples in this respect, though Latin America, West Asia and Africa are full of



similar cases. The question of aid is linked with that of industrialisation, which again shows that industrialisation has not necessarily taken place under the military regimes. Here again, it may be kept in mind that industrialisation by itself is not development. The most successful examples of industrialisation and economic growth under military or military-based regimes are those of Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. In all these countries, the societies have undergone heavy regimentation and we have witnessed the rise of a dependent capitalist growth through the consolidation of the multinational corporations as the principal actors in economic life.

The undue emphasis placed on industrialisation in these countries has also tended to obscure the other vital sector of their economies, viz. agriculture. Such economic growth, which is both lopsided and devoid of social content, does not conform to the concept of development as viewed here.

Thus, by way of securing foreign aid and capital investment, the military and the military-based regimes in the Third World enable and facilitate the penetration of external economic interests into the given Third World society which, in most cases, work to the detriment of the receiving society and economy. The role of military and military-based regimes is not unique in this respect, as other civilian or traditional/oligarchic regimes also pursue this line of action. However there are some notable peculiar aspects to military regimes in this respect. The military regime utilises this channel of foreign penetration to meet its requirements of military hardware, as well as its strategic doctrine and war ethos to serve its professional interests and to perpetuate itself in power. Further, the military regime also secures the requirements in consumer and luxury goods through this external channel, for itself and those sections of the upper social strata that constitute its narrow support base in the society. Accordingly, on the one hand, it allows the exploitation of national resources by foreign economic interests, and on the other ties the Third World country to the powerful international forces in a dependency relationship. It is only recently that academics have drawn attention to this aspect of the Third World states' behaviour in the global structure of dominance and dependence.<sup>111</sup>

The narrow support base of the military and military-based regimes has other adverse implications for development in the political and social fields. Such regimes being narrowly based are compelled to perpetuate the status quo and discriminatory policies. There is no incentive for ensuring distributive justice and a welfare society since the legitimacy is secured, not only on the basis of wider participation and consensus, but on force and coercion. Thus neither the political system is allowed to become representative and participatory, nor the faithful expression of social urges and aspirations permitted and institutionalized. As such, the growth and consolida-

tion of the military as a political force and institution in a society that is structured upon arms build-up processes is clearly a phenomenon that is detrimental to overall development.

## Processes

Socio-economic and political structures generate and encourage processes that have profound implications for development in a given society. The same is true of these structures brought into being by the arms build-up, as discussed in the previous section. The processes of modernisation and industrialisation have been mentioned in this respect. Let us look at these and other relevant processes resulting from the arms build-up phenomenon in relation to the external and internal *milieu* of development in the Third World. Arms build-up in the Third World has led to the opening of new modes and channels of contacts and interaction between the Third World countries and their external environment. In particular, it has opened channels for the flow of ideas and life styles (through training programmes, communication, negotiations and bargains of arms deals etc.) on the one hand and transfer of technology (through the transfer of weapons and weapons production arrangements) on the other. The channels of former types have affected directly the small groups of decision makers, ruling elites or the upper layers of armed forces and military establishments. These groups have consequently acquired cultural symbols and life styles that bear a heavy imprint of alien impact. This has resulted in the growing distance between these small privileged groups, thriving on the basis of external connection on the one hand, and the general mass of people in the society on the other. It is difficult to say and measure if, and to what extent, this has generated or stimulated modernisation within the Third World societies. Certainly, other things have proved to be more effective in this regard. One can cite, for example, modern channels of communication, such as the media, which exposes a society to wider information. Then, there is the scientific and technological revolution which has served to break down distances and cultural barriers. These things have led to a greater social consciousness and international awareness in Third World countries, and have consequently helped more than arms build-up to generate and stimulate modernisation processes. Further, it is also debatable if the ideas and experiences carried through the arms build-up channels of exposure and contact have always been conducive to the development process within the Third World countries.<sup>112</sup>

We have made some observations earlier about the industrialisation and modernisation processes induced in the Third World countries under military regimes. It may

be assumed that such processes were also stimulated by technology transfers taking place under the arms build-up activities, particularly weapons production arrangements. The impact of military technologies thus transferred to the Third World remains to be studied properly and in depth.<sup>113</sup> Some observations may, however, be made in this respect.

It has been noted while analysing the arms build-up trends that weapons production has not necessarily followed weapons transfers in each case (i.e. channels for transfer of technology have not been created in most of the countries receiving arms). Such transfers depend upon the recipients' capacity (in terms of infrastructure) to absorb the technologies so transferred, as also on the donor's willingness, which is conditioned by strategic and political considerations. Thus, West Asia has received sophisticated weapons without channels for the transfer of technology being established, or any weapons production programme, with its consequent industrialisation spin-off effects, being initiated. South Africa, Israel, Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore on the other hand, may be seen as specially favoured countries in this respect.

It has also been noted that two strategies of weapons production have been adopted in the Third World. One is through licence and co-production arrangements. Countries like Brazil, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea and South Africa may be mentioned in this category. The pattern of industrialisation stimulated by military technology in these countries, has linked them vertically with the industrialisation and weapons production in the West and has therefore made them dependent upon the latter. It has invariably required a disciplined and cheap labour force and industrial peace to maintain that pattern, which in turn has necessitated an authoritarian and regimented political order.<sup>114</sup> The second strategy of achieving self-reliance has been attempted in Egypt, India, Argentina, Israel and South Africa. The last two countries have been specially favoured by the suppliers of technology and capital and are, therefore, in a different category. They have no doubt achieved considerable success. The rest of the countries in this category, particularly India, have made notable progress in weapons production and industrialisation, but not in achieving a self-reliant economy. The costs have been high and dependence has not been reduced.<sup>115</sup>

The industrialisation process induced by military technologies has naturally been conditioned primarily by the requirements of the supplier of technologies rather than being geared to social needs and priorities of the recipient society. The industrialisation has been of the capital and technology intensive variety. The goods produced for civilian consumption through such technologies have also been catering to the upper strata in the society. The production sectors usually encouraged by military technology have been those of electronic equipment (like transistors, radios, television),



and fridges, electrical goods and cars, in the field of metallurgy, etc. Though the communication equipment has been of great use in the process of modernisation, the consumption of other goods has not been brought down to mass level owing to poverty, very low purchasing power and the absence of ancillary pre-conditions like availability of electric power, gasoline, etc. Because of this, the loud claims of converting defence industries into civilian production during peacetime have not materialised.<sup>116</sup> Such lopsided industrialisation has not only widened the inequality and gap in the living standards of the upper and ruling strata of society on the one hand and the masses on the other but it has also diverted governmental attention and action from other vital areas of social priority, such as agriculture or production of goods for mass consumption. India, Brazil and South Africa may be identified as typical examples of such distorted industrial growth. If one ignores the adverse socio-political implications, one can say that in Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea industrialisation progress has coincided with their military technology and would appear to be working well. However, this is due partly to the export orientation of these countries' economies, and partly to the preferences and protection given to their products in Western markets. This treatment these countries owe to the co-ordination of the multinational corporations' transnational economic activities. Given these facts, these three models cannot be seen as a viable prescription for the Third World in general.

Apart from the economic processes, there is an important, but so far, largely ignored, aspect of political corruption in the Third World which has received impetus as a result of arms build-up. The kickbacks paid by Western arms manufacturing companies to the Third World ruling elites to promote business and secure orders have led to the corruption of political processes, including electoral practices and campaigns. Money thus acquired has also been used by individual leaders (civilian or military) as well as political parties for various purposes. Most often it is used as an instrument to distribute patronage, build personal fortunes and consolidate professional or political influence in the Third World social conditions (as well as elsewhere) which are characterised by scarcity and deprivation. Difficulties in gathering data in this field are obviously formidable.<sup>117</sup> But an idea of the serious extent to which this factor is relevant can be gleaned from the US Senate Committee enquiry into the affairs of Lockheed and Northrop weapons manufacturing companies. Dr Kissinger, the former Secretary of State, urged the enquiry not to disclose the names of those who had received payoffs from these companies, for this would have resulted in governmental crises in the many Third World countries involved, and would have adversely affected their relations with the United States! Naturally, the persons

involved were high officials and prominent political leaders. In some countries, for example Indonesia, Burma, Thailand and Uganda, influential military officials have initiated private ventures to make money and build personal fortunes.

The last, but not the least, aspect of linkages between arms build-up and national development is the diversion of resources to arms build-up at the expense of basic developmental activity. The United Nations Reports and other studies have clearly underlined the fact that global military activities absorb enormous human material and scientific/technological resources of the world. Even if a small proportion of such resources were diverted to developmental activity, a substantial potential would be released for improving the quality of life of a large number of people in the world, who are otherwise living under miserable conditions of poverty and deprivation.<sup>118</sup> Some scholars have even found that the military build-up activities have contributed to growing inflation in the world and its resulting adverse implications for development.<sup>119</sup> The United Nations also had a study prepared to show that the reduction of a mere 10 per cent of the military budgets of five permanent member states of the Security Council, and diversion to the Third World nations of the resources which would thus become available, would boost tremendously the flow of development.<sup>120</sup>

In the internal context, the increase in expenditure for military purposes has placed heavy burdens on the developmental activities. Whereas some studies show that such burdens have been heavy,<sup>121</sup> others see a low 'opportunity cost' of defence spending.<sup>122</sup> There is one notable study by Benoit which also underlines a positive relationship between economic growth and military expenditure.<sup>123</sup> His findings, however, need to be viewed with caution for various reasons. Firstly he is talking of economic growth, not development, as he himself makes clear. He also shows in his study that in countries like Mexico, economic gains have been distributed unequally.<sup>124</sup> Neither does he address himself to the question of whether the rate of growth might have been still higher if the defence burden had been lower in the countries studied. There are some other methodological questions regarding Benoit's study. He takes a short period (five years) for the study, which may not indicate long term trends. He also does not take the role of external aid into account properly, for that was a greater stimulant to growth than defence expenditure.<sup>125</sup> A majority of the opinions, therefore, seem to be inclined in favour of a negative relationship between military expenditure and economic growth. At times, examples of roads and communication networks, dispensaries and welfare schemes for servicemen financed under the defence allocation may be cited for their positive role in developmental activities. But such structures and institutions are primarily meant for the military as a group, and their utility for the society at large is both incidental and marginal. Moreover, even these small, positive spin-off gains are largely negated by the distortions

caused by military expenditure in the economy, polity and society of any Third World country.

Thus, if we sum up the nature of the relationship between arms build-up and development, we find that there are definitive linkages between them and the nature of these linkages is predominantly negative. The arms build-up generates values and processes and creates structures that are not only incompatible with, but positively detrimental to, the values, processes and structures required for stimulating development. Further, the arms build-up consequences vitiate the domestic and external *milieu* of a given society so as to hamper developmental activity.



## Appraisal

We started with three propositions regarding the form and character of the linkages between arms build-up and development in the Third World. It emerges from the foregoing sections of this study that close and powerful linkages exist between the two phenomena or processes at various levels and that such linkages are predominantly negative in character. The negative character of the linkages is at times obscured when certain specific variables are studied in a specific, selected case in isolation from other implications and attributes of those variables. In this respect, we have identified studies that see military technology as an engine of industrialisation and modernisation, or military expenditure as a stimulant of economic growth. However, when other economic effects of such relationships are observed, or their socio-political prerequisites and consequences are studied in a wider, comparative frame of reference, we find that the so-called positive correlations between arms build-up and development disappear and the negative character of their linkages becomes unmistakable. We might reiterate and strongly urge here that in order to be relevant and meaningful both the phenomena of arms build-up and development must be studied in their broader and more comprehensive thrusts rather than in parts or components, or from a narrow perspective.

In this study, the linkages between arms build-up and development have been analysed from the arms build-up viewpoint, by observing what this does to the phenomenon of development in the Third World. What happens if those linkages are observed from the developmental viewpoint? This has not been attempted here, because the Third World is characterised by *under*-development rather than by development. It is possible to set the picture as seen from the developmental side in a historical context and argue on the basis of Western experience that arms build-up grows along with development. Such an argument will, however, lead us to another question regarding the pattern of development. The Western developmental pattern can be broadly described as exogenous. In particular, the arms build-up levels in the West rose significantly with the extension of empires and colonialisation. Such expansion, which strengthened and stimulated developmental processes at home, was inevitably based upon military strength to protect external sources of supplies and markets. The international context and the internal potential for development in the Third World present an entirely different picture. At its worst, where it is being exploited by powerful, external forces, the Third World has a dependent and thus unbalanced development. At its best, it may have an endogenous, self-reliant

development. It is well-nigh impossible to visualize a scenario in which the Third World, like the West, finds itself in a position to develop itself by exploiting the rest of the world through control of material resources it does not own. Thus, in the case of the Third World, the Western experience of advancing developmental processes by stepping up arms build-up (for reasons of colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism) would seem to be an impossibility.

One could argue that the proposition regarding the negative nature of linkages between arms build-up and development has a very weak empirical basis. But then there are no sound, empirically supported studies to show a positive correlation between them either. The empirical weakness of the negative linkages proposition is due to several factors. Among the most important of these is that as noted earlier, both arms build-up and development have significant areas of subjective evaluation and therefore cannot be fully subjected to quantification and empirical exercises. Then, it should be kept in mind that scholarly attention is only recently being directed towards this field. And even in this short period empirical support has been built in favour of some aspects of the negative linkages. More empirical support for the negative linkages hypothesis may be forthcoming subsequently. At this stage, the arms build-up enthusiasts may say that in future, empirical evidence may increasingly show a positive relationship between arms build-up and development. If this should ever be the case, it would be a sad day indeed, for then, disarmament and arms control efforts would have to be abandoned to ensure development of the Third World. As a consequence, the goal of world peace would have to be pushed into a state of deep-freeze as being irrelevant and retrograde. The experience and insight gained by the human race thus far compels us to believe that this would not be the case; that arms build-up would not emerge from further studies as an instrument of overall comprehensive development.

One might think that the negative nature of the linkages between arms build-up and development in the Third World might have some influence on arms control or disarmament measures. Apparently it lacks the necessary power, for the general attitude still seems to be: "Arms build-up hampers development — so what? Who is interested in development anyway?" The answer to that, of course, is the teeming, deprived masses of the Third World! But then, they do not take decisions nor command authority, nor rule societies, and those who do have different priorities. The rulers and decision-makers in the Third World understand, of course, that development is an essential factor to reckon with if they wish to preserve and perpetuate their privileged positions, orders, systems and regimes. And that the challenge of development is fast becoming unavoidable. But they also understand that their road to self-preservation and perpetuation through development is a hard and difficult one. The

alternate route, through arms build-up, is comparatively much easier and more convenient. At least, so it appears in the immediate context. And human beings have an irresistible tendency to opt for easy and convenient routes to survival, so long as such routes are effective. In order to govern and to ensure a more convenient and durable survival, they have evolved and pursued certain strategies which in effect rest upon arms build-up measures, but which are at the same time couched in a developmentalist idiom and rhetoric.

Therefore, the problem of arms control and disarmament in relation to the Third World must be approached at the very source of arms build-up. Accordingly, a simultaneous attack should be launched, if need be, on all the agents of arms build-up in the Third World. As we have seen in the section of this study on "Arms Build-up Agents", such an attack would not be confined to the Third World alone. The most powerful impulses for arms build-up have come from outside the Third World, from the Great Powers, and such impulses will have to be tackled and confronted with strength at their doorstep. Any other attempt would be far from adequate and therefore futile.



Table 1.1  
World Military Expenditure 1977  
(US \$m at 1973 prices and 1973 exchange rates, final column, X, at current prices and exchange rates)

| Region                                 | 1973   | 1978   | 1979   | 1980   | 1981    | 1982    | 1983    | 1984    | 1985    | 1986    | 1987    | 1988    | 1989    | 1990    | 1991    | 1992    | 1993    | 1994    | 1995    | 1996    | 1997     | 1998    |
|--|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|----------|---------|
| NATO                                   | 99,401 | 96,923 | 99,834 | 99,480 | 103,178 | 112,240 | 112,521 | 110,567 | 110,028 | 124,318 | 139,343 | 140,872 | 136,231 | 127,446 | 122,523 | 125,088 | 121,686 | 121,860 | 120,785 | 117,873 | 123,459  | 120,899 |
| OECD                                   | 34,000 | 33,400 | 36,000 | 35,638 | 44,030  | 48,747  | 51,369  | 51,171  | 49,498  | 51,813  | 56,022  | 64,987  | 69,212  | 70,598  | 70,974  | 71,240  | 71,808  | 71,344  | 71,363  | 71,948  | 71,700   | 71,948  |
| Other Europe                           | 3,160  | 3,225  | 3,200  | 3,200  | 3,546   | 3,867   | 3,999   | 4,226   | 4,226   | 4,422   | 4,420   | 4,560   | 4,740   | 4,864   | 4,983   | 5,286   | 5,382   | 5,772   | 5,867   | 5,977   | 5,970    | 6,244   |
| Japan                                  | 1,266  | 1,283  | 1,207  | 1,298  | 1,345   | 1,471   | 1,565   | 1,721   | 1,762   | 1,805   | 2,029   | 2,177   | 2,308   | 2,587   | 2,825   | 3,216   | 3,395   | 3,447   | 3,546   | 3,598   | 3,707    | 5,018   |
| China                                  | 9,250  | 9,000  | 10,000 | 10,000 | 11,800  | 13,700  | 15,200  | 18,400  | 19,400  | 21,800  | 23,500  | 25,500  | 27,500  | 29,300  | 30,000  | 27,500  | 27,500  | 27,500  | 27,500  | 27,500  | 27,500   | 27,500  |
| Urss/asia                              | 974    | 976    | 1,024  | 1,018  | 1,006   | 1,039   | 1,166   | 1,356   | 1,559   | 1,779   | 1,937   | 2,101   | 2,129   | 2,125   | 2,125   | 2,131   | 2,102   | 2,177   | 2,174   | 2,158   | 2,124    | 2,749   |
| South Asia                             | 1,075  | 1,225  | 1,323  | 1,340  | 1,450   | 1,620   | 1,810   | 2,060   | 2,400   | 2,875   | 3,275   | 4,425   | 5,225   | 6,175   | 6,900   | 9,643   | 13,480  | 16,538  | 18,560  | 21,525  | 17,750   | 32,796  |
| North Africa                           | 1,100  | 1,100  | 1,025  | 1,090  | 1,150   | 1,094   | 2,317   | 2,287   | 2,364   | 2,313   | 2,101   | 2,176   | 2,312   | 2,401   | 2,856   | 3,082   | 2,745   | 2,921   | 2,835   | 3,315   | 3,240    | 3,850   |
| Far East<br>(excl. Korea<br>and Japan) | 1,634  | 1,837  | 1,993  | 2,202  | 2,205   | 2,312   | 2,412   | 2,583   | 3,026   | 3,623   | 3,403   | 3,909   | 4,162   | 4,464   | 4,871   | 4,947   | 4,786   | 4,817   | 5,279   | 5,402   | 5,893    | 7,951   |
| Africa<br>(excl. Egypt)                | 300    | 275    | 325    | 390    | 575     | 855     | 967     | 1,163   | 1,328   | 1,397   | 1,733   | 2,012   | 2,422   | 2,567   | 2,843   | 2,996   | 3,362   | 4,128   | 5,223   | 6,210   | 64,500   | 8,621   |
| Latin America                          | 2,350  | 2,435  | 2,100  | 2,140  | 2,138   | 2,239   | 2,338   | 2,336   | 2,767   | 2,796   | 3,277   | 3,281   | 3,386   | 3,568   | 4,084   | 4,163   | 4,620   | 4,727   | 4,893   | 5,310   | 5,210    | 4,520   |
| Third World                            | 6,409  | 6,852  | 6,818  | 7,382  | 7,518   | 8,520   | 9,864   | 10,599  | 11,925  | 12,405  | 14,249  | 15,813  | 17,167  | 18,177  | 21,554  | 25,031  | 28,001  | 32,011  | 36,250  | 41,762  | (79,093) |         |
| Total                                  |        |        |        |        |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |          |         |

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1978.

X - at current prices.

TABLE 1.2  
Leading Third World Countries in Military Expenditure (Constant Prices, US \$ m at 1973)

| Region and Country     | 1962  | 1963  | 1964  | 1965  | 1966  | 1967  | 1968  | 1969  | 1970  | 1971  | 1972  | 1973  | 1974  | 1975    | 1976  | 1977    |
|------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|---------|-------|---------|
| <b>WEST ASIA</b>       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |         |       |         |
| 1. Egypt               | (400) | 447   | 560   | 607   | 625   | 838   | 816   | 946   | 1,343 | 1,756 | 1,719 | 3,171 | 3,502 | 3,403   | 2,957 | 3,139   |
| 2. Iran                | 287   | 292   | 323   | 343   | 598   | 752   | 852   | 759   | 959   | 1,245 | 2,107 | 3,691 | 4,498 | 5,556   | 6,712 | 4,636   |
| 3. Saudi Arabia        | (183) | 230   | 224   | 235   | 428   | 624   | 465   | 505   | 570   | 634   | 839   | 1,079 | 1,324 | 2,784   | 3,974 | (3,342) |
| <b>SOUTH ASIA</b>      |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |         |       |         |
| 1. India               | 1,296 | 2,055 | 2,011 | 1,961 | 1,852 | 1,718 | 1,788 | 1,892 | 1,949 | 2,320 | 2,449 | 2,165 | 2,014 | 2,221   | 2,644 | 2,562   |
| 2. Pakistan            | 173   | 188   | 212   | 341   | 398   | 324   | 333   | 363   | 396   | 474   | 525   | 470   | 459   | 462     | 463   | 449     |
| <b>FAR EAST</b>        |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |         |       |         |
| 1. Indonesia           | 313   | 216   | 169   | 151   | 104   | 226   | 292   | 339   | 359   | 405   | 456   | 430   | 401   | 586     | 521   | 494     |
| 2. Korea, North        | 305   | 341   | 366   | 429   | 429   | 576   | 824   | 877   | 878   | 922   | 612   | 625   | 765   | 922     | 1,007 | 939     |
| 3. Korea, South        | 213   | 177   | 167   | 175   | 214   | 238   | 281   | 324   | 334   | 394   | 443   | 456   | 601   | 747     | 988   | 1,258   |
| 4. Vietnam, X          | (390) | (485) | (585) | (620) | (640) | (630) | (630) | (585) | (585) | (585) | (635) | (565) | (585) | (605)   | -     | -       |
| 5. Vietnam, X<br>South | 326   | 345   | 350   | 602   | 459   | 479   | 512   | 540   | 550   | 563   | 661   | 513   | 446   | (244)   | -     | -       |
| <b>AFRICA</b>          |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |         |       |         |
| 1. Algeria             | 108   | 129   | 137   | 153   | 152   | 152   | 150   | 149   | 139   | 136   | 134   | 138   | 262   | 229     | 263   | 300     |
| 2. Libya               | 21    | 23    | 25    | 32    | 60    | 171   | 270   | 413   | 455   | 648   | 668   | 888   | 1,789 | (1,650) | 1,594 | -       |
| 3. Morocco             | 85    | 112   | 100   | 88    | 92    | 99    | 116   | 125   | 118   | 126   | 158   | 193   | 172   | 174     | 583   | 301     |
| 4. Nigeria             | 41    | 52    | 58    | 68    | 58    | 201   | 346   | 564   | 550   | 468   | 553   | 564   | 671   | 1,090   | 1,187 | -       |
| 5. South Africa        | 263   | 267   | 374   | 384   | 416   | 469   | 467   | 481   | 460   | 511   | 518   | 633   | 830   | 1,020   | 1,298 | 1,625   |
| <b>LATIN AMERICA</b>   |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |         |       |         |
| 1. Cuba X              | 237   | 252   | 262   | 252   | 252   | 296   | 355   | 296   | 343   | 343   | 316   | 320   | 334   | 386     | -     | -       |
| 2. Mexico              | 158   | 173   | 194   | 195   | 238   | 236   | 254   | 267   | 273   | 294   | 332   | 353   | 342   | 408     | 544   | -       |
| 3. Argentina           | 558   | 559   | 515   | 573   | 646   | 704   | 595   | 633   | 659   | 590   | 596   | 511   | 689   | 1,135   | 1,010 | 1,145   |
| 4. Brazil              | 554   | 544   | 583   | 863   | 736   | 1,013 | 1,017 | 1,119 | 1,056 | 1,444 | 1,514 | 1,767 | 1,072 | 1,076   | 1,216 | 1,407   |
| 5. Chile               | 158   | 144   | 135   | 153   | 189   | 199   | 212   | 236   | 323   | 330   | 398   | 628   | 590   | 409     | (912) | 882     |
| 6. Peru                | 127   | 175   | 171   | 170   | 169   | 215   | 215   | 226   | 285   | 297   | 276   | 337   | 345   | 469     | 378   | 278     |
| 7. Venezuela           | 148   | 177   | 183   | 206   | 213   | 242   | 241   | 228   | 229   | 277   | 312   | 304   | 422   | 475     | 353   | 530     |

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1978, Tables 6A.11 to 6A.29.

X At current prices and 1973 exchange rates.

( ) shows rough estimates.

TABLE 1.3  
Leading Third World Countries in Military Expenditure  
(% of GNP<sup>a</sup> Central Government Expenditure and the MILEX Per Capita)

| Region and Country         | 1967                       | 1968                       | 1969                | 1970                 | 1971                | 1972                | 1973                | 1974                 | 1975                 | 1976                 |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Developing Countries (Gen) | a 6.3<br>b 41.0<br>c 19    | 6.3<br>44.7<br>20          | 6.4<br>46.0<br>21   | 6.3<br>45.3<br>22    | 6.4<br>43.8<br>23   | 5.9<br>37.9<br>24   | 5.8<br>40.3<br>25   | 5.8<br>37.9<br>25    | 6.1<br>34.3<br>27    | 6.1<br>32.2<br>26    |
| WEST ASIA                  |                            |                            |                     |                      |                     |                     |                     |                      |                      |                      |
| Egypt                      | 6.7<br>15<br>18.4          | 8.7<br>19<br>n.a.          | 9.6<br>22<br>27.3   | 12.8<br>31<br>32.5   | 12.8<br>31<br>32.4  | 15.1<br>37<br>33.7  | 15.5<br>38<br>32.1  | 14.9<br>38<br>25.9   | 11.2<br>29<br>18.1   | 10.5<br>28<br>19.4   |
| Iran                       | 6.9<br>8<br>27.9           | 7.4<br>56<br>25.8          | 8.3<br>66<br>28.4   | 7.8<br>68<br>25.8    | 8.3<br>78<br>26.9   | 8.9<br>94<br>27.6   | 8.4<br>108<br>30.2  | 11.8<br>168<br>29.0  | 14.5<br>223<br>32.5  | 12.2<br>207<br>30.5  |
| Iraq                       | 10.3<br>78<br>32.5         | 11.6<br>99<br>30.2         | 13.8<br>119<br>38.0 | 12.9<br>110<br>37.9  | 12.3<br>104<br>31.0 | 11.5<br>104<br>32.4 | 11.6<br>136<br>30.8 | 15.7<br>155<br>26.3  | 10.5<br>125<br>16.3  | 10.6<br>134<br>16.8  |
| Jordan                     | 11.7<br>63<br>35.3         | 17.8<br>89<br>44.3         | 17.7<br>94<br>46.9  | 14.9<br>68<br>41.1   | 14.3<br>65<br>41.6  | 15.0<br>65<br>39.8  | 16.5<br>70<br>35.9  | 11.9<br>53<br>30.0   | 12.1<br>37<br>23.4   | 9.4<br>36<br>23.7    |
| Oman                       | n.a.<br>n.a.               | n.a.<br>n.a.               | n.a.<br>n.a.        | 15.2<br>311          | 15.9<br>324         | 25.2<br>514         | 32.5<br>474         | 26.4<br>436          | 39.5<br>911          | 40.1<br>1,020        |
| Saudi Arabia               | 11.1<br>403                | 6.4<br>246                 | 6.8<br>277          | 6.3<br>269           | 6.4<br>287          | 6.4<br>303          | 7.2<br>381          | 5.1<br>228           | 5.8<br>311           | 19.4<br>932          |
| Syria                      | 23.1<br>15.4<br>87<br>n.a. | 15.2<br>11.0<br>64<br>n.a. | 15.6<br>9.8<br>36.7 | 14.1<br>11.8<br>37.7 | 17.6<br>8.9<br>29.2 | 17.0<br>8.6<br>29.6 | 17.0<br>8.6<br>44.4 | 21.7<br>15.0<br>44.4 | 22.7<br>11.9<br>30.1 | 21.3<br>16.7<br>33.9 |
| SOUTH ASIA                 |                            |                            |                     |                      |                     |                     |                     |                      |                      |                      |
| India                      | 3.0<br>4<br>9.7            | 3.1<br>4<br>19.3           | 3.0<br>4<br>19.4    | 3.0<br>4<br>18.8     | 3.6<br>5<br>21.6    | 3.5<br>4<br>20.0    | 2.9<br>4<br>20.3    | 3.1<br>4<br>21.0     | 3.4<br>5<br>19.7     | 3.4<br>5<br>18.4     |
| Pakistan                   | 6.0<br>4<br>20.5           | 6.2<br>4<br>20.5           | 5.9<br>4<br>29.1    | 5.8<br>4<br>31.8     | 6.4<br>4<br>43.6    | 6.7<br>4<br>40.8    | 6.6<br>4<br>40.8    | 5.7<br>4<br>29.8     | 6.2<br>4<br>27.0     | 5.7<br>4<br>25.2     |
| FAR EAST                   |                            |                            |                     |                      |                     |                     |                     |                      |                      |                      |
| Indonesia                  | 2.6<br>4<br>24.7           | 3.1<br>5<br>34.2           | 3.2<br>5<br>n.a.    | 3.3<br>5<br>n.a.     | 3.5<br>6<br>24.8    | 3.4<br>6<br>21.6    | 2.9<br>6<br>16.5    | 2.9<br>6<br>15.1     | 4.0<br>8<br>17.5     | 3.6<br>7<br>15.9     |
| Korea (N)                  | 14.0<br>57<br>n.a.         | n.a.<br>89<br>n.a.         | n.a.<br>83<br>n.a.  | 15.8<br>68<br>n.a.   | n.a.<br>67<br>n.a.  | n.a.<br>67<br>n.a.  | n.a.<br>67<br>n.a.  | 8.1<br>47<br>n.a.    | 7.2<br>44<br>n.a.    | 9.6<br>56<br>n.a.    |
| Korea (S)                  | 3.9<br>11<br>22.9          | 4.0<br>12<br>22.4          | 4.0<br>15<br>22.5   | 3.9<br>14<br>22.8    | 4.5<br>18<br>25.7   | 4.5<br>19<br>23.8   | 3.7<br>17<br>24.5   | 3.7<br>22<br>28.3    | 4.4<br>26<br>32.5    | 6.1<br>36<br>25.8    |
| Singapore                  | 2.1<br>26<br>11.7          | 2.8<br>40<br>17.2          | 6.0<br>95<br>38.9   | 5.7<br>100<br>31.7   | 6.2<br>120<br>34.4  | 5.4<br>115<br>33.2  | 5.3<br>121<br>34.5  | 5.0<br>120<br>33.3   | 5.4<br>133<br>32.8   | 6.0<br>154<br>n.a.   |
| Taiwan                     | 10.7<br>61<br>48.7         | 10.5<br>63<br>48.7         | 10.4<br>67<br>54.4  | 10.6<br>74<br>50.9   | 10.0<br>77<br>50.7  | 9.0<br>77<br>45.8   | 8.5<br>75<br>43.8   | 7.1<br>69<br>39.9    | 8.9<br>64<br>39.0    | 32.1<br>85<br>n.a.   |
| Vietnam (N)                | 23.3<br>25<br>n.a.         | 25.0<br>23<br>n.a.         | 21.4<br>20<br>n.a.  | 20.0<br>19<br>n.a.   | 18.8<br>17<br>n.a.  | 25.0<br>18<br>n.a.  | 21.1<br>15<br>n.a.  | 21.9<br>14<br>n.a.   | 22.7<br>13<br>n.a.   | n.a.<br>n.a.<br>n.a. |
| Vietnam (S)                | 14.8<br>30<br>n.a.         | 18.7<br>35<br>n.a.         | 16.5<br>32<br>n.a.  | 15.5<br>31<br>n.a.   | 17.1<br>34<br>n.a.  | 18.5<br>36<br>n.a.  | 18.5<br>35<br>n.a.  | 18.9<br>29<br>n.a.   | 15.7<br>22<br>n.a.   | n.a.<br>n.a.<br>n.a. |
| AFRICA                     |                            |                            |                     |                      |                     |                     |                     |                      |                      |                      |
| Algeria                    | 2.2<br>14<br>7.3           | 1.9<br>13<br>6.0           | 1.7<br>13<br>5.2    | 1.5<br>12<br>5.7     | 1.5<br>11<br>5.2    | 1.5<br>11<br>5.2    | 1.3<br>11<br>4.7    | 1.3<br>16<br>4.2     | 2.1<br>18<br>8.6     | 2.2<br>19<br>6.1     |
| Libya                      | 1.8<br>50<br>5.7           | 1.5<br>56<br>n.a.          | 1.9<br>78<br>6.9    | 2.8<br>118<br>9.9    | 2.9<br>117<br>8.8   | 2.9<br>117<br>8.8   | 2.6<br>84<br>6.1    | 1.0<br>107<br>6.7    | 1.2<br>141<br>8.8    | 1.7<br>83<br>3.8     |
| Morocco                    | 2.8<br>11<br>11.5          | 3.0<br>12<br>12.7          | 3.0<br>12<br>12.5   | 2.9<br>13<br>12.4    | 3.0<br>13<br>13.1   | 3.0<br>14<br>14.1   | 3.2<br>14<br>15.8   | 3.6<br>16<br>13.6    | 3.2<br>16<br>10.2    | 3.6<br>17<br>8.9     |
| Nigeria                    | 3.7<br>8<br>n.a.           | 3.9<br>12<br>n.a.          | 9.8<br>24<br>n.a.   | 9.8<br>24<br>36.6    | 4.2<br>14<br>24.1   | 4.2<br>14<br>25.4   | 5.2<br>18<br>21.1   | 5.0<br>15<br>13.9    | 4.6<br>19<br>8.3     | 5.3<br>23<br>11.5    |
| South Africa               | 2.6<br>14<br>18.1          | 2.6<br>13<br>17.8          | 2.8<br>14<br>21.9   | 2.4<br>14<br>23.8    | 2.4<br>17<br>23.7   | 2.4<br>18<br>23.7   | 3.0<br>18<br>19.0   | 3.0<br>20<br>19.8    | 4.3<br>27<br>20.5    | 4.3<br>27<br>11.1    |
| Peru                       | 3.5<br>24<br>19.3          | 4.0<br>26<br>23.4          | 3.3<br>22<br>19.4   | 3.3<br>23<br>18.2    | 3.3<br>24<br>17.2   | 3.3<br>24<br>17.2   | 3.3<br>24<br>19.2   | 3.7<br>29<br>18.9    | 4.5<br>29<br>21.5    | 5.2<br>14<br>24.3    |
| LATIN AMERICA              |                            |                            |                     |                      |                     |                     |                     |                      |                      |                      |
| Cuba                       | 4.3<br>34<br>n.a.          | 5.3<br>40<br>n.a.          | 4.4<br>32<br>n.a.   | 4.9<br>37<br>n.a.    | 5.1<br>36<br>n.a.   | 5.3<br>36<br>n.a.   | 4.7<br>39<br>n.a.   | 5.6<br>40<br>n.a.    | 6.2<br>42<br>n.a.    | n.a.<br>n.a.<br>n.a. |
| Mexico                     | 0.7<br>6<br>8.1            | 0.7<br>6<br>8.1            | 0.7<br>6<br>6.6     | 0.7<br>7<br>6.8      | 0.7<br>7<br>7.6     | 0.7<br>7<br>6.3     | 0.7<br>7<br>5.3     | 0.7<br>9<br>5.3      | 0.9<br>9<br>5.7      | 0.8<br>8<br>4.6      |
| Argentina                  | 2.0<br>26<br>18.0          | 2.0<br>25<br>23.0          | 1.9<br>27<br>16.0   | 1.8<br>25<br>15.2    | 1.4<br>21<br>11.9   | 1.3<br>19<br>10.7   | 1.5<br>19<br>9.3    | 1.6<br>25<br>8.5     | 2.3<br>23<br>9.7     | 2.4<br>33<br>11.7    |
| Brazil                     | 2.2<br>14<br>18.1          | 3.0<br>13<br>17.8          | 2.1<br>14<br>21.9   | 2.3<br>17<br>23.8    | 2.2<br>17<br>23.7   | 2.2<br>18<br>23.7   | 2.0<br>18<br>19.0   | 2.0<br>20<br>19.8    | 2.2<br>20<br>20.5    | 1.7<br>14<br>11.1    |
| Chile                      | 2.0<br>13<br>8.5           | 2.0<br>16<br>8.5           | 2.0<br>16<br>10.1   | 2.5<br>20<br>11.6    | 2.4<br>20<br>n.a.   | 2.4<br>23<br>n.a.   | 2.8<br>25<br>n.a.   | 3.2<br>25<br>n.a.    | 5.6<br>45<br>n.a.    | 4.3<br>29<br>n.a.    |
| Peru                       | 3.5<br>24<br>19.3          | 4.0<br>26<br>23.4          | 3.3<br>22<br>19.4   | 3.3<br>23<br>18.2    | 3.3<br>24<br>17.2   | 3.3<br>24<br>17.2   | 3.3<br>24<br>19.2   | 3.7<br>29<br>18.9    | 4.5<br>29<br>21.5    | 5.2<br>14<br>24.3    |

Source: ACDA 1967-76.

Figures in each column are in this order:

a. Percentage of GNP.

b. MILEX per capita.

c. Percentage of Central Government Expenditure.

\* 29.1 according to SIPRI figures.



TABLE 1.4

| Military Expenditure<br>as % of GNP | GNP Per Capita   |  |   |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|--|---|--|
|                                     | Less than \$200  | \$200-499  | \$500-999   | \$1,000-1,900  |
| More than 10%                       | China (PRC)<br>Egypt   | Soviet<br>Albania  | Oman<br>Iran<br>Iraq  | Israel<br>Saudi Arabia<br>Soviet Union<br>Qatar  |
| 5 - 10%                             | Somalia<br>Yemen (Sana)<br>Pakistan  | Yemen (Aden)<br>Nigeria  | Korea (North)<br>Jordan<br>Korea (ROK)<br>Turkey<br>Congo<br>Peru               | Bulgaria<br>Singapore<br>Czechoslovakia<br>United States<br>United Kingdom<br>Hungary<br>South Africa<br>Greece                                    |
| 2 - 4.99%                           | Ethiopia<br>Zaire<br>Tanzania<br>Bolivia<br>India<br>Chad<br>Upper Volta<br>Burma<br>Burundi<br>Bangladesh | Indonesia<br>Mauritania<br>Zambia<br>Mali<br>Mozambique<br>Uganda<br>Seychelles<br>Philippines<br>Togo<br>Thailand | So. Rhodesia<br>Malaysia<br>Norocco<br>Argentina<br>Ecuador<br>Nicaragua        | France<br>Germany (FRG)<br>Netherlands<br>Brazil<br>Austria<br>Sweden<br>Kuwait<br>Belgium<br>Bahrain<br>Traly<br>Denmark<br>Canada<br>Switzerland |
| 1 - 1.99%                           | Afghanistan<br>Benin<br>Bosnia<br>Malawi<br>Haiti  | Madagascar<br>Cameroon<br>Cent. Afr. Rep.<br>Honduras<br>Senegal<br>Kenya<br>Ghana<br>El Salvador                  | Chile<br>Guyana<br>Tunisia<br>Dom. Rep.<br>Paraguay<br>Guatemala<br>Ivory Coast | Venezuela<br>Finland<br>Ireland<br>Brazil<br>Libya<br>Luxembourg<br>Austria  |
| Less than 1%                        | Niger<br>Nepal<br>Sri Lanka<br>Gambia  | Sierra Leone<br>Liberia<br>Guinea-Bissau<br>Swaziland<br>Botswana  | Malta<br>Mexico<br>Panama<br>Barbados<br>Trinidad and<br>Tobago<br>Surinam      | Japan<br>Iceland   |

Within each cell, ranked according to Military Expenditure as per cent of GNP.

Source: ACDA, 1967-76, p.4.

TABLE 2.1  
Armed Forces, Third World 1966 - 76

|  | 1966<br>X | 1967   | 1968   | 1969   | 1970   | 1971   | 1972   | 1973   | 1974   | 1975   | 1976   |
|--|-----------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Armed Forces ('000)                                | 11,633    | 12,100 | 12,500 | 13,000 | 13,400 | 14,100 | 14,700 | 15,100 | 16,200 | 15,500 | 15,600 |
| Armed Forces per<br>Thousand                       | 4.63      | 4.70   | 4.73   | 4.82   | 4.83   | 4.98   | 5.19   | 5.21   | 5.51   | 5.12   | 4.97   |
| Expenditure per<br>Soldier (Constant<br>Dollars X) | 3,576     | 3,601  | 3,740  | 3,879  | 4,152  | 4,178  | 4,078  | 4,205  | 4,310  | 4,512  | -      |

Sources: ACDA, 1967-76,  
X ACDA, 1966-75.

TABLE 2.2  
Armed Forces Third World Regions, 1965 - 76

| Region                                      | 1965 <sup>0</sup> | 1966* | 1967  | 1968  | 1969  | 1970  | 1971  | 1972  | 1973  | 1974   | 1975   | 1976  |
|---|-------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|--------|-------|
| NEAR EAST                                   |                   |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |        |        |       |
| Armed Forces ('000)                         |                   |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |        |        |       |
| 1   | 799               | 813   | 844   | 841   | 914   | 988   | 1,140 | 1,250 | 1,280 | 1,410  | 1,680  | 1,750 |
| Armed Forces per thousand                   |                   |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |        |        |       |
| 2   | 9.18              | 8.96  | 9.04  | 8.75  | 9.26  | 9.73  | 10.90 | 11.60 | 11.60 | 12.40  | 14.40  | 14.40 |
| Expenditure per soldier (constant* dollars) |                   |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |        |        |       |
| 3   | 2,624             | 3,467 | 4,231 | 4,832 | 5,356 | 5,855 | 5,752 | 6,027 | 8,487 | 11,509 | 10,403 | -     |
| AFRICA                                      |                   |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |        |        |       |
| 1   | 487               | 544   | 564   | 635   | 688   | 764   | 914   | 949   | 936   | 965    | 1,000  | 1,090 |
| 2   | 1.90              | 1.92  | 1.94  | 2.13  | 2.24  | 2.43  | 2.83  | 2.86  | 2.75  | 2.76   | 2.79   | 2.93  |
| 3   | 2,205             | 3,050 | 3,398 | 3,396 | 4,090 | 3,602 | 3,063 | 3,297 | 3,509 | 4,095  | 4,252  | -     |
| LATIN AMERICA                               |                   |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |        |        |       |
| 1   | 1,018             | 1,032 | 1,050 | 1,060 | 1,110 | 1,120 | 1,130 | 1,170 | 1,210 | 1,250  | 1,300  | 1,330 |
| 2   | 4.21              | 4.16  | 4.10  | 4.02  | 4.13  | 4.03  | 3.96  | 4.01  | 4.02  | 4.04   | 4.08   | 4.07  |
| 3   | 2,266             | 2,857 | 3,011 | 3,069 | 3,023 | 3,369 | 3,586 | 3,459 | 3,735 | 4,111  | 4,460  | -     |
| EAST ASIA                                   |                   |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |        |        |       |
| 1   | 6,184             | 6,087 | 6,420 | 6,680 | 6,980 | 7,130 | 7,490 | 7,830 | 8,030 | 8,990  | 7,850  | 7,840 |
| 2   | 5.40              | 5.13  | 5.30  | 5.39  | 5.51  | 5.50  | 5.64  | 5.77  | 5.79  | 6.35   | 5.44   | 5.27  |
| 3   | 2,062             | 4,865 | 4,694 | 4,766 | 4,910 | 5,316 | 5,319 | 5,013 | 4,920 | 4,422  | 5,187  | -     |
| SOUTH ASIA                                  |                   |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |        |        |       |
| 1   | 1,620             | 1,835 | 1,900 | 1,970 | 2,030 | 2,080 | 2,100 | 2,130 | 2,320 | 2,410  | 2,460  | 2,360 |
| 2   | 2.47              | 2.54  | 2.57  | 2.60  | 2.63  | 2.61  | 2.58  | 2.82  | 3.00  | 3.04   | 3.03   | 2.79  |
| 3   | 1,393             | 1,390 | 1,308 | 1,364 | 1,347 | 1,397 | 1,676 | 1,681 | 1,356 | 1,366  | 1,519  | -     |

Sources: <sup>0</sup> ACDA, 1963 - 73; \* ACDA, 1966 - 75; ACDA, 1967 - 76.



TABLE 2.3  
Leading Third World Countries in Armed Forces 1966 - 77

|                    | 1966    | 1967  | 1968  | 1969   | 1970   | 1971   | 1972   | 1973   | 1974   | 1975   | 1976 <sup>a</sup> | Rank |
|--------------------|---------|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------------------|------|
| <b>MIDDLE EAST</b> |         |       |       |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |                   |      |
| Egypt              | 1 7.13  | 7.11  | 6.15  | 7.09   | 7.69   | 9.29   | 11.25  | 11.01  | 11.32  | 10.79  | 10.53             | 13   |
|                    | 2 2,577 | 2,323 | 3,451 | 3,452  | 4,431  | 7,714  | 3,667  | 3,846  | 3,780  | 3,075  |                   |      |
| Iran               | 7.83    | 7.61  | 7.39  | 7.69   | 8.14   | 8.23   | 8.31   | 8.67   | 9.16   | 11.03  | 11.67             | 11   |
|                    | 3,132   | 4,300 | 5,190 | 5,867  | 6,000  | 7,725  | 9,434  | 10,421 | 19,258 | 18,442 |                   | II   |
| Iraq               | 10.93   | 10.58 | 10.24 | 9.91   | 10.13  | 10.83  | 10.48  | 10.14  | 10.28  | 14.01  | 16.67             | 5    |
|                    | 4,344   | 4,200 | 5,500 | 6,833  | 6,316  | 5,886  | 5,610  | 7,476  | 27,182 | 10,903 | -                 | IV   |
| Jordan             | 25.61   | 29.76 | 26.39 | 27.06  | 31.42  | 28.19  | 29.33  | 28.31  | 27.33  | 22.61  | 23.72             | 4    |
|                    | 2,120   | 2,150 | 3,436 | 3,450  | 2,200  | 2,323  | 2,329  | 2,243  | 1,986  | 2,200  | -                 |      |
| Saudi Arabia       | 9.33    | 10.09 | 11.78 | 11.46  | 12.07  | 13.53  | 13.14  | 12.76  | 13.22  | 15.25  | 12.45             | 10   |
|                    | 5,067   | 9,180 | 4,767 | 5,333  | 5,015  | 5,493  | 6,307  | 9,387  | 14,375 | 16,842 | -                 | III  |
| Syria              | 14.55   | 14.08 | 11.08 | 12.38  | 11.98  | 17.02  | 17.22  | 16.67  | 18.23  | 31.20  | 30.22             | 1    |
|                    | 3,925   | 4,250 | 3,938 | 3,493  | 4,293  | 2,473  | 2,548  | 4,609  | 3,477  | 3,326  | -                 |      |
| <b>SOUTH ASIA</b>  |         |       |       |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |                   |      |
| India              | 2.78    | 2.76  | 2.82  | 2.81   | 2.82   | 2.78   | 2.77   | 2.76   | 2.70   | 2.72   | 2.23              |      |
|                    | 1,529   | 1,479 | 1,520 | 1,523  | 1,568  | 1,897  | 1,843  | 1,556  | 1,605  | 1,814  | -                 |      |
| Pakistan           | 2.56    | 2.90  | 2.88  | 3.07   | 2.98   | 2.99   | 5.53   | 7.13   | 7.43   | 7.24   | 8.0               | 15   |
|                    | 1,220   | 974   | 1,067 | 990    | 1,062  | 1,203  | 1,491  | 1,120  | 1,144  | 1,133  | -                 |      |
| Bangladesh         |         |       |       |        |        |        | 0.63   | 1.13   | 1.27   | 1.24   | 1.51              |      |
| <b>FAR EAST</b>    |         |       |       |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |                   |      |
| Burma              | 5.34    | 5.25  | 5.13  | 6.38   | 6.27   | 6.16   | 6.57   | 6.65   | 6.63   | 6.70   | 6.58              |      |
|                    | 1,341   | 1,103 | 1,081 | 913    | 989    | 1,074  | 958    | 1,051  | 688    | 751    | -                 |      |
| Indonesia          | 3.05    | 2.98  | 2.92  | 2.94   | 2.87   | 2.81   | 2.73   | 2.33   | 1.98   | 1.86   | 1.80              |      |
|                    | 422     | 931   | 1,221 | 1,335  | 1,458  | 1,623  | 1,784  | 1,897  | 2,626  | 3,708  | -                 | XIII |
| Korea (North)      | 30.41   | 29.51 | 30.67 | 29.77  | 30.88  | 30.79  | 30.54  | 30.28  | 29.37  | 28.47  | 29.41             | 2    |
|                    | 1,386   | 1,807 | 2,098 | 2,015  | 2,037  | 2,020  | 1,265  | 1,464  | 1,489  | 1,419  | -                 |      |
| Korea (South)      | 19.38   | 20.26 | 20.05 | 19.59  | 19.91  | 19.25  | 18.73  | 18.29  | 17.89  | 17.38  | 16.53             | 6    |
|                    | 514     | 515   | 592   | 676    | 679    | 673    | 978    | 940    | 1,194  | 1,440  | -                 |      |
| Singapore          | 0       | 5.06  | 5.47  | 5.87   | 6.75   | 7.11   | 9.32   | 10.98  | 10.82  | 11.99  | 15.28             | 7    |
|                    | 0       | 4,870 | 6,864 | 15,167 | 14,000 | 15,933 | 11,650 | 10,375 | 10,500 | 10,333 | -                 | V    |
| Taiwan             | 44.74   | 40.02 | 37.80 | 38.88  | 35.81  | 36.26  | 36.20  | 32.48  | 31.24  | 31.35  | 28.27             | 3    |
|                    | 1,443   | 1,470 | 1,621 | 1,463  | 1,492  | 2,037  | 2,000  | 2,326  | 1,970  | 2,560  | -                 |      |
| Thailand           | 4.65    | 4.52  | 4.85  | 4.93   | 4.79   | 5.18   | 5.29   | 5.84   | 5.39   | 5.38   | 5.10              |      |
|                    | 1,013   | 1,219 | 1,339 | 1,549  | 1,783  | 2,011  | 1,927  | 1,489  | 1,602  | 1,604  | -                 |      |
| Vietnam (North)    | 12.69   | 20.17 | 21.07 | 22.03  | 20.44  | 20.16  | 27.17  | 26.88  | 27.83  | 26.44  | 13.76             | 8    |
|                    | 1,953   | 1,346 | 1,025 | 845    | 845    | 800    | 605    | 506    | 451    | 442    | -                 |      |
| Vietnam (South)    | 37.37   | 38.06 | 42.25 | 49.96  | 54.57  | 54.36  | 56.98  | 55.00  | 48.18  | -      | -                 |      |
|                    | 752     | 733   | 776   | 587    | 526    | 560    | 583    | 591    | 558    | -      | -                 |      |
| <b>AFRICA</b>      |         |       |       |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |                   |      |
| Algeria            | 6.30    | 6.13  | 5.95  | 6.16   | 5.98   | 5.80   | 5.62   | 5.44   | 5.27   | 5.10   | 5.25              |      |
|                    | 2,093   | 2,080 | 2,067 | 1,913  | 1,825  | 1,763  | 1,763  | 1,825  | 3,250  | 3,450  | -                 | XV   |
| Libya              | 11.88   | 11.42 | 16.44 | 13.14  | 9.07   | 9.18   | 9.26   | 8.89   | 10.68  | 10.26  | 9.84              | 14   |
|                    | 2,605   | 2,755 | 2,150 | 3,752  | 7,722  | 8,632  | 7,750  | 10,400 | 15,480 | 7,360  | -                 | VII  |

TABLE 2.3 continued

|                        | 1966           | 1967           | 1968           | 1969           | 1970           | 1971           | 1972           | 1973           | 1974           | 1975           | 1976* | Rank |
|------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|-------|------|
| Norway                 | 4.28<br>3,892  | 4.69<br>2,056  | 4.91<br>2,229  | 5.76<br>2,286  | 4.30<br>2,354  | 4.17<br>2,754  | 4.05<br>3,072  | 3.94<br>3,538  | 3.82<br>3,013  | 4.28<br>3,080  | 5.03  | -    |
| Nigeria                | 0.60<br>5.73   | 0.88<br>8,143  | 1.62<br>5,141  | 2.05<br>7,827  | 3.65<br>3,480  | 5.66<br>1,701  | 5.26<br>2,298  | 5.12<br>2,534  | 4.90<br>2,820  | 4.28<br>3,619  | 4.18  | XIV  |
| South Africa           | 2.62<br>10,820 | 2.54<br>11,920 | 2.71<br>11,018 | 2.63<br>12,636 | 1.86<br>15,875 | 2.70<br>12,000 | 3.28<br>9,427  | 1.69<br>22,175 | 1.85<br>24,667 | 1.99<br>27,800 | 2.20  | I    |
| Zambia                 | 2.90<br>3,018  | 2.57           | 2.75           | 2.87           | 2.81           | 2.98           | 3.11           | 3.45           | 3.34           | 3.24           | 3.45  | IX   |
| LATIN AMERICA<br>Total | 13.95<br>1,927 | 13.66<br>2,273 | 13.41<br>2,727 | 16.79<br>1,786 | 16.53<br>2,079 | 16.28<br>2,071 | 15.96<br>2,071 | 15.70<br>2,284 | 15.40<br>2,429 | 12.97<br>3,000 | 13.27 | 9    |
| Mexico                 | 1.71<br>3,280  | 1.77<br>2,988  | 1.60<br>3,480  | 1.55<br>3,460  | 1.60<br>3,513  | 1.55<br>3,823  | 1.50<br>4,288  | 1.45<br>4,438  | 1.49<br>4,353  | 1.60<br>5,084  | 1.63  | X    |
| Argentina              | 5.71<br>3,185  | 5.92<br>3,019  | 6.82<br>3,088  | 6.72<br>3,325  | 5.80<br>3,721  | 5.71<br>3,136  | 5.63<br>2,971  | 6.35<br>3,050  | 5.87<br>3,873  | 6.17<br>4,919  | 5.92  | XZ   |
| Brazil                 | 3.91<br>3,108  | 3.86<br>3,364  | 3.87<br>3,206  | 3.98<br>3,361  | 4.04<br>3,947  | 3.92<br>4,187  | 4.17<br>4,024  | 4.15<br>4,476  | 4.18<br>4,598  | 4.25<br>4,901  | 4.09  | XII  |
| Chile                  | 7.30<br>2,154  | 7.68<br>1,957  | 7.51<br>2,014  | 7.35<br>2,057  | 7.21<br>2,700  | 7.08<br>2,757  | 7.46<br>3,040  | 7.33<br>3,267  | 8.65<br>4,811  | 10.39<br>2,755 | 10.57 | 12   |
| Peru                   | 5.91<br>3,043  | 5.74<br>4,043  | 5.97<br>4,293  | 5.80<br>3,667  | 6.00<br>3,688  | 5.66<br>4,160  | 5.30<br>4,413  | 5.14<br>5,307  | 5.99<br>4,478  | 6.13<br>5,979  | 6.29  | VIII |
| Venezuela              | 4.19<br>6,150  | 4.05<br>6,925  | 3.93<br>6,650  | 3.80<br>6,500  | 4.14<br>5,356  | 4.00<br>7,800  | 3.88<br>7,222  | 4.17<br>7,220  | 4.03<br>10,080 | 4.29<br>8,964  | 4.17  | VI   |

Source: ACDA, 1966 - 75.  
\* ACDA, 1967 - 76.

1. Armed Forces per thousand.
2. Expenditure per soldier in constant dollars.

TABLE 2.4  
Selected Third World Countries, Reserve and Paramilitary Forces 1965 - 78 ('000)

| Regions and Countries   | 1965   | 1970   | 1974    | 1975  | 1976  | 1977  | 1978    | Remarks |
|---|--------|--------|---------|-------|-------|-------|---------|---------|
| <b>MIDDLE EAST</b>  |        |        |         |       |       |       |         |         |
| Egypt   | 1      | 120    | 105     | 534   | 535   | 515   | 515     | 515     |
|   | 2      | n.a.   | 90      | 100   | 120   | 120   | 50      | 50      |
| Iran  |        | n.a.   | 146     | 300   | 300   | 300   | 300     | 300     |
|   |        | 26     | 40      | 70    | 70    | 70    | 70      | 74      |
| Iraq  |        | n.a.   | n.a.    | 268   | 250   | 250   | 250     | 250     |
|   |        |        | 20      | 19.8  | 20    | 54.8  | 54.8    | 79.8    |
| Jordan  |        | n.a.   | n.a.    | 20    | 30    | 30    | 30      | 30      |
|   |        |        | 37.5    | 22    | 10    | 10    | 10      | 10      |
| Saudi Arabia  | n.a.   | n.a.   | n.a.    | n.a.  | n.a.  | n.a.  | -       |         |
|   |        | 24     | 32.5    | 16.0  | 26.5  | 41.5  | 41.5    |         |
| Syria   |        | n.a.   | n.a.    | 203.5 | 102.5 | 102.5 | 102.5   | 102.5   |
|   |        |        | 6.5*    | 9.5   | 9.5   | 9.5   | 9.5     | 9.5     |
| * Stated to be building up a Peoples' militia of 250,000        |        |        |         |       |       |       |         |         |
| <b>SOUTH ASIA</b>   |        |        |         |       |       |       |         |         |
| India   |        | n.a.   | 110     | 230   | 200   | 240   | 240     | 240     |
|   |        | n.a.   | 100     | 100   | 150   | 180   | 300     | 300     |
| Pakistan  |        | n.a.   | 28      | 513   | 513   | 513   | 513     | 513     |
|   |        | 140    | 225     | 80    | 55    | 75    | 157     | 109.1   |
| Bangladesh  |        | -      | -       | -     | -     | n.a.  | 36      | 36      |
|   |        | -      | -       | 29    | 36    | 20    | 12      | 20      |
| <b>FAR EAST</b>   |        |        |         |       |       |       |         |         |
| Burma   |        | n.a.   | -       | -     | n.a.  | n.a.  | n.a.    | n.a.    |
|   |        |        | -       | 35    | 35    | 35    | 38 + 38 | 38      |
| (PPF)   |        |        |         |       |       |       |         |         |
| Peoples Police Force  |        |        |         |       |       |       |         |         |
| Peoples Militia   |        |        |         |       |       |       |         |         |
| Indonesia   |        | 150    | 65      | n.a.  | n.a.  | n.a.  | n.a.    | n.a.    |
|   |        | 130    | 20      | 12    | 112   | 112   | 112     | 112     |
| Korea (N)   |        | n.a.   | n.a.    | 254   | 254   | n.a.  | n.a.    | n.a.    |
|   |        | 25     | 25      | 50    | 50    | 40    | 40      | 40      |
| ∅ Peoples militia with small arms from 1,000 to 2,000 (maximum) |        |        |         |       |       |       |         |         |
| Korea (S)   | 10 Div | -      | 1,128   | 1,128 | 1,115 | 1,240 | 1,240   |         |
|   |        | 2,500* | 2,000   | 2,000 | 750   | 1,000 | 1,000   |         |
| Proposed  |        |        |         |       |       |       |         |         |
| Singapore   |        | n.a.   | -       | 30    | 25    | 45    | 45      | 45      |
|   |        |        | (in the | 9     | 37.5  | 37.5  | 37.5    | 37.5    |
| process)  |        |        |         |       |       |       |         |         |
| Taiwan  |        | n.a.   | n.a.    | 1,005 | 1,005 | 1,170 | 1,170   | 1,170   |
|   |        | n.a.   | 175     | 175   | 175   | 100   | 100     | 100     |
| Thailand  |        | 32     | -       | 200   | 200   | 350   | 500     | 500     |
|   |        | n.a.   | 17      | 63    | 63    | 66    | 66      | 66      |
| Vietnam (N)   |        | -      | -       | -     | -     | -     | -       | -       |
|   |        | 230    | 20      | 20    | 50*   | 50    | 70      | 70*     |
| * Armed militia, approximately                                  |        |        |         |       |       |       |         |         |
| Vietnam (S)   |        | -      | -       | -     | -     | -     | -       | -       |
|   |        | 260    | 705     | 1,995 |       |       |         |         |



Table 2.4 continued

| Regions and Countries | 1965        | 1970         | 1974         | 1975         | 1976        | 1977           | 1978                     | Remarks                      |
|-----------------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|----------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|
| AFRICA                |             |              |              |              |             |                |                          |                              |
| Algeria               | n.a.        | n.a.<br>8    | 50<br>10     | 50<br>10     | 100<br>10   | 100<br>10      | 100<br>10                |                              |
| Ethiopia              | n.a.        | n.a.<br>4.5  | n.a.<br>20.4 | 8<br>11.2    | 28<br>11.2  | 20<br>84       | n.a.<br>129.0            |                              |
| Morocco               | n.a.        | n.a.<br>23   | n.a.<br>23   | n.a.<br>30   | n.a.<br>30  | n.a.<br>30     | n.a.<br>30               |                              |
| Nigeria               | n.a.        | n.a.<br>n.a. | 12<br>-      | 12<br>-      | 12<br>-     | 2.0<br>-       | 2.0<br>-                 |                              |
| South Africa          | 6.0<br>29.6 | 56<br>61     | 72<br>75     | 151.4<br>75  | 173.5<br>90 | 165.5<br>125.5 | 173.5<br>165.5           |                              |
| Zambia                | n.a.        | n.a.<br>n.a. | -<br>1.2     | n.a.<br>2.5  | n.a.<br>2.5 | n.a.<br>n.a.   | n.a.<br>1.2              |                              |
| LATIN AMERICA         |             |              |              |              |             |                |                          |                              |
| Cuba                  | 200<br>-    | n.a.<br>13   | 90<br>213    | 90<br>113    | 90<br>113.0 | 90<br>113.0    | 90<br>113.0              |                              |
| Mexico                | n.a.<br>-   | n.a.<br>n.a. | 250<br>n.a.  | n.a.<br>n.a. | 250<br>-    | n.a.<br>n.a.   | 250<br>n.a.              |                              |
| Argentina             | n.a.        | 250<br>25    | 250<br>19    | 250<br>21    | 250<br>20   | 250<br>51      | 250<br>42                |                              |
| Brazil                | n.a.        | n.a.<br>120  | n.a.<br>150  | n.a.<br>200  | -<br>200    | n.a.<br>200    | n.a.<br>200 <sup>a</sup> | a State militias in addition |
| Chile                 | n.a.        | n.a.<br>22.5 | 160<br>30    | 160<br>30    | 160<br>30   | 160<br>30      | 160<br>30                |                              |
| Peru                  | n.a.        | n.a.<br>18   | n.a.<br>20   | n.a.<br>20   | -<br>20     | n.a.<br>20     | n.a.<br>20               |                              |
| Venezuela             | n.a.        | -<br>10      | -<br>10      | n.a.<br>11.5 | -<br>10     | n.a.<br>10     | n.a.<br>10               |                              |

Source: Military Balance 1965 - 66 to 1978 - 79.

1. Reservists
2. Paramilitary forces

CHART 2.5  
Nature of Military Service in the Third World 1978

| Region           | Conscription<br>(Two years or more)   | Conscription<br>(Less than two years)                    | Voluntary   | Not Known   |
|------------------|---|--|---|---|
| MIDDLE EAST      | Egypt, Iran, Iraq,<br>Jordan, Syria,<br>Yemen (North)   | Kuwait, Lebanon, Yemen<br>(South), Turkey,<br>Yugoslavia | Oman, Saudi<br>Arabia, United<br>Arab Emirates  | Bahrain,<br>Qatar*  |
| ASIA             | Afghanistan, Taiwan<br>Korea (North), Korea<br>(South), Laos, Mongolia<br>Singapore, Thailand,<br>Vietnam | Indonesia, Philippines                                   | Bangladesh,<br>Burma, Brunei,<br>Burma, India,<br>Malaysia, Nepal,<br>Pakistan, Sri Lanka                     | Kampuchea   |
| AFRICA           | Angola, Ethiopia, Libya,<br>Senegal, South Africa,<br>Sudan, Zaire  | Algeria, Morocco,<br>Rhodesia, Tunisia                   | Congo, Ghana,<br>Kenya, Mozambique,<br>Nigeria, Somali<br>Democratic<br>Republic, Tanzania,<br>Uganda, Zambia | Benin, Botswana X<br>Burundi, Cameroon,<br>Central African<br>Empire, Chad, Gabon, Guinea,<br>Ivory Coast,<br>Liberia*,<br>Malagasy*,<br>Malawi*, Mali*,<br>Mauritania,<br>Niger, Rwanda*,<br>Sierra Leone*,<br>Togo, Upper<br>Volta* |
| LATIN<br>AMERICA | Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador,<br>Peru, Venezuela   | Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,<br>Chile, Mexico, Paraguay   | Dominican<br>Republic, Honduras,<br>Uruguay   | Guatemala,<br>El Salvador*,<br>Guyana*, Haiti,<br>Jamaica*,<br>Nicaragua, Costa<br>Rica*, Panama*   |

Source: Military Balance 1978-79,  
\* All services from part of army.  
X Do not have armed forces at all.

TABLE 3.1  
Value of Imports of Major Weapons by Third World Countries: By Region, 1957 - 77<sup>a</sup>  
(in U.S.S. at constant 1975 prices)

| Region <sup>b</sup>         | 1957  | 1958  | 1959  | 1960  | 1961  | 1962  | 1963  | 1964  | 1965  | 1966  | 1967  | 1968  | 1969  | 1970  | 1971  | 1972  | 1973  | 1974  | 1975  | 1976  | 1977  |  |
|-----------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--|
| World Total                 | 392   | 325   | 311   | 161   | 196   | 574   | 393   | 388   | 541   | 440   | 1,063 | 1,258 | 1,212 | 1,352 | 1,478 | 1,076 | 2,211 | 2,636 | 3,327 | 3,166 | 4,667 |  |
| Far East<br>(incl. Vietnam) | 286   | 724   | 510   | 793   | 274   | 431   | 366   | 483   | 474   | 734   | 693   | 719   | 884   | 704   | 856   | 1,116 | 381   | 3,065 | 660   | 1,035 | 482   |  |
| South America               | 147   | 176   | 59    | 181   | 205   | 109   | 72    | 51    | 110   | 138   | 124   | 208   | 136   | 158   | 222   | 310   | 332   | 444   | 646   | 710   | 804   |  |
| North Africa                | 7     | 5     | 8     | 17    | 15    | 39    | 34    | 40    | 81    | 122   | 115   | 83    | 87    | 121   | 123   | 167   | 155   | 228   | 261   | 929   | 658   |  |
| South Asia                  | 112   | 639   | 394   | 208   | 289   | 189   | 221   | 79    | 213   | 91    | 271   | 297   | 312   | 90    | 599   | 409   | 289   | 373   | 177   | 514   | 571   |  |
| Sub-Saharan Africa          | 2     | 4     | 60    | 36    | 56    | 47    | 47    | 68    | 95    | 93    | 61    | 55    | 71    | 123   | 134   | 89    | 152   | 366   | 232   | 532   | 574   |  |
| South Africa                | 98    | 26    | 22    | 5     | 4     | 16    | 155   | 51    | 136   | 92    | 78    | 65    | 46    | 77    | 60    | 25    | 37    | 274   | 179   | 118   | 290   |  |
| Central America             | 8     | 15    | 19    | 58    | 211   | 298   | 86    | 34    | 18    | 21    | 16    | 8     | 10    | 6     | 47    | 35    | 56    | 87    | 137   | 98    | 114   |  |
| Oceania                     |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |  |
| Totals <sup>c</sup>         | 3,012 | 1,611 | 1,203 | 1,513 | 1,251 | 1,703 | 1,364 | 1,195 | 1,539 | 2,031 | 2,465 | 2,693 | 2,780 | 2,939 | 3,707 | 3,473 | 3,627 | 5,064 | 6,304 | 7,312 | 8,163 |  |

Sources: SIPRI Yearbook, 1978.

a. The values include licensed production of major weapons in third world countries. For the values for the period 1950 - 56, see SIPRI Yearbook, 1976, pp. 250-51.

b. The regions are listed in rank order according to their average values for 1970 - 76.

c. Items may not add up to totals due to rounding. Figures are rounded to nearest 10.



TABLE 3.2  
Leading Third World Arms Importers, 1967 - 76  
(U.S. \$ m. Constant)

|                 | 1967  | 1968  | 1969  | 1970  | 1971  | 1972  | 1973  | 1974  | 1975  | 1976  | Total  | Rank Order<br>(1967-1976) | Remarks                             |
|-----------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|---------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| MIDDLE EAST     |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |        |                           |                                     |
| Egypt           | 323   | 176   | 162   | 888   | 458   | 691   | 883   | 170   | 357   | 131   | 4,239  | 3                         |                                     |
| Iran            | 165   | 205   | 321   | 220   | 418   | 635   | 707   | 974   | 1,210 | 1,380 | 6,256  | 1                         |                                     |
| Iraq            | 143   | 202   | 100   | 67    | 66    | 178   | 758   | 602   | 525   | 729   | 3,432  | 5                         |                                     |
| Jordan          | 27    | 38    | 104   | 66    | 69    | 59    | 80    | 66    | 137   | 128   | 1,137  | 12                        |                                     |
| Saudi Arabia    | 75    | 120   | 120   | 36    | 25    | 167   | 100   | 395   | 272   | 606   | 1,696  | 10                        |                                     |
| Syria           | 92    | 61    | 69    | 82    | 144   | 355   | 1,550 | 1,110 | 313   | 354   | 4,102  | 4                         |                                     |
| SOUTH ASIA      |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |        |                           |                                     |
| India           | 160   | 255   | 205   | 137   | 308   | 258   | 217   | 144   | 171   | 254   | 2,109  | 8                         |                                     |
| Pakistan        | 62    | 105   | 113   | 83    | 63    | 158   | 164   | 106   | 72    | 142   | 1,068  | 13                        |                                     |
| PAC EAST        |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |        |                           |                                     |
| Indonesia       | 2     | 5     | 19    | 22    | 31    | 25    | 32    | 38    | 23    | 72    | 269    |                           | Very high in 1963-64, 65.           |
| Kampuchea       | 3     | 11    | 7     | 83    | 71    | 105   | 94    | 327   | 128   | n.a.  | (829)  |                           |                                     |
| Korea (North)   | 128   | 111   | 12    | 81    | 216   | 250   | 297   | 159   | 124   | 31    | 1,412  | 11                        |                                     |
| Korea (South)   | 344   | 490   | 520   | 206   | 292   | 643   | 181   | 123   | 185   | 312   | 2,753  | 6                         |                                     |
| Laos            | 138   | 109   | 80    | 95    | 145   | 137   | 114   | 72    | 22    | 11    | 923    | 14                        |                                     |
| Taiwan          | 158   | 241   | 237   | 418   | 309   | 281   | 173   | 136   | 165   | 154   | 2,272  | 7                         |                                     |
| Thailand        | 89    | 111   | 69    | 61    | 50    | 40    | 58    | 52    | 51    | 76    | 635    | 18                        |                                     |
| Vietnam (North) | 1,310 | 804   | 453   | 275   | 406   | 917   | 396   | 428   | 89    | 7     | 5,127  | 2                         |                                     |
| Vietnam (South) | 808   | 1,100 | 1,350 | 1,260 | 1,050 | 1,650 | 1,360 | 720   | 906   | -     | 10,204 |                           |                                     |
| AFRICA          |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |        |                           |                                     |
| Algeria         | 65    | 23    | 10    | 40    | 46    | 18    | 29    | 22    | 85    | 225   | 563    |                           | Angola, 389 (in 1975 and 1976 only) |
| Libya           | 13    | 5     | 28    | 81    | 127   | 170   | 225   | 255   | 428   | 706   | 2,060  | 9                         |                                     |
| Morocco         | 41    | 23    | 9     | 14    | 7     | 4     | 7     | 20    | 65    | 196   | 366    |                           |                                     |
| Nigeria         | 38    | 29    | 46    | 6     | 4     | 23    | 25    | 17    | 67    | 46    | 301    |                           |                                     |
| South Africa    | 22    | 18    | 33    | 54    | 39    | 161   | 101   | 105   | 126   | 170   | 829    |                           |                                     |
| Zaire           | 5     | 8     | 3     | 10    | 25    | 40    | 25    | 52    | 27    | 120   | 315    |                           |                                     |
| LATIN AMERICA   |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |        |                           |                                     |
| Argentina       | 10    | 29    | 68    | 33    | 18    | 101   | 50    | 46    | 34    | 46    | 435    |                           |                                     |
| Brazil          | 54    | 65    | 75    | 29    | 67    | 77    | 151   | 78    | 88    | 161   | 845    |                           |                                     |
| Cuba            | 130   | 20    | 32    | 30    | 33    | 34    | 38    | 56    | 67    | 83    | 521    |                           |                                     |
| Chile           | 13    | 27    | 9     | 15    | 35    | 19    | 93    | 80    | 21    | 116   | 428    |                           |                                     |
| Peru            | 14    | 46    | 36    | 33    | 69    | 87    | 102   | 81    | 117   | 168   | 751    |                           |                                     |
| Venezuela       | 16    | 5     | 4     | 4     | 26    | 82    | 106   | 112   | 64    | 51    | 472    |                           |                                     |

Source: ACDA, 1967 - 76.

TABLE 3.3  
Rank Order of Third World Arms Suppliers, 1970 - 76

| Supplier                  | Total Value of Arms Supplies US.\$ m <sup>a</sup> | Per Cent of Third World Total | Largest Recipient Regions                       | Region's Per Cent of Supplier's Total | Largest Recipient Country/Countries in Each Region | Country's Per Cent of Supplier's Total |
|---------------------------|---|-------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|--|--|
| Israel                    | 174   | 24                            | Central America<br>Far East<br>South Africa     | 35<br>30<br>20                        | El Salvador<br>Singapore<br>South Africa           | 15<br>19<br>20                         |
| Iran                      | 160   | 22                            | South Asia<br>Middle East<br>Sub-Saharan Africa | 75<br>22<br>2                         | Pakistan<br>Jordan<br>Ethiopia                     | 75<br>21<br>2                          |
| Jordan                    | 159   | 22                            | South Africa<br>Middle East<br>South Asia       | 90<br>10<br>0.2                       | South Africa<br>Oman<br>Pakistan                   | 90<br>10<br>0.2                        |
| Libya                     | 77  | 11                            | Sub-Saharan Africa<br>South Asia                | 97<br>3                               | Uganda<br>Pakistan                                 | 47<br>3                                |
| Brazil <sup>b</sup>       | 47  | 6                             | South America<br>Sub-Saharan Africa             | 98<br>2                               | Paraguay<br>Togo                                   | 2<br>2                                 |
| South Africa <sup>b</sup> | 30  | 4                             | Sub-Saharan Africa                              | 100                                   | Rhodesia<br>Malawi                                 | 98<br>2                                |
| Singapore                 | 17  | 2                             | Far East<br>Middle East                         | 81<br>19                              | Brunei<br>Kuwait                                   | 51<br>19                               |
| Cuba                      | 13  | 2                             | South America                                   | 100                                   | Peru   | 100                                    |
| Ivory Coast               | 10  | 1                             | Sub-Saharan Africa                              | 100                                   | Cameroon   | 100                                    |
| India <sup>b</sup>        | 7   | 1                             | South Asia                                      | 100                                   | Bangladesh<br>Nepal                                | 70<br>30                               |
| Iraq                      | 6   | 1                             | Sub-Saharan Africa                              | 100                                   | Uganda   | 100                                    |
| Libon                     | 6   | 1                             | Sub-Saharan Africa                              | 100                                   | Cameroon   | 100                                    |
| Malaysia                  | 5   | 1                             | Far East  | 100                                   | Indonesia  | 100                                    |
| Egypt                     | 4   | 0.5                           | Sub-Saharan Africa<br>North Africa              | 67<br>33                              | Nigeria<br>Libya                                   | 67<br>33                               |
| Abu Dhabi                 | 4   | 0.5                           | Middle East                                     | 100                                   | Oman<br>Yemen                                      | 56<br>44                               |
| Argentina <sup>b</sup>    | 3.5   | 0.4                           | South America                                   | 100                                   | Bolivia<br>Peru<br>Paraguay                        | 55<br>43<br>2                          |
| Saudi Arabia              | 1   | 0.1                           | Middle East<br>South Asia                       | 58<br>42                              | Oman<br>Pakistan                                   | 50<br>42                               |
| Chile                     | 0.5   | 0.1                           | South America                                   | 100                                   | Ecuador  | 100                                    |
| Third World Total         | 724   | 100                           |   |                                       |  |  |

Source: SIPRI Yearbook, 1978.

a. At constant 1975 prices.

b. Most weapons exported are of local production.

TABLE 3.4

Rank Order of Arms Suppliers in the Third World, 1970 - 76

| Supplier               | Total Value of Arms Supplies US. \$ m <sup>a</sup> | Per Cent of World Total | Largest Recipient Regions | Region's Per Cent of Supplier's Total | Largest Recipient Country in Each Region | Country's Per Cent of Supplier's Total |
|------------------------|--|-------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|--|
| USA                    | 12,303   | 38                      | Middle East               | 62                                    | Iran                                     | 31                                     |
|                        |  |                         | Far East                  | 27                                    | S. Vietnam                               | 12                                     |
|                        |  |                         | South America             | 7                                     | Brazil                                   | 2                                      |
| USSR                   | 11,057   | 34                      | Middle East               | 57                                    | Syria                                    | 23                                     |
|                        |  |                         | North Africa              | 13                                    | Libya                                    | 13                                     |
|                        |  |                         | Far East                  | 13                                    | N. Vietnam                               | 7                                      |
| UK                     | 3,076  | 9                       | Middle East               | 49                                    | Iran                                     | 26                                     |
|                        |  |                         | South America             | 22                                    | Chile                                    | 8                                      |
|                        |  |                         | South Asia                | 14                                    | India                                    | 12                                     |
| FRANCE                 | 2,963  | 9                       | North Africa              | 24                                    | Libya                                    | 16                                     |
|                        |  |                         | Middle East               | 23                                    | Egypt                                    | 5                                      |
|                        |  |                         | South America             | 18                                    | Venezuela                                | 6                                      |
| ITALY                  | 562  | 2                       | Middle East               | 40                                    | Iran                                     | 34                                     |
|                        |  |                         | South Africa              | 27                                    | South Africa                             | 27                                     |
|                        |  |                         | South America             | 18                                    | Brazil                                   | 10                                     |
| CHINA                  | 537  | 2                       | South Asia                | 46                                    | Pakistan                                 | 46                                     |
|                        |  |                         | Far East                  | 29                                    | N. Vietnam                               | 11                                     |
|                        |  |                         | Sub-Saharan Africa        | 25                                    | Tanzania                                 | 16                                     |
| F. R. Germany          | 451  | 1                       | South America             | 74                                    | Argentina                                | 22                                     |
|                        |  |                         | Far East                  | 10                                    | Singapore                                | 6                                      |
|                        |  |                         | Sub-Saharan Africa        | 6                                     | Nigeria                                  | 2                                      |
| NETHERLANDS            | 214  | 0.7                     | Middle East               | 40                                    | Iran                                     | 28                                     |
|                        |  |                         | Sub-Saharan Africa        | 25                                    | Nigeria                                  | 10                                     |
|                        |  |                         | South America             | 9                                     | Argentina                                | 6                                      |
| CANADA                 | 178  | 0.6                     | South America             | 60                                    | Peru                                     | 23                                     |
|                        |  |                         | Sub-Saharan Africa        | 28                                    | Zambia                                   | 9                                      |
|                        |  |                         | Middle East               | 4                                     | Lebanon                                  | 3                                      |
| CZECHOSLOVAKIA         | 87   | 0.3                     | South Asia                | 59                                    | India                                    | 59                                     |
|                        |  |                         | Middle East               | 30                                    | Egypt                                    | 11                                     |
|                        |  |                         | Sub-Saharan Africa        | 7                                     | Sudan                                    | 7                                      |
| SPAIN                  | 70   | 0.2                     | South America             | 82                                    | Uruguay                                  | 51                                     |
|                        |  |                         | Far East                  | 11                                    | Indonesia                                | 11                                     |
|                        |  |                         | Middle East               | 7                                     | Jordan                                   | 7                                      |
| AUSTRALIA <sup>b</sup> | 60   | 0.2                     | Far East                  | 82                                    | Indonesia                                | 50                                     |
|                        |  |                         | South America             | 15                                    | Brazil                                   | 14                                     |
|                        |  |                         | Middle East               | 2                                     | Oman                                     | 2                                      |



TABLE 3.4 continued

| Supplier                           | Total Value of Arms Supplies US \$ m <sup>a</sup> | Per Cent of World Total | Largest Recipient Regions | Region's Per Cent of Supplier's Total | Largest Recipient Country in Each Region | Country's Per Cent of Supplier's Total |
|------------------------------------|---|-------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|--|
| SWEDEN                             | 54  | 0.2                     | South Asia                | 87                                    | Pakistan                                 | 87                                     |
|                                    |   |                         | South America             | 9                                     | Chile                                    | 9                                      |
|                                    |   |                         | Sub-Saharan Africa        | 4                                     | Sierra Leone                             | -                                      |
| POLAND <sup>c</sup>                | 30  | 0.1                     | South Asia                | 99                                    | India                                    | 99                                     |
|                                    |   |                         | Far East                  | 0.7                                   | Indonesia                                | 0.7                                    |
| YUGOSLAVIA <sup>c</sup>            | 24  | 0.1                     | Middle East               | 78                                    | Egypt                                    | 70                                     |
|                                    |   |                         | Sub-Saharan Africa        | 22                                    | Tanzania                                 | 13                                     |
| SWITZERLAND                        | 17  | 0.1                     | South America             | 59                                    | Argentina                                | 41                                     |
|                                    |   |                         | Far East                  | 18                                    | Thailand                                 | 18                                     |
|                                    |   |                         | Middle East               | 12                                    | Oman                                     | 12                                     |
| NEW ZEALAND <sup>b</sup>           | 12  | 0.04                    | South Asia                | 77                                    | India                                    | 77                                     |
|                                    |   |                         | Far East                  | 23                                    | Thailand                                 | 17                                     |
| JAPAN                              | 6   | 0.02                    | Far East                  | 50                                    | Philippines                              | 50                                     |
|                                    |   |                         | Sub-Saharan Africa        | 50                                    | Zaire                                    | 50                                     |
| BELGIUM <sup>b</sup>               | 5   | 0.02                    | South Africa              | 50                                    | South Africa                             | 50                                     |
|                                    |   |                         | Sub-Saharan Africa        | 50                                    | Ethiopia                                 | 50                                     |
| IRELAND <sup>b</sup>               | 2   | 0.01                    | Middle East               | 100                                   | Oman                                     | 100                                    |
| THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES <sup>d</sup> | 724   | 2                       | South Africa              | 24                                    | South Africa                             | 24                                     |
|                                    |   |                         | Sub-Saharan Africa        | 19                                    | Uganda                                   | 15                                     |
|                                    |   |                         | South Asia                | 18                                    | Pakistan                                 | 12                                     |
| WORLD TOTAL                        | 32,427  | 100                     |                           |                                       |  |  |

Source: SIPRI Yearbook, 1978.

a. At constant 1975 prices.

b. Included under Other Indust. West, Table 8A.2, p.256.

c. Included under Other Indust. East, Table 8A.2, p.256.

d. See Table 3.2 for the rank order of Third World Arms Suppliers.

TABLE 4.1

Production of Major Weapons and Components  
in the Third World 1950 - 77

| Region and Countries | Military Aircraft | Guided Missiles | Armoured Fighting Vehicles | Warships | Military Electronics | Aero Engines       |
|----------------------|-------------------|-----------------|----------------------------|----------|----------------------|--------------------|
| <b>MIDDLE EAST</b>   |                   |                 |                            |          |                      |                    |
| Egypt                | x                 | x               |                            |          |                      | x                  |
| Iran                 | x                 | x               |                            |          |                      |                    |
| Syria                |                   |                 |                            | x        |                      |                    |
| <b>FAR EAST</b>      |                   |                 |                            |          |                      |                    |
| Burma                |                   |                 |                            | x        |                      |                    |
| Indonesia            | x                 |                 |                            | x        |                      |                    |
| Korea (North)        | x                 |                 |                            | x        |                      |                    |
| Korea (South)        | x                 |                 |                            | x        |                      |                    |
| Philippines          | x                 | x               | x                          | x        | x                    |                    |
| Singapore            |                   |                 |                            | x        | x                    |                    |
| Taiwan               | x                 | x               |                            | x        | x                    |                    |
| Thailand             | x                 |                 |                            | x        |                      |                    |
| Vietnam              | x                 |                 |                            |          |                      |                    |
| <b>SOUTH ASIA</b>    |                   |                 |                            |          |                      |                    |
| Bangladesh           |                   |                 |                            | x        |                      |                    |
| India                | x                 | x               | x                          | x        | x                    | x                  |
| Pakistan             | x                 | x               | x                          | x        |                      |                    |
| <b>AFRICA</b>        |                   |                 |                            |          |                      |                    |
| Gabon                |                   |                 |                            | x        |                      |                    |
| Libya                | x                 |                 |                            |          |                      |                    |
| South Africa         | x                 | x               | x                          | x        | x                    | x Chemical weapons |
| <b>LATIN AMERICA</b> |                   |                 |                            |          |                      |                    |
| Argentina            | x                 | x               | x                          | x        |                      | x                  |
| Brazil               | x                 | x               | x                          | x        | x                    | x                  |
| Chile                |                   |                 |                            | x        |                      |                    |
| Colombia             | x                 |                 |                            | x        |                      |                    |
| Dominican Republic   |                   |                 |                            | x        |                      |                    |
| Mexico               | x                 |                 |                            | x        |                      |                    |
| Peru                 | x                 |                 |                            | x        |                      |                    |
| Venezuela            |                   |                 |                            | x        |                      |                    |

Source: 1. SIPRI Data, Yearbook, 1978. 2. Frank Barnaby, 'Arms and the Third World: The Background', Development Dialogue 1977, pp. 18-36.

TABLE 4.2  
Register of Indigenous and Licensured Production of Small Arms in Third World Countries, 1976

| Country       | Indigenous Production   |  | Licensured Production   |  |
|---------------|---|--|---|--|
|               | Type  | Status of Programme<br>Other Information                               | Type  | Status of Programme<br>Other Information   |
| Argentina     | 105mm anti-armour cannon, grenade                                 | In production  | Pistol, sub-machine gun, rifle, machine gun, grenade, mortar            | Licensers: Belgium, France, FR Germany, Switzerland, USA. The Fabrica Militar and Fabricaciones Militares manufacture most of the small arms required by Argentina |
| Brazil        | -   | -  | Sub-machine gun, rifle  | Licensers: Denmark, FR Germany   |
| Chile         | -   | -  | Rifle, light machine gun  | Licenses: Belgium  |
| India         | -   | -  | Pistol, machine gun grenade, rifle, anti-tank weapon, anti-aircraft gun | Licensers: Belgium, UK, France, USSR. India produces most of its small arms requirement locally  |
| Indonesia     | -   | -  | Pistol, rifle, machine gun  | Licensers: Belgium, Italy. Some earlier Soviet weapons are copied and produced   |
| Iran          | -   | -  | Pistol, machine gun   | Licenses: FR Germany. Iran is devoting large effort to entering arms production and there are programmes to expand small arms production                           |
| Israel        | Sub-machine gun, <sup>Uzi</sup> grenade, mortar, anti-tank weapon | Israel designs and produces many small arms and electronic components. | Grenade   | Licenses: USA  |
| Korea (North) | -   | -  | Pistol, rifle, machine gun  | Licensers: China, USSR, many Soviet and Chinese small arms are manufactured in N. Korea  |
| Korea (South) | -   | -  | Rifle   | USA supplies most S. Korean requirements; some weapons are now produced at a factory set up in Pusan by Colt Military Industries                                   |
| Pakistan      | -   | -  | Rifle   | Licenses not known: Ordnance factory built by Chinese in 1970 and 8 other factories produce several small arms   |
| Philippines   | -   | -  | Rifle   | Licensers: FR Germany, USA   |
| Saudi Arabia  | -   | -  | Rifle   | Licenses: FR Germany. Saudi Arabia produces some small arms under licence  |
| Singapore     | -   | -  | Rifle, mortar   | Licensers: Finland, USA  |
| South Africa  | -   | -  | Rifle, machine gun  | Licenses: Belgium. S. Africa produces most of its small arms requirements locally under licence  |
| Turkey        | -   | -  | Pistol, rifle   | Licenses: FR Germany   |
| Vietnam       | Light machine gun   | Designed locally, it uses a Soviet cartridge                           | Sub-machine gun, rifle, grenade   | Licensers: China, USSR   |

Source: SIPRI Yearbook, 1977.

TABLE 1.2  
Arms Production in the Third World

|                       | Fighter Aircraft<br>Jet Trainers | Light Aircraft | Helicopters | Missiles<br>Rockets | Large<br>Fighting<br>Ships | Medium<br>Fighting<br>Ships<br>(up to<br>500 ts) | Small<br>Fighting<br>Ships<br>and Others<br>(below<br>100 ts) | Submarines | Tanks and<br>APC | Small Weapons<br>Ammunition<br>Guns etc. | Electronic<br>and<br>Avionic |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------|----------------|-------------|---------------------|----------------------------|--|---|------------|------------------|--|------------------------------|
| EUROPE                |                                  |                |             |                     |                            |  |   |            |                  |  |                              |
| Turkey                | 1*                               | 1*             |             | 1                   | 1                          | 1  | n   | 1          | 1*               | 1  |                              |
| Yugoslavia            | i                                | i              | 1           | 1                   |                            | 1  | n   | n          | n                | 1  |                              |
| LATIN AMERICA         |                                  |                |             |                     |                            |  |   |            |                  |  |                              |
| Argentina             | i                                | 1              | 1           | 1                   | 1                          | 1  |   | 1          | i                | 1  |                              |
| Brazil                | i                                | i              | 1           | i                   | 1                          | 1  | i   | n          | i                | 1  | n                            |
| Chile                 |                                  |                |             |                     |                            | n  |   |            |                  |  |                              |
| Colombia              |                                  | 1              |             |                     |                            | n  | 1   |            |                  |  |                              |
| Dominican<br>Republic |                                  |                |             |                     |                            | n  |   |            |                  | i  | 1                            |
| Mexico                | 1*                               | 1              |             |                     | n                          | 1  |   |            |                  | 1  |                              |
| Peru                  | 1*                               |                |             |                     | 1                          | i  |   |            |                  | 1*                                       |                              |
| Venezuela             | 1*                               |                |             |                     |                            |  | 1   |            |                  | n  |                              |
| AFRICA                |                                  |                |             |                     |                            |  |   |            |                  |  |                              |
| Algeria               |                                  |                |             |                     |                            |  |   |            |                  | n  |                              |
| Congo                 |                                  |                |             |                     |                            |  |   |            |                  | n  |                              |
| Cabon                 |                                  |                |             |                     |                            | n  | n   |            |                  |  |                              |
| Chad                  |                                  |                |             |                     |                            |  |   |            |                  |  | 1                            |
| Guinea                |                                  |                |             |                     |                            |  |   |            |                  |  | 1                            |
| Ivory Coast           |                                  |                |             |                     |                            |  | n   |            |                  |  |                              |
| Malagasy<br>Republic  |                                  |                |             |                     |                            |  | 1   |            |                  |  |                              |
| Nigeria               | 1*                               |                |             |                     |                            |  |   |            |                  | 1  |                              |
| South Africa          | 1                                | 1              | 1           | 1                   | 1                          | n  | n   | 1          | 1                | 1  | n*                           |
| Sudan                 |                                  |                |             |                     |                            |  |   |            |                  | 1  |                              |
| Zaire                 |                                  |                |             |                     |                            |  |   |            |                  | ?  |                              |
| Morocco               |                                  |                |             |                     |                            |  |   |            |                  | 1  |                              |
| NEAR MIDDLE EAST      |                                  |                |             |                     |                            |  |   |            |                  |  |                              |
| Egypt                 | 1                                | 1              | 1           | 1                   |                            | n  |   |            | 1                | 1  |                              |
| Iran                  | 1 <sup>o</sup>                   |                | 1*          | 1*                  | 1*                         |  |   |            |                  | 1  | 1 <sup>1</sup>               |
| Israel                | i                                | 1*             | i           | 1                   | 1                          | 1  | i   | 1          | i                | 1  | i                            |
| Saudi Arabia          |                                  |                |             |                     |                            |  |   |            |                  | 1  |                              |
| Yemen (Aden)          |                                  |                |             |                     |                            |  |   | ?          |                  |  |                              |
| ASIA                  |                                  |                |             |                     |                            |  |   |            |                  |  |                              |
| Bangladesh            |                                  |                |             |                     |                            |  | n   |            |                  |  |                              |
| Burma                 |                                  |                |             |                     |                            | n  | 1   |            |                  | 1  |                              |
| Hong Kong             |                                  |                |             |                     |                            | n  | n   |            |                  |  |                              |
| India                 | i                                | i              | 1           | 1                   | 1                          | 1  | 1   | 1          | 1                | 1  | 1                            |
| Indonesia             | 1                                | 1              | 1           |                     |                            | n  |   |            |                  | 1  |                              |



TABLE 4.3 continued

|               | Fighter Aircraft<br>Jet Trainers | Light Aircraft | Helicopters | Missiles<br>Rockets | Large Fighting<br>Ships | Medium Fighting<br>Ships<br>(up to<br>500 ts) | Small Fighting<br>Ships<br>and Others<br>(below<br>100 ts) | Submarines | Tanks and<br>APC | Small Weapons/<br>Ammunition<br>Guns etc. | Electronic<br>Warfare<br>and<br>Avionics |
|---------------|----------------------------------|----------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------------------|---|--|------------|------------------|---|--|
| Korea (North) | 1*                               |                |             |                     | n                       | n   | n  |            |                  | 1   |  |
| Korea (South) | 1*                               |                | 1*          |                     |                         | n   | n  |            |                  | n   | 1  |
| Malaysia      |                                  |                |             |                     |                         | 1   |  |            |                  | n   |  |
| Nepal         |                                  |                |             |                     |                         |   | n  |            |                  |   | 1  |
| Pakistan      | 1*                               | 1*             | 1           | 1                   |                         |   |  |            |                  | 1   |  |
| Philippines   |                                  | 1              | 1*          | n                   |                         | 1   | 1  |            |                  | 1   | n  |
| Singapore     |                                  |                |             |                     |                         |   | 1  |            |                  | 1   |  |
| Sri Lanka     |                                  |                |             |                     |                         |   | 1  |            |                  | 1   |  |
| Taiwan        | 1                                | 1              | 1           | n                   | n, 1 <sup>0</sup>       | n   | n  |            |                  | 1   | n  |
| Thailand      |                                  |                |             |                     |                         |   | 1  |            |                  | 1   |  |
| Vietnam       |                                  | 1              |             |                     |                         |   | n  |            |                  | n   |  |

Source: Peter Lock and Herbert Wolf, Register of Arms Production in Developing Countries, Hamburg, March 1977, p. XII.

i = Indigenous design

1 = license production and technical assistance

n = not known whether i or 1

\* = planned

0 = only refitting, repair etc.

TABLE 4.4  
Third World Nuclear Capacity as of 31 December 1977

| Country      | Facility/<br>Reactor                               | Power (MWe)<br>or Capacity   | Year of<br>Operation | Status   |
|--------------|--|--|----------------------|--|
| Argentina    | Ezeiza Nuclear<br>Centre                           | 319 (up to<br>1976)  | -                    | Closed down  |
| Brazil       | Experimental                                       | 0  | Planned              | Agreements with F.R. Germany (October<br>1971) and France (July 1975)            |
| Egypt        | Inshas   | Design<br>capacity may<br>be in the range of<br>0.5 - 1t<br>U/year | 1961                 | Unknown  |
| India        | Trombay, Tarapur,<br>Kalpakam                      | 603  | Since 1956           | Operational 1st explosion in May 1974  |
| Iraq         | Prototype  | -  | Planned              | Agreement with France in November 1975   |
| Israel       | Dimona research<br>reactor. Re-processing<br>plant | Unknown  | 1963                 |  |
| Pakistan     | Chashma  | Design capacity<br>100t of U/year                                  | -                    | Another agreement with France in 1977<br>for the delivery of re-processing plant |
| South Africa | Pilot enrichment plant                             | -  | 1975                 | Operational  |
| Taiwan       | Lung Tau   | -  | -                    | Dismantled   |
| Yugoslavia   | Boris Kidric Institute                             | -  | -                    | Closed down  |

Source: SIPRI Yearbook, 1978.



## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> League of Nations, *Armaments Year Book*, 15 vols. Geneva 1924-1939/1940; *Statistical Information on the Trade in Arms, Ammunition and Implements of War*, 15 vols. Geneva 1924-1939/1940; *National Supervision of the Manufacture of and Trade in Arms*. (Action taken on the Resolution Adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations, September 1937.) 1938 IX.2, Geneva 1938.

<sup>2</sup> For survey of UN efforts in this field see United Nations, *The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1970* (New York United Nations 1970), *The United Nations and Disarmament 1970-1975* (New York, United Nations 1976), and *Disarmament* (A Periodic Review by the United Nations), Vol.I No.1, May 1978, (UN Publications Sales No.E.78, IX 3). Also, the UN Reports on Social and Economic Consequences of Disarmament published in 1962, 1972, 1973, and 1977.

<sup>3</sup> For one of the early works on the subject, see Francis W. Hirst, *Armaments: The Race And The Crisis*, London, 1937.

<sup>4</sup> See the Final Document and Resolution No.A/RES/S-10/2, UN General Assembly, 13 July 1978. In pursuance of this resolution, the UN set up a unit and distributed funds in January 1979 to various individual scholars and institutions to undertake research in the field of disarmament and development. The findings of that research will be presented in a co-ordinated form to the next UN Special Session of the General Assembly on the subject in 1982.

<sup>5</sup> Mention may be made in this context of the following: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Sweden; Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), United States; The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London; International Peace Research Institute, Oslo; Pugwash Movement and various organisations studying world order models.

<sup>6</sup> SIPRI's publication of 1971 was the first attempt to document this Third World phenomenon in its totality. Notable in the earlier attempts was John L. Sutton and Geoffrey Kemp, 'Arms to Developing Countries 1945-65', in *Adelphi Papers*, No.23, October 1966 (IISS, London).

<sup>7</sup> Amelia C. Leiss *et al.*, *Arms Transfers to Less Developed Countries C/70-1* (Cambridge, Mass., MIT, Center for International Studies, 1970); Robert E. Harkavy, *The Arms Trade and International Systems* (Ballinger Publishing Co., Cambridge, Mass., 1975).

<sup>8</sup> Harkavy, *op.cit.*, pp.18-20.

<sup>9</sup> Hedley Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age* (Praeger, New York, 1965, Second Edition), p.5.



<sup>10</sup> Colin S. Gray, *The Soviet American Arms Race* (Saxon House, Lexington Books, Lexington 1976); Chs. I and II; Michael D. Intriligator and D.L. Brito, *Formal Models of Arms Races*, Program in Arms Control and International Security, University of California, Los Angeles 1976, Paper No.2.

<sup>11</sup> SIPRI, *The Meaning and Measurement of Military Expenditure*, Research Report No.10, August 1973; Stockholm, Stephanie Neuman, 'Security, Military Expenditures and Socio-Economic Development: Reflections on Iran', in *Orbis*, Vol.22, No.3, Fall, 1978, pp.569-79.

<sup>12</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, 'Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results', in C.J. Friedrich and S.E. Harris, *Public Policy 1958* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1958), VIII, pp.41-86.

<sup>13</sup> V. Solodovnikov; V. Bogoslovsky, *Non-Capitalist Development: An Historical Outline*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975.

<sup>14</sup> For critical evaluation of the dependency school of theories, see: Ivar Oxaal, Tony Barnett and David Booth (eds.) *Beyond the Sociology of Development* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975); Gabriel Palma, 'Dependency: A Formal Theory of Under-Development', *World Development*, Vol.6, No.7/8 July/August 1978; and Tony Smith, 'Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of Dependency Theory', *World Politics*, Vol.XXXI, No.2, January 1979.

<sup>15</sup> Johan Galtung, *Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development: A Project Description*, The UN University HSD Programme Document, HSDPD9/UNUP-11, 1979, p.1.

<sup>16</sup> See for instance, 'What Now: Another Development' (1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Report on Development and International Co-operation), *Development Dialogue* 1975, 1 and 2; *Pugwash Conference Proceedings 25th Session* (Madras, 13-19 January) 1976; Dudley Seers, 'The New Meaning of Development', *International Development Review*, Vol.XIX, No.3, 1977/3, pp.2-7; K.N. Raj, 'Growth with Equity', *Asia Week*, 2 February 1979, and Wahidul Haque, *et. al.*, 'Towards A Theory of Rural Development', *Development Dialogue*, 1977; 2, p.15.

<sup>17</sup> Mehbudul Haq, 'Towards a Just Society', *International Development Review*, Vol.XVIII, No.4, 1976, pp.2-7.

<sup>18</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> Galtung, *et. al.*, 'Measuring World Development' (I and II), *Alternatives*. Vol.I, Nos. 1 and 4, 1975.

<sup>20</sup> Wahidul Haque, *et. al.*, *op.cit.*, p.15.

<sup>21</sup> S.D. Muni, 'The Third World: Concept and Controversy' *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.I, No.3, July 1979, pp.119-128.

<sup>22</sup> *World Bank Atlas*, 1977; *World Development Report*, 1978, The World Bank, Washington DC, August 1978.

<sup>23</sup> Ismail Sabri Abdalla, 'Heterogeneity and Differentiation: The End of the Third World', *Development Dialogue*, 1978, 2, p.3.

<sup>24</sup> For such a comprehensive development-based perspective on the Third World, see I.L. Horowitz, *Three Worlds of Development: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification* (Oxford University Press) New York, 1966; II Edition 1972; also, Dudley Seers and Leonard Joy (eds.) *Development in a Divided World* (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1970).

<sup>25</sup> C.R. Hansman, *From Gandhi to Guevara* (Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1969), p.71.

<sup>26</sup> Editorial Department of 'Renmin Ribao', Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a major contribution to Marxism Leninism. *Peking Review*, Vol.20, No.45, 4 November 1977, 99.7-41.

<sup>27</sup> Ruth Leger Sivard. *World Military and Social Expenditures 1978*, (WMSE Publications, Virginia, 1979) p.15. (Hereafter referred to as WMSE 1978).

<sup>28</sup> *The Military Balance 1978-79*, IISS London, 1979, p.90.

<sup>29</sup> For a study of selected States of Tropical Africa which took some of these aspects into consideration for comparative purposes, see Paul Mench, 'The Defence Forces of Small States: A Comparison of Defence Statistics in 26 States of Tropical Africa, Papua New Guinea and Fiji.' *Occasional Paper No.5*, Development Studies Centre, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1976. This study is based mainly upon data up to 1973.

<sup>30</sup> *The Military Balance 1978-79*, *op. cit.*, pp.53 and 78.

<sup>31</sup> For some good informative studies on the subject see: John L. Sutton and Geoffrey Kemp, 'Arms to Developing Countries 1945-65', in *Adelphi Papers Number Twenty-Eight*, IISS, London, October 1966; SIPRI, *The Arms Trade with the Third World*, (SIPRI, Stockholm 1971); Ron Huisken, 'The Development of Conventional Arms Trade' in Robert O'Neill (ed.) *Insecurity! The Spread of Weapons in the Indian and Pacific Oceans*, (The Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1978), pp.21-57; G. Thayer, *The War Business, The International Trade in Armaments*, London 1969; Lewis A. Frank, *The Arms Trade in International Relations* (New York; Praeger 1969).

<sup>32</sup> For the study of structure and behaviour of arms suppliers in addition to those noted above see Harkavy, *op.cit.*

<sup>33</sup> ACDA, 1967-76, Table VII, pp.157-60.

<sup>34</sup> This spread is only for new combat aircrafts. Otherwise, many Third World countries had jet and other combat aircraft even before 1960.

<sup>35</sup> SIPRI Yearbook 1978, *op.cit.*, pp.238-252; also see Huisken, in O'Neill (ed.) *Insecurity I*, *op.cit.*, pp.27-29.

<sup>36</sup> Harkavy, *op.cit.*, Tables 6.2 and 6.4, pp.190-91 and 193; also see G. Thayer, *op.cit.*

<sup>37</sup> For example, the Turks seized a busload of arms with a Pakistani driver in a bus having West German registration. *New York Times*, 24 June 1975. For a report by Anthony Sampson on South Africa's clandestine network of arms acquisitions through NATO and other sources see *The Age* (Melbourne) 13 February 1979. For another report on arms production in a Pakistani village for consumption across the border by Afghan rebels see, *International Herald Tribune* (Zurich) 2 November 1979, p.5.

<sup>38</sup> R.B. Pengelly, 'The Singapore Military/Industrial Scene', *International Defense Review*, No.4, 1976, pp.657-660.

<sup>39</sup> S.D. Muni, 'Arms Production in the Third World: Some Reflections', *Indian Journal of Defence Studies*, Vol.10 1977-78; Allahabad, India, pp.53-60.

<sup>40</sup> Peter Lock and Herbert Wulf, *Register of Arms Production in Developing Countries*, Study Group on Armaments and Under Development (Hamburg March 1977), pp.xviii-xxi.

<sup>41</sup> *International Herald Tribune*, 13 July 1977; *News Week*, 26 February 1979.

<sup>42</sup> See Table 3.3; also Lock and Wulf, *op.cit.*

<sup>43</sup> The only exception to this in India's case was the statement of its Defence Minister C. Subramaniam (*Times of India*, 30 October 1979). However, he is a minister in the caretaker government and a clearer picture on the issue may emerge only after a new government assumes power in January 1980.

<sup>44</sup> Richard K. Betts, 'Prospects For Nuclear Proliferation: 1978-1990', *1978 Proceedings*. The Fifth National Security Conference co-sponsored by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense and the National Defense University (Washington, August 1978), pp.135-48.

<sup>45</sup> As quoted in Alva Myrdal, *The Game of Disarmament* (Pantheon Books, New York, 1976), p.19.

<sup>46</sup> The previous UN Secretary-General U Thant repeatedly underlined the strong interrelationship existing between poverty (i.e. inequality), violence, reliance on force and insecurity in the world, *New York Times*, 15 July 1969; *Times of India*, 4 January 1970.



Johan Galtung's delineation of structural violence also stresses this mutually reinforcing relationship. Also see Anatol Rapoport *Conflict in a Man Made Environment*, Penguin 1974.

<sup>47</sup> See for instance Loren J. Kavic, *India's Quest for Security: Defence Policies 1947-65*. (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967); R. Booth 'The Armed Forces of African States, 1970', *Adelphi Paper No.67* (IISS London 1970).

<sup>48</sup> For details see SIPRI, *The Arms Trade with the Third World* (Almqvist and Wiksell, Uppsala, 1971), Chapter 5, pp.215-48.

<sup>49</sup> The overthrow of the Mossadegh government resulting from CIA activities in Iran and the re-establishment of the Shah's dynasty may be mentioned as an example in support of this observation. For some other instances of a similar nature in West Asia, see Miles Copeland, *The Game of Nations* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1969); The US activities in Latin America, particularly in the Dominican Republic and Guatemala are too well known in this respect to be recounted here.

<sup>50</sup> International Development Agency, *The Mutual Security Program: Operations Report*, (Washington, December 1962), p.35.

<sup>51</sup> Both Egypt and India had been denied modern combat aircraft in 1955 and 1960 respectively by the British.

<sup>52</sup> For the relationship of Soviet economic capacity and planning with its arms supplies to the Third World, see Raymond Hutchings, 'Soviet Arms Exports to the Third World: A Pattern and Its Implications', *The World Today*, October 1978, pp.378-379.

<sup>53</sup> R.K. Ramazani, 'Soviet Military Assistance to the Uncommitted Countries', *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, November 1959; Roger F. Pajak, 'Soviet Arms Aid in Middle East', Washington, Georgetown University, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 1976; SIPRI, *The Arms Trade with the Third World*, *op.cit.* Chapter 4, pp.180-214; Catherine McArdle, *The Role of Military Assistance in the Problem of Arms Control: The Middle East, Latin America and Africa*, Center for International Studies, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts, August 1964 (C/6424); W. Joshua and S. Gilbert, *Arms for the Third World: Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1969); Uri Ra'anana *The USSR Arms in Third World: Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy* (MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1969).

<sup>54</sup> *SIPRI Yearbook 1978*, Table 8.1, p.226.

<sup>55</sup> 'Soviet Union's Entire Foreign Aid Programme Undergoing Major Shifts in Emphasis', *Kalamazoo Gazette*, December 7, 1971 (News Week Service despatch), as quoted in Harkavy, *op.cit.*, pp.147 and 265.



<sup>56</sup> Colin S. Gray, *op.cit.*, p.22 (in mimeo); Michael T. Klare, *Supplying Repression* (Field Foundation, New York, December 1977), pp.11-12.

<sup>57</sup> As quoted in David Horowitz (ed.), *Containment and Revolution* (Anthony Bland, London, 1967), p.11. George Kennon criticised NATO as 'a military defense against an attack no one was planning'. *ibid.*

<sup>58</sup> In addition to the previous section see SIPRI Yearbook, 1976 (table on spread of weapons factories).

<sup>59</sup> Michael Klare, 'Have Guns, Will Travel', *New Internationalist*, May 1977, pp.23-24. Also U. Albrecht, D. Ernest, P. Lock, H. Wulf, 'Militarisation, Arms Transfers and Arms Production in Peripheral Countries', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.XII, No.3, 1975, pp.195-212.

<sup>60</sup> Ian Clark, 'Autonomy and Dependence in Recent Indo-Soviet Relations', *Australian Outlook*, Vol.31, No.1, April 1977.

<sup>61</sup> SIPRI Yearbook, 1976.

<sup>62</sup> Leslie H. Gelb, 'Arms Sales' *Foreign Policy*, Number 25, Winter 1976-77, pp.11-12.

<sup>63</sup> Anders Thunborg, *The Evolution of Doctrines And the Economics of Defence*, Ministry of Defence, Stockholm, April 1973; Mr Thunborg, Under-Secretary of State in the Swedish Ministry of Defence in this book shows the relationship between arms shipments to the Third World and changes in the Super Powers' strategic policies.

<sup>64</sup> See for instance Robert W. Tucker, 'Oil, The Issue of American Intervention', *Commentary*, January 1975, pp.21-31. Such threats were officially made in the aftermath of the Shah's fall in Iran early 1979; also Mohammed Ayoob 'Blueprint for a Catastrophe: Conducting Oil Diplomacy by "Other Means" in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf', *Australian Outlook*, Vol.33, No.3, December 1979, pp.268-273.

<sup>65</sup> *The Age*, 24 November 1973; 1 December 1973; 26 January 1974. *The Times* (London), 31 December 1976; *The Japan Times*, 1 March 1975.

<sup>66</sup> William B. Hankee and Dr Alwyn H. King, 'The Role of Security Assistance in Maintaining Access to Strategic Resources', *Parameters* (Journal of the US Army War College), Vol.VIII, No.3, September 1978, pp.41-50; also see Michael P. Lavis, *Critical Resources and Their Implications for US Economic and Foreign Policy*, Air War College, Professional Study No.15983, 1976.

<sup>67</sup> *White Paper on Export of Surplus War Material*, Her Majesty's Government, London, January 1956.

<sup>68</sup> David J. Louscher, 'The Rise of Military Sales as a US Foreign Assistance Instrument', *Orbis*, Vol.20, No.4, Winter 1977, p.936; Anthony Sampson, *The*

*Arms Bazaar*, (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1977), pp.115-117; 155-157; also SIPRI, *Arms Trade*, *op.cit.*, Chapter 3, and Anthony Sampson in *Newsweek*, 31 January 1977; George Thayer, *op.cit.*

<sup>69</sup> Louscher, *ibid.*

<sup>70</sup> Lawrence Freedman, 'Britain and the Arms Trade', *International Affairs*, Vol.54, No.1, July 1978, p.370. Also see his book *Arms Production in the United Kingdom: Problems and Prospects*, (Chatham House, London, 1978). Also see *The Times*, 31 March 1971.

<sup>71</sup> SIPRI, *Arms Trade*, *op.cit.*, Chapter 6, p.251.

<sup>72</sup> Anthony Sampson, *op.cit.*, pp.159-60.

<sup>73</sup> *ibid.*, p.163.

<sup>74</sup> Carrol W. Pursell Jr. (ed.), *The Military Industrial Complex* (Harper & Row, New York, 1972); Sam C. Sarkesian (ed.), *The Military Industrial Complex: A reassessment* (SAGE Publications California, London, 1972). Lawrence Freedman, *Arms Production in the United Kingdom*, *op.cit.*; George Brown, *In My Way* (London). A report on France's military industrial complex in *New York Times*, 23 October 1976; Steven Rosen (ed.), *Testing the Theory of Military-Industrial Complex* (D.C. Heath & Co., Lexington, 1973). 'French Ministry of Bribes', *Sunday Telegraph*, 7 September 1975.

<sup>75</sup> Multinational Hearings, Parts 12 and 14, of the US Senate Committee brought to light the misdeeds of Lockheed and Northrop arms manufacturing companies. The disclosures about the scandals of the French firm Dassault were made in 1976. See, for instance, *New York Times*, 25 January 1976. Also, in Sweden, the arms dealers were tried in 1970. See *The Times* (London), 26 November 1970; *The Age* (Melbourne), 20 November 1970. Sampson, *op.cit.*

<sup>76</sup> United Nations *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures*, (United Nations, New York, 1978), para.39, p.14. Also see para.17, p.6. This point had also been made in an earlier report on the same subject in 1972. Also see Ralph Lapp, *Arms Beyond Doubt: The Tyranny of Weapons Technology* (Coules, New York, 1970).

<sup>77</sup> Seymour, Melman, *Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War*, (McGraw Hill 1970). Also see his *The Permanent War Economy: American Capitalism in Decline* (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1976). Murray L. Weidenbaum, *The Economics of Peacetime Defence* (Praeger, 1974); Geoffrey Best and Andrew Wheatcroft, *War, Economy and the Military Mind* (Croom Helm, London, 1976).

<sup>78</sup> Vernon V. Aspaturian, 'The Soviet Military Industrial Complex: Does It Exist?',

in Steven Rosen (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp.103-133. Also, Richard Armstrong, 'Military Industrial Complex — Russian Style', *Fortune*, 1 August 1969; William T. Lee, 'Soviet Military Industrial Complex', *Armed Forces and Management*, April and May 1970. See also David Holloway, *Technology, Management and the Soviet Military Establishment*, Adelphi Papers, No.76, IISS, London, 1971 (particularly for military-political-economics relations in Soviet Union).

<sup>79</sup> Egbert John, 'The Role of the Armaments Complex in Soviet Society (Is there a Soviet Military Industrial Complex?)', *Journal of Peace Research*, No.3, Vol.XII, 1975, pp.179-194.

<sup>80</sup> R. Hutchings, *op.cit.*, p.378. John Stanley and Maurice Pearton, *The International Trade in Arms*, IISS (Chatto & Windus, London, 1972), p.111, 123.

<sup>81</sup> Uri Ra'anan, *op.cit.*, pp.161-163 (f.n.). Also see N.K. Chandra, 'USSR and Third World, Unequal distribution of gains', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Annual Number, February 1977; also Santosh K. Mehrotra and Patrick Clawson, 'Soviet Economic Relations with India and Other Third World Countries', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Special Number, August 1979.

<sup>82</sup> Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya, 'Disarmament and Development, Structural Linkages', *Alternatives*, Vol.IV, No.1, July 1978, pp.11-34.

<sup>83</sup> For a comprehensive study of Third World conflicts and the role of the Great Powers in such conflicts, see Mohammed Ayoob (ed.), *Conflict and Intervention in the Third World* (Croom Helm, London, 1980).

<sup>84</sup> W. Howard Wriggins, *The Rulers Imperative: Strategies for Political Survival in Asia and Africa*, New York, 1969; Robert C. Good, 'State Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States', in Lawrence W. Martin (ed.), *Neutrality and Non-alignment*, New York 1962; Franklin B. Weinstein, 'The Users of Foreign Policy in Indonesia: An Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy in the Less Developed Countries', *World Politics*, Vol.XXIV, No.3, April 1972, pp.358-81.

<sup>85</sup> Franklin B. Weinstein, 'The Meaning of National Security in South East Asia', *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November, 1978, pp.20-28. Maxwell D. Taylor, 'The Exposed Flank of National Security', *Orbis*, Vol.XVIII, No.4, Winter 1975.

<sup>86</sup> The Naxalite and Naga insurgencies in India and the Che Guevara-inspired insurgency of April 1971 in Sri Lanka may be mentioned as examples in South Asia. South East Asia and Latin America provide a large number of examples of the combination of socio-economic and cultural (ethnic) factors behind insurgency threats. Also see: E. Wayne Nafziger and William Richter, 'Biafra and Bangladesh: The Political Economy of Secessionist Conflict', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.XIII,



No.2, 1976, pp.91-109; Ian Smart, 'Future Political Patterns in the Middle East', *The World Today*, Vol.32, No.7, July 1976, pp.243-50; Jack Davis, 'Political Violence in Latin America', *Adelphi Papers*, No.85 (IISS, London, February 1977).

<sup>87</sup> See, for instance, Guy J. Pauker, 'Sources of Instability in Developing Countries', *RAND Report*, p.5029, June 1973; Brzezinski sarcastically observed in this respect: 'Now war is a luxury only weak and poor can afford', *The Japan Times*, 27 March 1971, p.1; *Civil Violence and International System*, Parts I and II, *Adelphi Papers* Nos.82 and 83, IISS, London, December 1971. See particularly the papers by Ali A. Mazrui on 'The Contemporary Case for Violence', in Part I (pp.17-27), and by Samuel P. Huntington on 'Civil Violence and the Process of Development' in Part II (pp.1-15). Also, Graham and Gurr, 'The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfaction as a cause for some Great Revolutions and Contained Rebellion,' *American Sociological Review*, No.27, February 1962.

<sup>88</sup> Barry M. Belchman and Stephen S. Kaplan (eds.), *The Use of the Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Brookings Institute, Washington DC, 1976); Abjorn Eide, 'The Transfer of Arms to Third World Countries and their Internal Uses', *International Social Science Journal*, Vol.28, No.2, 1976, pp.307-25. Quoting a study on the subject of growing regimentation in the Third World, *New York Times* (1 January 1973, p.4), reported that two-thirds of the world and almost the entire Third World (with the exception of India and a few others) was without political freedom.

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