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Philosophy as a way of caring  
in teacher education

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**ABSTRACT.** In Ancient Greek philosophizing was understood as a practice to improve oneself. Recently, philosophical counseling has picked up this idea. At around the same time ethics of care was developed as an alternative approach to traditional ways of understanding ethics and moral education. Although suggestions for the use of a framework of an ethic of care in the preparation of teachers have been made, how to address the challenges and predicaments for student teachers within such an approach have not been addressed. This paper argues that the problems and predicaments student teachers face in learning to teach and becoming a teacher in care-ethical focused teacher education programs are structurally similar to those philosophical counselors address with their clients. Hence, the counseling approach in philosophical counseling provides a ready-made model for addressing these problems and predicaments in the preparation of student teachers.

**Keywords:** *ethic of care, teacher education, caring, philosophy*

## INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of Western philosophy in ancient Greece and Rome philosophy has been used “as a way of life” (Hadot, 1995).

Philosophy thus took the form of an exercise of thought, will, and the totality of one’s being, the goal of which was to achieve a state practically inaccessible to mankind: wisdom. Philosophy was a method of spiritual progress which demanded radical conversion and transformation of the individual’s way of being.

Thus, philosophy was a way of life, both in its exercise and effort to achieve wisdom, and in its goal, wisdom itself. For real wisdom does not merely cause us to know: it makes us ‘be’ in a different way (Hadot, 1995, p. 265).

The Stoics distinguished *philosophy as a practice to improve oneself* from the *discourse about philosophy* in which theories about matters close or not so close to everyday living were set forth, like logic, physics, ethics (Hadot, 1995, pp. 266-267). Hadot gives a historical account of the shift from the dominance of philosophy as a practice in ancient times to the dominance of the discourse of philosophy in the form of modern

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academic philosophy (Hadot, 1995, pp. 269-272; for an additional historical account see Lahav & Tillmans, 1995, pp. x-xii). In his account, however, he emphasizes that throughout the history of philosophy, there have always been philosophers who have seen philosophizing as a practice for improving oneself, like Descartes, Spinoza, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. It is these philosophers educational theorists refer to when trying to make the case for *practicing* philosophy in education (see Bai, 2006; Bingham, 2005).

About twenty years ago a movement in the philosophical field itself was started, which “rejuvenated” (Phillips, 1998) the ancient practice of philosophizing: philosophical counseling (sometimes also called ‘philosophical practice’ or ‘philosophy practice’; see Achenbach, 1995; Schuster, 1999). At about the same time another movement in the triangle of philosophy, education and psychology was started, which put the notion of ethics of care in the center of ethics and moral education. In this paper I want to demonstrate how those two movements can be brought together in teacher education and, thus, contributing to the efforts of those educational theorists who try to make the case for philosophical *practice* in education. As argued in the third part of this paper, theoretical considerations of the practice of teacher education for caring teaching indicate a need for some form of rational inquiry into caring practice and teacher self. The central thesis of this paper is that the use of philosophy as suggested in philosophical counseling provides a ready-made model for using philosophizing as a way of addressing that need in teacher education for caring teaching. (The term ‘caring teaching’ is borrowed from Goldstein (2002) and will be explicated below).

Assuming a centrality of caring in the practice of the teaching profession (with the focus on

general education), the relevance of this paper’s thesis becomes clear: If caring is central to teaching for general education, then caring is central to a teacher’s self, hence, caring is central to the development of a teacher’s self; teacher education which contributes to the development of the teacher’s caring self has to find ways of achieving that goal; my claim is that practicing philosophy as it is done in philosophical counseling can be such a way. As philosophy is viewed as ‘a way of life’ in philosophical counseling, I suggest viewing philosophy in teacher education as a way of caring (teaching). However, as ‘philosophy as a way of life’ does not imply that philosophy is considered the *only* way of life, so should ‘philosophy as a way of caring in teacher education’ not imply that that is the *only* way of supporting caring teaching in teacher education.

In the next two sections I describe central features of the two movements of ethics of care and philosophical counseling, respectively, whereby specific views in both movements will be emphasized. In the last section I outline, first, major difficulties experienced in teacher education which aims at cultivating caring teaching, and, second, argue that and outline how the philosophical practice in philosophical counseling can be used in teacher education for caring teaching to address these difficulties.

## **AN ETHIC OF CARE FOR GENERAL EDUCATION**

An ethic of care is an ethical or moral theory which sees ethical or moral engagement with the world guided by caring relationships. Considering caring as a moral orientation is generally seen as having started with Carol Gilligan (1977, 1982). Today, Nel Noddings (1984, 1992, 2002) is probably the most outstanding proponent for ethics of care in education. Following, I want to briefly

characterize her approach to caring in education because it is the most developed and convincing one for educational purposes. The characterization will be guided by the purpose of the paper and will, hence, not discuss critical issues around an ethic of care in general and her approach in particular.

Not just in everyday English but also as a term in educational contexts ‘caring’ is used with a variety of connotations, in education often connected with “gentle smiles and warm hugs” (Goldstein, 2002, p. 2), a notion that Goldstein suggests to move away from if one wants to “[position] caring as a crucial factor in the teaching-learning process” (p. 2). Noddings uses the term ‘caring’ with a specific meaning. Her notion of caring is based on the concept of a caring encounter, which can be reconstructed as follows (see Noddings, 1984, pp. 14-16, 19-21; 1992, pp. 16-17; 2002, p. 19):

- (CE) *A* (the carer) and *B* (the cared-for) are in a *caring encounter* (*A* cares for *B* in this encounter) if and only if:
- (a) *A* shows open, non-selective attention towards *B* (engrossment)
  - (b) *A* is thinking about *B*’s needs and is motivated to do s.th. for *B*’s needs (motivational displacement)
  - (c) *B* recognizes and responds to *A*’s caring (reciprocity)

Caring can happen in a one-time, short encounter between two people, for instance, between two strangers who meet at the bus stop. Caring does not require long-term, closer relationships between carer and cared-for. However, features like the stability of a caring relationship might be affected by the closeness of the relationship between the carer and the cared-for.

A caring encounter is needs-and-response based, meaning that a caring encounter is characterized

by someone responding to the needs of someone else. That response takes the form of a specific mental state, rather than actions. On the part of the carer, the mental state consists of three components. First, the carer is attentive toward the cared-for (engrossment). Second, the carer is thinking about the needs of the cared-for. Third, the carer is motivated to do something about the needs of the cared-for (motivational displacement). A caring encounter also requires that the cared-for acknowledges the mental state of the carer (reciprocity).

Noddings distinguishes between six different domains of caring (Noddings, 1992): caring for oneself (= caring for one’s self), caring for intimate others, caring for distant others, caring for non-human life, caring for objects, caring for ideas. The concept of a caring encounter defined above, however, applies only to domains of caring that involve relations between two human beings and not, for instance, between a person and ideas. For purposes of this paper I will focus on the domains of caring for oneself and caring for intimate / distant others because these seem to be the primary domains for teacher education for caring teaching.

In (moral) education based on an ethic of care “we concentrate on developing the attitudes and skills required to sustain caring relations and the desire to do so” (Noddings, 1992, pp. 21-22). This notion of a caring self seems to be close to Arntine’s (1990) notion of caring as a disposition.

Noddings lists these four components of moral education that is based on an ethic of care (see Noddings 1992, pp. 22-27):

- *modeling*: teachers model caring for their students; a caring teacher provides also experience for students of being cared-for, which is crucial for developing the capacity (disposition) to care;

- *dialogue*: “dialogue is a common search for understanding, empathy, or appreciation” (1992, p. 23), hence, the outcome of a true dialogue cannot be predetermined by any of the parties involved in the dialogue;
- *practice*: students have to have opportunities to practice caring, because “attitudes and ‘mentalities’ are shaped, at least in part, by experience” (1992, p. 23);
- *confirmation*: confirmation is the act of affirmation and encouraging the best in others; “Confirmation requires attribution of the best possible motive consonant with reality.” (1992, p. 25)

The foregoing components form the pillars of a process of the cultivation of the attitudes and skills required to build and sustain caring relations.

Noddings (1984, pp. 79-90; 2002, pp. 29-31) distinguishes between natural caring and ethical caring, the former of which is “a form of caring that arises more or less spontaneously out of affection or inclination”, and “[does] not require a special ethical effort” (2002, p. 29), though it does “need continuous and sensitive cultivation” (p. 29). Ethical caring, on the other hand, does not arise spontaneously from affection or inclination, but it rather requires a special ethical effort. In ethical caring the carer appeals to his or her ethical ideal, view of him- or herself as a caring person in order to act with care in the respective moment in which he or she cannot act with care out of affection or inclination (1984, pp.79-90; 2002, pp. 29-31). That means *ethical caring requires some form of rational inquiry*. Furthermore, “ethical caring is instrumental in establishing or restoring natural caring” (Noddings, 2002, p. 30), that means that ethical caring is instrumental in the “continuous and sensitive cultivation” of natural caring. Natural and ethical caring form a cycle or a spiral in which one affects the other. In this sense, *caring (natural and ethical)*

*involves rational inquiry*. This is why Noddings, when describing how education can cultivate caring selves, talks about engaging students in themes in a way that– as I see it – requires a kind of rational inquiry. Here are some examples (Noddings, 1992):

- “We all need to understand ourselves as individuals and the groups with which we affiliate. We affect the ways in which groups operate, and they press us toward conformity.” (p. 55)
- “Learning about human relations is one of the toughest tasks which an individual faces. Too often we equate interpersonal skill with smooth talking or a form of one-way influence.” (p. 55)
- “In addition to learning to communicate appreciatively with people of good will and effectively with people who may be untrustworthy, I want our children to examine the effects of their own lives on others.” (p. 55)
- “I am concerned, too, with how our children relate to nonhuman life. Most of us introduce our children to pets and try to instill a sense of responsibility concerning their welfare. . . . But our relations with nonhuman creatures are complicated, and many issues arise as we explore them. Should we wear furs, for example, or is the whole fur trade immoral?” (p. 56)
- “In schools we more often preach than teach in the areas of race, ethnicity, religion, and gender. Dialogue is required, and dialogue ends in questions or in great sadness as often as it does in solutions. The reader will notice how often I’ve ended paragraphs in questions or confessions of uncertainty. When we struggle to understand, when we are committed but are unsure how to achieve this, we need genuine dialogue with concrete others. Then we may come to a satisfactory resolution governing this time, these people, this place.” (p. 120)

This need for rational inquiry in the cultivation of caring selves will be the basis of my argument for the support that the practice of philosophical counseling can provide to such cultivation in the context of teacher education.

### **PRACTICING PHILOSOPHY IN PHILOSOPHICAL COUNSELING**

According to Lahav and Tillmanns (1995, p. xii) the modern movement of philosophical counseling started in 1981, when the German philosopher Gerd Achenbach opened the first philosophical counseling center in Bergisch Gladbach near Cologne, a suicide-prevention organization, according to Phillips (1998, p. 48). As with counseling and therapeutic theories in psychology, the term ‘philosophical counseling’ describes more a cluster of approaches than one unified approach. Raabe (2001) discusses different views on different aspects of philosophical counseling within the movement as does Lahav (1995, pp. 19-24). Nevertheless, different attempts were made to characterize philosophical counseling as a movement (Raabe, 2001, pp.8-10). In probably the most general way, “philosophical counseling consists of a trained philosopher helping an individual deal with a problem or an issue that is of concern to that individual. It can also be done in a group situation” (Raabe, 2001, p. 203). Following is a general characterization of the features of the *actual practice* of philosophical counseling (Raabe, 2001, chapter 5):

- (PC) 1. with the help of the philosophical counselor the client engages into a client-focused philosophical inquiry into the philosophical aspects around the client’s problems or predicaments using philosophical methods (like Socratic dialogue)

2. the purpose of the philosophical inquiry is twofold: first, to enable the client to solve his or her immediate problems or predicaments and, second, to empower the client to avoid or solve certain problems in the future

For the purpose of this paper the second goal in PC2 is of particular interest: Philosophical counseling is more than the attempt to help someone with a particular problem. It aims to contribute to the self formation of the client. For this to be achieved, philosophy cannot just play the role of providing the counselor with tools for the inquiry, but it has to become ‘a way of life’, a way to deal with life. This is expressed by Ran Lahav, one of the leading proponents and practitioners of philosophical counseling, who suggests that people become clients of a philosophical counselor in order to “improve themselves, to live a deeper, richer, better, and more significant life” (Lahav, 1996, p. 276), Schuster even talks about philosophical counseling as “the philosophical care of the self” (quoted in Raabe, 2001, p. 8). Due to the importance of this point for the purpose of this paper, let me illustrate this point by quoting Raabe at length:

Philosophical counseling allows individuals, in general, but especially women and minorities, to recognize ways in which gender, class, race and ethnicity have conditioned their experiences. Feminist philosophies are said to have tremendous relevance to the philosophical counseling process in this area. For example, an individual encountering sexist or racist discrimination can come to question what discrimination is, what causes it, what it means, what it aims for and whether to justify or condemn it. Such an intellectual search will guide the client into philosophic domains where she may find or create ‘wisdom of life’ and thereby be better able

to deal with sexism and racism as it emerges in her life, both in terms of dealing with the attitudes of others as she experiences them, and by way of inquiring into the authenticity of her own thoughts and feelings. A sexist or racist encounter can thus become an opportunity for understanding and wisdom. Philosophical counseling is also said to be able to facilitate intergenerational and intercultural values clarification, and in this way bring family members to a better understanding of the underlying assumptions and often unexpressed expectations of all concerned. (Raabe, 2001, pp. 31-32).

One of the controversial issues within the philosophical counseling movement is the relationship between philosophical counseling and psychological and psychoanalytical forms of therapy. Views range from Elliot Cohen's variant of Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET), in which he focuses on the philosophical foundations of RET, to Ran Lahav's 'worldview interpretations' approach, which insists on a clear distinction between philosophical counseling and any psychotherapeutic approach. For the purpose of this paper, Lahav's 'worldview interpretations' approach to philosophical counseling seems to be the most fruitful to consider, which I do in the following.

Lahav's approach to philosophical counseling can be characterized by the following four features (see for the following in particular Lahav, 1995):

- (WV) 1. Life problems and predicaments can be looked into (interpreted) as philosophical in nature.
2. It is a worldview concept that captures someone's 'way of life' as expressed in the various aspects of

one's daily life, as in one's emotions, cravings, behavior and expectations.

3. Worldviews have the ontological status of abstract theoretical frameworks; they are not psychologically real in any sense.
4. Philosophical counseling is inquiry into the problematic aspects of one's interpretations, of the philosophical meanings and implications of one's worldview.

WV1 can probably be seen as a fundamental principle of all approaches of *philosophical* counseling, since it expresses that philosophy (philosophical inquiry) has something to contribute to dealings with everyday life problems and predicaments. Lahav calls it "the principle of worldview interpretation" (1995, p. 5). Lahav illustrates the *philosophical* interpretation of someone's life predicaments in the following example from his practice: "a recurring difficulty in making up one's mind may be interpreted as expressing the unquestioned (and unrealistic) assumption that every decision must be justified by a conclusive reason." (1995, p. 9). Interpreted in this way, the predicament can undergo a *philosophical* inquiry.

WV1 does *not* express that daily life problems and predicaments can *only* be perceived as philosophical in nature. Considering them as *psychological* in nature is another possibility. Lahav (1995, p. 13) does not deny the relevance of psychology in therapy or counseling, nor does he deny that philosophical interpretation of a problem can *correspond* to a psychological interpretation of the same problem (p. 8), but he insists that there is a clear distinction both ways of approaching everyday problems and predicaments. While psychotherapeutic approaches interpret life events and predicaments in terms of (a) psychological

mental states and events and (b) hidden causal mechanism and processes related to those psychological mental states and events, worldview interpretations interpret life events and predicaments in terms of the philosophical meanings and implications of these events and predicaments. As such, worldview interpretations have the ontological status of theoretical frameworks and philosophical counseling based on worldview interpretations does not postulate that they are something that exists in the mind of the client as psychological approaches do for the psychological mental states and the hidden causal mechanisms (see WV3 & Lahav, 1995, pp. 6-7, 11-13): “For example, one is likely to find among psychologists a tendency to deal with *feelings* of worthlessness instead of the *concept* of worthlessness, and with the *experience* of freedom rather than with the *concept* of freedom” (Lahav, 1995, p. 14).

Philosophical counselors are concerned with the philosophical meaning (concepts) and the philosophical implications of the client’s worldview rather than (possibly) underlying psychological mental states or causal mechanisms (WV4). Two analogies might illustrate that point (Lahav, 1995, p. 8): A philosophical counselor is like an art critic who interprets a painting with respect to its aesthetic meaning, for instance, the expressed tranquil atmosphere of the painting, rather than the psychological state of the painter or the psychological processes that caused the painter to paint something with that aesthetic meaning. A philosophical counselor, so his second analogy, is like a chess expert who interprets the meaning and implications of a move for the game, for instance, as a move within a defense strategy defending the right flank, rather than analyzing the psychological state of the chess player or the psychological processes that caused the player to make that move. Like the art critic and the chess expert, the philosophical

counselor is concerned with the philosophical meaning and the philosophical implications of the client’s worldview as expressed in his or her emotions, cravings, behaviours, expectations, etc.

Summarizing, Lahav characterizes the purpose of philosophical counseling and the role of the philosophical counselor as follows:

I suggest that philosophical counseling can be characterized as an approach aimed at helping counselees interpret the worldview expressed by their way of life (or some relevant part of it). It aims, more specifically, at exploring the philosophical implications of their various everyday attitudes for their conception of themselves and reality, thus unfolding the worldview expressed by their behaviors, emotions, preferences, hopes, etc. (Lahav, 1995, p. 7)

A philosopher familiar with the literature on concepts related to human life – such as freedom, the meaning of life, the right and wrong, or the self – is acquainted with a variety of alternative lines of thought. . . .

As an expert in worldview interpretation, the philosophical counselor helps counselees uncover various meanings expressed in their way of life, and critically examine those problematic aspects that express their predicaments. . . . In doing all this, the philosophical counselor does not offer philosophical contents i.e., readymade theories but rather, primarily philosophical skills and those related to conceptual analyses, drawing implications, phenomenological descriptions, among others.

In short, the philosophical counselor addresses everyday predicaments not

through the psychological processes that presumably underlie them, but through the philosophical meanings and implications of their contents (Lahav, 1995, p. 10).

As the quote indicates, a certain degree of academic philosophy skills are required for the philosophical counselor, however, “it is also crucial to be sensitive, to have natural intelligence, be able to read between the lines, express understanding towards the other person, grasp the unsaid, and be tolerant of other approaches to life” (Boele, 1995, p. 38).

It is Lahav’s view of the role of philosophy for philosophical counseling that I think can be of great use in teacher education which aims at educating for caring teaching. The next section will make that case.

Because the notion of (natural) caring involves affect and emotion, it is of interest to note that some philosophical counselors argue that philosophical counseling can help clients with emotional issues and matters of feelings (Lahav, 1995, p. 8). Raabe (2000, pp. 60-62) refers to philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, and Hobbes, who advanced the idea that how we respond emotionally to the presence of something is depending on how we *value* what we perceive. Human reason can address the value question and, hence, human reason can control emotions. Also, in modern psychology a serious debate is going on about the cognitive control of emotions (see, for instance, Lazarus, 1999).

### **PHILOSOPHICAL COUNSELING AND TEACHER EDUCATION FOR CARING TEACHING**

There is need for a kind of counseling approach in teacher education for caring teaching, and that need is currently not adequately being met. The

philosophical practice in philosophical counseling provides a ready-made practice for how philosophizing can help teacher educators address that need in their teacher education program.

When one talks about the need for a kind of counseling approach, this does not want to imply that this is *the* approach in teacher education for caring teaching, because this need is only one out of several. Hence, philosophical practice would be only one out of several approaches used in a comprehensive teacher education program for caring teaching.

#### *Educating for Caring Teaching*

Teacher educators with focus on the ethics of caring seem to agree that if caring is placed at the center of one’s teaching, it has to be the benchmark for one’s educational decisions. For instance, Goldstein (2002) characterizes such teaching as teaching in which “caring becomes a way for teachers to make thoughtful professional choices about their interactions with their students” (p. 31); Rogers and Webb (1991) write that “student teachers should be required to evaluate these tools [specific teaching techniques, etc.] in terms of an ethic of caring; they should be asked to consider how the use of such approaches affects the well being of their students.” (p. 177); and Noddings (1986, p. 499) writes that “our guiding principles for teaching arithmetic, or any other subject, are derived from primary concern for the individuals whom we teach, and methods or teaching are chosen in consonance with these derived principles. An ethic of caring asks, What effect will this have on the individuals I teach? What effect will it have on the caring community we are trying to build? Following Goldstein (2002), I use the term ‘caring teaching’ for such teaching, and it is teacher education that aims for such caring teaching that I am interested in in this paper.



I draw now on various studies on and approaches to teacher education for caring teaching in order to identify places for philosophizing in the sense used in philosophical counseling. These places, as it will turn out, are so central to the practice of caring teaching, that the title of this paper, “philosophy as a way of caring in teacher education” seems to be justified.

Goldstein (2002, p. 69) distinguishes in teacher education between “classroom processes [and] practices and strategies for creating caring communities in classrooms” on the one hand and “*presage variables*” (for instance, teacher background, beliefs, values, experiences etc.) on the other hand. Without doubt, focus on processes, practices, and strategies for cultivating caring in the classroom is of much importance in teacher education for caring teaching (see Charney, 2002; Gootman, 2001). However, it is the presage variables that determine which classroom practices and strategies are used and how these are implemented to cultivate caring in the classroom. This is the first argument for the need for a kind of counseling approach in teacher education for caring teaching: to address the worldview (interpretation) issues involved around presage variables. Such an approach would be distinct from an approach which aims at developing classroom techniques and strategies.

Goldstein’s (2002, chapters 3-6) study focuses on how presage variables work out in caring teaching, in particular for student teachers. Four areas of challenges of enacting caring teaching are thus identified (2000, pp. 82-99):

- *developing professional identity as a caring teacher;*
- *dealing with the loss of teacherly relationship with students*  
“The students [student teachers] were shocked at the depth and intensity of their

sadness at the loss of a teacherly relationship” (p. 88), when students moved away or at the end of their placement.

- *the relationship to the parents of the cared-for students*

“The [student teachers] quickly realized that teachers engage not only with individual children, but also with the significant adults in those children’s lives. Developing and negotiating relationships with parents is a particularly sensitive and complex facet of a teacher’s professional responsibility . . . . The preservice teachers in the study struggled with this challenge” (p. 92).

- *stress during the field placement*

Next to stress factors that can be found in the general literature on student teachers’ field placements, Goldman lists one stress factor that should be of particular interest to teacher education for caring teaching: “I believe that the [student teachers’] gentle smiles and warm hugs view of caring might have been a significant factor in their exhaustion, stress and the resultant negativity.” (p. 98)

McCall (1989) identifies in a case study two of the three “dilemmas of caring that women teachers often face” (p. 43) as follows:

- developing her own authority in the classroom and
- finding caring for herself as she cared for children in her teaching. (p. 43)

Outside of teacher education for caring teaching the case is made for the centrality of the professional identity, the teaching self for how teachers function in their role as (caring) teachers. For instance, Palmer (1997/2003, 1998), as a result of reflections on his own practice as a teacher, has stressed that “good teaching comes from the identity and integrity of the teacher” (1997/2003, p. 67), and Weissbourd (2003) connects the moral development of

students with the “maturity and ethical capacities of the adults with whom they interact” (p. 6); and points out how states of stress, disillusionment, and helplessness in teachers make their behaviour “governed by their own moods and needs rather than by an awareness of others” (p. 9).

Caring is grounded in the relationship with others and caring teaching in the relationship to the students. If, as the last paragraphs state, a teacher’s professional identity, moral and emotional states (short: ‘the teaching self’) are so central for how the teacher relates to his or her students, then addressing these needs of ‘the teaching self’ should be central to teacher education focusing on caring teaching. This is the second argument for the need of a kind of counseling approach in teacher education for caring teaching: to address the needs of ‘the teaching self’.

Areas of needs of a kind of counseling approach in teacher education were identified with reference to studies of the practice of caring teaching. It is also theoretical frameworks designed for teacher education for caring teaching that suggest such a need for their respective approach, although not necessarily acknowledged as such by the designers of the respective framework. First, such theoretical frameworks stress the importance of the development of a caring self in teachers, that means that teachers have to become caring themselves to be able to cultivate caring in the classroom (see Noddings, 1986, p. 502; Arstine, 1990, pp. 239-240; Rogers & Webb, 1991, p.176). If, as the last paragraph states, the teaching self is central to a teacher’s relationship with his or her students, then the development of a caring self should include the aspects of a teaching self. Consequently, the call for the development of a caring self implies the need for a kind of counseling approach in teacher education.

Second, the four components of moral education based on the ethics of care and explicated above (modeling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation) are also seen as components in teacher education for caring teaching (see Noddings, 1986, pp. 503-505; Rogers & Webb, 1991, pp. 178-179). The dialogue component seems to create a need for a kind of counseling approach. The following quote characterizes what dialogue as a component of care-based moral education means in a classroom:

If dialogue is to occur in schools, it must be legitimate to discuss whatever is of intellectual interest to the students who are invited into dialogue. God, sex, killing, loving, fear, hope, and hate must all be open to discussion (Noddings, 1984, p. 183).

Applying this notion of dialogue to teacher education, the quote translates as follows: It must be legitimate to discuss whatever is of educational interest to the student teachers for caring teaching who are invited into dialogue. Professional identity, loss of teacherly relationships, relationships to parents, stress, authority in the classroom, and caring for oneself must all be open to discussion. This demand for dialogue is reminiscent of the argument for the need to address the ‘teaching self’ from above, which implied a need for a counseling approach in teacher education. Noddings (1992, p. 23) stresses that the notion of dialogue used here includes the concern for the relationship between the two parties in the dialogue, a notion of dialogue that is also used in (at least) some approaches in philosophical counseling.

Third, the theoreticians also emphasize the importance of creating a caring community for student teachers in order for caring to be cultivated (see Noddings, 1986, p.502; Rogers & Webb, 1991, p. 176). A caring community implies the intended support of its members. If,

as the studies of the practice of teacher education for caring teaching suggest, members of the community (student teachers) need support with the issues listed above, then the theoretical demand for the creation of a caring community implies the need for a counseling approach in teacher education, analogous to the first two arguments for the need of such an approach.

After having identified different areas in teacher education for caring teaching with the need for the counseling approach, the next section demonstrates that and how the philosophical practice in philosophical counseling provides a ready-made model for addressing those needs.

### *Philosophical Counseling and Teacher Education: A General View*

The places in teacher education for caring teaching I have identified as in need of a kind of counseling approach involve worldview interpretations, where 'world' refers to the teacher's teaching world. These worldview interpretations are the hook in teacher education to attach the philosophical practice to (as a form of counseling). The somewhat simplified big picture of philosophizing in teacher education for caring teaching – in analogy to (PC) and (WV) – looks as follows:

- (TE) 1. Problems and predicaments in adopting and implementing caring teaching are interpreted as philosophical in nature.
2. Philosophizing under the guidance of the teacher educator is used to inquire into the problematic aspects of the student teacher's worldview of caring teaching with respect to its philosophical meanings and implications.
3. The aim of these inquiries is to enable the student teacher to cope with the

identified problems and predicaments and to empower him or her to solve problems around caring teaching on his or her own.

The identified problems and predicaments for caring teaching can be interpreted philosophically (TE1), and the notion of worldview interpretations is relevant to teacher education (TE2), and philosophizing in teacher education can have the empowering effect TE3 claims.

My main argument for all three points is the claim of analogy between the issues around caring teaching identified in the previous section and those problems and predicaments philosophical counseling deals with. The issue of the professional identity as a caring teacher (as identified by Goldstein) seems to be a special case of issues of identity in general. As philosophical counseling claims that philosophical inquiry can help the client solve problems of identity or self-image, so should philosophizing help a student teacher to solve professional identity problems in teacher education. The philosophical nature of identifying problems in general transfers to the specific identity problems in caring teaching. Palmer's (1998) dealing with the relevance and the role of the professional identity for teaching in general illustrates that connection.

Caring for the self in caring teaching (as identified by Goldstein and McCall), for instance dealing with stress, does not seem to be different from the issue of taking care of oneself as a general issue for philosophical counseling. Caring as a way of relating to other people is a special case of relating to other people, in general, the latter of which is often a source of problems and predicaments in a person's life for which they seek philosophical counseling. The issue of relationship to the parents of the cared-for students (as identified by Goldstein) and the

issue of a teacher's authority in his or her relationship to the students (as identified by McCall) have a philosophical aspect. Emotions in caring teaching like the feeling of loss when the teacherly relationships to students end (as identified by Goldstein) are a special case of problems and predicaments arising out of emotional feelings.

What does philosophizing in the sense of philosophical counselling mean for teacher educators? Lahav's quote about philosophical counselors again:

As an expert in worldview interpretation, the philosophical counselor helps counsees uncover various meanings expressed in their way of life, and critically examine problematic aspects that express their predicaments. . . . In doing all this, the philosophical counselor does not offer philosophical contents – i.e., ready-made theories – but rather, primarily philosophical skills or those related to conceptual analyses, drawing implications and phenomenological descriptions. (Lahav, 1995, p. 10)

In the first part of the quote Lahav describes the role of and the skills for a philosophical counselor. These can be 'translated' for a teacher educator for caring teaching as follows: As an expert in interpretation of views of caring teaching, the teacher educator helps student teachers uncover various meanings expressed in their way of life as a caring teacher, and critically examine problematic aspects expressing their predicaments.

The second part of Lahav's quote could be considered problematic for my analogy claim. While philosophical counseling does not offer ready-made theories for the client to adopt (as expressed in the quote), teacher education for caring teaching seems to offer a ready-made

theory of education, namely caring teaching, for the student teacher to adopt. This point needs broader discussion.

Philosophical counseling was described as client-centered, and Lahav's emphasis that the philosophical counselor does not provide a ready-made theory to the client's problems and predicaments can be seen as part of an explication of the client-centeredness. However, Raabe sees limits to the client-centeredness in philosophical counseling as follows:

But a problem arises when the philosophical counselor is seen as merely a neutral, value-free professional to hire. . . . Some philosophers argue that, just as fundamental moral principles support the assertion that a teacher should not facilitate the teaching of hatred, a philosophical counselor should not act in the role of a value-neutral technician who merely helps the client to obtain whatever goal she desires. . . . If an individual's worldview involves, for example, the random hatred of others, and she approaches a philosophical counselor in order to seek a comprehensive justification for such hatred, most counselors see it as not only more appropriate but as a moral responsibility to both their client and their community to address the client's rationale for such hatred rather than to simply assist her in formulating the justification she desires. In this sense, philosophical counseling is said to encourage the client to transcend her present way of being and evolve into a different one, with a new way of seeing, experiencing, relating, and thinking. (Raabe, 2001, p. 33)

Although it is a client's desire that determines the development of the inquiry, it is, ultimately, the philosophical counselor who chooses among different philosophical approaches

during the inquiry into the client's worldview, based on what Raabe calls fundamental moral principles.

Relating to teacher education for caring teaching, writers stress the importance of the student teacher experiencing care during teacher education in order to cultivate a caring disposition (see Noddings, 1986, p. 502; Arstine, 1990, pp. 239-240; Rogers & Webb, 1991, p. 176). It simply would not be an experience of care, if teacher educators come with a ready-made theories about caring teaching they want the student teachers to adopt. As cited above, for some teacher educators *dialogue* is a component in teacher education for caring. Dialogue, in the sense used here, is open ended, there is no predetermined outcome. Here is the room for student teachers to develop their worldview on caring teaching, and the room for philosophizing to uncover their philosophical meanings and implications. It also accounts for the view that caring teaching takes different forms with different teachers (see Noblit, 1993, p. 37). However, an underlying common notion of caring is as fundamental and general to education for caring teaching as the 'fundamental moral principles' Raabe refers to are to philosophical counseling. The analogy claim holds.

After having clarified that teacher education for caring teaching also does not provide ready-made theories for student teachers to adopt, one can turn to Lahav's claim that a philosophical counselor offers the client "primarily philosophical skills: those related to conceptual analyses, drawing implications, phenomenological descriptions, etc." (1995, p. 10). Is this also what I would like to see philosophizing offering to student teachers in teacher education? Because the problems and predicaments in caring teaching are special cases of those philosophical counseling deals with, any promises philosophical counseling

holds for the problems they deal with should also hold for educating for caring teaching. The following points are particularly of interest.

First, a teacher's view on caring teaching will not stay static. In more general terms – in terms of adults' moral development – Weissbourd (2003, p. 9) writes: "Yet new models of adult development suggest that adults' ethical qualities do not remain static at all – they zigzag depending on many factors." If teachers' worldviews on caring teaching change, a solution to a problem or predicament a teacher came up with through philosophizing in teacher education might not be useful anymore once the worldview has changed. That means for purposes of philosophizing in teacher education that it has to aim for skills that empower the student teacher to deal with his or her future problems and predicaments in caring teaching. Philosophical counseling suggests what these skills might be. In this sense doing philosophy (practicing the aforementioned philosophical skills) is a way of caring in teaching, because it allows teachers to deal with central problems and predicaments in caring teaching.

Second, as cited above, it has been repeatedly pointed out that in order to cultivate the disposition of caring in student teachers there should be opportunities to practice caring. However, practice without reflection upon the practice will not empower the student teachers to analyze the philosophical meanings and implications of his or her worldview on caring teaching. The foregoing skills suggested that philosophical counseling might, however, empower student teachers to reflect beneficially on their practice of caring teaching – during their phase as student teachers as well as afterwards. Here, again, philosophizing is viewed as a way of caring, because it is a way of dealing with constant challenges to caring in teaching. One crucial aspect of caring is that entering in a caring relationship means entering in a non-rule

guided, non-routine relationship with the consequence that a practice of caring teaching cannot use fixed techniques to sustain these relationships or enter in new ones. In this sense, the philosophical skills Lahav describes do not have the same status as teaching techniques that can be used to, for instance, create a caring environment or community in the classroom.

As mentioned above, the paper's title 'philosophy as a way of caring in teacher education' should not imply that philosophizing is all there is to educating for caring teaching. However, it is suggested that philosophizing should take a *central* role in education for caring teaching in the sense that it can guide the practice of caring teaching. Additionally, if caring is viewed as a fundamentally *emotion- or feeling-based relationship* to another person, how can philosophizing, which consists in a *rational* philosophical inquiry, guide caring teaching?

As cited above, caring is a cycle or spiral of natural and ethical caring and involves centrally a kind of rational inquiry. In ethical caring one appeals to the ethical ideal, our view of ourselves as caring persons in order to act with care in the respective moment in which we cannot act with care out of affection or inclination. Philosophizing fits here in the cultivation of caring teaching. This view of inquiry affecting feelings and emotions is very similar to the effect philosophical counselors say their philosophizing with a client can have on the client's emotional state (See the section on philosophical counseling).

Looking at caring teaching in particular, even if it holds true that the teaching profession attracts people for whom caring for their students "arises more or less spontaneously out of affection or inclination" (Noddings, 2002, p. 29), there are times when that does not happen for teachers. Rephrasing Noddings's notion of ethical caring,

Weissbourd (2003) writes about what to do in such situations:

Teachers need opportunities to reflect why they have difficulty empathizing with particular students, on the successes and failures in cultivating moral thinking, and on the state of their own ideals. (p. 11)

Philosophizing as practiced in philosophical counseling can provide exactly such opportunities for student teachers as they make sense of their learning to caring teaching.

Student teachers in a teacher education program that aims for the cultivation of caring teaching face particular problems and predicaments. With predicaments structurally similar to those philosophical counselors address with their clients. In the worldview interpretation approach in philosophical counseling a client's problems and predicaments are understood as philosophical in nature and expressing the client's view of the world or aspect thereof. They are addressed through a rational inquiry into the philosophical meanings and implications of the interpretation of the client's worldview. Due to the structural similarity of these problems and predicaments to those experienced and expressed by student teachers in a teacher education program aiming for caring teaching, the counseling approach in philosophical counseling can be used as a ready-made model for addressing these problems in the teacher education program.

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