

## Creatives after the crash

Betsy Donald<sup>a</sup>, Meric S. Gertler<sup>b</sup> and Peter Tyler<sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup>*Department of Geography, Queen's University, Mackintosh-Corry Hall, Room D201, Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6, Canada, [betsy.donald@queensu.ca](mailto:betsy.donald@queensu.ca)*

<sup>b</sup>*Faculty of Arts and Science, University of Toronto, Sidney Smith Hall, 100 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G3, Canada, [meric.gertler@utoronto.ca](mailto:meric.gertler@utoronto.ca)*

<sup>c</sup>*Department of Land Economy, University of Cambridge, 19 Silver Street, Cambridge CB3 9EP, UK, [pt23@cam.ac.uk](mailto:pt23@cam.ac.uk)*

*Received on November 26, 2012; accepted on December 19, 2012*

**We examine recent evidence concerning the fate of creative workers since the economic crash of 2007–2008. There is some consensus that the creative economy is an important economic driver and does represent a source of fundamental economic change. There is less agreement on what this change means for the creative worker and workforce. Some studies suggest that the creative workforce has weathered the storm much better than those in lower-order service and manufacturing occupations. Others challenge this finding and some studies point to the growing precariousness and vulnerability of creative work. What does seem clear is that the nature and degree of vulnerability is shaped and influenced by the wider macro-institutional architectures within which this economic activity is situated.**

*Keywords:* creative economy, creative class, creative work, urban economic development, Great Recession

*JEL Classifications:* O1, R1, R58

### Introduction

Much has been written about the rise of the creative class (Florida, 2002a) and the growing importance of creative work in advanced economies around the world. At the core of this thesis is the idea that employment in creative occupations has been growing considerably faster than the overall economy, and that this marks a long-term secular transition in economic structure. Moreover, the implicit contention underlying this approach is that creative workers are less vulnerable to economic fluctuations than those in lower-order service and manufacturing occupations. The recent worldwide economic

downturn and subsequent halting recovery provide the first real opportunity to appraise the accuracy of these arguments. In particular, these events allow us to examine directly how creative industries and workers have fared and whether they have survived unscathed and have continued to prosper. It also provides an opportunity to probe for evidence of differential impacts of the recession across what is a large and internally diverse sector, and to consider what this may mean for our understanding of its development, particularly in different places.

We begin by making clear distinctions between concepts of the creative economy, the creative sector and creative workers before

reviewing the recent critical discussion on the so-called ‘rise of the creative class’. Following on from this, we consider the creative sector’s contribution to economic activity in the years leading up to the economic crash. Next we describe the nature of the financial crisis of 2007–2008 and what is known thus far about its impact on particular groups and places in society. We then assess some recent evidence concerning the fate of creative work and creative workers in advanced economies around the world since the crash. The emerging picture remains far from clear. While Florida and his colleagues find evidence that, in aggregate at least, the creative work force has been less vulnerable to the downturn, these conclusions are challenged by findings from other scholars. In particular, those studies that pursue a more finely variegated approach and that disaggregate their analysis more closely along occupational, sectoral and city-size lines find many creative workers still struggling to recover ground that was lost since the start of the major downturn. Moreover, their working lives appear to have become considerably more precarious in the process. Nevertheless, the emerging evidence suggests that the nature and degree of this exposure and vulnerability are shaped and influenced by the wider macro-institutional architectures within which this economic activity is situated.

### **Clarifying ‘creative’ concepts in economic development**

The use of the term creativity in debates about economic development is highly contested, but at its most basic level, creativity is defined as the invention of a new product, process, solution or idea that has some economic value. The notion of creativity as an economic concept can be traced back to Joseph Schumpeter’s (1942, 83) idea of ‘creative destruction’, defined as the “process of industrial mutation that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from

within, incessantly destroying the old one, [and] incessantly creating a new one”

More recently, the term ‘creative economy’ (sometimes used interchangeably with ‘knowledge economy’) has been used to capture the longer-term ‘creative destruction’ occurring in Western advanced economies, especially with respect to the nature and organization of work. The earlier Fordist period placed a premium on the quantity and efficiency of labour in the manual and mass production context, whereas today’s competitive realities are said to privilege the cleverness and creativity of the workers in the design and production of niche products, processes and services. Traditional physical inputs in production are still important, but the ideas behind the best way to use and adapt these inputs matter more and more.

Scott (2007) calls this new economy the “cognitive cultural economy” where “intellectual and affective human assets” manifest in a diverse array of high-technology sectors, health care, financial services, neo-artisanal manufacturing activities, media and other cultural products industries. Pratt (2008) suggests that these cultural products industries, or what he refers to as the ‘cultural industries’ (for example, film, internet, music, textual, music, television, advertising, architecture, crafts and design), are especially important to study because they are “practical examples of the hybrid and complex relationships between production and consumption, the symbolic and material”. These cultural industries are produced in specific places and times and, like the cognitive cultural economy as a whole, are inherently urban-based and at the vanguard of a new economy.

In the last few years, the international policy community has been grappling with definitions and measurements of the creative economy and cultural industries as evident in two influential reports by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2008, 2010). Traditionally, international agencies have defined cultural industries or creative industries as those commercial industries involved in generating

intellectual property (DCMS, 2001). However, more recently, the definition has been extended to include “not-for profits; informal and public funded agencies as well as for-profit, formal and private sector activities. It also includes production systems and value chains required to sustain such products” (Pratt and Hutton, 2012, 3). As a result, the international policy community now recognizes the ‘creative economy’ to include this broader scope. This broader definition has been adopted by UNESCO. This agency recently revised its statistical framework for cultural statistics to reflect the growing complexity and novelty of what is now widely recognized as a set of ‘new’ industrial activities (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2009). While none of these measurements is perfect, there is now widespread recognition among scholars and practitioners that the creative economy represents a profound change in economic structure and that its constituent sectors are important drivers of economic change. There is some emerging evidence that the creative economy may have grown faster than other segments of the economy since the recession, and that several key creative occupations within the creative economy have performed quite well (Pratt, 2012; UNCTAD, 2010). Nevertheless, the concept of *creative work* and its contribution to this process are still strongly contested.

Creative work is key to any analysis of the knowledge or creative economy. Generally speaking, creative work is defined as work that allows for self-expression and work that is understood to be much less stable and predictable than just ‘a job’ (Christopherson, 2013). Where the concept becomes most controversial is when creative work is characterized as extending to cover all knowledge-based professions and is grouped into one ‘creative class’ (Florida, 2002a).

### The rise (and fall) of ‘the rise of the creative class’

Most would agree that, notwithstanding some important earlier antecedents (for example,

Hall, 1998; Scott, 1997), widespread recognition of the growing importance of creative work was first stimulated by Florida’s (2002a) arguments about the economic significance of creativity and his creative class thesis. His ideas are well known, but worth reviewing here briefly because his core assumptions about creativity and the creative class have become deeply entrenched in local economic development policies in many different jurisdictions, particularly those that one might characterize as liberal market economies.

Similar to others, Florida (2002a) defines creativity as the development of new ideas, new technologies and/or new creative content, but what distinguishes his concept from others writing in the field is his emphasis on the importance of the ‘creative class’ as the main driver of the creative economy and as a predictor of urban fortunes. Florida’s (2002a, 8) definition of the creative worker is much broader than of those who make up the core occupations in cultural industries. He defines the creative class as “people in science and engineering, architecture and design, education, arts, music and entertainment, whose economic function is to create new ideas, new technology and/or new content”. The outer ring of the creative class includes ‘creative professionals’ in business and finance, law, health care and related fields who are engaged in complex problem solving that requires a high degree of independent judgement and education. This group shares a “common ethos that values creativity, individuality, difference and merit” (8). They may be smaller in number than their manufacturing and service-based counterparts, but they generate the majority of wealth in the USA and arguably, according to Florida, are the core wealth generators of the future.

One of the main underpinnings of Florida’s theory is that those in the creative class are said to be much more *mobile* than their service and manufacturing counterparts, both between employment opportunities locally and between city-regions. Throughout the boom years prior

to the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent global recession, Florida's research pointed to a "large-scale resorting of people among cities and regions nationwide" in which some cities became centres for the creative class while others were composed of larger shares of either or both working and service classes (Florida, 2002b). He also argued that creative class centres were more likely to be economic winners relative to other cities and regions.

The preference of the creative class for certain places over others became the backbone of the 'creative cities'<sup>1</sup> or 'three Ts' (Tolerance, Talent, Tolerance) policy model that Florida promoted and policymakers embraced in countless cities and communities around the world.

The model was instantly attractive to urban policymakers and a broader audience because it seemed to give them some potential for agency over their local fortunes in light of the major social, cultural and economic upheavals brought on by globalization and technological change in the preceding decades. Policymakers became keen to assess and harness the potential of the creative economy and to attract the creative class to replace the economic growth and jobs lost as a consequence of longer-term deindustrialization. Over the next 10 years, hundreds of policy reports were produced promoting Florida-inspired creativity-led economic development strategies. At the same time, scholars began to challenge seriously many of the conceptual and empirical underpinnings of the theory and how it was applied.

## Critiques of the creative class

### Creative class theory and measurement

Many authors have taken issue with Florida's particular definition of the creative class and his approaches for measuring creativity. Markusen (2006) argues that Florida's approach is simply too broad and 'fuzzy' and obscures many of the differences within the creative workforce in terms of organizational,

labour market and innovation dynamics. Similarly, an extensive body of work has investigated the dynamics of creative work and documented the variegated and diverse sets of practices that exist within this sphere. Workers in artistic and design-related professions, for example, have always been and continue to be subject to high levels of precariousness and risk (Vinodrai, 2013). Moreover, research on labour inequalities within particular creative professions has shown that levels of risk and precariousness are further differentiated by socio-economic class, gender and race (Anthony, 2001; Kelan, 2007; Leslie and Catungal, 2012; McCann, 2007; Nixon and Crewe, 2004; Peck, 2005). These and other authors have been at pains to point out that workers in these creative professions are far from a coherent 'class', as Florida would suggest. They have very different workplace experiences and lifestyle preferences, are not always mobile and do not necessarily "share a common ethos that values individuality and merit" over other social and political values (see also Kratke's detailed review, 2011).

Another important critique has emerged from the literature on the geography of innovation, which has investigated how workers learn, how knowledge is transmitted and how creativity is embedded in certain production dynamics. Storper and Scott (2009) take issue with Florida's argument about the direction of causality between creative workers and urban growth. They directly question his claim that creative talent attracts employment-generating investment and growth, arguing that the opposite is true: urban growth and employment opportunities are attracting creative people. As Scott (2007, 1477) points out, "cities are subject to path-dependent growth trajectories in which both the supply and the demand for labour move in patterns of mutually cumulative causation. The primary engine of this process is not the inward and unilateral migration of particular types of workers, but the complex apparatus of the urban production system."

This same literature has emphasized that the urban production system has many parts, including a critical mass of economic actors, specialized suppliers and services, a deep labour pool, clusters in related industries and other public and private institutions, and resources for firms to draw upon (Porter, 1998). Cities also provide the necessary place-based social processes for innovation to flourish. According to this view, innovation does not just happen because one person takes an idea to market, but rather it is a dynamic social process engaging many actors. Often these actors work in teams and share codified and tacit knowledge through face-to-face interaction. This sharing of skills, education and experience has been called social learning, and evidence suggests that this form of learning occurs more readily when people are in the same place (Dosi, 1984; Gertler, 2003; Lundvall, 1988). Storper (1995) refers to these place-based assets as “region-specific assets in production” or “untraded interdependences” that cannot be easily bought and sold on the marketplace. Given the socially embedded nature of the creative process, it is not surprising that only certain places are able to nurture particular kinds of industries and activities. In this light, an extensive body of research demonstrates why, for certain cultural industries (for example, film, fashion, art, advertising), the concentration of firms, creative actors and a particular cultural milieu within the urban system is highly selective and unique and cannot be easily replicated (Christopherson, 2002a; Currid, 2007; Grabher, 2004; Kratke, 2011; Rantisi, 2004; Storper, 1995). Furthermore, Pratt (2008) has stressed the interrelationship between different components of the entire production chain in his studies on cultural industries, arguing that Florida’s creative class thesis unhelpfully reifies the separation between production and consumption, essentially individualizing a complex and hybrid phenomenon. De Propriis (2013) has also emphasized this point in her recent empirical study of UK cultural industries.

She argues that the creative industries and their creative talent are key to the UK’s recovery, and they are particularly essential in kick-starting high-value-added manufacturing.

Another important part of this complex phenomenon is the role played by national and regional institutions in shaping the character and function of creative industries and creative work (Beaverstock and Hall, 2012; Christopherson, 2002b; Gertler, 2010; Lam, 2002). For example, Vinodrai’s (2013) cross-national comparison of the design industry in both a liberal and a coordinated market economy demonstrates the important role played by different national institutions, rules and norms in shaping the character and function of the social and professional networks of design workers.

### Creative class theory in practice

An equally important set of concerns raises doubts about the theory’s prescriptions for urban planning, economic development policy and how the creative class thesis has been applied in practice. Glaeser (2004, 4) has raised questions about why creative people should necessarily prefer dense, vibrant downtowns and street-level culture. He questions Florida’s distinction between a more mainstream human capital approach and the creative class approach (see also Hoyman and Farley, 2009). Using Florida’s own dataset, he conducts his own empirical modelling and finds “no evidence to suggest that there is anything to diversity or Bohemianism once you control for human capital”. Accordingly, Glaeser (2004) argues that local policymakers would do better to focus on providing those commodities that “those with skills want”—which are, according to his research, lower taxes, looser regulatory control over housing and land use, and better public schools.

Other authors challenge the theory’s prescriptions for urban planning based on their understanding of the socially embedded nature of creativity. Rather than focusing on

upgrading amenities for one particular group in society, [Kratke \(2011\)](#), [Leslie and Rantisi \(2012\)](#) and [Scott \(2007\)](#) suggest policymakers would be wiser to focus on attracting firms and promoting diversified industrial clusters, upgrading training and improving educational offers for many in the cultural industries. Others stress the importance of paying attention to national institutions and regulations that govern innovation, such as the entry and accreditation of particular creative professions and workers ([Vinodrai, 2013](#)). [Sommerville and Walsworth \(2009\)](#), for example, have found that some ‘creative class’ migrants trained and experienced in their home country often face difficulty with career continuity once they reach their ‘host’ country destination. Immigrant deskilling is a particular problem for professional women ([Pratt, 1999](#)), and as [Leslie and Catungal \(2012, 115\)](#) note “there is an ironic and unproductive contradiction between policies that attempt to attract creative workers [on the one hand] and those that prevent these workers from practicing their occupations” on the other.

For several critics, the notion that the creative class is somehow privileged in the investment attraction strategies developed by cities, regions and countries means those not in the creative class (that is the working and service classes) have been neglected by public investment strategies ([Donald and Morrow, 2003](#)), thus furthering class inequality ([McCann, 2007](#); [Shearmur, 2007](#)) and maintaining existing relations of racial and gender-based inequality ([Leslie and Catungal, 2012](#)). [Peck \(2005, 764\)](#), in particular, has taken issue with the celebratory nature of the creative class thesis by stating that “the script and the nascent practices of urban creativity are peculiarly well suited to entrepreneurialized and neoliberalized urban landscapes. They provide a means to intensify and publically subsidize urban consumption systems for a circulating class of gentrifiers, whose lack of commitment to place and whose weak community ties are perversely

celebrated.” From this perspective, Florida’s policies amount to no more than old-fashioned boosterism and place-based competition with a narrow focus on appeasing the consumptive desires of a particular class of individuals ([McCann, 2007](#); [Peck, 2005](#)).

[Pratt \(2012, 14\)](#) agrees with most of Peck’s critique of Florida’s focus on place competition and consumption, but seeks to open up the line of critique further by focusing on the productive dimensions of the cultural industries. According to [Pratt \(2008\)](#), much of Florida’s argument—and Peck’s critique—has sidetracked other important arguments regarding the potential role that culture and cultural industries play in urban growth. Culture and the cultural industries, he notes, are in fact major potential motors of urban growth and regeneration in their own right. Recent comparative international studies have shown that employment and output in the cultural industries seem to be outperforming other parts of the economy ([UNCTAD, 2008, 2010](#); see also [De Propriis, 2013](#)). At the European level, estimates produced by the European Commission suggest that the cultural industries were growing faster than the European economy as a whole in the early part of the new century ([KEA European Affairs, 2006](#)). This work is part of a broader international policy project to develop clearer definitions of the creative economy and its contribution to economic growth.

## **The economic contribution of the creative sector**

### **Definitions**

As discussed above, during the last decade, academics and policy makers have shown increasing interest in the creative economy and those creative industries and forms of work that comprise it ([Howkins, 2001](#)). In some cases the discussion has been more focused around the concept of cultural industries ([Hesmondhalgh, 2002](#)). Clearly, definitions matter, but actually

defining the creative economy has proved to be anything but straightforward.

A useful discussion of the issues and challenges involved is provided by UNCTAD (2008, 2010), whose analysis focuses on the task of defining creative industries. Following their review of the state of the art, Table 1 summarises four prominent approaches. The first, proposed by the Department of Culture and Media Studies (DCMS) in the UK, defines the creative industries to be “those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property” (DCMS, 2001). At the present time in the UK, the creative sectors are thus identified as advertising, architecture, arts and antique markets, crafts, design, designer fashion, film, video and photography, software, computer games and electronic publishing, music and the visual and performing arts, publishing, television and radio (DCMS, 2006). The second approach, referred to as the ‘symbolic texts’ model, focuses on “the process by which the culture of a society is formed and transmitted through the industrial production, dissemination and consumption of symbolic texts or messages, which are conveyed by means of various media such as film, broadcasting and press” (UNCTAD, 2008). The third, termed the ‘concentric circles’ model, builds on the idea of ‘cultural content’ (Throsby, 2001) reflecting the view that creative ideas radiate out from what are termed ‘creative arts’ through sound, text and image to other sectors. This approach has found favour in Europe (KEA European Affairs, 2006). The fourth classification approach builds on research promoted by the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO, 2003, 2012). The emphasis here is on those “industries involved directly or indirectly in the creation, manufacture, production, broadcast and distribution of copyrighted works” (UNCTAD, 2008; WIPO, 2003).

UNCTAD (2004) has produced its own approach to defining the sector to comprise

“any activity producing symbolic products with a heavy reliance on intellectual property and for as wide a market as possible.” The UNCTAD classification highlights their focus on the four core groups of heritage, arts, media and functional creations, and the definitions it adopts are summarised in Figure 1.

### The contribution of the sector to economic activity

Interest in the creative economy has been widespread in both developed and developing economies, propelled in large part by Florida’s (2002a) analysis. The UK, in particular, has been one country that has embraced the potential of the creative economy to replace the economic growth and jobs lost as a result of longer-term deindustrialization (DCMS, 2001). For developing countries, the sector has been recognized as having the potential to reduce their traditional economic dependence on commodities and to stimulate the more diversified export-led growth so long desired by development economists. Thus,

the interface among creativity, culture, economics and technology, as expressed in the ability to create and circulate intellectual capital, has the potential to generate income, jobs and export earnings while at the same time promoting social inclusion, cultural diversity and human development. That is what the emerging creative economy has already begun to do as a leading component of economic growth, employment, trade, innovation and social cohesion in most advanced economies. The creative economy also seems to be a feasible option for developing countries.... (UNCTAD, 2008)

Given the definitional challenges involved, it is not surprising that it is difficult to acquire comprehensive and up-to-date statistics on the contribution of creative sectors to economic activity. Table 2 provides some insight into

**Table 1.** Classification systems for the creative industries based on different models of the sector

1. UK DCMS model	2. Symbolic texts model	3. Concentric circles model	4. WIPO copyright model
Advertising Architecture Art and antiques market Crafts Design Fashion Film and video Music Performing arts Publishing Software Television and radio Video and computer games	Core cultural industries Advertising Film Internet Music Publishing Television and radio Video and computer games Peripheral cultural industries Creative arts Borderline cultural industries Consumer electronics Fashion Software Sport	Core creative arts Literature Music Performing arts Visual arts Other core cultural industries Film Museums and libraries Wider cultural industries Heritage services Publishing Sound recording Television and radio Video and computer games Related industries Advertising Architecture Design Fashion	Core copyright industries Advertising Collecting societies Film and video Music Performing arts Publishing Software Television and radio Visual and graphic art Interdependent copyright industries Blank recording material Consumer electronics Musical instruments Paper Photocopiers, photographic equipment Partial copyright industries Architecture Clothing, footwear Design Fashion Household goods Toys

Source: UNCTAD (2010).



<b>Heritage</b>	Defined as the origin of all forms of arts and the soul of cultural and creative industries. Group comprises the traditional cultural expressions of arts, crafts, festivals and celebrations; as well as cultural sites (archaeological sites, museums, libraries etc).
<b>Arts</b>	Group includes creative industries based on arts and culture. Group comprises the Visual arts (painting, sculpture, photography and antiques) and Performing arts (live music, theatre, dance, opera, circus, puppetry etc).
<b>Media</b>	Comprises media that produces creative content with purpose of communicating with large audiences and thus: publishing and printed media ( books, press and other publications) and audio visual films (television, radio and other broadcasting).
<b>Functional creations</b>	Comprises more demand driven and services orientated industries creating goods and services with functional purposes which includes design (interior, graphic, fashion, jewellery and toys) and new media (architectural, advertising, cultural and recreational, creative research and development (R&D), digital and other related services) and also creative services (architectural, advertising, cultural and recreational, creative research and development (R&D), digital and other related creative services.

**Figure 1.** UNCTAD definition of the creative industries  
Source: UNCTAD (2010).

their contribution to the European national economies, based on the ‘concentric circles’ definitional framework described above (KEA European Affairs, 2006). The evidence presented here suggests that the contribution to value added as a proportion of GDP—at least prior to the 2008 crash—varied from below 1% to over 3%, with the highest proportions seen in France, Norway, Denmark and Finland. The average would appear to be between 2% and 3%. It should also be noted that one of the aspects of the creative economy that has proven to be attractive to policy makers is the rate at which it appears to have been growing prior to the crash, certainly as compared to the manufacturing sector but also in relation to broadly defined service sectors (Howkins, 2001).

Gordon and Beilby-Orrin (2007), working on behalf of the OECD, provide one of the most extensive sources of evidence on the economic contribution of the creative industries before the crash. Table 3 shows some of the evidence they were able to provide for five countries, albeit for a number of different years. They too conclude that something in the order of 3% of national economic output seems appropriate for the USA, Canada, Australia and France, but they indicate a far higher percentage for the UK.

The same study also provides some idea of those creative industries that contribute the most to economic activity. In all the countries for which evidence is available, the largest contribution to GDP or GVA was from publishing/written media

**Table 2.** Contribution of the European cultural and creative sector to the European national economics

	Turnover, 2003 (all sectors included) (€ million)	Value added as % of national GDP (all sectors included) (%)
Austria	14,603	1.80
Belgium	22,174	2.60
Cyprus	318	0.80
Czech Republic	5,577	2.30
Denmark	10,111	3.10
Estonia	612	2.40
Finland	10,677	3.10
France	79,424	3.40
Germany	126,060	2.50
Greece	6,875	1.00
Hungary	4,066	1.20
Ireland	6,922	1.70
Italy	84,359	2.30
Latvia	508	1.80
Lithuania	759	1.70
Luxembourg	673	0.60
Malta	23	0.20
Netherlands	33,372	2.70
Poland	6,235	1.20
Portugal	6,358	1.40
Slovakia	2,498	2.00
Slovenia	1,771	2.20
Spain	61,333	2.30
Sweden	18,155	2.40
UK	132,682	3.00
Bulgaria	884	1.20
Romania	2,205	1.40
Norway	14,841	3.20
Iceland	212	0.70
Total European Union (25 countries)	636,146	
Total 30 countries*	654,288	

\*The countries covered by the statistical analysis include the 25 Member States of the European Union plus the two countries that joined in January 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) plus the three European Economic Area countries of Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein.

Source: Eurostat and AMADEUS/Data elaborated by Media Group.

**Table 3.** Contribution of the cultural industries<sup>a</sup> to GDP or GVA for five countries, various years<sup>b</sup>

Country	Reference year	Currency	Aggregate measured	Contribution of cultural industries	
				Value (millions)	% of GDP/GVA
Australia	1998–1999	\$A	GDP	17,053	3.1
Canada	2002	\$Can	GDP	37,465	3.5
France	2003	€	GVA	39,899	2.8
UK	2003	£	GVA	42,180	5.8
USA	2002	\$US	GVA	341,139	3.3

<sup>a</sup> Industries included: advertising; architecture; video, film, photography; music, visual arts, performing arts; publishing, print media; broadcast media; art and antiques trade; design, including fashion design.

<sup>b</sup> For qualifications to the interpretation of these data, refer to source.

Source: Gordon and Bellby-Orrin (2007).

(except for France where it was joint equal with advertising). This industry contributed a share ranging from just over 1% to just over 2% of national economic activity across the countries shown (Gordon and Beilby-Orrin, 2007).

Table 4 provides further insight for eight European countries based on research commissioned by the European Commission (KEA European Affairs, 2006) and it shows the contribution the sector makes to *employment* (alongside Value added), with estimates ranging from 10–12% of national employment in Sweden and Denmark to around 3–4% elsewhere. In the UK in 2001, this was some 1.3 million workers. It should be remarked that estimates of the contribution of the sector to an individual country's GDP, GVA or employment tends to vary significantly depending on the year taken and/or the data source.

On the basis of the various different analyses reviewed above, it appears that the economic contribution of creative work even before the 2008 crash was relatively small. Employment-based assessments generate somewhat larger numbers than do those that use GDP or GVA as their unit of measurement, but even these seem small relative to the prominence accorded by these activities in the literature reviewed earlier in this piece. One reason for this is that the agencies undertaking the empirical studies included

in our review have all adopted rather narrow definitions of creative work, confined largely to what one might generally describe as the creative or cultural sectors. This stands in distinction to Florida's original definition, which emphasizes the creativity inherent in a considerably wider array of occupations and industries. The work of most of these policy agencies also tends not to look critically at the creative work experience.

With these key distinctions in mind, we now turn our attention to the economic crisis of 2008—its origins, its nature and its consequences for creative work and workers.

### The economic crash

The 2008 financial crisis was indeed a watershed moment in the history of capitalism, and its fallout has been very uneven and difficult to understand (French et al., 2009; Garretsen et al., 2009). Baily et al. (2008) argue that the crisis started in the USA in August 2007 and had its origins in the US housing market, resting on three interrelated developments: (1) the widespread uptake of newer subprime mortgages and other financial inventions that masked risk; (2) companies that did not follow their own risk management procedures and (3) regulators and supervisors that failed to prevent excessive risk-taking.

**Table 4.** Contribution of the cultural sector to the national economies of eight European countries, various years<sup>a</sup>

Country	Reference year	Contribution of the cultural sector to					
		Turnover		Value added		Employment	
		€ billions	%	€ billions	%	millions	%
Denmark	2000–2001	23.4	7.3	8.3	5.3	0.170	12.0
Finland	2004–2005	12.6	n.a.	4.3	3.8	0.086	3.2
Latvia	2004	0.8	n.a.	0.3	4.0	0.041	4.4
Lithuania	2002	0.6	n.a.	0.04	0.2	0.057	4.0
Netherlands	2004	8.4	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.240	3.2
Poland	2002	8.7	n.a.	17.3	5.2	n.a.	n.a.
Sweden	2000–2001	n.a.	n.a.	171	9.0	0.400	10.0
UK	2001	165.4	n.a.	85.0	6.8	1.300	4.3

<sup>a</sup> Industries included differ significantly among countries. For further details and qualifications to the interpretation of these data, refer to original source.

Source: UNCTAD Creative Economy Report 2010. Originally sourced from Eurostat and AMADEUS, quoted by KEA European Affairs (2006, 68).

The lack of responsibility by all players was in large part due to an incentive model that encouraged actors to pass off the risk of an asset to someone else. Many supposedly rational economic actors became caught up in the prevailing bubble mentality, believing that housing prices would continue to climb indefinitely, creating a contagion of expectations (Shiller, 2008). The period between 2001 and 2007 was one of rather modest growth in household income, but household consumption continued to grow as the personal saving rate declined. In advanced economies such as the USA and the UK, homeowners were tapping into the rising wealth they had in their homes to finance consumption for secondary homes, new home renovations, designs and appliances. This demand in turn created a new consumption-oriented lifestyle that sought out unique, niche products and experiences, including the same urban cultural amenities that Florida associated with those elements of ‘quality of place’ desired by the creative class. For example, during the boom years, many municipal governments embraced policies that encouraged the establishment of trendy bohemian neighbourhoods, design centres and arts districts. Some of these policies led to the further gentrification of inner-city neighbourhoods, whereas others emphasized the redesign of public spaces (Rantisi and Leslie, 2006).

When the credit crisis hit in August 2007, risk was heavily concentrated among leveraged institutions at the heart of the financial system. The first hit was to the financial institutions themselves, which in turn shed financial sector jobs. However, by far the largest impact has been registered through the wider recession that this initial crisis produced. The depth and duration of the recession has itself been exacerbated by governments’ attempts to deal with their indebtedness (itself, in part, a result of the credit crisis and the bailouts required to their banking sectors). In almost every Western country, there have been sharp increases in public debt, which have provoked many countries to begin cutting public expenditures, further reducing

aggregate demand and employment and leading to increases in unemployment. The economies of Western Europe are particularly blighted.

It has since become clear that the impact of the credit crisis on financial services employment has not been nearly as severe as many first thought, nor has it impacted, particularly, severely the relatively prosperous cities and regions in which those who work in this sector tend to live. Rather, the effect in the USA and Europe (European Commission, 2012) has been felt most directly by workers in traditional sectors, like manufacturing, as well as in government, and often most profoundly by those on relatively lower incomes and who were already living in economically weaker areas (for a discussion of these effects, see Bardhan and Walker, 2011; Kitson et al., 2011). What all this has meant for the economic livelihood of those who constitute the creative class is not easy to predict without in-depth research, and it is to this we now turn.

### **Creatives after the crash?**

So what has happened to creative work and the creative class in advanced economies since the crash? Since we are still in an extended period of uneven and tenuous recovery, the impact on the creative economy is still evolving. Some recent policy reports suggest that, overall, the creative sector has fared much better than other segments of the economy (see, for example, European Commission, 2011; UNCTAD, 2010). However, caution is needed in interpreting these results, as most of these reports have based their analysis on 2008–2009 data, which are mostly reflective of economic activity *before* the prolonged period of major economic slowdown.

Florida and his colleagues have recently revisited his creative class thesis since the crash, asking if members of the creative class have been less likely to experience unemployment than workers in other occupational groups. Drawing on evidence from regression models using individual-level data from the 2006–2011 US Current Population Surveys, Mellander

et al. (2013) find that, while at first there were sharp increases in US unemployment across their manufacturing, service and creative class groupings, members of the creative class had a lower overall probability of being unemployed. This suggests to them a structural change underway that favours knowledge-based creative industries.

In an effort to address the criticism that the creative class framework aggregates together too many occupations into a single category (Markusen, 2006; Peck, 2005), Currid-Halkett and Stolarick (2013) seek to understand how different occupational subgroups within the creative class have contributed to growth and recovery after the crash. They examine variation in unemployment rates between city-regions during the period 2007–2011, comparing this performance against baseline unemployment in 2005. Their analysis isolates subgroups within the creative class to distinguish between the experiences of the following occupational groupings: management, business and finance, computer and math, architecture and engineering, life and physical sciences, law, education, arts, design and media, and healthcare professionals. They are also interested in how these creative class subgroups have fared within metropolitan areas of different sizes. They find that, with the exception of legal occupations, all of their creative subgroups were associated with lower unemployment. However, their analysis also reveals that size of region matters. Smaller cities were found to have benefited particularly from having employment in subsectors like life and physical sciences and architecture and engineering, underscoring the inappropriateness of a one-size-fits-all approach to regional economic development policy. Not surprisingly, the largest and most diverse cities were found to be less vulnerable to fluctuations in individual creative class subgroups. These results provide some support to the creative class approach as a useful construct in helping to make sense of current urban and regional economic change, but at the same time remind us of the need

to steer clear of broad-brush definitions and applications.

Picking up on this same theme of city size, Sands and Reese (2013) have examined how mid-sized US cities (between 250,000 and 750,000 in population) fared in the economic slowdown period. They find that mid-sized US cities with a high proportion of employment in creative occupations were as likely to suffer decline as those communities with a lower prevalence of creative workers. As they put it:

It does not appear that the creative class indicators have had much effect on how mid-size metropolitan areas have endured the Great Recession, however. And, the evidence suggests that creative class may have been more important to economic health in the past.

They also concluded that, *contra* one of the core arguments in Florida's creative class thesis, the presence of a relatively large population of recent immigrants is negatively associated with economic growth. Given these findings, their analysis raises further questions about the applicability of a theory developed to explain growth in large metropolitan regions to mid-sized and smaller cities and places (see, for example, Bradford, 2003; Donald and Lewis, 2010).

Even before the 2008 crash, the literature on the creative economy emphasized the fact that the performance of creative work provided no immunity from the fundamental riskiness inherent in many creative occupations and industries (see the review in Reimer, 2009). Indeed, for many forms of creative work, risk and precarity are dominant features. This theme emerges strongly in a number of recent papers, which interrogate the proposition that the 2008 crash has accentuated the economic vulnerability of at least certain kinds of creative workers.

Bain and McLean (2013) focus on perhaps the riskiest form of creative work—creative arts—examining the strategies that artists have employed to manage precarity in their everyday life, concentrating on the period since the crash.

Exploring two case studies from the suburban and exurban hinterland surrounding Toronto, they examine how artists have come together to create shared physical spaces—both permanent and temporary—that support and nurture experimentation and collaboration. They characterize these alternative spaces as non-capitalist and collectivist, achieved through means outside of normal market mechanisms. They argue that such spaces are vital assets in sustaining those segments of the cultural economy that eschew individualist modes of cultural production in favour of “generosity, exchange and co-creation”. A key insight arising from this work is that those working in the creative arts are most likely to buffer themselves from the negative consequences of the downturn by pursuing such collective, collaborative production models that operate at some distance from the vagaries of the market.

While such strategies may prove effective in locations within the economic influence of larger metropolitan regions, it is not clear that artists are faring as well in smaller and less centrally located urban regions. Grant and Buckwold (2013) have recently examined the plight of immigrant artists in post-crash Halifax, Nova Scotia, and reached a less-than-optimistic conclusion concerning their opportunities to build viable careers locally. Using a qualitative methodology based on interviews with immigrant artists, they conclude that, while membership in local social networks is crucially important in providing access to economic opportunities, these networks prove difficult for diverse newcomers to penetrate successfully. At the same time, the relatively small size and limited base of the local economy has curtailed the range of opportunities for artists to earn a living wage in such settings, further enhancing the precarity of their working lives.

Another response to the ravages brought on by the 2008 recession has been to turn to non-capitalist forms of production altogether—in particular, to artisanal modes of self-employed production associated with the making of crafts.

A recent analysis by Jakob (2013) explores this trend, noting the tendency of commentators to romanticize this activity as a fulfilling and psychologically appealing, do-it-yourself or ‘indie’ alternative to more conventional forms of employment, or even a conscious act of resistance and search for authenticity. With access to the internet now widespread and with the development of specialized websites such as [Etsy.com](http://Etsy.com) that cater to home-based crafts producers, might this form of economic activity provide opportunities for high-quality work and constitute a viable alternative path for individual and community prosperity? Jakob’s analysis reveals a much less rosy picture. She finds that, despite the well-publicized successes of a small number of ‘craft stars’, few crafters actually earn enough income through this activity to support themselves. Indeed, most of the growth in earnings associated with craft-based production has been achieved by craft-support enterprises situated squarely within the mainstream of capitalism: producers of craft supplies, providers of crafts training and online retailers. Jakob’s conclusion is that the hype around crafting amounts to little more than “glorifying precariousness.... Can creative people craft their way out of the recession? It has never seemed easier to sell one’s work, but it has never been harder to actually make a sale.”

The example of craft-based enterprise demonstrates vividly how the lines between capitalist and non-capitalist forms of production have become increasingly blurred. However, as Christopherson (2013) makes clear, this hybridization of economic activity is not confined to the realm of crafting but is increasingly widespread. In her recent analysis of the US film and television sector, she documents the emergence of a ‘do-it-yourself’, self-employed workforce in which previously prosperous creative workers in entertainment media have been forced to contend with heightened vulnerability and uncertainty, and the erosion of ‘middle income work’ opportunities. Three trends in particular have driven this development:

increasing market concentration in the hands of media distribution conglomerates, pervasive downsizing and outsourcing within the broadcast television sector, and a decline in project-based media production. In Christopherson's view, while these trends have become more visible and accentuated since the 2008 downturn, they constitute the most recent manifestation of a longer-term transformation in the organization of work within the entertainment media sector.

Moving away from the US context, Vinodrai (2013) undertakes a cross-national comparison of the design industry following the economic downturn to examine how creative workers are adapting in different national and regional institutional spaces. She examines design work (focusing on industrial, product, graphic and related design activities) in two urban settings in advanced capitalist economies—one in a more liberal market economy (Toronto) and one in a more coordinated one (Copenhagen). Her results underscore the importance of existing national and regional institutions in mitigating the effects of a downturn in the graphic and industrial design sectors, which traditionally have been precarious and risky forms of work. She argues that, under the institutional circumstances that prevail within a coordinated market economy such as Denmark, some of the negative attributes commonly associated with flexible and risk-oriented creative work will be dampened, thanks to the national social safety net protecting workers in times of crisis and unemployment. She further argues that—contrary to the received wisdom—these same institutional features may in fact provide a stronger context for increased entrepreneurship, innovation, risk-taking and experimentation among creative workers.

### **Concluding thoughts**

We have been concerned to assess the experience of the creative sector in advanced economies since the crash. The picture is far from

clear. During the boom period, we saw widespread recognition of the growing importance of creative work and an extensive appreciation of the economic significance of creativity and the creative class thesis by the public policy community. Following the work of Howkins (2001) and Florida (2002a), policy makers have invested a huge amount of energy and time into researching and promoting creativity-led economic development strategies.

At the same time, scholars have begun to challenge many of the conceptual and empirical underpinnings of the theory and how it is applied. Questions have emerged as to particular definitions of creativity and creative work, approaches to measuring creativity, and the direction of causality between creative workers and urban growth.

An equally important set of concerns has centred on the theory's prescriptions for urban planning, economic development policy and how the creative class thesis had been applied in practice. By 2007, the theory had faced an onslaught of scholarly criticism and many were left wondering what remained. At the core of the thesis was the belief that employment in creative occupations had the ability to grow considerably faster than the overall economy, reflecting a long-term secular transition in economic structure. Furthermore, an underlying contention was that creative workers would be less vulnerable to economic fluctuations than those in lower-order service and manufacturing occupations. There was thus probably no better test of these views than the 2007–2008 financial crisis and the wider recession that this initial crisis produced.

The evidence thus far is inconsistent. On the one hand, Florida and his colleagues find that, in aggregate at least, the creative work force has been less vulnerable to the downturn. But these conclusions are challenged by findings from others. The crash, it would appear, has further thrown into question many of the assumptions about creative work, especially when a more finely variegated approach is taken

and disaggregated along occupational, sectoral and city-size lines. Many creative workers are still struggling to recover ground that was lost since the start of the major downturn, and their working lives have become considerably more precarious in the process. However, it is difficult to say if they are more or less resilient than if they had pursued careers in other occupations and sectors. Some of the emerging evidence suggests that the coping strategies used by creative workers blur the lines between capitalist and non-capitalist forms of production. Most interesting is that hybridized coping mechanisms are not just confined to traditionally risky and precarious sectors like creative arts but are extending into other more mainstream and traditional creative sectors (see also McDowell and Christopherson, 2009). Whether or not these creative workers are more flexible, resilient, 'creative' and thus less vulnerable than other workers in their experience of an economic downturn is also difficult to determine.

National and regional institutions matter in terms of mitigating the effects of a downturn, even in creative sectors that have traditionally been dominated by precarious and risky forms of work. Moreover, the evidence of how workers are faring since the recession in different capitalist systems challenges the commonly held view that liberal market economies are necessarily better at providing a stronger institutional context for increased entrepreneurship, innovation and risk-taking among creative workers.

Further research should seek to move beyond a unidimensional definition of creative work and the creative class. As the events of the last few years remind us, the conditions that have supported the creative economy in the past are capable of rapid change. If we are to understand more about the role that the creative sector can play in economic development, both at the national level and, in particular, places within a country, it is essential that we better understand the relevant pathways that link it into the wider economy.

At the present time, we know too little about how sensitive activity in the creative economy is to changes in aggregate demand in the national economy and the overall balance between consumption and investment activity within it. These shortcomings are also apparent in our knowledge as to how creative workers are linked into, and affected by, changes in the labour market as economies expand and contract through time. Only when these gaps in our knowledge are closed will we understand how the companies and workers that comprise the creative economy fare during economic downturns and recoveries, and in often quite different national and regional institutional contexts.

### Endnote

<sup>1</sup> Another competing concept of 'Creative City' puts more focus on creative governance practices and is closely associated with the work of Charles Landry (2000).

### References

- Anthony, K. H. (2001) *Designing for Diversity: Gender, Race and Ethnicity in the Architectural Profession*. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Baily, M., Litan, R. and Johnson, M. (2008) *The Origins of the Financial Crisis*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Bain, A. and McLean, H. (2013) The artistic precariat, *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, **6**: 93–111.
- Bardhan, A. and Walker, R. (2011) California shrugged: fountainhead of the Great Recession, *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, **4**: 303–322.
- Beaverstock, J. V. and Hall, S. (2012) Competing for talent: global mobility, immigration and the City of London's labour market, *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, **5**: 271–288.
- Bradford, N. (2003) Cities and Communities that Work: innovative Practices, Enabling Policies. *Discussion Paper F/32*. Ottawa: Canadian Policy Research Network.
- Christopherson, S. (2002a) Project work in context: regulatory change and the new geography of media, *Environment and Planning A*, **34**: 2003–2015.



- Christopherson, S. (2000b) Why do national labour market practices continue to diverge in the global economy? The 'missing link' of investment rules, *Economic Geography*, **78**: 1–20.
- Christopherson, S. (2013) 'Hollywood in decline? US film and television producers beyond the era of fiscal crisis', *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, **6**: 141–157.
- Currid, E. (2007) *The Warhol Economy: How Fashion, Art, and Music Drive New York City*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Currid-Halkett, E. and Stolarick, K. (2013) Baptism by fire: did the creative class generate economic growth during the crisis? *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, **6**: 55–69.
- DCMS (2001) *Mapping the Creative Industries*. London, UK: Department of Culture, Media and Sport. Available online at: <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/>; <http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/part1-foreword2001.pdf> accessed 17th January 2013
- DCMS (2006) *Creative Industries Statistical Estimates Statistical Bulletin*. London, UK: Department of Culture, Media and Sport.
- De Propriis, L. (2013) How are creative industries weathering the crisis? *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, **6**: 23–35.
- Donald, B. and Morrow, D. (2003) *Competing for Talent: Implications for Social and Cultural Policy in Canadian City-regions*. A report prepared for the Strategic Planning and Policy Coordination. Quebec, Canada: Department of Canadian Heritage.
- Donald, B. and Lewis, N. (2010) A new rubric for 'Creative City' potential in Canada's smaller cities, *Urban Studies*, **47**: 29–54.
- Dosi, G. (1984) The nature of the innovative process, In Dosi, G. et al. (eds.), *Technical Change and Economic Theory*. London, UK: Pinter.
- European Commission (2011) *Creative Europe—A New Framework Programme for the Cultural and Creative Sectors (2014–2020)*. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament. Available online at: [http://ec.europa.eu/culture/creative-europe/documents/communication\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/culture/creative-europe/documents/communication_en.pdf) accessed 17th January 2013.
- European Commission (2012) *Labour Market Developments in Europe 2012*. European Economy.
- Florida, R. L. (2002a) *The Rise of the Creative Class: And How It's Transforming Work, Leisure, Community and Everyday Life*. New York: Basic Books.
- Florida, R. L. (2002b) The rise of the creative class: why cities without gays and rock bands are losing the economic development race, *Washington Monthly*. Available online at: <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0205.florida.html> accessed 17th January 2013.
- French, S., Leyshon, A. and Thrift, N. (2009) A very geographical crisis: the making and breaking of the 2007–2008 financial crisis, *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, **2**: 287–302.
- Gabe, T., Florida, R. and Mellander, C. (2013) The Creative Class and the crisis, *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, **6**: 37–53.
- Garretsen, H., Kitson, M. and Martin, R. (2009) Spatial circuits of global finance, *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, **2**: 143–148.
- Gertler, M. S. (2003) Tacit knowledge and the economic geography of context, or the undefinable tacitness of being (there), *Journal of Economic Geography*, **3**: 75.
- Gertler, M. S. (2010) Rules of the game: the place of institutions in regional economic change, *Regional Studies*, **44**: 1–15.
- Glaeser, E. L. (2004) Review of Richard Florida's *The Rise of the Creative Class*, *Regional Science and Urban Economics*, **35**: 593–596.
- Gordon, J. and Beilby-Orrin, H. (2007) International Measurement of the Economic and Social Importance of Culture. *OECD Statistics Working Papers*, 2007/03. OECD Publishing. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k92znx7sc30-en> accessed 21st January 2013.
- Grabher, G. (2004) Learning in projects, remember in networks? Communitarity, sociality, and connectivity in project ecologies, *European Urban and Regional Studies*, **11**: 103–123.
- Grant, J. L. and Buckwold, B. (2013) Precarious creativity: immigrant cultural workers, *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, **6**: 113–126.
- Hall, P. (1998) *Cities in Civilization*. London, UK: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- Hesmondhalgh, D. (2002) *The Cultural Industries*. London, UK: Sage Publications.
- Howkins, J. (2001) *The Creative Economy: How People Make Money from Ideas*. London, UK: Penguin.
- Hoyman, M. and Farley, C. (2009) It takes a village: a test of the creative class, social capital and human capital theories, *Urban Affairs Review*, **44**: 311–333.
- Jakob, D. (2013) Crafting your way out of the recession? New craft entrepreneurs and the global economic downturn, *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, **6**: 127–140.
- KEA European Affairs (2006) *The Economy of Culture in Europe*. Study prepared for the Directorate-General for Education and Culture.

- Brussels: European Commission. Available online at: <http://www.keanet.eu/ecoculture/studynew.pdf> accessed 17th January 2013.
- Kelan, E. K. (2007) 'I don't know why' – accounting for the scarcity of women in ICT work, *Women's Studies International Forum*, **30**: 499–511.
- Kitson, M., Martin, R. and Tyler, P. (2011) The geographies of austerity, *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, **4**: 289–302.
- Kratke, S. (2011) *The Creative Capital of Cities: Interactive Knowledge Creation and the Urbanization Economies of Innovation*. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Lam, A. (2002) Alternative societal models of learning and innovation in the knowledge economy, *International Social Science Journal*, **171**: 67–82.
- Landry, C. (2000) *The Creative City*. London: Earthscan.
- Leslie, D. and Catungal, J. P. (2012) Social justice and the creative city: class, gender and racial inequalities, *Geography Compass*, **63**: 111–122.
- Leslie, D. and Rantisi, N. (2012) The rise of a new knowledge/creative economy: prospects and challenges for economic development, class inequality and work, In Barnes, T. J., Peck, J. and Sheppard, E. (eds.), *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Economic Geography*, 1st edn. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
- Lundvall, B. A. (1988) Innovation as an interactive process: from user-produced interaction to the national system of innovation, In Dosi, G., Freeman, C. and Nelson, R. (eds.), *Technical Change and Economic Theory*, pp. 349–369. London, UK: Pinter.
- Markusen, A. (2006) Urban development and the politics of a creative class: evidence from a study of artists, *Environment and Planning A*, **38**: 1921.
- McCann, E. (2007) Inequality and politics in the creative city-region: questions of livability and state strategy, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, **31**: 188–196.
- McDowell, L. and Christopherson, S. (2009) Transforming work: new forms of employment and their regulation, *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, **2**: 335–342.
- Nixon, S. and Crewe, B. (2004) Pleasure at work? Gender, consumption and work-based identities in the creative industries, *Consumption, Markets and Culture*, **7**: 129–147.
- Peck, J. (2005) Struggling with the creative class, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, **29**: 740–770.
- Porter, M. (1998) Clusters and the new economics of competition, *Harvard Business Review*, November/December, 77–90.
- Pratt, A. C. (2008) Creative cities: the cultural industries and the creative class, *Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography*, **90**: 107–117. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0467.2008.00281.x
- Pratt, A. C. (2012) A world turned upside down: the cultural economy, cities and the new austerity, In Beauclair, A. and Mitchell, E. (eds.), *Proceedings of the Regional Studies Association Winter Conference*, pp. 13–19, November 2012. Seaford: Regional Studies Association.
- Pratt, G. (1999) From registered nurse to registered nanny: discursive geographies of Filipina domestic workers in Vancouver, BC, *Economic Geography*, **75**: 215–236.
- Pratt, A. C. and Hutton, T. (2012) Reconceptualising the relationship between the creative economy and the recession: learning from the financial crisis, *Cities*. Available online 12th July 2012, In Press, Corrected Proof <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2012.05.008> accessed 21st January 2013.
- Rantisi, N. M. (2004) The ascendance of New York fashion, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, **28**: 86–106.
- Rantisi, N. M. and Leslie, D. (2006) Branding the design metropole: the case of Montreal, Canada, *Area*, **38**: 364–374.
- Reimer, S. (2009) Geographies of production III: knowledge, cultural economies and work (revisited), *Progress in Human Geography*, **33**: 677–684.
- Sands, G. and Reese, L. (2013) Fair weather friends? The creative class and economic health of mid-sized US metropolitan areas, *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, **6**: 71–91.
- Schumpeter, J. A. (1942) *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. New York: Harper & Brothers.
- Scott, A. J. (1997) The cultural economy of cities, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, **21**: 323–339.
- Scott, A. J. (2007) Capitalism and urbanization in a new key? The cognitive-cultural dimension, *Social Forces*, **85**: 1465–1482.
- Shearmur, R. (2007) The new knowledge aristocracy: the creative class, mobility and urban growth, *Work, Organization Labour and Globalization*, **1**: 31–47.
- Shiller, R. J. (2008) *The Subprime Solution: How Today's Global Financial Crisis Happened, and What to Do about It*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Sommerville, K. and Walsworth, K. (2009) Vulnerabilities of highly skilled immigrants in Canada and the United States, *American Review of Canadian Studies*, **39**: 147–161.
- Storper, M. (1995) The resurgence of regional economies, ten years later: the region as a

- nexus of untraded interdependencies, *Journal of European Urban and Regional Studies*, **2**: 191–221.
- Storper, M. and Scott, A. J. (2009) Rethinking human capital, creativity and urban growth, *Journal of Economic Geography*, **9**: 147.
- Throsby, D. (2001) *Economics and Culture*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- UNCTAD (2004) *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Creative Industries and Development (Eleventh session)*. Available online at: [http://unctad.org/en/Docs/tdxibpd13\\_en.pdf](http://unctad.org/en/Docs/tdxibpd13_en.pdf) accessed 17th January 2013.
- UNCTAD (2008) *Creative Economy Report. The Challenge of Assessing the Creative Economy towards Informed Policy-making*. Available online at: [http://unctad.org/fr/Docs/ditc20082cer\\_en.pdf](http://unctad.org/fr/Docs/ditc20082cer_en.pdf) accessed 17th January 2013.
- UNCTAD (2010) *Creative Economy: A Feasible Development Option*. Available online at: [http://unctad.org/es/Docs/ditctab20103\\_en.pdf](http://unctad.org/es/Docs/ditctab20103_en.pdf) accessed 17th January 2013.
- UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2009) *Framework for Cultural Statistics*. Paris: UNESCO.
- Vinodrai, T. (2013) Design in a downturn? Creative work, labour market dynamics and institutions in comparative perspective, *Cambridge Journal Regions, Economy and Society*, **6**: 159–176.
- WIPO (2003) *Guide on Surveying the Economic Contribution of the Copyright-Based Industries*. Publication No. 893(E). Geneva: WIPO.
- WIPO (2012) *WIPO Studies on the Economic Contribution of the Copyright Industries*. Geneva: WIPO. Available online at: [http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/creative\\_industry/pdf/economic\\_contribution\\_analysis\\_2012.pdf](http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/creative_industry/pdf/economic_contribution_analysis_2012.pdf) accessed 17th January 2013.

