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**Not Can I, But Should I: Analyzing the
Pre-existing conditions surrounding successful
third party intervention into intrastate conflicts**

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Not Can I, But Should I: Analyzing the Pre-existing conditions surrounding successful third party intervention into intrastate conflicts



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Background, Question, Argument

- What pre-existing conditions in an intrastate conflict facilitate successful third-party intervention focused on spawning regime change?
- The United States has historically failed in the intervention of foreign intrastate conflicts.
- Our final intent is to identify general conditions that, if carefully exploited or cultivated, will lead to direct success for the United States when providing assistance to other countries.
- Our belief is that four conditions, Political, Economic, Social, and Informational, have a direct effect on the success of third party intervention

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables									
	DV= Rebel Victory					DV= Rebel Loss		DV= Gov. Victory		DV= Violence Level
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (7)	Model (8)	Model (9)	Model (10)	Model (11)	Model (12)
Base Variables										
Years of Conflict	-0.070**	-0.069**	-0.075**	-0.076**			0.026***	-0.027**	-0.032***	
Level of Violence	0.909***	0.891***	0.923***	0.844**	0.735**		2.328***	0.013	0.015	
Democracy (Polity>5)	(0.349)	(0.354)	(0.348)	(0.341)	(0.316)		(0.428)	(0.234)		
Polity 2 Score*2	-2.125**	-2.110**	-2.216**	-2.275**				-0.549*	-0.604**	
	(1.032)	(1.033)	(1.027)	(1.019)				(0.306)	(0.278)	
Political Variables										
#of Military Personnel Per-Capita	-0.070*	-0.074*	-0.082**	-0.089**				-0.051**		0.026**
Total Mil Personnel (State side)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.041)				(0.022)		(0.008)
Military Variables										
GDP Per-Capita	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000			0.00001**			
Military Expenditure Per-Capita	(0.00000)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)			(0.00000)			
Economic Variables										
Literacy Per-Capita	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0002***	-0.0002***			-0.00003			-0.0002***
Primary Education Per-Capita	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.00004)	(0.00004)			(0.00001)			(0.00003)
Secondary Education Per-Capita	-0.00000	-0.00000	0.00000***	0.00000***			0.00000			0.00001**
Population Density (log)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)			(0.00000)			(0.00000)
Social Variables										
Media Density Index (log)	0.0004	0.0004	0.001	0.001			0.001			-0.162***
Internet Access Per-Capita (log)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	0.203**		(0.051)	0.147*		(0.056)
Cell Phone Access Per-Capita	-0.555	-0.558	-0.532	-0.670**			-0.457***			-0.191***
	(0.341)	(0.342)	(0.335)	(0.339)			(0.173)			(0.046)
Informational Variables										
Third Party Intervention (Rebel side)	0.003*	0.003*	0.002*	0.003*			0.002***	0.002***		0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)			(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.001)
Constant	1.194	1.185	1.163***	0.953*			-0.020	-0.371	-0.604	1.401***
	(0.594)	(0.582)	(0.575)	(0.426)	(0.447)		(0.476)	(0.551)	(0.530)	(0.296)
Observations	1,317	1,317	1,317	1,327	1,423	1,387	1,330	1,317	1,348	1,341
Log Likelihood	-155.891	-155.840	-156.918	-159.011	-216.913	-197.628	-562.452	-349.518	-362.769	-739.158
Akaike Inf. Crit.	339.783	341.679	337.836	336.022	437.826	403.255	1,140.904	729.036	735.537	1,492.315

Ten predictive models created to understand which variables significantly effect successful third party intervention into intrastate conflicts

TACTICAL Success Macro-Condition Score					TRANSITION Success Macro-Condition Score				
Macro Condition Type	Individual Conditions	Iran '53	Libya '09	Syria '12	Macro Condition Type	Individual Conditions	Iran '53	Libya '09	Syria '12
Political	Level of Democracy	3	3	3	Political	Level of Democracy	3	1	1
	Popular Representation	2	3	3		Popular Representation	2	1	1
Economic	GDP	3	3	3	Economic	GDP	1	1	1
	Military Expenditure	2	1	1		Military Expenditure	2	2	1
Social	Literacy	1	3	2	Social	Literacy	1	3	3
	Education	1	3	2		Education	1	3	3
Informational	MDI	2	2	3	Informational	MDI	2	2	3
	Internet Access	2	1	3		Internet Access	2	3	3
Total Score		13	19	20	Total Score		14	16	16

Pre-existing Conditions Score Table for Successful Intervention

Research design

- **Hypothesis:** The level of political, economic, social, and informational conditions can directly lead to successful third party intervention
- We used empirical data and historical/current case studies to highlight the importance of the four main conditions
- Data sources used:




Results

- Intervention into intrastate conflicts is ill-advised if the conditions are not thoroughly understood
- Our Hypothesis was supported
- Our research suggests that the pre-existing conditions can be shaped to increase chances of success however shaping must occur prior to intervention.

The "So What"

- These findings provide examples of the power of pre-existing conditions in influencing the success of foreign intervention.



The graph on the left depicts a decision calculus that considers the effect of pre-existing conditions on achieving both successful regime change and establishing stability, thereby achieving overall success. The graph on the right is representative of a decision calculus that fails to consider the effects of pre-existing conditions on establishing stability after a regime change, thereby negating overall success.

Next Steps

- Future research should further examine what conditions better support foreign intervention on the behalf of host nation government



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