

DOCTORAL THESIS

The appropriation of dramatic television elements in contemporary British current affairs broadcasting

Narrative, characterisation, and the presence of primary definers. A critical discourse analysis (CDA) of Panorama's coverage of the 2003 Iraq War

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Award date:
2019

Awarding institution:
University of Roehampton

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**The Appropriation of Dramatic television elements in Contemporary British Current
Affairs Broadcasting: Narrative, Characterisation, and the presence of Primary
Definers. A Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of *Panorama*'s Coverage of the 2003 Iraq
War**

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

PhD

Department of

Media, Culture and Language

University of Roehampton

2019

Abstract

At a time when there are critical debates about the role of Public Service television in the UK, this thesis will provide a timely, original and innovative new approach to the study of Current Affairs broadcasting. The research will critically examine the BBC Current Affairs broadcasting strand most closely associated *with*, even emblematic *of* public service broadcast ‘values’, *Panorama* (1953 – current). *Panorama* is of particular significance inasmuch as it is the established Current Affairs television text, the standard bearer against which other contemporary television Current Affairs broadcasts are measured: *Panorama* is perhaps *the* key signifier of serious journalism on television. Furthermore, the BBC’s public service remit is figuratively and discursively displayed by the *Panorama* ‘brand’. The BBC in general, and *Panorama* in particular, are framed by ideas of impartiality and balance, this research examines what these terms mean, and how are they manifest in the television journalism discourse and landscape. Alongside its position as a ‘flagship’ brand, an additional rationale for selecting *Panorama* as the sample lies in the fact that research into contemporary representations in high modality forms has largely been limited to analysis of News texts. Concomitantly, there is a paucity of research data regarding the ‘extended’ text that is Current Affairs broadcasting. This thesis addresses this ‘lack’.

Analysis in Media Studies, Cultural Studies and Journalism have so far paid little attention to the techniques and methods appropriated and imported from other modes of representation. In this instance, attention will be paid to the representational modalities of drama – character, archetype, casting, narrative, non-diegetic score – to assess the extent to which these elements are evident (even central) in Current Affairs broadcasting, and to assess the role these modalities play in the discursive formation of Current Affairs in general and *Panorama* in particular.

Employing a multi-modal approach, the thesis incorporates an extensive content analysis in order to chart patterns and regularities within a large sample of *Panorama* broadcasts pertaining to the Iraq War/Gulf War. The research assumes a Critical Discourse Analysis approach to investigate the ideas evoked both linguistically and visually throughout ten *Panorama* broadcasts. Taking a qualitative approach, the thesis develops specific analytical and discursive frames of analysis that systematically examine the recurring themes and scrutinises their discursive strategies and functions in the construction of meaning and ideology. The dominant thematic and discursive findings suggest that the *Panorama* broadcasts of 2002–2004 pertaining to Iraq all, to some extent, employ a combination of televisual, journalistic and dramatic characteristics that construct a vision and version of Western Power that has at its core, benign and benevolent intent(ions). What this thesis outlines as the ‘doctrine of benign intervention’.

The thesis concludes by suggesting that Current Affairs in general, and *Panorama* in particular, must either shift away from the overly and overtly dramatic and instead [re]turn to an approach that [re]locates issues and events in their wider social, historical, ideological and geo-political context. Or alternatively, if, as contemporary trends suggest, the latest iteration of television Current Affairs journalism increasingly does focus on the personal, utilising dramatic frames in order to tell stories, and if *Panorama* continues to remain within the genre, the form, and utilising the practices and discourses of journalism, with all its contemporary attendance to ‘the personal’ and ‘the dramatic’, then it will need to cast its net wider. In order to provide the necessary wider contextual detail, the Current Affairs journalistic form will need to feature a much wider and greater plurality of voices. Anything less means that, through its internalised and established practices, *Panorama* will continue to place limitations on what constitutes legitimate, salient and ‘acceptable’ opinion(s).

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Acknowledgements

This research first emerged many years ago, I was at that time, engaged in (a different) doctoral research project at Lancaster University. One Lancaster friendship in particular endures to this day, and continues to provide both intellectual and collegial sustenance. It was Geraldine ‘Geri’ Harris that first mooted the possibility that perhaps my heart was not in my original research, and that she’d heard more ‘passion, energy, devotion and intellectual rigour when talking about news and current affairs coverage of Iraq’. This particular research would not exist without that realisation, and it was Geri who prompted it. Thank you, Geri, you were right.

My two marvellous, calm, reassuring, generous and supportive supervisors: Paul Rixon and Ben Cocking, you read work at short notice, provided invaluable feedback and support, and latterly, calmed my fears and nerves. That it is complete at all, is in part due to you both.

My proof-reader, Will Goodey, thank-you for proofing the work at short notice, and for your insights, comments and suggestions, any clarity evident in the final submission is, at least partly, due to you.

Alongside my supervisors, the department of Media, Culture and Language at the University of Roehampton provides me with an intellectual ‘home’. The many colleagues there offer collegial support, friendship and insights that I myself lack – among them, Kate Wright, Ros Coward, Julia Peck, Mark Riley, Deborah Jermyn, Mike Witt, Paul Sutton, Caroline Bainbridge, Karen Cross, Michael Chanan, Anita Biressi, Heather Nunn, and recent additions to the team, Alison McClintock, Ping Shum, Gary Merrill and Athanasia Batziou.

Six Roehampton colleagues deserve special credit and acknowledgement. It is they who provide, not only the vibrant intellectually stimulating environment and conversation, but enduring friendship, too: Annabelle Mooney, Andrea Esser, John Doyle, Sean Tunney, Juan Perez-Gonzalez, and Adam Cox, thank you, I very much doubt this research would have been completed without all your support, friendship, ‘political’ and intellectual nourishment. It is greatly appreciated.

I am fortunate to be surrounded by wonderful friends – and now their growing families: John Cantrell, Charlotte Cantrell, Matt Connell, Hollie Connell, Andy Banks, Gemma Banks, Karl Westworth, Jamie Mullan, Jon Simpson, Ric Thomas, Rose Thomas, most of you have been around so long you can remember my original research project. Thank you all so much for continuing to politely ask ‘how’s the PhD going?’ To save you asking in future...now, finally, it is done. Thank-you ‘The Guys’.

Two other friends deserve particular acknowledgment. (Dr) Imogen Lee and (Dr) Rob Priest who provide so much love and support, so many WhatsApp messages, Alan Partridge references, political discussion and debate, and so much more. Your own research, and that you, too, both made it through PhDs inspired me and often kept me going. I cannot thank you both enough, unless ‘enough’ is a(nother) coffee in Caffè Nero.

To my family. To my sister, Sally, and my niece Ellie, and nephews Luke and Sam, it’s finished, thank you for being around, and at times, through difficult circumstances. To my Uncle Alan and Auntie Jenny, it was you who provided me with an office space in which to write. For three long summers’ I sat in the office in your beautiful idyllic garden, it inspired

me to continue, without that space and your generous offer that I use it, this work would not be complete. Thank you.

To my parents who always encouraged and allowed me to become the person I have become. I am more sorry than I can convey that my Mum, Janet is no longer here to see this to completion, wherever you are, know that I did it...Finally, since the viva, I am distraught to write that my Dad, Geoff is no longer here either. He read excerpts of this research as I went and when we knew he was terminally ill, I delivered a bound version of the thesis to him, which I know he worked his way through as we discussed bits of the work. When I originally wrote these acknowledgements, I suggested it was surprising that a former plumber would end up writing a Cultural Studies PhD. My lovely father expressed no such surprise, just enormous pride and love. Thank you Mum and Dad, I did it, and my Dad, got to see it to (almost) completion.

To my in-laws, (Dr) Mandy, Mike, John and Jo, what a wonderful and loving family you are, thank you for everything you do for us, and for welcoming me into your family.

To my amazing children, Nathaniel and Edie, when Daddy was 'always working', this is what he was doing. I do not know if it was worth it, but here – for better or worse – is the result, it is for you both.

Finally, while all of the above remain vital, all the above did offer various and varying support to me, and in innumerable ways, this thesis simply would not (could not) exist without one person in particular. She provides continued strength, energy, enthusiasm, emotional and intellectual support, and above all else, love. Hannah, mother to our wonderful, amazing, inspiring and crazy children, you are simply the most extraordinary woman I have ever met, that you supported me through this is amazing. While my thanks can be conveyed, the debt can never be fully repaid. My world is a lighter, brighter, warmer and more loving place because of your presence in it.

Hannah, this thesis is dedicated to you, and you alone. Thank you.

Glossary

A note on terms and style. In the following research, when referring to the ‘genre’ of Current Affairs Broadcasting, I have chosen to define it using upper case lettering. This decision is based on the need for both stylistic consistency and generic precision. There are also a number of officially designated acronyms employed. These are alphabetically listed below:

BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation
CDA – Critical Discourse Analysis
DA – Discourse Analysis
PNAC – Project for the New American Century
PSB – Public Service Broadcasting
WPM – War Programming Model

When using particular Discourse Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis terms, I have used the upper case to designate the terms *as* important analytical terms. Additionally, I have used Upper Case when referring to the key term(s) ‘Primary Definer’

Attributes
Ideological Squaring
Lexical Choices
Lexical Absences
Nominalisation
Over-Lexicalisation
Primary Definers
Transitivity/Intransitivity

The ten *Panorama* broadcasts referred to and analysed in this research have been shortened.

These are listed chronologically using the following acronyms

Pre-conflict Phase:

P:SAWFH – *Panorama: Saddam: A Warning from History*

P:TCAS – *Panorama: The Case Against Saddam*

P:TCAW – *Panorama: The Case Against War*

P:CSW – *Panorama: Chasing Saddam’s Weapons*

Conflict Phase:

P:BW – *Panorama: Blair’s War*

P:TRTB – *Panorama: The Race to Baghdad*

P:TBFBS – *Panorama: The Battle for Basra*

Post-conflict Phase:

P:TPOV – *Panorama: The Price of Victory*

P:SOTR – *Panorama: Saddam on the Run*

P:SCSW – *Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam’s Weapons*

Introduction

This thesis was first born many (too many) years ago, but emerged, took shape, was honed and was, in some ways, a reaction to (and against) what I perceived to be the inadequacies of firstly News and then in time, Current Affairs coverage of the (then impending) war in/against Iraq. Incredulous at the coverage, one sought refuge among other like-minded campaigners and activists, which culminated, for some, in the march against the war on February 15th, 2003 in London. I attended this demonstration and was, at the same time, engaged in research on a very different doctoral thesis in the Department of Theatre Studies at Lancaster University. The above is mentioned precisely because both events, attendance at the march and the early doctoral research, have contextual importance. The early research work was undertaken, albeit in a different context, and the remnants of the (unfinished) previous thesis remain here, not least, its focus on characterisation, diegetic and non-diegetic music, and the dramatic as *the* principle means through which ‘stories’ are communicated to an audience. It is this, the drama, the narratives, the characterisation, the deployment of dramatic archetypes where this research hopes to contribute to media and journalism scholarship regarding journalistic broadcasting in general, Current Affairs journalism in particular, and *Panorama* more explicitly. The research seeks to develop an innovative and original way of critically interrogating and assessing the extent to which the British flagship public service broadcast journalism strand *Panorama*, provides a developed and fully rounded picture of the world; ‘our’ place and role within it, and the extent to which *Panorama* functions (and offers) a critically reflective analysis of the urgent global issues of the day. Is *Panorama*, as befits its obligations, and as is often claimed, an interrogator, an effective communicator of salient and vital geo-political issues of the day, is it an effective check and balance on power?

While (if) still operating within the public service remit that is its obligation, is it the case that *Panorama*'s coverage of conflict, specifically in Iraq, is able to posit the notion that, 'Western intervention' is, if not always welcome, then at least benign. To clarify, that the 'intervention' is benign in *intent*, if not always in operation and practice. One can of course partially understand this belief, this framework, or at least a degree of journalistic trepidation and safety regarding the *intent* of political elites. After all, one (a journalist) would have to be in possession of incontrovertible evidence in order to publicly level the accusation of malign intent. Intent is, in all likelihood, rather more difficult to demonstrably sustain and *prove*. This of course is not a piece of historical research, nevertheless, while understanding the reticence of the *Panorama* journalists, it is not too onerous a task, nor is it too difficult with merely a cursory glance at historical precedents, to at least posit the notion that 'Western intervention' is not always benign. In fact, said cursory glance at historical record would indeed soon uncover a range of instances whereby 'our' intervention is anything but benign. Intent may be one thing, but the cumulative weight of 'our', sometimes bloody, history is quite another. However, *Panorama*'s coverage of the Iraq conflict, while offering some semblance of critical scrutiny, continuously seemed to assume that Western 'intervention' is, in intent, even if not in actuality, benign and motivated by high-minded principle(s). In the face of sometimes compelling alternative evidence, what can account for such assumptions, such oversight? It is not the *intention* here to rush head-long into something I myself cannot demonstrably prove, but what follows is a systemic critical and critical discourse analysis into 10 of the *Panorama* broadcasts pertaining to the Iraq war of 2003. The analysis is undertaken in order to map out the frameworks, narratives, the discourses that underpin and that might orient audience understanding of urgent globally and locally resonant geo-political issues. What are the organisational, televisual, journalistic, ideological, and political practises and discourses that are embedded, how do they enable stories to be told, and, to what end?

Other than the key works *Public Issue Television: World in Action 1963-1998* by Corner, Goddard and Richardson (2007), Patricia Holland's *The Angry Buzz: This Week and Current Affairs Television* (2006) and Rob Stones *Why Current Affairs Needs Social Theory* (2015) research into contemporary representations in high modality forms has largely been limited to analysis of News texts. Concomitantly, there is a paucity of research data regarding the 'extended' text, sometimes referred to as 'long-form' journalism, that is Current Affairs broadcasting. *Panorama* is selected because it was, and remains, the flagship Current Affairs television broadcast. In many ways *Panorama* developed, and continues to develop, the very form of television Current Affairs. Beginning in 1953, as Richard Lindley discusses,

Panorama effectively

...invented television journalism in Britain ... it was *Panorama* that first found effective ways of reporting and presenting what was happening in the world to a mass television audience. *Panorama* that first made television journalism important. Similar programmes – *This Week*, and *World in Action* – followed, thrived and died. *Panorama* survived, a potent symbol of public service broadcasting. (Lindley 2002: ix)

Panorama is of particular significance inasmuch as it is the established Current Affairs television text, the standard bearer against which other contemporary television Current Affairs broadcasts are measured in the UK: *Panorama* is perhaps *the* key signifier of serious journalism on British television. Further, it is representative of the BBC's output with regards serious journalistic discourse. This thesis will argue that the BBC's public service remit is figuratively and discursively displayed by the *Panorama* 'brand'. This study will offer an in-depth analysis of *Panorama* as the exemplar of the BBC's serious journalistic output, and as the exemplar of the *form* of Current Affairs broadcasting. Academic studies have so far paid little attention to the techniques and methods appropriated and imported from other modes of representation. In this instance, attention will be paid to the representational modalities of drama, and, importantly drawing on the historical structuralist canon of Propp, and the later Television Studies academics, the notion of the archetype as principle characterisational and

storytelling trope. Drama and the archetype are chosen principally because tropes such as character, casting, narrative and non-diegetic score are, perhaps despite expectations, frequently present within both News and in particular Current Affairs texts, therefore the ways in which such representational devices *work* is ripe for analysis. Secondly, dramatic forms of representation tend to interpellate (Althusser 1972) using emotive and emotional register, such as normally found in fiction(al) forms. This thesis will attempt to assess the extent to which these tropes are evident in Current Affairs broadcasting, and to assess the role these modalities play in the discursive formation of Current Affairs in general and *Panorama* in particular. The research will also attempt to discuss the extent to which such televisual and journalistic discourses effectively ‘frame’ news events and potentially subsequently shape our understanding of said events.

Summary of Chapters

The opening chapter, Chapter 1 functions as a ‘Contextual Chapter’ and concentrates on the importance of both the BBC, as preeminent and most established publicly funded, public service oriented broadcaster in the world; and *Panorama* which being the longest-running Current Affairs journalism broadcasts in the world, is similarly preeminent. Both the BBC and *Panorama* are ‘flagships’ or standard bearers, they therefore establish journalistic and discursive parameters that others’ follow, in both a journalistic and televisual sense. Therefore, *Panorama* deserves critical scrutiny, and such scrutiny needs to be located in the context of it being a vital plank of Current Affairs broadcast journalism within a specific PSB context. This context is vital because the BBC and *Panorama*, at least in part, derive their value from being seen, with ‘due impartiality’, to provide the public with vital information regarding important, global and geo-political events. In other words, *Panorama* does not emerge from nowhere, it does not exist in a vacuum, but is instead inextricably located within this context, and, to some extent draws its legitimacy from its PSB oriented journalistic focus.

Current Affairs broadcasting is itself a peculiarly British construction, it exists (in this form at least) in no other country in the world and is situated as a separate area of documentary production, but one more beholden, and bearing resemblance to, traditional News broadcasting. It is this generic slippage between documentary reportage and news, these contextual features that remains both interesting and problematic in the broad overview and approach of this research.

Chapter 2 functions as a traditional review of the literature. That is to say, the overall focus of this chapter is to assess and chart the overall scholarly academic literature relating to the fundamental research questions this thesis concerns itself with. The aim: to locate this research within this wider academic critical landscape, a landscape that has as its focus, similar themes, concerns and issues. Given the overall lack of critical academic work on Current Affairs broadcasting, this thesis first draws attention to this ‘oversight’ then, through careful and critical development, addresses this apparent ‘lack’ and begins to map out potential critical, discursive and journalistic possibilities. In order to assess and to map out the territory and concerns of this thesis, it is necessary to thread a line through the various complimentary concerns that characterise academic scholarship on News; television (the specificities of the form); Current Affairs (what it *is*); journalism (as a distinct discourse, and its over-reliance on sourcing via ‘Primary Definers’) (Hall 1978, 1980); ‘infotainment’, the public sphere (and its relation to Public Service Broadcasting (PSB)); the ‘War on Terror’ and what David Altheide and Jennifer Grimes refer to as ‘The War Programming Model’ (2005).

My own major additional contributions are to address the lack of critical academic scholarship pertaining to the longer-form of Television Journalism (Current Affairs); to address the lack of critical academic scholarship that focuses on the flagship ‘brand’ *Panorama*; at a time when journalism in the Public Service broadcast tradition is facing

increasing scrutiny, it is vital that academic scholarship develops and makes the case that the (potential) values of PSB are recognised, improved upon and secured; and methodological, that a combination of Critical Discourse Analysis and the use of televisual and dramatic frames, techniques and tropes has an effect on both the form *and* the content. The use of drama, and the consistent deployment of universally recognised archetypes as a means of story-telling potentially orients understanding in quite distinct and narrow ways.

It will be argued that in order to convincingly inform the audience and ‘tell the story(s)’ of Iraq, the Current Affairs broadcast journalism found in BBC *Panorama* make such extensive and specific use of dramatic forms, that the story of Iraq is refracted and narrated through recognisable archetypal and stereotypical characters as a series of narratives that renders the news ‘event(s)’ as emotionally resonant story-lines that demonise officially designated enemies, while simultaneously humanising ‘our’ central protagonists. All of the above form a critical frame through which this research develops its own theoretical approach and analytical model.

The focus of Chapter 3 is both theoretical and methodological. Drawing on established qualitative textual methods (Discourse and Critical Discourse Analysis; The War Programming Model; the focus on the dramatic aspects of broadcast Current Affairs) this chapter sets out the analytical, theoretical and methodological frames that provide a new systemic form for the analysis of Television Current Affairs broadcasting as it is currently instituted on British public service broadcast channels. This chapter will also develop and outline specific key terms, namely: ‘Primary Definers’; hegemony; and archetypes, as they relate to my research. This chapter also outlines and discusses the ways in which my particular research, the frames and discursive terms were operationalised. While the analytical and discursive focus remains specifically trained on the BBC (and *Panorama* in particular), and conflict coverage, the developed methodology and methodological frames

will provide an original analytical approach capable of being applied across a range of Public Service-oriented Current Affairs broadcasts (not merely *Panorama*), and, importantly, *across a range of subject matters* (not merely Conflict programming).

The following three chapters are the analytical chapters. Beginning with Chapter 4, using the methodology identified and honed in the methodology and theoretical framework chapter, locating the broadcasts in the context of the BBC as the emblematic and paradigmatic example of PSB and the changes brought about by ‘Birtism’; relating to the specificities of Television (its visuality, its need and demand for ‘infotainment’) and of journalism more broadly (its discourse, its reliance on specific operational and sourcing practises) the research seeks to analyse the selected *Panorama* broadcasts within the above context(s). Additionally, the ‘War Programming Model’ (WPM) of Altheide and Grimes (2005) provides a specific analytical, discursive and temporal frame – pre-conflict; conflict; post-conflict – into which each broadcast can be located and critically interrogated. However, whereas the WPM of Altheide and Grimes concentrates its focus on News, this research pays close attention to the more developed long form or ‘extended reportage’ (Corner 1996) journalism of Current Affairs Broadcasting.

Chapter 4 focuses on four of the *Panorama* episodes broadcast prior to the ‘outbreak’ of the conflict in Iraq (Gulf War II), in Altheide and Grimes terminology, the ‘pre-conflict phase’ (2005) to assess the extent to which the WPM is applicable, and where it is not. Further, and in addition to the WPM, this research assesses and critically interrogates the use of the dramatic televisual codes and conventions that *Panorama* employs in order to tell the story(s).

Chapter 5, following the discursive and temporal logic, analyses a further three episodes broadcast as the conflict was underway (the conflict phase). The tone of the coverage shifts in these broadcasts. In place of any wider, contextual and geo-political

analysis or critique, the focus moves on to concentrating on ‘getting the job done’ rather than critically interrogating precisely *what* the ‘job’ is, and the rights and wrongs of it in the first instance. The dramatic focus in these episodes is certainly obvious and the focus shifts to moments of ‘action’, much of it told through the ‘soldiers eyes’, it is their conflict, and we are asked to bear witness to it through the dramatic signifiers of action and the representational storytelling strategies of character(isation) (typically reliant on the figure(s) of the archetype(s)). Additionally, and as outlined by the WPM, some of the action is substantiated and ‘explained’ by the use of ‘expert’ commentators. The ‘expertise frame’ provided by the (usually military) commentators and, through repetition and familiarity, the archetypal characterisation role they play is also significant in the context of this research.

Chapter 6 analyses a final three episodes broadcast once the conflict had ‘officially’ ceased – the ‘post-conflict phase’. The discursive and journalistic focus or angle in these final three episodes is demonstrably marked by a tendency to tie up loose ends. We return to many of the key sources, the ‘Primary Definers’ we first encountered in the pre-conflict phase of Chapter 4. As befits their (still established) status as key sources of information, and as proposed by the WPM, the(se) sources are asked to reflect on what went wrong, and to (pro)pose possible solutions for future engagements and conflicts. At no point is the self-critical focus turned on the television journalism practices of *Panorama* itself. There is a decisive discursive and journalistic shift in favour of denouement. There are certainly a number of dramatic signifiers and frames employed in order to tell us the story of post-conflict Iraq, and a sense of the media caravan beginning to pack up and move on (to the next conflict) having, as my development of the WPM implies, learned nothing (or very little).

Finally, the research concludes by drawing together the key findings of the thesis, making the case that the methodology developed over the course of the research can help us understand both the issues and problems faced by television broadcast Current Affairs strands

(particularly *Panorama*) and proposing possible alternative approaches to both its construction and its (likely) reception.

This thesis will provide an original and innovative new approach to the study of Current Affairs broadcasting. The thesis proposes that: relying on (and emphatically endorsing) standardised forms of journalistic sourcing, employing similarly standardised television aesthetics, using both journalistic sources and television tropes, when combined together as the principle means of *dramatic* story-telling, *Panorama* in particular, and consequently, Current Affairs television more generally, reproduces a discourse largely incapable of critiquing or countering western hegemony. Taking the above into account, the research will ask questions as to how ‘we’ might analyse, think about, talk about, and even produce, Public Service Current Affairs broadcasting more generally, in the (changing) contemporary broadcast television landscape.

Part I

Chapter 1

The BBC, Panorama and the genre of Current Affairs

This, the opening chapter outlines and seeks to provide context for the research as a whole. The overview is principally necessary in order to locate this research and the *Panorama* sample in the context of British Public Service Broadcasting (PSB), what it is, what it means and why the BBC remains perhaps the most important ‘practitioner’ and signifier of public service journalism. The research will outline a theoretical and critical model of analysis in order to provide a new model of understanding the ways in which Current Affairs broadcasting might be said to discursively and ideologically serve the needs and demands of pro-Western, neoliberal elites. Given this fact, it is important that the opening chapter provides a rigorous contextual frame that locates and positions the actual sample contained in the research. Said sample is drawn from a very specific and, in some ways unique producer of ‘journalistic content’. As such, the industrial, national, social-economic and journalistic site(s) of its production and distribution, its continuing relevance, its ability to disseminate widely and with legitimacy, needs to be adequately outlined and contextualised in sufficient detail. Additionally, it is hoped that the theoretical and analytical model that is developed will be applicable across a range of Current Affairs broadcast strands, particularly those produced and broadcast on channels with a PSB remit, and not merely *Panorama*. Moreover, although the issues identified are perhaps most pronounced when dealing with war and conflict ‘events’, it is proposed that the creation of the theoretical and analytical model will provide a useful framework that is applicable when scrutinising news events and issues *beyond* war and conflict.

1.1 The Historical Emergence of the BBC

Historically, the BBC was first established by six different wireless radio manufacturers – Marconi; Radio Communication Company; Metropolitan-Vickers (MetroVick); General Electric; Western Electric; and British Thomson-Houston (BTH). Under the supervision of, and granted licence to broadcast by, The General Post Office (GPO), the BBC was in some ways, established on the basis of supervening social necessity. In short, a supervening social necessity is essentially a break or fracture, something beyond or outside the confines of the industry, some wider social factor(s) that creates a ‘necessity’ for technological developments to be oriented in particular directions. Something, or usually several related things, must be present in the wider social sphere in order for the technology to go from the prototype stage to the invention and diffusion stages. With regards the establishment of the BBC, the key supervening social necessities were the First World War and its aftermath. Prior to, then during the First World War (WWI) specific technological and infrastructural developments and advancements in radio wireless technology aided the war effort. At the conclusion of WW1 there was less need for products developed in war time, thus producing an abundance of spare capacity, an over-supply of technological equipment produced by the electronics industry with no apparent obvious use to which they could be put or adapted. Additionally, other social factors and developments were the emergence of a working and middle class (now with parliamentary representation in the form of The Labour Party) producing an aspirant class with a concomitant rise of and increased demand for (home) entertainment. Thus, mass broadcasting, mainly for entertainment purposes, was established and rolled out, slowly of course, but rolled out all the same. This of course suits the nascent ‘electronics industry’ perfectly. It allows an entry into a market, or perhaps more accurately, *the creation* of a market where none previously existed. The invention phase of broadcasting is synchronous with the supervening social necessities. It is the spare capacity of the electronics industry that drives the innovation, researchers and inventors working in the electronics

sector (then, industry) trying to develop commercially viable and attractive technologies. Historically, and merely as a means of providing a (slightly) more up to date example, much the same can be said of the mass marketing of, for instance, the video cassette recorder (VCR). Contemporarily, we might see this mirrored by the invention phase for new digital technology and convergence processes. What I mean by this is: as opposed to the industry *responding to* consumer demand, inventions are consistently and continuously developed *by* the industry, firstly for use within the field for which they are originally deployed (a micro-economic sphere or context) and then marketed for a mass consumer audience in order that the products that can generate income (a macro-economic sphere or context). Added to this, the emergence and now dominance of advertising, in which desire for new products is constantly manufactured, and prior to the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008, the emergence and reliance on ‘easy credit’, the proliferation of what has been dubbed a ‘consumer culture’ are now well-established parts of everyday lived experiences in Western socio-cultural and economic life.

At this point, it should be added that the above points are elucidated merely as a means of providing some context regarding the supervening social necessities that some analyses of the BBC might overlook. Although only brief and in-exhaustive here, such details remain important in this instance, as they provide some important contextual detail outlining that the BBC was partly compromised from the outset. It was caught between the competing demands of manufacturers, the needs of a previously non-existent but then emerging audience and all bound-up with notions of the public value or use of journalism.

1.2 The BBC and ‘Impartiality’

With these competing demands in place, the BBC, once transformed into the corporation in 1928, did though attempt to establish a form of journalism not beholden to industry (broadly defined) or government, to produce a form of broadcasting that acknowledged the *public*

value of journalism. In the words of founder and first Director General of the BBC, John Reith, the BBC was established as a means to:

Carry direct information to innumerable people who thereby will be enabled not only to take more interest in events which were formerly outside their ken, but who will after a short time be in a position to make up their own minds on many matters of vital moment, matters which formerly they had either to receive according to the dictated and partial versions and opinions of others, or to ignore altogether. (Scannell and Cardiff 1991: xvii)

The corporation was designed and established as an outlet to provide information, and, what is more, information that was free from ‘the dictated and partial versions and opinions of others’. Additionally, if, over time, the practice of journalism became a perfect distillation of what Donald Matheson and (slightly differently) Michael Schudson have referred to as a ‘news voice’ and news (as) discourse, one not in need of authority of legitimisation ‘outside of itself’ (Matheson 2000), then in part because of its unique (public) resourcing, thus placing on it specific public (service) obligations, we might therefore identify the BBC itself as the exemplar of a form of journalism, that was, in the words of its first Director General, both distanced *from* and separate *to* ‘commerce [n]or the state’. Namely: a form of journalism formally practised as ‘objective journalism’. In BBC parlance, this manifests as ‘impartiality’ or ‘impartial’ journalism and has remained the bedrock on which the BBC maintains its journalistic reputation. So the BBC, as the inventor of mass broadcasting in the UK, effectively set(s) the template for the broadcast and broadcast journalism industry.

However, despite this now accepted association the BBC has with the term ‘impartiality’, it was not in its original remit:

The strange thing is that the BBC was never officially told to be impartial. People often assume it was there on its birth certificate – the first Wireless Broadcasting Licence of 1923. It was not ... nor was impartiality mentioned in the first Royal Charter of 1926, by which time the new Corporation was allowed to ‘collect news of and information relating to current events in any part of the world and in any manner that may be thought fit’. (From Seesaw to Wagon Wheel: Safeguarding Impartiality in the 21st Century 2007: 25
http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/review_report_research/impartiality_21_century/report.pdf)

The perceived objectivity, or, ‘impartiality’, even if use of the term was unspoken in its formative years, did however function as an important guiding principle. The establishment of the BBC was founded on the principles that it would function as ‘an institutional space for broadcasting that was tied neither to commerce nor to the state’ (Scannell and Cardiff 1991: 31) or, to repeat, what we might understand as a(n) (impartial) public service broadcaster.

Once ITV had been granted a licence, and began to broadcast in 1955, and the legalised framework of impartiality had been enacted, the term and the practice became established. Over the course of the following decades, because the term was (and remains) so important for both the BBC’s self-image, and the image it projects to outsiders, numerous attempts were made to outline its precise meaning in the context of broadcast journalism. In fact, as late as 2007, the BBC commissioned the report: *From Seesaw to Wagon Wheel: Safeguarding Impartiality in the 21st Century. 2007*. Wanting and needing to both engage *with* and generate (or continue) support *for* its journalistic output, the commissioning and distribution of reports for public consultation and consumption, are in many ways of course laudable endeavours. However, such documents and consultations also serve other equally interesting functions. They essentially underpin the idea that it is possible to conduct journalism objectively, impartially and that in so doing, ‘we’ the public, can trust what we see, read and/or hear. With regards the BBC, cementing the idea of ‘impartiality’ also establishes a template or set of practises that the rest of the industry might be encouraged to aspire to and follow.

Even though the requirement for ‘impartiality’ is now legally defined, or at least defined in the terms of its licence, for those at the BBC, beyond the institutional and legal obligations, it still remains (and retains) something of a badge of honour, mark of quality, and essential for its reputation: ‘It (impartiality) is practised day in, day out, by BBC journalists, who have an impartiality gene implanted in their earliest days at the Corporation’ (BBC

2007: 23). While resisting the attempt to be too dismissive of the claim ‘journalists...have an impartiality gene implanted in their earliest days at the Corporation’ the phrase, used in public documentation as late as 2007, does demand some scrutiny and critical interrogation as to what it might mean exactly. We can see from BBC discussions and official documentation that the term itself is vital and frequently referenced, the term remains vitally important reputationally. How though might the ‘impartiality gene’ work in practise, and what is the evidence for it?

Despite impartiality not ‘being imposed on the BBC’ ‘Impartiality has been conceived by the BBC’, the term does act as a ‘foundation of its reputation around the world’ (*From Seesaw to Wagon Wheel: Safeguarding Impartiality in the 21st Century* 2007). How is the journalistic, televisual, this most linguistic and semiotic practise, guaranteed to remain ‘impartial’? How can the claim for an ‘impartiality gene’ possibly stand up to scrutiny? What exactly does the BBC mean by ‘impartiality’? Importantly, how does this measure up in the face of the evidence collected and analysed in this (and much other) research?

With regards the BBC of course, the idea[1]s of ‘impartiality’ go beyond the mere practices of news and journalism, and are distributed via all forms of BBC ‘content’. Furthermore, said content over time has accumulated a status that might be perceived as constitutive of ‘British values’ or British life: ‘the routine character of a country’s politics, entertainment and culture is embodied in the daily output of its broadcasting services’ (Scannell and Cardiff 1991: xi). Therefore, the BBC, because of the cultural and national characteristics it is assumed to uphold (and simultaneously reproduce) through its daily practices (broadcasts), demands a level of scrutiny precisely because as an institution, and as a set of practices, its content, represented in this instance by its News and Current Affairs journalism, sets a benchmark against which the other exponents of broadcasting in general, and broadcast journalism specifically, are measured and are encouraged to aspire to. If, as

Scannell and Cardiff identify, the content of the BBC acts as both reflector and constitutor of 'British values', therefore the journalism (the high modality form, that which is most associated with truth and accuracy) of the BBC is in some respects the way the nation is accurately imagined, represented and reflected.

...broadcasting technologies play(ed) a fundamental role in promoting national unity at a symbolic level, linking individuals and their families to the centres of national life, offering the audience an image of itself and of the nation as a knowable community, a wider, public world beyond the routines of narrow existence, to which these (television) technologies give symbolic access. (Morley and Robins. 1995. 66)

Hartley has argued that 'television is one of the prime sites upon which a given nation is constructed for its members' (Hartley, J 1982. 124). Additionally, as Ellis states, television is 'the private life of the nation state' (Ellis, J 1982. 5). National(ly) broadcast Television then can (help) 'imagine' the nation into existence:

These technologies allowed people a space of identification; not just an evocation of a common memory, but rather the experience of encounter and of solidarity. Thus, the nation is to be understood not simply as an abstraction, but as lived experience made possible by broadcasting technologies whose achievement was the transmutation of the political idea of the nation into lived experience, into sentiment and into the quotidian (Morley and Robins. 1995. 67)

All of the above is of course particularly the case with the BBC. National Television then, particularly on the BBC plays an important role not only in (re)producing the nation state and national identity, but appearing to embed and conflate sometimes radically disparate lives into a coherent national whole. Given all of the above, is television journalism on the BBC able to act and report with 'due impartiality' when, for instance, 'the state' engages in potentially harmful activities, such as military conflict overseas? Given its (national television's) role in reproducing the nation state, and national identity, how (if) can Television broadcasting possibly provide the requisite journalistic space and licence in and with which to critically interrogate normative assumptions about the nation?

1.3 The Discursive Limitations of 'Impartiality'

Clear definitions as to what the term(s) mean in principle and in practise can be found, as one might expect, within the charter of the BBC itself. Section 4 deals explicitly with notions of ‘impartiality’. In the words of its own charter, in the section on ‘impartiality’ the document states that the BBC:

4.2.1 ...must do all we can to ensure that 'controversial subjects' are treated with due impartiality in all our output. **4.2.2** News in whatever form must be treated with due impartiality, giving due weight to events, opinion and main strands of argument. **4.2.3** We seek to provide a broad range of subject matter and perspectives over an appropriate timeframe across our output as a whole. **4.2.4** We are committed to reflecting a wide range of opinion across our output as a whole and over an appropriate timeframe so that no significant strand of thought is knowingly unreflected or under-represented.
(http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/guidelines/editorialguidelines/pdfs/Section_04_Impartiality.pdf)

As the charter outlines, when it comes to ‘impartiality’ the BBC seeks to represent, be representative of, and ‘reflect a wide range of opinion across our output’ Point 4.2.1 does not adequately address what might constitute ‘impartiality’ merely that the term itself, as an idea(l), be adhered to with regards even ‘controversial subjects’. What might be meant by ‘controversial subjects’? Would the Iraq war qualify as such? One imagines so. How then, under the rubric of the ‘impartiality’ guidelines, is the ‘controversial subject’ of the Iraq war journalistically, ‘impartially’ and discursively constituted by *Panorama*? What does it mean in practice? What or who would define and limit ‘controversial’? How defined, and by who, using what parameters?

Point 4.2.2 appears to lack the necessary detail as to what might constitute impartiality save for the mention of ‘main strands of argument’. What are ‘main strands of argument’ and, crucially, which sources are legitimate sources for ‘strands’ or indeed entire arguments, frames or positions? This is of course one of the most crucial points, what would constitute a ‘main strand of argument’? The discursive capacity to decide, through selection and amplification, what and which ‘arguments’ (and by who) constitute a ‘main strand’ is, what we might consider, a well-established, officially sanctioned journalistic method of

circumscribing debate, or the very definition of a discursive formation. In this tradition and with this understanding, a detailed analysis of overall BBC news content, combining quantitative and qualitative methods of data gathering and research undertaken by researchers at Cardiff University in 2013: *The Prebble Report*, details that ‘main strands of argument’ are typically derived *from* and represented *by* already established political organisations (Political Parties and their representatives) and associated (read, journalistically legitimised) parties or organisations, such as Think Tanks.

(http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/our_work/breadth_opinion/content_analysis.pdf).

Point 4.2.3 ‘We seek to provide a broad range of subject matter and perspectives over an appropriate timeframe across our output as a whole’ makes an important point with regards temporality, timeframe(s), chronology and seemingly covers ‘output’ beyond the confines of this research sample. Given that this research sample covers *Panorama*’s ‘output’ over a period of some nineteen months, we can make reasonable assessments and comparisons, and thus draw certain rigorous conclusions as to the applicability of the impartiality model when applied to *Panorama*. However, ‘Output as a whole’ will of course necessarily include much data not captured by this research. Nevertheless, given that a) this research is not claiming nor necessarily making the case that the BBC *as a whole* tends towards reproducing hegemonic positions, but is instead wholly focused on *Panorama* itself, the broader point(s) remain; b) as has been stated, *Panorama* remains the benchmark against which the BBC, and wider industry is measured, it is *the* high modality form, the Current Affairs broadcast strand of record, as such, it stands as an emblem to be critically interrogated.

Point 4.2.4; ‘no significant strand of thought is knowingly un-reflected or under-represented’ could again be easily quantified and constrained, still within the ‘impartiality’

remit, through the now standardised practises of legitimate sourcing and source relations which inevitably produce, establish then reproduce a frame. Or, in the discursive register, a ‘discursive hierarchy’ of sources, ‘those with most to say’ (Van Dijk). Establishing what constitutes a ‘significant strand’ is seemingly wide-open to, if not abuse, as that specific term is too loaded and assuming of deliberate malfeasance, then at least subject to debate.

Remaining within the remit of journalistic practise, sourcing from ‘those with most to say’, the does seem to function as a device for delimiting. It is a form of journalistic legitimation, and broadly in line with an adherence to the ‘strategic ritual’ (Tuchman 1978). So the term itself, seemingly vital for broadcast journalism in general, and the BBC in particular, seems to be so loosely drawn that one (a journalist) could conceivably ‘define’ and ‘limit’ the frame of debate while still remaining perfectly ‘in-line’ with BBC guidelines on impartiality.

Whilst the term ‘impartiality’ is, under scrutiny, rather loosely defined, the role the BBC sees itself playing, and, what constitutes politics, and political activity is an altogether more tightly defined discourse or epistemology. What I mean by this is that in order to legitimate the term, the BBC has tended to construe impartiality in very specific (but narrow) ways. So that we can more fully understand this, discussions around BBC impartiality need to be contextualised and located within the BBC’s sense of ‘self-image’ and the role it sees itself playing in ‘civil society’ and the Public Sphere. Perhaps most importantly, if and how notions of the ‘public good’, ‘public service’ and, concomitantly ‘main strands of argument’ are constrained and contained within certain limits.

1.4 Public Service Broadcasting

News journalism, through the developing discursive formation of ‘objective’ journalism, asserts for itself the dominant *framework* through which ‘we’ understand the political, public and social world. Terms such as ‘impartial’, ‘objective’ and ‘public service broadcasting’ feature prominently in discussions of News and Current Affairs on television. Given the

emergence of the BBC and its founding principles outlined by John Reith, Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) can certainly be analysed and broadly located within the bounds of what media and social theorists would term, the ‘public sphere’.

Over time a set of principles for public service broadcasting was established: universality of coverage; diversity in programming; reflection of national identity and culture; the servicing of minority interests; the provision of an *impartial news and current affairs service free from the influence of business of government*; and the delivery of innovative, ‘quality’ programming designed to inform, educate and entertain. (Debrett 2010: 19)

Maintaining a distance from influence and conflicts of interest, government or commercial imperatives, ensured that BBC television journalism, from a very early stage, had to adopt specific principles based on public service idea(l)s. Within the News and Current Affairs departments this distance could be most readily assured by the adoption, and crafting, of the principles and practices of ‘objective’ and ‘impartial’ journalism. In this respect, television plays(ed) a crucial role:

A crucial player in the struggle over legitimacy is television. This is because *television* is a form of *public sphere*, which presents and debates current affairs, providing media publics with the opportunity to make judgements and deliberate over issues of common interest. (Barnett 2003 *in* Chouliaraki 2005: 144)

As already discussed (above), ‘Closely related to, but distinct from, the concept of objectivity is that of “impartiality”, a notion of particular importance to any discussion of British broadcasting journalism’ (McNair 2009: 36), the notion of ‘impartiality’ is, in some ways, the television equivalent of journalistic ‘objectivity’. Alongside these ideas, and enshrined within the BBC charter come assurances of ‘quality’. ‘Quality was also applied to News and Current Affairs through the principle of impartiality, and the seriousness with which the BBC maintained a stance of editorial “neutrality”’ (Debrett 2010: 35). In this context, the BBC emerges as the exemplar of PSB founded very specifically to ‘inform, educate and entertain’.

Under the terms of the Agreement (BBC Royal Charter) in force at the time of the Iraq invasion, the corporation was required to offer ‘comprehensive, authoritative and

impartial coverage of news and current affairs in the United Kingdom and throughout the world to support fair and informed debate at local, regional and national levels'. (Department of National Heritage 1996: 6 *in* Robinson et al. 2010: 65)

Such principles *and* practices are put in place of course to ensure that the BBC continues to uphold the values of democracy, debate and civic responsibility, and all made possible by an adherence to notions of 'quality', 'objectivity' and 'impartiality'.

An integral aspect of the civic role associated with the public sphere is the provision of an impartial, non-commercial, national news and current affairs service – independent from the influence of private vested interests. (Debrett 2010: 16)

The establishment of the BBC as *the* publicly funded embodiment of objectivity and impartiality, and the ways in which this can be located and analysed forms an important theoretical template of this thesis. For if 'television news is still perceived to be the most important of all journalistic media, not least because of its reputation as an "impartial" source of information' (McNair 2009: 43) then the journalistic limits enshrined within the discursive practices of 'impartiality' and of television broadcast News and Current Affairs need to be scrutinised and interrogated. *Panorama*, by adhering to the model of journalistic practice, public sphere and public service values, 'impartiality' and 'objectivity', and, because it was the first of its kind, and remains something of a paradigm, acts as standard bearer for BBC 'quality' and public service journalism in particular, and for television journalism more generally.

1.5 Discursive and Journalistic Constituting of 'Politics' and 'The Political'

Given that 'the BBC was never officially told to be impartial' this hardening adherence to 'impartiality' was within the confines of Public Service Broadcasting (PSB), in some ways, a response to the fracturing of the political post-war social and political order that emerged after the 'oil shock' of 1973, and the collapse of Bretton-Woods. What is more, in the specific context of the UK, in 1976 the then Labour Government were forced to agree to a loan from the IMF. Such a deeply problematic move effectively dealt a (further) death knell

to the post-war social-democratic consensus. A detailed examination regarding the extent to which these events (and others) had an impact on the social-democratic consensus is beyond the remit of this research, nevertheless, this fracture does locate the BBC and its decisions regarding News and Current Affairs in historical, social, political and economic context. It is surely inarguably the case that such ‘shocks’ and fractures to the wider social, economic, political and cultural global system (or order) would necessitate a degree of self-examination across large sectors of society, and institutions such as the BBC. In fact, one could argue that precisely because the BBC is organised and oriented around a notion of ‘the public’ (as opposed to ‘the private’), an organisation, as was the dominant trend of the era, that had something of the ‘social democratic’ tradition about it, it would need to examine and interrogate itself more urgently than other private(ised) institutions. Additionally, and related to this changing political and ideological landscape in which, over time, ‘the market’ becomes the chief means of organising and managing society, the only means or form of legitimate social and political organisation, the very bedrock of democracy (sic), the ‘legitimate’ sources, their ‘main strands of argument’, their ‘significant strands of thought’ are increasingly derived from this dominant ideological position. In short, once ‘the market’ dominates society, begins to dominate even parliamentary politics, then as the aforementioned ‘*Prebble Report*’ detailed, the sources, too, with their ‘main strands of argument’ are similarly predisposed and ‘market’ orientated. This is, in fact, how hegemony operates (Gramsci 2005).

To return to the BBC more explicitly. It is in this context (post Bretton-Woods) that the BBC did, during the time, engage in a series of inter-BBC discussions around what constitutes News and Current Affairs. What emerges from the various discussions and papers is instructive. The papers and discussions provide some clues as to how the BBC develops then cements a particular version of impartiality in News and Current Affairs. In particular,

some attention needs to be paid to what the BBC defines as ‘professionalism’ and the ways in which said ‘professionalism’ is seemingly bound within parliamentary discursive limits. As Tom Mills has outlined, the ways in which the BBC understood (and still understands) *political impartiality* is very closely tied to institutions of the British state. The section from Mills is worth quoting at length:

It was in its *appeals to parliamentary democracy* that the political nature of journalistic professionalism, as understood by the BBC, became most explicit. The BBC’s 1975 discussion paper, ‘How Should We Broadcast News and Current Affairs?’ was typical when it stated: ‘of course the BBC totally accepts the need to *support and maintain Parliamentary democracy.*’ Another document stated that ‘the *parliamentary democracy evolved in this country is a work of national genius to be upheld and preserved,*’ linking it to the BBC’s ‘primary constitutional role’ as ‘a supplier of news and true information’. The link between *parliamentary democracy and broadcasting professionalism* was made most explicit in, ‘The Broadcasting of News in the United Kingdom’: ‘BBC journalists still aim to uphold the same qualities of honesty, accuracy, responsibility and independence [that they did during the Second World War]. They are the *qualities at which journalists in Parliamentary democracies have been taught to aim, for the public good* and sometimes at considerable cost to themselves for generation after generation. Such responsible journalism rests on the belief that society will, *through the institutions of Parliament,* cure itself of ills which are brought to its attention...’ (Mills 2015: 47. Unpublished. *My emphasis*).

As we can see, such limited notions as to what would (and does) actually constitute ‘politics’ or ‘the political’ is, journalistically and discursively, narrowly defined. Explicitly *political* News and Current Affairs, what might actually constitute them, are here so closely allied with the state and parliamentary democracy that to be outside those limits is to effectively be placed outside or beyond politics or (legitimate) political expression itself. What remains most important here is that, given this narrow limit or remit, in such circumstances, any semblance of radical politics, extra-parliamentary activism, critical anti-capitalist, wider social formations, or (most importantly in the case of this research into *Panorama*’s coverage of the Iraq war) anti-war protests, and more specifically, ‘Peace movements’ are not considered or defined as ‘politics’ or legitimately ‘political’. So then, in Current Affairs broadcasting, in which *Panorama* is emblematic, any organisational forms that do *not fit in or*

flow *from* this rather rigid vision and version of what actually constitutes ‘politics’ in the United Kingdom, would not be covered by the BBC. Or rather, such forms, actions, groupings and activities are simply not included *as* forms of *overtly political expression*. They might, at times, feature in BBC broadcasts (in one-off documentaries for instance), but *routinely* not as a part of the Current Affairs ‘political’ landscape. The 2003 Iraq War was explicitly framed *as* ‘political’, the dominant sources were drawn from the discursively narrow political landscape, the frame, was a political one. As a consequence, the remit of the BBC’s political coverage, and self-fulfillingly, the view the BBC has of itself and of ‘politics’ means that in the case of the 2003 Iraq War, such marginal(ised) (sic) issues, themes, groupings, activities and social-political or ideological formations can, and were, journalistically, ‘legitimately’ excluded. Even while doing so, the BBC can simultaneously remain within the terms of ‘impartiality’ defined by their own documentation and further endorsed by their (continuing) licence to broadcast. Hence, ‘main strands of argument’ can be, and were in this case, defined too narrowly. In fact, one could go further still. It was certainly my experience that there was a very significant and large proportion of the population that were wholly against any military engagement or conflict in/with Iraq. While of course acknowledging that one’s own experience(s) are merely anecdotal, and further, that one’s own experiences are of course, in part, defined by one’s own social and political environment and social circle, it does remain the case that sometimes quite overt criticism and scepticism was vociferous. Given this, it is even more remarkable that the dominant themes and ‘strands of argument’ remained (broadly, though with a little scepticism) so rigidly ‘pro-Western’ or at least unwilling to acknowledge the possibility of more malign or ideologically motivated intent on ‘our’ part. In television journalism terms, my own experiences were not reflected back, they were almost wholly unrepresented, absent or when (notionally) present, diminished and side-lined and not considered a ‘significant strand of

thought'. 'Significant strand(s) of thought' are, and were in this case, similarly discursively framed and defined by the narrow journalistic parameters the BBC continually and consistently erects regarding politics or the political. 'Impartiality' here functions, perhaps unwittingly, as a form of ideological, political and discursive *policing*.

In such circumstances, it is then imagined that *legitimate* political subjectivity, 'significant strands of thought' are *not only* associated *with* and safely contained *within* the limits of parliamentary democracy, but in fact can *only* be represented parliamentarily, with the BBC as the natural (and 'neutral' (sic)) conduit, all encompassed by notions of the 'professionalism' of the BBC journalists which now begins to act, not only as the badge of honour, but as a set of learned and internalised practises. These now *professionalised* practises of sourcing, of what constitutes politics, on whom is granted legitimacy and space, granted a 'legitimate' voice, and, important for this research, through the televisual, multi-modal forms of expression (the genre of Current Affairs represented here by *Panorama*) can be said to shape political discourse.

1.6 Current Affairs: An inexact Generic Category

One of the issues that arises when discussing broadcasting and analysis of this (particular) genre, is the solidity or concreteness (or not) of the term Current Affairs itself. In fact, when first approaching this thesis, I looked for a solid and rigorous definition of the term, of the genre. Even while consulting Glen Creeber's invaluable *The Television Genre Book* in amongst the many different generic categories, Current Affairs remained stubbornly absent. It did not appear in the 'News' section, nor was it present in the 'Documentary' chapter, and, even though as this thesis will argue, it has many of the hallmarks, Current Affairs was absent from the extensive chapter on 'Television Drama'. This research will attempt to address this problem of generic categorisation.

As it is currently (and historically) imagined, the specific format: a mixture of News frames, current events, and documentary style is a strangely and uniquely British invention.

As Corner and Hill outline:

Current Affairs has been an important category of work in British Television for many years, drawing on the production values and skills of both news programming, with which it has often been institutionally paired, and a range of forms of documentary. As a generic designator, essentially indicating a category of long-form journalism, it has a certain relaxed vagueness which some have found amusing and distinctively British. (Corner and Hill. 2008: 34)

As Corner and Hill outline, while ‘Current affairs has been an important category of work in British television for many years’ it still remains something of an inexact and slippery genre. It ought to be added, too, while acknowledging that it is ‘an important category’, as a distinct genre, it has remained largely unexamined in academic scholarly research.

On initial inspection, the genre of Current Affairs can be understood as cognate, or at least closely related to Documentary. There are of course similarities with the Documentary form, and while the form or status of documentary itself might be ‘always in play’ (Ellis 2012: 8) there are at least some well-understood parameters or signifiers of what constitutes the form. In the words of Grierson, documentary can be understood as ‘the creative treatment of actuality’ (Grierson *in* Ellis 2012: 8). At first glance then, this phrasing, this understanding and categorisation bears some relation to Current Affairs, and while it is clear that the forms have similarities, and are, on occasion, conflated, the forms, or genres, in the wider television industry, and one assumes, in the BBC *Panorama* office and in the minds of viewers, are understood as different. They (Documentary and Current Affairs) *are not* the same thing. What differentiates the forms, styles and genres of Current Affairs and Documentary from each other?

There are perhaps a number of answers to this question, however, the most important differences, for the purposes of this research, are as follows: Current Affairs, like

News, *tends* to concern itself with events, disruptions, actions, circumstances and incidents occurring ‘in the now’. That is, the tradition, the organisational principles and practices relating to News and ‘News Values’ (Galtung and Ruge 1965, Harcup and O’Neill 2001, 2017) are often the organising logic of the Current Affairs genre. This is perhaps emblematically represented by the words of former *Newsnight* editor, Peter Rippon ‘...it (Current Affairs) exists not to break news, but to help viewers make sense of what they have heard, seen or read elsewhere’ (*The Observer* 2011). In fact, as Holland identifies:

Current affairs television is political television in its widest sense, a project that is jealous of its status and political centrality, which constantly proclaims its aim to dig behind the headlines and to explain, explore and challenge (Holland 2006: xiii)

In this way then, Current Affairs broadcasts have a tendency to explore and explain explicitly News-related issues and events. This tendency and practice firmly locates Current Affairs within the practice and discourse of journalism. Documentary on the other hand appears to have more licence, Documentary can (though it is not obliged to) focus on activities, events, incidents and people way beyond the confines of the immediacy, the recency, the unambiguity to be found within the more ‘News values’ related form of Current Affairs. As Holland (above) says, if Current Affairs has ‘status and political centrality’ then it is this ‘political centrality’ and, in the context of this research, its relation to News which constrains and contains its ability to deviate from the associated normative ideals encompassed by the ‘impartiality’ doctrine. In short, the BBC (and now industry-wide) version *of* and adherence *to* impartiality might be said to lock Current Affairs (with)in too narrow a frame or discourse.

So while there is a certain broad agreement regarding other television genres, such as ‘News’ and ‘Soap Opera’ for instance, as we can see, the term Current Affairs is rather more slippery and elastic. In a report by Ofcom, published in 2006, Current Affairs is described and demarcated thus:

A programme which contains explanation and analysis of current events and ideas, including material dealing with political or industrial controversy or with public

policy. Also included are investigative programmes with contemporary significance (Ofcom (2006) *The Provision of Current Affairs*)

As we can see, the explanation and template it establishes does attempt to define the term(s) but within it, there still remain some areas of slippage or inexactitude. While clearly related *to* but demarcated *from* both News and Documentary, the term has tended to be one based on its *content*, rather than its *form(s)* or formal characteristics. Current Affairs has, as McQueen notes, usually been designated or marked;

...through its difference to news and documentary, rather than on its own clear-cut terms (see Tunstall 1993; Creeber 2001; Bignell 2004; de Burgh 2008). Holland (2000) identifies the core objectives of current affairs when she describes long-running series such as *Panorama* and *This Week* as providing 'a model of journalist-led programmes whose aim was to address the news and the political agenda in greater depth than the news bulletins allowed' (Holland 148 in McQueen 2010: 60. Unpublished)

As a definition from which to work, McQueen's (following Holland) is certainly sound. We can see its relevance when discussing what Current Affairs (or its proponents/producers) sees itself playing and is perfectly encapsulated by the above quote from Peter Rippon in *The Observer* newspaper. It exists to further the debate, or at least to help viewers 'make sense' of complex political, and in the case of Iraq, geo-political *news* events they 'have heard, seen or read elsewhere'. Do the *Panorama* broadcasts scrutinised here help viewers 'make sense' of complex geo-political events? Or are they safely contained in and constrained by the discursive practises of the form? It is perhaps the case, as Holland identifies, that Current Affairs does 'address the news and the political agenda in greater depth than the news bulletins allowed' but as this research will seek to demonstrate, it does so but in quite narrow terms. One could go so far as to say that 'we' (might) get depth (of single characters and arcehtypes, and or single story-arcs) but at the expense of breadth (wider context).

With very little by way of critical interrogation in either academic or professional contexts, the term Current Affairs broadcasting, and the discursive practises that constitute it,

can become self-fulfilling or self-legitimizing. However, equally important for a form that typically, by design and motivation, deals with vital issues of national and international significance, is the extent to which Current Affairs broadcasting, particularly in the case of a reputationally established brand, such as *Panorama*, also continues to legitimise and reproduce a particular (neoliberal, neo-imperialist) discourse as ‘common-sense’. This is particularly acute with regards to the BBC. What I mean by this is that with an established reputation and extensive archive on which to draw, in some cases, the BBC’s forms of News and Current Affairs broadcasting might even go so far as to function *as* established historical fact. In a detail that neatly captures the already discussed ideas delineated in point 4.2.3 of the BBC Charter discussion on ‘impartiality’, Gardiner and Westall (2016) outline:

Such is the BBC’s embeddedness in state machinery that documentaries and dramas are quietly charged with producing saleable versions of history *as* history. It is now common, for example, for BBC documentary histories to present their own footage as a memory of the time without any acknowledgment of this mediation...as if the BBC’s televisual output is itself history. (Gardiner and Westall 2016. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourbeeb/claire-westall-michael-gardiner/bbc-and-british-branding>)

The phrase ‘without any acknowledgement of this mediation’ is vital here. That the BBC is so ‘embedded’ or anchored to ‘impartiality’, so embedded in our national cultural landscape, perceived *as* neutral mediator of historical detail(s) means that, over time, the BBC’s output effectively ‘stands-in’ for or as ‘fact’. Of course, in the context of this research, one can conceivably make the same argument for the BBC’s archive of News and Current Affairs. By analysing *Panorama*’s use of its own, and that of related News coverage archive, and because said archive is drawn from the already *legitimated* genres of News and Current Affairs, this research can analyse and assess the extent to which the BBC’s journalism, a form of practise ‘not requiring legitimation outside of itself’ (Matheson 2000) can become a form of self-fulfilling historical ‘fact’. That it might do so, or at least that it has the capacity to do so, has important ramifications.

The mixing of stock archive and recent footage might be said to have a deleterious effect in furthering a necessarily complex and broader understanding of the “conflict”. The mixing of quickly retrievable archive footage to forge instant visual narratives seems to be a standard feature of the *Panorama* sample. It further underscores the point that Television (and the BBC in particular) uses archive in such a way that very often no further contextualisation or explanation is required when an image or set of images supports news narratives.

Television current affairs therefore can be seen to promote an essential inhibited and oversimplified view of the past and people, not just through its paucity of detail and brevity of language, but because it is increasingly dependant upon the visual image for its direction and narrative drive. (Hoskins. A 2004. 115-116)

1.7 Current Affairs Broadcasting and ‘The Mission to Explain’

Importantly for this research, and as discussed above with reference to generic categorisation, News and Current Affairs broadcasting, though sharing similarities, do have important differences. However, in 1988, newly appointed Director General of the BBC, John Birt set himself the ambitious task of overhauling BBC News and Current Affairs journalism. The traditions of investigative and documentary journalism were conflated with that of News. Current Affairs was given a ‘mission to explain’ (Birt *in* Barnett 2011: 117).

There were no concessions to the more chaotic forms of television journalism, either the *investigative tradition* or the *documentary tradition* that had its roots in film-making rather than in journalism; and there was some anxiety even among his supporters that this rigid philosophy could stifle creativity and produce a more conservative and compliant approach (Barnett 2011: 117)

This approach gave rise to Current Affairs practises and became well established. Further, ‘...four specialist units were established covering politics, economics and industry, social affairs and foreign affairs each with a weekly programme devoted to its specialism’ (Barnett 2011: 117). This approach to the Current Affairs broadcasting genre appropriates some of the discursive techniques and approaches from traditional News broadcasting. The division into

‘specialist units’ has a tendency to discursively form and shape the kind of stories that are told. In fact, one could conceivably go further and suggest that it sets up *divisions* where perhaps *links* might be preferable. As discussed above, Documentary practices are *generically* licensed to explore issues, events, people and disruptions (to social order) whilst simultaneously discarding the more-narrow contextual parameters the adherence to ‘news values’ and impartiality typically (re)produces. Not beholden to journalism, Documentary (can) necessarily include(s) a much wider contextual focus. So, having discarded the ‘more chaotic forms of ... the documentary tradition’ (Barnett 2011: 117) the distinct ‘specialist units’ approach to News, and, after Birt’s intervention, to Current Affairs, could be said to discursively shape research, information gathering *and* story-telling (dissemination of) output. In short, the question must be asked: does this approach, in fact separate issues that are potentially (necessarily) linked?

Perhaps it might be best to explain by way of example. In 2013, the BBC broadcast a *Panorama Special Report - Panorama: Britain on the Fiddle* (2013). The broadcast told the story of housing benefit claimants, or to appropriate the contemporary register ‘benefit cheats’. The story was told through the journalistic prism, or discursive formation, of the immediately tangible but reductive story of costs to the public purse. This has the distinct ring of a production perhaps by a ‘home affairs’ oriented ‘unit’. However, it produced a narrow discursive frame. If there are complaints to be made and heard about housing benefits, as perhaps there might be, then how should the story of this crisis be told? Should the Current Affairs narrative seek in its ‘mission to explain’ to outline and investigate the precarious and poorly paid nature of work in a neo-liberal capitalist economy? The running down and deliberate underfunding of public services? Or perhaps the selling-off of large swathes of social (council) housing? How about the low rate of council house (re)building? Even if *Panorama* does not draw its explicit research and production ‘frame’ from a distinct ‘unit’,

all of the above are (were) ideological decisions, they can be located within the discourse(s) of ‘politics’, *and* social affairs, *and* economics. However, the broadcast narrowly framed the issue within the discourse of social affairs, and in so doing, excised and excluded the political and economic dimensions of the ‘story’.

How might a more critically interrogative broadcast represent the issue(s)? Perhaps by narratively and investigatively linking the crisis to, for instance, the trends and demands of the neoliberal(ised) political economy? Such long form, nuanced, and contextually rich approaches are perfectly possible when adhering to the traditions found in investigative Documentary Current Affairs broadcasting. Having seemingly discarded such an approach however, do the discursive templates enshrined within the ‘specialist units’, and, vitally, bound up within the narrow discourse and practises of television journalism found in *Panorama* allow for nuance, linkage and developed narratives?

According to the logic of News and Current Affairs broadcast journalism as envisaged and subsequently established and entrenched, at least in part, by the changes Birt introduced, it is *not* the poor provision of services and resources that is the issue (in the chosen housing and housing benefit example), but the *monopolisation* of these services and resources by whatever *Other* is currently the subject of demonization. Given that there is a dominant narrative (discourse) established by the practices of News broadcasting, it is not therefore surprising to find *Panorama* increasingly devoting attention to issues within this narrow (‘news values’ oriented) discursive limit, it might, after all make perfect journalistic organisational sense to conjoin services, or at least to develop the story and issue within already established templates and frames that already dominate the News genre. However, these changes in approach do not necessarily achieve the purported aims of Current Affairs ‘Mission to Explain’ oriented Journalism. In their ‘unambiguity’, they might ‘make sense’, but such an approach does not locate the issue(s) in the wider context. The style of *Panorama*

broadcast manifestly does *not* critically interrogate wider social, economic, political and ideological issues or motivations, does not shed any light on major issues of the day as they are too narrowly framed. The ways in which Current Affairs broadcasting was given the ‘mission to explain’, aligned with the establishment of the ‘distinct units’ cannot help but reproduce a certain discursive logic. It is therefore the task of this research to open up, discuss and critically interrogate these tendencies and practices, and further to analyse the ramifications such adherence to practices reproduces.

A more recent small-scale analysis of recent editions of *Panorama* concluded that ‘many of the investigations appear to be based on finding popular subjects and presenting the results in ways that put almost as much emphasis on production values as editorial content’. (Barnett 2011: 161)

The extent to which *Panorama* is able to bear this weight of responsibility, will be critically analysed in detail. The utilisation and (re)production of templates can, and indeed must be analysed within the context of the demands of television. If, ‘journalism became the art of structuring reality, rather than recording it’ (Smith *in* Alexander 2015: 9) then it might be germane to analyse the ways in which the specific demands of BBC television Current Affairs broadcasting, with its own temporal logic, its narratives and aesthetics combines with the practices of News journalism and ‘impartiality’, in order to produce a ‘structured’ and template(d) vision of the social and political world.

Being an eminently visual medium, television excels at constructing powerful meanings, at creating vivid impressions, associations and eliciting emotional involvement. It is not so good at presenting lots of facts and the kinds of messages where attention to nuances, reservations and contradictions is vital. TV reportage seldom allows longer explanations or accounts. In studio debates speakers are commonly interrupted when they verge into details or dwell on specifics. (Ekström 2002: 265)

As we can see from the above discussions, Current Affairs broadcasting, particularly in the case of the BBC flagship brand, *Panorama* is located in an interesting but problematic position. Compared with other factual genres – such as Reality, Lifestyle,

Consumer – Current Affairs continues to be associated with ‘prestige’ (Hill, 2007 46). Such prestige is even more heightened precisely because the programme is long-running and established, and moreover, because of its location on the BBC. As Ofcom define it, Current Affairs (h)as a key purpose in the PSB landscape:

‘to inform ourselves and others and to increase our understanding of the world through news, information and analysis of current events and ideas’ (Ofcom 2006) Current affairs is defined as ‘a programme which contains explanation and analysis of current events and ideas, including material dealing with political or industrial controversy or with public policy ... *Current affairs ...draws on the production values and skills of both news programming, with which it has often been institutionally paired*, and a range of forms of documentary (Hill, A. 2007: 45)

The legitimacy of the form is underscored by its ‘institutional pairing’ with that of News. Whereas documentary can be subject to admiration *and* a degree of scepticism, Current Affairs maintains its position as prestigious PSB oriented output. In this research, I want to assess the extent to which this pairing, this generic location acts perhaps as an impediment. Is *Panorama* constrained by its adherence to the more News oriented values and practises? Current Affairs broadcasting remains, as Patricia Holland identifies ‘a journalist-led genre’ (Holland, P 2001. 149). Such practises, such journalist-led approaches are particularly striking in case(s) regarding issues of social and (geo)political importance (such as the Iraq war(s)). Current Affairs as it was historically engendered and contemporarily produced to this day, applies particularly rigid journalistic accounts of vitally important national and international events. Always acutely aware of the needs for ‘impartiality’, such journalistic accounts can partly explain *Panorama*’s reluctance or inability to overtly critique ‘the state’ or ‘state actions’. While on occasion specific (and narrow) state actions might be subject to critique, the more overt critical interrogation of state and policy – and in particular their ramifications *on* wider society – such as might be found in the more elastic genre of documentary, remains largely absent in this particular form. Such weaknesses are directly contrary to the role Current Affairs – and *Panorama* in particular – is assumed to play in

contemporary society. *Panorama* remains the flagship brand, on *the* flagship Public Service Broadcaster. The critical question to pose is: Is *Panorama*, by its prescriptive generic characteristics, incapable of more overt critical interrogation? In some ways the above lack of critical interrogation of wider issues, might (again) be a result of the rigidity in UK television generic categorisation. *Panorama* is explicitly Current Affairs television but a form of Current Affairs ‘reportage’ as opposed to Current Affairs ‘Investigative’. *Panorama* exists as a part of the BBC’s News/Journalism field which therefore restrict and govern *Panorama*’s output. These rules or constraints – televisual, generic, journalistic, public service broadcast – important though they remain, do mean that *Panorama*’s content must adhere to the ‘journalist-led’ reportage style and form. ‘Reportage’ approaches effectively ensure that *Panorama* adheres to and remains within the tightly defined ‘impartiality’ doctrine governing BBC journalistic output (discussed above). Such a rigid position provides an explanatory frame in the forthcoming chapters in an attempt to assess the extent to which said rigidity might necessarily discursively narrow down critical, counter-hegemonic approaches.

1.8 Is the BBC an Ally or Part of the Institutions of ‘The State’?

With regards the counter-hegemonic potential of *Panorama*, we can deduce that what emerges from Reith’s (and subsequently every BBC Director General) organisation is that while it might be the case that the BBC is not overtly ‘ beholden to commerce or the state’ it is, in practice, discursively and institutionally aligned with important *aspects of the state*. In terms of *Panorama*, that it is ‘often institutionally paired’ with that of News, meaning it must adhere to ‘impartiality’, embracing a form of journalistic reportage ensures that its relationship with ‘sources’ remains similarly institutional(ised). As the historian AJP Taylor, remarking on the BBC’s performance during the 1926 General Strike, put it, certain institutional conditions and practises exist so that ‘the vaunted independence of the BBC was

secure so long as it was not exercised' (Taylor 2001: 246). In fact, as Tom Mills, in part quoting Scannell and Cardiff, again outlines:

...with its reconstitution into a public corporation shortly after the (general) strike (1926), the BBC 'crossed the political threshold', becoming 'a "governing institution" with aims and functions delegated to it by Parliament, committed to cooperation with government, and *sharing its assumptions about what constituted the "national interest"*.' By the 1930s, they write, the 'continuous routine contact [that] had built up over the years between senior personnel in Broadcasting House, Whitehall and Westminster meant that they all abided by the same rules and code of conduct. The Corporation had become the shadow of a state bureaucracy; closed, self-protective and secretive.' (Mills 2016b; *The General Strike to Corbyn: 90 years of BBC establishment bias*. Open Democracy. *My emphasis*)

It is precisely these aspects, these conditions and practises which allow, grant legitimacy for and reproduce the logic of its journalism. Particularly in times of war and conflict, is it the case that *Panorama* is in lock-step with other institutional, state and parliamentary actors? Do they effectively 'share assumptions about what constitutes the national interest'?

Assumptions regarding the universality of 'national interest' are surely, at the very least, questionable, if not wholly inaccurate. But, is it the case that the assumptions regarding 'national interest' – that it is somehow naturally analogous with (all) 'our' interests – remains unexamined, remains unproblematised, and are largely assumed in News and Current Affairs broadcasting, particularly *Panorama*? Does the most vaunted and assumed to be critical, 'flagship' Current Affairs strand of *Panorama* create the necessary space in which notions of (for instance) 'national interest' are subject to scrutiny and debate? Such considerations are particularly acute at times of war and conflict. As outlined by Mills (2016a), Scannell and Cardiff (1991), and Curran and Seaton (2005) and further discussed and developed in this research, one can make the case that historically, the journalistic practises of the BBC's Current Affairs output can be said to be narrowly defined, an effective discourse and epistemology. The extent to which these assumptions and practices are embedded and still the case more contemporarily is forensically examined by Georgina Born.

1.9 Broadening the Remit of ‘The Political’? – The BBC in the 21st Century

Developing the discussion around impartiality and ‘the political’ in more detail, in her seminal 2005 work *Uncertain Vision: Birt, Dyke and the Reinvention of the BBC*, Georgina Born provides a useful contemporary framework. She identifies a number of interesting and important developments regarding impartiality and, as importantly, the breadth and scope of what might constitute ‘the political’ and to whom such a term might be applied.

...what ‘politics’ means and where the ‘political’ resides. The changing conceptions of politics manifest in environmental and identity politics, in *anti-globalisation and anti-war movements*, made this an incipient theme of internal BBC debate by the late nineties, questioning the exclusive equation made not only between ‘politics’ and Westminster, but between ‘political’ programming and news and current affairs. (Born 2005: 376)

As Born, above, indicates, given the shifting social and political movements, the BBC perhaps might feel duty-bound to orient their News and Current Affairs coverage around more representative, developed, critical, alternative and nuanced representation(s). We might even suggest that the very notion of what constitutes politics and ‘the political’, for the BBC, was ripe for scrutiny. Indeed, according to Born’s ethnographic research and analysis, this very idea was ‘an incipient theme of internal BBC debate by the late nineties’ (Born 2005: 376).

How easy is it to shake off the ‘impartiality gene’ that, as we have seen, delimits what constitutes politics in the BBC News and Current Affairs output? Secondly, how do these claims stand up when applied to our sample of *Panorama* texts pertaining to Iraq? What is the relationship between ‘political programming’ and News and Current Affairs? How (if) do they feed into one another (or not)? Is there significant cross-over and/or separation? What is the significance of such a perceived shift in emphasis and/or representation? When it comes to vital issues of national security, indicated in this example by the decision and motivations to invade Iraq, the rationale for doing so, and *crucially*, which voices were included as visible and audible presence on screen, do the BBC *Panorama* team(s) fall-back

into tried and tested, established and hegemonic discursive actors (sources) and modes of address? The research will analyse the extent to which, BBC *Panorama* coverage of ‘the political’ included a range of voices from (previously) marginalised groups, campaigners and ideological formations. If it was ‘an incipient theme of internal BBC debate’ and the terrain was shifting, there should be significant moments and examples of alternate or subaltern representation. In what Anne Phillips has referred to as ‘the politics of presence’. Born again:

The notion of representation itself needs unpacking. It indicates the importance of programmes that reflect the tastes and interests of diverse social groups – programmes made *for* those groups. But it also refers to the necessity of programming made *by* such groups, the better to represent their own interests and identities. Representational diversity points not only to reception but to self-expression, the right to participate and to be heard. (Born 2005: 380)

As a means of critically interrogating and subjecting institutionalised, legitimised social and political actors to scrutiny, perhaps a different framework, mode of address, or alternative form might well emerge. Again, Georgina Born’s research indicates that this was/is indeed a consideration.

The nineties also saw a mining of the inherently unstable borders between documentary and current affairs, while documentary succumbed to the influences of entertainment and reality formats, and these in turn responded to the ageing of the British sitcom and the problems in popular drama. Birt’s organisational changes interacted with these genre-bending shifts, to different effect. Documentaries flourished, and the Community Programme Unit continued in striking ways to portray little-represented aspects of social experience. By contrast, Current Affairs was in the doldrums – strangely, as it might have seemed the area with most to gain from Birt’s reorientation of the BBC’s journalism – and News had to contend with the growth of new formats and outlets. (Born 2005: 377)

As Born makes clear above, with the reorientation towards analysis and the resources it was still able to garner, should, at first glance have meant Current Affairs (in which we obviously include as the standard bearer, *Panorama*) would flourish. Furthermore:

The BBC’s democratic duty, in this view, was not only to continue its independent scrutiny of government and of power, but to broaden the character and range of its representations in tune with new social and political times. (Born 2005: 376)

In this new(ly) formed and innovative form of BBC Current Affairs terrain, how successful was *Panorama*? Or, to put it another way: How did *Panorama* change, seek to represent previously subaltern groups or political positions, and/or orient their programmes in new and innovative directions? One of the crucial aspects that this research posits is that, while it might be the case that financial, organisational time and resources were/are still available to *Panorama*, the now *professionalised* practise of its journalism, these *representational resources* act(ed) as a constraining mechanism or ‘brake’. They acted as a brake on (the necessary) innovations required to adequately provide the spaces for alternative voices to emerge; to critically interrogate ‘power’ and to orient public debate towards a more developed and nuanced understanding of the ‘political’ and ideological terrain. Such terrain was emerging in the light of recessions and the burgeoning (post Seattle, 1999) anti-globalisation social movements, but the BBC, perhaps constrained by their own self-imposed limits on a) what (still) constituted the ‘political’ and b) the ‘impartiality’ doctrine encompassed by their journalism, was unable to adequately represent such trends and themes. ‘If Birt steered news and current affairs towards serious analysis, he also introduced conditions that discouraged risk-taking and independence’ (Born 2005: 387).

In fact, one could go even further and suggest, it is perhaps the case, that precisely because *Panorama* exists *within*, is oriented *around* and constrained *by* the discourse of ‘Journalism’ and journalistic practice that it lacks both the formal(ly) innovative techniques, *and* the polemical character that might really ‘hold power to account’. Constrained by the discourses of (the BBC’s version of) impartiality and journalism; the inherent faith in official and legitimated sources; the televisual resources, practises, discourses and techniques of ‘story-telling’, *Panorama* is perfectly able to hold some ‘powerful (individual people) to account’ but in so doing, is simultaneously discursively and structurally incapable of critically interrogating the structural conditions of power, from where said power is derived,

and how it is seamlessly reproduced. *Panorama*, with its associations of ‘prestige, claiming the legitimacy granted to it by its adherence to, and location in, the practices of journalism, but encumbered by the rigidity of BBC impartiality is thus significantly ideologically neutralised.

It should be clear to see that the ‘impartiality’ principles on which BBC journalism continues to be based, requires and demands critical interrogation. This is an important factor precisely because if, as this research identifies, the content and discourse of *Panorama* is, in the case of this research sample, largely (though perhaps not wholly) uncritical of Western political strategies and actions, what one might refer to as ‘neoliberal’ forms of capitalism, of Western ‘neo-imperialist’ geo-political positions and actions, then how are such uncritical positions and narratives reproduced while remaining, broadly, within the confines of the impartiality doctrine, practises and remit?

Could it be the case that in fact, the BBC, rather than being overtly biased to the left (a claim with little academic evidence to substantiate it) or, as some claim, biased to the right, instead, constrained as it is by adhering to its own (narrow) remit of ‘impartiality’ with all this entails, the corporation might be more accurately described and defined as ‘an organisation which will inevitably favour existing concentrations of economic, political and cultural power’ (Novara Media Wire 2014). As Tom Mills outlines in his 2016 book:

...the BBC, whatever liberals would like to imagine, does not stand apart from the world of politics and power and the corporate interests which predominate there. Rather, it is an important part of those complex networks of power and influence. It further shows that, insofar as the BBC can be said to exhibit any political bias, it is not based in political partisanship, but rather in an orientation towards those networks of power and their shared interests – interests which, it should be noted, are not necessarily self-evident or immutable, but are worked out in and through these networks, and in and through key political institutions like the BBC. (Mills 2016a: 139)

On this understanding, the BBC is then inextricably linked *to* and a part *of* the complex network(s) of institutional power. The extent to which this institutional and contextual

location, the effect this has on its *storytelling* and how this impacts on the discourse of the Current Affairs broadcast strand *Panorama* will be assessed and examined in the subsequent analytical chapters. It might therefore be the case, or at least we might deduce, that in fact, the remit, the obligations and the very practices of ‘impartiality’, the ways in which they are imagined and enacted (upon) are in fact, in their current guise, while perhaps laudable aims, in the contemporary parlance, ‘unfit for purpose’.

1.10 Why *Panorama*?

In the context of Public Service Broadcasting that has an obligation to inform and educate, to provide critical knowledge pertaining to world events, geo-politics and political culture, *Panorama* is considered to be the paradigm. In part because *Panorama* is the longest running Current Affairs broadcast strand in the world, it has an accumulated, discursive, semiotic, journalistic legitimacy and integrity. The legitimacy is, in some ways, its most valued asset. As perhaps the ‘flagship’ Current Affairs broadcast strand, *Panorama* carries considerable weight ‘...inter-elite communications and the culture of elites are just as, if not more, significant, [than elite-mass communication] for sustaining political and economic forms of power in society’ (Davis, A 2003: 669).

Its position of legitimacy is reinforced by its longevity, its position in (and as) a form of ‘impartial’ journalism, by its location on the primary PSB channel in the UK (perhaps in the world) and its resourcing. Therefore, as a form of public service television journalism, it has significant power to frame issues and events. One of the questions to ask here, is the extent to which, the risk-averse culture the Birtist changes engendered, the shift away from the episodic, investigative journalism of its past, and the increasing adherence *to* and reliance *on* journalistic television practices, means *Panorama* comes increasingly more in line with the fast(er)-paced 24 hour news culture. The obvious impact is that such a form leaves less space for detailed and developed critical analysis.

At a time of intense political pressure and build up (to the Iraq war), *Panorama* produced and the BBC screened a series of broadcasts about the build up to, and then the success/failure of the war (with)in Iraq. It was of course able to produce so many because *Panorama* is seen as a vital plank in the landscape of the BBC, therefore it remains well-resourced. Given the perceived authority of *Panorama*, the aim of the thesis is to outline and assess the extent to which *Panorama* is deserving of its assumed critical and scrutinising (of power) legitimacy. Additionally, given the place *Panorama* is assumed to hold in the context of important Current Affairs broadcasting traditions in the UK, it potentially sets the standard for the industry to follow. As previously stated, *Panorama* is the established Current Affairs television text, the standard bearer against which other contemporary television Current Affairs broadcasts are measured, I would argue that it is *the* key signifier of serious journalism on television. Therefore, *Panorama*, and crucially for this research, the ways in which *Panorama* represents war and conflict, is televisually, journalistically and generically (discursively) influential.

The genre draws from and feeds into other forms of media production, including motion pictures and television series, and all these in turn shape audience perceptions and expectations about warfare and how the media should cover war. (Boyd-Barrett in Allan and Zelizer 2004: 26)

Additionally, and as the theoretical framework chapter will go on to discuss;

For critical discourse analysts, discourse is a form of social practice which both *constitutes* the social world and is *constituted* by other social practices. As social practice, discourse is in a *dialectical* relationship with other social dimensions. It does not just contribute to the shaping and the reshaping of social structures but also reflects them. (Chouliaraki 2006: 61)

Therefore, as well as being journalistically, televisually, and generically significant, *Panorama* is ideologically exigent, for it has considerable social and political weight, it helps set the terms and frames for debate, it is therefore ideologically and *discursively* instrumental.

Panorama is able to draw on a considerable library of (already legitimated) archive footage:

...many public service broadcasters have maintained a brand identity as a trusted and valued source of information in many countries because their commitment to impartial and accurate news and current affairs provision. Those values associated with well-resourced and high-quality journalism lie at the heart of public service values, informing not only public but also some commercial broadcasters in this new millennium. (Cushion, S. 2012. 21)

The research will examine both original and the archive deployed in the 10 *Panorama* broadcasts contained within the sample. This thesis will argue, by way of example and by deploying a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) framework that *Panorama* utilises and appropriates techniques from the canon and style of dramatic representation, and in so doing it will be argued that it is this debt to fictionalised dramatic conventions, and by deploying long-established dramatic mechanisms and archetypes (of hero/villainy; dark/light) that actually betray a, perhaps unwitting, ideological bias in favour of elite western (capitalist, imperialist) interests. As I will go on to demonstrate, that such tropes exist is not necessarily in doubt, however, the extent to which methods, approaches and techniques of broadcast journalism contribute to the wider television journalism landscape is important. Furthermore, these methods, approaches and techniques might also be said to contribute to and reproduce the ideological and hegemonic position. If *Panorama* typically utilises and appropriates signifiers typically found in dramatised forms of representation, then they need to be critically interrogated and examined in detail. What are the characteristics, the frames, the templates, the discursive practises of Current Affairs journalism? Because of its assumed authority and legitimacy, can *Panorama* be said to be (partly) responsible for a pro-Western ideological positioning? Whether and how the televisual, journalistic and discursive forms and practices endorse and underscore an unquestioning Western authority, legitimacy (sic) and hegemony. Furthermore, given *Panorama's* critical, intellectual, journalistic, public service broadcast remit and reputation, it is germane to analyse and to ask, the extent to which *Panorama* lays the foundations for serious Current Affairs journalism in the UK Public Service Television landscape. *If*, as is suggested the BBC in general, and *Panorama* in

particular *do* in fact set the terms and bear the weight of industry practise(s), then the style, form(al) characteristics, tropes, signifying practises, and the content and delivery establish themselves as *the* template for reportage-based Current Affairs television journalism. One could even level the charge that *Panorama* produces a discursive formation or helps sustain a certain ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault 1977: 30).

Does *Panorama* stand as a rigorous examination of the powerful? Or, through specific journalistic and television characteristics and conventions, does *Panorama* merely restrict itself to an examination of those *individual* powerful elite actors in UK political culture, but does not examine the culture itself? Does the established (establishment?) neo-liberal, neo-imperialist political elite *as* immovable, as benign, as structurally sound, remain largely, perhaps wholly, under-examined? Does the immovable, systemic and structural order, with all the attendant inequalities it reproduces, remain unexamined by precisely (one of) the organ(s) of investigation and critique entrusted with the task in the first place: Current Affairs broadcasting (*Panorama*).

1.12 Concluding Remarks

The principle purpose of this initial chapter has been to map out a series of key aspects and points regarding the BBC’s institutional framework; its adherence to ‘impartiality’; the specific generic position of Current Affairs journalism; and how such things relate to *Panorama*’s coverage of conflict. In the context of BBC impartiality and Current Affairs broadcast journalism, the specific contribution this thesis seeks to make is centred on the following ideas and issues: To critically evaluate and understand the *Professional practices*’ of broadcast Current Affairs journalism, particularly broadcast journalism on the BBC, notionally that of ‘impartiality’ and ‘balance’ and to measure how such (already epistemologically compromised) professional practices are perhaps then further constrained by the idioms and tropes of television *and Television journalism*. The ways in which

adherence to such forms, within the confines of the professional practices, might be said to effectively (re)produce a *Discursive formation*. This is of paramount importance regarding the contribution this research makes to understanding the television Current Affairs broadcasting landscape as it is currently imagined. Further, even if now officially distanced from the Birtist ‘distinct operational units’ approach, to assess the extent to which this legacy might still impact on the journalistic storytelling in *Panorama* and that such units also inculcate a *discursive formation*. This distinct unit approach might be said to have some impact upon the kinds of stories that are told, the discourses mobilised in order to ‘tell the stories’.

Chapter 2

Literature Review: From Television Tropes to the War Model

This thesis sets out to address the notion that the BBC Current Affairs broadcasting strand *Panorama* (1953–current), operates as a discourse, effectively policing representation(s), identities and ideologies. Concomitantly, this discursive ‘policing’ might be said to effectively narrow down identity formations and alternative ideologies. If it is still the case that television Current Affairs strand(s), principally the BBC programme *Panorama*, are in part necessarily framed by ideas of objectivity, impartiality and balance, then, as discussed and detailed in the previous chapter, what exactly is this balance, what constitutes ‘impartiality’ and how are limitations placed on what constitutes ‘acceptable’ opinion? *Panorama* is selected principally because it is the flagship Current Affairs programme on BBC television and as such is bound by and has come to define the BBC’s public service rhetoric of ‘balance’ and ‘impartiality’. I will now seek to position this work in relation to other work in the area. To do this I have divided up this chapter using specific critical subheadings.

2.1 Television – The Specificity of the Form

This research is itself part of a wider intellectual tradition found within the disciplines of media, cultural and journalism studies.

This analysis contributes to the larger critical project to which both cultural studies and critical rhetorical studies subscribe, which was also Foucault’s own objective: to understand how power is produced, reproduced, and maintained in culture. (Shugart 2006: 80)

Despite the development of what Cottle (2006) has described as a ‘media ecology’ in the twenty first century, encompassing fast-changing digital internet based mediatisation, television remains the primary means of expression *of* and engagement *with* the mediatised political public sphere and political events. This being the case, analysis of the mediatised

political public sphere must then engage with and critically interrogate the space where political communication finds its most frequent expression;

Political actors are all trying to have an impact: on their communities, on their country and on the world...one thing they all share is that at one point or another they want the news media to help them achieve their goals. Getting coverage...can bring lots of benefits. (Wolfsfeld 2012: 7)

In short, one must critically analyse and engage with the forms of television and political communication, namely: television News and Current Affairs broadcasting;

...the defining characteristics of television [are] its ‘nowness’, the sense of being always ‘live’ which it constantly tries to promote. Film presents itself as a record of what has happened, television presents itself as a relay of *what is happening*. (Feuer in Fiske 1987: 18)

Television is importantly defined as both instant or ‘live’ and domestic in form.

Television offers a sense of ‘liveness, or ‘nowness’, its constant flow of images seeming to transmit and record everyday reality, giving us a constantly updating ‘window on the world’. It is, moreover, a supremely domestic medium, addressing us directly as individuals and members of family groups, in the privacy of the home, which is assumed to be the space in which our identity as individuals is most fully expressed and preserved. (Thornham and Purvis 2005: 76)

Notwithstanding the recent development and availability of (mobile) television on the move, television is principally viewed *in* and engaged *with* in the domestic setting of the home.

Ethnographies of media use have shown how the television set is strategically placed at the centre of people’s social living space...Television viewing is “utterly ubiquitous in Western societies, part of the fabric of everyday lives, a common resource for *story-telling*, scandal, scrutiny, gossip, debate and information: always there, taken for granted...television, both as communicator of meanings, and as a daily activity, is *ordinary*. (Cushion 2012a: 15)

Observations of the intimate ‘nature’ of television are perhaps even more pronounced in relation to the high modality forms of News and Current Affairs. As Ellis reminds us;

Television has a key role in the social process of working through because it exists alongside us, holding our hands...The very act of broadcast transmission itself creates a sense of instantaneous contact with the audience. (Ellis 2000: 74)

Thus, television production and distribution has a desire (need?) to tell stories, sometimes of necessary complexity whilst simultaneously managing to intimately connect with the domestic audience. In marked contrast to other forms of popular entertainment, such as theatre, cinema, and live music, where one must leave the home with the explicit goal of seeking out specific forms, television (and radio, though this research will not include radio as a form) communication is more instantly, readily available and as such more readily embeds itself within the narrative of everyday lived experience(s).

Television has become embedded in the complex cultures of our domesticity. We can no more think of television as anything than a necessary component of that domesticity than we can think of our domesticity without seeing both in the machine and the screen a reflection and an expression of that domestic life. (Silverstone 1994: 24)

This domesticity and intimacy means that in order to communicate effectively, television employs specific idioms, tropes and signifying practices that, through repetition come to be seen as normal(ised) or even 'real'.

In order to convincingly explain the complexities of the world to us, television has to master certain practicalities and representational contradictions. On the one hand television, and this is most urgent and obvious with regards to News and Current Affairs texts, demands something understandable, something familiar, a sense of location and recognition, a sense of the real. The sense of intimate connection, this intimacy, or perhaps 'personal' touch is best achieved by way of addressing audience members with personalised stories and narratives. The most apposite means of communicating stories on television is often through the signifying practises, tropes and idioms most often found in the 'realist' genre.

2.2 Television and 'Realism'

Despite the claims, assisted by the term 'real' being embedded in the genre itself, 'Realism' is merely an accumulated collection of recognisable signifiers and symbols, myths and

narratives, characters and places. Developing the work of Stuart Hall (1980) Thornham and Purvis (2005) discuss the ideological ‘work’ of television and television realism:

‘Realism’ [on television]...provides images and representations of the lives, meanings, practices and values of social groups unfamiliar to us...provide a means of ordering this social imagery, by providing classification labels, ways of making sense of, these unfamiliar groups]...[and shake them into an acknowledged order. (Thornham and Purvis 2005: 76)

Realism might be said to be the means by which television masters the contradictions and practicalities of representation. Legitimacy is conferred upon such a means of representation through repetition, making the unfamiliar, familiar and recognisable. Further, Fiske (1987) draws attention to the work of discourse in the construction of television texts:

We can call television an essentially realistic medium because of its ability to carry a socially convincing sense of the real. Realism is not a matter of any fidelity to an empirical reality, but the *discursive* conventions by which and for which a sense of reality is constructed (Fiske 1987: 21, *emphasis added*.)

The ‘sense of reality’ is an important facet in this instance as is the explicit reference to *discursive conventions*. It is in revealing that they (discursive conventions) are themselves *conventions*, merely part of the representational apparatus, the critical work of Media, Cultural Studies and Journalism Studies, where this work is situated, attempts to analyse the extent to which the machinery (of representation) conceals its theatricality (or constructedness), and, to what (possible) end.

It is therefore suggested that realism and representation on television, constructs particular forms of ‘social knowledge’ by framing actions and discourses of their characters in relation to a central set of truths:

...these truths are carried...in television by what the camera shows us. Seeming to offer ‘direct access to truth’, a transparent rendering of reality against which we can measure the discourses and actions of various characters. (Thornham and Purvis 2005: 78)

Many of the recognisable signifiers predominantly found in the “Classic realist” genre can be found across a range of television texts, and, one could argue, News, as part of television, has

these in abundance. These signifiers and framing devices are easily recognisable and familiar, in short, realism does not (simply) reproduce reality, it constructs it. The essence of the realist text is to reproduce reality in such a form as to make it easily understandable (Fiske 1987). What remains important in the context of this thesis, is that these conventions are not only *seen* to be merely conventions, but that the ‘form’ of television; the ‘work’ of television journalism and television Current Affairs broadcasting, appropriating the familiar, recognisable and ‘common sense’ tropes of the (realist) form, conceals this theatricality. In this way, drawing attention to the conventions of the (television) form, goes alongside some of the assumptions and claims made for journalism.

Long established as a tradition that underpins the work of the ‘objective’ journalist: ‘...the assumption was not that the media are objective, but that there was a world “out there” to be objective about’ (Schiller 1981: 48) it is a tradition in need of critical evaluation and analysis. Drawing attention to the (dramatic) *conventions* and the role they play in reproducing ‘the familiar’, remains one of the central tasks of this thesis.

...realism can be regarded as a system of conventions which represent the world to us through a series of devices...television presents the viewer with *narrative* structures that are tightly patterned ways of organising reality. Television narratives tend to be recognisable, reassuring and comforting. (Casey et al. 2002: 194)

According to this model, much television representation owes a clear debt to the realist drama genre. It therefore raises a question of how might the extended text of Current Affairs broadcasting utilise similar tropes and practices.

Discussing the characteristics of television drama, Raymond Williams (1975) identifies three main features: television drama tends to have a contemporary setting; television drama concerns itself with human action, described in human terms; drama on television tends to be ‘socially extended’, meaning that it deals with the concerns and lives of ‘ordinary people’. These three characteristics of course allow and encourage a sense of

identification necessary for the text to ‘work’. Fiske (1987) drawing on and developing

Williams’ work states:

‘The three characteristics’ [contemporary setting; human action; social extension] ‘explain realism’s particular suitability for television; television’s audience, like realism’s content, is socially extended...television is particularly well suited to representing human action in human terms – its small screen and comparatively poor definition [pre HD] lead it to concentrate on mid-shots and close-ups of people acting, reacting and interacting. (Fiske 1987: 22)

As suggested by Williams, Fiske, then further developed by Schlesinger (1987), unlike cinema film, the aesthetics of television (and for this thesis, particular attention will be paid to television broadcast journalism), because of the formal and discursive restrictions, offer fewer panoramic shots, fewer landscapes, and many more close-up shots. In order, then, to tell news stories, television News and Current Affairs can often find itself drawing on ‘types’ of story, character, narrative and event. Discussing Stuart Hall’s work, Helen Davis (2004) reminds us that ‘Television was, and still is, the medium of the close and the personal’ (Davis 2004: 51). These aesthetic limitations place certain limits on television News and Current Affairs’ ability to provide adequate, or fully developed political, ideological, socio-cultural and geographic contextual detail in favour of easily recognisable ‘stock’ characters, or archetypes, narratives, locations and story-lines. Accordingly, these idioms and devices in some ways produce a sense of familiarity and comfort;

...television news might not appear to be comforting or reassuring, on closer examination it is clear that News too is presented as a series of structured narratives. ‘Real’ people, ‘real’ events, ‘real’ places are used, but edited and reorganised to fit a specific time-slot and to make a rounded news story. (Casey et al. 2002: 194)

Is this assertion true of television News more generally, and Current Affairs broadcasting in particular? Examining and interrogating this assertion and assumption is vital in this research;

...it (television) must give us explanations of the real in the form of narratives which will shape the *disorder* of reality into forms which are recognisable, meaningful and safe – forms, in other words, which comply with the requirements of cultural and generic verisimilitude. (Thornham and Purvis 2005: 66)

2.3 News, Current Affairs and Media Templates

As discussed above, both cultural and generic verisimilitude is evident through established tropes, forms and signifying practices, they are instantly familiar and recognisable and are what Kitzinger (2000) and Hoskins (2004) might refer to as 'Media templates'. Appositely, for this research, discussing the US media's coverage of the first Gulf War, Andrew Hoskins states:

Throughout the US media coverage of the Gulf War the Vietnam War was frequently used as a template to frame events that were unfolding in real time. Frequent repetition and reframing of key TV images extends the past into the present (and perhaps the future) in new ways, creating templates with which to measure the present. Templates are also constructed through journalistic talk and their often routine contextualising of the present with reference to a past event. (Hoskins 2004: 36)

According to this model, television News sometimes explicitly represents the present through means of drawing on and narrating the past, 'Journalists, like generals, are often fighting the last war' (Wolfsfeld 1997: 176). Moreover, the media template, in part because of the accumulated semiotic significance and recognition, and in order that it be easily accessible, imposes (on events) an overly simplistic vision(s) of the world. Instead of a 'frame' or 'window', with their possible different vantage points or views, a template 'implies a more rigid and precisely outlined perspective (which both operates within and contributes to specific substantive frame)' (Kitzinger 2000: 75). It also suggests a certain transferability, the template can be easily transferred and seamlessly relocated into the next conflict. It might be argued then that the discursive 'logic' of media template(s) repeat relatively fixed ways of reporting events, and concomitantly, (re)produce relatively fixed ways of viewing the world and world news events. Media templates then, if widely used, by drawing on past events *and* standardised discursive signifying practices tend to present easily digestible narratives. The use of templates on television are vital in the representational economy, they allow News and Current Affairs the 'luxury' of representing potentially complex events in terms that can be

easily (enough) understood. In 'News Values' terms (Galtung and Ruge 1965), the templates are *required* in order to present news events with a degree of 'unambiguity'.

In its attempts to 'make sense', television and news *on* television, much like television drama, draws on established tropes and (story-telling) devices. In order to 'tell the story' television makes use of narrative, characterisation and, with regards to News and Current Affairs texts, embeds them within the text of a 'real life' narrative: 'story-telling is television's forte...everything is subject to interpretation by television as story-telling machine' (Nicholls 1994: 43). This 'story-telling machine' extends to its (television's) own capacity to influence the political culture in which it is enmeshed.

By the 1980's, television had reached a point of maturity where, whatever the party of government, it was seen as a decisive weapon in the battle for electoral hearts and minds. Because it was not open to the same partisan approach as the press, it was implicitly trusted by voters. (Barnett 2011: 118)

So, not only does television 'fall back' on templates, it also narrates its own past and weaves this into the fabric of political culture and discourse. As television News and Current Affairs broadcasting assumes a primary role in dissemination, communication and 'conversation' it establishes itself both *at* and *as* the centre of political discourse and communication, the principle means *and* form through which we are encouraged to view and understand the world.

...television journalism in particular is the main source of people's information about the world...around two-thirds of the mass public of modern industrialised societies claim that television is their main source of national and international news. (Gunter 1987 *in* McNair 2009: 19)

2.4 Language, Discourse and Journalism (as) Strategic Ritual.

Television and news on television is then widely seen, and seen widely as a (relatively) fixed form in which the population can have a degree of faith and trust. Such ideas of trust and faith in the story-telling capabilities and machinery of journalism develops over time and in

particular ways. In order to fully undertake a critical analysis of News form, one must locate and outline the emergence of news and journalism (as) discourse;

...news has to be available before journalists can choose what they consider suitable, and as long as official sources have the authority and resources to deliver newsworthy statements and events, journalists will remain dependent on them. (Gans 2004: xvii)

The emergence of News ‘as a recognisably modern cultural form, and media to disseminate it...coincided not only with the invention of printing, but also with the development of capitalism’ (McNair 2009: 32). In this context then, historically the emergence of news practice and language could be seen to represent, *and* be representative *of*, particular capitalist, dominant or bourgeois values. Created in relation *to* and as part *of* bourgeois values, the system of news gathering, dissemination and *writing* were bound by the interests within which they were formed. This is not to suggest that such values can be so easily traced and thus proved to be *all encompassing*, but merely to locate the emergence, the very idea of ‘News’ within a specific territory, historical trajectory and social, ‘professional’ contextual development, and containing specific practices representative of *values*. If news production becomes that activity, that sphere of work that informs us about the world around us, then what constitutes that world around ‘us’, which version(s) of the world are represented, by whom, and through which discursive practices?

The ‘birth of modern news’ develops its ‘...own particular discourse, through which reality was refracted, and which the newspaper’s claim to authority and authenticity was made’ (Matheson 2000: 561). In order to ensure that the commodity of news is able to be disseminated coherently and consistently, what we might call a ‘news voice’ (Schudson 1982) emerges, ‘...a journalistic discourse emerged, which allows the news to subsume these various voices under a universal, standard voice’ (Matheson 2000: 564). News becomes not merely a ‘collection of raw information’ but ‘...a form of knowledge *in itself*, not dependent on other discourses to be able to make statements about the world’ (Matheson 2000: 559).

Closely related to this development of news language, news as *professional(ised)* practise (as discourse) is the concept of ‘objectivity’. News and ‘objectivity’, the ‘objectivity’ able to be secured in part because of the appropriation of the ‘news voice’, can be discussed by way of reference to journalism as ‘strategic ritual’ (Tuchman 1978). ‘The concept of “objectivity” is premised on the assertion that a person’s statements about the world can be trusted if they are submitted to *established rules* deemed legitimate by a professional community’ (Schudson in McNair 2009: 33). In this framework of ‘established rules’ and ‘professional community’ one can clearly trace the professional practice of journalism, the ‘strategic ritual’ (Tuchman 1978) using the ‘news voice’ (Schudson 1982, Matheson, 2000), as discursive. What emerges within this tradition is a premise that in order to ‘be objective about’ the world, a language of news is cultivated that places journalists in the position of story-teller *par excellence*

...the news story became recognised as a self-contained language event. It no longer had to refer to outside itself to the source text to be able to assert a fact; the journalist’s role changed from a gatherer and recorder of news to a *storyteller*. (Matheson 2000: 570, *emphasis added*)

The journalist or news-maker, with their own set of rules, practices, conventions, linguistic and visual tropes, is independent *from*, and able to stand *outside* other authoritative, authorising, legitimating state actors, in short, the journalist as ‘professional’ storyteller is a significant development in news and journalistic history.

Professionalism – in particular the notion that experts should confine themselves to their ‘legitimate *professional* concerns’ and not ‘politicise’ their work – helps keep individual professionals in line by encouraging them to view their narrow technical orientation as a virtue, a sign of objectivity rather than of subordination. (Schmidt 2000: 204)

This notion of ‘professionalism’ is problematic and (ought to be) highly contentious, for as McChesney discusses:

Reporters report what people in power say, and what they debate. This tends to give the news an establishment bias. When a journalist reports what official sources are saying, or debating, she is professional. When she steps outside of this range of

official debate to provide alternative perspectives or to raise issues those in power prefer not to discuss she is no longer being professional. (McChesney, R. 2002. 95)

However, as we have seen with regards the BBC notion of ‘impartiality’, this roughly translates as in-line with elite thinking, or safely contained *within* the limits of parliamentary democracy. ‘Professionalism’ here becomes a term and a set of institutionalised practices which ascribe legitimacy in the first instance to ‘Primary Definers’ and, in the second, to ‘secondary’ definers as *the* means through which complex newsworthy events are disseminated and perhaps understood.

To use Tuchman’s term, ‘News making’ (1978), journalism practice that makes use of the established ‘news language(s)’, forms and tropes, whilst adhering to specific styles and expressions, ensures the establishment of both a perceived ‘objectivity’ and the ‘journalist as storyteller’. As McNair et al. have outlined, it might also be read as indicative and representative of dominant bourgeois values prevalent at the time of this formation. Said values are, however, contained (concealed, and assumed to be value free) within ‘universal’ ideas embodied and represented by specific techniques and modes of address, ‘...reporters ceased simply to report the voices of those in public life, but frame them within the voice of journalism’ (Matheson 2000: 564). News media practices, embodied by news journalists, establish(ed) for themselves the authority, and indeed the frame through which the world was explained.

To produce what will constitute the public sphere [...] it is necessary to control the way in which people see, how they hear, what they see. The constraints are not only on content – certain images of dead bodies in Iraq, for instance, are considered unacceptable for public visual consumption – but on what “can” be heard, read, seen, felt and known. The public sphere is constituted in part by what can appear, and the regulation of the sphere of appearance is one way to establish what will count as reality, and what will not. (Butler 2004: xx)

Butler, in referring to acceptable images, makes a forceful point with regards what constitutes not only the public sphere, but moreover, that which is deemed appropriate, for news broadcast representational purposes, effectively circumscribes the limits of the form, and

what (or whom) is allowed to be represented and imagined in such a space. The notion of ‘acceptable’ imagery, or perhaps imagery deemed unpalatable serves an instrumental purpose:

Under social conditions that regulate identifications and the sense of viability...censorship operates implicitly and forcefully. The line that circumscribes what is speakable and what is liveable also functions as an instrument of censorship. (Butler 2004: xx)

These are important ideas, and as we can see, many of them find televisual and journalistic expression on the BBC, and, in the case of this research, in *Panorama*. If television representation, limited, in this research to Current Affairs, can confer legitimacy, then who is represented, and how? Not only does presence on screen provide mere visibility, but how such visibility is manifest requires critical interrogation. What televisual, dramatic, emotive and archetypal tropes are utilised and reproduced in the service of making sense, making knowable, making familiar, and making empathic? Furthermore, who is invisible, or *when* visible, how is this visibility stitched on(to) our screens and, perhaps, in(to) our minds?

2.5 The Public Sphere

The emergence of ‘News’ as practice, as event, as commodity, genre, and discourse, and following Butler’s evocation of the term (above), it is necessary to locate News and the BBC more widely, and *Panorama* explicitly, within the context of the ‘public sphere’. Theorised extensively by among others, Habermas (1989), McNair (2009), Curran and Seaton (2010), Conboy (2004), Boyd-Barrett (1997), McQuail (2009, 2013) and Dahlgren (1995, 2009). Debates and theories about the ‘public sphere’ emphasise the importance of information, available to all ‘...free of attention to social status...’ (Habermas 1989: 22) where ‘issues of general social importance’ (Habermas 1989: 16) can be discussed and debated. Based on this conception, and it is a dominant and established one, it is assumed that with the emergence and development of a professional(ised) body of news workers, adhering to principles, voices and practices (discussed above) such Habermasian idea(l)s are the ‘best’ means of achieving

a form of mediated public sphere: ‘...the media must provide citizens with the information, ideas and debates about current affairs so as to facilitate informed opinion and participation in democratic politics’ (Dahlgren 2009: 34). If, as is suggested, this is one of the major roles of journalism and News media, one can see how ‘public sphere’ values sit and fit easily with the development of ‘news language and the emerging ‘discourse’ of news. We can also see their presence on the BBC.

Media provide not only *cognitive* knowledge (knowledge about political facts), but also *structure and order* political reality (presenting particular frameworks – such as focusing on two-party conflicts, focusing on individuals, focusing on action rather than processes. (McNair 1999: 27)

Furthermore, television in particular might conceivably have an important role to play in such a process:

...television is exceptional in its ability to mobilize affective involvement and convey the amorphous entity called implicit social knowledge ... and I would emphatically underscore that this quality is by no means entirely detrimental to its role in the public sphere. (Dahlgren *in* Barnett 2011: 142)

So, news as language, as practice (as discourse), and as the major conduit through which the world is narrated, aligned together with the practices, languages and aesthetics of television, combine in this instance to form a public sphere. This is not to suggest that on their own, they embody the public sphere in its entirety, but that such things need to be analysed in relation to one another.

The public sphere is briefly summarised here as a means of characterising what television journalism can democratically make possible rather than something it can tangibly achieve. What the public sphere represents, in other words, is a normative rather than an empirical aspiration. (Cushion 2012a: 13)

2.6 Infotainment, Drama and The Story-telling Machine

As discussed, television’s ubiquity, its sense of immediacy and ‘nowness’ are all important factors with regards the ways in which television News and Current Affairs are able to tell us stories of far-away places and peoples. That television and television News and Current

Affairs make use of idioms, tropes, signifying practices, forms, content, narratives and characters is not necessarily in doubt, News and Current Affairs broadcasting *has* to ‘make sense’; ‘...television must approximate the real; that is, it must be seen to give us unmediated access to both the everyday and a world beyond our immediate experience’ (Thornham and Purvis 2005: 76). However, the extent to which this sense-making apparatus is overly simplified is problematic. Equally troubling is that the machinery of representation conceals its own theatricality and in the service of apparent ‘sense making’ transparency becomes something of a self-fulfilling machine. News and Current Affairs is already underscored by a long and accumulated hierarchy of discourses (already discussed). This discursive hierarchy privileges particular forms and means of explaining the world ‘...within this hierarchy, narrative is given an unquestioned dominant place, which sets up “reality” as unproblematic’ (Casey et al. 2002: 228) and positions disparate places and peoples within a hierarchical ‘logic’ of understanding. Furthermore, particular journalistic and broadcast tropes, narrative, and characterisation, assumes and confers legitimacy on television journalism as objective ‘...narrative types of description is, in this sense, instrumental in establishing objectivity, the quality of broadcasting necessary to legitimise the television footage as public sphere genre’ (Chouliaraki 2005: 150). Therefore, it is this hierarchy of discourses and the ways in which they lay claim on and for direct, unmediated access to real lives and real stories that must be held up to scrutiny. In fact, this thesis will argue that we must not only scrutinise the formal characteristics of the high modality form(s) but that we must go further. We must foreground and reveal the levels of theatricality, *Panorama*’s use of dramatic templates contained within the formal characteristics and texts, outline the dramatic templates and signifiers of the form, explain how and why they might be considered historically and contemporarily necessary and important, and finally to interrogate the ways in which Current Affairs broadcasting ex-

nominates or conceals these characteristics and, in so doing, reproduces a vision of the world and those in it that is commensurate *with* and in the service *of* dominant ideology.¹

Utilising the tropes of the realist genre but with the added legitimisation of the News text, with its attendant legitimacy conferred upon it by way of news voice, news language, to underpin it, the more developed and in-depth Journalism text that is Current Affairs broadcasting extends the ‘logic’ of ‘more rounded news story’ to its conclusion. Based partly on the style(s) and conventions of documentary, which tends to privilege narrative and location, partly on the conventions of the classic realist drama, privileging characterisation and the personal, and importantly, utilising the legitimating forms, tropes, styles and discourse of the journalistic, it combines these elements together to produce an extended News text, or what John Corner (1996) has referred to as ‘extended reportage’ (Corner *in* Kilborn and Izod 1997: 24). This extended text, legitimated by extensive use of news footage, produces a more developed extended narrative, ‘Documentaries and current affairs programmes [...] might well allow for some discussion of the roots of the conflict, or the motivations of its protagonists, or even some critique of the state’s position’ (McNair 2009: 45). The extent to which this extended News style text necessarily offers (or does not) a more nuanced, contextually detailed, explanatory role in our understanding requires critical interrogation.

Even, or perhaps especially, in times of war and conflict, stories of a personal and dramatic nature become the quickly retrievable ‘fall back’ position (template), or journalistic rhetorical shorthand. This is in part explained by the previously outlined reliance on the

¹ It must be added, that this concealing or rendering invisible is not necessarily a matter of deliberate misleading – in fact, it would be impossible in a study such as this to level such a charge at those working in the field. It is more a case of the discourse, or the discursive practises of broadcast journalism being brought to bear on the production, writing and dissemination of news texts, or the extent to which it is simply ‘the way things are done’. Again, this is rather difficult to ‘prove’ but we can begin to trace links and discern certain characteristic ‘footprints’ of the form, and then analyse the extent to which these might be said to offer or reproduce a (particular) vision of the world.

Western ‘objectivity’ principle and partly in the developed and established aesthetics of television journalism. ‘The taking of sides [...] is related less to a conscious media complicity and more to the news values associated with journalistic choices about *how* to represent the war *on television*’ (Chouliaraki 2005: 154). Located in the wider, but under explained, contextual logic of a war, the use of the personal *dramatic* template offers a quickly understandable, retrievable and simplified framework through which to view the ongoing conflict. For television News journalism, and even more explicitly with regards television Current Affairs, this is the ‘perfect’ mix of form and (availability of) content. There are concrete examples of media templates significantly contributing to stories that are told, and importantly, their discursive function:

The Pentagon’s embed (sic) strategy was ingenious because it increased rather than limited access to information. By giving broadcasters access to highly newsworthy *action* footage from the frontline, they were encouraging a focus on the actions of US and British troops, who would be seen fighting a short and successful war. The *story* was about winning and losing, rather than a consideration of context in which the war was fought. (Lewis and Brookes in Allan and Zelizer 2004: 299)

Thussu (2007) maps out this apparent *need* or *demand* for action in relation to what he terms ‘infotainment’: ‘Given the demand of television News for arresting and *action-packed* visuals and *dramatic* pictures, wars and civil conflicts are particularly susceptible to infotainment’ (Thussu 2007: 113). One can seamlessly and usefully apply and include the notions of the ‘dramatic’ and the ‘action-packed’ visual spectacles and their relationship to ‘infotainment’ to my own analysis and analytical model.

The characteristics of television itself structure the knowledge it communicates and, by extension, our understanding of the world. The medium lends itself to aesthetically appealing and dramatic representations but is less appropriate for logical and factual argumentation, discriminating descriptions of reality and in-depth analyses. (Ekstrom 2002: 262)

In fact, it returns us to some of the tropes of the televisual form more generally, and the demands of television journalism more specifically. The demands are for accessible footage,

comprehensible, easily understandable in the context of fast paced demands of news production; immediacy, recently happened/happening events that can be located in the context of the developing 'story'; visual spectacle, action-packed, dramatic, lending itself to easy comprehension; visual narrative, easily identifiable events and persons. Crucially, this visual spectacle, partly because of the aesthetic limitations of the form have, over the last decade, tended to feature arresting, video games-style, graphics; images of 'surgical' precision, and 'chat-show style use of "experts"' (Thussu 2007: 115). Using a steady stream of 'experts' and, in conflict journalism, such 'experts' are usually drawn from the armed forces, bringing to the newsroom a degree of 'first-hand' knowledge, can render certain persons as knowable and perhaps trustworthy. By dint of sheer repetition such personalities become familiar faces. Familiarity and recognition, standard tropes of television, adds to the personalisation of News and Current Affairs and is consistent with the 'drift' towards personality and characterisation. This is in part, explained by news *as* story

The media are dedicated more than anything else to telling a good story ... it should have heroes and villains, conflict (especially bloody conflict), interesting characters, and above all a major dose of drama. Many news stories are also constructed as episodes in an ongoing series ("The War in Afghanistan," "The Struggle over Abortion"). The best episodes need to be sufficiently gripping so that the audience feels compelled to come back and see how the story resolves (Wolfsfeld 2012: 73)

This is important in the context of this thesis given that such 'drifts' are a classic standard(ised) trope of 'the dramatic' and moreover, character and characterisation are the staple of television, audiences tend to return for character, not plot. In fact, it is redolent of Propp's 'character function in narrative structures' a point to which this research will return in the next chapter.

Returning to some of the formal, mechanical (representational tropes) and signifying characteristics of realist drama contained within Williams' thesis, (see above) we can see, perhaps unsurprisingly, that: contemporary setting; human action; social extension are readily found within News and Current Affairs broadcasts, and particularly so with regards war and

conflict. Furthermore, the ‘infotainment’ of Thussu’s thesis is similar, in style and content, to this research’s mapping of the dramatic. If we are to understand drama as a means of *story-telling*; that frequently employ *narrative conventions*; and bearing a similarity to a situation or succession of events in *real life* that have the *dramatic progression* or *emotional effect* characteristic of a play, then these are surely all to be located within the Current Affairs texts that narrate, explain, expand upon and ‘tell the story’ of the build up to, the prosecution of, and the, until recently, continuing conflict in Iraq to be found on British public service television screens. ‘The *dramatic* visual spectacle of violence and death grabs attention and engages the audience like few other media subjects’ (Thussu 2007: 113). It is the ways in which this [tele]visual spectacle is frequently employed that bears close scrutiny and analysis.

Developing Judith Butler’s ideas (discussed above), Chouliaraki analyses the spectacle of suffering (or lack of) on television within a framework of television as ‘space of appearance’ and within the ‘analytics and aesthetics of mediation’ (Chouliaraki 2006: 70). Located within the remit of the principles and practices of journalistic ‘objectivity’ and the aesthetics and principles of public sphere (public service) television journalism; ‘The term “space of appearance” seeks to define the public sphere of television not only as a space of language and deliberation, but also as a space of image and visibility’ (Chouliaraki 2005: 145). Accordingly: ‘In order to be acceptable for “public visual consumption,” spectacle and emotion on television need to be constrained and managed, in certain ways’ (Chouliaraki 2005: 145) it is these constraining and ‘managing’ techniques and the effects of these techniques and practices that demand rigorous attention and critical scrutiny.

As already noted, because of its domestic setting, its ‘nowness’ and its aesthetic limitations, television, and in this example, television Current Affairs is the ‘ideal’ medium for such constructions and ‘explanations’ of conflict. Drawing on already established news narratives, and inserting into the text, already legitimated images drawn from news

broadcasts, often no further contextualisation or explanation is required, precisely because the image or set of images supports, dramatically rendered, news narratives. Television Current Affairs therefore can be seen to promote an essential inhibited and oversimplified view of the past and people, ‘not just through its paucity of detail and brevity of language, but because it is increasingly dependent upon the visual image for its direction and narrative drive’ (Hoskins 2004: 115–116).

Television’s dependence on the visual sits seamlessly and easily with the rhetoric, the exaggerated and the dramatic story-telling templates;

...one typical transformation is overstatement, which is of the same general category as over-generalisation as we know it from stereotypes and prejudices or ‘extreme case’ formulations in conversations. In addition to a change of semantic content or meaning, such a structural transformation relation between source discourse and news discourse may also be rhetorical, since rhetoric deals with the way information (meaning, content) is emphasised or de-emphasised for various reasons. This may be to emphasise the bad characteristics of out-groups or the good ones of in-groups ... but also for *dramatic effect*: where scholarly discourse tends to hedge, media discourse tends to be much more categorical and exaggerated – with the tacit assumption that readers [viewers] will be more in, or will better remember the ‘exaggerated’ news. (Van Dijk in Wahl-Jorgensen and Hanitzsch 2006: 195)

The aesthetics and visuals of television News and Current Affairs broadcasting, drawing on easily-sourced and memorable dramatic pictures, and rendered comprehensible by the accumulated audience knowledge, can, in this way function as a sort of rhetorical shorthand. It is not merely the ‘dramatic effect’ of Van Dijk’s thesis, which is always difficult to measure, but the dramatic tropes that are of interest, precisely because such representations render the ‘events’ and ‘characters’ ‘knowable’, understandable, familiar and recognisable. Or, in the case of Butler’s and Chouliaraki’s theses (echoing Foucault 1969), the limits of what is ‘speaking’, ‘liveable’ and ‘viable’ are effectively rendered visible (or not) by the mechanics and practices of television Current Affairs journalism and the perceived ‘values’ inherent within the discourse. What one effectively ends up with, is a model of broadcast, a

style that can render complex events legible. It is in this tradition that Altheide and Grimes (2005) developed what they refer to as ‘The “War Programming” model’.

2.7 The War Programming Model

In this model, Altheide and Grimes map out in some detail the patterns of reporting in the pre-conflict phase; the conflict phase; and the post-conflict phase. These patterns and techniques include: the demonisation of certain individual leaders; a focus on the ‘battle’ on the ‘front-line’ during conflict, and a post-conflict shift to a more critical approach to the conflict and a questioning of the necessity of war. It is the pre-conflict phase that is most important in the initial stages of this study. As the ‘flagship’ Current Affairs ‘show’ *Panorama* played an integral role in, what Altheide and Grimes have termed the ‘media logic’ (2005) or the ‘ecology of communication’ (2005) and as McQueen has commented ‘the media do not start the war, but they do shape the context, the audience expectations, the *discourse* and the production of symbolic meanings’ (McQueen 2009: 52). This ‘ecology of communication’ does not suggest an overt bias, nor does critique of it posit bias either. Rather ‘News becomes slanted not because of partisan bias on the part of reporters but rather because Western rules of “objectivity” lead the press to be beholden to elite, government sources’ (Aday, Livingston and Hebert 2005: 6). This echoes, of course, the already discussed notion(s) of news as discourse (Matheson), legitimated by ‘news voice’ (Schudson), the ‘strategic ritual’ (Tuchman) and of the ‘Primary Definers’ (Hall 1978a) see next Chapter. What all this means is that once, perhaps perfectly reasonable ‘media logic’, decisions are made to cover and report on elite government and policy-maker debates and actions, then the ‘War programming’ narrative becomes, at least partially, self-fulfilling, a self-fulfilling logic or ecology. ‘Journalists continue to be primarily messengers who mainly simplify and dramatize what their sources say and do’ (Gans 2004: xviii).

Gans' suggestion here seems to be that war correspondents act almost as stenographers. This is perhaps a little difficult to sustain, however, as Altheide and Grimes suggest;

...each new 'war situation' is presented by the producers as something unique and novel, while the informational and emotional context for relating to it is historically embedded in previous wars, often experienced mainly through the mass media. Analysis of news media coverage of previous wars indicates that each current war is greatly informed by images, symbols, language and experience associated with previous wars, including demonization of the enemy, the *virtues* and *necessity* of waging war, and the social and political benefits of doing so. (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 621–622)

'The "War Programming" Model' does seem to suggest, if not overt complicity, then at least an adherence to a set of 'professional' practices inadequate to the task of 'Holding power to account' (Barnett 2011: 248). It does of course also fit the terms of this thesis that the second logic and pattern mapped out by Altheide and Grimes also discusses the importance of covering the 'battle on the front-line' (2005). This representational trope is entirely appropriate (for this research) in that the focus on battle readily lends itself to the 'dramatic'. Signifying practices and representational modalities already firmly embedded, established and reproduced in a form of televisual representation more readily associated with dramatic fiction, can be, and are, easily appropriated and reproduced in News *and* Current Affairs broadcasting.

Broadcasters found themselves irresistibly drawn into the action-packed drama of war against a rarely seen enemy: if Iraqi civilians were enigmatic, the Iraqi soldiers were almost invisible – rarely seen or discussed, but generally assumed to be supportive of Saddam. This left very little time for discussions about the war's purposes or outcomes [...] the great majority of reports, 92% on the BBC [...] were simply about the coverage of war. (Lewis 2004: 305)

This thesis, while making use of Altheide and Grimes' War Programming Model (WPM), seeks to develop an additional discursive and critical frame through which ideological analysis can be undertaken. Where the WPM establishes a set of incisive and useful temporal

frames, this research develops the temporal, and constructs a rigorous additional frame that focuses on the dramatic templates and tropes employed in order to ‘tell the story(s)’. In all three narrative stages of this media logic, the pre-conflict phase; the conflict phase; the post-conflict phase, different but related elements of the *dramatic* are accentuated. The stylistic devices, the signifying practices, the tropes of story-telling are akin to those commonly associated with dramatic or fictional accounts of events. But as we shall see, they are not merely *present* in Current Affairs broadcasting of war and conflict, they are in fact consistently a *key feature*, even its organising logic. Such signifying practices and representational tropes fit perfectly with the established values and practices of television journalism; the professional(ised) ‘news voice’ of journalism; and the aesthetics of historical and contemporary public service Current Affairs journalistic discourse(s).

Said practices are also consistent with what Hoskins (2004) has called ‘Media memory’. Such practices and tropes play an increasingly important role in the defining and (re)production of events, places and peoples. ‘A logic’ of regretful necessity, of benign intervention is established. As Altheide states ‘the informational and emotional context for *relating to it* is historically embedded in previous wars’ (Altheide 2009: 143). The extent to which the *Panorama* broadcasts end up reproducing this sense of regretful but necessary and benign intervention will be analysed in detail;

...the pro-war camp were able to build on a well-established discourse about the depravity of the regime, and to stress the *moral* obligation to *liberate* the Iraqi people from such an oppressive dictatorship. While this did not provide the legal basis for intervention, it became increasingly important as a de facto justification for war. (Lewis 2004: 299)

That support for such interventions is able to be mobilised is partly explained by the news journalists’ reliance on ‘official’ sources, already discussed, and easily retrievable narratives, characters, forms and aesthetic styles.

It is hard to exaggerate the importance of this change to a *war mode of reporting*. Claims and counter-claims about the justification for military intervention became secondary as attention turned to questions concerning the actual combat. Who's winning? What does the battle *look* like? What does it *feel* like? How many of our people are getting wounded and killed? What's the strategy? What weapons are being used? When will the ground war start? Will there be a cease fire? Are the Americans going to go after Saddam Hussein? (Wolfsfeld 1997: 182)

Moreover, this reflects the previously discussed notion(s), mapped out by Gans, Wolfsfeld, Kitzing, Altheide, McQueen and Lewis that refers more explicitly to established temporal and socio-political discursive frames. A more critically developed and nuanced understanding of the geo-political situation might be considered a necessary detail for anyone wishing to fully comprehend a developing war situation. Such understanding(s), and the means through which nuanced, critical perspectives and understandings might be mobilised, are not often to be found however within the frames and representational apparatus of *Panorama*. In the discourse of television Current Affairs broadcasting, it is far easier and more economical to simply rely on already existing templates, and the narrow perspectives such templates reproduce. 'It is always much easier to *create* frames than to *change* them' (Wolfsfeld 1997: 175), how much easier still to simply continue with the well-established frame, perhaps tweaked a little in order to 'fit' the developing situation, particularly when such frameworks rely *upon* and appeal directly *to* the theses of 'law and order' and the benign nature of Western intervention. Based on such assumptions (of benign and well intentioned, if at times 'badly planned' or ineffectually prosecuted interventions (conflicts)), News and Current Affairs narratives seemingly require no further explanation or critical discussion. All the news consumer 'needs' to know is that there appears to be disruption and dislocation of the social order, somewhere and that 'we' will intervene to 'restore order'.

The disruption of social order is a recurring theme of news stories, identified by Herbert Gans (1979) as an important value in the news. That value is underscored on television. Opening with attack and disruption is the beginning of a good news story. *Dramatic conflict*, especially visually depicted, is exciting and gains the attention of the viewer, as the crisis unfolds, the viewer remains engaged, waiting to see how it will be resolved. Crisis is made to order for television news reporting of the

developing world, because little or no background information is needed to encapsulate an exciting story. (Andersen 2006: 72)

2.8 'The War on Terror' Narrative

The most developed framework of the last decade has been the 'War on Terror' narrative. Little, if any, extra background information, at least within the narrow confines of News media and Current Affairs, is required when the 'War on Terror' is the explanatory narrative. This is not to suggest that the 'War on Terror' receives no critique or overt criticism, it has been critically interrogated by, among others, Altheide (2006, 2009), Price (2011, 2013), Hodges (2011), Entman (2004), Butler (2005, 2009), Solomon (2005), Cottle (2006), Jackson (2005), Freedman and Thussu (2012), Moeller (2010), and Allan and Zelizer (2002, 2004) but in the context of News and Current Affairs broadcasting, particularly Current Affairs broadcasting that deals with conflict, it functions as *the* explanatory format. Even when subjected to questioning, or when reduced to background detail, there can be little doubt that it at least places the forthcoming or ensuing social disruption and conflict in an easily understandable, 'necessary' story and framework. What begins, or certainly could at least be more fully explained, nuanced, textured and differently framed, becomes by causal link (of course unfounded) a matter of defence against 'terror states' in the developing and unfolding 'War on Terror' narrative.

It is at this point we can see how the Bush administration and its allies have exploited the elliptical nature of the news media's influence on public opinion. Those involved in advertising – our culture's most abundant persuasive discourse – have long understood that you make claims not by argument but by association. You do not say that a product will make you attractive or popular – such claims may be proved untenable – you simply *associate* the product with attractiveness or popularity. In the same way, those making the case for war with Iraq would juxtapose it – vaguely, intangibly, but repeatedly – with the war on terrorism. For a public with a limited knowledge of geo-politics, these associations become the building blocks for making sense of the world. (Lewis 2004: 297)

In a piece of research that is *not* explicitly 'Political science' but one rooted in Media, Culture and Journalism, the point here is not (necessarily) to offer overt critique of actions taken but

to notice and critique the lexical, semiotic, discursive choices and consequently to ask questions regarding the applicability of the phrase ‘The War on Terror’ as narrative or legitimising phrase. Adopted uncritically, the term functions as a legitimising phrase used to justify a range of different approaches to a range of different contextual (and actual) fields. The number of different events to which such a term is applied bears scrutiny. Used across a range of different actions, territories and events, whether Syria, Georgia, Pakistan, Yemen, Israel/Gaza, or as in this case, Iraq, all with their own geographical, political, social, cultural contexts, does the phraseology serve to actually define the context, or merely to sweep up different actions too broadly into a dominant narrative arc, thus erasing the local contextual (battle) field?

Because the ‘War on Terror’ narrative exists beyond the immediate confines of the Iraq conflict, once present, in fact dominant, it can be seamlessly linked with forthcoming and ensuing conflicts. Post September 11th 2001, ‘the meaning of terrorism changed from a method to a condition of the world’ (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 626).

If, as stated here, terrorism shifts exponentially from a *mere* technique to something akin to a constant state, a ‘condition of the world’ then it is not too difficult a task for elite political actors and the(ir) agents of dissemination to construct ‘our’ response to ‘terror’ in a similarly urgent manner. What I mean by this is: if terror is a constant, and moreover, an all-encompassing, all consuming, all pervading state (of our very conditions of existence) then the ability to move beyond this state, to move outside, are curtailed to such an extent as to be considered impossible. Journalistically and televisually, the discursive ‘logic’ is set.

What has changed, since September 11, 2001, is the ability of this discourse (discourse of terror/terrorist states) to engage public opinion, making terrorism highly newsworthy and a key area of public concern. If the problem of terrorism can be linked to the need to take *military* action, it provides a rationale for military spending. (Lewis 2004: 296)

The ‘rational’ response of Western governments’ and the similarly ‘rational’ agents of dissemination (in this example, broadcast Current Affairs broadcasting in the form of *Panorama*) are trapped in a circular logic. Western *military actions* become mere *responses*. Responses to the all-pervading violent, irrational, inconsolable state and ‘condition of the world’ (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 626). ‘Suddenly, from a technique that is available to any organisation, state or “non-state”, which has access to the means of coercion or intimidation, terror(ism) becomes something entirely alien to democracy’ (Price 2010: 23).

This inconsolable state and condition is located within the discourse of fear, of the maniacal ‘Other’ (Said 1978), marked against the rational agents of western states. ‘The Gulf conflict represents an excellent example in which the news media enthusiastically adopted the authorities’ *law and order* frame and virtually ignored the *injustice and defiance* frame being promoted by the challenger’ (Wolfsfeld 1997: 170). So the Iraq conflict beginning in 2003 was, and continues to be characterised by the rationale of the ‘War on Terror’ and a ‘law and order’ frame and its logical extension: the assumed ‘values’ inherent in the ‘benign’ and necessary Western intervention.

Given the focus on ‘Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction programme’ that dominated the build up to the 2003 conflict, the ‘law and order’ frame was easily mobilised and perfectly able to fit within the war programming model, or the crisis mode of reporting (Wolfsfeld 1997). Once breached, this mode of reporting proves rather difficult to retreat from.

Research on “news decision making” suggests that commercial news organisations’ tend to select items and events for news reporting that can be told in narratives that express ethnocentrism, altruistic democracy, responsible capitalism, small town pastoralism, individualism, modernism, social order, and national leadership (Gans 1979; Wasburn 2002). In other words, reports are favoured that sustain news audiences’ worldviews about world order and legitimacy. (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 628–629)

This particular reading and approach fits perfectly within the realm of what Chomsky and Herman might term the bounds of acceptable opinion (1988) and what we might refer to as the discursive limit;

...the media are able to claim they are fulfilling journalistic ideals of balance and objectivity when a conflict is underway by switching to presenting and analysing the ability of government to achieve the goals it has set. (McQueen 2010: 64)

As Cottle (2006), Lewis et al. (2006), Altheide and Grimes (2005), and Barnett (2011) discuss, once conflict is underway, reporting the war becomes about immediacy and drama. The needs of the story, to depict the *heat* of the battle, as opposed to the '*light*' of analysis, take precedence over any need or desire to adequately contextualise the bigger picture. With regards the BBC Current Affairs output there are precedents. Most notable perhaps was the case of the *Panorama* programme covering the 'arms to Iraq' scandal that engulfed the Government of the day. Due for broadcast in January 1991:

Birt unilaterally pulled the programme, not because he had any problem with the integrity or accuracy of the journalism but because, in his own words, 'I was extremely concerned that the BBC should maintain the trust of the British people at a time of war'. (Barnett 2011: 120)

One of the interesting things to note with regards 'maintaining the trust of the British people during a time of war' is the internalised and embedded journalistic 'logic' that trust is somehow maintained by concealing, delaying, subverting or just plain absencing issues of socio-political and geo-political importance from public service Current Affairs output. However, we can take this further. The reproduction of not only the content but the method of dissemination then serves to reinforce dominant idea(s) about what constitutes a reasoned and reasonable 'response' to the constant 'condition of the world'. The extent (or existence of) these 'threats; the *response(s)* to said threats; and, most of all, *the limitations prescribed* by representational trope(s) found in *Panorama* are central components of this thesis;

...thus reports will be less favourable or sensible to audiences if they suggest that the institution of government has failed, that the process of selecting leaders is corrupt, and that decisions about life and death, such as declaring war, are made with neither the national interest in mind, or with the well-being of citizens as a priority. (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 629)

This has wider philosophical, political, social, cultural and professional (journalistic discourse) ramifications. The desire for wider critical ‘self’-examination, of systems and values, perhaps considered ‘innately’ superior and thus ‘exportable’, is not easily located. Conversely, the assumption regarding a level of institutional governmental corruption of ‘Othered’ societies is well established. A narrative that ‘they’ require ‘our’ benign intervention (the new Divine Intervention) to free them from the despotic, irrational, undemocratic, regime under which they labour, is, given this context, very easily mobilised. Of crucial importance in this mobilised narrative is the erasure of wider social, geo-political, military/industrial contextual detail. By this I mean: any trace that ‘we’ might have some, even minor, role to play, or have played, in this ‘institutionally corrupt’ ‘regime’, in its foundations, its perpetuation, its underpinning, its (covert) financial support via the instruments of oppression (torture; military machinery; diplomatic support and aid; compliant marketisation of economy; etc.) is *almost* entirely absent. Absented by (geo)-political and ideological ‘necessity’ (sic) it might be but, it is surely the task of critical broadcast Current Affairs journalism, such as the exemplar, *Panorama*, to critically interrogate this position. Therefore, this research asks the question: to what extent is this near total absence (of counter-hegemonic narratives) a condition of the televisual and journalistic practices, aesthetics and discourses of the Current Affairs form? News journalism’s (particularly on television) most repeated trick is the erasure of historical and contextual detail. This erasure seems to be particularly acute when such detail represents ‘us’ in less favourable light. The extent to which this can be explained by journalistic news values; news gathering techniques; the practices and belief in the ‘impartiality’ principle found in ‘public service’ and ‘public

sphere' broadcasting; the dramatic templates; the aesthetics of television journalism; the established frames; and concomitant 'values' such broadcasting practices (re)produce, will be analysed and critically interrogated in detail during the course of this thesis. For the purposes of this thesis, and the position it sets out, these analytical frames serve as a demonstration of the social and cultural power of dominant, accepted and established practices, media forms and codes and conventions of broadcast, and the(ir) concomitant ability to establish then reproduce particular interpretations and representations of various crises.

2.9 Panorama as Exemplar of the Form

As has been outlined in Chapter 1, given that the very currency on which *Panorama* trades is precisely that it has been and continues to be a critical perspective that 'digs *behind* the headlines' (Holland 2006: xiii) how do the specificities of the 'War Programming Model' and the ways in which 'dramatic' modes of representation are used, work in this contextual frame? The extended timeframe (each *Panorama* episode analysed in this research is 50 minutes in length) is purportedly designed to provide a level of detail, critique, explanation, investigation and wide-reaching critical interrogation of those in power and the decisions that they make. To what extent *Panorama* is commensurate with 'objective' (or 'impartial') journalism; embodies the traits and tropes of television Current Affairs practice; and is related to the wider rationales found within television News, is one of the central questions this thesis sets out to examine. The extent to which *Panorama* functions discursively, as a 'constraining and managing' (Chouliaraki 2005: 145) text, and the journalistic and dramatic tropes it employs in order to 'tell the stories' of conflict (in Iraq) will be critically examined. In short; whether, under scrutiny, *Panorama* functions as a rigorous examination of the powerful (Lindley 2002) or as a necessary fig leaf of critique. Or whether criticism and scepticism are allowable (even encouraged) but within acceptable limits (Chomsky 2003).

‘Criticism is included within the overall discourse of War Programming; it has a place, but not larger than is warranted by a script that has emerged through numerous interactions between journalists and politicians over several wars’ (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 630). Over the coming chapters I will attempt to map out this terrain and interrogate the extent to which Current Affairs broadcast journalism, specifically *Panorama*, is seen to be upholding the practices and ‘values’ of ‘objective’, ‘impartial’ journalism. For if it is still the case that;

...television matters because it remains central to people’s lives, and television journalism matters, partly because it still commands proper resources and mass audiences, and partly because it upholds the central tenets of professional practice: truth telling and holding power to account. (Barnett 2011: 248)

Then are said ‘central tenets’ and ‘professional practices’ adhered to by *Panorama* adequate to the task they have been set, and are largely assumed to uphold?

2.10 Concluding Remarks

While there is a reasonably long and well-established history of ideological analysis of television News, and, what is more, some focused lengthy analysis of the BBC’s tendency to take a consensual approach to news reporting, and, notably, that the BBC News reports tend to produce misunderstanding because of a lack of context, most notably Philo’s 1990 *Seeing and Believing: The Influence of Television* and Philo and Berry’s 2004 *Bad News from Israel*, there is a lack of focused attention paid to, and analysis of Current Affairs television. As discussed above, regarding the term (and practice) there is an elasticity, a flexibility to the ‘genre’ of Current Affairs television journalism. As such, often, it either entirely disappears as a form to be analysed, or, more frequently, it is conflated with that of the News genre. While of course sharing some subject, content, journalistic and stylistic conventions with television News, the form or genre is, as discussed above, however different. These differences and similarities need to be foregrounded and identified precisely because the

forms function differently. So, there is a paucity of academic studies into the ‘long(er) form’ journalism that is Current Affairs broadcast television. Equally problematic though is the fact that, the longest running Current Affairs broadcast strand in the world, one largely acknowledged as the BBC ‘flagship’ brand, *Panorama* is almost entirely overlooked in academic (and popular) analyses. The fact of this lack of attention is somewhat surprising, and is an oversight that demands to be addressed. Other than Lindley’s 2002 (non-academic) book *Panorama: Fifty Years of Pride and Paranoia*, the only other significant book length study is David McQueen’s (as yet unpublished) PhD, *BBC TV’s Panorama, conflict coverage and ‘Westminster Consensus’* (2010). This research makes occasional reference to McQueen’s work (he kindly made his PhD available) and where there are similarities, not least the focus on Iraq, and the general findings that the coverage tends to be favourable to (Western) political elites (in McQueen’s language ‘The Westminster Consensus’), these will be acknowledged. However, there are marked differences. Firstly, combining a number of frames and approaches, not least my own focus on the dramatic elements and discursive focus, means this research develops an original and quite different methodology. Using, but developing Altheide and Grimes War Programming Model, the methodological approach here seeks to examine the discourses, the televisual and journalistic practices, and assess the preponderance of dramatic signifying practices employed. In so doing, this research is an attempt to construct a critical and systemic analytical and methodological approach to the analysis of Current Affairs broadcast journalism. While the analytical and discursive focus remains specifically trained on the BBC (and *Panorama* in particular), and conflict coverage, it is proposed that the developed methodology and methodological frames will provide an original analytical approach suitable for being applied across a range of Public Service-oriented Current Affairs ‘journalism-led’ (Holland, P. 2001. 149) broadcasts, and,

additionally, an analytical frame, a methodological approach that is applicable across a range of subject matters (not merely Conflict programming).

This chapter has sought to locate my own developing research in the context of the relevant academic literature in the field(s). The academic literature engaged with is that which principally concerns itself with:

Television – as form, as domestically located, further, that its representational tropes are dominated by the genre of ‘Realism’.

Television News – its formal characteristics and tropes.

Current Affairs broadcasting – its generic flexibility and inexactitude, its style, its relation to the News genre, *and* as demarcated from News.

Journalism – the discourses of journalistic practices, the languages, the source-relations.

The Public Sphere – its currency and validity.

Public Service Broadcasting – its relation to the Public Sphere, its relation to televisual forms, its adherence to ‘impartiality’ and the extent to which this adherence is sufficient, or whether such adherence amounts to a narrow discursive formation.

The contemporary trend for ‘Infotainment’ in News and Current Affairs broadcasting – the contemporary focus on entertaining forms for explaining complex events.

The ‘War on Terror’ – the extent to which this forms a dominant explanatory format in the early twenty-first century.

The ‘War Programming Model’ – the efficacy of this mode of analysis with regards critically interrogating *Panorama* and its coverage of conflict.

All of the above establish a thread, a framework, and lead to my own focus on the various aspects of the ‘dramatic’ elements that are employed by *Panorama* in order to tell the story of the Iraq conflict. This thesis will assess and analyse the extent to which, whilst adhering to (restricted by) the tenets developed and enshrined within professionalised journalistic practice and principles of ‘impartiality’; Adhering *to* and restricted *by* the aesthetic limitations of the televisual form, and further; in utilising the tropes and characteristics of ‘the dramatic’, *Panorama* might be said to discursively reproduce both journalistic *and* societal normative

‘ideals’. Such normative ideals though, instead of rigorously challenging the powerful, dominant, hegemonic interests, are instead perfectly commensurate with perceived ‘values’ of western hegemony and (the always unspoken) imperialist interests.

Having outlined, discussed and analysed much of the complimentary academic research in this chapter, in the next chapter I will not move on to discuss the theoretical overview and methodological approach.

Chapter 3

Theoretical Overview and Methodological Approach

Having located this research in the context of the BBC, its adherence to notions of impartiality, and the generic specificities of Current Affairs; and having identified, critically interrogated, and located my own research within much of the academic scholarship in the field(s) relating to my research, the purpose of this chapter is a) to develop, outline and provide a critical overview of some key theoretical terms, and to discuss the ways in which said key terms are applicable in the context of my research. Chief among the theoretical terms are the notions of the ‘archetype’ and its relation to ‘stereotypes’ and dramatic forms of representation; the ways in which ‘Primary Definers’ are used and functionalised in Current Affairs broadcasts and discourse; the ways in which such practices effectively reproduce already-existing narratives and ‘hegemony’; b) to clearly identify, discuss and outline the research methods most apposite to my task. The following chapter will also identify and examine the methodological approach best-suited to analysing the television Current Affairs form, and outlining the overall theoretical approach the remainder of the research adopts.

3.1. Key Terms and Theoretical overview

Given that one of the main focal points and key contributions this thesis will make centres on the somewhat unexpected use of drama in Current Affairs broadcasting, this section will map out some of the key theoretical terms. It will be argued and demonstrated that the use of drama and related dramatic signifiers – the like of which one tends to expect to ordinarily find in fictional(ised) accounts and representations – are here employed in Current Affairs broadcasting. In so doing, the question arises: does the Current Affairs strand *Panorama* essentially reproduce hegemonic discourse? And if so, how? In order to outline and discuss this prognosis, first it is necessary to critically outline some important key terms and theoretical territory.

3.1.1. Primary Definers

As discussed in the previous chapter, News is made-up of institutionally recognised and legitimated social actors and sources. By ‘actors’ in this context I mean those in various positions who take key decisions. In the tradition of Media and Cultural Studies, these sources are referred to as ‘Primary Definers’;

In the main, journalists position themselves so that they have access to institutions which generate a useful volume of reportable activity at regular intervals...[these are] professional ideological rules in journalism. The important point is that these professional rules give rise to the practice of ensuring that media statements are, wherever possible, grounded in 'objective' and 'authoritative' statements from 'accredited' sources. This means constantly turning to accredited representatives of major social institutions. (Rock in Hall et al. *Policing the Crisis* 1978: 60)

We know that News (and Current Affairs) perform(s) a vital social function, and according to Wollacott:

The news' performs a crucial role in defining events, although this is seen as *secondary* to the *primary definers*: accredited sources in government and other institutions. The media also serve 'to reinforce a consensual viewpoint by using public idioms and by claiming to voice public opinion (Woollacott 1982: 109)

In this light, building on the ideas articulated by Hall *et al*, Wollacott, and Tuchman, Aeron Davis goes on to comment;

Journalists, in attempting to fulfil ‘public interest’ aims and present authoritative accounts, purposively seek out those who already appear knowledgeable, authoritative or representative. As such they reinforce as well as reflect power imbalances by awarding such ‘primary definers’ greater visibility and legitimacy. (Davis 2007: 40)

According to this logic, said sources *primarily define* the event itself, the narrative orientation, the spheres of influence, and, importantly, the parameters of (legitimate) debate. In this context then, the frame(s) are *primarily defined* by both institutional sources of primary information (officially designated and trusted sources/voices) and secondarily, those definers of dissemination (journalists as ‘secondary definers’), both of which, when combined, engage in a mutually beneficial, or symbiotic relationship. If the institutional and structural relationship between Primary Definers (accredited, legitimated sources) and

‘Secondary Definers’ (journalists and reporters) is relatively fixed, then this symbiotic relationship between sources and reporters will effectively go some way to circumscribe the limits and parameters of debate.

However, is the relationship, the interaction and interrelation between ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary Definers’ that neat and tidy? Are there complexities and difficulties? Does the very notion of the primary definer assume too much passivity on the part of the journalist or reporter? Does the assumption of the Primary Definer and its *primary* role in journalistic reportage overlook or side-line competing interests even among elite sources? Does it provide no room or space for journalistic agency? In this light, there are a number of criticisms levelled at Hall et al’s notion of Primary Definers, most notably by Schlesinger and Tumber (1994). These ideas are discussed below.

3.1.2 The Problem(s) with ‘Primary Definers’

Schlesinger and Tumber identify six issues, flaws or at least overlooked and less than satisfactory assumptions with the Primary Definers framework. Given this thesis’s overall concerns and partial reliance on the idea and frame, I will discuss each point in detail as they relate to my research, below.

First, the notion of ‘primary definition’ is more problematic than it seems. The broad characterization offered does not take account of contention between official sources in trying to influence the construction of a story. In cases of dispute, say, amongst members of the same government over a key question of policy, who is the *primary* definer (Schlesinger and Tumber. 1999. 258)

According to this first point then, the notion of the ‘Primary definer(s)’ overlooks or ‘does not take account tension of contention’ among elite sources as to who and which version of events, the ‘primary definition’ will emerge. It might in fact be particularly the case when the issue is a highly contentious and dangerous one of global conflict, in which case, the above may well be pertinent to this case study. It is certainly true that in some of the sample episodes there is some visible (televised) contention and dispute among elite ‘primary

definer' sources, some of whom are members of the same government. However, across the sample, the *primary and* hegemonic definitions do dominate. Straw, Blair, assorted military sources and commanders, US policy-makers, individual soldiers, chiefs of staff et al literally 'have most to say' (Van Dijk. 1993 in Wetherell 2001), are not consistently challenged, certainly not ideologically so, and even when subject to some critique or minor challenge, the challenge is phrased and framed as one of practicalities, and not counter-hegemonic or ideological. Even with some notable moments of dispute and contention, the extent to which the overall objectives, and the view of 'us' are remarkably similar, such that even if not easily traced as emerging from easily identifiable 'primary definers' there simply *is* a primary definition, an assumption of (hegemonic) benign intent. So even if and when there are 'cases of dispute, say, amongst members of the same government over a key question of policy' (Schlesinger and Tumber. 1999. 258) what remains dominant (or hegemonic), certainly in the sample collated and analysed here, is the 'benign intervention' thesis.

Second, the formulation of Hall et al, fails to register the well-established fact that official sources often attempt to influence the construction of a story by using 'off-the-record' briefings – in which case the primary definers do not appear directly as such, in unveiled and unattributable form (Schlesinger and Tumber. 1999. 258)

With regards the above criticism, while 'off-the-record' briefings can of course shape policy and narrative orientation, they can alter things in the background, in the sample collated and analysed in this research, there are no discussions or mentions of 'off the record' sources. Perhaps this is usual, after all, 'off-the-record' might mean exactly that. However, usually, when such briefings are present, they are at least acknowledged even if the 'source' is not directly identified. In the many hours of coverage included in this research, there are no references to such sources, they do not appear. Equally important however is that in the period of conflict, perhaps imbued with desire for 'World Statesman' status, most sources

were only too happy to 'own' the policy, thus 'off-the-record' briefings were seemingly redundant.

The third criticism bears some close resemblance to the second, insofar as it revolves around potentially competing elite sources:

Drawing of boundaries of primary definition...presumably, primary definition is intended to include all consensually recognised 'representative' voices. But access to the media is plainly not equally open to members of the political class. PM's and presidents routinely command disproportionate attention and politicians may also use media strategies to gain attention for themselves in competition with others. There is nothing in the formulation of primary defining that permits us to deal with such inequalities of access amongst the privileged themselves. (Schlesinger and Tumber 1999. 258-259)

While the above has merit, they are correct, the formulation seemingly does not allow for dealing with 'inequalities of access amongst the privileged elites themselves', this research – as an analysis of discourse - is chiefly concerned not necessarily with the processes of selection (of sources) but with their dominant presence on screen, in the narrative, as 'those with most to say'. As the analysis goes on to demonstrate, it is the extent to which clearly identifiable 'primary definers' are present that is important. By dint of their presence (and dominance), particularly those with the highest profile, able to help 'set the agenda' on the screen itself that identifies specific actors to be 'primary definers' and not the relationship between them and the *Panorama* journalists. This research is interested in the final 'product' (content), not necessarily with process of selection itself. Many that 'have the most to say' in fact end up saying remarkably similar things. Thus, *Primarily Defining* the parameters of debate and the subsequent narrative orientation.

Fourth, there is the unconsidered question of longer-term shifts in the structure of access. Writing in the 1970's, it may have been obvious to talk of the CBI and the TUC as major institutional voices. But with the disappearance of corporatism in Britain under successive Conservative Governments, such interests have lost their one-time prominence. What this point reveals is the tacit assumption that certain forces are permanently present in the power structure. It is thus an atemporal model, underpinned by the notion that primary definers are simply accredited to their dominant ideological place in virtue of an institutional location. (Schlesinger and Tumber. 1999. 259)

The ‘atemporal’ point is interesting and certainly important. Does the model assume too concrete and immovable structural conditions? For instance, in the ‘neoliberal era’ the formerly institutional voice and presence of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) might indeed be less legitimate, (though of course the CBI (Confederation of British Industry) remains preeminent) it certainly plays a smaller, less significant role in public, political and journalistic life, but who replaces it? What I mean is that even though the ‘atemporality’ point has credence and relevance, it is not as if the TUC has now been replaced (in the journalistic, sourcing relationship) by a more radical group? The TUC have not been replaced by the radical coalition of Marxist Accountants. In part, a version of this argument has already featured (see Chapter 1) insofar as, post Bretton-Woods, the wider social, economic and political forces that emerged, means that the BBC had already shifted focus towards those same forces – *and (as) sources* – that dominate public discourse. As former BBC labour and industrial correspondent, Nicholas Jones has documented, labour correspondents became something of a ‘lost tribe’ replaced by a stream of ‘city’ and ‘business correspondents’ (Jones, N 2011). What this means is that while the individual and institutional relations might fluctuate, hegemonically, things stay the same (or even get worse).

So, using the above critique, in our example of the Iraq war, who precisely could or would provide a contrary institutional voice. Who becomes or is cast as an oppositional ‘accredited’ ‘legitimate’ social and political actor? Parliamentary opposition was muted other than the ‘usual suspects’. When the assorted ‘Peace movements’ were cited – and in fact, as we shall see, actually featured in *Panorama: Blair’s War* – they were largely delegitimated and ‘cast’ or characterised as rather maverick, and on the ‘fringes’ of society. As such, in the *Panorama* sample, they might serve a useful and necessary (impartiality) function, but they remain largely cast aside, on the ‘fringes’ of debate. To assume that mere presence in the

broadcast is equivalent to having the ability to help set an agenda is mistaken. Mere protagonists are manifestly not the same as Primary Definers. They never quite achieve the position of a legitimate or ‘significant strand of thought’ (http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/guidelines/editorialguidelines/pdfs/Section_04_Impartiality.pdf).

Schlesinger’s and Tumber’s fifth explicit criticism revolves around passivity and the seeming lack of journalistic agency:

The media are characterised as a subordinate site for the reproduction of the ideological field: in effect, they conceived as ‘secondary definers’...Hall et al tend to overstate the passivity of the media as recipients of information from news sources: the flow of definitions is seen as moving uniformly from the centres of power to the media...Aside from seeing the media as excessively passive, this way of conceiving of their relations to news sources tends to elide the variations that exist within and between different news media. Access for ‘alternative’ viewpoints differs as between the press and television, and indeed, as between different newspapers. (Schlesinger and Tumber. 1999. 259)

Again, while this point is certainly interesting and potentially important, this research is chiefly concerned with what actually appears on screen as the final ‘product’. No doubt there was a degree of scepticism, some agonising over angles’, approaches, challenges but the end point, the discourse that appears is largely, if not exactly uniform, then at least hegemonic and uncritical of Western imperialist power (the term seems totally disavowed). It is also true that the expectations might in fact suggest some semblance of conflict would in fact make for ‘good television’ but there is seemingly little call or need for conflict, for drama between ‘us’ when the Iraqi ‘Other’ serves up a far more compelling set of contrasting characters and narrative orientations.

The final critique from Schlesinger and Tumber revolves around:

...the conception of the ‘primary definition’ renders largely invisible the activities of sources that attempt to generate ‘counter-definitions’. This rules out any analysis of the process of recognition about policy questions between power-holders and their opponents that may occur prior to the issuing of what are assumed to be primary definitions. (Schlesinger and Tumber. 1999. 260)

Again, in practice this may well indeed be the case – in fact, television, reliant, as it is, on the ‘dramatic’ might be more inclined to represent arguments and ‘counter-definitions’ than other forms of representation precisely because such ‘counter-definitions’ set up moments of character conflict, and ‘plot twists’. Nevertheless, the actual discourse on display, the dominant (and largely hegemonic) discourse(s) present never really gain much counter-hegemonic momentum. For example, there are some notable moments of dispute as to Primary Definition in the episode: *Panorama: Blair’s War* in which Ken Clarke features as highly-critical of ‘Blair’s War’. However, this narrative and character is easily embedded within ‘parliamentary’ politicking. As a Conservative, Clarke is expected to challenge Labour Government. Also, his presence does not puncture the Primary Definition too fully, his character, his position as protagonist but *not* ‘Primary Definer’ functions as a mere addendum not a counter-hegemonic narrative arc. The contention around primary definition in this case, is not one of dispute as to whether ‘we’ ought to prosecute war against Iraq. There is certainly some critique and contention allowable and present in the sample. The ‘Primary Definition’ is instead the assumption that – even if mistaken – ‘our’ motivations are/were wholly benign and well-founded. This is definitively linked to notions of hegemony *and* to characterisation and archetypes. It might very well be possible to concede some dispute, some contention, some disagreement on some minor policy goals, or means of achieving certain policy goals, but the hegemonic – which the next section discusses – remains precisely that.

So perhaps the notion of the ‘Primary Definer’, at least on first reading, may appear to place the media in too subordinate or passive a position in relation to their sources. However, given that the focus of this research is not necessarily concerned with the detailed sourcing processes journalists go through, but is instead ‘textual’ and discursive, then some of the criticisms by Schlesinger and Tumber adroitly identify are less relevant here. What I mean is that this research is not overly concerned with the processes the journalists go through in

order to source the information. At the analytical stage of this thesis, the decisions have been made, the evidence is before us, what is on screen before us, and the hegemonic narrative it reproduces is the chief concern of this discourse analysis. High-profile and already-legitimated sources seemingly provide a relatively easy access route to official and legitimated opinion, positions and policy options, in the example of the data captured here, while not being wholly in-hoc to them (Primary Definers) said elite sources certainly dominate. This assessment is, in some ways, consistent with Hallin's critique:

...the *routines* of objective journalism, which tied the news closely to the *official sources* and the Washington agenda, and the ideology of the cold war, which locked events in a framework of understanding that made fundamental questioning of American foreign policy unthinkable. (Hallin, D 1986. 110. *Emphasis added*)

In his case study of Vietnam, Hallin explains 'that television coverage was highly dependent both on official sources in Washington, and probably more important in the early years of the war, on military sources in Vietnam' (Hallin, D. 1986. 111). Such practises, it is argued, have the effect of placing the war beyond 'the sphere of legitimate controversy' (Hallin, D. 1986. 111). Nearly 50 years later, broadly similar themes seem to be present here.

While many of the critiques and criticisms regarding the theoretical and practical issues with the term 'Primary Definers' are valid, the extent to which the presence in the *Panorama* sample of (assumed) Primary Definers is consistent. This means the use of the term, critically but nevertheless still deployed, is relevant here. This is to not suggest that Primary and Secondary Definers, with their ability to 'reinforce as well as reflect power imbalances' (Davis, A. 2007) can wholly explain *Panorama's* largely hegemonic discourse. The point here is to analyse the extent to which *Panorama* deploys particular dramatic elements and techniques, and whether such techniques hegemonise particular discourses and epistemologies. Is *Panorama* able to build-on the established characters and archetypes of dramatically rendered Primary Definers? The extent to which both Primary and Secondary Definers adhere to a series of hegemonic narratives is striking. The discourses in the

examples contained in this research are almost wholly uncritical of Western power (assuming its general benevolence) meaning that to some extent, the term(s) have critical and explanatory validity and currency in this research. The (relative) straightjacket of ‘impartiality’; the ‘News Values’ orientations of recency, clarity and unambiguity; the televisual demands and requirements for narrative structure(s), archetypes and narrative closure; the over-reliance on ‘key legitimated sources’ all combine to produce a discourse largely in-line with many of the dominant Primary Definer political actors. Importantly, as discussed by Schlesinger and Tumber (above) even when there are, even among the elite political and social actors, some competing narratives, this ‘competition’, this apparent battle for narrative dominance never translates into overt critical interrogation of the assumed benevolence of Western power. Or, to put it another way: even when there are competing narratives from (notionally) competing Primary Definers, it is rare that counter-hegemonic discourse(s) emerge, solidify, perpetuate or gain the necessary legitimacy or currency. To adopt the BBC charters own terms, the competing narratives and voices are rarely awarded the status of ‘significant strands of thought’; or ‘main strands of argument’, never really permitted to challenge the existing legitimated ‘strands’. In other words, the battle for narrative prominence (even dominance) is often conducted as an ‘inter-elite’ (Davis 2003) struggle, and one that never transforms into anything close to counter-hegemonic. Primary Definition ‘sets the limit for all subsequent discussion by framing what the problem is’ (Hall, S et al. 1978. 59) and *what* (and who) the problem *is* in these examples turns out to be remarkably consistent across the sample.

3.2 Television Journalism, Current Affairs Discourse and Hegemony

Both because it directly relates to the above discussed notions of elite actors Primarily Defining the political, economic, social and cultural landscape, *and* because it provides a vital

analytical frame and helpfully explains a number of issues this thesis concerns itself with, the concept of hegemony is vital. Simply put:

Hegemony describes the general predominance of particular class, political, and ideological interests within a given society. Although society is composed of varied conflicting class interests, the ruling class exercises hegemony insofar as its interests are recognised and accepted as the prevailing ones. (White, M. 1992. 167)

Principally then, that 'ruling class interests are recognised and accepted as the prevailing ones' is the chief concern. The various means by which such interests are naturalised, normalised and secured as common-sense is then of vital interest.

As Barker (below) outlines, the hegemonic model (of analysis) provides a framework for understanding and interrogating cultural (media) 'products'' propensity for securing hegemony or at least reproducing ruling class interests as analogous with all our interest.

Within cultural studies the hegemonic model has been popular. Any given culture is constructed in terms of a multiplicity of streams of meaning. However, it is argued that there is a strand of meanings that can be reasonably called ascendant or dominant (Hall, 1981; Williams, 1973). The process of making, maintaining and reproducing these authoritative sets of meanings and practices has, after Gramsci (1968) been dubbed cultural hegemony (Barker, C. 2008. 319)

One of the most important discussions around the concept of hegemony lies in its covert or at least concealed nature. What I mean by this is that ruling-class interests are seemingly able to institute themselves as common interests, or 'common-sense'. Convincing (a) subaltern class(es) to acquiesce in their own oppression, disenfranchisement or at the very least to operate in ways that actively disenfranchise, and act in ways which harm their (our) own material interests, is remarkably prevalent. However, how are such things achieved? How are they able to persuade a mass of people to acquiesce?

Some clues as to how are elucidated by (among others) Lawrence Grossberg. He explains that hegemony is not:

...limited to the ideological struggle of the ruling class bloc to win the consent of the masses to its definitions of reality, although it encompasses the processes by which such a consensus might be achieved. ...Hegemony need not depend on the consensus

nor consent to particular ideological constructions. It is a matter of containment rather than compulsion or even incorporation. (Grossberg, L. 1996. 163)

Herein lies one of hegemony's key facets. It is precisely because coercion is not required, indeed for Grossberg, not even consent, but 'containment'. What are the methods of both persuasion and containment and where can one readily find examples?

Some answers can be located precisely in the unique mix of the journalistic and the televisual found in *Panorama*. One of the journalistic containing mechanisms can be found in the already discussed notion of Primary Definition, and Primary (and Secondary) Definition is inextricably linked to the idea of cultural hegemony, for, as Barker explains:

Within a hegemonic model, ideological processes in *news production* are not the result of direct intervention by owners or even a conscious attempt at manipulation by journalists. Rather, they are an outcome of the *routine attitudes* and *working practices* of staff. (Barker, C. 2008. 319 *emphasis added*)

The above 'routines' and 'working practices' certainly has echoes of Tuchman's institutional(ised) 'strategic rituals', and latterly with Aeron Davis's work on financial journalists: that in order to do their job, journalists routinely and consistently 'purposively seek out those who already appear knowledgeable, authoritative or representative. As such they reinforce as well as reflect power imbalances by awarding such 'primary definers' greater visibility and legitimacy'. (Davis 2007: 40). It is through this kind of frame, at least in part, that this research operates and seeks to examine *Panorama*.

Gramsci's notion of hegemony is important for introducing and reconfiguring notions of cultural as well as political leadership because it privileges civil society and hence the element of consent rather than coercion' (Landy, M. 1994. 58)

Precisely because hegemony is not operationalised through coercion, but through 'consent' and/or 'containment', and being non-coercive, but instead persuasive, the flagship broadcast journalism text *Panorama* requires critical interrogation and analysis. The extent to which *Panorama* might be said to, at least partially, operationalise, concretise, temporarily secure and reproduce hegemonic discourse by, among other things, 'the attitudes' and working

practices of staff' (Barker, C 2008. 319), and the narratives and discourses produced *by* such practices, must be examined. Having a well-established legitimacy, and utilising the televisual tropes of the form, *Panorama* can certainly be 'persuasive'. However, by restricting counter-hegemonic voices, while simultaneously foregrounding Primary Definers, *Panorama* can also perform a 'containing' function: 'the definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power' (Schattschneider 1960: 68 *in* Perloff 2014: 121). Does *Panorama* then function as a hegemonic text? Or is there sufficient space provided for counter-hegemonic discourse(s) to emerge, take shape, institute themselves, to become 'issues of common concern' (Habermas) or, 'significant strands of thought' (BBC)? These are some of the questions this thesis sets out to examine.

3.3 Television and Narrative Structures and Drama

Televisually, one of the means through which 'containment' is operationalised, might be found through the presence and examination of the traditional 'narrative structure' first identified then systematically theorised by Vladimir Propp. These narrative structures appear to be consistently applied, and consistently appear across different *story genres*:

Propp's work (1968) provides the most extreme example of syntagmatic structuralist analysis. He analysed one hundred Russian folk tales and found an identical narrative structure in each of them (Fiske, J. 1987. 135)

According to this analysis, an identical structure is common to dramatic (or dramatized) stories. As Livingstone (1990) outlines:

Various partially compatible schemes exist for understanding narrative, many prompted by Propp's (1968) scheme for folk tales. Propp realised that apparently diverse stories all draw upon a constant underlying structure. This structure has a standard set of character roles (hero, villain, magical helper etc.) and a standard event sequence (setting, discovery of a problem or lack, hero sets out on a journey, and so on until the goal is reached and overcoming of the lack is celebrated). (Livingstone, S. 1990. 74-75)

If the above prognoses – that 'apparently diverse stories all draw upon a constant underlying structure'; and that '...this structure has a standard set of character roles (hero, villain,

magical helper etc.) and a standard event sequence’ – are true, then Propp’s model could provide a workable analytical and practical schema for understanding perhaps all *story genres*, including television representation, and even that found in the notionally non-dramatic, such as Current Affairs. The characters that feature in Current Affairs tend to be ‘the hero’; ‘the villain’ with perhaps the media in general functioning as ‘the dispatcher’, the one who makes the evil of the villain known and sends the hero off in pursuit.

Furthermore, Propp’s classical narrative structure could provide evidence that television representation effectively acts to ‘contain’ alternative or subaltern narratives. ‘Functions of character serve as stable, constant elements in a tale, independent of how and by whom they are fulfilled. They constitute the fundamental components of a tale.’ (Propp, V. 1968. 20) By seeing in Propp’s model – ‘standard set of character roles... standard event sequence’ – a critical televisual (drama) template, a critical analysis of the discourse of *Panorama* can shed light on the extent to which the ‘constant underlying structure’ is present *even* in television Current Affairs broadcasting. This is not to suggest that Propp’s overview provides an exact template in this research, merely that the narrative structure form, and the characters identified in the classic folk tale, can, and perhaps have, provided a useful template for many dramas – on television, and beyond. If said constant underlying structure is present, what are the representational, televisual, journalistic and wider ideological ramifications? In the context of this research, are there identifiable ‘constant underlying structures’ and ‘standard character roles’ through which the stories of Iraq are told? Do they go some way to Primarily Define a largely hegemonic narrative? And if so, is there a lack of sufficient space devoted to counter-hegemonic narratives?

3.4 Narrating and representing the story through Archetypes and/or Stereotypes

To address the question of the means through which the stories are told, we need to identify some of the particular televisual and television journalism mechanisms or practices

commonly deployed. Given that one of the main focal points of this research is oriented around drama, dramatic forms of representation, and that such forms are a perhaps unexpected means of story-telling and communication in the high modality form of Current Affairs broadcasting, it is vital to undertake an overview and analysis of specific televisual, narrative and dramatic tropes. Propp's model is instructive with regards the 'standard event sequence' the 'constant underlying structures' and 'standard character roles' but also in terms of the notion of the archetype. According to McKee (1999), an archetypal form of storytelling differs from that of the stereotypical in particular ways:

The archetypal story unearths a universally human experience, then wraps itself inside a unique, culture-specific expression. A stereotypical story reverses this pattern: It suffers a poverty of both content and form. It confines itself to narrow, culture-specific experience and dresses in stale, non-specific generalities... an archetypal story creates settings and characters so rare our eyes feast upon every detail, while its telling illuminates conflicts so true to humankind that it journeys from culture to culture... stereotypical stories stay at home, archetypal stories travel. (McKee, R 1999. 4)

The most illuminating excerpts from the above quote are the ideas that 'stereotypical stories stay at home, archetypal stories travel' meaning that the notion of the archetype is able to embed itself more fully, more roundly, and with more nuance than that of the stereotype. Archetypes can, via recognition, find a sympathetic audience who can relate to the *specificity* of each character, while *simultaneously* recognising their *applicability and universality*: 'archetypal stories unearth a universally human experience' (McKee. 1999. 4). The archetype, and its apparent universality is an important theoretical frame in the context of understanding *Panorama's* methods of storytelling. If and how does *Panorama* represent the 'universal human experience' through the deployment of the archetype? Or perhaps, to rephrase it: does *Panorama* tell the story(ies) of the Iraq conflict through 'universal' archetypes? Does *Panorama* hegemonise a particular perspective through 'universal(ised)' archetypes, and what is more, what might the wider ramifications be?

According to this schema then, it seems probable that one finds, in all representation, the presence of the classic structuralist narrative forms. In the context and discourse of this research, they are a key element of what we might refer to as dramatic tropes (in television). Contained within the model of the classical structuralist narrative, Propp's account of character functions is instructive:

Propp called these narrative morphemes 'functions' because he wanted to emphasize that what they *do* to advance the narrative is more important than what they *are*. ...the narrative functions are, according to Propp, always in the same sequence and they are common to all fairy tales, though not every tale will have every function. (Fiske, J. 1987. 137)

In classic television drama such as 'Soap operas' with its longevity, its regularity on screen, and in our homes on a (more than) weekly basis, there tends to be a consistent cast of characters with whom the audience identifies *as* regular and knowable characters. In this case then, '*what* (and who) they *are*', is important. However, *Panorama* has an irregularity (at least in terms of subject matter), its subject matters change, no consistent News event schedule is present, thus it has fewer regular consistent characters. As such, the 'narrative morphemes' their 'functions' and 'what they *do*' are 'more important than what they *are*'. Does *Panorama* storytelling adhere to this form? As has already been discussed (see Chapter 2), Current Affairs, in part because of its close relationship with news, with the news values of immediacy and unambiguity; because it trades on the fact it is 'current', particularly when telling stories of conflict, tends (has?) to deploy certain storytelling templates. News templates are a vital part of the Current Affairs Journalism representational repertoire. In this regard, archetypes, drawing on their own version of a (character) template, serve a useful televisual and dramatic shorthand function, and are the perfect complement to the journalistic shorthand described above. Recognisable archetypes anchored in and by news templates are effectively a symbiotic match.

However, even the notion of the archetype might be problematic. As we have seen, McKee asserts that archetypes ‘travel’, and that they say something ‘universal about human experience’. However, in contrast to McKee’s assertions of the value(s) of the archetype, Gray (2008) instead asserts that the archetype itself is, or can at least become, just a(nother) form of shorthand:

Over time, too, television’s various cartographers have learned bad habits from previous shows and writers, and thus many stereotypes and regressive depictions have become archetypes. A stereotype is a fixed, reductionary image of a particular type of person, whereas an archetype is a stock character of the storyworld, used to save a writer in establishing motivation and psychology. When archetypes take on stereotypical overtones, the storyworld becomes invaded by prejudicial and demeaning images. Sadly, though, television has developed numerous archetypal characters with worrying depictive potential...while such characters serve an archetypal role within the given programme, reflected out to reality, they serve a stereotypical role (Gray, J. 2008. 106-107)

While archetype is certainly a more nuanced and perhaps more judicious term than that of ‘character’, given that the genre under scrutiny and analysis in this research is explicitly *not* drama per se, but that (as this research claims) has *elements* of dramatic representation, do the ‘characters’ in Current Affairs broadcasting ‘travel’? Or are they ‘reductive’? As Gray attests, ‘When archetypes take on stereotypical overtones, the storyworld becomes invaded by prejudicial and demeaning images’ (Gray. 2008. 107) is the distinction somewhat blurred in any case? Given the discussion above regarding the requirements of *Panorama* to tell a sometimes-complex story, one with contemporary relevance and currency, in an unambiguous way, there are certainly elements of stereotyping in the *Panorama* sample. Similarly, while there is certainly evidence to suggest an attempt to be more rigorous, more ‘impartial’ and to provide a more rounded and nuanced story in *Panorama*, it is also true that ‘while such characters serve an archetypal role within the given programme, reflected out to reality, they serve a stereotypical role.’ (Gray. 2008. 107). Who, in the representational repertoire is afforded the characterisation of one who ‘unearths a universally human

experience... (who) illuminates conflicts so true to humankind' (McKee. 1999) and one who, contrastingly, is reduced to 'a vivid but simple representation that reduces persons to sets of exaggerated, usually negative, character traits' (Barker. 2004. 188).

One of the classic television genres that successfully deploys archetypes is that of the 'cop show' and/or 'police procedural'. In some ways there are marked similarities here between the representational form of *Panorama* with that of the classic 'police procedural' drama, and with some elements of the 'cop show' genre. The Police Procedural is characterized by the *lack* of emphasis on the character's personal lives but with an increased focus on the nuts-and-bolts of law enforcement. Whereas the classic 'cop show' tends to depict an idealised representation of police work, one in which the police officers or detectives concerned are individually inspired and use significant individual prowess in order to 'get their man'. The focus on individual(isation) and personal character(isation) and investigative prowess are a classic of this dramatic genre. The question is, to what extent are these elements of the genre applicable to the *Panorama* broadcasts analysed here? Rarely are the 'heroes' of police procedurals or cop shows the site of complexity or moral ambiguity, is the same true in these instances of *Panorama*? It should be stated that it is not the intention here to suggest that the producers, writers, journalists, editors and directors of *Panorama* deliberately and explicitly set out to replicate or imitate the genres, such a claim would be impossible to prove, highly unlikely to actually be the case, certainly beyond the remit, and not the intention of this research. The case being made here is that, particularly post the Birt revolution in BBC news and Current Affairs, the four units approach; the 'mission to explain' with all the attendant shifts away from documentary journalism such moves engendered, the very mechanics, the now established tropes of Current Affairs, and multi-modal forms of expression so easily and seamlessly found on *television drama*, make recourse to such

representational modes an obvious choice with which to communicate the message[s] and tell the sometimes complex stories.

Aside from US show(s) *Homicide: Life on the Street* (1993-1999) and *The Wire* (2002-2008), and in the UK *The Cops* (1998-2000), in which socio-political, ideological, characterisational, and economic complexity is foregrounded, typical Police Procedural and ‘cop shows’ operate through reinforcing and reproducing hegemonic discourse. They are in fact, remarkably similar in structure to Propp’s classic narrative structure:

Traditional television ‘cop shows’ achieve meaning through symbiosis between ideological assumptions and dramatic structure – the ‘beginning’ involves disruption to the status quo by a ‘deviant’ agency (the villain); the ‘middle’ is occupied with the police procedural as the villain is identified by a usually ‘maverick’ detective hero; resolution involves the apprehension of the villain, the neutralisation of the threat he poses to the status quo (coded here as ‘law and order’), and, since the audience is in tacit agreement that he is justly ejected from ‘legitimate’ society, the verification of that society as ‘right-thinking’ and valid. (MacMurrough-Kavanagh 2000 in Carson and Llewellyn-Jones)

One of the questions to pose in this research is, does *Panorama* operate through using similarly simplified, semiotic, televisual, journalistic and dramatic mechanisms and representational forms?

There is an extent to which the two dramatic genres (Cop Show, Police Procedural) are combined in the *Panorama* broadcasts devoted to conflict. As with the ‘cop show’ and the police procedural which, in place of examining the structural conditions of society as necessary (and partial) ‘causes’ of (some) crime(s), the focus is on procedure and/or individual pursuit. In *Panorama*, in place of a critical interrogation of the structural conditions and considerations of, for instance, the neo-imperialist and neoliberal ambitions of the US/UK (Western) coalition, *Panorama*’s focus, tends to home in and focus on a combination of individual stories, characterisation and narrative arcs. Using the above quote as the template for Police drama, we can clearly trace and find many of the same tropes, ‘heroes’ and ‘deviant’ agents within the texts of *Panorama*.

Whatever the relative merits of archetypes, and the extent to which they significantly differ from stereotypes, what remains important in this research is that some form of recognisable ‘type’ exists and is deployed in *Panorama*. Both Archetypes and Stereotypes tend to function (or be functionalised) as a series of relatively stable representational forms that are consistent over time.

The traditional narrative pattern, as discerned for example by Propp’s narratology (Propp 1968), sees the forces of stability engaged with those of disruption. In this view a problem or force threatens the equilibrium in the social formation at the outset of the narrative only for *order to be restored* by the end, typically in Western culture by the agency of a white male protagonist. (Nelson, R 1997. 33. *Emphasis added*).

That they exist, are present in a genre typically associated with truth, accuracy, and impartiality needs to be critically interrogated. Whose equilibrium? Who are the dominant hegemonic social and political actors that define said ‘equilibrium’ and who or what are ‘disruptive’ agents who threaten the ‘equilibrium’? Who or what forces or agents ‘restore order’? What would constitute ‘Order’? In the *Panorama* sample, what matters is the extent to which the representational affordances of archetype and stereotype are (or are not) equally distributed.

3.5 Television, Journalism and Emotion

Given that there is here a focus on the dramatic elements typically employed by and on Television, and that what this research refers to as character (whether through archetype, stereotype or a more nuanced and developed representation), plays an important role in orienting and driving a narrative, communicating ‘message(s)’ what then of television and emotion? What role might the ‘sincere performance of emotion’ (Ellis 2009) play in encouraging a viewing audience to engage in the narrative, via an emotional connection with those present on screen? Though this research does not deal explicitly with audience engagement, it is not extensively discussed in this research, there are, unsurprisingly given the nature of conflict, examples of emotion in some of the broadcasts. Though its

manifestation is, perhaps surprisingly, rare, on occasion, (particularly in the conflict and post-conflict phases) it is clear that the emotionally literate performance(s) of some key characters, is present, and that such televisual emotional literacy does journalistically, ideologically and televisually assist in underscoring and reproducing the overall discourse of the broadcasts. On occasion, the televisual performativity, the emotional literacy of (some of) those people cast in *Panorama*, helps to carry the story(line)?

Given that *Panorama* has a public service obligation for the communication and analysis of often difficult and complex situations and events, how best to adequately communicate complexity while simultaneously adhering to its PSB obligations? For *if*, as Ellis writes, ‘Television has given visibility and prominence to the emotional’ and that ‘TV has enabled us to take a close look at people who previously were distant or invisible.’ (Ellis, J. 2009. 103), then how do the two (emotion; visibility of previously invisible) marry together? Such visibility of the previously distant or invisible is of course one of the key claims public service television makes for its vitality, its continuing validity and its ability to provide the ‘window on the world.’ One of the principle contentions of this research of course is that the main mechanism(s) deployed, are that of dramatic codes and conventions. When dealing with, and *telling* complex events and storylines, Current Affairs broadcasting, often reverts to kind of storytelling template. Echoing this notion of a journalistic template or shortcut, in research based on an ethnographic study of journalists in Finland and Netherlands, Mervi Pantti reveals that many journalists themselves acknowledge the role emotions, and emotional expression can play:

Emotional expression is seen to provide an intellectual shortcut for telling a story: ‘[Emotion] is an element that is in fact very suited to telling a really big story in a very short time, sometimes even in a few seconds’ (reporter home affairs 1, NOS)’ (Pantti. 2010. 176)

Within these sets of dramatic signifying practices, these storytelling templates, the representation of emotion can play an important role. Perhaps understandably, as Wahl-Jorgensen writes, on occasion, and perhaps with increasing regularity, journalists effectively ‘outsource’ the storytelling to protagonists:

...unavoidable subjective appraisals are carefully managed through a distinctive series of discursive strategies...there is a strategic ritual of *emotionality* in journalism which operates alongside the strategic ritual of objectivity, drawing on some of its practices and enabling what is often profoundly emotional story-telling to emerge through a form of ‘outsourcing’ of emotional labor to the subjects of the stories. (Wahl-Jorgensen 2013: 130)

There are occasions in which this ‘outsourcing of emotional labour to the subjects of the stories’ is present in the *Panorama* sample(s). In fact, this should not surprise us, for as Pantti (again) writes:

It has also been claimed that emotion has gained more ground in news reporting, to the extent of becoming a new ‘news value’ Recent events such as 9/11 have been seen to accelerate a trend towards embracing emotion as a legitimate part of the journalistic culture (Tumber and Prentoulis, 2003: 228. (Pantti. 2010. 169)

Therefore, the previously discussed News Values considered vital in this research, namely: ‘immediacy or recency’, ‘unambiguity’, ‘availability of pictures’ has another potential News Value ally – emotion. Is emotion(ality) a key trope of Current Affairs broadcasting? As I wrote above, particularly given the nature of the event, there are some moments of emotional expression, the outsourcing of ‘emotional labour’. This is particularly true of one post-conflict broadcast (see Chapter 6) and when this occurs, it will be discussed. In short, emotion and emotional literacy, though surprisingly rarely represented, is occasionally present and when it is so, it will be discussed and contextualised as one small element of the dramatic frame(s) this research situates as a key part of *Panorama*’s discursive and representational repertoire.

3.6 Discourse and Epistemology

When assessing the various and varying possible methods available, one must take account of what it is precisely one hopes to demonstrate, prove, achieve or at least critique. One must also take note of previous studies in the field, identifying both the strengths and the flaws contained with previous work. As discussed, academic scholarship in Current Affairs Television broadcast journalism is rather scant, what research does exist, while excellent, does not apply a critical discursive approach. Given the topic and the temporal focus, a Discourse and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) seems to be the most useful and applicable for the needs of this research. Chiefly because:

Critical discourse analysis is critical in the sense that it aims to reveal the role of discursive practices in the maintenance of the social world, including those social relations that involve unequal relations of power. (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 63)

Undertaking critical analysis of Current Affairs broadcasting thus requires a rigorous theoretical framework. This chapter will outline the theoretical template, the methodological approach and the rationale for selecting a specific form. In short, this chapter will map out an explanation regarding the theoretical frame in order to ensure that a suitably applicable and rigorous lens is cast on the object(s) under scrutiny.

Discourse, Foucault argues, constructs the topic. It defines and produces the objects of our knowledge. It governs the way that a topic can be meaningfully talked about and reasoned about. It also influences how ideas are put into practice and used to regulate the conduct of others. Just as discourse rules in certain ways of talking about a topic, defining an acceptable and intelligible way to talk, write, or conduct oneself, so also, by definition, it 'rules out', limits and restricts other ways of talking, of conducting ourselves in relation to the topic of constructing knowledge about it. (Hall 1997 *in* Wetherell et al. 2001: 72)

Taking the above statement as a starting point, we can readily postulate that if discourse simultaneously defines and limits ways of speaking about topics and events, then an analytical model that has at its heart an understanding of this and of the practical limitations discursive formations impose upon public knowledge and understanding of events is a necessary resource. Additionally:

Discourse never consists of one statement, one text, one action or one source. The same discourse, characteristic of the way of thinking or the state of knowledge at any one time (what Foucault called an episteme) will appear across a range of texts, and as forms of conduct, at a number of different institutional sites within society. However, whenever these discursive events ‘refer to the same object, share the same style and ... support a strategy ... a common institutional, administrative or political drift and pattern’ (Cousins and Hussain 1984: 84–85) then they are said by Foucault to belong to the same discursive formation. (Hall 1997 *in* Wetherell et al. 2001: 73)

This being the case, the theoretical framework needs to take account of the ways in which different texts, but from within the same (and similar) canon or genre, can be said to epistemologically produce a discursive formation (or, discursively produce an epistemology of Iraq), and, what is more, what such discursive formations essentially limit. The CDA approach used in this research is able to cast a consistent critical lens on a very particular set of television journalism practices, on the flagship Current Affairs strand *Panorama*, and across an extended temporal frame (19 months) to assess the extent to which, even while ‘fronted’ by different journalists, dealing with different events in the Iraq War (pre-conflict phase; conflict phase; post-conflict phase), the sample (of 10) broadcasts over the time period can be said to constitute a discursive formation. Do the sample texts constitute a consistent (dramatic) story-telling *method* of communication and inform(ation)?

Logonomic systems have rules that constrain the general forms of text and discourse. Such systems often operate by specifying *genres* of texts (typical forms of text which link kinds of producer, consumer, topic, medium, manner and occasion). These control the behaviour of producers of such texts, and the expectations of potential consumers. Genre-rules are exemplary instances of logonomic systems, and are a major vehicle for their operation and transmission. (Hodge and Kress *in* Wetherell et al. 2001: 295)

Hodge and Kress identify an important idea in the context of this research. Discussing both the ‘behaviours of producers’ and ‘expectations of consumers’ they highlight the ways in which both production and reception are themselves discursively loaded. Dealing, as it does, with television broadcast journalism in the form of *Panorama*, this research notes that it remains important to take account of the intended (and likely) audience. Given its position in the social, political, journalistic and cultural environment, *Panorama* therefore draws its

likely audience from a particular class or group(s) with significant cultural and social capital (Bourdieu 1986). The content is thus devised with those constituencies in mind. Is such a constituency sufficiently wide when it comes to the case of the Iraq war? Given the level of vocalised scepticism from large swathes of ‘the public’ surely a wider range of opinions would be sought and included within the texts?

As already stated, the *Panorama* texts for study will be limited to ‘Special Investigations’ that deal with Iraq from September 2002 until April 2004. The 10 texts selected for critical analysis have been chosen precisely because the debate about the Iraq conflict (in the pre-conflict phase); the ongoing but short conflict (the conflict phase); and the fall-out *from*, and the ‘rebuilding’ *of* Iraq (the post-conflict phase) were all broadcast at a time of intense social and political debate. Furthermore, war and conflict Current Affairs events and coverage are also considered (perhaps quite rightly) as highly securitised, dangerous, and subject to issues of ‘national security’. Therefore, the selection(s) of source(s), the central protagonists featured in the broadcast(s), and the values, legitimacy and authority attributed to them is an important ideological, discursive and contextual feature. Who has authority to speak, and on whose behalf? Who is disavowed? Who is excluded and why (if we can know why)? When/if alternatives are represented, how so? What value and character is attributed to them? How do legitimate and delegitimized figures feature within both the micro-narrative of individual broadcasts and across the range of texts dealing with (broadly) the same issue? If and how alternative voices do feature across the ‘range’ is there a shift in tone, narrative and characterisation as the situation (actual combat operations for instance) develops? All of the above can be analysed using a CDA method.

To remain credible and responsible in times of social upheaval, journalist may need to cover alternative groups (students, feminists, anti-war protesters) and thus be partly pulled to an alternative ideological direction. In this way, hegemonic frames may slowly shift if such coverage wants to be credibly consistent with how the world is perceived. (Van Dijk *in* Wetherell et al 2001: 197)

The requirement for journalists to engage in such hegemonic shift or ‘drift’ is certainly an important point that bears closer scrutiny. For instance, how do dominant and mainstream news operations credibly cover, what at certain times seem to be cases of large scale social upheaval? We can assess such discursive features by way of a more contemporary example.

During the Higher Education protests of autumn 2010 – and into spring 2011 – the BBC News covered the protests in some detail. The evening BBC News broadcast at 6:00 pm on November 10th 2010, informed the watching public in the following way: ‘Thousands of students have clashed with police at Westminster today during a mass demonstration against plans to increase university tuition fees in England’ (BBC Six O’Clock News: November 10th 2010. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=he51eQBYrNM>) followed by pictures of gathering students (and UCU staff members). This single sentence and the accompanying imagery can be analysed using the critical discourse model. Despite the fact that the protest was co-organised by the National Union of Students (NUS) and the University College Union (UCU) the ‘objects’ of news coverage were the gathering thousands of *students*. That *only students* were mentioned is significant. It allows a very specific act of categorisation. Students as represented in this instance are denied a certain legitimacy (albeit a rather loose legitimacy that is often applied to ‘striking’ union members). Secondly, and discursively most important, is what the news story elides. In the above example, repeated ad infinitum from that moment onwards, was that the protest was *entirely concerned* with the ‘rise in tuition fees’. While this is and was certainly a concern, what this particular discursive formation ‘achieves’ (the epistemology) is to represent those protesting as merely disaffected *consumers of education*, as if the students are merely unhappy at the potential cost. The actual protests, surely at least in part, were centred around the 80% cut in the teaching funds available to universities. In the Arts, Humanities and Social Science subjects the cut in the teaching fund was (and is) in fact 100%. The protests were in effect against the de facto privatisation, personalisation and

financialisation, in protest against the total transformation of Higher Education in the UK. However, that part of the story was erased, and has been absented from that point on. *The* story is now one of cost benefit analysis, fees and consumption.

3.7 Critical Discourse Analysis

For the questions this research is concerned with, the most apposite approach for analysing *Panorama* is critical discourse analysis (CDA). From the outset, one must of course identify and acknowledge that all methods and approaches are necessarily limiting. CDA should be seen clearly as an approach, as opposed to a methodology. By which I mean, CDA says, ‘these are the tools we have, and what we can do with them’. It is an iterative, a general and generative approach to analysis of texts and their related ideologies, what we might call a critical ideological stance. In this way, CDA helps us understand texts and their ideological underpinnings. It is an ideal approach for providing a ‘toolkit’ that allows a level of detailed analysis that other methods do not, and yet it works in a complimentary way with other methods. For instance, in this research, the Primary definers – who they are (the meso) - help give us a toolkit for the CDA (the micro-analysis). Then when measured across a large sample, we can make reasonable and rigorous assertions regarding the wider structural issues (the macro).

It should also be noted here that such a theoretical approach should *not* be seen as politically or ideologically neutral, but as a means of intervening in the construction of the social, political and cultural world.

Critical discourse analysis does not ... understand itself as politically neutral (as objectivist social science does), but as a critical approach which is politically committed to social change. In the name of emancipation, critical discourse analytical approaches take the side of oppressed social groups. Critique aims to uncover the role of discursive practices in the maintenance of unequal power relations, with an overall goal of harnessing the results of critical discourse analysis to the struggle for radical social change. (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 63)

In this respect, the analysis begins from a position that assumes *Panorama* itself is similarly not neutral but is in fact discursively and ideologically compromised. This is not to suggest that this particular broadcast strand is biased *per se* (if we take bias to mean a *deliberate* attempt to deceive or persuade) but that:

...news making is based on cultural *routines* and professional practices that are taken for granted and hence implicit and hard to observe directly. Analysis of news talk is therefore able to reveal the (usually not explicit or intentional) ideologies of journalists. (Van Dijk *in* Wetherell et al 2001: 196)

However, what is posited here is that precisely because,

...journalism, in its various forms, is clearly among the most influential knowledge-producing institutions of our time. Renderings of reality are produced and published day in and day out, with unparalleled penetration. People obtain knowledge of the world outside their immediate experience largely from mass media, where journalistic content predominates. (Ekstrom 2002: 259)

It is therefore incumbent on social science, media scholars that are so inclined, to pay critical attention to the role such powerful social and communicative forms of information gathering and dissemination continue to enjoy, and, to what end. Such focused attention and scrutiny is of course required at all times but is perhaps particularly urgent when scrutinising the representations and assumed policy goals pertaining to war and conflict. CDA provides a theoretical framework that pays explicit attention *to*, and takes account *of* ‘discursive practices, through which texts are *produced* (created) and *consumed* (received and interpreted)’ which ‘are viewed as an important form(s) of social practice which contributes to the *constitution* of the social world including social identities and social relations’ (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 61). Furthermore an examination of the televisual forms and modes of address, journalistic practices (relations with sources and the perceived legitimacy of elite sources), news reporting templates, the ‘War Programming Model’ (Altheide and Grimes 2005); the ‘operational units’ favoured by BBC News and Current Affairs during this period, the visual and linguistic tropes, and the over-determined dramatic characters and dramatic templates identified, provides a clear Current Affairs broadcast template that CDA is best

placed to scrutinise. The analytical model seeks to ‘uncover the role of discursive practices in the maintenance of unequal power relations’ (Fairclough 1989 *in* Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 65). With this in mind, and with this critical approach, this thesis asks questions regarding the BBC and neutrality; the place of *Panorama* both within and beyond the BBC; the role of Current Affairs broadcasting and how it differs and is demarcated from News; the construction of particular identity formations, ideologies and narratives, and furthermore, the role such broadcasting plays in the reproduction of power. For if, as is suggested here, News and Current Affairs are discursive formations, then in what way might such practices restrict debate? Do they, by adhering to practices internalised as ‘best practice’ effectively reproduce hegemony ‘the work of hegemony, all in all, consists of imposing standardised assumptions over *events* and conditions that must be “covered” by the dictates of the prevailing news standards’ (Van Dijk *in* Wetherell et al 2001: 197). Of vital importance for this research is the fact that a CDA method and approach is able to provide the requisite tools to undertake micro (individual broadcasts) and macro (across the sample, generic) analysis.

In the build-up *to* and subsequent fall-out *from* the Iraq conflict, and the increasing rhetoric directed towards Iran, ISIS and Syria, the need for critical, interrogative media is acute and, in fact, urgent. This thesis will therefore limit its scope to a critical discursive analysis of programmes dealing specifically with conflict, or the war time narrative. Furthermore, it can certainly be argued that Current Affairs broadcasting is a necessary adjunct and plank of democracy. News and Current Affairs broadcasting has the ability and capacity to ‘hold power to account’, the extent to which it does so is one of the principle questions of this research;

...the media have accumulated a level of influence through their control of the flow of information, such that they vie with the more traditional political channels in the process of pluralistic power bargaining, creating agendas ... the media must be viewed as agencies with semi-autonomous influence over politics. This is the basic reason that the study of news production is essential, the public must become more aware of the news as a political process; yet the media have only the most primitive

capacity to examine themselves critically. (Kline 1976 reviewing Altheide, D., *Creating Reality: How Television News Distorts Events*)

According to Kline, news media organisations and operatives are (largely, though one presumes not wholly) incapable or unwilling to critique their own practices and forms. Consequently, analysis of the discursive formation of this resource (Current Affairs media texts) by media scholars is necessary as (an)other form of democratic accountability. CDA tracks form(s), styles, imagery, language, patterns, practices, sourcing *and* the generic characteristics of form. Precisely because CDA not only focuses on individual texts, but extends the analysis to entire genres, what links them and what divides them, means it is the ideal theoretical approach. Understanding the ways in which both the signifiers and the genre specific signifiers ascribe value(s) to statements, officials, statements *by* officials, imagery, sources, et al. is of paramount importance, not least when the genre under scrutiny remains the principle means through which intricate geo-political discussions, decisions and narratives are imagined and brought into focus. Whereas discourse analysis (DA) restricts its focus to what merely appears in the text(s), CDA extends the focus to what *might be* erased. In other words, CDA assumes that other salient points, issues, debates, characters, and narratives might be elided, not necessarily through any conspiratorial manoeuvring, but instead through the demands and practicalities of the form(s), of both journalism, and of journalism *on* television.

The research focus of critical discourse analysis is accordingly *both* the discursive practices which construct representations of the world, social subjects and social relations, including power relations, *and* the role that these discursive practices play in furthering the interests of particular social groups. (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 63)

Thus, News and Current Affairs media texts play an important, perhaps crucial role in narrating issues of political, social, cultural, geo-political and public interest. It is therefore vital that they are subject to scrutiny. The scrutiny required is best served by the theoretical frame of CDA.

A critical discourse approach is best suited to analysing the Current Affairs text(s) of *Panorama* for it asks questions regarding, amongst other things: the limit[s] of acceptable opinion; limits of acceptable identity formation[s]; the construction of the feared 'Other', and all the while understanding and mapping out that limitations and identity formations are brought into vision, focus and understanding by way of language, imagery, characterisation and narrative drive. Further, the approach is based on

...the premise that any instance of discourse is simultaneously a piece of text (written or spoken language) an instance of discursive practice and an instance of social practice (Fairclough). The aim of analysis is to show how imagery and a range of discursive strategies can be used to legitimize a particular policy. (Fairclough 1992: 4)

For example: the uses of the terms 'violence' and the 'restoration of order' are used in News and Current Affairs discourse. These terms are laden with positive and negative assumptions and connotations. The pejorative term: 'violence', and the more 'security' laden, urgent but less menacing term: 'restoration of order' and to whom those terms are applied are important contextual, linguistic and discursive strategies or features of News and Current Affairs texts.

As Steuter and Wills remark:

The language of war, which includes the metaphors it draws on, does not simply hold a mirror up to the enemy. It does not reveal a clear, objective or pre-existing image of what we fight. What is reflected in language is not reality but construct, something *conditioned* and *assembled*, put together from fragments of information and observation. Parts of these observations may very well be accurate, but they are always influenced and shaped by the processes and contexts of their assembly (Steuter and Wills 2008: xv)

If one accepts, as one surely ought, that the construction of texts is not accidental but guided by principles and practices (contexts and processes), then, what are these principles and practices? Are they internalised and naturalised? How are they manifested in the economy of representation? And how does this reflect the social world and, as importantly: how does it constitute the social world? In short, and for the purposes of this research: what are the linguistic, aesthetic, organisational, televisual, journalistic, textual, characterisation and dramatic narrative devices of *Panorama*? And how can a CDA theoretical framework

critically interrogate the ways in which *Panorama* might be said to discursively reproduce hegemonic, normative assumptions and values?

3.8 Television Journalism as ‘Communicative Event’

As Gray (2008) notes, ‘television entertainment’s power to invoke, depict, augment, create anew, and/or criticize reality demands that we constantly study its representations’ (Gray 2008: 130). Television still has the power to narrate the world to (for) us, despite the fact that on entry into office, the coalition Government (2010–2015) capped the licence fee at £145.50 per annum (<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/bbc/8074703/BBC-ordered-to-accept-six-year-freeze-in-licence-fee.html>) television News and Current Affairs continues to ‘enjoy’ considerable (though diminishing through inflation) funding for its output, this was of course certainly the case in the ‘relatively’ buoyant period of 2002–2004 which is the period to which this thesis devotes its critical attention. ‘Television journalism matters because it still commands proper resources and mass audiences’ (Barnett 2011: 248). Given this fact, it should come as no surprise to discover that many people in the UK rely, and certainly did rely in 2002–2004, on the trusted output of the principle Public Service Broadcaster.

What role then can and did the television Current Affairs output of *Panorama* play in the war in Iraq? Or more pertinently, what role might *Panorama* have played in orienting debate and discussion of Iraq around specific issues, specific *elite* policy goals, and concomitantly, within narrow discursive frames? Were elite policy goals the normative against which alternative strategies and objectives (anti-war; peace-campaigning; anti-imperialist) were marked? If so, how did *Panorama* represent alternatives, if at all? Was the discourse of *Panorama* seemingly contingent with those of western policy elites? If so, how? And how can a CDA theoretical framework shed light on these issues, factors, and concerns?

Firstly, of course Current Affairs broadcasting on television has a visual dimension that one must take into account. CDA contains within its analytical framework and method, a forensic appreciation of verbal, aural and visual semiotics

Discourse encompasses not only written and spoken language but also visual images. It is commonly accepted that analysis of texts containing visual images must take account of the special characteristics of visual semiotics and the relationship between words and images. (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 61)

It is precisely because critical discourse analysis tends towards ‘multi-modal’ analysis that it is particularly apposite in this instance. ‘The term “multimodality” designates a phenomenon rather than a theory or method – the phenomenon in texts and communicative events whereby a variety of “semiotic modes” (means of expression) are integrated into a unified whole’ (Van Leeuwen and Kress *in* Van Dijk 2006b: 107). Moreover, not only does this theoretical approach take account of multi-modal forms of semiotic expression, CDA also seeks to locate individual texts within wider trends, themes, genres and forms of communication. Thus, news media, or in this case, Current Affairs broadcasting, are routed back *and* rooted in an understanding that each text is, in some way beholden to the genre and form to which it belongs. CDA thus scrutinises and understands the importance of visuals and linguistic tropes, contextual detail (and its elision by News and Current Affairs broadcasting), and legitimised sources, whilst simultaneously outlining that such forms have a generic and, as such, an ideological footprint.

...Foucault is concerned with the production of knowledge and meaning through discourse. He does indeed analyse particular texts and representations, as the semioticians did. However, he is more inclined to analyse the whole *discursive formation* to which a text or practice belongs. (Hall 1997 *in* Wetherell et al. 2001: 78)

This being the case, whereas the micro-narratives produced by individual News and Current Affairs broadcasts, *and* the analysis undertaken by adherents of semiotics tends to separate, or perhaps dislocate, CDA makes the necessary generic links. CDA does not therefore ‘involve making claims for universal objective truth. Rather it involves making claims for the

context-bound veracity generating achievements of consensually validated sets of procedures' (Barker and Galasinski 2001: 23). It is the context dependent, and the consensually validated procedures that are important in the context of Current Affairs broadcasting, particularly so in the case of *Panorama*. *Panorama* is able to draw on already validated and pre-legitimated news archives; draw on a range of (legitimated) semiotic, social, cultural, journalistic, and economic resources, and, most importantly, draw on its reputational 'flagship' resource. In so doing, it will be argued that BBC *Panorama*, drawing on these accumulated resources, adopts a consensual approach to information gathering (via source-relations) and dissemination (via broadcast). The consensus approach though is dominated by elite-level sources *and* by established formal, discursive and televisual forms of Current Affairs broadcast conventions and dramatic representations. The various approaches in CDA are united by 'a shared interest in the semiotic dimensions of power, injustice, abuse, and political-economic or cultural change in society' and furthermore united by '... a) its view of the relationship between language and power; b) by its critical approach to methodology' (Fairclough, Muldering and Wodak 2011 *in* Van Dijk 2011: 357). As a theoretical approach, CDA, is able to sustain a more developed ideological analysis. It is the developed, sustained ideological and discursive analysis to which this research devotes itself.

3.9 Visuals, Aesthetics and the Specificities of Television Journalism

The primacy of presentation is a trait that journalism shares with art and advertising but not science. It makes the practice of journalism directly dependent on the characteristics of the medium... Visualization is television's forte. Knowledge about the world is articulated visually. The medium represents reality, creates powerful engagement, identification, fascination, thoughts and values through pictures. (Corner 1996 *in* Ekstrom 2002: 264)

What remains important here is that the very form of television, its 'visuality'; its domesticity, combined with the routinized practices of journalism, endorses Current Affairs practice as a transparent, visually arresting 'window' on the world.

What rules, routines, institutionalized procedures and systems of classification guide the production of knowledge, and how do TV journalists decide what is sufficiently true and authoritative? This is the area of TV production and journalistic practices, including institutionalized relations and patterns of action that are essential to this particular kind of knowledge production. (Ekstrom 2002: 261)

Given the above apparent limitations, that the principle means through which the discussion, debate and eventual decision to ‘go to war’ with Iraq was mediated (partly) through the high modality form of *Panorama* is somewhat problematic. The form is seemingly incapable of bearing the weight of its own responsibility (Postman).

Neil Postman analyzes how characteristics of television itself structure the knowledge it communicates and, by extension, our understanding of the world. The medium lends itself to aesthetically appealing and dramatic representations but is less appropriate for logical and factual argumentation, discriminating descriptions of reality and in-depth analyses. (Ekstrom 2002: 262)

Perhaps the most important debate and decision of the early part of the twenty-first century was enacted by officials who were notionally held accountable for their decisions by the public perhaps largely informed by a form that has built into it, too many circumscribed, formal and journalistic limitations. What is more, as Ekstrom outlines, with an echo of Matheson (2000), often ‘Journalistic accounts of reality are frequently cited and often serve as starting points in public discourse’ (Ekstrom 2002: 263). Journalistic accounts then serve as *the* starting and end point(s) of public debate, or certainly they serve as the principle means through which debate is *staged* and subsequently largely understood by the public. The efficacy of such mediated representations to provide the knowledge necessary for a fully informed public understanding is in need of critical interrogation and analysis. To what extent does News and Current Affairs broadcasting on the public service broadcaster, particularly *Panorama*, circumscribe the limits of available public knowledge? Utilizing the journalistic, televisual and representational apparatus available, *Panorama* in fact could be said to merely reproduce the ideological norms perfectly commensurate with unquestioning pro-western and pro neo-liberal market ideologies. Drawn *from* and oriented *around* this neo-liberal, neo-

imperialist ideology, *Panorama* is itself constrained by the very journalistic and televisual practices it has long championed.

The form of knowledge that television conveys best arouses feelings and empathy on the part of the viewer. Television journalism does not generally invite critical reflection or questioning of the facts presented. This is not to say that television mesmerizes its audiences, rendering them totally uncritical. Reception studies that we have conducted show, however, that viewers' criticism tends not to focus on the truth or validity of statements and stories but rather on the persons involved in the stories, their actions and appearance or on the programme and programme format. (Ekström, 2000a in Ekström 2002: 265)

That 'viewers' criticism tends *not* to focus on 'truth or validity of statements or stories but rather on the persons involved in the stories, their actions and appearance or on the programme and programme format' is both indicative of the limits of journalistic forms (narrow focus, narrow range of opinions from experts, insertion into an already established media template (Kitzinger 2000)) and constitutive of television journalism itself. Perhaps we can go further still. According to this analysis, criticism is safely contained within the discourse of presentation. In other words, it might merely be the *performance*, or the lack of convincing performance that renders some statements by official, legitimated sources subject to critique. Not overtly critical of the content, or even perhaps uncritical of the policy goals, but of the degree of plausible or implausible performativity of key sources and interlocutors. The broadcasts under scrutiny reveal that the representation, the narratives and the ways in which these are mediated set the frames and terms of debate in such a fashion that only narrow policy options and possibilities are ever foregrounded. In this respect, Sayer's notion of retroduction is apposite (1992).

The epistemological concept of retroduction, associated with critical realism, can help us to be even more precise. Retroduction is a mode of inference whereby 'events are explained by postulating (and identifying) mechanisms which are capable of producing them'. (Sayer 1992: 107)

In short, as Sayer explains, News and Current Affairs, by rigidly adhering to the discursive logic so long established and entrenched, not only contain and constrain the frames of debate,

but in so doing, establish the 'solutions' to ongoing crises within a narrow discursive limit. 'The knowledge TV journalism produces is regarded with ambivalence. On the one hand, it is made use of without further ado, not only in everyday life but also in the spheres of culture and public affairs, politics and science' (Ekstrom 2002: 263). In this respect, television journalism is something of a self-fulfilling practice, a source of legitimation in and of itself, and of course bears striking similarities with the *form* and practice of journalism itself, as Matheson reminds us, journalism becomes 'a self-contained language event. It no longer had to refer to outside itself to the source text to be able to assert a fact; the journalist's role changed from a gatherer and recorder of news to a *storyteller*' (Matheson 2000: 570). This discursive formation and the ways in which television specifically draws on imagery from the canon of its own historical and contemporary production means that the television journalism of *Panorama can*, in many cases, act as its own authenticating agent.

Ekström and Eriksson go farther still and in fact suggest that the very form itself is problematically compromised by its over-reliance on the visual, not only because previous examples act as an authenticating resource, nor only for its *ability* to tell stories in too simplistic or 'arresting' a fashion, but that 'the visual' in fact plays a major role in the ways in which television journalism develops.

Innovation in television journalism is largely a question of developing new programme formats, new dramaturgical solutions and aesthetics. Even in the case of investigative journalism a good portion of the production process is oriented directly or indirectly toward visualization. Access to good visual material actually decides what gets investigated. Interviews are carried out with a view to fitting them into the *dramaturgical structure of the narrative*. (Ekström and Eriksson 1998 in Ekström 2002: 265. *Emphasis added*)

As such, it is perhaps incapable of the nuance one might expect or need. Of course, that such visually arresting or stimulating images are available and put to use is in some ways to be expected. As Hartley explains:

Journalism's presentational aspects, its visuality and its discursive visualizations, can be understood not as the unfortunate contaminants of an otherwise pure and factual realism but as the very purpose of journalism, from the very start. (Hartley 1996: 43)

So television journalism, constrained and bound up in 'the visual' has obvious links to the dramatic, or perhaps the kind of story-telling, characterisation, narrative tropes one might expect to find within the canon of fictionalised representation. Ekström again develops this theme:

Investigation and presentation are, in some sense, common to both journalism and science but, in the case of journalism, presentation is a *sine qua non*. It is a defining property of journalism and a key to its unique contribution. But it is (in principle) quite possible to perform journalism without any sophisticated method of investigation. (Ekstrom, M 2002: 264)

It might be too much to suggest that the television journalism produced by *Panorama* is possible without the need for 'any sophisticated method of investigation' but what is instructive is despite the fact that there is much original documentary footage (or 'evidence') in the texts under scrutiny, the way(s) in which some of the footage is visually arresting, dramatic and character-driven does give some credence to Ekström's prognosis.

Furthermore, the use of action-packed archive footage, the high-intensity interviews with central protagonists, the insertion of emotive and, in some cases, high-tempo music into the broadcast, all combine to present the viewer with a dramatic, dramatised narrative.

Being an eminently visual medium, television excels at constructing powerful meanings, at creating vivid impressions, associations and eliciting emotional involvement. It is not so good at presenting lots of facts and the kinds of messages where attention to nuances, reservations and contradictions is vital ... The medium lends itself to aesthetically appealing and dramatic representations but is less appropriate for logical and factual argumentation, discriminating descriptions of reality and in-depth analyses. (Ekström 2002: 265)

The lack of in-depth analysis is directly counter to the claims made for *Panorama*. It remains one of the most celebrated and revered of all Current Affairs television broadcast strands. The extent to which such claims are able to be sustained is a central and pressing concern of this research.

3.10 War, Conflict, Television and (as) Drama

Classic warfare is the epitome of a ‘good story’, high in tension and drama, with complex main plots and sub-plots played out within traditional binary oppositions of aggressor and victim. (Boyd-Barrett *in* Allan and Zelizer 2004: 26)

The theoretical framework outlined above explains how CDA focuses critical attention on structure, language, and multi-modal critical discourse analysis. Important and pertinent for this research is that CDA seeks to locate the representational tropes and signifying practices of each object(s) under scrutiny within the characteristics, guiding principles and demands of professional practices and standards (Journalism); tropes, form and formal characteristics (television) and the genre, or discourse to which the text of *Panorama* belongs (Current Affairs broadcasting). In the case of this research, the objects are a series of *Panorama* broadcasts pertaining to Iraq. The theoretical approach is therefore able to draw direct analytical comparisons across the ‘range’ of broadcast examples and draw suitably rigorous conclusions based on their similarities and differences. In this respect, the CDA analytical model developed in this research, paying attention to generic, lexical, linguistic, visual, oral, aural (musical score) detail, can, and does, elicit new understandings about precisely how each broadcast draws on a series of learned practices or tropes of the form, and concomitantly, the ways in which, using such tropes, *Panorama* discursively shapes events and might orient our understanding of events as they unfold. An adherence to a rigorous theoretical approach allows one to notice and track patterns in the representational apparatus.

One of the most prominent features of *Panorama* is its use of stylistic conventions one might ordinarily associate with fictional representations. This is *not* to suggest that *Panorama* is *fictionalising* the accounts, characters, narratives and events contained within the broadcasts. However, the question posed here is: to what extent do such styles of representation locate and render unfolding events within a dramatic stylistic template? And if so, do such representational tropes necessarily restrict understanding? Or perhaps more

pertinently at least, orient such understanding in specific directions? In some regards, this can be traced back and related to the forms and practices constitutive of television journalism:

Television journalism is produced *primarily* for presentation and visualization. The form of presentation is the actual point of the production. All TV journalism is produced with the presentation and the viewer in mind. Interviews are not conducted primarily to elicit information, but are staged performances produced for an overhearing audience. (Heritage 1985 in Ekström 2002: 264)

According to this framework, ‘the form of presentation is *the actual point of production*’ suggesting that broadcast journalism is oriented around the demands and characteristics of the form, and that this orientation places visuality ahead, or at least equal to, and in an intrinsic relationship *with* journalistic content. In part because of the visual dimension, historically, television has been, and remains, the form most closely associated with drama. As already discussed (see Chapter 1) Raymond Williams reminds us, television specialises in:

‘representing human action in human terms – its small screen and comparatively poor definition [pre HD] lead it to concentrate on mid-shots and close-ups of people acting, reacting and interacting’ (Williams in Fiske 1987: 22). For instance, to what extent might the focus on ‘reaction and interaction’ (of character or central protagonists) preclude a deeper and more developed understanding of geo-political issues and events? This is not to say that the dramatic elements should necessarily always be excluded, after all, there are many examples of fiction providing more nuance, subtlety and understanding of many issues, sometimes of an overtly ‘political’ nature, through character and characterisation. Similarly, that such central protagonists, in the form of policy elites, military generals, expert witnesses, et al., feature in the non-fictional Current Affairs broadcasting is to be expected and understood, they are, after all, the very same elite political, diplomatic and military personnel orienting policy, and then, in some cases, engaging in the conflict. Nevertheless, it is proposed that the *over representation* of specific people (character), combined with the style and insertion of character into narrative structures, might compromise understanding. After

all, *Panorama* is inextricably the *high modality* form, it presumes and bases its entire reputation on the journalistic bedrocks of *impartiality*, accuracy and truth, therefore the (over)-utilisation of dramatic devices might render understanding(s) as necessarily narrow. In short, does the focus on characters in a narrative disavow a systemic analysis of the structural conditions of Western, imperialist, neoliberal discourse? In fact, do such factors (structural, neoliberal, neo-imperialist ideologies) even figure in the *Panorama* broadcasts under scrutiny? Are such overtly ideological considerations absented from *Panorama*? Is it the case that forms of visual story-telling are the ‘*primary*’ drivers of content, and if so, do they render complex events too simple (unambiguous) or easily ‘solved’?

In some ways then, this approach to covering conflict means ‘War-reporting’ might even constitute a genre in itself.

To the extent that the news agenda is determined by its potential for gathering audience ratings (and therefore advertising revenue, in the case of commercial networks), newscasts will consistently prioritise stories revolving around drama, conflict and controversy over and above (expensive, less ‘ratings-efficient’) investigative journalism. War reporting is no exception to this general rule. (Allan and Zelizer 2004b: 12)

If, as Allan and Zelizer propose ‘war-reporting’ in News broadcasts ‘is no exception to this general rule’ then this research will further examine the extent to which the needs and demands for drama are even more pronounced in the ‘War Reporting’ produced in and by the genre of Current Affairs television journalism. If it is indeed the case, then such issues remain problematic and thus demand rigorous analysis and critique.

In the 10 *Panorama* broadcasts selected, characterisation – perhaps through the form of archetypes and stereotypes – is certainly a feature and in some cases, the central feature. The titles of *Panorama* broadcasts in themselves are instructive in this instance. In the pre-conflict phase the following titles are used: *Panorama: The Case Against Saddam* (September 2002); *Panorama: Saddam: A Warning from History* (November 2002);

Panorama: Chasing Saddam's Weapons (February 2003). In all three of the above-mentioned pre-conflict phase broadcasts pertaining to Iraq, 'Saddam' is not only *a* feature, but is *the* central protagonist. 'He' is essentially identified as *the* issue to be dealt with. Furthermore, as will be discussed later (see Section 2) the explicit reference and allusion to the Nazis means that attempting to mount a forceful critique of Western policy is difficult when located in this narrative, context, epistemology and discourse. The broadcast, from the title alone, means critique of policy, the *stated* policy goals, and the fundamentally benign (sic) nature of Western 'intervention' effectively ensures critique is, if not wholly marginalised, then set against the normative criteria of Western (as 'good') intervention as benign. Furthermore, when located and marked against the uniquely evil Saddam, the narrative, discursive and epistemological orientation demands scrutiny. Within the confines of such a broadcast, *and* if this characterisation of Saddam is replicated across the sample, then any possible critique of the stated policy-goals is set against this demonized narrative and character. Those who seek to critique or criticise the stated policy-goals are represented as having chosen the wrong side, chosen the side, in fact, of the evil dictator (to whom 'we' sold weapons in the past). In such a journalistic, broadcast and wider socio-political environment, is mobilising overt critique, or even merely attempting to question the stated policy aims of political and military elites replete with problems? If so, and as this thesis proposes, then to what extent did and does *Panorama* contribute to this difficulty? In what ways does *Panorama* discursively and ideologically frame the issues and events? Using which journalistic and televisual forms and tropes? The three broadcasts mentioned above (plus one other, the more sceptically and critically titled: *Panorama: The Case Against War*) will be critically analysed in Chapter 4. The remaining six – three conflict-phase, and three post-conflict phase broadcasts – will be analysed in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively. It is hoped that this systemic analysis will go some way to demonstrate that *Panorama*, contrary to expectations, reproduces a journalistic,

discursive, and ideological formation, what is more, a discursive and ideological formation that almost entirely uncritically cements Western hegemony.

3.11 Metaphor, War and Drama

As this research proposes then, as a means of ‘explaining’ necessarily complex ideas, in this case: the build up *to*, prosecution *of*, and fall-out *from* war and conflict in/on Iraq, *Panorama* typically utilises tropes, and signifying practises of drama. This dramatic rendering of stories lends itself readily to metaphor. At times of vital national geo-political interest, ‘we’ look to News and Current Affairs as guides, they are a vital and necessary conduit through which our world, the geo-politics, the social formations are narrated, understood and comprehended. Given the complexity of the issues, combined with the relative scarcity of broadcast space and time, do News and Current Affairs broadcasts require a series of simplifying mechanisms in order to render stories understandable? If so, what might the ideological effects of this be?

Because of information processing demands, people cannot pay attention to all aspects of political evidence. Therefore, something is needed to simplify decision making, and metaphor and other *shortcut* devices (e.g. cognitive heuristics) address this need. (Mio 1997: 130)

Mio accurately explains one of the primary functions, or at least representational strategies of news media. Information *needs* are typically addressed by and catered for by News and Current Affairs media. One of the standard representational means of communicating complex ideas is through metaphor. The(se) aforementioned metaphors, or perhaps metaphorical ‘shortcuts’ are typically used as a means of explaining difficult or complex decisions and socio-geo-political situations. Furthermore, such shortcuts and techniques establish themselves as routine practices to such an extent that they constitute an epistemology:

...epistemology ... refers to the *rules, routines* and *institutionalized procedures* that operate within a social setting and decide the form of the knowledge produced and the *knowledge claims* expressed (or implied). (Ekström 2002: 260)

Epistemologies tend to remain unexamined, they become internalised as common sense, or even institutionalised. Perhaps under pressure of time, resources and limited access to alternative sources, journalists take such approaches for granted:

...news making is based on cultural *routines* and professional practices that are taken for granted and hence implicit and hard to observe directly. Analysis of news talk is therefore able to reveal the (usually not explicit or intentional) ideologies of journalists. (Van Dijk *in* Wahl-Jorgensen and Hanitzsch 2009: 196)

As outlined in Chapter 2 (Literature Review), the journalistic discursive shorthand techniques are subject to a degree of over-simplification, based on an existing (and concomitantly (re)producing) series of media templates (Kitzinger, Hoskins). In this regard, dramatic metaphors serve the story well. The extent to which such stories, narratives and metaphorical tropes serve the needs of the public (sphere) though, is debateable. As Steuter and Wills discuss:

The literal meaning of the word metaphor is to ‘carry over’; metaphor symbolically transfers aspects of one object to another, even if the objects are originally in no way connected. Through this transference, metaphor shifts ideas or meanings from one thing to another to achieve “a new, wider, ‘special’ or more precise meaning.” With repetition, this happens so adeptly that the transference is invisible and comes to be seen as inevitable. When the media repeatedly return, therefore, to similar patterns of image and language, these patterns begin to appear both familiar and natural (Steuter and Wills 2008: 3)

Metaphors assist in the structuring of reality but, as important, through repetition, they begin to take on the form of reality, or at least specific ways of describing events, places and peoples become ‘familiar and natural(ised)’. Metaphors literally ‘carry over’, they take on the appearance of familiarity, a natural(ised) way of describing events and situations. They shape reality and our comprehension of it.

In his extensive research into media narratives about ‘immigration’ Jonathan Charteris-Black explains some use of metaphor by policy elites thus:

Conceptually, metaphors referring to liquids are preferred because of the knowledge that, by their nature, liquids – tides, rivers, waves, etc – move around: they can therefore be related to a more primary conceptual metaphor: Changes are movements that are part of the ‘event structure metaphor’. (Charteris-Black 2006: 572)

Such metaphors are instructive insofar as they are typically employed as exculpatory, as a means of absolving the speaker of guilt for the ways in which events unfold. Metaphors serve many functions and are discussed in detail by, among others, Charteris-Black (2005, 2006), Steuter and Wills (2008), and Lakoff (1990). In important ways, metaphors signify that some actions and events are beyond control, they simply happen or exist. In the case of Charteris-Black's analysis, immigrants are part of a 'flow' or a 'tide' which is almost impossible to stem. Approximating the physical movements of people with that of natural, and physical geography underlines that to fight or stem the flow is in this case analogous to halting *nature itself*. These sometimes subtle, often difficult to spot 'event structure metaphors' are present across the sample of *Panorama* texts, and when they appear, they will be discussed and analysed in subsequent chapters of analysis.

A common representational metaphorical technique is to place distance *between* or to disavow ownership *of* specific policies that might (re)present distinctly problematic ideological positions. For instance, when discussing media representations of 'immigration', again Charteris-Black's work on critical metaphor analysis is instructive:

...an accusation of incompetence is an explicit way of undermining the legitimacy of political opponents because competence is a basic requirement of government. The argument is that the cause of popular resentment is not immigration as such, but the government's incompetence in dealing with it. (Charteris-Black 2006: 573)

The non-ownership of policy direction, to be replaced by the ability (or not) to carry out the onerous actions of government is an act of disavowal and a rhetorical and metaphorical act.

According to this analytical lens, we have clearly reached a stage where apparent 'incompetence' is preferable to any ideological position beyond the mythic 'centre ground'.

To take another example from events and issues that are central concerns of this research. One of the stated policy goals in the build up to conflict often used, and consequently, and understandably repeated, by News and Current Affairs journalism was the

‘search for weapons of mass destruction (WMD)’ A linguistic critical discourse analysis of the term ‘WMD’ is itself revealing, particularly when located and represented by metaphorical language. The weapons themselves, which of course remained stubbornly absent (about which, more in subsequent analysis) were often represented in metaphorical terms. As a means of explaining, narrating and contextualising the events, BBC News focused on speeches made by policy makers, chiefly, in this and many other cases, Tony Blair:

If we do not confront these twin menaces of rogue states with weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, they will not disappear. They will just feed and grow on our weakness (BBC News 15 February 2003
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2765763.stm)

In the above example, ownership of weapons of mass destruction is seamlessly linked with terrorism: ‘twin menaces’. Further, positioning those that would resist the march to war as somehow partly responsible for weakness (those ‘not confronting’), and what is more, *creating* a weakness, either real or imagined, for ‘Others’ to exploit is a classic case of using metaphor in the service of conviction rhetoric. Representing the threat in animate terms, that ‘feed and grow’ is also directly from the metaphor and conviction rhetoric playbook, ‘...in this case terrorism and the ownership of such weapons are described as if they are animate entities that – like malign offspring – are fed by the indecision of the UN’ (Charteris-Black 2005: 162). The speech features as part of the pre-conflict phase build-up to the Iraq war, and sets the frame through which the subsequent ‘hunt’ for weapons is viewed.

Even the term WMD itself – [W]eapons of [M]ass [D]estruction – demands rigorous critical interrogation. A CDA focus reveals that three principle words all signify terrifying, menacing and deadly consequences likely to be suffered (by not confronting). [W] actual physical objects connoting a deadly threat; [M] to large numbers (of people) and/or areas (of land); [D] they destroy, resulting in devastation. At this point it should be added that this analysis does not seek to deny the possibility that such objects might (will) indeed wreak

such devastating consequences. However, the focus of critique is not their deadly ‘quality’ per se, but that when phrased uncritically, assigned such deadly quality, and most importantly assumed to be *in the possession of* the demonised Hitler-like figure of ‘Saddam’ the ‘service’ to narrative is far from the objectivity or impartiality (‘The Case Against’) promised by various *Panorama* broadcasts. Finally, when such objects (WMD) are featured as in ‘our’ possession, though this is itself a rarity, they are simply referred to as a ‘deterrent’ sometimes a ‘nuclear deterrent’ a term with less deadly, more ‘security’ focussed connotations. ‘Our’ weapons are to ‘deter’ those that would cause ‘us’ harm, such as ‘Saddam’, with his (stubbornly absent) WMD.

At this juncture, it should be added that of course the focus on WMD was not created by journalists working for the BBC more broadly, or those working on the *Panorama* programme(s) more directly, but were in fact specific stated policy objectives of political elites. However, the frame created by policy elites, then reproduced by BBC *Panorama*, of ‘the regime’ made specific and forceful assumptions regarding the presence of WMD. This narrative, character, template and utilisation of rhetoric, metaphor and dramatic representation framed the issue so as to leave us in little doubt that *he* (Saddam) was in possession of weapons of mass destruction, and that it was merely a matter of hunting them down. I will return to this analysis in Chapter 4, and again in Chapter 6, I use it here merely as an example, to outline the focus and direction of this research, and, most pertinently, because such a narrative orientation exists not only within single episodes but *across* the *Panorama* sample, to exemplify the applicability of the CDA method.

3.12 Access to Discourse

As stated above, the policy focus, searching *for*, and assuming the presence *of* ‘WMD’, was not, nor could it be, at the behest of News and Current Affairs journalists. In this, and in other regards, both News and Current Affairs journalism is responding to and reflecting the policy

orientations of political elites and their assorted advisors. Van Dijk, with admirable clarity, refers to this social and political formulation as a ‘hierarchy of power’.

...some members of dominant groups and organisations have a special role in planning, decision-making and control over the relations and processes of the enactment of power. These (small) groups will here be called the *power elites* (Domhoff 1978; Mills 1956). For our discussion, it is especially interesting to note that such elites also have special access to discourse; they are literally the ones who have most to *say*. In our discourse analytical framework, therefore, we define elites precisely in terms of their ‘symbolic power’ (Bourdieu, 1982), as measured by the extent of their discursive and communicative scope and resources. (Van Dijk 1993 in Wetherell et al. 2001: 303)

‘Having the most to say’ both literally and discursively is an important aspect to consider and takes us beyond the remit of mere Current Affairs journalism onto the terrain of political science. Such terrain is beyond the scope of this research but, the ways in which such hierarchies coalesce with political Current Affairs broadcasting cannot be overlooked. For if it is true that political elites have ‘symbolic power’, or social, symbolic and cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986) then how is it imagined, challenged, enacted, and reproduced in and by *Panorama*? Is it the case that the assumptions and orientations of political elites are reproduced largely uncritically? To analyse this, we can trace back via the practices and traditions of journalism and its reliance on sources, and source relations (Hall et al.’s ‘Primary Definers’) and Hallin’s ‘Official sources’:

...the *routines* of objective journalism, which tied the news closely to the *official sources* and the Washington agenda, and the ideology of the cold war, which locked events in a framework of understanding that made fundamental questioning of American foreign policy unthinkable. (Hallin 1986: 110)

It is what we might refer to as proximity *with* or access *to* discourse. Persons with a legitimated position, and precisely because of this legitimacy, have access *to* and location *in* the dominant discourse. Such personnel are able to use their positional and discursive resources as a means of persuasion and in some cases, manipulation. As Van Dijk outlines:

One crucial power resource is privileged or preferential access to discourse. One element of such complex access patterns is more or less controlled or active access to

the very communicative event as such, that is, to the situation; some (elite) participants may control the occasion, time, place, setting and the presence or absence of participants in such events. In other words, one way of enacting power is to control context (Van Dijk 1993 *in* Wetherell et al. 2001: 303)

The ‘control of context’ is one of the most crucial points. Of course such control is exerted by both policy elites (as sources and ‘Primary Definers’) and journalists (as disseminators or ‘Secondary Definers’) alike. Ethnographic studies of BBC Journalistic content (Born 2005, McQueen 2010 (unpublished)) might point towards the ways in which journalists’ access to and reliance on their key sources guides the content, narrative and context. The methodology of this study is not ethnographic, nor should it be, both Born and McQueen have undertaken admirable work in this respect, but discursive. In fact, it is not necessary in this instance to undertake any great detailed ethnography in order to realise the extent to which certain hierarchies of power (Van Dijk) are operationalised. A CDA approach is enlightening with regards ‘who gets to speak’ and ‘on which topics’. The ‘control of context’ is detectable by analysing and tracking the very presence of particular people on screen, and the lexical and linguistic choice(s) both the sources *and* the *Panorama* journalists make when representing the issue(s) and event(s). Do they, by definition of presence, have symbolic discursive power? Are they dominant social and political actors with access to knowledge and discourse? Are they subjected to challenges by way of journalistic questions? Importantly for this research and its focus on the dramatic elements used to represent the issues, to what extent are they in control of their representation of *character*, are they allowed moments of self-reflection and self-examination? In what way does this impact on the narrative direction of the broadcasts? By analysis of character(isation) and framing we can gain insights into the narrative direction and the ways in which such narrative direction begins to constitute an allowable frame or discursive formation. If *Panorama* in this instance can ‘dig behind the headlines’ (Holland 2006: xiii) provide more context ‘Help viewers make sense of what they have seen and heard elsewhere’ (Rippon 2011, *The Observer*) then precisely who maintains

or cont(estr)ains the narrative? *Panorama* does indeed provide extra detail but who controls the context? And, as important what is the context allowed and through which forms and practices might certain contextual details be foregrounded, whilst others remain absent(ed) (and thus delegitimated)?

One of the key areas of difference between News and Current Affairs broadcasting is that the extended form of Current Affairs is precisely the space in which context can and should be developed. The *Panorama* broadcasts under scrutiny in this research are all over 50 minutes in length. This length of broadcast afforded the ‘flagship’ broadcast strand is indicative of; 1) The seriousness of the issue and event being covered; 2) The continuing (at the time of broadcast at least) resourcing of Current Affairs broadcast journalism; and 3) The necessity for and (perceived) ability of Current Affairs broadcasting to offer critical, interrogative, long-form journalistic accounts of issues of social, cultural and (geo)political importance. This perception, now well established and entrenched, is what we might call the normative understanding of the form. Precisely because it is normative, it remains (largely, if not wholly) unexamined by practitioners. Therefore, it is imperative that such analyses are undertaken by critical scholars of news, journalism, television and cultural studies.

Developing this analytical focus, and further, underscoring precisely why analysis must be undertaken by scholars, Van Dijk suggests that the ideological position(s) or narratives of journalists are perhaps likely to be unintentional, and that analysis is even more vital and urgent because of it: ‘Analysis of news talk is therefore able to reveal the (usually not explicit or intentional) ideologies of journalists’ (Van Dijk *in* Wetherell et al. 2001: 196). As (Tuchman 1978) identified, journalistic practices are routinized and assumed to be a ‘strategic ritual’. Schmidt develops the theory that the ‘narrow technical orientation’ is transformed into ‘a virtue, a sign of objectivity rather than of subordination’ (Schmidt 2000: 204).

To develop the ideas proposed by Schmidt, we can undertake some analysis of the BBC's use of the 'correspondent'. For instance, on BBC Radio and BBC Television such titles as 'political correspondent' exist as taxonomy, such a title confers upon the journalist a degree of assumed expertise, it is a demarcated and idealised figure. On *Newsnight* Allegra Stratton was the 'chief political correspondent' and on *Radio 5 Live* John Pienaar is similarly titled. In these instances both Pienaar and Stratton provide 'expert' commentary and insights into very specific and rigid spheres of 'political life'. During the (ongoing) economic crisis, both Stratton and Pienaar have, at various times, been called upon to comment on and explain the debates and decisions of policy makers and politicians, and the 'political' context in which said decisions take place. As (one of) the flagship current affairs broadcast strands (in this example), *Newsnight*, and given the overarching 'responsibility' for analysis, context, in-depth investigation and explanation, Current Affairs broadcasting carries significant weight. This being so, one could read the discursive formation of the BBC 'correspondent' positively insofar as it does at least attempt to locate decisions within specific contexts, in the case of the current 'economic crisis' BBC 'economics correspondents' also comment, of course. However, the rigidity materialised and manifest in the 'political correspondent' role separates and importantly, makes little effort to 'join the dots' of policy and its material affects beyond the soap opera characterisation of 'Westminster politics'. In the case of 'chief political correspondent' commentary is informed by the narrow discursive formation of what constitutes 'politics' (usually the two (or three) party system and the 'logic' that this reproduces) and 'political decisions and debates'. It renders decisions that have mass and wide material and *social* impact as the mere machinations of party machines and party politicking, or what one might sceptically term 'the theatricality of democracy'. For the BBC (and much journalism) 'politics' simply *is* electoral politics. In many ways of course this is a consequence of the UK's particular brand of parliamentary 'democracy' and as such laying

(even partial) blame at the feet of broadcast journalism might be considered misplaced. However, we should be wary of such claims, cast as they are within a narrow discursive terrain and further, demonstrating a (perhaps wilfully) limited appreciation or understanding of the ways in which News and Current Affairs journalism operates and influences both ‘politics’ and public perception and understanding *of* politics.

3.13 Mediatization and the ‘Political Correspondent’

Scholarship in Journalism and Media studies has increasingly turned to analyses of the potential influence of media on both elite actors within the frame(s) and those lay-persons outside. Often referred to as a process of ‘mediatization’, Strömbäck perhaps most pertinent for our purposes, puts it best. Mediatization, he writes:

... can be taken to mean the dominance in societal processes of the *news values and the storytelling techniques* the media make use of to take advantage of their own medium and its format, and to be competitive in the on-going struggle to capture people’s attention. These storytelling techniques include *simplification, polarization, intensification, personalization* (Asp 1986; Hernes 1978), visualization and stereotypization, and the framing of politics as a strategic game or “horse race” (Mazzoleni 1987; Patterson 1993). (Strömbäck 2008: 233)

Furthermore, John Street (2010) develops the point that in fact:

Politicians are adapting to the medium upon which they have come to rely. They design their campaigns and their approach to fit the media. Their schedules are timed to coincide with journalists’ deadlines; their public performances are intended to look good on screen. (Street 2011: 8)

If ‘Politicians’ and other associated legitimated political actors ‘design their campaigns ... to fit the media’ then journalists, too, are seemingly caught in this bind. The ‘political correspondent’, the ‘economics correspondent’ and for the purposes of this research the ‘war correspondent’, and in the case of John Simpson, the ‘world affairs correspondent’ thus become rigid frames applied to experts beyond which they are seldom encouraged to trespass. In the case of the ‘political correspondent’, important decisions are thus reduced to the pantomime of party politicking (as political as opposed to ‘Political’ or ideological).

Legitimacy and authenticity are conferred upon these practices by discursive operational expertise of the generic ‘correspondent’. As Kline, reviewing the work of media sociologist David Altheide, comments, there are ‘...various ways a slant will evolve out of the pragmatics of covering an event. Moreover ... several ways in which the *journalistic practices* predispose the reporter to a *particular range of angles on the story*’ (Kline 1976), reviewing Altheide, D., *Creating Reality: How Television News Distorts Events*). Thus, in the developed News and Current Affairs broadcast strands of *Newsnight* and *Panorama*, in place of analyses that link together stories, narratives, decisions and their potential wider social impact, such extended texts serve merely to discuss, perhaps in more detail, the *already legitimised micro narratives* and the machinations of the assorted characters contained within. What appears to be lacking, are critical Current Affairs debate and analysis strands that link together (seemingly) disparate, but of course related events. Such links are able to be found in the Documentary genre, but here, constrained *by*, and contained *in* the logic of journalism, Current Affairs broadcasting, particularly *Panorama* is seemingly incapable of developed contextual analysis and focus. This is of course problematic in itself but compounded by the fact that, as we have seen, such News and Current Affairs broadcast strands lay claim to do more: ‘*Newsnight* exists not to break news, but to help viewers make sense of what they have heard, seen or read elsewhere’ (<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/aug/21/debate-newsnight-lost-its-way>).

Given the statement above, we can begin to understand the view broadcast Current Affairs has of itself: as an explainer of events, adding the (context) detail. But which detail(s) are included and which context(s) are excluded...and why/how? We can also begin to see traces of the ‘Four key units’ approach adopted post the Birt revolution in BBC News and Current Affairs broadcasting.

Defending the role of *Newsnight*, in the *Observer* newspaper debate, the already quoted Rippon explained that, the need to obtain (and maintain) viewing figures has perhaps led to a general drift toward populism, as such, he suggests they:

...attempt(s) to do too much too quickly. There is an addiction to haste and compression. Complex subjects are necessarily trivialised because of the desire to move briskly on to the next subject.

(<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/aug/21/debate-newsnight-lost-its-way>)

Faced with competition and threats to its licence fee, in such an environment, the BBC, perhaps understandably resorts to populism and filters political, social, cultural and geopolitical discourse through the narratives of dramatic characterisation, political intrigue, political (in)fighting and all explained, contextualised and materialised through the discursive templates of correspondents and their respective ‘beats’. But need it be the case that in such an environment, public service broadcasting of Current Affairs act as containing devices for the more progressive or radical alternatives to dominant (neo-liberal, neo-imperialist) narratives? That *Newsnight*, *Question Time* and (for the purposes of this research) *Panorama* are discursively limited and limiting is problematic. What *Panorama* (and others’) appear(s) to lack is the ability or journalistic and televisual resources to adequately provide the in-depth, developed, nuanced, contextual detail necessary to link together rather than separate. Equally troubling is the near total absence of any other alternatives.

The *Panorama* broadcasts under scrutiny in this research were the product of this specific type of orientation towards expertise. Such demarcated orientation though was not by way of reference to any particularly sophisticated expertise with regards the geographical, political, sociological or cultural knowledge, but was instead largely filtered through the narrative expertise of the ‘Correspondent’. To what extent then does this epistemology, this taxonomy and this discursive formation of expertise readily lend itself to nuanced, developed,

contextually rich, socio-politically, ideologically informed interrogation? And to what extent might (in particular) the ‘war correspondent’ already pre-suppose a direction of travel?

In some ways this bears a resemblance to what has been referred to as ‘parachute journalism’. If we understand the term as ‘the practice of thrusting journalists into an area to report on a story in which the reporter has little knowledge or experience’. Of course it also has significant differences. No doubt the journalists concerned, in the case of this research these are, principally though not exclusively, Jane Corbin and John Simpson, would critique the assertion of ‘little knowledge’, and in some ways they would be correct to do so.² Both Corbin and Simpson have a wealth of experience ‘overseas’ as ‘foreign correspondents’ (or ‘world affairs correspondent/editor’ in the case of Simpson) and in some cases, as they make clear in the *Panorama* broadcasts, they have experience of the country (Iraq) concerned. However, *the way* this experience is developed, in *what context*, covering *which stories and events*, bears close-scrutiny. Both Simpson and Corbin have devoted significant time, energy and resources to reporting from that country (Iraq). Both are ‘seasoned campaigners’, have a wealth of experience, and are (rightly) admired for their journalistic output. However, the extent to which their experience(s) have been developed whilst Iraq itself has been ‘on a war footing’ might mean that the journalistic styles, templates and forms are discursively framed and epistemologically cemented. This of course resonates with the earlier suggestions regarding the generic nature of ‘War Reporting’. ‘Genre is not only about text but is also a feature of the “routinization” of production that shapes audience reception and perception as much as it is shaped by them’. (Boyd-Barrett 2004 *in* Allan and Zelizer 2004: 26). Even if in

² The ‘foreign correspondent’ role speaks to wider issues concerning the ability, wherewithal, resources and desire of News and Current Affairs to cover overseas issues and events. Foreign correspondent, overseas editor et al. are themselves generic and inexact terms. Such terms also indicate the inexact, generic, discursive ‘over-there-ness’ of news pertaining to overseas. This is an area related to the ‘news values’ of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and the relative merits of this approach. As it stands *Panorama* is therefore constrained in some ways by this adherence to ‘news values’ though one could make the argument that Current Affairs broadcasting could and should be the location in which such values are challenged. These issues are covered extensively by, among others, Galtung and Ruge (1965), Harcup and O’Neill (2001; 2017), Bennett (2015), Thussu (2007), Cottle (2006), Brighton and Foy (2015) and Allan (2004).

these cases, both Simpson and Corbin can point to significant research, experience and expertise *beyond* the micro narrative and discourse of conflict, the extent to which their anchoring of the broadcasts positions the programmes themselves, *and* the viewing audience on a ‘war footing’ is surely important and problematic. In the case of John Simpson, he is already established, somewhat unfairly perhaps, as ‘The Liberator of Kabul’ (<https://www.theguardian.com/media/2001/nov/13/warinafghanistan2001.bbc>). In short, the journalists have expertise, but such expertise, and audience knowledge of them is oriented around and filtered through their ability to narrate and *tell the story of conflict*. Orienting the *Panorama* broadcasts around this specific form of correspondent expertise is a particularly pressing concern when the programmes are broadcast *prior* to conflict or war beginning, in the pre-conflict phase. Their visible presence on screen, their narration and guidance through the events, their perceived ‘war correspondent’ expertise already establishes the discursive terrain and template. It might perhaps lead one to assume or posit the question: ‘Well, if Simpson’s there, surely war is not far away!’

Significantly, the epistemological and taxonomical position of the ‘War Correspondent’ the ‘Overseas Editor’ or ‘World Affairs Editor’ is not only a mark of authority and legitimacy, it is an essential point about News and Current Affairs’ place in the journalistic and public sphere environment. Furthermore, for the purposes of this research, in the specific context of British broadcasting, such positions are essential aspects and part of the ‘trustworthy’ repertoire that underpins and contributes to the BBC as an institution and broadcaster *of, to and for* the nation.

3.14 Chronology and Temporality

Chronological and temporal logics have a great deal of importance in the overall context and narrative of war, likewise, and partially located as it is within the WPM, pre-conflict phase; conflict phase; post-conflict phase, the chronology and temporal ‘logic’ is important in the

narrative and context of this research. Chronology and temporality are of course equally important in broadcasting (of stories). Therefore, the analysis chapters are organised both chronologically, and in the conclusion, thematically. By which I mean: so that one can ascertain then outline the dominant themes that emerge, in all three Chapters of analysis, each broadcast will be analysed in turn. The conclusion sections of each chapter will then draw together the analysis in order to assess and outline the extent to which the sample can be said to constitute particular discourses and epistemologies regarding the conflict (phase) in Iraq.

Given that the second Gulf War is the most consequential foreign policy news event of the 21st Century, and that the BBC remains the primary Public Service Broadcaster in the UK, as one might expect, in the build-up *to*, the prosecution *of*, and the fall-out *from* the war in/on Iraq, *Panorama* produced and broadcast a number of programmes pertaining to the issue, and the ‘event’. Beginning in September 2002 and ending in March 2004, the sample contained here is comprised of 10 *Panorama* broadcasts. These 10 broadcasts will be analysed as a means of critically interrogating what one might call *Panorama*’s ideological, journalistic and discursive footprint.

For reasons of organisation and for generic consistency, this research will devote itself to analyses of 10 broadcasts. The rationale for this selection remains rigorous and is in fact based on the ‘type’ of broadcast under scrutiny. This research is a media, cultural studies, journalism doctorate, therefore, even though the methodological approach and theoretical overview explicitly makes comment and specific claims regarding the wider social, ideological, and political issues, *and* I do claim the *Panorama* broadcasts played an important role in reproducing dominant hegemonic discourse, the main point of the analysis is the specificities of the form, the formal characteristics, the generic and journalistic discourses of *Panorama*, and the ways in which they establish the genre, set the precedent, and in so doing, reproduce a dominant discursive and ideological hegemonic discourse.

Additionally, and relatedly, this research is restricted to those broadcasts that have, as their central components, large sections of ‘original material’. That is: original material filmed explicitly for use (and assumed insight) in(to) the topic and news events under scrutiny. The action, and the ways in which such ‘action’ is represented helps frame the issue(s). Furthermore, there is also, in some cases, extensive use of archive material, usually drawn from BBC News broadcasts and previous editions of *Panorama*. The use of already established and *legitimated* archive material is also a key aspect of the ways in which the debate can be framed, or the stories can be told. The above type of broadcast also functions as the archetype, and as such has set something of a (now much imitated) broadcast journalism precedent or template.

Principally then, the chapters of analysis are based on a rigorous analysis of a sample of *Panorama* episodes produced and broadcast in the pre-conflict phase; conflict phase; and post-conflict phase. The texts, stretching across 19 months in total, via specific journalistic and televisual signifying practises produce epistemological and discursive themes as a means to ‘tell the story’ (of conflict). Further, the extent to which the dominant themes inherent in each and all broadcasts ‘produce’ a vision and version of the world will be subject to scrutiny, analysis and critical interrogation.

The three chapters of analysis involved undertaking rigorous discourse and multi-modal critical discourse analysis. In so doing, I was able to identify specific consistent thematic, televisual, representational, and journalistic themes inherent *in* each broadcast *and across* the entire sample. The analysis then goes on to outline, explain and critically interrogate the ways in which particular discursive actors (functioning as ‘Primary Definers’) shape the themes, concretise the discourse, and ‘produce’ a vision and version of the world. The analysis provokes questions regarding the extent to which the discourse of *Panorama*

across the sample of 10 different but related broadcasts produces an epistemology, and the extent to which said epistemology and discourse is commensurate with elite-centred interests.

3.15 Organisation of Analysis

Each of the broadcasts were analysed and critically interrogated by drawing on the summary paragraphs the BBC themselves use to publicise the programmes. These officially designated and publicised summaries are vital, they make explicit what the focus, the storyline(s), of each broadcast will be. The summary paragraphs literally mark out in stark press release (and trailer) terms, the specific aspects, storyline(s), characters, themes and focus points *as* both the most politically and *journalistically* significant. In short, the BBC *Panorama* summary paragraphs identify the main players in the wider socio-political landscape, and in the broadcasts themselves, they simply become the main actors in the story, they shape and frame the narrative orientation. In so doing, does this narrow focus exclude and excise wider structural and ideological considerations? Using the summary paragraphs the BBC themselves deem worth using ensures that the analysis does not simply become a case of finding those examples, those frames which merely confirm my own view. By clearly remaining within the narrative and storyline arcs BBC *Panorama* themselves highlight, the research is able to avert the potential for ‘data (or semiotic, discourse) mining’, or ‘confirmation bias’. The analysis will identify and examine the ways in which said dominant concerns, themes and issues of the broadcasts are discursively, televisually, and journalistically communicated. In so doing, the research is able to draw conclusions as to the overall themes of each individual broadcast, and latterly, the overall discourse and epistemology of the sample as a whole.

To ensure that the research is rigorous, and that the approach is consistent and transparent, the ways in which the approach was operationalised is set out below.

3.16 Operationalising the Approach and the Selection of Textual Sample

The particular method and approach applied in this research was as follows.

1. Firstly, the timeframe was identified, in part this was somewhat self-selecting because the 'news agenda' became dominated by discussions of Iraq. The sample begins with the first broadcast (post 9-11) in which conflict in Iraq – as a real and enduring policy proposal – was discussed as a possibility, and the sample ends once Saddam Hussein was captured. These dates and the broadcasts are the most important principally because this was when 'debate' around the rights and wrongs of embarking on conflict were under most urgent consideration by policy elites, and consequently, by News and Current Affairs broadcasting, and the public more generally. Or to put it another way, the *Panorama* episodes in question were broadcast at a time when the issues were driven by the news agenda, the 'news values' of the time. Once Iraq dominated the News, *Panorama*, being the preeminent Current Affairs strand in the UK, as expected, followed suit. Given that the methodological approach here is CDA, which involves more detailed textual analysis than some other methods require, the sample had to be contained enough to manage, but simultaneously large enough to constitute a representative sample. The selection of ten episodes across 19 months achieves this aim.
2. Once the (19 month) timeframe had been established, I then identified each *Panorama* broadcast that had Iraq/Saddam/WMD/Conflict in Iraq as its storyline. Over the timeframe selected, it became clear that, adhering to the template identified and established by Altheide and Grimes (2005) the broadcasts could be grouped together by temporality or 'phases':

Pre-conflict phase.

Conflict phase.

Post-conflict phase.

The War Programming Model (WPM) provides a useful analytical framework. As listed above, in the WPM, the programmes divide broadly into three categories: 1) The pre-conflict phase: designed to analyse and deal with threat ('the threat of Saddam's weapons program'); 2) The conflict phase: broadcasting updates on the progress of the war (sometimes through the experience of coalition troops); 3) The post-conflict phase: dealing with the 'reconstruction' of Iraq and the search for Saddam (once 'combat operations were effectively over' (Bush, G., 18 April 2003)). In the post-conflict phase, *Panorama* tended to focus on the 'reconstruction programme' and in at least one edition: *Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam's Weapons*, the continuing search for WMD.

The style and approach to News and Current Affairs broadcasting demonstrated by *Panorama* from 2002–2004 are broadly consistent with Altheide and Grimes' model. This analysis, however, develops the model in three particular ways: 1) The analytical model developed by this research is a wholly critical discourse analytical one. This ensures this research is able to track, trace and analyse the consistently applied signifying practices; 2) The focus of this research also deals exclusively with Current Affairs as opposed to News. As already discussed, the length of time devoted to each broadcast means that, in theory at least, these broadcasts are well resourced, well researched, and by devoting more time to the issue, are able to tell the more detailed and longer story. As such, *Panorama* carries considerable weight (and responsibility) for contributing to the public sphere. This resourcing, and location on the principle public service broadcaster in the UK, in turn feeds into and cements its established currency of legitimacy, the very commodity on which *Panorama* trades; 3) That the broadcasts tend to locate the action in broadly dramatic terms provides an analytical focus often overlooked by other contemporary studies, and certainly overlooked by

Altheide and Grimes. In all three narrative stages of this media logic, the pre-conflict phase; the conflict phase; the post-conflict phase, the *dramatic* is accentuated in sometimes similar, and sometimes different ways. Although differences exist, the (most) dramatic is demonstrably and forcefully present. The stylistic devices, the signifying practices, the forms of story-telling correspond with those commonly associated with dramatic or fictional accounts of events. Such extensive use of dramatic forms and tropes of story-telling have the potential to render understanding of events as narrowly focussed and therefore potentially incompatible with the claims often made for and of public service broadcast journalism. Each 'phase' will provide some critical underpinning in the subsequent chapters, and the dramatic templates employed to tell the stories will be referred to, alongside significant examples, in each Chapter of analysis.

3. **Selecting the sample:** Over the 19-month period selected, *Panorama*, as one would expect, produced and broadcast a number programmes devoted to Iraq. Using the WMP's phases template, these can be divided as follows:

Pre-conflict phase = 7

Conflict phase = 5

Post-conflict phase = 6

Total = 18.

So to remain consistent, and to ensure that the sample contained programmes of similar style, the next step in the process was one of **differentiating the form:** The focus of this research is explicitly trained on a particular form, type, or style of Current Affairs broadcasting. The particular form of broadcasting that constitutes this sample is what is referred to (above) as Current Affairs 'reportage'. This is a mode of broadcast in which a significant proportion of its content is original filmed footage

combined with archive material drawn from News and previous iterations of Current Affairs broadcasts. During the chosen time-period, those broadcasts *not* under scrutiny in this research are ‘studio-based’ discussions. Studio-based discussions are an entirely different ‘form’. Their conventions and characteristics sit uneasily in this research, based as they are on entirely different temporal, locational and formal logic(s), as such, they are, not extraneous, but at least peripheral in this research. This is not to say however, that they played no part in the narrative of war, and indeed they appear to fit fairly-seamlessly into the ‘war programming’ model as outlined by Altheide and Grimes (2005). As such, they play some role in shoring-up the wider political discourse of the period, they play some role in the ideological footprint and the reproduction of the dominant narrative. However, in the context of *Panorama* as it is currently imagined, studio-based discussions remain an anomaly. As anomalous, and as a Critical Discourse Analysis theoretical framework proposes, while they might produce and contribute to interesting and important aspects and narratives, they might be said to help circumscribe limits of debate (Chomsky 2003) their very different (and more rarely-used) characteristics are less formally, journalistically, and televisually interesting. Such forms are also less imitated, their currency is diminished, they are certainly not the standard *Panorama* template. The studio-based discussions and debate format is one found in different, though related broadcast strands, principally *Question Time* and *Newsnight*. Both *Question Time*, and, to a lesser extent, *Newsnight* are certainly ripe for analysis and perhaps will feature as objects in future research, but in the meantime, this research restricts its analysis to the *Panorama* broadcasts with the standard(ised) format, containing a combination of archive material and new original footage.

Of the broadcasts adhering to the *style* and *form* with which this analysis concerns itself, the above total of 18 is reduced to 12.

Pre-Conflict phase = 4

Conflict phase = 3

Post-Conflict phase = 5

Selecting four in the **pre-conflict phase** was an obvious choice because, firstly, there were only four. Additionally, to explain why this chapter of analysis contains a sample of four, whereas the next two chapters contain a sample of only three in each one, the pre-conflict phase was the most urgent period, one in which the preeminent Current Affairs broadcaster *ought* to be devoting itself, its attention to the whys and wherefores, the competing arguments of embarking on a conflict with a foreign power. It is the time-period in which some critique, some resistance might be able to be mounted and sustained.

In part explained by the fact that the ‘official’ conflict was so short, and with the gestation period for Current Affairs typically being longer than for News, sampling and analysing only three broadcasts in the **conflict phase** was equally self-selecting. There were only three *Panorama* broadcasts in this ‘phase’.

In the final **post-conflict phase**, the selection of three (from a possible five) was based on the following complimentary considerations: a) the simple practicality of management of material. Each analytical chapter ought to have a sense of balance, of reciprocity. b) Having closely watched and analysed all 5 from the post-conflict phase, episodes in this phase end up saying essentially similar things. c) Most importantly, the most interesting and obvious reason for the selection of the three chosen is based on that fact that each programme under scrutiny and analysis ‘echoed’ and followed up from a programme from the earlier pre-conflict and conflict phase(s).

There is a return to the same storyline(s) and the same Primary Definers. Discourse and narratives are reiterated, in some (minor) cases challenged, but largely, drawing on, and echoing drama and adhering to the (partly Proppian) template identified in this research, the post-conflict phase broadcasts tie up the loose ends, they conclude the storylines developed in earlier in the ‘series’. In the terms of Robin Nelson, above (echoing Propp) the final three broadcasts offer a cogent illustration of how ‘Order is restored’. In this case, such order is political, ideological, televisual *and* journalistic.

4. The next step in the approach was to view each of the programmes in their entirety, and in order. By adhering to their temporal sequence, I was able to assess the extent to which they might begin to constitute a discourse, an epistemology of the conflict in Iraq, and, more interestingly, a televisual dramatic storytelling template. This process was then necessary in order to familiarise myself with the editorial, journalistic and televisual approach (to storytelling). In research such as this, the categories of analysis are ‘emergent’, they are part of an iterative research process. By which I mean, while ensuring that the analysis always paid close attention to *Panorama*’s own publicity, its own purported storyline(s), the categories, the tools of analysis, the frames, the terms and the salient issues and methods are gradually set and settled through the very process of close watching and subsequent analysis. To assess the extent to which *Panorama* has a generic style, I then closely analysed the visual, aural signifiers (the semiotics) present in the text(s), and with the assistance of the official BBC transcripts if any speech was unclear, I was able to begin the linguistic and lexical analysis.
5. The process was then to watch each *Panorama* episode all the way through, and this time while examining the extent to which each episode bore close relation to the salient features the BBC themselves identified as most pressing, most urgent, the focus of their attention.

6. Having examined and analysed each programme, and the extent to which they did comply with the promotional paragraphs, the salient issues BBC *Panorama* produced to go alongside each broadcast, I then assessed the extent to which each episode made extensive (even dominant) use of original material; The extent to which each episode made extensive use of Primary Definers – as **storytellers**, who they were, their position in a cultural, social and political hierarchy, with the attendant ability to frame the event(s), and ‘have most to say’ (Van Dijk). The questions I posed to myself in each circumstance was: Did *Panorama* deploy particular journalistic and storytelling methods? If so, what were these? Were dramatic elements prominent? Was character, archetype(s), stereotypes, and narrative deployed? How so? What did they communicate? How did this meet and match the BBC PR paragraphs?
7. Once these elements were identified and became clearer, the specificities of CDA and multimodal analysis could come to the fore. On repeated viewing of the broadcasts, the principal CDA tools that became most applicable were:
Ideological squaring and attributes;
Over-lexicalisation, Lexical Absences;
Nominalisation and Transitivity.

3.17 Ideological Squaring and Attributes

Given that the Iraq war was a highly politically charged, a much-debated topic, with significant opposition, how (if) does *Panorama* include and represent dissident voices and opinion(s)?

In the case of conflict, hegemonic boundaries are not overstepped. As he (Gitlin) argues, the “work of hegemony, all in all, consists of imposing standardised assumptions over events and conditions that must be ‘covered’ by the dictates of the prevailing news standards.” (Van Dijk *in* Wetherell et al 2001: 197)

What are the ‘prevailing standards’? Who is afforded space and voice in the discursive formation? In what ways are dominant and/or dissonant and subaltern voices and opinions represented and narrated? Analysing the ways in which such (wider) opinions, if present, are (stage) managed; their place in the unfolding narratives; the extent to which resistant or critical voices are themselves discursively and *dramatically* constrained is of vital importance when discussing News and Current Affairs. With regards the specificities of this research, Current Affairs television coverage of war and conflict, (*Panorama’s* coverage of Gulf War II) how are sources and protagonists represented? How are sources and protagonists legitimised and/or de-legitimised? In what ways can the theoretical model provide the necessary critical rigour? Van Dijk’s extensive analysis and his theoretical model are instructive in this respect:

Since the underlying ideologies (and the social attitudes and personal opinions influenced by them) are generally polarised, this also tends to be the case for ideological discourse, typically organised by emphasising the positive representation of Us (the in-group) and the negative representations of Them (the out-group) – and its corollary (mitigating the negative representation of Us and the positive representation of Them). We call this combination of general discursive strategies the ‘ideological square’. (Van Dijk *in* Wetherell et al 2001: 193)

One way in which this ‘ideological square’ is completed is to over-represent specific protagonists while simultaneously under-representing (when complete absenting would be impractical) others, or ‘Others’:

One typical transformation is overstatement, which is of the same general category as over-generalisation as we know it from stereotypes and prejudices or ‘extreme case’ formulations in conversations. In addition to a change of semantic content or meaning, such a structural transformation relation between source discourse and news discourse may also be rhetorical, since rhetoric deals with the way information (meaning, content) is emphasised or de-emphasised for various reasons. This may be to emphasise the bad characteristics of out-groups or the good ones of in-groups ... but also for *dramatic effect*: where scholarly discourse tends to hedge, media discourse tends to be much more categorical and exaggerated – with the tacit assumption that readers [viewers] will be more in, or will better remember the ‘exaggerated’ news. (Van Dijk *in* Wahl-Jorgensen and Hanitzsch 2006: 195. *Emphasis added*)

For example, in the sample drawn upon in this research, the (oft-repeated) claim: ‘Saddam Hussein is able to launch chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes’ was frequently cited. That this claim emerged from elite policy-makers (Primary Definers), chiefly Tony Blair, means that it was immediately afforded legitimate newsworthy status. This is to be expected and accepted. However, despite the fact this claim became perhaps the most critiqued, the most urgently debated, the most cited and most subject to critical interrogation does not diminish its resonance within a ‘war programming’ mode of address and discourse. In fact, despite its critical reception, the phrase itself assisted in setting a template of menace and fear. In this instance, it is not *even* that ‘he’ (Saddam) *could* launch an attack within 45 minutes, such a claim proved (too late of course) fairly easy to disprove (and was conclusively disproved). It is precisely because, through repetition, ‘He’ is already demonic, unhinged and clearly demarcated as ‘Other’, so much so that ‘he’ already has attributed to ‘him’ a certain cumulative semiotic, discursive and epistemological resource (of uniquely menacing). This ‘resource’ (of menace), this process of ‘Ideological squaring’ means we understand that it is not necessarily that ‘he’ *can* launch weapons of mass destruction (WMD), it is that ‘*He would if he could*’. Even critical Current Affairs broadcasting, and *Panorama* is the paradigm, seeking to unpick and ‘dig behind the headlines’ (Holland 2006: xiii) potentially faces (and might end up reproducing) this accumulated semiotic and discursive template. Furthermore, and with the additional deployment of already-legitimated archive footage, does *Panorama* actually reproduce this characterisation and locate it within a narrative of ‘Othered’ menace set against benign Western intervention? The analytical resource of ‘ideological squaring’ is therefore a valuable one. As befits research that utilises the CDA methodology, we know that stereotyping, (see above) because it can ‘emphasise the bad characteristics of out-groups or the good ones of in-groups’ (Van Dijk *in* Wahl-Jorgensen and Hanitzsch 2006) plays a major role in the process of Ideological Squaring. The analysis

will assess and critically analyse the extent to which such ‘Ideological squaring’ is a common feature, a common representational ‘resource’ in the chapters of analysis.

3.18 Over-Lexicalisation and Lexical Absences

Discourse (and critical discourse) analysis, being a linguistic form of analysis, provides useful resources with which to critically interrogate the ways in which language ascribes value(s) to ideas, places, events and agents (and non-agents) in various storylines and events covered by the *Panorama* sample. First extensively theorised by Halliday (1978; 1985) the term ‘Over-Lexicalisation’ refers to ‘the existence of an excess of quasi-synonymous terms for entities and ideas’ (Fowler, R 1991; 85). Machin and Mayr (2012) put it as follows, over-lexicalisation, they argue ‘results when a surfeit of repetitious, quasi-synonymous terms is woven into the fabric of news discourse, giving rise to a sense of over-completeness.’ (Machin, D and Mayr, A. 2012; 37). Sometimes referred to as ‘over-assertion’ (Bell, A in Bell, A and Garrett, P 1998 83) it describes and analyses the ways in which language is deployed, ideas and characterisations repeated, and synonymous terms used to underscore a way of understanding the events in question. In making strong assertions, ‘Over-Lexicalisation’ attempts to make definitive that which might be more nuanced and complex.

In addition to the linguistic tools, the visual and aural aspects present in television representation means that the Over-Lexicalisation can take on an even more powerful means of over-emphasising the ‘in-group’ v ‘out-group’ dichotomy. Visual framing, edits, close-ups for emotional expression, and musical accompaniment can represent or ‘cast’ people and events in particular light(s). This is particularly acute when dealing with contentious and dramatic issues such as conflict, where the actions of agents involved (can) have deadly consequences. Because of its repetitions, its analogies, its synonyms, the practice of Over-Lexicalisation is an obvious means through which the afore-mentioned ‘Ideological squaring’ can be sustained and strengthened.

A distinct but related linguistic and lexical approach is ‘Lexical Absences’. The term refers to ‘suppression, where certain terms we expect to find are absent’ (Machin and Mayr 2012; 38). This particular approach proves very useful for critical and reflective ideological analysis. However, it also requires more detailed contextual overview, by which I mean, in order to identify an absence, one must have a detailed understanding of wider contextual and ideological fields. The ‘News Values’ oriented journalistic practices of clarity, unambiguity and simplicity might assist in ease of understanding, but the CDA tools applied with these approaches ‘ask what has been left out or added and the ideological work this does’ (Machin and Mayr. 2012; 39). Over-lexicalisation, and its discursive bedfellow ‘Lexical Absences’ is perfectly commensurate with news discourse, news practice(s) and ‘News Values’. Over-Lexicalising specific terms (particularly when one finds repeated examples, as a developed and well-defined CDA approach does) while simultaneously absenting others, often absenting complex terms (as Lexical Absenting often does) reduces ambiguity. In ‘News Values’ terms, that which might be complex, is, via ‘Over-lexicalisation’ and ‘Lexical Absenting’ made unambiguous.

3.19 Transitivity and Nominalisation

‘Transitivity’ and its subtle use in media representation is vital to understand. In short, the term refers to ‘agency structures within the narratives, the way in which ‘doing things’ is represented in discourse, including who is positioned as doing which kind of things, in relation to what, or whom’ (Barker and Galisinski 2001; 144). The transitive verb in fact only makes sense if it actually exerts its action on an object (or a person). This has obvious consequences for the apportion(ing) of blame, or its opposite, the denial or excision of blame. For instance, in conflict journalism, the difference between the Transitive verb – a participant being ‘Killed’ – someone performed the action; ‘Killed by’ – an agent is more directly responsible, and the Intransitive ‘dying’ which is agentless, is vitally important. In the above

example, identifying who is most often the agent responsible (for ‘killing’), and contrastingly, which actions are signalled as agentless can help us understand the discourse, the epistemology and the ideological work going on in texts. The critical lens provided by Transitive analysis means the ‘focus is on how events and processes are connected (or not connected) with subjects and objects’ (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002; 83). It is necessary therefore to apply the above analytical approach of assigning agency via transitive and intransitive verbs to *Panorama* sample.

Closely related to Transitive analysis is the process of ‘Nominalisation’. While still engaged in the transformation of active into passive, ‘Nominalisation’ takes a step further from the above transitive and intransitive, and instead changes verbs into nouns. So for instance, a politician is less likely to say ‘we are going to privatise the railways’, they instead might say ‘There will be a privatisation of the railways’. This choice of grammatical form is a discursive practice. Its effect is to constitute a set of actions (the transfer of public goods into private hands) as ‘agentless’. However, we know that this promotes the interests of certain groups in society. During the financial crisis, one of the most frequently occurring acts of ‘Nominalisation’ is to say ‘These are tough economic times’ in place of taking ownership of policy that is explicitly the (at least partial) *cause* of said ‘tough economic times.’ Again, this particular analytical approach is useful and applicable to the sample contained within this thesis.

Nominalisation is frequently to be found in government dispatches and reproduced by Current Affairs broadcasting. For example, as we shall see, discussions and debates regarding the prosecution of war on Iraq, and the officially sanctioned opposition to it, can become oriented around the *practicalities* of engaging in conflict, and what is more, in questions of competence, competence regarding the UK/US coalition *preparedness* in ‘taking on the task/Saddam’. In this event, officially sanctioned narratives and challenges, by which I

mean Political opposition in the House of Commons (again, via institutionalised sources, Primary Definers), becomes oriented around the (lack of) support for ‘our troops’ or ‘our boys’. Such traits are particularly pronounced and (over) represented in broadcasts pertaining to ‘conflict-phase coverage’ and ‘post-conflict phase coverage’. In short, this is the very definition of a discursive formation and the extent to which, instead of overt challenge, it is reproduced by the *Panorama* broadcasts under scrutiny provides a framework for some of this analysis. As opposed to any rigorous wider contextual, geo-political critique, the criticism that is present becomes focused on the unfolding events themselves. Echoing Chomsky (again) (2003), critique is allowed, even encouraged but within narrow terrain (discursive limit).

Within the analysis chapters there are also some other notable discursive techniques employed. For the most part, these did not appear with sufficient regularity as to deserve their own category. Nevertheless, on occasion, discursive categories and techniques (such as ‘Salience’, Lexical Choices’) do appear, and when they do so, they will be discussed, even if only briefly. The ways in which all of these particular representational and discursive techniques were, through ‘routine attitudes and working practices of staff’ (Barker, C. 2008) deployed in order to establish, reproduce and cement particular narrative(s), discourses and epistemologies will be analysed in detail in the three chapters of analysis.

3.20 What and who constitutes a ‘Primary Definer’ in Panorama discourse.

Equally important in the methodological approach is the ways in which definitions are applied and operationalised in the research. Having identified the notion of Primary Definers and Primary Definition as an important, key part of the Current Affairs repertoire, one also has to have, in the textual examples, some method of defining what constitutes a ‘Primary Definer’, what is more, what differentiates a Primary Definer from a mere protagonist?

Through the iterative and generative process of designing the CDA approach applicable in this sample, these particular aspects were decisive.

1. The extent to which specific persons had a particular location in social and political hierarchy. In the television and Proppian narrative structure terms, the ‘who they are’ combined with the ‘what they do’ (or say). In this regard, the Proppian narrative structure is matched with and by their location in a political, social and discursive hierarchy. The ‘who they are’ (hierarchical) was in something of a symbiotic relationship with ‘what they do’ (say). In short, does the ways in which both the ‘who they are’ and ‘what they do’ (say) (re)produce hegemonic narrative(s).
2. The extent to which their discourse matches that of the *Panorama* PR, do they essentially shape the discourse and epistemology. Do their words and actions orient, reflect *and constitute* the dominant *Panorama* discourse?
3. Do they have ‘most to say’ (Van Dijk 2001)
4. How much their words, their explanations, their discourse, is challenged by the *Panorama* journalists.

All of the above contribute to the constitution of the ‘Primary Definer’ and Primary Definition (of events). In short, and, importantly for this research, deploying a particular CDA method and approach, one can assess the extent to which they (Primary Definers) both *reflect* and simultaneously *constitute* the dominant *Panorama* discourse.

3.21 Drama, Music Score and Non-diegesis

The final piece of the analytical jigsaw comes in the guise of perhaps one of the more surprising signifying practices in many of the *Panorama* broadcasts. Namely: the presence of music. News rarely (if ever) includes music, certainly non-diegetic musical scores are extremely rare. Music within the scene, the diegetic, might be present at times, depending on the scene. However, the additional post-production layering of a sound or

musical score over top of the on-screen footage demands scrutiny. The rationale for the non-use of music in News broadcasts is well established. Music can function as an emotive and emotional driver or setter of mood. It can help establish character, setting and guide the viewers' emotional response to the on-screen 'action' or footage. Therefore, were music to be a regular feature in the News genre its presence would understandably compromise its high-modality, public sphere credentials. However, non-diegetic music *does* appear in *Panorama*, and, given its post-production materiality (the addition of music as non-diegetic *has* to be a deliberate production decision) what is the mood, character or setting to which music contributes? Furthermore, how might non-diegetic music shape and contribute to mood, feelings or establish character in *Panorama*? If it does so, does this compromise the high-modality, public sphere credentials of *Panorama*? What decisions are made and how might music be used in *Panorama*? As this research is not ethnographic, but is instead discursive and textual in nature, it cannot lay claim to *know* why certain editorial decisions were made. However, the research can certainly identify trends, themes and analyse the potential effect such editorial (musical) decisions might have on the narrative, and ideological orientation of the text(s). In what ways might the addition of a non-diegetic musical score act as an enabler or setter of narrative and characterisation?

Musical soundtrack in scenes of *acted* narrative and *dramatised* setting, perhaps underneath dialogue, guides us in our imaginative responses to a *fictional world*, a world that is the rhetorical project of the film or programme to encourage us to be drawn within. (Corner 2002: 358)

As Corner suggests, music is frequently employed in 'acted' and 'dramatised' setting(s). Further, music 'guides us in our imaginative response' therefore the association is dramatic and encourages an imaginative response. If, as is surely the case, music is there to 'encourage us to be drawn within' (the unfolding narrative) then, with the inclusion of music, what is the imaginative response sought by the production?

Within the aural profile of television, music plays varying roles and functions ...these functions include generating *thematic* support for what is on screen – indications of historical time, of geographical place and of appropriate mood being prominent – and providing *formal* support for programme organisation, pacing and shifting intensities of portrayal. In all these modes of application, the ways in which rhythm, tempo, harmony, melody, etc. feed into contextual associative patterns of cultural meaning will be a matter for careful production judgement, however ‘intuitively’ exercised. (Corner 2002: 357)

There are numerous examples of music, to which I will return in due course, but suffice to say that its deliberate and considered inclusion in many of the broadcasts, locates *Panorama* in something of a contradictory position. It trades on its currency of legitimacy and its association with the paradigmatic high modality form of news broadcasting, and yet, with its frequent use of non-diegetic music, it seems to utilise an emotive register, deploying techniques that fit more obviously in a dramatic ‘Narrative Structure’ form, and, I would suggest, all in the service of characterisation and narrative development.

3.22 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has sought to outline the theoretical framework and the methodological approach, and the rationale for said methodological approach. If we accept that ‘Discourse’ refers to a body of knowledge that both *defines and limits* what can be said about specific topics and events, then by analysing a relatively large sample of *Panorama* texts that engage with and represent the conflict in Iraq, we can assess and critically analyse the extent to which *Panorama* is a discourse, or, effectively functions as a discursive formation. By identifying and assessing the precise patterns, narratives, (tele)visual and aesthetic styles, use of sources (‘Primary Definers’, legitimated discursive actors), and location in wider political and journalistic frames, the selected research approach can effectively analyse the ways in which specific representations are given value and endorsed. In CDA terms, the methodology provides a critical and theoretical framework that allows one to assess how the social object is being constructed by the discourse's choice of description, and the associations it implicitly makes. Simultaneously, though this task is notoriously more difficult, through rigorous and

close analysis, the CDA method can also ascertain which ‘ways of speaking about’ (representing) the social object (of Iraq) are excluded or ‘ruled out’. Assessing the extent to which particular words, phrases, terms of reference, metaphors, rhetorical styles, and journalistic methods effectively produce an epistemology of Iraq. This method looks for how things are constituted by discursive practices, in this case, the discursive practices are contained within the PSB television Journalism of *Panorama*. The value of a critical discourse analytical approach adopted for this research is precisely that CDA seeks to identify, track and trace examples from not only the same generic category, but, explicitly in the case of this research, from the same journalistic ‘stable’. The tracking, tracing and analysing, across different phases, across a temporal sample, allows one to develop an understanding as to how (and which) material is used and reused in order to tell the story (stories) of Iraq.

To summarise: perhaps constrained by the televisual form; utilising the specific formal characteristics and tropes of its genre; limited by the discursive context and frames encompassed by BBC Impartiality; limited by the rigid frames of the journalistic form and practices; and the utilisation of communicative templates more often found in other forms, most notably, drama, the multi-modal CDA approach, assessing broadcasts over a time period of 19 months, covering and analysing 10 *Panorama* broadcasts, offers critical insights regarding the ways in which *Panorama* effectively circumscribes ‘ways of talking about’ Iraq.

Concomitantly, attention to previous research: principally that produced by the media sociologists Altheide and Grimes and their creation of the ‘War Programming Model’ of broadcast, *and* analysis, helps us to understand the ways in which already established patterns and narratives for telling the stories of conflict effectively provide a storytelling template. Finally, to critically interrogate the significant and dominant use of dramatic templates. The

use of music and non-diegetic score within a paradigm of Current Affairs broadcasting, and the use of such tropes to measure the extent to which the appropriating of the *dramatic*, as story-telling device(s), might narrow down public understanding of critical, vital, geo-political issues and events.

The theoretical approach of CDA pays critical attention to individual broadcasts but locates them *in* and *as* a template, as a legitimated style and form, a genre, a discourse, producing an epistemology (of events and issues) in this case, an epistemology of Iraq. The multi-modal critical discourse analysis when applied to a sample of *Panorama* conflict texts is able to draw conclusions regarding the extent to which, by incorporating dramatic story-telling tropes and devices, *Panorama* is able to effectively circumscribe the limits of debate. I will argue that we must examine *Panorama* as it draws on different forms of archive: both its *actual* archive of already legitimated historical footage, the forms these take, its televisual signifiers, its styles of broadcast, and the extent to which such forms, signifiers and styles set a *journalistic story-telling template* for Current Affairs broadcasting. I would argue that drawing on its ‘flagship’ resource(s) of legitimacy, it also (of course) reproduces wider social, economic, cultural and political hegemony.

The principle purpose of the initial three chapters of this research has been to map out a series of key aspects and points regarding *Panorama*’s coverage of conflict. The specific contribution this thesis seeks to make is centred on the following ideas and issues: 1) The extent to which the ‘central tenets’, particularly on the BBC, of ‘professional broadcast practices’, ‘impartiality’ and ‘balance’ are adequate to the task they have been set, and are largely assumed to uphold? 2) Do the specific idioms and tropes of Television (Journalism) (news values – intimacy; immediacy; unambiguity) constrain our ability to fully comprehend complex events? 3) Does the legacy of the separating of News and Current Affairs at the BBC into distinct units further discursively form and narrow down frameworks for

understanding; 4) With specific focus on war and conflict, does (in this instance) *Panorama* adhere to the 'War Programming Model' and if so, what are the ramifications? 5) Does news media and Current Affairs broadcasting's need for drama and attachment to long-established dramatic tropes, archetypes, classic narrative structure, and representational forms further limit frames for understanding?

It might be the case that *Panorama* remains rigidly within the confines required of it as a Public Service broadcaster of journalistic content, it also (largely) remains the standard bearer against which others are measured. However, adhering to these practices ensures that to some extent, *Panorama* discursively reproduces normative ideals perfectly commensurate with perceived 'values' of western hegemony and (unspoken) imperialist interests.

The most important elements are thus identified as follows: **Discursive terms:** Over-lexicalisation and Lexical Choices; Ideological Squaring; Transitivity; Nominalisation. **Dramatic (televisual) elements:** Archetypes; Classic (Proppian) Narrative Structure; Character(isation) (through either archetypes or stereotypes); Use of Music. **Journalistic elements:** Primary Definers (sources); News Values of unambiguity (clarity), Us and Them (which can of course be seamlessly linked with the above discursive tool(s) of 'Ideological Squaring), Recency (immediacy). **Ideological elements:** Hegemony; Epistemology.

The ways in all the above come together and frame this research will be documented and analysed in the following three chapters of analysis.

Section ii

The Analysis

Introduction to the Analysis Section

Having outlined and located this research within the broader terms, environment and terrain of the BBC, both historically and contemporarily, and argued that *Panorama* is the paradigm of Public Service Broadcast (PSB) Current Affairs journalism on British television (Chapter 1), discussed and located my own research in the critical academic landscape (Chapter 2), established and outlined some of the key theoretical terms, and the appropriate research approach and theoretical framework (Chapter 3), the remainder of this research is devoted to undertaking the necessary critical discourse analysis of *Panorama's* coverage of the Iraq War (Gulf War II) in each 'phase' of the conflict.

Policing the borders ...of legitimacy

'Who controls the present controls the past. Who controls the past controls the future.'
(Orwell '1984', 1969: 309)

As the infamous quote alludes to, political and ideological battles are fought in the arena of representation. Or perhaps to adapt it slightly, '...those who control *access to images and narratives* of the past' will also have some control over the present and the future.

Importantly, *access to*, and *ownership of* specific, trusted and legitimised images of 'the past' and the ability to seamlessly (re)use or (re)introduce said images into contemporary (news) events, gives established and *legitimated* broadcasters and broadcast strands a particularly powerful role in public (sphere) life. To frame, shape and emphasise particular narratives, characters and events in certain, even apparently honest and credible, ways, is both a responsibility and one that has enormous and resonant power. Drawing on the already legitimated footage and inserting it/them into contemporary reports, acts as a storytelling frame and can function as a means to guide the audience through the complexity of the stories. The reference to legitimated footage is of course redolent of well-established research

into ‘news values’ (Galtung and Ruge 1965, Harcup and O’Neill 2001; 2017) one of which is of course the simple yet crucial resourcing issue ‘the availability of pictures’ (Harrison 2006 *in* Brighton and Foy 2007: 9)

As the longest-running, and best-established Current Affairs programme, and as part of the well-established, publicly funded, and largely ‘trusted’ BBC, *Panorama* has fewer resourcing issues. In fact it has a wealth of available footage, some of it drawn from its own ‘canon’. Therefore, given its own reputation, its well-established history, its ‘availability of pictures’ on which to draw, its ‘control of the past’ (Orwell), that it provides (and can draw on) an enormous wealth of footage, means that *Panorama* (perhaps inevitably) ends up narrating the upcoming conflict in relation to the past. ‘Journalists, like generals, are often fighting the last war’ (Wolfsfeld 1997: 176). Additionally, *Panorama* can use its (and the BBC’s more widely) own archive:

...the informational and emotional context for relating to it (conflict) is historically embedded in previous wars, often experienced mainly through the mass media. Analysis of news media coverage of previous wars indicates that each current war is greatly informed by images, symbols, language and experience associated with previous wars, including demonization of the enemy, the *virtues* and *necessity* of waging war, and the social and political benefits of doing so. (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 621–622)

Therefore, there is a demand and need to scrutinise and pay attention to *Panorama* as text, as discourse and the potential effects such discursive power, and use of archive, has on television journalism storytelling, and the ways in which such storytelling might (help) set an agenda. If it is indeed the case that *Panorama* plays a significant role in shaping the agenda, then in which direction(s), and how so?

In what ways might *Panorama* represent and produce a particular vision and version of the world? *If* it is the case that, by chiefly responding *to*, and repeating the assertions *of* elite political actors, who with their social, political and cultural capital

(Bourdieu), with their proximity and access discourse (Van Dijk), and their position as Primary Definers (Hall et al.) do they effectively pose the questions ‘what actions can “we” (and only we) take’? If so, how then might this shape the coverage, the discourse of conflict? Or in the methodological lexicon of this thesis, the analysis is designed to understand and interrogate:

...how ‘some aspects of a perceived reality [were made] more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation’ (1993: 52)... which ‘treatments’ were promoted as legitimate and credible. (Boyce-Kay and Salter 2014)

In the forthcoming analysis regarding Iraq, this research will outline and assess the ways in which *Panorama* is partly responsible for representing which of said actions are deemed credible? Which actions are ‘salient’, and what possible ‘treatment recommendations’ and options are given credence? Which options are promoted as legitimate and credible? Conversely, which ‘alternatives’ are deemed non-credible or fanciful, and in some cases excluded (beyond the discursive formation), and crucially, from how wide a range of possible actions and scenarios? As the American political scientist E.E. Schattschneider reminds us ‘the definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power’ (Schattschneider 1960: 68 in Perloff 2014: 121).

To phrase it another way: if it is a truism of political communication that political victories are secured *not* by having the best answer, but *by setting the question*, then it is incumbent on us to assess precisely who sets the question(s), shapes the narratives, establishes the frame and, crucially for this research, what role *Panorama*, as the flagship Current Affairs Broadcast strand in the UK, plays in reproducing (or challenging) the question, the frame, the narrative. Such analysis remains important in the context of the BBC, for as previously discussed (see Chapter 1), the BBC must account for and ensure that its version of ‘impartiality’ is adhered to:

News in whatever form must be treated with due impartiality, giving due weight to events, *opinion and main strands of argument*... We are committed to reflecting a wide range of opinion across our output as a whole and over an appropriate timeframe so that *no significant strand of thought is knowingly unreflected or under-represented*. (My *emphasis*)
(http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/guidelines/editorialguidelines/pdfs/Section_04_Impartiality.pdf)

In light of all this, the analysis chapter(s) will consider specific concerns: a) Journalistic; the sourcing and resourcing, who are the sources ('opinion(s)' formers), the Primary Definers deemed to possess the necessary legitimacy, therefore producing (and reproducing) which discourses (or 'main strands of argument') are deemed 'legitimate'. Are some 'significant strand(s) of thought...unreflected or under-represented'? b) Televisual; which are the dominant styles and types of specifically televisual journalistic broadcast tropes? Are particularly dramatic forms typically found in the stories pertaining to the issue? c) How do both the above contribute to the overall content or storylines; what is the content, what are the storylines produced through both the journalistic activities and the televisual forms? Outlining the ways in which each content theme is underscored and legitimated by the specific practises, tropes and discourses of the Current Affairs broadcast journalism *form*. Do the discourses produce a frame of legitimacy (for particular actions)? If so, to what extent this might constitute and establish an epistemology?

Each phase of the conflict can be observed, firstly by the most obvious fact of the dates of broadcast. However, importantly for this research, each phase can also be discerned by a number of journalistic, televisual and dramatic characteristics or *repertoires*. In the following three chapters, each phase of the conflict will be examined *as* a specific phase, with its own variety of televisual and dramatic repertoires. The research will then assemble the findings together to assess the extent to which, using a series of dramatic, televisual, journalistic and discursive techniques, *Panorama* can be said to establish and reproduce a

Current Affairs television template, while simultaneously constituting specific (and narrowly defined) ways of speaking about (representing) Iraq and the Iraq conflict.

Chapter 4 The Pre-conflict Phase

In the post-September 11 2001 world, as one might expect for the flagship Current Affairs broadcast strand that focuses on current *news events*, we did not have to wait too long before *Panorama* broadcast an episode devoted to bin Laden and al Qaeda. The programme: *Panorama: bin Laden's Biological Threat*, was broadcast on BBC1 on Sunday the 28 October 2001 (just short of seven weeks after the terrorist attack in New York). However, this episode, while firmly located within the newly emerging, soon to be cemented 'War on Terror' narrative was not firmly focused on Iraq per se. It was not until 11 months later that *Panorama* broadcast an episode devoted to Iraq. Given the wider political debates and discussions around the time, and given *Panorama's* firm position as a form of Current Affairs inextricably located *in* and as a part of the wider News organisational form and discourse, the decision to focus on Iraq is to be expected. For the purposes of this research then, we can say that the overall Iraq 'conflict phase' begins explicitly in September 2002 with the broadcast of *Panorama: The Case Against Saddam*, 23 September 2002. Alongside *P:TCAS* the other three pre-conflict phase *Panorama* broadcasts selected for analysis in this research are; *Panorama: Saddam A Warning From History*, 3 November 2002; *Panorama: The Case Against War*, 8 December 2002 and *Panorama: Chasing Saddam's Weapons*, 9 February 2003. In most instances, the titles will forthwith, be abbreviated: *P:TCAS*; *P:SAWFH*; *P:TCAW*; *P:CSW*.

4.1 Aspects of the 'War Programming Model'

In this, the 'pre-conflict' phase chapter, the main elements of the WPM are features one and two.

- 1) Reportage and visual reports of most recent war (or two);
- 2) Anticipation, planning, and preparing the audience for impending war, including demonizing certain individual leaders. (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 622)

As previously discussed, the above model is partly applicable here. However, while the WPM is interesting, and provides a useful framework, it provides only a partial blueprint. This research utilises a CDA method, it further develops the frame and of course includes analyses of the long(er) form, and the employment of dramatic conventions used to aid the journalistic and televisual storytelling.

The first of the pre-conflict phase *Panorama* broadcasts is *Panorama: The Case Against Saddam*. The following provides an outline and explanation for the programme and its focus. As the drumbeat for war intensified in the wider political environment, *Panorama* broadcast the programme with the following summary paragraphs.

4.2 *Panorama: The Case Against Saddam*

The war of rhetoric between the Bush administration and Saddam Hussein threatens to spill over into a bloody confrontation that may change the regime in Baghdad but in the process spark a conflagration throughout the Middle East. Amidst this rhetoric, what is the real truth - the real case against Saddam?

Panorama investigates the evidence against the Iraqi dictator – his ambition to create weapons of mass destruction, the instability of a leader described as a psychopath and the corruption of his cronies that has let the Iraqi people suffer while militarisation continues in secret.

Discovering the truth

Using testimony from top scientists in the west, and from defectors who have fled the regime carrying its secrets, *Panorama* examines Saddam's history of developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and reveals just what he still has in his arsenal and where it is hidden.

In New York we visit the UN Agency charged with finding and destroying his weapons of mass destruction and talk to the weapons inspectors involved with assessing his capability. Just how close did the Iraqis get to firing missiles with anthrax warheads during the Gulf War? And how real now are the claims that Iraq will soon have enough uranium for four nuclear bombs?

Panorama speaks to the politicians who will be making the case for war - the Republican Hawks who are busily plotting the next stage in the War on Terrorism. And we speak to the players in the last war to see whether they stand by their action then and whether they support a new war.

'The cult of Saddam'

We examine the real motivation of Bush and his inner circle and explore the fears of would-be allies in Britain and Europe, afraid of the price both their own troops and the Iraqi people will pay. We also investigate the cult of Saddam himself and his cronies to assess how he would react with his back to the wall and what that means for Israel and the Middle East. It may be unfinished business for America but what will a war amidst the oilfields in countries where Islamic extremists wait in the wings mean for the rest of the world?

Jane Corbin, the award winning Panorama reporter, has made a number of films about Saddam's secret weapons programmes and first brought the public's attention to the threat posed by his nuclear, chemical and biological projects.
(<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2264844.stm>)

The above provides a quite detailed and lengthy outline as to what the programme will be about, its focus, its attention, its discourse. Within the quite lengthy descriptions, there are a number of salient points. Most notable perhaps are the mentions of 'examines the evidence' which locates *Panorama* within, and as a part of a critical journalistic tradition. References to 'Saddam' (villains, at times, require only a single-name); Saddam *as* 'psychopath', 'corruption' 'cronies' 'Ambitions to create Weapons of Mass Destruction', the 'cult of Saddam', 'Nuclear bombs' 'Saddam's secret weapons programmes', 'Islamic extremists' (seamlessly framing this new conflict within the 'War on Terror' discourse) and references to 'biological, chemical and nuclear projects' all of which is assumed to be in 'his' possession. These features signify an obvious orientation that 'demonizing certain individual leaders, for example...Hussein' (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 622) (in this broadcast signified by 'the cult of Saddam'), is a consistent '*feature*' of this particular pre-conflict phase broadcast. It is also our first evidence of the 'Over-Lexicalisation', 'Attributes' and 'Over-Completeness' (Machin and Mayr. 2012). As we can see below, when measured against the representation of 'us', we can also see some evidence of 'Ideological Squaring'.

There are a number of notable caveats regarding the motivations of the 'west': 'unfinished business' and the 'price' paid by 'their own troops and the Iraqi people'. So, even if relatively muted, there is a degree of sceptical enquiry regarding Western actions. A clear

framework, identified by Wolfsfeld, and Altheide and Grimes, notably, the location of current (or upcoming) conflict ‘...greatly informed by images, symbols, language and experience associated with previous wars’ (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 621–622) is alluded to with the following phrase: ‘Just how close did the Iraqis get to firing missiles with anthrax warheads during the Gulf War’. There are also clear indications as to the role of high-profile sources (functioning as Primary Definers) to which *Panorama* has access, ‘Using testimony from top scientists in the west, and from defectors who have fled the regime carrying its secrets’; ‘In New York we visit the UN Agency charged with finding and destroying his weapons of mass destruction and talk to the weapons inspectors involved with assessing his capability’, and:

Panorama speaks to the politicians who will be making the case for war - the Republican Hawks who are busily plotting the next stage in the War on Terrorism. And we speak to the players in the last war to see whether they stand by their action then and whether they support a new war. (*P:TCAS* 2002)

The references to such high-profile sources has a dual function here. It provides the necessary frame(s) of legitimacy, and it showcases *Panorama*’s own flagship, journalistic role. The summary paragraph then clearly indicates that this episode of *Panorama* will base much of its testimony on trusted, high-profile, legitimated ‘Primary Definer’ sources. By doing so, it will ‘examine the case against Saddam’ using said sources and its own archive. It appears to be the case that this, the first broadcast of the pre-conflict phase ‘season’ will devote significant time, energy and resources into Over-Lexicalising and (re)presenting Saddam Hussein as villainous ‘psychopath’. However, from the summary at least, through the analytical frame of Ideological Squaring, Saddam is ‘Attributed’ specific characteristics and cast as a villainous character seemingly dislocated from any Western complicity in his ‘dictatorial’ ‘regime’.

4.3 *Panorama: The Case Against Saddam - The Demonized Saddam (Versus the Legitimated)*

In the opening sequence (prior to the opening credits) of *Panorama: The Case Against Saddam*, as one might expect given the title, images of Saddam dominate. Lasting one minute and twenty-two seconds, a range of images, diegetic and non-diegetic ‘strategies’, some ‘Primary Definers’ and the journalistic endeavours (secondary definers) are all employed in the introductory ‘front-page’ scenes.

The opening visual is one of an image of a war plane as it takes off from a warship (aircraft carrier). This is against a sun setting/rising sky. The beauty of the sunlit landscape and bright blue skies that typically frame ‘our’ planes are in stark contrast to, and in some cases directly ‘cut against’ the grainy darker footage of the ‘Other(ed)’ Iraqi armed forces. The non-diegetic of a George W. Bush speech overlays these opening shots of war planes. The various shots of scans signify the West as keeping a watchful eye on ‘him’; they are also resonant of (most likely drawn from) official military images. That they are obtained from high-level sources means: a) The programme makers enjoyed a level of access to official and ‘legitimate’ social, military and political actors in the wider public sphere. b) Related to a), such images and the location from which they are drawn means that, discursively and journalistically, they *assume* legitimacy. That the scan image(s) are present, also foregrounds *Panorama*’s own role. In short, the presence of the scans essentially demonstrates the (high) level access which *Panorama* has. Access *to* and proximity *with* dominant legitimated Primary Definer discursive actors means that once inserted into the frame(s) or discourse, they are established as documentary ‘evidence’ (sic). Officially sourced scans of course signify something authentic, even scientific. Lest we be in any danger of underplaying or misunderstanding the precise threat posed by Saddam Hussein, *Panorama* chose to allow the words spoken by George W. Bush (the diegetic) to be played out but with various visual stimuli and interventions.

Bush: Saddam Hussein’s regime...is a grave...and gathering danger. (*P:TCAS*)

On the word ‘danger’ the image cuts away from the president speaking to an image of Saddam aimlessly firing a gun into the air. Visually, semiotically over-emphasised and Over-Lexicalised, he is represented as uncontrollable, menacing, not to be trusted. Such danger is not only *assumed* to be in ‘his’ possession, we can see it, in his hands, albeit in the less harmful form of a rifle. Nevertheless, he is shown firing a weapon, the evidence is in front of us, an action or activity often erased from the representational form of ‘our boys’. ‘Our’ troops are rarely represented actually firing weaponry, less still, represented firing wildly, uncontrollably and aimlessly in the air. A Lexical (or semiotic) absence of ‘our boys’ combined with Saddam aimlessly and dangerously firing a weapon is a further early example of the Ideological Square. To underscore the dramatic representation of demonization, the decision to layer a diegesis of Bush’s statement over the top, *as* narration while the image of Saddam firing the rifle is quite a compelling casting of character. To multimodally underscore ‘his’ menacing character, the shot firing appears on the cue word ‘danger!’ Although this specific moment is, by its nature, very short, in the context of the opening minute, it adds significantly to ‘his’ characterisation, the danger facing ‘us’. It also provides a very clear example and indication of the editorialising. Such close and tight editing, is a journalistic and televisual *cultivation* of an archetypal villain. A cultivation of menace, of danger, and all contained within the character of ‘Saddam’. It introduces the representation that will be significantly cemented and solidified over the subsequent broadcast (and broadcasts):

Bush: ...to suggest otherwise [beat] ...is to hope against the evidence. (*P:TCAS*)

Again, the visual stimulus added to the oral/aural diegetic is significant. On the cue word ‘evidence’ the threat (and apparent evidence) of chemical warfare is clearly represented through aspects of the visuals, what we might refer to as a semiotics of ‘science’ imagery. Visuals of unspecified chemicals/germs, in green and under a microscope, are used to

represent both that the weapons programme is a clear and present danger, which would of course be true *if* such a weapons programme existed. Here though, the semiotics of vague, unspecified, most-likely library footage ‘science’ imagery provide a sort of sheen of scientific legitimacy and journalistic evidence (sic). In this way, the deliberate decisions as to how one might visually signify said threat, the multi-modal, the semiotics, works to underscore this *as* evidence, while simultaneously representing ‘danger’. That the ‘evidence’ is merely generic library footage, *not* actual evidence is problematic but all a part of the developing characterisation. When inserted in this way, the imagery solidifies the narrative orientation. Simultaneously, any such reference as to ‘our’ weapons capability, surely *at the very least*, equal to Saddam’s, are absented. ‘Our’ weapons, if mentioned at all (they are not mentioned, certainly not *as* weapons per se, later on they are referred to as ‘coalition troops’, ‘coalition forces’, ‘military build-up’ or ‘military machine’), are a ‘deterrent’. ‘His’ weapons (which ‘he’ did not have, at least, not in any substantial proportion) pose a unique *threat*. Of course ‘our’ weapons are represented, but in such a way as to render them necessary in order to stave off the threat. I will return to an analysis of ‘our’ military machinery later in the chapter.

This opening sequence from *P:TCAS*, which includes a range of semiotic indicators and broadcast journalism techniques, sets up an interesting frame through which to view, firstly ‘the regime of Saddam’, secondly, the remainder of the broadcast, and thirdly it might in fact set up a discursive frame through which the entire, forthcoming, conflict is narrated, characterised and contextualised. So important are these pre-conflict broadcasts in the initial framing that they demand scrutiny as a means of critically interrogating the extent to which they largely shape the unfolding events. The first frames, and the narratives and characterisation they engender certainly adhere to what one might expect having read the *BBC Panorama* summary paragraphs.

Even the very title of the first broadcast in the strand is in itself instructive. Interestingly titled, *'The "Case" Against Saddam'* it is clearly located within the discourse of 'law' (and order). (Tele)visually substantiating this discourse, semiotic indicators of 'hard evidence' signified by *images of* 'scientific' data, biological and chemical germ cultivation, maps, and radar images are utilised. There is also grainy library footage of weapons being amassed. The use of library archive footage acts to further underscore and augment the (historical and contemporary) 'threat' by means of the authenticating legitimising tropes of the News and Current Affairs 'form'. In the discourse of *Panorama*, the presence of weapons is presented, via archive, library footage and multi-modal forms, simply *as* evidence. The above analysis constitutes the opening minute of the broadcast *Panorama: The Case Against Saddam*. As a means of establishing the frame, it certainly goes some way to potentially shaping perceptions of the 'threat' of 'Saddam' *as* threat, and albeit briefly, the role Western forces might have in reducing the threat by 'tackling Saddam'.

Panorama's role in explaining the world is also journalistically foregrounded. In the longest unbroken footage of the opening minute, a camera slowly pans across the room. Jane Corbin goes in and out of shot as her image disappears behind large bank of computer screens, windows, and a water cooler. Her attention is focussed on the 'evidence' before her, signifying forensic attention to detail. This focus is broken, though not the shot, by a direct address to camera. The camera then continues to pan around. In the background are two computer screens visible. One with an image of Saddam (in sunglasses); the other is an (green – night vision) image of a missile. Also visible in front of the screen(s) on her desk are a number of maps and bits of (unspecified) data pertaining to weapons (we assume).

This entire sequence could be designed to signify a range of different things. Firstly, the narrative into which the images are inserted or located can be analysed as specifically designed to mobilise an image of Saddam as unique threat. These images are 'cut against'

images of Western forces. The Western armed forces are represented not as any threat but as keepers of order. Some of the images are direct from the Hollywood playbook, action, sunsets, military technology and machinery (about which, more in subsequent analysis).

One of the other interesting aspects of this opening sequence is quite how much detail and effort is devoted to foregrounding the signifiers of journalism. Firstly, of course there are sequences from *Panorama*'s own archive. However, having Corbin, not only as the narrator but also placing her at the centre of the visuals, in a long, unbroken shot, should leave us in no doubt that, whatever the outcome, *Panorama* has left no stone unturned in the(ir) quest to put the case before us. These tropes are journalistic, (tele)visual and dramatic resources that signify we are party to previously undisclosed information, detail(s) and documents. We are televisually and journalistically 'peering behind the curtain'. Given that this is an examination of the 'case' against 'Saddam' and that this is prior to the official launch of conflict, much of the footage in this opening minute of *P:TCAS* certainly seems to work hard at simultaneously representing the impending 'threat' of 'him' together with the dramatised, Hollywood style representation of 'our boys', thus completing (for this minute at least) the Ideological Square.

To continue the theme of demonization, immediately following the opening pre-credit sequence of *Panorama: The Case Against Saddam* (2002), the programme proper begins with archive images of Saddam pictured on a 'peaceful shopping spree' (Corbin 2002, *P:TCAS*) in Paris in 1975. Interestingly, and related to other discursive, journalistic frames, *archive footage* of him is used. Saddam Hussein is pictured here dressed, unusually, in a laboratory coat. The laboratory coat is instructive here. Admittedly, while it was of course Saddam Hussein himself that wore the garment, the selection of such footage here in this instance does serve an instrumental, narrative, discursive and potentially *characterisational* purpose. In a broadcast entirely devoted to examining the 'case *against* Saddam' and one that

has already (during the opening two minutes) included a plethora of references to chemical and biological weapons, depicting Saddam Hussein *in* the white lab coat of the archetypal (evil) scientist serves to underscore this representation. In the context of a programme that has, through the generalised signifiers and semiotics of ‘science’, already clearly represented the dangers of ‘chemicals’ and ‘germs’ as weapons, the lab coat seems to build on the characterisation of Saddam as an archetypal ‘dangerous madman’ and even to cast him as a maverick scientist hell-bent on nefarious purposes.

What further underscores this dramatic characterisation though is the use of specific non-diegetic music. The visual representation of Saddam here is accompanied by the opening bars of *The Godfather* (1972) soundtrack. Such a deliberate musical non-diegetic choice is *surely* selected in order to dramatically characterise Saddam as ruthless criminal. The selection of this particular film score is indicative of the time period represented on screen (1970s) and is simultaneously a form of characterisation, playing on an intertextual nostalgia and media-memory in order to cast Saddam as mafia figure. Saddam (and family) as archetypal ruthless gangster(s) is a characterisational theme returned to in the post-conflict phase sample.

Again in the very early scenes of *P:TCAS* (3m 49s) we see a long close-up of a painting of Saddam’s eyes, the semiotics designed perhaps to signify his menacing ‘character’, and that he watches over, like a menacing prison guard, the entire society. This is substantiated by Corbin’s voiceover:

Corbin: For 11 years Saddam Hussein kept Dr Shahrstani in prison. (*P:TCAS*)

We then cut to archive footage of Saddam walking through a sand-bagged trench in *battle fatigues and sunglasses*. This is familiar media memory, scenography, and archetypal characterisation. A series of shots/cuts follow: A man kissing the hand of Saddam while Corbin’s voice-over explains:

Corbin: The dictator still needed a more compliant scientist to develop his bomb programme. (*P:TCAS*)

At this point there is a cut to more archive footage taken from another (unspecified) time. The sequencing and temporal frames are unspecified in place of generic archive. Using a collection of archive images edited together and decontextualized has the effect of cumulatively developing the character. So despite the fact that this, and other broadcasts in the sample (*Saddam: A Warning From History; Chasing Saddam's Weapons*), are attempting to provide an overview of Saddam, and of his weapons, strict temporal and historical accuracy does not appear to be the organising logic. Instead, via Over-Lexicalisation and Ideological Squaring, cementing the archetypal representation, cultivating the demon appears to be the organising logic.

The next image is of Saddam with left arm raised smoking a cigar. These sequential but temporally fractured images are straight out of the Proppian, Narrative Structure of Folk tales, and Hollywood playbook of villainous character tropes and representations. It is a route-one archetypal caricature. People cowering in fear, kissing the hand of the dictator. In fact, the lingering shot of Saddam Hussein smoking a cigar perhaps only lacks the white cat of the Bond villain Blofeld to make it complete.

Further explicit references to 'Saddam's weapons ambitions' are narrated in *P:TCAS* (5m 3s). This time using *Panorama's* own archive, referenced by the non-diegetic title music of *Panorama* and a visual of the titles, we see, slowly emerging, panning across a computer screen, Saddam in military fatigues (again) and customary sunglasses (again) surveying his nuclear facility.

Corbin: Saddam Hussein was undeterred. In 1993 *Panorama* revealed how a British company sold machine tools to Iraq. (*P:TCAS*)

The reference to British complicity is an important point, and one to which this thesis will return in due course. However, for now, depicted in his 'nuclear facility' the narrative has

more pressing (archetypal demonizing) concerns. More archive footage, this time very fast-cut, as follows: soldiers running through desert: close-up of feet; a series of quick jump-cut images, diagrams, centrifuges, a point-of-view (POV) image zooming through the landscape (redolent of a missile); image of weapons launcher launching three missiles in quick succession; Saddam again in military fatigues entering Iraqi Parliament to ‘rapturous applause’ (*P:TCAS*).

Corbin: He scoured the world for nuclear technology...he couldn’t resist gloating publicly that despite Western embargoes he could still smuggle in forbidden parts into Iraq. (*P:TCAS*)

That ‘he’ scoured the world in search of nuclear technology is interesting for it conceals as much as it reveals. Significantly, that the technology exists is somehow not considered problematic, possibly reasonably so, but the verbs he ‘scoured’ and that ‘he couldn’t resist gloating’ are certainly Lexical devices in the service of archetypal characterisation. The ‘British company’ that ‘sold machine parts’ has also been quickly discarded. In the original broadcast, which was something of a coup and in part helped cement *Panorama*’s reputation as a broadcast strand of record, the focus was, again, on ‘his’ egregious pursuit of ‘weapons of mass destruction’. In defence of *Panorama*, there was certainly a large element of the *original* broadcast that did in fact critically interrogate one of ‘our own’ companies but, the focus was very much on the individuals involved, as perhaps an example of the ‘bad apples’ theory. The use of this information in *this* broadcast however, in 2002, has a dual purpose, neither of which is to critically interrogate Western complicity in any meaningful sense. It seems that the reason for its inclusion here is a) to foreground the journalism, the historical accuracy of *Panorama*, that the BBC itself stands-in *for* or functions *as* historically accurate ‘evidence’, b) it contributes to the narrative orientation and characterisation of the archetypal villainous Saddam. In so doing, via Lexical Absence, Attributes and Ideological Squaring, it erases, or at least chooses not to scrutinise, the systemic manoeuvring (or failings) of our own

Western elites and hypocrisy. Any hypocrisy that was in evidence was quickly discarded then effectively neutralised by way of characterisation of Saddam.

At 16 minutes into *P:TCAS*, further archive visual evidencing is utilised, this time in the form of yet more archive imagery of Saddam, complete with battle fatigues and sunglasses (again) this time projected onto a computer screen behind Jane Corbin. Adjacent to Saddam on screen is a computer-generated map of Iraq with nuclear facilities indicated by flashing lights. The demonized archetype here located, in shot adjacent to (alleged) WMD. The image of Saddam is thrown into sharper focus when contrasted and measured against the next section of the broadcast. Given the overt focus on WMD, the next sequence of shots is illustrative of a particularly problematic narrative direction.

From 18 minutes and 15 seconds, continuing for one minute and 25 seconds, the narrative, via imagery and via comment from legitimated political sources, is of '9/11'. The opening image in the montage is of the Twin Towers, shot from a distance so as to locate the Twin Towers geographically *and* discursively in 'The nation's greatest city' (Corbin *P:TCAS*). Smoke billows from the buildings as a siren howls, slow haunting music is the non-diegetic score. As the phrase 'the nation's greatest city' is uttered, the image is of New York, at dusk, a setting sun peeks from behind a skyscraper (though not the Twin Towers as these, by then, had collapsed to the ground). We know the image is from September the 11th 2001 because of the sounds of sirens and that smoke still permeates the atmosphere (and the representation). A cut to another shot of New York, different buildings, but a recognisable, even familiar landscape is evident. The final landscape shot is again of a bright red-orange setting sun, closer this time, the setting sun dominates the picture, sirens still wail signifying that an emergency is unfolding, but the somewhat beautiful image solidifies that the US (New York in particular) is recognisable, familiar, the aesthetically appealing sunset able to cast light onto a troubled world, that some beauty still exists in amongst the horror. This imagery

is, what we might refer to in multi-modal CDA and Television Studies scholarship as an Over-Determined or Over-Coded representation.

It is the next section though, and that it is directly cut against the previous images that cements the representation and demands critical interrogation. The legitimated sources, *primarily defining* the narrative orientation and direction of the broadcast speak the following words:

Dr David Kay - Chief Nuclear Weapons Inspector, 1991-92:

9/11 is a prism through which American political leaders are examining everything that occurred since 9/11 and every threat.

Perle: What September 11 did was bring home in a way that no amount of abstract debate could have, the dangers of waiting until it's too late.

Kay: They've realised they can't... cannot count on intelligence to provide them with the warning of when he truly becomes dangerous and consequently they have to deal with him in the here and now as opposed to try to interrupt him after an attack has begun. (*P:TCAS*)

Following on from over one minute of emotionally resonant imagery (described above), to seamlessly link 9/11 with 'his' desire for WMD is intensely problematic. Particularly given the preceding 18 minutes, the three high-profile sources here function as Primary Definers. They help set the scene. The narrative, underscored by said Primary Definers, is, via Ideological Squaring, inextricably bound up in cultivating a story arc in the classic narrative structure of Propp's classic folk tale(s). Via various lexical, semiotic, journalistic and televisual methods, the archetypal villain has been crafted in contrast to the hero(ic) figures of the 'West'. While *Panorama* itself, the journalists and the primary definers are careful to not make an explicit link, between 9/11 and Iraq/Saddam, such a suggestion would be fantastical and damage the credibility of the sources and of *Panorama* itself, the edits, the selections, the choice(s) of shots to accompany the apocalyptic statements does carefully construct (not a causal but) a correlative *relationship*:

Those involved in advertising – our culture’s most abundant persuasive discourse – have long understood that you make claims not by argument but by association. (Lewis 2004: 297)

In the above example, the juxtaposition, and the narrative it created is problematic. To establish that the terror wrought on New York on September 11th 2001 is a part of the same overall template, ‘the condition of the world’ (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 626) and that ‘we’ must ‘deal with him in the here and now’ (Kay *P:TCAS*) acts as a fairly forceful statement in the circumstances. The statements are not immediately challenged, they simply *are*, as David Kay (actually rather caustically and critically, suggests): ‘The prism through which American political leaders are examining everything’ (Kay *P:TCAS*). The problems here lie in the fact that the statements receive no rigorous challenge from Jane Corbin. In a clear example of Primary Definition, because they are not challenged, and are instead permitted to frame the events, the three sources can clearly be identified as not mere protagonists but Primary Definers. It is true that they do receive some muted challenge from the source, however, it is that the statements form a part of an already dramatized and emotionally resonant template over the preceding minute of broadcasting that is problematic. To punctuate the images of New York, the still raw devastation wrought on that city with comments about the need to confront Saddam before he ‘truly becomes dangerous’ (Kay, BBC *P:TCAS*) reveals that the narrative and characterisational drive is not sufficiently nuanced. There is also a sense of urgency represented by the statement: ‘and consequently they have to *deal with him in the here and now* as opposed to try to interrupt him after an attack has begun’ (Kay *P:TCAS*). The inclination that he must be challenged, or ‘interrupted’ before rather than ‘after an attack has begun’ also seamlessly links the dreadful attacks we have just (re)witnessed with ‘*His*’ capacity to inflict similar damage. This, at the very least, reveals a worrying tendency to multi-modally and discursively connect, attach or articulate Saddam Hussein with the terror of 9/11, not the *actual* attack, but that *he could* inflict similar carnage unless confronted with

urgency, ‘in the here and now’ (*P:TCAS*). The full-stop in this section, certainly in terms of imagery, comes via news archive footage of George W Bush, his arm around a firefighter amidst the rubble of the Twin Towers. Such emotionally resonant images, particularly when, narratively speaking, so visibly cut, thus, via editorial decisions engaging in Ideological Squaring, *marked against* the archetypal villainy of Saddam, not only begins to *prepare the ground* for UK and US troops engaging in conflict, but perhaps begins to *generate the justification for doing so*. There are many other examples of images *of* and references to ‘9/11’ used across the conflict phase (Chapter 5), and post-conflict phase (Chapter 6) sample. This research will return to those examples in subsequent chapters.

The dominant narrative of *Panorama: The Case Against Saddam* is one of demonization. The broadcast devotes significant time and space to characterising Saddam by associating him with menace, and by associating him with ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ (WMD). Having done so, it is therefore interesting to analyse the extent to which the *associations* with weapons are differently phrased and framed when it is ‘us’ in possession of them. The example below is telling:

Corbin: The Chief Civil Servant at the MoD during the Gulf War was Sir Michael Quinlan, the man who developed *Britain’s nuclear deterrence policy*. But he’s sceptical about the urgency of dealing with Saddam. (*P:TCAS*)

In the above statement delivered to camera, Jane Corbin introduced her next interviewee, granting him legitimacy as a ‘Primary definer’ no less, the term ‘Britain’s nuclear deterrence policy’ is the one to which attention ought to turn. The phrase passes by, not only unremarked upon, but his very legitimacy is explicitly granted by this functional honorific. He *is* a primary definer, he *is* explicitly marked as such precisely *because* he ‘developed Britain’s nuclear deterrence policy’. To describe him as above is of course a Lexical Choice, it Attributes specific values to him – and, by extension, to us – and when cut against previous imagery completes an Ideological Square. In an exchange, in an entire

broadcast, and, as we shall see, in an entire ‘phase’ devoted to forcefully and explicitly detailing the dangers of ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’, in this instance and when referring to this specific Primary Definer, the weapons in ‘our’ possession are lexically, linguistically and discursively (safely) contained within a discourse of ‘deterrence policy’. It is an actual fixed and still ongoing or ‘live’ policy, organised, debated and operationalised at the very highest level. Despite the UK and US being signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT), a policy of possession of ‘nuclear deterrence’ is, by absence of critique, considered perfectly laudable and acceptable. In fact, the different linguistic appellation applied to ‘our’ weapons (of mass destruction), and that Quinlan developed them, is precisely what grants this source his legitimacy. ‘We’ are afforded, via Lexical Choices, Lexical Absences and Ideological Squaring, a position directly contrary to the archetypal villain of Saddam.

4.4 The ‘Media-memory’ Discursive and Ideological *Function* of Halabja.

The city of Halabja, or rather, what the city comes to stand for across the sample of *Panorama* broadcasts is interesting and demands critical scrutiny and interrogation. In the pre-conflict phase the extent to which the city of Halabja, or at least, *what happens to/in Halabja*, features as a discursive and representational means to cement the process of demonization. While Halabja could have been ‘folded in’ to the overall demonization schema, so significant were the examples that they warranted their own subheading. The Halabja example is also interesting particularly when located in the process of Ideological Squaring, when it is assessed and measured against the Hollywood style representation afforded the more recognisable, trusted and relatively familiar city of New York (discussed above). Both cities effectively stand-in *for* and function *as* recognisable signifiers. Halabja signifying lawlessness, the uncontained demagoguery of Saddam, of ‘His’ brutality. New York signifying law and order (represented by the UN), recognition, familiarity, even

‘comfort’ *in* familiarity. So Halabja as specific ‘event’ in Iraq’s history, stands as a benchmark, as a signifier of Saddam’s now entrenched archetypal brutality.

Even on the occasions whereby there is some degree of nuance, or acknowledgement of Western culpability, the *event* of Halabja is our reminder, frequently returned to, used as journalistic and televisual shorthand that demonstrates Saddam’s uniquely evil character. In the example below, not only is the Saddam as threat narrative foregrounded, but the frame through which the forthcoming conflict is narrated is an emotionally resonant one. So while it is true that a high-profile, Primary Definer legitimate source, Sir Michael Quinlan, expresses reservations (below), these reservations are a) filtered through the prism of ‘9/11’, b) bookended by images of Halabja:

Sir Michael Quinlan: Permanent Under-secretary. Ministry of Defence, 1988-92: I understand very well that the appalling thing that was done to America on 9/11 has changed psychology. I don’t myself believe, though, that it directly affects the Saddam situation. Saddam was not behind it. We still have to assess the Iraq problem in terms which are directly relevant to Iraq. It doesn’t create some special new legitimacy that didn’t exist before. (*P:TCAS*)

The phrase ‘Saddam was not behind it’ is highly significant and is an important caveat that challenges the (apparent) drive to war being mobilised by the ‘US Hawks’. Not only has the critical Primary Definer, Sir Michael Quinlan, overtly referenced the fact that ‘Saddam was not behind it (9/11)’ but in so doing, potentially poses a challenge to the overall narrative direction, epistemology and discourse of Iraq *and* ‘Saddam’ contained within the pre-conflict sample. The phrase itself and *Panorama*’s inclusion of it, does warrant some critical acclaim. However, it quickly becomes apparent that once again, such a statement is not sufficient to interrupt the overall discourse (of Saddam as threat). While Quinlan speaks, he is in frame, and Corbin is not present on screen. At the conclusion of his speech, Corbin, via voiceover narrates and swiftly hangs up the next peg onto which the story will hang (as follows).

The *Panorama* spinning globe motif or emblem, and a few bars of the signature theme tune is used to signify *Panorama*'s own archive (*Panorama*'s archive functions as the authenticating and legitimating agent) it introduces us to the next 'act'. This is the very next scene after Quinlan speaks. As Corbin speaks the words below, archive footage of Halabja are on screen.

Corbin: It's not just Iraq's nuclear threat that's being viewed differently through the prism of 9/11. In 1986 *Panorama* revealed the pesticide plant at Samara. Saddam was developing chemical weapons. He used them first against Iranian soldiers in the long and bitter war with his neighbours in which a million men were sacrificed. And then in 1988 he turned them against his own people. A cloud of poison gasses enveloped the town of Halabja. Five thousand people died, most of them women and children. Chemical weapons were outlawed by every international convention, but Saddam was then the ally of the west against the mullahs in Iran. Nothing was done. (*P:TCAS*)

The above commentary from Corbin is significant here. Firstly, it follows immediately after the critical nuanced commentary and insight from a legitimate and authenticated, sceptical source or Primary Definer. In her defence, and developing the newly found critical position sketched out by Quinlan, Corbin does reference that Saddam was, at the time, 'an ally of the west'. Furthermore, when referring to Halabja, the phrase 'nothing was done' indicates a lack of action to address the atrocity of Halabja. However, used in this way, the phrase 'nothing was done' performs an interesting discursive function. It is perhaps too nuanced. Framed so as to place some distance between the actions of 'Saddam' and the West. To an extent, the Nominalisation (placing discursive distance between actions and agency) is understandable, after all, it is not 'us' that actively engaged in the slaughter of innocents, but 'him'. However, the discourse operationalised here '...Nothing was done' has no overt agent, it is not 'us' that stands by (though of course, as allies at the time, it was) doing nothing, but an abstract non-agent. How different it would be had the phraseology been Transitive, had the Nominalisation of 'nothing was done' been differently phrased, had some agency been assigned to 'us', for instance: 'his Western allies did nothing'. The images are of death, and

of demonized Saddam, firmly linking (albeit understandably) the deaths of civilians with that of the dictator. The use of the images of death, themselves a rarity on British Television News and Current Affairs, visually and discursively demonstrate the ‘problem’.

Another key aspect to the above discussed section, and this demonstrates the swiftness with which such critical positions are discarded, Corbin uses the scepticism regarding Iraq’s nuclear capability (sic) to move the story forwards, away from the ‘nuclear’ to the ‘chemical’. The threat of chemical weapons is viscerally and visually documented by the images on screen. The images are of death by mass poisoning, signified here by dead bodies lining the streets. The final image is of a young child.

Alongside Jane Corbin’s voiceover, there is an extra *dramatic* dimension to this use of archive and the ways in which it might ‘fit’ the overall narrative direction. The images of Halabja used in *Panorama: The Case Against Saddam* are accompanied by the non-diegetic score, the staccato haunting and rhythmical *Le Sacre Du Printemps Part ii – The Sacrifice*. In fact, the final shot of a young child, laid flat out and lifeless on the pavement, is frozen on screen, the frozen image then zoomed in on so three times with each ‘beat’ of *Le Sacre Du Printemps Part ii – The Sacrifice*. Two further significant aspects about the non-diegetic score need to be addressed. The haunting rhythm is surely chosen precisely because it has a particular rhythm, a haunting quality, its slow ominous ‘movement’ representing the creep and reach of Saddam. Even if on initial viewing, one does not *know* that the score is called ‘*The Sacrifice*’, the editor or producer that made that selection must have chosen it for such reasons, either its title, but more-likely for its haunting rhythm and the picture it helps to paint. In research that focuses exclusively on the textual and discursive, that does not undertake ethnographic research or interviews with the journalists concerned, such assumptions must remain just that, assumptions. It surely remains the case though that such a musical selection would certainly seem an odd choice to have been made by *accident*. In this

case, overlaying images of innocent people literally *sacrificed* for Saddam's own ambitions, with the non-diegetic musical accompaniment of 'The Sacrifice' does seem rather bleakly fitting. This is not drama, but this multi-modal representation is however, dramatized for maximum effect.

So it appears that even when critique is foregrounded, such critical positions are not permitted to alter the narrative orientation? One could argue that the critical reflections used here are for the purposes of marketing. To explain: if *Panorama* is to maintain any semblance of critical legitimacy, the above facts (that Saddam was, for a time, an ally of the West; that Saddam was *not* behind the terror attacks on 9/11) need to be acknowledged. By which I mean, this is the *very least* that *Panorama* ought to acknowledge. Perhaps that reads as too critical, sceptical or dismissive. However, I would argue that the remainder of the sample substantiates that claim. It is simply the case that despite evidence of Western complicity, very little overt scepticism is allowed to puncture the representation of Saddam as archetypal villain. The 'Demonization of Saddam' is further substantiated when, using the CDA approach of the Ideological Square, representations of 'us', very often via Primary Definers is more muted, more measured thus underscoring 'His' demonic villainous characterisation.

As briefly outlined above (p124), and will be discussed in more detail below, the very title of one of the broadcasts in this, the pre-conflict phase sample, *Panorama: Saddam: A Warning from History*, draws on BBC drama *as* history. However, the title of that particular broadcast is not the only implicit or explicit reference to Saddam Hussein as Hitler. In *Panorama: The Case Against Saddam*, Primary Definer, Richard Perle is allowed to frame him in precisely this way, thus continuing the process of demonization. Responding to a degree of sceptical questioning from Jane Corbin as to the rights and wrongs of engaging in military conflict, Perle responds as follows:

Perle: Well the same logic would have said alright we throw up our hands and leave Hitler forever, he can do what he likes. We can't oppose him because if we

oppose him he will do the thing we're trying to stop. It only gets worse with the passage of time. (*P:TCAS*)

In the above section, Perle makes the case for 'confronting Saddam' by firstly directly comparing the fascist ambitions of Hitler, with the (more muted though of course still brutal) more local(ised) ambitions of Saddam Hussein. The two are simply not analogous, located here however, they are precisely that. Secondly Perle subtly references (and of course criticises) the strategy of appeasement prior to the Second World War. The notion of comparing those resisting the upcoming conflict with appeasers is repeated in the conflict phase broadcast, *Panorama: Blair's War*.

Though Corbin does not directly challenge this frame, the next two interviewees (former UNSCOM inspector, Terry Taylor, and former Chief of Defence, Michael Quinlan) do at least provide some alternative critical viewpoints, some 'balance'. However, in this section of the broadcast *Panorama: The Case Against Saddam*, the rhetoric returns to the individualised, characterisation and dramatic arc the majority of the broadcast has devoted itself to:

Corbin: But for those on both sides of the Atlantic who've made up their minds to get rid of him, the decision is based on the nature of Saddam's regime. They want to act pre-emptively before he reaches his goal of nuclear weapons. (*P:TCAS*)

'The *nature* of Saddam's regime' is an interesting phrase. The '*nature*' of his 'goal', to accrue 'nuclear weapons' (referred to as *deterrent* when in 'our' possession), is taken as fact, as importantly though, the representation, the '*nature*' of his regime, effectively dislocates Saddam and Iraq from local, global political contexts. Such an assertion is not sufficiently challenged. In fact, that assumption has been developed over the course of this, the first (of four) pre-conflict phase broadcasts, and used here to 'sign-off' the broadcast in suitably menacing fashion.

The second broadcast in the pre-conflict phase is *Panorama: Saddam: A Warning from History*.

4.5 *Panorama: Saddam: A Warning From History*

As the USA plots to remove the world's most durable dictator, *Panorama* investigates Saddam's past in a search for clues to his future actions. BBC World Affairs editor John Simpson speaks to witnesses who have watched first-hand the Iraqi leader's ruthless rise to power – and the methods he has employed to hold onto office – to reveal new insights into Saddam's volatile personality.
(<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2371697.stm>)

A much more concise summary this time, but what does it reveal about the narrative orientation, the discourse of this individual episode, and, furthermore, the discourse or epistemology of the wider (and longer) pre-conflict phase sample? Reference to 'durable dictator' is interesting insofar as, from the summary paragraph at least, his 'durability' is dislocated from any historical complicity. This episode, we are informed, will examine 'Saddam's past in a search for clues to his future actions'. Interestingly, this sort of approach gives a clear indication of the ability of the BBC in general, and *Panorama* in particular, to draw on its own historical archive and footage. In a reference to the already used (above) quote from Orwell, its position as flagship Current Affairs broadcaster, able to use its wealth of already legitimated archive means it maintains a semblance of 'control' ...of the 'present' ensuring that it can also 'control the past', and because its archive means it 'controls the past' it can subsequently 'control the future' (Orwell 1969). In what ways might access *to*, and use *of* already legitimated archive orient the present, past and future direction and understanding of Iraq? We are also informed that John Simpson will 'speak to witnesses who have watched first-hand the Iraqi leader's ruthless rise to power'. Important as this undoubtedly is, will those 'witnesses' be comprised of some of the previous Western elite political actors who ensured, to some extent at least, that he was able to 'hold onto office'. The 'ruthless'(ness) is

another example of the dramatic archetypal characterisation of the television journalism form. How will 'he' be represented? Through which dramatic and televisual methods? We are promised that the investigation, the witnesses, the journalism of *Panorama* will 'reveal new insights into Saddam's volatile personality'. Again, such focus on individual mendacity, on his unpredictability ('volatility'), on personality, is a classic dramatic characterisation repertoire communicated and represented through dramatized forms of storytelling. Furthermore, the linguistic and lexical features, the focus on personality is a discursive act that will potentially dislocate the wider geo-politics of Iraq from 'our' previous actions, and will instead attach all responsibility (for Iraq's ongoing problems) on to a 'demonized' individual.

Equally problematic though, is the title of the programme itself. *Panorama: Saddam: A Warning from History* draws on the mythologised, already well-established media and popular culture narrative of villainy by explicitly referencing a previous television broadcast, *The Nazis: A Warning from History* (1997, BBC Television). Perhaps more evidence that the 'BBC's televisual output is itself history' (Gardiner and Westall 2016). This programme, or at least its title, essentially dramatically *casts* 'Saddam' as the modern-day equivalent of Hitler. *Saddam: A Warning from History* not only casts 'Saddam' in the central position, *as the* issue to be dealt with, but draws on such emotional, evocative imagery, character and aspects of well-documented twentieth century history (and Media Memory), that the narrative and characterisation of villainy is solidified. The normative criteria that Saddam deserves to be seen, cast and characterised as cognate with the, until now, uniquely evil Hitler is certainly problematic, and an over-statement. Nevertheless, not only does *Panorama* not challenge this view, by using such an emotive, dramatized, historically resonant, provocative (and provocatively titled) broadcast, *Panorama: Saddam: A Warning from History*, from the name alone, establishes, then sustains a very specific and explicit

narrative *through* characterisation. It sets a template, and through subsequent representation of archetypal character and the classic narrative structure, it consequently structures the complexity of Iraq's history, *and* the forthcoming Iraq conflict in too simplistic (and individualised) a manner.

Significantly, though the term 'plotting' does hint at something slightly nefarious or underhand on the part of the US, the associated US actions are coded here as 'removing'. The actions that were planned ('plotted'), and subsequently undertaken, can surely be represented in more forceful terms. The 'removal' was 'achieved' by way of a mass bombardment during 'Operation Shock and Awe' then subsequently continued (in the conflict and post-conflict phase(s)) as 'Operation Enduring Iraqi Freedom'. The lexical, linguistic and discursive selection of terms are important. 'Operation Enduring Iraqi Freedom' is almost comically propagandistic, whether the term is used (and challenged) is an important aspect.

4.6 *Panorama: Saddam: A Warning from History* – Solidifying the Archetypal Demon characterisation

There are a number of journalistic and televisual methods by which each *Panorama* broadcast in the sample effects to demonize Saddam Hussein, the broadcast *P:SAWFH* begins with footage from the newly released (at time of broadcast) video game: 'Conflict: Desert Storm'. Overlaying footage of scenes from the game, video pixel soldiers run across the screen:

Simpson: A brand new game has hit America's computer screens as Saddam Hussein lurks in his bunker the forces of freedom and democracy close in for the kill. It treats Saddam as just another cartoon villain. (*P:SAWFH*)

The narration continues to outline the ways in which such products reduce Saddam to a series of flat images, similarly 'flat and cartoon like' (Simpson *P:SAWFH*) are the representations of Saddam on Iraqi television screens. This serves an interesting function, presumably the following broadcast is designed to resist such overly reductive representations and is instead designed to move beyond the flat caricature, away from archetype (or even stereotype), and

perhaps give flesh to the character. However, as a means of introduction, it does reduce Saddam to the very flatness the programme purportedly deigns to critique.

As the computer game images shift to television images of Saddam, Simpson assures us that

Simpson: In Iraq, he seems equally two-dimensional...every single night, state television broadcasts a different music video, starring....*Him*...but which of Saddam's many faces, is the real one? (*P:SAWFH*)

Excerpts from Iraqi state television, with the less than clear pictures, works as a form of Media memory, this is particularly the case when, using their extensive archive, *Panorama* uses some potentially familiar images. In particular the image of him standing, arm aloft in battle fatigues (an image that is often repeated across the sample, pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict). The image then shifts back to one taken from the new computer game.

Overlaying the imagery, Simpson continues:

...and, as the final showdown comes, what lessons can we draw from the past, about what he'll do now? (*P:SAWFH*)

That the above non-diegetic verbal introduction overlays imagery taken directly from a newly released computer game, and that the computer game has, as its central narrative 'the forces of democracy and freedom' (*P:SAWFH*) capturing Saddam, is significant. The phrase: 'what lessons can we draw from the past, about what he'll do now?' is uttered whilst Saddam, within the game, and within the frame of this broadcast, is pictured, in digital game imagery, firmly located and held within the gun-sights. However, the potential that 'we' might be represented as the aggressors is partly neutralised by the fact that the gun-sights in which he is located and held, are the already mentioned Over-Lexicalised 'forces of "democracy and freedom"' (*Video Game: Conflict Desert Storm* featured in *P:SAWFH*). The title of the broadcast *Saddam: A Warning from History* is then super-imposed over the image. Saddam, wearing his infamous battle fatigues, cornered, within the gun-sights provides the narrative drive necessary to establish the archetypal characterisation of 'dangerous madman'. In fact,

even prior to the broadcast, the news anchor as ‘lead-in’ states ‘BBC’s John Simpson reveals the ‘warnings from history’ about how Saddam acts...when he’s cornered’ (BBC News, 3 November 2002). While locating him in a mode of response, ‘when he’s cornered’, it does signify ‘Saddam’s’ feral like qualities, he is, of course assigned a transitive quality in the text, he has ownership of his (nefarious) actions. He is potentially animalistic with feral responses to threat, though the agents of threat, its carriers are absent, merely hinted at, or when articulated, via the linguistic (even noble) Over-Lexicalised choice of phrase: ‘forces of democracy and freedom’. This serves as an introduction to the broadcast. The sequence finishes with the aforementioned title *Saddam: A Warning from History* super-imposed over the computer-generated image. The title of the broadcast alone draws allusions with a previously demonised and murderous figure of the Western and European political landscape. As discussed (above p190), reference and title alluding to The Nazis is no accident, it simply must be by design and acts as a means of characterising Saddam as the new Hitler.

As a means of attempting to explain his rise, his character and his, until now, unique, evil personality, even (or especially) Hitler has of course been subject of and to television ‘treatment’. In this pre-conflict phase broadcast, similar discourses are mobilised as a way of explaining Saddam. In some ways of course, the opening shots from particular broadcasts serve as an important mark against which the upcoming broadcast can be measured. Simpson has assured us, though, that this broadcast is designed to resist and re-imagine Saddam, beyond the ‘one-dimensional, flat and cartoon-like’ to examine Saddam, his ‘rise’ and the reasons for his ‘endurability’ (*P:SAWFH*, summary paragraph). Such re-imagining is, though, rather contained within the overly simplistic characterisation of villainy which, while at least slightly developed, is hardly more nuanced. At the most, perhaps we might suggest that ‘he’ moves from caricature (or stereotype) to character (or archetype) in a drama.

When not overtly representing Saddam *as* Hitler-like, alternative linguistic and (a)historical forms are employed. Having previously identified Saddam as comparable with Hitler, lest this be insufficient, in *Panorama: Saddam: A Warning from History* an additional historical and murderous figure against which Saddam is measured is alluded to:

Simpson: Soviet Communism never attracted Saddam and yet he became fixated on Joseph Stalin, his hero ... Having taken over as leader he put his Stalinism to work. He called a meeting of the party leadership which was carefully filmed. Exactly as in Stalin's show trials, a senior figure was persuaded through torture, to reveal details of a supposed conspiracy... Like Stalin Saddam made himself the embodiment of the country, the central figure of its history and culture. (*P:SAWFH*)

In the space of this particular broadcast, we have two infamously murderous historical figures against which Saddam can be assessed. Even though such an assessment might be problematic in any case, within the text of *Panorama: Saddam: A Warning from History* no such critical assessment is forthcoming. The above mentioned murderous historical figures are used merely as devices or hooks onto which the story of Saddam's brutality is hung. What I mean by this is: even *if* one could make the case that Saddam is the contemporary equivalent of Hitler and/or Stalin, which is problematic in any case, this *Panorama* broadcast seemingly lacks the critical capacity to do so. Stalin, Hitler *and* Saddam reduced to mere 'flat or cartoon-like' (Simpson, *P:SAWFH*) archetypal villainous characters. Saddam is merely being inducted into a similar and familiar Dictatorial Hall of Fame. *Panorama's* use of 'history' and historical evidence (via the extensive archive), centre on using these examples from the pre-conflict phase as means of erasing and de-contextualising the 'West's' prominent (though largely disavowed), historical, political, ideological and military role in his regime. By uncritically and seamlessly dramatically casting Saddam as the menacing, demonized contemporary equivalent of Hitler (and now Stalin), *and* by suggesting that all the ills of Iraqi society can be hoisted onto the shoulders of this one (dimensional) demonised archetype of Saddam, it seems that no additional geo-political context is required. Despite the

claims for, and use of ‘history’ and historical evidence, representations of Saddam’s history, seem to be strangely ahistorical.

There are numerous attempts to psychologise Saddam and characterise him in specific ways, these are littered throughout the pre-war *Panorama* sample. Such attempts are particularly marked and significant in this broadcast *Panorama: Saddam: A Warning from History*. Elements of this particular broadcast are akin to some sort of forensic psycho-social analysis, assuming such an approach can provide some unique insights into the formation of his character. What is more significant however, is that the conclusions the analysis draws are then assumed or claimed to provide the necessary insight *into* understanding Saddam, and by seamless extension, understanding Iraq itself. *Panorama: Saddam: A Warning from History* in particular, and via Attributes, Over-Lexicalisation and Ideological Squaring constructs a frame that presents Saddam as ‘dangerous’ (two references), ‘unpredictable’ (two references), ‘brutal’ (four references) and ‘ruthless’ (one reference). None of this critique is designed to deny that he may well have been all of these things, and much more besides. However, the gleaning and presenting of the ‘evidence’ provides a frame of understanding. Such a frame is, it seems, perfectly in-keeping with the summary paragraph (above). It is (seemingly) designed to cumulatively establish his ‘dangerous’, ‘unpredictable’ and untrustworthy personality. In one (of a series of) broadcast(s) *prior* to the start of conflict, and that the broadcast was ostensibly commissioned, so it is claimed, in order to examine the case, or provide a ‘warning’, the partial representation is, here rather stark. Even in the moments whereby there are some notable references made regarding the West’s role in his coming to power and his continued longevity, these are lost amidst a litany of representations and dramatic signifiers of Saddam. These representations of dramatic character, of the archetypal villain constructed in a classic narrative structure, particularly acute in a broadcast devoted to

focusing on his psychological profile, are, on occasion more redolent of Mafia films, and Bond films than they are of a flagship Current Affairs broadcast strand.

In a broadcast that purportedly attempts to reveal Saddam's 'Volatile Personality' (*P:SAWFH* summary paragraph) perhaps fittingly, there are occasions in which the language used to describe Saddam's character and early life are, via a source, given a psychological legitimacy:

Jerrold Post - Former CIA political psychologist: After the invasion of Kuwait, finally *he had the world by its throat* and he was now recognised as an important world leader. (*P:SAWFH*)

Having devoted significant time and space to thoroughly representing Saddam as 'brutal', the phrase 'he had the world by its throat' is significant. Via Transitivity, its phraseology attaches agency to Saddam specifically in the context of global threat. Over the course of the broadcast(s), by way of selected imagery and repeated phrasing, we have been shown his brutality. In the above example, a legitimate high-profile source informs us that, if left to his own devices, the very same brutal practises that have terrorised his own population, might well be inflicted on a global scale. This sense of agency is significant insofar as it represents Saddam in specific ways. If left alone, unchallenged, he will be (en)able(d) to 'grip the throat' of the world. The previous broadcast: *Panorama: The Case Against Saddam*, already discussed above, also documented Saddam's ruthlessness and brutality (broadcast six weeks earlier). So a discourse and epistemology is emerging and being solidified. This example, coming, as it does, midway through a broadcast that has already demonstrated his brutality, means the phrase is transformed from mere metaphor to actual threat, and one we can easily (tele)visualise. Furthermore, when measured against 'our' own military forces and those in command of them, no such agency is present. The very next scene and line from Simpson is instructive:

Simpson: But while President Bush was assembling a force to evict him from Kuwait, Saddam made yet another serious blunder. (*P:SAWFH*)

While the phrase ‘assembling a force’ does not wholly deny Bush’s (Senior) agency, the phrasing of the actions means that there is a degree of Nominalisation. ‘Assembling a force’ is certainly more neutral, less overtly threatening than ‘gripping the throat’ of the world. Similarly, the word ‘evict’ is redolent of a more low-level dispute as one might find in the more domestic context over property or tenancy for instance. A classic example of the application of the Transitive and the Intransitive verbs in the discourse.

As in the previous *Panorama* broadcast, through archive footage, reference to and representation of Halabja is used as a means of foregrounding *Panorama*’s historical accuracy, to demonstrate Saddam’s brutality, and to imbue the contemporary characterisation and narrative of brutal menace with a degree of individual(ised) agency and with some historical and journalistic legitimacy. In short, Halabja is again used as an instantly visually arresting means to continue the process of demonization. BBC News and *Panorama* archive is again deployed.

Simpson: Halabja provided another warning. A small Kurdish town in Northern Iraq which had gone over to the enemy. When I went there a few days afterwards I found that Saddam’s chemical weapons had killed 5,000 people as a punishment.

BBC News March 1988:

The bodies which litter this town were those of people who ran out of their houses to try to escape the gas and then were killed out in the open either by more gas or by high explosive. (BBC *P:SAWFH* 2002)

As in the previous example (from *P:TCAS*), BBC News and *Panorama*’s own archive is drawn on here. Also, as above, immediately preceding the above section, John Simpson had in fact outlined some elements of the geo-political context. We are informed that in fact the US had been allies of Saddam. However, the context of this particular broadcast, and as a part of a series of pre-conflict broadcasts, this extra historical, geo-political context, whilst vital and acknowledged as such, is here used as a means *not* to examine the West’s complicity, but is instead used to further underscore, entrench and endorse the character of Saddam, he is,

again, the ‘flat and cartoon like’ archetypal villain. The explicit ‘warning from history’ *could* in fact refer to Western complicity with the demonized Saddam, but of course, that particular warning is disavowed in favour of a narrative that Saddam is not to be trusted, that he is uniquely untrustworthy and dangerous. By repeatedly using them, the images of Halabja, of bodies, the ‘evidence’ (sic) literally and visually piles up. In so doing, it helps create, cement, sustain and reproduce the demon archetype that ‘we’ must ‘deal with...in the here and now’ (P:TCAS).

The third programme in the pre-conflict phase sample promises to be more critical, perhaps even self-critical, by which I mean, potentially critical of Western power.

4.7 *Panorama: The Case Against War*

Worried about war with Saddam? Panorama reveals your doubts are shared by many you'd expect to back invading Iraq.

In the last programme of Panorama's widely-acclaimed year, Steve Bradshaw examines the arguments of critics on both sides of the Atlantic, including some whose lives could be at risk.

(<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2535973.stm>)

As summary paragraphs go, in contrast to the first two *Panorama* episodes in the pre-conflict phase sample, this particular example offers a rather sparse summary. The opening sentence is an explicit mode of address, it addresses concerned citizens, and in so doing, perhaps aims to put such citizens at, if not ease, then at least to make clear that the audience's own reservations, ‘worries’ and ‘doubts’ are shared by (some) members of the political, military and social elite. Interestingly, again, from the summary *and* the title at least, the reservations are here coded via the prism of (all too human) ‘worries’. Additionally, some of the sources furnishing the worries with legitimacy are those ‘whose lives could be at risk’. Whilst resisting the urge to be overly critical, this broadcast is at least an attempt to foreground some of the concerns, it must be highlighted that, from this short summary, there is little indication

that the reservations will be framed by ethical, legal or moral concerns. From the summary, the programme is an examination of ‘both sides of the Atlantic’. It is unclear whether this refers to the US and UK. If so, then the absence of ordinary Iraqis is stark.

4.8 *Panorama: The Case Against War – Challenging the ‘March to War’*

There are, with varying degrees of force and nuance, significant moments presented within all the pre-conflict phase *Panorama* texts that counter the ‘march to war’ narrative. Some significant moments wherein Jane Corbin (*The Case Against Saddam; Chasing Saddam’s Weapons*), and John Simpson (*Saddam: A Warning From History*) do explicitly reference a) some of the historical Western support for Saddam Hussein; b) include sources expressing reservations regarding the contemporary desire for engaging in conflict. The most explicit and most-considered and critical are, though, as one might expect, present in the December 2002 broadcast, *Panorama: The Case Against War*.

Having devoted the previous two broadcasts to developing and sustaining the Saddam as demon character (examining the case *against* Saddam), as a critical and public service broadcast oriented brand, *Panorama* devotes its next broadcast to examining *The Case Against War*. It is certainly the case that *Panorama: The Case Against War* is, for the most part, overtly critical. In fact, within this sample, the broadcast is striking precisely because it seems so anomalous (it is this incongruity that is key). While it would be too much to suggest that *Panorama: The Case Against War* is counter-hegemonic, it is, at the very least, highly sceptical of and highly critical regarding US and UK political-elite claims. The journalism contained within the broadcast certainly provides a critically interrogative position. It would be intellectually dishonest to suggest that *The Case Against War* adheres to the exact same template as the other three *Panorama* broadcasts in the sample. It does remain the case that lengthy sections of *The Case Against War* has a critical focus. There are significant examples and moments in which the doubts of (some) sources are foregrounded.

Some of the sources even go so far as to express grave misgivings regarding the possibility of forthcoming conflict, perceived Western complicity, geo-political strategies, and even, motivations:

Major General Patrick Cordingley: My reservations are all to do with the numbers of Iraqis that might be killed, you could argue, unnecessarily. (*P:TCAW*)

And:

Haifa: Iraq could be the largest reserve oil country in the world after Saudi Arabia and Britain is fighting to gain access to that, to have a share in the spoil of the war. The British involvement at the moment in Iraq, or trying to involve in this war, is definitely will be looked upon by the Iraqis as another colonisation of Iraq, something which they fought very hard during the whole last century to get rid of.

Bradshaw: Now Iraqis fear their natural resources are being coveted by a new imperial power. As the US builds up its forces in the Gulf, Haifa fears the world's solo superpower is starting to behave like Britain before it with the arrogance of empire.

Haifa: Iraq is only the beginning I think. There was Afghanistan of course, I mean this is Iraq here, and probably Iran or Syria next. What else? I mean is there an end to it? This is real expansion of power. There is one power in the world nowadays and it is the US, and the US wants that area. (*P:TCAW*)

However, despite the above (and other) examples, even in this critical broadcast, the ways in which the evidence of the more critical (even anti-war) sources are represented in *Panorama: The Case Against War* is not quite as critical as might first appear to be the case. As has been discussed, different dramatic conventions are used to (for example) cast Saddam a) as analogous to Hitler, b) in more generalised demonized terms. Although non-evidence-based, and as such, highly problematic, such conventions are an incredibly powerful dramatic device. It represents an attempt, through dramatized codes and conventions (typically the classic Proppian narrative structure; the archetypal representations found in Propp's analysis of Folk Tales), to invest the more pro-war view with emotional weight and legitimacy. However, in this particular broadcast (*P:TCAW*), one in which there is a significant orientation towards critical and sceptical inquiry, the representation of the sources is, even though occasionally 'dramatic', comparatively much more detached and even emotionless.

The broadcast, *Panorama: The Case Against War* is largely oriented around and narrated through seven critical sources. Each character is still dramatically multi-modally introduced, afforded a functional honorific, or perhaps more accurately, afforded a characterisation more readily found in fictionalised drama. However, such dramatic rendering, in this instance does *not* mean each ‘character’ is rendered or imbued with *dramatic emotional* depth. Furthermore, we must examine the extent to which, even though largely deriving from elite social and political locations, the seven sources are afforded the designation of Primary Definer. Do they Primarily Define the story, the context, the narrative orientation, the discourse? Are they subject to (more forceful) challenge by the *Panorama* journalist? In another classic of the dramatic repertoire, each character is instead reduced to a kind of route one *caricature*: ‘The Spy – Robert Baer’; ‘The Bishop – The Right Reverend Richard Harries’; ‘The Ambassador – Sir Andrew Green’; ‘The Presidential Advisor – Jessica Stern’; ‘The General – Major General Patrick Cordingley’; and ‘The Senator – Chuck Hagel’. The one striking deviation from this representation and casting comes via ‘The Exile – Haifa Zangana’. Her testimony, though only relatively short, is at least imbued with some emotionally resonant force, she is characterised and rendered all too human. However, the remaining sources are each afforded approximately seven minutes, but the case(s) are dislocated from the wider context. Their only narrative link (though of course invaluable) is their scepticism regarding the necessity of engaging in conflict. In the context of this sample of pre-conflict broadcasts, such overt scepticism is certainly noteworthy.

Vital as this broadcast is, the general presence, and the contents of their testimony is important, in the context of these broadcasts their presence might be characterised as journalistically incongruous. Crucially for this research, they are anomalous in *form* and *representation*, too. What I mean by this is that, other than ‘The Exile – Haifa Zangana’ the remaining six sources are not presented in ways which allows for dramatic human

engagement. They are much closer to what one might expect to find in a traditional Current Affairs broadcast. In this respect, the(ir) representation(s) are much more in-line with generic expectations.

This being the case, one could argue that when located as a part of a larger (and temporally longer) discourse across the sample, their representation is not designed to engage or encourage an empathic response. As a consequence, the emotional investment in these more critical perspectives is harder to achieve. So perhaps, it is not necessarily that emotional and dramatic forms of representation are employed, but *who* in the representation is afforded the relative luxury of televisually engaging characterisation and representation. Furthermore, how such characterisation is deployed in order to sell a vision, to persuade the audience regarding the rightness (or otherwise) of the geo-political events. Are we persuaded by the more rational, cold, detached and emotionless perspectives (re)presented in *P:TCAW*? Or is it now the case that in the early twenty-first century, Current Affairs television broadcasting, by utilising the various journalistic, televisual, dramatic forms, ensures we are more likely persuaded by drama and emotional engagement?

The case can certainly be made that, having attached highly emotive characterisational depth to ‘our side’ while simultaneously reducing ‘Others’ from the ‘enemy side’ to simplified (but no less dramatically rendered) archetype and *caricatures* across the pre-conflict phase broadcasts, when confronted by more cold, emotionless, detached, though still reasonably dramatically rendered, caricatures represented here by the critical sources in *P:TCAW*, the lack of emotional dramatic engagement, certainly when measured and assessed *against* the other broadcasts in the sample, means the audience might be less inclined to invest in the narrative orientation (of critical inquiry and scepticism regarding ‘our’ march to war).

Additionally, even here in *P:TCAW* what remains vital is the continuing representation of Saddam. Many of the same narrative structure and archetypal forms are employed. So within this highly critical and, in some ways exemplary piece of broadcast Current Affairs journalism, some aspects, focus and critical attention is centred on a) Western strategic interests; b) previous Western complicity. However, in part at least, that critical position is slightly diminished by the fact that, within the narrative of this individual broadcast, subsequently fitting well within the overall discourse, through the various sources, Saddam Hussein, while not represented as an immediate threat, still remains *a problem to be solved*:

Harries: He is a long-term worry, but the policy of containment and deterrence has worked for the last ten years. (*P:TCAW*)

...as such, he is still subject to demonization. That Saddam remains one of the major focal points, while not surprising, does mean in some ways, even while less visible and less dominant, his dramatic characterization is consistently rendered and broadly adheres to the previous archetypal, discursive and journalistic template established by the remainder of the pre-conflict phase sample. This is most obvious by the ways in which much of the very same archive imagery is deployed. An example of the semiotic Ideological Squaring is in the neutral visuals of 'our' combat 'operations' (e.g.); repeated (though less frequent) images of a menacing Saddam, firing a rifle (once), smoking his cigar (once); dressed in combat fatigues and sunglasses (twice). These images might be fewer and further between, but it remains the case that Saddam is presented as having a case to answer. Saddam still remains the demonized mark against which everything else is measured.

Another important and significant aspect regarding the critique of the desire for conflict as found in *Panorama: The Case Against War* is that still, even in this broadcast,

criticism or reluctance to engage in conflict is, on occasion, made on tactical, strategic and practical grounds:

Jessica Stern: There are compelling reasons to go to war against Iraq. Saddam poses a threat to the entire world. However, we need to consider whether the risks of going to war exceed the benefit and I believe they do. (*P:TCAW*)

So the desire for conflict is critically questioned at times in all four broadcasts.

Significantly the journalistic is also foregrounded, Corbin, Bradshaw and Simpson all use the BBC and *Panorama*'s own archive as authenticating agent, revealing the role that *Panorama* has played in telling us the story of Iraq. Corbin and Simpson themselves feature in the archive material further endorsing their own role as expert(s), interested, and critical observer(s) of both Iraq and the West's role in Iraq. It is through archive that one of the most interesting and critical possibilities for countering the march to war narrative comes.

However, surprisingly, it comes not from *Panorama: The Case Against War*, but in the *Panorama* broadcast *The Case Against Saddam*.

Deriving from archive (from 1993), at 23 minutes into *Panorama: The Case Against Saddam*, there features an interview with Alan Clarke MP who, at the time (1992) was Minister of State for Ministry of Defence, 1989–92. In the original broadcast, *Panorama* outlined how British companies had been selling weapons technology to Saddam:

Clarke: I think our attitude on this is very much coloured now by the fact that we did actually subsequently go to war with Iraq and it is a risk that is always present when you're selling to dictatorships. You just have to weigh up the probabilities and weigh that probability against the economic advantages of the trade. (*P:TCAS Panorama archive*)

This particular narrative thread is consistent with some of the threads developed in *P:TCAW* (a degree of complicity, a 'cost-benefit analysis' frame). The archive (from 1993) also indicates that such brilliant, rigorous, critical journalism is possible, *Panorama* demonstrates that it is so. What role does it play in the *Panorama* broadcast(s) that, I have argued,

devote(s) such significant representational, over-emphasising (ideological squaring) resources to demonization? The above section from *P:TCAS*, including the quote from Alan Clarke MP, foregrounds and acknowledges a degree of Western complicity, of the powerful role the UK and US play(ed) in the region. The point made by Alan Clarke MP is hugely significant. That ‘we’ ‘weigh up the probabilities and weigh that probability against the economic advantages of the trade’ is fairly stark. It is an explicit foregrounding of political elite-level discussions of geopolitics, discussions regarding the extent to which (though never overtly and explicitly admitted as much), on occasion, economics and ‘trade’ might in fact trump (distant) human life. A significant admission and quite a journalistic scoop for *Panorama* in 1993. Such an admission does serve here to punctuate the developing narrative in 2002. However, this brief sojourn, this critically interrogative frame is then quickly discarded. In this particular broadcast in 2002, Corbin *does not* develop that particular (journalistic) ‘angle’. This critically interrogative, self-critical content does not impact or in any way shape the discourse of this broadcast, nor does it materially affect the remainder of the sample. Firstly, save for this one statement from *Panorama*’s own archive, the theme(s) or possible frame(s), notably, Western geopolitics, energy resource capture, economics and imperialist ambitions, are simply not returned to, certainly not from *legitimated* sources. That the forthcoming war in Iraq might also be shaped by the ‘economic advantages of’ the war (oil resources, strategic geo-political position) remains stubbornly absent in most of the sample. They are absent in favour of overt dramatic demonization of Saddam. Instead, the use of *Panorama* archives merely stands-in for critique. The few examples that do exist (mainly from *P:TCAW*), feature in *one single* episode, subsequently largely dislocated from the remainder of the sample, and then in this case, mainly archival, *showcase* the journalism but do not materially affect the narrative orientation.

To put it another way, and the reason I consider this particular very brief excerpt as having a potentially counter-hegemonic or critical role to play is because, *Panorama* could use Clarke's narrative, or the contemporary equivalent of an equally critical, sceptical questioning, high-profile and legitimated source as the *starting point* or *the frame* through which the subsequent broadcasts are viewed. *Panorama* could, perhaps should have developed the journalistic angle from such a critical perspective. They could have researched, sourced and represented this particular narrative, it could have been the dominant frame. For instance, Scott Ritter, who was absent, or Hans Von Sponeck, who was (re)present(ed), are never allowed to fully set *the* frame, or orient the discourse in a suitably critical and rigorous direction. Given that there is evidence to suggest that such economic and geo-political considerations *do* (or did historically) weigh on global decision-makers (*Panorama*'s archive has just revealed as much), the overall narrative arc of any number of *Panorama* broadcasts prior to the conflict, *could*, and perhaps *should* start and end with such sceptical critique, such critically reflective accounts. In short, that the very political elites now arguing for conflict and 'overthrowing the regime' might be energized and driven by less than benign motivations could be the starting and end points, the frame through which to examine the forthcoming conflict. Western geopolitical strategy, the capture of energy resources (which of course is discussed endlessly by the critical 'left' in the UK, but who do not substantively feature in the pre-conflict phase sample), the installation of a neoliberal market economy in Iraq, or any number of counter-hegemonic angles, *could* have been *the* frame. Even on the most basic journalistic level, surely such a critical frame would be worth pursuing. That they never were the frames is instructive. In the context of War Programming, the absence of such subaltern frames is also consistent with regards point seven of Altheide and Grimes 'War Programming Model', 'Return to the point 1' (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 622). Despite the fact that *Panorama*'s own archive and research demonstrates that 'our' motivations are not always

benign, the assumptions, developed then solidified over a number of months, are that ‘our intervention’ if it comes, will be reluctant but motivated by higher more noble considerations than ‘the economic advantages of the’ war. That this remains the case goes some way to demonstrate that, despite some notable but largely minor, then discarded angles, the narrow discursive epistemological template *Panorama* employs in its coverage of conflict continues to be oriented around representing Saddam as the ultimate demon, the menace requiring urgent intervention.

Again, the existence of *P:TCAW* is striking here. There were possibilities for mounting rigorous critique, and, vitally given that this is one of the claims made for and by the BBC and *Panorama*, for locating the current debate in a historical context. Despite the fact that in many cases the sources quoted in *P:TCAW* are (or were) manifestly high-profile, they do not quite accrue the same level of legitimacy. This has something to do with a) the ways in which each source is characterized and dramatically represented; b) their total absence from any other broadcast in the sample. In short, their single appearance(s), means they never solidify into Primary Definers, at least, not across the entire sample. As a result, their perspectives are not permitted to reorient the narrative direction. The potentially counter-hegemonic never quite becomes a ‘main strand of argument’ (BBC).

In the context of this research, one tracking and assessing a collection of different *Panorama* broadcasts across an extended time-frame, and one employing a Critical Discursive lens, we can measure the potential for narrative subversion or critique across the sample. Despite *P:TCAW* being a demonstrably critical broadcast in the pre-conflict phase, I would suggest that it remains critical *only* within tightly defined narrowly framed discourse. The principle reason for this is the fact that, save for two brief examples from the conflict phase broadcast *Panorama: The Race to Baghdad*, in which Robert Baer, and Major Cordingley briefly appear, no other source featured in this broadcast (re)appear(s) in any

other broadcast across the entire sample. The alternative positions, the subaltern narratives and critical commentary each source provides *is* (for the most part) overtly critical, and, at times even critical of Western motivations:

Major General Patrick Cordingley: Isn't it a throwback to days of empire, back to the last century when armed force was used whenever we wanted to around the world for particular foreign policy aims. Surely we've moved on from that now. (*P:TCAW*)

Sir Andrew Green: I think this talk about Saddam being a threat to the west frankly is largely manufactured. I think the policy is misguided and misconceived. I think any attack on Iraq will be a huge bonus to Osama bin Laden, it will destabilise the Gulf and we'll have consequences that cannot be foreseen or indeed predicted. (*P:TCAW*)

Jessica Stern: I think there would be a far more compelling argument for going to Iraq if we had intelligence that Saddam was about to strike the UK or the United States. I don't believe that any intelligence has been uncovered. (*P:TCAW*)

However, their near *complete* absence from the remainder of the broadcasts in the pre-conflict phase, conflict phase, and post-conflict phase, means they are journalistically and ideologically at variance with the remainder of the sample(s). Because five of the seven do not appear or reappear, their presence, their casting here is somewhat 'maverick'. Perhaps their testimonies, their 'storylines' are not thought sufficiently rigorous, interesting or 'salient'. Their absence from the remainder of the sample certainly goes some way to delegitimising them. The social and cultural positions of (some of) the sources, as formerly adjacent to or even *as* 'Primary Definers' seemingly not sufficient, not legitimated (enough) such that they might be granted further representational licence to reappear in other broadcasts in the sample. They are present, but only in this one example, on the edges of 'primary definition', cast here, in this *one single*, critical broadcast, they fulfil the BBC function of ensuring 'no significant strand of argument is under-represented', but as a mere fig-leaf of impartiality but *not* such that they are able to (re)orient, reorder, subvert or challenge the dominant narrative arc of the *Panorama* conflict-based sample. They do not

become a ‘main strand of argument’. Even if Saddam as *the* problem is a legitimate and defensible narrative arc, in adhering to the now established discourse this broadcast diminishes the critical position *P:TCAW* could have developed.

One final point with regards this relatively more critical broadcast *P:TCAW*. As in other pre-conflict phase broadcasts, Richard Perle features. In this broadcast, Perle is in fact identified as a founder-member of The Project for the New American Century (PNAC). In the academic literature already quoted by this research, PNAC are referenced extensively by Altheide and Grimes (2005). Perle is directly attributed as a PNAC member and signatory to a controversial and highly inflammatory letter. This controversial fact is alluded to, then outlined by Bradshaw in *P:TCAW*. What remains vital, interesting, and identified as problematic in this research, is why this direct attribution and textual positioning within *one single* broadcast is not enough to discredit him in *P:TCAS* and *P:CSW*. Despite Richard Perle’s clearly demarcated, easily retrievable and proven ideological position, when he (re)appears within the text and discourse of *P:CSW* and *P:TCAS*, he is still granted authority as a primary definer. The texts continue to position him in such a way as to ensure that he still maintains authority and legitimacy, Corbin still defers to his expertise, his statements pass by unchallenged. Such discursive features are indicative of an ideological position or at least indicative of a narrative orientation that is in part reproduced by the largely uncritical use of and legitimacy granted to *specific* primary definers. That *Panorama* are willing to continually grant uncritical authority to *legitimate* sources, clearly indicates its adherence to the WPM. However, we need not wait for ‘the next war’ before Point 7 ‘Return to the point 1’ (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 622) even within the context of this single conflict, journalistic myopia and amnesia is all that is required.

Given *Panorama*’s location in and as a News form, as one might expect given the increasing focus (at the time of broadcast) on the hunt for ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’,

the final broadcast in the pre-conflict sample has an explicit focus on the search for said weapons. Summarised and thematised as follows.

4.9 *Panorama: Chasing Saddam's Weapons*

Panorama goes to Iraq in search of the 'smoking gun' that could lead to war. The attention of the world has been focused on the UN Weapons Inspectors' search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. During this time, Panorama has gained access to both sides in the game of hide and seek that stands between Saddam's Iraq and war. Panorama's Jane Corbin reports from Baghdad as it braces itself for conflict. She visits the weapons sites where inspectors have been concentrating their efforts, and interviews the Iraqi officials and scientists who run them.

Panorama has followed the inspectors for three months, in Iraq, New York and Vienna, during a period which has taken them from early planning, to the battle for more time, as they come under increasing pressure from Washington. As one of the few documentary crews that has managed to get into Iraq, Panorama visits the sites at the centre of the dossiers compiled by the British and US Governments and provides a unique insight into a nation on the brink of conflict and invasion. We assess what has happened to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and whether there are breaches of the UN resolution which support those who are calling for war.

(<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2706841.stm>)

The title itself is interesting. In a more critical or nuanced sample, one in which the same level of scrutiny was cast on elite Western political actors (and their motivations), as was cast on 'Saddam' (and his alleged ambitions), the title could be defended on the grounds of nuance and questioning. The title however, lacks the crucial addition of a question mark (?). Also coming, as it does, at the conclusion of fully five months of otherwise largely demonizing narratives, in which, from the titles and summaries (above) alone, Saddam has been consistently rendered and 'cast' as 'dictator', 'volatile', 'ruthless', 'unstable', 'threatening', akin to Hitler, Stalin, and 'psychopath', the title *Chasing Saddam's Weapons* takes on a more sinister tone. It strongly suggests that Saddam is in possession of such weapons, and it is merely a matter of tracking them down, to find (the dramatic signifier of) 'the smoking gun'.

Panorama again make much of their proximity to primary high-profile sources 'Panorama has gained access to both sides', 'She (Jane Corbin) visits the weapons sites

where inspectors have been concentrating their efforts, and interviews the Iraqi officials and scientists who run them'. We are also informed that *Panorama* has followed the inspectors across the world, and that the broadcast can 'provide a unique insight into a nation on the brink of conflict and invasion'. So the dominant themes for this, the final pre-conflict phase sample, are the (continuing, though perhaps more muted) demonization of Saddam; the search for weapons of mass destruction, and that said weapons are (likely to be) in 'his' possession.

4.10 *Panorama: Chasing Saddam's Weapons* – Searching for the 'Smoking Gun', the Ideological Square: Demonizing Saddam v Fetishizing 'Our' Military Machine.

This, the final broadcast in the pre-conflict phase *Panorama: Chasing Saddam's Weapons*, was broadcast a matter of weeks (five weeks, to be exact) prior to the second Gulf War beginning. By this stage of the pre-conflict phase, the image of Saddam (that of the archetypal villain in classic folk-tale style narrative arc), in part solidified by *Panorama* (and others) is firmly entrenched. It is also the case that by this time in the wider social and political sphere, the dominant debate was around the possible evidence of, and search for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). As befits the remit of *Panorama*, this, the final broadcast prior to conflict, centres on the search for said weapons in Iraq.

Once again, this time in *Panorama: Chasing Saddam's Weapons (P:CSW)* images of Halabja are used. Again directly cut against the familiarity of New York. In this example, the horror of Halabja is foregrounded, archive footage in black and white, dead bodies literally piled up in the back of a truck, accompanied by more (unspecified) haunting music. This is followed by a black and white image of a young boy, lying dead on the street while the non-diegetic narration by Jane Corbin that overlays these horrific images of dead bodies in Halabja is as follows:

Corbin: Saddam Hussein developed his weapons of mass destruction to give him power in his region, and as he showed in 1988 he was prepared to unleash poison

gas against his own people to crush internal dissent and ensure his regime's survival. It raised the question would Saddam ever reveal what had happened to his forbidden weapons. Would he not gamble everything and try and keep them?
(P:CSW)

The screen then fades to black for one second, (the transition shot) before the next scene begins. The scene is New York, Jane Corbin crosses the street as the camera pans upwards to capture the UN building. In quite a stark multi-modal act of Ideological Squaring, the relative calm and familiarity of New York stands in sharp contrast to the horrors of Saddam's Halabja. The non-diegetic score used to introduce us to the more familiar sight and site of New York is the cello score *Documentary* by *Rolan Vega*. The cello, often associated with classical music, in this instance at least might be said to signify Western taste, class and urbane sophistication. The music functions as a lead-in to the equally urbane and sophisticated '...quiet Swedish diplomat, Dr Hans Blix' (P:CSW) (referred to again in similar terms 'the mild-mannered Swede' at 44 minutes and 31 seconds). Over the course of the next 14 minutes, the multi-modal Ideological Squaring is stark. As the images and Jane Corbin herself flit between Iraq, Vienna and New York, the narrative development is such that shots of western cities are often sharply contrasted with that of the darker, more desolate, more threatening images and shots of Iraq (including one shot of Saddam Hussein holding a rifle aloft). At 24 minutes, we return to New York.

The image begins from up-high, possibly shot from one of the 'skyscrapers' of which New York is synonymous. In contrast to the darker (bleaker, less-known, more threatening) hues that depict various Iraqi cities, New York is captured not only in bright colours and contrasts, but the shot selections themselves are indicative. A bright blue sky containing one single cloud and a very bright sun is our opening image, the camera pans down to reveal the (familiar) Manhattan skyline. The next shot is, one assumes, selected precisely to render New York familiar (again), knowable and recognisable. Shot from the

ground, the image is of a yellow New York cab sat in heavy traffic on a Manhattan Street. The recognition that it *is* New York is cemented by the steam rising from grates; the ‘Walk/Don’t Walk’ roadside signs so familiar from Hollywood(ised)/New York movies. Corbin herself is captured walking along the street clutching an armful of paperwork, signifying (as she does repeatedly by way of visuals) that she is on the journey to track down Saddam’s weapons. The final two shots in this section are of the United Nations building complete with flags of every nation fluttering in the gentle New York breeze. The non-diegetic score is again the cello score of *Documentary* by *Rolan Vega*. This score, together with the shots of the New York skyline, and with the additional, now becoming customary shots of yellow New York cabs (used again at 44 minutes) ensures that, within the confines of this broadcast at least, *Vega’s Documentary* becomes a part of the character of New York, used to punctuate the images of that city, as if New York itself is becoming one of the central characters in the dramatized story-line of the *Panorama* discourse. These are images we in the west are supposed to trust, or at least be vaguely familiar with. While such images might, strictly speaking *journalistically* at least, be almost obsolete and unnecessary, their location and insertion here certainly *televisually* and *dramatically* assists in the telling of the story. New York has and is a recognised trustworthy character. If a military intervention is forthcoming, such military actions will be sanctioned by the (frequently framed in New York) UN and, we can rest assured that, only after the best efforts of the Over-Lexicalised and positively Attributed ‘quiet Swedish diplomat’ have been exhausted. The ‘military option’ while ‘regrettable’ will be undertaken by thoughtful, familiar and trustworthy allies.

4.11 The Fetishisation of ‘The War Machine’

We have seen then, repeatedly, though usually only through repeated legitimated archive images of Halabja, what Saddam’s weapons *can do*. But, in-keeping with the now more urgently represented near inevitability of forthcoming conflict, the Western ‘Military

Machine' (*P:CSW*) needs to be foregrounded and represented. So what of the representations of our military might and technology? Given that there has been some focus on the 'military build-up' (*P:TCAS*) how might 'our' weapons and weapons technology be represented?

A particularly interesting and highly stylised example appears at 28 minutes into the broadcast *Panorama; Chasing Saddam's Weapons*. In this sequence, we are treated to perhaps one of the most filmic sections in the pre-conflict phase sample. In the following sequence - again via the Ideological Square method - cut against a previous representation of a dark and dreary Baghdad, are images of Western forces.

The sequence, lasting 35 seconds, contains a range of images. The first image in the 35 second sequence, is of a large ship as it cuts through the water. Shot from on board, 'we' the viewers are on the journey. The next image, shot from the air, a US navy aircraft carrier (possibly the same ship, though this is never made clear) with troops on board spelling out the words 'READY NOW' (the exact same image shot from the air with the troops spelling out 'READY NOW' has been used already in *Panorama: The Case Against War*). The following shot is of two pilots on board the aircraft carrier, dressed in military uniforms, one strides towards the other, they salute then shake hands, and one warmly wraps the other on the shoulder. Then cut to (different) military personnel loading a missile onto a fighter-jet. The next shot is a close-up of a pilot, now in the cockpit, visor down, the glass of the cockpit comes down over his head. As it does so, the pilot gives another salute and raises his index finger to signify that he's ready (for action). Cut to a member of the ground-crew as he visually counts down for take-off. Next shot is from inside a cockpit, perhaps more library or archive footage. In this shot, from inside the cockpit, we see what the pilot sees, the viewers are on board (literally, (tele)visually, discursively and ideologically). Cut to another shot from the cockpit, but this time camera facing back, as the plane takes off, the aircraft carrier and the sea very quickly recede into the distance. The moving image perfectly captures the

overwhelming speed of the take-off and places the viewer at the centre of the 'action'. Now back on board but facing forward, we are on the journey across the ocean with the pilot on his mission. The final shot is again from inside the cockpit, this time however the focus is on the pilot, the sunlight glinting off his visor. These images all signify, by way of explicit action shots, that 'our boys' are 'ready now' for action. An interesting non-diegetic dramatic addition is that the musical score that accompanies the previously discussed montage is *Celestial Annihilation* by *Unkle*. This very fast tempo, upbeat soundtrack perfectly conforms to a Hollywood vision of conflict. The Western armed forces are here represented not as any threat but prepared, action-oriented keepers (or restorers) of order. Some of the images are direct from the Hollywood playbook, action, sunsets, military technology and machinery. The commentary by Jane Corbin is also instructive:

Corbin: Saddam Hussein was courting war while America was very publicly building up its forces on his doorstep. And Britain too announced it was sending troops and aircraft to the Gulf. (*P:CSW*)

We see the build-up of troops, but in this instance, they are represented via the imagery and narratives drawn from a Hollywood vision of conflict. Following directly from the above depiction of the 'military build-up' Jane Corbin's voiceover asserts, somewhat counter-intuitively: '...with Saddam now courting war'. Given the build-up of 'our' Western/Coalition military personnel in the region, the notion that 'Saddam is/was courting war' would, ordinarily, be hard to sustain. However, given the overt demonization focus, coupled with the polished, Hollywood style representations of the Western 'military machine', Saddam *as* 'courting war' makes journalistic, televisual, and narrative 'sense'. The next image is of the high-profile source, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, sat in his office in London (framed by a picture of London behind him):

Greenstock: This is actually for real, but it's being done in a way which can be switched off if Saddam Hussein decides to comply 100% and hand all his stuff in. So he's got his hand on the switch actually, and if he declines to use it, then the military machine will roll onward as it's being prepared now. But he's got to come forward

credibly with all those explanations – with the materials behind them that are gaps in the declaration – now. (P:CSW)

His words carry implicit threat but, his calm, assured and measured delivery ensures the words are coded as the reasonable *response* to the Transitive ‘Saddam courting war’. The assertion from Greenstock that ‘...he's got to come forward credibly with all those explanations’ is interesting. Given the discourse in which this series of broadcasts is located, including much suspicion of Saddam from the elite US sources, it is rather difficult to see what precisely would constitute ‘credibility’, but the viewers are left in little doubt that, as yet, this credibility has not been granted. The phrase ‘So he's got his hand on the switch actually’ has the effect of, again, coding Saddam as the principle agent of aggression. The Transitive is applied to Saddam, he is the agent, and that it is somehow in his control how the immediate future plays out. Such Lexical Choices are further strengthened of course by the fact that agency is ascribed to Saddam by a legitimated ‘Primary Definer’.

After the brief appearance of Jeremy Greenstock, the very next sequence of images returns us to more action oriented montage. This time shorter in length at a mere 18 seconds but the focus and effect remains the same. An image of a fighter-jet at very fast pace taking off from an aircraft carrier; the next shot is from inside the cockpit, the viewer is again televisually (and ideologically) located with the military forces, ‘Our Boys!’, as it flies across the open sea; cut to the fighter-jet dropping its load (bombs) before quickly cutting back to (UN Weapons Inspector) Jacques Baute. This cut away is important. When interviewing the Iraqi scientists (historically) involved in the research and development of weapons (of mass destruction), Corbin et al. forensically question Saddam’s former defence researchers. They are not only questioned, but *confronted* with over-coded phrases that reveal the impact of *their* weapons:

Corbin: Thousands of tons of toxins which suffocate their victims and cause liver cancer. (P:CSW)

Similarly urgent and deadly phraseology was used in the earlier pre-conflict broadcast,

Panorama: The Case Against Saddam.

Corbin: They found thousands of litres of anthrax, botulinium, an aflatoxin which causes liver cancer. (*P:TCAS*)

This phrasing simultaneously reveals to the viewers the likely deadly effect and reality of the Iraqi scientists' work, and of course such phrases reassert the dangers of an uncontained Saddam.

Both montages, interrupted by Sir Jeremy Greenstock, appear to show 'Our' 'military machine' in a more neutral light. Firstly, by the quick-paced sequencing of dramatic images and by the non-diegetic up-tempo musical accompaniment. Then by the fact that the commentary locates the Western 'military machine' as somehow distance(d) from human agency and complicity, as a machine, not as the aggressors but in a mode of *response*. Saddam has already been characterised by the representation in a specifically archetypal demonized fashion, it is of course also the fourth and final broadcast in the pre-war sample, therefore the overall discourse is well-established.

These more neutral but simultaneously 'action' oriented images need to be measured against the already repeatedly framed and characterised Saddam, his WMD (sic) and his attack on Halabja. Action montages are inserted or located into a narrative that has largely been devoted to specifically mobilise and solidify the image of Saddam as a unique threat. These images are 'cut against' images of Western forces. The Western armed forces are represented not as any threat but as keepers of order. Some of the images are direct from the Hollywood playbook, action, sunsets, military technology and machinery. Another necessary critique is that, given the explicit reference to serious injury, long-term disease ('liver cancer') and death ('suffocate their victims'), when referencing 'Saddam's weapons', it is a striking 'omission' that 'our' bombs, while actually (re)present(ed) on screen, are spared the same scrutiny. They may appear (in action shots) but their deadly qualities are

semiotically, discursively and Lexically Absent. 'Our weapons' are not granted the same deadly 'qualities'. In discourse and multi-modal analytical terms, this is an act of Nominalization: 'Our' weapons, which 'we' *do* possess, are distanced from 'us'; they are visually, semiotically, and aesthetically fetishized, coded by their *actions*, not by their deadly *material effects*.

The final words spoken in *Chasing Saddam's Weapons* are by Jane Corbin:

Corbin: Three months ago when I started out, the Inspectors hoped they could avert a war, but Saddam Hussein has still not been prepared to reveal his secrets. The Inspectors may soon be just a footnote in history as America warns Saddam has thrown away his last chance. (P:CSW)

Saddam is again over-coded as somehow in charge of the events. Despite some vague critique within the text, and very good reasons to cast scepticism on US and UK officials' claims, Corbin asserts, without critical scrutiny that 'Saddam Hussein has still not been prepared to reveal his secrets'. The claims are simply assumed to be true, that 'he' is still prepared to deceive. At the programmes conclusion, with the images of preparation for battle in front of us, Corbin assures us that war now seems almost certain. Discursively and multi-modally, it remains significant that *Panorama: Chasing Saddam's Weapons* is the final pre-war broadcast (broadcast in February 2003) weeks prior to conflict actually beginning. That the narrative focus *and* images, a mixture of archive, newly filmed and library footage, is here on the *forthcoming action*. This is indicative of the move towards action in a literal and in a representational sense. During conflict, war programming tends to focus on action at the expense of context or explanation. Despite claims that the pre-conflict phase *Panorama* broadcasts examine the case (against Saddam, or against war) by representing *action(s)*, *Panorama: Chasing Saddam's Weapons* actually, discursively, epistemologically and representationally prepares us for what is to follow.

4.12 Concluding Remarks: The Mission to Explain ...The Build-up to Conflict

According to both the summary paragraphs and the subsequent analysis, the identifiable and dominant themes that emerge(d) in the pre-conflict phase sample are as follows:

- 1) Demonization of Saddam.
- 2) The threat and/or presence, and search for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
- 3) The *need* to take action.
- 4) Representations that challenge or counter the ‘march to war’.
- 5) The journalistic and television position *of*, and reliance *on*, sources (Primary Definers).
- 6) Extensive use of the BBC’s and *Panorama*’s own archive as legitimating force.

When assessed and tracked across the pre-conflict phase sample as a whole, one theme and characterisation certainly dominates. The discourse *is* one of demonization, the epistemology of Iraq is that of a place of brutality and lawlessness that only ‘Our intervention’ can salve. Principally by selectively deploying specific *archive material*, via Over-Lexicalisation, Attributes and selective use of Transitivity, by granting authority and legitimacy to Western sources and Primary Definers, by repeatedly representing Saddam as an archetypal brutal ‘character’ with very little by way of overt focus on ‘our’ complicity, the overall discourse and epistemology of Iraq is of an urgent threat to world peace. The critical positions alluded to, on occasion given significant time and space within (some of) the broadcast sample, are almost always measured, assessed, discursively and multi-modally repeatedly marked against the consistent characterisation of Saddam as uniquely threatening. Saddam, and often representatives of the Iraqi ‘side’ are not afforded the same levels of legitimacy and authenticity granted to ‘our own’ Western sources or Primary Definers. We need to recall that the sample analysed here were all broadcast prior to the second Iraq war (Gulf War II) actually beginning. Though this might seem self-evident, the extent to which *Panorama* significantly ramps up the war drumbeat needs to be considered in that (pre-conflict) context. The consequences of weapons are demonstrably represented when ‘he’ is the possessor (and architect of previous atrocities). This is particularly evident in, and by repeated references *to*,

and archive shots of Halabja. Such brutal and devastating consequences are represented via the archive and as such, presents Saddam as uniquely dangerous; as brutal and untrustworthy. Our intervention, represented first by political and military elites, and second represented via a displaced and simultaneously fetishized 'Military machine' is urgently required and only ever as motivated by benign intent.

The term 'Weapons of Mass Destruction' is repeated across the sample: Three uncritical references in *P:SAWFH*. There are a further eight uncritical references, and six neutral or sceptical references in *P:CSW*. And a further 10 uncritical references in *P:TCAS*. When the mere mention of the term 'Weapons of Mass Destruction' is not sufficient, *Panorama* frequently turns to the semiotics of science, green screen, microscope (library) pictures of biological weapons, computer generated images of missiles and dead bodies in Halabja, in order to substantiate the threat. So in the narrative(s) examining 'the case against Saddam' or 'the case against Iraq', even 'the case against war' the overall thematic concern, narrative orientation and characterisation dramatically represents Iraq, via the demonized archetypal villain characterisation of Saddam, as a uniquely dangerous threat to us all.

Finally, given the sheer number of representations of 'Saddam' and that they always cast him as an evil 'to be confronted', might there be a case for deducing that this representation is in fact not an archetype – able to 'travel', and recognisable 'across boundaries' – but is instead a rather clumsy stereotype. As McKee reminds us, stereotyping 'confines itself to narrow, culture-specific experience and dresses in stale, non-specific generalities' (McKee. 1999. 4). In the cases analysed here, there are some attempts to cast Saddam beyond mere stereotype. I would argue that this is principally because there is a degree of political analysis of Iraq, some 'backstory' and even some familial history (about which, more in subsequent chapter(s)), some attempts to psychologise the 'demon'. However, it remains the case that this potentially more nuanced representation is constrained by the

overall narrative(s) in the pre-conflict sample. When measured against representations of ‘our boys’, and ‘our’ Primary Definers, he is Over-Lexicalised, Over-Determined and Over-Coded. Via Ideological Squaring, Saddam is in danger of being represented as a ‘flat and cartoon like’ stereotype. Sure, he may be fleshed out a little, but the role he plays in the storyline(s) are typically one-dimensional: ‘while such characters serve an archetypal role within the given programme, reflected out to reality, they serve a stereotypical role (Gray, J. 2008) ‘He’ – the demon – must ‘be confronted’.

Chapter 5

How is the War Going?

5.1 The Conflict Phase

For the purposes of this chapter, conflict phase coverage will refer to the time period from 19 March 2003 until 1 May 2003 or until President George W Bush, on board the USS Abraham Lincoln, beneath a banner declaring ‘Mission Accomplished’ officially declared ‘an end to military operations’ and thus the successful completion of the mission. Bush arrived in a fixed-wing aircraft on the aircraft carrier USS *Abraham Lincoln*, the ship had just *returned* from combat operations in the Persian Gulf, he then posed for photographs with pilots and members of the ship’s crew while wearing a flight suit. However (and interestingly for a research project largely focused on media representation), the shots were tightly framed so as to promote and produce a particular a vision to the world. Most of the News reported that Bush had swept into the Gulf and delivered his speech to the personnel fighting *in* the Gulf conflict. Or at least if this was *not overtly said*, the news media chose not to foreground the fact that the naval vessel was, in fact, anchored off the shore of San Diego. This minor detail goes some way to explain that the US government and military forces were (and are) engaged in acts of overt (but concealed) propaganda. In this propagandistic endeavour, they are ably assisted by news media who chose to elide the location of the *USS Abraham Lincoln*. Despite News archive shots of Bush aboard this very vessel in *Panorama*, Bush’s actual geographical location was not explicitly referenced, the visuals were inserted into the narrative arc, and in the same way that the News coverage used the footage, as a form of ‘commander in chief’ characterisation. In the context of this research, what is equally interesting is, alert to the ‘effects’ of mediation, even Bush’s speech focused on imagery over and above reality. As Hammond (2003) notes:

It was telling, in this example, that in his 1st May ‘Mission Accomplished’ speech, Bush stopped short of declaring the conflict over. Instead, he emphasised the image,

rather than the fact, of victory, claiming that: 'in the images of falling statues, we have witnessed the arrival of a new era'; and that 'in the images of celebrating Iraqi's, we have also seen the ageless appeal of human freedom'. (Hammond 2003: 24)

As we saw in Chapter 1, the term Current Affairs is rather a loosely defined one. Unlike the News genre, *Panorama* does not broadcast 'live' footage. Instead it presents a series of filmed events referring-back to a period of time, sometimes very recent footage and film, employing some of the signifying practices of News, and in some cases, utilising the already 'legitimated' News footage as points of anchorage, legitimacy, news values and 'authenticity'. Such usual practice is designed, one assumes, to provide a means of looking back, developing, critiquing, 'digging behind the headlines' (Holland 2006), providing context and detail on recent news events. As such, and as a(n emblematic) form of Current Affairs broadcasting, *Panorama* lacks the immediacy of broadcast News. This being so, *Panorama* instead presents itself as a broadcaster of record, able to make use of its significant resources as a means of referring back, reflecting and critically interrogating the events as they unfold(ed). As discussed (see Chapter 2), *Panorama* functions and sits between the margins of *Documentary* with all the attendant points of realism, anchorage and legitimacy assumed by such forms, and that of News, which of course also obtains similar levels of legitimacy, authority, and with the additional urgency, 'recency' and other associated 'News Values' characteristic of that form. The above point is elucidated here in this chapter precisely because, with the somewhat urgent nature of conflict coverage, its immediacy, is, when represented in Current Affairs coverage obviously slightly compromised. This lack of 'liveness' means that there are fewer examples of conflict coverage 'as it happens/is happening' in these broadcasts and in this chapter than one might find were the analysis focussed on News (such as in Altheide and Grimes' WPM) and not Current Affairs. Nevertheless, examples of conflict coverage do remain, in fact they dominate, but they are of course slightly temporally distanced when compared with News coverage. There are

significant instances of ‘cross-over’ with regards the filmed examples pertaining to battle and conflict that appear in pre-conflict phase, conflict phase and that of post-conflict phase broadcasts. All phases in the overall sample in this research utilise some examples from ‘battle scenes’ as a means of rendering the dramatic story-lines and narratives legible and ‘meaningful’ in the context of the wider socio-political and media discourse.

5.2 Aspects of the War Programming Model

Panorama devoted a number of broadcasts to Iraq during the conflict-phase. Of these, three will be included for analysis. One of the broadcasts not selected for analysis is *Panorama: After Saddam* which was an entirely studio-based discussion (see Chapter 3). It therefore lacks the usual discursive, aesthetic, formal, multi-modal practices and, for this reason, it is not particularly representative of the Current Affairs broadcast model as exemplified by the usual *Panorama* style. While the panel discussion, and possibilities for feedback via email and text messaging, does provide a degree of public sphere, public service engagement, an opportunity to ‘speak back’, and therefore an opportunity, however muted, to enter and affect the dominant discourse, *Panorama: After Saddam* does lack the standardised formal multi-modal characteristics one has come to expect from *Panorama*. Such broadcast styles are also now absent from the ongoing *Panorama* canon, panel discussions are now limited to BBC *Question Time* and, to a lesser extent, or at least in a different format, on *Newsnight*.

As already stated, any footage sourced from the time period 19 March 2003 until 1 May 2003 can be included *as in war-time* and as part of the template. It is important to trace the practices and examples within the developed theoretical framework, while simultaneously acknowledging that Altheide and Grimes’ War Programming Model is not as immediately applicable to Current Affairs broadcasting when compared with News. However, the WPM

still provides a useful template. In this, the conflict-phase, points two and three are the most apposite:

2. Anticipation, planning, and preparing the audience for impending war, including demonizing certain individual leaders.
3. Coverage of subsegments of current war, using the best visuals available to capture the basic scenes and themes involving the battle lines, the home front, the media coverage, the international reaction, and anticipation of war's aftermath. (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 622)

5.3 *Panorama: Blair's War*

The first of the broadcasts from the Conflict phase 'season', broadcast on 23rd March 2003 (only days into the conflict-phase), was *Panorama: Blair's War*.

Panorama: Blair's War

Could Tony Blair lose his job over the Iraq crisis? For two months *Panorama* has been following the opposition to him, in the anti-war movement, in the Labour Party, and in Parliament. This is the real-life political drama of a Prime Minister, accused in the past of being guided by focus groups, yet apparently now determined to override a million demonstrators and over a hundred of his own MP's – the story of the war on the home front.

(<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2858047.stm>)

The most obvious and immediately clearly identifiable theme is the extent to which the broadcast will focus on the 'threat' to Tony Blair, or at least to his 'job' and reputation. It is, we are informed, 'A real-life political *drama*' as such, the focus will be on the individual (character) of Blair. Once again there is a reference to (reliance on) access to sources (those Primary Definers), and in this case, some potentially alternative sources. The summary paragraph suggests that the broadcast will provide the necessary space and time to critics and oppositional voices. Explicit mention of the 'anti-war movement' is some indication that, as detailed by Georgina Born, this episode of *Panorama* might take seriously its remit 'to broaden the character and range of its representations in tune with new social and political times' (Born 2005: 376). It is a focus on 'the war on the home front'.

5.4 *Panorama: Blair's War* – The Human(e) Deliberations (Rationalisations) of the Primary Definer(s)

Panorama: Blair's War is largely oriented around and chiefly concerned, perhaps unsurprisingly given its title, with the personal and political risks Tony Blair was taking with his own premiership, political position and 'legacy'. The fact that it is titled as a war, and with a sense of ownership attached, might, at first glance (15 years hence) seem surprising. However, at the time, there certainly was a sense of ownership of the (impending) conflict, and this was something Blair seemed only too happy to contribute to. Blair did 'own' the war, certainly in a UK context, and this first broadcast in the conflict phase is chiefly devoted to exploring this position.

Some insight into the narrative orientation *Panorama: Blair's War* might take comes via the very first words of the broadcast. In the following segment, Blair is represented as simultaneously risk-taking but all too human *for* that. The very first lines of the broadcast *Panorama: Blair's War* are accompanied by News archive shots of Blair (in slow-motion) jacket slung across his shoulder, striding through the corridor of Parliament (the 'corridors of power'). The words which open the episode come from high-profile primary definer, Foreign Secretary of the time:

Jack Straw: This man, Blair, has taken really very significant risks with his own future as a Prime Minister, and there have been some dark moments when weaker people might have simply given up. (*P:BW*)

Straw, granted legitimacy and authority as a Primary Definer by his status, literally and visually framed by the accoutrements of high office, outlines that Blair is the necessarily strong man for the task ahead. He reveals the 'dark moments', thus characterising Blair as an all too human subject engaged in moments of agonising despair. He then communicates that because Blair is not weak, he will not give up. In the context of a conflict phase narrative, such a statement demonstrates Blair's resolve, and his determination. In immediate contrast

to the ways in which ‘Saddam’ has been reduced to stereotype, or at best, an archetypal figure (the demon to be confronted), Blair is here over-coded, Over-Lexicalised and given positive (human) Attributes. Furthermore, the risks are here framed as personal risks. A most-likely bloody conflict that may well (and did) cause great suffering and as yet still unknown numbers of deaths, is here entirely framed through the purview of risk to Blair’s ‘own future as Prime Minister’. Such a statement reveals the narrative orientation of this, largely (though not wholly) uncritical conflict phase broadcast. We are to be guided through the (very) early stages of conflict via the pensive reflections of Blair, ventriloquized, in this instance by Jack Straw.

In this broadcast, not only is this characterisation replete with institutional and hierarchical connotations, Blair, via Jack Straw, has ‘most to say’, and has the luxury of institutional knowledge and insight, it also reveals that here, even in the very first stages of the conflict, ‘character’ takes centre stage. Very little, zero minutes in this broadcast, focus on the material effects the current conflict would have/is having on the people of Iraq, the British soldiers involved in the actual fighting and very little concern about the wider geo-political landscape. However, as the BBC’s own summary paragraph identified, this is an examination of the ‘war on the home-front’, therefore the micro-*political* landscape certainly is foregrounded insofar as the narrative continually focuses on Blair’s future (or not) as Prime Minister. While under some scrutiny and while many critical voices are present, what appears in the broadcast itself remains largely oriented around the rationalisation for the ‘actions’. It is not the wider social and geo-political ramifications (beyond the US/UK ‘special relationship’) that feature, and that Blair is symptomatic *of* and the sympathetic cypher *for* this special relationship, but Blair’s personal mission that is foregrounded. As such, it and his character(isation) provides the template and narrative orientation. Even when the actions are questioned, or rendered questionable, such as by Ken Clarke MP:

Ken Clarke MP: I listen to a man who preaches at me with deep, deep conviction and I'm afraid I sit in the congregation and think, and I don't really think we should be there and I don't really think your allies on the other side of the Atlantic see it quite like that. (*P:BW*)

And his motivations scrutinised, Blair, with his 'deep, deep conviction' remains characterised as essentially ethical, as moral, as motivated by the best of intentions. Or, despite the fact that 'There is no present and clear danger to British interests', Blair is, in the words of another criticising and critical ally:

John Lloyd: ...doing it in a sense out of a missionary duty to the world, to rid the world of evil people. (*P:BW*)

The most heavily featured voice in the broadcast belongs to the Foreign Secretary of the time, Jack Straw, and his commentary (of course supportive) is dominated by Blair's position, Blair's strength of character, his beliefs, his desire to 'do what he believes to be right' (*P:BW*). Here, Blair is *cast* as a perhaps flawed character but nevertheless a moral one. Afforded the luxury of, if not direct then vicarious and characterised, discursive *presence*, with the possibility for (self)-reflection and, what is more with the narrative actually oriented around such contemplative, moralising, self-reflection, Blair takes centre stage in a classic drama. Given that the previous broadcasts (already discussed) cast and caricature 'Saddam' (in absentia other than by archive) as 'dictator', 'volatile', 'ruthless', 'unstable', 'threatening', 'psychopath' (see Chapter 4) and affords him no such self-reflexive space, this broadcast grants to Blair, and other similar Primary Definers, the relative luxury of televisual self-representation, and character development. Blair is certainly not a stereotype, he may be an archetype, and he is certainly fleshed-out, human, self-examining, critical, pensive, 'not weak' and doing 'what he believes to be right'.

Using the dramatic elements of the televisual form, one can again (continuing the critical position developed in Chapter 4) posit that the drama is established as one between good and evil. Even if the 'good' is cast as flawed, prone to 'mistakes' and likely to take

political risks (with his own position) those representing the ‘good’ are still, after all, *human*. In fact, one can conceivably go further. It might in fact be precisely *because* Blair (or Straw) is flawed, prone to mistakes and willing to risk it all, that he is rendered all the more human. Flawed? Yes. A political gambler? Yes. Human? Yes. ‘Ruthless’, ‘Psychopath’? ...no, for that is reserved for the caricature, not the more rounded, contemplative, reflexive and pensive political actors of Western imaginary, of which the *character* of Blair is emblematic.

Perhaps one of the best examples of the fact that the broadcast frames the entire forthcoming conflict as an issue *for* Blair, that the ‘cost’ will be borne by him is the following:

Tony Blair: I simply ask the marchers to understand this. I do not seek unpopularity as a badge of honour. But sometimes it is the price of leadership and it is the cost of conviction. (*P:BW*)

Despite the many thousands of deaths suffered by Iraqi citizens, Blair is discursively, journalistically and televisually distanced from them, from the material effects *his* bombs cause. How different it might be if Current Affairs and News broadcasting had a similarly forensic and televisually, dramatically rendered focus on the deaths *caused* by Blair’s sanctioning of war. In the above quote though, Iraqi subjectivity is of course entirely Lexically Absented. Any ‘cost’ here is simply narrated as a personal price worth paying for having ‘conviction’. In fact, unpopularity as the price worth paying for having ‘conviction’ is given added force and ‘legitimacy’ in the following example. Straw’s statement below serves a dual function, there is conviction rhetoric located in historical precedent. This direct reference to historical precedent also reacquaints us with the notion of Saddam as somehow the equivalent of Hitler we found in Chapter 4:

Jack Straw: There have been other leaders of ours who have been profoundly unpopular and in the 1930s – and I’m not suggesting there are exact parallels, there never are – but in the 1930s it’s worth remembering that there were huge marches in favour of what was... came to be called pejoratively ‘*appeasement*’. I understand, indeed sympathise with the stand they took, *although history later told us that they were wrong*. (*P:BW*)

The above statement delivered in interview is certainly consistent with the narrative Blair and his government (including Jack Straw) mounted during the build-up to the Iraq war, and was therefore represented (with some critique) within the confines of *Panorama: Blair's War*. More problematically though is that, as in the previous chapter, there was no direct challenge to this narrative orientation. It might be the case that within the discourse of *Panorama: Blair's War* other political actors do challenge this narrative, and do seek to insert counter-arguments to that discourse within the *Panorama* text. However, as the analysis detailed in Chapter 4 outlined, within the texts of the pre-conflict phase sample, particularly in *Panorama: Saddam: A Warning from History* and *Panorama: The Case Against Saddam*, the Iraqi president is repeatedly associated with the most uniquely evil leader of the 20th century. Straw's statement and *Panorama's* lack of challenge to this assertion essentially casts those resisting or critiquing the decision to engage in war as equivalent to the 'appeasers' of Hitler. Lest we forget, Straw reminds us 'history later told us that they were wrong'. Even prior to, but especially now, in the context of a post-Chilcot Inquiry world, such a statement is offensive and, I would argue an overstatement of absurd proportions. That such an Over-Lexicalised statement passed by unchallenged tells us that *Panorama* is certainly not in the business of positing a counter-hegemonic position. A similar reference to Iraq, Saddam and Nazi Germany are made by Jane Corbin in *Panorama: The Race to Baghdad*.

As mentioned above, in *Panorama: Blair's War* the most dominant figure is Jack Straw. Straw speaks over 720 words in total and is the most dominant figure of the broadcast. He, more than any other figure Primarily Defines the narrative arc. So even though this particular broadcast contains many critical commentators, and, what is more, some have a degree of profile, though perhaps are less legitimated as sources, Straw dominates, in terms of both time afforded, and televisual space. He is granted the televisual space in which to ruminate and does so in broadly very sympathetic terms. Facing questioning by *Panorama*

reporter Vivienne White, Straw again represented Blair as reflective, thoughtful, strong, able to 'stand the heat'. Straw, this time, casts Blair as the statesman.

Jack Straw: Well you get used to these things in politics and if you... as Truman famously said: 'If you don't like the heat, get out of the kitchen'. I think the Prime Minister thrives on the heat.

White: He thrives on the heat?

Straw: Yes, he thrives on the pressure. I mean the interesting thing about taking on a job like mine, a job like his still more, is that amongst many things you find out about yourself and what happens when you are subjected to very considerable pressure. As far as the Prime Minister is concerned, he is very resilient, very determined, and he responds magnificently to challenges. (*P:BW*)

The decision to go to war here explained and narrated ('you find out about yourself') via the logic of a sort of 'personal growth' narrative and character. We are reliably informed that Blair is 'resilient, very determined' and that 'he responds magnificently to challenges'. If we are to assess this through the prism of a classic narrative structure, then the above words by Straw certainly go some way to casting him (Blair) as a heroic archetype, someone recognisable and sympathetic. In the overall theme and discourse of this *Panorama* text, Blair simply *is* the focus and central protagonist. As such, certainly in this, the earliest stages of the conflict (and conflict-phase broadcasts), the decision as to whether British forces ought to be sent to war is almost entirely narrated and represented through the micro-political sphere, the characterisation of one man, his 'resilience', his fortitude, his 'determination' and the 'very significant risks with his own future as a Prime Minister'. Such themes are returned to time and again. Towards the conclusion of the broadcast, Blair himself appears (via very recent News footage archive). Taken from the House of Commons, even in the midst of personal, political crisis, Blair delivered what came to be seen as his tour-de-force.

Blair: This is not the time to falter. This is the time for this House, not just this Government or indeed this Prime Minister, but for this House to give a lead, to show that we will stand up for what we know to be right, to show that we will confront the tyrannies and dictatorships and terrorists who put our way of life at risk. (*P:BW*)

The above casts Blair, again, as a man of moral conviction. The references to ‘our way of life at risk’ recurs in Chapter 6 through the words of Bernard ‘Bernie’ Kerik. Despite the flaws, or perhaps because of them, Blair is represented as fundamentally human. What is more, he is granted the right, as Primary Definer, as elite political source, and able to present himself as a man of conviction, even moral courage. There may well be a number of perfectly rational journalistic and televisual reasons for this. However, in the context of this research, those reasons identified are not enough, not so insurmountable that an alternative, more critical, more forensically questioning, counter-hegemonic representation could not be possible. Such alternative or subaltern Current Affairs broadcasts ought to be imaginable, however, those constructing the broadcasts need to be able to see beyond the narrow journalistic and televisual practices that continue to define their world view, and the subsequent broadcasts.

Despite this over-representation of Straw and other high-profile, elite political actors, *Panorama: Blair’s War* does devote some time and attention to those critical of the march to war. Some of these, such as former government minister, Ken Clarke MP, have a degree of authority and legitimacy. However, within the context or frame of *this particular* conflict phase broadcast, even these fierce critics of Blair, are able to be largely contained within the narrative orientation of the broadcast. That is to say: given the frame, the discourse and the characterisation granted to Blair in this dramatic representation, even those critics are usually left to criticise his mission(ary zeal) as opposed to the morality (or not) of an illegal invasion, or even, a war of aggression. When such legal questions are raised, we are reminded that the United Nations (UN) is ‘on board’. The exception to this, certainly from a legitimated high-profile source, is when Ken Clarke MP foregrounds the explicit nature of Blair’s legal approach:

Ken Clark MP - Conservative Minister, 1979-97: I think Mr Blair's mission was to try to cloak all this with legality, with the old world order. So because of Blair in part, the Americans allowed the politics and the diplomacy to go round a loop line trying to get some support for this in United Nations whilst the build up of the American and

British armies and air force and navy continued, ready for the war to start in the spring. (*P:BW*)

This is perhaps the most explicit criticism of, not only Blair but of the ‘fig-leaf’ nature of going to war under the banner of a United Nations resolution. Such overt criticisms are rare, and rarer still that they emerge from an extremely high-profile former government minister, and still sitting MP. Even in this, the most critical of the conflict-phase broadcasts though, Clarke remains a high-profile and legitimated anomaly. Importantly, as a member of official opposition, Clarke can perhaps be written-off through the narrative of ‘party-politics’.

5.5 Representations of the ‘Anti-War’ Protesters

Nevertheless, there are other occasions whereby there is some overt critique and criticism, here represented by the ‘anti-war’ protest movement. The ‘anti-war’ movement were the main voices critical of the march to war, they were the principal alternative(s). However, another caveat, in some ways screening this programme at this time was slightly obsolete insofar as, by the time of broadcast, 23 March 2003, coalition troops were already inside Iraqi territory. So screening alternatives to war, *however* represented, and framed, is compromised by the date of broadcast. This being the case, how large a role could these alternatives play in the build-up to conflict in Iraq, and in this broadcast? What space did they occupy and what shape did this take in *Panorama: Blair’s War*? Was an ‘anti-war’ position given prominence and credibility, were any of the anti-war voices afforded the position of ‘main strand of argument’, and if so was this position located within a specific hegemonic hierarchy?

Some answers to this hegemonic hierarchy can be found in the multi-modal representation combined with the functional honorifics granted to them. In *Panorama: Blair’s War* the protesters, certainly those granted any presence (if not legitimacy) at all, are first pictorially represented in moving image, but as their names are announced, the picture freezes, their picture then turns to ‘greyscale’ and the accompanying non-diegetic soundtrack

is that of the sound of a photograph being taken, as if taken in a police line-up. They are also introduced to the viewers with fairly explicit qualifiers, caveats or ‘health warnings’:

White: The Chairman of Stop the War was Andrew Murray. He’s the Senior Press Officer at ASLEF the train drivers’ union, *a communist*.

Lindsey German: I thought it was a good turnout, and I thought actually the fundraisers meeting I thought wasn’t a bad turnout.

White: Lindsey German, convener of the Stop the War Coalition, a long-serving member of the *Socialists Workers Party*. These *traditional left-wingers* had built a very untraditional political movement. (*P:BW my emphasis*)

So the ‘anti-war protestors’ lacking both the proximity to ‘official’ authenticated, legitimate ‘political’ discourse are also depicted as traditional left-wingers, in other words: ‘the usual suspects’. One might even posit – adhering to the dramatic narrative structure elements that thread throughout this research – that they are cast in archetypal roles. Whilst it might be problematic to suggest they are cast as ‘villains’, the above introduction to them certainly casts and multi-modally, Lexically represents them as potentially villainous. At least with the Over-Lexicalised ‘Communist’ ‘Socialist Workers Party’ appellation, they are hardly cast as those ‘we’ can trust. As opposed to the previous *Panorama* episodes thus far analysed (Chapter 4), in a broadcast that largely lacks any overt representation of Saddam, the ‘anti-war’ protestors here fulfil the function of enemy (within). In the absence of ‘Saddam’ or various ‘Others’ from Iraq, the anti-war movement, because they are explicitly foregrounded as belonging to (apparently) long-discredited political orientations ‘socialist workers party’, ‘communist’, are the opposite side of the Ideological Square. This rather sceptical appellation does not offer the same or even a similar functional honorific granted to legitimate sources or Primary Definers. The ‘anti-war’ spokespersons are thus immediately and consistently diminished in the narrative build-up to war in Iraq. They might believe what they say, but their representation in this broadcast does not grant them the same levels of authority and legitimacy granted to Blair (and Straw). Alongside this casting, the ‘anti-war’ voices that do

feature also tend to be framed in opposition to Blair, and through the prism of his individual culpability and future tenuous position and grip on power. What I mean by this is that even the anti-war position tends to be represented, in the broadcast at least, through their opposition to legitimated, authoritative, essentially human, and moral(ising) 'Blair'. However, appear they do. As such, even while critically interrogating their narrative and characterisational casting in this *Panorama* broadcast, the fact is they do appear, they are given voice and some space with which to mount some critique (too late of course). The one possible counter-hegemonic alternative, which was not explored in detail, was the reference to the protesters *not* as merely 'anti-war' but as 'peace movement' campaigners.

White: Led by experienced political activists the Stop the War Coalition had been organising a widespread public protest movement from its modest Union premises near London's King's Cross. Its organisers have long service records in the Peace Movement and in industrial disputes. The Chairman of Stop the War was Andrew Murray. He's the Senior Press Officer at ASLEF the train drivers' union, a communist. (*P:BW*)

This is an important addition that was, unfortunately, not explored.

To put it another way, other than this one example, one direct reference to the 'Peace Movement' the campaigners were, from that moment, *reduced* to being represented for what they are *against*, as opposed to what they might be *for*. This might seem a small, overly critical, micro-linguistic point, but I believe it is indicative of the trends and practices of Current Affairs Television Journalism, of which *Panorama* remain emblematic. As previously discussed (above, p31; p92), the 'peace-movement' exists beyond the usual confines of what BBC Current Affairs constitutes *as* political. Therefore, the sources, the frames, are beyond the narrow discourse. Represented here, but as a small band of 'the usual suspects' ('communist') not affiliated to *official* politics or political expression, as such, *Panorama* cannot quite grant them the legitimacy afforded 'official' legitimated political actors and Primary Definers. Had *Panorama* somehow been able to devote an entire broadcast to the 'Peace-movement' campaign, their explicit ideological and philosophical

outlook; had it been broadcast *prior* to the conflict actually beginning, the peace-campaigners may well have had enough time, within the confines of a broadcast at least, and in the wider socio-political sphere, enough discursive space to perhaps reorient the discourse in interesting and counter-hegemonic ways. Located in this broadcast, the peace-campaigners, largely functionalised by the term ‘anti-war’, (the ‘what they do’ and ‘who they are’) merely fulfil the BBC obligations of ‘balance’ and ‘impartiality’. Cast here, ‘against the war’, in opposition to the legitimated social and political actors, the Primary Definers, they merely provide some necessary backdrop, some much required critique ‘reflecting a wide range of opinion across our output as a whole and over an appropriate timeframe’ ensuring ‘that no significant strand of thought is knowingly unreflected or under-represented’. (BBC 2006, *Editorial Guidelines on Impartiality*) but without (re)orienting the epistemology or discourse of Iraq per se. Additionally, in the context of war and conflict, the term and *very meaning* of the term ‘peace’ tends to be located in direct and diametrically opposed opposition to ‘war’.

...any binary opposition establishes a hierarchy so that one term in the binary moves into a privileged position over the other. In the war/peace binary, war provides the dominant *conceptual framework* through which both terms come to be defined, conceptually subordinating peace to war. Peace therefore becomes the ‘absence of war’ (rather than a concept defined on its own terms), *perpetuating a militaristic framework* for thinking about peace. (Hodges 2013: 12, *emphasis added*)

The binary oppositions outlined by Hodges are a clear indication of the establishing of a (militaristic) framework through which subsequent reporting takes place. This is manifest in the, already discussed (Chapter 3) taxonomy of the ‘war correspondent’. The journalistic position of ‘peace correspondent’ is of course absent, there are simply no ‘peace correspondents’. In some ways this is, at the level of journalistic practice at least, if not defensible as such, at least understandable, for as Wolfsfeld identifies:

...there is an inherent contradiction between the logic of peace process[es] and the professional demands of journalists. A peace process is complicated; journalists demand simplicity. A peace process takes time to unfold and develop; journalists demand immediate results. Most of a peace process is marked by dull, tedious negotiations; journalists require drama. A successful peace process leads to a

reduction in tensions; journalists focus on conflict. Many of the significant developments within a peace process must take place behind closed doors; journalists demand information and action. (Wolfsfeld 1997: 67)

Using Wolfsfeld's approach, it is hardly surprising that no such 'peace correspondents' exist, there are simply too few quickly retrievable, easily represented, legible, operational and journalistic hooks on which to hang a developing story arc. It is therefore unsurprising, when using Wolfsfeld's outline as a frame or analytical lens, to find in the dominant explanatory frameworks for discussions and broadcasts pertaining to Iraq, that the discourse of the early part of the twenty-first century are framed by war and conflict (and war's role in 'restoring order') and as such are overly reductive. Peace campaigns remain, save for the one example above, unmentioned, certainly as an *a priori* position. With regards coverage of conflict, so far, all phases of *Panorama* conflict broadcasting seem to rely on an already established frame, one principally filtered through and oriented around the position and practice of the war correspondent. In fact, one could argue that built in to the very practices of journalism, its structures, the needs and demands of 'News', and concurrently, Current Affairs journalism, already pre-establish a very specific operational form and frame for reporting. A focus on action at the expense of detailed analysis of geo-political context of conflict is the 'sine qua non of war' reporting. As Cottle has identified, geo-political context, tends to be erased, in part, because:

...in times of crisis – War, etc – 'the public' becomes constituted in the exchange and contestation of different points of view as well as rhetorical appeals and emotion laden symbols. (Cottle in Allan and Zelizer 2002: 179)

Given that the sample in the chapter is derived from the conflict-phase, we need to assess the extent to which there is (or is not) an 'over-supply' of 'emotion laden symbols'? If so, is the focus and use of 'emotion laden symbols' inadequate to the task of providing context? Do these specific modes of representation fail to reveal the 'social totality'? So far as *Panorama: Blair's War* is concerned, the totality amounts to an examination of the Over-Lexicalised,

Over-Determined and positive(ly) Attribute(d) Blair's 'determination' his 'resilience' and, through characterisation, he is represented as thoughtful, agonising, examining his conscience, but in the end, motivated by his desire to do 'what I know to be right' (*P:BW*) he is essentially cast in this narrative as an ethical and moral character. The Televisual performance of emotion(ity) plays an important role here. As Ellis states:

Television enabled British citizens to see Prime Minister Tony Blair furrowing his brow and presenting his decision to join the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 as a struggle with his conscience. He explicitly appealed to the overwhelmingly skeptical British public to trust him. (Ellis, J. 2009. 113)

Though difficult to imagine now – with the benefit of hindsight – *Panorama*, if we are to understand this form through dramatic elements and frames, casts Blair (and other Western allies) much closer to the role of the emotionally literate Hero, than they do the villain.

Ever the professional 'performer' Blair, in reasonably muted and subtle terms, reframes the impending conflict:

Tony Blair: I know this course of action has produced deep divisions of opinion in our country. But I know also the British people will now be united in sending our armed forces, our thoughts and prayers. (*P:BW*)

In the above statement, Blair essentially provides the template for the conflict. By (largely) uncritically reproducing it, *Panorama* (and most News media) adopts that model. The approach from hereon in will be to represent the conflict *as it is pursued*. Once war begins, he 'knows' that we, the 'British people will be united in sending our armed forces our thoughts and prayers'. Once the war is underway, and as this broadcast went to air, the 'British troops' were inside Iraq, we are urged to get behind our troops. Taking their lead from the legitimated political actors, the Primary Definers, the following two broadcasts in the conflict phase largely adhere to this template.

5.6 *Panorama: The Race to Baghdad*

Panorama tells the story behind the story of the war. The coalition plan for the invasion of Iraq was built on a campaign to remove Saddam Hussein and to be welcomed as liberators.

John Ware investigates how the British and American war strategy has been tested in the heat of battle.

(<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2903799.stm>)

Adhering, at least in principle, to the expectations of Current Affairs broadcasting,

Panorama: The Race to Baghdad promises to maintain the Hollandian spirit of ‘digging behind the headline’ (Holland 2006) in order to ‘tell the story *behind* the Iraq war’. Telling ‘the story behind’ is an interesting and urgently required task, perhaps this conflict-phase broadcast might exceed expectations and provide some geo-political context. Explicit reference to the imagined and planned for expectation that ‘we’ would be ‘welcomed as liberators’ adds impetus to this expectation. Or perhaps, now that war is underway, that story will focus explicitly on the action as it is being undertaken. Indications that this might indeed be the case are revealed by the final sentence of the summary paragraph ‘John Ware investigates how the British and American war strategy has been tested in the heat of battle’.

5.7 *Panorama: The Race to Baghdad* – ‘The Heat of Battle’ *Not* the Light of Analysis

As in some of the examples cited in the previous chapter, the ‘lead-in’ to the programme itself is prefaced by the national news. In this instance, as previously, the lead-in statement is revealing.

Next on BBC1, *Panorama* ...and the gambles behind the American and British war-plan. John Ware reports on ‘The Race to Baghdad’. (*BBC News* 6 April 2003)

This reveals that, in a broadly similar manner to the previous example in the conflict phase (*P:BW*) in which the ‘political risks’ (*P:BW*) (for Blair) were foregrounded, the following programme is to be framed by and oriented around the ‘gamble’ template, the risks being taken. The frame is very directly oriented in the direction of this gamble having potential consequences for our political elites, our military and in a wider sense, the perceived ‘us’ of

the assumed Western imaginary that constitutes the *Panorama* audience. This frame, particularly the ways in which ‘we’ are being addressed, is very quickly confirmed by John Ware’s opening monologue.

Accompanying a series of still photographs, John Ware delivers the ‘headlines’, the narrative orientation of what is to follow over the next 49 minutes. The broadcast begins, the opening one minute, with a series of still photographs, these are exclusively (one assumes though it is not made clear) photos from the current conflict. They depict in some cases the pain and anguish of conflict, and in some notable cases actually semiotically, pictorially represent the pain, heartache and devastation of and on the local population. Here, one assumes, though it is not made explicit, that the image of devastation, injury and death are though *not* to be linked to or caused by the actions of coalition troops. As anticipated, there are elements of the WPM ‘Anticipation, planning, and preparing the audience for impending war’ (Altheide and Grimes 2005) from the pre-conflict phase ‘playbook’. The three images that conclude the opening address and montage are as follows:

1. Two weary, tired, dirty and battered coalition soldiers carrying unspecified munitions – possibly landmines segueing into.
2. A deceased woman lying stretched out, bloodied on a makeshift hospital bed – this particular image accompanies Ware’s ‘...and how, now...as the war has started’ and offers a compelling visual semiotic indicator of the brutality, cost and severity of conflict and war. That the image of the deceased woman is immediately cut against the previous image of coalition soldiers is also significant. ‘Our boys’ are involved in the dangerous activity of clearing away landmines, landmines laid by the (unspecified, un-represented) enemy.
3. The final image is of another coalition soldier, in full battle kit holding his rifle across his chest. The camera slowly closes in on this final image accompanied by the sound of helicopter blades cutting through the air. This is the soundtrack to conflict. Fade to black.

Accompanying the three images (above), Ware ends the opening credit sequence with the ominous: ‘This is the story of the enormous risks *we* and the Americans are taking...’

(*P:TRTB my emphasis*). Directly using the collective pronoun ‘we’ when referring to UK forces and political elites is problematic, but does reveal its orientation and the subject

position offered to the viewing audience. Using the collective ‘we’ effectively means the text seeks to address and interpellate the viewing audience as somehow *in* the current unfolding conflict, ‘We’ have ‘skin in the game’ as it were. Given that this is in the opening minute, the ‘front page’, the interpellation is significant, it seeks to establish a sense of connection in the opening minute, rendering us as somehow *interested* subjects (on a particular side) in what follows. Also noteworthy is the present tense, ‘the risks we and the Americans *are* taking’, so despite this being Current Affairs, and not News, the broadcast has a present urgency. The ‘risks’ while found on the streets of Iraq, are, for the most part, *not* represented *as* risks *to* the population of Iraq, but to ‘our boys’, and, as importantly, to the wider political context.

Ware: Here in Basra the British forces are battling for the hearts and minds of ordinary Iraqis...attempt to convince them they are here as liberators. (*P:TRTB*)

Further in to the broadcast, such ideas are developed:...

Ware: Do you think the planners have underestimated the extent to which Iraqis, who may well loathe Saddam Hussein, but still feel a powerful loyalty to either Arab nationalism or their country?

Maj Gen Patrick Cordingley, Commander, Desert Rats, 1991 Gulf War: I think undoubtedly that’s so. You see, don’t you, the fact that Americans are not seen as liberators. I don’t think they ever would have been seen as liberators. A much – I use the word ‘hated’ because I think that’s probably the right word - a much hated nation in that region, despite the fact that they’re trying to be helpful. That’s not how the Arabs actually see them, and I think that is a powerful factor in this.

Ware: On this fire of Arab hatred for America, TV pictures like these, beamed across the Middle East, are the equivalent of high-octane fuel. This is how Islamic fundamentalists are exploiting the Iraq War.

In other words, the focus is not, for the most part, on innocent lives lost, or on the legality (or not) of the Iraq war, but is instead concerned with the fact that the narrative of ‘Liberators’ will be compromised. If (once) compromised, then such narratives are able to be ‘exploited’ by ‘Islamic fundamentalists’ (linking to the ‘War on Terror’ frame) thus endangering us all. Note that a similarly sceptical motivation (that Bush and Blair might be ‘exploiting’ 9/11 as their own motivation for Iraq) is not forthcoming, only ‘fundamentalists’ exploit geo-

political, historical conditions, not ‘our benign’ leaders. Also noteworthy is the phrase ‘they’re trying to help’, a statement that one could, quite conceivably, subject to scepticism and critical interrogation is here used unproblematically and thus assumed to be fact, and functions as the de-facto legitimation.

As previously discussed (above and in previous chapter) according to this analysis, the pre-conflict phase broadcasts effectively established a frame whereby the possibility of war was rendered, if not exactly desirable, then at least necessary and inevitable. Given that the broadcasts analysed in this chapter are reflecting on and representing a war that *is* ongoing, the three broadcasts epistemologically and discursively adhere to this ‘logic’. Note that in Ware’s opening address the focus has shifted:

Ware: ...now that the war has started, the time taken to finish it is critical. (*P:TRTB*)

What is significant, if not surprising, here is that the journalistic focus is on the procedural elements, the swiftness of ‘getting the job done’, not what the ‘job’ is, or the ethics and perhaps geo-political motivations and ramifications of doing so. The narrative is against the clock, a sort of early iteration of a kind of Jack Bauer figure of 24.

Immediately following the still photographs comes the opening credits: *The Race to Baghdad*, outlined against a black screen. Within the lettering are sepia video images of conflict, in this instance the image is taken from an aerial camera panning across a desert landscape. The broadcast proper then begins with extended and extensive use of aerial video footage (as above), the footage is taken at the end of the previous Gulf War (1991) with the voiceover of John Ware explaining how the last war concluded.

The archive footage depicts a barren landscape, one of desert, bombsites, decimated unspecified industrial and chemical facilities while Ware explains that the ‘Iraqi army was decimated’ and that the ‘US forces stopped’ at the Kuwait Iraq border. Use of this footage of

course is consistent with the WPM, and in fact adheres to some of the characteristics usually found in the pre-conflict broadcasts,

Point 1) Reportage and visual reports of most recent war (or two). (Altheide and Grimes 2005)

In this instance the use of archive has interesting functions. It acts as a means of legitimising News and Current Affairs discourse; it simultaneously locates this specific *Panorama* broadcast (with)in a tradition; it draws on its own archive material, and as such, advertises its own critical role in the journalistic and political landscape, and it prompts ‘Media memory’. Additionally, and perhaps most significantly, given that *Panorama* is an extended text, ‘extended reportage’ (Corner) it is able, or arguably necessary, to use such material as a means of providing a more developed narrative, a developed and fuller context if you will. News broadcasts may use some archive footage but rarely of this length and detail. By contrast, *Panorama* is able to make use of more extensive and extended excerpts in order to tell the story of conflict. Still images overlaid with a non-diegetic score of machine gun fire and helicopter blades, providing an aural signifier (the soundtrack) of war and conflict, seamlessly referencing the current war with dramatic reference, imagery and memory with (*Panorama*’s own) archive material from Gulf War I (1991) locates, contextualises and multi-modally fixes the current conflict by way of reference to the previous Gulf War, a war that has largely escaped much critical comment and is thus assumed to be a ‘just war’. Again, this is consistent with points 1 and 3 of the WPM. The ways in which these semiotic and discursive resources are used to tell the story though is important. Which stories, which versions, featuring who? Is the narrative direction and development critically focused on and oriented around a narrow discursive frame?

5.8 Historical Archive and the Critical Perspective

On occasion, some overt criticism of the US is present. This particular broadcast does draw attention to some historical precedents and that the failure (by many Iraqi citizens) to see the

invasion as one of liberation might be linked to previous failures by the US to live up to their promises. In perhaps the most critical excerpt from the broadcast, and one that locates the history of Iraq in a wider context, the following excerpt reveals that *Panorama* can, on occasion, play a vital role as a highly critical broadcaster of record:

Ware: One thing is certain, the Iraqis have a deep mistrust of what motivated the bombing of their country. The American led victory from the last Gulf War provides one important explanation. Then the objective was just to push Saddam back from Kuwait, not to topple him. However, George Bush senior, the then President, did encourage the Iraqis to take matters into their own hands. He said they should rise up against Saddam.

1st March 1991

George Bush Senior: Iraqi people should put him aside and that would facilitate the resolution of all these problems that exist, and certainly would facilitate the acceptance of Iraq back into the family of peace loving nations.

Ware: And so most Iraqis answered the President's call – 14 out of 18 provinces rose up. They expected the Americans to come across the Kuwaiti border to help them – but they didn't.

Archive footage from BBC News The Gulf War I BBC1, 1996 Robert Gates US National Security Adviser 1991 Gulf War: That was the quagmire, therein laid Vietnam as far as we were concerned, because we would still be there. (*P:TRTB*)

Ware goes on to foreground, via archive and historical detail, the difficulties encountered in this conflict with the memories of the end of Gulf War I in which ‘Having encouraged the Iraqis to rise up, the Americans went home’ leading Saddam to ‘lay waste even to sacred Shia shrines at Najaf and Kabala’ in which ‘More than 300,000 Iraqis in the south in particular and some central cities were massacred’ (*P:TRTB*). In a series of broadcasts seemingly (mostly) devoted to airbrushing ‘our’ previous encounters from memory, this rare but crucial contextual detail is welcome. However, even here, before long, the final brutal act is narrated via (yet) another reference to Halabja:

Ware: Directing operations here is one of Saddam’s key henchmen, Ali Hassan al Majid. Otherwise known as ‘Chemical Ali’ for arranging the poison gassing of 5,000 Kurds in Halabja. According to British forces in this Gulf War, Chemical Ali and his

extensive network of thugs in the Fedayeen and the ruling Ba'athist party have been directing the fighting in most of Southern Iraq. Fear of the regime's grip may help explain why the people of Basra, Iraq's second largest city, have yet to greet British troops as liberators. (*P:TRTB*)

Overlaying the above words from Ware, are the now all too familiar archive images of the devastation of Halabja.

Other criticism of the conflict emerges, too. However, in the example below, as opposed to framing the current conflict in terms the possible anti-imperialist, self-determination, emancipatory potential of sovereign nation states, such resistance is instead discredited and written-off as 'anti-American':

Colin Powell - US Secretary of State: There's a lot of anti-Americanism out there but it's fuelled to a large extent by the Iraq situation and the Middle East peace process. When we fix Iraq and when we show progress with the Middle East peace programme, and people can see that this is a nation that is not against any religion, especially not the religion of Islam. (*P:TRTB*)

The ability (not to mention the desire) to 'fix Iraq' requires more critical scrutiny than even the critical John Ware is able to manage.

As already briefly discussed, once the war is underway, even this slightly wider, or at least temporally longer, context is largely dislocated from global contexts or at the very least, side-lined, in favour of a more tightly defined, narrowly outlined and forensic focus on the local(ised) impact and effect the war is having (had) on the various central actors. Localised, in this context means local to a UK population, or perhaps phrased differently, how the ongoing conflict is able to be located within and speaking for/to 'our interests'. The central actors and protagonists are, in the conflict phase, Tony Blair, George W. Bush, various individual military personnel and latterly, some of the local population. 'The time taken to finish it is vital' adds the necessary urgency and also relates explicitly to the 'race' of the title.

Though there are some criticisms of policy, these tend to be oriented around the ability of getting the job done with only ‘half the number of troops’ (*P:TRTB*) used in Gulf War I. As expected (demanded) of the title, *The Race to Baghdad* there is an explicit fixation on time, on the urgency with which the ‘job’ needs to be done. Repeatedly, the focus returns to speed, efficiency, urgency and time:

Ware: How *long* in your view does this *war have to go on* for before you lose the peace, as it were. You may win militarily but you lose the peace? (*P:TRTB*).

Ware: This called for troops to be *fast, flexible and light*. (*P:TRTB*)

In the end, despite critical interrogation, this, at times forensic focus and critical questioning, and despite the historical references and the foregrounding of historical precedents, there remains very little to suggest that even John Ware is able to wholly discard the notion of benign intervention. The sense of surprise, that US and UK forces were surprised at the levels of resistance is the dominant frame. Largely adopting this frame, Ware effectively communicates and builds into it the need and demand for urgency lest ‘we’ ‘lose the peace’. Of course, we know who the ‘we’ is in this narrative, and ‘we’ are also seamlessly linked to ‘peace’, as if that is de facto ‘our’ aim. Given the discursive treatment the ‘peace-campaigners’ received in the above discussed broadcast *Panorama: Blair’s War*, one does not have to be too sceptical to read this particular narrative as intensely problematic at best, and wholly hypocritical at worst. Herein lies one of the values of this particular methodological approach. Having the ability to track and trace examples from the same journalistic stable, across an extended timeframe (although with regards these two examples, temporality is hardly a problem given that the broadcasts were separated by weeks), means we can assess the extent to which, through Primary Definition, and dramatic means of storytelling, *Panorama* adopts a hypocritical perspective. However, one needs to acknowledge some caveats. Scepticism that peace was ‘ours’ to distribute in the first place

does arise, and is welcome, but despite being laced with some critique, the final words and frames, much like the first (top-and-tailing the broadcast) returns us to the dominant theme. That time, urgency, the need to ‘secure the peace’ (that might not be ‘ours’ to distribute) remains the explanatory format:

Ware: These are just the opening shots in the new world order dominated by American supremacy with some help from their closest ally Tony Blair. Whatever this war takes, both leaders are going to finish it because both remain confident that its outcome will bring peace and security to the world.

Bush: These are sacrifices in a high calling – the defence of our nation and the peace of the world. We are applying the power of our country to ensure our security and to serve the cause of justice, and we will prevail. [cheers and applause]

Ware: And yet, apparently, to *secure that peace*, we may now have to engage in war over several decades. After Iraq other states deemed by America to be a threat to its security could be in the firing line. But first the face of the Middle East has to be changed according to a former CIA director close to the hawks in the Bush Administration.

James Woolsey: Director, CIA, 1993-95: This Fourth World War I think will last considerably longer than either World Wars One or Two did for us, hopefully not the full four plus decades of Cold War.

Ware: If this apocalyptic vision is right, the stakes for what George Bush and Tony Blair have embarked on could not be higher.

Finishing with some scepticism but simultaneously a sense of urgency, with the overt reference to ‘high stakes’ we return to the gamble template. We can also see traces of the ways in which such scepticism is neutralised. By which I mean, with the above statement(s), Ware seems to be more concerned with the time this conflict might take to ‘secure the peace’, as opposed to examining (too much) the extent to which ‘we’ ought not to be there in the first place. Taking a gamble (with ‘our’ peace), foregrounding an ‘apocalyptic vision’ focusing intently on strategy in the heat of battle, is insufficient.

John Ware investigates how the British and American war strategy has been tested in the heat of battle. (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2903799.stm>)

Much of the action as it unfolded on screen was devoted to precisely examining ‘how the British and American war strategy has been tested’ and is perhaps the most revealing insight. Such ‘testing (of) the war strategy’ more clearly adheres to the WPM than almost any other signifier. The above description, the contents of the broadcast, and the analysis undertaken here are the clearest sign yet that *Panorama: The Race to Baghdad* is, in those moments at least, the paradigmatic example of conflict-phase broadcasting. The focus on strategy in action, at the expense of developed, geo-political context is emblematic of conflict phase broadcasting. Combining a plethora of archive footage, and of legitimated elite political actors (Primary Definers) the focus on strategy (of conflict), the procedures of war, and, what is more, that the focus will be on ‘the heat of battle’ demonstrates that this particular discursive approach generates much more ‘heat’ (of battle) than light (of analysis). This approach though, does lead neatly to the final broadcast in the conflict-phase.

5.9 *Panorama: The Battle for Basra*

As Iraq looks forward to an uncertain future, *Panorama*’s Jane Corbin reports from Basra on how the people of Iraq’s second city are beginning to shape the future of their shattered city and their broken lives. With exclusive access to the British troops in Basra, the programme also tells, for the first time, the story of the struggle of Iraqi citizens and the military battle by British forces to take control of a city which the coalition never expected to have to have to fight for.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2950827.stm>

As the summary paragraph makes clear, ‘Iraq looks forward to an uncertain future’ the extent to which such uncertainty can be said to be in any way linked to ‘our’ invasion is debatable. However, hope for a different approach, one that places Iraqi subjects themselves at the centre of the narrative, and concomitantly *at* the centre and *as* the central actors of Iraq’s (currently) ‘uncertain future’ lies in *Panorama*’s promise that ‘Jane Corbin reports from Basra on how the people of Iraq’s second city are beginning to shape the future of their shattered city and their broken lives’. This may well (again) provide some evidence and hope

that the *Panorama* broadcasts of the conflict-phase take seriously the need to ‘to broaden the character and range of its representations in tune with new social and political times’ (Born 2005: 376). *Panorama*, as ever, foreground their status as the broadcaster of note and of record, by reference to their ability to gain access to, and therefore offer voice to, Primary Definers ‘exclusive access to the British troops in Basra’. However, the claim that ‘the programme also tells, for the first time, the story of the struggle of Iraqi citizens and the military battle by British forces to take control of a city’ must be critically interrogated. For the summary paragraph makes no claims to have access *to* said ‘Iraqi citizens’ but only to have ‘exclusive access to British troops’, therefore, the story of Basra, the story of *The Battle for Basra*, looks, from this reading to remain in the ‘exclusive’ hands (through the eyes) of ‘our boys’. If the story is constrained and contained from within the purview of ‘British Troops in Basra’, then the ability to locate Iraqi citizens at the centre would seem to be curtailed by the standard, journalistic, narrative and televisual practices detailed and documented in this research.

5.10 *Panorama: The Battle for Basra* – A Restoration of Order Tale

Following the tradition outlined above for *Panorama: The Race to Baghdad*, the lead-in to the *Panorama: The Battle for Basra* contains some problematic though lexically interesting statements. The brief statement regarding the programme that is about to follow helps frame the broadcast.

Coming up, *Panorama* looks at the uncertainties that lie ahead, as British troops try to *restore order* in *post-war* Iraq. (*BBC News* 27 April 2003)

Immediately striking is the Lexically and Linguistically interesting and problematic couched notion of ‘uncertainties’ While acknowledging that war and conflict does indeed produce a degree of uncertainty, the extent to which ‘our troops’ might be the partial cause of said ‘uncertainty’ remains, in this brief introduction, entirely Lexically Absented. This particular narrative is further augmented by the statement ‘as British troops try to *restore order*’. This

particular Lexical Choice is revealing. British military forces are deliberately characterised as having good intent. They are not there as an overt threat (to ‘*order*’ no matter how brutal or ambiguous such order might have been) or to Iraqi citizens, but, as Robin Nelson puts it when discussing the classic narrative structure of Propp’s schema, as heroes ‘restoring order’. ‘Our troops’ are forces intent on the *restoration* of order. By the use of the verb to ‘try’ they are designated the role of those making a laudable effort. What are they trying to achieve? The ‘restoration of order’ To ‘restore’ is to renovate, to rebuild, revive, revitalise and improve. It is something laudable; the ‘order’ is similarly praiseworthy or desirable and also fits neatly the ‘law and order’ frame established in some of the pre-conflict broadcasts (see Chapter 4). So in this context, instead of an (arguably illegal) invasion of a sovereign nation, thus producing ‘uncertainty’ and *disorder*, ‘we’, ‘our’ troops are over-coded, given positive Attributes, Over-Lexicalised and engaged in a laudable endeavour that is oriented around the discourse of law and order, and by the motivation to restore, resuscitate, revivify and improve ‘normal life’. The above analysis demonstrates the extent to which ‘our’ illegality, complicity, or causal link with the unfolding disaster(s) in Iraq is (largely) absented. Absented in favour of a representation of conflict told through (and represented by) ‘Our boys’. Lexically and discursively, an invasion of a sovereign nation by foreign armed forces, with the concomitant ‘uncertainties’ such an invasion produces; and subsequently framing the ongoing war, ‘our’ place and role within it, as somehow a ‘restoration of order’ is replete with problems. That no such ambiguity or problems are presumed or foregrounded in the representation(s) is indicative of the discursive frame. The phrase ‘...in a post-war Iraq’ is also significant. Given that the war was still ongoing (until 1 May 2003), this edition of *Panorama* (broadcast 27 April 2003) is already looking ahead to what is to follow.

But what (or who?) are the British soldiers fighting, and what for? Some clues, via a subtle ‘call-back’, arises in the excerpt below. Given the repeated associations with Hitler

from the pre-conflict phase sample, then, via Straw's earlier evocation of Nazi Germany, via the references to 'appeasers' in *Panorama: Blair's War*, a further Hitler frame, while (sadly, journalistically) not incongruous, is highly contentious and problematic. This characterisation, this narrative orientation is again referenced here in this *Panorama* broadcast from later in the conflict phase:

Corbin: The imam of a local mosque however can't run a city the size of Basra. The Ba'ath Party dominated almost every aspect of life here as the Nazis once did in Germany. It will prove almost impossible to root the Ba'ath out completely.
(*P:TBF*)

Within a text that is, arguably, one of the most critically interrogative, or at least reasonably nuanced and 'balanced' within the sample, this reference to the Nazis, while brief, does go some way to reproducing the logic, the discourse the pre-conflict phase broadcasts established. Over-Lexicalising the previous 'regime' by way of reference to the Nazis, while over-Attributing positive characteristics to 'our troops' in the valid endeavour to 'restore order' assists in the Ideological Squaring. The visuals used in this section go some way to viscerally demonstrating the pressures the coalition troops are under. At this point in the broadcast the viewers have been alongside the soldiers, as such we have, vicariously at least, experienced the real dangers they face. Lest the visuals not be sufficient, evoking (again) the sceptre of Hitler or 'the Nazis' might just do the trick. This short statement certainly fits the template developed over the pre-conflict sample, then repeated in the conflict phase (in *P:BW*) and as such, it contributes to the overall discourse, epistemology and characterisation.

As was detailed in Chapter 4, another significant and further contribution to the narrative developed over the course of the pre-conflict sample was the repeated references (across the sample) to Halabja. Halabja functions like journalistic, Lexical and multi-modal short-hand for Saddam's brutality. The town, and what it evokes makes a small but telling return here:

Corbin: Otherwise known as 'Chemical Ali' for arranging the poison

gassing of 5,000 Kurds in Halabja. (P:TRTB)

We then return to the streets of Basra with the troops. Post-battle when the troops with whom she is embedded have finished an encounter with a group of militias, Corbin sums up their motivations as follows:

Corbin: It seems some of them will do anything to prevent Basra getting back to normal again. (P:TBFB)

The statement by Corbin is significant as much for what it conceals as for what it reveals. The mark against which ‘normal’ is measured is absent, what precisely is ‘normal’ for Basra? Given that the so-called ‘Mahdi Army’ represent the remnants of ‘Saddam’s militia’ one could make the argument that ‘normal’ is in fact a society and city dominated by the local militia. Here it is not my intention to ascribe positive values or less still, virtues to said militia, but to outline the extent to which the broadcast provides no reasonable measure against which the viewer can judge ‘normality’ or the ‘normal’ life of Basra’s citizens. Why this is important though is because this frame is one in which the British troops are (re)present(ed) as those fighting the good fight, for the restoration of ‘normal’ life.

Corbin: The breakdown of law and order in Basra is likely to last some time. It risks getting British troops bogged down in peacekeeping duties in the city. (P:TBFB)

The above statement addressed to the audience at home is revealing. Once again, the assumptions are that the objective is that of ‘law and order’ and once this is restored, perhaps for ‘peacekeeping’. I ought to (again) make it clear that I do not doubt that for those troops ‘on the ground’ ‘in the line of fire’ such policy objectives might very well be the goal. I cannot know different, therefore, I, too, might assume this to be the case. However, should this be the assumption of *the* critical Current Affairs broadcast strand in the UK? As the frame, it does rather replicate or repeat government sound-bites or government statements *as* the objectives, with no recourse to more closely examine other possible motives and explanations. Of course framing the current conflict in such a way, ascribing such laudable

aims to the Iraq conflict is far easier to achieve when the ongoing conflict is depicted by repeated representations of coalition troops. In critical discourse and narrative structure terms, 'Our boys' are represented heroically, they are Over-Lexicalised, and certainly afforded positive Attributes as 'peacekeepers' and as 'restorers of order'. We are not in a position to critique the motivations of individual (or even collective) soldiers doing an almost impossible, and certainly terrifying 'job'. The focus on action, and on sympathetically framed, recognisable characters as the narrators of conflict allows the *Panorama* broadcast(s) to elide wider critical interrogation of policy, to absent wider ideological contexts.

That the British soldiers are represented sympathetically is, to some extent problematic but I ought to foreground the fact that I do not doubt for a moment a) the real and present danger said British soldiers faced and were involved in and b) that the actual motivations of many of the *individuals* represented are in fact laudable, or certainly more innocent than the anti-war rhetoric of this thesis might presume. The point is not that their (soldiers) individual motivations, nor that *Panorama* journalists' motivations are malign in intent, or anything less than ethical, within the context of conflict, but that there are assumptions that Western forces and political elites are always motivated by benign intentions. So here individual motivations are foregrounded but only through the discursive lens of them having benign intentions and positive impact. In this way then, the functional honorifics afforded the coalitions soldiers, the ethics of their mission, coded through individual performance, and the benign motivations here stand-in for, or might be said to be *representative of* the wider political context.

Representing the always more innocent, human(e), characterful and fully rendered troops as essentially 'good' here serves the wider political elites rather well. In fact, we can refer back to the first broadcast in the conflict phase sample, *Panorama: Blair's War*. In *Panorama: Blair's War* the protestors did actually find some limited discursive space. One

may (have) be(en) against the conflict, but look at these hardworking soldiers, trying their best in testing circumstances, their role in the ‘new Iraq’ is beyond critique. Within the context of this sample from the conflict phase, even the coalition politicians and more senior military personnel are framed positively. The structural conditions of geo-politics are overlooked, the structural, epistemological, discursive conditions of *Panorama*, the very practises of the discourse make it seemingly very difficult to frame and narrate the story in any other way. It is this that is intensely problematic and does not accurately represent the geo-political context; nor does it hold power to account, notionally, surely, one of the purported claims made for, of and by *Panorama*.

On occasion there are some interesting Lexical Choices when describing coalition actions:

Corbin: The war in Basra had pitted British troops against a regime prepared to hold its own people hostage in order to survive. The coalition targeted the regime's nerve centre, the Ba'ath Party, Saddam's henchmen and his loyalist militias. (*P:TBFB*)

In the above statement from Jane Corbin the terms or frames of conflict are markedly different for the different national actors. Note that the ‘coalition targeted the regime’s nerve centre’. The explicit reference to ‘targeting’ is entirely consistent with discourse of Western Current Affairs broadcast journalism. Targeting is a text-book example of Nominalisation. It is even euphemistic and might be what one would describe as a fetishization, an Over-Lexicalisation of technology. Coalition troops ‘target’ (with precision), the ‘henchmen and loyalist militias’ do no such thing. All such examples place distance between the agents undertaking action(s) and the actions themselves. The use of the term target appears repeatedly in *Panorama: The Race to Baghdad*, some examples are below:

Corbin: Major Lindsay MacDuff showed me what lay beneath an anonymous looking block *targeted* by coalition bombers during the battle to take the city...

Corbin: A British drone, a pilotless plane with a camera was called in to observe the *target*. American planes armed with jadams – bunker busting munitions – were scrambled overhead.

Corbin: complete the *targeting* plan. (excerpts from *P:TBFB*)

In these examples, even while ascribing agency to ‘us’, using the Transitive form, the actions are Nominalised and afforded noble, or at least well-intentioned motivations. If the WPM is applicable in this context, then one would expect to find a degree of nuance, of self-reflection, examination and regret within the text of *Panorama: The Battle for Basra*. Reflections and anticipation are also factored in to the WPM ‘the international reaction, and *anticipation of war’s aftermath*’. In fact, as expected, there is some evidence that this broadcast does have some critical, reflective practice embedded in its narrative. As in the previous example from the conflict phase, the overwhelming discourse is of ‘a just-war’ or at the very least, the discourse that locates and characterises ‘our troops’ as demonstrably, inarguably the *archetypal* ‘good guys’, is present. However, there are notable moments in which these assumptions are, if not challenged or scrutinised as such, then at least some of *the material effects* of policy and *actions* are at least accounted for and fiercely critiqued. In the most moving section of the broadcast, despite the challenges the discursive, journalistic and televisual logic imposes on her, Jane Corbin demonstrates that she remains a critical and sensitive Current Affairs broadcast journalist:

Abed Hassan Hamooudi: All the bricks though reinforced concrete fell on the family and a heap of dust was about 1 metre high. They were all there. What I did, I managed luckily to save the life of my daughter with her two sons, four years and 6 months. The third one was killed with his grandmum. I managed to remove the bricks from them because I heard a noise ‘ba, ba, ba’ which means dad, dad. So I tried my...you know...my case at that time, at the time I was removing the bricks, another rocket fell there. Luckily I escaped a disaster otherwise I should have been killed.

Corbin: Ten members of the family from three generations of Hamooudis died that night. Dina's infant son was killed, her mother and her sister and a beloved niece Zanam, on the threshold of a bright future.

Dina: Zanam 19 years old, she’s in pharmacy.

Corbin: She was a pharmacy student?

Dina: Yes, the first year.

Corbin: And she was in the house that night?

Dina: Yes, she was in the same room with me.

Corbin: Yes, and your own young son was there.

Dina: Yes, between her and my mum.

Corbin: Yes.

Dina: And my sister and her daughter ... little daughter.

Corbin: Mr Hamooudi's oldest son, a doctor, identified his mother, his brother, sister and four of his five children amongst the dead, the youngest, Zena, just 8 years old. The smell of death hung over the bomb site six days later. Coalition forces had yet to investigate the scene of a bombing they claimed was carefully targeted to avoid civilian casualties. (*P:TBFB*)

The above section is perhaps the most moving example in the entire sample collated and analysed throughout the course of this research. The images and words spoken allow, even encourage empathic identification. Perhaps signifying their level of education, the characters represented here speak, through tears, in halting, though perfectly understandable English. Granted the televisual and discursive space, their words and the multi-modal representation speaks volumes. Notable is that in the context of a *Panorama* broadcast from the conflict phase, that has, up until this point, chiefly concerned itself with tactics, strategy, the procedural elements and the difficult conditions facing 'our troops', granting such authorial legitimacy, such subjectivity to those 'killed' by 'our own' troops is noteworthy and laudable. Disappointingly, perhaps it remains so noteworthy precisely because the presence of such a representation is itself a rarity. Nevertheless, and even though the above excerpt does *not* actually amount to a rigorous interrogation of the Western forces' *motivations*, nor does it challenge the logic and discourse of *benevolent intent*, it does at least ably demonstrate that a more interesting and challenging contextual focus, a fully developed, more rounded sense of characterisation of, until now 'Othered', subjectivity *is* possible.

As befits the analytical model, and as importantly, as most academic scholarship on media coverage of conflict attests, there is an intense focus on the procedural; the actual micro-action. The following statement by Corbin is in that tradition. It refers back and returns us to some of the more procedural elements contained within the previous conflict phase broadcast, *P:TRTB*.

Corbin: ...the real battle for Basra, to ensure security and foster a Government that Iraqi's trust is still being waged on the streets. (*P:TBFB*)

While this is not surprising, it is nonetheless illuminating with regards the specific orientation of the narrative. In the context of *Panorama: The Battle for Basra*, locating the context as one of helping to create 'a Government that Iraqi's trust' helps us understand, what in other, television drama context one would refer to as, the casting process. That an invading force can help produce or sustain 'a Government that Iraqi's trust' is indicative of the ways in which the coalition troops are *cast*, i.e. (echoing Cordingley's 'trying to be helpful' *P:TRTB*) *not* as an invading force but as there to help. Once again, it is not the goal here to suggest that the individual troops on the ground, the individual subjects with their own motivations, desires and characteristics are motivated by malign intentions. More that the narrative and discourse in which *Panorama: The Battle for Basra*, by way of dramatically rendered repetition of *archetypal* character, narrative orientation and the institutional(ised), discursive practises, locates them, and their 'Mission' in specific ways and using specific terms. In the hands of *Panorama: The Battle for Basra*, the Iraq 'mission' simply becomes a story of valiant even heroic troops as they try to 'restore the city's functions' (*P:TBFB*) transforming 'from a brutal regime to a democracy' (*P:TBFB*). Again, this may well *be* the motivation of the troops, we could even (generously) posit that it may even be the motivation of the political elites that sent their troops into battle in the first instance. However, ascribing such values, un-problematically, to both political and military actors, without recourse to wider geo-political and discursive considerations is, contrary to the claims made by and for *Panorama*, not sufficient, not critical or interrogative. In fact, one could argue, to simply 'take it as read' that the policy goals of the US and UK political elite narratives, simply are the goals, is not journalism but stenography. Such a position is tantamount to Western (neo-imperialist) propaganda. It works by slow, gradual repetition of the form, of the narrative, of the characters drawn and cast within the series of broadcasts: 'of course 'Our Boys' are the

good guys'. Despite the one notable exception above, and even here, the deaths of innocent civilians are Over-Lexicalised and simultaneously Lexically Absented, and framed as mistakes, or collateral damage from a 'targeted' military strike (*P:TBFB*) before swiftly moving on. Rarely is there any slippage from this central organising logic, rarely are there opportunities to voice, let alone challenge, the 'logic' of benign intervention, and *Panorama* rarely provides the journalistic, narrative, discursive space or resources with which to do so.

5.11 Concluding Remarks

Within the text of these, at times, critical broadcasts there are a number of interesting Nominalisations and Functional Honorifics. In particular, attention should be drawn to the extent to which, even here, with some overt acknowledgement that the US/UK coalition troops might not be seen as 'liberators', there is still an in-built assumption of moral certitude. The critical commentary is still coded as within the frames of benign intervention. Those casting doubt on that actual assumption are often framed as fanatics, or, at least, as misguided. Many of the 'mistakes' are here framed, coded and represented merely as a matter of lack of proper planning or 'mistakes'.

Within the texts of the *Panorama* conflict-phase sample, and beyond, it is rare to find any critical commentary beyond the tactical. Certainly after Blair's War, the focus turns to getting the job done. Or, in the words of John Ware: 'now that the war has started, the time taken to finish it is critical' (*P:TRTB*) and any critical comment that does arise or is present tends to be oriented around the tactical or practical difficulties encountered by the coalition troops. The focus is on the efficacy (or not) of particular military tactics as opposed the legitimacy of the war itself. This is reflected in (or perhaps, more accurately, *Panorama* reflects back) the wider political (Westminster) sphere. This is essentially, the Liberal Democrat (UK political party) position of being against the war...until it begins, after which support for 'our brave boys' takes precedent.

Corbin: Unless they have security soon, people here may well turn on those who came to liberate them. (*P:TRTB*)

The above statement by Jane Corbin serves as the final word in *Panorama: The Race to Baghdad*, in many ways it is the most fitting conclusion imaginable, it certainly broadly captures the conflict phase discourse of the broadcast sample. Despite some, on occasion, overt critical excerpts, sequences, sections and comments that appear, that do indeed cast some critical eye over *proceedings*, the overall discourse is, again, that the intentions were, and remain 'liberatory'. To use the phrasing favoured by Paul Bremer (see Chapter 6) the Iraq War is a 'noble exercise'.

The dominant themes to emerge in this, the conflict-phase were:

- 1) A focus on action at the expense of deliberation on policy objective or the rights and wrongs of the conflict.
- 2) Deliberations that *were* present, tended to be narrated and framed through the dramatic rendering of character (and characterisation) of 'our' political elites, and/or soldiers.

As has been stated by others, it is often the case that once war is underway, the explicit media focus does tend to be on the action. However, what marks this research out is the extent to which, using both a CDA frame, *and* by examining the dramatic television storytelling codes and conventions, the 'war story' is able to be safely contained within the rational, and human(e) deliberations (through archetype and character) on 'our' side, and on the continuing demonization (through one-dimensional caricature, Over-Lexicalisation) of the 'Other' (enemy) side. When assessed against one another, there is a clear Ideological Squaring deployed.

There is little to suggest that the conflict phase broadcasts contain much in the way of overt critical or ideological, counter-hegemonic critical interrogation. Not much that casts critical scrutiny on the motivations. The scrutiny that is present contents itself with a sometimes-fierce critical perspective on some of the tactics, the conflict strategy, latterly, regarding the planning for the post-conflict Iraq, and in one particular notable example, the

deaths of innocent Iraqi civilians. However, representation of said deaths, sensitively represented in *Panorama: The Race to Baghdad* is a rarity and, as discussed, does not necessarily puncture the assumptions of benevolent (if mistaken in this instance) intentions.

I would suggest that the reason(s) this sample of conflict phase broadcasts are able to *appear* critical lies in the fact that some considerable time, energy and resource is devoted to asking sometimes searching questions of some of the dramatically represented and *cast* high-profile elite military and political sources. These Primary Definers *are* subjected to critical scrutiny, to facing questions they might otherwise wish they did not have to answer. This is undoubtedly an urgently required, necessary task, and, in this guise, within narrow parameters, *Panorama* does indeed demonstrate its immense value as a public service broadcaster. Elements contained in this sample are indicative of some of the best examples of Current Affairs broadcasting, and it would be intellectually dishonest to claim otherwise. However, the extent to which *Panorama* (too) narrowly frames its critique is the focus of this research. The critique, scepticism and criticism that does appear is a) too often, only a small part of the overall discourse; b) as such, the wider critical interrogation is unable to be sustained; c) the criticism that emerges does so in very specific forms and through specific *characters*; d) the overall discourse is inarguably that the coalition troops, whom the conflict phase broadcasts tend to *follow*, or with whom the journalists are embedded, are, in the words of Patrick Cordingley ‘trying to be helpful’ (Cordingley *P:TRTB*). When regret or, more likely, concerns are raised, these are narrated either by high-profile already legitimated, already cast as pensive and fundamentally ethical, Primary Definers. Or conversely, when not Primary Definers, i.e. when not represented by those Primarily Defining the conflict and its rationale, the concerns are represented through the characters having to deal with the consequences of those (unforeseen) circumstances. When such ‘characters’ are represented, in the spirit of the research undertaken here, they tend to be represented as archetypal ‘good

guys' or heroes, and, what is more, in the classic realist narrative structure, undertaking a near-impossible task of 'restoring order'. Of course one should not overlook the very real possibility that the viewer watching the events unfold, seeing the dangers faced by 'our boys' would not then turn their critical attention to those that sent them to war in the first place. However, a) we are repeatedly assured that the architects of the conflict are motivated by good intentions; b) even possible criticism of the ways in which the war is being pursued, does *not* amount to a critical interrogation of policy, of objectives. Most importantly for this research, such critique *does not* constitute a fundamental rejection (or even questioning) of the thesis of benign intervention.

Furthermore, some of the criticism that does emerge, and does, at times, take centre-stage, also partially fits the template of the WPM. The difference here is that, perhaps indicating the swiftness of the conflict (officially at least) the move to Point 4:

Following the war, journalists' reaction and reflection on various governmental restrictions, and suggestions for the future (which are seldom implemented),

and Point 6:

Media reports about such studies, and so on, which are often cast quite negatively and often lead to the widespread conclusion that perhaps the war was unnecessary, other options were available, and that the price was too high. (Altheide and Grimes 2005)

..are present much earlier than the WPM would ordinarily suggest. Perhaps the drama, the dramatic templates of the Iraq war means even media coverage demands a quicker narrative (and journalistic) closure.

The principle findings here are that the discourse is too narrowly set, framed, established and reproduced. Criticism is allowable but not so much that the fundamental motivations are called into question. It is the particular focus on drama, and forms ordinarily expected to be found within the forms and genres of fictionalised television texts that reproduces and solidifies this narrow frame. *Panorama* represents the conflict largely through

discourse of the realist narrative structure, deploys archetypes of 'heroes' and 'villains', and consistently engages in Over-Determining, Over-Lexicalising oppositional elements. Over-emphasising 'our' goodness and simultaneously over-determining their 'bad guy' characterisation, in other words, by engaging in Ideological Squaring. By ascribing specific values and Attributes onto the characters featured in the sample, evil, barbarous, malign, uncontained, demonised for 'them'; ethical, human, humane, selfless, and benign for 'us' that the story of Iraq is communicated. It is only through these explicitly televisual forms of over-coding of character, of over-determined representation, narrative (and generic) coherence that the story of Iraq, and the story of conflict *in* Iraq is communicated to an audience, and communicates in such a way as to render critical interrogation of the fundamentals of benign western intervention difficult to sustain.

Chapter 6 Tying Up the Loose Ends

6.1 The Post-conflict Phase

As with Chapters 4 and 5, each of the three broadcasts in the post-conflict-phase will be analysed in chronological order. The discursive, thematic, journalistic, televisual and multi-modal forms and tropes present in each of the three examples from the post-conflict phase sample will be subject to scrutiny and analysis *in turn*. It is only at the conclusion of the chapter, where the analysis is then really fully drawn together to assess the extent to which the post-conflict phase sample does amount to a discursive formation, and an epistemology of Iraq, and what this might be.

Again, the analysis will examine the extent to which consistent themes are present. However, consistent themes, certainly *consistently represented themes*, in this chapter, were not quite as obviously present, meaning the overall discourse here was, at first, more difficult to discern. Unlike in the previous chapters, and as was particularly the case in Chapter 4, the post-conflict phase sample, while having some generic and discursive similarities, also have some marked differences. As previously, the temporal separation ensures some thematic and analytical consistency, however, an additional rationale present in this chapter is based on the fact even though the *Panorama* episodes were broadcast after ‘Major combat operations in Iraq have ended’ (George Bush, *Panorama: Saddam On the Run, P:SOTR*) thus generically or discursively concerned with ‘post-conflict’ discourse, each broadcast has a quite different ‘story to tell’. That each different broadcast has a different story to tell is related to both the wider social and political context; and to the journalistic and televisual contexts that shape their formation and dissemination. Though wider political, social and journalistic contexts (for instance, that *Panorama* continues to draw the majority of its *source* material from Primary Definer, legitimated sources) means *all* phases of the conflict are, to some extent, bound by these organisational principles, the different story angle is particularly pronounced

in the post-conflict phase. Interestingly, each programme was also concerned with completing the storyline(s) first encountered in the pre-conflict phase broadcasts. The examples are concerned with the details *after* conflict has *officially* ceased, therefore the focus of the *Panorama* texts cited here tend to take their lead *from*, and thus respond *to*, the *official* wider geo-political circumstances. The extent to which this is the case can be seen fairly explicitly in the summary paragraphs.

6.2 Aspects of the War Programming Model

As in previous chapters, some elements of the WPM are applicable. In the post-conflict phase, elements of Point 3:

3. Coverage of subsegments of current war, using the best visuals available to capture the basic scenes and themes involving the battle lines, the home front, the media coverage, the international reaction, and anticipation of war's aftermath.

are combined with the elements of those below:

5. Following the war, *journalists' reaction and reflection on various governmental restrictions*, and suggestions for the future (which are seldom implemented).
- 6 Media reports about such studies, and so on, which are often cast quite negatively and often *lead to widespread conclusion that perhaps war was unnecessary, other options were available, and that the price was too high. All of this will be useful for the coverage of the next war.*
- 7 For the next war, return to step 1. (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 622)

The fact that elements of Point 3 are still present in this, the post-conflict-phase sample is indicative of the fact that, even here, in 'post-conflict' (sic) Iraq, the conflict continued for a number of years. The first broadcast in the post-conflict phase is, *Panorama: The Price of Victory*.

6.3 *Panorama: The Price of Victory*

Every week in Iraq coalition soldiers are being wounded and killed in a conflict which is crippling the reconstruction effort. For three long, hot and increasingly violent summer months, a *Panorama* team has been filming on the streets of Baghdad, day in day out recording scenes of a city still at war. This powerful documentary examines

the nature of the resistance in Iraq, gaining access to American troops as they hunt down paramilitaries.

This is a story of men who came to rebuild a country but who found themselves sucked into an urban guerrilla war instead. This is a story also about Baghdad's five million Iraqis whose gratitude over liberation is in danger of being squandered amidst a deepening unease over occupation. Throughout the programme Panorama scrutinises Iraq's new 'occupiers', questioning whether the world's most powerful nation is up to the task of rebuilding a country as effectively as it can defeat it in war.

As the reconstruction process falters, Panorama is invited to quiz the key players at the heart of the new regime, including Coalition chief Paul Bremer and the former New York cop and so-called 'Baghdad Terminator' Bernie Kerik. Kicking off the 2003 autumn run in Panorama's 50th year, this film also features the last television interview with UN Special Envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello, just 48 hours before his office was destroyed in a car bomb attack.

(<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/3097864.stm>)

As we can see from the summary paragraph, the first in the series, *Panorama: The Price of Victory (P:TPOV)* like those found in the conflict phase, tells the stories of battle; focusing on the conditions faced by the troops but with the 'recently ended' (sic) conflict still fresh in the memory. The Transitive verb is used when referring to deaths of coalition soldiers, troops are 'being killed' (agency attached to the 'enemy') on a regular basis and this, we are told is 'crippling the reconstruction process'. Such a statement of course makes specific assumptions regarding 'our' troops, but, more urgently, frames the ongoing conflict in benign terms. That 'we' are involved in a 'reconstruction process' is the stated policy objective of the political elites that took 'us' to war in the first place. Not subjecting such assumptions and assertions to critique is to effectively perform a vital Public Relations (PR) exercise on behalf of said political elites. Even when 'gaining access to American troops' and 'invited to quiz the key players at the heart of the new regime' to scrutinise 'Iraq's new "occupiers"', the assumption that the motivation *is* 'rebuilding a country as effectively as it can defeat it in war' remains in place, a taken for granted, common-sense assertion. In short, 'our' 'reconstruction' (paraphrased differently via the equally benign assumptions 'This is a story of men who came to rebuild a country') is framed here as *the* motivation. In such a context, particularly when 'a

Panorama team has been filming on the streets of Baghdad’ alongside the ‘men who came to rebuild a country’ mounting a forceful (or even muted) critique of original policy *objectives* and *motivations* is difficult to sustain and represent.

Once again, *Panorama* makes much of its access to high-profile sources ‘invited to quiz the key players at the heart of the new regime, including Coalition chief Paul Bremer and the former New York cop and so-called ‘Baghdad Terminator’ Bernie Kerik’ the extent to which said sources *Primarily Define* the frame, the narrative orientation, the context, and through which dramatic means is a key part of the analysis. Use of the term ‘quiz’ is also problematic insofar as the term is more neutered than one might hope for. Surely when successfully securing access to key Primary Definers and decision-makers, a more forceful and forensic term might be applicable. ‘Quiz’ connotes something more playful. The equally characterised soldiers (‘gaining access to American troops’) ensures that this ‘powerful documentary’ is designed to tell a dramatic and emotionally resonant story of ‘three long, hot and increasingly violent summer months’, alongside (or even as part of) coalition troops. That the *Panorama* team are proximate to the coalition troops is, in practical and safety terms, understandable. It echoes the analysis of Lewis and Brookes:

The Pentagon’s embed (sic) strategy was ingenious because it increased rather than limited access to information. (Lewis and Brookes *in* Zelizer and Allan 2004: 299)

However, also documented by Lewis and Brookes, this ‘embedded’ nature potentially compromises *Panorama*’s ability to provide a critical and impartial version of post-conflict Iraq.

By giving broadcasters access to highly newsworthy *action* footage from the frontline, they were encouraging a focus on the actions of US and British troops, who would be seen fighting a short and successful war. The *story* was about winning and losing, rather than a consideration of context in which the war was fought. (Lewis and Brookes *in* Zelizer and Allan 2004b: 299)

This frame means the post-conflict ‘reconstruction’ *is* the (only) goal and motivation, it is certainly the dominant frame on offer in this broadcast, and that the troops undertaking it simply *are* a benign force for good.

6.4 *Panorama: The Price of Victory* - The Dramatic Resonance of the Soldiers’ Stories

So *Panorama: The Price of Victory* is the story of conflict and of rebuilding *in* a post-conflict (sic) Iraq, it is essentially the ‘story’ of how coalition troops set about rebuilding, restoring order, or, in a phrase that really outlines *Panorama*’s approach, it is the story of how the US (and UK) forces attempt to ‘turn Iraq into a beacon of democracy for the Middle East’ (Andy Davies *P:TPOV*). ‘Turning Iraq into a beacon of democracy’ is some claim. It is Over-Lexicalised, the troops are afforded positive Attributes which is in-line with the stated policy goals of the political elites that sent the troops to war. Surely a critical Current Affairs broadcast ought to be in the business of forensically challenging said stated aims rather than reproducing them as ‘common-sense’ and unproblematic.

One of the principle weapons in the *Panorama* armoury is the use of dramatic characterisation. Telling the story of post-conflict Iraq is, at times, effectively ‘outsourced’ to those on the front-line. This particular trope is particularly acute in *Panorama: The Price of Victory* though other sporadic examples also appear in *P:SOTR*

Andy Davies: It is now July and attacks on coalition troops are averaging over 80 a week. A soldier *is being killed* almost every day, and this more than two months after President Bush declared an end to major combat operations. (*P:TPOV*)

The above statement follows on from a full three minutes of explicit action. All the action is original film, shot for the purposes of this broadcast. Journalist Andy Davies, who has ‘been following a battalion of American troops’ (*P:TPOV*) and the *Panorama* crew capture previously unseen footage right in the centre of battle as it is ongoing. It is also a cross-over from the style of footage usually found in (Point 3 of) the conflict phase: ‘focus on action on

the frontline' (Altheide and Grimes 2005). This type of footage does manage to viscerally communicate the danger and the unpredictability. That it is shot alongside (or as part of) the troops of the 437th Battalion does give the viewers some insights into the battle(s) in Iraq. Having been on the same journey, placed inside the battle and having heard first-hand from a number of soldiers, including one soldier directly addressing the camera as he explains the actions, feelings and emotions experienced, Davies's statement regarding the death of soldiers is a clear and demonstrative example of the 'risks' 'our troops', those on 'our side', are taking.

Having witnessed the risks for ourselves, albeit only briefly over the previous three minutes, the phrase takes on a more emotionally resonant tone. The phrase 'soldiers are killed' while perfectly understandable, is also discursively and linguistically revealing. 'Killed' of course ascribes agency, someone is responsible. As the statement is made the image is of a(n injured) US soldier being carried on a stretcher to a waiting helicopter. The use of the Transitive verb 'killed', though perhaps understandable and subtle, is important in this context.

This sort of Lexical Choice, to use the Transitive for 'bad actions' of the enemy combatants, the Over-Lexicalisation and Attributing good characteristics to 'our' troops, establishes the tone of *Panorama: The Price of Victory*. The images of injury and/or death, cut against the measured deliberations of the soldiers, is a multi-modal form of the Ideological Square. However, it is through the dramatized and highly emotional(ized) stories of character that the discourse of *P:TPOV* is most resonant and most obviously ideologically positioned. By way of explanation, let us now examine one of the key characters to emerge in the text *P:TPOV*. Having already briefly seen him (in the opening few minutes) and heard reference to him, Reggie Harris is (re)introduced to the viewers at 19m...

Davies: Are you any good at soccer?

Reggie Harris: I'm pretty good, I'm average. It's a sport so I'm good at him. (laughs) We're going to head out now and get motivated. Today we're here to work on the football field and give these young kids like this a chance to play soccer. Okay? That's what we're here for, alright?

Davies: A lot of the reconstruction of Iraq has been painfully slow. Coalition attempts to revive the antiquated oil and electricity networks have been hindered by sabotage, and community projects like this are limited. The soldiers know only too well that the longer they stay in any one place, the greater the risk of attack.

Harris: This is a project that was brought to my attention. I'm kind of the sheriff, mayor, so to speak of this neighbourhood, me and my forces here. So we decided to give something back to the community, and one project that we're doing, we've called the Taskforce Neighbourhood Project, and what we're calling it is 'Completing a Kid's Dream'. We're not only here to provide peace, security and civility, we're also here to help rebuild Iraq. Will you present the first ball to the people.

Soldier: On behalf of the Iron Thunder Battalion and the Gators we hope the children can continue to be children and have fun. (*P:TPOV*)

The above sequence is a moving account of Harris and his team as they attempt to rebuild this small part of Iraq and the means by which they are trying to do so. Through the universal language of sport, and 'completing a kid's dream' it would be difficult to be overly critical or cynical about such a project. The project is presented (quite rightly) as a means to provide activity for children, to heal wounds, to assuage the local population and all through the universal language (activity) of sport and the always emotionally resonant signifier of 'kids'. The point here is not necessarily to critique or criticise the actual idea or policy, which is of course beyond the remit and expertise of this research, but merely to assess the extent to which the sequence *characterises* Reggie Harris, in what way, and, as this research suggests, as a means *to carry the story, orient the narrative* arc in a particular direction. Harris is photogenic, frequently smiling and articulate. He is perhaps emblematic of all that the US imagines itself to be, in this respect, Reggie Harris is the perfect character onto which the US and UK (and *Panorama*) can project and inscribe their idea(s).

Harris appears throughout the episode, sometimes directly, other times more obliquely, by reference or seeing him 'in shot' in the background. Nevertheless, even when background, he remains a feature, a character in whom we are surely encouraged to identify,

and through which the story of Iraq in general, and *The Price of Victory* especially, is communicated. Towards the end of the broadcast, in perhaps one of the most emblematic examples of the emotionally resonant, characterisational and story-telling devices employed, Reggie Harris (re)appears directly. The sequence reintroduces him by way of his familial responsibility. We are informed:

Davies: Reggie Harris and his men will be in Iraq until next year. Thousands of others who fought the war are still waiting to go home. Today's Pentagon favours a lean, high-tech military using the minimum number of troops. But in Washington there are now those who are convinced that America came into Iraq with a force large enough to win the war but too small to secure the peace. A lot of these soldiers will be away from their families for at least a year. Reggie Harris is about to miss a milestone in the life of any first-time parent.

Reggie Harris: I miss em... you know... definitely, and I'm definitely going to miss his 6th birthday and I'm going to miss him going to school and getting first day... his first day at school now, and I told my wife if by some chance... you know... I don't make it out of here, and I don't make it back to him, you just keep telling him that daddy always told him to accomplish the mission, you know... and tell my soldiers that now. But I tell her to tell him that, and whatever he put his mind to, you know... he'll accomplish it and he'll do it regardless of what anybody else tell him, he'll accomplish the mission (controlled voice – visible tears) you know... and I just... I just pray that I make it out and I can tell him that myself. But he's going to be alright. I know God is watching over him and he's going to be alright. He's going to be fine. (P:TPOV)

In some ways, the repeated representation of the emotionally literate Reggie Harris means he becomes the central character, the central military protagonist and, alongside Andy Davies, our guide through the narrative. The initial lengthy statement by Andy Davies (above) provides some critical comment. With the statement: 'But in Washington there are now those who are convinced that America came into Iraq with a force large enough to win the war but too small to secure the peace' (P:TPOV) certainly adopts a moderately sceptical or questioning position from which to mount some critique, and, what is more, some muted critique of policy, or at least of 'planning' for the post-conflict Iraq. Even within this muted critique though, the assumptions remain that the policy objective *was* to secure the peace. This is a very subtle difference, but it does reveal that within the journalistic discourse, while questions can be asked, on certain points, via positive Attributes inscribed onto 'us, the

assumptions of benign intent remain irrevocable and established ('common-sense') facts. 'Securing the peace', while perhaps not going well, is assumed to have *always been* the objective. The point here is not to suggest for a moment that securing the peace was *not* a key objective (certainly for those troops now inside Iraq), I cannot know, none of us can. However, the point is that a more critically interrogative, counter-hegemonic approach (that the Iraq war might be a war of imperialist ambition; for energy resource capture; or simply motivated out of a misguided sense of 'post 9/11 revenge' against the/any 'Other') is simply not present. So we are left with some muted critique of actions, of planning, of tactics, or of conflict *and* post-conflict strategy, but anything more ideological, more counter-hegemonic does not, indeed *cannot*, appear.

Towards the end of his commentary, the mood then shifts, Davies reintroduces us to the familiar, and now familial character of Reggie Harris. I would argue that there can be no other reason to include this section other than to help illustrate the story of conflict through the narrative and archetypal heroic characterisation of the fully rendered human subject. Something wholly denied official enemy combatants. Enemy combatants are represented through Lexical and multi-modal Absence, or, more frequently, via an Over-Lexicalised demonized characterisation. 'They' tend to be ascribed negative Attributes, and afforded Transitive agency for their (mis)deeds. They are inescapably cast as the nefarious stereotypical villains of the piece. Reggie Harris is not just *any* US soldier, but one with whom we have become familiar, one named, a single tear rolling down his cheek clearly visible, Harris is afforded the luxury of characterisation, of character development, of narrative, and perhaps most importantly, he is given the narrative, discursive and televisual space in which to *self*-reflect. The questions he ponders and the stories he tells are powerful, familiar, familial and emotionally resonant ones, rich in dramatic, evocative human detail. This is, in many ways, equivalent to the middle-class subjects of reality television, afforded

time and space to discuss the 'self-project'. The ways in which television provides them the space with which to reflect upon themselves, and become 'subjects of value' (Skeggs and Wood 2011) is significant. The telling of the self, the narrative allowances made for Western subjectivity is manifestly different to that made for the subjectivities of representationally designated 'Others'. The dramatisation and performance of oneself is differently argued, textured and represented. Particularly when one takes account of the multi-modal forms of expression, the above scene from *Panorama: The Price of Victory* offers a stark and compelling reminder of the power of television to represent character in evocative and dramatic terms. In this example, Western subjects, represented by the charismatic, warm, emotionally literate, tearful and photogenic character, are afforded and given narrative and characterisational control, an emotional depth denied the excessive, immoral one-dimensional nature of the 'Other'. Harris's emotionally laden address is resonant of the different psychological depth, what Skeggs and Wood have termed 'a subject of value with interiority and depth' (Skeggs and Wood 2011). Western subjectivity is afforded this relative 'luxury' by representation in *Panorama*. To be represented as a 'subject of value' is precious, it is conducive *to* and illustrative *of* the extent to which certain subjects are sympathetically framed, elevated to something recognisable, even 'civilising'. In fact, coterminous *with* the overall discourse and epistemology, one could argue that the civilising function inscribed onto Reggie Harris here fits the geo-political narrative that 'we' are always a force for good, or that the soldiers are engaged in, what sociologist Norbert Elias would term a 'civilising process' (Elias 1976). Represented here by the charming and televisually appealing character of Reggie Harris, he thus stands-in *for*, and is emblematic *of* the civilising process of the Iraq conflict. The soldiers are a civilising force in the world. In the unfolding, dehumanising, brutal story of conflict, using the aesthetics and modes of dramatic television representation to humanise the subjects in the midst of an otherwise dehumanising environment, is a

resource upon which one can draw. In fact, it takes us back to McKee's assertions regarding archetypes: 'archetypal story unearths a universally human experience' and that they can 'illuminate conflicts so true to humankind' (McKee. 1999). In this example, Reggie Harris is the archetypal 'good guy'. Such a resource though is not equally distributed and available to all, but only to those designated allies. In an act of now typical Ideological Squaring, the 'enemy' is reduced to the 'vivid but simple representation that reduces persons to sets of exaggerated, usually negative character traits' (Hall 1997) of the stereotype.

6.5 Dramatically Rendered Primary Definer(s)

Signifying something of a middle-ground between the standard 'Primary Definer' and the more emotionally resonant central protagonist role that typifies the *soldiers' stories* (see above), sits Bernard Kerik. At 6m through to 9m into *Panorama: The Price of Victory*, we are introduced to former New York City Police commissioner, Bernard 'Bernie' Kerik, now in his new role, described by Andy Davies as follows:

Davies: '...nicknamed "The Baghdad Terminator" for his no-nonsense approach...(he is) effectively Iraq's temporary interior minister' (*P:TPOV*)

Kerik is stood overlooking and overseeing a cache of captured weapons and money. Stocky, balding, dressed in if not military fatigues, at least in the colours of said fatigues he looks every inch the solid and dependable strong man required for such tasks. Kerik explains that the cache is the result of operations and were;

Kerik: ...seized over the last day and a half from the same group of individuals. This information was given to us, civilians came forward to talk about possible attacks on the coalition. (*P:TPOV*)

The camera cuts from Kerik to a slow pan of various military hardware, mainly rifles, then back to Kerik stood alongside an Iraqi official. The camera then cuts back and lingers on the weapons cache. The diegesis then shifts, the sound is clearer, indicating a more formal recording while Kerik begins to explain the 'mission' as follows:

Kerik: The objective here is to create a free Iraq. You don't do that by cowering, you don't do that by backing down. (*P:TPOV*)

His own words, then, are casting him as the (necessarily) 'Strong-man' required for the task, underscoring the 'Baghdad Terminator' appellation. The shot then shifts to what one presumes is his (Kerik's) office, or the offices of the temporary interior ministry, framed by a map of Iraq. Kerik, in mid-shot, now dominates the screen, and the diegesis:

Kerik: We're going to deal with the resistance in two ways, we're going to either arrest them, or we're going to kill them. (*P:TPOV*)

Linguistically and discursively, the overt description of the actions, the Transitive ownership and agency of the mission 'to kill' is perhaps surprising. However, surprise should perhaps be tempered by the fact that Kerik has already been identified as the necessarily strong military man, and one necessary and up to the task of tackling (the thoroughly demonized) Saddam. The shot then shifts again to show Kerik inspecting photographic evidence, the diegesis is now another US official, perhaps army personnel, suggesting 'it looks like he's been tortured' accompanied by a pensive looking Kerik. The clearly audible discussion of 'torture' (though of whom is not made clear) signals that 'the enemy' – multi-modally absent, but Over-Lexicalised and assigned agency for 'torture' through something close to a Primary Definer – are engaged in torturous activities and that (part of) the mission here is to address, deal with and stop the torture conducted by 'the insurgents'.³

However, it is with what follows that attention ought to focus. What follows is a highly dramatically charged discursive and epistemological frame, and within the epistemology and discourse, *Panorama* provides a sort of discursive, journalistic and generic 'call-back' to the pre-conflict phase sample. The final change of shot in this sequence is a classic of the televisual form, the television drama aesthetic. Kerik, again in his office, now in mid-close-

³ Of course we now know that one of the methods employed to deal with the 'torturing insurgents' was the torture by US forces at the Abu Ghraib military facility.

up shot, the site of emotional expression (his face) now dominates the screen, while speaking the following words:

Kerik: This job to me is very personal. On September 11th 2001 I was the Police Commissioner of New York City. I responded to the towers when they were hit. I stood beneath tower one when tower two was struck by flight 175. I watched over the next 24 hours as 23 members of my department were in fact missing inside those buildings. They never came out. I lost 23 people. They were responding to defend the freedom of the United States. This country was the threat to that freedom. This country was a threat to the freedom of the UK. We have now freed this country. We have liberated Iraq and I think I owe it to the 23 people I lost. (*P:TPOV*)

As we can see from the above statement, this section of the broadcast is devoted to Kerik, framing the ‘mission’. So even though there is a televisual and discursive ownership regarding coalition actions, the Transitive is deployed, even to actions that potentially locate ‘our’ actions in a negative light (to ‘hunt’ and actions with deadly consequences, to ‘kill’) the mission is explicitly framed as a *reaction* to the ‘events of 9/11’. Therefore, overt Lexical and discursive ownership is located within this narrative. This is assisted by Kerik’s willingness to take ownership, he references the personal pronoun with ‘I lost 23 people’. That the main semiotic focus is on Kerik’s face is significant, as is the contents of his testimony. Locating him *at* and *as* the dramatic, characterised, semiotic, narrative, emotional, discursive and journalistic centre is indicative of the narrative direction of *Panorama: The Price of Victory*. It of course draws on a now well-established discursive feature of the *Panorama* canon when dealing with Iraq (see Chapter 4) and helps provide some narrative orientation for the remaining post-conflict phase sample. Bearing in mind that this particular episode of *Panorama* is part of the post-conflict series of broadcasts, his testimony that ‘9/11’ is the motivation; that the operation is ‘personal’ and further, *understood* through the prism of ‘9/11’ is intensely problematic. However, it remains unchallenged. ‘9/11’ is in fact used as the journalistic and narrative hook onto which the *dramatic story* arc is pegged. The statement ‘This country (Iraq) was the threat to that freedom’ demands more scrutiny and analysis than is provided by this *Panorama* broadcast. Iraq as both ‘threat to the US...and UK’ and that

‘Iraq was freed’ or ‘liberated’ remains unchallenged and undiscussed. The statements pass by, they simply *are* the justification and rationale for the Iraq ‘operations’, and within the discourse of this broadcast, take on a particularly resonant status. That 9/11 is the motivation, and moreover, that Iraq was a threat (‘to freedom’ no less) establishes itself as incontrovertible truth.

Each society has its own ‘regime of truth’, its ‘general politics’ of truth – that is, the types of discourse it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances that enable one to distinguish true and false statements; the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. (Foucault 1977: 131)

We can see from Kerik’s statements, that, in Foucault’s terms, Kerik is, by his ‘Primary Definer’ ‘status’ one of ‘those who are charged with saying what counts as true’ and the journalism of *Panorama* the conduit through which such ‘truths’ are communicated. Given that there was an ‘insurgency’ and that it was a growing and considerable threat to coalition forces, should give some indication, even if muted, that perhaps the coalition forces were not welcomed as the agents of ‘freedom’. However, to challenge such assumptions seemingly requires the desire and ability to imagine that ‘we’ ‘our forces’ are not always the agents of ‘freedom and liberation’, that our motivations might not always be to ‘turn Iraq into a beacon of democracy for the Middle East’ (Andy Davies, BBC *P:TPOV*). It requires that those tasked with communicating, representing and mediating ‘our’ actions can step outside the ‘regime of truth’, to see beyond and outside the discourse in which their own world view has been crafted. As this thesis has documented, such stepping beyond, discursively, theoretically, methodologically, representationally, televisually, and journalistically, proves rather difficult.

Kerik is permitted to frame the conflict in this way, unchallenged and while dominating the screen, his face initially a picture of stoic determination, then shifting to one of sad and pensive reflection (see above). His words partially shape the discourse and

narrative direction of *Panorama: The Price of Victory*. The final frame of Kerik in this segment is a lingering shot of him looking down, perhaps even gulping back tears as he struggles with the grief and loss of his colleagues. As part of a post-conflict series of broadcasts, the claims of Iraq as ‘threat’ less still, a threat to ‘freedom’ is, frankly, absurd and cannot (should not) be conceivable. Such a statement, post-conflict, is, one could feasibly argue, indefensible. The dramatic and emotional ‘pull’ of such journalistic representation though is indicative and representative of the approach *Panorama* seemed to adopt when representing the Iraq war. The discursive logic of the pre-conflict phase; the conflict phase; and now the post-conflict phase broadcasts are partly framed by 9/11, it is a post-9/11 world and as such, *Panorama*, through repetition of this dominant discourse, even while occasionally offering some muted criticism, effectively helps to sustain and represent a binary, ‘with us or against us’, worldview. Such a worldview is of course now established in the context and discourse of ‘The War on Terror’.

The lack of overt challenge, which, I would of course argue is required, can though seemingly be justified within the journalistic logic[s] of objectivity, or ‘impartiality’ As Wahl-Jorgensen insightfully theorises:

...unavoidable subjective appraisals are carefully managed through a distinctive series of discursive strategies...there is a strategic ritual of *emotionality* in journalism which operates alongside the strategic ritual of objectivity, drawing on some of its practices and enabling what is often profoundly emotional story-telling to emerge through a form of ‘outsourcing’ of emotional labor to the subjects of the stories. (Wahl-Jorgensen 2013: 130)

In this (and other) instance(s), the ‘emotional labour’ of the story has been effectively ‘outsourced’ to one of the principle subjects. And what a story, and what a ‘subject’. A man still suffering, still grieving the loss of colleagues, drawing together two disparate events in this way, narrating the still ongoing conflict in Iraq via, geo-politically, inarguably the most catastrophic rupture, the most dramatic and emotionally resonant ‘event’ of the early part of the twenty-first century. For clarity, this is not to diminish the loss, the undoubted heartbreak,

the grief, but merely to question the extent to which *Panorama* should *uncritically* locate him and it (9/11) as *the* central character and narrative device, as *the* frame. Such emotionally resonant and dramatic characterisation, the framing of the ongoing conflict in such terms, in such a way effectively cedes the ideological ground to those undertaking the conflict, and, one could argue, the political forces that engendered it. This returns us to Lewis's thesis (in Chapter 2);

those making the case for war with Iraq would juxtapose it – vaguely, intangibly, but repeatedly – with the war on terrorism. For a public with a limited knowledge of geopolitics, these associations become the building blocks for making sense of the world. (Lewis 2004: 297)

'9/11' is unquestionably emotive, highly dramatically charged. Such emotion, such unsubtle pathos as expressed by Kerik, and further, the allowances for self-reflection and character development mean the text can be read as a means of interpellating viewers in such a way as to be empathetic, to be emotionally involved with the principle subjects, those 'with most to say' (Van Dijk). In this instance, those with most to say are often emblematic of Western power, but framed and represented as thoughtful, reflective, humane and human, and, not coincidentally, always those sympathetic to the 'cause' [sic]. In the case of Bernard 'Bernie' Kerik, the resonance of his story, and that his story is allowed, unchallenged, to frame the ongoing post-war fall-out reveals the limitations of critique.

One final point: I ought to make it very clear that I do not doubt for a moment that the regime of Saddam Hussein was among the most brutal imaginable. It is simply not my intention in any way whatsoever to diminish the brutality, the cruelty and barbarism. The point remains, as I hope is obvious, that by adherence to journalistic, televisual, dramatic and aesthetic practises and templates, the Ideological Squaring discourse of *Panorama* systemically, in the end accentuates the very obvious brutality and flaws of officially designated 'Others' while, despite surely having the wherewithal and knowledge to do otherwise, simultaneously overlooks, side-lines, obscures, obfuscates and excises both 'our'

own blemished historical *and contemporary* global record, and the role ‘we’ played in sustaining Saddam Hussein for over 30 years. There were some notable moments, some examples whereby ‘our’ role was referenced, but this was not sustained, not examined, the references became merely additional contextual extras, that further strengthened the Over-Lexicalised, Ideologically Squared, demonised characterisation. Even in the most critical of *Panorama* broadcasts, the critical contextual frame never began by even proposing to briefly examine our own deeply flawed, historical and neo-imperialist adventurism. What remains significant is that the necessarily critically interrogative frame cast on to Saddam Hussein is never cast in the direction of ‘our own’ high-profile, elite Primary Definers. Or, to be more clear, never cast on the systemic and structural global conditions that gave rise *to*, and sustained the regime *of*, Saddam Hussein. What is required is for critical Current Affairs broadcasting to join the contextual dots rather than separate out the archetypal and stereotyped villainous demons from the (sometimes flawed) archetypal heroes. On the evidence of this analysis, *Panorama* remains incapable or unable to undertake such a task.

On which note, it is only fair that this research does acknowledge the notable examples from *Panorama: The Price of Victory* where the coalition troops are represented less favourably. With what follows, another version of a ‘soldiers story’, the visual footage is demonstrably less favourable to the US troops. We are introduced to this more critical segment by Andy Davies:

Andy Davies: In the torrid heat of an Iraqi summer and struggling to pacify, let alone understand, a people who’d been asking them for help, for some soldiers discipline becomes a casualty. (*P:TPOV*)

The statement is certainly critical but one could argue that the criticism is muted or contained (again) within the benign motivation discourse. Their motivation is merely to (Over-Lexicalised, positive Attributes) ‘pacify’ (an unruly mob), their ‘(in)discipline’ (Lexically Absenting potential brutality) merely a ‘casualty’, one that is apparently licensed by the

‘torrid heat of an Iraqi summer’ (even the *weather* in this place is as ‘brutal’ as its people, or at least as ‘brutal’ as Saddam). While some of the footage *does* viscerally contradict the assumption (to pacify) however, this is explained away by understandable pressures placed upon the individual soldiers the broadcast introduces us to. It is represented as a perhaps regrettable but all too human response to the ‘torrid heat’ and the pressures of the occupation. The episode continues with further footage from outside ‘Assassins Gate’. In this incident, two Iraqi’s were ‘killed’ by a US soldier firing into a crowd. This is explained by Andy Davies as follows:

Andy Davies: But the protest became violent, rocks were thrown at an army convoy, and in response an American soldier shot into the crowd. Two of the demonstrators, apparently unarmed, were killed. (*P:TPOV*)

While it is significant and noted that the Transitive verb ‘killed’ is used, thus ascribing agency to the US forces, the act was not carried out by any of the individual characters we have met. The above statement had been preceded by some evidence of US army ‘force’ (though not ‘brutality’ which is the phrase used for designated enemies). The footage captures the US army ‘indiscipline’. However, that the protesters were ‘unarmed’ is heavily caveated by a) Davies tone; b) by the fact that those protesting are represented as fairly unruly, and that they were formerly (highly-trained) Iraqi soldiers; c) that the actions of US soldiers were a ‘*response*’ to ‘violence’. These facts, combined with the emotionally literate US soldiers (characters) we get to know does, rather viscerally, represent the ongoing situation in Iraq, but, for the most part, the coalition forces are represented as under-pressure and all too human. To be clear, the individuals are of course human, they are under pressure, the point is that this particular method of ‘story-telling’ elides wider critical contextual focus. It is simply assumed by the representation that, even if difficult and on occasion beset by ‘indiscipline’, the US forces, according to Paul Bremer

...are learning about peacekeeping...and have a solemn obligation now to see this through and to see it through well and to put the time and resources behind it so we succeed. (*P:TPOV*)

Or, in another excerpt, Iraq remains a perhaps misguided but nevertheless

Bremer 'noble exercise' (*P:TPOV*).

The phrase is repeated at 56m in *Panorama: The Price of Victory*. That the above phrase, and the exact same footage is used to essentially 'top and tail' this broadcast is indisputably significant. The Over-Lexicalised 'nobility' and sacrifice of the 'exercise' of the 'mission' (Kerik) frames the first broadcast of the post-conflict era, whatever follows in the remaining broadcasts will be inextricably framed by such assumptions.

As we saw from the previous chapter, and the above discussed broadcast, there is a significant focus on action. However, given that action(s) are foregrounded by the very titles of the remaining two examples, are there similar active, action-based narratives and storylines in *Panorama: Saddam on the Run* and *Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam's Weapons*?

6.6 *Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam's Weapons*

Panorama has secured exclusive access to the secret and controversial work of the Iraq Survey Group as they hunt for Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. The failure so far to find the weapons the politicians insisted were there has been an embarrassment to Tony Blair and George Bush. Iraqi scientists and officials, once part of the regime, give Panorama their assessment of whether Saddam really posed a threat to the west and reveal details of one of Iraq's illicit weapons programmes.

(<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/3261705.stm>)

In the second of the *Panorama* broadcasts, *Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam's Weapons* (*P:SCSW*) the focus is on the (continued) search for weapons. Said weapons were of course the principle (stated) rationale for the conflict in the wider socio-political discourse, covered extensively in the pre-conflict phase sample (*P:TCAS*; *P:SAWFH*; *P:CSW*) and discussed in this research (Chapter 4). Therefore, given the importance of (the ongoing search for)

weapons (of mass destruction) the results of the search thus requires some partial narrative closure, which *P:SCSW* seeks to provide.

The summary paragraph reveals (once again) in *Panorama*'s access to high-profile legitimated sources (Primary Definers) 'Panorama has secured exclusive access to the secret and controversial work of the Iraq Survey Group'. There remains an explicit assumption that Weapons of Mass Destruction *were* in Saddam's possession in the phrase 'hunt for *Saddam's weapons* of mass destruction'. The 'failure so far to find the weapons the politicians insisted were there' is here, not an explicit and serious legal (and moral failing) but instead assumed to be nothing more than 'an embarrassment to Tony Blair and George Bush'. The use of such phrasing is, at the very least, insufficient. For instance, one cannot imagine such a relatively harmless (though uncomfortable) adjective being applied to a designated enemy. Here though, the failure to '*so far* find the' elusive 'weapons', while perhaps relatively compromising the perilous career(s) of the politicians involved (in a call-back to *Panorama: Blair's War*), is here coded as little more than a trying inconvenience. The final sentence 'Iraqi scientists and officials, once part of the regime, give Panorama *their assessment of whether Saddam really posed a threat to the west* and reveal details of one of Iraq's illicit weapons programmes' locates this example firmly in the realm of Point 6 of the WPM:

...lead to widespread conclusion that perhaps war was unnecessary, other options were available, and that the price was too high. (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 622)

6.7 *Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam's Weapons* – The Return of the 'Primary Definers'

Even within the most critical broadcast in the post-conflict phase, *Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam's Weapons* the critique is muted or downgraded in very interesting and problematic ways. The use of the 'Primary Definers' and *Panorama*'s use of its own archive to demonstrate the 'intelligence failures' is a significant and not to be overlooked facet of this broadcast. That such things are foregrounded is noteworthy. However, what is equally

noteworthy is the extent of the journalistic oversights, or the timely forgetfulness of those producing the programme(s). The example below is particularly striking:

Richard Perle: I don't know what sort of evidence... a *mushroom cloud* would be a powerful statement, but do you want to wait for that? (*P:SCSW* 2003. Archive footage from *P:TCAS*)

In the example above, Richard Perle is clearly represented as an authoritative source' but within this narrative, the representation is designed so as to demonstrate the failings of *individual* high-profile elite sources (but not the wider structural conditions or motivations). The footage inserted into the relatively critical narrative of *P:SCSW* is precisely that used in the pre-conflict *P:TCAS*. Further examples are used in much the same way, again, with the apocalyptic 'Mushroom Cloud' as the signifier:

Corbin: A year ago the message coming from Washington and London was that Saddam's Hussein's regime posed a current and serious threat. In the US the President and his officials raised the ultimate spectre of modern warfare, *the nuclear bomb*.

7th October 2002

Bush: They've seen clear evidence of *peril*. We cannot wait for the final proof, the *smoking gun* that could come in the form of a *mushroom cloud*.

8th September 2002

Condoleeza Rice: There will always be some uncertainty about how quickly he can acquire *nuclear weapons*, but we don't want the *smoking gun* to be a *mushroom cloud*.

23rd September 2002

Richard Perle: I don't know what sort of evidence... a *mushroom cloud* would be a powerful statement, but do you want to wait for that?

So not only does *Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam's Weapons* make use of the very same sources, it uses the *same footage*. In the pre-conflict phase, those same sources, and this exact footage, not only passed by without critique, but, more importantly, it was deployed in such a way that, as I argued in Chapter 4, materially assisted in the perpetuation of an 'immediate threat' narrative, and of Saddam as uniquely dangerous. Now, in the more reflective and

critical broadcast, the same footage, the same sources, are here wheeled out and deployed for a different narrative purpose. Because the storyline demands are manifestly different, the archive from only 14 months previous, is stripped of its original *uncritical* context. While there might be nothing inherently wrong with referring to previously ‘reliable’ sources (sic), *and*, furthermore, clearly revealing their flaws and shortcomings, what is more problematic is that the *Panorama* production (producers and journalists) see no reason to assess and critically interrogate *its own* practices, its own relationship to its sources and that they appear(ed) to (have previously) grant(ed) them uncritical legitimacy. *Panorama*’s own archive footage of Perle, Kay, Bush and Rice is deployed merely to adopt a critical pose but without the requisite critical self-reflection regarding the part *Panorama*’s own previous broadcasts might have played in hyping the ‘threat’ of Saddam, the ‘immediate danger’ he posed to the world if he remained in place. The Over-Lexicalised ‘mushroom cloud’ together with occasional semiotics of (library footage of) said cloud certainly continues to Attribute negative connotations (to say the least) to – the already thoroughly demonized – Saddam.

Another example of this lack of self-reflexivity regarding *Panorama*’s own role in the build-up to the Iraq war, appears later in the same broadcast. Using the same source previously used in *P:TCAS* on this occasion, David Kay is, too late of course, subjected to critical scrutiny:

Corbin: Though Saddam was still interested in nuclear weapons, the UN had dismantled his nuclear infrastructure and placed his raw stocks of uranium under guard in 1991. Sanctions appear to have made it impossible for Saddam to reactivate his nuclear programme. So where did that leave Mr Kay’s certainty about the tubes?

Kay: Well the problem we have with the tubes is the tubes a year ago...two years ago when we weren’t in the country we were just looking at the tubes themselves, and the tubes looked like they were suitable for centrifuge, and in fact I still think, if I were only looking at the tubes, they were suitable for the centrifuge. Now we’ve got a great advantage now, we’re inside the country, so we don’t have to grasp at straws of evidence.

Corbin: Straws of evidence, Dr Kay’s description of some of the intelligence that took us to war in Iraq. (*P:SCSW*)

Corbin is correct to forensically focus on alleged intelligence failures (though ‘intelligence failures’ themselves quickly became the get of jail free card deployed by the elite political actors who had themselves seemingly been angling for conflict (see Chilcot Inquiry <http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-report/>)). In the above statement, Corbin even goes so far as to explain that ‘the UN had dismantled Saddam’s nuclear infrastructure’ and that ‘sanctions appear to have made it impossible for Saddam to reactivate his nuclear programme’. In the context of this sample, by which I mean the entire discursive sample collated and analysed in all three analysis chapters of this research, such an admission is startling. It is simply beyond credibility that the same *Panorama* team that produced and researched both this episode, and *Panorama: Chasing Saddam’s Weapons* would, fourteen months previously, have been unaware that ‘sanctions appear to have made it impossible for Saddam to reactivate his nuclear programme’. They are startling *precisely because* such definitive and *overt* claims regarding the UN dismantling are absent from the pre-conflict phase sample, when arguably, their presence could well have provided some vitally necessary critique. That the same source was legitimated and used uncritically in the pre-conflict phase demonstrates that the discourse of *Panorama* was largely uncritical, or at least that the journalists involved were all too willing to accept explanations and the logic(s) of its Primary Definer sources. Again, perhaps because the storyline demanded a different narrative orientation, these same previously legitimated and authoritative sources are questioned and scrutinised more fully during this more critical broadcast (now too late of course). However, critique of legitimate(d) and ‘authoritative’ (sic) sources and Primary Definers now fit the wider social and political narrative of ‘intelligence failures’. So even *Panorama’s* (muted) critique is able to be contained within an elite discursive frame. What is absent is the necessary self-critical assessments and examinations of *Panorama’s* own role in legitimating conflict prior to it beginning. This is perhaps related to their journalistic practices of sourcing

and the high-profile access *Panorama* continues to enjoy. Gaining access to such high-profile, legitimate(d) Primary Definers is significant and provides *Panorama* with its own legitimacy and authority in the wider television journalism landscape. However, in continuing to operate in this way, by refusing to critically interrogate said sources *prior* to the conflict, only doing so once it is too late, and by discounting or discarding more critical sources (Scott Ritter for instance) *Panorama* might have an officially designated legitimacy, but is manifestly *not* the necessarily critically interrogative, counter-hegemonic broadcast that we urgently require. As a reminder and in order to compare, this is (just one example of) how David Kay was represented in the pre-conflict phase:

Kay: I've seen one of them. The centrifuge tubes look like they're of the design which is German derived, that the Iraqis acquired some time in the 1980s and developed therefore enriched uranium, that is taking natural uranium up to the level that makes it useful for a weapon.

Corbin: What does it tell you, the fact that they're trying to get several of these? There have been several shipments.

Kay: Well it tells me that they're going for a large scale programme over a thousand centrifuges which in fact is what they were going for before the Gulf War intervened. (P:TCAS)

In this example from the pre-conflict sample, Corbin essentially believes him, no critical scrutiny, a soft question (a gentle 'quizzing' perhaps – see p267) that merely confirms, cements and reproduces the narrative orientation of the pre-conflict phase sample.

Furthermore, even though some of the (same) sources and Primary Definers *are* subject to critical interrogation and scrutiny in the latter broadcasts, there is little to suggest that similar strategies of granting legitimacy to high-profile sources would be questioned in future. Sure, the examples cited are questioned and scrutinised, they are examined for their failures, the *individual* political and social actors might be discarded as unreliable witnesses, but what evidence exists that *Panorama* would, in future be sceptical of similarly high-profile (but personally different) Primary Definers? Of course the WPM, rather adroitly, has already

accounted for this in Point 7: ‘For the next war, return to step 1’ (Altheide and Grimes 2005).

I would add my own addendum to Step 7: ‘Nothing significant is learned’.

I would argue herein lies the value of a critical discourse analytical approach as used in this research. This research has tracked and traced examples across different phases, across a temporal sample in order to assess the ways in which material – both original and archive – is used and reused in order to tell the story (stories) of Iraq. In so doing, it has revealed the extent to which, encumbered by source-relations, televisual and discursive codes and conventions, *Panorama* is seemingly incapable of stepping beyond the narrow representational, discursive, epistemological, and hegemonic limits.

Related to the above, we can assess the frame in a little more detail by examining some of the discursive Lexical Choices made and then used by the journalists involved. Within the opening scenes of *Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam’s Weapons*, Jane Corbin continues to use the established frame for the post-conflict sample:

Corbin: The stakes are high. The reputations of a Prime Minister and a President are on the line. (P:SCSW)

Note that the discourse here is on reputation and not legality, not the ethical or moral issues of destroying a country (in order to ‘rebuild’ it). Reputations are on the line, though what remains notable is that reputations of journalists that uncritically reflected or reproduced the logic of benign intervention are not ‘on the line’. Additionally, that individual ‘reputations are on the line’ is manifestly different to the structural conditions and ‘reputations’ of either ‘the West’, or its (our) media systems, practices and discourse, in general, or *Panorama* in particular.

Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam’s Weapons remains the most critical of the post-conflict phase broadcasts in this sample, but even here, the critique is muted and firmly contained within a certain discursive logic. At seven minutes into the broadcast we hear (again) from chief operations director of the ISG (Iraq Survey Group) Dr David Kay. With

the narrative set by Corbin, Kay begins to lay out his own critical reflections regarding the hunt for weapons, and that their presence (or absence) is of paramount importance for the ‘credibility’ of the entire mission. Herein we find one of the few examples whereby some muted criticism and questions regarding ‘the necessity of waging war’ and that ‘perhaps war was unnecessary, other options were available, and that the price was too high’ (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 616). Notable though is that this critique is both muted *and* refers to political and intelligence gathering, not, you will note, critical of the media coverage of the build up to and prosecution of the Iraq war. Nor are the reflections overtly critical of the motivation(s), the necessarily benign nature of the intervention continues to be apparently self-evident, it remains an issue of ‘common-sense’. Then follows a series of archive clips, sourced from US news, in which Dr Kay repeatedly, across four different broadcast examples explains that ‘regime change’ is the only solution.

The final clip, that sees Kay explaining that ‘finding them (weapons) is the new priority’ (*P:SCSW*), is instructive. Finding weapons as the new priority is surely the political-military version of arranging the evidence around an already existing policy decision, or policy-based evidence making. In partial defence of *Panorama*, that these clips are present in the narrative of *Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam’s Weapons* does at least indicate some willingness to critique the very policy on which the (rush to) war was based. However, a) the critique is not overt, it is not explicitly mentioned or discussed again, the clip, the evidence, is simply left hanging; b) the motivations of benign intent are not examined or critically interrogated; c) such critique that does appear, and these clips feature in a sequence in which the policies are demonstrably examined, not in detail, but at least foregrounded, is again, as expected, filtered through the characterisation of individuals. Point 6 of the WPM suggests that, post-conflict, there are often reflections and assessments that suggest ‘widespread conclusion that perhaps the war was unnecessary, other options were available, and that the

price was too high; all of this will be useful for the coverage of the next war' (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 616). However, the research conducted here would suggest that any 'widespread conclusions' and reflections are cast in the direction of individuals, small groups of policy formers, or, in the case of Iraq, 'intelligence experts' (and their failures). In the above example, it is 'Dr Kay's reputation on the line' and not the lives of ordinary Iraqi's, and certainly not the narrative or characterisation of the fundamentally benevolent Western intervention. Dr Kay, and others' when mentioned, and the 'intelligence failures' are simply the bad apples in an otherwise benign barrel. *Panorama* itself, its televisual, dramatic and journalistic methods are of course, not subject to critical self-examination, interrogation or scrutiny. As discussed above, the critique that does emerge remains rigidly within the confines, the context, logic and discourse of stage seven of the WPM 'For the next war, return to step 1' (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 616).

6.8 *Panorama: Saddam on the Run*

In the final broadcast of the sample, *Panorama: Saddam on the Run (P:SOTR)* the multi-modal and journalistic focus is centred on the hunt for the previously excessively demonised Saddam. Given Saddam's 'over-representation' in the pre-conflict phase sample (*P:TCAS*; *P:SAWFH*; *P:CSW*), it makes narrative and journalistic sense that this theme is returned to.

Panorama: Saddam on the Run

In April 2003, as Saddam's statue was being toppled in Baghdad, US Marines were locked in a deadly gun battle with Saddam Hussein and his supporters just across the city. Yet their Ace of Spades escaped. The next time the world would see him was at his capture, eight months later. For all this time – through handwritten letters, tape recordings, personal messages – Saddam stayed in touch with his fellow Ba'athists, helping to direct those fighting the Coalition.

Sheltered by a handful of people, appearing secretly in public, he still thought he could win a guerrilla war against the Coalition. Yet all this time, a team of US soldiers and Special Forces was methodically closing in on him. How did Saddam Hussein evade capture for so long? Where did he hide out? Who protected him? Which family member betrayed Saddam's sons, killed in a fierce shoot-out? And who finally betrayed Saddam to the Americans?

Panorama speaks to the American army generals and ordinary soldiers who tracked and caught Saddam; to the bodyguards who once protected the dictator; to the Iraqi minister who confronted Saddam in his prison cell; and to the families of those accused of betraying Saddam Hussein and all he believed in.

(<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/3546081.stm>)

As the summary paragraph makes clear, the focus here is explicitly on the ways in which the coalition troops, characterised here as ‘a team of US soldiers and Special Forces’ ‘methodically closed in on’... ‘their Ace of Spades’. The broadcast also reveals that while the world waited, not knowing where he was, ‘Sheltered by a handful of people’ the ‘Special Forces’ firstly ‘locked in a deadly gun battle’ in the end ‘tracked and caught Saddam’. This is therefore dramatic, action oriented, and simultaneously procedural. The broadcast also seems to set up a series of questions that will be answered: ‘How did Saddam Hussein evade capture for so long? Where did he hide out? Who protected him? Which family member betrayed Saddam’s sons, killed in a fierce shoot-out? And who finally betrayed Saddam to the Americans?’ *Panorama* again reference their access to high-profile sources: ‘Panorama speaks to the American army generals and ordinary soldiers who tracked and caught Saddam’ and, they also speak to the designated (perhaps former) enemy: ‘to the bodyguards who once protected the dictator; to the Iraqi minister who confronted Saddam in his prison cell’. To continue the characterisation of brutal demon, which while no-doubt deserved, does, in the context of a post-conflict broadcast, finally cement the demonized characterisation and, further underscore that the effort was worth it, *Panorama* also speaks to ‘the families of those accused of betraying Saddam Hussein and all he believed in’.

6.9 *Panorama: Saddam on the Run* - The Return of the Stereotypical Demon

Perhaps surprisingly, given the active verb of the title, *Panorama: Saddam on the Run* is less concerned with action. What emerges in the discourse and throughout the narrative of *Panorama: Saddam on the Run* is, perhaps unsurprisingly, a return to representing Saddam as the archetypal demon. By now though, so used are we to this representation, ‘He’ has simply

morphed into ‘a fixed, reductionary image’ who when ‘reflected out to reality... serve(s) a stereotypical role’ (Gray. 2008) However, given that we already know Saddam is captured, by the time and date of broadcast (28th March 2004) the event of his capture was known the world-over, and given the fact of his rather pathetic demeanour when captured, in order to sustain the characterisation that Saddam was worth the effort, resources and time, *Panorama: Saddam on the Run* still needs to represent him and his associates in a way that cements the demonised characterisation. So here in the post-conflict sample, in which he obviously poses less of a threat, the more overt representations of menace we saw in the pre-conflict sample (particularly in *S:AWFH* and *P:TCAS*) are largely (though not wholly) absent. Instead the representational focus of this broadcast is oriented around a) the perhaps more prosaic procedural elements usually found in a detective caper, perhaps in the style and genre of Columbo. From the outset, the narrative cuts to the chase, the conclusion (Saddam’s capture) is revealed. Much of this episode of *Panorama* is simply devoted to dramatically representing the actions and decisions that led to his capture; and b) there is more focus in this broadcast on Saddam’s wider network and family.

In order to continue and reinforce the demonised archetype/stereotype, the early sequences in *Panorama: Saddam on the Run* refer back to his past, and uses some previously unseen footage. At 11m we are reminded of his brutality by way of some original footage shot for this broadcast. The image that follows is one of the few occasions whereby Iraqi citizens themselves are represented in human terms. The shot, over 10 seconds in length, features an elderly Iraqi woman, dressed in a black hijab, faced with a mound of body bags, she drops to her knees and weeps uncontrollable tears. As she does so, Jane Corbin provides the following commentary:

Corbin: The lie being exposed by now was Saddam, his denial of his regimes crimes against humanity. Mass graves are being uncovered all over Iraq, evidence of the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of ordinary Iraqis on the orders of Saddam and his

henchman. In May investigators began identifying the victims and preparing evidence. But there was still no former president to put on trial. (*P:SOTR*)

The above commentary serves multiple functions. Firstly, it reminds us, both visually and lexically that the perhaps now pathetic figure was once a brutal presence who committed 'crimes against humanity'. As the phrase 'Mass graves' is spoken, an Iraqi man emerges from the mass grave clutching a long-deceased body. The evidence is placed before us on screen. The 'slaughter of 100's of 1000's of ordinary Iraqi's' is accompanied by shots of hundreds of bodies which then pans up to reveal hundreds of Iraqi citizens at the graveside to no doubt begin the task of identifying their loved ones. This deliberately filmed original footage and excerpt provides some useful perspective. Saddam's armed forces are characterised and functionalised by what they do 'henchman'.

The screen then fades to black before a change of scene.

Corbin: Hunted by the coalition last spring Saddam headed for his hometown of Tikrit in the so-called Sunni triangle in central Iraq. We travelled the same route to find those who'd helped Saddam in this Ba'athist heartland and those who'd tracked him. (*P:SOTR*)

The opening shot to accompany Jane Corbin's continued commentary is a computer-generated map of Iraq. The map transforms into a 3D image and the viewer is placed 'inside' the map. A moving red line indicates the journey from Baghdad to Tikrit. Accompanied by the non-diegetic musical score '*Drum Ensemble: Various Artists*' the soundtrack has an otherworldly haunting urgency to it. We are then reminded of the mission, or the Over-Determined 'noble exercise', Saddam is to be 'hunted down'. Corbin legitimates her own position by reminding us that she, too, will 'travel the same route' in the 'Ba'athist heartlands' (*P:SOTR*) and the accompanying visuals demonstrate that point. Shot from the car, Iraqi countryside passing quickly by. The next shot is of Jane Corbin herself, in the car, *on the journey*. *Panorama* viewers are on the same journey, we will accompany Corbin and also accompany 'those who'd tracked him' (*P:SOTR*). The monster will be hunted, Corbin

and the viewers will go on the same dramatically represented journey. As a means of positioning the viewers, this is potentially quite effective. Reminded, even in his absence, of his brutality, Iraqi subjects are (finally, rarely, though briefly) represented humanely. What hardly needs saying is that 'our' (covert) role in supporting Saddam whilst these brutal crimes were undertaken is completely multi-modally, Lexically Absent(ed) and ignored.

The broadcast then devotes attention to documenting the steps the US and UK coalition took in order to capture Saddam. One such step allows for *Panorama: Saddam on the Run* to continue with the dramatized narratives. Outlined thus:

Corbin: The Americans came up with their own BIG incentive.

Ambassador Paul Bremer - Head of Coalition Provisions Authority: I am today announcing a twenty-five million dollar reward for information leading to the capture of Saddam Hussein, and a fifteen million dollar reward for information leading to the capture of either of his sons. (*P:SOTR*)

The \$25million reward announced by Paul Bremer and used in *Panorama: Saddam on the Run* is used here as an interesting story-telling device. That it is allowed to stand without the necessary critique or reference to the US essentially functioning beyond any pretence at International Law is instructive. Ostensibly, the war in Iraq was in defence of international law, however, the Coalition Provisions Authority in Iraq is here permitted, uncritically, to essentially function as the world police force. In this broadcast, Iraq stands in for the 'Wild West', a 'Wild West' in which the US plays the role of sheriff to Saddam's villainy. The use of non-diegetic score is also instructive. When discussing 'the huge sums Saddam had squirreled away' (*P:SOTR*), shots of said millions are cut against US military and political spokespersons, but the transition from shot-to-shot is accompanied by the sound of a bank vault opening. Perhaps the explanation for non-diegetic aural stimulus is to multi-modally represent Saddam as Heist mastermind.

With clearly represented access to high-profile Primary Definers, legitimated sources and figures, we are introduced to General David Petraeus. Interestingly, and in a

similar fashion to that which is granted to Bernie Kerik and, in a different way to Reggie Harris, Petraeus is afforded the time and televisual space with which to fulminate. He is afforded a functional honorific, his title; nominated by use of his name, and the semiotic space he is afforded; and functionalised by what he does. Discursively, this is a fairly comprehensive representation.

Having begun the journey and then the investigation with reference *to*, and interviews *with* high-profile sources, the next sequence appears perhaps a little incongruous. The imagery is archive footage and again, by referring back to the pre-conflict phase examples of demonization designed to remind us of Saddam's villainy. The sequence is archive of Saddam's family which serves to represent him (via association with his sons) as akin to mafia figures. In order to achieve this characterisation, this previously unseen footage of Saddam Hussein's family at a party.

Corbin: On family home movies Uday and Qusay lived up to their image in Iraq – gangster sons of a mafia don, hated and feared.

The party theme, we are told, is 'Capone' and the attendees are all dressed as gangsters. This allows the narrative of *Panorama: Saddam on the Run* to segue neatly from the images of the 'squirreled away' cash and jewellery seamlessly back to descriptions of the family as 'gangster sons of a mafia Don' (Jane Corbin *P:SOTR*). This is narratively and characterisationally vital. Perhaps the Hussein family were as seduced by the same signifiers of Hollywood imagery and popular culture as the imagined audience. However, in this representation (perhaps rightly) such ideas are precluded so that the demonised figure can be augmented, they can thus be represented as archetypal villains in the drama. This latest representation serves to fix the image in the mind of the audience, a dramatized rendering of the gangster Saddam, 'on the run'. The archive footage, particularly that sourced from the Saddam Hussein personal family archive, does undoubtedly add something, some authenticity and legitimacy. However, as they appear in these broadcasts, they are stripped of

context. Instead they are free-floating signifiers, abandoned textual threads weaved into the fabric of (whatever) the narrative orientation requires. And what *Panorama: Saddam on the Run* requires is to reanimate the characterisation of Saddam the archetypal demon.

Having re-established the demon and fixed him in the narrative, the remainder of the broadcast then again returns to devoting attention to documenting the steps the US and UK coalition took in order to capture Saddam. Having devoted significant time and attention to demonization (across the sample), the next sequence of the narrative thread signals a return to the Primary Definer of David Petraeus. Corbin offers Petraeus what one might describe as something of a soft or feeder question:

Corbin: How important was it for what you were trying to do – out there – with ‘hearts and minds’ that you find the family, the father and the sons? (*P:SOTR*)

There is no discussion of the international legal obligations, the extent to which it is (or is not) within the terms of the ‘mission’, within the remit, within international law to hunt down these men? An explicit, but disavowed and assumed correct, ‘common sense’ even, acknowledgement of the battle for ‘hearts and minds’, or in other words, explicit propaganda. Petraeus, in mid-shot, dominating the screen, talking in calm and measured tones (always marked against the more uncontrolled and chaotic representation of Saddam et al, thus contributing to the Ideological Square) in his answers actually references the ‘psychological impact’ the capture of Saddam’s sons might have on Iraqi’s, but devotes most of his answer to the ‘substantive’ points:

Patreus: ...on the substantive side, people like Uday and Qussai (Saddam’s sons) have enormous amounts of money...

Corbin: And what are they doing with this money?

Patreus: ‘They were hiring others’ to take shots at our soliders, to *take shots at those who are trying to play a role in the new Iraq*’ (*my emphasis*) (*P:SOTR*)

The final words from Petraeus, while perhaps not unexpected, he is, after all the general and is therefore expected to believe in the mission, are interesting in themselves. However, equally interesting is Corbin’s response to this statement. There was no response, the shot

then shifts to a crowded Mosul street. This is important because his statement passes without comment, without critique, without question. Is there not some demand that the ethics, the legality, the human cost of this mission are questioned or foregrounded? Some discussion or critical interrogation of the role, what that might be, might involve, might suppress? What is this ‘new Iraq’? On whose terms will the ‘New Iraq’ be established? What are political, military, bureaucratic and social mechanisms by which the new Iraq will be organised? ‘Trying to play a (positive) role in the new Iraq’, the positive Attributes, is simply a given, that the role, *and* the new Iraq itself, will, by dint of its architects and authors, automatically be a positive one. It is this interview which most clearly reveals the orientation of the narrative and the limits of critique. That the ‘new Iraq’ will be a place of ‘freedom and democracy’ is simply a given, uncritiqued and further demonstrates, against mounting evidence, that the benign intervention thesis is firmly established, entrenched and actually functions as the *sine qua non*, the organising logic, the common sense of the ‘operation’ in general and the post-conflict *Panorama* broadcasts explicitly. Is this the expected and necessary role demanded and required of the flagship Current Affairs broadcast strand, to simply act as uncritical cheerleader for ‘benign Western intervention’?

One of the most important things to note about *Panorama: Saddam on the Run* is quite how muted any discussion of the actual conflict is. Despite it only *officially* ending a matter of months previously (and of course it continued unofficially via guerrilla warfare for years) it is almost completely Absented and ignored. This is one of the clearest demonstrations of the extent to which the sample of broadcasts referred to in this chapter are concerned with each telling a different (though related) story. That the actual conflict, either recently ended or the continuing ‘insurgency’, is almost completely ignored (in two of the three broadcasts) is indicative of a) the disparate threads the post-conflict sample is attempting to weave together; b) that the post-conflict discourse is concerned with providing

narrative closure; c) it indicates the extent to which the media caravan swiftly and decisively ‘moves on’. *Panorama: Saddam on the Run*, perhaps unsurprisingly given its title, is chiefly concerned only with the ‘Manhunt’ aspect, as such all political, ideological, geo-political considerations are entirely side-lined and overlooked in favour of the ‘procedural elements’ of the hunt and capture. What historical references do feature are only ever concerned with the brutality of Saddam and his ‘henchmen’.

There are some occasions whereby the actions of the coalition forces are foregrounded and are the central focus. However, in the overall narrative and discourse of this broadcast, the example serves chiefly to demonstrate the difficulty of the mission, the continuing ‘battle for Iraq’.

Corbin: At dawn the next morning, they launched an assault against Saddam loyalists, many Iraqi’s and one US soldier were to die. (*P:SOTR*)

Jane Corbin’s description of events here is an act of Nominalisation, the agency recedes. The term ‘assault’ is, in the circumstances, rather euphemistic. ‘Many’, how many? An example of the discursive tool of ‘Aggregation’, reducing individuals to a mass, not even statistics as there are no numbers provided, merely a lumpen mass. That it is then followed by the passive, or Intransitive verb ‘to die’ is an act of Nominalisation or exnomination. So even though, in this instance, there is some agency attached, within the same sentence, ‘we’ do know *who* is responsible, the US troops are distanced by omission (not named, merely referred to as ‘they’) and the passivity attached to the verb ‘die’ is markedly different to the verb used (by Andy Davies, above: ‘kill(ed)’). Even if disavowed, accidental, logically (journalistically) coherent, just the way things are done, the ascribing of blame, fault, outright mendacity or cold-bloodedness to the ‘Other’ while simultaneously distancing bloody ‘effects’ from ‘our troops’, though subtle, and only visible after extensive analysis, is illustrative of the discourse of the *Panorama* canon when dealing with conflict in Iraq.

One of the final scenes in *Panorama: Saddam on the Run* provides the narrative closure, that this particular episode in Iraq's history is now at a close:

Dr Adnan Pachachi - Iraqi Governing Council

As soon as Ambassador Bremer said: 'We've got him' there were cheers all over the place and people were crying. It was a very emotional period. I mean a lot of people have lost so many relatives of their own, so many friends, so many... really Iraq passed through a terrible, terrible time. (*P:SOTR*)

Televisually, journalistically and discursively, this returns us to the tropes and forms found in the pre-conflict phase sample, particularly *P:TCAS*; *P:SAWFH* and *P:CSW* found in Chapter 4. The use of archive material, some of it never previously seen, serves as a reminder for the viewers as to why 'we' are pursuing him in the first instance. This is interesting on a number of levels. On the most basic level, having been reminded of his brutality, the manhunt discourse entirely shifts the narrative away from any internationally legally binding agreements. The above scene complimented by tearful and cheering crowds, witness statements and relief, serves as the ultimate denouement. Despite the efforts, despite the bloodshed (though this is mostly disavowed) the hunt *was* worth it:

...the pro-war camp were able to build on a well-established discourse about the depravity of the regime, and to stress the *moral* obligation to *liberate* the Iraqi people from such an oppressive dictatorship. While this did not provide the legal basis for intervention, it became increasingly important as a *de facto* justification for war. (Lewis 2004: 299)

Panorama clearly represents the story that, despite the illegal, destabilizing and unwanted nature of the war, even without the presence of WMDs, getting rid of the evil that was Saddam was worth it anyway. No further analysis is required when 'We've got him', the ultimate villain has been captured. The capturing of 'Saddam on the run' of course also obscures or simply ignores the structural conditions of neoliberal and neo-imperialist adventurism.

6.10 Concluding Remarks

All three post-conflict phase examples cited in this chapter build on the various narrative(s) developed over the timeframe and present in the discourse of this sample. Discussed in the previous two chapters, all three broadcasts encompass elements from the previous two *phases*. However, in addition, the examples cited in this chapter are combined with (an)other key facet. This facet is one of the key dramatic tropes that is television's speciality, chiefly: a sense of denouement which is typically found in fictionalised drama(tic) texts. Though all three have different narrative and characterisational focus (different stories to tell), there is demonstrably a sense that the episodes of *Panorama* are engaged in a sort of tying up of the loose ends.

All three post-conflict broadcasts are clearly, demonstrably and discursively linked to other, previous examples in the sample. *Panorama: The Price of Victory* has as its narrative focus the action of battle, told principally through military personnel, discursively, narratively, aesthetically, televisually and journalistically linked *to* and building *on*, similar frames and discourses utilised in the conflict-phase (particularly, *P:TBFB* and *P:TRTB*).

Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam's Weapons returns us most forcefully and overtly to the search for Saddam Hussein's (always illusive or illusory) 'weapons of mass destruction', discursively, narratively, aesthetically, televisually and journalistically drawing on and linked to elements contained within the pre-conflict sample. *Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam's Weapons* has some elements of the police procedural or cop show genre. This broadcast also makes most direct reference to, uses footage from, another, already discussed and analysed example from the pre-conflict phase sample. In fact, even the title is instructive, making an overt reference to *Panorama's* own historical example from Chapter 4, *Panorama: Chasing Saddam's Weapons*. As such, we can begin to see the discursive *and* journalistic, televisual trends this research has sought to identify and analyse.

Panorama: Saddam on the Run charts and traces the ‘hunt for Saddam’, discursively, narratively, aesthetically, televisually and journalistically linked to, and building on (referencing back) to the already demonised representations clearly evident in the pre-conflict phase sample (*P:SAWFH*; *P:TCAS*). This broadcast, too, combines moments of action with elements of a detective caper.

In some regards the dramatic is obviously present even in the very titles of the broadcasts in the sample. Admittedly, ‘Price’ is not, on its own, particularly dramatic, however, the contents of this broadcast certainly are, and the sense of drama through character is certainly forcefully present within the text. The remaining two broadcast both reference action by way of the verbs contained in the titles. ‘Chasing’ and ‘Running’ are both indicative of some (descriptions of) action and within the texts themselves, this urgency is at times accentuated. What remains more acute and urgent though in these broadcasts, in the latter two in particular, is the denouement elements. The sense of narrative closure each broadcast attempts to bring.

One of the reasons to focus on character, and in this chapter I would apply that term to include the soldiers (stories), the journalists and the Primary Definers is because, as outlined by both Altheide and Grimes (2005), and this research, post-conflict broadcasts tend to focus more explicitly on reflection, on what went wrong:

Following the war, journalists’ reaction and reflection on various governmental restrictions, and suggestions for the future (which are seldom implemented)... Media reports about such studies, and so on, which are often cast quite negatively and often lead to widespread conclusion that perhaps war was unnecessary, other options were available, and that the price was too high. All of this will be useful for the coverage of the next war. (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 616)

As such, the mistakes, the problems, the issues, many of them *complex*, are *more easily communicated when attached to, or told through individuals*. The extent to which such reflections are present has been subject to analysis. However, crucially, such reflections and examinations that were present, were, when ‘our side’ were represented, typically filtered

through the self-reflexive, contemplative and thoughtful musings of individuals. On occasion, even the moments and examples of critical reflection are undertaken by the very same people involved in the original ‘mistakes’. Those already ‘cast’ as ethical, thoughtful, contemplative and human(e). Very little outside agency is permitted, nothing or no one from beyond the confines of the political elites, the military elites, or the journalistic elites. Simply invited to (self) reflect, afforded time and televisual space with which to do so. There are some muted acknowledgements of ‘mistakes’ made, or at least that the task was larger and more difficult than anticipated ‘the US forces large enough to win the war but too small to secure the peace’ (*P:TPOV*) but these are confined within a narrow discursive regime, no critical interrogation of the wider geo-political, ideological or ethical implications. No critical reflection (or rejection of) the benign Western intervention thesis. The focus on character (in a dramatic text) has been dominant.

Whether the characters are military personnel, elected officials or assorted other political actors, the text(s) tend to narrate the war/conflict as having impact on individuals, on their future career, or on their relations with their families, etc. When the focus has been on one of the military coalition troops, by way of empathy, and recognition, particularly recognition of the(ir) human failings or their familial qualities, the texts represented those on screen as (potentially) sympathetic characters. The texts leave us in little doubt that those represented are human, innately flawed yes, but human and motivated with the best of intentions. The discursive and epistemological effect this has on them, and potentially on our vision of them, and, by implication, even perhaps our vision of ‘ourselves’ as Western subjects, is significant. Through representational apparatus, the discourse, the casting of character as thoughtful, contemplative humans, through sheer repetition, viewers might be unable to so easily dismiss the motivations of those represented in quite the same way we are interpellated to dismiss or even be hostile to officially designated enemies.

Throughout the post-conflict phase broadcasts, and as a means of demarcating them from the conflict broadcasts, the focus slowly shifted. There was a gradual refocusing, and re-energising with regards continuing the ‘search’ for or ‘chasing’ down ‘his’ ‘weapons of mass destruction’ and latterly the ‘hunt for Saddam’. These search templates, searching for Saddam *and* his weapons, take on a significant role. Despite the fact that these particular policy objectives are related to the wider political context, ‘his weapons’ and ‘his brutality’ functioned as de facto justifications *for* the conflict, the search discourse orients the narrative away from wider structural accounts and considerations to a more procedural, a more dramatic narrative arc.

What has been present most consistently, or at least is most clearly observable is that the, perhaps expected, more critical and more reflective discourses of the post-conflict sample, while to some extent, present, are not necessarily oriented around either a) journalistic self-reflection, nor b) critical reflection or interrogation of actual policy.

Firstly, that a major critique that does emerge is oriented around the hunt for Saddam ensures that, to some extent, the texts can (re)play the visual reminders of Saddam’s brutality. This of course continues (cements) the narrative developed in the pre-conflict phase sample (including archive visuals of, and reference to Halabja in *Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam’s Weapons*). The dominant mode of critique that is operationalised by the sample texts tend to be framed by ‘our’ continuing hunt for the demon. Once caught, as he is in *Panorama: Saddam on the Run*, there is a sense of narrative closure, the type of narrative closure typically found in dramatic narratives. In the genre(s) of News and Current Affairs, this literal closing of the circle is then followed by *the actual departure* of the ‘news media caravan’.

Secondly, a major discursive, narrative and characterisational orientation is the focus on the ‘soldiers’ stories’. This approach is particularly acute within the confines of the

text *Panorama: The Price of Victory*. The limited critique that is (re)present(ed) tends to focus on the fact that ‘they’ (the coalition troops) might not be as prepared as necessary; that the soldiers are not provided with the tools necessary to ‘do the job’ required; or when on those rare occasions the troops are represented less-favourably, such actions are licensed by their human frailty, the pressures of the job in the ‘torrid heat of an Iraqi summer’ (*P:TPOV*) and perhaps indicative of a few bad apples. In this narrative, the ‘shortcomings’ or any discussions ‘that perhaps war was unnecessary’ (Altheide and Grimes 2005) while present, and at times, foregrounded and argued, are contained within an overall discourse or template that demands a degree of sympathy for those on screen while simultaneously disregarding or overlooking the rationale, the ethics, the potentially neo-imperialist and (capture of) energy resources that might have been (one of) the objectives. In other words, critical reflections that are present and observable are represented as tactical or procedural. The coalition soldiers are caught in the middle of perhaps ill-prepared or hapless planners. This is manifestly not an ideological critique or critical reflection on the policies of neoliberal or neo-imperialist geopolitics. By framing the post-war discourse in this way, the critique that does emerge is coded and safely contained within very narrow parameters. These parameters are consistent with the WPM, and are particularly acute for *the* Public Service Broadcaster of record, with all its attendant focus on ‘impartiality’ and ‘balance’. It would appear that the discourse and idea(l)s applied once the ‘conflict is underway’ continues to be a motivating factor here in the post-conflict sample. There is of course also an additional focus on achieving those objectives, not questioning or casting critical scrutiny on what they *are*:

...the media are able to claim they are fulfilling journalistic ideals of *balance and objectivity* when a conflict is underway by switching to presenting and analysing the ability of government to achieve the goals it has set. (McQueen 2010: 64)

Furthermore, and as consistent with the critique developed over the course of this research, the focus on individuals, authoritative sources (Primary Definers), soldiers, and

their familial familiarity essentially casts them as sympathetic, even empathetic *characters*. None of the above is to suggest that the individual ‘characters’, particularly those characters featured in the soldiers’ stories arc, are *not* worthy of such identification. The point is that in focusing on such characters, the narrative orientation, the discourse is established such that it dislocates the micro-narrative(s) from their wider (macro-narrative) ideological contours.

Thirdly, there is some focus (again) on the ‘Primary Definers’. These sources, with all the institutional authority that comes with such positions reproduces legitimacy for specific policy objectives. These sources and primary definers are principally drawn from senior diplomatic core, senior military command, and senior elite politicians. So if and when opinions, ‘facts’ and arguments *against* the war *do* emerge and find a place in the post-conflict phase *Panorama* sample, the critique, from these sources and institutions, never examines *motivations*, but is coded, contained and restricted to the difficulty of getting the job done, *not* what that job *is*. When they themselves are subject to critique, they can be written-off as ‘mistakes’ and further, *Panorama* itself does not see the need to subject itself to (even) similar levels of (muted) critique.

Interestingly, I would not cast the soldiers in this instance *as* ‘primary definers’. I would characterise them as central actors, or protagonists, their voice and presence in the narrative is entirely (dramatically at least) necessary, but they do not wholly shape the discourse or narrative orientation. Instead I would argue that they provide the personal, dramatic resonance, the characterisational depth demanded by the narrative orientation. Said narrative orientation is defined by the more senior, more legitimated authority figures, the soldiers merely add the character, the dramatic depth (though not breadth).

What remains important throughout the analysis, and in fact is a consistent feature of all phases, pre-conflict; conflict; post-conflict is the representations of different central actors: elite, military and civilian, when marked against one another. The sheer weight, the

number of sympathetically framed representations of ‘our’ side when cast and cut against those of the ‘Other’ has a semiotic cumulative, epistemological, Ideologically Squaring, discursive effect. So even when snapshots, little moments of either sympathetic representation of ‘Others’, or conversely less than sympathetic representations of ‘our’ side do appear, they do not necessarily puncture the over representations that have accumulated.

Within the narratives of the final broadcasts, the questioning by the *Panorama* journalists is at times fairly forensic but the focus is on mistakes or things overlooked that should not have been. ‘That’s what tyrants do’; ‘why were our troops badly briefed’; ‘Why are our troops (Brave boys) not given the resources they need?’, as opposed to why the war is being prosecuted in the first place. The wider geopolitical context and rationale for conflict, and equally importantly, to what (ideological, geo-political and hegemonic) end[s] is largely absented or erased?

The *drama* of the post-conflict phase broadcasts, through ideological expediency, and through a combination of the aforementioned factors, does not provide the necessary texture or nuance(d) representation. Perhaps through the more banal practicalities of lacking available footage, we are often denied the fully developed context and/or background character. Concomitantly, it might be said that in so doing, *Panorama* through either invisibility or more likely caricature, renders Iraq as subaltern, ‘Other’, backwards, dangerous and fundamentally unknowable in terms ‘we’ might understand and empathise with. *Panorama*, by detaching persons from the set of relations that make up their experience in the world, tends to objectify or ‘Other’ subaltern characters. They are ‘not like us’. This is of course visually, discursively and multi-modally marked against the representation of ‘our boys’ where the persons are inextricably attached to the set of relations (quite literally when Reggie Harris discusses missing family, or Bernie Kerik sheds tears over lost colleagues) that make up their experience(s) in the world.

Despite the fact that each broadcast from the sample tells a different story, there are two significant, and clearly present consistent discursive features of the post-conflict phase sample. The first consistent theme that unites the post-conflict sample is that the broadcasts seem to attempt to communicate a sense of narrative closure. Building on the narratives, characters, frames and discourses found in the pre-conflict and conflict phase(s), using the televisual and discursive features of denouement typically found in fictionalised dramatic texts, the post-conflict sample seems to be designed as a means of bringing events to a (partial) close.

The second consistent discursive element is that, and as the WPM suggests, a more critical approach is notionally present. There are certainly sections and comments from sources and from journalists that critically examine the situation in ‘post-war Iraq’. Indeed, there are elements of a sort of ‘lessons learned’ discourse. In this way *Panorama: The Price of Victory*; *Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam’s Weapons* and *Panorama: Saddam on the Run* adhere to the WPM. However, it is because the post-conflict sample *returns* to and is oriented around already previously established (in the previous pre-conflict and conflict phases), now entrenched, narratives, that the critique is limited or diminished.

Perhaps the best way to summarise this, is by way of quoting from a Primary Definer contained within one of the post-conflict phase broadcasts. Concluding in the same way that *Panorama: The Price of Victory* begins and (almost) ends, American source, Paul Bremer sums up the limits of *Panorama’s* critique:

Paul Bremer: The American people have undertaken with the British and our other coalition allies here a noble exercise and we will see it through. (*P:TPOV*)

This particular statement posits that despite some problems, the UK and US are engaged in (and thus motivated by) a(n) Over-Lexicalised, positively Attributed ‘noble exercise’.

Similarly, and as our lead-in to Bremer, seconds prior to that statement, *Panorama* journalist Andy Davies utters the following statement:

Andy Davies: The vision, to turn Iraq into a beacon of democracy for the Middle-East. (*P:TPOV*)

For a journalist on notionally and reputationally the most critical broadcast strand on British television to uncritically Over-Lexicalise and positively Attribute ‘us’ in such a way is problematic. That the apparent motivations of coalition forces and the political elites that sent them to war are essentially benevolent, is surely naïve (at best). Such a statement is a literal, journalistic, televisual narrative based entirely on the rationalisations and justifications of the UK and US Government sources. However, it, and the related ‘nobility’ referenced by Bremer becomes the main frame through which the post-conflict phase broadcasts are organised and narrated. Even when examples of moderate criticism are (re)present(ed), they are able to be safely constrained by the dramatically rendered emotional signifiers and practices, and simultaneously safely contained within an epistemology of what this research would summarise as the benign intervention thesis.

Conclusion

Throughout the course of this research, it has been my contention that the public service broadcast Current Affairs strand, *Panorama*, while remaining broadly within its public service obligations, has systematically, journalistically, epistemologically and discursively misinformed, or at least, only partially informed ‘the public’ with regards the (still) ongoing situation in Iraq. It is also my contention that this partial informing was/is not done through any particular journalistic malfeasance, or even *easily* identifiable *deliberate* inadequacies. In this way then, the ‘inadequacies’ (such as they can be referred to as such) are not a matter of either bias, which we can summarise as a *deliberate* attempt to mislead or persuade, or of misinformation, but that there is something else is at work here. Something else embedded within the very practises of the Current Affairs television journalistic form. Perhaps the partial vision and version of events that *Panorama* presents us with might instead be a product of the very practises and discourses of the long-form broadcast (television) journalistic ‘form’.

With regards television specifically, complaints regarding it (television) are of course longstanding:

This warning against the ‘contamination’ of the journalistic enterprise from the high-principled field of documentary, as opposed to populist frivolity, nevertheless contains the familiar suspicion of the contaminating power of the medium itself. It implies that the visual nature of television may hinder the verbal attempt to explain, and that an emotional concentration on ‘societies sores’ always discourages a cool attempt to account for those sores (Holland 2006: 92)

Despite much critique and interrogation of the form and medium in this research, it was not my intention to repeat and rehearse the exact same reductive complaints regarding its (television specifically) shortcomings. There are of course echoes here that may hint at this view, but my critique is not (wholly) focussed on the limitations of the visual(s) but on the hybridized form of Current Affairs as it is currently imagined. Post-Birt revolution, while News and Current Affairs, and *Panorama* in particular, were afforded more resources as a

means to undertake ‘the mission to explain’, the mixing of forms, journalism, news and the more entertainment centred tropes found increasingly present in ‘reality’ formats, means that *Panorama* never really satisfactorily produces a fully-formed rigorous method that journalistically informs the audience of the (full) story (of conflict). The analysis contained herein outlines that relying on the practices and forms of the classic narrative structure, often reverting to archetypes and stereotypes, largely dependent on Primary Definers to shape the narrative arc and define the discourse, *Panorama* instead seeks to tell the, often emotional and dramatic, story (or stories) in visually arresting form(s), while simultaneously being incapable of examining the wider ideological and geo-political context(s) of stories and News events. In this specific case, the news event was the conflict in Iraq.

There is of course a danger that the above prognosis has echoes of the long established and much debated ‘dumbing-down’ thesis. Some have argued forcefully against the perhaps lazy assumptions that such journalistic tropes and approaches necessarily lead to a ‘dumbing-down’. Among these, McNair (2009), Harrison (2006), de Burgh (2005) and Bird (2010), in fact posit the theory that there are many positives to be found in the attempt to engage viewers/readers of News with personal stories and narratives as a means of understanding complex events. In the editions of *Panorama* subjected to critical discourse analysis in the course of this thesis, such representations are present, and, I would argue, forcefully so. The characters tend to be over-determined. In television studies theory, the dramatic ‘pull’ of character can act as a point of entry for viewers. Cushion (2012a) paraphrasing Temple (2006) argues:

‘Dumbing-down’ is good ... scholars should look beyond a Habermasian model of constructing audiences as rational and critical actors since many people engage with news that is trivial or emotionally driven. The ‘dumbing-down’ thesis, in this context, is caught up in intellectual snobbery, informed by an elitist and highbrow sense of what news and current affairs should be as opposed to an accessible form of journalism that audiences can understand and participate in (Cushion 2012: 25)

According to this critique then, perhaps the dramatic and ‘emotionally driven’ (Cushion 2012) story-lines of (some of) the *Panorama* episodes are designed to be accessible, understandable and as such to possibly encourage understanding and engagement.

As the research developed, and to my own surprise, it became clear(er) that in fact the dramatic and emotional elements present in much of the sample, do not, *in themselves*, act as impediments to Public Service Broadcast, Public Sphere oriented, public interest journalism. It need not be the case that broadcast Current Affairs (or News) journalism be compromised by dramatic and emotional engagement, it need not be a ‘binary’ choice.

According to Pantti’s ethnographic research with journalists in Finland and the Netherlands:

Within all newsrooms, traditional views of journalism, based on the reason/emotion and information/entertainment binaries, were present. Importantly, however, the journalists did not simplistically distinguish ‘good’ journalism from ‘bad’ journalism on the grounds that the latter is concerned with emotion; instead, they highlighted the different ways and motivations for using emotions. (Pantti. 2010. 180)

As the above quote, paraphrasing broadcast journalists demonstrates, the binary might be a false choice. Furthermore, emotional and dramatic moments are considered a vital and valid part of the journalistic storytelling repertoire, and what is more, that such elements can enhance audience understanding and social knowledge:

Presenting and interpreting ‘relevant’ individual and collective emotions were seen as a part of journalism’s aim to reveal reality, as ‘facts’, without which the whole truth is not told; on the other hand, the main objective of emotional storytelling was to enhance the political and social knowledge of the audience, to facilitate the understanding of news. (Pantti. 2010. 179)

Perhaps then, it is not so much that drama, character and emotive representation are present, but who are the ‘subjects of value’ (Skeggs and Wood 2011) afforded time, space, depth, interiority, character and that have some impact on the direction (even partial) of the unfolding narrative. So perhaps part of the limitation can be identified as deriving not merely from the Television aesthetic, but in the journalism itself. What I mean by this is that the sheer unavailability *of* alternative or ‘enemy’ sources, and the simultaneous proximity *to/with*

‘Primary Definers’ represented as ‘subjects of value’ might be accounted for by the relative geographical distance the subjects have from the journalists attempting to represent them. It might be that a physical, intellectual, social, cultural and emotional distance; the lack of local proximity and subsequent knowledge and investment, affects the ways in which the central social, political, diplomatic and military actors are represented. These various and varying *journalistic* impediments and difficulties of basic access perhaps combine with the *television aesthetics*, the semiotics of production and dissemination; the needs and demands for dramatic and emotional ‘story-lines’ into which character[s] can be rendered and made knowable. An explicitly related impediment that precludes more in-depth, critical contextual understanding is the location of *Panorama* in the context of journalism, or *as* a piece of journalistic reportage. By which I mean, *Panorama* is so firmly and clearly demarcated *as* part of the BBC News output, and that having discarded the ‘more chaotic forms of ... the documentary tradition’ (Barnett 2011: 117) is thus ‘reduced’ to a form of televisual storytelling too narrowly contained in and constrained by the discourse(s) of journalism and News. It could be then that the combination of factors ensures that journalists revert to the story-telling template, a template which foregrounds and privileges recognisable, knowable ‘characters’ of Western imaginary and thus precluding the possibility of a fully developed overview of geo-politics.

Might it then be perfectly acceptable and understandable to make use of dramatic codes and conventions, narratives and characters? If so, should the focus then *not* be on the fact that such modes are present and dominant, but with whom, within the texts, the audiences are encouraged to identify. Who, in the narrative is represented as the more-rounded, nuanced and sympathetic human subject(s). As important, what might the dramatic strategies (for identification/dis-identification) be? This research posits that the television journalism strategies tend to be the Over-Coding, Over-Lexicalised, positive Attributes of

‘our’ recognisable ‘characters’, represented as archetypal ‘good guys’. Even if such a positive representation is not always possible, at the very least, when such a representation is compromised or hedged, ‘we’ tend still to be represented as thoughtful and self-reflective, more fully-rendered human subjects, sometimes in archetypal form, but nevertheless, a more fully-rounded and ‘universal’ human. Contrastingly, officially designated enemies are ‘flat and cartoon like’ (BBC), often a more ‘fixed, reductionary image of a particular type of person’ (Gray. 2008) with little room for character or narrative development, a stereotype against whom, the more rounded character(s) of ‘us’ are marked. Such representations, particularly via visual and Lexical cues and edits, and through repetition, accumulate representational power and solidify a picture of the world. The contrasting is a form of Ideological Squaring. The important additional question posed is: what might the wider socio-political ramifications of this be?

This developed critique is not arguing that television journalism, the visual, *necessarily* contaminates the best intentions, or the ‘verbal attempt(s) to explain’ (Holland 2006: 92) but that television journalism as it is currently practised tends to have an over-reliance on *specific* discourses, narratives, characters and visuals. There is an over-reliance on deliberately chosen and particular dramatic examples. The deliberately chosen examples can no doubt be rationalised journalistically, but the detailed critical discourse analysis present in this research, indicates that the examples chosen are most often those that *fit* (and therefore significantly contribute *to*) the developing, soon to be dominant, ‘Saddam as uniquely threatening’; ‘Benign Western intervention’ narrative(s). In part because of their source-relations, the journalists end up reproducing hegemonic discourse. This eventually dominant discourse is mobilised, imagined and represented via a detailed focus on specific character(s), sometimes through archetypal representation(s), and sometimes through the more clumsy stereotyped representation(s). When the focus is on ‘our side’ most often, though not

exclusively, the ‘characters’ are recognisable elite political actors, imbued with legitimacy in part through sheer repetition of representation, in part through the hierarchical social location, or, emotionally literate soldiers or other individuals with whom ‘we’ can relate. Whether political officials, advisors, military experts, they, over time, through repetition take on the authority of Primary Definers. In the case of ‘our’ combat troops, in place of Primary Definers’ (as we would ordinarily understand the term) they become the central dramatic and characterisational actors, called upon to burnish or support the discourse established by the primary definers/elite sources. The combination of this repetitious presence and, especially with regards the combat troops ‘on the front-line’, the dramatic and emotionally resonant story-arcs and characterisation tropes, play a significant, often overlooked, role in sustaining the ‘muscular liberalism’ or what this thesis has defined as the ‘benign intervention’ of Western power. The dramatically resonant representations sustain this (disavowed as) ideological imperative with little or no criticism of its foundations or of its merits. It is the over-representation (of the above) that produces a narrow vision and version of the event(s). Even ‘benign intervention’ might in fact be too anaemic a term. Perhaps a better, more accurate term might be ‘benevolent intervention’. This is not the time or space in which to develop this argument, however, it is worth bearing in mind the polling that consistently demonstrates that the British population, think – overwhelmingly – that the British Empire was a ‘good thing’ (<https://yougov.co.uk/news/2014/07/26/britain-proud-its-empire/>). Such a response is hardly surprising given the research undertaken and documented here. It should of course go without saying that I do not propose *Panorama* is solely responsible for this state affairs, more that it is merely a small, but significant (and legitimated) piece of the jigsaw. Further analysis of these dramatic, storytelling, journalistic and televisual signifying practices, and the ways in which they might contribute to the benign intervention thesis, offers possibilities for future research.

Returning to the ‘narrow vision’, specifically regarding television, this is a part of a general trend. Or, as John Ellis, echoing Susan Douglas, puts it:

...television can be used either as a telescope, opening up world vistas as in its early years; or, as now, as a microscope, investigating ever more constrained topics in an ever more detailed way. Is it true, then, that television is deeply implicated in a flight away from political engagement towards the ‘navel-gazing’ of reality TV? (Ellis 2016 <http://cstonline.tv/politics-tv>)

It is therefore a combination of factors: the medium, the form, the journalistically narrow discourse(s) and the accumulated ‘weight’ of representations, of Primary definers, of characters, and narratives, and the all too readily available narrative structure template which precludes fully developed contextually rich explanation(s) of vitally important events and issues.

In all three historical, textual genres and phases (pre-conflict phase; conflict phase; post-conflict phase) the identification of the villain is clearly represented. As discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5, *Panorama* devotes significant representational effort in casting and characterising Saddam Hussein as the primary ‘deviant’ agent. While this trope does rather reduce the ‘Whodunnit’ element (much like in Columbo), we are left in little doubt as to who the villain is. Nevertheless, a villain is present and known. Saddam (single name depicting his villainy) becomes the object and subject, the central narrative and characterised concern. In Chapter 5 ‘he’ recedes a little into the background as the focus turns to the action. In Chapter 6, given that there is a sense of denouement, of seeking some narrative closure, once the ‘hunt’ for him is ‘on’, the narrative arc of *Panorama* takes on the characteristics of the cop show. This is even indicated by the title(s), *Panorama: Saddam on the Run*, and to a lesser extent, *Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam’s Weapons*. The villain, on the run is pursued by the archetypal heroic figures of coalition troops and associated Primary Definers.

In the *Panorama* broadcasts analysed here, the pre-conflict phase is the disruption, we, the audience are aware of some disruption to the normal ‘harmonious’ way of life, the

representation of Saddam in the broadcasts analysed in Chapter 4 set up the disruption, and the villain, that said disruption is the fault of a 'deviant' agent. Chapter 5 is the procedural element, we are invited to witness the procedure(s) of war and conflict. There are also additional 'cop show' individual(ised) story-lines and characters. The pursuit of the deviant agency and an attempt to bring him to justice. Chapter 6 is the denouement, the (partial) narrative closure, elements of the procedural, the practises of the chase are combined with the 'resolution', when the disruptive element is apprehended, the 'neutralisation of the threat he poses' (MacMurrough-Kavanagh in Carson and Llewellyn-Jones. 2000) is achieved and, in the *Panorama* post-conflict phase broadcast examples, the task of 'the restoration of order' is undertaken, resolved and partially 'achieved'. Perhaps it is not the mission that matters, but the pleasure one takes from experiencing the act of the hunt, and the safe resolution brought about by the capture. It is also the case that each broadcast has, in and of itself, a certain Proppian narrative structure, including 'disruption', identification of deviant agent, identification of hero, pursuit of deviant agent, and (partial) narrative resolution.

Even if the above 'police procedural' and 'copshow' analogies and analysis are not *wholly* sustainable, the point remains that many of the signifiers, such as archetypes, stereotypes, and the classic narrative structure elements contained within dramatic television genres, become the principle storytelling devices used in the *Panorama* broadcasts (pertaining to conflict).

Through an adherence to rigorous discourse and critical discourse analysis, the research has sought to identify particular characteristics, styles, epistemologies and discourses that feature prominently in *Panorama* broadcasts pertaining to Iraq. The ways in which such discursive practice(s) produce a set of frames through which the event(s) in question can be read and understood, has been of paramount importance. The principle findings suggest that, particularly in the case of the flagship Current Affairs series *Panorama*,

and additionally when dealing with war and conflict, a focus and concentration on dramatic elements of the story are employed. Whilst understanding and appreciating the need to communicate (some of) the salient points to an audience in a form that both captivates and informs, it would appear that such dramatic mechanisms and forms tend, via a combination of Over-Lexicalisation, Lexical Absences, Nominalisation, Transitivity/Intransitivity, Attributes and Ideological Squaring to overstate the relative menace of officially designated enemies, whilst simultaneously overstating the benign 'nature' of 'our own' political and military motivations and interventions. Or, if you prefer: understating and underplaying the less than benign motivations and characteristics 'our own' political and military elite actors *might* have. It is hard to over-state the sheer weight of number of these examples, there were too many to analyse, thus, as an adherence to a detailed CDA methodological approach would suggest, this over-abundance of representations should be seen as indicative of wider and more sustained trends. Crucially, it is their repetition that frames the debate(s) in very specific, pro-Western (elite), neo-imperialist, neoliberal, directions.

The selection of The BBC, and specifically, *Panorama*, is based on the fact that the institution itself, and the flagship nature of *Panorama* means that they are together, and separately, particularly powerful media actors. Through high-level access, historical institutional weight, accumulated social and cultural capital, economic journalistic resources and historical reputation, *Panorama* has the power to establish dominant discourses and epistemologies regarding vital geo-political issues of the moment. The question here is the extent to which *Panorama* (re)produce(d) a reductive, largely pro-Western discourse or frame through which the war in Iraq is/was refracted. Does the cumulative repetition of particular characters and narratives have a serious and deleterious effect on public understanding of vitally important events and issues?

With regards public understanding, nor has it been my intention here to make any claims regarding the extent to which audiences *uncritically accept* the frames offered. Whilst having a very different textual, discursive and ‘event’ sample and example, Boyce-Kay and Salter (2014) perhaps summarise it adroitly:

By situating the ... BBC texts in their institutional, historical, political and discursive contexts, we hope to demonstrate how *qualitative analysis of these texts can provide insights into the processes by which the hegemony of neoliberalism is discursively sustained*. It is neither the remit nor the intention...to determine the extent to which audiences uncritically accepted the dominant frames in these features; rather, our *interest is in how a powerful institution such as the BBC – which is ostensibly protected from market forces – delineates the boundaries for ‘legitimate’ political debate*. (Boyce-Kay and Salter 2014: 2)

Perhaps we can begin to summarise that it is not *necessarily* that character, characterisation, archetypes, stereotypes, casting, the classic narrative structure, non-diegetic score, and *stories* (that they are all significant elements and signifiers of the ‘dramatic’) are themselves overtly problematic, after all, events need to *make sense*, but who in said stories is afforded characterisation[al] depth, space, voice and general presence. Representational presence, voice and characterisation establishes, at least in part, through story and characterisation, *how* certain events, *make sense*. ‘Our own’ recognisable, public, political and military actors take ‘centre-stage’ in the ongoing drama of the events. So much so that it is sometimes the case that the events are in fact filtered almost entirely through the narrative and characterisation of individual protagonists and Primary Definers (*Panorama: Blair’s War* – March 2003, for instance). These figures are knowable and able to resonate depth of character and perhaps draw in an audience. This is particularly the case when said characters are afforded the relative luxury of self-reflection and self-examination. We are invited to ‘see’ for ourselves the apparent agonising over decisions, and the ways in which such agonising has emotional and material effect *on* them, as human beings. Such ‘casting’ within the dramatic narrative means that even if we might disagree with their actions, such rendering of human character might make it more difficult to question their (human(e)) motivations. If

‘our’ political and military elites are always represented as fundamentally motivated by benign intent(ions), and what is more, said elites, cast within the confines of Current Affairs narratives, and representationally *marked against* the demonised, unknown, unknowable, darker forces of the ‘Other’, then this representational practise and form has the potential to have a quite profound effect on the ways in which geo-politics is understood. In this context, and throughout this research, by restricting which opinions, policy proposals, voices and visions of the world are deemed ‘credible’ we can see that the BBC and *Panorama* function as a means to ‘manage’ public opinion: ‘human wellbeing is understood as the wellbeing of the capitalist economy, and democracy is understood as the *management of the public*’.

(Boyce-Kay and Salter 2014)

Conversely, those only partially or notionally represented, afforded no, or very little, and marginalised, space, time, character and presence, often when represented at all, are represented perhaps clumsily, through caricature, stereotype and as importantly, in *opposition* to the ideologically, politically, emotionally and humanly rounded characters (‘our boys’; our elected officials) effectively means that the story established is a somewhat lopsided one. What chance of developed and nuanced representation of a complex geo-political situation, when the representation of character is a) deemed so necessary; b) so firmly embedded *in*, and based *on* binary opposition? c) Said binaries are so demonstrably marked...the ‘Other’ is marked against the fully-rounded benign and human(e) characters of Western hegemony? ‘Blair’ (for instance) is afforded a pensive, reflective human quality through both direct and indirect representation. However, no such luxury is afforded ‘Saddam’, or (m)any Iraqi’s involved in the conflict. Moreover, as above, when such character, caricature, archetypes, stereotypes and narrative structure are the organising logic and principle through which the event(s) are refracted and represented, the character(s) deemed officially as the (would-be) enemy tend(s) to be overly reductive and demonised. Such demonization (in these examples)

are occasionally the filter through which the entirety of the broadcasts are narrated and organised: *Panorama: The Case Against Saddam* – September 2002; *Panorama: Saddam: A Warning from History* – November 2002; *Panorama: Chasing Saddam's Weapons* – February 2003; *Panorama: Saddam on the Run* – March 2004.

As the analysis chapters have demonstrated, even while notionally examining the 'case' against Saddam, the broadcasts, and other related programmes, establish 'him' as the dramatically rendered, central caricature(d) and stereotyped figure. The broadcasts thereafter simply present that *he* has a case to answer, whereas no such overt accusations are forthcoming when dealing with 'our own' western political elites. In fact, in the one example in which one of 'our own' political actors does feature as *the* central protagonist (perhaps, with a 'case to answer') *Panorama: Blair's War*, Blair is afforded more space, more time, and certainly, vicariously through the character of Jack Straw, Blair is represented as critical, 'resilient', 'thriving on the heat' (*P:BW*) thoughtful, pensive, emotionally tortured and motivated by benign intent(ions), doing 'what' he 'believes to be right' (*P:BW*). So even when Blair is the central figure around whom the broadcast is organised, it is his thoughtful ruminations, faithfully reported by *Panorama*, that establish and set the judgemental frame through which the case will be made, and answered.

We see this, somewhat muted, but at least still present critique of 'Western leaders' most readily perhaps in the *Panorama* broadcasts notionally critiquing the 'decision to go to war'. In such broadcasts, there is certainly an element of critique, a striking element whereby the 'anti-war' protestors are afforded presence and a degree of developed character. To some extent this is understandable, and of course entirely defensible and necessary given the levels of disquiet at the time the programme was made and broadcast. However, within the context of both this individual broadcast, and, moreover, the collection or overall discourse of *Panorama* episodes of the time, such criticism is marked against elite source Primary

Definers, and what is more, the ways in which such elite sources have been, and continue to be represented as (perhaps) flawed but always motivated by benign intentions. They, the characters with 'benign' motivations, continue to be the driving narrative force.

Of course as befits the WPM (Altheide and Grimes 2005) as analytical framework and model, there is a significant proportion of the broadcasts under scrutiny, particularly the pre-conflict phase, and some elements of the post-conflict phase broadcasts, in which a healthy dose of scepticism and critical interrogation (of Western elite assumptions and rationales) is present. Equally, as befits the (CDA) methodology and approach, such 'moments' must be included, they must feature in the analysis and the ways in which their characteristics, narrative and critical positions challenge the (by now dominant) assumptions of this thesis. Even though there is a great deal of scepticism, or at least significant moments of sceptical and critical inquiry, certainly in two of the four broadcasts of the pre-conflict phase sample (*Panorama: Case against Saddam; Panorama: The Case Against War*) these can certainly be permissible within the frame of the WPM. What is more, even within the narrative of the aforementioned texts, the overall discourse remains one oriented around Saddam having a case to answer. Even when 'our' political and military elites are scrutinised, the frame established still represents them as fundamentally good and as benign (if misguided) human subjects. In fact, it is largely the very political actors that ought to be under intense scrutiny who actually set the terms, and establish the frame. Scepticism about the impending war is oriented around a narrative in which the case is perhaps *not yet made as fully* as required. Not, that the case (for war) itself is problematic, unethical, and/or illegal. The case is certainly never made that the motivations of our political elites might be propelled by other less than benign geo-political, energy-resource issues or less still, neo-imperialist ambition(s).

The main difficulty in giving too much credence to *Panorama*'s apparent critical position during the pre-conflict phase broadcasts lies in the fact that the chief narrative and characterisation device of the WPM in the pre-war broadcasts remains that of 'demonization of individuals'. Therefore, any critical comments, excerpts, moments, characters, discourses and narrative developments need to be contextualised, located *within* and measured *against* the overall schema (overt demonization of Saddam). As we have seen, even within these more critical broadcasts, most of the narrative, most of the time is devoted to precisely that, demonising Saddam. This is certainly the case here. Even when some minor focus on 'our' mistakes or earlier refusal to intervene or stop selling munitions, the focus quickly and irretrievably returns to what 'He' will do with them (weapons) if he could. Set in this context, in this epistemology of benign western intervention, and when such discourses are the organising logic of the 10 broadcasts in this sample, and over the course of 19 months, mounting a forceful critical position that challenges this logic is rather difficult to sustain, and thus, does not appear, certainly not in any sustained manner.

Using a series of related 'public service' Current Affairs broadcast journalism examples, this thesis has sought to critically interrogate *Panorama*'s discursive role in the shaping of public understanding (the epistemology) of politics, power, and 'conflict' with specific focus on Iraq. This research concludes by suggesting that by focussing attention on narrow, reductive, personalised stories, characters and narratives, combined with an absence or displacement of wider social political and ideological concerns, it is the case that in place of critical interrogation of wider geo-political and structural issues and inequalities, *Panorama*, as it is currently imagined, reduces the complexity of geo-political concerns to a narrow, personal(ised) and reductive focus. The Western hegemonic, even neoliberal, 'consensus' is left unremarked upon in favour of a narrative of demonization, exclusion and

fear. *Panorama* constrains representations, closes down alternative readings, cements and reproduces the hegemony of ‘benign’ (or even benevolent) Western intervention.

In relation to these themes and to outline: a) that our political elites continue to engage in rhetoric that locates ‘western intervention’ in positive terms; b) that they are explicitly permitted to do so precisely because News media and Current Affairs merely reproduces the rhetoric of the Primary Definers without the necessary critical interrogation, it might be useful, albeit very briefly, to provide an example from the contemporary debates about Syria.

Having won the Parliamentary vote that permitted UK forces to intervene in Syria, the (at the time) Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne suggested that this means ‘Britain’s Got its Mojo Back’ (<http://www.cfr.org/united-kingdom/conversation-george-osborne/p37302>). Such statements move beyond a mere callous lack of concern for human life, and perhaps revealingly, move beyond the benign intervention thesis, to instead perform a sort of western imperialist machismo. According to his logic, Britain is revitalised, becoming strong again, recovered its swagger on the ‘world stage’. In this version of events, George Osborne is treating the bombing of Syria as if the act(ion) itself functions as Viagra for imperialists. Such statements are a mythologizing of (empire and) violence. The news media response was at best uncritical, and at worst, silent. There is more than an echo here of Altheide and Grimes War Programming Model point 7 ‘For the next war, return to step 1’ (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 622), with of course my own addendum to Step 7 ‘Nothing significant is learned’ providing the additional punctuation mark in the overall discourse.

This thesis has attempted to outline that, in part because of the visual ‘story-telling’ features contained within the televisual form; in part because the journalistic ‘sources’ are elite-policy-makers, advisors or military officers, ‘Primary Definers’; in part because of the dramatic ‘nature’ of war and conflict, and that such dramatic events fit seamlessly and easily

with the requirements of Current Affairs broadcasting *and* further, the requirements of Journalism and television; in part because of the division of the BBC Current Affairs output into distinct units, or discursive silos, *Panorama*, despite its claims, is only able to provide a very narrow perspective (an epistemology or discourse). By dividing the thesis into clearly identified sections; the historical and BBC/*Panorama* specific context; the wider academic field; the methodological, followed by the three analysis chapters (pre-conflict phase; conflict phase; post-conflict phase broadcasts) over a specific period over nearly two years (19 months), the particular discourse analysis methodology presented here has been able to ‘track’ these practices across time, so that one can identify the extent to which these are the consistent features, tropes, journalistic and visual practices, consistent story-telling ‘templates’ and discourses used to tell the story of Iraq. In part because *Panorama* is the flagship, these practices become the ‘common-sense’ way to ‘do’ Current Affairs conflict journalism. It is hoped that this research has thus demonstrated that the *Panorama* broadcasts were essentially a pro-Western apologia or, at least provided a discourse legitimising Western imperial ambitions, and that such ‘imperialist adventurism’ was, continues to be, concealed beneath a discourse of ‘noble’ rescue and benign western intervention.

While not exhaustive (there are of course textual absences within, even this extensive, research sample) the claims made are not necessarily that BBC *Panorama* wholly failed to provide a rigorous, nuanced or balanced representation of Gulf War II, but that in adhering to specific journalistic and televisual templates, *Panorama* produces and sustains a narrowly defined discourse and epistemology of Iraq. The point is not that *Panorama* is solely responsible for the public understanding of Iraq. However, given *Panorama*’s profile, its much vaunted and celebrated position as marker of journalistic quality; that it sets the mark, and continues to establish the formal characteristics of the genre, combined with the BBC’s role and position as authoritative, legitimated journalistic and cultural leader, means

critical scholarship ought to scrutinise its journalistic and televisual methods, approaches and output in order to assess the extent to which, in setting a benchmark, it cements a journalistic, televisual, methodological and ideological template and discourse.

The main argument is that: encumbered by its seeming faith in drama and the employment of dramatic templates as the most efficient and effective means to communicate social and (geo)political activity (and ‘reality’), and storylines, *Panorama* in particular, but perhaps Current Affairs in general, ends up focusing attention on those actors to whom they have access, granting legitimacy to them. Concomitantly, the broadcasts effectively disenfranchise, characterise or cast often negative and stereotypical characteristics to those ‘Other(s)’ represented in the discourse. These journalistic and televisual decisions are dependent *on*, established practises. However, in so doing, they then shape the discourse depending on the demands of the storyline(s).

To return to the central proposal of this thesis. Namely, that the complexity of detailed ‘investigative’ Current Affairs broadcasting seemingly necessitates the adoption of a dramatic template in order to tell the stories. *Panorama* largely deploys and depends upon a Classic Narrative Structure, relies on casting and characterisation – through archetypes and stereotypes – and makes explicit use of apparently unproblematic, self-evidently legitimate sources (Primary Definers). Though the focus has been on conflict coverage, I would argue that the same – or at least broadly similar – method(s) of storytelling are deployed when detailing, investigating and broadcasting other News and Current Affairs events. Applying the same (or similar) analytical, multi-modal, CDA forms of analysis across a range of different story types, reveals that long-form, extended reportage, complex journalism seems to require (overly) simplified dramatic devices.

One of the contributions this thesis makes is: the theoretical overview and methodological approach developed here, when applied over different News event(s)

sample(s), can be used to undertake critical analysis, assess and draw conclusions as to how dramatic codes and conventions are deployed in order to communicate salient issues and storylines. Furthermore, that such televisual, journalistic codes, conventions, and storytelling devices have tended to favour elite, hegemonic discourse and epistemology. In short, the methodological approach is designed to be applicable when examining Current Affairs coverage of different (non-conflict based) storylines.

What this research, and methodological approach demonstrates is that the specific CDA lexical, linguistic and multi-modal methods and tools of analysis identified are particularly acute with regards analysing storytelling on television. If storytelling on television demands a certain dramatic engagement, then by applying a rigorous CDA methodology and approach, one which incorporates Over-Lexicalisation, Lexical Choices, Lexical Absences, Ideological Squaring, Attributes, Transitivity/Intransitivity, one can undertake rigorous analysis which can reveal the ways in which hegemonic discourse is reproduced. If journalism in general, and journalism *on* television continues to be about stories, and if – as appears to be the case – stories are best told through individuals (characters, archetypes, stereotypes), then the dramatic elements and the methodological approach identified in this research, can provide a discursive and analytical template to be applied over *many different* News and Current Affairs events, storylines and broadcasts.

As an example, perhaps we can refer back to my earlier example of the *Panorama Special Report - Panorama: Britain on the Fiddle* (2013). As discussed (see p38-41), this particular broadcast focused on the cost to the ‘public purse’ when a range of people were ‘caught’ claiming various benefits to which they were either wholly not entitled, or that said featured protagonists were found to be claiming more benefits than they were entitled to. Being the respected and institutionally recognised Current Affairs brand, *Panorama: Britain on the Fiddle* made use of its access to Primary Definers who proceeded to Primarily Define

the narrative orientation. The entire frame was provided by these elite-level sources, it clearly framed, contextualised and provided the basis for the programme. In short, that some (stereotyped feckless individuals) had a ‘case to answer’ was the starting (and end) point of the broadcast, and, one assumes the research. The Primary Definer sources were Over-Lexicalised and positively Attributed, assisted by their location in a social and discursive hierarchy. Contrastingly, setting an Ideological Square, the claimants were often Over-Lexicalised with negative Attributes, framed as deviant agents, threatening the fragility of the post-2008 financial crisis political economy. Cast and marked against the legitimated Primary Definers, there were even moments of dramatic confrontation, denouement and partial narrative closure when the deviant subjects are confronted and then subsequently apprehended.

However, equally – to repeat – if journalism in general, and journalism *on* television continues to be about stories, and if – as it appears to be the case – stories are best told through individuals (characters, archetypes, stereotypes), then how could an *alternative* story be told?

Using the above example: *Panorama: Britain on the Fiddle*, an alternative means of telling the story, would, admittedly require a different frame, a completely different start-point. However, one could quite easily still deploy the (seemingly favoured) dramatic codes and conventions, the classic narrative structure and cast of characters (archetypes at least) and still produce a well-sourced, public service oriented, public interest focused piece of television Current Affairs broadcasting. Characters and sources would need to be drawn *from*, and located *in*, wider social contexts, those framed as ‘deviant’ agents could be reframed in a wider social, political and economic context (precarious labour, under-employment, rampant asset and house-price inflation, and how such structural issues effectively disenfranchise the protagonists in late capitalism) but an at least partially sympathetic frame could be drawn

around the central protagonists. The already poor and suffering could primarily define the discourse and epistemology of late capitalism in 21st century Britain. *Panorama* could, while still adhering to the storytelling, classic narrative structure template, tell the story while remaining within the confines of ‘impartiality and balance’. That it does not do so, raises vitally important questions that this research has sought to examine and interrogate.

The principle findings of this research indicate that, increasingly, Current Affairs broadcast journalism, of which *Panorama* remains paradigmatic, is seemingly unable to provide the necessary nuance or context. In his 2009 seminal study of the media industry *Flat Earth News*, Nick Davies of *The Guardian* put it as follows:

The failure to provide context has multiplied and divided into a preference for human interest over issue; for the concrete over the abstract; for the event rather than the process; for the current over the historic; for simplicity rather than complexity; for certainty rather than doubt. This applies in both print and broadcast, generating patterns of distortion so consistent as to amount to a bias against truth. (Davies 2009: 139)

In his book, Davies devotes particular attention to general news trends, and his main sample(s) are newsprint-based, however the above statement serves here as a rather neat summary (echoing Wolfsfeld) of the discourse of *Panorama*.

So what might the alternatives be? In truth, the discourse and form(s) are so well established that to even attempt an alternative approach is replete with problems. Were any alternative, subaltern, counter-hegemonic, critical discursive means employed to tell the stories, so well-established, entrenched and ‘common-sensical’ are the standard forms of television journalism, that to explain the rationale for the different semiotic, lexical, and discursive choices might necessitate an entire series of broadcasts.

However, I maintain that the standardised (and standard bearer) forms of broadcast journalistic practice must be radically shifted in favour of forms that locate contemporary issues in their wider ideological, (geo)political, discursive, social and historical context. In short, in order to fully ‘tell the story’ (of, in this case, conflict) and inform ‘the public’,

Current Affairs in general, and *Panorama* in particular could (perhaps should) shift away from the overly and overtly dramatic and instead (re)turn to an approach that (re)locates issues and events in their wider social, historical, ideological and geo-political context. Perhaps such a form is possible, but it might need to be a form distanced from journalism as it is currently imagined and practiced, and one more readily embedded *within* and associated *with* documentary practice.

Either that, or alternatively, if, as contemporary trends suggest, the latest iteration of (television) journalism increasingly does focus on the personal, utilising dramatic frames in order to tell stories, and if *Panorama* continues to remain within the genre, the form, and utilising the practices and discourses of *journalism*, adhering to the ‘news values’, with all its contemporary attendance to ‘the personal’ and ‘the dramatic’, then it will need to cast its net wider. In fact, as the political fallout of 2016 and 2017 continues, as the collapse in the political ‘centre ground’ produces a swing away from this notional ‘centre ground’ towards both left and right, as the distrust in ‘liberal democracy, and, by extension a media that reports *on*, and is part *of* ‘liberal democracy continues, then it might be germane to ask a) how media deals with and represents this swing away; b) how emergent and disparate political formations might deal with a media seemingly incapable of political and ideological nuance. To repeat my own words from above (p313), perhaps then, it is not so much that drama, character and emotive representation are present, but who are the ‘subjects of value’ (Skeggs and Wood 2011) afforded time, space, depth, interiority, character and that have some impact on the direction (even partial) of the unfolding narrative. One of the things that the continuing defeats of the left might teach us, is that facts, challenges, fact-checking, statistics and data, while important (even vital) do not – on their own – necessarily win political victories. In fact, if defeat(s) teach(es) us anything, then it is that character, narrative, and stories ‘win hearts and minds’. It is journalistic and Televisual storylines and narratives

that shape the political and ideological terrain. In which case, in order to provide the necessary wider contextual detail, the Current Affairs journalistic form will need to feature a much wider and greater plurality of voices. As documented by Georgina Born, if the BBC are serious about plurality and multiplicity, then a radical transformation as to whom ‘primary definers’ *are* will be necessary. If, even in News and Current Affairs broadcasting, we are to learn about the world through increasingly dramatised frames, then those featured ‘characters’ must be drawn from a much more diverse social, political, cultural and economic field. A more diverse reservoir of voices and characters must be used. In short, a wider coalition of social, political, ideological, cultural and counter-hegemonic identity forms must be sought out and represented, and their subsequent place in the discourse(s) (or storylines) must be(come) more central(ised).

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Appendices

Appendix 1

Pre-Conflict Phase

Panorama: The Case Against Saddam: 23/09/2002

Panorama: Saddam A Warning from History: 03/11/2002

Panorama: The Case Against War: 08/12/2002

Panorama: Chasing Saddam's Weapons: 09/02/2003

Conflict Phase

Panorama: Blair's War: 23/03/2003

Panorama: The Race to Baghdad: 06/04/2003

Panorama: The Battle for Basra: 27/04/2003

Post-Conflict Phase

Panorama: The Price of Victory: 28/09/2003

Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam's Weapons: 23/11/2003

Panorama: Saddam on the Run: 28/03/2004

Appendix 2

Panorama: Summary Paragraphs

Pre-Conflict Phase:

Panorama: The Case Against Saddam

The war of rhetoric between the Bush administration and Saddam Hussein threatens to spill over into a bloody confrontation that may change the regime in Baghdad but in the process spark a conflagration throughout the Middle East. Amidst this rhetoric, what is the real truth - the real case against Saddam? Panorama investigates the evidence against the Iraqi dictator - his ambition to create weapons of mass destruction, the instability of a leader described as a psychopath and the corruption of his cronies that has let the Iraqi people suffer while militarisation continues in secret.

Discovering the truth

Using testimony from top scientists in the west, and from defectors who have fled the regime carrying its secrets, Panorama examines Saddam's history of developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and reveals just what he still has in his arsenal and where it is hidden. In New York we visit the UN Agency charged with finding and destroying his weapons of mass destruction and talk to the weapons inspectors involved with assessing his capability.

Just how close did the Iraqis get to firing missiles with anthrax warheads during the Gulf War? And how real now are the claims that Iraq will soon have enough uranium for four nuclear bombs? Panorama speaks to the politicians who will be making the case for war - the Republican Hawks who are busily plotting the next stage in the War on Terrorism. And we speak to the players in the last war to see whether they stand by their action then and whether they support a new war.

"The cult of Saddam"

We examine the real motivation of Bush and his inner circle and explore the fears of would-be allies in Britain and Europe, afraid of the price both their own troops and the Iraqi people will pay. We also investigate the cult of Saddam himself and his cronies to assess how he would react with his back to the wall and what that means for Israel and the Middle East. It may be unfinished business for America but what will a war amidst the oilfields in countries where Islamic extremists wait in the wings mean for the rest of the world?

Jane Corbin, the award winning Panorama reporter, has made a number of films about Saddam's secret weapons programmes and first brought the public's attention to the threat posed by his nuclear, chemical and biological projects.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2264844.stm>

Panorama: Saddam A Warning from History

As the USA plots to remove the world's most durable dictator, Panorama investigates Saddam's past in a search for clues to his future actions. BBC World Affairs editor John Simpson speaks to witnesses who have watched first hand the Iraqi leader's ruthless rise to power - and the methods he has employed to hold onto office - to reveal new insights into Saddam's volatile personality.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2371697.stm>

Panorama: The Case Against War

Worried about war with Saddam? Panorama reveals your doubts are shared by many you'd expect to back invading Iraq. In the last programme of Panorama's widely-acclaimed year, Steve Bradshaw examines the arguments of critics on both sides of the Atlantic, including some whose lives could be at risk.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2535973.stm>

Panorama: Chasing Saddam's Weapons

Panorama goes to Iraq in search of the "smoking gun" that could lead to war. The attention of the world has been focused on the UN Weapons Inspectors' search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. During this time, Panorama has gained access to both sides in the game of hide and seek that stands between Saddam's Iraq and war. Panorama's Jane Corbin reports from Baghdad as it braces itself for conflict. She visits the weapons sites where inspectors have been concentrating their efforts, and interviews the Iraqi officials and scientists who run them.

Panorama has followed the inspectors for three months, in Iraq, New York and Vienna, during a period which has taken them from early planning, to the battle for more time, as they come under increasing pressure from Washington. As one of the few documentary crews that has managed to get into Iraq, Panorama visits the sites at the centre of the dossiers compiled by the British and US Governments and provides a unique insight into a nation on the brink of conflict and invasion. We assess what has happened to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and whether there are breaches of the UN resolution which support those who are calling for war.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2706841.stm>

Conflict Phase:

Panorama: Blair's War

Could Tony Blair lose his job over the Iraq crisis? For two months Panorama has been following the opposition to him, in the anti-war movement, in the Labour Party, and in Parliament. This is the real-life political drama of a Prime Minister, accused in the past of being guided by focus groups, yet apparently now determined to override a million demonstrators and over a hundred of his own MP's - the story of the war on the home front.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2858047.stm>

Panorama: The Battle for Basra

As Iraq looks forward to an uncertain future, Panorama's Jane Corbin reports from Basra on how the people of Iraq's second city are beginning to shape the future of their shattered city and their broken lives. With exclusive access to the British troops in Basra, the programme also tells, for the first time, the story of the struggle of Iraqi citizens and the military battle by British forces to take control of a city which the coalition never expected to have to have to fight for.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2903799.stm>

Panorama: The Race to Baghdad

Panorama tells the story behind the story of the war. The coalition plan for the invasion of Iraq was built on a campaign to remove Saddam Hussein and to be welcomed as liberators.

John Ware investigates how the British and American war strategy has been tested in the heat of battle.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2950827.stm>

Post-Conflict phase:

Panorama: The Price of Victory

Every week in Iraq coalition soldiers are being wounded and killed in a conflict which is crippling the reconstruction effort. For three long, hot and increasingly violent summer months, a Panorama team has been filming on the streets of Baghdad, day in day out recording scenes of a city still at war. This powerful documentary examines the nature of the resistance in Iraq, gaining access to American troops as they hunt down paramilitaries.

This is a story of men who came to rebuild a country but who found themselves sucked into an urban guerrilla war instead. This is a story also about Baghdad's five million Iraqis whose gratitude over liberation is in danger of being squandered amidst a deepening unease over occupation. Throughout the programme Panorama scrutinises Iraq's new "occupiers", questioning whether the world's most powerful nation is up to the task of rebuilding a country as effectively as it can defeat it in war.

As the reconstruction process falters, Panorama is invited to quiz the key players at the heart of the new regime, including Coalition chief Paul Bremer and the former New York cop and so-called "Baghdad Terminator" Bernie Kerik. Kicking off the 2003 autumn run in Panorama's 50th year, this film also features the last television interview with UN Special Envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello, just 48 hours before his office was destroyed in a car bomb attack.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/3097864.stm>

Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam's Weapons

Panorama has secured exclusive access to the secret and controversial work of the Iraq Survey Group as they hunt for Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. The failure so far to find the weapons the politicians insisted were there has been an embarrassment to Tony Blair and George Bush. Iraqi scientists and officials, once part of the regime, give Panorama their assessment of whether Saddam really posed a threat to the west and reveal details of one of Iraq's illicit weapons programmes.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/3261705.stm>

Panorama: Saddam on the Run

In April 2003, as Saddam's statue was being toppled in Baghdad, US Marines were locked in a deadly gun battle with Saddam Hussein and his supporters just across the city. Yet their Ace of Spades escaped. The next time the world would see him was at his capture, eight months later. For all this time - through handwritten letters, tape recordings, personal messages - Saddam stayed in touch with his fellow Ba'athists, helping to direct those fighting the Coalition.

Sheltered by a handful of people, appearing secretly in public, he still thought he could win a guerrilla war against the Coalition. Yet all this time, a team of US soldiers and Special Forces was methodically closing in on him. How did Saddam Hussein evade capture for so long? Where did he hide out? Who protected him? Which family member betrayed Saddam's sons, killed in a fierce shoot-out? And who finally betrayed Saddam to the Americans?

Panorama speaks to the American army generals and ordinary soldiers who tracked and caught Saddam; to the bodyguards who once protected the dictator; to the Iraqi minister who confronted Saddam in his prison cell; and to the families of those accused of betraying Saddam Hussein and all he believed in.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/3546081.stm>

Appendix 3

Panorama broadcast Transcripts **THE CASE AGAINST SADDAM**

PANORAMA

THE CASE AGAINST SADDAM

RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION: BBC-1

DATE: 23:09:02

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JANE CORBIN: The talk is of war.

BUSH: Saddam Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger, to suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence.

BLAIR: Doing nothing in those circumstances is not an option.

CORBIN: The regime of Saddam Hussein is in the firing line and Britain waits to hear the evidence to be put before Parliament tomorrow. Will it make the case for confronting a man who has menaced his people and his region for a quarter of a century? Over nearly two decades Panorama has revealed how Saddam Hussein caught, stole, smuggled and copied western technology in a bid to develop weapons of mass destruction.

JANE CORBIN

We've put together the hard evidence of what he's actually got today and what he stands a good chance of getting in the not too distant future. Tonight we ask what is the real case against Saddam Hussein and is it strong enough to justify going to war?

Paris, 1975, a visitor with a secret ambition arrived on a costly shopping spree. He was welcomed by the then Prime Minister of France, Jacques Chirac, eager to secure a multi billion dollar contract. The VIP was none other than Saddam Hussein. He'd come to buy a nuclear reactor for peaceful purposes he said, to develop a nuclear power plant. But back in Baghdad Saddam was soon summoning his top atomic energy officials. He left them in no doubt of what he really wanted. Dr Hussain Shahrستاني, then the head of Iraq's civilian atomic programme and a man opposed to nuclear weapons was at the meeting with Saddam.

DR SHAHRISTANI: It was clear to me and to everybody else at the meeting that he meant that he wanted the scientists at the Atomic Energy to devote all their time to develop a nuclear bomb for him. I chose at that time basically to remind him very innocently if you like, that Iraq had signed the non-proliferation treaty with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and then he just looked at me and he said Dr Hussain, you are a good scientist, mind your scientific work and leave politics to us, we know what to do.

CORBIN: Dr Shahrستاني refused to participate in Saddam Hussein's new venture. The President tried brutal persuasion.

DR SHAHRISTANI: In the torture chambers they start by hanging a person till their arms are usually paralysed and then they give them electric shocks on their sensitive parts of their body, their private parts and so on. They will keep on at it, day in, day out, not allowing a person to sleep. That went on for 22 days in my case.

CORBIN: For 11 years Saddam Hussein kept Dr Shahrستاني in prison. The dictator still needed a more compliant scientist to develop his bomb programme. Dr Jaffar Jaffa, a brilliant London University trained physicist was the man for the job. He too needed some persuading at first.

Dr HUSSAIN AL- SHAHRISTANI
Former Senior Scientific Advisor
Atomic Energy Organisation of Iraq

Dr Jaffa himself for example was the key figure, the single person that was really responsible for all the technology and development. I know that he has been brought to prison and they brought other people and tortured them to death in front of him. Till he cracked down and he just couldn't take it anymore and he said you know.. I'm not going to be a cause for all these people to be tortured like this till they die, and he decided to go back to work.

CORBIN: By 1981 the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak was about to go on line. But spies were watching closely and in July Israel sent warplanes to scupper Saddam's plans. They took out Osirak before Iraq could divert the plutonium it would produce to build the bomb. Saddam Hussein was undeterred. In 1990 Panorama revealed how a British company sold machine tools to Iraq. They helped create a new clandestine nuclear programme to replace what Israel had destroyed. Saddam still harboured nuclear ambitions. Using Iraq's huge oil revenues he scoured the world for nuclear technology. He couldn't resist gloating publicly but despite western embargoes he could still smuggle forbidden parts into Iraq to build atomic weapons.

He looks pretty determined in those pictures. What do you think, seeing him there holding that piece of nuclear technology?

SHAHRISTANI: Absolutely, I mean he has been very determined to get this programme going. He sent his stepbrother who was in charge of the Iraqi intelligence at that time, Barazan al Tikriti, and he told me: "We need the atomic bomb because that will give us a long arm to reshape the map of the Middle East."

CORBIN: A hawkish member of the American administration in the 80s, Richard Perle, is again a key advisor in the Pentagon today. He's speaking in his personal capacity he says, on the subject of Saddam Hussein.

RICHARD PERLE: He believes that nuclear weapons will transform Iraq and Saddam Hussein into a world power of such a character that we will be unable to oppose his ambitions whatever they may turn out to be.

CORBIN: Saddam Hussein's ambition was made clear in August 1990. He invaded his neighbour Kuwait to grab its enormous oil well. Iraq had already developed chemical and biological weapons as the coalition ranged against him new full well.

Interviewed 1996

General Sir PETER DE LA BILLIERE
Commander, UK Forces, Gulf War

The Iraqis had chemical weapons, we knew that. They had biological weapons, we knew that. They had used them, we knew that. And they were going to be fighting what Saddam Hussein called: "The mother of all battles".

Interviewed 1996

Brig. General JOHN LEIDE
Director of Coalition Intelligence, Gulf War

I would wake up in the middle of the night in a cold sweat just thinking about would they use them.

CORBIN: But Saddam's hands were tied. He'd invaded Kuwait before he developed his atomic warheads. He was afraid to use his chemical weapons for fear of what that might bring.

General COLIN POWELL
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990

And of course there was always the implicit threat of nuclear weapons. I don't think we ever would have used them, but nevertheless the Iraqis didn't know that and we could have if provocation was serious enough.

Interviewed 1996

TARIQ AZIZ
Iraqi Foreign Minister, 1991

We didn't think that it was wise to use them. That's all what I can say, that it was not wise to use such kind of weapons in such kind of a war with such an enemy.

CORBIN: Panorama was there when the superior military might of the west forced Saddam out of Kuwait. His retreating army was devastated along the road of death that led back towards Iraq. Kuwait was liberated but Saddam did not withdraw gracefully. His parting vindictive order was to fire the Kuwaiti oil wells. It was a defiant sign he would not easily abandon his quest to control the region. The world decided it must contain the dangerous ambitions of the Iraqi dictator. And so the United Nations sent weapons inspectors to route out and destroy forever Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. They discovered that the scope of his ambition was greater and better hidden than they had thought. The leader of the team of UN nuclear inspectors in Iraq was David Kay. He discovered four extensive separate programmes to develop nuclear weapons alone.

DAVID KAY: You have to remember that we ultimately found over 24 large facilities that employed somewhere between 20 and 30 thousand Iraqis and cost 10 billion dollars. The extent of that programme was not known.

CORBIN: For 7 years Saddam Hussein and the UN inspectors played an elaborate game of cat and mouse. The inspectors chased and Iraqi officials tried to hide forbidden technology before they pounced.

Dr DAVID KAY

Chief Nuclear Weapons Inspector, 1991-92

They managed to conceal physical facilities from some of the best technical intelligence in the world and they managed even while we carried out the inspections to learn how to conceal things to defeat ways we were actively using against us and in fact to carry their own programme on while we continued inspections.

CORBIN: The difficulties were evident, when David Kaye arrived unexpectedly at (Faluja?). Forbidden to enter a secure industrial area he persuaded military guards to let him climb a watchtower to get a better view. The inspectors saw massive metal disks being driven hurriedly away, calutrons machines used to process nuclear material.

UN INSPECTOR: ?? movement on this site at this point puts you in clear violation of the Security Council Resolution, the Commander is in serious violation of an agreement that your own government has signed.

CORBIN: It was a lucky break for the UN inspectors but not for the unfortunate Iraqi guards. They paid the price for not protecting Saddam's most valuable asset.

KAY: We do know that several Iraqis that we came across, I'm thinking particularly at Faluja of the base commander who made the mistake of allowing me to place men on a water tower overseeing the facility while he waited for permission to let us in, and consequently we observed them moving around the calutrons. We know fairly certainly that he was executed the next week by a firing squad for his mistake.

CORBIN: The calutrons were disabled and left in the desert where they could be monitored. The UN couldn't trust the Iraqis not to salvage material and start up their nuclear quest again. There was continual confrontation with the Iraqi officials. The Deputy Head of the UN Mission, Bob Galucci, recalls one of the occasions when he caught out an Iraqi official. Galucci revealed he had a list of nuclear equipment imported from abroad. Despite official denials that Iraq had any of it.

BOB GALUCCI: The Iraqi who led his side consulted with his colleagues and said he would take us the next day to show us these components and that they were destroying them. I noted that he had a moment ago said there were none, and that now he was telling me something entirely different. He said yes. There was nothing about this that embarrassed him, nothing about having lied that seemed to trouble him. When I indicated that we could save a lot of time if they gave us truthful responses to our questions, he told me that this was really not a cooperative endeavour.

CORBIN: When the United Nations inspectors uncovered Iraq's extensive nuclear programme it was being led by the London educated Dr Jaffa. Dr Jaffa tried to stop the weapons inspectors from getting their hands on lists of those who worked in the nuclear programme and details of their technical expertise.

Dr ROBERT GALLUCCI
Deputy Executive Chairman
UNSCOM. 1991-92

That large establishment was manned by nuclear physicists and engineers, experts of all kinds. To the best of our knowledge, most of these, if not virtually all of these people are still in Iraq, so the significance of that kind of expertise ready to be engaged cannot be overstated. It is extremely important if one is trying to assess how far away Iraq is from acquiring nuclear weapons.

KAY: We got the documents but even we knew we didn't get the original and only copy of any of those documents. In this digital age and Xerox age that's not possible. So the Iraqis actually were left with copies of those documents that we removed. I did not know, nor did any of us know, how you remove technology knowledge from the minds of people who have already learned the secrets of weapons of mass destruction.

CORBIN: So what do we now know about where Saddam has got to in his ambition to acquire atomic weapons? His scientists ran an extensive network of research facilities and they still have the design for the device to trigger a nuclear weapon. Saddam has the raw material for the bomb. Natural uranium mined and processed inside Iraq. But it needs to be enriched to reach weapons grade. Now there's new information that Saddam is seeking centrifuges, machines to enrich uranium, just as he did before. In the last 14 months several shipments, a total of 1000 aluminium centrifuge tubes have been intercepted by intelligence agencies before they actually reached Iraq.

KAY: I've seen one of them. The centrifuge tubes look like they're of the design which is German derived, that the Iraqis acquired some time in the 1980s and developed therefore enriched uranium, that is taking natural uranium up to the level that makes it useful for a weapon.

CORBIN: What does it tell you, the fact that they're trying to get several of these? There have been several shipments.

KAY: Well it tells me that they're going for a large scale programme over a thousand centrifuges which in fact is what they were going for before the Gulf War intervened.

CORBIN: But there's another, quicker way Iraq could get the essential fissile material, enriched uranium or plutonium on the black market. As Panorama reported in 1993, the former Soviet state of Kazakhstan was just one place where poorly guarded enriched uranium was secretly sought by Middle Eastern countries. If he could buy such material, Saddam would be much closer to acquiring nuclear weapons than if he had to laboriously enrich uranium in his own centrifuges. The British government's dossier will reveal tomorrow that Saddam has tried several times to smuggle fissile material from countries in the former Soviet Union and Africa. Criminal elements are helping the Iraqis but so far the dossier says they have not succeeded.

KAY: They could be as close as right now if Saddam manages to obtain fissile material from example the former Soviet Union where corruption and insecurity unfortunately still reigns. If he in fact has to produce his own material himself the best guess is somewhere in the three to six year period but that's a soft number. I

don't know exactly when that period began. It could have begun a year ago or two years ago even.

CORBIN: But the real answer is we just don't know. It is not necessarily imminent.

KAY: It's not necessarily imminent but it's not necessarily far off. Just don't know means just don't know.

RICHARD PERLE

Chairman, Defense Policy Board

Department of Defence

It's a race against time, it's a race against his crossing that threshold before you have restrained him. So I don't know what sort of evidence a mushroom cloud would be a powerful statement but do you want to wait for that?

CORBIN: The Chief Civil Servant at the MoD during the Gulf War was Sir Michael Quinlan, the man who developed *Britain's nuclear deterrence policy*. But he's sceptical about the urgency of dealing with Saddam.

SIR MICHAEL QUINLAN: I find the desire to push this forward in great haste disquieting. No one claims that Saddam has nuclear weapons now. I've seen no compelling evidence that he is very close to getting nuclear weapons and that stands quite aside from the question of even if he has them. Even if one day he gets them, why will not deterrence work as it has in so many other contexts and as it did with Saddam.

CORBIN: But things have changed. Doomsday scenarios have haunted the Bush administration ever since the day a year ago when the President learnt America was under direct attack. The nations greatest city devastated by a small group of terrorists. A threat which few in America had taken seriously until the unthinkable happened.

Dr DAVID KAY

Chief Nuclear Weapons Inspector, 1991-92

9/11 is a prism through which American political leaders are examining everything that occurred since 9/11 and every threat.

PERLE: What September 11 did was bring home in a way that no amount of abstract debate could have, the dangers of waiting until it's too late.

KAY: They've realised they can't.. cannot count on intelligence to provide them with the warning of when he truly becomes dangerous and consequently they have to deal with him in the here and now as opposed to try to interrupt him after an attack has begun.

CORBIN: After September 11th hawks in the American administration, who'd long been pressing for Saddam's removal, suddenly had the ear of the President and the American people.

Sir MICHAEL QUINLAN

Permanent Under-Secretary

Ministry of Defence, 1988-92

I understand very well that the appalling thing that was done to America on 9/11 has changed psychology. I don't myself believe, though, that it directly affects the Saddam situation. Saddam was not behind it. We still have to assess the Iraq problem in terms which are directly relevant to Iraq. It doesn't create some special new legitimacy that didn't exist before.

CORBIN: It's not just Iraq's nuclear threat that's being viewed differently through the prism of 9/11. In 1986 Panorama revealed the pesticide plant at Samara. Saddam was developing chemical weapons. He used them first against Iranian soldiers in the long and bitter war with his neighbours in which a million men were sacrificed. And then in 1988 he turned them against his own people. A cloud of poison gasses enveloped the town of Halabja. Five thousand people died, most of them women and children. Chemical weapons were outlawed by every international convention, but Saddam was then the ally of the west against the mullahs in Iran. Nothing was done.

Dr HUSSAIN AL-SHAHRISTANI

Former Senior Scientific Advisor

Atomic Energy Organisation of Iraq

The west even allowed him to use his weapons of mass destruction against his own people and they covered it up for him, so they've not only allowed him and helped him to produce weapons of mass destruction, they even allowed him to use them against his own people during the Iran Iraq war. I mean this is well known and this is something that they don't even deny, but as one of them have said, you know..we have always known that Saddam was son of a bitch but he was our son of a bitch. Now he's different. So when Saddam was basically serving their purposes, they were very happy to let him do whatever he wanted to do.

PERLE: We were wrong in 1988 not to take him on then. We mustn't repeat that mistake. And the fact that we failed in 1988 is hardly an argument for failing in 2002.

CORBIN: Halabja was just one example of Saddam's willingness to slaughter and torture his own people. As Panorama found out 20 years ago in the first ever western interview with the Iraqi President, he makes no apology for using violence to crush his opponents at home and abroad.

SADDAM HUSSEIN: (translator) The opposition in our country, it was no longer a local opposition, but an international opposition. Q: Should it be subject to torture and executions?

HUSSEIN: Yes. It calls for it to be subject to execution and to torture.

CORBIN: Yet despite all this the west went on selling Saddam technology. There were fat contracts to be had for ailing defence industries at home.

Interviewed 1992

ALAN CLARK MP

Minister of State

Ministry of Defence, 1989-92

I think our attitude on this is very much coloured now by the fact that we did actually subsequently go to war with Iraq and it is a risk that is always present when you're selling to

dictatorships. You just have to weigh up the probabilities and weigh that probability against the economic advantages of the trade.

CORBIN: When the inspectors uncovered Saddam's chemical weapons programme after the Gulf War they found nearly half a million litres of chemical warfare agents and the precursors, the material to make them. Iraq finally admitted they had made nearly 4 tons of the nerve agent VX, one microscopic droplet can kill. The inspectors also found and destroyed 38,000 munitions. They were filled with mustard gas and deadly sarin. Colonel Terry Taylor worked for the UN in Iraq for 4 years, using his expertise in chemical and biological weapons.

TAYLOR: They finally admitted to production of VX but we don't know how much there is. We know they had problems in its manufacture and particularly the stability of this particular agent, but they had continued to work on this and this would probably be the most valuable weapon in their chemical arsenal which we're convinced is still progressing.

CORBIN: So where has Saddam got to in rebuilding his chemical weapons capability today? He still has enough material to manufacture 200 tons of VX gas in just a few weeks. And he's got several hundred tons of mustard gas, the choking agent he's used before, plus several thousand munitions to deliver it on the battlefield. This summer a chemical plant at Faluja showed signs of being rebuilt after an earlier pounding from British and US warplanes. Satellite pictures revealed new chemical storage tanks, buildings and piping systems. The CIA believes Saddam is up to his old tricks, producing chlorine here, but far more than Iraq actually needs. Chlorine is an ingredient in some chemical weapons. It is, however, impossible to tell from the air just what's in these tanks and pipes, even harder to detect and contain is Iraq's other existing weapons of mass destruction programme, its biological or germ warfare plan. It took the UN years to begin to uncover it. The Iraqis blocked them at every turn. But the inspectors unpicked a trail of documents showing Iraq had imported 40 tons of growth medium on which to culture bacteria. It was 20 times what the country's hospitals actually needed.

Colonel TERRY TAYLOR

Chief Inspector, UNSCOM, 1993-97

It was the quantities that made us suspicious. They had all sorts of extraordinary stories about where this material might have been used and so on, and eventually they were forced to admit that they were lying and the documents were forged.

CORBIN: The Iraqis did their best to keep their key bio weapons researches hidden. At a laboratory supposedly for civilian purposes, a scientist tried to slip past Terry Taylor.

TAYLOR: I said I'm Terry Taylor and he immediately introduced himself, so I knew he was the right man, and asked him if he would give me the documents which he did.

CORBIN: And what did they reveal?

TAYLOR: Well after getting past his wife's driving license application which was on the top and at the back, they revealed.. there was a report on his work with a team on research and development to see if ricin would be viable biological warfare agent. He was looking at

delivering it in aerosol form, a very fine powder or dust or this dry aerosol form, and a very, very tiny quantity of that, if inhaled, would kill a human being quite quickly.

CORBIN: It was only when this man, a son-in-law of Saddam's fled Baghdad 4 years after the Gulf War that the inspectors gained a real insight into Iraq's bio-weapons programme. Hussein Kamal was the head of Saddam's special weapons projects. He brought with him Iraq's most closely guarded germ warfare secrets. A homesick Kamal was however persuaded by the President to return, assured of a warm welcome. Instead he was executed on Saddam's orders with 40 members of his family. Armed with Kamal's information the UN inspectors set off for Al-Hakam, an agricultural complex. They found thousands of litres of anthrax, botulinium, an aflatoxin which causes liver cancer. Iraqi officials insisted they never planned to actually deploy the killer spores and toxins in weapons. But when the river next to the factory was dredged, warhead were found, weapons modified to take biological agents. The inspectors were convinced that Iraq kept thousands of litres of other biological stocks and substantial amounts of the growth medium on which to culture germs. Al-Hakam had been unmasked but not Iraq's entire bio-weapons programme. Despite destroying 14 major weapons facilities the UN believed that others are still undiscovered. With no independent observers on the ground in Iraq since 1998 it's almost impossible to tell how true the rumours are. Which are emerging from intelligence agencies around the world.

This summer German intelligence hinted that the biological toxin ricin was again being produced at Faluja, the huge Iraqi chemical complex. New warehouses had appeared in one part of the site amongst the bomb destruction. One man decided to investigate. Hans von Sponeck was a former under secretary who had supervised the UN's humanitarian projects in Baghdad. He'd resigned in protest of the UN's sanctions policy against Iraq. In mid July this year Mr von Sponeck returned to Baghdad with the blessing of the regime, a film crew in tow. He wanted to investigate his tip off that ricin was being extracted from the waste at a castor oil plant at Faluja. The Iraqis had notice that he was coming. There were only derelict or abandoned buildings in the one area he had asked to see.

HANS VON SPONECK
UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator for Iraq
1998-2000

There was nothing. There were empty halls but the key of this facility that I was interested in was the castor oil facility that was specifically singled out by intelligence organs to argue that it was functioning and producing chemical agents. And that facility again I could verify as a non-specialist that it was disabled, that there was nothing and there hadn't been anything. It was rusting away with pipe connections being severed and absolutely in a state where it could do.. could produce nothing.

CORBIN: A month later western reporters were taken to Faluja. The Iraqis insisted that barrels stored in the new warehouses were pesticides for agricultural use.

IRAQI SPOKESPERSON: As you see, those barrels are not sealed. If they were chemical or biological weapon protection unit, the windows are sealed.

CORBIN: The reporters only saw one small part of the vast complex and not being experts could only report what they Iraqis told them. But he's known to have hidden his chemical weapons production facilities all over the place. There are many sites dual use, it's hard to really know what's going on in Iraq.

SPONTECK: I would agree that it is not easy to know what's happening in Iraq but the important point to remember is that we have in different areas, in the humanitarian field as well as in the disarmament field, we have examples where information is given to the public, information is given to political decision makers which is wrong. That was what worries me because you don't want to end up involving Europe and the US in a war based on conjecture and disinformation.

CORBIN: With all the uncertainty what do we actually know about the state of Saddam's biological programme today. The exact locations are still shrouded in secrecy. But Iraq is known to have retained several tons of growth medium to culture bacteria and the UN and most experts believe there are still stocks of anthrax viable today, and most importantly Iraq still possesses the industrial capability and the know-how to produce new bio-weapons quickly and in quantity.

Have you any doubt that Iraq continues to stockpile some biological agents and to have the ability to produce more in fairly short order.

TAYLOR: I have absolutely no doubt whatsoever. Some of these stocks will obviously become less effective over time, but they have the capability to carry out production at times when and where they wish to do so.

CORBIN: There are no inspectors now inside Iraq to verify what Saddam is up to. But there is the testimony of recent defectors who brought out new information about his weapons programme. Some are unreliable but we've spoken to two who we understand are believed to be credible in what they say about the Iraqi regime.

Abandoning his prosperous engineering company Adnan Saeed Al-Haideri fled Iraq 9 months ago before disappearing into protective custody he gave this exclusive television interview.

HAIDERI: I am engineer.. civil engineer but I am advised in clinical construction.

CORBIN: Haideri has details of 20 secret facilities where he went to fit out specialised buildings. He believes they were sites for developing chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

Defected 2001

ADNAN SAEED AL-HAIDERI

Iraq civil engineer

This is a mixture of.. ammonia mixture, as I said. Inside of these buildings, I did the finishing that they needed for clean area antibacterial, resistance to bacteria and this just for four chemicals. This place is not normal place, not for normal chemicals. The exhausting is not normal.

CORBIN: So the new weapons and technology have been hidden away in heavily populated areas, even under a hospital in Baghdad according to Haideri. Beneath Saddam's many presidential palaces too, and weapons are constantly on the move to outwit the vigilant spy planes.

HAIDERI: The important thing is.. the important, very secretive thing, this didn't fixed in one place, always it's mobile, movable in any place. He produced here and after a month or 20 days go to other place, and change of place again.

CORBIN: Haideri's most harrowing account comes from people forced to work inside the secret weapons programme. They've told him Saddam's ordered the testing of chemical weapons on prisoners.

HAIDERI: He said they test chemicals on them. They take ten people, they put masks on five of them and five without mask, and testing chemical weapons on them, and they waiting when this with masks died and without masks when he died. So there is very.. for them is very cheap to kill these people.

CORBIN: Another defector has described how Saddam has siphoned off billions through illegal oil exports. Shadowy front companies fund the smuggling of forbidden technology from the black market in Russia and other countries. Once a top aid to Saddam's son, Abbas Al Janabi was imprisoned but managed to flee Baghdad four years ago.

AL JANABI: I worked now 15 years, I am very close to all the inner circle, anybody in this circle we know each other.

CORBIN: Al Janabi reveals how Saddam has constructed a web of deceit and corruption in which the President himself sits and at the very centre.

ABBAS AL JANABI
Personal Assistant to Uday Hussein
1983-98

People inside this inner circle, even those people divided into this group responsible for the smuggling, this group responsible for hiding the weapons or hiding.. you know.. the machines, the equipment and a group hiding all the documents. So each one doesn't know, but those who control the operation – maybe 5 or 6.

CORBIN: And they know everything.

AL JANABI: They know everything, they have.. you know.. each line comes to a point and this point is controlled by Saddam Hussein.

CORBIN: So could the man at the centre of the secrets weapons programme threaten the west directly? As Panorama reported in 1989 Saddam was already seeking long range missiles. They would be the most essential element in his weapons of mass destruction arsenal enabling him to hit his neighbours in the region. Saddam had used his scuds, conventional warheads, to strike at Israel and the inspectors destroyed almost all the hundreds of missiles which remained. The

UN found Iraq had secret ambitions to build intercontinental rockets which would go even further. They were confident they had stopped Saddam. But there will be new evidence tomorrow in the British government's dossier, evidence that Saddam is rebuilding mobile platforms to launch his missiles from.

AL-JANABI: They managed to rebuild them completely and these are five platforms, I know about them.

CORBIN: Mr Al-Janabi says he saw the platforms during a Baghdad arms parade, not on public display but at a special showing for the inner circle.

AL-JANABI: We filmed the people working on these platforms to repair with spare parts from outside Iraq, mainly from Russia. I am not saying that they bought it directly from Russia, you know.. the black market is very huge and I am quite sure the operation was done by the black market, and they managed to rebuild five platforms.

CORBIN: So how far has Saddam got in developing his missiles today? Experts believe he has at most 24 scuds which could hit neighbouring countries. They can be fitted with biological or chemical warheads but they're unreliable. And though Iraq still wants to develop rockets, with a range of 1500 kilometres, the country's missile project is still best described as modest.

Sir MICHAEL QUINLAN
Permanent Under-Secretary
Minister of Defence, 1988-92

It would take him years to get to the point where he could directly threaten the United States, and even if he did, there's still the point about deterrence. Why would he dare, unless we ourselves force his back right against the wall.

CORBIN: You mean unless we put him in a position where he has to lash out.

QUINLAN: Where he has nothing left to lose. At the moment, what he has to lose is his survival in power which is I think what he prizes above everything else, and it would be strange to say the least if we now rush to take the one step that might provoke him into using these weapons.

CORBIN: But Western intelligence has detected another system by which Saddam could deliver chemical and biological agents.

US MILITARY OFFICER: We attacked the L29 unmanned aerial vehicle programme which he developed for the delivery of biological and chemical weapons.

CORBIN: Four years ago when British planes bombed an Iraqi airfield they exposed a hangar full of trainer aircraft which were being reconfigured as unmanned drones to carry Saddam's weapons.

Colonel TERRY TAYLOR
Chief Inspector, UNSCOM, 1993-97

They're continuing work on this and this remotely piloted vehicle can carry spray tanks which could deliver not just biological weapons but also chemical spray as well, and that could go out to about 600 kilometres, so about the same range as a missile could. So they will have a small number of those unmanned aerial vehicles as we call them.

CORBIN: So what's our final assessment of Saddam Hussein's secret weapons programmes? What we know now isn't radically different from what we've known for a number of years. He still has chemical and biological weapons or the means to make them quickly. And his nuclear ambition remains the same, although it's clear he's some years away from building the bomb. Unless he can save time by smuggling in the necessary enriched uranium, it's clear that Saddam Hussein has no missiles with which to hit New York or London. But following September 11th a new method of delivering WMD, weapons of mass destruction has become President Bush's nightmare. The suicide terrorist carries a biological or chemical weapon to an American city in a suitcase. There is no direct evidence to link Saddam to Al-Qaeda, although the Bush administration has tried hard to find some. But Saddam Hussein has had links to other terror groups in the past.

RICHARD PERLE

Chairman, Defense Policy Board
Department of Defense

The terrorist links add another dimension which is.. it raises the question of whether he might not choose to disseminate these terrible weapons through suicidal maniacs who are terrorists in other organisations. I mean we've seen people..

CORBIN: But he's likely to do that if you push his back to the wall. He'll give a weapon to a terrorist, you're creating the problem possibly by making this push against him.

PERLE: Well the same logic would have said alright we throw up our hands and leave Hitler forever, he can do what he likes. We can't oppose him because if we oppose him he will do the thing we're trying to stop. It only gets worse with the passage of time.

QUINLAN: Certainly like a number of other countries in the region he has been sympathetic to terrorists, he has given them a degree of support and succour but the idea that he has been the main driver of terrorism seems to me, to put it politely, to lack evidence. And the idea that he would put WMD in the hands of terrorists out of his own control and that he might be found out later and have to take the consequences seems to me deeply implausible.

CORBIN: Four years ago the Secretary General tried in vain to persuade Saddam Hussein to keep the UN in Iraq to contain his weapons of mass destruction. But the inspectors were thrown out and a divided UN Security Council let Saddam get away with it. Now, his future hanging in the balance, Saddam has offered to have the inspectors back again.

TAYLOR: In my view, and perhaps I'm an optimist, but it's worth giving another chance the inspectors, unfettered, unconstrained, no links to any other issue, and

perhaps say to Iraq by a certain date, take the inspectors back. We're not negotiating over conditions that might surround it. The obligation is on you, Iraq, and I think that's the way inspections should work, and it's worth another shot.

CORBIN: Shouldn't the weapons inspectors, though, be given a chance to find these things before we resort to war?

PERLE: Well I can only give you a personal view which is if you know that the mission is going to fail, why bother? Why give Saddam the additional time that's involved in demonstrating that the inspections will fail and how do you know what you're accomplishing with inspections?

CORBIN: There will be no smoking gun to warrant immediate action when the British government lays out its evidence against Saddam tomorrow, just more details of his efforts to procure forbidden technology. But for those on both sides of the Atlantic who've made up their minds to get rid of him, the decision is based on the nature of Saddam's regime. They want to act pre-emptively before he reaches his goal of nuclear weapons.

If Mr Blair fails to convince the British public and Parliament that the case against Saddam has been made, will you deal with Saddam anyway, America?

RICHARD PERLE

Chairman, Defense Policy Board

Department of Defense

No President, no country, can allow it's security to be dependent on the views of others. I don't see how the President can do anything other than the best job he can arrange at protecting the American people and he is convinced that if Saddam is left in place he will ultimately do terrible damage to the United States.

Sir MICHAEL QUINLAN

Permanent Under-Secretary

Minister of Defence, 1988-92

I think we have to think very carefully about war. It's always a very grave thing to do and we can't be sure how it will go. Do you remember what Churchill said? "Never, never, never assume that any war will be smooth and easy." Even if it goes easily, this hypothetical invasion, a huge amount of damage will be done. It may go less than easily and whatever way the military operation goes, there is still the enormous problem, the enormous uncertainties about the future of Iraq and the future of the region.

CORBIN: The dilemma is that if politicians do not act, Saddam will continue down the nuclear path. But if he's attacked, then he may use his chemical or biological agents. The hawks are clear where America's interests lie.

Well if containment has failed with Saddam Hussein, what message does that send to other states seeking weapons of mass destruction about the attitude America will take towards them?

PERLE: Well I hope it sends the message that if you pursue weapons of mass

destruction and if you are a threat to the United States, we will not stand by and allow you to achieve your objectives.

CORBIN: The Bush administration has put Saddam and the rest of the world on notice. This is a new era. Time for Saddam Hussein is running out.

PANORAMA

SADDAM A Warning From History

PANORAMA

SADDAM

A Warning From History

RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION: BBC-1

DATE: 3:11:02

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“Conflict: Desert Storm”

SIMPSON: A brand new game has hit America’s computer screens as Saddam Hussein lurks in his bunker the forces of freedom and democracy close in for the kill. It treats Saddam as just another cartoon villain. In Iraq he seems equally two dimensional. Every single night state television broadcasts a different music video starring him. But which of Saddam’s many faces is the real one? And as the final showdown comes, what lessons can we draw from the past about what he will do now?

SIMPSON: For years Saddam Hussein has been fooling everyone. A German

forensic scientist Dieter Buhmann, armed with the latest computer technology, has analysed thousands of hours of video footage and made an extraordinary discovery.

BUHMANN: On the left side is the real Mr Saddam Hussein, on the right side is Mr Hussein in the year 94.

SIMPSON: He takes careful measurements of the images of the genuine Saddam. He knows there is one double but he is surprised at what he finds.

BUHMANN: I found the left one is the real Saddam Hussein in the year 1990, the second is a double and that is the other doubles.

SIMPSON: Are you absolutely certain that those are four different men that we are looking at there?

BUHMANN: I am absolutely sure.

SIMPSON: It's part survival technique, part a useful convenience. Saddam can't be bothered to meet the less important foreign visitors. The Austrian far right leader Joerg Heider for instance. He thought he was meeting the real Saddam. Dieter Buhmann shows he merely met a fake.

BUHMANN: This is a picture of the double, you see a lot of differences in the anatomical areas. The corner of the left eyelid is in the wrong place. The top of the nose has another form and the ear is different and altogether you can be sure that they are two different persons.

SIMPSON: It's Saddam's birthday and the people of Baghdad are celebrating compulsorily. Privately almost everyone would be glad to get him off their backs but it is suicidal to say so. The images are everywhere but the man himself is nowhere to be seen. His elusiveness has helped to keep him in power for 23 years. But now, as the American pressure on him builds up, those who have watched him are certain that he will come out and fight.

Sir STEPHEN EGERTON

British Ambassador to Iraq, 1980-82

I don't think bullies die in bunkers. He will always try and get out somehow.

General BRENT SCOWCROFT

US National Security Advisor, 1989-93

I think he is an absolutely dangerous man. Because he is relentless. He simply doesn't quit.

Dr HUSSAIN AL-SHAHRISTANI

Former Chief Scientist

Iraq's civil nuclear programme

He was on record on Iraqi television, when he first came to power, saying that we have come to stay. If we have to go, everybody else will be going with us.

SIMPSON: Saddam's violent, proud, defiant character was formed by a dreadful

childhood, deprived and brutalised 12 miles from the town of Tikrit. He was born here 65 years ago. This is the first time his closest childhood friend has spoken publicly about him.

IBRAHIM ZOBEDI

Childhood friend of Saddam

He feels that he is lonely, nobody likes him, especially his uncle always, you know, laugh at him and treated him as a dummy. He doesn't like to go to school, he is always alone, walked alone, stay alone, and he has very, very few friends.

SIMPSON: He was routinely beaten by his step-father.

HASSAN AL-ALAWI

Former friend of Saddam

He used to carry an iron bar to protect himself from stray dogs or other people. Society neglected Saddam when he was a child. Saddam grew up believing that the only thing he could trust was that iron bar.

SIMPSON: The child with the iron bar turned into a violent youth but he was soon to find an outlet for all this violence. In 1950's Baghdad the young Saddam was drawn into nationalist politics. Iraq has had a long tradition of political murder. At 22 the opposition Ba'ath party recruited him to assassinate the Iraqi president in his car. Saddam loved the whole business. He wasn't ashamed of what he had done, on the contrary, he would one day hire a Hollywood director to make a film about it.

“The Long Days”

SIMPSON: You have to watch quite carefully to realise that the attack actually failed. No matter, it was the making of him.

SAID ABURISH

Saddam's Biographer

That was the first time anybody heard about somebody called Saddam Hussein and that is the way he rose to power. It wasn't through any of the institutions or organisations of the State, it was through being a tough thug - really - for the party.

SIMPSON: Even by Iraq's bloody standards, Saddam's Ba'athists were ferocious, yet when they seized power in 1968 they had the backing of the CIA which thought their nationalism was better than the old government's communism. Saddam was the new president's deputy and the party's enforcer.

JERROLD POST

Former senior political psychologist for CIA

Analysed Saddam for US Government

This is not a mad man but he does have the most dangerous personality that we know - what I call malignant narcissism.

SIMPSON: Jerrold Post, for years a psychological profiler for the CIA.

POST: On the one hand he is so caught up with his own vanity - his own messianic dreams that there is no room for the pain or suffering of others, that doesn't count at all. He has got conscience whatsoever and making it all the worse, will use whatever violence is necessary to carry out his ambitions and violence has been the hallmark of his very success.

SIMPSON: Soviet Communism never attracted Saddam and yet he became fixated on Joseph Stalin, his hero.

ABURISH: People who knew him when he was a young man told me stories about him wondering around saying "Wait until I take over, I'm going to run this country the way Stalin ran Russia". And of course they laughed him off. Little did they know. I mean he has studied and read every single book about Stalin and he most definitely models himself after him.

AL-ALAWI: He was different from other tyrants like Hitler or Stalin; they were rulers who became criminals, he was a criminal who became a ruler.

SIMPSON: In 1979 he made another film but this time the violence was genuine.

Ba'ath Party video
July 1979

SIMPSON: Having taken over as leader he put his Stalinism to work. He called a meeting of the party leadership which was carefully filmed. Exactly as in Stalin's show trials, a senior figure was persuaded through torture, to reveal details of a supposed conspiracy. "The conspirators had many dreams", he says, stubbing out his cigar. "But be assured that I will pick up my gun and fight to the end." People who have been named in the audience try to protest, it doesn't do any good. One by one, dozens of Saddam's former supporters are led out to be shot. Saddam ordered a copy of the video to be sent to every party member.

HASSAN AL-ALAWI

Saddam's former spin doctor

It was unbelievable. Saddam didn't make the video in order to show that there was a conspiracy against him, he wanted to send out the message that these people were innocent but I still executed them. The aim was to terrorise people.

SIMPSON: Two years later Panorama asked him if it was right to treat political opponents like this. He was engagingly frank.

Panorama
1981

SADDAM: Yes, it calls for it to be subject to execution and to torture in accordance with the law we say he who collaborates with a foreign party is sentenced to death.

SIMPSON: When the British ambassador in Baghdad, Sir Stephen Egerton, met Saddam for the first time, he realised this was an extraordinary personality.

Sir STEPHEN EGERTON

British Ambassador to Iraq, 1980-82

We went through a series of rooms, huge rooms, each colder than the last and the one he was in was the coldest of all, which was of course matched by his demeanour. He was very cold towards me and it sticks in my memory because all the people around him were sweating and I realised afterwards they were afraid.

SIMPSON: The fiercest punishment awaited anyone who failed to conform. Dissent was treasonable. You and your whole family could be wiped out for it. Even members of his inner circle like the head of military intelligence had to be careful with him.

Gen WAFIC SAMARAI

Former head of Iraqi Military Intelligence

We didn't have to look at the ground while we talked to him, however, no one would dare to raise his voice in the presence of Saddam Hussein. And if someone banged their fist on the table they would certainly be executed.

JERROLD POST

Former CIA political psychologist

This is a deeply brutal man indeed who, however, rationalises his brutality as necessary for the cause in which he believes, the advancement of Iraq and in his mind there is no separation between Saddam and Iraq and what is good for Saddam is good for Iraq and that means staying in power.

SIMPSON: Saddam's power base has always been his family, his clan. The men from Tikrit and its surrounding villages. They were the only people he could entirely trust. As a young man he married his cousin and by all accounts was a loving father. His son, Uday, would later become one of the most powerful men in Iraq, violent, uncontrollable and a serial rapist. No wonder he needed a double too. Latif Yahia was an old school friend of Uday. He was imprisoned and forced to have plastic surgery.

LATIF YAHIA

Uday Hussein's double, 1987-91

He has stolen my personality. It has taken me a long, long time to get over it. They train me, show me videos of how he walked, how he talked, how he do conferences, how he drives, how he smoked, how he drinks, and every movement of Uday. And after that they started to make me stronger they started showing me how they torture people, how they kill people, how they hung people, how they kept the fingers, the nails and ears and nose and...

SIMPSON: Uday has so many enemies the life of his double is an unenviable one.

YAHIA: Eleven times some people tried to kill me and I have got 9 bullets in my body.

SIMPSON: Eleven attempts to kill you?

YAHIA: Yes, and twice just they missed me. Nine times I got shot, the bullets are

in my body.

SIMPSON: The presidential family was quite extraordinary. On Saddam's orders Uday, standing in the middle at the back here, later took part in the killing of his two brothers in law standing on the left of this family photo. Their wives have never been seen in public since.

YAHIA: The word was 'mafia'. There is a mafia. Because every son, every grandson, every doctor, every bodyguard, he has his own business. If you do something with this government you must pay the price. Just don't try to play a game with him and send him money. If you don't send it your head will be cut off.

SIMPSON: Literally?

MALE: Yes, you and your family.

SIMPSON: Like Stalin Saddam made himself the embodiment of the country, the central figure of its history and culture. Nebuchadnezzar, Saladin who was also from Tikrit, and now the greatest Iraqi of them all. He rebuilt ancient Babylon with little regard for archaeological correctness, stamping his name on the bricks for later generations to admire. It all hinted strongly at his future ambitions.

Dr HUSSAIN AL-SHAHRISTANI

Former Chief Scientist

Iraq's civil nuclear programme

The regime started to invest a lot of money in infrastructure but mostly to enhance the military might of the country. Saddam has always been very clear saying that he is there to unite the Arab world under his leadership.

SIMPSON: But in fact he made the Arab world nervous. Thanks to his ferocity, his immense oil revenues and the weapons he was buying. Still, the Americans decided he was the man to sort out his turbulent neighbour. Iran was undergoing its violent and bloody Islamic revolution.

Iraqi propaganda video

From the start of it Iraq had been broadcasting hostile propaganda, now the American's encouraged him to invade Iran, and Saddam, sensing its weakness, decided to do it. The invasion came within 18 months of his becoming president. Once again life was cheap for him. The war was to last 8 years and cost a million lives. Like many of the big moves he has made it was a serious mistake. Soon he assumed direct control of the war himself but he made a poor general. In 1986 I saw for myself how his enemy, Iran, scored a stunning victory invading Iraqi territory at the far peninsular.

JOHN SIMPSON

BBC News 1986

There is no questioning the extent of the Iranian victory in recapturing all this land and they seem to be repelling the Iraqi counter-attacks pretty well. What is in question is what use the Iranian's can put their victory too.

SIMPSON: The American's were now seriously worried. If Saddam lost Iran's fiery Islamic fundamentalism might sweep through the entire region. The American's might not like Saddam but they were prepared to help him in his hour of need.

JAMES WOOLSEY
CIA Director, 1993-95

We gave him, for example, satellite photos which indicated movements of Iranian forces. That would have been extremely useful to him even though it was relatively easy for us to do. So to know where your enemy is deployed and where his reserves are and that sort of thing could have been extremely important to him.

SIMPSON: It could have saved him.

WOOLSEY: Possibly.

SIMPSON: Yet the American's were double crossing Saddam by channelling arms to the Iranians at the same time as part of a deal to get American hostages released. Saddam never forgave them.

General WAFIC SAMARAI
Former Head of Iraqi Military Intelligence
Each piece of information we received from the Americans and all the meetings we had with them were referred to Saddam personally. He studied every detail, he used to tell us to be cautious and he said this very clearly "The American's are conspirators".

SIMPSON: The war had reached stalemate. Iraq was haemorrhaging men and money. Now he was backed into a corner Saddam showed how far he would go to save his regime. Again using western technology, Saddam deployed a weapon scarcely seen since the first world war - poison gas. It was horribly effective against the closely packed Iranian forces.

Dr HUSSAIN AL-SHAHRISTANI
Iraq's former chief atomic scientist
Even in the military communiqués that were read on the Iraqi television they said "We have killed Iranian soldiers like flies being sprayed". And that is what he considered his nerve gasses to be - killing soldiers like flies.

SIMPSON: Halabja provided another warning. A small Kurdish town in Northern Iraq which had gone over to the enemy. When I went there a few days afterwards I found that Saddam's chemical weapons had killed 5,000 people as a punishment.

BBC News
March 1988
The bodies which litter this town were those of people who ran out of their houses to try to escape the gas and then were killed out in the open either by more gas or by high explosive.

SIMPSON: Now Saddam knew how easy it was, what he had done once he could do again.

Sir STEPHEN EGERTON

British Ambassador to Iraq, 1980-82

He has actually used them, he has used them against his own people and that is quite frightening but I don't think that they would be for wider use - not unless his back was absolutely up to the wall, against the wall, and he was being invaded.

SIMPSON: In 1988 the war with Iran was at last over. Saddam claimed it as a victory, even though it wasn't. He celebrated by putting up vast monuments. But he couldn't rest, an even bigger crisis was brewing. Saddam was broke and so he met the immensely rich Emir of Kuwait to demand his help. "After all" he said "I saved the rest of the Arab world from Iran". The Emir refused and Saddam was deeply insulted. From that moment the invasion of Kuwait was inevitable.

HASSAN AL-ALAWI

Former friend of Saddam

We must remember his words "This is my price". He meant Kuwait was his price for fighting Iran. He was saying "I fought Iran on your behalf and I lost thousands of soldiers but you haven't given me my reward and my reward is Kuwait".

SIMPSON: There was world-wide shock and revulsion. But the invasion was another colossal miscalculation. By now it had become habitual for Saddam to shift the blame for almost everything onto the west.

SADDAM HUSSEIN: Any aggressive act is not characteristic of us. But it is characteristic to repel aggression.

JERROLD POST

Former CIA political psychologist

This is a man who has unbounded ambition. For years he suffered believing that he had gotten no recognition as being one of the world's great socialist leaders, that he was destined to be ranked with Tito, Mao Tse Tung, Castro, but the world had not seen him as being in this league. After the invasion of Kuwait, finally *he had the world by its throat* and he was now recognised as an important world leader.

SIMPSON: But while President Bush was assembling a force to evict him from Kuwait, Saddam made yet another serious blunder. Mr Bush and his advisors knew that if Saddam staged a partial withdrawal their plans would collapse. Saddam might even be able to keep Kuwait's oil fields.

General BRENT SCOWCROFT

US National Security Advisor, 1989-93

We had half a million troops there, we couldn't keep them there, we couldn't sustain them there over a long period of time. But he never took advantage of that and that was my greatest fear that he would be skilful and do something which would make it difficult, if not impossible for us to attack.

SIMPSON: Saddam's greatest problem is his isolation. It is the price he pays for terrorising the people around him.

SCOWCROFT: I am convinced that nobody tells him the truth about what is going on. People are afraid to tell him to give him bad news because it may cost them their lives. So he lives in this cocoon, in a way, of people telling him things that they think won't get them in trouble and that has to affect his view of the world.

BBC News

15 January 1991

SIMPSON: All the firing that's going on, and there is a great deal of it, is just pretty wildly up in the air and it doesn't seem to be aimed at anything. It looks as though they're just getting ready for the big attack.

The big attack didn't bring the terrible loss of life that Saddam had expected, but it did convince the generals they must pull out of Kuwait, but they didn't dare say so.

General WAFIC SAMARAI

Head of Iraqi Military Intelligence, Gulf War

Saddam Hussein might think that we were conspiring and had no intention of keeping Kuwait, secondly he'd probably think that we were accusing the leadership of failing to take the right decisions.

SIMPSON: Although we were shown occasional pictures of Saddam in his bunker, he actually spent much of his time outside Baghdad, driving round in a red Volkswagen Passat with only a single bodyguard, that way he was almost impossible to target. The Islamic world had always distrusted Saddam. He was seen as anti-Muslim and headed an aggressively secular state. But in the Gulf War he showed how clever he was at manipulating opinion. A few days before the war began he suddenly became publicly devout. It may seem a trifle obvious but it worked.

SAID ABURISH

Saddam's Biographer

'I have become a Muslim'. He takes a great deal of responsibility on the average Muslim in the Middle East. What are you going to do now? 'I am fighting those people as a Muslim, not as an Iraqi, not as an Arab, but in a much larger context. If you are part of the Islamic nation then you must support it'.

SIMPSON: Arab Government didn't but ordinary people did. It revealed the path which Saddam has been able to follow ever since. Even more important for Arab opinion, he decided to target Israel. Israelis expected an attack with chemical weapons, and there was near panic and some absurdity.

BENJAMIN NETANYAHU

Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister, 1991

I must say that this is darnedest way to conduct an interview. Of course what it does demonstrate I think in a fairly dramatic way is the kind of threat which we're

facing.

SIMPSON: As Saddam launched his scud missiles at Israel pro-Iraqi demonstrations erupted right across the Middle East. Saddam was hugely popular. It made him realise that he can play to public opinion, encouraging him to hang on, hoping his enemies will crumble.

Dr HUSSAIN AL-SHAHRISTANI

The Arab masses felt at least there is somebody now with the capability to challenge Israel, so the effect in general was positive, at least he had succeeded to convince the Arab masses that he is their hero, their champion who can really stand up for their rights.

SIMPSON: But in the next war Saddam probably won't be able to attack Israel like this. He's only got around 18 long range missiles now. His former chief nuclear scientist:

AL-SHAHRISTANI: If he does have a few missiles left and he manages to use them against Israel, I don't think it will be different from what we saw in 1991. They will be just empty, hardly causing any damage. The object of the exercise is basically to stir up the Arab masses to come on the street and demand stop of the war against Saddam, and that's what he wants.

SIMPSON: As it turned out, Saddam's army put up scarcely any fight at all. It was all just hype about being the world's fourth biggest army, willing to fight to the death. Soldiers, like the Iraqi civilians, weren't interested in laying down their lives for Saddam. But in retreat he showed what he was capable of when his back is against the wall. Blowing up oil wells is something he could do again, next time, unless they're properly defended against him that is. The coalition forces advanced and then stopped at the Iraqi border. The Americans had privately promised the Egyptians and the Saudis they wouldn't invade Iraq. They didn't.

General BRENT SCOWCROFT

US National Security Advisor, 1989-93

The mission was to drive his forces out of Kuwait. And while almost everyone thought that he would be toppled as a result of being defeated, but there was no talk before the war that the mission had to be getting rid of Saddam Hussein.

SIMPSON: At the surrender ceremony the Americans failed to insist that Saddam should be there in person. If he had been shown up to be that weak, his generals would probably have overthrown him. Instead President Bush appealed to everyone else to get rid of him.

Victory Speech

March 1991

BUSH: Iraqi people should put him aside and that would facilitate the resolution of all these problems that exist, and certainly would facilitate the acceptance of Iraq back into the family of peace loving nations.

SIMPSON: The Shiites in the South and the Kurds in the North took the appeal

seriously. They believed the Americans really wanted Saddam overthrown and would help them. Saddam's authority began to crumble. But President Bush left the rebels to their fate.

Dr HUSSAIN AL-SHAHRISTANI

Rebel leader, 1991 uprising

I felt betrayed by the Americans. The Americans were hoping that there could be a palace coup where another general can take over and be friendly or controllable by them, and they decided basically to allow Saddam and indirectly to help him to crush the uprising and that has caused the Iraqi people 300,000 lives.

SIMPSON: Once again Saddam wanted people to see it for themselves. Iraqi television showed pictures of Saddam's cabinet members beating up and killing prisoners after the uprising. It was the old method of conspicuous punishment. Slowly he was regaining his dominance. The rebellion was crushed.

JAMES WOOLSEY

CIA Director, 1993-95

I think the decision not to support that was one of the worst American decisions of the 20th century frankly. I think they had a bit of a blind spot on not wanting bad states to break up because they didn't know exactly what was going to follow.

SIMPSON: Thousands more died after a second uprising four years later.

[Film footage of brutalities]

OFFICER: Slit their throats and divide their hearts in two.

General WAFIC SAMARAI

Head of Iraqi Military Intelligence, 1995

He cured Iraqis of trying to overthrow Saddam for themselves. As for his army, the one institution that might challenge him, he purged its senior officers regularly and thoroughly.

He executed the Head of the General Security, he executed the Head of Intelligence. He poisoned and killed another head of intelligence. He poisoned and killed another Head of General Security. I was convinced that if I hadn't left Iraq I wouldn't have been alive by now.

SIMPSON: So in spite of all his disastrous mistakes, Saddam was firmly back in charge. Now he planned to turn Iraq into a regional superpower again by developing more weapons of mass destruction.

JERROLD POST

Former CIA political psychologist

How can they be at the very peak of world leadership without having these weapons that are associated with significant world leaders. This is very important to him, not only to be a weapon of leverage and threat, but also in terms of his own personal view of his own stature.

SIMPSON: After the Gulf War, United Nations weapons inspectors had tried to

destroy Iraq's massive programme for making nuclear chemical and biological weapons, but it was an immensely difficult job. The inspectors were frustrated at every turn, partly by the Iraqi's skill at hiding their weapons but also because of the fear Saddam created in his own people.

CHARLES DUELFER

Dep chief UN weapons inspector, 1993-2000

It was not a pleasant experience because we would identify a low level person and ask him to describe what he was doing, and he would do this under the eye of Iraqis observing this, and he would know perhaps even his life was at risk, depending upon how he behaved in this interview. But when you see these individuals, they'd be quivering sometimes because they were afraid that they would say something or reveal something that was not part of the party line.

SIMPSON: *In 1998 the inspectors had to leave.* But it was pretty clear that Iraq had kept part of its arsenal in tact. The inspectors may go back soon but the problem is Iraq has now had 4 years in which to hide its weapons well.

SAMARAI: Iraq has built its policy on weapons of mass destruction in accordance with the strategic balance in the region. I don't believe that Saddam will ever give up his policy in the future.

SIMPSON: By the end of the 90s Saddam, or it may be his double of course, seemed indestructible.

LATIF YAHIA

Uday Hussein's double, 1987-91

Where is John Major? Where is George Bush? Where is Mitterand? Where is.. you know.. Gorbachev? Everything is gone. Who stay? Still Saddam in the power. Everyone is gone but he stay.

SIMPSON: Saddam has outlasted and outwitted all his enemies and there seemed no sign that he was ready to capitulate. The Americans seemed prepared to tolerate him, merely keeping him in his place by the imposition of UN sanctions. They were indeed a savage punishment but they chiefly hurt the ordinary people of the country. Saddam made sure they suffered even more than they had to. The situation could have gone on indefinitely and then everything changed. The hawks in the Pentagon insisted that Al-Qaeda was linked with Saddam Hussein even though the CIA were certain it wasn't. No matter, Saddam was public enemy number one again. Now Afghanistan had been dealt with, Iraq was next.

September 2002

BUSH: We can't let the world's worst leaders blackmail, threaten, hold freedom loving nations hostage with the world's worst weapons.

SIMPSON: In the recent referendum Saddam says he got 100% of the vote. Well, perhaps. There was no one else to vote for. But the turnout wasn't very high. A kind of lethargy has come over Iraq, as it did before the war 12 years ago. They're going through the motions. Not Saddam though.

SADDAM: [Speech] The evil of the evil doers will never end until they are defeated. And their defeat is coming in the near future, God willing. [applause]

SIMPSON: Whether the British will send troops to join the Americans may depend on whether President Bush gets UN support or not. *It will be a hard decision for Tony Blair.* It now looks as though an attack will come in February, even March. As for Saddam, we can be sure he won't go quietly.

Sir STEPHEN EGERTON

British Ambassador to Iraq, 1980-82

In the normal course of events, when things are going quite well, he's pretty predictable. But with the back to the wall, you know.. any person, any human being with so much at stake, becomes unpredictable.

SAID ABURISH

Saddam's Biographer

If Saddam believed that he is going to go, that the campaign against him.. any campaign against him was succeeding, and that they're after him personally, I think he'd use the weapons of mass destruction. What has he got to lose?

IBRAHIM ZOBEDI

Childhood friend of Saddam

He is in the corner. He will not give up. He will not leave the country. He will not resign. He will not go to another country at all. He will stay to the last minute.

SIMPSON: But when the moment comes, will Saddam bring everything crashing down about him? He'll certainly try but it won't necessarily be easy. His weaponry is limited. His soldiers don't want to fight and his generals must be looking for a way out. Still we cannot write him off, especially now he's cornered.

Dr HUSSAIN AL-SHAHRISTANI

Former Chief Scientist

Iraq's civil nuclear programme

I think he'll fight to the last man. He will go down as the world's biggest suicide bomber, making sure that he takes as many lives with him when he goes.

SIMPSON: Still, forget the gung-ho simplicities of the computer games, it's likely to be the Americans who hunt him down than the Iraqi army. As so many dictators have discovered, it's the people he's underestimated will get the real Saddam in the end.

PANORAMA

THE CASE
AGAINST WAR

RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION: BBC-1

DATE: 8:12:02

.....
STEVE BRADSHAW: We've examined the case against Saddam. Tonight we assess the case against going to war with Saddam.

PATRICK CORDINGLEY: My troops led the armoured attack into Iraq. At the moment I don't believe the case has been made for another war against Iraq.

HAIFA ZANAGAN: Even though I was imprisoned by the regime, I was tortured by the regime. I would love to see this regime changed, but still I am against the war.

BISHOP HARRIES: I've supported every war that this country has been engaged in over the last 20 years, but on the evidence at present available to us I can't support a military action against Iraq.

BRADSHAW: The inspectors are still searching Iraq for weapons of mass destruction. The west is pouring over the dossier Saddam has handed to the UN as America prepares for war. It could be the last chance to consider the arguments for peace. Tonight the case against war through the stories of seven people you might not expect to hear making it. If there's one man who might be surprised to hear himself making the case against war it's the man who led British Armour into Iraq back in 1991.

The
GENERAL

Major General Patrick Cordingley is on his way to Westminster Abbey for Remembrance Sunday. For the General who retired two years ago it's time to contemplate the cost of war, including another war against Iraq.

Maj Gen PATRICK CORDINGLEY

Commander, 7th Armoured Brigade 1988-91

My reservations are all to do with the numbers of Iraqis that might be killed, you could argue, unnecessarily.

Saudi Arabia, 1991

CORDINGLEY: [addressing the troops] I'm absolutely certain that his morale is taking a hammering...

BRADSHAW: The general knows all too easily how combat can turn to slaughter. Eleven years ago he led Britain's Seventh Armoured Brigade, "The Desert Rats" against Saddam's conscript packed army.

CORDINGLEY: [addressing the troops] ...and there's good evidence to show that even the Republican Guard is not that happy, and if that's the case, that's very good news for us.

BRADSHAW: Less than 200 British and American soldiers died in combat in the last Gulf War. The Iraqis lost tens of thousands. Eleven years on the Americans estimate Iraq's land forces, weakened by sanctions, are at half strength, while the allies have even more sophisticated weapons than those which so hideously devastated the Iraqi forces.

CORDINGLEY: People don't understand what it means to send a modern British division to war today. How much fire power is available to it and how massive that will be, and the effects on the enemy will be remarkable. I do think that there is an inevitability about this. The Americans have geared themselves up now, or are gearing themselves up now. I think that they think the only way of resolving this problem is by going in on the ground and finishing the matter off.

BRADSHAW: Like any prime minister, moved by the Remembrance service, Tony Blair would be offended by suggestions he'd lead us into a war of unnecessary slaughter. He says the reasons for fighting would be disarming Saddam, not getting rid of his tyrannical regime.

8th November 2002

TONY BLAIR: I may find this regime abhorrent, any normal person would. But the survival of it is in his hands. Conflict is not inevitable but disarmament is.

BRADSHAW: It's a day to think of the ordinary soldier. Before General Cordingley would see any more go to Iraq he'd want another Security Council resolution explicitly calling for military action against Iraq, not just serious consequences like the last resolution. Otherwise the general would be seriously

concerned about what the troops would think, a concern he knows to be shared by some top serving commanders.

Maj Gen PATRICK CORDINGLEY

Commander, 7th Armoured Brigade 1988-91

If we go – and this is critical – if we go into this war unilaterally with America and some other allies without the United Nations resolution, I think there would be doubt in the minds of the British soldiers the justness of this cause, and I think it is a great shame if you get a situation where they're being used in a way that the British public are not easy with.

BRADSHAW: You say: "A great shame" I mean.. tough some people might say.

CORDINGLEY: Yes, but I mean I'm not going to dispute that and they will do their job and get on with it. But I, if I was a commander out there, would feel sad that we were being used in a way that.. and uneasy too, being used in a way that did not have the support of the nation.

Whitehall, London

BRADSHAW: On the wall in her London home, the fading memory of another city. She is one of many exiles with a personal reason to hate Saddam's regime. When she was 25 Haifa was arrested by Saddam's secret police at her old home in Baghdad. The treatment she faced was already becoming an horrific hallmark of Saddam's regime.

The
EXILE

HAIFA ZANGANA

Iraqi exile

I was too frightened to speak even. I was frozen totally. They thought I was courageous at that time so they started bunching and kicking. I lost conscious. I was naked.

BRADSHAW: Three friends arrested with her, also involved with the anti-Moscow wing of the communist party were executed.

HAIFA: They moved me to a room next to the torture room and I had to spend about three weeks there listening to the screams of people while they're being tortured. It was a howling, not screams. It wasn't human voices at all. They were begging, asking, and in many languages, Arabic, Kurdish...

BRADSHAW: After all that, don't you want a war to get rid of Saddam?

HAIFA: I want to get rid of Saddam but not by war. I don't want the war. I was imprisoned, I was tortured, I witnessed the suffering of many Iraqi people. I know the suffering of Iraqi people in exile yet I don't want Iraq to be led to another war.

BRADSHAW: Haifa watched the bombardment of Baghdad at the start of the Gulf

War in 1991 from exile in London.

HAIFA: The night of that bombardment I was listening to one commentator saying this is like Christmas tree, and was crying because it's not a Christmas tree – it's Baghdad, my city, burning until the morning. I felt angry, I felt dead worried about my family.

Baghdad, 1991

BRADSHAW: Back in '91 it seemed bombing military targets in Baghdad by so-called 'smart bombs' could be a relatively casualty free exercise, until the destruction of the al-Ameryah shelter showed the reality of the carnage on and under the ground. Some estimates suggest the total civilian death toll in Baghdad was between one and two thousand. If American and British troops try to occupy the city the death toll could be much worse.

HAIFA: I worry about my family and the rest of the population. People are frightened. They have kids, they have old people.

BRADSHAW: But you say some people in Britain will say look, this guy is a menace to world peace, to his neighbours. You've tried but you haven't got rid of him so now we'll have a go.

HAIFA ZANGANA

Iraqi exile

I don't think he's a threat to the world peace, he's not a threat to the world. He's definitely not a threat to America or Britain. The real threat was, and still is, to his own people. So why don't we let his own people to deal with him.

Baghdad, 1917

BRADSHAW: Britain's armed forces first marched into Baghdad in the First World War, and didn't leave. In the 20s the British installed a client king and bombed rebels into submission, staying on after full independence in the 30s.

Iraq, 1934

The number 55 Bomber Squadron stationed at Hinaida, near Baghdad, exercising with an armoured car section over 250 miles from any civilised habitation.

BRADSHAW: Aerial bombardment, regime change imposed by the west, to Iraqis it's nothing new, and to Iraqis the reason for our continuing interest has been clear from the start.

[News footage]

There was oil seepage to the surface, more than a hint of what lay beneath. So the west invested in the east, bringing it's knowledge and skill to bear upon the desert.

Iraq, 1958

BRADSHAW: Although more and more regions outside the Middle East are meeting the west's demand for oil, the Iraqis know the strategic value of their reserves.

HAIFA: Iraq could be the largest reserve oil country in the world after Saudi Arabia and Britain is fighting to gain access to that, to have a share in the spoil of the war. The British involvement at the moment in Iraq, or trying to involve in this war, is definitely will be looked upon by the Iraqis as another colonisation of Iraq, something which they fought very hard during the whole last century to get rid of.

BRADSHAW: Now Iraqis fear their natural resources are being coveted by a new imperial power. As the US builds up its forces in the Gulf, Haifa fears the world's solo superpower is starting to behave like Britain before it with the arrogance of empire.

HAIFA: Iraq is only the beginning I think. There was Afghanistan of course, I mean this is Iraq here, and probably Iran or Syria next. What else? I mean is there an end to it? This is real expansion of power. There is one power in the world nowadays and it is the US, and the US wants that area.

Maj Gen PATRICK CORDINGLEY

Commander, 7th Armoured Brigade 1988-91

Isn't it a throwback to days of empire, back to the last century when armed force was used whenever we wanted to around the world for particular foreign policy aims. Surely we've moved on from that now.

US Embassy, London
[Peace Marchers]

WOMAN: The Americans who are behind all this evil warmongering and I am against it.

MAN: Bush uses the term "The war on terrorism" but for me that's just a smoke screen. It's just a smoke screen to give the Americans the right to invade any country and any regime they don't want.

BRADSHAW: As an agent for the CIA, America's central intelligence agency, he was once suspected by the FBI of trying to murder Saddam Hussein.

The
SPY

Robert Baer was a top CIA agent, then the FBI investigated him for allegedly trying to kill Saddam. That would have defied a presidential order on assassinations and been a potential crime under 'murder for hire' laws.

ROBERT BAER

CIA Agent, 1976-97

I was detained, and my team, by the FBI. Had we been guilty and tried, we could have all been executed.

BRADSHAW: In the United States?

BAER: In the United States, so it's stupidity but...

BRADSHAW: For trying to murder Saddam?

BAER: Murdering Saddam Hussein.

BRADSHAW: Baer hadn't tried to kill Saddam and hadn't broken any US laws. But he had become involved in a plot by Iraqi dissidents to unseat Saddam. He'd done so on the Clinton administration's orders, until a nervous Washington pulled the plug.

Given that you were there and you were the man on the ground trying to get rid of Saddam, you must presumably be pleased that President Bush is now going to try and do it for real?

BAER: No, because what we're inviting is World War Three in the Middle East. It's too late to invade Iraq a second time.

BRADSHAW: In 1991 the allies have the support of Arab nations like Saudi Arabia for invading Iraq. After all, Saddam had just invaded another Arab country – Kuwait. Try to invade now though, Baer argues, there'd be no such support for war. Any government helping the west would fear a fundamentalist backlash.

BAER: I talked to people in the CIA and they're worried about the stability of the region.

BRADSHAW: And privately people in the CIA say to you..

BAER: War is a bad idea, it's going to cause my terrorism. Cooperation, local governance is going to end.

BRADSHAW: Baer believes war with Saddam is being sold to President Bush by right-wing hawks, so-called neo-conservatives who started promoting war against Iraq long before the 11th September last year. Four years ago a group calling themselves Project for the New American Century wrote to President Clinton urging the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime. Using military action to disarm him and to protect our vital interests in the Gulf, including oil. Most of those who signed it now serve the Bush Administration including defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld.

BAER: Today they have the chance to do something about it and they want to prove themselves right. They say we were right in the 90s and we're going to show you today. Just watch.

BRADSHAW: Watch while we.... ?

BAER: (laughs) While we set the place afire.

BRADSHAW: Alarmist? Maybe not. These are the kind of images that make some of Washington's neoconservatives hope war against Saddam will destabilise much of the Middle East. What such American hardliners hope is Saddam's fall will be followed by the collapse of what they call other terrorist states, countries like Iran and Syria which they say are backing terrorists. One neoconservative even advocated turning the Middle East into a cauldron. In Washington President Bush has distanced himself from the more extreme neoconservatives. But they do have old allies in the Pentagon where the Department of Defence has rebuilt its offices and is now strengthening its Washington powerbase.

Pentagon
13th September 2001

When I came around that corner, you could see pieces, way up there at the far end of the airplane..

BRADSHAW: What critics like Baer allege is the Pentagon has been trying to skew the evidence to support war against Saddam in the process, sidelining the CIA.

ROBERT BAER
CIA Agent, 1976-97

Well I think all power in Washington has sort of gravitated toward the Pentagon which has set up its own intelligence units which is reinterpreting intelligence to ensure the outcome they want.

BRADSHAW: Some top democrats in Congress shared Baer's fears about this so-called politicisation of intelligence. The old CIA hands accusations are strongly denied in the Pentagon, but Baer believes many neoconservatives are set on war.

BAER: Today a land war or massive air war against an Arab country is going to cause several governments in the Middle East to fall, among them Saudi Arabia, Jordan, possibly Egypt.

BRADSHAW: Some on the right would say that's a good thing.

BAER: I think people in Washington are so hurt, so damaged by the attacks on September 11th that they want to take revenge, and Saddam happens to be the vehicle.

BRADSHAW: It's not revenge, surely it's a precaution.

BAER: Well, I mean how do you fight a billion people. I'm not sure. Is this another crusade? It looks like that to Arabs.

Florence

[Stop the war coalition marchers]

BRADSHAW: You might at least think all the men who helped shape Tony Blair's Middle East policy would back the war. But meet our old Ambassador in Saudi Arabia and Syria.

The
AMBASSADOR

August 1991

BRADSHAW: When the three British hostages were freed in Beirut after five years of captivity, Sir Andrew Green welcomed them back into the world.

GREEN: I shall never forget it. I was the Ambassador in Syria when they were released and they were released to me. John McCarthy bounced into the room, shook us all by the hand and I sat him down, briefed him. But it was a huge relief, so that was quite a moment.

BRADSHAW: For 35 years Sir Andrew Green advised British governments, including Tony Blair's. Now he's in no doubt the Prime Minister is making a big mistake.

Sir ANDREW GREEN
Ambassador to Syria, 1991-94
And Saudi Arabia, 1996-2000

I think this talk about Saddam being a threat to the west frankly is largely manufactured. I think the policy is misguided and misconceived. I think any attack on Iraq will be a huge bonus to Osama bin Laden, it will destabilise the Gulf and we'll have consequences that cannot be foreseen or indeed predicted.

BRADSHAW: You're putting it very strongly.

GREEN: Yes, I think we've gone off the rails. I think American policy has changed. Indeed it clearly has changed in this determination to achieve what they call regime change, and I think that the British government have effectively fallen into line and I think that's a serious mistake.

BRADSHAW: Back in 1996 a group of American neoconservatives helped write a report called: "A Clean Break". It was published by a think tank based in Israel. They hoped their ideas might be taken up by incoming Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. They included removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq which they called an important Israeli strategic objective. The paper never became official policy but was widely read.

GREEN: I think it's very interesting. I think there has always been a group in Israel that has wanted to knock out Iraq – Iraq being the main remaining strategic threat to Israel. Now if that has the effect of creating chaos in the Middle East and hostility towards America, why should they worry? It's we who should worry. If we're going to march to war to an Israeli drum, then that would be a very foolish thing to do.

BRADSHAW: And eight strong group behind the paper was chaired by Richard Perle, now the Pentagon's top civilian advisor. Two other members of the group [Douglas Feith – David Wurmser] now have official posts in President Bush's administration.

GREEN: There's certainly a group of people at the top of the American administration who have a great deal of sympathy with Israeli aims in the region.

BRADSHAW: And who therefore..?

GREEN: And who, therefore, are open to suggestions that removing Saddam Hussein is a good thing to do.

BRADSHAW: The policy of disarming and maybe removing Saddam, the US administration says, is most certainly not the result of pro-Israeli pressure. After all, the American President didn't campaign on action against Saddam. He only decided to act after 9/11. He could be taking a huge political gamble.

Surely he simply wants to do it because he doesn't want another 9/11.

GREEN: Well there's no connection between Saddam and 9/11 so removing Saddam is not going to prevent another 9/11.

BRADSHAW: And this isn't an Arabist in the Foreign Office's conspiracy theory or paranoid or...?

GREEN: Well of course they would say that, wouldn't they. But perhaps someone else can explain why this has suddenly come forward as a policy option.

New York

LARRY HOLMES

US Anti-War Coalition

If Bush goes into Iraq again, invades it, slaughters people, as if they hadn't done enough already over the past ten years, occupies it, you know what that's going to do. That's going to create thousands of people who are willing to martyr themselves, fly a plane into a building or drop something..... (applause)

BRADSHAW: Few people have tried so hard to warn about weapons of mass destruction they've inspired a Hollywood movie.

The

PRESIDENTIAL

ADVISER

In the 90s Jessica Stern was an advisor to President Clinton. She once warned that terrorists could nuke the Empire State building and to alert people for the dangers of so-called hyper-terrorism she helped make the Hollywood movie: "The Peacemaker" she was the model for the Nicole Kidman character who saves New York from a nuclear suitcase bomb. The former presidential adviser now lectures

on public policy and religious terrorism at Harvard University.

JESSICA STERN

National Security Council, 1994-95

There are compelling reasons to go to war against Iraq. Saddam poses a threat to the entire world. However, we need to consider whether the risks of going to war exceed the benefit and I believe they do.

BRADSHAW: Last October the CIA made public part of its secret intelligence assessment on Iraq. It said the probability of Saddam initiating an attack without provocation on the United States in the foreseeable future was low.

STERN: I think there would be a far more compelling argument for going to Iraq if we had intelligence that Saddam was about to strike the UK or the United States. I don't believe that any intelligence has been uncovered.

BRADSHAW: But the CIA argued that if Saddam was attacked, the chances would then become pretty high that he'd respond with biological or chemical weapons.

GREEN: There were rumours that he had been threatening to use chemical agents in perfume bottles several years ago. That's always a risk. The question is, if we go to war, are we increasing that risk or are we decreasing that risk. There is no question in my mind that we are increasing the risk, that those weapons, chemical or biological agents will be used, possibly in our cities, deployed with relative ease in our cities.

BRADSHAW: President Bush believes that's all the more reason to act now before the threat from Saddam gets even more serious. If we don't, he says, we may have to face still worse horrors.

7th October 2002

PRESIDENT BUSH: Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists. Alliance with terrorists could allow the Iraq regime to attack America without leaving any fingerprints.

BRADSHAW: And the Hawks say there's an even bigger risk waiting for Saddam to team up with the religious terrorists of Al-Qaeda. The CIA has warned it has solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and Al-Qaeda, but despite the odd appearance of piety there's no evidence Saddam's planned terrorist attacks with Al-Qaeda.

STERN: At the moment Al-Qaeda and Saddam are mortal enemies. Saddam is a secular ruler. He is an infidel from the perspective of Al-Qaeda. However, if we go to war against Saddam, it seems to me that is the most likely way that those two entities, now enemies, would join forces against a bigger enemy which is the west.

BRADSHAW: But isn't getting tough showing there is a downside to terrorism,

the only way of really guaranteeing our security?

STERN: I don't think it is. I think that the United States has been very slow to recognise that we are really despised around the world. We are despised because our troops are in Saudi Arabia, we are despised because of the sanctions against Iraq.

HAIFA ZANGANA

Iraqi exile

There is no deep understanding of what is going on. There is no understanding of the anger of the people. Go and see any Arab and the ordinary Arab in the street.

BRADSHAW: There is already growing anger against American policy in the Middle East in Muslim countries across the world. The fear is anger could turn into support for terrorism if America bombs Iraq. Here in Iran they're still chanting 'death to America'. But for George Bush, war against terror is both the war against extremists who turn to violence and against states who back them.

JESSICA STERN

National Security Council, 1994-95

We are in the middle of a war on terrorism, this is the most important war we have to fight. Right now terrorists pose a far more significant threat to international security than states do. I think that attacking Saddam will increase the appeal, will help the terrorists mobilise disgruntled youth. We, in fact, will be doing Al-Qaeda's work if we attack Saddam.

Cardiff

[Stop the war protesters]

MAN: I am actually opposing the war because I believe there are so many innocent people would be killed, and thus I think it's not justified.

BRADSHAW: Back in the 60s he fought in the Vietnam War. Now he's worried we'll go into Iraq without learning its lessons.

The

SENATOR

Chuck Hagel is not only a Vietnam vet, he's also a senior and pretty right wing US senator. He's one of two senators who led the US fight against the Kyoto Global Warming Treaty, and he's in favour of at least preparing for war with Saddam. But even the Senator from Nebraska is having doubts whether the risks of war have really been thought through.

Senator CHUCK HAGEL

Republican

Foreign Relations Committee

There's always risk in action, and there is always risk in war, and we should ask some of the same questions that we did not ask about Vietnam, we should ask those now about Iraq.

Vietnam, 1969

BRADSHAW: Chuck Hagel won two purple hearts for his courage in Vietnam. The US was sucked into war in South East Asia without real honest debate, and the Senator wants to be sure that won't happen again.

HAGEL: What is the objective? Who are we doing this with? Have we thought through the consequences? What kind of government do we want? How long are we going to be there? Have we thought through the cost? Those are things we didn't ask ourselves in Vietnam and we got into a lot of trouble, and you always get into trouble when you don't ask yourself the tough questions.

BRADSHAW: Etched on Washington's Vietnam war memorial are over 58,000 names, including some of the Senator's friends. So of the current administrations, Hawks and Neoconservatives though, have never seen combat and some escaped the draft.

HAGEL: I think it is interesting that many of those who have been advocating the world the last few months, actually the last few years, are individuals who have never experienced war. That certainly does not disqualify them from their opinions, because they have other experiences. But I tend to first of all listen to those who have seen, experienced, the horrors of war.

Vietnam, 1966

When there's nothing but horror and suffering and people being killed, a lot of innocent people being killed and our own people being killed, and the other people being killed, then you balance your perspective.

BRADSHAW: As America builds up its forces, the Senator is also worried by the economic cost of war. The President's former economic advisor has estimated the overall cost could be as much as 1-200 billion dollars. In Britain estimates also run into billions of pounds. The Chancellor has already put aside one million pounds for extra military spending alone.

HAGEL: Certainly it will be costly if we go to war. Certainly the unknowns of what if those oil fields in Iraq go down? What if we have other surrounding oil producing countries in the Middle East are affected? What if terrorism strikes at some of those countries, some of their oil capacity goes down? That would have a disastrous effect on the world economy.

BRADSHAW: But war could mean recession.

HAGEL: War could mean a recession, sure. I mean again it's the unintended consequences, the unknowns, we don't know.

BRADSHAW: With a clear United Nations resolution for military action the senator might be a back wall, but he'd be reluctant to support a decision to go it alone as George Bush and the British Government have indicated they might do if necessary.

HAGEL: We don't want to be there alone. We don't want to isolate ourselves like we did in Vietnam.

BRADSHAW: Coming from the same party as the President, the Senator normally sees eye to eye with George Bush. In principle he has no quarrel with the President's new defence policy which permits pre-emptive strikes against perceived enemies that haven't yet attacked. But the Senator is worried how the new policy could be interpreted.

Senator CHUCK HAGEL

Republican

Foreign Relations Committee

We're fighting against a shadowy dark insidious evil called terrorism, so it is tougher. But at the same time we have to be careful here and be responsible as a great power that we don't overplay that or unintentionally give the world a perception that we are now going to be the bullies of the world and we'll take it upon ourselves to attack anyone that we believe could harm us.

ROBERT BAER

CIA Agent, 1976-97

We're talking about pre-emptive war and that's very dangerous because once you set those standards for pre-emptive war you have wars all across the world.

Westminster, London

[Stop the War demonstration]

BRADSHAW: Mr Benn, BBC Panorama, we're making a film about the case against war. I'd just like to ask you why you're here.

TONY BENN

Former Labour Cabinet Minister

Well I'm here because if the war begins, President Bush and the Prime Minister will be taking decisions to kill women and children and thousands and thousands of innocent Iraqis and it would be wrong. This is a question of right and wrong.

BRADSHAW: Donning his robes for a sermon on weapons of mass destruction, he is perhaps the last senior churchman you would expect to oppose war with Iraq.

The

BISHOP

He is the son of a brigadier and he was educated at the top officers college Sandhurst only to leave the army and join the church. The Bishop of Oxford has had a controversial record – not for opposing war but for backing it.

Rt Rev RICHARD HARRIES

Bishop of Oxford

I'm not a pacifist and with much moral fear and spiritual trembling I even

supported a policy of nuclear deterrence at the height of the Cold War. I supported the action to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, I supported the military action in Afghanistan. I do believe that force does have to be used on occasions in order to maintain international stability, order and justice, but on this occasion I can't support military action on the evidence at present available to us because I simply don't think the traditional 'just war' criteria have been met.

BRADSHAW: Just war, the age old Christian tradition, it allows believers to fight with a clear conscience. The Bishop has made a special study of 'just war'. He says it must be fought for a good reason, and the evil it prevents must outweigh the evil it causes. Not every Christian would agree with the Bishop how that applies to Iraq, Tony Blair for one. But the Bishop believes that as things stand, war with Iraq would not be just.

HARRIES: In order for a war to count as just, there must be a just cause, and it would be a just cause if the threat posed by Saddam Hussein was immediate and serious, but the threat is not immediate and serious. He is a long-term worry, but the policy of containment and deterrence has worked for the last ten years, nothing new has come on the scene to force us to cross this terrible threshold of a war.

BRADSHAW: The Bishop may believe in containment but President Bush says that's not led to compliance. Iraq is still developing weapons of mass destruction. The Bishop though, points out that most mainstream Christian churches in the US and UK back his view.

HARRIES: We have the extraordinary situation that at the moment the national church, the established church, the Church of England, is predominantly opposed to military action, so is the Roman Catholic Church, so are the other churches, and in the United States there's this unusual coalition of all of us believe that this war is both mistaken and immoral, and that has not happened in my lifetime.

BRADSHAW: What the Bishop fears is suffering in Iraq and unrest in Britain. He's concerned about reaction in other faith communities in Britain, other religions including Islam, the religion of most people in Iraq.

HARRIES: I'm certainly concerned about the possibility of communal strike in cities where there are significant Moslem communities, but my concern is also that there could be a much broader division in this country.

[News footage]

Cairo 1954. Egyptians hear Colonel Nasser speaking of a future Arab Empire.

BRADSHAW: Back in the 50s the British faced another Arab leader, Colonel Nasser who nationalised the western owned Suez Canal.

Suez Canal, 1956

Britain was divided over plans to recover the canal. Opinion poll showed only a minority, about a third, supported military action. Today less than half support war with Saddam. In Egypt the troops went in anyway but the mission ended in failure

and national humiliation.

Rt Rev RICHARD HARRIES
Bishop of Oxford

It was bad enough over Suez all those years ago. I think that if there was military action now the country would be even more divided and I think the cabinet would be divided, Parliament would be divided, the churches would certainly be opposed to it, and I think it would be a very, very serious situation in this country.

Edinburgh
[Stop the War marchers]

BRADSHAW: 168,000 square miles of Iraq to search for deadly weapons labs that could be hidden in a truck. The inspectors showing they can even check Saddam's cupboards. If these sometimes quixotic seeming inspections fail, or if Saddam's weapons dossier proves flawed, we could be on the edge of war, and if we are, well it won't be the inspectors who are in a fix but the politicians. The opposition to a war to disarm Saddam is not just coming from the usual suspects.

Maj Gen PATRICK CORDINGLEY

This is not appeasement. What I'm saying very clearly is that if we go to war a lot of Iraqi soldiers and civilians will probably die. We've got to make absolutely certain that it is necessary to do that, that some material breach of the resolution has taken place and there is no other option.

JESSICA STERN

National Security Council, 1994-95

It's very important in thinking about whether to go to war to consider the cost and benefits. The benefits seem quite clear, the costs are really frightening.

PANORAMA

"CHASING SADDAM'S WEAPONS"

PANORAMA

"CHASING SADDAM'S WEAPONS"

RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION: BBC-1

DATE: 9:02:03

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JANE CORBIN: Vienna Airport last November, the start of a journey into unknown territory. Physicist Jacques Baute headed a team of nuclear experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency travelling to Baghdad. I was with them.

The UN Inspectors had agreed to let Panorama follow them over the coming weeks. There was an air of anticipation but also a big question mark hanging over their mission. Would they be able to prevent a war, or would they just delay it? On board with Jacques Baute was Demetrius Perricos who would lead the UN search for missiles and biological and chemical weapons. The inspectors were already feeling the political pressure. They knew they wouldn't be given much time.

CORBIN: How are you feeling about it?

TOM: Excited but also nervous, but enthusiastic for the mission. I think it's a very important mission. I think that if we can go the places that we need to go to, to do the things we need to do, that we can help maybe prevent a war.

CORBIN: It's going to be tough on the team.

JACQUES BAUTE: It will be tough on the team. It will be tough for probably at least 6 months. In other words, we are not going to have many days of leave or things like that.

CORBIN: And you think you're going to be there for six months? You don't think that American pressure in the interim will actually take us towards war?

BAUTE: You know, the political decision of.. you know.. going to military action or letting inspections go on is not ours.

CORBIN: This is the inside story of the last three months chasing Saddam's weapons. Iraqis traditionally welcome foreign guests with a meal of fish from the Tigris River. The day after my arrival in Baghdad I was summoned to meet two of the most important officials in the Iraqi regime - General Amer el Saadi, a British trained engineer once headed the country's chemical weapons programme. Now he's an adviser to President Saddam Hussein. General Hussein Mohammed Amin heads the team responsible for proving that Iraq no longer has forbidden weapons programmes. These officials had promised me I could visit suspect sites and talk to scientists. They wanted to convince me Iraq no longer had weapons of mass destruction.

The West still doesn't seem to believe Iraq, there's still this feeling you're hiding something, that you're not really laying out your cards on the table.

General AMER AL-SAADI
Presidential Advisor

Well how else can they justify their military build up? They must portray things as not being satisfactory, that Iraq is holding back, Iraq is hiding things. How else can they justify their actions to their public? If we have something we would produce it. We'll be happy to produce it to get rid of it and get done – but we don't. We don't. What do we do?

CORBIN: For years I had heard about Iraq's notorious weapon sites, researched and reported on what had gone on there. Now I was arriving at a remote spot in the desert outside Baghdad, once the centre of Saddam Hussein's germ warfare

programme. I was escorted by my minder, the official from the Ministry of Information who must accompany ever film crew at all times, and another Iraqi who turned out to be personally acquainted with this place.

So, this is....

MINDER: This was El Hakam site.

CORBIN: This was El Hakam.

MINDER: Yes, because you have seen there is no El Hakam site here.

CORBIN: Were you working here?

MINDER: Yes, I was responsible for the production of anthrax.

CORBIN: You were responsible?

MINDER: Yes.

CORBIN: Ah, well I didn't realise that.

MINDER: Yes.

CORBIN: So this was Iraq's main biological weapons site.

MINDER: Yes, that's right.

CORBIN: And what was produced here?

MINDER: It was used for the production of Biological agents which included bacillus anthracis spores.

CORBIN: Anthrax.

MINDER: Yes, anthrax. Clostridium botulinum toxin.

CORBIN: Botulinum toxin, yes.

MINDER: perfringen spores. That's it.

CORBIN: So a big variety of weapons here.

MINDER: Just the three, no more.

CORBIN: That's enough.

MINDER: Yes.

CORBIN: After the Gulf War in 1991 the UN forced Iraq to disarm and accept

inspection teams. They visited Al Hakam repeatedly. For four years the Iraqis lied, denying they had a germ warfare programme. They dumped the evidence, the bombs, in a nearby river, and they hid documents, records of what they'd produced. It took a defector to reveal where to look. Thousands of tons of toxins which suffocate their victims and cause liver cancer were eventually found and destroyed. The inspectors made sure Al Hakam could never again be used to produce biological weapons. Today Al Hakam lies abandoned. But the Iraqis have still not explained what happened to over 8,000 litres of anthrax, tons of growth medium to culture bacteria, and many thousands of munitions filled with biological agents. There was one Iraqi scientist who masterminded the bio warfare programme at Al Hakam and the cover-up. I wanted to meet the woman the inspectors nicknamed 'Dr Germ'. Dr Rihab Taha has never spoken publicly before. She met me accompanied by several officials at the ministry responsible for proving Iraq has destroyed its forbidden weapons. Dr Taha learnt her scientific skills in a British university.

Can I ask you a little bit about your history. Where did you train and what do you remember of those days?

Dr RIHAB TAHA

Well I did my PhD in England, in the University of East Anglia in Norwich City, and that was from 1980 to 1984.

CORBIN: And what did you study?

TAHA: I studied bacterial toxin, phytopathogenic toxin.

CORBIN: That's toxins in plants is it?

TAHA: Infected plants.. infected plants, yes.

CORBIN: Dr Taha's British education was put to use testing lethal toxins on animals and, some suspect, on people. She became head of the germ warfare programme.

Are you ashamed of what you did in those years when you were working on the biological weapons programme for Iraq?

TAHA: No, not at all. No, because you know we are under a threat of different sides and different enemy so I think it is our right to be able to defend ourselves and to have something as a deterrent.

CORBIN: So even though you were producing toxins and bacteria that could kill hundreds of thousands of people...

TAHA: Well we never have this intension to use it. We never want to cause harm or damage to anybody.

CORBIN: Are you doing any research work anymore on pathogens, biological agents?

TAHA: No. Now my work is just from the administrative point of view.

CORBIN: Saddam Hussein developed his weapons of mass destruction to give him power in his region, and as he showed in 1988 he was prepared to unleash poison gas against his own people to crush internal dissent and ensure his regime's survival. It raised the question would Saddam ever reveal what had happened to his forbidden weapons. Would he not gamble everything and try and keep them?

November 12, 2002.

United Nations, New York

CORBIN: I arrived in New York to meet the Weapons Inspectors just a few days after they'd received their orders to return to Iraq. Their predecessors had spent seven years uncovering and destroying Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Their mission had ended before they completed their task. Now, under the leadership of a quiet Swedish diplomat, Dr Hans Blix, they were going back.

Can you do this? Can you get to the bottom of what Iraq is up to?

Dr HANS BLIX

Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC

Well we've been preparing ourselves since the early year 2000, so we have a lot of trained people, we have also analysed a lot of the things from the past. So if we are not prepared now, I think we will never be prepared.

CORBIN: America was threatening war against Iraq, but the UN passed a unanimous resolution. Dr Blix and Mohamed El Baradei of the IAEA was set the task of verifying if Iraq had breached its promise to abandon its weapons of mass destruction.

KOFI ANNAN

Secretary General of the United Nations

Resolution 1441 was extremely important, not only was it passed by the council but every member of the council voted for it and sent a unanimous message to Saddam Hussein that he must disarm.

CORBIN: The French-led UN opposition to America's plans for regime change in Iraq. The Bush administration, at Britain's urging, reluctantly backed the resolution on inspections. But hawks with influence in Washington were already undermining Dr Blix.

RICHARD PERLE

Chairman, Defence Policy Review Board

He was not our first choice, that's well known. He was the first choice of the French. I have never thought that Dr Blix was sufficiently aggressive in getting at the truth. I think he's much too concerned about Saddam Hussein's sensitivities. Saddam is not a sensitive man.

CORBIN: You must be aware that there are mutterings amongst some elements in

the American administration, what you might call the hawks, saying are you tough enough for the job, are you up to it, are you the man for the moment?

BLIX: Well the proof of every pudding is in the eating so I think they will have to see what I do, or else they will eat me (laughs).

CORBIN: The Weapons Inspectors of UNMOVIC had few people and limited resources. They knew they'd have to depend on friendly governments with their much vaunted intelligence dossiers to have a real chance of finding Saddam's weapons.

The British government seems pretty sure that Saddam Hussein still has chemical and biological weapons, has produced more recently and is trying to get a nuclear bomb.

BLIX: Well we are asked to provide facts to the Security Council and the best way of doing that is through inspections, what we see. I read this as totally as I read the intelligence reports but frequently they simply state that intelligence tells us this, or intelligence shows that etc. Fine, it may all be true. I mean I meet some of these people and I have the greatest respect for them. I know they do a necessary job. But simply saying that "intelligence shows.." is not evidence.

CORBIN: The UN inspectors opened up their old headquarters in the Canal Hotel in Baghdad. The inspectors were there to verify that weapons programmes banned since the Gulf War had not restarted, and that former UN sites were empty. But the resolution made it clear it was up to Iraq to come clean if they were hiding weapons of mass destruction.

TARIQ AZIZ

Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq

When you listen to Bush and Blair they tell Iraq has weapons of mass destruction; Iraq has to declare weapons of mass destruction; the Onus is on Iraq – and this is not fair. This is not logical. The onus is not on Iraq. The onus is on the accuser. Who is accusing Iraq, he has to prove his case.

CORBIN: The hunt began on November 27th. The Inspectors' plan was to begin by checking hundreds of sites, factories, laboratories and military areas, places which they had been to before, and which had been involved in suspicious activity in the past.

BAUTE: The first day was absolutely crazy. We were three cars of ours, six or seven on the Iraqi side, and probably thirty of forty cars trying to compete who would get photo of us, that was an interesting challenge.

CORBIN: What did you actually do? How did you organise these expeditions so the Iraqis wouldn't be forewarned that you were coming?

JACQUES BAUTE

Chief Weapons Inspector

International Atomic Energy Agency

As the Chief Inspector I was the only one having in mind where we were going. I would inform the team members the evening before, by signs, not speaking, because we always take care...

CORBIN: In case you're bugged.

BAUTE: Exactly. We don't know the status of the rooms.

CORBIN: Each morning as the Inspectors set out in convoys Iraqi officials, equipped with communications kit, were hard on their heels. They were trying to work out where the Inspectors were going and give the sites advance warning.

DEMETRIUS PERRICOS

Chief Weapons Inspector, UNMOVIC

In the cars that follow us they had people who were constantly on the telephone or the radio, and they are saying okay, we passed this particular mile, so the sites which are let's say five miles back, it's fine, they can be released. For the sites that are in front, they're all on high alert, that there is still a very good probability that the inspectors are going to visit it. They already have in all the sites that they know.

CORBIN: On the 6th day, however, the Inspectors seem to have flustered the Iraqis when they arrived unexpectedly from two different directions at one of Saddam's palaces in Baghdad. In the past the inspectors lacked the powers to enter these so-called presidential sites. For Demetrius Perricos and Jacques Baute it was a test of their powers to go anywhere, any time. After a brief wait the gates were opened and the inspectors descended on the Palace.

PERRICOS: They were surprised. They were surprised because they didn't think that we would go so early to one of those presidential sites.

CORBIN: What happened?

PERRICOS: Well we went in of course and we split the work and we started going through. One team went over to the side buildings, another team went over to the main building.

CORBIN: Demetrius Perricos, a veteran of past inspections, knew from defectors that important documents and computer records had been hidden in Saddam's huge palaces before.

PERRICOS: We've tried to see whether you can find the computer which, strange enough there was no computer there. But when we were down in the kitchens and we started looking at the refrigerators, which we did, we found the marmalades.

CORBIN: Jars of marmalade, jam, sweetmeats.

PERRICOS: Jars of marmalades, everything that you can imagine.

CORBIN: But didn't you feel a bit foolish that you'd gone looking for biological weapons and all you found was marmalade?

PERRICOS: Not really, because part of the job is you look if you want to find.

CORBIN: Saddam Hussein was publicly welcoming the Inspectors to Iraq, urging his officials to assist them in their work. But his propaganda machine was busy, the state-controlled media calling them the "Un spies". I took a stroll in a Baghdad market to see what people really thought. Perhaps, surprisingly, a former director of Iraqi Airways who'd lived in London was suddenly on hand to give me his views of how the inspections were going.

EX DIRECTOR, IRAQI AIRWAYS: Up to now there is nothing serious up to now.

CORBIN: But do you think, though, that that will avoid war even if they find nothing, or what do you think will happen?

EX DIRECTOR: This depends the policy of America. They want.. seeking for a reason.

CORBIN: You think they're looking for a reason for war?

EX DIRECTOR: Yes, yes.

CORBIN: What do people think about the UN coming here and going everywhere, looking for weapons of mass destruction?

The stall holder was more suspicious?

STALL HOLDER: [translated] It's a violation. We consider it to be spying. They're leading the spying activity in this country. They did their inspections before and left so what are they doing back here? They are inspecting areas which have no weapons.

CORBIN: The Inspectors were telling me, as they worked through all the old familiar sites around Iraq, that they had little hope of finding anything, without, that is, some help from the real spying experts. The CIA had produced reports claiming they knew from secret sources Iraq was hiding forbidden weapons. And last autumn the British government had produced its own intelligence dossier.

I'm on my way to Al Dara, it's a vaccine laboratory which British intelligence in their dossier have called "a facility of concern". They suspect it of being involved in Iraq's research and biological warfare programme. The spook suspicions had been aroused by a recent Iraqi application for a license to restart vaccine production at Al Dara. Could it be a cover for a new and secret programme to make other deadly bugs? Al Dara was disabled six years ago by the previous UN inspectors. I found it shut and empty. There was, of course, another helpful Iraqi official, Al Dara's former director waiting to take me on a tour.

So is this laboratory as it was left by the United Nations before or have you been rebuilding it at all?

OFFICIAL: No, no. No rebuilding. This remain like this after they destroy all the equipment. So we leave it without any repairing.

CORBIN: And is there any production here at all?

OFFICIAL: No, no, no, no. No productions at all now. It is from the 96 until now we don't produce anything here, it's as you see it.

CORBIN: Have the Weapons Inspectors been back here to Al Dara in recent weeks to inspect it, and did they...

OFFICIAL: At the second day when they are here they visit this place.

CORBIN: And what did they find?

OFFICIAL: Nothing, and I said there is nothing here.

CORBIN: The inspectors knew that this ruined laboratory wasn't likely to be in use again. They were more interested in whether specialised equipment had disappeared. But their American critics dismissed their repeated visits to known sites.

RICHARD PERLE

Chairman, Defence Policy Review Board

I think the weapons inspections are going in a predictable way. That is to say they are not finding anything because the inspectors don't know where to look and Iraq is a big country, and until there is a clear declaration from Saddam and a full and truthful accounting, there is really little that the Inspectors can do.

CORBIN: To the untrained eye at least Al Dara was clearly non operational. But what about the testimony from Iraqi defectors that germ labs were now hidden in the back of lorries?

The suspicion of the British and the Americans is that it doesn't matter if this laboratory isn't being used because Iraq now has mobile laboratories. You've taken the things you had here and you move them around the country all the time so it's impossible to find them.

OFFICIAL: Everything they are here, everything from this place they are here, still here, so what they destroy they destroy, and when they're remaining they are remaining here.

CORBIN: So nothing from here moved.

OFFICIAL: Nothing. No.

CORBIN: As the weeks wore on the inspectors were becoming increasingly frustrated. While American critics complained they were ineffective the US and Britain too were reluctant to hand over their secret information.

Dr HANS BLIX

Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC

We want to have intelligence about sites to visit. It's alright and it's interesting and important to be informed that they draw conclusions that Iraqis have done this or that, but we are inspectors and they have to be in the geography somewhere. They have to go some places. So we'd like to know are there some places you'd suggest us to go for good reasons?

CORBIN: And they haven't told you those places?

BLIX: No, no, I think that will come, I hope so, if they have them. I hope they have them.

CORBIN: At the beginning of December came the first test of Saddam Hussein's intentions. Under the UN resolution Iraq was required to submit its declaration. A full and final account of what had happened to its weapons of mass destruction. There had been debate in Saddam's highest council about how open they should be. The 12,000 page document arrived at the Canal Hotel two days early in piles of boxes. But would the Inspectors, waiting in New York and Vienna, find Iraq had provided any new information to add to what they'd given the UN in previous years?

JACQUES BAUTE

Chief Weapons Inspector

International Atomic Energy Agency

The first reaction was simply to try to get in the first 30 seconds a feeling of what it was. What matters could be a small paragraph added here or there, so that's why we cannot draw any conclusion before we have every single word.

CORBIN: So it will take a few days, perhaps even weeks, to really get a measure of it.

BAUTE: We're working I can almost say days and night, and when I say 'we' it includes the translators for instance, so that we get a good flavour of what to say.. what to tell the council next week.

CORBIN: In New York at the United Nations UNMOVIC's Inspectors, specialists in missiles and chemical and biological weapons laboured for a week through stacks of paper. Dr Blix was telling me he still had many questions about missing anthrax and VX, a deadly nerve gas – a drop can kill. The head of UNMOVIC had warned the Iraqis to answer truthfully and told them they didn't have much time to do so. But Dr Blix's people searched in vain for hard information in the Iraqi declaration. One told me the huge document was no more than a pile of garbage recycled from past documents they produced many years ago.

BLIX: What Iraq needs to do is to show evidence that they have finished their weapons programme, that they actually destroyed weapons, and until they do that there will not be the confidence arising in them. They are a well organised country and if you produce scud missiles or you produce anthrax, you keep track of it and

you have records of that, you will have reports given to it, you have individuals who have dealt with it. And therefore, it seems to me, that it would not be impossible for them to do so, and of course the suspicion arises that if they don't do that, they have actually kept something.

CORBIN: The Inspectors knew that Saddam Hussein's regime had failed a crucial test. Their chances of uncovering what had happened to the missing items were diminishing. Iraq was now on notice as far as the American Government and its British ally at the UN were concerned.

Sir JEREMY GREENSTOCK
UK Ambassador to the United Nations

The silences are eloquent. They have not wanted to explain what we have fairly strong evidence they are still holding and the onus is on Iraq to explain those silences under the resolutions and it's a huge disappointment to the UK which wants to resolve this whole thing without the use of force that the declaration has not been used as an opportunity to do that.

CORBIN: There had been debate amongst the top figures in the American administration about what should constitute a breach of Iraq's obligations serious enough to trigger war. The US decided to warn Iraq that snubbing the Inspectors with a less than truthful declaration was in itself a cause for military action.

COLIN POWELL: Iraq's response is a catalogue of recycled information and flagrant omissions. It should be obvious that the pattern of systematic holes and gaps in Iraq's declaration is not the result of accidents or editing oversights or technical mistakes. These are material omissions that in our view constitute another material breach.

General AMER AL-SAADI
Presidential advisor

That's absolute nonsense. The declarations were truthful and complete. Allegations to the contrary are the same as the allegations about the Blair document and the CIA report in which it was said that Iraq had resumed.. prescribed activities and harbouring weapons of mass destruction. None of this is true. Also the reference to gaps in the declaration is just not true. There are no gaps.

CORBIN: Saddam Hussein was courting war while America was very publicly building up its forces on his doorstep. And Britain too announced it was sending troops and aircraft to the Gulf.

GREENSTOCK: This is actually for real, but it's being done in a way which can be switched off if Saddam Hussein decides to comply 100% and hand all his stuff in. So he's got his hand on the switch actually, and if he declines to use it, then the military machine will roll onward as it's being prepared now. But he's got to come forward credibly with all those explanations - with the materials behind them that are gaps in the declaration - now.

CORBIN: The military build up in late December increased the uncertainty of the UN mission. The Chief Inspectors admitted it underlined the vulnerability of their

people in the field.

BAUTE: The last thing we want to happen is to have them caught in dramatic events.

CORBIN: Caught when the bombs start falling?

BAUTE: Caught when the bombs start, caught with a possible and predictable reaction.

CORBIN: You mean held as human shields or something by the Iraqis.

BAUTE: Maybe, you know history shows UN staff are usually well protected. However, in some instances they've been used as human shields and when you have your own people there it's definitely something that crosses your mind.

CORBIN: In January the pressure was mounting on the UN inspectors to produce a smoking gun. I'm on my way to Al Tuwaitha. It was the site of Iraq's secret nuclear weapons programme before the Gulf War. Since November the UN Inspectors have been back to Al Tuwaitha repeatedly, trying to find out if Iraq has restarted its bomb programme. US intelligence agencies had accused Saddam Hussein of continuing work to build a nuclear bomb, and the British insisted he was trying to procure enriched uranium to do it. These accusations, if proved, were most likely to trigger a war to topple his regime before it acquired these strategic weapons. Previous inspectors had discovered industrious scientists developing all stages of the bomb and the raw material to the warhead design at Al Tuwaitha – the Los Alamos of Iraq.

Tuwaitha is like a small city. There seem to be buildings, administrative headquarters, looks like a self-contained town. Vast earthworks surround the massive site, much of it in ruins today. Once more there was a welcoming committee and another guided tour in prospect.

OFFICIAL: The site was the nuclear research site.. the main nuclear research site in Iraq.

CORBIN: And today, what activities go on here?

OFFICIAL: General activities concerning research on material, agriculture and biology.

CORBIN: So for peaceful purposes only.

OFFICIAL: For sure.

CORBIN: And how many times have the UN inspectors been to Tuwaitha this time?

OFFICIAL: The inspection team have been visiting the site eleven times.

CORBIN: Eleven times?

OFFICIAL: Yes nine since 27 of November.

CORBIN: So in not even two months they've been here eleven times.

OFFICIAL: Yes, you are right.

CORBIN: Al Tuwaitha bears the scars of the world's determination to halt Saddam's nuclear ambitions. The Israel's bombed the first reactor here 22 years ago. And American planes crippled the second reactor in 1991. The Inspectors are aware that new activities not only nuclear but perhaps biological too could emerge from the ashes of Al Tuwaitha. The Iraqis were very anxious to show me round a brand new building, an experience that hovered on the brink of farce.

OFFICIAL: The farm is nearby, nearby the building, and now they are cleaning it and... it's a small, small farm related to the agricultural directorate here in IAEC.

CORBIN: But the problem is that last time Iraq denied that it had any of these weapons of mass destruction. You made all sorts of excuses, and then after the war it was discovered that you did have all these programmes. So this time people feel there's still a lack of credibility.

OFFICIAL: This is good credibility, it's in front of you, you can see it. You can see it. Do you think that this is a mass of destruction weapons?

CORBIN: No, it looks like mushrooms now, but how do we know what's been happening here before?

OFFICIAL: You can test it.

CORBIN: It's easy to...

OFFICIAL: No, no, the inspection teams they used the latest technology they have and even it's clear it's a mushroom and you can test it. If you don't believe go and test it.

CORBIN: So why did the inspectors come and look at the mushrooms then if nothing's going on here? They had their suspicions.

OFFICIAL: Yes, and even they looked everywhere. For example they went to universities, to college.

CORBIN: Yes, but why did they look at the mushrooms? Why did they come to this building?

OFFICIAL: You should ask them why they are so interested this building. They have visited this building twice since they returned back.

CORBIN: The UN weapons inspectors know full well that laboratories can be used

to culture other things than mushrooms. And Iraq has used what it claimed were food production facilities before to secretly develop biological weapons.

The problem for Iraq is that in the past you've said you didn't have weapons of mass destruction and then they were discovered. You lack credibility. You yourself even said you didn't have them in the past. So the world says well why should we believe you this time?

TARIQ AZIZ

Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq

No, when the inspectors came, madam, when the inspectors came in 1991 we didn't say that we don't have weapons of mass destruction. Chemical we did have, long range missiles we did have. We did have a nuclear programme. We didn't have nuclear weapons, but we did have a nuclear programme, we confessed that to UNSCOM and to the IAEA. As regards the biological area, we revealed all the facts to UNSCOM after 1995.

CORBIN: But it took years.

AZIZ: It took years because why, why?

CORBIN: Because you didn't put it all on the table to begin with.

AZIZ: Who is to blame for that? Who is to blame for that?

CORBIN: Mr Aziz had conveniently forgotten that after the Gulf War Iraq never revealed any significant weapons until the Inspectors found them. The UN inspectors told me in January they would change their strategy and make surprise visits to places they'd never been before. The Chief Inspector had brought new information back from his Christmas break. Nervous security officials kept the press outside another presidential compound in Baghdad. The Inspectors were inside looking for documents. The arrival of Demetrius Perricos in Baghdad has signalled a new phase in the weapons inspections and will target a more direct approach. Intelligence has been handed over by the United Kingdom and I've been told that the Weapons Inspectors are hoping for a breakthrough in the search for weapons of mass destruction. The Inspectors knew this was the headquarters of Saddam's special security force, believed by western intelligence to be responsible for concealing Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. They found only an armoury of guns, but Iraqi unease was a signal the leadership was feeling the pressure.

Does the President Saddam Hussein feel the pressure on the country, on himself?

AZIZ: Of course. He is the leader of Iraq. When there is a pressure on his country he is the first person to feel the pressure. But President Saddam Hussein is a very strong and courageous person. He will not bow to pressure.

CORBIN: That evening I went to the Canal Hotel to talk to Demetrius Perricos about the Inspectors new strategy and the Iraqi reaction to it.

DEMETRIUS PERRICOS

Chief Weapons Inspector, UNMOVIC

They are afraid that something may be found, maybe new style of doing inspections. No longer at only declared sites, and they don't know to which site we will go. They don't know what information we will have. They don't know what sort of buildings or people we are going to try to speak or to try to enter.

CORBIN: A quiet Baghdad suburb became the next target in the Inspectors' search for evidence. British intelligence had tipped the inspectors off that documents relating to the nuclear programme would be hidden here in a private home. When I visited Dr Faleh Hassan Hamza I found him still smarting at the Inspectors' visit.

Dr FALEH HASSAN HAMZA

They search the house room by room. They went to the bedroom of my wife. She was sleeping in the bed and they are searching in her private things.

CORBIN: Then Dr Hamza was asked to open a locked junk room upstairs. There was something else there.

Dr KAY MERRISH

Weapons Inspector, UNMOVIC

It was a manmade wooden box. When I opened it.. it was as high as this table, probably as big as this table. The box was that big.

CORBIN: And what's in it?

MERRISH: It's full of documents. I said right away, I said Dr Hamza, this is what I am looking for.

HAMZA: So, if it is important paper it wouldn't be in order in this way.

CORBIN: Yes, but the inspectors would say this is just the place you would hide documents you didn't want anybody to see, in a rubbish, in a....

HAMZA: It's rubbish things, you know.. this is rubbish. This is one of the report...

CORBIN: The papers that were found..

HAMZA: Most of them, 95%, it's old paper, it's nothing to do, it's unreality.

CORBIN: But what about the rest of them?

HAMZA: The rest of them they are private documents.

CORBIN: Did you know immediately that these were scientific papers of a very special kind..

MERRISH: Oh yes. Oh absolutely.

CORBIN: .. to do with uranium and ?? enrichment.

MERRISH: Oh yes, I could read it, and when it said classified documents...

CORBIN: And it said classified documents?

MERRISH: Yes, secret. They are bound by the government, it's a government document, and they have a number because they are classified documents.

CORBIN: The papers turned out to be about using lasers to enrich uranium for a nuclear bomb, part of Iraq's past weapons programme. Dr Hamza's papers should have been given the inspectors years ago, but the documents have never been disclosed, and neither had they been part of the supposedly full and final declaration given to the UN five weeks before. This inspection gave credence to the claim that Iraqi scientists were keeping sensitive documents at home. The only chance of getting at the truth was to interview scientists either abroad or in private at the Canal Hotel, but everyone the inspectors asked had a standard answer, only in a government ministry with a minder by their side.

PERRICOS: It's a certainty they don't come because they're afraid. And because they had been told.. they are not afraid because they are afraid just by themselves, but they have been told: "You will answer that you are not accepting any interviews except in our own territory.

CORBIN: History teaches everyone a lesson. Hussein Kamal, Saddam's son-in-law, the keeper of the special weapons, defected in 1995 and spilled the secrets of the germ warfare programme. But homesick, Kamal returned to Iraq. He and dozens of members of his family were murdered on Saddam's orders. I wondered if the scientists I'd met would talk to the UN in private or go abroad.

Would you go?

HAMZA: No, certainly not.

CORBIN: Why?

HAMZA: Because I don't trust UNMOVIC to start with.

CORBIN: You don't trust UNMOVIC, the UN.

HAMZA: The UN... because I have very bad experience with them. Second thing is I don't feel secure abroad to be honest with you, and I am only feel secure at my country. I don't like to leave my country. I feel secure whether President Saddam is here more than anybody else.

CORBIN: Would you go to speak to them privately?

Dr RIHAB TAHA

No, I don't trust the previous inspector and I think it is better for me and for them, and for everybody to have witnesses because I think it is our right and it is a human right that if you don't want to speak to anybody, no any one obliged you or force

you to do that.

CORBIN: During my interview with Dr Taha we had several witnesses. Her every word was recorded by two Iraqi officials.

AZIZ: Why should they take Iraqi experts outside Iraq? What's the objective behind it.

CORBIN: Because they feel they wont talke freely inside Iraq.

AZIZ: Free outside their own country? They are a free inside their country. They are free men.

CORBIN: As the 12th anniversary of the first Gulf War dawned, Iraqi's gathered in Baghdad's tea shops to hear their leader's televised address. Saddam Hussein's defiance continued. He said his people should again prepared themselves for battle. They would defeat the American aggressor. The bullish speech reinforced the stand Saddam Hussein had taken. The inspectors knew that his intentions to tough it out meant it was unlikely Iraq would ever put it's cards on the table. By now they'd made discoveries which heightened their suspicions, rocket engines which haven't been declared. Chemical shells had turned up in an arsenal empty and unused the Iraqis insisted they'd been overlooked by accident. The aluminium tubes which the US and British intelligence had made so much of were harder to fathom. The Iraqis said they were for conventional rockets. The inspectors agreed it was plausible. But they haven't yet ruled out that the tubes could be used in a centrifuge to enrich Uranium.

JACQUES BAUTE

Chief Weapons Inspector

International Atomic Energy Agency

We need more time. We're in the middle of the river, we've made major progress but we're not yet at the stage to draw any conclusion regarding the absence of a nuclear programme in Iraq.

January 27, 2003-02-10

United Nations, New York

CORBIN: At the end of January the UN gathered to hear the results of the first 60 days of inspections in Iraq. Dr Blix had no smoking gun to report to the Security Council but the mild mannered Swede was harder on the Iraqis than his critics, even the Americans, had expected, and he made it clear Iraq had not yet revealed what had happened to all the anthrax and the nerve gas.

BLIX: Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it, and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world.

CORBIN: There were deep divisions in the United Nations and public opinion in many countries was increasingly opposed to a war. Influential voices were raised in the council. They argued that giving the inspectors longer for tough 'no holds

barred' inspections could contain Saddam Hussein's ambitions to develop weapons of mass destruction, they could thwart his greatest threat of all, his desire to build a nuclear bomb.

KOFI ANNAN

Secretary General of the United Nations

The Security Council has indicated, depending on the evidence that is brought to it, it can declare Iraq in material breach, and following that, they will decide what grave consequences should be taken. I would prefer that we have other means to disarm Iraq than war, and it is quite clear the Inspectors destroyed more weapons of mass destruction than all the bombings that has taken place in Iraq since 1991.

CORBIN: America wasn't interested in giving the UN time. The Inspectors would never contain Saddam's weapons, they said, because they'd never find them. The US declared it would present secret intelligence to prove Iraq's guilt.

There's real frustration here at the UN. If the Americans have substantive evidence, then why haven't they given it to the Inspectors before. Amongst the Inspectors there's real scepticism that these new revelations will amount to anything at all.

Dr HANS BLIX

Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC

Much of this evidence I think and understand will be circumstantial or will be by inference and it will be personal judgment how convinced are you by it. We will see on Wednesday what Colin Powell has to say.

POWELL: This council placed the burden on Iraq to comply and disarm and not on the Inspectors to find that which Iraq has gone out of its way to conceal for so long. Inspectors are inspectors, they are not detectives.

CORBIN: The American Secretary of State laid out what he said was evidence before the Council. He claimed Iraq was again playing the old game of hide and seek with the inspectors. Mr Powell produced secret intercepts.

POWELL: Listen:

(recording of exchange of dialogue in Arabic – translated)

COL: Hello.

CAPT: Hello.

COL: Hello.

CAPT: May I help you, Sir?

COL: Who is this? Captain Ibrahim?

CAPT: I am with you, Sir.

COL: Remove.

CAPT: Remove.. [repeats instructions]

COL: The expression.

CAPT: The expression.

COL: "Nerve agents."

CAPT: "Nerve agents."

COL: Wherever it comes up.

CAPT: Wherever it comes up.

CORBIN: There were spy satellite photos which he said showed sites had been sanitised ready to receive Dr Blix's teams. Mr Powell made it clear he thought inspections were pointless now. US patience with Iraq was almost exhausted.

POWELL: We wrote 1441 to give Iraq one last chance. Iraq is not so far taking that one last chance.

CORBIN: The Inspectors had already got the message. A weary Dr Blix had told me the week before, he couldn't spin out the inspections any longer.

BLIX: Take note of the fact that we had inspection in Iraq for eight years, and thereafter four years we had no inspection at all. Since then we started have had two months. Well that's a rather short time to call it a day, and therefore, if more time were given, yes, I will welcome it. But I cannot in good conscience plead for it.

CORBIN: Is that because you feel perhaps even however much time you have, the fact you're not getting the answers from the Iraqis it's futile really.

BLIX: That's right. Yes, if you do not have that change of attitude, then it could drag out.

CORBIN: This weekend the heads of the UN Inspection Teams went to Baghdad once more to hear the Iraqis promise new cooperation. Scientists had suddenly come forward for private interviews and new documents were handed over.

BLIX: I perceived a beginning, more serious attitude and cooperation of substance and I welcome that. Breakthrough is a bit too strong word for what we are seeing, but we are seeing some...

CORBIN: There was a hint of even more Iraqi concessions to come just before Dr Blix next briefs the Security Council in five days time. But Iraq's brinkmanship may still offer too little, and this time be too late. People here believe that war is

coming.

TARIQ AZIZ

Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq

It will be a bloody war. Yes, they can inflict a lot of losses in the civilian area. But if they decide to invade Iraq, then they will pay a very heavy price.

CORBIN: Dr Blix, if your inspectors have to leave Iraq, if war becomes inevitable, wont it show, in effect, that the UN has failed in its mission to peacefully disarm?

BLIX: Yes, it's a failure and I certainly would want to have disarmament through the peaceful route of using in sections. But there is only so much you can do.

CORBIN: Three months ago when I started out, the Inspectors hoped they could avert a war, but Saddam Hussein has still not been prepared to reveal his secrets. The Inspectors may soon be just a footnote in history as America warns Saddam has thrown away his last chance.

Next week on Panorama, "Promises Promises" the first in a series of the state of Britain's public services. John Ware investigates whether Tony Blair's government is living up to its promises on Transport. If you want to comment on tonight's programme write to us at our website:

PANORAMA

“BLAIR'S WAR”

PANORAMA

“BLAIR'S WAR”

RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION: BBC-1

DATE: 23:03:03

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JACK STRAW: This man, Blair, has taken really very significant risks with his own future as a Prime Minister, and there have been some dark moments when weaker people might have simply given up.

TAM DALYELL: I suppose, if it was a short, sharp, victorious war, that he would bathe in glory – heaven help us.

JOHN LLOYD: There is no present and clear danger to British interests. He's doing it in a sense out of a missionary duty to the world, to rid the world of evil people.

KEN CLARKE: I listen to a man who preaches at me with deep, deep conviction and I'm afraid I sit in the congregation and think, and I don't really think we should be there and I don't really think your allies on the other side of the Atlantic see it quite like that.

VIVIEN WHITE: This is the story of the road to war for Tony Blair, of his personal conviction, of the risk that he's taken. And this is inside story of the long and intense campaign fought by hundreds of thousands in this country to try and prevent the war from happening.

TONY BLAIR: I know this course of action has produced deep divisions of opinion in our country. But I know also the British people will now be united in sending our armed forces, our thoughts and prayers.

WHITE: Blair's war and the political risk he's taken was forged in the USA by the bond between Bush and Blair, the remarkable political and personal alliance between a Labour Prime Minister and a Conservative rightwing Republican President.

6th April 2002

GEORGE BUSH: Laura and I are very honoured to have our friends, Tony and Cherie Blair and their family, visit us here in Crawford. We appreciate the rain that the Prime Minister brought with him, and so do the other farmers and ranchers in the area. Mr Prime Minister thanks for bringing it.

TONY BLAIR: My pleasure George.

Sir CHRISTOPHER MEYER
British Ambassador to US
1997-2003

The first meeting was over lunch. The President said to Blair: "Welcome Tony. Can I call you Tony?" And of course Blair said: "Yes". And Blair said: "Well it's great to be here George. Can I call you

George?" And the President said: "Yes, of course you can." And then... "Well what shall we talk about?"

"Middle East." "Middle East." And off they went.

WHITE: But after the attack on the World Trade Centre America fundamentally changed its foreign policy and asserted its right to take action wherever it saw itself as potentially threatened.

CHAIR: The President of the United States. [cheers and applause]

29th January, 2002

WHITE: The doctrine of "pre-emption" was born. The countries which the President saw as a threat were named. The list of perspective targets for a pre-emptive first strike, and Iraq was top of the list.

GEORGE BUSH: States like these and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil arming to threaten the peace of the world. I will not wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.

CHRIS SMITH MP

Labour Cabinet Minister, 1997-2001

This is a completely new doctrine that overturns all the normal rules of international engagement. We

should, as a government, have been much clearer at the time about the scale of the change which that

doctrine of pre-emption identified, and we should have been actively saying: Hang on a moment, this is not

the way in which you deal sensibly with international relations.

WHITE: But Tony Blair wasn't carried along against his will by this new policy. A longstanding friend of

his says pre-emption coincided with his own view of international morality.

JOHN LLOYD

Former Editor, "New Statesman"

Friend of Tony Blair

It's clear I think that after 9/11 he took the position that states like America and its allies must at times use

military force to depose evil people or to go into failed states where there is a danger. He'd accepted that..

in some ways he'd accepted that before George Bush, and it puts him rather on a par with these so called

hawkish advisers of George Bush who also say you should go into states, depose evil men and bring in

democracy if you can. So in a sense he is in conventional terms to the right of the Republican Party.

WHITE: Blair's agreement with Bush's new policy was quite unacceptable to many within the Labour Party. The gulf between the Prime Minister and some of his own MPs was dramatically displayed when in the Commons he was challenged by a left-winger about the threat posed by Saddam Hussein.

29th January 2003

DR LYNNE JONES: Can my right honourable friend explain why he represents a greater threat today than he did in 1997, 1998, 1999 and all the time that my right honourable friend was Prime Minister up until President Bush's "axis of evil" speech when apparently the situation changed?

BLAIR: The fact is, way before President Bush's speech, at the very first meeting I had with President Bush back in February 2001 I said that weapons of mass destruction is an issue and we have to confront them. In this House on the 14th September I said this was the issue that after the 11th September was even more important to deal with. And I simply say this to her, the UN having taken its stand, if we do not deal with Iraq now, the UN having taken its stand, my honourable friends says? "Who's next?" Well after we deal with Iraq we then do... yes, through the United Nations, again have to confront North Korea about its weapons programme.

HOUSE MEMBERS: Whoooooo

JONES: There was this extraordinary "Whoooo". I can't even make the sound of it.

WHITE: And what did that tell you was going on inside your Party?

LYNNE JONES MP

Labour

Well there's deep unease but also it was almost jeering at the Prime Minister which was very, very unusual because obviously for many years he's been held in enormous respect. He's seen as the leader that did the impossible and led Labour into a second victory.

DEMONSTRATOR: Sign the anti-war petition here today. Grab some leaflets for your neighbourhood. Say to Bush and Blair that we don't want your slaughter in the Middle East. We don't want your blood for oil."

WHITE: Beyond Parliament there was growing opposition to the war. But at first it was discounted by the government. The activists were on the left which Mr Blair was used to defeating. But the public were becoming politicised. Iraq had made street politics genuinely popular.

MAN [member of public]: What will you do? What's your suggestion as to alleviate that pain.

DEMONSTRATOR: Right, okay. First of all, will this war solve...

MAN: No, no, never mind the war.

DEMONSTRATOR: No, you just asked me what the position is.

MAN: Never mind the war. Never mind the war because you said you don't want war. So....

DEMONSTRATOR: No, hang on, what do

MAN: Right, okay. First of all, will this war solve...

DEMONSTRATOR: No, no, ?? in the war.

MAN: No, you just asked me what the position is.

DEMONSTRATOR: Never mind the war. Never mind the war because you said you don't want war. So....

MAN: No, hang on, what do you want. What do you want to happen.

DEMONSTRATOR: Every time I open my mouth you jump in. So let me finish...

MAN: Your friend here is not ??. He's actually suggested an alternative because there is no alternative.

WHITE: But the anti-war movement thought they could win the argument. They'd become a professionally organised national campaign.

[CALL HANDLERS]

Stop the War. How can I help you?

Go on GMT tomorrow morning...

We're not starting till Andrew gets here, are we?

No. No.

WHITE: Led by experienced political activists the Stop the War Coalition had been organising a widespread public protest movement from its modest Union premises near London's King's Cross. It's organisers have long service records in the Peace Movement and in industrial disputes. The Chairman of Stop the War was Andrew Murray. He's the Senior Press Officer at ASLEF the train drivers' union, a communist.

LINDSEY GERMAN: I thought it was a good turnout, and I thought actually the fundraisers meeting I thought wasn't a bad turnout.

WHITE: Lindsey German, convener of the Stop the War Coalition, a long-serving member of the Socialists Workers Party. These traditional left-wingers had built a very untraditional political movement.

MAN: I mean I was talking to Tariq and to Colin Redgrave and whatnot about...

ANDREW MURRAY

Chairman, Stop the War Coalition

We started off with the issue of the war in Afghanistan which a lot of people opposed, I wouldn't say a majority. But since then it's been an almost insane drive for war coming from Washington, and Tony Blair's decision to support it throughout that has driven ever wider sections of the population into the anti-war movement and the Stop the War Coalition has been there to coordinate and express that.

WHITE: The Coalition made grandiose claims. They said there was a movement large enough to threaten the Blair government.

MAN: It's going to have to pay a massive political price for this in the future.

2ND MAN: The government should listen to the people that fought to get it elected.

3RD MAN: Unless Blair changes course, Blair will fall on this.

WHITE: To make an impact, the Coalition had to be more than a Leftwing movement. It had to reach the Prime Minister's heartland. Blending the ancient arts of politics and the new, the movement set out to play Tony's own game, and built a coalition in the middle ground from Blair's supporters.

Birmingham

WHITE: Sophie Churchill, director of a Birmingham think tank. She's a politics graduate who'd voted Labour and never thought that street protests worked. Lots of teenage children, far from being uninterested in politics became very involved over Iraq. In Sophie Churchill's home in Birmingham and many others, getting ready for the national march on February 15th became a family affair.

SOPHIE CHURCHILL

I think one of my main actions to this is to wake up to how much of the Presidential style of leadership we have been moving to, and one of my big concerns has been what's been happening to Parliamentary democracy through this. I'm somebody who has never thought that there was anything wrong with taking to the streets and demonstrating, but I've always thought there are other ways which are a little bit more effective.

It think it's really effective because it's so simple really, isn't it.

One reason I'm going tomorrow is that I feel we've got to the point where actually just being visible is as effective as going through our own democratic processes.

Well, it's a good use of an old sheet anyway.

Dorset

WHITE: Deep in Middle England the very voters who enthusiastically elected Mr Blair were now preparing to march against his policy on Iraq instead. For writer Minette Walters, opposing the war now inevitably meant opposing him. She's the best selling author of nine crime thrillers. Five of them already adapted for BBC1.

MINETTE WALTERS

Author

I have a real problem about invading another country, particularly as I'm afraid I have not seen any evidence to show me that it's justified. But Tony's got himself into such a terrible position. How does he back away from this?

Suffolk

BERNARD MILLS

Retired Major, British Army

They don't trust him. I thin this is the frightening thing. There's been so much spin, there's been so much misinformation coming out, and even if he put out something which was absolutely accurate people wouldn't believe it.

WHITE: You wouldn't?

MILLS: I wouldn't, know.

WHITE: Bernard Mills, a former major in the British Army who served in the SAS, a Middle East specialist, another recruit for the anti-war march.

On February 15th there was a political demonstration against the war unlike anything ever seen here before.

TONY BENN

We cannot take a nation to war against its will. Eden tried it. Do you remember what happened to him?
He lost his job.

EMILY CHURCHILL

There's no evidence that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction, and if he does, they're going to have been given to him by the US and the UK which is a fact that a lot of people are ignoring.

MAN: Well I'm marching on behalf of the Iraqi people who I think have suffered enough in the last 30 years.

WHITE: Hundreds of thousands of people who'd never taken part in any political event before filled the capital's streets. Tony Blair wasn't impressed.

Glasgow
15th February 2003

BLAIR: If there are 500,000 on that march, that is still less than the number of people whose deaths Saddam has been responsible for.

SOPHIE CHURCHILL: When you actually get here and you just feel that you suddenly belong to a whole lot of other people, and in a democracy you just don't feel that very often.

BLAIR: If there are one million, that is still less than the number of people that died in the wars that he started.

MILLS: I think it is something he'll remember because I think this is going to be actually a changing situation.

WHITE: Bernard Mills, the former army officer, was marching for peace though he knew serving officers in the Gulf waiting to fight.

MILLS: When you join the army, you join to defend your country and I think I'm defending my country as much by coming on this march as if I was out now with a lot of young friends of mine in Kuwait.

WHITE: Downing Street got a special jeer from the protesters as they passed by. The decision on peace or war was Tony Blair's.

MINETTE WALTERS

Author

I think Tony does have to take notice of this but whether he will I'm not perhaps that optimistic. But I think a million people, if a million people turn out, I think that's a very, very loud voice speaking against war.

BLAIR: The moral case against war has a moral answer. It is the moral case for removing Saddam.

SOPHIE CHURCHILL: I think this sends a message to Tony Blair that if he feels isolated in his Cabinet and in the Government, he should feel... he should feel isolated. This is quite a personalised message that going, a lot of the banners are about Blair and about Bush and they're talking about regime change here as well.

WHITE: British Muslims were on the march in large numbers, making their voice heard. A Muslim organisation was part of the Stop the War coalition.

SELMA YAQOOB

Birmingham Stop the War Coalition

If today only the Centralists had turned up, they would have said: It's just the Loony Left. If today only

CND had turned up, they would have said: It's just a bleeding heart Liberal. If today only the Muslims had

turned up, they would have said: it's the Fundamentalists. Well Tony Blair, you can not dismiss us all.

HAROLD PINTER

Playwright

The United States is a monster out of control. Unless we challenge it with absolute determination,
American barbarism will destroy the world. It is a country run by a bunch of criminal lunatics with Tony Blair as a hired Christian thug.

[applause]

TONY BLAIR: I simply ask the marchers to understand this. I do not seek unpopularity as a badge of honour. But sometimes it is the price of leadership and it is the cost of conviction.

CHRIS SMITH MP

Labour Cabinet Minister, 1997-2001

I'm sure one of the things that he sees as being a test of leadership is being able to be strong, to be forthright, to be convinced of what you're doing. So a little bit the same way that Mrs Thatcher had, that you could disagree passionately with what she was doing and what she stood for, I think he's adopted the same mantle himself. But sometimes, if they're going down the wrong track, you also need to have a Prime Minister that has the courage to say okay, I think I may have made a mistake here.

JACK STRAW

Foreign Secretary

There have been other leaders of ours who have been profoundly unpopular and in the 1930s – and I'm not suggesting there are exact parallels, there never are – but in the 1930s it's worth remembering that there were huge marches in favour of what was... came to be called pejoratively 'appeasement'. I understand, indeed sympathise with the stand they took, although history later told us that they were wrong.

BLAIR: Right, Jack, why don't you start us off with current diplomatic situation.

STRAW: Right, well the Security Council resolution went through.....

WHITE: Blair and Straw thought they had an Iraq strategy which would satisfy many of the protesters.

Blair had persuaded President Bush to go down the UN route. Last November the United Nations passed

Resolution 1441. Sponsored by the US and the UK it sent the inspectors back into Iraq and threatened

serious consequences if Saddam did not disarm. But it didn't say there will be war.

8th November 2002

BLAIR: In the event of Saddam refusing to cooperate, or being in breach, there will be a further UN

discussion as we always said there would be. To those who fear this resolution is just an automatic trigger point without any further discussion, paragraph 12 of the resolution makes it clear this is not the case.

31st January 2003

Ladies and gentlemen – the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

WHITE: Blair publicly committed himself to seeking the so-called second UN resolution which would be an explicit trigger for war. It was politically critical for him, but it wasn't for Bush. He would go to war without UN backing if he judged it necessary.

BUSH: I appreciate my friend's commitment to peace and security. I appreciate his vision. I appreciate his willingness to lead. Most importantly I appreciate his understanding that after September 11th 2001 the world changed.

Sir CHRISTOPHER MEYER

British Ambassador to US

1997-2003

Blair made a very forceful case to the President for using the United Nations, for going through the United Nations, a moral case, a realpolitik case, and we made it to the US Administration at various levels. Now there are others inside the Administration also making the case. And in the end, as we know, that is what the President chose to do.

KEN CLARKE MP

Conservative Minister, 1979-97

I think Mr Blair's mission was to try to cloak all this with legality, with the old world order. So because of Blair in part, the Americans allowed the politics and the diplomacy to go round a loop line trying to get some support for this in United Nations whilst the build up of the American and British armies and air force and navy continued, ready for the war to start in the spring.

WHITE: But for many inside the Foreign Secretary's own Blackburn constituency Labour Party, a second UN resolution wasn't just desirable but the absolute minimum price for their support. They debated a motion insisting on a second resolution.

10th February 2003

MAN: We at Shadworth are very concerned about the brinkmanship that's happening in the Middle East just now. There should be no war without a second resolution, and there should be no second resolution without substantial proof.

2nd MAN: What we are saying is, Labour Party members, members from my world, that's why I've come up here, they are telling me to go and tell Labour Party in Blackburn that what Jack is doing is wrong.

3rd MAN: If we follow America without any thinking, without any philosophy, then we are... it's blind leading the blind.

PHIL RILEY: I think a number of you are doing the government a disservice. My belief would be – and this might be naïve – but my belief would be that if the British Government had not taken the stand that it has done, then the chances of the American government particularly under Bush taking any sort of steps through the United Nations would be very, very slight.

WHITE: The government's policy was being challenged in constituency Labour Parties up and down the country. In Blackburn the question was: Would they only support the war with a second UN resolution?

WOMAN: All those in favour of the resolution. Against. That's clearly carried.

WHITE: If there should be a war without a second UN resolution, how do you think your local MP, the Foreign Secretary, be placed, and how will you be placed?

PETER DAWSON

Blackburn Labour Party

It's a very big question and I'm sure Jack Straw is aware of the difficult decision that he's got. First of all he's got to do what he believes is the right thing for the country in respect of all the other interests and also demonstrate to his constituency and England in general, that we are a pacifist party, so it does put him very, very starkly between a rock and a hard place.

WHITE: The Chamber of the Commons now became the chief theatre of opposition to the war. The protesters had spoken, so had local Labour Parties. Now it was the turn of over 100 Labour MPs to tell the government that they wouldn't back the war without a second US resolution.

26th February 2003

STRAW [speaking in the House]: We are now close to the crunch point. Saddam must either embark immediately on voluntary and full disarmament or the Security Council has to face up to its responsibility to see that he is disarmed by force. That's the truth. That's the reality. I give way to my humble friend.

WHITE: A former Cabinet Minister, normally a strong political supporter of Mr Blair, was leading the rebels.

SMITH: It grieves me, madam deputy speaker, that I'm seeking to amend a resolution tabled by my government, a government that I applaud and support. But these are serious times and this House must make a serious judgment. We must say here today in this chamber, that now is not the time, that the case has yet to be fully made, and that war with all its consequences cannot be the present answer.

HOUSE MEMBERS: (Cheers and applause):

WHITE: That night 122 Labour MPs defied the government whip. It was the biggest party rebellion for a hundred years. The threat to Tony Blair was now there for all to see, even though the Conservative opposition voted along with the government.

AMERICAN DEMONSTRATOR: Use your head, not your guns. Oh boy!

CHRIS SMITH MP

Labour Cabinet Minister, 1997-2001

And this was not about rebelling for the sake of rebelling. It wasn't about playing politics.

This was about

a serious issue of whether we go to war or not. And I think actually the House of Commons dealt with it in

that sort of serious frame of mind.

WHITE: If there is a war without a second UN resolution, a war involving British troops, what do you now think is going to happen at Westminster?

LYNNE JONES MP

Labour

I think that there will be an enormous vote against war and part of the parliamentary Labour Party and Blair

will only get a majority if he gets the Tories voting with him, and I just don't think that is acceptable for a

Labour Prime Minister, and then there will be growing talk about whether it is appropriate for him to continue to lead the Labour Party in such circumstances.

WHITE: Do you think Mr Blair is gambling his premiership?

TAM DALYELL MP
Labour
Yes.

WHITE: And do you think it's....

DALYELL: Yes, yes, yes.

JACK STRAW MP
Foreign Secretary
Well you get used to these things in politics and if you... as Truman famously said: "If you don't like the heat, get out of the kitchen." I think the Prime Minister thrives on the heat.

WHITE: He thrives on the heat?

STRAW: Yes, he thrives on the pressure. I mean the interesting thing about taking on a job like mine, a job like his still more, is that amongst many things you find out about yourself and what happens when you are subjected to very considerable pressure. As far as the Prime Minister is concerned, he is very resilient, very determined, and he responds magnificently to challenges.

Madrid

WHITE: The day after the Commons vote Blair had to go to a summit in Madrid and attend the enthronement of the Archbishop of Canterbury on the way. Then, obviously exhausted, he gave his response to the rebellion.

28th February 2003

BLAIR: I don't ignore the voices of people who are opposed to the course that we are taking. I understand why they take that view and I respect that view. But in the end, I have got to say as Prime Minister to the country on an issue such as this, what I believe and why I believe it. And I believe genuinely, passionately, that international terrorism and unstable repressive states developing chemical, biological, nuclear weapons are real threats to our security.

STRAW: Six years of this intensity as Prime Minister and nine years as Leader, he's bound to show in a way.. I mean he's remarkably energetic, hugely resilient, one of the reasons why he was looking tired over a particular period, was because he was having to take diplomatic calls from heads of state of government into the small hours of the morning and then start again in the early hours of the next day, and for all of us, if you get three or four hours sleep, unless you're Margaret Thatcher, it takes its toll.

Blackburn

WHITE: And with the Blair Government under intense political pressure the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, arrived in his constituency for a series of engagements that weren't all about the war.

The Foreign Secretary is potentially as politically vulnerable in his Blackburn constituency as any other Labour MP, in some ways more so.

Jack Straw, isn't your government's policy on Iraq now dangerously out of line with public opinion here in your constituency in Blackburn, in Parliament and in the country at large?

STRAW: I don't think so. I mean of course the issue is one of great anxiety for people. It's one of great anxiety for those of us right at the centre of it. What I think the opinion polls over all show is real understanding about the problem of Iraq and the need to disarm it, great support for the United Nations, big hesitation if action were taken without a second resolution, and that's essentially I think the mood of the House of Commons. But also, it has polarised opinion in a way that we've not seen for many years.

WHITE: And Blackburn had particularly strong opposition to the war because it has a large Muslim minority, and many saw the threatened conflict as a war against their fellow Muslims. The local area on the latest census is nearly 20% Muslim, and in the town itself the proportion is considerably higher. The prospect of the war added to existing tensions. The Muslim Asians are a power in the Labour Party and the Iraqi conflict presented some of them with a difficult choice between their religion and their politics.

You're a Labour councillor but you're a Labour Asian councillor, a Muslim yourself. On this issue, do you see yourself... where do you see your loyalties?

Cllr YUSUF JAN VIRMANI

Blackburn Labour Party

My loyalties again, yes, Labour Party, yes, but my conscience and my religion comes in as well, enormously. If it's wrong and I think it is wrong, I will fight for it. That's what I'm doing. I will fight.

PHIL RILEY

Secretary, Blackburn Labour Party

We've almost got two parallel communities in the town but in the broadest of terms there are... this is biculturalism rather than multiculturalism.

WHITE: And is your concern then that Muslims, even Muslims in this constituency Labour Party may judge the Iraq issue on Muslim perspective, on what's happening to Muslims in another country?

RILEY: It feels like that to me as an outsider. The danger is, is that we will end up discovering how different we are rather than how much we have in common.

WHITE: Iraq is a Muslim issue here. The faithful who attended one of Blackburn's many mosques for Friday prayers were urged directly by the Imam to oppose the war and the policy of their Labour Mp.

IMAM: At 5 o'clock at the community centre the Foreign Minister Jack Straw is coming. We all need to be there to make our voices heard. We voted Jack Straw into Parliament.

WHITE: And the Imam then led the congregation in chanting prayers seeking Allah's help for repressed Muslims the world over, including those of Iraq.

God, show mercy on the Muslim world. Glory to the Muslim world. Give independence to the Muslims of Kashmir. May the Muslims of Palestine be freed from cruelty and oppression. May the Muslims of Iraq gain salvation at this time when the world of infidel has united against the Muslim world.

WHITE: That afternoon outside the community centre where Jack Straw was due to hold his next surgery the demonstrators gathered, the Imam amongst them, awaiting the Foreign Secretary.

Do you really believe that Tony Blair the Prime Minister, and you for that matter, can survive politically the course you're now taking?

STRAW: Well we have endorsement in the House of Commons, yes I do, and we have got the first resolution from the Security Council. We're working very hard to get the second resolution, and as I've repeated, we could only take military action if that decision was itself endorsed by our democratic representative body which is called the House of Commons.

10th March 2003

WHITE: But in the Elysée Palace the Blair Government strategy of getting a second UN resolution was wrecked by the French. In public, on prime time TV President Chirac exercised his veto and said he would vote 'Non' whatever happened. And in Downing Street, the failure of Mr Blair's diplomatic strategy was there for all to see.

BLAIR: Right. Good morning everyone. First of all can I say... France or any other country is simply going to say we will veto, no matter what. That's obviously a very difficult position.

WHITE: You can't possibly claim that politically that situation was prepared for either in terms of public opinion or the Party or Parliament.

STRAW: Well all three were clearly prepared for, and if you look at what I've been saying in Parliament ever since... well I think probably before 1441 was finally agreed but certainly from the moment that 1441 was agreed, I've been continually asked about what about second resolution and I've said words to the effect that we would prefer to have a second resolution but we don't regard it as necessary.

WHITE: But getting that second resolution had been the agreed position of the Cabinet. It was make or break point. One Cabinet minister, Clair Short, invited herself onto a radio programme, threatened to resign and condemned the Prime Minister.

SHORT: Reckless with our government, reckless with his own future position and place in history. It's extraordinarily reckless.

COOK: It is for that reason, and that reason alone, and with a heavy heart, that I resign from the Government.

WHITE: The Leader of the House, Robin Cook, did resign because there was no second UN resolution.

Though Blair did not. He was rewarded with a standing ovation. Parliament now had to decide and vote for war or no war. Outside, the protesters made their voices heard. It was their last chance to stop the war.

BERNARD MILLS

Retired Major, British Army

I think what we have done is follow a very, very rightwing American Government and I think our Prime Minister has been, dare I say, tricked into following that lead.

WHITE: Tony Blair had faced a million protesters and a record rebellion in the Commons. Now he went into the Chamber and put his premiership on the line.

Has he blinked?

STRAW: Well he's never blinked in the sense of his commitment to the strategy of disarming Iraq. I mean there have of course been many moments when we've had the most intensive discussions about the steps you take the next day or the next day the next week, of course. But in terms of the overall strategy is there a real and present danger from Iraq, should we do something about it? No, of course he's not blinked.

JOHN LLOYD

Former Editor, "New Statesman"

Friend of Tony Blair

The reason why he hasn't blinked is that he's always sustained by this view that this is the right way, and in some ways, as many people who were in that position, the very fact of the opposition, and indeed the growth of the opposition, itself underscores the rightness.

HOUSE: (voices in support)

BLAIR: This is not the time to falter. This is the time for this House, not just this Government or indeed this Prime Minister, but for this House to give a lead, to show that we will stand up for what we know to be right, to show that we will confront the tyrannies and dictatorships and terrorists who put our way of life at risk.

18th March 2003

HOUSE: (voices in support)

BLAIR: To show, at the moment of decision, that we have the courage to do the right thing.
I beg to move
the motion.

HOUSE: (cheers)

WHITE: Mr Blair secured a clear parliamentary majority for war against Iraq. Outside Parliament the protesters stopped the rush hour traffic. Inside, 139 Labour MPs and 78 MPs of other parties had voted against military action.

MARTIN LINTON MP

Labour

Certainly we were in the position, and Tony Blair would be the first person to describe it as far from ideal, where we were under a great deal of pressure from the Americans to go along with them and equally the French were looking for delay. But at the end of the day we had to make a decision and I think the right decision has been made.

WHITE: And you've backed the government.

LINTON: I have indeed.

LYNNE JONES MP

Labour

I hope that those who think that this is the right way to go will be proved right. I hope I... you know.. the sick feeling that I have, that somehow or other we are laying down a path for conflict for several decades to come. I hope that I'm going to be proved wrong.

WHITE: George Bush's ultimatum to Saddam Hussein was rejected. Tony Blair was armed with the democratic assent of British MPs. The war began.

LLOYD: He is gambling his premiership. I think he's gambled his premiership in his mind for some time.

I think soon after 9/11 he realised his premiership would be on the line. Indeed he was saying so to people close to him that he would see himself at risk politically for the role that he was going to have to play with America. And now that gamble is being made, well clear to everyone that the dice are being played, the cards have been dealt, and that dependent upon the outcome of this war will depend his political outcome.

20th March 2003

WOMAN: We have no confidence in this government who doesn't listen to us. Doesn't that show you about the MP that you voted for?

WHITE: On the night war broke out there were demonstrations all over the country, including Blackburn, Jack Straw's constituency.

MAN: And if they don't resign, then in the coming elections we won't vote for them. In the next general election and local elections we will give a clear no to Jack Straw.

WHITE: Inside the town hall that night the constituency Labour Party had been meeting just as the invasion of Iraq began.

PETER DAWSON

Blackburn Labour Party

I'm, as many other Labour Party members are, will be thinking about our positions, but there's got to be something ?? ?? there's no... I don't feel any bitter hatred for the Labour Party, I just feel that there's issues that need to be.. to instigate serious discussion at the moment.

WHITE: This is exactly the war that you voted against.

DAWSON: Absolutely, yes.

WHITE: You told us before that if this happened, people might resign from the Labour Party. Are there signs of that?

PHIL RILEY

Secretary, Blackburn Labour Party

I mean, the answer is no in fact at the moment, and that's not to say that there won't be but in fairness, at this current minute, there is no indication that anybody is going to resign?

Cllr MAUREEN BATESON

Chairman, Blackburn Labour Party

Dependent on how people see the handling of that war will I think colour their decisions about their position within the Labour Party. At present I would hope that everybody within the party at this difficult time will support whatever action is being taken.

WHITE: The war has caused a reassessment of Tony Blair. Some of his former supporters are alarmed by

the war leader they now see.

MINETTE WALTERS

Author

I actually am now agreeing with what people always said about him before which is that he was arrogant and he didn't listen to people. I never thought it before. I thought he was a very conscientious man and I actually thought he believed in what he was doing. I still do and I mean it's... well in a way I'm frightened by this. I think he does believe in good and evil and that he's on the side of good and that Iraq is on the side of evil. That terrifies the living daylights out of me.

WHITE: Yesterday there were antiwar protests across the country. Five weeks ago a million people had marched in London to try to stop the war. The police estimate that yesterday 200,000 turned out there again to demonstrate against the conflict now underway.

SOPHIE CHURCHILL

We have failed in our main intention which was to stop the war, and today's demonstration feels a little bit more angry, a little bit sadder perhaps. But some things are worth doing whether you win or not.

WHITE: Last month Tony Blair told a million marchers that they were wrong. Now some public opinion polls report increasing support for him and for the war.

ANDREW MURRAY

Chairman, Stop the war Coalition

He has decided to ignore the British people which is a profoundly undemocratic thing in addition to the issue of war and peace which is our main concern, and we will keep the pressure up on him. I mean if you give voice to the people's views and you're ignored, all you can do is shout louder.

DEMONSTRATOR: You are a Blair faced liar. [cheers from demonstrators]

STRAW: Yes it has been a bumpy ride and it's not over yet, but I believe that we will come through it and I believe that the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, will come out of a strengthened individual in terms of his public position, not weakened or undermined.

WHITE: Do you?

STRAW: Yes.

WHITE: A bumpy ride that strengthens Tony Blair.

STRAW: Not the purpose of it but it happens to be the experience.

WHITE: British and American troops are now advancing deep into Iraq. Tony Blair has taken an awesome political risk. He is convinced of the justness of the cause. But the war has, in his own words, produced deep divisions of opinion in this country. Blair's war isn't over yet.

PANORAMA

THE RACE TO BAGHDAD

PANORAMA

THE RACE TO BAGHDAD

RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION: BBC-1

DATE: 6:04:03

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JOHN WARE: Every night on television we are witness to a huge gamble, what some American insiders say are just the opening shots of a Fourth World War, a series of perpetual wars against states that threaten our security. President Bush and Tony Blair have promised the Iraq War will make the world safer. But what we see from within the Arab world is incomprehension and seething hatred. This is the story of the enormous risks we and the Americans are taking, and how now that the war has started, the time taken to

finish it is critical.

Gulf War 1991

In the First Gulf War we saw the American doctrine of overwhelming force drive Saddam Hussein's invading army from Kuwait. First the battle field was 'prepared', as the military men say, with five weeks of aerial bombardment. Then half a million ground troops, led by the Americans, went in. Saddam Hussein's army was decimated as it retreated back across the border which is where the Americans stopped.

Maj Gen PATRICK CORDINGLEY

Commander, Desert Rats

1991 Gulf War

Last time round we used a hell of a lot of shock. I mean we killed 20, 30, 40 thousand Iraqi soldiers – I know not how many and I don't think we'll ever know.

WARE: This, the second war in Iraq, is very different. The war objectives are much more ambitious, and yet the Americans and British have set out with half the number of troops. Baghdad was also spared weeks of aerial bombardment before the troops moved in.

REPORTER: It was a nerve wracking flight. On board we felt vulnerable to anti-aircraft and artillery fire, flying low beneath Iraqi radar made us easy targets for anyone with a decent rifle. The 20 minute journey felt like a lifetime.

WARE: This time the soldiers are going all the way to Baghdad to unseat Saddam. This war is like no other. More than ever what matters is not just winning but how the war is won. The new American war plan was inspired by the hawkish Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld. This called for troops to be fast, flexible and light.

MOD footage

Colonel ROBERT KILLEBREW

US Military Planner

1991 Gulf War

The Rumsfeld doctrine that has been evolving seems to be based on the Secretary's view that technology

and expertise allows us to go with sufficient force provided you've got your assumptions right and that psychological operations and special operations and all those things makes it unnecessary to use overwhelming force or even lots of force to accomplish your objectives.

WARE: The American gamble was to race north about 300 miles to Baghdad. In purely military terms this seemed risky. Just 80,000 fighting men and women to take a country the size of France.

Is it not a bit of a risk, though, to go with light forces?

KILLEBREW: There is a risk and it's exaggerated by the lack of enough force to recover from failure if your assumptions are wrong. So you've got to be pretty sure that your planning assumptions are right before you go into it.

WARE: One hawk, close to the Bush administration said this Iraq war would be a cake walk.

REPORTER: Then a long line of Abram Shanks and Bradley fighting vehicles began driving for what turned out to be a 12 hour drive.

AMERICAN SOLDIER: Never has a mechanised force moved so fast and so far.

WARE: But while the Bush administration said the Iraq regime was history, their invasion of a Muslim country rekindled the embers of Arab antipathy. Demonstrations spread like bushfire across the most unstable region in the world.

Cairo, Egypt 2003

ARAB: I am from Arab world. I have message for Mr Bush and Mr Tony Blair. You are liars. You are gangs.

ARAB: I hate Americans. I hate what's happening in the world. And we will all reject what's happening in the world.

COLIN POWELL

US Secretary of State

There's a lot of anti-Americanism out there but it's fuelled to a large extent by the Iraq situation and the Middle East peace process. When we fix Iraq and when we show progress with the Middle East peace programme, and people can see that this is a nation that is not against any religion, especially not the

religion of Islam.

Cairo, Egypt 1991

WARE: The First Gulf War saw demonstrations even though most Arab governments had sent troops.

This time the stakes are much, much higher. Most Arab governments are against this war and the street demonstrations are much bigger.

How long in your view does this war have to go on for before you lose the peace, as it were. You may win militarily but you lose the peace?

General Sir MICHAEL ROSE
Commander, UN Protection Force
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1994-95

We all thought that we needed a quick decisive victory, and that's obviously what the strategists planned for. If we're still fighting in Baghdad, Basra, Kabala and Nasiriyah after six weeks, I think we're in serious danger of rising a tide of opposition not only within Iraq but also in the neighbouring Arab states, and indeed in the 1.4 billion Muslims around the world which would then start to question the way... the original strategy.

WARE: The Americans expected to be able to sweep past towns on the way to Baghdad, and that the Iraqi army would stay in its barracks. Many Iraqi units didn't engage them but equally many did. On the road to Baghdad the Americans met stiff resistance. For one division almost every mile to the capital was contested.

AMERICAN SOLDIER: There is a little bit more resistance than we've expected, and there are also some fanatics who will remove their uniforms and become... masquerade as civilians and still shoot at us.

WARE: Above the din of battle can also be heard the clash of cultures. Incomprehension from American soldiers about why a Middle Eastern nation should resist their offer of freedom.

AMERICAN SOLDIER: Most of them are either running or lying to us, trying to deceive us when we're just here to help them.

Colonel ROBERT KILLEBREW
US Military Planner

1991 Gulf War

I'm reminded of a saying by Winston Churchill that when making war plans, you sometimes have to take the enemy into account. I think we focused a lot on our own theories and we didn't give Saddam Hussein the credit for adapting his style of warfare to our style of warfare over the past ten years or so.

WARE: Again and again the message coming back from correspondents in the field was of commanders saying the level of resistance was not what they'd been led to expect.

AMERICAN SOLDIER: [over walkie-talkie] We've got a critical case that needs to get out of here.

REPORTER: They are encountering these pockets of resistance where Iraqis are fighting fiercely, far more fiercely than they imagined.

WARE: Coalition soldiers have suffered some of their worst casualties away from the TV cameras.

Lance Corporal JOSHUA MENARD

We were told when we were going through Nasiriyah that we should see little to no resistance. And then when we got in, it was a whole different ball game. We received a lot of resistance and we were more prepared for what happened in the Gulf War where they turned over and surrendered most of the time. We saw a lot of surrendering but they weren't rolling over like we thought they would.

WARE: Some of the fiercest resistance has come from a bloodthirsty group of Saddam loyalists. They are called the Fedayeen, martyrs for Saddam. Iraqi TV portrays them as patriotic and noble savages, ready to fight and die for their president. In fact many are criminals freed from gaol.

Dr HUSSEIN AL-SHAHRISTANI

Chief Scientific Adviser, 1970-79

Iraqi Atomic energy Commission

These are people who really owe everything they have to the regime, and have committed so many atrocities against the Iraqi people where they cannot go back even to their own families. I mean members of the Fedayeen have been known in the community to go and arrest their own mothers and sisters and hand them to the security to rape them.

WARE: According to the Iraqi opposition Saddam had been preparing the Fedayeen for guerrilla warfare

for many months. They've often mounted their hit and run raids from converted farm trucks. That this was to be Saddam's war strategy appears to have been an open secret.

Dr SALAH SHAIKHLI

Opposition Spokesman

Iraqi National Accord

Recently he had imported 1,400 trucks from South East Asia. This was on the oil for food programme, and the idea was that he is importing these for farm use. As soon as these trucks arrived in Iraq, he armoured them and he mounted machine guns and now they are with their thousands of them being used for the Fedayeen.

WARE: Does that level of resistance from the so-called Fedayeen and Ba'athist militia, that didn't surprise you?

GEOFF HOON MP

Secretary of State for Defence

It didn't surprise us. What shocked us were the lengths to which they were prepared to go in threatening both regular members of the armed forces, and obviously the civilian population in the way that we know they have done, threatening.

WARE: Why should that have shocked you? They were loyal to a tyrant. It's entirely predictable that they should have done that.

HOON: They were loyal to a tyrant but equally they have gone to lengths.. extremes that...

WARE: That's what tyrants do. That's what tyrants do. It was all entirely predictable, surely.

HOON: Well, as I say, we anticipated that they would resist, that they would fight, that has happened, they have very largely been defeated.

MOD footage

Brig General VINCENT BROOKS

US Military Spokesman

I don't think that we have necessarily underestimated, and I am certain that we accounted for enemy action.

The specifics of the action, no one can ever predict exactly how a battle will unfold.

WARE: After the first week of fighting cheerful optimism had given way to some glummer faces. One

American general conceded: "The enemy we're fighting is a bit different than the one we war-gamed against. This had been no cakewalk as some advocates of the war had so breezily predicted. In fact it was beginning to look as if it might become a quagmire. Back in Washington a discreet blame game opened up between the Bush administration and the generals in the Pentagon, especially those directing the war out in the Gulf. The overall commander there is General Tommy Franks. His hawkish boss, the Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld.

Colonel ROBERT KILLEBREW
US Military Planner
1991 Gulf War

It's unusual in our system for a Secretary of Defence though, to get personally involved in battle plans and impose his own philosophy of war. The last time that happened was Secretary of Defence McNamara during the Vietnam era. So part of the friction on this is a Secretary imposing a different style of warfare over one that existed when he came in and took office.

DONALD RUMSFELD
US Defence Secretary

The war plan is Tom Frank's war plan. It was carefully prepared over many months. It was washed through the tank with the chiefs on at least four or five occasions.

KILLEBREW: There's certainly an atmosphere in the Pentagon of strain between Secretary Rumsfeld and his top military planners.

WARE: And Rumsfeld is a tough guy.

KILLEBREW: He's a very tough guy.

WARE: The gamble in the Rumsfeld doctrine of 21st century warfare being fast, flexible and light, became apparent as long snaking supply lines were exposed to attack.

AMERICAN SOLDIER: They hopped out and began to open fire with AK47s and they fired one RPG also at our convoy.

WARE: Saddam was making good his promise to hit 'the snake' as he described the armoured columns now strung out so thinly.

AMERICAN SOLDIER: Food, we're now one meal a day until supply comes.. re-supply.

WARE: And how long is that going to be?

AMERICAN SOLDIER: Well we don't know. Hopefully soon.

General Sir MICHAEL ROSE

Commander, UN Protection Force

Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1994-95

Modern technology in the battlefield consumes a vast amount of power, a vast amount of fuel, vast amount

of ammunition and even a vast amount of battery power. They've got a very vulnerable and extended line

of communication. Conventional military terms they should have had at least a cavalry regiment - or in our

terms, probably a brigade - looking after that line of communication.

WARE: You don't think you took a gamble with ground troops being on the light side, because that's what a lot of American generals have complained about.

GEOFF HOON MP

Secretary of State for Defence

Well there is obviously a debate in free societies about how governments go about what they do, and that

includes the debate about the use of military force. But I repeat, this is a remarkably successful military

campaign that has achieved its objectives much more quickly than anyone could have anticipated.

WARE: Another key assumption of the American war light strategy was that ordinary Iraqis would

welcome them and the British and then rise up against Saddam. The Vice President emphasised this just

four days before the war started.

US Vice-President DICK CHENEY

The read we get on the people of Iraq is there's no question but what they want to get rid of Saddam

Hussein and they will welcome as liberators the United States when we come to do that.

WARE: A senior member of the Bush administration predicted an explosion of joy would eventually greet

the soldiers. First though there would have to be what the Americans called "shock and awe" from

thousands of precision guided munitions. So far the prevailing sound from the Iraqi people has been grief

and pain. Iraqis put the civilian death toll at over 1,250. More independent reports put the figure lower but

still in the hundreds.

Just as a matter of fact, do you have an approximate figure for the number of civilian casualties to date?

HOON: No we don't.

WARE: Do you have any idea at all? You've not been keeping a tally?

HOON: It's impossible for us to keep an accurate assessment.

WARE: Sure, but some kind of assessment?

HOON: No. Our assessment is that we have been very successful in minimising the number of civilian casualties.

WARE: Well then you must have a figure, roughly, in your head. That's why I asked you how many roughly – roughly. Is it in the hundreds, has it gone past the thousand mark? If that is your pre-eminent aim and concern you must have an idea of what the collateral damage is to date.

HOON: Well I don't have a figure in my head because, as I've indicated, it can only be speculation. But what I do know is that careful efforts that have been to target regime targets in Baghdad have been successful. The careful aim to minimise civilian casualties has been successful.

WARE: The Americans have called this war "Operation Iraqi Freedom" though no one asked the Iraqi people if bombing was the price they were prepared to pay for liberation from Saddam. It's hard to know exactly what the Iraqi people are thinking. But so far as one can tell, the prevailing mood looks to be more muted than joyful.

New York, 1991

WARE: One thing is certain, the Iraqis have a deep mistrust of what motivated the bombing of their country. The American led victory from the last Gulf war provides one important explanation. Then the objective was just to push Saddam back from Kuwait, not to topple him. However, George Bush senior, the then President, did encourage the Iraqis to take matters into their own hands. He said they should rise up against Saddam.

1st March 1991

GEORGE BUSH SENIOR: Iraqi people should put him aside and that would facilitate the resolution of all these problems that exist, and certainly would facilitate the acceptance of Iraq back into the family of peace loving nations.

WARE: And so most Iraqis answered the President's call - 14 out of 18 provinces rose up. They expected the Americans to come across the Kuwaiti border to help them – but they didn't.

"The Gulf War"
BBC1, 1996

ROBERT GATES
US National Security Adviser
1991 Gulf War
That was the quagmire, therein laid Vietnam as far as we were concerned, because we would still be there.

WARE: Having encouraged the Iraqis to rise up, the Americans went home.

"The Gulf War"
BBC1, 1996

JAMES WOOLSEY
Director, CIA, 1993-95
I think the decision not to support that was one of the worst American decisions of the 20th century frankly.
I think they had a bit of a blind spot on not wanting bad states to break up because they didn't know exactly what was going to follow.

WARE: When Saddam realised he would have a clear run, he sent in his helicopter gun ships and laid waste even to sacred Shia shrines at Najaf and Kabala.

Dr HUSSEIN AL-SHAHRISTANI
Chief Scientific Adviser, 1970-79
Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission
More than 300,000 Iraqis in the south in particular and some central cities were massacred. The Iraqis have not been able to overcome, as I've said, the bitterness of that betrayal. It strengthened our conviction that the Americans are not there to help the Iraqi people. They are not there for liberty and freedoms for other people, and that conviction, I think is carried by the majority of Iraqis even today.

27th March 2003

TONY BLAIR: They've been let down before, when they thought coalition forces were going to remove Saddam. And my message to them today is that this time we will not let you down.

Iraqi TV

IRAQI OFFICER: [addressing troops] Slit their throats and divide their hearts in two.

WARE: But, if the Americans underestimated their legacy of mistrust from the First Gulf War, Saddam had certainly learned some lessons of his own. These pictures on state run Iraqi TV after the uprising were designed to send a clear message to Iraqis contemplating a second one. Directing operations here is one of Saddam's key henchmen, Ali Hassan al Majid. Otherwise known as 'Chemical Ali' for arranging the poisoning of 5,000 Kurds in Halabja. According to British forces in this Gulf war, Chemical Ali and his extensive network of thugs in the Fedayeen and the ruling Ba'athist party have been directing the fighting in most of Southern Iraq. Fear of the regime's grip may help explain why the people of Basra, Iraq's second largest city, have yet to greet British troops as liberators.

BRITISH SOLDIER: Tango two one bravo, we are receiving harassing occasional fire from the north west.

WARE: According to the British, some of the gunmen who fired at them are doing so because their families have themselves been threatened with death by Ba'athist militia unless they fight. When these Iraqis left Basra to collect water, chemical Ali's death squads thought they were fleeing and fired on them.

BBC News
30th March 2003

REPORTER: From inside the city the sound of distant gunfire, the final humiliation for a desperate people, attacked by their fellow countrymen.

WARE: Here in Basra the British forces are battling for the hearts and minds of ordinary Iraqis. In their attempt to convince them they are here as liberators committed to destroying Saddam's network, the Royal Marines have arrested leading Ba'athists.

BRITISH SOLDIER: The aim of this operation was to try and take out the leadership. And so if the brain of the operation has gone, I hope that the other parts of it may crumble.

WARE: The Marines have also stormed the palatial home of Chemical Ali. Inside they found a sandpit with toy tanks. If this is how he war-gamed the defence of Basra, it doesn't seem to have been much help. Today real British tanks reached the town centre. A precision guided missile also destroyed this Ba'ath Party building in Basra – 200 Ba'athists were said to be inside. In their quest to be seen as liberators the Americans have dropped leaflets and transmitted freedom messages. Saddam, by contrast, depicts the Americans and the British as conquerors. A message which readily finds its mark in the Arab world with its long memories of Christian crusades. All Saddam needs is a TV station to address the nation and rail against the invaders. In this appeal to Iraqi patriotism the state run TV makes much of the smallest of victories. Small arms fire from Fedayeen guerrillas downed this Apache Long Bow helicopter. Iraqi TV said it was done single-handedly with an old gun fired by this patriotic farmer. To Iraqis, this is David fighting Goliath. The patriotic calls around which many ordinary Iraqis with no love for Saddam seem to have rallied.

Do you think it's been a mistake to keep the TV station to keep broadcasting in Iraq?

Colonel ROBERT KILLEBREW
US Military Planner
1991 Gulf War

I think it's a catastrophic mistake. I think that is... early in the war we tried real hard not to draw conclusions about specific things because we know that history has a way of giving us a different view. But I'm willing to say right now our key error in this war so far has been to allow Iraqi television and Iraqi radio to go on. That should have been destroyed the first day, and Saddam Hussein should be right now a voiceless fugitive somewhere in Baghdad.

WARE: The Americans have bombed the information ministry. Yet, although its signal has sometimes been shaky, Iraqi TV is still on the air.

Do you think it was a mistake not to have taken Iraqi TV off the air straight away?

GEOFF HOON MP
Secretary of State for Defence

What we were trying to achieve in this campaign was both military success but also to leave as much of the

infrastructure of the country in place as possible.

WARE: But the TV is a central part of the Saddam regime, isn't it.

HOON: Certainly it has been used for propaganda reasons. It's been used to support the military resistance.

It is part of the regime, and certainly I have consistently complained about the way in which Saddam's propaganda has been rebroadcast not least in the Arab world but even in the western world.

Amman, Jordan

WARE: But it would be unreal to suppose that in the wider Arab world beyond Iraq's borders those who want to take up arms against the Americans and the British are all dupes of Saddam's propaganda machine.

Since the war began there's been a steady stream of Iraqis returning from Jordan saying they want to fight for their country.

IRAQI MAN: Why would the coalition want to liberate Iraq? Iraq is not occupied. Iraq should be protected by its own people, it's own men will defend it, and if someone crosses that line, we will stamp on their head.

2ND IRAQI MAN: They're coming here out of greed, for oil, and to occupy the whole of Iraq. We will not accept this. Even if the last one of us is martyred, we will still defend Iraq.

ALI MUHSEN HAMID

Arab League Ambassador to UK

They are resisting because they believe that they have been invaded by outside forces, without any reason, without any mandate by the UN, without any legal reason, without doing anything or harming the British or the Americans. They have done nothing against the British people or the American people.

WARE: Do you think the planners have underestimated the extent to which Iraqis, who may well loathe Saddam Hussein, but still feel a powerful loyalty to either Arab nationalism or their country?

Maj Gen PATRICK CORDINGLEY

Commander, Desert Rats

1991 Gulf War

I think undoubtedly that's so. You see, don't you, the fact that Americans are not seen as liberators. I don't think they ever would have been seen as liberators. A much – I use the word 'hated' because I think that's

probably the right word - a much hated nation in that region, despite the fact that they're trying to be helpful.

That's not how the Arabs actually see them, and I think that is a powerful factor in this.

Al-Manar TV

WARE: On this fire of Arab hatred for America, TV pictures like these, beamed across the Middle East, are the equivalent of high-octane fuel. This is how Islamic fundamentalists are exploiting the Iraq War.

RUMSFELD: [message subtitled] The weapons that are being used today have a degree of precision that no one ever dreamt of.

WARE: The message is that America and Britain are deliberately targeting Iraqi civilians.

RUMSFELD: [voice echoing over scenes of civilian casualties] Weapons that are being used today have a degree of precision that no one ever dreamt of.

WARE: It's what many Arabs believe anyway, without this satellite channel associated with Hezbollah.

RUMSFELD: ... have a degree of precision that no one...

Rabatt, Morocco

WARE: This virulent anti-Americanism is being echoed ever more loudly in the Arab street, even in moderate countries like Morocco. According to the commentator the crowd is chanting: "We are all Iraqis now".

ROBERT BAER

CIA Agent, Middle East, 1976-97

I've never seen anti-Americanism for instance in the Middle East this strong, ever. What they're saying is you're American and a private citizen. We don't have anything against you but your President.. President Bush is a fascist. He's crazy or he's on a religious crusade or whatever and they said we don't understand.

WARE: Now the Iraqi regime has welcomed what it calls a "non-conventional" weapon. Not that those wielding it need much encouragement.

EGYPTIAN MAN: Thank God today I have come as a holy warrior, leaving behind in Egypt four

daughters, my son and a mother, protected by God and his prophet. I pledge myself to the service of God, his prophet and President Saddam. I don't intend to go home, and by God's will I will die here as a martyr.

WARE: Perhaps this is another stunt from Iraqi TV - perhaps. But there are credible reports of hundreds of Palestinians, Yemenis, Tunisians and Saudi's assembling at a camp outside Baghdad. Britain and America say this war will stop Iraq's weapons of mass destruction from getting to Al-Qaeda. None has yet been found though there is evidence they do exist.

Cairo, Egypt

WARE: What's less clear is whether Iraq had an active link to Al-Qaeda in the first place. If this didn't exist before the war, it will soon warn Arab leaders.

HOSNI MUBARAK

President of Egypt

There will be more terrorism and the terrorist groups will deny it and instead of one Bin Laden, we will have a hundred Bin Laden.

WARE: The President of Egypt is the head of an Arab state and presumably if he thinks this is going to create the very thing that you're trying to remove or destroy then you have to take him seriously, don't you?

GEOFF HOON MP

Secretary of State for Defence

Of course we take him seriously. I've had the privilege of meeting him on a number of occasions. He is a very impressive observer of the Arab world and one who, from experience, needs to be taken seriously.

WARE: But you think he's wrong when he says this will precipitate an even greater global terrorist problem. You think he's just flat wrong, even though he's head of an Arab state.

HOON: I recognise that there is a concern, as I've indicated already. It's something that we will have to have regard to, but it doesn't mean that taking action to remove a dreadful, appalling regime in Iraq is any less legitimate.

WARE: In the last week what appears to be two suicide bombings have killed seven soldiers. In one case the bomber posed as a taxi driver.

AMERICAN SOLDIER: They stopped the vehicle at the road block that has clearly marked in Arabic that it's a road block. The driver beckoned them a little bit closer and as the soldiers approached, the driver detonated a bomb killing himself and the four soldiers.

WARE: Soldiers are understandably now much more nervous. Away from the cameras twice last week American soldiers shot first and asked questions later. At least 14 Iraqis, including 7 members of one family have been shot at checkpoints.

3rd April 2003

GEORGE BUSH: Having travelled hundreds of miles, we will now go the last 200 yards.

WARE: Now that the Americans have reached Baghdad they face their biggest gamble. The city has a population of five million. Yet because the Americans have nothing like the number of troops that would normally be expected to take a city of this size, they seem not to have planned for a big ground battle.

Are you suggesting that there wasn't an original plan.. a ground plan for that?

Maj Gen PATRICK CORDINGLEY
Commander, Desert Rats
1991 Gulf War

I think that must be obvious because there are simply not enough soldiers in place for a full-scale assault on Baghdad, and the...

WARE: That's a pretty major admission, isn't it, if there is no ground plan? Are you seriously suggesting there might not be ground plan.

CORDINGLEY: I'm saying that I genuinely believed that the Americans thought that Baghdad would capitulate once it had been attacked in a surgical way. I genuinely believe that the Americans never thought that it was going to be necessary to put large numbers of ground troops into Baghdad.

WARE: On the way to Baghdad, as American troops closed into Saddam airport, 12 miles from the city centre, the posture of the Iraqi regime was, as always, bluster.

IRAQI MINISTER OF INFORMATION: They are nowhere. They are nowhere really. Why not to take Saddam Airport? Yes, this is silly.

WARE: Twelve hours later Saddam Airport had been renamed Baghdad International Airport, and tonight an American military plane landed there. Lining stretches of the road to Baghdad, and tonight in Basra, were cheering crowds, emboldened perhaps by a growing belief that the tyrant who called himself variously the anointed one, the glorious leader, direct descendent of the prophet and the President of Iraq will soon be toppled.

HOON: What we've seen in previous conflicts, perhaps most obviously the Kosovo campaign, a certain point is reached at which even the most fanatical determined regime, with however many supporters, may implode, may collapse from the inside, because that regime recognises in some way that's hard to detect sometimes from the outside, that there is no purpose and no utility in carrying on resistance. We have not yet got to that stage in Baghdad or Iraq. We may not notice it happening until there is a sudden collapse.

WARE: This war has never remotely been a fight between equals. Even Saddam's famed Republican Guards didn't offer much resistance. Those who did were pulverised from the ground and air. The gamble is that as the Americans probe further into the city, Saddam's soldiers will simply melt away. But will they?

CORDINGLEY: Of course if that gamble is wrong, then you've got a whole series of Republican Guard soldiers joining up with these irregular forces in Baghdad. I think you've got to accept that there are half a million people perhaps who are members of the Ba'ath Party who's jobs are going to be lost and quite a number of those are going to think it's going to be worthwhile putting up some form of resistance just to see if the international community can say that's enough and stop and save Saddam Hussein at the last minute. I mean clearly they've got that judgment wrong and there's no way the Americans aren't going to finish this particular thing, but nevertheless there are definitely going to be some people there who are going to fight for their jobs.

WARE: This is just a foretaste of what fighting in a built up area like Baghdad will be like if that's what it comes to. It took British troops a week to finally take control of the southern port of Umm-Qasr, a town of 40,000 people. In comparison to what a lengthy ground war would mean in Baghdad, Umm-Qasr was just a

skirmish.

REPORTER: It takes a while to pinpoint exactly where the shots are coming from. We're slowly being sucked into a street fight. It seems the gunfire has been coming from the police station down here and there are reports of gunmen positioned on some of the roof tops. This is the kind of urban warfare no Marine wants to fight.

WARE: How much experience has the US army of urban warfare?

Colonel ROBERT KILLEBREW
US Military Planner
1991 Gulf War

Not nearly as much as you Brits have from Northern Ireland. Most of our urban warfare training has been theoretical. We have had some experience, of course, in Panama in '89. We did a little bit obviously and famously in Mogadishu, but generally speaking, our troops have been training for urban warfare extensively but it's only been training.

WARE: Yesterday there were signs in the centre of Baghdad that special Republican Guard troops were digging in for a fight. They're amongst the most loyal of Saddam's troops. The coming days will tell just how loyal they'll be.

If urban guerrilla warfare does break out in Baghdad, how bloody is it going to be?

CORDINGLEY: I think it could be very bloody. The problem there is that you find yourself trying to cope with an enemy who is hidden in houses, and if that is the case after you've taken some casualties yourself which is sometimes very difficult to avoid, you then have to demolish the house that they're in and then civilian casualties will be involved as well. So it could become a bloody affair.

WARE: And the difficulty there of course is that you lose Iraqi hearts and minds which must be feeling pretty fragile anyway after two weeks of very heavy aerial bombardment.

ROSE?: You are definitely going to make a significant difference again in the hearts and minds and make it much more difficult afterwards to win back any support that you might have from the local population, a great danger.

WARE: Any resistance within Baghdad, like this show of it yesterday, may not subside until the Americans capture him dead or alive. To do that they'll need the help of live informants close to him, and that could be difficult.

When you were in the CIA working on Iraq, did the CIA then have a reliable and extensive intelligent network in Baghdad and Iraq?

ROBERT BAER

CIA Agent, Middle East, 1976-97

No, not at all. There was... there's virtually nobody. It was a closed country. We called it a 'denied' area.

It was almost impossible to figure out what was going on. Saddam was a hard nut to crack and no one did very well at it for the last 30 years.

WARE: Saddam has many doubles and whether he's dead or alive his days are surely numbered. The manner of his passing though is already oxygen not just to anti-Americanism but also to hostility to Britain too.

ALI MUHSEN HAMID

Arab League Ambassador to UK

Arabs will not forget this war. I heard a British politician some days ago and he said that we have never forgotten our wars with France, which is hundreds of years old. So we will not forget this war at all.

BAER: You know, if Bin Laden is alive, I can assure you he's watching his television right now. He's watching BBC, keeping his fingers crossed this war goes on for a long time and is very bloody because he will have a lot of recruits.

WARE: These are just the opening shots in the new world order dominated by American supremacy with some help from their closest ally Tony Blair. Whatever this war takes, both leaders are going to finish it because both remain confident that its outcome will bring peace and security to the world.

BUSH: These are sacrifices in a high calling - the defence of our nation and the peace of the world. We are applying the power of our country to ensure our security and to serve the cause of justice, and we will prevail. [cheers and applause]

WARE: And yet, apparently, to secure that peace, we may now have to engage in war over several decades.

After Iraq other states deemed by America to be a threat to its security could be in the firing line. But first the face of the Middle East has to be changed according to a former CIA director close to the hawks in the Bush Administration.

JAMES WOOLSEY

Director, CIA, 1993-95

This Fourth World War I think will last considerably longer than either World Wars One or Two did for us, hopefully not the full four plus decades of Cold War.

WARE: If this apocalyptic vision is right, the stakes for what George Bush and Tony Blair have embarked on could not be higher.

In the latest incident of friendly fire an American jet hit a convoy of American forces and Kurdish fighters killing 16. With the convoy was a BBC team including John Simpson and Panorama producer Tom Giles.

We regret to say the BBC's translator, Cameron Abdu Raza Mohamed was killed. The rest of the team escaped with minor injuries.

PANORAMA

Battle For Basra

PANORAMA

Battle For Basra

RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION: BBC-1

DATE: 27:04:03

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JANE CORBIN: The British army have seized Basra from the grasp of Saddam Hussein's militias, but at night there is no peace on these streets, only fear. A few people brave the curfew to guard their homes and their families.

BASRA MAN: Now we are from this area, now we are afraid because somebody that came, they will become thief. So I am afraid really because somebody they want to kill us because they are thief, they will take my car, they will take everything. So you want to help us – help us.

JANE CORBIN

It's incredibly eerie here on the streets of Basra tonight. In recent days several state owned banks have been looted and it seems that some of those responsible are members of Saddam's militia, people who escaped the battle. It seems they'll do anything to prevent Basra getting back to normal again. Earlier in the evening these Irish guards were involved in a gunfight. Two nights ago one of their number was seriously wounded by an Iraqi sniper. There is a power vacuum in Basra.

Sergeant, what sort of problems have you been having at night on these patrols? What's going on?

Sergeant NICK PERRY

Irish Guards

Basically what we've got is groups, groups of guys coming in from the slums area into the town centre where we are now and they're armed with AK47s and basically harassing the locals, you know.. kicking front doors in, going into houses and firing their weapons off, scaring people. I would say they probably are, or were at one stage certainly, in some way, shape or form part of the military.

CORBIN: The real battle for Basra to ensure security and foster a government that Iraqis trust is still being waged on these streets. The British Army may well be in for a long stay. Basra is Iraq's second city, home to nearly a million and a half people, mostly Shiah Moslems. Saddam hated Basra and its people, he starved it of funding and brutally repressed its citizens after they dared to defy him by rising up after the Gulf War 12 years ago. As we arrived in Basra, British troops had just entered the city and begun investigating the regime's many official buildings. Major Lindsay MacDuff showed me what lay beneath an anonymous looking block targeted by coalition bombers during the battle to take the city.

MAJ. MacDUFF: We found these cells here which there are a fair number of them, some this side and then further over to the rear.

CORBIN: There seems to be metal cots, beds or something in there.

MAJ. MacDUFF: Yes, I assume that they were used for accommodation of people and that's slightly more salubrious. In others you'll find that there's just nothing, not even windows.

CORBIN: Not even windows?

MAJ. MacDUFF: All cages. Just...

CORBIN: Just complete cells.

MAJ. MacDUFF: Yes.

CORBIN: Tens of thousands of prisoners, people targeted for their political and religious beliefs were incarcerated by the regime in its prisons during its two and a half decades in power. Many of them never emerged again. Iron rings in the floor hinted at shackles, hooks in the ceiling of worse. Torture inflicted on those who opposed the regime. Two local men emerged from the shadows in the prison with a British army interpreter. They'd been held here recently and were convinced there were still secret cells hidden deep underground, cells where prisoners were still locked up.

So what have they been telling you?

Major ANDY DOCHERTY
King's Regiment

They believe there's an underground prison, but that's a belief of many Iraqis because there have been underground prisons before, a lot like this but even deeper. They believe they've got friends, relatives ?? in prison close to this location. We searched yesterday, we're searching again today.

CORBIN: And this is the map that he's...

DOCHERTY: And this is the sketch map of... this here is where we are, and his belief is that there's another stairway which leads to another underground prison, but 1) we can't find the stairway, can't find a door, there's nothing obvious, and this is a concrete structure so it should stand out but there's nothing.

CORBIN: These men had been held blindfolded, easily disorientated. Who knows exactly where they'd been held and where the other prisoners might be? In a compound there was more evidence of the methods used by the regime.

What do you think this area was?

MAJ. MacDUFF: Well all around the outside of us here are a number of cells and then we're standing in a cage, and we've had a number of reports of people who've come and said to us that they were strapped to the cages and then electrocuted. Normally you'd put animals in cages, but clearly these weren't animals kept here.

CORBIN: Out side the Security Headquarters a crowd was growing. It was the first time ordinary Basrians had ventured inside this forbidden compound. The rumours spread that friends and relatives were still holed up underground. Major MacDuff struggled to keep control. The crowd wanted the British to bring diggers and excavate the site. Five thousand men at least from the city had disappeared into Saddam's prisons in the last decade alone.

BASRA MAN: My brother was taken. They brought him here and I... me and my mother and my wife, my father, my brothers, were taken to another prison.

CORBIN: Everyone here had a terrible story to tell of people missing since the Shiah uprising against the regime 12 years ago. The bloody reprisals then had engrained a sense of fear in Basran society. People wouldn't give me their names, afraid still of the shadow of Saddam.

Until people know that Saddam is dead, they won't feel really free?

BASRA MAN: Yes, this is what we say, we want to see him dead.

CORBIN: The war in Basra had pitted British troops against a regime prepared to hold its own people hostage in order to survive. The coalition targeted the regime's nerve centre, the Ba'ath Party, Saddam's henchmen and his loyalist militias. The vast majority of the people of the city took no part. Even Iraq's regular army had no stomach for a fight. We found the home of the man who came to symbolise the regime's brutality in Basra, Saddam's cousin, the military governor of Southern Iraq. This once palatial mansion had belonged to Ali Hassan al-Majid, nicknamed 'Chemical Ali'. He'd ordered the killing of 5000 Kurds with poison gas, most of them were women and children. Homeless families now occupied al-Majid's house. They too had suffered at the hands of Saddam and his cousin.

KHALOOD BANDA

President Saddam Hussein killed my husband. I have five children, five young girls. When he was killed I was pregnant with the fifth girl.

CORBIN: Why was your husband killed?

BANDA: I think he was killed for political reasons.

CORBIN: And what is the situation now, are you still afraid of the Saddam Hussein regime?

BANDA: Yes, I'm scared of course of the people and of everybody. Thank you Mr Blair.

CORBIN: You want to thank Mr Blair for bringing the army here?

BANDA: Yes, yes. Very good.

CORBIN: And many people feel that in Basrah?

ALL: Yes, yes, yes, yes. [applause]

MAN: Thank God Mr Blair.

CORBIN: When the war began in March British troops advanced rapidly on Basra. They took control of the bridges on the outskirts of the city within 48 hours. Inside Basra, people listening on their radios knew what was coming. Abed Hassan Hamooudi took us into the compound of the house into which he gathered

his family. From across the city three generations of Hamooudis - sons and daughters, spouses and their children - came here. They wanted to live through the war together.

MR HAMOUDI: From the time the invasion started, 17 days ago or 18 days ago we all moved here.

CORBIN: The Hamooudis are a well respected family in Basra. A manager in the oil business Abed Hassan and his wife had brought up their children to have successful professional careers as doctors and scientists. The family has strong links with Britain, spending many years in Manchester.

CORBIN: How did you live from day to day with the difficulties of when the battle was on?

DINA: No, we were so happy. There was TV, we were all together, playing, loving, just nothing.

CORBIN: So despite....

GIRL: We've got water, got electricity, everything, so we were very happy, a very happy family. We were all together.

CORBIN: The Hamooudis had dug a well in their garden in the centre of the city. They were prepared for a long siege but they prayed that the British Army would arrive soon to liberate them from the regime.

ABED HASSAN HAMOUDI

So we had taken all the precautions, we'd done shopping etc, ration food, dry food, we got plenty here.

CORBIN: On the bridges leading in to Basra the British 7th Armoured Brigade had routed the Iraqi Army's tanks. The Iraqi regular troops here were unwilling to fight, they tried to melt away. But behind them were hard line militias, Fedayeen fiercely loyal to Saddam Hussein. They put up a ferocious fight.

Brigadier GRAHAM BINNS

Commander, 7th Cavalry Armoured Brigade

They were coercing the regular army to go back and get their equipment, and they were coercing them to fight on behalf of the regime.

CORBIN: What do you mean, coercing them?

BINNS: Well they were using money, they were using threats of force, they were holding their families hostage.

CORBIN: After six days of fighting, around a thousand Iraqi civilians tried to flee the city in search of water and safety. They knew the British controlled the bridges and were emboldened to make a break for it.

Major LINDSAY MacDUFF

The Blackwatch

The indirect fire came without warning quite clearly and the result of that where people would try and disperse in order to avoid being hit by the mortar rounds.

CORBIN: The Iraqi militias were firing on their own people from inside the city. One woman was badly injured by shrapnel from the mortars.

MacDUFF: Our soldiers, fortunate for them, had warrior vehicles to jump in the back of, but for the civilians there was no cover.

CORBIN: The militias were prepared to terrorise the population, to kill women and children. They wanted to stop men, they were forcing to fight, from escaping.

MacDUFF: There were militia men machine-gunning people to prevent them from leaving Basra.

CORBIN: Machine-gunning them?

MacDUFF: Yes.

CORBIN: Their own people?

MacDUFF: Yes.

CORBIN: What was your reaction at that point?

MacDUFF: Well, unbelievable, heinous kind of activity to do.

CORBIN: British commanders camped in the desert outside Basra hoped that having troops surrounding the city would encourage Iraqis to rise up and topple the regime. There was an attempt at revolt. A crowd set fire to a government building but the rebellion was crushed when seven policemen who refused to fire on their own people were executed. British hopes were dashed. They would now have to destroy Saddam's regime in Basra without wrecking the city.

BINNS: We developed a concept for Basra and we imagined it to be a body. What we wanted to do was to remove the brain but at the same time keep the vital organs and the central nervous system in tact.

CORBIN: British commanders then received a vital tip-off from inside the city. Dozens of members of Saddam Hussein's main instrument of power and repression would be gathering in Basra that night.

Captain CHARLIE TAYLOR

Royal Artillery

Basically we had a human intelligence report.. a human report that there was a meeting within the Ba'ath Party Headquarters.

CORBIN: A British drone, a pilotless plane with a camera was called in to observe the target. American planes armed with jadams – bunker busting munitions – were scrambled overhead.

And what was the end result?

TAYLOR: The end result, as clearly as you can see on the screen there, that the jadam munitions hit pretty much in the centre of the Ba'ath Party Headquarters.

CORBIN: The next day the British military received reports that 200 people had been killed in the bombing. The Ba'ath Party pervaded Iraqi society at the highest levels. Key figures in the security apparatus were now dead. But it was soon clear that Saddam's cousin, al-Majid, the infamous 'Chemical Ali' had escaped. The militias continued to fight and hold people hostage. Then late one afternoon, came word that al-Majid and key aids were expected at a private villa in the city. It was right next door to the house where the Hamooudi family had been holed up for weeks.

DINA: There was my brother, Afonz, daughter Azana and Zena and Zaiandin, and Mustapha, Diad's son Hassan, all were there playing, laughing, they were playing computer.

CORBIN: At 6 o'clock the coalition planners received word from their source on the ground. al-Majid had arrived at the house and had taken a sleeping pill, he'd be there for the night. It took hours to get permission for a bombing raid on a residential street in Basra and complete the targeting plan.

The house in question was believed to be occupied at the time by Chemical Ali as he's called, the cousin of

Saddam.

BINNS: Yes, it was. It was occupied by him.

CORBIN: It was. You're sure about that?

BINNS: Absolutely sure. Yes. Otherwise we wouldn't have attacked.

CORBIN: Did you hear the planes overhead before?

DINA: Yes, yes because it hit the road this side.

CORBIN: As those bombs hit the road?

DINA: Yes, second bomb also. The third one was on our heads.

ABED HASSAN HAMOUDI

All the bricks though reinforced concrete fell on the family and a heap of dust was about 1 metre high.

They were all there. What I did, I managed luckily to save the life of my daughter with her two sons, four

years and 6 months. The third one was killed with his grandmum. I managed to remove the bricks from

them because I heard a noise "ba, ba, ba" which means dad, dad. So I tried my.. you know.. my case at

that time, at the time I was removing the bricks, another rocket fell there. Luckily I escaped a disaster

otherwise I should have been killed.

CORBIN: Ten members of the family from three generations of Hamooudis died that night.

Dina's infant

son was killed, her mother and her sister and a beloved niece Zanab, on the threshold of a bright future.

DINA: Zanab 19 years old, she's in pharmacy.

CORBIN: She was a pharmacy student.

DINA: Yes, the first year.

CORBIN: And she was in the house that night?

DINA: Yes, she was in the same room with me.

CORBIN: Yes, and your own young son was there.

DINA: Yes, between her and my mum.

CORBIN: Yes.

DINA: And my sister and her daughter.. little daughter.

CORBIN: Mr Hamooudi's oldest son, a doctor, identified his mother, his brother, sister and four of his five children amongst the dead, the youngest, Zena, just 8 years old. The smell of death hung over the bomb site six days later. Coalition forces had yet to investigate the scene of a bombing they claimed was carefully targeted to avoid civilian casualties.

We did actually meet one family, the doctor's family, we met his father and ten members of that family were killed in a raid on the house next door.

Brigadier GRAHAM BINNS

Commander, 7th Cavalry Armoured Brigade

Yes, well I understand their anger. But we.. that particular attack, it took us... and this was very precise intelligence of a meeting of all the senior Ba'ath Party figures in a house, and it took us seven hours to come to the decision to attack it. We re-checked and checked, checked and re-checked the intelligence. Were very careful with the type of munitions that were delivered, and we hit the target. One of.. as a result of that attack I acknowledged that one prominent doctor lost ten members of his family.

CORBIN: Despite the Brigadier's certainty that Chemical Ali was in the house, there is doubt about whether this attempt to kill him succeeded. In the bottom of the crater there was a military epaulette bearing a general's stars and a black beret. Were they torn from Ali's body by the blast or put there afterwards to convince people he was dead while he got away? A man here just now was too afraid to speak openly but he told me that Chemical Ali was at this house that night with 12 of his bodyguard. The rumour around here is that somehow Saddam Hussein's cousin and henchman escaped from this bombsite and fled Basra.

Do you think you killed him?

BINNS: I don't know. Chemical Ali's rather like Elvis. Nobody is quite sure whether he's dead or alive, and every day we get five... at least five reports of his current location. Whether or not we killed him, we certainly removed him, in that we forced him to leave the city.

CORBIN: As the 7th Armoured Brigade seized their opportunity to enter at last the heart of Basra they

discovered a real hard core of fighters in the city. These men, unlike many of Saddam's militia, did not flee Basra in disarray after the bomb attack on Ali Hassan al-Majid. They were extremists prepared to fight to the death to defend a Moslem country from Western invaders. These fighters killed two soldiers of the Royal Scots Dragoon Guard in a fierce battle at an Islamic college.

Lt col HUGH BLACKMAN

Royal Scots Dragoon Guards

We attacked into the College of Literature where we believed there was something between about 60 and 100 Fedayeen or militia men of various nationalities.

CORBIN: What sort of nationalities?

BLACKMAN: We believe there were Syrians. We certainly saw evidence that there were probably Tunisians and Algerians.

CORBIN: They'd come what, to fight for the regime, a sort of Jihad or what?

BLACKMAN: I believe so. There were clearly local Basra men who had joined the militia, whether that was coerced or voluntarily, but quite clearly some people had come in. One ticket showed a man who had chanced it through Damascus in late March, he'd clearly come to fight the war.

CORBIN: The presence of foreign fighters in the city has raised the spectre of terrorism in the future, and of suicide attacks against western forces. British troops had taken Basra and killed hundreds of militia men, but an unknown number of Saddam's loyalists and their supporters from abroad had simply disappeared. British casualties were only in single figures, but the death toll of Iraqi civilians was far higher. The figures are impossible as yet to verify. But local estimates were 400 injured and 90 dead. The war is over and people of Basra are venturing out on the streets again, but they face an uncertain future. The coalition was convinced it could win this war. It had a battle plan, but there was no blueprint for a post-Saddam Iraq. Basra was without water, electricity and fuel. And after decades of dictatorship there was now a dangerous power vacuum. Major Duncan McSporran and his company of 150 soldiers took over an old police barracks in the north of Basra. They suddenly found themselves responsible for 150,000 civilians.

McSPORRAN: That fire's still burning over on the northern front. I'm surprised they've not put that out yet. I'm surprised it's not gone out. It's been burning for 21 days.

CORBIN: Looting and gunfights were breaking out across the city. Leaderless and fearful, local people turned to British officers and their men for food and water and security. Many showed their appreciation for the forces which had liberated them. But there was anger too, it was directed at invaders who'd prepared no immediate backup administration for Basra.

BASRA MAN: The main problem here also to bring government suitable, the situation is difficult.

McSPORRAN: Yes, okay, let me explain, the situation is difficult. Firstly, with the water, is that you're correct, the water engineering works aren't working. Okay? This is... we're working as hard as we can to fix them and bring them to you.

BASRA MAN: Let me say something.

McSPORRAN: Yes?

MAN: You are better than Saddam Hussein.

McSPORRAN: Excellent. I'm glad you think so.

CORBIN: It was now four days since the taking of Basra and people were desperate for clean drinking water. Ever since the uprising 12 years before, the regime had allowed the city's infrastructure to crumble, using water as a weapon to control the people. The water system was not bombed by the coalition. British soldiers watched the regime shutting down the supplies.

Major DUNCAN McSPORRAN

1st Fusiliers

We were able to observe, over a period of about five or six nights, the water reserves in that tank just dropping.

CORBIN: That was a deliberate move by the regime, even though it was failing, was to deprive people here of water.

McSPORRAN: Yes. I have absolutely no doubt of that whatsoever, and part of their propaganda war against their own people and against us to say the water's off but it's the coalition force's fault.

CORBIN: The next morning a local religious leader, Jassim Michman arrives at the base to try and coordinate relief efforts with the British. Most imams untainted by association with the Ba'ath Party are trusted.

MICHMAN: I have a report for you and you can read it.

McSPORRAN: Yes, thank you very much.

CORBIN: Looting is widespread, but the police, many with links to the Ba'ath, have vanished, fearful of revenge attacks.

McSPORRAN: The police, have they said that they will come back to work?

MICHMAN: I told the responsible man on that and he said yes but what I am not quite sure, we are afraid.

CORBIN: The need for water is urgent. The pumping system can't be restarted and water must be brought from far away.

McSPORRAN: How is the water situation at the moment?

MICHMAN: Ah, this is we want to talk about it. You know.. still there is no water.

McSPORRAN: Yes, I have asked for some water tankers free of charge to bring water, and I am hoping today that I will bring some water tankers here.

MICHMAN: Good.

McSPORRAN: And then what I will do is I will escort the water tankers to the mosque and we will park them up outside the mosque.

MICHMAN: One outside the mosque, one in front of the mosque.

McSPORRAN: Yes, to help with the people.

CORBIN: For the coalition forces it's now a hearts and minds campaign to convince the Basrans the new British regime can restore the city's functions and its security. Major McSporrان helps the imam to use a satellite phone, a brief chance to reassure his son in London. He's been unable to speak to him since before the war.

McSPORRAN: It's an answer phone, do you want to just speak to the phone. It's just an answer machine.

MICHMAN: A message?

McSPORRAN: Yes.

MICHMAN: Hello son. Hello, I am your father here. We are very good. ?? in Basra. Yes, there is no telephone to contact you. Okay son? Your mother and your brother okay.

McSPORRAN: Thank you.

CORBIN: The imam of a local mosque however can't run a city the size of Basra. The Ba'ath Party dominated almost every aspect of life here as the Nazis once did in Germany. It will prove almost impossible to root the Ba'ath out completely.

The problem is, how do you know who the good guys are and the Bad guys? That's a real problem for you surely?

McSPORRAN: It is but what we're doing is we're deferring to the people that we can identify and particularly as with this gentleman's own case, the sort of religious leaders who the locals obviously respect, we found very quickly in the small villages on the outskirts of town that the key Ba'athist members, the people who've been responsible for enforcing the regime were indicated to us straightaway.

CORBIN: So people here know who the bad guys are.

McSPORRAN: Yes, they do very much so.

CORBIN: The bad guys were still very much in evidence on the streets of Basra as the Irish Guard were finding on their nightly patrols. These young soldiers with experience of Northern Ireland reckoned that some criminal elements were seizing their opportunity as the regime released its grip on Basra. But Sergeant Perry suspected that some of the gunmen were one time members of Saddam's militias seeking to prolong the anarchy.

SOLDIER: You see Ali Baba?

BASRA MEN: No, no, no.

SOLDIER: Ali Baba?

BASRA MEN: No, no, no. No Ali Baba.

CORBIN: Locals call the looters 'Ali Babas' – thieves, a familiar term to British ears.

SOLDIER: All is very quiet?

BASRA MAN: We hear a shooting another time.

CORBIN: Still no local police had been persuaded to patrol these streets, especially at night. Householders, in this well-off part of Basra, had banded together to protect their own properties.

SOLDIER: Very soon the police will be here to protect you.

BASRA MAN: I swear by my God. Really?

CORBIN: Saddam's regime had fallen by now in Baghdad as well as Basra. But people here fear the old police and their Ba'ath Party associations. The soldiers were already wondering when they would be able to go home, but many people wanted the British to remain in Basra to protect them.

Why is it that you don't have any trust in the old police? You seem to not want the old police back. Why is that?

BASRA MAN: We don't know. Maybe they from same government before, maybe from Saddam government also.

CORBIN: And you don't trust them?

McSPORRAN: Speaking to them there you can see the sort of doubts they have within, you know.. not the old police not the old regime, which is obviously something that people at the top need to be aware of.

BASRA PEOPLE: Thank you, good bye. Thank you very much and welcome.

CORBIN: Further down the road the patrol stopped a large empty truck breaking the curfew. The three men inside were acting suspiciously. Inside the truck the soldiers found an iron bar.

McSPORRAN: What is that for?

BASRA MAN: No, no, nothing.

McSPORRAN: Show me.

CORBIN: The men's protestations of innocence cut no ice. The soldiers were convinced they were off on a looting spree.

McSPORRAN: Right, I understand. You get in the van and you go. Yes? Listen to me. You get in the van and you go. Yes?

MAN: Yes.

McSPORRAN: I don't want to see you here again.

MAN: Yes, yes.

McSPORRAN: Go.

CORBIN: The breakdown of law and order in Basra is likely to last some time. It risks getting British troops bogged down in peacekeeping duties in the city. The commander of the 7th Armoured Brigade which had taken Basra established himself in Saddam's summer palace, a huge and ornate complex in a city of poverty and squalor. The Brigadier's planning meetings were now increasingly concerned with preventing any extremist Shia or tribal faction from unilaterally taking over the city.

BINNS: It's inappropriate that any grouping at this stage occupies the Mayor's house.

CORBIN: Vast quantities of arms and ammunition were still being discovered throughout the city, fuel for future conflict.

OFFICER: Also I understand, just to the South East is the naval dockyard comprehensively trashed.

CORBIN: And the illusive Chemical Ali still featured on the map, showing the latest reported sightings of Saddam's cousin. The army was now tasked with handing out Tony Blair's message to the people of Basrah via a newspaper masterminded by Downing Street's export spin doctor.

OFFICER: The newspaper at the moment is only 5,000 copies per day. I spoke to Colonel Nick last night and were going to see if we could try go get it changed to 30,000 in a week and therefore have a hopefully better impact on the city in Basra. The newspaper is actually being controlled by Alistair Campbell's office so he takes interest in it and it is only here for an 8 week trial and then they will review it and see if it's been successful or not.

CORBIN: An unstable currency, the Iraqi dinar posed one of the biggest problems in the aftermath of war.

OFFICER: You might be interested to note Brigadier that these are the three currencies that are circulating at the moment. These are circulating.

BRIGADIER: What are they?

OFFICER: They are the new print 250, from the entire stock handed in they haven't been touched.

BRIGADIER: That's what I exchanged yesterday.

OFFICER: Well you've been done then.

ALL: (laughter)

OFFICER: The 10,000 he said to me last night was not acceptable at all on the streets. And there's a million there.

CORBIN: One banker, afraid of looters, was bringing vast quantities of the increasingly devalued notes to the British base.

OFFICER: Also G5 last night asked for some....

BRIGADIER: What are you going to do with it?

OFFICER: I have no idea Brigadier, I was looking for a bit of a steer on that actually... [laughter]

Added to that, today he's coming back with another billion... [laughter]
And he's also handed in 47 gold bars, there's sackfuls of them, absolutely sackful.

BRIGADIER: I think we'd better discuss this.

CORBIN: There really is a sense out there that there's a power vacuum, that a war was fought, but who is running the place? Are the Americans going to run it? You know.. do you expect a local leadership to arise, and if so, who will it be and can people trust them or will they be part of the old guard?

Brigadier GRAHAM BINNS

Commander, 7th Armoured Brigade

Iraq will be run by the people of Iraq and we have to transition from where they were, from a brutal regime

to a democracy, and that transition will be difficult, and we will see, and we are beginning to see different groupings vying for power.

CORBIN: There are many tribes and religious groupings in Basra. The marsh Arabs form a large majority on the outskirts of the town. They were ruthlessly persecuted by Saddam Hussein after the uprising 12 years ago when American forces failed to support their rebellion. They still remember this betrayal. Brigadier Dens has come to meet the Sheikhs of the Goramsha Clan to find out who they would support in an interim council the British are trying to put together. But their continuing fear of the old regime is paralysing their ability to make decisions about their future.

MAN: We still fear of Saddam Hussein. We want you to show us on television, is he dead, is he alive, where has he gone, because we're afraid of the Security Police and the Ba'ath Party regime. We afraid of them. We've got fear in our heart.

DENS: The regime has gone.

MAN: He said: "I don't want you, your friendly army to leave us like 1991. Now we are with you, now we are happy, but please don't leave us. We're afraid. That is the truth I'm telling you.

DENS: We're not leaving. We demonstrated our commitment by coming here, fighting a war and liberating. The emphasis is now on you to start working.

CORBIN: The Brigadier insists that this tribe of 2000 people must first choose their own representative and then work with the new council to get Basra functioning again.

DENS: So are you prepared to place your trust in the members of this council?

MEN: We are with you.

CORBIN: The British Army, as yet, has no answer to the question of how to rid Basra of the Ba'ath Party's grip. Many competent people have some affiliation with Saddam Hussein's party in the past.

BINNS: All people with influence have linkages with the Ba'ath Party. That was the only way that they could survive. So I judge people not necessarily by what they did in the past, but how they are adapting to the future.

CORBIN: In Basra's port the wreck of Saddam's official presidential yacht lies rusting, battered by the coalition's bombs. In this place, once the stronghold of the Ba'ath there are angry officials who now deny they were ever members of the party. Their anger though, underlines how fragile peace is, and how many problems still remains to be resolved.

How do people here in the port feel about what happened?

IMAD HASSAN

We are very angry. We are very sorry for what is happening here because our ship is destroyed. That ship, the crew of the ship, now they have no job, they have no salary. How can they do their living?

CORBIN: People come here to draw water from the river. There's still no clean drinking water and no local leadership, just the British Army who hope they'll only be temporary custodians of Basra.

How do people feel now? It's more than a week since the war ended but how do people feel about the British troops on their streets?

HASSAN: Well I will tell you something. People have infighted against the English troops, and there is nothing happening now, but if these things will continue, I mean without water, without food, without medicine, without schools, no the people will not stay still, they will fight.

CORBIN: They will fight the British?

HASSAN: They will fight I assure you for that.

CORBIN: The old ruler and the old regime are gone. They symbols of their power lie broken, but there is no sense yet of what will replace them. The Hamooudi family still wait to bury their dead at a shrine north of Basra. The roads are not yet safe to travel there. Meanwhile they are trying to repair their shattered home. They have written to Tony Blair and to the Ministry of Defence demanding compensation for the ten relatives who were killed. Nothing will replace their loss but they feel it is their right.

What will your family do now? What will the women do?

DINA HAMOUDI

Nothing, just crying. We don't have anything to do, just crying, do just nothing.

CORBIN: Despite their personal tragedy the Hamooudis are determined that something good must come out of the suffering the people of Basra endured under Saddam Hussein.

ABED HASSAN HAMOUDI

The main thing, the most important thing we got rid of the regime so we don't want to go back to the same trouble by nominating poor people and not knowledgeable person, this is what happen. We want democracy, we want quietness, fairness, peace of mind, at least we live as a human being.

CORBIN: British commanders in Saddam's palace know their troops who fought for this city now want to go home. But no clear exit strategy has emerged from the chaos of the war. There is little sign yet of democracy and peace in Basra. Unless they have security soon, people here may well turn on those who came to liberate them.

PANORAMA

The Price of Victory

PANORAMA

The Price of Victory

RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION: BBC-1

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MAJ. SCOTT PATTON: Tell him (injured Iraqi resistance fighter) that if he cooperates with us we might be able to save his life because we have very good doctors, okay, but tell him if he doesn't cooperate with us, it's bad for him, it's bad for his health. Tell him that.

REPORTER: For three months we've been on the streets of Baghdad chronicling a long, hot and bloody summer.

PATTON: Tell him if he's lying he's going to piss me off really bad.

SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO: You occupy with a military force but you can't restore law and order with the military. This is why an occupation cannot last.

REPORTER: We've been following a battalion of American troops as they take on an increasingly dangerous and unpredictable enemy.

PATTON: We're going to help you if you help us. If you don't help us you can forget it, okay? We came here to help you.

PAUL BREMER: The American people have undertaken with the British and our other coalition allies here a noble exercise and we will see it through.

REPORTER: But that noble exercise requires America to show the same commitment for nation building as it did to removing Saddam. This is the story of three months in Baghdad with the occupiers as they face up to that challenge.

PATTON: (addressing troops) I'd like to welcome everybody to 'Thunder Run 6'. We've got some credible intelligence....

REPORTER: Major Scott Patton has just received a tip off about some paramilitaries who targeted his battalion in a recent grenade attack. He's about to send in nearly 300 troops in one of the units biggest counter insurgency operations to date.

PATTON: Reggie, your task is to secure objective Tammy.

REPORTER: These men are from the 427 field artillery. They call themselves Thunder Battalion. They

arrived just after the war. They're artillery specialists used to firing shells across a battlefield, now they're in the middle of Baghdad experiencing for the very first time an urban guerrilla war. We joined Captain Reggie Harris in one of the lead vehicles.

CAPT. REGGIE HARRIS: Right now we've got about close to 100 US forces that's operating on the street right now. We suspect ?? that have weapons caches that might have been involved in recent attacks that's going on against US forces. We don't know if they're Fedayeen, Ba'athist, but we do know they have talks with Saddam. (to driver) Stop right here, stop right here. Block the road, block the road.

REPORTER: The gang they're looking for are believed to be operating out of a high rise apartment block in Sheik Marouf, Baghdad's oldest quarter. As Reggie Harris' troops secure the building, a group of elite snipers head to a nearby roof to provide covering fire. Poised outside the target flat, Thunder's lead assault team moves in. But the resistance are one step ahead. Inside there's nothing. No paramilitaries, no guns, just an empty flat. A block away, the US army snipers have just spotted an Iraqi in the street below armed with a Kalashnikov.

(sounds of gunfire)

SOLDIER: He's gone down that hole again. Did you shoot that one?

SOLDIER 2: I might have got him. I don't see anyone. A man was across the wall in a green shirt, he was being handed an AK by a man in white shorts. I shot the wall. I don't think I hit him. I suppose I didn't hit him.

REPORTER: Thunder Run 6 is aborted but the soldiers are left exposed, bunched in a small area of town with few exit routes, and their vulnerability is not lost on the resistance.

SOLDIER: (on radio) Right now they've got contacts out-fired and exposed right now. They've got one MP that's critical. Right now they're moving to the FOB to the Medivac point. Over.

REPORTER: Two American soldiers and one Iraqi civilian have been injured. There are 550 soldiers in Thunder Battalion. They've been attacked 40 times in the last month

alone.

SOLDIER: I felt the percussion wave, it kind of stunned me. I closed my eyes and opened my eyes and I could see the dust and debris were all around us, the windshield was cracked, both of 'em, driver's and passenger's side had fallen out, and we... exited and set up security and started assisting wounded. And what they say about everything going into slow motion, I found out today it's true. From the time the percussion waves hit, everything for the next minute or so were slow motion.

REPORTER: It is now July and attacks on coalition troops are averaging over 80 a week. A soldier is being killed almost every day, and this more than two months after President Bush declared an end to Major combat operations. By mid July the US commander in the Middle East finally admits they're engaged in a classic guerrilla type campaign. And the Americans say they know who the insurgents are, remnants of the former regime, still free, still loyal to Saddam and still heavily armed. A resistance President Bush had once challenged with the phrase: "Bring 'em on". Drafted in to help the military hunt them down in a country awash with weapons is the former New York Police Chief Bernard Kerik. Effectively he's Iraq's temporary interior minister, nicknamed the Baghdad terminator for his 'no-nonsense' approach.

BERNARD KERIK

Coalition Provisional Authority

These (referring to range of displayed weapons) were seized over the last day and a half by the same group of individuals. This information was given to us civilians, came forward to talk about possible attacks on the coalition. The objective here is to create a free Iraq. You don't do that by cowering, you don't do that by backing down. We're going to deal with the resistance in two ways, we're going to either arrest them, or we're going to kill them. This job to me is very personal. On September 11th 2001 I was the Police Commissioner of New York City. I respond to the towers when they were hit. I stood beneath tower one when tower two was struck by flight 175. I watched over the next 24 hours as 23 members of my department were in fact missing inside those buildings. They never came out. I lost 23 people. They were responding to defend the freedom of the United States. This country was the threat to that freedom. This

country was a threat to the freedom of the UK. We have now freed this country. We have liberated Iraq and I think I owe it to the 23 people I lost.

REPORTER: Iraq is officially under military occupation with 140,000 troops in the country. Britain is the other main occupier, but it remains essentially an American show with the UN, in peace as in war, relegated to the sidelines. The occupiers go by the name of the Coalition Provisional Authority or CPA, now based in the sumptuous palaces of the old regime. The vision, to turn Iraq into a beacon of democracy for the Middle East.

Would you say the Americans are a good nation at peacekeeping?

PAUL BREMER

Head of Coalition Provisional Authority

We are learning about peacekeeping. It's not something we have done in a long time. We have had experience now in Germany, Japan, to some extent Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan. So we have got some experience in it. The problem with nation building is that it takes time, and it takes a lot of patience, and Americans are not usually renowned for their patience, but I'm encouraged by my conversations with people in both our executive branch in Congress that our country understands that we have a solemn obligation now to see this through and to see it through well and to put the time and resources behind it so we succeed.

REPORTER: Baghdad, two months after the end of the war. When we first arrived we found a city still scarred by battle but free of the apocalyptic scenario some had predicted. There was no famine, no mass refugee crisis, no religious civil war. But at the street level the city was barely functioning. Once regarded as the most advanced in the Arab world, now buried in its own waste and just about anything else which had served its purpose (carcass of dead horse in the road). Many people were struggling just to get enough electricity and water, and, for that matter, money. With so many fraudulent bank notes in circulation since the war, the genuine high denomination notes had lost their value.

This is the 10,000 dinar note. Most people's savings and salaries are in this denomination. But they're finding it extremely difficult to use these notes. A lot of the traders won't accept it and money exchanges

like this will only pay 70% of its value.

But the coalition came up with a solution. Ad hoc money exchanges for people to swap their savings for smaller, usable bank notes. The problem was, they opened at only a few locations leaving a small group of soldiers – in this case from the 1.6 Infantry Battalion – to deal with thousands of anxious civilians. Precisely the sort of scenario where Iraqis get to judge Americans as peacekeepers.

SOLDIER: Men and women are poor, they're not able to get to the bank, and then they come and we try and have a number system where they get in, they got a number to get through the line. Some people are cutting. Once one person comes in, five or six will try to push through the line. That's when we have to defend ourselves and push them back to keep the flow of movement going the way we want it to.

SOLDIER: (to woman in surging crowd) Do you want these (cuffs) on your fucking hands? Then get the fuck out!

IRAQI MAN: You know it's very difficult for Iraqi people to hear the soldiers shouting on a woman. We respect the woman here so much. So you have to tell those soldiers how the Iraqi people respect each other.

2nd IRAQI MAN: He said: "fuck Iraq".

REPORTER: Who did?

2nd IRAQI MAN: He... this army. I don't know what his name.

REPORTER: What did you say?

2nd IRAQI MAN: I say? If I have gun in my hand I tell him what I say by gun.

REPORTER: In the torrid heat of an Iraqi summer and struggling to pacify, let alone understand, a people who'd been asking them for help, for some soldiers discipline becomes a casualty.

(footage of ferocious attack by several soldiers on one Iraqi pinned motionless and helpless on the ground)

The soldiers would later claim that they had to use such force because the man, a suspected pickpocket, was

resisting arrest and fighting them on the ground. The Americans release him a few minutes later to go to hospital to get treatment for the injuries he's just received. While we were filming the money exchange a more serious situation had developed outside Assassin's Gate, the entrance the CPA headquarters. 400,000 Iraqi soldiers had been dismissed, unpaid, as part of the coalition's purge of the old regime. And now some of them were on the street demanding emergency payment. But the protest became violent, rocks were thrown at an army convoy, and in response an American soldier shot into the crowd. Two of the demonstrators, apparently unarmed, were killed. We were directed to the house of one of the men who'd been shot. Tarik Al-Mashhadani, a father of five. His family had just received his body in a US army body bag. For many in Iraq, and especially Ala, now sniffing the blood of his younger brother, the occupiers have little margin for error.

ALA AL-MASHHADANI: The martyr is alive forever and his blood is always fresh. It smells good. I can't get dirt from it. I want to know who shot my brother and bring him to trial. If this doesn't happen I won't keep silent and neither will the Iraq people.

REPORTER: The Americans say that there is an investigation continuing into this matter.

AL-MASHHADANI: They won't do anything. The Iraqi people know why the Americans and British are here – oil, and to allow Israel to grow across the Middle East. These are his five children. Who will feed them now? We have our tribal system of justice. Either the killer is killed, or the victim's family receive compensation. If we don't get justice, we will punish them. We will kill four for the one they killed.

REPORTER: As the brother's coffin was being led through the streets, the US military had already issued a press release claiming someone on the crowd had begun shooting at their soldiers so one of them fired back. But when we found a senior army doctor who'd actually witnessed the incident, his version of events was somewhat different.

Major MATTHEW JENNINGS

82nd Airborne Division

My instinct of the shooting was... well I hate to say this but I don't think it was necessary. I believe

someone felt threatened. You know, the American military police company that was coming by in their vehicles, someone felt threat enough, great enough, to open fire on the crowd. Yet where was no weapons to be seen within the crowd.

REPORTER: You didn't see any?

JENNINGS: I did not see any weapons. Now granted we're in Baghdad. There probably were weapons there, but I did not see any, nor was any fire that I heard, returned back on the soldiers.

REPORTER: The conduct of some in the US military was also worrying the UN's then main trouble shooter and head of mission in Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello. He worked closely with the CPA Chief Paul Bremer. A highly regarded diplomat, he would later be murdered in a suicide bomb attack on the UN headquarters in Baghdad. This was his last television interview.

SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO

UN Special Envoy to Ira

I have discovered in my career, and I've been in six or seven peacekeeping operations that soldiers are bad policemen, they are not trained for that, and as a rule one should never use the military for law and order tasks which is why so many mistakes are being committed here.

MAJ. JENNINGS: With a little bit of the morale deficit that we have here, you put us in a situation where do we shoot or do we not shoot? We're still the shooters, and there's a great possibility that we'll shoot first, and then let things sort out and fill out the reports and do the investigations afterwards.

REPORTER: We've since found out there was no investigation into the shooting of Ala's brother, Tarik. Not since the Second World War has the US Military been in control of a city of 5 million people responsible with the CPA for making it function at every level, and that can even mean rebuilding soccer pitches, the latest task for Reggie Harris.

Are you any good at soccer?

REGGIE HARRIS: I'm pretty good, I'm average. It's a sport so I'm good at him. (laughs) We're going to head out now and get motivated. Today we're here to work on the football field and give these young kids

like this a chance to play soccer. Okay? That's what we're here for, alright?

REPORTER: A lot of the reconstruction of Iraq has been painfully slow. Coalition attempts to revive the antiquated oil and electricity networks have been hindered by sabotage, and community projects like this are limited. The soldiers know only too well that the longer they stay in any one place, the greater the risk of attack.

HARRIS: This is a project that was brought to my attention. I'm kind of the sheriff, mayor, so to speak of this neighbourhood, me and my forces here. So we decided to give something back to the community, and one project that we're doing, we've called the Taskforce Neighbourhood Project, and what we're calling it is 'Completing a Kid's Dream'. We're not only here to provide peace, security and civility, we're also here to help rebuild Iraq. Will you present the first ball to the people.

SOLDIER: On behalf of the Iron Thunder Battalion and the Gators we hope the children can continue to be children and have fun.

REPORTER: The US military is also involved in constructing a grass roots political framework for Iraq. Reggie Harris' extensive portfolio now includes chairing one of the city's newly established neighbourhood council's, essentially a forum for local communities, to highlight their immediate concern.

How many jobs are you actually doing here?

CAPT. HARRIS: (laughing) I'm a negotiator, I'm a police officer, I'm a mayor, I'm the sheriff of my neighbourhood. I'm a councilman, sometimes I'm an unemployment officer.

REPORTER: Without wanting to sound rude, what makes you qualified? What qualifications do you have for all these jobs?

Captain REGGIE HARRIS
27th Field Artillery Regiment

Well honestly, I have a degree in several of the... (laughs) no, I don't know. I guess when you wear the uniform the people here automatically assume that you can provide a lot of assets for them.

REPORTER: Many, many Iraqis are grateful to the soldiers for ridding their country of Saddam's tyranny.

In video stalls across Baghdad there's now a macabre trade in DVDs where the full horror of the old regime is finally laid bare. This footage is thought to have been taken in a Baghdad prison.

(horrific scene of whipping of prisoner, on the ground, amongst others apparently whipped to death)

The systematic brutality that became a hallmark of the Saddam regime dehumanised the nation. We came across Ali one morning in the west of the city. He told us how they cut off his ear when he tried to desert the army.

Can I ask you how you feel about the Americans?

IRAQI MAN: Good bush, no Saddam.

REPORTER: Good bush?

IRAQI MAN: Yes. No Saddam.

REPORTER: Then in a coffee house a local GP articulated why it meant so much to him that Bush and Blair had gone to war.

Dr GAITH AL SAUD

I can't forget what the previous regime have done to us. There is no sense of forgiveness. It was so bad. So bad. So many of my colleagues were executed. (emotional, close to tears) Excuse me. I remember them, they were true Iraqis, true people, keen to do help to others. They have been executed for political reasons, nothing else.

REPORTER: These are friends of yours?

AL SAUD: Yes, close friends of mine, with the same graduation. They were brilliant people. I don't know how to forgive them. Forgiveness has lost its meaning.

REPORTER: By the middle of the summer the coalition concluded Saddam was still alive and still somewhere in Iraq and they wanted to believe that it was his die hard supporters, the so called dead enders who were leading the resistance. So they assumed they'd struck at the heart of the movement when they killed his sons Uday and Qusay after a 6 hour fire fight in the

northern city of Mosul. The coalition paraded their bodies on TV so that no one was in any doubt that they were dead. And now everyone wanted to know when would they get Saddam.

BERNARD KERIK

Coalition Provisional Authority

The bottom line is he will be caught. He will be captured or killed, just like his sons. As confident as I am sitting here right now, we will have him in custody dead or alive some time in the future.

REPORTER: Dead or alive.

KERIK: Dead or alive.

REPORTER: What's preferable?

KERIK: (pause) Dead or alive.

REPORTER: Another day, another fractious gathering at a Baghdad money exchange. Life in the city is still far from normal. As before, the CPA has opted for only a few locations to set up their exchanges which means once again that thousands of people are descending on one street having to wait for hours to get their money in temperatures of up to 50 degrees Celsius. This time the Americans who are still doing most of the policing in the city have brought riot batons.

What techniques are you using to control this crowd?

SOLDIER: There's nothing, it seems, that this mob understands except an iron fist. At first you come in and you try to be polite and try to say: "Look, we need you to move back, you just stand over there" and you get no response. You get no response.

REPORTER: How old are you?

SOLDIER: 28 years old, college student. I'm actually an art major at school, which is totally different than this. I'd rather be studying fine literature and art.

REPORTER: Do you think as soldiers you're getting satisfactory support from the senior civil administrators in this country?

SOLDIER: I'll leave it at this. I think the people that are in charge very high up don't see what's actually

happening, and that's how I feel. There's a definite disconnect between what needs to happen and what's actually happening, and I think the administration needs to take that in effect. We need to get these people food, water, housing and government fast.

REPORTER: But that can't happen overnight.

SOLDIER: I know it can't happen overnight but something has to be implemented to get this plan moving because here on the lowest level of military hierarchy I don't see it happening. I see nothing of this happening and I'm sure there are plans being made, papers drafted, whatnot, but these people don't see that and I don't see it and that's what makes them angry and that's what makes them want to attack us, and day by day more and more soldiers are going down.

REPORTER: It's not just junior ranking soldiers who are prepared to openly criticise the way the coalition is running Iraq. Matthew Jennings is a Westpoint graduate, a major with 12 years experience as a professional soldier. Having fought a war he still believes in, it's now early summer and he thought he'd be home.

Major MATTHEW JENNINGS
82nd Airborne Division

I know personally I'm upset because people seem to be dragging their feet. I wonder how often many of these folks in these large palaces, how often do they come visit these hospitals here? How often do they see the actual problems that are there?

REPORTER: Do you listen to your boss in CPA, Paul Bremer, electricity is back, a number of courts are up, the schools are running, everyone seems a lot happier than many people would suggest on the streets.

JENNINGS: You're on the streets, I'm on the streets. I'd like to report the same things they're reporting. I don't know – maybe the emperor is not wearing any clothes.

REPORTER: Ambassador, there's a strong perception among many Iraqis and not a few American soldiers that the CPA is far too detached from the situation on the ground. How do you respond to that?

PAUL BREMER
Head of Coalition Provision Authority

Well I don't think it's true. We've got hundreds of people working for us all across the country. We have officers now in all 18 provincial capitals, and we have people working every day in the ministries both here and in capitals. We have a lot of people out all the time.

REPORTER: But a panel of experts sent out by the Pentagon recently concluded that there is a disconnect between on the ground realities and policy formation at CPA HQ. One member of the group described the CPA as "living in a cocoon inside a bubble". Do you really know what the Iraq people are experiencing day to day?

BREMER: Oh yes, I think so, they're pretty clear about it. They make it clear in their demonstrations and their newspaper stories. We have a pretty good understanding of the problems they have. They have problems with security and with power and water and those are the problems that we spend a great deal of our time on, those are our top priority issues, just as they are their top priority problems.

REPORTER: Under international law an occupying power has a duty to restore civic order, but in Baghdad the coalition has been finding it difficult, especially when it comes to restoring power even to pre war levels. As in any modern city, electricity is its life blood, the essential provider of light, heat and water. But supply here hardly ever exceeds 12 hours a day. Some homes get just three, and the slow pace of progress is feeding a growing discontent within the city.

Saturday night, the centre of Baghdad and the electricity has gone again. What people around here can't understand is how a superpower which took their country in just 21 days can't even get the lights to work.

Perhaps the most important and most onerous of all the obligations facing the occupiers is the duty to restore law and order, and in Baghdad in particular this has been a problem. It's not possible to verify levels of crime before the war, but there's a widespread perception in Baghdad that the number of shootings and stabbings in the city has risen sharply since the occupation. This man has just received bullet wounds to his shoulder and head. Baghdad Central Morgue - nearly four months after the toppling of Saddam we filmed coffin after coffin being brought to the building. We were told that in the previous two days 91 bodies had

been registered here. The Morgue's director told me that in a similar period before the war that figure would rarely have exceeded 5. You don't have to stay here very long to get a clear picture of just how far law and order has broken down in the city. There's an almost constant stream of coffins, nearly all of them containing bodies of people who've been killed by gunshot.

(footage of procession of chanting Iraqis carrying coffin)

Apparently this is a 20 year old Iraqi whose family are claiming was shot by American troops. Now they said it was time for retribution. His family and friends had no qualms about telling me they were ready to fight the Americans.

But hang on, they liberated you and Iraq from Saddam Hussein, he's no longer here and that is thanks to the Americans and in a small part the British.

IRAQI MAN: Saddam is a hero and will continue to be a hero. Every Iraqi is a soldier for Saddam. The Americans are killing us and looting our oil. I'm in Saddam's Fedayeen. I love Saddam and I want to drink the blood of all American soldiers.

REPORTER: Whatever the true circumstances surrounding the death of this young Iraqi, these mourners made no attempt to hide their deep hatred of the Americans, and they left with one final show of defiance.

(several bursts of gunshot from departing procession)

Getting Iraqi police, or IPs as they're known, back to work has been a priority for the coalition. But the old police are still being retrained leaving just over half the numbers they need on the ground. Towards the end of August we found a police station near Thunder Battalion being rebuilt. It had minimal resources. And outside, Baghdad's by now familiar sound (gunshot and machinegun fire) was becoming relentless. Now this is the funeral... Is that a machine gun?

SOLDIER: Yes they are, and AK47.

REPORTER: The shooting is in fact illegal but neither the soldiers, nor the Iraqi police are inclined to intervene.

SOLDIER: Now if you don't mind I'm going to move you out of this

area for your own safety.

REPORTER: Okay. I mean this has been going on for half an hour now, this shooting. Do you think law and order has been more or less re-established in Baghdad?

SOLDIER: Slowly, yes.

REPORTER: What, when you hear this constant gunfire?

SOLDIER: Well they have been practicing doing this for 35 years, so it's not like overnight you're going to stop performing acts and deeds that you've been performing.

REPORTER: But I think Saad, my translator, you were saying that before the....

SAAD: Yeah, before the coming of the American troops, anyone who shoots a bullet in a funeral or in a wedding party, he would be put in prison for six months.

REPORTER: If they were caught firing like this?

SAAD: Well, they will be sent to death. This is a battle. This is not a.... It is a battlefield. They are showing their power.

REPORTER: I mean that was.. that was just extraordinary. I mean the whole.. I mean for about half an hour this area was just reverberating to the sound of gunfire and the police, the soldiers, you can't do anything... no one can do anything about it.

SOLDIER: This station itself is used to a 118 IPs. We have a total of 48 here at this station. It is going to take more larger amounts of people on the ground in order to stop these type of activities.

REPORTER: When are you going to get these extra people?

SOLDIER: I have no idea.

BERNARD KERIK

Coalition Provisional Authority

If you want a safer and more secure environment then do something about it. You can't just say well it's all the Americans and all Britain's fault. We're losing people protecting the lives of Iraqis, many of whom aren't doing anything to protect themselves.

REPORTER: But you... Britain and America are legally bound under the Geneva Convention to restore law and order.

KERIK: Well we're doing that. We're doing that. What do you think, it happens overnight? People here, they want it done in 120 days, and they want it done without any infrastructure, any, zero, like no police stations, no cars, no telephones, no internet, no technology, none. No forensic people, no papers to write a report on, and if we had the paper we don't have a desk and a chair to sit at.

REPORTER: Reggie Harris and his men will be in Iraq until next year. Thousands of others who fought the war are still waiting to go home. Today's Pentagon favours a lean, high-tech military using the minimum number of troops. But in Washington there are now those who are convinced that America came into Iraq with a force large enough to win the war but too small to secure the peace. A lot of these soldiers will be away from their families for at least a year. Reggie Harris is about to miss a milestone in the life of any first time parent.

REGGIE HARRIS: I miss em.. you know.. definitely, and I'm definitely going to miss his 6th birthday and I'm going to miss him going to school and getting first day.. his first day at school now, and I told my wife if by some chance.. you know.. I don't make it out of here, and I don't make it back to him, you just keep telling him that daddy always told him to accomplish the mission, you know.. and tell my soldiers that now. But I tell her to tell him that, and whatever he put his mind to, you know.. he'll accomplish it and he'll do it regardless of what anybody else tell him, he'll accomplish the mission (controlled voice – visible tears) you know.. and I just... I just pray that I make it out and I can tell him that myself. But he's going to be alright. I know God is watching over him and he's going to be alright. He's going to be fine.

REPORTER: On the battalion are professional and highly committed soldiers who believe fervently in the US cause in Iraq. But the methods some American soldiers are using in this highly volatile and fragile environment raise questions about their suitability as peacekeepers. Last month Thunder got another tip-off. A man suspected of being behind a recent attack on the battalion was in hospital. He'd been shot and

his condition was thought to be critical. Thunder dispatch a team.

Major SCOTT PATTON

Head of Operations "Thunder Battalion"

If it turns out that we have and we can keep him alive to try to get some more intelligence from him, it'll be a pretty significant find for us.

PATTON: (arriving at hospital) How you been?

SOLDIER: I'm doing fine sir.

PATTON: What kind of condition is he in?

SOLDIER: He don't look too good sir.

PATTON: Not looking good? Okay. Alright. I'm going to go check out your patient. Okay?

REPORTER: In fact the man Thunder's head of operations is about to interrogate has been shot in the stomach in a gunfight near his home.

PATTON: Okay, we're going to ask him some questions. Tell him that if he cooperates with us we might be able to save his life.

(translated)

PATTON: Because we have very good doctors. Okay? But tell him if he doesn't cooperate with us....

INTERPRETER: He's dead.

PATTON: Yes, it's bad for him, it's bad for his health. Tell him that.

(translated)

PATTON: Tell him I need to know who else was with him the day he shot an RPG at US forces on Haifa Street.

(translated)

PATTON: Tell him if he's lying then he's going to piss me off really bad. Eight other people have mentioned your name and your brother's name. I'm not.... Look at me, I'm not stupid, okay? I'm not stupid. And it's going to... we're going to help you if you help us. If you

don't help us you can forget it. Okay?
We came here to help you. Alright? So it behoves you to give help.
Alright. Come on.

(To reporter) He's lying. They all do. Well I mean when you have
12 other sources and they're all
independent and they're not interlinked so it's not like a family
feud... Most of them are very scared to tell
the truth and I don't think he... he looks like he's in pretty decent
shape so he doesn't look like...

REPORTER: Has he been... he's been shot, has he?

PATTON: Yes. Looks like it's somewhere in the abdomen. We're going
to have our doc check him out in
a minute and then what we'll do is we'll take him back to the...

REPORTER: After the interview, if he doesn't cooperate, what's going
to happen to him?

PATTON: We're still going to... ah... I mean.. we'll still give him
medical care, I mean that's... you know..
that's our way. But we're going to put him in jail. He'll
eventually give us information.

REPORTER: After Thunder's medics have examined him, the patient, now
detainee, is given the all clear
to be moved. He'll be handed over to the military police for more
questioning. As Scott Patton and his
team move out, the man's mother is left bewildered, not knowing what
will happen to her son.

PATTON: We've always tried to use approach of.. you know.. the
carrot and the stick. We're going to be
very polite and nice and you've seen our soldiers be that way. And
then if somebody gives us a reason to be
ugly, we'll be ugly.

REPORTER: One tactic the American troops employ in Iraq is the
cordon and search operation. In this
case a whole section of Thunder's neighbourhood has been sealed off.
It's 2 o'clock in the morning and 600
troops have been brought in to search every single home for any
evidence of paramilitary activity. But so
far no weapons have been found.

REPORTER: Are you concerned that you could do more damage by these
house to house raids ultimately
because you're not... I mean you haven't found weapons.

PATTON: No, but as you see, we engage the people, we tell them why we're here, and most of them have been pretty receptive.

REPORTER: In the past such raids such raids have yielded important weapon finds and paramilitaries have been detained. But the whole process is driven often by low grade intelligence and as a result the raids are very hit and miss. It's all eerily reminiscent of what happened in Belfast in the early days of the troubles. As for the detainees, questions have been raised about their treatment. The use of hoods, we were told, is so that they don't try to escape on their way back to the base. And this is what awaits them when they get there – a temporary detention centre where, with their hands still cuffed and with no access to bedding or chairs – they'll have to spend the rest of the night.

What do you think of the conditions in which people are being arrested? They're being hooded, taken off to barbed wire compounds, made to sit in these compounds for hours on end.

SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO August 2003
UN Special Envoy in Iraq
Unnecessarily rough. I have made that point. Then again, not always respecting, often not respecting local sensitivities, the culture and religion, and that is unnecessary because I presume you can achieve the same purpose by displaying more respect for local traditions and local culture.

REPORTER: Are the soldiers using excessive force?

PAUL BREMER
Head of Coalition Provisional Authority
I don't think so. I think they do their very best. Their rules of engagement are very clear. They do their very best to avoid unnecessary force, and I think while there are mistakes as there always are in any kind of combat situations, on the whole they're doing a very good job.

REPORTER: For all the criticism and for all the set backs there has been significant progress in Iraq. The new power sharing, governing council offers a tantalising glimpse of what both occupiers and occupied ultimately desire, a democratic Iraq. As their holidays near an end, in October Iraq's children will be back at school. Universities will also open. A new press has been born with 150 newspaper titles heralding new

freedoms of speech. Baghdad is finally being cleaned up, and although the bulk of the reconstruction work has yet to be done, smaller projects are beginning to appear across the city.

BREMER: I think we have made enormous progress in the last three months. We've carried out several thousand reconstruction programmes. The larger projects which take a little time to get cranked up are now beginning to show progress, particularly in the area; reconstructing roads, bridges, airports and of course the power system. These are big projects which require time to get worked up and you don't spend hundreds of billions of dollars overnight.

REPORTER: But undermining all of these advances is the constant problem of security – or lack of it. One morning we went into the centre of Baghdad to film a shop selling an item previously banned under Saddam, the TV satellite dish, now one of many defining images of the new Iraq. But then, an hour later, on our return to the shop, we found this – the area, one of the city's most affluent neighbourhoods had become a battle zone, and the TV satellite shop we'd filmed earlier was now being pulverised by heavy cannon and machinegun fire. A group of American soldiers had just taken a hit on one of their vehicles and they decided to hit back with another overwhelming show of force. But this was a busy shopping district and in the confusion the soldiers opened fire on a group of onlookers.

(devastating scenes of those shot and grief stricken relative)

REPORTER: Since the end of the war, how many Iraqis have been killed by American soldiers?

PAUL BREMER: I don't really know. I don't know. I don't keep numbers. It's been a very restricted number and it's been in fact what... it's.. it's a... it follows on, probably the war that killed the fewest civilians and did the least collateral damage of any war in history.

SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO: You occupy with a military force but you can't restore law and order with the military. This is why an occupation cannot last. This is why occupation is, by definition, good for the short-term – if it is good at all as a matter of fact. I don't think it is. It think it is anachronistic. But since this country is occupied, the occupation should be kept as short as possible, particularly when it comes to

the security sector.

REPORTER: Is too much being asked of the military in this reconstruction period?

Major SCOTT PATTON
27th Field Artillery Regiment
Who else will do it?

REPORTER: Civilians, could bring in civilians from the United Nations, give the United Nations a bigger role.

PATTON: Yeah, this could. But if you look at.. if there's one organisation in the world that could make this happen, you're looking at 'em. Not me but the US Army.

REPORTER: Iraq is fragmented but determined resistance movement has grown bolder in its public defiance of the occupiers. By August the coalition's insistence that these remained principally diehard Ba'athists looked increasingly unconvincing. In these propaganda videos the majority of fighters claim they were killing on behalf of Islam and not Saddam. And at the street level the men of Thunder Battalion now realise they're facing a very different threat to the one they first encountered.

PATTON: Okay, what have we got?

REGGIE HARRIS: (holding up document for filming) Osama Bin Laden, this is ?? word tracing.

REPORTER: A picture of Osama Bin Laden. The irony of such an image will not be lost on Washington and London.

PATTON: Why do they have Osama Bin Laden pictures in their house?

REPORTER: Few things could undermine the coalition's sense of victory more than the realisation that their war may now be helping to swell Bin Laden's movement.

PATTON: (to Iraqi captive) I've been hearing some bad things about you.

(Translated)

PATTON: That you want to plan attacks.

REPORTER: In Washington some officials are now describing Iraq as a magnet for Al-Qaeda. Last month a US military commander in Iraq conceded that the foreign fighters who've entered the country since the end of the war may have links to Al-Qaeda. The changing nature of Iraq's resistance was illustrated all too clearly last month when a car bomb ripped apart the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad. Eleven people were killed and fifty injured. The sophistication and sheer scale of the attack represented a whole new terrorist threat.

Is there a danger of the coalition getting trapped into a prolonged guerrilla war here?

PAUL BREMER
Head of Coalition Provisional Authority
No.

(long pause)

REPORTER: That's it?

BREMER: What's your next question?

REPORTER: Well at this rate America is going to be stuck in Iraq for a long time. I mean you do not have the security situation under control. American soldiers are being killed every week.

PAUL BREMER
Head of Coalition Provisional Authority
I fundamentally disagree with you. We do have the security situation under control. We have a problem of security in a small area of the country from Baghdad north to Tikrit where we are taking casualties, and every one of those casualties is a tragedy but the level of casualties is not substantial. We will of course be here a long time. We've always said we'd be here a long time. We will be here until the job is done.

SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO August 2003
UN Special Envoy to Iraq
We're all betting on a successful transition from the Saddam Hussein era to a democracy, a stable, united, peaceful Iraq that no longer threatens its neighbours as Saddam did for so long. And if this fails, obviously no one can predict what the architecture of the Middle East will look like.

REPORTER: And if it were to fail?

DE MELLO: I can't predict. I don't have a crystal ball but it would be bad for Iraq. This country could turn into a true and long-term anarchy which by necessity would affect its neighbours and the region as a whole.

REPORTER: 48 hours later Sergio Vieira de Mello was sitting in the same office when a truck, laden with explosives, drove into the UN compound; 22 people were killed in the attack including Sergio Vieira de Mello.

(on site) About an hour ago a massive car bomb ripped out a corner of the building here and the casualties are coming out, they're being airlifted off to field hospitals and this is the United Nations which is here, it has one agenda, that is to help rebuild this country. Why anyone would target it in this fashion is baffling. What made the attack so surprising was that the UN always stated explicitly that it wanted to end the occupation as quickly as possible. But perhaps this was more of a message to America and everyone else willing to help them, a reminder of just how vulnerable they are in this part of the Middle East.

What possible motivation could there be for an attack on the United Nations?

BERNARD KERIK
Coalition Provisional Authority
(May-Sept 2003)

Well it's obviously people that don't want us to succeed. It's people that don't... you know.. it's the same people that's fighting the coalition, fighting the resistance, they've got to learn – we're not leaving. The coalition is not leaving. The coalition is not going to be intimidated nor is the United Nations and they can speak for themselves. The bottom line is, this is the same type of people that's fighting the coalition that is doing this. They're cowards.

REPORTER: Washington is now coming to terms with the fact that Iraq has become a common battlefield, not just for those wanting to end the occupation but also for the multitude of foreign fighters who've spotted a new arena for waging their Jihad against America. Earlier this week the UN's Baghdad office was bombed again. Nineteen people were injured, one killed. As a result

the UN has decided to further reduce its international staff in Iraq, prompting many of the remaining aid agencies to reconsider their position. And in America there are some who are now calling for the troops to come home too.

Some people in the States are advocating a withdrawal from Iraq. Is it time to cut and run?

BREMER: Not at all, and I wouldn't pay very much attention to those voices. The American people have undertaken with the British and our other coalition allies here a noble exercise and we will see it through.

REPORTER: On Friday the Pentagon announced the deployment of an extra 10,000 troops to Iraq. That Iraq has the potential to lead the Arab world one day as a wealthy, secure democracy is not in doubt. But as the debate at the UN this week has shown, the world is still divided on how the country should get there. America now wants help in Iraq but its reluctance to relinquish its dominant role in the country remains a hurdle for many nations who could offer support. And all the time in Iraq the patience of a grateful but hugely expectant people is wearing thin. Before we left the country at the end of August, we returned to one of Baghdad's busiest hospitals just over a mile away from Thunder Battalion.

I mean this is extraordinary. We're back in emergency of Koran Hospital and it's empty, there are no doctors. It's empty! Look at it! That's the men's ward – absolutely empty. The women's ward – that's empty. It's extraordinary. The doctors have just vanished.

Local residents suffering from repeated blackouts had tapped into the hospital's already struggling generator and caused a complete collapse of the system. No electricity – no power. One of the city's largest hospitals empty and unusable. While we were there we met one of the hospitals transplant surgeons, a man like so many inside and outside Iraq, is not counting the price of victory.

What do you think of the coalition at the moment, progress being made?

Dr HOTHAME KHALID

Now the Iraqi people they are counting days. They have been here for two months – okay. They have been here for three months – okay. They have been four months – that's okay too. But when they have been here

for five or six months you can expect explosion here.

(Sounds of gunfire)

KHALID: You can see now – gunfire.

REPORTER: Would you ever take up arms against the American troops?

KHALID: Yes. Yes. In the right moment – yes.

REPORTER: Why would you take a gun to the Americans if you felt the time was right?

KHALID: This is something built inside me. I cannot tolerate occupationists. I cannot tolerate something that break my freedom. You see the Americans are playing with dangerous traits in the Iraqi personality now. They are putting the nose of Iraqi people to the earth and this is a very dangerous point.

REPORTER: But they came here to give you your freedom. They freed you from Saddam Hussein.

KHALID: Well that's what keep my mouth shut for the moment.

PANORAMA

STILL CHASING SADDAM'S WEAPONS

PANORAMA

STILL CHASING SADDAM'S WEAPONS

RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION: BBC-1

DATE: 23:11:03

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JANE CORBIN: Panorama is going on a hunt for Saddam's illusive weapons.

The Scientific Bureau was a front company for the Ministry of Defence. They engaged in a lot of legal activity but also some illegal activities.

CORBIN: It's the first time any outsider has been on a mission with the Iraq Survey Group.

OFFICER: And heading up towards the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, and we'll head up to Street 15.

CORBIN: The stakes are high. The reputations of a Prime Minister and a President are on the line.

OFFICER: Get out and secure the area. EOD will enter the building first.

CORBIN: They said Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, that's why we went to war. Every day for the past 4 months these hunters have hoped to strike lucky.

This is a surprise trip right into the heart of down town Baghdad. The team is hoping that they're going to find not only relevant documents but also Iraqis who can tell them something about the programmes of mass destruction. Tonight we reveal just what the weapon hunters have found and why it doesn't substantiate many of the statements made by the politicians who took us to war.

On the outskirts of Baghdad lie rusted remains, Iraq's feared armoury. No weapons of mass destruction, just old tanks, battlefield rockets and artillery. Yet George Bush and Tony Blair had been adamant before the war that Saddam Hussein was a current and serious threat. The danger, they suggested, was imminent.

24th September 2002

BLAIR: The weapons of mass destruction programme is not shut down, it is up and running now.

26th September 2002

BUSH: The danger to our country is grave. The danger to our country is growing. The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons.

24th September 2002

BLAIR: He has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons which could be activated within 45 minutes including....

CORBIN: But there was no Iraqi order to fire weapons of mass destruction as coalition troops advanced.

The chemical and biological shells they confidently expected to find within days never materialised. Now the Iraq Survey group continues the hunt for the weapons the politicians and intelligence agencies told us existed. The ISG has received a tip off that this small Iraqi pharmaceutical company was secretly importing

materials to make long-range missiles for Saddam Hussein. The company's own website makes clear its view of America's war against terror.

SOLDIER: [reference to material found] Bulls eye on Bush, note to make this the home page.

CORBIN: The public were led to expect that coalition soldiers would unearth warheads filled with nerve gas and anthrax, but they're dismantling computers instead.

MAJ SUTTER: The good thing is we found a lot of email addresses, we found a lot of names of individuals that we're already aware of and other contacts that they've worked with, so that's a good start right there.

CORBIN: Then they find blueprints which reveal this drug firm was really a front company for military procurement.

SUTTER: We're finding a lot of standard pharmaceutical stuff on the top of each pile, and usually when you go down through, you find more about military applications, radar, body armour and a number of other items in here. A lot of chemicals mentioned here, probably most are pharmaceuticals, we're interested in certain ones that could be used for propellant applications.

JANE CORBIN

There's an order for 500 tons of a chemical used in propellant missile fuel. The ISG Group has been here for about 2 hours now and they say it is worth taking these boxes back. There are files of interest to them. But the big question is, how significant would all this turn out to be. The prospect of finding the smoking gun has faded. Now there's just a giant puzzle the ISG has to piece together.

Major JOHN SUTTER

Iraq Survey Group

We found lots of documents where they were trying to go around legal ways to purchase these things, and again it's a front company, so we've got lots of information. We didn't find the things we were looking for but we're going to have to sit down and do the research to try to make to the missile firms. And so yes, there's no single large missile that we've found or a chemical that we've found. But we've found a lot of small pieces so far and we just need to continue this find.

CORBIN: It took two months from the end of the war to set up the Iraq Survey Group and begin the systematic search for the weapons. A thousand experts from America, Britain and Australia were brought together. A US led group took over an old palace of Saddam's renamed 'Camp Slayer'. It was trashed and looted like many of the places in Iraq they were interested in. The coalition's failure to secure sites and preserve evidence created a problem for the ISG from the start. In the new command centre the murals proclaimed Iraq's military might, but what was the truth? Did they possess forbidden weapons? It was the ISG's task to find out.

DR KAY: This document gives you a good view of the grandeur of this complex, and in fact you can't even see all of it here, and that was a Ba'ath convention centre in the middle of the lake. This is what was to be a main presidential palace still under construction at the time of the war.

CORBIN: Under fire for their intelligence estimates before the war, the CIA chose a man they called their 'ramrod' to head up the ISG. David Kay was close to the Pentagon too. Dr Kay, an ex-UN inspector who'd helped uncover Iraq's past nuclear programme started knowing political futures could rest on his findings.

DR DAVID KAY

Iraq Survey Group

The entire credibility of both the US and I must say I think British foreign policy and intelligence has been called into question by our inability to find the weapons immediately. I think we all realise after Iraq we really do have to readjust our intelligence services for the new demands posed by countries like Iraq and others. We're not going to know how to make that adjustment until we know what the lessons learned here, what was the ground truth?

CORBIN: Dr Kay's own credibility was also at stake. A supporter of regime change before the war, he'd been convinced Saddam had WMD.

17th September 2002

KAY: If you want to disarm Iraq, remove it's weapons of mass destruction, there is no alternative to replacing the regime.

18th December 2002

KAY: Essentially, everyone who runs an active intelligence service knows this regime has been seeking weapons of mass destruction.

14th April 2003

KAY: Oh I think it's there and it's got to be found and that is the new priority. The administration has to invest the effort and the people into doing it.

CORBIN: Some Washington insiders were concerned about David Kay's appointment. Greg Fieldman was a Director in the State Department's Intelligence Bureau until six months before the war.

GREG THIELMANN

State Dept Intelligence Bureau 1998-2002

My only concern about David Kay is that he doesn't have the reputation for objectivity and care in precisely describing what the evidence is. I'm not concerned that his group is still seeking evidence. I would look forward to seeing whatever he comes up with but his position was so outspoken on the outset I worry a little bit about his objectivity.

CORBIN: Dr Kay's critics pointed to remarks he'd made just after the war but before he joined the ISG about two captured Iraqi trailers.

KAY: ... nutrients. Think of it as sort of a chicken soup for biological weapons.

CORBIN: David Kay judged these vehicles to be mobile production facilities for biological weapons.

11th May 2003

KAY: Literally there is nothing else you would do this way on a mobile facility. That is it.

CORBIN: The CIA was also quick to declare the trailer's part of a mobile biological weapons programme.

Tony Blair and George Bush seized on the find.

2nd June 2003

BLAIR: I would point out to you we already have, according to our experts, two mobile biological weapons facilities.

30th May 2003

BUSH: We've found the weapons of mass destruction, we found biological laboratories.

KAY: I wish that news hadn't come out. We're still under active investigation trying to figure it out. My

standard of proof is that you need documentation, you need physical evidence or analytical proof, and you need Iraqis who were involved in the programme who can testify as to what you've found.

CORBIN: The infamous trailers are parked on a back lot at Camp Slayer, but you don't hear much about them now. The Iraqis claim they produced hydrogen to fill weather balloons on an artillery range. Because some pipes are missing, experts can't tell if they carried a gas or a liquid biological agent. The vessel at the centre of each trailer is the biggest mystery of all. The experts are pretty much split 50/50 on this bit of kit. Is it a fomentor to brew deadly germs or a vessel to produce hydrogen. Somebody even suggested it resembles a giant coffee peculator. Exhaustive testing of the equipment failed to reveal any trace of biological weapons agent. Reluctantly, by July, the ISG leader conceded everyone had been rather hasty.

It was premature to announce them as being that definitely and embarrassing.

KAY: I think it was premature and embarrassing. That's exactly what we're trying to do. That's why I'm so reticent in my discussion with you essentially in early July when we're talking now, because I don't want this.. I don't want the mobile biological production facilities fiasco of May to be the model of the future.

CORBIN: As they moved into Camp Slayer the ISG team adopted a forensic approach to the hunt. Frontline troops had failed to find anything at sites identified before the war. The search would now concentrate on people and records. Iraq had been a bureaucratic nation. Members of Saddam's regime tried to destroy many documents as they fled. But the mountains of paperwork of ministries, barracks and factories was soon collected at Camp Slayer.

SOLDIER: There's no exact figure been done but we estimate it's about 7½ miles if it was laid end to end.

CORBIN: Twelve years ago, after the first Gulf War, it was a paper trail which led UN inspectors to Iraq's hidden weapons programmes. For decades denial and deception had been built in to the very fabric of the regime. But clues had been inadvertently been revealed in documents. That's where the ISG began, sifting through tons of paper. Selected documents were passed to the heart of the operation. The secret

intelligence analysts working with translators. Their job – to identify any Iraqi who might be involved in producing, storing or moving weapons of mass destruction.

OFFICER: Could I get everybody's attention again. What we're looking for are high ranking officials starting with major and above, working with Special Republican Guard, Republican Guard.

This is a Special Security Force and it's about information.

CORBIN: The mood of the Iraq Survey Group in July was upbeat. But a change of language was already detectable with less emphasis on finding actual weapons.

Dr DAVID KAY

Iraq Survey Group

I can say that we've already found enough evidence to convince me that we will be successful, if you judge success by finding a weapons programme that involved weapons of mass destruction.

CORBIN: What about the weapons themselves, because I think the public expected to see weapons lined up ready to use against our troops.

KAY: Well, if I'd found weapons ready to be used and lined up I'd be breaking news. I just don't know.

We're looking for them. The Iraqis engaged in quite a bit of destruction and dispersal effort prior to the war, certainly during the war and after the war, and that's why it's not an easy task.

CORBIN: In New York another man who'd found Iraq no easy task is retiring as Mr Kay began his hunt.

Dr Hans Blix's UN teams had searched Iraq for weapons of mass destruction just before the war. He suspected Iraq might have forbidden research programmes, but Dr Blix came under fire from the Americans for failing to find stockpiles of anthrax and weapons. In June Dr Blix also noticed there was more emphasis now not on the weapons but on Iraq's so-called capabilities and programmes.

Dr HANS BLIX

UN Weapons Inspector 2000-2003

I've even seen American spokesmen sort of veering in that direction rather than talking about big stocks of the supplies, talking about the capability and programme. That's conceivable. Saddam might have said that one day we'll be out of sanctions and then we can do.. can do these programmes again, that is possible. But that doesn't.. did not make them into an imminent danger.

CORBIN: A year ago the message coming from Washington and London was that Saddam's Hussein's regime posed a current and serious threat. In the US the President and his officials raised the ultimate spectre of modern warfare, the nuclear bomb.

7th October 2002

BUSH: They've seen clear evidence of peril. We cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.

8th September 2002

CONDOLLEEZZA RICE: There will always be some uncertainty about how quickly he can acquire nuclear weapons, but we don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.

23rd September 2002

RICHARD PERLE: I don't know what sort of evidence... a mushroom cloud would be a powerful statement, but do you want to wait for that?

CORBIN: These aluminium tubes became a weapon in the hawk's armoury to make their case Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear programme. UN inspectors believed Iraq's explanation. The tubes were for conventional battlefield rockets. But David Kay agreed with the President's officials who said the tubes were for centrifuges to enrich uranium for a bomb. He talked to Panorama last year.

Panorama

September 2002

Dr DAVID KAY

I've seen one of them. The centrifuge tubes look like they're of the design which is German derived, that the Iraqis acquired some time in the 1980s and developed, therefore enriching uranium, that is taking natural uranium up to the level that makes it useful for a weapon.

CORBIN: But Mr Kay's statement glossed over an intense debate in Washington. Energy Department officials, the foremost experts, said the tubes were not suitable for centrifuges. And many in the State Department believed Iraq's nuclear programme was dormant.

GREG THIELMANN

State Dept Intelligence Bureau 1998-2002

This is something that became controversial within the US government. We certainly thought it was

plausible that the Iraqis might be doing this. But over time the State Department Intelligence Bureau was convinced by some of the best experts in the US government and elsewhere on centrifuges that this particular type of aluminum was not suitable for use in a nuclear weapons programme.

12th September 2002

CORBIN: But in a keynote speech at the UN before the war President Bush used the tubes as proof Iraq was reactivating its nuclear weapons programme.

BUSH: Iraq has made several attempts to buy high strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. Should Iraq acquire fissile material it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year.

THIELMANN: The President in his speech to the United Nations in September of 2002 just made a flat assertion, this aluminum was for a nuclear weapons programme. No acknowledgment whatsoever that there was any controversy.

CORBIN: Why was that? What was he trying to do, do you think?

THIELMANN: Well, he was trying to build a case that Iraq posed an imminent danger, and there's no better way to scare the American people than to conjure up a mushroom cloud.

CORBIN: The Iraq Survey Group's first missions went out looking for evidence of nuclear weapons facilities, but after several months the ISG concluded and then stated publicly that there was no evidence that Iraq had an active nuclear programme just before the war. It was no comfort to the US administration.

THIELMANN: I mean this was basically David Kay as the President's hand chosen leader of the Iraq's survey group acknowledging that the President was dead wrong in his information to the world on the most important category of weapons of mass destruction.

Dr DAVID KAY
Iraq Survey Group
To date we have found only small indications of interest in centrifusion, not even anything I would call a restart of the centrifusion programme.

CORBIN: So pretty dormant.

KAY: I wouldn't say it was dormant. There are signs of new interest in it but it was certainly not a vigorous ongoing programme.

CORBIN: Though Saddam was still interested in nuclear weapons, the UN had dismantled his nuclear infrastructure and placed his raw stocks of uranium under guard in 1991. Sanctions appear to have made it impossible for Saddam to reactivate his nuclear programme. So where did that leave Mr Kay's certainty about the tubes?

KAY: Well the problem we have with the tubes is the tubes a year ago.. two years ago when we weren't in the country we were just looking at the tubes themselves, and the tubes looked like they were suitable for centrifuge, and in fact I still think, if I were only looking at the tubes, they were suitable for the centrifuge. Now we've got a great advantage now, we're inside the country, so we don't have to grasp at straws of evidence.

CORBIN: Straws of evidence, Dr Kay's description of some of the intelligence that took us to war in Iraq. There was other evidence too, it came from defectors who provided a window on the brutal regime in a country western intelligence found difficult to penetrate. This man, Ahmad Chalabi, Leader of the opposition Iraqi National Congress, ran a US funded intelligence and propaganda campaign. He brought some of the defectors to the world's attention.

Dr AHMAD CHALABI

Leader, Iraqi National Congress

We evaluated that these people knew what they were talking about and we handed them over, but it's not our job to make an intelligence assessment for the government of the United States or for the governments of Britain. They have very large agencies to do so.

CORBIN: Since the war the claims of several defectors promoted by the INC have come under further scrutiny. Last September a nuclear physicist who called himself Saddam's bomb-maker spoke to Panorama. In an interview we decided not to broadcast Kadir Hamza said he had inside information that Iraq had revived its nuclear programme.

September 2002

HAMZA: Iraq is on a more accelerated pace of trying to achieve nuclear weapons before it is stopped by inspections or war or otherwise.

CORBIN: We didn't broadcast our interview with Dr Hamza because several sources suggested he wasn't credible. The claims had already made front page news across the world. The State Department had their doubts about him, but Dr Hamza appeared before Congress and was cited by the President and top US officials.

15th January 2003

DONALD RUMSFELD: As I've said repeatedly, I honestly believe that the way information is gained is through defectors.

7th Cavalry October 2002

BUSH: Information from a high ranking Iraqi nuclear engineer who had defected revealed that despite his public promises Saddam Hussein had ordered his nuclear programme to continue.

GREG THIELMANN

State Department Intelligence Bureau 1998-2002

It looks now like it did then to some of us that one has to be very careful with human intelligence.

Particularly intelligence from the Iraqi National Congress and others who had an obvious motivation to alarm foreign governments about what Saddam Hussein was doing. And saw a whole collection of people in the US government who were making very strong arguments in advance that Iraq was pursuing all of these weapons.

CORBIN: The man who helped bring some of the defectors to the west's attention is now back in Baghdad, with Saddam's removal Dr Chalabi is now enjoying a taste of power as a leading member of the Iraqi interim governing council.

Does it matter at the end of the day if the defector's claims weren't found to be true and the war happened, you got what you wanted at the end of the day?

Dr AHMAD CHALABI

Leader, Iraqi National Congress

Indeed we are proud that we got what we wanted. We are back in Baghdad, we are back in Iraq and Iraq is

now... the Iraqi people are much better off than they were under Saddam, and they will be much better off in the future.

CORBIN: By August the heat was on the Iraq's Survey Group at Camp Slayer. It was now three months since the end of the war and no weapons of mass destruction had been found. Missions got underway to follow up information found in the documents. People had been traced and some Iraqis had come forward to offer tips on where the weapons might be found. Twelve ISG teams spread out to begin searching 120 huge ammunition dumps. They were looking for hidden stockpiles of chemical weapons which the politicians and intelligence agencies said existed before the war, along with plans for their deployment.

5th February 2003

COLIN POWELL: A conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agents. That is enough agent to fill 16,000 battlefield rockets.

24th September 2002

BLAIR: The dossier shows that Iraq continues to produce chemical agent for chemical weapons, has rebuilt previously destroyed production plants across Iraq.

Panorama
July 2003

Dr HANS BLIX

UN Weapons Inspector 2000-2003

I had several conversations with Tony Blair and my definite impression was that he was convinced..

subjectively convinced that they had weapons of mass destruction. He was not fooling me at all. But the

analysis of it, the examination of it, that had been made by his staff, or himself, he had had time, was not sufficiently critical.

CORBIN: Not sufficiently critical?

BLIX: No.

CORBIN: Again and again ISG teams returned to Camp Slayer without finding any weapons of mass destruction. It was an exhausting, frustrating task. Brigadier John Deverall, the British Deputy Commander of the Iraq Survey Group led a two week mission to the Al Asad Airbase.

Brigadier JOHN DEVERALL

Iraq Survey Group

We went through a total of some two and a half thousand tons of conventional ammunition in order to try to find the jokers in the pack.

CORBIN: Several Iraqis had claimed that chemical weapons were hidden at the base amongst a batch of conventional munitions.

DEVERALL: Based on a apparently good information, based on an awful lot of physical searching, based on over 100 people from across the board in terms of speciality, and teams working in tandem, we found nothing.

CORBIN: But doesn't it show, surely, that the intelligence was wrong, it was wrong before the war and the intelligence you've been given subsequently is wrong as well.

DEVERALL: For all we could assess the intelligence might well have been correct. The point was, when we came to do the uncovering there was nothing left to uncover that we could find.

CORBIN: So, where is it?

DEVERALL: It is indeed conceivable the intelligence was wrong, but bearing in mind it was multi-sourced I think conceivable they were removed, conceivable they were hidden elsewhere and or destroyed. But so far impossible to tell with that particular batch.

CORBIN: It was a familiar story to Hans Blix now home in Sweden writing a book. By now the ISG had had the same time on the ground in post-Saddam Iraq as the UN had been given before the war and had found no weapons. But Dr Blix himself had been suspicious. He had not received satisfactory proof from the Iraqis that they had destroyed their WMD a decade earlier as they claimed.

You helped to create this impression they were there.

BLIX: In a way we did, because we certainly didn't exclude that they had them. But it's true that we did say that this is unaccounted for, and I also warned the Security Council that you cannot jump from that to saying that they have it.

DEVERALL: Certainly we need more time to find evidence of the weapons themselves, or what's

happened to them. But it's not just about the shiny weapons themselves.

CORBIN: Well as far as the public is concerned, it is about the shiny weapons because that's what led us to war, that was the imminent threat.

DEVERALL: But you have to look at things in a more detailed way and certainly the ISG has worked for three months involving interviewing over 500 Iraqis who have been possibly complicit in these programmes, indicate that you're looking at a much deeper area here.

CORBIN: Unless the ISG find proof WMD existed before the war, Mr Blair's claim that some weapons could be deployed within 45 minutes can't be substantiated. So could it be that Iraqi officials were telling the truth when they claimed they'd long since destroyed all the weapons. In January I went to lunch in Baghdad with the man responsible for satisfying the UN that Iraq no longer had WMD. A key figure in the weapons programmes in the past, Dr Amer Al Sa'adi insisted they'd destroyed all the stockpiles in 1991, but there were no records or independent witnesses.

The West still doesn't seem to believe Iraq, there's still this feeling you're hiding something, that you're not really laying out your cards on the table.

General AMER AL SA'ADI
Adviser to Saddam Hussein

Well how else can they justify their military build up? They must portray things as not being satisfactory, that Iraq is holding back, Iraq is hiding things. How else can they justify their actions to their public? If we have something, we will produce it. We will be happy to produce it, to get rid of it and get done. But we don't... we don't. What do we do?

CORBIN: When I returned to Baghdad in the summer, the restaurant had escaped the bombs and the looting, but my host was no longer available for lunch. He'd discovered he was one of the infamous deck of cards the US wanted list, and so Dr Al Sa'adi chose to give himself up. The city was still violent and lawless and the doctor's family had been holed up for weeks at home in a suburb of Baghdad.

HELMA AL-SA'ADI: [showing photograph] My husband and the older son and the younger son.

CORBIN: Helma, Dr Sa'adi's German wife had heard nothing from him for months, since he disappeared into US custody. She insisted he was innocent and couldn't understand why he hadn't been released.

HELMA AL-SA'ADI

He was so convinced about what he had always said, and up to the... half an hour before he left, and he went to the Americans, he said that I know there is nothing to be found and I've always said that and I'm repeating it again and time will bear me out. These were his sort of last words, I remember very well.

CORBIN: Dr Al Sa'adi is being held at Camp Slayer in a special prison. He is one of the high value detainees as the ISG calls them. Top officials and scientists from Saddam Hussein's regime.

What about Dr Amoral Sa'adi, you're now holding him. Is he saying anything and what do you really think about his role?

Dr DAVID KAY

Iraq Survey Group

Well we are talking to him and he is talking. Do I think it's the whole truth and nothing but the truth? No indeed I do not. I think Dr Sa'adi continues to vital pieces of information, but we're actively talking to him.

In fact I think Dr Sa'adi was extremely important over the years.

CORBIN: But by September the interrogations of Dr Saadi and other high ranking Iraqis haven't led to the discovery of any weapons. The ISG team, now 1400 strong, was about to deliver its first report. Criticism of both the British Prime Minister and the President was growing, and so was the pressure on David Kay.

KAY: I just want to produce the facts and others have to draw the answers of what were the differences and what are the implications of any differences that exist.

CORBIN: You've found no weapons at all so far, actual weapons.

KAY: We have found no actual weapons of mass destruction that exist at this point. But, having said that, and I know that sounds like a pretty struggling statement, you know how large this country is. The situation that we found ourselves in for example, we didn't start until June, there had been widespread looting in April and May. Material had disappeared, it's a huge country. It's not possible to easily move around.

GREG THIELMANN

State Dept Intelligence Bureau 1998-2002

I think he's in a very delicate position. He's obviously struggling with a desire to maintain his own personal integrity and also probably a political understanding that he is failing in his mission as assigned by the White House to get this troublesome issue behind him.

CORBIN: In October I went with David Kay as he investigated suspicions Iraq had a biological weapons programme. Before the war the politicians insisted on the basis of intelligence that Iraq was producing such weapons.

24th September 2002

BLAIR: ... that they have now got such facilities. The biological agents we believe Iraq can produce include anthrax, botulinum, toxin, aflatoxin and ricin; all eventually result in excruciatingly painful death.

5th February 2003

POWELL: There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more, many more, and he has the ability to dispense these lethal poisons and diseases in ways that can cause massive death and destruction.

KILLIP: We've been through this headquarters building here, it's taken us quite a long time through all the documents.

KAY: Any documents?

KILLIP: Lots of documents.

CORBIN: The ISG was looking at evidence Iraq had misled the UN at this agricultural research centre south of Baghdad.

KILLIP: Okay, what you've got down this side is a whole series of laboratories and I think...

CORBIN: A former UN inspector with long experience of Iraq's WMD, Hamish Killip had been conducting an inventory to see what was here and determine if anything had been removed.

HAMISH KILLIP: There's a bit of looting here. Clearly things that had been ripped out from the wall like that, that looks like looting. On the other hand, there are buildings that we do find here where you come

into a place like this and it is suspiciously clean, there is absolutely nothing left, and you know that was done some time ago.

CORBIN: In the past Iraqi scientists lied, denying they'd developed a military bio weapons programme they hid it behind civilian facilities. Under a crucial UN resolution 1441 Iraq was given one last chance to declare equipment which could be used in forbidden programmes. Here the ISG say they've found evidence of Iraq's deception.

KAY: It is interesting that this fomenter was not declared. I mean that in and of itself is a violation of 1441. That fomenter was subject to declaration.

CORBIN: And it ends up in a biological laboratory context.

HAMISH KILLIP

Iraq Survey Group

It ends up in a highly secure, highly competent centre of excellence of Iraqi science which is, as you saw, you came in, extremely well protected, one of their secret enclaves in the country. Yes, I mean the context of this is very strange.

CORBIN: The ISG now says the fomenter was suitable for culturing bio warfare germs, but testing hasn't shown that it was used for this purpose. So far the strongest indication that Iraq may have continued a clandestine programme is the ISG's discovery of 97 samples reference strains. A scientist had kept them hidden in his fridge at home for the past ten years. One of the test tubes or vials contained an organism called botulinum.

What about the vial of botulinum that was found? I mean how dangerous is it? I mean could it have been used for biological weapons?

KILLIP: No, that was for diagnostic purposes. It was not one of the strains that Iraq weaponised.

CORBIN: But the suggestion is that it could have been used.

KILLIP: It's something that Iraq should have declared to us. It's like other bits of equipment you've seen here today. Iraq had an obligation to tell us about these things and it did not do so, and that in itself breaks 1441.

CORBIN: But not a substance that could have been weaponised.

KILLIP: Not as a vial, no.

CORBIN: This Iraqi ministry was responsible for declaring to the UN any items remaining from Iraq's past weapons programme. I'd been here before the war, when UN inspectors were searching the country.

This place has been pretty much cleared out, hasn't it? There's nothing left.

In January in the Ministry I'd been allowed to meet a Ba'ath Party official and senior scientist whom, it now turned out, had given the botulinum to her colleague to hide. Dr Rihab Taha, the woman UN inspectors called Dr Germ, had trained in Britain and had used her skills in Iraq's past bio weapons programme. She admitted she'd played a key role in developing anthrax and botulinum for Iraq's self-defence she claimed.

Panorama
February 2002

Dr RIHAB TAHA

I think it is our right to have a capability and be able to defend ourselves. And to have something as a deterrent.

CORBIN: So even though you were producing toxins and bacteria that could kill hundreds of thousands of people.

TAHA: Well we never have this intention to use it.

CORBIN: But the ISG say they've been told by Dr Taha's colleague that as well as botulinum she wanted him to hide other samples including anthrax, an agent Iraq had weaponised.

Dr DAVID KAY

Iraq Survey Group

This side has turned back after two days the larger box of samples, he says, to Dr Taha and said he was keeping it in his refrigerator. "It's too dangerous, I have a small child in the house, take it back" We've not been able to find that group of samples and we need to.

CORBIN: And what does she say? What does Rihab Taha say about this?

KAY: Well she says absolutely nothing about this.

CORBIN: She denies it?

KAY: No, she just doesn't talk about it. She just won't respond to questions on this issue.

CORBIN: Another Iraqi scientist has told us Dr Taha gave samples of a third bio warfare agent, aflatoxin, to a colleague to keep at home, but there's still no proof Iraq had restarted a bio-weapons programme, and the language is changing again. The ISG isn't talking so much about programmes but Iraq's violation of the UN resolution.

But those who would say that this war was fought on faulty intelligence, would point to the fact that you found a few old vials of material. This doesn't constitute a biological programme or even really proof of an intention to start one.

KAY: We haven't said that it constitutes a biological programme or the intention. What we have said, and I think it's undeniable, is that this was a clear violation of UN resolution 1441, the Iraqis under the resolution were required to give up all of this material, to declare it to the UN, for over ten years they failed to declare it and failed to return it. That's all we've said about this.

CORBIN: It was another defector Sayeed Adnan Al-Haideri, sponsored by the Iraqi National Congress who helped create the impression that Iraq was hiding a biological weapons programme. He claimed he had fitted out specialised secret laboratories. The INC arranged an interview with Mr Haideri before handing him over to American intelligence. Last year we did broadcast some of this defector's testimony because several sources had told us he was credible.

Panorama
September 2002

ADNAN SAEED AL-HAIDERI

This place is not normal place, not for normal chemicals. The exhausting is not normal. There is HNO₃ here.

CORBIN: The ISG has searched but they have found none of the laboratory facilities described by Mr Haideri, including a bunker under a hospital.

GREG THIELMANN

State Dept Intelligence Bureau 1998-2002

There was obviously a faction in the US government and in the US intelligence community that never met a report that it considered unreliable. It already knew what the answer was, it was faith-based intelligence.

KAY: I don't think any of us would be surprised if it turns out in the end that there were a number of defectors who told less than the full truth. Some put out disinformation at the direction of the Iraqi government, others just exaggerated their own roles or completely fabricated what they knew. This has always been the case with defectors.

CORBIN: The ISG produced their first interim report in October. They had failed to find chemical or biological weapons or an active nuclear programme. But they did have something to reveal. The ISG had been collecting up Iraq's battlefield rockets, weapons with a range of up to 150 kilometres which were allowed under UN resolutions. But Iraq had been secretly developing several long-range missiles and seeking forbidden technology from North Korea. There was no sign of Iraq's old scuds but the ISG discovered evidence that engineers had continued to produce fuel for the rockets.

KAY: Missiles are very significant to us because they're the long pole in the tent, they're the thing that takes the longest to produce. We do not get a 1000 kilometre range missile in a matter of weeks or even months. The Iraqis had started in late '99-2000 to produce a family of missiles that would have gotten to 1000 kilometres.

CORBIN: Valuable information was coming from an Iraqi engineer prepared to risk his life to expose Iraq's illicit missile programmes. I set off to meet him in a safe house in Baghdad. He didn't want to be identified. The engineer explained his team had been given orders in April 2001 to begin secretly to design a long-range missile.

So how far was this missile designed to go?

ENGINEER: 500 kilometres.

CORBIN: 500 kilometres, that's beyond the permitted range.

ENGINEER: Yes.

CORBIN: The design involved adding an extra engine to a short-range rocket. The Iraqis reckoned they'd be able to hide things more successfully inside an existing programme that was allowed. Then the team were told to double the missile's range.

ENGINEER: This rocket from 1000 kilometres.

CORBIN: So this was even further, 1000 kilometres.

ENGINEER: A 1000 kilometres yes.

CORBIN: And how many engines?

ENGINEER: Five engines.

CORBIN: Why did you work on this forbidden programme?

ENGINEER: Our regime here was harsh. We could not refuse to work. When the state ordered us to make a missile with a range of 500 kilometres, we couldn't say we would not work on it because we would have been killed or imprisoned.

CORBIN: The missile was never built. The designs we've seen show only a conventional warhead. But when the UN visited last year everything was hidden.

ENGINEER: We were told that we must hand documents and designs for long-range missiles to the project director, that is the Director General. We would hand them over to him and he would hide them. When the UN left, these documents would be returned to us and we would start work again.

CORBIN: I wanted to talk to another missile scientist to find further evidence for the engineer's story. It meant travelling to another part of town. Baghdad is a dangerous place for westerners and Iraqis alike.

I've just come back from talking to a second Iraqi scientist. He's a more senior individual and he confirms he was involved too in this illicit missile programme. He wont let me film him, however, he wont even let me say who he is. He's absolutely terrified. He's scared of retribution, he says, from members of Saddam's old regime.

Iraqi scientists have learnt the risks of talking. One man who had cooperated with the ISG has already paid the ultimate price.

KAY: One was killed right after being talked to by us. Someone came up to him in front of his house, put a gun to the back of his head and blew his brains out. Another source, very important source to us on the biological programme took six bullets into his body and it's only by the grace of god that he's still alive. Others report routinely that they're under threat and we're trying to deal with that.

CORBIN: So what's the answer, I mean this reign of fear, it's likely to continue, will you ever really get to the bottom of this?

KAY: Well we all have hopes that, when Saddam is captured, the pressure will go off somewhat, but we'll get to the bottom.

CORBIN: So what was Saddam really up to? Did he have WMD, and if not, why did he give the impression he hadn't come clean with the UN inspectors. It had all been so different before 9/11. Then the American assessment of the threat his regime posed was in stark contrast to the rhetoric in the run up to the war.

24th February 2001

POWELL: He has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction, he is unable to project conventional power against his neighbours.

CORBIN: Historically Iran has always been Iraq's great enemy. A monument commemorates the million lives lost in their most recent war. That's the most likely reason why Saddam wanted missiles, not to hit the West.

Iraqi Missile Engineer

The minister said that Iran had fired a 750 kilometre range missile. So, within 6 months, we had to design one that went 500 kilometres. The government wasn't on the best of terms Iran, and a missile like that could reach Israel.

CORBIN: Coalition troops expected to be the target of chemical weapons as they crossed what they called the red line, the approach to Baghdad. But they found just abandoned tanks. We've spoken to an officer from the elite Special Republican Guard who was there. He believes Saddam's way of countering all his enemies was to bluff.

Special Republican Guard Officer

He used chemical weapons at Halabja, everybody was afraid of him using them, even during the war with

Iran. People in Kuwait were afraid of chemical weapons, Israel was afraid of them. So everybody was afraid that Iraq would use chemical weapons against them, so they avoided him.

CORBIN: The officer says he ran his unit's weapons inventory. Western intelligence believed the Special Republican Guard had responsibility for Saddam's weapons of mass destruction.

SRG OFFICER: After the sanctions, that is to say from 1991 onwards, there were no stocks of chemical weapons, neither with the Special Republican Guard nor other units, there were none available at all, it was no more than talk, a lot of hot air.

BLIX: I have some theories, it's like putting up the sign on the door "beware of the dog" and you don't have a dog.

CORBIN: If it was a bluff by Saddam, it was also a massive miscalculation. He lost his army, his family and his country.

HELMA: [reading from letter] "There seem to be plans underway to supply us with winter clothes and covers which I find ominous."

CORBIN: Mrs Al Sa'adi's letters from her husband, the Iraqi official in prison show he doesn't expect to be released soon. He still maintains the weapons were long since destroyed. His wife believes he was trapped between trying to satisfy the UN and serving a dictator who had his own agenda.

Why didn't Saddam Hussein come clean? What happened? There is a big mystery here, what's the answer?

HELMA AL-SA'ADI

My husband was fighting on two fronts. He was trying to convince the UN and also he was trying to convince the government, the regime, to cooperate with him. But somehow they always kept decisions or admissions right to the last moment. Maybe the President was bluffing, thinking they will be afraid.

CORBIN: The ISG have now undertaken 355 missions. They say they need more time, time the UN

inspectors never had. But some suggest it may be safer for politicians not to let the ISG reach a final verdict.

Dr HANS BLIX

UN Weapons Inspector 2000-2003

They would rather end the whole thing by controversy than by an admission that it was wrong.

CORBIN: So in other words they want to leave it hanging.

BLIX: Yes, I think so.

CORBIN: So no one can say well there definitely weren't weapons.

BLIX: I think so. Controversy will be preferable to a judgement. Politicians will prefer to retreat under a cloud of dust or... or mist. But we ordinary people I think would like to have some real clarity.

CORBIN: David Kay is still searching for the weapons he was sure existed before the war. His next report is due in January as an election year begins in Washington, and as Lord Hutton produces his verdict, one that is likely to throw the spotlight on Mr Blair and British intelligence assessments before the war. It's too soon to conclude there were no weapons or programmes but should Mr Kay be downgrading expectations?

Do you ever think that you may have got it completely wrong? There may be nothing to this at the end of the day, nothing really substantial, nothing current and really threatening?

KAY: I think we have a process that if we get to the end of the day and we find nothing, we will all be able to say this is the evidence that led... leads us to the conclusion that there was nothing there or there was something there.

CORBIN: And you're prepared to be proved wrong, that there was nothing at the end of the day?

KAY: Absolutely. If that turns out to be the truth, you know.. so be it.

CORBIN: Iraq's people are reclaiming the places out of bounds for so long. Even Saddam's weapons factories and research establishments now destroyed by war. The Iraq Survey Group is still searching but it may well be that only the historians will ever discover what really went on in Iraq and in Saddam's mind.

PANORAMA

SADDAM ON THE RUN PANORAMA

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RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION: BBC-1

DATE: 28:03:04

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JANE CORBIN: A winter's evening in a quiet village near Tikrit. US forces advance under cover of darkness. Their goal – the man they call the "Ace of Spades". They've been hunting him for eight long months now. Finally they've run him to earth in a miserable hole beneath the ground. Tonight on Panorama we tell the story of how Saddam Hussein and his family evaded the Coalition's greatest manhunt. It's a tale of brutality and revenge. We tell of the treachery that led his sons to die in a hail of rockets, and we reveal who ultimately betrayed the dictator himself. Last month in A'Zamiya in Baghdad's old quarter they celebrated the Muslim festival of sacrifice. The children here still sing Saddam's praises. To this day much of A'Zamiya supports Iraq's former president, though he's in jail. The scars of the war are still fresh in people's hearts and on the walls of the mosque which bore the brunt of an American attack here during the hunt for Saddam. I met two imams who'd witnessed Saddam's final appearance in the city here.

ABU HAMED

Imam, Al-A'Zamiya mosque

Four or five metres away from where I stood Saddam was in a car surrounded by lots of people, and there were his bodyguards armed with RPGs and automatic rifles.

Baghdad

April 9th 2003

[footage of Saddam Hussein waving to cheering crowd]

He was standing up, Qusay was at the car with him. The A'Zamiya were cheering them and applauding, he was greeting them as well.

CORBIN: These pictures of Saddam's last stand on the streets of Baghdad were taken on April 9th last year as Saddam worked the crowd, surrounded by his faithful bodyguards and loyal supporters. But at this very moment US forces were seizing control of the city centre only a couple of miles away. Very different images were recorded here which came to symbolise the toppling of Saddam's regime. This crowd saw him only as a hated figure who'd held Iraq in the grip of fear for almost 30 years. Saddam would cling on in the capital for one more day, but the Americans had already picked up a rumour he was in A'Zamiya. This assault team of 300 US marines were sent to capture or kill the former Iraq President.

April 10th 2003

At dawn the next morning they launched an assault against Saddam loyalists now holed up in the mosque at A'Zamiya. The battle was intense. The marines were convinced they had Saddam cornered. Many Iraqis and one US soldier were to die.

ABU MOUSSA

Imam, Al-A'zamiya mosque

I opened the door of the mosque to look out and saw lots of martyrs on the ground. On that day we buried 33 martyrs, I counted them one by one. I would pray over them while the others would dig and bury.

CORBIN: As the Americans closed in on him Saddam realised Baghdad was lost. He ordered his family be evacuated from the city.

RAGHAD HUSSEIN

Daughter of Saddam Hussein

After about midday my dad sent his cars from the private protection who told us to get in. We had almost lost contact with my father and brothers because things had got out of hand. I saw with my own eyes the army withdrawing and the terrified faces of the Iraqi soldiers who unfortunately were running away and looking around them. Missiles were falling on my left and right. They fell not further than 50 to 100 metres away. We moved in small cars. I had a gun between my feet – just in case.

CORBIN: With US forces moving in from all sides Saddam dismissed most of his aids. One of his bodyguards who was there described the scene to us.

'ABU DHARI'

Saddam Hussein's personal bodyguard

Words spoken by actor

The last time I saw him he said: "My son, each of you go to your homes." We said: "Sir, we want to stay with you. Why should we go?" But he insisted. Even his son, Qusay, was crying a little. He was trying not to show his feelings. He was stressed but he didn't want to destroy the moral of the people who were watching him, but inside, he was definitely broken.

CORBIN: Then, with only two bodyguards to accompany him, Saddam drove off in his white Oldsmobile and vanished. The rule of Saddam Hussein was over, his family scattered. Today their palace complex on the outskirts of Baghdad lies ruined, the target of the coalition's bombs and missiles in the first strike of the war. Some of the graffiti reads: "From a palace to a hole". Iraqis once feared and were fascinated by the nation's first family. They were celebrities, some bloodstained, others tragic. This is Saddam with his first and only official wife, Sajida, the matriarch of the family. Uday and Qusay were their sons, the heirs whom Saddam promoted to high positions. But their cruelty and greed earned them hatred amongst ordinary Iraqis. Hala was Saddam's youngest daughter, his two eldest girls, Rana and Raghad. Saddam wasn't there when his family's compound was struck by coalition missiles. One valuable target that was hit by the Americans that night – a shed in the palace grounds. They didn't know its contents or that they were intended to support Saddam on the run. Eight year old Ali took me to see a secret he'd discovered. Ali had been finding burnt out cases in the rubble.

[to Ali] So this is where you found the dollars?

Two days before the war Saddam had ordered a heist of a billion dollars from the central bank. We believe this was some of that money.

ALI ADNAN SAAD

Son of site guard

This is Saddam, and I came here and I found it. They're burnt. I found them in the truck and I find some

every day.

CORBIN: The loot was hidden inside a rubbish truck, part of a hoard earmarked to buy loyalty and weapons if Saddam lost the fight to stay in power. During the war Saddam had evaded the coalition's assassination attempts by moving between a succession of safe houses. This was just one of the villas he used. The extra generator and multiple phone lines which suddenly appeared were a giveaway to the neighbours. Saddam met his war cabinet here when it still seemed possible to him that he could hang on to power. But within days he had to flee. When he left Baghdad on April 10th Saddam and his handpicked bodyguards made for a bunker in Dialah on the northern outskirts of the city.

Dr AYAD ALLAWI

Security Committee

Iraqi Governing Council

He stayed there in that bunker until some of the couriers were exposed going in and outside the area.

CORBIN: And who were his couriers?

ALLAWI: His step-nephew was a courier between his wife and him... himself, Saddam, at that stage.

CORBIN: He would carry letters or messages?

ALLAWI: Messages, yes, and they had, by then, distributed also satellite telephones. They were using them heavily the first part of Saddam's disappearance.

CORBIN: Wasn't it risky to use satellite phones and perhaps lead Americans...

ALLAWI: It was risky. It was very risky. It became very risky in fact.

CORBIN: Saddam was forced to leave the bunker after 3 weeks and give up using phones. He began moving every few hours. But he needed to show Iraqis he was still alive and rally them to the Ba'athist resistance which was beginning to grow. Sa'ad Al-Silawi broadcasts for Al-Arabiya were being closely watched by Saddam in hiding. In the early summer the reporter got a message to be in a certain place at a certain time.

SA'AD AL-SILAWI

TELEVISION Reporter, Al-Arabiya

It said: "Saad go under the tree, okay and under the tree you will find an envelope. There is something important in this envelope."

CORBIN: Very mysterious.

AL-ARABIYA: Very. And I went to the assigned place, you know..

CORBIN: Can you play me one.

AL-ARABIYA: And I put it in very cautious, you know.. and suddenly I discovered....

[plays tape]

CORBIN: It's the voice of Saddam Hussein.

AL-ARABIYA: It is Saddam Hussein, you know.

CORBIN: Did you know immediately? Did you recognise him?

AL-ARABIYA: I know, because we used to listen to him, we know his voice and even his way of speaking.

CORBIN: When you heard that first tape, what was Saddam Hussein saying on the tape, what was his message?

AL-ARABIYA: His message, you know.. is convince the people to defend Iraq, saying a political things about the lines of Bush administration, Bush himself and Blair.

CORBIN: The lie being exposed by now was Saddam, his denial of his regimes crimes against humanity.

Mass graves are being uncovered all over Iraq, evidence of the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of ordinary Iraqis on the orders of Saddam and his henchman. In May investigators began identifying the victims and preparing evidence. But there was still no former president to put on trial. Hunted by the coalition last Spring Saddam headed for his hometown of Tikrit in the so-called Sunni triangle in central Iraq. We travelled the same route to find those who'd helped Saddam in this Ba'athist heartland and those who'd tracked him.

The US 4th Infantry Division first raised the American flag over Saddam's favourite palace in Tikrit last may. Their task was to sort out the Sunni triangle where former elements of the regime were already

beginning to organise and challenge the coalition. The division's commanding general soon became aware the most wanted man in Iraq was still alive and on his patch.

Maj. General RAY ODIERNO

Commander, US 4th Infantry Division

We were very aware of the fact that this was a place with a lot of close ties to Saddam Hussein, both tribal and family, so we were very much aware of that. So when we first came in here, we did understand that this was probably the heart of his support. We continued to get intelligence that told us, from the ground, human intelligence, that said no he's alive and he's operating.

CORBIN: The division's intelligence unit under Lieutenant Colonel Steve Russell set out to pin down

Saddam's whereabouts to find his sons and key officials. Within a month they'd scored their first success.

In June an informer led US soldiers to a local farm and told them to start digging.

Lt. Colonel STEVE RUSSELL

1-22 Battalion, 4th Infantry Division

On this particular farm they found eight and a half million US dollars, over eight hundred thousand in

foreign currency. We found an additional estimated two million dollars of jewellery that belonged to Sajida

Hussein, Saddam's wife, right there on the farm.

CORBIN: Just in one place.

RUSSELL: Just in one place. It was buried in vault type containers that you would see in a treasury or in a bank.

CORBIN: Did it seem to you that a lot of thought had gone into this, that there were caches of money and gold and jewels ready to fund a resistance.

RUSSELL: Other units had captured these type of containers and they matched the same general

description and type. It became apparent to us that there was a lot of money that was out there.

CORBIN: To counter the huge sums Saddam had squirreled away to buy loyalty and guns, the Americans came up with their own big incentive.

July 3rd 2003

Ambassador PAUL BREMER

Head of Coalition Provisions Authority

I am today announcing a twenty-five million dollar reward for information leading to the capture of Saddam Hussein, and a fifteen million dollar reward for information leading to the capture of either of his sons.

CORBIN: At first the Americans thought the key to catching Saddam lay in seizing the top men on the US wanted list, the deck of cards. In June they captured the former president's personal secretary, number 4 after Saddam and his sons Uday and Qusay. Then the Americans just missed catching the sons in Tikrit.

RUSSELL: We knew that they were on the move. They had been in our suburb north of Tikrit. We didn't know where they went. We got intelligence that they had left after a series of raids. It turns out they were in Mosul.

CORBIN: Mosul lies just over 200 miles north of Baghdad, near the border with Syria. The city is an ethnic mix of Kurds and Arabs. Under Saddam, most of them had become the Ba'athist stronghold in the north. A number of key regime figures had already been captured here. The city was controlled by another US division, the 101st Airborne. The daily military intelligence briefing of the 101st. Last summer the Commander heard reports from time to time that both Saddam and his two sons might be in his area.

Maj. General DAVID PETRAEUS
Commander, 101st Airborne
We chased various rumours in Mosul and throughout Nineveh province on a variety of occasions reports of sightings of Saddam or Uday and Qusay and we were working very, very hard to try to develop the intelligence that would result in the capture or death of these individuals.

Home movie

CORBIN: On family home movies Uday and Qusay lived up to their image in Iraq - gangster sons of a mafia don, hated and feared. Qusay was known as the thug. He headed Saddam's security apparatus. Uday, dubbed 'the psychopath' was a serial rapist who had tortured and killed. They were vicious and corrupt and Iraqis still live in fear of their return to power.

How important was it for what you were trying to do out there with hearts and minds that you find the family, the father and sons?

PETRAEUS: It was very important, both substantively if you will and very, very important psychologically. On the substantive side, people like Uday and Qusay had enormous amounts of money.

CORBIN: And what were they doing with the money?

PETRAEUS: They were hiring others to take shots at our soldiers, to take shots at those who were trying to play a role in the new Iraq.

CORBIN: Resistance attacks in the Mosul area increased last summer, but there was no firm evidence that Uday and Qusay were in the city. Then one day in late July came the lucky break. Someone walked through the door offering the Americans valuable information on Saddam's son.

PETRAEUS: Each day people would come to the wire, if you will, of various compounds and offer to tell us where Saddam was if we'd just give them that 30 million dollars right there, right then. So this was another source offering to tell us where high value targets were, and at this point frankly we'd developed a bit of scepticism about quite a bit of this. But the credit for the initial bit of this goes to a great army sergeant who saw something believable about this source.

CORBIN: The source made a startling admission. Saddam's sons were staying with him in an affluent area of the city.

JANE CORBIN

That red sign on the wall reads: "Land for Sale". It was once the place where a palatial house stood, but now it's completely levelled because that is where Uday and Qusay, the sons of Saddam, made their last stand. Saddam's sons had been living right under the noses of the Americans. Their host had installed an extra generator in his home and had been buying more food than usual. Qusay's 14 year old son, Mustafa, Saddam's grandson, had even visited the local bakery, though no one knew who he was.

ANASS SHAFIQ

Mosul Baker

This is how unaware we were. If we knew that Uday and Qusay were here, we'd have recognised his son.

We had never heard that Uday and Qusay had even been to Mosul.

CORBIN: The owner of the house in which the sons were staying was a distant relative of Saddam's.

Nawaf Zaidan was the only one who knew the identity of his house guests.

Home movie

In a ropery family video, Nawaf Zaidan in a tribal headdress played host to a group of Saddam's bodyguards and some prostitutes in a Mosul hotel. As always in this clan, relations were complicated. Zaidan's brother had once been imprisoned by Saddam and a blood feud simmered in the background. The US wont confirm it but we know it was Nawaf Zaidan who betrayed Uday and Qusay to the Americans. What was the gist of what the source was telling your people?

PETRAEUS: Well, the source told us where they were, what they were doing, who they had with them in terms of security and so forth, so it was very, very detailed.

CORBIN: Why did he tell you? What was in it for him? What was motivating him?

PETRAEUS: Well certainly 30 million dollars helps motivate someone.

CORBIN: Dawn on July 22nd last year, as Mosul awoke US special forces, units from the 101st Airborne, cordoned off Zaidan's neighbourhood.

July 22nd 2003

SHAFIQ: It was about 6.30.. 6.45 and we saw lots of American cars. We thought they must have come to search for weapons. They found that the doors were closed and nobody was answering. Then there were two gunshots from inside.

PETRAEUS: That was the first time in any of the operations that we'd conducted where once we had someone surrounded that they actually shot back.

CORBIN: So you knew it was serious this time, that those people in that house intended to fight.

PETRAEUS: Yes, they had quite an arsenal inside there and it was a pretty robust house.

SHAFIQ: Then the Americans were shooting at the house and shouting from loudhailers: "Give yourselves up". No one responded but carried on firing, so then the battle started in earnest.

PETRAEUS: We did in fact prep the target if you will, with machine gun fire and with fire that we thought

probably would not kill them but would intimidate them to the point that they might this time surrender, and that didn't happen. We decided that we weren't going to risk anymore American lives and we were just going to blow 'em up. It turned out that those killed, Uday, Qusay and their bodyguards in a bathroom in which they were hiding inside the bedroom on the top floor that was totally barricaded, and then the son who was a fairly large 15 or 16 year old was killed when the forces entered the house clearing it.

CORBIN: This is the son of Qusay.

PERAEUS: Yes.

CORBIN: And was it necessary to kill a 14 year old as well?

PERAEUS: Again, in that context, it is something I would never question, that these soldiers were clearing a room where they had been shot at previously, three of their members had been wounded, and the individual made a threatening move with a weapon, so that's not something I'd ever second-guess.

CORBIN: Mustafa, here in black, having a weapons lesson from his father, was clearly no stranger to guns. He may or may not have actually threatened the Americans, either way, he died. Qusay's death caused little grief but the killing of Mustafa sparked anger amongst many Iraqis. During the two hour attack local people had gathered to demonstrate against the heavy-handed operation. Stones were thrown. The Americans say shots were fired from the crowd. The people here deny this. One protestor was killed by US forces. People were angry and the Americans needed to get the news out first, this controversial operation had succeeded in killing Saddam's sons. So after identifying the bodies the Pentagon decided to display the disfigured corpses to the media. There were accusations of barbarism. But Iraqis now accepted Uday and Qusay were gone forever. As for the betrayer, he was last seen in Mosul sitting in a car watching the American operation. He and his family then disappeared.

What's happened to the source that led you to Uday and Qusay?

PERAEUS: I don't know. He and his family are 30 million dollars richer and enjoying it in some undisclosed location.

CORBIN: So America has looked after them, has it?

PERAEUS: Someone has. We put them on a plane and wished them well and that was the last we saw or heard of them.

CORBIN: Was it worth it, 30 million dollars to catch these two?

PERAEUS: Oh absolutely, yeah, yeah. These two were absolutely barbaric in what they did.

CORBIN: Saddam's sons were buried in a family graveyard near Tikrit, closely watched by the coalition.

Yes, according to one of Saddam's bodyguards, the former president actually went to the grave himself on the evening of the funeral.

'ABU DHARI'

Saddam Hussein's personal bodyguard

Words spoken by an actor

After the funeral people saw Saddam Hussein visiting the graves with a group of his protectors. No one recognised them and even the car they came in wasn't spotted. At the grave Saddam read a verse from the Koran and cried. There were flags on the grave. After he finished reading, he took the flags and left. He cried for his sons.

CORBIN: Eight months later and Uday and Qusay's graves lie untended, just mounds of earth. No one mourns them, only their father who called them martyrs in a tape released just after their funerals.

Had Saddam one hundred children other than Uday and Qusay I would have sacrificed them on the same path...

CORBIN: With Saddam's sons disposed of, the hunt for the ace of spades himself took on added urgency.

Tikrit has long been the haunt of diehard Ba'athists as we found out one day in the division's intelligence

headquarters. A roaring overhead heralded a rocket attack. Daring attacks like this began in earnest last

summer. The resistance was growing in strength and US casualties began to mount. The Americans knew

that establishing security in their area and finding Saddam were interlinked. The weapons were being fired

by the same men protecting the former president.

Lt. Colonel STEVE RUSSELL

1-22 Battalion, 4th Infantry Division

There were approximately half a dozen families that were closely tied to him, and when I say closely, these were people that literally had their entire lives, their occupation taking care of Saddam, doing his bidding. Maybe they didn't hold important cabinet posts, and that was not readily known initially. We imagine that the deck of cards people were.. okay, we collect the whole set and we've got him. But what we found fairly early on was these families were really the ones that were doing a lot of the resistance.

CORBIN: Saddam's secretary snatched by the US a month earlier wasn't talking. But documents discovered with him enabled intelligence officers to work out who was who in Saddam's circle. The cooks, the bodyguards the drivers, and photographs proved a goldmine.

CORBIN: [looking at photographs] The same people for years...

RUSSELL: Sure, right.

CORBIN: And some of these were picked up in raids were they?

RUSSELL: Most. These would be the bodyguards, some of the inner circle that we were talking about and some of the different things. These became very important to us. We would ask okay, who's this guy and why is he standing so close to Saddam and....

CORBIN: One photo, taken just two years before, featured a row of bodyguards around Saddam, looking every inch the mafia don. One by one the Americans put names to faces, found their homes, then they planned to catch them. Manhunts were launched nightly throughout the Sunni triangle. Safe houses and family homes were raided as soon as any tip came in that someone in Saddam's circle might be in the area.

RUSSELL: We would go after one of these once we got intelligence and moved very swiftly, very quickly. There was a time where we were conducting multiple raids, even sometimes on the same day, we would go across the river to farms. We would go into the cities, into the villages, all on these tips. We were successful in a great number of them, and it did create a momentum and an excitement that were getting somewhere, we were getting closer to him.

CORBIN: Raids last summer didn't turn up the ace of spades but the Americans did find large quantities of

arms, explosives and money. It confirmed that Saddam loyalists were running the resistance in the area.

Then, on July 29th at 4am, the Americans had a breakthrough. They caught someone they were sure could lead them to Saddam.

July 29th 2003

Adnan Abdullah Abid al-Musslit was one of Saddam's longest serving bodyguards. He'd been brought out of retirement by the President just before the war. Adnan is standing on Saddam's immediate left in the photograph of the bodyguards. Another picture confirmed al-Musslit's trusted position within the family. A younger, thinner Adnan attending Uday's birthday party.

We wanted to know more about Adnan and his family. In a bullet-scarred compound, witness to US raids in this part of town, I found a group of Tikritis well acquainted with the family. They told me the al-Musslits were related to Saddam, and that as well as Adnan, at least three of his cousins were also Saddam's bodyguards, it was the family business.

TIKRITI MAN: They're a well known family in the area with a good reputation. They've never attacked anyone, I'm talking about the brothers. They're also known to be in the Special Guard. They're bodyguards.

CORBIN: So this family was part of Saddam Hussein's Special Guard?

MAN: Yes, they were part of the Special Guards, but they'd stopped doing their job with Saddam Hussein, and they were spending time with their families in this area.

CORBIN: Adnan refused, under interrogation, to reveal Saddam's whereabouts. But the al-Musslit family remained a focus for the Americans. The raids and arrests of people known to be close to the former President drove him deeper underground. Once more the trail was growing colder. In August the US military released photo-fits of how Saddam might be disguising himself in traditional garb, hair died grey, even without his signature and moustache. The Americans knew that Saddam had abandoned his usual mode of transport for battered taxis.

Maj. General RAY ODIERNO
Commander, US 4th Infantry Division

In the beginning we'd look for these large columns, four/five vehicles, big SUVs a lot of protection. We were told that absolutely was not the case. He was moving with taxi cabs, he was moving dressed like a shepherd. He had grown a beard, it was greying, that he was moving quite often. Well what would happen is when he'd go into a place, he'd have a network that worked very clearly when US forces were coming, and then you need to be able to hide and move right away.

CORBIN: Saddam was on familiar territory. He'd put this town on the map and brought riches and preferment to Tikriti clans. The 4th Infantry Division held the area in an iron grip with 25,000 soldiers, but no Iraqi whether out of sympathy or fear was prepared to rat on Saddam.

It seems extraordinary that Saddam hid out for so many months here in Tikrit, the place with the Heaviest US military presence in Iraq. He did it by calling in favours, relying on family loyalties and the sacrosanct Arab tradition of offering hospital and refuge.

Resistance propaganda film

Last autumn violence across Iraq increased. Loyalists from the former regime were bolstered by Islamic militants from outside, attacking a common US enemy. In Tikrit the Americans were suffering significant losses. There was no evidence that Saddam was directing resistance operations day to day, but the coalition believed he was a vital inspiration for the Ba'athists.

ODIERNO: Mortar attacks increased. Attack on helicopters started. The IEDs – the improvised explosive devices – tripled. So they really started to raise the level. I still did not believe that Saddam was running it and coordinating it, but I still believed he was the icon. He was the individual they still looked to as their icon, this is why we're doing this.

CORBIN: Saddam at large taunted the Bush administration. It was now 4 months since President Bush prematurely proclaimed the war was over, a war, he said, was justified.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Major combat operations in Iraq have ended in the Battle of Iraq the United States and our allies have prevailed.
[Cheers and Applause]

CORBIN: But by September the number of US soldiers killed during the occupation surpassed those who died during the invasion.

REPORTER: What about the weapons Prime Minister, what about weapons of mass destruction ?

CORBIN: And Tony Blair was under pressure too. Six months and still no WMDs to show a sceptical British public.

What sort of messages were you getting from on high about the importance of catching this man, the importance politically?

ODIERNO: Yes, first stop no pressure, there was really no pressure to capture him. Obviously I'd get questions about "what are you hearing, what do you know?" But there was no specific pressure: "you have to get Saddam Hussein, that's extremely important to our goal."

CORBIN: No pressure?

ODIERNO: Not one time did somebody come down and say what are you doing about this, you know.. are you going to capture him, we need to capture him right now. Never said to me.

CORBIN: By the early autumn the Pentagon had also formed a secret unit – Taskforce 121. Using electronic surveillance and undercover agents, the CIA and Special Forces scoured Iraq for clues. Their orders were clear, to capture or kill high value target number one, Saddam Hussein.

Dr AYAD ALLAWI

Security Committee

Iraqi Governing Council

Definitely there were a lot of pressures, emanating from both London and Washington on the Coalition here to try and get him, and I think maybe 2 ½ or 3 months prior to his arrest there were taskforces were formed here who had nothing to do really but to keep tracking Saddam.

CORBIN: As the autumn progressed the US military in Tikrit found local people, tiring of the violence, more willing now to give them information. The First Brigade's commander, an officer with a reputation as a tough operator, stepped up the raids. Colonel Hickey believed he was getting closer to Saddam.

Were there times when you thought you actually got close to Saddam Hussein?

HICKEY: Yes there were three incidents where I thought we were quite close.

CORBIN: Within hours even?

Colonel JAMES HICKEY

1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

I would say in one instance, it was in the early autumn, maybe 3-4 hours. It was just one of those things

that soldiers get a sense of after a while, and it made perfect sense at the time that told by god, we were

close that night. And then we kind of went back and figured out how to do it better.

CORBIN: As well as the relentless raids, the US military stepped up the fire power. They used missiles

and tanks to destroy alleged resistance safe houses round Tikrit. By the beginning of November Saddam

was under siege. His home town and powerbase surrounded his faithful bodyguard targeted and then

arrested one by one by the Americans. The noose was tightening day by day. Protests erupted in several

towns in the Sunni triangle. People showed their support for Saddam. The US learnt Saddam was secretly

appearing at some of the demonstrations. The resistance was trying to bolster their failing figurehead.

Maj. General RAY ODIERNO

Commander, US 4th Infantry Division

We were getting a series of protests that started in Bacuba, Tikrit, Beji, Kirkuk, and the reports we were

getting is that they were doing this as a show of support for him. Those are the reports we were getting so

we were kind of tracking him around these areas to see if this was true. We did do a couple of raids based

on information and we went in right behind him so we just missed him, he was here a few nights ago.

CORBIN: In early December the Al-Arabiya TV station received a final message from the former President

which showed how cut off from reality he'd become.

SA'AD AL-SILAWI

TV Reporter, Al-Arabiya

This is the last, two pages letter and ten days before they catch him.

CORBIN: And this came what, delivered to you or...?

AL-SILAWI: Delivered to our office in Baghdad.

CORBIN: And it's handwritten.

AL-SILAWI: It's handwritten.

CORBIN: And are you sure... ?

AL-SILAWI: And this is the signature.

CORBIN: This is the signature on your...

AL-SILAWI: Yes, and he's confused, he is, and if you look at that...

CORBIN: So you felt it was...

AL-SILAWI: Yeah.

CORBIN: Rambling.

AL-SILAWI: Rambling, rambling.

CORBIN: Saddam must have known the noose was tightening. His family were dead or in exile. His closest advisers and bodyguards arrested one by one. He was hardly the leader of a resistance, more a hunted fugitive. By now the Americans knew that one man only held the key to the capture of Saddam.

HICKEY: I felt so strongly that if we got our hands on this man, we would get information about the whereabouts of Saddam Hussein, and that was simply as a result of process of elimination, there wasn't anybody else that would know.

CORBIN: Anything at all that you can say about this man? What did he look like?

HICKEY: He was a middle aged man that sort of went pear shaped.

CORBIN: Pear shaped.

HICKEY: Yeah.

CORBIN: His waistline?

HICKEY: Right.

CORBIN: Young, old?

HICKEY: Middle-aged.

CORBIN: Middle-aged. And was he someone who you'd identified from photographs around Saddam as being the inner core?

HICKEY: We knew who he was and we knew exactly what he looked like.

CORBIN: The Americans won't say but we've learnt that man was another member of the al-Musslit family. Mohamed Ibrahim Omar al-Musslit. He's on Saddam's right in a brown striped shirt, and these pictures filmed just before Baghdad fell. For years Mohamed had been a key figure in the President's special security organisation. His cousin Adnan had been arrested last July. Mohamed had taken control of Saddam on the run, the only person who knew where he was from hour to hour and who was with him. On the night of December 12th a series of raids in the Sunni triangle led US Special Forces to a house in Baghdad where they unexpectedly caught Mohamed al-Musslit. It took just a few hours of interrogation for him to crack and betray Saddam.

So you found the source that gave you the final clue. How did you get the information out of him?

ODIERNO: Well I was not there so I can't answer that question. We have special people do that but it was...

CORBIN: Was force used?

ODIERNO: No, no, it was in fact.. I did ask that question and force was not used.

CORBIN: Because many Iraqis talk about torture, they believe torture would have been used on him.

ODIERNO: No, I believe there was not torture used. I truly believe there was not torture used on him.

CORBIN: And what did he tell you?

ODIERNO: Well what he said was, this is Saddam, this is where Saddam is. This is where he's been for the last few days and if you go here you'll find him.

CORBIN: Within hours Colonel Hickey's unit was on the road. He took Panorama back over the route he'd traced that night to hunt down Saddam. Together with US Special Forces under cover of darkness Hickey

and his men made for the village of Al Doha on the outskirts of Tikrit. This place was home to one of many clans related to Saddam. The informer had told US forces the former president would be in one of two groups of buildings on a farm codenamed Wolverine 1 and 2.

HICKEY: We knew we had to quickly clear each one of those objectives to see if we could find our man.

We suspected however that there would be a.. what we'd call an underground tunnel somewhere in those

palm groves just beyond where you see.. get to Wolverine 2. Now it was just a matter of finding our man.

Nothing was found there. Nothing was found there. As we moved down into the palm grove and began

moving through the palm grove we started to find a couple more men.

CORBIN: Those men were members of Saddam's clan and owned the farm. One had been his cook, the

other, one of his drivers. Colonel Hickey's men took up position in the palm grove while Special Forces

advanced on a shack near the river. At 8.30 that night they found Saddam hiding in his bolthole.

So this is it.

HICKEY: This is it. This is where the ah... this is the presidential suite.

CORBIN: The presidential suite.

HICKEY: Yes, this is the kitchenette here and there'd be the boudoir.

CORBIN: And what was under this tarpaulin covered in area?

HICKEY: There was a kitchen there, and in there they found the money.

CORBIN: So what do you think, that he was living here...

HICKEY: He was living here.

CORBIN: And the hole was a bolthole for when he felt there was danger.

HICKEY: Yes, that's where found him, yeah, yeah, he was right down there. We've since covered it.. I've cleaned it up and covered it up, but it was right there.

CORBIN: It was here.

HICKEY: Yeah.

CORBIN: US soldiers from the top secret Task Force which had tracked Saddam for many months uncovered the underground chamber and pulled him out.

US Special Forces – personal pictures

They posted their own record of that moment on the internet, despite army rules banning any publicity of special operations.

What did he say?

Colonel JAMES HICKEY

1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Well he introduced himself as: "I am Saddam Hussein, I am President of Iraq and I'm willing to negotiate".

And of course we accepted his surrender.

CORBIN: Some people say that he actually spat at one of the soldiers and the soldier hit back with a rifle butt.

HICKEY: I don't know.

CORBIN: You didn't see that yourself.

HICKEY: No.

CORBIN: In the shack beside the hole the kitchen area was littered with food. Next door a bedroom with a stack of books, a ceremonial flag propped against the wall, the only reminder of Saddam's lost status. His swimming trunks were hanging on a tree for bathing in the river. A metal box was found with \$750,000 and there was a gun which Saddam failed to use on the Americans or on himself, despite his pledge to die a martyr. Some of the papers in his briefcase revealed those around him had been feeding Saddam with lies about what was happening in Iraq while he was on the run.

Maj. General RAY ODIERNO

Commander, US 4th Infantry Division

They had made one comment that one of our units had lost like a hundred tanks or something like this,

some outrageous statement in there and told him that it had been real successful and everything was going great in our area when it was very much far from the truth, so...

CORBIN: So he continued to be deluded to the end.

ODIERNO: Yes, very much so. Very much so.

CORBIN: A path from the shack where Saddam surrendered leads down to the River Tigris. Forty-four years before at this same spot he had swum the river and made his getaway after attempting to kill Iraq's then leader.

July 1992

It was an event commemorated each year by Saddam in a ritual swim. He used it to bolster the myth of his invincibility. Now he'd been captured here, within a few miles of the place where he'd been born and where his sons were buried.

Coalition Press Conference
December 14th 2003
Ladies and gentlemen, we've got him.
[Cheers and Applause]

CORBIN: A former Iraqi foreign minister, an exile, was on the platform when Saddam's capture was announced.

Dr ADNAN PACHACHI
Iraqi Governing Council

As soon as Ambassador Bremer said: "We've got him" there were cheers all over the place and people were crying. It was a very emotional period. I mean a lot of people have lost so many relatives of their own, so many friends, so many... really Iraq passed through a terrible, terrible time.

CORBIN: Saddam was shown submitting to medical tests in a humiliating television broadcast, an echo of the earlier controversial parading of the bodies of his sons. The Americans and some Iraqis claimed these pictures were necessary to prove the dictator had finally been defeated without even putting up a fight.

PACHACHI: A lot of Iraqis said that he should have committed suicide or he should have at least resisted like his sons and gone down as a fighter.

CORBIN: Saddam was taken to the American high security prison at Baghdad airport. A delegation from the Iraqi governing council went to see him, amongst them Adnan Pachachi. They found the former dictator dismissive when confronted with accusations of his crimes against the Iraqi people.

PACHACHI: They told him: "What happened to the mass graves?" He said well I think they're probably either deserters or criminals. So he didn't seem to be remorseful or repentant.

CORBIN: A phone call came through from President Bush for Dr Pachachi as he was leaving Saddam's cell.

PACHACHI: As we went out from Saddam the President called us and I said well we are very happy in this, yeah.

CORBIN: And how did he sound?

PACHACHI: Elated.

CORBIN: Following Saddam's capture this spider hole became a magnet for US soldiers, amongst them Lieutenant Colonel Russell's unit which had tracked down the bodyguards over many months. And Colonel Hickey and his men who were there that night brandishing Saddam's cashbox for the camera. Since Panorama's visit a few weeks ago, the hole has now been capped with concrete. The trusted bodyguard and clansman who betrayed Saddam to the Americans wont be reaping any benefit, unlike the other relative who'd informed on Uday and Qusay.

There was a 25 million dollar bounty on Saddam Hussein's head. Who gets the money?

Maj. General RAY ODIERNO
Commander, US 4th Infantry Division
I'm not sure. I don't think anybody gets the money. I think the US Treasury is going to save 25 million dollars.

CORBIN: Because the source is under arrest you mean?

ODIERNO: The source has a very shady background so he will not get the reward.

CORBIN: As for the former First Family of Iraq, Saddam's wife Sajida and their youngest daughter are now living in Syria. Sajida has refused to break her silence. His other daughters, Raghad and Ranah are in exile in Jordan. Raghad gave this fierce defence of her father just after his capture.

Speaking on December 16th 2003
RAGHAD HUSSEIN
Daughter of Saddam Hussein

I am once again proud that this person is my father. We all know what the purpose is of the way in which he was displayed. Where is democracy, where is the immunity that every president of a country enjoys? But there he is. I swear that the lion remains a lion even if he is chained. Do you think that they could have caught him without drugging him?

CORBIN: With Saddam in jail evidence of his regime's atrocities committed across three decades is still being uncovered and trials prepared. It will be months, perhaps years before Saddam himself faces his accusers. The coalition worked so hard to capture a man they believe committed crimes against humanity, but when he goes on trial, many nations, including the US and Britain may face hard questions too.

Dr AYAD ALLAWI

Security Committee

Iraqi governing Council

I think this should be really on trial, why Saddam was allowed to do this, why he was allowed to become a tyrant and why he was allowed to stay in power for that long. So I think this is all going to be on trial now.

CORBIN: That sounds as if the West will have some questions to answer as well.

ALLAWI: I guess everybody is going to have a lot of questions to answer for.

CORBIN: As Saddam Hussein awaits his fate, likely to be the death penalty, he is reportedly vague and uncooperative, but he still talks as if he was President of Iraq.

What was your picture as you left him in that cell alone, what did you think?

Dr ADNAN PACHACHI

Iraqi Governing Council

You can imagine what kind of thoughts must have gone through his head. I mean to see himself in this situation, it's really something almost of Shakespearian or ancient Greek proportions. And when we finished he said: "Is that all?" As though he was expecting something else. He was expecting, you know.. some kangaroo trial, you know.. as he, during his regime, you know.. they used to bring people and try them and within half an hour the trial was finished and they face a firing squad.

CORBIN: Next week on Panorama on the tenth anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda, Fergal Keane talks

to the killers to discover why ordinary men obeyed their government and murdered their neighbours. If you have any comments about tonight's programme, visit our website, bbc.co.uk/panorama.

Appendix 4

***Panorama* broadcast DVD's**