Negative Complementizers: Interclausal Licensing of Negative Polarity Items

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NEGATIVE COMPLEMENTIZERS:
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0. Introduction: the central asymmetry.

Negative Polarity Items (henceforth NPI) can be licensed across clause boundaries without overt negation (Klima (1964), Ladusaw (1979), Linebarger (1980)):

(1) a. The witnesses denied [that anybody left the room before dinner]
     b. The professor doubts [that anybody understood her explanation]

It has been assumed since Klima (1964) that the negative force verbs like **deny** and **doubt** directly licenses the NPI in the embedded clause. Under this hypothesis, we expect the NPIs in (2) to be licensed as well, since they are complements of the same verbs **deny** and **doubt** in (1a) and (1b). However, as noted by Feldman (1985) and Progovac (1988), this is not the case[1]:

(2) a. *The witnesses denied anything
     b. *The professor doubts any explanation

The **any** determiners in (2) can only receive, very marginally, a 'free choice' reading, characteristic of **any**'s that are not licensed (Ladusaw (1979)). In this paper, I discuss in detail this asymmetry between clausal and non-clausal arguments of negative lexical items. I present an account of the asymmetry that crucially involves the C^0 selected by negative predicates to head their clausal complements. I argue that this negative

275

276
ITZIAR LAKA

Comp (C_{Ng}) is directly responsible for the licensing of the NPI, whereas the lexical item itself is not an NPI licenser. This predicts the results in (2), where no C_{Ng} is involved. Thus, under this hypothesis, the asymmetry in (1) versus (2) will depend strictly on the presence on the functional head C_{Ng}.

1. Three tests to distinguish licensed NPIs.

This contrast between clausal and non-clausal arguments of negative predicates holds consistently. I present three tests that discriminate between licensed and unlicensed **any**'s. In each of them, the sentences in (1) pattern as having licensed NPIs, whereas the sentences in (2) pattern like instances of unlicensed, 'free-choice' **any**.

1.1. The first test involves the particle **just**. Attachment of this element forces a 'free choice' interpretation of the DP headed by **any**[2]. The effect induced by **just** is seen comparing (3a) to (3b):

(3) a. I didn't eat anything, I starved
                    # I ate truffles
     b. I didn't eat just anything, I ate truffles
                    # I starved

In (3a), **anything** is licensed by sentence negation; (3a) has the same truth conditions as 'I ate nothing'. 'I starved' is an appropriate continuation for the sentence, unlike 'I ate truffles', which yields a contradiction. In (3b), however, the presence of **just** induces a significant change regarding the truth conditions of the sentence: now it must be the case that I ate something. Moreover, what I ate was out of the ordinary. **Just** forces the 'free choice' reading of the NPI, blocking the licensing of **any** by negation. Introducing **just** in an environment where **any** is otherwise licensed as an NPI induces a significant change in the conditions under which the sentence is true, whereas introducing **just** in a context where the constituent headed by **any** is interpreted as a 'free choice' variable does not alter the truth conditions of the sentence. Consider the results obtained when **just** is introduced in examples (1) and (2). If **just** is introduced in (2), the interpretation of the sentences does not change: (4a) and (4b) have the same truth conditions as (2a) and (2b):

(4) a. The witnesses denied just anything
     b. The teacher doubts just any explanation

NEGATIVE COMPLEMENTIZERS

If anything, the only change is that the sentences are now slightly more acceptable. This is so because **any** has only a 'free choice' reading in all the examples in (2) and (4), and **just** makes that reading more salient[3]. The sentences in (2) also become more easily acceptable with modals, and if the DP itself is modified (5):

(5) a. The witnesses will deny any statement made by the
         defendant
    b. The professor would doubt any explanation given
         by a student

These sentences sound less awkward that the ones in (2); but, even in these cases (and maybe even against the speaker's first intuition), the **any** determiners still have only a 'free choice' reading. Thus, if we introduce the adverb **just**, the truth conditions of the sentences do not change, a result that can only obtain if the DPs headed by **any** had a 'free choice' reading in (5):

(6) a. The witnesses will deny just any statement made
             by the defendant
  . b. The professor would doubt just any explanation
             given by a student

In contrast, when we consider the sentences in (1), they behave in a radically different way. Adding **just** to the sentences in (1) induces a sharp change in truth conditions, indicating that the **any** previous to the insertion of **just** was not 'free' but licensed:

(7) a. The witnesses denied that just anybody left the
             room before dinner
    b. The professor doubts that just anybody understood
             the explanation

The conditions under which the sentences in (7) and (1) are true are not the same. (7a) is true even if the witnesses agree that some people left the room before dinner. Their claim is that only certain people did it. By contrast, the sentence in (1a) is true if the witnesses are claiming that absolutely no one left the room before dinner. Similarly, in (7b), the sentence is true even if the professor believes that some of her students did understand the explanation, whereas in (1b) the professor believes that none did.

1.2. The second test for distinguishing 'free' and licensed NPIs involves substitution of the negative verbs for non-negative ones. In cases of 'free' **any**, this change has no consequences, whereas in cases of licensed

278
ITZIAR LAKA

NPIs it results in ungrammaticality, thus showing that
the choice of main verb is irrelevant in cases like (2),
whereas it is relevant in cases like (1). Consider the
sentences in (5), which are identical to those in (2)
except for the fact that modals and relative clauses have
been added to make them more acceptable. If the **any** in
(5) is a 'free choice' variable, then replacing **deny** or
doubt will have no effect on the acceptability of the **any**
constituent, which will remain 'free'. This is borne out:
If we substitute **repeat** and **believe** for **deny** and **doubt**,
(8), the sentences remain good and the **any**'s have the
same 'pick any' interpretation (Vendler (1967)) in (5):

(8) a. The witnesses will repeat any statement made by
            the defendant
     b. The professor would believe any explanation given
            by her students

However, when this test is applied to the cases in
(1), and we substitute **repeat** and **believe** for **deny** and
doubt, the results are now sharply ungrammatical:

(9) a. *The witnesses repeated that anybody left the
            room before dinner
     b. *The professor believes that anybody understood
            the explanation

1.3. The third test involves NPIs that do not have
a 'free choice' reading available. There are NPIs like
a single N which do not have a 'free' reading. They only
have the following two choices: if licensed by an
affective element, they are interpreted as existentials,
but if not licensed, they are interpreted as equivalent
to 'one and only one'. This is shown in (10)[4]:

(10) a.I didn't write a single letter, I had no paper
                              # the one for Mary
     b. I wrote a single letter, #I had no paper
                              the one for Mary

Let us now substitute the DPs headed by **any** in
sentences (1) and (2). The prediction is that in the
cases where the **any** is a licensed NPI, we will find the
interpretation in (10a), whereas in those cases where the
anys are not licensed, we will only find the reading in
(10b). Consider first the clausal cases in (1), now (11):

(11) a. The witnesses denied that a single person left
            the room before dinner
     b. The professor doubts that a single student
            understood her explanation

The sentences in (11) have a reading which is equivalent to their corresponding ones in (1): The NPI a single N is indeed licensed in the embedded clause[5]. By contrast, when we consider the sentences in (2) under this criterion, the effects are the opposite. Take the sentences in (5) to give these sentences the best chance, given that some speakers find the sentences in (2) already quite marginal. Consider now the cases in (12):

(12) a. The witnesses will deny a single statement made
            by the defendant
     b. The professor would/can doubt a single
            explanation given by her students

The sentences in (12) have only one interpretation: in the case of (12a), there is only one particular statement the defendant will make, which the witnesses will deny. In (12b), there is only one explanation the professor will doubt. Thus, (12a) can be followed up with '...namely, the statement about her being in the garden during the shooting', and, similarly, (12b) can be continued with '...namely, the one about having lost the homework'. No matter what intonation is given to the sentence, the NPI reading is simply not available in these cases. We can conclude that the asymmetry in (1) and (2) is consistent: NPIs are licensed only in clausal complements of negative predicates. In what follows, I will mark as deviant (*) all instances of non-licensed NPIs like the ones in (2), regardless of whether they acquire a 'free choice' interpretation. The asterisk means that the NPI is not licensed by negation, not that the sentence cannot have any interpretation at all.

2. No asymmetry induced by overt Negation.

The asymmetry between clausal and non-clausal complements does not surface in cases where an overt negation licenses NPIs across a clause boundary (13):

(13) a. The witnesses didn't say that anybody left the
            room before dinner
     b. The witnesses didn't say anything

If we apply the tests used above to distinguish licensed anys from free-choice ones, the results show no clausal/non-clausal asymmetry in (13): If just is present, the meaning of both sentences changes (14a, b). If negation is absent, the NPIs are not licensed (14c,d):

(14) a. The witnesses didn't say that just anybody left
            the room before dinner

280
ITZIAR LAKA

  b. The witnesses didn't say just anything
  c. *The witnesses said that anybody left the room
       before dinner
  d. *The witnesses said anything

  Finally, if we substitute the **any** NPI for a **single**
N, no radical change in truth conditions obtains (15):

(15) a. The witnesses didn't say that a single person
     left the room before dinner
  b. The witnesses didn't say a single thing

(15a) has a reading equivalent to (13a). Similarly, (15b)
has as an available reading one equivalent to (13b) (see
endnote 5). This shows that the NPI is licensed in (15).
Given this evidence, we can conclude that there are
fundamental differences between NPI licensing in the
environment of an overt functional negative morpheme
versus an inherently negative lexical item: Whereas an
overt negative marker does not discriminate between
clausal and non-clausal complements in its ability to
license NPIs, inherently negative lexical items do
discriminate between these two types of arguments with
regard to NPI licensing. This result is unexpected if the
negative content of the verbs is an active NPI licenser;
both morphological negation and this inherent negative
feature should have similar properties.

3.Some tough cases: Action Nouns

  There are some cases where the generalization
presented above might seem to break down. These cases
involve action nouns like:

(16) a. The bumper prevented any damage to the car
  b. The witness denied any involvement in the crime
  c. She dispelled any doubts we had
  d. He refused any medication
  e. The senator denied any allegations of drug-dealing

  These cases may appear to be NPI **any** at first
glance, but important differences can be pointed out that
clearly show otherwise. I will present a fourth test that
distinguishes 'free choice' **any**'s from NPI ones; It is
based on Ladusaw's (1979) argument that 'free choice' **any**
is a universal quantifier, whereas NPI **any** is an
existential. The test involves substituting **all** for **any**.
If **any** is a 'free choice', this change does not alter the
truth conditions of the sentence. However, if the DP
headed by **any** is an NPI, the truth conditions change
significantly. In order to illustrate this, consider

uncontroversial cases of both 'free choice' **any** and NPI
any. Let us start with the former; take (17):

(17) a. any dog can bite
     b. any store would be cheaper than this one
     c. all dogs can bite
     d. all stores would be cheaper than this one

The sentences in (17a, c) and (17c, d) mean almost
the same[6]: if any dog can bite, then it must be true that
all dogs can bite, and vice versa. Similarly, it is a
necessary truth that any store would be cheaper than this
one iff all stores are cheaper than this one. It is a
sufficient condition for **any** to be a 'free choice'
(rather than NPI) that the substitution of **all** preserves
truth conditions. If the substitution is possible, the
any at stake is a 'free choice'. Take now NPI **any** (18):

(18) a. I did not see any dog
     b. Did any store give you a lower price?
     c. If any human being were to enter this room...

If we now introduce **all** where we had **any**, the
meaning of the sentences change considerably: (18a) can
be false while (19a) is true, for instance if I have seen
some dogs but not all of them. Similarly, one could
answer 'yes' to (18b) and 'no' to (19b) being entirely
truthful, and the same is true for the remaining cases.

(19) a. I did not see all dogs
     b. Did all stores give you a lower price?
     c. If all human beings were to enter this room...

This confirms that there is an observable difference
between NPIs and 'free choice' **any**s regarding their
existential and universal quantificational force,
respectively. We can now make the substitution in the
apparently problematic cases in (16), in order to
determine whether these cases are truly exceptions to the
generalization that negative verbs do not license NPIs
in non-clausal complements. Consider (20):

(20) a. The bumper prevented all damage to the car
     b. The witness denied all involvement in the crime
     c. She dispelled all doubts we had
     d. He refused all medication
     e. The senator denied all allegations of drug-dealing

There is no possible scenario where any of the
sentences in (20) could be true and its correlate in (16)
false, or vice versa. Thus for instance, if it is true

282
ITZIAR LAKA

that the bumper prevented all damage to the car, then it is necessarily true that the bumper prevented any damage to the car. Similarly, if the witness denied all involvement in the crime, she denied any involvement in the crime as well, and if she dispelled all doubts we had, then it is also true that she dispelled any doubts we had. All sentences in (20) entail their correlates in (16). Crucially, however, the entailment from **all** to **any** does not hold in cases of NPI **any**; the sentences in (19) do not entail the sentences in (18). Therefore, the examples in (16) are cases of 'free choice' **any**. They do not constitute counterevidence to the claim that negative verbs do not license NPIs in non-clausal complements. The clausal versus non-clausal asymmetry holds consistently.

4. An account of the asymmetry: Negative Complementizers

I would like to argue that the clausal/non-clausal contrasts just discussed involve the presence versus absence of a negative Complementizer; that is, a C^0 that may be selected only by certain lexical items. Verbs like **deny** and **doubt** select a C that has the feature [+Ng], parallel to the way in which verbs like **wonder** and **ask** select a C that has the feature [+Wh]. It is the C^0 what licenses the NPIs in the examples in (1). Its absence precludes NPI licensing, and the fact that NPIs in non-clausal arguments are not licensed follows trivially. The syntactic representation of (1a, b), under this hypothesis, is as illustrated in (21a, b):

(21) a. [$_{IP}$ the witnesses denied [$_{CP}$ that$_{Ng}$ [$_{IP}$ anybody left the room before dinner]]]

   b. [$_{IP}$ the professor doubts [$_{CP}$ that$_{Ng}$ [$_{IP}$ anybody understood her explanation]]]

Previous discussions of these type of sentences assumed that the syntactic structure of the embedded sentences in (21a) and (21b) was identical to the structure of a declarative clause like 'I say [that penguins fly]'. The NPI licensing properties relied crucially on the matrix verb (Klima (1964)), or on the downward entailing properties of the matrix predicate (Ladusaw (1979)). In the case of **doubt** or **deny**, these analyses focus on the verbs themselves in order to account licensing of NPIs across clause boundaries, failing to explain the asymmetry discussed in previous sections. The proposal made here follows the spirit of Hale's (1968) analysis of sentence negation in Warlpiri, which involved selection of a negative AUX by a matrix negative verb; and it follows Progovac (1988) in that the syntactic representation of sentences embedded under

NEGATIVE COMPLEMENTIZERS   283

inherently negative verbs diverges from the structure of
that clauses embedded under non-negative verbs. Progovac
(1988) also argues that it is crucially the CP projection
that is responsible for the successful NPI licensing
inside the embedded clause. I depart from her analysis
in the specifics of what element of the CP projection
licenses the NPIs. Progovac's proposal involves a
polarity operator in the specifier of the CP projection,
rather than a [+Ng] C head.

     Subject NPIs in English are usually not licensed by
sentence negation, because negation does not c-command
the subject constituent at S-structure (22a); only when
Neg moves to C can the subject NPI be licensed (22b)
(Laka (1990)). In the cases under consideration here, the
licenser is C itself, and, similar to cases where Neg has
moved to C, licensing of subject NPIs obtains (22c):

(22) a. *[$_{IP}$Anybody [$_I$ didn't leave]
     b. [$_{CP}$Why didn't [$_{IP}$ anybody leave]]
     c. I doubt [$_{CP}$ that$_{Ng}$ [$_{IP}$ anybody left]]

     If the licenser does not c-command the NPI at S-
structure, licensing fails. Hence, a case where the
negative verb does not c-command the NPI but where C
does, is a crucial testing ground for this hypothesis.
The prediction is that even if the lexical verb does not
c-command the NPI, the NPI will nevertheless be licensed,
since the C$_{Ng}$ c-commands it. This is borne out:

(23) [$_{CP}$that$_{Ng}$ [$_{IP}$anyone left the room early]]$_i$ was denied
     t$_i$ by the witnesses

5. A solution for Ladusaw's (1979) puzzle

     Examples like (23) force Ladusaw (1979) to introduce
an 'ad hoc' condition in his Inherent Scope Convention
for the distribution of NPIs in English. Under Ladusaw's
(1979) definition of scope, both the subject and the VP
are under the scope of negation in a clause. Ladusaw
notes that, given this fact, it cannot be claimed that
being in the scope of a trigger is a sufficient condition
for the licensing of an NPI. If it were, subject NPIs
would be licensed in negative sentences in English.
Ladusaw points out that when a triggering element
precedes the subject, subject NPIs are licensed:

(24) a. has anyone seen Clarence?
     b. rarely is anyone audited by the IRS

     In light of this evidence, Ladusaw (1979) adds a

284
ITZIAR LAKA

condition in the principles accounting for the distribution of NPIs; this condition requires that the NPI appear rightward of their triggers as well as within their scopes. However, Ladusaw notes, when negation is in a higher clause, the precedence condition seems not to apply anymore. His data are shown in (25):

(25) a.that anyone has finished yet isn't likely
                                    is unlikely
                                    is doubtful
      b. for John to have found any unicorns is impossible
                                        isn't possible
      c. for anyone to win all six races would be unlikely

Because of examples like (25), identical to (24) in all relevant respects, Ladusaw reduces the precedence condition to those cases where the trigger and the NPI are clausemates, as in (26)[7]:

(26) A NPI must appear in the scope of a trigger. If its
      trigger is in the same clause as the NPI, the
      trigger must precede the NPI. (Ladusaw 1979:112)

This solution is not wholly satisfactory, given the premises of Ladusaw's work: that NPI licensing can only be accounted for in terms of the semantics of the clauses in which they occur, and not in terms of the Syntax. The problem posed to the enterprise by the addition of this condition is acknowledged by Ladusaw: "In spite of the argument of section 0, it is wrong to say that polarity filtering is totally semantic, since there is still reference to syntactic structure in part of the ISC [Inherent Scope Convention]: the left-right order restriction on clausemate triggers and NPI's." (Ladusaw 1979:207). The problem encountered by Ladusaw (1979) can be avoided if we accept that syntactic structure also plays an essential role in determining the distribution of NPIs (Klima (1964), Progovac (1988), Laka (1990)). Once the role of Syntax in NPI licensing is acknowledged, the oddities displayed by NPIs as compared to other quantifiers can be better accounted for. The precedence condition is no longer necessary if the licensing conditions require that NPIs be in the c-command domain of their triggers at S-structure (Laka (1990)). The clausemateness condition, on the other hand, can be done without once it is accepted that what licenses the NPI in the embedded clause is not the upstairs negative verb, but, rather, the C^0 that heads the embedded clause.

Let us go back to (23). It cannot be argued that D-Structure plays any role in the licensing of NPIs

NEGATIVE COMPLEMENTIZERS   285

(Linebarger (1980)), since subjects of passives are never
licensed by an element that c-commands them at D-
structure but not at S-structure. The grammaticality of
(23) cannot be accounted for on the basis of the D-
structure configuration. Neither can it be argued that
the NPI in the embedded sentence is actually licensed by
the negative verb at Logical Form, after reconstruction
has taken place (Chomsky (1976), Van Riemsdijk & Williams
(1986) and references therein). If reconstruction were
available for NPI licensing, an NPI in a preposed VP
should be licensed even if the licenser is not preposed
along with it. This is not the case. Consider the VP
preposing cases in (28), which yield ungrammaticality:

(28) a.*$[_{VP}$ buy any records$]_i$, she didn't t_i
     b.*[buy any records] is what she refused to do

The importance of the head C_{Ng} in the licensing
process is also independently confirmed by the contrast
between (29) and (30) (Pesetsky, p.c.):

        (29) (i) What did nobody do?
             a. * $[_{VP}$ Buy any records]
             b. $[_{VP}$ Buy records]

        (30) (i) What did Bill deny?
             a. $[_{CP}$ That$_{Ng}$ he had bought any records]

The answer to the question in (29a) is
ungrammatical, because there is no available licenser in
the VP that constitutes the answer. Note, however, that
without the NPI, the answer is fine (29b). In contrast,
the answer to the question in (30b), which has an NPI in
it and does not contain the negative verb deny is
perfectly grammatical. The crucial difference between
(29a) and (30a) is the presence of the C_{Ng} heading the
clause. The evidence strongly suggests that it is
precisely the C of the embedded sentence in (23) what
makes the difference. The ungrammatical cases lack C_{Ng}.

6. On selection

The presence or absence of C_{Ng} is also crucial in
complements of negative nouns. Consider (31):

(31) a. her denial that anybody left the room before the
                shooting surprised the jury
     b. *her testimony that anybody left the room before
                the shooting surprised the jury

The contrast in (31) is accounted for under the C_{Ng}

286

ITZIAR LAKA

hypothesis: in (31a), **denial** selects a C_{Ng}, which in turn licenses the subject NPI in the clause it heads. In (31b), however, there is no C_{Ng} (**testimony** does not select it). Thus, licensing fails. Moreover, the contrast in (32) illustrates that, parallel to (1), complements of negative nouns also display a [+/- CP] asymmetry:

(32) a. Her denial that any human rights should be respected shook the audience
b. *Her denial of any human rights shook the audience

Whereas (32a) is fine as a result of the NPI being licensed by C_{Ng}, (32b) is deviant or only acceptable in a 'free' reading, as the test with **just** will confirm.

C_{wh} is usually selected by lexical items that have an interrogative force like **wonder** and **ask**, and C_{Ng} can be selected by lexical items with a negative force (**deny** and **doubt**, for instance). However, both types of Comps can also occur in environments where the main verbs does not appear to be 'interrogative' or `negative' (33):

(33) a. I can't say whether Mary will arrive
b. that anyone might do anything like that never occurred to John

The presence of the modal and **not** (or a Q morpheme in the matrix sentence) is necessary in order to allow the presence of the [Wh] Complementizer in (33a). If the modal and **not** are missing, the embedded C can no longer be [+Wh] as shown in (34a); on the other hand, the verb **say** can always take a C_{wh} if the subject of the matrix sentence is focalized, as in (34b):

(34) a.*I say whether Mary will arrive
b. I̲ say whether we will go on vacation or not!

Similarly, in (33b), (from Ladusaw (1979)) the verb **occur** selects a C_{Ng}, although it is by no means an inherently negative lexical item. The presence of **never** is mandatory to sanction the Comp type, and its absence makes the presence of C_{Ng} impossible:

(35)   *that$_{[Ng]}$ anyone might do anything like that often occurred to John

Feldman (1985) discusses cases similar to those in (33). He notes that affectives in the sense of Klima (1964) and Ladusaw (1979) and root modals can alter the selectional properties of certain verbs[8]: the presence of

NEGATIVE COMPLEMENTIZERS   287

these elements allows these verbs to take [+Wh] Comps:

(36) a.*Albert said whether energy was matter
     b. Albert didn't say whether energy was matter
     c Why did you assume who I would bring?

     Feldman (1985) concludes that the evidence forces
us to abandon the idea that complement selection is
determined by the verb of the matrix clause alone
(Grimshaw (1979) and Pesetsky (1982)). Rather, complement
selection must be viewed as a compositional process, one
where not only the matrix verb, but also the inflectional
elements of the matrix sentence play a role. That
selection may involve more elements than just the matrix
V, was also noted by Bresnan (1970) in the case of 'for
to' infinitivals. The distribution of C_{Ng} supports this
view of selection as a 'team work', because functional
elements distinct from the verb affect the selection of
the C heading the embedded clause.

     Both [Wh] and [Ng] Comps license NPIs (37):

(37) a. I wonder whether anybody will show up
     b. I deny that$_{[Ng]}$ anybody will show up

     Given that in (39a) it is the complemetizer that
licenses the subject NPI in the embedded sentences, all
the asymmetries observed in the case of negative verbs
and C_{Ng} also surface in relation to interrogative verbs
and C_{Wh}. For instance, similarly to the cases above,
involving licensing of NPIs in the domain of negative
verbs, there is also a clausal/non-clausal asymmetry when
we consider interrogative verbs (H. Lasnik, p.c.):

(38) a. I wonder whether any questions will be asked
     b. *I wonder about any questions

     Whereas in (38a) the NPI **any questions** is licensed,
this is not the case in (38b), where the NPI occurs in
a non-clausal argument. As usual, we can resort to the
just test: a non licensed **any** will be interpreted
identically whether **just** is present or not; a licensed
NPI is forced to acquire a 'free' interpretation and thus
the truth conditions under which the sentence is true
will change. Consider now (39a) and (39b):

(39) a. I wonder whether just any questions will be asked
     b. I wonder about just any question

     It is clear that **just** induces a change in the
interpretation of (38a) and (38a). The two sentences do

288
ITZIAR LAKA

not mean the same thing: in (38a) the subject wonders
whether the number of questions asked will be zero or
more than zero. In (39a), however, the subject of the
sentence wonders about the kind of questions that will
be asked. On the contrary, (38b) and (39b) have the same
meaning. If anything, the only difference between the two
is that (38b) is more easily acceptable that (39b).
Nevertheless, both of them are instances of 'free' any.

7. Conclusion

I have argued that NPI licensing across clause
boundaries governed by negative predicates is due to a
functional head, C_{Ng}, and not to the lexical item whose
complement contains the NPI. I have argued that there is
a consistent correlation between the presence of C_0 and
the possibility of having licensed NPIs in the domain of
a negative predicate. This result suggests the
possibility that NPI licensing in general must involve
a functional head, and that lexical items are never NPI
licensers, but must rely on a functional element.

NOTES:

1. Progovac (1988) shows that the asymmetry extends to
Servo-Croatian, and in a footnote in Kempchinsky (1986)
Jàcas notes the same asymmetry for Spanish. Laka (1990)
discusses Spanish and Basque regarding this phenomenon.

2. I assume that any belongs to the category D (Abney
(1986), and that it heads a DP, as in (i) and (ii):
        (i) [$_{DP}$ any [$_{NP}$ thing]]
        (i) [$_{DP}$ any [$_{NP}$ blue paintings by Picasso]]
The categorial status of just is less clear to me. I will
assume that it is either the Spec of the DP headed by
any, or that it is generated as an X^0 adjunct of any.

3. Speakers who do not find just particularly helpful in
inducing a 'free choice' reading can introduce the
modifier ol' after any.

4. The readings are facilitated if given a particular
intonation contour. However, as we shall see in (12),
intonation cannot salvage cases were a single N is not
licensed. I assume that intonation does not determine
licensing, but is its phonological reflex.

5. The examples in (11) have also another reading, where
a single N is not interpreted as an NPI but rather as
'one and only one'. This reading is not relevant here;
what is crucial is the availability of the NPI reading.

NEGATIVE COMPLEMENTIZERS   289

6.There is of course one difference between 'free choice' any and universals like all and every: the former takes the totality of elements one by one, but the latter does not necessarily do so (Vendler (1967)). This difference becomes apparent in cases like (i) and (ii):
     (i) pick any card
     (ii) pick all cards
This difference between 'free choice' any and other universal quantifiers is not relevant for this argument.

7.Ladusaw also modifies the first part of his Inherent Scope Convention in accordance to (26): "When an N-meaning becomes the scope of a trigger, the resulting meaning is no longer an N-meaning. If the NPI is clausemate with the trigger, the trigger must precede." where N-meaning stands for the interpretation of a licensed NPI.

8.The verbs mentioned by Feldman are believe, suspect, doubt, suppose, assume, expect, assert, say, deny, imply, think, regret.

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