



DOCTORAL THESIS

For Effect or Affect? UK Defence Change: Management

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FOR EFFECT OR AFFECT? UK DEFENCE CHANGE: MANAGEMENT

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of PhD

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ABSTRACT

For Effect or Affect? UK Defence Change: Management

This thesis is a critical examination of the UK defence discourse. It is an exploration of the dominant explanation of defence in the UK in 2015, as evidenced by the artefacts of the discourse—most importantly, by the voices of those within the community. In doing so, this thesis seeks to challenge the notion that there is only one *right* way to manage and judge the notion of defence, highlighting the cultural and contextual dependence of such ideas, and the dangers which arise from it.

In asking the simple question *what is defence?* I have aimed at identifying the references and experiences, through the deployment of an ethnographic approach, which are drawn on to construct the dominant understanding. In doing so, I have sought to distinguish that which is considered *legitimate* by the dominant managerial narrative and in what contexts.

My findings are illustrated in the form of a power structure within which language and symbolism, and their influence on practice, together build the defence community's expression of identity.

The predominance of managerialism in today's explanation of defence in the UK and the failings I have identified as a result, are perceivable throughout the UK public sector. Therefore, the restrictive nature of the narrative in excluding creativity and innovation in the defence sector, also has implications for wider public sector reform in the UK and abroad.

The primary contribution this thesis makes rests in the application of the ethnographic approach and a post-structuralist three-pillared framework to a discipline which has traditionally been analysed from an organisational or political perspective. The hope is that, in applying this same approach in multiple contexts, a greater understanding of the mechanisms sustaining dominant explanations can be gained, as well as of the importance of legitimised spaces for innovation and creativity in reform processes.

Key Words: Change Management; Defence; Discourse; Document Analysis; Ethnographic Approach; Governmentality; Identity; Ideology; Managerialism; Narrative; Panopticon; Performativity; Post-Structuralism; Power; Reflexivity; Risk; Security; Traditionalism; United Kingdom

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I write this final dedication with apprehension as submission of this thesis marks the end of the most complicated relationship I have had. My PhD has been a refuge during one of the most turbulent times in my life, providing me with one of those safe spaces I write about; one in which I could be a good version of myself and prove my worth and membership to my community. Equally, however, it has made me cry with anger and frustration, made my stress levels rise to unprecedented levels and given me no end of sleepless nights. So, as you can imagine, I am conflicted: eager to rid myself of what has been, at times, only a burden whilst fearful of losing my safe haven.

However, there are some gains I have made that submission of this PhD cannot take away: the realisation that I am a fortunate person and have many people to be grateful to. First, to my family: My mother has never wavered in her support for me, what appeared to be, perpetual studentship. I have done ten years at university, enjoying (more or less) every moment only because my mother has believed in my abilities, putting my career satisfaction first, and financed me throughout. My sister, Amaranta, who has listened to me rant about my work and, I am sure, taught herself to take an interest in my subject only for my sake, becoming one of the best sounding-boards anyone could ever ask for. Also, to her partner Francisco, who trusted me to commandeer their home for six weeks so that I could finish writing- up this thesis in peace. My dearest friend, Raja, who has held my hand through the worst and best of times, and, without my asking, always known when and how to lighten the burden.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADC	Annual Defence Conference
APC	Chief of the Air Staff Air Power Conference
BDD	British Defence Doctrine
BPR	Base Profit Rate
CBA	Cost-Benefit Analysis
CfQ	<i>Competing for Quality</i> (White Paper)
CGS	Chief of the General Staff
DAC	Defence Acquisitions Conference
DE&S	Defence Equipment & Support
DE&S+	Defence Equipment & Support (reconstituted to be more <i>business-like</i>)
DISP	Defence Industries and Society Programme
DR	Defence Reform (publication)
DRA	Defence Reform Act
Dstl	Defence Science and Technology Laboratory
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
GOCO	Government Owned Contractor Operated
HoCDC	House of Commons Defence Committee
HR	Human Resources
JCNSS	Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy
LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
LWC	Land Warfare Conference
MNC	Multi-National Company
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MP	Member of Parliament
NAO	National Audit of Office
NPM	New Public Management
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
QDC	Qualifying Defence Contract
RUSI	Royal United Service Institute for Defence and Security Studies
SDR	Strategic Defence Review
SDSR	Strategic Defence and Security Review
SSRO	Single Source Regulations Office
TCIF	Target Cost Incentive Fees
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
VfM	Value for Money
WFC	Whole Force Concept

TABLE OF PRIMARY DOCUMENTS

No.	Document	Year	Reference
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2	HM Government, <i>A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy</i> , Cm 7953	2010	HM Government, 2010b
3	Ministry of Defence, <i>British Defence Doctrine: Joint Warfare Publication</i> , (JWP) 0-01	1996	MoD, 1996
4	Ministry of Defence, <i>The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter</i> , Cm 5566, Vol. 1	2002	MoD, 2002
5	Ministry of Defence, <i>Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review</i>	2010	MoD, 2010
6	Ministry of Defence, <i>Appraisal Report: Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces 1963- 2014</i>	2014	MoD, 2014
7	HM Government, <i>National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom</i> , Cm9161	2015	HM Government 2015
8	House of Commons Defence Committee, <i>The Armed Forces Covenant in Action Part 5: Military Casualties, a review of progress: Government Response to the Committee's Fourth Report of Session 2014-15</i> , Eleventh Special Report of Session 2014-15	2015	HoCDC, 2015a
9	House of Commons Defence Committee (2015b), <i>The Situation in Iraq and Syria and the Response to al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq al-Sham (DAESH)</i> , Seventh Report of Session 2014-15	2015	HoCDC, 2015b
10	House of Commons Defence Committee, <i>Re-thinking Defence to Meet New Threats</i> , Tenth Report of Session 2014-15	2015	HoCDC, 2015c
11	House of Commons Defence Committee, <i>The Situation in Iraq and Syria and the Response to al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq al-Sham (DAESH): Government Response to the Committee's Seventh Report of Session 2014-15</i> , Twelfth Special Report of Session 2014-15	2015	HoCDC, 2015d
12	House of Commons Defence Committee (2015e), <i>Towards the Next Strategic Defence and Security Review: Part Three</i> , Twelfth Report of Session 2014-15	2015	HoCDC, 2015e

13	House of Commons Defence Committee, <i>Decision-Making in Defence Policy</i> , Eleventh Report of the Session 2014-15	2015	HoCDC,2015f
14	House of Commons Defence Committee, <i>Re-thinking Defence to Meet New Threats: Government Response to the Committee's Tenth Report of Session 2014-15</i> , Second Special Report of Session 2015-16	2015	HoCDC, 2015g
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16	Ministry of Defence, <i>Cost Comparison Analysis of Army Regular and Reserve Sub-Units</i>	2015	MoD, 2015a
17	Ministry of Defence, <i>Joint Doctrine Note 1/15: Defence Engagement</i> , August 2015	2015	MoD, 2015b
18	Ministry of Defence & Defence, Equipment and Support (2015), <i>Defence Equipment Plan 2015</i>	2015	DE&S, 2015
19	National Audit Office, <i>Ministry of Defence, Defence Equipment and Support: Reforming defence acquisition</i> , HC 946 Session 2014-15	2015	NAO, 2015a
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21	Single Source Regulations Office, <i>SSRO Corporate Plan: 2015- 2018</i>	2015	SSRO, 2015a
22	Single Source Regulations Office, <i>Review of Single Source Contract Profit Rate Methodology 2015: Consultation Paper</i>	2015	SSRO, 2015b
23	Single Source Regulations Office, <i>Programme of Value for Money Studies: Consultation Paper</i>	2015	SSRO, 2015c

PART I: BREAKING-IN

This section introduces the subject of this thesis: namely, managerialism in UK defence. In Chapter One, *Introduction*, I illustrate what managerialism means in practice in defence and demonstrate its relevance when trying to understand where existing policy emanates from. I briefly lay out the themes which emerge from the research subject, the question I will answer throughout this thesis, and the method by which I do so.

In Chapter Two, *Witnessing the New Defence I*, I present some of my core observations, based on my own observations of the defence community at work. In this Chapter, I describe the way in which defence is practiced in the UK, with particular attention paid to the use of language, the allusion to artefacts, prescribed and accepted formalities, and interactions between community members. Furthermore, I introduce myself and the role which I hold within the community and, therefore, in my research.

In Chapter Three, *Witnessing the New Defence II*, I conclude my observations and extract the themes that underscore my research and conclusions throughout the remainder of this thesis.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

This introductory chapter constitutes the end of the story of my research. In this chapter, I look back on the rationale that led me to write this thesis to begin with, the relevance of my topic of research and how I have implemented my method over three years to arrive at the conclusions I have today.

1.1 Background

On the morning of the 17th of July 2015, Britain woke to sensationalist media reports that the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, had authorised an act of war against Syria in defiance of Parliament. The headlines read: 'David Cameron 'knew British pilots were bombing Syria'' (Turner, 2015) and 'UK pilots authorised to bomb Syria without democratic sanction'. (RT, 2015a) The media onslaught aimed to lead readers to the conclusion that British democratic values had been violated. But, despite the political implications of such an act, the news reports soon petered out and the nation's attentions diverted to other matters.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) as we know it today was established in 1947, amalgamating the various offices within government and the civil service which had dealt with defence matters since the inter-war period. (MoD, 2014: 10) As was and is its responsibility, the MoD managed all matters pertaining to defence, including the budget, single services and the implementation of defence policy. (MoD, 2014: 14- 19) However, *how* these matters have been dealt with has inevitably been dependent on how *defence* as a conceptual construct has been framed. Over time the parameters of the frame of reference have changed and shifted to accommodate the dominant ideological driver in British politics. Today it appears that the dominant interpretation of defence management focuses more on the *management* aspect and less on *defence* (Pickard, 1997; Bishop, 2003; Uttley, 2005; Kinsey, 2009b; Louth 2009; Dunn, *et. al.*, 2011; Burgess & Moore, 2012; Heidenkamp, 2012; Ekström & Dorn, 2014; Frindorf, *et. al.*, 2014; Louth & Boden, 2014; MacBryde, *et. al.*, 2014; Taylor, 2014).

Let us take the news of the 17th of July 2015 as an example. Parliament had taken the decision in 2013 not to permit the United Kingdom (UK) to take part in an offensive against Syria, (BBC, 2013; The Economist, 2013; Bryan-Low, 2013) despite pressure from our closest ally, the United States (US). However, less than two years later, news reached the UK that British-trained military pilots had taken part in a bombing campaign in Syria. Armed with these basic facts, the logical conclusion is that the British Prime Minister had ignored Parliament's decision and sanctioned the UK armed forces to carry out an offensive alongside the US. However, if we add into the equation knowledge of the existence of a contract

between the US and UK armed forces, how we perceive the legitimacy of the act is transformed.

The contract in question authorised the transfer of accountability and decision-making powers over these pilots from the UK chain of command to that of the US. (MacAskill, 2015) In this case, British pilots had been embedded in the US armed forces and, as per their contracts, were obliged to act as full members of the US armed forces, answering to the US chain of command. Therefore, UK personnel—trained in the UK and paid by the British tax-payer to represent UK national interests as decided by democratic means—were able to carry out activities contra to UK policy, with the act being legitimised by the simple existence of a *contractual obligation*. As the Prime Minister proceeded to make clear in his response, the UK armed forces have a long history of embedding British military personnel in allied armed forces, thus it is by no means an unusual situation.

To return to my initial observation, this example demonstrates that the *defence* aspect—a policy decision not to take part in operations in Syria—had been superseded by the *management* aspect: the requirement to meet *contractual obligations*. The logic of this argument and the *a priori* acceptance of the legitimacy of the contractual obligation over the political decision of Parliament meant that the issue soon became a non-issue in the media, left only to be debated by experts within the field out of the public domain.

Today, the realm of defence in the UK is organised and managed through a plethora of schedules, frameworks, projects, portfolios, contracts and timelines by a far-reaching network of managers within management chains—a model wholly adopted from private sector management techniques. (Araujo, 2001; Boden, *et. al.*, 2001; Hookana, 2008; Burton, 2013; Frindorf, *et. al.*, 2014; MacBryde, *et. al.*, 2014; O'Connor, 2014; Van Dooren, *et. al.*, 2015) To not put too fine a point on it, defence has been extensively *managerialised* - a concept that will be explored at length throughout this thesis (Hopton, 1999; Hookana, 2008; Power, 2012; Gilling, 2014). This is a marked difference from the way that defence was conceptualised and managed throughout the twentieth century. Looking at the MoD's 1996 British Defence Doctrine (BDD), published by the then Defence Secretary, Michael Portillo, the notion of contracts and management chains is simply not present. As a matter of fact, the private sector, as represented by the British defence industry, only gets a single mention in a call for its support. (BDD, 1996) Instead, there is a heavy emphasis on the self-sufficient model by which the military retain the ability to deploy at any given time safe in the knowledge that all its capabilities are at hand as its fighting force is.

Moreover, the direction and value system that the BDD reveals is implicitly aligned to that of the armed forces. The majority of the document is dedicated to describing and framing the work of the armed forces, unashamed to make clear to the reader where the MoD's interests and support lay. In essence, it is clear by the structure and wording of the document that defence was military-centric. In stark

contrast, MoD publications and defence related studies sponsored by the government since, such as the *Strategic Defence and Security Review* (SDSR) (2010) and *Defence Reform* (DR) (2011), mention the armed forces relatively little. Instead, they espouse a value system based on notions of *efficiency*, *value for money* (*VfM*) and *good management*— notions which form part of a public sector- wide process of reform for improving *performance*. (Saxi, 2013; Ekström & Dorn, 2014; Frinsdorf, Zuo & Xia, 2014; O'Connor, 2014; Van Dooren, Bouckaert & Halligan, 2015)

This thesis, therefore, focuses on *how* and, most importantly, *why* the British construction of the notion of *defence* has been transformed in less than twenty years from *traditional* conceptualisation to a heavily *managerialised* one. Traditionalism, in this context, refers to the military-centric explanation of defence which dominated the UK defence discourse during the second half of the twentieth century. It was particularly characterised by concepts such as nationalism, patriotism, honour and the pursuit of victory. (Knott, c.1940; MoD, 1996; Kinsey, 2009a)

The persistent omnipresence of managerialism in today's defence discourse appears to encase and delimit the way in which we think about the topic, marginalising creative and innovative thinking in defence management that might fall outside the managerial conceptualisation of defence. Consequently, the object of my research has been to understand the managerial explanation, its apparent irrefutable legitimacy within the defence community and the purpose of shunning the traditional, military-centric approach.

1.2. Themes and Issues

Understanding the *how's* and *why's* in UK defence change management requires an understanding of its components and artefacts. Through the literature and my experiences I have identified five key elements of defence which, in turn, have framed my research: managerialism, the individual agent, the practice, governance and relationships.

1.2.1. Managerialism

Managerialism for the purpose of my thesis is not the same as management. Management has and always will be a necessary part of an organisations structure in some shape or form, thus has always been a part of the MoD's work: the services have always had to be managed as has the work of the MoD's civil servants. *Managerialism*, however, refers to the ideology which has management, contracting and the notion of risk at its heart and as its goal and focus (Enteman, 1993; Klikauer, 2015). This is an important distinction to make as it dictates the historical point which I have identified as the moment at which the managerial explanation of defence becomes dominant.

On a number of occasions I have been challenged to justify 1996 as my moment of transformation and my answer quite simply is that this is the last moment in which we can identify the MoD’s choice of language as being *traditionalist* as opposed to *managerial*. I could have begun in the 1940s, as some have suggested, when an emphasis on managing the forces better came to the fore, with senior military personnel demanding organisational reform in the face of what was identified as failings in the system during the two World Wars. (Martin *et. al.*, 2016: 347-8) Others have raised the merits of starting with the 1980s Heseltine Reforms when management information systems were introduced across government. (Smith, 1996: 265-310) However, although both of these are instances of change in the management and processes of the MoD, they are merely moments in which management was used as a tool for improvement.

Since 1996, with the *British Defence Doctrine* marking the end of the dominance of the traditional narrative, we see *managerialism* become a perspective from which to approach the framing of problems and solutions and the wholesale adoption of the managerial language to legitimise these practices—a phenomena that has been observed and researched in numerous contexts within the public sector. (Cap, 2010; MacBryde *et. al.*, 2014; Marín- Arrese, 2015) Thus, whereas the twentieth century MoD would have managed defence with an aim to fulfilling its very traditional defence objectives of *territorial integrity*, *patriotic values* and the *victory of good over bad*, today the MoD manages defence with a view to fulfilling managerial aims. This does not mean that the MoD no longer *does defence* but rather that the *defence* it does do is framed and coloured by the parameter of the managerial rather than traditional explanation.

So, what exactly does *managerialism* entail? The defence community appears to be motivated by notions of efficiency, contracts and risk— all managerial concepts, but these are mere elements of the narrative. The crux of managerialism is the belief that the private sector model of management is better than the public sector, bureaucratic model of old. At its core, it ‘is a modern management practice with the logic of economics retaining core public values which are not a static phenomenon but an evolving one.’ (Kalimullah, et. Al, 2012: 2) Its origins can be traced back to the New Public Management (NPM) school of thought which Thatcher popularised throughout the 1980s, with the help of Heseltine, by implementing its model of management across all government departments, putting into practice her vehement opposition to the inefficient bureaucratic model of administration that had ruled the public sector and, according to popular opinion at the time, created a budgetary deficit. (Burton, 2013: 17-26)

Table 1 explains the differences between the NPM model and the public administration model it replaced:

SI. No.	Elements	New Public Management	Traditional Public Administration
1	Government organization	Break-up of traditional structures into quasi-	Services provided on a uniform basis operating as a

		autonomous units	single aggregated unit
2	Control of public organizations	Hands-on professional management with clear statement of goals and performance measurement	Control from the head quarters through the hierarchy of unbroken supervision and checks and balances
3	Control of output measures	Stress results and output control rather than procedures	Control on inputs and procedures
4	Management Practices	Using private sector management style	Standard established procedures throughout the service
5	Discipline in resources use	Check resources demand and 'do more with less	Due process and political entitlements

Figure 1.1: Public Administration vs. New Public Management (Araujo, 2001)

The NPM model was thus 'a framework for reorganizing management procedures in the public sector with the aim of greater effectiveness and efficiency.' (Kalimullah et al., 2012: 9) In practice, these measures translated into a reorganisation of the public sector bureaucracy into a private sector management model in which each organisation has greater autonomy whilst remaining accountable to the relevant ministries for their performance, as measured against sets of indicators. Table 2 outlines the doctrines of NPM and their justifications.

SI. No.	Doctrine	Meaning	Justification
1	Hands-on professional management of public organization.	Visible managers at the top of the organization, free to manage by use of discretionary power.	Accountability requires clear assignment of responsibility, not diffusion of power
2	Explicit standards and measures of performance.	Goals and targets defined and measurable as indicators of success.	Accountability means clearly stated aims; efficiency requires a 'hard look' at objectives.
3	Greater emphasis on output controls	Resource allocation and rewards are linked to performance.	Need to stress results rather than procedures
4	Shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector	Disaggregate public sector into corporatized units of activity, organised by products, with devolved budgets. Units dealing at arm's length with each other.	Make units manageable; split provision and production, use contracts or franchises inside as well as outside the public sector.
5	Shift to greater competition in the public sector.	Move to term contracts and public tendering procedures; introduction of market	Rivalry via competition as the key to lower costs and better standards.

		disciplines in public sector.	
6	Stress on private-sector styles of management practice.	Move away from traditional public service ethics to more flexible pay, hiring, rules, etc.	Need to apply ‘proven’ private sector management tools in the public sector.
7	Stress on greater discipline and economy in public sector resource use.	Cutting direct costs, raising labour discipline, limiting compliance costs to business.	Need to check resource demands of the public sector, and do more with less.

Figure 1.2: Doctrine of New Public Management (Hood, 1994)

Although at the time it appeared that NPM was a party-political tool wielded by a Conservative cabinet that had traditionally been in favour of small government, its doctrines and its logic have persisted through changes in government. In fact, I would argue that it is the actions of the New Labour government between 1997 and 2010 that provide most of the evidence that NPM infiltrated the defence discourse to the extent that it is now the managerial philosophy which underscores the way the defence community make decisions, regardless of party affiliation. (Cutler & Waine, 2002) As a result, in 2015, *doing defence* requires a robust understanding of *management techniques, accounting, project management, Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), Value-for-Money, risk assessment, performance measurement*, and, in general, what it means to be *business-like*.

Despite its omnipresence, however, the different levels and incarnations of the defence discourse provide us with evidence that managerialisation was once a *disruption* which continues to be challenged by those who, although few, consider it an unwelcome driver of defence change management. Thus, within the discourse, there exist other narratives, particularly the traditional, which test the managerial narrative on a daily basis. For this reason, although for ease of understanding and description I depict it so, the managerial and traditional narratives are not binary in nature, but, in some contexts, overlap, with the former subsuming those aspects of the latter it is able to whilst marginalising those it cannot to maintain its dominance.

Some might argue that, rather than construct a theoretical framework to understand the discourse and language, the issue is better understood from a political theory perspective—more specifically, as a critical analysis of the dominance of neo-liberal politics in the UK (Nedeva & Boden, 2006; Bruff, 2014; Dahl & Soss, 2014; Kotz, 2015; Twort, 2015). However, I contend that widespread neo-liberalism is simply another artefact of the managerial narrative which some elements of society have adopted. *Managerialism*, on the other hand, also permeates institutions which have not been constructed from the neo-liberal ideology (such as the military). For this reason, I do not delve into neo-liberal political ideology at any point in my thesis.

1.2.2. The Individual

The identity of the individual in the defence ecosystem is central to understanding how we, as agents, contribute to the construction of the notion of *defence* in the UK. (Berger, 2011; Basham, 2013; Rumelili, 2015) One of the areas for exploration is how our current environment, and what aspects of it, contributes to the contemporary conceptualisation of *defence*. Foucault (Kritzman, 1988) philosophically theorised that, according to our social contexts, we tailor our identities by internally excluding certain ideas and behaviours which we, by observing the behaviour of others, deem inappropriate. Therefore, in any given community, there are implicit rules which we impose upon ourselves by observing how others behave—these he called internal exclusions. In turn, by our adherence to such rules, we unconsciously impose these rules on others, enforcing external exclusions. (Foucault, 1979) This same process has been recognised in the field of experimental psychology. Hood (2011) posits that as humans the biggest change that occurs through learning is the perceived necessity and ability to inhibit our own behaviour. Part of my research entailed the identification of these processes within the defence community by seeking out and understanding the process of legitimisation in defence management. (Habermas, 1976; Hobsbawn & Ranger, 1983; Bauman, 1989; Fromm, 2004; Cap, 2010; Deleuze, 2014; Giddens, 2014)

1.2.3. The Practice

Practices are, in essence, performances of our learnt identities; an expression of the *individual*. (Bell, 1999; Fortier, 1999; Loxley, 2007; Butler, 2005; Abes & Hernández, 2016) Such performances, though, have wider implications, beyond the definition and expression of the *self*. (Butler, 2005; Butler, 2010; Hood, 2011) Whereas *identity* is who we are, it is the *performance* of our identity which influences the formation of identity in others and reinforces our own. Butler's (2005) theory of *performativity*, in which she posits that the continual performance of an action leads to its integration into one's identity, is central to understanding how the managerial narrative has been normalised into the practice of defence and its norms.

The work of Giddens (2014) identifies that which we consider the *norm* as a consequence of one's observations of others' behaviour. Adding to this Deleuze's (2014) assertions that it is the mimicry of the *norm* by others' that lends a behaviour or norm its legitimacy, I have conceptualised practices as a form of legitimisation of behaviours. Thus, it is my objective to demonstrate through the observation of behaviours within the defence community that the continual performance of managerial models and their replication by those who perceive it as the only way to *fit-in*, is the managerial narratives primary vehicle of dominance maintenance. (Deleuze, 2014)

1.2.4. Governance

By understanding *governance* as the result of the formation of *identity* and its performance, the resulting acceptance of different or particular types of

governance becomes a source of information, illustrative of the dominant mode of thought. (Miller & Rose, 1990; Rose & Miller, 1992; Dean, 1994) Dean's (2010) concept of *governmentality* suggests that the act of government, both of the state and the self, arises from, and is dictated by a *mentality* or an identity. *Governmentality* is thus the tool by which the dominant mentality governs. I use the notion of *governmentality* to demonstrate how *managerialism*, having been identified as the dominant mentality of the agents of defence, courses through the system of government (both the political form of government and the governance of the individual) propagating its own logic (Power, 1994). In doing so, *managerialism* uses *governmentality* as a way of self-legitimising and as a secondary vehicle to maintain its dominance within the discourse.

1.2.5. Relationships

For the purpose of this research, *power* is not understood in the traditional sense—that is, as exercised by an individual or organisation over others—but rather as something that every individual practices and holds over all other individuals through relationships. In practice, this means that power resides more in ideas and narratives of explanation than in individuals, despite the latter being the conduit. In accordance with Lukes' (2005) third dimension of power by which we *collectively* and *unconsciously* exert power over each other by sustaining the *status quo* (Goleman, 1998; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Schmidt, 2001; Basham, 2009b; Zinn, 2009) My thesis is essentially a case-study for not only Lukes' third dimension of power but also Foucault's (Kritzman, 1988) notion of *totalisation*, by which a narrative encases a discourse. In the case of defence, the managerial explanation, as opposed to the traditional, has bounded the defence discourse so as to prevent any other explanations from becoming dominant. In doing so, the managerial narrative has become essential to the British defence identity, how we perform defence and, therefore, the *governmentality* driving defence. (MacBryde *et. al.*, 2014)

1.3. Research Questions

The primary question that guided my research was *how is defence as a concept constructed in Britain in 2015?* To answer this question, I needed to understand *how* the concept has changed, and, more importantly, *why*. Thus, from the primary research question there emanated a further three, providing a structure for my thesis. First of all, by analysing the official narratives found in government publications from the early twentieth century onwards (Ministry of Defence, 1996; HM Government, 2010a; HM Government, 2015; House of Commons Defence Committee 2015a; House of Commons Defence Committee, 2015g; Single Source Regulations Office, 2015a), *how has the concept of British defence changed?* Answering this question entailed an exploration of the evolution of the defence discourse since the 1940s. Having understood the history of the discourse, I tracked the reconstitution of defence from the mid-1990s, answering the question: *what means and processes can be identified in the reconstitution and maintenance of this new explanation of defence?* Finally, taking into consideration

the role of the individual, practices, governance and relationships in defence in the reconstitution process, I asked *why has the conceptualisation of British defence changed?*

1.4. Methodology

With the central theme of my research being conceptual, it was necessary to construct a complex and detailed theoretical framework. (Anfara & Mertz, 2104; Ravitch & Riggan, 2016) Although I have incorporated the work of various philosophers, sociologists and psychologists into the framework, it is based on the work of four theorists in particular and the key elements of their work: Foucault's (1979) notions of *regimes of truth* and *totalisation*, Butler's (2005) work on *performativity*, Dean's (2010) concept of *governmentality*, and Lukes' (1974) conceptualisation of the third dimension of *power*.

The work of Foucault (1979) on *regimes of truth* and *totalising narratives* aids the analyst in identifying the role of both the individual and practices in maintaining the dominance of the narrative. The notion of *regimes of truth* provided me with a way of understanding the impact and centrality of the use and proliferation of a particular language in maintaining managerialisms hegemony. By replicating the managerial language and reproducing its artefacts in practices, the agents of power (i.e. individuals) create a never-ending cycle of self-legitimation. (Basham, 2008; Basham, 2009a; Basham, 2009b; Louth, 2009; Twort, 2015) For example, if we seek to measure success through performance indicators, we are limiting ourselves to an interpretation of success based on quantitative data and statistics. Furthermore, we are limiting the kind of people that can interpret what success is to statisticians. This cycle of self-legitimation, in time, creates a *regime of truth* which encompasses the discourse in what Foucault labels a *totalising narrative*. (Foucault, 1979; Foucault, 1991)

This theorisation of the process is based on the assumption that there exists no one *truth*, but rather multiple, with the dominant truth at any given time being determined by the marginalisation of alternative *truths*. (Foucault 1988) To continue with the example of measuring success, the totalising effect of the *managerial* narrative means that even the plausibility of *measuring* success is taken for granted. Such inherent value judgements are a result of the repeated performances and, thus, the normalisation of such practices. (Butler, 2005) In turn, the ingrained identity and continued performances of it become a mentality of governance, dictating the bounds by which we accept being, and expect others, to be governed. (Dean, 2010) However, although a narrative is deemed totalising, it can never be *absolutely* totalising or else the constitution of the concept of defence could never have changed, leading to the acceptance of a single truth. Instead, the totalising narrative is constantly challenged by other narratives in the same way that, within the past twenty years, the managerial narrative has challenged and replaced the traditional narrative in how we define, perform and govern defence. It is this facet— recognition of the ability that defence can be framed by different parameters— which enabled me to cast a critical eye over the discourse. (Basham, 2009b; Louth, 2009; Twort 2015)

In his book *Power: A Radical View* (1974), Lukes explores what he calls the three *dimensions* of power. The first and second dimensions are examples of basic forms of exerting power: firstly as an observable, physical act, (Dahl, 1957) and secondly, through coercion or duress. (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962) However, in an age and society in which the use of force is unacceptable¹ and coercion is almost impossible taking into account the size of the population, neither of these can describe how *identity, performativity* and *governmentality* enable a *regime of truth* to totalise the discourse. (Foucault, 1979) It is the third dimension, Lukes' own work, which applies to my research. According to Lukes, this form of power is exercised unconsciously by the individual as well as collectively: each individual holds to and performs their interpretation of defence, the collective result of which is a large-scale manifestation of an overriding belief. (Schmidt, 2001; Basham, 2008; Louth, 2009; Locke & Spender, 2011; Power, 2012; Louth & Boden, 2014; Twort, 2015; Van Dooren, Bouckaert & Halligan, 2015) I posit that, within the defence community, those who are most powerful are the individuals who unconsciously propagate the managerial narrative by performing their managerial identities in their official, and sometimes unofficial, capacities. The collective impact of each small exercise of power results in the dominance of the managerial narrative and the exclusion of other narratives which might well be present in each individuals identities, and thus the performance of their identities, outside of their official roles. Such a distinction can be identified in the language that key agents choose to use according to the contexts in which they are performing. (Abdi, 2002; Coupland, 2007)

My method of choice—the ethnographic approach, borrowed from the anthropological discipline—is closely tied to the post-structuralist lens of my theoretical framework. The ethnographic approach combines observation and participation to enable the researcher to expand their evidence base to that which is non-verbal and unintended. (Gold, 1958; Bernard, 1994; Johnson & Sacket, 1998; Schensul, Schensul & LeCompte, 1999; Fine, 2003; Kawulich, 2005) With the purpose of my research being to uncover and understand the role of individuals, interactions and language, I felt that this method was the only way in which I could arrive at credible and valid conclusions. In observing, I primarily looked for organised patterns of behaviour, (Fine, 2003) enabling me to record non-verbal cues and symbolism, (Schmuck, 1997) to enrich my evidence base and conclusions.

¹ Today, our armed forces are governed by the Law of Armed Conflict and the Geneva Conventions (1949) which place a number of restrictions on the use of force in attempt to restrict it to the purely necessary. Although the laws in themselves might not be well-known, the aversion to the use of force is widespread, particularly in the UK, where there is societal opposition to military presence and action unless justified. See Ekins, Morgan & Tugendhat, 2015; Ferrell & Terriff, 2002; Roberts, 2000.

The participant element of the method allowed me to use my *self* as an active tool in the continual collection of information. In order to do so, I needed to be clear on the personal baggage I brought to my research. (Merriam, 1998) Having spent five years at university *specialising* in the international law and politics of defence and security, I carry with me a number of preconceived notions of how defence is, and more strongly, *should* be practiced. Throughout my research and through re-reading my own chapters, I have realised that this is an impossible mentality to shed and one that colours the way I portray events. On the other hand, it has been one that has enabled me to understand how those who populate the defence community can reconcile two seemingly incompatible narratives. My deeply traditionalist stance and my naiveté regarding how defence management and decision-making actually works today has, in fact, afforded me the ability to identify where and to what extent the managerial narrative is manifest. In short, my inability to identify with the managerial nature of defence is the precise part of me which has enabled me to recognise its prevalence.

The ethnographic approach has further allowed me to exploit my position as a researcher within the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI). As the oldest think-tank specialising in defence and security matters, RUSI has a long-standing relationship with the political, military and industrial establishment in the UK (O'Connor, 2011). It has an expansive network of contacts and is respected as a source of authoritative research on defence and security matters. It is also geographically uniquely placed on Whitehall, a stones-throw from the MoD and the Houses of Parliament. All of these factors combined to give me extensive access to numerous events in the defence community's calendar and to people in influential positions, willing to speak freely to and around me due to the institute to which, and researchers to whom, I am affiliated. This has been an invaluable source of information which has enabled me to gain a perspective of the discourse that secondary sources or formal interviews could not have. Therefore, my conclusions emanate from a unique source and offer a perspective on defence which is not accessible in any other context. However, this thesis aims to offer a snap-shot of the UK defence discourse today, it is not a sweeping statement that explains away defence through time nor do I assume to have the ability to predict how it will be constructed in the future. It is only meant to show how narratives can dominate and shape a discourse, and, in turn, explain why we do defence the way we do in 2015. Thus, it is methodologically bound to a specific time period.

Although an ethnographic approach has been the predominant method of collecting information, I have also carried out extensive document analysis to provide a starting point for my research as well as to support my conclusions. I have sought to analyse official MoD documents and research papers to demonstrate that the dominant narrative is present at all levels of the defence discourse, and to understand why, at times, it appears not to be.

1.5. Thesis Overview and Contribution

Part I of this thesis is entitled *Breaking-In* as it is dedicated to giving an account of my experiences in research, breaking-in to my field. This introductory chapter maps the journey of my research, from the identification of a research area, to the formulation of a question, through to the design of my method.

Chapter Two, *Witnessing the New Defence I*, and Chapter Three, *Witnessing the New Defence II*, on the other hand, are an account of my interactions with those in the defence community as a young new-comer. It is in these chapters that I offer up my observations of the practices and relationships that occur daily, out of the public eye, and which are only relevant and important in their context. Many of these are official, rehearsed performances, used by the defence community to reinforce the message put forward by official documents. However, these are but one layer of the defence discourse as they consist of deliberately formulated agendas in which certain individuals are excluded and others implicitly placed at the centre and afforded authority. The immediate reactions and interactions during and after conferences also provide a layer of the discourse which cannot be found in official papers.

Furthermore, I sought to depict the role of agency and complexity in the relationship between the managerial and traditional narratives, to be found in the choice of language and the legitimisation of the managerial narrative through certain behaviours. Through my narration, I attempt to illustrate that many members of the defence community value both the managerial and traditional narratives. However, depending on the context, they appear to select which narrative is most appropriate. In general, it appears that the managerial belongs to the formal and the traditional to the informal forum.

The chapters are presented and structured as a piece of fiction, in which I, the narrator, describe my surroundings and my own conversations at a fictional conference. Although the setting is fictional, all observations and reported conversations are representations of my real experiences with prominent people in the UK defence community. I am aware that a traditional PhD thesis begins with the presentation of the methodology; however, I have chosen to begin by telling my story as all subsequent chapters are about unpacking the events I describe. Thus, I felt that, by not beginning so, my thesis would lack coherence.

In Part II, *Making Sense of 'Defence'*, I present my methodology over two chapters, making the link between the theory, method and story clear. I have chosen to present it this way in order to illustrate that my methodology is not only a tool with which to collect data, but is crucial to my structure, method and conclusions. In Chapter Four, I construct my theoretical framework in detail, emphasising its importance to the credibility and validity of my conclusions. Chapter Five is dedicated to explaining and justifying my method. In this chapter I explain a little more about myself and my role, not only as researcher, but as interpreter. Here I try to reflect upon those parts of my history and present, as well as my characteristics, which colour the way in which I read and present the

information. I go on to describe the virtues of the ethnographic style as well as its limitations. I also reflect on my own subjectivity during the research process.

Part III of this thesis, *Affecting Efficiency*, tracks the history of the defence discourse as found in the language and use of artefacts. In Chapter Six, *Disrupting Defence*, I use a number of primary sources in the shape of official documents to demonstrate the shift in the dominant narrative through the change in the language used. In this same chapter, I provide an analysis of the process of change and its official and unofficial justifications. In Chapter Seven, *For Queen and Country*, I analyse a number of sources including autobiographies and military handbooks intended for political decision-makers, seeking out expressions of the traditional narrative which dominated defence in the UK between the 1940s and 1990s. In addition, I provide an overview of research published since 2010 which demonstrates the continuing existence of traditionalism in defence, albeit as a residual narrative. Lastly, in Chapter Eight, *For Economy and Prosperity*, I analyse official documents published in 2015, dividing issues thematically to illustrate that, today, choice and the treatment of salient themes demonstrates that the transformation of the defence discourse has resulted in a deeply managerial explanation of defence.

In Part IV, *Feeling the Effect*, I lay out my findings and conclusions. In Chapter Nine, *The Corridors of Power*, I return to my theoretical framework to enable me to demonstrate how and why relationships within the defence community create a self-legitimising, self-reinforcing narrative in a continuous cycle of power and dominance. I also use this space to identify the weaknesses of the dominant narrative and how its totalising boundaries are always being challenged by the alternative, traditional narrative. These challenges are observable in conversations being held within and outside of the official context. Chapter Ten sees a harking back to the purpose of this thesis, with a return to the questions posed in Chapter One, by drawing on the numerous sources that I have referred to throughout. Chapter Eleven concludes my thesis, providing an overview of my research journey and findings as well as identifying areas for future research.

With this research, I have sought to fill a gap in the literature regarding defence management and its explanations. Although there is an abundance of research into the managerialisation of the UK public sector as well as literature on the dominance of neoliberal thought in the West, there is little research which seeks to understand how legitimacy is conveyed and assessed within defence and, thus, the way in which decisions are made and explained. But '[w]ithout a deeper understanding of the theory which informs expected performance it is difficult to effectively carry out other critical activities such as making corrections when required and explaining variations to key stakeholders.' (Burgess & Ekström, 2014: 150)

In sum, through the employment of an ethnographic-type approach and the construction of a three-pillared theoretical framework, this research is an exemplary of Foucault's and Lukes' theories on power, demonstrating that power

in defence management is exercised by each individual, with these contributions being the basis for *legitimate* decision-making. (Basham, 2009b; Louth, 2009; Twort, 2015)

CHAPTER TWO: WITNESSING THE NEW DEFENCE I

2.1. Introduction

Defence is something that is done—we defend something or someone against *another*. Although speaking of *defence* intuitively brings to mind images of battlefields and war zones, a large part of it is done here in the UK at desks, behind computers or around meeting tables. One of the ways in which the defence community witnesses and learns about these aspects of the work of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is through attendance at a number of annual conferences.

In this chapter and the next, I seek to explore the performance of defence by key members of the community at conferences. But why is performance important? Although documents provide us with a well worked and thought over presentation of the authors' defence identities, performance provides its own nuances. (Butler, 2005) In the acting out of their identities, individuals not only demonstrate their ability to stick to the official narrative but, inevitably, sometimes stray from it. It is precisely these breaks in consistency which show us the importance of the dominant narrative in shaping practice and the mechanisms of power which sustain its dominance. (Foucault, 1988)

Exploiting my position at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), I have been able to attend a number of conferences and observe the performances of those invited to speak and those attending, both during the formal procedures as well as during the lunches and dinners which provide a more relaxed setting. During these, I observed the impact that the expected competencies, roles and behaviours of each individual have on the way in which they inhabit the space they are provided, the interactions they have with others and the dialogues which arise from these.

In this chapter, I begin by explaining what I mean by *performance* in the defence community and its impact on how change is understood and carried out. Following a brief introduction to the context of my narration, the remainder of the chapter is dedicated to those voices which unwittingly and, most importantly, comfortably propagate the dominant ideology in defence today.

2.2. Performance and Change in the Defence Community

Performance of defence in the UK is largely in the form of public statements, speeches, attendance at inaugural events, meetings overseas and engagement with industry. (MoD, 2015b) Very little of it is carried out by the armed forces on operation. Quite to the contrary, the forces are no longer expected to engage in battle but rather the defence community works to keep them out of it. Thus, if we take performance as the production of 'truths, entities and subjects', (Bell, 2012: 13) the notion of defence is best determined by reference to the former rather than the latter.

Performances of the UK defence identity provide a forum wherein ‘[p]ower relations are exercised, to an exceedingly important extent, through the production and exchange of signs’. (Faubion, 1994: 338) The wearing of uniforms, displaying of ranks, elevation of certain individuals as *authorities*, selection of *topical* subjects and exclusive invitations to VIP dinners are all signs and symbols which encase the defence discourse. Their prevalence and presumed legitimacy have a *totalising* effect, reinforcing the dominant *regime of truth*. (Foucault, 1991) This *regime of truth* is quite simply that business-like private-sector models of practice and behaviour are inherently *good*. (Uttley, 2005; Louth, 2009; Louth & Boden, 2014) In their performances at annual conferences, individuals within the defence community demonstrate their adherence to this *truth* by speaking in managerial terms and avoiding the framing of issues in any other way. (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Abdi, 2002; Basham, 2009b; Louth, 2009) This is not only a result of their own internal discipline, but also a result of the way these events are structured and the subjects that they are asked to speak on—essentially, exclusionary practices which are embedded in the defence discourse and which delimit the *legitimate*. (Mills, 2003: 57)

The process of *totalisation*, whereby a singular narrative becomes the frame of reference and thus the only way in which individuals are able to interpret information, relies on the repeated and consistent performance of the narrative. (Loxley, 2007) Conferences and major annual events provide the perfect space for the reproduction of symbols of identity and the defence culture. *Spaces* are often created to provide forums in which *forward-thinkers* (or outliers) can voice their opinions in a safe environment. (Stengel & Weems, 2010) I argue, however, that conferences are spaces nonconsciously created for quite the opposite purpose. They instead provide a *comforting space* within which attendees can nonconsciously mimic accepted behaviour, (Goleman, 1998; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) safe in the knowledge that no more is expected of them. (Stengel & Weems, 2010) The organisers do not consciously set out to create an environment in which participants and attendees are comfortable, but do so by virtue of the fact that there appears to be no other way to run a conference— ‘common sense tends to end up with a black box methodology, accessible to a few, thereby making it difficult to reflect critically, or transmit the knowledge to others.’ (Burgess & Ekström, 2014: 146) In truth, they do not serve to inform attendees of any new ideas or policies, but serve as spaces for the reinforcement of the narrative, addressed to the *right* people.

The *norm* is the standard by which we judge the legitimacy of an act. Taken as such, the norm rests upon the expectations that others have of individuals as well as the individuals’ perception of what others expect. (Connerton, 2013: 35) In defence, uniforms, ranks and titles are legitimised as a source of authority but, as we will see below, so is the ability to *speak management*. Thus, the coupling of these provides a ‘canopy of legitimations’ (Berger & Luckman, 1991: 79) into which the audience are *socialised*- the process by which behaviour is moulded within a community. (Van Maanen & Schein, 1977) If it does not succeed in socialising an individual, then this individual is not considered a legitimate or full

member of the community. (Cooley, 1922) This observation is taken from, not only the literature, but also from my own experiences as I have no uniform, no rank, no title and no experience or ability to speak management. Therefore, I am always taken as an *in-training* member of the community and very rarely do I feel that I am being taken seriously. However, I recognise that this is not so due to the arrogance or a deliberate striving for exclusivity from the defence community, but rather a result of their inability to conceive of another perspective of defence as legitimate. Each of these individuals have ‘almost an instinctive feeling for the right ideology’ (Schmidt, 2001: 148) and any deviation from it is an uncomfortable prospect to consider.

Through constant repetition, the narrative becomes the informer of institution, convention and truth. (Berger & Luckman, 1991: 70) The formal setting of a conference, the mode of invitation and the people around us at these events, become triggers for unconscious memories and environmental cues, which dictate how we perform at them, illustrating to the observer what is considered legitimate and proper. (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999: 462; Connerton, 2013) These legitimised performances at conferences have become ingrained in the defence identity of the community, and, the more times these performances are repeated and accepted as legitimate by their audience, the harder it becomes for individuals to deviate from their managerialised identities and speak or perform in a way that does not conform. (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999: 465-6) This merely serves to reinforce the *regime of truth* embodied by the narrative. (Loxley, 2007)

What are the implications then for *change* within defence? How are we to introduce *adaptability* and *flexibility* in UK defence, (HM Government, 2015) to respond to the ever-changing context in which we must operate if the totalising nature of the narrative does not permit decision-makers to innovate? Despite the restrictive nature of the totalising narrative, the notion of *change* is integral to defence management. The connotations that the idea of *change* carries with it, however, are limited to change as conceivable within the managerial narrative. Thus, when there are failures in defence (for example, operational failures or overruns in expenditure) change is often called for, but, in this context, change is conceived of as simply *more* managerialisation and failures attributed to the bad implementation of managerial practices. (House of Commons Defence Committee, 2015c; House of Commons Defence Committee, 2015f) As we will see below, it is at conferences that this embodiment of change is often explained and promoted as the only path to success.

There are many people in important positions, who do not cynically *subscribe* to the managerial ideology in order to advance their careers. In fact, individuals are often entirely unaware of the ideological underpinnings of their expressions. In conversation, many are simply trying to *teach* me how to progress in the defence community, with all their good intentions. It is clear that they hold to a belief that the way to succeed is through *better management*. To them, there is no alternative way and how could there be?

However, some members of the defence community voice their opposition and become relegated to the periphery of that community, perhaps respected, within the limits of the group's capacity, for their personal achievements and their intellect. Their thoughts, opinions and the core of their work is acknowledged with a metaphorical nod and a smile, and they are invited to attend conferences, sometimes to sit on a panel of four within which their voice is drowned out by the majority, but their words are reinterpreted to fit the dominant narrative. In this chapter as well as the next, I provide a space for these different voices, as witnessed and understood by a newcomer trying to understand what it takes to be a part of their world.

2.3. Annual Defence Conference 2015

The Annual Defence Conference (ADC) (programme provided in Appendix 1) is an event I have created to illustrate how defence is performed in the particular medium of the conference. Although ADC itself is imagined, none of what occurs throughout is. I use observations gleaned during three of the defence community's most attended annual conferences in the year 2015 to describe what occurs and how interactions are carried out. In addition, I use my own participation in numerous conversations with fictitious respondents (biographies throughout as well as in Appendix 2) that are each based on combinations of participants whose responses were similar, to express those views which are common within the community.

Before starting, however, I think it is important to underscore the importance and significance of the fact that I am able to describe these three conferences, each on a distinctive area within defence—land warfare, air power and acquisitions—as if they were one. To any expert, the combining of these three areas into one melting pot seems extreme as, in terms of subject knowledge, they are completely different. However, one of the perceived benefits of *good management* in the managerial ideology is that of universalisation. (Araujo, 2001) In other words, that all good management techniques can be lifted and applied to all subject areas as management is external to the field. That is how we get management experts. Therefore, whether they be on land, air or acquisitions, conferences follow the same structure and, at their core, they could be one and the same. The same ranks of people are sought for the key speeches such as opening and closing remarks and the same expertise is looked to for the analysis. Thus, most, if not all, the elements of ADC can be found in each of the real conferences I observed. In essence, there is an observable *norm*.

2.3.1. 0800 Registration

Every year, the RUSI Land Warfare Conference (LWC), Chief of the Air Staff Air Power Conference (APC) and Defence Acquisitions Conference (DAC) are held in the same venues at roughly the same time of year. To date, I have attended three of each of these and have struggled to see much variance year-on-year

beyond the change of session titles. Every year, the same people attend, often all three conferences. At ADC 2015, it is much the same routine.

I arrive early to help with the hosting of the event, nodding my *good morning's* to the habitual group of fifteen or so Christian and pacifist protesters who gather outside the ADC venue. (RT, 2015b; Morning Star, 2015) Having pretended to help set up the registration tables, my efforts hampered by the excessive number of host employees, I make myself look useful as I begin to see the awakenings of life outside the main door against a background of lulling hymns enthusiastically sung.

Entering with full authority and a small posse of colleagues whose faces are familiar to me but whose names I can never remember, is General Arp in full military regalia, joined promptly by Lieutenant General Beltmer, an old colleague and friend of his, now working at the MoD. Moments later, Professor Dalí enters to a warm welcome from RUSI staff and other academics from numerous institutions. There is very little movement within this core of people who make up roughly seventy percent of the attendees to all the conferences on the calendar, other than maybe a promotion or job title change. The remaining thirty percent of attendees will be made of people who are studying advanced degrees or on a visit to the UK with a foreign delegation so will not be seen again. I observe this ritual of greeting being repeated again and again throughout the first hour of the day, on occasion joining in, until most of the delegates (with the transitory attendees standing firmly by the coffee table) have regrouped with their peers, most of which they most certainly saw at the same place last year, if not at numerous other events in-between.

Slipping away from my post I make a bee-line for Lord Miró. I have, by now, my own tactic for getting through conferences, always starting my day with a nice comfortable conversation with someone I know might not necessarily express these views in an official capacity, but who will gladly engage with me in what to them is a purely theoretical conversation on one of my own subjects of interest—it is a nice way to ease myself into a group and sure way of getting myself noticed.

Right Honourable Lord Miró

Lord Miró is an outspoken man who has never been in the military, worked for the MoD nor in academia. He is a career politician. He is a well-respected man who is attended to as a senior member of the defence community who—and this is my impression alone—attends events as a hobby. Lord Miró is happy to express his opinions loudly, with the care-free attitude of someone who knows that very few will listen. And this would be right. People are often quick to admit they enjoy his company, but will do so indicating through their vocabulary, body language and context in which they are willing to talk about him

(i.e. never at the podium or in a workshop) that his conversation is merely a *bit of fun*. Therefore, regardless of his passion for the subject of identity and traditionalism, his ideas do not filter into the realm of decision-making.

Over a coffee we stand together, almost talking over each other in an attempt to make, really, what is the same point: identity is essential to defence in the UK; if we are able to understand what our identity is and have an input into its construction, then we will be better able to define and control our purpose and direction in decision-making in defence. It is an argument I have heard him make on numerous occasions. Neither of us is able to contain an almost childish excitement at simply being able to agree on something we actually believe in. However, after only five minutes of animated discussion, we are joined by Professor Dalí and a quiet colleague of his.

After the polite and gentle greetings and introductions common to these occasions, we are asked what we might have been talking so excitedly about. Rt. Honourable Miró does not hesitate to answer 'strategy'. 'Oh, how interesting!' And thus the tone of the conversation is once more raised and a purely academic debate ensues. In the knowledge that we will all be called into the conference hall soon, we politely wrap up the conversation, with a useful, although sarcastic, summing up by Professor Dalí:

So, we conclude that we need a binding message to be put out to our public and armed forces, as generalities such as *peace* and *prosperity* provide very little guidance in the formulation of doctrine. We must take this straight to the Minister! (2015)

Though I chuckle along, I secretly think to myself: *maybe we should*. With the sarcastic end and the confining of the conversation to a small group of academics, it is clear to me, however, that my fellow philosophers do not feel this conversation belongs in the conference programme. A few wry smiles and winks later, the conversation is laid to rest outside the conference hall, in the realm of jest and time-fillers.

Walking towards the hall in that paused manner that only occurs when a large group of people are attempting to funnel through a narrow doorway in a polite and orderly fashion, I notice that there is one thing that, by 2015, I no longer really see but that used to be something to take note of when I first joined RUSI: the sponsor logos. At ADC 2015, as at all other conferences, the sponsor companies have strategically placed their names all over the conference programme, conference hall and reception rooms. All delegates have undoubtedly received an email upon registration informing them of the details of the conference including (and I am sure the email is worded to indicate immense gratitude to them) the details of the sponsors. In fact, each event outside of the sessions (i.e. registration, lunch and

dinner) has been sponsored by a different company, and the organisers have gone to great lengths to ensure the delegates know it.

After a few conferences, I have ceased to notice the sponsor logos; it is this that is fascinating. Where the organisers have put a company logo, I see the name of a man (occasionally, a woman) who I know will be at the conference and whom I will be able to speak with. This is noteworthy because industrialists appear to have become so integral to defence that we are unable to run an event without them. The organisers of ADC 2015 would have thought *we need a list of twenty people integral to defence to speak at our conference*. Politicians, academics, armed forces representatives and industrialists would have sprung easily to mind, followed by the habitual struggle to find media names that might have enough authority to fit in beside these mammoths of defence. But if we look at defence in the early 1990s, we would not find that these industrialists' names were as common place or, if they were, that they would be so readily placed on a podium with full legitimacy to speak authoritatively on any matters of defence.

2.3.2. 0830 Opening Address

As is expected of a member of staff, I hold back as I enter the conference hall, allowing guests to find a seat before slotting myself in wherever there might be a space. It is, I have learnt, the correct way in which to demonstrate deference, despite the fact that, although I am affiliated to the organisers, I am in attendance as a delegate and not as a host. Unfortunately, I was naively unaware of this protocol when I began, erroneously following my own logic, when at my first conference I was one of the first to be seated alongside a Professor I had been deep in conversation with. Suffice it to say that, following a not-so-subtle and very loud comment as to the impropriety of my behaviour from a colleague, I have never risked the embarrassment again.

The welcome speech is always delivered by someone of status and authority—today it is Sir Roy. He (never in my experience *she*) must inevitably rush off immediately after the address, leaving everyone to apologise for him, due to the substantial demands on his time. To their credit and as usual, the organisers have got this one right as the delegates are attentive throughout. One cannot help but wonder, however, are we listening so avidly to the rank and status of the man or to his words?

Sir Roy begins with a common opener on the importance of defence today despite the fact that not a single person in the room would ever contest its significance. He proceeds with the habitual complaints, emphasising the fact that, although we sitting in the room can see quite clearly how important defence is, others of lesser expertise are not paying it the attention it deserves. This is not an uncommon complaint and I suspect that in all sectors—education, health, etc—conferences start on the same note. In defence, the complaint is that security is being prioritised above defence. But, in today's world, what is the difference? This

subject is never touched upon and I have been unable to find a satisfying answer, neither during observations nor through active enquiry.

So what does Sir Roy believe the reasons behind this inattention to defence are? The answer is, apparently, quite simple: defence management is perceived, and by his delivery I suspect he agrees, as ‘expensive and inefficient.’ (2015) The result has been that defence policy has evolved without direction and thus is lacking in structure and good management. With each body within defence having taken charge of itself, it is now hard to define what the UK’s political objectives are. In essence, there is no unifying direction. So what do we do about this? Sir Roy suggests that defence is all about avoiding, not fighting, war. What we need instead is a ‘values-based approach’, (2015) taking into account that contemporary society expects military restraint. He is quite adamant that he knows how we can achieve this: we must ‘fight smarter, operate smarter and maximise talent.’ (Sir Roy, 2015) Although I am initially taken in by the conviction of his delivery, it does not take me long to remember that I have heard this over and over again. In terms of policy or strategy, it really does not mean anything. But looking around, not a single eyebrow is raised and the only response is a quiet frenzy of nods of assent in the front rows (reserved only for those of status) serving only to encourage our speaker.

But the next section of the pre-drafted speech has nothing about values—not in the traditional sense anyway. Instead, we are treated to a short lesson on a very repetitive topic: the 2%-of-GDP issue. (HM Government, 2015) It is beyond me to this day why we talk so much about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 2% expenditure requirement. But Sir Roy triumphantly announces that 2% is most certainly ‘necessary and sufficient’. At no point would I claim that I know how much it is necessary we spend on defence but I am more convinced by explanations as to *what* we need and *how much* it will amount to. And if this comes to less than 2%, is that not sufficient? Equally, if it comes to more, should we not be prepared to consider it? Nevertheless, once more, it appears that the correct response to this kind of sweeping statement is to express unanimous agreement.

Sir Roy continues, outlining what we should be spending our 2% on: hard power and soft power. ‘Hard power’, he says, ‘is important because we must maintain our alliances. Today, collective security is one of the most important factors in this globalised world, especially in the face of such diverse threats. Our forces’, he continues, must be ‘adaptable and flexible’ to be useful, but we must not lose sight of the importance of deterrence, which, ‘along with protection, contributes to stability.’ (2015) Maybe it is implicit, but I am sat waiting to hear that we need hard power as conventional forces remain an important part of our defence capabilities. But this does not materialise. In my mind, his version of hard power is almost synonymous with soft power as it is alliances which have political, and thus deterrent, clout. Is that now the only purpose of hard power?

‘The most important thing is always good management, however.’ (Sir Roy, 2015) Sir Roy explains that good management will result in the *efficient* and *effective* running of the MoD and armed forces and the only way to achieve this is through running them like a business. This means that we must place an emphasis on changing MoD culture and organisational behaviour to inculcate in its people a *business ethos*. The rest of the speech is given over to the need to have access to the right skill sets in the private sector by ensuring that industry feel that they are a part of the defence ecosystem and are being listened to. In turn, the idea is, industry will keep the MoD well supplied with the right types of skills and cater to its requirements.

I am left wondering by the end of it how any of what has been said can be translated into what I perceive as *defence*. He has talked in the abstract about what the armed forces must do; he has said no more on expenditure other than to reassert the UK’s commitment to the 2%; he has talked about remaining useful to our allies; and he has championed the business model of management. But there has been neither mention of threats and how we will respond to them nor any allusion to how we will be successful in our endeavours. But the audience are satisfied and Sir Roy steps down from the podium to vigorous applause and expressions of gratitude from the chair of the session, before heading straight for the door and continuing on with his daily business.

2.3.3. 0900 Session 1: Why is defence important? Tackling the threat environment

In contrast to the opening session, session one, with all its prestige, is never a silent affair. I say *prestige* as it is *common knowledge* that session one is the best slot to be given: all delegates are excited for their day out of the office and suitably propped up by the free coffee and biscuits distributed beforehand. However, once more, delegates sporadically break out into whispered *hello’s* and *nice to see you’s* as latecomers try to find a seat near to their peers. It is worth noting that many latecomers, such as Dr Carrington, would rather stand at the back until the coffee break than take a seat next to some unknown. Instead, she continuously scans the backs of uniformed and suited heads trying to spot someone she knows. Keeping a trained eye on them until she has the opportunity to muscle her way through to them. With all this going on, you can imagine that there are very few people actually paying attention to the speakers, especially since, in truth, what they are saying is already well known.

Although I criticised Sir Roy for not speaking about threats, the first session of the conference will be dedicated to this subject. However, looking at the panellists they appear to be made up of economists and management consultants and it is their opinion which is championed.

The very first speaker of the conference is a strategy and management consultant and Director of one of the largest European firms in the business. The entire presentation is given over to economic considerations and the framing of defence

issues from this perspective—in truth, we really could not expect anything else from someone in that field. The defence environment is characterised by the speaker in just three very simple terms: interdependency, civilianisation and commercialisation. In essence, we are no longer opening a conference on defence issues with discussions of military operations and the role of the armed forces, nor with reference to existing threats despite that being the subject of the first session, but, instead, are satisfied with a descriptive account of what it is that appears to be worrying people the most, regardless of its relevance to defence matters.

But of course it is relevant. Although it does not quite sit right with me personally, today the emphasis on economic interdependence, the civilianisation of skills and technology and the inherent good of commercialisation has reframed and redefined what defence means in the public sector and, for that matter, to the public in general. In contemporary society, it is clear that defence is performed largely by those out of uniform. This is not necessarily a new thing—there has always been a large civilian contingent behind those in uniform. The difference is that now defence is being framed in such a way that the roles are reversed: it is now the uniforms that are cast in the supporting role. As made clear by the speaker, this has been the result of a concerted effort to change the culture of the MoD with a view to making it a *well-run* organisation.

The second panellist steps up to, essentially, pick up where the first left off. Also a consultant, he uses this platform to explain in great detail how there has been a convergence in civilian and military technologies. By his wording, the audience are led to understand that this is one of the wonderful things about modern life: we need not have nationalised industries, riddled with bureaucratic inefficiencies, when private companies are developing technologies with multiple purposes and much faster. In addition, private companies are able to pay and retain skilled workers, enabling them to develop their careers at a socially acceptable rate. The public sector simply cannot offer these benefits. So where is the logic in not slimming down the public sector and contracting the private sector to provide the services and capabilities the MoD need?

As for the third speaker, a foreign head of international aviation strategy, he uses his ten minutes on the platform to extol the virtues of competition and cooperation in enabling the *customer* to acquire what they need whilst stimulating the economy and making crucial financial savings. Considering his job role, I am quite surprised at just how much regard he appears to have for the private sector way of conducting business and at how central he considers it to be to international aviation strategy. It is either that he holds it in significantly high regard, or that he does not know what he is supposed to be saying to this audience. Either way, the one thing that is qualifying him to talk about defence on this panel can only be that the organisers of the conference consider his job title and/or the organisation he represents to be sufficiently important to override whatever the content of the presentation might be.

There are a few issues that the speakers have not touched upon. Let us take the example of *sovereignty*. Most of these large companies are not British but multi-nationals, thus the technology that our military could be buying could also be bought by other countries. More worrying still, information on our capabilities could be sold to the highest bidder or leaked to our enemies and used against us. What about the issue of *values*? Private sector entities will never, by definition, have the same values as the military. That is not to say that private companies cannot have ethical standards, but these are centred on universal values such as equality and anti-exploitation. We cannot expect a private, multi-national company, employing people from all sorts of backgrounds and nationalities, with numerous skill levels, to have as a value the protection and defence of our nation.

Maybe this is all too traditionalist and I could be accused of not moving with the times. So let us take an economic perspective and prioritise a crucial factor in economics: employment. If low levels of unemployment are crucial to the security and defence of our country, then how do we justify contracting out and paying large sums of money to multi-national companies who, as and when it suits them could leave this country and produce and manufacture in another? What does Britain look like in the extreme hypothetical where all defence contractors have done this? I can safely predict we would have increased levels of unemployment, a skills shortage and be relying on foreign nationals to bolster our defence capabilities through the provision of services. But no one, including myself, raises any of these issues in the question and answer session.

2.3.4. 1030 Morning Coffee Break

After one and a half hours and a couple of questions from the audience, with the most avid questioner being Ms Giacometti from RUSI, everybody is very excited to break for coffee. All the seated delegates rush out of what is usually a very hot conference room to greet those, like Dr Carrington, who have clung to the back walls of the conference hall for safety. I am not simply being facetious in writing this. The way in which delegates enter and instinctively group together is significant within itself. Despite the uniforms, the ranks, the fancy job titles which lend a certain air of confidence to individual performers, most still practice *safety in numbers* as they are unconsciously aware that these characteristics only lend authority in the presence of certain audiences. This, of course, has an impact on the tone and subjects of discussions as delegates always seek to keep things *safe* in a bid to remain part of their selected group.

At coffee breaks, very rarely do these groupings of people initiate a conversation into which anyone can interject or offer a dissenting view. Instead, they talk about the last conference or dinner they attended—inevitably an exclusive topic of conversation—standing, like a bovine herd, with their backs to outsiders, seemingly emanating the threat of a hoofed kick were anyone to attempt to join inadvertently. Newcomers, therefore, find comfort in other single attendees who stay close to doors or beverage tables. Most of the time, the best way to get into a herd is to wait for one member to separate and head to the anti-social smoker's

area. These individuals, aware of their anti-social behaviour, are open to any conversation starter and will then introduce you to their friends inside, where you can join the herd, offering your own threatening rear to those who remain wandering strays. I personally have adopted this tactic on numerous occasions, and today, having noted that Professor Dalí has a tendency to make the most of any opportunity to veer away for a smoke, I recourse back to my early days, fishing out my pack of twenty and leaving my lighter buried deep in my pocket.

Professor Dalí

Professor Dalí is a career academic. He has dedicated his life to researching defence management, particularly in regards to managing the education of the armed forces. Today he holds an authoritative post within academia, and is a globally respected Professor, often being asked to lecture abroad on his expertise. His post, however, as those of many other academics, has become a matter of management. Although many academics are fighting this, Professor Dalí is of the firm belief that private sector management models make for better education as well as a better run military. Thus, despite his never having been a military man nor a private sector employee, he is able to communicate well with industry and understand private sector practices; a skill he is proud of.

Like an awestruck teen, I follow the Professor out and nonchalantly (in my own mind) mumble some jokes about always forgetting my lighter before accepting the offer of his own. Having unashamedly used my RUSI credentials to introduce myself, I find that we are chain-smoking in the sunshine, enjoying our conversation. Professor Dalí, a man who has dedicated a lifetime (almost four decades) to researching defence but who has never wandered out of the comfort of academia, most certainly has some very strong views with regards to its management and is most willing to instruct me on them in the hope that I will learn something valuable during my early dabbings in the defence community.

Smiling, I ask how he feels defence management has changed throughout his working years. My smile is promptly rewarded when he beckons me over to a seating area—a clear sign that he is in it with me for the long haul and will not be abandoning me in favour of an old acquaintance with a better job title anytime soon. But his opening line is my greatest reward: ‘Efficiency is how we have changed’. (Professor Dalí, 2015)

What is the main change in how daily life is conducted within defence? ‘A change in vocabulary’, (2015) he says. I am by no means diminishing Professor Dalí’s ability to think for himself but at this point and with this response I feel a little like he is trying to frame things in a way which will fit in with my research—a topic we have just been discussing. So, bearing this in mind, I ask him to expand.

‘The defence enterprise is fragmented. The way to fix this’, he explains, ‘is to ensure compatibility in language and practices which the MoD and the defence community in general have been working hard to achieve.’ (Professor Dalí, 2015) He himself as a professional, it appears, is perfectly compatible with, and able to speak fluently to, an industrialist at the top of his game despite his never having left the academic sphere. This is not uncommon, however, as, today, there appears to be an emphasis on employing practitioners (e.g. consultants) in to academia. Theoretical assertions are no longer considered advancements; instead, academia has virtue only where it is *operationalisable* (i.e. able to be implemented in practice).

This is logical only within the dominant managerial narrative. Academia used to serve a purpose other than the advancement of existing practices and norms: to open up spaces for new ways of thinking. But making funding available only for research with a *practical* application has meant limiting innovation and creativity to the existing sphere of thinking. In an academic environment such as this one, we are bound to be promoting a whole legion of Professor Dalí’s who wholeheartedly believe in the advantages of the dominant school of thought as they are not encouraged, let alone funded, to criticise it. Instead, he and his colleagues have only advanced as academics by jumping the step of questioning the current school of thought and simply applying themselves to *operationalising* it.

‘So what’, I ask, ‘would you say is the core purpose of the MoD?’ Without hesitation, he replies: ‘To support the armed forces. The purpose of defence’, he expounds,

is to generate capability, prepare for the future through the purchase of equipment and making investments, and, finally, to conduct successful operations. This must all be done with limited resources, as these will never be infinite... efficiency and value for money must be at the core of all defence policy. (Professor Dalí, 2015)

He does not believe, however, that the MoD as a body is capable of correctly supporting the armed forces, but it must remain responsible for doing so. In essence, Professor Dalí believes that all the MoD must consist of is ‘competent people capable of making value for money decisions.’ (2015) But who are these people; defence experts, industrialists, politicians, military personnel...? ‘No, they are professional programme and project managers.’ (Professor Dalí, 2015) Despite the extent to which the defence community has already changed throughout his career, Professor Dalí appears so invested in its managerialisation that he feels strongly that the reform process needs to be taken to the next level, where the MoD only consists of managers.

His reasoning honestly throws me off kilter a little. Here is a man who has no trouble expressing complete support for the armed forces and placing them at the centre of this thing we call *defence*—a very traditionalist stance. But with no sense that there may well be tensions between the two notions, he believes that it is the private sector that will best serve the armed forces. In addition, the public

sector body of the MoD need have no experts to support and run the forces, but should instead be populated with non-subject experts who specialise in management. I had foolishly made the assumption that my respondents would either be *traditional* or *managerial*. However, this conversation, with a very well-respected member of the community, has proved that there are some aspects of the traditional narrative which have been adopted and normalised into the managerial narrative, including the notion that the armed forces remains integral to the UK's defence performance.

But I am curious, if VfM is best determined by programme and project managers, what is value? Professor Dalí is adamant that 'value = cost + effect' —a simple formula, universally applicable whenever a decision needs to be made. Nonetheless, you must be a 'management professional in order to apply it. The MoD as it is, however, is of entirely the wrong cultural leaning to be implementing such a formula, resulting in endemic inefficiencies.' (Professor Dalí, 2015) In the MoD, he says, 'there are more personnel that understand money than do value' and the answer is to privatise the majority of its function. Indeed, in a circular argument, this would provide value for money.

Reordering my thoughts and attempting to make sense of what he is saying, I repeat his argument to myself: in order to attain VfM we must contractorise work to private businesses with defence expertise but retain management professional to manage the experts. *Would it not be simpler to employ experts to do the job in-house?* I refrain, however, from asking for fear he might simply categorise me as stupid. Instead, I plump for a question more in-line with his train of thought: 'then why don't we privatise the armed forces?' After what feels like an eternal silence, I try to move on but am prevented by a raised hand and the words 'I will answer in just a moment'. (Professor Dalí, 2015) Despite the heavily furrowed forehead, however, the silence persists for yet another age, and he permits me to move on with a shake of the head and a sheepish smile.

In an attempt to keep the conversation on track, I ask if he believes there is still a place in defence and the armed forces for notions such as victory and patriotism. Considering the look I am given, it is clear that the Professor is baffled by my need to ask these questions. But he humours me, and quite simply answers that victory is 'no longer relevant' and, without offering an explanation, moves on to patriotism. 'Patriotism', he instructs me, 'has been replaced by globalisation. It is a defunct concept and feeling that no longer applies in an inter-connected and inter-dependent world as we cannot only be loyal to our countries.' (Professor Dalí, 2015)

Picking up on my focus on moral aspects of defence, the Professor proceeds to tell me that 'morality and ethics are not a part of defence; instead it is all about risk. Therefore, the role of the defence community at home is all about risk assessment', (2015) i.e. assessing the likelihood of an outcome and its consequences; yet another formula to add to my growing repertoire. The MoD should only retain those activities deemed to be of high risk as otherwise 'what

would we say in court?’ (Professor Dalí, 2015) I should really have inquired further into what exactly he meant by this, but, as at so many other points in this conversation, I am dumbstruck by the rationale. In essence, there is no limit to privatisation except the limits of that which the public consider acceptable. But he is quite clear that this can change to include the armed forces.

Once more I am led back to the question that stumped him initially, and I ask if contemporary limits of acceptability are the only thing stopping us from privatising the forces? He answers in the affirmative, visibly pleased with himself for finally arriving at an answer, and adds that

contracting out high-risk activities means that there must be more supervisory actions by the MoD which stop contracting from being financially worth it. Loss of control would, obviously, be the point at which privatisation becomes detrimental. (Professor Dalí, 2015)

But he has yet another little piece of information which will leave me at a loss: ‘it would also be very hard to insure a privatised armed force.’ (Professor Dalí, 2015) I am unable to respond to this comment and am quite relieved to hear the call to re-enter the conference hall for the beginning of the second session. Shuffling along with the slow-moving herd, I recap the conversation, stunned at how much the notions of risk, efficiency, insurance and public sector cultural inadequacies have dominated it and evidently dominate how this prominent man conducts his work within his significant role in UK defence.

2.3.5. 1100 Session 2: What do we do in defence?

Session two holds a special place at conferences as, along with the last session of the day, it is the most undesirable, particularly for the last speaker on the panel. A *fact* one quickly learns is that being the last speaker before lunch can never end well. The excitement of the day out is over and everybody is slowly succumbing to the rumbling in their guts.

Today it is expressly dedicated to communicating to the audience what exactly it is that the British defence community *do*. Although it seems to be quite a basic issue that you would assume people who have chosen to attend would be familiar with, I am quite pleased to see it on the agenda as it is surprising how incoherent the different stakeholders’ (i.e. the three services, politicians, civil servants, industrialists, academics and the media) definitions of *defence* are. So who has been selected to speak about this simple but crucial issue: two industrialists, one senior member of the military (General Arp) and one academic.

We begin with General Arp. I ready myself for a verbal onslaught of operational tactics and military strategy as a way of defining defence. But I am wrong.

General Arp is clear that a large part of his job is to understand that ‘the private sector is now a necessary component of UK defence and essential to fulfilling our needs. Therefore, accepting them as a crucial actor, the Whole Force Approach² becomes a strategy for *manpower management*.’ (2015) Having opened with such an assertion, he directs his entire presentation to instructing the audience on the virtues of aligning the MoD with industry. ‘The movement of people from the public sector and into industry’, he says, ‘is *inevitable*. In order to have an efficient MoD, we must accept this and find a way to access the critical skills that we need.’ (General Arp, 2015) One way he suggests is through building relationships. To be successful in this endeavour, ‘we must change culturally’. (General Arp, 2015) Due to the rigidity and exclusivity of the traditional, military-led culture of the MoD many potential partners are, he declares, ‘repelled’. To ingratiate ourselves and move forward we must be more business-like, offering industry a partnership on terms that they understand. Similar to Professor Dalí, General Arp is advocating change. What is striking is that both military and academic representatives advocate the same kind of change: more managerialisation.

Still confused as to what this has to do with defining *defence*, I am hurried to move my attention to our second speaker: the academic, Doctor Carrington (to be precise, an academic in accountancy). Our second speaker begins by asserting that

that which we are now labelling the *defence enterprise*—that is to say all those bodies contributing to defence today, including the services, MoD and industry—must morph to match the world in which they operate. This we can achieve through the process of policy learning. (Dr. Carrington, 2015)

Very few could argue with the logic that defence management and the way in which we defend our country must correspond to its context, but what is this *world* which it must reflect and does this mean universalising our processes to meet those of other states?

The speaker, however, opts not to pick up on either of these lines of enquiry and instead speaks of the need to reflect private sector practices and accept the inevitability of movement of personnel, adapting the way we use them to this *reality*. It follows that we must move away from the notion of owning skills within the MoD to simply ensuring we have access, much the same as what was said by General Arp a few moments earlier. Recognising his own sentiments, the General nods vigorously in his seat next to the Dr. ‘To this end, we must standardise procurement and contracting processes by acquiring a comprehensive understanding of these.’ (Dr. Carrington, 2015) The Single Source Regulations

² The Whole Force Approach is a part of a new approach to defence management which is explained in greater detail in Chapter 7.2.

Office (SSRO) is given as an example of one such body charged with this task. Within this process of assessment and standardisation, it is also important that the notion of *value* is determined. ‘This’, the speaker admits, ‘is not simply a matter of price.’ (Dr. Carrington, 2015) However, there is no more on the matter and the audience is left no better informed as to what the MoD is willing to pay for and on what basis it will or should determine value. One can only deduce as a listener, that the *world* we are hearing of is one which is dominated by the private sector, its treatment of personnel and its approach to societal relations. Nevertheless, this appears to me to be a redundant comment as it is clear that this is precisely what the MoD is and has been doing for many years. Everyone in the audience is already a convert, so who is this meant to convince?

The final speaker on the panel takes the shape of the *Chief Executive* of a newly formed *public* organisation, created to respond to this changing environment we are hearing so much about. Repeating in essence what the preceding speakers have said, he emphasises the need to look to other sectors for innovation in approaches and solutions for finding ways to fund projects and how to tailor processes to our needs. The information should then be used to grow our defence industry, growing the number of skilled people in the UK but also enabling it to put forward business cases to fulfil identified market needs abroad and increasing our revenue. The entire presentation is one I personally find difficult to follow as all his business-speak is alien to me still. I find it hard to relate the vocabulary to defence, stuck in my own traditional realm of the notion, especially as the only time he uses the word *defence* is if it is immediately followed by the word *industry*.

Forty-five minutes into the second session, after holding on for as long as possible, people begin to murmur to one another, expressing the shameful thought they have held on to till now: *what is for lunch?* The chair of the session, Mr Kahlo, does not have a choice at this point but to start making the same jokes about the delegations hunger pangs as last year’s did. To the sound of a few hundred titters, the chair must find a quick but pithy way to end the session. ‘Any questions?’ he asks, to an audience whose eyes have simply glazed over, in the hope that no one will ruin the fantasy of a beautifully laid out buffet lunch. But Ms Giacometti, however, musters up her best attempt at a probing, pre-lunch question, with the best intentions to save the reputation of her colleagues who have slogged for months to put this very important event together. Much to the delegate’s dismay, Mr Kahlo offers the question up to the entire panel of four—an endeavour that could last an extra ten minutes at least. But, looking around, no one is listening. People are shifting in their seats, putting their notebooks down, placing their pens pointedly into their breast pockets, clicking them determinedly shut. Once the question is answered, the delegates are released from their seats, with a polite and half-joked plea to remain orderly. I, on the other hand, remain with my back glued to the back wall, pressing myself firmly against it, avoiding the booted step-fall of the exiting stampede.

Ms Giacometti

Ms Giacometti is an employee of RUSI and, thus, a colleague of mine. However, she has worked at the Institute for almost a decade, circulating within the defence community for many more years. She has an unquestioning regard for process and structure and does not take kindly to any infringement of these, considering appearances to be where respect is gained. Therefore, despite her role as a researcher, she does not have patience for questioning that goes beyond the scope of the practical, seeking only to influence policy and improve effect.

2.3.6. 1230 Lunch

Once the herds have migrated, there remain a few stragglers. At first, you think it could only be the outsiders, those who do not belong, but they were the first to leave and, in truth, they are of some prestige. Observing them from my post, I see this *crème-de-la-crème*, turning to their neighbours as old friends would, to bow their heads together and share a joke. For years they have attended the same events and made the rounds of the job posts in the upper echelons of defence, whether in the MoD, the services or industry. They all know each other and have ceased to see the other few hundred attendees whose faces are forever changing, finding comfort in the familiarity of their evergreen colleagues who barely seem to age, let alone depart.

At some point, we must all join the not-so-exclusive herd, to take a chance at the buffet. To this day, I do not know if other delegates realise, but the lunch is always the same. Maybe they do, but it is not worth passing comment on as so is everything else. The queue to the buffet is another of those rare opportunities for an outsider to muscle their way into an established group. If you are a strategist, you will wait until the person you really want to speak to joins the queue and do the terribly un-British thing of pushing in right behind them. From your strategic position, you can strike up a rapport by taking the simple step of commenting on the virtues of the lunch laid out ahead of you. This topic, unlike an opinionated remark on defence management or the success, or lack of, military operations, never fails to impress.

Drawing on my knowledge, I push-in behind Mr Kahlo, the chair of session two, who predictably enjoys my little remarks on the quality of the lunch and feels obliged to respond with a blunt ‘who are you with?’ The moment I mention that I am with RUSI, all doors are opened with a smile. Even better, the mention of my *in-training* status as a PhD clearly ignites an opportunity for Mr Kahlo to *teach* and *pass-on* his hard-earned knowledge. Like a calf, protected from the stampeding bulls, I am escorted to a table of elders where I am helpfully offered instruction on how to be a functioning and useful member of the herd.

Mr Kahlo

Mr Kahlo is also a former military man, with over forty years experience in the Royal Navy. Today, he works in the private sector. As appears to be the pattern, expertise carried over from former military personnel into the private sector tends to take the form more of a critique of the management of the forces and less the form of a recognition of the needs of the military in traditional terms. Thus, Mr Kahlo is quick to criticise the military and the MoD for their lack of management, advocating instead the private sector style of management. He is, in fact, adamant that the MoD must look towards the private sector to improve its practices and minimise its own participation.

Picking over our generic lunches, Mr Kahlo and I get into a discussion about the relationship between the MoD and the UK defence industry. He opens quite bluntly with the assertion that ‘industry deserve far more respect than the MoD are willing to give.’ (Mr Kahlo, 2015) Tentatively, I ask him why he feels this way, knowing that a monologue will ensue. His gripe rests around his *fact* that

the MoD is not the best manager, nor should it be, and that it does not pay sufficient attention to industry’s grievances—an act that can have dire consequences for our capabilities. Skills and sustainability are one of the greatest worries from within industry. (Mr Kahlo, 2015)

It is a topic I have heard spoken of numerous times, including during the morning sessions of today’s conference, but Mr Kahlo does not feel that the issue is actually being dealt with, rather only spoken about. ‘Industry’, he argues, ‘is better placed and more experienced at garnering the correct skills’, (Mr Kahlo, 2015) through apprenticeships and skills transfer schemes, as well as using its employees’ abilities. However,

industry is always being restrained by the MoD’s inability to delegate certain powers of decision-making, unwillingness to share information within reasonable timeframes (if at all), and its failure to utilise industry to its full potential. (Mr Kahlo, 2015)

Why should this be? Fumbling a little with his words, Mr Kahlo indicates he feels that the idea that the MoD needs to be an *intelligent customer* is actually the hindrance.

The notion of *intelligent* has been interpreted as more academic. The MoD, however, does not need more theoreticians or employees with research abilities, but rather needs to focus on becoming a more ‘*informed customer*’. (Mr Kahlo, 2015)

Most importantly for him, this information must come from the services, the civil service and industry in equal measure. The creation of the SSRO, for example, is one of these initiatives which does not serve the MoD nor industry in any manner as it is made up of accountants and auditors whose sole focus is on numbers; there is no effort made to actually understand the needs of the MoD nor those of industry. Therefore, although it was constituted to place more power in the hands of the MoD, its independent status has meant that the methodology it has come up with for determining baseline profits for single source contracts is generic and unsuited to the types of contracts the MoD is involved with, particularly taking into account the level of risk these contractors incur.

The solution is simply to ‘allow industry to have more decision-making powers and equal amounts of responsibility for decisions and risks.’ (Mr Kahlo, 2015) The MoD is counter-productively attempting to hold on to the old-guard idea of self-sufficiency in certain areas (namely decision-making) whilst trying to outsource and contractorise logistics, production and research & development (R&D). The

tension created by these two approaches is merely resulting in widespread inefficiencies. Instead, the MoD should be clearer in its approach, offering projects for tender to industry having already determined the precise requirements and how much it is willing to pay. (Mr Kahlo, 2015)

In this way, Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S), the body responsible for procurement and acquisition will gain ‘stability in its custom, better-suited talent within its supply chain and, therefore, better capabilities.’ (Mr Kahlo, 2015)

The result would be controversial and difficult for the old-guard to swallow: a reduced civil service (down to supposed core functions, in fact) and greater industry participation in defence decision-making. With better-suited expertise, the focus would be ‘less on Value for Money and more on Value for Defence.’ (Mr Kahlo, 2015) The MoD, he continues, is too focused on processes and procedures. Instead, in his many decades of experience, he feels ‘problems and issues are better dealt with outside of process.’ (Mr Kahlo, 2015) In my own mind, this rings alarm bells, as the reason procedures are in place is to avoid corruption. However, I soon correct myself as, in my very short time working in the defence community, regardless of how many processes are in place, problems really are sorted out in informal settings, away from desks and offices. In informal gatherings decision-makers can comfortably argue their case to those they consider their peers, in the knowledge that their grievances will be translated into action in more formal settings but with less argument and input from those who do not really have the *expertise* nor *knowledge* of those long in the tooth who attended the club meeting the night before.

I ask Mr Kahlo if he thinks that industry could do front-line combat better. ‘No!’ is the gut reaction, but when I ask why, I am confronted once more with the

slightly bemused face of someone who feels that they *should* be able to answer the question easily. After a long pause and some visibly hard-thinking, Mr Kahlo replies that

the front-line could never be privatised for accountability reasons. Industry, is not owned by the public and therefore is accountable only to its book-keepers. The fighting force, however, must be accountable to the public alone as its work is done in their service. (2015)

Although I do not push the line of questioning, wary of the fact that we must return to the conference hall, Mr Kahlo's answer leaves me unsatisfied as, in truth, that argument could be applied to a lot of defence work so why stop at the front line.

By 13:30 I realise that there is a common thread that runs through all presentations and the conversations I have shared with my companions: the need for change. *Change*, however, is predictably limited to the bounds of the managerial frames of reference which dominate the defence discourse today. Restricted by these frames, these members of the community appear to only be capable of attributing failure to a lack of commitment to the pursuit of efficiency.

2.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have introduced the notion of performance, what it means in application to the defence community, and its implications on how we explain defence and understand change. In addition, I have narrated an account of a morning at a fictional conference which is typical of the annual events in the defence community's calendar. Throughout the morning, we see that there are a number of stakeholders in the defence community who uphold the dominant managerial narrative, particularly in formal contexts such as presentations. Others, those who have assimilated the managerial identity almost in its totality, continue to speak in managerial terms even in informal conversation.

In the following chapter, however, we move on to the afternoon sessions during which we predominantly witness how those who express different ideas are treated, and the self-imposed censorship which dictates the context in which most people are willing to counter the dominant managerial narrative.

CHAPTER THREE: WITNESSING THE NEW DEFENCE II

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I conclude my narration of ADC 2015, laying out my observations of the afternoon sessions, engagements and conversations with individuals in attendance, most of which express varying degrees of the traditional narrative. However, these people chose to express these traditional opinions in informal settings—namely, in private conversation with me—for fear of being ignored and discredited. The fear is not illogical, as we will witness in one of the afternoon sessions, it is a common occurrence.

Finally, I end this chapter by pulling together the themes that emanate from my observations (described both in this chapter and the previous) and which inform the pillars of my theoretical framework.

3.2. ADC 2015

3.2.1. 1330 Session 3: The role of technology in UK defence

Session three at any conference is notorious for its lethargic atmosphere. Much to the discomfort of the panellists, the audience is more often than not only able to muster a vacuous stare on their full stomachs. Nonetheless, the presentations go ahead on the subject of the role of technology and technological advancements in UK defence.

The first speaker is, once more, an academic. In a short and concise presentation, she centres her argument on critiquing the lack of funds allocated to applied research and the excessive focus on the achievement of technological superiority. Technological superiority, she argues, is not the key to success, to the contrary of popular belief. Instead, we must continue working on the historically proven assumption that mass—i.e. the size of the armed forces—will always be integral to success. Rather than revolutionising the way we do defence through technology races and a focus on economic factors, the UK should be looking to evolve the way defence has always been done, using technology and taking into account the economy, but always realising that mass still counts.

Following his introduction, the second speaker, a senior researcher at an international institute with a military background, lays out the options we have for the organisation of the British armed forces as he sees them, with the main considerations being economic circumstances and technological advances. ‘You can choose’, he says, ‘to have a small armed forces, skilled in many areas, or a small armed forces that specialises in certain bespoke skills.’ (2015) The latter, he concludes, is the smartest option. Holding on to the idea that the armed forces should produce its own technology or that the MoD needs to be the sole funder and benefactor of research, development and production of defence technology is an outdated concept. Instead, a smart MoD will look to the private sector, recognise it has the means and brain power to advance faster technologically—

particularly in the area of non-specialised, non-sensitive technology— and buy off-the-shelf that which is commercially available. This process is not only cost-effective as mass produced goods are always cheaper than those produced for a single customer, but also because the chain of supply and production is already in place and need not be financed by public money. ‘In truth’, he concludes, ‘the MoD and the armed forces need to begin to accept that, in terms of technology, there is no longer such a thing as a *military advantage*.’ (2015) Today, the military is no longer the best funder of technology for military uses, and we must accept that the private sector has better means as well as the motivation to produce more technologically advanced goods at a cheaper price.

The final speaker, a senior military educator, changes the direction of the discussion somewhat, departing from the notion that the conceptual aspect of training and education is key to success. Therefore, creativity within higher military education must be rewarded. Due to a lack of an adequate reward system, however, we are letting specialist skills, honed and nurtured within the military, drift to other sectors. This indicates an inherent flaw in the education and training system which must be addressed if the armed forces are to serve their purpose. In a bid to incorporate the actual topic under discussion, the speaker alludes to the role of technology in training. Considering the time he apportions to the subject, it is clear he does not feel that a lack of technology is truly an issue in training. His only comment is that synthetic training and simulation can only be used as a supplement to live training, despite the fact that it is the best way to meet and comply with the extensive health and safety regulations in force today. Live training, he insists, cannot be replaced if we are to produce an armed force of the calibre we purport to have.

Considering that two of the speakers on the panel gave unconventional opinions, I am expecting many people to jump to argue the party line. However, quite to the contrary, looking around the conference hall I realise most delegates are deep in a stupor. I wonder to myself whether this is a result of over-eating at lunch, or simply an inability to respond to, or even critique, ideas that are outside of their comfort zone. This is the first time today that the speakers have not been unanimous in their support for managerialist reform. Two of the session’s speakers have expressed a belief that the traditional form of defence must not be entirely abandoned, that we must invest in maintaining it, as it is a crucial element of defence, despite the changing times. Far from acting as acceptance of these ideas, however, the silence they are greeted with and the lack of engagement from the audience acts as a screen or filter, keeping these slightly out-of-the-box ideas off the agenda entirely. I, too, join the herd in their mass silence.

3.2.2. 1500 Afternoon Coffee Break

Being set free from our seats for the afternoon coffee break sends a ripple of excitement through the audience. By this point in the day, many are flagging and caffeine appears to be the only solution. To the side of the conference hall, I spot the familiar face of a former colleague of my boss’. Looking for some respite

from the older members of the audience to whom I feel I owe some deference, I make my way over to him. Mr Picasso used to work on the bank of general staff at the Defence Committee but has since moved into one of the ministries as a civil servant. However, he has retained an interest in defence from his many years of involvement and, as a person now removed from the fold, always has interesting insights.

Mr Picasso

Mr Picasso worked for the House of Commons Defence Committee before transferring into one of the Ministries to work as a civil servant. The move was made out of disillusionment as, although he has a passion for defence and would prefer to work within the community, he found that the Committee did not foster nor respect his defence expertise. Instead, Committee staff are encouraged to improve generalist skills which can be used regardless of which Committee they work for. In addition, he felt that, although many of the Committee members were interested in defence, the nature of membership of the Committee as a secondary responsibility to that of Member of Parliament prohibited them from having much impact. As a result, he felt his own impact was restricted further. Nevertheless, despite appearing to be quite a traditionalist, Mr Picasso is always uncomfortable asserting that his opinions matter if they do not adhere to the processes and structures that are in place. Thus, he is a traditionalist at heart but a managerialist employee and does not see any tension between these postures.

Settling down for a coffee together, feeling like two equals in the community hierarchy despite the disparity in years of experience, I ask what he thinks of today's conference. With a slight smile, he answers that 'it is really no difference to any other conference we have attended in the past five years: the usual delegates, the usual topics and the usual questions.' (Mr Picasso, 2015) Unable to hide my complicity in this slightly arrogant disdain, I nod slowly in agreement, knowing that many around us are having the same conversations with their own equals, whilst trying to hide their true thoughts from the group at large. It seems a little bit of a pointless exercise, but all of us here know it is absolutely necessary. Why, however, I am personally not sure.

Having inevitably got onto the subject of the Defence Committee, Mr Picasso repeats his usual opening line on the subject in which he insists that the Committee 'does its best with a bad lot', (2015) eyeing those in the vicinity as if to indicate that these are the 'lot' he refers to. The real problem is the system and the MoD, whose staff see the Committee as a 'minor annoyance rather than a body whose scrutiny it should respect and fear. Working in a ministry now', he

says, he realises that, actually, ‘ministry staff delegate Committee response reports to the lowest civil servant’, (Mr Picasso, 2015) indicating their disdain and disrespect for the process. In addition, the MoD is known to withhold information from the Committee claiming that it is too sensitive and that the Committee is not an appropriate body to handle such information. In his opinion, ‘this is just an excuse for the MoD to avoid accountability.’ (Mr Picasso, 2015)

The MoD’s lack of concern for such matters, however, also impacts the military’s involvement. In his experience, ‘the military has not fought hard enough to be heard by the Committee. This is not for lack of opinion, but rather because it does not appear to bode well with the MoD when it does.’ (Mr Picasso, 2015) The military are also afraid of being held accountable when things go wrong, and a culture of passing-on-the-buck has become systemic. He is quick to assure me that this is not simply a matter of opinion. The witness system the Committee uses, he gives an example, highlights these issues as there is a clear distinction between the witness statements taken from existing staff members and those of retired personnel. ‘Sometimes, an individual, once retired will give an entirely different statement.’ (Mr Picasso, 2015) This only shows that the MoD does have a party-line which might not be explicitly enforced but most certainly holds some power over its employees. I follow up the comment, asking whether or not the drive to include external voices had been successful in his time working for the Committee. He answers in the affirmative but quickly qualifies his answer.

There appears to have been a real attempt to listen to academics, industrialists and personnel from other public bodies, but, despite taking their reports and statements down, the information is not being used adequately. Besides a pass-the-buck culture, there is also a culture of short-termism—a wholly inefficient way of running the system. (Mr Picasso, 2015)

Expertise is let go as soon as it appears it is no longer needed, only to result in a mad rush to recruit it once more in a moment of desperation when similar issues arise. In defence, he points out, this is simply a lack of basic understanding of the nature of the sector, as one of its key features is that we cannot always predict what will happen. As far as he is concerned, acceptance of this fact would mean the fostering and retention of all forms of expertise, such as languages and cultural knowledge, which could be called upon at very short notice and used to our advantage.

Despite the positive note on which all his sentences and statements begin, there is an inevitable sense of disappointment by the end of the conversation. Mr Picasso gives me the impression that what is lacking from the MoD and the Defence Committee is simple respect—respect for the military, respect for subject matter experts and respect for those who have a passion for the job. Instead, the only people able to maintain permanence in their jobs are managers and statisticians, or generalists, as he refers to them. Despite the reverence in the system for such people, he clearly does not feel they fulfil the brief. One thing that truly strikes me

in this conversation is that he is clearly what I would term a traditionalist. However, he is unable to articulate his thoughts in ways which veer away from the managerial. Efficiency, investments, justifiable contracting all seem to be integral to the way in which he frames what defence is to him. As a matter of fact, he makes clear to me that absolutely everything could be contracted out, including the front-line, as long as it were 'justified', never once explaining what this means. Nonetheless, he expresses a moral difficulty with accepting that the front-line might be contracted out but asserts that he could never argue with 'good reasoning'.

With a sigh of exasperation, Mr Picasso looks to his watch and with a slightly embarrassed smile, mumbles that he must use the facilities before heading back into the conference hall. Averting my eyes from his and eliciting an exaggerated 'of course!' to cover my own discomfort, I quickly turn and march back into the auditorium.

3.2.3. 1530 Session 4: Future Considerations

Within minutes however, people begin to re-enter the hall, not waiting for the call to return either. The final session of the day is never well attended. In contrast to the first session, where enthusiasm for a day out seems to pass through the attendees like an electric current, the final session is always characterised by a muted resignation. Half the remaining attendees are staff members of the sponsoring organisations and the other half have travelled in for the day precisely for ADC and have nowhere else to go. Most of the other delegates have lost the ability to concentrate, leaving empty seats peppered around the conference hall. It seems to me, however, that, as far as session themes are concerned, this is the most important one. Everything we do within the academic community, policy makers, and the higher ranks of the military is geared towards learning lessons from previous actions and translating them into considerations for the future. Nonetheless, the hall is almost empty.

Our first presenter leads one of the largest multi-national companies, catering to both the global commercial and defence sector. The future of UK defence, his presentation appears to suggest, will hinge on how good we are at contracting. 'The smart move', he goes on, 'would be to focus more on in-country supply to cross-European collaborative equipment procurement.' (2015) In essence, defence expenditure will come to overpower the UK if it does not use exports as a source of revenue. Although international collaboration and partnering in procurement must be accepted as inevitable, where we will lose out in defence is in missing the opportunity to establish and maintain in-country supply. Defence must fulfil an economic purpose. 'We have arrived at this point', his analysis continues, 'because the defence industry has become indistinguishable from the commercial.' (2015) It is defence now, which must catch up and look to civilian sectors for advancements, rather than the other way around. 'This trend is *irreversible*.' (2015) With industry leading the way in technology and the MoD shrinking, industry must look to new customers and is unable to confine its base

to the MoD. For this reason, industry chose to spread investments across multiple sectors, inadvertently negatively impacting the MoD's competitive technological edge. MoD must learn new ways of coping with this, by investing in and encouraging the domestic defence industry and becoming a supplier of technology through the private sector rather than merely a buyer.

Speaker number two of the panel, and the final speaker of the day, once again chooses to frame the future of UK defence in terms of the role of industry. By 2020, he asserts, there will be less emphasis on the single services, with all three being represented by a single body or individual. However, considering the direction which the MoD is currently taking, over-commitment of resources and forces will not decrease. Quite to the contrary, it is likely to increase. For the future, therefore, it is important that the MoD develop the ability to match its aspirations to its resources. It is here that the role of industry begins to almost surpass that of the services in that it is faced with two options: waiting for the MoD to express what it is interested in or showing it what it wants. The MoD, in turn, must also decide whether it is a passive or an active customer. The future, therefore, is about both the MoD and industry striking the right balance in their relationship, increasing the exportability of home-developed and produced products as well as their usability by the UK forces.

The session ends abruptly, with frantic hand-waving from the back of the auditorium to the chair of the session signalling the arrival of yet another VIP. Sensing the commotion and being on the receiving end of stern glares from colleagues, the chair ignores the few raised hands in the audience, hurriedly summarising the session for the sake of form. The audience are asked to remain seated whilst the session four panellists are ushered off the stage to be replaced by the chair of the closing session and our second VVIP of the day.

3.2.4. 1700 Closing Remarks

To summarise the day's proceedings, the Secretary of State for Defence is called in to speak. Unsurprisingly, the conference hall has filled up once more. In addition, an email has been sent out requesting that all members of staff return to the conference to fill up the seats lest the Secretary of State feel unappreciated.

Despite having not been in attendance, the Secretary of State has been asked to close the conference, commenting from his perspective on the big issues plaguing defence today and how the government is working towards fixing these. The Whole Force Concept (WFC), he begins, is integral to success. The notion of bringing together all the component elements of defence into one strategy is integral to the success of UK defence. Understanding and providing for the defence ecosystem as a whole made up of equal parts rather than as a hierarchical, linear system, will lead to cost-savings and more efficient processes. In fact, the Secretary of State is in favour of expanding the WFC, a task it appears he believes the audience might relish.

The New Employment Model, he continues, is crucial to the WFC. The ability for personnel to move swiftly between being a regular and a reservist, and thus between the military and the defence industry, brings together two of defence's major factions. But this, of course, means that both regulars and reservists need to be trained to the same standard, able to operate in the same environments. It also means that industry needs to be incentivised to participate in the scheme. To this end, the Secretary of State emphasises the government's renewed commitment to spending 2% of GDP on defence. The increase in monetary commitment, it is implicit, will pay for better training, better incentives and enable the MoD to invest better in industry leading to better relations between them. However, this is implicit, and there is no mention as to what exactly will be spent where, and how this will contribute to UK defence.

Having said his piece, the Secretary of State descends from the dais to a round of applause and endless smiles of gratitude from the front row. As did his colleague this morning, he leaves swiftly through the nearest exit, followed by his security entourage, en route to his next appearance to offer the same message of certainty.

3.2.5. 1745 Closing Reception

Breathing a sigh of relief as a collective, we, the replenished audience, rise from our seats, stretching our arms above our heads and turning towards one another with wry smiles indicating our exhaustion in what is almost a choreographed routine that has been rehearsed countless times at an endless number of conferences. Stooping lethargically to collect our belongings, we silently put on our coats and accommodate the numerous papers, cards and other such conference paraphernalia we have collected throughout the day. The end of a conference is always anti-climactic. Instead of animated conversations triggered by the issuance of new information proffered in the safe space that is the conference hall, the audience has nothing to talk about. All conversation has been exhausted during the breaks and, as nothing new has been said, there is nothing to communicate to each other except for our exhaustion.

For one final time today, we funnel through the narrow doors, through the winding corridors, following the herd to the promised watering hole. Upon arrival, we are greeted by smiling waiters dressed in black and white, offering a modest selection of wines and soft drinks, the former of which quickly run out as people desperately seek a little pick-me-up before dinner. Regrouping once more, generally around the small circular tables offering up crisps, nuts and dried fruits of non-descript flavours and origins, the usual comforting conversations of days of old spark up once more. I too cannot help but seek comfort. Although a day away from my desk might appear to be a bonus to an outsider, I myself forget just how exhausting it is to keep a welcoming and attentive smile plastered to my face, especially when battered by confusion and suffering a loss of self-esteem from a lack of understanding the conversation around me. So it is that I find myself searching out a familiar and friendly face who will not prove too tiresome to

speak with nor too demanding of my (limited) insights into the world of defence, at least until I am able to regain a little strength from a drink or two.

Professor Magritte appears at my elbow, making his presence known to me with a quiet *lovely to see you again*. Professor Magritte is a quiet man who has, in the past, had a tendency to forget he has ever met me. Recently, however, much to my delight, he has begun to remember my face (perhaps a sign that I have truly joined the herd, albeit as a calf). Feeling slightly guilty, he now approaches me sheepishly at events, making a point to greet me in an attempt to make obvious that he does indeed know who I am. Although infrequent, our conversations are always easy and despite the fact that we do not necessarily agree with each other on everything, I respect him for his authority in his field as well as for the way in which he has embraced me as a newcomer without ever patronising me. At this particular moment in time, exhausted from the day, I am no end of grateful for his easy company and can see that he is more than happy to oblige.

Professor Magritte

Professor Magritte came late to academia. His employment history has nothing to do with defence or the military thus his perspective is that of an outsider. However, although he criticises the MoD for their lack of reference to more traditional perspectives, he is also aware that if he wishes to be an influential member of academia in his chosen field, his official publications must remain within the managerial frame of reference. Thus, despite the fact that he often speaks freely to me, his publications are tempered versions of his opinions, alluding only to the MoD's lack of ability to adhere to good management structures largely due to a lack of communication, rather than critiquing the managerialist approach as a whole.

Never missing an opportunity to talk shop and encouraging me to stick to the advice he gave me on our first meeting (to make the most of every moment to collect information for my PhD), Professor Magritte asks me how it is all going. Exercising the usual caution, I give him the short version of my research question whilst ensuring him I remain suitably confused. In truth, this is my stock answer as I am always wary of promising too much only to disappoint. Immediately, I see his face light up with a challenge: 'Mid-1990s? Is that really when managerialism began to impact defence in Britain?' Defending his position, he begins to list the many reforms the MoD has undergone since the 1940s, leading to an ever-increasing dominance of management tools and techniques. Feeling sufficiently confident for once to argue back, I clarify to him that he is conflating management as a political tool with managerialism as a process and identity former. The latter, I contend, only became apparent in the mid-1990s. To support my argument, I cite numerous documents published since then, contrasting their content and use of language to a number published before. Professor Magritte looks perfectly

satisfied with my defence and tells me that he accepts my premise. Pleased with my ability to defend at least a small element of my thesis, I move the conversation along.

Professor Magritte and I have, on numerous occasions, discussed the concept of managerialism as a political ideology. In his own work, he differentiates between leadership and management, stressing that the former is really about the organisation of people to maximise public good in the form of profit. However, profit does not always equate efficiency but, as managerialism has been so widely and strongly advocated, members of the defence community are unable to see an alternative way of making decisions. He has always conceded that he himself does believe that contracting out some functions within defence leads to greater efficiencies. An example he likes to use, is catering, wherein outsourcing has proved better value for money and an increase in standards. However, issues arise when discussing the limits to outsourcing as these appear to have less to do with the logic of outsourcing particular functions according to their characteristics and more with the political ideology which dictates that outsourcing is best practice.

This evening I continue our conversation where our last (a few months ago) left off, asking him, without needing to make the context clear, what his thoughts are about today. ‘These events’, he begins, ‘only highlight how much politicians meddle in strategy and how little the generals are willing to speak up against them.’ (Professor Magritte, 2015) A clear example of this is the war in Afghanistan where the armed forces were sent with no hope of succeeding. The Iraq war was much the same. Why? ‘Because the equipment was not appropriate for a war of insurgency’ (Professor Magritte, 2015)—something a politician does not even consider. Added to this, there was no consideration for the level of logistic support that such an operation would need. Again, this is because a politician cannot conceive of this as an issue and therefore cannot provide for it. So why do we rely on politicians to make these decisions for us? If it is clear that their decisions do not have the desired outcomes, why are we relying on their *expertise* and not the military’s?

Knowing full well that, between us, we need not express out loud the answer to this question, we leave a short silence, sipping our drinks in what I can only assume looks like a dejected fashion. At this moment it occurs to me that, although we have conversed extensively about the managerialised approach of the MoD, I have never asked him what he thinks about the military and if, over his twenty-year career, he has perceived any significant changes in the organisation. Not being a military man himself, he can ‘only speak as an outsider’; he begins, but, scoffing, indicates that the military has ‘become something else altogether.’ (Professor Magritte, 2015) The military is now too scared to pass comment or have an opinion as the idea of *objectivity* has become an oddly emotional subject. On the few occasions when a military professional dares to raise his voice, the public outcry demanding that more balanced opinions be heard is tremendous, forcing these individuals back into the shadows. Equally, the MoD, without making it explicit, frown upon such independent action and have restructured in

such a way that the only way a military voice can be heard, is from out with the protection of management structures, risking exposure and criticism.

‘So where do you think this leaves the armed forces, in terms of their role?’ I ask. ‘Well, we need them. We all know we need them.’ (Professor Magritte, 2015) By *need* he means that we are not yet in the right frame of mind to privatise the armed forces, we are not yet ideologically equipped to deal with that proposal. But it does not mean we will not get there. ‘Is it a question of morality?’ Pausing for a while to think through his answer carefully, he repeats the word *morality* several times. Satisfied with his own reasoning, he says ‘morality is too fluid’. (Professor Magritte, 2015) Explaining himself, he points out that during World War II morality was about saving our own, British skins, whereas today, morality is about saving others. The latter is always the *moral* argument for beginning a war. But if we really look carefully at how wars are waged and fought, or *operations* are *carried out* as is today’s preferred terminology, ‘the idea of morality is not properly thought through.’ (Professor Magritte, 2015)

With a sharp exhalation and a last deep, swig of his wine, Professor Magritte firmly places his glass on the closest table and holds his hand out to me, ‘Lovely to see you again but I really must rush off or I’ll miss my train.’ (2015) Without any eye contact, after a short handshake, he turns on his heel and rapidly burrows through the crowd until he disappears.

After half an hour, the only people left are those willing to go on for the night. As these delegates make the most of the free drink, the room livens up once more and loud laughter can be heard echoing through the room, its source indistinguishable as, looking around, almost everybody’s face is cracked wide with an alcohol induced smile. Tumbling out into the open air, the delegates separate into multiple groups, based on which tube station they might be heading towards or, for those staying the night in town, where they might be settling in for something to eat. Most importantly for me, however, is the group attending the VIP dinner. At the end of every conference a number of *important* people, those with decision-making powers, influence over budgetary matters or big industry players are invited to attend an exclusive dinner. Among these, a few members of staff from the organising and sponsoring parties are scattered, tasked with buttering up these VIP’s in the hope of building our networks further. It is in this capacity that I am invited.

3.2.6. 1930 VIP Dinner

Avoiding the central London traffic and making the most of the almost warm summer evening, the VIP guests are organised into what can only be described as a train of people. These moments always remind me of when I was a young child in infant school and we would be asked to pair up and hold hands to make our way safely to the library, only 200 metres away. Although we are not asked to do this on these short walks, people automatically do pair up and walk in quite an orderly line, following the lead. I always feel that high-viz jackets and a red flag being held up at the fore would not go amiss and am always baffled at why we are

not simply given a time and address to which we could make our own way. Nevertheless, this is how it is and likely how it will remain, its only value perhaps being that the repeated performance of these short but structured forays to dinner add to the sense of security we feel, particularly as, ironically, the lack of freedom distinguishes our guests as VIP's.

Arriving at the venue, always a small but adequately classy restaurant, the group settles around the bar whilst the organiser speaks to the maitre d'. A low bubbling of small talk starts up once more whilst everyone tops up on their alcohol intake prior to dinner. It is at this moment that who you will sit next to is defined and most people are angling for their chosen target, trying to get into deep conversation with them, ensuring that they will be seated side-by-side. Tonight, however, instead of joining the rush I decide to let fate take its course and see who I end up with. Just as I collect my drink from the bar, a senior colleague beckons me over and introduces me to a former senior human resource manager in one of the British armed forces. The gentleman is perfectly pleasant, making an extra effort to keep me included in the conversation, despite it being clear that I am not able to contribute much. When the call to seat ourselves around the table finally comes, he escorts me to the oval end of the table, pulls out a chair for me and seats himself to my right, whilst my colleague sits to my left.

Retired Air- Marshall Ernst

Retd. Air- Marshall Ernst had a career in the armed forces spanning over two decades. Having worked his way up the ranks, his career ended when he retired from the post of human resources manager. Today, he works as a consultant for a private company abroad, providing advice to foreign governments on managing change. Despite his having spent his entire adult and working life in the military, his post as Human Resources manager has prepared him well for the private sector, with his already being accustomed to the vocabulary and terms of management which a consultancy requires.

Having only just retired from the military, the former Air Marshall Ernst is still imbued with the military lifestyle and is clearly struggling to leave it behind. Consequently, everything he says has a reference to his military years—a practice I do not mind as it gives me the opportunity to speak with someone with recent senior experience, but not so senior that he or she has been assimilated into the MoD mentality. My assumptions, however, are proved wrong. The conversation starts off interestingly enough, with Mr Ernst asserting categorically that the British armed forces are useless at using and exploiting the potential they have within their ranks. I am quite excited by the prospect of this conversation as I feel that there is much more that can be done in this area too. However, without once letting me interject, he continues with his rant, during which he effectively takes full credit for implementing a *talent management system* in the forces. By this

point, I have absolutely given up attempting to contribute to the conversation, to the point that the gentleman feels the need to comment on my silence but still not give me the opportunity to speak. But I am in for a real treat this evening as he is willing to let me in on how he managed to capitalise on the talent he had within his reach during his time as an HR manager. He ‘ordered his staff’, he says, ‘to identify the top performing 5% within the ranks and arrange for them to get together’ (Mr Ernst, 2015) with him. However, by what measure these are determined to be the *crème-de-la- crème* he does not go into nor gives me the opportunity to ask.

During the subsequent meeting, I forced the top men to list their competencies, asking them what characteristics made them the best amongst their peers, and, compiling this list, was able to come up with a ground-breaking competency framework, (Mr Ernst, 2015)

which appears to have led to his promotion. Evidently extremely proud of his achievement, it is at this point that he sits back, sighs with self-satisfaction and says: ‘I bet you didn’t expect that from me’. Having found comfort in almost an entire bottle of red wine whilst he spoke, I am already slow in my reaction but his statement would have caught me off-guard in any circumstance. I slowly search within my repertoire of responses for the right reaction but, unable to find an adequate response, I simply raise my glass to him and take yet another swig of my wine, burying my face in my rather large glass.

I had hoped that this might be over but, turning to my colleague who has management responsibilities unlike me, he informs him that what makes a real difference is ‘knowing your people and taking an interest.’ (Mr Ernst, 2015) Knowing your staff personally means that you know who you can trust and are able to delegate tasks appropriately whilst always adhering to a proper line-management system. Sensing that if I do not speak now I will never be able to, I try to ask him about the role of initiative: ‘what role does initiative have in this talent management process? Do these personal relationships enable you to trust people enough to use their initiative?’ Without hesitation he latches on to the word initiative, loudly proclaiming that he has always held that ‘initiative is the same as innovation!’ (Mr Ernst, 2015) Although I am very tempted to raise my voice enough for him to hear me say *no it is not*, I realise this would be rather futile. Instead, I turn to the waiter and smile lethargically, accepting yet another glass of red wine. After a short pause, Mr Ernst turns to me and says ‘you see, I am a rebel’ (2015) with what I guess he thinks is a mischievous smile. My colleague swiftly changes the conversation to a generational subject which completely excludes me, allowing me to make my excuses and remove myself to the bar.

As I walk away I summarise his ‘rebellion’ in my slightly foggy mind: identifying the *top 5%* of the forces by some unknown measure of success and creating a competency framework out of a series of words they wrote on a whiteboard according to the frequency at which they appeared. Incidentally, initiative has no

place in these competencies as it is trumped by innovation. And he labelled the system talent management. Unable to contain myself, I smile a little as I arrive at the bar and am promptly asked by Ms Giacometti why I look so pleased with myself. I explain to her that I have had a number of interesting conversations throughout the day which have left me laden with information I did not expect to have. 'I almost feel the need to propose that we shouldn't have an armed force anymore in the traditional sense but rather an army of managers. I mean, really, is there a point in the military anymore?' knowing full well how I would answer this question. Although more experienced than I, she does not bother to answer directly. Instead, with perceptively rising despair and irritation and with as much sarcasm as she can muster she smiles condescendingly, replying 'I guess it's good to ask provocative questions' (Ms Giacometti, 2015) before pointedly turning her back to me, leaving me stood alone at the bar.

3.3. Emerging Themes

My narration of the events at ADC 2015 (in both chapters Two and Three), provides a rich source of information regarding the numerous elements which drive the way in which we understand and perform defence today. As it is these that form the basis of my research and conclusions throughout this thesis, below I extract the evidence for these from my observations.

3.3.1. Managerialism

Managerialism, or managerialisation, as opposed to management, is the most obvious and consistent concept that can be picked out of my observations. Managerialism can be identified in both the language used as well as the nature of the ideas expressed by many speakers and attendees.

Firstly, if we look to the language which appears commonplace at ADC, the words *efficiency*, *expense* and *value for money* crop up repeatedly (for example, Sir Roy's presentation and Professor Dalí's insistence of efficiency as the best form of change). Similarly, there is a constant allusion to management in various contexts; for example, 'good management' (Sir Roy) and 'talent management'. (Mr Ernst) These terms belong to a specifically managerial taxonomy which emanates from private sector practice.

In addition, other than the use of particularly managerial vocabulary, the conflation of traditional, military terminology in some case, with managerial interpretations, demonstrates the managerial frames of reference by which many individuals understand their environment. For example, Sir Roy, a military man, appears to use the term 'hard power' to mean projection of power based on technological advancement, which is a reinterpretation of the term to fit the dominant narrative. (Sir Roy)

Secondly, the presence of managerial concepts and the managerial way of expressing ideas is clear. In fact, Professor Dalí puts this down to a concerted

effort by the MoD and the defence community as a whole, due to the perceived need for the MoD to reach out to industry. This is borne from the notion that the private sector is better at management and, thus, better placed to make good decisions, (Mr Kahlo) as expressed explicitly by the second speaker of Session 1 of ADC 2015. Examples of such ideas that legitimise the managerial explanation of matters of defence can be found in the repeated allusion to the 2% of GDP expenditure target without further explanation; (Sir Roy; Secretary of State) the approach to a ‘good’ serviceman as one that ‘objectively’ possess a generic list of competencies; (Mr Ernst) the potential for the acceptance of the privatisation of the armed forces subject to insurance policy; (Professor Dalí) the idea that morality and ethics have less to do with defence than risk; (Professor Dalí) and the notion that defence as a sector should reflect all other sectors for easier and better management (universalisation). (Dr Carrington)

The use of these terms and ideas has displaced many of those previously commonplace. For example, in none of the sessions was there an explanation of the impact of today’s defence policy on *sovereignty* and Professor Dalí makes it quite clear that there is no longer a place for ideas of victory and patriotism in defence today, as the former is obsolete and the latter has been replaced by globalisation.

3.3.2. Governance

Throughout the day there is also a clear understanding among many of the speakers and delegates as to what is good governance. First and foremost, many echo the first speaker of the days assertion that the military-heavy culture of the MoD is detrimental to its proper functioning (for example, presentations given by the first speaker, Session 1, second speaker Session 1 and General Arp). This immediately places, in essence, managers above Generals—a concern Professor Magritte expresses. This is, once more, down to the belief that managers, and the private sector in general, are best placed to make good decisions and should, in effect, be given the space and freedom to do so without any bureaucratic controls. (Mr Kahlo) This mentality can be seen in the members of the panels themselves, with the first session on threats consisting of economists and management consultants and the last session on the future of the MoD largely centring on the suggestion that the MoD reposition itself in reference to industry.

The impact of this notion of governance, however, is not only felt when people are expressing how they feel government should work or the direction it should take, but also in how the present group (i.e. the delegates at the conference) feel they should legitimately conduct, or govern, themselves for the duration of the day. First of all, this is evident in the natural inclination of delegates to instantly group with those they consider like- or equal-minded. This happens at the beginning of the day during registration, at morning coffee break as latecomers are sought out, when people are selecting where to sit for lunch, as well as at the close of day. As a matter of fact, when there is not the opportunity to join a familiar group, most

people prefer to wait till it is possible rather than join a group of people they do not know. (Dr Carrington)

This reflexive grouping together tends to result in the inadvertent limiting of topics of conversation to those which the participants (known to each other) are comfortable with, excluding possible newcomers. Individuals unconsciously understand this, often abruptly ending a conversation when someone new arrives or, at the very least, putting it on pause until it feels safe to continue. When a person, however, is deemed to have stepped out of the legitimate bounds, a reprimand will often ensue, such as the sarcastic end to our group conversation by Professor Dalí when it became too ‘philosophical’. These are all forms of unwittingly governing what can and should be spoken of, and in what context.

3.3.3. The Individual

The identities that individuals adopt, and, as a result, the identity of the defence community as a group, create a metaphorical sounding board for the ‘legitimate’ in defence. Already in Session 1 of ADC 2015 we see an example of this when the first speaker feels legitimately able to frame successful defence as one that takes into account economic interdependence, the civilianisation of skills and commercialisation. These factors are indicative of the universalised nature of defence today and the expectation of individuals in the community that defence reflect other sectors of public and private life. The appointment and acceptance of a ‘Chief Executive’—a title historically reserved for large companies— of a public body, illustrates the same transformation in frames of reference in the public sector.

Although this demonstrates that the community has accepted by-and-large the adoption of private sector models of management and organisation, there remain some things which individuals do not find acceptable, as well as issues of contention. A prime example is that of the inability of people to accept that the armed forces might be privatised. Many of my participants struggled to find a ‘rational’ reason for rejecting the idea, such as Professor Dalí, who fights with himself to provide me with a ‘reasonable’ explanation.

The result of this managerialisation of the defence discourse, is not only a result of the identities of the individuals who populate it (Session 4; Ms Giacommetti, 2015; Professor Dalí, 2015), but it also shapes those within it to whom the managerial identity does not come naturally. The most striking of these are those who have had careers in the military, sometimes spanning decades, and whom you would expect to have stronger military identities (see, for example, General Arp, Mr Kahlo and Retired Air Marshall Ernst who are all former servicemen). In addition, there are those who struggle to give up their non-managerial identities, but for the sake of being perceived as legitimate members of the community, mould themselves to fit the group (see, for example, Mr Picasso and Professor Magritte who limits his critique for publication).

3.3.4. Relationships

The way that interactions and relationships play out are observable through moments in which individuals exert a degree of power over those around them, often unconsciously. One of the broader ways in which we can identify power at play in the defence community, is in the advancement of those individuals that have adopted the managerial identity in its entirety, such as Professor Dalí. Although power has worked for him, others with slightly different ideas have been suppressed. Lord Miró is a good example of this as, though many respect him and enjoy his company, his ideas are not given a platform in the formal context of the conference. Similarly, in Session 3 at ADC 2015, the first speaker, who advocated for a continued reliance on mass in the military rather than just technology, and the third, who is of the opinion that technology cannot replace live training, the audience simply do not engage with the expression of a counter-narrative.

As a delegate at the conference myself, I often experience these moments. At the end of the first session, for example, I do not ask the questions that come to mind about sovereignty nor, at the end of session, do I express my concerns regarding the use of the armed forces in the traditional sense. Similarly, I do not feel comfortable approaching a group during the morning coffee break and wait for an individual to break away before attempting to begin a conversation and refrain from asking questions when I feel I might be perceived as ‘stupid’.

Nevertheless, I know that I am not alone in these feelings as, from the newcomer to the old-timer, comfort is instinctively sought, particularly in topics of conversation. Professor Magritte, I feel, hit the nail on the head when he says that ‘objectivity’ is an ‘emotional’ subject. The need to be seen as ‘legitimate’, with ‘objectivity’ being a part of this, drives many to remain silent or speak in managerial terms. It is here that power is at its most obvious.

But what is the purpose of this power? In this case, within the defence community in the UK, the result of the exercise of power between individuals and within the discourse is the displacement of the traditional narrative which dominated the discourse in the latter half of the twentieth century. As it is a continual effort for a narrative to maintain its dominance, this displacement can be identified in quotidian events, including at ADC 2015.

Traditionalism as a counter-narrative remains a part of almost all my participants identities, even those who appear imbued with the managerial. Professor Dalí, for example, still finds it difficult to think of the armed forces as privatised and has to think hard to reason why it cannot be so, despite his insistence that the vast majority of the MoD’s activities can be outsourced.

However, as Mr Picasso intimates, a non-managerial critique is rarely taken serious in the formal context, thus, people like Professor Dalí, feel obliged to seek out managerial rationales for their assertions. Mr Picasso, in fact, gives examples

of this when he tells me that often information is collected from alternative sources but rarely used in Defence Committee and MoD proceedings.

Due to this particular mechanism of power, whereby individuals feel that they must adhere to the *legitimate* narrative, people's belief that the armed forces should not be privatised is generally only expressed in the informal context (i.e. in private conversation with me). For example, Mr Picasso expresses a moral difficulty with privatising the armed forces but also says he could not argue with 'good reasoning' and Mr Kahlo retains a limited traditional identity which, despite his stretching of the accountability argument to numerous other areas of defence, also leads to his not accepting their privatisation. This demonstrates that, although the managerial narrative is dominant in the discourse, it continually fights to keep the traditional narrative in the periphery of the discourse, preventing it from informing any more than the most superficial of concepts. (Professor Magritte)

3.3.5. Practice

Practice, or performance, is the final element which arises from my narration. Although it is repetitive and predictable, it is precisely this which gives us an understanding of how we understand defence and seek to fulfil the UK's defence needs.

It appears that ADC 2015 is a redundant exercise as no new information is imparted and there is a predictable routine in place which most attendees have performed on numerous occasions; it is expected that Session 1 be energetic, Session 2 an exercise of endurance, the menu identical to last years, Session 3 somnolent and Session 4 poorly attended. Moreover, the opening and closing remarks fulfil the audiences expectations so long as someone of authority (Sir Roy and the Secretary of State at ADC 2015) delivers them, regardless of their having been in attendance and aware of the proceedings. Most likely because no one expects anything new or spontaneous to occur, a pre-prepared speech will still be relevant. However, the repeated performance serves an important purpose in the maintenance of the dominant narrative in the defence discourse. These events serve to refresh the managerial frames of reference of the identities of the individuals in attendance, as well as provides a space for the community to almost practice their 'legitimate' performances. Thus, this predictability is far from redundant, providing a safety net to which individual's recourse to be reassured of the legitimacy of their actions.

3.4. Conclusion

In this Chapter, I have concluded my narration of ADC 2015, predominantly focussing on those who express a counter-narrative to the managerial and the reactions of those around them to these expressions. To conclude this chapter, I extracted evidence of the themes which inform my research and conclusions and form the subject matter of the remainder of my thesis: managerialism, governance, the individual, relationships and performance.

In the following two chapters which constitute Part II of this thesis, I reformulate these themes to demonstrate how they are the core elements of my theoretical framework and methodology allowing me to access this dominant, legitimising narrative of defence.

PART II: MAKING SENSE OF 'DEFENCE'

Part II of this thesis consists of theoretical and methodological bodies of knowledge enabling my emerging understanding of defence. In Chapter Four, *Theoretical Framework*, I explain the intricacies of each element of the theory that underpins my research, based on identity, performativity, governmentality and power, delving into the writings of the philosophers who have written authoritatively on these. By weaving their work with my research space in this Chapter, I expound the importance of my framework to my conclusions.

In Chapter Five, *Methodology*, I justify the methods I have used to make observations, linking these to my theoretical framework and to the aim of this research. In particular, I focus on the use of observation, its benefits and limits, as a form of collecting the appropriate evidence to answer the primary research question.

CHAPTER FOUR: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

4.1. Introduction

In Part I, I introduced the background, purpose and design of my research, indicating how I have structured my PhD journey. In the second and third chapters, I pulled together my observations into a fictional moment in the UK defence calendar. The purpose of doing so was to highlight, not only the topics which are spoken about by decision-makers, but also to give an example of the language I encounter on a daily basis and how it differs from my own expectations as, what I term, a *traditionalist*. However, to really understand the impact of the language used and how it serves to maintain certain ideals, I had to anchor my conclusions in a robust methodology. Thus, in Part II, I lay out my theoretical framework and justify the methods I have chosen to use to collect information.

An exploration of the constitution of the concept of defence in the UK requires a robust theoretical framework on which to draw on in reporting collected material— be it written, spoken or performed. As it is my belief that a collection of figures and *objective facts* is limited in providing understanding and depth, I am employing interpretative techniques in the post-structuralist tradition. In particular, I will draw upon the work of Michel Foucault (1979, 1988, 1991), Judith Butler (2005), Mitchell Dean (2010) and Steven Lukes (1974) to engage with that which I witnessed in Chapter Two and Three. In addition, I will use the work of a number of theorists, (Parsons, 1963; Berger & Luckman, 1991; Bell, 1996; Bell, 1999; Fromm, 2004; Bell, 2007; Loxley, 2007; Deleuze, 2014; Forti, 2014, Giddens, 2014; Lacalau & Mouffe, 2014) sociologists (Cooley, 1922; Procacci, 1987; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Zinn, 2009; Connerton, 2013; Verhaeghe, 2014) and psychologists (Jacoby, 1991; Goleman, 1998; Hood, 2011) who have either based their own analyses on these philosophers or who have come to similar conclusions through their own research.

4.2. The Panopticon




Figure 4.1: *The Panopticon*

Recognising its complexity and in a bid to illustrate my theoretical framework, I have chosen to depict it using Foucault's metaphor of the Panopticon. (1979) The idea is originally that of the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1787) who was tasked with designing the perfect prison. Bentham came up with the panopticon design whereby the cells are built on multiple levels around a central watchtower. (Figure 3.1) In this way, the watchtower can be seen from all cells and they from it. In Foucault's (1979) metaphor, the watchtower is covered in reflective glass so the cells occupants cannot see in to the tower but those within the tower can see them. From each cell, the occupants can see the reflection of the interior of the other cells as well as their own. We can apply the metaphor to the conferences I have witnessed by placing each of the agents of defence in attendance at ADC 2015 within the structure: the dominant managerial narrative, i.e. the language and artefacts of the conference, sit in the watchtower making it empty of any human agent, and each cell is filled with the delegates such as politicians, military personnel and industrialists who in their reflections in the glass of the tower collectively form a group, coexisting within the defence cultural group. The Panopticon itself is the conference structure.

In finding their identities, (Foucault, 1988; Hood, 2011) each agent, or delegate, learns the community's rules which include the do's and don'ts as well as the hierarchies of authority, (Goleman, 1998; Fromm, 2004; Connerton, 2013) all of which form part of the conferences *regime of truth*. (Foucault, 1988) A newcomer learns these rules by observing and mimicking the behaviour of others in the reflective glass. (Berger & Luckman, 1991; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) Through constant performances, the newcomer begins to embody the culture of the conference in the performance of their identity. (Fromm, 2004; Deleuze, 2014) These performances will then inform their behaviour at future conferences, prompting their institutionalisation through habitualisation. (Schmidt, 2001; Bell, 2007; Loxley, 2007; Bell, 2012; Giddens, 2014)

As performance acts, these episodes are part of regulatory practices that produce social categories and the norms of membership within them. They are sites where hegemonic definitions of the collective body relate to multiple injunctions of the individual bodies. (Fortier, 1999: 43)

Through the creation and proliferation of identities and their performance, a mentality of governance is established, (Dean, 2010) becoming the reference point for the formation and establishment of truths and institutions, encasing and limiting the ways in which we, as agents, are able to conceive of the manner in which a conference, or any performance of defence for that matter, can be constructed. (Foucault, 1988)

In the Panopticon, power is everywhere: it is in the physical structure of the prison as well as in the interactions, both verbal and through body language, between resident agents. (Lukes, 1974; Foucault, 1988) As the watchtower is, in fact, empty of a human agent, the belief within each individual that there is a figure of authority within it results in a form of self-censorship, preventing each agent from

behaving in a manner which they *believe* will be disapproved of by the authorities. (Parsons, 1963; Lukes, 1974; Foucault, 1988; Goleman, 1998) ‘Power... is typically at its most intense and durable when running silently through the repetition of institutionalized practices.’ (Giddens, 1992: 9) At ADC, each delegate feels watched by the others. It is observable how newcomers will look to other attendees, who appear to be well practiced at attending conferences, as a guide to how to behave. In addition, the prisoners form a group in their reflections through which they inadvertently apply pressure on one another to conform by making them feel watched. (Lukes, 1974) As described in Chapters Two and Three, the group that conference delegates form is clearly demarcated. We form semi-orderly queues upon entering the conference hall, stand in line to collect our lunch and, without being prompted, clap at all the right moments. Sometimes, even the collective laughter at the jokes being made from the podium can feel forced, like an attempt for the individuals to not be perceived as the odd one’s out. This way, every agent will ‘walk in line because of the extreme narrowness of the place where one can listen and make oneself heard’. (Foucault, 1988: 327)

The result is that, without the application of any violence or coercion, every member of the community conforms and thus maintains the corresponding *regimes of truth* of the dominant narrative. (Foucault, 1988)

Power then is generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by units in a system of collective organization when the obligations are legitimized with reference to their bearing on collective goals and where in case of recalcitrance there is a presumption of enforcement by negative situational sanctions—whatever the actual agency of that enforcement. (Parsons, 1963: 237)

In sum, it is the dominant narrative rather than an individual or organisation, with its language and symbols, which enforce social control, determining what can and cannot be done or said legitimately, and governing the production of truth. (Lukes, 1974; Foucault, 1988; Butler, 2005; Dean, 2010) Below, I explore the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of each aspect of this panoptical framework in detail.

4.3 A Three- Pillared System of Analysis

For the purpose of this research, I have constructed a framework which stands on three pillars: identity (of the agent/ delegate), (Foucault, 1979; Hood, 2011) performativity (of the defence community) (Butler, 2005; Bell, 2007; Loxley, 2007) and govern-mentality (arising from the combination of the first two pillars). (Dean, 2010) Vital to understanding these aspects of the defence community is the acceptance that at no point do any of these pillars supersede the others in importance nor do they follow a sequential order. (Foucault, 1988) Instead, each cannot exist without the other as each relies and feeds off the strength of the other two. For this reason, the same terms and notions crop up in my description of each

pillar, illustrating how tightly linked they are to one another and, in reality, their inseparability.

4.3.1. Identity

The first pillar, *identity*, consists of a concept which has been explored by theorists, philosophers, sociologists and psychologists alike for many years, with a focus on its origin and development. The philosopher Michel Foucault, who theorised about the relationship between power and knowledge, posited that as we develop, we begin to self-regulate our likes and dislikes, rights and wrongs, according to that which we learn from others— this he called internal exclusions. (1988) Similarly, experimental psychologist Bruce Hood, concludes that ‘inhibiting our impulsive thoughts and behaviours is one of the main changes over the course of a lifetime that contributes to the development of the self.’ (2011: 11) Thus, it appears that our identities are inextricably tied to our environment and they continue to form as we learn about our environment and how to react to it.

If we extend the notion of ‘environment’ to include ‘culture’, we can extract this notion from the abstract and begin to apply it to our realities. Erich Fromm, a renowned psychologist and critical theorist, asserted that ‘[m]an’s nature, his passions, and anxieties are a cultural product; as a matter of fact, man himself is the most important creation and achievement of the continuous human effort’. (2004: 9) By accepting that, with the exception of obvious biological limitations, we impose upon ourselves limitations which grow to delineate our identities according to what we have learnt from our cultural surroundings, we find that ‘[o]ur identities are not given by nature or simply represented or expressed in culture: instead, culture is the process of identity formation’. (Loxley, 2007: 118) For example, in today’s UK defence culture the notion of *victory* has been replaced by that of *success*. Most individuals who now work within its decision-making circles will not use the word ‘victory’ or ‘win’ but rather refer to ‘successes’ which are measured by the extent to which a goal has been achieved. On the other hand, during and after WWII, ‘victory’ and ‘win’ were central to the rhetoric, evoking an emotional response in the form of total support for the forces from the public. The difference in language usage suggests that today’s defence culture is led by the ideal of objectivity and the adequacy of measurement as opposed to support on the basis of emotional response. ‘[T]he way we hold ourselves, the way we speak, the spaces we occupy and how we occupy them, all in fact serve to create or bring about the multi-levelled self that these acts are so often taken merely to express or represent.’ (Loxley, 2007: 118-119) Similarly, throughout time, the British defence identity has been informed, not only by the past, but also by the actions of all those participating in the defence community. As is inevitable, the actions of those within the community are influenced by those outside, resulting in a constant cross-pollination of ideas and concepts (e.g. from political life, private life, past professions, etc) that inform the way that the defence identity is constituted.

At the risk of over-simplifying, I conceive our multiple identities as being subject to a continuous cycle of learning, nonconscious mimicry, and automatic conformity. In order for my identity to form, culture provides a normative framework which ‘not only... direct[s] my conduct but... condition[s] the possible emergence of an encounter between myself and the other.’ (Butler, 2005: 25) It is these frameworks that we learn and which become the building blocks of our identities as well as the frames of reference for interpreting our experiences. These cultural frameworks were conceptualised by Foucault as *regimes of truth*—

a regime of truth offers the terms that make self-recognition possible. These terms are outside the subject to some degree, but they are also presented as the available norms through which self-regulation can take place, so that what I can ‘be,’ quite literally, is constrained in advance by a regime of truth that decided what will and will not be a recognizable form of being. (Butler, 2005: 22)

These *regimes of truth* are learned from the language and actions associated with and legitimised by our cultural groups. To take a strong and almost global culture as an example, militaries all over the world might well have different modes of dress and conventions, but all have a very strong sense of hierarchy enforced by dress codes and rituals, made clear to all members of the community. The intrinsic legitimacy of this hierarchy is a *regime of truth* to which any new member will adhere to by learning the rules from his or her peers and superiors. Although there is explicitly enforced discipline in the military, this hierarchy is largely enforced through learned self-discipline (Thornborrow, T. & Brown, A. D. (2009)). Thus, ‘[t]he narrative of one life is part of an interconnecting set of narratives; it is embedded in the story of these groups from which individuals derive their identity.’ (Connerton, 2013: 21)

Having learned the legitimate behaviours associated with our cultural groups, we begin to nonconsciously mimic the actions of those who conform and whom we aspire to identify with. Chartrand & Bargh refer to this as the *Chameleon Effect*: the ‘mechanism behind mimicry and behavioural coordination and thereby [the] source of the observed smoother social interaction and interpersonal bonding’. (1999: 897) In the case of the new soldier, he or she will begin to, not only adhere to the rules, but also carry him or herself and speak in the same way as his or her more experienced peers, in a nonconscious bid to ‘fit in’. As a result, ‘the reality of everyday life is ongoingly reaffirmed in the individuals interaction with others’ (Berger & Luckman, 1991: 169) as ‘[g]roups provide individuals with frameworks within which their memories are localised’. (Connerton, 2013: 37)

Nonconscious mimicry in cultural groups then becomes automatic conformity, but, by virtue of its nonconscious character it is impossible to identify when this occurs. From a psychologist’s perspective, automatic conformity differs from the learning and nonconscious mimicry stage in that, at the point of learning we are making a conscious decision to understand how to become a member of the cultural group, and when nonconsciously mimicking we are simply *fitting in* the

way in which our brains know to, but at the point of automatic conformity there is ‘a bias in perception [which] implies an unconscious centre at work in the mind, imposing its judgement on all we perceive, shaping our experiences to fit its priorities.’ (Goleman, 1998: 62) ‘[T]hat information is scanned for *meaning* before it reaches the filter... [shows t]he filter seems to have some intelligence; it is tuned by the importance to a person of a message’— (Goleman, 1998: 64) an importance which is defined by the previous processes of learning and nonconscious mimicry. In essence, the practice of a culture becomes the expression of our identities. ‘[O]ur need to conform is a powerful force that shapes us and literally changes the way that we think.’ (Hood, 2011: 143)

Fromm also recognised that *automaton conformity*, as he labelled it, ‘is the solution that the majority of normal individuals find in modern society... he adopts entirely the kind of personality offered to him by cultural patterns’. (2004: 159) Fromm asserts that it is a solution to isolation which, as social beings, we are unable to tolerate—the ‘lack of relatedness to values, symbols, patterns, we may call moral aloneness and state that moral aloneness is as intolerable as the physical aloneness’. (2004: 15) By finding ourselves connected to and accepted by a community, a basic human need is fulfilled and ‘by not being different, these doubts about one’s own identity are silenced and a certain security is gained.’ (Fromm, 2004: 219)

This process is present in the conceptualisation of defence as, only twenty years ago, the extent of privatisation that we are witnessing today was inconceivable. Instead, there was a narrow focus on self-sufficiency within the military for which there was no alternative. Everyone within the defence community automatically adhered to this *traditional* model of defence management. However, today, there is very little argument as to the virtue of privatisation and business-models, only over the extent to which they should be implemented. The only commonality with defence management twenty years ago is that any alternative model of management is also not taken seriously. Between these two eras of defence management there has to have been—and continue to be—the process of learning and mimicry in order to reach automatic conformity.

Every experience and every interaction we have is therefore, yet another layer added to reinforce or modify our identities. If this is so, it means that no one individual is truly *individual* but rather that ‘[e]very word we say, every movement we make, every idea we have, and every feeling, is, in one way or another, an outcome of what our predecessors have said or done or thought or felt in past ages.’ (Cooley, 1922: 3-4) However, in turn, it also means that each one of us has an impact on the identities of those we interact with in future as, with every experience and interaction we have and with the peculiarity of how we react to them, we are reinforcing or modifying our cultures and thus the cultures of others. In essence, our identities are continuously formed by culture, thus with every re-enactment we influence those of others. (Fortier, 1999: 43) It is this latter aspect of identity formation—how each individual influences and feels the influence of others—which I am particularly interested in to understand *how* and *why* the

driving ideology behind defence has changed so profoundly from the traditional to the managerial.

4.3.2. Performativity

The second pillar of my theoretical framework—performativity—plays a large role in both the first and third pillars. Judith Butler’s concept of performativity—whereby ‘truths, entities and subjects are understood as arising from practices and events’—(Bell, 2012: 13) has its roots in Foucault’s idea that ‘[p]ower relations are exercised, to an exceedingly important extent, through the production and exchange of signs’. (Faubion, 1994: 338) The repeated production and performance of signs leads to *totalisation*—a continual reinforcement of the *regime of truth* until it dominates totally. (Foucault, 1991) For totalisation to be complete, however, exclusionary practices (for example, the internal exclusions discussed above) must become embedded in society’s fabric and limit ‘the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories’. (Foucault quoted in Mills, 2003: 57) Totalisation thus ensures that we are only able to process and interpret new information ‘according to the structures available to us and in the process of interpreting we lend these structures a solidity and normality which is often difficult to question.’ (Mills, 2003: 56) Totalisation, in practice, is a result of performativity, in which symbols of identity and thus culture are repeated so often that they not only become automatic, but also become convention, institution or what we commonly refer to as *the norm*: ‘[a]ny action that is repeated frequently becomes cast into a pattern, which can be reproduced with an economy of effort’ (Berger & Luckman, 1991: 70-71)

- *Performing performativity*

Performativity is a mechanism through which existing norms and identities are reinforced and entrenched in society. However, performativity does not work consciously but rather relies on memories which are automatically activated by certain cues in our environment. Thus,

most of a person’s everyday life is determined not by their conscious intentions and deliberate choices but by mental processes that are put into motion by features of the environment and that operate outside of conscious awareness and guidance. (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999: 462. See also Connerton, 2013)

Over time, with the build up of many encounters, experiences and interactions in our nonconscious minds, we design maps of understanding which enable us to retrieve memories from our subconscious. These memories provide us with standardised and, in our memories, already legitimised responses to analogous situations (Jacoby, 1991; Hood, 2011). Moreover, the more we repeat these actions and interpretations and the more approval we gain for them, the less likely we are to deviate from them in future as they become ingrained in our identities:

Perceptual interpretations of behaviour as well as assumptions about an individual's behaviour based on identified group membership become automated like any other representation if they are frequently and consistently made in the presence of the behavioural or group membership features. (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999: 465-6)

At conferences, for example, we need not ask where we are to sit as the nature of our presence will trigger memories of analogous situations and inform us of the answer. Many years attending educational institutions or even attending the theatre as observers will have taught us that, if we are not the feature of the event, we are to sit among the general audience.

The mapping of memories is a natural process for the brain as '[h]abitualization carries with it the important psychological gain that choices are narrowed' (Berger & Luckman, 1991: 71) so our minds do not have to spend too much time processing an infinite number of options. However, the constant use of the same memories and the repeated interpretations of them illustrate that the process of identity formation through performativity is central to our difficulty to deviate from the regimes of truth. This is a result of the totalising effect as 'repetition is a conduct only in relation to that which cannot be replaced. Repetition as a conduct and as a point of view concerns non-exchangeable and non-substitutable singularities'. (Deleuze, 2014: 1)

- *Performativity as legitimisation*

Performativity is also useful as 'a tool of analysis by which to interrogate differentiated subject formation within practices that sustain lines of power and power effects' (Bell, 2007: 16) as the process does not just serve to imprint in our memories interpretations of society and capture us in a cycle of conformity, it also serves to simultaneously legitimise those same actions and interpretations by enabling the same actions to be considered convention. (Loxley, 2007) '[E]ntities... require not only forms of practice and co-ordination, certain specific technologies that place them in time and space, but also a community of affirmation to sustain them through their interest and attendance.' (Bell, 2012: 8)

The *norm* is a notion that each one of us uses as a standard by which we judge the legitimacy or illegitimacy of our own decisions and those of others. The norm is established by performativity itself as the more we see others making the same decisions and responding in the same way, the more we come to believe that it is the only way to behave (Giddens, 2014)— in essence, we perceive the existence of a *regime of truth*. For example, the consistent use of schedules and timetables for management purposes in the workplace has cross-pollinated our personal lives. It only takes a short trip to any of the number of stationery shops to be bombarded with endless products designed to help us timetable and schedule our day-to-day lives, to the half hour if necessary. Thus, the norm 'rests upon others' conventional expectations such that it must be interpretable as a socially

legitimate (or illegitimate) performance.’ (Connerton, 2013: 35) Convention leads to institutionalisation which ‘occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors.’ (Berger & Luckman, 1991: 72) In turn, ‘the expanding institutional order develops a corresponding canopy of legitimations... [which] are learned by the new generation during the same process that socializes them into the institutional order.’ (Berger & Luckman, 1991: 79) Ultimately, the belief in and performance of the legitimised norm becomes a continuous and almost unbreakable cycle of reinforcement.

We begin to see that performance is extremely important to the continuance of regimes of truth and thus to a perception of stability in society. Jeff Schmidt gives a telling example in his book, *Disciplined Minds: A Critical Look at Salaried Professionals and the Soul-Battering System that Shapes their Lives*, in which he explores how impostors in well established and prominent professions manage to maintain their disguise by simply acting as they are expected to regardless of their level of qualification or experience.

By combining the knowledge they gained as nonprofessionals with a good imitation of the appropriate attitudes and values, they are often extremely successful as professionals. The well-known tendency of employers to overlook the shortcomings of incompetents who display the proper attitude, also works to protect those impostors who have technical deficiencies. (2001: 49)

On this basis, he concludes that, despite claims to the contrary, professional qualifications, education or any other proof of knowledge and experience are irrelevant to our being accepted into a community if we are not able to perform the culture of the community simply because ‘[a]n institution is not going to trust someone to make decisions in its interest and in its name unless that person shows almost an instinctive feeling for the right ideology.’ (Schmidt, 2001: 148) This *instinctive* feeling for the right ideology inevitably is a result of either careful study, as in the case of impostors or endless repetition: ‘*Repetition changes nothing in the object repeated, but does change something in the mind which contemplates it.*’ (original authors’ italics, Deleuze, 2014: 90)

4.3.3. Govern-mentality

Mitchell Dean’s notion of *governmentality* essentially combines the first two pillars— identity and performativity— to illustrate how they translate into a form of governance: ‘to analyse mentalities of government is to analyse thought made practical and technical’ (Dean, 2010: 27) Governmentality is a hybrid of the notions to *govern* and *mentality*. Taking the first, we understand that:

Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through the desires,

aspirations, interests and beliefs of various actors, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes. (Dean, 2010: 18)

According to Dean, this has a number of implications. Firstly, ‘to govern means to... attempt to deliberate on and to direct *human* conduct’; (2010: 18) secondly, it ‘refers to an attempt to bring *any* form of rationality to the calculation about how to govern’; (2010: 18) thirdly, government thus ‘presume[s] to know, with varying degrees of explicitness and using specific forms of knowledge, what constitutes good, virtuous, appropriate, responsible conduct of individuals and collectives.’ (2010: 19) The rationale and forms of knowledge which are drawn upon are inevitably absorbed through the identity and culture of those within the governing community. In the case of defence, the rationale and knowledge base for how to govern—or, in today’s terminology, to *manage* defence—is centred on an identity that has been learned and is performed by those within the decision-making and management community. Thus, ‘the notion of government extends to cover the way in which an individual questions his or her conduct (or *problematizes* it) so that he or she may be able to better govern it.’ (Dean, 2010: 19)

Taking the second notion, *mentality*, Dean writes, ‘[i]t entails the idea that thinking is a collective activity. It is a matter not of the representations of individual mind or consciousness, but of the bodies of knowledge, belief and opinion in which we are immersed.’ (2010: 24) So the truths by which we govern and how we accept to be governed, are dictated by the collective mentality or culture to which we subscribe, primarily, nonconsciously. (Dean, 2010: 27) Governmentality itself does not produce any truths but, according to Foucault, is present through the *apparatuses of security*, which ‘include all the practices and institutions that ensure the optimal and proper functioning of the economic, vital and social processes that are found to exist within the population’. (Dean, 2010: 29) Instead of producing the truths, ‘[r]egimes of government... elicit, promote, facilitate, foster and attribute various capacities, qualities and statuses to particular agents.’ (Dean, 2010: 43-44)

An example of a key truth identified as central to governmentality, and to my research, is that of *risk*.

There is no such thing as risk in reality... Risk is a way, or rather, a set of different ways, of ordering reality, of rendering it into a calculable form. It is a way of representing events in a certain form so they might be made governable in particular ways, with particular techniques and for particular goods. (Dean, 2010: 206)

Beck’s work focuses on the role of risk and theorising the *risk society*. Recognising that the concept of risk itself is meaningless, he posits that we determine risk, and thus make decisions, based on ‘cultural definitions and standards of a tolerable or intolerable life... [which] assume in equal measure

insight into technical know-how and familiarity with cultural perceptions and norms.’ (2012: 215) ‘The concept of risk thus characterizes a peculiar, intermediate state between security and destruction, where the *perception* of threatening risks determines thought and action.’ (Beck, 2012: 213)

In understanding the role of govern-mentality in the defence community, we begin to see that these legitimised behaviours, as well as we as members of the community by accepting their legitimacy, become mediators of human interaction, and thus agents of power. (Giddens, 2014: 23)

4.4. Power

Although I originally thought of power as one of my frameworks pillars, through observation I came to the realisation that power cannot be a pillar as it runs through each of the three pillars in equal measures, and is the link between them. Power is *in* the framework, *in* the Panopticon, and is what makes it stand. ‘[P]ower relations are, before any other determination, relationships between bodies, and are therefore inevitable.’ (Forti, 2014: 197) Power is exercised by the individual through the expression of their identity, and by others in the influence they have over the formation of an individual’s identity. However, since power is not exercised consciously by individuals over others, I argue that it is the totalising narrative and the corresponding regimes of truth which exercise the power, shaping the defence discourse—in this case, the managerial narrative. Coupled with the notion of totalisation, Laclau’s work on the hegemonic relationship goes some way to explaining how a narrative comes to dominate a discourse by ‘becom[ing] the signifier of the absent communitarian fullness’. (Laclau, 1996: 43) Managerialism as a narrative thus has transcended its position as the particular interest of the private sectors managerial class, and come to represent the universal interest by posing as a universal solution to the perceived threat that bureaucracy posed to the smooth running of the state. By doing so, the narrative itself has become powerful, particularly if we perceive power as ‘a circulating medium... within what is called the political system, but notably over its boundaries into... the economic, integrative, and pattern-maintenance systems.’ (Parsons, 1963: 236)

But once a narrative has become powerful, how does it maintain its power and secure its dominance? Although we as subjects of the totalising effect are unable to be individually powerful, we are the only mechanism by which power can be enforced and maintained. However, as Steven Lukes’ asserted, this occurs *unconsciously* and *collectively*. In his influential book, *Power: A Radical View* (1974), Steven Lukes traces the development of the concept of *power* and adds his own conclusions, dividing it into three stages in which the *dimensions* of power are revealed. The first of these dimensions consists of the work of Robert Dahl in *The Concept of Power* (1957) in which he describes the exercise of power as an observable act: for example, the application of physical force. In 1962, Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz added the second dimension in their article *The Two Faces of Power*, in accordance with which power can also be an unobservable

influence (e.g. manipulation) or the exercise of non-decision making. Lukes himself adds the third dimension, which is separated into two components: unconscious and collective power. The former mode of power is exercised unwittingly whereas the latter refers to the ability of a group to form by adhering to an unspoken set of rules, thus excluding all those who choose not to comply. Collective power thus implies that there are numerous ways in which a group could organise itself and ‘assume[s] that it is *in the exerciser’s or exercisers’ power* to act differently.’ (1974: 55) It is this third dimension of power which is useful to understanding and framing the managerial narrative as powerful and which will enable us to understand the mechanisms through which the narrative has come, not only to dominate, but also to maintain its dominance.

As ‘there is no such thing as ‘power’ in the singular: there is only a ‘multiplicity of force relations’’, (Loxley, 2007: 122), I have divided the following into three sections which will each in turn demonstrate how the three main actors of power—the narrative, the individual and the group—enable its spread and maintenance.

4.4.1. The Narrative

The assertion that some form of behaviour or interpretation might be correct, moral and responsible, or even the recognition that something is a fact, can ‘assert its transcendence, which is to say that it was there all along. It can do so because this fact emerges through certain specific devices and *constraints* that do not pertain to a ‘raw’ fact’. (Bell, 2012: 9) Instead, the nature of the dominant narrative lends a *fact* its legitimacy, filling the world ‘with frames that guide our awareness toward one aspect of experience and away from others. But we are so accustomed to their channelling our awareness that we rarely notice that they do so.’ (Goleman, 1998: 202). In essence, we are socialised into the effect. (Louth, 2009)

Taking the example of the current *fact* of the virtues of managerialisation in the public sector, only twenty years ago this was no fact at all. The fourth edition of the British Defence Doctrine still spoke of *duty, freedom* and *integrity* (MoD, 1996) as opposed to the three E’s—*efficiency, effectiveness, economy*—that pepper the latest Ministry of Defence *Strategic Defence and Security Review* (2010). Today, however, we are hard pushed to hear non-managerial language in any official capacity, be it on the news or in official government publications. The narrative with its artefacts places limits to that which we are able to consider as an option when we make decisions and interpret the actions of others and other externalities.

As per Lemke’s work, even those things we consider insentient also form part of the dominance maintenance patterns as the interpretations of what they are and how they are to be used are also limited by the narrative- this he calls new materialism whereby ‘matter itself is to be conceived as active, forceful and plural rather than passive, inactive and unitary... Central to this movement is the

extension of the concept of agency and power to non-human nature.’ (Lemke, 2014a: 2) In the case of defence management, the non-human agents would be the schedule templates, endless forms that need to be filled out by bureaucrats in order to gain approval for acquisitions, for example, as well as the depiction of very human issues such as the human consequences of war in percentages. All these serve as vehicles of power enforcement for the dominant managerial narrative. Thus, external influences which embody the dominant narrative are central to the proliferation of power through our identity and performativity. As Ernesto Laclau writes, ‘the relationship between words and images, the predominance of the ‘emotive’ over the ‘rational’, the suggestibility and the identification with the leaders, and so on, are all too real features of collective behaviour.’ (2005: 39)

Out of the narrative and within the regimes of truth, we inadvertently create institutions which proceed to ‘control human conduct by setting up predefined patterns of conduct, which channel it in one direction.’ (Berger & Luckman, 1991: 72) The most powerful tool a narrative has is not that of directly informing us what we must think and do but rather of *a priori* excluding a plethora of options from our consideration. Government is a prime example of an institution which is directed by the dominant narrative. Procacci wrote in 1987 that, as a result of power lying in omission,

the analysis of government cannot be exhausted by an assessment of the ‘realized effects’... but must also extend to that which is avoided or lost along the way... In government, the power relation is therefore productive of subjectivity, in the sense that it consists in giving form to action, through which the subject experiences himself/herself. (1987: 5)

Judith Butler also recognises this as ‘[t]he force she associated with the performative is partly a normalising power that constitutes by exclusion’. (Loxley, 2007: 123) To give an example of how much omission affects our daily lives and cultures, both Vikki Bell (2007) and Jeff Schmidt (2001) point to the fact that this practice affects everyone’s professional lives as ‘all education involves *selection*’. (Zinn, 2009: 609) Bell identifies that ‘[d]isciplines act as filters of concern, and are themselves ecologies.’ (2012: 11) Furthermore, ‘[e]ach disciplinary regime produces a notion that appears to call for the regime’s regulation but which in truth owes its very conditions of possibility to the operations of power.’ (2007: 15) In a similar vein, Schmidt analyses the use of the *profession* as a vehicle of dominance maintenance: ‘Evidence that professionals are not independent thinkers has been around for a long time but has generally been ignored, in part because people don’t know how to make sense of it.’ (2001: 10)

Although it appears impossible that the dominant narrative can be breached, as even ‘narratives of escaping strategies of power are themselves entangled in power/knowledge networks’, (Bell, 1996: 83) these deviations do occur. However, ‘[d]isruptions of continuity or consistency *ipso facto* posit a threat to the subjective reality in question.’ (Berger & Luckman, 1991: 174) Throughout

this thesis, we will see that managerialism itself was once a *disruption* and is still challenged by those who, although few, continue to consider it an unwelcome newcomer in the approaches to defence management. Nevertheless, to most, opposition to managerialism and managerialisation is to lack common sense or credibility—itsself ‘a partisan act’. (Schmidt, 2001: 34) But, most importantly, the need for performativity of the narrative to retain its power ‘highlights the extent to which [it is] not natural or inevitable and [is], therefore, potentially open to change.’ (McNay, 1999: 177)

4.4.2. The Individual

Our ability to be powerful is inescapable as ‘subjects are attached to power because their interiorities—the desires and motivations that seem to characterize one’s very individuality—arise through participation in power relations.’ (Bell, 2007: 22) Thus, ‘[t]o be a human being is to be an agent... and to be an agent is to have power... [and] the capability to intervene in a given set of events so as in some way to alter them.’ (Giddens, 1992: 7) So how do we as individuals exercise our power over others? One of our initial acts of power is in expressing our identities, which ‘*obliges* [us] to organize [our] embodiment and, perhaps more accurately, [our] sense of inwardness, in accordance with [powers’] attentions.’ (Bell, 2012: 3) As we express our identity to others and enable it to direct our work, our social interactions and our personal lives, we are expressing what to us is legitimate and creating an expectation that others will respond in kind. ‘The boundaries we articulate and the exclusions that we thereby perform are simultaneously ones about relevance and about ethics; since many different possibilities for (intra-) acting exist at every moment.’ (Bell, 2012: 11)

Throughout our lifetime, our ability to continue within the legitimate and to expect the same from others increases in importance as we involve ourselves more and more in different cultures: we start with only our family culture, and then we begin to add educational, social, professional cultures to our lives as well as many others. As membership to these cultures is contingent on a shared ideology, ‘to question the norms of recognition that govern what I might be... is... to risk unrecognizability as a subject’. (Butler, 2005: 23) Thus, ‘refraining from questioning doesn’t *look* like a political act’, (Schmidt, 2001: 35) but in reality, it is an expression of our willingness to maintain the *status quo*.

Individuals are expected to cope with social risks and insecurities, to measure and calculate them, taking precautions for themselves and their families. In this perspective it is entrepreneurial action, rational risk management, and individual responsibility which accounts for social success or failure. (Lemke, 2014b: 65)

I can give a personal example of this as it is something I face almost daily. As a newcomer to the UK defence community, coming from an educational background in law and politics, I repeatedly feel inadequate at conferences and meetings due to my lack of ability to understand and communicate in

management- speak. I am personally baffled at the predominance of managerialism in UK defence but rather than question its relevance I often choose to remain silent. Inevitably, my silence leads to the impression in others that I subscribe to their same ideological approach to defence and that any issues I may wish to discuss which fall outside the managerial bounds of discussion are not raised and remain unaddressed.

Having submerged ourselves entirely in the dominant narrative, the strength of our belief that what we are doing is correct or our inability to challenge the dominant narrative impacts those around us. Cooley depicts well how we impose ourselves and thus the dominant narrative on others in a quotidian example:

‘So long as we agree with a man’s thoughts and aims we do not think of him as selfish or egotistical, however urgently he may assert them; but so soon as we cease to agree, while he continues persistent and perhaps intrusive, we are likely to say hard things about him. It is at bottom a moral judgement, not to be compromised in any simple definition, but to be determined by conscience after the whole situation is taken into account.’ (1922: 211)

‘If we should question many persons as to why they thought this or that man selfish, a common answer would probably be ‘He does not consider other people.’ What this means is that he is inappreciative of the social situation as we see it; that the situation does not awaken in him the same personal sentiments that it does in us’ (1922: 214)

These situations and these same reactions arise daily in all our lives, so much so, that we no longer take notice of them. But this is one of the strongest ways in which we exercise our power to maintain the dominant narrative and it works so well precisely because we do not need to do it consciously. As a result, we do it more often than we are aware of. This assertion is also supported by the work of experimental psychologists. Bruce Hood writes that ‘mere exposure to words triggers thoughts that for a moment can influence our behaviours.’ (2011: 154) Thus, ‘[t]he most important vehicle of reality-maintenance is conversation... [as] it takes place against the background of a world that is silently taken for granted.’ (Berger & Luckman, 1991: 172) Whenever we interact with one another, we are adhering to the dominant narrative and expressing to those around us that we subscribe. The more of us who do this, the more we place those who do not subscribe to the same mode of thinking in a minority. In itself, this is a pressure to conform that we do not intend to put on others, but it is also a large part of the limited education that we are imparting on those still learning their identity. Therefore, ‘[e]ach proposes something for the next to repeat because everyone believed the other has the same expectation’ and, in doing so, ‘[e]very person, individually, by accepting the rules of the game... allows that system to continue.’ (Forti, 2014: 196)

4.4.3. The Group

I have already mentioned Foucault's notion of internal exclusions, but, bearing in mind Lukes' definition of power, Foucault's notion of external exclusions also becomes relevant. External exclusions which we impose on others essentially force people to act in conformity in order to avoid being perceived as mad or as liars by other members of their cultural groups. In the case of the defence discourse and managerial narrative, members of the defence community begin to speak in managerial terms in order to not only be understood but also to avoid being dismissed as lunatics or as attempting to spread false truths against 'established science'. (Foucault, 1979) In this way, the managerial language is used to condition our own way of thinking unconsciously and collectively, whilst simultaneously making others believe that it is the language of truths.

The collective mind is as vulnerable to self-deceit as the individual mind. The particular zones of shadow for a given collective are the product of a simple calculus of the schemas shared by its members. The areas of experience blanked out in the most individual minds will be the darkest zones for the group as a whole. (Goleman, 1998: 226)

As we have already concluded, the individual is essentially only an *individual* in so far as their role in any given group allows them to be as it is the group that provides us with our identities. This is not only a conclusion we are able to arrive at according to previous studies of social groups and society, but also from a psychological perspective. Bruce Hood concludes that this dependency is actually a biological necessity of the brain, not just social: 'the brain itself is surprisingly dependent on the world it processes, and, when it comes to generating the self, the role of others is paramount in shaping us.' (2011: 3)

This dependency on the group to define our identities means that group cohesion is a central motivation behind many of our interactions. Thus, the group itself is a substantial enforcer of power since 'they are comprised of relations of autonomy and dependence between actors or collectivities of actors.' (Giddens, 1992: 8) With group cohesion being the main motivation of all individuals in the group, getting everyone to *like* me is inevitably going to be my main concern, thus blending in seamlessly and creating as little disturbance as possible will be my strategy.

Within a social group setting, one is more likely to get on harmoniously with others in the group if one is behaving similarly to them... Thus, it makes sense for the default behavioural tendency in an interaction to be based on one's perception of what the other person is doing. (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999: 467)

As a matter of fact, the more fiercely we defend a regime of truth the more we will be liked as '[t]here is nothing more respected—and even liked—than a persistent and successful pursuit of one's peculiar aims, so long as this is done

within the accepted limits of fairness and consideration for others.’ (Cooley, 1922: 212)

These unspoken rules which draw out boundaries to the behaviours we are allowed to indulge in when we are part of a group are what Daniel Goleman, a psychologist specialising in brain science, refers to as *schemas*:

the group self entails a set of schemas that define the world as it pertains to the group, that make sense of collective experience, that define what is pertinent... [and i]t is the activation of shared schemas that unites the ‘we’; the more such a common understanding is shared, the more stable the group. (1998: 163)

We do not deviate from these schemas as such behaviour would mean running the risk of exclusion: ‘[p]erformances that do not serve to reinforce this law are repressed, mocked, denied recognition’. (Loxley, 2007: 120) Whenever we do, either by accident or in the spirit of rebellion, act in contravention to the silently agreed schemas, the fear is that the group will react by either ignoring the act, ignoring us, or by mocking.

The major strategy for smoothing over such breaches is to ignore them outright. In lieu of denial, the fallback is to shrug it off, most commonly by laughing at it. Laughter acknowledges the frame break while showing that it is not serious enough to disrupt proceedings. In either case, the ploy is denial: of the seriousness of the breach on the one hand, or that it occurred at all on the other. (Goleman, 1998: 212)

For the same reasons that we first join a group—that isolation and exclusion denies us the ability to satisfy an inherent need to build our identities within the parameters of our cultural groups—we are unable to cope with the exclusion that these reactions may lead to. Thus, we are likely to mimic the group to once again create group cohesion.

Ultimately, ‘the resulting sum of all of these complex interactions are the decisions and the choices that I make. We are not aware of these influences because they are unconscious and so we feel that the decision has been arrived at independently’. (Hood, 2011: 89) However, ‘existing within power, within certain temporal and spatial coordinates, within certain ways of speaking and knowing, is also a coexisting with others.’ (Bell, 2007: 20)

4.5. Conclusion

Within our defence Panopticon, the three pillars of my theoretical framework inevitably result in the totalisation of the dominant managerial narrative through the exercise of power. Viewing the shift in explanation through the lens of Foucault’s concept of totalisation, we can see that, although there exists a counter-narrative, the dominant managerial narrative continues to prevail by adopting a

tactic of marginalisation. Despite the existence of alternative views, ‘the question of security is no longer posed in terms of closure as in the modern age... but, instead, in terms of control of circulations and exchanges’— (Gros, 2014: 25) that is, control of the circulation and exchange of *legitimate* arguments. And where there is control, we invariably assume that there is a gate-keeper: but who is trusted to have access to the *illegitimate* arguments and who decides what can be legitimised? The evidence supports Foucault’s argument of totalisation in that there is no gate-keeper— in fact, we are our own censors. ‘[D]efence as risk management is far from rational and technocratic, but is rather the result of the ensnaring of thoughts and deeds in an ideology.’ (Louth & Boden, 2014: 304) The predominance and totalising effect of the prevailing managerial ideology means that we all participate in its enforcement through our everyday actions, affirmation and repetition of information as legitimate or illegitimate and our self-censorship. ‘Interpretation does not emerge as the spontaneous act of a single mind, but as a consequence of a certain field of intelligibility that helps to form over responsiveness to the impinging world.’ (Butler, 2010: 34)

In this chapter I have detailed the theoretical framework by which I have contextualised my observations. In the following Chapter, I lay out how this theoretical framework informed the way in which I carried out my research.

CHAPTER FIVE: METHODOLOGY

5.1. Introduction

Taking into consideration the nature of my research question and the need to understand relationships and interactions within the defence community, there was, to my mind, only one method of research that I was able to adopt: the ethnographic approach. Although the term ‘ethnographic’ encompasses a variety of approaches and interpretations, for the purposes of this research, the ethnographic-approach is understood as one that permits the participant to locate him or herself in the research, as an active member of the community being researched, recognises subjectivity as an asset, and, in doing so, enables the interpretations of observations, as informed by the researchers experiences, to form part of the research. (Bernard, 1994; Louth, 2009; Cunliffe & Karunanayake, 2013; Weeden, 2013; Kenny & Gilmore, 2014; Dahlke, Hall & Phinney, 2015; Twort, 2015) Therefore, exploiting my position at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), I have been able to observe behaviours at conferences as well as numerous other events, in addition to participating in them, becoming an agent within the defence Panopticon. (Shdaimah, 2013)

Below I outline how each element of my chosen method enabled me, as a researcher, to access the right type of information and enrich the conclusions arrived at. In addition, I briefly explain the role of reporting, validity and credibility in carrying out my research and presenting my conclusions. Finally, in this chapter, I have dedicated some space to laying out my rationale for discarding certain methods which to others may seem adequate in the context of this research.

5.2. Observation

Observation as a method emanates from the ethnographic approach (which originates in the anthropological discipline) and was developed to enable the researcher to observe the community that he or she is researching. The ethnographic approach ‘stresses not the structural functioning of fields but the reality of the chains of mutual knowledge and interdependence that constitute them.’ (Weber, 2001: 485) The researcher is, thus, able to use unconscious actions and interactions, which the subjects are unable to communicate in an interview due to their lack of awareness of them, as evidence. This includes the social setting— ‘the universe of reference and socialization in which interactions take on meaning for their participants’— (Weber, 2001: 485) which the observed take for granted. Observation of the unconscious actions and interactions of the defence community is crucial to my research as it is ‘certain elements of the context [that] help to fix the interpretations that each protagonist gives of [an] event’. (Weber, 2001: 485) In order to understand *how* and *why* the construction of the conceptualisation of defence has changed, and how the dominant interpretation of defence is maintained, observations on who interacts with whom, how these

interactions play out, how long for and in what context these interactions are deemed legitimate, (Schmuck, 1997) has been crucial. (Nason, 1997)

By collecting information on the defence discourse in its totality rather than merely in its verbal form, I have been able to build a more comprehensive understanding on how defence is framed through exclusion as well as inclusion. In the context of the Annual Defence Conference (ADC), for example, if interviewed, my participants would not choose to speak of the way in which delegates group or of the predictable flux of attendance according to the time at which a session is being held, as these are matters which, most of the time, they do not notice. At the very least, it is not something that they consider important. As an observer, however, I have been able to use these as evidence to demonstrate that conferences are not about learning but rather about grouping together and producing a community of safety in which *safe* subjects can be discussed.

In my role as observer, I sought to systematically describe those factors which contribute to the defence discourse: events, behaviours and artefacts within the defence context. (Marshall & Rossman, 1989) Van Maanen (1979) divides these observations into two categories. First order concepts for observation are simple behaviours and the participants own depictions of their behaviours. Second order concepts, however, require the observer to identify and interpret behaviours taken for granted by the participants. These are ‘matters as seen as deeply embedded in the commonsensical though unarticulated understandings carried by virtually all members... ‘background expectancies’ and as such they must always be inferred’. (Van Maanen, 1979: 541) It is the second order concepts which enrich a report since they require understanding beyond description. It is here the researcher themselves become relevant to the research as his or her observations are interpreted according to his or her knowledge and frames of understanding. (Schensul, Schensul & LeCompte, 1999) In my research, it is the education I have received, my form of *specialisation* in defence and security, my position within RUSI and many other factors which have framed my interpretations. Returning to ADC 2015, it is my background which means that managerial terms stand out and that I am able to identify them as belonging to a narrative that dominates and shapes the discourse. Were I to have been educated in the managerial tradition, this language would go unobserved. Along with reflexivity of my own role in my research, it is for this reason that my theoretical framework has been so central: ‘the most accurate observations are shaped by formative theoretical frameworks and scrupulous attention to detail’. (Kawulich, 2005: 95)

5.3. Participation

This observational method is defined as ‘the process of learning through exposure to or involvement in the day-to-day or routine activities of participants in the researcher setting’ (Kawulich, 2005: 91). Thus, rather than simply observing, this method entails observation through participation. (Cunliffe & Karunayake, 2013) ‘I’ as researcher form part of the research in this method and am a member of the group. There is no deception, however, as the group is aware that, although a

member, I am also carrying out research activities. (Gold, 1958) It is my natural conversations with others in the defence community, unstructured interviews and other unobtrusive methods of witnessing which have led to my conclusions, (Bernard, 1994) as the *participants* actions ‘stimulate researchers to ask questions and provide observations of contexts that promote nuanced theory development.’ (Dahlke, Hall & Phinney, 2015: 1)

Research has traditionally been conceived as an *objective* activity which requires the *unbiased collection* and analysis of data. However, the post-structuralist tradition not only recognises but requires that the researcher make clear and always be aware of their influence and subjectivity. In my research, I have not been merely a *collector* of data as every time I note down something of importance I am interpreting its value to my research, simultaneously assigning it value according to my own frames of reference. (Wedeen, 2013) Therefore, the *I* in my research must be made explicit, not only to the reader, but also to myself. (Kenny & Gilmore, 2014)

The subject I have chosen to research was not my original thought. I initially applied to do a PhD in the codification of a system of sovereign wealth recovery based on socio-political indicators. The idea was born from my background in international law and politics, in which I had done an MA and an LLM (specialising in defence and security). However, I was originally told that I was not ready to do a PhD, I presume due to my lack of knowledge in theory, but also due to the rigidity of my stance in terms of my approach to research; codification and indicators came naturally to me but did not fit with the work being done in Defence Industries and Societies Programme (DISP) at RUSI.

Before writing about why and how my research project changed, I think it is important to talk about how I came to do a PhD in the first place as it is a huge part of what makes me *me* and how my perspective is formed. I am not sure what makes a natural academic, but I do know what does not: *me*. I struggled through my education as I was not created a disciplined person nor responsive to authority. Instead, I spent my teen years and, to some extent, my early twenties fighting authority and, on principle, doing the opposite of what I was asked. In my teens, I frequently failed exams and missed deadlines, only to be expelled at the first possible opportunity: the first year of sixth form. After being scared into compliance by the prospect of *no future*, I eventually succeeded in completing sixth form and being accepted to university. After only one year at university, however, I was once more expelled at the age of twenty and left with the prospect of *no future*. So my response was to change who I was. As a matter of fact, I am the perfect example of the power of the narrative and how strong its influence can be. From being the most un-academic, un-disciplined person, I fought my way back into university, moved to the other end of the country, from London to Aberdeen, completed a four-year undergraduate degree achieving a respectable 2:1, relocated myself once more to Amsterdam to do an LLM, and again graduated with a respectable Merit. In sum, I worked hard to become an accepted member of a respectable society, subscribing to the dominant way of life.

Having studied defence and security for five years, I was familiar with RUSI's work and was excited by the prospect of starting my career at such a prestigious institute. However, I was not familiar with DISP's work and really had no idea that my now boss and supervisor was looking for a different perspective on existing issues. And so I arrived with a very conventional PhD proposal and was promptly rejected. Nevertheless, I was offered a second opportunity because I proved myself as an individual. I was not even aware of what DISP were looking for, let alone capable of delivering it, and I had worked hard for years to become one of the many—I was essentially far from the ideal candidate. However, I had spoken to DISP's director on the phone on several occasions prior to submitting the application, during the interview I had made it clear that I was committed to working on the areas I was lacking, and, subsequently, had agreed to wait another year to join the programme. Essentially, it was me, the person, the individual, not my qualifications nor my grades, which was selected to join the programme. I am placing great emphasis on this as, throughout my research, I constantly remind myself of this and try my hardest to carry it through to my research and findings. It colours the criteria I have for collecting information and how I interpret it. It means that, although this is a piece of research about the big issues and abstract notions and concepts, it is the individuals lives, both the past and present, which will give me a better understanding of what they are saying and what they mean by it. It is their histories and the communities within which they move which will really help us understand how ideas are generated and perpetuated: through the contributions of the individuals and their interactions with one another.

So how did I come to research the managerialisation of defence when my initial idea was to codify socio-political indicators for the purpose of sovereign wealth recovery? As I already mentioned, I was given the opportunity to do an internship at RUSI to better prepare to begin a PhD in 2013. During this time, I attended all the conferences, seminars and briefings I possibly could, and became more and more confused and less certain in my knowledge and understanding of defence and security. As a matter of fact, that year shattered my confidence and the certainty I had in my learned expertise, and I have yet to recover. I always knew I could not speak military, but I was well-versed in politics and law. The problem is, no one else speaks politics or law. Instead, they all speak management. Throughout my life I have avoided all things business and management, firm in my belief that I am a *public-sector-person*— to find myself then, in the community I had worked hard to join, an outsider because I avoided all things business and management was a huge shock and a fact hard to avoid. Thus, with a lot of help and encouragement, I arrived at my research topic.

It remains, even after three years of participating and observing the defence community in the UK, counter-intuitive to me to treat wars, the loss of lives, threats to our security and the apparent loss of British identity as a matter of management and business—a point I constantly bring up throughout my thesis. I recognise, of course, that this is coloured by the tradition within which I was educated on the matter, which focussed greatly on the human aspects of international law and policy-making. I was never exposed to the intricacies and

mundane tasks of domestic defence policy and decision-making. Therefore, I have struggled with a construction of defence which is not military-centric.

I have grown up in an era in which my country, Britain, was fighting a war in both Iraq and Afghanistan against terrorism- I was only fourteen when 9/11 happened and, to me, we were fighting to protect our way of life and prevent more unnecessary deaths. I never doubted the moral rightness of our actions even if I did become fully aware that both wars were begun illegally and not necessarily fought in a way I considered correct. But the basis of the wars— the protection of innocent peoples—was one I always thought worthy and one I felt illustrated the British identity perfectly. However, after eight years in Iraq and thirteen in Afghanistan, the global situation has arguably deteriorated and the threat has been brought closer to home.

Initially, I was certain I could carry out my research without making a judgement. I wanted to understand how and why defence has become managerialised without making a judgement on whether or not it is correct, but the research process has taught me that this is not possible. At its heart, this research sits in the post-structuralist tradition. Me and my observation of that which I see and hear within the defence community is central to the interpretation of how and why this has occurred, and the two—me and my conclusions—cannot be separated. Throughout my writing, I can hear the judgement and must always be aware of this. My post-structuralist framework, however, allows me to constructively use myself and my voice, as well as of those around me, to personalise my research and offer a snapshot of the construction of the concept of UK defence right now.

Post-structuralism posits that knowledge and power are intertwined to construct what we see as the truth. Thus a word or a label has no meaning within itself- they are merely empty signifiers. (Laclau & Mouffe, 2005) So the word *defence* is empty of meaning and can only trigger understanding in people according to the knowledge and narratives that they have been privy to. In essence, the narrative is the explanatory frame of reference for the defence discourse. Therefore, my interpretation of defence is precisely that: *my* interpretation, which has resulted from a joint journey with my participants and our environment.

I am privileged in that I am placed within RUSI as part of the RUSI/ Roehampton PhD Programme. I am able to access the defence community and participate within it as a member of RUSI. Due to how important having constant access to the community has been to my research, I have chosen to largely locate myself physically at RUSI rather than at the University of Roehampton. Through my unique location I have been able to attend a plethora of events and conferences, and speak to many people, not only of a variety of professional backgrounds but also levels of experience, enabling me to identify the narratives which run through the defence discourse, and how they are hierarchically organised to constitute how defence is interpreted and understood in the UK. My history, my education, my network and my location are the only constants throughout my research. Thus, it

is to my theoretical framework that I anchor my *self* along with my observations in order to create a valid and credible piece of research.

I, as I have depicted myself above, have participated in my research on two levels. First of all, my use of my own interpretative frames to understand that which I witness and come to conclusions is already a form of participation which cannot be avoided. It must be recognised that 'I' as researcher am a subjective being who cannot be objective in the interpretation of my observations. (Johnson & Sackett, 1998) In recording my observations, I am implementing my own form of exclusionary practices according to my own frames of reference. 'The ethnographer's own taken-for-granted understandings of the social world under scrutiny are also tied closely to the nature and quality of the data produced.' (Van Maanen, 1979: 547) To draw on my subjectivity fruitfully, I have constructed a strong, detailed theoretical framework, determined beforehand, which is strictly adhered to. The second form of participation is my participation in the community itself. Full immersion in the defence community allowed me a certain level of access that others may not have gained. However, Schensul, Schensul & LeCompte (1999) rightfully observe that most researchers are not full participants in their community of research. In my case, I have joined the community to do my research and was therefore not a full participating member beforehand. Thus, I relied heavily on my association to RUSI and strong contacts with people who are full participating members to afford me the access I needed without provoking reactivity in other participants.

One of the greatest difficulties in researching as a participant is that field notes cannot be taken at the time of research. Participation requires full engagement in any events or conversations and the use of a notebook or recording device can often interrupt the natural course of events. Furthermore, as a participant it is the researchers own contributions to these conversations and events which also form part of the evidence base thus the researcher cannot remove themselves to become simply the observer. The difficulty is then, of course, that, with notes being taken at a later point in time, field observations are arguably tainted by time and distance. However, having written my notes soon after the events, I was able to capture the essence of these conversations and reflect upon them. It is through my reflections that I was able to combine participants into, essentially, *types* which are represented by my informants throughout ADC.

Despite the numerous advantages to carrying out my research using this method, the role itself also has a disadvantage which I am aware can be framed as a breach of ethical standards. Due to the importance of collecting information in naturally occurring contexts, although I was always open about my role and purpose, it was not always possible to provide a great deal of information regarding my research. This, however, has been mitigated by having participant consent forms given to those who I have quoted and who have contributed through conversation in informal settings to my research as well as by always being open about my role when asked.

In addition, although the approach allows the research subject to determine which observations are relevant and when, as opposed to the researcher doing so ahead of time, it also means that defining a boundary to where the research space begins and ends can be difficult. (Merriam, 1998) This is an issue I have struggled with throughout my research as, in truth, places and people that can form a part of my subject of research are endless. Thus, instead of bounding the locations and, for example, ranks of people that contributed to my research I have chosen to time-bind my research space to the calendar year 2015. With it being a twelve-month period, this time span enabled me to add the important annual events to my spaces of observation. (Denskus, 2014; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016; Spradley, 2016: pp. 53-62.)

Nevertheless, these limits on my time, space and access to different parts of the defence community have impacted my research in terms of denying me the conditions to produce a *comprehensive* report on the defence discourse by taking into account the numerous other facets of the community and discourse (i.e. military, military education, industry). This, however, would be a much larger undertaking which I would look to do in future.

5.4. Document Analysis

In order to gain a better understanding of how the defence community wishes to portray *defence* and its practice in the UK today, I carried out an analysis of a selection of relevant documents published throughout the calendar year 2015 by official bodies representing the government. Document analysis is my chosen supporting method as it ‘is particularly applicable to qualitative case studies—intensive studies producing rich descriptions of a single phenomenon, event, organisation, or program’. (Bowen, 2009: 29) As I am seeking to understand the intricacies behind the dominance of a particular narrative in a particular time and space, the analysis of relevant documents provides a spring-board from which to glean the dominant themes and issues in UK defence today by providing information on the context in which my participants operate. (Bowen, 2009: 29)

Without using software or any aids, I read through each of these documents highlighting those statement and topics under discussion which I interpreted as central to the purpose of the document. The reason I did not use software is that I felt that, although I recognise that these can aid in giving us a general understanding of the discussion, the results could be misleading. By reading each individually, I was able to identify nuances in the argument and contextualise the vocabulary in order to interpret it and pick out key themes. I then went on to tabulate the themes to provide me with a visual aid in understanding and comparing which were dominant across most or all documents. These themes were selected based on how the documents were structured and the priority given to each topic area (determined by how often they were written about and how much space was dedicated to them in each publication).

If we take officially published documents as ‘social facts’, which are produced, shared and used in socially organised ways’, they can ‘be examined and

interpreted in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge'. (Bowen, 2009: 27) To this end, I sought out the themes and issues that are foremost in the minds of the participants in the UK defence community today. According to Fereday & Muir- Cochrane, '[t]hematic analysis is a search for themes that emerge as being important to the description of the phenomenon'. (2006: 3) In doing so, however, it was important that I considered the purpose and audience the document was intended for, thus information regarding the author(s) and the source of the information presented is crucial to the validity and credibility of my analysis. (Bowen, 2009: 33)

Document analysis as a method of research must, nonetheless, be considered a supporting method as it has its own limitations. Often, there is little detail in the information presented due to time and space pressures, as well as, often inadvertently, the interest of the authors and the audience it is intended for. Furthermore, once more for the same reasons, but also for political reasons, there is inevitably selectivity of information. (Bowen, 2009: 31- 32) In its supporting role, however, document analysis serves a purpose for the sake of triangulation—an issue I will explore further in the section on validity and credibility below. (Bowen, 2009: 29)

5.5. Genealogy

Genealogy as a concept saddles theory and method. However, I use it explicitly as a method, particularly in analysing documents with a view to collecting information on context. The reason I categorise genealogy as method and not theory is that I used it to guide the way in which I collected information whilst relying on my theoretical framework to frame it.

In order to provide a credible account of what defence looks like in the UK today, it was imperative that I provided historical context. However, a simple recounting of historical facts would not suffice to demonstrate how ideology and thought processes behind defence management have evolved. In a 2002 article, Kearins & Hooper outline how genealogy can be used for this purpose. It is important to make explicit that '[h]istory is... a practice where the material is not raw, but already the result of other practices of conservation and organisation.' (Kearins & Hooper, 2002: 735) Therefore, there is no obvious starting point but rather moments or performances in which the dominance of particular narratives is made explicit by relations and manifestations of power. In order to uncover these power struggles, the genealogical method 'emphasises a reconceptualisation of the current order, rejecting what is tacitly accepted but known to be flawed, and problematising it in terms of its historical production.' (Kearins & Hooper, 2002: 735) To do this, I had to extract from historical documents the 'local, discontinuous knowledges. It is from such disqualified knowledges... that critical discourse may be produced' (Kearins & Hooper, 2002: 735) by 'incorporate[ing] rather than ignor[ing] ruptures and discontinuities involved in the historical emergence of things.' (Kearins & Hooper, 2002: 736)

The implications of applying such a method are that, when analysing a document, I am looking for the performances of participants within the defence community, and how they choose to represent their ideas. These are important choices and performances as, '[b]y virtue of their location and status in society, their statements and interpretations become interventions. Their discourse is a form of action; their *theory is practice*.' (Shiner, 1982: 383) The consequence of these interventions is either the maintenance or a slight modification of the dominant narrative within acceptable and legitimised bounds. Identifying and recognising how information is distributed and its influence on others shows us 'how power is exercised and sustained through the use of disciplinary discourses and through associated administrative routines of surveillance, individualisation, exclusion, and ultimately through normalisation.' (Kearins & Hooper, 2002: 736)

Genealogy, however, has its downfalls in a world where research appears to have a very narrow purpose. It is the most widely held view that research should provide answers and conclusions which are generalisable. Genealogy, on the other hand, is a method which enables the researcher to 'make no claims to any absolute truth—theirs is just one possible narrative among others.' (Kearins & Hooper, 2002: 736) As a result,

[t]he diagnoses that emerge from genealogy are not in any way empirically demonstrable, but rather emerge as one interpretation in a field of many possibilities. Evidence is not used exhaustively to establish a set of causal relations, but selectively so as to render a problem intelligible. (Kearins & Hooper, 2002: 737)

Thus, as a method, it is inextricably linked to my theoretical framework and the purpose of this piece of research—to provide an in-depth understanding of the ideological underpinnings driving defence management in the UK in 2015 and to contribute to the establishment of a new way of framing defence issues. (Louth, 2009; Twort, 2015)

5.6. Reporting

The reporting of findings achieved through the ethnographic approach are as important as the research itself. The way in which the researcher reports and what he or she chooses to report lends any conclusions validity but can also discredit them if not done carefully. (Alcoff, 1999)

First and foremost, concepts must be made clear from the outset. 'The strategy most commonly employed by the fieldworker is to explicitly examine the linguistic categories used by the informants in the setting to describe various aspects of their routine and problematic situations.' (Van Maanen, 1979: 541) Throughout my research, the concepts of identity, performativity, governmentality, power and managerialism have been at the forefront of how I have interpreted my observations. They have shaped my interpretation of what is important to note and how these observations apply to my theoretical framework.

Within the bounds of my theoretical framework and concepts, I have sought to identify and report on two types of data: operational and presentational. (Van Maanen, 1979) The first pertains to the continual observance of conversations and activities in which I have participated and the second to observations concerning the ‘appearances that informants strive to maintain (or enhance)’. (Van Maanen, 1979: 542) In reporting these observations, I have sought to clearly distinguish between the two, always making clear that the latter, presentational data, are a result of my own interpretation. Furthermore, I have attempted to maintain clarity when reporting on the distinction between the opinions of the participants in my research and my own observations and interpretations. They are both equally as important but must be distinguished in order to maintain validity. Lastly, I have sought to continually refer back to my theoretical framework in order to anchor my conclusions to something beyond my personal opinions. Reflexivity in this guise has been a constant preoccupation and thus crucial to how I have chosen to report my findings.

The issues of validity and credibility are integral to the acceptance and legitimisation of a piece of research. In purely qualitative research, these issues are of particular concern, however, as ‘[b]y their nature, qualitative findings are highly context and case dependent... The focus is on understanding and illuminating important cases rather than on generalizing from a sample to a population.’ (Patton, 1999: 1997) For me, these issues were not only important to consider when I carried out my research and presented my findings, but were also integral to the research subject itself in the form of the notion of *legitimacy*. Today, quantitative data is held in high regard and considered to lend results credibility by its very nature. However, although quantitative data can offer one interpretation, in order to understand the role of statistics in defence management, I needed to adopt a different approach.

Bernard (1994) gave five reasons why an ethnographic approach increases a studies validity. Here I apply them to myself and my research, to demonstrate the suitability of my selected method to ensure the validity and credibility of my findings:

- a. My familiarity with the community through close ties with long-standing members of the defence community facilitated my involvement in sensitive activities in which my involvement might not have otherwise been accepted, allowing me to collect a greater variety of information;
- b. The unquestioned legitimacy of my presence at such events, indicating to other attendees that I *belong* and, possibly, subscribe to the same narrative, reduced reactivity in people around me as they were less likely to feel observed and act differently;
- c. My constant immersion in the community and the understanding of defence which I already carried with me enabled me to pursue lines of enquiry which someone with more or less knowledge of defence might not have conceived of;

- d. The conclusions I arrived at are better supported by well-informed observations arising from constant immersion and participation in the community as well as my status as a newcomer;
- e. The final advantage is that to understand the proliferation of a totalising narrative, constant contact and interaction with the people which populate and proliferate the narrative is simply the only way to collect data. Carefully prepared papers and secondary evidence could not give my research the depth of understanding that engaging with participants did.

As ‘issues of quality and credibility intersect with audience and intended research purposes’, (Patton, 1999: 1189) I have sought to lend validity and credibility to my findings by triangulating information gleaned through purely qualitative methods—namely, an ethnographic approach, document analysis and genealogy—with which I have been able to collect information, observe performances and participate in discussions which have betrayed the dominance of the managerial narrative.

‘The logic of triangulation is based on the premise that no single method ever adequately solves the problem of rival explanations.’ (Patton, 1999: 1992) However, I have used these different methods, not to prove that all the artefacts of the defence discourse (whether it be documents, speeches or conversations) demonstrate that the only narrative within defence is the managerial, but rather to explore how at all levels of the defence community we can identify the presence of other narratives, particularly the traditional, to varying degrees, and yet the managerial narrative remains dominant. Thus, although

[d]ifferent kinds of data may yield somewhat different results because different types of inquiry are sensitive to different real world nuances... [f]inding such inconsistencies ought not to be viewed as weakening credibility of results, but rather as offering opportunities for deeper insight into the relationship between inquiry approach and the phenomenon under study. (Patton, 1999: 1193)

5.7. Interviews

When considering the methods that I would use to carry out my research, my primary concern was ‘considering the weight of the evidence and looking for the best fit between data and analysis.’ (Patton, 1999: 1191) Although I initially considered semi-structured interviews, I came to the conclusion that this would increase the likelihood of reactivity, thus altering the performance of my participants. Although it appears that interviews are the best way to gain as much information as possible from participants, I sought rather to observe and participate in conversations with my participants in a naturally- occurring setting (in this case, an event that would be held regardless of my presence) which would not cause, neither myself nor participants, to perform any differently. This was a

very important decision for me as I battled with the prospect of sacrificing scientific rigour. However, having carried out the research, I feel that it was the correct decision to make as my field notes enabled me to capture the different levels of narrative in the defence discourse through observation of the day-to-day performance of the defence community—more than I could have gained through interviews carried out in formal settings. In this way, I was also able to triangulate the prioritisation of themes and issues which I had gleaned from the document analysis.

5.8. Conclusion

Taking into consideration the purpose of my research and the unique degree of access my position at RUSI afforded me, a participant-observer ethnographic approach has been the most adequate method for collecting information. Whilst my attendance and participation at conferences and discussions within the defence community has provided me with a wealth of observations upon which to draw, I have also carried out a genealogy of the UK defence identity through document analysis, not only to provide context, but also to triangulate the evidence and support any conclusions.

The results of the ethnographic study are thus mediated several times over—first, by the fieldworker’s own standards of relevance as to what is and what is not worthy of observation; second, by the historically situated questions that are put to the people in the setting; third, by the self – reflection demanded of an informant; and fourth, by the intentional and unintentional ways produced data are misleading. (Van Maanen, 1979: 549)

This blend of an ethnographic approach, my own participation and background, as well as the genealogy of the defence discourse, it is my hope, have resulted in a rich, robust, valid and credible report in the ethnographic tradition.

PART III: AFFECTING EFFICIENCY

In Part III of this thesis, I track the changing narrative in an attempt to highlight, not the moment, but the process of change in the discourse, through the identification of themes and choice of language associated with different *regimes of truth*, taking a historical perspective of the transformation that has occurred in defence over the past twenty years. However, rather than merely looking at timelines, I trace the history of ideas. In Chapter Six, *Disrupting Defence*, I begin by looking at the narrative that dominated and shaped the defence discourse in the late twentieth century, moving on to understanding the drivers of its transformation.

In Chapter Seven, *For Queen and Country*, I bring to the fore the sources in which we can identify the continued existence of the traditionalist perspective. Here, I review the work of my own department at RUSI as well as the works of others that, for a variety of reasons and to differing extents, expose the limitations of the managerial narrative within defence.

In Chapter Eight, *For Economy and Prosperity*, I focus solely on the official narrative in 2015 as portrayed by official publications. Here I pull out the ideas that appear to be of foremost concern to the government and its bodies, examining the frames of reference within which they are problematised and the solutions sought.

CHAPTER SIX: DISRUPTING DEFENCE

6.1. Introduction

In the space of two generations, notions and explanations of defence in the UK have shifted drastically from the traditional to the managerial. The managerial narrative is intrinsically linked to the extensive privatisation of public services in the UK and the growing emphasis on the role of industry in UK defence. However, contracting in defence is not new; prior to the two World Wars, defence was almost entirely contractorised. ‘Only when states started to move towards total war did the supply role of contractors diminish as militaries began to become self-sufficient... This transfer of responsibility was no doubt the result of military necessity.’ (Kinsey, 2009b) Today’s discourse, as those which have preceded it, has been formed in response to a number of socio-political and economic factors which define the context in which we practice defence. In order to understand it, it is not only pertinent that we explore the core drivers behind policy, but also the historical processes, both of thought and practice, which caused it to change, and which still drive the need for reform.

6.2. The Pre-1997 Defence Discourse

An analysis of sources pertaining to defence between World War II (WWII) and the beginning of the Blair Administration in 1997 show that defence was once framed in quite a different way. The image of new and professionalised armed forces, based on pride, honour and discipline, was the foundation of the official explanation of defence. This narrative was to become the dominant characteristic of UK defence for the remainder of the twentieth century.

There were a number of factors which enabled the dominance of this notion, the most important of which— the institutionalisation of high regard for the forces, the separation of the forces from civil society, and ensuring the visibility of the military—are worth exploring to understand how and why it became dominant and, eventually, was overridden.

6.2.1. Top- down institutionalisation

Throughout the twentieth century, the military simply was defence. Knott’s book examining the human problems in military life, written in the first half of the twentieth century, gives us an insight into the portrayal of the military, and thus defence, in the 1940s:

The first essential is that it should be in a form such that the whole population realises the necessity for it and the value of it to the nation and individual. This is mainly a matter of education of the youth of the nation to realise their responsibilities and duties as worthy citizens of a great nation. (Knott, c.1940: 13)

In the context of the World Wars, defence was understandably foremost in the minds of both the British public and government, encouraging total support for the armed forces and their service: '[t]he security of the realm is the concern of every man and woman in it and it cannot be sound to allow the many pay the few to shoulder their responsibilities for them.' (Knott, c.1940: 12)

With the professionalisation of the military came the need to instil an institutionalised respect for the forces as much to secure support as to ensure a continuous stream of willing recruits. In order to prevent the few shouldering the burden of the many, Knott, like many representatives of the government and military, prescribed that 'the army must be an integral part of the nation, recognised by all as essential to its continued existence as a free people and thus duly honoured for the duty it fulfils.' (c. 1940: 165) This attitude was to be instilled in the population from a young age, hence the popularity of cadet groups for young children. According to Knott,

the main object of all cadet organisations should be to interest the cadets in the services in which they will eventually serve as full members, to show them the value of these services to the nation and the individual and to inspire a pride in them, their achievements and their members. (Knott, c.1940: 15)

Although it is only one source, as a member of the establishment, Knott's book affords us an insight into how the government wished for the public to view the newly professionalised forces. As an authoritative element of society, the government's wishes had a great impact, particularly through education, on the formation of opinion on the armed forces in civil society.

6.2.2. An Institution Apart

One of the most successful mechanisms by which the traditional explanation of the military was institutionalised in quotidian life was by its clear separation from the civilian. The rationale behind such a strict separation stemmed from the notion that the physical and moral protection of the military from civilian life was crucial to its proper functioning and success. This included making a distinction between the military and the political as '[i]t has always been recognised that the good soldier, particularly the professional soldier, keeps clear of what is generally termed 'politics'.' (Knott, c. 1940: 171) This statement is somewhat presumptive, however, as the professional soldier had only been in existence for a historically brief period of time by the 1940s, but illustrates that the military was portrayed and perceived as an entity with inherent, unchangeable attributes. The insistence on fencing-in the military lasted well past the two World Wars and into the second half of the twentieth century. 'During the 1960s... the British Army remained singularly untouched by the outside world... They continued to live in a self-contained society, virtually impervious to the fads and political fashions of the rest of the country outside.' (Beevor, 2000: 63)

By institutionalising this image of the military as inherently deserving of a certain degree of autonomy, and by preventing it from interfering with political and civilian life, the UK government managed to institutionalise a deep respect for the military. In order to maintain this image, the government continued to ensure that the military was as self-sufficient as possible and ‘controlled and managed the private defence industry through its investment, custom and government assistance with armaments exports’ (Krahmann, 2010: 66) into the 1970s.

6.2.3. Visible yet untouchable

Strengthening its institutionalisation, the military was deliberately made visible to civilians by the stark contrast of way of life and forms of dress. The glaring differences made the military a constant presence as well as untouchable, protected by an invisible wall of discipline, ritual and hierarchy. By 1945 there were 4,653,000 uniformed personnel- (Vinen, 2014: 55) approximately 9.5% of the total population.³ With such high numbers, uniformed presence of military personnel on the streets was inevitable. After centuries without a professional army, this was a sharp and startling change of environment for civilians. ‘The frontiers between military and civilian life could be found in the oddest of places. Waterloo station was a frontier post, patrolled by military policemen and sometimes thronged with young men on their way back to garrisons in Hampshire.’ (Vinen, 2014: xxviii- xxix)

In addition, however, many who were not uniformed worked, or were put to work, for the various industries drafted in to support the war effort. ‘National Service in the Second World War extended beyond the purely military. Men of military age were permitted (or required) to work in war industries and could, indeed, be forbidden to join the armed forces.’ (Vinen, 2014: 37) Approximately 44% of the population made up the UK workforce in 1940s Britain, with 24% of these in the armed forces, 20% working in industries crucial to the war economy (such as metals, engineering, vehicle and shipbuilding, explosives and oil), and 55% working in industries aiding the war effort by virtue of being necessary to the sustenance of the population (for example, in agriculture and fishing, mining, government, textiles, construction and consumables). (Table 7, Broadberry & Howlett, 2002: 26)

Through the repeated use of symbolism and the saturation of the public with messages of patriotism and the need to support the troops on the battlefield, the government succeeded in socialising the British public into revering the military. In addition, the introduction of national service meant every man and woman in the country would feel the impact of the professionalisation of the military and thus would inevitably form an opinion on the matter.

³ Extrapolation based on population figures retrieved from <http://chartsbin.com/view/28k>

The introduction of compulsory service in the militia in 1939 did much to change the unsatisfactory outlook on the part of the general public. When they found that their own sons, however carefully brought up and however well placed in civil life, had to go into the army, or might have to go, the lot of the soldier began to be more interesting and more important to them. (Knott, c.1940: 6)

With the inclusion of the entire population came widespread support for the regular and reserve armed forces and UK defence policy. Vinen describes some of the experiences of the young men on national service and the unexpected benefits the uniform brought them: 'Most recruits spent much of their first free weekend travelling to and from home, they found that it was relatively easy for men in uniform to get lifts, probably the first concrete advantage of military service that they discerned.' (Vinen, 2014: 140) This increased respect and deference from the public led members of the armed forces to feel the pride and honour in their choice of career that the government had sought to instil. In a collection of memories of those who had done their training at Eaton Hall, Taylor & Stewart record these feelings of pride. Maurice Craft of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps, 1954 writes:

There was an unremitting focus on standards... I felt there were integrity and an ethical undertone to the preparation we were being given in respect of the responsibilities we would soon be required to undertake... I actually felt much pride in the uniform and at being offered this opportunity to repay Britain for my education and upbringing. (Taylor & Stewart, 2006: 96)

Similarly, Ian Barclay of the Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment, 1955, recounts 'I cannot tell you how proud I was to graduate and join my regiment... I commend this introduction to adulthood' (Taylor & Stewart, 2006: 60) and Bryan Cooper of the Royal Engineers, 1947, echoes these sentiments— 'at the end of the course when parents were invited to see our Passing Out Parade, I reckon that we looked really smart and actually felt quite proud.' (Taylor & Stewart, 2006: 92)

6.3. Traditionalism

As evidenced by existing first-hand accounts, the twentieth-century British defence identity was strongly characterised by pride, patriotism and honour. This narrative is what I term *traditionalism*. This was all achieved through instilling a *national* pride in the military as an institution and by the success in defining the military as a public service purely in the interest of the nation and general public, with a strong moral motivation.

Nationalism enabled states to centralise military forces under its authority, while bureaucracy was the means by which it was achieved. Importantly, the state no longer had to rely on contractors/civilians to perform certain

tasks, but had the manpower to perform whatever it needed to do on the battlefield. (Kinsey, 2009a: 21)

This *traditional* framing of defence persisted into the late twentieth century. As late as 1996, only a year before the publication of the SDR in 1997, the then Secretary of State for Defence, Michael Portillo, had the MoD publish the *British Defence Doctrine*, ‘the authoritative source from which all United Kingdom doctrine should be derived.’ (MoD, 1996: 1.5) In the section entitled *The Nature of War and Armed Conflict*, the MoD chose to quote von Clausewitz’s *On War* to express that ‘*the political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.*’ (MoD, 1996: 2.3) The document goes on to add that ‘clear and firm political direction needs to be maintained throughout the course of a conflict; if this does not happen, wars can run out of control and become self-sustaining.’ (MoD, 1996: 2.3) The *Doctrine*’s warnings and conclusions were a true product of its time, based on ‘history and deriv[ing] its authority from being the distillation of much hard-won experience.’ (MoD, 1996: 1.2) Michael Portillo had the *Doctrine* written at a time in which conflict was commonplace and ‘there [was] no clear distinction between war and peace.’ (MoD, 1996: 2.11) Although the Berlin Wall had fallen seven years previous, Britain remained in a state of high alert as it had since the beginning of the Cold War, fearing that ‘[e]ven relatively minor, localised conflicts may have implications for world peace and stability.’ (MoD, 1996: 2.11)

For the MoD in the 1990s, defence had two facets: an *effective* and a *credible* military capability. To fulfil these criteria to the best of their ability, the UK’s defence structure consisted of the MoD headquarters, the single Services, the Defence Crisis Management Organisation, the Permanent Joint Headquarters and the single Services headquarters— (MoD, 1996: 5.9- 5.10) not a single component dedicated to business or industry. This highly militarised defence community was in place to fight the ideological battles of the Cold War of liberalism versus communism with ‘[t]he most important duty of any government [being] maintaining the freedom and integrity of its territory and its people.’ (MoD, 1996: 3.2) As a result, ‘it [was] important that the armed forces should not become alien institutions with markedly different values and goals from the rest of society.’ By representing society,

the armed forces provide[d] an important and distinctive strand in the fabric of the Nation. They promote[d] the ideals of integrity, discipline, professionalism, service and excellence... embody[ing] much tradition, which help[ed] promote a sense of regional and national identity. (MoD, 1996: 5.10)

Most significantly, the aim of the British armed forces and their supporting structures in any conflict was to ensure that it was over quickly, with battles being fought intensely, minimising their impact. Primarily, these wars were to be won with a clear victory ‘measured by the achievement of political aims.’ (MoD, 1996: 2.3) The last of these wars was that of the Falklands in 1982. The Argentine Junta,

unable to garner enough support from the public for its rule and in a bid to improve its situation, attempted to reclaim sovereignty of the Falkland Islands in April that year. Refusing to surrender 150 years of British rule, Margaret Thatcher promptly sent 28,000 British soldiers to secure the Islands against 12,000 Argentine conscripts. The war lasted 24 days during which the UK lost 255 soldiers and 3 civilians. It was a bloody and brutal hand-to-hand battle, with a clear claim to victory. Management of the twenty-first century wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, was markedly different in character.

6.4. Official Documents

Official documentation outlining the UK's defence aims over the past twenty years provides us with an understanding of how the purveyors of the official narrative chose to frame defence. In turn, we are able to understand how defence was practiced in this era and, thus, why it contrasted with that of Pre-1997. Here, I predominantly look at four defence publications, which I will first summarise then pick out key recurring themes from.

In 1997, Tony Blair's New Labour Party won the general election with a manifesto promising a Strategic Defence Review. The result was a 390 page document (Command Paper 3999, 1998) reassessing Britain's defence and security needs. In response, the House of Commons published a White Paper (SDR), the first document I will be analysing, summarising the course of the review, as well as its results and its merits. The authors highlight that the aim of the review was to forge a national consensus over defence strategy, (Dodd & Oakes, 1998: 11) desperately needed as 'personnel shortages, coupled with a high level of operational commitments, have led to overstretch.' (Dodd & Oakes, 1998: 15)

The second document is the 2010 *Strategic Defence and Security Review* (SDSR), one of a pair of important documents published that year. SDSR 2010 was a comprehensive review promised by the new coalition government, elected the previous year, in the midst of an economic recession. The central focus of the SDSR was to formulate a five-year plan to reduce the MoD's portfolio and bring it back within budget. The government's approach consisted of 'scaling back in the overall size of the Armed Forces and the reduction of some capabilities' whilst '[s]trengthening our key defence partnerships [as] critical to managing those reductions.' (SDSR 2010: 16) This meant a major restructuring of the armed forces, to make them of higher quality, rigorously prioritised, balanced, efficient, well supported, flexible and adaptable, expeditionary, and connected. (SDSR 2010, 17-18) The government claimed that their:

approach recognises that when we fail to prevent conflict and are obliged to intervene militarily, it costs far more. And that is why we will expand our ability to deploy military and civilian experts together to support stabilisation efforts and build capacity in other states, as a long-term investment in a more stable world. (SDSR 2010: 3)

SDSR 2010 was accompanied by the third document of interest: *The National Security Strategy* (NSS) 2010. The NSS was essentially a report outlining the overall security situation in the UK. Its conclusion was that '[w]e must do all we can, within the resources available, to predict, prevent and mitigate the risks to our security.' (NSS 2010: 24) In order to do so, it put forward the National Security Risk Assessment to guide the prioritisation of defence and security aims and activities.

The final document is the *Defence Reform* paper, published in 2011 by the Defence Reform Steering Group at the request of the government. Once again, the key driver behind the request for an independent report on defence reform – the first of its kind since the 1980s—was the over-extended MoD portfolio. The report is particularly interesting as the Steering Group outline what they have found to be recurring problems in defence throughout the last century: the extent to which management in defence should be delegated, when should delivery be on a single service basis as opposed to joint, the balance between ministerial/civil servant and military roles of authority, accountability, matching ambition to resources and privatisation. (Defence Reform Steering Group, 2011: 10) The document claims to put forward solutions to those problems particular to the contemporary environment. Among its recommendations is the creation of a Defence Board to 'cover the departmental strategy and business plan; financial management, including the allocation of resources, financial controls and risk; the approval of major investment proposals, and periodic performance monitoring.' (Defence Reform Steering Group, 2011: 21) In addition, it recommends that financial management should be strengthened, management of human capability be prioritised, career management redesigned, and that the Chief of Defence Materiel must play a crucial management role in overcoming the over-committed portfolio. (Defence Reform Steering Group, 2011: 68- 72)

Throughout these documents, a number of recurring themes can be picked out: the centrality of the armed forces to the construction of the notion of defence, the role of the budget in how defence is strategised, the importance of defining and improving the remit of Joint Operations and the need to reform the procurement process.

6.4.1. The role of the armed forces

The 1997 SDR recognises that the nature of warfare has changed, with force projection becoming increasingly important and an increasing lack of differentiation between high- and low-intensity warfare. (SDR 1997: 24) Therefore the focus of the SDR is in strategising defence around preventative measures rather than preparing for offence. The role of the armed forces was thus reduced to that of an insurance policy. (SDR 1997: 15)

However, although I do not count it as an important document in terms of leading and framing British defence, in 2002 the MOD published *The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter*, which repositioned the armed forces. This document was

published in response to the tragic events of September 11th 2001. In the wake of the attack, the British government knew that it would need to respond to the US need for operational support, and would thus need to build a strong armed forces. Capitalising on the British public's emotional response to the attacks, this 2002 publication places the British public and its *heroes* at the centre of British defence. *A New Chapter* asserts that '[t]he availability of suitably trained and motivated personnel is key to operational success', (2002: 19) placing a renewed emphasis on recruitment efforts. However, the document also recognises that as a recruiter, the MOD must compete with the private sector. 'The emphasis we place on recruiting people who wish to make a career of the Service is also at odds with a workforce which moves increasingly quickly from employer to employer. We face strong competition for the best'. (2002: 20)

As a result of the repositioning of the armed forces post-9/11, later documents place a greater emphasis on their importance. In the coalition's first SDSR the government states that the 'Armed Forces, police, intelligence officers, diplomats and many others... are a fundamental part of our sense of national identity' (2010: 3) thus 'we are determined to retain a significant, well-equipped Army.' (2010: 4) In contrast to the 1997 SDR, in which the armed forces are relegated to an insurance policy, in 2010 it is armed forces personnel which appear to be at the centre of our ability to defend ourselves from further attacks: 'ultimately, it is our people that really make the difference... We must never send our soldiers, sailors and airmen into battle without the right equipment, the right training or the right support.' (SDSR 2010: 6)

Nevertheless, in the 2011 *Defence Reform* report, there is a less emotional and more practical description of the armed forces' role. The Defence Reform Steering Group lay out the role of the forces: to give environmental advice to the MoD, make proposals for their own development, support the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) and be a customer to the Chief of Defence Materiel. (2011: 34) Whilst recognising that 'people, cultural and behavioural issues are as important, if not more important, than structures' (2011: 11), the report suggests taking a more pragmatic approach to the treatment of personnel:

human capability should instead be integrated fully into Defence planning, in coordination with the work on a 'New Employment Model' for Service personnel, which, on the military side, is aiming to deliver the future human capability Defence needs and can afford. (2011: 58)

Although there appeared to be an appeal to a more traditionally conceptualised armed forces after the 9/11 attacks, the turn-around was simply a momentary reaction to an emotive event. By 2011, we see that the forces are once more relegated to their role as risk managers and insurance policy—one which persists today.

6.4.2. Budgetary Pressures

The 1997 SDR was proposed as a foreign policy and treasury led approach to defence rather than one centred on financial savings. However, the House of Commons Research Paper it prompted makes clear from the outset that the majority of its conclusions are arrived at by taking into account the need to save rather than in response to the challenges the UK was facing: ‘The Review, whilst reducing defence expenditure and forces, does not actually reduce the UK’s defence commitments.’ (SDR 1997: 20) The authors of the Research Paper question the choices that the government made regarding trade-offs, querying whether our commitment to spending 2% of GDP is truly necessary, advocating a threat rather than expenditure based approach: ‘it is still open to question why Britain should spend more in GDP terms in defence than many of its competitors, when home is acknowledged to be no longer under a direct threat.’ (1997: 20)

Despite these criticisms, in 2010, the official documents continue in the same vein, emphasising the need to retain the health of the economy as an indicator of the ability to defend and secure the country as ‘[o]ur national security depends on our economic security and vice versa.’ (SDSR 2010: 3) The NSS makes explicit that ‘[t]he security of our nation... is the foundation of our freedom and our prosperity’, (NSS 2010: 9) with prosperity being ‘a core part of our national interest and a strong economy... a vital foundation for national security.’ (NSS 2010: 10) Thus, ‘[o]ur most urgent task is to return our nation’s finances to a sustainable footing and bring sense to the profligacy and lack of planning we have inherited.’ (NSS 2010: 14)

Nevertheless, the government maintained ‘that savings will not be made at the expense of our core security’. (SDSR 2010: 9) Instead, the government proposed to control expenditure by reducing the legacy of over-commitment. This was to be done through a reduction in spending on non-frontline commitments by a total of 25% in the following areas: civilian and non-frontline personnel, the defence estate (by selling off assets), training, contracts (through renegotiations), allowances, commodities, and media and communications. (SDSR 2010: 31- 32) The SDSR, whilst placing the need to cut costs at the centre of the reformulation of defence, recognises in passing that such cuts will inevitably have an effect on the ability to deploy.

Further entrenching the importance of economics and financial planning, in 2011, the Defence Reform Steering Group criticise the lack of finance-led decision-making in the MoD, criticising it as insufficiently focussed on affordability, management information analysis, career management and cost-effectiveness, leading to problems such as the inability to take timely decisions and the ineffective use of civilian manpower. (2011: 13-14) The Steering Group suggest that the ‘[k]ey to achieving [a] steady state is agreeing a balanced and affordable plan at the outset that is costed properly, having transparency of financial information, and effectively holding individuals to account for performance.’ (2011: 37)

Taken in context, the prioritisation of budgetary pressures is a common-sense policy decision in the midst of a financial crisis. However, the recession and decisions taken during it have left a long-lasting legacy in the form of the legitimate catapulting of financial considerations to the forefront of decision-making in defence matters today.

6.4.3. Defining Joint Operations

The need to improve the effective use of Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) does not come up in all these documents but is an important element of the direction the last three administrations have wanted defence to take, particularly as a cost-saving activity. In 1997, joint operations escalated in importance as they were ‘intended to maximise the cost and operational effectiveness of the armed forces through inter-service co-operation or pooling’, (SDR: 27) with a view ‘to spread best practice and make efficiency gains.’ (SDR: 28)

In 2011 the Defence Reform Steering Group cite as one of the major problems facing the MOD the disempowerment of delivery arms which have organically evolved corporate frameworks and are thus lacking in structure, process and shared management. (2011: 14) In addition, the Steering Group outlines the criteria by which capabilities should be assessed for joint operations. These are whether or not it is a core capability, efficiency and cost-effectiveness, the feasibility of establishing an appropriate governance structure, and its optimum command and control structure. (2011: 46)

In my analysis of the conceptualisation of defence cost-saving and efficiency measures being implemented in 2015, the earlier prioritisation of joining the services serves as a successor policy to the now sweeping cuts being made to single service provision and representation. These few but important remarks in earlier documents serve as early drivers to today’s rationale to treat the forces as one service.

6.4.4. Managing Procurement

The procurement process has been at the centre of defence reform for the past two decades as it is considered an area in which a significant amount of savings can be made; ‘defence acquisition has taken on an increasingly important strategic role in terms of delivery of military capability.’ (Burgess & Ekström, 2014: 144) As a result, a lot of how defence is framed has to do with the efficiency and effectiveness of the procurement process.

In 1997, it was concluded that the procurement process suffered too much from slippage and cost overruns (SDR 1997: 49) thus ‘[t]he SDR provided an opportunity to examine the procurement process from first principles, drawing on best practice from the private sector.’ (1997: 50) Having examined private sector models, the SDR determined a new procurement process based on a three option framework: off-the-shelf purchases, low-cost low-risk minor development

contracts, and high-cost high-risk projects with few potential contractors. In addition, the new model would take a through-life approach and incorporate incremental upgrading in order to keep a tighter rein on spending and avoid escalating costs. Such an approach, it was concluded, would necessitate the 'establishment of a new specialist stream of acquisition personnel in the MoD, a cadre of both civil and military staff, who will be specifically trained and spend much of their careers in the procurement field.' (SDR 1997: 51)

Another feature of the new model was an emphasis on partnering with industry, intended to enable the MoD to share the cost burden. This move gave industry a prominent role in defence with the intent that the relationship would improve competitiveness and greater international industrial collaboration, bringing the cost to the MoD down. (1997: 55) However, the House of Commons Research Paper warns that such a move would damage national industries as large multi-nationals would always be able to offer more cost-effective contracts. This emphasis on the role of industry carried through to the new century. The 2010 SDSR has a section wholly dedicated to the role of industry. Its role is justified by the government as the only way to ensure that defence expenditure demonstrates VfM by using open competition on the global market for large acquisitions. In addition, a greater involvement of industry in defence was expected 'to ensure that private sector skills and technologies are protected where these are essential to maintaining sovereignty in the use of our Armed Forces.' (SDSR 2010: 30) However, in 2011, the Steering Group identify that the procurement process remains inefficient, overcomplicated, fragmented and lacking in standardisation. (2011: 14) To improve the model, they recommend involving industry even more and a greater focus on improving support to defence exports in order to generate an income. (2011: 52) At no point in the discussion on procurement reform is the notion that privatisation and the greater involvement of industry equates to *best practice* challenged. There is no discussion of alternative modes of administration but instead a push to extend existing policies; the critique is always that not enough is being done rather than that the wrong policies are being implemented.

These documents are all evidence that cost-saving, VfM, efficiency and cost-effectiveness are, not only central tenets to private sector organisations but also to the contemporary notion of defence in the UK. The insistence on the centrality of the armed forces appears to be skin-deep and to have little impact on policy-making. As a majority of UK policy in all departments is now finance driven, particularly since the financial crisis of 2008, this may well not come as a surprise. However, defence, in my opinion, is intuitively a public area of regulation, and it is difficult to understand how it can be reconciled with the business ethos of profiteering—a view shared by the government up till 1997.

6.5. Justifying change

Although the effects of a change in ideology were only felt this century, ideological change began to seep into the administrative structure as early as the 1980s. This was a response to the changing defence needs of the country in-line

with the once more changing global political landscape. ‘The post-war pattern of UK defence spending underwent a significant change from the mid-1980s onwards with the introduction of policies to contain costs and the ‘ending’ of the cold war.’ (Bishop, 2003: 14)

6.5.1. Change management

The primary function of a military organization, broadly, is to provide the best means for securing the state and state interests, and thus in turn means that military change should be geared to improving the military’s capability to do this. (Farrell & Terriff, 2002: 266)

In the 1980s, public service management was transformed by the election of Margaret Thatcher to Prime Minister. In her three terms in office, she began a trend toward privatisation throughout the public sector, to better align it to the goals and perceived level of achievement of the booming private sector. The reasons put forward for these changes were initially widely supported as many believed the private sector was the answer to the budgetary pressures that came hand-in-hand with changing priorities and the rapidly increasing pace of technological change. (Farrell & Terriff, 2002: 3) Thus, ‘[i]t was the legacy of 2 decades of outsourcing that provided the impetus for contractor battlefield support and shaped MoD’s assessment of how private sector involvement should be organized and managed.’ (Uttley, 2005: 4)

But how did this new private sector style management model fit with the aims of British defence? Taking into account the new priorities which largely settled around the speed of growth and innovation in the private sector as well as financial pressures, the rationale behind how privatisation would serve defence revolved around the maximisation of the budget and cost-saving: ‘MoD can reinvest resources released by outsourcing into operational enhancements in the form of additional front line military personnel, extra equipment, or access to private sector expertise.’ (Uttley, 2005: 12) This was a right-wing model of management which was attributed to the ideological roots of the governing party. However, when in 1997 the British public elected New Labours Tony Blair with the hope that a *socialist* government would reverse the privatisation trend that saw British public services suffer, the privatisation trend continued. By extending the implementation of the NPM model, the government set in motion an ideological revolution which centred on the managerialisation of defence as the only adequate response to the changing strategic environment although, ‘[t]o the electorate, the New Labour government presented its policies as non-ideological responses to budgetary constraints.’ (Krahmann, 2010: 88)

6.5.2. Managerialising

Krahmann theorises that:

changing ideological preferences for particular models of the state and the soldier have stemmed from three factors: transformations in the security environment, problems with the implementation of these models and the internal weaknesses of these ideologies, (2010: 78)

suggesting that the traditional narrative failed to ideologically fulfil Britain's defensive needs by the 1980s, prompting a top-down ideological revolution. The political managerialisation of defence, in turn, transformed the ideological direction of the military leadership. '[T]he process whereby strategic developments shape military change is shaped by politics within the state and within the organization itself... [P]olitics and strategy are inseparable', (Farrell & Terriff, 2002: 16) as

[c]hoices of how military force is organised do not happen in a vacuum, but are influenced by other factors such as socio-political pressures that can be beyond the control of politicians and bureaucrats responsible for the organisation of military force. (Kinsey, 2009a: 69)

The practice of placing management at the centre of the defence identity by decision-makers has inevitably and irretrievably shaped the discourse, through 'the articulation of words and actions, so that the quilting function is never a merely verbal operation but is embedded in material practices which can acquire institutional fixity.' (Laclau, 2005: 106) These new irrefutable parameters of how defence should be managed make 'meaningful action possible by telling military actors who they are and what they can do in given situations. In this way, cultural norms define the purpose and possibilities of military change.' (Farrell & Terriff, 2002: 7) This new culture has seen management strategies lifted from the private sector become crucial to our understanding of success in defence. Terms such as risk management, timeframes, projects and portfolios are the buzz-words which populate MoD publications and political statements. Rather than pride, honour and professionalism in the military, risk management, efficiency and VfM are now the dominant characteristics of UK defence. These terms 'provide individuals with reference points, sense-making and normative guidance in what can be thought of as systems of govern- *mentality*.' (Louth & Boden, 2014: 305)

As a result, following the publication of the 1991 *Competing for Quality (CFQ)* White Paper, '[b]y 2000, some £10 billion, or 45 percent of the MoD's 'annual business', had been reviewed for potential private sector involvement.' (Uttley, 2005: 7) As per the CFQ White Paper, this portion of the MoD's business was to be scrutinised and categorised for abolishment, privatisation, efficiency measures, contractorisation, market testing or the establishment of an agency, in a bid to secure cuts. (Pickard, 1997: 34) 'The fact that the UK government did not a priori exclude any military service from consideration from outsourcing or private

financing... demonstrated the predominance of Neoliberalism.’ (Krahmann, 2010: 89)

With Blair’s election, management ceased to be a tool by which to organise the MoD – a fact that has always been an important part of the administration’s role—and became the prime driver behind the making of policy. This signalled the transition from management to managerialism. Managerialism ‘is a phenomenon associated with membership in a specific group of managers that share specific attributes—a caste’. (Locke & Spender, 2011: 2) Despite the lack of moral dimension to the management caste, the MoD appears to believe that ‘contractors and professional soldiers share a corporate ethos which permits close and mutually beneficial cooperation’. (Krahmann, 2010: 106) With this new caste dominating the realm of decision-making in UK defence, a plethora of new concepts and targets have been imposed on the MoD. Today, *good management* is all about risk management, effectiveness, economy and efficiency. Thus, ‘Westernised neoliberal states now go to war, supposedly, to manage effectively identified risks in a functional calculative manner.’ (Louth & Boden, 2014: 303)

‘[T]echnological changes in weaponry have also meant changes in the recruitment and training of the military and the management of relevant financial and human resources.’ (Kinsey, 2009a: 69) The use of advanced technology developed in the private sector often means that the MoD and the services must rely on contracting-in training and maintenance rather than holding in-house services. ‘Ultimately, the changing force structure of the military as a result of advances in technology is leading to an ever-increasing reliance on technical and service contractors.’ (Kinsey, 2009a: 70)

Managerialism as an ideology can also be identified in the administrative parts of defence- namely in the MoD and its subordinate bodies, through the recruitment of employees in accordance with private sector skills, thus refusing to identify defence as a unique sector. Firstly, recruitment into the MoD is done through a general civil service website which advertises civil service vacancies by categorising them into 57 roles. With the exception of those which are professional roles (such as engineer, doctor or veterinarian), many of the role titles are directed specifically at management professionals. For example, the website recruits business managers, debt managers, risk managers and knowledge and information managers. In addition, there are many roles that would at one point have been unique to the private sector such as statisticians and auditors. (Civil Service Jobs Site) By employing for these specific roles rather than subject specialists, ‘there is a technical strand through which team members exercise practices and regimes of knowledge in order to improve or develop as better project managers.’ (Louth & Boden, 2014: 316)

Today, the results of managerialisation are clear not only in the MoD but also on the battlefield: 30% of personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan were contractors thus had ‘become strategic assets that the military must learn to manage’ (Kinsey, 2009b) with ‘[a] successful strategy [being] one that accurately accounts for the

role of the contractor in operations.’ (Kinsey, 2009a: 91) The centrality of contractors to this new notion of success means that,

the UK government has almost entirely abandoned the notions that there are core functions of the state, excluded, as a matter of principle, from the private sector supply, or that there are major differences between professional soldiers and private military contractors. (Krahmann, 2010: 84)

Consequently, our interpretation of what is defence has also transformed to fit the way we practice defence.

In the past, citizenship was bound up with patriotic duty, loyalty and responsibility. Everything has now been turned upside down within little more than a decade. First came Thatcherite individualism. It was followed from 1991 by Major’s rhetoric of citizenship, which, unintentionally, gave a populist twist in a different direction. This encouraged the notion of individual responsibility. All of this, followed by notions of a ‘stakeholder’ society, has led to a revised idea of democracy based on individual rights rather than collective duties. (Beevor, 2000: 71)

Although Beevor wrote this over a decade and a half ago, this trend towards individualisation has continued. Placing the individual at the centre of the explanation of defence is at the core of managerialisation. Instead of security and defence of the territory being the focus, the individual and all that his or her protection entails—risk assessments, reducing tax, career prospects, employment—have become the main goal of defence in the UK. As already noted, this is a cross-party ideology which is no longer subject to scrutiny and criticism but is rather taken as a basic fact of life: as *the truth*. This completely distorts the traditional narrative of defence and thus transforms the way we practice defence.

The changes in society have been a mixed blessing. The great social advances which have taken place over the past century have empowered the individual and introduced a vastly improved standard of living, but the other side of the coin has tended to diminish exactly those elements which are most useful to a military life. Selflessness, commitment to the common good and the submersion of private gain in the pursuit of a higher intangible, all run counter to the prevailing ethos in civilian life. (Hawley, 2000: 218)

6.6. Conclusion

By analysing the discourse as presented in key documents published since 1997 and contrasting them with the narratives present between 1945 and 1997, we can identify a number of changes in the prioritisation of issues. Modern publications (1997 onwards), prioritise the issues of budgets, joint operations and procurement,

and question and narrow the role of the armed forces within UK defence. However, an analysis of older documents, both official and unofficial, present a different conceptualisation of defence—the *traditional*. The traditional narrative emphasises instead the need for top-down institutionalisation of the importance of the armed forces through its physical separation from civilians (i.e. separate accommodation, uniform and codes of practice) whilst maintaining its visibility and constant presence among the civilian community.

If we are to take the modern official narrative in isolation, we see that this distinction has been watered down and defence, within it the armed forces, is being homogenised with civilian society. By this, I mean that it is managed by a universalised system which is applied to all government departments. In this chapter, I have tracked how this has occurred: first through the implementation of management techniques as tools to better organise the MoD, to the idealising of the management model, through to the situation today in which we have an institutionalised belief in the inherent virtue of management. In other words, a managerialised system. In the following chapter, however, I look to sources which demonstrate the continuing existence of the traditional narrative, in the shape of a residual counter-narrative. These provide evidence that the traditional narrative has not disappeared from the discourse, but rather play a different role in shaping our understanding of defence.

CHAPTER SEVEN: FOR QUEEN AND COUNTRY

7.1. Introduction

Although it appears that the managerial ideology has overridden any other interpretation of defence, the traditional narrative is still present and continues to inform the argument for an alternative method of management. However, this counter-narrative is kept at the fringes of the decision-making community, seldom having an impact on how defence is organised and managed. In order to understand how and why it is kept at bay, it is necessary to explore and understand the drivers of the traditionalist argument and how it is constituted.

That which I have defined as the traditional narrative continues to inform the way in which the general public understand defence: relating it to the military, battlefields and acts of valour, tending to refer to soldiers as heroes. Thus, there exists a counter-narrative whereby traditionalists ascribe the shift in dominant narrative to the capitalist interests of individuals in powerful positions:

the demands for change come from opinion-forming elites, from pressure groups, minority activists and from cost-cutting governments enthusiastic to implement innovations that have led to greater efficiency in the private sector, but which cut across the grain of military culture. (Frost, 1998: 4)

The Defence, Industries and Society Programme (DISP) at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) within which I have been embedded for the past three years, has been building a body of research regarding this change in the nature of defence in the UK. This research is aimed not only at identifying the change but also to understanding and illustrating it—the latter being where my research lies. An analysis of DISPs publications between 2010 and 2015 tracks the basis for the shift and problems that this transformation has prompted.

7.2. Defence Industries and Societies Programme, 2010- 2015

7.2.1. Identifying tensions

Defence has always been a contentious issue, with the failings of the MoD falling under close and brutal scrutiny due to the sensitive nature of defence and the potential for disaster where defence policy fails. One of the constant criticisms and difficulties that the MoD has faced since its inception has been balancing financial interests against operational interests— ‘defence for good reason can never find it easy to reconcile the Whitehall golden rule about always avoiding budget overspends with the other pressures that arise when military lives and operational success are at risk.’ (Taylor, 2010) However, it is a recent trend in defence policy to pay close attention to and prioritise budgetary needs; often, it is argued, at the expense of military needs. Although in a time of economic recovery budgetary constraints are of great importance, in defence such prioritisations can lead and have led to serious failures. In 2010, RUSI Acquisition Focus published

a report highlighting that the emphasis on cost-cutting is putting the UK's long term safety at risk, and thus indirectly leading to climbing expenses in defence.

If the Government is serious about building and maintaining a coherent set of defence capabilities, while still running a significant campaign in Afghanistan, it will provide sufficient short-term funding for defence to minimise the need for incoherent measures whose essential virtue is that they allow short-term savings. (RUSI Acquisition Focus, 2010: 14)

In 2014, Taylor identified that this short-sightedness continues. Writing about the reported underspend in Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S) in the financial years 2012/12 and 2012/13, he wrote:

It is not clear whether the underspend was due mainly to staff throughout the defence machine being reluctant actually to spend the money when there was such a government emphasis on minimising the annual deficit, or whether the absence of major process reform to underpin staffing cuts meant that it was taking longer to generate the necessary documents and complete the processes needed for projects to advance. (Taylor, 2014: 34)

In either case, Taylor asserts that 'the underspends may, perhaps, have had real consequences for defence capability.' (2014: 34) Furthermore, staff cuts have led to, not only a lack of reporting but also a haemorrhage of skills out of the public and into the private sector. As a result, one of the major problems facing the defence sector today is that 'much of today's military competencies actually reside in the industrial base.' (Heidenkamp, *et al.*, 2013: 3) In and of itself it is not necessarily a problem, but to an MoD accustomed to owning skills it does necessitate a change in models of behaviour and policy.

Despite this huge transformation in defence management, 'the extensive privatisation of public bodies and outsourcing to the private sector of services funded by government has taken place with little explicit discussion of what responsibilities the government cannot pass across.' (Taylor & Louth, 2013: 1) This does not only mean that the public has not been privy to, and therefore neither a part of, the reforms that defence management has undergone, but also that it has been left in the hands of the few-;

the energy and enthusiasm witnessed for today's reform initiative have emanated from very similar quarters to that of many of the other change programmes undertaken across defence acquisition every few years since 1998... Yet these programmes must, logically, have failed for us to have arrived at the current juncture. (Louth, 2015: 6)

Louth, Director of DISP, argues that since 2001, 'we seem to be reforming the reform but, strangely, with the tools, techniques and taxonomy already in our possession.' (Louth, 2015: 6)

7.2.2. Problematizing

Having recognised that a problem exists, where does it stem from? What exactly has shifted in defence management that makes finance and cost-cutting appear to supersede the need to save lives? For the past fifteen years, it has been central to the MoD's interests and policy 'that industry and government should be seen to be 'in it together', working co-operatively to protect the lives of UK forces and to enhance the chances of British military and political success.' (Heidenkamp, *et al.*, 2013: 50) This is not only applicable to military operations but also to the procurement and acquisitions process. '[I]t is worth considering the notable tendency in defence discourse to argue that the MoD must be 'business-like'' (Taylor, 2014a: 6) Although the MoD maintains that it must be a *smart customer*, it has not initiated a debate with regards to the costs of such arrangements as it has taken it for granted that these would be minimal and inevitably more efficient than past practices. (Taylor & Louth, 2013: 4)

This belief has recently been codified into a new, official approach labelled the Whole Force Concept (WFC). WFC consists of 'a partnered arrangement of regular military, regular reserves, volunteer reserves, sponsored reserves and private-sector contractors.' (Louth & Quentin, 2014: 1) Within it, the private sector and its employees contribute on two levels: on the one hand preparing the military for operations through the use of the expertise lying within it (e.g. development of technology and training), on the other, undertaking activities in theatre (e.g. logistics), not only as a contractor but also by sponsoring reserves. In this way the private sector becomes a *force multiplier*, undertaking activities which free up the military to carry out those functions deemed exclusive to a body accountable only to the MoD. In essence, '[w]hat was once the preserve of standing armies now resides, in part, with standing commercial arrangements. (Louth & Quentin, 2014: 2)

RUSI's research demonstrates that the shift is actually an ideological one: the belief that private sector management models are always better than public sector models and that, on this basis, there need not be any difficulties with the MoD working closely with the defence private sector as '[t]he vision of the Whole Force Concept rests heavily on the intellectual case for seamless partnership and partnering' (Louth & Quentin, 2014: 6) However, I, along with some of my DISP colleagues, do not fully embrace this philosophical *truth* and the notion that there is a natural partnership between the MoD and the defence business sector.

Generating and delivering defence capabilities that enable force projection on a range of missions, some sustained, is a complicated as well as expensive business, where there is a need to accept risks in the hope of gaining advantage. Measuring and judging politically charged defence programmes with the same metrics as commercial programmes distorts reality. (Dunn *et al.*, 2011: 16)

This assertion is based on the belief that business practices are not always best suited to the running of a sector inherently public in its nature.

Commercial business philosophies and practices are not sustained to deliver 'best in class' year on year... But defence must be positioned to be first in class, as the 'UK shareholder' understands that where national security/ is at stake, its defence forces must never be positioned to come second. (Dunn *et al.*, 2011: 18-19)

There is, however, little dispute of the virtues of rigorous management practices in the running of such a huge organisation as the MoD. Both the MoD and the Armed Forces can benefit from contracting in support for operations as resources are undoubtedly saved, particularly in the short-term. In addition, societally this approach appears to be more acceptable than that of a heavily visible military:

Outsourcing non-core military tasks allows the government to match society's demand for a light military footprint in operations abroad, while also enabling politicians in the government and parliament to communicate a more cost-effective utilisation of scarce public financial resources. (Heidenkamp, 2012: 16)

In an article focussing on partnering, Louth espouses the benefits of such an approach whereby '[i]ndividual partners can keep their respective identities and even their autonomy and yet still work openly and frankly... partnering as a concept seems best when it is enwrapped by robust programme management techniques.' (Louth, 2012: 10) However, Louth also warns that partnering 'becomes less meaningful when deployed merely as a branding or marketing tool, and as devoid of all relevance as an objective in its own right.' (Louth, 2012: 10) Thus, the problem arises when adherence to management practices becomes an ideological fixation which curtails the realm of possibilities and innovation: 'this logic dictates that units and their tasks must be placed in the private sector either if they are deemed inefficient or if they can already win contracts and deliver on them.' (Taylor, 2014a: 6)

The work of DISP, therefore, demonstrates that the demonization of private sector practices is an ideological stance with no practical foundation, despite the fact that these models can sometimes be useful to the good management of defence. Equally, however, the whole-hearted adoption of private sector models is dangerous to good defence management as defence should inherently be within the realm of public sector decision-making.

The existence and safeguarding of defence businesses, the promotion of their commercial interests, and the provision of skills, competencies and other scarce and precious elements of a defence value-chain that generates specialist defence goods and services are inescapably the business of government. (Heidenkamp, *et al.*, 2013: 139- 140)

7.3. The Traditionalist Argument

Traditionalists hold that a professional army—the central component to British defence—cannot survive or perform successfully without the legitimising traditional narrative.

Today... there are additional reasons for supposing that our armed forces will be ill-prepared when they are most needed. These have to do with developments whose origin lies in civilian rather than military society but whose impact on the military ethos is proving deeply corrosive—with serious and profound implications for operational effectiveness. (Frost, 1998: 2)

The critique of the managerial explanation and organisation of defence today is based on two factors which I explore below: the assumptions that managerialism in defence is based on being unfounded and the notion that it produces more instability and, thus, is a potential threat.

7.3.1. Unfounded assumptions

The primary rationale behind the counter-narrative arises from the assertion that a managerial explanation of defence is based on a number of unfounded assumptions, making it the enemy of the defence community by being the ‘principle cause... and chief promoter of bad management’. (Locke & Spender, 2011: 185) The identification of these assumptions highlights the cracks in the totalising managerial narrative, illustrating that it cannot be the singular *truth*.

In his book on contractors on deployed operations, Matthew Uttley lists the assumptions made by the managerial model, each of which is refuted by the prevailing counter-narrative.

- *Assumption 1: ‘There will invariably be readily identifiable safe and secure areas on any operational deployment where private contractors can operate’ (Uttley, 2005: 14)*

The *Competing For Quality* White Paper makes the assumption that all components of defence, including those on operational deployment, can be subject to categorisation and a degree of managerialisation. However, the critique holds that the existence of regulation dictating that there are a number of areas in which contractor participation is categorically unacceptable disproves the assumption. For example, the United Nations International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (1989) clearly provides for a categorical ban on the use of mercenaries. Therefore, it is clear that it is a breach of our international obligations to place contractors on the front-line. Nevertheless, there are a number of grey areas and many argue that it is not just the front-line that should be safe-guarded. Intelligence, for

example, is an area of dispute as it concerns sensitive information which, it is argued, should only be handled by subjects loyal to the military and not to private interests. There are those too who argue that no contractors should be involved at all on deployed operations as all matters surrounding such operations are inherently matters for the state.

Wherever the line is to be drawn, the traditionalist believes that, in order to protect the military from such detrimental change, the MoD must:

define core military tasks that only the military should be allowed to do... where a task cannot easily be defined as a core military or auxiliary task, the MOD will need to demonstrate political will to ensure that in such situations the interests of the MOD are protected against those of contractors. (Kinsey, 2009a: 111)

- *Assumption 2: '[C]ontractors can enhance significantly the armed services' logistics and equipment support capabilities up to the 'benign edge' of deployed operations...' (Uttley, 2005: 14)*

Linked to the first assumption, the second argues against the government taking it for granted that the involvement of contractors inevitably results in greater efficiency and thus in better performance. However, traditionalists argue that contractors should only be asked to step in for the professional military in a limited number of situations. Thus,

states must be clear about what is the primary purpose in undertaking to innovate or adapt their military... states that undertake military change for reasons of identity and prestige run the risk of creating a military organization that is not appropriate to the military strategic environment in which they operate, with repercussions for national security. (Farrell & Terriff, 2002: 266)

- *Assumption 3: 'Contractors providing deployed support can be integrated into military operational planning, and command and control (C2) arrangements without disruption...' (Uttley, 2005: 15)*

The ability to integrate without disruption presupposes that both the military and contractors exist for the same purpose and function in the same way. However, the military offers the 'development of a collective professional identity through extended schooling and training. Both serve to instil democratic norms and standards of operation.' (Krahmann, 2010: 45) This is not a process that contracted personnel are put through. Quite to the contrary, today contracted staff are expected to be flexible in their career paths as well as individualistic in their personal goals.

[T]he distinguishing characteristics of military life—the emphasis on obedience, loyalty, honour, tradition, and the need for self-sacrifice—reflect experience of the attributes needed to perform their task. What makes their task unique is that it requires an unlimited liability on the part of the serviceman. Redefine the task and you change the culture (Frost, 1998: 3)

In other words, '[t]he functional imperatives of war and military operations ensure that the services stand apart from civilian society.' (Dandeker, 2000: 174) By attempting to assimilate the military with the private sector culture, we risk making the Armed Forces just another organisation with no special role in society—an unthinkable reconceptualisation for those who hold to the traditional view.

- *Assumption 4: 'The reliability of private firms to deliver the deployed support they are contracted to is ensured by 'gain-share'' (Uttley, 2005: 14)*

This assumption places profitability at the centre of success. However, traditionalists do not agree that profitability enters into the formula of success in defence matters. Quite to the contrary, some would argue that this private sector model is damaging to military success as the latter cannot be measured by the same standards. 'Along with privatisation has gone the introduction of management techniques to an area where 'productivity' is often impossible to measure, and where statistics may do more to obscure the truth than reveal it.' (Frost, 1998: 9)

Whereas profitability is the aim of contractors, the military and the defence community should measure their success on a moral basis. Therefore, assessing whether or not services should be contracted out on the basis of 'financial risk transfer, value for money and its potential consequences for military effectiveness', disregards any questions of 'the ethics of a commercial, profit-oriented supply of military services and the implications of the growing role of private military contractors for democratic control and accountability.' (Krahmann, 2010: 104) The British military is at its core a traditionalist institution and would be non-existent if it were not so since 'British soldiers are professionals who chose to serve because they want to be soldiers.' (Roberts, 2000: 197) In contrast, contractors have no obligation to endure danger as '[u]ltimately, no businessman asks his employees to put their lives on the line.' (Coker, 1998: 29)

- *Assumption 5: 'Outsourcing can enhance the morale, cohesion, combat effectiveness, and ethos of the armed services themselves.'* (Uttley, 2005: 16)

This assumption is an extension of the last. It is based on the notion that both the military and contractors have the same motivation. However, as outlined above, it is undeniable that contractors have profitability as their aim, whereas 'the Army's basic human needs—those of mutual trust, cohesion and respect for authority—have not changed, and cannot change if an effective war-fighting capability is to be maintained.' (Beevor, 2000: 67) The willingness of the serviceman or woman to sacrifice his or her life on moral grounds is unique to the profession. A contractor 'presumably has no loyalty to the state and may walk away if he or she believes the situation is becoming too dangerous to stay.' (Kinsey, 2009b)

As a result of these differences, traditionalists argue that 'privatisation... risks turning the military vocation into a trade, thereby eroding the moral content of military service and diminishing the serviceman in his own eyes.' (Coker, 1998: 19) Furthermore, although in the short-term the government might make some savings and protect the lives of some individuals,

it is not the immediate impact of such measures on cost efficiency which should most concern us but the gradual replacement of the military ethos with that of commerce. The end result of this process will be that protection of the citizen—the first duty of government—will be contracted out. (Frost, 1998: 10)

7.3.2. A Threat to Ourselves

In addition to the unfounded assumptions argument, traditionalists contend that managerialisation does not enable the UK to meet threats appropriately, thus creates an undependable system of defence. Traditionalists argue that 'the notion that a management caste should be allowed to run things is... problematic'. (Locke & Spender, 2011: 174) Instead, those who are qualified to be in charge are those who have gained specialist skills through experience rather than so-called universal management skills.

- *Risking risk management*

The traditionalist argument contends that, although it may well have its place in civilian society, the emphasis that the managerial ideology places on the safety of individuals who can be counted and neatly placed into tables, is the greatest risk that our military, and thus our defences, face. 'We live in an age when people, and governments, believe that anything dangerous, from food poisoning to sport, should be controlled. Yet the Army has to recruit and train for the most unpredictable and dangerous of all occupations.' (Beevor, 2000: 65)

In his chapter entitled 'Who Will Defend the Defenders?', J. Brazier gives examples of how the states obsessive need to manage risk and protect individuals has a detrimental impact on the work of the military from the training stage to the battlefield. Writing in 1998, when regulations were only just beginning to have an impact on the military, Brazier rails against the injustice of safety measures and precautions, as, although they are adequate in our well-protected cities in which we do not face dangers that cannot be handled, servicemen and women are meant to be trained to handle and remain confident in war zones. 'If the training programme is to be halted every time there is a risk that a regulation may be broken, training will not be realistic and the responsibility to prepare our armed forces for the brutal realities of warfare will have been neglected.' (Brazier, 1998: 66) As a result, the military will not be well prepared and, although they will have remained safe whilst on training, they will be more likely to come to harm whilst on deployment.

Furthermore, the UK government has not only seen it fit to comply with European Union (EU) regulations which we must enforce on our military, but have also felt it necessary to go the extra mile. The military had already by 1998 been smacked with regulations which the EU only requires civilians to comply with. However, as a ministry of a managerialist state,

the Ministry of Defence has decided to comply with civilian drivers' hours legislation, although neither EU nor UK legislation requires it to do so. The rules apply even in areas like Bosnia. As a consequence, an officer may now be faced with abandoning his mission or breaking highly detailed regulations. (Brazier, 1998: 65)

Although saving as many lives as possible is, of course, central to the military's work, the risk management approach is not considered the most effective by traditionalists. Instead, they insist that good training, the ability to take initiative and the recognition of the battlefield as a place unlike any other are crucial to saving lives and to military success:

In the military context, excessive caution may manifest itself in a number of ways. Reluctance to commit forces to an exceptionally dangerous situation may avert immediate losses in the narrow strip of the front—but at the much greater cost of broader strategic defeat for our forces. (Ekins, Morgan & Tugendhat, 2015: 23)

- *Judicial Activism*

A second threat to our defences is that of judicial activism. Until recently, the military have been recognised as an organisation acting in extraordinary circumstances and thus unable to be judged by civilian standards. The existence of military law and its own separate enforcement body 'illustrates the professional soldiers special duty towards the state and simultaneously safeguards the democratic control and accountability of the professional armed forces.'

(Krahmann, 2010: 44) However, in recent years there seems to have been a lack of separation between military and civil law, and servicemen and women are being judged by civilian standards for acts committed whilst on deployment.

In their article on the detrimental effects of judicial activism in the UK, Ekins, Morgan & Tugendhat outline how the infringement on the jurisdiction of military courts by civil courts is causing confusion among military personnel and thus threatening the effectiveness of the military.

Our courts, once kept away from judging the confusion of the battlefield, can now consider with the benefit of hindsight how those commanders should have trained, prepared and equipped for—or even how they should have fought—the very conflicts in which they serve. (Ekins, Morgan & Tugendhat, 2015: 9)

The authors argue that judging military matters, whether it be on strategic or procurement decisions, should remain a matter for military professionals and specialists as ‘it would be quite inappropriate for a judge to second-guess policy-makers’ choices with the benefit of hindsight.’ (Ekins, Morgan & Tugendhat, 2015: 23)

In addition, insisting on the application of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), drafted for the protection of civilian rights in general, to the activities of servicemen and women on deployment, instantly puts the British military at a disadvantage. It makes our military more restricted by regulation than most others in the world, particular those considered the enemy, and thus unable to respond with sufficient force. Furthermore, it makes the British army an unattractive partner to non-European states such as the US as ‘the legal framework for the use of force becomes much more complex’. (Ekins, Morgan & Tugendhat, 2015: 22) According to the authors, such judicial activism risks changing ‘the mindset of the commander from one of willingness to take risk for strategic gain, to one of risk aversion that is incompatible with the winning of wars’ (Ekins, Morgan & Tugendhat, 2015: 23) as ‘[e]ven if commanders can somehow perform incompatible duties simultaneously, the general point remains: the new tort duty will place UK forces at a military disadvantage.’ (Ekins, Morgan & Tugendhat, 2015: 24)

- *Losing sight of morality*

Finally, managerialisation threatens to erode the moral basis for our defence. The military was originally professionalised to respond to immoral acts that might not necessarily be criminal, but that threaten the safety and dignity of humans. However, managerialisation threatens to dehumanise defence, thus effectively removing the basis for its existence. Managerialism reduces people to figures which is why the individual is so important. The individual can be counted and placed as a number in a table or added to a total to represent a variable. However, these numbers cannot represent quality of life, respect, the preservation of dignity

or security in human terms as '[n]ot all acts of knowing are acts of recognition.' (Butler, 2010: 6) The consequence of the managerialisation of defence management is that those lives we deploy our military to preserve and improve do not actually count as lives. We instead grieve numbers rather than people, with daily news bulletins reporting the number of dead, the number of attacks, the number of enemies apprehended or, better still, destroyed. In essence, 'certain lives do not qualify as lives or are, from the start, not conceivable as lives... these lives are never lived nor last in the full sense.' (Butler, 2010: 1)

As we are unable to conceive of these figures as lives as our own are, we as a population are more willing to accept their destruction when they are framed as a threat:

the shared condition of precariousness leads not to reciprocal recognition, but to a specific exploitation of targeted populations of lives that are not quite lives, cast as 'destructible' and 'ungrievable'. Such populations are 'loseable'... they are cast as threats... [thus] the loss of such populations is deemed necessary to protect the lives of 'the living'. (Butler, 2010: 31)

The traditionalist argument is that the demise of the moral component of war, of the honour and integrity of being servicemen fighting for the morally correct, is and will continue to erode the essence of military service until our professional military is conceived of as nothing more than a legitimised band of mercenaries.

Traditionalists offer a counter-narrative in the dominantly managerial discourse by disputing the assumptions upon which the prevailing explanations are based. They argue that these assumptions are unfounded and run contrary to the central ethos of the professional military and that, although we feel we are reaping the benefits now in terms of cost saving, the consequences of this change of direction will be profound and extremely damaging. Many will agree that managerialism is too far ingrained in defence management as it is in the rest of society, but that its effects can be mitigated by controlling its spread. Thus, '[t]he important question now is how much more can be contracted out before the process starts to have a negative impact on the effectiveness of the armed services on operations as a consequence of undermining the integrity of the forces structure.' (Kinsey, 2009b)

7.4. Traditionalism: Ideological or Practical?

The belief that defence management decisions should ultimately lie within the public sector can also be argued to be an unfounded ideological assumption. Taylor writes, however, that

the defining feature of the UK defence sector is that it must ask people to put their lives at serious risk... because an elected politician would like that to happen. The single services do not and should not run according to the profit motive that drives businesses. (2014a: 7)

I would also add that, it is not only telling that the armed forces should not be motivated by financial incentives, but also (and this may seem obvious) that those in the private sector are not motivated by the defence and protection of the UK. That is not to say that private sector employees are not patriotic, but it is not why they do their job. Thus, this fundamental difference in the rationale for the existence of the MoD and the Armed Forces as opposed to that of private business, immediately places the two in, maybe not opposing, but most certainly distinct conceptual camps. This conclusion is supported by the growing legal vulnerability of the government with regards to the inadequacy of equipment, suggesting that there exist 'real limits to the risks and responsibilities that could be passed to a procurement contractor' (Taylor & Louth, 2013: 5)

In practical terms, the counter-narrative also throws up a number of difficulties and problems arising from the *business-like* approach, and the existence of a private sector supply chain. One of the most problematic of these is the issue of sovereignty:

While in some cases the 'home' government may still own a significant percentage of a defence company modern companies are, in essence, owned by individuals and organisations from all over the world with these shareholders having either no particular identity or alternatively a number of varied national identities or affiliations... These multi-layered, transnational ownership structures raise legitimate questions about the influence of governments and parliaments... on the long-term strategic development of the defence industrial base. (Heidenkamp, 2012: 20)

The lack of control of and accountability to the UK government of businesses accountable to private stakeholders means that the government is less able to dictate and limit the dissemination of information as well as exclusivity of ownership of technology. Thus, '[a]n excessive reliance on foreign suppliers for the adaption and sustainment of military capability would both entail operational risks and damage the UK's stance as a significant military player capable of independent military action.' (Heidenkamp, *et al.*, 2013: 29)

Although the globalisation of supply chains for goods and services has many financial advantages, specifically in the case of defence it poses an equal number of threats.

First, it is a challenge to the sovereignty of the nation state... Second, globalisation increases risks for governments as they lose their monopsony position and, therefore, their ability to tightly direct defence industries around their own national needs and long-term interests... Third, globalisation creates several challenges around sovereign capability. From a military strategy perspective in terms of securing supply lines, it is// generally more desirable to have as few interdependencies as possible

outside a nation's borders. Fourth, globalisation creates several issues with respect to knowledge management. (Burgess & Moore, 2012: 110- 1)

The private ownership of technologies and skills does not only impact the sovereignty of the UK government but also its ability to access and operationalise capabilities. Where there is a decrease in demand for services and products, businesses will inevitably begin to lose expertise, close down or move elsewhere. Thus were there to be a time in which the need becomes urgent, the defence industry would find it difficult to meet the needs of the government in time.

The key consideration for the British government and industry here is ensuring the sustainability and commercial viability of the CSO market... With its military capabilities so dependent on CSO, the British government could find its options seriously limited should a situation arise that requires a large-scale operation at relatively short notice. (Heidenkamp, 2012: 34)

Taken as a whole, the work of the DISP highlights that

there is an overall situation comprising the coming together of three uncomfortable bedfellows: the continued emotional and political preference for national identity and capability; the managerial need for defence businesses to be multinational in nature and for governments at least to co-operate on big projects; and the dependence of the military on a capable and agile military supply. (Heidenkamp, *et al.*, 2013: 13)

It is the result of such difficulties, and the explanation of defence resulting from it that forms the subject of my research. In particular, the fact that 'how a government responds to these challenges is contingent on a country's political ambition, its culture, history and world view', (Heidenkamp, *et al.*, 2013: 138) and what this means for our British defence identity.

7.5. Conclusion

We can see that there are many indications of counter-narratives attempting to chip away at the dominant narrative. Traditionalism remains alive today, providing a critique of the underlying assumption of the managerial explanation of defence, and warning of its potential detrimental and limiting impact on the defence of the UK: the danger of risk aversion in military training and operations, the encroachment onto the ability of the MoD and military commands to make decisions risking the lives of military personnel through judicial activism, and the erosion of the moral basis for the Armed Forces.

The work of the department within which I work, DISP, at RUSI, contributes further to this critique, but, rather than locating itself against it, its work has unearthed the existence of a problem with the implementation of the narrative in defence management. DISP, through its research, has identified the failings of the

system and questions whether it is because the dominant narrative has not come to dominate entirely and thus the tensions with the residual emotion-laden notions of honour, pride, patriotism and victory, alongside a practical dependence on the military, are sitting uneasy with the managerial approach to defence as the tensions between the two narratives lie in their distinct core belief and value systems. It appears, therefore, that they are irreconcilable.

CHAPTER EIGHT: FOR ECONOMY AND PROSPERITY

8.1. Introduction

Having looked at the process of change in methods of defence management and identified the existence of a traditionalist counter-narrative, what does the official defence discourse look like in 2015? The following documents, published by officially created bodies, under the guidance of the MoD, and charged with either supporting the government and/or casting a critical eye over its actions, are reflective of the legitimised narrative by which the defence community frames and makes its decisions, including how to answer the burning questions. However, it is not only the documents themselves which reflect the dominant narrative in the defence discourse, but also the bodies, and their composition, which author them.

In this chapter, therefore, I will unpick a number of documents, key to the construction of the concept of defence. Within these, there are a number of factors which will illustrate the make-up of the concept of defence in the UK. In particular, the topics chosen which demonstrate how the defence community is prioritising issues, the solutions offered to those problems considered the most important, and, lastly, but central to identifying the prevalence of the managerial narrative in defence thinking, the language used to frame these issues. We also see that the traditional narrative is not excluded entirely. Instead, it is allowed to reside within the parameters of the dominant narrative, within a limited capacity and with limited impact. Therefore, it is the level at which it is excluded, rather than its total exclusion, which is indicative of the nature of the discourse.

Agent: *The Ministry of Defence (MoD)*

The MoD and the Defence Minister of the British government are charged with implementing defence policy and managing the defence budget. However, it is not the MoD itself which acts as an agent in the defence discourse, but rather the innumerable individuals working within it, who write and publish authoritative documents which are generically disseminated under the stamp: *Ministry of Defence*. Unable to access or process information on thousands of individuals, the only thing we can do to understand *who* the MoD is and what it *believes*, is seek out information on the kind of people it employs and attempt to understand the direction in which these individuals might steer the organisation.

Accessing the MoD website and clicking on the *jobs* link takes me to a general website for all civil service jobs. On this page, I can choose to search for jobs according to my location or to apply for one of the numerous employment programmes—e.g. graduate or summer schemes—that they have. For the latter, we can be certain of one

thing: they are not looking for defence experts. Quite to the contrary, in today's employment market, one of the most valuable assets a potential employee can have is that of a good set of *transferrable skills*. Thus, for the schemes, all that is required is a decent set of A-Levels and/ or a 2:2 degree in any subject. However, if I chose to search for a job specifically for the MoD anywhere in the UK, I am awarded with a list of 165 vacancies. Out of these, I can discard any specialist medical, engineering or financial jobs and unskilled roles (e.g. store assistant) as these are, of course, skill sets that are similar (with differences learnt on the job) in both the defence and civilian sector. By my own analysis, and using the parameters of my own interpretation of a defence specialist or expert, the vast majority of remaining roles do not require defence specialists at all, but rather insist on a variety of generic competencies which are fashionably required in almost any role in any sector today. For example: Leading and Communicating, Collaborating and Partnering, Making Effective Decisions, Seeing the Big Picture, Delivering Value for Money, Making Effective Decisions, and Managing a Quality Service. As a matter of fact, by my own count and interpretation, there are roughly five non-specialist roles advertised (primarily for managers or *project professionals*) for every one defence specialist role.

What does this mean for the MoD's identity? If we take Fromm's (2004) notion that identity is inevitably a product of culture and recognise that it is culture that provides the framework for self-regulation (Foucault, 1988) and enables individuals to inhibit impulses that might contravene the dominant culture, (Hood, 2011) then we are left with an MoD identity which is dominated and regulated by the business, managerial culture from whence the individuals that populate it come. This is further reinforced and encouraged by the fact that increased MoD interaction with the commercial sector means that the business-like behaviour enables smooth interaction between itself and its partners. (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) The constant additions of management and project professionals as well as the reward that comes from it in the shape of good relations with the business sector, appears to have resulted in an MoD which has an inherent tendency to select and deal with information that fits in its managerial frames of reference. (Goleman, 1988: 62)

Within the documents published there are a number of themes which can be recognized as a priority to the authors: the identification and treatment of new or existing threats, decision-making effectiveness (including its cost-effectiveness), and, with the first two themes in mind, the composition and content of the next Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR).

8.2. What threats?

8.2.1. The new traditional threat?

In 2015 the most notable and newsworthy threat is that of DAESH (a.k.a. ISIS, IS or the Caliphate) in Syria and Iraq. DAESH is a terrorist movement which proclaims the supremacy of extreme Islamism as the only true way of life and seeks to eradicate any other way of living, particularly *the West's*, from its territories. After the UK's lengthy engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan at the beginning of the century, Parliament had originally been reluctant to sanction operations against the terrorist group in Syria and Iraq. However, in 2014 the decision was made to take action against DAESH in Iraq alone, justified by the groups sponsor of terrorism and their murdering of British hostages, *the barbaric* acts against the Iraqi people, the threat they pose against Iraq's territorial integrity, and the growing threat posed by returning British nationals trained by DAESH to carry out attacks in Europe. (HoCDC, 2015b: 15)

Agent: *The House of Commons Defence Committee (HoCDC)*

'The Defence Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administrations, and policy of the Ministry of Defence and its associated public bodies.'

The HoCDC's constitutional purpose is to validate the MoD's spending. However, as we can see from the subject of each report, the budget is one of the matters of least concern for Committee members. Instead, it appears that Committee members are more concerned with holding the MoD to account on numerous issues which are politically salient.

Despite its statutory purpose, the reality of the Committee's self-appointed function makes more sense as its members are political appointees themselves and come to the table with their own individual agendas. It is these agendas which inform the identity of the Committee itself, behind which members hide their individual identities and purpose.

The House of Commons Committees, regardless of for which ministry, provide Members of Parliament (MP) with valuable opportunities to be recognised for their work and expertise by senior politicians, and thus the opportunity to work their way up the political ladder. For this reason, many Committee member's bring no specific expertise but are simply capitalising on the opportunity. However, each Committee has a bank of permanent staff who aid the members with research and writing. Thus, it often takes no time for members to gain the level of expertise that we, as members of the public, might expect them to have. In place of expertise, what is expected from Committee members is, once again, a set of

transferable skills which, surprisingly, they receive training for. These skills include the usual culprits: listening, questioning and analysis—much the same as you would find under the *Required Competencies* section on a call for applicants for jobs at BP, Deloitte or the MoD.

How do these factors impact the Committee's identity as an official stakeholder in British defence? It is, as the MoD is, a product of its culture which provides a normative framework (Butler, 2005) according to which a regime of truth (Foucault, 1988) has been produced. This regime of truth is based on the notion of transferable skills and generic forms of analysis which require no prior expertise in a subject but simply training as is provided to all, no matter which Committee they are to sit on or work for. As we can see in the reports, however, this does not prevent members from voicing their opinions on defence matters, but it does affect the impact these words might have. Government responses are peppered with phrases such as *the Department does not accept* which are sufficient to bat down any criticism and banish it to the realm of the unheard. This is all down to the fact that it is simply not what a members role on the Committee is—they are merely there to learn transferable skills and find a way to further their career. If they are lucky, they might have a true interest in the topic under discussion, but that is simply a bonus.

Seeing others adhere to these roles is an ongoing reaffirmation of the validity and legitimacy of the role each individual has been cast in, (Berger & Luckman, 1991) providing a solution to career isolation. (Fromm, 2004) Bit-by-bit, however, this endless cycle results in the reinforcement of the Committee's identity as simply a forum in which to voice an opinion but, where it is not in conformity with the Department's dominant narrative, not necessarily be taken seriously. (Cooley, 1922)

In response, the HoCDC published their Seventh Report of Session 2014/2015 on *The Situation in Iraq and Syria and the Response to al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq al-Sham (DAESH)* with a view to making recommendations on the way in which the government should respond to the threat by learning from the mistakes made in previous operations this century. One of its main concerns is that:

Insofar as it is possible to define a UK mission in Iraq and Syria, it appears to combine a narrow focus—the elimination of a terrorist group—with a very broad definition of how to achieve it: no less than the fixing of the Iraqi and Syrian states. (HoCDC, 2015b: 20)

The crux of the report is thus that a lack of an explicit strategy in Iraq will cost us the operation. In their investigations they found that ‘it is immensely difficult to define the nature of the UK strategy... the Service Chiefs implied that there was not an overall military strategy or campaign plan’ (HoCDC, 2015b: 18). Similarly, the House of Lords & House of Commons Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (JCNSS), reporting on the general behaviour of the Government, commented: ‘**[w]itnesses who submitted evidence commented that they were concerned at the lack of ‘strategy’**’.⁴ (2015, 11) Moreover, ‘senior figures seemed to go out of their way to downplay the UK contribution, and the military contribution in particular: to emphasise that they were only one part of a large coalition’. (HoCDC, 2015b: 18) ‘Senior Chiefs were also insistent that one of the reasons they could not describe or define the mission, was that it was not their mission to define.’ (HoCDC, 2015b: 19) ‘**We were shocked by the inability or unwillingness of any of the Service Chiefs to provide a clear, and articulate statement of the UK’s objectives or plan in Iraq.**’ (HoCDC, 2015b: 39) The Committee report that the lack of detail afforded to the Service Chiefs implied that the UK is merely following the US in its strategy against ISIS—a conclusion supported by one of the HoCDC witnesses. (HoCDC, 2015b: 19) The MoD, however, retorted that the criticisms were unfounded as ‘[r]esponsibility for such advice to the Defence Secretary does not lie with the Service Chiefs but with the Director General Security Policy and the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Strategic Operations) through the Chief of Defence Staff.’ (HoCDC, 2015d: 3)

In addition, the HoCDC raise fears that one of the reasons for past failures is the lack of appropriate intelligence gathering strategies—a matter closely linked to the perceived lack of overall strategy, as, where there is no clarity on how the aims are to be achieved, there can be no clarity on what kind of intelligence is needed: ‘We would suggest that such intelligence failures can only be remedied through human intelligence sources and political reporting, rather than a reliance on technology which cannot provide any degree of context or cultural understanding.’ (HoCDC, 2015b: 39)

The sum of these issues which are of clear concern to the HoCDC is that ‘the British military and public is being asked to support a plan, which the UK is in no position to evaluate independently.’ (HoCDC, 2015b: 39) In essence, the HoCDC fear that the MoD is sending the military in blind, with inadequate intelligence and a lack of objectives and strategy—a recipe for failure as one witness, Dr Douglas Porch, suggested: ‘the campaign of airstrikes would result in collateral damage, the legitimisation of DAESH, the radicalisation of the local population and an increase in the number of foreign fighters.’ (HoCDC, 2015b: 38)

⁴ All recommendations published in House of Commons Defence Committee reports are in bold. Throughout this thesis, I have kept the original style when quoting directly from these reports.

The basis of the critique by the HoCDC— that there is an insufficiently satisfactory level of military input in decision-making— demonstrates that within the Committee there is a certain degree of traditionalism with regards to the military role in defence. Further evidence of this lies in the allusion to the importance of sovereignty, even if it is not framed in this way. The combined emphasis on the need to adhere more to military advice and retain sovereignty in decision-making and strategy is a clear indication that the traditional narrative continues to be a basis for critique of the current system. On the other hand, however, the MoD have felt comfortable not responding in kind, by clearly stating that the representations of the Chief of Defence Staff are sufficient to cover what it considers the input of the military should be. The MoD, therefore, is not recognising the traditional approach of the HoCDC and diminishing its importance off-hand.

In their report, the HoCDC consider and suggest alternative strategies, including inaction, identifying that such a strategy ‘could conceivably reduce the risk of DAESH targeting UK citizens. It involves no commitment to long-term re-engagement with the security problems of Iraq. It would involve in the short term minimum cost for the UK.’ (HoCDC, 2015b: 38) Nevertheless, the Committee recognise that inaction would have broader implications for the defence and security of the UK, despite the ability to keep the military out of the conflict. As one of their conclusions, the HoCDC categorically state that inaction

would mark a substantial departure from the UK’s long-term security partnership with both the United States and its partners in the Middle East. It would heighten perceptions that the UK has stepped back from its international role and could risk undermining wider commitment to the US-led coalition, possibly weakening the effort against DAESH. It would also make it harder for the UK to influence political developments thereafter. (HoCDC, 2015b: 38)

Having discarded inaction as an option, the Committee proceed to make suggestions which would, in its opinion, be viable and compatible with the UK’s long-term goals. The most favoured course of action is evidently that of supporting the Iraqi Security Force by providing training which ‘**should be related to institutional reform... To do so again, without first addressing the structural issues, would be a total waste of time and money.**’ (HoCDC, 2015b: 42) Such a contribution ‘**would require only the deployment of a few hundred personnel, the cost would be relatively modest, and it would not entail the risks inherent in deploying UK troops in combat roles.**’ (HoCDC, 2015b: 51) In what appears to be a 180-degree turn of perspective, the HoCDC begins to criticise the MoD on the basis of VfM rather than involvement of the military. In fact, it appears that the authors are valuing cost-saving above minimising the risk of losing soldiers and other lives. However, understanding the subtext is important as, in their criticism, the Committee is casting the military in its traditional, front-line role, accepting as part-and-parcel of the professionalization of the military that there will be some lives lost.

In reaction to these particular Committee concerns, the Government response was minimal. Having refused to accept the validity of the HoCDC's concerns, the government response report states that:

The UK is fully engaged in the development of the coalition military campaign plan as it evolves and has contributed a number of military officers to the coalition's headquarters staff who are undertaking influential roles in the formulation and delivery of the coalition strategy and effect. (HoCDC, 2015d: 4)

The dismissive government reply demonstrates that the military, from their own perspective, is no longer as central to how defence is practiced in the UK today, but rather has ascertained that the amount of input into decision-making and advice the military has is proportionate to their role in defence. In their stead, other expertise on economics, industry and project management are proportioned input in accordance to the value the government accords them.

8.2.2. The old traditional threat?

The HoCDC, in an earlier report entitled *Re-thinking Defence to Meet New Threats*, laid out their concerns that the past two decades have seen a refocusing of defence capabilities to meet threats emanating from non-state actors as opposed to those from States. The Committee recognise that this trend was justified considering the outbreak of the terrorist threat from various sources post-Cold War but express concerns that more traditional threats have been disregarded, particularly those posed by Russia, and we will now have to scramble to meet them.

All these planning assumptions, embedded in the National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review, have been challenged by the re-emergence of a conventional threat from Russia, and an ever-expanding list of fragile states, many dominated by terrorist-affiliates. (HoCDC, 2015c: 13)

The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (JCNSS), in their First Report of Session 2015- 15, echo these concerns: '**Threats have changed over the last Parliament... It may even be the case that existential threats become of greater importance**'. (2015, 9) As a result, the HoCDC suggest that the MoD's approach to threat analysis and the way in which capabilities are structured will have to adapt accordingly. (HoCDC, 2015c: 36) To this end, the Committee 'proposes that the UK acquires the necessary capabilities to perform across all capabilities, rather than assuming that an ally such as the United States will 'fill the gap'' (HoCDC, 2015c: 21) and '**urge[s] the MoD to re-establish a Defence Historical Analysis and Conflict Research Centre in order to address the lessons of recent conflicts and to investigate current trends in warfare.**' (HoCDC, 2015c: 31) Once again, the issues of a strong military and sovereignty are explicitly raised in the Committee's critique, indicating the strength of the

traditional narrative in defence thinking. However, when issues are framed in a different, less emotive light, the narrative easily switches to the managerial, as we will see below.

8.3. Effecting Cuts

An analysis of most documents published in 2015 makes it clear that the notions of *good* decision-making and cost-effectiveness are inextricably linked. The HoCDC report entitled *Decision-Making in Defence Policy* opens with an analysis of two situations in which bad decision-making have led to cost-ineffectiveness, implying that cost-effectiveness is equal to life-saving in priority.

The Helmand deployment and the carrier decisions are two clear examples in which poor decision-making in the Ministry of Defence was a risk to people's lives, and taxpayers' money. The process seems to have failed at almost every stage of decision-making. (HoCDC, 2015f: 21)

The HoCDC appear to attribute this failure, not to a lack of coherent military strategy or clarity of requirement, but rather to too much reliance on military advice— '[t]he advised information on which decisions are made did not appear to be sufficiently open to debate and challenge... Ministers themselves did not appear able to challenge military advice.' (HoCDC, 2015f: 27) In addition, the Committee bring up a perceived lack of accountability where 'the decision-maker, who was responsible for allowing actions to happen, based on their preferences, was not identifiable.' (HoCDC, 2015f: 26)

In complete contrast to criticism volunteered in previous reports, the HoCDC attributes poor decision-making to a disproportionate reliance on military expertise—precisely what the MoD was previously accused of being deficient of. The framing of the issue, i.e. *decision-making* as opposed to *response to DAESH*—appears to have elicited a less emotive reaction, with the Committee report falling in-line with the narrative we are accustomed to getting from the MoD. However, curiously, later in the report, the Committee return to the old line of critique, accusing the MoD decision-making process as under-representing the military:

One particular, area of expertise, inadequately represented on the NSC, is in military advice... the removal from the Chiefs of Staff of their traditional role of having an individual and collective responsibility for advising on defence policy as a whole has left a void at the heart of the decision-making machine. (HoCDC, 2015f: 39)

8.3.1. Counter-balancing military advice: an example

The notion that military advice is insufficient in the process of making *good* decisions is not new. In fact, many steps have been taken to counter-balance military advice, such as the creation of the Single Source Regulations Office

(SSRO) by the Defence Reform Act (2014) (DRA) in order to *challenge* military advice and prioritise cost-effectiveness and value for money in contracting. The SSRO is an independent regulator charged with analysing and commenting on the treatment of inflation in contracts, pay rates, overhead rates, cost of maintaining facilities, back office costs, amendments to contracts, and pricing methods. (SSRO, 2015c: 5)

Agent: *The Single Source Regulations Office (SSRO)*

The SSRO was created by the Defence Reform Act (DRA) (2014) to ensure that Value for Money is obtained in all single source contracts and that they are paid at a fair and reasonable price. (SSRO, 2015a: 7) The official remit and scope of the SSRO and its investigations appears to be limited to adjustment of target cost incentive fees (TCIF), determination of appropriate contract profit, allowable costs under contract, amount of final price adjustments, determination of genuine commercial reasons, qualifying sub-contracts, compliance or penalty notices, and reasonable exercise of functions. However, in their Corporate Plan, they are also able to investigate any matters ‘jointly referred’. (SSRO, 2015a: 10) In effect, the SSRO are able to investigate any matter pertaining to single source contracts.

The SSRO operates under the appointed leadership of an accountant by training, with a long employment history working his way up to CEO of one of the largest accounting services firms in the world. With it being a newly formed body there has not been much published. However, the purpose of any investigations and the resulting guidance is, according to the published Corporate Plan, ‘to establish a single point of reference to be used by all stakeholders to establish whether their actions adhere to the Defence Reform Act and Single Source Contract Regulations.’ (SSRO, 2015a: 15)

It is not the SSRO’s leadership or work which is significant for this research as they are both self-explanatory in reference to one another. Instead, it is the fact that we can take it for granted that such a body would be created at all in 2014 when there is not an organisation charged with assessing whether or not a task should be contracted for at all. The latter is merely one of the many roles of the MoD as a whole and is swallowed up alongside the thousands of administrative tasks carried out daily by tens of thousands faceless MoD civil servants.

The SSRO owes its existence to the group of agents to which it belongs- (Connerton, 2013) namely, the plethora of MoD bodies. The story that the transformation of the purpose of the MoD and its existing bodies tell, culminates in the *rational* creation of such organisations as the SSRO. These, in turn, will serve as precedent to

justify and legitimise the perpetuation of more organisations of their kind, reinforcing the dominant managerial narrative.

By the end of 2015, the SSRO published one review and one study programme. As per the requirement in the DRA to ‘annually... review the figures used to determine the contract profit rate for pricing single source contracts’, the SSRO have published ‘a new approach to calculating the baseline profit rate in future.’ (SSRO, 2015b: 6) The organisation makes clear that it places great emphasis on the credibility of its method, determined by ‘striking the right balance between delivering a fair and reasonable return for industry while ensuring value for money for the taxpayer.’ (SSRO, 2015b: 6)

What is a *fair* profit? According to the SSRO,

[s]uch a judgement can only be reached with reference to comparative data, where profits are determined through arms’ length or market-based processes, so that the level of profit attained can be held up as objective evidence of what constitutes a fair profit. (SSRO, 2015b: 12)

Thus, ‘the revised methodology will identify comparable companies tailored specifically to the activities, including assets and contract risks, involved in qualifying defence contracts and qualifying subcontracts.’ (SSRO, 2015b: 18) Simultaneously, a new study on VfM has been launched. In the programme published in 2015, the SSRO state their purpose as being to ‘enable it to comment on value for money issues, identify potential for savings and facilitate the sharing of best practice where appropriate.’ (SSRO, 2015c: 2)

In the creation of the SSRO and its purpose, we detect the pure dominance of the managerial narrative. Its employees are charged with analysing purely quantitative data to determine value and draw conclusions on a purely financial basis as to the *fairness* of the cost. The notion of allowing accountants to determine what value is in defence is, to me, the most concerning matter. The SSRO is only able to determine matters of financial value which inevitably impacts the way in which contracts are outlined and value provided for. What does this mean for military effect?

8.3.2. Cutting for effect

- Reserves vs. Regulars

On the military side, cost-effectiveness appears to have translated into the *unprofessionalisation* of the military. Successive strategies regarding the organisation of the military are aimed at increasing the number of reserves and decreasing the number of regular members of the military—the strategy is touted as the best way to make the most of the military personnel budget. As a result, the MoD requested a study from the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory

(Dstl) ‘to identify the cost of ownership and use of these Sub-Units’ (MOD, 2015a: 1)

Agent: *Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl)*

‘We supply specialist services to the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and wider government. 60% of MOD’s science and technology programme (total funding: £410 million) is supplied by our external partners in industry and academia worldwide.’

Dstl is a trading fund and, as such, run in-line with the commercial model. It is charged with providing specialist science and technology services to government, advice and analysis on defence procurement, horizon-scanning and acting as an interface between the MoD and other governmental, private and third sector bodies.

According to their website, their priorities are to

- ‘identify and monitor national security risks and opportunities
- Protect the UK and our interest at home, at our border, and internationally, in order to address physical and electronic threats from state and non-state sources’.

Dstl is inherently a scientifically led body, and yet we rely on it to ‘identify and monitor’ threats. As a result, the notion of ‘threat’ itself is laden with managerial values. For example, as a scientific body, it is focussed on measurable threats which it can advise the MoD to respond to in a measurable way. This managerial model is the ‘intelligent filter’ (Goleman, 1998) through which we are assessing threats in the UK. The managerial model, however, is considered its greatest asset as it enables smooth interaction with the private sector (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) and provides us with a sense of security in the familiarity of the lens through which we view threats and solutions. (Fromm, 2004)

The overall conclusion of the study is that two reserve units are comparable to one regular unit (a methodological determination made by the MoD), and that they are more cost-effective, with the exception for the period on which they are on deployment. (MOD, 2015a: 2) These savings are made due to the fact that the MoD only pay ‘Reservists when they train, the[re is a] lower consumption of training consumables and [a] lack of a requirement to provide subsidised accommodation’. (MOD, 2015a: 3) It appears that the last area of saving is the most significant: ‘the additional cost to MOD of leasing and maintaining Service Families Accommodation (SFA) and Single Living Accommodation (SLA) for Regular service personnel was the key infrastructure cost differential.’ (MOD, 2015a: 6)

The conclusion of the report as laid out at the beginning appears to indicate that it is the best way to save money. However, scouring through the document, there are indications that there are significant caveats to this which the authors are aware of. Firstly, the study does not include transitional costs incurred through the implementation of the Army 2020 and Future Reserves 2020 programmes. (MOD, 2015a: 6) The research and reorganisation required to implement these programmes might be a one-off cost, but, in a time in which cost-saving appears to be paramount, why has this not been factored in? This indicates that the contracting-out and slimming down of in-house expertise is an ideological imperative rather than a result of careful consideration of how to reduce costs in the long-term.

Were one to argue that a one-off payment for long-term cost-effectiveness is justified, the study goes on to assert that it 'should not be used for budgetary purposes' as 'no effort has been made to investigate their relative effectiveness on operations'. (MOD, 2015a: 1) 'If Reserve Sub-Units are to be of equal effectiveness to Regular Sub-Units then the costs may significantly change... The Reserves may not be able to mobilise sufficient personnel to efficiently form a Sub-Unit... Readiness has not been valued'. (MOD, 2015a: 8) If operational effectiveness is not assessed, does this mean that cost-effectiveness supersedes operational effectiveness? What does this mean for our interpretation of the term *value*? Once more, the determination of *value* to the MoD is being left to a body created and charged with drawing conclusions on a scientific basis. It, in effect, means the transformation of the notion of value from a *value*-laden one to a scientifically and financially determined one, obscuring the input of the military.

- *The Skills Debate*

A third big issue under discussion in 2015 with regards to decision-making is the lack of skilled decision-makers as well as the lack of *good* decisions being made with regards to skills within the MoD. For this reason, a complete reform of the acquisition process has been under debate, with the National Audit Office (NAO) criticising the blurring of roles and responsibilities and lack of skills and management freedoms within the current process. (NAO, 2015a: 11)

Agent: *The National Audit Office (NAO)*

According to their website, the NAO's role is to scrutinise public spending for Parliament and aid in holding Government to account for their use of public money. The three key concepts by which they assess whether or not money is being spent correctly are efficiency, effectiveness and economy. It is by applying these three criteria that the NAO ascertain whether the departments are achieving *value* for money. Moreover, the body reports on good practice and supports the Parliamentary Committees.

In their own words, the NAO ‘do not question government policies but examine objectively and independently the value for money with which departments and other bodies implement those policies.’ But what do *objectivity* and *independence* mean to the NAO? We can gain an insight into this by looking at who is in their *leadership team* and thus the expertise the NAO seeks to use. Of the six members of the team, five have accounting, finance or economic backgrounds in both the public and private sectors. The only non-finance expertise comes from one team member whose expertise is in IT capability. This is not particularly surprising considering the NAO is primarily an audit body.

However, in 2015, an audit and accounting body was legitimately charged with passing comment on the status of the development and retention of skills within the UK defence industry. To do so requires a good understanding of what value which skills have to the UK defence effort. However, as a finance driven body, the NAO can only pass comment on the financial value of skills in the UK. This is a universal criterion which can be applied to all departments and all skill sets, regardless of their nature, resulting in the treatment of defence as any other sector.

Furthermore, one of the NAO’s roles is to support Committee’s. Once again, it is only able to do so in terms of reporting and advising on accountancy and financial matters. If this is the community from which Committee’s are gaining support, (Connerton, 2013) inevitably all matters are framed in terms of economy, efficiency and effectiveness rather than the more traditional notions arising from a military-centric narrative. (Berger & Luckman, 1991)

The National Audit Office (NAO) report on the reform of defence acquisition published in early 2015 identifies that a ‘[s]kills gaps emerged primarily because DE&S could not recruit and retain enough skilled staff, exacerbated by a requirement to cut staff to meet Departmental efficiency savings.’ (NAO, 2015a: 17) Although the NAO recognise that savings have been made as mandated, it reports that it is doubtful that these savings are due to cost-effective measures and processes being implemented and not simply down to poor reporting and mismanagement: ‘Our review of a sample of major defence projects found that most underspend had not come from efficiencies, but from poor project team or contractor performance.’ (NAO, 2015a: 21) In addition, the NAO criticise the MoD for contracting out where permanent employment contracts would prove more cost-effective. ‘Potential savings, however, have been offset by employing contractors who, on average, cost between three and four times more than permanent DE&S staff.’ (NAO, 2015a: 18)

In a second report this year, on strategic financial management within the MoD, the NAO continue to criticise the MoD's decision-making priorities with regards to cost-cutting:

The Commands are beginning to develop integrated workforce plans (across civilian, military and contractors) in line with the Department's aspiration of a 'whole force approach' being adopted. However, the Department's targets to reduce staff numbers to control costs are limiting the flexibility the Commands have to fully deliver that aspiration, as is a lack of reliable management information on staff skills. (NAO, 2015b: 30)

So what do the NAO propose the MoD do to improve its performance with regards to being cost-effective rather than simply cost-cutting? In the first report, the NAO commend Defence, Equipment & Support (DE&S) for implementing a new improvement programme which includes board-level quarterly review of performance, finance and risk; enhancing of commercial expertise; enhanced inventory management commission to a private sector company; contract to a management service provider to identify an optimum organisational structure. (NAO, 2015a: 22) In this context, the NAO claims that

Employing contractors can be beneficial, allowing more flexible working practices as well as providing essential skills that are not available in-house... However, DE&S lacks robust information on how project teams are using contractors, and the cost of doing so. (NAO, 2015a: 18)

Agent: *Defence, Equipment & Support (DE&S)*

'We are a bespoke trading entity, and arm's length body of the Ministry of Defence. We manage a vast range of complex projects to buy and support all the equipment and services that the Royal Navy, British Army and Royal Air Force need to operate effectively. We work closely with industry, including through partnering agreement and private finance initiatives.'

DE&S' work is pivotal to the functioning of the UK military and provides us with an interesting example of the managerialisation of defence. In 2013, the limits of privatisation were tested as Bernard Gray, Chief of Defence Materiel, attempted to convert DE&S into a GOCO (Government Owned Contractor Operated) enterprise. Despite a lot of debate as to, essentially, the moral implications of outsourcing defence procurement and acquisition, Gray went ahead and accepted bids from three corporations. However, by the end of 2014 plans were dead in the water, not due to any outcry or definitive decision as to the implications of such actions, but rather as two of the three bidders pulled out. The lack of competition meant that the

contract could not be awarded. Instead, DE&S was slimmed down and given more powers to outsource whilst remaining a trading body of the MoD. As it stands, we are left in a situation in which DE&S might still be outsourced in future, and no limits have been placed on what other sections of MoD might be.

Taking DE&S as it is now, the organisation outlines its priorities as:

- ‘providing the right equipment to the armed forces and supporting it, whilst delivering better value for money to the taxpayer
- Transforming the organisation so that it can better support the armed forces’.

In practice, this second priority entails the extensive use of contractors as they are perceived (under the leadership of Bernard Gray until September 2015 Tony Douglas, a businessman, since) to be the better service providers. Through DE&S, thus, the notion of defence and its practice is being influenced by private sector actors as, not only do they provide a large portion of the service, but those working within DE&S must also be well versed in the private sector language and model of behaviour in order to maintain and secure good relations. (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) Therefore, much of DE&S’ identity is informed by these models of behaviour which it then feeds back into the MoD through its interactions. (Connerton, 2013)

Much in the same vein, with regards to financial management within the MoD as a whole, the second report praises the implementation of a new operating model aimed at improving VfM in a number of areas, including:

- ‘Reducing the risk of not having the right military capability;
- Increasing the efficient and effective delivery of operational outputs;
- Reducing non-front-line costs as a proportion of overall defence expenditure; and
- A better skilled, motivated and engaged workforce.’ (NAO, 2015b: 23)

Although it appears that the NAO’s initial intentions of focussing on *effectiveness* rather than *cutting* costs are in line with the traditional narrative, the body itself is not composed of the adequate people to determine effectiveness in terms of operational impact. Therefore, taking into account their areas of expertise, value continues to be framed in a measurable, scientific and financial way.

8.4. Strategic Defence and Security Review

Most of 2015 sees the British defence community expecting the next Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). In anticipation, a number of documents have been published making recommendations and outlining expectations of the

content of the SDSR. With it being the closest the UK gets to defining a defence doctrine, and taking into account the apparent change in the nature of the defence and security environment, there has been much focus on extracting a definitive answer to the question: what are we defending ourselves against and how will we do it?

According to Her Majesty's Government's (or the group of individuals the label represents) SDSR, our national security objectives: 'embody an integrated, whole-of-government approach, supported by greater innovation and efficiency. They are underpinned by new, substantial and targeted investment, made possible by our renewed economic strength.' (2015: 10) The next five years will see the prioritisation of the threat of terrorism, security of our cyber-space, the international order, and our prosperity above all else in our defence strategy. (HM Government, 2015: 9-10) According to the SDSR, the strategy involves strengthening the armed forces, deploying soft power, and investing in domestic resilience and law enforcement capabilities. (HM Government, 2015: 9)

The above is the general defence objective and the strategy by which they will be achieved, but how does the SDSR actually respond to and treat the issues raised by those bodies (i.e. the NAO and HoCDC) which are charged with its scrutiny throughout 2015?

Agent: *Secretary of State for Defence, Her Majesty's Government*

The current Secretary of State for Defence, Michael Fallon MP, has been in Parliament since 1988. His career before being appointed Minister largely consisted of posts in the Treasury and Trade & Industry, with the exception of just under two years as Parliamentary Under-Secretary in the Department of Education and Science in the early 1990s. Since 2012 he has been in the Cabinet firstly as joint Minister of the Department for Business, Innovations & Skills and the Department of Energy and Climate Change and, since 2014, of Defence.

As evidenced by his career, Fallon has years of experience in politics but largely in Business and Trade. Inevitably, this experience has and will continue to impact how he runs the Ministry of Defence. However, the fact that a man with his experience has been appointed to the MoD is also indicative of the kind of leadership the Government is looking for in defence and the direction it is expected to take.

8.4.1. Intervention

One of the foremost questions the SDSR was expected to answer, in light of the numerous conflicts arising globally, is under what circumstances will the UK

government intervene in a conflict and in what way. In their 2015 report on the direction of the SDSR, the HoCDC concluded that the SDSR ‘must state when and whether the UK would intervene to maintain stability overseas and it must define how success should be measured in international defence engagement and stabilisation operations.’ (HoCDC, 2015e: 4)

However, the SDSR did not cover this issue other than to say ‘over the course of this Parliament our priorities are to deter state-based threats, tackle terrorism, remain a world leader in cyber security and ensure we have the capability to respond rapidly to crises as they emerge.’ (HM Government, 2015: 6) Throughout the SDSR there has been no attempt to tackle the definition of when and how the UK would intervene in a conflict. Instead, HM Government have opted to focus on what form defence will take and, in Annex A, how each of these threats will be identified.

The National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) 2015 ‘places the domestic and overseas risks we face into three tiers, according to judgement of **both likelihood and impact.**’ (HM Government, 2015: 85) Tier one risks include terrorism, cyber threats, international military conflicts, instability overseas, public health and major natural hazards. (HM Government, 2015: 85-86) However, there is no indication as to when these become a reason to intervene militarily or diplomatically or what form this intervention might take.

8.4.2. Public Relations, Military Perceptions and Military Roles

A second salient issue in defence today relates to the role of the Armed Forces, as well as public relations with and public perceptions of the military and defence as a whole. As outlined above, the HoCDC has repeatedly raised concerns that the current system under the National Security Council (NSC) does not permit for what it considers proportionate representation of military interests.

[I]ts disadvantage is that it significantly weakens the military voice, and military expertise in the formulation of national strategy. This has been made worse by the marginalisation of the role of the Chiefs of Staff in providing strategic advice during progressive structural reforms at the MoD. (HoCDC, 2015e: 6)

Agent: *The National Security Council (NSC)*

‘...the main forum for collective discussion of the government’s objectives for national security and about how best to deliver them in the current financial climate.

A key purpose of the Council is to ensure ministers consider national security in the round and in a strategic way.’

The Council was a part of the Cabinet Office and was thus chaired by the then Prime Minister, David Cameron. The PM, however, is advised on security matters by the National Security Advisor (NSA) who acts as a: (Devanny & Harris, 2014: 27)

- ‘source of personal advice and counsel to the prime minister
- Focal channel for information during situations of crisis
- Conduit for written information to and from other principals
- Organiser of the prime minister’s regular national security briefing
- Provision of day-to-day support to the prime minister
- Efficient management of the NSC secretariat
- Shepherd cross-Whitehall preparation for, and delivery of, NSC decisions.’

The NSA is an appointment made by the PM, although he or she is to act as advisor to the entire Council. Thus, ‘[w]hen identifying a prospective candidate for the NSA post, much will depend on a prime minister’s conception of the NSC, on what kind of personal approach to national security the prime minister intends to take, and accordingly on what role the NSA needs to play.’ (Devanny & Harris, 2014: 28)

As a result, the Committee has on numerous occasions requested clarification on the role of the armed forces in defence today. (HoCDC, 2015e: 15) This includes its contribution to decision-making, and when and how it is to be used. Furthermore, in light of increasing representations made to the UK legal system by and on behalf of military personnel, ‘it is essential that the next SDSR should look strategically at the legal framework for future armed conflict and the whole spectrum of military operations’ (HoCDC, 2015e: 17)

Whilst recognising that the armed forces ‘put their lives on the line every day’ and honouring military personnel as ‘the pride of our nation’, (HM Government, 2015: 7) the SDSR avoids passing comment on the Committee’s line of questioning other than to assert that ‘[w]hile our Armed Forces can and will whenever necessary deploy on their own, we would normally expect them to deploy with allies’. (HM Government, 2015: 29) The fact that the only allusion to the role of the military in what is, essentially, the UK’s only doctrinal document to emphasise our role as one member of an alliance, is an indication of the importance of partnering in defence today. No longer do we expect to have sovereign capabilities or even to act alone, but instead think nothing of forming a partnership agreement, whether bi- or multi-lateral, in order to ward off or respond to an attack.

With regards to public relations and public perceptions of the military, the HoCDC stresses the importance of the image of the Armed Forces in acting as a deterrent and defensive capability in the eyes of British society: ‘The will of the

population and its government to respond to attack, and its attitude towards the military, is crucial for the deterrence of potential adversaries.’ (HoCDC, 2015e: 6) The Committee goes on to express unease over the current status of the Armed Forces in society today, claiming that ‘[o]ne of the greatest strategic threats to the UK Armed Forces remains a disconnect with the public.’ (HoCDC, 2015e: 5) As increasing judicial claims demonstrate, today military personnel are being framed as victims of the MoD and Government’s actions instead of their traditional role as heroes. The Committee’s concerns indicate that this transition is damaging UK defence as the military is no longer able to fulfil its traditional role of projecting strength and power.

Recent operations and commemorations have risked the development of an unhealthy perception of the Armed Forces as simply ‘victims’ of conflict. The next Defence and Security Review should play an important role in explaining to the public the role of the Armed Forces and the importance of defence in protecting UK values and society. (HoCDC, 2015e: 6)

The notion that a publicly supported Armed Forces able to project strength is central to good defence belongs to the traditional narrative. However, the government response to these concerns is completely absent from the SDSR. The lack of willingness to even engage with these concerns amounts to a discrediting of the idea that the public image of the armed forces is of any importance at all, thus diminishing their role in defence and deterrence.

8.4.3. External Voices

Linked to the previous set of questions is that of the lack of voices external to the government and civil service being heard on the NSC. The HoCDC has identified that, in addition to a lack of military representation on the Council, there is an ‘unwillingness to fully incorporate external voices. There is an insufficient culture of informed challenge and of learning lessons within the system.’ (HoCDC, 2015e: 6) The Committee report indicates that the members feel that the reason for this is that the NSC is unwilling to hear critical viewpoints and is thus ‘functioning more as a crisis response centre, rather than a body forecasting long term changes.’ (HoCDC, 2015e: 7) The report puts across concerns that including voices of academics, think-tanks, and other experts would enable the NSC to fulfil its role in planning how to act against threats.

The government, however, once again does not confront the issue head-on, but rather only makes promises ‘to work further with the private sector to make both government innovation and private sector contributions to national security more effective.’ (HM Government, 2015: 73) There is no mention of whether this would be within the NSC or simply at DE&S level.

8.4.4. Resource Allocation

In a time of crisis, the allocation of financial resources is paramount in government. However, the Government appears to believe it sufficient to ring-fence the defence budget whereas the HoCDC are insistent in the need to understand, not only how much the MoD can rely on, but also how this will be spent.

[W]e believe that the next SDSR should take account of the potentially distorting effect a statutory ring-fencing (such as the 0.7% of GNI to be spent on international development) and how such ring-fencing could distort the allocation of resources to defence and security. (HoCDC, 2015e: 13)

In response, the SDSR simply reiterated how much will be spent on defence, framing the decision as putting the UK at the forefront of the international community: ‘We are the only major country in the world to spend both 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence and 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) on overseas development. These commitments will increase our security and safeguard our prosperity.’ (HM Government, 2015: 9)

However, the question remains: how does spending 2% of GDP and 0.7% of GNI within themselves improve security and contribute to defence? The only indication of any response to this issue in the SDSR comes in the form of an undetailed promise to reinvest in the Armed Forces: ‘We will allow the MOD to invest efficiency savings into the Armed Forces.’ (HM Government, 2015: 27) In terms of investing in research and technology, the Government appears to be relying entirely on the private sector, claiming that ‘[t]he private sector, not governments, drives today’s rapid pace of technological change.’ (HM Government, 2015: 73) This addresses indirectly one the HoCDC’s concerns with regards to the loss of sovereignty—an issue which the SDSR addresses explicitly over half a page out of 84. The Committee report:

ADS have said that they hope that the next SDSR would see Government working with industry to identify, develop and deliver capability requirements; prioritising Government investment in defence and security research and development; and recognising that the UK’s freedom of action in defence was underpinned by its defence industrial capabilities. (HoCDC, 2015e: 21)

Although the SDSR does not frame it in this way, the Government make explicit that sovereignty is no longer a central concern within defence procurement and acquisition by ignoring the issue entirely. Instead, the MoD glorifies outsourcing and strengthening ties with the private sector, both national and international.

8.4.5. Soft Power

As the second objective, the SDSR prioritises projecting global influence. This, at least, responds to a concern raised by the JCNSS report which stated that **‘[a]t a time of restricted Government spending, ‘soft’ power may be an opportunity to examine ways of extending a positive UK influence around the world at minimal cost.’** (2015: 14) The strategy behind doing so is through spending 0.7% of GNI and 50% of the Department of International Development’s budget to invest more in alliances and upholding our values by investing stability overseas. This all amounts to a reliance on soft power to project the UK’s influence (HM Government, 2015: 6) to avoid involvement in military conflict or uncertainty overseas which ‘can affect our prosperity and the prosperity and security of some of our closest allies.’ (HM Government, 2015: 18) Once more, this is an issue which had not been raised by the Committee.

8.4.6. Economic Security

Despite the numerous concerns raised by the HoCDC, the SDSR addresses very few of them and, even the ones which are addressed are covered very briefly. Instead, the vast majority of the SDSR is dedicated to explaining how defence will increase our economic security and vice-versa—an issue that is not once raised by the Committee. In fact, the opening line of the Foreword to the SDSR by Prime Minister David Cameron reads: ‘Our national security depends on our economic security, and vice versa. So the first step in our National Security Strategy is to ensure our economy is, and remains, strong.’ (HM Government, 2015: 5)

Two of the SDSR’s three objectives are centred on economic prosperity. The first is to ‘protect people’ by spending 2% of GDP. The third objective is to ‘promote our prosperity’ by ensuring a rules-based international trading environment since, ‘[a]s a trading nation with the world’s fifth biggest economy, we depend on stability and order in the world’, (HM Government, 2015: 5); maximising prosperity opportunities with ‘[o]ur strong economy provid[ing] the foundation to invest in our security and global influence, which in turn provides more opportunities at home and overseas for us to increase our prosperity’; (HM Government, 2015: 69) and working closely with the private sector ensuring ‘[i]nnovation... drives the UK’s economic strength, productivity and competitiveness.’ (HM Government, 2015: 73)

In the SDSR the Prime Minister goes on to claim that the emphasis on economic security is justified in defence terms as they intend to ‘use our hard-earned economic strength to support our Armed Forces, and to give those in our police and our security and intelligence agencies who fight terrorism the resources they need’. (HM Government, 2015: 7) This heavy emphasis on economic matters and the equating of prosperity with security carries with it heavily managerial connotations. The exclusion of other issues which had been discussed by other bodies in the run-up to the publication of the SDSR, topics not subsumed by the managerial narrative, demonstrates the government’s inability to deal with criticisms that fall outside of the regime of truth.

8.5. Conclusion

This chapter consists of an exploration of a selection of documents officially published by numerous official bodies in 2015. The aim of the chapter was to illustrate how these documents serve to reinforce the dominant managerial narrative to shape the UK defence discourse. Moreover, looking briefly into the authoring organisations, their identities and the limits to their contributions, I have sought to illustrate how each body's identity—as defined by their composition—is reflected in the documents.

Most significantly, I have attempted to demonstrate that there are certain types of concerns which are ignored or dismissed off-hand by the most authoritative body (the MoD) on the basis that they do not fit the authority's dominant narrative. Other matters, on the other hand, which have not even been raised by the bodies charged with critiquing government, are expounded upon extensively by the MoD without fear of seeming illegitimate. The documents, coupled with the composition of the organisations authoring them, all serve to reinforce the dominant managerial narrative. This is not to say that the traditional is no longer present, it is merely kept out of the decision-making arena.

PART IV: FEELING THE EFFECT

Part IV of this thesis comprises the concluding chapters, pulling together the theory and my observations. In Chapter Nine, *The Corridors of Power*, I hark back to Foucault's metaphor of the Panopticon in Chapter Four, populating it with my observations as reported in Chapters Two, Three, Six, Seven and Eight illustrating how it is the relations of power which sustain the dominant managerial narrative.

In Chapter Ten, *For Effect or Affect?*, I refer back to the title question of this thesis, seeking to string together the main points taken from this research that can answer it for us.

Chapter Eleven, *Conclusions*, provides an overview of this thesis, tying together all its elements. Furthermore, I explain the limitations of my research and make suggestions for future research, ending with some final thoughts.

CHAPTER NINE: THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

9.1. Introduction

The *corridors of power* is a common expression used to refer to the government buildings within which those perceived as holding the power in their hands walk, talk and broker deals away from the public eye. For me, however, the corridors of power are the endless invisible ties which link every individual within a community to all others. The corridors are used to transmit symbols through body language, vocabulary and artefacts which we are constantly emitting and receiving. Thus it is the corridors themselves, the corridors of the Panopticon, which hold the power. Power is an invisible structure, built upon the exchange of information, with the purpose of providing shelter for the *truth*. It may be hard to draw a diagram of what power looks like, but the exercise of power is identifiable in the way in which we interact and the way in which we respond to each other. With every action and with every word, we are building the walls, creating a structure founded on certain notions, keeping these safe and keeping others out.

In this Chapter, I demonstrate the strength of these corridors and their ability to withstand external influences and maintain their managerial dominance. Firstly, I return to my theoretical framework, populating the defence Panopticon to illustrate how the narrative is able to withstand these events which could have transformed the discourse. Secondly, I look outside of Whitehall, to the world beyond and all those events in 2015, of which there were many, which posed a threat to our defences. By recalling these and the emotive responses that we experienced as a result, we can see how sturdy the narrative remained. Finally, I look to myself, to my experience, as an exemplar of how continued exposure to the community, to the totalising culture, can change an individual's identity.

9.2. Populating the Defence Panopticon

So what are the forces within the UK defence ecosystem which determine how we react to a threat? Recalling the metaphoric Panopticon, the actions and artefacts of the defence community are encompassed by a power structure, characterised by the construction of identities, the performance of these and their translation into a mentality of governance. Such forces can be identified in interactions such as those I have documented in reporting my observations as well as in the choice of language recorded to express ideas in official documentation. Factors such as systems of differentiation, types of objectives, forms of institutionalisation and degrees of rationalisation (Kearins & Hooper, 2002: 740) all provide indications of the parameters of the dominant narrative and its vehicles of legitimisation. Thus, I 'look for the myriad ways relations of power create the idea of the subject, the rules of truth, and our modes of behaviour.' (Shiner, 1982: 392)

9.2.1. Defence Identities

Beginning with the first pillar of my theoretical framework and one of the vehicles of power—identity, what are the indicators to be found in documents and conversation which hint at the way in which we, as members of the defence community, feel it is *correct* to identify ourselves?

To me, intuitively, if we are talking about the *British* defence identity the first thing that comes to mind is that *Britishness* is key. I need not define this, however, as none of my respondents allude to this nor does it arise as a matter in any of the documents I have analysed post-1997. In contrast, the 1996 BDD is full of allusions to the British nation and values. The document makes clear that ‘it [was] important that the armed forces should not become alien institutions with markedly different values and goals from the rest of society.’ (1996: 5.10) By representing society,

the armed forces provide[d] an important and distinctive strand in the fabric of the Nation. They promote[d] the ideals of integrity, discipline, professionalism, service and excellence... embody[ing] much tradition, which help[ed] promote a sense of regional and national identity. (1996: 5.10)

The only moment at which I have been able to approach the subject of *Britishness* was, as recorded, during an informal conversation with someone who, frankly, few in the defence community take seriously. Nevertheless, I have been able to bring up the issue of *patriotism* and *sovereignty* with some respondents. The reaction to my allusion to these only supports the above criteria, as invariably my respondents dismissed questions on the matter indicating or verbalising that they are irrelevant in today’s *globalised* world. Professor Dalí, who I converse with during the morning coffee break at ADC 2015, is an example. (pp. 37- 40) Thus it is this—*globalisation*—that has replaced *Britishness* as core to the British defence identity.

Globalisation is repeatedly mentioned, not just in conversation and conference presentations, but also in official documents. Key members of the defence community and organisations under the authority of the MoD will speak at length about building a culture open to partnering, both with foreign government’s as well as multi-national companies (MNCs). According to the HoCDC ‘[d]ecision-making’ is the act of identifying the alternatives available, and choosing between those alternatives based on the values and preferences of the decision-maker.’ (2015f: 23) The NAO adds that ‘[w]here the Department does not sufficiently understand interdependencies this can undermine its ability to manage risks’, (2015b: 15) indicating the importance of interdependency as a value. The result has been restructuring organisations according to private sector-models and a closer affiliation to industry. A perfect example is the reconstitution of DE&S into DE&S+: ‘Under this structure, DE&S remains within the public sector, although now as an arm’s-length part of Department, with its own board, chaired by a non-executive director. DE&S would then contract with the private sector for business

support.’ (NAO, 2015a: 16) These assertions and actions indicate that today there is a deliberate drive to ensure that members of the community, from the bottom to the top, understand the importance of partnering and are able to conceive of and defend solutions to problems based on the partnering model.

Since the end of WWII, the military and thus defence, particularly with the formation of the modern MoD as a formal ministry in the 1960s, has been extensively professionalised. The idea of the *professional* retains its centrality to defence; however, it has taken on entirely different connotations. Whereas we can glean that, prior to 1997, the *professional* in defence was primarily military with all the training and expertise that this entails, today the military professional is less and less a part of it. From the reform documents, we can see that there has been a concerted drive to decrease the level of influence the military has in decision-making circles, as evidenced by the exclusion of the Single-Service Chiefs from the NSC, with the entire military now being represented by a single individual. Simultaneously, those defence professionals I have spoken to, including numerous individuals with military backgrounds, have minimised their military identities in order to be part of the defence decision-making community. Mr Kahlo, for example, whom I lunch with at ADC 2015 (pp. 43- 46), despite spending most of his career in the military, feels that industry is better placed to make decisions with only management issues being dealt with in the MoD. It is not my impression that this has been enforced on my respondents, but rather that they do not feel that the military belongs in Whitehall. Instead, a competent *professional* today is a *manager*.

Many of those whom I spoke with alluded to their own abilities to manage as a virtue or to the lack of others’ to do so (particularly the MoD) as a primary failing of defence. Mr Ernst is a prime example, as most of the conversation during the VIP dinner revolved around the lack of the MoD’s ability to *manage talent* within its existing employees, implying that it takes an individual with extraordinary management skills to change this ingrained cultural failing (pp. 57- 58). Although in and of itself, the ability to manage is not particularly contrary to the traditionalist narrative as all leadership skills require an element of management, it is the construction of the idea of *good management* which differentiates the identity of the defence professional of today from that of the mid- to late-twentieth century’s. This cannot be identified in conversation with participants as they take for granted what they mean by *good management*, expecting me to know and thus offering no explanation. Instead, I looked to competency frameworks for the MoD civil service as well as within military training. From these I learnt that *good management* is conceived as a universalisable skill which can be applied in any sector, completely eliminating the exclusivity of defence which was so inherent to the traditional conceptualisation. Crucially, the notion of *good management* is directly lifted from the private sector model of management, which defence professionals consider a virtue as it enables them to facilitate successful partnering through the identification of common ground between sectors. One of the ways the MoD has sought to do this is by creating a ‘standardised costing method’ (2015a: 4) for contracts. As a part of this goal, the

SSRO has worked on establishing a standardised methodology for calculating baseline profit rates (BPR) for qualifying defence contracts (QDC) which incorporates all sectors thus is specific to business, not defence.

The analysis we produce will be based on a range of evidence and will generate comparative management information and defence benchmarks and parametrics. This data can be used by the MOD to work with industry to negotiate and manage contracts in a manner more closely aligned with the aims of the Defence Reform Act. (SSRO, 2015a: 19)

Evidence on this matter will be taken from the SSRO in the House of Commons Defence Committee on the 31 January 2017.

9.2.2. Performing the Defence Identity

The most common and popular conception of the performance of defence is that of *war*. This is not a misplaced conception as, historically, the defence community's activities ebbed and flowed according to the needs of the battlefield. Many would argue that it is still about *war* as the UK has been in the longest sustained period of *war* in history, having continuously deployed forces from the first Gulf War in 1991, amounting to twenty-five years at *war*. However, I put the word *war* in italics as I would argue that we have not been at *war* at all. Instead, our troops have been on *operation*. The differentiation is not of my own fabrication. Looking at the difficulties that the UK is currently experiencing in the courts, struggling to determine whether civil courts have jurisdiction over occurrences on deployment, the arguments put forward are based around the notion that troops are on operation not at war thus the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) do not apply.

These arguments are gaining legitimacy as *war* has not been declared since the Falklands War in 1982, but rather a series of operations implemented—a fact the MoD does not deny. So what is the difference? In simple terms, it is a matter of contract. An operation is an agreement with an interested party for the lending of military support. Thus, technically we have not been at *war* but rather have been fulfilling partnership obligations as one would under any contract. My argument is further supported by the document analysis I carried out in which the word *war* does not arise once, and by the complete absence of the word in my conversations with key decision-makers in defence, even when asked directly *what is defence?* Pulling-in the *manager* identity and adding it to the notion that the defence community, including the military, exists to fulfil a series of obligations by implementing operations, we begin to see that it is not only acquisition programmes and policy-making that are subject to management. To this end, for example, the NAO has established a series of *performance targets* that need to be met on projects: equipment support performance, operating cost-efficiency, forecast accuracy, customer satisfaction and delivery of transformation plan. (2015a: 25) As a result, the vast majority of what the defence community does, by

their own admission, is *project/ portfolio management*—just as the private sector does when meeting its contractual obligations.

This transformation in how the defence community perceives itself has inevitably impacted its presentation of itself. Through reading numerous documents and listening to presentations, we can hear a heavy emphasis on the need to be *business-like*. According to the HoCDC,

the requirement for original defence and security research and development can be added to the immediate requirements of operations and mean that defence must be seen as a complex enterprise that needs active strategic management and a degree of certainty for investment. (2015e: 22)

On operation, this means, for example, that

[t]he first step of the UK must be to develop a serious independent assessment of the situation on the ground in Iraq... It must develop a much more complete picture of the current coalition strategy, and be in a position to assess its costs, benefits and risks and to use this understanding to influence that strategy, and ensure that it is more than simply a repeat of the 2007 ‘surge’ strategy conducted with a fraction of the resources. (HoCDC, 2015b: 50)

This is, once more, a battle against the exclusivity of defence as a sector, with the aim of creating an organisation with counterparts to its desired private sector partners. Such re-constitution of the performance of defence has drastically changed the artefacts that we traditionally associate with defence. Gone are the military ceremonies which only military personnel understood, to be replaced by conferences which are structured and populated in the same format that a conference for business innovation or enterprise might be. Instead of a doctrine like the BDD full of rhetoric on the virtues of our moral standing and the need to support our military in ensuring they protect us and others, we now have handbooks and manuals which tell defence employees which process to follow and by which parameters to measure and evaluate performance indicators.

In addition, symbolism within the community is dominated by an entirely different narrative. Whereas uniforms and ranks used to be the prime indicators of someone standing within and belonging to the community, today it is the *vocabulary* they are able to use comfortably which distinguishes them. Despite uniforms still being worn to conferences, they feel more like remnants of an old-time, worn to indulge a certain nostalgia for the wearers youth: little more than a side note saying *this is who I used to be* rather than a warning of whom they are now. Instead, the ease with which they speak in the *managerial vocabulary*—discussing CBA, VfM and QDCs—gives them a sense of belonging. To give an example, in the 2015 SDSR the government writes of ‘maintain[ing] our ultimate insurance policy’ in reference to the military, and ‘increas[ing] our investment’. (HM Government, 2015: 6) The HoCDC, in addition, writes about employing

strategies on operation which enable the UK to retain ‘some ‘equity’ and influence in shaping decisions.’ (2015b: 41) The feeling that they are able to speak to industrialists, politicians and military personnel alike, in one language, enables an invisible community to form around this thing *defence* which only they—the *managers*—can belong to.

9.2.3. Identity+ Performance= Govern-mentality

The identity of members of the defence community and their performances both contribute to a dominant mentality of governance. As per the above, the centrality of the military is no longer a factor in modern day defence. Quite to the contrary, the notion that the military might contribute *too much* is a source of fear among decision-makers and those in charge of holding the MoD to account. The fear stems from the notion that the military is unable to solve problems in any other way than through the use of aggression. In fact, the critique contends that the military is too subjective and unable to provide an objective analysis of a situation. (p. 133) Thus, other voices such as those of industry have been given a greater vote, diminishing military input to the extent that today it forms a very small part of the decision-making process. In addition, as I heard from some of my respondents, e.g. Mr Picasso during the afternoon coffee break at ADC 2015 (pp. 49- 51), those military personnel who are still asked to contribute often stick to the MoD-line for fear of being delegitimized. Thus, we see that the govern-mentality of defence has been *demilitarised*.

The desired repercussion of *demilitarisation* was the *universalisation* of forms of governance. The elimination of military exclusivity is a key component of the managerial ideology, which seeks to break down the dividing barriers between the public and private sectors by universalising language and practices. As already stressed, this enables successful *partnering*. So what are these universal forms of governance? Primarily, it entails the consideration of the three E’s—efficiency, effectiveness and economy—in decision-making. Sifting through the documents, the dominance of these three principles is self-evident. In the 2015 SDSR, for example, the Government declares that: ‘All government departments are expected to meet high levels of efficiency. Alongside the development of the strategy, we have scrutinised the efficiency of national security spend.’ (HM Government, 2015: 81) Furthermore, just through their use of vocabulary, we can also see that the community’s employees are comfortable with framing problems and solutions in this light too. Mr Picasso, although intuitively favouring the traditionalist arguments for the organisation of defence, is only able to problematize and offer solutions through reference to concepts such as efficiency and investment, subconsciously delimiting his form of expression and the sources from which he can draw solutions. (pp. 49- 51)

The centrality in the rhetoric of these three tenets of govern-mentality has an impact on the expectations of government from the work of the community. The most evident of these and the most relevant to defence is the lack of emphasis on *victory*. Today, the notion of victory no longer forms part of the dominant

narrative within defence, but rather has been replaced by the concept of *success*. In his opening keynote speech at the LWC 2015, General Sir Nicholas Carter, Chief of the General Staff (CGS) openly confirms this, stating: 'it is no longer enough to talk in straight forward terms, with terms like 'defeat' and 'victory'... success now tends to be judged through the management of perception'. Instead, he refers to the 'tactical success' the UK achieved in Afghanistan. The reason for this is that *success* can be measured against pre-determined indicators represented by numerical symbols. Success, therefore, is almost always achievable, the question is merely *how successful have we been?* This is a symptom of the need to be objective, removing all subjective and emotive elements from defence such as *winning* in a bid to legitimise the governance of operations.

An understanding of the defence identity, performance and govern-mentality demonstrates that defence in the UK is now about *globalisation* and *partnerships*, *universalisable management skills*, *project/portfolio management*, *business-like managerialism* and *successful operations*. But is there still a place for *Britishness*, the *military*, *war* and *victory*?

9.3. Responding to Threat?

The story so far has been a narrow one. Although we have searched through history, have observed the context of the conference and reviewed what has been written, the story has been of the quotidian dealings of the few that circulate within the decision-making community. It is easy to get sucked into the vacuum that is that small geographical space between Westminster, the MoD and RUSI, but all those events, conversations and decisions are for a wider purpose and cannot, or at least should not, be removed from their context. How the current narrative responds to the *threat environment*, however, gives us an indication of its *totalising* nature. The nature of the managerial narrative means that the threats themselves are construed and framed within a particular conceptual framework, leading to a certain set of responses that differ from those that might be expected within the traditional narrative.

Below, I have listed a handful of the threats we have faced in our globalised world in 2015, illustrating just how human in nature it continues to be:

a) *Charlie Hebdo Attacks, Paris, 07- 09/01/2015*

Within a week of celebrating the New Year, Europe and the world were racked with news of yet another terrorist attack. At approximately 11:30am local time on the 7th January 2015, two masked gunmen forced their way into the Charlie Hebdo offices in Paris, shooting nine members of staff and one visitor dead, eight of which appear to have been the targets. The reason given for the attack was that the magazine had permitted the publishing of images of the prophet Mohammed despite it being prohibited in Islam. During their escape, the two gunmen also shot dead a police officer at close range, having already inflicted on him a disabling gunshot wound. By abandoning the getaway vehicle which was the object of the ensuing police hunt and hijacking another, the gunmen managed to get away.

With Paris on high alert and 500 policemen involved in the search for the gunmen, another lone attacker shot two people on the subway at approximately 08:45 the following day. On the 9th of January 2015, whilst police were seeking out the two gunmen, a further two jihadist sympathisers took fifteen people hostage in a supermarket, demanding that the two gunmen be left to go free. Having surrounded the first two and shot them dead whilst they tried to escape, police stormed the supermarket, securing the release of the hostages. In total twelve people were killed during the attacks. (BBC, 2015a)

Although the number of victims did not reach those of 9/11 or 7/7, the attacks left the European population in a state of shock, sending an infectious cry of *Je Suis Charlie* throughout Europe in support of, essentially, freedom of speech. Many statesmen and public figures emerged to express their sadness at the events but also to encourage the public to continue to exercise their freedoms, denying the terrorists a *win*. The narrative that emerged was very similar to that post 9/11 and 7/7 in which we were encouraged to continue on with our daily lives, using transport as usual, in a bid to demonstrate that we would not be intimidated.

a) *Putin confirms plans to annex Crimea, 09/03/2015*

Within two months of the Hebdo attacks, fears that President Putin intended to annex Crimea were confirmed, threatening the Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty. (Ukraine CSIS, 2015) Not only are such actions a threat to the individual States which Russia aggresses against, but they are also a threat to Russia's main rivals: the NATO States. Such assertions and subsequent actions on behalf of Russia are reminiscent of the Cold War era during which the USSR were unapologetic in their aim to conquer and occupy as much of Eastern Europe as they could. As a result, many in the US as well as in Europe were quick to warn the public through the media of the dangers of allowing Russia to run rampant in its own backyard, as, although for the time being these occupations do not necessarily affect us, in the long-run Russia is making its way ever closer to our borders. In doing so, not only is Russia placing itself geographically closer to the West, but also leaving political instability in its wake, creating conditions for terrorists to organise. Thus, by the third month of the year, two threats to the UK are confirmed: the terrorist and the State threats.

b) *Deadly terrorist attacks, Tunisia, 27/03/2015 and 26/06/2015*

The terrorist threat continued to spread in 2015 with North Africa being targeted. On the 27th of March, a popular Tunisian tourist attraction, the Bardo National Museum, was stormed by two gunmen, leaving at least twenty dead, most of whom were foreign tourists, and dozens more injured. (Stephen, *et. al.*, 2015) Three months later, gunmen opened fire on a beach by a hotel in the popular holiday resort of Sousse, killing dozens of tourists. (Elgot, 2015)

Both attacks were aimed at damaging the basis of the Tunisian economy. Jihadist group such as ISIS consider it immoral and anti-Islamic to base a State's economy on Western tourism, as it means relying on money acquired by immoral people and anti-Islamic means. Inevitably and as intended, the result of the two attacks

was a significant decline in tourism to Tunisia. The resulting economic struggle has provided extremist groups with fertile ground to plant the seed of their ideology among the struggling population, increasing the terrorist threat to the West, and thus to the UK, substantially.

c) Shocking images of drowned Syrian boy, 02/09/2015

By September 2015, mass immigration from Syria into Europe of those fleeing the destruction and dictatorial rule of ISIS had reached crisis point. Although used to seeing images of boatloads of people arriving at European shores and even hearing of dozens found dead in the water after failed attempts at crossing the dangerous waters at night, on the second of September 2015 heart-wrenching photographs of a toddler's lifeless body found by a policeman on a Greek beach tore through the British media. (Smith, 2015) Although not within itself an attack on Britain's, the desperate plight that led to the tragic death of a toddler, alone in cold waters was an assault on British values. In an era in which one of the roles of defence is to defend and proliferate British values, this tragedy could only be viewed as a consequence of an attack on these.

d) Paris Attacks, 13/11/2015

The last quarter of 2015 saw the largest and most deadly terrorist attack of the era. On the evening of the 13th of November 2015, a series of attacks in Paris once more left 130 dead and over 100 injured. The attack consisted of five different acts of aggression including shootings and bombings during which members of the public were targeted at random on the basis that they were in attendance at locales which are considered un-Islamic. These included bars, restaurants and a concert venue. At the concert hall, exits were deliberately blocked off in order to enable the most amount of people to be killed, with others being strategically chased into an alleyway at the end of which another attacker awaited. (BBCb, 2015) The attack was carried out by eleven men in the name of Jihad. (BBC, 2016)

e) Russian airstrikes help ISIS, Syria, December 2015

As if responding to the analysis made earlier in 2015, Russia, under the guise of combating ISIS, begins to bomb indiscriminately in Syria in early December. Although Russia does not admit it, its strategy appears to be to eliminate any opposition to President Assad of Syria's regime, whether or not it be emanating from ISIS. From the West's perspective, this opposition extends to include legitimate political opposition which does not fall under the definition of terrorism. Despite requests to stop bombing non-ISIS targets, Russia denies any wrong-doing, targeting innocent civilians.

The UK's then Secretary of State for Defence, as a result of Russia's actions, releases a statement to the effect that Russia is not only increasing its own power by expanding into the region, beyond its traditional limits of Eastern Europe but is also enabling ISIS, the new non-state threat, to exert a better foothold in Syria by eliminating any guerrilla forces that might help Western forces oppose it on the ground. (Withnall, 2015)

f) Paris attacks linked to Hungary's migrant crisis, 17/12/2015

Budapest, Hungary, in late 2015 becomes the centre and culmination of the ongoing migrant crisis. The millions fleeing the unstable Middle East— from Syria to Afghanistan to Iraq—travel to Hungary, the entry point to Europe, to seek asylum. Although the initial labelling of the mass influx of migrants is that of a humanitarian crisis, media rhetoric soon turns on them, with many outlets at the very least offering a *balanced* view on the way in which the mass influx could affect our security and way of life in the West.

It is not long before the attacks in Paris that terrorised Europe in 2015 are linked to the migrant crisis. By mid-December, the narrative turns on the migrants and the media becomes saturated with analyses and stories to the effect that the uncontrolled access to Europe of migrants, and the indiscriminate offer of entry, only provides a breeding ground for extremist cells, posing a risk to our cities of further large-scale, concerted attacks. (Higgins, 2015)

Within the Panopticon we have a constant flow of power through its corridors emanating from the actions of the agents within defence. However, outside the walls of the Panopticon, the threats continue to bombard the community. So how does the community use the nature of the discourse as a point of reference to frame and filter those events and in what guise does it allow it to penetrate? Taking the actions of the community during 2015—the conferences, the publications, the brief government responses to HoCDC reports, etc—as the UK's response to these external threats, it is hard to see how the community is responding adequately.

‘Genuine relations of power occur in a field of struggle where various parties attempt to give structure to the action of others and the others in turn may comply, resist and/or themselves attempt to give structure to the same terrain of action.’ (Shiner, 1982: 391) We can observe this field of struggle in the vocabulary used and the sentiments expressed from within the community. On the one hand, the government expresses purely traditionalist sentiments in the SDSR such as the UK has ‘a proud tradition of protecting its people, promoting civil liberties, upholding the rule of law, and building diverse, integrated communities tolerant of different faiths and beliefs... We will continue to uphold these values’. (HM Government, 2015: 10) On the other hand, these abstract goals and aims are operationalised in heavily managerial ways. For example, in the same document, the government expresses the way to defend these values as by protecting ‘the golden thread of conditions that lead to security and prosperity’. (HM Government, 2015: 10) By linking security to prosperity, and thus defence to economic stability, the human aspect of the values we must uphold is obfuscated, to be replaced by a need to convert inputs into tangible outputs.

The power is not in the choice made, i.e. adhering to the managerial narrative, but rather in the ability to make that choice: ‘power necessarily involves freedom, that is, a field of possible behaviour and reactions.’ (Shiner, 1982: 391) However, as

already recognised, this is not a result of cynical self-interest on the part of the agents of UK defence, but rather emanates from a belief in the productivity of these actions:

power [is] not merely... prohibitive but... productive; not primarily exercised from above but as widely distributed; not as exclusively political or economic but as dispersed in a multitude of forms from the most finely tuned disciplines for bodily movements to the broadest rules for the formation of true statements. (Shiner, 1982: 389- 90)

The managerial narrative has, through the formation and reproduction of the defence identity and its performance, become the legitimiser of action and basis for productivity. By its very nature it is exclusive. The narrative, therefore, in the defence Panopticon 'is not to modify any given phenomenon as such, or to modify a given individual insofar as he is an individual, but, essentially, to intervene at the level at which these general phenomena are determined, to intervene at the level of their generality.' (Foucault, 2003: 246) The generality for *reality*, for example, has been framed by the parameters of the managerial narrative. In UK defence, reality is the need to merge with the private sector by adopting its practices. The SSRO, to this end, reports that '[i]t is important to consider factors which govern the level of risk in a business, as this will drive the potential profit levels of that business, and the likely volatility of that profit', (SSRO, 2015b: 18) recommending that the needs of industry are prioritised and thus the practices of the MoD aligned to them. "Get real' [therefore] means something like, 'Adapt to the new norm of the new narrative, because that's the reality.'" (Verhaeghe, 2014: 111)

The need to adhere to this reality has resulted in defence being populated by a certain type of professional that, without the need to think through the process, automatically adheres to the dominant narrative: '[p]rofessional training therefore centres around ideology, because ideology guides the subtle decisions and creative choices that the professional makes as she fills the blank sheet.' (Schmidt, 2001: 37) Simultaneously, those who do not *get real* have been excluded from the realm of decision-making. Consequently, decisions are made within a certain realm, not just where the MoD must interact with the defence industry, but also those which affect the military on operations— '[t]he lesson of our last engagement in Iraq is that the absence of such 'granular' knowledge prevented the international coalition then from designing a credible plan or monitoring its performance'— (HoCDC, 2015b: 40) to those affecting the treatment of returning personnel:

aim to minimise the likelihood of soldiers suffering from psychological problems and enable effective and timely management of those who have been exposed to traumatic or stressful events... Those identified are kept under line management review through follow up interviews and management. (HoCDC, 2015a: 6)

9.4. 'BPR for SSRO QDCs'

I have written about what shape external threats take in our defence community once filtered through the dominant narrative and how we each influence each other, exercising power individually to mould the discourse. However, I have spoken about this in broad themes, illustrating how as a whole and on a mass scale, a narrative can influence practice and thought. But there is another layer yet which only I can testify to: how has the dominant narrative in the defence discourse changed me and shaped my way of thinking? What are the experiences of this individual?

Only a few months before submitting this PhD a colleague asked me what I was working on and, without stopping for thought, I answered: 'understanding the methodology for calculating the BPR for SSRO QDCs.' Shrugging her shoulders, my colleague looked at me as if to say 'I have no idea what that is' and walked off. Although it seems ridiculous, I actually sat for a few moments afterwards marvelling at the words (if you can call them that) that had just rolled off my tongue. If you recall, one of the reasons I stated for doing this PhD was because I felt so excluded from the world of defence despite the fact I had spent years at university specialising in it. I felt that I was unable to communicate with people for a lack of common vocabulary—a feeling which has to this day not deserted me. However, that short sentence that spilled out of my mouth (the meaning of which is irrelevant) astounded me because I sounded just like those people milling around the conference reception room, rolling out acronyms as if they were understandable to every man on the street. I can only conclude, therefore, that no matter how excluded I continue to feel and no matter how concerted my efforts have been to make the most of my outsider position, the reality of the matter is that I have not escaped the influence of the narrative.

Looking back on my notebooks from my first year at RUSI, when I made an effort to attend every event, no matter how irrelevant it seemed, in an effort to learn as much as I could about defence and security in the real world away from university, I see they are peppered with red question marks. My own version of the events I attended is incoherent as I did not understand the terminology and the acronyms that people threw about and therefore could not contextualise them. Next to some of the question marks and in a different colour, I had written what I had found these things to mean; some just single words or phrases, others lengthy explanations spilling into the margins and around the paragraphs. Most of it is, frankly, illegible. In truth, this is the first time I have revisited these early notebooks as, by my second year, I had refined my research area. Thus, the most interesting thing about these notebooks is not what is written but rather how full of doubt they are.

I still recall how inadequate I felt at events, particularly small meetings where it was impossible to blend into the crowd. In contrast, although I am still aware that I have huge gaps in knowledge and am lacking in experience particularly in comparison to the majority of my colleagues, I no longer lose myself in acronyms and terminology. I make no claim to knowing everything as there are still

moments in which I am caught out by a particular reference, but they are so few and far between now that I do not have a problem asking the speaker to clarify. However, due to the nature of my research, I am consistently making an effort to remain critical of the discourse, always aware of the use of language by individuals and looking out for any breaks in the narrative. As a matter of fact, it has become almost second nature, and I find myself doing it even when I am not working.

Nevertheless, I have most certainly been caught up in the dominant interpretations of *legitimacy* and *professionalism*. Though I would love to continue working and writing in the critical tradition, juxtaposing my alternative conceptualisation of defence to that of the dominant managerial narrative, I am now faced with the need to build a career for myself. It is possibly the most mundane reason to let go of what has been so central to three years of my life, but there is a *reality*, a *truth*, to which I belong: I need to work. I am thus in a position in which I must build a knowledge base in something *operationalisable*, a subject matter which I can write and teach about within the dominant discourse, making myself employable. Therefore, although I come to the office at RUSI and sit behind my laptop tapping away a critique of the discourse, when I am out within the community I put on my own managerial voice. I am thus able to converse with colleagues and make myself known to them in an attempt to carve out my own space in academia and, in truth, further my own employment prospects.

It would be easy for me to now argue that because I am consciously subscribing to the dominant narrative in order to further my career I have not been subsumed by it. However, I believe that, initially, we all see ourselves as ‘simply playing the game’, but in the long run, after repeated conversations about VfM, CBA, project management and QDCs, it becomes second nature—in essence, automatic conformity. Thus, who knows: in future, because of the need to legitimise my presence in the defence community today, I may well be the career academic who genuinely believes in the universal nature and inherent goodness of the managerial approach?

9.5 Conclusion

In this Chapter, I have concisely illustrated how the defence Panopticon metaphor and the notions of *identity*, *performativity*, and *governmentality* apply to the workings of the defence community by populating it with some of my observations which I presented in previous chapters. Furthermore, by giving examples of threats we have faced in the year 2015, I demonstrate the apparent disparity between the threat we are facing and the way in which we are choosing to practice defence in response. In doing so, I sought to show how it is the exercise of *power* which enables the defence community to reconcile the traditional, personal threat with the managerialised defence we practice. Finally, to highlight the importance of the individual identities of those populating the defence community, and their expression of these, I use myself as an example of how continued exposure to the defence community and the desire to belong can

mould identities, further contributing to the managerial narrative's dominance and the capillary nature of power (Louth and Boden, 2014).

CHAPTER TEN: FOR EFFECT OR AFFECT?

10.1. Introduction

So far, I have presented three years worth of theoretical framing, document analysis, and critical observation. But how close have I come to answering the question it is all meant for: *what is defence?* In this Chapter, I return to the title question—*for effect or affect?* — picking out the main points that have emanated from the preceding chapters.

10.2. Explaining *defence* in the twenty-first century

According to the documents analysed in Chapter Seven, defence is all about safeguarding our economic prosperity: ‘Our national security depends on our economic security, and vice versa. So the first step in our National Security Strategy is to ensure our economy is, and remains, strong.’ (HM Government, 2015: 5) The concept that prosperity and a thriving economy provide the main source of security in the UK appears to dominate the official narrative. From my conversations with key stakeholders in defence and presentations observed at conferences (pp. 29- 59), however, the idea of economic security is never directly referenced. It is instead indirectly referred to through a nuanced rationale which dominates interactions in the defence community. Firstly, the *best* technologies are touted as part of doing *good* defence despite a recognition that there exist times at which ‘a reliance on technology...cannot provide any degree of context or cultural understanding’. (HoCDC, 2015b: 39) Secondly, cost-saving strategies, particularly in procurement where cost-overruns are common, are considered best practice. (p. 105- 106) Thirdly, cost-benefit analyses, such as that commissioned by the MoD on the cost of reserves versus regulars in the Army (pp. 136- 138) are deemed a worthwhile investment. Finally, seeking out efficiency measures within defence particularly through extensive outsourcing with the idea that ‘[o]utourcing can enhance the morale, cohesion, combat effectiveness, and ethos of the armed services themselves’ (Uttley, 2005: 16) are promoted. All of these issues come down to a simple assumption: the more money we have, the better defence we will do- under the guidance of a managerial framework.

This emphasis on cost has made the notion of *value for money* a central one to defence. Although the idea is quite simple, emanating from the world of accountancy, the notion of *value* itself is a complex one. Due to the origins of the term, many would assume that *value for money* is simply about money. However, cost-saving in itself has always been a part of defence as we have never sought to simply spend as much as possible. Nevertheless, in defence today, *value* as equivalent to money is an accepted *fact of life* even if not everyone agrees with it on principal. This is an assertion supported by the fact that we are comfortable to put the determination of what *value* is into the hands of accountants as in the Single Source Regulations Office (SSRO). Mr Kahlo, with whom I speak at Lunch during ADC (pp. 43- 46), for example, feels that accountants and auditors should not be allowed to determine *value*. He does, however, emphasises that it is

not the MoD either that is best suited for this task, but rather industry. These tensions only show that, despite the fact that many are still resistant to the idea that defence is quantifiable, practice shows that quantifiable indicators are how we measure *value* in the sector.

Procurement is where the MoD has identified *VfM* and *cost-cutting* are most likely to be achieved. As a result, since 1997, its reform has become one of the focuses of defence policy and activity. (pp. 105- 106) ‘Many of these reforms have been so profound that they have fundamentally changed the defence-industry relationship to the point of determining the very nature of the types of wars that defence organisations can conduct’. (Burgess & Ekström, 2014: 144) *VfM* in procurement has meant an increase in buying off-the-shelf and partnering with industry to develop capability. As evidenced in Session One of ADC (pp. 34-36) the need for the projection of soft power is considered fulfilled by efforts to partner. Similarly, Session Four of ADC (pp. 51- 52) on Future Considerations in defence, shows a belief that partnering is considered essential to ensure the retention of skills within the UK and the fast-paced development of new technologies and capability. The tangible results of this drive to partnering has been the creation of bodies such as the SSRO, charged with ensuring the MoD’s interests are safeguarded in the drafting of single source contracts, manned by accountants and auditors (pp. 135- 136).

But what are we to use the money we save for? The consensus is that *investment* in partnerships— between contractor and government, governments and government and civilians (‘we will expand our ability to deploy military and civilian experts together to support stabilisation efforts and build capacity in other states, as a long-term investment in a more stable world.’ (SDSR 2010: 3)) — is key to success in defence. This is the basis of the Whole Force Approach: ‘an integrated, whole-of-government approach, supported by greater innovation and efficiency. They are underpinned by new, substantial and targeted investment, made possible by our renewed economic strength.’ (HM Government, SDSR, 2015: 10)

For similar reasons, technology research and development programmes are proliferating. Many of these run for tens of years with billions of pounds invested for simply having the *best* technology. Questions are never asked, however, as to what this technology is *best* for. We have programmes in place now for the development of, for example, fifth generation fighter jet technology (i.e. the F-35 programme which has been subject to massive time and cost overruns but has not been abandoned) which will outperform in terms of technological advancement, the technology of any potential attackers. However, this technology is not being developed to outperform in a competition. Nonetheless, there is no attempt to understand how this *best* technology will combat the enemy on the ground in case of actual combat. I, for one, struggle to see how a fifth generation fighter jet can help the UK combat a suicide bomber intent on destroying the Houses of Parliament in population dense central London—an attack we are, at the moment, expecting as likely rather than one that constitutes the worst-case scenario. Yet,

the *best* (or *most advanced*) technology appears to always be worth the investment.

This is not just about technology, however; it is not just about boys and their toys. There is a crucial tenet of managerialism which is also being fulfilled by the search for the *best* technology: the imperative to partner. Forgetting the need for sovereign capabilities, today partnering, allying and forging long-term relationships, which entail equal measures of risk and investment, are essential to success in defence: In fact, '[t]he vision of the Whole Force Concept rests heavily on the intellectual case for seamless partnership and partnering'. (Louth & Quentin, 2014: 6)

Nevertheless, it is no secret that the implementation of these reforms and the emphasis on partnering are expected to have a detrimental effect on UK defence and its industries. 'Given the increasingly important role of defence acquisition, it is our assessment that the risks associated with ignoring theoretical aspects of defence acquisition are too great to be ignored.' (Burgess & Ekström, 2014: 145) The House of Commons Defence Committee, for example, warns that the focus on the need to save and the resulting use of multi-national companies could be quite damaging to national industries. (p. 146) In addition, many worry about the impact these practices will have on sovereignty, and thus safety, (p. 146) as well as our ability to perform defence well (p. 144-145). 'The speed at which these reforms have been introduced and implemented has been such that a deeper intellectual understanding of what has occurred, and is still occurring, in defence acquisition, has lagged well behind practice.' (Burgess & Ekström, 2014: 144)

What does this centrality of money to the notion of *value* in defence and the drive to save costs mean for practice? The rigidity of compliance to these notions, in fact, produces quite contrary practices, which pass unquestioned. This indicates that how we practice defence in the UK is motivated less by *effect* and more about *affect*. There appears to be an *irrational* need to adhere to the managerial narrative, which produces quite contrary practices. For example, on the one hand, we hear constant rhetoric promising the spending of 2% GDP as per NATO guidelines without there ever being an explanation as to what this will entail and how it will benefit defence (p. 33) as well as in numerous official publications. (p. 146) Simultaneously, however, there is a constant search for cost-saving measures and the pressure to implement them in narrow timeframes, with detrimental effects. For example, the Reservist strategy is to be implemented by 2020 despite the fact that the report commissioned by the MoD from Dstl makes clear that the impact on operational effectiveness of its implementation is unpredictable. (p. 136- 138) Nonetheless, neither strategy is questioned for its validity nor the contradiction highlighted as their pursuit as ideals is more about process than outcome.

10.3. Defence: a response to yesterdays failures

Defence as the construct it is today is essentially a result of the perceived failures of the *inefficient* traditionalist approach. (p. 107- 111) The impetus for change has not only come from authoritative bodies but also from individuals working in defence. For example, Professor Dalí, throughout our conversation, made clear that further change is needed in the pursuit for efficiency. (pp. 37- 40) General Arp and Doctor Carrington, in the second session of ADC on what it is that the defence community do, both emphasise the need for the MoD to change culturally in order to improve relations with industry. (pp. 40- 42) Mr Kahlo is more explicit in his support for greater involvement of industry, advocating greater respect for the latter and essentially stating that it is key to UK success in defence. (pp. 43- 46)

In asserting its dominance, the managerial narrative requires its proponents to silence traditionalist voices. This is not a conscious act but rather a result of the lack of their ability to recognise the counter-narrative (p. 47- 48) as legitimate and thus to incorporate it. SDSR 2015 is a perfect example of the official narrative silencing the counter-narrative. In omitting to address concerns regarding the lack of military and other external sources of advice in defence matters, (p. 145) of defined criteria for intervention, (p. 142- 143) and the detrimental effects of the changing perceptions of the military, (p. 143- 145) the authors of SDSR 2015, for example, have delegitimised traditionalist concerns, choosing to focus solely on economic security. (p.147) This does not only occur in an official capacity, however. In Session Three of ADC on the role of technology in defence, the audience fail to recognise the ideas of the speakers who do not express managerial views. (pp. 47- 48) Such lack of recognition, and thus exclusion, of these members from the community, force those with traditionalist views to unconsciously change their identity to feel included. In House of Commons Defence Committee reports in 2015 alone, we see this happen, for example, where the Committee begins to advocate decreased use of troops (p. 132) and call for less reliance on military advice (p. 134- 136).

The managerialist explanation does not always disregard the traditionalist entirely but rather incorporates and absorbs those aspects of it that it is able to reconcile with its own approach. The most basic example of this is the managerialist assumption that both the military and the private sector share a moral motivation for their participation in defence (p. 120).

As a result, the defence *professional* is constructed in a particular way. He or she needs the ability to speak to industry, negotiate on commercial terms, draw up a contract, safeguard the MoD's budget, know where to cut costs and be able to maintain good relationships with industry partners and other governments. As the defence community is governed by schedules, project templates and programme management, those who work within it have either been employed for their ability to do so or retained for their ability to adapt to it. Thus, what these employees produce is invariably more of the same. For example, the employment of statisticians means we are relying on information from professionals who 'are

creating a certain image of reality. That image reflects expectations, the production of an ideology we are not always aware of.’ (Verhaeghe, 2014: 231) As statisticians, they are invariably selective with the information that they chose to present. Not out of any conscious moral judgement, but rather because statistics can only incorporate certain forms of information and, in turn, can only represent them in a certain way. The information we receive, therefore, has already been filtered and inevitably presents us with a pre-formed opinion: ‘To choose ‘this’ fact over ‘that’ fact is already to express an opinion. To highlight ‘this; fact over ‘that’ fact is to comment.’ (Edwards & Cromwell, 2009: 4) Professor Dalí (p. 37-40) makes clear that these are essential attributes for those working in the defence community. He, an influential man in forming those in the higher ranks of the military, feels that this move of deference by the decision-making community to defence industries is essential to the unifying of a *fragmented* defence enterprise. Thus, the *professional* in defence today is essentially one lifted from the private sector or one who embodies the private-sector ethos and approach wholeheartedly, as does Professor Dalí.

We live in an era in which we have deemed the regulation of safety and risk management the best method of protecting the individual. We all truly believe in this as it is the only narrative we hear from a young age but also the way we are taught to be professional. However, ‘being a neutral, impartial and apolitical ‘professional’ is impossible.’ (Cromwell, 2012: 221) This selectivity is not conscious it is simply a matter of the limit to our knowledge and the way we have learnt to frame problems. We only understand chains of management, regulations and indicators as a way of accounting for and measuring progress. But this ‘has generated an unstoppable proliferation of different types of ethics... and codes and regulations are running rampant.’ (Verhaeghe, 2014: 38) In defence management, the inability to question the virtues of a private-sector style management and contracting-out already pre-frames the way we understand defence as ‘contracting-out also alters the process through which government functions, including the use of force, are controlled and more often than not reduces transparency by redistributing power away from legislators and into the hands of the market.’ (Kinsey, 2009: 95)

The process of exclusion and adaptation is one which I have experienced and been subject to myself (pp. 161- 162). When I, having *specialised* in international defence and security, am spoken to by defence professionals at conferences and workshops, I find myself at a loss. Many will say it is because I am inexperienced, but I argue it is because the defence community is not specialised in the defence and security that I am. I am unable to participate as I do not speak management—I do not understand accountancy or contracts or risk management, thus I do not understand the conversation. I am essentially a traditionalist in a world of managerialists. However, among those around me, the conversation flows freely and when, on occasion, another interjects with a question about culture or human security, they are invariably dismissed with a casual nod. It seems that they feed off each other’s management speak but cannot handle a change in subject. ‘Keywords activate underlying frames of association with a powerful emotional

charge, provoking a gut response... Activating a single value also activates associated values, while suppressing opposing values.' (Verhaeghe, 2014: 241)

This managerial identity, therefore, has been formed through a series of lessons in compliance and self-governance which we need as social beings in order to feel included in a group or community but also to score out the line which separates us and our group from everyone else. Thus, in defence in 2015, the way in which defence personnel are able to fluently speak management delineates and differentiates them from those more traditional members of the defence community as well as from those others who are now considered unprofessional (for example, Lord Miró, p. 30- 31). In the twentieth century on the other hand, the professional in defence was recognised by their ability to speak the uniquely military language and understand all the cultural artefacts that came with it: 'the British Army remained singularly untouched by the outside world... They continued to live in a self-contained society, virtually impervious to the fads and political fashions of the rest of the country outside.' (Beavor, 2000: 63)

10.4. Filling the *defence* vessel

So, defence is about partnering, saving money, managing projects and speaking the managerial language. But that is only defence *today*. Only twenty years ago, defence was about Britishness, sovereign capabilities, a professional military that represented the British society's morals and the search for moral victory. (BDD, 1996) Thus, everything I have said in this chapter so far only serves to describe defence in 2015. Observation, document analysis and interviews can only give us an insight into how society has determined defence should be practiced at the time to which they belong. In order to determine what defence is in more general terms, we must look to those underlying mechanisms which determine the mentality with which we approach the subject of defence and, in turn, how we practice it.

Defence as a concept is simply a result of relations of power. What is transmitted during these interactions of power, is a mentality as determined by the identity of the individuals which populate the defence community. These identities are determined by the dominant narratives which frame the cultural understanding of defence. So in 2015 our interactions are managerial in nature, represented and governed by managerial narratives, which amount to the expression of our managerially constructed ideas in reference to the managerial regimes of truth in which we have formed them. For this reason, we seek to better our management skills, hone our management speak and expect others to do the same, proliferating the notion that these skills are *good* (Chapters Two and Three). In 1990, however, the way into defence was to understand and express reverence for military culture, an identity built on an institutionalised personal connection to the military and a particularly powerful sense of patriotism (Chapter Six).

The outcome of melding together the process of identity formation, expressions of identity and the resulting relationships of unconscious and collective power

formed in the community, is a governmentality which controls the way in which defence is practiced. This governmentality is not imposed upon the community but rather grows organically. It is a mentality of expectation: the expectation of legitimate behaviours and the exercise of self-control and discipline. For this reason, in 2015, after a disruption in the defence discourse at the end of the twentieth century, the dominant defence narrative is managerial in flavour. The implementation of NPM and growing respect for the private sector and its models of management in light of its financial success, caused a transformation in the mentality of society— ‘It was the legacy of 2 decades of outsourcing that provided the impetus for contractor battlefield support and shaped MoD’s assessment of how private sector involvement should be organized and managed.’ (Uttley, 2005: 4) This is now an ingrained mentality in the individuals who populate the defence community thus is one from which it is difficult for them to depart. As a result, the way we frame problems and solutions remains within the bounds of the managerial governmentality and different mentalities are either subsumed within it or ignored.

10.5. Conclusion

In the title, I ask whether today we practice defence for *effect* or *affect* as I felt that, the constant drive to be objective suggested that one of the main differentiations between today’s conceptualisation and that of twenty years ago is that, we are no longer motivated by *affect* but rather by *effect*. However, the lack of questioning of norms and assertions even if, under scrutiny, they appear *illogical* under the managerial norms themselves, tells us that defence is and will always be about *affect*. We are wedded to a dominant narrative and way of thinking through the human need to belong and the fear of being shunned. Thus compliance to notions of and the belief in objectivity, efficiency, economy and effectiveness are simply a response of *affect* that fills in the concept of the *rational*. There is no fixed way of practicing defence correctly but rather it is subject to the culture of the era, expressed by each individual within the community and transmitted in each interaction between the members. In essence, it is an empty word, the meaning of which has to be filled in as we practice defence on a day-to-day basis and in negotiation with the identities of those around us. Thus, in response to the question – *for effect or affect?*—defence will always be about *affect* no matter how much value we place on *effect*. The implications this has for our national security and for the success, or otherwise, of expensive change agendas for defence are profound.

CHAPTER ELEVEN: REFLECTIVE CONCLUSIONS

11.1. Introduction

In this concluding Chapter, I begin by giving an example of the reach of the managerial narrative, citing my experience in a town on the front-line of our defence industry. Following this account, I look back on the nature of my research and what I have found to be the nature of *defence*. Bringing these together, I summarise the contribution to the knowledge that this research has made, moving on to identify the limitations of the research and opportunities for future investigation that it has opened up. Finally, I offer up some final thoughts.

11.2. ‘Barrow designed, Barrow built’

Only a few weeks before this thesis is due for submission, I find myself in Barrow-in-Furness, North West England. Just as if we had landed on an entirely different planet, never having left our hometowns, we head straight for the information leaflets, grabbing at any that look entertaining or useful. Moments later, we struggle down what I now know to be the main road through Barrow to find our lodgings— a huge corner building with ‘Wetherspoons’ emblazoned on its imposing facade, only 300 metres from the train stations entrance. Having spent almost four hours on the train planning our stay based on the assumption that Barrow will be empty on the weekend and there will not be much to do, I am intimidated to find that the pub we are staying in is teeming with people stopping by for a pre-dinner drink this Saturday afternoon. Thankful that the hotel entrance is separate from the pubs, desperate to avoid pushing our way through the throng laden with suitcases and laptop bags, we fall in to the reception area.

Once in our room, the usual exploration ritual begins: check the bathroom, assess the view, and sort through the materials left by the hotel staff. Among these is the ‘Barrow-in-Furness: Official Guide and Street Plan’. Opening its colourful pages, the words ‘Barrow designed, Barrow built’ bounce off a shiny photo of a submarine. Although it is an advert for BAE Systems who build the submarines, the phrase simply emanates a sense of pride, making me forget its commercial origins. Having provoked a good ten minutes of chatter between us, we eventually set it aside to get on with our evening.

Hours later, however, the ‘Barrow-in-Furness: Official Guide and Street Plan’ is spread over the sticky, beer stained table between us. After ten minutes of gawping as only a foreigner could at the huge photographs, paintings and diagrams, (some a century old) that cover the walls, we become obsessed with Barrow’s industrial history. Struggling to hear each other over the booming Barrovian revellers in the pub, we point dramatically at the different pages in the book, hoovering up any morsel of information about Barrow’s past and supplementing our knowledge with a few Google searches. It is hard to explain exactly what it is that causes so much excitement: it is the extensive displays of

information, the obvious pride in the Barrovian identity, and, contrary to London, the evident insularity of their way of life.

On Sunday morning at 7am, choosing to combine my usual morning run with a reconnaissance mission, I jog through the deserted streets of Barrow. Within five minutes, following the salty scent of sea air, I am confronted by two huge taupe corrugated iron buildings, proclaiming BAE Maritime System's presence in Barrow. On the side of the largest, not too far from the BAE logo, there is a sign that simply proclaims: Shipbuilders Love Barrow.

Having gotten through our morning rituals, my colleague and I set off for the Barrow Dock Museum. The museum is conveniently located on the waterfront, sharing a plot of land with BAE Systems recruitment centre; the first of a chain of BAE-owned buildings which dominate the Barrow waterfront. In the museum, we are reminded once more of the town's industrial past and present, with beautiful displays of detailed models of ships and submarines. Most interestingly, they are showing a series of short films about different aspects of Barrow's history, the most interesting of which is on the launches of locally built vessels. The video instructs the small audience on the importance of the docks and shipbuilding industry to local pride, showing stills and grainy videos of the whole town lining the waterfront to see the vessels off on their first voyage.

Less than twenty four hours in Barrow, I am intoxicated by the strength of the sense of what it means to be Barrovian— it appears to be all about the ship building, BAE, and the Navy's needs. It is clear that without all of these factors the Barrow that we encounter would not exist. It is at this moment that I realise that Barrow is everything that my past three years has not been: it encompasses the workers of the defence community instead of the decision-makers; it is the front-line of defence not the administrative, back-office that is Whitehall; its identity is based on pride associated with good engineering, honour associated with service and the traditional, historical explanation of defence rather than the modern, reforming managerial.

However, noticing signs of regeneration on the streets of the town, we begin to enquire into the administration's plans for the future. Paying closer attention to the guide book, I begin to notice that, although there is an unmistakable pride in their ship-building history and BAE forms part of it, Barrow has moved with the times. The entire regeneration plan, the adverts which cover the leaflets, and the words on billboards are aimed at a particular audience: private investors beyond BAE and their government customer. They speak of a long history in ship-building and engineering, champion civil commissions and promote the move they are making into the clean energy sector.

The sense of pride that is so apparent in Barrow, has nothing to do with defence. It is a pride in their hard-graft, their adaptability and their resilience. Barrow offers up no resistance to the managerialisation of defence. Instead it has adapted, focussing on the transferable skills it can offer any new industries—wind-farming

is the current choice. Thus, although their role in defence plays a part in its historical identity, Barrow has assimilated this into a managerialised identity which places greater emphasis on the skills they can offer in attracting investment.

11.3. The nature of the research

The aim of my research has been to understand the basis on which decisions are made in UK defence and the importance of narrative. For the latter, there has been an undeniable drive to privatise, outsource and minimise military involvement in defence matters—an approach which stands in stark contrast to that which dominated defence in the twentieth century. For many, this is simply a result of neo-liberal politics, but, through observation and document analysis, I have found that it is in fact a result of a deeper transformation in the mentality of the individuals that form the defence community, from the streets of Whitehall to the shipyards of Barrow. This transformation in identity and mentality is evident in the use and legitimisation of language and artefacts—the main source of evidence in my research.

The result of my three years of research has been a dense theoretical framework, an immersive methodology, and a rich pool of observations culminating in a two-tiered understanding of defence—of the role of power in forming identities and in informing and shaping defence—all of which unfolds over the preceding nine chapters.

In Part I, *Breaking-In*, I map the journey of my research and present my space. In Chapter One, *Introduction*, I gave an example (the participation of UK pilots in the US bombing campaign in Syria, July 2015) of the everyday stories which prompted me to do this research and explained the themes which come out of them: managerialism, the individual, practices, governance and relationships. From these themes came my primary research question: how is defence as a concept constructed, followed by three sub-questions to enable me to answer it. Then, I explained my theory and method and how they are intrinsically linked to the nature of my research questions.

In Chapter Two and Three, *Witnessing the New Defence I and II*, I presented my research space: the conferences which bring together the defence community on an annual basis. I began by explaining the implications of performances on identity and introducing the notion of change, a common theme in the defence discourse. The bulk of these Chapters is dedicated to reporting my observations, which I chose to do in the form of an account of a fictional conference (the Annual Defence Conference). Although the conference and the characters were fictional, the quotes and conversations I reported were not. By reporting my observations early on and in this format, I wanted to illustrate the way in which the use of language and performance can inform, not only the observer of the nature of the frames of reference of the performers, but also the discourse by reinforcing it.

In Part II, *Making Sense of Defence*, I set out in detail my theory and methodology. In Chapter Four, *Theoretical Framework*, I used Foucault's Panopticon metaphor to represent my framework, explaining how identity, performance and governmentality deploy power through the individual, group and narrative to proliferate and maintain a dominant narrative. In Chapter Five, *Methodology*, I explained and justified the use of my chosen method—observation—and the importance of my own participation in my research to the interpretation and presentation of my observations. In addition, I explained my use of document analysis and genealogy to support my conclusions. Finally, I delved into the importance of reporting for validity and credibility.

In Part III, *Affecting Efficiency*, I compiled the results of the extensive document analysis I carried out, presenting the narrative between the 1940s and today as gleaned from primary and secondary sources. In Chapter Six, *Disrupting Defence*, I looked to personal accounts as well as official documents to understand the traditional narrative that dominated and shaped the UK defence discourse between the 1940s and 1990s. Here I showed that the narrative was a result of its top-down institutionalisation and of the government's efforts to use language and artefacts to separate the military from the civilian, all the while maintaining its visibility and exclusivity. Making reference to the vocabulary used in those documents analysed, I then explained what the traditional narrative entailed.

In this same Chapter, I went on to explain how defence as a concept was disrupted by the strengthening of managerialism in the discourse. By analysing four pivotal documents published between 1997 and 2011, I demonstrated that, between 1996 and 1997 alone, there appears to have been a dramatic change of vocabulary, use of artefacts and frames of reference for interpreting the role of the armed forces, the budget, joint operations and procurement processes. In this section, I also explained the given justification for change, the resulting change management process and the subsequent managerialisation of the defence discourse.

In Chapter Seven, *For Queen and Country*, I focussed on the traditionalist counter-narrative which continues to exist in the defence discourse today. First I reviewed the work of my own department, DISP in RUSI, which identifies the tensions between the traditional and managerial narratives in the discourse and problematises it. I also sought out traditionalist literature from this century to present the traditionalist argument against the current approach to defence. The main argument is based on the notion that the managerial narrative is built upon unfounded assumptions and that it makes defence policy unsafe. The latter of these arguments refers to the inadvertent side-effect of risk management, whereby the attention to risk in training, for example, causes our forces to be underprepared in combat. Moreover, that the treatment of defence in the universalisable managerial tradition is resulting in the civilianisation of military affairs and the removal of *morality* as a component of defence.

Chapter Eight, *For Economy and Prosperity*, consists of a literature review of defence related documents published in 2015. Through an analysis of the

language and the response to these, or lack thereof, I demonstrated the strength of the managerial narrative in the discourse and its ability to either subsume aspects of the traditional where possible, or simply avoid their recognition. My analysis showed that, despite a call for issues such as threats, the negative side-effects of cuts, the parameters of intervention, and military perceptions to be addressed, government documents such as the Security Defence and Security Review (SDSR) simply fail to recognise these voices, choosing to focus on economic security which fall in line with the managerial narrative.

In Part IV, *Feeling the Effect*, I pulled together the themes that ran through my earlier chapters. In Chapter Nine, *The Corridors of Power*, I engaged with these themes with regard to the exercise of power in the community as represented by Foucault's metaphor of the Panopticon. I demonstrated what the defence identities of the individuals in the defence community are, how they are performed and how these add up to create a governmentality exclusive to defence. In this Chapter, I use some examples of attacks that occurred in Europe during 2015 which are of a traditional nature but still elicit a managerial response to show the strength and dominance of this explanatory narrative. I end this Chapter, with a sense of how this narrative can exert its power to change an individual—myself.

For Effect or Affect?, Chapter Ten, is my understanding of how this identity impacts the way that we explain defence. In this Chapter, I recalled some of the key pieces of evidence from my document analysis and observations to, first, understand how we explain defence today and, second, demonstrate that defence is an empty concept, which the defence community fill with meaning according to the dominant narrative of the time.

In this final, concluding Chapter, I look back over my thesis, including a summary of my conclusions and the limits of my research, as well as forward to the opportunities for future research.

11.4. The nature of *defence*

To answer the question *how is defence as a concept constructed in Britain in 2015?* required an understanding of the nature of defence today. In order to gain this, my first line of inquiry was into *how the concept of British defence has changed?* I had perceived that, between the 1990s and 2015, the way that defence is practiced had changed significantly. Thus, I carried out a review of primary and secondary sources to analyse the language used to explain defence in that time period (this evidence can be found in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight). My research led me to identify that defence in the period 1940s to 1996 was understood as being military-centric, with emotive and subjective concepts such as *pride*, *honour* and *victory*, at its heart. Apart from the use of language, this is evident in the reference to the army as almost synonymous with defence. Since 1997, on the other hand, defence has been managerialised. The vocabulary of today's official defence discourse is the strongest evidence for this, with

efficiency, effectiveness, economy, partnering and value for money being central to practice.

Having understood the history of the discourse and recognised that a change occurred in the 1990s, I then had to track the reconstitution of defence, answering the question: *what means and processes can be identified in the reconstitution and maintenance of this new explanation of defence?* This required, not only the analysis of written language, but also observation of defence in practice today and a robust theoretical framework to underpin these (to be found in Chapters Two, Three and Eight). These led me to the conclusion that it is the consistent use of managerial language, resulting from a managerial frame of reference for legitimisation, which maintains the dominance of the narrative. With the practice of defence and policy redirected towards a private sector model throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the final few years of the twentieth century witnessed the absorption of these in the British mentality of governance. As a result, the identities of those working in the defence community were managerialised, as was their use of language, artefacts and notion of what it means to do *good* defence.

Finally, bearing in mind the role of the individual, practices, governance and relationships in defence and the reconstitution process, I sought to understand why the conceptualisation of British defence changed. By combining what I had learned through document analysis about the justifications of change (Chapter Six) with theories of power, I came to the conclusion that *defence* is an empty term which is filled with meaning according to the dominant frames of reference of the era. As the traditional explanation of defence had been perceived as failing the UK's defence needs, the empty term was then filled with managerial meaning, with policy and practice following to fulfil the new criteria. In essence, the nature of defence is a question of the identities of the individuals and thus the group within the defence community.

11.5. Contributions to knowledge

In conducting this research, I have sought to make the following principal contributions to the existing academic literature:

- *A multifaceted theoretical framework*

The primary contribution I hope to make with my research is in the form of my theoretical framework (Chapter Four). The framework draws on the work of numerous philosophers and theoreticians— a construct I put together to ensure that, although remaining reflexive and aware of the subjectivity of my observations, my conclusions were anchored in a robust theoretical construct.

The framework is designed with the particular aims of my research in mind: to understand the frames of reference by which decisions are made in defence. Looking at statistics or sending out questionnaires would not have gained me the answers I needed, meaning that I had to use observation and participation to

collect information. However, this meant that I needed a theoretical framework to populate with the vast amounts of observations that I made throughout 2015, which would organise the evidence and enable me to place its relevance in the complex network that was the field of my research. In addition, having a well-founded theory to anchor my observations in was essential to the validity and credibility of my conclusions.

As in any community case study, when studying discourse there are a number of components which play their own, equally important roles. For me, these were identity, practice, mentality of governance and the exercise of power. Due to the number of elements and the complexity of including all these in a single theory, I was unable to find an existing comprehensive theory to direct my research. Nonetheless, I found that there existed influential works on each of these components individually.

Identity has been extensively researched, particular in respect to its formation, by sociologists, psychologists and philosophers. Although I explored various works, I particularly relied on Foucault's theory of identity formation through the practice of internal and external exclusions. (1988) These ensure that we learn to self-censor (internal exclusion) and legitimise the behaviour of others through our reactions (e.g. laughing or ignoring those comments which are without the legitimised narrative) (external exclusions), not only reinforcing our own identities but also informing those of others.

To incorporate practice into the framework, I looked to Butler's (2005) theory of performativity. Adding it to the framework allowed me to locate observations of the practice of defence within the construct. Performativity frames practice as a way of reinforcing identity through the repetition of legitimate practices. Every time the practice is repeated it is more widely accepted by the community and any lack of opposition ensures the performer repeats it in future. Performativity, therefore, is not only an enforcer of identity but also a vehicle through which the dominant narrative can proliferate; in essence, it is a way of educating others in the community.

Both identity and performance come together to inform a mentality of governance in the defence community. Governmentality, as Dean (2010) labelled it, refers to the way in which a group shares a mentality by which it agrees to legitimately be governed. Therefore, it is not a matter of imposed authority, but rather of an unconscious choice, putting power in the hands and actions of the many.

Power was the final component that I needed to incorporate into my framework. The literature on power is extensive; however, much of it depicts power as a conscious act by an individual or small group over others. As I needed a conceptualisation of power which recognised the role of the individual, practices and mentality of governance, I could only use Lukes' (2005) third dimension of power: collective and unconscious. His theory essentially recognises that influence is at its strongest when we individuals unconsciously and collectively

use our actions and practices to teach or put unconscious pressure on others to conform to our legitimate mentality of governance. I combined this conceptualisation of power with Foucault's (1979) theory of totalisation whereby the narrative which is enforced through the unconscious and collective exercise of power, encases the discourse to form a limiting frame of reference (or regime of truth) by which the discourse is understood.

By bringing these works together to create a three-pillared framework exemplified by the Panopticon, I hope my theoretical framework can contribute to an alternative way of framing the pillars which constitute a community—identity, practice and mentality of governance—and the exercise of power that runs through it, evident in the relationships between the pillars. The framework is therefore not exclusive to my topic of research. It can be applied in any community as it is a lens through which to understand the construction of a culture. However, application of this framework requires an interpretative approach to research and an understanding of the implications of the researchers role and participation in the research to the conclusions drawn.

- *The growing use of the ethnographic approach*

Qualitative methods of research remain a subject of debate in social sciences, as many argue that conclusions drawn from these vary in credibility and validity. The debate is a result of a continuing mentality which inherently relates *good* scientific research to those methods employed by researchers in the natural sciences (i.e. positivist methods of research which tend to be quantitative in nature), and *good* data as that which is presented in quantifiable measures. This approach has limited the legitimate use of qualitative methods to the deployment of questionnaires and structured interviews which are perceived as producing data which can be *objectively* analysed. However, there is a growing body of qualitative research which legitimises the use of purely interpretative qualitative methodologies such as the ethnographic approach (Basham, 2009b; Louth, 2009; Twort, 2015). With observation and participation having been my main methods of enquiry, I have sought to add to this body of work.

By recognising as legitimate methods and subjects of research our own abilities to subjectively interpret our observations and participation as researchers, we implicitly accept the changing nature of social relations as well as the lack of fixity today's *truth* holds. In doing so, we are better placed to understand that which drives social relations and to represent it, contrary to popular belief, with more accuracy; as social scientists, we are only able to witness that which *has been* or *is* according to our own frames of reference, always accepting that that which *will be* is changeable. If we want to influence the future, I feel we must recognise that social relations, institutions and conventions are and will be influenced by the actions of individuals and, as a result, the dominant narrative of the collective. Thus, recognising what drives these through observation and participation holds a great deal of value in the literature, without diminishing the

value of other forms of research. In essence, it is yet another source of information which contributes to our understanding of the social world.

- *The relevance of theory*

Here theory is not meant to refer to the abstract philosophical frameworks which guide research, but rather to the specific theories which govern practice in practical situations. Today there is a perceptible desire to ensure that all research is *practical*. Funders of research want researchers to produce documents which can be translated directly into practice; they want to know exactly how policy should be formulated, what are the optimal management structures, or which is the cheapest and most effective way to train soldiers. There is, however, a limited desire and available funding to understand what it is that makes us think that *this way* is better than *that way*. To my mind, allowing the gap to grow between the amount of research into practical and theoretical aspects of society, to the extent that existing theoretical research becomes out-dated, poses a danger in that, where we have stopped questioning theory, we have stopped valuing creativity and innovation *outside* of the bounds of that which has been *proven* and thus stopped seeking to improve.

With my research, I hope to add to the literature which promotes the understanding of that which we call *legitimate*, including within the field of research methods, to question its validity and ensure that practice is being led and underpinned by comprehensive (insofar as is possible) theoretical understanding.

11.6. Implications

The implications of this research are not specific to defence as one of the main 'benefits' of managerialism is its ability to be universally applicable. This belief has led to, particularly in the UK, the public sector undergoing further managerialisation, sustaining and proliferating the belief in its inherent value. Therefore, just as in defence where we are witnessing an inability to tackle those threats that we are faced with due to the inability of the managerial narrative to respond to the nature of these, other traditionally public sector departments which have been established to provide crucial services, also appear to be suffering.

Managerialism and its curbing of innovation, creativity and stunting of the ability to respond flexibly, does not permit a space for the nuances of each sector—be it health, education, housing or transport—to form part of the decision-making process. Thus, we are experiencing a deterioration in the provision of services, regardless of whether they are provided by the private or public sector as both appear to apply the same principles.

In addition, for those other nations who look to the UK as an example in building their public sectors and informing their administrative culture, this research should provide food for thought. Without a doubt, the provision of platforms such as conferences for the voicing of different opinions and the inclusion of different voices in the decision-making process is not within and of itself a negative.

However, it is the meaning that the dominant managerial narrative attributes to these (i.e. the conference as a self-legitimising space and the limiting of external voices to those who can speak ‘management’) and its inability to interface and learn from different ideas which is the cause for concern.

11.7. Limitations of the research and opportunities for the future

Although my position has been unique and my role at RUSI has provided me access that many would not have, due to time and space constraints I have had to limit my *field* to the decision-making community, gauging how and why it is that in these circles the managerial narrative is so dominant. Similarly, I consider the twelve month time-frame a limitation.

Nevertheless, the constraints on time, space and access to different parts of the defence community limited my research in terms of refusing me the conditions to produce a *comprehensive* report on the defence discourse. However, such an endeavour, would require continuous observation of different aspects of the community (e.g. industry management, MoD civil service, management of the services, front-line manufacturing, armed forces, trade negotiators, etc.); a huge task. Each component of the defence community, nonetheless, offers up opportunities for future research, employing this same methodology.

In the first year of my PhD, it became clear that I would need to place boundaries in terms of time to my space of research as I found it impossible and detrimental to my findings to limit the types of people I might speak to or documents I might analyse as they are all evidence of the discourse. However, there were concepts and lines of enquiry which I had to set aside due to the restrictions on space and to preserve a coherent line of enquiry. Below, I give a few examples:

- The role of *trust* in the unconscious collective complicity to maintain the dominant managerial narrative in the defence discourse;
- The changing nature of boundaries in *legal jurisdictions* as a result of the managerialisation of the defence discourse;
- A focus on the impact of the discourse on the development and retention of skills in the UK defence industry;
- The impact of the discourse on the treatment of reserve and regular armed forces on operation as well as at home.

11.7. Final thoughts

The basic, human desire to live in a community, to work together, will ensure forevermore that one will look to the other for approval and reassurance. This is true for those in *powerful* positions as it is for those who are considered to be of no *influence* at all. Consequently, both these individuals are tied to one another as their positions in the community are, in their own minds, reliant on the others recognition and willingness to accept their membership.

The endless relationships of power which result from our need for reassurance mean that whenever we *do* anything we are simultaneously complying to that which we believe others will approve of, as well as demonstrating to others who look to us what is *right*. We are, in essence, setting precedent. Therefore, those daily routines we live by, that we consider simply time-fillers between *interesting* and *momentous* occasions in our lives, must be recognised for what they are: the foundations of every big decision we are impacted by and momentous occasion we look forward to.

For this reason, we must never abandon awareness of our actions and how they fit into wider society, and always seek to understand what it is that drives us. In doing so, we will be better placed to ensure that the next time we send our troops on operation they will be better prepared, when we are faced with a new threat we can respond appropriately and, when we are offered billions of pounds for the sale of a core defence industry, we understand the long-term, societal impact our decisions could have on individuals and communities alike.

Finally, my role in this community is not neutral. Whether it is my permissions, or ignorance as citizen, which allows defence operations to unfold, I am now better placed to understand and report on the multiple discourses of defence. This is a prize worth having, but with it comes responsibility which my future work will try to execute.

APPENDIX 1: Annual Defence Conference Programme 2015

0800 Registration

0830 Opening Address

- Sir Roy

0900 Session 1: Why is defence important? Tackling the threat environment

- Ms. De Chirico, Director of a large European management consultancy firm

- Mr. Tanguy, Consultant for a small, specialised management consultancy firm

- Mr. Masson, Foreign head of military strategy

1030 Morning Coffee

1100 Session 2: What do we do?

- General Arp

- Dr. Carrington, Senior Lecturer in Accountancy

- Mr. Duchamp, CEO of a public body

1230 Lunch

1330 Session 3: The role of technology in UK defence

- Dr. Matta, Lecturer in Business Management

- Dr. Delvaux, Senior Researcher at an international research institute specialising in security studies

- Prof. Oppenheim, Senior Military Educator

1500 Afternoon Coffee

1530 Session 4: Future considerations

- Mr. Tanning, Head of a multi-national company

- Dr. Picabia, Senior Lecturer in Management Studies

1700 Closing remarks

- Secretary of State for Defence

1745 Closing reception

1930 VIP Dinner

APPENDIX 2: List of Informants, Annual Defence Conference 2015

Dalí, Professor

Professor Dalí is a career academic. He has dedicated his life to researching defence management, particularly in regards to managing the education of the armed forces. Today he holds an authoritative post within academia, and is a globally respected Professor, often being asked to lecture abroad on his expertise. His post, however, as those of many other academics, has become a matter of management. Although many academics are fighting this, Professor Dalí is of the firm belief that private sector management models make for better education as well as a better run military. Thus, despite his never having been a military man nor a private sector employee, he is able to communicate well with industry and understand private sector practices; a skill he is proud of.

Ernst, Retired Air- Marshall

Retd. Air- Marshall Ernst had a career in the armed forces spanning over two decades. Having worked his way up the ranks, his career ended when he retired from the post of human resources manager. Today, he works as a consultant for a private company abroad, providing advice to foreign governments on managing change. Despite his having spent his entire adult and working life in the military, his post as Human Resources manager has prepared him well for the private sector, with his already being accustomed to the vocabulary and terms of management which a consultancy requires.

Giacometti, Ms

Ms Giacometti is an employee of RUSI and, thus, a colleague of mine. However, she has worked at the Institute for almost a decade, circulating within the defence community for many more years. She has an unquestioning regard for process and structure and does not take kindly to any infringement of these, considering appearances to be where respect is gained. Therefore, despite her role as a researcher, she does not have patience for questioning that goes beyond the scope of the practical, seeking only to influence policy and improve effect.

Kahlo, Mr

Mr Kahlo is also a former military man, with over forty years experience in the Royal Navy. Today, he works in the private sector. As appears to be the pattern, expertise carried over from former military personnel into the private sector tends to take the form more of a critique of the management of the forces and less the form of a recognition of the needs of the military in traditional terms. Thus, Mr

Kahlo is quick to criticise the military and the MoD for their lack of management, advocating instead the private sector style of management. He is, in fact, adamant that the MoD must look towards the private sector to improve its practices and minimise its own participation.

Magritte, Professor

Professor Magritte came late to academia. His employment history has nothing to do with defence or the military thus his perspective is that of an outsider. However, although he criticises the MoD for their lack of reference to more traditional perspectives, he is also aware that if he wishes to be an influential member of academia in his chosen field, his official publications must remain within the managerial frame of reference. Thus, despite the fact that he often speaks freely to me, his publications are tempered versions of his opinions, alluding only to the MoD's lack of ability to adhere to good management structures largely due to a lack of communication, rather than critiquing the managerialist approach as a whole.

Miró, Right Honourable Lord

Lord Miró is an outspoken man who has never been in the military, worked for the MoD nor in academia. He is a career politician. He is a well-respected man who is attended to as a senior member of the defence community who—and this is my impression alone—attends events as a hobby. Lord Miró is happy to express his opinions loudly, with the care-free attitude of someone who knows that very few will listen. And this would be right. People are often quick to admit they enjoy his company, but will do so indicating through their vocabulary, body language and context in which they are willing to talk about him (i.e. never at the podium or in a workshop) that his conversation is merely a bit of fun. Therefore, regardless of his passion for the subject of identity and traditionalism, his ideas do not filter into the realm of decision-making.

Picasso, Mr

Mr Picasso worked for the House of Commons Defence Committee before transferring into one of the Ministries to work as a civil servant. The move was made out of disillusionment as, although he has a passion for defence and would prefer to work within the community, he found that the Committee did not foster nor respect his defence expertise. Instead, Committee staff are encouraged to improve generalist skills which can be used regardless of which Committee they work for. In addition, he felt that, although many of the Committee members were interested in defence, the nature of membership of the Committee as a secondary responsibility to that of Member of Parliament prohibited them from having much

impact. As a result, he felt his own impact was restricted further. Nevertheless, despite appearing to be quite a traditionalist, Mr Picasso is always uncomfortable asserting that his opinions matter if they do not adhere to the processes and structures that are in place. Thus, he is a traditionalist at heart but a managerialist employee and does not see any tension in between these postures.

APPENDIX 3: Sample Participant Consent Form



PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM

Title of Research Project: *Assessing the impact of the managerial narrative on British defence*

Brief Description of Research Project, and What Participation Involves:

Project details:

Today government publications and the discourse surrounding UK defence are significantly different to that before the mid-1990s. Rather than speaking of defence in terms of military, it has now become a matter of budgets, efficiency, economy, effectiveness, frameworks, assessments, projects, programmes and countless other management terms. In essence, the discourse has gone from being inseparable from that of the military to being almost completely demilitarised. It is this shift- how it occurred and what its impact has been- which is the focus of this research.

Information for Participants:

The participant is one of thirty participants in this research, all members of the defence community (academics, politicians, military personnel, industrialists, and media). The researcher will conduct the interviews at a time and public place convenient to both the participant and researcher. Prior to the interview, both the researchers' supervisors will be informed of the details of the meeting. Interviews should last between 1 hour and 1.5 hours. The interviews are unstructured and will not be recorded as the researcher is carrying out an ethnography thus all information gathered during interviews will be explicitly presented as filtered through the observation and participation of the researcher in the discussion. However, consent is requested for the researcher to take notes.

Additionally, where he/she has been in attendance at all/any of the following conferences, the participant consents to the researcher taking notes of observations of the participants contributions (if applicable) during these:

- RUSI Land Warfare Conference
- RUSI Chief of the Air Staff Air Power Conference
- RUSI Defence Acquisitions Conference.

Participants have the right to withdraw their contributions without giving a reason at any time. However, once the results have been written up it may no longer be possible to do so. To do so, the participant must contact the researcher (contact details given below), and any notes taken specifically pertaining to the relevant discussion will be destroyed. However, any information used in an aggregate form may still be used.

If the participant has any concerns regarding any of the above information or other matters concerning the interview, he/she must contact the researcher.

Finally, were the participant to experience and emotional discomfort as a result of the interview, which can sometimes arise from recalling distressing events, he/she can contact their GP and/or one of the following organisations:

Samaritans:

Helpline 08457 90 90 90
Email jo@samaritans.org
Address Samaritans
Freepost RSRB-KKBY-CYJK
Chris, PO Box 90 90, Stirling FK8 2SA

Mind:

Helpline 0300 123 3393
Email contact@mind.org.uk
Address Mind
15-19 Broadway,
Stratford, London E15 4BQ

PTSD Resolution:

Helpline 0845 021 7873
Email contact@ptsdresolution.org
Address Meadow Cottage, Poundfield Road
Chalvington, Sussex BN27 3TH

Investigator Contact Details:

Name	Gabriela Thompson
Department	Business School
University address	Erasmus House, Roehampton Lane, London,
Postcode	SW15 5PU
Email	thomsog@roehampton.ac.uk
Telephone	07564131979

Consent Statement:

I agree to take part in this research, and am aware that I am free to withdraw at any point without giving a reason, although if I do so I understand that my data might still be used in a collated form. I understand that the information I provide will be treated in confidence by the investigator and that my identity will be protected in the publication of any findings, and that data will be collected and processed in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and with the University's Data Protection Policy.

Name

Signature

Date

Please note: if you have a concern about any aspect of your participation or any other queries please raise this with the investigator (or if the researcher is a student you can also contact the Director of Studies.) However, if you would like to contact an independent party please contact the Head of Department.

Director of Studies Contact Details:

Name Professor Rebecca Boden
University Address (as above)
Email Rebecca.Boden@roehampton.ac.uk
sharon.mavin@roehampton.ac.uk
Telephone +44 (0)208 392 3620

Head of Department Contact Details:

Name Professor Sharon Mavin
University Address (as above)
Email
Telephone +44 (0) 20 8392 3440

APPENDIX 4: Sample Organisation Consent Form



PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS CONSENT FORM

Title of Research Project: *Assessing the impact of the managerial narrative on British defence*

Brief Description of Research Project, and What Participation Involves:

Project details:

Today government publications and the discourse surrounding UK defence are significantly different to that before the mid-1990s. Rather than speaking of defence in terms of military, it has now become a matter of budgets, efficiency, economy, effectiveness, frameworks, assessments, projects, programmes and countless other management terms. In essence, the discourse has gone from being inseparable from that of the military to being almost completely demilitarised. It is this shift- how it occurred and what its impact has been- which is the focus of this research.

Information for organisations:

The participating organisation agree to allow the researcher to observe proceedings during the..... Conference. The researcher will be collecting data on the form, structure and nature of proceedings during the event as part of an ethnographic study. As the researcher is carrying out an ethnography, all information gathered will be explicitly presented as filtered through the observation and participation of the researcher in the discussion in the final document.

Participating organisations have the right to withdraw their contributions without giving a reason at any time. However, once the results have been written-up, it may no longer be possible to do so. To do so, the organisation must contact the researcher (contact details given below), and any notes taken specifically pertaining to the relevant discussion will be destroyed. However, any information used in an aggregate form may still be used.

If the participating organisation has any concerns regarding any of the above information or other matters concerning the interview, he/she must contact the researcher.

Finally, were the individuals involved to experience any emotional discomfort as a result of their participation, which can sometimes arise from recalling distressing events, they can contact their GP and/or one of the following organisations:

Samaritans:

Helpline 08457 90 90 90
Email jo@samaritans.org
Address Samaritans
Freepost RSRB-KKBY-CYJK
Chris, PO Box 90 90, Stirling FK8 2SA

Mind:

Helpline 0300 123 3393
Email contact@mind.org.uk
Address Mind
15-19 Broadway,
Stratford, London E15 4BQ

PTSD Resolution:

Helpline 0845 021 7873
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Investigator Contact Details:

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Postcode	SW15 5PU
Email	thomsog@roehampton.ac.uk
Telephone	07564131979

Consent Statement:

I agree to take part in this research, and am aware that I am free to withdraw at any point without giving a reason, although if I do so I understand that my data might still be used in a collated form. I understand that the information I provide will be treated in confidence by the investigator and that my identity will be protected in the publication of any findings, and that data will be collected and processed in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and with the University's Data Protection Policy.

On Behalf Of

Signature

Date

Please note: if you have a concern about any aspect of your participation or any other queries please raise this with the investigator (or if the researcher is a student you can also contact the Director of Studies.) However, if you would like to contact an independent party please contact the Head of Department.

Director of Studies Contact Details:

Name Professor Rebecca Boden
University Address (as above)
Email Rebecca.Boden@roehampton.ac.uk
sharon.mavin@roehampton.ac.uk
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