

**Understanding effectiveness in peacekeeping operations:  
Exploring the perspectives of frontline peacekeepers**

Ellen Furnari

National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies

University of Otago

Dunedin, New Zealand

March, 2014

## Abstract

This project explores the experiences of frontline peacekeepers in order to understand a ground level view of effective peacekeeping. This thesis is influenced by critical peace studies and uses constructivist grounded theory as research theory and method. The research leads to modest theorising based on what those interviewed perceived as crucial elements of effective peacekeeping and how these insights might contribute to improving or re-visioning peacekeeping. Thus I include both problematizing and problem-solving in what is, I believe, a productive tension. In this thesis peacekeeping refers to organised action by third parties to prevent violence, protect civilians, and support local problem-solving by controlling or influencing belligerents and/or their proxies as well as local people, a definition constructed from this research and the literature. In existing research on peacekeeping, the opinions of frontline peacekeeping soldiers, police and civilians have rarely been considered in analysis of the effectiveness of a mission nor when theorising how peacekeeping works. My research reflects an assumption that there are differences in how effective peacekeeping is understood from the different perspectives and standpoints of elite or high level peacekeepers and academics who study peacekeeping and those of frontline peacekeepers. I assume there is value and important knowledge in the experience and perspectives of ground level peacekeepers which can contribute to the discussion of effective peacekeeping generally and a more emancipatory peacekeeping specifically. Utilising the above definition of peacekeeping, themes addressed here include how peacekeeping works on the ground to prevent violence, protect people and support local problem-solving through coercive and cooperative practices, with a particular focus on the importance of acceptance, local ownership and good relationships. In the eyes of peacekeepers, good relationships that are task oriented, cooperative and trusting are critical in peacekeeping. This thesis reflects my valuing nonviolent paths for addressing social and political conflicts, and my intention to make a contribution to more effective peacekeeping, oriented to increasing peace in conflict affected communities and countries.

## Acknowledgements

This thesis reflects the support and input from many people. I owe a great deal to my supervisors and am grateful for their guidance and support. Dr. Heather Devere provided guidance on research methods, content, and the process of being a PhD student. She was patient with my twists and turns, providing caring and consistent support, encouragement and suggestions for how to keep going. Dr. Kevin Clements generously contributed ideas, direction for exploration in the literature, and useful challenges to my analysis. Many others at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies gave feedback and encouragement, for which I am thankful. My deep gratitude goes to the many former peacekeepers who took the time to talk with me and share their perspectives. Without their insights, intelligence, commitment and generosity with their time, this thesis would not have been possible. Most importantly my family was supportive, encouraging, patient, tolerant of periods of time when I was hardly available, and great cheerleaders to just keep swimming.

## Table of contents

<b>Abstract.....</b>	<b>i</b>
<b>Acknowledgements .....</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>Table of contents .....</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>List of tables.....</b>	<b>vii</b>
<b>Abbreviations .....</b>	<b>viii</b>
<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>1</b>
Thesis focus .....	1
Theoretical framework.....	5
Research methodology.....	12
Outline of the thesis structure .....	15
Conclusion .....	17
<b>Chapter One Setting the context: History, critique and definitions .....</b>	<b>19</b>
History of peacekeeping.....	19
History of nonviolent and unarmed civilian peacekeeping.....	20
History of military peacekeeping.....	22
A brief review of critiques of traditional narratives on peacekeeping history, purpose and processes .....	29
Definitions.....	31
Peace .....	31
Peacekeeping.....	34
Conclusion .....	39
<b>Chapter Two Research methodology, themes and theorising: Frontline peacekeepers perceptions of effective peacekeeping .....</b>	<b>40</b>
Research methodology and process .....	40
Constructivist grounded theory.....	40
Interview participants.....	43
Research process.....	46
Effective peacekeeping themes and theorising .....	51
What is peacekeeping .....	52
Organisational effectiveness .....	54
Legitimacy and acceptance .....	55
Preventing violence.....	57
Protecting people .....	58
Making space for local ownership and problem-solving.....	58

Relationships are central to effective peacekeeping .....	60
UN peacekeeping faces challenges .....	63
Limits to peacekeeping .....	65
How peacekeepers know they are being effective .....	67
Effective peacekeeping - theorising robust relationship peacekeeping .....	70
Conclusion .....	72
<b>Chapter Three Peacekeeping and peacekeeping institutions.....</b>	<b>75</b>
Peacekeepers' understanding of peacekeeping .....	75
Effective peacekeeping organisations .....	78
Decision making .....	79
Organisational learning .....	81
Operational issues – budgets and deployment .....	83
Leadership .....	85
National representation, multicultural work teams and training.....	86
Other organisational issues .....	91
Who does peacekeeping? .....	91
UN or other organisations .....	91
Military, police or civilian peacekeepers .....	92
Conclusion .....	97
<b>Chapter Four Legitimacy, acceptance and peacekeeping principles.....</b>	<b>99</b>
International legitimacy .....	99
Principles of peacekeeping, legitimacy and acceptance .....	103
Unbiased, impartial and nonpartisan.....	104
Consent .....	108
Use of force.....	112
Undermining Acceptance.....	115
Expectations and acceptance.....	115
Peacekeepers behaviour and cultural stereotypes .....	117
Imposition of solutions and cultural sensitivity .....	120
Conclusion .....	123
<b>Chapter Five Effective peacekeeping prevents violence and protects people .....</b>	<b>124</b>
Peacekeeping activities .....	125
Preventing violence.....	127
Protecting civilians.....	132
How peacekeeping works .....	139

High functioning organisations.....	142
Context.....	142
Legitimacy and acceptance.....	143
Information gathering, analysing and communication.....	144
Increase the costs of violence and increase the benefits of maintaining peace.....	147
Negotiation and diplomacy.....	151
Use of force.....	153
Make space for local actors.....	157
Comparison of existing theories and research findings.....	159
Conclusion.....	162
<b>Chapter Six Effective peacekeeping makes space and promotes local ownership... 164</b>	
Activities.....	164
Local ownership and making space.....	165
Local ownership and community problem-solving.....	165
Making space.....	169
Sustainable peace and local ownership.....	172
Discussion of research findings related to local ownership.....	173
Critique of peacekeeping and local ownership.....	174
Lack of implementation.....	174
Culturally inappropriate.....	176
Critique of liberal peace.....	179
Is the liberal peace agenda working?.....	179
Does the liberal peace agenda undermine local ownership?.....	181
Conclusion.....	184
<b>Chapter Seven Differences and similarities between categories of peacekeepers... 186</b>	
Different motivation, training, length of service and organisation.....	186
Motivation and the path to becoming a peacekeeper.....	186
Training.....	190
Length of service.....	193
Different peacekeeping organisations.....	195
Differences in global standpoints and gender.....	199
Differences between global north and south standpoints.....	199
Differences by gender.....	202
Different perceptions of effective peacekeeping.....	204
Different perceptions of peacekeeping.....	204

Different perceptions of effective peacekeeping .....	205
Differences in understanding the use of force and nonviolence .....	207
Differences in purposes and doctrines .....	207
Differences in mandates.....	210
Differences in understanding the use of force and nonviolence .....	211
Conclusion .....	217
<b>Chapter Eight Relationships in peacekeeping.....</b>	<b>220</b>
Relationships prevent violence, protect people and support local problem-solving ...	220
Relationships in peacekeeping literature .....	227
Peacekeeping and relationship theories .....	229
Peacekeeping and Trust .....	236
Peacekeeping and social capital .....	236
Bonding and bridging social capital .....	239
Trust and shared interests.....	241
Trust and confidence.....	243
Trust is complicated.....	245
Theorising good relationships.....	246
Envisioning fundamental robust relationship peacekeeping.....	248
Conclusion .....	252
<b>Conclusion .....</b>	<b>255</b>
Contributions to the field .....	256
Summary of key themes.....	258
Theorising effective peacekeeping .....	260
Envisioning an evolution of peacekeeping .....	261
Further research .....	262
Concluding the conclusion.....	264
<b>Appendix A Research Participants .....</b>	<b>265</b>
<b>Appendix B Semi- structured interview questions .....</b>	<b>267</b>
<b>Appendix C Participant Information Sheet .....</b>	<b>268</b>
<b>Appendix D Armed Peacekeeping vs. Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping .....</b>	<b>272</b>
<b>References.....</b>	<b>273</b>

List of tables

<b>Table 1 Characteristics of the participants .....</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>Table 2 Theories of peacekeeping.....</b>	<b>140</b>



## Abbreviations

AU African Union

APC Armoured Personnel Carrier

DDR Disarm Demobilise Reintegrate

DDRRR Disarm Demobilise Repatriate Reintegrate Resettlement

DoD Department of Defence

DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

IED Improvised Explosive Device

EU European Union

FPU Formed Police Unit

INGO International Non-governmental Organisation

IOM International Organisation for Migration

LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam

MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo  
or Mission de l'Organisation de Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo  
(changed to MONUSCO or Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la  
Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo United Nations Organization  
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2010)

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NGO Non-governmental Organisation

NP Nonviolent Peaceforce

OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)

P5 Permanent Five Members of the UN Security Council ( China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States)

PBI Peace Brigades International

PCCs Police Contributing Countries

R2P Responsibility to Protect

SG Secretary General of the United Nations

TCCs Troop Contributing Countries

UCP Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping

UN United Nations

UN DPKO United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund (previously the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund)

UNPOL United Nations Police

## **Introduction**

This chapter introduces the background and focus of this thesis, both personal and academic. I then situate this focus in relationship to a theoretical framework which is most broadly constructivist and influenced by critical peace studies and standpoint and world view theories. This is followed by an initial introduction to constructivist grounded theory research theory and method generally and my research specifically. This introduction concludes with an outline of the structure of the thesis and the contents of the remaining chapters.

### **Thesis focus**

The focus of this thesis – exploring frontline peacekeepers’ understanding of effective peacekeeping, how this is different from or similar to other perspectives and what it might imply for effective peacekeeping interventions – emerged from several strands of interest. I had become interested in how people learn from their work through an association with the Centre for Reflective Community Practice at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, beginning in 2001.<sup>1</sup> It seemed to me that the knowledge people have from doing particular activities such as working to decrease violence, is important and rarely captured. I was deeply moved by Michael Polanyi’s phrase “we know more than we can tell” (Polanyi, 1962, p. 1). To me, this implies something about knowledge we carry without having converted it into words or that cannot be converted into words (Polanyi uses the example of knowing how to ride a bicycle). I also interpret it in a more general sense that a collective ‘we’ who care about nonviolence, social justice and the like, know more than we have articulated, in particular that there is knowledge at the front lines of struggle which is not more widely known. And this knowledge is critical to building a more peaceful, just, and sustainable world. I was able to develop these interests further during my association with the Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) in Sri Lanka in the years between 2003 and 2008. Among my tasks was working with field staff (unarmed civilian peacekeepers), to articulate their learning as it was developing in the field.<sup>2</sup> This led to a heightened interest in the capability of nonviolent interventions to

---

<sup>1</sup> Though no longer in existence some material from the Center can be found at <http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/16165>.

<sup>2</sup> See Furnari (2006) and Furnari (2010) for articles based on my work with the Nonviolent Peaceforce.

protect people and support social change, as well as in the contradictions between the expectations that funders and other international organisations had of unarmed civilian peacekeeping, with the impact field staff thought possible from their work. Given NP's commitment to nonviolence, I also began thinking about the use of force in other peacekeeping practices, which I will call armed or military peacekeeping.<sup>3</sup> I became increasingly curious about perceptions of peacekeeping effectiveness.<sup>4</sup> Brigg and Bleiker suggest that research be organised around a puzzle or major concern of our times (Brigg, 2010, p. 792). My puzzle or concern was (and is) how to strengthen peace oriented interventions by third parties into armed conflict within communities, regions and nations, in ways that protect people and support local ownership of change processes, and in ways that might be more emancipatory. I was sure that those who did the work would have important perspectives and insight, different from those developed from higher up the hierarchy of organisation or within academia. In other words, I was interested in theorising about effective peacekeeping from the bottom up, rather than top down. Fundamentally I wanted to undertake a project that would demonstrate the superiority of unarmed, civilian peacekeeping, though this is not the result that emerged from my research.

Reading the literature, I found that there is a gap in that the views of frontline peacekeepers were largely missing in relevant research and theorising. Some researchers have interviewed high level military and senior level civilians within missions and the hosting organisation, others have interviewed senior staff involved in police peacekeeping, many have interviewed people from international nongovernmental organisations working alongside peacekeeping missions, and a few have interviewed staff who worked in unarmed civilian peacekeeping.<sup>5</sup> There is some research that includes interviews of frontline, lower level military peacekeepers related to constructions of

---

<sup>3</sup> I define these terms in Chapter one, suffice it to say here that I refer to peacekeeping undertaken by the UN or other multilateral organisations, as armed or military peacekeeping.

<sup>4</sup> See Fortna (2008a, pp. 4-5) for a statement of the question, does peacekeeping work.

<sup>5</sup> For examples of research (all referenced later in this thesis) that includes interviews with high level military and high level civilian mission staff see Fortna (2008), Howard (2008), Durch (2006b), Schondorf (2011). For examples of research that includes interviews primarily with high level civilians and local people see Pouligny (2006), Talentino (2007), Higate and Henry (2009b), Zanotti (2011). Research which includes material from interviews with high level staff related to police peacekeeping see Greener (2009b), and Peake (2011). See Mahony and Eguren (1997), and Wallace (2010) as examples of literature including interviews with civilian peacekeepers.

effectiveness, though of those I read, only Last (1995) used these interviews to directly address his construction of how peacekeeping works.<sup>6</sup>

My research addresses this gap in two ways. Firstly, I interviewed former peacekeepers who were primarily low ranking or low in an organisational hierarchy.<sup>7</sup> Secondly I included a broad range of roles in my interviews. Former peacekeepers interviewed include people who worked as military, police, civilians and unarmed civilian peacekeepers.<sup>8</sup> This research starts to capture and construct how peacekeepers active in the everyday work of peacekeeping, primarily in communities (where most contemporary peacekeeping takes place), reflect on their experiences and develop explanations for what they understood was effective. It is intended to bring the knowledge and perspectives of a broad range of those who do the work, into the theorising about how peacekeeping works at the ground level. I presume that actions and the making of meaning at the ground or community level is different from that at high levels of organisations and missions. This thesis does not however, generally address the differences in perceptions and meanings between that shared by peacekeepers interviewed in this research with the views of local people in hosting communities, which is reported in the literature (Higate & Henry, 2009a; Pouligny, 2006). This is another gap, and is beyond the scope of this project.

I initially included all four roles of military, police, civilians and unarmed civilian peacekeepers to highlight their differences. While there are significant differences, which I will discuss throughout the thesis and in particular in Chapter Seven, what was unexpectedly more salient to me was the striking similarities in their actual tasks and in what they understood to be effective peacekeeping despite their different experiences, use of force and contexts. Through this research which includes diverse voices in these four

---

<sup>6</sup> As examples see Kramer (2007) for research on complexity and Dutch military peacekeeping, and Goldsmith (2009) and McLeod (2009) for research on challenges faced by Australian police peacekeepers. I am excluding here the body of research that interviews frontline peacekeepers regarding their motivation, psychological issues, and other related issues, which will be mentioned later in Chapter seven.

<sup>7</sup> See Appendix A for information on interviews. My interviews included former peacekeepers who at the time of the interview were a general, a brigadier general, a lieutenant colonel and a colonel. Only one functioned in that rank when working as a peacekeeper, and he was also the only one who was the head of his military mission.

<sup>8</sup> Military peacekeepers were active members of their country's army, navy or airforce; police were civilians employed as police in their home country; civilians were employed by the UN, EU or NATO in non-military positions; unarmed civilian peacekeepers were employed by small International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs) working to protect people and prevent violence using nonviolent strategies and tactics.

roles, I identified a further gap in the literature, which is the centrality of good relationships for effective peacekeeping as identified by peacekeepers.<sup>9</sup> Relationships as both a critical aspect of the context in which peacekeeping takes place and a vehicle of effective peacekeeping receives little attention in the literature on armed peacekeeping. The literature on unarmed civilian peacekeeping discusses the importance of relationships but not with the same emphasis that peacekeepers themselves did.<sup>10</sup>

As I grounded myself more fully in understanding the implications of critical peace studies, the primary influence in my theoretical framework, I came to see that my intention to contribute to improved peacekeeping was in tension with critiques of the underlying rationale and impact of such interventions. Not surprisingly, given my life primarily lived within a global north<sup>11</sup> or western culture, influenced by mainstream western media, I tended to assume that peacekeeping itself was good and just needed reforms, significant reforms perhaps, but not a major reconceptualization. From a critical studies perspective, I was focused on problem-solving rather than problematizing. Through the process of this research and reading the literature, I have come to accept the uneasy tension or strain of embracing critiques of peacekeeping interventions which imply a need for radical changes, while simultaneously envisioning improved peacekeeping, some of which could occur within current systems and some not.

This thesis thus includes constructing and theorising an understanding of how peacekeepers I interviewed understood effective peacekeeping, related to the literature on peacekeeping specifically and the critical studies analysis of peacebuilding more generally. I generated analysis and theorising, in relationship with interview data, using constructivist grounded theory to develop emergent themes and understanding and finding sensitising concepts in the literature and interviews that warranted further attention. I fabricated (in the sense of fabricating sculpture with found objects) a vision of a different kind of robust peacekeeping, which I share in Chapter Eight. This is not however, a definitive prescription for change, but a reflection of what I constructed from

---

<sup>9</sup> See Chapter eight for a focused discussion of relationships in peacekeeping

<sup>10</sup> Though this may be changing as Schweitzer used similar language in personal communication February 2013.

<sup>11</sup> Throughout this thesis I primarily use the phrase ‘global north’ and ‘global south’ to distinguish between parts of the world others might call western and non-western, developed and developing, first and third world. See Santos, Nunes and Meneses (2007) for discussion of these terms and the implied epistemologies.

the interviews. It is meant to instigate further thinking. Similar to others (Gelot & Soderbaum, 2012; Mac Ginty, 2011; Merlingen, 2005; Stamnes, 2010), this work combines critical analysis with limited problem-solving. Thus I moved away from my initial formulation of developing analysis regarding the appropriate use of peacekeeping in terms of strategic objectives, practices and evaluation. Nonetheless I offer this work with the intention of contributing to the expansion of practices which work with conflict nonviolently.

The central focus of my inquiry remained exploring how frontline peacekeepers, from military, police, civilian and unarmed civilian peacekeeping roles, understand effective peacekeeping, based on their own experiences in the field. This led me to asking questions related to what they understood peacekeeping to be, what activities they engaged in, and what they found to be effective toward the purpose of their mission as they understood it.<sup>12</sup> The frequent mention of preventing violence, protecting people, supporting local people to solve their own problems (local ownership) and the centrality of good relationships for effective peacekeeping, led me to focus on these as the primary themes. Relationships were frequently mentioned so I asked further questions about what characterised good relationships, how these are built and maintained, and the challenges to relationships. While my initial impetus had to do with wanting to ‘prove’ that nonviolent peacekeeping was superior, not only did this fail to materialise, but I came to see it was incompatible with my framework and both simplistic and dualistic. The issue of armed and unarmed peacekeeping and the use of force and coercion became primarily a subset of concerns that peacekeepers articulated about the importance of relationships in peacekeeping.

### **Theoretical framework**

This thesis is framed by a number of theoretical perspectives, as well as my own underlying beliefs and values. In this discussion, I envision a framework which if I could draw or take a photograph would look like a dwelling fabricated from found materials – cardboard from here and a piece of metal from there. In other words, this is a framework that draws on several disciplines and theories, including work from fields such as international relations, sociology, anthropology, human geography, social psychology and disciplines such as critical peace and critical security studies. At the broadest or most

---

<sup>12</sup> See Appendix B for a further description of interview questions.

basic level, this work is done within a constructivist social science approach, in contrast to what might be called naturalist, positivist or traditional science (Downes, 2000; Moses & Knutsen, 2007, pp. 144-148; Williams, 2001). While there is not a singular constructivism (Steele, 2007; Williams, 2007), there are shared fundamental commitments (Jackson, 2009). Constructivism implies an ontology that assumes that what can be known about our social world is constructed through the process of observing and theorising, influenced by the observer and the process of observing or interacting with this world. Both standpoint theory (Harding, 2004; Stoetzler & Yuval-Davis, 2002) and world view theory (Docherty, 2001) can be understood as constructivist analysis of research. Both consider as central the influence that a researcher's social status, gender, education, ethnicity and other relevant life experiences have on the questions posed and methods used in research, whose knowledge is considered valuable, and what meaning is constructed through research interactions. This meaning is not arbitrary, but developed inter-subjectively (Guzzini, 2000), in the interactions between people and with the worlds in which we live. In opposition to a positivist or traditional science ontology, constructivism understands meaning as dependent on conditions and in flux, so eschews claims of objective, foundational truth, which is waiting to be discovered through a neutral, impersonal process. Constructivism also addresses the relationship between power and knowledge, recognising that there is power in deciding what can be known and whose knowing and methods of knowing are privileged (Smith, 1997).

The implications for this research project are many. Most importantly, I assume there is no singular, neutral, objectively knowable successful or effective peacekeeping. In contrast with much of the literature on effective peacekeeping which is based on statistical analysis and mixed methods and which claims or implies objectivity and neutrality, I assume that what is understood to be success or effective peacekeeping is created through various processes, and varies according to who is doing the constructing and for what purpose and when. It also suggests that numerous concepts discussed in peacekeeping literature such as impartiality, legitimacy, or protection to name just a few, become alive through social processes and connote different meanings to different people. I understand the themes and explanations of effective peacekeeping which I offer in this thesis to have developed through my interaction with the literature and inter-subjectively, between myself and the peacekeepers I interviewed as they reflected on their experiences guided by my questions and in the context of research interviews (Charmaz, 2006).



These themes are influenced by my standpoints, and this research was carried out because of a deep interest in finding ways for international third parties to intervene effectively in violent conflicts.

This thesis is influenced by the emerging field of critical peace studies (Mac Ginty, 2010) critical peace research (Jutila, Pehkonen, & Väyrynen, 2008; Patomäki, 2001) and critical security studies (Collective, 2006). Just as there is no singular definition of critical security studies (Collective, 2006; Shepherd, 2013a), a field which seems to have influenced critical peace studies, I do not believe there is a singular definition of critical peace studies or critical peace research. Based in an orientation and commitment to critique the underlying assumptions of peace oriented interventions the fields draw on several streams of theory variously labelled the Frankfurt school, post modernism and post structuralism (see George and Campbell, 1990 for a general review), and on specific authors such as Cox ( for example Stamnes, 2010) and/or Foucault ( for example Zanotti, 2011) for concepts which inform their critiques.<sup>13</sup> What I understand to be the shared basis of critical peace studies, and in particular that body of work which directly relates to this thesis is the commitment to critique or problematize the purpose of peace oriented interventions (including peace-making, peacekeeping and peacebuilding), and the impact of these interventions on the political processes in the host country as well as on the everyday lives of local people. These concerns result in critiques of the liberal peace agenda (see Chapter One for discussion) which generally underlies current peace interventions in terms of who is served, whose agendas and interests are promoted, the success of such interventions to establish functioning democracies and stable economies, the impact on local cultures and social structures, and the impacts on the safety and well-being of local people.

As stated, some authors in critical peace studies tend to draw on Cox's work ( for example R. W. Cox, 1994) which distinguishes between problem-solving and critical theory, often referred to as problem-solving and problematizing in the literature. Problematizing addresses underlying structures and purposes, questioning the basis of current practices rather than focusing on problem-solving to improve them. Themes within critical peace studies and of particular relevance to this thesis include both the macro level political critique of the assumed neo imperialist or neo colonial aspect of

---

<sup>13</sup> Authors such as Zanotti, whom I characterize as included in critical peace studies, might not categorize themselves in this way, reflecting the unclear boundaries.

peace interventions, as well as the critique of the impact of these interventions at the local level. These concerns, as they relate to peacekeeping and impact peacekeepers' understanding of effective peacekeeping, will be explored in detail in coming chapters (in particular see Chapter Six).

Much of the literature on the effectiveness of peacekeeping is written from a realist and/or liberal perspective, assuming the appropriateness of multilateral interventions to prevent violence and promote democratic liberal peace or the liberal peace agenda (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Durch, 2006c; Fortna, 2008a; Howard, 2008; Last, 1997; Pushkina, 2006; Sartre, 2011). This literature addresses questions such as whether peacekeeping is successful at preventing a return to war, how or why it is successful, and how to improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping, with little questioning of the underlying rationales for interventions nor the liberal peace agenda which shapes most of current interventions. This literature primarily reflects the analysis of academics and high level military or multilateral organisational staff. Some of the literature on peace interventions is primarily critical of peacekeeping, though seeming to stop short of critiquing the underlying geopolitics of international interventions, and is mostly focused on the perceptions of and adverse impacts on local people (Aoi, Coning, & Thakur, 2007; Pouligny, 2006). As noted above, critical peace studies literature of particular relevance here, focuses on peacebuilding, (reflecting the subsuming of peacekeeping as one component of peacebuilding more broadly), and problematizes both the purpose and processes of international peacebuilding interventions (see Fetherston, 2000 and Pugh, 2003, 2004 as exceptions which specifically address peacekeeping). One section of this literature is primarily theoretical and focuses on the ways in which peacebuilding interventions can be understood to be an imposition of western powers, imperialistic, neo colonial, and/or an extension of bio-political control and governmentality (Cunliffe, 2012; Darby, 2009b; Jabri, 2010; Lidén, Mac Ginty, & Richmond, 2009; Olsson, 2008; Richmond, 2007, 2009b, 2010; Zanotti, 2011). There are interesting parallels between these critiques and the perspectives of some of the peacekeepers I interviewed, which I explore in some detail in Chapter Six.

Some of the critical literature (I refer here to both critical peace and critical security studies) is based on case studies and the knowledge of local people, and here the focus is primarily on the problematic impact of peace interventions on people in the host communities, how it affects their experiences of security, issues of governance, changes

the political landscape, and leads to hybrid political and economic practices, institutions, and structures. This literature to some degree also explores how the peacebuilding aspects of interventions might better serve local people (Higate & Henry, 2009a; Mac Ginty, 2011; Pugh, Cooper, & Turner, 2008; Richmond & Franks, 2009; Shepherd, 2013b; Stamnes, 2004; Talentino, 2007; Zanotti, 2011). This literature is primarily focused on critiquing liberal peace, the broad array included in current peacebuilding interventions and practices, the focus on state security rather than community or individual security, and the equating of domestic security in global north countries with imposing a version of liberal peace. Thus it rarely addresses peacekeeping itself nor how to improve this component, that is, how to increase the effectiveness of preventing violence and protecting of people as distinct from other aspects of the liberal peace agenda.<sup>14</sup> Nor does it explore the potential within a more limited peacekeeping, to support a more locally rooted and more agonistically oriented peace.

My work, influenced by this diverse body of work and the critique of current peacebuilding practices, and more broadly the liberal peace agenda, is primarily focused on bringing the knowledge of peacekeepers into the discussion for the purpose of improving peacekeeping to better serve local people in their need for ending armed conflicts, protection from violence and sufficient safety to pursue longer term social change to address underlying issues. In this sense I include both problem-solving and problematizing in this thesis. In line with the critical literature, I share a concern with the experience of peacekeeping at the local level where it is enacted, rather than the international or national level (Booth, 2005a; Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond, 2009b), the agency of local people and peacekeepers themselves (Darby, 2009b; Mitchell, 2011; Richmond, 2009b) and with the impact of peacekeeping on local ownership of change processes (Mac Ginty, 2011; Merlingen, 2005; Peterson, 2010; Richmond, 2008; Richmond & Franks, 2009; Zanotti, 2011). In other words, I understand peacekeeping as involving day to day work in communities affected by conflict.

Peacekeepers interviewed for this research discussed developing relationships and interacting with local people from many social sectors and directly experienced the impact of local actors in their work to prevent violence and protect people, which led them to focus on influencing local people toward nonviolent conflict and local problem-

---

<sup>14</sup> Merlingen (2005) and Stamnes (2010) are outstanding exceptions that combine critique and problem-solving, with focused recommendations for improvement of peacekeeping or peacebuilding interventions.

solving. They also directly experienced the conflicts, dilemmas and challenges created by what some peacekeepers reported perceiving as imposing solutions which might not be accepted by local people, nor fully or partially applicable to local contexts. As will be seen in coming chapters, in discussion of the empirical data of the research interviews I pay particular attention to these sensitizing concepts of everyday experience and local actors, local action and local ownership, while attending to the contested understanding or definition of 'local' (B. Charbonneau, 2012; Mac Ginty, 2008; Richmond, 2009a). I use these concepts and the research data to not only critique, but also to envision more effective peacekeeping, which many would see (as mentioned above) as moving beyond problematizing and into problem-solving. This move creates a certain tension in the work, which I acknowledge. I believe it is a productive tension.

My analysis is also influenced by some of the concerns about the creation of knowledge expressed in nonrepresentational theory and human geography, adult learning, and critical peace studies (to name a few). I share an analysis of peacekeeping as an everyday, embodied experience which is the basis of peacekeepers' knowledge, viewing this knowledge as both rational and non-rational or intuitive, based on lived and embodied experiences mediated by the various other aspects of peacekeepers' own life experience such as ethnicity and gender (Anderson & Harrison, 2010; Heshusius, 1994; Higate & Henry, 2009a; Merlingen, 2005; Merriam & Kim, 2008; Mitchell, 2011; Stoetzler & Yuval-Davis, 2002). I share the concern that ground level, local or practitioner knowledge is valuable and contains an expertise that is often silenced or ignored (Darby, 2009a; Mac Ginty, 2011; Nicholls, 2011; Pouligny, 2006). Kramer (2007) points to the particular situation within the military of a tendency for higher officers to disdain or disrespect the perspectives of those with no or low rank, and I assume this contributes to the absence of frontline peacekeeper knowledge in the literature.

I also embrace the concern expressed in critical security and critical peace studies with the emancipatory potential which may be immanent in or able to be developed within peacekeeping interventions (Booth, 1991; Peterson, 2012; Pieterse, 1992; Richmond, 2010; Stamnes, 2004; Wyn Jones, 2005). By emancipatory, I mean not only an increased potential for individual people to lead the lives they chose with increased freedom from oppression, but also at a community or society level, an increase in tolerance and agonistic political processes (or nonviolent conflict) (Peterson, 2009;

Shinko, 2008), wide political participation, and equality more broadly.<sup>15</sup> As many of the authors referenced above suggest, emancipation is not an end state, but sets a vision from which we can consider the potential of specific practices to be more emancipatory. Related work rejects the view that peace interventions are totalising, recognising that while there is an imposition of agendas, policies and practices, there is also local resistance, contradictory movements, and that each intervention has its own particular nuances (Mac Ginty, 2011; Pugh, 2012; Zanotti, 2010, 2011), all of which create possibilities or potential openings for this emancipatory potential to be enacted.

I add a focus on relationships, which receives more attention in the conflict transformation literature (Francis, 2010; Lederach, 2005) and the civilian peacekeeping literature (Mahony, 2006; Mahony & Nash, 2012; Schweitzer, 2010).<sup>16</sup> Because most peacekeepers work in the community interacting with local people, relationships, as I will discuss throughout this thesis, are an important aspect of effective peacekeeping in the view of peacekeepers. And while the liberal literature understands legitimacy to come from appropriate international authorisations (Durch, 2006a), and the critical literature questions the legitimacy of interventions given the agendas of these international institutions (Lidén et al., 2009), in line with the focus on local agency and the everyday, I explore how peacekeepers understand and discuss acceptance, rather than legitimacy, in their relational, everyday experience.

To recap, this thesis is influenced by critical peace studies, while embracing related concerns from other theoretical frameworks. I share the normative values expressed in critical peace studies for nonviolence, decreased militarization of peace interventions, support for local ownership of processes to address the underlying causes of conflict and to actualise more emancipatory potential through social change, as well as valuing local, ground level knowledge. My work reflects concerns with the local, everyday experience of peacekeepers in the communities where they work, and where they experience themselves as effective or ineffective at decreasing violence and increasing local ownership. I use these values and sensitising concepts to analyse the

---

<sup>15</sup> While these may be thought of as liberal values, it does not require adherence to the vision embedded in the liberal democratic peace agenda as currently practiced, in order to enact them.

<sup>16</sup> Though Mahony does not use the phrase civilian peacekeeping and would likely characterize his work as addressing how civilians in the UN and other INGOs can provide protection to local people generally and human rights defenders more specifically, I include his work as it is applicable to unarmed civilian peacekeeping as a particular subset of his broader field.

interview data and critique current peacekeeping practices and conclude the thesis with envisioning a potential, more emancipatory evolution of peacekeeping.

### **Research methodology**

In accordance with the broad constructivist approach to understanding social interactions, and influenced by the need to expand critical peace research methodology (Juttila et al., 2008), I used constructivist grounded theory in my research. As Clarke (2005) notes, grounded theory is both a theoretical and methodological framework (see Chapter Two for more on the specific use of grounded theory methods). Charmez (2006), usually credited as the initial developer of constructivist grounded theory (Mills, Bonner, & Francis, 2006), states that while the original formulations of grounded theory focused on finding objective reality, constructivist grounded theory recognises that meaning is created by the researcher in interaction with and in response to the people she interviews, published material and other data sources. Rather than assuming there is a singular truth, meaning is fabricated through iterative reflection and inter-subjective interactions.

Other aspects of constructivist grounded theory important to this project include the assumption that as meaning is developed based on the interactions between the researcher and the researched, it is not appropriate to start with a hypothesis to investigate, but rather to begin with an inquiry into an area of interest (Mills et al., 2006). This meant I started without a specific hypothesis or definitions of key concepts such as effectiveness or peacekeeping. The meaning of effective peacekeeping I use here developed through my interactions with peacekeepers and the literature, as well as my own previous experiences and values, and is reflected in the definitions articulated in Chapter One. Given these assumptions, that this material reflects my own values, standpoint and experiences, as well as those of the people I interviewed, I focus on the meaning peacekeepers constructed from their experiences. I did not try to confirm the truth of their experiences from some outside, other source but focused on listening deeply and bringing to the surface my own assumptions as I reflected on interviews.<sup>17</sup> This is in contrast to “theory driven empirical investigation” (Hoglund & Oberg, 2011, p. 4) or “value-free social-science testing” (Diehl, 2009, p. 533) frameworks that would have guided me to develop a testable hypothesis, and then discover whether it was true,

---

<sup>17</sup> See Chapter Two for a detailed description of the research methodology and process.

partially true or false. I do not claim to have found an objective truth but to have brought to the surface themes and concepts useful to understanding effective peacekeeping at the ground level, and that, I believe, bear further investigation. This is both a strength and limitation of this research.

Situated within constructivist grounded theory, I also recognise that while the material from the interviews is empirical data, it is contingent on the particular moments I interviewed people, and the standpoints or worldviews we brought to those interviews. Meaning is understood to be in flux, our understanding always limited by the particulars of our worldview (or as Docherty, 2001 says, our world viewing). In many ways this is freeing. Rather than trying to freeze experience to find one true meaning, I was able to reflect and shift my understandings over time, without trying to adhere to a pre-determined framework. My analysis evolved as I read, interviewed, reflected, and discussed in iterative loops. In this framework Clarke (2005, p. 28) suggests there is no validity in grand, all encompassing theories, given the ever changing, contested understandings of social experiences. Rather we need "...grounded theorizing through the development of sensitising concepts and integrated analytics."

My analysis of the interviews is situated within these assumptions. I recognise that my research rests on interviews with specific people, in a particular context and moment. The themes I developed were grounded in the research interviews, and influenced by the voices of previous researchers in the literature, and the innumerable conversations I have had over the years about peacekeeping, nonviolence and the specific experiences in Sri Lanka. I also understand that the meaning of this project is re-created in relationship with the reader. As this thesis is read, the readers bring their own standpoints, experiences, and meanings. Thus I have included significant data, in the form of quotes from interviews,<sup>18</sup> so that readers have some access to this critical material in their own process of constructing meaning.

As previously stated this thesis is focused on understanding effectiveness as experienced at the community level where peacekeepers work and through their insights. This contrasts with much of the research based literature on effective peacekeeping, which attempts to explain or prove why peacekeeping succeeds, fails, or has partial

---

<sup>18</sup> Recognising that I have made the choice of which quotes to include.

success or failure, through universal or generalizable factors and based on a particular set of macro level variables.<sup>19</sup> My focus is not on determining the fundamental success or failure of a specific peacekeeping mission, but on expanding the understanding of how peacekeeping works at the ground level and how third parties can effectively intervene in conflict affected communities, in relationship with local actors. The achievement of effective peacekeeping is related to many different elements in various systems, these elements are dynamic and changing, and different standpoints will perceive what is effective differently. Therefore, the choice of qualitative research, and in particular constructivist grounded theory is a good fit for this project. I believe it contributes to the broadening and deepening of peace research both in terms of methodology and the focus on the everyday experiences of ground level peacekeepers.

This thesis contributes to the understanding of how peacekeeping works from many different peacekeepers' perspectives. As Fortna notes, within the literature that discusses peacekeeping success, there are few attempts to explain how it works (2008a, pp. 2-3). There appear to be even fewer who are interested in the everyday work peacekeepers perform in the field (Higate & Henry, 2009b, p. 1). As already noted above, Last (1997) is one of the few who appears to include the perspectives of frontline military peacekeepers in his theorising. As constructivist grounded theory suggests, there are many perspectives and no singular, objective explanation or set of variables. Whose definitions of effective peacekeeping, perspectives on what peacekeepers do and why, and who defines the outcomes will have much influence on how peacekeeping is understood to work. There may, however, be patterns we can identify that may be useful, while recognising it is also in flux (Snowden, 2005).

In addition to the epistemological limitations to this study already mentioned, there is a significant limitation based on whose perceptions are included. As Fortna points out (2008a, p. 3), there has been insufficient attention to the perspectives of people in the receiving country, regarding how peacekeeping works.<sup>20</sup> In her analysis, she is referring

---

<sup>19</sup> See Fortna and Howard (2008) for a summary of literature, with a particular focus on quantitative explanations for why peacekeeping works. See also Pushkina (2006), Kreps (2010) and Martin-Brule (2012) for more qualitative approaches, and Hegre et al (2010) for a more recent summary of the quantitative literature. Mvukiyeh and Samii (2010b) and Levin (2013) examine the impact and success of peacekeeping at the local level.

<sup>20</sup> See work by Taylor, Mvukiyeh and Samii for examples of research on the perceptions of local people and belligerents on the impact of UN peacekeeping (E. N. Mvukiyeh & Samii, 2010a; Samii, 2007; Taylor, Mvukiyeh, & Samii, 2006).



to the views of belligerents, but the same has been said about excluding the views of civilians (Poulligny, 2006). This thesis includes material from a small sample of former frontline peacekeepers, while other perspectives and knowledge are brought in only through the literature reviewed. I do not address the gap of how local people understand peace interventions nor the discrepancy between peacekeepers' and local people's perceptions and understanding. This also limits the power of this research to generalise or theorise about peacekeeping more broadly.

In summary, this thesis is influenced by critical peace studies, and based on research undertaken with constructivist grounded theory as articulated by Charmaz (2006) and Clarke (2005). The thesis is ultimately constructed by me, a white, middle class woman raised in the United States of America, immersed in a culture that privileges traditional scientific based knowledge systems that can express findings through mathematical analysis. It undoubtedly reflects the tensions of my own effort to move more fully into the consciously embraced constructivist and critical frameworks. The thesis is influenced by my values including a commitment to nonviolence and non-harming, and my lived experience working in the US on the intersections of race, poverty and violence and in Sri Lanka with unarmed civilian peacekeeping. And it reflects my assumptions that people who do a particular kind of job, have important perspectives on how and why things work the way they do, as well as my endless curiosity about what people learn from their work.

### **Outline of the thesis structure**

Following this introduction, Chapter One begins the process of bringing the worlds of unarmed civilian peacekeeping (referred to as UCP) and armed peacekeeping (defined in Chapter One) together, through a brief narration of their respective recent histories constructed from different standpoints. This is followed by a critique of the traditional narration of that history. The final section of Chapter One reviews the contested definitions of peace and peacekeeping, offering definitions of peacekeeping that will be used in this thesis.

Chapter Two introduces the research itself, with an explanation of the methodology used and descriptions of the people interviewed. Here the experiences of all four peacekeeping types – military, police, civilian and unarmed civilian peacekeepers, begin to emerge. The next section offers summaries of the themes which I fabricated from

the interviews and which I use in my theorising. This chapter concludes with some initial brief theorising on how peacekeepers understand peacekeeping.

The next six chapters (Chapters Three, Four, Five, Six, Seven and Eight) bring together the literature, the interview data and my theorising on each of the themes described in Chapter Two. Given how each of the themes relates to others, I chose to weave together the literature with my research and analysis by theme. It seems more coherent this way and avoids a great deal of repetition. This means however, that there will not be a separate literature review as is found in many theses. As previously stated, each chapter includes significant interview data in order to both substantiate my analysis, but importantly so the reader can also more fully participate in co-creating meaning (Mills et al., 2006, p. 7). These chapters primarily discuss peacekeepers as if their perspectives were similar. While acknowledging differences along the way, the main exploration of differences occurs in Chapter 7. This reflects my perspective (and surprise) that the similarities in many themes were more salient to me than the differences.

Chapter Three goes more deeply into an exploration of how peacekeepers understand peacekeeping and its purposes. The next sections discuss the importance of peacekeeping organisations for effective peacekeeping and examine issues such as decision making, leadership, training, and who is employed to do peacekeeping.

Chapter Four discusses legitimacy and acceptance in peacekeeping. Legitimacy is often referred to as a judgment or conferred status, while acceptance can be understood as a relational experience. While peacekeepers talk about acceptance, the literature mostly discusses legitimacy. The first sections of Chapter Four review issues related to legitimacy and peacekeeping. These include the authorisation of missions and what are considered to be the original principles of unbiased, consent and minimal use of force for self-protection only. I then move on to a discussion of acceptance as understood by peacekeepers, some of the barriers to acceptance, as well as highlighting how acceptance and relationships are related in the field.

Chapter Five focuses on two of the three main purposes of peacekeeping identified by peacekeepers – preventing violence and protecting people. The chapter begins with a review of the literature on whether peacekeeping prevents violence and protects people, with a view toward how success is defined and whose voices are included in the literature. I then discuss theories of how peacekeeping is understood to

prevent violence and protect people, including an exploration of the centrality of relationships. This leads to a discussion of the current focus on the increasing use of force, often termed robust peacekeeping in the literature, and how peacekeepers themselves talk about the use of force.

Chapter Six reviews the third purpose of peacekeeping identified by peacekeepers, which is local ownership or local problem-solving. I review the literature and discuss how peacekeepers understand local ownership to be affected by legitimacy and acceptance, good relationships and cultural appropriateness, among key issues. Given the critiques shared by peacekeepers and how they understood local ownership to be related to sustainability, the next section reviews the literature which critiques liberal peace and current multilateral peacekeeping missions focused on what it means for local ownership.

Chapter Seven breaks the pattern of primarily focusing on the commonalities between the different categories of peacekeepers, with a discussion of the differences among peacekeepers. The chapter discusses the differences between armed and unarmed civilian peacekeepers in terms of their motivation, training, organisations, work and understandings of nonviolence and the use of force. Other sections discuss differences by length of service, global north/south backgrounds, various identities, and by gender. While avoiding generalising, these differences have implications for constructing effective peacekeeping.

Chapter Eight is an in depth examination of and theorising about the centrality of relationships as described by peacekeepers. As there is sparse commentary and analysis of relationships in peacekeeping literature, I then relate the explanations peacekeepers provided of good relationships to some literature on relationships, social capital and trust. The literature used here was selected as it provided particularly useful sensitising concepts. The last sections share my analysis and theorising on peacekeeping, with a particular focus on robust relationships.

The thesis closes with a conclusion which summarises and highlights what I consider to be the main contributions and themes of the thesis.

## **Conclusion**

In summary, this thesis explores the views of frontline peacekeepers from different roles, in their understanding of effective peacekeeping. Critical peace studies is

the primary influence in this theoretical framework, though I draw on many theories and disciplines in my analysis. I used constructivist grounded theory as the research methodology. This thesis addresses gaps in the literature of both the rarity of frontline peacekeeper views, and including the diverse perspectives of military, police, civilian and unarmed civilian peacekeepers. It addresses a gap that emerged through the research, the perceived centrality of good relationships for effective peacekeeping. Frontline peacekeepers are rarely discussed as having perspectives, agency, or individuality. In works on the effectiveness of peacekeeping or on the perceptions of peacekeepers by those in the community, they are mainly described as a unitary peacekeeping force.<sup>21</sup> In adding the perspectives and knowledge of peacekeepers to the discussion of peacekeeping, I also disaggregate peacekeepers into individuals, while at the same time drawing some generalised conclusions. Weaving together the literature, interview data and my analysis, the thesis presents a contribution to the many efforts underway to construct a more peaceful and equitable world.

---

<sup>21</sup> Though a few, such as Higate and Henry (2009a), look at differences, such as how peacekeepers from different countries are perceived.

## **Chapter One Setting the context: History, critique and definitions**

The introduction provided the rationale for this thesis and described the basic theoretical and research framework. This chapter provides the background historical context from a traditional and critical perspective, and the definitions of peace and peacekeeping I use. I briefly discuss the history of civilian and military peacekeeping, focused on the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries. This is followed by a brief review of critical peace and related critical studies' critiques of this historical and explanatory narrative. The chapter concludes with a review and discussion of the ways in which peace and peacekeeping are understood and provides definitions. The next chapter continues to set the context with a discussion of my research methodology and a brief summary of themes developed from the interviews.

### **History of peacekeeping**

This chapter reviews the history of two strands of peacekeeping. These histories are primarily narrated in the literature as if they are objective truths, rather than constructed perspectives of events. One strand, which developed from nonviolent activist traditions, employs unarmed civilians and is carried out by relatively small international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). The other strand of peacekeeping is traditionally described in the neo realist and neo liberal traditions<sup>1</sup> as growing out of international, multinational diplomatic efforts to end or prevent wars. This strand employs military personnel, increasingly police and other civilians, and is carried out by the United Nations (UN) and other multi-lateral organisations. While these strands developed for the most part along parallel paths, civilian and armed peacekeeping have both increased dramatically since the end of the Cold War.

Peacekeeping, in the sense of third party interventions to prevent violence, has a long history. As Schirch (2006) points out, people have wanted to do something to prevent armed conflicts, wars, and genocide for a long time. But often there is a sense of powerlessness and confusion about whether anything can be done. She reminds us that

---

<sup>1</sup> According to Jackson (2009) within the academic discipline of international relations neo-realism sees an anarchic international field in which states must act for their own benefit thus creating endless security dilemmas. Neo-liberalism posits that this anarchy can logically be best resolved through cooperation and recognized interdependence.

there are ancient and indigenous traditions of peacekeeping, where non-combatants, people in communities stand between fighters or warriors and stop the fighting (Schirch, 2006, p. 17). Situating peacekeeping as a modern or western invention, the history of unarmed civilian peacekeeping (UCP) narrated in the literature reviewed below is focused on nonviolent movements that began in Europe (though influenced by Gandhi and his followers), and that of international military peacekeeping focuses on efforts begun by the UN. In the main, these histories do not acknowledge that there are other long standing traditions, as Schirch points out, of preventing war and war-like violence, through the intervention of third parties.

### History of nonviolent and unarmed civilian peacekeeping

According to Thomas Weber (2000), some of the earliest modern European efforts to use outsiders to interrupt violence can be found within the nonviolent traditions. Weber chronicles the history of what he terms third party nonviolent intervention across borders, beginning with Maude Royden's call for a peace army in 1931 (Weber 2002 p. 17-19).<sup>2</sup> Her vision, later joined with those of other visionaries, was a call for men and women to place themselves between combatants, making it necessary to kill unarmed civilians in order to pursue war, with the expectation this would prevent fighting. This practice is now called unarmed inter-positioning (Weber 2000 p. 20), and envisions third parties as creating a buffer between fighting factions. This original vision and call was refined and repeated by various Europeans in the next few years, but silenced by the circumstances leading up to World War II. The vision resurfaced in several places in the 1950's.

In India, Mahatma Gandhi was killed during the time he was creating a Shanti Sena or peace army, to try to interrupt the fighting that had broken out between Hindus and Muslims after independence. One of his students, Vinoba Bhave succeeded in establishing the Shanti Sena in the mid 1950's. The Shanti Sena worked not only as peacekeepers but also included work that would now be called humanitarian and peacebuilding (Weber 2000 p. 22). Eventually the European and Indian streams joined and began several new attempts at creating unarmed civilian peacekeeping (UCP) efforts. A proposal for a peace guard was made to the UN in 1960, suggesting the creation of an unarmed guard that would intervene between fighting parties. Their legitimacy, it was

---

<sup>2</sup> The following history is taken from Weber's chapter unless otherwise noted.

assumed, would come from UN members' previous agreements. Weber finds no evidence that this proposal was ever given serious consideration by UN members.

Unlike military peacekeeping initiated by the United Nations, which was undertaken with little theoretical basis (Durch, 2006b; Feldman, 2010), the use of unarmed civilians for peacekeeping received careful analysis before being launched. Because nonviolent or unarmed intervention is carried out by small international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and runs counter to widespread assumptions about the efficacy and necessity of force, many questions were raised about how it could work, and when and where (Weber, 2000, p. 27). This on-going theorising about the potential for unarmed intervention kept the ideas and vision alive and led eventually to the founding of the World Peace Brigade in 1961. Committed to demonstrating the potential effectiveness of this form of nonviolent intervention, three projects were undertaken by various groupings within the World Peace Brigade, though none was deemed to be successful, and the organisation dissolved (Weber 2000 p. 30).

Throughout the 1960's and 1970's nonviolent activists continued to work for what has come to be called unarmed civilian peacekeeping (see definition section below) (Wallis, 2009). Reflecting an analysis that people on different sides of a conflict will not agree on what constitute a just war, the overarching perceived need to do least harm, and a long term history of nonviolence as a useful response to conflicts, people continued to work on developing nonviolent alternatives to military peacekeeping (Wallace, 2010). After numerous attempts at forming various organisations, the first durable international organisation devoted to civilian peacekeeping, Peace Brigades International (PBI), was formed in 1981 and began work in Guatemala in 1983 (Mahony, 2000). As Mahony, one of the early staff of PBI narrates, this marked a turning point as PBI has undertaken civilian peacekeeping continuously since this time, fielding missions of various durations in nine different countries.<sup>3</sup>

During the 1990's and into the current century, peace teams of civilian peacekeepers were formed by various organisations to expand work in Central America and work in Haiti, Mexico, South America and the Balkans (Bekkering, 2000; Griffin-

---

<sup>3</sup> These include Balkans, Canada, Columbia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Indonesia, Mexico, Nepal, and Sri Lanka (Peace Brigades International, 2013).

Nolan, 2000; Schirch, 2006; Schweitzer, 2009). The Nonviolent Peaceforce was founded in 2002 and began their first mission in Sri Lanka in 2003 (Schweitzer, 2010).

There are numerous examples of civilians preventing violence through their organised presence or accompaniment with individuals and communities under threat. Civilian peacekeepers<sup>4</sup> have operated in areas considered post-conflict and in areas in the midst of conflicts. They have provided protection, monitoring, witnesses, coordination with other peace related actors, and shared their views with a wider world to influence media coverage and governmental actions. The literature which narrates this history is written by people who appear committed to nonviolence, many of whom have participated in nonviolent interventions. It seems to share an intention of promoting the visibility of nonviolent peacekeeping and its effectiveness, and is primarily historical and descriptive.<sup>5</sup> Literature on peacekeeping undertaken by the UN or other multilateral organisations does not usually include consideration of unarmed civilian peacekeeping, a gap I address in this thesis.

### History of military peacekeeping

The historical review of modern peacekeeping usually begins with the development of peacekeeping by military and police under the auspices of the UN and other multi-national institutions, intervening in armed struggles since the end of WWII.<sup>6</sup> The literature reviewed in this section primarily reflects a positivist approach and neo liberal analysis which assumes their narrative is neutral or objective, that military peacekeeping interventions are conceptually a good and necessary practice, and that the United Nations is conceptually a good institution even if it needs some reforms. The literature takes a problem-solving orientation, framing the short comings of peacekeeping missions and the institutions that host them as problems to be solved rather than problematizing the institutions and their agendas.

---

<sup>4</sup> Not all organisations which have intervened as organised third parties in areas of conflict call themselves civilian peacekeepers. See definitions section below.

<sup>5</sup> One recent exception to this is the statistically based work of Stephan and Chenoweth (2008), though it focuses primarily on civil resistance rather than third party nonviolent intervention.

<sup>6</sup> See Pugh (2004) for a history which connects the formation of UN peacekeeping to significantly earlier historical events.



The UN launched its first peacekeeping efforts, somewhat simultaneous to Gandhi's efforts to create a peace army. According to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) the first efforts began in 1948 with the creation of a process to supervise truces and the military observer mission between India and Pakistan (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping). Most authors however cite the Sinai Peninsula mission in 1956 as the first peacekeeping mission (Morrison, Cumner, Park, & Zoe, 2008). Named the United Nations Emergency Force, this mission took up positions in the Sinai when the French, British and Israeli forces pulled out of positions they occupied when Egypt nationalised the Suez Canal. This mission served as a buffer between Israeli and Egyptian forces and lasted until 1967.

These early UN efforts were justified on the basis of Chapter VI in the UN Charter which calls for the peaceful resolution of conflicts (Morrison et al., 2008). Some commentators have seen this as a creative effort, while others see it as evolving from the failures of diplomacy (Sartre, 2011). The phrase 'peacekeeping' came into usage in the 1960's as further peacekeeping missions, both short and long term, were initiated in places as diverse as Cyprus, the Congo, the Middle East and Lebanon, the Dominican Republic and West New Guinea (Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin, 2010; United Nations Department of Peacekeeping). Until the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping missions are described as being limited by Cold War politics played out particularly in the UN Security Council (Morrison et al., 2008). UN and other multilateral institutional peacekeeping are described as emerging as a practical response to particular situations (Durch, 2006b). Early peacekeeping developed a set of basic tenets or principles for interventions, assumed to apply to all peacekeeping missions (Ryan, 2000). These include impartiality, consent of the parties, and the non-use of force except to protect peacekeepers. These interventions were staffed primarily by military who were not from the major powers and who were lightly armed only for their own protection, or by unarmed military observers. This is now described or referred to as traditional or first generation peacekeeping.

With the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping has become more complex, including military, police and extensive civilian components, with more ambitious goals (Durch, 2006b). Durch (ibid) cites the UN mission to Namibia in 1989 to assist with the transition to independence, as the first of these more complex missions, sometimes called second generation missions. As international relations emerged from Cold War politics, UN

missions have undergone further changes. Missions today are most likely to be involved with intrastate conflicts and peacekeepers may now be armed with heavy weaponry, and authorised to use force necessary to protect civilians.<sup>7</sup> Current missions routinely include soldiers, police and civilians and address not only preventing violence, but include elements associated with peacebuilding such as the creation of stable democratic states, free market economies, reformed judiciary systems and institutions that can uphold international standards of human rights, frequently referred to collectively as liberal peace (Durch, 2006b). Peacekeeping missions are now often referred to as multidimensional peacekeeping or peace support operations, reflecting this expansion of expectation and mandate (Bellamy et al., 2010). Additionally peacekeeping and peace operations may be undertaken by regional security or other multilateral organisations, other than the UN.<sup>8</sup> These newer operations, sometimes referred to as third generation peacekeeping, may be based on Chapters VII of the UN Charter, which allow for the use of force to maintain peace and Chapter VIII which allows for regional associations to be involved in peace and security operations (Morrison et al., 2008). Additionally there have been a number of missions authorised by the UN though carried out by others, such as in Libya and Afghanistan, where there was no peace agreement or ceasefire. Rather the UN authorised external intervention to enforce a particular set of conditions. These missions are referred to as peace enforcement, security and stabilisation, or peace support operations (Ministry of Defence, 2004; New Zealand Defence Force, 2008; NORDCAPS, 2007). By 2009 the UN had undertaken 69 peace missions since the end of the Cold War (Franke & Warnecke, 2009),<sup>9</sup> and many commentators credit international peacekeeping with a significant contribution to the drop in the number of armed conflicts and the deaths attributed to armed conflict.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> Pouligny (2006)(p. 7) cites the UN mission in Somalia, begun in 1992, as the first mission to intervene in a country for humanitarian purposes and authorised to use force to protect civilians.

<sup>8</sup> See NORDCAPS (2007) for a good summary of a number of the multilateral organizations which initiate peacekeeping missions.

<sup>9</sup> Though Franke discusses 69 as of 2009, the DPKO states there have been 67 missions since 1948 see <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml> accessed 1 August 2012. For the purposes of this thesis, the exact number, or the reason for the discrepancies is not important. But it does reflect the lack of agreed upon definitions.

<sup>10</sup> For instance see Human Security Report (2010) and Goldstein (2011). See further discussion of this literature in Chapter Five on preventing violence.

The changes in missions are theorised to reflect, in part, changes in the kinds of violence that peacekeeping has to address. While traditional peacekeeping was developed to deal primarily with interstate conflicts, today most peacekeeping missions are launched to address intrastate conflicts.<sup>11</sup> The belligerents may include the government and one or more other armed group. In fact there may be several armed groups fighting each other as well as fighting the government, and the armed group itself may fracture into factions (Morrison et al., 2008). Additionally current armed conflicts frequently target civilians, and while there has been an overall decrease in deaths attributed directly to armed conflicts, there has been an increase in the proportion of deaths of civilians, compared to wars during the Cold War period.<sup>12</sup> Pivotal moments in this literature are described as including the civilian massacres in Srebrenica and Rwanda, during which UN troops failed to protect and prevent mass civilian killings (Tardy, 2011a). In response to public outcries and critical evaluation, UN peacekeeping mandates today frequently include requirements to use the force necessary to protect civilians. This is referred to as third generation peacekeeping and sometimes described as more robust or muscular peacekeeping (Kreps & Wallace, 2009; Tardy, 2011a). Intrastate wars and the targeting of civilians create a set of conditions that peacekeeping operations now address such as internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees needing resettlement, disarming and reintegrating armed groups, and rebuilding governments that are perceived to have lost both credibility and the infrastructure necessary to function (Durch, 2006b). These conditions also create what has been called a permissive environment in which UN troops themselves may become a significant problem, distorting the local economy, and engaging in sexual exploitation and abuse, as well as other criminal activities (Aoi et al., 2007). These issues have become an embarrassment and challenge for the UN and other peacekeeping organisations to manage.

The period since the end of the Cold War has also seen a shift in the ascribed purpose of peacekeeping in this literature. During the Cold War, the primary goal of

---

<sup>11</sup> See Human Security Report . See Wallenstein (2011)(p. 29) for a discussion that while most wars historically have been intrastate, peacekeeping was originally used primarily for interstate conflicts. Only more recently has it been used to address intrastate conflicts.

<sup>12</sup> See Human Security Report (2010), though Goldstein (2011) debates the accuracy of this statistic. What is agreed upon is that civilians are often targeted with attacks and killed in today's armed conflicts, the number of civilians killed in these conflicts is too high, and that the UN has a role and obligation in protecting civilians. See Holt, Taylor and Kelly(2009) for example.

peacekeeping was understood to be stabilising and preserving state sovereignty, upholding the Westphalian perspective of the primacy of the nation state (Bellamy et al., 2010). The charter of the UN talks about the need to protect state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs (Morrison et al., 2008). Wallensteen (2011) suggests that one of the major challenges for the UN is the shift in norms and assumptions, from state centric politics to global governance. Today state sovereignty may be infringed upon by the UN, in order to protect civilians, using the principles of responsibility to protect (Bellamy et al., 2010). And when the UN fails to do so, some consider the very legitimacy of the UN to be in question (Annan & Mousavizadeh, 2012; Holt et al., 2009).<sup>13</sup> These changes are reflected in practice. Peacekeepers are now more likely to be in contact with local communities and their behaviour to have more impact on local people and local economies than was the case during earlier eras (Aoi et al., 2007).

These changes continue to cause much debate and disagreement within the UN. This debate and disagreement in part circles around the discussion about the need for robust peacekeeping (that is peacekeeping which uses greater force) and responsibilities to protect civilians (R2P), the difficulty at times in distinguishing between robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement (that is interventions which enforce a settlement on non-consenting parties), and how this is or is not warranted by the particular circumstances (Tardy, 2011a). Other tensions relate to the difficulties of carrying out the mandated integrated missions, fielding sufficient staff, as well as the interplay of internal UN politics and politics in the countries where interventions occur.<sup>14</sup>

Other regional international organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the African Unions (AU), the European Union (EU), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) also began implementing peacekeeping missions since the end of the Cold War. The EU and NATO's first missions were in Bosnia, ECOWAS began peacekeeping in 1990 in Liberia, and the AU in Burundi in 2004.<sup>15</sup> Similar issues have affected these regional peacekeeping missions.

---

<sup>13</sup> Though as Homan and Ducasse-Rogier (2012) suggest, given the experience in Libya, the UN Security Council is reluctant to authorize this infringement.

<sup>14</sup> See Gowan (2008) who suggests that as of 2008 peacekeeping was in crisis. The reasons he gives appear to me to be still relevant. See also the New Horizons report (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2010).

<sup>15</sup> See Lightburn (2011), Gundz and Herbolzheimer (2010), Murithi (2009) and ECOWAS (ECOWAS, 2005)

There has been a trend toward strengthening mandates, not requiring consent of the host country, the use of heavier weaponry and the authorisation of the use of force to protect citizens.

The composition of those employed in peacekeeping has also changed as peacekeeping has become more complex and multi-functional. As Schirch points out, there are civilians involved with rebuilding political institutions, civilian police who are sometimes unarmed, civilian monitors and in some EU countries there are now civilian peace services whose members are employed in various peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks (Schirch, 2006, pp. 27-29).

Other significant changes since the 1990's have included an increase in the number of missions, the fielding of several very large missions such as MONUC<sup>16</sup> in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and a shift in troop contributing countries so that by the mid 2000's almost all the peacekeeping soldiers came from the global south. In 2011 there were 98,972 uniformed UN peacekeepers (Sherman & Gleason, 2012).<sup>17</sup> Including those in non-UN missions there were 263,118 peacekeepers in total. The largest troop contributing countries to UN missions were Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, though Sherman and Gleason note that looking at per capita as well as overall numbers, Ghana, Nepal, Rwanda and Uruguay are in the top ten. Italy is the top global north troop contributing country to UN missions, and is fourteenth on the list of the top twenty countries (B. D. Jones, 2012, p. 131) The only other global north country that makes the list is France, at number nineteen. This shift in troop contributions to the global south for UN peacekeeping is attributed to the concentration of NATO troops in Afghanistan (Durch, 2006a), as well as a preference for global north countries to provide funding and technological support to missions, rather than risk the lives of their troops (Howard, 2008, p. 332).<sup>18</sup>

---

<sup>16</sup> United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Mission de l'Organisation de Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo.

<sup>17</sup> All the following numbers are from Sherman and Gleason (2012).

<sup>18</sup> In 2011 the top 10 troop contributing countries to non UN missions – which include NATO, AU and other regional organisations – were the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Uganda, France, Italy, Burundi, Poland, Turkey, and Romania. See Jones (2012, p. 168).

Reflecting the increasing role of civilian police in peacekeeping, police deployments in the UN have increased dramatically (Sherman & Gleason, 2012, p. 7) and the top five police contributing countries are Bangladesh, Jordan, India, Nepal, and Pakistan. This mixture of soldiers and police from many cultures is seen to raise a number of operational issues of command and integration, and these challenge efficiency (Woodhouse, 2010).<sup>19</sup> Peake (2011) notes that this diversity in police raises issues of quality and capability. Related to the changes in numbers of missions, the budgets for peacekeeping operations have increased significantly. As the costs of UN missions increased, the UN has created a funding mechanism whereby the wealthiest countries contribute the most financial support to peacekeeping (Durch, 2006b, p. 31). In 2011 the top five contributors to the UN peacekeeping budgets were the United States (which at 27% is more than twice as much as the next country), Japan, United Kingdom, Germany and France (B. D. Jones, 2012, p. 160).

There are a number of on-going organisational challenges identified in this literature which are seen to affect current peacekeeping efforts. In addition to the substantive challenges raised in debates (and discussed above) about tying peace to liberal visions of democracy, the use of more robust force, interventions without full consent, and state sovereignty versus R2P (responsibility to protect), more operational challenges are discussed as problems to be solved. There are insufficient resources generally and specifically high quality resources (both human and material) to meet the needs of peacekeeping operations. Thus most, if not all peacekeeping efforts are stretched thin and suffer from this situation (Durch, 2006a; United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2010). Even if there is consent from the government, it may be marginal or decrease over time, which affects what programmes are possible (see Chapter Four for further discussion of consent). Within peacekeeping organisations themselves (whether large and multilateral or small NGOs) there are struggles with issues of organisation, hierarchy, integrating people from different cultures into the same mission and insufficient training of soldiers, police and civilian peacekeepers.<sup>20</sup>

---

<sup>19</sup> See discussion in Chapters Three and Seven regarding issues of efficiency and effectiveness of multinational troops and the views of peacekeepers.

<sup>20</sup> See Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber (2000) and Durch (2006a). These challenges will be discussed at greater length in later chapters.

## **A brief review of critiques of traditional narratives on peacekeeping history, purpose and processes**

The history of armed peacekeeping narrated above is critiqued from a critical peace and critical security studies perspective as reflecting a narrative that comes out of neo liberalism and serves the hegemony of western powers.<sup>21</sup> This critical literature is extensive and draws on critical theory, postmodern, post structural, and post colonial frameworks. Some of this literature constructs a history and explanation of peacekeeping as in the service of imposing a version of liberal democracy or liberal peace, which may not best serve the local population.<sup>22</sup> For instance, Michael Pugh (2004) narrates the history from a critical peace studies perspective. While he starts his review with earlier events, he notes that the first UN intervention in the Sinai is related to post colonialism, as the French, British and Israeli forces invaded the Sinai in response to the nationalization of the Suez Canal. Whitworth (2004, pp. 30-31) suggests that the UN intervention in the Sinai was not only about western imperialism, but also related to internal organisational agendas aimed at solidifying the role of the UN as the keeper of world order. She asks questions such as why there was intervention in the Sinai and not in Hungary, and how the intervention which is generally celebrated as a success, affected the Egyptian people?

This theme of peacekeeping as neo imperialism, post or neo colonialism,<sup>23</sup> is mentioned in diverse sources (Cunliffe, 2012; Darby, 2009b; Francis, 2010; Human Security Report Project, 2010). Current peacekeeping, based on the liberal peace agenda is described as operating to stabilize the status quo so that the corporations of wealthy countries can exploit the resources and people of the developing world (Duffield, 2010), without the drawbacks of their governments actually occupying them (Human Security Report Project, 2010). Peacekeeping and peacebuilding more broadly, are characterised as too far removed from, and therefore hardly relevant to, the everyday lives of people in

---

<sup>21</sup> There is a significant and growing body of work analysing peacekeeping and peacebuilding from a critical studies and post modern theorising perspective. For instance see Pugh (2004), Booth (2005a), Bigo (2008), Darby (2009b), Richmond (2009b), Liden et al (2009), Jabri (2010), Pugh (2011), Zanotti (2011), Cunliffe (2012) as examples.

<sup>22</sup> See Chapter Six for further discussion of peacekeeping and liberal peace. Here it is enough to note that there are different views on the history, purpose and practice of peacekeeping.

<sup>23</sup> That is the imposition of governance and economic systems or domination of a country without actually occupying it and for the benefit of the great powers which the UN is thought to serve in this analysis.

conflict affected communities (Darby, 2009b; Richmond, 2009b). Jabri (2010) suggests that current peacebuilding interventions deprive local people of self-determination and at core are about policing international security rather than liberal peace. Perhaps the use of the term liberal peace itself is a misnomer, in that the interventions that impose models of governance and market economies bear little resemblance to traditional liberal visions (Chandler, 2010). Cunliffe (2012) argues that peacekeeping and peacebuilding are manifestations of imperialism, and that the use of multilateral intervention has a history in earlier imperial periods. Many note that imposing models of liberal peace and liberal democracy is generally not carried out by troops from countries in the global north, countries which they perceive it serving (International Peace Institute, 2010; Pugh, 2004; Richmond, 2007; Tardy, 2011b). Howard (2008, p. 333) notes that using troops from the global south to carry out mandates that do not generally serve global south interests may be understood as itself a form of neo colonialism.

Critical peace and critical security studies include a variety of perspectives on security (Collective, 2006; Shepherd, 2013a), but most problematize the focus of peacekeeping interventions on supporting state sovereignty or state security rather than individual or community security or well-being (Booth, 2005a; Cheesman, 2005). Others critique interventions which focus on good governance and democratization as the path to international security and the need to implement universal models to correct failed states, with their emphasis on efficient administration and rule of law in order to control local people, extending the power of the liberal global north into the everyday lives of the 'non-liberal' other (Merlingen, 2005; Mitchell, 2011; Peterson, 2010; Zanotti, 2011). And this ever expanding field of intervention requires an ever expanding number of security professionals who police and intervene with populations at home and abroad, and are supposedly non-political and only focused on creating safety (Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008; Olsson, 2008). Multidimensional peacekeeping and peace enforcement interventions are understood as part of the move to label an ever growing number of issues as relating to security, termed securitization, which links and blur the distinction between national and international boundaries (Burke, 2013; Collective, 2006; Nyman, 2013).

This critical and postmodern construction of the history and purpose of peacekeeping interrogates and undermines the view of peacekeeping as the evolution of altruistic humanitarian impulses to prevent and care for suffering, or as a creative intervention to decrease violence and improve global governance for the genuine benefit



of all. Rather it is understood as an evolution of neo colonialism or neo imperialism, or at best suffused with mixed motivations (Higate & Henry, 2009a; Zanotti, 2011). While some of these perspectives are solely critical and perhaps dismissive of the potential for reform, some lead to, as well as reflect views that see either a need for a major restructuring of peacekeeping, or even a major restructuring of international institutions given the powers they are believed to currently serve (Merlingen, 2005; Stannes, 2010). Echoes of these critiques from the perspective of former frontline peacekeepers will be found in the coming chapters. I hear these echoes particularly in the sense of discomfort when peacekeepers believe they are imposing unwanted or inappropriate solutions and the sense of powerlessness or limited ability to make a difference some discussed. They shared concerns about the need to work with local people, with cultural appropriateness, to support local solutions. In particular in Chapter Seven, I discuss the disconnection between many military and police peacekeepers' self reported altruistic motivation and their frustration at their inability or limited opportunity for doing good. I suggest this reflects their everyday lived experiences in these contradictions between the generally accepted view of peacekeeping as undertaken for the good of those in the local communities, and their perspectives that this was not so.

## **Definitions**

When talking about peacekeeping, it is important to understand what is meant by peace and peacekeeping, and the difference between armed and civilian peacekeeping. Standpoint theory reminds us that concepts such as peace are understood and explained to serve particular interests, and are created with particular methods and technologies (Stoetzler & Yuval-Davis, 2002). What is imagined or envisioned as peace and what might bring it about are all shaped by our standpoints. My personal conceptualisation of peace is related to both an agonistic (Shinko, 2008) and Buddhist (Han, 1992) perspective, that peace is a process and in process, and is about differences flourishing while dealing with conflicts nonviolently. My imagination is influenced by my experiences and beliefs.

## Peace

If peace is the goal of peacekeeping, and more broadly peacebuilding, what is the vision or specific description of peace being sought? Richmond reviews differing

definitions and visions of peace, demonstrating it is a contested concept (Richmond, 2008). He notes that peace has been viewed as a utopian ideal that cannot be attained, or as simply the absence of war, and much in between. He points out that while the supposed goal is peace, much of the work in the field of international relations is focused on war, reflecting an assumption that war leads to peace (Richmond, 2008, p. 154).

A very different image of peace emerges from theories of agonistic peace, which describe peace not as harmonious nor involving a stable consensus, but including the nonviolent conflict and struggles which occur when differences flourish (Shinko, 2008). This is an understanding of peace that embraces conflict in order to avoid the dominance of one particular elite or one particular discourse. While there is struggle and conflict between perspectives, views, or beliefs, this struggle must not prevent the expression of other perspectives and views, nor cause harm (Campbell, 1998).

Other traditions have understood peace as a process rather than a static condition or goal. For instance Thich Nhat Han (1992), a Buddhist monk, describes peace not as a goal or the end of a path, but the way we take each step on a path. In this sense peace is constructed over and over again through the processes we engage in. Means and ends are not separated and peace cannot be achieved through war. Schirch (2006) echoes this view of peace as a process, that how we work will effect what is achieved.

From the field of conflict transformation Francis (2010, pp. 75-76) discusses peace in terms of constructive, nonviolent conflict and peaceful relationships. She contrasts this with a traditional political realist viewpoint that focuses on peace at the state level, as referring to state security. While peace is assumed to be good, Lederach (1997) points out that in communities struggling with violence and peace, there can be a tension between peace, mercy, justice and truth. He suggests that moving toward reconciliation as part of transforming conflicts will require addressing these tensions in many manifestations. Both these authors are focused on peace at the community or even individual level, rather than primarily at the national level.

Galtung (1996) discusses negative and positive peace, a distinction which is widely used in peace literature.<sup>24</sup> In this dichotomy negative peace is simply the absence

---

<sup>24</sup> Adler (1998) discusses the debate around these terms and the original resistance to the concept of negative peace. The resistance stemmed from a concern that negative peace was not actually peace. Currently, however these terms are in widespread use.

of war whereas positive peace includes a vision of a more just society characterised by cooperation and conflict transformation and an absence or significant diminishment of structural violence. This distinction becomes quite important in terms of the evolution of peacekeeping, as traditional peacekeeping missions focused primarily on negative peace have become less common. Today's peacekeeping missions are usually multidimensional with more expansive mandates, and typically include numerous elements meant to build a particular vision, which some think of as positive peace (Durch, 2006c). This shift is related to the call for peacekeeping to lead toward positive peace and include elements related to governance, human rights, and justice, and thus peacekeeping has become intertwined with peacebuilding.<sup>25</sup> This version of a peaceful society is discussed as if it is universal and intended to serve the interests of people in conflicts, but whether it does is not yet clear, as the particular version of "positive peace" being promoted is contested.<sup>26</sup>

Peace can be understood as an on-going social construction, involving shared norms, meanings and practices (Adler, 1998). In particular, this attention to peace as practice, echoes the understanding above, of peace as a path, rather than a static end goal. Adler notes that understanding peace as a practice implies the agency of people who make and share peace. Williams (2007, p. 2) argues for a constructivist approach to understanding peace processes and defines peace as an "inter-subjectively constructed category", which indicates that a situation is sufficiently sustainable and agreeable to the relevant people so that attempts to use violence to create change are unlikely.

Much peace research uses the methodology of statistical analysis of the correlates of armed conflict in the study of peace and war (Fortna & Howard, 2008; Hegre et al., 2010). This research is based on large databases which use specific criteria to code information. These codes reflect theorising about peace and violence and assumptions about what can be measured and the usefulness of doing so. The Uppsala conflict data program<sup>27</sup> is based on data related to armed conflict and codes active armed conflicts as

---

<sup>25</sup> See Zanotti (2011) for a discussion of how these elements reflect assumptions embedded in global north standpoints regarding forms of governmentality which are superior and assumed to lead to peace, which is linked to security.

<sup>26</sup> See Liden et al (2009) for a summary of the critique of liberal peace and Chapter Six for further discussion of this point.

<sup>27</sup> See <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/>

including years in which there are 25 or more battle related deaths, distinguished from conflicts coded as war, which include 1000 or more battle related deaths. Others such as the Correlates of War (COW) only include cases where there are 1000 or more battle related deaths (Mueller, 2009). These differences reflect different assumptions about whether armed conflict is of concern at different levels of intensity. The focus, as Richmond noted (2008), is on years of armed conflict rather than years of peace.

For the purpose of this thesis I understand the goal of peacekeeping to be a version of negative peace, that is an absence of armed violence between belligerents or directed at civilians. Peacekeeping works to keep open sufficient safe political space for positive peace to occur (see next section which defines peacekeeping). This is not arguing that negative peace is sufficient, that ending violence (or physical security) must come first, nor a rejection of the possibilities of more positive peace, but reflects the usage I found amongst peacekeepers, who were almost exclusively concerned with preventing violence and protecting people in the places where they were working (see Chapter Five for more).

### Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is a phrase which is also constructed to carry different meanings. The term is not always defined, similarly to the word peace, it appears to be assumed that we know what peacekeeping is, or that the definition is simply what that particular project or mission is doing.<sup>28</sup> The literature suggests the term originated with the UN Emergency Force in the Suez (Schweitzer, 2010) which was described as a peacekeeping mission. UN General Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined peacekeeping in 1992 as an activity of the UN emphasizing deployment of military and police personnel, while noting the frequent inclusion of civilians, to prevent conflict and make peace (without defining what he envisioned as conflict or peace). At the time his definition also included the expectation that this deployment was “with the consent of all parties concerned”(Boutros-Ghali, 1992). A recent UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO) manual on peacekeeping refers to peacekeeping simply as “... a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing

---

<sup>28</sup> For example see Roberts (2011), who does not define peacebuilding nor peacekeeping and appears to use them interchangeably.

agreements achieved by the peacemakers. ... working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace." (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, 2008, p. 18).

Definitions of peacekeeping have changed over time. The use of the same phrases to describe quite different interventions is thought to normalise the greater use of force and emphasis on global governance over state sovereignty (Pugh, 2004). As Fortna and Howard (2008) point out, earlier definitions referred to peacekeeping as taking place in an international setting, using no or light force, and requiring the consent of the countries affected. As the contexts and purposes of peacekeeping missions have changed, some definitions of peacekeeping have become broader and more encompassing. Some use the term peacekeeping operations rather than peacekeeping missions, restricting the word missions for those engagements that have more limited goals and that use no or very limited force (Durch, 2006b). The UN now uses the phrase multidimensional peacekeeping operations,<sup>29</sup> acknowledging that peacekeeping activities are now intertwined with efforts that lie outside of peacekeeping and are often thought of as peacebuilding, such as improving governance, human rights and economic development (United Nations Department of Public Information, 2013). The UN, in this description of peacekeeping, still discusses consent of the parties and the use of force only for self-protection, though some of the operations have in fact occurred without the consent of all parties (Rowlands & Carment, 2006), and have been authorised to use all force necessary to protect civilians within their capabilities (Nasu, 2011). Fortna and Howard define peacekeeping as "the deployment of international personnel to help maintain peace and security" which is a very broad definition and leaves undefined 'peace' and 'security' (Fortna & Howard, 2008, p. 285).

Pugh (2004) describes traditional peacekeeping as including a multinational force, to neutrally monitor and patrol in areas of recent conflict, having only light arms, being impartial, and with the consent of those affected. While not necessarily undertaken by the UN, he suggests the word conjures the image of soldiers in their blue berets. He questions the usefulness of using the same word when describing coercive interventions to enforce the domination of powerful international interests, as it continues to inaccurately connote humanitarianism, impartiality, and a non-politicised version of peace.

---

<sup>29</sup> (United Nations Department of Public Information, 2013)

The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre definition focuses on actions that are specifically approved by a national or international body “designed to enhance peace, security, and stability; they are undertaken cooperatively and individually by civilian police, military, humanitarian, good governance, and other interested agencies and groups.” (Morrison et al., 2008, p. 1571). This is a definition that includes a broad spectrum of activities and reflects the expanded peace operation missions, while still leaving undefined terms such as peace, security and stability. With its focus on the approval of national or international bodies it excludes efforts by smaller communities and organisations thus underscoring the hegemony of nation states and organisations of nation states to perpetuate or control violence. In line with his analysis, Durch (2006a, p. 598) states that in order to count as peace operations and not just war, legitimacy must be conferred by the approval of an international organisation.

A broader definition of peacekeeping, more in line with both traditional UN missions and with unarmed civilian peacekeeping (to be defined below) is found in Schweitzer (2009, p. 43). Using Galtung’s definition of peacekeeping as “efforts to stop the destruction of other people, things and even themselves” she focuses on peacekeeping as action to prevent violence by controlling or influencing belligerents (Galtung, 1996 as quoted in Schweitzer 2009 p. 43). This definition is in a sense both broader and more focused. Interventions here can be undertaken by many different kinds of organisations, leaving room for others besides states and organisations of states to initiate peacekeeping. On the other hand, the interventions would primarily consist of peacekeeping actions for the purpose of stopping violence, rather than the broader functions of peacebuilding.<sup>30</sup> Much of what is currently included in peace operations functions to support peacebuilding – that is the emphasis on post-conflict state building that includes governing institutions, justice systems, voting, human rights and economic development.

Unarmed civilian peacekeeping (UCP) organisations use only civilians for peacekeeping work, not as adjuncts to military or police. The literature on UCP is sparse. In an attempt to define the field, Wallis suggests UCP missions are activities by civilians to prevent or reduce violence so as to make it safe for others to engage in peacebuilding activities (Wallis, 2009). In line with her more general definition of peacekeeping

---

<sup>30</sup> These three phrases of peacekeeping, peace-making and peacebuilding, originally proposed by Galtung, were used by Boutros-Gali (1992) in discussing UN interventions and have become common in the literature.

Schweitzer defines UCP as “the prevention of direct violence through influence or control of the behaviour of potential perpetrators by unarmed civilians who are deployed on the ground” (Schweitzer, 2010, p. 9). Schirch (2006, p. 14) defines civilian peacekeeping as involving unarmed individuals who enter a conflict situation intentionally to reduce inter-group violence, with the goal that local people can safely carry out nonviolent actions or dialogue or other activities to build peace. Wallace suggests unarmed civilian peacekeeping falls within her category of nonviolent intervention to prevent violence and protect people (Wallace, 2010, p. 92).

These definitions, not surprisingly, emphasize the role of organised civilians as peacekeepers, rather than the military or police from states authorised by multilateral organisations, paired with their nonviolent or unarmed status. Some of the definitions also focus attention on the goal of providing sufficient safety for local people to engage in peacebuilding. This challenges the hegemony of states to regulate violence, by including smaller organisations, communities and even individuals in the realm of peacekeeping. Even more radically, it challenges notions of weapons and force as the central factors in keeping the peace. As reviewed above in the discussion of the history of civilian peacekeeping, this work was originally developed by people and communities committed to nonviolence, most famously inspired by Gandhi. Thus it reflects a knowledge system that is concerned with solving conflicts nonviolently.

For the purposes of this thesis, peacekeeping is understood to be organised action by third parties to prevent violence, protect civilians, and support local problem-solving by controlling or influencing belligerents and/or their proxies, as well as local people. This reflects the emphasis peacekeepers put on the need to support local efforts, which can be understood as influencing local people to engage in peacebuilding work. Rather than passive recipients of peacekeeping, it recognises the agency of local actors in reciprocal processes. In this way, while primarily focused on preventing violence and protecting people, peacekeeping can contribute to peacebuilding indirectly, through helping to create sufficient safety and relational support of local efforts to address conflicts nonviolently (see Chapter Six for discussion of the complexity of ‘local’). This definition is constructed from the views of peacekeepers interviewed in this research, the literature referred to above and my own experiences, with a view toward a more emancipatory practice.

Effective peacekeeping, by extension accomplishes a significant degree of protection, prevention and support of local problem-solving. Peacekeeping is undertaken by outside third parties of many types and can employ soldiers, police and/or civilians in various combinations. It is carried out by communities, ad hoc networks, and organisations with or without a specific mission or mandate for peacekeeping. It accomplishes its goals through influencing or controlling participants in armed conflict. It provides support for local peacebuilding efforts by working for sufficient safety for this to occur, primarily using relational strategies (see Chapter Eight) rather than aid. It is the general term which includes both armed and unarmed peacekeeping. The term armed or military peacekeeping will be used in the sense of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, that is interventions which include the peacekeeping efforts of military, police and various civilians attached to military missions, authorised by national or international institutions, and potentially using force to protect civilians and enforce peace. Though some of this work is done by unarmed civilian personnel, these peacekeeping missions are defined by and depend on having a credible military presence as a key to their success (Fortna, 2008a). While an attempt will be made to separate out the peacekeeping component from the broader mission, this is virtually impossible in most of the research and theorising on current peacekeeping efforts, as the blurring of peacekeeping and peacebuilding has become almost ubiquitous in the literature.

The term unarmed civilian peacekeeping or UCP will be used in accord with both Wallis' and Schweitzer's definitions referenced above. That is efforts by unarmed civilian third parties, in the field, to prevent or diminish violence by influencing or controlling potential perpetrators for the purpose of protecting people and making it safe for local people to engage in peace and justice efforts. This emphasises both the efforts of unarmed civilians and their purpose of making it safe for others to engage in peace making and peacebuilding efforts. Here there is little to no emphasis on the functioning of the state, but rather the focus of unarmed civilian peacekeeping is primarily a negative peace, focused simply on making it safe for other civilians, with a particular emphasis on making it safe for civilians engaged in peace and justice work. UCP may be connected to a peace process and as such help ensure it is implemented, but it is not limited to these situations. This definition includes the work of organisations such as Peace Brigades International which does not use the term peacekeeping to describe its work. For the



purposes of this thesis I will however, refer to their work as unarmed civilian peacekeeping.

## **Conclusion**

While unarmed civilian peacekeeping and military peacekeeping have different histories, they are both related to efforts by third parties to control and prevent armed conflicts. The history, purpose and process of military peacekeeping is critiqued as obscuring a focus on state security over civilian safety and on promoting global north, hegemonic agendas over serving the needs of people in the host communities. Military peacekeepers echo some of these concerns, in the discomfort they describe at times when they perceive their work as imposing unwanted solutions and their sense of powerlessness and disappointment that they feel unable to do much that is good for local people. UCP peacekeepers are not connected to liberal peace agendas, as will be discussed throughout the coming chapters, but they too struggle with a sense of powerlessness and inability to do enough or to make enough difference.

Peace and peacekeeping are contested concepts. For the purpose of this thesis, I assume that the appropriate goal or purpose of peacekeeping is a version of negative peace, that is, the absence of armed conflict. This reflects the assumption peacekeepers made, as I will discuss throughout this thesis, that local people could and would take ownership over their own change processes if they were sufficiently safe to do so, and that they tend to resist imposed solutions. UCP interventions challenge the notion of peacekeeping as in the service of global north powers, requiring force to prevent violence and protect people, and needing to be undertaken only by large multilateral organisations. This begins to bring into view the potential, which I develop more fully in theorising found in Chapter Eight and the Conclusion, for a more emancipatory, de-militarised peacekeeping.

Having set the context in terms of the history and critique of peacekeeping, and the discussion of peace and definition of peacekeeping, I now turn to my research. The next chapter describes my research methodology and process and gives an initial overview of my research findings. The introduction and chapters one and two set the context for the analytical and theorising chapters which follow.

## **Chapter Two Research methodology, themes and theorising: Frontline peacekeepers perceptions of effective peacekeeping**

This chapter describes the methodology used in this research project and summarises the findings. After introducing and describing constructivist grounded theory, I then share characteristics of the participants interviewed in the research including gender, organisation fielding their mission, a list of countries in which they served, and their nationalities. The following section gives information on my research process. The next section provides a brief summary of the themes and theorising I have constructed from the research interviews, influenced by the literature in the field and my own standpoint. This chapter provides a general overview of the research project itself. The following chapters will go in depth with each of the themes, relating them to the literature and further analysis.

### **Research methodology and process**

#### Constructivist grounded theory

This research was conducted using constructivist grounded theory. I found both Charmez (2006, 2009) and Clarke (2005) helpful in understanding constructivist and postmodern applications of grounded theory.<sup>1</sup> As discussed in the Introduction, constructivist grounded theory is both theory and methodology. At the theoretical level, it shares general constructivist ontological commitments including the understanding that while there is empirical data which is used as a basis, meaning is socially fabricated (in the sense of building or sculpting) and thus contingent on experiences, contexts, time, the researched and the researcher. It shares the perception that findings in research are created inter-subjectively and thus understanding emerges through the research process which helps to explain the social processes of interest. This is in contrast to the original formulations of grounded theory, which embraced the traditional science ontology (Charmaz, 2006). Grounded theory was originally developed as a method to find objective truth that was presumed to emerge from a close, neutral reading of the collected

---

<sup>1</sup> For further elucidation of grounded theory methods see an excellent compendium edited by Bryant and Charmaz (2007).

data. Constructivist grounded theory, embracing the constructivist evolution in the understanding of social phenomenon, emphasises staying close to the interview material and other data while at the same time acknowledging and working with the inter-subjective, political, specific nature of the research process and research findings.

I chose this theoretical and methodological approach in part because it is in accordance with my own underlying beliefs and assumptions about what can be known and how knowledge is developed. Constructivist grounded theory seemed to me respectful of the people I was interviewing, viewing them as reliable and knowledgeable informants with expertise based on their lived experiences as peacekeepers. Those I interviewed became guides in my exploration of how frontline peacekeepers understood what had been effective in their work. The methodology transparently uses material from the interviews, other data, and my own responses, and this felt ethical, accurate and useful. Constructivist grounded theory is also considered useful for exploring new territory (Kramer, 2007, pp. 49-51) given the open nature of inquiry used. Given the dearth of material on how frontline peacekeepers understand effectiveness, this was also a compelling reason to use this approach. Constructivist grounded theory also seemed an appropriate research methodology given my concerns about local agency and local ownership, particularly because it encourages the development of knowledge with participants, acknowledging their expertise.

As a methodology constructed grounded theory begins with an exploration of an issue of interest. Rather than starting with a hypothesis developed from a literature review,<sup>2</sup> it is recommended to start by collecting and analysing data related to the researcher puzzle or questions. Data include interviews, personal reflections and notes, texts and any other material considered relevant and available (Charmaz, 2006). Texts, including the academic literature related to the issue, are thought of not as objective representations of truth but as data to be considered, analysed and critiqued through questions such as who it was produced by, how, for what purpose and in what context (Charmaz, 2006, pp. 35-40).

Through a process of iterative data collection, coding, reflection and analysis, and back to gather more data, understanding and theorising are developed and deepened.

---

<sup>2</sup> The original development of grounded theory actually recommended not reading the related academic literature until after the research itself was completed (Mills et al., 2006).

Reichertz (2007) frames this process as abductive reasoning, analysing what is gathered through the various kinds of data and then taking a creative leap into theorising through this engagement. This allows the messiness, as Clarke and Friese (2007) call it, of complicated issues to emerge and clarify. The iterative coding and reflection both acknowledges that I, the researcher, am constructing this understanding, while keeping the construction well connected with what is emerging in the data collection through reading, interviewing, writing and talking. This is one of the significant differences with other research interview methods. Because the researcher is coding and analysing in the midst of the research rather than after the interviews are completed, earlier interviews influence the focus and questions in later interviews, as well as leading back to repeat interviews with participants. There is conscious attention paid to personal assumptions, beliefs and reactions that arise in the process, trying to surface contradictions between these personal responses and what is emerging in the data for careful analysis with the intention to not distort the data to support our own personal perspectives. At the same time there is the recognition that some of this distortion is inevitable, as we do not see our own blind spots.

This methodology also allows flexibility so that if the researcher wants to understand a particular aspect of the data more deeply, she can return and ask more questions or find particularly relevant new texts, interviews or data from other sources such as the media. While the primary data in grounded theory is usually interviews, Clarke (2005) encourages the use of all relevant data such as material already published, as well as less traditional material such as visual and geographic material. This methodology focuses on active engagement, on theorising rather than finding a theory. This active engagement is also reflected in communicating the research in writing, with encouragement to use our personal voices as researchers and to make the voices of participants visible as well (Mills et al., 2006, p. 7). The theorising is recognised to be contingent, constructed, and not the final word. Thus for simplicity in language, while this project will refer to what peacekeepers think, or what peacekeepers know, it always refers back to the specific peacekeepers interviewed, and the understanding and meaning which was developed in relationship with their perspectives and analysis. This is an important point to keep in mind when reading this thesis. I am not claiming that all peacekeepers think similarly to those I interviewed, nor to have found the singular objective truth.

## Interview participants

I interviewed 53 people<sup>3</sup> between 30 June 2011 and 5 June, 2012. I am deeply grateful to the 53 people who gifted me their time, intelligence, perspectives and stories.

**Table 1 Characteristics of the participants<sup>4</sup>**

Sample characteristics		
<b>Total</b>	<b>53</b> (3 served in two roles)	
	Male	36
	Female	17
	Military	17
	Police	17
	UCP	17
	Civilians (in military peacekeeping missions)	5
<b>Organization</b>	<b>Number interviewed</b>	
United Nations	18 (5 served in multiple missions and 3 served in UN missions that became NATO)	
NATO	11 (three served in 2 missions)	
RAMSI (Solomon Islands) <sup>5</sup>	10 (three served multiple times)	
Australian/New Zealand (Solomon Islands, Timor Leste) <sup>6</sup>	6 (2 served in both the Solomon Islands and Timor Leste)	
EU	3	
AU	1	
Nonviolent Peaceforce	12 (5 served in two missions)	
Peace Brigades International	6 (3 served twice or more and one also worked with NP)	
<b>UN/EU/NATO/AU countries or areas of intervention</b>	Afghanistan, Bosnia, Burundi, Chad, DRC <sup>7</sup> , Eritrea/Ethiopia, Georgia, Kosovo, Lebanon, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Timor Leste	
Nonviolent Peaceforce	Sri Lanka, Guatemala, Philippines, S. Sudan	
Peace Brigades International	Guatemala, Indonesia – Aceh and W. Papua, Nepal, W. Timor	
<b>Nationalities of those interviewed</b>		
	Australia (3), Canada (2), Egypt, Finland, Germany (2), India, Ireland, Kenya, Nepal (2), NZ (19), Poland, S. Africa, S. Korea, Sri Lanka, Sweden (3), Switzerland, UK (5), US (7)	

<sup>3</sup> My research design called for interviewing 40 people, but in the process of snowball sampling I was able to interview 53, thus including a broader set of perspectives.

<sup>4</sup> Appendix A contains a list of the interviewees, identified by the initials I assigned them, and other characteristics of interest. These details are limited in order to protect their identity either at their request or in my judgment of the ease with which they might otherwise be identified. In particular I have identified people by region rather than country. It seemed there might be only one person from a particular country who served in several missions at particular dates.

<sup>5</sup> RAMSI – Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands.

<sup>6</sup> Australia and New Zealand sent peacekeepers to the Solomon Islands before the RAMSI in 2002 and to Timor Leste before the UN mission in 2006.

<sup>7</sup> Democratic Republic of Congo.

This set of participants enabled me to interview a few people from many places, in order to get a preliminary sense of cultural differences or similarities in how peacekeepers in many different roles, understand effective peacekeeping. However, while reaching a broad cross section of peacekeepers, the sample does not have representation from Central or South America despite efforts to include peacekeepers from these areas. This was one of the limitations of conducting interviews in English. Ease of access to former peacekeepers in New Zealand, and the kind cooperation of the New Zealand Police led this to be the single largest nationality.

The peacekeepers interviewed worked in many different contexts in terms of the stages of conflicts, as well as geographies, cultures, institutions, and mandates. All of the UN, EU, AU and RAMSI missions were post conflict missions (with the exception of Bosnia), though a number of people interviewed experienced episodes of armed conflict or violence during their peacekeeping. All of the military peacekeeping missions are considered to be second generation or third generation peacekeeping, with the exception of Afghanistan which might be thought of as a hybrid with the UN mission being multidimensional peace operations and the NATO mission considered a stability and security operation. The Australia and New Zealand interventions in Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands were undertaken by regional ad-hoc groups and occurred during or just after violent periods and before more formalised peace missions were in place. I interviewed four people who were peacekeepers during those transitions.

The interventions or projects carried out by Peace Brigades International (PBI) were not characterised by PBI as peacekeeping missions nor were they officially related to internationally authorised missions, though they overlapped with some. However they meet my definition of peacekeeping so I have included them. Their work in Guatemala spanned several periods of armed conflict and continues today. The project in Aceh began during the armed conflict and closed in 2008 as peace seemed to be taking root. The project in West Papua was not focused around a particular armed struggle but rather responding to the need of human rights activists for protection, though there was a secessionist movement underway. The project closed in 2010 at least in part due to government restrictions. The Nepal project began in 2006 in the midst of what was then primarily political turmoil, which has continued despite the signing of formal peace accords.

The Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) characterises their work as unarmed civilian peacekeeping (UCP). The NP project in Sri Lanka began during the period following an official ceasefire, and continued through the renewed fighting and end of the war, closing in late 2011. The project in Mindanao, Philippines began during a period of armed conflict in late 2006. The NP project became a part of the International Monitoring Team in 2009, leading the civilian protection component. NP's South Sudan project began in mid-2010, a period marked by the lead up to elections in 2011 as called for in the 2005 peace accords. After the elections South Sudan separated from Sudan, becoming an independent country. NP has continued to work in the post separation violence, in part under contract with UN agencies involved in the UN mission.

The sample (see Table One above) includes people from different countries and different missions, and many different positions. For instance the military category includes people who served in an army or navy, two who served as medics, as well as one general, one brigadier general, two colonels and one lieutenant at the time I interviewed them, though they were lower ranked officers at the time of their service. The rest were not ranked at the time of their service. Most of the police interviewed served as commanders or heads of their units, though three were simply basic officers. Three of the five civilians also served as heads of their unit or office, while two were simply employees within a specific unit. The UCP however, were all frontline staff except for one country director, one trainer and one security consultant.

Initially the interviewees were located via convenience sampling through my own personal networks, and the networks of my supervisors and colleagues at the University of Otago.<sup>8</sup> This quickly moved to snowball sampling, as people I interviewed referred me to others whom they thought would be interested. This then led to theoretical sampling where I sought out specific categories of people to shed further light on the issues emerging in the research. I received permission to include former peacekeepers from the New Zealand Police Department and referrals to police who might be willing to be interviewed (none were compelled to participate and several chose not to). As part of this effort I placed a request for participants in the quarterly newsletter of the New Zealand RSA (Returned Services' Association) which reaches former military peacekeepers (among others) in New Zealand. In particular I sought out peacekeepers who served in the

---

<sup>8</sup> See (Morse, 2007) for a discussion of sampling in grounded theory.

armed forces from the developing world or global south to explore similarities and differences with those I had interviewed from the global north.

### Research process

I conducted semi-structured interviews between June, 2011 and June, 2012 with frontline peacekeepers regarding their understanding of effective peacekeeping.<sup>9</sup> The research design was approved by the Otago University Human Ethics Committee and each participant signed an informed consent which included the reminder that their responses would be kept anonymous and that they were free to withdraw at any time or decline to answer specific questions. I started with a set of questions about how frontline peacekeepers conceptualise effective peacekeeping, how it works, what they understand peacekeeping contributes (if anything) to the overall peace mission, how they think about formal and informal practices (see Appendix B for an outline of potential interview questions and Appendix C for the participant information sheet). Additionally I wanted to understand how they know this - their ways of knowing, and their views of their missions. I intended to explore the similarities and differences between different kinds of peacekeepers – i.e. military, police, civilians and unarmed civilian peacekeepers (UCP). Initial concerns with which I began my research included: did it matter if they were armed or not; how did carrying weapons affect frontline military and police perceptions of effectiveness, if at all; how did not carrying weapons affect civilians' perceptions; did their views result from their experiences, from previously held perspectives, from what others tell them and if so, who these others are; what was their “way of knowing”?

Most of the interviews took place via Skype<sup>10</sup> or phone, though six of the New Zealand interviews were conducted face to face in Dunedin, NZ. The shortest interview was approximately 45 minutes and the longest close to two hours. There was no noticeable difference between the interviews conducted via Skype or in person. The shortest and longest interviews happened to be face to face. While in person interviews

---

<sup>9</sup> Of the 53 interviews, only three occurred after March, 2012.

<sup>10</sup> Skype is free downloadable software that allows free calls computer to computer, as well as toll calls to almost any place in the world. In addition I used MP3 Skype call recorder to record skype calls, downloaded from [http://voipcallrecording.com/MP3\\_Skype\\_Recorder](http://voipcallrecording.com/MP3_Skype_Recorder) in June, 2011.



allowed for eye contact,<sup>11</sup> I was not aware of this making a significant difference in terms of content. While some interviews were easy to arrange, involving the exchange of one or two emails, others took numerous email exchanges and changes in schedule before occurring. Three people who evidenced initial interest, did not answer my follow up emails. Whether in person or via Skype, I tried to convey interest, warmth, acceptance and safety. Through comments such as ‘oh that sounds like something that happened with me in Sri Lanka’, I tried to convey a sense of shared experience, positioning myself as another peacekeeper, with empathy toward their experiences.

I reflected in my journaling about how power plays out in this kind of interview process. The initial power is with the interviewees as they can grant an interview or not, and will share only what they choose. However it is in my power as the researcher to analyse and make meaning with what they have shared with me and how I present this. I set the agenda with my questions and made use of their material.<sup>12</sup> I felt that some perceived me as having a power to impact peacekeeping practices and told stories, often coloured by anger, which they wanted to be heard more widely. This was despite describing myself as a graduate student, with little idea about the potential impact of my work. It is not clear to me that one role or the other has more power in the interview process, but rather we have different power and different perceptions of power. I recognise that in the process of analysing and writing this thesis, I have exercised power in choosing what material to share and how I interpret their words.

Clearly some of the conditions which affected participation in this research included the requirement for significant English fluency (all interviews were conducted in English), access to email and phones, and most fundamentally an interest and willingness to participate. I do not know if there is a significant difference in understanding among people who would choose not to participate in this kind of research. Another aspect of the research is taking what peacekeepers say at face value, responding to and interpreting information and insights they shared as being true for themselves at the time they were speaking. As the methodology for this project is constructivist grounded theory, I was

---

<sup>11</sup> While I could have used the video option when calling people who were also using Skype, due to insufficient broadband on one or both ends of the calls, it was rarely possible to support two way video, so I decided not to use it at all.

<sup>12</sup> See Fine, Weis, Weseen and Wong (2003) as an example of the literature on our power as researchers, and how it is incumbent on researchers to consider how we use this power.

focused on their perspectives as they emerged in our interaction. While I made no attempt to verify what peacekeepers reported, many of their thoughts are reflected in the literature reviewed elsewhere in this thesis.<sup>13</sup> Some of the strength in this research is the breadth and diversity in the people interviewed, as described above.

Another limitation however, was the lack of focus groups commonly used in grounded theory. Given the wide geographical spread of participants, (even those from New Zealand came from different parts of the country), an in person focus group was not viable. I had planned to create an online forum with sufficient structure to protect the identity of those who chose to participate. I experimented with several different forum hosting sites, but was not satisfied with the identity protections until I found bulletinboards.com,<sup>14</sup> where I did set up a site. But by then interest and willingness had fallen off presumably due to the long time lag between interviews and the invitation to participate in the forum. Only three of those I interviewed, upon re-contact were interested in participating and I decided it was not possible to protect their identity well enough in this situation, as two of them came from the same organisation.

Following grounded theory methodology, I reflected on each interview as I was transcribing and coding.<sup>15</sup> I transcribed each interview and then coded and categorised them using Weft software.<sup>16</sup> I kept a research journal which included my memos on codes and categories. My initial interviews stayed close to the initial outline of questions. I asked everyone about the activities of peacekeeping, why and how they became peacekeepers, the dilemmas they faced, and what they understood to have been effective, as these provided grounding in the realities of their experiences. As the interviewing process continued, one of the clearest emerging themes was the centrality of relationships in peacekeeping, and how relationships are formed and work in the context of peacekeeping. The actual questions asked varied in response to both specific issues raised by the person being interviewed and my decision to focus on understanding what people

---

<sup>13</sup> In particular see Pouligny (2006), Talentino (2007), Mvukiyehe and Samii(2010b) and Whalen (2010) for research related to how people in host countries view peacekeeping and peacekeepers.

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.bulletinboards.com/>

<sup>15</sup> For good discussions of working with data via coding and frequent reflection on emerging themes, in grounded theory see (Lempert, 2007), (Clarke, 2005), (Charmaz, 2006) and (Holton, 2007).

<sup>16</sup> Free qualitative analysis software available at <http://www.pressure.to/qda/> as of 3 June, 2011

meant when they said good relationships are important. In this way, later interviews were shaped by the on-going research process. I had follow up interviews with four participants to better understand their views on the meaning of good relationships and how they developed and maintained them. I also sent an initial draft of the analysis of themes and theorising in this chapter to approximately ten others whose feedback I was interested in reviewing, receiving replies from eight.

I reached saturation<sup>17</sup> in my interviews with UCPs and in the questions regarding how peacekeepers know what works. By this I mean that while each interview contributed important insights, I felt I had a sufficient breadth of contributions in those areas, and new insights were minor. New interviews were not adding to my understanding of how UCPs understood peacekeeping, nor how peacekeepers know what works. I also felt I had achieved relative saturation with interviews with police and members of the armed services. I believe I have constructed an initial analysis of how armed peacekeepers understand their work. That said, I would have liked to interview a larger number of military peacekeepers from the global south, and to have interviewed police from more regions of the world. Police proved to be the most difficult category to reach, outside of New Zealand (I am deeply grateful to the New Zealand police for their participation and approval of my research and to the Australian and Swedish police who also participated). New Zealand police have a particular view of community policing. In many peacekeeping operations, formed police units (FPU) are used and I would have liked to include their perspectives as well. Perhaps this reflects both the relative scarcity of police in peacekeeping missions, compared to soldiers and civilians, as well as the limits of the networks I was able to access. The category with the fewest interviews was civilians in peacekeeping missions. As I progressed I realised that while their perspectives contributed to my understanding, frontline peacekeepers out in communities actually “keeping the peace” in some fashion, had more to say to my starting questions. Thus I did not pursue further interviews in this category.

I realised as I started my research that I held an assumption that unarmed civilian peacekeepers (UCP) would somehow seem superior to other forms of peacekeeping. This was not supported by my interviews. What emerged is a much more nuanced, complex picture of peacekeeping. I also realised that the dichotomy of my initial inquiry

---

<sup>17</sup> See (Charmaz, 2006) chapter 5 for an in-depth discussion of saturation. Briefly saturation refers to the experience of not gathering substantive new information or perspectives, from further interviews.

into armed and unarmed peacekeeping was too narrow, binary and linear. Peacekeeping involves a range of interventions, at different stages, in different cultures and environments. Another assumption that surfaced more clearly as I proceeded was the assumption that frontline people somehow know more than people in the headquarters or elsewhere. I began to see that a more useful way to think about this is that frontline people know “differently”, their knowing comes through direct experience, a form of social learning (Merriam, 2001). As I realised how much my assumptions were colouring what I heard, I went back and recoded all of the interviews and was interested to see how differently I “heard” each interview, when reading them many weeks later and in most cases, after I had completed many more interviews. I believe it helped me in analysing the nuances of what had been shared with me, to see things less simplistically.

These interviews are lifted out of their contexts in several ways. They are interviews with individuals whose work was embedded in organisations, in particular environments affected by conflicts. Yet they are singular voices, discussing experiences of the past, in currently more peaceful contexts.<sup>18</sup> The interviews reflect thinking and feeling at particular moments of time, not necessarily what the same person would say on a different day. It is impossible in the written form, to convey the emotions expressed in people’s voices. I have taken the interviews themselves apart, separated into codes and categories, and developed themes.<sup>19</sup> Through this process, and these individual interviews, I have theorised and constructed an understanding of peacekeeping, grounded in the data, influenced by critical peace studies and shaped by my analysis.

In the following section on themes and theorising, I have tried to accurately reflect the perspectives of peacekeepers I interviewed, but also acknowledge that what I created is affected by my own lens, experiences, and standpoint. It seems easy and glib to suggest that the focus on relationships which I discuss below, reflects my being female. Relationships are stereotypically considered feminine and force masculine in my global north culture.<sup>20</sup> Perhaps the frequent mention of relationships in interviews stems from

---

<sup>18</sup> With the exception of four people who I interviewed while they were still active in their mission or project.

<sup>19</sup> Clarke (2005, p.8) describes this process of analysis, of deconstructing and developing interpretations, as one of the differences between grounded theory and some other qualitative methods.

<sup>20</sup> For interesting discussion of gender and peacekeeping see Whitworth(2004, 2005) and Kembler (2010).

the perception of both male and female peacekeepers from all categories that as a woman I would be interested in or understand this aspect of peacekeeping. My class and race privilege have much to do with why I was able to pursue graduate studies and the ease with which I was able to network across continents. My deep commitment to nonviolence and desire for a more peaceful and just world is responsible for the focus of this thesis and surely drew my attention to some things and not to others. Standpoint theory suggests that all this influences my analysis. I do not claim that what I have to share is the objective truth, but it is the understanding I have constructed. I hope this work is useful in both its critique of, and envisioning improvements in, peacekeeping.

### **Effective peacekeeping themes and theorising**

As I read and reread, coded and reflected,<sup>21</sup> the following major themes emerged for me, from the data gathered in interviews with peacekeepers. In this chapter and section, I present summaries of the data organised by theme, without relating this to literature in the field. This will be done in the subsequent analytic chapters. Following this section, which describes each theme, is an overview and analysis which relates these themes to each other, making a coherent whole. The next six chapters then relate the analysis that I constructed from this data, with other theories of peacekeeping and related topics, by theme.

When reading the quotes below and throughout this thesis, the first initial of the participant identification code indicates in which role the participant served. I am aware that my responses to each interview were affected by the role(s) of the interviewee. I assume that readers will also want to locate these quotes as belonging to particular categories and notice the impact that has on their perceptions. Therefore the two identification initials I arbitrarily assigned each interview during the research process are preceded by an M for former military peacekeepers, a P for police, a C for civilian and a U for unarmed civilian peacekeepers.<sup>22</sup> For example MAP is a former military

---

<sup>21</sup> See Lempert (2007) and Holton (2007) for discussions of the iterative process of coding and reflection in grounded theory.

<sup>22</sup> The chart in Appendix A which lists all the interview participants includes the information on each person's role as well.

peacekeeper, PAV a former police peacekeeper, CBB a civilian and UAS an unarmed civilian peacekeeper. For those who served in more than one category, I have entered both identifying initials, for instance M/CAC first served as a military and then as a civilian in a peacekeeping mission. Additionally, I include the quoted material verbatim, not correcting for generally accepted English grammar. I believe this gives the reader a closer experience of the interview.

### What is peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is primarily conceptualised by peacekeepers whom I interviewed, as work by third parties, focused on preventing violence, protecting people and supporting local problem-solving and/or making space for local people to find their own solutions.<sup>23</sup> In general people tended to emphasize one aspect more than others, but included references to several aspects of peacekeeping in their reflections. This is an area of apparent disconnect between many of the mandates of peacekeeping with the orientation, understanding and experiences of peacekeepers. Mandates from multilateral institutions tend to be broad, reflect assumptions that peacekeeping is about creating stable sovereign states, and in support of a specific peace agreement which may require efforts to prevent violence and protect people. The mandates are focused at a national level for implementation. Peacekeepers, being rooted in the places and with the people with whom they work, have a more immediate, everyday focus on the practice or actions that contribute to decreasing violence, increasing protection, and for those who assumed that local people can and will solve their own conflicts if it is safe to do so, providing support to local initiatives. Their understanding of peacekeeping is informed by their interactions with local people in these communities, and this I believe, contributed to their perceptions of local people as active participants (whether cooperative or oppositional) in the processes.

Peacekeepers across the board used similar language in response to the question “what is peacekeeping?” However the people who had served as UCP’s frequently added a proviso about doing this with nonviolent processes. Police and UCP’s mentioned supporting local efforts more often than those who were in armed services. Thus while

---

<sup>23</sup> In the literature the phrase local ownership is also frequently used. I use these three phrases - local problem-solving, local ownership and making space for local actors – to refer to efforts to support local people solving their own problems. See Chapter Six for discussion of issues of definition and implementation of these phrases and the mixed or ambiguous nature of ‘local’.

military peacekeepers might refer to preventing an outbreak of further fighting, UCP would also talk about using nonviolence to make space for peacefully addressing conflicts. Some emphasized protection as the primary focus of peacekeeping. From an UCP perspective UBH emphasises the need to protect civilians who may be purposefully targeted or caught in the crossfire, using the metaphor of a protective shield.

UBH: The purpose of this work is to pay attention to the people who, and to provide direct protection, to basically put a pin in it and put a protective shield around people being used as cannon fodder whether overtly and purposefully or as a by product of a conflict.

A police peacekeeper emphasises the need to stop fighting, to keep peace between people in conflict, but also to provide other help as they can.

PBK: From my perspective, my understanding, from a police perspective, is you are going over there and keeping peace between people who are fighting and in a conflict. My understanding is to help stop the fighting and stop the conflict and to assist in any way we can.

Whereas MAP has a military orientation to using force and coercion to prevent large scale attacks on civilians.

MAP: I would use crisis management, or conflict management for these broader missions where you can use force or coercive power, to try to prevent genocide happening or something.

All three of these quotes emphasise protecting people. PBK includes other kinds of assistance, and MAP understands the use of force as an inherent part of peacekeeping in some conditions.

Some define peacekeeping with an emphasis on making space for local people to engage in processes to resolve their conflicts.

UAL: Inserting a nonpartisan presence between two sides, it makes a space between them, prevents further conflict, makes time and space for dialogue, and negotiation. The crux of it is to increase the space, provide space between parties in conflict.

This is one of many mentions of the phrase 'make space'. At times making space seems to be a more abstract metaphor for creating sufficient safety, but at others, such as in this quote, it refers to literally creating a place and time for dialogue and negotiation.

This space is created by the presence of nonpartisan peacekeepers, who in some literal or relational way, get between the parties to interrupt the conflict and provide a way for them to engage nonviolently.

Some I interviewed, such as PAI below, referred to supporting law and order as the purpose of peacekeeping.

PAI: I don't know... peacekeeping is really about the core values of society, prevention of harm and preserve a system of order.

UAI is the only one to state that deterring violence and protecting people is a side line to the main activity of supporting local engagement, but I heard the perspective a number of times that the long term purpose of interventions is to support local actors from all sectors of society to address their issues nonviolently.

UAI: For me this is the most powerful thing. Apart from saving lives, that is a sideline activity actually, by our presence we deter violence and destruction of property, but if you look deeply at what we do, the primary goal is really, we give voice to civilians, to give them that level of confidence...

Peacekeepers used general phrases to define peacekeeping that were primarily focused on action at the local level. There were very few references to peace agreements or mandates. This is in line with their understanding of effective peacekeeping as it manifests in communities. The themes I present next reflect what peacekeepers believed contributes to effective peacekeeping.

### Organisational effectiveness

One significant group of elements that were mentioned as being effective describe internal organisational effectiveness. This includes actions, conditions or processes internal to the intervening organisation that supported good work in the community. These mostly tend to be self-explanatory, such as good staff training, good equipment and good logistical support. Internal processes such as clear organisational decision making and communication were also mentioned. Less obvious perhaps were references to processes that linked internal and external effectiveness, such as rapid deployment of an intervention. MBI explains that the rate of deployment (which reflects internal processes), is linked to effectiveness because it impacts how local people respond.



MBI: So then we had rapid deployment, ships coming in and troops arriving, very rapid. People started to have hope in the system. If you don't have rapid deployment, if you don't have quick deployment, then the people lose hope.

Good leadership was mentioned frequently as a key to effective peacekeeping. MBL states this clearly as he reflects on his experience where a change in leadership made a huge difference in the effectiveness of the mission.

MBL: Maybe, just end with, I personally think the leadership of a mission right from the SRSG [special representative of the secretary general of the UN] down to the force commander, all the substantive component directors, you know the senior leadership in a mission can really make or break a mission.

Some aspects of effectiveness have to do with the team or unit itself. Several UCPs mentioned that the multicultural make up of their team had positive effects, while some of the military and police mentioned that units from certain countries are more effective than others and that the multicultural make up of their teams posed problems. Many viewed the selection of appropriate people to be peacekeepers as a critical contribution to effective peacekeeping.

The ratio of troop numbers to the size of the territory covered by the mission, while technically part of the mandate, is also an aspect of the intervening organisation. It is echoed in remarks made by UCPs regarding the limitations on effectiveness imposed by the small size of their staffs. While MBL could say that one of the problems with the mission in the DRC is the small number of troops compared to the size of the region, MBI mentioned the high ratio of troops to territory as an element of success in the Lebanon mission.

### Legitimacy and acceptance

The word legitimacy, which is frequently mentioned in the literature (Gelot, 2012; Whalan, 2010) was rarely used in interviews. Rather many discussed the need for acceptance, which seemed to me a related concept, in order to be effective. While not addressing the connection between a legitimately authorised and implemented mission with acceptance, peacekeepers discussed the need for the presence of the peacekeepers to be accepted. In order to work in a community, local people and belligerents must minimally accept you. MBI points out that at the most basic level of having a place to set

up and deploy there is a need for acceptance. He suggests this acceptance is contingent, at least in part, on local people perceiving that the peacekeepers played an important role.

MBI: Basically in any peacekeeping the land for the mission, the land for the deployment of the force, is provided by the host government. So we had difficulty finding land to deploy our troops, the people were so uncooperative at the beginning. But later on, gradually we were able to convince them .... the UN played a vital role, so then only we could find a way where we could deploy our troops.

Acceptance was thought to be augmented by the perception that peacekeepers are unbiased, impartial or nonpartisan.<sup>24</sup> M/CAC notes that maintaining this impression of impartiality, contributed to NATO's ability to work with all parties in Kosovo, to be perceived by all as a friend and helper.

M/CAC: Impartiality worked well. NATO managed to keep up the impression to be an impartial actor, overall, sometimes not, but overall. All parties see KFOR as a friend and helper.

Peacekeepers mentioned a number of barriers or challenges to acceptance. These included misbehaviour of peacekeepers and the need to meet and/or manage local people's expectations of the mission. Peacekeeping is seen as less legitimate by peacekeepers themselves as well as local people, when there is a concern or perception that external agendas and cultures are being imposed by the mission. Some felt that this undermined acceptance, or impeded effectiveness. PAI share his concern that peacekeepers not come in and tell local police what to do, and shares the positive experience of changing some of their procedures to be more relevant to local expectations.

PAI: Who are we to come in and tell them how to do it? So we changed some of our procedures. We had to do it their way, we had to respect their tradition, it worked.

The next themes address what peacekeepers thought was effective at accomplishing the purposes or goals of peacekeeping interventions.

---

<sup>24</sup> M/UAT explains why NP uses the word nonpartisan "NP is not neutral, we have an interest in the outcome -- we are interested in nonviolence, so we are not neutral -- but we are nonpartisan. Neutral is if you sit on the fence, with no stake, but NP's stake is in a nonviolent outcome."

## Preventing violence

One of the main purposes of peacekeeping according to those I interviewed, is to prevent violence. Peacekeepers prevent violence through presence on the ground, sometimes referred to as patrolling, or just spending time in the community. For example MBQ emphasises the protective result for women and children of simply being present in the community, while daily life tasks were going on around them.

MBQ: The most effective was just a presence, someone else was there.... The people most in danger tends to be women and children and just that presence improves their lot. So in many ways, pure presence provided them with some safety, some surety that they are going to go from A to B and not get beaten up on the way. It is that group of people, just be a presence, you make it better.

Presence, also sometimes referred to as accompaniment (when focused on particular people or a group), was described as being effective at preventing violence by providing international witnesses to what is happening, by providing a subtle or overt threat of military or police response to violence if it should occur, by disrupting the power dynamics in a community whereby some group or the government is able to harm civilians with impunity. Presence was described as being in and of itself supportive to local people or to community police to enable them to go about their work. Presence was also considered to be effective because by being present in a community, relationships are formed, which can be used to influence those who threaten the peace and safety in a community. Peacekeepers mentioned other factors that contributed to effectively preventing violence, including need for good information. And some peacekeepers shared examples of when force was needed to prevent violence directed toward others, themselves or both, or once started, to contain and end it.

Clearly there are limits to the ability of peacekeeping to prevent violence. Peacekeepers said that if a group is bent on committing violence, it is hard to prevent. Peacekeeping missions cannot guarantee there will not be more fighting. UAE describes both the limits to preventing violence and the success of a UCP project in protecting people. She describes the complexity of interactions that contributed to this protection, and contributed to wider changes in dynamics.

UAE: I do think if someone or group, really wanted to do harm to a person or group, we would not have been able to prevent it. I do think we delayed, may be changed, how people conducted their business. Truly bad actors will feel compelled to carry out their activities, I don't think they change their plans because internationals lived someplace, travelled here and there, but the big change was in dynamics, leveraging influence, establishing relationships that can influence actors, change dynamics, I do think we protected people via complex relationships, networks, coordination, over time, we influenced decision makers, as dynamics changed over time.

### Protecting people

A number of peacekeepers mentioned protecting people as a key aspect of being effective. Presence or accompaniment is described as both preventing violence, as mentioned above, and protecting people. This is perhaps common sense in that violence harms people, so preventing violence is a way to protect people, or vice versa. People were also protected with a specifically focused accompaniment strategy whereby peacekeepers maintain a presence with a threatened individual or community.<sup>25</sup> Accompaniment as a specific strategy to protect people was only mentioned by UCP, with the following exception. MBL, though not using the term accompaniment, describes using military personnel to protect specific people by accompanying them everywhere, as well as having troops in a wider perimeter on the alert.

MBL: Protecting the VIPs, rebels that were taken up in the transitional government. And protecting them from counter attacks and from whomever threatened them. [How did you do that?] In Burundi, for the VIP protection, we had VIP protectors that were stationed with VIPs in their homes and families, accompany them everywhere. And then at their homes we had troops that protected their homes. And then we had in a wider perimeter, troops that were deployed in different parts of the city.

### Making space for local ownership and problem-solving

Activities and approaches that support local problem-solving and/or local ownership of problems were frequently mentioned as effective, highlighting how peacekeepers thought it crucial to support local people in their work, decision making processes, implementation of new programs etc., rather than doing things for them. Peacekeepers linked this to acceptance and long term impact. For instance in talking

---

<sup>25</sup> See (Mahony & Eguren, 1997) for an extensive discussion of how accompaniment works.

about mentoring police PBG cautions against the tendency for mentors to fix things themselves, and suggests that what should happen is to influence local people to fix problems themselves.

PBG: So you tend to get, when people go mentoring, they operationalize themselves and they go in and they say oh we need to fix this, and then we will fix this, but really the idea is, you are trying to, maybe through a little bit of demonstration, influence someone who is in that organisation, to fix it themselves.

Supporting local problem-solving was seen as essential for the sustainability of the reduction in violence and other community changes. Peacekeepers suggest that being effective is to be no longer needed. And this requires supporting local work and local leadership. PBN shares her thoughts about this as ultimate goal of her work. She wanted to be able to leave knowing that local people were capable of taking care of themselves in relationship to the violence that had required peacekeeping intervention.

PBN: So my thoughts of peacekeeping and what I was doing there was really important, so then I could leave, and I could leave knowing that they could carry on. And it wasn't about me, it wasn't that it was going to fall over without me, but without international staff, they were capable of looking after the place, city, country and their safety all by themselves.

A few peacekeepers recognised that their intervention, while intended to be impartial or nonpartisan, impacted the local community in ways that were more supportive to some than others. Some commented on the complexity of understanding the local context and the challenge of knowing how to intervene. PBJ poignantly shares concerns about imposing specific forms of democracy and her concern that local people have to create their own democracy. I hear her speaking of herself, as well as more generally about the peacekeeping intervention, when she says that while our intentions are good, we may not be right. I think she means we may not be right in what we are doing in this intervention because there is not local ownership.

PBJ: We have our idea of how democracy works and how you are supposed to be a free person. But that doesn't mean it is correct for that country and these people living there. They have to create their own democracy, their own way. And democracy takes such a long long time to develop and it is such a delicate thing, a difficult thing. Because democracy is also changing a lot of things that you can never go back to, even if you think it was a good thing to

have, do you understand what I mean? So it is not always 100% that we are right, even though our intentions are good.

### Relationships are central to effective peacekeeping

Most peacekeepers believed that good relationships are central to effective peacekeeping. Good relationships were seen as the vehicle through which peacekeeping most effectively operates.<sup>26</sup> All of the themes mentioned above rely on relationships, as it is through relationships that peacekeeping deters violence, protects people and supports local problem-solving. I found it useful to conceptualise peacekeeping as taking place within relationships or relational fields<sup>27</sup> or systems, as does much of human activity. One way that seems helpful to conceptualize these relationships in peacekeeping, is moving within a range of mutuality and trust or divergent interests and mistrust. Thus the use of force and weapons in peacekeeping occurs in contexts of violent divergent interests, for instance between an active belligerent group and peacekeepers. Conversely sharing information with local community leaders to protect a community may occur in a context of task oriented, trusting, mutually beneficial relationships. Relationships are usually a mix of coercion and cooperation. While coercive relationships are not necessarily violent, as the presence of international observers providing accompaniment (as discussed above) can coerce armed actors to curtail violence, cooperative relationships are thought to produce more sustainable results. UAJ, describes the benefits of developing trusting relationships in his work as part of the International Monitoring Team in Mindanao, which allows different groups to begin to appreciate each other and work on resolving difficult issues.

UAJ: The issues of people coming in to peace negotiations or finding solutions to violent conflict, it becomes a more open engagement, people start to lose guard, people start to appreciate the contribution of different actors into the violent conflict. So for me, this is how best it works, it really creates some sense of confidence among the parties involved and it builds some kind of relationships of trust and this can help move forward especially on sticky issues. This is how I see it working now.

---

<sup>26</sup> As already described in the Introduction, good relationships are task oriented, and characterized by trust, confidence, mutual benefit and cooperation. The phrase ‘good relationships’ in this thesis always refers to these factors. See Chapter Eight for extensive discussion of relationships in peacekeeping.

<sup>27</sup> I use this phrase similarly to Goldstone (2004), a complex web of relationships, mutual connections, with different degrees of power and depth. Interventions enter the existing field, and change and are changed by it.

Peacekeepers perceived effective peacekeeping as needing good relationships within the intervening organisation and between peacekeepers and local people, local authorities, belligerents, and between national and international organisations in the field. Often they were referring to relationships with leaders such as village chiefs, mayors, local elders or local military leaders, but some were also referring to relationships with ordinary people. Peacekeepers must be reliable and credible, able to follow through on what they say. Words used to characterise good relationships included trust, confidence, mutual benefit, nonpartisan, acceptance, engaged, respect, understanding, cooperation, goodwill.

Forming relationships in peacekeeping, as in most informal relationships, requires time and frequent interaction with people engaging in shared activities. Building relationships can involve local customs, and some found living in the communities and speaking the language contributed to good relationships and improved understanding of the local situation. Relationships are considered essential for understanding the context and what interventions might be useful and for sharing of reliable information. This was frequently stressed, for instance M/CAC noted he spent time with people just chatting, sharing about a wide range of topics. This built relationships that allowed him to gather information of value to his mission.

M/CAC: We talk about anything, family and politics, to keep up to date. With a good relationship they eventually share information and important developments. And I make recommendations to the commander.

Though rarely addressed directly, there seemed a tension between using relationships more narrowly primarily for information gathering versus perceiving them as a critical element contributing to most effective peacekeeping tasks. Relationships were understood to be instrumental in protecting civilians as they were essential for gathering information, but also because civilians would ask for help when it was needed. They were also mentioned by some as important for self-protection. MAY notes that they relied on local people to warn them of danger, and that they could do this because they had close relationships. He also notes this was a dilemma, because being out in the community building relationships might put staff at risk.

MAY: The security dilemma -- the need to be out in the community versus security, the threat wasn't as much then as it is

now, but the physical risk of staff versus being close to the local people. The Defence force has taken the view of having close relationships with local people, the more secure you are, in the sense you will be warned of anything that might happen, that they think anyone is meaning you harm, and that is certainly how it worked when I was there, because we were out in the community, we relied on the community to help us with our security, to help protect us.

Peacekeepers also discussed that once relationships are built or developed, it is essential to maintain them. This was described as seeking out feedback, regular contact, and being able to manage people's expectations through regular and trusted communication.

Many other aspects of how relationships are critical in effective peacekeeping were discussed. Relationships are used to build networks with other organisations, both local and international to coordinate activities and services. Peacekeepers saw themselves acting as bridges or facilitators at times, helping to connect local people with needed resources. Peacekeepers can bring people together across divides, when they have relationships with people from different parts of a conflict. Peacekeepers also discuss the need for good relationships within their organisation. Knowing people personally within an organisation as large and complex as the UN for example, was seen as critical. Having good relationships with the people on your team is also important and when mistrust develops, it undermines the work. Both police and military peacekeepers discussed being involved with mentoring at times. Not surprisingly, good relationships are considered essential with those you mentor.

Speaking from experiences in Afghanistan<sup>28</sup> MBP highlights the importance of relationships because whatever the purpose or goals of an intervention, effectiveness ultimately hinges on relationships with other humans, rather than weaponry. He makes an interesting play on the word 'terrain' as generally in the military, terrain is geographical, but here he uses it to emphasize the need for good relationships.

MBP: Relationships are more important than any body armour or mine resistant vehicle the government could purchase. I can only speak about Afghanistan because that is where the majority of my

---

<sup>28</sup> As already noted, there is controversy regarding Afghanistan as a peacekeeping mission, but as this quote demonstrates, relationships were considered essential by the former military who served in missions there.



experience has been. It is a human terrain, and in order to operate effectively on that human terrain, you have to have relationships.

The context in which peacekeepers work is another factor that seemed to impact the creation of relationships. Some contexts were more violent or more foreign to the peacekeepers. And the same context might be experienced differently by different peacekeepers.

Lastly, and of importance in understanding how peacekeepers understood relationships, a number of peacekeepers mentioned that they enjoyed being in relationships with local people, that it was the most satisfying part of their time as peacekeepers. Several military peacekeepers also mentioned they felt it was a way to humanise themselves with local people, which was very important to them.

### UN peacekeeping faces challenges

Many of the peacekeepers I interviewed worked in or with UN missions. Numerous challenges to UN effectiveness were mentioned.<sup>29</sup> One of the most frequent was the requirement to have national balance, or staff from many different countries, combined in specific units or on the same missions. Peacekeepers from the global north voiced concerns that troops and police from the global south underperformed and were not held accountable. Concerns were mentioned about motivation – others only there for the money, as well as ethics – that troops, police and civilians from the global south engaged in corrupt practices, lied, spread HIV, and were not reliable in police or military actions. Only a few mentioned concerns about the motivation and skills of peacekeepers who were also from the global north.

Several of the military from the global south voiced criticisms of the poor cultural sensitivity of troops from the global north and additionally that the few officers from the global north who were part of UN mission commands, arrived without an understanding of peacekeeping. Military from the global north were seen by some as too oriented to the use of force, even to the point of just showing off. These are just some of the challenges raised by the multinational character of UN missions, which affect relationships within the mission, and thus their effectiveness in the field.

---

<sup>29</sup> As this thesis is primarily focused on what is effective in many kinds of peacekeeping, this is a brief summary of the extensive descriptions offered in interviews of what does not work well in UN peacekeeping.

There was a pervasive sense that there is no or inadequate accountability within UN missions, that complaints and concerns were ignored. Another concern was a perception that UN rules of engagement were unclear and contradictory. Many concerns were raised about the political processes and relationships within the UN. These ranged from the problems already mentioned related to multinational staff and the perception that leadership was chosen for political reasons rather than competency.

Of particular concern to those in the field was the lack of effective UN engagement with local communities, the differing rules that each military used in the same mission, or the perception of a disconnect between police and military components of a mission. Some perceived the UN as taking over government functions when there were local authorities that could have done the work with support, and the way this undermined the government they were there to support. There were reflections that the UN system is too big, is ‘the blue monster’, cannot be changed and is disorganised. Many mentioned problems with UN logistics and access to resources.

There were concerns that the UN does not and cannot address the underlying dynamics of the conflict. CBB worked for a UN agency in Afghanistan, and discussed debates as to whether the UN’s presence was worthwhile. She concluded that as the UN was able to help some, it was better that they were there, but felt the UN was not addressing the underlying issues, in particular as the politics of the Security Council hampered their efforts.

CBB: I think it was that while the UN could provide some services and some help to local people, so it was better that they were there than not. The UN was not addressing the underlying issues of the conflict, in part because they were too influenced by the Security Council and the big country agendas.

This sense of the limited value of their work may have contributed to some peacekeepers voicing concerns about burnout which they felt and saw around them. Another related concern was that UN peacekeeping is too focused on the military intervention and not enough on meeting people’s expectations for development aid. Of serious concern to a few is the way a peacekeeping mission can undermine or distort the local economy.

On the positive side, a number of those I interviewed appreciated the UN, perceiving it as an essential part of international relations and providing unique and

essential functions. And while some criticised the UN for lack of coordination within missions, others appreciated the role the UN plays in coordination of different organisations and actors. The neutrality of the UN was praised by some peacekeepers as an important factor in being effective. Others mentioned that the UN played a valuable role in providing civilians with recourse and concrete aid, within difficult situations.

Some of the same concerns about the UN were raised about NATO and the EU as well, including the issues with competing agendas, weak mandates, and large bureaucracies that are impervious to change.

### Limits to peacekeeping

Peacekeepers believed that peacekeeping has significant limitations. These were described overtly or by implication. In different ways people acknowledged that if a group is bent on doing harm, they will find a way, and that even when a country has signed the peace agreement, if the government or another armed group wants to abrogate it, they will just push the peacekeepers out of the way. The perceived dilemma of protecting staff versus protecting local people limits the ability to protect civilians in some circumstances, given the vulnerability of peacekeepers. As mentioned before, there is a widely shared concern that peacekeeping is not addressing the underlying issues which may prolong the intervention. MBQ notes that the underlying issues are often socio-economic and not addressed by peacekeeping.

MBQ: But yes, in many ways, I use the analogy of a wound, the people [peacekeepers] coming in are like a Band-Aid, but you haven't treated the cause of the wound, all you have done is slap a band aid over the top. Stop the bleeding and the patient will survive, but the big issues here is, in most of these countries the big issues are socio-economic.

Many concerns about the limits to the use of force were shared, such as this expression by M/UAT, who notes that when peacekeepers use force it can shift the perception of peacekeeping to being part of the problem, not impartial, and even a stakeholder in the conflict.

M/UAT: Now in chapter VI ½ missions it is more military focused, to save lives and reduce violence, to keep bullies out of the schoolyard. They're now prepared to use force, but being careful not to become a stakeholder to the conflict. Which is very easy once you start injuring and killing people.

Peacekeepers suggested that while it is possible for peacekeeping in some circumstances to make space for local people, what local people do is not up to the peacekeepers. Instances of local people not taking on leadership, not working for democracy, and not implementing the training or mentoring offered, demonstrate this limitation.

There was recognition of limits to what can be accomplished with force and limits to what can be accomplished without it. UCPs talk about the need for careful analysis, recognising that they cannot operate in all contexts, that they pick their conflicts carefully. UAM describes the kind of analysis PBI undertakes before starting a project, as their way of intervening only works when someone in power cares about the presence and influence of foreigners.

UAM: PBI is careful about the country context we go into. Someone in power in that country has to be sensitive to what foreign governments think, and doesn't want foreigners to see what is going on, that would mess up their getting IMF loans etc., they need to be dependent on it, so they care and don't want foreigners to get hurt.

The phrase “we made a difference” or some variation on that, often preceded a recognition that while there was some impact, it was limited. Many peacekeepers noted they could only make small changes, or only impact a few people. PBJ struggles with how many issues there are, and her sense of frustration at how little change is made. She acknowledges that it is up to local people to decide what they will do about all these issues. She concludes that if you influence even one person, you have to recognise that as making a difference and be happy about that, because you cannot change the whole world.

PBJ: Sometimes it is very frustrating to do these missions, there are so many problems that you see, so many issues that you want to discuss, both in police matters, in female matters, in how children are treated, so many big issues that make you want to cry. But you have to try and you think that at least you are giving them some options that they can do something, then it is up to them to make their own choices. And it takes such a long time. This is not the only solution, but at least you have to, it is frustrating you think, does this really matter, make a change, does it make a difference, but I think it really does, if you affect even one person just a little bit to make them think differently or act differently,

you make a difference and you have to be happy with that, you can't change the whole world, that is impossible as I see it.

Many poignant thoughts were shared about the need to make a difference, to be effective, in very difficult circumstances. In this quote, UBH refers to the importance of protecting each human life. She describes the urgency she feels that while negotiations at high levels are going on, local people are being attacked and killed. We, that is collectively as humans who care, need to find ways to effectively protect people during these dangerous times.

UBH: ...put a protective shield around people being used as cannon fodder whether overtly and purposefully or as a by-product of a conflict that is going on and to recognise the importance of each human life that happens. I think we see many many examples of this. If you look at the riots in Kenya, there were many high level meetings going on between the leaders, the EU was involved in negotiations, lots of film coverage of the very well fed men sitting in a conference room, talking about how to negotiate it and every minute that was happening, houses were being burned, women were being raped, people were being killed. And those kinds of negotiations have to happen, it is just the political structure of the world. But there has to be, there is a moral imperative that, there are more needs out there, someone has to say while that is happening we have to do as much as we can because every hour that negotiation is happening is unbelievably dangerous.

#### How peacekeepers know they are being effective

Peacekeepers are oriented toward understanding their work based on local, everyday experiences.<sup>30</sup> Therefore it is not surprising that they report looking to their immediate context for cues regarding their effectiveness. In response to questions regarding how they knew what they had just shared really worked, peacekeepers almost universally said they knew about what was effective and the impact of their work through what local people said and did. In other words, this knowing is constructed in relationships, in the embodied interactions between peacekeepers and the people they work with.

---

<sup>30</sup> Mitchell (2011, p. 1627), summarising literature on the everyday, notes that engaging in the everyday practices of life in a community leads to knowing concerned with human needs and relationships, among other knowledges.

Peacekeepers describe working to maintain good relationships with people in the local communities, to maintain acceptance and cooperation. For many, part of this process involved looking for feedback. Peacekeepers report being told that their presence deterred violence, protected people, saved lives. UAF reports that activists told them they were effective and adds that they took these responses seriously. This comment addresses the same decision, within his context, which I address in this research; that is, the decision to believe in the truthfulness and accuracy of what others tell you. MAQ also notes that he knew they were effective based on what others say, and values that he has heard it from several sources.

UAF: It was the view of local human rights activists that we were effective, looking to them and taking their responses seriously. As to the military, there is a film made about PBI in Aceh, the film includes a few former military. They said they valued our approach.

MAQ: It was mostly what several different people told us, what would happen if we weren't there. Just their word, but we heard it from several different sources.

Most frequently mentioned was that they knew about the impact of their work through changes in behaviour, changes in how others acted toward them or toward others in the community. PAR talks about the dramatic change in behaviour represented in increased reports of domestic violence, as women in the community began to trust there might be a more positive outcome if they reported. He shares this as a demonstration of their effectiveness in addressing community violence.

PAR: Like for instance domestic violence doesn't get reported at all in most places. We went from no reports of domestic violence in the area, to reports coming in, not just by neighbours but by the people involved in it. You have to have confidence the police will do something, you have to trust that the police will do something...and the reports went from 0 to 4 to 5 a week.

UAE notes their inclusion in various processes by other stakeholders (in promoting peace) in the area and the support they received was indirect affirmation that their work had positive impacts. She also mentions the behaviour of local families who continued to work with them over time, which indicated to her that their work was

effective and had value for these people. She assumes that if their work was not effective across a variety of sectors, these engagements would have stopped.

UAE: How we knew that some of what we were doing had impact, was indirectly at least evidenced by on-going support we received from various stakeholders, on-going and increased support, invitations to be involved in certain processes.... We had the reputation of being reliable actors, on the ground. We saw that over time. We also saw families we were trying to support, continued to seek us out and ask our help over time. If we weren't perceived by various stakeholders as having value, we would not have continued to be engaged with, from the community and up through the ranks, NGOs, UN, government and so on.

Other examples of peacekeeper's knowing through reflecting on the actions of others included noticing changes in the local police who were being mentored, changes in the activities of local authorities who were pressured to decrease abuses toward civilians, changes in the behaviour of rebels – i.e. going through a DDR process, changes in the levels of local disturbances. Peacekeepers also reported experiencing changes in communities such as local groups organising their own peace committees, or a group of mothers actively working to free their children who had been abducted by an armed group, or a community feeling secure enough to protest with local authorities, when accompanied by peacekeepers.

There are few studies analysing the effectiveness of peacekeeping based on the perceptions of local people.<sup>31</sup> Yet peacekeepers themselves look to local people for confirmation of their impact. Only one general talked about meeting quotas and other numerical measurements of effectiveness. All the others talked about knowing their effectiveness through social interaction, developed through relationships and in embodied, everyday interactions.<sup>32</sup> And in the descriptions of how they knew their work was effective, (or not), I felt I heard powerful emotion in their voices which cannot be transmitted in the written word. Peacekeepers that I spoke to (which may have much to do with why they chose to speak with me), cared a great deal about the people they worked with, cared that they did have an impact or were upset that they had none or only

---

<sup>31</sup> See Gelot and Soderbaum (2012) for a recent discussion of the literature directed toward understanding how local people perceive peacekeeping missions and Chapter Six in this thesis for further discussion.

<sup>32</sup> See Heshusius (1994), Cook (1999), and Anderson & Harrison (2010) for discussion from different disciplines, of embodied knowing.

a small effect, and were moved by what people said or how they perceived changes in the actions of local people.

### **Effective peacekeeping - theorising robust relationship peacekeeping**

Based on the research interviews with peacekeepers and grounded theory methods, the following analysis of effective peacekeeping summarises the above themes and theorises about the interactions between them. While I have constructed this analysis, I believe it reflects the perceptions and knowledge of frontline peacekeepers, my own personal experience working for the Nonviolent Peaceforce, my understanding of the literature in the field, and the theoretical framework concerns with peacekeeper agency, local agency and ownership, relationships, and acceptance described in the Introduction. As will be discussed in the next chapters of this thesis, some of this theorising is original, much of it supports existing theories of how peacekeeping works, and much of this needs further research.

In my analysis of peacekeepers' perceptions, peacekeeping appears to be fundamentally about creating enough safety, stability and capacity/capability so that people in the host country, at all levels of society, can take action to engage in political/nonviolent conflict, rebuild their communities and basic institutions, and lead normal lives (all ultimately peacebuilding tasks). Peacekeeping is organised action by third parties, to prevent violence, protect civilians, and support local problem-solving by controlling or influencing belligerents and/or their proxies, and local people. Much of the energy and effort in peacekeeping is directed toward preventing or ending violence and protecting people, or what might be termed negative peace. Nonetheless it is through the support for local ownership of processes to nonviolently address conflict and its impacts, that peacekeeping can most sustainably contribute to peacebuilding and the development of a more positive peace. Understanding local contexts and intervening to support local efforts for peace is complex and may challenge the perception of being impartial. Peacekeepers' preferred and often primary process of affecting both belligerents and civilians at all levels appears to be through relationships. In light of the current debates on robust peacekeeping, I came to think of these as robust relationships, strong enough to withstand the movement between coercion and cooperation, and the many stresses and strains of relationship in communities suffering from armed conflicts. While many armed peacekeepers believed that force may be necessary at times to protect themselves and/or



other people or prevent other violence, it was considered a crisis response, a precursor or back up to stages when more cooperative relationships are effective. Force is seen to have limits, drawbacks, and by itself does not produce sustainable results. Police, UCP and to a lesser degree, military peacekeepers described nonviolent coercion through pressure and presence that produced preventive and protective results. It appears to be critical that peacekeeping is perceived as a legitimate intervention and accepted by people in the host country in order to be effective. Sustainable social change is understood to be more likely through supporting local problem-solving rather than through the imposition of solutions, which also has the tendency to undermine acceptance.

Peacekeeping may be more effective when it is seen as legitimate by the people in the host country and has an internal coherency. Peacekeeping may be challenged by the agendas and capacities of peacekeeping institutions and their member states. And it appears to be important that peacekeepers themselves accept their mission, and believe they are carrying out a legitimate mission, in a context sensitive way, able to have sufficient impact.

Peacekeepers generally perceive peacekeeping that promotes/supports local problem-solving and local leadership through mentoring, advocacy, presence, accompaniment, concrete support and such, as more likely to create more sustainable impacts. Peacekeepers understand their work located in specific locations, in everyday interactions, and do not speak much about relating to national level objectives. Effectiveness needs on-going context sensitive analysis that can guide the use of violence or cooperation in their interactions, given the complexity of local contexts and the difficulty of intervening impartially.

Peacekeepers describe understanding their work primarily through the feedback they receive in relationships – by what people do and say. Effectiveness, or lack thereof, is known through lived experience.

Reflecting more generally, I see three broad themes. One theme concerns the structure and processes of the intervening organisation(s). Several peacekeepers mentioned concerns about UN interventions and processes being overly influenced by global north powers and questioned the corrosive impact of this on peacekeeping. Peacekeepers repeatedly mentioned the need for organisations to have good leadership, good staff selection, training and support, clear mandates and objectives, sufficient

budgets and staff to meet them, and good logistics and equipment to support the intervention (this is discussed in Chapter Three).

The second theme concerns legitimacy and acceptance. Peacekeepers discuss the value of peacekeeping being legitimate and accepted by both people in the host country or countries, and in the eyes of peacekeepers themselves. Because peacekeeping is not war and not peace enforcement, it is understood to require legitimacy and acceptance to be effective, to set and maintain the context for relationships that support sustainable change. Acceptance is challenged by imposing agendas and undermining local efforts, the use of force in some contexts, as well as by problematic peacekeeper behaviour (this is discussed in Chapter Four).

The third theme relates to the actual practices of peacekeeping through relationships. Whether coercive or cooperative, characterised by trust and mutual benefit, or mistrust, peacekeepers generally believe it is their actual practices in the field that accomplish peacekeeping. It is through the use of relationships, which at times may be violently coercive, and how these relationships are nurtured, that armed conflict may be prevented, civilians protected and local problem-solving supported (elements of this theme are discussed in Chapters Five, Six and Eight).

I am theorising that these three overarching themes are all important to produce highly effective peacekeeping. None was considered to stand alone. Poor leadership, for instance, can undermine acceptance and the actual practices in the field. Poor behaviour of peacekeepers may undermine the initial perceptions of legitimacy, and indicates internal organisational problems. The lack of perceived legitimacy and actual acceptance of a mission may undermine the ability to build good relationships in the field. The lack of good relationships can hamper efforts to prevent violence and protect people, which in the long run may undermine perceptions of legitimacy and further cooperation. And the lack of sufficient resources frequently seems to undermine the work in the field and the legitimacy of the mission, over time.

## **Conclusion**

Reviewing this chapter, I started with a description of how this research was undertaken using constructivist grounded theory, with its emphasis on meaning emerging through interactions between myself as the researcher and all I bring, and the participants

in the interviews. I described the diverse range of people I interviewed, who served in a wide range of missions and projects. While there were differences, which I discuss and will continue to refer to, my surprising and predominant impression was the similarities in views and even more, in practices. Themes which were generated in this research: effective peacekeeping prevents violence, protects people, and supports local ownership; organisational effectiveness; legitimacy and acceptance; preventing violence; protecting people; making space for local ownership; relationships as a central factor; and challenges and limits in peacekeeping. All these themes are interrelated, and I have grouped them into three overarching themes of organisational functions, legitimacy and acceptance, and practice.

Drawing those themes together produces a vision of peacekeeping which occurs in relational fields and needs robust relationships to prevent violence and protect people. Robust peacekeeping relationships are able to withstand the stress of embracing coercive and cooperative periods. Because peacekeepers work primarily in communities, effective peacekeeping is sensitive and responsive to local problem-solving and local ownership of peace enhancing processes. Good relationships and practice which supports local initiatives for peace strengthens local acceptance, as part of positive reinforcing cycles.

As I conclude this research chapter, it is clear that further research and analysis are needed to develop a richer understanding of how relationships deter violence and protect people, and how peacekeepers build “cooperative” relationships and the interplay between coercive and cooperative aspects of relationships. In addition, I perceive a need to understand more clearly how peacekeepers think about their experiences related to the use of force and the criteria they use when analysing conditions which require more or less violent interventions. Research in this area would be strengthened by a more inclusive sample. More broadly, I think it essential to pursue further research in the host communities where the peacekeepers worked. This research does not address how the peacekeepers are perceived by others. I am curious whether peacekeepers’ self perceptions and analysis would be reflected in the perceptions of the people in the communities where they worked.

The next six chapters will go into detailed analysis of the themes introduced in this chapter, starting with organisational effectiveness, followed by legitimacy and acceptance, and then several chapters which explore in more depth the particulars of

whether and how peacekeeping addresses prevention, protection and local ownership. This is followed by an exploration of the differences between different categories of peacekeepers, and finally a chapter on relationships as a critical factor in peacekeeping. Each of these chapters includes material from relevant literature, my research findings, and my own analysis. While this chapter has focused almost solely on my research, the following chapters intertwine relevant literature with my analysis of the views of peacekeepers.

## **Chapter Three Peacekeeping and peacekeeping institutions**

This chapter provides a discussion of the literature and analysis of interview material regarding peacekeeping and peacekeeping institutions. The literature on effective organisations I include is mostly in the liberal, problem-solving and positivist traditions, as concerns about improving the effectiveness of peacekeeping institutions and organisations is rarely a focus in critical peace studies. However, for peacekeepers engaged in the day to day work, organisational issues are understood to be a significant contributor to effective peacekeeping.

I begin this chapter with a more in depth analysis of peacekeepers' understanding of peacekeeping itself. In order to think about effective peacekeeping, it is critical to understand what peacekeepers thought their work was trying to accomplish. Next I examine organisational issues, as peacekeeping is shaped by the structures, processes and capacities of the organisations which field interventions. Included in this examination is a reflection on the influence of global north powers on peacekeeping agendas and a review of the debate about who should do peacekeeping, including the opinions of peacekeepers. The following several chapters examine primarily external issues related to effectiveness when these various organisations implement interventions.

### **Peacekeepers' understanding of peacekeeping**

Briefly revisiting the definition of peacekeeping already discussed in Chapter One, most definitions focus on peacekeeping as an intervention to maintain peace or prevent a return to armed conflicts. Different definitions emphasize different aspects. Once more reviewing the definition I use in this paper so it is freshly in mind, peacekeeping refers to organised action by third parties to prevent violence, protect civilians, and support local problem-solving by controlling or influencing belligerents and/or their proxies, and local people. In the research interviews, peacekeepers talk about the purpose of peacekeeping as being to prevent violence, protect people and support local problems solving. One of the main differences in the definition in use here is the emphasis on supporting local problem-solving, which is either absent or implied but not clearly stated in most other definitions. For instance the UN DPKO says that peacekeeping should "...help lay the foundations for sustainable peace" (2008, p. 18)

which is later discussed as having to do with local participation. Peacekeepers generally understood that sustainability rests on the efforts of local people. When discussing UCP, Schirch (2006) refers to the goal of local people resolving their own conflicts, and Wallis (2010) puts the primacy of local actors at the centre of his analysis, though not in a definition. Many peacekeepers, however, refer specifically to local problem-solving, or making space for local actors to address conflicts in their definitions of peacekeeping (see Chapter Six for discussion of these terms). Thus it seemed appropriate to include this phrase in the definition used for this thesis.

Peacekeepers interviewed for this research responded to the query “what is peacekeeping” with a variety of views. None of them mentioned the need to be legitimated by official approval. Only when interviewing higher level military did issues of national governance and peace agreements arise. MAZ’s response includes concepts of international peace and security and support for the government’s sovereignty, all of which can be found in mainstream definitions of peacekeeping. He was the only one to mention these phrases.

MAZ:[peacekeeping is] to restore international peace and security, and basically to assist the government to restore its sovereignty and authority.

The focus of other frontline peacekeepers on preventing violence, protecting people and supporting local problem-solving did not address issues of sovereignty at all. Peacekeepers reported more concern about what I came to describe as fundamental peacekeeping (see Chapter Eight and the Conclusion). It is more than negative peace in that local problem-solving is supported, but far short of the multidimensional operations which attempt to implement a liberal peace agenda. Peacekeepers interviewed in this project focused on their action in the community, rarely on the national level issues of sovereignty or governance, nor the many issues addressed by multidimensional missions, in defining peacekeeping.

Peacekeepers tended to view peacekeeping as an intervention between two or more groups, which gives those involved a chance to resolve their underlying conflicts without violence. Several peacekeepers used the metaphor of intervening between fighting children on a playground. Another metaphor used was a mediator between a couple, where one party feels so mistreated and hurt they want to leave the relationship. These metaphors seem to convey both this understanding of separating fighters, or third

party intervention, but also a certain paternalism, or hierarchical attitude about the childlike nature of those who fight and the adult/mature stature of those who intervene. Phrases and words used in interviews to define peacekeeping included: to prevent a reoccurrence of fighting; to support or establish law and order; security and stability operations; to prevent harm to people; to build confidence in people; to make it safe for rebuilding lives or for community reconstruction; to make space for local actors and to support local problem-solving. A few mentioned supporting negotiations, to get people around the table.

Many peacekeepers stressed the need to support stability, security and safe space for local people to address the underlying conflicts, though only the unarmed civilian peacekeepers stressed the need to do so nonviolently. They tended to understand the purpose of peacekeeping as limited to what might be called negative peace, that is working for the absence of violence. Within these safer conditions local people could solve their own problems, and peacekeepers might provide limited support. Some expressed concerns that missions that are multidimensional may undermine effectiveness by not nurturing local solutions. MBQ speaks of the challenges of multidimensional operations and references problems, which he later suggests includes not only coordination but also doing things for the local government which they could do themselves.

MBQ: And that does seem to me, today we are at the type of operations that has peace-making, peacekeeping, engagement, security operations, stability operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, all done in the one theatre, and that makes it a little more challenging and raises problems.

Specific missions are understood by peacekeepers to be about creating sufficient safety, stability, security, space – so that people can lead normal lives and engage in problem-solving. Some missions have a training component and peacekeepers understood the purpose in terms of transferring skills to local people to build local capacity. Peacekeepers generally understood security to refer to people in specific locations being safe from physical violence and that belligerents were deterred from committing violence, rather than the security of any particular state or government. Law and order is mentioned by a few, mostly police, and is used to mean creating safety and security for people to lead normal lives, rather than broader issues of legal and security sector reforms. MAO

talks about maintaining the rule of law in a very immediate way, as providing sufficient safety that there are no gun battles and people can get on with their day to day lives.

MAO: The whole time we were there, it was for maintaining rule of law, so people could get on with their normal daily business, get on with their lives and not have to worry about gun battles in the streets, on main highways, that kind of stuff.

PAV refers to maintaining law and order and rebuilding infrastructure so that people have the confidence and safety to rebuild their own lives.

PAV: Maintaining law and order, rebuilding infrastructure, allowing people safety and security so people can rebuild their lives. Giving them the confidence to do so.

In both these quotes phrases which are discussed in the literature in discussion of the imposition of global north agendas and national level reforms (Merlingen, 2005; Peterson, 2010), are here used to refer to pressing immediate local concerns for peacekeepers.

Whether this apparent disconnect between official mandates and theoretical understanding of peacekeeping, and the perceptions of peacekeepers impacts the effectiveness of missions is beyond the focus of this thesis. However it is striking how localised and immediate peacekeepers understood their work to be as well as the absence of references to a larger picture. Perhaps the unspoken link between this micro focus and the macro focus of mandates and theories and definitions of peacekeeping in most of the literature, is that it is the micro level work, in communities, day by day, which support the macro level goals of state building and peace building. Without significant stability and safety at the local level, political processes at the national level can easily be undermined (Kalyvas, 2003; Leonard, 2013). Without some vision and momentum of social change which supports transformation of the previous social structures on a larger level, the stability and safety at the community level is not sustainable. Effective peacekeeping, it seems to me, must be effective on multiple levels.

### **Effective peacekeeping organisations**

Before discussing the many elements, functions and challenges which peacekeeping organisations share, it is important to note that I recognize the significant differences between the smaller INGOs that field UCP projects and the large multilateral organisations that field military peacekeeping missions. While the emphasis here is



mostly on shared issues, smaller INGOs that field projects are generally not connected to larger peacebuilding and state building agendas, nor to supporting or imposing a liberal peace agenda (see Chapter Six for further discussion of these differences and their implications). They do not respond to member states nor have decision making affected by these states' agendas. These are major differences not to be ignored or minimised.

However, one of the critical elements which supports effective peacekeeping in all contexts is high functioning organisations. Perhaps obviously, less well functioning organisations provide numerous obstacles.<sup>1</sup> And while a focus on 'getting it right' at the organisational level is not the same as 'doing the right thing', organisational processes have a significant effect on what peacekeepers can and cannot do.<sup>2</sup>

### Decision making

Missions begin with a decision making process that leads to authorisation. Looking specifically at the UN as the organisation fielding the majority of peacekeeping operations, the literature is replete with criticisms of UN decision making processes.<sup>3</sup> The UN itself has commissioned reviews of their peacekeeping mission development and implementation processes. A recent wave of self and commissioned critique, inspired in part by the tragedies of Srebrenica and Rwanda, began with the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, often referred to as the Brahimi Report (*Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)*, 2000). More recent reports and reviews have included a paper by Jones, Gowan and Sherman (2009), and the New Horizons review (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2010). These reports have highlighted concerns about the initial authorization of missions, pointing to problems created by politics in and between the Security Council, the UN Secretary General's office, and the UN DPKO that affect the creation of mission mandates, and support for the implementation of the mission. For

---

<sup>1</sup> See Schondorf (2011) for an extensive discussion of the conditions which challenge UN organisations and the ways units within the UN develop 'pathological' or more useful coping strategies.

<sup>2</sup> See Richmond and Franks (2009, p. 4) for a discussion of the focus on improving effectiveness rather than questioning the underlying assumptions of peace operations.

<sup>3</sup> See Pugh (2004), Richmond and Franks (2009), Gowan(2008) and Sartre (2011) for examples of critiques of the UN decision making processes related to peacekeeping missions. Scott (2008) makes an argument that privatized peacekeeping can much better meet the organisational needs for effective peacekeeping.

those missions that are undertaken by the UN, there is a further process of developing a mandate, budget, getting troop commitments from member states and organising the actual operations (Bellamy et al., 2010; Durch, 2006a). These processes are influenced by the interests of the five permanent members of the Security Council (P5), current world economic conditions, the interests of the Secretary General and other high ranking UN officials, the media in various countries and public reactions to on-going events in areas suffering armed conflicts, to name a few. Decisions are often made behind closed doors in a very hierarchical and opaque culture (Rubinstein, 2005). Too often these various influences are dealt with separately and end up in mandates without sufficient political support, troop authorisation, budgets, or operational capacity, to say nothing of the complexities to be faced once the mission arrives in its intended area. Tardy (2011a) makes the point that the recent call for more robust missions may be misplaced, assuming that the use of greater force can make up for other challenges such as those mentioned above.

The literature is sparse and somewhat contradictory on the direct influence of the Security Council on successful peacekeeping. Howard finds there is a mid point of P5 interest which seems optimal – too much or too little was associated with poorer outcomes, but medium P5 interest was correlated with better outcomes from missions (Howard, 2008). Others such as Doyle and Sambanis discuss the symbolic value of international attention in deterring further fighting (2006), while Sartre (2011) includes strong unified support from the Security Council as a key factor in robust peacekeeping. Some peacekeepers saw the involvement of the great powers in mandating peacekeeping as potentially positive. They believed the signal of great power interests increased their ability to affect local behaviour and increase safety for local people. Others were more concerned about the undue influence of great powers in the actual implementation of peacekeeping.

While few of the peacekeepers interviewed focused at this level, below are two references to the politics within the Security Council and NATO. CBA references the debate regarding expanding the number of countries which are permanent members of the Security Council. Though he thinks it valuable to include global south countries (India and Brazil) he doubts this will improve the ability of the Council to work effectively for peace, as every country pursues its own agendas.

CBA: So I think this could, then the debate becomes very nationalistic -- they talk about expanding the Security Council, to include India, Australia, Brazil, that is a good thing, but even if they do join, will it have a real impact on global peace? In the immediate future, I think no, these countries will pursue their own national agendas.

And once a mission is underway, it continues to be influenced by many agendas beyond the basic intention to support a transition from armed conflict to peaceful life within the host country. For instance, M/CAC describes his experience of NATO organisational politics and competing agendas.

M/CAC: Each country has its own national agenda. They bring it to the theatre and it contradicts the overarching agenda... there are so many actors involved, same with the EU mission, so many levels of command. There is the Naples NATO Command and the Brussels Command. It is political games.

Organisationally, civilian peacekeeping also faces many challenges and decisions before launching a project, though with much less complexity and on a much smaller scale (Moser-Puangsuwan & Weber, 2000). Careful analysis of the situation is undertaken to determine if the situation needs civilian peacekeepers and if the threats to people's safety which are to be addressed by the project, will be influenced by the project's activities. If the analysis suggests civilian peacekeeping might make a contribution, a process begins of finding funding, hiring and training staff, organising logistics, coordinating with local partners, and obtaining some degree of cooperation with the government of the target country, before a project actually begins.

### Organisational learning

One of the concerns about peacekeeping is the perception that some mistakes are repeated too frequently. Howard (2008), Benner (2011) and Schondorf (2011) all discuss organisational challenges in UN peacekeeping related to organisational learning.<sup>4</sup> Howard identifies the need for sufficient autonomy at the mission level for decision making and the ability to interact well with local conditions and culture as critical factors for learning. Benner (2011) identifies both progress and problems in organisational learning within the UN DPKO. Schondorf (2011) suggests that deeply embedded dysfunctional organisational patterns within the UN are responsible for mission failure.

---

<sup>4</sup> See Peake (2011) for a discussion specifically of the challenges within the UN Police Division.

A major theme and finding in Howard's research is that organisational learning is one of the key determinants in the success of UN missions. She also discusses the way in which the lack of organisational learning leads to the use of previous mandates' language and mission strategies in new situations, without adequate adaptation to new circumstances. Kramer (2007) examines the Dutch military in peacekeeping missions and comes to a similar conclusion. He finds that the hierarchical military organisational structure and lack of pathways for soldiers to question orders and give feedback about concerns up through the chain of command, causes serious operational problems.

These concerns about organisational learning were echoed in the interviews. In response to the question "Did anyone ever ask you for your opinion about what was effective", the most frequent answer was some version of "no". In a typical example, PAI shares that he was not asked for input, and problems were addressed at higher levels within the UN. He also indicates his dissatisfaction with their response of adding more police as the way to fix things.

PAI: I wasn't asked that, issues were escalated to higher ups in the UN. The actual nuts and bolts of how to fix it wasn't at our level, they decided to just throw more police at it.

This points to one of the motivations for my research. As stated before, there appears to be very little research or theorising on how peacekeeping works, based on the actual experiences of people in the frontlines.<sup>5</sup> Knowledge management and organisational learning has become a major concern in the business world and a field in its own right in some institutions (Ichijo & Nonaka, 2007). The creation of knowledge in many fields starts with those actually doing the work. Thus, the absence of processes to capture the learning of those in the frontlines of peacekeeping, and using that learning in the design and implementation of missions, suggests to me that there are wasted

---

<sup>5</sup> Ryan (2000) raises this issue and hypothesizes that this reflects the reluctance of troop contributing countries and the UN itself, to have troops interviewed. However, as this research project demonstrates, it is possible to find former peacekeepers who will voluntarily and freely discuss their experiences and learning. Though I have no way of knowing if they were honouring their commitments not to discuss classified information, I did not think that anything which was shared with me was likely to have been confidential.

opportunities to improve peacekeeping.<sup>6</sup> This expresses the problem-solving aspect of this concern.

### Operational issues – budgets and deployment

The size and scope of an intervention is determined in part by budgets and actual funding, and this impacts the ability of the mission to be effective. As mentioned above, part of the decision making process in all peacekeeping institutions and organisations, is the agreement on budgets and the raising of funds. In recent years, the UN budgets for peacekeeping have grown tremendously but have not kept up with the growth in the number of missions.<sup>7</sup> A number of studies have been undertaken looking at the correlation of the size of budgets and peacekeeping effectiveness. Hegre, Hultman and Nygard (2010) and Ruggieri, Gizelis, and Dorussen (2010) model the impact of UN peacekeeping and find strong correlations between the size of the mission and/or the size of the budget, and positive impacts.<sup>8</sup> While Ruggieri, Gizelis and Dorussen analyse historical cases, Hegre, Hultman and Nygard are modelling the potential future impact of peacekeeping, based on a number of factors. Others do not talk about the budget directly, but include factors that are influenced by budgets and critical to peacekeeping. For instance Kreps (2010) finds the capacity of the peacekeeping troops to be a critical factor in explaining the success or failure of missions. Troop capacity relates to budgets, which relates to training and skills, as well as weaponry and other logistical equipment.

While peacekeepers do not talk about budgets directly, they do talk about the need for adequate equipment, good logistics, and sufficient staff in order to be effective. These are all clearly related to the budget. MCE discusses feeling exposed and undermined because he feels their equipment is inadequate for the tasks not only of protecting themselves, but of providing protection to others.

---

<sup>6</sup> While the UN has a division which includes a focus on best practices, it does not seem to include material based on the views of frontline peacekeepers. See <http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/AboutUs.aspx>

<sup>7</sup> For instance see Jones et al (2009, p. 5) for a discussion in the growth of missions, troops deployed and budgets, and the 2010 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute report (SIPRI, 2010) and IPI report (International Peace Institute, 2010) for further discussion of the processes involved in developing and fielding UN peacekeeping missions.

<sup>8</sup> Both of these research projects use positivist methodologies and make assumptions about variables and linear causality whose accuracy is not clear to me. Still, they raise interesting points to consider.

MCE: While we are servants of our masters, our hands were tied behind our backs, we had old equipment, we could hardly shoot back, if push comes to shove, we would have given it a good go, but we lacked the equipment and training and manpower. We were an army... assigned to go do a job without the equipment and training... one of our tasks was providing protection to a convoy, but our vehicles were too slow, so we got left behind. It was very frustrating, personally and professionally.

MBI assigns the failure of the mission in Chad, at least in part, to logistical problems.<sup>9</sup> The UN was unable to provide enough troops, quickly, and with adequate weapons and other equipment. This resulted in a huge waste of resources, in his view, with the ultimate rejection of the mission.

MBI: The problem in Chad, it was not a successful mission. We had to terminate the mission after two mandates, with one year of UN presence only. The basic problem I could see there, was lack of proper planning from a logistical point of view... But the problem was the UN was not able to provide all the number of troops that were authorised to be deployed. It was in the number of 5,000 but at the end of one year, only 3,000 troops were deployed. Basically many of the member states were reluctant to contribute troops there ... and the troops that were deployed weren't well-equipped, and not all the personnel and equipment were deployed timely... So they were not able to do their routine work, that affected their routine work like patrolling and all... Ultimately the government didn't renew the mandate. It was almost one year plus of deployment and almost \$1 billion down the drain.

In these quotes, one can see the manifestation of internal organisational processes which contribute to inadequate budgets, the struggle to find countries willing to contribute troops and in sufficient numbers, and with adequate equipment.

On a much smaller scale, UCP projects face similar tensions. UAH notes that because they were a small organisation with insufficient resources, they were not able to have the impact they wanted, and might have achieved with more staff.

UAH: We were spread too thin, we didn't have enough staff, we had very little capacity to have the impact we wanted, but the impact we did have was highly appreciated.

Rapid deployment is considered another essential aspect of effective peacekeeping. In the New Horizons review (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping

---

<sup>9</sup> This is not to ignore that there were political issues, but this is MBI's perspective.

Operations and Department of Field Support, 2010), the UN DPKO discusses the need for rapid responses to crises. Jones et al (2009) note that slow deployment misses the moment of crisis when needs are greatest and undermines the impact of the mission. MBI captures this need, linking P5 interest to rapid deployment and to people's hope in the mission in Lebanon. (Later in the interview he links hope and belief in the mission, to effectiveness, which will be discussed below.)

MBI: They were deploying troops because Lebanon was in the interest of everybody. All the Europeans were interested there. So then we had rapid deployment, ships coming in and troops arriving, very rapid. Peoples started to have hope in the system. If you don't have rapid deployment, if you don't have quick deployment, then the people lose hope.

### Leadership

Leadership is a key function in any organisation. Although rarely discussed in the peacekeeping literature, peacekeepers themselves point to the need for good leadership if a mission is to be successful.<sup>10</sup> MBL states this clearly, sharing his experiences when bad leadership cost lives, and good leadership returned the mission to higher functioning.

.MBL: The quality of the planning that goes in to what has to be achieved, the coordination that goes on at the top, goes a long way toward achieving success in a peacekeeping mission. From my perspective, from where I stand, you can have the best troops in the world, the best civilians, pushing through the field, you can have a lot of good NGOs, but if the top structure is not in order, it is very difficult to achieve good success... I have experienced in one mission, two leaders and that is why I am quite outspoken of such things. When I worked under someone that didn't know what the hell he was doing, and then another guy comes in and he turns the whole thing around, in a month or two, by just good leadership. It is amazing to see it happen, and that is why I am such a firm believer in leadership, because I saw both sides of it, I saw what bad leadership can do and what good.

Other peacekeepers raised issues of poor leadership, the need for culturally diverse leadership, and dilemmas experienced as leaders. CBA addresses the tension between needing diverse national representation in leadership, which will have an impact on the mission, with a need for high quality leaders.

---

<sup>10</sup> An exception is Howard (2008) who discusses the need to provide leadership in the peace process, as a central aspect of organisational effectiveness.

CBA: I guess as peacekeeping, it is important to have regional representation, getting leadership right. For instance in Timor we have an Indian SRSG [special representative of the secretary-general], and then a Bangladeshi... you need a good person at the end of the day. And nationality is just one of the issues, but these are things which will have an impact, getting the overall structure, leadership, overall mandate, but again you can't just go by nationality, there have been complaints in African missions about the top man there, so you need a good person, that selection process is important.

UBD addresses his own experience of being a team leader, and the tension between being supportive and trying to get the multi-ethnic team to work well together, and expecting more professionalism and confronting people regarding problematic behaviours.

UBD: ...the temperament of specific individuals, their weaknesses... discipline or calling people out on not just performance, behaviours you think is not professional, but at the same time not wanting to rock the boat, wanting the team to get along, and also accepting that this is what you have to work with. One has to manage as best as one can, but at the same time is one overlooking too much? ... Yes the dilemma for me when I was in a leadership role was how to create, motivate spirit in the team, but at the same time expect professionalism.

### National representation, multicultural work teams and training

As indicated here, there can be contradictions between the perceived need for national representation and perceptions of competence and skill, and even ethics. Peake (2011) discusses the difficulties the UN Department of Police (UNPOL) faces in terms of finding quality police from many different nations in sufficient numbers. Bove and Elia (2011, p. 703) discuss perceptions that troop contributing countries (TCCs) who are motivated by financial gain contribute poor quality troops. This was a recurring theme amongst peacekeepers from the global north, many of whom complained about corruption and the lack of skills amongst peacekeepers from other countries, almost exclusively referring to the global south. Higate and Henry (2009b, chapter 7), discussing the stereotyping of troops based on their nationality, note a belief among local people and international NGO staff that peacekeepers from European countries are better at providing security. Local people also stereotyped troops from different global south countries, believing some to be better than others because they appeared tougher.



Some of what peacekeepers addressed were just the basic challenges of operating in a highly multicultural team. MBL notes the challenges of working with people from many countries.

MBL: For instance I had staff officers and military observers from 57 different nations under my command... You have to manage them as well. All of them have their own national characteristics as well. Some of them don't work well together in teams, there are a lot of dynamics within the teams that you have to monitor and sort out and to get them going, to get some productivity out of them, and for them to do their job.

Typical of perceptions of peacekeepers from the global north referred to above, MAY describes his concerns about staff from the global south as not being very capable and just there for money, implying that people from wealthier countries are more altruistic and tolerant of difficult working conditions.

MAY: Most people who are on UN staff are often there for the money, if they're not from the wealthier countries. So a lot of the contributing countries, people from Fiji or the African countries, for example, where they don't make much as military officers, getting posted to the UN is like winning the lottery. So there's a huge amount of money they have access to on a daily basis, so many of them are there for the money, not because they are ideologically driven, or wanting to help people, though some of them are... This motivation affects how they treat local people, they are driven by self advancement, and they don't really want to be there suffering in hot weather and risking malaria, and other hardships, but they do it because they get good money out of it. But they are not happy about it. And sometimes they take their frustration out on local people I suspect...in UN projects that don't have a good command structure, and not good discipline.

Peacekeepers from the global north question the capacity of troops and/or police who come from countries that currently host an active UN peacekeeping mission. Words and phrases frequently used to describe those from the global south included lazy, corrupt, they do not do things like we do (with the clear implication 'our' way is right). Some believed that requirements for English fluency were misrepresented, and some perceived that appointments to peacekeeping missions from many countries rested on political connections and payoffs rather than skills. A few also mentioned the concern that troops from the global south spread HIV among an already vulnerable population. Several were concerned that bringing poorly trained and poorly behaved people into

vulnerable communities is unethical as it adds to their problems rather than helping. Clearly the misbehaviour of peacekeepers undermines the acceptance of the intervention.

One way to understand these concerns amongst the global north peacekeepers is to look at the motivation to help and do good, that many of these same peacekeepers shared (see Chapter Seven for a discussion of motivation). Many of them shared disappointment in their experiences with the UN and reflected that they had entered the role with high expectations about being able to do good by helping people and saving lives. This echoes Rubinstein's (2005) suggestion that the UN is framed in many people's minds as a symbol of international cooperation to create a peaceful world. They were upset by what they perceived as corruption and lack of capacity, and the way the UN policies and practices prevented them from doing the good for others which they came to do. I heard their sense of the work as being something higher and better than 'just a job' and their sense of outrage at those whom they perceived as there just for the money. In other words they perceived that the commitment to national representation led to the inclusion of too many poor quality peacekeepers, thus undermining the potential to be effective at the good they came to do. Anyone who was not there for the purpose of saving local people, was suspect. And the stories they shared raise serious concerns about the behaviours of other peacekeepers. There have been numerous documented instances of breaches of ethics and incompetence among UN peacekeepers which have adversely affected missions and severely harmed local people (Aoi et al., 2007). When peacekeepers rape, steal, traffic in women and children and otherwise abuse their power, it undermines the acceptance and trust essential for good relationships, which peacekeepers believe necessary to work effectively. At the same time, these critiques seemed to me to lack awareness and reflection that in their own countries there have been histories of corruption and poor performance in the police and military, and particularly as peacekeepers, as well as people there just for the money, just doing a job. I was disturbed by what could be heard as a neo-colonial tendency to equate global north with good and global south with less good among many of the peacekeepers from the global north (Darby, 2009b).

On the other hand, MBL expresses a view from the global south, expressing his strong belief that in general Africans are good peacekeepers and the best for peacekeeping in Africa.

MBL: “I agree there are many troops deployed in peacekeeping missions, that should not be there, specific countries that got no guts to get things done, afraid of everything and they are basically there for the wrong reason. But there are many peacekeepers out there especially from Africa, that you can depend on and that are really good in their job. The fact of the matter is, in my opinion, if you want to do peacekeeping in Africa, the best people to do it are Africans.

Several of the military from the global south voiced criticisms of the military from the global north. They perceived a lack of cultural sensitivity in global north troops and additionally that the few officers from the global north, who were part of UN mission commands, did not arrive with an understanding of peacekeeping. Military from the global north were seen by these former peacekeepers as being too oriented to the use of force, even to the point of just showing off, and this undermined the acceptance of the mission in the community. And several peacekeepers from the global south thought much of the behaviour and motivation problems that exist with peacekeepers from the global south could be addressed by better training.

Keeping in mind that a sense of trust and mutual benefit is important for good relationships within a mission, from the peacekeepers view, it is clear that these cultural tensions create challenges in missions (See Chapter Eight for more on relationships). This is not limited to police and military, as UCPs also mentioned that getting teams to work well with people from many different countries and cultures was sometimes a challenge. Mistrust within a mission can have effects that range from annoyance to life threatening if you cannot rely on others in your group for mutual protection.

There is less mention of these issues in the literature specifically linking effectiveness of missions to challenges with multicultural staff.<sup>11</sup> There is however, discussion of problems caused by UN staff. Aoi et al (2007) discuss a number of unintended and problematic consequences of UN missions. While some problems relate to the impact of missions on the local economy – a concern echoed by several peacekeepers worried about the inflation caused by their mission and the resulting difficulties for local people – others relate directly to the behaviour of peacekeepers

---

<sup>11</sup> Peake (2011) being a recent exception in his discussion linking the lack of results of UN police efforts at police reform to the challenges of enrolling quality staff. Though Higate and Henry (2009a) in Chapter 7 discuss the stereotypes local people have of different military peacekeepers, they do not specifically link this to how it may or may not affect the effectiveness of the peacekeepers. Similarly Rubinstein (2005) discusses the challenges of bringing peacekeepers together from different cultures, but does not directly link this to effectiveness.

including the trafficking and rape of women and an increase in corruption linked to peacekeepers. Whitworth's (2004) analysis portrays this behaviour not as related to cultural differences between the global north and south, but rather as part of the socialisation of masculinity and being a soldier. She discusses examples of violence against local people committed by soldiers from Canada as manifestations of this socialisation. Pouligny's comprehensive research on the experiences and views of people in communities hosting peacekeeping, finds many examples of peacekeeper misbehaviour and the resulting disdain for the mission itself (Pouligny, 2006).

As mentioned earlier, several peacekeepers from the global south believed that better training would correct some of these problems. From the military perspective, they thought better training of troops in the context and civilian needs in the country where they will operate, would go a long way to address the concerns of troops and police not performing adequately in UN missions. CBB speaks from the perspective of acknowledging that the UN includes many countries, and if some send less qualified staff, they need training. She suggests the UN do more to develop shared values in order to decrease sexual harassment and other problematic peacekeeper behaviour. She recommends training rather than blaming.

CBB: But still the UN is many countries together, but if someone is less qualified, less equipped, they need some orientation and training process. Even if the soldiers come for money, some training to avoid sexual harassment and other problems in their behaviour is needed and would make a difference ... but instead of blame, they should have some sort of training, some harmonisation process, so they should have shared values, so they can think the same thing.

These comments are in stark contrast with those voiced by many UN peacekeepers from the global north who shared criticisms without attention to what might be done to change the situation.

Other training issues were mentioned. The need to cultivate an understanding of mentoring, and how it is different from training, was discussed by several police peacekeepers. Many peacekeepers appreciated the training they received, both in terms of specific skills, which included local language for some, but also for the training in the history of the conflict and the culture of the host communities. Training that prepares people well for the work they will do and the country in which they will be working, was

perceived as an important facilitative factor for effective peacekeeping.<sup>12</sup> Given the frequent turnover in staff of all peacekeeping missions, not only is good training essential, but organisational practices that ensure good communication and handover between those arriving and those leaving, were understood to be critical.

### Other organisational issues

Other organisational aspects that support effective peacekeeping are the design or strategy of a mission. Some peacekeepers felt that the specific design of their mission was effective. In particular, military peacekeeping that has sufficient troops for the size of territory, though not a guarantee of effective peacekeeping, was seen as contributing to the possibility.<sup>13</sup> This links to literature on mandates. A number of authors point to the tendency to use the same language in many mandates, the lack of specificity in the language, and the wide range of interpretations possible because of the use of generalities.<sup>14</sup> A few peacekeepers also mentioned the need for clear, realistic mandates. Additionally an organisational focus on supporting local problem-solving or local ownership, was seen not only as being effective in and of itself, but as facilitating effective peacekeeping, as it arouses less resistance and promotes good working relationships.

### **Who does peacekeeping?**

#### UN or other organisations

An on-going debate in peacekeeping literature concerns the success rate of missions implemented by different institutions and organisations. While many of the officially recognized peacekeeping missions are carried out by the UN, other institutions who implement missions include NATO, the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the EU, as well as other regional groups. Bellamy and Williams (2009) find that non-UN missions are less successful.

---

<sup>12</sup> Feldman (2010) makes an interesting point, suggesting that the focus on learning local customs creates a frame for seeing local people as different. Additionally the training does not provide enough learning for peacekeepers to deeply understand a different culture and related ways of thinking and acting.

<sup>13</sup> See Sartre (2011) for a recent discussion of the limits to force and why size of force is related to a complex set of other factors.

<sup>14</sup> See Howard (2008), Jones, Gowan and Sherman (2009), Nasu (2011) for example. See Franke and Warnecke (2009) for a summary of mandates from recent peacekeeping missions.

Kreps and Wallace (2009), talking about preventing one sided violence (meaning protecting civilians), finds evidence that some types of UN missions make a difference, but non-UN missions do not. They hypothesise that this has to do with the UN having more legitimacy and being seen as unbiased and also because the UN can field larger and better equipped troops. They suggest that the lack of capability and equipment hinders the non-UN troops specifically in limiting their ability to acquire and communicate critical information. Mvukiyehe and Samii find that former rebels in Liberia believed that UN soldiers were essential in the disarmament process, that they would not have cooperated with ECOWAS soldiers (E. N. Mvukiyehe & Samii, 2010a). This seems to contradict the calls for regional institutions to field missions, such as in the Brahimi report (*Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)*, 2000). Fortna and Howard (2008), reviewing the literature on the subject note that research on this question has only recently emerged and that the results are contradictory and unclear.

While this concern was rarely addressed by peacekeepers interviewed, several quotes mentioned earlier in this chapter refer to the issue of who is best suited for peacekeeping. Howard notes that the increased reliance on troops from the global south to do peacekeeping, while the global north pays for it, is creating a kind of division which echoes other economic and political divisions (Howard, 2008, pp. 332-333). As quoted earlier in this chapter, one peacekeeper from South Africa stated that African troops are generally best for peacekeeping in Africa. In MAZ's experience, troops from countries with an interest in the conflict do not perform as well.

MAZ: Those that have interest in that country, religious, global, regional interests -- their soldiers can't perform well, there were examples of the soldiers being repatriated on these grounds as well.

Neither of these statements addresses which overall institution is best for fielding the mission. Given the lack of attention to UCP in the literature, I am unaware of any academic literature addressing the merits of UCP undertaken by one organisation or another.

#### Military, police or civilian peacekeepers

There is discussion and debate in the literature and within the UN and other peacekeeping organisations regarding the appropriate use of military and police in

missions. From a critical peace or security perspective, this (and the above discussion of which institution is effective) can be seen as focusing on problem-solving or a technical fix (Olsson, 2008; Richmond & Franks, 2009). The important issues are to understand what these missions are doing and how they are a part of the larger move to link international security and liberal peace to our daily security (Shepherd, 2013a). Bigo (2008) and Olsson (2008) analyse the ever growing field of security professionals, and their work of surveillance and enforcement both at home, in global north countries, and abroad in the name of increasing domestic security. From this perspective, it does not matter if peacekeeping work is carried out by military, police or civilians. They are all involved in the security field which creates, through everyday actions, a web or network meant to enforce a particular vision of world security. Bigo (2008) suggests that the military do ever more policing at home, while police do more military work abroad, continuing to blur the division between internal and external, domestic and international security. Olsson (2008) argues that the blurring between military and civilian humanitarian interventions obscures the political nature of these interventions and suggests that the military is becoming more engaged in typically civilian activities, while INGOs are become more involved with the military. Both describe a vast web of professionals working to enforce a version of security which serves global powers and which may simultaneously have the effects of making people feel less secure and more uneasy. Merlinger (2005) points to the invasive, controlling practice of police mentors in Bosnia, revealing underlying political implications of what might otherwise be seen as practice which is less invasive than the military troops stationed in the country. From these critical perspectives, the debate on when and where to use armed service personnel, police, or civilians misses the underlying issues of what is being accomplished in the name of peacekeeping. It reduces what is political, to a technical debate.

However, in the liberal, problem-solving literature which focuses on improving current practice, there is a debate regarding the appropriate use of military, police and other civilians in different stages and for different purposes during peacekeeping missions. Given the difference in socialisation and training of military, police and civilians (discussed later in Chapter Seven) and their use of violence, this seems to be an important consideration in thinking about decreasing the militarisation of peacekeeping. This concern surfaced in several of the interviews as well. This debate on the use of military and police reflects in part the increased use of executive policing, that is police

from other countries acting as the local police, in addition to the use of police as mentors and trainers. Greener (2009a) and Greener and Fish (2011) identify many of the threads in this debate, which include not only differences in the normative roles of military and police, but aspects of international law and the authority for peacekeeping police, and which kind of doctrine and practices are appropriate at what stage of a peace process. Marten (2004), though primarily discussing the difficulties in peace enforcement and imposing democracy, believes that peacekeeping is problematic for soldiers as it is in many ways antithetical to their military training and expectations which focus on ‘kill or be killed’, ‘win or lose’. She suggests peacekeeping is much closer to policing and that the military needs different training for soldiers so they can act more like police. She stops short however, of suggesting more police and fewer soldiers, noting that soldiers have a historic function similar to police during the colonial periods. den Heyer (2011), however, argues for a larger role for police in peacekeeping missions, particularly in executive policing. He finds that police are much better suited to addressing the security gap which emerges when the fighting stops, but effective national law and order is not yet established. The UN has increased the use of police and made numerous efforts to increase the capacity to field police peacekeepers effectively (Peake, 2011). Military forces are described as easier to use, as most countries have standing armies that are not otherwise occupied (Marten, 2004). Whitworth (2004) suggests that peacekeeping or peace support now justifies the existence of militaries in places like Canada that are unlikely to use their military for self-protection. This contributes to political pressure to continue their role in peacekeeping even though military training may be inappropriate for the tasks they will do.

One of the issues in this debate has to do with the generic differences in actual training and practices between the military and police. While the military are trained for combat, to win a battle or war, police are trained to maintain law and order in the community. These quite different goals are reflected in the different doctrines and skills in which members of the forces are trained in their home countries.<sup>15</sup> Troops are generally much easier to field in large numbers. Troop contributing countries have standing armies and if they choose, can contribute whole units – i.e. battalions. Police contributing countries in general do not have extra police to send as peacekeepers, and

---

<sup>15</sup> For example contrast Fielding’s article on community policing (Fielding, 2005) with British doctrine on peace support operations (Ministry of Defence, 2004).



tend to send them individually, though the trend to send formed police units (FPU) is increasing.<sup>16</sup> Greener (2009a) discusses concerns about the legal basis for the authority of international police acting as executive police operating in missions. den Heyer (2011) argues that police are better trained than the military for the kinds of security issues that face communities post conflict, such as riot control, criminal behaviour and community disputes. He suggests that while there is a clear role for military peacekeepers in establishing basic security conditions, it must be quickly turned over to police. There are concerns however, about the capacity of police to successfully undertake law enforcement practices in so called failed states, and to mentor emerging police in countries with quite different backgrounds (Howard, 2008). Howard views the attempts to replicate the UN policing intervention in Namibia, which she deems successful, in other interventions such as Cambodia and Mozambique, as an example of simply transferring practices without sufficient analysis (Howard, 2008, pp. 354-355). She enumerates serious reservations about the usefulness of police in peacekeeping missions, as currently deployed.

Themes related to the use of military and/or police are echoed in my research interviews. A number of police who came from community police forces struggled with concerns about the appropriate role for the military in their missions. Some of them also had similar concerns about the FPU. These concerns related to what they perceived as the over reliance on weapons and the related distancing from people in the community. Police tended to see their strength as being the development of effective relationships, which encourages local people to call on them for assistance with general disorder and specific crimes, and provides them with the information they need to deal with these situations in a mutually reinforcing loop. While the police universally appreciated the need for military to end the fighting if necessary, and the FPU for large riot control, many had concerns that if the peacekeeping did not quickly move to civilian policing, and community type policing, long term damage was done in the community in terms of relationships, as well as the ability to deal with conditions effectively.<sup>17</sup> MBQ states that once the military has stopped the fighting, they should leave the community. He suggests that when they stay too long, they become part of the problem of continued violence.

---

<sup>16</sup> Australia being an exception with its International Deployment Group (B. K. Greener, 2009a, p. 28).

<sup>17</sup> As I did not interview any police from an FPU, this research project cannot represent their views. However, a recent review of the all women Indian FPU in Liberia (Kembler, 2010) described a unit that was active in the community, doing many of the same activities as community patrol police.

MBQ: But at the end of it, once we have stopped that particular situation, we need to come out as quickly as possible. There is a finite period of doing it. It gets to the point where you, you actually become part of the problem eventually. I would argue first take the military uniform off the streets for a start.

MAO reflects on his struggle to modify his initial military training, to better fit the conditions in the Solomon Islands where he worked as a peacekeeper. He suggests he needs to learn how to be more like the police, and try to resolve issues without using force, only using his training to kill if really necessary.

MAO: The thing we found, or I found, most difficult and most rewarding, was to be polite in dealing with people but also we were there to maintain law and order, you could do it nicely if you could, but you have to be nasty if needed, sort of firm, fair, and efficient, maintain professionalism. It's no different to what police have to do in their daily jobs, but it's a wee bit foreign to the mindset of a soldier [how?] Because infantry soldiers at the end of the day, our job is to seek out the enemy and kill them. We are trained to the highest level, everything else is sort of easy. It is a different kettle of fish, to get your head around that, this is a lower level of risk, a graduated level of risk, not just going to the top shelf, it needs a lower level of response, lots of training to get that to be instinctual, to go through lower levels of response first.

The theme of needing to move from military to police was echoed by police who suggested they needed to move as quickly as was reasonable, from executive policing (that is doing the policing for the community) to mentoring, where they are in a support role to local police. Civilians also echoed the need for the military to be responsive to civilian leadership, as soon as possible. In all cases this reflected concerns about military taking too much of a warfare stance. This was seen as problematically affecting local relationships and local ownership and possibly undermining the development of national and local governance, which was a mission goal. These are also themes in the critique of the aftermath of peacekeeping missions.<sup>18</sup> The inability of either military peacekeepers or local police to control (out of choice or lack of capacity) the surge in criminal activity often associated with former rebels or government related militias, has become a key

---

<sup>18</sup> For example Pouligny (2006) and Hume (2008) both discuss the increase in “criminal” violence after peacekeeping missions.

problem during and post peacekeeping. The associated harm to civilians is currently seen as one of the key failings of peacekeeping.<sup>19</sup>

The similarities between unarmed civilian peacekeeping and community policing were striking to me when reviewing the interviews.<sup>20</sup> Both are peacekeeping processes designed to provide protection while supporting people in solving their own problems. They often reported using similar methods such as presence and patrolling, rumour control, bridging people to resources, and supporting local people to have confidence in contacting local authorities to resolve issues. And while police focus on training and/or mentoring the host country police, UCP, in some of the projects, focuses on training local people to be actors in their own protection and community safety. I think it useful to extend the discussion of when to use military or police, to include when to use unarmed civilian peacekeepers as well. That said, perhaps one of the key and essential differences is that UCP interventions, because they are not tied to directly supporting and improving the host country government, can more flexibly respond to violations and violence committed by host country police and military, while peacekeeping police are more constrained in this regard. As will be discussed in Chapters Five and Six, peacekeeping missions, because of their ties to governments and other (former) belligerents, sometimes end up supporting local governments and local groups who are engaged in human rights violations and wider violence against civilians. This is a major complication which must be taken in to account when moving to support local ownership. Other differences between police and civilian peacekeepers will be discussed further in Chapter Seven. Nonetheless, it appears there is significant overlap between their ways of doing peacekeeping which warrants further research.

## **Conclusion**

In summary, peacekeepers identified a number of organisational processes and operations as key contributors or detractors to effective peacekeeping. Many of these are reflected in the problem-solving oriented literature. Peacekeeping is affected by numerous factors within the organisation which fields the mission and the behaviours and attributes

---

<sup>19</sup> For instance see Holt et al (2009) and Durch and Giffen (2010) for discussion of the importance of protection of civilians in maintaining positive public opinion.

<sup>20</sup> This reflects to a large degree that 13 of the 17 police interviewed were from New Zealand, where community policing within peacekeeping is stressed.

of the peacekeepers themselves. The multi-ethnic character of peacekeeping interventions produces challenges to effective teams, and appeared in the interviews to be a lightning rod for neo-colonial perspectives, while some from the global south suggested a need for increased training. Though I use the phrase peacekeeping as if it is singular, there are numerous variations reflecting variables such as which organisation is intervening where, what mandate and design, what staff, training and logistics, and other such elements. Good organisations, appropriate mandates, collegial staff trained appropriately for the tasks, and sufficient material support, are seen as essential for effective peacekeeping.

While the debate on the appropriate timing and tasks in the use of military or police in peacekeeping missions misses the underlying critique of the political nature of these interventions and decisions, both the literature and the interviews suggest that there is a meaningful difference for people in communities. My sense is that the training and orientation of military personnel gives them fewer skills to respond nonviolently. Additionally, as will be discussed in Chapter Five, the presence of peacekeeping soldiers may draw belligerent attacks. Police, depending on their training and orientation, may be more oriented toward supporting community leadership, and less oriented to using violence. The similarities I perceived between the community oriented police and the UCP interventions was striking and suggest to me that it might be beneficial to expand the use of trained, unarmed civilians as peacekeepers. Engaging with this debate is an example of the tension in my work. I agree with critiques of peacekeeping interventions which point to a neo colonial character and as part of an effort to extend control, rather than decreasing violence and protecting people. At the same time I also think it crucial to explore how to improve the fundamental tasks of peacekeeping. People generally, and local activists in particular, in communities affected by conflict have a need for protection. Peacekeeping which is undertaken by people trained in preventing violence and protecting people nonviolently, or with the least violence, and who are oriented toward supporting local problem-solving could be a dramatic improvement.

Having addressed definitional and primarily internal, organisational issues in this chapter, the next chapter discusses legitimacy, acceptance and peacekeeping principles, as a start to exploring what happens when peacekeepers undertake interventions and move into communities.

## **Chapter Four Legitimacy, acceptance and peacekeeping principles**

This chapter will discuss the need for legitimacy and acceptance in effective peacekeeping missions. Legitimacy is understood in this context to be essential at the international level and is conferred to missions by multilateral institutions, primarily the UN. Acceptance as perceived by peacekeepers is essentially pragmatic and relational, at the local level. The first section of this chapter reviews the literature and peacekeepers' contributions to the discussion of legitimacy and acceptance. This is followed by an exploration of the basic principles of peacekeeping – impartiality, consent and use of force for self-protection - in relationship to legitimacy and acceptance, as well as the theme of good relationships. I then examine some of the current peacekeeping practices that undermine or challenge acceptance.

The next chapter focuses on two of the three main purposes of peacekeeping identified in this thesis – preventing violence and protecting people.

### **International legitimacy**

Acceptance of peacekeeping interventions by local people is one of the factors of effectiveness, according to many of the peacekeepers interviewed for this research. Although the word legitimacy was not used in reference to their own work,<sup>1</sup> there was significant discussion of the need to be accepted in order to get the needed cooperation and mutuality for effective peacekeeping, and the challenges to a mission when this was lacking. This notion of acceptance appeared to me to be related to the literature discussion of legitimacy.<sup>2</sup> Effective peacekeeping may need both legitimacy and acceptance. A productive way of understanding legitimacy as it relates to peacekeeping is as a social construct related to various norms and values, and referring to perceptions of social status (Gelot, 2012, p. 11). Whalan (2010, p. 629) suggests that peacekeeping makes use of three kinds of power including coercion, inducement and legitimacy. She

---

<sup>1</sup> One peacekeeper used the word legitimate in relationship to working only with legitimate armed groups (M/UAT) and another in calling for the need for a new legitimate voice in public policy, describing the UN and various human rights organizations as being too influenced by western country agendas (CBA).

<sup>2</sup> An online thesaurus offers 'accepted' as the first synonym for legitimate at <http://thesaurus.com/browse/legitimate> accessed 3 March 2012.

summarises the literature on legitimacy as it relates to peacekeeping according to three main types – source, substantive and procedural legitimacy. Source legitimacy reflects the authorisation for the mission and status of the interveners. Substantive legitimacy stems from the effectiveness of the intervention. Procedural legitimacy is created through the actual practices of peacekeeping. Nye (2011, p. 224) notes that legitimacy is one of the key elements for converting power into desired outcomes. And Wallace (2010 chapter two), in her analysis of the potential for a just war, reflects that violence without legitimacy is considered brute force.

Starting with source legitimacy, at the international level military peacekeeping needs to be authorised by an appropriate body in order to be widely perceived as legitimate. Durch (2006a, p. 598) points out that it is this authorisation by an appropriate body, and not just the decision by the country or countries sending their military to intervene elsewhere, that distinguishes peacekeeping or peace enforcement, from other kinds of military operations. The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre includes appropriate authorisation in their definition of peacekeeping (Morrison et al., 2008). The British Military (Ministry of Defence, 2004) state that international authorisation sets the context for the legitimacy of peace support operations. Finnmore (2003, pp. 16-17) notes that international legitimacy is important to make force most useful, with the least cost or problematic side effects. Along similar lines, Gelot (2012, p. 10) suggests that legitimacy improves the effectiveness of peacekeeping by decreasing the costs of intervention and increasing the number of countries who support the intervention through contributing troops and other needed materials. She also proposes that reciprocally, participating in a legitimate peacekeeping mission increases the perception of the legitimacy of the troop contributing country. The UN Peacekeeping Operations Guidelines and Principles (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, 2008, p. 24) state that one of the critical success factors for peacekeeping is the legitimacy conferred by UN Security Council authorisation and further “The fact that multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations enjoy a high degree of international legitimacy and represent the collective will of the international community gives them considerable leverage over the parties”.

This belief is challenged from several perspectives. Through a critical security studies lens Cheesman (2005) questions the legitimacy of internationally authorised interventions, asking whose security peacekeeping serves and suggests that it is primarily about security for western powers in their efforts to establish free markets and liberal

democracies. His analysis aligns with Pugh's argument that peacekeeping is used quite selectively and only in situations where there is so much violence at the edges of the developing world that it directly or indirectly threatens the interests of the great powers by the degree of disruption (Pugh, 2004). As discussed in the previous chapter, the very political process of creating UN authorised missions suggests that the mandates are heavily influenced by western power agendas. Liden et al (2009) summarise the failures and critiques of liberal peace including a discussion of how peacebuilding (and they subsume peacekeeping within peacebuilding) has lost its credibility, and thus perceived legitimacy, for many. As discussed in Chapter One, much of military peacekeeping today is part of the process of implementing or imposing (depending on your perspective) liberal peace agendas. Based on interviews with local people, Pouligny (2006) and Talentino (2007) both discuss the ways in which people from all sectors of society may not accept the legitimacy of the intervention, despite international authorisation. Roberts (2011) argues that in order to become legitimate, peacebuilding and peacekeeping must shift to focus on what he terms popular peace, that is peace as envisioned by, and meeting the needs of, local people in their everyday lives.

Pugh (2004) points out that while the political realist tradition analyses peacekeeping as part of the power politics of state sovereignty and affected by the foreign policy agendas of the great powers, peacekeeping is situated within humanitarian narratives, as part of establishing legitimacy. This narrative ignores underlying causes of armed conflict such as poverty, injustice and marginalisation, and any links between the policies of the global north and these underlying causes, which might challenge the legitimacy of the intervention. Marten (2004) suggests that western powers need the legitimacy conferred by UN or other multilateral authorisation of their interventions, in order to obscure the neocolonial practice of trying to control other countries, for their own benefit. The realities of this analysis are not lost on local people, as documented by Pouligny (2006), Whalan (2010) Talentino (2007), and Roberts (2011) who all discuss ways in which local people undermine or resist interventions (or aspects of interventions) they find illegitimate.

Another challenge to the perception of source legitimacy stems from the increase in interventions to protect civilians, based on the post-Westphalian doctrine of

‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P).<sup>3</sup> This doctrine challenges the state as having a monopoly on the use of violence, in circumstances when the state is either not protecting citizens from organised violence or is itself responsible for the violence. When governments are not carrying out their responsibility and duty to protect the physical safety of citizens, R2P shifts that responsibility to international institutions to intervene to provide this protection. As Booth (2005a) says, the traditional view of security is state security, rather than the welfare of individuals living in that state. The doctrine of R2P provides the rationale for legitimate interventions under Chapter VII in the UN Charter which authorises a wider use of force and tends toward peace enforcement rather than peacekeeping (Nasu, 2011). This move toward increasing concerns about civilian protection and use of R2P as the basis of interventions is resisted by many members of the UN as an illegitimate infringement on sovereignty (Homan & Ducasse-Rogier, 2012; Tardy, 2011a), and another neo-colonial move by western powers (Lidén et al., 2009). Tardy (2011b) notes, “Emerging powers have a principled approach to peace operations, with conceptions of sovereignty, non-interference and local ownership that may impact the actual peace operation mandates.”

Organisations engaged in UCP base the legitimacy of their intervention on the basis of invitations from local organisations.<sup>4</sup> Schirch (2006, p. 44) suggests that there is a moral authority, as well as authority from international law, for nonviolent third party intervention. Schweitzer (personal communication) suggests that UCP interventions uphold international law regarding human rights and this provides legitimacy. Whatever process the UCP organisation goes through to initiate an intervention, it must work out the political acceptance of their presence with the government in the host country, or it will not be able to function. This provides a certain kind of consent, though it may be a reluctant consent, motivated primarily by the government not wishing to be perceived as rejecting international presence. And though the process is quite different, it may resemble the way in which belligerents consent to peacekeeping under coercion. Additionally, while the government must provide visas and the like in order for UCP to be present, acceptance must be earned with other belligerents through interactions and building relationships. Thus issues of consent and acceptance rather than legitimacy, are

---

<sup>3</sup> See Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010, p. 36) for a summary of Westphalian and post-Westphalian UN doctrines and the movement within the UN to override state sovereignty with the responsibility to protect.

<sup>4</sup> See Wallis (2010) as well as interviews with UAM, M/UAT, and UBC.



predominant for UCP. As discussed later in this chapter, effective peacekeeping requires acceptance in the communities where peacekeepers work.

Many peacekeepers are sensitive to these issues, echoing the challenges to legitimacy raised above. They express concerns that they are imposing an agenda which is not accepted or appropriate for the country or people with whom they work. While they do not discuss the liberal peace agenda per se, many of the peacekeepers were active in missions with mandates that included many liberal peace elements. These include, for instance, Timor, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the DRC. And as discussed further in Chapter Six of this thesis, they expressed concerns that imposing solutions undermined effective peacekeeping, as it undermined acceptance and local ownership. A few expressed concerns that at times, their intervention may undermine the government they are there to support. While the AU intervention in Burundi had a legitimate mandate, from the international perspective, here MBL talks about his experience of having to work hard to build acceptance once they were working in the frontlines.

MBL: In Burundi the key problem was the general acceptance of the peace process by the population. The peace process was sort of pushed down their throats by continental pressure... Mandela was the chief architect, how shall I put it, of the whole peace process in Burundi. And through the pressures from the AU side and pressures from neighbours in the Great Lakes region, they eventually agreed to the process that was outlined but they didn't like it. Your presence, even there, was not that well accepted and we had to work very hard to get that sorted.

### **Principles of peacekeeping, legitimacy and acceptance**

Both legitimacy and acceptance are affected by the way in which peacekeeping principles manifest in action in missions or projects on the ground. In this section I discuss acceptance primarily, pointing to peacekeepers' experience of the connection between their enactment of peacekeeping principles and the acceptance or resistance they perceived in their relationships with belligerents and other local people. Peacekeeping is assumed to rest on a set of principles which include consent of the parties, being unbiased, and the use of force only for self-protection.<sup>5</sup> These principles both define

---

<sup>5</sup> See Ryan (2000), Brahimi report (*Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)*, 2000) and the UN peacekeeping guidelines (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, 2008) for further discussion.

peacekeeping and are elements of effectiveness.<sup>6</sup> These principles have been challenged in current peace operations by the call for a greater use of force to protect not only peacekeepers, but also civilians; by interventions without the consent of one or more parties to the conflict - i.e. peace enforcement; and by a perceived bias toward one or more of the parties (Sartre, 2011). These changes in peace support operations inclusively (i.e. not just the peacekeeping aspects) challenge the perceptions of legitimacy of the peacekeeping itself. In other words, when the actual operations, or what Whalan (2007, p. 629) terms procedural legitimacy, are not accepted by the people in the host country or some UN members, the actual peacekeeping will not be seen as fully legitimate. Peacekeepers perform or express these principles (or their dilution) in their everyday activities, and experience the resulting degree of acceptance, linked to perceptions of legitimacy, primarily through relationships of cooperation or non-cooperation. In the eyes of peacekeepers then, acceptance is relational, while legitimacy in the literature as noted above is more of a judgment or social status.

#### Unbiased, impartial and nonpartisan

Impartiality, neutrality or being unbiased is the peacekeeping principle mentioned most often by peacekeepers in this research. These phrases have somewhat different meanings and the use and meaning in UN missions has changed over the years (Yamashita, 2008). Originally impartiality or being unbiased pointed to the intention to refrain from influencing the balance of power, to keeping an equal distance from all parties. Yamashita suggests that today the meaning of impartiality must be reconciled with the calls for more robust peacekeeping, which will affect the various armed parties differently (thus changing the power dynamics) and may be incompatible with being equally distant. Today these phrases are meant to convey being active rather than just standing by, being fair, not acting out of prejudice but out of judgment of the current situation and to best uphold the mission mandate. Nonetheless there is ambiguity in these phrases and there is a tension between 'being impartial', the calls for more robust peacekeeping (ie stronger use of force), and the humanitarian R2P interventions.<sup>7</sup> Sartre

---

<sup>6</sup> The UN peacekeeping guidelines (2008) add legitimacy, credibility, local ownership and sensitivity to political and social contexts as further elements of effective peacekeeping.

<sup>7</sup> The recent UN authorized mission in Libya is an example of this tension. It might be considered an impartial use of force for humanitarian purposes, or a neo-colonial, western power serving armed conflict (Homan & Ducasse-Rogier, 2012).

(2011, p. 13), in his argument for more comprehensive robust peacekeeping, goes so far as to call for abandoning impartiality, if needed, in peacekeeping crisis management. He suggests that a higher degree of shared analysis and commitment to an intervention within the Security Council can create the context for a clear decision to be partial in working against those responsible for the violence in the conflict, and in support of those working for peace and the victims.

The assumption that peacekeeping interventions can be impartial is questioned. Berdal (2000) and Olsson (2008), from different perspectives and considering different interventions, raise important questions concerning the possibility of impartial intervention. Particularly with the evolution of peacekeeping toward multidimensional and more robust mandates, it seems reasonable to query whether it is truly possible to intervene without local political consequences, without changing the power relationships. The numerous critiques of the liberal peace agenda (well summarised in Stamnes, 2010) clearly point to the overall political nature of these interventions. But what is less emphasised in this literature is that these interventions will, by their very nature, support or strengthen some of the armed belligerents (usually the government), while decreasing the strength of others. Additionally the protection of civilians so that they can engage in political processes with less fear of death or other forms of intimidation will change the power dynamics in ways that will be seen as more or less favourable by different groups. This may be seen as decreasing the power asymmetries by some, and as providing unwanted support to opponents by others. Thus it seems unclear what degree of impartiality, if any, is really possible.

Wallis (2010, pp. 32-33) discussing UCP states the need to be nonpartisan. He suggests that neutrality as used by an organisation like the Red Cross is too limiting, implies too much non-interference, and he finds that impartiality is also not the correct word. UCP must maintain good working relationships with all parties to the conflict or they will not be able to function at all. As unarmed civilians, they do not have the means to impose their presence nor protect themselves from an armed group determined to throw them out. Historically, they have not had the international sanction of the UN behind them,<sup>8</sup> to protect them from being ejected by the country government. So they

---

<sup>8</sup> This may be changing, see the Nonviolent Peaceforce website for updates on their work with the UN in South Sudan, for instance. <http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/np-deploying-8-field-teams-south-sudan> accessed 3 March 2012.

must be nonpartisan, that is not taking sides between the various armed groups, but they are actively working to stop and prevent violence, protect human rights, and make space for local people to engage (Schweitzer, 2010, p. 12). Mahony and Eguren (1997, p. 236), discussing the relationship between impartial and nonpartisan, state “Nonpartisan service responds to demonstrable objective and external criteria rather than to alignments in the conflict.” They go on to discuss the need to protect the poor, the vulnerable, to argue for being partial to those who need protection, but not being partisan, not taking sides in the political struggle itself. Again this seems to overlook the likely partisan impact of intervening to protect the vulnerable, who may then be able to engage in political struggle more safely and effectively, thus changing local politics.

In the literature on UCP the term nonpartisan is used while in the literature on armed peacekeeping the terms impartiality or unbiased are primarily used. This seems to reflect the different traditions using different words to convey similar ideas of meaning to be non-political, and also a way for UCP to clearly state their bias toward protecting people. This bias differentiates UCP from armed peacekeeping which began with a focus on protecting states and national borders, and still struggles to put civilian protection into practice.<sup>9</sup> And both seem to obfuscate the potential political implications of intervention.<sup>10</sup>

In her theorising of how peacekeeping works Fortna (2008a), though not highlighting impartiality as a central factor of effective peacekeeping, notes in several places (p. 91-2 and 97 for instance) that being impartial links to legitimacy, but also that there is a time and place for biased intervention to stop violence. Howard (2008, p. 40) finds that impartiality is not linked to success and her case studies imply, at times, that impartiality in fact contributed to problems. Mahony (2006, pp. 55-57) discusses the need to be perceived as without bias as an important aspect of what he terms multi-level diplomacy.<sup>11</sup> He describes a number of strategies that can help maintain relationships with many sectors and influence their behaviour, without appearing to be too close to one

---

<sup>9</sup> For instance see Giffen (2011) for a recent discussion of UN civilian protection practices. This is also a point Annan (2012) makes frequently in his memoirs.

<sup>10</sup> I will return to this point, in my theorizing on robust relationship peacekeeping – see Chapter Eight.

<sup>11</sup> Multi-level diplomacy relates to having frequent interactions with all parties and people related to the conflict, at all levels, and making consistent efforts to influence their behaviour. (Mahony, 2006, pp. 49-61)

group or biased. At the same time he is clearly arguing for making the protection of civilians the key focus, or bias. He also acknowledges the reality, which a few of the peacekeepers themselves mentioned, that while the organisation can work to be seen as unbiased, individual staff will often have a bias against those committing the most violence, or for those perceived to be victims.

Being impartial or nonpartisan was thought by peacekeepers to be essential for being accepted by all the different parties to the conflict. It was seen as important for being accepted by local people, who may have allegiances due to identity, politics, geography, or other reasons, to one of the conflict parties. And peacekeepers believed this acceptance is very important, no matter what their role. In the context of on the ground peacekeeping, acceptance is relational, created, maintained and known through the actions of those with whom peacekeepers interact. UAK links the reputation of being nonpartisan to acceptance, and with the ability to connect with all groups. MAZ identifies neutrality as the important factor in being effective.

UAK: One thing, at that time, in terms of rebel groups, because of our reputation, the perception of NP as nonpartisan, we got access to all stakeholders, we got the acceptance, access and trust of all actors... We got accepted, we could access most communities, even if it was just a curious acceptance, we could reach out, and be an opportunity for people to come together in a neutral setting, nonpartisan setting, that worked well.

MAZ: We must be neutral, neutrality is the most important, it makes a difference...

M/UAT advises that you have to monitor and work to maintain your reputation of being non partisan. Even if you have not done something partisan, others may try to undermine your reputation. Either way, you have to take corrective action.

M/UAT: You must be seen as not taking sides, having strong non-partisanship... You have to monitor your image of being nonpartisan all the time, if someone tries to undermine your image of nonpartisan, we have to ask ourselves what we did... and what we need to do to correct this.

One former military peacekeeper suggested that proximity to one side or more frequent cooperation with one side can lead to partiality among individual troops. His experience while in the field was feeling one belligerent group was better than the other. Once home and with more distance, he later questioned this judgment.

UAL narrates some of these challenges of being perceived as nonpartisan, and of actually being nonpartisan. She expresses the dilemma that in truth she was partisan, but struggled to operate in a nonpartisan manner.

UAL: Like learning the local languages, being part of the community, using public transportation – that makes you very visible, and the language makes you able to talk to everyone...being embedded in the community. But this made the military and government question our non-partisanship. Over the long term, it is difficult for us to know exactly what triggered difficulties in the end. And [if] that perception of our non-partisanship was too compromised in our way of working, it is hard to know... The Papua indigenous people on the land were usually not armed, they are generally very poor, and struggling in their day to day lives. The Indonesian state was armed, with a history of brutal conflicts and oppression. To be nonpartisan in that situation, and also, the Indonesian settlers from the rest of Indonesia lived quite differently. Away from the coast at times it was like an apartheid situation. To remain nonpartisan was especially difficult, especially difficult because we worked so closely with the community, it seems a moral question, fundamentally to see what was happening and it seemed wrong, to be nonpartisan in that situation is hard. It was easy to control our actions, to try to convey non-partisanship, but in our hearts that is not how we felt at all, and that inevitably comes across and it was hard to be nonpartisan. And that can compromise the work, it is so important that all sides see you as nonpartisan, so that was a dilemma.

Being perceived as nonpartisan appears to be an important factor for peacekeeping to be accepted. And this sets the conditions for operating effectively. At the same time it seems essential for creating and maintaining good relationships, as discussed below.

### Consent

Traditional or first generation UN peacekeeping was undertaken with the consent of the armed parties, generally two or more governments. Currently, the lack of consent from one or more parties to the conflict is becoming more frequent. The justification for these interventions may be to protect civilians, though the track record of doing so is weak.<sup>12</sup> Whether the intervention is undertaken in order to protect civilians, or because of concerns about the on-going and spreading instability caused by the conflict, or concerns

---

<sup>12</sup> See Hultman (2010) for research on this issue and Durch and Giffen (2010) for a discussion of challenges and failures to protect civilians in UN missions.

about the despotic nature of the current regime, peace enforcement<sup>13</sup> is now considered a legitimate form of intervention when authorised by the UN or other multilateral institution.<sup>14</sup> The research on the effectiveness of peace enforcement missions is mixed.<sup>15</sup> Authors use different definitions of success or effectiveness, different data bases, and look at the issue from different perspectives. Research questions include whether the initial use of force to start a peace operation without the consent of all parties can lead to a lasting peace (Fortna, 2008a) and if so is this characterized by a democratic, relatively peaceful society, and how long after the intervention this might emerge (Kreps, 2010; Sambanis, 2008). Thus it is not clear how effective missions have been that lacked full consent.

The UN Peacekeeping Operations Guidelines and Principles (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, 2008, pp. 31-33) discusses the need for consent of the parties. The explanation implies acceptance as part of consent, explaining that consent gives peacekeeping operations “freedom of action, political and physical...” (p. 32). The Guidelines caution that without consent, the intervention may be seen as part of the conflict and the practices will become peace enforcement. There is recognition that the mission must work to maintain consent as it may be withdrawn, and that even when the main parties have consented to the intervention, this does not mean that local people have consented. The Guidelines reflect a tension between the need to implement the mission mandate without losing the consent of the conflicted parties and while also maintaining local civilian consent.

Howard (2008, pp. 228-229) finds consent to be one of the critical elements for success in UN missions. She links consent to setting the conditions for operations, and thus learning, which is another critical element for success in her analysis. Pushkina (2006) finds higher levels of consent linked to cooperation and therefore one of the factors in successful peacekeeping.

---

<sup>13</sup> Defined in the British military doctrine as “Peace enforcement - a peace support operation conducted to maintain a cease-fire or a peace agreement where the level of consent and compliance is uncertain and the threat of disruption is high. A peace support force must be capable of applying credible coercive force and must apply the provisions of the peace agreement impartially.” (Ministry of Defence, 2004, pp. 1-2).

<sup>14</sup> Durch (2006b, p. 7), summarizing various typologies of peacekeeping interventions, demonstrates that most authors include some form of enforcement in their analysis of peace operations.

<sup>15</sup> See Doyle and Sambanis (2006), Fortna (2008a), Fortna and Howard (2008), Sambanis (2008) and Hegre et al (2010) for discussions on the effectiveness of peace enforcement.

Johnstone (2011a) discusses the way in which peacekeeping without consent slides into peace enforcement and to war, with blurred distinctions, and claims that the use of Chapter VI and Chapter VII (of the UN Charter) language in the mandates is unclear on these points.<sup>16</sup> He also points out that consent can be coerced or unreliable on the part of one or more of the parties. Consent can change over time, and in peace support missions today the consent is challenged by the many elements of the liberal peace agenda – in other words consenting to a peacekeeping intervention related to a ceasefire, may not mean a consent to implementing liberal democracy as well. It is easier to get consent to a very limited mandate and harder for a more complex mandate. Managing to maintain the relationship and substantive consent, without compromising too much in any number of ways, is extremely difficult. Thus it is not a simple proposition of having or not having consent. Johnstone (2011b, p. 176) emphasises the need for consent at all levels of intervention, not just at the national government “...perhaps the peace agreement should be seen not merely as a bargain between the host governments and local elites, but as a social compact with the population as a whole.” Leonard (2013) makes a similar point in that governance and social contracts in tropical African states exist at community and regional levels as well as the national level. He suggests the lack of understanding and ignoring of these social practices when trying to build post-conflict governance, undermines effective peacebuilding in part because consent is not developed at the community level. This view is echoed in, and supported by, this research project. As noted above peacekeepers did not use the words legitimacy or consent. However, if as Johnstone suggests, there needs to be a compact or consent at the local level, I suggest that when peacekeepers talk about acceptance they are talking about consent in action, expressed relationally. They recognise that peacekeeping needs acceptance at the local level or it faces significant obstacles.

UCP interventions, as already mentioned, have a different issue with consent. They are rarely invited in by one or more of the armed groups, though the Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) project in Mindanao Philippines is now part of the International Monitoring Team and NP has been asked by the governments of Kyrgyzstan and

---

<sup>16</sup> A point echoed and elaborated by Sartre (2011).



Myanmar to field projects.<sup>17</sup> UCP interventions generally operate at the invitation of local organisations but must earn the acceptance of the government in order to receive visas and remain in the country. They must also have the de-facto acceptance of local armed groups, as they are quite vulnerable to being forced out. Thus in general UCP is focused on a more informal consent.<sup>18</sup> It is essential and a very practical matter. For instance U/CAG talks about the need for acceptance from the local armed groups, as it would have been easy to force them out, given they were unarmed. In this sense one could say acceptance implied consent to their presence.

U/CAG: From a security point of view we had to have their acceptance, we would have had to move if they threw a hand grenade, attacked us, anyone could have forced us to move, so they had to accept us, had to know what we were doing.

Other peacekeepers discuss the need for acceptance. They are not focused on the international level of legitimacy or governmental consent, but the actual, active acceptance of the intervention in the community. UAK links acceptance and trust with implementing the mission.

UAK: To be effective you have to have trust and acceptance, people would be willing to meet with you and approach us with appropriate requests, that is an example of trust and understanding the mandate, people share the sensitive details of their challenges, that they don't share with others.

MBI has earlier linked acceptance, hope and cooperation and now gives a thorough explanation of why cooperation (which I take to imply acceptance) are critical for effective peacekeeping. He stresses that local people are not just passive recipients of peacekeeping, but have to cooperate, there has to be team work in order to be effective. There has to be a sense of mutual benefit.

MBI: The cooperation of people is very important. Unless and until the people there cooperate with you, you cannot operate. It is not only the peacekeeper who operates individually, there has to be a sort of teamwork between the local people and the UN. Like right from the beginning, you remember me mentioning about the

---

<sup>17</sup> See NP website for further information <http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/fieldwork> and <http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/myanmar-invites-np-support-peace-processes> accessed 10 February 2013.

<sup>18</sup> One could construe the process by which NGOs register with the government, as consent. But this is quite a different matter than the formal consent given by agreeing to a peacekeeping mission.

land that the local people provide you so you can deploy troops. Similarly people provide you access, informations and so many other things. The logistic support that you require, the local people provide you logistic support also. These are the things you don't get when people do not cooperate and when people start to lose hope. Information is very important, that is how you can plan your future operations, and this is what you get from local people. If there is a communication gap, if people lose hope and there is a communication gap, and then the gap starts to widen and then people do not cooperate with you and then slowly you cannot perform effectively. That is why it is very essential that you have good relations with the local people and local people have confidence in you. It is very important that people understand the UN presence is for their benefit and their [?], it is very important that they understand this, and only then can the peacekeepers operate effectively.

M/UAT links acceptance by all parties as the main strategy for staff protection, and notes that you have to prove to people why they should accept the intervention.

M/UAT: But the key strategy is acceptance strategy by all stakeholders. And if you depend too much on a prevention strategy [preventing being attacked], you won't win back the acceptance strategy. It isn't that we are all tree hugging and open eyed, saying love us. You have to prove why people should accept us.

These comments are echoed in Pouligny's various descriptions of how people in host countries, once they lose respect for the peacekeeping mission, purposefully do not cooperate, pretend they do not know, and in various ways are unsupportive to or undermine the intervention (Pouligny, 2006). In other words, while having the consent of the government and other armed groups is important to the success of a mission, on the ground, community level acceptance expressed through cooperative relationships also appears to be critical for effective peacekeeping. And they can exist independently, legitimate authorisation of a mission does not automatically confer acceptance.

### Use of force

The third principle of traditional peacekeeping is the use of force only for self-protection. With the evolution of third generation peacekeeping and with the development of R2P, many missions today are authorised to use force to protect civilians as well. The lack of consensus on what this means operationally (Tardy, 2011a) leads to a discussion of the legitimacy of the use of force in armed peacekeeping missions, primarily focused

on the UN. As noted in Chapter One, one of the responses to the failures of Srebrenica and Rwanda was a call for more robust peacekeeping, which is primarily understood to mean the authorisation and use of increased force. I will discuss the effectiveness and dilemmas of the use of force in a later chapter (see Chapter Five), so will only comment on how it relates to legitimacy here. Robust peacekeeping generally refers to the use and implementation of phrases in the UN mandate about using all force necessary for self-protection and to protect civilians under threat.<sup>19</sup> Peace enforcement missions authorised under Chapter VII of the UN charter also allow the use of force to achieve specific goals. Tardy (2011a) discusses the lack of clarity in the meaning and operations of robust peacekeeping and the concerns raised by many UN members that this is a new form of infringement on state sovereignty. He notes that while robust peacekeeping is intended to increase the credibility of a peace operation mission, it may actually undermine the perceptions of impartiality and thus legitimacy. This points to the interrelationship of impartiality, consent and use of force only for self-protection. Howard (2008, p. 14) suggests that restraint in the use of force increases UN legitimacy. In an examination of the tensions between calls for more robust peacekeeping and a greater reliance on a hearts and minds approach, Lardsotter (2009) notes that minimal use of force is assumed to lead to greater cooperation and legitimacy with the local population. Last (1995) identifies the tension between the need to use military fire power versus the use of negotiations and other kinds of contact interventions,<sup>20</sup> as one of the key problems in peacekeeping. The NORDCAPS Tactical Manual (2007 p. 34), while defending the use of the minimal force necessary, nonetheless notes that the use of force may undermine the legitimacy of the mission, leading to the withdrawal of consent and the failure of a mission.

Sartre (2011) develops an analysis of robust peacekeeping which suggests that use of force is only one element that must be subordinated to a much broader understanding of robust peacekeeping. He argues that in order for the use of force to be legitimate in what he considers necessary, though limited use, it must be for protection – protection of the mission and protection of civilians, rather than for self-defence. He presents extensive argumentation that this doctrine of protection is legitimate within the UN

---

<sup>19</sup> See Nasu (2011) for a more extensive discussion of the relationships of R2P and protecting civilians.

<sup>20</sup> Last (1995) analyses the use of military action as defensive and describes offensive action as contact, by which he means negotiation and mediation, discussion and dialogue, all the relational work that de-escalates and moves toward sustainable peace.

Charter, and legitimises a limited use of force, when it is not to attain political objectives, but to protect UN troops and staff and civilians.

Discussing the RAMSI intervention, Whalan (2010) suggests that the coercive power of the large military intervention worked in part because it was initially welcomed and understood to be legitimate by local people. However, the paradox was that this legitimacy stemmed in part from not actually using the fire power represented in the force. Thus while the threat of force was considered legitimate and was considered to be a significant factor in the decrease of violence, actually using the force might have undermined this legitimacy, which was so important. In a later chapter (see Chapter Five), I will further discuss this dilemma as reported by peacekeepers themselves in various parts of the world, but it is important to note that this dilemma seems to be part of many military peacekeeping missions.

Use of force is a nonissue during the history of UCP. This has been raised as a criticism, that it makes UCP too idealistic and limited to be effective.<sup>21</sup> This criticism might be construed as reflecting the lack of legitimacy of UCP in the eyes of critics, but I have not found any discussion on this topic, nor was it raised in interviews.

Peacekeepers in this research raise concerns that the inappropriate use of force can undermine acceptance, or even the purpose of the mission as peacekeeping, rather than peace enforcement. MAZ thinks the use of force is not a problem, if it is used minimally and carefully. If not, it undermines acceptance.

MAZ: The only thing they don't like is the showing off, if you are unnecessarily armed, or heavily armed and it isn't needed, if you are just showing off yourself, it makes a difference. Otherwise, if you are lightly armed, or reasonably armed, or not, as required, it doesn't make a difference to them, that is what I think. You have to be sincere, as the principle says, the minimum use of force. This applies to the showing off as well, you show off only what is required, you don't show off what is not required.

M/UAT raises concerns that once a UN mission starts shooting, they are part of the problem.

---

<sup>21</sup> See Wallace (2010) for a discussion of the supposed idealistic and unrealistic nature of nonviolent third party interventions.

M/UAT: But you don't want to be part of the conflict, but you will, once you go in and start shooting people you are part of the conflict, that's how it is, its human nature.

MAP in defining peacekeeping believes it involves no or minimum use of force, and implies that peace enforcement would not be carried out by the UN.

MAP: Peacekeeping is, it's based on neutrality, reciprocity of governments. It is based on these things, being neutral, as little use of force as possible, use of force is minimum. If the recipient government doesn't want the UN to be there, the UN withdraws, wouldn't use force. You wouldn't have missions like Iraq, where they force the country to change systems or prevent genocide.

CBA notes that what he considers to be an inappropriate use of force undermines the perception of legitimacy in the eyes of UN staff. This reflects the concerns about the UN association with peace enforcement rather than peacekeeping. Referring to the killing of civilians in Afghanistan CBA says:

CBA: ...these incidents continued to occur, the military could say it was unavoidable, but the UN couldn't say that. It blunted the effectiveness, because all the peacekeeping and efforts and all, something like that happens, things become difficult and hugely embarrassing. The human rights officers say, what are we doing there, you feel, you lose faith in your own efforts, you feel how can you explain it to anyone, it is something you cannot explain, nor justify to anyone, that was a big problem there.

### **Undermining Acceptance**

The literature, and peacekeepers I interviewed, pointed to a number of factors that undermine or hold the potential to undermine acceptance. These include not meeting the expectations of local people, problematic behaviour on the part of peacekeepers and the imposition of culturally inappropriate solutions.

#### Expectations and acceptance

Protecting people has become one of the central, if not the most central general public expectation of peacekeeping (Annan & Mousavizadeh, 2012; Durch & Giffen, 2010; Holt et al., 2009). This will be discussed later in detail (in Chapter Five), but here only as it relates to acceptance. Peacekeepers themselves use phrases like protecting people, or making it safe for people to lead normal lives, in their definition of

peacekeeping and descriptions of the purposes of their missions. Holt, Taylor and Kelly (2009) make the point in a number of different ways that UN legitimacy overall, and the specific legitimacy of the mission, depends in part on effectively protecting civilians. The inability to meet the expectation of protection can undermine the legitimacy of the mission with local people and the wider international public, and this has problematic consequences for the mission. Pouligny (2006, p. 186) finds in her research that when local people perceive UN troops as more concerned with their own protection than with protecting civilians, the mission loses legitimacy and people distance themselves from it. As Whalan (2010) and Talentino (2007) both discuss, when the mission does not meet general expectations, or when local people believe too many promises have been broken, the cooperation with the mission decreases, and this undermines the possibility of mission success.

These expectations may be in conflict with the overall politics of security and the focus on national security rather than individuals and communities. They may also be in conflict with the mandate which gives more focus and attention to developing government functions rather than protecting civilians. MBI talks about rapid deployment and effective logistics to support the operation as it relates to meeting expectations and notes the problems that arise when expectations are not met.

MBI: The expectations of the people, people have a lot of expectations at the beginning. But if you cannot meet, manage their expectations, then slowly, the press are after you, the press are after the mission, people talk about it, and people slowly lose hope in the entire system itself.

On the positive side MBL emphasises his success in communicating with people regarding what they can expect and how this generates good will.

MBL: I conducted probably 50 to 60 town hall meetings, in all the different small villages in my area of responsibility. Where you get 200 to 300 people together, you talk to them through an interpreter and you explain to them what is happening and without making promises, tell them what they can expect of the mission, etc etc. And that creates a lot of understanding and a lot of goodwill.

In addition to protecting people, local people increasingly have expectations that peacekeepers can provide humanitarian or development aid. While there is debate in the field about the meaning, purpose, benefits and challenges of mixing aid and peacekeeping

(Duffield, 2010; Egnell, 2009; Olsson, 2008), some military peacekeepers believed it was a good thing for their interventions. UCP peacekeepers were more challenged by the need to explain why they were there, and what they could do, being civilians without any aid, humanitarian or development program to offer. MAQ emphasises the protective aspect he assumes when peacekeepers are linked to aid.

MAQ: And it would be good protection for us, if we could help, people would be less likely to attack us. It would be easier to prove to people we aren't there to do harm and it would be harder for the enemy to say we were bad, there to destroy. It would be good protection for us if we had resources to help.

MBI talked about the way global north countries can contribute aid and global south countries cannot, along with their peacekeeping.

MBI: These are the things that matter, these are the things that people expect [you can hear the tension in his voice]. The presence of the UN doesn't mean security, that is what the people say, more than the military presence, they want to see the development taking [place], that is what they expect on the presence of the UN... So people want to see more and more of these activities, rather than the military patrolling. So that is why, participation of these kinds of nations, who can assist the local people, they are bringing in funds from their own country.

Other comments described dilemmas, pointing to the dilemma between short term projects or assistance which local people want immediately, and slower, more long term interventions meant to build local capacity and local ownership, but which may not meet local expectations. Several peacekeepers discussed how easy it is to think you are doing good, when the result of the assistance not only takes staff and resources from protection work, or long term capacity building, but actually undermines the credibility and leadership of the local authorities you are there to support. This was described as happening when peacekeepers provided direct aid and assistance, which they believed should have come from the government.

### Peacekeepers behaviour and cultural stereotypes

Acceptance is a delicate process, not an end state. There are numerous ways acceptance is undermined and challenged. Whalan (2010) discusses one type of legitimacy – procedural legitimacy - as related to the actual practices of peacekeeping. This is echoed in the perception that the behaviour of peacekeepers themselves was one

factor in either increasing or decreasing acceptance. While there is very little research on the issue of acceptance, early research by Galtung and Eide (1976) explored these questions from the perspective of why local people in Gaza did not reject peacekeepers.<sup>22</sup> They suggest that the way soldiers lived a basic lifestyle, their attempts to hide culturally inappropriate behaviour such as smoking, and the efforts soldiers made to be helpful in the community, were all important. Aoi et al (2007) discuss many aspects of misbehaviour and illegal behaviour, and suggest it stems in part from a permissive environment for peacekeepers, far from home, and with significant power in the community. Whitworth (2004) suggests this misbehaviour stems from the socialization practices within the military, though various military doctrines note the importance of cultural sensitivity for successful operations (Ministry of Defence, 2004; NORDCAPS, 2007).

Feldman (2010) suggests peacekeepers represent the international community to local people. The very wording of ‘peacekeepers’ and ‘local people’ underscores this distinction of internationals who have come to help and those who are to be helped. As noted previously, she makes an interesting observation that the very training which is meant to increase cultural awareness, brings attention to the differences between the culture of the peacekeepers and local people. She suggests that the training is usually too shallow to develop an understanding of how local people think and shape their understandings of the world. She thinks this may contribute to the prejudice and problems between peacekeepers and local people. Contact theory suggests that increased contact between individuals from different identity groups decreases prejudice. Contact theory would suggest that although knowledge shared in training would be less likely to weaken prejudices, the extensive contact between peacekeepers and local people might be expected to (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008). However, Johansson (1997) found the opposite, that prolonged contact appeared to increase negative perceptions of local people and belligerents. As I discuss below, a few of the peacekeepers I interviewed echoed this perception, that the stress of action in the field undermined tolerance. While not a focus of this research, it does suggest that the context in which contact occurs may be important in terms of the impact on prejudice.

---

<sup>22</sup> Feldman (2010) reviewed numerous UN documents from the UNEF mission in Palestine and concludes that the reception of the peacekeepers was much more mixed.



Whatever the causes, when troops, police or civilians mistreat civilians, sexually abuse women and men, undertake illegal economic activities, behave too far outside of local cultural norms, or just drive too fast, do not have translators, or are in other ways inaccessible and inconsiderate, the local population may become unwilling to cooperate (Aoi et al., 2007; Pouligny, 2006). Other problematic behaviour occurs when peacekeepers are perceived as failing in their duty to protect civilians, as discussed above.

MAP served in Ethiopia and Eritrea, and shared a long list of troop misbehaviour and concluded it had to do with uneducated men. He shared his anger that a few soldiers could ruin the reputation of the all the peacekeepers.

MAP: ...if you put uneducated soldiers.... 5,000 troops, mostly men, that creates problems and also there are some idiots who can ruin the reputation of the whole troops.

From the perspective of a civilian in UN missions, CBB believes the UN simply does not pay enough attention to these issues. She suggests that these issues could be prevented with sufficient attention, implying that the leadership does not care enough to allocate resources to this.

CBB: You can look at the criticism, micro and macro issues, sexual violence issues, they could actually be prevented, if there was a bottom line, some criteria, but this is not monitored... maybe the UN people should focus on avoiding corruption issues, and sexual violence issues, and to keep the UN image good, it could be avoided.

As Pouligny (2006) documents from the receiving side, the perceived prejudices of peacekeepers toward local people is the source of some of the misbehaviour, expressed in unconscious disrespect, if nothing else. Some of what I assumed to be unconscious disrespect or prejudice seemed evident in some of the interviews. For instance PAV shares how much she enjoyed working with the people in the Solomon Islands, and yet her unconscious prejudice is also apparent.

PAV: They are fabulous people, Solomon Islanders. I used to walk into the office, people greeted each other warmly, like the folks at the office here, after a while I didn't notice the colour of their skin, they are dark there, and all the banter just like working here ...

MAY talked about what he perceived as the ingratitude of the local government, which might be understood as resistance to the liberal peace agenda by others. He also refers indirectly to the sacrifices he perceived were made by people like himself, from the global north, who took pay cuts and left comfortable situations to be there.

MAY: So you do get this frustration between trying to do good work, the UN itself trying to achieve certain things, and being part of that, and the conflict with the local government, since the local government doesn't seem to appreciate the sacrifices people make to go there to help, so they criticise the UN and take the UN for granted at the same time...

The following remarks suggest that the stress and challenges of peacekeeping contribute to an increase or maintenance of prejudice and a cynical attitude that has to be challenged to maintain discipline and effectiveness.

MBQ: But by about month 3 or 4, the newness of the environment has started to pale and you have people who are starting to get tired, the hours are long, missing their families. The strange environment, they got used to that, they tend to be hot, so there are environmental issues. We are generally self-starters, and what my soldiers couldn't get over, on both missions, was the lack of self-starting that you would see in the local people. That turns in to a cynicism, that we are here, and we are doing it all for them, and they are not even willing to help themselves. And that goes to attitudes like rag heads, towel heads, and they start to talk along those lines. That is always, how do you maintain discipline, civility, the ability to get the job done, without all the points of rub and friction that have generated over the last couple of months, particularly as people start to get tired, and start missing home, there is always the element of sameness. Every morning, there is a line up of people outside the door, outside the gate, of people who wanted something. People get cynical about that.

### Imposition of solutions and cultural sensitivity

While supporting local problem-solving will be discussed as a central purpose of effective peacekeeping later in this work (see Chapter Six), here I want to discuss the imposition of solutions and western cultural norms, as it relates to undermining acceptance and therefore to good working relationships.

It is not clear if it is possible to successfully impose liberal democracy and the other elements of liberal peace, but it seems clear to peacekeepers interviewed, and some authors, that attempting to do so can undermine acceptance. Fortna (2008b) summarises

the literature on peacekeeping and democracy and finds that the very efforts to impose democracy undercut local governance efforts that might lead to democracy. Part of the problem with this research is that there is no consensus on the definition of democracy (Luckham, 2011). Gowan (2008) notes that the overall liberal peace agenda is too large, unrealistic and undermines legitimacy. Looking at Afghanistan as a recent example of international attempts to impose a particular model of democratic governance (and where a number of people interviewed served), Lافراie (2011) finds these efforts failing and perhaps even providing opportunities for the Taliban to strengthen their positions. Mac Ginty (2011) examines ways in which communities resist this imposition, creating various hybrids. There is a set of literature, referenced earlier in Chapter One and to be discussed further in Chapter Six,<sup>23</sup> which provides extensive discussion of the drawbacks to imposing a solution created for a different society, the inability to do so, and the standpoint that trying to impose a western/northern agenda serves the interests of the great powers.

From a different perspective, Howard (2008) discusses the need for a mission to relate appropriately to the post-conflict environment and to have its actions guided primarily by field level analysis in order to be successful (for example p. 328). She uses the phrase ‘integrative’ to describe missions that relate well to the local environment, as opposed to a ‘colonial profile’. She implies, but does not specify, that cultural sensitivity is an important factor and her focus is on how having an integrative profile supports learning and thus success. Wallis (2010) specifically notes that cultural sensitivity is a critical element of effective civilian peacekeeping.

Peacekeepers spoke clearly to this issue. As already mentioned in Chapter Two, some spoke of the problem of trying to impose democracy, and a particular form of democracy, on others. CAD worked in Afghanistan with the UN and shared her concerns about the intervention and whether the model being promoted was appropriate. MAA echoes these questions, though he did not serve in Afghanistan. He wonders what soldiers are being asked to do, and worries they have been put in a precarious position, unable to be successful.

CAD: The Taliban said you work for the Americans, which was true, the UN was doing the American agenda. I was aware of this,

---

<sup>23</sup> For good discussions of the limits to the liberal peace agenda see Roland (2002), Pugh (2004), Richmond and Franks (2009), Liden, Mac Ginty and Richmond(2009), (Leonard, 2013) and Mac Ginty (2011).

uncomfortable, I am from human rights and democracy. But does democracy work in Afghanistan? I wasn't sure, and the local Jirga is like a small parliament, we should have reinforced their own system, not exported our system, the UN and American policy is very close.

MAA: The concept of peace building is great, but trying to implement western ideas, from Europe, to places like Afghanistan, has its limits. The concept is good but Afghanistan has 1000 years of tribal life... Asking troops to carry out orders, but they are in a precarious situation, before they even get there. They don't even begin to understand the Afghan situation - tribes, culture, mind, so how can someone in the UN, U.S., or EU send troops over, to do what?

MBQ is concerned that coming in and imposing a solution may not be the right one, and links that later in the interview to the difficulty in effectively making the intervention sustainable.

MBQ: But when you go to a failed state, you don't have a government to talk, and you don't have a peace accord that can be kept. What I think is this is being used as an opportunity to say 'we have a solution for you' and it might not necessarily be the right solution.

UAL discussed the resistance PBI experienced in Indonesia, suggesting it reflected that the intervention was not in accord with the local culture.

UAL: PBI and its philosophy didn't translate well to the Indonesian context. Sometimes, looking back, so much of what we did really offended the government. We could have done it differently, to translate that work and approach in a way that could be more easily swallowed and grasped, people could have felt more comfortable with. PBI developed in Latin American countries, culturally a different context, but Indonesia was a very different culture. PBI assumes it is a model that can be applied anywhere, but I am not totally sure of that, at least adjustment needs to be made to take into account where you are at.

PBF speaking to the same issue on a local scale notes that you have to work in accordance with the local culture in order to be accepted and work effectively.

PBF: If you are going into a lot of cultures and pretending you care, but you upset them because you are working against their culture, and you are using force, there is no way they will come on board, but if you can meet them at a level where you can communicate with them, and gain their trust and support, then

they will come to you with their problems, and you can look at their problems and problem solve with them.

## **Conclusion**

Reviewing salient points from this chapter, there is a complex interaction between legitimacy conferred by the formal international authorisation, impartiality or non-partisanship, the consent of parties to the intervention, the use of force and local, relational acceptance in communities. Even when the national government has consented to a legitimate mission, authorised by the UN or AU or other institution, peacekeepers suggest that local people must accept the mission and cooperate in order for it to function well. Acceptance is seen to be influenced by perceptions of legitimacy; the actual implementation of the peacekeeping principles of being unbiased, having consent, and using force only for self defence and for the protection of civilians; the capacity and orientation toward meeting expectations; peacekeepers' behaviour and respect for local cultures; and the perception that the mission supports local solutions which are in accordance with local cultures.

Legitimacy and acceptance may be interrelated at many levels of interaction, affected by the perceptions, beliefs and behaviours of the many actors involved in a peacekeeping process. The legitimacy of a peacekeeping intervention can be seen as a judgment conferred by a particular multilateral process, while acceptance is expressed in relationships and everyday interactions. These are not static states but concepts that describe aspects of ever renewing experiences. Acceptance, as a relational enactment in everyday work, is understood by peacekeepers to be essential for effective peacekeeping in communities.

I turn now, in the next chapters, to the actual functioning and actions of implementing peacekeeping in the effort to prevent violence, protect people and support local problem-solving.

## **Chapter Five Effective peacekeeping prevents violence and protects people**

This chapter will discuss if and how peacekeeping is thought to prevent violence and protect people in armed conflicts and conflict affected communities, weaving together the literature, the views of peacekeepers and my own reflections. This has not been a specific focus in critical peace studies. Critiques focus on the efforts in peacebuilding interventions to control people in their day to day lives (Mitchell, 2011); the ways in which peace interventions undermine local ownership and local change processes (Mac Ginty, 2008; Richmond & Franks, 2009); perceptions of implementation as part of a wider security practice (Booth, 2005a; Olsson, 2008) and the imposition of global north hegemony or imperialism (Cunliffe, 2012; Darby, 2009b; Lidén et al., 2009); and the failure of peace interventions to create real peace, let alone safety (Higate & Henry, 2009b; Mac Ginty, 2010). Therefore this chapter relates primarily to liberal peacekeeping literature that focuses on effective peacekeeping through quantitative and qualitative analysis. While some of this literature includes critique of the liberal peacekeeping practice that parallels critical peace studies, it remains primarily concerned with problem-solving and technical analysis. I think however, that the effective practice of third party intervention to prevent violence and protect people effectively does not require connection with a liberal peace agenda. Rather I think the potential of peacekeeping interventions to contribute to conditions of sufficient safety so that local people themselves nonviolently engage in conflict and work out their particular version of peacebuilding, begins to emerge through understanding what peacekeepers do and how they perceive what is effective. This analysis requires engaging with both problem-solving and critiquing.

Drawing on both quantitative and qualitative literature, primarily in a positivist approach, I examine the relationship of peacekeeping to the prevention of war and other outcomes such as negative and positive peace, the duration of peace, and the impact on one sided violence. There is little research on the effectiveness of UCP interventions, though I do reference their self evaluations. Having looked at the potential outcomes of peacekeeping, I will then turn to the central theories proposed in this literature of how peacekeeping actualises the prevention of violence and protection of people. One of the

current debates regarding the effectiveness of peacekeeping focuses on the appropriate use of force, often referred to with terms such as robust or muscular peacekeeping, and how the use of force is understood to relate to successful peacekeeping. The likelihood of using force and the effectiveness is critiqued from several directions, along with a reflection of how peacekeepers from different roles understand these issues. The chapter closes with a comparison of the literature with the findings constructed in my research.

### **Peacekeeping activities**

Before further discussion of peacekeeping, it is important to get a ground level view of what peacekeepers describe as their day to day activities.<sup>1</sup> In each interview, I asked participants to describe what they actually did. Below is a comprehensive list of their activities demonstrating the wide variety of peacekeeping actions. The list reflects that most of them were engaged in peacekeeping in communities.

The specific activities any peacekeeper reported engaging in are related to the following elements: the purpose of their part of a mission – i.e. monitoring borders, protecting vulnerable communities, or providing training to police; the stage of the conflict – during a conflict or the immediate aftermath of a peace agreement versus later on in a peace process, or even working in a conflict affected community unrelated to a peace process; their role as police, military, civilian or unarmed civilian peacekeeper; their specific job; and the particulars of the organisation within which they worked – the UN, PBI or NP, RAMSI, etc. Peacekeepers described the following activities:

- ❖ patrol;
- ❖ accompany key individuals to protect them;
- ❖ accompany and protect groups and communities;
- ❖ gather information and analyse;
- ❖ meeting and coordination;
- ❖ providing protective presence;<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> My focus on the everyday experiences of peacekeepers parallels the emphasis on understanding the every day lives of people in conflict affected communities. See Darby (2009b) Richmond (2009b) Roberts (2011) and Mitchell (2011).

<sup>2</sup> Activities that provide protection or violence prevention simply by being present – for instance MBQ “You might assist a local committee, assist them with a development task, you might assist them with a security task, like assist the local police. So in some way, your presence acts like a security blanket and you are doing, your presence, in both places, you are security blanket.”

- ❖ create safe space;
- ❖ provide or build concrete services;
- ❖ monitor borders;
- ❖ monitor local police;
- ❖ monitor conditions in communities;
- ❖ monitor the activities of potential belligerents;
- ❖ election related activities;
- ❖ democracy related activities;
- ❖ mentoring and coaching;
- ❖ training local people and/or training own staff;
- ❖ bridging and connecting local people to resources or authorities;
- ❖ build networks to protect others and the team;
- ❖ listen to and witness people;
- ❖ shuttle diplomacy;<sup>3</sup>
- ❖ clarifying rumours;
- ❖ guarding and protecting;
- ❖ fighting;<sup>4</sup>
- ❖ demobilise, disarm and reintegrate (DDR);
- ❖ build relationships by spending time with the community;
- ❖ build relationships via time with key people – i.e. village elders or local commanders;
- ❖ early warning activities;
- ❖ community policing and investigating;
- ❖ support local problem-solving/local ownership;
- ❖ help communities prevent violence;
- ❖ child protection and gender based violence prevention;
- ❖ internal staff meetings and internal organisational work such as pay bills and negotiate local contracts;
- ❖ self-care.

---

<sup>3</sup> Shuttle diplomacy refers to informal efforts to facilitate communication between two or more groups, by the peacekeepers themselves moving back and forth.

<sup>4</sup> The actual engagement in exchanging fire.



While some of these activities were only mentioned by one or few, activities that were mentioned by many peacekeepers as occurring in many settings, carried out by many different kinds of peacekeepers included presence, patrolling, gathering and analysing information, some sort of monitoring, time spent building relationships, some sort of coordination or facilitating relationships/connections, shuttle diplomacy, support local problem-solving/local ownership, and internal organisational functions.

It is important to keep these activities in mind, in the next sections. This is how frontline peacekeepers understand and describe what they do with their time. It is also critical to keep in mind that they do this in conflict affected communities which are grappling with the aftermath of armed conflicts and war, and often with on-going violence as well. These are communities that are highly stressed, vulnerable, and in transition. When talking at the abstract level of research, it is possible to lose track of the everyday challenges people face in these circumstances,<sup>5</sup> both local civilians and peacekeepers. Even the list above obscures the bravery, care, pride, fear, worry, confusion and thoughtfulness I heard expressed by peacekeepers I interviewed.

### **Preventing violence**

As discussed in Chapter One, there are many different ways to understand peace and peacekeeping. However, there is a shared assumption that peacekeeping is supposed to do something about reducing, ending or preventing armed violence. What this assumption means, however, is contested.<sup>6</sup> Does it mean prevent a return to war – ie 1,000+ battle related deaths, or a return of armed conflict measured as 25-999 battle related deaths,<sup>7</sup> prevent violence against civilians, or contribute toward a reduction or prevention of violence, measured in other ways? Or should effectiveness be measured in relationship to some defined version of positive peace that includes more than just the

---

<sup>5</sup> See Fetherston (2000), Pouligny (2006), Korac (2006) and Richmond (2009b) for discussion of the everyday experience of war affected communities.

<sup>6</sup> Druckman(1997) reports on a conference discussing how to understand and research peacekeeping success. The range of views and lack of consensus reported then is reflected in the literature now, for instance see Fortna and Howard (2008) and Diehl (2009). Martin-Brule (2012) states in her article that there is a consensus that peace operations can be effective while still debating what constitutes success, without appearing to be ironic.

<sup>7</sup> See the Uppsala conflict data program for definitions of war, armed violence, battle related deaths and other terms frequently used in statistical analysis of the impacts of peacekeeping. <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/> accessed on 19 July, 2012.

absence of war? And how is the cumulative effect understood – for example Hegre, Hultman and Nygard (2010) assume in their model that preventing violence in one period prevents further violence in a future period. Nor is there agreement on how this question should be answered, nor whose knowledge and perspective must be included (Jacoby, 2011). Can it be answered by collecting published data from many sources, which is then statistically analysed? Do the people involved in the host countries have something to say about success, and if so which people? Whom does it serve to use different methods and include or exclude certain perspectives? The following section will discuss research and theorising that approaches these questions from different standpoints, using different methodologies and reflecting different assumptions and ways of knowing.

There is a body of work on peacekeeping which addresses the question of whether peacekeeping is effective. The Human Security Report of 2009/10 (2010) states unequivocally that peacekeeping has contributed to the decline in war. Goldstein, in a comprehensive argument regarding the reduction of war, also concludes that international peacekeeping by the UN and others has made a significant contribution to this reduction (Goldstein, 2011). Fortna (2008a), in her statistical analysis of this question examines variables associated with the instigation or continuation of civil wars to determine if peacekeeping has a positive effect. Variables she examines include the intensity of the conflict, importance to UN Security Council P5 countries, geography, governance, contraband, economic well-being, infant mortality, and identity issues. These are all factors considered to be external to the peacekeeping intervention itself, but which might have higher correlations with the success or failure of a mission, than the mission itself. She concludes from this statistical analysis that peacekeepers go to the toughest conflicts and that there is a positive correlation between UN peacekeeping and no return to war which cannot be attributed to other factors. She finds that traditional and multi-dimensional peacekeeping are as likely to succeed as peace enforcement,<sup>8</sup> and thus raises questions about the need for more robust force. Gilligan and Sergenti (2008), using statistical analysis, find that peacekeeping is effective after a civil war but not when initiated before a cease-fire. Fortna and Howard (2008), reviewing the previous decade of research using statistical analysis, find that peacekeeping after a peace agreement significantly decreases the likelihood that war will resume and that peace is more likely to

---

<sup>8</sup> There is less research addressing the effectiveness of peace enforcement at preventing further violence. Sambanis (2008), for instance, finds little evidence of success, which he describes as participatory peace.

continue after the peacekeepers leave than if there had been no mission. Sambanis (2008, p. 11) uses a more complex concept of participatory peace<sup>9</sup> to examine the success of peacekeeping. Participatory peace is “a state that involves an end to the war, the absence of significant residual violence, undivided sovereignty, and a minimum level of political openness (participatory peace is inconsistent with extreme authoritarianism).” Comparing civil wars with and without UN intervention, he finds that UN intervention is correlated with a less likely return to war. Using a basic negative peace definition, he also finds that UN intervention is likely to prolong the absence of war. The relationship between UN interventions and participatory peace in the long term is more complex and mixed.

Hegre, Hultman and Nygard (2010), using similar analytic methods, find peacekeeping is effective at preventing future war as well. They extend their analysis into a predicted future and suggest that stronger mandates, larger budgets and more troops have a significant impact on reducing the likelihood of a return to war. All these studies control for a variety of variables such as difficulty of the conflicts, availability of natural resources for financing a rebellion, issues of identity, religion and governance, economic conditions, duration of the conflict, relationship with UN Security Council P5 countries, terrain, and leadership. Controlling for what might be considered exogenous variables outside the mission sphere of influence, they consistently find that peacekeeping has a statistically positive effect. The applicability of this kind of mathematical analysis to complex and dynamic systems is questioned by some.<sup>10</sup> And the above mentioned studies do not agree entirely on which missions they describe as successful. Nonetheless different researchers, using different assumptions and processes, find that peacekeeping is correlated with a decreased chance of a return to war, which certainly supports the view that peacekeeping has had a deterrent effect on the resumption of war in a number of missions. Complexifying this perspective the World Bank (2011, p. 2) notes that 90 per cent of civil wars in the decade preceding 2011 occurred in countries that had already experienced civil wars within the last 30 years. Whether this reflects a lack of peacekeeping intervention or that the above research looks at shorter time frames, it does suggest there is much still to be learned about preventing violence through effective interventions.

---

<sup>9</sup> Building on early work of Doyle and Sambanis (2006).

<sup>10</sup> See Byrne (1998) for an extensive discussion of quantitative research in complex systems.

Looking at the success of peacekeeping through different standpoints brings different conclusions. There are few studies that link specific peacekeeping missions with the views of the local people. Among the few that do, Pouligny (2006) interviewed people in a number of different host countries including El Salvador, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Cambodia and Mozambique during UN authorised peacekeeping missions. She found that while there were aspects of the missions that local people appreciated, in general there was a sense of frustration, disappointment, resentment and a judgment of failure. Talentino (2007) cites evidence that while the Balkan missions may have been successful at ending the wars and preventing a return to war, the missions are now seen as an imposition, resented, and problematic. She does not address whether this means they are successful or not, but it does beg the question of who decides. While El Salvador is considered by some to be a successful peacekeeping mission, Hume (2008) questions this assessment as El Salvador has become one of the most violent societies.<sup>11</sup> Richmond and Franks (2009) also examine a number of cases regarding the question of successful peacebuilding. They conclude that the perceptions and assessments of mission impact are quite different between the official intervening organisations and many local organisations and people. These research projects not only include different voices in assessing the effect of interventions, but rely on qualitative methods. This includes the knowledge of local people which is excluded in traditional quantitative analysis.

A particularly interesting variable that Doyle and Sambanis (2006) include in their definition of participatory peace and in their analysis, is undivided sovereignty (see discussion of Sambanis 2008 above). They use this phrase to indicate an intact sovereign state without break away regions. This line of thought reflects the international commitment to upholding sovereignty as a good in and of itself. Thus in their analysis the lack of a unified sovereign state implies failure. This view of peacekeeping is critiqued in critical security studies (Booth, 2005a; Smith, 2005) as holding a focus on a particular view of governance, privileging state sovereignty over the well-being of civilians, and/or making an assumption about the beneficial effects to civilians of a sovereign state. Similarly, while the focus of much research on the success or effectiveness of peacekeeping is on the absence of war or absence of armed conflict, there

---

<sup>11</sup> Pushkina (2006) hints at this issue, using the establishment of a stable environment which is sustained after the peacekeepers leave as one criterion for success. However this is defined as no further outbreak of violence between belligerents, and does not speak to other kinds of violence.

is a body of work, discussed in the next chapter, which relates international intervention to the establishment of democracy as a marker of success.<sup>12</sup> This literature reflects assumptions that peace is more than an absence of war.

The peacekeepers I interviewed focused primarily on their own work in the specific communities where they were located. In response to an inquiry about the effectiveness of their missions, they usually responded with a local perspective rather than an assessment of the overall success of their mission. Mvukiyehe and Samii (2010b) focus research on the community experience of effectiveness, and pose questions about the difference peacekeeping makes for local people. These concerns are echoed by a number of peacekeepers who shared thoughts about whether they made a difference in preventing violence on a large scale. In some cases the phrase they used, ‘made a difference’, clearly referred to the overall impact of the mission. For instance UAX, acknowledges that the project did not prevent a return to war, (nor was that the purpose) but thinks they made a difference in the lives of many, including people who themselves would contribute to local efforts for human rights and peace. PBJ shared extensive criticism of the mission and its lack of impact, yet concludes that they made a difference for people, meaning there was no more armed conflict.

UAX: And it can’t be overplayed that with individuals we accompanied, they all said it made a difference, in some cases they say it saved their lives. It certainly facilitated their ability to advocate, I am thinking about the higher-level human rights defenders, witnesses of the human rights violations cases, and journalists... but I do think that some of the accompaniment interventions had an impact on those people lives, and for children, it was in the hundreds.

PBJ: (after sharing criticism of the mission and its lack of impact) It is my personal opinion, nobody, well of course, everything is political, political decision making and everything, but this one was very obvious, political. But also it was very important to the people that we were there, only our presence there, in the end we were the only international organisation there, to make sure Russians didn’t go in and do anything, or start the war again or anything. I think that made a difference.

---

<sup>12</sup> See Chapter Six for further discussion in this thesis and Call and Cook (2003), Fortna (2008b), Jarstad (2008), Heldt (2011) and Olson Lounsbury, Pearson and Talentino (2011) for discussion of the failure or mixed results of peacekeeping to install or support democratic governments.

One research question that encompasses many aspects of effective or successful peacekeeping addresses the meeting of a mission mandate, recognising that preventing violence is frequently only one component (Pushkina, 2006). While it might seem to be an easily answered question, Gowan (2008) points out that mandates are often unclear and missing important guidance while Sambanis (2008) notes that mandates are interpreted differently by different leadership in the field, implying that analysing the fulfilment of the mandate would not be simple. Tardy (2011a), focusing primarily on the issue of robust mandates, finds that there are numerous contradictions in the language as well as interpretations of the language. Nasu (2011), discussing R2P, notes contradictions within the mission mandates. Pouligny's research (2006), in addition to documenting the views of local people, finds that missions are understood and implemented differently by different components of the same mission and at different times. Mvukiyehe and Samii (2010a), discussing the UN mission in Liberia, note that while fighting had not resumed, it was not at all clear that this was a result of the mission, raising issues of attribution. And there is evidence that different components within missions have different agendas and do not coordinate well (Rolfe, 2011). There may be less unity in the carrying out of missions than is implied in the overarching mandate. Thus, while Howard (2008) and Martin-Brule (2012) use meeting the mission mandate as one of their criteria for success, it seems that analysing this achievement is very much open to interpretation. Here M/CAC discusses his experience of the impact of competing agendas on trying to meet the mandated agenda .

M/CAC: [discussing dilemmas] The different agendas of each troop contributing countries. Each country has its own national agenda. They bring it to the theatre and it contradicts the overarching agenda, the mission agenda. This makes it hard to be an effective mission. The local mission commander chooses his national agenda, not the mission agenda. So different regional commands, choose different agendas, based on their country's own agenda.

### **Protecting civilians**

Currently peacekeeping is judged in part on the basis of protecting civilians (Annan & Mousavizadeh, 2012). Frequent articles in the press chronicle the failure of UN missions to protect<sup>13</sup> and bring to the attention of the general public this perceived failure.

---

<sup>13</sup> For an example see Charbonneau (2011).

Since 1999 most UN peacekeeping missions include language about protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, with the caveats of being within its capabilities and area of deployment (Holt et al., 2009). Protecting civilians is now linked to the very legitimacy and credibility of the UN as an institution. The UN Peacekeeping Operations Guidelines and Principles (2008) frequently mention the need for protecting civilians, but when finalised in 2008 they did not include guidance on how to do this.

Protection is defined and measured differently by different organisations. Gelot (2012) notes that protection as used by the International Red Cross implies protection of all human rights, whereas for others it means a minimal protection of physical safety. The UN conceptualises civilian protection through a three tiered approach: through political processes; through physical protection from physical violence including the use of force to do so; and through a protective environment (Giffen, 2011). However the UN and other peacekeeping missions continue to struggle to operationalize the commitment. Holt, Hultman and Nygard (2009) describe numerous internal challenges such as lack of leadership, lack of clarity as to the meaning of key phrases and inconsistent interpretation, lack of strategy and plans and lack of resources. In addition they chronicle the reluctance of some troop contributing countries (TCC) to risk their forces in the service of protecting civilians if they do not feel adequately prepared for the task. These challenges appear to be entrenched (Giffen, 2011). A recent Security Council report suggests that after the UN authorised intervention in Libya in 2011, there has been increased resistance to operationalizing civilian protection from within UN members (Security Council Report, 2012). Homan and Ducasse-Rogier (2012) speculate that 2011 may have been the first and last time the Security Council used the doctrine of Responsibility To Protect (R2P) in the mandate of an intervention, given the perceptions by some Council members that these interventions (in Libya and Côte d'Ivoire) became focused more on regime change than civilian protection.

Research on the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions to protect civilians reaches mixed conclusions. Krain (2005) in a quantitative study finds that interventions which actively challenge genocide have an impact, but efforts which appease or are less forceful have little benefit and may make things worse. Bellamy and Williams (2009), looking at a broader range and including more recent interventions, find that UN

peacekeeping operations have a stronger impact on protecting civilians during conflicts, but after hostilities have ceased this effect weakens.

The Human Security Report in 2010 (Human Security Report Project, 2010) chronicles a significant change in the perpetrators of armed violence against civilians. Using the phrase ‘one-sided violence’,<sup>14</sup> the report notes that while in 1989 75% of one-sided violence was committed by governments or groups associated with the government, by 2008 this had shrunk to only 20% of the deaths attributed to one-sided violence. They suggest this reflects both the rise in deaths attributed to non-state terrorism and the success of the more recent inclusion of civilian protection in UN mandates. Kreps and Wallace (2009) measure the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions based on the lack of one-sided violence, rather than battle related deaths. They find that UN peacekeeping is more effective than non UN missions at decreasing one-sided violence. Disaggregating the missions by type, they find traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement to be correlated with a decrease, but observer missions are correlated with an increase in one-sided violence. They hypothesise this is because observer missions give civilians a false sense of security. They find that multidimensional missions appear to have no correlation with decreasing one-sided violence, and hypothesise that the overly ambitious mandates of these missions work against making civilian protection a sufficiently high priority. It could be argued that the attention and resources that go toward state building and economic development divert efforts and resources from protecting civilians (Tull, 2009). Melander (2009) suggests that the findings are heavily influenced by where peacekeepers go. Controlling for the degree of conflict with statistical analysis, he finds that peacekeeping has a significant association with decreasing the likelihood of mass killing.

An alternative hypothesis looks at the negotiation process leading up to a cease-fire or peace agreement, and the immediate aftermath, for explanations of the increase in one-sided violence. Whether considered the results of perverse incentives<sup>15</sup> or unintended consequences (Hultman, 2010; Rowlands & Carment, 2006), some research links the jostling for power between the government and other armed groups, to the increase in

---

<sup>14</sup> I find this change in language, using the phrase ‘one-sided violence’ troubling and wonder whose interests it serves. The use of jargon seems to me to somewhat obscure the horrific acts it denotes. It is the phrase used by the Uppsala data base and many researchers.

<sup>15</sup> See Pouligny (2006) and Francis (2010) for discussion of perverse incentives for belligerents to engage in violence in a peace process, and the corresponding exclusion or disregard of civil groups.



one-sided violence. Thus the increase in the violence is seen less as a failure of peacekeeping and more as a manifestation of the struggle to be best positioned for the rewards of peace. Wood, Kathman and Gent (2012) find the patterns of one sided violence change with peacekeeping intervention. The side supported by the intervention will decrease their violence against civilians, while belligerents not supported may use one-sided violence to improve their strategic positioning in the peace process.<sup>16</sup> Given the state-centric tendency of UN mandates, this may relate to the Human Security report (2010) finding that governments now commit a smaller percentage of one-sided violence. However Hultman (2010), echoing Krain's (2005) finding that genocide must be directly addressed by interventions, finds that when the mandate includes language authorising the use of whatever force is necessary to protect civilians, there is not a correlated increase in one sided violence.

A recent analysis of one- sided killings in Africa (Fjelde & Hultman, 2010) suggests one-sided violence is a strategy to weaken your enemy, whether the enemy is the government or a rebel group. The intention is to decrease the ability and will to keep fighting. Additionally, in order to further understand one-sided violence, through this statistical methodology, Fjelde and Hultman suggest that the data must be disaggregated by region and time, as the patterns of one-sided violence vary by region and period of fighting.

Examining the UN mission in the DRC (UNMOC at the time of his article) Tull (2009) finds a dismal record of protection perhaps because, as Melander (2009) says, there is a high level of on-going violence overall. Tull however suggests it is related to a number of issues including poor strategy and implementation, with conflicted interpretations of the mandate to protect and an over emphasis on state building and elections, to the detriment of attention paid to protecting people. He notes that the worst killings have occurred after the peace accords were signed and the mission was underway. This analysis is in line with both the recent reviews of the UN mentioned above, which highlight poor strategy, operations and unclear rules of engagement, as well as the hypothesis regarding power struggles in the post peace agreement period. It may also reflect the concern, which is periodically stated, that TCC are reluctant to risk the lives of their troops in order to protect civilians (Tardy, 2011a).

---

<sup>16</sup> Which again indirectly, questions the possibility of interventions to be impartial.

While there is no equivalent body of research on UCP, the self-reporting of PBI and NP shares numerous instances of actively and successfully protecting people.<sup>17</sup> Preventing harm to civilians is the primary way both organisations evaluate their success. Very few have been killed when PBI is present, and none reported by NP. There are clearly differences in the contexts and levels of violence and the kinds of threats UCP deals with. It may also reflect the centrality of protecting civilians in their overall organisational mission, with a corresponding lack of commitment to supporting a particular state. There may also be differences in training and in the motivation of those who become unarmed civilian peacekeepers. In any case, given the purpose of UCP interventions, there is no competition for attention and resources for components such as state building or security sector reform.<sup>18</sup> Nor will killing civilians get any benefits such as better positioning in power sharing or reintegration funding or such from UCP missions.

UCP generally has a broad perspective on protecting civilians, looking not only at protection from armed groups, but also reflecting a concern to protect civilians from the kinds of violence that emerge in the aftermath of social upheaval, such as revenge killings.<sup>19</sup> UCP protection work is focused at the micro level, in the communities where projects are located, and some of the efforts focus on supporting local people to develop strategies to protect themselves. At the same time there can be a focused effort to protect key people, so that civilians can engage in social change without being harmed or killed (Schweitzer, 2010). This includes civilians involved in opposition politics, those engaged in human rights protection and other civil society activities such as community peace networks, women's groups, or farmers' organisations. There is a strong link in the UCP practice between protecting people and making space for civil society action.

Critical security studies raise important questions regarding the relationship between state security and the security of civilians (Booth, 2005b). The focus on a stable,

---

<sup>17</sup> See PBI website for numerous self evaluation publications <http://www.peacebrigades.org/publications/> accessed 20 July 2012, and Mahony and Eguren (1997) . For NP see <http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/resources> accessed 20 July 2012 for reports and self evaluations.

<sup>18</sup> See Appendix D for a comparison of UCP and armed peacekeepers developed by NP staff.

<sup>19</sup> See NP website reports on Mindanao and Sudan at <http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/fieldwork/all-projects/philippines-project> and <http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/fieldwork/all-projects/south-sudan-project> accessed on 20 July 2012. Police peacekeepers who serve in an executive police function are also involved in preventing and responding to a wide range of violence in communities.

well functioning state as the vehicle for civilian welfare obscures the reality that states commit significant harm against their own citizens, and will not or cannot always protect civilians from violence related to armed conflicts (Stamnes & Wyn Jones, 2000). Within critical security studies, security itself is understood to be more than protection from physical harm, but to include a wide array of elements of human security (Smith, 2005). Cheesman (2005) questions whether peacekeeping is more about the security of western powers than the security of civilians. Newman (2010) optimistically suggests a shift is underway. Rather than state demands that citizens recognise the legitimacy of control of territory and violence, he perceives that states are increasingly called upon to support human rights and the well-being of citizens,<sup>20</sup> in order to establish and maintain their legitimacy.

Peacekeepers I interviewed gave high priority to protecting people, seeing it as a central purpose of peacekeeping, and frequently describing their work in relationship to protecting people. PAI links protecting people and preventing violence, as part of a discussion of the need to develop good relationships with local people in the practice of effective peacekeeping.

PAI: It was basic good policing to prevent harm to people, to prevent violence, to install confidence, we did sightseeing in areas of high risk, being seen in places where police were afraid to be seen, here we are, we are here to protect you, and not afraid.

UAE combines protecting people and preventing violence for the purpose of making time for people to resolve their own issues, for violence to be transformed.

UAE: But for NP, trying to keep people alive, and protect human life and human rights, in a way that, and to the extent that the dynamics of a situation can evolve, so that the violence that disrupts peace can be transformed. I don't know if that makes sense, try to keep the peace long enough so that people can come to agree and appreciate that there are other ways than violence that can serve their interests and needs.

MBL notes that what peacekeeping is and does varies by context. Here he shares his perspective that in the DRC, protecting people was the main focus.

---

<sup>20</sup> Stamnes and Wyn (2000) point out problems inherent in the word citizen, in conflict affected regions where citizens may live in other states as refugees and refugees within a state.

MBL: In the DRC, for instance, your main problem is that armed groups are conducting their business as such, there are a lot of atrocities against the local population, so the main thrust there is to keep the population secure.

MBQ reflects on the limited ability of peacekeepers to protect people, particularly when they are only observers.

MBQ: There is an argument that in various UN missions, there is a peace to be observed, but the parties just ignore it when it suits them. In Somalia, Israel and Lebanon, Hezbollah, you have observers on the sidelines, they have to come to a solution themselves, and the people in between, well they just become casualties.

And UBC links protecting people from physical harm with making space for people to solve their own problems, recognising it does not guarantee particular results .

UBC: Ultimately I think of peacekeeping, very simply, is creating space in violent environments, for local people to be able to work out their own problems, without violence hindering them. So I think it is the creation of that space, it doesn't mean that things will change, or not, but at least it means that they have space to be working on their own problems. So to at least take out the biggest threats of direct physical violence, in order for them to feel safe enough for them to begin to think about solving their own problems.

Drawing on the above literature and research interviews it appears that protecting people is both a goal and an important aspect of maintaining the acceptance of a mission. Whatever the causes of organised violence against civilians, when peacekeepers do not respond by protecting people, they risk losing their perceived legitimacy and acceptance in the community.<sup>21</sup> As already discussed in the previous chapter, there is a connection between legitimacy, protecting people, and acceptance. When local expectations for being protected are not met, acceptance may be lost and local people may cooperate poorly or not at all with peacekeepers. This may make it more difficult to gather the information peacekeepers need in order to protect civilians or accomplish other tasks, which further undermines their acceptance. Protecting people is understood to be an end in and of itself, but also a means toward achieving other goals, particularly to create sufficient safety that local people can engage in their own problem-solving. And

---

<sup>21</sup> See Pouligny(2006), Talentino(2007), Gelot and Soderbaum (2012), Roberts (2011) as well as numerous interviews.

protecting people constitutes a form of preventing violence, in that harming civilians is one form of violence in conflict affected communities. The perceived need for and use of relationships is woven throughout, as good relationships contribute to protection and protecting people is seen by peacekeepers to contribute to good relationships.

### **How peacekeeping works**

Moving beyond the question of what defines success, one of the central concerns in this research project is how peacekeeping produces the effect of preventing violence, protecting people and supporting local problem-solving. As Fortna (2008a, p. 2) and Diehl (2009) point out, there are few theories of how peacekeeping works. Military peacekeeping is often described as a pragmatic response to the needs of the moment (Durch, 2006b).<sup>22</sup> The recent discussion of robust and muscular peacekeeping implies a reliance on having the greater force as an important contributor to effectiveness (Sartre, 2011; Tardy, 2011a). This appears to be a response to perceived failures in the field, rather than based on theory and careful analysis.<sup>23</sup> Reading military doctrines on peace support interventions supports the claim that there is little explanation of how peacekeeping works outside of the use of force in various configurations.<sup>24</sup>

There are however, a number of comprehensive theories put forward which analyse how peacekeeping works. These include military peace support doctrines and the United Nations guidelines which imply mechanisms, if not overall theories. The following table is a summary of elements of effective peacekeeping as understood in different theories.<sup>25</sup> While there is overlap, each has a distinct emphasis. Each defines effectiveness differently, and some are more comprehensive than others. Most of the military peacekeeping theories are oriented to preventing violence or a return to war, and

---

<sup>22</sup> I have thought that describing peacekeeping this way obscures the possibility it is a well-developed process to serve hegemony.

<sup>23</sup> Berdal (2000) discusses the apparent gap between assumptions of what force can achieve and the record in Somalia and Bosnia in particular, as 'lessons not yet learned'.

<sup>24</sup> For instance see the British (Ministry of Defence, 2004), NORDCAPS (2007) or New Zealand (New Zealand Defence Force, 2008) doctrines for peace support. While each has a recognition of the need for legitimacy, and distinguishes between peace enforcement and other strategic levels of peace support, none has an explanation or theory of how peacekeeping actually works.

<sup>25</sup> List of theories summarized: Last (1995), Mahony and Eguren(1997), Schirch (2006), Doyle and Sambanis (2006), Mahony (2006), Fortna (2008a), Howard (2008), United Nations (2008), Wallis (2010), Sartre (2011), British Military (Ministry of Defence, 2004), NORDCAPS (2007), and New Zealand Military (New Zealand Defence Force, 2008).

lack specific focus on how peacekeeping effectively protects civilians. Much of the UCP theory is the opposite, with a primary orientation to protecting people, though also including analysis of how to prevent violence. Following the table, I will discuss critical elements that appear in several theories and documents and then relate this to perceptions of the peacekeepers I interviewed.

**Table 2 Theories of peacekeeping**

<b>Author</b>	<b>Definition of success (or purpose if no definition)</b>	<b>Key elements</b>
Last 1995 (includes interviews with military)	Not defined - emphasis on de-escalation	Clarity of intent; minimum use of force – do not escalate; relationship between minimum use of force, consent and impartiality; Offense is direct contact including negotiation, discussion, uses relationships – primarily civilian. Tactics – police belligerents – incentives and disincentives; go between mediation; conciliation; principled negotiation; consultation and problem-solving workshops.
Mahony and Eguren 1997 (interviews with key government and community people, peacekeepers and personal experience)	Making safe space for civil society social change actors	Nonpartisan, independent and nonviolent: accompaniment and presence; deterrence; clearly articulated consequences; accurate information and power analysis of potential aggressors and hierarchy;
Schirch 2006 (updated from 1995 research including interviews with UCP and nonviolent activists)	Protect individuals and communities.	Moral and international law authority; leverage via media and international pressure; nonviolent tactics; extensive power analysis; impartial; relationships are important.
Doyle and Sambanis 2006 (primarily statistical analysis, also interview and literature review)	Participatory peace – no war, low or no social violence, democracy, human rights.	Reduce parties' fear by providing security; improve flow of information; facilitate negotiation and implementation of peace agreement; reassure compliance; increase costs to spoilers of violating agreements; induce moderates and new civil society actors to participate in processes; increase costs of non-cooperation and benefits of cooperation.
Mahony 2006 (interviews with field staff and personal experience)	Protect civilians – key individuals and communities	Protection via deterrence; encouragement of civil society; influence; expand space with unacceptable consequences for abusers and expand safe space for civil society action; five strategies - sustained multilevel diplomacy, conscious visibility, active encouragement and empowerment, convening and bridging, public advocacy; unbiased; good relationships between mission and civilians.
Fortna 2008 (statistical analysis, case studies and interviews with high level staff)	No return to war	Increase costs of aggression; reduce fear and mistrust; prevent accidental return to war; prevent political exclusion.
Howard 2008 (case studies including	Implementing the mandate and basic	Three main factors: a. favourable country situation – consent of parties, detailed peace

interviews with high level staff)	positive functioning after the mission ends.	agreement, support of regional powers; b. moderate level of Security Council interest; c. first order learning within UN Secretariat during mission which includes good information gathering and analysis, effective central coordination, integrative engagement with environment, flexible effective leadership.
United Nations Guidelines 2008	Preserve peace and lay foundation for sustainable peace	Core functions: a. safe and secure environment while supporting State's abilities; b. facilitate political process and legitimate and effective governance institutions; c. coordinate UN and other international actors. Three major principles – consent of parties, impartial, non-use of force except in self- defence and defence of the mandate; additional success factors – legitimacy, credibility, promote local and national ownership, sensitive to political, social and economic context.
Wallis 2010	Protect individuals and communities, prevent violence	Three main sets of principles; nonpartisan and independent; nonviolence; transparent, visible quiet diplomacy, and cultural sensitivity. Other elements - trust and good relationships with all; good information and analysis; primacy of local actors.
Sartre 2011	Prevent violence and protect people	Truly robust peacekeeping includes: legitimacy; unity of security council; specific and clear mandate based on shared analysis; good use of TCC troops and shared burden including P5; robust information; well trained and equipped troops; robust well managed organisation; robust leadership; robust media strategy; robust control of theatre – control of entry and exit in area of crisis; robust use of force for protection rather than self-defence.
<b>Military Doctrines</b>	<b>Focus</b>	<b>Central Concepts</b>
British Military doctrine 2004	Sustainable peace	Military power used only when other powers inadequate or failed; Framework institution and lead nation in charge; clear mandate, rules of engagement, goals and strategies; international legitimacy; campaign authority and local cooperation; three force stances – enforcement, stabilisation and transition; threat must be credible; Fundamentals – campaign authority; credible and reasonable force; perseverance.
NORDCAPS 2007	Support international peace and security	Political primacy; clear objectives; composite response; coordinating mechanisms; clear exit criteria; impartiality; minimum use of force necessary; consent of parties; credibility; civil-military coordination.
New Zealand military doctrine 2008	Ensure a stable security environment in which all forms of power can be exercised	Military is the ultimate power base; multiple organisations and actors involved; coercion; impartiality; consent; crisis management; conflict prevention; peace enforcement; need to balance need for consent with use of robust force as needed.

## Frequently mentioned themes and key terms<sup>26</sup>

### High functioning organisations

As previously discussed in Chapter Three, effective peacekeeping is influenced by the degree of functionality within the hosting organisation, including factors such as the leadership capacity, decision making processes, organisational learning capacity, and clarity of mission and mandate. All of these factors are mentioned in the above theories. Many peacekeepers shared criticisms of what they perceived as the dysfunctions in their organisations, with discussion of the need for improvement. PBF gives an example of how poor management undermines effective peacekeeping.

PBF: These are organisational issues that could have been worked out and made the whole flow and the job a lot easier. They, this is all logistical stuff, they gave me people without arms, body armour, or helmets, so I was expected to go to large scale disorder incidents and deal with these with unarmed men... So I am not sure, but I have heard that a lot of missions are like that, poor management, they just want to be seen as things going well.

### Context

Whereas Fortna (2008a) examines many contextual variables and finds that peacekeeping is correlated with no return to war in most contexts, Howard (2008) and Doyle and Sambanis (2006) find that the context in which peacekeeping occurs is a critical factor in the effectiveness of missions. However there is little analysis that links context with how peacekeeping works. Sartre (2011), as described in the table above, develops a comprehensive guide to robust peacekeeping, which includes recommendations for attempting to control the context in ways that will contribute to effective peacekeeping. In particular he points to the need to control the movement of people and small arms and other weapons in and out of the region, as one critical factor in robust peacekeeping. His emphasis on communicating with the host population can also been understood as a way to influence the context. The few peacekeepers who discussed

---

<sup>26</sup> Some key terms have already been discussed in previous chapters, in particular the issues of organisational function, consent and impartiality in Chapters Three and Four, and will not be further developed here, other than to highlight that these elements were common to many of the theories, and frequently mentioned by peacekeepers interviewed as critical to their effectiveness.



context as a factor of effectiveness were unarmed civilian peacekeepers. In all cases they were discussing the limitations to where UCP can work, recognising that some contexts are either too violent and unsafe or that there is insufficient potential to leverage their status as foreigners or in other ways influence belligerents.

### Legitimacy and acceptance

Legitimacy and acceptance (see discussion in Chapter Four) are mentioned as critical factors for effective peacekeeping. Legitimacy here is not only the existence of an internationally authorised mandate, but a mandate that has clear and specific goals, based on a shared analysis, and in the case of the UN, with adequate Security Council support (Sartre, 2011). This provides the legitimate context for a mission. Howard (2008) and Sartre (2011) disagree on the degree of Security Council support which is useful for success, with Howard finding that a medium level is key, while Sartre argues for a high level of support. It seems clear however that some serious and on-going Security Council interest and support is critical for UN authorised missions.<sup>27</sup>

The need for legitimacy does not end with authorisation however, and concern for legitimacy may not be limited to the peacekeepers. Governments and other armed groups frequently (though not universally) want to be seen as legitimate (Gelot, 2012; Mahony, 2006). Their support from the local population and others may be undermined if this legitimacy is strongly challenged. Mahony (2006) describes leveraging this concern for an image of being reasonable, responsible leaders, engaged in political change that belligerents (government and non-government alike) wish to project and maintain, as a source of coercion available to UCP efforts. When civilian peacekeepers, monitors, soldiers, and/or police are present, there may be a reluctance to attack non-military targets (Mahony, 2006; Mahony & Nash, 2012; Schirch, 2006). Many belligerents do not want to be portrayed in the international media as the group most at fault, or responsible for atrocities, or even as not actively working for peace. When observation is in place, belligerents cannot easily shift the blame, pretending attacks were committed by someone else, some other army or group, or deflect attention to other issues.

Peacekeepers discuss the need to maintain acceptance of their intervention, in local communities (as discussed in the previous chapter). Despite having international

---

<sup>27</sup> See Marten (2004) for a discussion of how support and interest gets undermined by local politics.

legitimacy, they suggest that if the intervention is understood to be biased, to impose unwanted or inappropriate conditions or solutions, expectations are not met or the behaviour of peacekeepers is harmful, acceptance decreases or is lost. The need for both international legitimacy and acceptance at the local level is addressed in the military doctrines referred to in the table above, reflecting the practical experience of needing both. And it is the essential need for some degree of community acceptance which is addressed by those interviewed for this research. The ability to establish and maintain legitimacy and acceptance appears to provide avenues for influencing the behaviour of belligerents and peacekeepers themselves.

### Information gathering, analysing and communication

Gathering, analysing and using information is another frequent theme in the theories outlined in the above table. Gathering information is thought by peacekeepers to require trusting relationships with local people and/or armed groups.<sup>28</sup> Without some basis of trust, it may be impossible to know the validity of any shared information. Peacekeepers note that developing relationships of sufficient trust, like several other elements of effective peacekeeping, requires being out and about in communities. Several peacekeepers remarked that being careful in the use of information is critical in building and maintaining trusting relationships. If belligerents or others think you are passing on sensitive information, they will stop talking to you and might even attack. Howard (2008) points to this with her distinction between an integrative style of engaging with the environment and a colonial style. Colonial engagement implies staying mostly in the compound, going out only for meetings or needed patrols, keeping a distance from local people, while decisions are made from afar, toward the top of the UN hierarchy. Integrative engagement is the opposite – out in the community, building relationships, able to make decisions locally. Military doctrine understands the need for a link between contact with local people that builds understanding and trust, and good intelligence.<sup>29</sup> Peacekeepers stressed that UCP missions depend heavily on accurate information and

---

<sup>28</sup> See interviews in Chapter Eight for a discussion of the centrality of relationships and trust in gathering and using information.

<sup>29</sup> See the Ministry of Defense (2004) p. 3-10 for a good example of this analysis. And see <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol46no3/article02.html> for a discussion of lack of definition of the word intelligence, in military usage. Accessed 20 July 2012.

good analysis, developed through many relationships, to plan effective actions which protect people in the community and themselves.<sup>30</sup>

Information and analysis are reportedly used for both internal and external use. Internally missions use information to analyse the situation, parties, pressures, culture, and to plan. Peacekeepers reported the importance of gleaning direct and indirect feedback on their work, leading to corrections or changes as needed. Perhaps because UCP cannot fall back on military force, good information and analysis are seen as one of the central factors of effective peacekeeping (Mahony, 2006; Wallis, 2010). UCP theories suggest that because the peacekeepers are unarmed, they are more trusted and thus have easier access to better information.

Missions use information externally to reassure parties about each other's movements and demobilising. Commonly called the commitment problem (Walter, 2001), belligerents have reason to mistrust each other. Sharing information to reassure all parties about adherence to the peace agreement can overcome this problem, as well as prevent misunderstandings that might lead to a resumption of fighting based on false information or interpretations (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2008a; Last, 1997). The information must be accurate, or it will undermine the confidence in the mission. And peacekeepers must be sufficiently trusted to get close to belligerents to deliver messages.<sup>31</sup> This set of factors is one of the most frequently referred to mechanisms for how peacekeeping supports the maintenance of peace.

Missions frequently work with the media to promote an understanding of the mission and/or to influence the behaviour of belligerents by praising compliance or exposing breaches of agreements.<sup>32</sup> One part of a media strategy may be directed to local people and decision makers to build understanding of the goals of a mission, its capacities and limits, and to share important information. Another part of a media strategy may be directed internationally, to the home countries of peacekeepers to maintain support, but also for advocacy, when a strategic decision has been made to expose wrong doing or

---

<sup>30</sup> See Mahony (2006) and Wallis (2010) as well.

<sup>31</sup> MBL notes that one reason good relationships and trust are important is that you can approach rebel bases without getting shot.

<sup>32</sup> See Sartre (2011) for a discussion of a robust media strategy and Mahony (2006) for discussion of using media, reports and other public communication.

praise peaceful acts. As mentioned above, the threat or use of media in this way can influence belligerents, who wish to maintain a legitimate, peace seeking image. But it can also backfire, decreasing cooperation or even getting peacekeepers thrown out, so it is recommended to be well thought out (Mahony, 2006). Thus the careful use of information may help shape the behaviour of all sectors of a conflict affected country, as well as international actors. And this may help to deter violence, protect people, and in particular make space for local actors to work on their own solutions, knowing the world (or at least some important subset of the world) is watching and caring.<sup>33</sup>

As examples of how peacekeepers talked about gathering and using information, UBH and UAM discuss how PBI uses information to promote good analysis and therefore effective peacekeeping that can save lives nonviolently.

UBH: They [PBI] have a particular and careful way of analysis, they have come very close to mastering things like security and context analysis and demonstrating that [creates]...living breathing hard protection strategies.

UAM: ...in a repressive context there isn't a lot of trust, you don't know who to trust, so it was helping to build trust. We could share information and good information creates better analysis and better analysis saves lives, so there was a real emphasis on building contacts in all sectors of society.

U/CAG talks about being able to bring accurate information to the attention of other international actors, so as to counter the belligerents' descriptions of what was occurring in the communities where she worked, while keeping themselves in the background.

U/CAG: We could provide Human Rights Watch with really good information, connect them to families so they could see what was really going on. They could officially show the world how the [armed group] was working. It was dangerous, but we did it well, it worked, the way we used our information, we gave our information to others who could do something with it, in a professional manner.

PAI talks about the mutually reinforcing loop when good information supports good protection, which supports more information.

---

<sup>33</sup> See Schirch (2006), Mahony (2006), and Wallace (2010) for analysis of how international attention supports local actors.

PAI: You notice people's defences would drop, you would get more information, so you could go nip it [riots and street violence] in the bud early. So then they had more confidence, and they would tell us more. They would leave us a message that they wanted to see us, or call us over on the street.

MAQ talks about sharing information to protect themselves.

MAQ: ... We built up contacts, getting and giving information. ... you could say that was our best defence ... so using information to protect, to make sure they don't attack us, is probably a good defence, so they don't confuse us with the Soviets trying to take over their country, then we wouldn't have much chance.

UAX links supporting local people to work in their communities, with the ability of local people to speak out, get important information out to others and to resist violent intimidation and silencing.

UAX: If you think about systems theory or system change, in order for emergence to happen, people who have that different behaviour [speaking out] have to get some momentum, and get some positive feedback going. ... Having long-term relationships, allowed a deeper understanding of those struggles and having field offices, especially in rural areas, had an impact on their ability to do their work. And that had an impact on their communities, and these people existed in every area where we worked. Maybe not stopping bullets but they were absolutely critical for community resilience, getting information out, getting people so they are still willing to put out information, to say we want to get our children back, actually we are going to record when people are killed in our town in front of other people, they are the main resistance, and when the situation became more stable, they could be more positively proactive, rather than the reactive resistance.

#### Increase the costs of violence and increase the benefits of maintaining peace

Although using different words, in some way all the theories summarised in Table 2 above point to the need for peacekeeping to increase the costs for belligerents of engaging in violence and to create or increase a peace dividend. As previously mentioned, the mere presence of witnesses who can report accurately may itself be a deterrent. Potential acts of violence are thought to be considered by some belligerents, in some contexts, in light of the ramification of their being reported. At the community level, presence or patrolling may provide this witnessing (Schirch, 2006). At the individual level key people may be accompanied by peacekeepers so that any harm to

them would be witnessed and potentially prevented (Mahony & Eguren, 1997). Mahony (2006) discusses ways in which creating negative consequences nonviolently for violent acts, decreases the space for belligerents to harm civilians by increasing the costs or negative consequences of doing so. These concrete consequences can include: decreased perception of legitimacy in local and/or international audiences; diplomatic pressure; holding back of aid; sanctions of various kinds; and ways to isolate those who break a cease fire or commit human rights violations, up to and including charges in the International Criminal Court.<sup>34</sup> Strategies Mahony identifies include sustained multi-level diplomacy, conscious visibility, active encouragement and empowerment, convening and bridging, and public advocacy. These are all nonviolently coercive, potentially restricting the intended violent actions of belligerents. This analysis is echoed by Gelot (2012), who suggests that the perception of being a legitimate government (and by implication a legitimate rebellion or freedom movement) has specific benefits such as loyal citizens who cooperate without the need for coercion as well as better standing with other international actors. This desire for legitimacy gives power to those who might expose actions that could be considered illegitimate locally or internationally.

While UCP theories put nonviolent strategies at the core, others see the credible potential or actual use of force as a central mechanism for increasing the costs of violence (see below for a discussion of the use of force). Fortna (2008a), for instance, finds that missions that start out with a peace enforcement intervention tend to be effective because they have already enacted the use of force, and therefore the threat of military firepower is credible and deterring. If force is used as a threat, the performance of the threat must be credible in terms of actual movements of troops, weapons and equipment, as well as communication (Higate & Henry, 2009b). Force can be used as a direct response, but also troops can be used as a buffer between belligerents. Any movement of one belligerent can be observed and shared with the other(s). Peacekeeping troops may also signal a willingness to engage if they are attacked on the way to reach the other party. These are all tactics that use or threaten violent coercion and the use of minimum level of force as discussed by Last (1995) and various military doctrines (Ministry of Defence, 2004; United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2010), to increase the cost of violence.

---

<sup>34</sup> See Høglund and Svensson (2011) for a discussion of using good cop/bad cop or sticks and carrots, while avoiding undermining the peace process. Their analysis shares some similarities.

The actual actions of presence and patrolling are described by peacekeepers as serving many functions simultaneously. Both the literature and some peacekeepers suggest that presence and patrolling not only signal international interest and intentions, provide witness, and provide a buffer between parties, but also provide the opportunities to build relationships with people in the community and with belligerents.<sup>35</sup> As will be discussed later in Chapter Eight, these relationships are considered a key to success. Peacekeepers shared their experience that when belligerents trust peacekeepers, they are willing to listen and respond to concerns, which opens the possibility of cooperation. In this context the potential costs of increased violence may be avoided not via coercion, but through cooperative discussions.

Maintaining the peace can also bring benefits. UN missions may include a DDR process which provides benefits to former fighters as they demobilise. The missions may also be authorised to support the transition of fighting organisations into political organisations, (though this is a component that can be considered beyond peacekeeping). Both Fortna (2008a) and Doyle and Sambanis (2006) highlight the need for peacekeeping missions to support inclusive political processes, bringing in moderates, civilian actors, as well as preventing political exclusion. While there is a great deal of discussion as to the purpose, appropriateness and actual impact of combining some aid and quick impact projects with military peacekeeping, cooperation with the peace process may also bring aid, investment and other benefits to a community.<sup>36</sup> Other benefits noted in the literature and by peacekeepers may come from other international institutions linking programs, support and investment to cooperation with the mission and maintaining the peace.<sup>37</sup> These may be particularly directed at the government. And as discussed above, cooperating with the peace process can strengthen the perceived legitimacy of, and support for, belligerents, and media can be used to acknowledge this cooperation.

Like all elements of effective peacekeeping discussed by peacekeepers, the focus tends to be immediate, practical and local. Increasing the costs of violence was rarely

---

<sup>35</sup> See Sartre (2011), Mahony (2006).

<sup>36</sup> See Olsson for a critique of the blurring of military and civilian which blurs the political nature of both (2008), Duffield (2010) for a discussion of the dangers to aid workers and the manipulation of aid to serve western interest, Egnell (2009) for a review of the benefits and concerns of mixing aid and peacekeeping.

<sup>37</sup> Mahony and Nash (2012) discuss use of cooperation and pressure to protect human rights. Though addressing the capacity of UN human rights projects to protect people, the contexts often overlap with peacekeeping.

addressed as such, but was implied. For instance, MAA, speaking of his experience in Bosnia when the mission shifted from UN to NATO rules of engagement, shares his perspective of the value of military power in increasing the costs of violence.

MAA: The infantry changed, we could say no, this is how it's going to be. For instance, we found a weapons dump but under the UN we had to leave it. Under NATO we could seize the weapons dump immediately. NATO, NATO had a more aggressive force. Once NATO started, the conflict slowed because of their power.

UAM gives an example of how PBI works to raise the cost of committing violence and non-cooperation with a PBI mission, demonstrating the concern governments have with maintaining their image.

UAM: PBI is careful about the country context we go into. Someone in power in that country has to be sensitive to what foreign governments think, and doesn't want foreigners to see what is going on, that would mess up their getting IMF loans etc. They need to be dependent on it, so they care and don't want foreigners to get hurt ... [for example a researcher] asked someone high up in the Sri Lankan government about our impact. He was a high up official, and he said - 'are you kidding me, all of a sudden I'm going about my work and suddenly I have this flood of faxes and letters about some guy who is being threatened, so I have to go and figure out who was threatening him and tell them to knock it off, because I can't get any work done, my faxes are jammed, my whole office is ground to a halt, and I have to make sure this guy is protected.'

U/CAG gives an example of how a desire for potential benefits leads to cooperation.

U/CAG: Since Georgia politically is keen on being accepted in NATO, EU, wants to be a modern democracy, it is just on the surface though. So when working on human rights, the role of women, rural women, that you are representing the EU, the issue you put a light on, you want local authorities to act on, [and] because of the EU they do it.

MAO shares a perspective that is positive toward using aid as part of peacekeeping.

MAO: ... The threat level had gone down, the big stick was working, so now was time to bring out the carrot, people were able to go about their daily lives, so we could focus on things like civil/military, to build up the infrastructure, it's not that, they are,



it's not that flash, they only build roads to access logging and things like that, otherwise it is pretty rubbish... so you go out and purposely tell people about the things that are available to them, and assist them in access to it.

Conversely CBB shares concerns about mixing military and aid, believing that the violence committed by the military creates resistance to receiving aid.

CBB: So we say to the military, don't go with any humanitarian assistance, as the local people are confused. So if military persons come to give food, local people refuse, because the military has killed people... so what is the point of peacekeeping, if the military bring the conflict, what is the point.

### Negotiation and diplomacy

As is clear from this discussion, the many strategies or mechanisms by which peacekeeping seems to influence belligerents appear to be interrelated. Negotiation and diplomacy has already been touched on above, in the discussion about using information and increasing the costs and benefits through peacekeeping. Fortna (2008a) understands peacekeeping to be effective in part by reducing fear and mistrust among belligerents as well as reducing the unintentional instigation of renewed fighting. All this involves activities related to negotiation and diplomacy. Last (1995), in the earliest work referred to here, suggests that what he calls the offensive action in peacekeeping is actually the negotiations and discussions. In his analysis this is because peace is actually achieved and maintained not by military means, but through these so called contact activities (a point discussed further below). Looking back at the activities listed at the beginning of this chapter, peacekeepers from all roles engage in some kind of rumour control, shuttle diplomacy, and reassurance communications. Peacekeepers may provide a safe process to send messages back and forth between belligerents and within different sectors of a community or region. This may happen at high levels within a government or belligerent organisation, or at the community level. Peacekeepers may use the relationships they have and these negotiation interactions to advocate for the safety of civilians, and for actions which will promote peace.<sup>38</sup> This not only protects local people immediately, but preventing local flare up of violence may prevent larger scale violence, which is often sparked initially by some smaller event. For instance UBE describes helping local groups

---

<sup>38</sup> See both Durch and Giffen (2010) and Mahony (2006) for discussions of the need to advocate for civilian protection.

reach their own peace agreement at the community level, which prevents local violence. He notes they do not just focus only on government officials, but include local, traditional leaders and people from the different ethnic groups in conflict.

UBE: One is inter-tribal conflict. And then cattle thieving... our teams responded bringing conflict parties together for dialogues. It was very effective and had a big impact on the communities, where NP played a big role bringing conflict parties together for dialogues and peace talks ... we have achieved peace in those areas. So still we encourage local authorities to come up with a draft of peace agreement between communities.... When we bring conflict parties together, we don't bring individual persons for the peace talk. We bring the chiefs, tribe's paramount chief, and government authorities who operate in those communities... We bring people from both parties and then we organise a place and we bring religious leaders, military leaders together. Those people involved in community protection, and people who are involved in community conflict, we bring them together.... After the peace agreement in between the communities we do follow up visits. We don't just stop by and see if both of the parties are ok, but we regularly do our follow up visits, we see how the stakeholders' communication is strengthened.

MBR speaks from a military perspective about his experience with negotiation, noting that doing shuttle diplomacy, being a conduit for communication between the belligerents, took up much of their time.

MBR: They needed someone to go in and open up routes, talk to locals, and that was most of our time. We worked to negotiate access, and figure out why one lot was shooting at another lot, and getting them to stop...

These examples show how at the local level, peacekeepers understand their actions can reduce or prevent violence, which Kalyvas (2003) suggests has much to do with the continuation or ending of armed conflicts. He notes that civil wars are complex and underlying causes may not be clear and in any case are in flux. Leonard (2013) makes the point that insensitivity to local conflicts, and the traditional processes for addressing them, fuels violence which can easily expand, and which undermines peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts. Local conflicts can fuel regional fighting if they become violent. Preventing small, local conflicts from turning violent or spreading may be significant contributors to peace.

## Use of force

Reviewing the theories of peacekeeping and the various manuals and guidelines summarised in Table 2, as well as considering the views of peacekeepers, provides differing views on the use of military force. For example Martin-Brule (2012), taking the use of force as a given, suggests that the strategy of how force is used is a critical factor, finding that the use of force to deter unwanted action is more effective than when used to compel compliance. There appear to be both advantages and disadvantages in the use of military force and their fire-power, depending on the standpoint. The central dilemma, repeatedly discussed in military doctrines<sup>39</sup> and by Last (1995), as well as in many of the peacekeeper interviews, is that the very use of force can undermine the acceptance and cooperation with local people and belligerents understood to be so essential. Berdal (2000) suggests that while the rhetoric of peace enforcement as a form of peacekeeping assumes force can be used impartially, in reality the use of force cannot be impartial, will affect belligerents differently and while it may not be war, it is not peacekeeping. He reflects that it must be part of a well thought out strategy that is realistic about the implications of the use of force for impacting political as well as military manifestations of power. The use of force does not guarantee success, and may in fact sow seeds (or water them) of non-cooperation or other challenges to the mission. A summary of the literature on the use of force (Duyvesteyn, 2008) suggests that it is not possible to force democracy (discussed further in the next chapter), and that there are clear limitations to the usefulness of force in peace support operations. Given the limitations of not having sufficient force to simply dominate via military power, force is intended to be a communication or signal of the credible intent to ‘punish’ those who violate a peace agreement, as much as the punishment itself. Duyvesteyn (2008, p. 424), referring to analysis from military leaders, notes that force is designed to kill and destroy. While it may be possible to use force to violently coerce or deter belligerents in particular situations, it will not by itself lead to peace. These leaders suggested that to be effective at all in contributing to peace support, force must be used as a tactic in a clearly defined strategy, which Sartre (2011) suggests is lacking in many missions.

The UN itself states:

---

<sup>39</sup> See the doctrines in the table above.

The use of force by a United Nations peacekeeping operation always has political implications and can often give rise to unforeseen circumstances. Judgments concerning its use will need to be made at the appropriate level within a mission, based on a combination of factors including mission capability; public perceptions; humanitarian impact; force protection; safety and security of personnel; and, *most importantly, the effect that such action will have on national and local consent for the mission* (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, 2008, p. 35)(emphasis added).

Many have noted that these complexities make the use of force in missions inconsistent (Tardy, 2011a).

Although there is a lack of consensus on the theoretical basis or practical outcomes, there continue to be calls for more robust peacekeeping within the UN and elsewhere. These are perhaps motivated not only by the earlier failures in Srebrenica and Rwanda, but also by more recent failures of troops to protect people in the DRC and Sudan/South Sudan. Military doctrine states that military power is the ultimate fall back when all else fails, or the ultimate power base (see Table 2 for British and New Zealand key themes). It is reasonably assumed from this standpoint that a credible threat of force is a central element in peacekeeping, providing the backbone of deterrence and also contributing to a secure environment in which other peacekeeping objectives can be achieved.<sup>40</sup> Based on this assumption, TCCs are blamed for their unwillingness to use their soldiers to protect people, not taking into account either the mixed messages embedded in mandates and rules of engagement, or the actual limits that peacekeeping forces have, which contribute to the lack of secure environments.<sup>41</sup> Examining the assumption that peacekeeping does create space or ‘bubbles of security’ around regions where peacekeepers are based, Mvukiyehe and Samii (2010b) find the opposite. They found no evidence of a security bubble with increased economic and social well-being near peacekeeping bases. Rather they found evidence of these effects in communities with larger NGO activities, which tended to be in other regions. They raise an interesting question of how much of the effect attributed to peacekeeping forces is actually the

---

<sup>40</sup> See Fortna (2008a) and (2008b) and Doyle and Sambanis (2006) for explanations of how force contributes to successful peacekeeping, but also has limits and drawbacks.

<sup>41</sup> While it does appear that some TCC are unwilling to risk the lives of their troops, there are these other factors. See both Tardy (2011a) and Sartre (2011) for further discussion of these points.

product of the financial expenditures of the mission on the local economy and/or NGO work.

As discussed above, Sartre (2011) develops a comprehensive theory of robust peacekeeping. In order for peacekeeping to be robust, he suggests it must include robust mandates, robust media, robust control of entry and exit of weapons and other material as well as people to relevant regions, robust leadership, robust information, and the robust use of force for protection of civilians as well as peacekeepers. Only some of this requires the use of force, or even the threat of its use. As UCP by its very nature rejects the use of violent force, all UCP theories discuss strategies and tactics that run the spectrum of coercive to cooperative without relying on threats of fire power to back them up. Thus while some theories assume the use of force is essential to signal intentions and credibility, as well as to actually punish belligerents as needed, there is controversy over the accuracy of these assumptions or the ability to put them in practice. And there is evidence that effective peacekeeping has been done in some contexts without any threat or actual use of force.

Peacekeepers spoke about many of these issues. Military and police peacekeepers highlighted the dilemma and feelings of tension based on their belief in the need of weapons for self-defence, with the recognition this could undermine building critical relationships. While speaking about the need for force, they questioned what could be accomplished by the use of force. They spoke of their perceptions of local people, who sometimes seemed relieved to have armed peacekeepers and sometimes seemed to react with resistance and mistrust. UCP staff spoke of the need and value of being unarmed and how this supports their work. Almost all peacekeepers spoke of the importance of relationships over fire power. Weapons and military power seem necessary at times to some, and to be totally unnecessary and even dangerous to others, but most agreed that good relationships are central to accomplishing peacekeeping goals (see Chapter Eight).

PBK speaks to there being a time and place for weapons, from a police perspective, though he speaks later to the point that being unarmed is appropriate in many situations.

PBK: But I suppose the time I definitely wanted to be wearing my firearms, was in the threats and the riots and stuff. So I think there is a time and place for it.

MBI, who served as an unarmed observer as well as armed peacekeeper at different times, speaks of the tension of access to local people versus being armed.

MBI: So what we as a military observer, because we were unarmed, we had access, being unarmed we had more access than the contingents that were armed... Better if you are unarmed and going to the people... and going without the weapon. If you patrol out in the streets, with heavy equipment and APC [armed personnel carrier], they just got away from these things in the war, then they see the same things and they say – ‘we just got away from all these things, now you people come with the same things’ ... What people told me, ‘why do you come, what are you afraid of, why do you come in a big vehicle?’ It was difficult to convince them it was for their security. Later we started going without weapons and the people welcomed that, okay you come with the UN flag, you don't need weapons.

MAN addresses the dilemma of wanting to build relationships with local versus the need for self-protection.

MAN: It seemed to me [our] approach, engaging with people, building rapport with the locals ... But then there is also a bigger potential for things to go very wrong. We tried not to wear so much body armour or drive in armoured vehicles ... we assumed things are safe, and then put on gear if it's needed. It sounds like a minor thing, but that can be dangerous. But it's hard to relate to people in full helmet and glasses.

UAX discusses the use of force from a UCP perspective, and how being armed may simply perpetuate the escalation of force. Whereas standing with people, you can change the source of power.

UAX: If the only way people get from point A to point B, is just because we have guns, then you get bigger guns, you haven't changed anything, protection still comes from the same source, you haven't changed the dynamics. If it is about guns, it will escalate. But if you're trying to have a transformative impact, you are trying to work with people who work nonviolently, carve out a space that says we stand with you. But it's not the same if you have a gun and they don't. You aren't actually changing the situation. You want to change the source of power.

UBC also discusses unarmed peacekeeping as changing the paradigm.

UBC: I think it is changing the paradigm of how people perceive security in a conflict zone. Especially in places that have suffered from violence for decades. Recently in Southern Sudan, in

isolated rural areas where the only security they have seen is weapons, and if you ask them how do you deal with conflicts and they say, 'we kill each other', and you say well what else do you do, and they say, 'well what do you mean? We kill each other.' If you are working in that sort of environment it's hard to say there are other methods and other tools out there, for people to use. So I think changing that paradigm. And also helping people feel, especially if you are preparing local people to be their own peacekeepers, in a way, I think helping them feel confident enough that they can do this, without weapons, because it is outside the paradigm. And to be able to support them enough so they can be trailblazers in creating a new reality for themselves.

MAU refers to his sense of the basic immorality of the use of force, developed from his experiences being a soldier.

MAU: There is no weapon that can be justified, there's no war that can be justified. To see and experience the taking of the life of another human being, is never morally right. As humans, understand we all have the right to peaceful lives. People can say what they want about right to protection through means of arms, but the whole point of a weapon is to kill or maim. And that is just not right.

### Make space for local actors

Many of the theories refer in one way or another to the need to support local people to engage in their own problem-solving and their own political process. Peacekeeping may increase the safety of civilians engaging in communities and political activities. Phrases used in Table 2 above which directly or indirectly point to this include: prevent political exclusion; induce moderates and new civil society actors to participate in processes; expand safe space for civil society action; active encouragement and empowerment ; promote local and national ownership; and primacy of local actors. The integrative engagement with the environment discussed by Howard (2008) also requires following local leadership at times. It is striking to me therefore, given this frequent reference and that a number of peacekeepers included references to the need to support local problem-solving, or make space for local people to act for peace, that this aspect of peacekeeping is not mentioned in the traditional definitions of peacekeeping (see Chapter One for definitions). In order for peacekeeping to contribute to a long term sustainable peace, local people need to be involved in developing and implementing local solutions,

local transformations.<sup>42</sup> Absent local ownership, acceptance and legitimacy may decline, and resistance and non-cooperation may increase, undermining the potential of long term changes.

Peacekeepers of all types describe making space or supporting local problem-solving via accompanying key people, presence and patrolling in communities, negotiation and diplomacy, advocacy, use of the media, and other mechanisms which deter violence. Some also felt they created space through the potential to use force, as discussed above. Peacekeepers also believed they played a useful role by helping to connect local leaders and communities with national and international organisations and resources that could support their work (Mahony, 2006). As discussed above, either through cooperation or coercion, peacekeepers can decrease the space for violent intimidation and increase the space for civilian action. Given the concerns discussed above about the mixing of peacekeeping and material aid, it seems useful to note that the activities peacekeepers shared, which are listed at the beginning of this chapter, were all ways they worked to support local people's engagement without providing material assistance. Some of these efforts were seen to support local people engaging not just in conflict management, but conflict transformation over a period of time, which may shift the underlying conditions which contribute to conflict.<sup>43</sup> And this may be one of the fundamental contributions that peacekeeping makes to sustained peace. This is further elaborated in the next chapter.

PBF talks about the need for supporting local solutions and the process he uses. He suggests that if you take over and do what you think is right, it isn't going to work in the long term.

PBF: We had problem-solving methods that we use. We look at the problem, work through a whole series of options, select the option that suits everyone and work with that and if that doesn't work we will revisit it, and go through that again until the problem is solved. I can't see by using a more robust force that will happen. I can see in other places, in conflicts, in missions

---

<sup>42</sup> See United Nations Guidelines (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, 2008) p. 38-39 for typical language on local ownership. In critique of the failure to implement local solutions, see Howard (2008) for discussion of the use of pre-packaged mandates and Pouligny (2006), Liden et al (2009) and Sending (2010) for critiques of the lack of local ownership.

<sup>43</sup> See Francis (2010) for a further discussion of pacification versus conflict transformation.



around the world, if you go in with that attitude you are going to feel like you are taking over a community, you are doing it because you think it is good, but if you are not being sensitive to their cultural issues, and not listening to them, it isn't going to work.

UBC talks about the gap in UN work between theory and practice in supporting local ownership.

UBC: I have worked with a lot of groups internationally, recently at the UN, when we trained [a] team for prevention, they get it on an intellectual level, they all get that we have to build local capacity, they all get it, we need to support locals in their process, but deep down on an institutional level they usually usurp local staff and their role, on one level or another.

UAX explains how local involvement is critical to transform situations because they are the primary stakeholders, and change will not happen without them.

UAX: But the communities who were the prime stakeholders for peace and stability, and on the frontline of suffering, the communities weren't actively engaged in that process at all, because of the way political violence is played out in Sri Lanka ... and that is absolutely fundamental for transformation. For instance if you look at child protection – there was an agreement signed between UNICEF, LTTE<sup>44</sup> - the LTTE still needed fighters - and the government, poor rural Tamil youth are not the government's priority, but it is UNICEF's mandate, but they had a certain position, and are an international player, but for the communities, especially mothers, that was their primary concern... I don't think you can have any meaningful transformation without them.

### **Comparison of existing theories and research findings**

In this chapter I have reviewed both academic literature which theorises about how peacekeeping works to prevent violence and protect people and the findings from the views of peacekeepers I interviewed. In this section I compare these different two strands to further deepen the analysis of effective peacekeeping.

Starting with the similarities, there is significant overlap and alignment between the various theories discussed in this chapter and with my research findings. There is circularity between the theoretical elements of how peacekeeping works, which makes it

---

<sup>44</sup> LTTE stands for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

hard to discuss one without the others. Putting a number of elements together, most of the theorising and doctrines of how peacekeeping currently works, including my own, suggest the importance of effective organisations and leadership, legitimacy, acceptance, consent, nonpartisanship or impartiality, and either the non-use or minimum use of force. These elements work with each other. Without consent and acceptance, military peacekeeping as it is currently implemented may easily slide in to peace enforcement and/or war (Pugh, 2012; Tardy, 2011a). Equally, without acceptance which implies consent at least at the local level, peacekeepers may lose cooperation and the benefits of good relationships. Similarly my research aligns with the theorising on the importance of international involvement as a deterrent to violence.

The context in terms of kinds and degrees of violence, the political situation, and other local factors are understood to impact peacekeeping. Mahony (2006) advocates for changing the political context, by decreasing the space for violence against civilians. Only Sartre develops a comprehensive analysis of how to create a context more conducive to effective peacekeeping. And though few peacekeepers address these factors directly, my research suggests that the specific contexts of each intervention influence peacekeepers' perceptions of what can be accomplished, the use of force, and the kinds of opportunities and challenges for being effective.

The ability to gather, analyse and act on good information is included in most theories and doctrines. There are different emphases, highlighting the way information can be shared for the purpose of coercing or supporting compliance with peace agreements, preventing accidental return to war or violence, developing cooperative relationships at the local level or between local and other actors, or to support local and international advocacy. The focus on information shifts between what peacekeepers need, and what local people and/or belligerents need as well. My research situates the gathering, analysis and use of information within relationships. The ability to gather, analyse and act on information may prevent violence, protect people and/or support local problem-solving.

In one way or another, all the theories and doctrines address the need for peacekeeping to increase the costs of violence and increase the benefits of peaceful actions. Military doctrine and theory oriented to military peacekeeping posits the use of force as the ultimate source of power to increase the costs of violence, while recognising

there are other mechanisms. UCP theory suggests that there are many nonviolent ways to make the use of force by belligerents carry unacceptable consequences. My research suggests that violence is not the singular, ultimate source of power to achieve negative peace, but it is believed to be a strong source and a good signal by those who use it. Reflecting on my research I found it more helpful to think of affecting belligerents' behaviour along a continuum of coercive relationships to cooperative trusting relationships. Violence or the threat of violence may not be necessary to effect coercion. The kind of relationship in the forefront varies by circumstances and over time. It appears that benefits for belligerents resulting from cooperation with peacekeeping missions may include good relationships and a sense of safety and security generated through the resulting circumstances and interactions, as well as the more typically discussed perceptions of legitimacy, political inclusion and direct monetary or aid benefits. Other benefits less frequently discussed are unintended consequences of economic opportunities and political gains which may occur through serving and cooperating with peacekeeping missions (Aoi et al., 2007; Reychler, 2008).

All the doctrines, UN guidelines, as well as some of the theories referenced in Table 2, point to local involvement in some capacity as important for effective peacekeeping. However my research focuses greater attention on this, reflecting the influence of critical peace studies as well as the views of many peacekeepers, who understood local ownership in some form as a central purpose and element of peacekeeping. Local ownership and problem-solving are seen as critical for sustainable peace, to create an environment conducive to cooperation, to ensure cultural appropriateness, and to maintain acceptance and legitimacy.

The most significant difference between my research findings and much of the literature is the centrality of good relationships (trusting, mutually beneficial, cooperative) as a, and for some, the key mechanism in effective peacekeeping. While UCP theories discuss the need for good relationships as an important part of peacekeeping, as do some of the doctrines, none describe peacekeeping as taking place in relational systems or fields. Nor have I found in the literature an analysis of peacekeeping as using a conscious choice of coercive or cooperative relationships, based on the assumption that cooperative, trusting relationships are more powerful toward achieving peacekeeping's long term

goals.<sup>45</sup> Rather relationships and coercion are posited as opposites. However it is good relationships between peacekeepers, locals, and belligerents that are perceived to increase the likelihood of nonviolence among all parties. It appears that most peacekeepers I interviewed believed that through relationships peacekeeping contributes to the safety and stability of a community or region, and supports the expression and development of capacities and capabilities of local people to address their own conflicts (see Chapter Eight for further discussion).

## **Conclusion**

In summary, while some literature claims a consensus for the finding that peacekeeping prevents a return to war, and thus ‘works’, the research reveals a more complex picture. Success can be defined as no return to war, achieving the mandate, protecting civilians, establishment of a functioning democracy, or some combination of these or other criteria. Thus while statistical research finds that peacekeeping is significantly correlated with no resumption of war, the claims of success are questioned from different perspectives using other definitions. Research which includes the views of local people find that missions which are considered successful by others, may be considered partial or complete failures by some local people. Peacekeepers themselves expect peacekeeping to prevent violence and protect civilians in the places where they work, and have little to say about larger goals, though they are aware that the long term purpose of interventions is to contribute to sustainable peace.

In addition to asking if peacekeeping works, some research has investigated how it works. I have included theorising on strategies and tactics which are implemented by peacekeepers from academics, military doctrines, and peacekeepers. While the perspectives and experiences reported by peacekeepers for this research support much of the theorising, I highlight concerns about the limits and dilemmas posed in the use of force, the importance of supporting local problem-solving and the centrality of relationships for effective peacekeeping, reflecting the influence of critical peace studies. These factors are significant differences with previous theorising and contributions to the field. As will be elaborated in the next chapter, these concerns help identify potential for a

---

<sup>45</sup> Mahony and Nash (2012) make a similar point in their research relating to the centrality of relationships for UN human rights field staff to protect improve human rights through the use of cooperation and pressure strategies as needed.

more emancipatory peacekeeping, that is a peacekeeping more orientated toward increasing the potential for people to lead the lives they chose in more equitable, nonviolent and tolerant contexts (see Introduction and Conclusion for further elaboration on emancipatory peacekeeping).

Having reviewed how the literature and peacekeepers explain how peacekeeping prevents violence and protects people, the next chapter will review the literature and views of peacekeepers on supporting local ownership.

## **Chapter Six Effective peacekeeping makes space and promotes local ownership**

This chapter will discuss the need for local ownership, local problem-solving and the contributions peacekeeping can make to making safe space for this to occur.<sup>1</sup> The ‘local’ in peacebuilding has been a major concern in critical peace studies. This chapter relates liberal peacebuilding literature and critical peace literature, with the perspectives of peacekeepers. I start with a review primarily of traditional peacekeeping literature on the importance of local involvement for effective peacekeeping. I then review critiques of UN peacekeeping and the underlying liberal peace agenda as it relates specifically to the concerns of this thesis with effectiveness, looking at the lack of success of liberal peace in establishing democracies, and the undermining of local ownership. While some of the discussion in this chapter is repetitive of previous chapters, given the importance of local problem-solving or local ownership in the literature and in peacekeeper’s perceptions, I have given the topic a chapter in which to pull these various strands together.

Local ownership is related to effectiveness through legitimacy, acceptance, good relationships, cultural appropriateness and sustainability. As discussed in the last chapter, it is also an element of preventing violence and protecting people. While much has been said about the importance of this, peacekeeping (and peacebuilding) interventions have been criticized for undermining local ownership. There are striking parallels between the academic critique of peacebuilding and peacekeepers’ perceptions of problems with local ownership in their missions.

### Activities

Local problem-solving, local ownership or making space for local people to address their own issues nonviolently, was frequently mentioned by peacekeepers as either a purpose of the specific mission and/or part of defining peacekeeping itself. As a subset of activities reported in the previous chapter, peacekeeping activities that may relate to local problem-solving include:

- ❖ accompany and protect key individuals;

---

<sup>1</sup> As already mentioned I use local ownership, local problem-solving, and making space for local people interchangeably. Individual peacekeepers tended to use only one of these phrases, but all seemed to indicate a similar concept; local people need enough safety and possibly support to figure out and own the processes to address violent conflicts and their aftermath nonviolently.

- ❖ accompany and protect groups and communities;
- ❖ meetings and coordination;
- ❖ protective presence;
- ❖ create safe space;
- ❖ monitor conditions in communities;
- ❖ election related activities;
- ❖ democracy related activities;
- ❖ mentor and coach;
- ❖ train local people and/or training own staff;
- ❖ bridge and connect local people to resources or authorities;
- ❖ build networks to protect others and the team;
- ❖ listen to and witness people;
- ❖ shuttle diplomacy;
- ❖ clarify rumours;
- ❖ build relationships by spending time with the community;
- ❖ build relationships via time with key people – ie village elders or local commanders;
- ❖ community policing and investigation;
- ❖ support local problem-solving/local ownership;
- ❖ help communities prevent violence.

Almost all peacekeepers mentioned performing at least one of these activities, none engaged in all of them. Unarmed civilian peacekeepers and police gave the most emphasis to these activities, but all four types of peacekeepers directly named or described doing many of these. Many directly emphasized supporting local ownership as critical for the sustainability of peace.

### **Local ownership and making space**

#### Local ownership and community problem-solving

What is meant by local is often not clear. Distinctions of international, national and local may not stand up to close scrutiny given the many overlapping connections and paths of influence (B. Charbonneau, 2012). Richmond (2009a) uses the phrase ‘local-local’ to denote the complex, heterogeneous, relatively authentic local peoples and

practices. While I use the word ‘local’, I do not mean to imply there is a singular local in any community, let alone any country, nor to be passing judgment on who is really local. In general the literature (and certainly the peacekeepers I interviewed) use the phrases of local ownership to refer to people who live in communities and regions where activities take place, and whose actions are rooted in relationship with their local communities. There are variations on what is meant by the phrase local ownership or local problem-solving as well. Local ownership may imply giving advice, being in leadership or anything in between. The UN Principles and Guidelines for peacekeeping operations include national and local ownership as a critical element of success, linked to legitimacy and sustainability. The Guidelines (2008, p. 39) state “Effective approaches to national and local ownership not only reinforce the perceived legitimacy of the operation and support mandate implementation, they also help to ensure the sustainability of any national capacity once the peacekeeping operation has been withdrawn.” While not defined, local ownership here (based on my reading of the guidelines) seems to refer to the inclusion of local and national organizations as partners in implementing an already determined mandate. Phrases used in other literature imply a stronger vision of local ownership such as local leaders of peacebuilding or local primacy.<sup>2</sup>

The New Zealand police interviewed for this research used phrases that echo their training (New Zealand Police Community Policing Training Assistance Programme, 2010). They talk about local problem-solving as a process of engaging with the community to identify problems and find and implement solutions oriented toward decreasing violence. The training manual states “The first principle of community policing is that the priorities and issues identified by the local community should be a primary focus of the police effort. Initially this focus must be demonstrated by a commitment to engaging with the local community to identify these priorities.” (pp. 2-4); and “The joint identification and analysis of the actual and potential causes of crime and disorder within communities underpins this approach.” (pp. 2-9 & 2-10). This is an approach that relies on community input and shared problem-solving at the individual level and may include community leaders, but does not necessarily focus on local organizations, nor on protecting particular people who may be critical leaders under threat.

---

<sup>2</sup> For example see Wallis (2010, p. 26).



British military doctrine (Ministry of Defence, 2004), though not using the phrase local ownership, and expecting to have a military lead during peace support operations, recognizes the importance of local leaders and local NGOs. They note local people may have better knowledge, connections, and experiences in their communities, and that promoting local leadership in reconstruction efforts has benefits for sustainability and acceptance. The emphasis is more on local input than local ownership. NORDCAPS (2007, p. 25) states “The local community is familiar with their own environment, climate, culture, languages, etc. and they have a long-term interest in rebuilding their country. They are thus best placed to advise, or when appropriate, to lead the international peace building effort.” There is no further description or criteria to define or distinguish who is local or when to advise and when to lead.

Thus the phrase ‘local ownership’ or ‘local problem-solving’ can imply a range of approaches from consultation and input, to using peacekeeping to support what local people are already doing by assisting or facilitating their efforts (Martin & Moser, 2012).

Peacekeepers talk about the need to support local ownership and processes so that local people can be involved in addressing the causes and effects of armed conflicts. PBF uses community peacekeeping language to explain his work and how it was effective. He credits this community based approach with their success in quelling violence and for shifting responsibility back to the community.

PBF: The primary focus was taken at the community level, to problem solve the issues, that is what we do [at home], and that is the best way ...we had a structure in our area, meeting with the village chiefs. We were starting to problem solve with each of the villages, so you’ve gone from this area that was total devastated, where everyone has run away, there is so much violence, to where we’ve given the area stability... I’m also getting the community to take responsibility for what is going wrong and to act on it. And I see peacekeeping, this is a crucial part of peacekeeping.

PBJ reflects on her experience in several missions and shares her belief that local people need to find their own answers.

PBJ: I made a conclusion after my three missions. We can't solve the problems in these countries by being there. We are not the only answer, there is so much more answer to solving that problem, and that is the people themselves. But we can give them some peace and stability, so they can develop it themselves, that is the only way.

MBQ points to the need to shift the work so that peacekeepers do less and support local people in dealing with problems.

MBQ: ...that they provide the solution themselves, and then you start the peace that has to be kept, they are doing it, you are reducing the requirement that you have to be there. I think at the moment, we are a little bit, we are here, we will deal with this problem. But we actually have to change the situation, that the local people deal with problems, not us.

UAK talks about supporting communities in their own goals, seeing peacekeepers as tools.

UAK: And our mandate itself encouraged respect, encouraged us to support community initiatives, you have to understand what are the strengths and strategies and resources that exist, or what previously existed and had broken down, you have to understand what the community wants to achieve. How can they use us, as a tool, so they might use us to accompany them to someplace, or just for logistics – to use our vehicles or our offices.

Little of the discussion of local ownership addresses concerns about the content of what local people are doing. Mac Ginty (2008) warns about romanticising indigenous processes, noting that some reflect values and practices that serve elites and are oppressive and harmful to others. Both Tull (2009) and Erikson (2009) make this point in regards to the UN missions in the DRC. The UN peacekeeping mission's alignment with the national government and national army has meant supporting institutions that have been responsible for significant violence against civilians. A similar point is made by Gelot and Soderbaum (2012) in relationship to UN and AU intervention in Darfour. In discussing the potential in realms of everyday life to either produce positive quality of life practices or to exert dominance and control which can undermine this quality, Mitchell (2011) suggests that one realm does not belong to local actors and the other to international actors. Rather local actors are implicated in producing both more peaceful and more violent and dominating practices and cannot be seen only as a positive force. Zanotti (2011, pp. 10-11) notes that local resistance to the imposition of solutions by peace support missions may not, for instance, protect local minorities. She suggests that these missions are more complex and do not fit neatly into dichotomous categories of bad intervention and good local resistance. Local civil society, whether family, kin group, community or organisation, may not be motivated by an ethic of care, which is perhaps what is implied and hoped for in the calls for supporting local actors (Clements, 2012). I

think it would deepen the discussion of using peacekeeping to support local ownership to address who decides which local groups and for what purpose. Knowledge of the complexity of local contexts is needed to intervene in ways that support local efforts for peace and which do not exacerbate existing conflicts. And interventions will inevitably be more supportive or empowering to some local efforts than others, which will challenge perceptions of being impartial or unbiased. This seems critical to consider when advocating support to local ownership. However, peacekeepers in their interviews did not address this.

### Making space

Peacekeeping is said to ‘make space’ or generate safety in several ways as well as for different purposes. Generally these two aspects are blurred, with a primary focus on the purpose and little discussion in the peacekeeping literature, outside of UCP theorising, of how the space is created or secured.<sup>3</sup> Woodhouse (2010) identifies three ‘spaces’ in which peacekeeping operates – political, security and humanitarian. Military doctrines<sup>4</sup> and the UN Principles and Guidelines (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, 2008) recognize the need for humanitarian space, by which they mean sufficient safety for providing medical, food, shelter and other kinds of humanitarian aid. They acknowledge that military actions and the requirements for humanitarian space may at times conflict. The military also refer to creating and maintaining zones of separation, which is physical space between belligerents. In both instances, the military imply that space is made by threat or use of force. A recent review of UN peacekeeping suggests peacekeeping can make and preserve political space, the space to consolidate peace, and space for normal economic activities to take place (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2010, p. 14). Democratisation processes are also discussed in terms of making space for nonviolent political contestation, with wide participation and respect for human rights (Jarstad, 2008). These different conceptions of making space refer at times to safe physical space and at others to mix the sense of physical security with a more abstract conception of space in political and economic activities. Presumably, political and economic space requires institutions,

---

<sup>3</sup> Higate and Henry (2009a) are a significant exception. See discussion below of their work on the relationship between peacekeeping and secure and insecure spaces.

<sup>4</sup> See British doctrine (Ministry of Defence, 2004) and NORDCAPS (2007).

infrastructure and processes in which people can participate, but also sufficient safety and security so that actors in the host country are not limited by fear of violence and oppressive repercussions if they do participate.

UCP literature most often talks about ‘making space’ as providing sufficient safety so that people can participate in political processes, though also at times referring to sufficient safety for humanitarian work, or simply efforts to keep themselves and those they are with safe from harm. Schweitzer (2010) discusses making space by protecting specific human rights defenders so they can act with less fear of death or abduction, making space for local organizations to engage in social change work, and making space by accompanying humanitarian organisations to deliver aid or other humanitarian activities. In this case, while the focus is on the purpose, it is implied that space is made or supported through accompaniment and presence. Making space is said to address the culture of silence created by fear and intimidation that frequently occurs in communities affected by violence.<sup>5</sup> Mahony (2006) talks about protecting civilians so they can safely work to reform government and protect human rights.

Higate and Henry theorise that peacekeeping creates spaces of security and insecurity, through performances of specific acts (Higate & Henry, 2009a). Peacekeepers’ actions may create or augment perceptions of security or insecurity through basic activities such as when and where they do or do not patrol. Higate and Henry highlight that in order to create secure spaces, the threat or actual use of violence to protect local people must be credible. Thus non-human aspects of peacekeepers’ performances (which they call props), such as weapons and transportation equipment, must be convincing. They suggest that making space for local ownership or local problem-solving requires certain kinds of performances, which must meet the expectations of the intended audience, in order to sustain the perception of security in which local people may choose to act.

Peacekeepers talk about making space not only for local people, but also in relationship to their own need for space to act. Though peacekeepers in different roles talked about making space, UCP tended to use the phrase more often. UAF describes

---

<sup>5</sup> See Fetherston (2000) and Korac (2006) for a discussion of the everyday lives of people in the midst of violence.

how protecting key people makes space for local people to do their work and has long term impact.

UAF: ...to protect people in six organizations so they would have more space and work more freely. That was the point of our work. I saw some of the side effects that had. They were key leaders, in civil society, people arguing for civil rights and nonviolent change, to participate in politics, so that was part of our work too.

M/UAT talks about making space as a facilitation process, space is not made from thin air.

M/UAT: I have heard people say you create space, yeah you go in and work with two to three parties that want you, then we make space, but they want you there to create space. It's not that you create space out of nothing, we are going in there and helping them create space ... we are facilitators, not mediators, but facilitating, we are peace facilitators.

UAX talks about the tension of doing both short and long term work, and the impact this has on the space in which peacekeepers work. This highlights that maintaining relationships requires attention to what is important to community members as well as what peacekeepers sense is needed.

UAX: The key dilemma, first and foremost was the dilemma between immediate and urgent versus longer-term work. With limited resources, that was a constant dilemma. Both were important, that would be my first [dilemma]. We valued them both but also people in community valued them, you have to do both, and have to maintain your balance or you have lost your space to work or you have lost your effectiveness.

MBQ claims that much of peacekeeping is not particularly effective, but that interventions do make 'a breathing space' for people to find their own way and for local problem-solving to take hold.

MBQ: In many ways they [peacekeeping missions] are not particularly effective but at least they give the nation state, the society, the community, a breathing space. It is a, once you descend in to the darkness, anarchy and violence, it is a vicious spiral going down and down, it doesn't get better. In many ways, the elements coming in externally, they are a band aid. Yes they do give a breathing space, the community a breathing space they need, but the reality is they are not that effective. And solutions are generally internal to the nation. So when you look at the

fragile states, failing, failed states, the issue is to give them a breathing space... to give them the ability to reach out and do things they would normally do in a country.

### Sustainable peace and local ownership

Sustainable peace can be defined minimally as the absence of a return to war (Fortna, 2008a), or in more positive peace terms,<sup>6</sup> which might include some degree of resolution or transformation of the underlying conflicts, democratic governance, and an absence of criminal or community violence. Schirch (2006) argues that military peacekeeping, with its reliance on the use of force, is less suited to facilitating the emergence of sustainable peace than is UCP.

The inclusion of local people may not, in and of itself, imply local ownership. Charbonneau (2012) describes the manipulation of international and local labels to justify international actions. People who are from a particular place may be acting in the service of international agendas. Mac Ginty (2008) points out that inclusion of local participation in defining the goals and processes of peace and development is considered to be critical for sustainable interventions. However, local leaders may be co-opted by international interventions and become themselves the vehicle for promoting externally developed, problematic solutions. At times, according to Pouligny (2006), missions create new organisations led by local people they feel more comfortable with, ignoring existing and locally led organisations which already have a local basis in their community. And yet it is the inclusion of useful local practices and traditions that may lead to more sustainable peace. What local ownership or local inclusion means is debated both theoretically and in practice (Martin & Moser, 2012; Sending, 2010). However sustainable peace is defined and whatever process is put forward as best suited to facilitate it, local ownership and the centrality of local actors is considered an essential factor in achieving this desired goal. This is reflected in material from the UN, various military doctrines, and my own findings.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> See Galtung (1996) Lederach (1997), or Doyle and Sambanis (2006) as examples.

<sup>7</sup> See United Nations Principles and Guidelines (2008), British (Ministry of Defence, 2004) and Nordcaps (2007) military doctrines as quoted at the beginning of this chapter and Wallis (2010) as examples, as well as Chapter Two on themes and theorizing in this thesis.

## Discussion of research findings related to local ownership

One of the differences between my theorising and more traditional theories and doctrines (and in line with much UCP theorising) is the inclusion of making space for local problem-solving as essential to being effective. Peacekeepers mention it in their very definition of peacekeeping, as well as naming it as one of the main purposes of a mission. By this they seem to mean some combination of both creating sufficient safety and stability for local actors to engage in social or political work intended to decrease violence, as well as finding ways to support them in this work – such as helping those who have been silenced to be heard, connecting local actors to larger resources and higher levels of government, or providing training, mentorship and other support for local people to engage in a problem-solving or social change process. Fundamentally it is about recognizing the need for local people to lead and own their own processes of addressing the conflict nonviolently and helping to create a context in which they can do so, even when peacekeepers do not agree with, or even understand, the choices local people make.

In my analysis, peacekeepers themselves understand local problem-solving and making space as critical in several ways. As previously explained, they believe that acceptance is essential. Communities that experience a mission as imposing solutions, rather than engaging with them, may be less cooperative, which would make building good relationships more difficult. And this is thought to undermine effective peacekeeping. Peacekeepers assume that local people mostly understand their own communities better than outsiders. While there are international, regional and national systemic underlying issues related to the conflict, there are also local conflicts and violence, which peacekeepers find themselves addressing in the specific communities where they work.<sup>8</sup> The possibility of understanding these situations relies on good relationships with a cross section of local people. Information and analysis, leading to good actions and programmes, may be more easily acquired and developed when local people are in leadership and feel supported and facilitated by peacekeepers, rather than isolated or disrespected.<sup>9</sup> Local people may know how to address their own issues within

---

<sup>8</sup> See Kalyvas (2003) for discussion of the complexity of both central/elite and local level issues contributing to civil wars. See Darby (2009b, p. 712) who notes that the maintenance of peace may rely more on local, personal understanding.

<sup>9</sup> See Pouligny (2006) and Talentino (2007) for extensive discussion on these points.

their own cultures. And local ownership contributes to sustainable peace.<sup>10</sup> Thus perceptions of undermining local ownership through the imposition of inappropriate solutions was a significant concern to peacekeepers. Local participation however, often requires intervention to create, maintain or support sufficient safety and stability, or space, for engagement to occur. And it would seem critical for peacekeepers to analyse carefully which local leaders and groups are being supported for what, in terms of the impact on peace and violent conflict, as not all local actors will be acting for peace, nor the same version of peace.

### **Critique of peacekeeping and local ownership**

#### Lack of implementation

Given that it appears important to make sufficient safety and security for local ownership, local leadership, or local problem-solving, lapses and obstacles to this goal cause concern. The UN Principles and Guidelines (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, 2008, p. 39) caution that the principle of local ownership should not be simply rhetoric. And yet UBC, echoing many others, notes the lack of implementation of this principle.

UBC: ... the key to effectiveness, and the key to really changing conflicts and dynamics is to as much as possible keep the focus on the local actors. Really just do good work, help create space, deter violence, but as much as possible, keep the emphasis on the local people. That is the only way it will be sustainable. People say this all the time, but they don't put it in to practice very often in my experience. Yes, people been publishing books on this for 50 years probably, but you still see people at the higher levels of institutions making the same mistakes over and over again, creating dependency and disempowering people really.

The UN<sup>11</sup> struggles to coordinate work both within its many component departments and between the UN and other international actors in the field (Rolfe, 2011). Perhaps because even working with known entities is hard, Pouligny (2006, pp. 69-72) documents the ways in which the UN side-lines and undermines existing human rights

---

<sup>10</sup> This is recognized in the UN guidelines (2008), the British military doctrine (Ministry of Defence, 2004), as well as by peace researchers such as Lederach (1997) and Wallis (2010).

<sup>11</sup> Much of this discussion focuses primarily on the UN, because much of the literature and interviews focused there. Much the same can be said for other international institutions.



organisations, preferring to either bring in international NGO's or start new organisations with people they already know, who will work within the UN culture and assumptions. These are concrete manifestations of the critique that liberal peace denies self-determination (Jabri, 2010). PBG shares the experience of working to bring a new model of policing to Timor Leste, only to find they already have their own.

PBG: It was interesting, within about a month you realized the Timorese already had their own model of community policing. And it was quite interesting that we ... thought we could show them the model, when already there was, there was almost a model that had evolved in their own style.

UAX discusses UN staff's lack of orientation to working with local leaders and missed opportunities for having an impact in Sudan.

UAX: Before I left, there was a meeting with the head of the UN mission ... They were talking about emergency temporary bases, very expensive. When I brought up engaging with civil leaders, I had to explain it twice, for it to click in at all. They said, you mean like training them? And I said no, engaging them, and then they brought up resources. I said it would be the cheapest thing they could possibly do. I said you have somebody here already doing this and the community really likes what he is doing, are excited by it, and when a German organization was doing this kind of peace work, engaging the community leadership that way, engaging different actors, you had a great response. It seems to me this area must be starved for this in that environment, for people to respond to it so openly. And yet it was so off their radar, so hard for them to understand, it was contributing to a different way of working there. It seemed unusual, like we were talking about some revolutionary idea to a lot of the UN, but not to civil leadership.

The lack of orientation to developing relationships with local people means resources are not always available to make it possible. PAV and MAZ note problems with basic communication caused by the lack of translators.

PAV: Halfway through the UN mission, we started to bring in the local police, but we couldn't talk to them, they didn't speak English, so it was totally ineffective. They were showing up and being disempowered and getting in the way, not doing anything. We had no interpreters.

MAZ: It was quite difficult because of the language. We had some kind of problem with communicating. The local people spoke French and none of us were Francophones. The Malawi officer

spoke some Swahili, and some local people also spoke Swahili, that helped us some. So we hired an interpreter -- the UN didn't supply one for our team, they didn't have enough.

And CBB speaks to the internal culture of the UN which can be more oriented toward self gain and resists changes that might increase local ownership.

CBB: UN reform, it affects peacekeeping, there is talk [about improving local ownership], but very difficult to materialize, very hard to make changes, there are existing structures, there are people who want to make changes. But even SG Ban Ki Moon can make this an issue, but in the structure, there are people who resist change.

### Culturally inappropriate

The need for being culturally sensitive and appropriate is included in military doctrines and UN guidelines, as well as mentioned in several of the theories reviewed in the previous chapter as contributing to successful peacekeeping.<sup>12</sup> Here, the discussion of cultural sensitivity is less about day to day practices that affect acceptance as discussed earlier (in Chapter Four), but rather is focused on the kinds of political, economic and social programmes supported, promoted or imposed by missions. Work that focuses on supporting local people at various levels of society to engage in nonviolent conflict transformation is likely, by its very nature, to be sensitive to and appropriate for local cultures.<sup>13</sup> This is not to pass judgment on other values embedded in their work, but simply to point out that local people tend to work for changes that are understood as appropriate within their own cultures. They tend to know how to make bridges between what is current, and what might be new, when trying to shift what is acceptable and appropriate in their cultures.

There are many criticisms of peacekeeping regarding cultural appropriateness. Pouligny (2006) cites numerous examples of cultural insensitivity in peacekeeping programmes in her research on the views of local people toward peacekeepers. An example of the challenges presented by cultural sensitivity is the Australian police work in Papua New Guinea. McLeod (2009) finds that the Papuan police perceive the

---

<sup>12</sup> See for instance the UN Guidelines (2008), the British Ministry of Defence (2004), NORCAPS (2007), as well as Howard's discussion of integrative relationship with the environment (2008), and Wallis (2010) .

<sup>13</sup> See Lederach (1997) and Francis (2010) for extensive discussions of conflict transformation. Zanotti (2011) warns however, not all local efforts to transform conflicts will be emancipatory or appropriate.

Australian approach to policing as almost entirely inappropriate to their culture. For instance, Australians and Papuans have different norms and values related to police use of violence. While appreciating some of the technology and certain skills, McLeod finds that Papuans resist the general framework and focus of the training they have been given. She notes that this raises many questions regarding the practice of taking predetermined programmes and trying to minimally adapt them to the local culture with a view toward supporting local ownership.

In terms of the agenda or goals of multidimensional peacekeeping, many of the peacekeepers interviewed had deep concerns about the practice of imposing inappropriate solutions, embedded in their work. These mirror critiques of the liberal peace agenda (see next section), which argue that the elements of the agenda are pre-determined, often inappropriate, undermine self-determination and local ownership, and are seen to serve global north interests rather than the needs and interests of many local people (though serving the interests of local elites allied with global north powers). Peacekeepers stressed the need for supporting local problem-solving, local solutions to address community violence, and many worried that imposing an agenda or solutions created elsewhere undermines the acceptance or legitimacy of the mission and the relationships they thought needed to be effective. They were concerned that it undermines the sustainability of their work in communities. Some expressed a concern that their work imposes a western practice of democracy and law and order which is not culturally appropriate. And because these practices do not fit with the culture, it both disrupts social relations and creates problems for some individuals involved in the peacekeeping process. They also believed their efforts to create the kinds of relationships and make the kinds of changes needed in the places they work, were affected by tensions created by this mismatch. Because UCP missions do not carry elements of the liberal peace agenda, these kinds of concerns are not shared by these peacekeepers. However, they do talk about the need to be culturally sensitive, appropriate, and to not impose their own way of doing things.

MAQ speaks about the easy trap of seeing ‘our way’ as superior, but it may not be the best for others.

MAQ: It is very different than how we work, maybe when something isn't working, maybe it is just that I am not used to their way of how it works, maybe it is just different than I think.

Not better or worse, maybe it is just different than how I'm used to a society working. It is easy to feel a bit superior, if I speak for myself - our country is so good, and now we go to a third world country to help them, its my idea of democracy, it doesn't have to be the best, or the best for them. It's easy to fall into the trap that my way is best, it is better than their way.

MBQ talks about his impression that inappropriate governance solutions are being imposed through peace interventions.

MBQ: When we look at western society, civilization, it took us about 300 years to get where we are at the moment. So any solution we suggest, any solution we impose, is going to be completely foreign and completely wrong and so you are going to have some real problems and some real issues... And I think if anything, the problem we have is not peacekeeping or stability and security operations, but nation building. And oh by the way we have the right solution for you. Every time we go someplace we take our culture with us, and we tend to apply that culture, and say, well you failed and this is what you need.

UAX talks about the need to work with local cultures and traditions in Sudan, in order to have impact. Not stated, but implied, is the need to respect local processes and the time they take.

UAX: In Sudan, one of the hardest environments in the whole world, you won't actually get anywhere without working with people, systems and relationships that already exist. I am not talking about training them in new ways of doing things, but working with traditions and values and relationships that already exist. And they do, there are traditional ways of dealing with conflict. We sat in on a workshop, it was an amazing and long process, regarding customary laws looking at rights of women and children, trying to standardize customary law that had broken down during the war, so reviving the old laws, but also looking at how to bring them in line with human rights laws.

PCL talks about the need to work with the local culture, and that if you insult people, you do not get a second chance. He advises refraining from imposing western ways, having seen the resistance this provokes, and links this to the need to support local ways of doing things.

PCL: You need people who can understand and adapt to the ways of the host culture. Melanesian culture, it isn't hard to understand, their basic values. If you adopt their values and understand how they achieve, achieve their lives, it's not hard to do, but if you

don't, if you insult them, you don't get a second chance, so it's critical to work within their culture... There is no point in suffocating the local police and local people, with how we in the West do things, this way, that we are the best, the local people will resist this. You don't want to impose your ways, you want to support their ways... we are trying to make space for them to re-establish themselves and their ways, then you want to move behind them, support them in doing things their own ways.

### **Critique of liberal peace**

As discussed in Chapter One, most of the military peacekeeping missions today are multidimensional.<sup>14</sup> They include components tasked with implementing the liberal peace agenda such as the development of a western model of democracy and elections, justice institutions based on laws similar to western law, enforced by western style policing and institutions, and free market economies (Bellamy et al., 2010; Durch, 2006b; Schumacher, 2007). Some or all of these elements may be experienced as an imposition, as not all belligerents or sectors of society agree to this package.<sup>15</sup> Here I question two aspects of this agenda related to the focus of this thesis on effectiveness. Is the liberal peace agenda working, does it undermines local ownership, and what is the possible relationship between the two?

#### Is the liberal peace agenda working?

One of the central hallmarks of liberal peace is the emphasis on democracy and elections.<sup>16</sup> The establishment of a functioning democracy, legitimized by elections, receives considerable resources and attention in missions today (Lafraie, 2011). Elections themselves are seen as a possible signal for the end of a mission, as with democracy and elections established, peacekeepers can turn over the maintenance of peace to a legitimate government (Jarstad, 2008). This strategy is undermined by the social disruption in

---

<sup>14</sup> The following discussion focuses primarily on multidimensional peacekeeping or peace support missions fielded by multi-lateral international organisations such as the UN, EU and NATO, as the mandates of UCP missions or projects generally do not contain these elements. That said, NP at the time of this writing (June 2013) has two projects closely tied to multi-lateral peacekeeping missions in Mindanao Philippines and South Sudan.

<sup>15</sup> See Bellamy et al (2010), Richmond and Franks (2009) and Talentino (2007) for further discussion. Johnstone (2011b) points out that consent to the overall mission does not mean consent to many of the components.

<sup>16</sup> I will use this as a stand in for the larger liberal peace agenda, in this analysis.

conflict affected countries, the frequent violence associated with elections (Flores, 2012; Jarstad, 2008), and the resistance to a particular form of democracy (Mac Ginty, 2010) and even elections themselves.<sup>17</sup> The push for democracy is justified with the assumption that democracies are more peaceful, and do not fight each other. However, while it may be statistically accurate that democracies in the recent past tend not to fight each other, it may be for reasons which do not contribute to peace in countries affected by armed conflict (Mosseau, 2008; Rosato, 2003). Additionally, democracies do fight non democracies, and there continues to be internal violent conflict within many democracies, for example Mexico, Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland (Luckham, 2011, p. 90).

As a stand in for examining the attainment of liberal peace, it seems useful to ask if peacekeeping missions have been successful at facilitating democracy.<sup>18</sup> While some research on the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions finds they contribute to more than simply an absence of war,<sup>19</sup> those looking specifically at democracy find that overall the UN has not been particularly successful with supporting or imposing democratisation. Arguing that UN interventions (and not just peacekeeping missions) that focus resources on promoting democracy have achieved some success, Heldt (2011) calls for making major efforts to promote democracy, given the long term implications for improved chances of sustaining peace. However, Call and Cook (2003) find that between 1988 and 2002, most of the governments whose missions had democratic institution building as part of their mandate were classified as authoritarian to some degree as of 2002. Gurr et al (2010) note that the trend toward an increase in democracies seen in the previous decade appears to have stalled or even reversed. A number of governments during and post peacekeeping interventions have become anocracies, hybrids of democracy and autocracy (Frantz, 2012). Some may eventually transition to democracy, though historical statistics suggest they are slightly more likely to transition to autocracies. Lounsbery, Pearson and Talentino (2011) examine the results of a wider set of military interventions and find mixed results and at best weak support linking interventions with improvements in

---

<sup>17</sup> See Erikson (2009) and Tull (2009) for discussions of the challenges to democracy and elections in the DRC.

<sup>18</sup> Keeping in mind, as already noted, that the definition of democracy is itself contested. See Luckham (2011) for discussion.

<sup>19</sup> In particular see Doyle and Sambanis (2006) analysis of the correlation between UN peacekeeping and what they term participatory peace – which is a version of positive peace. Their data includes civil wars between 1945 and 1999.

political, economic or physical well-being. They recommend caution regarding the assumption that military intervention with the intent to install democracy and other liberal peace agendas will improve lives in the recipient country.

Jarstad discusses several dilemmas she believes are encountered in the work to simultaneously promote peace and democracy. She calls one of these dilemmas a systemic dilemma (2008, p. 24). While international interveners may be able to promote institutions and take actions that local politicians cannot without losing local support, this way of intervening does not promote local ownership. And the very process of promoting institutions without being accountable to local people is itself not democratic. She notes it may have the effect of alienating people and undermining support for the very democratisation it is meant to promote, an analysis which mirrors that of many peacekeepers as already discussed.<sup>20</sup> Perhaps part of the problem also lies in the commitment of the intervening institutions, as the establishment of democracy appears to take longer than the political will to maintain a mission, and is thus often hurried (De Mesquita & Downs, 2006; Marten, 2004). Lfraie (2011, p. 488) suggests that the failure of international efforts to create democracies in post-conflict countries reflects a lack of respect for the local culture and a focus on “form over substance”.

#### Does the liberal peace agenda undermine local ownership?

The efforts to impose liberal peace have been criticised as manifesting neo-liberalism, neo-imperialism, or the hegemony of the powerful. Paris (2002) notes that the terms of liberal peace are written into the peace agreements (which are frequently written by outsiders), and enforced through aid conditions, setting up neo-imperialistic relationships. Pugh (2004) suggests that while there may be benefits to some, the general thrust of liberal peace promotes sufficient stability for economic exploitation of non-western peoples and places by western powers, while undermining local self-sufficiency. Peterson (2009) critiques liberal peacebuilding efforts that focus on individual security under the rubric of human security. She suggests that these interventions contribute to insecurity and political domination through the imposition of a focus on political human rights and the assumption that this requires the full implementation of the liberal peace agenda. These interventions ironically contribute not only to armed violence at times, but

---

<sup>20</sup> This concern is supported by Fortna's (2008b) research on democratisation processes in peacekeeping missions.

also to forms of political and structural violence through the imposition of foreign solutions. She argues for the need to create agonistic political space – i.e. spaces in which differences can flourish amidst tolerance, conflicts can be engaged with safely, and local people can find their own way forward perhaps through new alternatives.

Liden et al (2009) summarise critiques of liberal peace. They point to concerns about legitimacy, given the way in which institution building is privileged over human well-being and the undermining or destruction of grassroots peacebuilding. Pointing to the lack of success and uncertain local ownership, they state (p. 588):

These problems and tensions have led to international efforts to build liberal peace often coexisting with a complex mixture of local resistance, co-option, compliance and rejection. At best a hybrid liberal peace has been achieved which exposes the weaknesses of international liberal and hegemonic assumptions and also the hidden local registers of peacebuilding.

The liberal peace agenda is critiqued for instituting the dominance of global north ideas, based on the assumption that these ideas, policies, technologies, and approaches are superior to any competing local ideas and practices and are worth imposing through both military presence and conditional aid (Darby, 2009b; Richmond & Franks, 2009). These practices are justified on the assumption that these underlying values and beliefs are universal, not culture bound, and are simply necessary for achieving the vision of peace embedded in the liberal peace doctrine, which is meant for the good of all and which everyone must desire. And yet liberal peace has frequently failed to materialise for various reasons, not the least of which is that local elites do not want to change the power structures. While some missions may have done some good, they have generally failed to produce the promised political, economic or social benefits envisioned in the liberal peace doctrine. Richmond and Franks (2009), Darby (2009b) and Roberts (2011) call, each in their own way, for a refocusing on supporting local dynamics for peace and community safety,<sup>21</sup> addressing the everyday needs identified by local people and trusting that local people will create functional governance, though it may not resemble liberal democracy.

In his article titled “Liberal Peace is Neither” Eriksen (2009) argues that the UN mission in the DRC is doomed not simply because it is under resourced and is using a one size fits all approach, but because the local elites wish to gain what they can through

---

<sup>21</sup> Which Darby (2009b, p. 709) terms ‘self-securing’.



keeping the peacekeepers there without actually giving up any control or power by allowing real political, economic or social changes. The dynamic of the liberal peace agenda sets up a hierarchy where international donors act as if they know more and try to impose their logic on the poor local people who need help. This cuts off input from local people and short circuits local efforts that might lead toward peace, especially if it contradicts the vision of peace in the current mission. Thus the peacekeeping aspect of the mission is undermined.

The imposition of rule of law, as understood in liberal theory and the practice of liberal peace, is attempted through illiberal (i.e. coercive) means and may in and of itself contribute to further conflict as it changes political practices and power relationships (Peterson, 2010). Leonard (2013) suggests that international efforts in African countries are unsuccessful and frequently contribute to further violence because they do not work with local culture and practices of governance. These practices could be productively integrated with international state building interventions, to improve the security of civilians and to be more successful at supporting the emergence of stable governance.

As mentioned earlier, Mac Ginty (2011) emphasises that all indigenous practices are not emancipatory or inclusive, and can be used to promote traditional elites, maintain inequality and suppress others. However, sustainable peacebuilding requires the inclusion of local leadership with their local traditions and practices, leading at times to hybrid practices. He suggests that current peacekeeping missions tend to ignore or even undermine local traditions. The liberal peace agenda tends to see local people as powerless rather than as active intelligent actors. He notes that key cultural practices of ‘developing societies’ are seen as backward and not relevant to policy, because they are not rational.

UCP missions by their very nature, do not support liberal peace, nor work against it. As discussed in the previous chapter the theory and practice of UCP is focused on preventing violence and protecting key people and communities. The emphasis varies by organization, but the purpose is generally to prevent violence and protect people with a particular focus on protecting and supporting local people engaging in their own social change processes to address conflicts nonviolently.<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup> Peacekeepers from both NP and PBI noted that they only support and accompany unarmed people and nonviolent organisations.

A number of UCP talked about the care they take to be supportive rather than imposing their own ideas of how things should be done. UBC talks about the need to support, rather than empower or encourage local people, both phrases he has encountered in his work, and which he finds paternalistic.

UCB: Recently I have changed my vocabulary. I don't use empowerment anymore and I don't use encouragement anymore, because I think in some way they are very patronizing. I think a lot of the local actors you meet, they are already empowered, they know what they want to do, they just don't have the space to do it, and you don't need to encourage them either, because they are already encouraged. They have lived in violent situations, many of them all their lives, and they already want to make changes, so a lot of them are empowered and encouraged. Some of them lack skills, so you can help build their capacity. I just like to say support, supporting local actors because as internationals or national staff, we can offer certain support, whether it be skills or knowledge, or space in a way for them to do what they are doing. But I think encouragement and empowerment are words I like to stay away from, it continues a paradigm of international patronizing local people.

Critical studies argues that processes of excluding and marginalising local knowledge and local people undermines liberal peace oriented interventions, and contributes to the lack of success of peacekeeping missions. Peacekeepers share parallel concerns that undermining local ownership undermines effectiveness and that one result of these processes, which will be discussed further in Chapter Eight, is that disrespect and exclusion of local people and their traditions, makes it very hard to create good relationships, which are so central to peacekeeping. Just as acceptance and local ownership contribute to good relationships, so too, good relationships contribute to understanding local conditions and effective intervention, in a circular inter-dependent manner.

## **Conclusion**

To recapitulate, terms such as local and local ownership are contested and local groups are not necessarily working for inclusive or just solutions to conflicts. Nonetheless local ownership is perceived as an essential component of effective and sustainable peace. The literature and peacekeepers agree that it is important for local actors to be involved in owning and solving their own problems. Effective peacekeeping

can support sufficient safety and security, often referred to as making space, for local people as individuals and groups, to engage in these efforts.

Actual peacekeeping performance is not always in alignment with this belief. The requirements of the liberal peace agenda manifested in multidimensional peacekeeping, means that goals and processes conceived elsewhere are imposed at times, in local communities where peacekeepers work. This may undermine effective peacekeeping as these efforts are not seen as culturally appropriate, nor respectful of existing local processes. These tensions, spoken of in the literature, are lived in the day to day work of peacekeepers. They are concerned not only with the larger sense of sustainability, but with their need for relationships, which can be challenged when missions do not relate well to local perceptions, needs, leaders, and cultures.

Interventions promoting the liberal peace agenda do not appear to be frequently successful at establishing stable democracy, one of the core measurements of success. Perhaps one way to understand this lack of success is related to the process and practices which undermine local actors and their efforts to address underlying causes of conflicts. Peacekeepers' perceptions or implications of the possibility of intervening to protect people and make space, without imposing agendas, opens possibilities for a more emancipatory peacekeeping. I suggest that attending to the development of this potential is a crucial task, one which bridges critique and problem-solving. It appears to me that peacekeeping interventions can be effective at supporting local peace efforts, it is the twining of peacekeeping and the liberal peace agenda which creates a particular set of difficulties. I elaborate on this theorising in Chapter Eight and the Conclusion.

Just as there is no unified local, there is no singular peacekeeper, nor even type of peacekeeper. Having primarily highlighted the similarities in how peacekeeping was understood to work by those I interviewed in the previous chapters, the next chapter examines important differences in backgrounds, contexts, experiences and views among the peacekeepers I interviewed.

## **Chapter Seven Differences and similarities between categories of peacekeepers**

Previous chapters have primarily constructed an analysis using perceptions of similarities between peacekeepers, stressing what is common in their understanding of effective peacekeeping. This chapter will construct and explore narratives of difference between various categories of peacekeepers. These differences have implications for the theorising or imagining a more emancipatory peacekeeping which will follow in the next chapter, particularly in terms of the different orientations toward use of force and relationships.

Critical peace studies has little to say about the issues discussed in this chapter (with a few exceptions such as Whitworth, 2005 and Higate and Henry, 2009a), so again I relate peacekeepers' understanding mostly to traditional peacekeeping literature in my analysis. I examine the differences I perceived between military, police, civilians and unarmed civilian peacekeepers in terms of their reported motivation and the path to becoming a peacekeeper; training; length of service; organisations; understanding of what peacekeeping is and what was effective; global standpoint; gender; and the use of force. Just as all peacekeepers interviewed in this project had unique features, so too even when putting peacekeepers into categories based on shared characteristics, it is important to acknowledge variation within categories. This chapter is not meant to erase or deny individual differences but to deepen the reflection on peacekeepers' understanding of peacekeeping, keeping in mind the limitations of this research to generalise.

### **Different motivation, training, length of service and organisation**

#### Motivation and the path to becoming a peacekeeper

There is a significant body of research concerning the motivation of military peacekeepers. In research undertaken in the mid 1960's Galtung and Hveem (1976) found that Norwegian soldiers volunteered to become peacekeepers in Gaza to see new places and for the increased salary. Their officers volunteered believing it would be a good way to get experience. Galtung and Hveem note that peacekeepers are focused on what they themselves will gain. Four decades later, Jelusic (2007) summarises the

research on motivation in peacekeeping soldiers from the global north, finding that many military peacekeepers are motivated by the desire for adventure, to expand their military experience, and because some aspect of the job was attractive.<sup>1</sup> Some researchers also report an altruistic motivation, a desire to do something good for others and possibly for one's country as well. Jelusic finds there is variation based on the particular culture and circumstances of different countries. Other motivations include family attitudes and support and the general public attitude toward a particular mission. He notes that the initial motivation to join often changes rapidly in the first few months, as the experience of peacekeeping often diverges from expectations.

In my research, noticeably different narratives were shared in response to prompts regarding how and why people became peacekeepers. While some themes such as the desire to do good and help others, as well as a desire to travel surfaced in many responses, I also saw distinct patterns. Military peacekeepers tended to talk about a chance to test or use their skills and/or the desire for adventure and travel. For some it was seen as a duty to their country. One referred to coming from a military family, wanting to perform and contribute as his forefathers had. While he did not say that this was the reason for becoming a soldier, throughout the interview MCE referred to wanting to be honoured and understood as a professional soldier, as his relatives had been.

MCE: Professionally it was very satisfying, we did what my uncles did in Vietnam ...I detest the term peacekeeping, I detest the people in the UN, the corrupt and the lazy. As an ideal it is great, but fraught with problems. My experiences with peacekeeping is that it was anything but. The perception at home is we were building schools and shaking hands, they don't see that we did what our forebears did... they don't see we are building on [our] reputation. As a professional soldier, you want to do it well..... I come from a long line of soldiers, this was galling.... Yes my generation is looking for an acknowledgment from our country, like my uncle and grandfather. We want to be seen, we are professionals and successful.

Other peacekeepers referred to being motivated by an opportunity to test their training, go overseas for adventure and to meet new people,<sup>2</sup> and for some, for economic

---

<sup>1</sup> Jelusic discusses the many challenges to summarising the research including different definitions of peacekeepers, motivation and methodology. Nonetheless, he finds that themes do repeat from research to research.

<sup>2</sup> Two specifically mentioned that volunteering for peacekeeping in Afghanistan was the only way to see a place of great interest to themselves.

reasons. MAN described getting to serve as a peacekeeper as an opportunity to run a race he has been training for, to test his learning.

MAN: Everyone wanted to go overseas, my bosses knew I wanted to go, it's like training for a race you never get to run, everyone wants to go... but you don't get a choice, the commanders wouldn't send you if they didn't think that was okay.[why did you want to go?] I had been in the Army for seven years, I wanted to test what I have learned.

MAZ mentions it as duty, but also a chance to work with people from different countries, use sophisticated weapons, a personal test of competency, but also as adventure travel and for economic benefits.

MAZ: ...well as part of our duty, but at the same time you get certain kind of exposure to a different environment, to interact with people from different countries, to work with sophisticated weapons and equipment. And test your capacity as commander, it is an adventure too. You get to new countries you wouldn't get to otherwise. Also and not least you get economic benefits.

I found little research on the motivations of police peacekeepers. Peter Greener (2009, p. 102) hypothesises that police volunteer for peacekeeping missions for reasons such as more adventure and an escape from what he terms 'social work' like duties and paperwork in their police job at home, for an increase in pay, and possibly for distance from difficult home situations. Police interviewed in my research shared their self perceptions as being motivated by a desire to help others. Other themes included a desire for new challenges, to go overseas and see new places, as well as for the pay. One person mentioned coming from a family with a history of service. PAR emphasises his desire to help people, while PAV states her primary motivation was to live and work overseas, to travel without being a tourist.

PAR: ... [I volunteered for] the same reason I joined the police, to help people. Realistically I can only do it on a small scale, but it adds up to a larger scale, and also I wanted to go overseas just to see what it was like over there.

PAV: It was the first opportunity to work overseas with the police, at that level...I love to go overseas and travel, and to work there. I don't like to be a tourist, I like to travel a lot and go off the beaten track. To be able to live there and work was very attractive.

PCH echoes the concern with continuing a family tradition of military service. He mentions adventure and putting training in to practice as additional motivations.

PCH: I asked myself often, it was an adventure, and an opportunity to put my skills and training into practice ... Also I come from a service family, soldiers and sailors. I have uncles who were in World War II, and in Korea and Vietnam, and cousins who are soldiers and sailors, the history of service in our family.

There is virtually no research on why people become unarmed civilian peacekeepers. Given the commitment it involves to nonviolence, it is not surprising that many who were interviewed for this research mention this commitment as part of their motivation. Other themes I hear in the quotes below include wanting to do something for peace and justice, and wanting to do something new, international, a feeling of it personally being the right thing to do.

UAE: I had always hoped to have an opportunity after my children were gone, to do something international and something for peace, justice, human rights.

UAJ: I have this feeling of doing Christian work... [I studied to be a minister] and all of a sudden I realised I wasn't going to make it ... I joined the [religious] justice and peace commission. I came to know others and eventually we formed a nonviolent organisation.... After working there for two years, I joined NP.

UAS: I found the organisation just by chance. It was one area I was interested in since I was quite young. I had served in the national army ... From that moment I got close to certain nonviolent organisations. It was a way to work more closely with a humanitarian organisation. It was time to discover a new country, it matched my personality.

As with UCP, I did not find research on why civilians chose to work in peacekeeping missions. The few I interviewed discussed wanting to do something different and something useful for others.

CBA: I was interested in leaving [S. Asia] at the time, working in something like this, I had recently mentioned to a friend it would be good to work for a multinational organisation, leave the practice. I was dissatisfied with the local law practice, it was too routine, it wasn't satisfying.

I was struck by the frequent emphasis by military and police on peacekeeping as an opportunity for travel and adventure, and to test skills, without reference to the potential for danger nor the political implications of peacekeeping interventions. Given these motivations, it does not surprise me that the research (Jelusic, 2007) finds military (and presumably would find police) peacekeepers' experience diverges disappointingly from their expectations. UCP are perhaps less disappointed by their experience as it presumably diverges less from their motivation.

While not mentioned by all as a motivation, most peacekeepers at some point in the interview mentioned their desire to help others who were in difficult circumstances. I came to think of this as the helper motivation. It appears to me to reflect motivation based on a belief that outsiders or third party interveners can make things better for people in the host country, through their combined efforts. It seems to me to contain elements of a dichotomous worldview that sees some other people as needing significant help, whereas one's own people/country are doing ok.<sup>3</sup> To me there was often a sense of 'we who have the skills, knowledge and capacity will help you who are in trouble because you lack these factors'. I heard little reflection, if any, on the poverty, corruption, violence, poor governmental function, or other such issues in their own home countries. In this sense, although I found differences between the different roles in their motivation, many seemed to share this underlying viewpoint. Thus while the military peacekeeper may want to use their skills for which they have no other arena, and many want to go overseas for adventure, and the UCP are particularly interested in nonviolence and other non-traditional aspects of their work, there were also commonalities in their frequently mentioned motivation to help and/or rescue.

### Training

The lack of sufficient or appropriate training is a repeating theme in research on military peacekeepers. Concerns raised include the need for more effective cultural training (Feldman, 2010), or training which is a better match with the mandate (Jelusic, 2007). As numerous authors suggest, military peacekeepers are initially trained to dominate an enemy, win a war, and fundamentally, to kill. The transition to

---

<sup>3</sup> See Richmond (2006, p. 304 and 307), for a similar point about liberal peace interventions more generally.



peacekeeping requires different training and provides many challenges.<sup>4</sup> Though not directly addressing training, Whitworth (2004) examines a larger frame, the way Canadian men are socialised to be soldiers and the mismatch with the job of peacekeeping. She hypothesises that this explains some of the horrific behaviour of peacekeepers.

Military peacekeepers I spoke with generally felt their training was useful. Some however, mentioned that it was inadequate preparation for their work in terms of cultures, language, and peacekeeping skills. What they did appreciate was the training in weapons, a training which not surprisingly, was not shared with other types of peacekeepers. What was noticeable to me was the absence of much training in working with people in the community to do problem-solving, mediation, reassurance, or other tasks that they reported doing.<sup>5</sup> While overall MAN found the training deficient, he did appreciate the background and technical training. MAP also appreciated the technical training, while noting there should have been more training on the context and culture.

MAN: [The training] has massive deficiencies, but some of it was good, how to use an interpreter, some background about Islam, technical things like the use of vehicles, counter IED stuff, and use of different weapons - both how to use them and what it means if it's pointing at you.

MAP: In my case, it was quite useful. We were trained quite well, not like for Iraq or Afghanistan. ... We had lots of operational training, like what to do in a mine field... how to protect ourselves, how to protect and secure headquarters, and if the camp was attacked what to do. Also we got training on equipment and technology. We also got some context specific training, some cultural things like the biggest ethnic tribes, and some local customs, like only eat with your right hand if eating with locals. This part should have been more, that sort of cultural training, but at least we had some.

Although there is less research addressing police training, police peacekeeping research also discusses the inadequacy of training. Concerns raised include the lack of agreement about what police peacekeepers should be doing in the field as well as insufficient training related to culture, language, history and context in the host country

---

<sup>4</sup> See Miller (1997), den Heyer (2011), Page (2007) and Marten (2004) for discussion of this issue from different perspectives.

<sup>5</sup> This echoes Last's observation that military personnel are not well trained for what he calls contact skills. (Last, 1997)

(Goldsmith, 2009; Peake, 2005). In recognition of these problems, UNPOL has recently created new training materials and is working to ensure that all police employed in UN missions have the same basic training (Peake, 2011). Police peacekeepers interviewed shared similar concerns that the training, though adequate, could have included more on culture and the current political context. PAR notes he already had general police training, and comments that he found most of the technical and cultural training was not very useful.

PAR: Yes. Obviously, there was a general training to be a police officer, I had that already. Then extra training largely for the conditions, drive training and navigation training, and that sort of stuff, to keep us safe or whatever. Training for the UN systems and bureaucracy. Some training in language, and some training in other cultures and why people might react differently, might seem threatening to us, but it is normal for them. Most of it was useless, well that isn't fair, it was not helpful... though some did benefit from it.

Unlike the military and police training for peacekeeping, which is additional to their basic or previous training, the UCP training usually begins with the organisation through which they volunteer for peacekeeping. While previous research has raised concerns about the training for civilian peacekeepers (Moser-Puangsuwan & Weber, 2000, p. 329), peacekeepers in these interviews reflected on training that was several months long and covered much of what they would do in the field. There was a greater sense of satisfaction with the training from the unarmed civilian peacekeepers who were part of PBI projects. Not surprisingly, UCP training covers material on responding to difficult situations nonviolently. This is quite different from the training reported by military and police. UAF and UAM describe intensive training over many weeks, with a focus on how to use nonviolent practices to respond to difficult situations. UAF also describes the intensive language learning which is part of PBI's training when staff do not already speak the local language.

UAF: The first training was a 4 day residential training, general introduction to PBI, participatory, light, realistic, experiential, run by people just back from Columbia. It covered the whole of the organisation.... It was an intense in depth training, run by people experienced in the field. ... Then in Indonesia, I had 3 ½ months learning language, frequent visits with people already on the team, learning culture and the political situation. And then informal training in the field. I would go with more experienced volunteers

to do work, and after two months, I was expected to take more lead.

UAM: Yes, absolutely [received training], at the time there had been attacks on PBI in El Salvador. Our training was intense, with overnight role-plays, dealing with guards and harassment on border crossing role-plays. It also included interpersonal stuff, how to work with consensus, how to get along in a team. It was a very comprehensive training. We also understood that you would get more training in the field.

Like the military and police, civilians appear to have previous experience and training related to their work. Those interviewed for my research reported receiving some additional training, which some found useful, and some not.

CAD: Yes, I received one week training for my education/public outreach work. And three days security training.

U/CAG: Then for the EU I had one or two days briefing, mostly useless. It was a waste of time. The foreign minister came, that was useful.

Military and police peacekeepers reported spending much of their time in communities in interaction with local people. The emphasis in their training of the technical use of weapons and other equipment coupled with the lack of emphasis on culture, language and political analysis, reflects I think, the privileging of the power of weapons over the power of other kinds of relationships (as I discuss further in the next chapter).

### Frequency of service

Of the 53 peacekeepers I interviewed, 32 served two or more times in peacekeeping missions or projects. It logically follows that these peacekeepers spent more time working as peacekeepers. For many, but not all of the military peacekeepers this frequency of service was also associated with achieving higher ranking. When I interviewed them, their rank was higher than when they had first served. Most, but not all of the police who has served in two or more missions had also become higher ranked officers. All of the military, police and civilian peacekeepers who served more than once were the heads of units, squads, departments or some ground level organisational structure during their peacekeeping. For unarmed civilian peacekeepers, this was less uniform, as PBI does not have this kind of organisational hierarchy and NP has little of it.

And while I did not find differences in the peacekeepers that seemed associated with rank, their breadth of experience did matter.

Most of the peacekeepers who served multiple times, were more articulate and the interviews tended to last longer. It is possible that serving more times was associated with higher class, education or with particular ethnicities in peacekeepers' home country, but this was not something we discussed in the interviews. Although I did not ask directly, my understanding of the requirements of PBI and NP would suggest that most of the unarmed civilian peacekeepers had university education, with the exception of national/local staff. In addition to the breadth of their service, these factors may also have affected their ability or choice to be articulate about their experiences. While reading this thesis the reader may notice that some people are quoted more often than others. While not everyone who served multiple times was particularly articulate, all of the people who I frequently quote served in two or more missions. My sense is that they had multiple experiences to draw on and prior to the interviews had reflected on the complexity of their experiences and developed narratives and meaning. Of significance to my research, many of these more frequently serving peacekeepers were also the most articulate and emphatic in their discussion of the importance of relationships for effective peacekeeping. For example, of comments about the importance of relationships or aspects of relationships,<sup>6</sup> here MBI, who served in four UN peacekeeping missions, talks about the need for cooperation as a critical factor, without which you cannot operate.

MBI: The cooperation of people is very important. Unless and until the people there cooperate with you, you cannot operate.

PAI served twice as a peacekeeper and here he talks about the need for good communication, networking and talking to people as equals. He highlights the shared interest of wanting to end violence.

PAI: The key to any dispute, anywhere is communication, I base my whole work on it. Networking and communicating, talk to people, talk to people one to one gives you a lot of respect. And on equal terms, they aren't being policed but being consulted. They don't like violence either, this is a way to get around it.

---

<sup>6</sup> Some of these examples appear elsewhere in this thesis as they are so clear.

UAX served in one UCP mission for several years and then briefly in another. She brings her grounding in nonviolent theory to bear in her reflections on the importance of long term relationships and being based in rural areas.

UAX: If you think about systems theory or system change, in order for emergence to happen, people who have that different behaviour [speaking out] have to get some momentum, and get some positive feedback going. ... Having long-term relationships, allowed a deeper understanding of those struggles and having field offices, especially in rural areas, had an impact on their ability to do their work.

### Different peacekeeping organisations

There were obvious and strong differences among the kinds of organisations peacekeepers worked within. I interviewed peacekeepers who worked in missions and projects under the auspices of the UN, NATO, EU, AU, RAMSI, PBI and NP. In addition I spoke with former peacekeepers who served in the Solomon Islands and Timor Leste as part of initial interventions jointly undertaken by Australia and regional ad hoc coalitions before the start of UN or RAMSI. In Chapter Three, I discussed the connection between effective peacekeeping and effective organisations. Here I will highlight what appear to me as significant differences between the organisations, the kinds of situations where they intervene, and the different technologies and support they have available.

Peacekeeping undertaken by multilateral organisations currently tends to be part of a broader multidimensional peacebuilding or state building agenda and set of programmes. As discussed in Chapters One and Six, there is significant concern about the neo colonial character and purpose of these agendas, their sustainability, and the dilemmas for peacekeepers who felt the tension of imposing solutions that may not be accepted locally. This is a fundamental difference between these large institutions and the smaller INGOs undertaking UCP,<sup>7</sup> and appears to affect how peacekeepers think about being effective in their work (see below in particular for the discussion of the use of force).

---

<sup>7</sup> Interestingly however, NP appears to be seeking to work with UN agencies in its projects, which might lead to being subsumed in the larger agenda. My research did not surface any concerns about this, but I wonder how this might impact their peacekeeping, if it is increasingly connected to interventions about which local people are at best ambivalent.

Focusing on how this manifests in their day to day experiences, peacekeeping undertaken by multi-lateral organisations must function within large, bureaucratic, hierarchical organisations. Concerns raised in the literature regarding these organisations include the need for increased organisational learning (Benner et al., 2011; Howard, 2008; Schondorf, 2011), improved leadership (Howard, 2008; Sartre, 2011), better coordination (Ricigliano, 2003; Rolfe, 2011), and increased clarity of mandates and unity of understanding and implementing mandates (Sartre, 2011; United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, 2008). These are organisations that base their peacekeeping in concepts that assume the threat or actual use of armed force is at the core of their work (see Chapter Five). While there are important differences among these organisations in terms of their structure, membership, centrality of the military, availability of weapons and other equipment and such, the largest difference related to this research appears to be between this kind of organisation and the smaller INGOs that undertake UCP.

While UCP organisations are much less studied, they too face many challenges in terms of structure, leadership, funding and organisation (Moser-Puangsuwan & Weber, 2000). The reported differences between PBI and NP on the one hand, and the UN, NATO and the other multi-national organisations were striking though not surprising to me, given the profound differences.<sup>8</sup> PBI attempts to maintain a non-hierarchical, de-centralised structure. NP has moved toward a more hierarchical structure over time, having country directors, program leaders, team leaders and a central headquarters where many decisions are made. Unarmed civilian peacekeepers' description of their organisations reflected the smaller, less formal nature of their organisations. I heard comments that indicated easy direct contact between peacekeepers in the field and others in the organisation, the ability to make decisions locally, and ways in which each peacekeeper felt they had influenced the organisation. The organisations are perhaps too small to have the same degree of internal coordination problems. This is in marked contrast to phrases used to describe the UN as 'the big blue monster', comments on the dysfunction of decisions made far from the field in the UN or NATO, and the sense of disconnect and lack of coordination between various layers and segments of these large bureaucracies. These differences appeared to affect both the peacekeeper's satisfaction in the work, and more importantly their sense about what needed to be done or could be done. PBN's metaphor of being in Roman times expresses the frustration of many and

---

<sup>8</sup> The following analysis is based on interviews unless otherwise referenced.

their sense that the work in communities was undermined by organisational politics and not well supported.

PBN: We are here to keep the peace, to stop these baddies from being able to continue on, and yet we weren't allowed to do that, because of some political gain from some country. That was one thing that kind of stopped us from being effective. And just the little things. I am talking about one day, one week we only got two reams of paper. I am like hang on a minute. I go in to the UN headquarters and there is plenty going around for everybody. So it's kind of like looking back in Roman times where you see that Caesar has got this lush green everything, and you go out from his palace, and everyone is living in squalor, that is kind of what it felt like. You go in to headquarters and there is plenty there but you come out in to the actual units and you know that on the frontline, [people] are doing their job, and there is nothing there.

The different organisations intervene in different kinds of situations. The UN and others require international authorisation and often do not intervene until there is a deep crisis which is widely recognised and which arouses significant P5 interest (Howard, 2008). PBI and NP, on the other hand, intervene based on requests from the field and their own internal processes.<sup>9</sup> These situations, such as that in West Papua during PBI's project, may not be well known. Given the commitment to nonviolence and the need to keep their staff safe, PBI and NP make careful analysis of the situation before and during intervention, to determine the likelihood that their intervention will make a difference without unduly risking injury or death.<sup>10</sup> This may not mean that the actual level of violence is lower in an area of UCP intervention, but the way in which the violence is organised and the way it is worked with will be quite different. For instance NP is part of a primarily military international monitoring team in Mindanao, Philippines, with a responsibility for civilian protection. In South Sudan, NP staff work in the same areas as UN military and civilians. PBI has missions in Guatemala, Colombia and Nepal, all places that have experienced high levels of violence and other peace related

---

<sup>9</sup> This analysis is based on information on the PBI and NP websites, interviews and my own personal experience with NP.

<sup>10</sup> See Mahony and Eguren (1997) and Schweitzer (2010).

interventions.<sup>11</sup> However in these violent contexts they generally do not do interposition between two or more groups of belligerents as military peacekeepers might.

The UN and other military peacekeeping organisations may intervene in more violent contexts, and the intervention frequently includes the use or threat of use of military force. The mission may not have been requested, though consent has been obtained. This affects what they do and how they do it. While actual activities and the centrality of relationships were described in similar ways by all peacekeepers, as narrated throughout previous chapters, there are substantial differences, for example, in the kinds of equipment and other resources available. While the UN may struggle to find the troops and equipment for authorised missions (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2010), NATO and the EU have access to significantly more and better equipment. The following quote from MBR gives a sense of the use of military force and the threat of force, to get things done, while at the same time reflecting on his greater satisfaction, as a soldier with NATO rather than UN peacekeeping. This contrasts with UAF describing an interaction at a check point, where simply their presence was influential and the goal was getting through rather than dismantling it.

MBR: Yes, under the UN, you felt you were impotent, the UN wouldn't allow it [use of weapons to take down a road block], we could go up and say to the local commander and say we are going through [a road block], we can fight you or you can let us go through and we will do something good for you. But the UN wouldn't allow us this [the actual use of military fire power]. So there was no reason for the local commanders to respect us. This changed when it went to NATO. We didn't have to refer everything back up, NATO gave commanders orders and limitations, and then they could operate in the field. So you go to a roadblock, and can say we will move it if you don't, and then they do. It made a major difference.

UAF: For instance we came up to a checkpoint, [with] the low level soldiers. The lawyers we were with said without you we wouldn't have gone through. It seemed like just being foreigners, we could chat about soccer, a quick chat about football, then get waved through. Then we get to know the soldiers. The activists felt without us they weren't getting through.

---

<sup>11</sup> See Nonviolent Peaceforce (Nonviolent Peaceforce, 2013) and Peace Brigades International (Peace Brigades International, 2013) for more details.



## Differences in global standpoints and gender

### Differences between global north and south standpoints

The majority of people I interviewed in this research are from the global north. Though a number of people interviewed are from New Zealand and Australia, they are considered from the global north in terms of their standpoint (See Santos (2007) for a discussion of the use of the phrase global north or south). Several of the interviews were with Māori from New Zealand, and I felt that their standpoint included some of what is referenced as the global north and some of the global south. So, while this dichotomy has limited usefulness, there were some unifying characteristics for many military and police from the global north.<sup>12</sup> They shared a tendency to believe their own nationality or ethnicity was the best for peacekeeping.<sup>13</sup> Another shared view frequently repeated was their discussion of the shortcomings of other peacekeepers, almost entirely from the global south. The need for peacekeeping to include troops and police from different regions was criticised for emphasising diversity over competence. Mostly police, but also military personnel from the global south, were judged as incompetent or less competent, there only for the money, and occasionally perceived as committing illegal acts.<sup>14</sup> This tended to be coupled with comments regarding the local police and belligerents as being incompetent as well as illogical and hard to understand. Some made comparisons between local police or belligerents to children who do not know better. Some perceived the local culture as problematic and possibly backward. PAR likens people coming from countries with current peacekeeping missions to kindergarteners.

PAR: And in some countries with UN missions going on in them, advising them, their local police are on mission to East Timor, so those who don't know, are teaching others. Like taking someone out of kindergarten and taking them to primary and saying teach that person what to do. At the same time the UN has to stay neutral and has to be politically correct, so I can't offer any suggestions, not a very useful complaint.

---

<sup>12</sup> Given the small number of people from each country, it did not seem useful to think about differences by nationality or ethnicity.

<sup>13</sup> There is some research which investigates this self perception of being the best peacekeepers and its implications, see Hedlund and Soeters (2010) or compares different peacekeepers regarding their ethnic characteristics suitability for peacekeeping, see Vuga (2010).

<sup>14</sup> These points are discussed in Higate and Henry (2009b) and Peake (2011).

MAY shares that while diversity is a strength, he has a number of concerns about people coming from the global south, including discipline, treatment of women and minorities, and corruption.

MAY: The diversity within the UN is the largest strength and weakness in some ways. We had people who came from countries which themselves have had UN interventions in the last few years. You have to question whether the military from troubled countries should be contributing to a UN mission in a different country. Also issues of discipline, treatment of minorities, and treatment of women. You have people who come from countries with different cultures and interactions with women, they don't work well with women from other countries. Or countries where nepotism, bribery and corruption is par for the course, and sometimes this manifests in the mission they are on.

Military from the global south perceived problems of arrogance in those from the global north. They had accepting attitudes toward those who were there for the money, and believed that this was compatible with doing good peacekeeping. Two peacekeepers from the global south suggested it was an issue of increased training. They focused their criticism on the UN for not providing sufficient training so that everyone in the mission understood the purpose and needs, could connect with each other's humanity, and for not enforcing the requirements to not harm local people. MBI acknowledges there are problems, though some stem from a lack of clarity in the mandate or rules of engagement, but ultimately thinks it is the UN's responsibility to provide good training, to balance the perception of being there for the money.

MBI: ... Yes, many situations do occur in the peacekeeping missions in Africa, where the peacekeepers have not done adequate, they have not performed effectively, they remain away from the problem ... they are not trying to solve the problem. This has happened. Sometimes the task or the mandate itself is not clear. The rules of engagement which the peacekeepers are supposed to follow in their deployment, are at time confusing. This is purely, again, because of improper training. It is confusing, they don't understand their role before they get deployed. The UN has to develop some kind of mechanism to make them understand their role, prior to their deployment. At times it happened very hurriedly, a member state is requested to contribute troops and immediately they are there in the mission... As I said there are two types of contributors, the budget contributors and the troop contributors, the troop contributors it is kind of lucrative sometimes, the allowance that the UN gives is good, people think that we go to the UN mission to make money,

because UN gives us good food, UN gives us good money. This is the concept that many of the troop contributing countries have. ... it is the UN responsibility as well.

This kind of distinction was not made or discussed by those who served in UCP missions. While most of those I interviewed came from the global north, there was no discussion of the superiority or inferiority of other civilian peacekeepers.<sup>15</sup>

The ethnicity which stood out for me in this research, as a mix of global north and south standpoints, was a small subset of Māori police from New Zealand, all of whom served in either the Solomon Islands or Timor Leste. The Māori women were not sure if their gender or ethnicity or just being 'Kiwi' made the difference, but reported an ease in making relationships with people in the community and with other peacekeepers from other countries. They all tended to believe that being Māori made it easier to develop relationships with other Pacific peoples, both those who were also peacekeepers and local people. Most reported receiving comments indicating they were particularly accepted due to perceptions of shared cultures and a greater ease and comfort with them. While not a significant focus of this research, I was struck by a difference in tone in the interviews with most of the Māori. Given that the number I interviewed is quite small, and this work is within a constructivist framework, I am not intending to imply any generalisations. It appeared to me however, in these particular interviews, that there was a greater acceptance of different cultures of the many police peacekeepers (all the Māori peacekeepers I interviewed were police) in their missions, as well as a greater acceptance of the local cultures. This was manifested in that there were either no, or fewer and briefer negative comments about peacekeepers from other countries. When questioned about this, several stated that their Māori culture taught them to be accepting of others. Several also discussed peacekeeping in a way that reflected an analysis based on understanding the local people as a community, and less as individuals. For instance here PBK is talking about what she does when someone stole petrol from a rural police post in the Solomon Islands, seeing it as a communal issue.

PBK: For example, at one post, the people have no power, no nothing you know, and they would quite often try and steal the petrol and stuff that we would have. It is like a really really big

---

<sup>15</sup> Though in my own personal experience in the field, I heard some staff discussing difficulties with others, based on what was assumed to be characteristics of their global south or north cultural background. It was not, however, mentioned in the interviews.

deal. I suppose we would try and discourage them, it was like if they were caught, it wouldn't take long for us to know who had stolen it, or what not, so just dealing with the whole community, explaining to them the pros and cons of what one person's actions have done for them, and doing it at the whole community, instead of just punishing the one individual, but making everyone realise how one person's actions affects everyone in those little communities.

### Differences by gender

There is an increase in attention to issues of gender in peacekeeping (United Nations Security Council, 2000), and particularly on increasing the number of women peacekeepers. Some suggest that increasing the number of women peacekeepers will improve peacekeeping, reflecting assumptions that women are socialised in ways that may make them more adept at peacekeeping, and that women in local communities will be able to relate better to female peacekeepers (Bridges & Horsfall, 2009). There is also a suggestion that women peacekeepers are good role models for local women (Kembler, 2010). Higate and Henry (2009a) point out this approach reduces issues of gender to simply the inclusion of women, without addressing complex issues including the masculine culture predominant in military peacekeeping. However, without addressing this, the inclusion of women may produce gender related problems among peacekeepers. Harris and Goldsmith (2010) discuss the experiences of Australian police women who serve as peacekeepers. They note that these women report a number of challenges relating to local customs and local male police, but that the biggest challenges reported stemmed from interactions with their Australian male counterparts.

While my research was not focused on the specific ways in which women peacekeepers did or did not experience gender as affecting their work, a few women and men did address these issues. One man, UAJ, noted the value that women peacekeepers bring in tense situations, implying that men behave differently when women peacekeepers intervene.

UAJ: It came to enrich my understanding, especially about mainstreaming gender in every kind of intervention, peacekeeping or humanitarian... Peacekeeping is a frontline issue, we think it is only men who can stand up to heat, when it comes to working in the field in hostile environments. It helped me to see how women can bring in powerful aspects and contribute. Instead of outright neglecting issues of inviting women into frontline peacekeeping,

instead of thinking ladies can't go through swampy areas, go through jungles, work in tropical heat. Ladies can go on and on, you have to say, 'you need to take R and R'! This has changed my perspective and understanding of the role of women in unarmed civilian peacekeeping, and especially in issues in connection with communities. When we go into the field, especially the jungle, the frontline, different forces are taking up positions. I find it very empowering to have women colleagues alongside. In a subtle way, it neutralises tension that has been building up. There is a longstanding argument, a lady comes in to the long standing tensions, interjects, everyone in the room or under the tree pays attention. I like to see contributions coming from my female counterparts.

Several women police peacekeepers referred to their experiences as it related to being women. They shared examples of things they could not do, due to local customs, and things that only they as women could do. Overall, my sense is that those who discussed this issue found being a woman helpful in making connections with local women. At times, their sense of being seen as unthreatening was also helpful in difficult situations. PCA speaks to her acceptance of the different roles assigned to women in the local culture, and the positive impact this had on her work.

PCA: Culturally the men have a role and it is separate from the women's role. I supported the men [officers she supervised] leading the talking, not me as supervisor. The elders would prefer to hear from a man. I am going into the kitchen with the women, like in Māoridom, men and women have different roles. And I'll learn from the women, what is happening, while you do the work in the front, the official line, with the men. Then the women get to know you as well, learn about us and what we do, and I learned about them. And they speak up for you in the community, they really help you.

The one woman former military peacekeeper I interviewed,<sup>16</sup> initially said that being a man would have helped but that being a woman made little difference in her own unit, but later in the interview, described significant discrimination against women, reflective of the predominant masculine culture.

MCG: I think it would have helped, being a man, when you come up against strong masculine base cultures, it can be quite tricky. You have to be very clear about how you conduct yourself, and how you communicate. They usually expect my role to be

---

<sup>16</sup> Although in my outreach for interviews, I made efforts to find military women, I was largely unsuccessful. This may reflect the low numbers of women who serve as peacekeepers from the military.

fulfilled by a man, they didn't make it hard for me, but they could have. But within [ her unit] there was no problem.

Toward the end of her interview MCG shares a different perspective.

MCG: In the military as a woman, you are considered either a bitch or a slut, and you decide which road to take, and this affects how you are respected... I said to the younger women I taught, keep your legs together and if you decide to sleep with someone in the mess, be very discreet. It is easier to be harder than suffer. Don't get involved with people in your unit... Men are not held to the same standards... And these are all things that undermine your ability to trust each other in the most testing of circumstances. So if you don't like this as a woman, the military is not a good place to be. This is gender discrimination. Once an officer called me a bitch, but I set limits, I won't allow you to call me that, you have to get good at giving back what you get.

### **Different perceptions of effective peacekeeping<sup>17</sup>**

#### Different perceptions of peacekeeping<sup>18</sup>

Although there were many similarities in how peacekeepers defined peacekeeping, each role also had a different emphasis, reflecting their different practices and orientation. Military peacekeepers were more likely to use phrases related to preventing the resumption of war or fighting, to bring stability, to support or implement a peace agreement including references to protecting borders, or to provide safety so that people can rebuild their lives. That said, the only one to suggest that prevention was better than peacekeeping, was a former soldier. Even within each role category, there was variation.

Police peacekeepers tended to refer to re-establishing law and order, protecting people, and to supporting local problem-solving. Reflecting that many police were involved in mentoring or training, there was also mention of giving people tools or new ways of solving their problems.

UCP tended to refer to protecting people, making space for local people and supporting local ownership, while naming the use of nonviolence as a core factor in

---

<sup>17</sup> As all of these descriptions of peacekeeping and factors of effective peacekeeping have been discussed in the previous chapters, I have minimised quotes in this section.

<sup>18</sup> See AppendixD for a chart compiled by NP staff, which compares armed and unarmed peacekeepers, including how they understand peacekeeping and their activities.

preventing violence. Civilians referred to both the intervention of third parties to help disputants resolve their conflict, as well as the prevention of violence.

### Different perceptions of effective peacekeeping

People from all the roles shared something about effective peacekeeping that related to the three main categories generated in this research – preventing violence, protecting people, and supporting local problem-solving or local ownership. However, there were differences here, in terms of emphasis, quantity and what I understood them to mean in their references.

The only people who described the use of weapons as the primary mechanism for effective peacekeeping were three soldiers who served in Bosnia. There appears to have been something about that experience, especially for the two who served in the transition period from UN to NATO, which developed a belief in the need for effective fire power and local decision making about its use as the most critical factor in effective peacekeeping. This was not modified by their later experiences in other missions, even if the situations were quite different. The attitude of other military peacekeepers toward weapons seemed to me more nuanced. Military personnel were more likely to focus on the need for acceptance as an element of being effective, as well as on a variety of activities that prevent violence, including disarmament. They tended to be oriented toward preventing violence between belligerents, more than preventing violence against civilians. Many talked about the centrality of establishing and using good relationships in order to accomplish these tasks. At the same time, a number emphasised the need for weapons for self-protection and/or to be taken seriously by various armed groups as elements of effectiveness. A number of them referred to their own role in negotiating or mediating between two or more belligerents to prevent active violence, or address problems such as roadblocks. Some of the military peacekeepers talked about the need to support local ownership or local leadership to achieve sustainable peace.

Most of the police interviewed in this research were from New Zealand.<sup>19</sup> As previously mentioned, the New Zealand police have a particular emphasis on community

---

<sup>19</sup> Of the 17 police interviewed, two were Australian, one was Swedish, and the rest were from New Zealand.

policing both at home and abroad.<sup>20</sup> Community policing focuses on supporting local people to identify and solve their problems. The police from other countries seemed to share this perspective, though not with the same emphasis. Thus it appeared that while police are focused on preventing violence and protecting people, many of the processes for doing so relate to engaging with the local community and/or supporting local problem-solving, rather than doing it themselves (reflecting in part at least their frequent role as mentors). Police tended to address preventing violence for the purpose of protecting people.<sup>21</sup> This reflects in part, the different contexts in which they deployed, though several had served in Timor Leste or the Solomon Islands during times of acute violence. They generally discussed efforts to prevent violence among gangs or identity based groups in the community. Only a few were involved in preventing violence between identified belligerents. Police talked about restoring sufficient law and order, safety, and confidence in the local police so that people could go about their daily lives. Only police reported being in consistent mentoring or training roles. Those who did serve as mentors identified the need for good relationships and an appropriate understanding of mentoring as critical factors in effective peacekeeping. Many also noted that they needed good relationships with local people based on trust, so that they could work together to prevent violence and protect people. They wanted to work with local leaders and local police to gain a local analysis of what needed to be done. A number of police spoke of the need for local ownership or local problem-solving for effective and sustainable interventions.

When discussing effective peacekeeping, civilians focused primarily on their particular component of the mission. Thus they concentrated on effectively supporting elections, revision of legal institutions and practices, or social and economic development, depending on their assignments. This focus on effective interventions aimed at changing institutional or government practices was similar to that of the police focus on law and order issues. Other than that particular overlap, civilians were responsible for quite different interventions than other peacekeepers. Civilians tended to perceive the sustainability of their work as dependent on local leadership and local ownership.

---

<sup>20</sup> See New Zealand training manual (New Zealand Police Community Policing Training Assistance Programme, 2010) made available to me by the New Zealand police.

<sup>21</sup> This is in line with differences in attitudes, training, skills and underlying purposes as described by Greener and Fish (2011).



UCP used phrases related to making space for local people to engage in their human rights and peace related work more often than other peacekeepers. There were some differences within the views of unarmed civilian peacekeepers, with some putting more emphasis on protecting people generally and others more on supporting local activists. Several referenced debates on this prioritisation within their own organisations. Preventing violence was discussed as primarily oriented toward protecting civilians. The interventions they described as preventing violence between groups were primarily focused on identity based groups, or between local groups and governmental forces represented by the army or police. UCP also discussed the need for long term relationships, and compared to the other peacekeeping roles placed the most stress on the need for interventions to support local actors, doing local work, as a condition for being effective.

### **Differences in understanding the use of force and nonviolence**

Some of the sharpest differences between the various categories of peacekeepers, is related to beliefs about the use of force, nonviolent interventions and the importance of relationships, though there was also a great deal of variation within each category and many shared beliefs and observations. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this is part of a fundamental difference between the organisations within which peacekeepers work, the motivations to become peacekeepers, and the training and socialisation of different peacekeepers. In important ways it leads them to construct the understanding of their work differently, based on assumptions about the efficacy of nonviolence on the one hand, or the efficacy of the use of weapons on the other. As Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis (2002) point out, different standpoints impact what is imagined to be possible. Situated in military peacekeeping, an entirely unarmed peacekeeping may seem impossible. Committed to nonviolent interventions, UCP question what can really be accomplished with weapons. These differences manifest in a variety of ways.

### Differences in purposes and doctrines

The UN Guidelines and Principles (2008, p. 13) state that “The United Nations was established to ‘save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’” and that peacekeeping has become one of the primary methods used by the UN for preventing war. The Guidelines also describe the use of peace enforcement, a higher level of military

coercion, to address threats to international peace and security, when authorised by the Security Council. The UN describes its purpose as addressing the prevention of war and the promotion of international peace, linking the use of force to peace and security. Mandates authorised by the Security Council, and the principles and practices described in the guidelines, are all said to flow from this fundamental orientation. In stated intention at least, the orientation of the UN is to prevent war and maintain peace with the lowest level of force to get the job done.

Different national militaries describe their purposes in their doctrines. The following quote is found in several of the military doctrines I reviewed, and says much about how these military organisations understand their purpose and the relationship between the use of force and peace. “Let him who desires peace, prepare for war” Vegetius, *De Re Militari*,iii,378 (Indian army headquarters army training command, 2004, p. 8). The Indian Army (*ibid* p.10) lists its purpose as including “Effectively project deterrence and dissuasion through the medium of strong, well-structured combat capability. Be prepared to engage in and conduct all types of military operations, singly or jointly, in the entire spectrum of conflict.” New Zealand military doctrine states:

By possessing the ability to conduct warfighting operations, the NZDF can conduct peace support operations and stability and support operations more effectively. Without an ability to successfully respond to an increasingly hostile environment approaching warfighting situations, military forces have a diminished capability to conduct operations that require a credible and effective military presence, such as peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. (New Zealand Defence Force, 2008 para 1.11)

This emphasis on being prepared to fight a war as the fundamental purpose of military forces sets them apart from the other categories of peacekeepers. It is seen by some as quite problematic as well, for becoming effective peacekeepers. Jelusic suggests the discrepancy between the military training to win a war by killing enemies and the work of peacekeepers can be seen as schizophrenic (Jelusic, 2007, p. 76). Sion’s research suggests that Swedish soldiers react to this discrepancy by perceiving peacekeeping as overly ‘feminine’ (2006). den Heyer (2011) discusses the orientation toward war as one among many reasons that police are better suited than soldiers for many post conflict peacekeeping tasks.

There are many different standpoints used in analysing the use of force in peacekeeping. Authors such as Whitworth (2005) and Hinojosa (2010) perceive the existence of the military as essential to specific norms and practices of masculinity, and view the behaviours of soldiers as reflecting these practices. Whitworth (2004) and Marten (2004) suggest that peacekeeping provides a reason for the continued existence of a military force in some countries, given the decreased likelihood of needing the military for national defence. Others suggest that the military is used to dominate and enforce the hegemony of the great powers, including the practice in peacekeeping (Cunliffe, 2012; Pugh, 2004).

Police departments on their public websites define their purpose with terms such as upholding or enforcing the law, preventing crime, and public or community safety.<sup>22</sup> This language identifies the focus of police as primarily internal to their country and as serving their communities through upholding the law. While police in many countries carry weapons, they do not discuss the use of force in describing their purpose.<sup>23</sup> The UN is working to develop an overarching police peacekeeping doctrine, but has not yet reached agreement on such a document (Peake, 2011). Greener (2009a) notes that police operate within their own national legal framework, and the legality of their use in international interventions, especially when they work directly as executive police in another country, is unclear in the absence of such a doctrine.

UCP organisations have very different purposes and mission statements than either military or police. PBI's mission statement focuses on addressing conflict through creating space for local, peaceful, nonviolent efforts.<sup>24</sup> The mission stresses the principles of non-partisan and non-interference in the organisations and people they accompany. NP understands its mission is "... to promote, develop and implement unarmed civilian peacekeeping as a tool for reducing violence and protecting civilians in situations of

---

<sup>22</sup> See websites for the New Zealand Police <http://www.police.govt.nz/about> Swedish police [www.upp.mai.gov.ro/Vault/upload/files/swedish\\_police.ppt](http://www.upp.mai.gov.ro/Vault/upload/files/swedish_police.ppt) and Western Australian police <http://www.police.wa.gov.au/Aboutus/tabid/893/Default.aspx> as examples. All accessed 10 August, 2013.

<sup>23</sup> See den Heyer (2011, p. 466) for a chart comparing military and police functions, skills and focus.

<sup>24</sup> See PBI website <http://www.peacebrigades.org/about-pbi/vision-and-mission/> accessed 10 August, 2013.

violent conflict.”<sup>25</sup> Embedded in their mission statement is a commitment to nonviolence and eschewing of the use of arms.

### Differences in mandates

The mandates for specific missions or projects are also quite different. Military, police and civilians are under the same overarching mandates in UN, NATO, EU or regional organisation missions such as RAMSI. These mandates tend to include instructions to implement some or all of the following components: implement ceasefires (where relevant), which may include monitoring; implement DDR; protect civilians and mission staff under imminent threats; deter violence in volatile areas; destroy weapons and prevent cross border arms trade; establish and maintain security for elections; facilitate humanitarian assistance; address human rights and gender based violence issues; and support transitional governments and constitutional development.<sup>26</sup>

The strategies or purposes of UCP interventions, which might be considered equivalent to mandates in the sense of articulating the overall goals of an intervention, are more limited and focused on protecting people and preventing violence, while supporting local individuals and organisations to work for peace and justice. This reflects both the limitations of their size and capabilities, as well as their overall orientation. For instance NP’s South Sudan project has a focus on protecting civilians, with a particular emphasis on protecting women and children.<sup>27</sup> At the same time they are working with local communities to defuse tensions and prevent violence, support local efforts to address underlying tensions, and teach people ways of protecting themselves. PBI’s project in Colombia describes itself in the following way:

The mission of PBI is to provide a protective space for the work of human rights defenders that suffer attacks as a result of their efforts in favour of human rights. PBI Colombia maintains a field presence, accompanying threatened individuals, communities and organisations. This physical accompaniment is complimented by elaborating and disseminating information about their risks and the work they are carrying out. In addition to this, PBI Colombia

---

<sup>25</sup> See <http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/about/mission>

<sup>26</sup> See Franke and Warnecke for a listing of all UN mandates for 69 missions since the end of the cold war.

<sup>27</sup> See NP website for documentation of the South Sudan project <http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/fieldwork/all-projects/south-sudan-project> accessed 10 August, 2013.

dialogues with civilian and military authorities, state institutions, accredited diplomatic corps present in Colombia, other NGOs, the Church, and international organisations—including the United Nations system—with the objective of informing about its presence and transmitting concerns about the situation of accompanied individuals, communities, and organisations.<sup>28</sup>

I suggest these differences in purpose and doctrines both create and reflect different standpoints from which to think about the use of force. While military and police believe it necessary to have weapons and military power as a threat or back up, UCP do not. The next section further explores these differences.

### Differences in understanding the use of force and nonviolence

Differences in motivation, training, purpose and focus were articulated in many different ways in the interviews, particularly related to the use or non-use, of force. Reflecting the absence of other opportunities, a number of military peacekeepers were motivated by a desire to practise their skills. Peacekeeping provided this opportunity. Their interest in using weapons beyond training situations might also incline them toward arguing for the necessity of this use. The discussion of being like elder generations in their families and carrying out their duties may also incline them in this direction. They are embedded in institutions that require a need for violence in order to continue, and which provide acceptable avenues for violent actions in certain circumstances. Potentially peacekeeping provides those circumstances. I assume that being embedded in organisations whose reason to exist involved the use of violence, and whose skills and practices are oriented to training people to kill, affected their thoughts about the use of weapons and violence in peacekeeping.<sup>29</sup> Military peacekeepers, perhaps for all these reasons as well as their specific contexts, described situations in which they believed their use of weapons was necessary to dominate particular belligerents and prevent further violence, for self-protection, or as a visible threat to prevent violence against themselves or civilians.

Many of the military peacekeepers however, also described experiencing a dilemma relating to the carrying of weapons as a show of the potential use of force and

---

<sup>28</sup> Quoted from PBI Colombia website <http://www.pbi-colombia.org/los-proyectos/pbi-colombia/sobre-pbi-colombia/?L=1> accessed 10 August, 2013.

<sup>29</sup> As mentioned in Chapter 8, this may be in part a so called weapons effect, whereby carrying weapons inclines a person toward more aggressive actions (Turner, Simons, Berkowitz, & Frodi, 1977).

making relationships (see Chapter Five). The dilemma arises because they see both as essential yet potentially contradictory. MAY talks about the tension between being close to local people versus staff security.

MAY: ...the security dilemma -- the need to be out in the community versus security, the threat wasn't as much then as it is now, but the physical risk of [harm to] staff versus being close to the local people.

Some military peacekeepers suggested the need for weapons depended on the context, in a sense holding local people responsible for their use of weapons. In general, they would not want to be without the potential for weapons. MAZ talks about the need for weapons related to the context in terms of stages in a peacekeeping mission.

MAZ: So, my opinion is, for the initial stages it is the armed peacekeepers and later stages the civilians take over. Although it is very difficult to draw a clear line between stages. Some kind of cooperation and coordination between these two organisations continues throughout different stages.

MBQ suggests the difference in being unarmed in Bougainville and armed in Afghanistan is related to the culture and level of threat, though the actual daily tasks were much the same.

MBQ: But the difference was quite different cultures [Afghanistan and Bougainville], one situation the threat was low and the other was quite high. In general terms if you were comparing the two soldiers, you would see one armed and one unarmed, but basic tasks were the same on a day to day basis, pretty much the same.

MAQ suggests that in Afghanistan, you must be armed to be seen as powerful and to get things done. He contrasts this with global north countries, where we treat each other nicely or the police show up.

MAQ: In my opinion, the Afghan society is used to so much violence, you can't get things done if you aren't prepared to use violence. They don't trust you to protect them, they won't think you are powerful enough, so your idea is no good... It can be hard for us to understand, we are used to our societies where people treat each other nice or else the police show up. But they are not used to this, there has been war for many years. They are not used to treating each other nicely, they are used to force... If you can't protect yourself, you are prey...

Police also tended to believe that there needed to be an option for the use of force, though it depended on context and purpose. The police shared more experiences with preventing violence without using force, and more examples of relying on local involvement to diffuse violence and protect people. PAI addresses the need for armed police in a riot squad, while PBG comments that in the early stages weapons are comforting to local people when in the right hands. He notes that later on people want police to wear a smiling face, not weapons.

PAI: That said, there is an appropriate response for some disorder, you always need a riot squad, the art is when to bring out. We try to talk first to get people to go home. But have the squad to clear it out if needed.

PBG: Talking to some of the community, especially in Timor, they wanted a controlling presence, and they actually liked the fact that the military was walking around, it made them feel safer, probably because the good guys have the guns... I felt that even in the Solomons, the community in post-conflict wanted to see police and soldiers with the bang bangs because they felt these are the good guys and they have the weapons to make us safe. But with most communities, after a while, you would get people, just as you mention, if the local cop comes to talk with them, they don't want a Robocop to show up, they want a smiling face, it has to be in parallel with what is happening in society at that point in time.

PCH describes working unarmed in Timor Leste before the elections, and some of the tactics they used to successfully protect themselves and other UN staff under extraordinary pressure and risk.

PCH: We went from being a fully armed SWAT team [before deployment], to being told to leave everything behind, we went in as a tactical team...we didn't take our side arms, we left behind our bulletproof vests, and batons and spray and even handcuffs. [How did you provide security without weapons?] We did a lot of talking to people, with our hands up, just talking, getting people to stop, to slow down. We mediated events... Things moved slower, you had to talk to someone, who introduced you to someone, who introduced you to the militia, or a new commander. We would explain that this will look bad if you do this, it will make the Indonesian government and President look bad if you do this. Lots of meetings, sit down and talk, we didn't have UN muscle to push things through. We knew this was the one chance for the Timorese to vote, if we stuffed it up, it would stay as is. We had to come up with alternatives, to convince people if you do this, it will make your supervisor look bad, sometimes we would

go back through our supervisors in Dili, to lean on their people, through their leadership. A lot of time was spent talking to people with our hands up in the air, with guns or machete or knives, pointed at us, lots of time talking, and looking unthreatening.

With the growing presence of police in peacekeeping missions, there is greater attention being paid to the differences between police and military peacekeepers, and the need for greater delineation of their respective roles, improved coordination, and clarity of command structure (Greener & Fish, 2011). Several police spoke of the differences between police and military peacekeepers, often emphasising their different use of force as part of what they saw as their greater orientation toward good relationships with local people. The phrase ‘we were not seen as a threat’ was used by several. PCK enumerates the differences between police and the army and why police are better for peacekeeping.

PCK: We are not seen as a threat. We are not carrying firearms, we are badged as police, and not wearing army uniforms. We do business differently, we are not so regimented, we understand the rule of law, proper police [he is distinguishing this from FPU police], we understand security sector reform. The police can't work without a functioning judiciary and correction services. We know how to work with children, how to work with civilians. We are civilian... Our rules of engagement are different, the police use of force is totally different than the army. The police are all about protecting life and property. The military is about fighting wars, and their training is for that. Our training is about protecting life and property, these are our principles.

Both military and police peacekeepers did mention benefits to being unarmed at times (see discussion in the next chapter as well). PAI notes that guns can be intimidating which inhibits gathering information, MBI shares his experience of being more accepted when he was unarmed.

PAI: Sitting down one on one, talking to a person, a villager, having tea. As soon as you have 4 to 5 police with guns, interrogating this villager, they build up resistance, it intimidates villagers, they don't talk.

MBI: When I used to go to the villages, like normally I was in the military, but people do not prefer to see a stranger approaching to you, an armed stranger approaching to you, a stranger with a weapon. When I had no weapons, I could access people, people had confidence at the first sight... People used to welcome us more, but if you are there with a weapon, you are looked at in a different way. People used to think about it before talking with you ... Which is very true, that is what I have found myself. You



could just walk into their house, their room. They would call you and invite you in ...

PCL perceives being unarmed in his work to disarm militants in the Solomon Islands, as giving them access they would not otherwise have, because they were not a threat. This repeats the perception stated by MBI and many of the UCP.

PCL: We were unarmed, which was good, so we could move among the militants, we weren't a threat to anyone because we were unarmed, that allowed us access.

M/UAT echoes that the lack of confidence related to being in uniform, may undermine relationships that facilitate gathering information.

M/UAT: Once you arrive with a uniform and a gun, even in civilian engagement, you are still a soldier, and all that means to people, even if you don't pull a trigger. You don't inspire people's confidence. Even if you only have a pistol, it affects women and children... And armed peacekeeping, you won't get as much information as [UCP] get, civilians won't share with them, whether UN or not.

UCP are committed to nonviolence. I assume this commitment shapes how they understand and make meaning of their experiences, and what they imagine is possible. They describe ways in which they believe nonviolence allows them to do things that would not be possible if they were armed, in terms of both the situations in which they can operate and interactions with people. They describe their perceptions that they are safer without weapons. They discuss ways in which they use relationships and various nonviolent tactics, to prevent violence and protect people. Their commitment to nonviolence is an essential principle and value in their work, so they were generally not open to thinking about how they might use force. However, several were able to imagine interventions that would use both military and UCP peacekeepers, though without a lot of thought about what this might mean beyond some logistical concerns. UAF notes they were able to intervene in situations because they were unarmed, and not part of a formal intervention. Otherwise the government would not have accepted them.

UAF: I don't think you can have an organisation committed to nonviolence and carry arms. Why nonviolence? For a very practical reasons, no government would sanction an armed group in its country, doing what we did. Where there are armed peacekeepers, either there is no functioning state, or so much pressure on the state to accept them... If we had been armed, it

would invite an armed response, more violence. We got lots of paperwork and comments, but not violence.

UAM stresses being unarmed gave them credibility, protection and a moral high ground.

UAM: It gives us a lot of credibility. Talking to governments, or to the military, how threatening can we be, really, if we are not trying to impose our beliefs, or our will, through armed force. Also you are avoiding certain kinds of conflicts and everyone knows that we are unarmed, it affords a certain kind of protection. And we told everyone that we didn't have arms, sure we were robbed, but that would've happened anyway. It gave us a very strong, moral high ground.

UAJ describes a situation when being unarmed and not a threat to anyone, was essential to defusing tensions.

UAJ: Recently there was a situation somewhere, where the military component [of a monitoring mission], led by soldiers, they went to a certain community, on a fact finding mission, ... as soon as they arrived with small arms, pistols on their waist, they were threatened. People threatened to pelt them, throw stones at them, thinking they are part of the military, and they are trying to manipulate suspicion... the local people didn't even allow them to sit down. So they just went back in their vehicles and drove off... We arrived there, the situation was quite different. We arrived there with local national monitors, we talked to the people... When we came in, we were civilians, and sat down, worked out what the problem was, why the soldiers were not allowed in. In that area they are not comfortable seeing military around, they have declared their area a zone of peace. So you see how unarmed civilian peacekeeping have a leverage over armed military peacekeeping personnel, this is simply because we don't pose any imminent threat to anybody on sight just by our own presence of our bodies, this is how I explain it.

M/UAT imagines the possibility of both armed and unarmed peacekeepers in the same UN mission.

M/UAT: There's room for both kinds of peacekeeping missions. Maybe in time we will have a UN mission with unarmed civilian peacekeepers working hand in hand, with a liaison officer in both wings, talking to each other.

Civilian peacekeepers did not comment much on the question of the use of force. Presumably those who had worked in more than one mission (which includes CBA

quoted below) accepted the necessity for some military presence and possibly appreciated the protection provided. The comments below do not question the presence or necessity of military, rather CBA addresses concerns about damage done by what might be understood as the misuse of military violence, when military interventions killed civilians.

CBA: And I have to say that the civilian casualties by aerial misfire, upset us in the UN family a great deal, they undermined the peace efforts, it was very unfortunate. Of course the UN High Commissioner made statements, repeated statements that civilian casualties have to be avoided at all costs, but they still kept happening, it undermined the UN efforts there considerably. Because when civilians get killed, and there is a blurring of the role of military and UN, that happened toward the later part, in the minds of the people, ordinary Afghans -- so that was unfortunate... The human rights officers say, what are we doing there, you feel, you lose faith in your own efforts, you feel how can you explain it to anyone, it is something you cannot explain, nor justify to anyone, that was a big problem there.

## **Conclusion**

The former peacekeepers interviewed for this research, differed in other ways.<sup>30</sup> In addition to differences already discussed, the peacekeepers differed in terms of the locations where they served; the stages of the conflict they were within; the specific jobs and tasks they were assigned; and their specific ethnic backgrounds. I am not discussing these because there were so few in each category and also because I did not find these categories related to how peacekeepers understood effective peacekeeping. Given these many differences it was quite surprising and significant to me how similarly peacekeepers described their work and how they understood effective peacekeeping. This explains why I have primarily constructed my analysis focused on these shared activities and perspectives. However, as I discuss in the next chapter and Conclusion, these differences take on particular importance or salience in terms of my theorising on the potential for robust relational peacekeeping.

Combining the perspectives of peacekeepers from such widely disparate organisations is, I think, one of the strengths of this thesis. I previously mentioned my

---

<sup>30</sup> See chart in Chapter Two for a summary of peacekeepers interviewed and Appendix A for further descriptions.

surprise at the similarity between peacekeepers and it strengthens the findings that so many peacekeepers shared perspectives. At the same time it is important not to gloss over differences, not to stretch the generalisations too far given the limitations of the research. I have tried to stay grounded in the interview material but again acknowledge that what I write is influenced by my standpoint, and my interest in envisioning peacekeeping beyond its current practices.

As discussed in this chapter, there were many differences between peacekeepers. Peacekeepers from differing roles have somewhat different motivations and receive different training. Many of those who served in multiple missions had a particular orientation toward the importance of relationships in peacekeeping. The views of global north military peacekeepers seems to reflect many cultural assumptions and opinions shared more widely between people in the global north toward those in the south. I heard in the Māori a softer global north, or perhaps a mixed north/south standpoint with somewhat different assumptions. Women in the military and police have some different experiences of peacekeeping, in terms of what they can and cannot do, and they experience this as strengths or limitations, but in any case, conditions which must be accepted to do their work. Women may have particular challenges in a primarily masculine organisational culture.

Peacekeepers within large multi-lateral organisations are embedded in quite different processes than UCP. The commitment to the use of force and the connection to larger international processes working on instituting a particular model of global governance, are deep, significant differences with the smaller INGOs committed to nonviolence and supporting local ownership. Not surprisingly armed and unarmed peacekeepers think about the use of force quite differently. While interventions by third parties of any type are political, I believe that unarmed civilian peacekeeping demonstrates the potential to intervene actively in communities to prevent violence and protect people, without promoting a larger political liberal peace agenda. While it might not always be possible to do so nonviolently, military peacekeepers caution about the need to use force appropriately, and recognize the limitations to the use of force as it can, at times, undermine achieving the kinds of relationships thought essential for achieving long term sustainability. These differing experiences with the use of force inform my theorising in the next chapter.

The next chapter explores the consistent and pervasive theme of the importance of relationships. I relate this to various literature on relationships and the views of peacekeepers, attending to both the similarities and differences between military and unarmed civilian peacekeepers.

## **Chapter Eight Relationships in peacekeeping**

This chapter focuses on the centrality of relationships in peacekeeping primarily based on peacekeepers' perceptions. I did not find this concern mentioned in critical peace studies literature. Therefore this chapter discusses analysis from other frameworks, sensitised by constructivist and critical peace concerns. Relationships are rarely addressed in traditional peacekeeping literature, though they are understood to be important in the UCP literature. Given this, I begin this chapter with an elaboration of how peacekeepers understood relationships as one of the most important factors in effective peacekeeping, rather than beginning with literature as in other chapters. Relationships are the context in which all other actions take place, be they coercive or cooperative, and the vehicle by which peacekeeping has impact. As the literature on relationships in peacekeeping is quite sparse, I then relate peacekeepers' views on how relationships work in the peacekeeping context to wider literature on relationships and in particular social capital and trust as this holds useful sensitising concepts. Peacekeeping relationships tend to be task oriented and move within a range of mistrustful, coercive, and disparate interests to relationships characterised by trust, shared interests and cooperation, and everything in between. They tend to encompass both formal and informal aspects, and are multidirectional. They function in contexts of conflict affected communities where violence has challenged trust and connections. Robust relationships, able to withstand the stress and strain of coercion, cooperation and other types of challenges, appear to me to be an essential missing element in the discussion of robust peacekeeping. Constructed from material discussed throughout this thesis, I theorise about what contributes to effective relationships and conclude by envisioning a potentially more emancipatory evolution of peacekeeping, disconnected from the liberal peace agenda, and based on robust relationships and oriented toward fundamental purposes of preventing violence and protecting people.

### **Relationships prevent violence, protect people and support local problem-solving**

One of the most surprising aspects of my research was the frequent mention of relationships as central to effective peacekeeping. Reflecting on this, it makes sense to

me, in that much of human endeavour takes place within relational fields.<sup>1</sup> Peacekeeping is no exception. Perhaps the foregrounding of relationship by recent peacekeepers reflects the changed practices of peacekeeping. While traditional peacekeeping tended to focus on observing a ceasefire at a physical border, today's peacekeepers primarily work in communities, in direct contact with others. Their understanding of peacekeeping reflects their involvement with the everyday actions of local life (Darby, 2009b; Higate & Henry, 2009b; Mitchell, 2011; Richmond, 2009a). The initial section below provides examples of how peacekeepers think about relationships in their work. It is followed by sections which analyse various dimensions of relationships.

In Chapter Two, I discussed peacekeepers' perceptions of relationships in peacekeeping as one of the themes generated from the research interviews. To recap, peacekeepers work to build relationships within their own organisation, with local authorities, local leaders in civil society, local people, and with belligerents as well as supporting relationships between different parties to the conflict and different parts of society. For instance, different peacekeepers described relationships with local government authorities such as mayors or the chief of police, with village chiefs and community elders, and with militia leaders and national military personnel. Some also talked about their work to establish good relationships with local people in the communities and IDP or refugee camps where they worked as well as with local civil society activists. They describe good relationships as being characterised by trust, mutual benefit and cooperation. Although friendships may develop, peacekeeping relationships are primarily task oriented, focused on preventing violence, protecting people and supporting local ownership. It takes time to build relationships, they are not one time occurrences.<sup>2</sup> Thus while primarily task oriented, over time these relationships may not only include socio-emotional aspects, but developing friendships and a sense of mutuality may be a critical component depending on specific contexts and individuals. Peacekeepers view relationships as core processes for keeping peace, as reflected in a series of excerpts below. MBP and PBK both address assignment duration. MBP notes

---

<sup>1</sup> My theorising on the centrality of relationships is quite similar to Lederach's discussion of the centrality of relationships for peacebuilding in his book *The Moral Imagination* (Lederach, 2005, pp. 34-35), which I discovered toward the end of this project.

<sup>2</sup> Mac Ginty (2008) makes this point, that in many societies on-going relationships are critical, that decisions are made through on-going processes, not at one time meetings.

that there is a connection between maintaining relationships and staff turnover, so that his organisation works to keep staff in the field longer.

MBP: So, the DoD [Department of Defence] saw that relationships were so important they made this [longevity of staff] their priority program. So even at the DoD level, at least in [my country], they see relationships as extremely important.

PBK suggests making a difference is connected to spending more time in one place.

PBK: I suppose, it is really hard to make a difference, because you weren't there for long enough time, I suppose if I had spent my whole time at one post, I could have made a difference with that little community.

MBL shares a situation which is a mixture of using weapons and coercive interactions with cooperative interactions, revealing the necessity of good relationships for overall progress.

MBL: So I basically sent out patrols, try to dominate the terrain, and those patrols were then accompanied by some of the substantive component members, initially mainly from political affairs, but also military observers to try and establish contact with the different rebel groupings to get talks on the go, and see if we could get them to go through the DDRRR process for the external rebels, and for the internal rebels to try to get them to comply with the DDR concept... Obviously, if you have a good relationship with the specific rebel leader, he is much more open to you, much more positively disposed toward you. It means you'll be able to operate in that specific area, you will be able to approach them without being shot at, etc etc. The deeper the relationship develops, the more keen they will be to listen to what you want to accomplish, to listen to what you want to say. But it is obvious the better that the relationships are with the people that you work with, the better progress you will make for sure.

Relationships appear to be critical as they are the field in which all aspects of gathering, analysing, understanding and using information occurs. This occurs with the people in communities, government institutions, media, diplomats and all other audiences. MBI addresses the connection between information, relationships and effectiveness.

MBI: Information is very important, that is how you can plan your future operations, and this is what you get from local people. If



there is a communication gap, if people lose hope and there is a communication gap, and then the gap starts to widen and then people do not cooperate with you and then slowly you cannot perform effectively.

UAM gives an example of how using their relationships with local people allows them to support information sharing, which helps with repatriation.

UAM: So we brought the local groups to the table, literally invited them to the OCHA meetings, so they would get to know the international actors and share their information, which was incredibly valuable. They started to arrange clandestine visits, and help IOM [International Organisation for Migration] find the people who wanted to go home, and help slip them out of the camps at night without soldiers being able to rally militias to stop them. So people started to be repatriated.

One way to view preventing violence and protecting people, whether through cooperative or coercive interactions, is as relational processes. These may be relationships between individual people, groups or institutions, though ultimately it is individual people who act (see next section for further analysis). Peacekeepers understand that relationships, once established, need to be maintained. One of the critical elements mentioned by peacekeepers, which helps to maintain good relationships, is working with people so they understand the possibilities and limits of the intervention. Peacekeepers note that good relationships, characterised by trust, also provide protection to the peacekeepers. UAF reflects that knowing the context and language improves their security and being unarmed ensures relationships based on trust.

UAF: But maybe what I get out of these experiences is that by having better understanding of the context, by being able to speak the language and interact with people, you could have a really good impact on your own security. And the fact you work with local organisations in the area, being unarmed was important to ensure a relationship based on trust.

M/UAT links being nonpartisan to being accepted, and both to community action to protect peacekeepers.

M/UAT: But also it's a security issue, if the community accepts you, they will look after you, they will give you early warning, mark your car, they will tell you if you step outside what they see as being nonpartisan in the situation, and they will, if they really accept you.

MBL addresses the need to maintain relationships and the challenges to doing so not only with people externally, but also internally within his own organisation.

MBL: Well it is 100% great, but you have to distinguish, in the first place you don't have good relationships necessarily and automatically with rebel groupings and, how shall I say, the people that are subjected to the peace making process. You have to establish both and maintain these all the time. And you have to go about it very creatively, you know, it is not like it is a normal situation, it is not a normal society... And once you have established good relationships, you have to maintain it. And all those things you have to do in an environment where you have a lot of multinational people, each with their own culture, each with their own way of doing business, each with their own national temperament, etc. versus the people that you work with who are in very difficult circumstances and you have to go about your business in that way.

PBN gives an example of how relationships are used to prevent violence in both the community and in a detention centre where she later worked, conveying the sense of mutuality.

PBN: ..hearing there was going to be some kind of violence between this village and that village, our local police and internationals would be able to go to that chief and say, we understand there is some kind of problem with that village, and then we would be able to get this chief to go visit that chief and sit down and have a meeting, and those chiefs would be able to quell the violence...[there were] 50 gang members in the cells at one time, all from one village, and they were starting to threaten my staff and they threatened to get violent with us, so we contacted their village chief and told him about this, he came into the cells and addressed them all and said this is how it is going to be, you know, act appropriately and all those kinds of things. And from there on, while they were in our custody there were no problems... So we know building relationships with locals means they come to us and we go to them.

Once relationships are built with different sectors of society, as well as other organisations in the area, peacekeepers say they can help connect people to needed resources such as training, aid, or legal support. They describe leveraging personal relationships they have made within and between organisations. They may support new networks, or help bridge local people to higher levels of authority. Though their own relationships are important, some also view the relationships they help to nurture between different sectors and local actors as more important in the long run.

UAG narrates how supporting local organisations to come together in a network and build working relationships is later used to prevent violence spreading to their area.

UAG: It was the first time in a long time, they're actually talking, sharing phone numbers, network and share information, talk about the tensions on the upcoming elections. There were regional elections, there was violence all over, but in the old time hotspot, it was completely calm, the information sharing network halted the kidnapping of one man, he came back. There was no shooting and no burning.

PAI shares an example of how having good relationships provides timely information to prevent escalation of violence.

PAI: ...making friendships at the grassroots level, not necessarily with the mayor, but with influential people in the community, say the head man of a social group.... we started to make good inroads to IDP camps. They were always the flash points to violence. We showed we weren't afraid to go there, find the right person, establish friendships, then when things festered, we could stamp it out before it got going.

UAJ shares an example of how relationships can both deter violence and how the process can be done in a way that supports local people co-owning the process.

UAJ: This becomes the norm, a relationship, you find if there is an issue, the leader will call, say the military is occupying a school, and they want our help to discuss, or someone drives them away from their rice field, at harvest time, what should they do. We discuss this together, come up with a strategy, come up with an action plan, community members are involved with us, who will do what.

And MBQ addresses the need to support connections between local people and local authorities because peacekeepers are transient and the solutions must be developed locally.

MBQ: Yes you are there for a period of time, you do what you can, you establish that relationship, but the solution very much lies with the local people and it isn't the relationship you have with the local village elder or head man, it is relationships he or she has with the national government or provincial government or district commander or whatever. We talk about relationships but it is not the relationship with the foreigner coming in, it is the relationships between the key players on the ground in the nation state. In terms of what I have to do, I can do it if I have good

relationships, I can do my job, but my mission, my task is actually secondary to the institutions and arrangements in the country. We are very transient.

Peacekeepers suggest that good relationships are more likely when peacekeepers are accepted, and being accepted opens doors for further relationship. Being nonpartisan is seen as important for being accepted and for having good relationships. Good relationships are seen to provide the possibility of influencing belligerents through trust and some degree of shared interests, not only via coercion. UAJ talks about how being actively present and engaging, builds relationships, which builds confidence in their non-partisanship, which leads to being able to affect the actions of all parties of an on-going conflict.

UAJ: This is something you have to encourage, when we do peacekeeping it is about building confidence and relationships, the more comfortable I am with you, the more I will buy your ideas, will support what you do, be interested in what you do... there is regular briefing of the government and non-state actors... This legitimises the work we do and we get support from the government and non-state [armed] actors. If you really engage them well, it really plays well with our work on the ground... When we engage them more, we become so more nonpartisan, our non-partisanship will play so strongly, you find that your presence will be so much welcome by all parties, so the issues that might arise concerning our own intervention, concerning our own understanding of what is happening on the ground, will be so appreciated, and if there is a criticism to either party, it will be taken with some positiveness.

Relationships are understood to be facilitated by contact with local authorities, belligerents and civilians. Being out and about or even living in the community, knowing the language, being accessible, can all contribute to good relationships. This echoes Howard's highlighting the need of an integrative relationship with the host community, in successful peacekeeping missions (Howard, 2008). It also echoes Darby (2009b) and Richmond (2009b) talking about the need to attend to the everyday experiences of life in local communities. UBD talks about the advantage of living in the community to develop relationships and deep knowledge about the context.

UBD: Being on the ground in a community experiencing human rights violations and violence, for me and the team, we had deep knowledge... at least we had a better understanding from living in such places, not just living in the capital, though that was

important too, but being based there in the community was important. It allowed us to build relationships in the communities.

MAY links going out in the community with getting information and knowing how the mission is going.

MAY: We lived in the community for about six months and you are out in it every day. You can tell what is going on, you can assess the mood of the people, when you develop relationships with individuals in the community, you can swap confidences and true comments with each other, you get a pretty accurate assessment of how the mission is doing otherwise.

Some peacekeepers shared their experience that spending time in the community playing games and other shared activities, led to relationships which contributed to preventing violence. PBF addresses this, noting that he encouraged staff to spend time in the community, which led to increased cooperation.

PBF: If you are walking through a neighbourhood you say hi, maybe play a quick game of soccer with the kids, they would love it, remember you, build trust and confidence. After three months of that we realised that people were coming in and reporting thefts and domestic violence.

### Relationships in peacekeeping literature

While the building and use of relationships has been a key feature in the theorising on nonviolent peacekeeping,<sup>3</sup> the discussion of force and the appropriate use of force are more central in the recent literature on multidimensional peacekeeping,<sup>4</sup> with very little mention of relationships. One valuable exception is Johnstone's discussion of peacekeeping as a relational contract (see Chapter Four for a more detailed discussion), and his application of relational contract theory to issues of maintaining consent (Johnstone, 2011b). He points out that as peacekeeping is a relational process, the initial consent and context will change over time. Relational contract theory prioritises maintaining workable relationships rather than a one-time contract in business situations where all the aspects of a contract cannot be anticipated and a good relationship will be as

---

<sup>3</sup> See Mahony and Eguren (1997), Schirch (2006), Mahony (2006), Wallace (2010) and Wallis (2010). Also personal communication C. Schweitzer (February 2013).

<sup>4</sup> See Fortna (2008a) and Hegre, Hultman and Nygard (2010) for example, though Howard (2008) and Higate and Henry (2009a) are exceptions.

important in on-going work, as anything else. His application of this theory to peacekeeping seems quite fruitful, highlighting that a peace process is not only a contract or agreement with elites, but in order to be effective must also include a sense of contract with all people as well. It will involve formal and informal agreements. And whatever the initial agreements may be, conditions and circumstances will change, so that the success of a mission will depend on evolving interpretations of an initial agreement. Peacekeepers, while not using contractual language, provide examples of how to do this.

As mentioned in the introduction, one of the assumptions which motivated this research was my previous belief in the superiority of unarmed peacekeeping. Although this research did not confirm this assumption, it does raise some important points regarding the impact on relationships of being armed or unarmed, which also relates to the use of coercive, violent relationships or cooperative, trusting relationships. Several former military peacekeepers spoke of their dilemmas of carrying and using weapons in self-defence versus making relationships. Several UCP spoke of their experience that being unarmed made them feel safer, less a target, and gave them access to belligerents and civilians they would not have had otherwise. This was echoed by several military peacekeepers who had served as unarmed observers. Several police spoke of their experiences of being armed in some situations and unarmed in others. Thus the question which emerged for further research was to understand in what situations the risk of being unarmed outweighs the potentially greater advantage of not carrying weapons, and what that implies for decisions about when to intervene and how. Unarmed military, police and civilians were able to accomplish a great deal without weapons. Most implied or stated (the exceptions being three military peacekeepers who had served in the Balkans) that relationships were more important in the long run than weapons, and that weapons could get in the way of relationships if they were carried when not needed, carried improperly, or when peacekeepers ‘showed off’ with them. Last (1997) and Sartre (2011) are examples of authors with military peacekeeping experience who address the limits of the use of force, although they do not directly discuss the implications for relationships.<sup>5</sup> The issue of being armed or unarmed is related to the literature in the previous discussion of the use of military versus police or civilians (see Chapters Three and Seven). Several peacekeepers pointed out that the military is trained to kill and win, and much of the

---

<sup>5</sup> Though Last (1997), as previously mentioned, considers tasks that are relational, such as negotiation, to be the offensive peacekeeping action.

relational work of peacekeeping might be better done by others. That said, it seemed (as described in further sections), that cooperative relationships were seen as more effective. And coercion can be accomplished through presence or the threat of sanctions without using weapons, so all peacekeepers needed to think about the impact of the use of coercive practices on the potential for cooperative relationships. These questions of understanding when the risks outweigh the benefits of being unarmed, whether the short term need for coercion outweighs the long term need for cooperation, who should do peacekeeping, what best promotes relationships, and how this changes as the context changes all seem well worth further study.

Peacekeepers reported that in order to support sustainable change, they worked to build and maintain cooperative, trusting, mutually beneficial relationships with belligerents and local people, building confidence in peacekeepers and in local people themselves to solve their own problems. Mahony (2006) and Wallis (2010) both discuss how to use relationships to protect civilians, but their primary frame is on deterring harm to civilians. While my research aligns with their findings and models, my findings expand the scope to see that all kinds of peacekeepers focus on relationships, not just UCP,<sup>6</sup> and not only for protection, but for violence prevention more broadly and local ownership as well. Other theories and military doctrines reviewed in Chapter Five discuss main elements of peacekeeping that require relationships such as: information gathering and analysis; encouraging the participation of moderates in political processes; disarming and demobilising combatants; negotiation; observing and monitoring; internal factors such as leadership and coordination; promoting or supporting local ownership; and even basic logistics like setting up bases. But there is a gap in the literature, in that the actual process of creating and maintaining relationships is not highlighted in most literature which analyses how military peacekeeping works.

### **Peacekeeping and relationship theories**

The literature reviewed in the next three sections is mostly developed within a positivist, and frequently quantitative, social science framework. This literature contains a number of sensitising concepts which I found useful though I understand it from within a broadly constructivist framework. I include this literature not because it speaks universal

---

<sup>6</sup> While Mahony has interviewed people from a wide variety of roles, including military observers, they were all unarmed.

truth about relationships, but because it provided some guidance and direction to my own processes of constructing and theorising about relationships.

Relationship is a word in common usage that carries many meanings. Reis, Collins and Berscheid (2000) summarising recent research in the area they term relationship science, suggest that interpersonal relationships are about the interactions between two or more people, where these interactions can influence each other. They note that relationships are core to human life and much of our action takes place within relationships.

Although discussing peacebuilding, Lederach (2005, p. 34) also uses the phrase ‘centrality of relationships’ and describes relationships as both the context of peacebuilding and the source of generative energy to build peace in communities that have suffered great violence. He notes “At the cutting edge of fields from nuclear physics and biology to systems theory and organisational development, relationships are seen as the central organising concept of theory and practice.” Lederach uses the imagery of webs of relationships as the field in which peacebuilding occurs and which it must affect.

Relationships can be understood according to various typologies and categorisations. Building on previous work in the field and with a concern with conflict, Deutsch (2011b) developed a typology of social relationships based on what he terms types of interdependence constructed out of a number of dimensions (pp. 248-249). By interdependence, he means the degree to which people either need each other to mutually achieve their goals, or the degree to which the achievement of one person or group’s goals depends on the failure to achieve the goals of the other. In other words how much do the actions of one affect the other. Interdependence does not necessarily imply cooperative or beneficial interdependence, as Deutsch developed this typology as part of exploring conflict among people. He uses the term negative interdependence for competitive relationships.

The following discussion is based on applying Deutsch’s typology to peacekeeping. It may be helpful to think of peacekeeping with these concepts, in order to better understand what kind of relationships are implied by peacekeepers’ desire for ‘good’ relationships. Yet the structure and language of categories and typologies implies dichotomies and distinctions that are often blurred or unclear and perhaps obscure the



ways in which peacekeeping relationships, even between the same two people, change and evolve over time and as needed.

Deutsch (2011b, p. 250) suggests that relationships can be thought of in two overarching categories of socio-emotional or task-oriented. Socio emotional relationships tend toward the intimate, more personal, more informal type of relationships. Task-oriented relationships, as reflected in the phrase, are oriented toward getting specific tasks accomplished. While Deutsch notes there is a continuum, he nonetheless tends to classify relationships as one or the other. I have considered peacekeeping as more task oriented, given its purposes. That is, peacekeeping relationships are created and maintained for the purpose of preventing violence, protecting people and supporting local ownership. However, listening to peacekeepers, it appears that in order to get some tasks done, with some people, in some circumstances, it is important to pay attention to the emotional, more informal and even friendship aspect of a relationship. And even if not required by the task, friendships do develop sometimes. This was discussed in particular in terms of mentoring relationships, where peacekeepers mentor other police or military, with co-workers, and in terms of building more personal connections with many different kinds of people in communities. Cross cultural interaction further complicates the experience of relationship in peacekeeping. In my experience in Sri Lanka, I learned that what is considered appropriate task oriented behaviours in one culture, may not be in another.

Deutsch describes a number of other dimensions along dichotomous lines, which combine to produce specific categories. These include cooperation versus competition, equal versus asymmetrical power, formal versus informal, and intensity of importance. He notes that a number of other dimensions appear in the literature, including temporary vs. long term, voluntary versus involuntary, public versus private, as well as the number of people involved in a relationship (Deutsch, 2011b, p. 249).

Before applying these concepts to peacekeeping relationships, I will stress again that relationships in peacekeeping are in flux. Peacekeeping relationships are initiated and maintained with people from governments, local military and police, other belligerent groups, and all sorts of groups and individuals. Peacekeepers report believing they have more power in some situations but experience having less power in other situations. They may have both formal and informal aspects of a relationship with people, and whatever dimension is under consideration, it evolves over time. Deutsch developed these

categories from a particular interest in conflict resolution. And yet even a basic judgment of a peacekeeping related relationship as conflictual or cooperative appears to change over time and context, and may be both at the same time. Equally significant, perceptions of the degree of cooperation may be different between peacekeepers and the other people and groups with whom they are relating.

In line with the focus on local ownership and sustainable peace discussed in Chapter Six, peacekeepers describe striving to have cooperative relationships. Cooperative relationships are thought to have a preponderance of common goals, while conflictual or competitive relationships give disparate goals more salience or weight. Coleman et al (2012) elaborate a model of conflictual or cooperative relationships, noting that the degree of cooperation or conflict will fluctuate over time and depends significantly on context. The experience of cooperation in peacekeeping may relate to both the practice of local ownership and the enactment of acceptance, both of which are important to peacekeepers. It would appear that when peacekeepers are supporting local problem-solving through local efforts, there is likely to be a higher degree of shared goals. Similarly, it is possible that the perception of shared goals is a significant component of acceptance. When local people perceive peacekeepers as acting to support their goals, rather than imposing other and perhaps conflicting goals, it may lead to actions which peacekeepers understand as acceptance. And this contributes to cooperation and trust while in turn providing peacekeepers more potential to appropriately support local efforts, in a positively reinforcing cycle. Although Wallace (2010, pp. 10-11) suggests that UCP can use relationships for both transformative and coercive purposes, and thinks military peacekeeping only has coercive options, it appears that all types of peacekeeping have potential for developing cooperative relationships which hold potential to support the transformation of underlying dynamics. At core, peacekeepers mostly believed they should strive to support local processes to transform conflicts.

Two other dimensions of relationship highlighted by Deutsch (2011b) and Coleman et al (2012) that also seem important in peacekeeping relationships are equality or power, and the importance of the goals and the relationship's ability to impact them. Starting with the second, some relationships have shared or oppositional goals regarding issues that are of little importance. In other relationships the goals are of more or high importance, but the relationship may have little ability to achieve these goals. Applying this to peacekeeping, it would seem likely that peacekeeper's goals to prevent physical

harm and stop armed conflict would be shared by many in the community, and would be of high importance. But presumably this goal would not be shared by all, as some groups may believe they need to continue to use physical violence to achieve their desired outcomes. Other goals currently involved in many peace support missions, such as government reforms, elections or developing free market economies, may have less or no shared interest with local people, or be of a lower priority than their physical safety or basic welfare. Conversely some local groups may have goals related to dominating through the use of armed violence, forcing particular ethnic groups to move, or profiting from a no war no peace situation, that are not shared by peacekeepers. And it may be that while shared, some aspects or goals are of less importance to particular people and groups, such as playing sports together. Again, these are not fixed points, but the degree of importance and mutuality will vary over time and context.

The dimension of equality or power seems of particular importance in understanding how relationships are central in effective peacekeeping. The dimension of equality in Deutsch's (2011b) typology is described as power by Coleman et al (2012). Recognising the complexity of the concept and its many usages, Coleman et al (2012, p. 19) explain "...we focus on parties' perceptions of relative power and define it specifically as the relative degree to which the parties believe they can affect each other's goals and outcomes." They note that these perceptions are fluid and reflect many different but simultaneous aspects of relationship.

The above definition of power has some useful application to peacekeeping relationships. Armed peacekeepers with the weight of the UN or other multi-lateral institution behind them, nonetheless described themselves as unable to fully reach their goals, whether shared or not with local people. It seems they perceived themselves as having insufficient power to fully achieve goals they believed were important. It also seemed to reflect a sense that others had greater power to resist or undermine their work. A few of the phrases which I interpreted this way included: 'we didn't make a difference' or 'we didn't make much difference'; 'we can give them tools but it is up to them what they will use'; "you can never have enough force"; "only when people cooperate... could we deploy"; "when people lose faith... the mission isn't renewed"; 'under the UN we felt impotent'; 'we saved a few lives but didn't make a larger impact'. Typical of these comments, U/CAG in a sense downplays the importance of the absence of war, implying

that the EU should have made more of a difference, and her personal experience of being insufficiently powerful to do so.

U/CAG: I didn't think, the EU didn't make a better difference for these people, the absence of war yes, but otherwise no.

Very few peacekeepers shared a perception that their mission was overall successful, which might be read as having sufficient power to achieve enough of their goals. The only clear statement of success comes from M/CAC as he talks about his work in Kosovo.

M/CAC: There were difficult times in 1999 and 2004 riots. But bottom line, it is the most successful peace keeping ever.

I found this sense of powerlessness, or limited power, intriguing. Armed peacekeepers may have better weapons, training, transportation and communication equipment, to say nothing of better food and shelter, than many belligerents. They tend to represent the interests of dominant world powers. Unarmed civilian peacekeepers tend to be better educated, well trained, with extensive international and national connections and perhaps some moral authority (as suggested by Schirch 2006), conferred by their commitment to nonviolence. Despite these factors which might be perceived as conferring significant power, peacekeepers tended to perceive themselves as insufficiently powerful in some fundamental ways. In other words, they felt very limited in their ability to achieve their goals. They tended to see local people as having significant power, based on their decisions to cooperate, or not, as well as on their ability to continue to engage in armed violence that could not be fully controlled, or at times even limited by peacekeepers. Peacekeepers believed their ability to control armed violence was actually quite limited reflecting not only their rules of engagement, but many factors which they could not control.<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, narrations of the experiences of people in host countries describe local people as frequently feeling powerless, at the mercy of peacekeepers and frequently unable to affect the behaviour and purposes of peacekeepers (Poulligny, 2006; Richmond & Franks, 2009; Talentino, 2007). This invites questions regarding how these relationships and perceptions are created and change over time. Who does it serve when peacekeepers feel powerless despite what might be considered

---

<sup>7</sup> A body of trust literature examines the relationship between trust and control (see Miller, 2004 and Jagd, 2010 for discussion), and how these tend to be contradictory trends in management and employee relationships. This may be related to the experience of powerlessness, or lack of control, and might be a fruitful area for further research as it is experienced in peacekeeping.

advantages? What do these contradictory perceptions indicate about the disjunction between peacekeepers and people in the host countries? How are these narratives constructed? These differing perspectives speak to the complexity of intervention in conflict affected communities and invites further research.

Bringing together all of the above dimensions, it seems that peacekeepers perceive that effective peacekeeping is more likely within relationships that share the following characteristics: primarily task oriented; able to identify, articulate and work on shared goals cooperatively; shared understanding of who has the power to effect what; and with shared assessments of the importance of various goals. What the literature referenced above does not seem to address is an understanding of how peacekeepers move between cooperative and coercive interactions, and how that affects their ability to maintain effective relationships.

Higate and Henry (2009a) discuss peacekeeping as embodied performance, with props. They emphasise that the props which are weapons, other equipment, transportation and the like must be convincingly menacing. Deutsch (2011a) theorises that acting cooperatively – i.e. acting as if one shares goals, trying to solve problems together, mutual respect, and acting benevolently if one has more power – creates the conditions for cooperation. Whereas behaviours that indicate competition create conditions for further competition and negative interdependence. The so-called ‘weapons effect’ theorises not only that people carrying weapons are more likely to act aggressively, but that weapons may also bring out anxiety and fear in others (Turner et al, 1977), responses not conducive to building positive relationships. Combining these strands of analysis, I am theorising that military peacekeepers and their weapons may symbolise an embodiment (as well as enactment) of coercion upon arrival in a community, a negative interdependence which may trigger anxiety and even resistance, and which must then be overcome in the process of creating ‘good’ relationships. UCP peacekeepers arrive with actions and props that may symbolise and embody their intention for, and reliance on, cooperative interdependence. They must work to establish sufficient understanding of their capacities however, to be able to be effectively coercive with those threatening violence. The performances of military and UCP peacekeepers are at least symbolically, and in many cases, actually, quite different in terms of weapons, living conditions and the like (see Chapter Seven for more on these differences). And yet both use coercive methods at times, which may undermine trust and cooperation. Still,

these differences in performance may account for the perceptions many peacekeepers shared, of the advantage to being unarmed. As peacekeepers say, they are perceived differently whether armed or unarmed, which leads to different possibilities of relationship.

### **Peacekeeping and Trust**

Trust was the word most frequently used by peacekeepers to describe good relationships. Trust is a much discussed phenomenon in many fields including sociology, political science, organisational development and business management.<sup>8</sup> The literature on trust is voluminous, and a thorough review outside the scope of this thesis. Instead I will reflect on concepts from a number of sources I found particularly useful in thinking about trust and peacekeeping.

#### Peacekeeping and social capital

There is an emerging discussion of trust and social capital in post conflict societies (Cox, 2009). This literature highlights what is perhaps obvious, that in communities, regions and countries that have experienced high levels of violence, previous relationships have been sundered and there tends to be low levels of trust, or conversely, there tends to be high levels of mistrust.<sup>9</sup> Putnam defines the basic concept of social capital as “social networks and the associated norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness.” (2007, p. 137). Nan’s (2009, p. 173) definition is more interactive: “social capital refers to the connections in and between networks and the qualities of these connections.” Putnam points out that just as there is physical capital and human capital, there is value in social networks and relationships. While criticised as being too static (Nannestad, 2008), there are a number of concepts from the body of work on social capital that seem quite relevant to peacekeeping relationships. Peacekeeping needs to create, develop or accumulate sufficient social capital - that is a general mutual norm of being trusted and trustworthy - amongst the peacekeepers themselves, with the local

---

<sup>8</sup> For recent reviews of the literature on trust from a number of these fields see Nannestad (2008), Newton and Zmerli (2011), Murphy (2006) Jagd (2010), and Han and Choi (2011).

<sup>9</sup> Though Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii (2011) findings seem to imply the opposite, that communities who experienced high levels of violence have stronger social capital. This may be explained by some people leaving the community, as the authors suggest, though it may also be an artifact of the quantitative measures used to explore the issue.

authorities, belligerents and local population. They frequently create new, or support existing networks. This social capital allows them to gather and share information, protect people, support local problem-solving, and learn culturally appropriate responses. In other words, many of the elements of effective peacekeeping could be said to create and depend on social capital, and are enacted within social networks.

Social capital in peacekeeping needs to be transferable, i.e. not dependent on a particular person, as peacekeepers rotate frequently. Social capital theorising investigates the difference between what is constructed as particular trust and generalised trust (Nannestad, 2008). There are different theories regarding how these two kinds of trust relate (Newton & Zmerli, 2011). Particular trust is thought to be trust in people who are like you, part of your family, neighbourhood, or some other close association. General trust is thought to be trust in people in general, reflected in the phrase ‘most people can be trusted’. Newton (2011) notes that the relationship between particular and generalised trust is not well understood, and it is not clear from interviews with peacekeepers to what degree the social capital implied in these relationships reflects generalised or particular trust.

Putnam’s research suggests that in diverse neighbourhoods trust of those like you and those not like you is significantly lower than trust of both categories in more homogenous communities (Putnam, 2007). He describes diverse neighbourhoods as undergoing significant change and in some cases, stress. While conflict affected communities where peacekeepers work may or may not be ethnically diverse, they are certainly undergoing change and are stressed.<sup>10</sup> A general tendency toward distrust in the community might add to the peacekeepers’ challenge of building trust. UBD suggests this, when comparing different communities in which they worked, finding the lack of trust posed challenges.

UBD: Just by virtue that Jaffna is more an urban environment, and has a higher level of fear and mistrust in their local community, we didn't have the relationships, and that undermined our work, not like in the East.

A question that needs further investigation is whether peacekeepers, by being foreign, are initially less or more trusted. Because they are potentially impartial or

---

<sup>10</sup> See Gilligan, Pasquale, Samii (2011) for research which suggests that social capital may strengthen during stressful conflicts.

nonpartisan, and not implicated in the recent violence, are they initially granted some level of general trust, with which they build social capital? Research on trust in hierarchical organisations or networks suggests that people lower in the hierarchy are willing to obey social rules and to defer to authorities when they trust them (Tyler, 2001). Tyler finds that authorities who are perceived as being neutral and fair, who treat others with dignity and a lack of bias, inspire trust. Trust “facilitates relationships between people and groups” (Tyler, 2001, p. 285), and reflects an assumption that authorities have benevolent motivation. In further research Tyler and associates find a positive correlation between perceptions that authorities have power and trust (van der Toorn, Tyler, & Jost, 2011). Perhaps then, if a mission starts with a general level of acceptance and peacekeepers are able to respond impartially and respectfully while displaying actions which can be interpreted as powerful (such as protecting people), local people will tend to cooperate and defer to the instructions of peacekeepers. However, this research is based on relationships that have developed over time, and so does not relate to the initial trust or distrust reactions to peacekeepers. It may, however, suggest something about trust that develops when peacekeeping missions can meet the criteria of neutrality and treating others with dignity, while using their power to achieve shared goals.<sup>11</sup>

Some peacekeepers experienced an initial distrust which they had to overcome, which makes sense in conflict affected situations. Peacekeepers are by definition, foreign and not part of any local group, and initial trust cannot be based on previous relationships or connections. That said, the argument for African peacekeepers in Africa, for instance, assumes that some sense of shared culture or history, language, or even just geography, is useful (Bellamy & Williams, 2005). MBL addresses this point.

MBL: The fact of the matter is, in my opinion, if you want to do peacekeeping in Africa, the best people to do it are Africans. For instance, in South Africa [troops] speak a language, Zulu, that is very close to Swahili, so they will pick up Swahili within a month of being deployed there. And your flow of information, your rapport with the local population, your understanding of the local culture is just better than anyone from Asia, S. American, or wherever they come from. .... It is just as simple as that...

---

<sup>11</sup> As mentioned previously in this thesis, Pouligny (2006) chronicles the perceptions of disrespect among local people and resulting non-cooperation.



## Bonding and bridging social capital

As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, peacekeepers work to create networks which link local people together across differences, or between different sectors of the community. They are also asked to support existing networks with protection or connection to other resources. This could be construed as developing bonding and bridging social capital (Korac, 2006). Korac discusses the terrible consequences to social capital in communities during and after civil wars. People who used to connect with each other have become enemies or at best are simply disconnected. The bonds with people who share an identity with you may have become stronger, which may create problems when these are exclusive networks (Nan, 2009). Bonding social capital refers to ties with those who are similar. Connections with those ‘not like you’, in whatever way the politics of identities has played out, may be fractured. Often the connections between people and local and national authorities have also been fractured. Creating bridging social capital describes efforts to develop relationships and networks between or across differences.

Bridging social capital is one way to interpret the emphasis peacekeepers placed on their work to build connections and networks and improve the relationships between local authorities and people in the community. PBG talks about helping police who had become quite isolated, make connections in the community, which can be understood as building bridging social capital.

PBG: We more acted as a facilitator, reintroducing them [local police] to various groups and people, because there was, they were very wary of other organisations, they had been very isolated, you know.

UAJ talks about the need to support the re-emergence of prior networks and structures to respond to community needs.

UAJ: We always create structures of support. Their own structures are there, but sometimes they become dormant, they are not put to good use, we encourage them to make good use of their own community structures, in times of difficulties. We get information on what is happening on the ground, ...we plan a response by getting in touch with local government agencies, and international agencies, to respond – be it during violent conflict or natural disasters.

UBH describes a complex set of bridging relationships and gives evidence of its effectiveness. One could see this as increasing bridging social capital in various directions, in the service of protecting people and helping them develop new local solutions, rather than the local community having been handed a pre-packaged program.

UBH: The default protection mechanism for a woman, who has been either sexually assaulted or is at risk for assault, is to put her in jail, they don't know what else to do with her so they incarcerate her to keep her safe. Our team that has been working with the police stations in the communities, and what we now have is, we have been able to form a group where other civil society actors and organisations work together, and when a woman comes in to report, the police call us and we work together to find other protection strategies. So they are demonstrating, while they still don't have the resources and things like that..., they demonstrate a shift in behaviour and understanding, that kind of thing quite frequently that tells us they have changed, our work is being effective.

Paffenholz (2009, pp. 192-196) describes a number of ways civil society rebuilds bridging social capital, or what she calls "intergroup social cohesion". Whilst she considers this to be applicable only in post conflict situations, and to be the work of civil society, a number of the functions she describes are fulfilled by peacekeepers of one or more types. These functions include protection (she does note that PBI is a civilian group that provides protection even during conflicts), monitoring and accountability, advocacy and public communication, intermediation and facilitation, and service delivery. These functions all sound quite familiar as they have appeared elsewhere in this thesis as activities that peacekeepers engage in to prevent violence, protect people and support local problem-solving. From this lens it appears that all these functions may help to rebuild bridging social capital depending on many contextual factors. One of the conditions that peacekeepers face, which Korac (2009) speaks to, is how rapidly bridging social capital can be destroyed and how painstaking it is to rebuild. UBD describes his view that work to rebuild connections must be done carefully, tentatively, and the outcome may not be clear.

UBD: ...maybe a bit more tentative, we did to some extent facilitate forums of people from different religions and ethnic groups, and that work is much more difficult, to bring people together and to try to bridge the divides. It is harder to judge the long-term effectiveness of that. And you have concerns about not being manipulated by one side for their own purposes. I remember

in one community, we held, we convened meetings between the local security forces and local religious and community leaders, created a forum where they can address security issues in the community and the thing is, like I said, you don't really know, the ulterior motives of the actors, and you worry if people are exposing themselves in a way that might put them in danger later. And it isn't always clear what the long-term impact was.

### Trust and shared interests

Peacekeepers suggested that when people trust you, they share information, they come to you and ask for help to prevent violence and for protection. When people trust you, they help you understand the local situation, and they may even help protect you. Peacekeepers reported experiencing that when governments and other belligerents trust you, they take into account what you say, and cooperate in peace related activities. With trust, peacekeepers may have relationships more characterised by cooperation than coercion. Peacekeepers use other words such as mutual benefit, reliable, confidence in you, and open engagement and rapport. Examining the different definitions and conceptions of trust in the literature reveals a number of areas that might be fruitful in this regard.

Hardin suggests trust is believing that the other has your best interest encapsulated in their interests (2002). In his analysis, trust occurs over time, it cannot be manifest during an initial encounter. People behave in a trustworthy manner because they want to be trusted by the other. They can see that it is in their interest to be trusted, and so they take into account the other's interests. Hardin views trust as relational.<sup>12</sup> While there may be a predisposition to take a risk at a first encounter, to act on optimistic expectations, trust must be developed over time within a specific relationship. He questions the existence of generalised trust, as it is assumed to exist outside of particular relationships. He points out that we trust specific people in specific ways, and not some general group of people in all ways. Hardin notes that in relationships where reputation is important, due to overlapping connections or so called thick relationships, there is a high incentive to be trustworthy.

This analysis seems relevant to peacekeeping. Peacekeepers need to develop the belief amongst themselves, and within the local population, that there is mutual benefit in

---

<sup>12</sup> Hardin critiques the use of games and other laboratory research to study trust, as they do not develop real relationships.

their work. This seems particularly poignant in terms of the people they work with in the same organisation. The lengthy sharing regarding mistrust of the motivation and capabilities of peacekeepers from other countries speaks to perceptions of divergent interests. Some are seen as there to do good, protect people, train local people, and some are there to make money and waste time and/or are just not up to the job. Certainly when language is a barrier among peacekeepers, trust based on mutuality becomes harder to develop.

Looking at interactions among peacekeepers and local people, it is critical to develop this sense of trust, encapsulated interests, with many different sectors in the community. Peacekeepers talk about the need to manage local people's expectations. They try to communicate that they share the interest or goal of protecting people, as well as their limitations in doing so, so that their shared interest is realistic. Trust is undermined when peacekeepers are unable to meet unrealistic or inappropriate expectations. Peacekeepers talk about the need to have relationships that are mutually beneficial. Perhaps protecting each other is the most critical potential area of mutual benefit with local people. Recognition of other shared interests such as supporting and strengthening local capacities and preventing violence also needs to be developed. In some contexts they share an interest that peacekeepers work themselves out of a job, and are no longer needed. When interests are not shared, when peacekeepers worry that the agendas or purposes of their mission are at odds with local people to some degree, they feel it challenges good relationships. It undermines their sense of shared interests and mutuality.

PBF talks about the need to work with cultural sensitivity, and build trust rather than rely on force, and then you can cooperatively solve problems, which local people have identified.

PBF: If you are going into a lot of cultures and pretending you care, but you upset them because you are working against their culture, and you are using force, there is no way they will come on board; but if you can meet them at a level where you can communicate with them, and gain their trust and support, then they will come to you with their problems, and you can look at their problems and problem solve with them.

MBL speaks to the need to provide for the basic safety of belligerents before you can build a good relationship. This suggests meeting their interests first.

MBL: When you look at these types of things from well, the way that we commit ourselves to a relationship, those people are in a completely different position. If you go down Maslow's model, they are right at the bottom of it, at basic security, that is their need at that stage. So if you can provide them with good security, they don't care to establish a good relationship with you, they just want to be safe and secure, and they want you to do that, since that is the purpose of you being there.

M/CAC talks about the interconnection of being impartial, protecting everyone, while doing civil/military operations that addressed specific needs, and notes that addressing these shared interests explains why they are trusted.

M/CAC: It is linked to impartiality, we protected all people. We protected all of them, all communities, we provided security to all people, and also supported them. When they were living in tents and it was winter, we provided heaters and generators, for heat, food and drink as needed in civil/military operations. We built buildings, cultural centres, churches, shelters, and roads, infrastructure. We had a huge budget for this, that's why everyone likes us, trusts us. So we not only provided security. We did things that improved their lives.

### Trust and confidence

Peacekeepers talk about the need to build confidence in their work, amongst local people. They suggest that when people trust you and have confidence, they may bring their issues to you. People may report crimes, ask for protection, or plan ahead with peacekeepers for a potential crisis. If they have confidence in your ability to protect them, they may ask for accompaniment or peacekeeper presence at crucial moments. In this sense confidence and trust build toward more mutuality. It may shift the dynamics so that peacekeepers less often need to go out to try to gather information. Instead local people and local authorities more often come to the peacekeepers to work cooperatively to prevent violence, protect people and make space for local problem-solving. PAI describes this process.

PAI: It got so we could walk around, and get local people's confidence. In the night we had to stay in our vehicles, two or more vehicles at once. We never got enough confidence so that people came to the police station, though it was moving that way.

MAZ talks about building confidence through their presence. He knows this is working when people share information.

MAZ: We installed confidence in the local population. We were the only international presence there, we visited remote places, with UN flag floating around, a kind of confidence for people, that someone is looking after them, that someone is looking at their problems, build confidence, it definitely helps. People came around and want to talk to you, shake hands with you, it shows they have confidence in you, they want to give you information. If they don't have confidence, they won't tell you.

Brown (2008) summarises literature which distinguishes between confidence and trust. Confidence arises when there is no doubt about a person or institution's ability to meet expectations. Trust arises when there is a risk for failure, but there is belief that this person or this institution will meet expectations. Although this distinction does not reflect the ways in which peacekeepers use these words, Brown's work points to relevant issues about institutional reform. Applying this to the UK health care system, he concludes that as confidence has eroded, there is a need to replace it with trust. He suggests that the government's attempts to build instrumental trust, that is some degree of limited trust in the institutions themselves, is to replace the lost confidence. He views the more important focus to be communicative trust. This is trust built between health care providers and their patients, through everyday interactions and communication. Communicative trust legitimises the authority of the providers and the system itself. Without communicative trust, he posits that no other efforts at institutional reform will satisfy patients' desire to trust the medical system.

This seems relevant to peacekeeping. While the efforts to reform and improve UN, NATO, EU, or AU peacekeeping are important and valuable, there is perhaps insufficient attention paid to the training and support needed to develop communicative trust between peacekeepers and those they work with. While Sartre (2011) talks about a robust media strategy, and the United Nations Principles and Guidelines (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, 2008) discuss the importance of effective public information and communication, these are oriented primarily to large scale media and one way communication. In contrast, the development of communicative trust, according to Brown (2008), would occur through the everyday interactions between on the ground peacekeepers and those they work with. And it is in these everyday interactions that trust may be built, maintained, or undermined. How peacekeepers indicate respect, shared interests, cultural sensitivity, as well as effectively protecting people, may have much to do with the acceptance of the mission and trusting expectations.

MBP speaks about the lack of training in important non-military interactions and functions in his experience as part of the NATO Afghanistan mission.

MBP: You can have a good commander on the ground say ‘you are right, you are correct, I need to focus on capacity building in the government, I need to focus on development and I need to focus on information operations, but I am an infantry officer, and I have no idea how to do that’. So even when you get a good guy and he says that, he may not receive the help he needs.”

### Trust is complicated

Trust is complicated, as Murphy (2006, p. 429) demonstrates in a comprehensive, multi layered definition of trust:

“trust is... a sociospatial process enacted by agents through relations mediated by structural factors, power differentials, emotions, meaning systems, and material intermediaries. The theoretical framework seeks to shift our understanding of trust beyond static conceptualisations – trust as instrument, input, or structural component of networks –and toward a more dynamic or relational perspective on how collaboration occurs and where and/or why it is situated in particular places and spaces.”

Further underscoring the notion of trust as a process which changes, Khodyakov (2007, p. 126) defines trust as “... a process of constant imaginative anticipation of the reliability of the other party’s actions based on (1) the reputation of the partner and the actor, (2) the evaluation of current circumstances of action, (3) assumptions about the partner’s actions, and (4) the belief in the honesty and morality of the other side.”

These definitions seem highly relevant for peacekeeping. Trust in peacekeeping takes place in particular environments. It is mutually created and maintained (or not), by all the people involved. It is affected by many factors which certainly include power differentials, emotions, and meanings. As circumstances are often in flux, who and what to trust, and on what basis, changes. The reputations of peacekeepers, governments, belligerents, and key local actors all contribute to perceptions of their legitimacy, acceptance and a perception of being nonpartisan. These factors affect trust in and between each other. Trust also includes the material elements such as weapons, transportation, and aid and how these are accessed and used. Trust between peacekeepers themselves and with people in the host country is not static; it shifts, and this affects the possibilities for collaboration and cooperation versus coercion. While trust may usefully

be thought of as occurring between specific people, peacekeepers also work with and within overlapping networks.

There is a gap which is not addressed by either peacekeeping or trust literature. Of central importance to peacekeeping is the anomaly of moving between coercive, even violently coercive periods, and trusting, mutually beneficial periods in relationships. While the trust literature contains references related to how to build trust and what happens when trust is broken at the dyad level, explained with game theory (Murnighan, Malhotra, & Weber, 2004), there appears to be no consideration of these dynamics at a larger level, nor involving military interactions. And while the social capital literature addresses the destruction and rebuilding of bridging and bonding social capital, it does not address the way in which peacekeeping seems to move between building and potentially undermining connections due to the use of coercion.

### **Theorising good relationships**

Reflecting on the importance peacekeepers placed on good relationships for effective peacekeeping and their satisfaction in these relationships, I am theorising that good peacekeeping relationships tend to be predominately task oriented (with attention to developing emotional aspects as appropriate), with sufficient recognised shared interests and goals to be predominantly cooperative and trusting, and where the perceived differences in power can be used, coercively if needed, to prevent violence and protect people. Conversely perceptions of having different goals, particularly through association with the imposition of unwanted conditions or solutions and the threat or use of force, may undermine trust and cooperation. It seems that all these factors in relationships are usefully understood as being in flux. Military peacekeepers have the particular dilemma of association with missions that impose externally driven agendas and rely on weapons for self and civilian protection, with the related potential for problematic impacts on relationship building. I theorise within a framework that acknowledges the multidirectional aspects of relationships; that perceptions of trust, power, cooperation, coercion and mutuality are influenced by all the various actors through on going complex interactions. It appears to me that peacekeepers' perceptions of trust, mutual benefit, and cooperation are constructed from their experiences in communities and the standpoints they bring to those experiences, while simultaneously different actors in the local communities are doing the same and not necessarily sharing the same perceptions.



Moving to a more theoretical description of these processes, I begin with Deutsch and what he describes as his crude law of social relations (Deutsch, 2011a, p. 30), as a sensitising concept (rather than law). Deutsch theorises that acting cooperatively produces cooperation and vice versa with competition, using the analogy of genotype and phenotype. This suggests that how peacekeepers enter a community is a critical factor. Entering in ways that symbolise and signal trust and expectations of cooperation may be more likely when unarmed or lightly armed. Many peacekeepers implied that heavy weapons and body armour signal mistrust or at least make a peacekeeper less accessible to people.

Building on Rubinstein's (2005) theorising that peacekeepers are seen as the embodiment of international order suggests that the way peacekeepers are perceived is possibly affected not only by their own actions but by the ways in which the overall intervention is understood in the local communities where they work. Some interventions are reported to be welcomed at the start. The perceptions peacekeepers and local people have of each other may be affected by their on-going embodied performances (Higate & Henry, 2009b; Pouligny, 2006) which indicate symbolically and concretely to each other cooperative or competitive intent, within interdependent relationships. The achievement of preventing violence, protecting people and supporting local ownership is positively interdependent in that peacekeepers and local people need each other to achieve their shared goals (here I am not addressing those local people who act to continue the violence, nor peacekeepers unwilling to protect people). Or it is negatively interdependent in that peacekeepers and local people need to overcome each other, when they do not have shared goals. If the goals of peacekeeping are perceived as linked to agendas based on assumptions that local society is backward, less civilized, needing correction and enlightenment from the global north,<sup>13</sup> it may be harder to establish cooperative, trusting relationships. Similarly if peacekeepers seem uninterested in, or unable to protect local people, it may challenge cooperation.

---

<sup>13</sup> See discussion in Chapters Six and Seven and in particular Pouligny (2006), Talentino (2007), Liden et al (2009) and Zanotti (2011).

## **Envisioning fundamental robust relationship peacekeeping**

In what follows, I draw on the literature, findings and analysis from the previous chapters, in particular concerns about acceptance, preventing violence, protecting people, supporting local ownership and the centrality of good relationships. I draw support from the differences in practice and perceptions discussed in Chapter Seven. I present here my theorising and visioning of a potential evolution for peacekeeping with the possibility to be more emancipatory.<sup>14</sup> Given the limited literature addressing how local people experience peacekeeping and the focus of my research, it is admittedly biased toward how peacekeepers understand peacekeeping. This theorising, however, is grounded in the interviews, influenced by critical peace studies, attempts to address the concerns in the literature on how local people perceive peacekeeping, and shares my overall theorising based on my reflections of the material in this thesis.

I began with a concern about how peacekeepers understand effective peacekeeping, influenced by critical peace studies problematizing the liberal peace agenda, and the interest in the need for local ownership and the everyday experiences of those impacted by peacebuilding interventions. Through relating the understanding which peacekeepers I interviewed shared with me, with literature from various fields, I developed themes related to acceptance, preventing violence, protecting people, supporting local ownership and the centrality of good relationships for effective peacekeeping. I attended to differences among types of peacekeepers particularly focused on their different training, experiences and emphasis in understanding effective peacekeeping.

This leads me to envision what I term fundamental, robust relationship peacekeeping. This peacekeeping would be more stand-alone and disengaged from the larger agendas of peacebuilding and state building in multidimensional peace operations. The development of multidimensional peacekeeping or peace support operations reflected, among many influences, a growing conflation of peace and liberal democracy as a path to international security and stability (Luckham, 2011). However, it appears

---

<sup>14</sup> As noted in the Introduction, I believe an evolved peacekeeping might contribute to increased emancipation in the areas where it is deployed. By this I mean contribute to an increase in the potential for individuals to lead the lives they chose with increased freedom from oppression, and at a community or society level, an increase in tolerance and agonistic political processes, wide political participation, and equality more broadly. This views emancipation not as an end state, but a perspective from which intervention can be judged to be more, less or anti emancipatory.

that multidimensional and third generation peacekeeping carries within it significant contradictions that may undermine efforts to decrease or stop the violence.<sup>15</sup> These contradictions can be seen as political in terms of the liberal peace agenda, the political bias of interventions despite the rhetoric of being impartial and strategic in terms of the tensions between political agendas, community acceptance and the use of force. Perhaps then, peacekeeping such as that undertaken by UCP organisations and interventions, holds promise of practices which prevent violence, protect people and make space for local problem-solving, unattached to a wider agenda, and decreasing some of the contradictions. This would not preclude peacebuilding efforts, but uncouple peacekeeping from these efforts.

As discussed in the introduction, the content of our imagining is framed by our standpoints and world viewing (Docherty, 2001; Stoetzler & Yuval-Davis, 2002). It seems essential to imagine possibilities outside of the current trends in peacekeeping, given the challenges and dilemmas to effective peacekeeping discussed in this thesis that appear connected to the liberal peace agenda and the calls for more robust peacekeeping. In doing so I imagine a potential evolution of peacekeeping toward fundamental, robust relationship peacekeeping. This vision reflects what I perceive as emancipatory potentials in peacekeeping interventions. Built on how I have understood peacekeepers' experiences, it would privilege cooperation and good relationships, and attend to the fundamental tasks related to supporting sufficient safety for local people to address their conflicts nonviolently. It assumes there are always some local people already engaged in this work. In this imagined fundamental peacekeeping, civilians (police and unarmed civilian peacekeepers) are the ideal primary peacekeepers. They are able to arrive lightly armed or unarmed<sup>16</sup> and might symbolise and embody efforts for cooperation with local people. I argue this based on the significant literature which questions the suitability of militarily trained peacekeepers for much of the work they do in the field.<sup>17</sup> As discussed in Chapter Seven, military organisations understand the use of violent force as the

---

<sup>15</sup> See Chapters One, Five and Six for further discussion.

<sup>16</sup> This is questionable regarding Formed Police Units.

<sup>17</sup> See Chapters Three and Seven for discussion of this point.

fundamental source of their power and the core training<sup>18</sup> is oriented toward the use of force to kill and win. Civilian peacekeepers, whether police or unarmed civilian peacekeepers, may have the orientation and training to put relationships first.<sup>19</sup> They do not need to overcome socialisation and training oriented toward war as their primary purpose, as it seems military personnel do. As several of the peacekeepers I interviewed suggested, perhaps there would be a military unit in the background to draw on when the civilian leadership of the mission determines it is needed. My own commitment to nonviolence makes this unattractive to my imagination, but I do not rule it out here. If and when violent force might be used, it would be within a clearly articulated strategy (such as that developed by Sartre, 2011) that has considered the impact on relationships and other factors relating to the mission mandate and goals, and only for self or civilian protection.

This fabrication<sup>20</sup> reflects my belief that local people are the primary source for resolving their conflicts, knowing this may create unjust and discriminatory situations which hold the seeds for further conflicts.<sup>21</sup> Much of the literature cited in this thesis supports the need for local ownership, not just local input.<sup>22</sup> Peacekeepers seem clear that supporting local efforts to resolve their conflicts and rebuild their communities is important for acceptance, relationships and sustainability. In this visioning peacekeeping works to create sufficient safety for local actors and helps bridge connections between different social sectors and international agencies, but it is up to local people to develop their future. Local people at all levels of society are understood to be active agents, not passive recipients or bystanders. I suggest that the political, biased implications of intervention are considered and decisions made to intervene in ways that best support local people who are working for more just, peaceful, equitable social change, rather than

---

<sup>18</sup> While recognizing that not all military personnel receive this training, for example military chaplains, military manuals, peacekeepers I interviewed and literature such as Last (1995), Whitworth (2004), Marten (2004), and den Heyer (2011) all question the suitability of military for primary peacekeeping roles.

<sup>19</sup> While police I interviewed were all from the global north and many had concerns about the capabilities of police from the global south, some literature describes positive interactions with global south police (Kembler, 2010). This issue clearly needs more attention.

<sup>20</sup> I am using fabrication in the sense that we fabricate art, or fabricate new vision from pieces of experience, knowledge, and other kinds of data.

<sup>21</sup> This belief stems from my perception that all societies hold seeds of conflict related to injustice, marginalization and other oppressive conditions, which are best addressed through agonistic (Peterson, 2012; Shinko, 2008) processes.

<sup>22</sup> By local I mean something akin to Richmond's distinction of local-local (Richmond, 2009a).

a more singular focus on state security and state building. Peacekeepers describe providing relational support for local ownership through presence and accompaniment, developing networks, shuttle diplomacy, advocacy and the many other relational strategies discussed previously.

The literature, the experiences peacekeepers related and my own experience suggest that providing material aid is complicated as the who, what and when are all filled with implications that affect perceptions of being nonpartisan, building trust and may have harmful unintended consequences. I envision peacebuilding work related to physical and social reconstruction, governance, reconciliation and further development, as done by others, optimally led by and in support of local leadership genuinely committed to nonviolent struggle. That said, the line between peacekeeping and peacebuilding will always be a bit blurred, if any efforts to address underlying causes of conflict are considered peacebuilding.

At the core of this vision are robust relationships, that is relationships strong enough to withstand the movement between coercion and cooperation, and the many stresses and strains of relationship in communities suffering from armed conflicts. Constructed around an understanding of good relationships as the key to effective and sustainable peacekeeping, it would be a major reconfiguration. It cannot be said to be impossible, as some limited version is in practice in the field already.<sup>23</sup> It does not directly address the tendency for internationally authorised peacekeeping interventions to occur only during periods of high crisis rather than early prevention. It would give decision makers wider options. It might be easier to get authorisation and support for preventive interventions as well as to stay longer in post-conflict situations as needed, if peacekeeping was undertaken primarily by civilians and focused on relationships as the main vehicle for influence.<sup>24</sup> Fundamental, robust relationship peacekeeping might be useful before, during and after periods of armed conflicts as well as in periods that rise to the level of war.

---

<sup>23</sup> In addition to the already referenced programs of PBI and NP, the experiences related to me of unarmed peacekeepers protecting election monitors in Timor Leste, unarmed military monitors in Lebanon and the DRC, and military experience in Bougainville as an initial list, suggest that unarmed interventions can work in some conditions.

<sup>24</sup> A point made in conversation with C. Schweitzer (Personal communication February 2013).

This seems worth further consideration. It does not address the problematic dynamics of the hegemony of global north powers, the attempts to create international security through the imposition of a particular form of liberal democracy and free markets through other means (though it removes peacekeeping from direct participation), nor the perhaps equally problematic impacts of trade in small arms and the globalised economy. It does not address what organisations are best suited for peacekeeping, not only related to the discussion of UN versus other multilateral organisations, but the implications of undertaking peacekeeping by small INGOs such as PBI and NP, versus these large institutions. While it doesn't address changing the masculine organisational culture of military peacekeeping interventions, it is a vision which would likely conflict with this culture, putting relationships at the core. It doesn't address the political process of who decides to intervene, where and when, nor the problems which would likely arise with obtaining consent if interventions were more focused on supporting local efforts rather than state sovereignty.

Nor does this imagined evolution of peacekeeping address the many ways in which local people establish or reinstate oppression and discriminatory practices, though it advocates focusing support to those who work for inclusion and nonviolence. The nonviolent social and political evolution in places of conflict would be primarily the business of local people. Overall, and in particular to address this concern, the absence in this visioning of input from local people is a distinct limitation. However, I believe that less violent and nonviolent conflict would be a meaningful change in societies where armed violence has been occurring for some time and effective peacekeeping which prevents violence and protects people would open up new spaces and possibilities. It is a vision which is perhaps somewhere between a technical fix and a deep reconfiguration of peacekeeping, or as Gelot and Soderbaum (2012) say, a top down and bottom up combination.

## **Conclusion**

In review, references to relationships as a central factor in peacekeeping appear throughout this thesis. This chapter developed this theme in more depth. Through this research I came to perceive peacekeeping as taking place in relational fields, and relationships as the vehicle for influencing and being influenced, in multiple directions. Relationships which are task oriented and characterised by trust, mutual benefit and

cooperation are the desired ideal, as narrated by peacekeepers. Good relationships are considered essential to effectively perform all the peacekeeping tasks related to protecting people and preventing violence, and to know what local efforts to support and how to do so effectively. Acceptance and cooperation in the community are the manifestation and result of good relationships, and can lead to further better relationships. Relationships are supported by a number of factors which include: perceptions of non-partisanship or impartiality; support for local efforts at addressing conflict; by knowledge of and sensitivity to local cultures and languages; time spent in the community; contact with a wide variety of local people; and staff remaining for longer periods in one community. Relationships are challenged by many factors including the perception that peacekeeping missions are imposing solutions, lack of cultural sensitivity, and the presence and use of weapons and related equipment unless local people believe they are necessary and being used appropriately.

Peacekeeping relationships are on-going processes, with the need to maintain and renew the basis of cooperation. Power dynamics, frequently asymmetrical, are complex and shifting, and depend on the context and task at hand, without a permanent allocation of more or less powerful roles. Cooperation and trust are built upon perceptions of shared interests. Coercion is used by peacekeepers to deter or stop armed violence, with actors who do not share an interest in nonviolent change processes at a particular time. Coercion may also be used to impose other agendas which are part of a mission, and it may undermine the desired goal of cooperation. Thus peacekeeping relationships are influenced by multi-directional interactions which build or undermine trust, attempt to assert influence or control, and which take place in dynamic contexts affected by external forces that may support further conflict or peace.

I theorise that peacekeeping relationships are influenced by the embodied actions in everyday life in communities, which symbolise and signal cooperation or coercion, between peacekeepers and the people with whom they interact. They are further influenced by the local perceptions of the overall intent and process of the wider mission.

Envisioning an evolution of peacekeeping that would consciously build on relational dynamics, I described an imagined robust relationship and fundamental peacekeeping. This would privilege the development of robust relationships, strong enough to cope with the stresses and strains of moving between cooperation and coercion,

as a core factor in effective peacekeeping. At the same time, peacekeeping would be decoupled from the wider peacebuilding, state building, development and aid agendas of other interventions. Freed of the wider agenda, robust relationship peacekeeping would focus on the fundamental peacekeeping tasks of preventing violence, protecting people and supporting local problem-solving. It views local people as the source of action to resolve conflicts, knowing that this may not lead to particularly just and inclusive conditions. Somewhere between a problem-solving and transformative approach, it envisions a significant reconfiguration of peacekeeping but leaves untouched profound forces such as the hegemony of great powers, globalised economics, the conflation of liberal democracy and world peace, and trade in small arms and all other aspects of the huge profits to be made from armed violence.

The next chapter concludes this thesis with a summary of the ground covered, a restatement of the visioning in this chapter and thoughts about further research.



## Conclusion

This work began with a curiosity about how frontline peacekeepers understood effective peacekeeping. I started with a belief that people who do peacekeeping on the ground, in the frontlines, would have a different perspective and knowledge than people who theorised about that work from other positions. Working within a general constructivist frame required me to surface my biases and judgments and work with them as consciously as I was able, in my analysis. This self reflection was influenced and sharpened by standpoint and world view theories, which directed my attention to particular aspects of my standpoint, and to the currents of power that affected my judgments and research. This constructives frame allowed me to focus on the subjective meaning and interpretations peacekeepers developed through their experiences, rather than trying to fit their descriptions in to my world view, described as an objective analysis. Constructivism freed my research from the constraints required to prove a specific truth; it allowed me to consciously work with my own standpoints and to some degree, that of those I interviewed, and to a small degree the standpoints of researchers I read. This allowed me to engage in analysis and reflection and led to conclusions regarding the experience peacekeepers have of the agency of local people and thus the importance of relationships that were not in my original thinking, nor in the literature. And this led to imagining and theorising peacekeeping which might be more effective because it is locally rooted and relationally oriented.

Influenced by critical peace studies and other elements of my theoretical framework, I assumed that the knowledge of frontline peacekeepers was crucial for imagining a more emancipatory peacekeeping. While critical peace and critical security studies have analysed peacebuilding interventions overall, little attention has been paid to the potential of the peacekeeping component itself to have a more positive influence (see Stamnes, 2004 as an exception). Other critical peace studies' concerns which helped shape this thesis include problematizing the liberal peace agenda impact on peacekeeping, a focus on local agency, and the impact of peace interventions on everyday life. Constructivist grounded theory as research theory and methodology allowed me to work outside of preconceived hypotheses so as to analyse the interview data and literature more freely and subjectively. The iterative process of interviewing, coding and analysing and

then doing further interviews, allowed me to focus on emerging themes, eliciting further perspectives on these themes as they morphed during the process. The recognised subjectivity within myself as researcher, and interview participants, became a source of creativity and meaning making. Research methods situated within a positivist framework require ignoring or suppressing subjective responses, and thus, it seems to me, cut our work off from rich sources of understanding. This methodology allowed inter-related themes to emerge that were quite different than the more simplistic, binary themes I began with regarding armed and unarmed peacekeepers.

Using constructivist grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006; Clarke, 2005), I interviewed 53 former peacekeepers who served in four different roles or functions: military, police, civilian and unarmed civilian peacekeepers. Military peacekeepers were service personnel in their own country. Police were employed in their country of origin as police. Civilians worked for the UN, EU or NATO in non-military positions. Unarmed civilian peacekeepers worked for small INGO's working to protect people and prevent violence, using nonviolent strategies and tactics. Bringing the research and literature together, this thesis has straddled, perhaps at times uncomfortably, the practice of problematizing or critique, and the practice of problem-solving.

### **Contributions to the field**

This research addressed several significant gaps in the literature on peacekeeping, only one of which I was aware of when I began. The literature on effective peacekeeping or the success of peacekeeping rarely includes the views of frontline peacekeepers and in particular that of unarmed civilian peacekeepers.<sup>1</sup> I assumed that people at the ground level have knowledge that can only be gained through the performance or practice of peacekeeping and assumptions about embodied, social learning as a path toward generating knowing (Heshusius, 1994; Higate & Henry, 2009a; Merriam & Kim, 2008). Thus it seemed important to address this gap by adding the voices and experiences of frontline peacekeepers to the literature.

---

<sup>1</sup> For instance of the literature reviewed by Fortna and Howard (2008) on the success of peacekeeping, none included the perspectives of frontline peacekeepers.

The second gap emerged through my research. Frontline peacekeepers emphasised the centrality of good relationships<sup>2</sup> for effective peacekeeping. While mentioned in literature on unarmed civilian peacekeeping (UCP) as a factor in peacekeeping (Mahony, 2006; Wallis, 2010), the critical function of relationships is not emphasised in the same way as peacekeepers did in these interviews.<sup>3</sup> The research literature on military peacekeeping rarely refers to relationships,<sup>4</sup> though military doctrines imply the need for workable relationships with local people to accomplish a number of tasks (Ministry of Defence, 2004).

Through the research process I came to see that another gap in the literature was the inclusion of only military high level military personnel, or only police peacekeepers, or only staff working in peacebuilding projects in any particular analysis, and not multiple perspectives. It was through the inclusion of all four roles or types of frontline peacekeepers that I could see how similar their perspectives were, how similarly they constructed peacekeeping and how many activities they shared, and most saliently, their shared emphasis on the need for acceptance, local ownership and good relationships. Including all four types also revealed differences in understanding peacekeeping, its purpose and particularly the use of force and the dilemmas posed by the use of force.

Based on the research, literature and my own theorising, I have attempted to make a modest contribution to the understanding and use of peacekeeping, through addressing the gaps identified above. While there were differences between individual peacekeepers and different patterns based on the roles, overall peacekeepers interviewed for this research shared similar perspectives on several significant themes. I believe the main contribution to understanding effective peacekeeping is drawing attention to the following concerns: the importance and role of local problem-solving to efficacy and sustainable peace; the distinction between legitimacy and acceptance; the centrality of relationships; and the interrelationship of all these concerns.

---

<sup>2</sup> As noted throughout this thesis, good relationships are task oriented and characterised by trust, mutual benefit and cooperation.

<sup>3</sup> As already mentioned C. Schweitzer, (personal communication February 2013) does see relationships as the central mechanism for some kinds of UCP.

<sup>4</sup> Though as mentioned, Last (1995) implies relationships with his concept of the offense in peacekeeping being accomplished through contact activities.

## Summary of key themes

One of the challenges of summarising peacekeepers' perspectives is the intertwining and overlap of these concerns and between the themes which I constructed from them. Stated most simplistically and generically, as if there was one view and as if the following elements could be separated, peacekeepers perceive good relationships as essential for effective peacekeeping. Peacekeeping takes place in a relational field and relationships are the vehicle or channel by which peacekeepers influence and are influenced by local people, including parties to the conflict. Recognising the agency of local people through their own embodied experiences, they suggest that local people must accept peacekeepers, as demonstrated in their actions. Supporting local people to pursue their own problem-solving contributes to acceptance, good relationships and sustainable peace. These themes are inter-dependent, each supported by the others.

Unpacking this reduction, I include influencing local people and supporting local ownership as a key theme for effective peacekeeping based on its frequent mention by peacekeepers and in the literature as a primary purpose of, as well as a critical element for effective peacekeeping and sustainable peace. All three themes – acceptance, local problem-solving and relationships - reflect the experience of working with people in the communities where peacekeeping primarily occurs. Local people are experienced as actors, not passive recipients of peacekeeping, and peacekeeping becomes part of the everyday life of peacekeepers and community residents. Local ownership or local problems solving seemed to indicate to some peacekeepers including local people within agendas already set by the mission. To others it meant making space and providing support for local people to do their own analysis and implement their own actions. The critical peace studies literature argues for this later view. Supporting local ownership was seen as useful for being culturally sensitive, for decreasing the likelihood of resistance, for promoting sustainable changes toward lasting peace specific to the context and acknowledging local self-determination. Some peacekeepers also reported feeling uncomfortable when they felt they were imposing solutions or in other ways working against local ownership. It is in the local, everyday actions of peacekeepers and the people they interact with that more emancipatory or more oppressive conditions can be developed.

Regarding acceptance, peacekeepers perceived acceptance by the host country population as a key factor contributing to effective peacekeeping. Legitimacy can be understood as a social construct and described as a judgment of social status (Gelot, 2012). Legitimacy can be judged in relation to the authorisation of the mission, as well as in relation to implementation of the mission (Whalan, 2010). While legitimacy may be seen as more of a judgment, acceptance was described as relational, expressed through cooperation, sharing information and resources, and helping to protect peacekeepers. Acceptance is related to, though not the same as, consent; and it was thought to be influenced by perceptions of being unbiased or nonpartisan. In the view of peacekeepers, acceptance is made more likely or strengthened when they act in ways that signal cooperation and trust, are culturally sensitive, and when they support local ownership to address conflicts and their underlying causes. Acceptance was thought to be undermined when local people perceive peacekeepers and the missions in which they are embedded as imposing outsider, predetermined and/or inappropriate agendas. Acceptance may also be undermined by culturally insensitive, harmful or illegal behaviour by peacekeepers, when peacekeepers do not spend time in the community due to lack of strategy or language capacity and when they fail to protect civilians.

Turning next to relationships, perceived as crucial in effective peacekeeping, peacekeepers shared experiences of creating relationships through many different kinds of interactions, both cooperative and coercive. While most of the discussion focused on relationships between peacekeepers and others in the host country, peacekeepers also mention the need for good relationships with other peacekeepers as these are the people who 'have your back'. Peacekeepers describe good relationships as task oriented and characterised by trust, confidence, frank exchange, reliability, and mutual benefit in both directions. They require sustained maintenance and cannot be taken for granted. Peacekeepers perceive themselves as dependent on the cooperation of belligerents and local people to achieve their goals. Reflecting on the interviews with peacekeepers suggests that the actual stages and needs for relationships vary by context, and require sensitivity and flexibility to the actual conditions.

Relationships are thought to prevent violence and protect people by creating conditions in which the cost of committing violence is too high, the reward for cooperation is desired, or the trust level between peacekeepers and belligerents creates a context for cooperation and an inclination to take each other's recommendations in to

consideration (to listen to each other). Relationships can be coercive or cooperative, depending on the degree of shared or oppositional interests, and move among periods of time and/or groups with convergent interests and high trust, to times or groups with divergent interests and mistrust. The use of coercion, and in particular the threat or actual use of weapons, is seen to make it more difficult to build positive relationships. Peacekeepers spoke of the dilemma between the perceived need for weapons for self-protection, and the ways in which carrying and using weapons undermined acceptance and relationships.<sup>5</sup>

### Theorising effective peacekeeping

Restating the summary from Chapter Two and based on the research data, my reading and analysing, peacekeeping appears to be fundamentally about creating enough safety, stability and capacity/capability that people in the host country, at all levels of society, can take action to engage in political/nonviolent conflict, rebuild their communities and basic institutions, and lead normal lives (all ultimately peacebuilding tasks). Peacekeeping is organised action by third parties, to prevent violence, protect civilians, and support local problem-solving by controlling or influencing belligerents and/or their proxies, and local people. Much of the energy and effort in peacekeeping is directed toward preventing or ending violence and protecting people, or what might be termed negative peace. Nonetheless it is through the support for local ownership of processes to nonviolently address conflict and its impacts that peacekeeping can most sustainably contribute to peacebuilding and the development of a more positive peace. Peacekeepers' preferred and often primary process of affecting both belligerents and civilians at all levels appears to be through robust relationships. While many armed peacekeepers believed that force may be necessary at times to protect people or prevent other violence, it was considered a crisis response, a precursor or back up to stages when more cooperative relationships are effective. Force is seen to have limits, drawbacks, and by itself does not produce sustainable results. It appears to be critical that peacekeeping is perceived as a legitimate intervention and accepted by people in the host country in order to be effective. Sustainable social change is understood to be more likely through supporting local problem-solving rather than through the imposition of solutions, which

---

<sup>5</sup> This analysis can be found in much of the military peacekeeping literature referenced such as Last (1997), NORDCAPS (2007) and Sartre (2011).

also has the tendency to undermine acceptance. Effectiveness needs on-going context sensitive analysis that can guide the use of violence or cooperation in their interactions.

Peacekeepers described understanding their work and knowing what was effective primarily through the feedback they receive in relationships, by what people do and say. Effectiveness, or lack thereof, was known through lived experience in specific everyday contexts.

### Envisioning an evolution of peacekeeping

My theorising brings together concerns described by peacekeepers regarding local ownership, acceptance and relationships with critical peace studies concerns regarding the imposition of the liberal peace agenda, the need for local ownership, and the manifestation of these issues in the everyday life of people in communities affected by conflict.

Bringing these themes together led me to theorise and envision a more emancipatory evolution of peacekeeping toward robust relationship and fundamental peacekeeping. Rather than a focus on robust force, this would put at the centre the need for the development of relationships sufficiently robust to withstand the stress of the movement between coercion, cooperation and everything in between which seems to be part of peacekeeping relationships. This imagining<sup>6</sup> perceives civilians – both police and unarmed civilian peacekeepers – as the ideal peacekeepers. Additionally, this vision imagines peacekeeping unlinked from the wider peacebuilding and state building agendas. This would allow peacekeepers to focus on the fundamental tasks identified by peacekeepers of preventing violence, protecting civilians and supporting local ownership. Though needing to be coordinated, physical and social reconstruction would be undertaken separately. Supporting local ownership is understood here as reinforcing local problem-solving and local action/actors through non-material, relationship based strategies such as presence and accompaniment, building networks, shuttle diplomacy. In order to actualise a more emancipatory peacekeeping, decisions must be made carefully regarding supporting local actors who are working for a more tolerant, inclusive and just society. While violent force might be used, it would be within strategies that take into account the impact of the use of force on relationships. This vision leaves many issues

---

<sup>6</sup> Imaging used in the sense referred to by Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis (2002).

unaddressed, unresolved or unchanged. Still versions or aspects of this peacekeeping are already in operation or have occurred, so it is not entirely imagined nor can it be said to be entirely unrealistic.

### Further research

This research has many limitations and, I believe, could be fruitfully expanded. In particular broadening the cross section of peacekeepers interviewed would bring in new standpoints and meaning. Undertaking interviews in Spanish, French and other languages, and including more former peacekeepers from more regions of the global south, would undoubtedly provide new perspectives on all the themes touched upon in this thesis. Exploring the differences in perspectives between local people and ground level peacekeepers might also provide important insights that would help contextualise peacekeepers' perceptions. Certainly using different research methods might include larger numbers (for instance a broadly distributed survey of former peacekeepers), and impact confidence in the new findings.

As with all research projects, this project raised many more questions for further investigation. Unlike most relationships described in the literature, peacekeeping seems to develop and use relationships that move between more coercive and more cooperative interactions and periods. There appears to be nothing in the relationship literature (at least from what I found) regarding coercive, and in particular violently coercive relationships which are intended to move toward more cooperative and peaceful relationships, let alone which move between these tendencies. What are the implications of this complexity for furthering understanding of social capital and trust? It would be quite fruitful to investigate what seems like a relational anomaly in peacekeeping relationships. I was only focused on the peacekeeper side. How do the partners in these relationships – belligerents, government officials, local civilians – experience and understand their interactions as relationships? While small, there is a growing body of work reflecting how belligerents and local people perceive peacekeeping, but it does not address their experiences as relationships.<sup>7</sup> There is much more to explore in terms of how all the parties to these relationships understand and work within these relational fields, as the

---

<sup>7</sup> See for example Pouligny (2006), Talentino (2007), Mehler (2008), Whalan (2010), Gelot and Soderbaum (2012), for discussion of how local people perceive peacekeeping. And Taylor, Mvukiyeh and Samii (2006), Mvukiyeh and Samii (2008), Mvukiyeh and Samii (2010a), for discussion of the views of belligerents.



relationships are constructed by on-going everyday interactions, symbols, meaning, and worldviews.

In addition to understanding how those participating in peacekeeping relationships understand them, there is further work to be done to explore how these relationships are believed to work. What happens in the process of constructing relationships, perceptions of power and influence, and other related dynamics that create perceptions of increased cost of violence and increased benefits of cooperation? How might we understand the intersection of acceptance, relationships and local problem-solving as it impacts effective peacekeeping? Most simplistically, how do relationships contribute to the prevention of violence and protection of civilians?

As with other literature on the subject, there is much more to be done to understand what peacekeepers mean when they talk about the need for local problem-solving, making space or local ownership. While the police from New Zealand seem to have a particular model for local problem-solving, others were less clear about what they meant. This seems particularly important in relating peacekeeper perceptions to the work on liberal peace. Some peacekeepers, charged with maintaining sufficient security and safety so that other components can do their work, believed their mandates undercut their effectiveness. If this is a more widely held perception, it has significant implications for the discussion and implementation of liberal peace, from a practical perspective as well as a more theoretical standpoint.

Numerous other avenues for inquiry come to mind. Particularly with the peacekeepers who perceived that their nationality or ethnicity was superior, I became quite curious about whether local people would hold similar perspectives. Much of the discussion of who should do peacekeeping in terms of military or police, might benefit from further input from frontline peacekeepers, as well as the views of local people. I am not aware, for instance, of literature that asks local people their views of police versus military peacekeepers. And in the very few situations in which there are military, police and unarmed civilian peacekeepers, acquiring feedback from local people and belligerents on their acceptance, relationships and effectiveness would make further contributions to the discussion of which type of peacekeepers to use in what contexts.

The dilemma posed by military peacekeepers, also indirectly referenced in military peacekeeping literature, between carrying and using weapons for self and civilian

protection vs. being more accessible to good relationships when unarmed, seems particularly compelling for further exploration. How do they understand when the risks of being unarmed outweigh the advantages to relationship building and maintenance, and all that being unarmed signals? How do peacekeepers think about the contexts and criteria for making these decisions? At what organisational level are the decisions made? Do local people perceive the dilemma at all, and if so, what does it mean for them? I am sure that this is the tip of the iceberg of questions related to this dilemma. And it is perhaps only a small portion of the questions raised by this research project.

### Concluding the conclusion

This research is offered with the intention of making a small contribution toward a more peaceful and just world, by envisioning ways to decrease reliance on military force in peacekeeping and to support increased emancipation in conflict affected communities.<sup>8</sup> This research has been influenced by my belief in the capacity of humans to work with conflict nonviolently and that more effective peacekeeping might contribute toward this goal. I close with a quote from a former soldier in Iraq, interviewed because we miscommunicated in setting up the interview, but there we were, and the interview unfolded. Toward the end, reflecting on the value of his experiences, which were quite difficult, he said:

“There is no weapon that can be justified, there's no war that can be justified. To see and experience the taking of the life of another human being, is never morally right. As humans, understand we all have the right to peaceful lives. People can say what they want about the right to protection through means of arms, but the whole point of a weapon is to kill or maim. And that is just not right. At the beginning of life every being is given the sense of love, everybody and everything wants to be loved at the beginning of life. We are all born with a sense of love and compassion, initially. It was there in the beginning, and it probably still exists now, and as human beings we have to get back to that, we have to try. But media and everything else makes life complicated, covers over what we really are. First and foremost we are humans. (former soldier in Iraq, interview August 2011)”

---

<sup>8</sup> This seems particularly crucial as I write, when the world seems enchanted with the efficacy of force, with the recent authorisation of a special intervention force in the DRC and the debate on providing arms for Syrian rebels.

## Appendix A Research Participants

Code	Date	Note: some have less identifying information to protect identity
MAA	June 30 2011	Male, European, Bosnia, 1995, UN then Nato
UAB	July 14 2011	Female, North American, Guatemala 2007 with NP
M/CAC	July 18 2011	Male, European, Kosovo with NATO 2009-2010 as soldier and 2011 civilian
CAD	July 18 2011	Female, European, Civilian UN DPK in Afghanistan 2004
UAE	July 19 2011	Female, North American, with NP Sri Lanka
UAF	July 21 2011	Male, European, PBI Aceh 2003-04
U/CAG	July 21 2011	Female, European, NP Sri Lanka and EU Georgia 2009
UAH	July 23 2011	Female, European, NP Sri Lanka
PAI	July 29 2011	Male, Australia/NZ, police, E. Timor with Aust/NZ then UN, 2006-7, Solomons 2002
UAJ	July 30 2011/Aug. 1	Male, African, NP, Philippines and Sri Lanka
UAK	July 31 2011	Male, European, NP Sri Lanka and Philippines
UAL	Aug 2 2011	Female, European, PBI, West Papua
UAM	Aug 6 2011	Female, North American, PBI, Guatemala and W. Timor
MAN	Aug 9 2011	Male, Australia/NZ, Army, Afghanistan - NATO, 2008
MAO	Aug 9 2011	Male, Australia/NZ Army, Solomon Islands - RAMSI, 2008
MAP	Aug 9 2011	Male, European, Eritrea/Ethiopia, UN, 2004
MAQ	Aug 12 2011	Male, European, Afghanistan - NATO 2006
PAR	Aug 13 2011	Male, Australia/NZ, Police, UN, E. Timor 2010
UAS	Aug 17 2011	Male, European, PBI in W. Papua 2004 and Aceh 2007
M/UAT	Aug 18 - 2011	Male, European, UN - Lebanon in 1988-9 and NP
MAU	Aug. 19 2011	Male, North American, army, Iraq, 2004-05
PAV	Aug. 22 2011	Female, Australian/NZ, Police, Solomons RAMSI 03 E Timor UN 06-07
UAW	Aug 23 2011	Female, North American, PBI, Nepal
UAX	Aug 23 2011	Female, North American, NP Sri Lanka and Sudan
MAY	Aug. 31 2011	Male, Australian/NZ, Army, Nato in Afghanistan 06 and UN in E Timor 2010
MAZ	Sept. 15 2011	Male, S. Asian, Army, 4 missions, 50's - UNIFIL 1985 & 1992, UNPROFOR 1995, MONUC 2001-02
CBA	Sept. 16 2011	Male, S. Asian, Civilian 4 UN missions - Kosovo 2000 and 2010, Liberia 2003, Afghanistan 2005, E. Timor 2011
CBB	Sept 17 2011`	Female, E. Asian, Civilian, UN Afghanistan 2008-2010, E. Timor 2001-02
UBC	Oct 4 2011	Male, North American, NP several projects
UBD	Sept 24 2011	Male, global south, NP Sri Lanka
UBE	Oct. 5 2011	Male, South Asian, NP Sri Lanka and S. Sudan
PBF	Oc. 3 2011	Male, Australian/NZ, police, UN E. Timor 2006-07

PBG	Oct 5 2011	Male, Australian/NZ, police, UN E.Timor 2008 and RAMSI Solomon Islands - 2002
UBH	Oct 6 2011	Female, North American, NP Sri Lanka and S. Sudan, also PBI Indonesia
MBI	Oct 13 2011	Male, S. Asian, Army, 4 UN missions - Bosnia 93-94, Sierra Leone 2001, Lebanon 2006, Chad 2009
PBJ	Oct. 18 2011	Female, European, police, UN Bosnia 2000-01, EU Jordan training Iraq police 2006 - 9 months, EU Georgia 2008
PBK	Oct 20 2011	Female, Australian/NZ, Police, RAMSI Solomon Islands 2006-7,
MBL	Oct 22 2011	Male, African, Army, AU Burundi 2001-02, UN DRC 2003-04
PBN	Oct 27 2011	Female, Australian/NZ police, E.Timor - Anzac then UN, 2006- 2007
MBP	Oct 28 2011	Male, North American, Army, NATO ISAF Afghanistan - 2008 & 2011
MBQ	Nov 14 2011	Male, Australia/NZ, Army, Bougainville 1998-99 and NATO Afghanistan 2007-08,
PCA	January 20 2012	Female, Australian/NZ, police, , RAMSI Solomons 2005 and 2006
PCB	January 30 2012	Male, Australian/NZ, police, RAMSI Solomons 2004 and UN E.Timor 2010
PCC	Feb 1 2012	Male, Australian/NZ, police, UN E.Timor 2007
PCD	Feb 2 2012	Male, Australian/NZ, Police, UN E. Timor 2000-01 and Sudan 2007
MCE	Feb 9 2012	Male, Australian/NZ, Army, UN Bosnia, UN E. Timor - 2000 and 2001-2, NATO Afghanistan
PCF	Feb 23 2012	Male, Australian/NZ police RAMSI Solomon Islands 2006 and 2008
MCG	Feb 24 2012	Female, Australian/NZ, military, EU Bosnia 2006
MBR	March 3 2012	Male, European, Army, UN Bosnia 1994, 1995-96, NATO 97-98 and 2000,
PCH	April 10 2012	Male, Australian/NZ police, Timor 1999 and Solomons 2004
PCJ	may 4 2012	Male, Australian/NZ, police, Mozambique 1994
PCK	June 1 2012	Male, Australian/NZ, police, Bougainville 1999, Aus/NZ and UN Timor 2000 RAMSI Solomons 2003 and 2004, UN Sudan 2007
PCL	June 5 2012	Male, Australian/NZ, police, Solomons 2002, 03, 04 and Afghanistan 2009

## Appendix B Semi- structured interview questions

Questions to be asked:

At the beginning of each interview the participant will be asked their age, gender, the mission they served in and length of mission, and nationality.

Other types of questions to be asked:

Please tell me how you came to serve as a peacekeeper?

Did you receive any special training for this?

(The main iterative questions will be along the following lines)

What did you actually do, week by week and what did you think was the purpose or reason for these activities?

Please tell me, based on your experience, what was effective during your time as a peacekeeper? Or what would you consider was a successful action? ( follow up phrases – what was most useful in your opinion or what worked?).

Some peacekeepers have mentioned relationships as part of effective peacekeeping. Were relationships part of your experience (or something along these lines).

How did you know that this worked? Why did it work?

(keep probing for other examples – was anything else successful? )

How, if at all, did this relate to what you understand to be the purpose of the mission or project, or what you were there to do? Do you have stories to share as examples?

What were the key or a set of key dilemmas, if any, that you had to deal with and how did you live in that tension, or resolve, or address it?

What do you think peacekeeping is? What is it supposed to do? How?

Did it matter that you were armed (or unarmed in the case of some police and civilian peacekeepers)?


Did anyone ever ask you or use what you knew "worked"?

Was it worth it?

## Appendix C Participant Information Sheet

[Reference Number 11/078]

[10 May 2011 ]



### **Conceptualizing effectiveness in peacekeeping operations: Exploring the perspectives and experiences of individual frontline peacekeepers.**

#### **INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS**

Thank you for showing an interest in this project. Please read this information sheet carefully before deciding whether or not to participate. If you decide to participate we thank you. If you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to you and we thank you for considering our request.

#### **What is the Aim of the Project?**

The aim of this project is to contribute to the field of peacekeeping by adding the experiences of soldiers, police and civilians to the analysis of how peacekeeping works. In this project, peacekeepers are being asked their opinions and views about what was effective or what was successful during their service in the field.

You are being asked to participate because we think it is important that the views of people who are or who have been in the field doing the day to day work of peacekeeping, contribute to understanding what works.

This project is being undertaken as part of the requirement for a Doctoral degree in Peace and Conflict Studies.

### **Who can participate?**

We are inviting former members of peacekeeping missions or projects to participate in interviews. Participants are being recruited through recommendations from other peacekeepers and non-field staff from peacekeeping missions.

In order to participate you must be: at least 22 years old; a current or former peacekeeper who served for at least 3 month in a mission or project; be willing to participate in an hour interview (though you can withdraw at any point); and speak sufficient English for the interview to be conducted in English. We expect to interview approximately 40 people.

A website will be created to post summaries of the interviews and to host discussion between those who were interviewed and the researcher. If you choose to participate in this study, and wish to participate in the online discussion, you will have the opportunity to do so, after reading a copy of your interview summary to ensure it accurately reflects your views. This is not a requirement. On the consent form there will be a place to check your interest in participating on the website, but you can change your mind at any time.

### **If you participate, what will you be asked to do?**

Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked to participate in an interview that will last approximately one hour, most likely via telephone or skype, and which will be recorded. During the interview you will be asked questions regarding your peacekeeping mission and your own experience of what you thought was effective or was successful, as well as some related questions such whether you received any training and your thoughts

about being an armed peacekeeper or unarmed peacekeeper. The precise nature of the questions have not been predetermined in advance, but will depend on the way the interview develops. Consequently, although the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee is aware of the general areas to be explored in the interview, the Committee has not been able to review the precise questions to be used.

In the event that the line of questioning does develop in such a way that you feel hesitant or uncomfortable you are reminded of your right to decline to answer any particular question(s) and also that you may withdraw from the project at any stage without any disadvantage to yourself of any kind.

### Risks

There is the possibility that discussing your experiences during your peacekeeping mission will bring up painful or uncomfortable memories. The interviewer will check in with you several times during the interview to be sure that you wish to continue the discussion and are not unduly uncomfortable. *You* are welcome to decline to discuss any question or to change the topic at any time. We do not want you to do anything that would cause you harm.

### **What personal information will be collected and how will it be used?**

If you decide to participate you will be asked to share your age, gender, name of the peacekeeping mission in which you served, length of service, and nationality. As mentioned above the interviews will be recorded and portions of them will be transcribed. Each recording will be given an alias associated with the personal data on the form. After that point your name will not be associated with your interview.

The information you share will be analysed with that of other participants to develop a deeper understanding of peacekeeping. It will be used to write a thesis and potentially other papers and reports. Fragments of your interview may appear in the final report, but will only be identified by alias and if relevant other personal information such as the name of the mission or project, length of service or gender. Your name will not be used in any publication, paper or report.



The interviews will be partially transcribed. This means that someone beside the researchers may hear your interview, though this person will not know your name. The researcher is a PhD candidate and her supervisors will also be able to listen to the interviews and read transcripts and summaries.

The spread sheet that links names with other personal data, the actual digital recordings of the interviews and any transcriptions will be retained in safe storage for five years at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Otago University, Dunedin, New Zealand. After five years they will be destroyed.

Reasonable precautions will be taken to protect and destroy data gathered by email or on the web. However, the security of electronically transmitted information cannot be guaranteed. Caution is advised in the electronic transmission of sensitive material.

The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve your anonymity.

You are quite welcome to request a copy of the thesis from the University of Otago. You can access the thesis online at <http://otago.ourarchive.ac.nz/> .

If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to contact either:

Ellen Furnari or Dr. Heather Devere at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies. Dr. Devere's office number is +64 03 470-3592. Ellen Furnari's email address is [furnarie@gmail.com](mailto:furnarie@gmail.com) and Dr. Devere's email address is [heather.devere@otago.ac.nz](mailto:heather.devere@otago.ac.nz)

This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479 8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated and you will be informed of the outcome.

## Appendix D Armed Peacekeeping vs. Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping

### Armed Peacekeeping vs. Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping

ARMED PEACEKEEPING		UNARMED CIVILIAN PEACEKEEPING
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Civilians worth protecting.</li> <li>-Discipline</li> <li>-Violent force legitimate if absolutely necessary.</li> <li>On principle of minimum force strictly within the mandate. Must avoid becoming a party in the conflict. This can be difficult if violence used.</li> <li>-Independent of any one government but dependent on Security Council mandate. Chapter six and a half<sup>1</sup></li> <li>-Adherence to IHL and UDHR.</li> <li>Dual chains of command in the field – National Military and UN</li> <li>Conflict sensitivity and do no harm.</li> </ul>	<b>Principles and Values</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Civilians worth protecting.</li> <li>-Discipline (must aspire to level of armed peacekeepers).</li> <li>-Nonviolence and Nonpartiality</li> <li>-Independent of any government.</li> <li>-Adherence to IHL and UDHR.</li> <li>-Responsibility for transforming society lies with internal actors; UCP's support them in this process.</li> <li>-Conflict sensitivity and do no harm</li> <li>True cross national peace force with one chain of command</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Stop/reduce Violence.</li> <li>-Increase physical security of conflicting people by keeping conflicting groups apart or by acting as a buffer between conflicting groups.</li> <li>- and if possible creating safe space for conflicting people to transform their conflicts.</li> </ul>	<b>Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Stop/reduce violence.</li> <li>-Increase security of conflicting people by creating a buffer between conflicting groups and creating safe space for conflicting people to transform their conflicts.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Armed deterrence against irregular armed groups</li> <li>Security Council mandate deters attack from regular state forces</li> <li>Acceptance as a ceasefire monitor or integral part of on the ground peace process arrangements</li> <li>-Preventative measures to reduce risk for staff.</li> </ul>	<b>Security Strategies</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Acceptance by communities in which UCP's work.</li> <li>-Mobilisation and advocacy of international support in case acceptance is at an unsustainable level.</li> <li>-Preventative measures to reduce risk for staff.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Work primarily with other armed actors (e.g. police, security forces) and government officials.</li> </ul>	<b>Focus in Relationships</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Work with all actors (security forces, civil society, government).</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Hierarchical, built on chain of command.</li> <li>-Decision making usually one way and subordinates follow orders.</li> </ul>	<b>Operational Structure and Communication</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Hierarchical, built on line management and dialogue (Sometimes decentralized power structure).</li> <li>-Consensus decision-making when possible built on feedback from relevant staff, local partners, and community members.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Power over (i.e. Threat of superior force if necessary).</li> <li>-Image: Outside actors stationed in conflicted communities to deter violence.</li> <li>-Trustworthy?</li> </ul>	<b>Sources of Strength/Effectiveness</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Acceptance and support of community because UCP's are in and committed to the community.</li> <li>-Ability to mobilize international opinion if necessary.</li> <li>-Image: Outside actor who works closely with conflicted communities.</li> <li>-Trustworthy?</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Conflict is destructive and something to be managed or suppressed with force.</li> <li>-Focus primarily on negative behaviours of conflict.</li> </ul>	<b>Perspective on Conflict</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Conflict can be a source of destruction or transformation. Negative conflict is to be managed in order to give space for internal actors to transform it.</li> <li>-Work with attitudes and behaviours of conflicting people/groups and help provide secure space for internal actors to address the root causes of the conflict.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Resides with superior officer, the organisation, and the government of the country armed peacekeepers are stationed in.</li> </ul>	<b>Accountability</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Resides with UCP her/himself, the line manager, the organization, the community in which the UCP's work, and the government of the country.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-SOP's</li> <li>-Contingency Plans</li> </ul>	<b>Security Planning</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-SOP's</li> <li>-Contingency Plans</li> </ul>

By Bernard O'Sullivan and Robert Rivers – Nonviolent Peaceforce  
 Provided to me by Robert Rivers October, 2011

<sup>1</sup> The term "peacekeeping" is not found in the UN Charter. Dag Hammarskjold referred to it as belonging to "Chapter Six and a Half" of the Charter, placing it between traditional methods of resolving disputes peacefully, such as mediation and fact-finding (Chapter VI) and more forceful action, such as embargos and military intervention (Chapter VII). .. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/intro/1.htm>

## References

- Adler, Emanuel. (1998). Condition(s) of Peace. *Review of International Studies*, 24 (05), 165-191.
- Anderson, Ben, & Harrison, Paul. (2010). The Promise of Non-Representational Theories. In B. Anderson & P. Harrison (Eds.), *Taking-place: Non-representational theories and geography* (pp. 1-34). Farnham: Ashgate.
- Annan, Kofi, & Mousavizadeh, Nader. (2012). *Interventions: A life in war and peace*. New York: Penguin Press.
- Aoi, Chiyuki, Coning, Cedric De, & Thakur, Ramesh. (2007). *Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- Bekkering, Dave. (2000). Balkan Peace Team International In Croatia: Otvorene Oci (Open Eyes). In Y. Moser-Puangsuwan & T. Weber (Eds.), *Nonviolent Intervention Across Borders: A recurrent Vision* (pp. 191-206). Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Bellamy, Alex, & Williams, Paul (2005). Who's Keeping the Peace?: Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations. *International Security*, 29(4), 157-195.
- Bellamy, Alex, & Williams, Paul (2009). The West and Contemporary Peace Operations. *Journal of Peace Research*, 46(1), 39-57.
- Bellamy, Alex, Williams, Paul, & Griffin, Stuart. (2010). *Understanding Peacekeeping* (second ed.). Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Benner, Thorsten, Mergenthaler, Stephan, & Rotmann, Philipp. (2011). *The New World of UN Peace Operations: Learning to Build Peace?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Berdal, Mats. (2000). Lessons not learned: The use of force in 'peace operations' in the 1990s. *International peacekeeping*, 7(4), 55-74. doi: 10.1080/13533310008413863
- Bigo, Didier. (2008). Globalized (in)security: the field and the ban-opticaon. In D. Bigo & A. Tsoukala (Eds.), *Terror, insecurity and liberty: Illiberal practices of liberal regimes after 9/11* (pp. 10-48). London: Routledge.
- Bigo, Didier, & Tsoukala, Anastassia. (2008). Understanding (in)security. In D. Bigo & A. Tsoukala (Eds.), *Terror, insecurity and liberty: Illiberal practices of liberal regimes after 9/11* (pp. 1-9). London: Routledge.
- Booth, Ken. (1991). Security and emancipation. *Review of international studies*, 17(4), 313.

- Booth, Ken. (2005a). Critical Explorations. In K. Booth (Ed.), *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Booth, Ken (Ed.). (2005b). *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. (1992). *An Agenda For Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*. New York: United Nations.
- Bove, Vincenzo, & Elia, Leandro. (2011). Supplying peace: Participation in and troop contribution to peacekeeping missions. *Journal of Peace Research*, 48(6), 699-714. doi: 10.1177/0022343311418265
- Bridges, Donna, & Horsfall, Debbie. (2009). Increasing Operational Effectiveness in UN Peacekeeping: Toward a Gender-Balanced Force. *Armed Forces and Society*, 36(1), 120.
- Brigg, M. (2010). Autoethnographic International Relations: exploring the self as a source of knowledge. *Review of international studies*, 36(3), 779.
- Brown, Patrick R. (2008). Trusting in the New NHS: instrumental versus communicative action. *Sociology of Health & Illness*, 30(3), 349-363.
- Burke, Anthony. (2013). Post-structural security studies. In L. Shepherd (Ed.), *Critical Approaches to security studies* (pp. 77-88). London: Routledge.
- Bryant, Antony, & Charmaz, Kathy (Eds.). (2007). *The Sage Handbook of Grounded Theory*. London: Sage Publications.
- Byrne, David. (1998). *Complexity theory and the social sciences: An introduction*. London: Routledge.
- Call, Charles T., & Cook, Susan E. (2003). On Democratization and Peacebuilding. *Global Governance*, 9(2), 233.
- Campbell, D. (1998). Why fight: Humanitarianism, principles, and post-structuralism. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 27(3), 197-221.
- Chandler, D. (2010). The uncritical critique of 'liberal peace'. *Review of International Studies*, 1(1), 1.
- Charbonneau, Bruno. (2012). War and Peace in Côte d'Ivoire: Violence, Agency, and the Local/International Line. *International Peacekeeping*, 19(4), 508-524. doi: 10.1080/13533312.2012.709776
- Charbonneau, Louis. (2011). UN probes peacekeepers' absence amid Sudan clashes. <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/exclusive-un-probes-peacekeepers-absence-amid-sudan-clashes>

- Charmaz, Kathy. (2006). *Constructing Grounded Theory: A practical guide through qualitative analysis*. London: Sage Publications Ltd.
- Charmaz, Kathy. (2009). Shifting the Grounds: Constructivist Grounded Theory Methods. In J. Morse, P. N. Stern, J. Corbin, B. Bowers, K. Charmaz & A. E. Clarke (Eds.), *Developing Grounded Theory The Second Generation* (pp. 127-193). Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press, Inc.
- Cheesman, Graeme. (2005). Military Force(s) and In/Security. In K. Booth (Ed.), *Critical Security Studies and World Politics* (pp. 63-88). Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Clarke, Adele E. (2005). *Situational Analysis Grounded Theory after the Postmodern Turn*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Clarke, Adele E., & Friese, Carrie. (2007). Grounded theory in the research methods context: Grounded theorizing using situational analysis. In A. Bryant & K. Charmaz (Eds.), *The SAGE handbook of grounded theory*. Los Angeles SAGE Publications.
- Clements, Kevin. (2012). Building sustainable peace and compassionate community. In L. Tropp (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Intergroup Conflict* (pp. 344-356). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Coleman, Peter T., Kugler, Katharina G., Bui-Wrzosinska, Lan, Nowak, Andrzej, & Vallacher, Robin. (2012). Getting Down to Basics: A Situated Model of Conflict in Social Relations. *Negotiation Journal*, 28(1), 7-43.
- Collective, C.A.S.E. (2006). Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto. *Security Dialogue*, 37(4), 443-487. doi: 10.1177/0967010606073085
- Cook, S. D. N. (1999). Bridging Epistemologies: The Generative Dance Between Organizational Knowledge and Organizational Knowing. *Organization science (Providence, R.I.)*, 10(4), 381-400. doi: 10.1287/orsc.10.4.381
- Cox, Michaelene (Ed.). (2009). *Social Capital and Peace-building: Creating and resolving conflict with trust and social networks*. London: Routledge.
- Cox, R. W. (1994). The Crisis in World Order and the Challenge to International Organization. *Cooperation and conflict*, 29(2), 99-113. doi: 10.1177/0010836794029002001
- Cunliffe, Philip. (2012). Still the Spectre at the Feast: Comparisons between Peacekeeping and Imperialism in Peacekeeping Studies Today. *International Peacekeeping*, 19(4), 426-442. doi: 10.1080/13533312.2012.709751

- Darby, Phillip. (2009a). Recasting Western knowledges about (postcolonial) security. In D. Grenfell & P. James (Eds.), *Rethinking insecurity, war and violence: Beyond savage globalization* (pp. 98-109). London: Routledge.
- Darby, Phillip. (2009b). Rolling Back the Frontiers of Empire: Practising the Postcolonial. *International Peacekeeping*, 16(5), 699-716.
- De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno , & Downs, George W. (2006). Intervention and Democracy. *International Organization*, 60(3), 627-649.
- den Heyer, Garth. (2011). Filling the security gap: Military or police. *Police Practice and Research: An International Journal*, 12(6), 460-473.
- Deutsch, Morton. (2011a). Cooperation and Competition. In P. T. Coleman (Ed.), *Conflict, interdependence, and justice: The intellectual legacy of Morton Deutsch* (pp. 23-40). New York: Srpinger.
- Deutsch, Morton. (2011b). Interdependence and psychological orientatoin. In P. Colemant (Ed.), *Conflict, Interdependence and Justice: The Intellectual Legacy of Morton Deutsch* (pp. 247-271): Springer.
- Diehl, Paul. (2009). Peacekeeping and beyond. In J. Bercovitch, V. Kremenyuk & W. Zartman (Eds.), *The SAGE handbook of conflict resolution* (pp. 525-542). London: SAGE Publications.
- Docherty, Jayne Seminare. (2001). *Learning lessons from Waco: When the parties bring their Gods to the negotiation table*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Downes, Stephen M. (2000). Constructivism. In E. Craig (Ed.), *Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy online*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Doyle, Michael W., & Sambanis, Nicholas. (2006). *Making War and Building Peace*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Druckman, Daniel, Stern, Paul C., Diehl, Paul, Fetherston, A. Betts, Johansen, Robert, Durch, William, & Ratner, Steven. (1997). Evaluating PeaceKeeping Missions. *Mershon International Studies Review*, 41(1), 151-165.
- Duffield, Mark. (2010). The Liberal Way of Development and the Development—Security Impasse: Exploring the Global Life-Chance Divide. *Security Dialogue*, 41(1), 53-76.
- Durch, William. (2006a). Are We Learning Yet? The Long Road to Applying Best Practices. In W. Durch (Ed.), *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations*. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace.

- Durch, William. (2006b). Restoring and Maintaining Peace: What we know so far. In W. J. Durch (Ed.), *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations*. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace.
- Durch, William (Ed.). (2006c). *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations*. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace.
- Durch, William, & Giffen, Alison C. (2010). *Protection of Civilians in Multidimensional Peace Operations*. Paper presented at the 3rd International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, Queenbeyan Australia: Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence.
- Duyvesteyn, Isabelle. (2008). Exploring the utility of force: some conclusions. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 19(3), 423 - 443.
- ECOWAS. (2005). Lessons from ECOWAS peacekeeping operations 1990-2004: ECOWAS.
- Egnell, Robert. (2009). *Between Reluctance and Necessity: The Utility of Military Force in Humanitarian and Development Operations* Oslo: The Norwegian Atlantic Committee.
- Eriksen, Stein Sundstøl. (2009). The Liberal Peace Is Neither: Peacebuilding, State building and the Reproduction of Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. *International Peacekeeping* 16(5), 652-666.
- Feldman, Ilana. (2010). Ad Hoc Humanity: UN Peacekeeping and the Limits of International Community in Gaza. *American Anthropologist*, 112(3), 416-429. doi: 10.1111/j.1548-1433.2010.01249.x
- Fetherston, A. B. (2000). Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: A Reconsideration of Theoretical Frameworks. *International Peacekeeping* 7(1), 190.
- Fielding, Nigel G. (2005). Concepts and Theory in Community Policing. *The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice*, 44(5), 460-472. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2311.2005.00391.x
- Fine, Michelle, Weis, Lois, Weseen, Susan, & Wong, Loonmun. (2003). For Whom? Qualitative Research, Representations, and Social Responsibilities. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *The Landscape of Qualitative Research: Theories and Issues* (2nd ed., pp. 167-207). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Finnemore, Martha. (2003). *The purpose of intervention: Changing beliefs about the use of force*. Ithica: Cornell University Press.

- Fjelde, Hanne, & Hultman, Lisa. (2010). *Weakening Your Enemy: Constituencies and the location of violence against civilians in Africa, 1989-2006*. Paper presented at the 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference, Stockholm.
- Flores, T. E. (2012). The Effect of Elections on Postconflict Peace and Reconstruction. *The Journal of politics*, 1(1), 1.
- Fortna, Virginia Page. (2008a). *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices After Civil War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Fortna, Virginia Page. (2008b). Peacekeeping and democratization. In A. K. Jarstad & T. D. Sisk (Eds.), *From war to democracy dilemmas of peacebuilding* (pp. 39-79). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fortna, Virginia Page, & Howard, Lise Morjé. (2008). Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11(1), 283-301. doi: doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.041205.103022
- Francis, Diana. (2010). *From Pacification To Peacebuilding A call To Global Transformation*. London: Pluto Press.
- Franke, Volker C., & Warnecke, Andrea. (2009). Building peace: an inventory of UN Peace Missions since the end of the Cold War. *International Peacekeeping*, 16(3), 407-436.
- Frantz, Erica. (2012). Trends in democratization: Unpacking Anocracies. In J. J. Hewitt, J. Wilkenfield, T. R. Gurr & B. Heldt (Eds.), *Peace and Conflict 2012* (pp. 31-38). Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
- Furnari, Ellen. (2006). The first 2.5 years: An evaluation of the Nonviolent Peaceforce in Sri Lanka *Intervention*, 4(3), 260-268.
- Furnari, Ellen. (2010). *Nonviolent Peaceforce in Action: A study in violence prevention and related theory*. Paper presented at the Institute of Mathematical Applications Conference: Analysing Conflict Transformation, Oxford, UK.
- Galtung, Johan. (1996). *Peace by Peaceful Means. Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. London: Sage Publications.
- Galtung, Johan, & Eide, Ingrid. (1976). Some Factors Affecting local Acceptance of a UN Force a Pilot Project Report from Gaza. In J. Galtung (Ed.), *Peace, War and Defense* (Vol. Two, pp. 240-263). Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers.
- Galtung, Johan, & Hveem, Helge. (1976). Participants in Peacekeeping Forces. In J. Galtung (Ed.), *Peace, War and Defense* (Vol. Two, pp. 264-281). Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers.



- Gelot, Linnea. (2012). *Legitimacy, peace operations and global-regional security: The African Union-United Nations partnership in Darfur*. New York: Routledge.
- Gelot, Linnea, & Soderbaum, Fredrik. (2012). Rethinking intervention and interventionism. *Development Dialogue Dag Hammarskjold Foundation*, 58(April 2012), 133-150.
- George, Jim, & Campbell, David. (1990). Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference: Critical Social Theory and International Relations. *International Studies Quarterly*, 34(3), 269-293.
- Giffen, Alison. (2011). Enhancing the protection of civilians in peace operations: From policy to practice: Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence, Queenbeyan Australia.
- Gilligan, Michael J., Pasquale, Benjamin J., & Samii, Cyrus D. (2011). Civil war and social capital: Behavioral-game evidence from Nepal Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1911969> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1911969>
- Gilligan, Michael J., & Sergenti, Ernest J. (2008). Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching to Improve Causal Inference. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 3, 89-122.
- Goldsmith, Andrew. (2009). 'It wasn't like normal policing': voices of Australian police peacekeepers in Operation Serene, Timor-Leste 2006. *Policing and Society*, 19(2), 119-133. doi: 10.1080/10439460802187548
- Goldstein, Joshua. (2011). *Winning the war on war: The decline of armed conflict worldwide*. New York: Dutton.
- Goldstone, Jack A. (2004). More social movements or fewer? Beyond political opportunity structures to relational fields. *Theory and Society*, 33(3-4), 333-365. doi: 10.1023/b:ryso.0000038611.01350.30
- Gowan, Richard. (2008). The Strategic Context: Peacekeeping in Crisis, 2006–08. *International Peacekeeping*, 15(4), 453-469.
- Greener, B. K. (2009a). *The new international policing*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Greener, B. K. (2009b). UNPOL: UN police as peacekeepers. *Policing and Society*, 19(2), 106-118. doi: 10.1080/10439460802187522
- Greener, B. K., & Fish, W. J. (2011). Situating police and military in contemporary peace operations. Queenbeyan Australia: Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence, Queenbeyan Australia.
- Greener, Peter. (2009). Police as international peacekeepers. *Policing and Society*, 19(2), 101-105.

- Griffin-Nolan, Ed. (2000). Witness For Peace. In Y. Moser-Puangsuwan & T. Weber (Eds.), *Nonviolent Interventions Across Borders: A Recurrent Vision* (pp. 279-304). Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Gunduz, Canan, & Herbolzheimer, Kristian. (2010). Standing united for peace: The EU in coordinated third-party support to peace processes: International Alert and Conciliation Resources
- Gurr, Ted Robert, Hewitt, J. Joseph, & Wilkenfield, Jonathan. (2010). *Peace and Conflict 2010*. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
- Guzzini, S. (2000). A reconstruction of constructivism in international relations. *European Journal of International Relations*, 6(2), 147-182.
- Han, Gyuseog, & Choi, Sang-Chin. (2011). Trust Working in Interpersonal Relationships: A Comparative Cultural Perspective with a Focus on East Asian Culture. *Comparative Sociology*, 10(3), 380-412.
- Han, Thich Nhat. (1992). *Peace is every step: The path of mindfulness in every day life*. New York: Bantam.
- Hardin, Russel. (2002). *Trust and Trustworthiness*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Harding, Sandra. (2004). A Socially Relevant Philosophy of Science? Resources from Standpoint Theory's Controversiality. *Hypatia*, 19(1), 25-47.
- Harris, Vandra, & Goldsmith, Andrew. (2010). Gendering Transnational Policing: Experiences of Australian Women in International Policing Operations. *International Peacekeeping* 17(2), 292-306.
- Hedlund, Erik, & Soeters, Joseph. (2010). Reflections on Swedish Peacekeepers' Self-image and Dilemmas of Peacekeeping. *International Peacekeeping* 17(3), 408-414.
- Hegre, Havard, Hultman, Lisa, & Nygard, Havard Mogleiv. (2010). *Evaluating the conflict-reducing effect of UN peace-keeping*. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC.  
[http://stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/PKO\\_prediction\\_SGIR.pdf](http://stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/PKO_prediction_SGIR.pdf)
- Heldt, Birger. (2011). Peacekeeping and transitions to democracy. In H. Fjelde & K. Hoglund (Eds.), *Building peace, creating conflict? Conflictual dimensions of local and international peace-building* (pp. 47-72). Lund: Nordic Academic Press.
- Heshusius, L. (1994). Freeing Ourselves From Objectivity: Managing Subjectivity or Turning Toward a Participatory Mode of Consciousness? *Educational researcher*, 23(3), 15-22. doi: 10.3102/0013189X023003015

- Higate, Paul, & Henry, Marsha. (2009a). *Insecure Spaces: Peacekeeping, power and performance in Haiti, Kosovo and Liberia*. London: Zed Books.
- Higate, Paul, & Henry, Marsha. (2009b). Space, Performance and Everyday Security in the Peacekeeping Context. *International Peacekeeping*, 17(1), 32-48.
- Hinojosa, Ramon. (2010). Doing hegemony: Military, men, and constructing a hegemonic masculinity. *Journal of Men's Studies*, 18(2), 179.
- Hoglund, Kristine, & Oberg, Magnus. (2011). Doing empirical peace research. In K. Hoglund & M. Oberg (Eds.), *Understanding peace research* (pp. 3-13). London: Routledge.
- Höglund, Kristine, & Svensson, Isak. (2011). Schizophrenic soothers. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 46(2), 166-184.
- Holt, Victoria, Taylor, Glyn, & Kelly, Max. (2009). *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations*. New York: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
- Holton, Judith A. (2007). The Coding Process and Its Challenges. In A. Bryant & K. Charmaz (Eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Grounded Theory* (pp. 265-289). London: Sage Publications.
- Homan, Kees, & Ducasse-Rogier, Marianne. (2012). Who is afraid of the responsibility to protect? *Clingendael Policy Brief*: Clingendael Institute.
- Howard, Lise Morje. (2008). *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hultman, Lisa. (2010). Keeping Peace or Spurring Violence? Unintended Effects of Peace Operations on Violence against Civilians. *Civil Wars*, 12(1), 29 - 46.
- Human Security Report Project. (2010). *Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War* (Pre-Publication ed.). Vancouver: Human Security Report Project.
- Hume, Mo. (2008). El Salvador: The Limits of a Violent Peace. In M. Pugh, N. Cooper & M. Turner (Eds.), *Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding* (pp. 318-333). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ichijo, Kazuo, & Nonaka, Ikujiro (Eds.). (2007). *Knowledge Creation and Management: New Challenges for Managers*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Indian army headquarters army training command. (2004). *Indian Army Doctrine*. Shimla: Indian Army Training Command.

- International Peace Institute. (2010). 2010 Vienna Seminar: UN Peacekeeping in the 21st Century - Partnerships for Peace. New York: International Peace Institute.
- Jabri, Vivienne. (2010). War, government, politics: A critical response to the hegemony of the liberal peace. In O. P. Richmond (Ed.), *Palgrave advances in peacebuilding: Critical developments and approaches* (pp. 41-57). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Jackson, Richard. (2009). Constructivism and Conflict Resolution. In J. Bercovitch, V. Kremenyuk & W. Zartman (Eds.), *The SAGE handbook of conflict resolution* (pp. 172-189). London: SAGE Publications.
- Jacoby, Tim. (2011). The Forum: Dealing with the Aftermath of Political Violence. *International Studies Review*, 13(2), 354-385. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2486.2011.01042.x
- Jagd, Soren. (2010). Balancing trust and control in organizations: towards a process perspective. *Society and Business Review*, 5(3), 259-269.
- Jarstad, Anna K. (2008). Dilemmas of war-to-democracy transitions: theories and concepts. In A. K. Jarstad & T. D. Sisk (Eds.), *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding* (pp. 17-36). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jelusic, Ljubica. (2007). Motivation for Peace Operations. *International Review of Sociology*, 17(1), 73-85. doi: 10.1080/03906700601129632
- Johansson, Eva. (1997). The Role of Peacekeepers in the 1990s: Swedish Experience in UNPROFOR. *Armed Forces & Society* (0095327X), 23(3), 451-466.
- Johnstone, Ian. (2011a). Managing Consent in Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations. *International Peacekeeping*, 18(2), 168-182.
- Johnstone, Ian. (2011b). Managing Consent in Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations. *International Peacekeeping* 18(2), 168-182.
- Jones, Bruce D (Ed.). (2012). *Annual review of global peace operations 2012*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Jones, Bruce, Gowan, Richard, & Sherman, Jake. (2009). Building on Brahimi: Peacekeeping in an era of strategic uncertainty. A report by the NYU Center on International Cooperation.: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Field support for the New Horizons project. .
- Jutila, Matti, Pehkonen, Samu, & Väyrynen, Tarja. (2008). Resuscitating a Discipline: An Agenda for Critical Peace Research. *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*, 36(3), 623-640. doi: 10.1177/03058298080360031201

- Kalyvas, S. N. (2003). The ontology of "political violence": action and identity in civil wars. *Perspectives on Politics*, 1, 475.
- Kemler, Olivia. (2010). *The Impact of the Indian Formed Police Unit in the United Nations Mission in Liberia*. (Master of Arts in Security Studies), Georgetown University, Washington D.C.
- Khodyakov, Dmitry. (2007). Trust as a Process. *Sociology*, 41(1), 115-132.
- Korac, Maja. (2006). Gender, conflict and peace-building: Lessons from the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. *Women's Studies International Forum*, 29(5), 510-510.
- Korac, Maja. (2009). Gender, conflict, and social capital: bonding and bridging in war in the former Yugoslavia. In M. Cox (Ed.), *Social Capital and Peace-Building: Creating and resolving conflict with trust and social networks* (pp. 107-121). London: Routledge.
- Krain, Matthew. (2005). International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and Politicides. *International Studies Quarterly*, 49(3), 363-388.
- Kramer, Eric-Hans. (2007). *Organizing Doubt: Grounded Theory, Army Units and Dealing with Dynamic Complexity*. Malmo: Liber Copenhagen Business School Press.
- Kreps, Sarah E. (2010). Why Does Peacekeeping Succeed or Fail. In I. Duyvesteyn & J. Angstrom (Eds.), *Modern War and the Utility of Force: Challenges, Methods and Strategies* (pp. 90-118). Hoboken: Routledge.
- Kreps, Sarah E, & Wallace, Geoffrey L. (2009). *Just How Humanitarian are Interventions? Peacekeeping and the Prevention of Civilian Killings during and after Civil Wars* Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting 2009 Toronto.
- Lafranie, Najibullah. (2011). Insurgency and Democratisation: Taliban Real Winners of Elections in Afghanistan. *Global Society*, 25(4), 469-489. doi: 10.1080/13600826.2011.605766
- Larsdotter, Kersti. (2009). The changing character of peace operations: The use of force at the tactical level. In K. Aggestam & A. Bjorkdahl (Eds.), *War and Peace in Transition: Changing Roles of External Actors* (pp. 90-106). Lund: Nordic Academic Press.
- Last, David. (1995). *Theory, Doctrine, and Practice of Conflict De-escalation in Peacekeeping Operations*. (Master of Military Art and Science), U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth.

- Last, David. (1997). *Theory, Doctrine and Practice of Conflict De-escalation in Peacekeeping Operations*. Clementsport: Canadian Peacekeeping Press of The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Centre.
- Lederach, John Paul. (1997). *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in divided societies*. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace.
- Lederach, John Paul. (2005). *The moral imagination: the art and soul of building peace*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lempert, Lora Bex. (2007). Asking questions of the Data: Memo Writing in the Grounded theory Tradition. In A. Bryant & K. Charmaz (Eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Grounded Theory* (pp. 245-264). London: Sage Publications.
- Leonard, David K. (2013). Social contracts, networks and security in tropical African conflict states: An overview. *IDS Bulletin*, 44(1), 1-14.
- Levin, Andrew. (2013). *Explaining sub-national peacekeeping outcomes in civil war*. Paper presented at the University of Pennsylvania Graduate Student Conference, Philadelphia.
- Lidén, Kristoffer, Mac Ginty, Roger, & Richmond, Oliver P. (2009). Introduction: Beyond Northern Epistemologies of Peace: Peacebuilding Reconstructed? *International Peacekeeping*, 16(5), 587-598.
- Lightburn, David. (2011). Lessons Learned. *NATO Review Web edition*, Vol. 49(No. 2 Summer), 12-15.
- Luckham, Robert. (2011). Democracy and security: a shotgun marriage. In S. Tadjbakhsh (Ed.), *Rethinking the liberal peace: External models and local alternatives* (pp. 89-109). London: Routledge.
- Mac Ginty, Roger. (2008). Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 43(2), 139-163.
- Mac Ginty, Roger. (2010). No war, no peace: Why so many peace processes fail to deliver peace. *International politics (Hague, Netherlands)*, 47(2), 145-162. doi: 10.1057/ip.2010.4
- Mac Ginty, Roger. (2011). *International peacebuilding and local resistance: Hybrid forms of peace*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mahony, Liam. (2000). Peace Brigades International: Nonviolence in Action. In Y. Moser-Puangsuwan & T. Weber (Eds.), *Nonviolent Intervention Across Borders: A recurrent vision* (pp. 133-161). Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

- Mahony, Liam. (2006). *Protective Presence: Field strategies for civilian protection*. Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.
- Mahony, Liam, & Eguren, Luis Enrigue. (1997). *Unarmed Bodyguards: International Accompaniment for the Protection of Human Rights*. West Hartford: Kumarian Press.
- Mahony, Liam, & Nash, Roger. (2012). *Influence on the Ground: Understanding and strengthening the protection impact of United Nations human rights field presences*. Brewster: Fieldview Solutions.
- Marten, Kimberly Zisk. (2004). *Enforcing the Peace*. New York: Columbia University.
- Martin-Brûlé, Sarah-Myriam. (2012). Assessing Peace Operations' Mitigated Outcomes. *International Peacekeeping*, 19(2), 235-250. doi: 10.1080/13533312.2012.665703
- Martin, Mary, & Stefanie Moser (eds). (2012). *Exiting conflict owning the peace*. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
- McLeod, Abby. (2009). Police capacity development in the Pacific: the challenge of local context. *Policing and Society*, 19(2), 147-160.
- Mehler, Andreas. (2008). Positive, ambiguous or negative? Peacekeeping in the local security fabric. *Critical Currents: Dag Hammarskjold Foundation Occasional paper series*, 2008(5), 41-63.
- Melander, Erik. (2009). Selected To Go Where Murderers Lurk? *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 26(4), 389-406.
- Merlingen, M. (2005). Power/Knowledge in International Peacebuilding: The Case of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia. *Alternatives: global, local, political*, 30(3), 297-323. doi: 10.1177/030437540503000303
- Merriam, Sharan B. (2001). Something Old, Something New: Adult Learning Theory for the Twenty-First Century. *New directions for adult and continuing education*, 2001(89), 93.
- Merriam, Sharan B., & Kim, Young Sek. (2008). Non-western perspectives on learning and knowing. *New directions for adult and continuing education*, 2008(119), 71-81.
- Miller, Gary. (2004). Monitoring, rules and the control paradox: can the good soldier Svejik be trusted? In R. M. Kramer & K. S. Cook (Eds.), *Trust and Distrust in Organizations: Dilemmas and approaches* (pp. 99-126). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

- Miller, Laura L. (1997). Do Soldiers Hate Peacekeeping? The Case of Preventive Diplomacy Operations in Macedonia. *Armed Forces & Society (0095327X)*, 23(3), 415-450.
- Mills, Jane, Bonner, Ann, & Francis, Karen. (2006). The development of constructivist grounded theory. *International journal of qualitative methods*, 5(1), 25.
- Ministry of Defence. (2004). *The military contribution to peace support operations*. Swindon UK: British Ministry of Defense Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre.
- Mitchell, Audra (2011). Quality/control: international peace interventions and 'the everyday'. *Review of International Studies*, 37(04), 1623-1645. doi: doi:10.1017/S0260210511000180
- Morrison, Alex, Cumner, S., Park, Hanbin, & Zoe, Kristeva A. (2008). Peacekeeping. In K. Lester (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict* (pp. 1571-1588). Oxford: Academic Press.
- Morse, Janice. (2007). Sampling in Grounded Theory. In A. Bryant & K. Charmaz (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Grounded Theory* (pp. 229-244). Londong: SAGE Publications.
- Moser-Puangsuwan, Yeshua, & Weber, Thomas. (2000). Nonviolent Humanitarian Intervention: A Framework for the Future. In Y. Moser-Puangsuwan & T. Weber (Eds.), *Nonviolent Intervention Across Borders: A Recurrent Vision* (pp. 320-327). Honolulu: University of Hawai'i.
- Moses, Jonathon W., & Knutsen, Torbjorn L. (2007). *Ways of Knowing: Competing methodologies in social and political research*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mosseau, Michael. (2008). Comparing New Theory With Prior Beliefs. In G. Palmer (Ed.), *Causes and Consequences of International Conflict*. London: Routledge.
- Mueller, John. (2009). War Has Almost Ceased to Exist: An Assessment. *Political Science Quarterly*, 124(2), 297.
- Murithi, Tim. (2009). The African Union's foray into peacekeeping: Lessons from the hybrid mission in Darfur. *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development*, (14).
- Murnighan, J. Keith, Malhotra, Deepak, & Weber, J. Mark. (2004). Paradoxes of Trust: Empirical and Theoretical Departures from a Traditional Model. In R. M. Kramer & K. S. Cook (Eds.), *Trust and Distrust in Organizations* (pp. 293-326). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Murphy, James T. (2006). Building Trust in Economic Space. *Progress in Human Geography*, 30(4), 427-450.



- Mvukiyehe, Eric N., & Samii, Cyrus D. (2010a). Quantitative Impact Evaluation of the United Nations Mission in Liberia: Final Report. *SSRN eLibrary*.
- Mvukiyehe, Eric N., & Samii, Cyrus D. (2010b). The Subtle Micro-Effects of Peacekeeping: Evidence from Liberia. *SSRN eLibrary*.
- Mvukiyehe, Eric, & Samii, Cyrus. (2008). Laying a Foundation for Peace? A Quantitative Impact Evaluation of the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire: Inspection and Evaluation Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services of the United Nations.
- Nan, Susan Allen. (2009). Social capital in exclude and inclusive networks: Satisfying human needs through conflict and conflict resolution. In M. Cox (Ed.), *Social Capital and Peace-Buidling: Creating and resolving conflict with trust and social networks* (pp. 172-185). London: Routledge.
- Nannestad, Peter. (2008). What Have We Learned About Generalized Trust, If Anything? *Annual Review of Political Science*, 413-436.
- Nasu, Hitoshi. (2011). Operationalizing the Responsibility to Protect in the Context of Civilian Protection by UN Peacekeepers. *International Peacekeeping*, 18(4), 364-378. doi: 10.1080/13533312.2011.588384
- New Zealand Defence Force. (2008). *Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine*. Wellington.
- New Zealand Police Community Policing Training Assistance Programme. (2010). *Community Policing Course: Implementing Change* New Zealand Police National Headquarters.
- Newman, Edward. (2010). Critical human security studies. *Review of International Studies*, 36(1), 77.
- Newton, Ken, & Zmerli, Sonja. (2011). Three forms of trust and their association. *European Political Science Review : EPSR*, 3(2), 169-169-200.
- Nicholls, S. (2011). Perpetuating the 'lack of evidence' discourse in sport for development: Privileged voices, unheard stories and subjugated knowledge. *International review for the sociology of sport*, 46(3), 249-264. doi: 10.1177/1012690210378273
- Nonviolent Peaceforce. (2013). Retrieved 8 April, 2013, from <http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/>
- NORDCAPS. (2007). *NORDCAPS PSO Tactical Manual 2007*.
- Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2011). *The Future of Power*. New York: Public Affairs.

- Nyman, Jonna. (2013). Securitization theory. In L. Shepherd (Ed.), *Critical approaches to security* (pp. 51-62). London: Routledge.
- Olson Lounsbury, Marie, Pearson, Frederic, & Talentino, Andrea K. (2011). Unilateral and Multilateral Military Intervention: Effects on Stability and Security. *Democracy and security*, 7(3), 227-257. doi: 10.1080/17419166.2011.600585
- Olsson, Christian. (2008). Military interventions and the concept of the political. In D. Bigo & A. Tsoukala (Eds.), *Terror, insecurity and liberty: Illiberal practices of liberal regimes after 9/11* (pp. 146-177). London: Routledge.
- Paffenholz, Thania. (2009). Exploring opportunities and obstacles for a constructive role of social capital in peacebuilding: a framework for analysis. In M. Cox (Ed.), *Social Capital and Peace-Building: Creating and resolving conflict with trust and social networks* (pp. 186-201). London: Routledge.
- Page, James. (2007). Teaching Peace to the Military. *Peace Review*, 19(4), 571-577. doi: 10.1080/10402650701681202
- Paris, Roland. (2002). International Peacebuilding and the 'Mission Civilisatrice'. *Review of International Studies*, 28(4), 637-656.
- Patomäki, Heikki. (2001). The Challenge of Critical Theories: Peace Research at the Start of the New Century. *Journal of Peace Research*, 38(6), 723-737.
- Peace Brigades International. (2013). Retrieved 1 August, 2013, from <http://www.peacebrigades.org/>
- Peake, Gordon. (2005). Policebuilding: The international deployment group in the Solomon Islands. *International peacekeeping*, 12(4), 520-532.
- Peake, Gordon. (2011). Partnerships and International Policing: The Reach and Limits of Policy Processes. *International Peacekeeping*, 18(5), 612-626. doi: 10.1080/13533312.2011.598327
- Peterson, Jenny. (2009). Creating space for emancipatory human security: Liberal obstructions and the potential of Agonism. *Centre for International Relations Working Paper 51* <http://www.cir.ubc.ca/cgi-bin/download.cgi>
- Peterson, Jenny (2010). 'Rule of Law' initiatives and the liberal peace: the impact of politicised reform in post-conflict states. *Disasters*, 34, S15-S39. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7717.2009.01097.x
- Peterson, Jenny (2013). Creating Space for Emancipatory Human Security: Liberal Obstructions and the Potential of Agonism. *International Studies Quarterly*, 57(2), 318-328. doi: 10.1111/isqu.12009

- Pettigrew, Thomas F., & Tropp, Linda R. (2008). How does intergroup contact reduce prejudice? Meta-analytic tests of three mediators. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 38(6), 922-934. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.504
- Pieterse, Jan Nederveen. (1992). Empancinations, Modern and Postmodern. *Development and Change*, 23(3), 5-41. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7660.1992.tb00455.x
- Polanyi, Michael. (1962). Tacit Knowing: Its Bearing on Some Problems of Philosophy. *Reviews of modern physics*, 34(4), 601-616. doi: 10.1103/RevModPhys.34.601
- Pouligny, Beatrice. (2006). *Peace Operations Seen from Below*. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press.
- Pugh, Michael. (2003). Peacekeeping and IR Theory: Phantom of the Opera? *International peacekeeping (London, England)*, 10(4), 104-112.
- Pugh, Michael. (2004). Peacekeeping and Critical Theory. *International Peacekeeping* 11(1), 39-58.
- Pugh, Michael. (2011). Local Agency and Political Economies of Peacebuilding. *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 11(2), 308-320. doi: 10.1111/j.1399-6576.2011.01113.x
- Pugh, Michael. (2012). Reflections on Aggressive Peace. *International Peacekeeping*, 19(4), 410-425. doi: 10.1080/13533312.2012.709749
- Pugh, Michael, Cooper, Neil, & Turner, Mandy. (2008). *Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Pushkina, Darya. (2006). A recipe for success? Ingredients of a successful peacekeeping mission. *International Peacekeeping*, 13(2), 133-149. doi: 10.1080/13533310500436508
- Putnam, Robert D. (2007). E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 30(2), 137-174.
- Reichertz, Jo. (2007). Abduction: The Logic of Discovery of Grounded Theory. In A. Bryant & K. Charmaz (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Grounded Theory* (pp. 214-228). London: SAGE Publications.
- Reis, Harry, Collins, W. Andrew, & Berscheid, Ellen. (2000). The relationship context of human behavior and development. *Psychological Bulletin*, 126(6), 844-872.
- Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)*. (2000). (A/55/305 - S/2000/809). New York: United Nations.

- Reychler, Luc. (2008). Sustainable Peace-Building Architecture. In L. Kurtz (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict* (2nd ed., pp. 2027-2043). St. Louis: Academic Press.
- Richmond, Oliver P. (2006). The problem of peace: understanding the 'liberal peace'. *Conflict, security & development*, 6(3), 291-314. doi: 10.1080/14678800600933480
- Richmond, Oliver P. (2007). Critical Research Agendas for Peace: The Missing Link in the Study of International Relations. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 32(2), 247-274.
- Richmond, Oliver P. (2008). *Peace in International Relations*. London: Routledge.
- Richmond, Oliver P. (2009a). Becoming Liberal, Unbecoming Liberalism: Liberal-Local Hybridity via the Everyday as a Response to the Paradoxes of Liberal Peacebuilding. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 3(3), 324-344. doi: 10.1080/17502970903086719
- Richmond, Oliver P. (2009b). A post-liberal peace: Eirenism and the everyday. *Review of International Studies*, 35(3), 557.
- Richmond, Oliver P. (2010). A genealogy of peace and conflict theory. In O. P. Richmond (Ed.), *Palgrave advances in peacebuilding: Critical developments and approaches* (pp. 14-38). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Richmond, Oliver P., & Franks, Jason. (2009). *Liberal Peace Transitions Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Ricigliano, Robert. (2003). Networks of Effective Action: Implementing an Integrated Approach to Peacebuilding. *Security Dialogue*, 34(4), 445-462. doi: 10.1177/0967010603344005
- Roberts, David. (2011). Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Liberal Irrelevance and the Locus of Legitimacy. *International peacekeeping*, 18(4), 410-424.
- Rolfe, Jim. (2011). Partnering to Protect: Conceptualizing Civil–Military Partnerships for the Protection of Civilians. *International peacekeeping* 18(5), 561-576.
- Rosato, Sebastian. (2003). The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory. *The American Political Science Review*, 97(4), 585-602.
- Rowlands, Dane, & Carment, David. (2006). Force and Bias: Towards a predictive model of effective third-party intervention *Defence & Peace Economics*, 17(5), 435-456.
- Rubinstein, Robert A. (2005). Intervention and Culture: An Anthropological Approach to Peace Operations. *Security Dialogue*, 36(4), 527-544. doi: 10.1177/0967010605060454

- Ruggeri, Andrea, Gizelis, Ismene, & Dorussen, Han. (2010). *Managing Mistrust: an Analysis of Responses to UN Peacekeeping in Africa*. Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Conference, New Orleans.
- Ryan, Stephen. (2000). United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter of Principles? In T. Woodhouse & O. Ramsbotham (Eds.), *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution* (pp. 27-47). London: Frank Cass Publishers.
- Sambanis, Nicholas. (2008). Short- and Long-Term Effects of United Nations Peace Operations. *The World Bank Economic Review*, 22(1), 9-32.
- Samii, Cyrus. (2007). *Revolutionary Mobilization in Burundi*. Retrieved from [https://www.dropbox.com/sh/jmfp5eweg8f9cbn/8BqtQSy7-h/samii\\_burundi\\_revolution070408.pdf](https://www.dropbox.com/sh/jmfp5eweg8f9cbn/8BqtQSy7-h/samii_burundi_revolution070408.pdf)
- Santos, Boaventura de Sousa, Nunes, Joao Arriscadeo, & Meneses, Maria Paula. (2007). Introduction: Opening up the canon of knowledge and recognition of difference. In B. d. S. Santos (Ed.), *Another Knowledge is Possible: Beyond Northern Epistemologies* (pp. xix - lxii). London: Verso.
- Sartre, Patrice. (2011). Making UN Peacekeeping More Robust: Protecting the Mission, Persuading the Actors. New York: International Peace Institute.
- Schirch, Lisa. (2006). *Civilian Peacekeeping Preventing Violence and Making Space for Democracy*. Uppsala: Life & Peace Institute.
- Schondorf, Elisabeth. (2011). *Against the odds: Successful UN peace operations - a theoretical argument and two cases*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Schumacher, Joseph. (2007). What to measure in peace operations. In A. Livingstone & A. Arnusch (Eds.), *Measures of effectiveness: peace operations and beyond*, (pp. 45-59). Ottawa: Pearson Peacekeeping Centre.
- Schweitzer, Christine. (2009). *Strategies of Intervention in Protracted Violent Conflicts by Civil Society Actors: The Example of Interventions in the Violent Conflicts in the Area of Former Yugoslavia, 1990 – 2002* (Doctor of Philosophy), Coventry University.
- Schweitzer, Christine. (2010). Introduction: Civilian Peacekeeping A Barely Tapped Resource. In C. Schweitzer (Ed.), *Civilian Peacekeeping A Barely Tapped Resource* (pp. 7-16). Belm-Vehrte: Sozio Publishing.
- Scott, R. Stanton. (2008). Privatized Peacekeeping: Predicting the Effects of Corporate Management of Conflict. *Conference Papers -- International Studies Association*.

- Security Council Report. (2012). Cross Cutting report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict New York: Security Council Report.
- Sending, Ole Jacob (Ed.). (2010). *Learning to Build a Sustainable Peace*. Oslo: Chr. Michelsen Institute.
- Shepherd, Laura. (2013a). Introduction: Critical approaches to security in contemporary global politics. In L. Shepherd (Ed.), *Critical approaches to security* (pp. 1-8). London: Routledge.
- Shepherd, Laura (Ed.). (2013b). *Critical approaches to security* London: Routledge.
- Sherman, Jake, & Gleason, Megan M. (2012). Strategic Summary 2011. In B. Jones (Ed.), *Annual review of global peace operations 2012* (pp. 3-10). Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers.
- Shinko, Rosemary E. (2008). Agonistic Peace: A Postmodern Reading. *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*, 36(3), 473-491.
- Sion, Liora. (2006). "Too Sweet and Innocent for War"? *Armed Forces & Society* (0095327X), 32(3), 454-474.
- SIPRI. (2010). SIPRI Yearbook 2010. Oxford University Press: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
- Smith, Steve. (1997). Epistemology, Postmodernism and International Relations Theory: A Reply to Østerud. *Journal of Peace Research*, 34(3), 330-336.
- Smith, Steve. (2005). The Contested Concept of Security. In K. Booth (Ed.), *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers.
- Snowden, D.J. (2005). Multi-ontology sense making: a new simplicity in decision making. *Informatics in Primary Care*, 13(1), 45-54.
- Stamnes, Eli. (2004). Critical Security Studies and the United Nations Preventive Deployment in Macedonia. *International Peacekeeping* (13533312), 11(1), 161-181. doi: 10.1080/1353331042000228508
- Stamnes, Eli. (2010). Values, context and hybridity *The future of the Peacebuilding Architecture Project*. Ottawa: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Centre for International Policy Studies University of Ottawa.
- Stamnes, Eli, & Wyn Jones, Richard. (2000). Burundi: A Critical Security Perspective. *Peace and Conflict Studies* 7(2), 37-56.
- Steele, Brent J. (2007). Liberal-Idealism: A Constructivist Critique<sup>1</sup>. *International Studies Review*, 9(1), 23.

- Stephan, Maria J., & Chenoweth, Erica. (2008). Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. *International Security*, 33(1), 7-44.
- Stoetzler, M., & Yuval-Davis, Nira. (2002). Standpoint theory, situated knowledge and the situated imagination. *Feminist theory*, 3(3), 315-333. doi: 10.1177/146470002762492024
- Talentino, Andrea Kathryn. (2007). Perceptions of Peacebuilding: The Dynamic of Imposer and Imposed Upon. *International Studies Perspectives*, 8(2), 152-171.
- Tardy, Thierry. (2011a). A Critique of Robust Peacekeeping in Contemporary Peace Operations. *International Peacekeeping*, 18(2), 152 - 167.
- Tardy, Thierry. (2011b). Peace Operations: the fragile consensus. SIPRI Yearbook 2011. Oxford University Press: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Retrieved from <http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2011/03>
- Taylor, Gwendolyn, Mvukiyehe, Eric N., & Samii, Cyrus D. . (2006). *Wartime and post-conflict experiences in Burundi: An individual level survey*. Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Philadelphia.
- Tull, Denis M. (2009). Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War. *International Peacekeeping* 16(2), 215-230.
- Turner, Charles W., Simons, Lynn Stanley, Berkowitz, Leonard, & Frodi, Ann. (1977). The stimulating and inhibiting effects of weapons on aggressive behavior. *Aggressive Behavior*, 3(4), 355-378. doi: 10.1002/1098-2337(1977)3:4<355::aid-ab2480030405>3.0.co;2-g
- Tyler, Tom R. (2001). Why Do People Rely on Others? Social Identity and Social Aspects of Trust. In K. S. Cook (Ed.), *Trust in Society* (pp. 285-306). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- United Nations Department of Peacekeeping. About the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping. Retrieved 1 August, 2012, from website <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/dpko/>
- United Nations Department of Peacekeeping. (2008). United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines: United Nations
- United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support. (2010). The New Horizon Initiative: Progress Report No. 1. New York: United Nations.
- United Nations Department of Public Information. (2013). Security Council Endorses Importance of 'Multidimensional' Approach to Peacekeeping Aimed at Facilitating

- Peacebuilding, Preventing Relaps into Conflict.  
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10888.doc.htm>>
- United Nations Security Council. (2000). *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*. Retrieved from [http://www.un.org/events/res\\_1325e.pdf](http://www.un.org/events/res_1325e.pdf) accessed 30 July 2012.
- United States Army Training and Doctrine Command. (2010). *The United States Army Operating Concept*. Fort Monroe VA: United States Army.
- van der Toorn, Jojanneke, Tyler, Tom R., & Jost, John T. (2011). More than fair: Outcome dependence, system justification, and the perceived legitimacy of authority figures. *Journal of experimental social psychology, 47*(1), 127.
- Vuga, Janja. (2010). Cultural Differences in Multinational Peace Operations: A Slovenian Perspective (Vol. 17, pp. 554): Taylor & Francis Ltd.
- Wallace, Mary (Molly) S. (2010). *Confronting Wrongs, Affirming Difference: The Limits of Violence, the Power of Nonviolence, and the Case of Nonviolent Intervention in Sri Lanka*. Dissertation. [A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science at Brown University]. Providence: Brown University.
- Wallensteen, Peter. (2011). *Peace Research: Theory and Practice*. New York: Routledge.
- Wallis, Tim. (2009). Civilian Peacekeeping *Oxford Encyclopedia of Peace, OUP*.
- Wallis, Tim. (2010). Best Practices for Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping. In C. Schweitzer (Ed.), *Civilian Peacekeeping: A Barely Tapped Resource* (pp. 25-34). Belm-Vehrte: Sozio Publishing.
- Walter, Barbara. (2001). *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars*. Princeton Princeton University Press.
- Weber, Thomas. (2000). A History of Nonviolent Interposition and Accompaniment. In Y. Moser-Puangsuwan & T. Weber (Eds.), *Nonviolent Intervention Across Borders: A Recurrent Vision* (pp. 15-41). Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Whalan, Jeni. (2010). The Power of Friends: The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands. *Journal of Peace Research, 47*(5), 627-637. doi: 10.1177/0022343310370107
- Whitworth, Sandra. (2004). *Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping*. Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers.



- Whitworth, Sandra. (2005). Militarized Masculinities and the Politics of Peacekeeping. In K. Booth (Ed.), *Critical Security Studies and World Politics* (pp. 50-70). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishing.
- Williams, Michael. (2001). *Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Williams, Sarah. (2007). Arguments in Favour of A Constructivist Analysis of Peace Processes. *Conference Papers -- International Studies Association*.
- Wood, Reed M, Kathman, Jacob D, & Gent, Stephen E. (2012). Armed intervention and civilian victimization in intrastate conflicts. *Journal of Peace Research*, 49(5), 647-660. doi: 10.1177/0022343312449032
- Woodhouse, Tom. (2010). Peacekeeping, Peace Culture and Conflict Resolution. *International Peacekeeping* 17(4), 486-498.
- World Bank. (2011). World Bank development report 2011: Conflict, security, and development. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Wyn Jones, Richard. (2005). On Emancipation: Necessity, capacity, and concrete utopias. In K. Booth (Ed.), *Critical security studies and world politics* (pp. 215-236). London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Yamashita, Hikaru. (2008). 'Impartial' Use of Force in United Nations Peacekeeping. *International Peacekeeping* (13533312), 15(5), 615-630. doi: 10.1080/13533310802396152
- Zanotti, Laura. (2010). UN Integrated Peacekeeping Operations and NGOs: Reflections on Governmental Rationalities and Contestation in the Age of Risk. *International peacekeeping*, 17(1), 17-31. doi: 10.1080/13533311003589132
- Zanotti, Laura. (2011). *Governing Disorder: UN Peace Operations, International Security and Democratization in the Post-Cold War Era*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.