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The many voices of interdisciplinarity

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Cogent Arts & Humanities aspires to publish high-quality, peer-reviewed academic work from around the world in a scholarly Open Access format supported by the finest Internet software, marketing, and analytics. While the journal as a whole is divided into five thematic sections defined roughly in disciplinary terms, *Cogent Arts & Humanities* does not center itself upon a specific discipline, tradition, or movement within or among academic disciplines. This makes it a particularly fine place to publish interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary, cross-disciplinary, as well as liminally or marginally disciplinary work—in addition, of course, to work that is properly disciplinary.

We collect here, in this our first special issue, a selection of extraordinary essays from authors exhibiting something of the range of interdisciplinary work with which academics and other intellectuals are today engaged. In part, the composition of this collection was driven by dynamics evolving within particular academic disciplines themselves—e.g. internal criticisms of the epistemological project of university scholarship and the exclusions, politically speaking, that have defined academia. In part, this collection has also emerged from stresses, challenges, and disruptions inflicted upon conventional disciplines by forces outside of them (often forces in government and commerce). In part, the composition of this collection exhibits the idiosyncratic drives, interests, and aspirations of its particular authors and editors.

Michael Davis' remarkable essay, "Lies like the truth," on Plato's philosophical dialog, the *Lesser Hippias*, and Homer's epic poem, the *Iliad*, offer a fine gateway into our volume with its meditation being *polutopos*—i.e. polytopical or many-placed—a concept that anticipates contemporary ideas about interdisciplinarity (Davis, 2016). Drawing on philology, philosophy, history, literature, and rhetoric, Davis argues that while Achilles is figured in the *Iliad* as seeing and speaking only from a simple-minded singularity—perhaps a virtue in a warrior—Odysseus presents us with something else.

Clever Odysseus lies and lies well because he can appreciate multiple perspectives, different places from which others (both friends and enemies) understand the world. Odysseus shows us how understanding the truth and turning one's practices upon it requires appreciating what truth is not (i.e. what is false or in error). But the idea of an other to truth also raises questions about the possibility of other truths, or at least the extent to which other perspectives might add depth and complexity to what one sees as (one's own) truth. That may be so perhaps because our own "truths" are necessarily incomplete. Perhaps it is even so because truth is in some sense itself "poly" or multiple. From this perspective, interdisciplinarity can help inquirers resist reductionism. It's an observation Brent Smith finely sharpens in his essay about the disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity of Religious Studies.

Following Parmenides' clue about the singularity of *esti* (or "what is"), Plato's characters variously maintain in dialogs such as the *Republic* that while *doxa* (opinion or belief) is many, plural, and shifting, *epistemē* (or knowledge) is singular or one and stable. Hegel, following out the implications of this thought in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, argues that while the truth is polyphonic in the process of its realization—with different competitors to truth vying among themselves—when finally the truth is complete, its realization is both singular and also comprehensive. "*Das Wahre ist das Ganze*" ("the true is the whole"), Hegel concludes in §22 of the Preface to the *Phenomenology*, a whole that comprehends all the world's apparently different knowledges in a systematic unity—a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.

Along similar lines, Richard Wagner aspired to create in his operas a *Gesamtkunstwerk* (complete artwork) that would combine all kinds of artwork into a unified, superior whole. The discordant mess of different instruments composing an orchestra as they tune at the outset of a concert come to harmony around a single shared tone. Just so does Leonard Bernstein's *Mass* begin with a cacophony that is silenced by a single chord heralding the entrance of a song about the singular, utterly simple God. In a different context but perhaps with not a terribly different result, social theorist Kimberlè Crenshaw has argued that it is often insufficient to understand or to prove the fact of discrimination by appeal only to a particular category of oppression (race, sex/gender, or class). Instead, what she calls an "intersectional" form of analysis is required (Crenshaw, 1991). Would it be too much to think about these intersecting wholes, or at least the wholes to which they aspire, as interdisciplinary unities? Were it possible to speak in a truly interdisciplinary way or achieve a properly interdisciplinary cognition, might we better think of the knowledge or understanding we achieve as transdisciplinary or supradisciplinary—or simply as the whole truth?

In conjunction with that singularity Parmenides, Hegel, and those that follow them describe, philosophers have also commonly read truth, or aspired to truth, as a form of universality. Francis Bacon in his *Novum organum* (1620) promised us that scientific method—where "method" (from the Greek for "path") is an idea perhaps not terribly far from "discipline"—can overcome the diversity of error. Bacon outlines the human condition through four famous "idols" that limit us, draw our minds off the path to truth, and lead us astray: individual limitations, the limitations of human nature, the limitations of language, and those of our dominant theories. René Descartes in a sister text, the *Discours de la méthode* (1627), envisioned the apprehension of universal truths accessible to anyone—even women and the lowly people of lower Brittany. For both of these foundational figures of the early modern epistemological project, it was to be not in the genius of our individual minds but by our adhering to the proper (disciplinary) method that human beings could transcend their shortcomings and achieve universal truths that are fully mathematical and logical.

Bacon and Descartes may have forgotten, or at least made it easy for us to forget something the ancients knew. In Davis' reading of the *Lesser Hippias*, radical and disruptive concerns about interdisciplinarity related to the wholeness and universality of truth emerge out of his mediations on our poly-topical condition. As epistemically finite, we humans can neither fully grasp nor fully express the whole, singular truth. In some sense, the truth for us always lies out there, beyond our reach, scattered among other poly-*topoi* (or many places). Our finitude is a condition we must suffer not only as individuals but also collectively, since even as groups we can think only through finite and historically located disciplines. As it is for each of us as individuals aspiring to know and express ourselves, so it is for whole disciplines and for academic traditions. The whole always escapes us, even while we labor to comprehend it as the correlate of the whole singularity we look for within ourselves. Perhaps, in fact, it is that sense of incompleteness within that drives us to seek the singular whole without.

Disciplinarity and truth conceived in this way, therefore, presents us with a curious rub. If epistemic finitude is our fate, perhaps the language of holism-through-interdisciplinarity might better be foregone in favor of a simple appreciation of the polytopical. Ibn Rushd in twelfth-century Córdoba seems to have recognized something like this when he argued that both philosophy and religion express the same truth but in different and irreducible terms. They are parallel discourses so separate, different, and independent that they cannot even be said to contradict one another—even though they are still united by a common ground in the ultimate singular truth to which they aspire. For Ibn Rushd there can be, in short, multidisciplinarity but no true interdisciplinarity.

Eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher David Hume, more radically skeptical than Ibn Rushd, argued that the self is a bundle without an abiding unity or common ground. If we extend this idea to the possibilities of human inquiry, by Hume's lights we might wonder not only whether a comprehensive integration of the disciplines is possible but also whether it's even desirable as an ideal to which we should aspire. Perhaps instead, rather than laboring toward truth of a singular sort, we

ought better to settle for (or perhaps, rather, celebrate) nothing more basic than a spectrum of contingent disciplinary bundles, a collection of hip-hop-like mash-ups and samplings. Why not gather and collect a variety of disciplinary approaches, depending upon our purposes, without the presumption of an underlying substantial unity to apprehend? Call it the bundle theory of interdisciplinarity.

Achieving a unified, systematic, holistic kind of known, even as a matter of aspiration, of course has institutional as well as theoretical implications. Brent Smith's article, "Transforming discourse," engages that implication head on as it interrogates the way the university's institutional history—especially its relationship to science—has helped organize its aspiration to unity and holism (Smith, 2016). Smith recognizes that taking the organization of the university around a unifying "epistemological project" with science at its core has come at significant cost, the cost of reducing knowledge to scientific findings. It's a cost, however, that interdisciplinarity can help remediate.

That remediation is possible, because one of the virtues of interdisciplinarity, as Smith shows, is its laying bare through historicizing critiques of knowledge the limits of scientific thinking's capacity to reach a systematically integrated whole. Simultaneously, interdisciplinarity exposes alternative possibilities opened by new forms of thinking and practice besides the sciences. Interdisciplinarity in short vaccinates us against reductive and oversimplified thinking just as it enriches and adds sophistication through cross-disciplinary cross-fertilization. David E. Cooper, who has written about philosophy and gardening, among many other things, exemplifies this model of interdisciplinarity in his contribution to this collection with an essay, "Archeology, landscape, and aesthetics," about the way esthetic reflection can enrich landscape archeology (Cooper, 2016).

At its limit, interdisciplinarity of this sort can synthesize something in a sense entirely new. Medieval philosophers skillfully synthesized Abrahamic religions with Greek and Roman philosophy into the new systems built by those such as Augustine, Ibn Sina, and Aquinas designed to illuminate truth. Similarly, Venetian architects would draw from both Asian and European models in composing their own brilliant and original style. English, while a distinct language of its own, is also, of course, more than many other languages, a pastiche of Gaelic, Anglo-Saxon, Norse, French, Hindi, and a great wash of affiliated tongues. Thinkers such as Montaigne, Dante, Ficino, Petrarch, and Michelangelo synthesized classical and vulgar forms in the inventions of Renaissance interdisciplinarity. Alternatively, the tropes of interdisciplinarity may, in a way literary theorist and philosopher Roland Barthes suggests, birth something new not by synthesis or hybridization but rather by simply reshuffling the semiotic network through which we read the world. Perhaps like shards of glass in a kaleidoscope, the very meanings of the words and concepts we use, even those we use in academic disciplines, may emerge from interdisciplinary encounters reconfigured and reorganized in new but also illuminating ways.

In Chapter 9 of his *Poetics*, Aristotle claims that poetry is like philosophy because both speak universal truths, while history in contrast can speak only about particulars. For Aristotelian holists, the universal speech of philosophy requires as a complement the particular speech of history. Troy Jollimore, however, a rare writer who works in both philosophy and poetry, sees things differently. In his essay, "Sketches of landscapes" (which draws its title from a phrase Wittgenstein enlists that by happy coincidence connects here with Cooper), Jollimore argues contrary to Aristotle that poetry offers to philosophy not (simply) another universal voice but rather an acute and sensitive attention to the details of the world, especially the world of thinking (Jollimore, 2016). Instead of the clear, singular conclusion, QED, poetry brings to attention by means of its own precisions the fraught, dynamic, and changeable processes of human reflection, making comprehensible the complicated, muddy churn of thought with its countless fractals, eddies, cross currents, upsurges, and backwaters. Thinking is composed of diverse processes to which philosophy only feebly attends with the name of dialectic but which more often it just ignores. Poetry can help correct that.

Philosophy is, perhaps because of its characteristic aspiration to abstract, universal, singular, clear, and coherent concepts, inclined to Achilles-like simplicity. That strength can also, however, be a weakness. In the very achievement of its ideal speech, philosophy can become deaf to the particularities of human life as well as to the intellectual diversity of the situations in which we locate ourselves. (Critics of philosophy's deaf ear to matters of gender, racial, and ethnic diversity have of course made this point in scores of compelling ways.) Whereas philosophy often aspires to stripping away diversity in its quest to reveal a single, univocal truth, poetry is content, as Jollimore shows, to perambulate around its topics hand in hand with ambiguity, polyvalence, complexity, and indeterminacy. The sensitivity and insistence with which poetry engages the details of human life can therefore act, in Jollimore's view, as a therapy for philosophy's too-frequent blinding capitulation to the universal. More than therapy, in Jollimore's reading, by performing this task poetry itself becomes philosophical.

On the other hand, perhaps one might supplement Jollimore's analysis with the idea that philosophy's universal speech can in its own turn illuminate particulars in a way that can guide poetry so that it does more than stumble around among them, even if it does so sensitively and evocatively. Kant argued in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (A51, B75) that while universal concepts without particulars are "empty," it's also the case that particulars, even poetic particulars, without universal concepts are "blind." In this way, while poetry promises philosophy sophistication, philosophy promises poetry an orderly eloquence and a widened scope. Perhaps it's no surprise, then, that Parmenides, like so many of the early philosophers, wrote poetically and that Plato, even as he criticized the poets for their emotional manipulation and for their ignorance, nevertheless expressed himself in poetic terms.

Through interdisciplinarity, disciplines, then, may enlarge and magnify one another, fortifying their powers in the work to which they set themselves, much as the layering of geometric patterns creates a more sophisticated whole in Turkish tile work or the composites of tesserae in Byzantine mosaics produce an elaborate image that's more than additive. Not only self-understanding but also self-improvement can come to disciplines through interdisciplinary thinking with and through others, too. Just as incestuous reproduction biologically produces unhealthy and afflicted offspring, so the pitfalls of disciplinary incest can be offset through interaction with disciplinary difference and diversity.

Jollimore's essay, however, almost in an aside, calls upon a reminder from Nietzsche that unleashes seismic tremors in the model of interdisciplinarity-as-fortifying-complementarity-and-holism. With a stinging deployment of a single word—the limiting "only"—Nietzsche writes, as Jollimore quotes him, in Section 3.12 of the *Genealogy of Morals*: "There is *only* a perspective 'seeing,' *only* a perspective 'knowing' ... the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the *more* eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our 'concept' of this thing, our 'objectivity,' be."

Nietzsche is nothing if not wily in his own writing, and his use of "only" in this passage (like so many of his complex remarks) falls from the page with an unsettlingly self-reflexive and even ironic quality, destabilizing the subsequent word "complete." If truth is "only" perspectival, then how can it ever be "complete"? If it's "only" perspectival, then there's nothing beyond perspectives to which we can appeal, no "one" available to us besides the "many" truths. Understanding this, perhaps truth ought to be redefined in a Nietzschean way as perspectival not in the sense that each perspective contributes a part to the comprehensive and well-ordered whole, but instead as the acknowledgment of each perspective in a way that ironically "completes" our appreciation of truths so that we regard them as nothing more than scattered shards without a whole to which they properly and finally belong.

This mode of interdisciplinarity promises an appreciation of complexity and diversity, therefore, but not, in contrast to others, one that leads to the apprehension of a more complete whole. Yielding

to this more limited view can be disconcerting, since interdisciplinarity of this sort risks leaving us not more whole but instead just self-consciously shattered, in the way philosopher and literary theorist Jean-François Leotard describes the "post-modern condition" we today suffer. Perhaps disciplines do not so much elevate and refine and complete themselves through interdisciplinary encounters. Perhaps instead they only temper and chasten one another, highlighting and making manifest their limits, their difference, their shortcomings, their places among a plurality, and even their relative blindnesses, simply because through interdisciplinary work they reveal themselves as "only" perspectives. At the end of the day, like it or not, under this model we remain bound to Bacon's idols, and the task of interdisciplinarity might be thought of as nothing more than to inure us to that result.

Perhaps most radically, Nietzsche's passage must turn reflexively back upon itself with the realization that its way of thinking about truth (call it the truth-as-only-perspective theory) is itself a "mere" perspective. To say "truth is only a perspective" is to assert a proposition and to make a truth claim. But according to its own content, that truth claim must itself be a perspective and not a complete and final declaration of any truth. Is that self-reflexive realization self-refuting and angst inducing, or is it liberating? More pertinently, can the same question be asked about the aspirations of interdisciplinarity? To put a finer point on it, can the very ideas of truth and knowledge survive interdisciplinarity? Various answers to these questions have for a long time been celebrated, resisted, and condemned. They're part of the weave of an ancient nest of anxieties about truth and knowledge. If this is so, it may also be the case that one of the strengths of interdisciplinary work may be ancient, too, namely its long-enduring capacity to show us how to engage this tangle in renewed and reinvigorated ways.

There is, it seems then, a curious anti-holistic resolution to the problem of interdisciplinarity and truth Odysseus leaves us. If claims to the apprehension of *das Ganze* (the whole) are ruled out (or at least momentarily suspended), and if the aspiration of interdisciplinary work is not properly to bridge or transcend the otherness of different disciplines, what remains? Is there a way to find gain (or even happy loss) in an interdisciplinary encounter that either (a) leaves different disciplinary truths in what Jacques Derrida calls their *différance* without reaching a single truth or (b) confronts them not only as multiple but also as non-cohering, clashing, and decidedly not complementary?

Kierkegaard discerned in the non-rational, clashing qualities of what he called in Chapter Three of his *Philosophical Fragments* the "paradox" of the Incarnation (i.e. that the Christ is both fully human and fully God; I am tempted to say some sort of "inter"-being) a means to deepen religious faith while simultaneously resisting Hegelian systematic holism. Logicians Kurt Gödel and Bertrand Russell similarly made discoveries about logic and abstract sets not within the settled terms of theory but rather at its margins, where logical-mathematical theory seems to dissolve in the paradoxes of a peculiar self-reflexive gaze, turning back upon itself to reveal something incongruous in the otherwise consistent, complete, and crystalline wholeness presumed to define reason. The orderliness of what we might call the discipline of reason seems to fall apart at its extremes. What then?

Like Kierkegaard, Ludwig Wittgenstein offers a possibility in the strange collections of remarks he assembles. These remarks present a means not to arrive at a unified singular theory but instead, in his own words, a "ladder" (an image Kierkegaard uses, too, in his character, Climacus), the climbing of which leads not to a higher theory but to a gain of another sort. It's a gain he says is achieved in a peculiar way, not by speaking, thinking, and acting in ordinary (perhaps disciplinary) ways, but rather by bumping one's head up against the limits of language (e.g. *Philosophical Investigations* No. 119). Following this clue out, in addition to modes of interdisciplinarity this collection figures as (1) complementarity toward wholeness and (2) the enrichment of disciplines through cross-fertilization, we might add (3) an appreciation of complexity, diversity, and plurality in a kind of disclosive head bumping. To borrow Wittgenstein's terms again, interdisciplinarity might not so much make it possible for us to "say" something new in the way of stating a new theory or new experimental results. Rather, like the color field paintings of Mark Rothko, interdisciplinarity may "show" us something

about how theory and the discourses that compose it work and fail to work, how they are not only finite, complex, and contextual but also incongruous and sometimes agonistic, how they do what they do but do not do (and will not do) otherwise.

Perhaps another way to say this is that there may be times when interdisciplinarity may achieve something positive in its standardly epistemic failures as much as in its successes. We might even think of these failures as offering us new forms of success, meaning, and gain defined not by the success criteria of particular disciplines but by instead something else—not something that combines or complements disciplines but is instead beyond them, altogether different from them, or at a reflective distance from their own terms and practices.

Wittgenstein was of course not the first to suggest as much. Interdisciplinary Neapolitan eighteenth-century philosopher, historian, anthropologist, and philologist, Giambattista Vico, offered his readers a loosely associated set of "axioms" to generate philosophical insight and lay bare otherwise unnoticed semantic connections among ideas. Nietzsche and Heraclitus set loose before their readers swarms of aphorisms that seem intentionally to resist and defy systematization. The erudite and lyrical essay we publish here by Emilio Mazza and Angela Coventry about David Hume's eyes ("Humeaneyes") as rendered in portraits of him follows in that train and exemplifies the circulating, threading, and leaping insights interdisciplinarity makes possible (Coventry & Mazza, 2016). Drawing upon Hume's philosophical work, his histories, criticism, letters, and biography, placing all that in its immediate context, especially in relation to Rousseau, while also drawing upon the work of recent critics and commentators, Mazza and Coventry craft a reading of Hume that ignites his ideas even as it defies disciplinary location. It's a roaring tumble of a read. Richard Fleming's contribution to this volume, "Listening to Cage," accomplishes an ignition of a similar sort (Fleming, 2016).

Fleming's text takes its cues from Wittgenstein and Austin, as well as from the anarchic work of musician John Cage and the philosopher of language and esthetics, Stanley Cavell. Rather than look for ways to bridge or cross-disciplines, as if to achieve a higher or deeper form of cognition, Fleming's work places their different voices side by side in not only thoughtful but also accidental ways, letting them speak or not speak themselves—and that not from their own isolated and discrete standpoints but rather in the light of otherness, difference, chance, comparison, and contingency. Confronting these placings in contextual and non-contextual (if that word makes any sense) ways raises questions about why we read and listen in just the particular ways we do, how we find value in just these words and deeds and inquiries and not others, what makes what we do and say meaningful in particular contexts rather than as candidates for general, absolute, eternal, necessary, and supra-contextual, super-human truth before which all must submit, no matter our location.

There is, in this way, by Fleming's lights a power that interdisciplinary work possesses in reminding us about the conditions under which we talk, act, and think so that we may resist the temptation to a putatively higher, complete speech. Reminders of this sort may help us resist nonsensical fantasies about e.g. saying all there is to say on a topic, or thinking there is one preeminent way of saying, or imagining that by some special form of saying we may lay hold of the ultimate real in ways somehow superior to our countless ordinary and particular ways of threading our talk and action. Interdisciplinarity, then, in Fleming's hands may serve both as a tool supporting the self-understanding of our disciplinary work and also as a guard against the pathologies disciplines suffer in the forgetfulness of the conditions of their possibility as well as in the silencing of other voices that occupy the world along with their own. (For Fleming, in fact, silence of this sort is one way to think of evil. (Fleming, 2010)) Fleming's work might be described, if I were inclined to speak with a Kantian vocabulary, as a transcendental but not transcendent therapy, a therapy that is interdisciplinary as a way of being meta-disciplinary but without the pretense to the god's eye views to which disciplinary epistemology, metaphysics, and meta-philosophies often pretend.

We have spoken repeatedly of interdisciplinarity in relation to remediation and as therapy, for the most part in relation to human understanding and self-understanding, but there is another

dimension of interdisciplinarity different from these that must be acknowledged: action and the political. In addition, that is, to interdisciplinarity as a project of (1) achieving epistemic holism, (2) appreciating diversity and complexity, (3) enriching cross-fertilization, (4) semiotic reshuffling, and (5) the recollection of conditions of possibility, there is a more directly political mode of interdisciplinarity to address in our collection. Inter-action among different groups has not, of course, always been unproblematic, as for example was the case when white British and US musicians appropriated (and sometimes misappropriated) African-American music in forging the new idioms of bluegrass, rock, and modern jazz. Imperial British India, like the territories of the Roman, Habsburg, and Ottoman empires, was in a sense interdisciplinary, too, though not always admirably so. Interdisciplinarity may at its worst become just another objectionable form colonization. On the other hand, perhaps in a way closer to its best, interdisciplinarity may offer a strategy for resisting problematic political implications intrinsic to disciplinarity. Lynette Hunter's work underwrites just that kind of resistance.

Wittgenstein had figured language as a city, and particular disciplines may be thought of as sectors or neighborhoods of that city. But in any city there are inter-spaces, interstices between the neighborhoods, sometimes shunned and feared by the existing neighborhoods (especially the privileged ones), sometimes forgotten, and often ignored. The characteristic sign of disciplinary neighborhoods is "Keep Out," a sign likely to be hung on well-guarded gates. There are, however, other spaces, other *topoi*, to be found in cities. In alleys, abandoned lots, feral brownfields, and predisciplinary wild forests barely traversed and still not entirely obliterated, the intellectually intrepid and revolutionary might still go. Some do go there, and their transgressions against disciplinary boundaries are well described as a form of interdisciplinarity, today one of the most important forms.

If by one model, the disciplines may be thought to fit together to help compose a greater whole where exterior spaces have been eliminated, if by another they may serve an additive and enriching function through exchanges with one another, if by still another model disciplines may knock against one another in a kind of fruitful, agonistic, transformative ruckus, and if still in another way they may be placed side by side to show us what it is to inhabit a city, we must also acknowledge those "in-between" spaces, hidden and ignored—both among and not among neighborhoods—in which to play, run, dance, and think in altogether new ways. Lynette Hunter has across her career and in the insightful essay in this collection, "Being in-between," exhibited a protean ability to find and move within the spaces between (or "inter") many different disciplines (Hunter, 2015). Like Fleming, Hunter draws from the ordinary language philosophy of J.L. Austin, especially as inherited by Judith Butler. She also draws from astonishingly varied years of experience in biochemistry, literary criticism, post/ neocolonial studies, critical theory, humanities computing, feminist philosophy, theater, dance, performance studies, performance art, and the history of science, printing, and women.

For Hunter, interdisciplinarity requires an acknowledgment and a willingness not only to be "responsive" to what is not known by the disciplines, what is properly unspeakable and in-apprehensible by them, but also to "engage" that not-known by sustained and reflective practices in spaces beyond the disciplines, unorthodox and uncanny though they may at times seem to be. Significantly for Hunter these practices, since they involve the not-known, are as much about feeling and affect as about theoretical cognition. As she has come to see it, by affectively engaging the not-known in interdisciplinary ways, we can release what Hunter calls in her introduction "emergent ways of knowing" that have been suppressed, denied, refused, or ignored by the disciplines.

Hunter deepens Smith's findings about the institutional resistance to interdisciplinarity built into the university's history. She does so by arguing on the basis of a theory of language that disciplines, because they seize specific knowledges, by necessity separate themselves from others. To assert "A" is to exclude "not-A." Those other claimants to knowing must accordingly in turn be dominated and excluded by the discipline's work. Because of its intrinsic requirement of exclusion and domination, then, disciplinarity is enacted as a form of violence, just as urban neighborhoods have been defined by processes of economic, ethnic, and racial segregation.

There is clearly a restive political implication to Hunter's work, one that this journal welcomes. Complementing Barthes' insight about new meanings emerging from a reshuffling of the semiotic order and recognizing the dominating and exclusionary dimensions of disciplinarity, Hunter argues that interdisciplinarity promises a way to facilitate a kind of hospitality for suppressed and excluded others, alt-erior to the disciplines. At the same time, she argues that interdisciplinarity offers powerful spaces and instruments for subversively transforming the disciplines in ways that undermine their inherent capacity for violence. Perhaps just as the cathedral Church of Holy Wisdom in Constantinople became re-inhabited as a mosque and then the Hagia Sofia museum in Istanbul, today's disciplines can be re-inhabited and transformed. Performance studies, with its emphasis on collaboration and affective engagement, for Hunter, present an especially capable site for accomplishing this end.

Generating sites of capable interdisciplinary work centers the work of Michael O'Rourke, Brian Robinson, and Stephanie E. Vasko (Robinson, Vasko, Gonnerman, Christen, & O'Rourke, 2016). In the practices they have cultivated, they turn a thoughtful eye toward discerning what enables (and what impedes) productive interactions among the disciplines. As if modeling the very kind of work they study and facilitate, Robinson et al. approach this task with the tools that combine philosophy, mathematics, and the empirical sciences as well as of humane criticism and theory.

O'Rourke, Robinson, Vasko, et al.'s Toolbox Project (www.toolbox-project.org) uses philosophy in interdisciplinary contexts to articulate assumptions, to frame questions and concerns, to conceptualize blockages, and to cultivate communication skills across disciplines. The Toolbox Project identifies and generates common commitments, and their work has proven effective in a number of collaborations. The research Robinson, Vasko, and O'Rourke with Markus Christen and Chad Gonnerman publish here reveals a surprisingly common ground across disciplines concerning the values and the place of values in scholarship and research. It suggests more potential exists than is often imagined for interdisciplinary work between the sciences and the humanities.

Staked on the idea that skillful communication and conceptualization, carefully rendered, can enhance collaborative ventures among the empirical sciences and between the sciences and other forms of inquiry, the Toolbox team has worked to support interdisciplinary collaborations not only among academics but also with government and commercial actors in ways that help cultivate the actual practice of successful interdisciplinarity. (Interdisciplinary work that engages academic disciplines with governments, non-profits, commercial institutions, and stakeholders outside of academia is sometimes, in fact, called "transdisciplinary.") It is a project that shares with Hunter's work the aim of constructing a space to sustain interdisciplinarity while at the same time in its differences exhibits something of the range of interdisciplinary thinking.

Interdisciplinarity labors, then, in various ways. In some of its practices, it aspires to more thorough-going and holistic forms of comprehension—a holism, one might say, of our humanness. It enriches existing disciplines through cross-fertilization and intellectual exchange. It also, however, problematizes the epistemological project of the disciplines by magnifying our understanding of the differences among them and the limitations to which they are subject. Confronting disciplines, setting them side-by-side, and even knocking them against one another can help us recollect the very conditions that make disciplinary as well as non-disciplinary ways of thinking and acting possible.

Interdisciplinarity can also reshuffle our ways of seeing, reading, and conceptualizing. It work can lead us into the inter-spaces between and beyond settled disciplines, and doing so it may free up ways of thinking and doing previously ignored, suppressed, or unrealized. Interdisciplinarity can create and cultivate spaces where what has been excluded, marginalized, and denied can emerge and show itself, not only from within existing disciplinary perspectives but also from among the rich emergent possibilities of thinking and doing that interdisciplinarity opens before us, possibilities we have perhaps never before conceived. We at *Cogent Arts & Humanities* look forward to publishing

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interdisciplinary work that opens to such possibilities here and in the future, and we look forward to doing so in an Open Access format that makes this work maximally available.

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