The Dynamics of Shame

in the Eden Narrative

Dedicated to my father: Rev. Dr. Francis Ian Andersen

היית הרוה תחת כנפי

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Introduction

Every culture has its grand narratives that are the stories that express the symbolic universe of that culture. These grand narratives address questions regarding our origins, the nature of the world we live in, human suffering, the purpose and meaning of life, and our future destiny.[1] Two grand narratives have been competing for the status of being the definitive story in Western culture, the grand narrative of evolution and the grand narrative of salvation history that is conveyed by Christianity.[2] These grand narratives operate on a cultural level and shape our view of the world and our identity as humans.

Any study of the Eden Narrative faces quite complex hermeneutical challenges. Interpretation of the Eden Narrative is complicated by the fact that this text has a rich and complex transmission history. The Eden Narrative probably had its origin as an ancient folk tale. Through an extended redaction process it was included in the corpus that became the Book of Genesis, and consequently acquired the status of a sacred text. It subsequently acquired the status of a major cultural metanarrative. As a result of this transmission history, the Eden Narrative came to occupy a significant place in the grand narrative of salvation history that encapsulates the Christian world view. The development of the doctrine of original sin ensured the prominence of the Eden Narrative as a significant episode in the grand narrative that addressed questions regarding the origin of human suffering and the tragedy of human existence. And so, the Eden Narrative in Genesis 3 has come to occupy a prominent place not only in Christian thought, but in the imagination of people in Western civilization generally, as an aetiological myth of primordial loss of paradise and Fall that explains the

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[1] Marie Vjrup Nielsen, *Sin and Selfish Genes: Christian and Biological Narratives* (Leuven, Bel: Peeters, 2010), 11.

[2] C. S. Lewis, "The Funeral of a Great Myth," in *Christian Reflections*, ed. Walter Hooper (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1967), 82-89.

tragedy of evil in the human race.[3] According to Buss, the reason why people still regard the

Eden Narrative as pertinent to our age is because:

> it is our myth, a sacred story that we as a particular interpretive community may no longer literally believe yet still value as retaining a strong residue of meaning/truth value, versus the myths of others, which our interpretive community has never accepted as sacred stories and which we tend not to interpret for their "existential" meaning.[4]

The enduring relevance of the Eden Narrative is reflected in its frequent representations in

medieval iconography,[5] Western art,[6] and the great Romantic poets Blake, Wordsworth,[7] and

Milton's epic tour de force *Paradise Lost*.[8]

That the original text does not support the key elements and themes of the Christian

aetiological myth of the Fall is a widespread view among Old Testament scholars.[9] Rather, an

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[3] Eleven perspectives on the ways the story of Adam and Eve evolved in cultural myth and imagination are presented in Bob Becking and Susanne Hennecke, eds., *Out of Paradise: Eve and Adam and Their Interpreters* (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2010), 255-61.

[4] Martin J. Buss, "Potential and Actual Interactions between Speech Act Theory and Biblical Studies," *Semeia* 41 (1988): 136-37.

[5] Jennifer O'Reilly, "The Trees of Eden in Mediaeval Iconography," in *A Walk in the Garden: Biblical Iconographical and Literary Images of Eden*, ed. Paul Morris and Deborah Sawyer (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992), 167-70.

[6] Famous paintings that depict human expulsion from paradise include: Michanelo's *Fall of Man and Expulsion from Paradise*, fresco on the Sistine Chapel, Rodin's *Adam*, Titian's *Adam and Eve*, Jan Gross's *Adam and Eve*, Albrecht,'s *Adam and Eve*, Masaccio,'s *Expulsion from Paradise*, Giovanni di Paolo's *The Creation of the World and Expulsion from Paradise*, John Martin's *Expulsion of Adam and Eve from Paradise*, Michelangelo Bounarroti's *Genesis the Fall and Expulsion from Paradise*, Guiseppe's *The Expulsion from Paradise*, Lucas Cranach's *Adam and Eve*, Cornelis Van Haarlem's *Adam and Eve*, Benjamin West's *The Expulsion of Adam and Eve from Paradise*, to mention just a few.

[7] Paul A. Cantor, "Blake and the Archeology of Eden," in *A Walk in the Garden: Biblical, Iconographical and Literary Images of Eden*, ed. Paul Morris and Deborah Sawyer (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992), 229-44.

[8] Hollander described the Eden Narrative as a primal scene of human shame, and he related the status Milton's *Paradise Lost* holds amongst Western literature as evidence of the degree to which this story has captured the human imagination. John Hollander, "Honor Dishonorable: Shameful Shame," *Social Research* 70, no. 4 (2007): 1061-74. Milton's Paradise Lost was enriched by his familiarity with a rich literary tradition ranging from classical times, yet the thematic presentation of the story as a tragedy and his affirmation of love and sexuality reflects the romanticism of his era. Gordon Campbell, "Milton's Eden," in *A Walk in the Garden: Biblical, Iconographical and Literary Images of Eden*, ed. Paul Morris and Deborah Sawyer (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992), 220-28, J. M. Evans, *Paradise Lost and the Genesis Tradition* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).

[9] Including: James Barr, *The Garden of Eden and the Hope of Immortality* (London: SCM Press, 1992), 3-4. Claus Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11: A Commentary*, trans. John J. Scullion (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress Press, 1984), 276. Calum M. Carmichael, "The Paradise Myth: Interpreting without Jewish and Christian Spectacles," in *A Walk in the Garden: Biblical, Iconographical and Literary Images of Eden*, ed. Paul Morris and Deborah Sawyer (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992), 47, Lyn M. Bechtel, "Rethinking the Interpretation of Genesis 2.4b-3.24," in *A Feminist Companion to Genesis*, ed. Athalya Brenner (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993), 78-80. Anderson wrote a study of the history of the interpretation of the Eden Narrative illustrating the active role of religious tradition in the 'rewriting' of the Bible through the way it is interpreted. Gary A. Anderson, *The Genesis of Perfection: Adam and Eve in Jewish and Christian Imagination* (Louisville, KY/London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), xv-xviii. ———, "Biblical Origins and the Problem of the Fall," *Pro Ecclesia* 10, no. 1 (2001): 17-30, Andre LaCoque, *The*

interpretation of the Eden Narrative with reference to its Ancient Near Eastern cultural context yields a picture different from the traditional story that we are familiar with. The story has themes of obedience or rebellion, exile and restoration that relate to the history of ancient Israel.[10]

The Eden Narrative is full of symbolism, including names, and polyvalent and homonymic words that lend themselves to different levels of meaning in the story, as well as archetypal themes of creation, sexuality, guilt, and exile. The sparseness of the Eden Narrative, however, means that the symbolic significance of key objects and characters is not explained. Consequently, there is a high degree of multivalence in the Eden Narrative that makes any definitive interpretation of the story a task fraught with peril. Indeed, one could argue that the story itself eludes definitive interpretation. Rather, the interpretation of the symbolic significance of the main characters and objects and of the themes of the story is left to the reader.[11] It is precisely this multivalent ambiguity that enables the story to become a bearer of the cultural myths that grew out of it.

The narrative leaves a lot of the story unsaid. In a detailed analysis Stratton argued that the Eden narrative had so many gaps in it that it would be almost unintelligible to a reader who relied exclusively upon the literal meaning of the narrative.[12] Consequently, the sparseness of the narrative leads to a heavy reliance upon implications for conveying the

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Trial of Innocence: Adam, Eve, and the Yahwist (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2006), 13, W. Sibley Towner, *Genesis* (Louisville, KY: Westminister John Knox, 2001), 49-54.

[10] P. Wayne Townsend, "Eve's Answer to the Serpent: An Alternative Paradigm for Sin and Some Implications for Theology," *Calvin Theological Journal* 33, no. 2 (2006): 400-03. Anderson observed that the Genesis Rabbah draws the parallel between Adam's transgression and subsequent exile and Israel's transgression and exile from the land. He cited Genesis Rabbah 19:9 as stating, "Just as I led Adam into the garden of Eden and commanded him and he transgressed my commandment; whereupon I punished him by dismissal and exile... so also did I bring his descendants into the land of Israel and command them, and they transgressed my commands and I punished them by dismissal and exile." Anderson, "Biblical Origins and the Problem of the Fall," 29.

[11] Terje Stordalen, *Echoes of Eden: Genesis 2-3 and Symbolism of the Eden Garden in Biblical Hebrew Literature* (Leuven, Bel.: Peeters, 2000), 214, David Carr, "The Politics of Textual Subversion: A Diachronic Perspective on the Garden of Eden Story," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 112 (1993): 593-94.

[12] Beverly J. Stratton, *Out of Eden: Reading, Rhetoric, and Ideology in Genesis 2-3*, Jsotss 208 (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995), 3-28.

story.[13] What is distinctive about this analysis of the Eden Narrative is that it will feature a systematic analysis of the implicatures and inferences in the text, rather than primarily interpreting the explicatures, which is more characteristic of literary-grammatical approaches to biblical interpretation.

This thesis has a dual analytical focus. On the one hand, this thesis has a methodological focus in the adoption of a distinctive hermeneutical approach in the interpretation of the Eden Narrative. This distinctive hermeneutical focus is afforded by the pragmatic insights of Speech Act Theory, Relevance Theory, and Communications Theory. On the other hand, it utilizes this methodological approach to present a novel reading of the Eden narrative that lays out of the presence of shame dynamics within the Eden Narrative. The reading draws upon psychological insights into shame in its analysis of the interplay between the characters in the story. So, this thesis presents an example how a preunderstanding informed by psychological research can make a valuable contribution to the interpretation of Old Testament texts.

Methodological approach

This methodological approach has been adopted because shame is commonly hidden rather than explicit. Traditional literary-grammatical approaches that pay almost exclusive attention to the explicatures often overlook shame dynamics that are conveyed through the implicatures in the text. Indeed, biblical hermeneutics has not developed a systematic methodology for interpreting implicatures, leaving interpreters to make their interpretations with respect to implicatures without a solid methodological foundation. Yet Douglas observed that, "The implicit is the necessary foundation of social intercourse."[14] All social discourse relies upon

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[13] Gutt points out that inferential communication relies heavily on cues within the immediate context, what he calls the primary communication situation. Interpreters of biblical texts are removed from this context. They are in secondary communication situations that by their nature tend to lead to misinterpretations simply due to the absence of the original contextual cues. Ernst-August Gutt, *Translation and Relevance: Cognition and Context* (Manchester/Boston: St. Jerome, 2000), 76-83.

[14] Mary Douglas, *Implicit Meanings: Essays in Anthropology* (London/New York: Routledge, 1975), 5.

the implicit to convey meaning to some degree.[15] So hermeneutics cannot afford to continue

to ignore the implicit in its interpretation of the text. The hermeneutical approach adopted in

this thesis represents an attempt to address this problem.

      This approach utilizes three theories concerned with the pragmatics of communication.

Relevance Theory maintains that communication occurs in two modes, the coding – decoding

and the ostension – inference modes. The primary mode of communication is the ostension –

inference mode that the coding – decoding mode is subservient to.[16] That is, appraisal of

meaning is derived from inferred meanings as well as from the comprehension of words.[17]

Relevance Theory recognizes that the meaning of a statement is derived from three main

sources: the semantic meanings of the words and idioms that make up the statement, the

unspoken implicatures conveyed by the statement, and the social function of the statement.

This social function is discerned by the social context and the location of the statement in the

communication sequence of exchanges making up the discourse.

      Communications Theory maintains that the implicatures in a speech generally convey

messages concerning the identifications of the speaker, identifications of the audience or

recipient, and definitions of their relationship. The emotional impact of speech acts is

generally with reference to these identifications. Social discourse involves a constant implicit

interchange where the participants either accept, reject, or disconfirm these identifications.[18]

      Finally, John Searle's Speech Act Theory maintains that the meaning of utterances is

conveyed through their locutionary content, illocutionary force, and perlocutionary effects.

Rather than presuming that all utterances are propositions, Speech Act Theory identifies five

distinctive types of speech acts: assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, and

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[15] Ibid., 173.
[16] Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*, 2 ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1995), 98-132.
[17] Ibid., 172-76.
[18] Paul Watzlawick, John H. Beavin, and David D. Jackson, *Pragmatics of Human Communication* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967), 75-76, 84-90.

declarations. Each has its own distinctive conventional rules and validity criteria.[19] Searle

regarded a speech act as an act in linguistic communication within an immediate social

context.[20] So it primarily applied to spoken utterances in social discourse. Speech Act Theory

has been extended to the analysis of texts on the basis that texts are speech acts utilizing a

written mode of communication.[21]

Theological Questions/Objectives

The question of the relationship between shame and sin has been generally neglected in

theology.[22] This absence is all the more surprising given the depth and extent of theological

reflection on the nature of sin throughout the centuries. There are very few references to

shame in the writings of the early church fathers.[23] Shame has been linked to the knowledge

of good and evil by Tertullian.[24] Augustine advanced what is perhaps the most developed

theological reflection on shame, linking it to sexual lust and a concomitant failure of the

sexual organs to submit to the will of the human mind as a sign of human disobedience.[25] The

way that shame has been hidden behind guilt in the Christian tradition has contributed to the

lack of attention that shame has received.[26]

This thesis begins to redress this oversight through exploring whether shame was a

factor in Adam and Eve's original decision to heed the serpent and eat the fruit. Recent

empirical evidence in the psychological literature provides a point of departure for the thesis

[19] John R. Searle, *Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 29. ———, *Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999), 39-110.

[20] John R. Searle, "What Is a Speech Act?," in *Philosophy of Language*, ed. John R. Searle (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 39.

[21] Mary Louise Pratt, *Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse* (Bloomington/London: Indiana University Press, 1977), 86.

[22] Stephen Pattison, *Shame: Theory, Therapy, Theology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 190-203.

[23] Chrysostom made a few references to shame in his homilies, such as his "Homily on 2 Corinthians" 8:15 (*NPNF¹: 12*, 361-2), and "Homily V on St. John," (*NPNF¹:14*), 25, "Homilies 3 on Philippians," (*NPNF¹:14*), 198, and "Homily 4 on Philippians," (*NPNF¹:14*), 201.

[24] Tertullian, "A Treatise on the Soul," 38, (*ANF 3*), 218-9.

[25] Augustine, "On Marriage and Concupiscence" I.6-8, II.37, 52, (*NPNF¹:5*), 266, 298, 304, and "A Treatise Against Two Letters of the Pelagians," I.31, (*NPNF¹:5*), 386, "On Original Sin" 39, (*NPNF¹:5*), 251.

[26] Robert H. Albers and William M. Clements, *Shame: A Faith Perspective* (New York: Routledge, 1995), Rebecca Thomas and Stephen Parker, "Toward a Theological Understanding of Shame," *Journal of Psychology and Christianity* 23, no. 2 (2004): 176-82.

to explore the question of the degree to which any human propensity to sin might be mediated

by shame. In so doing, this thesis opens up the possibility that the relationship between human

nature and human sinfulness may be more complex than has been previously considered; that

is, shame may be linked to a *propensity* to sin in addition to being a recognized *consequence*

of sin.

The thesis adopts an interdisciplinary approach in exploring the dynamics of shame in

the Eden Narrative. Hence, the thesis will include a review of the psychological literature,

which conceptualizes shame as a social emotion dependent on subjective self-awareness that

enables a person to view him/herself from the viewpoint of another. Shame is a complex

phenomenon with four dimensions: anticipatory shame that manifests as modesty and is

emotionally experienced as anticipatory anxiety;[27] public disgrace, which is related to social

rejection, public humiliation, and stigma;[28] acute shame, which is experienced as a painful

self-conscious emotional awareness that accompanies negative self-judgment or humiliating

public exposure;[29] and finally chronic shame, which develops as people incorporate memories

of shame into their autobiographical narratives with the result that their identities become to

varying degrees shame-bound.[30]

Accordingly, this thesis will undertake an interpretation of the Eden Narrative in

Genesis 3 that elicits the dynamics of shame that are mainly conveyed in the implicatures in

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[27] Thomas J. Scheff, "Shame and Conformity: The Deference-Emotion System," *American Sociological Review* 53, no. 3 (1988): 395-406, ———, "Shame in Social Theory," in *The Widening Scope of Shame*, ed. Melvin R. Lansky and Andrew P. Morrison (New York: Routledge, 1997), 205-30.

[28] Paul Gilbert, "What Is Shame? Some Core Issues and Controversies," in *Shame: Interpersonal Behavior, Psychopathology, and Culture*, ed. Paul Gilbert and Bernice Andrews (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), Richard H. Smith et al., "The Role of Public Exposure in Moral and Nonmoral Shame and Guilt," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 83, no. 1 (2002). Erving Goffman, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

[29] This definition is derived from: Helen Merrell Lynd, *On Shame and the Search for Identity* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1958), 23-24, Michael Lewis, *Shame: The Exposed Self* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 2. Merle Fossum and Marilyn Mason, *Facing Shame: Families in Recovery* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1986), 5.

[30] Susan Miller, *The Shame Experience* (Hillsdale, NY: The Analytic Press, 1985), 134, T. Patel et al., "Intrusive Images and Memories in Major Depression," *Behavior Research and Therapy* 45 (2007): 2573-80, Jose Pinto-Gouveia and Marcela Matos, "Can Shame Memories Become a Key to Identity? The Centrality of Shame Memories Predicts Psychopathology," *Applied Cognitive Psychology* 25 (2011): 281-90.

the social interactions between the main characters in these stories. This interpretation will explore the relationship between shame and sin as it is portrayed in the Eden Narrative.

Assumptions Regarding Adam and Eve

There are a number of assumptions regarding the symbolic significance and nature of Adam and Eve as the primal humans in the Israelite tradition that provide the terms of reference for this analysis. A full discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this thesis.[31] So this study has adopted the following assumptions regarding the nature of Adam and Eve and their relation to history.

The first assumption concerns the relation of Adam and Eve to history. The theological alternatives are that either they were historical figures like us, or they enjoyed a supra historical position as unique federal heads or representatives of the human race, or they were simply mythical figures.[32] The Eden Narrative itself contains ambivalent elements that treat them as historical individuals on the one hand, while presenting them as representative mythical figures on the other hand. This discussion presumes that there is a continuous historical relationship that makes Adam and Eve profoundly like us in their humanity, even though they possessed a unique status as the first humans in the Christian grand narrative of humanity, and they lived in a unique situation in the Garden of Eden as their habitat.[33]

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[31] A treatment of the symbolic significance of Adam as the primal human has been provide in Callander's study. Dexter F. Callender, *Adam in Myth and History: Ancient Israelite Perspectives on the Primal Human*, Harvard Semitic Studies (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2000), 42-72.

[32] Brunner and Trooster rejected historical view of Genesis that regarded Adam as a primal historical figure and a primal Fall resulting in a change in human nature. Rather, Adam was just like each one of us. Emile Brunner, *Man in Revolt: A Christian Anthropology*, trans. Olive Wyon, Lutterworth Library (London: Lutterworth Press, 1939), 86-112. Stephanus Trooster, *Evolution and the Doctrine of Sin*, trans. John A. Terr Haar (New York: Newman Press, 1965), 42-72. See also Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *Christianity and Evolution*, trans. Rene Hague (London: Collins, 1969), 36-54. Williams also concluded, "Adam and Eve were never historical people, merely symbolic figures in a symbolic narrative." Patricia A. Williams, *Doing without Adam and Eve: Sociobiology and Original Sin* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2001), 158.

[33] Blocher suggested that two features require a historical view: (1) Genesis is linked to history by a genealogy; and (2) the connection of Adam and Eve with the salvation story from Abraham to Christ places them in history. Genesis shares three characteristics with history as opposed to myth that presume a historical continuity: (1) chronological continuity, (2) human responsibility with historical consequences, (3) a historian's judgment regarding the cause of a historical state of affairs. Henri Blocher, *Original Sin: Illuminating the Riddle* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1997), 54. I accept Kierkegaard's objection that theological views that place Adam outside history simply have no supporting evidence. They are assumptions rather than explanations. Soren Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Dread*, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton, PA: Princeton University Press, 1957), 23-26.

The second assumption is that Adam and Eve possessed the same nature, neurophysiological and psychological make-up in Eden before the transgression as humans now have. That is, the Fall did not result in a significant change in human nature. Consequently, psychological insights can be applied to them. This study does not take a position on whether Adam and Eve should be regarded as the primal humans as opposed to the evolutionary perspective that traces human origins back to Africa.[34]

The third assumption is a definition of sin as a social act that violates the relational obligations that a person has to God. As a social act that is intersubjective in nature, the significance of sin lies in its social meanings. Sin is a social action as distinct from an emotion, thought, temptation, or lack of virtue.[35] As a social action, sin presupposes agency and volition. Sin is intelligible only in the context of specific relationship obligations to God that can be violated, rather than with reference to laws or a cosmic order. Sin is primarily a relational violation against God, rather than a moral or legal transgression.[36]

The fourth assumption is that the sins that Adam and Eve committed in Eden were not qualitatively different to the subsequent sins of their descendants. The doctrine of original sin rests on an assumption of qualitative difference. This qualitative difference is reflected in the distinction between *peccatum originale originans* (original sin as originating), which refers to

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[34] Works that discuss this complex issue include: Denis Alexander, *Creation or Evolution: Do We Have to Choose?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Camilo J. Cela-Conde and Francisco J. Ayala, *Human Evolution: Trails from the Past* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Bernard Ramm, *The Christian View of Science and Scripture* (London: Paternoster Press, 1954); Karl W. Giberson and Francis S. Collins, *The Language of Science and Faith* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2011); C. Deane-Drummond, *Christ and Evolution* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2009); D. N. Livingstone, *The Preadamite Theory and the Marriage of Science and Religion* (Philadelphia, PA: American Philosophical Society, 1992); G. B. Nelson, "Men before Adam: American Debates over the Unity and Antiquity of Humanity," in *When Science and Christianity Meet*, ed. D. C. Lindberg and R. L. Numbers (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2003); Fazale Rana and Hugh Ross, *Who Was Adam?* (Colorado Springs, CO: NavPress, 2005).

[35] I recognize that this is contrary to other conclusions that include thoughts and attitudes as sin. Augustine defined sin as, "Sin is a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal law." Cited by Aquinas, Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 2 vols. (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), Vol. II, Bk. I, Q. 71, Art. 6. Aquinas regarded sin as a voluntary act or omission contrary to divine law and against God. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Vol. II, Bk. I, Q. 72, Art. 1-4. Aquinas went on to identify three degrees of sin, thought, word and deed, and that the beginning of sin lies in the thought, while the deed is the consummation of sin. ———, *Summa Theologica*, Vol. II, Bk. I, Q. 72, Art. 7. My definition sets the boundary for sin at the stage of its consummation in the deed.

[36] A detailed argument in support of this conceptualization of sin was included in Chapter 5 of my Master of Theology Thesis. John M. Andersen, "Deficit Identity and Being-in-Contradiction" (Charles Sturt University, 2010), 123-41.

the historical event of Adam and Eve's sin and, *peccatum originale originatum* (original sin as originated), which refers to the condition of universal sinfulness of humankind, inherited from Adam.[37] This distinction rests on the assumption that in Eden sin came into the world through sin, and that sin presupposes sinfulness. The assertion that sin comes into the world only through sin involves an inherent contradiction.[38] The alternative is that sin came into the world through a prior process that was not itself inherently sinful. Aquinas' list of vices, which he called the Seven Deadly Sins referred to such a process. [39] Their significance lay in that they led to the commitment of mortal sins, not that they were sins themselves that incurred guilt and condemnation. This thesis argues for such a psychological process that was itself not inherently sinful, but opened up sinful social acts as a possibility.

Related Questions and Problems

There are many related questions and problems that have a bearing on this thesis, which lie beyond its scope to address. Some of these problems are identified below.

Any interpretation of the Eden narrative faces complex methodological challenges. There is considerable cultural and historical distance between what is an ancient Israelite text and the contemporary interpreter. Cognitive grammar particularly emphasizes the importance of an emic understanding of the cognitive environment for interpreting the meaning of a text. The almost insurmountable problem this presents for biblical studies is the incomplete knowledge we have of ancient Israelite culture.[40] While the thesis will be informed by an

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[37] Paul Rigby, *Original Sin in Augustine's Confessions* (Ottowa: University of Ottawa Press, 1987), 36, Tatha Wiley, *Original Sin: Origins, Developments, Contemporary Meanings* (New York: Paulist Press, 2002), 5.

[38] Kierkegaard identified this contradiction as support for his contention that through Adam's sin, sin did not come into the world, but rather as for each one of us, through Adam's sin sinfulness came into Adam. Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Dread*, 28-30.

[39] Aquinas argued that every sin has two causes. The immediate cause was the choice of the will to sin. The mediate causes lay in emotional pressures that inclined a person to sin. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Vol. II, Bk. I., Q. 73, Art. 7. These pressures he called deadly sins. ———, *Summa Theologica*, Vol. II, Bk. I, Q. 84, Art. 4.

[40] This consideration leads me to conclude that van Wolde is overoptimistic in her confidence of the utility of cognitive grammar for developing a cognitive rational approach in biblical studies. Refer to Ellen van Wolde, *Reframing Biblical Studies: When Language and Text Meet Culture, Cognition, and Context* (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2009), 201-03.

awareness of these issues, the depth and scope of analysis that would be required to do justice

to these concerns would result in the thesis losing its focus and becoming unmanageable.

This problem is further complicated by the literary history of the Eden narrative. The

original author(s) and historical/cultural context remains unknown, despite extensive biblical

research.[41] Furthermore, the nature of the text itself has evolved through changes in its

intertextual context, as well as an evolution of the social function of the text itself. This

means the way that the Eden Narrative is currently regarded and interpreted is far removed

from its original nature as a text. An analysis of the history of the evolution of the Eden

Narrative as a text that traces the history of its interpretation within the evolving Christian

cognitive environment in the West is a major study in its own right. This complex history of

transmission means that the thesis' primary interaction with the text is driven not by a concern

to recover its original meaning within a particular historical context, but rather by an attempt

to elaborate upon its contemporary meaning as a Christian aetiological myth located in the

Bible as a sacred creation story.

There are also related psychological problems and questions that have a bearing on

this study, which lie outside the scope of this thesis. The first regards the nature of

personhood. This thesis adopts the anthropological viewpoint that regards the person as a

differentiated-individual-in-relationship-with others.[42] That is, personhood comprises both

social and individual being. This perspective reflects the insights of Buber's dialogical

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[41] Herman Gunkel, *Genesis*, trans. Mark E. Biddle (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1910/1997), xvi-xviii, Gordon J. Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, ed. David A. Hubbard and Glenn W. Barker, vol. 1, Word Biblical Commentary (Waco, Tx.: Word, 1987), xxx-xliii. A summary of the current debate is presented by Hildebrand and King. D. R. Hildebrand, "A Summary of the Recent Findings in Support of an Early Date for the So-Called Priestly Material in the Pentateuch," *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* 29 (1986). and Greg A. King, "The Documentary Hypothesis," *Journal of Theological Studies* 12 (2001). This inconclusive debate has led Waltke to conclude that "we really do not possess reliable criteria for dating of the Pentateuch literature." Bruce Waltke, *Genesis: A Commentary* (Grand rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2001), 26.

[42] This perspective has been developed by a number of theologians including: Ray Anderson, *On Being Human: Essays in Theological Anthropology* (Pasadena, CA: Fuller Seminary Press, 1982); Stanley J. Grenz, *The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology of the Imago Dei* (Louisville, KY/London: Westminster John Knox, 2001); Alistair I. McFayden, *The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theory of the Individual in Social Relationships* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); John Zizoulas, *Being as Communion* (Crestwood, NY: Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1985).

personalism,[43] Mead's social self,[44] and the social constructionist emphasis on the social

nature of personhood.[45] This represents a departure from the conception of the person as an

autonomous individual that was based on Descartes notion of the self, which strongly

influenced Western culture over the last five centuries.[46]

Outline of Thesis

This thesis shall be presented in six chapters. The first chapter will discuss several

methodological issues with respect to interpretation of the Eden Narrative. Then it will

discuss how Relevance Theory, Communications Theory, and Speech Act Theory can be

utilized to gain a richer and novel interpretation of the text. The second and third chapters

will present a summary review of shame in the psychological literature that conceptualizes

shame as a phenomenon with four dimensions: anticipatory shame, social disgrace and

stigma, the emotion of acute shame, and finally chronic shame. The fourth chapter prepares

the ground for an analysis of the text by presenting an alternative literary structure of Genesis

2 – 4 and discussing some of the motifs and themes in the Eden Narrative. The fifth and sixth

chapters will present a novel interpretation of the Eden Narrative that elucidates inferences

and implicatures that have been overlooked in previous studies.   The thesis then concludes

with a general summary that also points out some theological implications that warrant further

exploration.

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[43] Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970), ———, *Between Man and Man*, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (London: Kegan Paul, 1947).

[44] George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self and Society* (Chicago, Ill.: Chicago University Press, 1934).

[45] Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Allen Lane, 1966), Kenneth J. Gergen, *Realities and Relationships: Soundings in Social Construction* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), ———, ed. *Refiguring Self and Psychology* (Dartmouth, U.K.: Aldershot,1993).

[46] For a review of the development of our conception of the person see Joseph Torchia, *Exploring Personhood: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Human Nature* (Lanham, MD: Roman & Littlefield, 2008). and Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989).

Chapter 1   Approaching the Eden Narrative as Literature

The approach that this thesis has adopted in its reading of the Eden Narrative reflects that hermeneutics has been undergoing a significant realignment with respect to its underlying assumptions. First, there has been a realignment away from the assumptions and concerns of 19th century positivist historicism in its focus on a diachronic approach aimed at identifying the original meaning of the text in terms of author's intention in its original historical context. Instead, new literary criticism is characterized by a renewed emphasis on a literary analysis of the text in its final form. Second, there has been a shift to expressivist linguistics with its emphasis on the way that language is used in communication, that has opened up the field of pragmatics. This thesis has adopted a hermeneutic approach in line with new literary criticism and based on expressivist linguistic assumptions. A feature of the methodological approach this thesis has adopted in its reading of the Eden Narrative has been the application of three theories in pragmatics to the interpretation of the text, namely Speech Act Theory, Relevance Theory, and Communications Theory.

1.1 A Literary Approach to the Eden Narrative

1.1.1 History as Literature

The historical critical method had been widely adopted because an objective of biblical theology was to analyse the Old Testament as a historical source document for reconstructing the history of Israel. It had been concerned with the reliability of the Old Testament as a historical source document.[1] There is a tension between regarding the Old Testament as a historical narrative that is historical in character and regarding it as a narrative of salvation history that is theological in character. This is because the Old Testament is primarily a sacred text. Yet taking the Old Testament seriously as a historical document reflects the concern in

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[1] Grant R. Osbourne, "Historical Narrative and Truth in the Bible," *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* 48, no. 4 (2005): 185-86. Han Young Lee, *From History to Narrative Hermeneutics*, Studies in Biblical Literature (New York: Peter Lang, 2004), 41-109.

biblical theology that the Old Testament needs to be based on historical facts to give its

theology credibility as revelation based upon God's acts in history.[2]

The historical-critical method maintained that the objective of exegesis was to identify

the correct definitive meaning of a text through uncovering the original author's intention and

historical meaning in the original context. This method along with the critical approaches of

form criticism, source criticism, and redaction criticism reflected the historiographical

assumptions of 19th century logical positivism that assumed that history could be an objective

chronicle of historical facts.[3] This approach faced the problem that many ancient sources were

not written according to the standards of 19th century historiography. They wrote chronicles

and preserved their historical traditions in epics, songs and legends.[4] These ancient documents

could not be regarded as reliable sources for history.[5] Even where the author of the Eden

Narrative was regarded as the Yahwist historian, it has been generally recognized that his

work did not meet the historiographical standards of modern history.[6]

These historiographical assumptions are no longer credible. Logical positivism

overlooked that historiography is itself a cultural construct. The historian's approach to

history is influenced by the contemporary cultural context and the evolving methodological

assumptions of historiography itself. Just as ancient writers did not have a scientific

methodological perspective; neither did they have the historiographical perspective of the

modern interpreter. Consequently, there is a significant gap between the methodological

presuppositions of the ancient writers and the modern interpreters, which is reflected in the

variation and imprecision with which these ancient sources are interpreted.[7]

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[2] Gerhard von Rad, *Old Testament Theology: Volumes I & II*, trans. D. M. G. Stalker (Peabody, MA: Prince Press, 2005), Vol II, p. 417-25. Osbourne, "Historical Narrative and Truth in the Bible," 189-91.

[3] Han Young Lee, *From History to Narrative Hermeneutics*, Studies in Biblical Literature (New York: Peter Lang, 2004), 3-5.

[4] Hermann Gunkel, *Genesis*, trans. Mark E. Biddle, 3 ed. (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1997), viii. Gerhard von Rad, *Genesis: A Commentary*, 2 ed. (London: SCM, 1966), 31-37, John Van Seters, *Prologue to History: The Yahwist as Historian in Genesis* (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1992), 109-29.

[5] Osbourne, "Historical Narrative and Truth in the Bible," 192.

[6] R. N. Whybray, *The Making of the Pentateuch* (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1987), 13-17.

[7] Lee, *From History to Narrative Hermeneutics*, 26-29.

History itself is not an objective collection of facts so much as an interpreted story composed by the historian. History inevitably involves interpretation of the significance and meaning of the events that are recorded. The selection of events as worthy of noting in a history presumes that they are significant. Historical narratives inevitably involve a reference to actual events and an interpretation regarding their meaning and significance.[8] This gives history an inherent literary element. As Lee stated;

> history blends into literature, in that history is itself literary, it is a literary 'painting' of historical events, and derives its coherence from a belief-system regarding the meaning of the history it depicts, it is inevitably interpretative. The concept of salvation history depicts the history of the Bible as "a narrative response to divine revelation in history.[9]

If history is made by literature, then there is no direct access to history except by means of literature. Consequently, one does not uncover the historical meaning behind the text, but within the intrinsic literary structures and content of the text. The literary form of history allows for a methodological integration between a historical and literary approach to interpreting the Bible and other literary historical texts.[10]

There is no "either/or" relation between fact and fiction in historical literary texts. Rather literature falls on a continuum ranging from fact to fiction. History in literary form is not 100% factual but conveys an interpreted meaning. There is no dichotomy between factual history and myths. Rather, there is a blurred distinction where myths provide general archetypes, whereas historical narratives focus on particular specific events.[11]

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8 G. B. Caird, *The Language and Imagery of the Bible* (London: Duckworth, 1980), 201-18. Collins also observed that factuality resides in the authors' intentions on how closely to base the narrative on facts known to the author, but there is inevitably a thematic interpretation and ordering of those facts into a coherent narrative with the literary elements of literary structure, character, plot and themes. Grant R. Osbourne, "Historical narrative and truth in the Bible," *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* 48, no. 4 (2005): 681-85. Choi likewise argues that "The chief aim of history-writing, then, is to produce an interpretation of the past, an account that reveals the significance of the past to the present and the future of the audience." John H. Choi, *Traditions at Odds: The Reception of the Pentateuch in Biblical and Second Temple Period Literature* (New York/London: T & T Clark, 2010), 115.

9 Ibid., 129.

10 Richard Waswo, "The History That Literature Makes," *New Literary History* 19, no. 3 (1988), Paul R. Noble, "Synchronic and Diachronic Approaches to Biblical Interpretation," *Journal of Literature and Theology* 7, no. 2 (1993).

11 John J. Collins, "The "Historical Character" Of the Old Testament in Recent Biblical Theology," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 41 (1979): 200-03. James Barr, *The Bible in the Modern World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 53-74.

1.1.2 A Synchronic Focus on the Text

The shift from modernism to postmodernism is reflected in a corresponding shift in

hermeneutics from a concern about the historical origin of a text to a focus on the text itself as

a finished product. This shift involved the abandonment of the quest for one definitive

meaning in favour of a recognition that the dynamic interaction between the text and readers

in their changing historical/cultural context inevitably gives rise to a plurality of

interpretations and meanings.   This shift to methodological pluralism and an increased

attention to the text itself are the distinguishing features of "new" literary criticism with its

close attention to literary details of the text, and concern with the text in its final form.[12] As

Exum and Clines expressed it, new literary criticism involves, "an attitude to texts that sees

them as works of art in their own right, rather than as representations of the sensibilities of

their authors."[13] This represents a decisive departure from the historical-critical approach and

its quest for the original historical meaning.[14] Where historical-critical criticism adopted a

diachronic approach, new literary criticism has adopted a synchronic approach that

concentrates on the literary meaning of the text in its final form. The synchronic approach of

new literary criticism provides an alternative to diachronic approaches that results in literary

meaning fusing with historical meaning. There is neither history outside the story nor story

outside history. This approach enhances the autonomy of the text. The emphasis on the

compositional skill of the final redactor and the final form of the text has reduced the value of

diachronic approaches that focus on sources, traditions, forms, or the author behind the text.[15]

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[12] Han Young Lee, *From History to Narrative Hermeneutics* (New York: Peter Lang, 2004), 5-7, Peter Thacher
     Lanfer, *Remembering Eden: The Reception History of Genesis 3:22-24* (Oxford/New York: Oxford
     University Press, 2012), 5-6.

[13] David J. A. Clines and J. Cheryl Exum, "The New Literary Criticism," in *The New Literary Criticism and the
     Hebrew Bible*, ed. J. Cheryl Exums and David J. A. Clines (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993),
     11.

[14] Barton rightly regarded these two approaches as being mutually exclusive because they reflect different
     epistemological assumptions, one objective, the other relativistic, and alternative synchronic or diachronic
     approaches to the text. John Barton, *The Old Testament: Canon, Literature, and Theology* (Burlington, VT:
     Ashgate, 2007), 130. Aichele insightfully observed that this quest for the right original meaning reflects the
     modern intolerance for ambiguity and polyvalence in its insistence on objective knowledge. George Aichele
     et al. *The Postmodern Bible* (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1995), 2-3.

[15] Noble, "Synchronic and Diachronic Approaches to Biblical Interpretation," 132, Adele Berlin, *Poetics and
     Interpretation of Biblical Narrative* (Sheffield, UK: Almond Press, 1983), 81.

1.1.3 The Author, the Text, and the Reader

The hermeneutical question regarding the nature of textuality is to what extent does the meaning of the text reside in the intention of the author, the autonomy of the text itself, or the construal of meaning by the reader (or the interpreting community). The historical-critical method emphasized that the meaning of the text resided in the intention of the author. The author was the creator of a text; it was crafted according to the author's intention. As Vanhoozer expressed it, "The author is the historical cause of a textual effect; his or her intention is the cause of the text being the way it is."[16] Thus, the task of the interpreter was to understand the definitive meaning of the text in terms of the intention of the author.

This approach, however, if extended to interpreting the intentions of the author behind what is conveyed in the text, risks committing an intentional fallacy, because we have no access to the author's intention apart from what has been actually written.[17] Another shortcoming is that this approach presumes modern conventions of originality by the author, whereas in medieval and ancient times, authors readily incorporated material from other texts, blurring the distinction between an author and an editor or redactor. This feature, along with the anonymity of the author of most Old Testament texts makes the intention of the author elusive indeed![18]

In contrast, new literary criticism emphasizes the autonomy of the text. Ricoeur argued that the further removed a text becomes from the occasion of its writing, the more it gains in autonomy. Texts inevitably enjoy greater autonomy than utterances. As Ricoeur explained, "Writing renders the text autonomous with respect to the intention of the author. What the text signifies no longer coincides with what the author meant."[19] There is an

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[16] Kevin J. Vanhoozer, *Is There Meaning in This Text?* (Leicester, UK: Apollos, 1998), 44.
[17] Caird, The Language and Imagery of the Bible, 61.
[18] Barton, *The Old Testament*, 119-122.
[19] Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Social Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation*, trans. John B. Thompson (Cambridge/London/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 139.

inevitable alienation of the text from the intention of the author. Ricoeur argued that there is a threefold autonomy to the text.

> This is a threefold autonomy: with regard to the author's intention, with regard to the cultural situation and all the sociological conditions that applied to the production of the text, and with regard to the original audience... The work of art, the literary work, the work in general transcends its psycho-sociological conditions of production, opening itself to an unlimited series of readings, themselves situated in always different sociocultural contexts. In short, that the work de-contextualizes itself, as much from the sociological as the psychological point of view, and allows itself to be recontextualized in other ways is what happens through the act of reading.[20]

Ricoeur maintained that the intention of the author is a short-lived event at the time of writing. After that the text launches out on a career of its own. The meaning of a text is inevitably contextualized, and the ever-changing contexts within which readers read the text inevitably have a modifying effect on the meaning that the text conveys.

Fish's reader-response criticism emphasized the construal of the reader in the context of his or her interpretive community. Fish located the creation of meaning in the reader's activity of construal, rather than in the text itself or the author's intention.[21] He maintained that the meaning of a text is actively construed by the reader with reference to the referential context and illocutionary force of a text rather than just its literal meaning.[22] Meaning did not reside in the text; nor did it lie in the author's intention. It lay in the interpretive activities of the reader.[23] He went so far as to say that the "objectivity of the text is... a dangerous illusion."[24] Fish maintained that the text does not place a constraint upon the reader's construal; rather the constraint is provided by the values and interpretative norms of the interpretative community that a reader is a part of. The way the interpretative community influences how a text is interpreted is that people will interpret a text in the way that they are taught by their community to regard it.[25] Fish, however, negated the possibility of the text

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[20] ———, *Hermeneutics* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2013), 96.
[21] Stanley Fish, *Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 32-43.
[22] Ibid., 268-92.
[23] Ibid., 158-67.
[24] Ibid., 43.
[25] Ibid., 167-73.

being able to challenge the reader or the interpretive community. Fish overstated his argument in overlooking that the act of writing reifies a speech act as a text and makes it into an institutional fact. Fish rightly drew our attention to the active role of the reader in construing meaning from the text, but he overemphasized this element at the expense of the other two elements – the autonomy of the text and the intentions of the author.

Gadamer also emphasized the active responsible role the reader has in interpreting a text and appropriating meaning from it. In contrast to Fish, however, he recognized that the text itself was a reference point for appraising meaning. Gadamer balanced the determinacy of meaning in a text with the creative appropriation of meaning as an event of reading through his notion of fusion of horizons, that the meaning the reader appropriates from the text is a contemporary contextualized meaning derived from the interaction of the text (the horizon of the text) with the contemporary context of the reader (the horizon of the reader), resulting in a "fusion of horizons."

Ricoeur also recognized the unique active engagement of the reader in interpreting the text in likening it to the way a musician interprets a score of music, stating, "Reading is like the execution of a musical score; it marks the realization, the enactment, or the semantic possibilities of the text."[26] Both Ricoeur and Gadamer recognized that the structure of the text constrains the possibilities of meaning depending on the epistemic specificity of the text, but texts convey a potentiality of meaning that does not reside in the text as such, but is realized in the event of reading.

The reader is an active interpreter who appropriates meaning from a text. The meaning does not reside in the determinative meaning of a text in and of itself. The semiotic process that the reader engages in involves both the processes of relating the linguistic signifiers in the code of the text to concepts in the reader's cognitive environment, as well as drawing inferences from explicatures and implicatures in the text. The reader contextualizes the text by

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[26] Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics*, 159.

the hermeneutical circle of relating the text to the whole of its literary context and back to the

text, and recontextualizes the text through the hermeneutical circle of relating the world-of-

the-text with the contemporary world of the reader. The apperception of meaning by the

reader involves these four concurrent processes.[27]

The polysemiotic structure of elements in a text and the connections between them

opens up many possibilities of meaning. Consequently, as Van Wolde expressed it, "A text

may be defined as a continuum, an undifferentiated whole of possibilities."[28] The reader

orders all these elements and their intersections into a network of meaning. How the reader

orders these polysemiotic elements is guided by the reader's purposes in reading the text, and

the reader's world-view (cognitive environment).[29]

How a reader interprets a text is influenced by the reader's pre-understandings made

up of a knowledge of the language, knowledge of the original cultural context, the reader's

contemporary cultural context, and the reader's ideological and theological openness to the

world of the text. A reader's culturally conditioned world-view, and theological or ideological

precommitments function as a constraint upon the way the reader interprets the text.[30] This

interaction is reflected in one hermeneutical circle, the dynamic interplay between the world-

view or cognitive environment of the reader and the world-view presented in the world-of-

the-text.[31] This means that our cultural distance increases the likelihood of misinterpretations

through the application of our own cultural background knowledge or missing cultural cues in

the text.[32] In addition, the reader inevitably reads a text with specific purposes in mind. Those

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[27] Ellen Van Wolde, *Words Become Worlds: Semiotic Studies of Genesis 1-11* (Leiden/New York/Koln: E. J. Brill, 1994), 180-81.

[28] Ibid., 174.

[29] Ibid., 175-76.

[30] William W. Klein, Craig L. Blomberg, and Robert L. Hubbard, *Introduction to Biblical Interpretation* (Dallas, TX: Word, 1993), 97-116.

[31] Werner G. Jeanrod, *Theological Hermeneutics: Development and Significance* (London: MacMillan, 1991), 5-6.

[32] V. Philips Long, "The Art of Biblical History," in *Foundations of Contemporary Interpretation*, ed. Moisés Silva (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 299-303.

purposes determine what is most relevant in the text. The reader's interpretation is influenced by these determinations regarding relevance.

The tension between author's intention and reader's appropriation as the locus of meaning points to the intersubjective nature of texts. On the one hand, the author is the subject of the text through writing, and so one can say that the text reflects the author's intentions. On the other hand, the meaning of the text is realized through the subjective process of the reader as the subject appropriating the meaning of the text through the act of reading. The act of writing with the author as the subject compliments the act of reading with the reader as the subject.

Interpretation involves these three elements: the author's intention, the autonomy of the text, and construal of meaning by the reader, but the comparative prominence they may enjoy varies. This variance depends upon the particular features of the text with reference to genre, knowledge about the author, epistemic specificity, and the degree to which the text is decontextualized from its original context. As the figure below illustrates, the extent to which meaning resides in the intentionality of the author, in the autonomy of the text itself, or in the construal by the reader can be represented as a continuum between the three points of a triangle. All three are pertinent factors in interpretation. The space of the triangle represents differences in degree to which author's intention, the text itself, or reader's response is prominent in the process of appropriating meaning from the text.

Figure 1: The Hermeneutical Triangle

This trialogue involves the reader being honest about the pre-understandings and intentions he or she brings to reading the text. The text clarifies reading through the literary context and semantics, stylistic features and structure, the poetics of the text. The wider original historical-cultural context also is a pertinent aspect of literary context, especially with reference to

shared assumptions between the author and original audience (32-3).

As Osborne pointed out, this trialogue involves the reader being honest about the pre-understandings and intentions he or she brings to reading the text. For, there are two dimensions to the meaning of the text: the embodied intention of the author and the construed meaning by the reader. The text clarifies reading through the literary context and semantics, stylistic features and structure, the poetics of the text. The wider original historical-cultural context also is a pertinent aspect of literary context, especially with reference to shared assumptions between the author and original audience.[33]

1.1.4 The Autonomy of the Eden Narrative

The degree to which the author's intention or the autonomy of the text is more prominent is influenced by a number of factors. The first factor is the degree to which the author can be identified. In the case of the Eden Narrative the author cannot be identified. The traditional view of Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch no longer has credibility in scholarly circles

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[33] Grant R. Osborne, "Literary theory and biblical interpretation," in *Words and The Word: Explorations in Biblical Interpretation and Literary Theory*, ed. David G. Firth and Jamie A. Grant, 32-3 (Nottingham, UK: Apollos, 2008).

since the 17th century.[34] Rather, the diversity and contradictions in the texts that make up the

Pentateuch suggests that the corpus was the result of a complex compilation process rather

being the composition of a single author.[35] The literary origins of the Pentateuch have been

explained by three different hypotheses: (1) the Wellhausen Documentary Hypotheses – that

the Pentateuch was compiled by an editor from four source documents, (2) the fragment

hypothesis – that the Pentateuch was compiled by a single editor from a mass of independent

short source texts, (3) the supplement hypotheses – an original unified account that was added

to by later writers that distorted the original unity of the composition.[36]

       Wellhausen's documentary hypothesis provided an explanation for the contradictions

and doublets in the Pentateuch text. The basis for distinguishing source documents was:

nature of the material, different choice of words and variation in style, duplicate versions of

the same stories, repetition of details in the same narrative, insertions of extraneous material

into an otherwise continuous narrative, factual contradictions, different cultural and religious

points of view. Different source documents were identified by their internal consistency and

continuity of their narrative.[37] Welhausen's hypothesis explained these discrepancies as

evidence of multiple authorship. He suggested there were four major documents written by

four different authors, identified as J (the Yahwist), E (the Elohist), P (the Priestly writer) and

D (the Deuteronomist).[38]

       The validity of the documentary hypothesis has been challenged by recent scholarship

on methodological grounds.[39] Rendtorff criticized the documentary hypothesis on the grounds

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[34] Joel S. Baden, *The Composition of the Pentateuch: Renewing the Documentary Hypothesis* (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2012), 14-16. Though there are still scholars who hold that view, such as: John Collins, *Genesis 1 - 4: Linguistic, Literary, and Theological Commentary* (Phillipsbury, NJ: P & R, 2006), 221-35.

[35] Christoph Levin, "The Yahwist: The Earliest Editor in the Pentateuch," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 126, no. 2 (2007): 209-30.

[36] Roger. M. Whybray, *The Making of the Pentateuch* (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1987), 17.

[37] A recent literary analysis by Baden concluded that each of these four documents have a narrative continuity and consistency that is consistent with them being literary works in their own right. Baden, *The Composition of the Pentateuch: Renewing the Documentary Hypothesis*, 68-81, 246-48.

[38] Whybray, *The Making of the Pentateuch*, 20-26.

[39] Wellhausen's documentary hypothesis is actually two interwoven hypotheses. One hypothesis is that the Pentateuch is a compilation by a redactor of four major source documents. The other hypothesis is that the diachronic process of the composition of the documents reflects the development of Israelite religion over the

of an inconsistent application of its criteria. He proposed a modern form of the fragmentary

hypothesis. He argued that the thematic unity and theological consistency of the Pentateuch

supports the conclusion that it was the work of a single author writing in the 6th century

B.C.E. He argued that the earliest histories, such as Herodotus, included composite materials

similar to what is found in the Pentateuch.[40] Whybray argued that the Pentateuch could be the

composition of one author rather than a redactor.[41] Van Seters likewise has maintained that

the Pentateuch is the work of an author-historian rather than the result of a complex

compilation process.[42] On the one hand that J was a later 8th - 6th century source is gaining

wider acceptance,[43] but on the other hand other scholars maintain that lack of narrative

continuity supports the view that the final form of the Pentateuch was the work of a

compiler.[44] The problem remains that, the lack of empirical evidence means that the

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centuries. Wellhausen's theory of the historical development of Israelite religion, upon which an early date for J was presumed is unconvincing. Apart from that, the documentary hypothesis is an elaborate literary theory, but there are problems in distinguishing between J and E material, which are frequently blurred. It presumed Wellhausen's theory of historical development of Israelite religion, which is unconvincing. As Sweeney pointed out, Wellhausen let his theory of religious development influence his documentary hypothesis. Marvin A. Sweeney, *The Pentateuch* (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2017), xix-xx. The literary criteria assumptions are anachronistic, and there is an over-reliance on theories of the diachronic development of the Hebrew language for identifying older material. The presumptions of internal consistency are not supported by the source texts. There is a lack of intertextual pre-exilic OT references to E and J, which raises doubt about their early date. Whybray, *The Making of the Pentateuch*, 129-31. Thompson argued that the chronological foundation for the Wellhausen hypothesis has lost its foundation, because we have no way of dating the sources and have no access to tradition sources. He concluded that "the long quest for a detailed reconstruction of the earliest forms of the traditions is a hopeless quest." Thomas L. Thompson, *The Origin Tradition of Ancient Israel: I. The Literary Formation of Genesis and Exodus 1 - 23*, Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Supplementary Series (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1987), 59.

[40] Cited by Whybray. Whybray, *The Making of the Pentateuch*, 42-73. Van Seters also argued in favour of the unity of the J material, arguing that J wrote like an ancient historian incorporating older source material into his narrative, rather than reflecting a subsequent redaction process. John Van Seters, *The Yahwist: A Historian of Israelite Origins* (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbauns, 2013), 13-17. Van Seters regarded the patriarchal sagas were derived from oral traditions and identified J as the later author and compiler of the Pentateuch rather than a source document. *Abraham in History and Tradition* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975).

[41] Wrybray concluded, "The Pentateuch... is an outstanding but characteristic example of the work of an ancient historian.... He had at his disposal a mass of material, most of which may have been of quite recent origin and not formed part of any ancient Israelite tradition. Following the canons of historiography of his time, he radically reworked this material, probably with substantial additions of his own invention, making no attempt to produce a smooth narrative free from inconsistencies, contradictions, and unevenness." Whybray, *The Making of the Pentateuch*, 242.

[42] Van Seters maintained that there is no evidence in any other classical literature of a complex editorial process, so positing the work of a subsequent redactor-editor is completely without justification. John Van Seters, "The Report of the Yahwist's Demise Has Been Greatly Exaggerated!," in *A Farewell to the Yahwist? The Composition of the Pentateuch in Recent European Interpretation,*, ed. Thomas B. Dozeman and Konrad Schmid (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2006), 146-47.

[43] Sweeney, *The Pentateuch*, xxi-xxv.

[44] Konrad Schmid, "The So-Called Yahwist and the Literary Gap between Genesis and Exodus," in *A Farewell to the Yahwist? The Composition of the Pentateuch in Recent European Interpretation*, ed. Thomas B.

compositional process by which the Pentateuch took its final form remains undetermined.[45]

Whether the Pentateuch was the work of a single author or the result of a compilation drawing

upon four source documents remains an open question.[46] The search for the author by tracing

source documents that gave rise to Wellhausen's documentary hypothesis remains

inconclusive even though the Yahwist has been most commonly identified as the prime

source of the Eden Narrative.[47] The author of the Eden Narrative remains unidentified.

The second factor is the genre of the text. The literary genre of the Eden Narrative is

not immediately apparent because it is such a unique piece of literature.[48] Most of the

discussion regarding genre has focused on whether the Eden Narrative is a historical report,

folktale, legend, myth, or saga. All these genres possess a high degree of autonomy in

comparison, for instance, to personal letters that have little autonomy.

Decisions regarding genre also involve adopting the corresponding reading strategy

that will be adopted in engaging with the text.[49] For example, the corresponding reading

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Dozeman and Konrad Schmid (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2006), 31-48; Albert De Pury, "The Jacob Story and the Beginning of the Formation of the Pentateuch," ibid., 51-60. While the compiler is generally regarded as P, Levin argued that three was a J editor who compiled the non-priestly materials prior to P. Levin, "The Yahwist," 209-30; "The Yahwist and the Redactional Link between Genesis and Exodus," in *A Farewell to the Yahwist? The Composition of the Pentateuch in Recent European Interpretation*, ed. Thomas B. Dozeman and Konrad Schmid (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2006), 132-36.

[45] J. H. Tigray, "An Empirical Basis for the Documentary Hypothesis," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 94 (1975): 329-42; Whybray, *The Making of the Pentateuch*, 230-42.

[46] Schwartz argued that Rendtorff's analysis does not disprove the documentary hypothesis because he did not address the issues of lack of coherence in the Pentateuch as a whole piece of literature, but analsyzed small sections of text in isolation. The documentary hypothesis still remains one plausible explanation for this literary problem. Baruch J. Schwartz, "Does Recent Scholarship's Critique of the Documentary Hypothesis Constitute Grounds for Its Rejection?," in *The Pentateuch: International Perspectives on Current Research*, ed. Thomas B. Dozeman, Konrad Schmid, and Baruch J. Schwartz (Tubigen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 3-16. In his summing up of the current status of research into the composition of the Pentateuch, Kratz concluded that while there was consensus that there are three literary strata in the Pentateuch, the identification of source documents and the diachronic process of the composition of the Pentateuch remains a matter of open debate. Reinhard G. Kratz, "The Pentateuch in Current Research: Consensus and Debate," ibid. (Mohr Seibeck), 33-55.

[47] E. A. Speiser, *Genesis: Introduction, Translation, and Notes*, ed. David Noel Freedman, Anchor Bible (New York: Doubleday, 1964), xxvi-xxix. Gordon J. Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, Word Biblical Commentary (Waco, TX: Word, 1987), 50-51. Stordalen, *Echoes of Eden*, 218-20. Tryggve N. D. Mettinger, *The Eden Narrative* (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2008), 16-17.

[48] We need to be mindful that 'genre' is a set of social conventional categories for classifying literature, and we need to avoid presuming that ancient cultures held the same genre conventions for its literature. Failure to recognize this can lead to misclassifying the genre of ancient texts. Jeannine Brown, "Genre criticism," in *Words and The Word: Explorations in Biblical Interpretation and Literary Theory*, ed. David G. Firth and Jamie A. Grant, 129-30 (Nottingham, UK: Apollos, 2008).

[49] Brown, "Genre criticism," 144-46.

strategy for folk tales focuses on the themes and moral of the story. The reading strategy for myths is identifying how the myth explains the reader's contemporary world, or the culture's corresponding world view. The decision regarding genre also influences the reader's response.

The status of the Eden Narrative as a myth and as a sacred text reduces the salience of author's intention. Myths require a high degree of autonomy for the text as the bearer of the myth. A myth as a grand narrative of an interpretive community acquires the status of an authoritative tradition that is a possession of the community, rather than the composition of an author. The tradition takes primacy over the intentions of the author as the authoritative reference point for interpretation of the text. This is certainly the case with the Eden Narrative, where the text has come to be interpreted primarily with reference to the grand narrative of the Fall.

Sacred texts particularly possess a high degree of autonomy, especially when a degree of divine authorship or inspiration is claimed. A complicating factor with Scripture is the notion of *sensus plenior*, the dual authorship of God behind the human author(s) of Scriptural texts. *Sensus plenior* generates a tension between the literal meaning based author's intention and the "fuller meaning" reflecting the divine intention.[50] Ricoeur pointed out that the extent to which a biblical text can be regarded as interpersonal communication between God and the believer depends upon the genre of the text. He identified five genre that varied in this regard, ranging from prophetic oracles, prescriptive, narrative, hymnic, and prophetic modes of discourse. The prophetic mode has the strongest claim to double human-divine authorship, with the hymnic mode having the least.[51] The element of divine revelation and inspiration contributes to the autonomy of sacred texts.

The third factor is the transmission history of editing and redaction of the text. A long complex transmission history increases the autonomy of a text. First, we have the

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[50] Vanhoozer, *Is There Meaning in This Text?*, 263-65.
[51] Paul Ricoeur, *Essays on Biblical Interpretation* (London: S.P.C.K., 1981), 111-29.

transmission history leading up to the final form of the Eden Narrative. The focus on the

transmission history of the traditional sources of the Pentateuch was the contribution of

Gunkel and Noth. Gunkel argued that the authors of the Pentateuch drew upon a rich source

of oral traditions of sagas and legends.[52] Genesis 1 – 11 was a collection of primal legends

that were mythical in character. They were stories about human characters, while the

presence of God as a character as well as their aetiological themes gave them a mythical

aspect.[53] Gunkel maintained that the primal legends have traces of Babylonia influence

though they have been substantially reworked to reflect Israelite monotheism.[54] Gunkel

suggested that early written collections of these legends were undertaken by E and J possibly

during the reigns of David and Solomon, followed by a final redaction identified as P in the

6th – 5th centuries B. C. E.[55]

The problem with these arguments that the writers of the Pentateuch drew upon oral

Noth followed Gunkel's approach in maintaining that J and E and subsequently P

drew upon tribal pre-monarchy oral traditions for their source material. Noth maintained that

the common elements in J and E pointed to a common source of oral or written traditions

(which he identified as G – Grundlage, meaning 'a common basis').[56] Noth maintained that

these traditional sources originated from local Israelite tribal traditions prior to the formation

of the Israelite monarchy that were subsequently compiled to form the traditional material for

the Pentateuch.[57]

The problem with these arguments that the writers of the Pentateuch drew upon oral

traditions is the absence of any evidence for Israelite oral traditions. There is also little known

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[52] Gunkel maintained that "Genesis clearly contains the final written record of oral tradition." Hermann Gunkel, *Genesis*, trans. Mark E. Biddle, 3 ed. (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1997), viii.

[53] Ibid., xii-xiv.

[54] Ibid., l-liv, lvii-lxi.

[55] Ibid., lxix-lxxxvi.

[56] Martin Noth, *A History of Pentateuchal Traditions*, trans. Bernhard W. Anderson (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981), 38-41.

[57] Ibid., 42-45.

about the extent of Israelite literacy and oral traditions and written texts interrelated.[58] The

oral tradition source hypothesis relies totally on assumptions.[59]

There is ongoing debate whether the material that was collected in the Genesis 1 – 11

prehistory could have been drawn from ancient Mesopotamian and Hebrew oral traditions.[60] It

has been argued that the redaction of Genesis may have gone through several phases of

development: the development of oral traditions in small narratives, followed by assembling

these small stories into sagas, which were subsequently written down into their final form. [61]

What these debates indicate is that the Eden Narrative has a complex and uncertain

transmission history that enhances the autonomy of the text.

The Eden Narrative also has a long subsequent transmission history that involves

subsequent redaction and changes in the status of the text from folk tale to sacred text to

myth. This means that the genre fluidity of the Eden Narrative is a complicating factor in

interpretation, in that genre does not only refer to the social literary conventions the author

referenced to in composing the work, but also decisions by the interpreting community that

inform how the reader will approach the text.[62]

The fourth factor is the extent to which the occasion or immediate context of the

writing of the text can be identified. There is a high degree of uncertainty regarding when

Genesis was written. Suggestions range from dating the composition of the Eden Narrative

from the 10th century B. C. E. to the 6th century B. C. E. On the one hand, there are allusions

to the political tensions at that time that suggest that the narrative dates from the times of

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[58] Grabbe estimated that between 5 – 10 % of the population of ancient Israel may have been literate, and these were mainly scribes. So the audience of ancient texts may have been primarily these scribes.Lester Grabbe, "The Law, the Prophets, and the Rest: The State of the Bible in Pre-Maccabean Times," *Dead Sea Discoveries* 13, no. 3 (2006): 332-33.

[59] Whybray, *The Making of the Pentateuch*, 133-42.

[60] Speiser, *Genesis*, xx-xxxvii, Gunkel, *Genesis*, xvii. Christoph Levin, "The Yahwist: The Earliest Editor in the Pentateuch," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 126, no. 2 (2007): 209-30, Bruce Vawter, *On Genesis: A New Reading* (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1977), 30-33, Long, "The Art of Biblical History," 319-37, J. Skinner, *Genesis*, International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh, UK: T & T Clark, 1910), xxiii-xxvii.

[61] Victor P. Hamilton, *The Book of Genesis Chapters 1 - 17*, Nicot (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1990), 17-20.

[62] Brown, "Genre criticism," 130-146.

David and Solomon.[63] Other scholars placed the date of composition after the division into

the two kingdoms.[64] The dilemma, as Sommer reminded us, is that it is difficult to date a

document through allusions to its historical context with any confidence in the absence of

conclusive extra-textual evidence.[65]

There is a growing consensus, however, that the Pentateuch is a 6th century work. This

conclusion is supported by the lack of intertextual references to Pentateuch material in the

other books of the Old Testament.[66] von Rad has argued that the lack of intertextual allusions

to Eden in the rest of the Old Testament, on the other hand, has been regarded as indicative

evidence for a late composition of the Eden Narrative.[67] Yet the Old Testament contains some

allusions to creation, and explicit references to Eden as a special place of fruitfulness,[68] and

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[63] R. B. Coote and D. R. Ord, *The Bible's First History: From Eden to the Court of David with the Yahwist* (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1989). Hans Walter Wolff, "The Kerygma of the Yahwist," *Interpretation* 20, no. 2 (1966): 134-36. Peter F. Ellis, *The Yahwist: The Bible's First Theologian* (Notre Dame, ID: Fides 1968), 87-96. Gary A. Rensburg, *The Redaction of Genesis* (Winona Lake, MI: Eisenbrauns, 1986), 107-20, Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, xlii-xliii, George W. Coates, "The God of Death: Power and Obedience in the Primeval History," *Interpretation* 29, no. 3 (1975): 227-39, Gerard von Rad, *Genesis*, revised ed. (London: SCM, 1963), 22-28. More recently, George and George suggested that suggested that the most likely period J wrote was during the reign of Joram (852-842 B.C.E.), and that J was probably Judean because the document reflected a Judean perspective. Arthur George and Elena George. The Mythology of Eden. Lanham, MD: Hamilton Books, 2014, 5-7.

[64] Arthur George and Elena George, *The Mythology of Eden* (Lanham, MD/Plymouth, UK: Hamilton Books, 2014), 5-7; Richard E. Friedman, *Who Wrote the Bible?*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper-Collins, 1997), 86-87. Kratz concluded that the Yahwist probably wrote between the fall of the Northern Kingdom in 720 B.C.E. and the fall of Juday in 587 B.C.E., with the final compilation of the Pentateuch occurring around 500 B.C.E. Reinhard G. Kratz, *The Composition of the Narrative Books of the Old Testament*, trans. John Bowden (London/New York: T & T Clark, 2000), 251-59, 309-22.

[65] Benjamin D. Sommer, "Dating Pentateuchal Texts and the Perils of Pseudo-Historicism," in *The Pentateuch: International Perspectives on Current Research*, ed. Thomas B. Dozeman, Konrad Schmid, and Baruch J. Schwartz (Tubigen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 85-108.

[66] Choi also argued that the Pentateuch may not have been regarded as a preeminent authoritative work without canonical status, and possibly neglected. Other Old Testament references to the exodus reflect traditions at variance with the Pentateuch account, suggesting that there were multiple versions and traditions concurrently in ancient Israel through the Old Testament and second temple periods. The lack of awareness of the Pentateuch is additional evidence in support of a late composition date. John H. Choi, *Traditions at Odds: The Reception of the Pentatecuh in Biblical and Second Temple Period Literature* (Lieden: Brill, 2010), 9-22, 243-44.

[67] von Rad, *Genesis*, 74. Other scholars have also made this observation. Nicolas Wyatt, "Interpreting the Creation and Fall Story in Genesis 2-3," *Zeitschrift fur die Altestamentliche Wissenschaft* 93, no. 1 (1981): 12-14; Joseph Blenkinsopp, *Creation, Un-Creation, Recreation: A Discursive Commentary on Genesis 1-11* (Berlin: W. De Gruyter, 2002), 65; Peter Thacher Lanfer, *Remembering Eden: The Reception History of Genesis 3:22-24* (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 41-65.

[68] Isaiah 51:3 refers to God making the wilderness of Zion like Eden and her desert like the garden of the Lord. Joel 2:3 refers to "The land is like the garden of Eden before them, but a desolate wilderness behind them". Ezekiel 31:8-9, 16, 18 refers to the trees of Eden in the garden of God, and 36:35 refers to the garden of God in Eden.

three possible allusions to Adam's transgression.[69] Finally, the Ezekiel oracle against Tyre has

been regarded a fall story from Eden that possibly echoes Genesis 3.[70] Nevertheless, there is a

startling contrast between the complete neglect of Adam and Eve in the pre-exilic corpus of

the Old Testament compared to the prominence that Adam and Eve received in the

intertestamental literature.[71] This is weighty evidence in favour of a conclusion that the Eden

Narrative may have been a later 6th century B. C. E. composition written during the period of

the Persian Empire,[72] even if it drew upon older materials in an extended redaction process.[73]

The fifth factor is the degree to which the intentions of the author are made explicit in

the text through the epistemic specificity of the text. As we shall see, the Eden Narrative has

a low epistemic specificity. The intentions of the author(s) of the Eden Narrative are not

explicitly stated in the text, nor can they be readily inferred from the themes or conclusion of

the story itself. The situation we face is that the intentions of the author are no longer

accessible to the interpreter, even though intentionality can still be inferred.

The sixth factor is the degree to which the audience the text addresses is identified.

The audience of the Eden Narrative is not identified beyond the literary context that suggests

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[69] Ecclesiastes 7:29, Hosea 6:7 and Job 31:33. Ecclesiastes 7:29 stated that God made humankind (הָאָדָם) upright, but they have sought out many devices. This passage referrs to humanity generically, rather than being a specific allusion to Adam. Collins, *Genesis 1-4*, 68-69.

[70] Van Seters also argued that thematic similarities with Ezekiel 28:14-19 and with Babylonian creation myths are suggestive for a similar late date for Genesis. John Van Seters, *The Yahwist: A Historian of Israelite Origins* (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbauns, 2013), 21.

[71] Nicolas Wyatt, "Interpreting the Creation and Fall Story in Genesis 2-3," *Zeitschrift fur die Altestamentliche Wissenschaft* 93, no. 1 (1981): 12-14. Joseph Blenkinsopp, *Creation, Un-Creation, Recreation: A Discursive Commentary on Genesis 1-11* (Berlin: W. De Gruyter, 2002), 65, LaCoque, *Trial of Innocence*, 5-20. Lanfer, *Remembering Eden*, 41-65. Gordon highlighted the dilemma that if Genesis 2-3 was such an etiological myth, then the lack of reference to it in the rest of the Old Testament is puzzling, unless it is due to a late date of composition. The Old Testament has a widespread awareness of the multiple forms and ubiquity of sin, which means the lack of a back-reference to Adam and Eve is striking. Yet, there is no rival text claiming to present an origin to sin. Gordon, "The Ethics of Eden," 23. Nevertheless, this evidence is not conclusive, because alternatively, the Eden Narrative may not have had the significance it subsequently acquired in the intertestamental period; it may have been regarded in ancient Israel as an obscure folk tale about Israel's first ancestor. Ellen A. Robbins, The Storyteller and the Garden of Eden (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2012), 5-6.

[72] Grabbe pointed out that the absence of any Hellenistic references suggests the text was completed prior to the conquest of Alexander the Great, even though the first extrabiblical witness to the Pentateuch was the 2nd century B.C. E. work the *Wisdom of Ben Sira*. Grabbe, "The Law, the Prophets, and the Rest: The State of the Bible in Pre-Maccabean Times," 323-33.

[73] Thompson does not rule out a 6th century date, but also maintains that the narratives may have a greater antiquity; the final redaction that formed the book of Genesis is set at this later date. The construction of this work was essential for strengthening Israel's identity and self-understanding in response to the crisis of exile and loss of their land and independent political status

that it is the community of ancient Israel. Conclusions regarding the date of the composition

of the work have significant implications for identifying relevant themes. An earlier work

would bring to the fore the theme of the importance of obedience and divine punishment,

whereas a 6th century date would imply that the themes of this work were in response to the

crisis of exile and the loss of their land and independent political status, the need to strengthen

Israelite identity.[74]

Finally, what contributes to the autonomy of a text is its existence as a work of art. It

is a product of composition, hence a work of art. Gadamer argued that a feature of art is that it

allows for the subjective engagement of the beholder with the art work, quite independent

from whatever original meanings the author or artist was conveying in the composition of the

work. Art is both one step removed from the world, while at the same time referencing the

world, and it is this removal that gives art its creative potency, and openness to imagination in

creating the world-of-the-text, with its creative open-ended potentiality.[75]

So, we see that the Eden Narrative possesses a high degree of autonomy as a text. Its

autonomy lends itself to interpretation utilizing a literary approach that engages with the text

in its final form, rather than following a strictly critical-historical approach.

1.1.5 Myth and History.

Regarding the Eden Narrative as a myth raises the question of the veracity of the story and its

relation to historical events. What rests on this decision regarding genre is whether or not the

Eden Narrative should be regarded as a historical account that literally reported actual

historical events.[76] That it was a historical account written by Moses was taken for granted by

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[74] Thompson, *The Origin Tradition of Ancient Israel: I. The Literary Formation of Genesis and Exodus 1 - 23*, 193-204.

[75] Ibid., 90-97, 130-35.

[76] G. C. Aalders, *Genesis Volume 1*, trans. William Heynen (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1981), 42-47. Davis maintained a historical view of the fall because the "redemption fulfilled in Christ is meaningless if the events of Genesis 3 are not historical." John D. Davis, *Paradise to Prison: Studies in Genesis* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Bookhouse, 1975), 85.

the early reformers and those who followed them.[77] A literal interpretation of Genesis was

adopted as an á priori position that was consistent with the theological viewpoint that regards

Scripture as the inerrant Word of God that was literally true in every respect.[78]

What was at stake in these debates as to whether or not the Eden Narrative was a myth

was the historical truth of the Bible. The modern presumption that myths are by definition

untrue left Christians with a stark either-or choice. Regarding the genre of Genesis as (untrue)

myth or legend, amounted to surrendering the truth of the Bible.[79] One defence was to claim

that Israel's myths were an exception. Hartman argued that they were true because, "Israel

alone had the true knowledge of God, divinely revealed to it. Its 'myths' were therefore true

explanations."[80] This argument reflects an uncritical adoption of the modern presuppositions

regarding objective truth, the fictional nature of myths, and historiography. Hartman,

however, failed to understand the complex relationship that myths bear to history.

The genre of myth covers a wide diversity of texts. While what can be regarded as a

myth is still subject to debate, myths are usually sacred narratives that embody dogma, are

associated with rituals, and feature supernatural principal characters.[81] The underlying

common elements in this diverse range of literature regarded as myth is that they are

narratives with themes that are concerned with the nature of reality.[82]

Myths, consequently, have an implicit truth claim. This appreciation is based on a

recognition that a myth is a narrative that sets out to convey a world view. Many myths are

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[77] John A. Calvin, *A Commentary on Genesis*, trans. John King (London: Banner or Truth, 1578/1965), 57-66, Matthew Poole, *Matthew Poole's Commentary on the Holy Bible: Volume 1 Genesis to Job*, 3 vols., vol. 1 (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1700/1985), 1. Matthew Henry, *Matthew Henry's Commentary on the Whole Bible, Volume 1 - Genesis to Deuteronomy* (McLean, VA: MacDonald, 1985), 9.

[78] Evangelical scholars who adopted this perspective include: James Montgomery Boice, *Genesis: An Expositional Commentary. Volume 1: Genesis 1 - 11* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1982), 157-60, Anthony A. Hoekema, *Created in God's Image* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1986), 124.

[79] Mark Pretorius, "The Creation and the Fall of Adam and Eve: Literal, Symbolic, or Myth?," *Conspectus* 12 (2011): 162-65.

[80] Louis F. Hartman, "Sin in Paradise," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 20, no. 1 (1959): 30.

[81] Lauri Honko, "The Problem of Defining Myth," in *Sacred Narrative: Readings in the Theory of Myth*, ed. Alan Dunda (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), 41-52, G. S. Kirk, "On Defining Myths," in *Sacred Narrative: Readings in the Theory of Myth*, ed. Alan Dundas (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), 53-61.

[82] G. S. Kirk, *Myth: Its Meaning and Function in Ancient and Other Cultures* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 115-20, 238-51.

inseparable from religious beliefs, in that they convey religious truth in a narrative form.[83]

Myths support cultural and social values by grounding them in a transcendent realm that is

projected beyond and before culture. Every culture possesses aetiological myths that explain

how the current cosmos came to be.[84] Myths function to anchor current social values and

mores in a primeval past so as to make them unchallengeable.[85] Because myths strongly

influence culture, and human moral and social behaviour, they are formative in shaping social

reality quite apart from their historical accuracy. Malinowski concluded that,

> Myth is thus a vital ingredient of human civilization; it is not an idle tale but a
> hardworked active force; it is not an intellectual explanation or an artistic
> imagery, but a pragmatic charter of primitive faith and moral wisdom.[86]

The efficacy of myths lies in the belief that the primeval reality they describe provides true

explanations of the world that the community currently lives in. Their efficacy depends upon

the conclusions that a community has come to regarding the truth of a myth, which were

determined beforehand by the community's acceptance of the world view assumptions that

the myth explained.[87] Accordingly, any analysis that attempts to do justice to myths must

acknowledge their implicit truth claims within the context of the corresponding cultural world

view.

Myths have an explanatory relationship to history, which involves an implicit truth-

claim, because the explanatory function of myths presupposes a correspondence with reality.[88]

According to McKenzie, myths can be regarded as exemplar history. They convey important

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[83] Theodore H. Gaster, "Myth and Story," in *Sacred Narrative: Readings in the Theory of Myth*, ed. Alan Dundas (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), 110-36. Rafaele Pettazzoni, "The Truth of Myth," in *Sacred Narrative: Readings in the Theory of Myth*, ed. Alan Dundas (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984).

[84] An early collection of Ancient Near Eastern creation myths was collected by Smith. George Smith, *The Chaldean Account of Genesis* (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington, 1876).

[85] Bronislaw Malinowski, *Myth in Primitive Psychology* (London: Kegan Paul, 1926), 120-25.

[86] ———, "The Role of Myth in Life," in *Sacred Narrative: Readings in the Theory of Myth*, ed. Alan Dundas (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), 194.

[87] C. S. Lewis, "Religion without Dogma?," in *God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics*, ed. Walter Hooper (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1970), 131-32.

[88] von Rad, *Old Testament Theology*, Vol. 1, 30-31, John Goldingay, "The Patriarchs in Scripture and History," in *Essays on the Patriarchal Narratives*, ed. A. R. Millard and D. J. Wiseman (Leicester, UK: InterVarsity Press, 1980), 16-35. Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics III/1: The Doctrine of Creation*, trans. J. W. Edwards, O. Bussey, and H. Knight (London: T & T Clark, 1951/2004), 81. LaCoque, *Trial of Innocence*, 9-14, 43.

truths about the nature and origin of the world and humanity's place in it that have significant historical implications. Consequently, as Croatto rightly maintained, "The historicity of a myth does not depend upon the original event that it narrates, but on a present reality that is interpreted by the myth."[89] McKenzie expressed a similar insight that, for a myth "to fulfil its proper function, it must always be a symbolic representation of the ultimate reality, however this may be conceived and interpreted, concerning the essential meaning and facts of existence and of human destinies."[90] Myths are not concerned with the factuality of historical events; rather, they are concerned with the underlying meaning of history and its relation to the spiritual reality of existence that gives history its meaningfulness.[91] Consequently, myths have more enduring relevance than mere historical accounts.

1.1.6 Myth as Grand Narrative

The essential role of myths in culture has been given theoretical underpinning by social constructionism. The distinctive feature of social constructionism is that it presents a socially relative epistemology that knowledge is a socially mediated construction, and by implication our social world is also socially constructed by humans. It also proposes an alternative anthropology that presents humans as social beings who construct and in turn are shaped by the social worlds they create.

Instead of living within an objective universe that is empirically appraised, humans live in social worlds that they have constructed. Our social worlds are 'nested' within a physical world that confronts us with its own uncompromising reality. While our social worlds with their institutions are created and maintained by human conventions and agreements, these social worlds are themselves the product of human adaptation to the demands of the physical environments that they find themselves in. Social worlds are unintelligible apart from the physical context they exist in. This is reflected by Searle's

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[89] J. Severino Croatto, "On the Semiotic Reading of Genesis 1-3: A Response from Argentina," *Semeia* 81 (1998): 189.

[90] John MacKenzie, "Myth and the Old Testament," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 21 (1959): 267.

[91] Helmut Thielicke, *The Evangelical Faith* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1977), 71-82.

distinction between the "brute facts" of the physical world and socially constructed "institutional facts".[92]

Our view of the world is shaped by a framework of conceptual assumptions by which we interpret our experience of the world and make it intelligible. It amounts to what Berger and Luckmann described as a symbolic universe. They argued that a symbolic universe is a humanly constructed conceptual framework that conceives the world as having a cosmic order. It contains fundamental assumptions about the nature of reality, the state of the universe, the place of humans in it, the fundamental meanings and purposes of human life, and who we humans are. A symbolic universe provides a meaningful framework for individual experience. It is in effect a socially constructed cosmos that humans have created for themselves to make their lives meaningful and intelligible. A symbolic universe provides an overall context for the institutions of society, individual biography, and presents the world as having a fundamental orderliness.[93]

Every symbolic universe is expressed in terms of a grand narrative. A grand narrative is concerned with the origins of the world and humans. It explains our current situation and presents a vision of a future destiny. Myths, then, are grand narratives that reflect and articulate a symbolic universe. As Simkins expressed it, "Myths are simply narrative elaborations of culturally shared perceptions of reality."[94] Myths correspond to the symbolic universe that they function as grand narratives for. The validity of a myth is tied to the corresponding symbolic universe. When the symbolic universe is the dominant world view, its myths are regarded as true; when the symbolic universe is rejected, the corresponding myths are dismissed as untrue. Therefore, those who dismiss myths as fictional stories only reveal their lack of understanding of the functional correspondence myths have in relation to the symbolic universe of a culture.

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[92] John R. Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality* (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 28-29.
[93] Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction of Reality*, 115-18.
[94] Ronald A. Simkins, *Creator and Creation: Nature in the World View of Ancient Israel* (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994), 46.

1.2 Expressivist Linguistics

New literary criticism operates within the framework of expressivist linguistics that has its origin in the work of Ferdinand de Saussure.[95] It has abandoned the assumptions of the classical correspondence theory of language that maintained that language is built up from discursive propositions that establish logical relations between propositions that contain elements (words) whose meaning is based on a correspondence to the objects that those words signify.[96] Expressivist linguistics is based on the epistemological assumption that lexical meaning is derived from the arbitrary psychological relation of a word (signifier) to a concept that it refers to (signified), rather than an empirically based correspondence to a signified object. The meaning of words is derived from their relations to other words, their usage, and linguistic context in social discourse.[97] This shift in the understanding of the nature of meaning was summed up in Wittgenstein's maxim that meaning was not derived from ostensive definitions but from its usage within the social context, namely: "the meaning of a word is its use in the language."[98] Subsequent expressivist linguists have built on this distinction in their focus on analysing the ways language is utilized in social discourse as a means of communication.

Three theories in pragmatics that are based on the assumptions of expressivist linguistics have provided the theoretical basis for the hermeneutical methodology utilized within this thesis to derive its reading of the Eden Narrative. These three theories, Speech Act Theory, Relevance Theory, and Communications Theory, are summarized below.

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[95] Ellen Van Wolde, *Words Become Worlds: Semiotic Studies of Genesis 1-11* (Leiden/New York/Koln: E. J. Brill, 1994), 113-48.

[96] The correspondence theory of languages can be traced back to Plato's *Thaetetus* that maintained language was a collection of names for objects according to Dirk M. Schenkeveld and Jonothan Barnes, "Language," in *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, ed. Keimpe Algra, et al. (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 193-216. Augustine reflected the same view. Augustine, "Confessions," (*NPNF[1]* 1): I.8.13. John Locke's referential theory of language provided a modern philosophical formulation of the correspondence theory of language. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Philadelphia, PA: Kay & Troutman, 1847), 3.1.5 - 3.3.13.

[97] Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), 112-13.

[98] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 2 ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972). §43, p.20.

1.2.1 Speech Act Theory

John Searle developed Speech Act Theory upon the foundation of Austin's pioneering work. Austin recognized that not all statements are propositions that make truth claims that are subject to verification whether or not the proposition is true or false. He demonstrated that language also has performative functions, where people utilize language to perform social acts that create new social realities. That is, people do things with words.[99] Austin also broke new ground in making a distinction between the locutionary act that conveys the meaning of the words, the illocutionary act which is the performative force of the utterance, what the speaker is actually doing through the utterance, and the perlocutionary function which concerns the response elicited from others. Austin maintained that "whereas locution has to do with a sign system or *langue*, illocutions and perlocutions have to do with sentences, with language in action or *parole*."[100]

Searle regarded a speech act as an act in linguistic communication.[101] A speech act utilizes language in a social situation that involves conforming to the rules governing language use. There is a direct connection between the semantic, syntactic and grammatical rules governing language and the rules that govern the way language is utilized in speech acts. Speech Act Theory is based upon social constructionist presuppositions that through performative acts people create institutional facts through making constitutive rules. Searle expressed this using the formula, "X counts as Y in context C." For example, a round red leather object (X) counts as a cricket ball (Y) in the context of a cricket game (C).[102] Searle asserted "that language is essentially constitutive of institutional reality."[103] This is because of

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[99] John L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, 2 ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 4-9, 53-60.

[100] Ibid., 209.

[101] Searle, "What Is a Speech Act?," 39.

[102] John R. Searle, *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 33-35. Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality*, 8-51.

[103] Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality*, 59.

the performative efficacy of speech acts for establishing the constitutive rules and conventions that social realities are based on.

An original contribution of Speech Act Theory is the development of a classification of a range of different speech acts that reflect the different social actions that people undertake with language. Searle argued that there are five basic types of speech acts: (1) assertives that state propositions to tell people about things, (2) directives that try to get other people to do things, (3) commissives where people commit themselves to specific courses of action, (4) expressives where people express their opinions, feelings and attitudes, and (5) declarations that change relationships and social structures.[104] This taxonomy represents a giant step forward from the now simplistic view that regarded all utterances as propositions.[105] This means that we no longer regard the proposition as the basic unit of language; it is one among a number of different speech acts.

These different types of speech acts have distinct conventional rules that function with reference to specific conventional agreements concerning the constitutive rules governing specific speech acts. The meaning of a speech act is construed with reference to the particular conventions and constitutive rules governing it. Furthermore, a speech act that violates a constitutive rule is still a form of rule-governed behaviour that derives its meaning from the rule that it is violating.[106] For example, lies that violate the sincerity condition are parasitic upon the truth, inasmuch as they rely upon reference to the sincerity condition for conveying meaning. Wittgenstein emphasized that meaning resides not just in the lexical meaning of words, but in the constitutive grammatical rules of language and ostensive references to social practices.[107] As soon as a speech act loses its reference to the social conventions and

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[104] ———, *Expression and Meaning*, 29. ———, *Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World*, 39-110.

[105] Dieter Wunderlich, "Methodological Remarks on Speech Act Theory," in *Speech Act Theory and Pragmatics*, ed. John R. Searle, Ferenc Kiefer, and Manfred Bierwisch (Dordrecht, NLD: Reidel, 1980), 291-312.

[106] Searle, *Speech Acts*, 33-42, 62-66.

[107] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 2 ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972), S 122-23.

constitutive rules governing it, it becomes essentially an unintelligible meaningless

communication.

Speech Act Theory makes distinctions between the locutionary (what it says),

illocutionary force (what it does) and perlocutionary aspects (what it effects) of a speech act.

The locutionary aspect refers to the propositional content of the utterance. Searle called this

aspect the propositional act. The illocutionary force refers to the *intended* effect upon the

hearer. The effectiveness of the illocutionary force of a speech act relies upon the hearer's

recognition and understanding of the speaker's informative intention. The perlocutionary

force of the speech act goes beyond understanding to the actual effect and response the speech

act evokes in the hearer. Consequently, people can be successful in communicating their

intention to inform the hearer of their informative intention, without succeeding in their

communicative intention, which relies upon the hearer accepting the communication and

responding in the way that the communicator intended.[108]

Speech acts have distinctive criteria for validity. Searle maintained that a speech act

must satisfy three conditions to be valid: the preparatory condition, the sincerity condition,

and the essential condition. For example, in order to give a valid order, the preparatory

condition that the speaker should be in a position of authority over the hearer needs to be

satisfied. The sincerity condition is that the speaker genuinely wants the ordered act done. The

essential condition has to do with the fact that the utterance aims to get the hearer to do it.

The preparatory condition for assertions is that the speaker has some basis for supposing the

asserted proposition is true. The sincerity condition is that the speaker must believe the

proposition to be true. The essential condition has to do with the fact that the utterance is an

attempt to inform and convince the hearer of its truth.[109]

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[108] Ibid., 24-25, 44-48.

[109] ———, "What Is a Speech Act?," 53. An example is John 21:24, "This is the disciple who bears witness of
these things, and wrote these things; and we know that his witness is true." (NASB).

While speech acts include references to objects, the relation between linguistic signifiers and objects signified is much more complex than the correspondence theory of language allows for. There are different types of references. In addition to the ostensive reference to an object, there are symbolic and analogical references characteristic of figurative and metaphorical language. There are also hypothetical references.

Referential statements vary in their illocutionary and perlocutionary force. For example, a descriptive reference, "that is a stone," has a different illocutionary force to a command regarding an object, "Pick up the stone." A referential statement is successful when the speaker can identify the referred object upon request, but it is a consummated reference when the hearer is able to identify unambiguously the object the speaker is referring to. Hence the intelligibility of speech acts relies upon ostensive references to identifiable objects as well as adherence to conventional rules.[110]

Speech Act Theory provides a framework for analysing both spoken and written statements as social acts of communication that perform a wide range of functions. Pratt summarized the advantages of Speech Act Theory for interpretation in this succinct way.

> In sum, speech act theory provides a way of talking about utterances not only in terms of their surface grammatical properties but also in terms of the context in which they are made, the intentions, attitudes, and expectations of the participants, the relationships existing between participants, and generally, the unspoken rules and conventions that are understood to be in play when an utterance is made and received.[111]

It provides a powerful tool for interpreting texts as communicative acts. It takes us beyond the literary interpretation of texts with reference to their locutionary force and the reader's construal of meaning, to their illocutionary and perlocutionary force with reference to the impact upon the reader and the reader's response.

1.2.2 Relevance Theory

In developing Relevance Theory, Sperber and Wilson built on Grice's work in pragmatics. Grice developed the inferential model, that maintained that communication is through people

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[110] ———, *Speech Acts*, 72-82.
[111] Pratt, *Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse*, 86.

communicating intentions and recipients interpreting the actor's intentions. Grice's inferential model maintained that communication is the attempt of the speaker to elicit a certain response in a hearer, or to draw an inference regarding the speaker's intentions. The intention of communication is pragmatic. And when a hearer draws a wrong inference, it means the communication provided misleading evidence about the speaker's intentions. Grice's hypothesis is that once a certain behaviour is identified as an act of communication, that observation of that behaviour with reference to general principles regarding communication would enable a person to infer the speaker's informative intention. The first principle, the co-operative principle is that people will co-operate in mutually engaging in a communication process. He then developed maxims for efficient communication: Make your contribution as informative as is required; Do not make your contributions more informative than is required; Try to make your contribution one that is true; Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence; Be relevant; Avoid obscurity of expression; Avoid ambiguity; Be brief; Be orderly. Grice maintained that efficient communication can be achieved through observing these maxims.[112]

Searle argued that the Gricean model with its maxim that communication relies upon co-operation between speaker and audiences inadequate. Rather, a person can be successful in communicating their intention to inform the hearer of their intentions – the informative intention, without succeeding in their communicative intention, which relies upon the hearer accepting the communication and responding in the way the communicator intended. A hearer may comprehend a communication accurately but may refuse to comply with what it requests.[113] Sperber and Wilson argued that Grice's hypothesis that communication presumes a co-operation between communicator and addressee based on a presumption of a common goal beyond merely understanding and being understood, and that information serves to further this common goal. This hypothesis does not apply to conflictual or non-reciprocal

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[112]   H. P. Grice. *Studies in the Way of Words* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 26-27.
[113]   Searle, *Speech Acts*, 46-48.

communication, or situations where the speaker's intention is deceptive. Relevance Theory

maintains that a common conversational goal need not be built into pragmatic principles.[114]

Rather, communication is based on a presumption of relevance.[115] Relevance Theory is

applicable to the Eden Narrative rather than Grice's theory given the context of deception and

conflict in the story that Grice's theory does not apply to.

The distinctive contribution of Relevance Theory is its analysis of the role of inference

in communication and the relation of explicatures to implicatures in speech acts. Relevance

theory recognizes that meaning is not conveyed solely through the decoding of the lexical

meanings of the words in an utterance. The lexical content of an utterance is incomplete in

itself; meaning is conveyed through a combination of explicit utterances, implicatures and

contextual references. In addition, words frequently convey figurative, metaphorical and

connotated meanings, indicating that the usage of words extends beyond their lexical

meanings.[116] An example of this is the phrase, "it's raining cats and dogs", which means 'its

raining very heavily'. Another example is the convention that railways in Victoria have

adopted that with reference to the direction a train travels, "Up" means away from Melbourne

and "Down" means towards Melbourne. The weight that these sources of meaning is given

depends upon the indeterminacy or ambiguity of the utterance, the strength of the

implicatures, and the determinate nature of ostensive references.[117]

The inference model of communication is based upon recognition of the polysemiotic

ambiguity of many sentences or utterances. The relation between words and concepts is a

fluid, varied and complex one. Some words are simply place holders, or statements of relation

rather than being conceptual in meaning. People also convey concepts through phrases rather

than single words. The phenomenon of ambiguity, multivalence and polysemy is evidence

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[114] Sperber and Wilson, *Relevance*, 268.
[115] Ibid., 260.
[116] Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber, *Meaning and Relevance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 16. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
[117] Wilson and Sperber, *Meaning and Relevance*, 8-13.

that there can be a many-to-many correspondence between words and concepts.[118]

Consequently, the determination of meaning from possible lexical alternatives is based on

inferences made by the hearer regarding the speaker's intention.[119]

This means that linguistic communication involves two modes of communication; the

inferential mode conveyed by ostensive references and implications, and the coding –

decoding mode that utilizes the linguistic symbols to convey meaning through the

explicatures in a speech act. The inferential model maintains that this coding – decoding

process enables the hearer to infer the message being linguistically communicated as a

function of the speaker's intention. This means that the coding-decoding model and the

inference model are both complimentary. Conveying meaning through speech acts involves a

semiotic process that both models make essential contributions to.[120]

The concept of relevance maintains that speech acts involve ostensive references that

infer that the intended communication is relevant and worthy of attention.[121] Furthermore, a

speaker will attempt to communicate his or her intentions in such a way as to optimize their

relevance to the recipient(s). This attempt involves conveying an implicit claim that the

communication (or speech act) satisfies the conventional criteria for its validity, because

relevance is optimized when the speaker fulfils Searle's preparatory, sincerity and essentiality

conditions of speech acts. Therefore, "every act of ostensive communication communicates a

presumption of its own optimal relevance."[122] Acceptance of the communication by the

recipient relies upon a favourable conclusion regarding its relevance. On the one hand, a

recipient will attend to a communication when he or she deems it to be relevant. On the other

hand, a recipient will disregard communications that are deemed to have little or no relevance.

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[118] Ibid., 31-35.
[119] Sperber and Wilson, *Relevance*, 10.
[120] Ibid., 27.
[121] Ibid., 50-54.
[122] Ibid., 158.

A communication is relevant to the extent that it intends to modify the cognitive environment of the recipient. A person's cognitive environment comprises of his or her world view, pre-understandings, and personal knowledge and assumptions. Modification of the recipient's cognitive environment is accomplished through the illocutionary force of a speech act. The illocutionary force of a communication is generally conveyed by the inferential process of optimizing relevance to the recipient, rather than solely by information conveyed through the decoding process.[123] The perlocutionary effect of a communication is the actual impact of the modification of the said cognitive environment of the recipient.[124] Receiving and comprehending the meaning of a communication involves relating the communicated assumptions (in the utterance or text) to the assumptions making up his or her cognitive environment. The greater the effect of the communicated information upon a recipient's cognitive environment, the more relevant the communication will be deemed to be.[125]

The inferential mode relies upon a mutual understanding of social cues. This creates a problem because every person's social viewpoint is unique. There are inevitable points of difference.[126] While humans live within a common physical environment, each person has a unique cognitive environment.[127] People share common elements of their cognitive environments based on commonality of culture and physical environment. Communication relies upon shared mutual assumptions, such as common language, which provides the basis for mutual understanding.[128] Gadamer described the unique perspective of the reader with the metaphor of "horizon." A person's cognitive environment constitutes the person's horizon. Gadamer described the reader's understanding of the text in terms of a fusing of the horizons

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[123] Ibid., 176.
[124] Ibid., 57-58.
[125] Ibid., 109-22.
[126] Ibid., 16.
[127] Sperger and Wilson defined a cognitive environment in this way. "An individual's total cognitive environment is the set of all the facts that he can perceive or infer: all the facts that are manifest to him. An individual's total cognitive environment is a function of his physical environment and his cognitive abilities. It consists of not only all the facts that he is aware of, but also all the facts that he is capable of becoming aware of, in his physical environment." Ibid., 39.
[128] Ibid., 38-45.

of the text and the interpreter, and that this fusion of horizons establishes the relevance of the meaning of the text.[129]

Speech acts vary in their epistemic specificity. Because of the precision of language as a code system, verbal communication has a high degree of precision enabling the relatively unambiguous communication of complex assumptions.[130] This gives it a huge advantage over inference and non-verbal communication for conveying information. Explicatures, however, vary in epistemic specificity depending on how determinative and comprehensive the meaningful content conveyed by the utterance is. For example, the explicature "I have already eaten," is not as specific as "I have already eaten dinner tonight." A speech act with non-specific explicatures relies more upon the inferential element to convey the speaker's intention.[131]

Determinative implicatures are deduced from the explicatures of the utterance and from cues in the social context, whereas indeterminative implicatures are more reliant upon the recipient to supply cues from his or her cognitive environment. The more that a speech act relies upon the recipient to construe the implicatures, the more imprecise the communication will be. The more indeterminative the implicatures are, the higher the likelihood that the implicatures that the recipient supplies may be unintentional; that is, they may differ from the speaker's intention. Unintentional implicatures inferred by the hearer of the communication are a common source of misunderstanding. Indeterminate implicatures increase the likelihood of misunderstanding because they provide a wider range of possibilities of inferred meaning that the hearer can choose from.[132] This means that the more indeterminative the implicatures are, the less confidence the recipient can have that the inferences he or she makes will accurately reflect the speaker's intentions. Consequently, the achievement of mutuality of

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[129] Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. William Glen-Doepel (London: Sheed and Ward, 1979), 270-78.

[130] Ibid., 175.

[131] Ibid., 177-82. Wilson and Sperber, *Meaning and Relevance*, 77-80.

[132] Sperber and Wilson, *Relevance*, 193-99.

understanding is aided by increased epistemic specificity. Nevertheless, the intersubjective nature of communication means that achieving mutual understanding remains the shared responsibility of both speaker and hearer. It's just that the weight of that responsibility varies according to the determinacy of the implicatures in an utterance.[133]

The type of narrative genre influences the degree to which the writer relies upon explicatures or implicatures to convey intentions. For example, a set of directions relies heavily upon explicatures or determinative implicatures. A detailed narrative relies upon explicatures and implicated conclusions to convey determinative meaning. In contrast, a sparse narrative relies more heavily upon implicated premises that are inferred by the reader. It thereby relies more heavily upon the presumed shared cognitive environment between the author and the reader.

Poetry relies heavily upon indeterminative implicatures. The power of poetry lies in the use of poetic effects to generate many weak implicatures from which the reader can infer a large extension of inferred meaning. Sperger and Wilson called the multivalence and polysemy of poetry, in their indeterminacy of meaning, "poetic effects." A poetic effect involves utilizing explicatures to convey indeterminate implicatures that open up the possibilities for inferences the recipient may draw from. The more a text generates poetic effects, the more indeterminate it is, and the more it relies upon the construal of the reader to convey meaning in an undetermined way.[134] Gadamer maintained that poetry is language in its most artistic form. It is a deliberate departure from everyday language. Poetry enriches language in its ability to convey meaning in what it discloses and conceals through its very artistic play with language. Poetry particularly invites the reader into a dialogue with an art work with its indeterminate artistic meanings.[135]

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[133] Ibid., 217.
[134] Ibid., 218-24, Wilson and Sperber, *Meaning and Relevance*, 118-22.
[135] Ibid., 96-97.

Metaphors also generate poetic effects to extend the potential range of inferred meaning. There is a trade-off between epistemic specificity and creative power in metaphorical language. Ricoeur recognized that metaphors are the innovative creative edge of language, where words are used in novel non-lexical ways to create new meanings and ways of viewing the world.[136] Metaphors rely heavily on the inferential process rather than the decoding process for conveying meaning. Metaphors convey a richness of meaning that cannot be reduced back to the literal lexical meaning of words. Ricoeur observed, "Hence the relation between the literal meaning and the figurative meaning in a metaphor is like an abridged version within a single sentence of the complex interplay of significations that characterize the literary work as a whole."[137] By virtue of the indeterminate nature of inferred figurative meaning contained in metaphors, they have greater creative potential for creating new meanings than literal language. Metaphors have a large scope for generating new perspectives by free inventive associations. Therein lies the power of metaphors to convey a wealth of meaning succinctly. Relevance Theory provides tools for identifying and analysing the contribution of inferential processes of communication within a narrative to the conveying of meaning in a text.

1.2. 3 Communications Theory

Communications Theory maintains that all social activities occur within a context of social relationships. Furthermore, all social activity is communication. Even a non-response or refusal to communicate, itself communicates. Hence the axiom: "One cannot not communicate."[138] People can respond to communication either by acceptance, rejection, or disconfirmation. For example, a typical situation is when two strangers encounter each other, one of whom wants to make conversation, the other does not. The latter can either: (1) accept

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[136] Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Social Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation*, trans. John B. Thompson (Cambridge/London/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 169-74.

[137] Paul Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning* (Fort Worth, TX: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), 46.

[138] Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson, *Pragmatics of Human Communication*, 51.

communication, give in and make conversation, or (2) reject communication by making it

clear he or she is not interested in conversation, or (3) disconfirm the communication either

by complete non-response or by talking in a way that invalidates her or his own conversation.

Disconfirming a communication is a more powerfully negating of the speaker than open

rejection because disconfirmation negates the reality of the speaker's utterance, saying in

effect, "you do not exist." That is, the speaker's self-definition is completely discounted as if

the communication never occurred. This is why being completely ignored is so humiliating.[139]

Every speech act involves communication on two levels. There is the level of the

speech act itself with its locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects, and its

ostensive references to the world. Then there is the accompanying relational level of self-

identifications, relationship definitions, and identifications of others. Every act of social

communication conveys definitions of the relationship in the implicatures, which also may be

confirmed, rejected or disconfirmed by the hearer. When the relationship itself is the subject

of communication, however, these definitions may be expressed in the explicatures. These

definitions of relationship have three elements. The first element is a stated or implied self-

definition by the speaker regarding his or her identity. The second element is a definition of

what the relationship between them is. The third element is an identification statement

regarding who the hearer is.[140]

The emotional responses that people make to communications from others are

generally in response to the inferred identifications of persons and definitions of the

relationship conveyed by the implicatures and explicatures in a communication. Hearers are

most positively responsive to the illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects of a speech act

when there is substantial agreement regarding the nature of the relationship between them.

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[139] Ibid., 75-76, 84-90.

[140] It is interesting to note that Ricoeur identified that discourse involves a three-way reference, a self-reference
to the speaker, a reference to those being addressed, and an ostensive reference to the extralinguistic reality of
the world, or social context the discourse occurs in. Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Social Sciences*, 168. ——
——, *Hermeneutics*, 49-50.

Disagreement regarding the nature of the relationship increases the likelihood that the hearer

will reject or disqualify the communication.[141] It also increases the likelihood of

misunderstanding. Communications Theory can be applied to the interpretation of a narrative

through providing a methodology for systematically analysing the contribution of inferred

relational inferences in dialogues within a story.

1.3 Speech Act Theory and Literature

1.3.1 Literature as a Speech Act

Speech Act Theory, Relevance Theory, and Communications Theory focus their analysis on

utterances in social discourse.[142] Are these theories applicable to the analysis of texts? As

Gutt pointed out, a fundamental problem is that inferential communication relies heavily upon

cues within the immediate context, what he calls the primary communication situation.

Interpreters of biblical texts are removed from this context. They are in secondary

communication situations that by their nature tend to lead to misinterpretations simply due to

the absence of the original contextual cues.[143] Theorists who have addressed this question

have generally concluded that texts can be regarded as speech acts that utilize a different

mode of communication. The advantage that Speech Act Theory provides for literary

criticism is its functional emphasis on what the text actually does and its recognition of the

importance of social context.[144]

Literature has similar conditions to speech acts. The literary equivalent to the

preparatory condition is whether the author is authorized or qualified to write the text. The

sincerity condition also holds to texts in the presumption that the text satisfies the truth claim

conditions appropriate to the genre, and the author's intention is sincere. The stringency of

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[141] Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson, *Pragmatics of Human Communication*, 51-54, 82.

[142] Detweiler pointed out that because of its focus on social discourse, speech act theory did not adequately address fictional narratives that present fictional speech acts that are hypotheticals and construct alternatives worlds in the stories. Further elaboration of speech act theory in its application to written texts was required. Robert Detweiler, "Speaking of Believing in Genesis 2-3," *Semeia* 41: 138.

[143] Gutt, *Translation and Relevance: Cognition and Context*, 76-83.

[144] Hugh White, "Introduction: Speech Act Theory and Literary Criticism," *Semeia* 41 (1988): 2. Susan S. Lanser, "Feminist Criticism in the Garden: Inferring Genesis 2-3," *Semeia* 41 (1988): 69-74.

the sincerity conditions varies considerably from the stringent sincerity conditions attached to

the truth claims of affidavits to the permissive sincerity conditions attached to fictional

narrative. Literature has the same essential condition; the presumption regarding the intention

of the author being conveyed in the text.

Pratt argued that there is no linguistic difference between ordinary language as it is

used in speech acts and poetic and literary language. Rather, the difference lies in the manner

of usage, where the writer utilizes the ordinary language of discourse to accomplish his or her

intentions within the rules and conventions of literary and poetic genres. Pratt stated that,

> Literature itself is a speech context. And as with any utterance, the way people produce
> and understand literary works depends enormously on unspoken, culturally-shared
> knowledge of the rules, conventions, and expectations that are in play when language is
> used in that context.[145]

Pratt spoke of literary speech acts as a way of identifying the commonality of texts with

spoken speech acts, while allowing for the fact that literary speech acts are governed by

distinctive conventions and rules. Pratt concluded that, "a speech act approach to literature

offers the important possibility of integrating literary discourse into the same basic model of

language as all our other communicative activities."[146] What differs between utterances and

texts as speech acts is the mode of communication. Many of the same conventions and rules

governing speech acts also apply to texts.

Ricoeur similarly regarded a text as a discourse fixed by writing. He regarded the text

as a work of discourse that is structured according to the literary rules and conventions that

define the genre of a text. He regarded speaking and writing as alternative and equally

legitimate modes of discourse. The difference is that the mode of writing distances the

discourse from the immediate social situation that contextualizes spoken discourse. The

speech act is reified and externalized through the process of writing the text.[147]

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[145] Pratt, *Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse*, 86.
[146] Ibid., 88.
[147] Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics*, 131-40.

While a text can be regarded as a speech act, it is distinct from an utterance in significant ways. It has an autonomy or an abstraction from the author that an utterance does not have from its speaker. Thus, Gadamer regarded the written text as a kind of alienated speech,

> All writing is... a kind of alienated speech, and its signs need to be transformed back into speech and meaning. Because the meaning has undergone a kind of self-alienation through being written down, this transformation back is the real hermeneutical task. In contrast to the spoken work there is no other aid in the interpretation of the written word. Thus the important thing here is, in a special sense, the 'art' of writing. [148]

The written language refers back to the actual language of speech. Yet it is abstracted from the event of writing, and in a way, stands on its own.

Gadamer pointed out that this abstraction is both a strength and a weakness. Nothing can aid a text if it is misunderstood; the writer has no scope for clarification or explanation in response to a reader's question. The written text does not enjoy the support from ostensive references to the immediate context that utterances rely upon. The only contextual reference the text has is the literary context of the text. The advantage of the written text, however, is its permanence. The price for this permanence is that the written text is detached from the moment of writing in a way that utterances cannot be. This detachment provides the basis for the autonomy of the text, as a work of art that speaks on its own behalf.[149]

1.3.2 Speech Act Theory and Interpretation

There are a number of ways in which Speech Act Theory contributes to interpretation. Searle's taxonomy of speech acts increases our awareness of constitutive rules. The distinction between the locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary elements in a text enriches the semiotic process of interpretation.[150] As Van Wolde stated,

> The speech act from the point of view of the text is illocutionary; that is to say, the text has a thrust or force which indicates the intended function of the text in the

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[148] Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 355.
[149] Ibid., 354-56.
[150] Richard S. Briggs, "Speech-Act Theory," in *Words and The Word: Explorations in Biblical Interpretation and Literary Theory*, 99-103, ed. David G. Firth and Jamie A. Grant (Nottingham, UK: Apollos, 2008).

communicative situation, in a way that is recognizable by the reader.... The speech act from the reader's point of view is perlocutionary: the effect is the result of his/her process of interaction with the text. [151]

These elements are clearly seen in wills. The will has locutionary content. The will has illocutionary force in effectively being a legal directive to transfer ownership of the estate, and its perlocutionary effect depends on the executor's interpretation of the will.

The distinction between locutionary and illocutionary aspects is crucial to interpretation. As Briggs pointed out, a sentence that has the form of a declarative, may have the illocutionary force of a commissive. For example, the statement "It is hot in here." has an assertive form, meaning an observation about the temperature, but the implicatures may convey a commissive illocutionary force to the effect of "turn on the air conditioning!"[152] A lot of the ambiguity in a text does not rise from the lexical meaning of the locutions as such, but from the inferred illocutionary force of the passage.

The illocutionary force of narratives lies in the presentation of the world—of—the—text to the reader. The illocutionary force of wisdom literature such as fables lies in the presentation of the proverb. The illocutionary force of a narrative through introducing the reader to the world—of—the—text, however, is indeterminative. The reader exercises discretion as to in what way the meaning of the text will be appropriated. Finally, the perlocutionary effect of the narrative resides in the particular meaning the reader appropriates from the text.[153]

As soon as we speak of the Bible addressing the reader we are referring to the illocutionary force of the text. The perlocutionary potential of a text to have a transformative impact upon a reader is influenced by the illocutionary force of the text, which interacts with the genre of the text as a type of speech act. Stories influence the cognitive world of the reader

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[151] Van Wolde, *Words Become Worlds*, 180.

[152] Richard Briggs, *Words in Action: Speech Act Theory and Biblical Interpretation* (New York/Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2001), 98.

[153] Pratt, *Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse*, 91-94.

through introducing the reader to the narrative world of the text. In contrast, divine commandments influence the reader by confronting them with a demand or a prohibition of action with explicit or implied divine sanctions for obedience or disobedience. Sacred texts have a greater potential to be transformative than any other genre because they make a strong claim of relevance.[154]

1.3.3 Relevance Theory and Interpretation

Relevance Theory also provides some valuable perspectives for interpretation. The care that the author exercised in crafting the text and the act of publishing a text convey implicit claims to relevance. The artistry in producing a text implies that the text was written in a particular way to optimize its relevance to the author's intended audience. The selection and editorial process that most texts pass through in order to be published also support claims to relevance. So, the reader can presume that the way in which the text was written reflects the writer's intention to optimize relevance.[155]

The singular contribution that Relevance Theory makes to interpretation is its analysis of implicatures and explicatures. This analysis is valuable because the illocutionary force of the text is often conveyed in the implicatures, whose meanings are construed by the reader. Interpreters need to pay attention to the implicatures. To concentrate on the literal meaning or literary analysis of the explicatures only is to base interpretation on incomplete information. Meaning is conveyed by the implicatures, not merely by the explicatures in a text.

Relevance Theory identifies the features of a text that influence the degree to which the reader takes an active role in drawing inferences with respect to the text. These factors are: the extent to which texts are epistemically specific or indeterminative, how much the text relies upon explicatures or implicatures for conveying the author's intention, and the degree to

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[154] Anthony C. Thiselton, *New Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of Transforming Biblical Reading* (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1992), 31-32.

[155] Pratt, *Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse*, 116-20.

which the implicatures are determinative or indeterminative. Consequently, the degree to which interpretation is a matter of the reader's response is influenced by the indeterminacy of the text. With reference to our hermeneutical triangle of author's intention, autonomy of the text, and construal of meaning by the reader, a reduction of epistemic specificity, and reliance upon indeterminate implicatures to convey meaning increases the degree to which appraisal of meaning of a text relies upon active construal of meaning by the reader.

The reader's interpretation is influenced by the perceived relevance of the text to the reader himself or herself. So, one needs to be mindful of what makes a text salient to the reader's identity and situation; that is, what optimizes relevance. There are four matters that are always relevant to any recipient of communication. Communications Theory identifies three of these salient matters: (1) the self-identification of the author/speaker (particularly with reference to Searle's preparatory condition concerned with the authority of the author/speaker); (2) the identification of the recipient in relation to the author or text; (3) the identification of the nature of the relationship between the author/speaker and the recipient. Communications Theory overlooked the fourth salient matter, which is illocutionary force of the communication, the communication of the speaker's or author's intentions regarding what response is expected from the recipient(s).

The way the reader interprets and responds to the text is influenced by these inferences. The salience of these inferences depends upon the degree of self-involvement that the author and the reader have with the text. And the reader's response in either accepting, rejecting, or disqualifying the illocutionary force of the text is both with reference to the relational inferences, as well as the illocutionary force of the text. The perlocutionary effect of the text is determined by the reader's response in either accepting, rejecting or disqualifying the illocutionary force of the text.

1.4 Summary and Conclusion

This thesis has adopted a literary critical approach that interacts with the Eden Narrative in its final form. It pays close attention to the literary devices and language that have been utilized to convey meaning in the text. It recognizes that the Eden Narrative is a folk tale that has a long complex transmission history that involved its evolution into a sacred text and a myth.[156] Its status as a myth optimizes its relevance for the modern reader, rather than undermining its relevance on the grounds that it may not accurately portray actual historical events.

The hermeneutical methodology adopted in this thesis involves an application of Speech Act Theory, Relevance Theory and Communications Theory to the interpretation of the Eden Narrative. The contribution of Speech Act Theory lies in its recognition that texts, like other speech acts, are acts of intentional social communication. It makes important distinctions between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects of communication in the text, and recognizes that a lot of the ambiguity in interpretation revolves around identifying the illocutionary force of the text.

The contribution of Relevance Theory is the distinction it makes between explicatures and implicatures, the complimentary nature of the coding-decoding and inferential modes of communication, and the importance of epistemic specificity in determining the determinacy of meaning in a text. Relevance Theory draws attention to the importance of optimizing relevance with respect to both the intentions of the writer and the interpretation by the reader.

Finally, Communication Theory specifies what the aspects of communication are that optimize relevance, by drawing attention to the inferred identification messages conveyed in the implicatures. Optimum relevance is influenced by construed self-identifications by the communicator, identifications of the recipient, definitions of their relationship, and the

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[156] Niditch argued that the Eden Narrative contains generic elements that characterize folklore. Susan Niditch, *Folklore and the Hebrew Bible* (Mineapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), 35-47.

illocutionary force of what response is being sought from the recipient. The perlocutionary force of a communication is the result of the construal of these factors.

Consequently, interpretation that applies the inferential mode of communication recognizes that a text conveys four different types of information. First, it conveys implied propositional information that presumes unstated mutual knowledge. Second, it conveys the speaker's intentions with respect to the anticipated response of the recipient to the communication, which is the pragmatics of the communication.[157] Third, it conveys simultaneous identifications regarding the identity of the recipient, as well as the self-identifications of the sender. Fourth, it conveys proposed definitions regarding the nature of the relationship between the communicator and the recipient of the communication. Generally, when people respond emotionally to an utterance, the emotional response is to the inferred meanings regarding identity or the definition of the relationship conveyed in the inferential mode of the communication.[158] This thesis shall adopt this approach in its analysis of the text of the Eden Narrative.

This thesis approaches the text with the preunderstandings that I have gained into the dynamics of human cognition, emotion and social interaction as a psychologist and marriage and family therapist. My professional background has sensitized me to the importance of the interplay between interacting people at the inferential level of the implicatures. The purpose I am pursuing in interpreting the Eden Narrative is to examine the implicatures in the narrative with a particular focus on the clues within the story that point to the dynamics of shame and interplay of identifications, and their effect on the interaction between the characters of the story. This purpose is reflected in my methodology and in the issues that will be highlighted in my interpretation of the text. In this regard, I am engaging in an intersubjective interaction

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[157] Sperber and Wilson, *Relevance*, 183-93.
[158] Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson, *Pragmatics of Human Communication*, 80-89.

with the text, rather than an objective exegetical exercise according to the historical-critical method.

I have adopted a moderate postmodern position that is consistent with postfoundationalist evangelical theology. This position regards human truth as being fundamentally intersubjective in nature, socially mediated through community traditions and institutions, and communicated through intelligible speech acts. Texts, like other speech acts, vary in their purpose and epistemic specificity, which means they vary in the degree to which determinative meaning can be interpreted from the text. Interpretation of the text is a complex process that is undertaken with reference to a number of interacting factors: the intention of the author, the genre and autonomy of the text, and the cognitive environment of the reader. Interpretation involves trying to understand what the author intended in his or her creative act of writing, as well as engaging with the determinative and indeterminative meanings in the text, along with creatively appropriating meaning by the reader with reference to his or her cognitive environment, social/cultural context, and particular purposes for reading the text.

Chapter 2   Anticipatory Shame and Disgrace

The intention of this thesis to explore the dynamics of shame in the Eden Narrative involves adopting a biblical psychological critical approach in its interpretation of the story. In doing so, we are not, however, adopting the intentions of interpreters who have adopted a psychodynamic perspective aimed at explicating the unconscious psychic factors that influence the act or writing or construal or meaning by the reader.[1] These psychodynamic interpretations have been prone to psychologism, that is, interpreting the text exclusively through the interpreters psychological theoretical perspective.[2] To the degree to which they focus on exploring the psychic world of the author behind the text, they founder on the lack of access to the author's mind for the psychoanalytic investigation required to elicit this information. This means they become vulnerable to being speculative.

Rather than adopting a psychodynamic approach, this thesis utilizes the findings of psychological research regarding shame as a preunderstanding framework for interpretation of the text. It utilizes psychological theoretical perspectives in two ways. First, it draws upon psychological theory and empirical research for forming the questions the interpreter brings to the reading of the text. Second, interpretations of the psychological dynamics in the story are supported by reference to empirical research that suggests this characteristically reflects human behaviour.

We now turn from discussing the hermeneutical approach adopted in this thesis to a review of the phenomenon of shame from a theoretical perspective. The reading of the Eden

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[1] According to Capps, psychological biblical criticism has been heavily influenced by the psychodynamic psychological theories of Freud and Jung. Donald Capps, "Psychological biblical criticism: Envisioning its prospects," in *Psychological Hermeneutics for Biblical Themes and Texts*, ed. Harold J. Ellens, 43-60 (London/New York: T & T Clark, 2012). For example, Rollins' approach to psychological biblical criticism is dominated by his interest in unconscious dynamics, which reflects his Freudian psychodynamic theoretical orientation. Wayne G. Rollins, *Soul and Psyche: The Bible in Psychological Perspective* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1999), 93-144. This focus is also shared by other interpreters who have approached biblical texts from a Jungian perspective with its interest in archetypes of the collective unconscious. Andrew D. Kille, *Psychological Biblical Criticism* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001), 58-105.

[2] Kille, *Psychological Biblical Criticism*, 20.

Narrative that this thesis presents has focused its attention on the dynamics of shame

throughout the story. The following two chapters present a brief review of the nature of

shame in the light of recent psychological research. It presents shame as a complex

phenomenon with four dimensions: anticipatory shame, public disgrace, acute shame, and

chronic shame. This chapter reviews anticipatory shame and public disgrace. The following

chapter concludes the review with respect to acute and chronic shame.

2.1 The Nature of Shame

Shame has been identified as a primary self-conscious emotion that influences most social

behaviour. Scheff went so far as to say that, "Shame is the most frequent, and possibly the

most important of emotions, even though it is usually invisible."[3] As the following definitions

indicate, shame is a complex emotion that is closely related to a negative evaluation of

oneself. Lynd defined shame as,

> a wound to one's self-esteem, a painful feeling or sense of degradation excited by
> the consciousness of having done something unworthy of one's previous idea of
> one's own excellence. It is, also, a peculiarly painful feeling of being in a situation
> that incurs the scorn or contempt of others.[4]

Lewis defined shame in this way. "Shame can be defined simply as the feeling we have when

we evaluate our actions, feelings or behaviour, and conclude that we have done wrong. It

encompasses the whole of ourselves; it generates a wish to hide, to disappear, or even to die."

[5] Fossum and Mason's definition of shame is more expansive,

> Shame is an inner sense of being completely diminished or insufficient as a person.
> It is the self judging the self. A moment of shame may be humiliation so painful or
> an indignity so profound that one feels one has been robbed of her or his dignity or
> exposed as basically inadequate, bad, or worthy of rejection. A pervasive sense of
> shame is the ongoing premise that one is fundamentally bad, inadequate, defective,
> unworthy, or not fully valid as a human being.[6]

Shame is closely linked with individual identity. It concerns how I am regarded as a person by

others. People are generally ashamed about exposed inadequacy manifesting as weakness,

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[3] Scheff, "Shame in Social Theory," 210.
[4] Lynd, *On Shame*, 23-24.
[5] Lewis, *Shame*, 2.
[6] Fossum and Mason, *Facing Shame: Families in Recovery*, 5.

dirtiness (unchecked human appetites, sexuality, bodily discharges), defectiveness

(incompetence, failure, physical or mental shortcomings), or social impropriety that may elicit

disgust or rejection from others.[7] These features generally affect how others regard and

accept a person.

The root meaning of "shame" reflects two important features of the emotion of shame.

'Shame' is derived from the Teutonic word *skam* or *skem*, meaning "sense of shame"; that

word is traced back to the Indo-European root *kam*/*kem*, meaning "to cover to veil, to hide",

where the prefix "s" gives a reflective meaning, hence "to cover oneself".[8] These features

reflect that the experience of shame requires objective self-awareness, the capacity to monitor

oneself in the view of others, and the action tendency of shame to cover oneself or to hide.

Shame has an evolutionary basis in our social nature as primates. It is related to an

innate human need for belonging and inclusion in a social group. Inclusion both enhances

survival prospects and the chances of finding a suitable mate for reproduction. Because social

exclusion threatens these evolutionary imperatives, the threat of social exclusion evokes a

deep anxiety that is identified as anticipatory shame.[9] The implication of this functional

evolutionary perspective is that shame is neither the result of the Fall nor an awareness of

sinfulness. Rather, it is a natural feature of the social nature of humans.

2.1.1 The Hiddenness of Shame

Despite shame being a long-standing feature of human experience, it has been surprisingly

neglected as a subject of psychological study or theological reflection. Shame was totally

overlooked by early behaviourist theories. Freud regarded psychopathology as the result of

intrapsychic conflict. He misconceived shame as a defence mechanism and focused on

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[7] Edmond J. Gore and O. J. Harvey, "A Factor Analysis of a Scale of Shame and Guilt: Dimensions of Conscience Questionaire," *Personality and Individual Differences* 19, no. 5 (1995): 769-71.

[8] Michael Nichols, *No Place to Hide: Facing Shame So We Can Find Self-Respect* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 27.

[9] Mark R. Leary, Erika J. Koch, and Nancy R. Hechenbleikner, "Emotional Responses to Interpersonal Rejection," in *Interpersonal Rejection*, ed. Mark R. Leary (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 2001), 145-58.

anxiety. Consequently, shame was neglected by the psychodynamic school of psychology.[10]

It was not until 1958 with Helen Merrell Lynd's study *On Shame and the Search for Identity*

that shame became a subject of psychological study. Psychological research into and

theoretical development regarding shame did not take off until the 1980's.

Christianity has emphasized guilt to the extent that shame remained an overlooked and

unacknowledged aspect of human experience.[11] While guilt and forgiveness is a prominent

theme in Christian soteriology, shame has been largely neglected by theology. There was only

a smattering of theological journal articles that discussed shame prior to the 1990's. It was

only in the 1990's that shame began to attract attention in the theological literature, and this

was largely with respect to pastoral theology.[12] As Pattison's review highlights, there has

been very little work done on developing a theology of shame. There has been no analysis of

shame from a systematic theological perspective.[13]

A number of cultural factors in the West have contributed to the hiddenness of shame.

First, since the advent of Christianity with its emphasis on guilt and forgiveness, shame has

been hidden behind guilt. The assimilation of shame into guilt is reflected in the longstanding

failure of psychologists to distinguish between shame and guilt.[14] This failure to distinguish

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[10] Melvin R. Lansky and Andrew P. Morrison, "The Legacy of Freud's Writings on Shame," in *The Widening Scope of Shame*, ed. Melvin R. Lansky and Andrew P. Morrison (Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press, 1997), 3-9. As Blum (2008) pointed out, Freud came close to discovering the nature of shame in his observation that most hysterical women had a background of sexual abuse, but he focused on sexual fantasies that the guilt evoked, rather than paying attention to the factual nature of the reposts of sexual abuse and the shame that it caused. Alon Blum, "Shame and Guilt, Misconceptions and Controversies: A Critical Review of the Literature," *Traumatology* 14, no. 3 (2008): 91-102.

[11] Albers and Clements, *Shame: A Faith Perspective*, Thomas and Parker, "Toward a Theological Understanding of Shame," 176-82.

[12] Prior to 1994 there were only 5 - 8 theological Journal articles published a year on shame, whereas in the late 1990's this increased fourfold.

[13] Stephen Pattison, *Shame: Theory, Therapy, and Theology* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 190-203.

[14] Gary Thrane, "Shame and the Construction of the Self," *Annals of Psychoanalysis* 7 (1979): 321-41. (Walbott & Scherer, 1995). Harald Walbott and Klaus Scherer, "Cultural Determinants in the Experience of Shame and Guilt," in *Self Conscious Emotions: The Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment, and Pride*, ed. June Price Tangney and Kurt Fisher (New York: Guilford Press, 1995), 465-87. This is reflected in inventories such as the Buss-Durkee Guilt Scale and the Mosher Morality-Conscience Scale that included both guilt and shame items. June Price Tangney, P. E. Wagner, and R. Gramzow, "Proness to Shame, Proneness to Guilt, and Psychopathology," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology* 101 (1992): 469-78.

between shame and guilt reflects a *habitus* that disposed people to experience guilt, while leaving shame unacknowledged.

Bourdieu's concept of *habitus* refers to systems of durable dispositions and cognitive frameworks that give rise to social practices that operate at the subconscious reflexive level of behaviour.[15] *Habitus* is similar to Sperber and Wilson's concept of cognitive environment. Bourdieu's concept of *habitus*, however, goes beyond Sperber and Wilson's notion of cognitive environment, in that Bourdieu sought to capture the social-individual synthesis of habitus as essentially being a socially derived structuring of knowledge that operates on a subconscious schematic level psychologically. The notion of individual autonomy of knowledge and action fails to take into account the profoundly integral simultaneously social and individual nature of human knowledge. Sperber and Wilson, on the other hand, conceive cognitive environment as the person's subjective view of the world.[16]

Homogeneous communities form a consensus regarding *habitus*, which takes on a reified authenticity of 'simply the way things are' that becomes taken-for-granted unchallenged *doxa*.[17] The evolution in the interplay between shame and guilt reflects social processes of change in *habitus*. For example, Demos traced how guilt had replaced shame as the main emotion of social control in New England over the past two centuries.[18] This shift from shame to guilt is an example of the dynamic dialectic relationship between social practices and cognitive and emotional psychological processes that constitutes *habitus*, with its self-reinforcing homeostatic interplay between social norms and psychological dispositions, as well as the morphogenic potential for change in *habitus* as social conditions change from generation to generation.[19]

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[15] Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 72.

[16] Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*, 2 ed. (London: Blackwell, 1995), 39.

[17] Bourdieu, 80-81, 167.

[18] John Demos, "Shame and Guilt in Early New England," in *The Emotions*, ed. Rom Harré and W. Gerrod Parrott (London: sage, 1996), 74-88.

[19] Bourdieu, 78-84.

Second, Western individualism contributes to the prominence of guilt at the expense

of shame. Guilt is consistent with individualism, whereas shame has an inherent social

reference that has no place in the notion of the autonomous self. The Western emphasis on

individualism may function as a defence against the pain of threatened social bonds. Yet,

because Western society is experiencing a breakdown in community, where all social bonds

are less secure, there is an increased vulnerability to shame that is closely related to

alienation.[20] According to Breakwell, there are six components that identify alienation in an

individual: powerlessness (external locus of control), meaninglessness (uncertainty about

what can be believed to be true), normlessness (disregarding social norms to achieve personal

goals), cultural estrangement (disaffiliation with the community and its values), self-

estrangement (no intrinsic satisfaction in any activity undertaken), and social isolation (social

rejection). Two of these are directly related to shame, powerlessness and social isolation.[21]

Scheff also suggested that,

> The ideology of individualism, and its subsidiaries such as the myth of the self-made
> man obscures the part/whole nature of social systems. Such an ideology may be an
> adult parallel to a child's defences against the intense pain that follows severed or
> threatened bonds. Those approaches which insist on viewing human issues in terms of
> isolated individuals may be defences against the anomic conditions in our society.[22]

Consequently, shame became crowded out of our consciousness and relegated to an

unacknowledged background, where it nevertheless remained influential.

Third, shame has been crowded out by Western legalistic language. Legal language is

about winning cases, ascertaining wrong, and securing redress. It refers to impersonal laws

and rational process. It focuses on specific actions and tangible losses and recompense, rather

than the personal relational concepts of honour and shame, even though litigation is

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[20] Blavier and Glenn found that alienation was a robust predictor of shame. Donald C. Blavier and Ed Glenn,
      "The Role of Shame in Perceptions of Marital Equity, Intimacy, and Competency," *American Journal of
      Family Therapy* 23, no. 1 (1995): 73-82.
[21] Glynis M. Breakwell, "Processes of Self-Evaluation: Efficacy and Estrangement," in *Social Psychology of
      Identity and the Self Concept*, ed. Glynis M. Breakwell (London: Surrey University Press, 1992), 35-55.
[22] Scheff, "Shame in Social Theory," 226.

emotionally driven by honour and shame. Legal language has room only for guilt and innocence; honour and shame are unintelligible.[23]

Fourth, there are psychological reasons for the tendency to hide shame under guilt. Concealment is a common reaction to shame, and people respond to another's disgrace by turning away from it, or covering it up. Such is the degree of discomfort that is associated with shame that cultures have a shame-bound taboo about shame. A common social response to public exposure of shame is to conceal it in silence.[24] Shame is a deeper injury than guilt because it concerns a deficiency of the self, while guilt is concerned with a wrong action one has done.[25] Shame is often unacknowledged because it is extremely painful and perceived as irrational, whereas guilt is more readily acknowledged and dealt with. Helen Block Lewis observed that, "Insofar as guilt is a more articulated experience than shame, and a more dignified one, it may actually absorb shame affect."[26] Consequently, as Kaufman pointed out, the study of shame has been generally neglected because of: (a) cultural taboos regarding shame, (b) the lack of adequate language for describing shame, (c) the way that an emphasis on guilt obscures the presence of shame.[27] These factors contribute to a general reticence to acknowledge shame, let alone deliberately make it an object of reflection and study.

2.1.2 The Four Dimensions of Shame

The concept of shame has four dimensions.[28] First there is shame as discretion, experienced as an anticipatory anxiety about being disgraced that motivates people to conform to social norms and expectations. Second, there is shame in the objective sense of social stigma or

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[23] Dov Cohen, "The American National Conversation About (Everything but Shame)," *Social Research* 70, no. 4 (2003): 1075-108.

[24] Gershen Kaufman and Lev Raphael, "Shame as Taboo in American Culture," in *Forbidden Fruits: Taboos and Tabooism in Culture*, ed. Ray B. Browne (Bowling Green, OH: Popular Press, 1984), 57-66.

[25] Helen Block Lewis, *Shame and Guilt in Neurosis* (New York: International Universities Press, 1971), 30.

[26] Ibid., 42.

[27] Gershen Kaufman, *The Psychology of Shame: Theory and Treatment of Shame-Based Syndromes* (New York: Springer, 1989), 4-7.

[28] Other theorists have regarded shame as having three dimensions. Nichols and Wurmser specified that shame was either anticipatory anxiety, a painful affect, or an attitude to oneself. They overlooked shame as public disgrace. Nichols, *No Place to Hide*, 30-31. Leon Wurmser, *The Mask of Shame* (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1995).

public disgrace. Stigma is distinguished from disgrace in that it is based on a social act of

categorization, where a person is identified as a member of a social group or category that is

regarded negatively. Public disgrace is the result of a person's own actions that violate social

norms and triggering the social sanction of shaming. The third dimension is acute shame, the

painful emotional experience of feeling humiliated and ashamed. It is the corresponding

psychological experience to acts of social rejection. Finally, there is the psychological state

of chronic shame, whereby a person develops a shame-bound identity where his or her own

self-concept becomes defined in shameful terms. The first two dimensions focus on shame as

a social phenomenon, while the last two dimensions focus on shame as an emotion.

2.2 Dimension One: Anticipatory Shame

Anticipatory shame is described as "shame before the fact." It performs two social functions.

First, anticipatory shame functions as a social sanction that promotes prosocial behaviour that

conforms to social norms,[29] and inhibits behaviour that violates social norms and risks

incurring public shame and humiliation.[30] Second, it functions to safeguard the boundaries of

the self. In this respect, anticipatory shame is concerned with nakedness, exposure and

privacy.[31] Nichols expressed it this way.

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[29] De Hooge stated, "Moral emotions have an interpersonal function in that they stimulate prosocial behaviors in the short run, committing people to long-term prosocial strategies." Ilone E. de Hooge, Seger M. Breugelmans, and Marcel Zeelenberg, "Not So Ugly after All: When Shame Acts as a Commitment Device," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 95, no. 4 (2008): 934.

[30] Recent research bears out the influence of anticipatory shame in restraining white collar crime and encouraging prosocial behaviour in the workplace. Raymond Paternoster and Sally Simpson, "Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime," *Law and Society Review* 30, no. 3 (1996): 549-84. Stephen G. Tibbetts, "Shame and Rational Choice in Offending Decisions," *Criminal Justice and Behavior* 24, no. 2 (1997): 234-55. C. J. Rebellon et al., "Anticipated Shaming and Criminal Offending," *Journal of Criminal Justice* 38, no. 5 (2010): 988-97. Taya R. Cohen et al., "Introducing the Gasp Scale: A New Measure of Guilt and Shame Proneness," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 100, no. 5 (2011): 947-66. Harold G. Grasmick, Robert J. Bursik, and John K. Cochran, ""Render Unto Caesar What Is Caesar's": Religiosity and Taxpayers' Inclinations to Cheat," *Sociology Quarterly* 32, no. 2 (1991): 251-66. Ilona E. de Hooge, Seger M. Breugelmans, Marcel Zeelenberg, "Not so Ugly After All: When shame acts as a communal device." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 95(4), 2008: 933-943. In a review of self-destructive behaviour, Baumeister and Scher found that people placed a higher priority on not losing face, avoiding embarrassment, even at the cost of forgoing monetary and other rewards. Roy F. Baumeister and Steven J. Scher, "Self-Defeating Behavior Patterns among Normal Individuals: Review and Analysis of Common Self-Destructive Tendencies," *Psychological Bulletin* 104, no. 1 (1988): 3-22.

[31] Malcolm Pines, "The Universality of Shame: A Psychoanalytic Approach," *British Journal of Psychotherapy* 11, no. 3 (1995): 346-57.

> Shame does double duty, reflecting the dualism of human nature: individual privacy and social connectedness. Shame preserves the integrity of the individual - shielding the self against exposure - and enforces allegiance to the norms of the group.[32]

Anticipatory shame has a valuable positive function that makes a necessary contribution to the social life of human beings.

2.2.1 Shame and Culture

Shame and guilt exist side by side and reinforce each other as social sanctions in most cultures.[33] Nevertheless, cultures vary in the degree to which they emphasize shame or guilt as the primary social control mechanism.[34] Cultures structured around shame, honour and esteem tend to feature external controls for social conformity sanctioned by shame and disgrace. Cultures that emphasize guilt tend to emphasize the development of the internalized conscience with internalized controls, where offenses are sanctioned by guilt, and emphasis is placed on legal mechanisms of punishment, forgiveness and restitution.[35] This difference reflects a change in the cultural context from shame oriented culture to guilt based culture.

The relationship between guilt and shame is complex. On the one hand, guilt can be assimilated into shame in shame prominent cultures. For example, the ancient Greeks had no direct equivalent for guilt. As Williams pointed out, ᾽αιδός covers both guilt and shame. Reparation can be made for ᾽αιδός. The distinction between shame and guilt was not in their vocabulary.[36] Shame is still present in guilt based cultures. It is simply not openly

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[32] Nichols, *No Place to Hide*, 51.

[33] David P. Ausubel, "Relationships between Shame and Guilt in the Socializing Process," *Psychological Review* 62, no. 5 (1955): 387.

[34] Nichols (Nichols 1991: 47) is not sure that the distinction between shame cultures and guilt cultures holds up. The prevalence of shame may be a function of social compactness verses individualism. Nichols, *No Place to Hide*, 47.

[35] David Ausubel, "Relationships between Shame and Guilt in the Socializing Process," *Psychological Review* 62, no. 5 (1955): 378-90, Nevra Cem Ersoy et al., "Effects of Work-Related Norm Violations and General Beliefs About the World on Feelings of Shame and Guilt: A Comparison between Turkey and the Netherlands," *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 14 (2011): 50-62, Angela K. Y. Leung and Dov Cohen, "Within- and between-Culture Variation: Individual Differences and the Cultural Logics of Honor, Face, and Dignity Cultures," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 100, no. 3 (2011): 507-26, Patricia M. Rodriguez Mosquera, Anthony S. R. Manstead, and Agneta H. Fischer, "Honor in the Mediterranean and Northern Europe," *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 33 (2002): 16-36, Patricia M. Rodriguez Mosquera et al., "Attack, Disapproval, or Withdrawal? The Role of Honour in Anger and Shame Responses to Being Insulted," *Cognition and Emotion* 22, no. 8 (2008), 1471-98.

[36] Bernard Williams, *Shame and Necessity* (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1994), 91-92.

acknowledged. Shame is either a taboo subject that appears in disguised forms, or it is assimilated into guilt.

Even though it is regarded as a guilt culture, America actually is a shame based culture in which shame is hidden. The anxiety about the possibility of public disgrace is a significant motivator of prosocial behaviour and inhibitor of behaviour that violates social norms. Anticipatory shame regulates relationships and boundaries, and it is a compass for moral behaviour and social decorum. As Kaufman pointed out, there are three cultural scripts that foster shame: (1) the success ethic - we must compete for success and failure or mediocrity is a matter of shame "You're a loser", (2) independence or self-sufficiency - it is shameful to need anything from anyone, (3) be popular and conform - being different is shameful. Anticipatory shame is a prominent social sanction in "small town" America in the Midwest.[37]

2.2.2 Anticipatory Shame as Social Sanction

Anticipatory shame functions as a social control mechanism that restrains behaviour that violates the social norms and values that safeguard harmonious social relationships within a community. Avoidance of shame is a strong motivator for socially avoidant behaviour.[38] It also influences the unwillingness of people to seek help and utilize social services because admitting need is shameful.[39] This is a result of successful socialization that results in internalized moral values, as well as forming social bonds that give positive valence to meeting the external expectations of others.[40]

Anticipatory shame functions as a social sanction both socially and intrapsychically. This is because social conformity is supported by what Scheff calls a deference-emotion

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[37] I observed the power of public disgrace as a social sanction first-hand during my time working as a family therapist in Nebraska. Social conformity was driven by anticipatory shame, and public disgrace was followed by ostracism that left one permanently marginalized and stigmatized by a loss of reputation in the town community.

[38] James Macdonald, "Disclosing Shame," in *Shame: Interpersonal Behavior, Psychopathology, and Culture*, ed. Paul Gilbert and Bernice Andrews (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 147-48.

[39] Elaine Chase and Robert Walker, "The Co-Construction of Shame in the Context of Poverty: Beyond a Threat to the Social Bond," *Sociology* 47, no. 4 (2012): 1-16.

[40] Robert Svensson et al., "Moral Emotions and Offending: Do Feelings of Anticipated Shame and Guilt Mediate the Effect of Socialization on Offending?," *European Journal of Criminology* 10, no. 1 (2013): 22-39.

system that reinforces social conformity through informal emotional processes that utilize the social emotions of shame and pride, "in which conformity to exterior norms is rewarded by deference and feelings of pride, and nonconformity is punished by lack of deference and feelings of shame."[41] This deference-emotion system occurs both between people socially and within people intrapsychically. The intrapsychic system utilizes social emotions of pride, shame, guilt, and embarrassment. It functions to preserve personal ideals, values and a sense of integrity.

A mature sense of shame has an indispensable role in the maintenance of an integrated self. It protects individual privacy and ensures discretion in social behaviour. The Talmud states, "A sense of shame is a lovely sign in a man. Whoever has a sense of shame will not sin so quickly: but whoever shows no sense of shame in his visage, his father surely never stood on Mount Sinai;"[42] The interpersonal aspects of the deference-emotion system manifest in the form of positive and negative evaluations of behaviour with reference to conforming to social norms and expectations. Honour is ascribed both on the basis of superior social status and behaviour that upholds the requirements of honour. Violations of social norms that are deemed dishonourable are subject of disgrace. The responses of humiliation, praise, acceptance, or rejection are based on such evaluations.

The dual thrust of anticipatory shame in promoting prosocial behaviour and inhibiting deviant behaviour reflects the existence of two systems of moral regulation. The proscriptive system focuses on what is forbidden, while the prescriptive system focuses on what we ought to do. The proscriptive system regulates morality by inhibiting immoral behaviours, whereas the prescriptive system regulates the activation of prosocial behaviours. Shame functions as a social sanction in support of both these moral regulation systems, though it is more strongly

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[41] Scheff, "Shame and Conformity," 405.
[42] *Talmud, Nedarim fol 20* as cited in Carl Schneider, "A Mature Sense of Shame," in *The Many Faces of Shame*, ed. Donald L. Nathanson (London/New York: Guilford Press, 1987), 199.

related to the proscriptive system.[43] This reliance on moral emotions means that a sensitivity

to anticipatory shame is essential for it to be an effective social sanction.[44]

2.2.3 Modesty and Privacy

Anticipatory shame that manifests as modesty or discretion preserves the integrity of the

person by protecting privacy. Privacy refers to an individual's right to be left alone and to

decide the time, manner and extent of sharing oneself.[45] As Jacoby observed, "Shame

reinforces interpersonal distinctiveness and a sense of one's own individual identity."[46] It is

concerned with protecting the autonomy of the person. Violation of privacy through

involuntary exposure evokes shame.[47]

There are three aspects to personal privacy. There is the psychological aspect of the

boundary between the privacy of a person's own psychological world of self-as-known-by-

oneself, and the public self-presentation and self-disclosure of the self-as-known-by-other.[48]

There is physiological privacy associated with nakedness. Finally, closely associated to

physiological privacy is the privacy of sexuality that is also associated with nakedness.

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[43] Sana Sheikh and Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, "The "Shoulds" And "Should Nots" of Moral Emotions: A Self-Regulatory Perspective on Shame and Guilt," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 36, no. 2 (2010): 213-24.

[44] Fanita English, "Shame and Social Control Revisited," *Transactional Analysis Journal* 24, no. 2 (1994): 109-20.

[45] From an ethical perspective, privacy is the right of the person for protection from intrusion into personal affairs, and the right to determine to whom personal information is disclosed. Koocher stated it in this way, "Privacy, or the right of protection from unwanted intrusion by government or persons into one's affairs, is a personal value with a long tradition in law. Privacy rights are considered essential to insure human dignity and freedom of self-determination." Gerald P. Koocher, "Confidentiality in Psychological Practice," *Australian Psychologist* 30, no. 3 (1995): 158. Seigal defined privacy in this way. "Privacy is the freedom of individuals to choose for themselves the time and the circumstances under which and the extent to which their beliefs, behavior, and opinions are to be shared or withheld from others." Max Seigal, "Privacy, Ethics, and Confidentiality," *Professional Psychology: Research and Practice* 10, no. 2 (1979): 251.

[46] Mario Jacoby, *Shame and the Origins of Self-Esteem: A Jungian Approach* (London: Routledge, 1991), 18-19.

[47] Nichols, *No Place to Hide*, 45-46.

[48] The distinction between private and public domains is complex. For social psychologists – what is 'private' refers to mental events in one person that are inherently unobservable by another person. In contrast to socially observable behaviour that is 'public.' Another social distinction is that a person acting to enhance his/her own interests is acting privately, in contrast to a person who is acting as an official of a public institution. A third contrast is that behaviour that is limited to observations of a select group of intimate others is 'private' , it is done 'in private', whereas behaviour that is viewable by the general public and done in public is 'public.' James T. Tedeschi, "Private and Public Experiences of the Self," in *Public Self and Private Self*, ed. Roy F. Baumeister (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1986), 1-20.

The link between shame and exposure affirms that sustaining our existence as differentiated persons within a social context requires boundary maintenance, whereby each person is able to determine what aspects of his or her personhood - both psychological and bodily exposure - are exposed to the gaze of others and what remains private. This boundary maintenance involves exercising the right to choose to whom to expose one's nakedness to. The involuntary nature of exposure is what violates personal integrity. Involuntary violations of privacy are shaming because they also imply a lack of power, in contrast to voluntary acts of self-exposure.

Anticipatory shame protects personal privacy from excessive exposure by engendering a sense of discretion regarding appropriate self-disclosure. People manage the extent to which they self-disclose by selecting to whom self-disclosure is appropriate on the basis of the intimacy of the relationship and whether the other person will safeguard and respect the self-disclosure and the vulnerability it creates. Hence there is a social convention that expects reciprocity of self-disclosure in relationships because mutual self-disclosure creates mutual vulnerability and protection.[49]

Shame about nakedness is experienced as a sense of modesty, which is concerned with inappropriate exposure.[50] It performs the function of protecting what is deemed to be private from public intrusion. What is deemed to be appropriate public exposure, and what is private is a matter of social convention. Cultures vary considerably in what forms of exposure are regarded as private nakedness. As Schneider expressed it, "The sense of shame protects that which is private from public intrusion. Although cultures diverge widely in the content of what they feel should be concealed and not be freely accessible, virtually all societies assign

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[49] David W. Johnson and Patricia M. Noonan, "Effects of Acceptance and Reciprocation of Self Disclosure on the Development of Trust," *Journal of Counseling Psychology* 19, no. 5 (1972): 411-16, Zick Rubin, "Disclosing Oneself to a Stranger: Reciprocity and Its Limits," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 11, no. 3 (1975): 233-60, Zick Rubin and Stephen Shenker, "Friendship, Proximity, and Self Disclosure," *Journal of Personality* 46, no. 1 (1978): 1-22.

[50] So deeply rooted is this association of shame with exposure, that writing from a Jungian perspective, Jacoby suggested that shame with respect to exposure reflects a human archetype that transcends culture. Jacoby, *Shame and the Origins of Self-Esteem: A Jungian Approach*, 19-20.

some matters to the domain of the private."[51] Certain bodily activities that involve naked

exposure, such as bathing, changing clothes, doing ablutions, and sexual intercourse are all

regarded as private activities that should be kept from public gaze. Clothing both expresses

modesty in covering nakedness, while at the same time drawing attention to what is covered

and increasing sexual attractiveness. Immodest displays may be responded to by moral

disgust from onlookers. For example, in 1899, Ellis made the quaint remark that, "The fear of

arousing disgust is the ultimate and most fundamental element of modesty."[52] This reflects the

Victorian ambivalence regarding sexual attraction, where moral disapproval of sexual arousal

came close to the reaction of disgust. The clothing of the body symbolizes the clothing of the

self, and preserving the privacy of the being of the person. The cloaking of bodily features

and bodily functions protects the dignity of the person.

Sex is widely regarded as belonging within the private realm. Consequently, public

exposure of sexual activity or display of sexually explicit material generally evokes shame.[53]

In many cultures, the sexual organs are covered, and exposure of a person's nakedness is

shameful. This association is reflected in languages where the word 'shame' has the same root

as words for genitals. For example, The Latin word for shame, *pudor* is similar to the word

for genitals, *pudendum*. Likewise, the Greek word for shame *αἰδώς* is similar to the word for

genitals *αἰδόια* that literally means "shame parts."[54] Sexuality is a prime area of vulnerability

to exposure to public gaze of the private, where such exposure changes the nature of the

sexual act.

This vulnerability is not limited to the act of sex itself, but extends to the nakedness of

the body, such that sexually arousing features of the body are covered. Social conventions

regarding covering reflects the recognition that sexually arousing exposure of oneself can lead

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[51] Carl D. Schneider, *Shame, Exposure and Privacy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), 40.

[52] Havelock Ellis, "The Evolution of Modesty," *Psychological Review* 6, no. 2 (1899): 139.

[53] For example, Zoldbrod found that the intrusive nature of artificial insemination with its exposure of nakedness and sexuality was experienced as humiliating by patients. Aline P. Zoldbrod, "The Emotional Distress of the Artificial Insemination Patient," *Medical Psychotherapy* 1 (1988): 161-72.

[54] John Hollander, "Honor Dishonorable, Shameful Shame," *Social Research* 70, no. 4 (2007): 1061-74.

to the person being reduced to an erotic object. Schnieder stated that,

> Pornography is sexual obscenity – the exposure to public view of intimate bodily acts severed from the social, affectional, and moral considerations that makes human relations human. Bodily acts such as sex are invested with symbolic meaning – whether it be power, aggression, degradation, or love. Shame protects the human meanings of sexual relations from profanation and degradation. [55]

Pornography is obscene and dehumanizing because it changes the relational context of sex from private emotional intimacy to public degrading exposure.

Finally, sexual shame facilitates the social regulation of sexual acts. It expresses itself in shyness, modesty, coyness, and flirtation that allows for indirect public expressions of sexuality while creating boundaries that protect the exclusive restriction of sex to intimate relationships in private. Nichols stated,

> Shame, in the form of modest reticence, creates a space that allows lovers time - time to get to know each other, and time to slowly open themselves to each other. To intrude brusquely is to violate the other's intimate self. Shame resists sex that is exploitive, that is not accompanied by a loving attitude. To violate this restraint is to risk killing sexual passion and turning desire to disgust. Shame inhibits the sexual response until the person feels responded to - as a person - and cared for.[56]

Thus, modest shame regarding sexuality is protective in nature rather than reflecting any inherent shamefulness in sexuality itself.

2.2.4 Anticipatory Shame as Anxiety

Anticipatory shame is accompanied by a range of emotional responses, depending upon the social context, an underlying proneness to shame anxiety, and the subject of the shame. Anticipatory shame can be emotionally experienced as either a sense of modesty and discretion, or a more vulnerable sense of shame anxiety. Anticipatory shame anxiety can be triggered at the prospect of exposure of nakedness, or exposure to unfavourable evaluation by others, or embarrassment at the exposure of what should be private in an unfitting way, or imminent danger of exposure to humiliation. Shame anxiety motivates a person to avoid shame evoking situations. It can lead to a general attitude of bashfulness and avoidance of

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[55] Schneider, *Shame*, 56-57.
[56] Nichols, *No Place to Hide*, 314.

potentially humiliating situations

According to social exclusion theory, behind this fear of shame is an innate fear of social exclusion or rejection that has an evolutionary basis.[57] Baumeister and Tice argued that groups may exclude individuals for three reasons that relate to the group's survival: incompetence or uselessness, being disruptive to social living together by violating rules or social conventions, and unattractiveness. Social exclusion theory maintains that humans possess a fundamental motivation to avoid social exclusion from important social groups. Much of social behaviour reflects attempts to improve one's inclusionary status. The perception of one's inclusionary status or social rank being less than one desires often results in distress and shame.[58] This anxiety regarding exclusion expresses itself in shyness, bashfulness, and avoidance of the possibility of failure, and pursuit of security.[59]

2.3 Dimension Two: Shame as Disgrace

Anticipatory shame occurs before any disgraceful act. In contrast, shame as public disgrace occurs after a disgraceful act. A central feature of disgrace is public exposure to negative evaluation by others of either a disgraceful transgression or one's weakness, incompetence and inferiority.[60] It refers to the social phenomenon of social exclusion and lowering of social status, and loss of reputation and honour. Public disgrace generally results in social exclusion ranging from disapproval to ostracism and exile.

There are two aspects to shame as disgrace. The first is public disgrace and dishonour, where shame corresponds to a loss of honour. The second aspect is stigma. Stigma is based on a cultural judgment that a certain characteristic is undesirable, whether or not the person is deemed to be responsible. This stands in contrast to public disgrace which is a social

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[57] Roy F. Baumeister and Dianne M. Tice, "Anxiety and Social Exclusion," *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology* 9, no. 2 (1990): 165-95.

[58] David M. Buss, "The Evolution of Anxiety and Social Exclusion," *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology* 9, no. 2 (1990): 196-201.

[59] Gilbert, "What Is Shame?," 6.

[60] Studies have found that public exposure of both moral transgressions and non-moral incompetence can evoke shame more than guilt. Smith et al., "Role of Public Exposure."

response to an action that is an offensive and disgraceful violation of cultural standards of

honour and respect. The attribution of responsibility is an essential component of public

disgrace and dishonour.

2.3.1 Shame and Honour

Honour is an important form of *capital*. Bourdieu refers to the resources that a person

possesses that contribute to his or her social standing or status as *capital*. *Capital* exists in

three different forms: (1) the objectified form, where capital is materially represented by

objects and possessions; (2) the embodied form, where capital is incorporated within the

person in the form of body language, stance, life-style choices, self-presentation, and (3) the

symbolic form of *habitus* that constitutes the attitudes, dispositions, knowledge, and skills the

person possesses and utilizes. Symbolic capital is valuated according to the amount of social

value others place on it. Symbolic capital can take different forms. It can be cultural capital -

being "cultured", or scientific capital - scientific knowledge and technical expertise. It can be

social capital - social status and social networking. Honour constitutes an influential form of

symbolic capital.[61]

Pitt-Rivers argued that honour is with reference to a person's social standing and

prowess as well as maintenance of social values and ideals, both in the eyes of others and

one's own internalized ideals. Honour is related to maintenance of social values, and so

contributes to maintaining the status quo. Honour is not only concerned with obligation, but

also with entitlement. Honour is a symbolic form of capital that has to be maintained,

asserted, competed for and defended. Honour functions as a *habitus* in that it provides the

nexus between the ideals of a society reflected in its honour code, and their reproduction in

the individual through his or her aspiration to personify them.[62]

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[61] Roger Moore, "Capital," in *Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts*, ed. Michael Grenfell (Durham, RSA: Acumen, 2008), 107-17, Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 171-83.

[62] Julian Pitt-Rivers, "Honour and Social Status," in *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society*, ed. J. G. Peristiany (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1965), 19-77, Bourdieu, *Outline*, 80-87.

Cultures vary in the degree to which honour capital is valued. Furthermore, what constitutes honour is determined with reference to the particular honour code of a culture.[63] Ancient Israelite culture placed a high valuation on honour as symbolic capital. However, it would be a mistake to assume, that it had a similar honour code to contemporary Mediterranean cultures.[64] While there are indeed similarities between these codes and the Israelite honour code with reference to sexual mores, nevertheless Israel possessed a distinctive honour code.[65] At the heart of the Israelite honour code was covenant faithfulness to God, which was reflected in giving God honour through ritualized honouring and obedience. In the Ancient Near East, covenants were affirmed through the public ritualized giving and receiving honour between covenant partners.[66] The foundation of the Ancient Israelite honour code was that God alone possessed and was the bestower of honour. Public disgrace was the consequence of dishonourable conduct against God, and God's response was to put the offender to shame.[67] The Psalms contained repeated pleas to God not to put the psalmist to shame, but to honour him through answering his prayers and delivering him from his plight. A major theme in the prophets was that God would punish covenant violations by publicly humiliating Israel by inflicting military defeat and economic disaster. An example is Joel, who interpreted a devastating plague as a withdrawal of God's protection. He called Israel to render God honour through appropriate mourning rituals in the hope of restoring his favour.[68] The disaster of the conquest and exile of Israel was interpreted as a public

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[63] Michael Herzfeld, "Honour and Shame: Problems in the Comparative Analysis of Moral Systems," *Man* 15, no. 2 (1980): 339-51.

[64] This is the mistake Pitt-Rivers made in his analysis of honour and shame in Ancient Israel in that he focused on honour related to sexual mores and incidents in Genesis, while overlooking other distinctive bases for honour in Ancient Israel. Julian Pitt-Rivers, *The Fate of Shechem or the Politics of Sex: Essays in the Anthropology of the Mediterranean* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 127-57. Plevnik likewise overgeneralizes from Mediterranean honour codes in assuming they also characterized Ancient Israelite culture. J. Plevnik, "Honor/Shame," in *Biblical Social Values and Their Meaning: A Handbook*, ed. John J. Pilch and Bruce J. Malina (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1993), 95-104.

[65] Ken Stone, *Sex, Honor, and Power in the Deuteronomistic History*, Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Supplements 234 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), 83-144.

[66] S. M. Olyan, "Honour, Shame, and Covenant Relations in Ancient Israel and Its Environment," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 115, no. 2 (1996): 204-05, 10-13.

[67] Johannes Steibert, *Construction of Shame in the Hebrew Bible* (2002), 95.

[68] Ronald A. Simkins, "Return to Yahweh: Honor and Shame in Joel," *Semeia* 68 (1996).

humiliation and rejection by God for repeated covenant violations.[69] The *Wisdom of Ben Sira*

depicted honour-shame in terms of the fear of the Lord and maintaining a good name.

Furthermore, there is a strong link between honour and wealth inasmuch as wealth denoted

God's blessing and favour, thus conferring honour. On the other hand, poverty implied

idleness and lack of wisdom, and thus was a basis of dishonour.[70] The Israelite honour code

also addressed sexual mores in a way that reflected similar values to other Mediterranean

cultures with the emphasis that male honour was tied up with the sexual decorum displayed

by wives and daughters under his authority, and that female honour was tied up with fertility

and sexual decorum. But this was not the central reference point for honour; rather

faithfulness to God was.[71]

Shame as disgrace involved public exposure of a disgraceful deed, implying a

culpability that justified social rejection and ostracism. The main emphasis in the Old

Testament was on shame as public disgrace that was closely related to a loss of dignity and

honour. Shame pointed to a crisis in the covenant relationship with God, where God's

blessing and protection was withdrawn as a divine shaming punishment for covenant

unfaithfulness.

2.3.2 Shame and Stigma

Shame as public disgrace is also related to stigma. Stigmatization is a social construction, a

negative social marker by which a social identification is made that a person is shameful.

Stigma is delimited by cultural norms, values and perspectives regarding deviance from

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[69] Steibert, *Construction of Shame in the Hebrew Bible*, 108-23. S. M. Odell, "The Inversion of Shame and Forgiveness in Ezekiel," *Journal for the Study of the Old Testament* 56 (1992): 101-12.

[70] This emphasis is particularly evident in Proverbs according to a study by Domeris. W. R. Domeris, "Shame and Honour in Proverbs: Wise Women and Foolish Women," *Old Testament Essays* 8 (1995).

[71] Claudia V. Camp, "Understanding a Partiarchy: Women in Second Century Jerusalem Though the Eyes of Ben Sira," in *Women Like This - New Perspectives on Jewish Women in the Greco-Roman World*, ed. Amy-Jill Levine (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1991), 1-40. Steibert concluded that the use of shocking sexual imagery in the prophets in their shaming discourses can convey this impression, but the sexual imagery was probably utilized for its shock value given Israel's conservative sexual mores. What was dishonourable was not sexual immorality, but covenant unfaithfulness to God. This distinction is important to maintain. Steibert, *Construction of Shame in the Hebrew Bible*, 168-72.

norms.[72] Stigmatization involves placing low relational value on a person or group of persons who warrant social exclusion. Leary stated that there are generally four reasons for low relational valuation of others; people who may physically harm us, people who have little to offer us, people who exploit us or take more than they give, and people who don't like or accept us.[73] Stigmatization has an emotional impact that is experienced as shame, rejection, anger, sadness, humiliation, or embarrassment, along with lowered self-esteem and diminished self-efficacy.[74]

Stigma as a social phenomenon has three aspects to it.[75] First, there is public stigma, which is the social labelling process of attaching stigma to certain social collectives.[76] The social labelling process of stigmatization is based on identifying undesirable characteristics. The wide range of characteristics that can lead to stigmatization fall into three categories: tribal or out-group membership, physical deformity or unattractiveness, and blemishes of character.[77] Not only are people stigmatized for their own characteristics, but there is also stigmatization by association with stigmatized persons.[78] This social labelling process

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[72] Christian S. Crandall, Amy Eshleman, and Laurie O"Brien, "Social Norms and the Expression and Suppression of Prejudice: The Struggle for Internalization," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 82, no. 3 (2002): 359-78.

[73] Mark R. Leary, "Toward a Conceptualization of Interpersonal Rejection," in *Interpersonal Rejection*, ed. Mark R. Leary (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 2001), 14.

[74] Patrick W. Corrigan, "How Clinical Diagnosis Might Exacerbate the Stigma of Mental Illness," *Social Work* 52, no. 1 (2007): 31-39. Michael Lewis, "Shame and Stigma," in *Shame: Interpersonal Behavior, Psychopathology, and Culture*, ed. Paul Gilbert and Bernice Andrews (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 126-40. Susan E. Varni et al., "Disengagement and Engagement Coping with Hiv/Aids Stigma and Psychological Well-Being of People with Hiv/Aids," *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology* 31, no. 2 (2012): 123-50. Stigma has been identified as contributing to depression by Lindsay L. Monteith, "Implicit and Explicit Stigmatizing Attitudes and Stereotypes About Depression," *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology* 30, no. 5 (2011): 484-505.

[75] Burke identified three different aspects, the social labelling process of stigmatization, situational stigma that refers to identification with a discriminated locality, and structural stigma that refers to discriminatory practices by institutions. My view is that situational stigma is simply using locality as a criterion in the stigmatizing process rather than a different aspect of stigma in itself. I identify a different third aspect, the corresponding psychological process by a stigmatized person of constructing a spoiled identity marked by stigma. Peter Burke, "Disadvantage and Stigma: A Theoretical Framework for Associated Conditions," in *Social Work and Disadvantage: Addressing the Roots of Stigma through Association*, ed. Peter Burke and Jonathan Parker (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2007), 11-26.

[76] A social collective is a grouping of individuals into a category on the basis of shared characteristics.

[77] Goffman, *Stigma*. Brenda Major and Laurie T. O'Brien, "The Social Psychology of Stigma," *Annual Review of Psychology* 56 (2005): 393-421.

[78] L. Li et al., "Stigmatization and Shame: Consequences of Caring for Hiv/Aids Patients in China," *AIDS Care* 19, no. 2 (2007): 258-63. Jennifer L. Fortune and Ian R. Newby-Clark, "My Friend Is Embarrassing Me: Exploring the Guilty by Association Effect," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 95, no. 6 (2008): 1440-49. (Fortune, 2008). Peter Burke and Benedict Fell, "Childhood Disabilities and Disadvantage: Family

influences how others interact with and make identifications of stigmatized individuals. People commonly have an initial reflexive response of disgust or fear and withdrawal to stigmatized persons, followed by a more reflective response which may either mitigate the initial negative response or reinforce it with adopted prejudicial attitudes.[79]

The second aspect is structural stigma that refers to discriminatory practices by institutions and persons in authority. Stigmatization involves an element of implied blame, so that stigmatized persons are regarded as blameworthy for their disadvantage that justifies community attitudes of discrimination and exclusion.[80] For example, overweight people are regarded as responsible for their condition, whereas other sources of stigma such as disability, mental retardation, elicit more sympathy because the person is not regarded as being responsible for their condition.[81] Structural stigma results in social marginalization and lack of access to resources. This leads to social-economic disadvantage and social isolation that in turn increases the risk of poverty, mental and physical health problems, and lower life expectancy.[82]

The third aspect is internalized stigma, which is the corresponding psychological process of forming what Goffman called a "spoiled identity", an identity influenced by stigma

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Experiences," in *Social Work and Disadvantage: Addressing the Roots of Stigma through Association*, ed. Peter Burke and Jonathan Parker (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2007), 45-62. John B. Pryor, Glenn D. Reeder, and Andrew E. Monroe, "The Infection of Bad Company: Stigma by Association," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 102, no. 2 (2012). Patrick W. Corrigan and Frederick E. Miller, "Shame, Blame, and Contamination: A Review of the Impact of Mental Illness Stigma on Family Members," *Journal of Mental Health* 13, no. 6 (2004): 537-48.

[79] John B. Pryor et al., "A Dual-Process Model of Reactions to Perceived Stigma," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 87, no. 4 (2004): 436-52. Paul Rozin, Laura Lowery, and Rhonda Ebert, "Varieties of Disgust Faces and the Structure of Disgust," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 66, no. 5 (1994): 870-81.

[80] Bernard Weiner, Raymond P. Perry, and Jamie Magnusson, "An Attributional Analysis of Reactions to Stigmas," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 55, no. 5 (1988): 738-48. Feldman found that three characteristics account for 60% of the variance in stigma: attribution of responsibility, perception of peril, and whether the characteristic was uncommon. David B. Feldman and Christian S. Crandall, "Dimensions of Mental Illness Stigma: What About Mental Illness Causes Social Rejection?," *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology* 26, no. 2 (2007): 137-54.

[81] Jennifer Crocker and Brenda Major, "Social Stigma and Self-Esteem: The Self-Protective Properties of Stigma," *Psychological Review* 96, no. 4 (1989): 608-30.

[82] Major and O'Brien, "The Social Psychology of Stigma," 393-421. Markus H. Schafer and Kenneth F. Ferraro, "The Stigma of Obesity: Does Perceived Weight Discrimination Affect Identity and Physical Health?," *Social Psychology Quarterly* 74, no. 1 (2011): 76-97. Jean M. Twenge, Kathleen R. Catanese, and Roy F. Baumeister, "Social Exclusion Causes Self-Defeating Behavior," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 83, no. 3 (2002): 606-15.

with an accompanying sense of chronic shame.[83] A spoiled identity involves identifying

oneself in terms of stigmatized characteristics with a consequent reduction in self-esteem and

self-efficacy,[84] poorer performance,[85] and poorer outcomes in recovery from mental illness.[86]

A spoiled identity includes role expectations. When a person enacts a stigmatized role, his or

her self-presentation contributes to the development of a stigmatized spoiled identity that

confirms the stigma.[87] This in turn deepens the sense of shame. [88] The impact of stigma on

identity is greater when the stigmatized characteristic is central to a person's self-concept,

when it results in frequent prejudice, when it is salient across a wide range of social situations,

or when it is devalued culturally.[89] Internalized stigma lowers a stigmatized person's

confidence in overcoming the stigma to gain social acceptance.[90] Lack of confidence in turn

increases sensitivity to negative feedback as indicating rejection. This sensitivity leaves a

person more vulnerable to the negative emotional impact of stigma and fosters chronic

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[83] Goffman, *Stigma*, 126-28.

[84] Amy Kroska and Sarah K. Harkness, "Stigma Sentiments and Self-Meanings: Exploring the Modified Labeling Theory of Mental Illness," *Social Psychology Quarterly* 69, no. 4 (2006): 325-48. ———, "Exploring the Role of Diagnosis in the Modified Labeling Theory of Mental Illness," *Social Psychology Quarterly* 71, no. 2 (2008): 193-208.

[85] William von Hippel et al., "Coping with Stereotype Threat: Denial as an Impression Management Strategy," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 89, no. 2005 (2005): 22-35.

[86] Fred E. Markowitz, Beth Angell, and Jan S. Greenberg, "Stigma, Reflected Appraisals, and Recovery Outcomes in Mental Illness," *Social Psychology Quarterly* 74, no. 2 (2011): 144-65. Mei Tang et al., "Transferred Shame in the Cultures of Interdependent Self and Independent Self," *Journal of Cognition and Culture* 8, no. 1-2 (2008): 163-78.

[87] Abdullah argued that there are two parallel processes in operation here. Public stigma functions this way: cue (stigmatizing mark) - activates stigmatizing belief (stereotype) - stigmatizing attitude (prejudice) - stigmatizing behaviour (discrimination). Self-stigma has a parallel process: cue (salience of stigmatizing mark) - stigmatizing identification (stigmatizing stereotype salient to identity) - self-identification (self-concept conforming to stereotype) leading to shame, low self-esteem, - self-enactment (behaviour influenced by stigmatized self-belief) social withdrawal (marginalization), lack of self-efficacy, and loss of social confidence. Tahirah Abdullah and Tamara L. Brown, "Mental Illness Stigma and Ethnocultural Beliefs, Values, and Norms: An Integrative Review," *Clinical Psychology Review* 31, no. 6 (2011): 934-48.

[88] Kimberly Matheson and Hymie Anisman, "Anger and Shame Elicited by Discrimination: Moderating Role of Coping on Action Endorsements and Salivary Cortisol," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 39, no. 2 (2009): 163-85. Shoham examined how this labelling process with respect to criminality leads to social exclusion and recidivism. S. Giora Shoham and Giora Rahav, *The Mark of Cain: The Stigma Theory of Crime and Social Deviance* (Brisbane, Qld.: The University of Queensland Press, 1982), 145-61.

[89] Diane M. Quinn and Stephanie R. Chaudoir, "Living with a Concealable Stigmatized Identity: The Impact of Anticipated Stigma, Centrality, Salience, and Cultural Stigma on Psychological Distress and Health," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 97, no. 4 (2009): 634-51.

[90] Carol T. Miller and Cheryl R. Kaiser, "Implications of Mental Models of Self and Others for the Targets of Stigmatization," in *Interpersonal Rejection*, ed. Mark R. Leary (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 2001), 189-212.

shame.[91]

2.3.4 Disgrace and Humiliation

The social process of bringing public disgrace is public humiliation by others. Humiliation is

a deliberate social act that attacks another person's attractiveness and social acceptance.[92]

Public humiliation performs two social functions: it is an act of social exclusion, and it

reduces the status of the recipient by identifying the person as being inferior, unacceptable,

and not good enough.[93] Social groups may have developed rituals of public disgrace that

involve a public humiliation of the disgraced person. Humiliation is distinct from shame in

that the focus of attention is placed on the other person who is the target of humiliation as

opposed to the focus on the self that characterizes shame.[94] Public humiliation is a powerfully

aggressive act that can be deeply shaming to the person subject to the humiliation, regardless

of how justified it may be.[95] Public humiliation involves three parties, the humiliators, the

recipients of the humiliation, and a third party who serve as witnesses to the humiliation,

making it public.[96] The intent of humiliation is to evoke a corresponding response on the part

of the humiliated person of an acute shame reaction that corresponds to being humiliated.[97] A

humiliated person will typically respond with rage or with social withdrawal, and feel highly

stressed, ashamed and depressed.[98]

A person subject to public humiliation has a choice whether or not to accept the

implied identification. The choice not to accept the implied identification leads to a non-

corresponding response of refusing to feel humiliated, even though a person may feel hurt and

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[91] Gregory M. Walton and Geoffrey L. Cohen, "A Question of Belonging: Race, Social Fit, and Achievement," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 92, no. 1 (2007): 82-96.

[92] Paul Gilbert, "The Evolution of Social Attractiveness and Its Role in Shame, Humiliation, Guilt and Therapy," *British Journal of Medical Psychology* 70, no. 2 (1997): 113-47.

[93] Shimul Melwani and Sigal G. Barsade, "Held in Contempt: The Psychological, Interpersonal, and Performance Consequences of Contempt in a Work Context," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 101, no. 3 (2011): 503-20.

[94] Susan Miller, "Humiliation and Shame: Comparing Two Affect States as Indicators of Narcissistic Stress," *Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic* 52, no. 1 (1988): 44-45.

[95] Nichols, *No Place to Hide*, 31.

[96] Francis J. Broucek, *Shame and the Self* (New York: Guilford Press, 1991), 75.

[97] Silvan S. Tomkins, *Affect Imagery Consciousness, Vol. 2: The Negative Affects*, 2 vols., vol. 2 (New York: Springer, 1963b), 137. Nichols, *No Place to Hide*, 31.

[98] Melwani and Barsade, "Held in Contempt," 503-20.

rejected.[99] People defend themselves against the impact of humiliation in several ways. One

way is to maintain one's dignity in the fact of humiliation.[100] An alternative defence against

humiliation is to show contempt to those who are doing the humiliation, or in turn to

humiliate a third party. The display of contempt is an attempt to rid the self of shame and

relocate it onto another.[101] Another defence against humiliation is to seek vindication that

disproves the humiliating allegations of others and restores one's social standing. A number

of Psalms expressed David's desire for vindication, and contained prayers that God would

vindicate his cause and put his enemies to shame.[102]

2.3.3 Disgrace and Social Rejection

Shame as disgrace is related to social rejection. Social rejection is an inevitable fact of social

life. People have a limited capacity for social relationships, which requires being selective.

Choosing one person involves rejecting others. As Leary points out, "People have a limited

number of relational niches, and they must decide the best way to fill them with individuals

who will provide the best long-term benefits to them."[103] This selectivity inevitably involves

social rejection.

Social rejection takes a number of forms. It can range from formalized ostracism, and

include, public humiliation, aggression, passive and indirect non-acceptance, denial of access

to resources, terminating social interactions, ignoring, and moral disapproval. Social

exclusion can take the form of silent rejection, open humiliation and ridicule, violence, or

formalized rituals of exclusion.[104] Social rejection includes overt shaming when it involves

public humiliation and disgrace.[105]

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[99] Donald C. Klein, "The Humiliation Dynamic: An Overview," *Journal of Primary Prevention* 12, no. 2 (1992): 93-121.

[100] Gilbert, "What Is Shame?," 12.

[101] Writing from a psychoanalytic perspective, Broucek argued that contempt for the other often represents a projective identification of shame, and the experience of shame can be the introjective identification of the other's shame as one accepts their contempt for the self. Broucek, *Shame*, 72.

[102] Ps. 7, 25, 26, 31, 43, 44, 54, 69, 70, 109, 119:31, 80, and 116.

[103] Leary, "Toward a Conceptualization of Interpersonal Rejection," 12.

[104] Ibid., 4-6.

[105] Steven R. Asher, Amanda J. Rose, and Sonda W. Gabriel, "Peer Rejection in Everyday Life," in *Interpersonal Rejection*, ed. Mark R. Leary (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 2001), 113-27.

2.3.4 Responses to Social Rejection

The ostracism that follows public disgrace has a destructive psychological impact on the person. This is reflected in the fact that the reflexive response to ostracism is the physiological generalized stress response, accompanied by intense negative feelings of hurt and shame.[106] One common response is cognitive deconstruction. Ostracized people often experience a deconstructed state where they feel that life is meaningless, and they lose a sense of future that presumes a meaningful existence spanning time. The deconstructed state is characterized by uninhibited, impulsive, and self-destructive behaviour that reflects a truncated focus on immediate gratification and loss of consideration of negative consequences that presupposes a meaningful future. The deconstructed state is also characterized by lethargy, passivity, and a reduced sense of self-awareness.[107] The action tendency of this deconstructed state is social withdrawal and isolation that expresses alienation, perceived lack of value, and anticipated rejection, which fosters the development of ongoing depression.[108] This deconstructed state of the socially excluded person highlights the fact that social belonging is crucial for the development and maintenance of a cohesive sense of self, and that the threat of the severing of social bonds to the dissolution of the self is not an idle one.

Another common response to social exclusion is to engage in increased efforts to

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[106] Geoff MacDonald, Rachell Kingsbury, and Stephanie Shaw, "Adding Insult to Injury: Social Pain Theory and Response to Social Exclusion," in *The Social Outcast: Ostracism, Social Exclusion, Rejection, and Bullying*, ed. Kipling D. Williams, Joseph P. Forgas, and William von Hippel (New York: Psychological Press, 2005), 77-90. Leary, Koch, and Hechenbleikner, "Emotional Responses to Interpersonal Rejection," 149-58.

[107] Jean M. Twenge, Kathleen R. Catanese, and Roy F. Baumeister, "Social Exclusion and the Deconstructed State: Time Perception, Meaninglessness, Lethargy, Lack of Emotion, and Self-Awareness," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 85, no. 3 (2003): 422. Refer also to Roy F. Baumeister and C. Nathan De Wall, "The Inner Dimension of Social Exclusion: Intelligent Thought and Self-Regulation among Rejected Persons," in *The Social Outcast: Ostracism, Social Exclusion, Rejection, and Bullying*, ed. Kipling D. Williams, Joseph P. Forgas, and William von Hippel (New York: Psychology Press, 2005), 53-75.

[108] Nicholas B. Allen and Paul B. T. Badcock, "Social Risk Hypothesis of Depressed Mood: Evolutionary, Psychosocial, and Neurological Perspectives," *Psychological Bulletin* 129, no. 6 (2003): 887-913. John T. Cacioppo and Louise C. Hawkley, "People Thinking About People: The Vicious Cycle of Being a Social Outcast in One's Own Mind," in *The Social Outcast: Ostracism, Social Exclusion, Rejection, and Bullying*, ed. Kipling D. Williams, Joseph P. Forgas, and William von Hippel (New York: Psychological Press, 2005), 91-108.

regain acceptance through helpful and prosocial, and appeasement behaviour,[109] or efforts to

affiliate with others.[110] Should these efforts fail, a person may subsequently withdraw, become

despondent, or retaliate aggressively.[111]

An alternative response is to react with aggressive behaviour that takes the form of

verbal abuse and derogation or physical violence as a way of gaining attention and a sense of

significance.[112] Social exclusion can lead to increased aggressiveness generally to other

people, even innocent third parties.[113] Social rejection and humiliation also is related to

subsequent aggressive behaviour and bullying in schools.[114] There is a vicious cycle between

social rejection and aggression, in that aggressive children are generally more rejected and

lonely than non-aggressive children,[115] and rejection in turn leads to increased aggression.[116]

Where aggression is judged to be unfeasible, an alternative is to join alternative sub-

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[109] Kipling D. Williams and Lisa Zadro, "Ostracism: The Indiscriminate Early Detection System," in *The Social Outcast: Ostracism, Social Exclusion, Rejection, and Bullying*, ed. Kipling D. Williams, Joseph P. Forgas, and William von Hippel (New York: Psychological Press, 2005), 19-34.

[110] Jennifer Zwolinski, "Psychological and Neuroendocrine Reactivity to Ostracism," *Aggressive Behavior* 38, no. 2 (2012). It should be noted that this study was of a low social exclusion condition in an online game).

[111] Williams noted an interesting gender difference in that women who were excluded in a workplace setting generally worked harder to regain acceptance, whereas men would generally become more socially disengaged. Kipling D. Williams and Lisa Zadro, "Ostracism: On Being Ignored, Excluded, and Rejected," in *Interpersonal Rejection*, ed. Mark R. Leary (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 2001), 34.

[112] Jean M. Twenge, "When Does Social Rejection Lead to Aggression? The Influences of Situations, Narcissism, Emotion, and Replenishing Connections," in *The Social Outcasts: Osracism, Social Exclusion, Rejection, and Bullying*, ed. Kipling D. Williams, Joseph P. Forgas, and William von Hippel (New York: Psychological Press, 2005), 201-12. Kathleen R. Catanese and Dianne M. Tice, "The Effect of Rejection on Anti-Social Behaviors: Social Exclusion Produces Aggressive Behaviors," in *The Social Outcast: Ostracism, Social Exclusion, Rejection, and Bullying*, ed. Kipling D. Williams, Joseph P. Forgas, and William von Hippel (New York: Psychological Press, 2005), 297-306.

[113] Jean M. Twenge et al., "If You Can't Join Them, Beat Them: Effects of Social Exclusion on Aggressive Behavior," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 81, no. 6 (2001): 1058-69. Mark R. Leary et al., "Teasing, Rejection, and Violence: Case Studies of the School Shootings," *Aggressive Behavior* 29, no. 2 (2003): 203-14.

[114] Cecilia Aslund et al., "Social Status and Shaming Experiences Related to Adolescent Overt Aggression at School," *Aggressive Behavior* 35 (2009): 1-13, Simona C. S. Caravita, Gianluca Gini, and Tiziana Pozzoli, "Main and Moderated Effects of Moral Cognition and Status on Bullying and Defending," *Aggressive Behavior* 38, no. 6 (2012): 456-68.(Aslund, 2009; Caravita, 2012; though as Leary (2006) points out the actual reasons behind this connection are still unclear).Mark R. Leary, Jean M. Twenge, and Erin Quinlivan, "Interpersonal Rejection as a Determinant of Anger and Aggression," *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 10, no. 2 (2006): 111-32.

[115] Nicki R. Crick and Jennifer K. Grotpeter, "Relational Aggression, Gender, and Social-Psychological Adjustment," *Child Development* 66 (1995): 710-22, Mark R. Leary, Lisa A. Schreindorfer, and Alison L. Haupt, "The Role of Low Self-Esteem in Emotional and Behavioral Problems: Why Is Low Self-Esteem Dysfunctional?," *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology* 14, no. 4 (1995): 297-314, Nicole E. Werner and Nicki R. Crick, "Relational Aggression and Social-Psychological Adjustment in a College Sample," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology* 108, no. 4 (1999): 615-23.

[116] Leary, Twenge, and Quinlivan, "Interpersonal Rejection," 111-32, Aslund et al., "Social Status and Shaming," 1-13.

cultures or anti-social groups where acceptance is likely to be found.[117] Suicide is the ultimate act of self-exclusion, which is the inner logic behind people opting for suicide as their solution to the pain of shame and rejection.[118]

Disgrace is a social phenomenon of social rejection that creates a crisis of belonging. Often the act of exclusion permanently changes a person's social standing in a community, and it is extraordinarily difficult for a person's social standing to be completely restored. Because belonging is such a crucial human need, social rejection frequently evokes the intensely painful experience of acute shame. Much of social conformity is motivated as much by the desire to avoid acute shame as it is by the desire to be accepted and belong.

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[117] Kipling D. Williams, "Ostracism," *Annual Review of Psychology* 58 (2007): 425-52.

[118] Hartmut B. Mokros, "Suicide and Shame," *The American Behavioral Scientist* 38, no. 8 (1995): 1091-103. Armand Chatard and Leila Selimbegović, "When Self-Destructive Thoughts Flash through the Mind: Failure to Meet Standards Affects the Accessibility of Suicide-Related Thoughts," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 100, no. 4 (2011): 587-605.

Chapter 3   Acute and Chronic Shame

This chapter continues the review of the four dimensions of the phenomenon of shame. These two dimensions of shame are primarily psychological in nature. Acute shame is the highly painful emotional state of feeling ashamed and humiliated. It typically is in response to negative evaluation by others, and generally accompanies experiences of public disgrace and social rejection. In the absence of a corrective experience that reaffirms a person's identity and social standing, repeated experiences of social rejection and acute shame can result in a modification of a person's view of oneself. Such a modification of one's identity in terms of shame can give rise to an ongoing psychological state called chronic shame.

3.1 Shame as a Social Emotion

3.1.1 Basic Emotions

Human emotion is a complex phenomenon that has both a biological and a social basis. Emotion theorists have distinguished between basic and social self-conscious emotions. Basic emotions have an evolutionary basis. They are related to fundamental life tasks. Ekman maintained that basic emotions "evolved for their adaptive value in dealing with *fundamental life-tasks.*"[1] Tomkin's Affect theory conceived of basic emotions as having an innate biological basis, and that they function as a primary motivational system for human behaviour. Tomkins stated that, "the primary motivational system is the affective system, and the biological drives have motivational impact only when amplified by the affective system."[2] Between six and nine basic emotions have been identified by different theorists. Ekman identified six basic emotions: anger, fear, disgust, interest/excitement, sadness, and surprise.[3] Izard's Discrete Emotion Theory identified seven basic innate biologically based emotions:

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[1] Paul Ekman, "An Argument for Basic Emotions," *Cognition and Emotion* 6, no. 3-4 (1992): 171. (italics in the original).

[2] Silvan S. Tomkins, *Affect Imagery Consciousness: Vol. 1: The Positive Affects*, 2 vols., vol. 1 (New York: Springer, 1963a), 4.

[3] Paul Ekman, "Strong Evidence for Universals in Facial Expressions: A Reply to Russell's Mistaken Critique," *Psychological Bulletin* 115, no. 2 (1994): 268-87.

happiness, surprise, sadness, contempt, anger, disgust, and fear.[4] Tomkins argued that there

were nine basic innate basic affects: first, two positive affects: interest-excitement,

enjoyment-joy, then a resetting affect of surprise-startle, and then six negative affects:

distress-anguish, fear-terror, shame-humiliation, disgust-contempt, dissmell, and anger-rage.

Two of these emotions, shame-humiliation and disgust-contempt, have subsequently been

identified as social emotions.[5] Basic emotions are distinguished from each other on the basis

that they have distinctive antecedent conditions, expressions, cognitive appraisals,

physiological responses, subjective qualities of emotional awareness, and action tendencies.[6]

Affective neuroscience is in the process of identifying and mapping out different

emotional systems, or emotional states that can be distinguished by different patterns of

neuron activation. A meta-analysis by Vytal and Hamaan found neuroaffective evidence for

five basic emotions; happiness, sadness, anger, fear, and disgust.[7] Panskepp identified four

basic emotion systems: the Seeking system, Fear system, Rage system, and Panic system; and

two other distinctive emotional systems that do not correspond to basic emotions, the Play

system and the Love/Nurture system. These basic emotion systems arise from executive

circuits that synchronize a large number of functions in response to situations, including

sensory information processing, somatic awareness, appraisal of meaning, memory recall,

cognitive processing, and higher order integrative processing. All these neural processes are

integral to our emotions, and require the contribution of many different structures in our

brains.[8]

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[4] Carol E. Izard, *The Psychology of Emotions* (New York: Plenum Press, 1991).

[5] Tomkins, *Affect Imagery Consciousness: Vol. 1*, 185. The two word label Tomkins gave these emotions
     reflects variance in intensity. The first word indicating the mildest representation of the affect and the second
     the upper reach of affect intensity.

[6] Ira J. Roseman, Cynthia Wiest, and Tamara S. Swartz, "Phenomenology, Behaviors, and Goals Differentiate
     Discrete Emotions," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 67, no. 2 (1994): 206-21.

[7] K. Vytal and S. Hamann, "Neuroimaging Support for Discrete Neural Correlates of Basic Emotions: A Voxel-
     Based Meta-Analysis," *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience* 22, no. 12 (2010): 2864-885.

[8] Jaak Panksepp, *Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions* (New
     York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 122-23. Panksepp, *Affective Neuroscience*, 123.

3.1.2 Social Self-Conscious Emotions

Self-conscious emotions have five characteristics that distinguish them from basic emotions.

First, they require objective self-awareness and self-representations. Second, they emerge

later in childhood. Basic emotions emerge around 9 months, whereas self-conscious emotions

emerge between 18 - 24 months, after the infant has developed objective self-awareness.[9]

Third, whereas basic emotions are elicited with reference to survival goals, self-conscious

emotions are elicited in respect to social behavioural goals. They are responses to inferences

about other persons' evaluations of the self, and they play a key role in self-regulation of

interpersonal behaviour.[10] Fourth, self-conscious emotions do not have universally

recognizable facial expressions. What elicits them varies between cultures depending on

cultural norms and values.[11] Fifth, self-conscious emotions are more complex cognitively.

They are elicited by identity-salient social stimuli. Positive self-conscious emotions are

elicited by appraisals of identity-goal congruence, whereas negative self-conscious emotions

are elicited by appraisals of identity-goal discrepancies between actual and ideal self.[12] Self-

conscious emotions motivate people to seek achievement and act morally and socially

appropriately.[13]

Five self-conscious emotions have been identified along the basic dimensions of

shame and pride.[14] There are three negative emotions - shame, guilt, embarrassment, and two

positive emotions - hubristic pride, and achievement-oriented pride. These emotions are

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[9] Michael Lewis, "Self-Conscious Emotional Development," in *The Self-Conscious Emotions: Theory and Research*, ed. Jessica L. Tracy, Richard W. Robins, and June Price Tangney (New York/London: Guilford Press, 2007), 134-41, Kristin Hansen Lagattuta and Ross A. Thompson, "The Development of Self-Conscious Emotions: Cognitive Processes and Social Influences," in *The Self-Conscious Emotions: Theory and Research*, ed. Jessica L. Tracy, Richard W. Robins, and June Price Tangney (New York/London: Guilford Press, 2007), 92-94.

[10] Mark R. Leary, "Motivational and Emotional Aspects of the Self," *Annual Review of Psychology* 58 (2007): 329-30.

[11] Jennifer Goetz and Dacher Keltner, "Shifting Meanings of Self-Conscious Emotions across Cultures," in *The Self-Conscious Emotions: Theory and Research*, ed. Jessica L. Tracy, Richard W. Robins, and June Price Tangney (New York/London: Guilford Press, 2007), 158-62.

[12] Jessica L. Tracy and Richard W. Robins, "Putting the Self into Self-Conscious Emotions: A Theoretical Model," *Psychological Inquiry* 15, no. 2 (2004): 103-25.

[13] Leary, "Motivational and Emotional Aspects of the Self," 332-34.

[14] Charles Horton Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, revised ed. (New York: Scribner & Sons, 1922), 184-208.

distinguished on the basis of whether the attributions of behaviour are congruent or discrepant to identity-goals, whether attributions are made globally to who the self is or with reference to specific behaviour, and whether the attributions are stable/enduring descriptions of the self or temporary/unstable self-presentations of the self in specific social contexts. Furthermore, the level of cumulative shame or pride is directly reflected in the level of a person's self-esteem.[15]

These social self-conscious emotions generally have a functional adaptive form that is consistent with a person's sense of adequacy, alongside a maladaptive form that is bound to shame. Achievement-oriented pride reflects adequacy, whereas hubris pride is a defence against shame. Guilt likewise has the two forms of true moral guilt and false guilt. Envy has the two forms of admiration and envy characterized by inferiority and hostility. Shame also has an adaptive form of anticipatory shame anxiety and a maladaptive form of chronic shame. Whether a person has an adequate identity or a shame-bound identity influences which form of social emotion will tend to predominate.

These social self-conscious emotions reflect the quality of a person's social bonds with others. Kaufman argued that shame is evoked when a person's social bonds are threatened or disrupted.[16] When social relationships reflect secure belonging, authentic pride becomes predominant. When social relationships are insecure and threatened, then negative self-conscious emotions of guilt and shame become more predominant. Scheff wrote,

> These two emotions have a signal function with regard to the social bond. In this framework, pride and shame serve as intense and automatic bodily signs of the state of a system that would otherwise be difficult to observe, the state of one's bond to others. Pride is the sign of an intact bond; shame, a severed or threatened bond. [17]

Scheff argued that emotions that relate to the social order, such as shame and guilt are important motivating factors in social relationships and social behaviour, and are important

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[15] Scheff, "Shame and Conformity," 395-406.

[16] Gershen Kaufman, *Shame: The Power of Caring* (Boston, Mass.: Schenkman, 1985). Dacher Keltner, Randall C. Young, and Brenda N. Buswell, "Appeasement in Human Emotion, Social Practice, and Personality," *Aggressive Behavior* 23, no. 359-374 (1997): 362-69.

[17] Thomas J. Scheff, *Microsociology* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 15.

ways of sustaining and monitoring social bonds.[18] He regarded shame as the primary social

emotion, being based on monitoring of oneself in view of the other, stating, "Shame is the

most frequent, and possibly the most important of emotions, even though it is usually

invisible."[19]

3.1.3 Distinguishing Shame and Guilt

Given the extent to which shame has been hidden under guilt in the Christian tradition, it is

important to be clear in the ways in which shame is distinct from guilt. There is a complex

relationship between shame and guilt. Both shame and guilt are self-conscious emotions

related to negative self-assessment. Shame and guilt can be readily distinguished by their

distinctive antecedents, emotional displays, and action tendencies.[20] Despite distinctive

expressions, affect and action tendencies, however, guilt and shame have been frequently

confused. For example, Tomkins regarded shame as the basic affect underlying guilt because

it is broader than guilt. Tomkins wrote, "guilt refers to shame which is about moral matters."[21]

This is because they often occur together simultaneously with respect to moral transgressions.

Guilt is generally accompanied by some degree of shame,[22] and people who are shame-prone

also tend to have guilt-proneness.[23]

First, we need to clearly conceptualize guilt. Like other self-conscious emotions, there

are two forms of guilt, true moral guilt and false guilt.[24] True moral guilt is characterized by

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[18] Scheff, "Shame in Social Theory," 227-28.

[19] Ibid., 210.

[20] June Price Tangney, "Recent Advances in the Empirical Study of Shame and Guilt," *The American Behavioral Scientist* 38, no. 8 (1995): 1132-45, Jeffrey S. Ashby et al., "Psychologists' Labelling of the Affective States of Shame and Guilt," *Psychotherapy* 34, no. 1 (1997): 58-63.

[21] Tomkins, *Affect Imagery Consciousness Vol. 2*, 135. Tomkins also stated, "Much of what has been called guilt we would call internalized contempt." This is because guilt is characterized by a split between an internalized judge and defendant. ———, *Affect Imagery Consciousness Vol. 2*, 136.

[22] Karen Kugler and Warren H. Jones, "On Conceptualizing and Assessing Guilt," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 62, no. 2 (1992): 318-27. June Price Tangney, "Assessing Individual Differences in Proneness to Shame and Guilt: Development of the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 59, no. 1 (1990): 102-11, Tangney, "Recent Advances in the Empirical Study of Shame and Guilt," 1132-45.

[23] Tangney, Wagner, and Gramzow, "Proness to Shame, Proneness to Guilt, and Psychopathology," 469-78. Kugler and Jones, "On Conceptualizing and Assessing Guilt," 318-27.

[24] Ayfer Dost and Bilge Yagmurlu, "Are Constructiveness and Destructiveness Essential Features of Guilt and Shame Feelings Respectively?," *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior* 38, no. 2 (2008): 109-29.

regret, self-hatred, a sense of deserving punishment, an awareness of a guilty conscience, and a need to make reparation.[25] It is situation specific. The antecedent conditions for true moral guilt involve an action that violates moral standards or social norms.[26] True moral guilt inhibits behaviour that violates morals and social norms. Proneness to experience guilt is related to ethical decision making.[27] A number of factors contributing to guilt have been identified: an awareness of an interpersonal transgression, violation of trust, level of emotional distress, attributions of responsibility, lack of justification, violation of values, and foreseeability or preventability of the action or event; as well as contextual variables of inflicting damage or harm on another, being blamed by others, whether the damage is temporary or irreparable, and the closeness of the relationship to the harmed person.[28] Sensitivity to guilt is related to the types of moral values a person holds. In contrast, shame-proneness appears to be unrelated to personal values.[29]

False guilt is distinct from true moral guilt. There are a number for forms of false guilt. First, there is survivor guilt, where a person feels guilty for having survived a traumatic experience that involved the serious injury or death of other people. Survivor guilt is a feature

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[25] Gian Vittorio Capara, Jorge Manzi, and Marco Perugini, "Investigating Guilt in Relation to Emotionality and Aggression," *Personality and Individual Differences* 13, no. 5 (1992): 519-32, Kugler and Jones, "On Conceptualizing and Assessing Guilt," 318-27.

[26] Dacher Keltner and Brenda N. Buswell, "Evidence for the Distinctiveness of Embarrassment, Shame, and Guilt: A Study of Recalled Antecedents and Facial Expressions of Emotion," *Cognition and Emotion* 10, no. 2 (1996): 155-71, Carlos Tilghman-Osborne, David A. Cole, and Julia W. Felton, "Definition and Measurement of Guilt: Implications for Clinical Research and Practice," *Clinical Psychology Review* 30, no. 5 (2010): 536-46.

[27] Cohen et al., "Gasp Scale," 947-66.

[28] Bernard Weiner, "An Attributional Theory of Achievement Motivation and Emotion," *Psychological Review* 92, no. 4 (1985): 548-73. Janice Lindsay-Hartz, "Contrasting Experiences of Shame and Guilt," *American Behavioral Scientist* 27, no. 6 (1984): 689-704, Jessica L. Tracy and Richard W. Robins, "Appraisal Antecedents of Shame and Guilt: Support for a Theoretical Model," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 32, no. 10 (2006): 1339-51, K. Jessica Vliet, "The Role of Attributions in the Process of Overcoming Shame: A Qualitative Analysis," *Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice* 82, no. 2 (2009): 137-52, Jun Gao, Jun Wang, and Mingyi Qian, "Differentiating Shame and Guilt from a Relational Perspective: A Cross-Cultural Study," *Social Behavior and Personality* 38, no. 10 (2010): 1401-08. Fontaine, however, found that both shame and guilt had aspects of global attributions and behaviour specific attributions, reminding us that this distinction is not hard and fast. Johnny R. J. Fontaine et al., "Untying the Gordian Knot of Guilt and Shame: The Structure of Guilt and Shame Reactions on Situation and Person Variation in Belgium, Hungary, and Peru," *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 37, no. 3 (2006): 273-92, Gore and Harvey, "Dimensions of Conscience Questionaire," 769-71, E.S. Kubany and S. B. Watson, "Guilt: Elaboration of a Multidimensional Model," *Psychological Record* 53, no. 1 (2003): 53-90, Blum, "Shame and Guilt," 98.

[29] Mia Silfver et al., "The Relation between Value Priorities and Proneness to Guilt, Shame, and Empathy," *Motivation and Emotion* 32, no. 1 (2008): 69-80.

of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.[30] Survivor guilt is highly related to shame.[31] Another form

of false guilt is separation guilt, a sense that separation from others may harm them. This

form of guilt can occur in enmeshed families where there is a lack of individuation of family

members, and care-givers can readily feel guilty when other family members experience

distress.[32] Another form of false guilt is omnipotent responsibility guilt, along with a tendency

to self-blame. This form of false guilt is a feature of people who are victims in abusive

relationships, whether they are domestic violence relationships or sexual abuse.[33] Both guilt

and shame can be evoked simultaneously when we commit a moral transgression that is also

salient to our own global sense of identity. This occurs when the transgression reflects

negatively on a person's self-image, highlights a deficiency of character, damages a person's

social standing, or is regarded as both immoral and disgraceful by others.[34]

   Nevertheless, there are significant contrasts that distinguish shame from true moral

guilt. Shame-proneness is correlated with a tendency to externalize blame, whereas guilt-

proneness was negatively correlated with a tendency to externalize blame.[35] True moral guilt

is concerned with a specific transgression, whereas shame involves a global characterological

appraisal. Nichols pointed out that;

> The primary distinction between guilt and shame is the difference between the evil
> of being too powerful and the disgrace of being too weak. We feel guilt for being
> bad, for transgressing against others; we feel shame for being weak and worthless.
> Guilt is bad, shame is worse. Guilt is about something you've done; shame is about
> who you are. Guilt is the inner experience of breaking the moral code. We feel bad
> about what we've done - worse than that, terrible - and we imagine being punished.
> But it's punishment for what we did, not for who we are. Shame, on the other hand
> is involves a negative judgment upon who we are, and our self-worth as a human

[30] Stephen Joseph, "Psychosocial Perspectives on Post-Traumatic Stress," *Clinical Psychology Review* 15, no. 6 (1995): 515-44, Deborah A. Lee, Peter Scragg, and Stuart Turner, "The Role of Shame and Guilt in Traumatic Events: A Clinical Model of Shame-Based and Guilt-Based Ptsd," *British Journal of Medical Psychology* 74, no. 4 (2001): 451-66, Dost and Yagmurlu, "Constructiveness and Destructiveness," 109-29.

[31] Lynn E. O'Connor et al., "Interpersonal Guilt: The Development of a New Measure," *Journal of Clinical Psychology* 53, no. 1 (1997): 73-89.

[32] Lynn E. O'Connor and Jack W. Berry, "Interpersonal Guilt, Shame, and Psychological Problems," *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology* 18, no. 2 (1999): 181-203.

[33] Zvi Eisikovits and Guy Enosh, "Awareness of Guilt and Shame in Intimate Violence," *Violence and Victims* 12, no. 4 (1997): 307-22. O'Connor and Berry, "Interpersonal Guilt, Shame, and Psychological Problems," 181-203.

[34] Nathan Harris, "Reassessing the Dimensionality of the Moral Emotions," *British Journal of Psychology* 94 (2003): 457-73.

[35] Kugler and Jones, "On Conceptualizing and Assessing Guilt," 318-27.

being. Guilt is concerned with wrong actions; shame reflects a fundamental inadequacy and unacceptability that amounts to a lack of self-worth.[36]

This characterological appraisal can either give rise to motivation for self-improvement, or it can feed into internalized shame characterized by self-criticism and inferiority, leading to shame-proneness.[37] Shame is evoked when the integrity of the self is threatened in response to public exposure, either of a moral transgression, inadequacy, or failure.[38]

Shame and guilt have a different focus of awareness. True interpersonal guilt hinges upon empathic awareness of someone's distress and an awareness of being responsible for that person's distress.[39] With shame the focus of awareness is not the other person, but oneself as the object of negative evaluation by others.[40] This preoccupation with the self is inconsistent with the other-focused orientation of empathy. This means that shame-prone individuals may be impaired in their ability to empathically identify with others, because identification with another's pain may be overlaid by self-focused distress at experience of their own shame.[41]

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[36] Nichols, *No Place to Hide*, 40.

[37] Nicolay Gausel and Colin W. Leach, "Concern for Self-Image and Social Image in the Management of Moral Failure: Rethinking Shame," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 41, no. 4 (2011): 468-78, Nicolay Gausel et al., "Defend or Repair? Explaining Responses to in-Group Moral Failures by Disentangling Feelings of Shame, Rejection, and Inferiority," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 102, no. 5 (2012): 941-60. Gausel's model is conceptually flawed in that the distinction between shame leading to self-improvement and inferiority leading to ongoing self-criticism in incorrect. Rather, the distinction lies in the response of the person to acute shame in the face of moral failure. If identity is damaged and redefined by shame, then an enduring sense of inferiority leading to chronic shame emerges. If a person reconstitutes a positive identity in the face of acute shame, this response involves moving from global to specific, and mobilizing resources towards self-improvement and prosocial restoration that reasserts one's identity as a moral agent.

[38] Tjeert Olthof et al., "Shame and Guilt in Children: Differential Situational Antecedents and Experiential Correlates," *British Journal of Developmental Psychology* 18, no. 1 (2000): 51-64, Smith et al., "Role of Public Exposure," 138-59, Fontaine et al., "Untying the Goridan Knot of Guilt and Shame," 273-92, Ersilia Menesini and Marina Camodeca, "Shame and Guilt as Behaviour Regulators: Relationships with Bullying, Victimization and Prosocial Behavior," *British Journal of Developmental Psychology* 26, no. 2 (2008): 183-96, Scott T. Wolf et al., "Shame Proneness and Guilt Proneness: Toward the Further Understanding of Reactions to Public and Private Transgressions," *Self and Identity* 9, no. 4 (2010): 337-62. Ying Yi Hong and Chi Yue Chiu, "A Study of the Comparative Structure of Guilt and Shame in a Chinese Society," *Journal of Psychology* 126, no. 2 (1992): 171-79.

[39] Jeffery Stuewig et al., "Shaming, Blaming, and Naming: Functional Links among the Moral Emotions, Externalization of Blame, and Aggression," *Journal of Research in Personality* 44, no. 1 (2010): 91-102.

[40] June Price Tangney, "Situational Determinants of Shame and Guilt in Young Adulthood," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 18, no. 2 (1992): 199-206.

[41] ———, "Moral Affect: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 61, no. 4 (1991): 598-607, K. P. Leith and Baumeister Roy F., "Empathy, Shame, Guilt, and Narratives of Interpersonal Conflict: Guilt-Prone People Are Better at Perspective Taking," *Journal of Personality* 66, no. 1 (1998): 1-37, Mu-Li Yang, Chao-Chin Yang, and Wen-Bin Chiou, "When Guilt Leads to Other Orientation

Guilt and shame have distinctly different action tendencies and remedies. Guilt is dealt with through rituals of atonement, confession, punishment, penance, and forgiveness. The distinctive emotional features of guilt are remorse, self-blame, and a troubled conscience.[42] The action tendencies of guilt are a desire to repair, confess, apologize and to make amends.[43] In contrast, shame has no clear remedy. It cannot be forgiven, only concealed.

3.1.4 Distinguishing Hubristic and Authentic Pride

The social emotion of pride has two forms, hubristic and authentic pride, rather than simply a single emotion of pride.[44] Authentic pride is closely related to achievement, in that it fosters intrinsic achievement motivation and creativity. In turn achievement builds a sense of authentic pride.[45] Authentic pride is also associated with co-operative prosocial behaviour in groups, a positive stable self-esteem, and emotional and behavioural self-regulation.[46] In contrast, hubristic pride is associated with narcissistic self-aggrandizement and shame-proneness, a fragile high self-esteem, egoistic behaviour in groups, perceived arrogance, and a tendency towards defensive anger or aggressive behaviour in response to ego threat.[47]

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[42] Smith et al., "Role of Public Exposure," 138-59, Toni Schmader and Brian Lickel, "The Approach and Avoidance Function of Guilt and Shame Emotions: Comparing Reactions to Self-Caused and Other-Caused Wrongdoing," *Motivation and Emotion* 30, no. 1 (2006): 43-56. Paula M. Niedenthal, June Price Tangney, and Igor Gavanski, "'If Only I Weren't' Verses 'If Only I Hadn't': Distinguishing Shame and Guilt in Counterfactual Thinking," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 67, no. 4 (1994): 585-95.

and Shame Leads to Egocentric Self-Focus: Effects of Differential Priming of Negative Affects on Perspective Taking," *Social Behavior and Personality* 38, no. 5 (2010): 605-14.

[43] Lindsay-Hartz, "Contrasting Experiences of Shame and Guilt," 689-704, Tangney, "Situational Determinants of Shame and Guilt," 199-206, Kugler and Jones, "On Conceptualizing and Assessing Guilt," 318-27, Ilone E. de Hooge, Marcel Zeelenberg, and Seger M. Breugelmans, "Moral Sentiments and Cooperation: Differential Influences of Shame and Guilt," *Cognition and Emotion* 21, no. 5 (2007): 1025-42, Sheikh and Janoff-Bulman, "The "Shoulds" And "Should Nots" Of Moral Emotions," 213-24, Cynthia E. Cryder, Stephen Springer, and Carey K. Morewedge, "Guilty Feelings, Targeted Actions," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 38, no. 5 (2012): 607-18. Susan Shott, "Emotion and Social Life: A Symbolic Interactionist Analysis," *The American Journal of Sociology* 84, no. 6 (1979): 1317-34.

[44] Jessica L. Tracy and Richard W. Robins, "The psychological structure of pride: A tale of two facets," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 92(3), 2007: 506-525.

[45] Aaron C. Weidman, Jessica L. Tracy, and Andrew J. Elliot, "The Benefits of Following Your Pride: Authentic Pride Promotes Achievement," *Journal of Personality* 84, no. 5 (2015), Rodica I. Damian and Richard W. Robins, "Aritotle's Virtue or Dante's Deadliest Sin? The Influence of Authentic and Hubristic Pride on Creative Achievement," *Learning and Individual Differences* 26 (2013): 156-60, Lisa A. Williams and David DeSteno, "Pride: Adaptive Social Emotion or Seventh Sin?," *Psychological Science* 20, no. 3 (2012): 284-88.

[46] Jessica L. Tracy and Richard W. Robins, "The Nature of Pride," in *The Self-Conscious Emotions: Theory and Research*, ed. Jessica L. Tracy, et al. (New York/London: Guilford Press, 2007), 263-82, Jessica L. Tracy et al., "Authentic and Hubristic Pride: The Affective Core of Self-Esteem and Narcissism," *Self & Identity* 8 (2009): 196-213.

[47] Jessica L. Tracy and Richard W. Robins, "Emerging Insights into the Nature and Function of Pride," *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 16, no. 3 (2007): 147-50, Tracy et al., "Authentic and Hubristic Pride:

Authentic pride is related to personal maturity and psychological well-being, whereas

hubristic pride is unrelated to personal maturity and associated with a lack of psychological

well-being.[48]

       Authentic and hubristic pride are associated with different self-regulation strategies.

Authentic pride is associated with self-control and goal-focused self-regulation. In contrast,

hubristic pride is associated with impulsive behaviour, emotion suppression, and aggressive

behaviour. People with authentic pride are characterized by an energized intrinsic pleasure in

achievement and attaining goals, an engagement in life and a sense of purpose. In contrast,

hubristic pride is associated with either extrinsic social status seeking through attaining fame

or wealth as a sign of social success, or acquiring social status through dominance. It is also

characterized by a lack of purpose.[49]

       People can choose between two routes for acquiring social status; prestige based on

possession of skill and expertise, or dominance based on intimidation. Hubristic pride has

been associated with seeking dominance, whereas authentic pride is associated with seeking

prestige. This is reflected in the former showing more aggressive self-aggrandizing behaviour,

whereas pursuit of prestige is associated with prosocial co-operative agreeable behaviour, and

conscientious pursuit of achievement.[50] The moral implications of these two choices are

obvious.

       Authentic pride has all the characteristics of a virtue. It is consistent with humility. It

is based on a secure identity, which is itself based upon a sense of adequacy and reflected in a

stable positive self-esteem. It is expressed in creativity, pursuit of excellence in achievement,

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The Affective Core of Self-Esteem and Narcissism," 196-213, Maarten J. J. Wubben, David De Cremer, and Eric van Dijk, "Is Pride a Prosocial Emotion? Interpersonal Effects of Authentic and Hubristic Pride," *Cognition and Emotion* 26, no. 6 (2012): 1084-97, Dianne Trumbull, "Hubris: A Primal Danger," *Psychiatry* 73, no. 4 (2010): 341-51.

[48] Ulrich Orth, Richard W. Robins, and Christopher J. Soto, "Tracking the Trajectory of Shame, Guilt, and Pride across the Life Span," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 99, no. 6 (2010): 1061-71.

[49] Charles S. Carver, Sungchoon Sinclair, and Sheri L. Johnson, "Authentic and Hubristic Pride: Differential Relations to Aspects of Goal Regulation, Affect, and Self Control," *Journal of Research in Personality* 44 (2010): 698-703.

[50] Joey T. Cheng, Jessica L. Tracy, and Joseph Henrich, "Pride, Personality, and the Evolutionary Foundations of Human Social Status," *Evolution and Human Behavior* 31 (2010): 334-47.

and prosocial behaviour. In contrast, hubristic pride is based on an unstable high self-esteem

that functions as a defence against disavowed shame and suppressed anxiety. It is expressed in

egoistic self-aggrandizement, pursuit of dominance, and aggressive behaviour.[51] Hubristic

pride can be regarded as a vice. The Christian condemnations against pride accurately

describe hubristic pride, but generally overlook the characteristics of authentic pride.

3.2 Dimension Three: Acute Shame as an Affect

We generally identify shame with the intensely painful emotion of acute shame that makes us

want to hide and simply disappear. It is frequently accompanied with scathing self-criticism

and self-rejection. The aversive effect of acute shame makes it a powerful motivator for

avoiding situations of humiliation and public disgrace.

There is a complex relation between public disgrace and acute shame. Any form of

social rejection has the potential to evoke acute shame. This is particularly true in the case of

public disgrace and humiliation. A common factor in social situations that evoke acute shame

is exposure to negative evaluation by others. The psychological impact of social rejection and

disgrace is the result of an interaction between the appraised meaning of the social actions of

rejection and the way a person chooses to respond to the experience. The impact is influenced

by whether the rejection is public or private, whether the intention is personal and specific or

not personal, the relation between the person and the rejecters, the amount of social support,

and the robustness of a person's self-esteem.[52] Acute shame can be externally focused in

response to perceived negative evaluations of others, or internally focused on a negative self-

evaluation of oneself.[53] What is central to shame is a negative self-evaluation of possessing a

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[51] It is interesting to note that greed and materialism, a preoccupation with the acquisition of possessions as the
      central focus of one's life is associated with shame, regret, lack of gratitude, and hubristic pride. In contrast,
      authentic pride is associated with gratitude and was unrelated to materialism. David C. Watson, "Self-
      Conscious Emotions and Materialism," *Imagination, Cognition and Personality* 35, no. 2 (2015): 190-210.
      Another study found that authentic pride is associated with good sportsmanship, whereas hubristic pride is
      associated with arrogance, poor sportsmanship, and an obsession with winning at all costs. Julien S. Bureau et
      al., "On Passion and Moral Behavior in Achievement Settings: The Mediating Role of Pride," *Motivation and
      Emotion* 37 (2013): 121-33.
[52] Asher, Rose, and Gabriel, "Peer Rejection," 130-36.
[53] Marcela Matos and Jose Pinto-Gouveia, "Shame as a Traumatic Memory," *Clinical Psychology and
      Psychotherapy* 17, no. 4 (2010): 300.

basic flaw that renders the person unlovable or unacceptable.[54] Behind the sense of shame is a

fear of abandonment, rejection, and loss of love.

3.2.1 The Shame Reaction

Behaviour is related to acute shame in four ways: first, behaviour that expresses shame affect,

second, behaviour that defends against shame, third, behaviour aimed at avoiding shame, and

fourth, behaviour aimed at repairing shame, either by placating others, or by restoring oneself.

Acute shame is an emotional reaction that has a number of phases. First, it involves a

cognitive appraisal that involves a sense of being negatively evaluated by others as inferior,

defective, incompetent, undesirable, weak or unlovable. This appraisal in turn leads to a

corresponding self-evaluation as being weak, defective, dirty, inferior, useless, and a failure.[55]

The experience of acute shame is characterized by an internalized focus of attention where a

person becomes acutely self-conscious as an object under scrutiny and judgment,[56] whether

by other people or from an internalized "generalized other."[57] So shame can be regarded as a

self-conscious affect that is linked with self-appraisals of having failed to live up to personal

standards and other peoples' standards and expectations.[58] Shame is accompanied by a sense

of personal incongruity - that I am not who I ought to be, and the world is not what it should

be, and there is a lack of fit of myself in relation to the world. This self-conscious incongruity

interferes with the smooth unself-conscious functioning of the self,[59] and produces a sense of

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[54] Gilbert, "What Is Shame?," 21-22.

[55] The association of shame with weakness and helplessness is supported by the negative relationship between shame and self-efficacy. Kim M. Baldwin, John R. Baldwin, and Thomas Ewald, "The Relationship among Shame, Guilt, and Self-Efficacy," *American Journal of Psychotherapy* 60, no. 1 (2006): 1-21. Shame is also experienced as fear of negative evaluation, helplessness, self-consciousness, inferiority. P. Gilbert, J. Pehl, and S. Allan, "The Phenomenology of Shame and Guilt: An Empirical Investigation," *British Journal of Medical Psychology* 67, no. 1 (1994): 23-36.

[56] Duval and Wicklund emphasized that there are two forms of conscious attention, subjective self-awareness where awareness is directed outwards towards features in the environment, and objective self-awareness where the person's awareness is directed towards him or herself as an object of another's gaze. Shelley Duval and Robert A. Wicklund, *A Theory of Objective Self Awareness* (New York/London: Academic Press, 1972), 2-40. Two studies have found that the experience of shame is accompanied by heightened self-consciousness and self-focused attention. Gilbert, Pehl, and Allan, "Phenomenology of Shame and Guilt," 23-36. P. J. Watson et al., "Further Contrasts between Self-Reflectiveness and Internal State Awareness Factors of Private Self-Consciousness," *Journal of Psychology* 130, no. 2 (1996): 183-92.

[57] Donald L. Nathanson, "About Emotion," *Psychiatric Annals* 23, no. 10 (1993): 543-55.

[58] Gausel and Leach, "Concern for Self-Image," 468-78.

[59] Lynd, *On Shame*, 34-41. Lewis, *Shame and Guilt*, 34ff.

threat to trust in the nature of things, where one's place in the world appears to be jeopardized.[60]

Acute shame is accompanied by a marked physiological stress response characterized by the activation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical axis, which is identified with the general activation system stress response.[61] Intense shame can evoke physiological responses of nausea, stomach pain, a sense of one's chest exploding or imploding, and the intensity of the physiological response can itself trigger a spontaneous rage response.[62] People who are experiencing shame characteristically react by blushing, averting the head, lowering their gaze, body slumping or collapsing, motor avoidance, and social withdrawal.[63] The shame reaction also is an emotional reflex response involving withdrawal, feeling deflated, mortification, aggression aimed at the self, and depression.[64]

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[60] Lynd, *On Shame*, 43ff. Pattison also observed that, "Shame thus produces a feeling of meaninglessness and hopelessness as the disoriented self drowns amidst its own confusions." Pattison, *Shame*, 73.

[61] Mattie Tops et al., "Task Engagement and the Relationships between the Error-Related Negativity, Agreeableness, Behavioral Shame Proneness and Cortisol," *Psychoneuroendocrinology* 31 (2006): 847-58. James F. Cavanagh and John J. B. Allen, "Multiple Aspects of the Stress Response under Social Evaluative Threat: An Electrophysiological Investigation," *Psychoneuroendocrinology* 33 (2008): 41-53. Tops et al., "Task Engagement and the Relationships between the Error-Related Negativity, Agreeableness, Behavioral Shame Proneness and Cortisol," 847-58, Sally S. Dickerson and Margaret E. Kemeny, "Acute Stressors and Cortisol Responses," *Psychological Bulletin* 130, no. 3 (2004): 355-91, Sally S. Dickerson, Tara L. Gruenewald, and Margaret E. Kemeny, "When the Social Self Is Threatened: Shame, Physiology, and Health," *Journal of Personality* 72, no. 6 (2004): 1191-216, Sally S. Dickerson, Peggy J. Mycek, and Frank Zaldivak, "Negative Social Evaluation, but Not Mere Social Presence, Elicits Cortisol Responses to a Laboratory Stressor Task," *Health Psychology* 27, no. 1 (2008): 116-21, Sally Dickerson, Tara L. Gruenewald, and Margaret E. Kemeny, "Psychobiological Responses to Social Self Threat: Functional or Detrimental?," *Self and Identity* 8, no. 2/3 (2009): 270-86, Sally S. Dickerson, "Physiological Correlates of Self-Conscious Emotions," in *The Oxford Handbook of Psychoneuroimmunology*, ed. Suzanne C. Segerstrom (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 79-91, Sally S. Dickerson and Peggy M. Zoccola, "Cortisol Responses to Social Exclusion," in *The Oxford Handbook on Social Exclusion*, ed. C. Nathan DeWall (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 144-52.

[62] Herbert E. Thomas, "Experiencing a Shame Response as a Precursor to Violence," *Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law* 23, no. 4 (1995): 587-93.

[63] Broucek, *Shame*, 70.

[64] Dacher Keltner and Lee-Anne Harker, "The Forms and Functions of the Nonverbal Signal of Shame," in *Shame: Interpersonal Behavior, Psychopathology and Culture*, ed. Paul Gilbert and Bernice Andrews (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 78-98, Macdonald, "Disclosing Shame," 141-42. MacDonald, 1998: 141-142. Ilone E. de Hooge, Marcel Zeelenberg, and Seger M. Breugelmans, "Restore and Protect Motivations Following Shame," *Cognition and Emotion* 24, no. 1 (2010): 111-27. Lopez, 1997 found that shame-prone people preferred to do problem solving alone rather than collaboratively. Frederick G. Lopez et al., "Attachment Styles, Shame, Guilt, and Collaborative Problem-Solving Orientations," *Personal Relationships* 4, no. 2 (1997): 187-99. Chao found that ashamed people tended to subsequently withdraw, do passive avoidance, and do self-sufficient activities or tasks alone. Ting-Hsien Chao, Ying-Yao Cheng, and Wen-Bin Chiou, "The Psychological Consequences of Experiencing Shame: Self-Sufficiency and Mood Repair," *Motivation and Emotion* 35, no. 2 (2011): 202-10.

Acute shame has distinct reflexive action tendencies. It is accompanied by an overwhelming desire to hide, exit, or to disappear. This flight can extend to a person leaving their community altogether and moving to a new location and not telling anyone where they have gone.[65] Shame is often accompanied by a sense of powerlessness and passivity, and a paralysis in how to respond. Consequently, a person experiencing intense shame is often inarticulate. It leads to difficulty in communication.[66] This inarticulate nature of shame is accompanied by an experience of acute individual isolation.[67]

This initial reflexive action tendency to withdraw can be subsequently overridden by a more considered reflective course of action aimed at achieving personal goals of restoring social image and dignity. This reflective response can involve a range of approaches, including engagement, aggression, being assertive or reproving the other, renewed effort at pursuing success, or withdrawal action strategies. However, de Hooge and Breugelmans found that people with chronic shame appear to be less able to engage in this subsequent reflective approach; rather, they simply reflexively withdraw.[68] The distinction is whether it is a reflexive reaction or considered response.

3.2.2 Defence Scripts against Shame

Because acute shame is a deeply painful emotion, people commonly adopt a number of defence strategies against shame. A person's preferred defence strategies eventually become habitual mental manoeuvres that shape a person's self-presentation and patterns of social behaviour. Nathanson suggested that these defence strategies can be categorized into four basic defensive scripts for managing shame, which he described as the compass of shame.[69] These are Withdrawal, Attack-Self, Avoidance, and Attack-Other. There are a wide range of

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[65] Janice Lindsay-Hartz, Joseph de Rivera, and Michael Mascolo, "Differentiating guilt and shame and their effects on motivation," Pages 274-300 in June Price Tangney and Kurt Fisher. (Eds.). *Self-Conscious Emotions: The Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment, and Pride*. New York: Guilford, 1995.

[66] Lynd, *On Shame*, 65ff. From a social constructionist perspective, the inarticulate nature of shame amounts to an exclusion of the subject from the world of social discourse and shared narrative.

[67] Kaufman, *Psychology of Shame*, 25.

[68] de Hooge, Zeelenberg, and Breugelmans, "Restore and Protect Motivations Following Shame," 111-27.

[69] Donald L. Nathanson, "Shame and the Affect Theory of Silvan Tomkins," in *The Widening Scope of Shame*, ed. Melvin R. Lansky and Andrew P. Morrison (Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press, 1997), 134.

defensive responses that protect against shame that align with one or more of these four defensive scripts.[70]

These four coping styles are distinguished from each other along two dimensions. The first dimension is whether shame is felt or unacknowledged. People may acknowledge their shame and experience it as an emotional state of acute shame. Alternatively, people bypass unacknowledged shame by hiding it under another emotional response. Unacknowledged shame is most commonly hidden behind the emotions of hubris pride, guilt or anger. What defensive script a person adopts for coping with shame is determined by the extent to which shame is acknowledged in the first place.[71] The defence scripts of Attack-Self and Withdrawal are in response to felt shame, whereas the coping styles of Avoidance and Attack-Other involve not acknowledging shame.

The second dimension involves attributions and blame. Internalizing occurs when a person tends to attribute the cause of an experience to oneself with resulting self-blame. Externalizing occurs when events are attributed to other causes and others are blamed. Avoidance and Attack-Self reflect internalizing, whereas Attack-Other and Withdrawal are associated with externalizing. Making internal attributions for negative events tends to evoke shame, whereas making external attributions tends to evoke anger.[72]

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[70] Nichols elaborates on these defences in Nichols, *No Place to Hide*, 98-102.

[71] Lewis, *Shame and Guilt*.

[72] Tracy and Robins, "Appraisal Antecedents of Shame and Guilt," 1339-51. A study by Elison found empirical support for Nathanson's compass of shame model and found that the Internalized Shame Scale had strong correlations with the coping styles of Withdrawal (r=.71), Attack-Self (r=.72), and significantly lower correlations with Attack-Other (r=.31) and Avoidance (r=.16), which reflects the degree to which shame is acknowledged. Likewise, Withdrawal (r=-.55) and Attack-Self (r=-.37) have strong negative correlations with self-esteem, but Attack-Other (r=-.21) and Avoidance (r=-.10) had no significant correlation. The Attack-Other and Avoidance scripts share a factor of minimization, which also reflects the distinction between acknowledged and unacknowledged shame. Attack Self and Withdrawal share a factor of acceptance, and Attack Other and Attack Self share a common factor of anger. Attack Self and Withdrawal were highly correlated, reflecting the action tendencies of acute shame. The correlation between Attack Other and Withdrawal may reflect passive-aggressive behaviours. Jeff Elison, "Investigating the Compass of Shame: The Development of the Compass of Shame Scale," *Social Behavior and Personality* 34, no. 3 (2006): 221-38. Johnson also found that internalized shame was associated with deployment of Attack-Self and Withdrawal defence scripts. Diane E. Johnson, "Considering Shame and Its Implications for Student Learning," *College Student Journal* 46, no. 1 (2012).

Figure 1. Dimensions of Shame Around the Compass of Shame

Externalize
felt shame

Withdraw

compass
of shame

Attack-Self

internalize
felt shame

Attack-Other

externalize
unacknowledged
shame

Avoidance

internalize
unacknowledged
shame

The first defence script is Withdrawal. It can be overt and physical or psychological and internal. This defence script reflects the action tendency of acute shame to hide and withdraw. Withdrawal commonly involves literally departing from the situation. It can take a more subtle form of becoming quiet and withdrawing from interaction, while remaining physically present, but disengaged.[73] It can take the form of yielding in conflict, or surrendering a position or giving up the argument. All these are different forms of withdrawal. The problem is, following withdrawal one must either re-enter the situation with the risk of a repeated failure or humiliation, or to never come back with the restriction that it places upon one's life.

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[73] Baumeister and Scher, "Self-Defeating Behavior Patterns," 3-22. Nichols, *No Place to Hide*, 91.

The second defence script of Attack-Self involves the person becoming his or her own shamer, because it is less humiliating to shame oneself, than to openly acknowledge the humiliation of another. It takes the forms of self-criticism, self-derogation, and self-blame. Self-criticism takes the form of an internal dialogue characterized by self-contempt, self-hatred, or rage at oneself, which is a manifestation of inner alienation and self-rejection.[74] Such self-criticism creates a double bind of reliance upon the validation and affirmation of others, coupled simultaneously with an inability to receive that validation because it contradicts the person's own self-rejection. Self-derogation is utilized pre-emptively in social situations to ward off hostility and aggression of others. It is a defence against experiences of helplessness and humiliation.[75] Social manifestations of self-derogation can take the form of appropriate deference, conformity, self-effacement, or modesty. Religious teaching can serve to reinforce an Attack-Self script in the form of religious self-abasement, humility, and self-negation.

The third form Attack-Self takes is self-blame. The relation between shame and self-blame is complex. Self-blame involves confusion regarding responsibility and causality. Self-blaming involves taking responsibility for events that one did not cause nor was responsible for.[76] Self-blame is symptomatic of a lack of clear personal boundaries and self-object differentiation. These three forms of Attack-Self are related to each other.[77]

The Attack-Self defence script makes acute shame an even more devastating and painful experience because of the strong reaction of self-rejection and self-contempt that it triggers. This response of self-rejection and self-contempt causes repeated shame experiences

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[74] Kaufman, *Psychology of Shame*, 104ff.

[75] Maryke Cramerus, "Self-Derogation: Inner Conflict and Anxious Vigilance," *Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy* 19, no. 1 (1989): 55-69, Jeffrey A. Hall, "Is It Something I Said? Sense of Humour and Partner Embarrassment," *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships* 28, no. 3 (2010): 383-405.

[76] Kelly G. Shaver and Debra Drown, "On Causality, Responsibility, and Self-Blame: A Theoretical Note," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 50, no. 4 (1986): 697-702. and Sydney J. Blatt and David C. Zuroff, "Interpersonal Relatedness and Self-Definition: Two Prototypes for Depression," *Clinical Psychology Review* 12 (1992): 527-62., and Gilbert, "What Is Shame?," 19-20.

[77] Blatt and Zuroff, "Interpersonal Relatedness and Self-Definition: Two Prototypes for Depression," 527-62. Sydney J. Blatt, "A Cognitive Model Morphology of Psychopathology," *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease* 179 (1991): 449-58.

to have an amplified impact upon a person's own identity, accelerating the development of a shame-prone or shame-bound identity.[78]

The third defence script is Avoidance. The Avoidance script does not acknowledge the shame. There is little conscious awareness of shame, and avoidance operates at a subconscious level. Avoidance takes many forms. It can manifest as the psychological defences of disavowal, minimizing, denial, and distraction. It commonly involves repression of negative emotion. This can lead to numbness when one's heart gets so full of hurt that it becomes numb and one no longer feels. It can also result in apathy and boredom where one does not embrace experiencing life with all its risks.

An alternative pre-emptive avoidance strategy is to seek perfection, because the perfect self cannot be defective. This can manifest as over-conscientiousness and perfectionism, where a person must avoid mistakes at all costs. Chronic procrastination is another avoidance strategy that occurs when a person fears negative evaluation and not living up to the expectation of other people.[79] Another avoidance strategy is operating out of a false compliant conformist self that is acceptable to others. Other forms of avoidance are substance abuse, excessive computer gaming, avoidance of people and social situations, and the pursuit of the distraction of pleasure.

Repeated shame experiences can lead to a person adopting avoidance as a general social strategy where people are motivated to avoid potential shame and embarrassment. Shame-prone persons become more motivated by risk avoidance at the cost of risk taking in pursuing intimate relationships and friendships, or pursuing positive monetary and other rewards.[80] Repeated utilization of this defence of avoidance can develop into a general apathy about life.

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[78] Susan Miller, The Shame Experience, Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press, 1985), 134.

[79] Ronda L. Fee and June Price Tangney, "Procrastination: A Means of Avoiding Shame or Guilt?," *Journal of Social Behavior and Personality* 15, no. 5 (2000): 167-84.

[80] Baumeister and Scher, "Self-Defeating Behavior Patterns," 3-22, Macdonald, "Disclosing Shame," 141-57.

The fourth defence script is Attack-Other. This coping strategy does not acknowledge shame, but generally masks it under anger and blaming other people. Blaming other people is called externalizing. This defensive strategy involves projecting the hurt and distress of shame onto other persons in the form of blame, rage, anger and violence. It can manifest as arrogance, contempt, or ridicule of others. One minimizes the shame by belittling the other person. When this becomes a habitual manoeuvre, one's self esteem becomes built up by downgrading others to ensure that one is superior to others. Another manifestation is open defiance. Defiance is proud, a strong rejection of shame by challenging the legitimacy of the shaming sanction, or the other person. Nichols stated, "Defiance is combative, bellicose and brave; its defensiveness is hard to miss. If arrogance is cold defiance is hot. Instead of being paralysed by anxiety, defiant individuals confront any situation that threatens humiliation."[81] It can appear as a shameless blatant flaunting of one's badness, misbehaviour, or condition. The Attack-Other defence script can involve defiantly embracing the shameful thing. The intolerable split between good and bad is resolved by repudiating the ideal.

The Attack-Other defence script lies behind much verbal abuse and violence. Anger serves to bypass shame because it is less painful to be angry than to be ashamed. Anger gives a sense of power that counteracts the powerlessness and weakness of shame.[82] The Attack-Other defence script can take the extreme form of a shame-rage reaction, which can develop into a shame-rage spiral of cyclical violence. This can manifest in active or passive aggression, and bullying aimed at humiliating or hurting others. [83] Shame-rage spirals characterize domestic violence and explosive interpersonal violence.[84] The anger, focused

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[81] Nichols, *No Place to Hide*, 60.

[82] Thomas J. Scheff, "The Shame-Rage Spiral: A Case Study of an Interminable Quarrel," in *The Role of Shame in Symptom Formation*, ed. H. B. Lewis (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1987), 109-49, Suzanne Retzinger, "Shame-Rage in Marital Quarrels," in *The Widening Scope of Shame*, ed. Melvin R. Lansky and Andrew P. Morrison (Hillsdale, NJ: Analyic Press, 1997), 297-312. Tangney, "Assessing Individual Differences in Proneness to Shame and Guilt: Development of the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory," 102-11.

[83] June Price Tangney et al., "Shamed into Anger? The Relation of Shame and Guilt to Anger and Self-Reported Aggression," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 62, no. 4 (1992): 669-75.

[84] Fossum and Mason, *Facing Shame: Families in Recovery*, Dewey G. Cornell, Catherine S. Peterson, and Herbert Richards, "Anger as a Predictor of Aggression among Incarcerated Adolescents," *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology* 67, no. 1 (1999): 108-15, Melvin R. Lansky, "Shame and Domestic

outward, is a defence against hurt and shame. Generally, all that is seen is the anger, while the shame behind it remains hidden.[85]

Acute shame generally becomes apparent indirectly through the defensive scripts that people enact in their social actions. These defensive scripts point to the presence of shame, even when it is bypassed or unacknowledged. Ingrained shame reactions and defensive scripts form patterns of social behaviour, and become the underlying force behind dynamic interaction patterns that define and shape relationships. The deployment of these defences takes up emotional energy that otherwise could be deployed in more creative socially engaging endeavours. Defensiveness against shame also can inhibit a person from engaging in life enriching experiences. So, repeated deployment of these defences against shame can evolve into a social style that can be maladaptive leading to entrenched chronic shame or other psychopathology and social maladjustment.

3.2.3 Recovery from Shame

Acute shame is highly destabilizing to a person's sense of self that can amount to an identity crisis. It has been described as a fragmentation of the self. A person has to recover from the experience of acute shame by re-establishing his or sense of a positive identity. How a person responds to experiences of acute shame determines whether or not he or she develops chronic shame. When a person successfully defends him- or herself against shame, the result is that the experience of acute shame is regarded as not being salient to one's identity. When it is appraised as being salient to one's identity, then recovery from shame requires reintegration of one's sense of self. Failure to do so can result in a modification of person's sense of identity with reference to the shame resulting in a shame-bound identity that is experienced as a sense of chronic shame.

Violence," in *The Many Faces of Shame*, ed. Donald L. Nathanson (New York: Guilford Press, 1987), 335-61, Bob Wallace and Anna Nosko, "Working with Shame in the Group Treatment of Male Batterers," *International Journal of Group Psychotherapy* 43, no. 1 (1993): 45-61.

[85] Nichols, *No Place to Hide*, 63-64. Elly Farmer and Bernice Andrews, "Shameless yet Angry: Shame and Its Relationship to Anger in Male Young Offenders and Undergraduate Controls," *The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology* 20, no. 1 (2009): 48-65.

Recovering from acute shame involves rebuilding the self and restoring a sense of worth and adequacy. There are a number of actions that contribute to this process. The first is reconnecting with a supportive social network. The second is shifting one's focus from the self-focused attention of shame back to an outward focus on activities, priorities, and other people. Third, a person can engage in a process of acceptance of the experience that involves acknowledging and processing the shame, and accepting oneself and integrating the shame experience. Fourth, a person can make sense of the experience in terms of what caused it, making attributions regarding causality, what can be learned from it, and developing an objective balanced perspective on the experience. Recovery involves resisting the impact of shame upon their identity, and reasserting their positive sense of self, reasserting their sense of worth, power, and internal locus of control, and refusing to let the negative evaluations associated with shame be definitive for their sense of self.[86]

Other people can significantly contribute to recovery from acute shame by providing corrective experiences where they reaffirm the shamed person's identity. A biblical example of this is Jesus providing a corrective experience to a deeply ashamed Peter after his resurrection when he asked Peter three times, "Do you love me?" and he charged him three times to "Feed my sheep." This threefold charge corresponded to the three times that Peter denied him.[87]

Recovery from experiences of acute shame that restores an intact identity involves being able to shift from global attributions of failure, flawedness, and inferiority to specific attributions regarding unacceptable behaviour. The person then evaluates whether this unacceptable behaviour must be changed, or whether specific character weaknesses need to be improved, or whether they are weaknesses that can be acknowledged and accepted. When one is able to reintegrate one's sense of self, re-affirm a positive self-concept, and move on, acute

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[86] K. Jessica Van Vliet, "Shame and Resilience in Adulthood: A Grounded Theory Study," *Journal of Counseling Psychology* 55, no. 2 (2008): 233-45.
[87] John 21:15-17.

shame remains an isolated experience. The adaptive response that involves reintegration of one's sense of self in response to experiences of acute shame generally involves self-forgiveness and self-acceptance.[88] It may require accepting the aspects of oneself that were highlighted as being unacceptable in the experience of acute shame.[89] Also central to recovery from shame is regaining a sense of self-efficacy that one has power to influence one's future and is capable of change.[90] Failure to do this work of reintegration and self-acceptance increases the likelihood that a person may develop chronic shame.

3.3 Dimension Four: Chronic Shame and Identity

A key task in socio-emotional development is identity formation. Healthy identity formation that supports effective social functioning is characterized by self-differentiation, a realistic clearly defined self-concept, self-worth, and a positive stable self-esteem. A healthy identity is characterized by a sense of adequacy that, "I am okay, loveable, and acceptable."

People with chronic shame develop a shame-bound identity with an abiding sense of not being good enough, unlovable, unacceptable, or worthless. As Nichols expressed it, "A pervasive sense of shame is the deep conviction that one is fundamentally bad, unworthy, inadequate, defective, and ultimately unlovable."[91] Chronic shame results when a person incorporates memories of shame into their autobiographical narrative with the result that they become identity schema.[92] Chronic shame manifests in shame-proneness, a low or unstable self-esteem, or a shame-bound identity. Shame-proneness refers to a vulnerability to acute shame and sensitivity to being shamed in social situations.[93]

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[88] People with high shame-proneness find it more difficult to do self-forgiveness. Anita R. Rangganadhan and Natasha Todorov, "Personality and Self-Forgiveness: The Roles of Shame, Guilt, Empathy," *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology* 29, no. 1 (2010): 1-22.

[89] Steen Halling, "Shame and Forgiveness," *Humanistic Psychologist* 22, no. 1 (1994): 74-87.

[90] Vliet, "Role of Attributions in Overcoming Shame," 137-52.

[91] Nichols, *No Place to Hide*, 40.

[92] Patel et al., "Intrusive Images and Memories in Major Depression," 2573-80, Pinto-Gouveia and Matos, "Can Shame Memories Become a Key to Identity?," 281-90.

[93] Tangney, "Assessing Individual Differences in Proneness to Shame and Guilt: Development of the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory," 102-11.

3.3.1 Chronic Shame and Self-Differentiation

Chronic shame is related to a number of features of identity. First, it is related to low self-differentiation. Self-differentiation is concerned with developing a clear sense of self that is distinct from others. People with high self-differentiation have a clear sense of their own individual identity, and they are more socially effective and influential.[94] Differentiation of self is related to mindfulness and emotion regulation because it "refers to the ability of persons to keep separate the emotional and intellectual systems and to maintain choice between them."[95] Self-differentiation provides resilience for recovering from experiences of acute shame.

People with low self-differentiation have higher dependency in intimate relationships and have greater difficulty distinguishing themselves from others. Retzinger pointed out that a lack of self-differentiation is related to fragile social bonds. It leads either to enmeshment or fusion - intimacy with diffuse personal boundaries, or disengagement leading to isolation and shame.[96] Lack of self-differentiation creates greater vulnerability to shame that is evoked by threats to or severing of social bonds, especially in intimate relationships.

3.3.2 Chronic Shame and Self-Concept

Chronic shame is directly related to self-concept. A healthy identity is characterized by a realistic self-concept, along with a positive evaluation of oneself.[97] A person's self-concept is a description of who one is as an individual that is distinctive from other people. It is derived from reflective appraisal of feedback from others and monitoring one's own behaviour. This appraisal process may be either accurate and objective, or defensively inaccurate and biased.

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[94] Kristina Whitney, Lynda M. Sagrestano, and Christina Maslach, "Establishing the Social Impact of Individuation," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 66, no. 6 (1994): 1140-53.

[95] Murray Bowen, *Family Therapy in Clinical Practice* (New York: Jason Aronson, 1978), 110.

[96] Retzinger, "Shame-Rage in Marital Quarrels," 297-312.

[97] Self-concept and self-image are synonymous terms. Their difference reflects that self-concept emphasizes a person's psychological cognitive conception of oneself, whereas self-image reflects the image of the self developed by the internal observer. Jennifer D. Campbell and Loraine F. Lavallee, "Who Am I? The Role of Self-Concept Confusion in Understanding the Behavior of People with Low Self-Esteem," in *Self-Esteem: The Puzzle of Low Self-Regard*, ed. Roy F. Baumeister (New York: Plenum Press, 1993), 3-20.

A realistic self-image relies upon an accurate ongoing appraisal process.[98] A clearly defined well developed self-concept facilitates processing of personal information, it furnishes individuals with a basis for immediate action, it helps define goals to aspire to, and it provides predictability of social behaviour in that other people relate to us on the basis of the identity we project.[99] The key criteria for an adequate self-concept are whether it is accurate or distorted, realistic or unrealistic, stable or unstable, congruent or incongruent.

3.3.3 Chronic Shame and Self-Esteem

Chronic shame most directly affects identity through its impact on self-esteem. An accurate self-image can be positively or negatively evaluated, just as a distorted self-image can be positively or negatively evaluated, accepted or rejected.[100] Self-esteem is the result of an ongoing self-evaluation process that has affective and cognitive components.[101] The quality of a person's self-esteem is differentiated along two dimensions, whether it is stable or unstable, and whether it is characterized by a positive (resulting in high self-esteem) or a negative global self-evaluation (resulting in low self-esteem). Self-esteem tends to be a global evaluation of the whole person, with reference to self-worth, rather than focused on specific aspects of capabilities.[102] Self-esteem has an affective component that is either predominantly positive or negative. The affective element of self-esteem, how one feels about oneself, is supported by a cognitive component of specific characteristics that support the globalized

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[98] R. B. Felson, "Reflected Appraisal and the Development of the Self," *Social Psychology Quarterly* 47 (1985): 3-14.

[99] Jonathan D. Brown and Tracie A. Mankowski, "Self-Esteem, Mood, and Self-Evaluation: Changes in Mood and the Way You See You," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 64, no. 3 (1993): 421-30.

[100] Ray Anderson prefers to speak of positive or negative self-esteem, rather than high or low self-esteem. "A positive self-perception indicates a high degree of congruence between one's self-perception and the "ideal" self. A negative self-perception suggests that the self fails to measure up to its own standard regardless of how that standard is set." He is correct in that the contrast of positive and negative is a more accurate description, but the contrast 'high' and 'low' has become so widely accepted that we shall nevertheless use those terms. Ray S. Anderson, *On Being Human: Essays in Theological Anthropology* (Pasadena, Ca.: Fuller Seminary Press, 1982), 98.

[101] Task Force to Promote Self-Esteem and Social Responsibility California, "The Final Report of the California Task Force to Promote Self-Esteem and Social Responsibility," ed. California State Department of Education, Self-esteem and social responsibility (Sacramento, CA: Bureau of Publications, California State Department of Education, 1990), 3.

[102] Herbert M. Marsh, "Global Self-Esteem: Its Relation to to Specific Facets of Self-Concept and Their Importance," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 51, no. 6 (1986): 1224-36, Jennifer Crocker and Connie T. Wolfe, "Contingencies of Self-Worth," *Psychological Review* 108, no. 3 (2001): 593-623.

self-esteem perspective. The cognitive component of self-esteem is the product of a person's

self-evaluation of specific characteristics with respect to competency or adequacy, physical

attractiveness, and acceptability.[103]

As the figure below indicates, these four categories of self-esteem relate to

corresponding social emotional states of shame and pride. High stable self-esteem

corresponds to authentic pride. High unstable egoistic self-esteem corresponds to hubristic

pride. Unstable low self-esteem corresponds to sensitivity to shame, or shame-proneness,

while stable low self-esteem corresponds to the chronic shame emotional state that

characterizes a shame-bound identity.

Figure 2. States of Self-esteem and Corresponding Social Emotions

A shame-free identity manifests as stable high self-esteem. It is generally observed that

people with a stable high self-esteem have a clearer self-concept, are more internally

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[103] Todd F. Heatherton and Janet Polivy, "Development and Validation of a Scale for Measuring State Self-Esteem," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 60, no. 6 (1991): 895-910. Roy F. Baumeister, "Understanding the Inner Nature of Low Self-Esteem: Uncertain, Fragile, Protective and Conflicted," in *Self-Esteem: The Puzzle of Low Self-Regard*, ed. Roy F. Baumeister (New York: Plenum Press, 1993), 201-18.

consistent, and have a more stable sense of self across social situations.[104] A stable positive

self-esteem is related to emotional stability, resilience, and a stable sense of self.[105] It

functions as a buffer that protects the person from stressors including experiences and

information that may be detrimental to the self, distress, depression,[106] and the impact of

social rejection in intimate relationships.[107]

The other three categories of self-esteem reflect varying degrees of the impact of

chronic shame upon identity. An unstable high self-esteem is characterized by a high degree

of defensiveness, where self-esteem is easily threatened by negative feedback. A person will

protect it by a number of devices such as self-serving bias that makes external attributions for

failures, and internal attributions for success,[108] self-deception, denial, egocentricity,

compensatory self-enhancement, and as a last resort defensive aggression.[109] Stable low self-

esteem is characterized by a globalized negative self-evaluation that characterizes chronic

shame. Unstable low self-esteem is much more reactive to negative feedback, so it is

characterized by sensitivity to rejection, failure, and negative evaluation by others, which is

characterized by shame-proneness.

On the one hand, high self-esteem leads to self-acceptance and a sense of adequacy.

High self-esteem is characterized by greater emotional stability, self-management that enables

people to pursue goals, keep commitments, maintain a positive outlook, though people with

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[104] Research suggests that people with high self-esteem also tend to have a clear self-concept, whereas people with low self-esteem generally have poorly defined self-concepts. Campbell and Lavallee, "Who Am I?," 3-20. Jennifer D. Campbell, "Self-Esteem and the Clarity of the Self-Concept," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 59 (1990): 538-49.

[105] Campbell, "Self-Esteem," 538-49, Jennifer D. Campbell, Barry Chew, and Linda S. Scratchlet, "Cognitive and Emotional Reactions to Events: The Effects of Self-Esteem and Self-Complexity," *Journal of Personality* 59 (1991): 473-505.

[106] Peter J. Burke, "Identity Processes and Social Stress," *American Sociological Review* 56 (1991): 836-49, Leonard I. Pearlin et al., "The Stress Process," *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* 22 (1981): 337-56.

[107] Jennifer K. Bosson and Kelly A. Brennan, "Attachment-Style Differences in Attitudes toward and Rejections to Feedback from Romantic Partners: An Exploration of the Relational Bases of Self-Esteem," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 24, no. 7 (1998): 699-714, Jennifer Katz, Steven R. Beach, and Thomas E. Joiner Jr., "When Does Partner Devaluation Predict Emotional Distress? Prospective Moderating Effects of Reassurance-Seeking and Self-Esteem," *Personal Relationships* 5, no. 4 (1998): 409-21.

[108] Jennifer D. Campbell and Constantine Sedikides, "Self-Threat Magnifies the Self-Serving Bias: A Meta-Analytic Integration," *Review of General Psychology* 3, no. 1 (1999): 23-43.

[109] Crocker and Wolfe, "Contingencies of Self-Worth," 593-623.

high self-esteem are vulnerable to overconfidence and egotistical over-estimation of their own

capabilities and what can be achieved.[110] On the other hand, a feature of low self-esteem is

habitual negative ruminations that express self-deprecation and self-criticism, which are

enactments of chronic shame.[111] Chronic shame involves an on-going negative self-evaluation

resulting in low self-esteem.

Self-esteem is a moderating factor between shame and aggression. The tendency

towards hostility and aggression interacts with self-esteem in a complex way, not only

whether self-esteem is high or low, but also whether it is stable or not.[112] This is why, despite

a popular belief to the contrary, there is a lack of evidence that low self-esteem is a cause of

violence and aggression.[113] People with stable high self-esteem who are secure in positive

self-feelings, not easily threatened, emotionally self-regulated and unflappable are least prone

to reactive aggression. People with unstable high self-esteem tend to have fragile self-

feelings, be easily threatened, display strong negative reactions to negative feedback, and

have a strong need for self-enhancement. People with unstable high self-esteem showed the

most tendencies to aggressive violence. Finally, people with low self-esteem have a moderate

tendency to experience anger/hostility.[114]

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[110] Baumeister, "Inner Nature of Low Self-Esteem," 201-18.

[111] Janna Morrow and Susan Nolen-Hoeksema, "Effects of Responses to Depression on the Remediation of Depressive Affect," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 58, no. 3 (1990): 519-27, Susan Nolen-Hoeksema, "Responses to Depression and Their Effects on the Duration of Depressive Episodes," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology* 100, no. 6 (1991): 569-82, ———, "The Role of Rumination in Depressive Disorders and Mixed Anxiety/Depressive Symptoms," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology* 109, no. 5 (2000): 504-11, P. D. Trapnell and J. D. Campbell, "Private Self-Consciousness and the Five Factor Model of Personality: Distinguishing Rumination from Reflection," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 76, no. 2 (1999): 284-304, Jelena Spasojević and Lauren B. Alloy, "Rumination as a Common Mechanism Relating Depressive Risk Factors to Depression," *Emotion* 1, no. 1 (2001): 25-37, Nilly Mor and Jennifer Winquist, "Self-Focused Attention and Negative Affect: A Meta-Analysis," *Psychological Bulletin* 128, no. 4 (2002): 638-62, Susan Nolen-Hoeksema and Jannay Morrow, "A Prospective Study of Depression and Posttraumatic Stress Symptoms after a Natural Disaster: The 1989 Lorna Prieta Earthquake," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 61, no. 1 (1991): 115-21.

[112] Michael H. Kernis, Bruce D. Grannermann, and Lynda C. Barclay, "Stability and Level of Self-Esteem as Predictors of Anger Arousal and Hostility," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 56, no. 6 (1989): 1013-22.

[113] Sander Thomaes et al., "Trumping Shame by Blasts of Noise: Narcissism, Self-Esteem, Shame, and Aggression in Young Adolescents," *Child Development* 79, no. 6 (2008): 1792-801.

[114] Kernis, Grannermann, and Barclay, "Stability and Level of Self-Esteem," 1013-22, Michael H. Kernis, "The Roles of Stability and Level of Self-Esteem in Psychological Functioning," in *Self-Esteem: The Puzzle of Low Self-Regard*, ed. Roy F. Baumeister (New York: Plenum Press, 1993), 167-82, Michael H. Kernis et al.,

The relationship of unstable high self-esteem to aggression indicates that threatened egotism is the factor that triggers defensive aggression. A person with an unstable self-esteem is easily threatened, regardless of whether self-esteem is high or low. A person with an unstable self-esteem who also tends to externalize blame is more likely to respond to perceived threats to social rank and image through aggressive means.[115]

3.3.4 Attachment and Chronic Shame

The experience of shame is integral to the process of the emergence of a distinct sense of self and the development of emotional self-regulation. As Schore pointed out, the process of socialization and self-differentiation inevitably involves disruptions of the social bond with others that evoke shame. This early evoking of shame functions as an inhibiting mechanism to stop behaviour that is socially disapproved of, and it regulates impulsive emotional behaviour that is essential to social functioning.[116] What is essential to prevent these inevitable developmental experiences of shame from developing into chronic shame is repeated repairs of the social bond between child and caregiver and restoration of emotional equilibrium.[117]

Attachment Theory has drawn attention to the importance of the quality of early attachments between infants and their carers for socio-emotional development and identity

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"There's More to Self-Esteem Than Whether It Is High or Low: The Importance of Stability of Self-Esteem," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 65, no. 6 (1993): 1190-204.

[115] Joseph M. Boden, David M. Fergusson, and John L. Horwood, "Self-Esteem and Violence: Testing Links between Adolescent Self-Esteem and Later Hostility and Violent Behavior," *Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology* 42, no. 11 (2007): 881-91. Other research studies have made similar findings including: Baumeister, "Inner Nature of Low Self-Esteem," 201-18, Roy F. Baumeister, Laura Smart, and Joseph M. Boden, "Relation of Threatened Egotism to Violence and Aggression: The Dark Side of High Self-Esteem," *Psychological Review* 103, no. 1 (1996): 5-33, Brad F. Bushman and Roy F. Baumeister, "Threatened Egotism, Narcissism, Self-Esteem, Direct and Displaced Aggression: Does Low Self-Esteem or Self-Hate Lead to Violence?," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 75, no. 1 (1998): 219-29, Brad J. Bushman et al., "Looking Again and Harder, for a Link between Low Self-Esteem and Aggression," *Journal of Personality* 77, no. 2 (2009): 427-46, Thomaes et al., "Trumping Shame by Blasts of Noise," 1792-801. Collete L. Hoglund and Karen B. Nicholas, "Shame, Guilt, and Anger in College Students Exposed to Abusive Family Environments," *Journal of Family Violence* 10, no. 2 (1995): 141-57, Felicity W. K. Harper et al., "The Role of Shame, Anger, and Affect Regulation in Men's Perpetration of Psychological Abuse in Dating Relationships," *Journal of Interpersonal Violence* 20, no. 12 (2005): 1648-62, Stuewig et al., "Shaming, Blaming, and Naming," 91-102.

[116] Allan Schore, *Affect Regulation and the Origin of the Self: The Neurobiology of Emotional Development* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1999), 209-10. Allan N. Schore, "Early Superego Development: The Emergence of Shame and Narcissistic Affect Regulation in the Practicing Period," *Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought* 14 (1991): 193-214

[117] Ibid., 243.

formation. According to Attachment Theory, attachment is a biologically based innate

behavioural system common to primates that functions to protect a person from

environmental threats by activating a response to seek proximity and protection of an

attachment figure.[118] Attachment refers to a child's emotional connection to her or his primary

care-giver. According to Newton, "The primary attachment figure for an infant is the person

that the baby preferentially seeks out when stressed, tired, sick, afraid, or in need of

soothing."[119] This is typically the infant's mother. Attachment behaviour is activated by

physical needs, environmental threats, and the presence of people who are attachment

objects.[120] Bowlby identified three distinct attachment styles, secure, insecure-ambivalent, and

insecure-avoidant attachment.[121] Subsequent research by Main and Solomon identified a

fourth attachment pattern, which they described as insecure-disorganized.[122]

      Humans are born with an innate normal attachment behavioural system (ABS). When

the primary carer who becomes the initial attachment figure in an infant's world is reliably

responsive, then the infant develops a secure attachment pattern. When the initial attachment

figure is non-responsive, then the attachment behavioural system becomes disrupted. The

infant then develops secondary attachment strategies that characteristically involve

hyperactivation or deactivation of the ABS. These two secondary strategies evolve into the

insecure-ambivalent and insecure-avoidant attachment patterns.[123] Insecure-ambivalent

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[118] Bowlby assumed that attachment has an evolutionary basis among primates, where "the function of attachment behaviour is protection from predators" John Bowlby, *Attachment and Loss Vol. 1: Attachment* (London: Random House, 1969/1997), 224.

[119] Ruth P. Newton, *The Attachment Connection* (Oakland, CA: New Harbinger, 2008), 13-14.

[120] Bowlby, *Attachment and Loss Vol 1*, 258-59.

[121] Ibid., 337-39.

[122] Mario Mikulincer and Phillip R. Shaver, *Attachment in Adulthood: Structure, Dynamics and Change* (New York: Guilford, 2010), 19-22. A nation-wide demographic sample in the United States found that 59% of adults surveyed had secure, 25% had dismissive, and 11% had anxious attachment styles. Kristin D. Mickelson, Ronald C. Kesler, and Phillip R. Shaver, "Adult Attachment in a Nationally Representative Sample," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 73, no. 5 (1997): 1097. Another metanalytic U.S. study of non-clinical middle class families found that 62% infants were secure, 15% insecure-avoidant, 9% insecure-ambivalent, and 15% insecure-disorganized. M. H. van Ijzendoorn, C. Schuengel, and M. J. Bakermans-Kranenburg, "Disorganized Attachment in Early Childhood: Meta-Analysis of Precursors, Concomitants, and Sequelae," *Development and Psychopathology* 11 (1999): 225-49.

[123] Bowlby called these alternative insecure attachment patterns anxious resistant and anxious avoidant patterns. Bowlby, *Attachment and Loss Vol 1*, 260-338.

attachment is characterized by hyperactivation of the ABS. Insecure-avoidant attachment is

characterized by hypoactivation of the ABS.[124] It is characterized by detachment, and

disorganization or disorientation that is characterized by a breakdown of organized attachment

strategies.[125] Disorganized attachment typically emerges in response to the complex trauma

associated with ongoing child abuse and maltreatment. It is characterized by emotionally

labile alternative hyperactivation or hypoactivation of the ABS.[126]

     The quality of attachment sets up distinctive developmental trajectories throughout

childhood and into adult life. People develop different attachment styles on the basis of these

early infant experiences, which form relational patterns that shape their subsequent intimate

relationships into adult life, personality, and self-esteem.[127] These adult attachment patterns

have been identified as secure, preoccupied (which corresponds to insecure-ambivalent),

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[124] This is reflected by research findings that insecure-ambivalent people experience high emotional engagement and intensity, whereas insecure-avoidant people displayed least emotional engagement, intensity and self-awareness in social interactions. Secure attached people had greater self-awareness, and experienced less emotionality and distress. Paula R. Pietromonaco and Lisa Feldman Barrett, "Working Models of Attachment and Daily Social Interactions," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 73, no. 6 (1997): 1409-423.

[125] Mikulincer and Shaver, *Attachment in Adulthood*, 26. Insecure-ambivalent attachment was related to greater escalation of conflict and emotional distress. Lorne Campbell et al., "Perceptions of Conflict and Support in Romantic Relationships: The Role of Attachment Anxiety," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 88, no. 3 (2005): 527-29.

[126] Bowlby, *Attachment and Loss Vol 1*, 337-38. Newton, *The Attachment Connection*, 15-17. A fourth attachment style called disorganized attachment that combines the features of insecure avoidant and insecure ambivalent attachment has been subsequently identified. This is generally associated with chronic child maltreatment and abuse. ———, *The Attachment Connection*, 22-24. M. J. Bakermans-Kranenburg, "Disorganized Attachment in Early Childhood: Meta-Analysis of Precursors, Concomitants, and Sequelae," *Development and Psychopathology* 11 (1999): 225-49. Carlson found that 82% of maltreated children studied showed disorganized attachment. Elizabeth A. Carlson, "A Prospective Longitudinal Study of Attachment Disorganization/Disorientation," *Child Development* 69, no. 4 (1998): 1120-28.

[127] Mario Mikulincer et al., "The Pushes and Pulls of Close Relationships: Attachment Insecurities and Relational Ambivalence," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 98, no. 3 (2010): 450-68, Mario Mikulincer and Phillip. R. Shaver, "Adult Attachment and Affect Regulation," in *Handbook of Attachment: Theory, Research and Clinical Applications*, ed. J. Cassidy and P. R. Shaver (New York: Guilford Press, 2008), 503-13, Lisa J. Berlin, Jude Cassidy, and Karen Appleyard, "The Influence of Early Attachments on Other Relationships," in *Handbook of Attachment: Theory, Research, and Clinical Applications*, ed. Jude Cassidy and Phillip R. Shaver (New York: Guilford Press, 2008), 333-47, Mario Mikulincer and Phillip R. Shaver, *Attachment in Adulthood: Structure, Dynamics, and Change* (New York: Guilford Press, 2010), 116-40. Dale Griffin and Kim Bartholomew, "Models of the Self and Other: Fundamental Dimensions Underlying Measures of Adult Attachment," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 67, no. 3 (1994): 436-43. While attachment styles are generally found to be quite stable, there is evidence that they can be open to change through subsequent corrective experiences, and where the person experiences greater uncertainty with respect to his or her working models regarding the self and others. Joanne Davila, Dorli Burge, and Constance Hammen, "Why Does Attachment Style Change?" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 73, no. 4 (1997): 826-38.

dismissive-avoidant (which corresponds to insecure-avoidant), and fearful-avoidant, which is characterized by high approach-avoidance anxiety.[128]

A secure attachment style enhances emotional self-regulation and resilience, and prosocial behaviour.[129] It fosters a positive world-view, fosters development of a positive identity characterized by a sense of self-worth, high self-esteem, security and lovability.[130] It fosters the development of flexible cognitive open-mindedness, openness to experience, and self-confidence to learn and explore.[131] Secure attachment is associated with developing adaptive problem solving focused coping strategies. A person with a secure attachment style has a capacity to enter into adult intimate relationships characterized by love, trust, security and an interdependence that reflects a balance of connectedness and independent

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[128] Kim Bartholomew and Leonard M. Horowitz, "Attachment Styles among Young Adults: A Test of a Four Category Model," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 61 (1991): 226-44, Mikulincer and Shaver, *Attachment in Adulthood*, 38-39.

[129] People with a secure attachment style displayed less anger than those with insecure attachment styles. Mario Mikulincer, "Adult Attachment Style and Individual Differences In Functional Versus Dysfunctional Experiences of Anger," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 74, no. 2 (1998): 513-24. Secure attachment was associated with greater emotion regulation and a stable positive self-reflective self-view. ————, "Adult Attachment Style and Affect Regulation: Strategic Variations in Self-Appraisals," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 75, no. 2 (1998): 420-35, Mikulincer and Shaver, "Adult Attachment and Affect Regulation," 503-31. Attachment not only influenced emotion regulation, but also the accuracy of representations people made of themselves and others, where insecure attachment was associated with more inaccurate representations that reflected and supported their emotional distress arousal. Mario Mikulincer, Israel Orbach, and Daria Iavnieli, "Adult Attachment Style and Affect Regulation: Strategic Variations in Subjective Self-Other Similarity," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 1998, no. 75 (1998): 436-48. Mario Mikulincer and Netta Horesh, "Adult Attachment Style and the Perception of Others: The Role of Projective Mechanisms," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 76, no. 6 (1999): 1022-34. Secure attachment was associated with greater empathy, compassion, care-giving, and emotional support for others. Mario Mikulincer et al., "Attachment Theory and Reactions to Others' Needs: Evidence That Activation of the Sense of Attachment Security Promotes Empathic Responses," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 81, no. 6 (2001): 1205-224. ————, "Attachment, Caregiving, and Altruism: Boosting Attachment Security Increases Compassion and Helping," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 89, no. 5 (2005): 835-38.

[130] Mario Mikulincer, "Attachment Style and the Mental Representation of the Self," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 69, no. 6 (1995): 1203-15. Allan N. Schore, *Affect Regulation and the Origin of Self: The Neurobiology of Emotional Development* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1995), 65-167. Susan D. Calkins and Ashley Hill, "Caregiver Influences on Emerging Emotion Regulation," in *Handbook of Emotion Regulation*, ed. James J. Gross (New York: Guilford, 2007), 243. Grazyna Kochanska, Katherine C. Coy, and Kathleen T. Murray, "The Development of Self-Regulation in the First Four Years of Life," *Child Development* 72, no. 4 (2001): 474-90.

[131] Mario Mikulincer, "Adult Attachment Style and Information Processing: Individual Differences in Curiosity and Cognitive Closure," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 72, no. 5 (1997): 1226-228. Andrew J. Elliot and Harry T. Reis, "Attachment and Exploration in Adulthood," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 85, no. 2 (2003): 317-31.

autonomy.[132] Secure attachment fosters a sense of self-worth, a stable positive self-esteem,

and a well-integrated self-structure.[133]

The insecure-ambivalent attachment style reflects the habitual deployment of

hyperactivating strategies that tend to amplify emotional distress, which increases emotional

dysregulation. It is characterized by a pattern of alternating angry rejection and anxious

attention seeking, and is associated with inconsistent warm accepting or punitive rejecting

care-giving.[134] Anxious insecure attachment is associated with elevated underlying emotions

of fear and shame and a sensitivity to perceive anger in others,[135] and a tendency to do

projective blaming.[136] It leads to self-criticism, lack of self-worth, self-rejection, dismissal,

self-doubt, disempowered helplessness. An insecure-ambivalent attachment style is associated

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[132] Adult attachment style affects the quality, security, and stability of adult intimate relationships. Mikulincer et al., "Pushes and Pulls of Close Relationships," 450-68. Judith Feeney and Patricia Noller, "Attachment Style as a Predictor of Adult Romantic Relationships," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 58, no. 2 (1990): 281-91. R. Rogers Kobak and Cindy Hazan, "Attachment in Marriage: Effects of Security and Accuracy of Working Models," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 60, no. 6 (1991): 861-69. Don J. Sharpsteen and Lee A. Kirkpatrick, "Romantic Jealousy and Adult Romantic Attachment," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 72, no. 3 (1997): 627-38. W. Steven Rholes et al., "Adult Attachment and the Transition to Parenthood," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 81, no. 3 (2001): 425-33. One study found that attachment style affected relationship satisfaction. An insecure attachment style was related to more conflict and less satisfaction, but not stability. Lee A. Kirkpatrick and Keith E. Davis, "Attachment Style, Gender, and Relationship Stability: A Longitudinal Analysis," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 66, no. 3 (1994): 506-10. Jeffry A. Simpson, W. Steven Rholes, and Dede Phillips, "Conflict in Close Relationships: An Attachment Perspective," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 71, no. 5 (1996): 910-13. Insecurely attached partners experience greater physiological stress in response to relational conflicts than securely attached partners. Sally I. Powers et al., "Dating Couples' Attachment Styles and Patterns of Cortisol Reactivity and Recovery in Response to a Relationship Conflict," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 90, no. 4 (2006): 613-28. Attachment style also affects sexual responsiveness. Insecure-ambivalent attachment was associated with greater ambivalence regarding sexual intercourse, both positive and negative. Insecure-avoidant attachment was associated with greater aversion to sex and avoidance of sex in a relationship. Secure attachment was associated with less anxiety and more sexual responsiveness. Gurit E. Birnbaum et al., "When Sex Is More Than Just Sex: Attachment Orientations, Sexual Experience, and Relationship Quality," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 91, no. 5 (2006): 929-43.

[133] John Bowlby, *Attachment and Loss: Vol. 2 Separation, Anger and Anxiety* (London: Random House, 1973/1998), 366-410. Mikulincer and Shaver reviewed over sixty studies that suggested that secure attachments was related to high self-esteem and self-worth, while insecure anxious and insecure avoidant attachment styles were related to low self-esteem and lack of self-worth. Mikulincer and Shaver, *Attachment in Adulthood*, 155-58.

[134] Karlen Lyons-Ruth and Deborah Jacobvitz, "Attachment Disorganization: Genetic Factors, Parents Context, and Developmental Transformation from Infancy to Adulthood," in *Handbook of Attachment: Theory, Research, and Clinical Applications*, ed. Jude Cassidy and Phillip R. Shaver (New York: Guilford Press, 2008).

[135] Carol Magai, Nancy Distel, and Renee Liker, "Emotion Socialisation, Attachment, and Patterns of Adult Emotional Traits," *Cognition and Emotion* 9, no. 5 (1995): 461-81.

[136] Donald G. Dutton, "Male Abusiveness in Intimate Relationships," *Clinical Psychology Review* 15, no. 6 (1995): 567-81.

with greater approach-avoidance anxiety and fearfulness,[137] procrastination, and less

persistence in pursuing goals in the face of difficulties and setbacks.[138] Mikulincer and Shaver

concluded that, "anxious, hyperactivating strategies intensify doubts about self-worth and

self-efficacy, and intensify a person's sense of vulnerability to rejection or abandonment."[139]

This is symptomatic of the development of chronic shame, or a shame-bound identity.

An insecure-avoidant attachment style reflects the habitual deployment of

deactivating strategies that involve inhibition of emotion.[140] People with an insecure-avoidant

attachment style typically block negative emotional reactions, do not acknowledge need for

others, and maintain interpersonal distance and self-reliance.[141] It is characterized by a

pattern of withdrawal and avoidance.[142] It is associated with inconsistent neglectful and

nonresponsive care-giving.[143] Insecure-avoidant attachment sets up a maladaptive

developmental trajectory characterized by impaired motivational competence, emotional self-

regulation, low self-worth, lower levels of motivation and persistence coupled with higher

levels of inattention.

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[137] Two studies found that insecure-ambivalent attachment style was associated with heightened approach-avoidance anxiety when making initial approaches in relationships compared to securely attached persons, while insecure-avoidant persons adopted distancing strategies. Jennifer A. Bartz and John E. Lydon, "Navigating the Interdependence Dilemma: Attachment Goals and Theuse of Communal Norms with Potential Close Others," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 91, no. 1 (2006): 92-95. Gentiana Sadikaj, D. S. Moskowitz, and David C. Zuroff, "Attachment-Related Affective Dynamics: Differential Reactivity to Others' Interpersonal Behavior," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 100, no. 5 (2011): 905-17. Another study by Kockanska found they were more fearful and had poorer emotion regulation. Grazyna Kochanska, "Emotional Development in Children with Different Attachment Histories: The First Three Years," *Child Development* 72, no. 2 (2001): 1091-111.

[138] Mikulincer and Shaver, *Attachment in Adulthood*, 229-32.

[139] Ibid., 153.

[140] ———, *Attachment in Adulthood*, 39.

[141] This is reflected in degree of self-disclosure, where insecure avoidant attachment results in less self-disclosure than secure or insecure-ambivalent attachment. Mario Mikulincer and Orna Nachshon, "Attachment Styles and Patterns of Self-Disclosure," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 61, no. 2 (1991): 321-31.

[142] Newton, *The Attachment Connection*, 15-16. Biological research indicates that insecure-avoidant children are distressed when separated from their mothers, even though they did not approach them. This was reflected in higher heart rates and levels of stress hormones. G. Spangler and K. E. Grossman, "Biobehavioral Organization in Securely and Insecurely Attached Infants," *Child Development* 64, no. 5 (1993): 1439-50, Marina Zelenko et al., "Heart Rate Correlates of Attachment Status in Young Mothers and Their Infants," *Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry* 44, no. 5 (2005): 470-76.

[143] Judith A. Crowell, R. Chris Frawley, and Phillip R. Shaver, "Measurement of Individual Differences in Adolescent and Adult Attachment," in *Handbook of Attachment: Theory, Research, and Clinical Applications*, ed. Jude Cassidy and Phillip R. Shaver (New York: Guilford Press, 2008), 599-636.

Disorganized attachment is the third form of insecure attachment, which is characterized by a chaotic alternation between hyperactivating and deactivating strategies. It is associated with child maltreatment characterized by neglect and physical abuse.[144] Disorganized attachment is reflected in extreme approach-avoidance anxiety, fearful avoidance, and/or aggressive externalization problems.[145] Disorganized attachment patterns are characterized by a chaotic utilization of a mixture of hyperactivation and deactivation attachment strategies.[146]

Secure attachment is related to significantly lower levels of shame-proneness. In contrast, insecure attachment has been found to be linked with internalized shame.[147] Adults with fearful or preoccupied attachment styles have high levels of shame-proneness marked by low self-worth, and insecurity regarding acceptability and lovability. Dismissive attachment appears to be unrelated to shame-proneness. This probably reflects the fact that people with this attachment style have unacknowledged rather than felt shame.[148] Attachment Theory suggests that a secure attachment is an important protective factor against the impact of acute shame and the development of chronic shame. In contrast, the three forms of insecure attachment are related to chronic shame.

3.4 Conclusion

We see that shame is best conceptualized as a family of four related concepts: anticipatory shame, public disgrace, acute shame, and chronic shame. Anticipatory shame occurs before shaming events, is emotionally experienced as anxiety, and performs a social function of inhibiting socially inappropriate behaviour. Public disgrace is a social sanction that involves negative social evaluation by others, humiliation, social rejection and exclusion. Public

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[144] Carlson, "A Prospective Longitudinal Study of Attachment Disorganization/Disorientation." Mikulincer and Shaver, *Attachment in Adulthood*, 135-40. Mickelson, Kesler, and Shaver, "Adult Attachment in a Nationally Representative Sample," 1102-104.

[145] Karlen Lyons-Ruth, "Attachment Relationships among Children with Aggressive Behavior Problems: The Role of Disorganized Attachment Patterns," *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology* 64, no. 1 (1996).

[146] Mikulincer and Shaver, *Attachment in Adulthood*, 39.

[147] Magai, Distel, and Liker, "Emotional Socialisation," 461-81, Lopez et al., "Attachment Styles," 187-99.

[148] C. A. Gross and N. E. Hansen, "Clarifying the Experience of Shame: The Role of Attachment Style, Gender, and Investment in Relatedness," *Personality and Individual Differences* 28, no. 5 (2000): 897-907.

disgrace and social rejection or negative social evaluation by others evokes a corresponding psychological response of acute shame, which is a very painful negative emotion. To the extent that acute shame impacts a person's self-concept and self-esteem, it can lead to chronic shame that can have profound impact upon identity.

Chronic shame is reflected in three psychological dynamics; low self-esteem, shame-proneness, and a shame-bound identity. Shame-proneness refers to a person's sensitivity to shame and vulnerability to experiencing acute shame more readily. Proneness to shame is related to person's developing self-concepts in terms of negative attributes.[149] Andrews suggested that there are three types of shame-prone individuals: (1) individuals who are especially sensitive to feeling shame in potentially shame-eliciting situations, who are shame-prone, (2) individuals who frequently feel globalized shame, (3) individual who are chronically ashamed of their behaviour or personal characteristics. Individuals vary in the degree to which they are prone to shame.[150] Shame-prone sensitivity lowers the threshold for experiencing acute shame. Consequently, shame-proneness forms a vicious circle leading to more experiences of acute shame, which in turn confirm and strengthen the shame-proneness. A shame-bound identity involves having a self-concept that is defined in shameful terms, such as being a failure, unworthy, worthless, useless, unlovable, contemptible, or stupid.

These four dimensions of shame have been an enduring human reality that is integrally connected to the social nature of human existence as persons-in-relationship. Hence the dynamics of shame are a factor in biblical narratives throughout Scripture. This thesis next undertakes an analysis of the dynamics of shame in the Eden Narrative as an implicit psychological factor that influences the interactions between the characters in this story and the actions that Adam and Eve took. The Eden Narrative features anticipatory

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[149] Richard Gramzow and June Price Tangney, "Proneness to Shame and the Narcissistic Personality," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 18, no. 3 (1992).

[150] Bernice Andrews, "Methodological and Definitional Issues in Shame Research," in *Shame: Interpersonal Behavior, Psychopathology, and Culture*, ed. Paul Gilbert and Bernice Andrews (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

shame, connects shame as modesty with nakedness, public disgrace, social exclusion, and

acute shame. The extent to which the couple may have developed chronic shame subsequent

to their expulsion from the garden remains an open unanswered question, though the

interpretation of the Fall as a Christian myth implies that this was inevitably the case.

Chapter 4. The Eden Narrative: Characters and Symbols

4.0 Introduction

The next three chapters analyse the dynamics of shame in the Eden Narrative. First, this chapter provides an overview of the structure of the Eden Narrative as the middle part of a larger text from Genesis 2:4 – 4:25. Then it discusses the key symbolic objects and the identities of the main characters in this story with reference to other Ancient Near Eastern and Old Testament texts. The following chapter will present a detailed analysis of Genesis 3:1-7 that relates the dialogue between Eve and the snake leading up to Adam and Eve's discovery of their nakedness. The sixth chapter will provide an analysis of God's confrontation and judgment in 3:8-19, followed by the aftermath related in 3:20-24.

4.1 Literary Context of the Eden Narrative

The Eden Narrative is widely regarded as part of a larger text from Genesis 2.4b – 4:25 that has been ascribed to an unknown author identified as the Yahwist.[1] There is a clear literary marker between the creation narrative of Genesis 1:1 – 2:4a in the formula: הַשָּׁמַיִם וְהָאָרֶץ אֵלֶּה תוֹלְדוֹת . The phrase אֵלֶּה תוֹלְדוֹת has been identified as a major structural marker throughout the book of Genesis.[2] So Genesis 2:4b – 4:26 can be regarded as a literary unit delimited by תוֹלְדֹת, in Genesis 2:4a and 5:1. Genesis 2:4b starts with a characteristic literary formula for beginning a new story; בְּיוֹם followed by an infinitive, in this case עֲשׂוֹת. So, the Eden Narrative forms the middle part of a story that begins here at Genesis 2:4b. Consequently, Genesis 2.4b – 4:26 provides the immediate literary context for interpreting Genesis 3.

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[1] Gunkel, *Genesis*, 1-4, Cassuto, *Commentary on Genesis I,* 92-93, Speiser, *Genesis*, xxvi-xxix, Wenham, *Genesis 1 – 15*, 49, Westermann, *Genesis 1 – 11*, 190-195, von Rad, *Genesis*, 23-28, Arthur George and Elena George, *The Mythology of Eden* (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Books, 2014), 5-7; John Van Seters, *The Yahwist: A Historian of Israelite Origins* (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbauns, 2013), 18-23; Howard N. Wallace, *The Eden Narrative* (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1985), 29-55.

[2] Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, xxi-xxii. David W. Cotter, *Genesis* (Collegeville, MI: The Liturgical Press, 2003), 25-26, von Rad, *Genesis*, 70. Allen Ross argued that תוֹלְדוֹת has the sense of "this is what became of…". Genesis 2:4b-4:26 is the story of what became of the heavens and earth that were created with respect to the impact and development of sin within expanding human civilization. Allen P. Ross, *Creation and Blessing* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1988), 70-78. While recognizing תוֹלְדוֹת literally means 'generations', Speiser suggested that its usage as a marker in Genesis conveys a meaning of 'story'. Speiser, *Genesis*, 8.

4.1.1 Literary Structure

Genesis 2:4b – 4:16 presents a story in three episodes. There is the creation episode in

Genesis 2:4b-24 in which the first couple is created and placed in the garden of Eden. It is

followed by the Eden Narrative 2:25-3:24, which is followed in turn by the story of Cain and

Abel in Genesis 4:1-16 in the aftermath of Adam and Eve's expulsion from Eden. The last

section in 4:17-26 summarizes the descendants of Cain. It functions as a linking appendix

leading up to the next section of Genesis which is marked by the second תּוֹלְדֹת marker, "this is

the book of the generations of Adam".[3]

 Mettinger suggested that narrative of Genesis 2 – 4 can be structured as an

introduction followed by nine successive scenes.[4]

  Gen 2: 4b-6 Introduction
  Gen 2: 7-17 The creation of the man and the garden
  Gen 2: 18-24 The provision of a companion for the man
  Gen 2:25-3:7 The dialogue with the snake
  Gen 3:8-13 The interview with God
  Gen 3:14-19 The judgment of God
  Gen 3:20-24 The expulsion from Eden
  Gen. 4:1-8 The rivalry between Cain and Abel
  Gen 4:9-16 God's judgment and expulsion of Cain
  Gen 4: 17-26 The descendants of Cain

This structure places the Eden Narrative in a literary context of the preceding creation

narrative in Genesis 2 followed by the tragedy of fratricide in Genesis 4. While there are

important thematic links among these three chapters, this study will restrict itself to Chapter 3.

 Previous studies of the literary structure of the Eden Narrative have focused on

Genesis 2 – 3, while ignoring Genesis 4. Rosenberg identified a compound palistrophic

structure in Genesis 2 – 3 that centered around the transgression as the pivotal point of the

narrative.[5] Wenham and Walsh identified a seven scene palistrophic structure that had God's

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[3] Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, 49-51, Bruce K. Waltke, *An Old Testament Theology* (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2007), 252-53, Bruce Waltke, *Genesis: A Commentary* (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2001), 17-18.

[4] Mettinger, *The Eden Narrative*, 16-17.

[5] Joel W. Rosenberg, *King and Kin: Political Allegory in the Hebrew Bible* (Bloomington & Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986), 52-63. Rosenberg suggested a seven scene palistrophic structure: a^1 (2:4-22): narrative, b^1 (2:23): naming, c^1 (2:24): aetiology, d (2:25-3:19a): pivotal narrative, c^2 (3:19b): aetiology, b^2 (3:20): naming, a^2 (3:21-24): narrative. Rosenberg's structure appears to be forced in one point where it regards 3:19b as a comparative aetiology to 2:24. Rosenberg identified a more elaborate 17 scene motif

interrogation and judgment as the pivotal scene.[6] A structural feature that supports Walsh's

conclusion is that the interrogation scene stands out as the one where all four characters in the

story interact as individuals. It is preceded by the snake's interaction with the human couple

(woman prominent) in 3:1-6, and subsequently balanced by God's interaction with the human

couple (man prominent) in 3:22-24.

An extended structural analysis that includes Genesis 4 reveals a complex multistrand

balanced thematic structure. There are striking similarities and symbolic connections between

Genesis 3 and 4 that indicate a strong connection between these two stories.[7] This suggests

that the story of Cain and Abel should be interpreted in relation to the Eden narrative.[8]

The following analysis extends the structural analysis to include Genesis 4. It reveals that the

same motifs and themes weave together the three chapters of this story from Genesis 2 – 4.

The identifying letters for the different sections in the above structure have been selected with

a view to identifying those sections of text that are linked together thematically.

Opening structural break: (2:4) תּוֹלְדוֹת generations of heaven and earth

a[1]   (2:5-9) creation[1]: deficit: soil lacks water/tiller – stream[9] & 'אָדָם' made from 'אֲדָמָה';

   b[1]   (2:10-15) placement[1]: geographical – (a) water for plants flows into Eden;
                  (b) the man to cultivate ground placed in Eden
     c[1]   (2:16-17)   dialogue[1]: – God speaks to the man; sets prohibition

a[2]   (2:18-23) creation[2]: deficit: the man lacks companion – 'אִשָּׁה' made from 'אִישׁ'

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structure within this basic structure, within which the chiastic structure of 3:9-19 is nested. This structure was originally published in the article: ———, "The Garden Story Forward and Backward: The Non-Narrative Dimension of Gen. 2-3," *Prooftexts* 1, no. 1 (1981): 1-27.

[6]   The seven scene structure is: Scene 1 – 2:4b-17, Scene 2 – 2:18-25, Scene 3 – 3:1-5, Scene 4 – 3:6-8 (pivotal scene), Scene 5 – 3:9-13, Scene 6 – 3:14-19, and Scene 7 – 3:22-24. On the basis of the prominent characters, scenes 1 and 7 are linked, scenes 2 and 6 are linked, and scenes 3 and 5 are linked to form a palistrophic structure. Wenham, *Genesis 1 – 15*, 50-51, Jerome T. Walsh, "Genesis 2:4b-3:24: A Synchronic Approach," in *I Studied Inscriptions from before the Flood*, ed. Richard S. Hess and David Toshio Tsumura (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1993).

[7]   Commentators who have picked up on the parallels between these two narratives include: Claus Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11: A Commentary*, trans. John C. Scullion (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress Press, 1984), 285. Ross concluded that these parallels indicate that the story of Cain and Abel is an extension of the Eden narrative. Ross, *Creation and Blessing*, 154, Alan J. Hauser, "Genesis 2-3: The Theme of Intimacy and Alienation," in *Art and Meaning: Rhetoric in Biblical Literature*, ed. David J. A. Clines, David Gunn, and Alan J. Hauser, *JSOTSS* (Sheffield, UK: JSOT Press, 1982), 297-304.

[8]   Carmichael, "The Paradise Myth: Interpreting without Jewish and Christian Spectacles," 47-50.

[9]   Tsumura argued that אֵד is best translated as reference to subterranean water. David Toshio Tsumura, *The Earth and the Waters in Genesis 1 and 2*, Jsotss 83 (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1989), 93-116.

b^2 (2:24) placement^2: social - God commands the man to leave and cleave^{10}

   n^1 (2:25) naked/shame^1: the couple naked and unashamed

  c^2 (3:1-5)   dialogue^2: - snake speaks to the woman: challenges prohibition

     t^1 (3:6) transgression^1: couple against God – they eat fruit

   n^2 (3:7) naked/shame^2: the couple naked and ashamed

d^1 (3:8-20)   judgment^1: divine interrogation and judgment

   α^1 (3:8) the man (and woman) hides

     β^1 (3:9-12) God interrogates the man

        γ^1 (3:13)   God interrogates the woman

          δ^1 [3:13b] [God does not interrogate the snake]

          δ^2 (3:14-15) God curses snake – in relation to the woman

        γ^2 (3:16)   God (curses) woman – in relation to the man

     β^2 (3:17-19) God (curses) man – in relation to the ground

   α^2 (3:20) the man accepts divine judgment; names the woman

   n^3 (3:21) naked/shame^3: God covers nakedness with hide garments – act of grace

e^1 (3:22-24) relocation^1: God expels the man from Eden to till the soil in the east;
                          cherubim replace Adam

a^3 (4:1-2a) creation^3: deficit: the mother lacks children – Cain and Abel from Eve;
   b^3 (4:2b)   Cain to cultivate ground = Adam, Abel keep flocks = guard garden
     n^4 (4:5)   vulnerable/shame^4: Cain rejected by God – anger and envy at Abel

   c^3 (4:6-7) dialogue^3: - God warns Cain: observe prohibition (against murder)

     t^2 (4:8)   transgression^2: brother against brother - Cain murders Abel

  d^2 (4:9-15a) judgment^2: divine interrogation and judgment

        β^1 (4:9-10) God interrogates Cain

        β^2 (4:11-14) God curses Cain from the ground

   n^5 (4:15b) vulnerable/shame^5: God covers Cain with a sacred sign – act of grace

  e^2 (4:16) relocation^2: Cain goes from ground and presence of God into the east

g^1 (4:17-24) genealogy1: descendants of Cain – development of civilization;
                          increase of wickedness: movement away from God
a^4 (4:25-26) Eve gives birth to a son – replaces Abel; movement towards God

Closing structural break (5:1) תּוֹלְדֹת generations of Adam

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^{10} Genesis 2:24 has been widely recognized as an etymological gloss regarding the institution of marriage according to Angelo Tosato, "On Genesis 2:24," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 52 (1990). The conclusion that it is not integral to the narrative overlooks the important thematic connections this verse has with 2:23 and 3:16 with reference to the primacy of the woman's relation to the man from whom she was taken, is functionally tied to, and longs and shall return to socially through marriage. That these tensions correspond to those between the man and the soil support the conclusion that it is integral to the narrative.

First, there are four creation scenes (a[1]-a[4]). The common motifs are that there is a deficit that is met by a creative act of God. The first deficit (a[1] – 2:5-9) is that the soil that lacks water and a tiller for plants to grow and for it to become fertile. God met this deficit by creating from the ground a man to till the ground and a stream to water the ground. The man is tied to the soil. This connection of humans with the earth is both ontological and functional. Humanity's ontological connection with the earth is drawn attention to by the wordplay of "'ādām" and "'ădāmâ" in 2:5 (וְאָדָם אַיִן לַעֲבֹד אֶת־הָאֲדָמָה). This is best reflected in English with the words 'earthling' and 'earth'.

The second creation scene (a[2] – 2:18-23) addresses the deficit that the man lacks a corresponding helper, without whom he cannot be fertile and reproduce. God again is the primary actor, with the man playing a secondary naming role. The deficit is met through the creation of the woman who is taken from the man. The ontological and functional tie of the woman to the man is reflected in the wordplay "אִישׁ" and "אִשָּׁה". Just as the man's primary relation was to the ground, so the woman's primary relation was to the man.

The third creation scene occurs in two parts (a[3] – 4:1-2, a[4] – 4:25-26). This creation scene is anticipated by the man renaming the woman "חַוָּה", which conveys a specified symbolic meaning אֵם כָּל־חָי, "mother of all living" or "life giver" derived from the root הוי meaning "to be alive".[11] Eve as mother lacks children. This deficit is initially met in 4:1-2 with the birth of twins,[12] and the loss of Abel is met in 4:25 with the birth of Seth. The thematic tension of God being the primary creator and the woman secondary is reflected in the non-conventional phrase in 4:1 קָנִיתִי אִישׁ אֶת־יהוה "I have acquired a man with God".[13] The names of the man and woman reflect these primary relations.

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[11] S. C. Layton, "Remarks on the Canaanite Origin of Eve," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 59 (1997): 2-32. Richard J. Hess, *Studies in the Personal Names of Genesis 1-11* (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2009), 19-24.

[12] The characteristic Hebrew formula for the birth of children is the man "knew" (יָדַע) his woman and she gave birth (וַתֵּלֶד) to a son. Only in the case of twins is the verb יָדַע not repeated with reference to the second sibling. This is the case with the births of Cain and Abel. If they were not twins, this would have been the only instance in the Hebrew OT where יָדַע was not repeated to indicate the separate conception of a second sibling.

[13] While אֶת is most commonly the accusative marker, it can also convey the sense of "with" on occasions. This meaning can be derived from the usage of אֶת within the literary context, as is the case here.

Then there are corresponding motifs of placement and eviction. Both a tiller and water are brought by God to make his garden in Eden fertile. The man is taken from the original soil and placed in the garden to cultivate and guard it (b^1 – 2:10-15), and the four rivers testify to the abundance of water flowing in and out of it. This is a geographical placement with reference to man's primary relation to the soil. The second placement (b^2 – 2:24) is social in nature, where God places the woman in a one flesh relationship with the man. The third placement (b^3 – 4:2b) of Cain cultivating the soil and Abel keeping flocks is a social division of labour, which echoes Adam's task of cultivating the soil and guarding the garden.

Following their transgressions, there are corresponding modifications to their placements. The man is evicted from Eden (e^1 – 3:22-24) and sent back to till soil in the east. In a corresponding fashion Cain is evicted from the soil and departs and settles in the east (e^3 – 4:16). The role of Adam the transgressor is replaced by the cherubim; the role of Abel the victim is replaced by Seth, which involves a subtle balancing between the two relocations. There is no corresponding relocation for the woman because her placement was social rather than geographical. Instead her fundamental relation to the man is redefined in terms of desire and mastery in 3:16b.

A dialogue follows each of these three placements. The first dialogue (c^1 – 2:16-17) occurs between God and Adam, where God commanded the man to eat freely in the garden and prohibited him from eating from the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. The second dialogue is concerned with the same subject (c^2 – 3:1-5). In contrast to the first dialogue, it occurs between the snake and the woman. The intention of the snake is to challenge the prohibition laid out in dialogue 1. The third dialogue (c^3 4: 6-7) also concerns a prohibition, "thou shalt not murder." Here God is addressing Cain and in contrast to the snake, exhorting Cain to observe the prohibition. The outcome of the second and third dialogues is that God's words are disregarded and a transgression occurs.

When a dialogue climaxes in a transgression, an interrogation and judgement by God upon the transgressor(s) follows. The first interrogation and judgement (d^1 – 3:8-20) addresses three transgressors, and it forms a balanced chiastic pattern: God questions Adam, God questions Eve, [God not question the snake]; and in reverse order, God judges the snake, God judges Eve, God judges Adam. The second interrogation and judgement (d2 – 4:15a) follows a similar simpler pattern because only one transgressor, Cain, is addressed. No interrogation follows the first dialogue because no transgression occurred.

These three types of sections together form an: 'a^1' 'b^1' 'c^1' 'a^2' 'b^2' 'c^2' 'd^1' 'e^1' 'a^3' 'b^3' 'c^3' 'd^2' 'e^2' structure of interweaving themes and motifs in the narrative. The repeated transgression stories in Genesis 3 and 4 have the same introverted structure:

Structure		Genesis 2-3	Genesis 4
'a' creation		2:18-23	4:1-2a
'b' placement		2:24	4:2b
'c' dialogue: temptation		3:1-5	4:6-7
't' transgression		3:6	4:8
'd' dialogue: interrogation & judgment		3:8-19	4:9-14
'e' consequence: relocation		3:22-24	4:16

Interspersed between these blocks of text are five short one verse passages that have a common linking theme of shame, which are labelled 'n^1 – n^5'. The first three concern shame in relation to nakedness: n^1 – 2:25, n^2 – 3:7, and n^3 – 3:21. They reflect a movement from unashamed nakedness to ashamed nakedness, to the remedy of the shame of nakedness being covered by an act of God's grace. The last two concern shame in relation to vulnerability and exclusion. Cain reacted in shame to God's lack of favour and exclusion (n^4 – 4:5) and Cain's disgrace, social exclusion and vulnerability was met by a covering sign, a corresponding act of God's grace (n^5 – 4:15b).

The occurrence of a transgression determines whether there is a single 'n' statement or a pair. 'n^1' stands alone because there is no remedy needed where there is no transgression.

The following 'n² – n³' and 'n⁴ – n⁵' occur in pairs because transgressions that required remedies for shame/disgrace had occurred. These texts reflect the way in which references to shame and God's responses to events are interwoven into the structure of the narrative.

4.1.2 Unifying motifs and themes

There are a number of unifying motifs that provide a thematic thread through this text. The first motif is that of the human's functional relation to the ground as a tiller of the soil. For the ground to yield its vigour in growing plants it required watering rain from God and the tilling of the soil by humans. Adam was created to cultivate the soil in 2:5, placed in Eden to cultivate the garden in 2:15, and after his eviction was to continue to till the ground in 3:23. God cursed the relation Adam had to the ground he was to cultivate in 3:17-18. Just as the beginning of Adam's life was marked by being taken from the ground, so the end was marked by being returned to the ground. In Genesis 4:2, Cain inherited this mandate in becoming a tiller of the ground (עֹבֵד אֲדָמָה). God's judgment of Cain took his parent's eviction from Eden one step further by being uprooted (or cursed) from the ground to become a fugitive and vagabond. When Cain tills the ground, it would yield no fruit (literally not give to him of its virility).

Another important motif is the Tree of Life and the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, which are placed in the garden in Gen. 2:9. Eating the fruit of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil was prohibited, while the fruit of the Tree of Life was freely available along with the other trees in the garden (Gen. 2:15-17). These two trees have been closely linked to another prominent theme in this narrative, that of life and death. The man became a living soul in Gen. 2:7. He was presented with the choice between life and death in Gen. 2:17. The crisis in Eden focused around whether Adam and Eve could attain unending life, or would suffer the penalty of death. Even though their immediate death was averted, their eviction from Eden prevented access to the tree of life with its enjoyment of prolonged life (וְחַי לְעֹלָם). The theme of life versus death continues in Genesis 4 with the life of Cain

versus the death of Abel. Yet Genesis 4 closes on a hopeful note that points to the

prominence of life over death as the last word. The closing genealogy repeats descendants

being given life (fulfilling the prophetic nuance of Eve's name), but their death is not

mentioned, in contrast to the rhythm of life and death that occurs through the genealogy in

Genesis 5.

Adam and Eve's solution was to acquire knowledge through eating the fruit, whereas

Cain's solution was to remove the object of his envy. God confronted both Eve and Cain with

the same question, "What have you done?" There is an elliptical chiasmus where Cain

remained silent, while the couple openly admitted what they had done. In contrast, when God

made pronouncements regarding the consequences of their actions, the couple remained silent

while Cain protested against his punishment. God's subsequent act of mercy met both of them

in their vulnerability. With the couple, God addressed their vulnerability of nakedness by

clothing them. With Cain, God addressed his vulnerability to violence by covering him with

a sign of protection.

There are similar challenges using the same verbs. Eve shall *desire* (תְּשׁוּקָתֵךְ) her man

and he shall be *master* (יִמְשָׁל־בָּךְ) over her; sin *desires* (תְּשׁוּקָתוֹ) Cain and he must *master*

(תִּמְשָׁל־בּוֹ) it. Both suffer an expulsion from their homeland, the ground they were tilling.

Adam and Eve were expelled from Eden, and Cain was uprooted from the ground where

Abel's blood had been shed. These thematic similarities suggest that story of Cain and Abel in

Genesis 4 follows on from the story of Eden and is closely tied to it.[14]

4.2 Identity of the Main Characters

4.2.1 Identity of God

The Eden Narrative contains four principal characters. The first character is God. A

distinctive feature of this passage is that the narrator utilized the unique divine name YHWH

Elohim, which occurs 20 times throughout Genesis 2-3. The main exception is that the

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[14] von Rad, *Genesis*, 103. Aalders, *Genesis*, 117.

woman and the snake both referred to God only as Elohim in their dialogue.[15] This is an

intentional exception that probably drew attention to the fact that the snake only had a relation

to God as its creator.[16] The snake was excluded from the covenant based relationship that God

entered into with humans.[17]

The change in God's name from Elohim in the Genesis 1 creation account to YHWH

Elohim in Genesis 2.4b – 3.24 has been regarded as a significant identifier that specifically

identified Elohim the Creator with the covenant making God of Moses who rescued Israel

from Egypt in the Exodus.[18] Van Wolde argued that the Yahwist was making a sophisticated

theological statement through the choice of a double name; namely that God was uniting

within himself the tensions between singular distinctiveness and plural totality, creative

transcendence with redemptive immanence.[19] Brichto concluded that there was a theological

distinction between Elohim and YHWH, where Elohim referred to God as transcendent

creator, and YHWH in his personal and ethical relation to Israel.[20] LaCoque similarly argued

that the double name reflected the Israelite tension within God between justice (Elohim) and

mercy (YHWH).[21]

4.2.2 Adam as Individual or Representative Figure

Myths often feature representative characters. We encounter this feature in the Eden

Narrative. There is a blurring between the presentation of the man and woman as specific

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[15] These references by the woman and the snake occur in Genesis 3:1, 2, 5. Day's suggestion that the lack of reference to YHWH in the dialogue the snake had with the woman is because the woman did not know God by that name is unconvincing, especially in light of the woman's statement in 4:1 that she has acquired a man with YHWH. John Day, *From Creation to Babel: Studies in Genesis 1-11* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 38-9.

[16] Collins, *Genesis 1 – 4*, 170-71; Wenham, *Genesis*, 72-73.

[17] Barth argued that creation with all its creatures was the external basis of the covenant. It provides the sphere in which God's covenant with humans as God's covenant partner created in God's image could take place. Barth, *C.D. III/1*, 96-98.

[18] Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 198. Gunkel, *Genesis*, 2-4. Also C. John Collins, *Genesis 1 - 4: Linguistic, Literary, and Theological Commentary* (Phillipsbury, NJ: P & R, 2006), 137. Day, *From Creation to Babel*, 25. W. H. Griffith Thomas, *Genesis I - XXV: A Devotional Commentary* (London: The Religious Tract Society, 1913), 36, Barth, *C.D. III/1*. 232-33.

[19] Van Wolde, *Words Become Worlds*, 47; Ellen Van Wolde, *Stories of the Beginning*, trans. John Bowden (Ridgefield, CT: Morehouse, 1996), 40.

[20] Herbert Chanan Brichto, *The Names of God: Poetic Readings in Biblical Beginings* (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 6-19, 103-07.

[21] LaCoque, *Trial of Innocence*, 57-8.

individuals and as representative characters, which is reflected in the treatment of their names. The man's name 'אָדָם' means earthling.[22] The wordplay between 'אָדָם'and 'אֲדָמָה' (meaning arable land), points to the intimate linkage between the man and the land. The land needed water and a cultivator to become productive. So, God formed the man from soil to serve as its cultivator. This primary relationship between the man and the soil was a work relationship.[23] As Barth pointed out, this wordplay signifies that the man was derived from the earth, belongs to the earth, and that he was taken from earth by God's creative act, by which he was distinguished from the rest of the earth. Man was an earthling in the fullest sense of the term.[24] The 'אֲדָמָה'was both the origin of the dust that the man was made of and the object of the man's labour.[25]

The noun 'אָדָם' conveys a dual perspective of an individual and a representative generic human.[26] The word 'אָדָם' has three different usages in the Genesis pre-history. It sometimes refers to humankind generically,[27] sometimes to males, and sometimes to an individual called Adam. Genesis 2-3 consistently refers to the man as הָאָדָם.[28] The closest the story comes to a proper name are the two instances where God addresses לְאָדָם, literally "to a man" or alternatively "to Adam" (3: 17, 21).[29] It is not until 4:25 that the story refers to אָדָם

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[22] More strictly, he is "of the land" in that *'ădāmâ* means "arable land", whereas the Hebrew word for 'earth' is *'ereṣ.* The root *'dm* has three semantic meanings in the Ancient Semitic languages, 'red', 'earth', and 'human'. Hess, *Studies in the Personal Names of Genesis 1-11*, 14-18.

[23] S. R. Driver, *The Book of Genesis*, 5th ed. (London: Methuen, 1906), 37. Walter Bruggemann, *Genesis* (Atlanta, GA: John Knox Press, 1982), 46, James McKeown, *Genesis* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008), 30-2.

[24] Barth, *C. D. III/*1, 244. Van Wolde, *Words Become Worlds*, 13-5.

[25] Bechtel, "Rethinking Genesis," 95-8. Theodore Hiebert, *The Yahwist's Landscape: Nature and Religion in Early Israel* (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 34-5.

[26] Vawter, *On Genesis*, 74-75.; Mettinger, *The Eden Narrative*, 29-30.; Henri Blocher, *In the Beginning* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1984), 83.; McKeown, *Genesis*, 31, Van Wolde, *Words Become Worlds*, 15, Vawter, *On Genesis*, 74-5, Ross, *Creation and Blessing*, 122. McKeown, *Genesis*, 31.

[27] For example, in Genesis 6:1-6 daughters were born to אָדָם in the inclusive generic sense that included men and their women. Van Wolde argued that 'אֲדָמָה'was a generic term that was inclusive of both male and female. This implies that the man created from dust was sexually undifferentiated. God created a helper appropriate for him through dividing the man into two partners. This shift from undifferentiated human to gender differentiated male and female is reflected in the use of 'אִישׁ' and 'אִישָּׁה' instead of 'אָדָם' in 2:23. Van Wolde, *Stories from the Beginning*, 54-55.

[28] The only exception to הָאָדָם being the reference to "the man" is in the principle in Genesis 2:24 that a man shall leave his father and mother and cleave to his wife. Here the Hebrew term for male man is used, אִישׁ.

[29] Even this is not definitive, as the apparatus indicates there is a variant reading of וְלְאָדָם meaning "to the man" in both verses 17 and 21. Day concluded that because the story reverts back to referring to הָאָדָם that לְאָדָם is

without the definite article, unambiguously indicating that אָדָם means the proper name

'Adam'. Yet in the very next chapter the blurring of Adam with man generically reoccurs

with the statement "these are the generations of אָדָם," followed by language reminiscent of

Genesis 1:26 "in the day God created אָדָם in the likeness of God and male and female.[30] The

way that אָדָם is utilized in the narrative suggests a striking reticence to identifying Adam

prominently by his proper name.[31] The simultaneous presentation of Adam as an individual

character and representative figure introduces an element of ambiguity into the narrative that

suggests that Adam is a representative figure as well as an individual.

4.2.3 Identity of the Woman

God's creation of the woman from the body of the man (2:21-22) was a significant act of

identification. God observed that it was not good for the man to be alone (2:18). This could

have been with reference to procreation, companionship, or assistance in tending the garden.[32]

So God determined to make a helper suitable for the man. Then God created and brought each

animal to the man to name and determine whether it was a suitable companion for him (2:18-

20).[33] God finally created a woman from the man to provide him with a companion suitable

for him (2:21-22).[34] This has the implication that a good human existence is a social one of

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most likely a generic reference, which the variant reading sought to clarify in the text. Day, *From Creation to Babel*, 32-3.

[30] We should note that this link to Genesis 1 along with other evidence has led many commentators to regard Genesis 5 as being sourced by 'P" rather than J. Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, xxxvii.

[31] Schoonenberg also made this observation and concluded that this points to Adam being a representative figure rather than just an individual character. Piet Schoonenberg, *Man and Sin* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1965), 126.

[32] Wenham, *Genesis 1 – 15*, 68-69; Stratton, *Out of Eden*, 35-41.

[33] Thomas elaborated on the man's solitude as a not good thing to be addressed. Thomas, *Genesis I – XXV*, 41-44. Also, Cotter, *Genesis*, 31-3, Ross, *Creation and Blessing*, 126-27, Aalders, *Genesis*, 94-6. Stratton, *Out of Eden*, 38-40.

[34] Phyllis Trible, *God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality*, (London, SCM Press, 1978), 97-99, argued that humanity was initially created as an undifferentiated non-gendered being. When God formed the woman from the man, God also correspondingly made '*adam*' a male. Trible argued the creation of male and female was simultaneous, rather than the male preceding the female, for sexual identity depends on the correspondence between male and female. While there is a logic to this argument, the view that Adam was originally sexually undifferentiated implies that the essence of humanness is non-sexual, and sexuality is a secondary differentiation. This is a view that Barth emphatically rejects in his insistence that humanity lies in a particular sexually differentiated human existence. Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics III/2: The Doctrine of Creation*, trans. H. Knight, et al. (London: T & T Clark, 2004), 285-87.

companionship with fellow humans, which, as we have already discussed, is reflected in our deep need for belonging and the distress caused by social rejection and ostracism.

Adam's initial delighted response in naming her אִשָּׁה in Genesis 2:23 is the first recorded act of social identification by another human on the superordinate level of common humanity.[35] The wordplay between אִישׁ and אִשָּׁה emphasized the strength of the tie between the woman and the man. It corresponds to the wordplay between אָדָם and אֲדָמָה. Just as the ground remained unproductive without the man, so also the man remained infertile without the woman. Just as the man was built from soil, so also the woman was built from the man.[36] The means of creation of the woman from out of the man's body as one who is "flesh of my flesh" emphatically carries the implication that the woman is of the same human substance, sharing a common humanity that dwarfs their gender differentiation. There is a further subtle wordplay in אִשָּׁה itself in that *â* also functions as a suffix of direction towards the noun. This could convey the woman's fundamental orientation towards union with the man. The fundamental union of this couple is further emphasized by the description of the man and woman becoming one flesh.[37] That the woman was built from the man's body provided a biological basis for the intimacy and harmony of the closest possible relationship between the man and woman.[38]

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[35] The notion of superordinate identification is based on self-categorization theory that maintains that people categorize themselves at three different levels: on the superordinate level of common humanity, on the intermediate level of in-group and out-group (social identity), and on the subordinate level of particularity from other group members (personal identity). This identity formation process involves a person making self-categorizations that involve categorizing him or herself with reference to a range of social categories on basis of similarity (in-group) and difference (out-group). These categories contribute to the content of a person's self-concept. John C. Turner et al., *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), 40-45.

[36] LaCoque, *Trial of Innocence*, 114-21. Van Wolde, *Words Become Worlds*, 19.

[37] Vawter observed that the etymological word plays of *ādām, ʾiššâ,* and *ḥawwâ* are a feature of myths. Vawter, *On Genesis,* 74-75. Kikawada speculated unconvincingly that "Mother of all Living" may be a title that is an allusion to the goddess Mami, who was also given the title "mother of all the gods" in the Atra-hasis epic. Isaac M. Kikawada, "Two Notes in Eve," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 91 (1972): 33.

[38] Helen Schüngel-Straumann, "On the Creation of Man and Woman in Genesis 1-3: The History and Reception of the Texts Reconsidered," in *A Feminist Companion to Genesis*, ed. Athalya Brenner (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993), 67-8. Hauser emphasized that intimacy and harmony characterized the relationships in Genesis 2 in sharp contrast to the alienation and disharmony that occurred in Genesis 3. Hauser, "Genesis 2-3: The Theme of Intimacy and Alienation," 32-3.

The treatment of the woman's name also reflects this blurring between generic and specific. [39] She is unnamed for most of the story, simply being referred to as הָאִשָּׁה, "the woman." When she is subsequently named by the man, her name חַוָּה conveys a specified symbolic meaning of "life giver" derived from the root חוי meaning "to be alive".[40] So while the woman is portrayed as an individual character in the story, the treatment of her name conveys her generic representative function as being a bearer of children.

4.2.4 The Snake as an Iconic Symbol

The Eden Narrative provides no clue regarding the identity of the snake. Scholars following a literal interpretation of the Eden Narrative generally interpreted the snake as a particularly shrewd talking animal.[41] The principal difficulty with this interpretation is that animals don't talk.[42] The way the *Book of Jubilees* solved this problem was through depicting all the animals in Eden as being able to talk. These animals were expelled from Eden along with the couple from Eden. In addition, they lost language.[43] Alternatively, the snake's exceptional language ability may be based on its superior cleverness.[44] An alternative solution was to

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[39] Hamilton, *Genesis 1-17*, 204-07, Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, 84, Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 268.

[40] Layton, "Remarks on the Canaanite Origin of Eve." Hess, *Studies in the Personal Names of Genesis 1-11*, 19-24, Bechtel, "Rethinking Genesis," 95-98. Bledstein also noted that the Sumerian word ti also means "to make life". So the name "Eve" may also be an allusion to this. Adrien Janis Bledstein, "The Genesis of Humans: The Garden of Eden Revisited," *Judaism* 26 (1977): 192. Alternative allusions have been suggested, that *ḥawwa* has an etymological relation to the Aramaic word for serpent, identifying her with the serpent, or her title of "mother of all living" is an allusion to the Canaanite goddesses Asherah or Mami who was mother of the gods, but these are speculative associations. S. C. Layton, "Remarks on the Canaanite Origin of Eve," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 59, no. 1 (1997): 2-32; Isaac M. Kikawada, "Two Notes in Eve," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 91 (1972): 33-37; A. J. Williams, "The Relationship of Genesis 3: 20 to the Serpent," *Zeitschrift fur die Altestamentliche Wissenschaft* 89 (1977): 357-67.

[41] Flavius Josephus, *The Antiquities of the Jews*, trans. William Whiston (London: Ward, Lock & Co., 1885), 28. Davis, *Paradise to Prison*, 86, Marcus Dods, *The Book of Genesis* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1901), 15-16, Victor P. Hamilton, *The Book of Genesis Chapters 1 - 17* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1990), 187-88, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Creation and Fall*, ed. John W. De Gruchy, trans. Douglas Steven Bax, vol. 3, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works (Minneapolis MN: Fortress Press, 1937/1997), 106, Vawter, *On Genesis*, 72, 77-78. Aalders, *Genesis*, 98. Sarna suggested that the Yahwist writer could have deliberately demythologized the mythical snake by depicting it merely as a shrewd creature. Nahum M. Sarna, *Understanding Genesis: The World of the Bible in the Light of History* (New York: Schoken Books, 1966), 26.

[42] Irenaeus was puzzled about this, rejecting both the notion that God endowed it with speech or that Satan had imparted speech to it. Irenaeus, "Fragments from Lost Writings," XVI, (*ANF* 1): 570. As Savran pointed out, there are only two instances of talking animals in the Old Testament, the snake in Eden and Balaam's ass. G. W. Savran, "Beastly Speech: Intertextuality, Balaam's Ass and the Garden of Eden," *Journal for the Study of the Old Testament* 64 (1994): 34.

[43] *Jubilees* 3:28-30. Josephus also literally regarded the snake as a clever animal and he assumed that all the animals could speak with one language. Josephus, *The Antiquities of the Jews*, 28.

[44] Savran, "Beastly Speech," 39.

regard the snake as being possessed by a talking spirit, namely Satan.[45] One simple solution is that we are simply encountering a feature of a folktale or a fable. That is, folktales and fables would include talking animals as characters in the story in an unremarkable way. Furthermore, snakes were a common trickster character in folklore.[46]

The lack of a clear identifier of the snake in the narrative itself has caused interpreters to look to outside sources for clues regarding the identity of the snake. A detailed study by Charlesworth into snake iconography in the ancient world concluded that the snake was a widely utilized symbol that had a wide diversity of symbolic meanings.[47] Snakes were associated with divination. Snake omens heralded good or misfortune.[48] Snakes featured in the iconography of many gods and goddesses, suggesting that they were a general symbol for divinity. The raised cobra was a symbol of the Egyptian cobra goddess who represented life, order, and was the divine guardian of legitimate kingship. Snakes were symbols associated with kingship and kingly power in Mesopotamia and Egypt.[49] Because the snake sheds its skin and apparently obtained new life, it became the symbol of immortality and reincarnation. Thus, symbols that depicted a coiled snake may have denoted immortality. The characteristic of snakes disappearing into the earth also led it to become a primal symbol of the chthonic underworld of the dead. The snake can form a circle by holding its tail in its mouth, and this circular snake symbol has become a symbol of the cosmos that depicts the unity of the universe, or a symbol for unity.

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[45] Cassuto opted for an implausible alternative, that the dialogue between the snake and the woman was an internal dialogue within the woman's heart between her willing innocence and her cunning. This interpretation cannot be sustained in the following dialogue where God addressed the snake as a responsible personage in its own right. Umberto Cassuto, *A Commentary on the Book of Genesis: Part 1 from Adam to Noah: Genesis I - Vi.8* (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1961), 142-43. Poole suggested the woman may have regarded it as a spirit or angel appearing in the visible form of a snake, even though it was a snake being assisted by the devil. There are, however, no other occasions where angels appear in the form of an animal; they characteristically take human form. Poole, *Bible Commentary, Vol. 1*, 8, 10.

[46] This literary detail contributes to the impression that the Eden Narrative probably was originally a folk tale. Ellen A. Robbins, *The Storyteller and the Garden of Eden* (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2012), 1-4. Niditch, *Folklore and the Hebrew Bible*, 41-47.

[47] James H. Charlesworth, *The Good and Evil Serpent: How a Universal Symbol Became Christianized* (New Haven CN: Yale University Press, 2010), 64-100.

[48] Duane E. Smith, "The Divining Snake: Reading Genesis 3 in the Context of Mesopotamian Ophiomancy," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 134, no. 1 (2015): 45-6.

[49] Charlesworth, *The Good and Evil Serpent*, 228-30.

We see that the snake was a widely used symbol in Ancient Near Eastern myths and iconography. Snakes featured as symbols with a wide range of positive and negative meanings. They symbolized various gods, symbolized kingship and legitimate rule, functioned as guardians, and represented mythical chaos-monster antagonists of the gods. [50] Snakes symbolized the cosmos, eternal life, unity, as well as death and the underworld.[51] Yet the wide range of symbolic meanings that snakes acquired means that this background material does not provide us a basis for any conclusion regarding what the snake may have symbolized in the Eden Narrative.

4.2.5 The Identification of the Snake with Satan

An tradition developed that identified the snake with Satan, as witnessed by the intertestamental literature.[52] This view was supported in Revelation 20:2 that identified Satan with the ancient serpent. Consequently, this interpretation was widely adopted by the early church fathers.[53] It remains the most widely accepted interpretation.[54] This interpretation has

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[50] Ibid., 203-09, 28-60. Hermann Gunkel, *Creation and Chaos in the Primeval Era and the Eschaton*, trans. William Jr. Whitney (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006), 81-111. The prominence of serpents as chaos-monsters in other Ancient Near Eastern creation myths led Gunkel to suggest the Yahwist was influenced by these myths in his choice of a serpent for the divine antagonist in the Eden narrative. Gunkel, *Genesis*, 15-16. Likewise, the Ancient Near East mythology of the serpent as a mythical creature of chaos led Sarna to suggest that the Yahwist deliberately demythologized the mythical figure of chaos to a mere creature in the Eden narrative. This is a speculative conclusion, but it highlights the understated reserved style of the Eden narrative. Nahum M. Sarna, *The JPS Torah Commentary: Genesis* (New York/Jerusalem: Jewish Publication Society, 1989), 24.

[51] Gunkel, *Genesis*, 15, Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, 72-73, S. G. F. Brandon, *Creation Legends of the Ancient near East* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1963), 129-30. LaCoque's suggested that the serpent is a symbol representing the animals collectively staging a revolt from below in reaction to the man's rejection of animals to be his suitable companion. Thus, evil comes from "outside" as nature's declaration of autonomy from God. His viewpoint fails to take into consideration the polytheistic demonic nature of the Ancient Near Eastern view of the world. LaCoque, *Trial of Innocence*, 150-53.

[52] Intertestamental references to Satan as the serpent include: *2 Enoch* 31.3, *Wisdom of Solomon* 2:24, and *The Life of Adam and Eve*, 16:3; 33:1-3. James H. Charlesworth, ed. *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday,1985).

[53] Archelaus, "The Acts of the Disputation with the Heresiarch Manes," 31, (*ANF 6*): 206, Theophilus, "Theophilus to Autolycus,"28, (*ANF 2*): 105, Tertullian, "Against Marcion," II.10, (*ANF 3*): 305-6 , Gregory Nazianzen, "The Second Oration on Easter," 8, (*NPNF² 7*): 425, John of Damascus, "Exposition on the Orthodox Faith," II.10, (*NPNF² 9*): 28, Origin, "De Principiis," III.2.1, (*ANF 4*): 328, ———, "Contra Celsum," VI.43, (*ANF 4*): 52, Augustine, "On Genesis: A Refutation of the Manichees," in *Saint Augustine: On Genesis*, ed. Edmund Hill (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 388/2006), II.20, pp. 84-5, Augustine, *The Literal Interpretation of Genesis*, trans. John Hammond Taylor (New York: Newman Press, 1982), XI.34, p. 449, ———, *City of God*, trans. Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin, 1972), XIV.11, pp. 569-70, Ambrose, "On Paradise," in *Hexameron, Paradise, and Cain and Abel*, ed. John J. Savage, Fathers of the Church (Washington DC: Catholic University of America, 1961), 291.

[54] Matthew Poole, *Matthew Poole's Commentary on the Holy Bible*, 3 vols., vol. 1 (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1700/1985), 8, Thomas, *Genesis I – XXV*, 47; Davis, *Paradise to Prison*, 85, John A Calvin, *A Commentary*

two variants. Either the snake symbolized Satan who was the actual tempter, or Satan was literally speaking through or behind the snake itself. It was generally presumed that Satan was motivated out of envy.[55] An interesting variant is found in some of the Gnostic literature that presented the snake as the hero of the story as the bearer of Gnostic knowledge.[56]

The identification of the snake with Satan, however, was not a feature of the Eden Narrative itself. If anything, intertextual evidence is contrary to any identification of the snake with Satan. The Old Testament references to *śāṭān*[57] referred to a role rather than to a personage, where a person or angelic being functioned as an accuser or an adversary. Some Old Testament passages identified *śāṭān* as human adversaries and foreign enemies of Israel (1 Sam. 29: 4; 2 Sam. 19: 16-23; 1 Kg. 5: 2-6; 11: 14-25).[58] In the story of Balaam, the *śāṭān* was a messenger of God who blocked his way. Balaam's donkey saw the angel and stopped, but Balaam did not initially see the angel. Only after Balaam's eyes were opened, the angel abjured Balaam only to speak as God instructed him.[59] In Job 1-2 and in Zechariah 3 the *śāṭān* was a member of the divine court who functioned in the role of an adversary or accuser.[60] Finally in 1 Chronicles 21, *śāṭān* is identified as an unspecified person, whether human or

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on Genesis, trans. John King (London: Banner of Truth, 1965), 140, Martin Luther, *Luther's Works 1: Lectures on Genesis Chapters 1 - 5*, trans. Jaroslav Jan Pelikan (St. Louis, Mo.: Concordia Publishing House, 1958), 145, James Montgomery Boice, *Genesis, an Expository Commentary: Volume 1, Genesis 1 - 11* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1982), 150-54, Matthew Henry, *Matthew Henry's Commentary on the Whole Bible, Volume 1: Genesis to Deuteronomy* (MacLean, VA: MacDonald, 1985), 21, Waltke, *Genesis*, 91.; Bruce Vawter, *A Path through Genesis* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1957), 64, Vawter, *On Genesis*, 72, 77-8, Henry, *Genesis to Deuteronomy*, 21, Blocher, *In the Beginning*, 150-54. Hamilton, *Genesis 1-17*, 187-88, Hoekema, *God's Image*, 126-28, Aalders, *Genesis*, 98, Blocher, *In the Beginning*, 150-54, Marguerite Shuster, *The Fall and Sin: What We Have Become as Sinners* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), 40-41.

[55] *The Life of Adam and Eve*, 12-16, (*The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, 2: 262). Archelaus, "Disputation with Manes," 31, p. 206. John Chrysostom, "Homily 16," 206, *Homilies on Genesis 1 - 17*, trans. Robert C. Hill, vol. 74, Fathers of the Church (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1992), Tertullian, *Against Marcion*, 10, (*ANF* 3: 305); Ambrose, "Paradise," 332-33.

[56] Tertullian, "Against All Heresies," II, (*ANF 3*): 650-51. Pamela J. Milne, "The Patriarchal Stamp of Scripture: The Implications of Structuralist Analysis for Feminist Hermeneutics," in *A Feminist Companion to Genesis*, ed. Athalya Brenner (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993), 146-72.

[57] References to *śāṭān* were transliterated rather than in Hebrew script because these were references to a personage rather than quoting a text, and the transliteration was adopted to distinguish this Old Testament figure from the Satan of Christian tradition.

[58] Stokes argued the case for regarding the *śāṭān* as an attacker or adversary, rather than an adversary or prosecuting attorney in the forensic sense. Ryan E. Stokes, "Satan, Yhwh's Executioner," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 133, no. 2 (2014): 253-61.

[59] Peggy L. Day, *An Adversary in Heaven: Śāṭān in the Hebrew Bible* (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1988), 45-67.

[60] Ibid., 79-83, 107-26, Horst Dietrich Preuss, *Old Testament Theology*, trans. Leo G. Perdue, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Louisville, KY: Westminister John Knox, 1995), 260.

celestial, who persuaded David to do a census of Israel.[61] Day concluded that Satan as a

proper name for the angelic evil rebel against God does not occur in the Old Testament.[62]

Even though the snake was functioning as a *śāṭān* in the Old Testament sense, it was not

identified as symbolizing Satan. This implies that the notion of Satan had not yet been

conceived. The implication of this is that the identification of the snake with Satan reflected a

subsequent reinterpretation of the Eden Narrative.[63]

So the snake remains a mysterious figure whose identity is unclear. The snake

performed the role of a *śāṭān* in the story. An implication of the function of the snake is that

evil originated from without, confronting the human couple in the form of temptation, rather

than originating from within. The snake can be regarded as a "proto-satan" personification of

evil. This perspective recognizes that it is highly likely that the existence of Satan had not

been conceived of at the time that the composition of the Eden Narrative had been finalized. It

also recognizes that the subsequent identification of the snake with Satan is apt, while at the

same time acknowledging this identification is not integral to the text. The narrative, however,

provided no aetiology for evil, nor any mythological explanation for the symbolic significance

of the snake. The origin and identity of the snake remains a mystery, and along with it the

origin of evil.[64]

4.3 The Garden as a Sanctuary

God placed the man in a garden in Eden, and then created the woman as his companion there.

This garden has been traditionally identified with a primeval state of paradise, whether it was

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[61] Day, *An Adversary in Heaven*, 141-44, Preuss, *Old Testament Theology*, 260.
[62] Day, *An Adversary in Heaven*, 147. Preuss likewise maintained Satan was a post Old Testament development. Preuss, *Old Testament Theology*, 259-61.
[63] Gunkel, *Genesis*, 15-16.
[64] Von Rad emphasized that the narrative is concerned with the man, and the serpent's identity is not elaborated upon.   von Rad, *Genesis*, 87-8. Westermann and Bonhoeffer made similar observations. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Creation and Fall*, ed. John W. DeGruchy, trans. Douglas Steven Bax, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1937/1997), 104, Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 239. Robbins concluded that the snake was not the villain of the story, simply functioning as an enabler with no malevolent intentions. With no villain, the theme of good and evil drops out of the story, in favour of the theme of the couple gaining maturity through gaining knowledge, as an etiological tale of why humans alone among the animals possess a god-like knowledge that leads to civilization. *The Storyteller and the Garden of Eden*, 142-154.

a state or a paradisiacal location.[65] The Garden of Eden came to symbolize a prelapsarian

utopian state of human existence characterized by gloriousness, harmony, contentment, and

the absence of suffering, sin and shame.[66] The notion that it may refer to a paradise[67] enjoyed

philological support from the name 'Eden' since the word literally means "delight."[68] This

utopian interpretation of Genesis 2 persists despite the absence of any such allusions in the

text.[69] It primarily relies upon drawing some very large implications from the statement that

they were naked and unashamed, which as we shall see, can be interpreted differently.

The location of the Garden of Eden is unknown. The references to the four rivers

suggest that it had a specific geographic location. Only two of these rivers have been

identified, the Tigris and the Euphrates. The other two rivers, the Pishon and the Gihon,

remain unknown.[70] It is important to remember that the location of these other two rivers was

known to the ancient Israelites. They may have had a clearer idea of where this garden was

actually located than we do.

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[65] Augustine took it both ways, as both a delightful fertile grove in geographical location and figuratively signifying a state of bliss for the soul. Augustine, "On Genesis," II.12, p. 79, ——, *Literal Interpretation of Genesis*, VIII.1-4, pp. 346-8.

[66] This perspective reflects the influence of Reformed theology. It was popularized by Milton's Paradise Lost. Yairah. Amit, "Biblical Utopianism: A Mapmaker's Guide to Eden," *Union Seminary Quarterly Review* 44 (1990): 16.

[67] Paradise" is a transliteration of the Greek word for "garden παραδείσος, which in turn was a transliteration of the old Persian word *pairi-daēza*, meaning an enclosure and then a garden surrounded by a wall. Joachim Jeremias, "παράδεσος", TDNT, 5:765-773.

[68] The etymology of the Hebrew word עֵדֶן could have been derived from two sources, either the Akkadian word *edinu*, meaning "plain, steppe", or alternatively it is connected with the stem עדן meaning "delight." The traditional interpretation has been to associate עֵדֶן with "delight". This interpretation is supported by the bilingual Akkadian-Aramaic inscription on the Tell Fekhervah status dated 9th century BCE, on which the Aramaic verb *m'dn*, corresponded to the Akkadian word *muṭaḥḥidu*, meaning "to enrich, make abundant." Ziony Zevit, *What Really Happened in the Garden of Eden?* (London/New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), 86-89. This interpretation is further supported by the Septuagint translation of גַּן־עֵדֶן *as "ὁ παραδείσος τῆς τρυφῆς"*, garden of delight. Refer to Howard N. Wallace, "Eden, garden of', pp. 281-283 in *Anchor Bible Dictionary*, Vol. 2. Millard also argued in favour of the meaning of "lush, abundant" on the basis of an old Aramaic inscription. A. R. Millard, "The Etymology of Eden," *Vetus Testamentum* 34, no. 1 (1984): 103-05. Day, *From Creation to Babel*, 26. argued that because the Akkadian word *edinu* is extremely rare, the most likely etymology is the Hebrew stem עדן. Refer also to Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, 61. Luther also observed the similarity of the Greek word Θδενή "Eden" to ἡδονή meaning "delight" or "pleasure". Luther, *Genesis*, 87-8.

[69] Bruggemann stated that the traditional interpretation of utopia followed by a Fall reflects a doctrinal superstructure that has been imposed upon the text. Bruggemann, *Genesis*, 40-44. Westermann observed that our notion of paradise does not come from this biblical narrative. Claus Westermann, *Genesis: A Practical Commentary*, trans. David E. Green (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmmans, 1987), 19.

[70] Calvin' solution was that the Pishon and Gihon were alternative names for different sections of the Tigris and Euphrates, thus locating Eden at the head waters of these two rivers. Calvin, *Genesis*, 118-24, Poole, *Matthew Poole's Commentary on the Holy Bible*, 6.

The first two rivers suggest Eden was located at their source in a mountainous region in northern Iran. The Pishon has been speculatively identified with the Halys River in northern Turkey near which the ancient Hittite capital, Hattusha, known as the "Silver City" had been situated. Likewise, the Gihon could have been the Aras River that flows across Armenia. These four rivers would locate the garden in northern Turkey south of the Pontus Mountains.[71] Alternatively, Eden may have been located at their mouth at the head of the Persian Gulf.[72] The locality of the garden is unclear to us probably because we are unable to interpret half of the information that the story provided. This lack of clarity regarding its location gave an opening to alternative interpretations that the garden of Eden could be a symbol for a lost mythical primeval earth.[73]

Yet the notion of a paradisal primeval existence of humanity was not entirely unknown in the Ancient Near East. The Sumerian creation epic the *Eridu Genesis* depicted the original state of humankind before they built cities and settled down as care-free nomads. The original state of the ancient Sumerians was described in this way.

> Mankind of those distant days, since Shakan,
> the god of flocks had not yet come out on the dry lands,
> did not know arraying themselves in prime cloth,
> mankind walked about naked.
> In those days, there being no snakes,
> being no scorpions, being no lions,
> being no hyenas, being no dogs, being no wolves,
> mankind had no opponent, fear and terror did not exist.[74]

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[71] Zevit, *What Really Happened in the Garden of Eden?*, 98-113.

[72] Blocher, *In the Beginning*, 112-20. Stratton, *Out of Eden*, 29-34. Speiser suggested Eden lay at the mouth at the end of the Persian Gulf. Speiser, *Genesis*, 17. Westermann favoured locating the garden at their source. Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 252. In a slight variation, Boice located Eden somewhere in the Arabian desert. Boice, *Genesis*, 123-25. Both Wenham and Blocher recognized that the question cannot be resolved with current knowledge. Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, 66-67. Zevit argued that this option is not supported by the grammar of the text that unambiguously located Eden at the headwaters of these four Rivers rather than at the river mouths. Zevit, *What Really Happened in the Garden of Eden?*, 105.

[73] Yairah Amit, "Biblical Utopianism: A Mapmakers Guide to Eden," *Union Seminary Quarterly Review* 44 (1990), 16. Luther suggested a variation to this view that Eden was lost because it was washed away in the great flood. Luther, *Genesis*, 87-88.

[74] Patrick D. Miller Jr., "Eridu, Dunnu and Babel: A Study in Comparative Theology," in *I Studied Inscriptions from before the Flood*, ed. Richard S. Hess and David Toshio Tsumura (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1994), 161-62.

We see that the *Eridu Genesis* depicted primitive humans as wandering about naked as carefree nomads. This is reminiscent of the depiction in Genesis 2 of a naked unashamed couple who name animals and live in a garden. Yet this was not a predominate motif throughout the Ancient Near East.

Storvalen has undertaken an extensive analysis of the symbolic significance of garden motifs in biblical and Ancient Near Eastern literature. His review suggested that gardens generally symbolized blessing and well-being. Royal gardens symbolized the benefits that a king bestowed upon his people.[75] Gardens frequently formed the sacred precincts for temples. High places and altars were often located in gardens and sacred groves. Gardens provided the settings for romance and love-making. They were a location for graves. Gardens were settings for both fertility cults and ancestor cults.[76] When gardens featured in myths, they generally either portrayed numinous borderline places between the human and supernatural worlds, or they were places for divine activity in the human world.

There are two ways of regarding the garden. Either it was a provision for humankind, or it was God's sacred garden.[77] The view that it was God's sacred garden implies that Eden was not created for the humans, but it was a sacred place for God. It also means that the symbolic significance of Eden in Genesis is that it was a place where God dwelt.[78] A closely related idea is that the garden symbolized an archetype for the temple as the place where God and humans meet.[79] The significance of Eden lay in it being a place where human may encounter God in an unmediated fashion. Another parallel emerges that just as the temple

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[75] Stordalen, *Echoes of Eden*, 81-104.

[76] Ibid., 105-38.

[77] Stratton, *Out of Eden*, 29-34, Dexter F. Callender, *Adam in Myth and History: Ancient Israelite Perspectives on the Primal Human*, Harvard Semitic Studies (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2000), 48-9. This is inferred in *Jubilees* that referred to the garden as a sanctuary and more holy than any land, and every tree planted in it was holy (Jub. 3:10, 12-13).

[78] Barth described it as, "God's chosen sanctuary on earth", a sacred grove. And the man was chosen to keep it, which was analogous to the Levite's task of tending to the temple. Barth, *Church Dogmatics III/1*, 254-55. Collins also expressed a similar view. Collins, *Did Adam and Eve Really Exist*, 60-61.

[79] Daniel T. Lioy, "The Garden of Eden as a Primordial Temple of Sacred Space for Humankind," *Conspectus* 10 (2010): 34-9.

was the dwelling for the divinity, so the garden was a dwelling place for God, where God

would walk. [80]

This motif that Eden was a sacred garden of God echoes themes and motifs in

Mesopotamian creation myths that depicted humanity being created as agricultural labourers

to serve the gods.[81] This perspective defined the relationship between God and the humans in

terms of them being divine servants who had the privilege of working in the presence of God

in the sacred precincts where God dwelt.[82] Callender suggested that their vocation as

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[80] Callender observed that trees and groves figure prominently in Ancient Near Eastern literature and in other Old Testament passages as a cultic site or sacred tree or grove. The notion of a sacred garden was widespread in the Ancient Near East. Callender, *Adam in Myth and History*, 39-50.

[81] Stordalen does an extended discussion of this. Stordalen, *Echoes of* Eden,136-60. Some examples of this motif are: the Sumerian myth *Enki and Ninmah* depicted humankind as being created by the goddess Ninmah for the purpose of relieving the gods of their hard toil. William W. Hallo and K. Lawson Younger, eds., *The Context of Scripture: Canonical Compositions from the Biblical World*, 3 vols., vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 517.
The Akkadian *Atra-hasis Epic* related that, in response to the gods' complaint about their toil, Ea suggested,
>   Belet-ili, the midwife is present,
>   Let the midwife create a human being,
>   Let man assume the drudgery of god.
Hallo and Younger, eds., *Context of Scripture*, 451.
The Sumerian myth *The Birth of Man* relates that Namma, at Enki's request, gave birth to humankind as:
>   A fill-in worker for the gods,
>   That they get loose of their digging.
Thorkild Jacobsen, *The Harps That Once... Sumerian Poetry in Translation* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987), 144.
The Babylonian creation myth *Enuma Elish* spoke of humanity being made of earth to serve the gods. After careful deliberation Marduk decided to create humankind.
>   I shall compact blood, I shall cause bones to be,
>   I shall make stand a human being, let 'Man' be its name.
>   I shall create humankind,
>   They shall bear the gods' burden that those may rest.
Hallo and Younger, eds., *Context of Scripture*, 400.
The fragmentary *Eridu Genesis* relates how the gods fashioned humankind and gave them kings to oversee their labour.
>   When An, Enlil, Enki, and Ninhursaga
>   Fashioned the dark-headed (people),
>   They had made the small animals (that come up) from (out of) the earth…
>   And let me have him [the king] oversee their labor,
>   And let him teach the nation to follow along unerringly like cattle!
Jacobsen, *Harps*, 146.
It should be mentioned that this was not the only perspective. Other creation myths depicted humanity as being also the object of the god's benevolence. The myth the *Praise of the Pickaxe* depicted how Enlil broke the crust of the earth with a pickaxe that allowed humanity to sprout forth from the ground, and he then gave the pickaxe to humanity as a tool so they could better serve the gods. Richard J. Clifford, *Creation Accounts in the Ancient near East and the Bible*, Catholic Biblical Quarterly Monograph Series 26 (1994), 30-32. The incomplete Sumerian *Eridu Genesis* depicted humanity as the object of Enlil and Nintur's benevolence. Throkild Jacobsen, "The Eridu Genesis," in *I Studied Inscriptions from before the Flood*, ed. Richard S. Hess and David Toshio Tsumura (Winona Lake, ID: Eisenbrauns, 1994), 129-42.

[82] Jewish interpreters have made a thematic connection between Eden as being God's sacred garden that he gave to Adam and Eve to dwell in and tend, and Israel as God's country that God apportioned to the tribes of Israel to dwell in. Adam and Eve's expulsion from Eden for disobedience symbolized Israel's exile from the land for its persistent covenant breaking. Anderson, "Biblical Origins and the Problem of the Fall," 29-30.

gardeners in God's garden reveals something important about their relationship with God. This couple occupied a special role (almost proto-priestly) in serving in a sacred precinct that was not the privilege of all humans generally.[83] The same two verbs עָבַד and שָׁמַר also referred to the work of the Levites in tending the tabernacle.[84] The divine charge to keep or guard the garden may have amounted to an appointment to a sacerdotal role of tending a sacred precinct.[85] The appointment of cherubim to guard the garden in place of the evicted couple is consistent with this motif because cherubim were depicted in Old Testament as guardians of God's sacred sanctuary.[86]

Stordalen came to a different conclusion. He concluded that the motif of a garden of God where the deity was present or dwelt was not a feature in Ancient Near Eastern mythic stories. Neither did gardens symbolize a primordial paradise. So Stordalen's analysis favours the alternative view that the garden was created for humanity after Adam was created. The garden provided for human needs. It was a gift of God's gracious care for the man that God had created.[87] Stordalen's analysis supports the conclusion that the garden in Eden was merely a garden, not a primordial paradise.

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[83] Callender, *Adam in Myth and History*, 59-65. Callender goes so far as to suggest that they may have been intermediary figures.

[84] Scachter,

[85] Lioy, 34-9, Schachter, Scotchmer.

[86] Steinman, A.E. "Cherubim" pp. 122-3 Dictionary of the Old Testament Pentateuch (eds. T. Desmond Alexander & David W. Baker). Downers Grove, IL: IVP. Driver, *The Book of Genesis*, 60-1, Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, 86.

[87] Stordalen, pp. 139-161. This view has a long history. John of Damascus, *Exposition of the Orthodox Faith* 2.11, (*NPNF*[2] 9:29) stated, "And this is the divine paradise, planted in Eden by the hands of God, a very storehouse of joy and gladness of heart (for 'Eden' means luxuriousness). Its site is higher in the East than all the earth: it is temperate and the air that surrounds it is the rarest and purest: evergreen plants are its pride, sweet fragrances abound, it is flooded with light, and in sensuous freshness and beauty it transcends imagination: in truth the place is divine, a meet home for him who was created in God's image: no creature lacking reason made its dwelling there but man alone, the work of God's own hands." See also von Rad, *Genesis*, 77-78. Calvin also maintained that God chose "the most fertile and pleasant place, the first-fruits (so to speak) of the earth, as his gift to Adam, whom he had dignified with the honour of primogeniture among men, in token of his special favour." Calvin, *Genesis*, 114.

4.4 The Tree of Life and Immortality

4.4.1 The Two Trees in Genesis

The two trees are symbols unique to Genesis. There is no corresponding parallel to the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil in other Ancient Near Eastern literature.[88] The closest parallel to the Tree of Life is the reference in the *Epic of Gilgamesh* to a plant of rejuvenation.[89] That the plant gave longevity and rejuvenation is reflected in the name Gilgamesh gave the plant. "Its name shall be Man Becomes Young in Old Age. I myself shall eat it and return to the state of my youth."[90] The narrative itself contains no references specifying the symbolic significance of two trees apart from the implications derived from their names and the ways the characters in the story interacted with them. This makes it very difficult to draw definitive conclusions regarding their symbolic meaning. Nevertheless, the two trees are symbolically associated with three themes in other aetiological myths, the themes of life, knowledge, and death.[91]

4.4.2 The Tree of Life

The Tree of Life has been associated with life at its highest potential in various ways. Its fruit has been regarded as preserving life in a state of perpetual youth; so Adam and Eve could have been able to sustain their mortal life by feeding upon it.[92] Alternatively, access to the fruit would have granted them immortality; so denial of access to the tree of life amounted to a denial of immortality.[93] The Jewish tradition identified the Tree of Life as symbolizing the Torah, because in keeping the Law there was life. Observing the Law was the means for

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[88] Van Seters, *Prologue to History*, 20. Sarna, *Understanding Genesis*, 18-20, Blocher, *In the Beginning*, 126.

[89] Gunkel, *Genesis*, 8. Bernard F. Batto, "The Yahwist's Primeval Myth," in *Gilgamesh: A Reader*, ed. John Maier (Wauconda, IL: Bolchazy-Carducci, 1997), Ronald A. Veenker, "Gilgamesh and the Magic Plant," *Biblical Archaeologist* 44, no. 4 (1981): 200.

[90] Veenker, "Gilgamesh and the Magic Plant," 200.

[91] Thomas, *Genesis I – XXV*, 38.

[92] Augustine, *Literal Interpretation of Genesis*, VIII.1.1, pp. 353-54. *Gregory of Nyssa, "On the Making of Man," XIX.1-5 (NPNF² 5)*: 409. John of Damascus, "Exposition," II.11, (*NPNF² 9*): 29-30. Martin Luther, *Lectures on Genesis Chapters 1 - 5*, trans. Jaroslav Jan Pelikan, Luther's Works (St. Louis, MO: Concordia 1958), 92-3, Poole, *Bible Commentary, Vol. 1*, 6. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I.Q.97, Art. 4, p. 516. A contemporary exponent of this view is: McKeown, *Genesis*, 33.

[93] Dods, *The Book of Genesis*, 18, Sarna, *Genesis*, 18-19. Day, *From Creation to Babel*, 43.

gaining the righteousness required to gain access to the Tree of Life to regain the original lost

immortality.[94] In a similar fashion, Philo argued that the Tree of Life symbolized piety, which

in turn leads to immortality.[95] Augustine suggested that it symbolized the wisdom of Christ

that leads to life.[96] Alternatively, the Tree of Life symbolized life with God at its centre. The

tree was freely available. It represented a life at its highest potential, a life before God that

they could freely enjoy.[97] Barth also regarded the Tree of Life as a symbol pointing to God's

promise of life.[98] While the Tree of Life has been interpreted in several ways as a symbol,

quality of life is a common theme.

   It had been debated whether the Tree of Life was a symbol in the original narrative.

Westermann argued that it was a later interpolation on the grounds that it was only mentioned

twice in the narrative (2:9 and 3:22), whereas there are nine allusions to the Tree of the

Knowledge of Good and Evil (2:9,17; 3:2, 3, 5, 6, 11, 12, 17). In addition, the Tree of the

Knowledge of Good and Evil was referred to anonymously as the tree in the middle of the

garden (3:3). Westermann observed, however, that the theme of loss of immortality is implicit

throughout the story.[99]

   When God placed the man in the garden, God gave the man an emphatic command to

eat from all the trees in the garden freely, which is reflected in the verb construction of the

absolute infinitive followed by the imperative: מִכֹּל עֵץ־הַגָּן אָכֹל תֹּאכֵל (Gn. 2:16).

While the Tree of Life is not explicitly mentioned, כֹּל implies the inclusion of every tree with

the sole exception of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, which is explicitly

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[94] Paul Morris, "Exiled from Eden: Jewish Interpretation of Genesis," in *A Walk in the Garden: Biblical, Iconographical and Literary Images of Eden*, ed. Paul Morris and Deborah Sawyer (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992), 118. Lanfer, *Remembering Eden*, 41-65. Blocher noted that this view is supported by the other referenced to the tree of life in Proverbs 3:18; 11:30; 13:12 and Revelation 2:7, 22:1-5 where is it clearly a symbol. Blocher, *In the Beginning*, 123-25, Gillingham, *The Image, the Depths, and the Surface*, 39-40.

[95] Judaeus Philo, "Questions and Answers on Genesis," in *The Works of Philo*, ed. Charles D. Yonge (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1993), I.10, p. 793.

[96] Augustine, *Literal Interpretation of Genesis*, VIII.8-10, pp. 351-53.

[97] Bonhoeffer, *Creation and Fall*, 83. Waltke, *Genesis*, 86. Calvin, *Genesis*, 116. Henry, *Genesis to Deuteronomy*, 16, Shuster, *The Fall and Sin*, 27.

[98] Barth, *C. D. III/1*, 256.

[99] Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 213-14, Wallace, *The Eden Narrative*, 101-103, Brandon, *Creation Legends of the Ancient near East*, 134-35.

forbidden in the next verse.[100] The story is silent on whether or not the couple actually ate

from it. The conclusion of the Eden Narrative made it abundantly clear that access to the Tree

of Life was contingent upon their respecting the prohibition regarding the Tree of the

Knowledge of Good and Evil. The purpose of expulsion from Eden was to deny access to the

Tree of Life and the longevity that it offered. The fact remains that the Tree of Life is a

crucial symbol in the Eden Narrative, because the whole theme of the loss of immortality rests

upon it.

4.4.3 Human Mortality or Immortality

The implications for human existence of the denial of access to the Tree of Life are closely

associated with four views concerning human mortality. First, humans originally possessed a

contingent immortality, being created in the image of God, which was dependent upon their

obedience. They were doomed to mortality and lost their image as a consequence of their

transgression. This was widely maintained by the early church fathers,[101] and passed into

Roman Catholic doctrine through the synthesis of Aquinas who taught that before the Fall

man was incorruptible and immortal.[102] Second, humans were mortal who enjoyed prolonged

longevity through access to the Tree of Life, but lost their chance for longevity after being

denied access to the Tree of Life.[103] Third, humans were created mortal with the possibility of

immortality in reward for obedience in the garden under a covenant of works.[104] Fourth,

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[100] Blocher suggested that the symmetry between "eating you shall eat" and "dying you shall die" has the force
of command behind them both. Blocher, *In the Beginning*, 122.

[101] This view appears to have been held by the early church fathers. Barnabas, "The Epistle of Barnabas," in *The
Apostolic Fathers*, ed. J. B. Lightfoot and J. R. Harmer (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House), 12.5, p. 307.
Justin Martyr, "Dialogue with Trypho," 124, (*ANF 1*): 262, Tertullian, "An Answer to the Jews," 2, (*ANF 3*):
152. ———, "A Treatise on the Soul," 52, (*ANF 3*): 229, Lactantius, "The Divine Institutes," II.13, (*ANF 7*):
61-2, Gregory of Nyssa, "The Great Catechism," V, (*NPNF² 5*): 479. *Augustine, City of God,* XIII. 2, 23,
pp.510-11, 36-40.

[102] Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I.Q.97, Art. 1, p. 514.

[103] Augustine held the view that Adam was created mortal, but he enjoyed immortality through access to the tree
of life. Augustine, *Literal Interpretation of Genesis*, VI. 30-39, pp. 319-23. So also did: Luther, *Genesis*, 110-
11, Mettinger, *The Eden Narrative*, 48-49. McKeown, *Genesis*, 33. Sarna, *Genesis*, 18-19. Cassuto, *Genesis*,
124.LaCoque, *Trial of Innocence*, 99-102.

[104] The writings of the early reformers reflected this viewpoint. Luther, *Genesis*, 92-3, 110-11, Calvin, *Genesis*,
127, Henry, *Commentary*, 17-18, Driver, *The Book of Genesis*, 50.

humans have always been mortal by virtue of their creaturely nature, and the tree of life

symbolized a quality of life.

The third view that humans were created mortal with the potential for immortality has

the most support from the story. The story implies that the man was created mortal because he

was made from earth and to earth he shall return. The thrust of God's pronouncement in 3:19

is that the man shall toil for his food *until* he returns to the ground אֶל־הָאֲדָמָה because from it

he was taken. The reason is because the man is dust (עָפָר). This is a reference the man's

original creation, implying that he has always been mortal by virtue of being an earthling

made from the dust of the earth. What is depicted here is a natural creaturely mortality.

The significance of the exile from Eden and loss of access to the Tree of Life was the

loss of the *opportunity* to gain immortality. This was essentially James Barr's thesis. He

rightly pointed out that the problem God faced in Eden was not that Adam's disobedience had

brought sin and death into the world. On the contrary the problem for God was the possibility

that Adam and Eve might gain immortal longevity, which was life that has no death, in

contrast to the Christian hope of immortality, which is life after death. This endless life free

from death was regarded as the divine life of the gods, in contrast to the mortal life of

humans. So, pursuing immortality here amounted to a transgression of the divine - creature

boundary. [105]

4.4.5 *Natural Mortality or Penal Death?*

There are two related questions here. First, what was the nature of the death penalty? The

second question is, was the penalty actually inflicted? The threatened penalty of death has

been interpreted in several ways. The prohibition unambiguously conveys an inevitability

about it. The Hebrew phrase where the absolute infinitive מוֹת followed by the imperfect

second person singular form תָּמוּת is generally interpreted as meaning a statement of certainty

and inevitability. This is reflected in the translation, "you will *certainly* die." This sense of

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[105] Barr, *The Garden of Eden and the Hope of Immortality*, 5-19.

certainty is given additional weight by the phrase כִּי בְּיוֹם *"because on the day."* There will be

no delay, the doom of death will fall immediately on that very day not in a strictly temporal

sense, but rather, that on that very day their fate will be decided. Death would be an inevitable

result of breaking the prohibition, with no room for renegotiation.

The nature of the threatened death has been interpreted in various ways: (1) it literally

means a death sentence to be immediately implemented,[106] (2) a doom of mortality,[107] (3) a

natural consequence, (4) a spiritual death resulting from alienation from God,[108] (5) spiritual

death in the form of a corrupted sinful nature.[109]

The view that death was a natural consequence of eating the fruit was either because it

violated a taboo,[110] or the fruit itself contained some magical quality or toxic elements.[111] In

this case, the prohibition was a warning, not a threat.[112] This view has not gained much

acceptance. Augustine dismissed the notion that the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil

bore poisonous fruit, because God created only good things.[113] There are no allusions in the

narrative to the fruit having any magical properties or toxic effect.[114]

The problem with the literal interpretation that it was a death penalty that would be

immediately implemented was that this did not occur. As Barr pointed out, Adam lived 930

years according to Genesis 5:4-5. He lived a full life span, suggesting that his eventual death

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[106] Ibid., 11, von Rad, *Genesis*, 79, Jobling, "A structural analysis of Genesis 2.4b-3.24," 61-69. As Hamilton pointed out, no Old Testament passage interprets מוֹת תָּמוּת as "to become mortal." The consistent interpretation is that it refers to a death sentence. The idiom מוֹת תָּמוּת implies death by God's intervention in contrast to an execution of a death sentence by men, which is rendered מוֹת יוּמָת, "shall be put to death". Hamilton, *Genesis 1-17*, 174.

[107] Irenaeus, "Against Heresies," V.23.1, (*ANF 2*): 551, Hippolytus, "The Extant Works and Fragments: Exegetical," 7, (*ANF 5*): 239, D. E. Gowan, *From Eden to Babel: A Commentary on Genesis*, International Theological Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1988), 43-5, E. A. Speiser, *Genesis*, 17, Aalders, *Genesis*, 93. Cassuto likewise regarded it as a doom that became inevitable when they were deprived of access to the tree of life. U. A. Cassuto, *A Commentary on the Book of Genesis: Part One from Adam to Noah*, trans. Israel Abrahams (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1961), 125.

[108] Poole, *Bible Commentary, Vol. 1*, 7, Collins, *Genesis 1 - 4*, 140, Mettinger, *The Eden Narrative*, 22-3, Boice, *Genesis*, 173-74, Waltke, *Genesis*, 87. ———, *An Old Testament Theology*, 267.

[109] John A. Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, trans. John Allen, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, PA: Presbyterian Board of Christian Education, 1559/1939), II.1.5, p. 270, Luther, *Genesis*, 142.

[110] Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 224.

[111] Gunkel, *Genesis*, 8. D. R. G. Beattie, "Peshat and Derash in the Garden of Eden," *Irish Biblical Studies* 7 (1985).

[112] Barth, *C.D. III/1*, 259.

[113] Augustine, *Literal Interpretation of Genesis*, VIII.12, p. 354.

[114] Sarna, *Understanding Genesis*, 25.

was not the consequence of his disobedience, but that it occurred in the natural course of human life.[115] God pronounced different punishments and expelled them from Eden, while letting them live. This implies that God was making an empty threat that God never intended to implement, which raises doubts about God's truthfulness and integrity.[116]

This dilemma was resolved by adopting the interpretation that God was referring to spiritual death, either in the form of alienation from God or of a corrupted nature, a view that has been widely adopted in the traditional interpretation of the Eden Narrative. This interpretation has been adopted to solve the problem that Adam and Eve did not immediately die, so the death must have taken a less apparent form. This interpretation is consistent with the doctrine of original sin that humanity is fallen, corrupt, and spiritually dead in sin.[117] This interpretation, however, lacks an exegetical basis because there are no allusions to spiritual death in the text.

An alternative view is that God did not follow through with the penalty, but instead exercised mercy.[118] This view is supported by other instances in the Old Testament where God pronounced a doom, but subsequently did not follow through with it.[119] There are two instances where a pronounced death sentence by royal decree was not subsequently carried out in respect to Jonathan (1 Sam. 14:44) and Jeremiah (Jer. 26:8).[120] In their essay, "When Yahweh Repents," Andersen and Freedman argued that there are three types of situations where God commits himself to a course of action and subsequently reconsiders. God may relent in response to subsequent developments in the human situation, or in response to an

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[115] Barr, *The Garden of Eden and the Hope of Immortality*, 10.

[116] James Barr, "Is God a Liar? (Genesis 2 - 3) - and Related Matters," *Journal of Theological Studies* 57, no. 1 (2006), 1-22.

[117] This argument originated with Augustine who taught that the threatened death was the second death, the separation of the soul from God. The human was subject to two types of death, the death of the body when it is separated from the soul, and the death of the soul when it is separated from God. Augustine, *City of God*, XIII.1,15, 23, pp. 510, 23, 37.

[118] David J. A. Clines, "Themes in Genesis 1-11," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 38 (1976): 483-507.

[119] Gordon observed that this was a familiar pattern in the Old Testament. Robert P. Gordon, "The ethics of Eden: Truth-telling in Genesis 2-3," in *Ethical and Unethical in the Old Testament: God and Humans in Dialogue*, ed. Katharine J. Dell (New York/London: T & T Clark, 2010), 18.

[120] Hamilton, *Genesis 1-17*, 174.

intercession by a prophet, or in response to genuine repentance by people and humbling themselves before God. This subsequent change of mind does not make God a liar, as much as it reflects God's freedom to act at God's own discretion. [121]

There are a number of cases where God pronounced a doom and subsequently did not follow through with it. God doomed Cain to be a fugitive and a wanderer, but then showed mercy in providing a protective mark so that he would not be killed. Furthermore, far from being a fugitive and a wanderer, Cain subsequently founded and ruled a city. God also repented of creating humanity and resolved to wipe the human race out, but subsequently spared Noah, and through him the human race.

The incident of the golden calf at Horeb (Ex. 32:7-14) is a famous example of God changing God's mind in response to the intercession of a prophet. It was a dynamic and fluid situation, a crisis whose outcome was uncertain. God initially declared to Moses that he was determined to wipe the Israelites out and that he would start again and raise up a new people from Moses' line. Moses prevailed upon God to have mercy, and the way that Moses engaged with God was crucial to the outcome. The people of Israel were put on probation instead. Nevertheless, there were consequences, an immediate bloodletting in which 3,000 Israelite men died at the hands of the sons of Levi (Ex. 32:26-28).[122]

There is the case of Hezekiah. When he became mortally ill, Isaiah was sent to pronounce that his illness would be terminal. In response to Isaiah's oracle, Hezekiah grieved and besought the Lord to relent. In response to Hezekiah's prayer, God instructed Isaiah to return to Hezekiah, prepare him a cake of figs to lay on the boil, and tell Hezekiah that fifteen years had been added to his life (2 Kg. 20:1-11). This story presents the dynamic nature of prophecy in interaction between the prophet, God, and the recipient of the prophecy.

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[121] Francis I. Andersen and David Noel Freedman, *Amos: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, ed. David Noel Freedman, vol. 24A, The Anchor Bible (New York/London: Doubleday, 1989), 644-45.

[122] Ibid., 647-48.

There is the dramatic case of Jonah. Jonah was called to travel to Nineveh and deliver God's prophecy of doom against that city. Nineveh was the capital of Assyria, a deadly enemy of Israel.[123] Jonah did not want to because, "I knew that you are a gracious and compassionate God, slow to anger and abundant in lovingkindness, and One who relents concerning calamity." (Jn. 4:2). Jonah anticipated that God would be compassionate and spare Nineveh. This suggests that God had built up a reputation for compassionately sparing the guilty and not following through with pronounced punishments of calamity. Jonah was furious when after delivering his prophecy of doom, God did not subsequently follow through with what God had determined to do. The reason lay in Nineveh's response to the prophetic oracle of Jonah. The king of Nineveh believed the oracle and ordered the city to do an act of penance by fasting and putting on sackcloth and to turn from their wicked ways in order to avert the threatened calamity. When God saw their response, God relented.

These cases point out something important about the nature of divine oracles in the Old Testament. They are not set in concrete pronouncements about what will certainly happen, nor are they fixed determinations that irrevocably commit God to a course of action. God retains his freedom of movement. Even after God pronounces an intended course of action or doom, God may subsequently change his mind and exercise mercy rather than follow through with the threatened calamity. We also see in the case of Saul, that God may not relent, even when the miscreant repents (1 Sam. 15:24-31). This also was an exercise of divine discretion.[124] Prophecy has the nature of dynamic divine engagement, rather than fixed positional pronouncement. Its effectiveness lies in the impact prophecy has on the situation at the time.[125] We see this divine freedom in action in Genesis 3 and 4.

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[123] The date of the book of Jonah, and hence its historical context is very unclear. It could have been written any time between the reign of Jeroboam II and the third century B. C. E. when the Book of Tobit, which mentions Jonah, was written. Jack M. Sasson, *Jonah*, ed. David Noel Freedman, vol. 24B, The Anchor Bible (New York: Doubleday, 1990), 20-27.

[124] Andersen and Freedman, *Amos*, 651-52.

[125] As Andersen expressed it, "The power of prophecy does not lie in the certainty of its fulfilment, but in its impact on the situation at the time." Francis I. Andersen, "The Power of Prophecy," *Radix* 23, no. 2 (1995): 7.

A second perspective is that it refers to a penal doom of mortality. If Adam and Eve were already immortal, then this loss of immortality would be a heavy penalty. If, however, Adam and Eve were already created as mortal creatures, then this refers to a lost opportunity to gain immortality. There are no allusions in the narrative to suggest Adam and Eve were initially immortal.[126] To the contrary, the reference in Genesis 3:19 to Genesis 2:7 that that God formed the man from dust from the ground (עָפָר מִן־הָאֲדָמָה) implies that the man was created mortal. This is consistent with the Old Testament view that death was the natural lot of humankind, mortality was characteristic of human life. The naturalness of mortality did not exclude the hope and expectation of some form of continued existence after death, but life in Sheol was of a different form of existence to the mortal life before death. Death in good circumstances and with fullness of years was good and proper and a sign of favour in God's eyes. Death was a natural fact of life in ancient Israel.[127]

The third interpretation is that it was a spiritual death related to a changed and corrupted nature. There is no allusion to this in the story. The snake averred that they would not die, and the prohibition was that if they ate the fruit, they would die, not become sinners with a changed corrupt nature. Furthermore, the sentences God spoke against the couple did not allude to any change in nature or consignment to sinfulness. Rather they addressed the functions of each sex; women would find childbirth more painful, the man would have to toil harder to yield crops from ground that is cursed, and there would be enmity between the woman and the snake and tension between the sexes. Sin and corruption are neither mentioned nor alluded to.[128]

This leads us to agree with Barr that one of the themes of the Eden Narrative was the loss of the *possibility* of immortality. Adam and Eve were created mortal, and access to the

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[126]Cassuto stated," there is not the slightest indication that man was already immortal before his Fall; on the contrary, it is clear from iii 24 that he could not have achieved this condition save by an additional act on his part, to wit, by stretching forth his hand and eating of the fruit of the tree of life." Cassuto, *Genesis*, 125.

[127] Barr, *The Garden of Eden and the Hope of Immortality*, 21-56.

[128] Ibid., 8-10.

Tree of Life in the garden provided the opportunity for longevity. Their expulsion from the garden deprived them of this opportunity, and it doomed them to a natural lifespan. God, however, did not follow through with inflicting the threatened death penalty. God relented, showed mercy, and instead the consequences were the changed life circumstances that accompanied expulsion from the Garden of Eden.

4.5 The Knowledge of Good and Evil

The symbolic ambiguity of the identity of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil means that the Eden Narrative does not conceptually define the knowledge that the fruit imparted. The Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil is a unique symbol without any mythological parallel in the Ancient Near East. So, we cannot turn to extrabiblical literature to shed any light on the meaning of this symbol.[129]

There are three clues in the narrative as to the nature of this knowledge. First, it was knowledge that God and the snake possessed and the couple did not. Furthermore, possessing that knowledge would make them like God. Possession of this divine knowledge amounted to a boundary violation between creaturely and divine realms. Second, the reference to their eyes being opened suggests a change in awareness.[130] Third, the phrase "good and evil" itself provides another clue. These observations open up a wide range of possibilities.

4.5.1 Divine Knowledge

The impact of acquiring this knowledge was that they had now become like God knowing good and evil, a development that God recognized in 3:22. So the story testifies that knowledge has been acquired, but it does not elaborate what precisely that knowledge consisted of. A theme in other Ancient Near Eastern myths is the acquisition of divine knowledge by human heroes, at the price of a loss of immortality. In *the Epic of Gilgamesh* Utnapishtim was warned by Ea about an impending flood intended to wipe out humankind.

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[129] LaCoque, *Trial of Innocence*, 74, Van Seters, *The Yahwist*, 20, Wallace, *The Eden Narrative*, 115-16, Bruggemann, *Genesis*, 45.
[130] Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 245, 47.

So Utnapishtim built a boat and survived the flood on it.[131] Similarly, in the *Adapa Epic*, Ea gave Adapa the knowledge he needed to survive the storm of the South wind. In both cases, Ea imparted divine knowledge that enabled the hero to survive a storm. It was a practical knowledge for survival rather than moral or sexual knowledge. [132] That the knowledge was a divine prerogative does not take us very far in identifying exactly what this knowledge consisted of.

The Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil has been interpreted as a symbol of various kinds of knowledge. First, it has been regarded as ethical knowledge, a moral awareness of good and evil.[133] The weakness of this interpretation is that the giving of the prohibition itself presumed an ethical awareness of right and wrong, and the woman displayed moral reasoning in her discourse with the snake before eating the fruit.[134] Furthermore, it is an essential human knowledge for exercising moral judgment. The patristic fathers regarded that humans were originally created with reason, free will, and moral discernment, which were essential for accountability in the garden.[135] Possession of moral discernment could hardly be a moral failing.[136] If, however, it refers to an experiential knowledge of evil from committing evil, then that may be feasible.[137] This suggests that interpreting the knowledge of good and evil as moral discernment is inadequate unless one specifies that it is specifically based on an experiential knowledge of evil in contrast to good.

A second widespread interpretation was that it referred to sexual or carnal knowledge, or to the sexual awakening that accompanies coming of age. The view that identified this

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[131] N. K. Sandars, *The Epic of Gilgamesh* (London: Penguin), 106-08.

[132] Dexter F. Callender, *Adam in Myth and History: Ancient Israelite Perspectives on the Primal Human*, Harvard Semitic Studies 48 (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2000), 75-84.

[133] Augustine, *On Genesis: A Refutation of the Manichees.*II.12, p. 79-80, Driver, *The Book of Genesis*, 41, Sarna, *Genesis*, 18-19, Barr, *The Garden of Eden and the Hope of Immortality*, 62, Collins, *Genesis 1 – 4*, 115-16, Shuster, *The Fall and Sin*, 20-1, Barth, *C.D. III/1*, 257-58.

[134] Sarna, *Genesis*, 18-19.

[135] Justin Martyr, "The First Apology of Justin," 28, (*ANF 1*): 172, Martyr, "Dialogue with Trypho," 41, (*ANF 1*): 270, Irenaeus, "Against Heresies," IV.4.3, IV.37.2 (*ANF 2*): 466, 519, Hippolytus, "The Refutation of All Heresies," 22 (*ANF 5*): 151, Tertullian, "Treatise on the Soul," 22 (*ANF 3*): 202, ———, "Against Marcion," II.6, (*ANF 3*): 302-3, Origin, "De Principiis," III.1.3-6, (*ANF 4*): 303-06. This viewpoint was also adopted by the early reformers. Calvin, *Institutes*, Vol. 1. I.15.8, pp. 214-15.

[136] Vawter, *On Genesis*, 72-3.

[137] Irenaeus, "Against Heresies," IV.39.1 (*ANF 2*): 522.

knowledge with sexual or carnal knowledge was widely held by the early church fathers, who

generally believed that Adam and Eve were virgins in paradise. Their awareness of nakedness

reflected the loss of innocence following the first act of coitus.[138] This interpretation has been

supported by a motif in the *Epic of Gilgamesh* that the acquisition of wisdom is associated

with sexual experience. It includes a scene where a harlot seduced Enkidu, initiating him into

sexual awareness. then told him, "You have become wise, Enkidu, you have become like a

god". Then she clothed him, introduced him to human food and beer, and Enkidu adopted the

life of a civilized person. [139]

 While the two stories contain common elements and similar themes of acquiring

wisdom, divine-likeness, being clothed, and seduction, the way these themes and elements are

treated are dramatically different.   As Bailey pointed out, sexual seduction was prominent in

the *Epic of Gilgamesh*, whereas sexual initiation was not the event in Eden. The acquisition of

wisdom and civilization was morally neutral in the *Epic of Gilgamesh*, but eating the fruit was

a transgression of a divine command in Genesis. Being clothed symbolized Enkidu gaining

civilized status, whereas being clothed was a covering of nakedness in Genesis.[140] The lack of

sexual innuendos in the Eden Narrative in contrast to the explicit sexuality in the *Epic of*

Gilgamesh does not support this interpretation.[141]

 This interpretation is inconsistent with the Rabbinic belief that sexuality was integral

to the blessing to procreate and multiply. Rabbinic Judaism regarded sexual intercourse as a

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[138] Tertullian, "On Prayer," 23 (*ANF 3*): 688, Irenaeus, "Against Heresies," III.2.23, Elizabeth A. Clark, "Heresy, Asceticism, Adam, and Eve: Interpretations of Genesis 1-3 in the Later Latin Fathers," in *Genesis 1-3 in the History of Exegesis: Intrigue in the Garden*, ed. Gregory Allen Robbins (New York: Edwin Mellen, 1988), 99-133, Augustine, *City of God*, XIV.17-19, pp. 578-81; XIV.26, pp. 90-91.

[139] Batto, "The Yahwist's Primeval Myth." 245-259, Benjamin Foster, "Gilgamesh: Sex, Love and the Ascent of Knowledge," in *Gilgamesh: A Reader*, ed. John Maier (Wauconda, IL: Bolchazy-Carducci, 1997): 63-78, John Bailey, "Initiation and the Primal Woman in Gilgamesh and Genesis 2-3," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 89, no. 4 (1970): 135-150, Speiser, *Genesis*, 26, Gunkel, *Genesis*, 17-18, Brandon, *Creation Legends of the Ancient near East*, 136, Robert Gordis, "The Knowledge of Good and Evil in the Old Testament and in the Qumran Scrolls," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 76 (1957): 131-33.

[140] Bailey, "Initiation and the Primal Woman in Gilgamesh and Genesis 2-3," 137-50.

[141] Gillingham, however, suggests a variation on this view that identified the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil as a symbolic oblique reference to the Canaanite fertility cults that were a stumbling block for Israel into cultic syncretism and idolatry. Susan Gillingham, *The Image, the Depths, and the Surface* (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002), 13-18.

commanded act because of the first blessing to be fruitful and multiply .[142] Furthermore,

sexuality, sexual differentiation, and procreation were all in place before the fall, and the

subject of God's blessing; the couple was probably already sexually active.[143] Finally,

knowledge of sex cannot be regarded as divine knowledge that humanity should not be privy

to. Hence, sexuality could not have been forbidden knowledge. This interpretation reflects,

rather, a reading back into the story of our present lack of ease and sense of shame regarding

sexuality. It heavily rests on the close association that shame regarding nakedness has to our

sense of shame about sexuality. These observations lead to the conclusion that the knowledge

of good and evil refers to carnal knowledge is implausible.[144]

A third interpretation is that it referred to moral independence and autonomy.[145] This

symbolic meaning could be a subtle critique of Israelite kings' reliance upon counsellors and

foreign alliances, rather than reliance upon God.[146] The development of moral autonomy that

is associated with coming of age has strong intertextual support. The view that knowledge

symbolized coming of age recognizes that there is a transition in adolescence that involves

sexual awakening, acquiring knowledge and the passage from childhood to adulthood.

Children are not yet regarded as knowing good and evil (Deut. 1:39 and Isa. 7:14); it is

associated with the transition to manhood when one gains sufficient maturity to make moral

discernment for oneself. The *Rule of the Congregation of the Essene Sect* allowed its

members to assume family responsibilities when they reached 20 years, the age at which men

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[142]Gary A. Anderson, "Celibacy or Consummation in the Garden? Reflections on Early Jewish and Christian
Interpretations of the Garden of Eden," *Harvard Theological Review* 82, no. 2 (1989): 122.
[143]Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 242-5.
[144]Sarna, *Genesis*, 18-19, Davis, *Paradise to Prison*, 91, Hartman, "Sin in Paradise," 33-36.
[145]Calvin, *Genesis*, 118, Sarna, *Genesis*, 18-19, Speiser, *Genesis*, 26, Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, 64, Waltke,
Genesis, 87, Paul F. Scotchmer, "Lessons from Paradise on Work, Marriage, and Freedom: A Study of
Genesis 2:4-3:24," *Evangelical Review of Theology* 28, no. 1 (2004): 82. Bruggemann suggested that the
problem was human pursuit of autonomous freedom not delimited by God's permission on the one hand and
God's prohibition on the other hand, but only by human capability. Bruggemann, *Genesis*, 52-4.
[146]Gillingham, *The Image, the Depth, and the Surface*, 23-26.

could fight and are capable of making mature decisions, having a knowledge of good and evil.[147]

There are a number of allusions in other Old Testament texts to the knowledge of good and evil. Kings were regarded as having a knowledge of good and evil that enables them to exercise discerning judgment (2 Sam. 14:17). Solomon prayed that God would give him an understanding heart to discern between good and evil (1 Kg. 3:9). These passages suggest that knowledge of good and evil was desirable thing. So the reference to the knowledge of good and evil in Genesis 3 may refer to Adam and Eve reaching the age of maturity when they were expected to exercise mature judgment and assume adult burdens of responsibility.[148]

There is, however, another aspect to the knowledge of good and evil in these other passages that has been generally overlooked. Those who need to possess a knowledge of good and evil occupy a social position of authority that involves the role of exercising judgment regarding the welfare of those under that authority. The king has a position of authority over their subjects. A man acquires a position of familial authority when he comes of age and acquires his own woman. There were social rituals associated with the granting of this authority and the knowledge of good and evil that went with it. So, the issue in Genesis 3 may have been one of illegitimately claiming a social position of authority that God had not granted them. The issue could be one of process; they chose to exercise independent judgment when God has already made a ruling regarding the matter.[149]

A fourth interpretation is that the knowledge refers to maturation from being children with an innocent childish knowledge to become adults with an adult understanding of the world.[150] While this knowledge included sexual awakening, it was maturation rather than

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[147]Gordis, "Knowledge.", 123-38, J. Engnell, ""Knowledge" And "Life" In the Creation Story," in *Wisdom in Israel*, *Vetus Testamentum Supplements 3* (Leiden, BG: Vetus Testamentum, 1955), 103-09.

[148]George Wesley Buchanan, "The Old Testament Meaning of the Knowledge of Good and Evil," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 75 (1956): 114-20.

[149]W. Malcolm Clark, "A Legal Background to the Yahwist's Use Of "Good and Evil" In Genesis 2-3," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 88 (1969): 273-78.

[150]Gunkel, *Genesis*, 17.

carnal knowledge per se.[151] Some of the early church fathers suggested the problem was one

of human maturity.[152] Acquiring the knowledge of good and evil accompanied human

maturation into adulthood. John of Damascus regarded it as a knowledge of their own nature,

a knowledge reserved for the mature.[153] Gregory of Nazianzus likewise regarded it as

knowledge of contemplation, which was suitable for the mature.[154] Ambrose emphasized that

the problem was that they gained an imperfect knowledge of good and evil prematurely and in

the wrong way.[155] A more recent interpretation adopted an evolutionary perspective that

emphasized human maturation on a collective level. The acquisition of this knowledge was

related to human evolution out of the animal world through increased intellectual capacity,

changed self-awareness and independence.[156] This perspective disallows the interpretation of

the Eden narrative as a "Fall" in favour of it being a maturation myth.[157] The fatal weakness

of this interpretation is why would it be denied and culpable, when it is an inevitable feature

of human development?[158] Furthermore, there is no hint of immaturity; the couple are

portrayed as responsible adults.[159]

A fifth interpretation is that the knowledge of good and evil was general scientific

knowledge leading to the creation of culture. This interpretation relies upon regarding *tôḇ*

wārāᶜ as a merism, where the two nouns together point to a single concept.[160] Westermann

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[151]Bechtel, "Rethinking Genesis," 86-88.

[152]Irenaeus, "Against Heresies," III.22.4, (ANF 1), "Proof of the Apostolic Preaching," (XII, XIV), Theophilus, "Theophilus to Autolycus," (*ANF 2*): 104.

[153] Damascus, "Exposition," II.11, (*NPNF² 9*): 29.

[154] Nazianzen, "Second Oration," (*NPNF² 7*): 425.

[155] Ambrose, "On Paradise," 310-11.

[156] Julius B. Moster, "Revisiting the Garden of Eden," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 26 (1998): 223-30, Craig L. Nessan, "Christian Faith in Dialogue with Darwin: Evolutionary Biology and the Meaning of the Fall," *CurTM*, no. 29 (2002): 85-93.

[157] Kim Ian Parker, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Must We Leave Eden, Once and for All?: A Lacanian Pleasure Trip through the Garden," *Journal for the Study of the Old Testament* 82 (1999): 19-29.

[158] Gunkel, *Genesis*, 7, 31.

[159] Gordis, "Knowledge," 238-39.

[160] The fundamental joining of *tôḇ* and *rāᶜ* is pointed to by the presence of the conjunction *wā* rather than the usual conjunction *wĕ*. The conjunction *wā* denoted a conceptual joining of the two nouns, or a sense of comprehensiveness denoted "through to", from which interpreters have concluded means general knowledge in a comprehensive sense. Bonhoeffer also interpreted the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil as referring to knowledge, but a knowledge that has become split in a dialectical thesis – antithesis knowledge structured around contrasting polarities, such as the tension of pleasure – pain, or good – bad. This polarity is rendered in the Hebrew as *tôḇ wārāᶜ*, as testifying to a comprehensive knowledge where *tôḇ* and *rāᶜ* are defined with respect to the other, they are inseparably joined while denoting a fundamental split. Bonhoeffer,

made a useful distinction here in pointing out that it was not the content of knowledge, but the

functional purpose of seeking knowledge in order to gain autonomous mastery over their

world. This refers to the body of knowledge shared by a community that provides the basis

for culture.[161] The weakness of this interpretation is that exercising dominion over the earth

involves the application of scientific knowledge. In favour of this interpretation is the way the

development of culture is identified with the line of Cain rather than that of Seth in Genesis 4.

It is also supported by the observation that what really distinguishes humans from other

animals is our development of language and culture. It could be that the underlying issue was

the human quest for power by means of independently acquired knowledge.[162]

It could be that the significance of the tree in the middle of the garden was simply that

it was forbidden. Its fruit was unremarkable in itself. It was simply the object of God's

command, a command with no rationale that required unquestioning obedience.[163] The impact

in eating the fruit lay in the nature of the act itself as a transgression. The transgression itself

resulted in an experiential discovery of evil and its consequences of shame and guilt.[164]

Another emphasis is that this knowledge was a reserved divine prerogative, not for humans.

Seeking or possessing it constituted a boundary violation between human and divine

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Creation and Fall, 89. Other works that adopted this interpretation include: Philo *Questions and Answers on Genesis* 1.11, *Works,* p. 793; Gunkel, *Genesis*, 8, Sarna, *Genesis*, 18-19, Cotter, *Genesis*, 30-31, Mettinger, *The Eden Narrative*, 60-63, von Rad, *Genesis*, 79. Hamilton disputed his conclusion, pointing out that a reference to comprehensive knowledge is untenable given the couple did not become all-knowing; they still had a very partial knowledge. Rather, it was the *pursuit* of wisdom and knowledge for the mastery of life that was in view here. Hamilton, *Genesis 1-17*, 164-65. Wallace also regards *tôḇ wārā ͨ* as a merismus with the perspective that acquiring this comprehensive knowledge involved a violation of the boundaries between the human and divine realms. Wallace, *The Eden Narrative*, 122-132.

[161] Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 241-42.

[162] Waltke, *Genesis*, 86, Coates, "God of Death," 227-31.

[163] Luther, *Genesis*, 96, Gowan, *From Eden to Babel: A Commentary on Genesis*, 43-5, Dods, *The Book of Genesis*, 19, Blocher, *In the Beginning*, 133, Bruggemann, *Genesis*, 46, Shuster, *The Fall and Sin*, 52.

[164] This viewpoint has a long history reaching back to Gregory of Nyssa who taught that evil was the product of a choice of free will in turning away from the Good. Nyssa, "The Great Catechism," VII (*NPNF*[2] 5): 482, Chrysostom, *Genesis 1 - 17*, Homily 16, p. 219, Augustine, *Literal Interpretation of Genesis*, VIII. 28-34, pp. 363-4. This view passed into the mainstream of Protestant interpretation through Luther and Calvin. Luther, *Genesis 1 - 5*, 95-96, Calvin, *Genesis*, 125-26, Davis, *Paradise to Prison*, 85-88, Henry, *Genesis to Deuteronomy*, 16, 18.

realms.[165] Thus the significance of the presence of a prohibited tree was that it established human freedom as a freedom within limits.[166]

What is apparent in the preceding discussion is that there is no convergence of meaning in the different clues as to the nature of the knowledge imparted by eating the fruit. On the one hand, the above interpretations have focused on the content of the knowledge of good and evil as acquired knowledge. On the other hand, attention has been drawn to the process by which this knowledge was acquired irrespective of content. The weakness of the interpretations that focus on the content of the knowledge as being sexual, moral, scientific or cultural knowledge is that all options refer to domains of knowledge that are appropriate for humans to possess. How could these domains of knowledge be a divine prerequisite not for humans?

This observation supports the conclusion that the significance of the knowledge did not lie in its content but in the fact that the act of taking and eating the fruit itself was a transgression of a divine command. Even where the knowledge itself may have been desirable, the problem lay with the process. I favour the interpretation that the knowledge of good and evil referred to moral discernment along with the social authority to exercise moral judgment that went with it.[167] This view has the most intertextual support and incorporates the issue of inappropriate process in laying claim to it.

4.5.2 A Changed Awareness

That their eyes were opened suggests a change in awareness. There are four interpretations regarding the nature of this awareness; that it was an awareness of nakedness, sexuality, guilt, or vulnerability.

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[165] Callender, *Adam in Myth and History*, 66-70, Waltke, *Genesis*, 86, Mettinger, *The Eden Narrative*, 22-25.

[166] Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 223-4, Gowan, *From Eden to Babel*, 43-5, LaCoque, *Trial of Innocence*, 93, Helen Schüngel-Straumann, "On the Creation of Man and Woman in Genesis 1-3: The History and Reception of the Texts Reconsidered," in *A Feminist Companion to Genesis*, ed. Athalya Brenner (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993), 70.

[167] This view is also supported by reading regarding *tôḇ wārāᶜ* as a merism.

That it was an awareness of nakedness has the most support in the story. It states that their eyes were opened and they saw that they were naked. While shame itself is not explicitly mentioned in the story, the awareness of one's nakedness generally evokes shame, and the natural response to shame is to cover oneself up. Writing from a Jungian perspective Jacoby suggested that shame of nakedness is archetypal of human nature.[168] The story of Adam and Eve has become an image of the original experience of shame.[169]

Nakedness and shame are also closely associated with sexuality and exposure. This association is reflected in the meaning of the Greek word for the sex organs 'aidoía, which literally means "shame parts". It is very similar to the Greek word for shame, 'αιδός which means nakedness.[170] Likewise, the Latin word for shame, pudor is similar to the word for genitals pudenda, suggesting that genitals were regarded as shame parts that needed to be covered.

In ancient Israel exposure of male genitals in sacred precincts was taboo. It was sacrilege to expose one's sexual organs before God in the sanctuary. God instructed the Israelites to make altars without steps "that your nakedness may not be exposed on it." (Ex. 20:26). The priests were instructed to wear linen breeches reaching from the loins to the thighs to cover their bare flesh. They must wear them "lest they incur guilt and die." (Ex. 28:42-43). In contrast, female nakedness was more concerned with modesty and propriety before men. Female modesty was a matter of honour and respectability, rather than a concern about sacrilege.[171] Taboos against incest were described in the terms of uncovering the other's nakedness (Lev. 18:6-19). What was at stake in the way Noah's sons responded to his

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[168]Jacoby, *Shame and the Origins of Self-Esteem*, 19.
[169]Writing from a psychodynamic perspective, Francis Broucek observed that, "The Genesis myth thus suggests that history began with shame and the suddenly altered perception of the world associated with that shame." Broucek, *Shame*, 4. Hollander also observed that the Eden narrative was a story of the primal human experience of shame. Hollander observed, "the primal scene of shame for Western mythology is the moment in Paradise during which the biblical Adam and Eve feel shame for the first time." Hollander, "Honor Dishonorable, Shameful Shame," 1065.
[170]Williams, *Shame and Necessity*, 79-80.
[171] Michael L. Satlow, "Jewish Constructions of Nakedness in Late Antiquity," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 116, no. 3 (1997): 431-44.

nakedness was safeguarding Noah's honour after Noah disgraced himself in his drunkenness. Ham dishonoured Noah in gazing upon his nakedness, whereas his brothers upheld Noah's honour covered him with a garment without looking. The seriousness of the matter was reflected in Noah's reaction in cursing Canaan when he awoke (Gen. 9:21-23).[172]

Second, the connections of ashamed nakedness with exposure of genitals gave rise to interpretations that shame of nakedness was concerned rather with sexual awareness, desire and modesty. This interpretation is based on the assumption that the couple's state of being naked and unashamed reflected a state of sexual innocence.[173] This interpretation overlooks the common fact that people enjoy an unashamed nakedness in private with their sexual partner, particularly when that sexual relationship is characterized by love and acceptance. So, unashamed nakedness does not necessarily imply sexual innocence.[174] A self-conscious sense of nakedness, however, could reflect a change in the nature of sexuality as a desire to possess the other rather than be in unity with the other. Lust with its possessiveness violates the boundaries of the other person. Nakedness was no longer safe.[175] The man and woman's attempts to conceal their nakedness with fig leaves only drew attention to it.

The weakness of this interpretation with its emphasis on sexuality is that the conversation concerning the benefits of the fruit focused on wisdom. There are no explicit sexual references in the Eden Narrative to Adam knowing or having sexual relations with his woman.[176] Nevertheless, this interpretation reflects the close association that shame has come to have with sexuality.

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[172]It is puzzling that Noah cursed Canaan for what was his father Ham's indiscretion. This is the only clear case where an innocent descendant was punished for his father's wickedness. This aspect has given rise to interpretations that this episode is an allusion to the sexual sins of the Canaanites and symbolically represents God's sentence upon the sins of the Canaanites. Refer to Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, 200-02.

[173]For example, Irenaeus asserted that, though husband and wife, they were both virgins in paradise having no understanding of the procreation of children, because they had not yet matured into becoming adults. Irenaeus, "Against Heresies," III.22.4 (*ANF 2*): 455.

[174]As Bledstein pointed out, the creation story in Genesis 2 contains no explicit sexual allusions, in contrast to Gilgamesh, where the knowledge the harlot offered Enkidu was linked with her sexual seduction. The couple were not necessarily sexually innocent. It is equally plausible that they were naked and unashamed as sexual partners. Bledstein, "Genesis of Humans," 191-95.

[175] Bonhoeffer, *Creation and Fall*, 124.

[176] Carmichael, "The Paradise Myth: Interpreting without Jewish and Christian Spectacles," 49-50.

Third, it could be that the changed awareness was simply one of guilt. Shame is also closely associated with guilt. This guilt is often complemented with disgrace (Ezra 9:6; Jer. 22:22; 31:19; Ezek. 36:32; 16:52, 63). The prophets depicted the condition of a nation under diving judgement as shame (Isa. 1:29; Jer. 17:18; 20:11). Guilt and shame went together.[177] So the couple's ashamed sense of nakedness has been widely interpreted as due to an awareness of guilt, or more fundamentally an awareness of their sinful depravity and lost glory.[178] This became the predominant view in the Reformed Protestant tradition.

Fourth, it could simply be that their awareness of nakedness reflected a sense of shame associated with defencelessness and vulnerability. The Old Testament depicts instances of public humiliation where defeated foes are stripped naked and exposed in their defencelessness.[179]

All these various interpretations are based on drawing the implications of nakedness and its relationship to self-conscious shame. We have already pointed out that an ashamed self-conscious nakedness is concerned with inappropriate public exposure of what should remain private. That the significance of nakedness can be interpreted in these different ways testifies to the failure of the narrative to clearly specify exactly what evoked the awareness of nakedness and the implied sense of shame.

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[177]It is worth noting William's observation that the Greeks did not distinguish between guilt and shame. ʼαιδός covers both guilt and shame. Reparation can be made for ʼαιδός regardless of whether it was an immoral act or a failure to fulfil obligations of honour. Williams, *Shame and Necessity*, 92.

[178]This view was argued by Calvin who stated, "being sensible to their wretchedness." This became an influential perspective in the mainstream Protestant tradition. Calvin, *Genesis*, 157. Refer also to Poole, *Matthew Poole's Commentary on the Holy Bible*, 9. This view is reflected by more recent commentators such as: Waltke, *Genesis*, 92, Boice, *Genesis*, 178-80, and Hoekema, *God's Image*, 133. More recently, Lambden highlights this aspect in his comment that the consequence of eating the fruit is an awareness of nakedness and a loss of primordinal primitive dignity. Stephen N. Lambden, "From Fig Leaves to Fingernails: Some Notes on the Garments of Adam and Eve in the Hebrew Bible and Select Early Postbiblical Jewish Writings," in *A Walk in the Garden: Biblical, Iconographical, and Literary Images of Eden*, ed. Paul Morris and Deborah Sawyer (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992), 76.

[179]Waltke, *Genesis*, 92, J. Magonet, "The Themes of Genesis 2-3," in *A Walk in the Garden: Biblical, Iconographical, and Literary Images of Eden.*, ed. Peter Morris and Deborah Sawyer (Sheffield, UK: JSOT Press, 1992), 39-46.

4.6 Summary & Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the identity of the four main characters and some of the major themes and motifs in the Eden Narrative. Adam and Eve are presented as individual, yet representative mythological figures. The most mysterious character is the snake, who can be identified as a 'satan' by virtue of its role as the adversary in the story. While this role lends itself to a subsequent traditional identification of the snake with Satan, it is an identification that is not made in the story itself. A feature of the story is the prominence of powerful evocative symbols, such as the Tree of Life and the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. Yet the meaning of these symbols is generally ambiguous, and the roles of the main characters in the story are complex. This both gives the story its evocative power and the difficulty in arriving at a definitive interpretation.

As a result of its polysemiotic ambiguity, the Eden Narrative has had an enduring symbolic power to capture the human imagination. The central place occupied by the two trees that symbolize life and knowledge suggests that knowledge and immortality are the central themes of the story A closely related theme is that obedience leads to life and disobedience leads to death.[180] The Eden Narrative has these central themes of obedience, wisdom and immortality.[181]

While the Eden Narrative contains these themes, the story does not identify the snake with Satan, nor make any allusion to an original sin that was transmitted to all humankind, nor specify the nature of the knowledge of good and evil, nor the nature of Adam and Eve's sin. None of the key elements of the traditional myth of original sin and the Fall are unambiguously asserted in the Eden Narrative, even though the sparse and ambiguous treatment of symbols in the narrative lends itself to the line of interpretation that evolved into the traditional myth of original sin and the Fall.

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[180] Mettinger, *The Eden Narrative*, 57.
[181] Callender, *Adam in Myth and History*, 66-70, Mettinger, *The Eden Narrative*, 60-63.

The next two chapters will undertake a detailed examination of the story itself, in particular paying attention to the possible meanings conveyed by the implicatures. As we shall see, the dynamics of shame play a more prominent role in progressing the story and providing a psychological explanation for the way the characters interact than has been previously identified in the literature. As the analysis in the next chapter will demonstrate, this is particularly the case with the interaction between the snake and the woman, leading up to the couple eating the prohibited fruit.

Chapter 5: The Eden Narrative: The Dialogue with the Snake

This chapter presents a reading of Genesis 2:25 – 3:1-7 that applies Speech Act Theory,

Relevance Theory and Communications Theory to the interpretation of the text, as discussed

in Chapter One. The application of Speech Act Theory will be most apparent in the analysis

of the illocutionary and perlocutionary force of the speech acts in the interactions between the

characters of the story. Relevance Theory and Communications Theory provide a

methodological basis for the analysis of implicatures that convey a substantial amount of

meaning in the story. The reading will pay attention to exchanges between the characters that

involve negotiating substantial changes to their relationships. This process of renegotiating

relationships occurs on the inferential level of communication between characters. Finally, the

interpretation will make explicit implied dynamics of humiliation and shame within the story

and their impact on the actions of characters within the story in the light of psychological

research and theory regarding shame that was outlined in Chapters Two and Three.

The exegesis will draw out the implicit inferences in the story by examining the

dialogues and interactions between the characters in the story on a verse by verse basis. The

exegesis will refer to thematic and inferential connections to other parts of the story that shed

light on the text of each verse. This chapter will undertake an analysis of the first part of the

story related in Genesis 2:25 – 3:7. The next chapter will present the analysis of the remainder

of the story from 3:8 – 3:24.

5.1 Gen 2:25-3:7 - the Encounter with the Snake

5.1.1 Genesis 2:25

Genesis 2:25 introduces the Eden Narrative with a summary statement regarding the nature of

the relationship the man and his woman had together. The two of them were naked and not

ashamed. This verse sets nakedness and shame in apposition. As we have previously pointed

out, nakedness generally evokes a sense of shame related to modesty rather than guilt. The

implication derived from this statement is that the situation of the couple was an exception to

this general state of affairs. Their lack of shame raises fascinating implications regarding the

identity of the man and woman and the nature of their relationship.

We will approach this question by examining more closely in what sense they were

unashamed. The verb יִתְבֹּשָׁשׁוּ, which is translated "ashamed" is a hithpael. It can be rendered

either in a reflexive or a reciprocal form. Most commonly this verb has been translated in a

reflexive sense, suggesting that their lack of shame was an internal psychological state that

was with reference to their own internal lack of shame. We shall see, however, that there is

support in the text for rendering this verb in its reciprocal sense that they did not embarrass

one another or were not ashamed in the other's presence.

The implications that can be derived from rendering יִתְבֹּשָׁשׁוּ in either a reflexive or a

reciprocal sense are quite different. Rendering יִתְבֹּשָׁשׁוּ in a reflexive sense conveys

implications of the absence of any chronic shame with respect to their own identity and self-

esteem. This internal state has been understood in various ways. Philo regarded it as depicting

the naive innocence of the soul with respect to both virtue and evil.[1] Their nakedness has also

been associated with a moral and sexual innocence and unawareness of the sexual desirability

of the other person.[2] Alternatively, their lack of an internal sense of shame may have reflected

a complete lack of guilt, inadequacy, failure, or flawedness.[3] This reflexive interpretation of

יִתְבֹּשָׁשׁוּ supports the widely held depiction that the couple existed in a state of prelapsarian

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[1] Judaeus Philo, "Allegorical Interpretations," in *The Works of Philo*, ed. Charles D. Yonge (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1993), II.15, p. 43. Augustine regarded that being naked and not ashamed signified simplicity of soul and chastity. Augustine, "On Genesis," II.19, p. 84. Henry regarded it as reflecting their purity and innocence. Henry, *Commentary*, 21.

[2] Irenaeus, "Against Heresies," III.22.4 (*ANF 2*): 455, Tertullian, "On the Veiling of Virgins," 11 (*ANF 4*): 34, Luther, *Genesis*, 139-40. Aquinas also suggested that there were no inordinate motions of concupiscence, reflecting both the mastery their rational soul had over their bodies and their sexual innocence. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I.Q.96, Art.1, p. 511 Also Cassuto, *Genesis*, 137, Collins, *Genesis 1-4*, 139, Driver, *The Book of Genesis*, 43.

[3] Augustine's rationalism is prominent in his depiction of their prelapsarian state in paradise. They were naked and not ashamed because their bodies were obedient to their souls, and they had nothing to be ashamed of. There was no embarrassing movement in their bodies that was not subject to their will, nor any unruly passions that needed to be held in check. Augustine, *Literal Interpretation of Genesis*, XI.3, p. 430. Calvin concluded that this lack of shame at their nakedness, contrary to common human experience, was due to their uncorrupted nature. Calvin, *Genesis*, 137. Likewise, Poole, *Bible Commentary, Vol. 1*, 8.

bliss. They possessed an original righteousness and a gloriousness that excluded any sense of shame.[4] This reflexive interpretation continues to be readily adopted because it dovetails with widely held Christian beliefs regarding the prelapsarian state of the couple.

Rendering יִתְבֹּשָׁשׁוּ in a reciprocal sense, however, gives rise to quite different implications regarding the identity of each person and the nature of their relationship. The reciprocal voice conveys the sense that they did not cause embarrassment to each other, nor were they embarrassed by the other.[5]

There are four types of social contexts where people can be naked and not ashamed. Grosz identified three social contexts in which a person's naked body can be legitimately gazed at by others. There are functional power relationships where it is appropriate for a person to be naked in the presence of another, such as a doctor – patient relationship, a parent – young child relationship, and a carer – client relationship. Mutual non-abusive care-free healthy active sexual relationships between lovers are free from self-conscious defensiveness.[6] Then there are relationships where nudity is mediated through media or art, such as modelling for a nude painting. Cover identified a fourth social context, one where nakedness is shared in a privileged non-sexual context, such as showering in public showers at a pool, or being naked at a nudist beach.[7]

The social context in Genesis 2:25 could either be a privileged non-sexual social context, or the intimate context of a sexual relationship. The traditional explanation that their

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[4] Chrysostom, *Genesis 1 - 17*, Homily 16, pp. 207-8, Luther, *Genesis*, 141.

[5] Philo, "Questions & Answers," I. 30, p. 797, Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I.Q.96, Art. 1, p. 511. Lambden suggested that their unashamed nakedness presented a picture of a stable dignified innocent relationship of mutual trust and respect before God. The verse did not refer to sexuality, since in the Hebrew Bible 'nakedness' generally refers to loss of social dignity. Lambden, "From Fig Leaves to Fingernails: Some Notes on the Garments of Adam and Eve in the Hebrew Bible and Select Early Postbiblical Jewish Writings," 75.

[6] Gowan, *From Eden to Babel: A Commentary on Genesis*, 50, Hauser, "Genesis 2-3: The Theme of Intimacy and Alienation," 24.

[7] Grosz, Elizabeth (1998) 'Naked', unpublished paper given at the Centre for Comparative Literature and Cultural Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia, cited by Rob Cover, "The Naked Subject: Nudity, Context and Sexualization in Contemporary Culture," *Body & Society* 9, no. 3 (2003): 56. Cover goes on to observe that because of the increased sexualization of our culture along with increased awareness of homoeroticism and sexual abuse, privileged social contexts non-sexual nudity are being undermined, and the nudity that occurred in those situations are consequently being sexualized out of context. Ibd. 58-68.

lack of shame was due to an innocent lack of sexual awareness implicitly presumed that

Genesis 2:25 was describing a privileged non-sexual social context. The assumption was that

it subsequently became sexualized, hence inducing shame. This is not the only possibility.

One of the distinctive features of a sexual relationship characterized by mutual love and

acceptance is that both partners have a relaxed freedom to be naked and seen in their

nakedness in the presence of their lover.[8] They both had a comfortable sense of their own

sexuality and felt safe in the vulnerability of their nakedness in the sight of the other. This

reciprocal absence of shame does not require a prelapsarian absence of shame and guilt; but

rather, that modesty and the freedom to be naked went hand in hand in the privacy of their

sexual relationship.[9] Alternatively, the traditional interpretation of sexual innocence provided

the basis for regarding this as a privileged non-sexual context, similar to the one that naturist

activities creates.[10]

Either interpretation of יִתְבֹּשָׁשׁוּ is feasible. Because of the lexical indeterminacy of the

verb, the implications are not determinative, but rather indeterminative. What weighs in

favour of the reciprocal sense is the preceding emphasis on "both of them" with the redundant

rendering of שְׁנֵיהֶם "the two of them" "were naked", followed by "the man and his woman".

The couple is clearly in view. It is consistent with the strong unity this sexually differentiated

couple had on a biological (woman built from man's flesh), sexual (woman makes man

fertile) and functional (helper corresponding to him) level. Shame was foreign to the

differentiated union that characterized the couple's relationship.

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[8] Yairah. Amit, "Biblical Utopianism: A Mapmaker's Guide to Eden," *Union Seminary Quarterly Review* 44 (1990): 16, Bledstein, "Genesis of Humans," 193-95, Satlow, "Jewish Constructions of Nakedness in Late Antiquity," 82.

[9] Westermann rejected reflexive interpretations that their lack of shame inferred an absence of guilt or sexual innocence with respect to the inner life of the person. He maintained that shame exists between people, and this couple experienced an absence of shame in their relationship. Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 262.

[10] Naturist activities, such as nudist colonies or beaches create non-sexualized public space where people are free to be naked in a non-sexualized natural setting, where the naked body has a non-sexual symbolic meaning of being part of nature. There is a tension between the erotic and non-sexual in these settings, that is managed by the convention that while nudity is public, sexual activity is private. David Bell and Ruth Holliday, "Naked as Nature Intended," *Body & Society* 6, no. 3-4 (2000): 130-136.

This reciprocal interpretation does not require a substantial theological pre-understanding of a life of prelapsarian bliss followed by the loss of innocence in the Fall. Given that the pre-understanding of a Fall is a subsequent theological development, an interpretation of sexual intimacy rather than sexual innocence is more readily derived from the story itself. This suggests that an interpretation based on a reciprocal sense of יִתְבֹּשָׁשׁוּ requires less of a construal of meaning by the reader based on theological pre-understandings than one based on the reflexive sense.

5.1.2 Genesis 3:1.

We now come to the beginning of one of the most significant dialogues in the Bible. Let us first examine this dialogue from a Speech Act Theory perspective. The snake appears to be asking a question. This question, however, does not satisfy Searle's preparatory rule for a question that the inquirer does not know the answer. In this case the specific nature of the question conveys a determinative implication that the snake was already familiar with the command conditions that God had imposed on the couple. The snake already knew the answer. This means that the snake was making a request speech act.

This request satisfies Searle's preparatory rules that the hearer is able to do what the speaker is requesting and the speaker believes the hearer is able to do it, and that it is not obvious to both the speaker and the hearer what the hearer will do in the normal course of events of his or her own accord. The snake sincerely wanted the hearer to comply with its request. While the request took the form of a question requesting information, it was not information that the snake was seeking. Rather, the illocutionary force of the request was for the hearer to engage in a dialogue on a topic of the snake's choosing. This request not only functioned to open up a dialogue, but also the snake was taking the initiative in directing the dialogue.[11]

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[11]   Searle, *Speech Acts*, 66.

From a Relevance Theory perspective, communication conveys an ostensive reference of the speaker's intention that what he or she intends to communicate is relevant to the audience. The snake's request, however, was not at all highly relevant. Because communication is presumed to be relevant, then the couple's response would also include an element of curiosity as to what was relevant about the snake's communication. The snake had to demonstrate the relevance of its avenue of inquiry, or it risked the couple dismissing it for wasting their time. The apparent lack of relevance evokes the question, "What is really going on here?"

We can pursue this question by looking more closely at the identity of the participants in the dialogue. The ambiguous nature of the identity of the snake has already been discussed in Chapter Four. The snake is described as עָרוּם or "crafty" or "shrewd", indeed the most crafty of all the animals that God had created. The similarity of עָרוּם to עֲרוּמִּים, which is the masculine plural form of עָרוֹם, has been widely noted.[12] Regarding this as a deliberate word play unavoidably presumes authorial intentionality. One implication is this word play is functioning as a strong link between verse 2:25 and 3:1, implying that these two passages are consecutive scenes of the one story. The hermeneutical question is whether there is an implied meaning in linking the couple's nakedness with the snake's craftiness. The possibility that there might be such a link is strengthened by the observation that when their eyes were opened in verse 3:6, what they became aware of was their nakedness (עֵירֻמִּם). It begs the question of what the connection between the snake's shrewdness and the couple's nakedness is, and what is the significance of their subsequent self-conscious awareness of their nakedness.

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[12] A number of commentators have noted this wordplay. Cassuto, *Genesis*, 144, McKeown, *Genesis*, 35, Hamilton, *Genesis 1-17*, 187, Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, 72, Bechtel, "Rethinking Genesis," 95-98, Phyllis Trible, *God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality* (London: SCM, 1978), 108, Cassuto, *Genesis*, 144, Robbins, *The Storyteller and the Garden of Eden*, 35-36.

5.1.3 The Presence of Adam

Another important question concerns the identity of the dialogue partner(s); whether it was

the woman alone, or whether the man was already present. The text, וַיֹּאמֶר אֶל־הָאִשָּׁה states that

the snake addressed the woman. On this basis, it has been commonly presumed that the

woman alone was being addressed here, and that the man was absent from the dialogue.[13]

There are three indications in the dialogue that suggest that this may not be so. The first one

is that the ostensive reference directed to the woman non-verbally was itself communication

that conveyed an expectation that the woman rather than the man be the one to respond. An

empirical observation is pertinent here. Typically, a speaker addressing a couple has a choice

between making an ostensive reference to one or the other partner, or non-specifically to the

couple and then waiting for the couple to decide which person will respond as the

spokesperson. In this case the narrator informs the reader that the snake made an ostensive

reference addressing the woman that communicated the speaker's intention that the woman

would answer the question. The couple understood that was the snake's intention, and the

couple decided in a tacit reflexive manner that she would respond.[14]

     The second indicator is that the serpent's language was not addressed singularly to the

woman, but to them both as a couple. The pronoun in the question that occurs in the suffix of

the verb "you shall eat" is in the second person masculine plural (תֹּאכְלוּ). The snake

consistently addressed the woman utilizing the second person plural pronoun in its statements

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[13] The intertestamental literature that presented this view: *Jubilees*, *Life of Adam and Eve, Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs.* In the New Testament, Paul expressed this view in *2 Corinthians*, 11:3; *1 Timothy* 1:14; which probably reflects the influence of Jewish intertestamental writings on his thought. Through Paul this view passed into the Christian tradition with the backing of his apostolic authority. Some allusions to the snake's deception of Eve include: Irenaeus, "Fragments," XVI, (*ANF 1*): 571, Lactantius, "The Divine Institutes," II.31, (*ANF 7*): 62, Origin, "De Principiis," III.2.1, ———, "Contra Celsum," VI.43, Chrysostom, *Genesis 1 - 17, Homily 16,* pp. 208-13, Chrysostom, *"Homily 9 on Timothy,"* (*NPNF¹ 13*): 435-6, Nyssa, "On the Making of Man," XX. (*NPNF² 5*): 410, Ambrose, "Paradise," XIII, Luther, *Genesis*, 147-60, Calvin, *Genesis*, 152, Poole, *Bible Commentary, Vol. 1*, 8, Henry, *Commentary*, 22, Gunkel, *Genesis*, 16-7, Boice, *Genesis*, 66-7, Davis, *Paradise to Prison*, 88-90, Brandon, *Creation Legends of the Ancient near East*, 131, Gowan, *From Eden to Babel: A Commentary on Genesis*, 53-4, Waltke, *Genesis*, 91-2, Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 249, Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, 72-5, Collins, *Genesis 1-4*, 72-3.

[14] Relevance theory maintained that non-verbal ostensive references may function to draw the attention of the speaker's intended respondent to his or her communication in a way that presumes the optimization of relevance to the respondent. Sperber & Wilson, *Relevance*, 153-5; Wilson & Sperver, *Meaning and Relevance*, 8-13.

in 3:1-5. It stated, "You certainly will not die" (לֹא־מוֹת תְּמֻתוּן) and that "you eat from it"

(אֲכָלְכֶם מִמֶּנּוּ), "your eyes will be opened" (וְנִפְקְחוּ עֵינֵיכֶם), and "you will have become" (וִהְיִיתֶם).

This consistent use of the masculine plural pronoun indicates that the couple, both the male

and female, were being addressed in this dialogue.[15]

The third indicator is the sequence of her action in verse 6, that she took, ate, and gave

the fruit to her man who was with her. They both ate the fruit. Then both their eyes were

opened. This sequence suggests a simultaneous action, rather than a sequential action that she

ate, then her eyes were opened, and then she went and gave to her man. The simultaneous

nature of their action as a couple in eating is consistent with the implication that the man was

party to the conversation with the snake, even though he was not an active respondent. This

implies that the couple were acting together in unity up to this point, which reflects their

original created "one flesh" unity. As we shall see, their unity did not begin to fracture until

after the fruit had been eaten.[16]

The fourth indicator is structural. There is a balanced structure in the Eden Narrative,

where the first part of the story (3:1-8) features the snake engaging with the human couple,

where the woman is explicitly the respondent and the man is the implied silent partner. This is

balanced by the last part of the story (3:22-24) where God is engaging with the human couple,

where the man is explicitly the respondent and the woman is the implied silent partner. The

central part of the story (3:9-19) depicts God interacting with the three other characters as

individuals. Despite the fact that the man was addressed individually, and there was no

reference to the woman at all, interpreters have universally concluded that the woman along

with the man was also the object of God's actions in 3:22-24. They were evicted from Eden as

a couple. It is a consistent principle of interpretation to conclude likewise that the man was

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[15] Hauser, Sarna, Stratton, and Trible also drew the same conclusion that the snake was addressing them both as a united couple. Hauser, "Genesis 2-3: The Theme of Intimacy and Alienation," 25-26. Sarna, *Genesis*, 25, Stratton, *Out of Eden*, 48, Trible, *Rhetoric of Sexuality*, 113, Phyllis Trible, "Depatriarchalizing in Biblical Interpretation," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 41, no. 1 (1973): 40.

[16] Van Wolde, *Words Become Worlds*, 22-3.

present with the woman in 3:1-6, especially when there are actual allusions to his presence in the text. These indicators in the text support the interpretation that the man was present, whereas the only indicator that he was absent was his non-participation in the dialogue. This in itself is not conclusive.

Why did the snake address the woman rather than the man? The snake's reasons are unclear. Interpreters have identified a number of possible reasons. One possible reason is that in its shrewdness, the snake already had decided that the woman was more open to being manipulated into doing what it wanted the couple to do.[17] Yet, the woman appears to have been stronger and more reflective than the man was. She initially resisted and debated with the snake, whereas the man simply conformed and ate without protest.[18] Another possible reason is that the snake was challenging the hierarchy that established the male as the spokesman because he is in the superior hierarchical position in the couple. When the man did not speak up, he was in effect yielding this point to the snake. This is not necessarily so. A common social psychological dynamic in couple communication is that one partner generally adopts the role of spokesperson for the couple when they are engaged with others in social dialogue. Who takes the spokesperson role is generally determined on the basis of which partner is more socially engaging and extraverted. The choice of spokesperson does not necessarily have any bearing on any authority hierarchy that a couple has adopted.

There are, however, subtle indicators that a reversal of the hierarchy had occurred. There is a reversal of who was with whom. That the woman was brought to the man to be with him as his helper corresponding to him in Genesis 2:23 implied a primacy of the man. This primacy was reversed in 3:6 where the man was "with her" rather than she being "with

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[17] This view has a long history. Philo regarded the woman as more vulnerable to deception. Philo, "Questions & Answers," I.33, (*Works*): 798, Philo and Augustine also adopted an allegorical interpretation where the woman symbolized the appetites and desires of the soul and the man symbolized reason. Temptation bypasses reason and appeals directly to the emotional desires of the soul. Philo, "Questions & Answers," I.33, (*Works*): 798, Augustine, "On Genesis," II.20, pp. 84-5. Philo, "Allegorical Interpretations," II.18-26 (*Works*): 45-9.

[18] Irenaeus, "Fragments," XVI, (*ANF 2*): 570.

him". This primacy reverted back to the man in 3:8 when man hid (masculine singular verb

וַיִּתְחַבֵּא), and the woman [with him] accompanied his action.

That the snake was the shrewdest of all the animals (עָרוּם מִכֹּל חַיַּת) in 3:1 also provides

implications for how its request is to be interpreted. There are a number of subtle implications

behind the phrasing of the snake's question. They may have heard God's original instructions

regarding the trees incorrectly. They may have already inadvertently violated those

instructions simply because they have misconstrued them. There is a subtle inconsistency on

the part of God between giving them free access to all the trees in the garden on the one hand

and forbidding a particular tree on the other hand. They may have misconstrued the

prohibition. Yet, for God to deny access to all the trees would have been unnecessarily

prohibitive and unreasonably impractical.[19] On the face of it, the snake's question can be

regarded as an ignorant misunderstanding. The interrogative אַף כִּי has been regarded as

implying doubt or amazement, while on the face of it the interrogative is simply seeking

confirmation. The exaggeration of the prohibition, however, could amount to an ironic

inference implying that God's prohibition was unreasonable. [20]

The woman may have been more vulnerable to this line of argument than the man

because she had not been present when the commandment had been originally given to the

man. She would have received it indirectly through Adam.[21] The snake's comments

conveyed a subtle invitation to redefine the woman's relation to God's commandments by

entering into an evaluation of God's word rather than simply heeding and obeying it. This

was a subtle invitation to shift the position the couple took in relation to God's word, and by

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[19] John Chrysostom preached that the serpent implied that they were missing out on enjoying the fruit of the trees. Chrysostom, *Genesis 1 - 17*, 16.4, pp. 209-10. Luther suggested that the snake implied that, "God has given you everything; therefore you have everything in your possession; therefore this one single tree is not forbidden you." Luther, *Genesis*, 153. See also: Henry, *Commentary*, 22, von Rad, *Genesis*, 88, Calvin, *Genesis*, 147, Henry, *Commentary*, 22, Boice, *Genesis*, 154, Gowan, *From Eden to Babel*, 54, Gunkel, *Genesis*, 16.

[20] A few other commentators have made this observation. Cassuto, *Genesis*, 144. Hamilton, *Genesis 1-17*, 188-89, McKeown, *Genesis*, 35.

[21] Irenaeus, "Fragments," (*ANF 2*): 571, Ambrose, "Paradise," 12, p. 333, Henry, *Commentary*, 22, Driver, *The Book of Genesis*, 44, David Jobling, "A Structural Analysis of Genesis 2:4b-3:24," *Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers* 1 (1978): 61-9.

implication to God himself.[22] This perspective reflects modern evangelical theology's

emphasis on the Word itself, whereas the thrust of the snake's implications regarded casting

doubt on God's motives and by implication the legitimacy of the prohibition itself.

That God said they were not to eat from any of the trees of the garden, however, was

patently incorrect on two grounds. First, in Genesis 2:16 God commanded the man that he

must certainly or freely eat of the trees in the garden, stating, "מִכֹּל עֵץ־הַגָּן אָכֹל תֹּאכֵל", that is,

"from all the trees in the garden, eat freely." The occurrence of the infinitive absolute אָכֹל

preceding the jussive תֹּאכֵל conveys the sense of this being an emphatic injunctive. It can be

translated "freely eat." This command conveys the illocutionary force of permission rather

than commandment, on the grounds that the man would already be inclined to eat. This free

permission is totally contrary to the snake's suggestion that God instructed them not to eat

from any of the trees of the garden.

That the snake was shrewd rules out the interpretation that it was simply asking an

ignorant or stupid question, or it was seeking information out of ignorance. In this way the

narrator has flagged that it is not all what it seems. This comment by the narrator places the

reader in a position of possessing knowledge that the characters in the story did not

necessarily have. It is unclear whether the couple actually knew that the snake was shrewd

and crafty. Possession of this information would have influenced how the woman and man

would have regarded the snake's question.

5.1.4 Genesis 3:2.

The subtle interplay of identifications and implicit identity statements is an important aspect

of the dialogue that warrants interpretation from a Communications Theory perspective.

There is a subtle implicit interplay of identifications and negotiations of relationship between

the woman and the snake at this point. The woman replied to the snake by pointing out the

obvious, "from the fruit of the trees of the garden we may eat" (מִפְּרִי עֵץ־הַגָּן נֹאכֵל). She was

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22 Bonhoeffer, *Creation and Fall*, 106-07, Henry, *Commentary*, 22, Trible, *Rhetoric of Sexuality*, 108.

identifying herself as an eater of the trees of the garden. By implication, she was a person who knew and was abiding by God's explicit command regarding the availability of the trees for eating. She knew that she had divine permission; she was not simply eating the fruit of the trees out of sheer ignorance.

What is less clear is how the snake was regarded by the woman. It could be that in pointing out the obvious, the woman may have been conveying the implication that she regarded the snake's question as a stupid question, and by implication that the snake itself was stupid and ignorant. This interpretation rests on the assumption that she was ignorant of the fact that the snake was indeed far from stupid.

The woman replied, "from the fruit of the trees of the garden we may eat" (עֵץ־הַגָּן נֹאכֵל מִפְּרִי). The tense of the imperfect form of the verb נֹאכֵל is indeterminative. It is most commonly a future tense, sometimes a subjunctive mood, sometimes conveying a sense of permission, sometimes a preterite habitual past tense, but also sometimes a progressive continuous present tense.[23] The tense is generally inferred from the context. In this instance, the context of the dialogue supports an inference that imperfect is in a permissive mode because the question concerned what was permitted or prohibited. The couple had received divine permission to eat the fruit of the trees of the garden. The context also supports an inference that the verb is a subjunctive mood, denoting that they had permission to eat the fruit of the trees in the garden. This is the most plausible sense given the context that the subject of the dialogue was God's permission, rather than what they were actually doing.

In choosing to engage the snake and answer its question, the woman responded in line with the snake's intention. At this point, the request had achieved its perlocutionary purpose of engaging the woman in conversation. Furthermore, on an implication level regarding the definition of the relationship between them, the snake in making its opening request was offering an inquirer – respondent relationship. That she entered into the conversation on the

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[23] Allen P. Ross, *Introducing Biblical Hebrew* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 2001), 132.

snake's terms was itself significant.[24] In accepting and responding to the snake's inquiry, the

woman confirms the snake's self-identification as an inquirer, and accepts the corresponding

relationship position as an informer. At this point the snake secured an agreement regarding

the nature of the relationship between them, and its status as an inquirer who has a right to ask

questions and discuss the terms upon which they enjoy the bountifulness of the garden they

occupy.

The second aspect was a subtle shift in their relation to God's spoken command. The

snake's question amounted to an invitation to join with it in evaluating the command, rather

than simply heeding it. It accomplished this by simply presenting a misinterpretation of the

command that required correction.[25]

This turned out to be a significant choice that the woman had made. The man with her

also went along with it. This choice led to the events that follow. Yet, this was a perfectly

natural response. People have a reflexive default response to accept the relational definitions

that others claim in their communication and move into the corresponding relationship

position. To either reject the relationship definition claim of a speaker or disconfirm it,

requires a deliberate reflective choice to the contrary. This initial request by the snake

followed by the woman's response amounted to a significant relational transaction that

defined the relationship between them. This agreement regarding the nature of the

relationship set the stage for the interaction that followed.

5.1.5 Genesis 3:3.

The woman did not simply restate the prohibition, but added, "but from the fruit of the tree

which [is] in the middle of the garden God said 'You shall not eat any of it, nor shall you

touch it, lest you die.'" What has drawn a lot of attention by interpreters is analysing the

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[24] Chrysostom represents the earliest instance that I have come across of the view that the crucial mistake the woman was to engage in conversation with the snake on its terms in the first place. Chrysostom, *Genesis 1 - 17*, 16.6-7, pp. 210-11.

[25] Calvin, *Genesis*, 147, Boice, *Genesis*, 150-54.

implications of the differences between the woman's rendition and the original account of

God's prohibition in 2:17. We reproduce the two statements side by side below.

וּמֵעֵץ הַדַּעַת טוֹב וָרָע לֹא תֹאכַל מִמֶּנּוּ כִּי בְּיוֹם אֲכָלְךָ מִמֶּנּוּ מוֹת תָּמוּת 2:17

וּמִפְּרִי הָעֵץ אֲשֶׁר בְּתוֹךְ הַגָּן לֹא תֹאכְלוּ מִמֶּנּוּ וְלֹא תִגְּעוּ בּוֹ פֶּן־תְּמֻתוּן 3:3

Both statements have the structure – object, verb, consequence. The object is

identified differently, though the ostensive reference is to the same object. The original

prohibition to the man identified the tree by its name, "the Tree of the Knowledge of Good

and Evil", whereas the woman identified the tree by its location, "in the midst of the garden."

The fruit is inferred in the original command not to eat from the tree (וּמֵעֵץ), whereas the

woman explicitly referred to the fruit of the tree (וּמִפְּרִי הָעֵץ). The original prohibition " לֹא

תֹאכַל" was addressed to the man singularly, whereas the woman identified the prohibition

"לֹא תֹאכְלוּ" as addressing both of them. Then she added an elaboration, "and you shall not

touch".

Both statements mentioned the same consequence of death. The Hebrew phrase מוֹת

תָּמוּת was generally a formula for the death penalty. This formula supports the interpretation

that a death penalty was being pronounced here, rather than מוֹת תָּמוּת referring to the doom of

mortality.[26] The original prohibition was more strongly expressed with the addition of the

absolute infinitive. It stated, "on that day you shall certainly die" (be in no doubt about it!). In

contrast, the woman expressed it more briefly, simply פֶּן־תְּמֻתוּן "lest you die." The main

difference was the emphatic nature of the warning that God gave. God's pronouncement

emphasized both the immediacy of the consequence, that they would die on the very day they

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[26] Hamilton pointed out, furthermore, that no Old Testament passage interpreted מוֹת תָּמוּת as "to become
mortal." The consistent interpretation is that it refers to a death sentence. Furthermore, מוֹת תָּמוּת implies
death by God's intervention in contrast to an execution of a death sentence by men, which is rendered מוֹת,
מָת "shall be put to death". Hamilton, *Genesis 1-17*, 174. Similar conclusions were arrived at by: Speiser,
Genesis, 17, Sarna, *Genesis*, 17, Jobling, "A Structural Analysis of Genesis 2:4b-3:24," 61-69.

eat, as well as the certainty of the consequence through the construction of having the

infinitive absolute מוֹת preceding the second person singular future tense imperfect תָּמוּת.[27] The

woman's restatement presented it as a consequential contingency. This implies a familiarity

with the prohibition as a known and accepted consequence.[28]

How significant are these variations? One can assume that the crafting by the author

of these variations was intentional. The prohibition was originally addressed to the man alone

simply because the woman had not yet been created. He was indeed alone before God as the

solitary recipient of the prohibition. This was no longer the case after the woman became his

companion. That woman was familiar with the prohibition implies that the man had advised

her of the prohibition. That she had only received the warning second hand through the man

may be a reason why she was more likely to yield to temptation than the man.[29] A subsequent

indirect relayed warning from the man would not have had the same emotional impact. This is

an inference. The story is silent regarding the manner in which the woman was advised of the

prohibition, or from whom. Either the man or God could have warned the woman. Either

option is feasible.

What is clear is that the woman knew of the prohibition and she had placed herself

under the prohibition alongside her man. Her adoption of the second person plural indicates

that the couple had made a prior decision that the woman was equally under the same

prohibition as her man. On her part, she was committed to obeying the prohibition along with

her man.

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[27] Mettinger and Hamilton, however, have claimed that the expression *běyôm* (on the day that), is not necessarily temporal, but carries the sense of certainty and inevitability. Hamilton, *Genesis 1-17*, 173, Mettinger, *The Eden Narrative*, 22-23.

[28] Robbins suggested that the change in language inferred that the woman regarded the fruit as being possibly poisonous, rather than having the penal meaning in view. Robbins, *The Storyteller and the Garden of Eden*, 130. Luther, Calvin, and Henry, however, expressed the view that because פֶּן can infer doubt, this variance may be indicating that the woman was beginning to waver in her conviction. Calvin, *Genesis*, 149, Luther, *Genesis*, 155, Henry, *Commentary*, 23. The indeterminacy of the text at this point leads to the conclusion that this was their construal of meaning based on theological preconceptions, rather than a definitive exegetically based interpretation.

[29] Hoekema, *God's Image*, 129-30.

The significance of the added elaboration by the woman "and you shall not touch" has been interpreted in a number of ways. It could be an intertextual reference to Ex. 19:12 where the Israelites were prohibited from setting foot on Mt. Sinai.[30] Her elaboration has been interpreted as an exaggeration that departed from the command itself. The woman was reflecting on her own version of the prohibition, rather than God's command itself.[31] Of course, this interpretation presumes that the man had accurately informed the woman regarding the prohibition.[32] Her elaboration has been widely interpreted as a sign of wavering on her part.[33] At that point her relation to the commandment had changed from one of obedience to one of evaluation.[34] The problem with this type of viewpoint is that it comes close to maintaining an almost magical view of God's Word, that keeping it requires accurately restating it verbatim. This is not the case. Keeping God's Word is concerned with obeying the illocutionary force of the meaning, regardless of whether it is restated verbatim or is paraphrased.[35]

An alternative interpretation is that her elaboration reflected the couple's decision not even to touch the tree out of respect for God's prohibition.[36] The relation of the two verbs, with both sharing the same object מִמֶּנּוּ indicates that a single action of eating-touching was denoted, rather than two separate actions. The prohibition to touch certainly created a clearer boundary, since touching necessarily must precede eating.[37] The implication of these two

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[30] Gordon suggested this, but I am not convinced because the meaning of the two passages is quite different. Gordon, "The ethics of Eden: Truth-telling in Genesis 2-3," 18.

[31] Ross, *Creation and Blessing*, 135.

[32] Stratton, *Out of Eden*, 44-45.

[33] Luther, *Genesis*, 155, Thomas, *Genesis I - Xxv*, 48-49, von Rad, *Genesis*, 88, Aalders, *Genesis*, 100, McKeown, *Genesis*, 35, Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 239-40, Davis, *Paradise to Prison*, 88.

[34] Henry, *Commentary*, 22-3, Thomas, *Genesis I - XXV*, 49, Bonhoeffer, *Creation and Fall*, 109-10.

[35] This is an example where bearing in mind the Speech Act Theory distinction between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects of communication can contribute to more accurate interpretation, and rule out what are clear misinterpretations.

[36] Calvin, *Genesis*, 149, Henry, *Commentary*, 22-23, Poole, *Bible Commentary, Vol. 1*, 9, Driver, *The Book of Genesis*, 45, Trible, *Rhetoric of Sexuality*, 110.

[37] Cassuto arrived at a similar conclusion. He noted that this verb נָגַע has a graver connotation than merely touching, such as 'touching' a woman in the sense of sexual relations. He suggested that this verb is functioning synonymously with "you shall not eat". Cassuto, *Genesis*, 145.

variations is that the woman had placed herself under the prohibition alongside her man and she was committed to keeping it diligently. For her, the fruit was not even to be touched.

The woman identified the prohibited tree by location rather than by name. This infers that they already knew the location of the prohibited tree. Her reply to the snake could have been accompanied by a gesture pointing out the tree. We presume that it was nearby, because its fruit was ready to hand. Furthermore, there was only one prohibited tree, so an exclusive reference to that tree without distinction from the tree of life is plausible. The tree of life is in the same category as all the other trees, being freely available to be eaten from. From that perspective, the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil stood out alone. A distinctive reference to the tree of life is not required, because the relevant category here is prohibition versus permission.[38]

5.1.6 Genesis 3:4-5.

The snake addressed them both in its subsequent contradiction, "You certainly will not die because God knows that on the day that you eat from it, then[39] your eyes will be opened and you will have become like God..." The snake's statement has a low epistemic specificity. It heavily relies upon the implicatures to convey its inferred meaning. The significance of their eyes being opened is unclear. The implication is that this is a metaphor that refers to a change in state of awareness, where they would see or understand what they had not known previously, rather than simply referring to literally opening their eyes and seeing something. Other passages in the Old Testament refer to God opening the eyes of people so that they saw angels in the spiritual realm, or something else previously unseen.[40] Having one's eyes

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[38] The Relevance Theory concept of the optimization of relevance and emphasis on the role of ostensive reference in communication provided the basis for this interpretation.

[39] The *wāw* consecutive here denotes a temporal sequence.

[40] Balaam saw an angel (Nu. 22:31) and subsequently referred to himself in his oracles as "the man whose eye is opened" (Nu. 24:3, 15). Elisha's servant saw an angelic host (2 Kg. 6:17). God also opened Hagar's eyes and she beheld a life-saving well of water (Gen 21:19), and God blinded the eyes of a Syrian contingent that had come to capture Elisha, and after Elisha had led them unawares into Samaria, God opened their eyes, to reveal they were in the city of Samaria, and they were captured (2 Kg. 6:17-20). As Callender discussed, having one's eyes opened generally refers to gaining a spiritual perception or sensory awareness. Dexter F. Callender, *Adam in Myth and History: Ancient Israelite Perspectives on the Primal Human*, Harvard Semitic Studies (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2000), 73-5.

opened generally referred to seeing for the first time something that had been there all along.[41]

What the snake told them was that as a result of having their eyes opened, they would become like God in a way that they were not already.

The snake's statement contained features closer to the original prohibition than the woman's restatement of it. Where God stated, "מוֹת תָּמוּת", the snake stated, "לֹא־מוֹת תְּמֻתוּן".[42] Apart from the second person plural, this is a close restatement of the original prohibition, which provides further evidence that the snake was privy to the original prohibition. The snake was making a startling and totally unexpected proposition here. The word order of negative, absolute infinitive, finite verb is atypical. Usually the negative immediately precedes the finite verb. The interpolation of the absolute infinitive may convey a sense of blatant negation of the original proposition.[43]

On the level of the explicatures, the snake's assertion satisfied Searle's rules for a valid assertion. The preparatory rules are that the speaker has evidence or reasons for the truth of its proposition, and that it is not obvious to both the speaker and hearer that the hearer already knows the proposition. The snake had reasons for believing that its assertion was true, and it was obvious that the couple did not know the proposition. The snake believed it to be true, which satisfied the sincerity rule. The snake was presenting its assertion as representing an actual state of affairs, which satisfied the essential rule.[44] The way events turned out subsequently confirmed the truth of the snake's assertion. So the snake was making a valid

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[41] This observation, along with the epistemological argument raised by Johnson rules out a number of ways that having their eyes opened have been interpreted. Sarna is incorrect in concluding it concerned autonomy of empirically based knowledge and decision-making. Sarna, *Genesis*, 25. Origin's allegorical interpretation reflected his philosophy rather than being based on the text. Origin suggested that their eyes being opened symbolized the eye of the senses and the eye of the mind, and the eye of the senses was opened when she beheld the delightfulness of the fruit, and the eye of the mind that was to behold God and paradise was shut. Origin, "Contra Celsum," VII.39, (*ANF 4*): 626.

[42] The unusual position of לֹא before the infinitive may be in order to keep the phrase מוֹת תָּמוּת the same as in 2:17.

[43] Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 241. Stratton also pointed out that the serpent did not openly state whether the woman should aspire to or avoid this wisdom. Its statement was a provision of information regarding the fruit. Any suggested course of action was implied. Stratton, *Out of Eden*, 46-47. Chrysostom pointed out that with both the man and the woman there was no evidence of any force or pressure from the snake, only the presentation of a choice requiring a decision. This is the reason why ultimately both the man and woman were inexcusable. Chrysostom, "Homily 17", *Genesis 1 - 17*, 232-33.

[44] Searle, *Speech Acts*, 66.

true assertion. Yet the snake's assertion has been widely regarded as being a lie and deceptive.[45] This is because the deception lay in the implicatures, rather than in what was explicitly stated. This is drawn out by analysing the implied identity statements being made here from a Communications Theory perspective.

We will start our analysis of the implicatures by examining the snake's inferred statement regarding the identity of the couple. The snake inferred that the couple were ignorant. It adopted a superior position in the relationship as one possessing inside knowledge that they should be aware of. At this point the snake's statements suddenly acquired a high degree of relevance. Its information amounted to a significant modification of their cognitive environment.[46]

At the heart of the snake's suggestion was the lure to be like God. It is unclear exactly what the snake was alluding to in its assertion that, to the contrary, they would become like God. Calvin interpreted this as inferring that they would become equal to God, which is consistent with the myth that what caused Lucifer's fall was the desire to become equal to God.[47] Alternately, becoming like God has been inferred as meaning attaining a higher level of being through possessing a divine knowledge similar to that possessed by God.[48]

Becoming equal to God was concerned with power and status, the kind of temptation that an already divine being may be vulnerable to. Equality with God presupposes similar divine being. Aspiring to divine being similar to God's would be a desire of a creature who sought to transcend itself. The latter aspiration is consistent with the reoccurring theme throughout human history of the desire for self-transcendence and self-improvement through

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[45] Irenaeus, "Against Heresies," V.23.1 (*ANF 2*): 551. Henry, *Commentary*, 22, Boice, *Genesis*, 165-69. Ross pointed out that this was the original lie, that there were no consequences for sin and no punishment for transgression; they could get away with it. Ross, *Creation and Blessing*, 135.

[46] Sperber & Wilson pointed out that is we focus on information that we determine to be relevant with respect to our assumptions, and overlook information determined to be irrelevant. We pay attention to physical stimuli that constitute a relevant change in our cognitive environment, and overlook other stimuli that are not pertinent to our cognitive environment Sperber & Wilson, *Relevance*, 46-49.

[47] Calvin, *Genesis*, 151. Chrysostom likewise interpreted this as implying equality to God. Chrysostom, "Homily 16," *Genesis 1 – 17*, 213.

[48] Boice, *Genesis*, 165-66, Henry, *Commentary*, 23-4, Cassuto, *Genesis*, 146-47, Aalders, *Genesis*, 101, von Rad, *Genesis*, 88-90, Ross, *Creation and Blessing*, 135-36.

the pursuit of knowledge on the one hand, and spirituality through mystical disciplines on the other hand. This aspiration is driven by a sense of discontentment and an awareness of unrealized human potential that is there to be pursued. The snake was evoking both of these feelings in the couple in this scene.

The snake was implying that they would have divine rather than creaturely status. Because divine being is characterized by an inherent immortality, they would no longer be mortal. The knowledge of good and evil, being a divine knowledge, would be the means of gaining this.[49] The serpent's indirect suggestion amounted to an invitation to act on the basis of a disbelief that they were not all that they could be, rather than on a confident belief that they were already complete in themselves as humans, lacking nothing.

The illocutionary force of the serpent's assertion was conveyed through this inference regarding the adequacy of their identity as human beings. That the woman's eyes would be opened and she would be *like God* implied that there was the possibility of a higher dimension of life that could be gained by knowledge.[50] This new possibility cast doubt on the adequacy and sufficiency of who they already were. They were not all they could be. They lacked something; a "knowledge of good and evil" (whatever that was). Their lack of likeness to God was a deficiency in their make-up. Possessing it would improve who they were as humans.[51] This suggestion was aimed at undermining their contentment in their present state of being human.

The Communications Theory perspective on the emotional impact of inferred identifications is crucial for understanding the impact of the dialogue at this point. The snake was inferring that, God also regarded them as deficient and was deliberately keeping them

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[49] Calvin, *Genesis*, 150, Bonhoeffer, *Creation and Fall*, 112.

[50] Hamilton, *Genesis 1-17*, 190. von Rad also picked up on this issue, suggesting that "the serpent's insinuation is the possibility of an extension of human existence beyond the limits set for it by God at creation." von Rad, *Genesis*, 89.

[51] The irony of the serpent's assertion, as Bonhoeffer pointed out, was that the hidden cost of becoming like God was ceasing to be truly human. In this respect, the serpent was speaking of the death of humankind, but in a disguised form. Bonhoeffer, *Creation and Fall*, 112. See also: Cassuto, *Genesis*, 147, von Rad, *Genesis*, 88-89, Boice, *Genesis*, 165-66.

deficient for God's own purposes. Furthermore, not only were they deficient, but also they were ignorant. There was a whole realm of knowledge that the snake possessed that they were not party to. Indeed, it was being deliberately withheld from them, and it was a knowledge that was theirs to grasp. Furthermore, this ignorance was apparent to others who they were relating to. They were shown up in their ignorance. This inference also was potentially humiliating.

The snake's assertion also inferred some negative things about the nature of God's relationship with them. God's invitation to the man to name the animals, the trouble God went to in order to find a right helpmate for the man, and God's action in placing the man and woman in God's sacred garden, all implied a special intimate loving relationship. They were in the "in" group with God. That God was apparently excluding them from becoming like God, however, cast doubt on their standing with God. Rather than being one of love and trust, the snake inferred that it was a fundamentally self-serving manipulative relationship. God was playing them for fools. To accept that would have been profoundly humiliating.

What the snake inferred about God was also damaging. The snake suggested that God also had this insider knowledge. The determinative inference conveyed by this statement was that God had deliberately withheld this knowledge from them and had deliberately misled them. When God warned that they would certainly die, they had trusted the veracity of what God said. The penalty of death, however, was an empty threat; God was begrudging them a great good.[52] To be informed that what God had told them was in fact not true cast doubt on God's bona fides. In other words, God's pronouncement violated the sincerity rule.

The snake's assertion cast doubt on God's good intentions. What the snake inferred was that God's actual intention was to safeguard God's own interests. God was withholding

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[52] Gunkel and Bonhoeffer also noticed this, observing that from their perspective the serpent was offering the possibility of a new deeper more pious, more obedient creaturely being, which would have been a good and desirable thing, even though it was at the cost of transgressing the commandment. The transgression was presented as a good versus a greater good ethical dilemma. Gunkel, *Genesis*, 17, Bonhoeffer, *Creation and Fall*, 113-14. See also Boice, *Genesis*, 165-69, and Henry, *Commentary*, 22.

from them something good and desirable; namely, the additional unspecified benefits of becoming like God. The snake's assertion inferred some pretty negative things about God's character and identity by inferring that God was acting on the basis of hidden motives.[53]

This observation casts a different light on the widespread interpretation that the woman no longer believed the veracity of God's Word. The issue was not the truthfulness of the Word that was spoken, and that they must believe it. Rather, the issue was the fidelity of the speaker who spoke the word. Speech Act Theory maintained that a violation of the sincerity rule through the infidelity of the speaker invalidates the word. This is what occurred here, rather than Eve not believing the Word.[54]

It has been argued that the cause of original sin was that the couple acted out of unbelief in God's word. For example, Luther maintained that the thrust of Satan's temptation was to make them doubt God's benevolence and disbelieve God's Word but believe its lie instead. This observation led Luther to conclude that, "The source of all sin truly is unbelief and doubt and abandonment of the Word."[55] Luther maintained that Eve's unbelief led to a corruption of her will and intellect, which led to her rebellious act of eating the fruit that followed.[56]

Alternatively, this could have been a case of gullibility. The aim of the snake was to secure a disruption of the interpersonal bridge between the couple and God through deception. The snake did this by claiming an inside knowledge into God's purposes behind the divine prohibition. On the basis of this claim, the snake sought to get the couple to accept it as an authoritative interpreter of knowledge. Thus, the crucial decision in the lead-up to the

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[53] Driver, *The Book of Genesis*, 45, Blocher, *In the Beginning*, 139, von Rad, *Genesis*, 88, Hamilton, *Genesis 1-17*, 189.

[54] This subtle distinction has been overlooked by commentators who maintained the crucial issue was disbelief of the Word. The emphasis on belief in the Word of God is a distinctive feature of reformed and evangelical theology. Luther, *Genesis*, 156-60, Calvin, *Genesis*, 153, Boice, *Genesis*, 169, Waltke, *Genesis*, 87.

[55] Luther, *Genesis*, 149.

[56] Ibid., 167-72.

transgression was Eve's decision to accept the snake as an authoritative interpreter and to listen to it. She became deluded as a result.

The problem here was that they acted as believers, not unbelievers. The orientation of a believer towards belief creates a vulnerability to deception or delusion. A believer is receptive to the truth claims of others. This means a believer can fall for false truth claims made by those who are either deluded themselves or are setting out to deceive. In contrast, an unbeliever responds to truth claims by cynicism and rejection. That Eve confessed that she had been deluded indicates that she had responded as a believer. Her error lay in not recognizing deception and not questioning the truth of the snake's claims adequately. Her error was naivety, not rebellious unbelief.[57]

Her choice had two aspects to it. The first aspect lay in the choice to listen to the snake, rather than simply rebuke it.[58] A choice to listen to someone involves a decision to being open to being influenced by what that person is saying. According to Johnson, the human activity of knowing is through a process of "indwelled participation" where what is known is divulged through performing some action. Humans learn through active engagement with the physical world with the expectation that something will be revealed in a moment of discovery.[59] Humans also learn through listening to others who function as authoritative interpreters and conveyors of knowledge. Humans learn in two ways, through active engagement and through listening.[60]

This process of knowing is a different model to the Cartesian epistemology that regarded the knower as the disengaged objective subject observing whatever is the object of

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[57] Aquinas observed that, before the Fall, Adam could not be deceived with respect to those things that he knew, but he could have been deceived with respect to things that his knowledge did not extend to. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Bk. I, Q. 94, Art. 4. Bonhoeffer stated that because the man and the woman had no conception of the lie, they could only interpret the snake's promise as one of the possibility of becoming more pious, more obedient, having a new and deeper creaturely being, characterized by a closer communion with God on the basis of them being more like God. Bonhoeffer, *Creation and Fall*, 113-14.

[58] Calvin, *Genesis*, 140-42.

[59] Dru Johnson, *Biblical Knowing: A Scriptural Epistemology of Error* (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2013), 32-33.

[60] Ibid., 33-48.

knowledge.[61] Descartes gave a central role to perception to gaining true knowledge.[62]

Descartes depicted the scientist as an observer of phenomena, rather than an active

experimenter. In contrast, Wittgenstein concluded that human knowledge is verified through

active engagement with the world, rather than objective perception of the world.[63] That is,

knowledge comes through action and listening. Furthermore, Kant asserted that human

knowledge arose out of the interplay between *á priori* cognitions and analytical *á priori*

knowledge and sense impressions or empirical representations.[64] These *á priori* concepts that

humans rely upon to interpret the phenomena that they perceive are acquired through listening

to others.

Consequently, the acquisition of knowledge is a social process, and knowledge is a

possession of the community,[65] rather than being the result of objective empirical observation

and analysis by individuals.[66] Social institutions are made up of bodies of knowledge and

proven practices for interacting with the world. They form traditions that are passed on to

subsequent generations.[67] These traditions acquire an unchallengeable status of simply being

the way things are, which Bourdieu called *doxa*.[68] God's commands enjoyed this status of

doxa.

People develop a corresponding internalized way of viewing, conforming to and

interacting with the world, which Bourdieu conceptualized as *habitus*. A *habitus* comprises

the internalized cognitive structures that shape and are shaped by how a person interprets and

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[61] René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 6th Meditation, pp. 56-9. His confidence in the accuracy of our perceptions rested on a premise of the veracity of God. Rene Descartes, *Discourse on Method, Meditations and Principles*, trans. John Veitch (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1912), Principles XXIX, XXX, p. 177.

[62] Descartes, *Discourse on Method, Meditations and Principles*, 181.

[63] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Ansombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), 145-63, pp. 22-3. Johnson's epistemology is closer to Wittgenstein's thought than that of Descartes. Dru Johnson, *Biblical Knowing: A Scriptural Epistemology of Error* (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2013), 32-3.

[64] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn (London: J. M. Dent, 1934), 23-27.

[65] Kuhn argued that the adoption of scientific theories is the result of a political process within the scientific community rather than objectively based on examination of the empirical data. Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

[66] Kenneth J. Gergen, *An Invitation to Social Construction* (London: Sage, 1999), 8-30, 55-57.

[67] Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction of Reality*, 70-87.

[68] Bourdieu, *Outline*, 164-67.

interacts with the world. A *habitus* is acquired through a learning process that involves, observation, listening, and participation in a person's initial social environment.[69] The couple's initial or primary *habitus* would have been formed from their experience of living in the garden with God as the authoritative interpreter of their traditional knowledge.[70] This initial *habitus* is what was being challenged when the snake claimed the role of an authoritative interpreter who could guide the woman to knowledge.

The epistemological issue here was not that the couple was grasping autonomy of empirical knowledge independent of God. It was who would the couple accept as their authoritative interpreter. In this respect, the snake was claiming a role that belonged to God. In Genesis 2 the man listened to and was guided by God in the process of gaining knowledge. In Genesis 3 the couple listened to the snake, and the man listened to the woman.[71] Here, the couple accepted the snake as an authoritative interpreter who could guide them into knowledge, instead of continuing to trust and listen to God. This means that the interpretation that the knowledge of good and evil concerned asserting an autonomous empirically based knowledge is based on inadequate epistemolgy.[72]

Accepting the snake's implied claim to be an authoritative interpreter of knowledge opened them up to the psychological impact of the snake's inferences regarding their identity. Their sense of adequacy would have been replaced by a sense of inadequacy. Their sense of acceptance and belonging would have been replaced by a sense of exclusion. Their sense of trust would have been replaced by a sense of betrayal. The serpent's indirect suggestion amounted to an invitation to act on the basis of a disbelief regarding their adequacy.

The illocutionary force of these implicatures reflected the snake's intention to humiliate the couple. Casting doubt on God's character, casting doubt on the nature of God's

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[69] Deborah Reed-Danahay, *Locating Bourdieu* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 46-50, Bourdieu, *Outline*, 78-87.
[70] Bourdieu, *Outline*, 72-78.
[71] Johnson, *Biblical Knowing*, 48.
[72] Ibid., 52-62.

relationship with them, and casting doubt on their own dignity, were all inferences that would have had a humiliating impact. To be shown up for ignorant fools, who had been naively trusting, only to be tricked all along, is typically a highly humiliating experience. To be found to be mistaken about the nature of an intimate relationship is humiliating. To discover that one's trust in someone else's character is misplaced is humiliating. It casts doubt on one's judgment. Loss of trust leaves one feeling foolish and ashamed. If the couple had accepted what the snake was insinuating, then it was highly likely that they would have felt totally humiliated; they would have had an acute shame reaction.

This has profound theological and psychological implications. The serpent's suggestion amounts to an invitation to the man and woman to act out of a deficit identity. A deficit identity is a view of oneself in terms of what is lacking. One deficit identity statement we are all familiar with is, "I am a sinner." This identity statement defines a person in terms of what is lacking - a lack of righteousness and glory, a lack of self-completeness and adequacy, a statement that "I am not okay."

Awareness of deficit identity manifests itself in numerous ways: as shame, as anxiety, insecurity, inadequacy, ambition, and a drive to attain adequacy through pursuing things that symbolize success and self-fulfilment. One way a deficit identity manifests itself is through desire or concupiscence. The common factor behind the various interpretations regarding the woman's motivation in eating the fruit is self-enactment of a deficit identity that she already had, rather than an assuredness regarding her adequacy. Thus, we can see, this was not simply a crisis of faith in God, but more importantly, a crisis of faith in themselves.

As we have already discussed, an acute shame reaction is highly painful and very emotionally destabilizing. An ashamed person loses his or her objectivity and ability to think clearly and logically, and to make good problem-solving decisions and evaluations. A person

who feels humiliated tends to be emotionally reactive, and susceptible to suggestion and taking ill-considered impulsive action.[73]

5.1.7 Genesis 3:6.

The degree to which the snake succeeded in its intentions was revealed by the couple's response. The perlocutionary effect of the snake's assertion was that the couple took and ate the forbidden fruit of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. This involved a complex process with a number of distinct elements. On one level there was the epistemological process of heeding the snake as an authoritative interpreter of knowledge, followed by empirical verification through active experimentation. This is reflected in the process in verses 4-6. First, the woman listened to the snake. Then she empirically verified the snake's proposition through an experimental taste of the fruit to find out what would happen. Commentators who had emphasized the snake's deception focused on the listening aspect,[74] whereas those who emphasized the couple's independent action based on sensory desire for the fruit emphasized the empirical aspect.[75] What we have here is a combination of both processes rather than one or the other.[76]

As an authoritative interpreter, the snake was raising the couple's consciousness regarding a problem and presenting it as a problem. We see that from a Communications Theory perspective, the snake did this by making an inferred statement regarding their identity. The problem was that they were not only naively trusting, but also that they lacked knowledge. Furthermore, they were lesser beings than they could be due to the lack of this

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[73] Refer to Chapter Three, Section 3.4.

[74] Chrysostom, "Homily 16," *Genesis 1 - 17*, 214, ———, "Homilies on Timothy," Homily 9, (*NPNF¹ 13*): 435-36, Boice, *Genesis*, 166-67. Wenham emphasized the importance of the reversal of the hierarchy: the man listening to the woman, the woman listening to the snake, instead of the man listening to God and the woman listening to the man. Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, 75.

[75] This two stage process of listening followed by empirical verification is different to the assertion that the woman independently saw, desired and then tasted the fruit, which a number of interpreters have suggested: Tertullian, "On Modesty," 6 (*ANF 4*): 79, Philo, "Allegorical Interpretations," II. 18-26, (*Works*): 45-9. Chrysostom, "Homily 16," *Genesis 1 - 17*, 213, Augustine, *Literal Interpretation of Genesis*, XI.39, p. 451, Nyssa, "On the Making of Man," XVIII.4, XX.2-4, (*NPNF² 5*): 408, 10, Ambrose, "Paradise," 312, Henry, *Commentary*, 24, Davis, *Paradise to Prison*, 90, Stratton, *Out of Eden*, 46-7, Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 249, von Rad, *Genesis*, 87.

[76] A number of commentators have identified the presence of a two stage process. Luther, *Genesis*, 161, Calvin, *Genesis*, 151-53, LaCoque, *Trial of Innocence*, 197-99.

knowledge. They had not realized their potential to become like God (or become gods). The snake inferred that this deficit existed and that it was a problem. The snake was not drawing attention to what already was the case. Rather, it was engaging in an act of social construction, in effect engaging in a performative language act. If the couple were to accept the snake's interpretation, that would bring into existence a new social convention.

The snake is also pointing to a possible solution by drawing attention to the fruit of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. The snake, however, did not go so far as to suggest a solution. The couple were left to draw their own conclusions from what the snake was hinting at. The snake and the couple shared a prior knowledge that this knowledge was associated with eating from the forbidden tree. All that was required was an oblique reference to the fruit in question for the solution to their dilemma to become apparent.

There was also a parallel emotional process experienced as acute shame that was in response to inferred social shifts in relationships and social status. As we have already discussed, there are four defence scripts for managing acute shame as an emotion: Withdrawal, Attack-Self, Avoidance, and Attack-Other. As we have already argued, shame is related to an increased propensity to respond in maladaptive anger expressed through direct, indirect or passive aggression.[77]

The Attack-Other response can be expressed through various forms of aggression.[78] Aggression can be either physical or verbal, direct or indirect, active or passive. Physical aggression inflicts physical pain and injury, whereas verbal aggression inflicts psychological harm and emotional distress. Direct aggression is overt, whereas indirect aggression utilizes relational networks or social manipulation, and can be either overt or covert. Active

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[77] June Price Tangney et al., "The Relation of Shame and Guilt to Constructive Versus Destructive Responses to Anger across the Lifespan," 797-809.

[78] Most of the psychological research literature into indirect aggression has either studied the aggressive behaviour or children and adolescents with reference to their socio-emotional development, and the effect of school bullying and family dysfunction, or studied the relationship of aggression to personality disorders, or criminal behaviour. This body of literature is of very limited relevance to the situation of Adam and Eve in the garden, and it has not been referred to here.

aggression involves a deliberate act, whereas passive aggression involves inflicting harm

through deliberate inaction and tends to be covert and more deniable.[79] Aggression can be

goal-directed, an instrumental means to an objective, or person-directed aimed at harming

someone else.[80] Their act of eating the fruit can be regarded as goal-directed aggression with

the instrumental object of acquiring wisdom as a solution to what they lack.

The form of aggression people adopt is influenced by factors in the social context.

Björkqvist suggested that people adopt the form of aggression that is most likely to achieve

their objective with minimum danger to themselves, according to what he called an

effect/danger ratio.[81] In the social context where the other person occupies a superior social

status or has greater power, an Attack-Other response characteristically takes an indirect

aggressive form, rather than one of open defiance or direct aggression. Males have a greater

tendency to do direct aggression, while females tend to do indirect aggression.[82] People tend

to do indirect aggression in situations where there are established interdependent

relationships, and the social sanctions against direct aggression are high,[83] and when the threat

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[79] According to Buss's typology in The Psychology of Aggression, cited by Miller. Marisa L. Miller, "Covert Aggression: The Means and Motive of "Getting Away with It"" (University of Florida, 2008), 12-16.

[80] Melissa M. Kunimatsu and Monica A. Marsee, "Examining the Presence of Anxiety in Aggressive Individuals: The Illuminating Role of Fight-or-Flight Mechanisms," *Child Youth Care Forum* 41 (2012): 248.

[81] Björkqvist conceptualized the effect/danger ratio as "an expression of the subjective estimation of the likely consequences of an aggressive act." Kaj Björkqvist, "Sex Differences in Physical, Verbal, and Indirect Aggression: A Review of Recent Research," Sex Roles 30, no. 3/4 (1994): 181.

[82] These gender effects are influenced by other social factors, such as perceived power, richness of social networks, degree of threat of retaliation, and social norms and sanctions with respect to aggression. Deborah R. Richardson and Laura R. Green, "Social Sanction and Threat Explanations of Gender Effects on Direct and Indirect Aggression," *Aggressive Behavior* 25 (1999): 425-34; Deborah S. Richardson and Laura R. Green, "Direct and Indirect Aggression: Relatioships as Social Context," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 36, no. 10 (2006): 2492-508. Social sanctions against direct physical aggression affect the effect/danger ratio so people resort to indirect and relational forms of aggression instead.

[83] Ellen F. Dzus, "The Role of Potential Protective Factors in the Relationship between Anger and Aggression: A Cross-Cultural Investigation" (Pennsylvania State University, 2007). Hickman found this difference disappeared in work contexts where there are strong sanctions against direct physical aggression, and people generally resorted to relational aggression. Susan E. Hickman, "Examining Relational Aggression and Victimization in the Workplace" (University of Minnesota, 2005); John Archer and Sarah M. Coyne, "An Integrated Review of Indirect, Relational, and Social Aggression," *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 9, no. 3 (2005): 220-21. Research by Cohen et al found that the strong social sanctions and cultural norms in the culture of the southern United States fostered a shift away from direct aggression to covert indirect aggression. Dov Cohen et al., ""When You Call Me That, Smile!" How Norms for Politeness, Interaction Styles, and Aggression Work Together in Southern Culture," *Social Psychology Quarterly* 62, no. 3 (1999): 257-75.

was to a person's standing in a relationship.[84] This pattern is influenced by the degree to which people are socially connected, in that men who have rich social networks tend to respond more by resorting to indirect aggression.[85] The type of relationship influences the choice of what form of aggression to take. Choice regarding the form of aggression takes into account the nature of their interdependence, risk of retaliation, and damage to the relationship.[86] In relationships where the object of aggression has more power, a higher social status, and there is a relationship of dependency, the person in the inferior position is more likely to resort to indirect or passive covert forms of aggression, where there is a threat of retaliation that rules out direct aggression.[87]

Reactive aggression is related to emotion dysregulation.[88] Powerlessness in the relational context is related to the resorting to indirect aggression as opposed to direct especially physical aggression. Anxiety about one's status in the relationship is particularly related to the use of indirect aggression strategies.[89] Perceived organizational injustice is an identified precursor to indirect aggression by employees against the organization that takes the form of deviant behaviour that harms the interest of their employer.[90]

The snake's insinuations presented a threat to their standing in their relationship with God. The nature of the relationship and the nature of God ruled out the feasibility of any direct aggressive response. The indirect aggressive response made behind God's back in this

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[84] Lento-Zwolinski, "College Students' Self-Report of Psychosocial Factors in Reactive Forms of Relational and Physical Aggression," *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships* 24, no. 3: 407-21.

[85] Laura R. Green, Deborah R. Richardson, and Tania Lago, "How Do Friendship, Indirect, and Direct Aggression Relate?," *Aggressive Behavior* 22 (1996): 83-85; Samantha Walker, Deborah S. Richardson, and Laura R. Green, "Aggression among Older Adults: The Relationship of Interaction Networks and Gender Role to Direct and Indirect Responses," ibid.26 (2000): 145-54.

[86] Richardson and Green, "Direct and Indirect Aggression: Relatioships as Social Context," 2492-508.

[87] Agneta H. Fischer and Catharine Evers, "The Social Costs and Benefits of Anger as a Function of Gender and Relationships Context," *Sex Roles* 65 (2011): 23-34, Lauren Duncan and Ashli Owen-Smith, "Powerlessness and the Use of Indirect Aggression in Friendships," *Sex Roles* 55 (2006): 493-502.

[88] John J. Donahue et al., "Emotion Dysregulation, Negative Affect, and Aggression: A Moderated, Multiple Mediator Analysis," *Personality and Individual Differences* 70 (2014): 23-28; Kurt K. Stellwagen and Patricia K. Kerig, "Theory of Mind Deficits and Reactive Aggression in Child Psychiatric Inpatients: Indirect Effects through Emotion Dysregulation," *Journal of Child and Family Studies* 27 (2018): 3382-94.

[89] Duncan and Owens-Smith, "Powerlessness and the use of Indirect Aggression in Friendships," 493-502.

[90] Jesse S. Michel and Michael B. Hargis, "What Motivates Deviant Behavior in the Workplace? An Examination of the Mechanisms by Which Procedural Injustice Affects Deviance," *Motivation & Emotion* 41 (2017): 51-68.

instance was violating God's command, ignoring the prohibition, and rejecting God's authority with respect to this matter. These actions had an instrumental goal of acquiring wisdom as well as the emotional effect of a reactive getting back at God. While the emotional motivator behind this action was not hinted at in the story, it is plausible to infer that the couple acted out of anger at God. If the couple believed that God had duped them, anger would have been a natural response. This is because the emotion of anger functions to activate a person to defend his or her personal interests in response to boundary violations. A natural form of action their anger could have taken was simply taking and eating the fruit. But as verse six elaborates, the couple did not simply eat the fruit. Rather the effect of anger was to set aside the prohibition as simply a "given" that was not to be questioned. This suggests the unquestioned legitimacy of the prohibition has been successfully undermined by the snake's assertion. Where other commentators have regarded the couple's action as a deliberate act of rebellion, this thesis regards it as an impulsive act of anger.

Consequently, the couple entertained for the first time the very real possibility of eating the fruit. Prior to this moment, the couple simply had seen the fruit as forbidden; something not for them, something to be left alone. Its qualities simply did not come into consideration. Now the fruit became an object of desire.[91] The woman considered the fruit to be desirable for eating, pretty, and beneficial for wisdom or prudence. Her deliberation was not solely based on a rational consideration, but the emotional elements of desire now came into play.[92] There are two levels of temptation here, the serpent's suggestion regarding gaining wisdom, and the attractiveness of the fruit itself. Desire is the common factor behind both levels.[93]

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[91] There is a temporal sequence in this verse reflected in translating the wāw consecutive verbs: "when she saw ... then she took... then she ate,... then she gave". The rapid succession of verbs conveys a sense of a continuous sequential action.

[92] Calvin in his focus on the corruption of human nature in itself has lost sight of the relational significance of loss of confident trust in God, which is at the heart of the snake's deception. Calvin, *Genesis*, 151. Westermann offered an alternative interpretation that the mere fact that something is forbidden increases its attractiveness. Westermann does not adequately take into account the loss of confident trust that characterized the initial relationship between the couple and God. Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 249.

[93] This view has a long history in interpretation going back to Ambrose, "Paradise," 312.

There were a number of features that made it attractive. First, like the fruit of the other trees in the garden, it appeared to be good for eating (טֹוב הָעֵץ לְמַאֲכָל). That is, it appeared to be tasty. Curiosity about what this new taste sensation would be like would have come into play. They had already enjoyed the pleasure of sampling the fruit of the various trees of the garden, and finally they can sample this one as well. The reader can imagine her mouth already salivating. Certainly, neither the snake nor God's original prohibition had made any suggestion that the fruit itself was poisonous. This possibility may not have even occurred to them.

The second feature that the woman saw was that the fruit was beautiful in appearance (וְכִי תַאֲוָה־הוּא לָעֵינַיִם). Beauty attracts. Our natural inclination is to reach out, handle and touch beautiful objects, hold them and bring them closer for closer examination. We can imagine her taking the fruit and taking a moment simply to examine it and enjoy its prettiness. These two perceptions were with respect to the fruit itself, and its attractiveness on a sensual level.

The third consideration was of the tree itself. While the first two considerations were in the form of verbless clauses introduced by כִי and וְכִי, this third consideration was simply introduced by the prefix וְ. This subtle distinction in grammar supports the implication that this was a different type of consideration, a more considered reflective consideration rather than simply a naive unconsidered sensual desire to enjoy the fruit.

The tree itself was the object of consideration with respect to all that it stood for - what it offered, and what was to be gained. They were not simply chasing a taste sensation. The woman was taking into consideration all that the snake had suggested regarding being like God with a knowledge of good and evil. The narrator draws our attention to this avenue of consideration in the clause, "and [that] the tree was desirable (וְנֶחְמָד הָעֵץ) for prudence (לְהַשְׂכִּיל)." The niphil form of חָמַד meaning to desire or take pleasure in, identifies the tree as an object of desire, that it was desirable. The tree was not desirable in and of itself, but the object of desire was the acquisition of prudence. The hiphil infinitive construct of שָׂכַל has a

causative nuance to it. It has the sense of the gaining acquisition of prudence. And the

connotations of שֶׂכֶל is most accurately expressed by the English word "nous". We are

referring to a practical street-wise set of 'smarts' that enables a person to operate wisely and

prosper because of the consistent exercise of good decisions and acute social discernment.[94]

This provides a significant clue as to how "the knowledge of good and evil" was

understood to mean within the story. The snake suggested that they would gain a knowledge

of good and evil, which the narrator equated with שֶׂכֶל. This suggests that what was in view

here was not specifically moral autonomy, nor moral knowledge of what is good or bad, nor

the acquisition of scientific knowledge for its own sake. Rather, what was in view was

practical prudence, the ability to be smart and discerning with respect to making intelligent

life choices that lead to prosperity. This is not necessarily what the knowledge of good and

evil actually comprised of, but rather what *she* considered it to provide.

It is worth noting that becoming like God was not mentioned. There can be several

ways that the lack of reference to being like God can be interpreted.[95] The first one is that it is

implied, and that the tree was also desirable as a way to become like God. The snake

suggested that gaining a knowledge of good and evil was a means to becoming like God,

rather than an end in itself. Given that the woman was acting on the suggestion of the snake

rather than simply on her own initiative here, we can infer that what the snake suggested was

a motivating factor. That is, her objective was the desirability of becoming like God. The

second way it can be interpreted was that being like God was not being actively taken into

consideration at this point.

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[94] This is the subtle distinction between the use of שֶׂכֶל rather than the more widely used term for wisdom חָכְמָה.
Robbins also noted this distinction, and suggested that she wanted common sense wisdom rather than wanting
to be "like God" out of hubristic pride. Robbins, *The Storyteller and the Garden of Eden*, 131-134.

[95] It is worth noting in passing that unlike the impression one gains from the English translation, there is no
similarity in language between the reference to being "like God" here and the reference to being created as
God's likeness in Genesis 1:26. That passage refers to humans being כִּדְמוּתֵנוּ, whereas the snake simply stated
כֵּאלֹהִים.

A way of exploring the inferred meanings here is to examine the inferences regarding identity. The reference to שֶׂכֶל suggests that unlike the couple, God possessed שֶׂכֶל. This implies that they lacked it, and in that respect, they were inferior. In addition to the humiliation of being played for fools by God, there was the suggestion that God has withheld from them שֶׂכֶל. What is interesting is that a person who possesses שֶׂכֶל is not easily fooled. The snake was making a double-barrelled suggestion here. It was stating that the solution to not being fooled again was to gain the knowledge of good and evil from eating from the tree. Second, it was suggesting that they could overcome their inferiority to God by eating the fruit and becoming like God.

Chronic shame is closely connected with identity, and it is evoked by a sense of having an identity that is defined in terms of what one lacks (and should possess). As we have seen, an experience of acute shame can provoke an identity crisis. A person can either reaffirm his or her identity in the face of the disconfirming nature of the experience of feeling ashamed, or accept the disconfirming identification inferred by the humiliation and modify his or her sense of identity in the light of that experience. Repeated modifications of one's identity in response to experiences of acute shame lead to a person developing a shame-bound identity that underlies a person's sense of chronic shame.[96] When the snake made the humiliating insinuation that they had been deceived by God, it provoked such a crisis.

What this observation suggests is that the motivation for desiring the wisdom the tree provided was not *hubris* pride as much as a sense of humiliation that gave rise to a determination to not be humiliated in that way again. The more confident one's trust had been, and the closer the relationship to that person, the more distressing the experience of having one's trust being violated becomes. The greater the degree of distress, the more intense the sense of shame at betrayal of trust, and the more that the experience would give rise to general sense of distrust. The more a person has a general sense of distrust, the more

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[96] Refer to an extended discussion of this in Chapter Four.

desirable prudence becomes as an alternative characteristic to rely upon in the place of a naive trust in others.

What we are reconstructing in this analysis is that accepting the plausibility of what the snake was inferring would have evoked a strong emotional reaction from the man and woman. Their immediate action in taking and eating the fruit was the playing out of the reflexive action tendency of that emotional reaction. What we have here is three *waw* consecutive perfective verbs that suggest that we have an integrated action made of three components, rather than three separate consecutive actions. That is, the woman looked-took-ate-gave the fruit to the man with her and he also ate with her. The story presents this action as the initiative of the woman, as opposed to an action of the couple equally together. If the narrator wanted to emphasize the joint couple nature of the action, then presenting these verbs in third person plural, "they took and they ate the fruit" would have been the unambiguous way of presenting this. The story presents the woman as the primary actor. She was the first to be tricked, the first to respond, the first to eat, and the one who gave to her man with her.

There is a significant moment that is implied at this point. When they were on the point of actually eating the fruit, they would have been aware of a moment of truth. God's pronouncement that on the day they eat the fruit they would surely die was about to be tested. In other words, the immediate effect of eating the fruit would verify whose version was indeed correct, God's or the snake's.

The sequence presented here does not support the traditional view that the woman completely fell on her own and then, having fallen, subsequently set out to also tempt her man so that he would join her in the fall.[97] This interpretation relies on the assumption that there

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[97] This traditional view has been widely subscribed to, dating back to Jewish intertestamental literature in the pseudepigrapha. *Jubilees* 3:1-31 explicitly stated that the woman first ate the fruit and covered herself with a fig leaf, and then went and gave it to Adam. *2 Enoch* 31:3 stated that the devil corrupted Eve, and death came to Adam through his wife. *The Life of Adam and Eve*, 33: 3 stated, "Immediately the adversary, the devil, found opportunity while the angels were away and deceived your mother so that she ate of the illicit and forbidden tree. And she ate and gave to me." Likewise, the *Apocalypse of Adam and Eve* 7:3 stated, "And the enemy gave to her and she ate from the tree, since he knew that neither I nor the holy angels were near her. Then she gave also to me to eat." Paul's statement in 1 Timothy 2:14 provided a strong basis for this line of interpretation that was subsequently adopted by: Tertullian, *On the Apparel of Women* 1, (*ANF 4*): 14,

was an intervening dialogue between the woman and the man.[98] On the one hand, that the

man was with her and he also ate before the impact of eating the fruit became evident does

not support this traditional view of events here. On the other hand, the absence of third person

plural verbs here depicts the woman as the primary actor as distinct from this being a shared

action by the couple together. She was accompanied by the man when she responded to the

snake in taking and eating the fruit. He participated in the action in receiving the fruit that she

offered him and eating it with her. The story does not specify what motivated the man. Other

interpreters have suggested it was either simply a passive act of conformity,[99] or out of

solidarity with Eve,[100] or a deliberate act of rebellion.[101] The way the woman has been

depicted as the primary actor of the couple in the story supports the conclusion that the man

was acting out of conformity.

5.1.8 Genesis 3:7.

What was the impact of eating the fruit? The story states that the eyes of both of them were

opened. This suggests that there was a simultaneous impact, which infers that the action prior

to eating the fruit likewise was a simultaneous action. Even though the woman was the prime

actor who took the initiative, this suggests that both ate the fruit together at the same time.

Having one's eyes opened refers to a change of awareness where a person comes to see and

know something that had been hitherto unperceived. What they became aware of was the

self-conscious awareness of their own nakedness. The story does not elaborate what lay

behind their new-found awareness of the inappropriateness of their nakedness. Their action in

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Chrysostom, "Homilies on Timothy," (*NPNF[1] 13*): 435-36. Gregory Nazianzen, "Oration 18: On the Death of His Father," (*NPNF[2] 7*): 257, Ambrose, "Paradise," XIII, Henry, *Commentary*, 25, Luther, *Genesis*, 182, Schüngel-Straumann, "On the Creation of Man and Woman," 53-9, Jean M. Higgins, "The Myth of Eve: The Temptress," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 44 (1976): 639-44, Poole, *Bible Commentary,* 9.

[98] Gutt pointed out that it could be argued that the immediately preceding dialogue between the snake and the woman was implicitly repeated between the woman and the man as part of the overall sequence that is summarized as "he/she took the fruit and ate it." Gutt, *Translation and Relevance: Cognition and Context*, 86-7.

[99] Poole, *Bible Commentary,* 9, Cassuto, *Genesis*, 148, LaCoque, *Trial of Innocence*, 167-70, Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 249, Bledstein, "Genesis of Humans," 196, Trible, "Depatriarchalizing in Biblical Interpretation," 40.

[100] Davis, *Paradise to Prison*, 90, Skinner, *Genesis*, 72. This viewpoint was popularized in Milton's *Paradise Lost*.

[101] Boice, *Genesis*, 166-67.

covering themselves with leaves, however, implies a sense of shame.[102] There are a number of possible causes for this sense of shame.

From a psychological perspective, a sense of nakedness as nakedness has some characteristic features. Nakedness has to do with exposure, being seen by the wrong people in the wrong condition. This is accompanied by a sense of embarrassment, and the action tendency is to cover up one's nakedness by whatever means in available. It has been widely interpreted that in direct contrast to their unashamed nakedness in 2:25, they had a sense of nakedness in the gaze of each other. The implication of this was a profound change in either their own self-awareness as persons-in-the-gaze of the other, or a change in the nature of their relationship from innocent care-free unclothedness to self-conscious nakedness.[103]

There are enough clues in the story to enable us to construe what occurred on a psychological level following the eating of the fruit. A number of possible dimensions to this new self-conscious awareness of nakedness in gaze of each other have already been identified by interpreters. The first dimension is a sense of shame and guilt, that they now had something they felt ashamed of and had to hide. It reflected a guilty conscience and sense of conviction and shame at having sinned by disobeying God in eating the forbidden fruit.[104] Alternatively, their sense of nakedness could have gone beyond guilt to an awareness of a loss of former glory, and in its place a corruption of their nature.[105] This is still experienced as a deep sense of existential shame, that there is something profoundly lacking with me at the level of my being.[106]

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[102] Stratton, *Out of Eden*, 49-50.

[103] For extended discussion refer to Chapter Three, Sections 3.2.3-5.

[104] Irenaeus suggested that the leaves provided a girdle of continence in an act of repentance for their sin and its consequence of the stirring of sexual lust. Irenaeus, "Against Heresies," III.23.4, (*ANF 2*): 457. Other commentators concluded that it was an expression of guilt. Calvin, *Genesis*, 157-58, Hoekema, *God's Image*, 133, H. C. Leupold, *Exposition of Genesis* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1952), 145, Hartman, "Sin in Paradise," 34-5, Poole, *Bible Commentary, Vol. 1*, 9.

[105] Chrysostom, "Homily 16," *Genesis 1 - 17*, 217, Gregory of Nyssa, "On Virginity," (*NPNF² 5*): 357, Luther, *Genesis*, 167. Luther added that the corruption of our nature had a follow-on effect of corrupting our sexuality, reflected in the association that shame regarding nakedness has to sexuality. Henry, *Commentary*, 26. Henry added that covering their loins was a symbolic action for covering their sins. And more recently: Boice, *Genesis*, 178-80, Anderson, *The Genesis of Perfection*, 126, Davis, *Paradise to Prison*, 91.

[106] This was a key element of Sartre's philosophy. He connected human openness of being with a fundamental lack in being. The urge towards human transcendence, comes into being only through lacking" Jean Paul

The second dimension is a newly awakened sexual awareness of themselves as the object of lust and sexual desire from the other, in the place of a naive non-sexual innocent nakedness. The opening of the eyes is identified with sexual awakening, that moment of awareness that simultaneously changes the way that people of the gender that one is sexually attracted to are viewed, along with an embarrassed awareness of oneself as the object of sexual desire. [107] This new awareness is frequently accompanied by a sense of shame and embarrassment. Of course, this dimension presumes a prior relationship of naive sexual innocence, which we have already argued may not have been the case.[108]

There is, however, a third dimension that has been generally overlooked. There is a common sense of shame and embarrassment at appearing uncovered in public, which is closely related to a sense of propriety. Other interpreters have suggested that their sense of nakedness evoked a need for clothing, which may have been the first step towards civilization.[109] There was a third actor present, the snake. [110] Their self-conscious nakedness may have been with reference to the snake, rather than each other. The couple were still

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Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (London: Methuen, 1958), 85-87. He maintained that the human desire for self-transcendent completion is essentially a lacking. It arises out of human nothingness, and results from the nihilation of the totality of being in-itself into being for-itself. This lack occurs at the heart of being for-itself that characterizes human reality. According to Sartre, shame "is a shameful apprehension of something and this something is me. I am ashamed of what I am." Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 221. This shame is evoked when one perceives oneself as the object of the Other's gaze. "Thus shame is shame of oneself before the Other." Ibid., 222.

[107] Tertullian, "On Prayer," 22, (*ANF 3*): 688, ———, "On the Veiling of Virgins," 11, (*ANF 4*): 34, ———, "Treatise on the Soul," 38, (*ANF 3*): 218-19, Augustine, *City of God*, Book XIII.13, pp. 522-23, ———, *Literal Interpretation of Genesis*, Book XI.40-42, p. 452-54, Brandon, *Creation Legends of the Ancient near East*, 136. Bonhoeffer argued that their awareness of nakedness was in response to a perversion of their sexuality, which became characterized by the desire to possess the other person rather than the movement of love toward union with the beloved. Covering oneself was a necessary boundary protective measure in response to the threat of lust. Bonhoeffer, *Creation and Fall*, 122-26. LaCoque also observed that clothing both covers and draws attention to what is covered, and denoted a change to a more guarded intimacy in their relationship. LaCoque, *Trial of Innocence*, 171.

[108] Refer to Section 5.1.1

[109] Barr, *The Garden of Eden and the Hope of Immortality*, 60-4, Callender, *Adam in Myth and History*, 73-5, Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 251.

[110] LaCoque had identified this factor in his comments on the wordplay between ערום and עֲרוּמִים. He identified that the arrival of the snake introduced a third person who intruded upon the couple's reciprocal nudity and makes it public, and hence shameful. "Thus, nakedness is not inherently shameful; it is made shameful by a third party corrupting the quality of relationship." So, their awareness of nakedness may simply be in response to their self-consciousness in the presence of the snake. LaCoque, *Trial of Innocence*, 137.

under the gaze of the snake as they ate the fruit. What sort of gaze would it have been? There are rich implicatures in the scene being depicted here.[111]

The couple saw the tree as being desirable for the gaining of prudence. Instead, their eyes were opened to a sense of nakedness. This was distinctly not prudence. Neither was nakedness a desirable thing associated with prudence and wisdom. Quite the contrary. One can infer from this that the immediate effect of eating the fruit was totally unexpected.[112] What occurs when one does something expecting one outcome, and instead experiences a totally unanticipated negative outcome? Instead of wisdom, foolishness. It is reasonable to infer that they would have felt tricked. Then there was the snake, looking at them, with a satisfied knowing gaze that may have communicated that it knew all along. This is not the first time they felt tricked, however, nor was it the first time that their eyes were opened. That had already occurred in verse 5.

We have already analysed that while the facts that the snake relayed in its assertion in verse five, on the face of it, were true, what the snake implied was not. The illocutionary force of the snake's assertion was to open their eyes, so that they would see God and the prohibition in a different light. They would have had a gut-wrenching change of awareness of God from being totally trustworthy, to one who was duplicitous. They would have had a change of awareness with respect to the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil from something that was not for them and of no benefit, to something beneficial that had been withheld from them for self-serving purposes. The first instance of their eyes being opened had already occurred with the woman having a new awareness of the fruit of the tree as being edible, beautiful, and desirable for gaining wisdom. On the basis of their eyes being opened to the nature of the fruit, she and her man both ate.

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[111] It can be noted that the socially privileged areas of naturalist nakedness are vulnerable to intrusion by others who do not ascribe to the social conventions that protect these privileged areas, and that they are vulnerable to being taken out of context. Such an intrusion could have occurred here with the entry of the snake. Cover, "The Naked Subject", 63-68.

[112] Driver, *The Book of Genesis*, 46, Cassuto, *Genesis*, 148.

Immediately after this first change in awareness, their eyes were opened a second time. What did they become aware of? The first thing would have been the nature of the snake's deception. The snake had successfully manoeuvred them into taking an action that they immediately regretted. Rather than becoming wise, they became aware of their foolish gullibility. That would have been humiliating. This suggests that awareness of nakedness could be referring to their sense of exposure to the snake in their gullibility, followed by an awareness of guilt/iniquity and anticipatory anxiety regarding the upcoming confrontation with God when God discovers what they had done. The action tendency in response to both these emotions would have been a desire to withdraw, cover up and hide.

This means that it is quite possible that the fruit was a placebo. It was no magic fruit that yielded a new divine wisdom. The fruit in and of itself had no conscious changing effect. Nothing happened. It was precisely that nothing happened upon eating the fruit that gave rise to their sense of nakedness. Eating the fruit was the occasion for a change in awareness, and that change occurred on the level of the relationship dynamics surrounding the actions regarding the fruit. This means that the story does not rely upon the fruit itself causing a change in awareness for explaining how events unfolded.

The reflexive action tendency of people who find themselves exposed in their nakedness is to cover themselves up, giving priority to their genitals. This is precisely what the man and woman did. They took what were at hand, leaves, and they covered themselves up. Their action in making loin coverings (חֲגֹרֹת) was a characteristic reflexive response to the sense of embarrassment that people being found naked experience.[113] That the חֲגֹרָה was a loin covering is inferred from their nakedness, rather than the explicit lexical meaning. חֲגֹרָה most commonly refers to a belt that a warrior is girded with to hang his sword upon. While nakedness generally has sexual connotations, it is not exclusively so. Children have a bashfulness regarding their nakedness. Both men and women have a bashfulness regarding

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[113] The occurrence of the *holem* rather than the *holem waw* in this only instance of the feminine plural form of this noun may be a defective spelling.

nakedness in public showers and changing rooms. Nevertheless, as soon as there is nakedness

in the company where sexual attraction exists between those present, it unavoidably gains

sexual overtones. And so there would have been sexual overtones in the scene here even if

they were not the primary basis of the couple's sense of nakedness.

5.2 Summary and Conclusion

As we have just demonstrated, paying attention to the illocutionary force of the speech acts in

the dialogue between the snake and the couple provides for a richer interpretation of the story.

Paying attention to the way implicatures make reference to the identity of the actors and

convey the dynamic way that relationships are continually modified provides valuable insight

into what was actually occurring between the characters in this story. These inferred elements

can at times be decisive in providing support to one interpretation over against another.

Analysis of the implicatures is particularly valuable for identifying the presence of

shame within a story simply because humiliation and shame are rarely overt but are most

commonly inferred. The preceding analysis of the implicatures has identified the way that the

snake's communication would have had a humiliating emotional impact upon the couple. The

snake cast doubt on the quality of the couple's relationship with God that they had previously

taken for granted. The snake called into question their adequacy as persons, which would

have cast doubt upon their own identity. The snake took a power position in claiming superior

knowledge that provided the basis for its claim to be a superior authoritative interpreter who

could guide them into new knowledge. In calling God's fidelity and benevolence into

question, the snake delegitimized the authoritative position God had taken in God's

relationship with them. The knowledge the snake was presenting was a knowledge regarding

the nature of God's relationship with them, and their standing in that relationship. This was

the crucial issue.

Once the couple accepted the plausibility of what the snake was inferring, then shame

would have been the natural emotional response. We have argued that the couple's action in

taking and eating the fruit was consistent with the reflexive action tendency of the emotional response of acute shame. The fruit of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil happened to be the object around which this largely inferred debate regarding the couple's relationship with God revolved around. What was at stake was not the knowledge contained in the fruit itself, but how their action in taking and eating it would affect their relationship with God.

The analysis in this chapter has illustrated how the perspectives provided by Speech Act Theory, Relevance Theory and Communications Theory allow for a richer interpretation of the Eden Narrative through paying attention to the meanings conveyed by the implicatures in the text. We have also demonstrated how the dynamics of shame explain the illocutionary force of the snake's speech acts, and the reactions of the couple to the snake's revelations.

Chapter 6: The Eden Narrative: The Judgment of God

6.0 Introduction

The reading of the discourse between the snake and Eve and Adam presented in the preceding chapter demonstrated that paying attention to the implicatures reveals that there was a lot transpiring between the snake and the couple in this discourse in Genesis 3:1-7. The snake raised questions regarding the nature of their relationship with God, God's fidelity, their adequacy, and what they knew and did not know. The snake inferred that they had been tricked by God, which would have been humiliating. When the couple heeded the snake and took the fruit in violation of God's express prohibition, they discovered that they had been tricked in turn by the snake. The remainder of the story relates how God dealt with the situation that had now arisen. God first interviewed the man and the woman to ascertain the facts. Then God levied curses and punishments against all three miscreants. Finally, God implemented the curses against the man and woman by redefining their social relationships and by evicting them from the garden.

There are elements of shame throughout the rest of this story. The curse against the snake was primarily one of disgrace. The depiction of the snake slithering upon the earth is one of the permanent disgrace of defeat. The woman's disgrace lay in being subject to her husband. Finally, the man (and the woman with him) experienced the disgrace of eviction from the garden. All these punishments involved changes in social status. Yet, there were also acts of divine mercy. God did not inflict a death penalty, but banished the couple from the garden instead. God addressed their shame by providing garments that signified a high social status.

6.1 The Interview with God

6.1.1 Genesis 3:8.

Verse 8 introduces a change of scene with the sound of God strolling about in the garden. We have an anthropomorphic depiction of God in this passage. God walked in such a manner that God was heard. God spoke. God made garments. God did physical actions that implied that there was a corporeal aspect to God. The narrative depicts a theophany where God manifested his presence in a physical form.[1]

The reference to לְרוּחַ הַיּוֹם may contain an oblique reference to time, or a reference to the cooling wind that commonly rises up towards the end of the day prior to sunset.[2] The definite article may have the thrust of indicating *that* day, that is, the very same day that they ate the fruit.

The Hebrew hithpael participle מִתְהַלֵּךְ has an iterative sense of walking back and forth or strolling around.[3] The hithpael inferred that either God was casually wandering around the garden, or that God was purposefully looking all over for them. Two alternative implications can be construed here. One implication is that God was unaware that anything was amiss. God was simply showing up towards the end of the day, as God was accustomed to do in the normal rhythm of their relationship.

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[1] Philo regarded it as a misperception. Philo, "Questions & Answers," 1.42, (*Works*): 799. Other commentators regarded this as figurative language. Origin, "Contra Celsum," VI.64, (*ANF 4*): 602, Cassuto, *Genesis*, 151, von Rad, *Genesis*, 88, Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, 76. Gunkel regarded it as evidence of a primitive mythological source material. Gunkel, *Genesis*, 19. Tertullian suggested that God appeared through the agency of the Son, because the Father dwelt in unapproachable light. Tertullian, "Against Praxeas," 16, (*ANF 3*): 611-12 Poole also adopted the same conclusion. Poole, *Bible Commentary,* 9.

[2] Tertullian, "Against Praxeas," 16, (*ANF 3*): 611-12, Cassuto, *Genesis*, 151, Collins, *Genesis 1-4*, 151, Speiser, *Genesis*, 24, Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, 49-50, Driver, *The Book of Genesis*, 46. Niehaus argued that the gentle breeze was actually a storm, and that this was a storm epiphany. Jeffrey Niehaus, "In the Wind of the Storm: Another Look at Genesis III 8," *Vetus Testamentum* 44, no. 2 (1994): 263-67. His argument is refuted by Grundke who argued that even though storm epiphanies occur elsewhere in the Old Testament, it is a long stretch to interpret *rûah* as a storm. Christopher Grundke, "A Tempest in a Teapot? Genesis III 8 Again," *Vetus Testamentum* 51, no. 4 (2001): 548-551. This view that the "wind of the day" refers to a storm has its origin in the 19th century Old Testament mythical school that sought a naturalistic explanation for mythological events. Eichhorn and Herder argued that the original event was that a sudden thunder storm frightened the couple after they ate some fruit from a tree, and this event was embellished as a theodicy. This interpretation no longer has credibility with current scholarship. J. W. Rogerson. *Myth in Old Testament Interpretation* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1974), 9-13.

[3] Ross, *Introducing Biblical Hebrew*, 208.

The story implies that there had been a relaxed open easy relationship of intimacy, communion and friendship between God and this couple. This relationship had a hierarchy in which God enjoyed the superior position and God set the rules and stipulations governing the relationship. It was a relationship on God's terms. Breaking God's terms of relationship by eating the forbidden fruit changed the relationship. It was no longer one of easy familiarity, but one fraught with tension and fear. Rather than engagement, there was withdrawal. Rather than easy familiarity, there was evasiveness. Rather than welcome, there was fear. The original nature of their relationship and the subsequent change in their relationship is conveyed in the implicatures in the story. These relationship dynamics are discerned by paying attention to the inferred definitions of the relationship that are being exchanged here, which according to Communications Theory is a standard feature of social communication on an inferential level.

The response of the man was uncharacteristic when he heard God coming. The reader can construe that the man would have in the past gone out to meet and greet God, with whom he was friends. On this occasion the man hid for the first time.[4] Their failure to immediately greet God was the first indicator that something was seriously amiss. The man did not hide alone. He hid with his woman, just as they had eaten the fruit together and made leaf loin cloths together. They were hiding specifically from the face of God. Hebrew often utilizes face (פְּנֵי) metaphorically to mean in the presence of someone, or before someone, or an attitude towards someone. This indicates that they were specifically hiding from God and that they were using the trees for cover.

There a chiastic structure in reference to the trees of the garden. The Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil was referred to by the woman as הָעֵץ אֲשֶׁר בְּתוֹךְ־הַגָּן - literally "the tree which [is] in the midst of the garden. Here they hid in the midst of the trees of the

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4 The hithpael tense of חָבָא conveys a reflexive sense that he hid himself.

garden, בְּתוֹךְ עֵץ הַגָּן.[5] This chiastic structure suggests that these two actions are linked. The woman desired the fruit for the wisdom she would gain from it, yet the first two actions the couple took after availing themselves of the fruit stand out for their foolish futility. Covering themselves with leaves was futile. Likewise, their attempt to hide from God was futile.[6]

Both these actions convey a sense of desperation rather than wisdom that was almost pitiable. The couple's decision to hide was an emotional reaction rather than any thought through effective problem-solving strategy. The emotional basis of their reaction has been identified as shame, guilt, or fear.[7] Their subsequent futile actions suggest a lack of wisdom for effective problem solving in the situation they found themselves in. This implies that they had gained no additional knowledge or wisdom from the fruit itself. As mentioned in the last chapter, it may have been a placebo.

6.1.2 Genesis 3:9-10.

The reliance upon implicatures is reflected in a subtle chiastic structure in the dialogue here. The text presents God's request "Where are you?" (explicature), and the man's response in coming forth (implicature). Then there is God's unspoken questions, "Why are you hiding?" and "What has happened to you?" (implicature), to which the man responds (explicature). Taken literally, God's first question of "Where are you?" suggests that God did not know where they were.

The implications that a reader of the text may draw regarding God's intentions depend upon the reader's assumptions regarding God's omniscience.[8] If God was omniscient, then

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[5] The singular form of עֵץ can also collectively denote trees or a wood, because the plural form of עֵץ generally refers to firewood. The plurality of tree or trees depends upon ostensive references in the context.

[6] Henry, *Commentary*, 28, Luther, *Genesis*, 171-72, Calvin, *Genesis*, 158.

[7] Philo suggested that they hid out of an awareness of shame at their loss of virtue. Philo "Allegorical Interpretations" 2.1, (*Works*): 50, _____ "Questions and Answers on Genesis," I.43, (*Works*): 799. Irenaeus suggested that Adam hid out of terror, which itself was a sign of repentance. Irenaeus, "Against Heresies," III.23.5, (*ANF 2*): 457. Poole regarded their action as a combination of shame, guilt and fear. Poole, *Bible Commentary,* 9. It was fear of being naked before God: Stratton, *Out of Eden*, 50-51, Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 254. It was a sign of a guilty conscience: Hippolytus, "Fragments from Commentaries," (*ANF 5*): 163. Bonhoeffer, *Creation and Fall*, 128, Cassuto, *Genesis*, 154-55, LaCoque, *Trial of Innocence*, 208-9. Luther regarded their reaction as one of anxiety and guilt. Luther, *Genesis*, 171-72. Henry and Gowan regarded it as fear of God's judgment. Henry, *Commentary*, 26, Gowan, *From Eden to Babel*, 55.

[8] The presumption of God's omniscience has been maintained by: Athanasius, "Four Discourses against the Arians," in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Second Series*, ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (Peabody,

God already knew where the man and woman were and what had occurred. The implication

of this assumption is that God could simply have walked straight up to their hiding place and

brought them to light. God's intention was to give the man and woman an opportunity to

choose to either remain in hiding or come out into God's presence. God was giving the man

and woman relational space to respond. God's intentions have been construed as either

expressing reproof,[9] an inquiry regarding Adam's spiritual state,[10] providing opportunity for

Adam to confess,[11] or simply to respond and come forth.[12] The presumption that God was

being gracious, however, are construed primarily from the reader's pre-understandings

regarding the character of God obtained from later dogma, rather than from determinative

implicatures in the text itself. Since the omniscience of God is not presumed in the Eden

Narrative, we can conclude that the illocutionary force of this request was for the man to

emerge from hiding and come before God's presence (פָּנִים).

That God addressed the man alone rather than calling to both of them implied that

God had a primary relationship with the man. This can be inferred from the sequence and

manner of their creation in Genesis 2. The man was created first from soil, whereas the

woman was subsequently created from the man as a matching helper fit for him. This is not

simply a matter of stylistic balance where the fact that the snake addressed the woman is

balanced out by God addressing the man.

The reason for this conclusion is that whereas the snake consistently addressed both of

them with the second person plural, God addressed each of the three individually. This scene

provides a structural contrast between couple solidarity and individual accountability. The

snake addressed them as a couple prior to this scene, and God dealt with them as a couple

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MA: Hendrickson, 1892/1994), Discourse III.50, p. 421. *Tertullian, "Against Marcion," II.25, pp. 316-17.*
Speiser, *Genesis*, 24.

[9] Tertullian, "Against Marcion," II.25, (*ANF 3*): 316-17, Augustine, *Literal Interpretation of Genesis*, XI.45, p.
455, Luther, *Genesis*, 173-74, Calvin, *Genesis*, 162, Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, 76-7.

[10] Ambrose, *Paradise*, 348.

[11] Augustine, *On Genesis*, II.24, p. 87, Bonhoeffer, *Creation and Fall*, 128.

[12] Chrysostom, "Homily 17," *Genesis 1 - 17*, 224-26, Henry, *Commentary*, 26, Cassuto, *Genesis*, 155-56,
Gowan, *From Eden to Babel*, 56, LaCoque, *Trial of Innocence*, 31-2, Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 255.

following this scene. This scene is the only place in the narrative where all four characters explicitly interact individually. This scene suggests that prior to even the closest social relationship with any other human, every human is in a relationship of solitary responsibility to God in face-to-face encounter.[13] This tableau of God calling the man and the woman each into solitary face-to-face encounter describes something profound about the nature of the divine relationship with every human being. In coming forth, the man displayed an inclination to obedience in the face of his fear that was pressuring him to flee and hide. The man's obedience to God's requests reflected his corresponding position of obedience and responsibility in this relationship. Despite the crisis created by the eating of the fruit, their fundamental agreement regarding the terms of their relationship remained intact.

The sparseness of the narrative is apparent here. The explicatures are minimal and there is a reliance upon the implicatures to fill in the gaps. It is implied that the man responded and came out of hiding to meet God, and that the woman accompanied him. The man immediately gave an explanation for why he was hiding. He was afraid because he was naked. This is puzzling because one would expect that he was afraid because he was guilty breaking God's prohibition.[14] Furthermore, in Chapter 2 they were both naked with God and before each other and that was not an issue. Now suddenly nakedness was an issue, and this nakedness was directly connected with eating the fruit. Furthermore, it was an unanticipated and unintended consequence. In addition to the psychological consequences of changes in self-awareness of oneself-as-an-object-in-the-view-of-the-other, we see in their subsequent responses to God's arrival in the garden a profound change in the nature of their relationship with God.

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[13] This emphasis is a feature of Brunner's theological anthropology. Emile Brunner, *Man in Revolt: A Christian Anthropology*, trans. Olive Wyon, Lutterworth Library (London: Lutterworth Press, 1939), 279-85.

[14] Robbins also noted this discrepancy, though I think he takes his interpretation too far in suggesting that God was more interested in finding what manner of knowledge they had gained than the matter of disobedience itself. Robbins, *The Storyteller and the Garden of Eden*, 136.

Various explanations have been offered for the man's fear, including embarrassment at being naked, [15] the Israelite taboo against exposing one's nakedness in God's presence, [16] and guilt and shame due to sinfulness. [17] The variety of speculative reasons that commentators provided for why the man was afraid is due to the lack of attention they paid to the implied references to other parts of the story, which make it evident what the man was afraid of. The man was afraid of what he anticipated that God would do. God had stated what would certainly happen should the man eat of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. On the very same day the man would die. God was the bringer of this doom. The prospect of death was closely associated with this moment of accountability to God for his actions. So, a determinative implicature was that the man was afraid of the prospect of imminent death. It remained an unspoken tension between them.

6.1.3 Genesis 3:11.

Now came the inevitable confrontation. God asked two key questions. The man's behaviour in hiding and his admission of his nakedness was enough to make it obvious that the fruit had already been eaten, even if God did not know the details of how this event had transpired. There is a chiastic pattern to these two questions that suggests that they go together. The first question (מִי הִגִּיד לְךָ כִּי עֵירֹם אָתָּה) has the structure: interrogative, verb, indirect object, object; and the second question (הֲמִן־הָעֵץ ... אָכָלְתָּ) has the structure: interrogative, object, subordinate clause, verb. The illocutionary force of these two questions is that God was calling the man to account for what they both knew that the man had done.

What is puzzling about the first question is the implication that someone told the man that he was naked. This is contradictory to the story that relates that their awareness of nakedness came from the experience of having their eyes opened upon eating the fruit, rather than actually being told. The implication of the question is not supported by the context of

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[15] Augustine, *Literal Interpretation of Genesis*, XI.46, pp. 455-56, Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 254.
[16] von Rad, *Genesis*, 88.
[17] Calvin, *Genesis*, 162, Henry, *Commentary*, 27.

the story. The context of the story suggests that no one told them that they were naked. This was something they discovered for themselves. Yet this inconsistency highlights a discordant element and the tension between God and the man. That the story infers a "no" answer points to the loss of agreement between them, and the disconnect that that has led to.

There is a fascinating epistemological implication here. The modern conception of knowledge presumes that it is a possession of the individual and empirically based upon the individual's own perception of the world. This reflects the influence of Descartes' and Locke's empirical epistemology.[18] Yet Kant undercut both the rationalistic assumptions of innate *á priori* concepts as well as the absolute empiricist assumptions of the passive receptivity of the mind to sensory impressions. Kant argued that the mind actively perceives and organizes sensory information with reference to *á priori* concepts and categories. Kant asserted that human knowledge arose out of the interplay between *á priori* cognitions and analytical *á priori* knowledge and sense impressions or empirical representations.[19] Intelligible meaning requires sense impressions to be related to one another within a unified field of consciousness. Hence the mind is not a passive receiver of objective empirical impressions, but an active processor of sensory impressions in relation to *à priori* conceptions.[20] The notion of "nakedness" is such an *á priori* concept.

These *á priori* concepts are socially derived and a property of the community. As de Saussure pointed out, conceptual knowledge, indeed intelligible thought itself, is mediated by language. While the faculty of speech is a capacity of the individual, language is a possession of the speaking community.[21] Furthermore, intelligible meaning is not based on the relation between a word and the object it signifies, but it is derived from its relations to other words,

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[18] Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, 3rd Meditation 37-41, pp. 26-9; 6th Meditation 81-3, pp. 56-7, Locke, *Human Understanding*, 45.
[19] Kant, *Critique*, 23-27.
[20] Ibid., 91-121.
[21] Saussure, *General Linguistics*, 76-8. De Saussure defined language as a system of signs, stating, "It is both a social product of the faculty of speech and a collection of necessary conventions that have been adopted by a social body to permit individuals to exercise that faculty." ———, *General Linguistics*, 9.

for language is a system of interdependent terms.[22] Consequently, knowledge is a property of

the linguistic community rather than a possession of the individual. All conceptual knowledge

that is mediated by language has a social origin; it is learnt by individuals from the linguistic

community that they are a part of. That is, we know because someone told us.

Language is a powerful system of signs comprised of symbolic devices such as words

that by convention can come to signify, mean, represent or symbolize something beyond

themselves. Words are symbols, and people come to agreements regarding what the words

signify or what their function is in different discourses or institutional contexts.[23] This

emphasis on the central role of linguistic conventions in meaning has led social

constructionism to make the following assumption. "Social constructionists suppose that if

descriptive meaning is governed by conventions, then judgments about the truth or falsity of

descriptions must be made by reference to conventions, rather than by reference to observable

features of the world."[24] Furthermore, mutual understanding presupposes an agreement

regarding those conventions.

Thus, the concept of 'nakedness' is only intelligible with reference to social

conventions and agreements regarding nakedness and being clothed. Nakedness is a social

fact rather than a 'brute' empirically perceived natural fact.[25] Consequently, a knowledge of

'nakedness' is socially derived through being told, rather than empirically observed. Hence,

God was absolutely correct in deducing the man could only have known about nakedness

through being told. The implication is that the social conventions that serve as the reference

point for the meaning of 'nakedness' were those of Ancient Israel. This means that it is

reasonable to deduce that Adam's fear that he was naked was a veiled reference to cultural

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22 Saussure, *General Linguistics*, 114.
23 Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality*, 59-61.
24 John D. Greenwood, *Realism, Identity and Emotion: Reclaiming Social Psychology* (London: Sage, 1994),
     42-50.
25 Searle argued that there are two levels of phenomena, what he calls brute facts and institutional facts. Brute
     facts refer to phenomena in the physical world, whereas institutional facts refer to social phenomena.
     Institutional facts denote social structures and institutions that are created and maintained by conventions and
     agreements and patterns of social interaction. Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality*, 28-9.

taboos regarding exposure of nakedness in the presence of God.[26]

6.1.4 Genesis 3:12.

The man did not answer God's first question. It could simply be that he had no answer that he could make. To admit that no one told him amounted to an inexcusable admission of responsibility. He could have answered it by shifting the blame onto the snake, by stating that, "the snake told him." That he did not suggests that the snake was not that explicit. Alternatively, it could be an inference that the man had not been party to the conversation between the snake and the woman. That the man was intending to respond in a defensive way of shifting the blame becomes apparent in the way he answered the second question. This suggests that no one actually told him, and he had no one to shift the blame onto.

The second question addressed the heart of the matter. Has he eaten the fruit that God commanded him not to eat? The man only answered the second question by saying, "The woman whom you gave to be with me, she gave to me from the tree and I ate." On the face of it, the man's reply is the truth. It is consistent with the way it unfolded in verse 6. Yet here also, the implicatures convey a different message.

The man has adopted a commonly used defence strategy here. What is important to note here is that shifting blame is a defence against shame, rather than against guilt. A sense of shame is associated with the tendency to shift blame elsewhere, whereas the reflexive response to guilt is to self-blame.[27] Thus, the couple's reflexive responses in shifting blame elsewhere are indicative of their sense of shame, rather than an expression of guilt.[28]

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[26] Satlow, "Jewish Constructions of Nakedness in Late Antiquity," 431-40. It is worth noting that even though Ancient Israel possibly in the 6th Century B.C. E. was the most likely cultural context, the way nakedness was treated in the Eden Narrative may not necessarily reflect cultural norms regarding nakedness. The treatment of nakedness may either have implicitly challenged those norms, or reflected the preferred norms of the particular community the unknown author of the Eden Narrative was a part of.

[27] Kugler and Jones, "On Conceptualizing and Assessing Guilt," 318-27, Tangney, "Moral Affect," 598-607.

[28] Tangney, "Assessing Individual Differences in Proneness to Shame and Guilt: Development of the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory," 102-11, June Price Tangney et al., "Shamed into Anger? The Relation of Shame and Guilt to Anger and Self-Reported Aggression," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 62, no. 4 (1992): 669-75, Jeffrey Stuewig et al., "Shaming, Blaming, and Maiming: Functional Links among the Moral Emotions, Externalization of Blame, and Aggression," *Journal of Research in Personality* 44 (2010): 91-102, Gershen Kaufmann, *The Psychology of Shame: Theory and Treatment of Shame-Based Syndromes* (New York: Springer, 1989), 100-04, Tracy and Robins, "Appraisal Antecedents of

First, the man shifted the blame onto the woman. He stated that she was the one who gave him the fruit, so it is her fault that he ended up eating it. The man's reply confirmed the shift in initiative that had occurred in the interaction with the snake. The snake addressed the woman as the prominent member of the couple, and the man's reply confirmed the leadership the woman had exercised. She had taken the lead in picking the fruit and handing it to the man with the invitation to join her in eating it. In identifying her as the leader here, he also was identifying himself as the follower. This relational follower stance reflected a degree of relational passivity. Relational passivity is expressed through going along with things, rather being decisive on one's own part. It is also expressed in not challenging the actions of others and failing to be assertive with respect to one's own needs and feelings. The man displayed such relational passivity in failing to interject and challenge the direction that the dialogue with the snake took. His reply to God amounted to an admission that this was the case.

This is ultimately why blaming the woman was a pathetic ineffectual excuse. It failed to absolve him of responsibility. It only highlighted that listening to the woman and following her lead was itself inexcusable. As we subsequently see in God's judgment of the man, God regarded listening to and obeying the woman as culpable in itself.[29]

Second, the man subtly shifted the blame onto God. The additional phrase נָתַתָּה עִמָּדִי אֲשֶׁר, "whom you gave [to be] with me" also implied a shifting of the blame onto God as well. The loosely connected phrase "the woman whom you gave me" is a *casus pendens* that conveys a pointed emphasis that implied, "*You're* the one who gave her to me, so this is also partly your fault!"[30]

A number of commentators have regarded as significant that the man chose to try to avoid accountability by shifting blame onto the woman rather than simply owning up to his

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Shame and Guilt," 1339-51, Nichols, *No Place to Hide*, 98-102, Elison, "Investigating the Compass of Shame," 221-38.

[29] Chrysostom, "Homily 17," *Genesis 1 - 17*, 233. Cassuto, *Genesis*, 157-58.

[30] Augustine, *Literal Interpretation of Genesis*, XI.47, pp. 456-57, Calvin, *Genesis*, 164, Poole, *Bible Commentary,* 9, Cassuto, *Genesis*, 157-58, Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, 77, Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 255, Driver, *The Book of Genesis*, 47.

sin, confessing and repenting.[31] What this judgment presumes is that confession and repentance was the appropriate social action to take in that context. What has been overlooked is that confession and repentance themselves are divinely instituted social conventions for repairing the covenant relationship from the rupture of sin. These conventions were not yet in place in Eden,[32] because this was the first recorded instance of sin that created a new situation. God, the man and the woman were in new social territory here. The social institution of repentance was a subsequent development. Hence, the couple's failure to do the conventional response of confession and repentance does not necessarily imply an absence of remorse. Neither would God's subsequent actions be necessarily in response to their failure to observe this convention.

6.1.5 Genesis 3:13.

God did not reply further to the man, but instead turned to address the woman. This non-verbal response to the man was itself a form of communication.[33] It conveyed God's intention that no further information would be needed from the man. It also conveyed a message of dismissal. It may also have conveyed messages regarding the satisfactory or unsatisfactory nature of the man's response, and even God's favourable or unfavourable attitude to the man. Because this information would have been conveyed through gestures that are not described in the text, there is insufficient information in the text to infer what God's act of turning to the woman communicated to the man.

God next questioned the woman in the light of the man's admission that he had eaten the fruit, and that the man had implicated the woman. That God did not summon the woman separately implies that she had come out of hiding together with him. She had been present

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[31] Augustine, *City of God*, XIV.14, p. 574, Calvin, *Genesis*, 164, Luther, *Genesis*, 177, LaCoque, *Trial of Innocence*, 226-27, Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 255, Gunkel, *Genesis*, 19, Boice, *Genesis*, 178.

[32] Luther recognized that when there was no explicit promise of forgiveness, Adam had no basis for making a confession and asking for forgiveness. In such a situation, a person will do whatever he can to evade responsibility and clear oneself. Luther, *Genesis*, 177-78.

[33] The axiom of Communications Theory, "One cannot not communicate" reflects the recognition that all social behaviour is communication. Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson, *Pragmatics of Human Communication*, 51.

while God initially addressed the man, and she had just heard the man's admission. His

admission provided the immediate context for the ostensive reference in the question that God

asked the woman: מַה־זֹּאת עָשִׂית "What is this that you have done." It is clearly implied that the

question referred ostensively to the woman's action in picking and eating the prohibited fruit

and sharing it with her man.

This type of question occurs elsewhere in Genesis in response to the discovery that a

person has done a really damaging thing. God asked Cain, "What have you done?" after he

had murdered Abel (Gen. 4:10). The Pharaoh of Egypt asked this of Abraham when it was

discovered that he had been struck with plagues on account of Abraham's wife whom he had

taken into his harem (Gen. 12:18). Abimelech asked this of Abraham after his women

became barren on account of his taking Sarah as his concubine (Genesis 20:9 and 26:10).

Jacob made the same statement to Laban on the morning that he discovered that he had lain

with Leah instead of Rachael (Gen. 29:25).

This utterance is characteristically an expression of distress and dismay by a wronged

party to the one who has wronged him. That God is depicted as expressing the same utterance

implies that this is likewise an expression of distress and dismay. This utterance implies two

things. First, that God is primarily holding the woman responsible. This is something that she

(not the man) has done. Second, that God is the injured party, not simply the couple. God is

the one who has been wronged. In a sense God has suffered a misfortune.

The woman construed God's utterance as a request for an explanation. The woman

responded by stating truthfully that the snake had deluded her and she ate. While her response

has been regarded as a similar attempt to transfer blame,[34] it has an honesty that suggests

otherwise. Adam's attempt to transfer blame onto the woman is consistent with the passive

conforming position he had adopted during the dialogue with the snake. In contrast, the

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[34] Augustine, *Literal Interpretation of Genesis*, XI.48, p. 457, Driver, *The Book of Genesis*, 47, Westermann,
 Genesis 1 - 11, 256, von Rad, *Genesis*, 89, Calvin, *Genesis*, 164-65, Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, 77. There is no
 hint in the story that she was indirectly blaming God as Luther suggested. Luther, *Genesis*, 180-82.

woman engaged, thought it through, decided, and took action on her own initiative. So for her

to own responsibility for her action is also consistent with her previous actions. A person can

truthfully admit to being deceived, while at the same time, accepting responsibility for his or

her actions. In this instance, the woman accepted responsibility in contrast to the man's

attempt to divert blame.

The hiphil form of הִשִּׁיאַנִי has a causative nuance that may be expressed by rendering it

as "deluded me" rather than simply "deceived". Delusion goes beyond deception. It involves

deluded thinking, whereas deception involves a presentation of incorrect facts. This is the first

explicit indication in the story that the snake had functioned as a deceiver. The woman's

admission to having been deluded implies that she has seen through the delusion. The

moment of seeing through the delusion probably was when the eyes of both of them were

opened and they saw that they were naked. There is an irony here in that prudence often

comes out of bad experiences of suffering evil and being deceived. So even in this sense the

snake was correct in stating the fruit was good for acquiring wisdom in that she would learn

prudence from what would be a devastating experience.

There is another subtle contrast in the answers that the man and woman gave to God

that have generally been overlooked. The woman's answer addressed the question, and it did

fit the known facts in a way that makes sense. In this respect, it rings true. In contrast, the

man's answer deflected from the question. The man left unanswered the question of who told

him that he was naked. Instead, he gave a reply referring to eating the fruit that the woman

was responsible for giving him, and indirectly blaming God. He made no allusion to the

snake. He left that crucial piece of information out. His response leaves the reader feeling

confused. An experience of confusion in a discourse is usually a good indication that there is a

lack of truthfulness. Either important information is being held back, or false information is

being provided in order to deceive. The man's answer did not ring true in the same way that

the woman's answer did ring true.[35]

The man and the woman both admitted to the same thing, "and I ate". This first person

singular, rather than the first person plural, reflects the individual nature of responsibility

before God. They did not hold themselves accountable to God collectively as a couple, but

individually. We see here a cascading relational fall-out as a result of their action in eating the

forbidden fruit. The first effect in relational fall-out was the couple's mutual embarrassed

nakedness, followed by covering themselves with leaves. The second effect was the couple

seeking to hide from God, withdrawing from him, whereas previously they would have

happily gone out to meet him. Both of these scenes point to a loss of transparency in self-

disclosure in a relationship characterized by unreserved intimacy. The third effect apparent

here is the breakdown of solidarity as a couple, and the blame game that has taken its place.

6.2 The Judgment of God

There is a balanced chiastic structure that links this divine oracular judgment to God's

preceding interview with the man and the woman that lies in the order of who is addressed.

The structure is: man questioned, woman questioned, [snake not questioned] – snake judged,

woman judged, man judged.[36] This structure indicates that the judgement of God corresponds

to the preceding interview. God's pronouncements make plain that God regarded all three as

blameworthy for what each of them had done, but blameworthy for different reasons.

God's pronouncements have generally been regarded in three ways. They were either

curses, punishments but not curses, or descriptive statements regarding the inevitable

consequences.[37] The first two views present God as actively inflicting a punishment at God's

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[35] Robbins also identified that not only did Adam shift blame, but his answer was not completely truthful. He
also regarded the woman's answer that the snake deceived her as similar blame-shifting, whereas I regard it as
an honest answer. His conclusion that God's investigation failed to arrive at the truth is contrary to what is
inferred in the narrative. Robbins, *The Storyteller and the Garden of Eden*, 137.

[36] Philo identified an allegorical structure in the order of judgment. Philo, "Questions & Answers on Genesis,"
I.47, (*Works*): 800.

[37] Josephus regarded the pronouncements as punishment where Adam was punished for listening to his wife and
Eve was punished for persuading Adam. Josephus, *The Antiquities of the Jews*, 1.1.4, p. 28. Some early
church fathers also adopted this viewpoint. Irenaeus, "Against Heresies," 3.23.3 (ANF1:456). Tertullian,

own discretion. The third view presents God as a commentator, rather than an active inflictor

of punishment. This protects God from the charge of being a strict judge. As we shall see,

however, these pronouncements are performatives that are inflicting curses.

6.2.1 Genesis 3:14-15.

Whereas God asked questions of the man and the woman, the snake was asked no questions.

It has been suggested that this was because God already knew the snake's role in the matter,[38]

or that the snake itself or Satan possessing the snake was unredeemable,[39] or that God's

contention was with the couple because the commandment has been given to them.[40] The

absence of a question itself conveyed a definition of relationship between God and the snake.

The very act of asking Eve and Adam a question inferred that their relationship was one of

personal encounter and response. This type of relationship with God is an exclusive human

privilege that is not extended to animals. For God to ask the snake a question would have

amounted to offering the same person to person relationship that humans had. So the absence

of a question conveyed the message that despite its shrewdness and wisdom, the snake was

only an animal.

Nevertheless, there was accountability. "Because you have done this" (כִּי עָשִׂיתָ זֹּאת)

stands in chiastic contrast to the question that God asked the woman, "What is this that you

have done?" (מַה־זֹּאת עָשִׂית). This chiastic structure implies a direct link between the two

questions. The first implication is that God had completely accepted the testimony of the

woman as being truthful. This implied identification of the woman as being truthful stands in

direct contrast to the identification of the snake as being deceptive. If the snake was

deceptive, there is no confidence that God would have received a truthful answer from it.

"Against Marcion," 11, (ANF 3:306). This is still a contemporary interpretation. Henry, *Commentary*, 29-31. Cassuto, *Genesis*, 163, Aalders, *Genesis*, 108-10. von Rad, *Genesis*, 92-93, Vawter, *A Path through Genesis*, 67. Alternatively, God was describing the consequences of their actions. Stratton, *Out of Eden*, 61, Schüngel-Straumann, "On the Creation of Man and Woman," 71-72, Trible, *Rhetoric of Sexuality*, 128.

[38] Irenaeus, "Against Heresies," III.23.5, (*ANF 2*): 457.

[39] Augustine, *On Genesis*, II.25, p. 88, XI.49, pp. 457-57, Calvin, *Genesis*, 165, LaCoque, *Trial of Innocence*, 238-39.

[40] D. E. Gowan, *From Eden to Babel: A Commentary on Genesis*, International Theological Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1988), 56-57.

There was no point in asking the question. Alternatively, it simply could be that God did not need any more information at this point.

God took decisive action in the form of pronouncing curses. The curses recorded in Genesis 3:14-19 were performative speech acts that functioned to create a new social reality.[41] God pronounced that the snake now had a new status of being, that of being cursed more than the other animals. God's pronunciation of this curse brought it into existence as a new reality that the snake as the object of the curse now must live under.[42] Such curses have an enduring impact.

Curses were conceived of in two different ways in the Ancient Near East, the magical perspective or the cultic view. A magical conception of a curse was characterized by a belief in the efficacy of curse rituals in themselves to bring into being a curse that automatically had its impact upon the object of the curse. The operational power lay in the words of the curse formula. A cultic view of a curse maintained that the operation of a curse was a matter of divine action in response to either a curse appeal or when the conditions of a curse imprecation associated with an oath were fulfilled. The power of a curse lay in the effectual power of God to execute the curse.[43]

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[41] A curse contains elements of both verdictive performative utterance that involves rendering a judgment or verdict, and a commissives performative speech act that involve making promises or commitments to future actions, statements of intention. A curse was not an exercitive speech act that actually inflicts the substance of the curse. J. L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, 2 ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), 151-63.

[42] The grammatical form that the pronouncement of curses generally took was "cursed you are" (אָרוּר אַתָּה) (Gen. 3:14; 4:11; Josh. 9:23; Mal. 3:9), or "cursed is [the object], i.e. "cursed is the ground…" (אֲרוּרָה הָאֲדָמָה) - Gen 3:17, see also Gen 9:25 Josh. 6:26; 21:18; 1 Sam. 26:19; Jer. 17:5, 20:14; 48:10; Mal. 1:14, or "cursed is the man who…" (אָרוּר הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר) - Jer. 11:3, see also 1 Sam. 14:24, 28; Jer. 17:5; 20:15). Less frequently the passive participle is preceded by a participle gerund identifying the object of the curse by their activity. For example, "cursed are those who curse you' (וְאֹרְרֶיךָ אָרוּר). (Nu. 24: 9). See also Gen. 27:29; 49:7. Brichto's analysis of אָרוּר interprets the passive participle form as meaning that the spoken curse is itself the effective agent, possessing a reality and power to affect the declared result. His analysis supported the conclusion that once pronounced, divine curses could not be withdrawn, only delayed. Herbert Chanan Brichto, *The Problem of The "Curse" In the Hebrew Bible*, vol. 13, Journal of Biblical Literature Monograph Serice (Philadelphia, PA: Society of Biblical Literature, 1963), 4-10.

[43] Anthony C. Thiselton, "The Supposed Power of Words in Biblical Writings," *The Journal of Theological Studies* 25, no. 2 (1974): 290-99.

The cultic view of curses was widespread in the Ancient Near East. Curses were closely connected to binding oaths,[44] and treaty covenants generally included imprecation of curses for violating the treaty.[45] A person making a binding oath had the authority to invoke a curse upon himself or herself for breaking that oath.[46] Curses were invoked when sealing covenants as a divine sanction for covenant breaking. Such curses were in effect an appeal and authorization to whatever deity was functioning as a witness and guarantor of the oath.[47]

The pronouncement of a curse was not performative in the sense of the execution of a curse. Curses derived their power from the gods who executed them. This is reflected in the Philistine who cursed David by his gods, and David's response by invoking God deliverance. Invoking a curse escalated a dispute by appealing for divine intervention. This passage may allude to the fact that it may have been common practice to utter taunt speeches that included invoking curses upon one's enemies as the prelude to engaging in battle, or in this instance single combats between champions.[48]

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[44] The close connection between curse and a binding oath is reflected in the Hebrew word אָלָה, which means both a binding oath and an imprecatory curse. Brichto, *Problem of the Curse*, 23-63.

[45] This is a common feature in ancient Hittite and Assyrian treaties. McCarthy, Dennis J. McCarthy, *Treaty and Covenant*, Analecta Biblica Vol. 21 (Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1963), 22-79. We see this element of an oath implied in a ritual when God entered into a covenant with Abram in response to his request for a sign (Gen 15: 1-18). The ritual of cutting a covenant provided an unqualified assurance that God's promise that Abram would have descendants would certainly be fulfilled. The dramatic nature of God's action is underscored here in that when God passed between the dismembered sacrificed calf, God was in effect invoking the curse upon himself if God failed to fulfill God's covenant promise. Refer to Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, 332. McCarthy also noted that the Old Testament was reticent about recording covenantal oaths; they are implied in Israel's solemn declarations of agreement to observe the covenant. McCarthy, *Treaty and Covenant*, 170.

[46] During a war with Benjamin the men of Israel made a binding oath not to give their daughters in marriage to Benjamites, swearing "cursed is he who gives a wife to Benjamin." (Jg. 21:18). It is evident that the Israelites regarded that binding oath inviolable, and some way had to be found around it. The returned exiles under the leadership of Nehemiah made a binding oath to observe the Torah, binding themselves with a curse (Neh. 10:29). Under the law of jealousy, the suspect woman was required to make a binding oath invoking a curse that she has not been unfaithful (Nu. 5:11-31). The function of the oath and the curse at the heart of the ordeal is an appeal to God to execute judgment. The curse specified the form the judgment will take. Baruch A. Levine, *Numbers 1-20: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, ed. William Foxwell Albright and David Noel Freedman, The Anchor Bible (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1993), 200-07.

[47] Refer to Weeks discussion of Hittite, Assyrian and Babylonian treaty forms. Noel Weeks, *Admonition and Curse* (London: Continuum, 2004). The widespread use of curses to invoke deities as agents to effect a imprecatory curse for breaking a binding covenant oath is also mentioned by Brichto, *Problem of the Curse*, 11-12.

[48] P. Kyle McCarter Jr., *I Samuel: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, ed. William Foxwell Albright and David Noel Freedman, vol. 8, The Anchor Bible (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980), 297.

Invoking a curse was regarded as a performative action that brought the curse into effect once the conditions of the curse were satisfied.[49] Curses were a form of executing justice where the consequences fell not only upon the persons subject to the curse but upon their families.[50] They were only legitimate if prior conditions of injustice of oath-breaking had been satisfied. An effective performative action needed to be uttered by an authorized person. Pronouncement of curses by humans functioned as appeals for divine sanctions or punishment for oath-breaking or serious crimes. Curses specified various effects: exclusion from the community, or loss of fertility of humans, livestock or land, or inflicting disease. Curses functioned as social sanctions to reinforce social values and mores. Curses were directly tied to violations of social behaviour, anti-social behaviour, violation of binding commitments. Curses were also a resort for the weak and oppressed in calling upon a deity to witness their oppression and bring retribution upon their oppressors.[51]

That God executed judgment through pronouncing an imprecatory curse upon the offenders was completely consistent with Ancient Near Eastern cultural expectations. God pronounced that the snake would be lower than all the beasts of the field. In contrast to its superior status of craftiness, the snake's new distinction would lie in being more cursed than all the beasts of the field. God gave the snake's slithering upon the ground a new constitutive meaning as the sign of this cursed status.[52] Prostration was a human action of taking a position of inferior social status and recognizing the superior status of the one that the person prostrated himself or herself before, which was typically a king or a lord, or a master. A

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[49] Invoking a curse upon oneself involved making an auto-implicative performative utterance. In Deuteronomy 27-28 the curses generally took the grammatical form of a passive participle "cursed [is he]" (אָרוּר) followed by either an active participle "who [verb]" or by a relative clause introduced by "who" identified the subject of the curse. For example, Dt 27:15 stated, "cursed is the man, who…" (אָרוּר הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר). The people then assented to the curse by declaring "Amen."

[50] Michael V. Fox, *Proverbs 1-9: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, ed. William Foxwell Albright and David Noel Freedman, vol. 18A, The Anchor Bible (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 2000), 168.

[51] Jeff S. Anderson, "The Social Function of Curses in the Hebrew Bible," *Zeitschrift fur die Altestamentliche Wissenschaft* 110, no. 2 (1998): 228-31.

[52] Some commentators have taken this curse to literally mean that the snake's stature was changed from an upright stance to its current characteristic of slithering on the ground. Chrysostom, "Homily 17," *Genesis 1 - 17*, 237-38, Luther, *Genesis*, 186-87, Poole, *Bible Commentary,* 10. There is stronger support for the conclusion that this is a figurative description of humiliation than a literal biological change.

servant would prostrate himself or herself before a lord or master when that person had

incurred guilt or iniquity and was acknowledging his or her guilt. It was an act of humbling

oneself, which implied a plea for mercy. God was pronouncing that the snake would

henceforth be permanently prostrated, in a guilty self-abasing position in the way that it

slithered upon the earth, in distinction to all the other beasts of the field that walked.[53]

The statement "and dust you will eat" (וְעָפָר תֹּאכַל) conveys a figurative meaning of

humiliation in defeat. This metaphor occurs in other prophetic oracles. Micah 7:17 looks

forward to a military vindication of Israel where,

> Nations will see and be ashamed of all their might. They will put their hand on
> their mouth, their ears will be deaf. They will lick the dust like a serpent, like
> reptiles of the earth. (NASB)

The famous oracle in Isaiah 65:25 of the comprehensive peace between natural enemies that

God will establish where "the wolf and the lamb shall graze together and the lion will eat

straw like the ox;" then states "and dust will be the serpent's food." (NASB). The meaning

these figurative references to licking dust like a serpent is one of complete humiliation

following defeat. The figurative meaning is more prominent than any literal descriptive

meaning. It was a reference to prostration in humiliated abject defeat.

There is a talionic justice in this curse. Just as the snake humiliated the couple by

deceiving them regarding what the fruit would provide, so now the snake will suffer an

enduring humiliation in the gaze of the man and woman's descendants. They look down upon

snakes as they slither at their feet and regard the snake as a cursed beast. That this status shall

endure for the rest of the snake's life, (כָּל־יְמֵי חַיֶּיךָ) conveys a sense of permanence. There was

no appeal or alleviation from this curse.

There are some intriguing poetic effects in God's pronouncement that there shall exist

a state of enmity between the snake and the woman and between their descendants, which

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[53] Hamilton, *Genesis 1-17*, 196-97. Chrysostom argued that the pronouncement applied to the serpent
exclusively, not to Satan, because he already was facing a different fate, that of being cast into the lake of fire.
Chrysostom, "Homily 17," *Genesis 1 - 17*, 235.

gives rise to multiple layers of meaning.[54] This statement has the flavour of an aetiological myth. On one level, this curse means that there shall henceforth exist a state of enmity between snakes and women. This story provides a mythological explanation of why snakes of all beasts uniquely slither on the ground, and for the enmity and fear of snakes that humans have.[55] The way this enmity shall be expressed is that people shall bruise snakes on the head, while snakes shall bite people on the lower parts of their legs closest to the ground that snakes can reach.[56]

On another level of symbolic meaning, this pronouncement has become widely regarded as the first messianic prophecy, where the woman's seed is identified with Christ, and the seed of the snake identified with Christ's spiritual antagonist, Satan. Bruising the snake on the head in contrast to bruising the woman's seed on the heel, foreshadowed that Christ's defeat of Satan shall be decisive and fatal for Satan. In contrast, Satan's attempt to fatally wound Christ shall fail.[57] This interpretation is a *sensus plenior* that relies upon the reader's pre-understanding of the context of the Gospel and the death and resurrection of Christ. This *sensus plenior* illustrates the function of poetic effects that increase the

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[54] Wilson and Sperber point out that poetic effects rely upon weak implicatures to generate from which the reader can infer a large extension of inferred meaning, increasing the polyvalence in the text. Wilson & Sperber, *Relevance and Meaning*, 118-122.

[55] A number of commentators have viewed the curse in this aetiological way: Gowan, *From Eden to Babel*, 58, Hauser, "Genesis 2-3: The Theme of Intimacy and Alienation," 29-31, Stratton, *Out of Eden*, 58-61, Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 258.

[56] The Hebrew word עָקֵב refers to the lower shin and foot including the heel, rather than exclusively to the heel itself, as per the English translation. The meaning of שׁוּף is unclear, partly because it only occurs four times, here and in Job 9:17 and Ps. 139:11. While "crush" fits the usage in Job, and can figuratively apply in Psalm 139:11 to the darkness crushing the psalmist, it leaves open the question of whether the verb had a broader semantic range. The usage in this passage infers inflicting mutual violence and wounding. It can be rendered "bruise", "wound", or "crush". Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, 80-81.

[57] This interpretation has been in the literature since the time of Irenaeus. Irenaeus, "Against Heresies," III.23.7, V.21.1-2, (*ANF 2*): 457, 548-49, Luther, *Genesis*, 188-89, Poole, *Bible Commentary, Vol. 1*, 10, Collins, *Genesis 1-4*, 155-58, Hoekema, *God's Image*, 135, Waltke, *An Old Testament Theology*, 267. Collins and Alexander argued in favour of this interpretation on grammatical grounds, namely that the related verb and pronoun is in the masculine singular form. Jack Collins, "A Syntactical Note on Genesis 3:15: Is the Woman's Seed Singular or Plural?," *Tyndale Bulletin* 48, no. 1 (1997): 141-48, Desmond Alexander, "Further Observations on the Term 'Seed' in Genesis," *Tyndale Bulletin* 48, no. 2 (1997): 363-67. Their argument does not hold, because this is a purely syntactical correspondence of the masculine singular with the singular form of the collective noun זֶרַע. Other commentators have not accepted it. Calvin suggested it applied collectively to the righteous who made up the church. Calvin, *Genesis*, 170-71. Speiser regarded it as unwarranted. Speiser, *Genesis*, 24. Barr rejected this interpretation because the passage was a curse, not a prophecy. Barr, *The Garden of Eden and the Hope of Immortality*, 140. Driver also rejected it by pointing out the passage does not allude to victory but rather ongoing antagonism. Driver, *The Book of Genesis*, 48.

indeterminacy of a text and provide increased scope for construal of various meanings by the reader.

It is unclear who was the object of this curse. Many aspects of the curse simply do not apply to snakes. First, humiliation and loss of social status is meaningless to snakes. They have no social status to lose. Second, the pronouncement of enmity between humans and snakes does not fit how things played out. Snakes do not single humans out in enmity as prey. Like other wild animals, they prefer to avoid humans altogether. Snake bites only occur when humans intrude and threaten snakes. Humans are afraid of snakes because their bites are poisonous. Humans are afraid of animals that are potentially lethal, such as poisonous snakes, sharks, tigers, grizzly bears, etc. Our fear of snakes has reduced once anti-venom became available, with the result that poisonous snake bites are no longer as lethal as they would have been in the ancient world. Humans display enmity against any wild animal that threatens their interests, such as preying on their livestock. Humans hunt down dangerous animals. This is simply a matter of fear and self-protection that does not require any additional enmity that singles out snakes. Thus, this widely presumed enmity between humans and snakes has not played out in any distinctive way, which cannot be readily explained by these common factors. Consequently, the curse against the snake does not readily apply to snakes.

This raises the question of whether the object of the curse was Satan behind the snake.[58] The relationship between the devil and the spiritual forces of darkness and humans can be accurately described in terms of enmity. The human struggle against spiritual forces of evil and darkness has been a constant theme throughout history.[59] The allusion that the snake will wound the woman's descendants' heels, but they will wound its head, is consistent with the motif that good triumphs over evil. These implied identifications in the curse upon the

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[58] It has been widely interpreted that either the devil or both the snake and the devil are the objects of God's curse here: Calvin, *Genesis*, 165, Augustine, *Literal Interpretation of Genesis*, XI.49, pp. 457-58, Luther, *Genesis*, 184-85, Henry, *Commentary*, 29-30, Waltke, *An Old Testament Theology*, 265.

[59] Driver, *The Book of Genesis*, 48, von Rad, *Genesis*, 89-90, Scotchmer, "Lessons from Paradise," 84.

snake provide further support for the interpretation that the snake symbolized unspecified

powers of evil.

6.2.2 Genesis 3:16.

 God addressed the woman next. The speech act was a pronouncement that stated a decision

that God was making. It had a performative illocutionary thrust that was bringing a new

biological and social reality into being. This speech act could be a declaration or a

commissive that committed the speaker to a future course of action. Interpreting the

imperfect aspect of רָבָה as having an future tense gives the verb a commissive illocutionary

thrust. One question is whether the presence of the hithpael absolute infinitive conveys an

indefinite reference to the infinitive absolute in the prohibition phrase מוֹת תָּמוּת in Genesis

2:17. If this is the case, it may function as a subtle signal that this fate is in the place of the

original sentence in 2:17. What supports the conclusion that this was a declaration is that God

immediately began relating to the couple according to the newly pronounced patriarchal

hierarchy. After clothing them, God exclusively related to the man.

God's oracle to the woman could be a proposition describing an inevitable

consequence, or a performative speech act inflicting a curse. What is missing in this

statement is the traditional curse formula. God was making the one speech here, directed in

turn specifically to each of the three recipients. This observation supports the conclusion that

God was performing the same speech act, which was a performative speech act with the

illocutionary effect of a curse. Even though the curse formula אָרוּר אַתָּה was not repeated

when God addressed the woman, the curse formula could be implied through the similar

illocutionary force of the pronouncement to the woman. Likewise, the reason for God's action

against the woman (כִּי עָשִׂיתָ זֹּאת) is implicit.

There has been a general reticence against regarding God's punishments of the man

and woman as actual curses.[60] Indeed, some early church fathers regarded these punishments

as an alternative to God cursing them with death.[61] It has been argued that a divine curse upon

the man and woman is inconsistent with the fact of God's blessing.[62] Whom God has blessed,

God will not curse. The story of Balaam has been cited in support of this argument.[63] In this

instance, however, Balak the king of Moab sought an imprecatory curse against Israel, his

enemies. Balaam insisted that he simply does not have the authority or power to pronounce a

curse in the face of a divine blessing. He stated, "Behold I have received a command to bless;

when He has blessed, then I cannot revoke it." (Nu. 23:20). Israel was not guilty of any cultic

violation that warranted a curse. This divine refusal simply reflects that God has sided with

Israel against Moab. This statement does not amount to a general principle that those whom

God has blessed are safe from subsequent curses.

The curses in Deuteronomy 28 make the conditional nature of blessing clear. Blessing

is contingent upon observing the covenant; violate the covenant and the attendant divine

curses shall fall upon you.[64] This theme of blessing contingent upon obedience versus curse as

a consequence for disobedience is an important theme in Deuteronomic theology. This theme

has its origin in this scene in Eden. Therefore, regarding God's punishments of the man and

woman as being in effect divine curses is consistent with this theological perspective.[65]

This curse affected the woman's most distinctive function. She alone could bear

children.[66] The multiplication of pain in childbirth not only referred to the amount of pain

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[60] The only exceptions I have come across where it is regarded as a curse are: Calvin, *Genesis*, 172, Gunkel, *Genesis*, 29-31, Hoekema, *God's Image*, 134. Westermann stated that these pronouncements take the form of curses though they function as punishments. Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 258. Trible and Schüngel-Straumann regarded the curse of pain upon the woman as a result of the patriarchal interpretation of the narrative, and the pronouncements should rather be interpreted as descriptive statements. Trible, *Rhetoric of Sexuality*, 73. Trible stated elsewhere that only the snake was cursed. ———, "Depatriarchalizing in Biblical Interpretation," 41, Schüngel-Straumann, "On the Creation of Man and Woman," 71-2.

[61] Irenaeus, "Against Heresies," III.23.3, (*ANF 2*): 456. Tertullian, "Against Marcion," II.25, (*ANF 3*): 317.

[62] Scotchmer, "Lessons from Paradise," 85.

[63] Hans Walter Wolff, "The Kerygma of the Yahwist," *Interpretation* 20, no. 2 (1966): 143-45.

[64] Mettinger, *The Eden Narrative*, 49-54, 70-1.

[65] Bernard Och, "The Garden of Eden: From Creation to Covenant," *Judaism* 37, no. 2 (1988): 340-41.

[66] The masculine plural בָּנִים is gender inclusive in Hebrew, referring to both males and females depending on the context. The context here suggests that both sons and daughters are being referred to here.

experienced, but also that the toil of labour was itself life threatening. The immediately preceding hithpael infinitive absolute conveys the sense of intensifying the magnitude of the effect. The phrase literally means "multiplying I will multiply", which can be translated either "I will repeatedly multiply", or "I will greatly multiply" (רַבָּה אַרְבֶּה). Rendering it 'repeatedly' retains the reiterative sense of the hithpael, that the pain will be multiplied over and over again with each childbirth. The phrase עִצְּבוֹנֵךְ וְהֵרֹנֵךְ has been regarded as either a hendiadys referring to pain in childbirth, rather than toil as distinct from childbirth,[67] or as two distinct consequences, suffering and toil generally and childbirth.[68] Interpreting it as a hendiadys, however, strengthens the parallelism of the bicolon in 3:16b, favouring regarding this as a specific pronouncement about childbirth, rather than toil and suffering in general along with toil in childbirth. Childbirth was to be perilous to women. In this curse God came closest to actually following through with the original threat, מוֹת תָּמוּת.

This pronouncement has an implied aetiological inference. It gives the peril, pain and toil of labour a new punitive meaning. It implies that all women share in the Eve's penalty in their experience of childbirth. The peril and pain of childbirth is a consequence of Eve's transgression, not simply a neutral biological reality.[69] The severity of this penalty upon women has been regarded as an unfair cruel penalty, suggesting that God was heartless and cruel.[70]

Communications Theory alerts us to the way that God's next pronouncement amounted to a fundamental redefinition of the relationship between the man and the woman.

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[67] Speiser, *Genesis*, 24, Collins, *Genesis 1-4*, 153, Van Wolde, *Words Become Worlds*, 24, Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, 81.

[68] Cassuto, *Genesis*, 165, Carol L. Meyers, "Gender Roles and Genesis 3:16 Revisited," in *The Word of the Lord Shall Go Forth*, ed. Carol L. Meyers (Winona Lake, ID: Eisenbrauns, 1983), 344-45.

[69] Augustine adopted a different perspective in suggesting that the increased pain of childbirth was simply the biological consequence of now possessing a mortal body; the actual punishment lay in the changed relationship of servitude women would henceforth have with their husbands. Augustine, *On Genesis*, II.29, p. 90, ———, *Literal Interpretation of Genesis*, XI.50, pp. 458-59. The conclusion that this is rather a curse is supported by the observation that a curse upon the woman's primary function here corresponds to the curse upon the man's primary function of cultivating the soil.

[70] C. Meyers, *Discovering Eve: Ancient Israelite Women in Context* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), Stratton, *Out of Eden*.

Even though God was addressing the woman, this was in effect an explicit pronouncement that addressed them as a couple. This relationship redefinition affected both the woman and the man in corresponding ways. The woman was placed into a place of subjection; the man into a corresponding place of mastery. They both lost the equality that was implied in the original relationship of the woman being a corresponding helper that he delighted in. Henceforth her central relationship with her man would be marked by defensive tension, and a struggle over mastery. This pronouncement also has an aetiological inference as the origin of traditional gender roles.[71] The implication of this interpretation is that the hierarchal relation between the man as master to whom the woman is subjected has the force of a divine ordinance that legitimizes patriarchy as a divine order and a punishment for the part that she played in the Fall,[72] an implication that feminist theologians reject.[73]

In Genesis 2:18 God declared the intention to make for the man a helper who corresponds to him (עֵזֶר כְּנֶגְדּוֹ). This phrase was not only a description of who the woman was, but also a description of what their relationship was to be. The word עֵזֶר suggested that the woman would assist the man accomplish his tasks. It implied a working partnership characterized by teamwork, where the man exercises leadership and the woman assisted him in accomplishing his tasks, rather than the man helping the woman to accomplish her tasks. Yet עֵזֶר itself does not imply inferiority in that God is described as עֵזֶר elsewhere in the Old

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[71] LaCoque, *Trial of Innocence*, 216-20, 32-37.

[72] Augustine, *Literal Interpretation of Genesis*, XI.50, pp. 458-59, Tertullian, "Against Marcion," II.11, (*ANF 3*): 306, Henry, *Commentary*, 31, Luther, *Genesis*, 198-203, Calvin, *Genesis*, 171-72, Poole, *Bible Commentary, Vol. 1*, 11, Henry, *Commentary*, 31, Hoekema, *God's Image*, 136, von Rad, *Genesis*, 90, Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, 81. One dissenting voice is that of Westermann, who was unwilling to conclude that this punishment implied their relationship was different prior to the fall, but it was simply a description of the current tensions inherent in gender roles. Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 261-62.

[73] Lyn M. Bechtel, "Genesis 2.4b-3.24: A Myth About Human Maturation," *Journal for the Study of the Old Testament* 67, no. 1 (1995): 22-6, Michelle A. Gonzales, *Created in God's Image* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2007), 2-13, Stratton, *Out of Eden*, 61, Schüngel-Straumann, "On the Creation of Man and Woman," 71-2, Trible, *Rhetoric of Sexuality*, 128, Bechtel, "Rethinking Genesis," 111-16. Meyers regards this passage as a reference to the need for increased effort from both to gain a living. Meyers, 342-49. Lanser, however rightly pointed out that a linguistic analysis of the pronouncements supports the conclusion that God was inflicting punishments. Lanser, "Feminist Criticism in the Garden: Inferring Genesis 2-3," 75-84. Brenner has undertaken an in-depth study illustrating how the gender of the interpreter has influenced how this passage has been interpreted. Athalya Brenner, *Intercourse of Knowledge: On Gendering and Sexuality in the Hebrew Bible* (Leiden/New York: Brill, 1997).

Testament.[74] So עֵזֶר does not imply hierarchy of status within the relationship, but rather the functional focus and practical roles within their working relationship.[75] The other word כְּנֶגְדּוֹ has a meaning of "suited to him, appropriate for him, suitable for him, one who is a good match." The emphasis is that, in contrast to all the other creatures, the woman is the right companion and workmate for the man. The rightness of God's judgment was confirmed in the man's cry of delight when he beheld her.

What this redefinition of relationship entailed involves analysing the meaning of "desire" and "master". This verb occurs three times in Old Testament, here, Genesis 4:7 where sin desires to dominate and control Cain, and Song of Songs 7:10 where the woman had a deep loving and sexual desire for her man. The phrase וְאֶל־אִישֵׁךְ תְּשׁוּקָתֵךְ has been interpreted in various ways. It has been interpreted as emotional and sexual desire for her husband,[76] or desire for children.[77] Alternatively, it has been regarded as a desire to dominate her husband, leading to a struggle for dominance that the woman was doomed to loose, because he shall rule over her.[78] Calvin interpreted it to mean that his wishes would be her desire because she is subject to his will.[79] Trible suggested that her desire was not for her husband, but that she was pining for a lost male-female equality and unity.[80] The rabbinical interpretation is that desire here refers to the desire for its appropriate object. The woman

[74] Ex. 18:4; Deut. 33:7, 26, 29; Ps. 33:20; 70:5; 115:9-11; 146:5.

[75] Katharine D. Sakenfeld, "The Bible and Women: Bane or Blessing?," *Theology Today* 32, no. 3 (1975): 224-25.

[76] Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, 81, Hoekema, *God's Image*, 136, Gowan, *From Eden to Babel*, 58-9, Driver, *The Book of Genesis*, 49, LaCoque, *Trial of Innocence*, 232-37, von Rad, *Genesis*, 90, Wallace, *The Eden Narrative*, 143, Carmichael, "The Paradise Myth: Interpreting without Jewish and Christian Spectacles," 49-50. Lohr and Meyers observed that the other place this verb occurs is in the Song of Songs 7:10 where it refers to her beloved's desire for her, in support of the view that it means sexual and emotional desire. Joel N. Lohr, "Sexual Desire? Eve, Genesis 3:16 and תשוקה," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 130, no. 2 (2011): 228-30. Meyers, "Gender roles," 346-347.

[77] Chrysostom, "Homily 17," *Genesis 1 - 17*, 23-40.

[78] Collins, *Genesis 1-4*, 159-60, Susan T. Foh, "What Is the Woman's Desire?," *Westminster Theological Journal* 37 (1974): 376-83, Waltke, *An Old Testament Theology*, 266.

[79] Calvin, *Genesis*, 171-72. Likewise, Poole stated, "Thy desires shall be referred or submitted to thy husband's will and pleasure to grant or deny them, as he sees fit." Poole, *Bible Commentary,* 11.

[80] Trible, *Rhetoric of Sexuality*, 128.

desires her man just as rain desires the earth and God desires Israel. This desire causes them to repeatedly return to the object of their desire.[81]

The pronouncement has desire correspond to rule. The accompanying phrase יִמְשָׁל־בָּךְ וְהוּא implied that the woman would be in a corresponding relational position of subjection. There is a similar correspondence between desire and rule in God's warning to Cain that sin desires him, but he must master it (Gen. 4:7). This warning conveyed a determinative implication that תְּשׁוּקָה referred to a desire to dominate. The same inference is appropriate here.

There would henceforth be a fundamental change to this companionship workmate relationship. Rather than a goodness of fit and collaborative harmony, from now on the relationship shall be characterized by tension reflected by desire to dominate on the woman's part and rule on the part of the man. This oracle came to have the explanatory function of an aetiological myth that provided the origin of the familiar tension between the sexes experienced as manipulative desire and struggle over dominance.

6.2.3 Genesis 3:17-18.

The pronouncement against the snake had the structure: כִּי עָשִׂיתָ זֹּאת ... אָרוּר אַתָּה followed by the pronouncement of the details of the curse – humiliation and enmity. This formula was implied in the pronouncement against the woman, followed by the details of the curse – pain and subjugation. In the pronouncement against the man, God specified the offending actions of the man in listening to the voice of his woman and eating the fruit. What was inferred in God's pronouncements to the snake and woman was explicitly laid out to the man. That the man had eaten the fruit had already been established. The surprising accusation was that the man had listened to the woman.

God accused the man of listening to the woman rather than to the snake when the snake did all the talking to the couple in the beginning of the chapter. This is puzzling because

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[81] Lohr, "Sexual Desire?," 233-38.

there is no account of the woman saying anything to the man. What are the implications here? One implication is that the man was not present when the snake was dialoguing with the woman, and so he never listened to the snake. Another implication is that there was a subsequent dialogue between the woman and the man that was never made explicit in the story. This would have occurred between the woman listening to the snake and subsequently giving the fruit to the man.

This subsequent exchange was made more explicit in the other versions of the story related in *Apocalypse of Moses* and *Jubilees*.[82] These stories reflect a later Jewish tradition that placed the woman explicitly in the role of temptress who fell first and then seduced the man to do likewise. It placed the burden of blame squarely upon the woman. As we have already pointed out, this action of blaming the woman was precisely what the man attempted to do in his response to God's query. One can draw an inference that the man's descendants are continuing to do the same thing. God, however, did not exonerate him, but held all three accountable for their actions.

The preferred interpretation recognizes that listening did not necessarily imply a subsequent verbal exchange, but merely non-verbal communication. That is, just as the snake "told" the couple that they were naked nonverbally through a knowing look, so also the man could have "listened" to the woman's nonverbal communication. The gesture of holding out fruit for the man to eat was itself an act of social communication whose illocutionary force would have been clear. It was an invitation to partake of the fruit. No words were necessary. The Hebrew verb שָׁמַע 'to listen' has a more comprehensive meaning than its English equivalent in that it has in view the perlocutionary effect of a communication. A person listens when the speech act is not only comprehended, but when it is heeded. This sense recognizes that a communication is successful in achieving the speaker's intention by means of its perlocutionary effect. Thus, to listen to the woman was not merely to hear and

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[82] *Jub*. 3:21; *Apocalypse of Moses*, 17-21

comprehend the message, but to obey its illocutionary force. The advantage of this interpretation is that it does not require the insertion of a whole implied dialogue into the story. It also supports the view that the man's action was one of conformity.

God did not explicitly curse the man. Rather the land that the man was related to was cursed. The effect of cursing the ground, however, would directly impact the man. The object of the curse was the soil in relationship to the man, not the soil itself generically. This statement has been interpreted as a wholesale change in the fertility of the earth, where the land is made more barren generally.[83] As Bimson rightly pointed out, this view of a radical change in the order of nature flies in the face of overwhelming scientific evidence to the contrary that presents death as an essential element in the ecological system of nature. The absence of any allusions to a distortion of nature elsewhere in the Old Testament supports the conclusion that this curse entailed no radical change in nature.[84]

Rather, it was the man's relationship to the soil that was affected. Farming the soil will be more of a struggle for the man.[85] This curse anticipated the subsequent ejection of the man from the garden. It could simply be a reference to the fact that the surrounding countryside was more barren in contrast to the bounty and fertility of the garden. Alternatively, it could simply be that the man himself would be singled out in having a greater struggle to yield crops from the ground than his neighbours. This pronouncement has been regarded as an aetiological myth that provides an explanation for the generally experienced toil and struggle

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[83] Rufinus, " A Commentary on the Apostles Creed," (*NPNF*[2] *3*): 552, Tertullian, "Against Marcion," II.11, (*ANF 3*): 306, Hoekema, *God's Image*, 136-37, Poole, *Bible Commentary,* 11, Henry, *Commentary*, 17, Calvin, *Genesis*, 173-74, Gowan, *From Eden to Babel: A Commentary on Genesis*, 59-60, Methodius, "The Banquet of the Ten Virgins," II.3, (*ANF 6*): 317. Methodius went so far as to teach that the order of nature itself became corrupt and featured death as a consequence of human sin. ———, "From the Discourse on the Resurrection," I-III, (*ANF 6*): 364-70, Luther, *Genesis*, 204-06.

[84] John J. Bimson, "Reconsidering a 'Cosmic Fall'," *Science and Christian Belief* 18 (2006): 63-67, Preuss, *Old Testament Theology*, 227-31, John Goldingay, *Old Testament Theology: 1 Israel's Gospel*, 3 vols., vol. 1 (Downers Grove, MI: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 145-48.

[85] Irenaeus, "Against Heresies," III.23.3, (*ANF 2*): 456. Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 263-66, Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, 82, von Rad, *Genesis*, 90-1, Stratton, *Out of Eden*, 60-1, Driver, *The Book of Genesis*, 49, Ross, *Creation and Blessing*, 145-48.

experienced in farming, both with reference to the uncertainties surrounding harvesting a good crop, and having to constantly deal with prolific weeds.[86]

Just as the relationship between the woman and the man came to be characterized by struggle and tension, we also see a corresponding change in the relation between the man and the ground. The relationship between the man and woman had previously been one of harmonious teamwork. Now it would be characterized by tension between desire and mastery, pain and struggle. Likewise, where there had been a harmonious relationship between the farming man and fertility of the soil, now that relationship would be characterized by toil on the part of the man and unyielding infertility on the part of the soil. Both relationships would be characterized by toil, desire and resistant tension.

Whereas the snake and the woman had two consequences each, the man here has only one consequence, namely the toil to harvest food to eat from barren cursed ground. This consequence, however, is reiterated twice. The references to eating may be an allusion to eating the fruit. Where the fruit was abundant and freely available in the garden, the fruit of the ground was no longer freely abundantly available. Previously the couple could freely eat of the fruit of the garden, now he shall eat the plants of the field in toil or sorrow as the result of exertion by the sweat of his face. A lot of his labour shall be fruitless because the ground would henceforth sprout inedible thornbushes and thistles. This pronouncement anticipated their imminent expulsion from the garden.

This pronouncement that there would be a lack of productivity and fruitfulness in the yield they would gain from cultivating the land is reminiscent of the curses in Deuteronomy 28 that the produce of their land, herds and offspring would be cursed (Deut. 28:18). The heavens would be bronze, indicating drought, and the earth iron, indicating unyielding barrenness (Deut. 28:23). They would not enjoy the fruit of their labour, but the locust would devour their harvest, worms devour their grapes, their olives would drop off, crickets

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[86] Augustine, *On Genesis*, II.30, pp. 91-2.

consume their trees (Deut. 28: 38-42). The main difference is that in Deuteronomy 28 their

harvests would be snatched from them either by natural pests or by enemies. Here, the land

itself would be infertile and not readily yield a bounty of harvest. In both cases, the curses

bring about the unproductiveness of their labour.

The pronouncement to the man specified that this state of affairs would last all the

days of their entire lifetime (כֹּל יְמֵי הַיֶּיךָ). This repeats the same phrase specifying the duration

of the curse against the snake (כָּל־יְמֵי הַיֶּיךָ). This phrase is not included in the oracle addressed

to the woman, but it is implied. Therefore, the duration כֹּל יְמֵי הַיֶּיךָ can be regarded as applying

to the woman as well.

The curses made against the man and the woman directly impact their primary

relationships and primary functions. The woman's primary relationship is towards the man. It

is radically altered from being one of unified collaboration to one of desire and subjection.

Her primary function of being fruitful in procreating is now full of pain and struggle. In a

corresponding manner, the man's primary relationship towards the ground is radically altered

from one of abundant fruitfulness to one of unyielding infertility. The man's primary function

of cultivating the land becomes a place of toil and struggle to make the land fruitful in

producing food. The central cycle in human life revolves around the three core activities of

working, eating, mating, and the oracle God spoke here concerns these three core activities.[87]

There is one final observation to make regarding God's judgment of the man and the

woman. While God's judgment was addressed to the man and woman individually, each

judgment had ramifications for the partner. The ramification that the judgment upon the

woman had on the man was that he lost the relationship of equal sexually differentiated unity

that he had enjoyed with his woman. It was replaced where he now had to act as master over

the woman. Similarly, the judgment upon the man had ramifications upon the woman. As his

helper, she was also impacted by their change in lifestyle that was now characterized by the

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[87] LaCoque, *Trial of Innocence*, 221-26.

struggle to produce food from the land. She would also share the increased toil. Hardship, pain and sorrow would henceforth be an element in their relationship. Finally, the life-long nature of this toil until he returned to the dust applied equally to the woman.[88] Thus, God's judgment was also directed at them as a couple.

6.2.4 Genesis 3:19

God further elaborates upon this statement of duration by adding an 'until' clause. Adam's toil will last until he returns to the ground, which is a figurative reference to dying and being buried. This phrase "until you return to the dust from which you were taken" is a reference to the man's creation at the beginning of chapter 2:7, where God formed the man from dust from the ground (עָפָר מִן־הָאֲדָמָה).

  This deliberate reference to the man's original creation from the ground conveys a significant implication. What is depicted here is a completion of a life cycle. The man was formed from the ground and became a living being. Ceasing to be a living being would involve returning again to the ground from which he was formed. This ties the man to the ground with respect to his created creaturely nature. Furthermore, the death depicted here is not an "unnatural" penal death, but a natural death that reflects his creaturely earthly nature as an earthling. The man's return to the ground was his original fate, which reflected his originally created earthly nature.[89] This was not a carrying out of the death sentence that God threatened when God made the prohibition. To make this abundantly and unambiguously clear the oracle ends with the explanation:

כִּי־עָפָר אַתָּה וְאֶל־עָפָר תָּשׁוּב

His mortality is due to the man's nature as dust/soil (עָפָר), and his existence as a living being was always temporary until such a time that he returns to the dust/soil (עָפָר). This fate was *not* because he ate the fruit. The implication of this explanation was that the threatened penalty

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88 Van Wolde also observed the impact of the man's doom on the woman, but not the corresponding effect of the woman's doom upon the man. Van Wolde, *Words Become Worlds*, 24.

89 Barth, *C.D. III/1*, 247, Gillingham, *The Image, the Depths, and the Surface*, 36.

would not be inflicted. Far from certainly dying on the day that they eat the fruit, they shall

live the fullness of the days of their life until they return to the earth in the fullness of time.

The end of their life-long toil shall be their death. Rather than being an additional

sentence, their death and return to the ground would signal the end of their toil.[90] It also

reinforces the thrust of the preceding statement that they would toil all the days of their life.

How this pronouncement of returning to the dust has been interpreted depends upon

the interpreter's viewpoint with respect to whether or not Adam and Eve were originally

immortal in a prelapsarian paradise. If they had been created mortal creatures, then this was

not an additional sentence of death, where they are doomed to death on top of their toil, as

much as a normalization of their fate. Death is part of the natural cycle of life.[91] This

perspective presumes that they already were aware of their mortality. They already regarded

themselves as mortal, like all other creatures. This is consistent with the theological viewpoint

that death is a natural part of creaturely being. Our hope of resurrection amounts to a hope of

transcendence of our mortal creaturely being.[92]

If, however, this pronouncement was made in a context where Adam and Eve had

presumed their own immortality, then this doom would have been the most severe punishment

of all for their sins.[93] The theological implication would be that human mortality is penal; a

severe consequence of our sinfulness. Our hope of resurrection is a deliverance from the

doom of death that is associated with sin. It is a restoration to our original intended state. The

difficulty with this interpretation is that the rationale God gave for their eventual death would

presumably be that it was due to them originally being created from dust would not make

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[90] Luther, *Genesis*, 215.

[91] Commentators who have adopted this perspective include: Poole, *Bible Commentary,* 18, Irenaeus, "Against Heresies," V.16.1, (*ANF 2*): 544, LaCoque, *Trial of Innocence*, 227-31, Calvin, *Genesis*, 180, Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, 83.

[92] This is reflected in the widespread view held by the early church fathers that when we are resurrected, we shall be spiritual beings. Tertullian, "Against Marcion," V.9-10, (*ANF 3*): 447-51, ———, "On the Resurrection of the Flesh," (*ANF 3*): 586-87, Origin, "De Principiis," III.6, (*ANF 4*): 344-48.

[93] It has been interpreted as a pronouncement of a doom to mortality by the following writers: Athanasius, "Against the Arians," II.67, (*NPNF² 4*): 385, Chrysostom, "Homily 17," *Genesis 1 - 17*, 244-45, Methodius, "On the Resurrection," I-III, (*ANF 6*): 364-70. Methodius, "The Banquet of the Ten Virgins," II.3, (*ANF 6*): 317, Nyssa, "On the Making of Man," XXI.1-4, (*NPNF² 5*): 410-11.

sense.[94] It would make sense if Adam had been created a mortal creature. This passage

provides conclusive evidence within the text itself that the couple were originally created as

mortal creatures.[95] One can extrapolate from this the conclusion that predation and death was

an inbuilt feature of the natural ecosystem from the beginning.

6.3 The Expulsion from Eden

6.3.1 Genesis 3:20.

The curses that God pronounced against the couple presupposed that they would remain

living. Because the original prohibition threatened immediate death for transgression, the

most significant implication of these pronouncements was the absence of any death sentence.

These pronouncements implicitly constituted an act of mercy. The death sentence was being

commuted. They would live out their natural lives. Though they would face life-long

consequences of pain, toil, and hardship, that was outweighed by the gift of life itself.[96]

Another consequence is significant by its absence. There was no allusion to any

rejection by or separation from God, or that God would no longer be with them. There would

be a change in locality following their eviction from the garden, but no fundamental change in

their relationship with God; God would still be with them.[97]

That the man was quick to understand this pronouncement as a commutation of God's

death sentence is reflected in his immediate response, where he called the name of his woman

"חַוָּה". The explanation for her name was that she was the "mother of all living" (אֵם כָּל־חָי) in

contrast to being dead. He recognized that the final word of this oracle was mercy. He and

Eve were alive through the mercy of God, in addition to being a living being because God

breathed life into him. This story presents life not only as the initial gift of God through

creation, but now a second time by the mercy of God. Because they were alive by the mercy

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[94] Collins recognized but could not to resolve this difficulty. He concluded that, "there is no simple exegetical answer to the question of Adam's mortality". Collins, *Genesis 1-4*, 161.

[95] Day also regarded this explanation as conclusive evidence of their original mortality. Day, *From Creation to Babel*, 44-46.

[96] Other commentators have identified the element of mercy here. Ibid., 40-41, von Rad, *Genesis*, 92-3.

[97] This is hinted at in 4:1 where Eve referred to giving birth to a man "with YHWH."

of God, they shall have children who in turn shall be living - not only through the creative gift

of God who breathes life into them, but also through the flow-on of the mercy of God, who

spared them, when they deserved to die.[98]

6.3.2 Genesis 3:21

God followed this up with a second act of compassion that addressed their nakedness and

their shame. God's action becomes intelligible once one interprets it as God making provision

for covering their shame. It was an expression of care and acceptance rather than judgment.

In contrast to guilt, which is addressed through forgiveness, shame is generally

addressed by covering it. In this case, shame of nakedness was literally covered by clothing.

Shame is also typically covered by silence, where there is a tacit agreement to not mention or

make explicit a shameful matter. God's action in making garments and dressing them was

God's way of addressing their shame.

God's action of dressing them with garments has been interpreted in a number of ways

ranging from negative shaming to positive affirmation. Negatively, it was symbolic of their

new mortality as the penalty of sin.[99] It symbolized their new sinful condition, robes that

needed to be removed and replaced by the robe of the righteousness of Christ.[100] It was an

allusion to the necessity of sacrifice to cover sins, which was fulfilled in the sacrifice of

Christ.[101] This was not necessarily a construal the Israelites would have made because the

animal sacrifices required in the Levitical system served a wide range of purposes, from

thanksgiving offerings, peace offerings, cleansing rituals both to cleanse the person giving the

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[98] Other commentators have recognized that Adam's response was in recognition of the commutation of the threatened death sentence. Calvin, *Genesis*, 180-81, Poole, *Bible Commentary,* 11. That other commentators who did not make this connection found Adam's action here puzzling provides additional support to the superiority of this interpretation. Henry, *Commentary*, 33, Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, 84, von Rad, *Genesis*, 93, Stratton, *Out of Eden*, 62, Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 268.

[99] Methodius, "On the Resurrection," I. 2-4, III.8, (*ANF 6*): 364, 370. Augustine suggested that skin garments symbolize the mortal flesh that they are now clothed in and their mortal condition of life. Augustine, *On Genesis*, II.32, pp. 92-3, Nyssa, "The Great Catechism," VIII, (*NPNF[2] 5*): 482-83, Luther, *Genesis*, 221. According to the early church fathers and in the rabbinic tradition, they symbolized being clothed in mortal flesh. Anderson, *The Genesis of Perfection,* 126, Dods, *Genesis*, 25-6, Ross, *Creation and Blessing*, 149.

[100] Nyssa, "On Virginity," XII-XIII, (*NPNF[2] 5*): 358-60. This was symbolized by the rite of baptism in the patristic church. Anderson, *The Genesis of Perfection,* 129-31.

[101] Henry, *Genesis to Deuteronomy*, 34. Waltke, *An Old Testament Theology*, 267-68.

sacrifice as well as purify the sanctuary.[102] It was a shaming action on God's part driving home the reality of their degraded state.[103]

Another set of neutral implications is that it was simply an act of care. The garments were a practical provision for protection from the elements. There is the implied contrast between the adequacy of the leather garments that God made for them and dressed them with, and the inadequacy of the leaves they used to covered their loins.[104] Making hides requires a complex process of slaughtering an animal, curing its hide to make leather, and dressmaking to some degree. This event raises a whole range of questions that simply are not answered. Did God simply do a once-off provision, or was there an education process that occurred here where the man and woman learned to hunt and the art of tanning? Because hides imply the death of an animal, one could possibly draw the indeterminative inference that this refers to animals being killed either for meat or so that products could be made from their carcasses. The text is unclear regarding this implication. Some interpreters have speculated that the development of these skills amounted to the beginning of civilization with the advent of Stone Age culture, in contrast to uncultured naked fossicking and gathering that the couple hitherto did in the garden. The garments may also symbolize the change in relation of humans to the earth, where they are no longer a naked creature at one with all other naked creatures, but they have become a clothed creature over against all other creatures.[105] This interpretation was utilized to support the notion that the knowledge of good and evil was comprehensive knowledge and learning that is essential for the technical progress that is integral to developing culture.[106]

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[102] Henry, *Commentary*, 34, LaCoque, *Trial of Innocence*, 204-06, Thomas, *Genesis I - XXV*, 53, Waltke, *Genesis*, 95.

[103] Calvin, *Genesis*, 182.

[104] Poole, *Bible Commentary,* 11. Stratton, *Out of Eden*, 63. Barr found it puzzling that immediately after God inflicting all his punishments, God then proceeded to provide them clothing against the elements. Barr, "Is God a Liar?," 12.

[105] LaCoque, *Trial of Innocence*, 208, Stratton, *Out of Eden*, 63.

[106] Driver, *Genesis*, 50, Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 269-70.

The preferred interpretation is that the garments are a means of mitigating shame. This is preferred for two reasons. First, garments cover nakedness and provide dignity. There are implications regarding the changed nature of their relationship. The openness of mutual unashamed nakedness has been lost. The garments suggest a need for covering up in relation to each other, a protection from the gaze of the other that reflects a loss of the undefensive vulnerability they once enjoyed. This may be the first effect of the changed relationship God pronounced between the woman and man of desire and mastery. The tension brings with it a new element of conflict, defensiveness and need for self-protection through cover-up, which is symbolized by the garments.[107]

Another implication is that there was no return to the carefree unashamed nakedness they enjoyed before all this happened. God's act of dressing them was a statement that the situation had now irrevocably changed. The damage that their disobedience had caused could not be undone. Their sense of nakedness and the need for clothing would now be an ongoing feature of their life. Again, there is an aetiological mythological implication that points to the origin of the fact that humans are distinct from animals in their practice of wearing clothing.

These garments, however, also amount to a declaration of a high social status. The particular choice of the word כְּתֹנֶת instead of the more generic term בֶּגֶד may convey a specific implication of God garbing them with priestly garments, or with the expensive garb of a person of high status. This term occurs 29 times in the Old Testament. Twenty-three references are to the priestly vestments of the Levites, and six references are to distinctive costly coats.[108] The implication of this gesture is that God is reaffirming their high social status or consecrating them to a priestly role. This is a strong and dramatic affirmation of

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[107] von Rad, *Genesis*, 94. Wenham suggested that God's act of covering their nakedness reflects the Israelite taboo against nakedness in the divine presence, a taboo that symbolizes and was a reminder for the need for their sinfulness to be covered. Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, 85, Och, "The Garden of Eden: From Creation to Covenant," 154-55.

[108] References to priestly garments of the Levites are: Ezr. 2:69; Neh. 7:70,72; Ex. 28: 4, 37,39; 29:5, 8; 39:27, 40:14; Lev. 8:7,13; 10:5, 16:4. The other references are to outer garments of wealthy people: Joseph's multicoloured coat (Gen. 37), Job's coat (Jb. 30:18), a coat worn by Hushai the Archite, one of David's counsellors (2 Sam 15:32), Solomon's bride's dress (S.S. 5:3), and Tamar the daughter of King David's long sleeved robe (2 Sam. 13:18-19).

their special status, implying that their call to cultivate and keep the garden was a sacerdotal calling bestowing a priestly status.[109] This allusion would have been unmistakeable if God had clothed them with linen garments rather than skin. Nevertheless, it would not have been lost on the Hebrew reader. Either way, the כְּתֹנֶת indicates that despite their transgression and imminent eviction, God was affirming their high social status either as priests or as wealthy individuals. The priestly status conferred upon their ultimate ancestor could have been construed as anticipating the priestly hierarchy in Israel and the emergence of a national identity as a community set apart to be a holy nation under God.[110]

God was engaged in an anti-shaming exercise that countered the humiliation they had experienced. The most effective way of addressing the shame that accompanies a loss of social status was to make a public affirmation of a person's social status. The garments that God vested Adam and Eve with amounted to a divine public affirmation of their high social status. As we have argued in Chapter 3, a corrective action that reaffirms a person's identity is effective in preventing an experience of acute shame from becoming an ongoing state of chronic shame.

6.3.3 Genesis 3:22.

Verse 22 contains the only instance in the narrative of communication between a character and the reader. The narrator relates a divine soliloquy that, "Behold, the man has become like one of us by knowing good and evil..." God's little soliloquy is intended to provide the reader with an inside explanation for the rationale behind God's actions lest they be misunderstood. The ostensive reference is to God's actions in verses 23-24. What is amazing is how generally they have been misunderstood as the climactic divine punishment, despite the explicit statement in verse 22 to the contrary.

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[109]The intertestamental literature depicted Adam as a glorious priestly figure robed in glorious garments. *Jubilees* 3:27; *Ben Sira* 49:16. The rabbinic literature connected Adam's primordial priesthood with glorious garments. Lambden, "From Fig Leaves to Fingernails: Some Notes on the Garments of Adam and Eve in the Hebrew Bible and Select Early Postbiblical Jewish Writings," 79-80.

[110]John Goldingay, *Old Testament Theology: 2 Israel's Faith* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006), 192-206; Seock-Tae Sohn, *The Divine Election of Israel* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991), 94-97.

Even though the reader is the intended audience of God's statement, the ostensive reference is to a hearer who is identified as "one of us." The ostensive reference of מִמֶּנּוּ is not identified. It could be a polytheistic reference to a community of gods. It has been interpreted as God talking reflectively utilizing the royal "we", or a hint to the Trinity.[111] Alternatively, God could have been addressing a community of other spiritual beings who made up God's court, who likewise possessed the same knowledge of good and evil.[112] The identity of these recipients, however, is of secondary importance in light of the function of the soliloquy to inform the reader as to the divine intention in God's subsequent action.

A noteworthy detail is that the ostensive reference to the object of God's action is explicitly to the man, and implicitly to the man and woman as a couple. Despite the fact that it had been the action of the man and woman together, God speaks only about the man stretching forth his hand and eating. God subsequently drives the man out of Eden. The woman is not mentioned. The last mention of the woman in the story occurred in verse 21 when God clothed both of them. It can be inferred that this exclusive focus upon man as the object of God's action was intentional. It was not warranted because both of them ate from the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil and have become like God in their possession of the knowledge of good and evil. It naturally would follow that God's reflection would concern both of them. The woman was deliberately excluded.[113]

That the woman was overlooked conveys a message that from God's perspective she was of secondary importance. God was dealing with the man here; it was the man who stood in accountable relationship with God. The relationship that was implied by this deliberate oversight of the woman is one of male headship, where the man is in authority over the

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[111] Tertullian, "Against Praxeas," 12, (*ANF 3*): 606-07, Augustine, *Literal Interpretation of Genesis*, XI.53, p. 460, Luther, *Genesis*, 222-24, Poole, *Bible Commentary,* 11.

[112] Justin Martyr suggested that God was dialoguing with Wisdom. Martyr, "Dialogue with Trypho," 62, (*ANF 2*): 128. Pseudo-Clementine suggested it referred to angels in God's court. Pseudo-Clementine, "Recognitions of Clement," 39-42, (*ANF 8*): 108-09, ———, "The Clementine Homilies," Homily 1, 5-7, (*ANF 8*): 313-14, Cassuto, *Genesis*, 172.

[113] Stratton, *Out of Eden*, 64.

woman. The woman no longer stood alongside the man in a couple relationship of mutual

equal accountability before God, or else God would have addressed them both as a couple.

Any action upon the man by implication affected his woman also by virtue of the relationship

where she was 'under' him.

When God drove out the man, the universally drawn implication is that she was driven

out with him. They were driven out as a couple, not mutually together, but the man was

driven out, and the woman followed along with him. This suggests that God was following

through with the curse that God pronounced over the woman that the man shall be master

over her (3:16). This changed the way that God related to the couple. God's exclusive focus

upon the man was an act of identification that thereby defined the hierarchical relationship the

man now had with the woman. This identification not only conveyed a definition of the

relationship that the man and woman now had with God, but primarily what was the new

couple relationship. The patriarchal relationship was the new social state of affairs.

This divine statement "Behold the man has become like one of us, knowing good and

evil" is a proposition that explained God's intentions for driving the man out of Eden. The

first part of the statement was an observation "behold..." that described a new state of affairs.

The man now possessed a knowledge of good and evil. The significance of the possession of

this knowledge was that the man has become like "one of us". This confirms the truth of the

snake's assertion that if they ate the fruit they would become like God.

Those who were addressed as מִמֶּנּוּ were by implication identified as members of an "in

group" defined by possession of this knowledge of good and evil. The implication is that

possession of this knowledge made the humans possessors of knowledge that was reserved for

this "in group," and not fit for humans. Even though they now shared the same characteristic

through possession of this knowledge, the human pair remained interlopers; they did not

belong as part of this group. They may have become like "one of us", but they were not

accepted as "one of us." They remained excluded. This inferred social exclusion of the

couple was decisive. It anticipated their actual exclusion from the garden. The fact that

exclusion from a social group is inferred here supports the interpretation that מִמֶּנּוּ refers to

spiritual beings comprising God's court. It also implies that God's eviction of the couple from

the garden was also an act of social exclusion from membership of this "in group" of spiritual

beings.

The possession of this knowledge by the human couple created a new situation for

God that required an alternative course of action. The soliloquy makes it clear that God's

intention was preventative rather than punitive. It was a pragmatic response to the human

possession of this knowledge that made them "like one of us". God wanted to prevent these

humans who were now like them from having access to the tree of life and the duration of life

that its fruit provided.[114] The inclusion of גַם was an oblique reference to the fact that the man

had already taken and eaten from the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil.

The effect of eating from the tree of life would have been an extension of life. Its fruit

would enable the man to exist for a long time (וָחַי לְעֹלָם). Translating עֹלָם with the word

"forever" or "eternal" carries an inaccurate connotation inasmuch as these English words

reflect the Greek concept of timeless never-ending infinite life. עֹלָם may reflect, however, a

more constrained notion of long duration, lasting age. This fits in with the notion of the tree

of life providing eternal youthfulness, a duration of life, rather than a different type of eternal

immortal life. This prolonged life that the tree of life provided was to be denied to the man.

God's verbal statement is left incomplete. Yet verses 22-23 presents a complete divine

speech act, where the incomplete verbal statement is "grammatically" completed by the

subsequent action of expelling them from the garden. This can be regarded as a biblical

illustration of the integrated nature of speech acts as social actions that contain a linguistic

component. This is also the distinguishing feature of what Wittgenstein regarded as language

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[114]von Rad, *Genesis*, 94, Irenaeus, "Against Heresies," III.23.6, (*ANF 2*): 457, Henry, *Commentary*, 35-6,
    Cassuto, *Genesis*, 172, Stratton, *Out of Eden*, 64.

games. A language game is a social action that contains a linguistic element.[115] The climax of the story depicts God engaged in a language game, a single social response that had an integrated linguistic and physical action element.

6.3.4 Genesis 3:23-24

Just as God initially put the man in the garden to cultivate and keep it, so God now drove the man out to cultivate the land. The piel form of שָׁלַח conveys a sense of forceful eviction. The following phrase "from which he was taken" can have two meanings.

One meaning involves a reference back to Genesis 2:7, reminding us that the man had been formed from the ground. What this phrase reaffirmed is that regardless of the possession of the knowledge of good and evil, the man's original status with his close ties to the land remained unchanged. The man remained by nature an earthling, one formed from the ground. His original tie to the land that he was created to cultivate remained unchanged. This story makes no hint that the man's fundamental nature had changed in any way.

The second meaning refers back to Genesis 2:8 where God placed (יָּשֶׂם) the man in the garden that had been planted. The man is relocated back to his original locality and back to his original created task of tilling the ground. Far from the man falling from a prelapsarian state that he could never return to, the implication of this clause is that God returned him to his original vocation and location. It was a reinstatement to an original status prior to being appointed to cultivate and guard the garden. The man was literally put back in his place.

In verse 24, the image of being driven out is repeated with a more forceful verb גָּרַשׁ which means to dispossess or evict. This conveys the inference that the man had lost his tenancy rights to dwell in or enter the garden. God as the landlord had evicted him. This eviction was legal and permanent. Their banishment is consistent with being subjected to a curse. The eviction was the implementation of the pronouncement made against the man.

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[115]Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, ‍§ 7, p. 5.

God appointed cherubim to take the man's place. The phrase that related that

cherubim were appointed in the garden forms a chiasmus with the phrase in 2:8 where the

man was originally stationed in the garden.

Genesis 2:8:   גַּן־בְּעֵדֶן מִקֶּדֶם וַיָּשֶׂם שָׁם אֶת־הָאָדָם

Genesis 3:24: וַיַּשְׁכֵּן מִקֶּדֶם לְגַן־עֵדֶן אֶת־הַכְּרֻבִים

The implication of this chiasmus is that we have a new tenancy here. The cherubim were

depicted throughout the Old Testament as guardians of sacred sanctuaries.[116] That the task of

keeping the garden was given to cherubim reflects its status as a sacred grove. Cherubim now

had the privilege of dwelling in it, which had previously been the privilege of the man and

woman. They were appropriate for this task.

In addition, to ensure that there would be no subsequent attempt to trespass into the

garden or steal its fruit, God placed a permanent guard. The image of a flaming sword that is

constantly turning around is unique to this scene. It suggests constant vigilance and a never

ceasing guard. A flaming sword conveys an image of lethality. You do not mess with this

guard. The guard's purpose was specifically to guard the way to the tree of life, not the

garden generally. Thus assuring that access to the tree would remain barred.

What has not been generally recognized is the amount of disgrace that this eviction

involved. The man and woman were in effect sacked from their employment. In addition they

were evicted from their abode. This was a very public action. Furthermore, they were evicted

for culpable shameful reasons. There was a reversal of social status. They were originally

taken from an ordinary position of farming and appointed to a high status sacerdotal position

within a sacred garden. They were summarily dismissed from this position and sent back to

farming. The disgrace that this entailed was unavoidable. The couple would have probably

experienced the humiliation that would have accompanied this eviction, the story does not

tell. This means that there is another implicit movement in the story. The couple move from

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[116] Driver, *Genesis*, 60-1, Wenham, *Genesis 1 - 15*, 86, Cassuto, *Genesis*, 175, Westermann, *Genesis 1 - 11*, 274,
Preuss, *Old Testament Theology*, 256-57.

being naked and unashamed within the garden to being clothed and ashamed outside the garden.

6.4 Conclusions and Implications

We see that a closer attention to the meanings conveyed by the implicatures in the text heightens the drama and highlights the relational crisis that their action of eating the fruit had precipitated. The relationship between the couple and God has taken a dramatic turn for the worse. Instead of an easy open companionship, there was fear and deception. The story succinctly conveys the couple's futile attempt to evade God, first by hiding, and then by dissembling and blame shifting. All to no avail, and the woman finally responds with a reluctant confession. In a few words, with God's question "where are you?" and their trembling response the author paints a picture of dramatic confrontation.

The chiastic structure of God addressing Adam, then Eve, and then not the snake, then rendering judgment first to the snake, then Eve, and finally to Adam is further evidence of the careful composition of the story. It informs the reader that these two actions of divine inquiry and pronouncement correspond to each other. God's judgment was not uninformed, nor arrived at beforehand, but it was based upon careful inquiry. A subtle feature of this tableau is that here alone, the humans were addressed individually, whereas in the first part and final part of the story they were addressed as a couple. This nuance subtly indicates that even when we act in social solidarity with others, our ultimate relation to God is one of individual accountability.

The implicatures reveal that there was a reordering of relationships between the protagonists in this story that all involved changes in social status, with corresponding effects of disgrace and humiliation. The snake lost its status as the most cunning of animals for one of humiliated prostration in the dust. The outcome of its claim to be an interpreter of knowledge was the snake lost all influence upon the couple, and the future state of their relationship would be one of enmity, where the snake and its descendants would be crushed.

The judgment of God upon the couple involved significant changes with respect to their primary functions and their primary relationship. Both would experience increased difficulty, pain and toil with respect to their primary function, the woman with respect to childbearing, the man with respect to cultivating the earth. The woman's previous relationship of mutual teamwork as a helper corresponding to the man, became redefined to one of uneasy tension between desire and dominance. The implication is that these pronounced changes reflected God's determination that sin inevitably would have a social impact that left its mark upon changed social relationships.

Whether the divine oracle in 3:14-19 was one of judgment inflicting these changes as a penalty, or one of pronouncement of the inevitable consequences of their actions, has been a matter of debate. The divine curse oracle was a performative speech act that had the weight of divine judgment. This implies that the pronounced changes to their relationships were the result of a divine response rather than natural consequences.

Finally, the oracle implied that the threatened death penalty has been commuted to life banishment.   Rather than suffering a penal death on the day they ate the fruit, they would suffer life-long consequences of their actions. They would live out their natural life-span, but their life would be one of pain, struggle and toil. There would not only be struggle with respect to their primary functional tasks, but also in their relationship with each other. The life of ease and fellowship with God and each other was irretrievably lost. This sentence came into effect when they were subsequently evicted from the garden.

The divine pronouncement in the oracle in 3:14-19 was immediately followed by divine action. God does two actions that achieve a balance between grace and judgment. God's action in clothing the couple was one of grace. The social status conveyed by the garments suggests that God's act was similar to the one where God placed a sign upon Cain. It was an action that implied divine favour. It was followed by one of judgment; eviction from the garden. The story makes explicit that the eviction was done on a pragmatic basis. It was

not a capricious judgment, but a practical preventative action. This has the theological

implication that even acts of divine judgment are consistent with and serve an overriding

redemptive purpose.

General Summary and Conclusions

This thesis set out to make two contributions to Old Testament theology. On the one hand, it was a methodological study that utilized a new hermeneutical method for analysing the implicatures in a text. On the other hand, the thesis presented a novel interpretation of the Eden Narrative as an original contribution to the ongoing study of and theological reflection upon one of the most significant passages in the Bible.

Hermeneutics: Interpreting Implicatures

The contribution that this thesis offers to hermeneutics is the development of a systematic method for interpreting the implicatures in a text. This method is most applicable to texts that feature narratives and discourses. It is less applicable for interpreting other texts such as law codes that are further removed from social discourse and social interaction.

This hermeneutical approach was based on the epistemological assumptions of expressivist linguistics, which are founded on De Saussure's theory of language. It applied three theories in the emerging field of pragmatics to the analysis of the biblical text. These theories were Speech Act Theory, Relevance Theory, and Communications Theory. These theories shared common assumptions in their recognition that social discourse is made up of speech acts. These speech acts utilize two modes of communication to convey meaning, the coding – decoding mode with reference to the explicatures, and the inferential mode with reference to the implicatures and ostensive references. These two modes of communication complement each other in conveying meaning.

The contribution that Speech Act Theory offers to the interpretation of texts is the taxonomy that there are a range of different speech acts, each of which have their own constituent linguistic rules, and essential conditions for relevance. In addition, the meaning of a speech act is not restricted to its locutionary force (semantics), but also includes the illocutionary force (the intended response from the recipient) and perlocutionary effect (the

actual impact and response the recipient makes). Speech Act Theory allows for the interplay between meaning being based on the communicator's intention and being derived from the recipient's active construal of meaning.

Relevance Theory offers an approach for analysing the inferences in a speech act with reference to their ostensive references, optimization of relevance, and determinacy or indeterminacy of the implicatures. The contribution of Communications Theory is its framework that the emotional illocutionary force of a communication is conveyed through the implicatures. These implicatures convey ostensive references to the self-identification of the communicator, identifications regarding the social status and identity of the recipients, and inferences regarding the nature of their relationship.

These theoretical concepts provide useful tools for analysing the contribution that implicatures in a text offer to the construal of meaning by a reader. As the previous discussion has illustrated, a large portion of the meaning in this story is conveyed in the implicatures. The narrative is able to be sparse because of the reliance upon the reader's construal of meaning from the implicatures in the narrative. And it is the implicatures that progress the narrative and give it coherence.

What we have demonstrated is that a systematic approach that pays attention to the implicatures contributes to a more comprehensive interpretation of the text. Speech Act Theory has drawn our attention to the important contribution that the illocutionary force and perlocutionary effects of a speech act provide to the meaning of utterances. Relevance Theory has revealed the extent to which meaning is conveyed through the implicatures, the ostensive references, and the inferences in speech acts. Interpretation needs to engage with these elements in a text. The inferential model of communication goes beyond the decoding model of communication in providing the theoretical framework that enables us to do that.

Furthermore, matters where the interpretation is unclear or ambiguous can at times be clarified through an analysis of the implicatures. Verses where the implicatures are

indeterminate can also be clarified by examining the implicatures in other parts of the text. A coherent text will tend to have consistent implicatures. So implicatures that are consistent with other areas of the text are more likely to be accurate than those that stand alone in an unsupported manner. Paying attention to the internal consistency of implicatures within the literary context contributes to confidence in interpretation. The reading of the Eden Narrative presented in this thesis is an illustration of how interpretation of biblical passages can be strengthened by utilizing more systematic approaches for the identification and analysis of the implicatures in a particular text.

Interpreting the Eden Narrative

The thesis proceeded to utilize this hermeneutical approach to develop a reading of the Eden Narrative that paid particular attention the interplay of identifications and definitions of their social relationships between the characters in the story, which primarily occurred on an inferential level in the text. The reading highlighted how these social dynamics would have evoked shame. In offering this analysis of the dynamics of shame in the story, the thesis drew upon the insights regarding the nature of shame as a phenomenon that have been derived from psychological theories and empirical research. The literature review on shame that made up Chapters 2 and 3 argued that shame was a phenomenon with four distinct dimensions: anticipatory shame, disgrace, acute shame, and chronic shame. This conceptualization of shame provided the preunderstandings that the thesis brought to the interpretation of the text.

The main points that this reading of the Eden Narrative made are summarized below. The reading that was presented in Chapter 5 drew out that there are sufficient hints in the text to conclude that both Adam and Eve were present in the dialogue with the snake in Genesis 3:1-7, and eating the fruit was their joint action as a couple. The reading emphasized that the snake was identifying itself as an alternative interpreter of knowledge that they should heed instead of God. The snake's questions were aimed at undermining the validity of the divine prohibition by calling into question God's sincerity, and casting doubt on the nature of their

relationship with God. The snake inferred that they did not enjoy a special intimate loving relationship with God, but rather it was a self-serving manipulative relationship. The snake also made inferences regarding the identity of the couple, implying that they were ignorant, inadequate, and naive.

The seeding of this doubt regarding their social standing with God created the opening for the desire for self-transcendence in being like God, acquiring knowledge, and trying the fruit. This doubt provided the motivation for Eve and Adam with her to take the prohibited fruit. The reading also identified that these inferred identifications conveyed by the snake would have been humiliating, and would have evoked acute shame in the couple. The reading suggests that the couple acted out of acute shame in a state of emotional dysregulation, rather than deliberate premeditated rebellious pride.

Chapter 6 presented a reading of the remainder of the Eden Narrative that related God's response to the situation that the couple's action of eating the prohibited fruit had created. The story focused around the crisis of whether or not God would follow through with the threat that on the day they eat the fruit, they would surely die. The couple's action in hiding from God out of fear was in anticipation that this was precisely what God would do (3:8).

The story related that, instead of executing the death penalty, God did four things. God inquired (3:9-13), God cursed (3:14-19), God restored (3:21), and God evicted (3:22-24). That God did not inflict the death penalty is inferred by the curses that were pronounced in verses 14-19, which all presume ongoing life. This is made explicit in the pronouncement to Adam that he would toil all the days of his life, implying he would live out his natural life span. God linked Adam's eventual death in terms of returning to the earth (3:19), with the circumstances of Adam's original creation in being taken from the earth (2:7). Linking Adam's death to his mortal creaturely earthly nature tied his mortality with his original creaturely being, rather than being a new circumstance. The recognition that the divine oracle

implied that the threatened death penalty would not be inflicted lay behind the man's immediate response of naming his woman, Eve, because it testified to the wonderful reprieve that they would all be *living*.

God exercised divine freedom in addressing the new situation created by the couple's actions on its own merits. God did this by reordering the relationships that the snake, woman and the man would have with each other. The snake would be humiliated and brought lowest in social status. There would be enmity between the snake and the woman. The woman would experience greater difficulty in her primary created function of childbearing and in her primary relationship to her man from whom she was derived. The man would experience greater difficulty in his primary function of tilling the earth and in his primary relation to the earth from which he was derived.

God's reordering of relationships with the associated implications regarding social status, was immediately followed by a divine act of conferring social status. God's action in clothing them with expensive or priestly garments, could be regarded as a corrective experience aimed at addressing the impact of acute shame, thus preventing it from evolving into chronic shame.

Finally, God evicted them from the garden. This eviction was not penal. Verse 22 makes explicit that it was pragmatic and preventative in nature. This is another indication that God was managing the new situation that had transpired pragmatically on its merits. God's eviction returned Adam to his original state. Adam was created east of Eden because there was a need for a human to till the earth (2:4b-2:7). The man was subsequently placed in the garden to cultivate and keep it (2:15). The eviction removed the man from the garden and the preceding pronouncement made to Adam (3:17-19) inferred that he would return to his original task of cultivating the ground. What we see here is the closing of a circle, rather than a 'Fall' from a prelapsarian paradise.

The preceding reading with its focus upon the implicatures within the Eden Narrative has arrived at a number of conclusions. First, the man was present during the woman's dialogue with the snake, and the snake tempted them as a couple, and they ate the fruit together as a couple. Second, threatened penalty of death was not carried out. Instead, the couple was left to live out their natural life span. The penalty, rather, was the typical Ancient Near Eastern sanction of being cursed and exiled. The life in exile would entail increased toil and struggle in making a living and bearing children. Third, the analysis of the implicatures regarding relationships brings to light the significant changes that occurred in the nature of the relationships between the characters. The meaning of the key actions of the characters in eating the fruit, hiding, being clothed, and being evicted from the garden needs to be construed with reference to changes in social status and social relationships. Finally, the analysis has demonstrated that shame emerges as a key emotional motivator for the couple's actions. Inadequacy, humiliation and shame play a central role in explaining the psychological dynamics motivating the actions of the characters in this story.

The Dynamics of Shame in Eden

As our analysis of the text has demonstrated, there are allusions to shame throughout the Eden Narrative. The importance of shame is signalled by the astonishing observation in Genesis 2:25 that the couple were naked and unashamed before one another. This is the only place in the text where shame is explicitly referred to. Elsewhere, the presence of shame is inferred in the implicatures.

The snake by implication shamed the couple through inferring that they were ignorant and had been tricked by God. The suggestion that God was deceiving them disrupted the interpersonal bridge of trust between the couple and God, and acute shame was the result. The loss of confidence in God's benevolence would have jeopardised their sense of identity and place in the world. In other words, the protective factor of secure attachment in God was taken out of the picture. The snake's inferences would have evoked acute shame.

The trauma of social rejection, disgrace, or ostracism generally evokes acute shame, which is accompanied by activation of social pain circuits that overlap with physical pain.[1] Acute shame is literally painful. This is a highly destabilizing emotional reaction that evokes the Panic emotional system and the reflexive responses of freeze, fight or flight.[2] At this point emotion regulation often fails, as high activation of the limbic system corresponds with reduced activity of the prefrontal cortex. People experiencing acute shame characteristically react in ways that reflect emotion dysregulation. We see evidence of the shame-based flight response in Eden when the couple sought to cover themselves, socially withdraw and hide, or simply disappear through the 'floor' if they could. We also see evidence of the fight response in their passive-aggressive action to get back at God in defying his command and eating the forbidden fruit. The point is that acute shame is a point of high vulnerability to act in a reactive unconsidered way and commit a sin one would not otherwise consider doing.

We suggest that the couple ate the fruit in a moment of acute shame with its accompanying emotional dysregulation that would have impaired values based higher order processing. The couple became further ashamed when the outcome of eating the fruit was not what they expected. They had been tricked again; this time by the snake. Their nakedness then became a matter of shame under the evaluative gaze of the other, in contrast to their unashamed nakedness with each other beforehand. Their fear, guilt and shame motivated them to cover themselves and hide from God.

God's judgment began with bringing shame upon the snake. God condemned it to a position of ongoing humiliation. But God did not immediately shame the couple, who were already ashamed enough. Rather, God addressed their ashamed nakedness by clothing them

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[1] James K. Rilling and Alan G. Sanfey, "The Neuroscience of Social Decision-Making," Annual Review of Psychology 62 (2011): 31, Naomi I. Eisenberger, "Why Rejection Hurts: What Social Neuroscience Has Revealed About the Brain's Response to Social Rejection," in The Oxford Handbook of Social Neuroscience, ed. Jean Decety and John T. Cacioppo (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 586-98, ———, "Why Rejection Hurts: The Neuroscience of Social Pain," in *The Oxford Handbook of Social Exclusion*, ed. C. Nathan DeWall (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 153-62, ———, "Social Pain and the Brain: Controversies, Questions, and Where to Go from Here," *Annual Review of Psychology* 66 (2015): 601-29.
[2] Panksepp, *Affective Neuroscience*, 52-57.

with garments. This was a corrective experience that addressed their sense of shame. These garments covered their shame in two ways. They covered their nakedness, and they restored their social dignity.

When a person experiences acute shame, a corrective experience is needed to restore his or her previous social standing and affirmative sense of identity. If no corrective experience occurs, a person has to reaffirm his or her own identity by rejecting the identifying significance of the shame experience. If a person is unable to do so, it increases the likelihood that a person will redefine his or her self-concept in shame-bound terms. This then leads to chronic shame and a shame-based identity. We can regard God's action in clothing the couple with garments conveying a high social status as such a corrective experience aimed at restoring their sense of adequacy.

The story closes with the final humiliation of expulsion from the garden. So, we see that how these events played out in the garden can be more adequately appreciated by paying attention to these allusions to shame in the narrative. The role that shame had in this story as a motivating factor behind the couple's actions has some interesting theological implications.

Some Theological Implications

This reading of the Eden Narrative opens up a number of important theological questions that lie outside the scope of this thesis to address. The first one lies at the heart of theodicy. The Christian tradition of the Fall depicted God as relentlessly rendering judgment upon Adam and Eve's sin in inflicting the penalty of death in some form.[3] The holiness and retributive justice of God is prominent in this perspective, rather than the mercy of God. This reading gives greater prominence to the mercy of God as the basis of his response to Adam and Eve. This has implications for the theological balance between the wrath and judgment of God

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[3] Anselm, "Cur Deus Homo," in *Basic Writings*, ed. S. N. Deans (La Salle, OR: Open Court, 1979), Ch. XII - XIX, pp. 203-08. John A. Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, trans. John Allen, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, PA: Presbyterian Board of Christian Education, 1559/1939), Bk. II, Ch. 1.4, pp. 212-13. Louis Berkhof, *Systematic Theology* (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, 1958), 255-61.

upon sin on the one hand, and the redemptive grace and mercy of God for the sinner on the other hand.

God's response to sin in the Old Testament is characterized by a nuanced tension between forgiveness on the one hand, and letting loose the consequences of sin on the other. Often the consequences of sin are reinforced by the retributive justice of God. These consequences are often played out in subsequent generations. As von Rad pointed out, a theme of the primal history of Genesis 1 – 11 was how the world became increasingly full of corruption and violence, which were consequences of humans committing sins and violating the social order.[4] The intergenerational impact of sin from fathers to children was a feature of Old Testament thought.

This synthetic tension between forgiveness and punishment is most clearly evident in the nuances of the meaning of the Hebrew word $^{c}\bar{a}w\bar{o}n$. $^{c}\bar{A}w\bar{o}n$ referred to both iniquity, the guilt it incurred, and its punishment. It denoted both an act that diverged from the right way and the consequences of that act in terms of iniquity and guilt. It has the sense of culpability-incurring-punishment. The Hebrew verb root ^{c}wn means to bend or twist aside. As a theological term, $^{c}\bar{a}w\bar{o}n$, came to mean guilt before God that incurs His judgment.[5] In the Old Testament, Israelite pleas for forgiveness in effect was a plea for God to withhold the evil consequences of their iniquity (Num. 22:11). The alternative was that the offender had to bear his or her iniquity, which often meant expulsion from the community.[6] This meant that $^{c}\bar{a}w\bar{o}n$ was deadly unless removed or neutralized. Usually, $^{c}\bar{a}w\bar{o}n$ was either borne until it matured in consequences,[7] was shifted onto another person or object,[8] or God chose to bear the

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[4] Gerhard von Rad, *Old Testament Theology*, (Peabody, MA: Prince Press, 1962), p. 154-60.von Rad, *Old Testament Theology*, 154-60.

[5] R. Knierim, "'āwōn perversity," TLOT, vol 2: 862-866.Ernst Jenni and Claus Westermann, "Theological Lexicon of the Old Testament," trans. Mark E. Biddle, (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1997).

[6] von Rad, *Old Testament Theology*, p. 262-72.

[7] Gen 4:13; Ex. 28:43; Lev. 5:1, 17; 7:11; 17:16; 19:8; 20:17, 19; 22:16; Nu. 5:31; 14:34; 18:1, 23; Ez. 14:10; 44:10, 12.

[8] Ex. 28:38; Lev. 10:15; 16:22; 18:25; Nu. 18:1 Ez. 4:4, 5, 6; 18:19, 20.

consequences.[9] The remedies for neutralizing the impact of ʿāwōn were sacrifice and

forgiveness.[10]

The reading of the Eden Narrative presented in this thesis presents this story as the

earliest instance where this tension if evident. On the one hand, God did not inflict the

threatened death penalty in an act of mercy. On the other hand, God pronounced lasting

consequences in the curses in 3:14-19, and inflicted an immediate consequence in expelling

them from the garden. Then in Genesis 4 it is possible that the Yahwist is presenting the

fratricide of Abel by Cain as an intergenerational consequence of Adam and Eve's sin, where

the ʿāwōn of their sin is borne by their sons? If this were the case, it raises interesting

implications regarding the outworking of sin and iniquity, and the suffering of the innocent

who are victims of the sins and iniquity of others.

These observations open up the theological question regarding the nature of sin and

God's way of addressing it. The doctrine of the Fall interprets the Eden Narrative in terms of

the concept of original sin and God's response of consigning humankind over to death as the

divine penalty. An possible alternative perspective may give greater attention to sin in its

relation to the Hebrew concept of ʿāwōn in its intergenerational context of the tension

between the inherited iniquity of the fathers and the individual responsibility for one's own

sins. This is an avenue of inquiry that is opened up by this thesis.

This thesis also opens up the possibility of an alternative view to the three traditional

views regarding the root of original sin. This reading of the Eden Narrative suggests that

shame may be a significant contributing factor to human propensity to sin. Despite these

allusions to shame in the Eden Narrative, shame has been generally overlooked as a

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[9] Ex. 34:7; Nu. 14:18, 19; Isa. 33:24; Hos. 14:2; Mic. 7:18-19; Ps. 32:5; 85:2; Job 7:21.
[10] 1 Sam. 3:14; Isa. 22:14; 27:9; Jer. 18:23; Ps. 78:38; Prov. 16:6; Dan. 9:24; Job 14:17; Neh. 4:5; Ex. 32:30;
Lev. 4:26, 35; 5:6, 10, 13; 16:16, 30, 34; 19:22; Ps. 79:9; 2 Chr. 29:24; Lev. 5:16; 19:22; Ps. 32:1; 2 Sam.
24:10; 1 Chr. 21:8; Zech. 3:4; Job 7:21; 2 Sam. 12:13; Zech. 3:9; Ps. 51:2,7; Jer 2:22; 4:14; Job 10:14; Ps.
19:12; Lev. 16:30; Ez. 33:8; 36:33; Prov. 20:9 Nu. 8:7.

motivating factor for sin, and instead many interpretations have emphasized pride.[11]   For

example, envy has been traditionally associated with pride. Gregory of Nyssa stated that

Adam and Eve sinned out of envy of divine beauty and immortality, and he stated that the

origin of evil was envy.[12] He, however related envy to inordinate pride, rather than

identifying its relation to shame. This raises the question of how shame could be related to

pride. As we have already pointed out, a review of the phenomenon of shame indicates that

hubristic pride is often a defence against disavowed shame.[13]

      Alternatively, the early church fathers favoured the view that the original sin was a

result of the failure of the rational mind to govern the passions and emotions. The rational

choice was to choose the good. The contrary choice of evil was itself irrational, and the result

of the undue influence of passions that were contrary to reason.[14] The couple sinned out of

concupiscence. As a consequence, the harmonious order of rationality was a casualty of the

first original sin.[15] An alternative perspective that psychological research opens up is that

maybe this is not sensual desire per se, but rather a matter of emotion dysregulation.

      Acute shame, particularly, is a highly destabilizing emotional reaction. Psychological

research suggests that emotion dysregulation results in an impairment of the higher order

processing essential for considered values-based decision making, which is essential for

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[11]   Augustine in *City of God*, XIV 13., p. 573. Augustine, *On Genesis*, II.22, p. 86. ———, *Literal Interpretation of Genesis*, VIII.31, p. 364. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Vol. II, Bk. I, Q. 77, Art. 5; Q. 84, Art. 2-3. ———, *Summa Theologica*, Vol. II, Bk. I, Q. 77, Art. 5. Calvin, *Genesis*, 153. Herman Bavinck, *Reformed Dogmatics Volume 3: Sin and Salvation in Christ*, trans. John Vriend (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 1906/2006), 108, Henry, *Commentary*, 25, Mettinger, *The Eden Narrative*, 55-56, Callender, *Adam in Myth and History*, 71-72, Waltke, *Genesis*, 91-92.

[12] Nyssa, "The Great Catechism," VI, (*NPNF² 5*): 481.

[13]   Ibid., 190.

[14] Martyr, "Dialogue with Trypho," 41, (*ANF 1*): 270, ———, "First Apology," 28, 43, (*ANF 1*): 172, 77, Irenaeus, "Against Heresies," IV.4.3, (*ANF 2*): 466, Hippolytus, "Refutation of All Heresies," 29, (*ANF 5*): 151, Tertullian, "Treatise on the Soul," 15-17, (*ANF 3*): 194-96. ———, "Against Marcion," II.8, (*ANF 3*): 303-04. Origen taught that the rationality of the soul enabled humans to distinguish between good and evil. Our freedom of the will meant that a human freely chooses whether to resist or pursue a virtuous course or be allured by vices. Origen, "De Principiis," III.1.3-6, (*ANF 4*): 303-06. Origen maintained that the origin of sin lay in the deception of evil powers and yielding to the desires of the flesh. ———, "De Principiis," III.2.1-3, III.4.1-5, (ANF 4): 330-32, 337-40. Gregory of Nyssa also held the view that Eve yielded to the sensual desire for pleasure that bypassed the rationality of the soul, and so ate the fruit. Nyssa, "On the Making of Man," XX.4, (*NPNF² 5*): 410.

[15]   ———, "Man's Perfection in Righteousness," 6.12, (*NPNF¹ 5*): 162-63, Augustine, *City of God*, XIII.13, pp. 522-23; XIV.15, p. 69.

making sound moral choices.[16] The couple's ill-considered action in taking the fruit could be

an instance of impaired decision-making whilst in a state of emotion dysregulation.

The third traditional view was that anxiety or dread lay at the root of original sin.[17]

Anticipatory shame is experienced as anxiety, and social anxiety is related to shame. This

opens up the possibility that shame may be a common underlying factor behind these three

traditional perspectives. This possibility warrants further exploration.

This thesis, then, set out to accomplish two objectives. First, it presented a

hermeneutical method for analysing the implicatures and inferences in a text. Second, it

presented an alternative reading of the Eden Narrative that illustrated an application of this

hermeneutical method. This reading highlighted the shifts in social relationships that

occurred through the story, and the emotional impact of those shifts in respect to the

experience of shame. What emerged from this reading is a greater appreciation of the

contribution that the dynamics of shame makes to understanding the story.

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[16] James J. Gross and Ross A. Thompson, "Emotion Regulation: Conceptual Foundation," in *Handbook of Emotion Regulation*, ed. James J. Gross (New York: Guilford, 2007), 8-10, K. Luan Phan and Chandra Sekhar Sirpada, "Emotion Regulation," in *The Cambridge Handbook of Human Affective Neuroscience*, ed. Jorge Armony and Patrik Vuilleumier (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 376-94, Peter Mende-Siedlecki and Kevin N. Ochsner, "Emotion Regulation: Neural Bases and Beyond," in *The Oxford Handbook of Social Neuroscience*, ed. Jean Decety and John T. Cacioppo (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 278-84, Amelia Aldao, Susan Holen-Hoeksema, and Susanne Schweizer, "Emotion-Regulation Strategies across Psychopathology: A Meta-Analytic Review," *Clinical Psychology Review* 30 (2010): 217-37. Baumeister and Scher, "Self-Defeating Behavior Patterns," 3-22, Roy F. Baumeister, Anne L. Zell, and Dianne M. Tice, "How Emotions Facilitate and Impair Self-Regulation," in *Handbook of Emotion Regulation*, ed. James J. Gross (New York: Guilford, 2007), 408-26.

[17] Sören Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling and Sickness Unto Death*, trans. Walter Lowrie (New Yord: Doubleday, 1941), 182-213. James L. Marsh, "Kierkegaard's Double Dialectic of Despair and Sin," in *The Sickness Unto Death*, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1987), 67-83. Niebuhr, *Nature and Destiny of Man*, 195.

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