## UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA FACULDADE DE PSICOLOGIA



# The Effects of Bias Perception on Trait Impressions of People Describing Themselves vs. Others

THESIS DISSERTATION
JOÃO AMARAL

Specialization: Cognição Social Aplicada

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**Abstract** 

Past research has showed that people expect others to be biased, and these perceptions of bias,

in some contexts, can be associated with negative impressions. A widely studied example of a

biased claim is self-enhancement, where people blatantly describe themselves as better than

others. The Hubris Hypothesis predicts that these people are evaluated negatively. The present

research replicates this finding, but it shows the opposite pattern when these comparative

appraisals are directed towards others. People making flattering descriptions of their relatives

and loved ones were seen as biased but likeable, whereas people who did not enhance (nor

denigrate) their loves ones were seen as realistic but not likeable. This research suggests a more

nuanced version of the role of bias perception in impression formation, whereby biased

appraisals are expected in certain domains, and they can inspire favorable impressions when

directed towards others.

Keywords: enhancement; hubris hypothesis; bias perception; social desirability; better-than-

average effect.

#### Resumo

Estudos indicam que existe uma tendência geral para as pessoas se verem de forma mais promissora que a média. Efeitos como o *Better-than-average Effect* (tendência verem os seus atributos como superior à média; Alicke, 2005; Brown, 1986); o Otimismo Irrealista (tendência para se achar que se tem um futuro melhor que os outros; Hoorens, 1995; Weinstein, 1980) e a Superioridade Ilusória (a crença de que se tem mais capacidades e se é mais competente que os outros; Hoorens, 1995) apoiam esta visão da perceção do próprio como sendo superior aos outros. Esta ideia é claramente enviesada, uma vez que é logicamente impossível que a maioria das pessoas seja "melhor que a média".

Porém, estudos indicam que, apesar destas crenças de superioridade estarem presentes na grande maioria da população mentalmente saudável, com autoestima médio/alto (Hoorens, 1995; Taylor & Brown, 1988), a sua explicitação através de auto-enaltecimentos não é vista favoravelmente (Hoorens, Pandelaere, Oldersma & Sedikides, 2012).

Estudos anteriores mostram que as pessoas esperam que os outros sejam enviesados (Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002). Adicionalmente, estas perceções de enviesamento, em alguns contextos, podem estar associadas a pouca credibilidade (Wallace, Wegener, & Petty, 2020ab), havendo por vezes alguma necessidade de se ser dissociado delas (Choshen-Hillel & Caruso, 2018). Um exemplo amplamente estudado de uma asserção enviesada é o autoenaltecimento, em que as pessoas se descrevem como melhores do que as outras (semelhante ao efeito *Better-than-average*).

Hoorens et al. (2012) investigaram o efeito de enaltecimentos no contexto social. Primeiramente, procuraram perceber as diferenças de desejabilidade social de enaltecimento de "outros" e do *self*. Para tal, expuseram frases de comparação social por superioridade, em que variavam o sujeito entre "eu" ou um "ele/a". A desejabilidade social foi medida através de

uma Escala de Likert, em que os participantes avaliavam o locutor da frase em diversos adjetivos (que variavam entre favorável e desfavorável). Os resultados apoiaram que enquanto um enaltecimento do *self* era mal visto por observadores (participantes avaliaram como desfavorável), um enaltecimento de outra pessoa (ele/ela) já era visto favoravelmente. Explicando melhor estes resultados, um autoenaltecimento é castigado socialmente (p.e., "eu sou aluno que os outros") mas um heteroenaltecimento dos "outros" é visto favoravelmente (p.e., "ele é melhor aluno que os outros"), pois o primeiro implica a inclusão de uma visão negativa dos "outros", podendo incluir o observador (Hoorens et al., 2012).

Foi também investigado neste mesmo estudo um enaltecimento com uma comparação por igualdade (do outro e do próprio). Os resultados demonstraram que uma comparação por igualdade e um enaltecimento, ambos referentes a um "outro", são igualmente bem-vistos. Isto é, não houve diferenças no julgamento destas duas comparações, quando o sujeito da frase se tratava de outra pessoa. Por outro lado, confirmou-se que um autoenaltecimento era visto negativamente, mas uma comparação por igualdade era vista positivamente. A esta compilação de resultados denominou-se de Hipótese de Hubris.

Porém, para o presente estudo levantou-se uma questão adicional. Como variarão os resultados se os enaltecimentos forem dirigidos a uma pessoa próxima do locutor da frase? Segundo a literatura, existem evidências empíricas que apoiam que em determinadas situações, algum viés é visto (Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996) e até esperado (Shaw, DeScioli, Barakzai, & Kurzban, 2017) na interação com outros próximos. Desta forma, prevê-se que se o "outro" se tratar de uma pessoa próxima do locutor, as expectativas sobre o enaltecimento deste serão maiores, podendo a sua ausência levar a uma baixa desejabilidade social. Isto é, espera-se que haja um enaltecimento de um ente próximo, ainda que se saiba que se trata de um enviesamento lógico.

Assim, para a presente investigação, foram elaborados dois estudos. No primeiro procurou-se perceber a desejabilidade social e a perceção de enviesamento de quatro condições distintas: hétero enaltecimento; auto-enaltecimento; auto-comparação por igualdade; hétero comparação por igualdade. O "outro" foi definido como sendo uma pessoa próxima do locutor (parceiro/melhor amigo/filho). Os participantes avaliavam o locutor da frase tendo por base a frase apresentada, que constava uma comparação por superioridade (p.e., "Acho que sou a pessoa mais bonita que conheço") ou uma comparação por igualdade (p.e., "Acho que não sou mais bonito nem menos bonito que as outras pessoas em geral"), podendo esta ser dirigida para o próprio ou para uma pessoa próxima (parceiro/amigo/filho(a)). Semelhantemente ao estudo de Hoorens et al. (2012), os participantes avaliaram o locutor baseando-se na impressão que formavam depois de ler a frase. Para analisar o enviesamento percebido do locutor, foram também acrescentados itens de perceção de enviesamento (e.g., "Quanto é que acha que esta pessoa está a ser objetiva?"/ "Quão enviesada (isto é irrealista) é esta opinião desta pessoa?"/ "Quanto é que esta pessoa está a exagerar?"/ "Quão distorcida é a opinião desta pessoa?"/ "Quanto é que acredita na opinião desta pessoa?"). Os participantes avaliaram o enviesamento numa Escala de Likert.

No segundo estudo foram utilizados os mesmos métodos supramencionados, investigando mais detalhadamente as comparações sociais referentes apenas aos sujeitos próximos (hétero comparação por igualdade; auto comparação por igualdade).

O presente estudo replica em parte os resultados de Hoorens et al. (2012), mostrando que um auto-enaltecimento provoca desejabilidade social muito fraca, levando a uma avaliação desfavorável do locutor. Por outro lado, mostra o padrão oposto quando essas avaliações comparativas são dirigidas a pessoas próximas. Pessoas que fazem descrições lisonjeiras dos seus parentes e entes queridos foram vistas como enviesadas, mas simpáticas, enquanto pessoas que não valorizam (nem denigrem) os seus próximos foram vistas como realistas, mas

antipáticas. Estes estudos sugerem uma versão mais subtil do papel da perceção de enviesamento na formação de impressões, em que são esperadas avaliações tendenciosas em certos domínios, que podem suscitar impressões favoráveis quando dirigidas a outros.

Desta forma, é evidente como a perceção de enviesamento pode provocar diferentes impressões em diferentes contextos. Apesar de muitas vezes estar associado a pouca credibilidade (Wallace et al., 2020ab), e havendo muitas vezes necessidade de se procurar ser objetivo e concreto (Choshen-Hillel & Caruso, 2018), existem outras situações em que algum favoritismo é aceite e até esperado aquando de interações com pessoas próximas.

Os resultados destes estudos são importantes para complementar a Hipótese de Hubris de Hoorens et al. (2012), podendo sublinhar a importância da perceção de viés da formação de impressões. É também de notar como enaltecimentos de pessoas próximas podem servir como forma indireta de apresentar uma imagem mais favorável do próprio, uma vez que este tipo de comparações sociais suscitam uma boa impressão do locutor nas outras pessoas.

**Palavras-chave:** enaltecimento; hipótese de Hubris; perceção de enviesamento; desejabilidade social; Efeito *Better-Than-Average*.

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# The Effects of Bias Perception on Trait Impressions of People Describing Themselves vs. Others

People's self-view sometimes differs from reality (Klar & Giladi, 1999). Generally, this involves a superiority self-image, that one is better than others (Brown, 1986). Additionally, in trying to present this favorable image of themselves to others, people often engage in *bragging*, by explicitly claiming to be superior to others, or by listing their positive attributes. This can sometimes backfire, producing a worse impression of the claimant (Scopelliti, Loewenstein, & Vosgerau, 2015).

Nevertheless, there seems to be an exception where enhancement claims produce a favorable image of the claimant. Some studies (reviewed below) have shown that people are seen more positively when they enhance others.

The following literature review will focus on these self- vs. other-favoring biases, and how they are perceived by others. Firstly, the review will concentrate on the need for self-enhancement and the mechanisms behind it. As aforementioned, there is a general tendency to perceive oneself as better than others. Secondly, there is research showing how people can judge others as biased, but do not perceive themselves as such. That is, people only see biased thinking in others and are unable to recognize it in themselves. Thirdly, a case will be made for why bias is not always socially punished, and in certain social situations, some kind of favoritism towards others may even be compensated. Finally, these studies will be bridged to the main hypotheses of this dissertation regarding favoritism towards others and self.

#### The Better-Than-Average Effect

As mentioned before, people like to think of themselves as impartial and unbiased, being oblivious to the fact that thinking shortcomings are frequent and not uncommon in

everyday life. Among many skewed illogical ways of thinking, there is a general self-optimism propensity, which will be the cornerstone of this study.

Most people are average, but few know it. The tendency to perceive one's abilities, attributes, and personality traits as superior, compared to their average peer, is widely studied in social psychology and is commonly known as the *Better-Than-Average* effect (BTA). A well-known study consistent with this paradigm is Brown's (1986) investigation. Participants, when asked to rate how different adjectives described themselves and others, picked positive attributes as more descriptive of the self than of others, whereas negative attributes as less descriptive of the self than others (Experiment 1). This constitutes an illogical judgement since it is impossible for all individuals to be "better than the average person" (Brown, 1986).

Although this effect has been obtained in numerous studies, its explanation is still under debate. Several propositions have been made to explain the underlying mechanisms of the BTA effect:

One prevalent idea is that people selectively conscript downward targets who make them look favorable in comparison (Selective Recruitment; Weinstein, 1980). In other words, people do not have an accurate representation of others, and therefore glorify themselves by comparing themselves with selectively inferior others.

In explaining the unrealistic optimism, which is the tendency to perceive one's future as more favorable than the average peer's, Weinstein (1980) proposed that people tend to have an inaccurate view of others when comparing themselves to them, not realizing that others may have just as many chances of achieving desirable outcomes as they do. In his study, he asked participants to list behaviours that increased or decreased the likelihood of specific life events (positive and negative). Overall, participants rated their own chances of experiencing positive events as above average, whilst they rated their chances of experiencing negative events as

below average. For participants who had access to other people's lists, the tendency for this optimistic bias was significantly reduced, though not completely eliminated. Results support the hypothesis that people's overall image of others is inaccurate or incomplete when making social comparisons. Although Weinstein's (1980) study focused on the optimistic bias, this paradigm is applicable to the BTA effect as well, since people can also have a skewed image of others when comparing their abilities, traits and dimensions with the "average" person, and therefore claiming to be better than them.

A second proposition for the BTA effect explanation is the egocentrism view, backed up by Klar and Giladi (1999). They propose that comparative judgements are predominantly self-focused. In this study, they aimed at identifying the elements of the self-other comparison that people attend to when judging their own life contentment relative to that of their peers. Results showed that comparative contentment judgement is dominated by one's own contentment and is insensitive to comparative others' contentment. In other words, comparison judgements of contentment are predicted better by self ratings than peer ratings. This clearly favours the focusing-on-the-self view when comparing self to others.

One other possible explanation for this BTA mechanism, named the *focalism* view, is the tendency to place greater weight on whatever hypothesis or outcome is currently the focus of attention. This hypothesis focuses on the way the judgement task is structured. If the positions of self and average are switched, and the average peer is made the focal object and the self is made the referent, the BTA effect should be diminished. One study that supports this prediction is Otten and van der Plight's (1996) study on the optimistic bias. The authors measured this self-other rating of the probability of specific life events, manipulating the order of presentation of subjects (self-other vs. other-self). Results showed that when own probability was judged first, less optimism was found, though it was still present, than when others'

probability was judged first. This means that the others-as-standard perspective resulted in greater optimistic judgements than the self-as-standard perspective.

Alicke and Govorun (2005) argue that the mechanisms behind this *Better-Than-Average* effect are overall self-enhancement heuristics. Since this effect is shown in trait comparisons, this leaves some "wiggle room" for the individual to fit their self-ratings in their ideal conceptions of the given trait.

Given the mentioned paradigms, it seems that all of them moderate the BTA in some way, since variations in these judgments alter, but do not fully eliminate the effect. However, for this dissertation, it is mainly important to understand this self-favoritism tendency.

It is evident that people have a biased way of thinking about the world, and show it when making social comparisons, such as when attributing positive traits to themselves (Brown, 1986), or when estimating the desirability of their future (Weinstein, 1980). Despite the various underlying mechanisms, these studies consistently show that people like to think favorably of themselves, and often engage in different mechanisms to promote favorable self-views (Alicke & Govorun, 2005).

However, in the above-cited studies, self-other comparisons were made with explicit ratings concerning different traits, or the likelihood of the occurrence of a positive event in their lives, which, in itself, does not necessarily depict one's implicit beliefs. So, even though we can infer that individuals present a favorable image of themselves, do they actually believe it? Is this positive self-view a superficial mechanism to "sell" a more favorable image of oneself to others (impression management), or do people really see the world in a skewed, more self-favoring way, to maintain a positive self-view (self-deception)?

Hoorens (1995) addressed this question by measuring self-deception and impression management in different self-favoring claims: Illusory Superiority, the belief that one is better

and more competent than others; and the before-mentioned Unrealistic Optimism. Results showed that both mechanisms were associated with self-favoring biases but in different situations. Self-deception was related to "positive" self-favoring biases (endorsing positive traits and positive future events), whilst impression management was related to "negative" self-favoring biases (which is underestimating the chance of experiencing negative events or possessing negative traits). Put differently, people are overly positive towards themselves because they not only try to present a more favorable version to others but also seek to maintain a good self-view.

#### The Better-Than-Average Effect and Self-Esteem

Thus, evidently, people are biased to maintain a positive self-view and present it to others. This favoritism towards the self is linked to higher and healthier self-esteem. Brown (1986) noted that self-favoritism (in this case, the *Better-Than-Average* effect) was more pronounced in high self-esteem individuals, being attenuated in individuals with low self-esteem.

A later study complements such findings, supporting that other self-favoring biases (Unrealistic Optimism and Illusory Superiority) are positively related to higher self-esteem and subjective well-being (Hoorens, 1995). Taken together, research indicates that these biases, although skewed and unrealistic, are somehow related to self-worth.

Taylor and Brown (1988) term these self-favoring biases *Illusions*, since it implies a more general, enduring pattern than the terms "error" or "bias", which are, to their belief, "short-term mistakes that might be caused by careless oversight." (p. 194)

It has also been shown that the capacity to distort reality in a direction that enhances self-esteem, beliefs in personal efficacy, and promotion of an optimistic view of the future, are

characteristic of healthy human thought, and seem to promote the ability to be happy, engage in productive work and care about others (Taylor & Brown, 1988).

Parallel to these results, studies demonstrate that individuals who are low in self-esteem, moderately depressed, or both, are more realistic in their self-perceptions than people who perceive themselves more positively than others see them (Coyne & Gotlib, 1983; Lewinsohn, Mischel, Chaplin, & Bartor, 1980). Accordingly, it seems that individuals who are more likely to process self-relevant information in an unbiased way are the ones who experience subjective distress.

Thus, people are generally biased when comparing themselves to the average peer, believing they possess more positive traits (Brown, 1986), are more competent (Hoorens, 1995) and have a more favorable future (Hoorens, 1995; Weinstein, 1980). Although this is a biased view of the world and others around them, it enables them to have higher self-esteem and engage in more productive work (Brown, 1986; Hoorens, 1995; Taylor & Brown, 1988).

#### The Perception of Bias in Self vs. Others

However, people rarely conceive themselves as being biased, and can frequently be oblivious of their distorted way of thinking. That is, although people generally perceive themselves as better than others, they do not recognize this conception as distorted. And despite not recognizing bias in themselves, they see it and expect it in others, which results in an asymmetry in bias perception.

Studies from Kruger and Gilovich (1999), involving couples estimating how their partners assess responsibility, showed that spouses expected others to be self-serving (biased) when making responsibility judgments. They correctly predicted that their spouses would overestimate responsibility for desirable outcomes. Additionally, respondents estimated that an

"unbiased observer" would make the same responsibility judgements as themselves, which suggests that respondents think of their claims as being unbiased.

In a further experiment, respondents estimated self-serving responsibility judgments in opponents vs. their teammates. The results showed a similar pattern to the findings of the self vs. partner responsibility attributions. Teammates were estimated to be less self-serving than opponents. Factors known to influence motivations (in this case, an in-group vs. out-group orientation) influenced the application of participants' theories of motivational bias. So, people expect others to be self-serving in making responsibility judgements (claim responsibility for good outcomes). This assumption that others' judgements are motivationally biased is termed *Naïve Cynicism* (Kruger & Gilovich, 1999).

Complementary to these findings, *Naïve Realism* describes the tendency to expect others to perceive things as one does. This proposal holds that people assume that "their own take on the world enjoys authenticity and will be shared by other open-minded perceivers and seekers of truth" (Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002, p. 369). Pronin et al.'s (2002) studies were designed to document and explore invidious distinctions that people make between their own and others' susceptibility to bias. Results showed that individuals claim to be less susceptible than their peers to a variety of cognitive and motivational biases (Study 1), and insist that their assessments have been unbiased even under conditions that should make it easy to acknowledge such bias (Study 2). In the final study, they took a *bogus* test of social intelligence and were later asked to rate its validity. Results displayed the typical bias: those who were told that they performed well rated the test as more valid than those who were told that they performed poorly. Additionally, after being informed about the potential bias in their claims, participants were more likely to acknowledge that possibility in their fellow participant than in themselves (Study 3), which provides further evidence that the knowledge of particular biases

in human judgment, and the ability to recognize the impact of those biases in others, neither prevents one from succumbing to them nor makes one aware of having done so.

The above-mentioned experiments work together in explaining the difference in perception of bias in themselves and in others. People tend to think that others are biased (Naïve Cynicism) and believe their own take on the world is authentic and unbiased (Naïve Realism). This translates to people being biased but not recognizing it, and only being able to perceive this tendentious way of thinking in others. This effect is commonly named the "Bias Blind Spot" since people are "blind" to their own bias.

If bias in others is recognized, how is it perceived? Since it involves the crooked perception of reality, does it necessarily lead to a negative impression formation?

#### **Perception of Bias in Impression Formation**

In some cases, where impartiality is valued, people attempt to radically avoid bias. However, such an effort of trying to avoid the appearance of bias can backfire, and lead people to make biased decisions. In a series of 8 studies, Shaw, Choshen-Hillel, and Caruso (2018) showed that when a decision was made public, allocators were reluctant to give a bonus to a deserving employee when that employee was their friend compared to a non-friend employee (Studies 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7). This effect was not evident when the decision was made in private (Studies 1 and 2). It was clear that people sense this tension between rewarding a more deserving friend and trying to appear unbiased, suggested by the tendency to excuse themselves from this decision when given the opportunity (Study 6). This effect was a result of the avoidance of being perceived as "unfair" and biased.

However, it is important to note that this being seen as biased does not mean that one will be seen as untrustworthy. People can be biased, yet still be considered trustworthy

individuals. For example, a grandparent that enhances his grandchild may be giving his honest, yet bent opinion.

Wallace, Wegener, and Petty (2020a) investigated the perception of source bias and its effects on the perception of trustworthiness, credibility, and likeability. They found that source bias can have a negative effect on source credibility. However, people can infer source bias without also perceiving the source as dislikeable, untrustworthy, or inexpert. That is, perceiving a source as biased did not lead participants to perceive it as untrustworthy. Bias was found to be associated with the motivation to take a position or be ideologically driven; whereas untrustworthiness was associated with dishonesty and willingness to manipulate (Study 1a and 1b). So, we can infer that the perception of bias is not always associated with negative concepts, being significantly different from being perceived as dishonest.

In a follow-up study, Wallace, Wegener, and Petty (2020b) investigated the effects of source bias on persuasion, measuring likeability as well. In this study, not only were they aiming to demonstrate that perceptions of bias and untrustworthiness are separable and have independent effects, but also wanted to study effects of source bias on persuasion, source credibility, perceived expertise, and likeability. Results demonstrated that source bias can lead recipients to perceive the message as less persuasive (Study 2). Consistent with past results, a biased source was also perceived as less credible (Study 3), but not as less likeable, trustworthy, or expert (Study 4).

The above-mentioned studies show how biased claims need not always be seen as dislikeable and dishonest. Perception of bias has different outcomes, depending on different social situations. As mentioned before in the study of Shaw et al. (2018), people drastically avoid being perceived as biased, worrying that they are seen as dishonest. On the other hand,

according to Wallace et al. (2020ab), these two terms are dissociated, and bias is not always linked to negativity. It is then unclear how bias perception affects person impression formation.

Despite traditional models of impression formation focusing on perceptions of competence and warmth (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968; with this latter sometimes including "trustworthy" or "honest"), none of these scales includes perceptions of bias. So, it strikes me as relevant to understand what role the perception of bias plays over personality impression. "Untrustworthiness" and "bias" should represent two distinct impressions since they differ in meaning. The former refers to the intentional presentation of false information, whereas biased, but trustworthy people provide their honest yet skewed perspective.

The previous research suggests that the perception of source bias is taken differently in various social contexts. Despite sometimes being avoided, it is easy to think of situations where bias is accepted and even required.

#### **Desirable Bias**

In altercations and disputes, we normally think of our friends as supporting resources, who are willing to side with us when needed. In a series of three studies, it was shown that people not only felt negatively toward a friend who sided against them but felt as negatively when their friend remained neutral (Shaw, DeScioli, Barakzai, & Kurzban, 2017). Although this did not happen when the side-taker had a symmetrical relationship with both disputants (was equally close to both), it was clear how in some cases, friends expect you to side with them. In this study it was evident how impartiality can be seen negatively, valuing the role of favoritism in specific interpersonal relationships.

The expectation of favoritism towards close-others is shown at an early age. Children as young as the age of three expect people to distort the truth when talking about their friends

or enemies. Specifically, they anticipate that people tendentially spread positive information about their friends and spread negative information about their enemies (Studies 1a, 1b, 2 and 3). With this assumption, they are also able to make inferences on how trustworthy a testimony is (Study 1b; Liberman & Shaw, 2020). So, the given studies show there is an expectation of partisanship towards friends.

A similarly biased favoritism has been shown to be beneficial in romantic relationships as well (Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996). These authors proposed that satisfaction is associated with idealistic, rather than realistic perceptions of one's partner. In this study, couples were asked to rate their partners, themselves, their "ideal" partner, and the "typical" partner, on a series of attributes. Results showed that people evaluated their partners in a more favorable light than their partners rated themselves, which is striking considering that individuals already enhance their own attributes (Brown, 1986; Taylor & Brown, 1988). It was also evident that partners were rated more favorably than the "typical partner", being clear that this idealization was a biased enhancement of their significant-other. This enhancement has positive effects since it predicted relationship satisfaction. This leads to the assumption that a certain degree of self-deceived favoritism appears to be an integral feature of satisfying romantic relationships.

The above-mentioned studies show how a certain positively biased image of a loved one can even be beneficial to the healthy development of the relationship. Although impartiality towards a close-other is valued in formal and more objective situations (like in the workplace; Shaw et al., 2018), it can be detrimental in more informal and personal situations (Murray et al., 1996; Shaw et al., 2017). Therefore, if the benefits of being partial increase, it is expected that more favoritism is manfested. In certain situations, like acknowledging your loved ones, nepotism may be acceptable, if not even expected, and therefore be a sustainable justification for bias.

Additionally, results from the study of Hoorens, Pandelaere, Oldersma, and Sedikides (2012) have shown that favoritism towards others, through enhancement claims, is positively viewed by a third-party observer. On the other hand, the same study revealed that engaging in comparative self-enhancement claims is not so well received.

#### Others' Perception of Self-Enhancement

In the study by Hoorens et al. (2012), people who self-enhanced were rated unfavorably by the observers. It seems that enhancing others does a better job of selling a favorable image of oneself than enhancing one's own attributes and strengths.

In trying to present their best image, people often engage in self-promotional claims. That is, listing their strengths, explicitly claiming their achievements, overall manifesting their positive attributes. This type of behaviour, although frequent, may not always be beneficial, and can even backfire, causing targets of self-promotion to view self-promoters as less likeable and as *braggarts* (Scopelliti et al., 2015).

Scopelliti et al. (2015) sought to understand whether people overestimate positive emotions and underestimate negative ones, elicited by self-promotion, on others (Studies 1 and 2), and its consequences (Study 3). Results in all three studies suggested that self-promoters overestimated the extent to which their claims elicit positive emotions, like "happiness" and "proud", on the targets of self-promotion. Complementary, self-promoters also underestimated how their claims would evoke negative emotions, such as "upset" and "annoyed". This study shows that engaging in self-promotion through explicit self-enhancement claims has negative effects on impression formation of the promoter, causing less likeability and even eliciting negative emotions on the target.

#### The Hubris Hypothesis

The Hubris Hypothesis states that explicit self-enhancement, specifically when done via direct comparisons to others, has a social cost (Hoorens et al., 2012). According to this hypothesis, observers dislike individuals who convey superiority through social comparisons.

In a series of 7 experiments, Hoorens et al. (2012) tested this hypothesis by researching how blatant self-superiority comparisons are negatively viewed and can even portray an unfavorable image of the claimant.

These authors initially proposed that the reasons for the negative interpretation of such comparisons may lie in people disliking any type of social comparison (disapproval of social comparison), since it may violate social norms. Additionally, they proposed that self-superiority claimants impart an extremely positive self-view (positivity of self-view) and communicate a negative view of others, including targets of the self-promotion (negativity of other-view).

Since this dissertation is strongly influenced by this study, an extensive description of the methodology, as well as its results, will be done at this point. Firstly, the authors tested whether noncomparative positive claims ("I am good at sports") would be evaluated as negatively as self-superiority claims ("I am better at sports than others"). This latter claim depicts a similar belief to the BTA effect since it states that one is better than "others", "others" being the average person.

As stimuli, investigators used phrases showing self-enhancement on social roles (role of student/role of a friend). The former was chosen to represent communion, social, warmth, and an other-profitable domain ("You know, I am a better person to be friends with than others..."), whilst the latter represented agency, competence, and a self-profitable domain ("You know, I am a better student than others...").

In these experiments, participants read superiority claims and were asked to rate the claim and the claimant on a series of eight dimensions. For the first experiment, participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions (self-superiority claim or noncomparative positive claim) where an individual described his worth as a friend. After reading these quotes, participants rated, on a 7-point Likert scale, the claim on eight dimensions: unusual-usual, disagreeable-agreeable, unintelligent-intelligent, undesirable-desirable, unsuitable-suitable, unfriendly-friendly, abnormal-normal, worthy of disapproval-worthy of praise. Subsequently, they rated, in a 7-point Likert scale, the claimant on eight adjectives: disrespectful-respectful, disagreeable- agreeable, unfriendly-friendly, unintelligent-intelligent, egoistic-altruistic, meddlesome-peaceful, unattractive-attractive, conceited-modest. Results from the first experiment were consistent with the Hubris Hypotheses, showing that self-superiority claims were rated more unfavorably than the noncomparative positive claims. Participants' ratings of the claims were correlated with their ratings of the claimant throughout the study. Which means unfavorable ratings of claims mirror ratings of the claimant.

Experiment 2 replicated and extended the findings of Experiment 1 to the social role of studentship. Superiority claims and claimants were rated less positively than noncomparative ones.

In Experiment 3, Hoorens et al. (2012) assessed whether a self-superiority claim was rated as more unfavorable than a self-equality claim. This experiment aimed at understanding if all social comparisons would lead to unfavorable responses. If this were true, any blatant social comparison, regardless of pertaining to superiority or equality, would lead to social disapproval. In this experiment, participants either rated self-superiority claims similar to those described above or rated self-equality claims ("You know, I am as good a person to be friends with as others are."). Results showed that participants rated the self-superiority claim more unfavorably than the self-equality claim, the latter being evaluated as neutral.

Experiment 4 compared these three types of claims (superiority, noncomparative and equality). Results showed that noncomparative self-claims were rated more positively than self-equality claims, with even greater disapproval of self-superiority claims.

Experiment 5 focused on understanding how temporally comparative self-superiority claims ("I am better now than I used to be") are evaluated. Additionally, this experiment aimed at providing a test of the negativity of others-view and positivity of self-view by asking participants to rate how good they thought the claimant (a) believed herself or himself to be as a friend or student, and (b) regarded others as friends and students (0 = not at all, 10 = very much). Results showed, as predicted, that social comparisons were seen more negatively than temporal comparisons, with this latter being rated positively. Participants also thought that the claimant viewed himself as better (student or friend) in the social comparison condition than in the temporal comparison condition. Finally, addressing the negativity of others-view, the claimant was seen as having a more negative view of others in the social comparison condition than in the temporal comparison condition. The assumption of claimant's negative view of others was shown to predict evaluations of self-superiority more accurately than positive claimant's view of himself.

In Experiment 6, the superiority and equality claims were about the self vs. another person. The other-claims referred to an unnamed person that matched the gender of the participant. Results showed that participants rated the self-superiority claims more unfavorably than the self-equality claim, which was rated positively. However, they did not differ their evaluation of the other-superiority claim and the other-equality claim, which were both evaluated favorably. These results bolster the Hubris Hypothesis, adding that participants disliked self-superiority claims, but viewed other-superiority and other-equality claims favorably.

Experiment 7 tested whether the introduction of disclaimers would affect the likability of a self-superiority claim. In this segment, the authors added two control conditions: *subtle disclaimers* ("You know, I don't mean to say that I am a better person to be friends with than others, but..." and then continued as in the self-superiority claim condition) and *blatant disclaimers*, that consisted in the repeated denial of a self-superiority claim ("You know, I don't mean to say that I am a better person to be friends with than others..."). Results showed that evaluations of *subtle disclaimers* were neutral and more favorable than self-superiority claims, that were evaluated negatively. Moreover, *blatant disclaimers* were rated favorably, which proposes that the denial of making such claims was acceptable to observers, contrary to an outright self-superiority comparison.

In conclusion, the main findings of these experiments demonstrated that participants rated comparative self-enhancement negatively, but noncomparative positive claims positively, which means that an explicit positive comparison is sociably undesirable and may have repercussions in the social circle. Furthermore, other-superiority enhancements, as well as other-equality judgements, were evaluated positively, So, these enhancement claims were negatively evaluated in a social circle when directed towards themselves but were accepted when directed to others.

So, to sum up, people generally see themselves as better than the average person, possessing positive attributes, as being absent of negative ones (Brown, 1986), and having a more favorable future (Hoorens, 1995; Otten & van der Plight, 1996). Although possessing these biased beliefs, they do not recognize them as so, claiming that only others are susceptible to them. This need to avoid being perceived as biased is strong and very common, being evident even when deciding whether to attribute a prize to a deserving friend (Shaw et al., 2018). Nonetheless, a certain type of bias (favoritism) has been shown to be desirable and beneficial in the relationship with close "others" (e.g., a romantic partner; a friend; Murray et al., 1996;

Shaw et al., 2017). Additionally, this biased favoritism towards a close other is favorably seen by third-party observers when in the form of enhancement claims, but strongly frowned-upon when directed towards oneself (Hoorens et al., 2012).

Considering the reviewed studies about self vs. other enhancement, the primary goal of this research is to understand how the enhancement of close others is perceived by impartial observers. Since there are social contexts where bias is expected towards a close-other, the main question is: Are certain biases expected in the relationship with others, such that, when absent, that is unfavorably evaluated by third party observers? And how does the perception of bias affect those impressions: could it be that self- and other-enhancement are seen as equally biased, but whereas perceived bias hurts impressions of self-promoters, it does not have the same negative effect (or might even have a positive effect) on impressions of other-enhancers?

In accordance with Hoorens et al. (2012), it is predicted that self-enhancers will be negatively seen by observers (*Hypothesis 1*). Therefore, it is expected that self-enhancement claims will denigrate the impression of the claimant, translated by less favorable evaluations. Parallel to this hypothesis, it is also foreseen that "other-enhancements" will be positively seen by observers (*Hypothesis 2*), with favorable evaluations of the claimant.

The equality claims in the Hoorens et al.'s (2012) study were favorably evaluated. However, as stated above, the "others" in the given study were undefined subjects, giving the participant some "flexibility" to choose the relationship the claimant had with the referred "other". Since, in this study, the subjects of the claims were close to the claimant (e.g., son/romantic partner/best friend), favoritism could be expected in those claims. Therefore, it is proposed that equality claims will be favorably seen in the self conditions (*Hypothesis 3*) but unfavorably evaluated in the "others" condition (*Hypothesis 4*).

Additionally, in this study perception of bias/realism will be analysed as well. It is predicted that both conditions (self and other) of enhancements will be perceived as biased (*Hypothesis 5*). Foremost, the equality claims will be perceived as more realistic (less biased) (*Hypothesis 6*).

#### **Experiment 1**

#### Method

#### Design and Participants:

We sought to recruit 30 participants per cell of the 2 (self vs. another person) x 2 (enhancement vs. equality) between-subjects design. One-hundred and eighteen undergraduates successfully completed this study (107 women). Average participant age was 21.4 (SD=5.68). All were exposed to the same comparison domains (intelligence; "warmth"/character; beauty).

#### Procedure and materials:

Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the following four conditions: *self-enhancement* (e.g., "I'm more intelligent than others/"I think I am the most beautiful person I know"/ "I'm a better person than others"); *self-equality* (e.g., "I don't think I'm either more intelligent or less intelligent than others; I'm as intelligent as the average person"/ "I don't think I'm either more beautiful or less beautiful than others"/ "I'm neither a better nor worse person than others"); *other-enhancement* (e.g., "My son is more intelligent than other kids"/ "I think my partner is the most beautiful person I know"/ "My best friend is a better person than others"); *other-equality* (e.g., "I don't think my son is either more intelligent or less intelligent than others; he is as intelligent as the average kid"/ "I don't think my partner is either more beautiful or less beautiful than others"/ "My best friend is neither a better nor worse person than others").

The domains were inspired by Hoorens et al. 's (2012) study, being: character, exemplifying "warmth" and fellowship (e.g. "I am a better person than others"); and an "intelligent" domain, representing agency (e.g. "I am more intelligent than others"). Additionally, a "beauty" domain was included (e.g., "I am more attractive than others"), totalling three comparative domains. Best-friend, romantic partner and son/daughter were chosen as close "others" subjects since research shows those are rated as the closest relationships to an individual (Gebauer, Goritz, Hofmann & Sedikides, 2012).

After reading the claim, participants rated the claimant on different traits, ranging from an unfavorable (-3) to a favorable trait (+3) on a 7-point Likert scale. The traits were: Unsympathetic-Sympathetic; Arrogant-Humble; Unpleasant-Pleasant; Unfriendly-Friendly; Presumptuous-Modest; I wouldn't want to interact with this person at all - I would like to interact with this person; Bad person-Good person. This task was used to determine the impression of the claimant. Subsequently, to quantify perceived bias, participants were asked to rate how much they thought the claimant was biased (e.g., "How objective do you think this person is being?"/ "How biased (i.e. unrealistic) is this person's opinion?"/ "How much is this person exaggerating?"/ "How distorted is this person's opinion?"/ "How much do you believe in this person's opinion?"). Again, a 7-point Likert scale was used, ranging from (-3) to (+3). The order in which the different sentences and domains were presented was randomized.

#### **Results**

#### *Impressions*

In analysing impression formation, we aggregated the 7 trait-impression items across three domains in a single impression score ( $\alpha = .94$ ).

In an ANOVA assessing the effects of the target of the claim (self or other) and enhancement (yes or no) on this impression score, a strong main effect emerged of

enhancement on impression formation, F(1, 114) = 43.31, p < .001,  $\eta_p^2 = .28$ . However, contrary to Hoorens et al.'s (2012) study, results did not show a main effect of target in impression formation, F < 1. An overall interaction effect of target x claim on impression formation was also significant, F(1, 114) = 32.18, p < .001,  $\eta_p^2 = .22$ , such that effect of enhancement on impressions was only observed when the target of the description was the self, t(59) = 8.88, p < .001, not when it was about other people, t < 1. This interaction effect was not present in all domains, being evident in the "character" domain, F(1, 114) = 23.54, p < .001, and the "beauty" domain, F(1, 114) = 65.20, p < .001. The "intelligent" domain did not show this effect, F < 1.

Moreover, analysing the interaction from another angle, we observe that enhancement was more positively regarded for others than for the self, t(59) = 5.84, p < .001, whereas the opposite held for non-enhancement, t(55) = -2.86, p = .006.

Comparing each of the four conditions against the midpoint of the scale (4), using one-sample t-tests, self-enhancers were rated unfavorably, t(30) = -4.86, p < .001, whereas all other conditions were rated favorably,  $ts \ge 2.89$ ,  $ps \le .008$ .

Congruently with Hoorens et al.'s (2012) study, results show that self-enhancers were the only group rated unfavorably.

#### **Credibility**

In analysing the second dependent variable (perception of bias) we reverse-scored the three negatively-framed items and aggregated the five bias-related items across three domains in a single score ( $\alpha$  = .95) translating the degree to which the claim is seen as realistic and unbiased. So, higher ratings represent low bias /more realistic. Results showed a main effect of target claim, F(1, 114) = 5.68, p = .019,  $\eta_p^2 = .05$ . such that descriptions about the self were considered less realistic than descriptions about others. There was yet a significant main effect

of enhancement, F(1, 114) = 89.15, p < .001,  $\eta_p^2 = .44$ , where equality claims were perceived as more objective than enhancement claims. The interaction effect was not significant, F(1, 144) = 2.29, p = .133,  $\eta_p^2 = .02$ , meaning that the greater perception of bias associated with enhancing descriptions held for both descriptions about the self and others.

#### Moderation and mediation analysis

Thus, people see enhancement as biased, both for self and for others. The question now is whether that has the same effect on impressions in both target conditions. A moderation analysis using bootstrapping (Hayes, 2018), with ratings of realism as the predictor, trait impressions as the dependent variable, and target as the moderator variable (Model 1 of Hayes' PROCESS: Y = trait impression; X = realistic; W = target) revealed a significant interaction effect 95% CI = [-0.59, -0.14], pointing to objectivity having a positive effect on impression formation when the target is the self, b = .50, t(114) = 6.22, p < .001; but not when the description referred to others, b = .13, t(114) = 1.65, p = .101. Thus, being perceived as realistic had a positive effect on trait impressions when the target of the claim was the self. Objectivity had no effect on impression formation when the target was another person.

A similar analysis, for realism as predictor and enhancement as moderator variable, (Model 1 of Hayes' PROCESS: Y = trait impression; X = realistic; W = enhance or not) shows a marginally significant interaction (b = -.30, t(114) = -1.90, p = .060) on impression formation, such that perceived objectivity only affects impressions for enhancers (b = .38, t(114) = 2.83, p = .006), not for claimants of equality (b = .38, t(114) = .87, p = .387).

Moreover, results show a significant relationship between enhancement and trait impression, showing a direct effect of .62, p = .002. We tested the significance of the indirect effect using bootstrapping procedures, with 5,000 bootstrapped samples (Model 4 of Hayes' PROCESS: Y = trait impression; X = enhance or not; M = realistic). There was an indirect effect

of .28, and the 95% CI = [.03, .56], which suggests a mediation effect of realism such that enhancement significantly affects impressions via realism.

And this mediation is moderated by target (i.e., Model 14 of Hayes: moderated mediation = [-1.13, -0.32]), such that the mediation described above (i.e., the fact that enhancement impacts impressions via perceptions of bias/objectivity) only holds when the target is the self, [0.27, 0.99], not other people, [-0.44, 0.18].

#### **Discussion**

Regarding impression formation, results show that enhancers are rated less favorably than equality claimants, presenting an unfavorable image of themselves to observers. In this study, the self-enhancement condition was the only one that led to a negative impression formation (Hypotheses 1 and 3), meaning these results are congruent with the Hubris Hypothesis.

When addressing perceived bias, it was evident that people perceive enhancers as more biased than equality claimants. These results are consistent with hypotheses 5 and 6 respectively. Moreover, "other" claims were perceived as less biased than "self" claims.

What was additionally found in these experiments is that objectivity is valued when making claims about the self, since it was found to be a significant predictor of impression formation when talking about oneself. However, this same objectivity had no effect on impression formation when the target of the claims was another person, meaning that people are not punished for having a certain type of favoritism towards others. Complementary, objectivity only impacted impression formation in enhancements claims, which means equality claims can be perceived as biased and yet not be penalized (e.g., false modesty).

Overall, results showed that self-enhancers cause negative impressions because they are perceived as biased. However, biased favoritism directed towards others is not punished. At the same time, other-equality claims were not punished with negative impression; they were simply regarded as just as favorable as other-enhancement claims. Nevertheless, independent results from "better person" and "attractiveness" domains showed an interaction effect, such that people were marginally seen more favorably when enhancing others, compared to when claiming others to be equal.

To further explore this effect, in the next experiment, we analysed other-enhancement vs. other-equality conditions in more depth, to determine whether, in fact, showing a favoritism towards others is regarded positively.

#### **Experiment 2**

#### Method

#### Design and Participants:

We sought to have 50 participants per cell. A few participants did the study twice. We only counted their first participation. Ninety-four individuals participated in this experiment (46 for the non-enhancement condition, 48 for the non-enhancement condition).

#### Procedure and materials:

Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the following two conditions: *other-enhancement* ("My wife is the most beautiful woman in the world"/ "I went to see my son's Christmas school play and I thought it was amazing. I thought my son and the other kids in his class couldn't have been better!"/ "On my birthday my grandmother baked me a cake. I love her cakes. They're the best cakes in the world!"); or *other-equality* ("My wife is not the most

beautiful woman in the world; there are many women who are uglier than her, but there are also many women who are more beautiful than her"/"I went to see my son's Christmas school play and I didn't find it spectacular. I thought my son and the other kids in his class were average."/"On my birthday my grandmother baked me a cake. I don't exactly love the cakes that my grandmother bakes. They're not at all special.").

After reading each sentence, equivalently to the past experiment, participants rated the claimant on different traits, ranging from an unfavorable (-3) to a favorable trait (+3) on a 7-point Likert scale. The traits were the same as the first study. Afterwards, similarly to the first experiment, participants were asked to rate how much they thought the claimant to be biased on a 7-point Likert scale. The order in which the different sentences and features were presented was randomized.

#### **Results**

#### **Impressions**

An aggregate score for trait ratings and likeability was computed as in Study 1,  $\alpha$  = .97. Impression formation across the conditions was significantly different t(92) = -9.82, p < .001, where other-equality claimants were rated less favorably (M = 3.62, SD = 0.86) than the other-enhancers (M = 5.47, SD = 0.97).

One-sample t-tests comparing these ratings against the midpoint of the scale (4) show that the other-equality claimers were rated unfavorably, t(47) = -3.08, p = .003, whereas ratings of other-enhancers were favorable, t(45) = 9.30, p < .001. In sum, these results indicate that enhancement claims of others are favorably accepted, contrary to equality claimants, which in this experiment showed unfavorable impressions.

#### **Credibility**

An aggregate score was computed as in Study 1,  $\alpha$  = .86. Results show a numerical difference of other-equality (M = 4.55, SD = 0.79) and other-enhancement conditions (M = 3.65, SD = 0.93), the former being significantly more realistic than the latter, t(92) = 5.06, p < .001.

One-sample *t*-tests comparing these scores against the midpoint of the scale (4) show that the non-enhancing descriptions were considered realistic, t(47) = 4.82, p < .001, whereas the enhancing descriptions were considered biased, t(45) = -2.56, p = .014.

#### **Credibility and Impressions**

Finally, the ratings for the two measures (credibility and impressions) correlated negatively, r = -.21, p = .046, such that more biased descriptions of others generated more favorable impressions. And the positive mediation effect that was observed in Study 1 when the target was the self (X = enhancement or non-enhancement, M = credibility, Y = impression) was also significant in this study, but negative: [-0.43, -0.01]. That is, when the target is another person, enhancement affects impression formation via credibility, whereby more enhancement leads to less perceived objectivity, but this in turn results in more favorable impressions.

#### **Discussion**

Despite being perceived as biased, other-enhancers were rated favorably. On the contrary, equality claimants were negatively rated, leading to an unfavorable impression of the claimant. These results are congruent with hypotheses 2 and 4, where we predicted that other-

enhancers would be rated favorably, yet other-equality claimants would be rated unfavorably since a certain type of favoritism would be expected when talking about close-others.

#### **General Discussion**

In trying to understand the role of social comparisons in impression formation and complimenting the Hubris Hypothesis, the main findings of these experiments are consistent with Hoorens et al. 's (2012) study. Study 1 showed that despite self- and other-enhancements being perceived as biased, only the former seems to provoke a negative impression about the claimant. When talking about other people, the author is not perceived as negatively, despite also being perceived as biased. These results are congruent with our hypothesis. Furthermore, in Study 2 a clearer dissociation of bias perception and trait impression is evident. Again, despite other-enhancers being seen as more biased, they are linked to more favorable impressions. On the contrary, other-non-enhancers were rated as more realistic, but less likeable. In situations where we mention people dearest to us, a certain type of favoritism is expected, however biased it might be considered.

Despite these results being clearer in the second experiment, it is worth mentioning that in the first experiment, the "intelligent" domain was the only one that did not show an interaction effect. Which can suggest that in some situations, positive appraisals might be more expected than others (e.g., A father might not be expected to praise his kid's intelligence as much as he is expected to claim to like his son's performance in a school play).

Additionally, self-equality claims showed interesting results regarding impression formations. Modesty might be well-received, regardless of whether it is perceived as biased or not. These findings are consistent with literature regarding modesty and impression formation. It is consistently evident that equity claims regarding the self is even more favorable and works

better in forming a likeable impression of the claimant than self-promotions, even when these promotions are accurate (O´Mara, Kunz, Receveur, & Corbin, 2019; Schlenker & Leary, 1982). Evidently, modesty can work as an efficient strategy to promote a good image of oneself.

Study 1 showed that, when addressing oneself, perception of bias is associated with a negative view of the claimant. Similar research on the perceived accuracy of claims on impression formation has shown that when a third-party testimonial confirms the self-promotion, its negative effect on impression is reversed producing a more likeable image of the claimant (O'Mara et al., 2019). So, these studies complement each other by showing that self-enhancement by default is perceived as biased, and therefore directly linked to an unfavorable impression of the claimant. However, this effect is inverted when these claims depict the truth, since perception of bias is reduced and consequently perception of accuracy is heightened.

On the other hand, when addressing a close-other, perception of bias either had no effect or positively impacted impressions of the claimant. It seems that one alternative way to successfully present a favorable image of oneself, is by enhancing a close-other or his social group, and therefore indirectly, yet more efficiently, sell a more likeable image of himself.

One possible limitation in this study is that claims from the second experiment started with a negative point of view and then proceeded to an average opinion. A primacy effect could have influenced the results, leading to a more negative view of an equality claim. Nevertheless, in the first experiment there was a general tendency for less favorable ratings of other-equality claimers. So, it is safe to assume that the results from the second study complement the results from the first one.

Future studies might consider other targets: For instance, a fan talking about a local team as the best, or a person talking about his hometown as the most beautiful in the world.

These claims are explicit claims depicting an ingroup favoritism, a widely known concept "referring to any tendency to favour the ingroup over the outgroup, in behaviour, attitudes, preferences or perception" (Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979, p. 187). Claiming to be better than another group is most likely perceived negatively by the "opposing" group members. However, what is proposed for future studies is to investigate how ratings of social desirability from impartial observers vary regarding claims of ingroup appraisal. On the one hand, these are cases where observers would also consider those assessments as biased, but they would not necessarily hold them against their authors; on the contrary, as in Study 2, they might be more punishing of someone making more negative, but realistic, assessments.

On the other hand, it is also possible to think that this type of favoritism can lead to a dislikeable impression, since enhancing one's ingroup includes enhancing the author, and therefore be comparable to a self-enhancement. This way, the "close-other" relationship may have a turning-point, where enhancing an ingroup is too close to the claimant, leading to a dislikeable impression.

#### Conclusion

This research is of particular interest for the development of the Hubris Hypothesis, since it showed how biased appraisals might be expected when talking about others close to us. Moreover, the role of objectivity was also noted when talking about the self, pointing to objectivity being valued.

Despite the consistent results, future research should be conducted in order to verify the replicability of results and explore variants of social desirability with different subject-claims, as mentioned in the General Discussion section. These questions make it clear that the relation

between enhancements and impression formation is nuanced, and that there is much to explore in this respect.

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#### APPENDIX A Study 1

Código do participante
Introdução
Obrigado pela sua participação neste estudo. Os dados recolhidos nesta investigação serão
anónimos, não permitindo a identificação do participante através deles. O preenchimento deste
questionário tem uma duração média de 5 minutos, sendo a sua participação inteiramente
voluntária. Clique na seta para prosseguir com o estudo.
Dados demográficos
Sexo
O Masculino
○ Feminino
Outro
Idade:

#### Instruções

Neste estudo estamos interessados em saber as impressões e opiniões que as pessoas formam acerca de outros indivíduos com base no que esses indivíduos dizem. Vai ler várias frases. Cada frase foi dita por uma pessoa a falar acerca de si própria ou acerca de outra pessoa. Para cada uma das frases, queremos saber a sua opinião sobre a frase e a pessoa que a disse. Não existem respostas certas ou erradas. Estamos apenas interessados na sua opinião sincera. Clique na seta para começar a experiência.

#### AE amigável

A Madalena disse a seguinte frase: "Sou uma melhor pessoa que as outras pessoas em geral" Agora pedimos-lhe que indique o que pensa da Madalena

Antipática -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Simpática 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Arrogante -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Humilde 3
0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	0	$\circ$
Desagradável -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Agradável 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nada amistosa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito amistosa 3
0	$\circ$	0	0	0	0	0

Presunçosa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Modesta 3
0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\bigcirc$	0
Não gostaria nada de interagir com esta pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Gostaria muito de interagir com esta pessoa 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Má pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Boa pessoa 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0

## Enviesamento percebido AE amigável

Agora pedimos-lhe que indique o que pensa da frase que a Madalena disse ("Sou uma melhor pessoa que as outras pessoas em geral")

	Nada -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito 3
Quanto é que acha que esta pessoa está a ser objetiva?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão enviesada (isto é, irrealista) é esta opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0			0	0
Quanto é que esta pessoa está a exagerar?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão distorcida é a opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quanto é que acredita na opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

#### **AE** atratividade

O Dan	niel disse a segui	inte frase:	"Acho que	e sou a pe	essoa mais	bonita q	ue conheço"
Agora	pedimos-lhe que in	ndique o qu	e pensa do l	Daniel			
	Antipático	-2	-1	0	1	2	Simpático
	-3		1		1		3
		$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\bigcirc$		$\bigcirc$
	Arrogante -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Humilde 3
	0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$
	I						

Desagradável -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Agradável 3
0	$\circ$	0	$\circ$	0	$\circ$	0
Nada amistoso -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito amistoso 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Presunçoso -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Modesto 3

Não gostaria nada de interagir com esta pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Gostaria muito de interagir com esta pessoa 3
0	$\circ$	$\circ$	0	0	$\bigcirc$	$\circ$

.....

Má pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Boa pessoa 3
0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$

## Enviesamento percebido AE atratividade

Agora pedimos-lhe que indique o que pensa da frase que o Daniel disse ("Acho que sou a pessoa mais bonita que conheço")

	Nada -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito 3
Quanto é que acha que esta pessoa está a ser objetiva?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão enviesada (isto é, irrealista) é esta opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0			0	0
Quanto é que esta pessoa está a exagerar?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão distorcida é a opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quanto é que acredita na opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

## **AE** inteligente

O Rui di	sse a seguinte	frase: "So	ou mais in	teligente q	ue as outra	as pessoa	as em geral"
Agora ped	limos-lhe que inc	lique o que	e pensa do l	Rui			
	Antipático -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Simpático 3
	0	$\circ$	$\bigcirc$	$\bigcirc$	0	0	0
	Arrogante	2	1	0	1	2	Humilde
	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3
	0	$\circ$	$\bigcirc$	$\bigcirc$	$\bigcirc$	$\bigcirc$	$\circ$
	ı						
	Desagradável -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Agradável 3

.....

	3
0 0 0 0	

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Presunçoso -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Modesto 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0

\_\_\_\_\_

Não gostaria nada de interagir com esta pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Gostaria muito de interagir com esta pessoa 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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Má pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Boa pessoa 3
0	$\circ$	0	0	0	$\circ$	0

## Enviesamento percebido AE inteligente

Agora pedimos-lhe que indique o que pensa da frase que o Rui disse ("Sou mais inteligente que as outras pessoas em geral.")

	Nada -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito 3
Quanto é que acha que esta pessoa está a ser objetiva?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão enviesada (isto é, irrealista) é esta opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0		0	0
Quanto é que esta pessoa está a exagerar?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão distorcida é a opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quanto é que acredita na opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0		0	0

# HE amigável

	na disse a seguinte frase: "O meu melhor amigo é uma melhor pessoa que as out n geral". Agora pedimos-lhe que indique o que pensa da Madalena								
Antipática	-2	-1	0	1	2	Simpática 3			
	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Arrogante -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Humilde 3			
0	0	0	0	0	0	0			

Desagradável -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Agradável 3
0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$
Nada amistosa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito amistosa 3
0	0	0	0	0	$\circ$	0
Presunçosa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Modesta 3

0 0 0 0 0 0

Não gostaria nada de interagir com esta pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Gostaria muito de interagir com esta pessoa 3
0	$\circ$	0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$

Má pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Boa pessoa 3
0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$

## Enviesamento percebido HE amigável

Agora pedimos-lhe que indique o que pensa da frase que a Madalena disse ("O meu melhor amigo é uma melhor pessoa que as outras pessoas em geral").

	Nada -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito 3
Quanto é que acha que esta pessoa está a ser objetiva?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão enviesada (isto é, irrealista) é esta opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0			0	0
Quanto é que esta pessoa está a exagerar?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão distorcida é a opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quanto é que acredita na opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0		0	0

#### HE atratividade

l disse a seguinte frase: "Acho que a minha parceira é a pessoa mais bonita". Agora pedimos-lhe que indique o que pensa do Daniel.									
Antipático	-2	-1	0	1	2	Simpático			
0	0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	0	0			
Arrogante -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Humilde 3			
0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
Desagradável -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Agradável 3			

Nada amistoso -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito amistoso 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Presunçoso -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Modesto 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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Não gostaria nada de interagir com esta pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Gostaria muito de interagir com esta pessoa 3
0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\bigcirc$	$\bigcirc$	$\circ$

Má pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Boa pessoa 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	$\circ$

## Enviesamento percebido HE atratividade

Agora pedimos-lhe que indique o que pensa da frase que o Daniel disse ("Acho que a minha parceira é a pessoa mais bonita que conheço")

	Nada -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito 3
Quanto é que acha que esta pessoa está a ser objetiva?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão enviesada (isto é, irrealista) é esta opinião desta pessoa?	0	0				0	0
Quanto é que esta pessoa está a exagerar?	0	0	0	0	$\circ$	0	0
Quão distorcida é a opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quanto é que acredita na opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

## HE inteligente

O Rui diss	se a seguinte fras	e: "O meu	filho é mai	s inteligent	e que as ou	tras crian	ças em geral"
Agora ped	limos-lhe que inc	lique o que	e pensa do F	Rui			
	Antipático	-2	-1	0	1	2	Simpático 3
	0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$
	Arrogante -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Humilde 3
	0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$
	1						
	Desagradável -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Agradável 3

Nada nistoso -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito amistoso 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Presunçoso -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Modesto 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0

\_\_\_\_\_

Não gostaria nada de interagir com esta pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Gostaria muito de interagir com esta pessoa 3
0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\bigcirc$	$\circ$

Má pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Boa pessoa 3
0	$\circ$	0	$\circ$	0	0	0

## Enviesamento percebido HE inteligente

Agora pedimos-lhe que indique o que pensa da frase que o Rui disse (" O meu filho é mais inteligente que as outras crianças em geral")

	Nada -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito 3
Quanto é que acha que esta pessoa está a ser objetiva?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão enviesada (isto é, irrealista) é esta opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0			0	0
Quanto é que esta pessoa está a exagerar?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão distorcida é a opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quanto é que acredita na opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

# AI amigável

A Madaler	na disse a seguin	te frase: "N	Vão sou um	a pessoa ne	em melhor i	nem pior	que as outras
pessoas em	n geral". Agora p	edimos-lho	e que indiqu	ie o que pei	nsa da Mad	alena	
	Antipática						Simpática
	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Simpática 3
	0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$
	1						
	Arrogante -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Humilde 3
	0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	0
	I						
	Desagradável -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Agradável 3

.....

Nada amistosa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito amistosa 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Presunçosa -2 -1 0 1 2 Modesta 3

\_\_\_\_\_

Não gostaria nada de interagir com esta pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Gostaria muito de interagir com esta pessoa 3
0	$\bigcirc$	$\bigcirc$	$\bigcirc$	$\bigcirc$	$\circ$	$\circ$

Má pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Boa pessoa 3
0	$\circ$	0	$\circ$	0	0	0

## Enviesamento percebido AI amigável

Agora pedimos-lhe que indique o que pensa da frase que a Madalena disse ("Não sou uma pessoa nem melhor nem pior que as outras pessoas em geral")

	Nada -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito 3
Quanto é que acha que esta pessoa está a ser objetiva?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão enviesada (isto é, irrealista) é esta opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0			0	0
Quanto é que esta pessoa está a exagerar?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão distorcida é a opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quanto é que acredita na opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

### AI atratividade

O Daniel	disse a seguinte t	frase: "Ach	o que não so	ou mais boni	ito nem mer	os bonito	que as outras
pessoas ei	m geral". Agora	pedimos-ll	ne que indiq	ue o que pe	nsa do Dan	iel	
	Antipático	-2	-1	0	1	2	Simpático
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Arrogante -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Humilde 3
		0	0	0	0	0	0

Desagradável -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Agradável 3
0	$\circ$	0	$\circ$	0	$\circ$	$\circ$
Nada amistoso -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito amistoso 3
0	0	0	0	$\circ$	0	0
Presunçoso -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Modesto 3

Não gostaria nada de interagir com esta pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Gostaria muito de interagir com esta pessoa 3
0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$

Má pessoa -2 -1 0 1 2 pessoa 3

## Enviesamento percebido AI atratividade

Agora pedimos-lhe que indique o que pensa da frase que o Daniel disse ("Acho que não sou mais bonito nem menos bonito que as outras pessoas em geral")

	Nada -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito 3
Quanto é que acha que esta pessoa está a ser objetiva?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão enviesada (isto é, irrealista) é esta opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0			0	0
Quanto é que esta pessoa está a exagerar?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão distorcida é a opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quanto é que acredita na opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

# AI inteligente

O Rui disse	e a seguinte fra	ise: "Acho	que não so	u mais intel	igente nem	menos in	teligente que
os outros; s	sou igual às ou	tras pessoa	s em geral"	. Agora ped	limos-lhe qu	ue indique	e o que pensa
do Rui							
	Antipático -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Simpático 3
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1						
	Arrogante	-2	-1	0	1	2	Humilde
	-3						3
	0	$\bigcirc$	$\bigcirc$	$\bigcirc$	$\bigcirc$	$\bigcirc$	$\circ$

Desagradável -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Agradável 3
0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	0	0
Nada amistoso -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito amistoso 3
0	0	$\circ$	0	0	0	0
Presunçoso -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Modesto 3
0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	0	$\circ$

Não gostaria nada de interagir com esta pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Gostaria muito de interagir com esta pessoa 3
0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\bigcirc$	$\circ$

\_\_\_\_\_\_

Má pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Boa pessoa 3
0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$

## Enviesamento percebido AI inteligente

Agora pedimos-lhe que indique o que pensa da frase que o Rui disse ("Acho que não sou mais inteligente nem menos inteligente que os outros; sou igual às outras pessoas em geral")

	Nada -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito 3
Quanto é que acha que esta pessoa está a ser objetiva?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão enviesada (isto é, irrealista) é esta opinião desta pessoa?	0	0				0	0
Quanto é que esta pessoa está a exagerar?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão distorcida é a opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quanto é que acredita na opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

# HI amigável

A Madaler	na disse a seguin	te frase: "C	) meu melh	or amigo na	ão é uma pe	essoa nen	n melhor nem
pior que as	s outras pessoas e	em geral". A	Agora pedin	nos-lhe que	indique o	que pensa	da Madalena
	Antipática -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Simpática 3
	0	$\circ$	0	0	0	0	0
	I						
	Arrogante	-2	-1	0	1	2	Humilde
	-3						3
	0	$\circ$	$\bigcirc$	$\bigcirc$	$\bigcirc$	$\bigcirc$	$\bigcirc$
	Desagradável -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Agradável 3

Nada amistosa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito amistosa 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Presunçosa -2 -1 0 1 2 Modesta 3

\_\_\_\_\_

Não gostaria nada de interagir com esta pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Gostaria muito de interagir com esta pessoa 3
0	$\bigcirc$	$\bigcirc$	$\bigcirc$	$\bigcirc$	$\circ$	$\circ$

Má pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Boa pessoa 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	$\circ$

## Enviesamento percebido HI amigável

Agora pedimos-lhe que indique o que pensa da frase que a Madalena disse ("O meu melhor amigo não é uma pessoa nem melhor nem pior que as outras pessoas em geral")

	Nada -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito 3
Quanto é que acha que esta pessoa está a ser objetiva?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão enviesada (isto é, irrealista) é esta opinião desta pessoa?	0	0				0	0
Quanto é que esta pessoa está a exagerar?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão distorcida é a opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quanto é que acredita na opinião desta pessoa?	0	0		0	0	0	0

### HI atratividade

O Daniel d	Daniel disse a seguinte frase: "Acho que a minha parceira não é uma pessoa nem mais bonita									
nem meno	s bonita que as o	outras pesso	oas em geral	". Agora pe	dimos-lhe q	jue indiqu	e o que pensa			
do Daniel										
							g: 4:1			
	Antipático -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Simpático 3			
		$\circ$					$\circ$			
	Arrogante	2	1	0	1	2	Humilde			
	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3			
	$\circ$	$\bigcirc$	$\bigcirc$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\bigcirc$			

Desagradável -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Agradável 3
0	0	0	$\circ$	0	0	0
Nada amistoso -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito amistoso 3
0	0	0	0	$\circ$	0	0
Presunçoso -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Modesto 3
	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$

Não gostaria nada de interagir com esta pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Gostaria muito de interagir com esta pessoa 3
0	$\circ$	0	0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$

Má pessoa -2 -1 0 1 2 pessoa 3

## Enviesamento percebido HI atratividade

Agora pedimos-lhe que indique o que pensa da frase que o Daniel disse ("Acho que a minha parceira não é uma pessoa nem mais bonita nem menos bonita que as outras pessoas em geral")

	Nada -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito 3
Quanto é que acha que esta pessoa está a ser objetiva?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão enviesada (isto é, irrealista) é esta opinião desta pessoa?	0	0				0	0
Quanto é que esta pessoa está a exagerar?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão distorcida é a opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quanto é que acredita na opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

## HI inteligente

O Rui diss	se a seguinte f	rase: "Ach	o que o m	eu filho nã	io é mais i	nteligente	nem menos
inteligente	que os outros;	é igual às o	utras crianç	as em geral	". Agora pe	edimos-lhe	que indique
o que pensa	a do Rui						
	<b>A</b>						g: 4:
	Antipático -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Simpático 3
		$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$		$\circ$
	Arrogante -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Humilde 3

Desagradável -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Agradável 3
0	0	0	$\circ$	0	0	0
Nada amistoso -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito amistoso 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Presunçoso -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Modesto 3
			$\circ$			0

Não gostaria nada de interagir com esta pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Gostaria muito de interagir com esta pessoa 3
0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$

Má Boa pessoa -2 -1 0 1 2 pessoa 3

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## Enviesamento percebido HI inteligente

Agora pedimos-lhe que indique o que pensa da frase que o Rui disse ("Acho que o meu filho não é mais inteligente nem menos inteligente que os outros; é igual às outras crianças em geral")

	Nada -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito 3
Quanto é que acha que esta pessoa está a ser objetiva?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão enviesada (isto é, irrealista) é esta opinião desta pessoa?	0	0				0	0
Quanto é que esta pessoa está a exagerar?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão distorcida é a opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quanto é que acredita na opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

### Conclusão

Fim da experiência Obrigado pela sua colaboração

#### APPENDIX B Study 2

### Instruções

Neste estudo estamos interessados em saber as impressões e opiniões que as pessoas formam acerca de outros indivíduos com base no que esses indivíduos dizem. Vai ler várias frases. Cada frase foi dita por uma pessoa a falar acerca de outra pessoa. Para cada uma das frases, queremos

saber a sua opinião sobre a frase e a pessoa que a disse. Não existem respostas certas ou erradas. Estamos apenas interessados na sua opinião sincera. Clique na seta para começar a experiência.

#### HE filho

A Madalena disse a seguinte frase: "Fui ver o teatrinho de Natal da escola do meu filho e achei espectacular. Achei que o meu filho e os outros meninos da sua turma não poderiam ter sido melhores!" Agora pedimos-lhe que indique o que pensa da Madalena

.....

Antipática -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Simpática 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Arrogante -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Humilde 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0

\_\_\_\_\_

Desagradável -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Agradável 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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Nada amistosa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito amistosa 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0

\_\_\_\_\_

Presunçosa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Modesta 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0

\_\_\_\_\_\_

Não gostaria nada de interagir com esta pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Gostaria muito de interagir com esta pessoa 3
0	$\circ$	0	0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$

Má pessoa -2 -1 0 1 2 pessoa 3

### Enviesamento percebido HE filho

Agora pedimos-lhe que indique o que pensa da frase que a Madalena disse ("Fui ver o teatrinho de Natal da escola do meu filho e achei espectacular. Achei que o meu filho e os outros meninos da sua turma não poderiam ter sido melhores!")

	Nada -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito 3
Quanto é que acha que esta pessoa está a ser objetiva?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão enviesada (isto é, irrealista) é esta opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0			0	0
Quanto é que esta pessoa está a exagerar?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão distorcida é a opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quanto é que acredita na opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

# HE parceira

O Daniel d	isse a seguinte	frase: "Eu	acho que a	minha mulh	er é a mais	bonita do	mundo. Para
mim, não l	há nenhuma m	ulher tão b	onita como	ela." Agoı	a pedimos-	lhe que in	ndique o que
pensa do D	aniel						
							a
	Antipático -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Simpático 3
		0	0	0	0	0	0
	Armaganta						Humilde
	Arrogante -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3
		$\circ$		$\circ$		$\circ$	$\circ$
				_			

Desagradável -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Agradável 3
0	$\circ$	0	$\circ$	0	0	0
Nada amistoso -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito amistoso 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Presunçoso -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Modesto 3
0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\bigcirc$	$\circ$	$\circ$

Não gostaria nada de interagir com esta pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Gostaria muito de interagir com esta pessoa 3
0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\bigcirc$	$\circ$

\_\_\_\_\_\_

Má pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Boa pessoa 3
0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$

## Enviesamento percebido HE parceira

Agora pedimos-lhe que indique o que pensa da frase que o Daniel disse

("Eu acho que a minha mulher é a mais bonita do mundo. Para mim, não há nenhuma mulher tão bonita como ela.")

	Nada -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito 3
Quanto é que acha que esta pessoa está a ser objetiva?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão enviesada (isto é, irrealista) é esta opinião desta pessoa?	0				0	0	0
Quanto é que esta pessoa está a exagerar?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão distorcida é a opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quanto é que acredita na opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

### HE avó

O Rui diss	se a seguinte fra	se: "No m	eu aniversái	rio a minha	avó fez-me	um bolo.	Eu adoro os
bolos que a	a minha avó faz	. São os m	elhores bolo	s do mundo	o!" Agora pe	edimos-lh	e que indique
o que pens	a do Rui						
							a
	Antipático -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Simpático 3
	0	$\circ$			$\circ$	$\circ$	0
	Arrogante						Humilde
	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3
		$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\bigcirc$	$\circ$	$\circ$

Desagradável -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Agradável 3
0	$\circ$	0	$\circ$	0	$\circ$	$\circ$
Nada amistoso -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito amistoso 3
0	0	0	0	$\circ$	0	0
Presunçoso -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Modesto 3

Não gostaria nada de interagir com esta pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Gostaria muito de interagir com esta pessoa 3
0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\bigcirc$	$\circ$

\_\_\_\_\_\_

Má pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Boa pessoa 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0

## Enviesamento percebido HE avó

Agora pedimos-lhe que indique o que pensa da frase que o Rui disse (" No meu aniversário a minha avó fez-me um bolo. Eu adoro os bolos que a minha avó faz. São os melhores bolos do mundo!")

	Nada -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito 3
Quanto é que acha que esta pessoa está a ser objetiva?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão enviesada (isto é, irrealista) é esta opinião desta pessoa?	0	0				0	0
Quanto é que esta pessoa está a exagerar?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão distorcida é a opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quanto é que acredita na opinião desta pessoa?	0	0				0	0

#### HI filho

A Madalena disse a seguinte frase: "Fui ver o teatrinho de Natal da escola do meu filho e não achei nada de espectacular. Achei que o meu filho e os outros meninos da sua turma foram medianos." Agora pedimos-lhe que indique o que pensa da Madalena

\_\_\_\_\_

Antipática -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Simpática 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0

\_\_\_\_\_

Arrogante -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Humilde 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Desagradável -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Agradável 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nada amistosa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito amistosa 3
0	0	$\circ$	0	0	0	$\circ$
Presunçosa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Modesta 3

Não gostaria nada de interagir com esta pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Gostaria muito de interagir com esta pessoa 3
0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\bigcirc$	$\circ$

Má pessoa -2 -1 0 1 2 pessoa 3

### Enviesamento percebido HI filho

Agora pedimos-lhe que indique o que pensa da frase que a Madalena disse ("Fui ver o teatrinho de Natal da escola do meu filho e não achei nada de espectacular. Achei que o meu filho e os outros meninos da sua turma foram medianos.")

	Nada -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito 3
Quanto é que acha que esta pessoa está a ser objetiva?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão enviesada (isto é, irrealista) é esta opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0			0	0
Quanto é que esta pessoa está a exagerar?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão distorcida é a opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quanto é que acredita na opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

# HI parceira

O Daniel di	isse a seguinte t	frase: "Eu r	ıão acho que	e a minha m	ulher seja a	mais boni	ta do mundo.					
Para mim, há várias mulheres mais feias do que ela, mas também há muitas mulheres mais												
bonitas que ela." Agora pedimos-lhe que indique o que pensa do Daniel												
	Antipático -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Simpático 3					
	0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\bigcirc$	$\circ$	$\circ$					
	I											
	I											
	Arrogante	-2	-1	0	1	2	Humilde					

Desagradável -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Agradável 3
0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$
Nada amistoso -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito amistoso 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Presunçoso -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Modesto 3
0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$

Não gostaria nada de interagir com esta pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Gostaria muito de interagir com esta pessoa 3
0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$

Má pessoa -2 -1 0 1 2 pessoa 3

### Enviesamento percebido HI parceira

Agora pedimos-lhe que indique o que pensa da frase que o Daniel disse ("Eu não acho que a minha mulher seja a mais bonita do mundo. Para mim, há várias mulheres mais feias do que ela, mas também há muitas mulheres mais bonitas que ela.")

	Nada -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito 3
Quanto é que acha que esta pessoa está a ser objetiva?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão enviesada (isto é, irrealista) é esta opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0			0	0
Quanto é que esta pessoa está a exagerar?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão distorcida é a opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quanto é que acredita na opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

## HI avó

O Rui diss	e a seguinte fra	se: "No me	eu aniversár	io a minha a	avó fez-me	um bolo.	Eu não adorc		
particularmente os bolos que a minha avó faz. São mais ou menos." Agora pedimos-lhe que indique o que pensa do Rui									
	Antipático	-2	-1	0	1	2	Simpático		
	0	$\circ$	0	$\circ$	$\circ$	0	0		
	Arrogante -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Humilde 3		
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		

Desagradável -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Agradável 3
0	$\circ$	$\circ$	0	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$
Nada amistoso -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito amistoso 3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0
 Presunçoso -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Modesto 3
0	$\circ$	$\bigcirc$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$	$\circ$

Não gostaria nada de interagir com esta pessoa -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Gostaria muito de interagir com esta pessoa 3
0	0	0	$\circ$	0	0	0

Má pessoa -2 -1 0 1 2 pessoa 3

## Enviesamento percebido HI avó

Agora pedimos-lhe que indique o que pensa da frase que o Rui disse ("No meu aniversário a minha avó fez-me um bolo. Eu não adoro particularmente os bolos que a minha avó faz. São mais ou menos.")

	Nada -3	-2	-1	0	1	2	Muito 3
Quanto é que acha que esta pessoa está a ser objetiva?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão enviesada (isto é, irrealista) é esta opinião desta pessoa?	0	0				0	0
Quanto é que esta pessoa está a exagerar?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quão distorcida é a opinião desta pessoa?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quanto é que acredita na opinião desta pessoa?	0	0				0	0

### Conclusão

Fim da experiência Obrigado pela sua colaboração