

The Anxious Host: Czechoslovakia and Carlos the Jackal

1978-1986

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Abstract

The nature of engagement by communist states with international terrorism remains contested. Furthermore, it represents one of the most enigmatic aspects of the Cold War. This article challenges the notion that the Soviet Bloc provided uniform active support to late Cold War terrorists and suggests new categories of host. To demonstrate the complexities and paradoxes of state-terrorist relations we examine Communist Czechoslovakia's relations with Carlos the Jackal - the most notorious terrorist of the period. The historical consensus remains that Carlos was supported by the Eastern Bloc. However, as newly-released Eastern European secret service documents show, attitudes of Moscow's allies varied considerably. Czechoslovakia was, at best, a temporary and 'anxious host'. The arrival of major terrorists in such 'anxious' states were in fact often unannounced, uninvited and undesired - yet the hosts fell short of arresting the terrorists either due to ideological affinity or fear of retribution. From his first visit to Prague, Carlos the Jackal was considered to be a threat and a reputational hazard by the Czechoslovak State Security (StB). Gradually, the StB adopted subtle measures aimed at deterring the return of Carlos and his Group. Finally, in the mid-1980s, they artfully ejected the Jackal and his accomplices from its territory, but without risking formal expulsion.

Keywords: Carlos the Jackal, Czechoslovakia, Cold War, terrorism, intelligence.

“CARLOS” declares that he will not carry out any operation on the territory of Socialist states, which would harm the interests of these countries. Nevertheless, his very presence and attempts to organise operations while on CSSR territory are a threat to the political interests of the CSSR abroad.’¹

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I. Introduction

In the 1970s, Carlos the Jackal - born Ilich Ramírez Sánchez in Venezuela - became the *enfant terrible* of late Cold War terrorism. By attacking British, French, Jewish, Iranian as well as Arab targets for over a decade, Carlos - a self-proclaimed Marxist revolutionary-cum-hired gun - made the secret services of the democratic world look ‘inept and ridiculous’.² So much so that by 1976 the Federal Republic of Germany offered \$20,000 for information leading to his arrest and, by 1982, Carlos topped Francois Mitterrand’s assassination list.³

From the outset, Carlos was considered a tool of the Kremlin.⁴ Due to the nature of the Jackal’s targets, his liking for anti-capitalist and revolutionary slogans, and affiliations with the Palestinian cause, Carlos became emblematic of the Soviet Bloc’s support for terrorism. Remarkably, this hawkish Cold War interpretation largely lives on. Although some scholarship has challenged Carlos’s alleged affiliations with the KGB⁵, his relations with the Eastern Bloc remain tainted by Cold War biases invented forty years ago. Considered a monolithic entity, to date the Eastern Bloc has been unequivocally described by dominant texts as sponsor and active supporter of international terror, using violent non-state actors for ‘surrogate operations against rival states, internal enemies, or dissidents.’⁶

This politicised and simplistic interpretation requires reconsideration.⁷ This article does so by zooming in on the nature of Carlos’s relations with Czechoslovakia, Moscow’s Cold War satellite, once dubbed by the Carlos Group as ‘just the right place’ for conducting their business. To date, senior CIA officers have described the relationship between Prague and Carlos as that of client-patron. During the later Cold War, French intelligence thought the Jackal to be hiding in a medieval fortress in the Bohemian highlands, and others alleged that the Carlos Group was training in a Czechoslovak terrorist camp, and using false travel documents from ‘the document fabrication section’ of the Czechoslovak state security.⁸

New evidence suggests these interpretations are false. Based on 5,000 recently-released Czechoslovak communist-era documents, materials from the US National Archives, presidential libraries and interviews with former diplomats and intelligence practitioners, this article argues that Prague’s attitude towards Carlos was hostile from his first documented visit in the autumn of 1978 until he last set foot on Czechoslovak soil in June 1986. Remarkably, the country’s State Security Service (StB) considered the Jackal dangerous, unreliable and harmful to Czechoslovakia’s reputation. It thus meticulously monitored visits of Carlos and his associates to Czechoslovakia, making it increasingly difficult for them to access the country, and finally employing active measures and effectively ousting the Carlos gang on three separate occasions between 1979 and 1986.

Contrary to the dominant understanding, Czechoslovakia, at best, represented a temporary ‘anxious host’ of this international terrorist group. Prague was in fact nervous about Carlos’s stay on its territory and also about the prospect of ousting the terrorists. Nevertheless, it is still categorised as a ‘host’, since Prague never adopted a vigorous counterterrorism approach against the Group. Instead, it embraced myopic measures primarily aimed at keeping Carlos off its territory and

preventing him from carrying out operations on its soil. Arresting the international terrorist was not an option due to a combination of factors, ranging from Prague's fear of retribution to its superficial loyalty to seeming ideological allies. This 'anxious host' model extends and elaborates one of the most authoritative classifications of state-sponsored terror deployed by Daniel Byman in his 2005 study, *Deadly Connections*.⁹

Soviet objectives during the Cold War should not be romanticized. Moscow and its satellites had indeed fostered partnerships with non-state actors engaged in political violence.¹⁰ In mid 1970s, much like other Soviet satellites, Prague established a multifaceted relationship with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) as well as some of its more radical elements. The PLO was, '...the representative of the Palestinian people', argued Prague, 'leading a national liberation struggle with the goal of attaining full self-determination and the creation of an independent state on a territory'.¹¹ So called 'nihilist' international terrorist groups, however, were a separate category. Prague feared these could target foreign visitors, delegations and embassies or foreign aircraft on Czechoslovak territory. In the late 1970s, the 'Carlos terrorist group' was the StB's main concern.¹² Its 'political nature' and 'ideological profile', the StB argued, was extremist.¹³ Carlos was in their view a politically volatile terrorist with powerful ties to the Iraqi special services, other Arab states, and various nationalist terrorist groups. Most importantly, StB feared all of this 'could be used to compromise one of the states of the socialist community'.¹⁴ New material suggests, that the StB was also anxious about the likes of Abu Nidal or Abu Daoud, the Munich massacre architect, entering their territory.

Escaping the Cold War Mindset

Politicisation and reductionism have monopolised discourse on Cold War state-sponsorship of terrorism. Since Claire Sterling's famous 1981 book *The Terror Network* won the hearts and minds of key figures in the Reagan Administration, by labelling Moscow and its satellites the masterminds of worldwide terror, the study of late Cold War terrorism never fully recovered from this problematic paradigm.¹⁵ Hence, contemporary works continue to present a surprisingly limited understanding of the differences, complexities and anomalies of the Eastern Bloc's involvement with Cold War terrorism.¹⁶ Moreover, the study of Soviet and Eastern Bloc engagement with international terror has been predominantly shaped by the 'Germanosphere'. Documents of the East German Ministry for State Security - the Stasi - were the first and, for a long time, the only available primary sources on this issue. Unsurprisingly, most of what we know about this highly-contested phenomenon draws on the East German experience.¹⁷ Today, however, this politicisation and generalisation can be resolved by appreciating new findings from recently-opened Eastern European archives.

Incremental steps towards a more holistic understanding are under way. Since Poland released its communist-era archives in 2000¹⁸, we have gained a better understanding of its engagement with perpetrators of international terror, including those of Carlos the Jackal, Abu Nidal, as well as the PLO.¹⁹ Bulgaria and Romania revealed the secrets of their Cold War intelligence archives in 2007²⁰, which also prompted scholars to investigate the engagement of those countries with international terror.²¹ In the same year, the Czech government established the long-overdue *Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes* and in 2008 its branch, the *Security Service Archive* (ABS), which enabled access to documents of the StB.²² To date, Czech archives allow access to approximately ninety five per cent of communist-era documents, with the rest kept classified. Prague's approach arguably represents the most liberal in Europe. By contrast, although Hungary's Cold War archives are accessible to researchers, the issue of terrorism is yet to receive adequate academic attention.²³

Until recently, terrorism was also off limits in Prague.²⁴ Then, in November 2014, ABS released an extensive collection of documents on international terrorism and Middle Eastern non-state actors. Besides reports from the Czechoslovak StB, this contains documents on international terrorism from Hungarian, East German, Bulgarian, Polish and Soviet state security services. Overall, the collection constitutes a unique cross-roads of information generated by multiple security services east of the Iron Curtain and this article represents the first study of these freshly-released documents.

This new material must be assessed critically, with three caveats in mind. First, despite the considerable volume of new documents, a number of key files on Czechoslovak relations with the Middle East are still secret, most notably those of the country's foreign intelligence branch, the First Directorate.²⁵ Second, most declassified files on the topic have not been properly catalogued, which impedes assessments of the extent to which this collection is complete. Finally, immediately after the Velvet Revolution in November 1989, StB officers were given orders to destroy documents.²⁶ Although files on international terrorism were not the primary focus of this haphazard destruction, as they were thought useful in years to come, some relevant files were indeed destroyed or removed. For instance, a key document on Carlos's last visit to Prague in June 1986 has been removed and allegedly passed onto a Czech investigative journalist, which we learn from a short 2012 documentary by Stanislav Motl.²⁷ Other destroyed files were mostly related to foreign - largely Middle Eastern - informants working for the StB.

Constructing 'The Jackal'

Carlos began his terrorist career with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - External Operations (PFLP-EO) in the early 1970s. Since 1968, this son of a rich Marxist lawyer, was studying at the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow. Failing academically and refusing to obey the institution's strict discipline, by 1970 Carlos was expelled due to 'anti-Soviet provocation and indiscipline' and began searching for a new *raison d'être*.²⁸ Through Palestinian students he befriended at University, he set off on a new career path and travelled to Beirut to volunteer for the Palestinian cause. Here, Ilich met PFLP spokesman, Bassam Abu-Sharif, who - intrigued by the young Venezuelan's 'explosive intelligence' and 'a chameleon-like nature' - recruited him for the cause. Accepting his *nom de guerre* 'Carlos', the wanna-be revolutionary soon set off for initial training in Jordan. Passing the course with flying colours, Carlos was sent to a 'professional' training camp and later to the so called 'H4', a final training stop near the Iraqi border allegedly run by its armed forces. A prodigy revolutionary, Carlos briefly joined the Palestinian guerrillas in their war against the Jordanian King. Here, Abu-Sharif argues, Carlos 'was bloodied' and proved to be a ruthless and excellent soldier.²⁹

By 1971, Carlos was back in Europe, dividing his time between Paris and London, the latter a home to his mother and brothers. Although Carlos was put on the PFLP-EO's mission list, it was not until early 1972 when he began working full-time for the group's European branch, immersing himself into the world of false documents and safe-houses.³⁰ Much to his frustration, it took Carlos another year to graduate to his first solo terrorist attack. On the evening of 30 December 1973, Carlos shot Chairman of Marks and Spencer, Joseph Edward Sieff - a seasoned fundraiser for Israel and a host to the right-wing Menachem Begin during his visit of London - in the face. Failing to kill his target, his biographer John Follain considered this a 'disappointing baptism' for Carlos. Nevertheless, as the terrorist apprentice later confessed, 'It was at this time that the real Carlos was born'.³¹

Carlos's early years as the PFLP-EO hitman in Europe were characterized by further failures - the unsuccessful attack on Sieff was followed by a failed attack on the Hapoalim Bank in London and

two off-target RPG attacks on Orly Airport in Paris.³² In 1975, what was to become Carlos's most notorious operation also proved fatal to his association with the PFLP-EO. In December 1975, the Jackal raided the OPEC ministers meeting in Vienna - killing three and kidnapping a number of prominent targets. After days of protracted negotiations and stopovers in multiple countries, Carlos released his key captives - the Iranian and Saudi oil ministers - for a multi-million ransom. This failure to execute the oil ministers, as allegedly instructed by head of the PFLP-EO Wadi Haddad, prompted the latter to 'let Carlos go'. According to Haddad, 'Carlos had disobeyed orders by failing to shoot any of the Oil Ministers, and by negotiating their release in exchange for a ransom...and safe passage. The political rationale for the kidnappings had been sacrificed on the altar of Mammon...'.³³ Thereafter, Carlos's whereabouts were a mystery and the CIA even considered he had retired.³⁴ In reality, by March 1978, the Jackal had set up his own group - *The Organisation of Arab Armed Struggle*. In his new capacity as leader of the so called 'Carlos Group', the Jackal set out on a treacherous journey to find new partners and hosts across the Middle East and the Eastern Bloc.

The critical next phase remains a matter of controversy in the literature. Did the Eastern Bloc countries welcome Carlos? Was Eastern Europe's assistance to the Jackal monolithic? While behind the Iron Curtain, what activities did the Carlos Group engage in? Was Moscow the puppeteer? The literature on Carlos the Jackal is prolific, yet remains tainted by myths. Although former intelligence practitioners, comrades in arms, politicians, and historians have all written eagerly on Carlos, the majority of this literature is a product of journalists.³⁵ With impressive access to often elusive sources, journalists have been crucial in unveiling much of the Carlos story. Yet, with many critical facts unreferenced and sources anonymised, verification remains problematic. Moreover, by often letting 'the facts speak for themselves', some such journalistic accounts have struggled to grasp the wider context of events - predominantly in respect to Carlos's association with the Eastern Bloc. Few journalists writing on Carlos have revisited and confronted their accounts with recently released Cold War documents.³⁶

Although the existing literature avoids a systematic analysis of his associations with communist states, most books on the subject mention them in passing. *The Carlos Complex*, published in 1977, falls short of calling Carlos a Russian agent but argues that Carlos had maintained 'close contact with the Russians on a number of levels: through the PFLP's official contacts; through the Cubans; and indeed through his own 'case officer'.³⁷ After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Carlos's associations with 'the Russians' in the literature are toned down. In fact, in 1994 British journalist David Yallop allegedly gained access to Carlos's KGB file which led him to argue that, although at one point considered for recruitment, Carlos had never worked for the KGB. However, regarding Carlos's Eastern Bloc liaisons, Yallop subscribed to the arguments made by his predecessors regarding Eastern Europe hosting the terrorist, 'like virtually every other Warsaw Pact country their [East Germany's] secret services had deep relationships with a wide range of terrorist organisations in general and with Ilich Ramirez Sanchez in particular.'³⁸

In 1998, journalist John Follain published the most complex study of the terrorist's life to date. Like those who came before him, Follain predominantly focused on Carlos's earlier terrorist career and the French hunt for the fugitive. Nevertheless, his book is the first to utilise communist era Stasi archives to interpret the terrorist's relationship with the Eastern Bloc. Much like Yallop, Follain dispels the widely-adopted myth that Carlos and his gang were run by Moscow. His account of the Stasi's engagement is thorough and consistent - corroborated by multiple sources. However, Follain's analysis of Hungary's relationship with the terrorist is problematic - suggesting the Hungarian authorities asked the terrorist to leave its territory and, shortly thereafter, the 'Politburo' is said to

have supplied him with safe houses, women and whiskey.³⁹ According to sources familiar with the investigation of Carlos's links to Eastern European regimes, Hungary's assistance to the Carlos Group never extended to these areas.⁴⁰ Furthermore, Follain's brief comments on Carlos's relations with other Moscow satellites are erroneous, for instance, he claims that 'Czechoslovakia allowed him and his accomplices to use its training camps.'⁴¹ Thus far, no evidence has been found of the Carlos Group training on Czechoslovak soil. Moreover, the country's key training centre for security personnel for 'friendly countries and non-state groups' was only established in 1982 when Carlos was already banned from entering Czechoslovakia.⁴² Overall, Follain's book on the Jackal represents a welcome leap forward in our understanding of the Carlos Group. Nevertheless, as it largely draws on German and French sources, it fails to capture the nuanced multinational story of Carlos in the East.⁴³

Across all this literature there is little appreciation of the heterodox attitudes within the Eastern Bloc towards the Jackal. We now know, however, that these ranged from partnership, through fear and suspicion, to successful efforts at expulsion. To illustrate, by the early 1980s, Romania had hired Carlos to assassinate its opponents abroad and attack Radio Free Europe. Hungary, although not willing to engage with the Group operationally, allowed the Jackal to create a headquarters for almost two years. The German Democratic Republic, which initially considered him an ideological ally, always kept him at arm's length. Czechoslovakia, as this piece shows, did not cooperate with the Carlos Group, and soon after his first visit began looking for ways of keeping him off its territory.⁴⁴ While in the Eastern Bloc, members of the Carlos Group were closely monitored as they were regarded 'a loose cannon'.⁴⁵

Films and fictional accounts of Carlos's life have had a two-fold effect on the image of the Jackal. On the one hand, documentaries, depicting the lives of Carlos and some of his associates, have helped piece together the story of the Carlos era.⁴⁶ On the other hand, however, fiction and the silver screen have only helped elaborate the Carlos myth.⁴⁷

II. 'Just the Right Place'

Carlos's engagement with Eastern Europe began in the autumn of 1978 in Prague - which the Carlos Group members later described as 'just the right place to meet and organise'.⁴⁸ During the Cold War, Czechoslovakia was the geographical and, in many ways, the cultural and intellectual centre of the Socialist world. As the headquarters of the theoretical and ideological magazine *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, also known as *World Marxist Review*, the Czechoslovak capital attracted representatives of communist and worker's parties from around the globe. Moreover, since the 1950s, dissident communities from a number of Middle Eastern countries had found refuge in Central Europe. To Prague, first came the hard line communists fleeing Iran, followed by Syrian and Iraqi communist elites forced into exile after the Ba'athist coups in their respective homelands.⁴⁹

Remarkably, Prague also hosted some of the starkest opponents of communism. The headquarters of these so called 'reactionists'⁵⁰ was the Iraqi Embassy in Prague, allegedly staffed by Saddam Hussein's relatives serving under diplomatic cover. Their presence, the StB lamented, created a 'favourable environment' for planning attacks against their political and ideological opponents in Prague. In fact, through a trusted source, the StB learned that Iraq would not shy away from striking against its opponents anywhere, even on the territory of socialist states.⁵¹ In November 1979, the head of the Ba'ath Party in Czechoslovakia and Iraqi special services affiliate was overheard as saying, 'There are too many officials of the Iraqi Communist Party living in and supported by CSSR. We must therefore teach Czechoslovakia a lesson on its own territory.'⁵² Finally, during this period,

Czechoslovakia was much more open to tourists from socialist as well as capitalist countries than, for instance, the GDR or the Soviet Union (USSR). According to the StB, this relative openness made Prague vulnerable to attacks by international terrorists.⁵³

Today we know that Carlos never settled in Prague. Nevertheless, between November 1978 and mid-1986, the Czechoslovak capital became a significant meeting place for the Carlos Group and its associates, with most visits taking place between 1978 and 1980. During his travels through the Eastern Bloc, Carlos was accompanied by his closest associates: his German deputy and head of operations - Johannes Weinrich; his other right hand, Kamal al-Issawe, formerly of the Syrian secret service and later the PFLP;⁵⁴ and Magdalena Kopp, also known as 'Lilly', Carlos's wife and mother to his daughter, who served as the Group's secretary and occasional document forger.⁵⁵ Sometimes, Carlos was also accompanied by Salameh Tarik, in charge of the Group's arms supply, and Saleh Ahmet Al-Hamdani - exiled former Syrian minister of transportation - the Group's logistical and organisational pillar residing in East Berlin.⁵⁶ Overall, the Communist Bloc security services thought the Carlos Group was associated with 100-120 persons, but it remains unclear how many of the Group's collaborators were actual members rather than mere associates.⁵⁷ What we do know, however, is that the Group's leadership wanted to avoid expansion and thought foreign members difficult to manage.⁵⁸

Estimates of the Group's size were complicated by frequent identity changes. These demanded not only new cover names but also a constant inflow of new travel documents. Amongst the most popular were Iraqi, Kuwaiti, Lebanese and Syrian passports and, according to a former South Yemeni deputy minister of interior, his country (The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) had lost track of how many passports they handed out to 'the Palestinians' who then passed these on to terrorist groups.⁵⁹ By 1980, Carlos and his group were reported to have obtained genuine Syrian diplomatic passports issued by the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to the GDR's assessment, Syria did this unofficially to prevent any threat from Carlos as well as to create a good relationship with him.⁶⁰

Friends in High Places

Meetings held by the Carlos Group in Czechoslovakia can be divided into two categories: those with Middle Eastern diplomats mostly stationed in Prague and those with fellow terrorists from around the globe. In respect to the former, Carlos, most notably, sought the company of Iraqi, South Yemeni and later Syrian diplomats as well as employees of the PLO Office in Prague. He was wined and dined during each one of his stays, be it at their residences or in restaurants across the city.

Carlos's liaisons with Iraqi diplomats extended into a number of areas. In early 1979, Carlos was reported to have met with the Head of the Iraqi Baath Party in Czechoslovakia and Second Secretary at the Iraqi Embassy, Zaid Al-Nakib (supposedly Saddam Hussein's brother in law)⁶¹ and fostered close relations with the Iraqi ambassador in Prague.⁶² On numerous occasions, members of the Carlos Group drove around Prague in Iraqi diplomatic vehicles and used safe houses, rented out by the Iraqi Embassy for meetings with their agent network, to conduct clandestine meetings with their contacts.⁶³

These associations help us learn more about the Jackal and his politics. In August 1979, at a typical folklore Czech tavern, 'U Pastýřky', still in business today, Carlos and Weinrich spent the evening with a number of Syrian diplomats as well as a Syrian member of parliament. The Group leader, fluent in Spanish, Russian, English and with less-than-basic Arabic, told his friends about his earlier life - marriage to a Cuban woman, his stay in Moscow and how he 'used to be a communist'.

As the evening progressed, Carlos expressed his frustration about the lack of unity among Arab nations and advocated attacking Israel militarily.⁶⁴ Sitting around the table with his new friends, two of whom were StB informers, Carlos argued that: South Yemen was the only progressive Arab regime; Syria, however, was the only state with a foreign policy clearly focused on socialist states; and that Libya's Muammar Qaddafi was, '...a person, who does not know what he wants. Today he is friends with you, but tomorrow he could be your enemy. It is for this reason that we cannot rely on him.'⁶⁵

These meetings illuminate Carlos's ever-changing alliances with Arab regimes. When the Group members first arrived in Czechoslovakia at the end of 1978, they were closely associated with the Iraqi regime and its envoys in Prague. Less than six months later, around the time Saddam Hussein achieved power, Carlos became vocally anti-Iraqi and shifted his allegiance to Syria. In August 1979, during an evening spent with his Syrian friends in the Intercontinental Cocktail Bar, Carlos expressed his disgust at Iraq's policy towards Iraqi communists and confessed that he had recently been arrested in Iraq and detained for 24 hours. Soon after, the Head of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party in Czechoslovakia and Second Secretary at the Iraqi Embassy, Zaid Al-Nakib, entered the Cocktail Bar. When he walked up to Carlos, the latter refused to shake his hand saying, 'Zaid, you are doing bad politics'. Subsequently, when one of the Jackal's new Syrian friends jokingly suggested Carlos liquidate the 'reactionary' Iraqi diplomat, he replied: 'In principal, I am not against this idea, but it is not in our interest to carry out any operations while we are on CSSR territory or that of another socialist state as we are the protectors of all progressive forces.'⁶⁶

These meetings also shed light on the murky world of diplomatic privileges and terror. In 1978 and 1979, the StB detected purchases of large amounts of pistols, rifles and ammunition by the embassies of Syria and Iraq in Prague and feared that some of this arsenal was intended for the Jackal.⁶⁷ The StB knew Carlos always travelled armed, that his Group had already used its territory for transporting weapons to Hungary and Austria,⁶⁸ and that the Group was also moving weapons to African states.⁶⁹ Moreover, the Group was also suspected of using its friendships with diplomats based in Prague for long-term storage of their personal weapons.⁷⁰ This storage technique was precarious however. In March 1982, one of Carlos's associates came to collect a gun and a sealed suitcase that Carlos had left at the South Yemeni Embassy. The ambassador, however, claimed to have no knowledge of this cache, meanwhile Carlos's original contact there was no longer serving in Prague.⁷¹

A Terrorist Junction

During the late Cold War, Prague attracted not only exiled communists but also the terrorist elite. In contrast to Carlos's meetings with Middle Eastern diplomats based in Prague, which largely came about organically or resulted from random encounters, Carlos's meetings with fellow terrorists were carefully planned, exploiting Prague's relative openness to foreigners. Unsanctioned by the Communist authorities, the city became a nexus for some of the world's most notorious figures.

One of the Jackal's most intriguing terrorist associations occurred in the autumn of 1978. When he first set foot in Prague, the Jackal met a mysterious young Palestinian woman - known as Rihab Al Kasim. In her visa application to the Czechoslovak Embassy in Baghdad, Rihab asserted that she was an Iraqi student.⁷² Rihab was neither a student nor an Iraqi. She was one of Cold War's most notorious female terrorists - Souhaila Andrawes - seeking medical treatment of injuries incurred during a daring terrorist operation. On 13 October 1977, Souhaila, together with three other PFLP accomplices, hijacked a Lufthansa Boeing 737 flying to Somalia - with 83 passengers on board. Hostages remembered Andrawes as '...a fury, screaming at them continuously, with grenades held

ready in her hands, the pins linked to the rings on her fingers by a thin cord.⁷³ After the five-day hijacking drama, Souhaila's accomplices were shot dead with the assistance of a British Special Air Service team flown to Mogadishu in Somalia to help German commandos assault the plane. Souhaila miraculously survived, albeit incurring severe injuries to her chest and knee. Although sentenced to 20-years in a Somali prison, she was released on medical grounds a year later and secretly transported to Iraq.⁷⁴

It was this jewel of Palestinian violent resistance that Carlos was trusted to meet on several occasions during her clandestine five-month rehabilitation in Czechoslovakia.⁷⁵ Souhaila was a protégée of the Iraqi ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Anwar Al Hadithi. It was thanks to his intervention that the young Palestinian woman was admitted for treatment of her knee, shinbone, and chest shot wounds to an orthopaedic clinic in Prague. 'Rhubarb', the ambassador's close friend but also an StB informer, helped secure this. In January 1979, Souhaila underwent a second leg operation aimed at removing a bullet.⁷⁶ Although undercover and on 'friendly territory', Souhaila was under constant protection. When Carlos was not there, Souhaila was escorted by an unknown PFLP member, thought to be Layla Khaled's brother-in-law. Sometimes she would introduce Carlos as her fiancé. Nevertheless, during her time in the hospital, she had befriended a young Czech woman. To her Czech friend, 'Rihab' said she had incurred her injuries in Beirut when she stepped on a cluster bomb on a sidewalk.⁷⁷

Later that year, in August 1979, Carlos met the Black September commander and architect of the Munich Olympic Village massacre - Abu Daoud. Although by then, Daoud had suffered demotion within the PLO, he was still connected to some of the key players, including Abu Iyad, head of the PLO's intelligence. To this day, it remains unclear what the purpose of their Prague meeting was. The StB asked the representative of the PLO in Prague, Abu Bakr what was afoot. Bakr volunteered to use his fifteen-year long friendship with Abu Daoud to find out more about Carlos for his Czechoslovak hosts.⁷⁸ The StB had eventually suspected Abu Daoud of providing explosives and weapons to the Carlos gang.⁷⁹

The StB became more alarmed as they discovered Carlos's relations with other terrorists: the Red Brigades, the Swiss terrorist organisation Prima Linea, the Basque nationalist ETA, the Irish Republic Army (IRA), as well as the Red Army Faction (RAF). While in Prague, Carlos met with a number of his terrorist acquaintances including 'Nicholas', who the StB believed was 'Carlos's man' in the IRA. Although details of these meetings remain thin, Nicholas - known to be active in the arms trade to African clients to this day - was likely involved in the Group's weapons-dealing enterprise.⁸⁰ Furthermore, during his stay in Czechoslovakia, the Jackal was also to meet members of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), which he was once suspected of setting up.⁸¹

Carlos as a Threat

Carlos repeatedly claimed he would refrain from conducting terrorist activity on Eastern Bloc territory. The StB did not believe him and considered Carlos a threat from the outset. As early as March 1979, the StB argued that, '...it cannot be ruled out that...members of this terrorist group are planning to carry out operations on the territory of socialist countries against pro-American and pro-Israeli elements. It is of our opinion that such operations would damage the prestige of CSSR and the entire socialist bloc.'⁸² These worries were triggered by the Jackal's first recorded visit to Prague in the autumn of 1978. When he arrived, the StB was told Carlos was on 'a secret mission'.⁸³ Their blood pressure rose when he made an unauthorised visit to the editorial office of the magazine *Problems of*

Peace and Socialism, a safe haven for a number of prominent communists from the Arab world. Secretly entering the building, Carlos proceeded to the canteen and inquired about Arab employees of the magazine. After being spotted and asked to leave, Carlos resisted. The StB assessed this visit as a possible 'reconnaissance visit' for his 'special mission'.⁸⁴ As the magazine was soon to host a conference of Iraqi communists, the StB feared that Carlos's unauthorised visit heralded a strike ordered by Saddam Hussein against enemies living in exile.⁸⁵

The Iraqi Communist Party increased the StB's growing fear of Carlos with regular warnings about his possible terrorist attacks against 'enemies of Iraq' on socialist territory, directed by Saddam Hussein.⁸⁶ Although Iraqi Communists lost no opportunity to cast aspersions on their ideological enemies at the Iraqi embassy in Prague, the StB seemed to have taken them seriously.⁸⁷ Key Iraqi Communist representatives supplied the StB with high grade intelligence and assisted the StB in tracking Carlos's whereabouts and alliances.⁸⁸

In July 1979, during a liaison meeting with the East German Stasi, the StB firmly asserted that: '...CARLOS...is planning to carry out operations on CSSR soil against progressive Arab nationals.'⁸⁹ In August, the KGB, referred to by the StB as their 'Soviet friends', had informed Prague about the presence of Iraqi terrorists on Czechoslovak territory planning an attack on Iraqi communists living abroad. After receiving this chilling news, the StB carried out a massive investigation into the thousands of Iraqi nationals arriving or passing through Czechoslovak territory. Remarkably, the StB's extensive analysis finally concluded that there was no link between the Iraqi nationals and the Iraqi Embassy in Prague and simultaneously found no proof of the Carlos Group's intent to stage terrorist attacks on Socialist territory.⁹⁰ This confounded the StB's previous view of the Group's secretive contacts with the Iraqi Embassy, its joint safe houses and use of Iraqi diplomatic cars.

III. The Anxious Host

In 2005, Daniel Byman proposed a six-scale typology of state sponsors of terrorism. Byman primarily focused on the first four types of terror supporters - strong, weak, lukewarm and antagonistic - all representing varying degrees of 'active support' for terrorist organisations. His typology also recognised two categories of 'passive supporters': firstly those who 'turn a blind eye' to their activities because the terrorists enjoy popular support in that particular country; and secondly 'unwilling hosts', essentially failed or weak states unable to stop terrorist activity on their territory.⁹¹ Byman's key contribution lies in his understanding of state-sponsorship of terrorism as a spectrum and not a monolithic category. Nevertheless, his scale fails to address cases similar to those of Carlos and Czechoslovakia and requires refinement. His model requires another category of passive state-terror relationship, referred here as the 'anxious host'.

Foreign terrorists in such 'anxious' states are unannounced, uninvited, undesired. Yet, the state falls short of ousting or arresting the terrorists due to either ideological closeness and/or fear of retribution. The key distinction between 'anxious hosts' and Byman's two categories of 'passive support' are that the terrorists do not enjoy popular support and their stay on the 'anxious host's' territory is largely kept secret, nor are the host states weak. Moreover, such anxious hosts do not turn a blind eye to these violent non-state actors. They deploy their surveillance machinery and a web of informers to meticulously monitor the terrorists' activities and express genuine concern about their presence. 'Anxious hosts' are not, like Byman's 'unwilling hosts', weak states that do not possess the capacity to expel unwanted visitors. Nevertheless, they reluctantly tolerate the terrorists or use false

pretexts to force a departure. This reflects wider strategic motives or a desire to avoid violent confrontation with dangerous groups.

Multiple factors made Prague anxious, inept and impotent in respect to international terrorists. First, by the nature of Carlos's allies in the Middle East and his self-proclaimed Marxism, the Cold War had seemingly placed the Jackal and the Eastern Bloc within the same ideological category. Second, Prague feared the unknown. International terrorism was a foreign concept, poorly understood by Czechoslovak state security services who had spent decades perfecting their grip on the 'internal enemy'. Faced with unpredictable and uncontrollable violent non-state actors, suspected of plotting attacks on its territory, Prague feared hostile measures against these actors could trigger serious retribution.⁹² Third, the foreign nature of these actors represented a challenge to the StB's competency. At times, reports got delayed or lost, Arab names misspelled and nationalities mixed up.⁹³ Fourth, Moscow's guidance was amorphous. We now know that Moscow considered Carlos a terrorist. As early as August 1977, Moscow sent its Eastern Bloc allies a brief on the 'international terrorist Ilich Ramirez'. Nevertheless, there is no evidence of further guidance from Kremlin, which could have resulted in Prague's restrained approach.⁹⁴ Finally, in an atmosphere of *détente*, the West was closely watching possible links between terrorists and Socialist states. With this in mind, the StB was anxious as any attacks by Carlos on Czechoslovak territory - which they considered possible - would represent a blow to the prestige of Prague as well as its other Socialist allies.⁹⁵

Czechoslovakia's approach to the Carlos Group unfolded in three overlapping phases. First, as soon as Carlos set foot on Czechoslovak territory in the autumn of 1978, a surveillance approach was adopted by the StB to monitor the terrorist starlet and his associates. The StB found him difficult to control, arrogant and unprofessional, describing him as, 'very self-confident and stuck up; often not abiding by the laws of cover, maintaining contacts with unreliable and unscreened persons.'⁹⁶ Second, a preventive approach was adopted in the spring of 1979, only months after his first visit to the country's capital, aimed at preventing the Carlos gang from entering Czechoslovakia. During this phase, plans were designed to 'persuade' Carlos and his associates to leave. Third, the expulsion phase unfolded in 1985 when Prague ran out of patience and ousted Carlos's right hand man - Kamal al-Issawe - and, a year later, the StB tricked Carlos and his wife into immediately leaving the country.

A number of bodies in Communist Czechoslovakia were tasked to 'work on' Carlos. The country's counter-intelligence body - the Second Directorate - took the lead and assigned this agenda to its Fifth Department focused on small embassies including those of the Middle East. Close liaison was established with Czechoslovak foreign intelligence - the First Directorate - which periodically contributed with information to the Carlos case. On 20 March 1979, five months after Carlos's first visit to Prague, the StB sought high-level political guidance from the leadership of the Ministry of Interior and the Communist Party on how to approach the increasing inflow of suspected terrorists to Prague. This was a sensitive area and the StB visibly pushed decisions upwards, arguing that, 'it is in their remit to decide on what steps need to be taken'.⁹⁷

Phase One: Surveillance

Between the fall of 1978 and summer of 1979, the Carlos Group's stay in Czechoslovakia was closely watched by officers and informers of the Second Directorate. Czechoslovak counter-intelligence also turned to liaison partners, most prominently the PLO Office in Prague and the exiled Iraqi Communist leadership. No less important were informers - mostly Arab nationals - studying or working in

Czechoslovakia with good contacts to Middle Eastern embassies in Prague and the 'hotel *agentura*', the ubiquitous StB spies in hotels across Prague.

The StB had a number of eyes and ears within the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) community. 'Martin', its most active informer here, supplied the StB with information on Carlos's whereabouts, his visits to Iraq as well as some of his most prominent comrades. For instance, in September 1979, 'Martin' reported on Carlos's links to the former Prime Minister of South Yemen, Salim Rubai Ali, ousted and executed in 1978. Martin explained that Rubai actively promoted terrorist training on South Yemeni territory, enabled terrorist use of South Yemeni passports as well as assistance through diplomatic missions.⁹⁸ Alarming, 'Martin' gave the StB the details of an alleged \$500 thousand deal between Carlos and Iraq for operations against Iraqi Communists in Czechoslovakia.⁹⁹ Furthermore, another Iraqi Communist Party member who had previously 'worked' with Carlos, offered to penetrate the Carlos Group. It is still unclear whether the Czechoslovak security apparatus eventually took him up on the offer due to their extreme caution.¹⁰⁰

A top Iraqi Communist Party representative living in Czechoslovak exile, whose identity is kept secret until today, supplied the StB with high grade intelligence on the Jackal. In October 1979, Carlos sent an envoy to Prague to meet the ICP leader known as 'The King' to all but his handlers in the StB's foreign intelligence branch. The envoy was trusted to deliver an important message: Carlos had severed all ties with Iraqi intelligence and was now interested in cooperating with Iraqi Communists. To show his intentions were genuine, Carlos sent 'The King' a list of names of Iraqi intelligence hitmen who were to target Iraqi CP representatives on Socialist soil. Although 'The King' thought of Carlos as, 'not a very reliable person, extremely self-confident, and prone to adventures and personal popularity...', he considered Carlos' rapprochement genuine as improving his relations with Iraqi Communists would ensure Carlos better relations with Socialist countries. Moreover, Carlos had attempted to recruit the envoy for a top secret operation - the assassination of Egypt's President Anwar Sadat. Orchestrated in cooperation with Libyan intelligence, Sadat was to be killed by a SAM-6 rocket provided by Carlos. Instantaneously, this plan was forwarded to Moscow.¹⁰¹

Several other informants - including 'Peter' - were key to the StB's effort to monitor the Group. 'Peter' had first met Carlos in August 1979 through a mutual Syrian friend visiting Prague, the Group's logistics contact in Berlin, Al-Hamdani. Although Carlos had introduced himself as 'Salim', Peter immediately recognised the infamous terrorist. After introducing Peter to 'Salim', Al-Hamdani gave the StB informer a quick briefing on his new acquaintance, 'Latin American, progressive, Marxist, revolutionary, lived in Iraq for a while, nowadays in the GDR.' After they first met, 'Peter' spent practically every day with Carlos and his right-hand Johannes Weinrich during their three-week visit to Prague in August 1979. Despite the language barrier, the StB informer still managed to report back details of Carlos's life, his views of the Arab world as well as the Eastern Bloc.¹⁰²

At times, StB sources also managed to collect information on the Carlos Group from abroad. For instance, during a business trip to South Yemen, the Second Directorate's informant - 'Martin' - inquired about the country's links to Carlos. In a relaxed conversation, a senior South Yemeni politician told Martin that, 'PDRY "uses" CARLOS only in the most extraordinary situations, when they had exhausted all of their other options.' The Yemeni diplomat viewed Carlos as dangerous and was reluctant to share further information on his whereabouts, his Group's training and financing.¹⁰³

StB agents in hotels around Prague were crucial to surveilling 'suspicious' foreigners. While in Prague, the river-side Intercontinental Hotel in close proximity to the old town served as the Group's home-from-home as well as their business headquarters. During one of Carlos's stays there, a hotel informer observed that Carlos left his room only occasionally, clearly anxious about leaving it

unattended. The StB also learned that the Carlos Group had their own security team monitoring the hotel for people who expressed 'undue interest' in their boss.¹⁰⁴

The StB also attempted to collect information on Carlos via room bugging devices. Its hotel *agentura* helped place guests of interest into rooms already equipped with bugs.¹⁰⁵ The only surviving transcript of such meeting illustrates the problems of audio surveillance. Due to technical problems and the lack of Arabic speakers available in their ranks - the StB picked up only fragments of the conversation. Nevertheless, they heard the Group express the desire to raise more money from Libya and Syria; they named two Czechoslovak women who could be of assistance to them; and discussed internal Group conflicts. In order to decode parts of the conversation held in Arabic, the recording was passed onto Moscow for 'further processing'. Finally, the hotel *agentura* also assisted in obtaining telexes sent by Carlos to his contacts across the globe. In August 1979, the Jackal had sent a telex to Libya which subsequently found its way to the StB.¹⁰⁶

Phase Two: Preventive Measures

StB surveillance allowed a glimpse into the mind of Carlos and what they saw they did not like. Although Carlos came across as a 'progressive individual in agreement with the politics of socialist states', nevertheless they considered his liaisons with other terrorists and 'Iraqi special services' a threat to Czechoslovakia's political interests.¹⁰⁷ Hence, in the spring of 1979, after seeking guidance from the leadership of the Ministry of Interior and the Communist Party, the StB began adopting measures aimed to prevent Carlos from entering Czechoslovakia.¹⁰⁸

Identifying members of the Carlos Group attempting to enter Czechoslovakia was a Sisyphean task. The constant change of names and documents gave the StB a considerable headache. Carlos was dealt with by the counter-intelligence directorate which lacked expertise in the fields of both counterterrorism and the Middle East. They struggled with even basic tasks, such as accurately spelling the names and pseudonyms of their targets.¹⁰⁹

Nevertheless, on 21 May 1979, the StB took its first preventative measures. Carlos's aliases 'Mowsen Kassem Al Bakri' and 'Adil Fawaz Ahmed' as well as the aliases of his right-hand men Johannes Weinrich and Kamal al-Issawe were added to the INO - Index of Undesirable Persons for a period of 10 years. Magdalena Kopp, would be put on the INO four months later. The Head of the Second Directorate ordered this due to suspicions of 'engaging in criminal activity on CSSR soil'.¹¹⁰ A month later all Czech diplomatic missions abroad received a list of persons - including Carlos, Weinrich, Issawe and Tarek - who featured on the INO but were also thought likely to travel under multiple cover names.¹¹¹

Carlos evaded them. On 4 August 1979 he managed to slip through Czechoslovakia's defences thanks to a South Yemeni diplomatic passport, together with Kopp. During their three-week stay in Prague, Carlos met a number of his 'business' partners - including Abu Daoud and officers of the Romanian Securitate.¹¹² A vexed Head of the Second Directorate ordered further measures aimed at shortening Carlos's stay as well as preventing future visits.¹¹³ Five days later, the security representative at the Iraqi Embassy was called in and asked to press for the immediate departure of Carlos who 'is engaged in activities, which are in conflict with Cz. legislation' adding that his contacts with some employees of the Iraqi Embassy compromise them. The Iraqi emissary vehemently denied any association with Carlos, suggesting this was a conspiracy aimed at undermining friendly relations between Baghdad and Prague.¹¹⁴ On the following day, Czech diplomats met the Charge d'Affaires of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen to discuss the same problem. They expressed concern

over Carlos's use of South Yemeni diplomatic passports. Unexpectedly, the Head of the South Yemeni diplomatic mission admitted he was aware of this situation. Nevertheless, he claimed he was forced to assist Carlos and issue him visa by his ambassador, based in the GDR. He also confessed that Carlos was in contact with other diplomatic missions in Prague and had personally received a Czech-made pistol from the Iraqi ambassador.¹¹⁵

On 10 August 1979, the Czechoslovaks called in the ambassador of Iraq, A.S. Kedir Al Hadithi. During this meeting, the Czechoslovak diplomats openly stated that Carlos was preparing terrorist operations on Czechoslovak soil. The Iraqi ambassador admitted to knowing Carlos personally and meeting him in Prague through Palestinian friends six months ago. Moreover, he defended the Jackal as a vigorous fighter for the Palestinian cause, adding that no Arab who knows him would choose to avoid him. Expressing surprise about being summoned, the ambassador suggested that Prague simply oust Carlos if they did not want him on their territory. The Czechoslovak diplomats emphasised that this was only a friendly reminder that there could be 'unwanted complications for the Iraqi Embassy' were Carlos, for instance, to use Iraqi diplomatic vehicles in one of his operations. Responding, the ambassador ambiguously promised to adopt measures which would prevent any 'discrimination against his staff' by Czechoslovak authorities.¹¹⁶

By the end of August 1979, the StB were worried men. They concluded that, 'these are very dangerous terrorists'¹¹⁷ and effectively declared Carlos *persona non grata*, adding 'any further stays of Carlos in CSSR have been banned by relevant Czechoslovak authorities.'¹¹⁸ Subsequently, the Deputy Minister of Interior approved two plans devised to cut short Carlos's stay on Czechoslovak territory. According to Plan A, the Yemeni Charges d'Affairs would be asked to tell Carlos that capitalist media have learned of his stay in Prague which could result in negative propaganda against Czechoslovakia. Under Plan B, Carlos would be summoned to the Passport and Visa Office and told that capitalist diplomatic missions have learned of his presence in Prague, which could result in discrediting Czechoslovakia as well as the PLO. Both approaches were implied threats since, if Western media knew of Carlos's whereabouts, so did Western intelligence agencies.¹¹⁹ It is unclear whether either plan was carried out, nevertheless, according to StB's trusted informer 'Peter', the Carlos Group was made aware that Prague now feared Western intelligence services assassinating the Jackal on their territory.¹²⁰ Broadly, Carlos was tricked into leaving Prague.

We know the precise moment when Carlos realised he was not welcome. At 10:45am on 7 September 1979, the Jackal and his wife Kopp came to the Consular Department of the Czechoslovak Embassy in Sofia to pick up their visa for yet another trip to Prague. Dumbfounded, Kopp was told she was 'not allowed to visit CSSR'. After a feigned phone call to Prague, the Consul told Carlos firmly that he was also denied entry into Czechoslovakia. The seasoned terrorist turned visibly nervous and, with 'the corners of his mouth twitching', inquired about the reasons for this decision. When the Consul told him this was outside his authority, the terrorist couple left to request visas to Hungary or Poland. Anxious about the reaction of the terrorist duo, exceptional security measures remained in place at the Czechoslovak Embassy in Sofia until Carlos and Kopp left Bulgaria.¹²¹

Finally, in December 1979, the StB began a whole new approach to defence against terrorists. The V. Department of the Second Directorate devised a plan to cooperate closely on the matter with Iraqi intelligence officers stationed at the embassy in Prague as well as the PLO representative 'in order to find out about terrorist attacks under preparation'.¹²² More broadly, in January 1980, Carlos's ousting from Czechoslovakia triggered a set of structural reforms within the State Security system and its role in dealing with terrorism. Comprehensive measures to improve coordination, exchange

information on terrorism and counterterrorism, and to monitor terrorist whereabouts in the Eastern Bloc appeared for the first time.¹²³

Phase Three: Expulsion

By 1983, the StB assumed the presence of the Carlos Group on Czechoslovak territory was history. So much so that in March 1983, the StB had decided to close the file on 'Operation BAK', set up to monitor Carlos in 1979.¹²⁴ This proved to be premature. Throughout the first half of the 1980s, a number of the Group's members and associates continued to use Czechoslovakia for business. In fact, in March 1982, one of Carlos's associates was to travel to Prague to retrieve weapons Carlos had left at the Yemeni embassy.¹²⁵ Moreover, Carlos's supposed IRA connection, 'Nicholas', remained a frequent visitor throughout 1984 and 1985 despite featuring on the country's terrorist list.¹²⁶ In fact, in August 1985, he arrived in Czechoslovakia with a delegation of the Tanzanian Ministry of Interior and continued to act as a middle man for military equipment deals between the Pakistani Ministry of Interior and Czechoslovakia.¹²⁷ Similarly, Kamal al-Issawe, Carlos's head of operations in Europe also known as Abu Hakam, remained a serious problem for the StB in the early 1980s.¹²⁸

In August 1985, despite the Stasi's warning to the StB, Kamal al-Issawe entered Czechoslovak territory on a Yemeni diplomatic passport.¹²⁹ On 19 August 1985, at 20:00 the StB knocked on Abu Hakam's hotel room door. After briefly searching his room, Issawe was taken away for questioning. Clearly agitated, Issawe told the StB officers that, had this happened to him in a capitalist country, he would have already used a pistol and killed the officers, or would have arranged to have them liquidated later on. Eventually, he admitted to being a representative of the Carlos Group, lamenting that this association had caused him problems in Hungary, the GDR as well as capitalist countries. Conceding that Carlos's relations with Hungary and the GDR were now under a strain, Issawe told the StB that he was looking for a new safe harbour for the Group - which would entail establishing friendly relations with Prague; renting or buying a house there; purchasing cars; arms; blank travel documents including diplomatic passports; and long-term stays for the Carlos Group on their territory. To verify his story, in handwriting, Issawe gave the StB Carlos's telex coordinates: 'ATT Michael Sg. 4 // 379 HOMER Damascus'.

The StB were stunned as Issawe went on to present a case for the Carlos Group. Its primary aim, he argued, was to use terrorist tactics against Zionism, imperialism and reactionary Arab governments. In addition to terrorism, he also told the StB that the Group specialised in illegal arms trade. Although this trade was tricky between East and West, Issawe boasted, they had already managed to transport tons of military equipment. During a lengthy exchange, the StB made it abundantly clear to Issawe that his Group's goals were in stark contrast with Prague's Marxist-Leninist ideology and that 'our society considers terror an utterly foreign concept'. Although Issawe pleaded that good relations with Czechoslovakia were important to his Group, this was to no avail. Issawe was told to leave Czechoslovakia as soon as possible. The next day, he was escorted to the airport and put on a flight to Warsaw.¹³⁰ Issawe was then put on a permanent blocking list, with the following instructions, 'Report arrival. Cancel visa. Do not let into the CSSR, even if carrying a diplomatic passport.'¹³¹

For the remainder of 1985, the StB carried out an audit. It scrutinised measures taken by different directorates of the State Security to watch terrorists and block them from entering Czechoslovakia. A number of problems emerged: their SAPO computer system was flawed and had failed to register the arrival of a number of Carlos Group members, Issawe included.¹³² Hence, in

September, the Second Directorate issued yet another List of Permanently Blocked Terrorists.¹³³ Yet major loopholes remained. On 10 June 1986, the ace of spades of the Czechoslovak terrorist list - Carlos the Jackal under a new alias 'Walid Wattar' - unexpectedly turned up in Prague with the pregnant Magdalena Kopp and an associate, all travelling on Syrian diplomatic passports.¹³⁴ Although the Ministry of Interior had been tipped off about Carlos's planned trip from Moscow to Prague by the Hungarian Ministry of Interior, the StB were only informed a full day after their arrival.¹³⁵ It took another day to begin the trio's surveillance.

Surprisingly, while Carlos was well aware of Prague's hostile attitude, he did not attempt to stay out of the public eye. The trio took a late night walk through the old town of Prague, stopping by some of the city's landmarks including the world-renowned astronomical clock, the Prague Orloj. On the third day of their stay, they visited the Syrian embassy in Prague, which clearly changed the dynamic dramatically. After returning to the hotel, in front of the receptionists, Carlos and his associate hastily transferred the contents of their hotel safes into their brief cases. Carlos's associate was visibly nervous, his hands shaking. Quickly, they ordered flight tickets from the representative of the Czechoslovak Airlines at the hotel and, less than an hour later, settled their hotel bills and headed for the airport. Entering the transit zone via the 'employees' entrance', three StB officers escorted Carlos and his associates to the runway and watched them board a plane for Moscow.¹³⁶

Our knowledge about Carlos's last visit to Czechoslovakia is incomplete. How did the trio manage to enter Czechoslovakia? By this time, incoming Arab nationals would have been subject to a search in four different databases upon arrival in Prague including the StB's Index of Terrorists and Blocked Arab Nationals.¹³⁷ All three terrorists were travelling on Syrian diplomatic passports and possibly on the Syrian Embassy's invitation, but it remains mysterious. The questions as to why they left in visible haste is no less puzzling. Interviews with former Czechoslovak diplomats and intelligence practitioners suggest that the final ousting of Carlos was a combination of diplomatic pressure and an StB trick. During Carlos's last visit, Ivan Voleš, the senior diplomat superintending Middle East was instructed to call in the Syrian ambassador in Prague and tell him that Carlos had to leave Czechoslovak territory immediately. Voleš recalls that his Syrian counterparts insisted that Carlos was not a terrorist and argued that he was the victim of imperialist propaganda.¹³⁸ But Voleš was not in a mood to argue.

This was not the whole story and the StB had one last card to play. Resurrecting its previous plans to oust the terrorist, the StB now devised 'Plan C' to trick Carlos into leaving Czechoslovakia. This variant called for one of its officers to visit the terrorist in his Intercontinental hideaway and inform him that the French special services knew about his and his pregnant wife's whereabouts and were in fact already hunting him on Czechoslovak soil. By 1986, Carlos was at the top of the French wanted list. In 1982, President Francois Mitterrand told the Head of the country's external intelligence, DGSE, 'I authorise you to kill only Carlos and Abu Nidal.'¹³⁹ DGSE certainly had a fearsome reputation for direct action and had just bombed the Greenpeace ship "Rainbow Warrior" in New Zealand. To execute 'Plan C', the StB needed to send one of their own to confront the terrorist. As there was no one at the StB's international terrorism department who spoke the required languages, the StB outsourced this task to Václav Wallis of the counter-intelligence Third Department.¹⁴⁰ A nervous Wallis, accompanied by a colleague, entered Carlos's hotel room, well aware that Carlos was armed and known for his loose temper. However, he stuck to the StB's plan, informed Carlos about the French threat and told the trio Czechoslovakia could not guarantee their safety. After a heated debate and threats, the terrorists decided to leave Czechoslovakia on the next flight to Moscow.¹⁴¹

IV. Conclusion

Carlos's engagement with communist satellites represents a crucial chapter in the history of Cold War terrorism. Moreover, his turbulent relationship with Prague points to some key lessons. Firstly, despite the end of the Cold War, its ideology has cast a long shadow, distorting our view of communist state relationships with violent non-state actors and masking the considerable complexities. This can be rectified by engaging with new materials increasingly-available in Eastern European archives, of which the Czechoslovak materials represent some of the best. We find that the Eastern Bloc's relations with terrorists were not exclusively those of patron-client, as seen in the case of Czechoslovakia, Carlos's temporary and 'anxious host'. Although, in the Cold War context, Carlos was notionally Prague's 'ideological ally', its political, diplomatic and security echelons all resented and feared the terrorist from the outset, gradually adopting comprehensive measures aimed at ousting him and his accomplices from its territory. Moreover, investigations of Carlos's relationship with other Eastern Bloc countries also seem to fit the 'anxious host' model. To illustrate, Hungary was reluctant to let Carlos settle down in Budapest for long and tried to persuade him to leave. Carlos was reportedly shocked by a communist country refusing to help a fellow anti-imperialist and refused to leave.¹⁴²

Secondly, this anxious relationship with the world's most notorious international terrorist initially led Czechoslovakia to adopt an inward-looking and devious model of counterterrorism - aimed at chasing the problem away rather than solving it. Because Prague feared the vengeance of a man who had taken some of the Middle East's most powerful politicians hostage and in the early 1980s essentially declared war on France, it never attempted to arrest the Jackal.¹⁴³ However, this passive approach not only proved problematic in the eyes of Western states whose populations had suffered from the Carlos Group's terrorist rampage. It also caused long-term problems for the Czechoslovak security services who found themselves repeatedly ousting the Group's members from their territory, reforming their border control and surveillance mechanisms, desperate to avoid reputational damage.

Thirdly, by early 1980s, we can see the glimmerings of regional counter-terrorism cooperation in the East, albeit beset by hesitation and complications, but not unlike that emerging in the West. Arguably accelerated by the 21 February 1981 bombing of Radio Free Europe in Munich,¹⁴⁴ the cooperation between the GDR, Hungary and Czechoslovakia evolved into operational liaison aimed at coordinating common policies on 'how to curtail activities of this Group on the territory of Socialist states and how to push the Group out'.¹⁴⁵ Moscow's role with regard to this liaison channel remains unclear. New findings, however, suggest that since 1976 Moscow regarded the Venezuelan a terrorist and refused to be directly involved in its satellites' relations with him.

Finally, the eventful visits of Carlos the Jackal to Czechoslovakia offer a rare insight into the intricacies of terrorist diplomacy: the ever-changing nature of alliances between terrorists, spies and unruly states like Iraq, Syria and South Yemen. The new material from the archives in Prague is just the first exciting glimpse and, in decades to come, more surveillance records, together with hours of telephone intercepts from Yasser Arafat, Saddam Hussein and others will substantially reshape our understanding of this secret landscape.¹⁴⁶

Remarkably, post-Communist Czechoslovakia was given a second chance to assist in the downfall of Carlos. Shortly after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the newly-democratic country arguably contributed to Carlos's identification and arrest by providing their French counterparts with some of the latest photographs made by Czechoslovak services during his last stay in Prague. Thanks to these,

in 1994, DST officers from Paris and other western secret services finally caught up with the Jackal in Sudan - and this time he did not slip away.¹⁴⁷

Notes

¹ J.Jíra (Head of 5/Dept, [Second Directorate] II.S-SNB) to 3/Dept. X.S-SNB, 25 Oct. 1979, 'Informace o činnosti arabských teroristů na území ČSSR-zaslání', A[rchiv] b[ezpečnostních] s[ložek v Prahe]-[Osobní svazek 'ORIENT']19324/1.

² J.Follain, *JACKAL: The Complete Story of the Legendary Terrorist, Carlos the Jackal* (New York, 1998), 100.

³ 'Weekly Situation Report on International Terrorism', 7 Sept. 1976, NARA, CREST; Follain, *JACKAL*, 162-3. For more on how the United Kingdom first came to recognise international terrorism as a threat see R.Cormac, 'Much Ado About Nothing: Terrorism, Intelligence, and the Mechanics of Threat Exaggeration', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, xxv (2013), 476-493.

⁴ C.Smith, *CARLOS: Portrait of a Terrorist* (London, 1995), xiv; C.Sterling, *The Terror Network* (New York, 1981), 131.

⁵ V.Mitrokhin and C.Andrew, *The World Was Going Our Way. The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York, 2005), 254.

⁶ T.Riegler, 'Quid pro quo: state sponsorship of terrorism in the Cold War' in J.M.Hanhimäki and B.Blumenau (eds.), *An International History of Terrorism: Western and non-Western Experiences* (London, 2013), 115; G.R.Urban, *Radio Free Europe and the pursuit of democracy: My war within the cold war* (New York, 1997), 93.

⁷ Post-Cold War, a number of alliances between state and non-state actors in the Middle East have been reassessed. See, D.Little, 'A Puppet in Search of a Puppeteer? The United States, King Hussein, and Jordan, 1953-1970', *International History Review*, xvii (1995), 512-544; Z.Rubinovitz, 'Blue and White 'Black September': Israel's Role in the Jordan Crisis of 1970', *International History Review*, xxxii (2010), 687-706.

⁸ Remarkably, myths about Carlos's relationship with Prague have been promoted by some of those closest to the case. See V.Cannistraro, Former Director of the CIA's Counter-Terrorism Unit, in D.Weyand, *The Jackal* (The History Channel, 2015); or Follain, *JACKAL*, 125.

⁹ D.Byman, *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism* (Cambridge, 2005), 1-53.

¹⁰ K.Sieber and P.Zidek, *Czechoslovakia and the Middle East between 1948-1989* (Prague, 2009), 234-58; R.Dannreuther, *The Soviet Union and the PLO* (London, 1998); J.Herf, *Undeclared Wars with Israel: East Germany*

and the West German Far Left, 1967-1989 (Cambridge, 2016). For a critical overview of the West's relations with violent actors see: A.George (ed.), *Western State Terrorism* (Cambridge, 1991).

¹¹ B.Chňoupek (Minister of Foreign Affairs), [bez dátumu] 1975, 'Důvodová zpráva', ABS-19324/1.

¹² 5/Dept. II.S-SNB, 29 Jan. 1980, 'Současná situace a charakteristika mezinárodního terorismu a hlavní úkoly orgánů po linii II.S-SNB', ABS-19324/1.

¹³ K.Vrba (Head of II.S-SNB) to J.Kováč (Deputy Minister of Interior), 21 Aug. 1981, 'Zvláštní informace', ABS-19324/3.

¹⁴ J.Jíra (Head of 5/Dept, II.S-SNB), 17 Aug. 1979, 'ZPRÁVA o jednání mezi delegacemi MStB NDR a II.Správy SNB v Praze uskutočněné ve dnech 16.-17.8.1979', ABS-19324/1.

¹⁵ Sterling, *The Terror Network*. For a good round-up of the controversy ignited by Sterling's book see, M.Goodman, *Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA* (New York, 2008); A.Hänni, 'When Casey's Blood Pressure Rose: a Case Study of Intelligence Politicization in the United States' *Intelligence & National Security* (7 April 2016), 1-15.

¹⁶ Riegler, 'Quid pro quo', 119; Smith, *CARLOS*, xii-xiv.

¹⁷ B.Blumenau, *The United Nations and Terrorism: Germany, Multilateralism, and Antiterrorism Efforts in the 1970s* (Basingstoke, 2014); Blumenau and Hanhimäki, *An International History of Terrorism*; Herf, *Undeclared Wars with Israel*; J.O.Koehler, *Stasi: The Untold Story of the East German Secret Police* (Connecticut, 1999); M.Wolf and A.McElvoy, *Man Without a Face: the Autobiography of Communism's Greatest Spymaster* (London, 1997); T.Wunschik, *Baader-Meinhofs Kinder: Die zweite Generation der RAF* (Wiesbaden, 2013).

¹⁸ 'Institute of National Remembrance - Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation', *Institute of National Remembrance*, <http://ipn.gov.pl/en/about-the-institute/institute-of-national-remembrance-commission-for-the-prose> (Accessed: 5 March 2016).

¹⁹ See: P.Gasztold-Seń, 'Międzynarodowi terroryści w PRL-historia niewymuszonej współpracy', *Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość* xxi. (2013), 275-315.

²⁰ 'Modern Storehouse for Bulgaria Communist-Era Files', *Sofia News Agency*, 8 April 2010, <http://www.novinite.com/articles/114997/Modern+Storehouse+for+Bulgaria+Communist-Era+Files> (Accessed: 7 March 2016); O.Lungescu, 'Romania Securitate legacy 20 years after revolution', *BBC News*, 10 Dec. 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8401915.stm> (Accessed: 6 March 2016).

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- ²¹ J.Baev, 'Infiltration of Non-European Terrorist Groups in Europe and Antiterrorist Responses in Western and Eastern Europe (1969-1991)', *Counter Terrorism in Diverse Communities* 90 (2011); L.Tofan, *Sacalul Securitatii. Teroristul Carlos in solda spionajului romanesc* (Bucharest, 2013).
- ²² 'Council of the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes', *Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes*, <http://www.ustrcr.cz/en> (Accessed: 3 March 2016).
- ²³ 'Closing down history. Hungary's secret-police archives', *Eastern Approaches, The Economist*, 29 Feb. 2011, http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/02/hungarys_secret-police_archives (Accessed: 1 March 2016).
- ²⁴ Thus far, only Czechoslovakia's diplomatic relations with states have been scrutinised, see Sieber and Zídek, *Czechoslovakia and the Middle East*.
- ²⁵ These are documents still deemed crucial to the security of the Czech Republic or foreign nationals.
- ²⁶ Mostly those related to the so called 'inner enemy', dissidents. R.Schovánek, 'Svazek Dialog. StB versus Pavel Kohout', <http://www.ludvikvaculik.cz/index.php?pid=121&sid=149> (Accessed: 20 Feb. 2016).
- ²⁷ S.Motl, 'Stopy. Fakta. Tajemství', *Czech Television*, 2012; S.Motl, *Cesty za oponu času 3: Šakal na Vltave* (Prague, 2012). File Orient located in ABS only contains fragments of documents allegedly held by Motl.
- ²⁸ Follain, *JACKAL*, 13-4, 17-8.
- ²⁹ B.Abū Sharīf and U.Mahnaimi, *Best of Enemies: The Memoirs of Bassam Abu-Sharif and Uzi Mahnaimi* (Boston, 1995), 69-72; 78-9; 89.
- ³⁰ Smith, *Carlos*, 57, 61.
- ³¹ Follain, *JACKAL*, xvii-xviii, 40-41; Smith, *Carlos*, 101-5.
- ³² C.M.Andrew, *Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5* (London, 2009), 617-8.
- ³³ Follain, *JACKAL*, 105. Also see, Blumenau, *The United Nations and Terrorism*, 52-9.
- ³⁴ 'International Issues Review', *National Foreign Assessment Center, CIA*, 27 Sept. 1978, Carter Presidential Library Archive, CREST.
- ³⁵ Smith, *CARLOS*; C.Dobson and R.Payne, *The Carlos Complex: A pattern of violence* (London, 1977); D.Yallop, *Tracking the Jackal: The Search for Carlos, the World's Most Wanted Man* (London, 1993); Sharīf and Mahnaimi, *Best of Enemies*; Follain, *JACKAL*; O.Schröm, *Im Schatten des Schakals. Carlos und die Wegbereiter des Internationalen Terrorismus Taschenbuch* (not specified, 2002).
- ³⁶ For instance, J.Follain and O.Schröm based their accounts on extensive use of archival materials.
- ³⁷ Dobson and Payne, *The Carlos Complex*, 38.

³⁸ Yallop, *Tracking the Jackal*, 354.

³⁹ Follain, *JACKAL*, 124.

⁴⁰ Interview 2 June 2016, Private source.

⁴¹ Follain, *JACKAL*, 125.

⁴² P.Dvořáček, 'Ústav zahraničního studia Vysoké školy Sboru národní bezpečnosti a jeho role ve vzdělávacím systému ministerstva vnitra', in *Marginalia Historica*, Univerzita Karlova v Praze, ii. (2012), 114-5.

⁴³ Carlos also features prominently in memoirs and biographies: M.Kopp, *Die Terrorjahre: Mein Leben an der Seite von Carlos* (not specified, 2012); F.Schmaldienst and K.Dieter Matschke, *Carlos-Komplize Weinrich: Die internationale Karriere eines deutschen Top-Terroristen* (Berlin, 1995).

⁴⁴ See, for instance, Tofan, *Sacalul Securitatii*.

⁴⁵ E.Hradecký (Head of International Affairs Department, Office of the Minister of Interior) to K.Vrba (Head of II.S-SNB), 8 Sept. 1980, 'Mezinárodní teroristická organizace-sdělení', ABS-19324/1.

⁴⁶ For instance, Weyand, *The Jackal*; B.Schroeder, *Terror's Advocate* (Les Films du Losange, 2007); A.Oey, *My Life as a Terrorist - The Story of Hans-Joachim Klein. The Road to Radicalism* (Submarine VPRO, 2005).

⁴⁷ O.Assayas, *Carlos* (Film En Stock, 2010).

⁴⁸ To date, Carlos was believed to have begun his *tour de Soviet Bloc* in East Berlin, in the spring of 1979. Mitrokhin and Andrew, *The World Was Going Our Way*, 256; quote from Bokr ([First Directorate] I.S-SNB Resident in Sofia, StB), 9 Oct. 1979, ABS-[Osobní svazek 'BAK']16987.

⁴⁹ Interview with a former senior post-communist Czechoslovak intelligence officer, 4 Sept. 2015.

⁵⁰ In Marxist terminology, this term denotes all those whose thinking has any ruling class features or supporters of anti-communist regimes.

⁵¹ J.Větrovec (Deputy Head of 5/Dept. II.S-SNB), 24 Jan. 1979, 'INFORMACE-o pobytu arabských teroristů na území ČSSR', ABS-16987.

⁵² M.Hladík (Head of I.S-SNB) to K.Vrba (Head of II.S-SNB), 27 Nov. 1979, 'Akce VEZÍR-poznatky k irackým baasistům v ZSS', ABS-16987.

⁵³ V.Šubrt (Head of 3/Dept. [Tenth Directorate] X.S-SNB), 24 Aug.1979, 'Záznam', ABS-19324/1.

⁵⁴ Z.Němec (Head of [Fourteenth Directorate] XIV.S-SNB) to J.Kováč (Deputy Minister of Interior), 20 Aug.1985, 'Akce "CARLOS"-Informace', ABS-[Objektový svazek 'Mezinárodní terorismus']24113/4.

⁵⁵ J.Jíra (Head of 5/Dept, II.S-SNB) to 3/Dept. X.S-SNB, 25 Oct. 1979, 'Informace o činnosti arabských teroristů na území ČSSR-zaslání', ABS-19324/1.

⁵⁶ Head of International Affairs Department, Office of the Minister of Interior to K.Vrba (Head of II.S-SNB), 10 March 1980, 'Mezinárodní teroristická organizace-sdělení', ABS-19324/1; By Stasi, 'Catalogue of the Carlos Group', Private source.

⁵⁷ E.Hradecký (Head of International Affairs Department, Office of the Minister of Interior) to K.Vrba (Head of II.S-SNB), 8 Sept. 1980, 'International Terrorist Organisation-Information', ABS-19324/1.

⁵⁸ J.Jíra (Head of 5/Dept, II.S-SNB), 20 Aug. 1979, 'ZÁZNAM-Akce "BAK"', ABS-16987.

⁵⁹ J.Jíra (Head of 5/Dept, II.S-SNB), 8 May 1980, 'INFORMACE-styky ministerstva vnitra JČDR s teroristickou skupinou "RUCE SVĚTOVÉ REVOLUCE"', ABS-19324/1.

⁶⁰ Head of International Affairs Department, Office of the Minister of Interior to K.Vrba (Head of II.S-SNB), 4 March 1980, 'Skupina kolem CARLOSE-informace z NDR', ABS-19324/1; J.Jíra (Head of 5/Dept, II.S-SNB) to 3/Dept. X.S-SNB, 25 Oct. 1979, 'Informace o činnosti arabských teroristů na území ČSSR-zaslání', ABS-19324/1.

⁶¹ J.Jíra (Head of 5/Dept. II.S-SNB), 20 March 1979, 'INFORMACE o pobytu palestínských teroristů na území ČSSR', ABS-19324/1.

⁶² Informer 'Rhubarb' to 5/Dept. II.S-SNB, 27 Nov. 1978, 'Příslušníci teroristické organizace-poznatky', ABS-16987; J.Hrbáček (Head of II.S-SNB) to 5/Dept. II.S-SNB, 11 Jan. 1979, 'INFORMACE-o pobytu arabských teroristů v ČSSR', ABS-16987. To protect those who may still be alive, cover names are used for informers, agents or those investigated by the StB.

⁶³ On one occasion, StB surveillance also saw them in a Syrian diplomatic vehicle. J.Hrbáček (Head of II.S-SNB), 8 Aug. 1979, 'INFORMACE o pobytu palestínských teroristů na území ČSSR', ABS-16987; 'INFORMACE o činnosti arabských teroristů v ČSSR', [bez dátumu], ABS-16987.

⁶⁴ Informer 'Neil' to 5/Dept. II.S-SNB, 6 Sept. 1979, 'Terorista "CARLOS"-poznatky k pobytu v ČSSR', ABS-19324/1.

⁶⁵ Informer 'Peter' to 5/Dept. II.S-SNB, 29 Aug. 1979, 'Arabští teroristé-poznatky k pobytu v ČSSR, styky a politické názory', ABS-19324/1. Although the nature of Qaddafi's relations with Carlos remain unclear, numerous associations have been discussed, see: D.Little, 'To the Shores of Tripoli: America, Qaddafi, and Libyan Revolution 1969-89', *International History Review*, xxxv (2013), 70-99.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ K.Vrba (Head of II.S-SNB) to F.Šádek (Head of H[lavní] s[práva] P[ohraniční] s[tráže] a) o[chrany] s[tátních] h[ranic]), 4 Dec. 1979, ABS-16987; J.Vlček (Deputy Chief of Staff, Office of the Ministry of Interior) to J.Hrbáček (Head of II.S-SNB), 30 Aug. 1979, 'ADIL FAWAZ AHMED-sdělení z MLR', ABS-16987.

⁶⁸ II.S.-SNB, [bez dátumu] 1980, 'INFORMACE o činnosti arabských teroristů v ČSSR', ABS-19324/1; Head of International Affairs Department, Ministry of Interior to K.Vrba (Head of II.S-SNB), 10 March 1980, 'Mezinárodní teroristická organizace-sdělení', ABS-19324/1.

⁶⁹ M.Solický (Deputy Head of 6/Dept. II.S-SNB), 25 April 1981, 'Mezinárodní terorizmu zápis z porady s představitelem MV MLR s.plk. Wargou', ABS-19324/1.

⁷⁰ M.Hladík (Head of I.S-SNB) to J.Obzina (Minister of Interior of ČSSR), 10 Aug. 1979, ABS-16987; J.Jíra (Head of 5/Dept. II.S-SNB), 13 Aug. 1979, 'Informace k pobytu člena arabské teroristické organizace v ČSSR', ABS-16987.

⁷¹ Informer 'Martin' to 5/Dept. II.S-SNB, 11 March 1982, 'FUAD HEZEM-styk teroristy "CARLOSE", který přicestoval do ČSSR-poznatky', ABS-19324/1.

⁷² V.Sýkora (5/Dept. II.S-SNB), 28 Nov. 1978, 'ZÁZNAM-o pobytu arabských teroristů v Praze', ABS-16987/1.

⁷³ Follain, *JACKAL*, 110-1.

⁷⁴ 'Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Urteil Im Names Des Forlkes In Der Strafsache Gegen Souhaila Sami Andrawes Sayeh', 27 Nov. 1996, Private Source, 9.; For further information on the Landshut crisis, see: B.Blumenau, *The United Nations and terrorism*, 74-86; T.Geiger, "'Landshut" in Mogadischu. Das Außenpolitische Krisenmanagement Der Bundesregierung Angesichts Der Terroristischen Herausforderung 1977'. *Vierteljahrshefte Für Zeitgeschichte*, iii. (2009), 413-56.

⁷⁵ J.Jíra (Head of 5/Dept. II.S-SNB), 20 March 1979, 'INFORMACE o pobytu palestínských teroristů na území ČSSR', ABS-19324/1.

⁷⁶ Informer 'Martin' to 5/Dept. II.S-SNB, 27 Nov. 1978, 'Podezření z pobytu arabských teroristů v ČSSR-informace', ABS-16987; J.Jíra (Head of 5/Dept. II.S-SNB), 20 March 1979, 'INFORMACE o pobytu palestínských teroristů na území ČSSR', ABS-19324/1; Informer 'Rhubarb' to 5/Dept. II.S-SNB, 27 Nov. 1978, 'Příslušníci teroristické organizace-poznatky', ABS-16987; J.Hrbáček (Head of II.S-SNB) to 5/Dept. II.S-SNB, 11 Jan. 1979, 'INFORMACE o pobytu arabských teroristů v ČSSR', ABS-16987.

⁷⁷ I.Štubňa (Head of 2/Section, 5/Dept. II.S-SNB), 6 May 1979, 'ZÁZNAM o provedeném zpravodajském pohovoru', ABS-16987.

⁷⁸ V.Šubrt (Head of 3/Dept. X.S-SNB), 24 Aug.1979, 'Záznam', ABS-19324/1.

⁷⁹ This meeting was also corroborated by the Stasi. J.Vlček (Deputy Chief of Staff, Office of the Ministry of Interior) to J.Hrbáček (Head of II.S-SNB), 31 Aug. 1979, "'CARLOS"-informace z NDR', ABS-19324/1.

⁸⁰ Head of International Affairs Department, Ministry of Interior to K.Vrba (Head of II.S-SNB), 10 March 1980, 'Mezinárodní teroristická organizace-sdělení', ABS-19324/1.

⁸¹ J.Jíra (Head of 5/Dept. II.S-SNB), 17 Aug. 1979, 'ZPRÁVA o jednání mezi delegacemi MStB NDR a II.Správy SNB v Praze uskutočněné ve dnech 16.8.-17.8.1979', ABS-19324/1.

⁸² II.S-SNB, 28 March 1979, 'Informace o pobytu palestínských teroristů na území ČSSR', ABS-16987.

⁸³ Informer 'Rhubarb' to 5/Dept. II.S-SNB, 27 Nov. 1978, 'Příslušníci teroristické organizace-poznatky', ABS-16987.

⁸⁴ J.Jíra (Head of 5/Dept. II.S-SNB), 20 March 1979, 'INFORMACE o pobytu palestínských teroristů na území ČSSR', ABS-19324/1; Informer 'Martin' to I.Štubňa (3/Dept. II.S-SNB), 15 March 1979, 'AL BAKRI Mohsen Kassem, člen teroristické skupiny-informace', ABS-16987.

⁸⁵ J.Hrbáček (Head of II.S-SNB) to J.Hanuliak (Deputy Minister of Interior), 22 March 1979, 'Informace o pobytu arabských teroristů na území ČSSR-information', ABS-16987.

⁸⁶ M.Hladík (Head of I.S-SNB) to J.Hrbáček (Head of II.S-SNB), 8 March 1979, 'Akce VEZÍR-poznatky k terorismu', ABS-16987.

⁸⁷ For a debate on the reliability of sources see: L.Scott, 'Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Diplomacy', *Intelligence&National Security*, xix (2004): 322-341.

⁸⁸ M.Hladík (Head of I.S-SNB) to J.Obzina (Minister of Interior), 8 Oct. 1979, ABS-16987.

⁸⁹ J.Hrbáček (Head of II.S-SNB) to International Affairs Department, Ministry of Interior, 27 July 1979, 'ADIL FAWAZ AHMED-dožádání pro přátelé z MfS', ABS-16987.

⁹⁰ J.Hrbáček (Head of II.S-SNB) to J.Kováč (Deputy Minister of Interior), 21 Aug. 1979, 'Příjezd všech iráckých státních příslušníků do ČSSR a jejich počet v jednotlivých měsících roku 1979', ABS-16987.

⁹¹ Byman, *Deadly Connections*, 15.

⁹² J.Hrbáček (Head of II.S-SNB) to International Affairs Department, Ministry of Interior, 27 July 1979, 'ADIL FAWAZ AHMED-dožádání pro přátelé z MfS', ABS-16987.

⁹³ Informer 'Rhubarb' to 5/Dept. II.S-SNB, 27 Nov. 1978, 'Příslušníci teroristické organizace-poznatky', ABS-16987; J.Jíra (Head of 5/Dept. II.S-SNB), 17 Aug. 1979, 'ZPRÁVA o jednání mezi delegacemi MStB NDR a II.Správy SNB v Praze uskutočněné ve dnech 16.-17.8.1979', ABS-19324/1.

⁹⁴ F.Rezek (Head of Security at Border Police) to X.S-SNB, 7 April 1977, 'Seznam teroristů, dokumentace a opatření', ABS-H[istorický] f[ond] S[tátní] b[ezpečnosti], a.č. H-720/5. Moscow had allowed Prague to use this 300-page album of terrorists for 'operational purposes' as long as Russian commentary was removed.

⁹⁵ II.S-SNB, 28 March 1979, 'Informace o pobytu palestínských teroristů na území ČSSR', ABS-16987.

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- ⁹⁶ J.Jíra (Head of 5/Dept. II.S-SNB), 17 Aug. 1979, 'ZPRÁVA o jednání mezi delegacemi MStB NDR a II.Správy SNB v Praze uskutočněné ve dnech 16.8.-17.8.1979', ABS-19324/1.
- ⁹⁷ J.Jíra (Head of 5/Dept. II.S-SNB), 20 March 1979, 'INFORMACE o pobytu palestínských teroristů na území ČSSR', ABS-19324/1.
- ⁹⁸ Informer 'Martin' to 5/Dept. II.S-SNB, 13 Sept. 1979, 'Arabský terorista "CARLOS"-udržování kontaktů s bývalým předsedou vlády JĚDR ROBAJEM', ABS-16987.
- ⁹⁹ 'Martin' to 5/Dept. II.S-SNB, 25 July 1979, 'AL-BAKRI MOHSEN KUSSEN-plánování akcí na území ČSSR', ABS-16987.
- ¹⁰⁰ M.Hladík (Head of I.S-SNB) to J.Hrbáček (Head of II.S-SNB), 17 Aug. 1979, 'Průběžná informace o sledování CARLOSe', ABS-16987.
- ¹⁰¹ M.Hladík (Head of I.S-SNB) to J.Obzina (Minister of Interior), 8 Oct. 1979, ABS-16987; J.Jíra (Head of 5/Dept. II.S-SNB) to I.S-SNB, 47/Dept., ABS-16987.
- ¹⁰² Informer 'Peter' to 5/Dept. II.S-SNB, 29 Aug. 1979, 'Arabští teroristé-poznatky k pobytu v ČSSR, styky a politické názory', ABS-19324/1.
- ¹⁰³ J.Jíra (Head of 5/Dept. II.S-SNB), 8 May 1980, 'INFORMACE-styky ministerstva vnitra JĚDR s teroristickou skupinou "RUCE SVĚTOVÉ REVOLUCE"', ABS-19324/1.
- ¹⁰⁴ Informer 'Kristian' to 5/Dept. IV.S-SNB, 24 Aug. 1979, 'FAVAZ Ahmed-zpráva do akce BAK', ABS-16987.
- ¹⁰⁵ Informer 'Rudolf' to 5/Dept. IV.S-SNB, 16 Aug. 1979, 'Favaz Adil Ahmed, nar.1949, jemenský st. příslušník ubytován v hotelu IHC-poznatky', ABS-16987.
- ¹⁰⁶ J.Jíra (Head of 5/Dept. II.S-SNB), 20 Aug. 1979, 'ZÁZNAM-Akce "BAK"', ABS-16987.
- ¹⁰⁷ 'INFORMACE o činnosti arabských teroristů v ČSSR', [bez dátumu], ABS-16987.
- ¹⁰⁸ J.Jíra (Head of 5/Dept. II.S-SNB), 20 March 1979, 'INFORMACE o pobytu palestínských teroristů na území ČSSR', ABS-19324/1.
- ¹⁰⁹ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁰ J.Jíra (Head of 5/Dept. II.S-SNB), 3 May 1979, 'Návrh na zařazení do INO', ABS-19324/9; J.Jíra to 2/Dept. S[práva] p[asů] a v[íz]-SNB, 21 Aug. 1979, 'Návrh na zařazení do INO', ABS-19324/9.
- ¹¹¹ J.Jíra (Head of 5/Dept. II.S-SNB), [bez dátumu], 'Záznam', ABS-19324/1.
- ¹¹² Informer 'Rudolf' to 5/Dept. IV.S-SNB, 16 Aug. 1979, ABS-16987.
- ¹¹³ J.Hrbáček (Head of II.S-SNB) to II.S-SNB, 8 Aug. 1979, ABS-16987.

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- ¹¹⁴ J.Hrbáček to J.Vlček (Deputy Chief of Staff, Office of the Ministry of Interior), 8-9. Aug. 1979, 'Informace o pobytu arabských teroristů na území ČSSR', ABS-16987.
- ¹¹⁵ 'Střetnutí mezi představiteli Ministerstva zahraničních věcí ČSSR a chargé d'affaires JLDR s.A.Y.Mansour', 10 Aug. 1979, ABS-16987; J.Jíra (Head of 5/Dept. II.S-SNB), 10 Aug. 1979, 'INFORMACE k pobytu člena arabské teroristické organizace v ČSSR', ABS-16987.
- ¹¹⁶ 'Střetnutí mezi představiteli Ministerstva zahraničních věcí ČSSR a velvyslancem Irácké republiky A.A.Kadir Al Hadithi', 10 Aug. 1979, ABS-16987.
- ¹¹⁷ J.Jíra (Head of 5/Dept. II.S-SNB), 20 Aug. 1979, 'ZÁZNAM-Akce "BAK"', ABS-16987.
- ¹¹⁸ II.S-SNB, [bez data] 1980, 'INFORMACE o činnosti arabských teroristů v ČSSR', ABS-19324/1.
- ¹¹⁹ J.Hrbáček (Head of II.S-SNB), 23 Aug. 1979, 'Návrh na agenturně operativní kombinaci v akci BAK, sv.16987', ABS-16987.
- ¹²⁰ Informer 'Peter' to 5/Dept. II.S-SNB, 3 Jan. 1980, 'AL-HAMDANI Ahmet Saleh, styk teroristy "CARLOSE"-informace', ABS-19324/1.; J.Jíra (Head of 5/Dept. II.S-SNB), 13 Dec. 1979, 'Informace k zjištěným stykům teroristy "CARLOSE"', ABS-19324/1.
- ¹²¹ 'Sofie', 7 Sept. 1979, ABS-16987.
- ¹²² J.Jíra (Head of 5/Dept. II.S-SNB), 13 Dec. 1979, 'Agenturně operativní opatření organizovaná 5.odborem II.Správy', ABS-16987.
- ¹²³ 5/Dept. II.S-SNB, 29 Jan. 1980, 'Současná situace a charakteristika mezinárodního terorismu a hlavní úkoly orgánů po linii II.S-SNB', ABS-19324/1.
- ¹²⁴ J.Bouma (Head of 2/Section, 5/Dept. II.S-SNB), 28 March 1983, 'Návrh na uložení spisu PO "BAK" sv.č.16987', ABS-16987.
- ¹²⁵ Informer 'Martin' to 5/Dept. II.S-SNB, 11 March 1982, ABS-19324/1.
- ¹²⁶ 'Příjezd a odjezd osoby, který je na SPV SNB veden v seznamu teroristů', 30 July 1984, ABS-24113/6; Beluský, 16 May 1985, ABS-24113/6.
- ¹²⁷ Informer 'Andy' to XIV.S-SNB, 28 Aug. 1985, 'VC, "Nicholas"-poznatky k pobytu na území ČSSR', ABS-24113/6.
- ¹²⁸ Z.Peterka (Head of 17/Dept. I.S-SNB) to Office of the Head of II.S-SNB, 24 May 1982, 'Informace k teroristovi CARLOSovi', ABS-19324/1.
- ¹²⁹ 6/Dept. II.S-SNB, 16 Aug. 1985, 'Záznam ze součinnostní porady do akce "CARLOS"', ABS-24113/6.
- ¹³⁰ V.Nergl (Head of 6/Dept. II.S-SNB), 20 Aug. 1985, 'ZÁZNAM o provedení ZTÚ ANALÝZA v akci CARLOS čís.sv.24613', ABS-24113/6; Z.Němec (Head of XIV.S-SNB) to J.Kováč (Deputy Minister of Interior), 20 Aug.1985,

ABS-24113/6; V.Nergl, 21 Aug.1985, 'Záznam o opatření v akci CARLOS čís.sv.24613', ABS-24113/6; Z.Němec to International Relations Department, Office of the Minister of Interior, 20 Aug. 1985, 'OBADI AHMED Saleh-informace pro přátele MV PLR', ABS-24113/6.

¹³¹ V.Kába (Deputy Head of XIV.S-SNB), 19 Aug. 1985, 'Žádost o blokaci', ABS-24113/6; Sládečko (XIV.S-SNB), 22 Aug. 1985, 'Akce "CARLOS"-záznam', ABS-24113/6.

¹³² Sládečko (XIV.S.-SNB), 24 Sept. 1985, 'Akce "CARLOS"-vyhodnocení výsledků dotazu do SAPO', ABS-24113/6.

¹³³ V.Nergl to XIV.S-SNB, 10 Sept. 1985, 'Zoznam teroristů v trvalé blokaci', ABS-24113/6.

¹³⁴ V.Nergl to 5/Dept. IV.S-SNB, 12 June 1986, 'Akce "TURISTA"-žádost o agenturní obsazení v hotelu', ABS-24113/6; J.Jíra (Head of 5/Dept. II.S-SNB), 16 June 1986, 'Stanovisko k informaci ze dne 16.6.1986 č.j. N/V-603/86', ABS-24113/6.

¹³⁵ K.Fiřt (Head of II.S-SNB) to International Relations Department, Office of the Minister of Interior, 7 July 1986, 'CARLOS-informace pro přátele z MV MLR', ABS-24113/6.

¹³⁶ IV.S-SNB, 18 June 1986, 'SVODKA SLEDOVÁNÍ objektu TURISTA + 2 společníci', ABS-24113/6.

¹³⁷ 'INFORMACE', 16 June 1986, ABS-24113/6.

¹³⁸ Interview with Ivan Voleš, Prague, 2 Sept. 2015.

¹³⁹ Follain, *JACKAL*, 158; 163.

¹⁴⁰ 'Wallis: dříve kontrarozvědčík, poté podnikatel', 28 Dec. 2009, *Týden.cz*,

http://www.tyden.cz/rubriky/domaci/tvare-stb/wallis-drive-kontrarozvedcik-pote-podnikatel_152422.html

(Accessed: 21 Sept. 2016).

¹⁴¹ Interview with former employee of post-communist intelligence services, 4 Sept. 2015. Fragments of the story also available in: Schröm, *Im Schatten des Schakals*, 275-6; Motl, 'Stopy. Fakta. Tajemství'.

¹⁴² Follain, *JACKAL*, 124-125.

¹⁴³ J.Duquesne, 'Syria, Carlos, Yugoslavia, Swiss Ties Examined', *LE POINT*, 26 Apr. 1982, In: 'Terrorism' *Worldwide Report*, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 12 July 1982, NARA, CREST.

¹⁴⁴ R.H.Cummings, *Cold War radio: The dangerous history of American broadcasting in Europe, 1950-1989* (North Carolina, 2009), 92-145.

¹⁴⁵ E.Hradecký (Head of International Affairs Department, Office of the Minister of Interior) to K.Vrba (Head of II.S-SNB), 8 Sept. 1980, 'Mezinárodní teroristická organizace-sdělení', ABS-19324/1.

¹⁴⁶ Although substantial materials on Middle Eastern state and non-state actors have recently been released by Prague, further collections of relevant material remain classified.

¹⁴⁷ Interview with a former senior post-communist Czechoslovak intelligence officer, 4 Sept. 2015.