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## **Patterns in the legislative ratings and campaign contributions of business and labor pacs.**

Cornelius N. Hetzner  
*University of Massachusetts Amherst*

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PATTERNS IN THE LEGISLATIVE RATINGS AND  
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS OF BUSINESS AND  
LABOR PACS

A Dissertation Presented

By

Cornelius N Hetzner III

Submitted to the Graduate School of the  
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

February 1985

School of Management

c

Cornelius N Hetzner III

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
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
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
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
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## DEDICATION

This dissertation is respectfully dedicated to all those who use their experiences, strength and hope to teach those who consider themselves unteachable.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

As a spur to finish this work, several colleagues told me of the joy to come from writing the acknowledgements. Though joy is now present, present too, in equal measure are nostalgia and the anxiety commensurate with any formidable task.

My first thanks, being ever judicious, must go to the members of my committee. Dr. Arthur Elkins, the chair, has been a good friend and mentor since my entry into the doctoral program. He has made me three fine gifts - the freedom to pursue my own interests, a technique for suppressing ego when writing, and the germinal idea for this work. Dr. George Odiorne's legacy to myself, and to many other doctoral students, is the practical. *Cogito, ergo sum* is fine, but do. Dr. Tony Butterfield encouraged me to enter the doctoral program, often sustained me when times were tough, and encouraged (here, a euphemism) me to complete the present work. Dr. Janet Grenzke offered her expert knowledge and enthusiasm for the subject, always on short notice. Her behavior has been, without exception, at the highest plane of collegiality.

My thanks to a superb committee - one which found that rare balance point between freedom and discipline

for the candidate.

Being, too often, "a bear of small brain," I have had constant need of the bigger brains and generous hearts of my classmates. Drs. Stella Nkomo, Marty Moser, Jeff Born, and Mike Moore were always ready to lend assistance. That assistance was continued by my colleagues at the University of Rhode Island. Dean Richard Weeks and past and present Management Department Chairmen Drs. Craig Overton and George deLodzia, especially, have provided encouragement and resources to complete the task.

Equal in importance to the direct aid and comfort of faculty and peers has been the indirect motivation provided by numerous students who have graced my classrooms. Laura LaBelle, Chris Smith, Bill Zwemke, and Bonni Perrot-Baker are but a few of those who have made the process well worth the price.

Born without a compass, I often tend to lose direction. Fortunately I have been blessed with good guides. I wish to thank Nora Hertzfeld, Grace Rhodes, Stubb King, June Connelly, Martha Jones, Jane Randolph, Pam Hurtig, Phil Day, Ruth and Norman Day, Donald and Kathleen Teagno, Dee Hoover, and Bill Wilson and his myriad friends for their explicit instructions and exemplary behavior. Once was lost, now I'm found.



I thank my father, C.N. Hetzner II and my mother, Joan Cundiff Hetzner, for instilling me with a love for learning.

To my brother Phil I am deeply indebted - several thousand dollars worth. The Medici tradition lives on. To Erika, Alicia and Mark, thank you for care, concern, and your forgiveness of my inattention and broken plans.

Neither words nor money can repay Cathy McGovern and Judy Sugrue for their dedication to the typing of this work. The pressure of deadlines and the constant revisions must have made their job satisfaction akin to that felt by Sisyphus.

There are three people to whom my last thanks are the most important ones.

I thank Lynn Dannacher for keeping the lamp lighted when flame and fuel were low.

I thank Dr. Stu Westin for perfect patience in answering questions, uncountable hours in translating my jabberwocky to the computer and vice versa, and unbounded friendship for a very trying friend.

I thank Martha Day, lifemate, for all those things my heart knows well but which no vocabulary can well express. To my ineffable, irrepressible, practical poetry - thanks for days past and years future.

ABSTRACT

PATTERNS IN THE LEGISLATIVE RATINGS AND  
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS OF BUSINESS AND LABOR PACS

(February 1985)

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Directed by Dr. Arthur Elkins

The ability of interest groups in the United States to affect the political process has drawn interest and concern since before this nation's founding. During the last ten years, the role of interest groups in electoral politics has drawn even more heightened attention. The cause of the attention has been the substantial force political action committees (PACs) have played in campaign funding. The number of PACs and the proportion of their contributions to campaign financing have grown rapidly. Journalists and scholars have begun efforts to describe, analyze and evaluate the importance of PAC growth. Most of these efforts are founded on comparisons of the relative growth among the Federal Election Commission's (FEC) PAC categories, particularly the corporate and labor categories.

The relevance of making FEC or business/labor categorical comparisons hinges on two issues dealing

with cohesion. One issue of concern is the behavioral cohesion within a particular category. If organizations within a category act dissimilarly, that tendency will weaken the usefulness of the category as a unit of analysis. To date, PAC researchers have assumed behavioral cohesion among categorical elements. The findings of this study indicate that this assumption is not based in fact. Using organizations' ratings of members of Congress as a measure of behavior, discrepancies are found between PAC origin (categorical membership) and behavior (legislative ratings). Inferences about what a PAC seeks cannot be made from knowledge of its categorical membership.

The second issue dealing with cohesion is concerned with the correspondence between what instrumental goals a PAC wishes and its ability to pursue those goals through financial contributions. The PAC's instrumental goals are defined by their ratings; the pursuit of those goals is measured by their contributions to members of Congress. This study's findings show that there is less than perfect cohesion between approval when measured by ratings and approval when measured by contributions. However, unlike the case with ratings, the financial contribution patterns of PACs cause the sample of organizations to split into

well-defined business and labor categories.

The results found within this study indicate that the importance and complexity of this issue of categorical cohesion demand intensified research efforts.

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C H A P T E R I  
THE GROWTH OF PACS

Introduction

In The Federalist Papers, James Madison writes, "Among the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction."<sup>1</sup> While the Constitution has been successful in the control of factions in the sense that the United States is neither a monarchy nor a totalitarian state, the balance of forces has been precarious enough that factions have drawn piercing and critical observation since the country's founding.

It is the question of balance among factions that has been the impetus for the present study. Passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and the data recording and disseminating activities of the Federal Election Commission since 1976 have allowed political activity to be investigated with heretofore unknown depth and rigor. In the years since 1976 much attention has been paid to the amount of money being contributed to Congressional campaigns by the political action committees (PACs) of various factions. To a

great extent, the importance of those dollar flows hinges upon the cohesion of the givers. If campaign contributions of a particular size come from a set of sources that are like-minded in terms of legislative goals that money is apt to be more influential than the same amount of money coming from a number of contributors having very disparate legislative goals. Thus, the legislative cohesion of the givers enhances or mitigates the influencing capacity of the contributions.

On the surface, as evidenced by PAC contributions, the relative power of the business faction of the U.S. has grown while that of labor has shrunk. This conclusion hinges on certain assumptions about the cohesion within and the separation between the business and labor factions. This project looks at the strength of the cohesiveness assumptions. Before exploring these assumptions, modern attempts to preserve factional balance and the PAC growth of the last ten years, which has triggered the present concern over imbalance, will be described.

#### Modern Electoral Reform

In the 20th century, the United States has undergone three major periods of reform aimed at

restoring a balance among factions. In 1907, in reaction to the perceived political influence of businessmen in the election of Theodore Roosevelt to the Presidency, Congress passed the Tillman Act [Alexander (1976, 1980)]. The Tillman Act prohibited corporations from making political contributions of federal candidates. Three years later Congress passed a campaign funding disclosure law that required candidates to publicly disclose the source of the funds expended on their campaigns.

In the 1940s, Congress passed three pieces of legislation that sought to diminish labor's role in the electoral process. The Hatch Act of 1940 set a \$5,000 limit on an individual's contribution to a single federal candidate. The Smith-Connally Act forbade union political contributions to Federal elections for the duration of the war. With the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, unions were restricted from making expenditures or contribution from their treasuries to Federal political conventions, primaries, or general elections.

#### FECA and PACs

After a decade of false starts during the 1960s, Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1971 and the Federal



Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971. Congress' intent for the Revenue Act was to curb the potential for undue influence of wealthy donors by providing for publicly financed presidential elections.

The FECA was intended to be a modernized, reformed version of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925. Most electoral experts agree that the FECA, through the Federal Election Commission, has been successful in recording and making public the electoral financing of federal candidates [U.S. Congress, House. Campaign Finance Study Group (1979)]. Great dissension exists over the success of FECA in terms of controlling the influence of special interest groups over the electoral processes of federal candidates [Epstein (1982)].

The FECA, its 1974, 1976 and 1979 amendments, the FEC's SUN-PAC Advisory Opinion, and the Supreme Court's ruling in Buckley v. Valeo have contributed to a 3300% increase in the number of political action committees and a 900% increase in PAC receipts in the 1972-1982 period [FEC Record (Mar., 1984)]. The large increase in PAC receipts does not necessarily indicate a growing participation by interest groups in the electoral process. Prior to the 1970s it was almost impossible to accurately estimate interest group contributions. Much financing was done through purposefully deceptive

means. It may be that the proportion of campaign contributions funded by interest groups has remained relatively constant, that it is only the channels of funding that have changed.

The rapid growth in the numbers, receipts, expenditures, and contributions of PACs serves as a strong justification for their study. In addition, that growth has not been distributed evenly over what are perceived to be the major interest group blocks in this country [FEC Record (Mar., 1984)]. As research results in the next section will indicate, it appears that the electoral influence of business has grown while that of labor has waned.

If one accepts the Madisonian notion that the prevention of tyranny by either majority or minority needs constant vigilance in a democracy, then a change in the relative strength of interests such as business or labor calls for research into the implications of those changes.

From a different perspective, interest groups that engage in electoral politicking have a need for research that can explain, predict others', or enhance their own participation in the electoral process. For businesses susceptible to turbulent environments [Fahey and King (1977)], Bower and Doz (1979), Mintzberg (1979)], astute

political activity may become as important a factor for their survival as more traditional managerial skills. For business, increasing foreign competition, expanding government regulation, rising costs of funds, and changing tax policy may be more conducive to solution through the political process than through operational changes in the organization itself. For organized labor, foreign imports, high unemployment, and a diminished membership may cause it to seek redress in Congress rather than at the negotiating table.

The rapid growth of PACs, a growing segment of single issue PACs, and a perceived demise of party influence [Polsby (1981)] have caused PACs to become one of the most important political changes of the last ten years. To date, the research efforts directed at this great change in campaign financing have been relatively straightforward descriptive analyses of PAC growth and composition.

#### Descriptive PAC Research

Since passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, political action committees have grown in numbers from 113 in 1972 to 3700 (approx.) at the end of 1984. The receipts of PACs during the same period

have growth from \$19.2 million to an estimated \$200 million total for the 1982 two year election cycle [Epstein (1980), FEC Record (Mar., 1984)].

In fulfilling the mission given to it by Congress, the Federal Election Commission has issued summary statistics of PAC and other Federal electoral process activities since the 1976 elections.

Under the present FEC design, PACs are aggregated into six categories. The FEC defines PACs as "all political committees not authorized by a federal candidate and not established by a political party" [FEC Record (Mar., 1982)]. The FEC categorizes these political entities as: 1. Corporate; 2. Trade/Membership/Health; 3. Non-connected; 4. Labor; 5. Cooperative; and 6. Corporations without stock.

The financial activity of PACs is portrayed using three financial categories--receipts, expenditures, and contributions. In addition, within certain parameters, the FEC collects and disseminates the names of contributors, their economic affiliations, the size of the contributions, and the names of the recipients of the contributions [Cantor (1982)].

The efforts of the FEC have provided political researchers with a wealth of accurate detail that

previously was only estimable or, too often, unknown. Due to the way the FEC data is developed and arranged and to its accessibility on computer tape, researchers may analyze PACs using party, individual candidate, candidate status (incumbent, challenger, open), PAC category, individual PAC, and Senate or House of Representatives as categorical variables.

The following section is a summary of what descriptive studies have ascertained about the growth in numbers and receipts and the contribution behavior of political action committees.

#### PAC Growth

PACs have greatly increased in number since 1974. Table 1 records the growth in the number of registered PACs from 1974 through June of 1982. While all PACs have grown five fold in the eight year period, that growth has been uneven. PACs affiliated with corporations have increased from 89 in 1974 to 1,555 in December 1982, an increase of over 1700%. During the same period labor PACs have grown from 201 to 415, an increase of 206%. In other words, for every new labor political action committee, there have been seven new business PACs formed. This disproportion is magnified if one accepts Epstein's contention (in Malbin, 1980),

TABLE 1

## GROWTH OF NONPARTY POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES, 1974-1981

	Dec 74	Nov 75	Dec 76	Dec 77	Dec 78	Dec 79	Dec 80	Dec. 81
	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Corporate	89	139	433	538	784	949	1204	1327
Labor	201	226	224	216	218	240	297	318
Other <sup>a</sup>	52	357	489	601	631	811	1050	1256
TOTAL <sup>b</sup>	608	722	1146	1355	1633	2000	2551	2901
Total								
Business	243	318	678	839	1100	1355	1729	1953
Related <sup>c</sup>	41	44	49	62	67	68	68	67

NOTE: No. = number of committees registered with the Federal Election Commission.

<sup>a</sup> Composed of all PACs classified by the FEC as No-Connected, Trade/Membership/Health, Cooperatives, and Corporations without Capital Stock.

<sup>b</sup> All percentages do not add to 100 because of rounding.

<sup>c</sup> Includes figures for corporate PACs plus half of the "other" PACs which are assumed to be business-related.

that, at a conservative estimate, one half of the PACs included in FEC categories other than business and labor should be viewed as promoting a pro-business philosophy. Under that assumption, in 1982, business-oriented PACs outnumbered labor PACS 2,107 to 350.

Table 2 shows that in the period from 1976 to 1982 corporate PACs nearly doubled their proportion of receipts, disbursements, and contributions. Labor's share fell from 36% to 24% of all nonparty PAC contributions. Labor's receipts dropped even more precipitously as a percentage of all nonparty receipts; however adjusted receipts for all PACs grew by 260% in a period of five years.

Table 3 decomposes the contributions of PACs by year, category, amount, party, and status. By party, business PACs are more balanced in their giving than of labor. While labor has given less than 10% of its money to Republicans, business gives one third of its money to Democrats. Business and labor both distribute the majority of their funds to incumbents.

The above representations of PAC growth are descriptive in nature. The patterns they reveal may be summarized as follows:

TABLE 2

NONPARTY PAC FINANCIAL DATA: CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGNS 1976-1980  
(in millions of dollars and percentages)

	Adjusted Receipts		Adjusted Disburs.		Contributions to Candidates	
	1976	1978	1976	1978	1976	1978
Corporate	6.8 13%	17.4 22%	5.8 11%	15.2 20%	4.3 19%	9.8 28%
Labor	18.6 38%	19.6 25%	17.5 33%	18.6 24%	8.2 36%	10.3 29%
Other <sup>a</sup>	28.6 53%	43.0 54%	29.6 56%	43.6 56%	10.0 44%	15.1 43%
TOTAL	54.0 100%	80.0 100%	52.9 100%	77.4 100%	22.5 100%	35.2 100%
Total Business Related <sup>b</sup>	21.1 39%	38.9 49%	20.6 39%	37.0 48%	9.3 41%	17.4 50%
		73.0 53%		68.7 52%		30.6 56%

<sup>a</sup> Composed of all PACs classified by the FEC as No-Connected, Trade/Membership/Health, Cooperatives, and Corporations without Capital Stock.

<sup>b</sup> Includes figures for corporate PACs plus the half of "other" PACS that are assumed to be business-related.



TABLE 3

PAC CONTRIBUTIONS TO CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES IN GENERAL  
ELECTIONS BY TYPE OF PAC AND BY PARTY AND STATUS OF CANDIDATE:  
1972-1980 (IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS AND PERCENTAGES)

Type	Year	Amount Given	Party					Open
			Dem	Rep	Inc.	Chall.	Status	
Trade/ Memb./ Health	1972	\$ 1.0	\$ .2 (20%)	\$ .8 (80%)	\$ .5 (50%)	\$ .2 (20%)	\$ .3 (30%)	
	1974	\$ 1.8	\$ .5 (28%)	\$ 1.3 (72%)	\$ 1.4 (78%)	\$ .1 (6%)	\$ .3 (17%)	
	1976	\$ 2.6	\$ 1.0 (38%)	\$ 1.6 (62%)	\$ 1.7 (65%)	\$ .5 (19%)	\$ .4 (15%)	
	1978	\$ 10.6	\$ 4.4 (42%)	\$ 6.2 (59%)	\$ 6.4 (60%)	\$ 2.1 (20%)	\$ 2.2 (21%)	
	1980	\$ 15.0	\$ 6.5 (43%)	\$ 8.5 (57%)	\$ 9.9 (66%)	\$ 3.4 (23%)	\$ 1.7 (11%)	
Non- Connect.	1972	---	---	---	---	---	---	
	1974	\$ .7	\$ .3 (48%)*	\$ .3 (52%)*	\$ .1 (14%)	\$ .3 (43%)	\$ .3 (43%)	
	1976	\$ 1.2	\$ .6 (45%*)	\$ .7 (55%*)	\$ .4 (33%)	\$ .5 (42%)	\$ .3 (25%)	
	1978	\$ 2.3	\$ .5 (23%)*	\$ 1.7 (77%)*	\$ .7 (30%)	\$ 1.0 (44%)	\$ .5 (22%)	
	1980	\$ 4.5 (29%)	\$ 1.3 (71%)	\$ 3.2 (33%)	\$ 1.5 (51%)	\$ 2.3 (15%)	\$ .7	

TABLE 3 (continued)

Type	Year	Amount Given	Party				Status		
			Dem	Rep	Inc.	Chall.	Open		
Labor	1972	\$ 3.6	\$ 3.4 (94%)	\$ .2 ( 6%)	\$ 1.9 (53%)	\$ 1.0 (28%)	\$ .7 (19%)		
	1974	\$ 5.7	\$ 5.4 (95%)	\$ .4 ( 7%)	\$ 2.8 (49%)	\$ 1.7 (30%)	\$ 1.3 (23%)		
	1976	\$ 7.4	\$ 7.2 (97%)	\$ .2 ( 3%)	\$ 4.7 (64%)	\$ 1.6 (22%)	\$ 1.2 (16%)		
	1980	\$12.3	\$11.5 (93%)	\$ .8 ( 7%)	\$ 9.0 (74%)	\$ 1.9 (16%)	\$ 1.3 (11%)		
Corpo- rate	1972	\$ 1.7	\$ .5 (29%)	\$ 1.2 (71%)	\$ 1.1 (65%)	\$ .2 (12%)	\$ .4 (24%)		
	1974	\$ 2.4	\$ .9 (38%)	\$ 1.4 (58%)	\$ 1.9 (79%)	\$ .2 ( 8%)	\$ .3 (13%)		
	1976	\$ 6.7	\$ 2.9 (43%)	\$ 3.8 (57%)	\$ 4.8 (72%)	\$ 1.2 (18%)	\$ .8 (12%)		
	1978	\$ 9.1	\$ 3.1 (34%)	\$ 6.0 (66%)	\$ 5.4 (59%)	\$ 2.0 (22%)	\$ 1.7 (19%)		
1980	\$18.1	\$ 6.3 (35%)	\$11.8 (65%)	\$10.5 (58%)	\$ 5.6 (31%)	\$ 2.0 (11%)			

1. PACs have increased at a great rate in their numbers and in their ability to raise and distribute funds.
2. PACs, on average, contribute over one-fourth of a Representative's and one-fifth of a Senator's campaign funds.
3. Although PACs still favor Democratic candidates as recipients, the Democratic edge seems to be shrinking.
4. Over 60% of PAC contributions continue to be made to incumbents.
5. Labor PACs have shrunk from one-third of all PACs in 1972 to one-ninth in 1982. Labor's contributions, which constituted 50% of all donations in 1972, were down to 25% in 1980.
6. Corporate PACs have grown to become one-half of all PACs. From 1976 to 1980, business PACs increased their expenditures from 10% to 25% of all PAC expenditures. In the two year period of 1978-1980, corporate PACs increased their contributions from one sixth to one-third of all PAC contributions.

It is results such as these that have caused concern over factional imbalances and the perverting of political processes through interest group influence

based on contributions.

### Theoretical Research

As the number of PACs and their contributions have grown, more attention has been given to developing frameworks to discover the implications of that growth. Research is beginning to move from description to explanation and interpretation. What follows are the results of two studies that go beyond descriptive analysis.

### Environments and PAC Growth

In November of 1982, Edwin Epstein presented a paper to the Conference on the Impact of the Modern Corporation that may have surprised those who have followed Epstein's voluminous writing on PACs over the last dozen years. Epstein writes,

"In a more personal vein, I have argued for over a decade, that absent the legal right of corporations and labor unions to contribute directly to political campaigns, the PAC mechanism served as a useful and appropriate vehicle for their limited involvement in electoral politics. The almost exponential increase in PAC activity--particularly among corporate and other business-related committees--over the past several years has raised serious doubts in my mind as to whether PAC contributors do not already exceed their "fair share" of Congressional candidates' campaign receipts" [Epstein (1982 p. 118)].

Epstein's conclusion derives from his studies of the potential for future corporate PAC development. Only 35% of the 1,000 largest industrial corporations have PACs. The formation of PACs for those 1,000 corporations increased by nearly 50% between 1978 and 1980.

Epstein concludes that beyond the size variable, corporate PAC formation is influenced by both regulatory and economic dependence on the Department of Defense (DOD). Highly regulated industries and those corporations holding DOD contracts have a greater PAC formation rate than those not exhibiting those two characteristics.

#### Ideology vs. Pragmatism

In 1982 Edward Handler and John Mulkern published a study of the behavior of a sample of 71 corporate PACs. Using FEC data, corporate PAC bylaws, interviews with an officer from each PAC, and other information the authors attempted to discern if there were differences in the electoral philosophy and behavior of corporate PACs. Their results suggest that there are at least two styles of corporate PAC behavior--pragmatic and ideologic.

PACs in the pragmatic mode tend toward greater

support of incumbents. For a pragmatic corporate PAC:

"the priority is to accommodate, in what it regards as a realistic way, the existing composition of Congress, and to secure and maintain a high degree of access to incumbent elected officials, with some, but not heavy, emphasis on party affiliation" [Handler and Mulkern (1982, p. 14)].

When evaluating candidates for the possibility of contributing to them, pragmatic PACs focus on a relatively small set of issues that are of direct concern to the particular corporation. Ideological corporate PACs are:

"seeking to alter the political composition of Congress, to help produce a conservative or Republican majority in both houses, or failing that, to induce a movement in a more conservative and pro-business direction--in any case to move the center of gravity of the Congress to the Right" [Handler and Mulkern (1982), p. 14)].

Ideological corporate PACs evaluate potential recipients on a range of issues that they believe will improve the general business environment.

Handler and Mulkern classified their sample into a four part typology--ideological, ideological leaning, pragmatic leaning and pragmatic. Membership in a particular category was determined by using seven ratios that measured incumbency, Republican party and liberal Democrat support.

The authors found that ideological business PACs made greater contributions to and supported Republicans

much more strongly than did pragmatic PACs. The authors classified 56.4% of their sample as ideological or ideological leaning.

Handler and Mulkern conclude that "corporate PACs express differences in priorities and perceived interests in a continuum of contribution strategies" [Handler and Mulkern (1982, p. 33)]. The authors argue that the business community shows more political diversity than that of labor, although not so little that it could be claimed that no community of business interests exists.

The question of cohesiveness and diversity among corporate, as well as other, PAC categories is an important one.

It is the degree of cohesiveness of the behavior of interest groups that underpins all questions about the relative power of those groups. If it can be shown that the cohesiveness of the business community differs greatly from that of the labor community, then conclusions of factional imbalance based on straight forward comparisons of the numbers of PACs and the size of their contributions of these two factions becomes subject to doubt. Handler and Mulkern find diversity in PACs from the business community; however they provide no reference point that would allow the

determination of the meaningfulness of that diversity. Without a comparison point such as labor, it is difficult to draw inferences about the impact of corporate PAC behavior upon the relative power of business in the political process.

In the following chapter five hypotheses are developed to investigate the degree of cohesion within a set of politically active organizations composed of business, labor, liberal, conservative, agricultural, and other interests. The cohesion of these various factions is investigated from two perspectives. Similarity of approval toward members of Congress and similarity of campaign contribution patterns are used to determine the degree of cohesion within particular interest groups.

The choice of legislator approval and campaign contributions as the operational variables of the cohesion construct have not been chosen haphazardly. Their selection derives from theories of interest group behavior. The following sections discuss the relationship of interest group theory to group cohesion.

#### Introduction to Interest Group Theory

In the 19th century, the politics of America were



studied using the individual as the unit of inquiry. That focus changed in 1908 when Arthur F. Bentley's The Process of Government was published. Bentley argued that to understand American political behavior political scientists should study groups rather than individuals. In the following seventy-five years numerous theories about how interest groups form, adapt, and achieve their goals have been formulated [Bentley (1945), Schattscheider (1942), Truman (1951), Olson (1970), Salisbury (1970)].

During the last ten years, the study of interest groups has meant primarily the study of PACs. However, the body of interest group theory has not played a significant role in the investigations of PAC behavior.

In large part, the small number of theory driven, analytical PAC studies, when compared to descriptive studies, is due to the relatively short time that PAC statistics have been available.

### Proliferation Theory

Proliferation interest group theorists, such as Bentley, propose that the formation of interest groups is tied to the complexity of a society. As the social and economic relationships of a society become more

diverse, a need arises among people to form groups specifically directed to protecting their specialized interests. The more complex the society, the greater the number of interests, and the greater the number of groups needed to represent those interests.

There is little argument that the 1970s were a decade of rapid change in the U.S. Long term inflation, the embargo and price rise of oil, the influx of women into the job market, and conservation and consumerist legislation are but a few indicators of that change. The six fold increase in the number of PACs during the same period may reflect the attempt of groups of people with newly similar interests to deal with that change.

If societal complexity has increased and diversity of interests grown along with it, as the proliferationists would argue, that change is not reflected in PAC research. In almost all instances, academic researchers have used the six FEC categories as the units of analysis. Analysis is drawn from aggregating 3,700 PACs into six groups of origin. In non academic settings, journalists have used the behavior of single PACs to try to convey the impact of PAC growth and influence [Perry, 1982].

In each type of investigation, little note is made

of either increased diversity or the implications of that growing diversity. Instead, the common assumption is that corporations and business associations tend to act in a singular, cohesive fashion. Labor, too, is assumed to have congruent political goals. Handler and Mulkern's study is the most noticeable attempt to address the question of degree of cohesion in interest group PACs.

#### Homeostatis Theory

Homeostatis group genesis theory, of which David Truman's work, The Governmental Process, is representative, posits the formation rate of groups upon dislocations in the society at large. In Salisbury's words:

"A putative equilibrium among social groups is disturbed as a consequence of such socially disruptive factors as technological innovation, war, transportation or communication changes and such macro-social processes as major population movements, business cycle fluctuations and industrialization. The disequilibrium will evoke a response from the disadvantaged sectors as they seek to restore a viable balance"  
[Salisbury, (1970), pp. 35-36].

In the business literature much attention has been paid during the last twenty years to the increasingly turbulent environments in which business must act [Ansoff (1965), Bower and Doz (1979), Lawrence and

Lorsch (1967)]. As environments destabilize, the ability of business organizations to control their fates through business functional skills becomes less. Strong operational control diminishes to a necessary but not sufficient condition to maintain a successful business. Extra-organizational solutions developed through the political process become necessary.

The last ten years were witness to a number of business "haves" becoming "have nots." The steel and auto industry were devastated by imports. The savings and loan industry became stuck between low interest bearing mortgages and the high cost of new funds. Attempted passthroughs of the increased cost of petroleum and the fear of nuclear power caused the utility industry to fall from economic and social grace.

In each of these examples, the industry affected made a concerted effort to wrest a public policy solution to the problems caused by environmental instability.

With the exception of Epstein's work on formation rates among Department of Defense contract holders, almost no one has investigated PACs using a homeostatic perspective [Epstein (1982)]. There has been no investigation of whether formation rates or size of

contributions are affected by relative loss of economic position. Almost without exception, in the study of PACs the unit of analysis has been the FEC category.

### Sub Rosa Theory in Current Research

While in a formal sense there have been few explicit links between theory and PAC research, in another sense much of the analysis of PAC behavior has been made while implicitly subscribing to some theory or theoretical fragment. The very way data is aggregated and the comparisons deemed relevant imply some cognitive structuring by the researcher. This section attempts to elucidate the assumptions underlying the order that researchers have placed on their data.

To a great extent the analyses of PAC behavior have concentrated on a comparison of the growth and contribution patterns of labor PACs to those of business. To choose this comparison as a focal point implies some conflict between the electoral, and hence political and economic, aspirations of business and those of labor. In its essence, the making of this comparison is a Marxian based analysis. That is, it is assumed that the goals of a particular group, owners and managers, are inimical to those of workers.

While there is strong historical evidence of the usefulness of this type of comparison, it is arguable whether this diametricality is as clear cut in the 1970s and 1980s as it was during earlier periods.

In anecdotal fashion, it is possible to list numerous occasions during the past few years when portions of labor formed coalitions with various industries. The UAW and the domestic car manufacturers have fought together to curtail automobile imports. The USW and the largest steel producers have formed a partnership to try to limit imports of foreign steel. In 1980 and again in 1984, a great number of blue collar workers aligned themselves with large and small business owners to elect President Reagan with his program for reducing inflation, entitlements, and taxes.

#### Group Cohesion Assumptions

With the few exceptions such as Handler and Mulkern (1982) and Epstein (1982), PAC researchers have assumed the cohesiveness of the political goals held by the members of a particular FEC category, particularly with the corporate and labor categories.

Unions' recent declining membership, the relatively small proportion of U.S. workers that belong to unions in

comparison to European nations, the historical conflict between the often exclusionary policies of craft unions versus more inclusionary general unions, are but a few of the points that indicate a lack of cohesion within the labor community.

In the 1984 presidential elections, the leadership of the AFL-CIO made an early commitment to Walter Mondale's campaign. Large numbers of the AFL-CIO's members ignored that commitment in order to vote for President Reagan. This and other incidents offer evidence that interest group analyses based on assumptions of organized labor cohesiveness, either with respect to itself or with all workers, may be of suspect validity.

If the representativeness and cohesiveness of labor is suspect that of business is more so. Epstein (1982), and Handler and Mulkern (1982) have offered research findings that argue against the notion that businesses act as a cohesive economic interest group, or electoral force.

While it seems apparent that nearly all businesses and associations must hold some goals in common, what is less apparent is the degree of goal congruency among them. Economic interest group theory suggests that the fact that National Association of Manufacturers, the

Chamber of Commerce, the National Federation of Independent Business, the National Restaurant Association, and the National Realtors Association are able to maintain large memberships over many years means that they must be fulfilling some needs particular to their respective constituencies [Olson (1970), Salisbury (1970)]. To date, no attempt has been made to determine the congruency and disparity of goals among the numerous groups subsumed under the business category.

Rather than cohesion, micro economic principles suggest that the closer a business organization resembles another the greater the degree of competition (conflict) between them. While each unit in an industry may hold general goals in common, it is assumed that each unit also will attempt to influence events in such a way as to provide itself with a comparative advantage. In the same vein, different industries compete with one another over everything from national trade policies, to tax benefits, to access to the labor pool. Common situs picketing, transportation deregulation, minimum wage legislation, the deficits and interest rates, and revision of the Clear Air Amendments are recent examples where industries failed to act in concert with one another.



If corporations hold few goals in common and if the same is true for unions, then making judgments about PAC activity from the aggregated FEC category data is subject to questions of validity.

This project tests the relative cohesiveness of two groups - one composed of labor unions and a second composed of business associations. In addition, it investigates the criterion of mutual exclusivity of the FEC PAC categorical scheme. In the following chapter the author develops a paradigm to investigate interest group cohesion through cluster analyzing the legislative ratings and campaign contributions of interest group members. The strengths and weaknesses of using contributions and ratings as a means to measure cohesion are discussed. It is concluded that the analysis of interest group cohesion may be advanced through the use of these two variables. A series of interrelated hypotheses directed toward measuring cohesion through the linkage of these two variables concludes the chapter.

## FOOTNOTES

1. Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist Papers, (New York: Pocket Books, 1964), p. 16.
2. The data contained in Tables 1, 2, and 3 are compiled from FEC Record summary reports, Epstein's "PACs and the Modern Political Process" paper of 1982, and the 1979 Campaign Finance Study Group report to the Committee on House Administration.

## C H A P T E R II

### AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF INTEREST GROUP COHESION

"All the real knowledge which we possess, depends on methods by which we distinguish the similar from the dissimilar....

For we must not join in the same genus the horse and the swine, tho' both species had been one hoof'd nor separate in different genera the goat, the reindeer and the elk, tho' they differ in the form of their horns. We ought therefore by attentive and diligent observation to determine the limits of the general, since they cannot be determined a priori. This is the great work, the important labour, for should the general be confused, all would be confusion."

- Linnaeus, in  
Genera Plantarum

#### Categorizing PACs

The previous chapter indicated that much of the analysis of PACs has been confined to combinations and permutations of FEC-defined variables.

The section dealing with the theory of interest group behavior suggested that a modern industrial society is composed of numerous groups each having its own particular and, to some extent, unique set of concerns.

The manner in which the FEC categories PACs and their behavior causes much of the uniqueness of

interest group concerns to be submerged.

The FEC aggregates 3700 PACs into six categories. The FEC categorizes PACs by the PAC's parent body, i.e., by origin. This is an obvious way to separate one PAC from another; however, this scheme is not the only one available. The FEC could choose to divide PACs into two groups--liberal and conservative. Or, like Epstein, the FEC could divide the category of corporate PACs into subcategories of industrial and non-industrial, defense contract holding and non-holding, or highly and minimally regulated corporations.

The choice of categorizing scheme will obviously influence the results of any analysis. As analytical results influence the conclusions and implications to be drawn and, subsequently, public policy, it may be said that the choice of categorical scheme influences public policy. How the political interests of various groups in the United States are evaluated, and encouraged or curtailed as a result, depends in part upon the grouping variables used in the preliminary data aggregation.

Presently there exists an anomaly between the categorical variables used in research and the interpretations of the research results of those categories.

The primary research categorical variables are those of the FEC. The six FEC categories are essentially categories of PAC origin. The category into which an individual PAC is placed is determined by its parent organization. However, the interpretation of the results, including conclusions, implications, and suggestions for public policy, treat the origin variable as though it were a variable of purpose.

Where the PAC comes from (origin) is used to indicate what political goals (purpose) the PAC is seeking.

Whether stated or not, the underlying assumption of much PAC research is that the members of a particular FEC category tend to act in concert with, and seek the same goals as, other members of the same category.

Whether this assumption is true has not been thoroughly tested.

Epstein (1982) and Handler and Mulkern (1982) both touch on the behavioral dissimilarities of members of the FEC corporate category. Each concludes that there are subsets within the corporate category that display different behavior.

If the members of a particular category behave in different ways or seek different goals, then it may be presumed that the prima facie power of that group is greater than its real power. That is, a group in which

members fail to work in concert, or work at cross purposes to other members, may be expected to wield less power than a group, comparable in size and other relevant attributes, in which goal or behavioral cohesiveness is more pronounced.

In the previous chapter it was noted that economic and interest group theories suggest that a modern industrialized nation would be expected to have a large number and a great diversity of groups. That theoretical expectation has not been translated into research premises. Rather, in most cases, a small number of categories and an ersatz Marxian labor/business orientation have been the predominant research approaches.

The use of legislative ratings is proposed as an alternative way to analyze PACs without depending upon the common research assumptions. The logic of tying ratings to FEC data hinges on the notion that it is group political purpose, where purpose means both political goals and purposeful behavior to achieve those goals, rather than group origin, that should be the focal point of research.

### Ratings

Over seventy groups issue ratings of members of Congress. These ratings portray to what extent an

organization considers a member of the House or Senate to be supportive of its political goals.

In most cases, the rating components are made up of a number of votes on legislation deemed important by the issuing organization. After the legislative sample has been selected, the percentage of "correct" votes by individual legislators is tallied. Those lawmakers approaching 100% on the ratings may be judged to be more supportive of an organization's goals than those who score near zero.

In a few cases, as with Environmental Action Inc.'s Dirty Dozen, only a subset of Congress' members is evaluated. In most cases, all members of Congress are rated.

Different organizations make different use of the ratings. Some seek the widest possible dissemination of their ratings; others are more restrictive in circulating their evaluations.

If one accepts the assumption that an organization is the best judge of its own self-interest, then one may be led to accept organizationally constructed ratings as a strong surrogate for organizational self-interest. Admittedly, the optimal research situation would be to have all politically active groups evaluate all the legislation to come before

Congress. In this hypothetical situation, it would be possible to determine the absolute cohesiveness of FEC-defined groups. Comparisons within and across groups could be made. More importantly, it would be possible to determine the efficacy of the FEC categories. For example, if one were to find that the legislator evaluations of a subgroup of corporate PACs, e.g., smokestack industries, were closely matched by a segment of labor groups, e.g., industrial unions, then the usefulness of the FEC categories and those categories' linkages to electoral contributions could be questioned. Unfortunately, the above situation is not matched in reality.

Not all PACs rate; not all PACs that rate make campaign contributions. Perhaps the largest drawback is the lack of any individual corporations that issue ratings. However, the sample used in this research includes almost fifty organizations representing numerous interest groups.

For this study the emphasis is on the cohesion of approval toward the legislators not the legislation itself. It cannot be argued that the fact that several organizations rate a single legislator equally implies that those organizations hold goals in common. But, if several organizations tend to display the same pattern



of ratings across all members of one or both houses of Congress, then it does seem highly probable that the similar patterns derive from some commonality of purpose, if only electoral goals, rather than from chance.

. By applying similarity techniques such as cluster analysis to ratings, it is possible to construct groupings of organizations that are similar in terms of their behavior rather than their origin. The degree of difference between the membership of the origin group and that of the purpose group can be tested. In addition, the rating consistency of, for example, a group of business associations can be compared to the consistency of a group of labor organizations.

The use of ratings also allows for a greater understanding of the use and effect of PAC money in campaigns. The ratings profile of an organization or group can be compared to the contribution profile of the same entity to determine whether legislative behavior is necessarily rewarded financially. In addition, the contributions of dissimilar organizations to the same candidate can be investigated to determine the degree of contribution neutralization. The next section discusses the use of money as a variable in the study of interest group politics.

### Money as Power

The study of PACs is the study of political influence. Those who have analyzed PACs have tended to operationalize the construct of influence in terms of dollars [Adamany (1980), Alexander (1976, 1979, 1980)]. It is assumed that groups that are more successful at raising and contributing funds have an increased ability to influence both elections and legislation. On its surface this argument is both methodologically and logically pleasing.

In a methodological sense, the choice of money as a surrogate for influence eases the task of the researcher greatly. Financial data is easy to obtain. It lends itself to ready and comprehensible comparison. It allows the investigator to circumvent both the herculean task of attempting to define the goals of an organization tracing and the organization's ability to achieve those goals through the labyrinthine processes of Congress.

Unfortunately, money is not a perfect surrogate for political influence. Alexander (1980) has noted the difficulty in comparing the financial contributions of business to those of labor. Organized labor has a long history of augmenting its financial support of

candidates with extensive volunteer activities such as voter registration, get-out-of-the-vote efforts, leafletting and the manning of telephones. To look only at labor's financial resources would be to underestimate labor's political clout.

In an effort to improve the precision of money as a surrogate of influence, Jacobson (1980) attempted to trace the changing utility of contribution dollars. He found that money contributed early in a campaign, especially to an unknown challenger, has a greater utility to the candidate than later contributions. The viability of a campaign frequently hinges on voter recognition, and recognition, in most cases, must be purchased through the media.

An additional problem with using contribution dollars as a straight forward surrogate for influence is related to the interrelations among cohesiveness, conflicting interests, and the constrained recipient pool. Consider that while the number of PAC organizations has grown from 600 to 3700 and the amount of money these PACs contribute has risen from \$19 million to \$200 million over the last ten years, the number of recipients beyond the primaries has remained constant. More organizations and more money are trying to influence the same number of candidates. Each

contributor is further constrained in his ability to influence by the contribution limits imposed on PACs by the FEC. As the average cost of campaigns increase, the absolute percentage of support able to be provided to a single candidate by a single PAC declines. In a \$100,000 campaign, composed of primary and general election, a single PAC has the potential of providing, at most, 10% of a candidate's funds; in a \$500,000 campaign that potential diminishes to 2% because of the \$10,000 contribution limit.

The only way for an individual PAC to get around this declining influence is by acting in concert with other like-minded PACs. The researcher interested in this area is led back to trying to determine what groups tend to exhibit similar behavior or hold congruent goals.

If the researcher is able to surmount the problem of determining congruency among groups, another problem remains. This is the notion of neutralization. It was noted above that, while PAC numbers and receipts have grown astronomically, the candidate pool has remained constant. Given this trend and the earlier mentioned trend toward diminishing party discipline, it would appear that there is a high probability for two or more PACs, with some interests in conflict, to be making

contributions to the same candidate. While it seems apparent that, in some sense, the opposing dollars must neutralize each other, it remains to be researched what the outcome of this type of situation is.

A final issue that confuses the dollar/power surrogate again revolves around the limited candidate pool. Because of their limited choices, PACs may be forced to support candidates that offer small potential for supporting the organizations' goals for the sole reason that the candidate represents the lesser of two evils. That is, financial support of a candidate may not necessarily indicate more than a greater disapproval of that candidate's opposition by the PAC.

To this point the discussion has focussed on contemporary PAC research, the assumptions of categorical cohesiveness upon which that research is founded, and the suspect nature of those assumptions. The next sections develop a set of hypotheses that investigates the legislator approval and campaign contribution cohesiveness of a diverse set of organizations.

### Cohesion Hypotheses

#### Introduction

This research project combines a new line of

reasoning about the behavior of political action committees with some rather involved methodological steps used to carry out that reasoning. To avoid the pitfalls of attempting to explain two involved processes in parallel, the author has chosen to focus only on the reasoning toward, and delineation of, the hypotheses in the present chapter. The following chapter details the methodology. Thus, for example, while each of five hypotheses is tested on both the House of Representatives and the Senate individually, no mention, beyond this present instance, is made in this chapter of using these two separate populations.

#### Categorical Cohesion

In a previous section, an argument was made that there is a potential discrepancy between how PACs are categorized by the FEC and how researchers make interpretations from those categories. The FEC uses PAC origin as a categorizing variable. If one is interested solely in what sectors of the society are initiating PACs, the FEC categories will serve that purpose well. However, if one is interested in determining the goals or influence of various collections of PACs, then using the origin variable to

portray influence or goals is subject to questions of validity. The fact that the category of corporate PACs gives more money to candidates than the labor PAC category may carry less weight if business' purposes are found to be significantly less cohesive than those of labor.

One way to test the validity of using PAC origin to indicate behavior is to compare the FEC category membership of a set of organizations to the membership of groups formed by a cluster analysis on the ratings of the same set of organizations. If there is no significant difference in membership between the origin categories and rating clusters, confidence in the use of the FEC categories as a categorical variable useful in the study of goal cohesiveness would rise. When judgments derived from FEC categorical data are made as to the growing strength of business or labor's decline, confidence in the judgment would be greater.

The means used to discern the degree to which organizations are similar in their goals are the legislative ratings. A distinction needs to be made about what goals are being studied. The political end goal of an organization is to insure that legislation favorable to its interest is passed and that unfavorable legislation is defeated. These end goals

will be called legislation goals. For favorable legislation to be passed or unfavorable legislation defeated, legislators must be found who are in support of the organization's legislation goals. Encouraging the election or reelection of supportive legislators and defeating those opposed to the organizations' interests may be termed the legislator goals of the organization. Legislator goals are instrumental goals used to achieve the legislation goals of the organization. This distinction is an important one. The great complexity of U.S. society and the finite number of federal legislators may cause two organizations to have widely divergent, even conflicting legislation goals, yet hold the same set of instrumental or legislator goals in common.

As it is the electoral behavior of organizations that is of interest, it is the homogeneity of their legislator goals that is investigated. Ratings are the means used to discover the cohesiveness in legislator goals among organizations. The technique used to determine cohesiveness, or similarity, is cluster analysis.

The first hypothesis tests the validity of using FEC categorizations as surrogates for goal cohesiveness. It investigates whether differences



exist in the membership of a set of raters categorized by the FEC scheme with the same set when categorized by the similarity of their ratings.

H1: There will be a significant difference in the membership of three groups formed from FEC defined categories of Labor, Unconnected, and Trade/Membership/Health organizations and three clusters formed from the same set of organizations using a similarity of ratings criterion.

In a sense the first hypothesis is a strawman. The Unconnected and Trade/Membership/Health (T/M/H) categories are obviously hodgepodge categories. The corporate category can not be tested directly because no corporations make ratings available to the public. However, H1 does provide the opportunity to determine the cohesion of the FEC Labor group.

The tables in Chapter I and Handler and Mulkern's research indicate that labor acts in a more cohesive manner than business. If labor undergoes significant membership differences under H1 then it can be reasoned that that tendency would tend to be even more pronounced in a group of corporate raters if it were to exist.

The second hypothesis is a direct investigation of the cohesiveness of business and labor groups. H2 tests the difference in a group of business-related and

labor PACs to two groups formed by cluster analysis on the same organizations' ratings. The business-related group was culled from the sample of raters using either self-descriptions by the organization or descriptions contained within The PAC Directory. The labor PACs were designated such by the FEC.

H2: There will be a significant difference in the membership of two groups, one composed of business and the other of labor organizations and two groups formed from the same set of organizations using a similarity of ratings criterion.

If H2 is supported, that confirmation would indicate that conclusions drawn from simple business/labor comparisons may be too simplistic. Conclusions based upon assumptions of internal goal or behavioral cohesiveness within each group could prove to be inappropriate.

### Cluster Dispersion

The third hypothesis uses the cluster results from the second hypothesis to analyze the degree of dispersion within the resultant clusters. Handler and Mulkern's results indicate that the behavior of corporate PACs varies along a pragmatic/ideologic continuum. FEC financial data indicates that labor PACs give a higher proportion of their contributions to

a single party (Democrats) and a single status (incumbency) than the PACs of business. Those findings indicate that one might expect the ratings of legislators among the labor group to contain less dispersion than that of the business group. That is, labor raters will show a higher degree of similarity in their approval or disapproval of legislators than business PACs.

The third hypothesis is meant to compare the dispersion of the labor and business clusters.

H3: There is a significant difference in the dispersion of ratings between the cluster generated business group and the cluster generated labor group.

If H3 is supported, it would enhance the argument against making simple business/labor PAC comparisons. The greater the dispersion of members within a cluster, the less those members resemble one another on the cluster formation variable.

### Spokesperson Representativeness

Proliferation and homeostatic interest group theories emphasize the diversity of interests within a society as complex as the United States. A human being's capacity to deal with complexity and diversity is strictly limited. One means of dealing with

complexity is to select an object to represent a group of seemingly similar objects. President Reagan is represented as a spokesperson for Republicans; during the last four years, Speaker of the House O'Neill often has been represented as the spokesperson for Democratic party interests.

At times there is consternation over who or what represents the interests of a specific group. In the spring of 1984, the media and politicians, both black and white, argued over whether or not Jessie Jackson was the spokesperson for blacks.

A common choice as spokesperson for labor's interests is the AFL-CIO; a commonly accepted spokesperson for business interests is the Chamber of Commerce. Through ratings, it is possible to test the representativeness of the AFL-CIO and Chamber of Commerce as spokespersons for labor and business interests.

The fourth hypothesis is set up to test the appropriateness of the Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO as representative spokespersons for the interests of business and labor respectively.

H4: There will be a significant difference in the membership of the business and labor affiliated groups and two groups formed by cluster analysis using the Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO ratings as the cluster seeds.

If those clusters which form around the AFL-CIO and Chamber of Commerce are mixtures of business and labor organizations, legislators who wish to be business or labor partisans may need to rethink the advisability of using either of those two organizations' recommendations as guides to legislative action.

#### Ratings-Contributions Cohesiveness

The final aspect of the proposed research is a preliminary attempt to describe the relationship between approval of legislative behavior as measured by ratings and approval as measured by campaign contributions.

It would seem reasonable to presume that the better a legislator represented the interests of an organization, as measured by his rating, the greater the campaign support he would receive from that organization. This statement is not meant to imply a causal relationship between legislative performance and campaign contributions. That question is saved for some future time series based analysis. Instead, it is the congruency between approval patterns and contribution patterns that is of interest.

It was noted, in an earlier section, that the use

of money as a surrogate for influence may not be a straight forward substitution. There are numerous conditions arising from contribution limits and the limited pool of candidates that could weaken the correspondence between contribution size and degree of influence. The same logic may hold true for the relationship between legislator approval and that approval as made manifest by financial contributions. Big financial contributions need not follow high ratings. There are few, if any, constraints on an organization's ability to rate. But, there may be numerous constraints on an organization's ability to provide financial contributions commensurate with a legislator's ratings. Size of a PAC's kitty, or the special circumstances of a particular race, may cause discrepancies between rating score and contribution size. (A senator with moderate ratings may receive \$10,000 because if he or she were to be defeated a second senator with a lower rating may take over as chairperson of a specific committee. A highly rated senator may receive a modest contribution because his or her reelection is not in doubt). Thus, receipt of a large contribution from a particular organization may mean little in regard to how well the legislator serves that organization's purposes.

A prime example of the potential for discrepancy between ratings approval and campaign contributions occurred during the 1984 reelection campaign of Rep. Joseph Addabbo. Addabbo received more money from the PACs of America's ten largest defense contractors than any other member of the House. Simultaneously, Rep. Addabbo was receiving the highest level of ratings from major arms-control groups. While Rep. Addabbo's legislative record should have nullified defense contractor contributions, his role as chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense acted as a magnet for defense contractor PAC money. [Mapes (1984)].

The fifth hypothesis compares the membership of clusters generated from legislative ratings to clusters formed from the same set of organizations using campaign contributions as the clustering criterion.

H5: There will be a significant difference in the membership of business and labor groups constructed from ratings and two clusters generated from the same set of organizations by their similarity of campaign contributions.

A significant difference in membership between the ratings and contribution clusters would indicate that rewards in terms of campaign contributions are not directly related to the degree of partisanship seen in legislators' voting records.

The financial cluster outcomes indicate to what extent so-called business or labor money is cohesive in terms of recipients. If the financial results reveal members from both business and labor in the same cluster then that result adds fuel to the earlier contention that straightforward labor to business PAC contribution comparisons are inappropriate. Aggregate financial totals derived either from FEC categories or variations of Epstein's business-related categories may be too imprecise to be used to make judgments of, or policy decisions on, PAC electoral behavior.

### Summary

The five hypotheses constitute only a limited part of this research project. The manipulation of ratings, the linking of ratings and organizational orientation, rating seeds, and contribution and rating parallelism are all new approaches to the study of political behavior. Because of their nascent qualities, they act more as guideposts to thinking than they do as research end goals.

In the following chapter, "Methods," and the penultimate chapter "Results," greater detail is given to the thinking and techniques that led to the testing of the hypotheses. In these two chapters and their



appendices, detail is provided on the outcome of intermediate steps as well as ancillary analyses. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, description of technique was deferred to allow the reader to concentrate on the reasonableness of the hypotheses.

## C H A P T E R I I I

### METHODS

#### Introduction

The hypotheses of this project focus on the similarities in rating and campaign contributions among a diverse sample of organizations. The degree of similarity is determined through cluster analysis techniques.

#### Sample

The sample is a collection of 47 organizations that issued ratings for members of the House of Representatives and Senate during the 96th Congress, 1979-1980. [Appendix A contains a description of the members of the sample]. Keller has estimated that, for the 1979-80 period, approximately 75 organizations constructed ratings. The sample used in this research constitutes approximately two thirds of the population of raters. It is not, however, a simple random sample. It is the result of trying to collect the ratings from the population.

Being non-random, the sample is, of course, subject to questions of representativeness. In this

case, the representativeness is a dual issue. Does the sample of raters mirror the population of raters? Does the sample of raters mirror the population of political action committees? The answers to these questions depend upon the perspective of the questioner.

If the questioner is concerned with rigorous methodological purity, it cannot be argued that this sample and the results obtained from it are generalizable. If the assumptions underlying statistical sampling techniques are transgressed, then, logically, the results are suspect.

If the questioner is concerned with the usefulness or aptness of this sample within the context of which it is used, the present sample has much to recommend it. It contains nearly two-thirds of the organizations that construct ratings. Its elements represent a wide diversity of interest groups. It contains a large number of the most politically active interest groups in the United States. The following paragraphs describe the diversity of the sample membership.

#### Sample Elements

Labor. The largest grouping within the sample is composed of labor organizations. America's largest unions are represented. The AFL-CIO, teamsters,

autoworkers, mine workers, and teachers are sample members.

The professional service sector of labor is represented by two teachers' unions, the National Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers, as well as the National Association of Social Workers.

The industrial sector is composed of the United Autoworkers, the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers, the Communication Workers of America, the International Food and Commercial Workers, and the AFL-CIO.

The labor group is rounded out with the government workers of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Workers, the craft members of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters, and the eclectic membership of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.

This portion of the sample contains 12 of the 15 labor raters compiled by Keller. The American Federation of Government Employees, the International Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks, and the International Association of Machinists did not respond to requests for their ratings.

With industrial, craft, professional and non-professional service unions as members, the labor

grouping is representative of the breadth of the American labor movement.

Business. The portion of the sample judged to represent the interests of business is composed of 11 members. All of the members are umbrella groups; none is a corporation. The representativeness of the business subsample is not so clear cut as that of labor.

A large association of the country's largest manufacturers is represented.<sup>1</sup> The Chamber of Commerce, with its diverse membership of big and small, industrial and non-industrial members, is a sample element. The Council for a Competitive Economy is a recently formed group of businesses and business persons concerned with espousing the benefits of a free market economy. The National Federation of Independent Business is organized to represent the specific interests of small business.

The sample contains five industry specific organizations. The insurance industry is represented by the National Association of Life Underwriters; the petroleum industry by the Independent Petroleum Association of America; and the construction industry by the Associated General Contractors. Two

agricultural groups, the National Farmers Organization and the National Farmers Union, were included in the business subsample. The capital intensive nature of farming and its dependence upon credit, foreign trade, and tax policies are justifications for the inclusion of the two agricultural organizations in the business grouping. Another judgment call was categorizing the National Society of Professional Engineers as a business group. The large number of managers within this group and an inspection of the legislation chosen to construct the NSPE's ratings were the determining factors in making the judgment.

Of the business raters that Keller lists, the National Mass Retailers Association, the National Newspaper Publishers, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the Credit Union National Association, and the Business Industrial Political Action Committee (dropped due to missing values) are the organizations missing from this study. Numerous sectors of the American economy, such as banking, defense, automotive, information processing, health care, are not represented by specific organizations; however, the generic concerns of American business, large and small, would seem to be well represented.

Other. The remaining 50% or 23 members of the sample contain a great diversity of political interests. Women, consumer, peace, defense, Christian, liberal, conservative, senior citizens, conservation, civil liberty, children, and taxpayer issues are represented by one or more sample members.

In summary, in the author's judgment, the sample used in this study has no noticeable gaps in its breadth of representation of the major interest group issues of the late 1970s. It is not, however, a proportionally precise microcosm of America's interest groups in the 1979-1980 biennium.

#### Data Collection

The members of the sample came from two sources. Twenty-four of the raters were from the 26 rating organizations that Greevy and Weinberger included in the first edition of the PAC Directory. The two organizations dropped from the Greevy and Weinberger set, the Business Industrial Political Action Committee and the Christian Voters Victory Fund, were done so because of missing values.

The ratings for 23 other members of the sample were collected in response to a mail solicitation of 40 organizations that were extant, discoverable, listed by

Keller, and but not contained in The PAC Directory.

See Appendix B for a copy of the rating request letter. Of the 17 organizations not used in the study, 5 were non-respondents, 3 were not located and the remaining 9 either did not rate during 1979-80, or did not have copies of their 1979-80 ratings in their files.

### Rating Content

Organizations that use ratings construct those evaluations from legislator behavior toward particular legislation. In this study the organizations used as few as 5 and as many as 22 votes in their ratings. The norm for the number of votes used in an organization's ratings is in the 8-12 range. The votes used are almost exclusively votes from the floor. Committee and sub-committee behavior do not play a part in legislative ratings.

In regard to the selection of legislation to be used in the construction of the index, it is assumed that each organization selects those votes on legislation which it considers to be most important to its own interests. A typical example is the set of 14 pieces of legislation used to evaluate members of the House by the small business oriented National Federation of Independent Business. Subject matter for



this index included budget resolutions, trucking deregulation, restricting on site OSHA inspections, product liability insurance, Davis-Bacon Act requirements, restrictions on the Small Business Administration and welfare reform.

There is great diversity in how organizations publish voting information. Some construct a numerical index that ranges from 0 to 100. Others choose to publish the votes without constructing a numerical index. Of those that issue a numerical index, some construct the index by dividing "right" by "right" plus "wrong" votes. Others chose more complex formulas. Absences, present but not voting, paired absences, and declared but not voting with paired absences are handled in different ways.

Regardless of how an organization chooses to determine its ratings, the relative meaning of the ratings of that organization is constant. The ratings range from 0 to 100. Zero means that a legislator failed to vote in the direction of the organization's wishes for all the legislative issues that the organization chose to include in its index. A score of 100 means the opposite. Each vote of the legislator was in the direction that the organization sought. In an upcoming section, dealing with scale issues, the

relative meaning of a particular score across organizations will be discussed.

In those instances where organizations recorded votes but did not construct numerical scores, the author constructed scores in the simplest possible manner. A legislator's score was determined by the fraction of "right" divided by "right" plus "wrong," multiplied by 100. Rounding was to the closest whole number.

In cases where at least one "right" or "wrong" was recorded, absences were ignored. Rarely, a legislator was absent for all votes on the legislation making up a particular organization's rating. In that situation, a rating of 50% was assigned. Many of these cases were cases where resignations or deaths had occurred during the term. They, of course, were deleted.

Appendix C lists those legislators dropped from the analysis due to four or more missing values. Appendix D lists the nine occurrences where an organization's rating mean was substituted for a single missing value. Insertion of the mean allowed retention of the case.

### Similarity

The central issue of this project is one of trying

to distinguish what similarities exist within a set of organizations which have chosen to be politically active at the federal level.

The methodological means of determining similarity among the sample of organizations is based upon empirical techniques rather than theoretical or philosophical structures. Rather than assuming that the Chamber of Commerce and the National Federation of Independent Business desire the same political goals, or that the United Mineworkers and United Autoworkers are more similar one to the other than each is to the Associated General Contractors, the relationships among these organizations are empirically determined. The empirical technique used to determine the degree of similarity among the organizations is cluster analysis.

In its simplest form the problem may be conceived as determining the degree to which  $n$  organizations are similar in their evaluation of  $x$  members of Congress. The organizations are the objects being clustered and the Congresspersons are the variables used to do the clustering. In this setting the appropriate type of clustering is observation clustering or O-clustering [Tryon & Bailey (1970)]. Those organizations which are most similar in the way that they rate across all the legislators would fall together in the same cluster.

In the present situation there is a problem in doing observation clustering. The problem arises from the number of legislators in the Senate and particularly the House of Representatives. The cross product House matrix, 420 by 420, can not be factored because it is less than full rank. The variables outnumber the observations.

Two solutions are available to get around the rank problem. One approach is to pull random subsets of variables from the set of all variables such that the number of variables is less than the number of observations. The second approach involves transposing the matrix so that the legislators act as "observations" and the organizations represent "variables." In the case of the House of Representatives this causes the variable list to decrease by a factor of 10 while the number of observations increases by the same proportion, alleviating the rank problem. The clustering program switches from 0-clustering to Variable or Q-clustering. This allows the raw data set to be successfully clustered with no loss of variables. This second solution, of clustering by variable with the rating organizations being the variables, was chosen.

The matrix has the legislators as observations and

the organization as variables. The clustering is done on the variables. Figure 1 represents the structure of the raw data matrix.

The observation list begins with Alaska's first (and only) representative Don Young. Observation 425 is Wyoming's representative Richard Cheney. Observation 426 is Alaskan Senator Ted Stevens and the last observation, 521, is Wyoming Senator Malcolm Wallop.

Organizations vary in how they issue ratings. Some record votes only from the first session of a Congress; others record only from the second session; some issue a set of ratings for each session; some issue a single rating based on legislation from both sessions of the two year congressional cycle. To include as many organizations as possible within the analysis, the arithmetic mean was computed for those organizations that issued separate ratings for both the first and second session of the 96th Congress.

The data set was composed of 25 organizations for which the arithmetic mean of two sessions had been computed, 16 organizations which issued a single rating for both sessions, and 6 organizations which rated from only one session.

FIGURE 1

ORGANIZATION OF THE DATA SET

OBS	CANDID	BODY	1ST		STATE	DIST	FEC	NAME	PARTY	VAR1	VARn
			YR	CODE							
1	HGAK00045	H	6	AK	00	045	Young, Don	R	25	41	
2	HGAL01011	H	6	AL	01	011	Edwards, Jack	R	45	73	
.											
.											
.											
.											
425	H8WY00015	H	6	WY	00	015	Cheney, Richard	R	76	14	
426	S2AK00010	S	2	AK	00	010	Stevens, Ted	R	51	46	
427	S4AK00016	S	4	AK	00	016	Gravel, Mike	D	39	81	
.											
.											
.											
.											
521	S6WY00043	S	6	WY	00	043	Wallop, Macolm	R	77	63	

### Scale of Values

Scaling is an especially important issue in this study. This section traces the author's reasons for using the interval based ratings, rather than rankings, in the analysis. It can be argued that the similarity analysis should be performed using rankings rather than ratings. The reasoning behind converting to rankings is to correct for anomalies among the first and second moments of the distributions of ratings of different organizations. For example, it is possible for two organizations (A and B) to issue ratings much different in absolute terms yet exactly the same in the relative terms of rankings. Organization A might have a range of 0 to 81 with a mean of 36. Organization B might have a range of 0 to 100 with a mean of 52. Yet, in ranking the legislators from low to high, the two organizations could have exactly the same ordering of the legislators.

Under SAS VARCLUS, the cluster program used in this study, input, whether ranks or raw scores, may be converted to standard scores.<sup>2</sup> Thus, the input into the cluster analysis is mean and variance corrected. Using ratings that have been standardized will preserve both the order and magnitude of the scores. When using rankings, order is preserved, but magnitude is lost.

For example, consider organization A which uses ten pieces of legislation to construct its ratings index. Possible scores include 0%, 10%, 20% etc. Rankings have the potential to wash out the ten point differences in scores. If Senator A scores 100 and Senator B scores 90, the magnitude of that difference is preserved using the standardized scores of the ratings; however, under rankings that distance between the two can be lost. If Senator A is ranked first and Senator B second, the cluster program will treat the ordinal difference of 1 as an interval difference of 1, instead of 10 as it should be. That loss is preserved when the program converts the ranks into standard scores (somewhat of a misnomer) in order to generate the correlation matrix used for the cluster algorithm.

A second distortion can occur because of tied scores. If the top 40 legislators were tied at 100, they all would be given the mean rank, 20, if only one legislator had a score of 99, he would be ranked 41st, a difference of 21. As the cluster algorithm assumes that the data is interval scaled, the program would treat the actual 1 point ratings difference as a 21 point difference if the input used were the ordinal ranks.

A third problem exists with the mean of the



organization's ratings. In the House data sets, with their 421 observations, the mean of each and every variable will always equal 211,  $(n+1)/2$ , when ranks are used; the mean of the raw ratings will shift depending upon how the scores are distributed for each particular variable. The distortions that accompany the use of rankings as input into the cluster program dictates the use of the ratings themselves. The results that follow are based upon using the standardized interval scaled ratings as input.

### Cluster Analysis

In this project, the analytical technique used to discover the empirical similarity of organization is cluster analysis. Cluster analysis is a technique that is often used in the preliminary stages of an investigation to discover the structure of the data. In many cases, cluster techniques are used prior to the development of theory or hypothesis. Cluster analysis is used to gain enough understanding of the structure of a phenomenon to be able to generate theory and hypotheses [Andenberg (1973)].

The objective of cluster analysis is a simple one. One attempts to take a number of entities, either observations or variables, and arrange them into groups

in such a way that within-group distance is minimized with respect to the cluster centroids and between cluster distance is maximized. In other words, the object is to order the data so that the elements within a cluster are as homogeneous as possible while the clusters, in relationship to each other, are as heterogeneous as possible.

The process by which this goal is accomplished is by partitioning the data under a particular criterion. Usually the criterion is concerned with the maximization of intercluster centroid distances or minimizing intracluster element distances from the cluster centroid.

The cluster program used in this study is the SAS VARCLUS routine.<sup>3</sup>

In the present setting clustering techniques are used to test a limited number of hypotheses.

Many of the sticky issues of cluster analysis, such as how many clusters to generate and what the clusters mean, are avoided in this project. In a sense, rather than investigating data structure, here cluster analysis is being used as a treatment - confirmatory cluster analysis. The FEC, or business/labor, categories are known; these categories are "treated" with cluster analysis; and the membership

of the resulting groups are compared to the original. If it is assumed that the prior groups are homogeneous in terms of instrumental goals, then one would predict that the cluster "treatment" will have no effect. The membership of the clusters should duplicate that of the categories.

### Financial Profiles

The fifth hypothesis (H5) investigates the degree of congruency between a set of clusters formed by ratings similarity and a second set formed by similarity in contributions to congressional candidates.

With the contribution clusters there is a question as to whether to compare the organizations' contributions to all candidates or only to those candidates who are already in office, i.e., the same observations that are contained in the ratings data set. If the ratings set match is used, there is the potential for losing a large portion of an organization's campaign contribution behavior, but the information that is retained contains measures on exactly the same set of observations as the ratings. If all contributions are retained, no information is lost, but the set of observations is larger, as it

includes those who failed to be elected to the 96th Congress. H5 was tested using the rating set as the standard so as to be consistent with the other hypotheses.

The set of contribution profiles was developed from the FEC's 1979-1980 Master Committee tape and Non Party Political Committee (NPC) tape.<sup>4</sup>

Using the procedures described in the above footnote, a data set was constructed that contained the total dollar contributions of 421 members of the House and 96 Senators by 25 organizations. Of the 25 organizations, eighteen could be categorized as either business or labor.

Cluster analysis was performed on the contribution and rating similarities of these eighteen organizations. The cluster membership solutions derived from contribution similarities were compared to the solutions generated from rating similarities.

### Summary

This chapter has described the general procedures used to organize the ratings and contribution data sets. The following chapter, "RESULTS," contains more specific detail on how analyses for specific hypotheses were made.

## FOOTNOTES

1. This organization chose to remain anonymous.
2. SAS is a registered trademark of the SAS Institute Inc. VARCLUS is a cluster analysis program available in the SAS statistical package.
3. VARCLUS, an iterative algorithm is a divisive cluster program; it begins with all variables in a single cluster. If allowed to run to completion, the procedure ends when each cluster contains a single element.

To construct a cluster a seed or nucleus is needed upon which the cluster can be built. SAS VARCLUS offers three options for seeding or initializing a cluster. The first variable of the data set to be clustered can be used. In a second method a cluster is seeded with a variable specified by the researcher. This method is used in Hypothesis 4 to investigate the representativeness of the AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce. Under the third method, the cluster is initialized with a variable picked randomly from the set to be clustered. After initialization, the algorithm proceeds to a search phase.

This tests to determine whether, after assigning each variable to that component with which it has the highest squared correlation, variation explained can be improved through variable reassignment. The search phase of the VARCLUS algorithm was set to ten iterations. This exercise, while costly in CPU time, helps to insure against solutions hanging up on local optima.

A trial of the data for the House population was run three times using random initialization, MAXSEARCH = 10 iterations. In all three runs the solutions generated were equal.

For all hypotheses, the analyses were made using the correlation matrix of the standardized scores as input to the VARCLUS routine.

4. The Master Committee (MC) tape contains 7904 records of party and non party political committees active at the federal campaign level during the 1979-1980 Congressional cycle. Each record contains the committee's identification number, name, address, designation, type, interest group category, connected organization's name, and several other categorical variables. Twenty-nine of the 46 organizations contained in the ratings set were found on the MC tape. Twenty-five of the 29 had made direct campaign contributions. These 25 organizations had sponsored a total of 145 separate PACs.

The group of 145 PACs was used to pull contribution figures from a detail file of the NPC tape. This file is composed of 70,000 plus records. Each record contains the total amount of direct and in kind contributions to a single candidate by a single PAC.

The committee identification numbers of the 145 PACs from the MC tape were used to generate a list of all candidates who were given contributions by those PACs. That set of 5058 records was sorted by INDENT.

In those situations where no contributions were made to a candidate contained in the ratings data set, a dummy record was created for that candidate in the contribution data set. This situation occurred more frequently for those Senators who were not up for reelection in 1980.

At this point the file contains 5058 records of contributions to individual candidates by individual PACs plus dummy records of those rated candidates who received no money from any of the 145 PACs.

In the next step the contributions of the 145 PACs were aggregated by the 25 sponsors. This results in a set of 25 contribution profiles for 807 candidates for the House and 194 Senatorial candidates. The profiles have, of course, numerous missing values. The missing values occur because a candidate did not receive a contribution from an organization. No contribution is, however, the equivalent of a \$0 contribution. When the missing values are converted to zeroes

the resultant data set contains a dollar contribution value for each candidate for Congress for each of the 25 organizations that both issued ratings and made direct congressional contributions through their 145 PACs. This data set is reduced to the same set of observations in the rating set by merging on the INDENT variable. This data set contains the total dollar contribution for 421 members of the House and 96 Senators by the 25 sponsors.

## C H A P T E R IV

## RESULTS

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the results of the analysis. When necessary, it includes additional methodological descriptions beyond those contained in Chapter III.

Descriptive Statistics

Before portraying the results of the hypotheses, some descriptive statistics of the data set are given. The full set is to be found in Appendix E.

In the House of Representatives, the mean rating over all organizations was 50.35. The two farm organizations, NFO and NFU, gave the highest average ratings, 71.47 and 66.34 respectively. The AFL-CIO's average score is near the mean, 51.49; the Chambers of Commerce had the fifth highest average rating with a 60.66. It is notable that four of the five highest raters, (NFO, NFU, Chamber and NFIB) are from business. This is during a period when the House, Senate, and Presidency were controlled by Democrats. This positive approval is not matched by the Council for a Competitive Economy, a free market business



organization, which, with a 40.12, gave the second lowest average rating. The lowest rating, 36.05, was from the National Taxpayers Union.

In the Senate, where the overall mean is 50.04, several organizations join the NTU with scores under 40. The Christian Voice, National Christian Action Coalition, Consumer Federation of America, the Liberty Lobby, and the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy all have an average rating under 40. The Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO are more closely aligned in their approval of the Senate than the House. The nine point House difference shrinks to three points in the Senate for these two organizations. The highest Senate ratings are given by the two farm organizations and the Woman's Activist.

The mean scores of organizations are a very rough indicator of the central tendencies of organizational scores. In general, the distributions tend to be bimodal with a large proportion of the scores residing in the tails. The relatively high standard deviations give evidence of the bimodality of the distributions. The common case seems to be one in which the legislation chosen by a particular organization divides the Congressional body into two groups - those "for" and those "against" with a smaller group of neutrals.

Table 15, in Appendix E, represents interquartile points of the organizations in the data set. It shows the heavy concentration of observations that fall in the tails of the distribution of scores of many organizations.

### Hypothesis 1: FEC Categories

The first hypothesis:

H1: There will be a significant difference in the membership of three groups formed using FEC defined categories of Labor, Unconnected, and Trade/Membership/ Health organizations and three groups formed from the same set of organizations using a similarity of ratings criterion.

is a test of the validity of making inferences or drawing conclusions of aggregate group goals, purposes, or behavior from FEC categorical data.

The FEC categories of organizations were taken from the FEC's 1979-1980 Report on Financial Activity tapes. Of the 47 organizations included in the data set, 27 of those members were contained on the FEC tape. Those 27 organizations and their category membership are listed in Appendix F. A restrictive test of the H1 was made using only those 27 organizations categorized by the FEC. The test was performed on each body of the Congress individually.

The 27 organizations were divided into three

groups by their FEC category. Cluster analysis was run using the ratings as input. The resultant clusters were designated Labor, Unconnected, or Trade/Membership/Health by determining the proportion of each FEC category represented in a particular cluster. That cluster with the highest proportion of FEC labor category members was designated the Labor group, and so on.

The results are portrayed in three ways. In the setting specified by the particular hypothesis, a graphical figure of the movement of members from category to cluster precedes a table of the numerical results. The cluster memberships that are obtained when the cluster algorithm is allowed to proceed beyond the number of clusters specified in the hypothesis are presented in Appendix G.


Using the FEC categories, the 27 organizations were broken down into 11 Labor, 7 Unconnected, and 9 Trade/Membership/Health (T/M/H) members. In the tables of results, the FEC category to which an organization belongs is indicated by the last letter of its name. Labor is represented by L, Unconnected by U, and Trade/Membership/Health by T. With the cluster program truncated at three iterations, the three clusters have 23, 3, and 1 members.

FIGURE 2


## HYPOTHESIS 1

COHESIVENESS OF FEC CATEGORIES  
USING RATINGS OF THE HOUSE

## FEC Category Membership



## Cluster Membership



T = Trade/Membership/Health  
 L = Labor  
 U = Unconnected

TABLE 4

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING  
GENERATED SOLUTIONS FOR PEC-CATEGORIZED  
PAC SUBSAMPLE

## OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

## CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 3 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1 3	3.000000	2.588271	0.8628	0.288124
2 23	23.000000	19.815422	0.8615	0.746908
3 1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 23.40369      PROPORTION = 0.866803

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
CLUSTER 1	NSPE_T	0.8623	0.6446	0.7475
	LCVX_T	0.9144	0.7034	0.7692
	GNCONX_T	0.8115	0.4117	0.5074
CLUSTER 2	NALU_T	0.6947	0.5262	0.7574
	CHVC_U	0.8129	0.5434	0.6684
	NCAC_U	0.7687	0.5652	0.7352
	NFIB_U	0.8697	0.5744	0.6605
	WPC_U	0.7871	0.5189	0.6592
	TMSTR_L	0.7493	0.3630	0.4844
	AFT_L	0.8789	0.6555	0.7457
	CARP_L	0.7551	0.3254	0.4309
	NEA_L	0.8115	0.5091	0.6274
	ACAX_U	0.9212	0.5305	0.5759
	ACUX_T	0.9322	0.6026	0.6464
	ADAX_U	0.9057	0.8009	0.8843
	APLCIX_L	0.9561	0.6011	0.6287
	APSCMX_L	0.7782	0.5294	0.6803
	CFAX_T	0.9000	0.7443	0.8269
	COCUSX_T	0.9190	0.7170	0.7803
	CSFCX_U	0.9305	0.5648	0.6070
	CWAX_L	0.9534	0.6252	0.6558
	IFCWX_L	0.9506	0.6225	0.6548
	SOCWKX_T	0.9184	0.6139	0.6684
UAWX_L	0.9743	0.6708	0.6885	
UMWX_L	0.8879	0.7366	0.8296	
ACTWVK_L	0.7598	0.4979	0.6553	
CLUSTER 3	NFCX_T	1.0000	0.2819	0.2819

House of Representatives. Figure 2 and Table 4 portray the memberships of the FEC categories and the cluster membership at three clusters. All of the Unconnected and a majority of the T/M/H organizations end up in a cluster containing all the Labor organizations.

Under the null of H1, the number of expected members in each cluster is expected to equal the number of members in each of the original categories. Great shifts, however, occur. In fact, at three iterations the Unconnected category disappears. All seven Unconnected members shift into the Labor cluster. Of the nine T/M/H organizations five shift to Labor, three remain in a cluster by themselves, and the ninth, the National Farmers Organization forms a cluster unto itself.

When a fourth cluster is constructed [Table 16, Appendix G], cluster membership is much closer to the FEC scheme. Ten of eleven Labor organizations are members of Cluster 2, C2. Six of the seven Unconnected organizations are members of C3. Three of the nine T/M/H category members constitute C4.

In the three cluster solution, the National Farmers' Organization forms a cluster unto itself. Given its high mean, higher median, and relatively

small standard deviation, its tendency to be pulled away from the other sample elements is not unexpected. With this outlier removed, the large cluster, C2, splits in two, C2 and C4, in the next iteration. The configuration at this level may be reasonably compared to the FEC memberships. C1 has only Trade elements; however only three of the nine trade organizations are contained within that cluster. While all but one of the Labor unions are members of C2, four other members, 29%, are from different FEC categories. Three of the four outsiders, the Chamber, NFIB, and Underwriters, are business organizations. In C4, the cluster dominated by Unconnected members, 33% of the membership is from other FEC categories.

Under the House of Representatives condition, using similarity of ratings as the cluster criterion, the FEC categorization scheme does not result in categories of mutual exclusion. Those members which are categorized together by the similarity in which they rate members of the House are not the same members who are categorized together by their origin. Origin and purpose are not synonymous. The first hypothesis is supported.


Senate. The results in the Senate are even more supportive of H1. With three clusters, [Figure 3 and

FIGURE 3


## HYPOTHESIS 1

COHESIVENESS OF FEC CATEGORIES  
USING RATINGS OF THE SENATE

## FEC Category Membership



## Cluster Membership



T = Trade/Membership/Health  
 L = Labor  
 U = Unconnected



TABLE 5

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING GENERATED CLUSTER  
SOLUTIONS FOR FEC-CATEGORIZED PAC SUBSAMPLE

## OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

## CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 3 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	8	8.000000	6.775538	0.8469	0.600149
2	17	17.000000	13.838558	0.8140	0.703200
3	2	2.000000	1.822428	0.9112	0.177572

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 22.43652      PROPORTION = 0.830982

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
1	CHVC_U	0.9536	0.7932	0.8318
	NCAC_U	0.8972	0.7572	0.8440
	WPC_U	0.8455	0.6881	0.8138
	NEA_L	0.5585	0.3703	0.6630
	ACAX_U	0.9136	0.8881	0.9721
	ACUX_T	0.9478	0.8863	0.9351
	CSFCY_U	0.9625	0.9158	0.9514
	NFOX_T	0.6969	0.5527	0.7931
2	NALU_T	0.6144	0.4773	0.7769
	NFIB_U	0.8239	0.6936	0.8419
	TMSTR_L	0.7886	0.6719	0.8520
	AFT_L	0.6646	0.5015	0.7545
	CARP_L	0.5068	0.4145	0.8179
	ADAX_U	0.8779	0.8258	0.9407
	AFLCIX_L	0.9760	0.8548	0.8758
	AFSCMX_L	0.7031	0.6085	0.8654
	CFAX_T	0.8458	0.7414	0.8766
	COCUSX_T	0.9114	0.8537	0.9367
	CWAX_L	0.9603	0.8361	0.8707
	GNCONX_T	0.8096	0.6837	0.8446
	IFCHX_L	0.9246	0.8191	0.8859
	SOCHKY_T	0.8807	0.8348	0.9479
UAMX_L	0.9739	0.8908	0.9146	
UMWX_L	0.7358	0.5274	0.7168	
3	ACTWVX_L	0.8412	0.6993	0.8313
	NSPE_T	0.9112	0.4498	0.4937
	LCVX_T	0.9112	0.3949	0.4334

Table 5] the Unconnected cluster C1 contains three, or 37%, outside members. The Labor cluster C2 contains 10 of the 11 the labor unions--the National Education Association is again missing. However, 7 of 17, or 41%, of the cluster membership is composed of non FEC Labor category organizations. As in the House setting, the Chamber of Commerce and the small business oriented NFIB are comembers with the unions. The third cluster contains 2 of the 7 Trade categorized organizations. The solutions at four and five clusters fail to cause a clean split in C2 [Tables 18 and 19 in Appendix G].

Discussion. Using either the Senate or House populations, cluster analyzing the ratings of 27 organizations results in clusters whose membership is not composed of organizations from a single FEC PAC category.

The results of H1 indicate that the instrumental goals of organizations do not match to the origin of organizations. In addition, with this subset of organizations, and relatively few clusters, the instrumental goals do not clearly differentiate between groups of organizations. While single or dyadic member clusters may, as indicated by low  $R^2$  ratios, form relatively tight clusters, the high  $R^2$  ratios within the larger clusters indicate that the clusters are relatively amorphous.

Although the data set contains 47 organizations, only 27 were used in the H1 analysis. The remaining 20 were dropped as they did not make electoral contributions, hence, were uncategorized by the FEC. An analysis was made of the full set. Results and discussion of cluster analyzing all 47 organizations through ten iterations is to be found in Appendix H.

#### Hypothesis 2: Business and Labor Categories

It was noted earlier that the first hypothesis is weak. Its vulnerability stems from the FEC categories that are used. Few would expect the Unconnected and Trade/Membership/Health categories to remain inviolate to boundary jumping when ratings are used. It is apparent that the FEC meant Unconnected and Trade categories to imply no more than PAC origin. To show that the origin of PACs contained within these categories differs from their purpose is to show the obvious.

If individual corporations issued ratings and if the H1 data set had included sets of corporate ratings, in some minds H1 would no longer be a straw man. That the FEC did not mean for its categories to imply more than cohesion of origin for the Trade and Unconnected organizations does not, for some, hold for the business and labor groupings. For these two categories, origin

does imply cohesion of purpose. The bisected logic that allows two origin categories to imply purpose and the remaining four to not is circumstantially subjected to investigation in the second hypothesis. The means for doing so is by comparing the ratings of a set of business organizations to those of a set of labor unions.

Hypothesis 2 states:

There will be a significant change in the membership of two groups, one composed of business and the other of labor organizations, and two groups formed from the same set of organizations using a similarity of ratings criterion.

The group composed of labor organizations is a duplicate of those used in the labor category of H1 with the exception of the addition of the National Association of Social Workers. The twelve labor organizations represented are:

1. American Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial Organizations
2. Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers
3. American Federation of Teachers
4. National Association of Social Workers
5. American Education Association
6. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
7. International Brotherhood of Teamsters

8. United Brotherhood of Carpenters
9. United Auto Workers
10. United Mine Workers
11. Communication Workers of America
12. International Food and Commercial Workers

The business category contains 11 members:

1. Independent Petroleum Association of America
2. National Associated Businessmen
3. National Association of Life Underwriters
4. National Society of Professional Engineers
5. A Major Manufacturing Association
6. National Federation of Independent Business
7. Council for a Competitive Economy
8. Chamber of Commerce for the U.S.
9. Associated General Contractors
10. National Farmers Organization
11. National Farmers Union


House of Representatives. In the House population when the cluster program is truncated after two iterations [Figure 4 and Table 6], ten of twelve of the labor and eight of the eleven business organizations reside in one cluster. The two farm organizations and the Council for a Competitive Economy, a conservative business group, compose the second cluster with the Teamsters' and Carpenters' unions.

FIGURE 4


HYPOTHESIS 2

COHESIVENESS OF BUSINESS AND  
LABOR CATEGORIES USING HOUSE RATINGS

Category Membership



Cluster Membership



B = Business  
L = Labor

TABLE 6

HOUSE LEGISLATIVE RATING GENERATED CLUSTER  
SOLUTIONS FOR THE BUSINESS/LABOR SUBSAMPLE

## RANDOM INITIALIZATION

## CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 2 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	18	18.000000	15.089137	0.8383	0.696901
2	5	5.000000	3.872882	0.7746	0.704797

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 18.96202      PROPORTION = 0.824436

## OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH OWN CLUSTER	WITH NEXT HIGHEST	R**2 RATIO
1	IPAA63	0.8146	0.6075	0.7457
	NAB63	0.8838	0.6995	0.7915
	NALU63	0.6992	0.4574	0.6542
	NSPE63	0.7133	0.3524	0.4941
	NFIB63	0.8845	0.6067	0.6860
	AFT63	0.9017	0.5681	0.6301
	NEA63	0.7844	0.6764	0.8623
	AFLCIO3X	0.9495	0.7649	0.8056
	APSCM63X	0.8086	0.5926	0.7329
	COCUS63X	0.9439	0.6359	0.6737
	CHA63X	0.9559	0.7326	0.7664
	GNCON63X	0.4642	0.2155	0.4643
	IPCW63X	0.9412	0.7393	0.7855
	BUSORG63	0.7829	0.5516	0.7046
	SOCWK63X	0.8998	0.6691	0.7436
	UAM63X	0.9702	0.7284	0.7508
	UMW63X	0.9111	0.6237	0.6845
ACTHV63X	0.7803	0.5309	0.6803	
2	IMSTR63	0.7844	0.7071	0.9015
	CARP63	0.7870	0.7072	0.8986
	CCE63X	0.9095	0.6533	0.7183
	NFC63X	0.5814	0.2559	0.4401
	NPU63X	0.8106	0.4670	0.5760

There is no clean business/labor split at two clusters. More importantly, that split never comes. As was seen with H1, it is very possible that outliers will dominate the cluster algorithm at the beginning. That is, those organizations which are most unlike any other organizations will be split off in ones and twos. If there is cohesiveness within the labor and business communities, then once the most anomalous members of the sample are off in small clusters, the main body of the sample should split into two clusters with several members. That split never occurs under the second hypothesis.

Tables 20 to 27 in Appendix G portray the progression of the H2 analysis from three to ten clusters. At each increment, the cluster generated has only one or two members.

As more clusters are formed, the farmers form an isolated dyad as indicated by their relatively low  $R^2$  ratio. At the six cluster level [Table 23], with the variation explained proportion surpassing the .90 level, C1, the largest cluster, contains most of the labor organizations and most of the generic business organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce. With ten clusters [Table 27], the Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO occupy the same cluster. Even when 10 clusters



are generated 25% of C1's membership is from the business organizations.

In the House, when using ratings as the clustering criterion, there is no clear demarcation between those organizations whose origins are in the business community and those organizations from the labor community. In relative terms, the results indicate that the business community is much more divided in its evaluation of the members of the House than is the labor community.

Senate. At two clusters [Figure 5 and Table 7], the results from Senate ratings are, with the exception of the addition of the anonymous business association, BUSORG63, the same as for the House. The teamsters and carpenters are members of C1 with five of the 11 business organizations. The other six business category members are in C2 with most of the labor groups.



Again, as with the House ratings, the sample tends to divide one or two members at a time [Tables 28 to 35 in Appendix G]. At the tenth iteration, three of C2's nine members, including the Chamber of Commerce, are business organizations. C1 has one labor and two business members; C7 has one of each. Only C8 has all business members, of which two are the farm organizations.

## FIGURE 5


## HYPOTHESIS 2

COHESIVENESS OF THE BUSINESS/LABOR  
CATEGORIES USING RATINGS OF THE SENATE


## Category Membership



## Cluster Membership



C1



C2

B = Business

L = Labor

TABLE 7

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE BUSINESS/LABOR SUBSAMPLE

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

RANDOM INITIALIZATION

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 2 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	7	7.000000	5.766864	0.8238	0.409421
2	16	16.000000	12.579239	0.7862	0.707593

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 18.3461      PROPORTION = 0.797657

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
1	IPAA63	0.7958	0.6661	0.8371
	IMSTR63	0.8239	0.7388	0.8966
	CARP63	0.6776	0.4434	0.6543
	CCE63X	0.9303	0.8128	0.8736
	BUSCRG63	0.9144	0.8033	0.8784
	NPO63X	0.7509	0.5398	0.7190
	NPU63X	0.8738	0.7166	0.8201
2	NAB63	0.8386	0.7368	0.8785
	NALU63	0.6141	0.4689	0.7636
	NSPE63	0.5066	0.2914	0.5753
	NFIB63	0.8104	0.7285	0.8989
	AFT63	0.6638	0.4842	0.7294
	NEA63	0.4240	0.2938	0.6929
	AFLCIO3X	0.9688	0.8263	0.8529
	AFSCM63X	0.7125	0.5833	0.8188
	COCUS63X	0.9043	0.8759	0.9686
	CWA63X	0.9538	0.8362	0.8767
	GNCON63X	0.8107	0.6312	0.7786
	IFCW63X	0.9313	0.7411	0.7958
	SOCHK63X	0.9131	0.6544	0.7166
	UAW63X	0.9714	0.8532	0.8783
	DMW63X	0.7362	0.5522	0.7500
	ACTWV63X	0.8195	0.7464	0.9107

The results from clustering the Senate ratings of 23 business and labor organizations are duplicates of the House clusters. The organizations fail to cluster according to their origins. The business community organizations are less cohesive than the labor organizations.

Discussion. The solutions generated by the cluster program suggest that the specific interests of organizations from the business community outweigh their general needs. This pattern is reversed for labor. The fact that in the House nine of the twelve labor unions remain together in a cluster even at the tenth iteration [Table 27] indicates that the general outweigh specific goals. It should be noted that of the three business organizations that are co-members of the labor cluster, Cl, two, the Chamber and NFIB, are among the more generic of the business organizations in the sample.

From a political perspective, this contrast between labor community cohesion and business community disintegration seems to imply that, if one pleases one union one is apt to please all; however if one's vote pleases one business interest one is much less apt to please all. Hypothetically a vote for industry specific legislation that is perceived to be

unfavorable to labor's general interest could also cause segments of the business community to perceive that vote as unfavorable to its own interests too. There are apt to be numerous situations where issues of specific interest to a particular industry are not perceived to be in conflict with the general interests of labor. That is, one may help an industry without hurting labor - a non-zero sum game setting. This does not mean that other interests such as consumers, education or minorities may not be harmed. It does mean that judicious voting can lead to simultaneously pleasing segments of the business community, while not offending the labor community.

The business/labor contrast in degree of cohesiveness may be seen from another perspective. The dispersion of the business community may result from business' recognition of the turbulent complexity of its environment. General conditions are not enough to insure the well being of a specific industry. Labor's cohesion may result from a slowness to recognize a changed world. If declining memberships, union apathy among younger workers, difficulty in organizing new industries, and large numbers of union workers voting for Republicans are caused by something, that something may in part be a too high priority placed on labor

solidarity by labor's leadership. It may be that in a post industrial economic world, "Divided we stand; united we fall," is the new order of the day. If this is true the findings suggest that while many businesses have come to see this; labor has not done so.

### Hypothesis 3: Business/Labor Dispersion

The third hypothesis, H3, states:

"There is a significant difference in the dispersion of ratings between the cluster generated business group and the cluster generated labor group."

Given the poor discrimination between the business and labor organizations at the two cluster level as presented in the previous section, this issue is somewhat moot. However, if the poor discrimination is disregarded, in the House at two clusters [Table 6], the average  $R^2$  of the business cluster members, .77, is somewhat lower than the .84 average of the labor cluster members. The average  $R^2$  ratio of each cluster is .70. Indirectly, the tendency of the business community toward disintegration (clusters of one or two members) lends evidence to the argument that it is less cohesive than the labor community. That tendency, however, is reversed in the Senate clusters. There, with two clusters [Table 7], the average  $R^2$  of the

business cluster, C1, is .82; the C2 labor cluster average  $R^2$  is .79. Again, the average  $R^2$  ratios are equal, at .81. A comparison of how the business and labor communities divide in the Senate shows a strong resemblance to the outcome in the House setting. The labor community has a greater tendency to hold together. Six of the 13 labor organizations are cluster comembers in C2 at the stage of ten clusters [Table 35 in Appendix G].

#### Hypothesis 4: Spokesperson Representativeness

The fourth hypothesis states:

There will be a significant change in the membership of the business and labor affiliated groups and two clusters formed using the Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO ratings as cluster seeds.

To test H4, the same set of organizations that was used in H2 is used again. The only difference is that, rather than having the cluster algorithm be initialized randomly, the first two clusters are formed using the Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO as seeds for the initial formation of the two clusters.

House of Representatives. In the House, when the cluster program is truncated at two clusters [Figure 6 and Table 8], eight of the eleven business and ten of the labor unions reside in one cluster. More

FIGURE 6


HYPOTHESIS 4

SPOKESPERSON REPRESENTATIVENESS OF  
THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND  
AFL-CIO USING HOUSE RATINGS

Category Membership



Cluster Membership



B =Business  
L =Labor  
COC=Chamber of Commerce  
AFL=AFL-CIO



TABLE 8

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING GENERATED  
 CLUSTER SOLUTIONS FOR BUSINESS/LABOR SUBSAMPLE  
 WHEN SEEDED WITH SPOKESPERSON GROUPS

## OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

## CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 2 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	18	18.000000	15.089137	0.8383	0.696901
2	5	5.000000	3.872882	0.7746	0.704797

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 18.96202      PROPORTION = 0.824436

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH OWN CLUSTER	R-SQUARED WITH NEXT HIGHEST	R**2 RATIO
1	IPAA63	0.8146	0.6075	0.7457
	NAB63	0.8838	0.6995	0.7915
	NALU63	0.6992	0.4574	0.6542
	NSPE63	0.7133	0.3524	0.4941
	NFIB63	0.8845	0.6067	0.6860
	APT63	0.9017	0.5681	0.6301
	NEA63	0.7844	0.6764	0.8623
	AFICIO3X	0.9495	0.7649	0.8056
	AFSCM63X	0.8086	0.5926	0.7329
	COCUS63X	0.9439	0.6359	0.6737
	CWA63X	0.9559	0.7326	0.7664
	GNCON63X	0.4642	0.2155	0.4643
	IFCW63X	0.9412	0.7393	0.7855
	BUSORG63	0.7829	0.5516	0.7046
	SOCWK63X	0.8998	0.6691	0.7436
2	UAW63X	0.9702	0.7284	0.7508
	UMW63X	0.9111	0.6237	0.6845
	ACTHW63X	0.7803	0.5309	0.6803
	IMSTR63	0.7844	0.7071	0.9015
	CARP63	0.7870	0.7072	0.8986
	CCE63X	0.9095	0.6533	0.7183
	NFO63X	0.5814	0.2559	0.4401
NFU63X	0.8106	0.4670	0.5760	

importantly, the Chamber, though used to initialize the business cluster, does not remain a member. It, too, joins the labor cluster. It is not distinct enough from the AFL-CIO to sustain a cluster of its own. Inspection of the  $R^2$  values in C1 shows that both the Chamber and AFL-CIO have high and nearly equal values of .9439 and .9495 respectively.

The Chamber is not an outlier in the cluster; it is as integral a member of the cluster as the AFL-CIO. If the AFL-CIO were to be dropped from the sample, there would be almost no change in C1's composition.

Forcing the clustering algorithm to begin building the two clusters around the AFL-CIO and Chamber of Commerce changes nothing. By the completion of the process, the two organizations are both members near the center of the same cluster.

Senate. In the Senate, at two clusters [Figure 7 and Table 9], the Chamber again fails to build a cluster around itself. It becomes a co-member with the AFL-CIO in a cluster with ten of the twelve labor organizations and five of the eleven business organizations. The two cluster seeded results are the same as those in the unseeded condition.

Discussion. In neither the House nor Senate do a majority of the business organizations reside in a

## FIGURE 7


## HYPOTHESIS 4

SPOKESPERSON REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE  
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND AFL-CIO USING SENATE RATINGS

## Category Membership



## Cluster Membership



B = Business  
L = Labor  
COC = Chamber of Commerce  
AFL = AFL-CIO

TABLE 9

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING GENERATED  
 CLUSTER SOLUTIONS FOR BUSINESS/LABOR  
 SUBSAMPLE WHEN SEEDED WITH  
 SPOKESPERSON GROUPS

## CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 2 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	7	7.000000	5.766864	0.8238	0.409421
2	16	16.000000	12.579239	0.7862	0.707593
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED =			18.3461	PROPORTION =	0.797657

## OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
1	IPAA63	0.7958	0.6661	0.8371
	IMSTR63	0.8239	0.7388	0.8966
	CARP63	0.6776	0.4434	0.6543
	CCE63X	0.9303	0.8128	0.8736
	BUSCRG63	0.9144	0.8033	0.8784
	NFO63X	0.7509	0.5398	0.7190
	NFU63X	0.8738	0.7166	0.8201
2	NAB63	0.8386	0.7368	0.8785
	NALU63	0.6141	0.4689	0.7636
	NSPE63	0.5066	0.2914	0.5753
	NFIB63	0.8104	0.7285	0.8989
	AFT63	0.6638	0.4842	0.7294
	NEA63	0.4240	0.2938	0.6929
	AFLCIU3X	0.9688	0.8263	0.8529
	AFSCM63X	0.7125	0.5833	0.8188
	COCUS63X	0.9043	0.8759	0.9686
	CWA63X	0.9538	0.8362	0.8767
	GNCUN63X	0.8107	0.6312	0.7786
	IFCW63X	0.9313	0.7411	0.7958
	SOCWK63X	0.9131	0.6544	0.7166
	UAW63X	0.9714	0.8532	0.8783
	UMW63X	0.7362	0.5522	0.7500
ACTWV63X	0.8195	0.7464	0.9107	

cluster in which they hold a majority of the cluster membership. In both settings, most of the business organizations are cluster co-members with most of the labor groups. Given these results, it is not possible to say that the Chamber is not a spokesperson for business, but the meaning of "spokesperson" must change in light of these results.

The results of H2 showed an alignment of most of the labor unions and the Chamber. The H4 results show that the Chamber's cluster membership is not an artifact of the cluster program. Additionally, it reinforces the earlier discussion of business cohesion. The business community is so disparate that its commonly accepted spokesperson, the Chamber, may be seen as a better spokesperson for labor than business. Its role as a generic organization, in a world needing industry and even corporate specific solutions (such as the Chrysler and Continental Illinois rescues) may have caused the Chamber to be distanced from its constituency. Analogous to the exploding universe, as the violent economic forces of the last 25 years pushed industries away from the center to seek solutions to their individual environments, the Chamber, by choosing to remain at the center, becomes an isolate. Part of the Chamber's isolation is due to its decision to

represent the interests of both big and small business. Proliferation theorists might point to the danger inherent in trying to serve two masters, or more, well in an increasingly complex world.

#### Hypothesis 5: Contributions and Ratings

The focal point of the fifth hypothesis is a comparison of the cluster memberships that result from rating pattern similarity to that of contribution pattern similarity.

H5: There will be a significant difference in the membership of business and labor groups constructed from ratings and two clusters generated by the campaign contributions of the same set of organizations.

The comparison for H5 was constructed by using all those organizations contained on the FEC financial tapes, that made contributions to members of the 96th Congress, and could be classified as being from the business or labor community.

These were clustered on their contribution patterns. The results were compared to the clusters generated using the ratings of the same set of organizations.

House of Representatives. When the algorithm was truncated at two clusters [Figure 8 and Table 10], the contribution clusters form a near perfect split along

FIGURE 8


## HYPOTHESIS 5

COHESIVENESS OF THE BUSINESS  
AND LABOR CATEGORIES USING CONTRIBUTIONS  
TO THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE

## Category Membership



## Cluster Membership



B = Business  
L = Labor

TABLE 10

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CONTRIBUTION GENERATED  
 CLUSTER SOLUTIONS FOR BUSINESS/LABOR SUBSAMPLE

## RANDOM INITIALIZATION

## CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 2 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	5	5.000000	2.145746	0.4291	1.042346
2	13	13.000000	5.581356	0.4293	1.241438

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 7.727102      PROPORTION = 0.429283

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
1	NFIB63	0.5920	0.0529	0.0893
	COCUS63X	0.1738	0.0016	0.0094
	GNCON63X	0.5512	0.0143	0.0260
	NSPE63	0.1464	0.0023	0.0155
	NALU63	0.6823	0.0215	0.0315

## OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER				
2	AFLCIO3X	0.7446	0.0301	0.0404
	UAW63X	0.6063	0.0338	0.0557
	CARP63	0.5453	0.0359	0.0659
	ACTWV63X	0.3115	0.0180	0.0579
	CWA63X	0.4844	0.0044	0.0090
	NEA63	0.3778	0.0041	0.0109
	AFSCM63X	0.5893	0.0371	0.0630
	IFCW63X	0.7790	0.0349	0.0448
	UMW63X	0.0146	0.0026	0.1771
	AFT63	0.2756	0.0115	0.0416
	TMSTR63	0.2858	0.0010	0.0035
	NFO63X	0.0276	0.0017	0.0614
	SOCWK63X	0.5396	0.0207	0.0384



the business/labor dimension. Twelve of the thirteen members of C1 are from labor; five of the six business organizations are co-members of C1.

When ratings are used [Figure 9 and Table 11], the resulting clusters bear little resemblance to the contribution clusters. With ratings, C1 contains a single member, the NFO. The other seventeen organizations are contained in C2.

The proportion of variation explained by the cluster is almost twice as high with ratings, .8388, as it is with contributions, .4293. In like manner, the  $R^2$  between an organization and its cluster is noticeably higher with the ratings. Yet, the separation, as denoted by the  $R^2$  ratio between one cluster and the other cluster, is much cleaner in the contribution cluster results.


Senate. The membership split in the Senate is close to that of the House. With contributions [Figure 10 and Table 12], four of the five business organizations are in C1 while C2 contains all of the labor groups and the NFO. The Chamber of Commerce is dropped for this comparison as it did not give to any Senatorial candidates. In the rating clusters [Figure 11 and Table 13], the carpenters and farmers are members of C2; all of the other organizations are in C1.

FIGURE 9


HYPOTHESIS 5

COHESIVENESS OF THE BUSINESS/LABOR  
CATEGORIES USING RATINGS OF THE HOUSE

Category Membership



Cluster Membership



B = Business  
L = Labor

TABLE 11

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING GENERATED  
 CLUSTER SOLUTIONS FOR HYPOTHESIS 5  
 BUSINESS/LABOR SUBSAMPLE

## OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

## CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 2 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
2	17	17.000000	14.098745	0.8293	0.860917
TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED =			15.09874	PROPORTION =	0.838819

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
1	NPO63X	1.0000	0.2545	0.2545
2	NALU63	0.6973	0.1654	0.2372
	NSPE63	0.6874	0.1469	0.2136
	NFIB63	0.8865	0.1649	0.1860
	TMSTR63	0.7573	0.2257	0.2981
	AFT63	0.8980	0.1744	0.1942
	CARP63	0.7534	0.2330	0.3093
	NEA63	0.7966	0.2690	0.3377
	AFICIO3X	0.9596	0.2572	0.2680
	AFSCM63X	0.8224	0.1644	0.1999
	COCUS63X	0.9332	0.2171	0.2326
	CWA63X	0.9556	0.2612	0.2734
	GNCON63X	0.4446	0.1621	0.3647
	IFCR63X	0.9484	0.2595	0.2736
	SOCWK63X	0.8986	0.2649	0.2948
	UAW63X	0.9719	0.2562	0.2636
	UMW63X	0.9139	0.2209	0.2418
	ACTMV63X	0.7741	0.1736	0.2243

FIGURE 10

## HYPOTHESIS 5

COHESIVENESS OF THE BUSINESS/LABOR  
CATEGORIES USING CONTRIBUTIONS OF  
THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE

## Category Membership



## Cluster Membership



B = Business  
L = Labor

TABLE 12

SENATE CONTRIBUTION GENERATED CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR BUSINESS/LABOR SUBSAMPLE

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

RANDOM INITIALIZATION

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 2 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	4	4.000000	2.573917	0.6435	0.638682
2	13	13.000000	8.389955	0.6454	1.059196

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 10.96387      PROPCRTION = 0.609104

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
1	NFIB63	0.7198	0.0060	0.0083
	GNCON63X	0.6213	0.0058	0.0093
	NSPE63	0.7432	0.0003	0.0004
	NALU63	0.4897	0.0765	0.1563
2	AFLCIO3X	0.8668	0.0001	0.0002
	UAW63X	0.7968	0.0000	0.0000
	CARP63	0.7641	0.0079	0.0103
	ACTWV63X	0.7715	0.0001	0.0001
	CHA63X	0.8673	0.0003	0.0003
	NEA63	0.4991	0.0186	0.0373
	AFSCM63X	0.7843	0.0056	0.0072
	IFCW63X	0.8648	0.0005	0.0006
	UMW63X	0.2805	0.0002	0.0008
	AFT63	0.4471	0.0024	0.0054
	TMSTR63	0.4946	0.0007	0.0013
	NFO63X	0.1726	0.0448	0.2598
	SOCHK63X	0.7805	0.0013	0.0016

## FIGURE 11


## HYPOTHESIS 5

COHESIVENESS OF THE BUSINESS/LABOR  
CATEGORIES USING RATINGS OF THE SENATE

## Category Membership



## Cluster Membership



B = Business  
L = Labor

TABLE 13

SENATE CLUS WITH VARS THAT EQUAL BUS LAB BUCKCLUS FOR H5  
 OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS  
 CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 2 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	16	16.000000	12.503225	0.7815	0.740980
2	2	2.000000	1.669275	0.8346	0.330725

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 14.1725      PROPORTION = 0.787361

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
1	NALU63	0.6067	0.3968	0.6540
	NSPE63	0.4998	0.4117	0.2235
	NPIB63	0.8156	0.5169	0.6338
	TMSTR63	0.7665	0.5996	0.7823
	AFT63	0.6702	0.3422	0.5107
	NEA63	0.4139	0.1847	0.4463
	AFLCIO3X	0.9713	0.6250	0.6434
	AFSCM63X	0.7108	0.3980	0.5599
	COCUS63X	0.9061	0.6636	0.7324
	CWA63X	0.9562	0.6112	0.6392
	GNCON63X	0.8154	0.4268	0.5235
	IFCW63X	0.9307	0.5286	0.5680
	SOCWK63X	0.9010	0.4373	0.4853
	UAW63X	0.9720	0.6331	0.6513
	UMW63X	0.7369	0.4144	0.5623
ACTWV63X	0.8303	0.5980	0.7202	
2	CARP63	0.8346	0.4551	0.5453
	NFO63X	0.8346	0.5349	0.6409

The difference in explained variation is much smaller in the Senate than it was in the House, .7808 for ratings and .6091 for contributions. The  $R^2$  values for the contribution clusters are higher in the Senate in comparison to the House. The  $R^2$  ratio of the contribution clusters indicate very clear separation between the two clusters. The same cannot be said of the cluster separation when ratings are the clustering criterion.

Discussion. There seems to be a weak link between a legislator's performance, as evidenced by the ratings, and the rewards or sanctions for that behavior as evidenced by contributions. It is not possible to demonstrate this conclusively. Legislative ratings are based on end results - that is, votes that have come to the floor. This is but one demonstration of legislative behavior. As, or often more, important than floor votes are agenda setting and other committee behavior. Access to Congress at the beginning of the legislative process to make presentations, to apprise members of perceived outcomes if particular legislation is passed, and to develop compromises are valuable commodities. It is possible that much PAC money is directed toward insuring access at these earlier stages



of the legislative process. It is not possible to determine what a committee's agenda might have been without, or with a different pattern of, contributions.

Notwithstanding the above arguments, the dissimilarity between ratings and contributions needs further investigation. It would be hard to imagine a legislative issue holding the promise of great reward for a particular special interest that does not concomitantly hold the potential for significant harm for some other group of interests. If this is true, then one would expect many of the apparent outcomes of general congressional behavior to pertain at the committee level. The potential for contribution neutralization, the possibility of supporting the lesser of two evils, and the probability of not funding a stalwart supporter may be prevalent within the committee structure. The probability that these activities occur at committee level and the actuality that some interest groups are contributing money in patterns that greatly differ from their legislative rating patterns suggest the need for more investigation and explanation of the links between ratings and contributions.

With few exceptions, the journalists and scholars who have investigated the behavior of PACs over the

last ten years have implied or concluded that PACs receive good value for their money. The dissimilarities in ratings and contribution patterns that this study has found suggest the possibility that PACs are in fact, receiving poor value for their contribution efforts.

The following paragraphs are ruminations about how PACs may play a part in future electoral campaigns if, indeed, they are receiving bad value and if they become aware of that fact.

It could be that PAC mechanism has been so successful that the congressional election setting has become a seller's market characterized by high inflation - too few political goods are being chased by too many contribution dollars. If this is true, one may expect the market to try to correct itself. One change might be product substitution. The proportion of PAC receipts used for independent expenditures for positive or negative campaigns could increase, or an increasing proportion of PAC receipts could be used for voter education. If successful, the latter strategy would use the influence of propagandized voters to "pull" legislators' behavior into the "correct" pattern to serve an interest group's best interest.

A second possibility is that as present and

potential PACs recognize the poor value that they are receiving from contribution recipients, the growth rate, or even actual numbers of PACs, may decline. In marketing terms, consumer interest in this new product provided by the FECA may decline. In political history PACs may be remembered as a short lived fad.

Political solutions to factional problems will still be sought, but the mechanism may be something different. Two obvious mechanisms would be increased use of resources in direct lobbying and, more interestingly, increased funding to the parties, particularly the Democrats. If the parties began to regain their historical role as prominent electoral bankers and if PAC party contribution limits are raised, a closer correlation between electoral behavior and campaign support might be expected in the future. To a certain extent the influencing power of money is indirectly related to the number of sources of funds. The greater the proportion of electoral funds channeled through the party apparatus, the greater the potential for legislative discipline.

If PAC party contributions were to remain unchanged, a second means of exacting discipline would be for those interest groups most similar in their needs to develop coordinating mechanisms for their

contribution behavior. With the specifics of their ratings used as the similarity measure, organizations could look for suitable coalition partners. The process might resemble that of the personals columns in many newspapers, or more accurately, a computer dating service. "Young, black, high tech firm seeks ...."

### Summary

The results from a series of five hypotheses developed to investigate the political cohesiveness of a sample of interests groups indicate that neither FEC PAC categories, nor traditional denominations such as business/labor, discriminate well when rating patterns of members of Congress are used as the similarity measure. The legislative approval patterns of generic business groups tend to more closely resemble those of labor unions than other business associations. The sample of labor unions display a much greater degree of ratings cohesion than the business community. When the similarity measure is switched from ratings to financial contributions, a sample of PACs divides along the business/labor dimension.

The lack of ratings cohesion within the business community and the discrepancy in cluster membership between rating and contribution cluster solutions

indicates that straightforward comparisons of business and labor congressional contributions are inappropriate. The financial support provided by the business community, on a dollar for dollar basis, appears to be less potent than that of labor.

A review of the strengths and weaknesses of the present study and discussion of future research directions is presented in the last chapter.

## C H A P T E R V

### DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

#### Introduction

The results of this study may be controversial. Many children are warned by parents to avoid "bad companions." They are told that "we are known by the company that we keep." The sight of the Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO, or the ACLU and the National Christian Action Coalition, being cluster co-members is apt to be perceived by some as examples of organizations keeping bad companions. However, drawing such a conclusion from this study is too simplistic.

Almost all research in the social sciences is vulnerable to methodological criticisms. Often, what we wish to investigate is so ephemeral that operationalization of the ephemera may be done in myriad ways. While some of those many ways may be better than others, none will be without its weaknesses. Social science dealing with emotional or controversial topics, such as race, intelligence, or politics is especially open to criticism. This study falls in the latter category.

### Strength of Findings

The degree of controversiality of this study's findings are closely related to the believability of the research setting.

The use of legislative ratings as the operational definition of group self-interest offers an instrument of great verisimilitude. The group's self-interest is as the group itself defines it.

The sample of ratings used in the study includes almost two-thirds of the population of organizations that rate members of Congress. The sample represents a great diversity of factional interests. It includes the largest business and labor organizations in the country. Professional, craft, industrial, and government employee unions are represented. Small business and big business, manufacturing and service, agricultural and engineering associations are elements within the business sub-sample. Consumer, civil rights, Christian, conservation, and women's interests are represented. Free market enthusiasts, civil liberty activists, and groups professing traditional liberal or conservative orientations are contained within the sample of raters.

This study is concerned, primarily, with

similarity. Categories and cohesiveness are types of similarity. Prior to this study almost all studies of PAC similarity have used PAC origin as the similarity variable. This study uses a greatly expanded notion of similarity. Rather than relying upon a single variable, origin, it uses measurements on the legislative behavior of 96 Senators and 421 House members as its indicator of similarity.

To discern similarity, cluster analysis, with its great taxonomic capabilities, is used to reduce and dimensionalize several million similarity comparison points.

This study, of course, is not without its weaknesses. The sample is neither a random sample of the population of rating organizations nor a random sample from the PAC population. The interests of such specific factional economic groups as steel, computers, and automobiles are represented, if at all, only in diluted form through the Chamber of Commerce and other generic business organizations. The method of discerning similarity, cluster analysis, is one of the least formulaic of analytical techniques. Cluster interpretation is still more art than science.

There are serious questions as to the practical applicability of using cluster analysis with ratings



to comprehend the world of American politics. That the Chamber of Commerce and AFL-CIO are co-members in a cluster at the level where ten clusters are formed may be interpreted as meaning that these two organizations are very similar in their ratings. This need not be. Misinterpretation can derive from the difference in what similarity means in 47 dimension space as opposed to what it means in two dimensions. A two object comparison in multiple dimensions must be made in relation to all other members of the set occupying the space, not just between the two objects being compared. An orange and an apple, though very different, are highly similar if the rest of the set of objects is composed of a cow, hammer, candle, and crane.

The reader must judge whether the approach used in this study represents an improvement over what has gone before. Linnaeus' warning of the confusion resulting from misclassifying phenomena and Madison's fear of unchecked factions offer strong argument for accepting imperfect samples and esoteric techniques in the pursuit of greater depth to our knowledge of PACs.

#### Interpreting Results

Contingent upon the caveats discussed above, the

results of this project cast doubt upon the validity of using FEC or business/labor origin categories to study or draw conclusions of the behavior of PACs in federal electoral politics.

In the sample set, the membership within categories based on origin does not closely map to the membership with groupings derived from ratings similarity. Relative to the sample or subsample used in a particular hypothesis, many organizations whose origins are in the business sector are found to have ratings very similar to many labor organizations.

Origin and purpose (when operationalized as ratings) are not the same thing, nor do they denote the same information. Knowledge of what an organization wants is not derivable, necessarily, from knowledge of that organization's origin. This study indicates that the above statement holds for a business/labor categorical scheme as well as for the FEC scheme.

The results from the first four hypotheses indicate that there is no great correspondence between where an organization originates and how that organization rates the members of Congress. The results obtained under the fifth hypothesis support the argument made in Chapter II that there will not be a strong linkage between how organizations rate and how

they make contributions. But, the H5 results do show that the cluster membership derived from contribution patterns is almost exactly the same as the membership would be if the same set of organizations were categorized by origin. In other words origin denotes little about ratings, ratings denote little about contribution patterns, but origin denotes much about contribution patterns.

In relationship to the actual and potential theoretical guidelines discussed earlier in this paper, the results indicate that the actual may be being overused and the potential of great use.

The neo Marxian perspective, particularly of journalists, is not lent credit. The ratings cluster membership indicate that neither labor nor, especially, business are cohesive in their sought goals. The  $R^2$  values within clusters and the  $R^2$  ratios and correlations coefficients across clusters indicate that the diametricality of business and labor interests is more perceived than actual.

The fuzziness of the clusters and the intermixing of members from different origins lends credence to proliferation theorists. The United States of the 1980s is too complex to expect much explanatory power to come from paradigms based on two or three broad

interest groups. It appears that too much explanation has been sacrificed to achieve simplicity. The rubric to be followed is parsimony, not simplicity.

Political action committees are an important public policy issue because of their potential for exerting political influence. As the degree to which any faction can influence political events is related to the behavioral cohesiveness of its members measurement of cohesiveness must be a central issue in future PAC research. This study has attempted to show that cohesion is a theoretically and empirically complex construct. Investigation of this complexity will draw this and, it is hoped, other researchers' efforts. As the data base of ratings and contributions grows both in number of organizations and number of electoral cycles, an investigative field of increasing fertility will result.

The following section discusses ideas for future research that links ratings to PACs.

### Future Research

#### Theoretical

An obvious and necessary place to begin a stream

of PAC cohesion research is with a replication of this study using data from the 95th and 97th Congress. If findings from these two Congresses resemble those of the 96th, credence will be added to the theory, methodology and interpretations found within the present study. Dissimilar results may be explicable within the dynamics of American political life or may flag a need for a revised approach.

It was noted earlier that much of the investigation of PACs has been either from an atheoretical or an unexpressed Marxian perspective. There is great potential to link formally PAC rating and contribution behavior to interest group theory. From the homeostatic perspective, research can be conducted that would attempt to investigate the relationship between dislocations and political behavior. If an interest suffers a negative dislocation as evidenced either by such relative financial measures as rate of return or CPI adjusted wages, or by lower ratings, does it increase its participation in the political process through increased contributions? More generally, do those organizations who drop most precipitously in their ratings from one Congress to the next rise most

precipitously in their contributions? From another perspective, if lower ratings are indicative of unmet needs of a special interest, homeostatic theory would suggest that one could expect to find differences in the content of the legislation used to evaluate legislators. Lower rating groups would have more group specific legislation in their indices; higher rating groups would have more general legislation.

The distinctions between access and influence and between committee and floor behavior are amenable to investigation by linking ratings and contributions. Longitudinal studies can be done that trace committee assignments, reassignments, ratings assessment, and contributions. Is there a linear relationship between length of committee service (indirectly, agenda power) and size of contributions irrespective of ratings? Or, does the capture theory hold? Do committee members receive higher ratings the longer they remain on a committee?

### Applied

To begin to understand the disparateness of the business community, the standardized rating scores of legislators can be plotted on two axes. For example, the Chamber of Commerce and the NFIB ratings for the

House could be plotted. The mass of scores that fall into quadrants II and IV can be compared to the mass residing in the first and third quadrants. The greater the mass in the off diagonal quadrants, the greater the discrepancy in the instrumental goals of the two organizations. Comparisons can be made between the off-diagonal/diagonal proportion of the Chamber and NFIB, the AFL-CIO, the Teamsters etc. Refinements can be done using the scores of only the members of one party and one body. The latter, of course, offers insight into the cohesiveness of the parties' representatives.

In contrast to the present study, the focal point can become the legislators rather than the rating organization. The members of House or Senate can be clustered using sets of variables of close alignment to determine which legislators are most similar from the viewpoint of a particular organization or interest group. For example, the legislators could be clustered by their scores from the seven or eight labor organizations that tend to form the tightest cluster.

For an organization to expend the resources necessary to construct ratings and (from another perspective) the strong opposition to ratings shown by a number of Congressional members suggests that ratings

are perceived as having some significant effect on either legislative behavior or electoral outcomes. That premise has the potential to be tested by running regressions to determine whether and, if so, which ratings can be used to predict success in the campaign succeeding a rating period.

Much work remains to be done on investigating what connections, if any, there are between ratings and contributions. A very simple study would be to compare off diagonal/diagonal proportions, where the axes are ratings and contributions, using the standard deviations of the standardized ratings scores as the scale. Various organizations can be compared on the discrepancy proportion between their ratings and their contributions. The smaller the direct relationship between ratings and contributions, the weaker the argument that contributions purchase influence.

Organizational similarity as determined by ratings, similarity by contribution pattern, legislator similarity as determined by ratings, party affiliation, body membership, campaign success, and other empirical variables can be combined in numerous ways to study the political, and particularly electoral, environment. Cluster, discriminant, factor, and causal, analysis and dynamic programming techniques offer great promise to



better reduce, link, and understand the dynamics of politics in the age of PACs and ratings.

Future research can help to move our perceptions from fascination or fear of the size of PAC dollars, to an awareness of the extent to which those dollars are linked to influence.

### Summary

The growth in the numbers and contributions of political action committees during the last decade has been a worrisome effect of the FECA and its amendments. Worry as to the potential for undue influence by special interests and long term imbalance among interests, particularly business and labor, has led to research attempts to measure PAC political effect. Many of these efforts are founded upon making comparisons across aggregated FEC PAC categorical data. Other studies have relied upon business versus labor comparisons.

The present project has been a preliminary attempt to investigate the appropriateness of using FEC categories or business/labor categories in PAC analysis. The results of the study indicate that neither the FEC nor business/labor categories of

memberships hold up when similarity in legislative ratings is used to group organizations. The discrepant results between the two classification systems, described here as systems of origin and purpose, indicates that more sophisticated research is necessary before final judgment as to the effect of PACs upon the American political system may be rendered. It is hoped that this study is a first step toward making this important public policy judgment.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

## APPENDIX A

The following descriptions of organizations contained in the sample are excerpted from the Encyclopedia of Associations, 19th Edition, 1985.

## 1. AMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND TEXTILE WORKERS

UNION (ACTWU)

Founded: 1976. Members: 380,000. Locals: 1515. AFL-CIO; CLC. Sponsors Sidney Hillman Foundation. Bestows awards; maintains library. Divisions: Headwear; Shoe; Textile. Publications: Labor Unity, monthly. Absorbed: (1978) United Shoe Workers of America; (1982) Hat, Cap, and Milinery Workers. Formed by merger of Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (founded 1914) and absorbed International Glove Workers Union of America) and Textile Workers Union of America (founded 1929 and absorbed American Federation of Hosiery Workers). Convention/Meetings: triennial - next 1987.

## 2. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (ACLU)

Founded: 1920. Members: 250,000. Staff: 125. State Groups: 50. Local Independence and the Constitution: Freedom of inquiry and expression (speech, press, assembly and religion); due



process of law and fair trial for everybody; equality before the law for everybody regardless of race, color, national origin, political opinion or religious belief. Activities include test court cases, opposition to repressive legislation, public protests on every inroad of rights. Maintains library of more than 3,000 volumes. Sponsors projects on topics such as; women's right, juvenile rights, death penalty and national security. Committees: Academic Freedom; Church State; Communications Media; Due Process; Equality; Free Speech-Association; Indian Rights; Privacy. Divisions: American Civil Liberties Union Foundation (see separate entry). Publications: (1) First Principles, monthly; (2) Civil Liberties bi-monthly; also publishes policy statements, reprints and pamphlets. Convention/Meeting: biennial - next 1985.

### 3. AMERICAN CONSERVATION UNION (ACU)

Founded: 1964. Members: 400,000. State Groups: 42. Persons seeking "to mobilize resources of responsible conservative thought across the country and further the general cause of conservatism." Plans to provide education in such subject areas as political activity, "prejudice in the press,"

foreign and military policy, domestic economic policy, the arts, professions and services. Maintains speakers bureau and information service on conservative publications; conducts research programs; rates members of Congress on important legislation. Bestows awards. Committees: Political Action. Publications: Batteline, monthly; also publishes Issues Analysis Series. Absorbed: (1966) Political Action Committee of Young Americans for Freedom. Convention/Meeting: annual Conservative Political Action Conference - 1984 February/March, Washington, DC.

4. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS (AFL-CIO)

Founded: 1955. Members: 13,800,000. Staff: 500. Federation of national unions (95), state federations (51) and city central bodies (742) and directly affiliated local unions. Presents annual Murray-Green-Meany Award (a plaque and \$5000) for distinguished service to America, and annual George Meany Human Rights Award (a plaque and \$5000) for service to worldwide human rights and dignity. Maintains library. Committees: Civil Rights; Community Services; Economic Policy; Education; Ethical Practices; Housing; International Affairs;

Legislation; Maritime; Organization; Political Education; Public Relations; Research; Safety; and Occupational Health; Social Security; Veterans Affairs. Departments: Building and Construction Trades; Food and Allied Service; Industrial Union; Maritime Trades; Metal Trades; Professional Employees; Public Employee; Railway and Employees'; Union Label and Service Trades (see separate entries). Publications: (1) News, weekly; (2) American Federationist, monthly; (3) Free Trade Union News monthly. Formed by merger of: American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations. Convention/Meetings: biennial - 1985, October 28, Anaheim, CA.

5. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES (Government) (AFSCME)

Founded: 1936. Members: 1,200,000. Locals: 3000. AFL-CIO. Maintains library of 5000 volumes. Committees: National Public Employees Organized to Promote Legislative Equality (PEOPLE). Publications: (1) Leadership Newsletter, monthly; (2) Public Employee Newspaper, monthly; (3) Women's Newsletter, monthly; also publishes President's Letter. Convention/Meeting: biennial - next 1984.

6. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS (AFT)

Founded: 1916. Members: 580,000. Locals: 2100. AFL-CIO. Promotes collective bargaining for teachers and other educational employees. Conducts research on teacher stress, educating the handicapped, and other educational issues. Lobbies for passage of legislation of importance to education and the labor movement. Presents annual Human Rights Award; bestows grants in Professionals (see separate entry). Publications: (1) American Teacher (September-May), monthly; (2) American Educator, quarterly. Convention/Meetings: biennial - always July or August.

7. AMERICANS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL ACTION (Political Action) (ACA)

Founded: 1958. Political action organization supported by financial contributions of individuals. Maintains off-election year staff of five along with two professional consultants; for 1982 elections retained 22 individuals, firms and agencies in support of candidates. Undertakes "to help elect to the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States individuals, who by their actions, have proved their allegiance to the original spirit and principles of the Constitution." Presents biennial distinguished service award to selected

members of Congress. Publications: (1) Index (analysis and statistical evaluation of the voting records of members of Congress), annual (2) Congressional Record Digest and Tally, irregular.

8. AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION (Liberal)  
(ADA)

Founded: 1947. Members: 81,000 Staff: 20.

State Groups: 20. Local Groups: 50.

Professionals and businesspersons, labor leaders, educators, political leaders, and other individuals interested in liberal political ideas. To formulate liberal domestic and foreign policies based on the changing needs of American democracy, enlist public understanding and support of these policies, and put them into effect through the actions of major political parties. Sponsors Progressive Victory Fund. Committees: Consumer Affairs; Economics; Energy and the Environment; Foreign Policy; Political Policy. Divisions: Development; Legislative; Organization; Political; Public Relations. Publications: (1) The Courier, semimonthly (when Congress is in session); (2) For Your Information, monthly; (3) ADA World, quarterly; (4) Program for Americans, annual.

Convention/Meetings: annual.

## 9. AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL (ASC)

Founded: 1955. Members: 325,000. Staff: 39. Individuals (325,000), companies (700), colleges, labor unions, and others supporting national research and information center on national security. Maintains Washington bureau and broadcasts Radio Free Americas, a daily Spanish language program service, on over 38 stations throughout the Americas. Organizes and serves as program secretariat for Coalition for Peace Through Strength (see separate entry). Conducts annual National Security Issues Polls. Uses polls to rate members of Congress on key national votes. Holds regular national security luncheons for members of Washington press corps. Committees: Political Action. Publications: (1) Coalition Insider, monthly; (2) Washington Report, monthly; also publishes studies on key issues. Formerly: (1956) Mid-American Research Library.

## 10. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES

(U.S. Chamber)

Founded: 1912. Staff: 1400. National federation of business organizations and companies. Membership includes 4000 chambers of commerce and associations; over 200,000 business firms. U.S. chamber determines

and makes known to the government the recommendations of the business community on national issues and problems affecting the economy and the future of the country. Works to advance human progress through an economic, political, and social system based on individual freedom and initiative.

Informs, trains, equips, and encourages members to participate in policymaking at federal, state, and local levels and in legislative and political action at the national level. Produces weekly national televised programs, Biznet News Today, It's Your Business, and Ask Washington, and radio program, What's the Issue?, and operates the American Business Network (BizNet). Conducts continuing education for business executives, including business interacts with the federal government; and Institutes for Organization Management: courses to improve management skills of chamber of commerce and association executives. Major organizational units include: Association Department; Business-Government Affairs; Center for Leadership Development; Communications; Corporate Relations; Economic Policy; Human and Community Resources; International; Legislative Action and Political Affairs; Office of Chamber of Commerce Relations;

Resources and Environmental Quality; Small Business Center. Sponsors National Chamber Alliance for Politics. Maintains 28 committees, numerous task forces, and library of 10,000 volumes.

Publications: (1) The Business Advocate (newspaper), biweekly; (2) Business Action Network: Washington Watch, monthly; (3) International Business Review, monthly; (4) Nation's Business (magazine), monthly; (5) Analysis of Workers' Compensation Laws, annual; (6) Employee Benefits, annual; also publishes special reports, studies, and research papers; distributes films and slide presentations. Affiliated with: Citizen's Choice; National Chamber Foundation; National Chamber Litigation Center, Inc.; National Chamber Alliance for Politics. Convention/Meeting: annual - always Washington, DC. 1985 April 28-30; 1986 April 27-29.

11. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA (CWLA)

Founded: 1920. Affiliates: 400. Privately supported membership organization devoted to improvements of care and services for deprived, dependent, or neglected children, youth, and their families. Provides consultation; conducts research; maintains 3000 volume reference library and information service; conducts agency and community



surveys; develops standards for services; and administers special projects. Maintains placement service. Divisions: American Parents Committee (see separate entry); Center for Governmental Affairs; Florence Crittenton; Hecht Institute; Office of Regional Provincial and State Child Care Associations. Publications: (1) Child Welfare, bimonthly; (2) Directory, annual; also publishes books, monographs and newsletters on various topics. Absorbed: (1976) Florence Crittenton Association of America. Convention/Meeting: regional education conference.

12. CHRISTIAN VOICE (Conservative) (CV)

Founded: 1978. Members: 325,000. A major lobby organization representing the Christian community, including 41,000 ministers representing over 45 different denominations. Seeks to restore traditional Christian values throughout the country. Areas of interest include bringing back prayer in public schools, banning pornography from television and movies, and fighting against gay rights laws in Congress. Committees: Christian Voice Moral Government Fund. Publications: (1) Legislative Alert, monthly; (2) Congressional Report Card (a report on Senators' and Congressmen's voting records

on key moral issues, ERA and Federal spending control, annual.

13. COALITION FOR A NEW FOREIGN AND MILITARY POLICY

Founded: 1976. Members: 8000. Coalition of over 47 national religious civil peace, and public interest organizations. Purpose is to mobilize and focus nationwide grassroots pressure on Congress and the administration to develop a demilitarized, humanitarian, non-interventionist foreign policy for the U.S. Recent areas of activity include:

building nationwide support for congressional amendments to transfer funds from nuclear weapons programs to programs addressing pressing human needs, and to establish effective arms control and disarmament measures; promoting majority rule in South Africa and legislation cutting economic and military aid to repressive governments;

"normalizing" relations with Indochina. Provides information on budget priorities and foreign policy legislation in relations to ending U.S. intervention abroad; provides information about bills and amendments and sponsors and evaluation of "swing" members of Congress; organizes suggestions about Task Forces: Disarmament Working Groups; Human Rights Working Group. Publications: Coalition

Close Up (newsletter), quarterly; also publishes Action Alerts and Action Guides. Affiliated with: United States Student Association. Formed by merger of: Coalition on National Priorities and Military Policy (founded 1969) and Coalition for a New Foreign Policy (founded 1973 and formerly Coalition to Stop Funding the War).

14. COMMITTEE FOR THE SURVIVAL OF A FREE CONGRESS  
(conservative) (CSFC)

Founded: 1974. Staff: 6. Regional Groups: 10. Bipartisan political action committee dedicated to the election of "conservative, responsible, and realistic leaders" to the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. Activities include: identifying and recruiting conservative candidates; training candidates and personnel in the skills of campaigning; providing services in primary and general elections; providing financial support to campaigns; training newly elected members of Congress; and working with members on key legislative proposals. Publishes The Weyrich Report and pamphlets.

15. COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA (CWA)

Founded: 193. Members: 650,000. Locals: 910. AFL-CIO. Committees: Political Contributions.

Publications: (1) Newsletter, weekly; (2) News, monthly. Convention/Meeting: annual.

16. CONSERVATIVES AGAINST LIBERAL LEGISLATION (CALL)

Founded: 1977. Members: 42,000. Staff: 5.

Individuals and corporations interested in strong national defense, private enterprise, and less governmental affairs affecting national defense, economy and family life. Activities include lobbying, radio talk shows, speakers bureau, and informational service. Compiles statistics on congressional voting records and patterns.

Committees: Congressional Advisory Board.

Projects: Committee Opposing Legalized

Discrimination. Publications: (1) Call for Action (newsletter), monthly; (2) Congressional Directory, annual; (3) Congressional Scorecard, annual; also publishes Fact Sheets on Specific Issues.

Formerly: National Conservative Public Affairs Council.

17. CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA (CFA)

Founded: 1967. Members: 200. Staff: 10. Largest national consumer advocacy organization. National, regional, state, and local consumer groups; supporting groups; and state and local protection agencies. Objectives are: to promote the rights of

all consumers, in harmony with the general welfare; to stimulate and coordinate consumer programs and activities in such areas as product pricing, quality, servicing and guarantees, regulatory agencies, credit and insurance, cost of food, drugs, and medical care, safety, energy and natural resources development, and in other areas as determined by the board of directors; to act as clearinghouse for the exchange of information, ideas, and experiences; to engage in fact-finding and analysis of consumer issues, publish the results of such studies, provide a responsible and articulate voice for consumers, and conduct public information activities. Presents three annual awards: Distinguished Public Service Award; Distinguished Media Achievement Award; Distinguished Consumer Service Award. Committees: Antitrust; Communications; Credit; Education; Energy and Natural Resources; Environment; Food Health; Housing; Insurance; Needs of Low Income Consumers; Political Action; Taxation; Transportation. Divisions: Consumer Product Safety Network; State and Local Consumer Resource Center. Publications: (1) Consumer Lobby Reports, bi-weekly; (2) News, monthly; (3) Newsletter (for state and local

organizations), monthly; (4) Annual Voting Record on U.S. Congress; also prepares legislative fact sheets and testimony on consumer issues. Absorbed:

Electric Consumers Information Committee.

Convention/Meeting: annual consumer assembly.

18. COUNCIL FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY (Free Enterprise) (CCE)

Founded: 1977. Members: 1500. Staff: 6.

Business and individuals in the business community who espouse the concept of a free, competitive economy. Opposes government regulations, taxes, subsidies, protection, and barriers to competition of all types. Lobbies on behalf of the free market system to reduce existing regulations and prohibit new regulations, tariffs and subsidies. Also opposes government aid to ailing corporations, price supports, cartels, cargo preference legislation, subsidized credit and other economic intervention. Conducts research, sponsors conferences, and maintains speakers bureau. Publication: (1) Executive Commentary, semimonthly; (2) Competition (magazine), bimonthly; (3) News, bimonthly; (4) Congressional Watchdog Bulletin, irregular; also publishes Issue Analysis papers. Formerly: (1978)

Business Leaders Against Subsidies and Tariffs.

Convention/Meeting: annual.

19. FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION  
(FCNL)

Founded: 1943. Members: 8000. Staff: 15. An appointed committee of members of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) who feel a special concern for the political area of religious life; functions autonomously, but seeks to "keep responsive to concerns of Quakers generally."

Informs Friends on issues and events in Washington, DC; encourages expression of individual views through letters and calls to legislators and public officials. Compiles statistics. Interviews members of Congress and other government officials; arranges for testimony before congressional committees.

Areas of concern include American Indians, human rights, basic human needs, health care, refugees, militarism and disarmament, U.S. foreign policy, and U.N. affairs. Maintains collection of current materials and documents on war and peace and human rights. Publications: (1) Washington Newsletter, 11/year; (2) Indian Report, 3-4/year; (3) Action Bulletins, irregular; also publishes papers on topics of concern to Friends and booklets on working

in politics and writing letters to the editor.

Convention/Meeting: annual.

20. GENERAL CONTRACTORS OF AMERICA, ASSOCIATED  
(Construction) (AC)

Founded: 1918. Members: 8500. Staff: 95. Local

Groups: 112. General contractors engaged in

construction (factories, office buildings,

warehouses, highways, bridges, dams, railroads, and

municipal utilities). Conducts J.D. Marshall

Training Program and special conferences and

seminars designed specifically for construction

firms. Makes quarterly compilation of statistics on

job accidents reported

by member firms. Bestows annual awards for safety

and "Build America" awards for innovative and

outstanding achievements by general contractors.

Maintains J.L. Allhands Library, a collection of

books, booklets, and brochures on the construction

industry and construction firms. Maintains 65

committees, including joint cooperative committees

with other associations and liaison committees with

federal agencies. Divisions: Building; Education;

Equal Employment; Heavy-Industrial; Highway;

Information; International Construction; Labor;



Legislative; Manpower and Training; Municipal Utilities; Open Shop; Research; Safety.

21. INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA  
(IPPA)

Founded: 1921. Members: 7400. Staff: 37.

Independent of oil and gas operators, land and royalty owners, and others (suppliers, drilling contractors, bankers, oil attorneys, trucking contractors, rig building contractors) interested in the production of crude oil and natural gas. To represent small oil and natural gas producers in legislative and regulatory areas at the federal level. Maintains speakers bureau. Committees: Cost Study; Crude Oil; Economic Policy;

Environmental and Safety; Natural Gas; Oil Recovery; Public Lands; Supply and Demand; Tax. Publications:

(1) Petroleum Independent, bimonthly; (2) The Oil Producing Industry in Your State, annual.

Convention/Meeting: annual - always October. 1984 Oct. 21-23, San Diego, CA; 1985. Oct. 27-29, San Antonio, TX.

22. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,  
CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA  
(IBT)

Founded: 1903. Members: 2,000,000. Locals: 704.

Independent Publications: International Teamster, quarterly. Convention/Meeting: quinquennial - next 1986.

23. INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE  
AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF  
AMERICA (UAW)

Founded: 1935. Members: 1,100,000. Locals: 1540.  
AFL-CIO. Publications: (1) Ammo (magazine), monthly;  
(2) Solidarity (newspaper) monthly; (3) skill,  
quarterly. Formerly: (1962) International Union,  
United Automobile, Aircraft, and Agricultural  
Implement Workers of America. Convention/Meeting:  
triennial - next 1986.

24. INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF  
AMERICA (UMWA)

Founded: 1890. Members: 280,000. Independent.  
Publications: Journal, semimonthly.  
Convention/Meeting: quadrennial.

25. LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS (LCCR)

Founded: 1950. Members: 165. Coalition of  
national organizations (civil rights, labor, Asian  
and Hispanic Americans, religious, civic, fraternal,  
women, the aged, and handicapped) working to promote  
passage of civil rights, social and economic  
legislation, and enforcement of laws already on the

books. Publishes LCCR Memo; has recently released studies by six scholars who examined President Reagan's tax and budget recommendations in areas including housing, elementary and secondary education, social welfare, Indian programs, and tax cuts. Bestows Hubert H. Humphrey Award.

Committees: Compliance and Enforcement; Education; Employment; Federal Regulatory Agencies; Health and Welfare; Housing; Legislative; Veteran's Affairs; Women's Rights. Formerly: Civil Rights Mobilization. Convention/Meeting: annual board meeting - always winter, Washington, DC.

26. LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS (Environment)  
(LCV)

Founded: 1970. A national nonpartisan campaign committee that supports environmentalists running in House, Senate and gubernatorial elections. League contributes to campaigns with high environmental stakes. Selects outstanding candidates facing close races and raises money and manpower for their campaigns. Publications: How Congress Voted on Energy and the Environment, annual; also publishes Presidential Profiles and a report and support slate every congressional election year.

## 27. LIBERTY LOBBY (Conservative) (LL)

Founded: 1955. Members: 30,000. Staff: 50.

"Nationalists and populists interested in political action in behalf of 99 issues which are pro-individual liberty and pro-patriotic." Supports free gold market, lower taxes, fewer farm controls, less government spending, protective immigration laws, repeal of the Seventeenth and Twenty-Fifth Amendments, separation of church and state, the right to keep and bear arms, states' rights, an end to forced busing and withdrawal from the United Nations. Opposes federal aid to education, foreign aid, "unfair" foreign competition, the E.R.A., revenue sharing, government in business, monopoly in business or labor, recognition of Red China, civil rights laws, socialized medicine, peacetime drafts, tax-supported housing and world government. Airs daily radio broadcast, "This is Liberty Lobby." Publications: The Spotlight, weekly; also publishes Congressional Handbook and Liberty Ledger. Absorbed: Americans for National Security. Convention/Meeting: irregular.

28. NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF SENIOR CITIZENS (Aging)  
(NASC)

Founded: 1974. Members: 770,000. Staff: 9.

Regional Groups: 2. State Groups: 5. Persons advocating the advancement of senior Americans through sound fiscal policy and through belief in the American system of individuality and personal freedom. Purpose is to inform the membership and the American public of the needs of senior citizens and of the programs and policies being carried out by the government and other specified groups. Represents the views of senior Americans before Congress and state legislatures. Maintains library for political and general research and Golden Age Hall of Fame honoring individuals for outstanding service to the senior community. Compiles statistics. Advisory Council Chairs: Adult Education; Budgeting; Consumerism; Protection; Family Life; Farm and Rural Life; Gerontology; Health Care; Housing; Nursing Homes; Nutrition; Organized Labor; Pension and Retirement Benefits; Planning and Zoning; Political Action; Productivity; Psychologist on Aging; Retirement Centers; Rural Transportation; Veterans Affairs; Volunteerism; Welfare Publications: (1) Senior Guardian, monthly; (2) Our Age, bimonthly. Convention/Meeting: biennial - next 1986.

29. NATIONAL ASSOCIATED BUSINESSMEN (dissolved)

## 30. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LIFE UNDERWRITERS

(Insurance) (NALU)

Founded: 1890. Members: 1027. Staff: 105.

Federation of state (50) and local (1977)

associations representing 128,000 life insurance agents, general agents, and managers. Associate members are home office insurance agents, general agents, and managers. Associate members are home officials of life companies, life insurance teachers, journalists, and others. Objectives are: to support and maintain the principles of legal reserve life insurance and health insurance; to promote high ethical standards; to inform the public, render community service, and promote public goodwill. Sponsors educational and public service programs. Presents annual awards. Committees: Associations; Company Field Relations; Education; Federal Law and Legislation; Field Practice; Group Insurance; Health Insurance; Home Service; Liaison with Trade and Professional Organizations; Life Underwriters Political Action; Multiline; Planning and Development; Public Relations; Public Service; Recognition of Quality and Achievement; State/Company Field Communications; State Law and Legislation. Departments: Association Services;

Law and Government Affairs; Public Relations; Public Service; Communications; State Law and Legislation.

Departments: Association Services; Law and Government Affairs; Public Relations. Publications: (1) Life Association News, monthly; (2) Wheelhorse Newsletter, monthly; (3) Directory, annual.

Affiliated with: Association for Advanced Life Underwriting; General Agents and Managers Conference of NALU; Women Life Underwriters Conference.

Convention/Meeting: annual - always September.

1984 Sept. 9-13, Kansas City, MO; 1985 Sept. 8-12, Anaheim, CA; 1986 Sept. 7-11, New Orleans, LA; 1987 Sept. 13-17, Orlando, FL.

31. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS (NASW).

Founded: 1955. Members: 95,000. Staff: 125.

State Groups: 55. Regular members are persons who hold a minimum of a baccalaureate degree in social work. Associate members are persons engaged in social work who have a baccalaureate degree in another field. Student members are persons enrolled in accredited (by the Council on Social Work Education) graduate or undergraduate social work programs. Purpose is to create professional standards for social work practice, advocate sound public social policies through political and

legislative action, and provide a wide range of membership services including continuing education opportunities and an extensive professional publications program. Maintains a library of 4000 volumes. Presents National Public Citizen of the Year and National Social Worker of the Year Awards. Administrative Units: Academy of Certified Social Workers; Publications Editorial Office. Committees: Political Action for Candidate Election for Human Services. Publications: (1) News, monthly (except August and December); (2) Social Work, bimonthly; (3) Health and Social Work, quarterly; (4) Practice Digest, quarterly, (4) Social Work in Education, quarterly; (6) Social Work Research and Abstracts, quarterly; (7) Register of Clinical Social Workers, annual; also publishes Encyclopedia of Social Work, Director of Professional Social Workers and various books and pamphlets. Formed by merger of: American Association of Group Workers; American Association of Medical Social Workers; Association for the Study of Community Organization; National Association of School Social Workers; Social Work Research Group. Convention/Meeting: triennial delegate assembly - 1984 Sept. 7-10, Washington, DC. Also holds biennial symposium - 1985 November, New Orleans, LA.



## 32. NATIONAL CHRISTIAN ACTION COALITION

(Conservative) (NCAA)

Founded: 1977. Members: 62,000. Staff. 6.

Churches and Christian school administrators; local and state "good government" groups; interested individuals. Works for or against legislation in accordance with its stances of social issues, defense, and economic policy. Supports capital punishment, world peace, a balanced federal budget, a tuition tax credit for parents enrolling their children in private schools, and passage of a Human Life Amendment. Opposes abortion, gun control, and passage of the Equal Rights Amendment. Sponsors Christian Education and Research Foundation (research arm), Christian Voters' Victory Fund (political action committee), and New Century Foundation (research arm), which works to elect and support "pro-family" congressional candidates. Publications: (1) Focus on Freedom, semimonthly; (2) Alert (newsletter), monthly; (3) Family Issues Voting Index, annual; also publishes The Christian's Political Action Manual and various political training materials. Formerly: (1979) Christian School Action.

33. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF SENIOR CITIZENS (Aging)  
(NCSC)

Founded: 1961. Members: 4,000,000. Staff: 120.

Organization of 4000 autonomous senior citizens clubs, associations, councils and other groups with a combined membership of over 4,000,000 persons.

Educational and action group which supports Medicare, increased social security, improved recreational, educational and health programs, increased voluntary service programs, reduced costs on drugs, better housing, and other programs to aid senior citizens. Sponsors mass rallies, educational workshops and leadership training institutes; provides speakers on Medicare and other issues concerning senior citizens; helps organize and develop programs for local and state groups.

Encourages participation in social and political action activities; does not endorse candidates for political office but works on behalf of issues.

Distributes films, news mats, special reports and other materials. Maintains library of books and collection of materials on Medicare and other programs. Sponsors National Senior Citizens

Education and Research Center. Committees: Nursing Home Standards. Publications: Senior Citizens

News, monthly. Formerly: National Council of Senior Citizens for Health Care Through Social Security. Convention/Meeting: annual - always June or July.

34. NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION (Teachers) (NEA)

Founded: 1957. Members: 1,600,800. Staff: 600.

State Groups: 53. Local Groups: 10,000.

Professional organization and union of elementary and secondary school teachers, college and university professors, administrators, principals, counselors and others concerned with education.

Committees: Affiliate Relationships; Higher Education; Human Relations; Instruction and Professional Development; Political Affairs;

Research. Publications: (1) NEA Today, 8/year; (2) Handbook, annual; (3) Today's Education, annual.

Absorbed (1966) American Teachers Association;

(1981) NEA Higher Education Council (founded 1974 and superceded the combined activities of National Association of College and University

Administrators, founded 1969; National Society of Professors, founded 1967); (1982) Student National Education Association (formerly, 1957), National Association of Future Teachers of America-College

Section). Formerly: (1870) National Teachers

Association. Convention/Meeting: annual - 1984  
Washington, DC.

35. NATIONAL FARMERS ORGANIZATION (NFO)

Founded: 1955. Staff: 700. Producers of farm commodities. Non-partisan organization of farmers who seek to obtain the cost of production plus reasonable profits under long-term contracts for the sale of farm commodities through collective bargaining. Members currently marketing farm products under negotiated contracts with buyers, processors and exporters. Seeks continued improvement in contracts. Maintains speakers bureau. Divisions: Cattle (Slaughter and Feeder); Dairy; Grain; Hog; Sheep; Specialty Crop. Publications: Reporter monthly. Convention/Meetings: annual - 1984 - Dec. 4-6, Las Vegas, NV; 1985 Nashville, TN; 1986 Des Moines, IA.

36. FARMERS' EDUCATIONAL AND COOPERATIVE UNION OF AMERICA (FECUA)

Founded: 1902. Members: 300,000. Staff: 30. Local Groups: 3000. Farm families in 44 states interested in general agricultural welfare. Carries on educational, cooperative, and legislative activities. To represent farm families' interests and gain for them a more equitable share of the

national income; to help farm families develop self-help institutions such as cooperatives.

Publications: Washington Newsletter, monthly.

Convention/Meeting: annual - 1985 Mar. 3-6, Phoenix, AZ; 1986 Mar. 2-5, Spokane, WA; 1987 Mar. 1-4, Ft. Worth, TX; 1988 Mar. 6-9, Albuquerque, NM.

37. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS  
(NFIB)

Founded: 1943. Members: 560,000. Staff: 197.

Field Staff: 571. Independent business and professional people. Presents opinions of small business to state and national legislative bodies. Members vote by ballot on issues; ballots are tabulated and results forwarded to Congress.

Conducts surveys at the state level with area directors and government affairs representatives working with state legislatures. Maintains legislative, research, and public affairs office in Washington, DC. Publications: The Mandate (with ballots for membership voting), 8/year; also prepares and disseminates weekly press releases to daily papers, trade associations, and chambers of commerce nationwide, and monthly materials to all high schools, colleges, and universities throughout

the country. Convention/Meeting: quadrennial - 1987 Washington, DC.

38. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES (Municipal) (NLC)

Founded: 1924. Members: 1175. Staff 53.

Federation of 49 state leagues of 1126 cities.

Develops and pursues a national municipal policy, which can meet the future needs of cities and help cities solve critical problems they have in common.

Represents municipalities with Congress and federal agencies. Offers training, technical assistance,

and information to municipal officials to help them improve the quality of local government.

Sponsors the National League of Cities Institute.

Maintains 20,000 volume library. Committees:

Community and Economic Development; Energy,

Environmental and Natural Resources; Administrative and Intergovernmental Relations; Human Development;

Transportation and Communications. Publications:

(1) Nation's Cities Weekly; (2) Urban Affairs

Abstracts, weekly (with semiannual and annual cumulations); (3) Director of Local Officials,

semiannual; (4) National Municipal Policy, annual.

Formerly: American Municipal Association.

Convention/Meeting: annual - 1984 Nov. 24-28,

Indianapolis, IN; 1985 Dec. 7-11, Seattle, WA; 1986

Nov. 29-Dec. 3, San Antonio, TX; 1987 Dec. 5-9, Philadelphia, PA.

39. NATIONAL SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS  
(Engineering) (NSPE)

Founded: 1934. Members: 80,000. Staff: 75.

State Groups: 54. Local Groups: 525.

Professional engineers and engineers in training in all fields registered in accordance with the laws of state or territories of the United States, or provinces of Canada; qualified graduate engineers, student members and registered land surveyors.

Concerned with social, professional, ethical, and economic considerations of engineering as a profession; encompasses programs in public relations, employment practices, ethical considerations, education and career guidance.

Monitors legislative and regulatory actions of interest to the engineering profession. Committees:

Political Action. Departments: Education and

Preparation; Intersociety and Interprofessional

Relations; Legal and Government; Professional

Engineers in Industry; Professional Engineers in

Private Practice; Professional Practice;

Professional Qualification and Ethics; Public

Relations; Society Development. Publications: (1)

Engineering Times, monthly; (2) Professional Engineer, quarterly; also publishes reports and pamphlets. Absorbed: (1966) American Association of Engineers. Convention/Meeting: semiannual - always January and July. 1985 Jan. 28-Feb. 2, Albuquerque, NM and July 15-20, Buffalo, NY; 1986 Jan. 13-18, Ft. Worth, TX and July 14-19, Indianapolis, IN; 1987 Jan. 19-24, Orlando, FL and July 13-18, Denver, CO.

40. NATIONAL TAXPAYERS UNION (NTU)

Founded: 1969. Members: 120,000. Seeks to: reduce government spending; cut taxes; protect the rights of taxpayers. Claims to have helped generate federal budget cuts of over 120 billion dollars. Activities include research programs and an intense lobbying campaign in Washington, DC. Has been a leader in the fights against government ventures such as: the SST; guaranteed income; congressional and bureaucratic pay raises; federal subsidies of all kinds; foreign aid; the Space Shuttle; the B-1 bomber; plutonium reactors; national health insurance. Is working for a balanced Federal Budget Amendment; federal pension reform; reduction of capital gains and personal income tax; social security reform. Has worked for airline



deregulation; indexing of federal income tax; California's Proposition 13; Massachusetts Proposition 2½; and other state tax cutting initiatives. Conducts annual voting study of congressmen and senators, rating their votes on spending and tax issues and presenting awards for best and worst records. Is organizing state NTU councils to monitor state legislatures and work for tax and spending reductions on the state and local levels. Maintains library of books periodicals, hearings and information on federal, state, and local tax and spending issues. Committees: Balance the Budget. Publications: (1) Dollars and Sense, monthly; (2) Tax Savings Report, monthly; also publishes Cut Local Taxes, Congressional Spending Analysis, and Taxpayer's Action Guide.

41. NATIONAL WOMEN'S POLITICAL CAUCUS (Women's Rights) (NWPC)

Founded: 1971. Members: 75,000. Staff: 15. Local Groups: 300. "Anyone with a sincere interest in getting women more political clout." In seeking to gain an equal voice and place for women in the political process, the multipartisan caucus is organized at local, state, and national levels to support women candidates for elective and appointive

political offices. Raises women's issues in every election and is pressing to see that women hold policymaking positions in the political parties. Has lobbied in state legislatures to pass the Equal Rights Amendment, to protect women's rights to reproductive freedom, and to secure comparable worth on the job. Works for affirmative action within the major political parties. Compiles statistics.

Committees: Campaign Support; Leadership Development Education and Research Fund.

Publications: Women's Political Times, bimonthly.

Convention/Meeting: biennial - 1985 Atlanta, GA.

42. PUBLIC CITIZEN (Consumer) (PC)

Founded: 1971. Supporters: 200,000. Formed by Ralph Nader to support the work of citizen advocates. Areas of focus include: repealing government subsidies; alleviating secrecy between the public and Nuclear Regulatory Commission; opposing waste disposal; promoting conservation and renewable energy. Acquires contributions through direct mail, paid subscriptions, and purchases of publications and reports. Contributions have been used to support projects relating to citizen and community action. Projects supported by Public Citizen include: Tax Reform Research Group; Public

Citizen Litigation Group; Health Research Group; Critical Mass Energy Project; and Congress Watch (see separate entries). Works to provide effective citizen advocacy on the most pressing problems at the least cost by using the services of volunteers, keeping expenses as low as possible, and hiring dedicated professionals who are willing to work long hours for modest salaries. Publications: (1) Public Citizen (magazine), 4/year; (2) Report, annual; also publishes Critical Mass Bulletins, People and Taxes, The Congress Watcher, and books and reports.

43. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA (UBC)

Founded: 1881. Members: 800,000. Locals: 2047. AFL-CIO. Committees: Carpenters' Legislative Improvement. Publications: The Carpenter, monthly. Absorbed: (1979) Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers' International Union. Convention/Meeting: quinquennial - next 1986.

44. UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION (UFCWIU)

Founded: 1979. Members: 1,300,000. Locals: 900. AFL-CIO. Publications: Action, 8/year. Absorbed: (1981) Barbers, Beauticians and Allied Industries

International Association (1983) Insurance Workers International Union. Formed by merger of: Retail Clerks International Union (founded 1888 and formerly Retail Clerks International Association; absorbed Boot and Shoe Workers Union in 1979) and Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America (founded 1897; absorbed United Packinghouse Food and Allied Workers, formerly United Packinghouse Workers of America, in 1968).  
Convention/Meeting: quadrennial - next 1987.

45. THE WOMAN ACTIVIST (Women) (TWA)

Founded: 1975. Nonprofit consulting firm specializing in services on issues of political concern to women. Activities include research, program development, issue analysis, report writing, and statistics compilation. Rates members of Congress on women's issues and compares voting patterns of congressmen and congresswomen on civil and social rights issues. Maintains library of feminist books and information. Publications: The Woman Activist, 10/year; also publishes Guide to Precinct Politics, Guide to Lobbying, and Guide for Women Candidates.

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B  
RATING REQUEST LETTER

This is a copy of the letter sent to various PACs in order to solicit their ratings.

May 1983

Dear \_\_\_\_\_:

Numerous organizations, including \_\_\_\_\_, have chosen to assist their members in making voting decisions by issuing ratings of the legislative performance of the members of Congress.

Legislative ratings and the growth of political action committees represent two of the more interesting trends in electoral politics of the last ten years. While the PACs have received much attention from the popular and academic journals, to date very little attention has been given to developing information about ratings.

It is my intention, as a researcher at the School of Management of the University of Massachusetts, to begin a preliminary analysis of this newly popular political tool.

You could be of great assistance to this project by sending me copies of the ratings issued by \_\_\_\_\_ since 1977.

Although the strength of my academic research is increased when materials can be attributed to their source, the desire of some organizations to keep their contributions anonymous is understood and will be respected. Should you desire to have the ratings remain anonymous, please mark the lower left hand corner of your return envelope with "ANON."

## Appendix B (continued)

Upon completion of this study, I shall be happy to send you a condensed version of the results. Should you wish a copy of the results, please mark the lower left hand corner of your return envelope with "COPY."

It is my hope that your recognition of the intrinsic interest of ratings as a political tool as well as a piquing of your personal interest in the results of this research will encourage you to forward \_\_\_\_\_ ratings from 1977 forward.

Thank you for your time and efforts.

Sincerely,

C.N Hetzner III

APPENDIX C



APPENDIX C  
DELETION OF OBSERVATIONS

The following cases were deleted from the merged file because of the missing values that resulted from out of the ordinary circumstances.

FEC CODE	NAME	REASON
H8IL10016	John Edward Porter	Replaced Mikva.
H6IL10028	Abner J. Mikva	Resigned to become U.S. Court of Appeals judge 9/28/79.
H6IL16026	John B. Anderson	Votes missed due to presidential campaign.
H0LA03018	W.J. Tauzin	Replaced Treen 5/22/80.
H6MA08042	Thomas O'Neill	Speaker of the House only votes to break ties.
H6MD06022	Goodloe E. Byron	Unknown.
H6MI13023	Charles C. Diggs, Jr.	Resigned 6/3/80.
H6NM02028	Harold Runnels	Died 8/5/80.
H6PA11016	Daniel Flood	Resigned 1/31/80.
H0PA11035	Raphael Musto	Replaced Flood 4/15/80.
H0WV03029	John Hutchinson	Replaced Slack 6/10/80.

## APPENDIX C (continued)

H6WV03034	John M. Slack	Died 3/7/80.
S6ME00019	Edmund Muskie	Resigned to become Secretary of State 5/12/80.
S2ME00026	George Mitchell	Replaced Sen. Muskie 5/19/80
S4VT0017	Patrick Leahy	Key punch errors.
	Sen. William Proxmire (Wisconsin)	Not contained on <u>The PAC Directory</u> tape

APPENDIX D

APPENDIX D  
MISSING VALUE SUBSTITUTIONS

A final check for missing data revealed 9 occurrences of missing values. For these, the arithmetic mean of the ratings of the particular organization was inserted. Those nine cases are:

FEC CODE	NAME	VARIABLE	VALUE
H6MI04048	David Stockman	NAB63	49
H6MI03073	Howard Wolpe	CUVF63	51
H6MT02028	Pat Williams	NAB63	49
H6OH11020	William J. Stanton	NASC61	52
H8PA01039	Michael Myers	CFA62	43
H8PA01039	Michael Myers	PAR62	46
S4AR00020	Dale Bumpers	NASC61	52
S8AR00047	David H. Pryor	NASC61	52
S6MA00015	Edward M. Kennedy	NASC62	48

APPENDIX E

## APPENDIX E

The following are the summary statistics of the complete set of raters.

TABLE 14

SIMPLE STATISTICS OF THE  
RATINGS FOR THE FULL SAMPLE

<u>VAR</u>	<u>LABEL</u>	<u>House of Representatives</u>						<u>Senate</u>		
		<u>MEAN</u>	<u>STD DEV</u>	<u>MEDIAN</u>	<u>RANGE</u>	<u>MEAN</u>	<u>STD DEV</u>	<u>MEDIAN</u>	<u>RANGE</u>	
IPAA63	Independent Petroleum Assoc Amer	47.08	39.96	44	0-100	40.16	38.59	39	0-100	
NAB63	Nat'l Assoc Businessmen	48.96	37.23	50	0-100	49.25	32.22	45	0-100	
ASC63	American Security Council	54.6	37.00	56	0-100	54.38	34.54	60	0-100	
NALU63	Nat'l Assoc Life Underwriters	58.07	19.17	60	14-100	56.14	21.26	57	0-100	
CHVC63X	Christian Voice	49.38	31.87	47	0-100	38.81	32.42	34.5	0-100	
NCAC63	Nat'l Christian Action Coalition	53.48	33.63	55	0-100	37.18	33.06	30	0-100	
NSPE63	Nat'l Society of Professional Engineers	60.08	35.35	67	0-100	51.64	31.26	60	0-100	
LCCR63	Leadership Conference on Civil Rights	48.34	38.86	57	0-100	57.52	29.42	63	0-100	
BUSOR63	An Org of Manufacturers	54.59	25.77	60	0-100	50.00	33.64	40	0-100	
NFIB63	Nat'l Feder Indepen Businessmen	61.96	24.58	68	8-100	56.16	19.66	58	22-89	
ACLU63	Amer Civil Liberties Union	46.26	29.40	40	0-100	50.5	25.05	48.5	0-97	
CONSR63	Conservatives Agnst Liberal Legis	51.90	28.70	47	0-100	43.66	29.49	37	0-100	
WPC63	Nat'l Womens Political Caucus	45.76	34.08	48	0-100	56.30	32.13	58	0-100	
TMSTR63	Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters	59.32	26.77	64	0-100	52.92	33.38	54.5	0-100	
AFT63	American Feder Teachers	50.37	29.92	47	0-100	51.81	18.24	50	18-83	

Table 14 (continued)

VAR	LABEL	House of Representatives					Senate				
		MEAN	STD DEV	MEDIAN	RANGE	MEAN	STD DEV	MEDIAN	RANGE		
CARP63	United Bro of Carpenters	56.72	26.30	61	0-100	56.94	22.90	61	0-100		
NEA63	Nat'l Education Assoc	49.37	31.90	50	0-100	57.63	18.17	56	22-100		
LCV63X	League of Conservation Voters	47.00	25.68	41.5	4-985	45.16	25.75	44	0-96		
ACA63X	Amer for Constitutional Action	45.49	31.20	37.5	2.5-100	43.65	29.23	40.25	0-100		
ACU63X	American Conservative Union	43.86	32.11	37	0-100	41.81	31.23	34.75	1.5-100		
ADA63X	Amers for Democratic Action	43.07	31.38	38	0-100	41.31	23.83	43	2.5-86.5		
AFLCIO3X	Amer Federation of Labor	51.49	30.31	54	5-100	52.57	31.83	52.75	2.5-100		
AFSCME63X	Amer Feder State Cnty Munic Wrkrs	49.68	29.83	45	0-100	59.90	23.09	61.25	12.5-100		
CCE63X	Council for Competitive Economy	40.12	14.10	36.5	14-94.5	45.01	17.61	61.5	15.5-84.5		
CFA63X	Consumer Feder of America	40.55	28.62	36	0-98	36.22	25.41	31.75	0-89.5		
CNFTP63X	Coalition for New For/Mil Policy	44.67	33.07	40	0-100	38.95	30.34	31.75	0-100		
COCUS63X	Chamber of Commerce of U.S.	60.66	21.21	62.5	21-100	55.58	23.86	54	14-97		
CFSC63X	Comm Survival Free Congress	47.98	23.59	44	13-95.5	47.32	22.59	43.5	12.5-97		
CWA63X	Communication Wrkrs of Amer	48.96	38.41	48.5	0-100	51.03	33.96	51	0-100		
FNCL63X	Friends Comm on Nat'l Legis	48.40	33.26	50	0-100	43.30	32.58	58	0-100		



Table 14 (continued)

VAR	LABEL	House of Representatives					Senate				
		MEAN	STD DEV	MEDIAN	RANGE	MEAN	STD DEV	MEDIAN	RANGE		
GNCON63X	Assoc General Contractors	46.48	28.86	45	0-100	55.72	26.74	57.75	7-100		
IFCW63X	Int'l Food & Comm Wrkrs	51.61	36.74	53.5	0-100	51.53	33.94	49.5	0-100		
NASC63X	Nat'l Alliance Senior Citizens	51.48	36.60	50	0-100	45.03	34.52	40	0-100		
NFO63X	Nat'l Farm Organization	71.47	14.29	73	21-100	68.13	19.80	73.5	11-100		
NFU63X	Nat'l Farmers Union	66.34	17.78	70.5	9.5-9.7	62.31	20.13	66.5	16-97.5		
NTU63X	Nat'l Taxpayers Union	36.05	18.05	32	10.5-92.5	37.68	16.01	34.5	15.5-80		
PAR63X	Child Welfare League	50.58	29.33	50.5	6.5-100	55.95	26.44	56.5	0-100		
PCCW63X	Public Citz Congress Watch	43.40	23.41	37.5	8-93.5	41.30	18.93	39	11-81.5		
SCIT63X	Nat'l Council Senior Citizens	50.35	33.91	49.5	0-100	58.59	30.49	61.5	5-100		
SOCWK63X	Nat'l Assoc Social Workers	48.95	32.35	47	0-100	51.91	33.23	52.75	5-100		
UAW63X	United Autoworkers	50.97	36.38	50	0-100	51.78	34.80	51	0-100		
LCT63X	Nat'l League of Cities	51.29	26.78	50	0-100	52.72	30.22	60	0-100		
LIBLB63X	Liberty Lobby	41.20	33.35	30	0-100	30.73	17.67	20	0-80		
UMW63X	United Mineworkers	46.90	36.48	44	0-100	51.32	26.86	50	0-100		
WOMAC63X	Womans Activist	49.76	37.07	50	0-100	60.96	29.67	60	0-100		

Table 14 (continued)

<u>VAR</u>	<u>LABEL</u>	<u>House of Representatives</u>				<u>Senate</u>			
		<u>MEAN</u>	<u>STD DEV</u>	<u>MEDIAN</u>	<u>RANGE</u>	<u>MEAN</u>	<u>STD DEV</u>	<u>MEDIAN</u>	<u>RANGE</u>
ACTWV63X	Amal Clothing & Textile Wrkrs	50.17	30.49	50	0-100	53.72	38.52	60	0-100
CNCTY63X	Congress on Nation's Cities	61.44	28.82	63	0-100	59.82	25.34	57	10-100

TABLE 15

INTERQUARTILE POINTS OF THE  
RATINGS FOR THE FULL SAMPLE

VAR	LABEL	Interquartile Points			
		House		Senate	
		1st %	3rd %	1st %	3rd %
IPAA63	Independent Petroleum Assoc Amer	0.00	89.00	10.00	89.75
NAB63	Nat'l Assoc Businessmen	9.00	89.00	22.75	75.00
ASC63	American Security Council	20.00	90.00	20.50	85.25
NALU63	Nat'l Assoc Life Underwriters	41.50	76.00	37.00	70.00
CHVC63X	Christian Voice	19.00	91.00	7.25	66
NCAG63	Nat'l Christian Action Coalition	22.00	88.00	10.00	70.00
NSPE63	Nat'l Society of Professional Engineers	25.00	100.00	20.00	80.00
LCCR63	Leadership Conference on Civil Rights	0.00	86.00	38.00	75.00
BUSOR63	An Org of Manufacturers	33.00	78.00	20.50	83.00
NFIB63	Nat'l Feder Indepen Businessmen	39.00	84.00	39.00	72.00
ACLU63	Amer Civil Liberties Union	20.00	73.00	27.75	73.00
CONSER63	Conservatives Against Liberal Legis	25.00	80.50	18.75	66.50
WPC63	Nat'l Women's Political Caucus	16.00	76.00	32.00	84.00
TNSTR63	Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters	33.00	82.00	18.00	85.75
AFT63	Amer Feder Teachers	20.50	80.00	36.00	67.00

Table 15 (continued)

VAR	LABEL	Interquartile Points					
		House			Senate		
		1st q%	3rd q%	1st q%	3rd q%	1st q%	3rd q%
CARP63	United Bro of Carpenters	31.00	80.50	41.25	72.75		
NEA63	Nat'l Education Assoc	17.00	75.00	44.00	71.00		
LCV63X	League of Conservation Voters	25.50	70.75	25.50	70.00		
ACA63X	Amers for Constitutional Action	15.00	75.50	15.37	69.13		
ACU63X	American Conservative Union	11.50	75.50	13.00	67.00		
ADA63X	Amers for Democratic Action	13.50	73.00	19.13	60.00		
AFLCIO3X	Amer Federation of Labor	20.75	81.00	22.00	85.25		
AFSCME63X	Amer Feder State Cnty Munic Wrkrs	23.00	78.50	37.75	81.00		
CCE63X	Council for Competitive Economy	28.50	49.50	31.37	61.50		
CFA63X	Consumer Feder of America	12.50	67.00	12.25	53.63		
CNFMP63X	Coalit for New Foreign/Military Policy	14.25	71.25	14.00	64.00		
COCUS63X	Chamber of Commerce of U.S.	40.00	81.50	33.13	79.13		
CSFC63X	Comm Survival Free Congress	26.25	70.25	26.25	65.25		
CKA63X	Communication Wrkrs of Amer	6.00	89.00	15.63	86.50		
FCNL63X	Friends Comm on Nat'l Legis	14.00	79.00	12.00	75.50		

Table 15 (continued)

	Interquartile Points					
	House			Senate		
	1st q%	3rd q%		1st q%	3rd q%	
GNCON63X Assoc General Contractors	25.00	75.00		33.50	78.50	
IFCW63X Int'l Food & Comm Wrkrs	13.50	89.75		21.37	85.87	
NASC63X Nat'l Alliance Senior Citizens	15.00	90.00		11.50	79.50	
NFO63X Nat'l Farm Organization	63.50	82.25		54.25	83.50	
NFU63X Nat'l Farmers Union	55.25	80.00		49.00	79.50	
NTU63X Nat'l Taxpayers Union	19.50	51.75		25.50	46.87	
PAR63X Child Welfare League	25.00	75.50		33.00	80.00	
PCCW63X Public City Congress Watch	21.25	63.50		25.00	56.00	
SCIT63X Nat'l Council Senior Citizens	18.50	84.50		26.75	87.00	
SOCWK63X Nat'l Assoc Social Workers	18.00	79.00		23.13	83.50	
UAW63X United Autoworkers	14.25	87.50		16.37	87.13	
LCTY63X Nat'l League of Cities	29.00	71.00		25.00	75.00	
LIBIB63X Liberty Lobby	10.00	70.00		20.00	50.00	
UMW63X United Mineworkers	10.00	80.00		27.00	74.50	
WOMAC63X Womans Activist	20.00	80.00		40.00	80.00	

Table 15 (continued)

	<u>Interquartile Points</u>			
	<u>House</u>		<u>Senate</u>	
	<u>1st q%</u>	<u>3rd q%</u>	<u>1st q%</u>	<u>3rd q%</u>
ACTWU63X Amal Clothing & Textile Wrkrs	20.00	80.00	20.00	100.00
CNCTY63X Congress on Nation's Cities	37.00	87.00	40.00	86.00

APPENDIX F

## APPENDIX F

The following list contains the acronyms, FEC categories and names of the organizations that constitute the sample for the first hypothesis.

<u>Symbol</u>	<u>FEC Categories</u>	<u>Name</u>
ACA	Uncon	Americans for Constitutional Action
ACTWV	Labor	Amal. Clothing & Textile Workers
ACUX	T/M/H	American Conservative Union
ADAX	Uncon	Americans for Democratic Action
AFLCIX	Labor	Amer. Federation of Labor
AFSCMX	Labor	Amer. Fed. State, Cnty., Munic. Wrkrs
AFT	Labor	Amer. Fed. of Teachers
CARP	Labor	United Bro. of Carpenters
CFAX	T/M/H	Consumer Fed. of America
CHVC	Uncon	Christian Voice
COCUSX	T/M/H	Chamber of Commerce
CSFCX	Uncon	Comm. Survival of a Free Cong.
CWAX	Labor	Communication Workers of Amer.
GNCONX	Trade	Assoc. General Contractors
IFCWX	Labor	Int'l. Food and Commercial Workers
LCVX	Trade	League of Conservation Voters
NALU	Trade	Nat'l. Assoc. of Life Underwriters
NCAC	Uncon	Nat'l. Christian Action Coalition



## Appendix F (continued)

<u>Symbol</u>	<u>Categories</u>	<u>Name</u>
NEA	Labor	National Education Assoc.
NFIB	Uncon	Nat'l Fed. Independent Business
NFOX	Trade	Nat'l. Farmers Org.
NSPE	Trade	Nat'l Soc. Prof. Engineers
SOCWKX	Trade	Nat'l. Assoc. of Social Workers
TMSTR	Labor	Int'l. Bro. of Teamsters
UAWX	Labor	United Autoworkers
UMW	Labor	United Mineworkers
WPC	Uncon	Women's Political Caucus

APPENDIX G

## APPENDIX G

This appendix contains cluster solutions iterated beyond those dictated by the hypotheses.

TABLE 16

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING  
GENERATED SOLUTIONS FOR FEC-CATEGORIZED  
PAC SUBSAMPLE

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 4 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	3	3.000000	2.588271	0.8628	0.288124
2	14	14.000000	12.237808	0.8741	0.456322
3	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
4	9	9.000000	8.117227	0.9019	0.239142

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 23.94331      PROPORTION = 0.886789

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
CLUSTER 1	NSPE_T	0.8623	0.6482	0.7516
	LCVX_T	0.9144	0.6877	0.7520
	GNCORX_T	0.8115	0.4028	0.4963
CLUSTER 2	NALU_T	0.6943	0.6483	0.9338
	NPIB_U	0.8886	0.7835	0.8818
	TMSTR_L	0.7733	0.6645	0.8594
	AFT_L	0.8990	0.7902	0.8790
	CARP_L	0.7761	0.6741	0.8686
	AFLCIX_L	0.9702	0.8711	0.8978
	AFSCMX_L	0.8308	0.6517	0.7844
	CPAX_T	0.9070	0.8291	0.9141
	COCUSX_T	0.9273	0.8447	0.9109
	CWAX_L	0.9611	0.8776	0.9131
	IPCWX_L	0.9505	0.8869	0.9332
	UAWX_L	0.9703	0.9146	0.9427
	UMWX_L	0.9084	0.7983	0.8788
ACTWX_L	0.7810	0.6778	0.8678	
CLUSTER 3	NFOX_T	1.0000	0.3270	0.3270
CLUSTER 4	CHVC_U	0.9204	0.7030	0.7747
	NCAC_U	0.8625	0.6790	0.7872
	WPC_U	0.8702	0.7026	0.8073
	NEA_L	0.8203	0.7701	0.9388
	ACAX_U	0.9288	0.8757	0.9428
	ACUX_T	0.9452	0.8829	0.9341
	ADAX_U	0.9075	0.8648	0.9529
	CSFCX_U	0.9505	0.8769	0.9226
	SOCWKX_T	0.9118	0.8824	0.9678

TABLE 17

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING  
GENERATED SOLUTIONS FOR FEC-CATEGORIZED  
PAC SUBSAMPLE

## OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

## CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 5 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	2	2.000000	1.863239	0.9316	0.136761
2	14	14.000000	12.237808	0.8741	0.456322
3	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
4	9	9.000000	8.117227	0.9019	0.239142
5	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 24.21827      PROPORTION = 0.896973

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH OWN CLUSTER	R-SQUARED WITH NEXT HIGHEST	R**2 RATIO
CLUSTER 1	NSPE_T	0.9316	0.6482	0.6958
	LCVX_T	0.9316	0.6877	0.7382
CLUSTER 2	NALU_T	0.6943	0.6483	0.9338
	NFIB_U	0.8886	0.7835	0.8818
	TMSTR_L	0.7733	0.6645	0.8594
	AFT_L	0.8990	0.7902	0.8790
	CARP_L	0.7761	0.6741	0.8686
	AFLCIX_L	0.9702	0.8711	0.8978
	AFSCMX_L	0.8308	0.6517	0.7844
	CFAX_T	0.9070	0.8291	0.9141
	COCUSX_T	0.9273	0.8447	0.9109
	CWAX_L	0.9611	0.8776	0.9131
	IFCWY_L	0.9505	0.8869	0.9332
	UAWX_L	0.9703	0.9146	0.9427
	UMWX_L	0.9084	0.7983	0.8788
ACTWVX_L	0.7810	0.6778	0.8678	
CLUSTER 3	NFOX_T	1.0000	0.3270	0.3270
CLUSTER 4	CHVC_U	0.9204	0.7130	0.7747
	NCAC_U	0.8625	0.6790	0.7872
	WPC_U	0.8702	0.7026	0.8073
	NEA_L	0.8203	0.7701	0.9388
	ACAX_U	0.9288	0.8757	0.9428
	ACUX_T	0.9452	0.8829	0.9341
	ADAX_U	0.9075	0.8648	0.9529
	CSFCY_U	0.9505	0.8769	0.9226
	SOCWKY_T	0.9118	0.8824	0.9678
CLUSTER 5	GNCONX_T	1.0000	0.6176	0.6176

TABLE 18

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING GENERATED CLUSTER  
SOLUTIONS FOR FEC-CATEGORIZED PAC SUBSAMPLE

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 4 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	4	4.000000	3.430869	0.8577	0.375447
2	19	19.000000	16.073972	0.8460	0.504531
3	2	2.000000	1.822428	0.9112	0.177572
4	2	2.000000	1.669275	0.8346	0.330725

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 22.99654      PROPORTION = 0.851724

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
CLUSTER 1	CHVC_U	0.9404	0.8263	0.8786
	NCAC_U	0.8979	0.7849	0.8741
	WPC_U	0.8881	0.7138	0.8038
	NEA_L	0.7045	0.3923	0.5569
CLUSTER 2	NALO_T	0.6046	0.3968	0.6563
	NFIB_U	0.8194	0.6013	0.7338
	TMSTR_L	0.7813	0.5996	0.7675
	AFT_L	0.6498	0.4582	0.7051
	ACAX_U	0.9095	0.7720	0.8488
	ACUX_T	0.9115	0.8515	0.9341
	ADAX_U	0.8910	0.7821	0.8778
	AFLCIX_L	0.9765	0.7447	0.7625
	AFSCMX_L	0.7056	0.5363	0.7601
	CFAX_T	0.8512	0.6613	0.7770
	COCUSX_T	0.9209	0.7232	0.7852
	CSFCY_U	0.9394	0.8537	0.9088
	CHAX_L	0.9616	0.7232	0.7521
	GNCONY_T	0.8076	0.6262	0.7760
	IFCWY_L	0.9270	0.7463	0.8051
	SOCWKY_T	0.8902	0.8220	0.9234
UAWX_L	0.9805	0.7843	0.7999	
UMWX_L	0.7147	0.4523	0.6329	
ACTWVX_L	0.8323	0.5980	0.7185	
CLUSTER 3	NSPE_T	0.9112	0.4665	0.5120
	LCVX_T	0.9112	0.4138	0.4541
CLUSTER 4	CARP_L	0.8346	0.4802	0.5754
	NFOX_T	0.8346	0.5713	0.6845

TABLE 19

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING GENERATED CLUSTER  
SOLUTIONS FOR FEC-CATEGORIZED PAC SUBSAMPLE  
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS  
CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 5 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	4	4.000000	3.430869	0.8577	0.375447
2	18	18.000000	15.484894	0.8603	0.480277
3	2	2.000000	1.822428	0.9112	0.177572
4	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
5	2	2.000000	1.669275	0.8346	0.330725

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 23.40747 PROPORTION = 0.866943

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH OWN CLUSTER	WITH NEXT HIGHEST	R**2 RATIO
CLUSTER 1	CHVC_U	0.9404	0.8305	0.8831
	NCAC_U	0.8979	0.7899	0.8798
	WPC_U	0.8881	0.7150	0.8051
	NEA_L	0.7045	0.3975	0.5643
CLUSTER 2	NFIB_U	0.8209	0.6013	0.7325
	TMSTH_L	0.7884	0.5996	0.7605
	AFT_L	0.6529	0.4582	0.7017
	ACAX_U	0.9127	0.7720	0.8459
	ACUX_T	0.9133	0.8515	0.9323
	ADAX_U	0.8901	0.7821	0.8787
	AFLCIX_L	0.9749	0.7447	0.7638
	AFSCMX_L	0.7098	0.5363	0.7556
	CFAX_T	0.8501	0.6613	0.7779
	COCUSX_T	0.9204	0.7232	0.7858
	CSFCX_U	0.9406	0.8537	0.9077
	CWAX_L	0.9583	0.7232	0.7546
	GNCONX_T	0.8075	0.6262	0.7756
	IFCWX_L	0.9263	0.7463	0.8056
	SOCHKX_T	0.8880	0.8220	0.9257
	UAWX_L	0.9795	0.7843	0.8006
UMWX_L	0.7146	0.4523	0.6330	
ACTWVX_L	0.8366	0.5980	0.7148	
CLUSTER 3	NSPE_T	0.9112	0.4645	0.5097
	LCVX_T	0.9112	0.4177	0.4584
CLUSTER 4	NALU_T	1.0000	0.5734	0.5734
CLUSTER 5	CARP_L	0.8346	0.4783	0.5731
	NFOX_T	0.8346	0.5705	0.6836

TABLE 20

HOUSE LEGISLATIVE RATING GENERATED CLUSTER SOLUTIONS FOR THE BUSINESS/LABOR SUBSAMPLE  
 OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS  
 CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 3 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	18	18.000000	15.089137	0.8383	0.696901
2	3	3.000000	2.687477	0.8958	0.200828
3	2	2.000000	1.760757	0.8804	0.239243

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 19.53737      PROPORTION = 0.849451

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH CWN CLUSTER	WITH NEXT HIGHEST	R**2 RATIO
CLUSTER 1	IPAA63	0.8146	0.6415	0.7874
	NAB63	0.8838	0.7390	0.8361
	NALU63	0.6992	0.4975	0.7116
	NSPE63	0.7133	0.3696	0.5182
	NFIB63	0.8845	0.6952	0.7860
	AFT63	0.9017	0.6517	0.7228
	NEA63	0.7844	0.6813	0.8685
	AFLCIO3X	0.9495	0.8510	0.8962
	AFSCM63X	0.8086	0.6897	0.8529
	COCUS63X	0.9439	0.7016	0.7433
	CWA63X	0.9559	0.7918	0.8283
	GNCON63X	0.4642	0.2043	0.4402
	IFCW63X	0.9412	0.8051	0.8554
	BUSORG63	0.7829	0.5777	0.7380
	SOCWK63X	0.8998	0.7015	0.7796
	UAW63X	0.9702	0.7880	0.8122
UMW63X	0.9111	0.6868	0.7538	
ACTWV63X	0.7803	0.5893	0.7551	
CLUSTER 2	TMSTR63	0.9070	0.7071	0.7796
	CARP63	0.9163	0.7072	0.7718
	CCE63X	0.8642	0.6655	0.7700
CLUSTER 3	NFO63X	0.8804	0.3346	0.3801
	NFU63X	0.8804	0.5985	0.6798



TABLE 21

HOUSE LEGISLATIVE RATING GENERATED CLUSTER  
SOLUTIONS FOR THE BUSINESS/LABOR SUBSAMPLE

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 4 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	16	16.000000	13.956475	0.8723	0.365404
2	3	3.000000	2.687477	0.8958	0.200828
3	2	2.000000	1.760757	0.8804	0.239243
4	2	2.000000	1.720921	0.8605	0.279079

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 20.12563      PROPORTION = 0.875027

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH OWN CLUSTER	R-SQUARED WITH NEXT HIGHEST	R**2 RATIO
CLUSTER 1	IPAA63	0.8089	0.6415	0.7931
	NAB63	0.8922	0.7390	0.8283
	NALD63	0.6975	0.4975	0.7133
	NFIB63	0.8900	0.6952	0.7811
	APT63	0.9002	0.6517	0.7240
	NEA63	0.7917	0.6813	0.8605
	AFLCIO3X	0.9592	0.8510	0.8872
	AFSCM63X	0.8162	0.6897	0.8450
	COCUS63X	0.9373	0.7016	0.7485
	CWA63X	0.9623	0.7918	0.8228
	IFCW63X	0.9483	0.8051	0.8490
	BUSORG63	0.7843	0.5777	0.7367
	SOCWK63X	0.9049	0.7015	0.7753
	UAW63X	0.9738	0.7880	0.8093
UMW63X	0.9023	0.6868	0.7611	
ACTWV63X	0.7875	0.5893	0.7482	
CLUSTER 2	TMSTR63	0.9070	0.7268	0.8013
	CARP63	0.9163	0.7316	0.7984
	CCFE63X	0.8642	0.6748	0.7808
CLUSTER 3	NFC63X	0.8804	0.3346	0.3801
	NFU63X	0.8804	0.5985	0.6798
CLUSTER 4	NSPE63	0.8605	0.6701	0.7788
	GNCON63X	0.8605	0.4161	0.4836

TABLE 22

HOUSE LEGISLATIVE RATING GENERATED CLUSTER SOLUTIONS FOR THE BUSINESS/LABOR SUBSAMPLE  
 OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS  
 CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 5 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	15	15.000000	13.274916	0.8850	0.314627
2	3	3.000000	2.687477	0.8958	0.200828
3	2	2.000000	1.760757	0.8804	0.239243
4	2	2.000000	1.720921	0.8605	0.279079
5	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 20.44407      PROPORTION = 0.888873

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH OWN CLUSTER	WITH NEXT HIGHEST	R**2 RATIO
CLUSTER 1	IPAA63	0.8140	0.6415	0.7880
	NAB63	0.8928	0.7390	0.8277
	NFIB63	0.8910	0.6952	0.7802
	APT63	0.9019	0.6517	0.7226
	NEA63	0.7915	0.6813	0.8607
	AFLCIO3X	0.9614	0.8510	0.8852
	AFSCH63X	0.8181	0.6897	0.8430
	COCUS63X	0.9358	0.7016	0.7497
	CWA63X	0.9649	0.7918	0.8206
	IFCW63X	0.9490	0.8051	0.8483
	EUSORG63	0.7822	0.5777	0.7386
	SOCWK63X	0.9053	0.7015	0.7749
	UAW63X	0.9747	0.7880	0.8085
	UMW63X	0.9002	0.6868	0.7629
ACTWV63X	0.7920	0.5893	0.7440	
CLUSTER 2	TMSTE63	0.9070	0.7279	0.8026
	CARP63	0.9163	0.7354	0.8026
	CCE63X	0.8642	0.6790	0.7857
CLUSTER 3	NFO63X	0.8804	0.3346	0.3801
	NFU63X	0.8804	0.5985	0.6798
CLUSTER 4	NSPE63	0.8605	0.6690	0.7775
	GNCON63X	0.8605	0.4118	0.4786
CLUSTER 5	NALU63	1.0000	0.6652	0.6652

TABLE 23

HOUSE LEGISLATIVE RATING GENERATED CLUSTER SOLUTIONS FOR THE BUSINESS/LABOR SUBSAMPLE

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 6 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	15	15.000000	13.274916	0.8850	0.314627
2	3	3.000000	2.687477	0.8958	0.200828
3	2	2.000000	1.760757	0.8804	0.239243
4	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
5	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
6	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 20.72315      PROPORTION = 0.901007

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH OWN CLUSTER	R-SQUARED WITH NEXT HIGHEST	R**2 RATIO
CLUSTER 1	IPAA63	0.8140	0.6415	0.7880
	NAB63	0.8928	0.7390	0.8277
	NFIB63	0.8910	0.6952	0.7802
	AFT63	0.9019	0.6517	0.7226
	NEA63	0.7915	0.6813	0.8607
	AFLCIO3X	0.9614	0.8510	0.8852
	AFSCH63X	0.8181	0.6897	0.8430
	COCUS63X	0.9358	0.7078	0.7563
	CWA63X	0.9649	0.7918	0.8206
	IFCW63X	0.9490	0.8051	0.8483
	BUSORG63	0.7822	0.5777	0.7386
	SOCWK63X	0.9053	0.7015	0.7749
	UAW63X	0.9747	0.7880	0.8085
	UMW63X	0.9002	0.7108	0.7896
	ACTWV63X	0.7920	0.5893	0.7440
CLUSTER 2	TMSTR63	0.9070	0.7279	0.8026
	CARP63	0.9163	0.7354	0.8026
	CCE63X	0.8642	0.6790	0.7857
CLUSTER 3	NFO63X	0.8804	0.3346	0.3801
	NFO63X	0.8804	0.5985	0.6798
CLUSTER 4	GNCON63X	1.0000	0.5197	0.5197
CLUSTER 5	NALU63	1.0000	0.6652	0.6652
CLUSTER 6	NSPE63	1.0000	0.6690	0.6690

TABLE 24

HOUSE LEGISLATIVE RATING GENERATED CLUSTER SOLUTIONS FOR THE BUSINESS/LABOR SUBSAMPLE  
 OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS  
 CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 7 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	15	15.000000	13.274916	0.8850	0.314627
2	2	2.000000	1.887592	0.9438	0.112408
3	2	2.000000	1.842313	0.9212	0.157687
4	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
5	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
6	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
7	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 21.00482      PROPORTION = 0.913253

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED OWN CLUSTER	WITH NEXT HIGHEST	R**2 RATIO
CLUSTER 1	IPAA63	0.8140	0.6099	0.7493
	NAB63	0.8928	0.7001	0.7841
	NFIB63	0.8910	0.6947	0.7796
	APT63	0.9019	0.6462	0.7165
	NEA63	0.7915	0.6735	0.8509
	AFICIO3X	0.9614	0.8280	0.8612
	AFSCM63X	0.8181	0.6958	0.8505
	COCUS63X	0.9358	0.7078	0.7563
	CWA63X	0.9649	0.7619	0.7896
	IFCW63X	0.9490	0.7846	0.8268
	BUSORG63	0.7822	0.5612	0.7175
	SOCWK63X	0.9053	0.6739	0.7443
	UAW63X	0.9747	0.7642	0.7841
	UHW63X	0.9002	0.7108	0.7896
ACTWV63X	0.7920	0.5650	0.7134	
CLUSTER 2	TMSTR63	0.9438	0.7279	0.7713
	CARP63	0.9438	0.7354	0.7792
CLUSTER 3	CCE63X	0.9212	0.7151	0.7763
	NFU63X	0.9212	0.5788	0.6283
CLUSTER 4	GNCON63X	1.0000	0.5197	0.5197
CLUSTER 5	NALU63	1.0000	0.6652	0.6652
CLUSTER 6	NSPE63	1.0000	0.6690	0.6690
CLUSTER 7	NFO63X	1.0000	0.5701	0.5701

TABLE 25

HOUSE LEGISLATIVE RATING GENERATED CLUSTER  
SOLUTIONS FOR THE BUSINESS/LABOR SUBSAMPLE  
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS  
CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 8 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECND EIGENVALUE
1	13	13.000000	11.698171	0.8999	0.262863
2	2	2.000000	1.887592	0.9438	0.112408
3	2	2.000000	1.842313	0.9242	0.157687
4	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
5	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
6	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
7	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
8	2	2.000000	1.818037	0.9090	0.181963

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 21.24611      PROPORTION = 0.923744

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH OWN CLUSTER	WITH NEXT HIGHEST	R**2 RATIO
CLUSTER 1	NAB63	0.9002	0.7281	0.8088
	NFIB63	0.8940	0.7542	0.8437
	AFT63	0.9053	0.7602	0.8396
	NEA63	0.8035	0.6735	0.8382
	AFLCIO3X	0.9551	0.8739	0.9150
	AFSCM63X	0.8222	0.6958	0.8463
	COCUS63X	0.9313	0.8401	0.9021
	CWA63X	0.9597	0.8703	0.9068
	IFCW63X	0.9508	0.8117	0.8537
	BUSORG63	0.7842	0.6656	0.8487
	SOCWK63X	0.9145	0.7473	0.8198
	UAW63X	0.9766	0.8335	0.8535
	UMW63X	0.9038	0.7578	0.8385
CLUSTER 2	TMSTR63	0.9438	0.7348	0.7786
	CARP63	0.9438	0.7388	0.7828
CLUSTER 3	CCE63X	0.9212	0.7151	0.7763
	NFU63X	0.9212	0.5788	0.6283
CLUSTER 4	GNCON63X	1.0000	0.5197	0.5197
CLUSTER 5	NALU63	1.0000	0.6724	0.6724
CLUSTER 6	NSPE63	1.0000	0.6638	0.6638
CLUSTER 7	NFO63X	1.0000	0.5701	0.5701
CLUSTER 8	IPAA63	0.9090	0.7841	0.8626
	ACTWV63X	0.9090	0.7600	0.8361

TABLE 26

HOUSE LEGISLATIVE RATING GENERATED CLUSTER SOLUTIONS FOR THE BUSINESS/LABOR SUBSAMPLE  
 OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS  
 CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 9 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	12	12.000000	10.929488	0.9108	0.239263
2	2	2.000000	1.887592	0.9438	0.112408
3	2	2.000000	1.842313	0.9212	0.157687
4	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
5	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
6	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
7	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
8	2	2.000000	1.818037	0.9090	0.181963
9	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 21.47743      PROPORTION = 0.933E01

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH OWN CLUSTER	WITH NEXT HIGHEST	R**2 RATIO
CLUSTER 1	NAB63	0.9013	0.7281	0.8079
	NPIB63	0.8911	0.7542	0.8464
	AFT63	0.9095	0.7602	0.8358
	NEA63	0.8045	0.6735	0.8371
	AFLCIO3X	0.9587	0.8739	0.9115
	AFSCM63X	0.8254	0.6958	0.8431
	COCUS63X	0.9263	0.8401	0.9069
	CWA63X	0.9620	0.8703	0.9046
	IFCW63X	0.9533	0.8117	0.8515
	SOCWK63X	0.9112	0.7473	0.8201
	UAW63X	0.9794	0.8335	0.8510
	UMW63X	0.9068	0.7578	0.8358
CLUSTER 2	TMSTR63	0.9438	0.7406	0.7847
	CARP63	0.9438	0.7437	0.7879
CLUSTER 3	CCE63X	0.9212	0.7151	0.7763
	NFU63X	0.9212	0.5788	0.6283
CLUSTER 4	GNCON63X	1.0000	0.5197	0.5197
CLUSTER 5	NALU63	1.0000	0.6683	0.6683
CLUSTER 6	NSPE63	1.0000	0.6616	0.6616
CLUSTER 7	NFO63X	1.0000	0.5701	0.5701
CLUSTER 8	IPAA63	0.9090	0.7825	0.8608
	ACTWV63X	0.9090	0.7595	0.8355
CLUSTER 9	BUSORG63	1.0000	0.7524	0.7524

TABLE 27

HOUSE LEGISLATIVE RATING GENERATED CLUSTER SOLUTIONS FOR THE BUSINESS/LABOR SUBSAMPLE

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 10 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	12	12.000000	10.929488	0.9108	0.239263
2	2	2.000000	1.887592	0.9438	0.112408
3	2	2.000000	1.842313	0.9212	0.157687
4	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
5	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
6	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
7	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
8	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
9	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
10	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 21.65939      PROPORTION = 0.941713

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED OWN CLUSTER	R-SQUARED WITH NEXT HIGHEST	R**2 RATIO
CLUSTER 1	NAB63	0.9013	0.7001	0.7768
	NFIB63	0.8911	0.7181	0.8059
	AFT63	0.9095	0.7023	0.7722
	NEA63	0.8045	0.6735	0.8371
	AFLCIO3X	0.9587	0.8280	0.8636
	AFSCM63X	0.8254	0.6958	0.8431
	COCUS63X	0.9263	0.8126	0.8772
	CWA63X	0.9620	0.8212	0.8537
	IFCW63X	0.9533	0.7846	0.8230
	SOCWK63X	0.9112	0.7233	0.7938
	UAW63X	0.9794	0.7661	0.7822
	UMW63X	0.9068	0.7390	0.8150
CLUSTER 2	TMSTR63	0.9438	0.7406	0.7847
	CARP63	0.9438	0.7437	0.7879
CLUSTER 3	CCE63X	0.9212	0.7151	0.7763
	NFU63X	0.9212	0.5788	0.6283
CLUSTER 4	GNCON63X	1.0000	0.5197	0.5197
CLUSTER 5	NALU63	1.0000	0.6683	0.6683
CLUSTER 6	NSPE63	1.0000	0.6616	0.6616
CLUSTER 7	NFO63X	1.0000	0.5701	0.5701
CLUSTER 8	IPAA63	1.0000	0.7825	0.7825
CLUSTER 9	BUSOEG63	1.0000	0.7524	0.7524
CLUSTER 10	ACTWV63X	1.0000	0.7595	0.7595

TABLE 28

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE BUSINESS/LABOR SUBSAMPLE

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 3 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	7	7.000000	5.766864	0.8238	0.409421
2	15	15.000000	12.175489	0.8117	0.607218
3	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 18.94235      PROPORTION = 0.823581

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		CWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
CLUSTER 1	IPAA63	0.7958	0.6690	0.8406
	TMSTR63	0.8239	0.7430	0.9018
	CARP63	0.6776	0.4505	0.6648
	CCE63X	0.9303	0.8106	0.8713
	BUSORG63	0.9144	0.8075	0.8831
	NFO63X	0.7509	0.5404	0.7198
	NFU63X	0.8738	0.7174	0.8209
	CLUSTER 2	NAB63	0.8337	0.7368
NALU63		0.6228	0.4689	0.7529
NSPE63		0.5049	0.2914	0.5772
NFIB63		0.8151	0.7285	0.8938
AFT63		0.6616	0.4842	0.7319
AFLCIO3X		0.9711	0.8263	0.8509
AFSCM63X		0.7147	0.5833	0.8163
COCUS63X		0.9059	0.8759	0.9669
CWA63X		0.9548	0.8362	0.8758
GNCON63X		0.8138	0.6312	0.7756
IFCW63X		0.9296	0.7411	0.7973
SOCWK63X		0.9047	0.6544	0.7233
UAW63X		0.9707	0.8532	0.8789
UMW63X		0.7482	0.5522	0.7380
ACTWV63X	0.8239	0.7464	0.9059	
CLUSTER 3	NEA63	1.0000	0.3839	0.3839



TABLE 29

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE BUSINESS/LABOR SUBSAMPLE

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 4 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	7	7.000000	5.766864	0.8238	0.409421
2	14	14.000000	11.692101	0.8352	0.461713
3	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
4	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 19.45897      PROPORTION = 0.846042

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
CLUSTER 1	IPAA63	0.7958	0.6660	0.8369
	TMSTR63	0.8239	0.7550	0.9163
	CARP63	0.6776	0.4752	0.7013
	CCE63X	0.9303	0.8201	0.8815
	BUSORG63	0.9144	0.8130	0.8891
	NFO63X	0.7509	0.5468	0.7283
	NFU63X	0.8738	0.7182	0.8219
	CLUSTER 2	NAB63	0.8394	0.7368
NALU63		0.6223	0.4689	0.7535
NFIB63		0.8228	0.7285	0.8854
AFT63		0.6618	0.4842	0.7316
AFLCIO3X		0.9742	0.8263	0.8482
AFSCM63X		0.7169	0.5833	0.8137
COCUS63X		0.9065	0.8759	0.9662
CWA63X		0.9592	0.8362	0.8718
GNCON63X		0.8038	0.6312	0.7852
IFCW63X		0.9295	0.7411	0.7973
SOCWK63X		0.8975	0.6544	0.7291
UAW63X		0.9722	0.8532	0.8776
UMW63X		0.7528	0.5522	0.7335
ACTWV63X	0.8333	0.7464	0.8557	
CLUSTER 3	NEA63	1.0000	0.3807	0.3807
CLUSTER 4	NSPE63	1.0000	0.4619	0.4619

TABLE 30

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE BUSINESS/LABOR SUBSAMPLE

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 5 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	7	7.000000	6.039538	0.8628	0.364890
2	13	13.000000	10.793485	0.8303	0.457844
3	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
4	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
5	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 19.83302      PROPORTION = 0.862305

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
1	IPAA63	0.8193	0.6533	0.7974
	TMSTR63	0.8112	0.7516	0.9265
	CCE63X	0.9367	0.8093	0.8639
	COCUS63X	0.9214	0.8901	0.9660
	EUSORG63	0.9211	0.8001	0.8687
	NFO63X	0.7464	0.5350	0.7168
	NFU63X	0.8835	0.7081	0.8015
2	NAB63	0.8386	0.7584	0.9043
	NALU63	0.6230	0.4860	0.7802
	NFIB63	0.8219	0.7493	0.9118
	AFT63	0.6691	0.4982	0.7445
	AFLCIO3X	0.9733	0.8539	0.8774
	AFSCM63X	0.7210	0.6141	0.8518
	CWA63X	0.9557	0.8672	0.9074
	GNCON63X	0.7990	0.6757	0.8456
	IFCW63X	0.9289	0.7838	0.8438
	SOCWK63X	0.9008	0.7051	0.7828
	UAW63X	0.9673	0.8896	0.9197
	UMW63X	0.7623	0.5615	0.7366
	ACTWV63X	0.8327	0.7501	0.9008
3	NEA63	1.0000	0.3803	0.3803
4	NSPE63	1.0000	0.4604	0.4604
5	CARP63	1.0000	0.5809	0.5809

TABLE 31

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE BUSINESS/LABOR SUBSAMPLE

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 6 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECCND EIGENVALUE
1	7	7.000000	6.039538	0.8628	0.364890
2	12	12.000000	10.193642	0.8495	0.437729
3	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
4	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
5	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
6	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 20.23318      PROPORTION = 0.879703

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
1	IPAA63	0.8193	0.6575	0.8025
	TMSTR63	0.8112	0.7614	0.9386
	CCE63X	0.9367	0.8112	0.8660
	COCUS63X	0.9214	0.8883	0.9641
	BUSORG63	0.9211	0.8019	0.8707
	NFO63X	0.7464	0.5322	0.7131
	NFU63X	0.8835	0.7100	0.8036
2	NAB63	0.8399	0.7584	0.9029
	NFIB63	0.8251	0.7493	0.9082
	AFT63	0.6760	0.4982	0.7369
	AFLCIO3X	0.9717	0.8539	0.8788
	AFSCM63X	0.7293	0.6141	0.8421
	CWA63X	0.9513	0.8672	0.9116
	GNCON63X	0.8001	0.6757	0.8444
	IFCW63X	0.9290	0.7838	0.8437
	SOCWK63X	0.8989	0.7051	0.7844
	UAW63X	0.9661	0.8896	0.9209
	UMW63X	0.7660	0.5615	0.7330
	ACTWV63X	0.8402	0.7501	0.8927
3	NEA63	1.0000	0.3879	0.3879
4	NSPE63	1.0000	0.4575	0.4575
5	CARP63	1.0000	0.5809	0.5809
6	NALU63	1.0000	0.5762	0.5762

TABLE 32

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE BUSINESS/LABOR SUBSAMPLE

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 7 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	5	5.000000	4.352528	0.8705	0.299805
2	12	12.000000	10.495469	0.8746	0.348752
3	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
4	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
5	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
6	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
7	2	2.000000	1.744023	0.8720	0.255977

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 20.59202      PROPORTION = 0.895305

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
CLUSTER 1	IPAA63	0.8189	0.6923	0.8454
	CCE63X	0.9366	0.8495	0.9070
	EUSCRG63	0.9059	0.8375	0.9245
	NFO63X	0.7978	0.5632	0.7059
	NFU63X	0.8933	0.7405	0.8289
CLUSTER 2	NAB63	0.8474	0.7268	0.8577
	NFIB63	0.8333	0.7014	0.8417
	TMSTR63	0.7976	0.7399	0.9277
	AFLCIO3X	0.9714	0.8090	0.8328
	AFSCM63X	0.7270	0.5879	0.8088
	COCUS63X	0.9213	0.8855	0.9612
	CWA63X	0.9607	0.8253	0.8591
	GNCON63X	0.8015	0.6351	0.7925
	IFCW63X	0.9284	0.7426	0.7999
	SOCWR63X	0.8852	0.6996	0.7903
	UAW63X	0.9770	0.8499	0.8700
ACTWV63X	0.8449	0.7099	0.8402	
CLUSTER 3	NEA63	1.0000	0.3900	0.3900
CLUSTER 4	NSPE63	1.0000	0.4468	0.4468
CLUSTER 5	CARP63	1.0000	0.5658	0.5658
CLUSTER 6	NALU63	1.0000	0.5736	0.5736
CLUSTER 7	AFT63	0.8720	0.6148	0.7050
	UMW63X	0.8720	0.7125	0.8170

TABLE 33

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE BUSINESS/LABOR SUBSAMPLE

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 8 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	3	3.000000	2.681713	0.8939	0.201946
2	11	11.000000	9.714609	0.8831	0.345728
3	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
4	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
5	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
6	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
7	2	2.000000	1.744023	0.8720	0.255977
8	3	3.000000	2.719241	0.9064	0.188456

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 20.85959      PROPORTION = 0.906938

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH Q <sub>1</sub> N CLUSTER	WITH NEXT HIGHEST	R**2 RATIO
1-	IPAA63	0.8802	0.6836	0.7766
	TMSTR63	0.8778	0.7632	0.8694
	BUSORG63	0.9237	0.8287	0.8972
2-	NAB63	0.8480	0.7187	0.8476
	NFIB63	0.8253	0.7460	0.9040
	AFLCIO3X	0.9718	0.8117	0.8353
	APSCM63X	0.7290	0.5805	0.7963
	COCUS63X	0.9217	0.8691	0.9429
	CWA63X	0.9611	0.8441	0.8783
	GNCON63X	0.8055	0.6756	0.8387
	IFCM63X	0.9350	0.7464	0.7983
	SOCWK63X	0.8969	0.6996	0.7800
	UAW63X	0.9785	0.8541	0.8728
	ACTWV63X	0.8419	0.7405	0.8795
3-	NEA63	1.0000	0.3961	0.3961
4-	NSPE63	1.0000	0.4598	0.4598
5-	CARP63	1.0000	0.5750	0.5750
6-	NALU63	1.0000	0.5835	0.5835
7-	APT63	0.8720	0.6149	0.7051
	UMW63X	0.8720	0.7096	0.8138
8-	CCE63X	0.9283	0.8471	0.9126
	NFO63X	0.8725	0.5836	0.6689
	NFU63X	0.9184	0.7782	0.8473

TABLE 34

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE BUSINESS/LABOR SUBSAMPLE

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 9 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	3	3.000000	2.681713	0.8939	0.201946
2	3	8.000000	7.378738	0.9223	0.202607
3	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
4	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
5	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
6	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
7	4	4.000000	3.390641	0.8477	0.276970
8	3	3.000000	2.719241	0.9064	0.188456
9	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 21.17033      PROPORTION = 0.920449

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
CLUSTER 1	IPAA63	0.8802	0.6836	0.7766
	TMSTR63	0.8778	0.7433	0.8468
	BUSORG63	0.9237	0.8252	0.8933
CLUSTER 2	AFLCIO3X	0.9732	0.8789	0.9031
	COCUS63X	0.9274	0.8691	0.9370
	CWA63X	0.9582	0.8583	0.8957
	GNCON63X	0.8406	0.6756	0.8037
	IFCW63X	0.9447	0.8184	0.8662
	SOCWK63X	0.8924	0.8173	0.9159
	UAW63X	0.9820	0.8569	0.8726
	ACTWV63X	0.8602	0.7405	0.8608
CLUSTER 3	NEA63	1.0000	0.3949	0.3949
CLUSTER 4	NSPE63	1.0000	0.4738	0.4738
CLUSTER 5	CARP63	1.0000	0.5750	0.5750
CLUSTER 6	NALU63	1.0000	0.5916	0.5916
CLUSTER 7	NAB63	0.8731	0.8015	0.9179
	NFIB63	0.8811	0.7781	0.8831
	AFSCM63X	0.7967	0.6713	0.8426
	UMW63X	0.8398	0.6800	0.8097
CLUSTER 8	CCE63X	0.9283	0.8471	0.9126
	NFC63X	0.8725	0.5836	0.6689
	NFU63X	0.9184	0.7782	0.8473
CLUSTER 9	AFT63	1.0000	0.6323	0.6323

TABLE 35

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE BUSINESS/LABOR SUBSAMPLE  
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS  
CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 10 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	3	3.000000	2.681713	0.8939
2	9	9.000000	8.200175	0.9111
3	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000
4	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000
5	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000
6	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000
7	2	2.000000	1.836930	0.9185
8	3	3.000000	2.719241	0.9064
9	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000
10	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 21.43806      PROPORTION = 0.93209

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH OWN CLUSTER	R-SQUARED WITH NEXT HIGHEST	R**2 RATIO
CLUSTER 1	IPAA63	0.8802	0.6840	0.7771
	TMSTR63	0.8778	0.7488	0.8530
	BUSORG63	0.9237	0.8278	0.8962
CLUSTER 2	NAB63	0.8398	0.7388	0.8797
	AFLCIC3X	0.9730	0.8290	0.8519
	COCUS63X	0.9275	0.8691	0.9370
	CWA63X	0.9587	0.8441	0.8805
	GNCON63X	0.8282	0.6756	0.8158
	IFCW63X	0.9404	0.7651	0.8135
	SOCWK63X	0.9004	0.7337	0.8148
	UAW63X	0.9830	0.8541	0.8688
	ACTWV63X	0.8490	0.7405	0.8722
CLUSTER 3	NEA63	1.0000	0.4038	0.4038
CLUSTER 4	NSPE63	1.0000	0.4679	0.4679
CLUSTER 5	CARP63	1.0000	0.5750	0.5750
CLUSTER 6	NALU63	1.0000	0.5921	0.5921
CLUSTER 7	NFIB63	0.9185	0.7884	0.8584
	UMW63X	0.9185	0.6891	0.7503
CLUSTER 8	CCE63X	0.9283	0.8471	0.9126
	NFO63X	0.8725	0.5836	0.6689
	NFU63X	0.9184	0.7782	0.8473
CLUSTER 9	AFT63	1.0000	0.6245	0.6245
CLUSTER 10	AFSCM63X	1.0000	0.6801	0.6801

APPENDIX H



APPENDIX H  
CLUSTERING ALL VARIABLES

Only 27 of the 47 variables in the data set were contained and classified on the FEC's 1978-1980 Final Report, Reports on Financial Activity for U.S. Senate and House Campaigns tape. Without campaign financial activity at the federal level, an organization will not be classified.

In this section of analysis, however, FEC classification is not really an issue. This section deals with cluster membership of the full set of variables as a series of clusters are formed.

The purpose of clustering the full set of variables is to determine if a limited number of clusters will separate the organizations into relatively unfuzzy clusters (low  $R^2$  ratio) with memberships that can be described parsimoniously.

House of Representatives

Tables 36 to 44 portray cluster membership as the cluster algorithm proceeds from two to ten clusters. With two cluster [Table 36], the variable set splits in half. Each cluster contains a disparate collection of business and labor, and conservative and liberal

TABLE 36

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER  
SOLUTIONS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 2 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	25	25.000000	21.263913	0.8506	1.039955
2	21	21.000000	17.275055	0.8226	0.820703

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 38.53897      PROPORTION = 0.837804

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
1	NAB63	0.9104	0.8417	0.9246
	CHVC63	0.8476	0.7574	0.8935
	NCAC63	0.7837	0.7369	0.9403
	LCCB63	0.8759	0.8127	0.9279
	CONS63	0.8970	0.7844	0.8745
	WFC63	0.8067	0.7311	0.9063
	TMSTB63	0.7503	0.6220	0.8290
	CARP63	0.7675	0.6083	0.7927
	NEA63	0.8163	0.7328	0.8978
	ACA63X	0.9602	0.8212	0.8553
	ACU63X	0.9574	0.8625	0.9008
	AFLCIO3X	0.9288	0.8904	0.9586
	CCE63X	0.7873	0.5634	0.7156
	CSFC63X	0.9683	0.8467	0.8744
	CWA63X	0.9236	0.8999	0.9743
	IFCW63X	0.9289	0.8898	0.9578
	NASC63X	0.9454	0.9084	0.9608
	NFC63X	0.3686	0.2362	0.6408
	NFU63X	0.6202	0.4127	0.6655
	NTV63X	0.8834	0.6653	0.7531
	PAR63X	0.9056	0.8567	0.9459
	SCIT63X	0.9270	0.9168	0.9889
	SOCWK63X	0.9018	0.8767	0.9722
	UAW63X	0.9450	0.9368	0.9913
	LIBLB63X	0.8571	0.7294	0.8511

TABLE 36 - Continued.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER  
SOLUTIONS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER	2	-----	-----	-----
IPAA63		0.7755	0.7344	0.9470
ASC63		0.8259	0.7894	0.9559
NALU63		0.7092	0.6442	0.9083
NSPE63		0.7671	0.5667	0.7387
NFIB63		0.8431	0.8056	0.9555
ACLU63		0.7608	0.6697	0.8802
AFT63		0.8876	0.8153	0.9185
LCV63X		0.8400	0.6292	0.7491
ADA63X		0.9575	0.8603	0.8985
AFSCM63X		0.7578	0.7141	0.9423
CFA63X		0.9328	0.8352	0.8954
CNFMP63X		0.8261	0.6941	0.8403
COCUS63X		0.9244	0.8596	0.9299
FCNL63X		0.9053	0.8290	0.9157
GNCON63X		0.5478	0.3659	0.6679
BUSORG63		0.7658	0.7253	0.9471
PCCW63X		0.9354	0.7746	0.8281
LCTY63X		0.8449	0.7353	0.8703
UMW63X		0.9072	0.8203	0.9043
WOMAC63X		0.8277	0.8005	0.9671
ACTWV63X		0.7335	0.7077	0.9648

members. The two farm organizations in C1, the NFO and NFU and the General Contractors in C2 have the lowest  $R^2$  with their own clusters.

The nine organizations that form C3 in the third iteration [Table 37] seem to have little in common, other than a loose cohesion to their former co-members in C1 and C2. In the next iteration [Table 38] the two farm organizations form a triad, C4, with the Council for a Competitive Economy. In the fifth through eighth iterations [Tables 39 to 42] the farm groups form a dyad, C5, that is, as evidenced by the  $R^2$  ratio, relatively well separated from the rest of the set of organizations. This is the only cluster that has both a low average  $R^2$  ratio and apparent political consistency.

In contrast to the farmers is the cluster, C4, which forms at the fifth iteration and remains together through the tenth [Table 44]. It is composed of the free market espousing Council for a Competitive Economy, the Teamsters and Carpenters unions, and the National Taxpayers Union, a group dedicated to reducing government spending. While a labor historian familiar with the teamsters' close ties to the Republican party might not be surprised by the membership of C4; those who analyze PAC and political behavior might be

TABLE 37

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER  
SOLUTIONS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 3 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECND EIGENVALUE
1	16	16.000000	13.115126	0.8197	0.913078
2	21	21.000000	18.554602	0.8836	0.373616
3	9	9.000000	7.724552	0.8583	0.473984

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 39.39428      PROPORTION = 0.856397

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
1	CHVC63	0.8652	0.7642	0.8833
	NCAC63	0.7940	0.7412	0.9336
	LCCR63	0.8567	0.8386	0.9789
	CCNS63	0.9065	0.8007	0.8833
	WPC63	0.8110	0.7355	0.9069
	TMSTR63	0.7416	0.7129	0.9613
	CARP63	0.7574	0.7199	0.9505
	NEA63	0.8093	0.7711	0.9528
	ACA63X	0.9592	0.8808	0.9183
	ACU63X	0.9513	0.8935	0.9392
	CCE63X	0.8157	0.6714	0.8231
	CSFC63X	0.9667	0.8923	0.9231
	NFO63X	0.4230	0.2563	0.6058
	NFU63X	0.6741	0.4755	0.7055
	NTV63X	0.9060	0.7617	0.8407
	LIBLB63X	0.8774	0.7556	0.8612
2	IPAA63	0.8047	0.6860	0.8525
	NAB63	0.8941	0.8722	0.9756
	NALU63	0.6962	0.6454	0.9270
	NFIB63	0.8820	0.7452	0.8448
	AFT63	0.9045	0.7998	0.8842
	AFLCIO3X	0.9565	0.8782	0.9181
	AFSCM63X	0.8126	0.6516	0.8019
	CFA63X	0.9201	0.8666	0.9418
	COCUS63X	0.9353	0.8281	0.8854
	CWA63X	0.9603	0.8660	0.9018
	IFCW63X	0.9459	0.8794	0.9297
	BUSORG63	0.7809	0.6868	0.8795
	NASC63X	0.9539	0.9008	0.9444
	PAR63X	0.9042	0.8632	0.9547
	SCIT63X	0.9677	0.8701	0.8992
	SOCWK63X	0.9104	0.8580	0.9425
	UAW63X	0.9750	0.8924	0.9153
	LCTY63X	0.8311	0.7675	0.9234
	UMW63X	0.9028	0.8269	0.9160
	ROMAC63X	0.8306	0.7644	0.9204
ACTAV63X	0.7859	0.6449	0.8207	

TABLE 37 - Continued.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER  
SOLUTIONS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER	}		
ASC63	0.8653	0.7698	0.8897
NSPE63	0.7884	0.6766	0.8582
ACLU63	0.8282	0.6738	0.8136
LCV63X	0.8899	0.7267	0.8166
ACA63X	0.9625	0.8994	0.9345
CNFMP63X	0.8885	0.7350	0.8273
FCNI63X	0.9346	0.8386	0.8973
GNCON63X	0.6464	0.4274	0.6612
FCCW63X	0.9209	0.8743	0.9493

TABLE 38

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER  
SOLUTIONS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

## OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

## CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 4 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	12	12.000000	10.758553	0.8965	0.335542
2	22	22.000000	19.131139	0.8696	0.503789
3	9	9.000000	7.724552	0.8583	0.473984
4	3	3.000000	2.529473	0.8432	0.323977

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 40.14372      PROPORTION = 0.872689

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
1	NAB63	0.9020	0.8846	0.9807
	CHVC63	0.9095	0.7642	0.8402
	NCAC63	0.8379	0.7412	0.8847
	LCCB63	0.8909	0.8326	0.9346
	CONS63	0.9282	0.7984	0.8601
	WPC63	0.8439	0.7299	0.8649
	NEA63	0.8092	0.7764	0.9595
	ACA63X	0.9508	0.8851	0.9309
	ACU63X	0.9609	0.8939	0.9303
	CSFC63X	0.9674	0.8919	0.9219
	NTV63X	0.8620	0.7801	0.9050
	LIBLB63X	0.8959	0.7558	0.8436
	2	IPAA63	0.8049	0.6768
NALU63		0.6923	0.6454	0.9323
NPIB63		0.8838	0.7584	0.8581
TMSTR63		0.7461	0.6810	0.9127
AFT63		0.8987	0.7998	0.8900
CARP63		0.7523	0.7000	0.9304
AFLCIO3X		0.9650	0.8707	0.9023
AFSCM63X		0.8205	0.6417	0.7822
CFA63X		0.9122	0.8666	0.9499
COCUS63X		0.9332	0.8281	0.8874
CWA63X		0.9617	0.8692	0.9038
IPCW63X		0.9499	0.8830	0.9296
BUSCRG63		0.7748	0.7011	0.9048
NASC63X		0.9504	0.9179	0.9658
PAB63X		0.9015	0.8696	0.9647
SCIT63X		0.9654	0.8798	0.9113
SOCWK63X		0.9051	0.8834	0.9760
UAW63X		0.9742	0.9067	0.9307
LCTY63X		0.8262	0.7675	0.9289
UMW63X		0.9039	0.8269	0.9149
WOMAC63X		0.8263	0.7889	0.9548
ACTWV63X		0.7829	0.6550	0.8365

TABLE 38 - Continued.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER  
SOLUTIONS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER				
3	ASC63	0.8653	0.8205	0.9482
	NSPE63	0.7884	0.6611	0.8386
	ACLU63	0.8282	0.7169	0.8656
	LCV63X	0.8899	0.7098	0.7977
	ACA63X	0.9625	0.8855	0.9200
	CMPMP63X	0.8885	0.7213	0.8118
	FCNL63X	0.9346	0.8495	0.9090
	GNCON63X	0.6464	0.4153	0.6425
	PCCW63X	0.9209	0.8585	0.9322
	4	CCE63X	0.8473	0.7331
NFO63X		0.7844	0.3461	0.4413
NFU63X		0.8977	0.5860	0.6527



TABLE 39

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER  
SOLUTIONS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 5 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	10	10.000000	9.021856	0.9022	0.251379
2	21	21.000000	18.554602	0.8836	0.373616
3	9	9.000000	7.724552	0.8583	0.473984
4	4	4.000000	3.579633	0.8949	0.254778
5	2	2.000000	1.760757	0.8804	0.239243

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 40.6414      PROPORTION = 0.883509

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO	
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST		
1-	CHVC63	0.9252	0.7642	0.8260	
	NCAC63	0.8553	0.7412	0.8666	
	LCCR63	0.8934	0.8386	0.9387	
	CONS63	0.9336	0.8007	0.8577	
	WPC63	0.8564	0.7355	0.8588	
	NEA63	0.8112	0.7711	0.9506	
	ACA63X	0.9405	0.8808	0.9366	
	ACU63X	0.9540	0.8935	0.9366	
	CSFC63X	0.9563	0.8923	0.9331	
	LIBLB63X	0.8960	0.7556	0.8433	
	2-	IPAA63	0.8047	0.6686	0.8309
		NAB63	0.8941	0.8756	0.9794
NALU63		0.6962	0.6454	0.9270	
NFIB63		0.8820	0.7494	0.8497	
AFT63		0.9045	0.7998	0.8842	
AFLCIO3X		0.9565	0.8588	0.8979	
AFSCM63X		0.8126	0.6878	0.8464	
CFA63X		0.9201	0.8666	0.9418	
COCUS63X		0.9353	0.8281	0.8854	
CWA63X		0.9603	0.8580	0.8934	
IFCW63X		0.9459	0.8729	0.9228	
BUSCBG63		0.7809	0.6933	0.8879	
NASC63X		0.9539	0.9095	0.9535	
PAR63X		0.9042	0.8577	0.9486	
SCIT63X		0.9677	0.8673	0.8963	
SOCWK63X		0.9104	0.8781	0.9646	
UAW63X		0.9750	0.8964	0.9194	
LCTY63X		0.8311	0.7675	0.9234	
UMW63X		0.9028	0.8269	0.9160	
WOMAC63X		0.8306	0.7893	0.9503	
ACTWV63X	0.7859	0.6457	0.8216		

TABLE 39 - Continued.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER  
SOLUTIONS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RAIERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER	3				
		ASC63	0.8653	0.8316	0.9611
		NSPE63	0.7884	0.6766	0.8582
		ACLU63	0.8282	0.7368	0.8896
		LCV63X	0.8899	0.7267	0.8166
		ADA63X	0.9625	0.8994	0.9345
		CNFMP63X	0.8885	0.7350	0.8273
		PCNL63X	0.9346	0.8574	0.9174
		GNCON63X	0.6464	0.4274	0.6612
		PCCW63X	0.9209	0.8743	0.9493
CLUSTER	4				
		IMSIR63	0.8703	0.7129	0.8192
		CARP63	0.8889	0.7199	0.8099
		CCE63X	0.9000	0.7040	0.7822
		NTV63X	0.9205	0.8290	0.9006
CLUSTER	5				
		NFO63X	0.8804	0.3706	0.4209
		NFO63X	0.8804	0.6416	0.7288

TABLE 40

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER  
SOLUTIONS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY PCB 6 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	10	10.000000	9.021856	0.9022	0.251379
2	20	20.000000	17.870208	0.8935	0.318590
3	6	6.000000	5.329389	0.8882	0.317842
4	4	4.000000	3.579633	0.8949	0.254778
5	2	2.000000	1.760757	0.8804	0.239243
6	4	4.000000	3.468675	0.8672	0.317725

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 44.03052      PROPORTION = 0.891968

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH OWN CLUSTER	R-SQUARED WITH NEXT HIGHEST	R**2 RATIO
1	CHVC63	0.9252	0.8275	0.8943
	NCAC63	0.8553	0.7788	0.9106
	LCCR63	0.8934	0.8368	0.9366
	CONS63	0.9336	0.8261	0.8849
	WPC63	0.8564	0.7515	0.8775
	NEA63	0.8112	0.7703	0.9496
	ACA63X	0.9405	0.8809	0.9367
	ACU63X	0.9540	0.8925	0.9355
	CSFC63X	0.9563	0.8915	0.9323
	LIBLB63X	0.8960	0.7533	0.8407
2	IPAA63	0.8085	0.6709	0.8298
	NAB63	0.8948	0.8756	0.9786
	NFIB63	0.8826	0.7494	0.8491
	AFT63	0.9061	0.8009	0.8839
	AFICIO3X	0.9582	0.8588	0.8963
	APSCM63X	0.8141	0.6878	0.8449
	CFA63X	0.9198	0.8384	0.9115
	COCUS63X	0.9342	0.8175	0.8751
	CWA63X	0.9624	0.8580	0.8915
	IFCW63X	0.9464	0.8729	0.9223
	EUSCRG63	0.7794	0.6933	0.8896
	NASC63X	0.9540	0.9095	0.9534
	PAB63X	0.9044	0.8577	0.9483
	SCIT63X	0.9681	0.8673	0.8959
	SOCWK63X	0.9110	0.8781	0.9639
	UAW63X	0.9759	0.8964	0.9185
	LCTY63X	0.8317	0.7389	0.8883
	UMW63X	0.9014	0.7987	0.8861
	WCMAC63X	0.8280	0.7893	0.9533
	ACTIV63X	0.7892	0.6457	0.8181

TABLE 40 - Continued.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER  
SOLUTIONS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER	3			
		ASC63	0.9141	0.8316
		NALU63	0.7329	0.6723
		ACLU63	0.8539	0.7368
		ADA63X	0.9571	0.8973
		CNFMP63X	0.9107	0.7434
		FCNL63X	0.9607	0.8574
CLUSTER	4			
		TMSTR63	0.8703	0.7133
		CARP63	0.8889	0.7224
		CCE63X	0.9000	0.7040
		NTV63X	0.9205	0.8290
CLUSTER	5			
		NFO63X	0.8804	0.3706
		NFU63X	0.8804	0.6416
CLUSTER	6			
		NSPE63	0.8666	0.6761
		LCV63X	0.9308	0.7902
		GNCON63X	0.7587	0.5205
		PCCW63X	0.9124	0.8723

TABLE 41

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER  
SOLUTIONS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 7 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	10	10.000000	9.021856	0.9022	0.251379
2	20	20.000000	17.870208	0.8935	0.318590
3	6	6.000000	5.329389	0.8882	0.317842
4	4	4.000000	3.579633	0.8949	0.254778
5	2	2.000000	1.760757	0.8804	0.239243
6	3	3.000000	2.777624	0.9259	0.145347
7	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 41.33947      PROPORTION = 0.898664

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
1	CHVC63	0.9252	0.8275	0.8943
	NCAC63	0.8553	0.7788	0.9106
	LCCR63	0.8934	0.8368	0.9366
	CCNS63	0.9336	0.8261	0.8849
	WPC63	0.8564	0.7515	0.8775
	NEA63	0.8112	0.7703	0.9496
	ACA63X	0.9405	0.8809	0.9367
	ACU63X	0.9540	0.8925	0.9355
	CSFC63X	0.9563	0.8915	0.9323
	LIBLB63X	0.8960	0.7533	0.8407
	2	IPAA63	0.8085	0.7006
NAB63		0.8948	0.8756	0.9786
NFIB63		0.8826	0.7494	0.8491
AFT63		0.9061	0.8009	0.8839
AFLCIO3X		0.9582	0.8588	0.8963
AFSCM63X		0.8141	0.6878	0.8449
CFA63X		0.9198	0.8619	0.9371
COCUS63X		0.9342	0.8175	0.8751
CWA63X		0.9624	0.8580	0.8915
IFCW63X		0.9464	0.8729	0.9223
BUSORG63		0.7794	0.6933	0.8896
NASC63X		0.9540	0.9095	0.9534
PAR63X		0.9044	0.8577	0.9483
SCIT63X		0.9681	0.8673	0.8959
SOCWK63X		0.9110	0.8781	0.9639
UAW63X		0.9759	0.8964	0.9185
LCTY63X		0.8317	0.7587	0.9122
UMW63X		0.9014	0.8434	0.9356
WOMAC63X		0.8280	0.7893	0.9533
ACTWV63X		0.7892	0.6457	0.8181

TABLE 41 - Continued.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER  
SOLUTIONS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER	3				
		ASC63	0.9141	0.8316	0.9098
		NALU63	0.7329	0.6723	0.9173
		ACLU63	0.8539	0.7368	0.8628
		ADA63X	0.9571	0.8973	0.9375
		CNFMP63X	0.9107	0.7569	0.8312
		FCNL63X	0.9607	0.8574	0.8924
CLUSTER	4				
		TMSTB63	0.8703	0.7133	0.8197
		CARP63	0.8889	0.7224	0.8127
		CCE63X	0.9000	0.7040	0.7822
		NTV63X	0.9205	0.8290	0.9006
CLUSTER	5				
		NFO63X	0.8804	0.3706	0.4209
		NFU63X	0.8804	0.6416	0.7288
CLUSTER	6				
		NSPE63	0.8996	0.6761	0.7516
		LCV63X	0.9345	0.7902	0.8457
		PCCW63X	0.9436	0.8723	0.9245
CLUSTER	7				
		GNCON63X	1.0000	0.6140	0.6140

TABLE 42

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 8 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	10	10.000000	9.021856	0.9022	0.251379
2	20	20.000000	17.870208	0.8935	0.318590
3	6	6.000000	5.329389	0.8882	0.317842
4	4	4.000000	3.579633	0.8949	0.254778
5	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
6	3	3.000000	2.777624	0.9259	0.149347
7	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
8	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 41.57871      PROPORTION = 0.903885

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
1	CHVC63	0.9252	0.8275	0.8943
	NCAC63	0.8553	0.7788	0.9106
	LCCR63	0.8934	0.8368	0.9366
	CONS63	0.9336	0.8261	0.8849
	WPC63	0.8564	0.7515	0.8775
	NEA63	0.8112	0.7703	0.9496
	ACA63X	0.9405	0.8809	0.9367
	ACU63X	0.9540	0.8925	0.9355
	CSFC63X	0.9563	0.8915	0.9323
	LIBLB63X	0.8960	0.7533	0.8407
2	IPAA63	0.8085	0.7006	0.8665
	NAB63	0.8948	0.8756	0.9786
	NFIB63	0.8826	0.7494	0.8491
	AFT63	0.9061	0.8009	0.8839
	AFLCIO3X	0.9582	0.8588	0.8963
	AFSCM63X	0.8141	0.6878	0.8449
	CFA63X	0.9198	0.8619	0.9371
	COCUS63X	0.9342	0.8175	0.8751
	CWA63X	0.9624	0.8580	0.8915
	IFCW63X	0.9464	0.8729	0.9223
	BUSCRG63	0.7794	0.6933	0.8896
	NASC63X	0.9540	0.9095	0.9534
	PAB63X	0.9044	0.8577	0.9483
	SCITE63X	0.9681	0.8673	0.8959
	SOCWK63X	0.9110	0.8781	0.9639
	UAW63X	0.9759	0.8964	0.9185
	LCTY63X	0.8317	0.7587	0.9122
	UMW63X	0.9014	0.8434	0.9356
	WOMAC63X	0.8280	0.7893	0.9533
	ACTWV63X	0.7892	0.6457	0.8181

TABLE 42 - Continued.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER  
SOLUTIONS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER	3			
		ASC63	0.9141	0.8316
		NALU63	0.7329	0.6723
		ACLU63	0.8539	0.7368
		ADA63X	0.9571	0.8973
		CNFMP63X	0.9107	0.7569
		FCNL63X	0.9607	0.8574
CLUSTER	4			
		TMSTR63	0.8703	0.7133
		CARP63	0.8889	0.7224
		CCE63X	0.9000	0.7095
		NIV63X	0.9205	0.8290
CLUSTER	5			
		NFU63X	1.0000	0.6416
CLUSTER	6			
		NSPE63	0.8996	0.6761
		LCV63X	0.9345	0.7902
		PCCW63X	0.9436	0.8723
CLUSTER	7			
		GNCON63X	1.0000	0.6140
CLUSTER	8			
		NFO63X	1.0000	0.5788



TABLE 43

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER  
SOLUTIONS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF VOTERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 9 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PERCENTAGE EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	10	10.000000	9.021856	0.9022	0.251379
2	20	20.000000	17.870208	0.8935	0.318590
3	5	5.000000	4.639102	0.9278	0.176202
4	4	4.000000	3.579633	0.8949	0.254778
5	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
6	3	3.000000	2.777624	0.9259	0.149347
7	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
8	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
9	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 41.88842      PROPORTION = 0.910618

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
1	CHVC63	0.9252	0.8341	0.9014
	NCAC63	0.8553	0.7764	0.9078
	LCCR63	0.8934	0.8368	0.9366
	CONS63	0.9336	0.8190	0.8773
	WPC63	0.8564	0.7525	0.8786
	NEA63	0.8112	0.7703	0.9496
	ACA63X	0.9405	0.8809	0.9367
	ACU63X	0.9540	0.8925	0.9355
	CSFC63X	0.9563	0.8915	0.9323
	LIBLE63X	0.8960	0.7533	0.8407
2	IPAA63	0.8085	0.7006	0.8665
	NAB63	0.8948	0.8756	0.9786
	NFIB63	0.8826	0.7494	0.8491
	AFT63	0.9061	0.7925	0.8746
	AFLCIO3X	0.9582	0.8588	0.8963
	AFSCM63X	0.8141	0.6878	0.8449
	CFA63X	0.9198	0.8619	0.9371
	COCUS63X	0.9342	0.8175	0.8751
	CWA63X	0.9624	0.8580	0.8915
	IFCW63X	0.9464	0.8729	0.9223
	BUSORRG63	0.7794	0.6933	0.8896
	NASC63X	0.9540	0.9095	0.9534
	PAR63X	0.9044	0.8577	0.9483
	SCIT63X	0.9681	0.8673	0.8959
	SOCWK63X	0.9110	0.8781	0.9639
	UAW63X	0.9759	0.8964	0.9185
	LCTY63X	0.8317	0.7587	0.9122
	UMW63X	0.9014	0.8434	0.9356
	WOMAC63X	0.8280	0.7893	0.9533
	ACTWV63X	0.7892	0.6457	0.8181

TABLE 43 - Continued.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER  
SOLUTIONS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER	3			
		ASC63	0.9256	0.8316
		ACLU63	0.8682	0.7368
		ADA63X	0.9587	0.8973
		CNFMP63X	0.9256	0.7569
		PCNL63X	0.9609	0.8574
CLUSTER	4			
		TMSTR63	0.8703	0.7133
		CARP63	0.8889	0.7224
		CCE63X	0.9000	0.7095
		NTV63X	0.9205	0.8290
CLUSTER	5			
		NFU63X	1.0000	0.6416
CLUSTER	6			
		NSPE63	0.8996	0.6761
		LCV63X	0.9345	0.7882
		PCCW63X	0.9436	0.8723
CLUSTER	7			
		GNCON63X	1.0000	0.6140
CLUSTER	8			
		NFO63X	1.0000	0.5788
CLUSTER	9			
		NALU63	1.0000	0.6723

TABLE 44

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER  
SOLUTIONS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 10 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	10	10.000000	9.021856	0.9022	0.251379
2	18	18.000000	16.294207	0.9052	0.285468
3	5	5.000000	4.639102	0.9278	0.176202
4	4	4.000000	3.579633	0.8949	0.254778
5	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
6	3	3.000000	2.777624	0.9259	0.149347
7	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
8	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
9	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
10	2	2.000000	1.818037	0.9090	0.181963

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 42.13046      PROPORTION = 0.91588

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
1	CHVC63	0.9252	0.8341	0.9014
	NCAC63	0.8553	0.7764	0.9078
	LCCR63	0.8934	0.8431	0.9437
	CONS63	0.9336	0.8190	0.8773
	WPC63	0.8564	0.7525	0.8786
	NEA63	0.8112	0.7766	0.9573
	ACA63X	0.9405	0.8825	0.9383
	ACU63X	0.9540	0.8944	0.9375
	CSFC63X	0.9563	0.8943	0.9351
2	LIBLB63X	0.8960	0.7584	0.8465
	NAB63	0.9002	0.8756	0.9727
	NFIB63	0.8838	0.7542	0.8534
	AFT63	0.9090	0.7925	0.8719
	AFLCIO3X	0.9534	0.8739	0.9167
	AFSCM63X	0.8165	0.6878	0.8424
	CFA63X	0.9178	0.8619	0.9391
	COCUS63X	0.9308	0.8401	0.9026
	CWA63X	0.9583	0.8703	0.9081
	IFCW63X	0.9474	0.8729	0.9213
	BUSORBG63	0.7805	0.6933	0.8883
	NASC63X	0.9551	0.9095	0.9521
	PAB63X	0.9058	0.8577	0.9469
	SCIT63X	0.9684	0.8673	0.8956
	SOCWK63X	0.9160	0.8781	0.9587
	UAM63X	0.9773	0.8964	0.9172
	LCTY63X	0.8362	0.7587	0.9072
	UMM63X	0.9040	0.8434	0.9329
	WOMAC63X	0.8334	0.7893	0.9471

TABLE 44 - Continued.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER  
SOLUTIONS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF VOTERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER	3			
		ASC63	0.9256	0.8316
		ACLU63	0.8682	0.7368
		ALA63X	0.9587	0.9021
		CNFMP63X	0.9256	0.7569
		FCNL63X	0.9609	0.8574
CLUSTER	4			
		TMSTB63	0.8703	0.7167
		CARP63	0.8889	0.7235
		CCE63X	0.9000	0.7095
		NTV63X	0.9205	0.8290
CLUSTER	5			
		NPU63X	1.0000	0.6416
CLUSTER	6			
		NSPE63	0.8996	0.6731
		LCV63X	0.9345	0.7882
		PCCW63X	0.9436	0.8708
CLUSTER	7			
		GNCON63X	1.0000	0.6140
CLUSTER	8			
		NFO63X	1.0000	0.5788
CLUSTER	9			
		NALU63	1.0000	0.6781
CLUSTER	10			
		IPAA63	0.9090	0.7866
		ACTWV63X	0.9090	0.7660

disconcerted by C4's membership.

When the algorithm is truncated at ten clusters [Table 44], the following points may be noted. With the exception of the Woman's Political Caucus and the National Education Association, the remainder of C1 appears to be composed members of a conservative orientation. If C1 is "conservative," then C3 is liberal. The fourth cluster, C4, appears to be of a conservative nature; however that conservatism may have more of an economic orientation than C1. It is the largest cluster, C2, that is the most interesting. It contains most of the generic business organizations, such as the Chamber and the National Federation of Independent Business as well as a broad range of labor unions. This mixture, after ten iterations, indicates a large degree of overlap in the instrumental goals of business and labor organizations relative to the set of raters.

In Table 45 the intercluster correlation coefficients are given for the ten cluster House solution. The two conservative clusters, C1 and C4, have a high positive correlation of .895. They both have large negative correlations with C3, the liberal cluster. They have larger negative correlations to the business/labor cluster, C2, than to the liberal cluster.

TABLE 45

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER  
SOLUTIONS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

INTER-CLUSTER CORRELATIONS

CLUSTER	1	2	3	4	5
1	1.000000	-.944851	-.930485	0.895928	-.754637
2	-.944851	1.000000	0.920405	-.896525	0.691525
3	-.930485	0.920405	1.000000	-.759759	0.617367
4	0.895928	-.896525	-.759759	1.000000	-.801004
5	-.754637	0.691525	0.617367	-.801004	1.000000
6	-.835995	0.902947	0.911050	-.693268	0.551224
7	0.616517	-.651537	-.724022	0.462508	-.362365
8	-.581433	0.505742	0.478546	-.608743	0.760757
9	0.799661	-.823479	-.802583	0.713829	-.545762
10	-.850218	0.924084	0.813919	-.827176	0.635502

CLUSTER	6	7	8	9	10
1	-.835995	0.616517	-.581433	0.799661	-.850218
2	0.902947	-.651537	0.505742	-.823479	0.924084
3	0.911050	-.724022	0.478546	-.802583	0.813919
4	-.693268	0.462508	-.608743	0.713829	-.827176
5	0.551224	-.362365	0.760757	-.545762	0.635502
6	1.000000	-.783594	0.422135	-.771895	0.845683
7	-.783594	1.000000	-.402675	0.585824	-.607460
8	0.422135	-.402675	1.000000	-.406693	0.481797
9	-.771895	0.585824	-.406693	1.000000	-.729616
10	0.845683	-.607460	0.481797	-.729616	1.000000

The results from cluster analyzing forty-seven diverse organizations on their ratings of members of the House of Representatives indicate that dichotomous representations of politics, such as liberal/conservative or business/labor, offer little insight into the instrumental goals of interest groups.

### Senate

As in the House, when Senate member ratings are used the formation of clusters having an apparent internal political consistency does not take place early in the clustering process. For example, at the three and four cluster level, [Table 46 and 47] C3 contains the National Society of Professional Engineers, the General Contractors, and the League of Conservation Voters. However, by the fifth iteration [Table 48], C1 and C5 begin to resemble somewhat traditional representations of business and labor. Although four of C1's 16 members are business organizations, only the NFIB is a generic business group. Eight of the cluster's 16 members are labor unions. C5 is primarily a mixture of large business associations and conservatively oriented groups.

As the algorithm progresses, further splitting does not seem to add much refinement to the gross

TABLE 46

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 2 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	26	26.000000	21.401237	0.8231	0.903373
2	20	20.000000	15.191778	0.7596	0.899635

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 36.59302      PROPORTION = 0.7955

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
1	IPAA63	0.7379	0.6015	0.8151
	NAB63	0.8485	0.7586	0.8941
	NALU63	0.5745	0.5100	0.8878
	NFIB63	0.8157	0.6683	0.8199
	CONS63	0.8742	0.7914	0.9053
	TMSTR63	0.8043	0.5990	0.7447
	CARP63	0.5596	0.2565	0.4584
	ACA63X	0.9483	0.7922	0.8353
	ACU63X	0.9352	0.8541	0.9133
	AFLCIO3X	0.9479	0.8617	0.9091
	AFSCM63X	0.6992	0.6169	0.8823
	CCE63X	0.9184	0.7047	0.7673
	CCCUS63X	0.9313	0.8035	0.8627
	CSFC63X	0.9632	0.8851	0.9189
	CWA63X	0.9444	0.8206	0.8690
	IFCW63X	0.8859	0.8530	0.9629
	BUSORG63	0.8848	0.6976	0.7884
	NASC63X	0.9369	0.8372	0.8936
	NFO63X	0.6776	0.4961	0.7322
	NFU63X	0.8164	0.6604	0.8089
	NTV63X	0.8563	0.7012	0.8189
	SCIT63X	0.8766	0.8288	0.9456
	UAW63X	0.9628	0.8812	0.9153
	LIBLB63X	0.5121	0.3788	0.7398
	UHM63X	0.6674	0.5675	0.8503
	ACTWV63X	0.8225	0.6615	0.8042



TABLE 46 - Continued.

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER	2			
ASC63	0.7937	0.7629	0.9612	
CHVC63	0.8796	0.8363	0.9508	
NCAC63	0.8469	0.7864	0.9285	
NSPE63	0.6316	0.4035	0.6388	
LCCR63	0.6938	0.6205	0.8944	
ACLU63	0.7664	0.4798	0.6261	
WPC63	0.7822	0.7141	0.9129	
AFT63	0.6079	0.5684	0.9350	
NEA63	0.4883	0.3800	0.7783	
LCV63X	0.6211	0.3456	0.5565	
AEA63X	0.9442	0.8311	0.8802	
CFA63X	0.8508	0.8002	0.9405	
CNFMF63X	0.7789	0.5811	0.7461	
PCNL63X	0.8440	0.6820	0.8080	
GNCON63X	0.7935	0.7352	0.9266	
PAR63X	0.7374	0.6812	0.9238	
PCCW63X	0.8001	0.6242	0.7801	
SOCWK63X	0.9121	0.8326	0.9129	
LCTY63X	0.7616	0.7304	0.9590	
WOMAC63X	0.6577	0.4707	0.7157	

TABLE 47

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 3 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	28	28.000000	22.725286	0.8116	1.069782
2	13	13.000000	10.319004	0.7938	0.598988
3	5	5.000000	4.136811	0.8274	0.429534

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 37.18113      PROPORTION = 0.808285

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
1	IPAA63	0.7347	0.5928	0.8069
	NAB63	0.8499	0.7731	0.9096
	NALU63	0.5772	0.4925	0.8532
	NFIB63	0.8151	0.6660	0.8171
	CONS63	0.8694	0.8265	0.9506
	TMSTR63	0.8042	0.5876	0.7306
	AFT63	0.5955	0.5539	0.9301
	CARP63	0.5493	0.2632	0.4791
	ACA63X	0.9418	0.7987	0.8481
	ACU63X	0.9329	0.8806	0.9439
	AFLCIO3X	0.9540	0.8394	0.8799
	AFSCM63X	0.7076	0.5921	0.8368
	CCE63X	0.9087	0.7162	0.7881
	COCUS63X	0.9288	0.7826	0.8427
	CSFC63X	0.9615	0.8916	0.9274
	CMA63X	0.9497	0.7985	0.8408
	IFCW63X	0.8931	0.8315	0.9310
	BUSORG63	0.8784	0.6829	0.7774
	NASC63X	0.9358	0.8262	0.8829
	NFO63X	0.6646	0.5092	0.7662
	NFU63X	0.8098	0.6586	0.8132
	NTV63X	0.8513	0.7302	0.8578
	SCIT63X	0.8830	0.8073	0.9143
	UAW63X	0.9672	0.8625	0.8917
	LCTY63X	0.7528	0.7093	0.9423
	LIBLB63X	0.5023	0.4051	0.8065
	UMW63X	0.6799	0.5328	0.7836
	ACTWV63X	0.8267	0.6278	0.7594

TABLE 47 - Continued.

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER	2				
		ASC63	0.8011	0.7679	0.9586
		CHVC63	0.9081	0.8350	0.9195
		NCAC63	0.8671	0.7885	0.9094
		LCCR63	0.7151	0.6208	0.8681
		ACLU63	0.7704	0.6814	0.8845
		WPC63	0.8306	0.7126	0.8579
		NEA63	0.5436	0.3855	0.7092
		ADA63X	0.9269	0.8413	0.9077
		CNFMP63X	0.7758	0.6573	0.8473
		FCNL63X	0.8283	0.7515	0.9073
		PAR63X	0.7354	0.6818	0.9271
		SOCWK63X	0.9112	0.8441	0.9264
		WCMAC63X	0.7056	0.5085	0.7208
CLUSTER	3				
		NSPE63	0.7611	0.5595	0.7351
		LCV63X	0.8055	0.5321	0.6606
		CFA63X	0.8573	0.8065	0.9407
		GNCON63X	0.8127	0.7456	0.9174
		PCCW63X	0.9002	0.7280	0.8087

TABLE 48

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 4 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	28	28.000000	22.725286	0.8116	1.069782
2	12	12.000000	9.800979	0.8167	0.577260
3	5	5.000000	4.136841	0.8274	0.429534
4	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 37.66311      PROPORTION = 0.818763

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
1	IPAA63	0.7347	0.5928	0.8069
	NAB63	0.8499	0.7732	0.9098
	NALU63	0.5772	0.5041	0.8733
	NFIB63	0.8151	0.6738	0.8266
	CONS63	0.8694	0.8279	0.9522
	TMSTR63	0.8042	0.5935	0.7380
	AFT63	0.5955	0.5531	0.9288
	CARP63	0.5493	0.2666	0.4854
	ACA63X	0.9418	0.8045	0.8542
	ACU63X	0.9329	0.8775	0.9405
	AFLCIO3X	0.9540	0.8472	0.8881
	AFSCM63X	0.7076	0.5971	0.8437
	CCE63X	0.9087	0.7180	0.7901
	COCUS63X	0.9288	0.7891	0.8497
	CSFC63X	0.9615	0.8939	0.9298
	CWA63X	0.9497	0.8029	0.8453
	IFCW63X	0.8931	0.8353	0.9352
	BUSORG63	0.8784	0.6916	0.7873
	MASC63X	0.9358	0.8316	0.8886
	NFO63X	0.6646	0.5151	0.7751
	NFO63X	0.8098	0.6654	0.8216
	MTV63X	0.8513	0.7291	0.8564
	SCIT63X	0.8830	0.8140	0.9219
	UAW63X	0.9672	0.8676	0.8970
	LCTY63X	0.7528	0.7124	0.9464
	LIBLB63X	0.5023	0.4029	0.8022
	UMW63X	0.6799	0.5447	0.8012
	ACTHW63X	0.8267	0.6327	0.7652

TABLE 48 - Continued.

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER	2			
		ASC63	0.8042	0.7679
		CHVC63	0.9002	0.8350
		NCAC63	0.8647	0.7885
		LCCR63	0.7277	0.6208
		ACLU63	0.7674	0.6814
		WPC63	0.8225	0.7126
		ADA63X	0.9342	0.8413
		CNFMP63X	0.7805	0.6573
		FCNL63X	0.8333	0.7515
		PAR63X	0.7492	0.6818
		SOCWK63X	0.9110	0.8441
		WONAC63X	0.7062	0.5085
CLUSTER	3			
		NSPE63	0.7611	0.5670
		LCV63X	0.8055	0.5442
		CFA63X	0.8573	0.8065
		GNCON63X	0.8127	0.7456
		PCCW63X	0.9002	0.7403
CLUSTER	4			
		NEA63	1.0000	0.4924

TABLE 49

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF STATES

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 5 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	16	16.000000	13.353031	0.8346	0.464631
2	12	12.000000	9.800979	0.8167	0.577260
3	3	3.000000	2.596898	0.8656	0.246940
4	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
5	14	14.000000	11.685256	0.8347	0.504681

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 38.43616      PROPORTION = 0.835569

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		CWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
CLUSTER 1	NAB63	0.8383	0.8040	0.9591
	NALU63	0.6178	0.5041	0.8160
	NFIB63	0.8173	0.7531	0.9214
	AFT63	0.6579	0.5531	0.8407
	AFPCIO3X	0.9706	0.8833	0.9101
	AFSCM63X	0.7366	0.6297	0.8550
	CFA63X	0.8487	0.8018	0.9448
	CWA63X	0.9581	0.8833	0.9219
	GNCON63X	0.8012	0.7336	0.9156
	IPCW63X	0.9249	0.8353	0.9031
	NASC63X	0.9185	0.8990	0.9787
	SCIT63X	0.8951	0.8160	0.9116
	UAM63X	0.9704	0.9105	0.9383
	LCTY63X	0.8273	0.7124	0.8612
UMW63X	0.7397	0.5721	0.7735	
ACTWV63X	0.8309	0.7740	0.9315	
CLUSTER 2	ASC63	0.8042	0.7556	0.9395
	CHVC63	0.9002	0.8362	0.9290
	NCAC63	0.8647	0.7752	0.8965
	LCCR63	0.7277	0.6238	0.8572
	ACLU63	0.7674	0.6583	0.8579
	WPC63	0.8225	0.7067	0.8593
	ADA63X	0.9342	0.8735	0.9351
	CMPMP63X	0.7805	0.6453	0.8267
	FCNL63X	0.8333	0.7212	0.8654
	PAB63X	0.7492	0.6940	0.9263
	SOCWR63X	0.9110	0.8942	0.9815
WOMAC63X	0.7062	0.4711	0.6670	
CLUSTER 3	NSPE63	0.8507	0.5670	0.6665
	LCV63X	0.8978	0.5442	0.6061
	PCCW63X	0.8483	0.7403	0.8726
CLUSTER 4	NEA63	1.0000	0.4924	0.4924

TABLE 49 - Continued.

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER	5			
IPAA63	0.7628	0.6756	0.8856	
CONS63	0.8783	0.8279	0.9426	
TMSTR63	0.8038	0.7548	0.9390	
CARP63	0.6008	0.4609	0.7671	
ACA63X	0.9547	0.8767	0.9212	
ACU63X	0.9318	0.8779	0.9421	
CCE63X	0.9440	0.8174	0.8658	
COCUS63X	0.9134	0.8962	0.9812	
CSFC63X	0.9579	0.9180	0.9510	
BUSOR63	0.8989	0.8103	0.9014	
MFO63X	0.7457	0.5497	0.7372	
NFU63X	0.8531	0.7212	0.8454	
NTV63X	0.8563	0.7844	0.9161	
LIBLB63X	0.5867	0.4029	0.6868	

TABLE 50

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 6 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	16	16.000000	13.614021	0.8509	0.456858
2	6	6.000000	4.995402	0.8326	0.339398
3	4	4.000000	3.330644	0.8327	0.292830
4	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
5	14	14.000000	11.685256	0.8347	0.504681
6	5	5.000000	4.322043	0.8644	0.338730

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 38.94736      PROPORTION = 0.846682

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
CLUSTER 1	NAB63	0.8476	0.8040	0.9486
	NALU63	0.6225	0.5037	0.8091
	NPIB63	0.8204	0.7531	0.9179
	AFLCIO3X	0.9702	0.8833	0.9105
	AFSCH63X	0.7389	0.6297	0.8522
	CFA63X	0.8508	0.7757	0.9118
	CWA63X	0.9561	0.8833	0.9239
	GNCOM63X	0.7963	0.7407	0.9302
	IFCW63X	0.9310	0.8122	0.8724
	NASC63X	0.9211	0.8990	0.9760
	SCIT63X	0.8988	0.8160	0.9079
	SOCHK63X	0.9077	0.8555	0.9426
	UAW63X	0.9689	0.9105	0.9397
	LCTY63X	0.8305	0.6979	0.8404
	UMW63X	0.7323	0.5721	0.7812
	ACTHW63X	0.8208	0.7740	0.9429
CLUSTER 2	CHVC63	0.9083	0.8362	0.9206
	NCAC63	0.8951	0.7863	0.8785
	LCCB63	0.7866	0.6346	0.8067
	WPC63	0.8634	0.7067	0.8186
	PAR63X	0.7968	0.7064	0.8866
	WOMAC63X	0.7452	0.5442	0.7303
CLUSTER 3	NSPE63	0.8209	0.5447	0.6636
	ACLU63	0.7976	0.6873	0.8617
	LCV63X	0.8657	0.5023	0.5803
	PCCW63X	0.8464	0.6936	0.8195
CLUSTER 4	NEA63	1.0000	0.4765	0.4765



TABLE 50 - Continued.

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER	5			
	IPAA63	0.7628	0.6709	0.8796
	CONS63	0.8783	0.8105	0.9228
	TMSTR63	0.8038	0.7477	0.9303
	CARP63	0.6008	0.4508	0.7503
	ACA63X	0.9517	0.8797	0.9243
	ACU63X	0.9318	0.8822	0.9467
	CCE63X	0.9440	0.8207	0.8693
	COCUS63X	0.9134	0.8975	0.9826
	CSFC63X	0.9579	0.9145	0.9547
	BUSORG63	0.8989	0.8059	0.8965
	NPO63X	0.7457	0.5640	0.7563
	NPU63X	0.8531	0.7218	0.8462
	NIV63X	0.8563	0.7964	0.9301
	LIBLB63X	0.5867	0.4308	0.7342
CLUSTER	6			
	ASC63	0.8889	0.7551	0.8495
	AFT63	0.7242	0.6229	0.8601
	ADA63X	0.9126	0.8755	0.9593
	CNFMF63X	0.8848	0.6498	0.7344
	FCNL63X	0.9115	0.7201	0.7900

dimensions present at the fifth iteration. For example at the eighth iteration [Table 51] C2 has two Christian groups, the ACLU, and two woman's groups. C1 retains three business organizations; C5 contains conservative organizations, such as Conservatives Against Liberal Legislation along with major business organizations.

At ten iterations [Table 54], a scan down the  $R^2$  Ratio column reveals numerous values with  $R^2$  ratio above .85. There is not clear separation among the set of clusters. If one were to name the four clusters having more than three members, C1 is labor, although it contains the Chamber, General Contractors, and small business (NFIB). C2 is a Christian/Conservative collection with the Woman's Political Caucus being the most anomalous member. Business might be the name for C5, although it contains the Teamsters' and Carpenters' unions and both farm organizations. Cluster 6 is a liberal cluster. Inspection of the inter-cluster correlations [Table 55] shows, C1, C5, and C6, the labor, business, and liberal clusters to be positively and strongly correlated. The correlation of C2, the conservative cluster, with the above three clusters is strongly negative.

The results of clustering a diverse group of 47 organizations on their similarities in rating members

TABLE 51

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS  
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS  
CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 7 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	15	15.000000	13.009600	0.8673	0.409593
2	6	6.000000	4.995402	0.8326	0.339398
3	4	4.000000	3.330644	0.8327	0.292830
4	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
5	14	14.000000	11.685256	0.8347	0.504681
6	5	5.000000	4.322043	0.8644	0.338730
7	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 39.34294      PROPORTION = 0.855281

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
CLUSTER 1	NAB63	0.8494	0.8040	0.9466
	NFIB63	0.8232	0.7531	0.9148
	AFICIO3X	0.9691	0.8833	0.9115
	AFSCH63X	0.7467	0.6297	0.8434
	CFA63X	0.8506	0.7757	0.9120
	CWA63X	0.9530	0.8833	0.9269
	GNCON63X	0.7973	0.7407	0.9290
	IPCH63X	0.9316	0.8122	0.8719
	NASC63X	0.9211	0.8990	0.9760
	SCIT63X	0.8999	0.8160	0.9068
	SOCHK63X	0.9069	0.8555	0.9434
	UAW63X	0.9684	0.9105	0.9402
	LCTY63X	0.8321	0.6979	0.8388
	UMW63X	0.7340	0.5721	0.7795
ACTHW63X	0.8264	0.7740	0.9365	
CLUSTER 2	CHVC63	0.9083	0.8362	0.9206
	NCAC63	0.8951	0.7935	0.8865
	LCCR63	0.7866	0.6351	0.8073
	WPC63	0.8634	0.7067	0.8186
	PAR63X	0.7968	0.7017	0.8807
	WOMAC63X	0.7452	0.5442	0.7303
CLUSTER 3	NSPE63	0.8209	0.5447	0.6636
	ACLU63	0.7976	0.6873	0.8617
	LCV63X	0.8657	0.5023	0.5803
	PCCW63X	0.8464	0.6936	0.8195
CLUSTER 4	NEA63	1.0000	0.4765	0.4765

TABLE 51 - Continued.

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER				
CLUSTER 5	IPAA63	0.7628	0.6754	0.8854
	CONS63	0.8783	0.8111	0.9236
	INSTR63	0.8038	0.7554	0.9399
	CARP63	0.6008	0.4477	0.7451
	ACA63X	0.9517	0.8830	0.9278
	ACU63X	0.9318	0.8840	0.9486
	CCE63X	0.9440	0.8230	0.8718
	COCUS63X	0.9134	0.8967	0.9818
	CSFC63X	0.9579	0.9159	0.9561
	BUSORG63	0.8989	0.8079	0.8987
	NFO63X	0.7457	0.5640	0.7563
	NFU63X	0.8531	0.7242	0.8489
	NTV63X	0.8563	0.7989	0.9330
	LIBLB63X	0.5867	0.4308	0.7342
CLUSTER 6	ASC63	0.8889	0.7544	0.8487
	AFT63	0.7242	0.6260	0.8645
	ADA63X	0.9126	0.8747	0.9585
	CNFMP63X	0.8848	0.6498	0.7344
	FCNL63X	0.9115	0.7224	0.7925
CLUSTER 7	NALU63	1.0000	0.5860	0.5860

TABLE 52

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF STATES

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 8 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	15	15.000000	13.009600	0.8673	0.409593
2	5	5.000000	4.258289	0.8517	0.300978
3	3	3.000000	2.596898	0.8656	0.246940
4	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
5	14	14.000000	11.685256	0.8347	0.504681
6	5	5.000000	4.322043	0.8644	0.338730
7	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
8	2	2.000000	1.808764	0.9044	0.191236

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 39.68085      PROPORTION = 0.862627

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
CLUSTER 1	NAB63	0.8494	0.8040	0.9466
	NPFB63	0.8232	0.7531	0.9148
	APLCIO3X	0.9691	0.8833	0.9115
	APSCH63X	0.7467	0.6297	0.8434
	CFA63X	0.8506	0.7757	0.9120
	CWA63X	0.9530	0.8833	0.9269
	GNCON63X	0.7973	0.7407	0.9290
	IFCW63X	0.9316	0.8122	0.8719
	NASC63X	0.9211	0.8990	0.9760
	SCIT63X	0.8999	0.8160	0.9068
	SOCWK63X	0.9069	0.8436	0.9302
	UAM63X	0.9684	0.9105	0.9402
	LCTY63X	0.8321	0.6979	0.8388
	UMW63X	0.7340	0.5721	0.7795
ACTWV63X	0.8264	0.7740	0.9365	
CLUSTER 2	CHVC63	0.9210	0.8362	0.9080
	NCAC63	0.9020	0.7935	0.8797
	ACLU63	0.7896	0.6633	0.8400
	WPC63	0.8697	0.7067	0.8126
	WOMAC63X	0.7760	0.5545	0.7145
CLUSTER 3	NSPE63	0.8507	0.5447	0.6403
	LCV63X	0.8978	0.5153	0.5740
	PCCW63X	0.8483	0.6891	0.8122
CLUSTER 4	NEA63	1.0000	0.5423	0.5423

TABLE 52 - Continued.

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER	5			
		IPAA63	0.7628	0.6754
		CONS63	0.8783	0.8111
		TMSTR63	0.8038	0.7554
		CARP63	0.6008	0.4477
		ACA63X	0.9517	0.8830
		ACU63X	0.9318	0.8840
		CCE63X	0.9440	0.8230
		COCUS63X	0.9134	0.8967
		CSFC63X	0.9579	0.9159
		BUSOBG63	0.8989	0.8079
		NFO63X	0.7457	0.5511
		NFU63X	0.8531	0.7242
		NTV63X	0.8563	0.7989
		LIBLB63X	0.5867	0.4084
CLUSTER	6			
		ASC63	0.8889	0.7544
		APT63	0.7242	0.6260
		ADA63X	0.9126	0.8747
		CMFMP63X	0.8848	0.6601
		FCNL63X	0.9115	0.7224
CLUSTER	7			
		NALU63	1.0000	0.5860
CLUSTER	8			
		LCCB63	0.9044	0.6714
		PAR63X	0.9044	0.7017

TABLE 53

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 9 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	14	14.000000	12.094590	0.8639	0.402291
2	5	5.000000	4.258289	0.8517	0.300978
3	3	3.000000	2.596898	0.8656	0.246940
4	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
5	14	14.000000	12.036469	0.8597	0.492512
6	5	5.000000	4.322043	0.8644	0.338730
7	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
8	2	2.000000	1.808764	0.9044	0.191236
9	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 40.11705      PROPORTION = 0.87211

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH OWN CLUSTER	WITH NEXT HIGHEST	R**2 RATIO
CLUSTER 1	NAB63	0.8471	0.8134	0.9602
	NFIB63	0.8227	0.7686	0.9343
	AFLCIO3X	0.9678	0.8980	0.9280
	AFSCM63X	0.7499	0.6431	0.8577
	CFA63X	0.8501	0.7757	0.9125
	CWA63X	0.9506	0.9013	0.9481
	GNCON63X	0.7963	0.7407	0.9301
	IFCW63X	0.9341	0.8228	0.8808
	SCIT63X	0.8981	0.8329	0.9274
	SOCWK63X	0.9080	0.8436	0.9290
	UAW63X	0.9649	0.9255	0.9592
	LCTY63X	0.8400	0.6979	0.8309
	UMW63X	0.7398	0.5891	0.7963
	ACTWV63X	0.8252	0.7810	0.9464
CLUSTER 2	CHVC63	0.9210	0.8352	0.9068
	NCAC63	0.9020	0.7881	0.8738
	ACLU63	0.7896	0.6633	0.8400
	WPC63	0.8697	0.7040	0.8095
	WOMAC63X	0.7760	0.5545	0.7145
CLUSTER 3	NSPE63	0.8507	0.5447	0.6403
	LCV63X	0.8978	0.5153	0.5740
	PCCW63X	0.8483	0.6891	0.8122
CLUSTER 4	NEA63	1.0000	0.5423	0.5423

TABLE 53 - Continued.

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATES

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER	5				
		IPAA63	0.7611	0.6720	0.8829
		CONS63	0.8833	0.8026	0.9087
		TMSTR63	0.8023	0.7548	0.9409
		CARP63	0.5970	0.4409	0.7385
		ACA63X	0.9530	0.8761	0.9192
		ACU63X	0.9370	0.8778	0.9368
		CCE63X	0.9438	0.8160	0.8646
		COCUS63X	0.9264	0.8907	0.9614
		CSFC63X	0.9621	0.9099	0.9457
		BUSORG63	0.9068	0.7997	0.8819
		NASC63X	0.9225	0.9085	0.9848
		NFO63X	0.7365	0.5414	0.7351
		NFU63X	0.8564	0.7158	0.8358
		NTV63X	0.8482	0.7963	0.9388
CLUSTER	6				
		ASC63	0.8889	0.7499	0.8437
		AFT63	0.7242	0.6285	0.8679
		ADA63X	0.9126	0.8740	0.9576
		CNFMP63X	0.8848	0.6601	0.7460
		FCNL63X	0.9115	0.7200	0.7898
CLUSTER	7				
		NALU63	1.0000	0.5843	0.5843
CLUSTER	8				
		LCCR63	0.9044	0.6714	0.7424
		PAR63X	0.9044	0.6984	0.7722
CLUSTER	9				
		LIBLE63X	1.0000	0.5345	0.5345



TABLE 54

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS  
OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS  
CLUSTER SUMMARY FOR 10 CLUSTERS

CLUSTER	MEMBERS	CLUSTER VARIATION	VARIATION EXPLAINED	PROPORTION EXPLAINED	SECOND EIGENVALUE
1	15	15.000000	13.073895	0.8716	0.424359
2	9	9.000000	8.188569	0.9098	0.243740
3	3	3.000000	2.596898	0.8656	0.246940
4	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
5	7	7.000000	5.766864	0.8238	0.409421
6	5	5.000000	4.322043	0.8644	0.338730
7	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
8	2	2.000000	1.808764	0.9044	0.191236
9	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.0000	
10	2	2.000000	1.755081	0.8775	0.244919

TOTAL VARIATION EXPLAINED = 40.51211      PROPORTION = 0.880698

CLUSTER	VARIABLE	R-SQUARED WITH		R**2 RATIO
		OWN CLUSTER	NEXT HIGHEST	
CLUSTER 1	NFIB63	0.8210	0.7408	0.9023
	AFLCIO3X	0.9710	0.8871	0.9136
	AFSCM63X	0.7409	0.6523	0.8805
	CFA63X	0.8528	0.7757	0.9096
	COCUS63X	0.9100	0.8759	0.9626
	CWA63X	0.9566	0.8711	0.9106
	GNCON63X	0.8074	0.7407	0.9174
	IFCW63X	0.9347	0.8411	0.8998
	NASC63X	0.9234	0.8979	0.9724
	SCIT63X	0.9002	0.8313	0.9235
	SOCWK63X	0.9003	0.8582	0.9532
	UAW63X	0.9723	0.9142	0.9402
	LCTY63X	0.8245	0.6979	0.8465
	UMW63X	0.7258	0.5804	0.7997
ACTWV63X	0.8330	0.7464	0.8960	
CLUSTER 2	NAB63	0.8723	0.8288	0.9502
	CHVC63	0.9357	0.8046	0.8599
	NCAC63	0.8928	0.7858	0.8802
	CONS63	0.9155	0.8133	0.8884
	WPC63	0.8285	0.6940	0.8377
	ACA63X	0.9325	0.8920	0.9566
	ACU63X	0.9618	0.8835	0.9186
	CSFC63X	0.9740	0.9184	0.9429
	NIV63X	0.8755	0.7876	0.8996
CLUSTER 3	NSPE63	0.8507	0.5447	0.6403
	LCV63X	0.8978	0.5477	0.6101
	PCCW63X	0.8483	0.6891	0.8122
CLUSTER 4	NEA63	1.0000	0.4884	0.4884

TABLE 54 - Continued.

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

CLUSTER	5			
		IPAA63	0.7958	0.6847
		TMSTB63	0.8239	0.7563
		CARP63	0.6776	0.4497
		CCE63X	0.9303	0.8710
		BUSORG63	0.9144	0.8171
		NFO63X	0.7509	0.6688
		NFU63X	0.8738	0.7618
CLUSTER	6			
		ASC63	0.8889	0.7800
		AFT63	0.7242	0.6280
		ADA63X	0.9126	0.8749
		CNFMP63X	0.8848	0.6643
		FCNL63X	0.9115	0.7250
CLUSTER	7			
		NALU63	1.0000	0.5879
CLUSTER	8			
		LCCR63	0.9044	0.6484
		PAR63X	0.9044	0.6956
CLUSTER	9			
		LIBLB63X	1.0000	0.5347
CLUSTER	10			
		ACLU63	0.8775	0.6633
		WOMAC63X	0.8775	0.5899

TABLE 55

SENATE LEGISLATIVE RATING CLUSTER SOLUTIONS  
FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF RATERS

OBLIQUE PRINCIPAL COMPONENT CLUSTER ANALYSIS

INTER-CLUSTER CORRELATIONS

CLUSTER	1	2	3	4	5
1	1.000000	-.950602	0.779562	0.618645	0.913215
2	-.950602	1.000000	-.740336	-.698840	-.921292
3	0.779562	-.740336	1.000000	0.504448	0.635020
4	0.618645	-.698840	0.504448	1.000000	0.542004
5	0.913215	-.921292	0.635020	0.542004	1.000000
6	0.916282	-.893799	0.815152	0.652098	0.802991
7	-.766729	0.713162	-.575062	-.397714	-.684798
8	0.856434	-.861872	0.765281	0.540086	0.783823
9	-.638414	0.731247	-.436490	-.479177	-.723136
10	0.766156	-.815777	0.798843	0.668583	0.636510

CLUSTER	6	7	8	9	10
1	0.916282	-.766729	0.856434	-.638414	0.766156
2	-.893799	0.713162	-.861872	0.731247	-.815777
3	0.815152	-.575062	0.765281	-.436490	0.798843
4	0.652098	-.397714	0.540086	-.479177	0.668583
5	0.802991	-.684798	0.783823	-.723136	0.636510
6	1.000000	-.701255	0.794833	-.581610	0.828442
7	-.701255	1.000000	-.690478	0.429430	-.555548
8	0.794833	-.690478	1.000000	-.571948	0.798091
9	-.581610	0.429430	-.571948	1.000000	-.476351
10	0.828442	-.555548	0.798091	-.476351	1.000000

of the Senate throw doubt on the efficacy of using traditional definition of business/labor on conservative/liberal as dimensions or categories for PAC analysis. The memberships of the clusters at ten iterations show several clusters where co-members are from different origins. As important as the discrepancy between origin and instrumental goals are the frequent co-membership and the strong positive correlations among the business and labor organizations.

