

**THE DECOLONIZATION CRISIS
IN NEW CALEDONIA**

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
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Abstract
The Decolonization Crisis in New Caledonia

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This paper analyses the origins of revolutionary anti-colonialism in New Caledonia. The development of capitalism in the colony, under direct French imperial control, has created a territory with the most advanced development in the South Pacific. New Caledonia has served as both a colony of settlement and as a producer of raw materials, chiefly nickel and other minerals. A combination of unique features and consequences of capitalist development in New Caledonia has determined both the abnormally pro-longed colonial status of the country and has generated powerful social forces that have favored the advent of a revolutionary situation. Unlike African settler colonialism, the indigenous population of New Caledonia has not functioned as the basis of accumulation. Instead, they have been marginalized and impoverished in their own country in the midst of rapid economic growth and modernization. The presence of settlers makes a strong contribution to the achievement of revolutionary understanding and action in the colonized. The major factor contributing to the anachronistic colonial status of the country is its possession of the largest known nickel reserves in the world. The international political economy of nickel must be understood in order to understand why New Caledonia is subject to unusually prolonged direct imperial control well into the era of neo-

colonialism.

Data was obtained from a review of the extensive literature on economic and political developments particular to the settler colonialism. Data on the development of other (former) settler colonies (in Africa) was compared with the data on New Caledonia and this information in turn was compared to the data on economic and political development in select former non-settler colonies. An analysis of this literature led to the finding that colonies of white settlement in general exhibit characteristically advanced economic development and class formation.

The literature on theories of revolution was also reviewed. The factors that appear relevant in the case of New Caledonia were identified and analysed. The major causal factor is relative deprivation, but this can only be understood as being one social force that in combination with numerous other conditions acted as the revolutionary precipitate.

The conclusion is that while the unique characteristics of the development of capitalism in New Caledonia are the source of the subjective and objective prerequisites for the revolutionary anti-colonial movement, the superior coercive capability of the modern state and the ethnic divisions within the territory will preclude the possibility of successful social revolution in New Caledonia.

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INTRODUCTION

Imperialism and Decolonization

A complex combination of political, economic and social forces effect the process of decolonization: its timing, nature (relatively peacefully or through war), and place. While most colonies achieved independence by the 1960s, Namibia remained -- in the official parlance of the United Nations -- a "non-self-governing territory" until 1990. And New Caledonia, a French possession since the 1850s, has the distinction of being one of the world's last remaining colonies. In most cases, decolonization proceeded relatively peacefully. But some colonized peoples, for example the Algerians, were left no other alternative but war to obtain independence -- a seven-year long war in which over a million people perished. Understanding why some cases are "deviant" -- why independence comes late and/or only through war -- reveals much about the role of imperial self-interest in decolonization. Also, the many factors determining the selective granting of independence are important, not least because they continue to effect development in the post-independence period.

Imperial self-interest is the ultimate determining factor in decolonization. No imperial "parent-country" state bestows independence on its colonies unless and until it is confident it will continue to exert considerable political and economic influence in the post-independence state. As Tim

Witcher points out: "Even though its former territories took independence 30 years ago, French influence in Africa is one of the cornerstones of its claim to being a world power".*

Inter-imperial rivalry was a major determinant in colonization and continues to be a factor in decolonization (Stavrianos, 1981). For instance, a declining imperial state cannot afford the "luxury" of permitting its colonies independence because it fears a more powerful imperialism will usurp its interests. In this respect, refusing independence is a sign of a weak imperial state. A case in point was the inability of Portugal -- once a great imperial power, but in the contemporary era one of the poorest countries in Europe -- to grant a peaceful independence to its African colonies. Incredibly, even while Portugal was the only remaining European power holding colonies in Africa, it resisted granting independence to the bitter end. The result has been decades of war in Angola and Mozambique. The case of Portuguese colonialism in Africa, and of the history of colonization and decolonization in general, show that there is no such thing as a "reluctant imperialist".

It is important to understand that imperial self-interest is not simply a question of relations between "parent-countries" and their respective colonies and "spheres of influence"; although this is a crucial aspect of it. It is also a matter of geopolitical considerations and "high politics" a-

* Tim Witcher, "French hold on Africa faces serious threats", Mail-Star, July 7, 1990, p. A7.

mong advanced developed states. The external factors of geopolitical relations of competition, conflict, (and cooperation) among these states continue to effect the development of the modern-day Third World, in both colonial and decolonized countries.

Internal factors are also important in the process of decolonization. Since the imperial state's prime consideration is the protection of its own long-term interests, it regards the nature of the post-colonial state as an issue of the greatest concern. In this, the presence of white settlers is a major complicating factor as regards decolonization and the post-independence state. Not only is an independent "white-state" (such as Rhodesia after its "Unilateral Declaration of Independence" in 1965), counter to the interests of imperialism, the very presence of white settlers -- while favoring a "more real" capitalist development "on the spot", -- tends to have a radicalizing effect on the colonized (Kenneth Good, 1976). And of course, a social-revolutionary native state is the last thing desired by imperialism. For these reasons, white settlers always constitute a great latent threat to imperialism and are one of the major complicating internal factors effecting the time, place, and the nature of decolonization.

On the other hand, a native-led, nationalist-reformist post-independence state is ideal, from the point-of-view of imperialist states. Independence can be granted confidently and peacefully to a native-elite-led state (Stavrianos, 1981; Emmanuel, 1972; Good, 1976; Jeffrey, 1982; Anthony D.

Smith, 1983; Goodwin, 1989). In non-settlement colonies, where the creation of a "westernized" elite (a tiny fraction of the colonized population) could not be hindered by settlers and was fostered by imperialism, a peaceful and prompt neo-colonial independence was not only possible but decidedly preferable. It was under this condition that most of the Third World was decolonized.

Of course, there is always a complex interplay of external world historic economic and political forces, and purely local, internal forces. According to conventional wisdom, the days of colonialism were numbered after World War II, when colonized people were "awakened" by the combined forces of their recruitment into imperial armies, exposure to Europeans and war-time propaganda celebrating "freedom and democracy", nationalism, etc. In commonsense understanding, all these events prompted movements for independence in the colonies. Native elites took up their role as leaders of such movements and, enlisting the support of the poverty-stricken, disenfranchised, landless, and benighted colonized masses, led their nations to independence. This is one popular version of how decolonization happened. But because it leaves out a concrete analysis of specific internal and external factors it cannot account for the selective granting of independence.

However, in any case colonialism had already served its purpose and had become obsolete. Decolonization was inevitable, although it was temporarily delayed in a few places due to certain more or less unique factors. With the end of the era of high competitive imperialism after World War II,

outright undisguised colonialism no longer made any political sense. Nor was it any longer an economic necessity. Neo-colonialism and the cooperation with, and encouragement of, nationalism were the solution to the "unrest" in the colonies. Thus, external, world-historic forces, and internal factors, which varied somewhat from colony to colony, both played a role in decolonization.

Neo-colonial independence is a ruse: in fact it actually strengthens imperialism and increases underdevelopment. Despite the appearance of change with the advent of neo-colonialism, what did not change was the fundamental imperatives of center capitalism: the necessity of control of raw materials, the need for expanding markets and abundant, cheap, surplus-value-creating labour (Kolko, 1988). Independence has not enabled the ex-colonies to break-out of this imperial-imposed economic structure sometimes referred to as the international division of labor.

It is precisely because colonialism has proven to have no long-term political viability or economic usefulness to imperialism that neo-colonialism becomes expedient at a certain point. The promotion to independence can be viewed as a type of reform -- completely within the logic of monopoly capitalism -- granted by the imperial states to safeguard their own long-term economic interests. According to John Valorzi:* "Each year more money is leaving poor countries in

* John Valorzi, "IMF's lending policy to Third World criticized" The Mail-Star, August 14, 1990, p. B8.

Africa, Asia and South America -- about \$30 billion last year alone [1989] -- than is coming in". Obviously, imperialism remains immensely profitable for the advanced capitalist countries of the center in the neo-colonial era.

In the post-independence era imperialism has taken on new forms. Imperialism did not stop with the end of formal colonialism. The staggering Third World debt is a symptom of imperialism: the Third World now "owes" over one trillion dollars to creditors in the developed capitalist countries.* And the vast majority of Third World people continue to live in life-destroying poverty. Plainly, exploitation has not ended with the granting of independence.

Colonialism inflicts enormous damage on the colonized (Memmi, 1965; Fanon, 1961). If they can survive, the desire to undo this damage -- economic, psycho-social, cultural, etc., -- will be realized in some form of nationalist-independence movement. Depending on many factors -- internal and external -- these movements can be either nationalist-reformist or social revolutionary (Goodwin, 1989).

The actions of the imperial state itself go a long way in determining the degree of radicalism of colonial independence movements, as well as their outcomes (Sonderland, 1970). For instance, the imperial state -- with or without the cooperation of colonial elites (settler or native) -- can enact reforms designed to eliminate popular support for revolution-

* John Valorzi, "IMF's lending policy to Third World criticized", Mail-Star August 14, 1990, p. B8.

ary change. This can include land reform, granting independence, encouraging native cultural expression, and opening channels to permit at least some upward mobility to members of the colonized. As Bard O'Neill points out:

History provides a number of cases sustaining the proposition that benevolent treatment of the population and reforms designed to meet the basic needs of the people can go a long way toward undermining support for the insurgents.*

This is the imperial strategy of "pre-emptive counter-revolution", which along with decolonization, becomes unavoidable for imperialism as the negative effects of colonialism radicalize the colonized.

Gramsci** termed state-initiated, top-down reforms as a "passive revolution" ("passive" because the masses give "at most only passive consent to the new political order"). State-initiated reforms, generally speaking, often come in the aftermath of some crisis and the resulting wide-scale demands for change. Reforms serve a multi-faceted purpose: they play a very important social control function and thereby ensure the long-term interests of the ruling class and the maintenance of the mode of production (Galper, 1978; Spitzer, 1975). As Anne Showstack Sassoon explains:

The political, social and economic crisis of capitalism

* Bard O'Neill, "Insurgency: A Framework for Analyses", Insurgency in the Modern World, Bard E. O'Neill, William R. Heaton, and Donald J. Alberts, eds., Colorado: Westview, 1980, p. 20.

** See "Gramsci", Anne Showstack Sassoon, Dictionary of Marxist Thought, Tom Bottomore, ed., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983, p. 194.

can, however, result in a reorganization of hegemony through various kinds of passive revolution, in order to pre-empt the threat of the working-class movement to political and economic control by the ruling few, while providing for the continued development of the forces of production.*

This has been the main function of one of the major reforms of this century -- decolonization. State-initiated reforms always have political motives; the state grants them under duress, i.e. in crisis situations. Thus reformist and revolutionary phases occur in cycles. Acute revolutionary potential is not a constant feature of society. But a passive revolution cannot eliminate social revolutionary potential once and for all, because the underlying causes of revolt still exist.

Neo-colonial reforms (including independence, land reform, citizenship, voting rights, etc.,) -- and all other types of reforms within the logic of the needs of capitalism for that matter ("social welfare") -- are immediate measures taken in the face of an escalating class struggle with the intent of avoiding all-out "class war", which the state declares when it is feared that revolution is impending, and where reforms have been impossible to implement or have proven "too little, too late". There are many examples of this to be found in the history of decolonization: Malaya, Kenya, Algeria, Vietnam, Mozambique, for instance.

Preventing revolution is the rationale behind the

* See "Gramsci", Anne Showstack Sassoon, Dictionary of Marxist Thought, Tom Bottomore, ed., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983, p. 195.

"liberal" imperial policy of "containment" in its confrontations with the Third World in the post-independence period. The more "hawkish" policy of "roll back" involves direct military intervention. The object is to destroy revolutionary regimes/states and replace them with pro-western elites. (Bello, et al, 1985). Independence has neither permitted real development nor eliminated exploitative economic relations. The negative effects of this imperial-imposed economic and political relationship for the Third World are manifest. As a result, revolts against incumbent corrupt regimes are a frequent occurrence. Because of this, active imperial military intervention in the post-independence period is also a frequent occurrence.

The Imperial State

To understand the nature of the relationship between the advanced capitalist countries and their colonies, former colonies, and spheres of influence, it is essential to understand the role of the state. For one thing, the capitalist-imperialist state, operating within and across national boundaries, has very definite political motives behind its policies and reforms: to safeguard its own economic interests. During colonialism, the imperial state policy is directed to preserving the interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie. As Hamza Alavi points out: "In colonial societies the colonial state is the instrument of the metropolitan bourgeoisie and is deployed against indigenous classes where their respective rights

clash".* Likewise, according to Braverman: "In the most elementary sense, the state is guarantor of the conditions, the social relations, of capitalism, and the protector of the ever more unequal distribution of property which this system brings about".** The imperial state operates on the global level. It promotes and defends the ever-increasing unequal relationship between center and periphery.

But continuing to impose outright colonialism in the face of wide-spread native rebellion against it, threatens this economic relationship because in colonial capitalist social formations the social (political-ideological) and the economic (material) basis for ruling class (imperial) hegemony cannot be achieved or maintained. In the revolutionary decolonization crisis the state faces a dilemma: how to end the revolt without ending its effective political and economic dominance in the territory. Neo-colonialism -- a type of reform -- is the solution.

On the political-moral-ideological level, the colonized will always view direct imperial control (colonialism) as illegitimate (Seton Watson, 1978). They will actively oppose it, in the modern sense, as soon as they are able. Feelings of cultural nationalism are ineradicable. Native demands for independence cannot be ignored, trivialized, and caviled at

* Hamza Alavi, "Colonial and Post-Colonial Societies", in Dictionary of Marxist Thought, Tom Bottomore, ed., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983, pp. 82 - 83.

** Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974, p. 284.

indefinitely. The imperial state that ignores and represses nationalism in its colonies -- instead of encouraging it -- does so at its own peril. Attempts to avoid independence or countering with naked coercion is foolhardy from the point-of-view of imperialism as this is very likely to have the unintended consequence of further radicalizing the national liberation movement. Steinbeck has called this "the little screaming fact that sounds throughout all history: repression works only to strengthen and knit the repressed" (The Grapes of Wrath, 1972:324).

On the material level, the settler-promoted colonial mode of production and class relations, and the resulting imperial-imposed international division of labour, directly and visibly cause the emiseration of the masses in the colonies (landlessness, starvation wages). The fact that the cause of the miserable material situation of the colonized is easy for them to see, is part of what gives colonial exploitation its revolutionary potential. This, and the increasing inequality between settlers and colonized result in the latter's total opposition to the colonial system.

On the political level, in the absence of any constitutional (legal) openings for satisfactory reform, the result can only be violent opposition to the regime. In the ensuing national liberation struggle, the westernized native elite -- also a product of colonialism -- must enlist the support of the masses in the independence struggle. The political complexion (reformist or social revolutionary) of the movement and its outcome depend on many factors. The movement may

start out with a great deal of revolutionary potential but the result may be a reformist or even a reactionary post-colonial regime. Some of the factors effecting the outcome of independence struggles will be discussed below.

Whatever the factors favoring or impeding revolutionary change in any particular time and place, once the challenge "from below" becomes a fact, the imperial state will counter with a reform program for political and economic restructuring, and repression (e.g. the "state of emergency" which the British state declared during both Kenya's and Malaya's independence struggle, in which thousands of the colonized were killed). The crisis will culminate in formal political independence only when the state is satisfied that the post-independence regime will compliantly serve imperial interests. This "flag independence" (neo-colonialism), as Nyerere, former president of Tanzania has called it, not only guarantees imperial interests, it ensures the continued underdevelopment of the newly "independent" nation.

Gaining even limited reforms in the decolonization struggle is far from unproblematic because there are fairly narrow limits to the types of reforms that imperialism and local elites will tolerate. This is why any effort to "contain" revolutionary social change is always waged on two "fronts": reforms -- which embody an ideological dimension and are always limited to the type that will strengthen exploitative class relations over the long term -- and subversive coercion (counter-insurgency). When those classes (the local elite and the metropolitan bourgeoisie) with a material

interest in maintaining, as much as possible, the status quo, fear that reforms have already gone too far, or when the insurgent movement has grown so strong that revolution is an immediate possibility, the state declares "class war". Britain's declaration of a state of emergency during Kenya's "Mau Mau" rebellion, was in effect a declaration of "class war". The seven-year war in Algeria, that is, the French war against the Algerian National Liberation Front was "class war"; as was the war in Angola, with the imperialist war against the MPLA. In the neo-colonial context, for example in Chile, the overthrow of the Allende government was a counter-revolutionary class war. Likewise with the imperialist-backed ouster of democratically elected Cheddi Jagan in Guiana.

The neo-colonial nation is, in fact, an imperialist-created entity, which is not to say that it is under the complete control of imperialism (Baylson, 1987). Because neo-colonialism eliminates neither imperialism nor underdevelopment, and because of the ethnic plurality (including "tribalism") fostered and encouraged during colonialism and then by post-independence elites, the neo-colonial society remains "crisis-ridden and conflict-prone" (Omvedt, 1973; Crary, 1986). But the imperialist state has devised ways of dealing with this -- from the withholding of aid, to supporting local dictators, to direct military intervention and subversion -- in cases where it perceives a threat to the status quo (Clive Thomas, 1984; Stavrianos, 1981:467).

The factors that favour and impede the development of anti-imperialist revolutionary class action in the Third

World are determined by both internal factors (the local features specific to each case) and external factors (the "general determinants of the capitalist system"), as noted above, as is the outcome of the independence struggle in general. Therefore, one must understand the determining influence of local conditions and immediate imperial motives in order to determine the political and economic factors effecting decolonization in each concrete case. The outcome of the decolonization struggle, in turn, effects the subsequent development of the fledgling independent state and its ability to actually undo the damage of the colonial legacy.

In order to understand colonialism and decolonization, it is obviously necessary to understand imperialism: what it is, what "causes" it, how it effects the development of subject territories. According to the Leninist interpretation, imperialism involves the accumulation of capital on a world scale and the creation of a world market under monopoly conditions. The basic "cause" of imperialism is therefore, economic. It arises from the "needs" of advanced capitalism born out of its own internal economic contradictions. These economic imperatives include the need for cheap essential raw materials, cheap labour-power, markets for manufactured goods, and profitable investment opportunities. These are the functions that colonies, neo-colonies, and spheres of influence must serve (Gabriel Kolko, 1988; Lipietz, 1982). The major function of the imperial state is to ensure the continuance of this economic relationship.

Dependency theory has attempted to explain why the

introduction of capitalism via imperialism to the pre-capitalist world failed to create advanced capitalist societies everywhere. Dependency theorists have noted that underdevelopment persists in most of the ex-colonies in the post-independence era. Capitalism in the formerly self-sufficient pre-capitalist countries has resulted in "peripheralization", i.e., the dependence and underdevelopment of the subject territories (Palma, 1978). This involves the complete or partial destruction of pre-capitalist modes of production and the introduction of capitalist class relations, albeit in "distorted" forms. The subject economy is internally "disarticulated" and externally integrated with the imperial ("core") economy. Capital flows are from the subject to the dominant country as profits are siphoned-off. The result for the periphery: widespread poverty, lack of industrialization, technological dependence, mass unemployment and underemployment, and general mass misery. This is typically the case whether the dependent country has colonial or "independent" political status (Baran, 1967; Gunder Frank, 1967; Magdoff, 1966; Amin, 1976; Wallerstein, 1979; Jalee, 1972).

Petras (1987) describes imperialism as a "political-economic phenomenon". The imperialist state, according to Petras, operates on an international level. Its intention: to put in place the necessary milieu (infrastructure), to "create the universe" in which capitalism can operate across the boundaries of nation-states. The imperial states' functions are coercive and economic. In this way the imperial state "penetrates the social structure of another nation and creates an

international division of labour that favors the advanced capitalist nations". Thus, the "causes of Third World poverty are structural". Furthermore, Petras argues, the end of direct political control (colonialism) and the advent of formal political independence does not mean the end of imperialism. In the case of neo-colonialism, imperialism requires "collaborator classes" in the periphery. And while imperialism and its "client-state" collaborators will try to secure consent -- hegemony -- for their interests, client-states are of necessity authoritarian regimes because "repression is how imperialists and their collaborators try to contain the bad effects of imperialism". Imperialism is thus, "anathema to democracy" (Petras, lecture at Saint Mary's University, Halifax, July 21, 1987).

Imperialism and Decolonization in New Caledonia

The reasons for the abnormally prolonged colonialism in New Caledonia are complex. But clear enough is that French imperial self-interest has been paramount in every aspect of its relationship with its colony. Despite current French claims that France has no imperialist interests in New Caledonia, there is ample evidence to show that, on the contrary, France is definitely not a "reluctant imperialist".

New Caledonia is both a colony of settlement and a colony of exploitation. The development of capitalism in New Caledonia has brought a complete transformation of pre-contact society and economy. Almost a century and a half of colonial-

ism has created a relatively complex ethnic mix and class structure. With the most extensive white settlement in the South Pacific (except New Zealand and Australia), combined with the development of its rich mineral resources, New Caledonia has experienced a "quantum leap" in development in the last century and a half. From the stone age, New Caledonia is now by far the most developed island (and colony) in the region.

At the same time, these very features have complicated decolonization, causing France to refuse native demands for independence, and have transformed this remote territory into a regional "hotspot", potentially capable of "destabilizing" the entire region and thereby threatening imperial interests.

While a complex and unique combination of social, political, and economic factors have made New Caledonia a "deviant case" (to use Lijphart's expression*) -- a colony in the era of neo-colonialism, the most developed and urbanized island in the South Pacific with the largest contingent of settlers, and a violent independence struggle -- it is nevertheless a classic example of imperial exploitation, oppression, and underdevelopment, and the potential for revolutionary class action that these can produce under settler colonialism (Good, 1976).

New Caledonia's status as both a colony of settle-

* Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method", American Political Science Review, 65, September 1971, pp. 653 - 673.

ment and as a valuable raw material producer are the primary factors contributing to its long-drawn and sometimes violent independence struggle. Extensive white settlement greatly retards the creation of native elites under colonialism, to whom imperialism could confidently offer independence elsewhere, as noted above. At the same time, settler colonies experience a more rapid and complete capitalist development than non-settler colonies (Beckford, 1972; Good, 1976). The few among the colonized that become "westernized" via this development are often radicalized by the almost complete closure to upward mobility under settler colonialism. Rather than being conservative supporters of imperialism who are more afraid of their local oppressed classes than they are of the metropolitan bourgeoisie, these elites can play the role of revolutionary leaders in the national liberation struggle. This radicalization becomes operationalized and widely politicized in the independence movement. Because this predictable event threatens imperialism, the metropolitan state quickly intervenes with a counter-insurgency program (which includes reforms). Here, the purpose is not only to reduce native support for revolutionary change, but also necessarily to weaken the settlers' political and economic dominance in colonial society and economy. Ameliorating the indigenous population's material situation requires reducing the settlers' privileged position. It is at this point that settlers rebel against the agency that until then has been the very guarantor of their privileges: the imperial state. It is precisely this dynamic that is presently unfolding in New

Caledonia.

The decolonization of Africa, especially events in the white settler colonies of Africa (such as Algeria, Kenya, Rhodesia, South Africa, Belgian Congo, and Namibia), indicates that it is the settlers -- not the colonized -- that are the real threat to imperial interests especially when the inexorable transition to independence can no longer be delayed (Emmanuel, 1973). The danger settlers pose to imperialism is all the greater the more valuable the colony. The mineral possessing colonies in Africa are an example: oil in Algeria; various minerals in Rhodesia, gold and diamonds in South Africa, copper in Belgian Congo). In these, and other African settler colonies, "nationalistic" (as opposed to "loyalist") settlers threatened to secede and form independent "white states" on numerous occasions, especially when they feared an abrogation of their privileges at the mere suggestion of imperial state-initiated reforms for the colonized. Everywhere there is evidence to show the danger settlers pose to imperialism when they refuse to accept the state's reforms. But when the anarchic "settler mode of production" became obsolete -- a drain on and a threat to imperialism -- when occupation of the land by settlers is no longer necessary to imperialism as it had been during the initial competitive "scramble" for colonies, when settlers attempt to secede from the parent-country to form independent settler states, and when native insurgents are radicalized to the point of revolutionary anti-colonialism, the settler societies in Africa experienced their defeat.

New Caledonia exhibits all of these processes, but has certain unique features conditioning its political and economic development. For example, it possesses some of the largest known nickel reserves in the "free world". It is important to understand the international political economy of the nickel industry. Nickel is the "most highly concentrated major natural resource industry in the world" (Theodore Moran, in Blasier and Mesa-Lago, 1979, p. 258). Nickel has been declared a "strategic material" by France; it is, among its other uses, a critical war material. Furthermore, and very importantly, nickel is found in few areas in the world* and according to some reports, is "seriously depleted"*** in top First World World suppliers (namely Canada). This situation with nickel constitutes a "chokepoint": a sort of geopolitical obstruction to the trouble-free flow of an essential raw material (Bello, et al, 1986). French imperialism has no intention of losing one bit of its oligopolistic control of New Caledonia's nickel -- not to a white-settler state, native insurgents, or a regional "imperial satellite" interloper (such as Australia). Nationalism and efforts to promote local development by gaining control of raw materials locally, pose a potential threat to transnational corporations that control the supply of raw materials on the world market (Moran, in Blasier and Mesa-Lago,

* Guy de Rothschild, The Whims of Fortune, New York: Random House, 1985, p. 222.

** Susan Yellin, "Mining risks losing competitive edge", The Mail-Star, August 31, 1989, p. 9.

1979, p. 259). The imperial state takes the "chokepoint" problem very seriously where essential raw materials are concerned and intervenes accordingly.

But geopolitical concerns, white-settler troubles, native insurgency, and nickel are not the only considerations determining imperial policy in New Caledonia. Nuclear testing in French Polynesia is also an important factor. France had plans to conduct its testing of nuclear devices in the desert of Algeria -- plans that had to be cancelled when Algeria gained independence. French Polynesia was then chosen as the site for France's nuclear development program. But the independence of New Hebrides (an English and French colony) in 1980, increased demands for independence in the other French colonies. France needs French Polynesia as a nuclear colony and fears the "demonstration effect" of decolonizing New Caledonia.*

The history of the decolonization of white settler colonies, of anti-imperial movements in general, of post-independence development, and of revolutionary struggles everywhere in this century, reveals the extraordinarily protean nature of the phenomenon of revolution. Any attempt at tracing out its causality demonstrates its very complex nature. A careful study of particular revolutions -- both ones that failed and ones that succeeded -- contributes to our overall understanding

* Bengt Danielsson, "Poisoned Pacific: The Legacy of French Nuclear Testing", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 46, No. 2, March 1990, pp. 22 - 31.

of the factors that are conducive and those that delay the arrival of the "revolutionary moment".

In the following chapters I will discuss in detail the issues raised above. Chapter one will consist of a detailed framework for the analysis of revolution, social change and development in peripheral (especially colonial) social formations. I will draw on general scholarly work but will place it within the Marxist framework. It will be argued that the social and economic structures of certain colonial societies exhibit a strong potential to generate revolutionary consciousness in some groups/classes, but that the imperial state has, except in extraordinary circumstances, the ability to cause the "mis-carriage" of this potential.

Chapter two will be a general historical overview of the development of capitalism in New Caledonia. This will illustrate the "quantum leap" in development executed via imperialism as the indigenous society and economy was transformed from the stone age to revolutionary consciousness in less than one-hundred and fifty years. It is the special feature of the development of capitalism in New Caledonia that created the revolutionary situation of the present decolonization crisis.

Chapter three will consist of an in-depth discussion of the respective role of the principle actors in New Caledonia's decolonization crisis. This will include an analysis of the role and functions of the state in creating the conditions for capital accumulation to take place. Also the roles of the settlers, the indigenous population, and the immigrant popula-

tion in the decolonization crisis will be considered. And important also, as it impacts crucially on the decolonization process, is the unique position of New Caledonia in the international political economy of the nickel industry. The reasons for the territory's anachronistic status as one of the world's last colonies cannot be understood without a knowledge of the global aspects of the nickel industry. It will be argued that nickel -- a crucial raw material -- is an imperial "chokepoint".

Chapter four will be a discussion of the states's reforms and the likelihood of New Caledonia's neo-colonial future in the next century. France's reforms are designed to "stack the deck" in favour of a neo-colonial outcome to the present decolonization crisis. The resulting new balance of class and ethnic forces and new institutional arrangements will permit subsequent social conflict to be "institutionalized" -- channelled away from social revolutionary change and confined to reformism and "peaceful conflict". The pre-emptive counter-revolutionary reforms of the state in fact constitute a whole new model of development for the territory. This new model of development is, nevertheless, within the capitalist mode of production and favorable to the needs of imperialism. The failure of the oppressed and exploited in New Caledonia to become a "class for itself" rather than merely a "class in itself" -- due largely to the ideological domination of the ruling class and to the ideology of racism so pervasive a part of colonialism -- has spelled the defeat of the revolutionary forces.

Theoretical Framework

Part I Explaining Revolution: Academic Theories of Revolution

History has demonstrated the protean nature of revolution. For this reason, any generalized, abstract theory about the causes and outcomes of revolution is problematic: no one theory can explain all cases, but it may serve as a guideline for analyzing this extremely complex (and, as is often noted, rare) phenomenon. It is difficult to be confident about any categorical statements regarding the causes of revolutions. The immediate causes, at least, exist as a unique combination in each particular case. Therefore, a concrete historical analysis of specific revolutionary situations is probably the best approach to the problem, as opposed to insisting upon an unsubstantiated theory and trying to force the facts to support it.

This is not to say that no scientific progress has been made in the theoretical study of revolutionary phenomena and that the student must go into the problem "cold". In fact, a huge social scientific bibliography exists on the subject. But no consensus exists. Nevertheless, the researcher can and must begin with a conceptual framework -- modifying it when necessary -- with which to analyze the "facts" as he or she sees them.

Leaving the difficult problem of causality aside, the first step is to define what one means by revolution. It is necessary to explain how revolution differs from other

forms of "collective violence" that may or may not bring social change, such as revolts, rebellions (modern and pre-modern), and coups. There is also no consensus on this basic issue and much confusion surrounds it. Revolution often means different things to different researchers.

Beside the issue of causality -- the objective and subjective factors conducive to revolution -- one needs to know about counter-acting tendencies. What are the social forces -- sociological, political and economic -- that impede revolutionary social change? Again, it is evident that no one answer can explain all cases: it seems safe to say that there are both historic and country-specific differences determining revolutionary potential and outcomes.

Understanding the objective, structural-material factors that determine what is "historically possible", that -- in the right combination, at the right time and place, and perhaps aided by historical "accident" -- may result in a revolution, is obviously crucial. But on another level, the issue of human agency, of the subjective factors in any revolutionary situation, of how revolutionary understanding and action come about, and the issue of leadership -- these questions may be even more difficult. This is reflected in the fact that these questions are major points of contention in the comparative, historical and theoretical literature on revolution. A satisfactory theory of revolution would have to include an explanation of how objective and subjective factors interact: how they effect the origin of a potentially revolutionary movement and determine the outcome.

Theories of revolution can be typologicalized in various ways: Marxist and non-Marxist, structural and psychological, for example. Like any theory, each contains underlying, taken-for-granted (often unstated) assumptions about the normative value of certain societal characteristics -- cultural, political and economic conditions, etc., -- that a revolution could effect. More or less implicit value judgements are embodied in a theory. And some theories are better suited to explaining social change than others.

An abstract theory, approach or paradigm, at a high level of generalization, cannot be expected to explain every social force involved in every revolution at all times. An eclectic approach to the problem has definite advantages. Analyzing the specific sociological, political, economic and psychological factors that seem to be operative in each concrete case, comparing this with other historical evidence, avoiding categorical claims and single-issue explanations, is the most fruitful and scientific approach to the problem. The worth of academic theories of revolution should be judged by these sorts of criteria.

Within the non-Marxist tradition, the functionalist-modernization paradigm has focused on "strains" in the social system caused by a too-rapid transformation of traditional society. This may cause various psycho-social "tensions" that in turn may cause frustration and aggression directed against the government. Revolution is taken by modernization theory as evidence that some aspects of society are dysfunctional. Generally, revolution is viewed in a negative light: an event

that can and should be prevented.* As Coleman and Cressey explain:

To functionalists ... when national systems do not work smoothly and become increasingly dysfunctional, revolution is one possible result. For example, a society might exclude capable people from positions of power and distribute its wealth so unequally that citizens become bitter, resentful, and revolutionary. Political organization also becomes dysfunctional by championing established ways of doing things while the citizens' attitudes, values, and opinions are changing.... Functionalists therefore believe that the best way to head off revolutionary conflict is to implement ... gradual reforms ... on economics, government, poverty and ethnic minorities. (Coleman and Cressey, 1984:491 - 492)

Within the Marxist tradition, revolution is seen as the inevitable outcome of contradictions of basic economic laws inherent in the economic system -- the mode of production -- which is the basis of any society and which influences all other (the superstructural) elements of society. The mode of production gives rise to classes whose economic interests are in opposition. When the oppressed become conscious of the real economic and political causes of their suffering, become politicized and actively oppose the ruling class and the state that upholds the interests of that class, the "revolutionary moment" has arrived. If the oppressed succeed in wresting state power from the exploiting class, and subsequently establishes a new, more "progressive" mode of production and demo-

* For more on the modernization perspective see Ankie Hoogvelt, The Third World in Global Development, London: MacMillan, 1982, pp. 116 - 119. And "Warfare and International Conflict", The Functionalist Perspective, Social Problems, James Coleman and Donald Cressey, eds., New York: Harper and Row, 1984, chapter 16.

cratic, egalitarian society, a social revolution has occurred. For Marxists, revolution is the very essence and manifestation of social development and is thus viewed positively.* Giddens outlines the Marxist theory as follows:

When progressive changes occur in the sphere of productive activity ... a tension is set up between these new productive forces and the existing relations of production... These "contradictions" become expressed as overt class conflicts, terminating in revolutionary struggles fought out in the political sphere.... The outcome of these struggles is either "the common ruin of the contending classes" ... or "a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large"... The supersession of capitalism ... provides the circumstances in which it will be possible for man to recover his alienated self within a rational order which has freed itself from class domination. (Giddens, 197:44 - 45)

Structural, or "polity centered" approaches to revolutions examine the influence of various social crises in creating revolutionary situations. These theories point to agrarian upheavals, wars, disruptions effecting the military, etc., and how these crises may cause the state to lose control of the coercive apparatus thereby causing a "power vacuum" that may enable a revolutionary party to usurp state power, if it has mobilized sufficient resources. While class analysis is employed it is seen as insufficient: the focus is especially on the

[S]cope and nature of state power vis-à-vis civil society. ... Especially important in this regard is the way in which the state relates to the voluntary organization of social groups for the purpose of redressing grievances.

* For more on the Marxist theory of revolution see Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and modern social theory, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971, pp. 44 - 45. And Barbara Salert, Revolutions and Revolutionaries, New York: Elsevier, 1976, pp. 96 - 123.

Whether the state tolerates, represses, or sponsors such organizations -- and which organizations -- is crucial for understanding why mass revolutionary movements emerge and (sometimes) seize state power. (Goodwin in Terry Boswell, 1989:61)*

Psychological approaches focus on the states of mind of those -- both the leaders and the followers -- who rebel against governmental authority. Psychologists Brown and Herrnstein (1975:274), for instance, argue that "the disappointment by illegitimate means of legitimate expectations" causes people to react violently. The leaders, on the other hand, may be presumed to be suffering from mental illness or some sort of psychological abnormality or may be motivated by a "syndrome" that fills them with a "sense of injustice and a corresponding mission to set things right" (Rejai and Phillips, 1979:57).**

Theda Skocpol (in Coser and Larsen, 1976), offers a critique of the "three major approaches" (to revolution), which, in her typology are the "aggregate-psychological theories ... the systems/value-consensus theories ... and the political conflict theories" (p. 156). Dismissing each

* For an example of the "polity-centered" approach see Jeff Goodwin, "Colonialism and Revolution in Southeast Asia: a Comparative Analysis", Revolution in the World System, ed., Terry Boswell, New York: Greenwood Press, 1989, pp. 59 - 78. And for the "structural" approach see Theda Skocpol, "Explaining Revolution: In Quest of a Social-Structural Approach", The Uses of Controversy in Sociology, Lewis Coser and Otto Larsen, eds., New York: The Free Press, 1976, pp. 168 - 172.

** On some of the psychological causes of "political violence" see "Why human beings become violent", Anthony Storr, Churchill's Black Dog, Kafka's Mice and other Phenomena of the Human Mind, New York: Grove Press, 1988; and Mostafa Rejai with Kay Phillips Leaders of the Revolution, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979.

of these theories as incapable of providing satisfactory causal explanations for revolution, she argues the case instead for a "structural and comparative-historical" approach, of which, according to Skocpol, Marxism is one kind. Nevertheless, she is critical of "Marxist-derived theories" (she does not specifically say which ones), on the grounds that they

... cannot be uncritically accepted as rigorous, empirically validated explanations. [Because] The basic Marxist explanation sketch -- which argues that revolutions are caused by socio-economic developments that lead to the outbreak of class struggles which, in turn, transform and mark the divide between distinct modes of production -- simply does not succeed in laying bare the overall logic of actual historical revolutions. (p. 173)

Skocpol suggests as a corrective to the Marxist approach, "a new theory":

... one which synthesizes an historically grounded, social-structural style of explanation ... with a comparative historical method of hypothesis testing. By thus combining ... that fusion of theoretical understanding and historical relevance ... with .. the concern of contemporary social science for rigorous hypothesis testing, students of revolution can avoid the twin dangers of abstract, irrelevant theorizing and empirical inadequacy that have long plagued explanatory efforts in this area of inquiry. (pp. 174 - 175)

The usefulness or lack of usefulness of any of the above-mentioned theories; the validity of Skocpol's (or that of any one else) criticisms of them; and the value of her "new theory" for analyzing revolutions, are of course all issues open to debate. But it is important to keep in mind that in choosing a theory to analyze a given social phenomenon that there are different levels of analysis and thus different levels of theories attempting to explain the phenomenon in question. Relevant to this point is Anton Allahar's (1989) mention of the distinction between nomothetic knowledge and idio-

iographic knowledge. According to him, nomothetic knowledge is aimed at the "discovery of general causal sequences or propositions"; whereas idiographic knowledge is "generated ... from the study of specific, unique events" (p. 7). One type of knowledge is not "better" than the other. The following analysis of the decolonization crisis in New Caledonia will be an attempt to employ and develop both types of knowledge -- the nomothetic and the idiographic -- and to make use of theories of revolution at various levels of analysis.

The point is that a given theory may or may not be useful for understanding everything there is to know about a phenomenon. The student must be aware of this and may find it useful to draw on theories from several different approaches, which are designed to analyze macroscopic- or macroscopic-level phenomenon specifically.

To illustrate this point, take the theory of "relative deprivation". Relative deprivation refers to the situation of a group being underprivileged in comparison to another group; or of a group having less than it was accustomed to having in the past; or of a group having less than it thinks it should have by rights. Relative deprivation is often cited as being a causal factor in revolution and social conflict (see for instance Davis, 1962; Runciman, 1966; Gurr, 1970; Coser, 1956). Skocpol (1976) and Salert (1976), for instance, place the theory of relative deprivation in the psychological theories of revolution. For Skocpol, psychological theories explain only (at best) the superficial causes of revolution. Skocpol, citing the evidence of other scholars, rejects the

theory wholesale, because (among other reasons) of its subjective, voluntaristic orientation. She argues: "No successful social revolution has ever been "made" by a mass-mobilizing, avowedly revolutionary movement" (1979:17).

If anyone is saying, categorically, that relative deprivation causes revolution, (and none of the theorists Skocpol criticizes are making this claim), then they are certainly wrong. Of course, people who do perceive their underprivileged condition may well resent it, but they may think it is "natural", normal, and inevitable. They may have been socialized to believe their situation is their own fault, or that nothing can be done about it. They may even believe that it is God's will that some are very rich and that others have nothing. Obviously, these sorts of beliefs can do nothing to contribute to revolutionary understanding or action. But to reject the concept as having no relevance in revolutionary causality, even if only in some cases, is probably a mistake. This is because relative deprivation may, under certain circumstances, generate class consciousness. But then Skocpol also rejects class consciousness as a factor in bringing about revolution.

Objective, structural factors are at the bottom of any potentially revolutionary situation. Objective factors, like subjective ones, are necessary, but they may not be sufficient. But this does not mean that subjective responses are unimportant. They are. Both must be included in a causal explanation. As Ritzer (1983:154) puts it: "Skocpol's focus on the structural level may be right, but that does not mean that the other levels are insignificant."

The concept of relative deprivation, as a part of a theory of revolution, may well have some validity in at least some cases. Used in this way, "psychological" concepts and explanations are not inconsistent with a structural, Marxist, polity-centered, systems/value-consensus, or any other approach, but can be employed to uncover and understand a particular variable that may or may not apply in specific cases. Again, it is a question of the level of analysis that one is pursuing.

In any case, for the purposes of this essay, my interest is centered more on understanding, in general, the causes and outcomes of revolutionary situations, specifically in the colonial context, than on classifying and criticizing academic theories about revolution. My focus is limited also to the decolonization crisis in New Caledonia, which is furthermore, a colony of white settlement, (perhaps the last such colony remaining in the world). Whatever objective and subjective factors that have contributed to the potentially revolutionary situation in New Caledonia, and whatever the outcome may be, these same factors may or may not be operative elsewhere. Only comparative, historical studies can determine that. A study of other revolutions (successful and unsuccessful -- by whatever criteria one chooses to make this judgement in the "backward" areas of the world, can no doubt provide insights and clues to the contemporary situation in New Caledonia.

Part II
Explaining Revolution: The Historical Material Approach

Marx was interested in determining and analyzing the causes of social change. For him, the causes are rooted, first and foremost, in the objective, material world. Ideologies, (forms of consciousness) are a reflection of material realities. Historically, human beings had distinguished themselves from the animals when they began producing their means of subsistence (shelter, food, clothing). Early people did this in the context of a life-or-death struggle against the forces of nature. At this stage in the development of the human race, the level of technology was simple and consequently little or no surplus was produced. Thus, all early societies were tribal, non-literate, pre-class, and often nomadic or semi-nomadic. If geographical, climatic, etc., conditions were particularly favorable then the struggle to survive was less precarious; people could settle in such locations. Thus began agrarian civilizations. When people could settle in one place -- often both a result and a cause of their ability to produce a surplus -- a much more complex division of labour may begin to appear. When, in this division of labour, some people come to control the use of the surplus, and to control the "forces of production" themselves (people and their capacity to work, to conceive and to create; the land, tools, natural resources), as individuals, then in effect, ownership has come into being, and with it, classes. The appearance of classes is of world-historic significance for Marx; here begins the real history of human societies.

Each mode of production which Marx distinguished (primitive communal, the Asiatic, the ancient (slavery), feudal, capitalist, and communist) implies the development of human society in stages as the forces of production gain mastery over nature. Any one society will not necessarily progress through all these modes. All, except the first and the last, are class societies. In each mode of production the class that owns the means of production (land, tools, slaves, for instance), is the ruling class: it dominates politics, and presents its particular world-view (class interests) as the same as society's as a whole (including that of the dominated classes). Thus, the mode of production (the economic system) is the basis of society, and in class-divided societies, the ruling class -- which owns the means of production -- also controls the state (the government, the judiciary, the military). The elements of the "superstructure" (including law, religion, art, theories of morality, etc.,) embody ideologies: they reflect the nature of the economic system but also obscure its real, true (exploitative and oppressive) quality, and serve to propagate and defend the world-view of the ruling class. The mode of production -- the forces and relations of production which characterizes every historic society -- and its corresponding superstructural elements, constitutes the overall structure of a society.

According to Ankie Hoogvelt (1982), Marx was not so much interested in describing each mode of production as he was in identifying "the forces of transformation within each stage.... Their [Marx and Engels] description of the struc-

tural characteristics of various historical stages ... is subordinated to a dynamic analysis of the forces of change" (p. 157). Thus, the theory of historical materialism is a dialectical theory of social change.

At a very high level of abstraction, Marx's theory gives causal priority to the economic sphere in explaining societal characteristics, specific historic events, and wide-scale social change. In each class-divided society, very definite "contradictions" obtain. These contradictions of basic economic laws pit the exploiting class and the exploited class against each other. Thus, "class struggle" is necessarily inherent in every class society. According to Marx, when the material forces of production (technology) develop to such a level that the (class) relations of production are now preventing (rather than permitting, as in an earlier stage of that particular mode of production) their further development, an era of social revolution follows. In Marx's own words:

The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general ... At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production.... From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed ... No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself... (quoted by Salert, 1976, p. 99)

Although causal priority is given to the economic structure, this is not a theory of social transformation that is purely economic deterministic. Objective, material factors

are crucial in social change, but so are subjective ones. Therefore, an adequate overall theory of revolution must include theories that address both levels of analysis. In the subjective realm, people have to become aware of the real nature of the economic and social system. Once they have perceived the oppression and exploitation that characterizes any class society and have become politicized and organized to fight it, only then does the abolition of the old class system become a real possibility. Thus, Marx placed great importance on the development of class consciousness in the oppressed. As Ankie Hoogvelt (1982) puts it:

How soon and how successfully contradictions lead to conflict and revolution depends very much on the degree of the consciousness of the oppressed class, and this in turn is a matter of political organization, leadership, and the mass circulation of the historically correct analysis... (pp. 157 - 158)

Obviously, the theory of historical materialism is "grand theory" (in the words of C.W. Mills (1959), par excellence). More specific theories, at a lower level of abstraction, about revolutionary causality (such as the factors that favour the appearance of the subjective conditions for revolution, i.e. the development of class consciousness in the oppressed class(es)) and outcomes (such as the role of the state in neutralizing revolutionary tendencies and potentialities) are needed to augment, build upon and advance the general theory of historical materialism and social change. Latter theorists as well as practicing revolutionaries did just that. It is these theories that for the most part, have their origin in the Marxist tradition, that will guide my analysis of the de-

colonization crisis in New Caledonia.

In his theory of social transformation, Marx paid special attention to and made a detailed scientific analysis of the capitalist mode of production. His purpose in this endeavor was to identify the specific structural (objective, material) characteristics and economic contradictions that would eventually cause capitalism to "produce its own grave-diggers" as he put it, (i.e. create the conditions -- objective and subjective -- and classes that would bring capitalism's overthrow). Thus, the theory of historical materialism in general, and of the development of capitalism in particular, is essentially class-centered and class-theoretical: an understanding of class formation and class struggle is crucial to Marx's historical-economic theory of social transformation.

An involved description and analysis of Marx's theory of capitalist development is not necessary here. But certain aspects of it will be briefly discussed later on, for instance: some of capitalism's specific economic contradictions; the necessary concentration and centralization of capital; and the social conditions (competition, emiseration), to which all this gives rise and that in turn set up the conditions for the dialectical transcendence of capitalism through social revolution.

Of course, major developments and transformations have occurred in the world and in the capitalist mode of production since Marx's day. Theoretical advances have been made both in the Marxist and the non-Marxist traditions in an attempt to explain these events. No theory of modern revolutions

(especially revolutions in the underdeveloped world) would be satisfactory without taking into consideration the Marxist-Leninist theory of imperialism, in which imperialism is considered to be the necessary outcome of economic forces and contradictions inherent in the capitalist mode of production. The causes and consequences of imperialism, according to the Marxist-Leninist theory, will therefore be discussed in some detail.

Dependency theory has focused specifically on the impact of capitalism and imperialism on the colonies and former colonies (the modern-day "Third World"). Some versions of the theory have focused specifically on the question of how this has meant, among other things, the transferring of revolutionary potential from the developed capitalist countries to the underdeveloped world (Stavrianos, 1981, pp. 431 - 437). These new advances in theoretical understanding of current political and economic developments and of their implications for revolution, are of crucial importance. A complete theory of modern revolution must take into account and analyze the special objective and subjective features of underdeveloped/colonial territories, where history has so far demonstrated that revolution is most likely to occur.

The following is an outline of the Marxist definition of revolution and it will be seen how this relates to the theory of the successive stages of modes of production and of social transformation.

Part III
The Marxist Definition of Revolution

For Marxists, social revolution is scientifically defined as the total transformation of society: base and superstructure. A politically, economically, and technologically obsolete mode of production (the base of society), is "abolished" and subsequently the superstructural elements of society undergo profound changes (in laws, institutions, and also in ideologies of all kinds), that reflect the interests of the new ruling class. This new ruling class came into the ascendant (numerically, economically, and eventually ideologically), during the preceding economic system: it was a necessary product of it. The first sign of a social revolution is the political ascendance (the taking of state power), by this new class. Thus, a social revolution involves the removal of a "decaying" ruling class from state power and the institution of a new mode of production, a more democratic political system, and new property relations, that are more "progressive" (permit further development of the productive forces). A social revolution in modern times may be either bourgeois (this refers to the overthrow of the feudal mode of production and its replacement with the capitalist mode of production, e.g., the French Revolution); or socialist (this refers to the overthrow of the capitalist mode of production and its replacement with the socialist mode of production, e.g., the Russian Revolution of October 1917).

As Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner (1984) put it:

[In] Marxist theory ... there is a clear distinction between political changes in governments and radical changes in the economic organization of society.... For Marx, a revolution involved the replacement of one mode of production by another, as in the transition from feudalism to capitalism (p. 179).

It is very important to be clear on just what constitutes a social revolution (as opposed to a political revolution, which will be described below), according to the scientific principles of historical materialism. There is much confusion on this point as this problem is reflected in the academic literature on revolution. This has led some writers to define as revolutionary change what would be seen as mere political change in historical materialist analysis. For instance, John Walton (1984) argues that Kenya's attainment of national independence in 1963 was a revolutionary transformation of society. He writes: "I do not see how Kenya's independence ... can be considered anything else [but a basic transformation]" (p. 32). He defines revolution after Lasch as: "an attempt ... to seize state power on the part of political forces avowedly opposed not merely to the existing regime but to the existing social order as a whole" (p. 31). Walton is, of course, free to define revolution in this way if he chooses to do so. But this is not the Marxist definition of social revolution (as described above). Walton seems to be making the mistake that Lenin is said to have cautioned about when he (Lenin) warned: "Do not paint all nationalism red". The point is, there is a big difference between (political) nationalism and (economic) social revolution. The difference between these is reflected in the enormous implications that both have for post-independence de-

velopment.

I do not agree with John Walton that the outcome of Kenya's decolonization crisis was revolutionary just because there have been political and economic changes in post-colonial Kenya. I suggest that it is much more accurate to see Kenya's attainment of independence as a political revolution, rather than as a "basic transformation" in the economic structure of the post-colonial social formation. At the most, Kenya's promotion to independence, involved a partial bourgeois revolution. There was no essential change in the nature of the state nor in the mode of production that colonialism had introduced in Kenya -- at least no progressive change that opened immediate possibilities for the further development of the productive forces. There was certainly no change in class power in the state and thus no social revolution.

So just what sort of transformation did Kenya's independence constitute? Marx's concept of political revolution is enlightening in answering this question. Marx's analysis of political revolution accurately describes the type of social change that occurred (and, broadly, how it occurred), when the former colonies were recognized as independent states by the imperial powers. Marx writes:

[A] partial, merely political revolution ... leaves the pillars of the building standing. What is the basis of a partial, merely political revolution? Simply this: a fraction of civil society emancipates itself and achieves a dominant position, a certain class undertakes, from its particular situation, a general emancipation of society. (Karl Marx, quoted in Sociological Perspectives, Kenneth Thompson and Jeremy Tunstall, eds., New York: Penguin, 1971, p. 246)

The "fraction of civil society" that achieved the "general emancipation" of Kenyan society was the "Westernized" native nationalist elite that led the country to national independence in 1963. Did this "class" (that is, the Kenyan nationalist-native elite -- here the term "class" is used loosely), actually "emancipate society as a whole"? No, it did not!, because, in the words of Marx, it can do so "only on condition that the whole of society is in the same situation as this class, for example, that it possesses or can acquire money or culture". This condition clearly did and does not obtain in the case of Kenya: the African masses were totally excluded from British culture and certainly had no money. That is the nature of colonialism and of the colonial legacy.

All of this points to the importance of understanding the role of various social classes and the role of state in anti-colonial struggles. An anti-colonial movement contains a great deal of revolutionary potential -- latent or manifest -- depending on different features of specific decolonization crises. But the outcome of any potentially revolutionary situation is always uncertain. Understanding the role of the state and the class interests of non-revolutionary sectors of colonial society is crucial to understanding why this is so. Regarding the role of classes, Marx's analysis again applies to the case of Kenya's nationalist-native elite in the country's anti-colonial "revolution". The analogy is striking.

For a popular revolution and the emancipation of a particular class of civil society to coincide, for one class to represent the whole of society, another class must concentrate in itself all the evils of society, [such as the col-

onized masses] a particular class must embody and represent a general obstacle and limitation [the white settlers]. A particular social sphere must be regarded as the notorious crime of the whole society, [colonialism] so that emancipation from this sphere appears as a general emancipation. For one class to be the liberating class par excellence, [the nationalist elite] it is essential that another class should be the openly oppressing class [the British bourgeoisie]. (Sociological Perspectives, p. 246)

A few final points on Kenya. John Walton (1984)

writes: "I think it fruitless to belabor what is a basic transformation". But it is not "fruitless" if one is trying to pursue scientific accuracy in the study of revolution and to understand the causes of underdevelopment. If, by "basic transformation" one means the transition from one mode of production to another more progressive mode, then plainly no such transformation occurred in Kenya. Capitalist class relations that were imposed during colonialism persist in post-independence Kenya. It is also probably the case that independence has not been particularly favorable to the further development of the productive forces. Nor has it been the harbinger of a "new beginning" for Kenya as far as real improvements in the material quality of life for the majority of Kenyans is concerned. By all accounts, Kenya remains a very underdeveloped country. Just as an illustration, consider the following:

[In Kenya] hungry people live in shacks without running water. Crime ... robbery is booming in Nairobi, as is prostitution.... A 1977 UN survey ... disclosed that 72 per cent of household heads never attended school, one third of the children suffer from malnutrition, less than 2 per cent of the households have electricity and half the women trudge at least three times each day between their villages and the springs. (Stavrianos 1981:676)

The granting of independence is a type of reform that is completely within the logic of monopoly capitalism.

White-settler colonialism -- which in Kenya's case lasted from 1880 until 1963 -- was on the way out anyway. It had served its purpose during an earlier stage of capitalism, namely the era of high competitive imperialism. But imperialism and colonialism are objectively contradictory. When these contradictions become acute, independence is the inevitable outcome. This is because nationalist-reformist independence, with political authority handed to a native elite, "guarantees" the long-term interests of imperialism. Likewise, it ensures the deepening of dependency and underdevelopment. Thus, independence as a reform does not weaken imperialism, but strengthens it. This is the essence and the imperative of neo-colonialism. Because of this, in no way is neo-colonial independence capable of promoting real development. The history of the post-independence Third World has proven this tragic reality. As Stavrianos argues:

Throughout the Third World in all centuries, independent status was conceded selectively, depending on the prospective degree of social change. If the expectation was for merely political change, independence was usually conceded rather than resorting to extreme repressive measures. But if there was any likelihood of social restructuring that threatened metropolitan and local vested interests, then all possible measures were used to keep the social revolutionaries out of power. (Stavrianos, 1981:669)

This is not to say that no political nor economic development has taken place in post-independence Kenya. It has. But revolutionary? On the contrary, according to Kenneth Good (1976:616). He argues that independence actually meant the "newly initiated underdevelopment" of Kenya. He explains:

The enforced intervention of the metropole helps bring an

end to the settler state.... British imperialism succeeded in establishing the African landowning class in political power, and it also determined, thereby, that Kenya's subsequent independent economic development would be curtailed. As Richard Sandbrook puts it: "It is not only Marxists who suggest that the metropolis may now have more control over the Kenyan economy than in the colonial past, owing to the intertwining of the interests of the indigenous political class and big (i.e. foreign-controlled) business". (p. 616)

It may be counter to expectations and counter-intuitive that the granting of independence actually ensures dependency. But this fact only points to the analytical importance of understanding the difference between a change of the system (a truly revolutionary change from one mode of production to another), as opposed to political change merely within it. It is very important to grasp the significance of this distinction because of the enormous implications it has for the post-independence state's ability to overcome dependency.

Part IV The Origins of Revolutionary Anti-Colonialism

It is an historical fact that colonialism did not end everywhere at the same time or in the same way and that colonialism has had different effects on the level of development attained. Ghana, for instance, achieved a relatively peaceful transition to independence in 1957. Algeria fought a seven-year war of independence. New Caledonia remains a colony over thirty years later, yet it is much more developed than independent Ghana. Mozambique and Angola, on the other hand, only won independence in 1974, after fighting over a decade of revolutionary anti-colonial war. What accounts for these differences?

Analyzing specifically the decolonization of Asia, Jeffrey (1982) has tried to explain the conditions that determined a peaceful ("evolutionary") transition to independence as opposed to those that led to revolutionary anti-colonial wars. He has identified the following factors:

Evolutionary

- 1 Long period of rule, which grudgingly fostered education and participatory government.
- 2 Large Westernized élite, sympathetic to existing government structure.
- 3 Small proportion of Europeans (e.g. 1:1600 in Philippines, 1:3700 in India in 1930s).
- 4 Large locally-staffed colonial bureaucracy and army.
- 5 Colonial power willing to release its grip.

Revolutionary

- 1 Short period of colonial rule. Little Western-style education.
- 2 No nation-wide Westernized élite until well into the twentieth century.
- 3 Larger proportion of Europeans (e.g. 1:200 in Indonesia and 1:475 in Vietnam).
- 4 Heavy colonial economic interest in country, with little participatory government.
- 5 Colonial power unwilling to release its grip.
(Jeffrey summarized in Third World Atlas, prepared by Ben Crow and Alan Thomas, with Robin Jenkins and Judy Kimble, Philadelphia: Milton Keynes: 1983, p. 42)

These factors determining the path to independence are complex and inter-related phenomena. From Jeffrey's analysis, the following sorts of questions suggest themselves: What is it about a Westernized élite that determines so significantly the way to independence? Why was the colonial power "willing to release its grip" in some cases and not in certain others? And how and why does the proportion of Europeans present in a colony impact on decolonization?

The Radicalizing Effects of Direct Colonialism

The imperial powers employed two different types of political control in their colonies: direct and indirect. Direct political control involved administration of the colony by an imperial-appointed governor, a European-staffed bureaucracy and civil service. Few, if any positions were open to the colonized. And of course, all high-level positions were monopolized by Europeans. Direct colonialism was a case of almost complete social closure. Needless to say, there was no question of the colonized being democratically consulted in all this. It was a naked and crudely imperialist-imposed system intended to permit the most rapid exploitation possible of a colony's resources: land and labour. White-settler colonies are a type of direct colonialism. Malaya, on the other hand, had very few settlers, and was ruled under indirect colonialism.

Jeff Goodwin (1989)* has studied the effects of direct colonialism on decolonization in Southeast Asia. He argues that the type of colonial political control employed in Southeast Asia was the single-most significant factor determining the path to independence and the political complexion of the post-independence state. He writes:

The exact nature of Western colonial and Japanese rule in Southeast Asia crucially shaped the possibilities for different types of political leaderships in the postwar period,

* Jeff Goodwin, "Colonialism and Revolution in Southeast Asia: A Comparative Analysis", in Revolution in the World System, Terry Boswell, ed., New York: Greenwood Press, 1989, pp. 59 - 78.

depending especially on whether such rule was of a direct or indirect nature.... Where Western colonial regimes or the Japanese allowed or even encouraged non-Communist leaders to participate in colonial government and administration -- especially regimes engaged in a transition to self-rule -- revolutionary movements failed. (p. 76)

The radicalizing effect of direct colonialism on national liberation movements was especially acute in the case of Vietnam. Goodwin argues that French imperialism's failure to foster "compliant elites" (p. 63), allowed the insurgents no way forward but a militant path. He explains:

By failing to nurture moderate political groups, French rule inadvertently favored revolutionaries: "the pitiless suppression of Vietnamese political powers by the French" -- both before and during the war -- favored "clandestine organizations totally dedicated to the forceful overthrow of colonial authority" (Duiker 1976, 184). Co-opted or suppressed, non-Communist "nationalist reformists had almost disappeared as a political force in Vietnam" in the 1930s. (Duiker 1976, in Boswell p. 73)

Indirect colonialism, by contrast, in which a Westernized native elite or "traditional" chiefs are "groomed" to administer the territory in the interests of the imperial state, helps to permit a peaceful neo-colonial conclusion to colonialism. As Goodwin points out:

The Americans and British, in fact, had successfully groomed a conservative "neocolonial" elite in the Philippines and Malaya, ... to whom they could "safely" hand over political power without jeopardizing their local economic interests (p. 61).

The Malayan decolonization struggle -- which started out with real revolutionary potential -- was savagely repressed and rapidly deradicalized after the British declared a state of emergency in 1948. The "emergency", which did not end until 1960, and "Operation Starvation" resulted in the deaths of well over eleven thousand colonized people (Goodwin, 1989: 65 and

71). In addition to the all-out repression of the insurgents, Britain implemented reform policies and took advantage of divisions within the anti-colonial movement, especially ethnic divisions. Only after this pre-emptive counter-revolution succeeded in crushing the revolutionary movement was independence permitted in Malaya. Goodwin concludes:

In the postwar period, ... the slow movement towards Malayan independence also worked against the insurgency. Unlike Vietnam, in Malaya a peaceful transition to democratic self-rule appeared to be a real alternative to armed struggle. Had British rule been equally harsh for all ethnic groups, and had the British not begun a transition to self-government, the Communists might have been more successful in Malaya. (p. 74)

Another reason that direct colonialism has the unintended effect of radicalizing the colonized is the transparently, blatantly, nakedly coercive quality of it. The material situation of the colonized is not only appalling but the reasons for this condition are only too obvious to the oppressed. By totally excluding the vast majority of the colonized from even the appearance of opportunities for upward mobility and improvement in living standards, the state wins only their unmitigated hatred and opposition. The singularly repressive nature of direct colonialism delays the creation of an elite among the colonized, and disallows the institutionalization of conflict, thus inadvertently favoring militancy. Left no possibilities for reforms, the colonized have no other way forward but violent overthrow of the colonial state. This brings one to the following conclusion: maintaining political control and economic dominance through coercion alone has no long-term viability. A nakedly unjust system cannot contribute in any

way to the hegemony of any ruling class.

While colonialism is always viewed by the colonized as illegitimate, direct colonialism has particularly radicalizing effects on the colonized. These "by products" of direct colonialism will be the object of a systematic counter-insurgency program. The result is usually the gradual defeat and deradicalization of the anti-colonial movement. It is only in this case that the colonial power is "willing to release its grip".

White Settlers, Development, Class Formation
and Revolutionary Anti-Colonial Class Action

James Petras (1975)* has made the following important observation:

Social revolution is not a product of the underdeveloped areas of the periphery, but more likely initiated in those areas most penetrated by the metropolis, where capitalist social relations predominate and where productivity approximates that of the metropolis. (p. 306)

The colonies of white settlement have been the scene of some of the most extensive revolutionary class actions of this century. It is no coincidence that these are also the areas "most penetrated by the metropolis", where class formation, and economic development, have been relatively advanced. A number of complex, interrelated, social, economic, and political factors combined explain why white settlement colonies

* James Petras quoted by Anton Allahar in Sociology and the Periphery, Theories and Issues, Toronto: Garamond Press, 1989, p. 133.

have been noteworthy as "regions of revolt".

As mentioned above, white settlement colonies are under direct imperial political control. The colonized are thus systematically excluded from democratic representation. The tiny fraction of the colonized who are "Westernized" are themselves discriminated against. But the extreme oppression of the colonized contributes to the achievement of revolutionary action especially because of the relatively and highly visible privileged position of the settler.

The relative deprivation of colonized people in white settler colonies is a major factor moving them to revolutionary understanding and action. This relative deprivation is both material and political. Europeans monopolized the running of both the political and economic life of the colony. Pierre Van den Berghe and Kenneth Vickery have labelled this situation a "Herrenvolk democracy". Vickery (1974:309) has explained it this way:

[Herrenvolk democracy is] a parliamentary regime in which the exercise of power and suffrage is restricted, de facto and often de jure, to the dominant group; a regime democratic for the master race but tyrannical for the subordinate groups. Herrenvolk egalitarianism can be seen as the extension of equality in political, economic, or other spheres to those within the dominant group but not those without.

Vickery goes on to point out that "political forms are reflections of economic structures" (p. 311). Nowhere is this more obvious than in the white settlement colonial social formation where class exploitation and racial oppression necessarily overlap and where Herrenvolk democracy ensures this. The dominant position in colonial society -- that the settler

so jealously defends against the colonized -- is not simply a reflection of their "sadistic racist fury", as Good (1976:603) puts it. The settlers -- with the military and political support of the state -- rapidly divest the colonized of their land, often leaving them, in the process, virtually landless for all practical purposes. This transforms the settlers (and a small fraction of the colonized) into capitalist farmers and the vast majority of the colonized into a cheap wage labour force for plantations and industries. As Good (1976:604) argues:

The late nineteenth-century settler came to Africa ... as a "fully developed capitalist man", and with the forcible acquisition of vast supplies of land and labour, a potentially productive combination immediately came into being.

Thus, the relative deprivation of the colonized in colonies of settlement is not only extreme -- owing to the "more dynamic economic characteristics of settler colonialism" (Good, 1976:604) -- it is also highly visible. As Good (1976) points out: "Stark inequalities necessarily result in social change under settler colonialism" (p. 607). And revolutionary class action has very frequently been the the catalyst of social change in white settler colonies. The resentment caused by class inequalities in white settler colonialism is aggravated by its overtly racial character. Kuper (1971:105 - 106) has argued:

Status resentment seems to be most socially explosive in a status system based on race. A recent study of two racial revolutions concludes the "racial divisions are the propelling force in the revolutions, the predisposing factors that affect racial status in any of its many social dimensions, and the dialect of conflict is essentially racial".

The manifest and extreme economic unfairness of

white settler colonialism generates class consciousness in the oppressed colonized masses. But, relative deprivation alone will not move people to revolutionary action. Relative deprivation is necessary but must be combined with other factors; it must be visible, extreme, and furthermore, attempts to obtain reforms must have failed, before people may become revolutionary. Where a class system is incapable of presenting elaborate mystifications about itself, the potential for revolution is present. As the Latin American revolutionary, Che Guevara has pointed out:

Where a government has come into power through some form of popular vote, fraudulent or not, and maintains at least an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted, since the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted. (Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, quoted in Woddis, New Theories of Revolution, New York: International, 1972, pp. 249 - 250.

The classical sociologist, Max Weber, has observed: "The rise of societal or even communal action from a common class situation is by no means a universal phenomenon". In trying to explain why class action does sometimes arise, Weber noted that its occurrence was "especially linked to the transparency of the connections between the causes and the consequences of the class situation".* He goes on to argue:

The fact of being conditioned and the results of the class situation must be distinctly recognizable. For only then the contrast of life chances can be felt not as an absolutely given fact to be accepted, but as a resultant from either (a) the given distribution of property, or (b) the

* Max Weber, "Class, Status, Party" in Sociological Perspectives, Kenneth Thompson and Jeremy Tunstall, eds., New York: Penguin, 1971, pp. 253 - 254.

structure of the concrete economic order. It is only then that people may react against the class structure not only through acts of an intermittent and irrational protest but in the form of rational association. (emphasis mine)

The rapid economic development (by world standards) displayed by white settler colonialism; the resulting relatively advanced class formation; ever-increasing relative deprivation; closure of all avenues to upward mobility; and exhaustion of constitutional paths to reforms, and the "distinctly recognizable" existence, unfairness, and "non-inevitableness" of just these circumstances -- all observable in settler colonialism -- and the revolutionary action this unique combination generates, is an empirical validation of Weber's argument.

Amilcar Cabral, an anti-colonial revolutionary leader in Guinea and Cape Verde, also noted that political understanding and class consciousness could be born out of the misery and relative deprivation of the colonized. It is not enough that people are, as an objective economic and social fact, highly exploited and oppressed. They must also perceive it. By comparing their misery with the privileges enjoyed by the colonizers, the colonized can come to see both the cause of their suffering and that this condition is not immutable. As Cabral has explained it:

Many people say that it is the peasants who carry the burden of exploitation: this may be true, but so far as the struggle is concerned it must be realised that it is not the degree of suffering and hardship involved as such that matters; even extreme suffering in itself does not necessarily produce the prise de conscience required for the national liberation struggle. In Guinea the peasants are subjected to a kind of exploitation equivalent to slavery; but even if you try and explain to them that they are being exploited and robbed, it is difficult to convince them by means of an inexperienced explanation of a technico-econom-

ic kind that they are the most exploited people, whereas it is easier to convince the workers and the people employed in the towns who earn, say, 10 escudos a day for a job in which a European earns between 30 and 50 that they are being subjected to massive exploitation and injustice, because they can see. (Cabral, quoted in Woddis, 1971, p. 56, emphasis mine)

There are many illustrations of the above arguments that one could mention from the history of decolonization. Kenya, again, presents a classic example of many of these features of white settler colonialism, and how they can produce, in combination, revolutionary action.

Only a brief mention of the socio-economic features of colonial Kenya can be made here. Kenya was the most developed colony in East Africa: it was the most industrialized, it had the most developed infrastructure and the most integrated economy. It also had the largest number of settlers in East Africa with a ratio of Europeans to African of 1:130 according to Good (1976:610), (there were few settlers in Tanganyika and Uganda). Kenya had the most advanced elimination of the peasantry and consequently the most advanced class formation. It also had, by far, the most violent decolonization struggle in East Africa.

As Woddis (1972:30) has pointed out: "Armed action was a feature of the anti-colonial struggle only in a minority of African colonies". Kenya, like all the other areas used for extensive white settlement in Africa, suffered armed conflict to achieve independence. The conditions that determined Kenya's war of independence were, of course, years in the making. All the primary resistance movements had, as elsewhere, failed to repel colonization. And by the 1920s, wage labour was well

established throughout Kenya. Wages were very low and living conditions appalling (Wolff, 1974; Woddis, 1960 and 1971). As Woddis puts it: "In colonial Africa, the minimum wage, ... tended to be still lower than what a minimum wage, scientifically speaking, is supposed to represent" (Woddis, 1971:104). Not surprisingly, the emiseration of African workers was extreme:

Dr. H.C. Trowell has drawn attention to the limited amount of food consumed by African workers in Kenya in the 1940s, many leaving home without food in the morning, doing without food midday, and only eating once in the day, late at night. (Woddis, 1971:107)

Furthermore, living conditions for the "peasants" -- really almost landless rural workers -- were no better. In Kenya, by the 1950s, 73 per cent of the income of the peasants came from the earnings of migrant workers (Woddis, 1971:112). And, according to Good (1976:603):

By 1952, ... some 9,000 settlers had exclusive rights to 16,700 square miles of land, while several million Africans tried to exist on congested reserves, as contract laborers on white farms, and as unskilled workers in the towns.

It is in these deplorable conditions of poverty and inequality that lie the "roots of revolt" under settler colonialism.

Class conflict in Kenya was wide-scale and state repression was brutal from the beginning. In the early 1920s, workers rose up to protest working and living conditions in a general strike, "one of the earliest recorded in African history" (Woddis, 1971:128). Hundreds of protesters were killed, and wounded. And literally dozens of violent strikes occurred through the 1930s, '40s, and '50s, culminating in the state's declaration of a state of emergency in 1952, in the face of

a "dangerous" revolutionary situation. As Good explains:

Kenyan workers were increasingly forced to try and realize their potentiality for revolutionary action. The Mombasa strike of 1947 was followed by the banning of the African Workers' Federation and the loss of its leaders. the 1950 general strike ended only after nine days, a massive show of military force, and the arrest of hundreds of workers; again, the then main militant organisation was banned. (Good, 1976:613)

Due to the ensuing ant-colonial war, popularly referred to as the "Mau Mau Rebellion", at least 10,000 Africans were killed and 100,000 were jailed in concentration camps (Woddis 1961; Good, 1976). In Kenya's decolonization crisis, the state declared "class war" in response to a truly revolutionary situation. Good points out: "This potentially revolutionary movement, and the colonial mode of production which caused it, had no parallels elsewhere in East Africa" (p. 608).

The Objective Contradictions of White-Settler
Colonialism and Imperialism and the
Radicalization of the Colonized

Of course, strikes were commonplace throughout colonial Africa, including in non-settler colonies under indirect colonialism. And workers everywhere in Africa suffered very bad working conditions, starvation wages, poor housing, and naked repression. These were the conditions in existence as Africans achieved independence. But in the colonies under indirect colonialism, a small Westernized elite had been formed by imperialism. Political independence was granted fairly peacefully to these conservative nationalist reformers. In this way revolution was diverted and imperial interests were also thereby preserved.

In contrast to this, were the extremely violent de-colonization struggles in colonies under direct imperial control (including colonies of white settlement). This can only be understood in light of two main interrelated unique conditions: the anti-imperialism of the settlers and the radicalization of the colonized. The belated independence of Portugal's African colonies can be understood in part as due to the effects of direct colonialism. But there were other factors involved there as well. In any case, throughout the history of colonialism, settlers and imperialism have been objectively in opposition. In the American war of independence, for example, the American settlers broke with British imperial control to form an independent nation state. The Africaners tried to do the same in the Anglo-Boer war. White Rhodesians illegally unilaterally declared independence from Britain in 1965. Settlers in Algeria, Kenya, Congo-Katanga, Rhodesia, Angola, New Hebrides, and New Caledonia, had on occasion threatened to declare independence to the alarm of their respective imperial "parent-states".

Why is this so? And why did independence permit the U.S., South Africa, and Rhodesia (temporarily), to become advanced capitalist ("center") formations (according to Samir Amin -- see Good, 1976:609), while the remainder of independent Africa, for instance, continues to suffer varying degrees of underdevelopment? Frederick Engels noted: "To get rid of national oppression is the basic condition of all free and healthy development" (quoted in Smith, 1984:99). But why has

independence allowed only some countries to develop? For the majority of the world's countries, independence has meant relegation to the "periphery": continued dependency and underdevelopment.

Thus, a number of questions present themselves out of a study of decolonization crises in white-settler colonies: Why has independence allowed only some countries to develop, but not others (U.S., and South Africa, for instance, versus Zimbabwe and Kenya)? Why do the settlers oppose imperialism to the point of threatening to make a "radical break" with it by declaring independence? And why does the imperial state oppose both settler-led independence and the revolutionary anti-imperialism of the colonized?

The raison d'être of imperialism -- and its consequences -- begins to reveal itself in a closer examination of these problems. Arghiri Emmanuel (1972) has offered a forceful and convincing argument about the imperatives of decolonization and the contradictory and contentious relationship of settlers to both imperialism and the colonized. On the settlers' relationship with imperialism, Emmanuel writes:

They [the settlers] benefited from colonialism and therefore promoted it, without reserve or contradiction -- and for this reason they were basically anti-imperialistic.... From the beginning they were in conflict with their respective parent countries and therefore with imperialism itself -- objectively so at all times, subjectively so at times of crisis, going so far as to take up arms against it.... (p. 39)

In addition to the economic contradictions between imperialism and colonialism in which imperialism imposes an international division of labour and seeks to keep the colon-

ies as reserves of raw materials whereas settlers seek to promote economic development "on the spot", are conflicts between settlers and imperialism over the "native problem". According to Good (1976) serious conflicts between imperialism and settlers arise from demands by the colonized for reforms. But since the privileges of the settlers are based on the oppression of the colonized, settlers will brook no reforms. Thus the colonized are radicalized and imperialism is thus endangered. Good explains:

Settler societies display a strong and early drive towards political autonomy from the imperial metropole, and seek unimpeded action against the colonised.... Settlers seem to believe, with considerable justification, that the greater their degree of independence from the metropole, the more easily will their control over land and labour be maintained.... The long-term and more general aim is to ensure that the metropole makes no liberalizing concessions to the black majorities, and the basic method is constant reactive clamour and blocking manoeuvres. (pp. 610 - 611)

Imperialism does not, of course, try to enact reforms out of genuine concern for the well-being and advancement of the colonized. The object of reforms is to eradicate support for revolutionary change. This is one of the main reasons for granting independence. It is important to grasp the real political significance and purpose of reforms.

When imperialism is endangered by the inability of the settlers to tolerate amelioration of the colonized's condition, the overthrow of settler colonialism is at hand. The defeat of settler colonialism often necessitates a war because, in the words of Emmanuel (1972): "The settler community ... could only be saved by succession from the metro-

polis and by setting up an independent white state" (p. 39): a prospect not acceptable to the metropolis. Meanwhile, the situation is complicated by the simultaneous guerrilla anti-colonial war. When imperialism succeeds in defeating both factions seeking independence, neo-colonial reform concludes the decolonization struggle. The aim of defeating the revolutionary anti-colonial movement is to preclude the withdrawal of the country from exploitative economic relations with the advanced capitalist center by transition to a socialist mode of production. The necessity of defeating the settlers is to prevent the creation of an independent capitalist Herrenvolk republic (like South Africa) which also means the end of imperial exploitation of the country.

Neo-colonial Independence and Underdevelopment

Both Marx and Lenin thought that colonialism and the "export of capital" would transform the recipient nation into a developed capitalist country (Allahar, 1989:104). For this reason, they regarded capitalist expansion into the pre-capitalist countries as progressive -- without ever denying the misery and degradation it meant for the exploited in the oppressed nations. The expansion of capitalism into the "backward" areas of the world was a necessary evil if they were to develop and eventually undergo social revolutions.

Most observers agree that the recipient nations have so far failed to become the "mirror image" of the developed capitalist countries. While independence brought renewed

hope for Third World nations to improve their standards of living, these hopes were sorely disappointed.

As a result of this fact, numerous theories appeared that have tried to locate the causes of continued poverty in the post-independence period. Modernization theory, world system theory and dependency theory are all theories of development (or underdevelopment) and all try to explain why the Third World fails to become like the advanced capitalist countries.

Dependency theory sees a "structural link" between development and underdevelopment: the economic mechanisms that have permitted the development of the "center" have had the opposite effect in the "periphery". The center imposes an economic system that permits the exploitation of the periphery and because of this the periphery remains "backward" and "dependent".* According to Ankie Hoogvelt (1982): "In its original form the Frankian dependency paradigm had categorically denied the possibility of any capitalist development anywhere or at any time in the periphery of the world capitalist system" (p. 171).

Whatever the validity of Frank's argument, Irving Zeitlin (1972) has tried to explain why history has proven Marx's and Lenin's prediction wrong. According to Allahar

* For an in-depth discussion of dependency analysis see: "Dependency: A Formal Theory of Underdevelopment or a Methodology for the Analysis of Concrete Situations of Underdevelopment"? World Development, Vol. 6, pp. 881 - 924.

(1989):

Zeitlin argues that if left to itself (as both Marx and Lenin assumed would happen) the spread of capitalism to the periphery would indeed have resulted in some measure of balanced industrial growth. However, capitalist development was not "left to itself." At the level of politics, the imperialist interests realized that the free and autonomous development of the colonies could ultimately lead to political independence and economic nationalism, and pose serious threats to their own continued high profits. (pp. 104 - 105)

Likewise, as Baran (1957:28) has argued:

What is decisive is that economic development in underdeveloped countries is profoundly inimical to the dominant interests in the advanced capitalist countries.

The history of economic development and decolonization of white settler colonies and subsequent post-independence development seems to provide strong support for Zeitlin's and Baran's arguments. As described above, Good also (1976) notes that the imperial powers soon came to realize that relatively independent internal capitalist development was possible in the white settler colonies and that this opposed imperialist interests. The political root-causes of underdevelopment come to the fore.

Decolonization involved fairly long-drawn, complicated (and violent) political wrangling in order to defeat secessionist settlers. Neutralizing the radicalized native nationalist movement was relatively the easier task for imperialism (though no less crucial). The counter-revolution was won on two fronts: superficial economic and political restructuring (i.e. reforms), and the violent elimination of the state's class enemy. The removal of the enemies of imperialism thereby precluded further industrialization of the colony.

That was the whole point. Thus the real objective of defeating the settlers and the revolutionaries becomes clear: the maintenance of the imperial-imposed international division of labour and the security of continued control of raw materials.

Part V
The Determinants of Outcomes of
Revolutionary Anti-Colonialism

We have reviewed some of the factors that can contribute to revolutionary understanding and action in the colonial context. But it remains to be explained why, more often than not, the revolutionary movement is defeated. The main causal factor is the unequal relative abilities of the state and the revolutionaries to mobilize resources for the class struggle-become-class war. For those opposing the state, these resources include obtaining the support of the majority of the population for revolutionary change (or at least a majority of the "functionally indispensable" population -- more on this below); a revolutionary party or leadership; armaments and logistical support to counter state-initiated violence in the face of the hegemonic crisis; and conditions favourable for waging guerrilla warfare.

Where the state can garner and apply the greater force -- which it usually can -- it defeats the revolutionary insurgents. This happens in the vast majority of cases because the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of the means of violence. Also, the ruling class's control of ideology and mass media permits it to impose its definition of the insur-

gents as "terrorists", a "threat to democracy", etc., thus the state has a better chance of winning on the ideological front. In the advanced capitalist countries the media is important in discrediting revolutionary movements in the Third World. This helps to preclude the creation of international solidarity for revolutionary struggles. In any revolutionary challenge, the role of the state is decisive.

Trotsky identified "four conditions for the victory of the proletarian revolution":

The bourgeois impasse and the resulting confusion of the ruling class; the sharp dissatisfaction and the striving towards decisive changes in the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie without whose support the big bourgeoisie cannot maintain itself; the consciousness of the intolerable situation and readiness for revolutionary actions in the ranks of the proletariat; a clear program and a firm leadership of the proletarian vanguard.*

Trotsky goes on to explain that these conditions seldom reach the necessary level of "maturity" simultaneous. That is why most revolutionary situations fail to conclude with the oppressed class taking state power. Trotsky adds that war very frequently generates revolutionary situations because it: "rocks superannuated régimes to their foundation, weakens the ruling class, and hastens the growth of revolutionary indignation among the oppressed classes". Thus, the misery that war visits on most sectors of society can bring on a hegemonic crisis and detract from the state's ability to put down a revolutionary challenge.

* Leon Trotsky, "The Second World War", in The Age of Permanent Revolution: A Trotsky Anthology, Isaac Deutscher, ed., New York: Dell, 1964, p. 261.

Revolutionary leadership has long been recognized as as crucial (Gramsci, 1971:97; Allahar, 1989:134). Trotsky saw it as essential in winning a revolution although not as any more important than the actions of the masses. He explained it this way:

[Without the revolutionary party, revolutionary organization] the energy of the masses would dissipate like steam not enclosed in a piston-box. But nevertheless, what moves things is not the piston or the box, but the steam.*

Thus, numerous factors figure prominently and interact in determining the state's ability to succeed in the counter-revolution. The lack of a dedicated, creative, capable leadership of the insurgents with a profound knowledge of modern scientific thought on revolution, only gives the state more leverage in co-opting the revolutionary movement. A state not weakened by an external war can crush, fairly easily, revolutionary insurgents. Where the proletariat cannot win the support of the petty bourgeoisie in a revolutionary "bloc" (Gramsci) of classes the state has a sufficient social base to continue its rule. This situation constitutes no real hegemonic crisis for the ruling class and conflict can be contained and channeled to reforms. This is usually the case in a colonial situation, where the colonial petty bourgeoisie (native or settler) "naturally" sides with the imperialists -- not with the propertyless supporters of revolutionary change. Furthermore, the colonial bourgeoisie proves incapable of carry

* Trotsky quoted by Raj Desai and Harry Eckstein, "Insurgency, The Transformation of Peasant Rebellion", World Politics, Vol. XLII, No 4 July, 1990, p. 463.

through even a bourgeois revolution against imperialism. The result: capitalist development remains "backward". (See also Trotsky on this point in "Open Letter to the Workers of India").*

Another factor going against the success of the revolutionary movement is divisions (ethnic and ideological factionalism, for example) within the society in general and the movement in particular. Factionalism can seriously reduce the movement's ability to constitute a real threat to the status quo. On the other hand, according to Bard O'Neill (1980:13):

Although unity is usually important for insurgent movements, its absence has not always resulted in failure. Despite ideological divisions and internecine violence within the Algerian revolutionary ranks and between Tito and Mihailovitch factions in Yugoslavia, both insurgent groups achieved their political goals. But in each case other major developments offset the lack of cohesion.

Looking at the potentially revolutionary situation from the point-of-view of the insurgents, their ability to mobilize certain resources determines whether they constitute a real danger to the state. Obtaining outside political and material support can mean the difference between winning and losing. Also, getting and keeping popular support, as mentioned above, is crucial, but far from unproblematic. As Bard O'Neill (1980:6) argues:

The significance attributed to civilian support can be understood by viewing it as a means to offset advantages the government possesses by virtue of its control of the administrative apparatus of the state, and most specifically, the army and police.

* The Age of Permanent Revolution: A Trotsky Anthology, pp. 246 - 252.

Another oft-mentioned factor impacting on revolutionary situations in the modern era is the suitability of the country for waging guerrilla war. Bard O'Neill (1980) points to such factors as: "terrain, climate, road and communications network, ethnicity, religion and culture, size of the country, and the quantity and distribution of the people" (p. 16), as important determining factors favoring either the insurgents or the state.

The role of reforms in diffusing a potentially revolutionary situations has been mentioned above. This is such a crucial point it merits in-depth examination. The role of reforms in countering a revolutionary challenge was recognized by Lenin. Lenin called Stolypin's reforms in the aftermath of the 1905 crisis in Russia a "counter-revolution" (See Lenin's "The Student Movement and the Present Political Situation"). Recognizing a potentially revolutionary situation in Russia, Stolypin (the Tsar's prime minister) saw the need to initiate a rapid process of social, economic and political reforms in order to avoid revolution. In commenting on the political significance of the reforms for aborting revolution, Lenin commented: "our reactionaries are distinguished by the extreme clarity of their class consciousness. They know very well what they want, where they are going, and on what forces they can count" (quoted in Palma, 1978, 894).

One could cite numerous instances illustrating the role of reforms in ending colonial revolutionary crisis. Guinea-Bissau is a case in point. Reforms (the "Better Guinea" policy), including the granting of independence, put an

end to the revolutionary wing of the national liberation movement in that country (the PAIGC). It is much easier for the state to effectively apply a counterinsurgency program, (including reforms) where there are no or few white settlers, as noted above. This was the case in Guinea-Bissau. As Chaliand (1977:81) explains:

It was much easier than it would have been in Angola or Mozambique for them [the Portuguese] to institute reforms, because there was no white settler class around to feel its privileges threatened.

An important step the state takes in the colonial context is cooperating with (conservative) native nationalism. Encouraging reformist-nationalism and conservative nationalist leaders weakens support for revolution and diverts attention from radical change. But reforms must also be of a material nature in order to be effective. As Bard O'Neill (1980) has argued:

The material demands of the people [can be] distinguished from the political power aims of the insurgent leadership. While the government cannot accommodate the latter, it may well be able to deal with the former, and by so doing, deprive the insurgent movement of its main source of strength and resources -- the people... (pp. 20 -21)

But reforms are problematic in the colonial context in that they cannot eliminate cultural nationalism. According to Hugh Seton-Watson (1978:89 and 101), the "Law of Colonial Ingratitude" ensures that no matter how "generous" the imperial state is in bestowing reforms on the colonized, colonialism will always be viewed as an illegitimate and intolerable situation -- especially by the native elites. According to Seton-Watson:

It was precisely the good things the colonial rulers did

that raised up opposition to them among their subjects. As long as they ruled them with a rod of iron, there was no nationalism to be seen. When they gave them civil liberties, schools, universities, and factories ... new elites came into existence whose members became more and more discontented with what they had because it was less than their rulers enjoyed, and explained all the continued poverty and backwardness of their less fortunate compatriots, as well as their own "relative deprivation", by the fact that they were ruled by members of another nation. (p. 89)

Thus, granting independence remains unavoidable -- sooner or later it will have to be done. Bard O'Neill (1980) also recognizes the limitations and problematic nature of reforms in the colonial context:

Clearly, it will be more difficult to design an effective counterinsurgency program in colonial situations where not only the insurgent leadership but also the people are motivated by the nationalist aim of independence. Faced with such circumstances some regimes have sought to contain the situation by improving the well-being of the population in the hope that the latter would support the existing political order in return for short-term benefits. (p. 21).

Part VI

Summary and The Perspective of this Paper

Class and Race in Analyzing Decolonization Crises

When analyzing national liberation struggles there is a tendency to discuss the situation using non-class terms such as the "colonized", the "colonizer", "settlers", the "oppressed nation", the "oppressing nation", etc. Similarly, it is often noted that in the colonies and ex-colonies the cities are "developed" and the countryside is "underdeveloped", and this is taken as evidence that the city somehow "exploits" the countryside. It is a serious analytical error to think only in terms of non-class entities and furthermore to endow inanimate

objects and places (cities, countryside, countries) with agency. A national liberation struggle is in a very real sense a class struggle, although this is often obscured by the conflagration of the anti-colonial crisis itself -- seemingly, a "war of all against all".

If a certain sector of a colonized people rises up in defiance of the imperial state and a war between the two follows, this may not be only a national liberation struggle, it may also be a class war. This is the case where the property-less classes in the colonies (the urban and rural proletariat, the lumpen proletariat), having achieved class consciousness and having organized politically, are putting forth demands for reforms that in fact amount to a revolutionary challenge. The actions of the state in response to these demands -- if properly understood by the analyst -- reveals that the state very clearly sees the situation in class terms and acts accordingly.

As mentioned above, Lenin observed that Stolypin not only understood that the events in Russia in 1905 constituted a potentially revolutionary threat to the state, he also initiated extensive political, economic, and social restructuring in response -- in order to avoid a revolution. Lenin noted the "extreme clarity of their [the reactionaries] class consciousness" as revealed in the political content of their reforms. Not only did very rapid economic development (including industrialization) and class formation follow in Russia as a direct consequence of Stolypin's policies, but classes were deliberately created that would have material reasons to be staunch,

conservative supporters of the state. One of these classes was the Kulaks -- rich peasants -- whose numbers rapidly increases with Stolypin's agrarian policy which was designed to break-up the peasant communes -- a policy that the peasants opposed. It was the Kulaks who later proved to be the implacable enemy of the Bolsheviks. As John Bradley (1988) writes:

To cut the ground from under the Socialist Revolutionaries, [Stolypin] aimed to make agriculture prosperous by making peasants private holders of land and thus transform the restless and rebellious peasants into pillars of the 1906 establishment. (p. 18)

As Palma (1978) points out it was the counter-revolutionary effects of Stolypin's policy that led Lenin to muse: "we of the old generation will perhaps not live to see the decisive battles of our own revolution" (Lenin quoted by Palma, p. 895).

We saw above the parallels between Stolypin's counter-revolutionary creation of a Kulak class in Russia and Britain's decolonization policy to do the same thing in Kenya both before and during the "Mau Mau" Rebellion. And just like the earlier Russian Kulaks, the Kenyan landowning class has proven to be -- in the post-independence period -- a conservative property-minded "pillar" of the state and thus profoundly anti-progressive and of course, anti-revolutionary. Woodis makes the same point about the "stabilizing" influence of the "buffer class of African landholders". He writes:

Part of the intention of British imperialism in introducing private ownership of land in Africa was to facilitate the emergence of an African "middle class" on the land, which would act as a conservative force in society, tending to support the status quo.... It is this stratum ... which is able to accumulate sufficient capital to branch out into commerce and transport, and thus establish an African bourgeoisie. (pp. 70 - 73)

This is the class that imperialism counts upon to maintain and support the system, and it is this situation that ensures the continued underdevelopment of Kenya. Whereas Stolypin's policies successfully promoted the rapid development of capitalism in Russia (Palma, 1978:895; Bradley, 1988: 18 - 19), the Kenyan landowning class and global imperialist economic structures mean that the same thing will certainly not happen in Kenya -- despite "independence". Kenya's (and any other former colony's) inability to break out of dependency is not just a result of the "lateness" of its attempt to industrialize: it is a political and an economic phenomenon. The necessity of keeping Kenya as an underdeveloped supplier of raw materials and of cheap labour power was the real purpose of decolonizing that poverty-stricken country.

Though racial oppression is undeniably a part of colonialism and decolonization, thinking only in terms of the racial aspects obscures the essential class nature of anti-colonial struggles and the imperatives of decolonization. This is illustrated, for instance, by the fact that none of the "white states" -- the advanced capitalist countries -- (except South Africa) "recognized" Rhodesia when it illegally unilaterally declared independence in 1965. The advanced capitalist states were not about to do this in the name of "racial solidarity" just because fellow whites wanted to end colonialism and thereby establish an independent, developed nation-state. On the contrary, it was for this very reason that classes in the advanced capitalist states opposed Rhodesia. A white Rhodesian state would and did permit the fuller

development of capitalism in that country, as Samir Amin has argued. But this was against the material interests of the ruling class in the advanced capitalist (imperialist) countries and for this reason they were irreconcilably opposed to Rhodesia. Hence the U.N. sanctions, the trade embargo, etc., that finally defeated the settler state in 1980, and resulted in the establishment of independent Zimbabwe.

Likewise, it would be naive (and wrong) to suggest that the advanced capitalist countries opposed the white Rhodesian state because of moral outrage at the white's treatment of the blacks, although, no doubt, it was often portrayed this way in the popular media. But as Marx taught: "our opinion of someone is not based on what they think [or claim] about themselves". The advanced capitalist countries did not oust the white settlers and place blacks in political power in Zimbabwe out of moral feelings and the desire to a good deed for blacks. The decolonization crisis in Rhodesia consisted of the white bourgeoisie taking state power and a section of blacks -- radicalized by white-settler repression -- threatening revolution. The advanced capitalist countries intervened and succeeded in replacing whites with conservative, nationalist native elites. From a new center social formation under the white settler regime, Zimbabwe is now an underdeveloped Third World country with "flag" independence. Thus, while white Rhodesians certainly oppressed (and merciless exploited) their African population (it was on this basis that the Rhodesians achieved their remarkable capitalist development), to think in terms of the decolonization crisis as some sort of

"race war" obscures the essential class forces underlying the crisis. Thus, while not all anti-imperialist struggles or actors are social revolutionary, (not all nationalism is "red" as Lenin put it), all a movement has to be is "too" nationalistic, i.e., wanting and intending to make a break with exploitative economic relations with the metropolis, to provoke the retaliation of imperialism.

If one correctly understands the real motives behind the state's policies it is evident that the ruling classes in the advanced capitalist countries were very definitely thinking and acting in class terms and out of class interests. This was true in Rhodesia and the same was true of Algeria's decolonization crisis, and Namibia's, Kenya's, New Caledonia's, etc.

Nevertheless, as Lenin pointed out, there is no such thing as a "pure revolution". The racial divisions and their intertwining with class distinctions cannot be ignored in the anti-colonial crisis. Race solidarity has almost always proven stronger than class solidarity. This division in society is one of the reasons for the defeat of revolutionary movements that come out of colonial crises. It cannot be ignored that there are class divisions within the white community in white settler colonies. But the white proletariat in colonies does not side with the native proletariat in supporting revolutionary change. Instead, it invariably sides with the forces of reaction -- the white colonial ruling class -- in opposing revolution. In the colonial context it is the white proletariat and other non-indigenous exploited sectors of the "plural" social formation that typically play the role of the "bribed

tool of reactionary intrigue". Likewise, the native proletariat is frequently fooled into believing that with members of their "own" race in political power, life will get better after independence. Thus, due to racial distinctions, the colonial proletariat -- while being a class "in itself" -- fails to become a class "for itself". It is the class configuration of the post-colonial state -- not its racial make-up -- that has enormous implications for subsequent development.

Levels of Analysis in Understanding Revolutionary Situations

The different levels of analysis employed in theorizing about social phenomena were mentioned above. Some analysts focus mainly on the macrosociological level. Theda Skocpol, for one, is interested in the structural/objective factors that cause revolutions (and that "prevent" them). One of the factors making revolutions rare occurrences, according to Skocpol, is the formidable coercive power of the modern state. This is certainly true, but nevertheless revolutions did occur in Cuba and Nicaragua. A complete theory of revolutions would have to be able to explain the special characteristics in those countries that permitted the revolutionaries to defeat superior military forces. Thus, while structural factors that prevent revolution must be taken into consideration, one may have to proceed to other levels of analysis in order to explain exceptions. (For instance, Why and how did the coercive powers of the state succeed in preventing revolution in El Salvador, for instance, but not in Nicaragua and Cuba?)

To illustrate the middle-level of analysis one could mention Robert Dix' (1984) comparison of the Nicaraguan and Cuban revolutions with several other Latin American revolutions that failed. He cites two factors that favoured the success of the Nicaraguan and Cuban revolutions: (1) the existence of a "broad negative coalition" of classes opposing the dictators in each country and (2) the inability of the latter to reverse this legitimacy crisis. Picking up on Dix' work, Shaw (1989)*, also concentrating on middle-level theories, adds that the existence in both countries of a well-established and long-term history of organized political opposition to dictators favoured the chances of successful revolution. Shaw argues:

The rapid mobilization of many groups from all classes of Nicaraguan society in 1978 and early 1979 was due at least in part to the great number of political and politicized organizations that had developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. These organizations formed the basis for the loose negative coalition that was critical to the success of the revolution. (p. 95)

Other theories of the causes of revolution concentrate on the microsociological/psychological analytical level. According to Shaw:

The leading psychological theory of revolution proposes that relative deprivation is the essential background variable.... A number of theorists believe that relative deprivation is the most basic precondition of any revolution. (p. 84)

John Booth (1982), for instance, argues that the main cause

* Royce Quinton Shaw, "Dependency and Revolution: A Perspective Nicaragua", in Revolution in the World System, Terry Boswell, ed., New York: Greenwood Press, 1989, pp. 81 - 97.

of the Nicaraguan revolution was relative deprivation (see Shaw, p. 89). But it is certainly the case that relative deprivation was experienced elsewhere yet no revolution nor even revolutionary situation followed: revolutionary potential either remained latent or the state's coercive powers again proved decisive. It remains to be explained why relative deprivation allegedly caused the Nicaraguan revolution; while, despite the ubiquitous existence of relative deprivation, revolution is such a very rare occurrence.

Whatever the validity of the above-mentioned theorists' interesting analysis of the causal factors in the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions, the point is that all of these levels of analysis have to be considered in order to formulate a satisfactory general theory of revolution and to explain revolution in each concrete case. The analysis of revolution at any one of these levels alone, cannot allow us to understand why specific revolutionary situations occurred or succeeded. The necessary objective pre-conditions are not sufficient for a revolution actually to happen: no revolution ever simply takes place "automatically"; people have to take action if there is to be any possibility for a revolution to occur. The mid-range and micro levels of analysis allow us to try to explain the factors that motivate people to oppose the state and how and why they did so (successfully or unsuccessfully) in specific instances. An historical material analysis of the origins of the objective social forces that generate revolutionary consciousness and action is essential in understanding the factors that cause revolutionary situations and also

that determine their outcome.

The Development of Capitalism in New Caledonia
And the Decolonization Crisis: The Focus of this Study

As noted above, the development of capitalism in white settler colonies often tends to be characteristically more advanced than in non-settler colonies. This and the resulting class structure have important implications for revolutionary potential. While the reasons that capitalist development is more advanced in white settler societies is an important question, it is not the primary focus of my analysis of the decolonization crisis in New Caledonia. Going backward a step, to the question of the causes of imperialism itself, is also not the main purpose of this study. I will focus on the causes and effects of imperialism but not in order to explain these "for their own sake" but instead to show how they explain the French state's reasons for continuing to hold New Caledonia as a colony well past when most of the former colonies were granted independence. This is important because the factors that are causing France to hold New Caledonia have also contributed to the radicalization of the colonized. Thus the main focus of this study is to determine the factors that favor the development of revolutionary situations in colonial social formations.

Since revolutionary potential is seldom translated into a successful revolution, in order to know why this is so it is necessary to understand the role of anti-revolutionary actors -- including the state -- in countering revolutionary

threats. As an off-shoot of this sort of analysis, much is revealed about the causes and consequences of imperialism, its characteristics in the late twentieth century, the imperatives of decolonization, and the implications of all these for the post-independence development of the Third World and future potential for social revolutions.

Chapter 2
The Development of Capitalism in New Caledonia:
Background to the Present Decolonization Crisis

Introduction

In December 1986, the United Nations officially recognized New Caledonia as a "non-self-governing territory" but only after all constitutional attempts to achieve independence had failed and consequently the Melanese had reached a new level of militancy. The radicalization of the independence movement and several years of complicated "diplomatic pressure" -- from the South Pacific Forum, the South Pacific Commission, the New Zealand Federation of Trade Unions, the Melanesian Spearhead Group, the World Council of Indigenous People, the Nonaligned Movement, and others -- convinced the U.N. General Assembly that it was time to force the French state's hand to begin preparing the colony for its long-overdue independence. Even so, the vote to put New Caledonia back on the list of the Special Committee on Decolonization (full name: The UN Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, also known as the Committee of 24) was not unanimous. The U.N.'s reluctance to re-list New Caledonia and its recently expressed approval of France's policy in New Caledonia reveal what could be considered a pro-imperialist bias.

The French government put a great deal of effort into trying to prevent New Caledonia's re-listing with the Special Committee, using coercive tactics and other "behavior contrary

to diplomatic practice". Of the countries sending delegates to the Committee at that time, twenty-one of them were from poor Third World countries, two of them from former French colonies. France is alleged to have threatened to cut-off aid to those governments that did not vote against the motion to declare New Caledonia a non-self-governing territory. The then-Prime Minister of Australia also revealed that Chirac had written to him asking that he use his influence in the South Pacific Forum to prevent support for re-listment. When all these efforts failed, France blamed Australia for supporting decolonization and subsequently broke diplomatic relations, accusing Australia of "interfering in the internal affairs of France" (see Keesing's Contemporary Archives, pp. 34998 - 35001 and p. 35325).

It is an obvious double standard that the great and democratic state of France, that would go to any lengths to defend its own national sovereignty -- and makes no apology for that -- denies another nation the right to self-determination. France also denies that New Caledonia is being held against its will -- it is argued that the majority of the people in the territory support the continued presence of France -- and the state has never said that it ever intends to grant New Caledonia independence. As a French statesman remarked at the replacement of New Caledonia on the Special Committee's list: "France is in the right and is convinced the UN does not know the dossier of New Caledonia" (Keesing's, p. UN does not know the dossier of New Caledonia" (Keesing's, p. 35001).

While the next legal opportunity to gain independence

is the referendum set for 1998, France's policies in New Caledonia reveal that the former most definitely would prefer to maintain the status quo -- but with some reforms as it is obvious that going back to the old style of colonialism with the complete exclusion of the Melanese from political and economic life is no longer possible. From the late 1960s, when the Melanese were beginning to organize and were adamant that independence was their ultimate and uncompromising goal, to the next referendum in 1998, will be a period of some twenty years. It is difficult for the Melanese of New Caledonia to understand why they are not entitled to independence while their brothers and sisters in Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and the Solomon Islands had their colonial status ended years. The French state's double standard in New Caledonia is so blatant that the Melanese are well justified in accusing the colonial power of double-dealing hypocrisy. The state's bad faith has served to embitter the colonized further.

For its part, France maintains that it supports democracy, development and the advancement of the Melanese in New Caledonia. But its tactics of continuously putting off independence, violent repression of the leaders and supporters of the pro-independence parties, and its attempts to win the consensus of the Melanese with promises of good jobs, educational advancement, better housing and health care, etc., raise the question of the state's real motives in its colonial policies.

Obviously, we cannot base our opinion of the French state on what it claims about itself. We need to ask: What are France's real motivations in holding New Caledonia as a colony

into the twenty-first century? Why is New Caledonia a "deviant case"? And we need to make a rounded assessment of the good things that France has pledged to do for the Melanese: What are the political reasons and significance for the state's reforms? Reforms are not simply given when the state suddenly sees the error of its ways and admits its former moral laxity. Reforms are not merely granted out of the goodness of the reformer's hearts. In the case of New Caledonia a careful examination of the situation reveals that reforms only came in the face of a serious legitimacy crisis that had the potential to threaten long-term imperial interests in an extremely valuable colony.

The Introduction of Capitalism in New Caledonia:
From the Stone-Age to Revolutionary Consciousness

In our brief analysis of the decolonization crisis in Kenya and Rhodesia we saw how white settler colonialism displays a marked tendency to promote more advanced capitalist development internally. New Caledonia is no exception -- it is by far the most developed island in the South Pacific. A look at the usual economic and social indicators of development reveals that it is more developed than the vast majority of countries that received independence decades ago. Overall, it scores higher on the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) than Ghana, Benin, Chad, and even Singapore and Malaysia. But it has many features that make it quite unlike the white-settler colonies in Africa and these help to explain why it is still a colony. These, and the present situation can only be understood from an historical point-of-view.

Starting in the 1960s, the Melanese in New Caledonia ceased being a "passively rotting mass" of people, fatalistically submitting to their almost unbelievable poverty and fringe-dweller status. They are now on the move, becoming organized, they are beginning to understand imperialism and colonialism, and they were ready to fight back. Throughout this time -- up to the present -- there was a feeling among the Melanese that they would rather die on their feet than keep living with the injustice and humiliation of colonialism. The lateness to which they have come to their national liberation struggle serves to make the need for independence to be felt even more strongly and urgently. Everything the Melanese have done in their struggle -- from the throwing of rocks at cars driven by whites, setting-up road blocks, killing settlers' cattle and burning their houses to more dramatic political gestures like kidnapping French statesmen, smashing ballot boxes, going to Libya for guerrilla warfare training, and appealing to international forums for support -- illustrates the depth of their rage and bitterness, and the pain they have suffered and endured from being colonized. The readiness to fight one's oppressor is an encouraging sign: it is a sign of psychological health. As Galper (1978) puts it:

If publicly funded mental health centers were to take seriously the mission of helping people to become mentally healthy, they might well encourage a revolutionary spirit in their clients. After all, it may be a healthy response to a corrupt and oppressive social order to struggle to change that order. (p. 17)

For those who feel this way, the problem in question goes well beyond a mere conflict of wills or the desire to

make a point. The state's reforms may assuage the Melanese' embittered state; this is an open question and remains to be seen. In the meantime, one wonders: How did the Melanese get to this stage of awareness? Obviously, it is a necessary by-product of settler-colonialism and the colonial-capitalist mode of production. A colonialism that -- like everywhere else -- has sent generations of colonized people's lives to wrack and ruin. It seems unlikely that the Melanese can forgive and forget this, as the state apparently expects.

In light of this one can see how really preposterous is the French state's contention that New Caledonia is an integral part of France -- as much a part of France as Paris itself -- that just happens to be 10,000 miles away. France has kept putting the Melanese off. Plainly, the intention is to "stack the deck" in favour of neo-colonialism or, even better as far as France is concerned, to avoid having to give independence at all. The French state is making every effort to try to create the appearance of democratic consent for its presence in New Caledonia. It has also brought more settlers -- who reliably vote pro-France. The state and the white settler elite have engineered the most flagrant election jerry-mandering during the frequent referendums on the question of independence. These elections have been denounced by the pro-independence parties and the Australian government as "not in accordance with UN standards". The anti-independence propaganda of the state took on a new low with the comment that the people of New Caledonia had to "make a choice between Jesus and Marx". The majority of people in New Caledonia of

European, Polynesian and Asian backgrounds have been manipulated by the state and the white settler elite -- which consists of 20 very wealthy families -- to vote against independence. The national and metropolitan bourgeoisie have, in all probability, reached an agreement concerning the independence question and how best to handle the "native problem". Several independence leaders have been assassinated and many supporters of independence are in jail. Thus, reforms and repression have been applied to counter the legitimacy crisis that is now facing French rule in New Caledonia. With all constitutional attempts to gain independence failing, the anti-colonial struggle has predictably become more radical.

Indigenous society and economy in New Caledonia has been profoundly effected by colonization. The imperial penetration of the territory has meant a "quantum leap" in development on every level, but the suffering of the colonized has been enormous. Before annexation in 1853, the people had lived there for centuries in tribal stone-age societies (Terrel, 1986). There was no private property. There was a complex system of usufruct on the land. Colonial contact was a catastrophe for the colonized, as everywhere else. According to Susanna Ounei*, founding leader of the Kanak and Exploited Women's Group in Struggle -- a pro-independence group -- the population decreased from 200,000 in the 1850s to 26,000 by

* Susanna Ounei, "The Kanak people's struggle for independence in New Caledonia", Auckland: Labour Publishing Co-operative Society in conjunction with the New Zealand Association for International Relief, Rehabilitation and Development, 1985.

the 1920s. (Harold Brookfield gives the following figures: 42,000 Melanese in 1887, 27,000 in 1918, see Brookfield 1972, p. 24). With the coming of settlers the Melanese were confined to reservations on land of poor agricultural quality where the majority of Melanese live to this day. While the size of the reserves has increased only slightly throughout the years, the population on the reserves has grown steadily. This demographic change has contributed to the crisis. Many thousands of people starved and suffered from sickness brought on by poverty: malnutrition, leprosy, tuberculosis, maternal and infant deaths, blindness, mental illness. Education of Melanese was mostly neglected, schools were segregated. Social Darwinist ideas led settlers to believe that the Melanese were a dying race. On the role of religion in colonization, Susanna Ounei has commented:

The bible was the beginning of our colonisation. In their bible it said, never steal and never kill because God will be unhappy. While we believed in God, they massacred our people and stole our land. Now we end up with nothing but the bible, and they have our land.

According to Ounei, about 7,000 Melanese worked outside the reserves in 1984. The remainder of the 60,000 Melanese are employed in subsistence and cash crop production (the main crop is coffee) on the reserves. The average annual income for Melanese is \$3,000 -- about one-quarter the income of European New Caledonians. Colonization has meant not only class formation and inequality it also means that the traditional way of life is gone forever. So it is not "tradition" that is preventing the Melanese from enjoying the benefits of development as modernization theory would have it. Instead,

it is the structural location of the Melanese in the economy that has condemned them to poverty.

Modern Anti-Imperialism and State Reaction

Primary resistance movements to colonization all failed and only provoked more brutality from settlers and the imperial state. The contemporary independence movement has little resemblance to these early attempts to repel imperial penetration, although not all archaic reactions to colonization are gone. But the anti-colonial struggle in New Caledonia is essentially a modern anti-imperialist, potentially revolutionary movement. The movement has its origins in the political, economic and social conditions of colonial society. The state reaction to the opponents of imperialism is also much more sophisticated than in the days of initial contact. The massacre, confinement, and terrorism that virtually destroyed the native society and economy is replaced in the contemporary era with a well-planned scientific counter-insurgency program.

Social classes, inequality, and private property were introduced from outside with colonization. Direct colonialism and white settler reaction precluded the creation of an indigenous elite who could administer the colony for the colonial power and take over the running of local affairs at independence. The French state -- as the colonial power -- faces a serious and chronic inability to legitimate itself. Furthermore, relative deprivation has increased in New Cale-

donia with development, especially with the nickel boom of the 1970s. The Melanese -- having historically been marginalized to a very extreme degree -- have not been under the ideological embellishments of a ruling class. There is strong evidence to support the contention that they see the colonial system for what it is: unjust -- they have "named" the problem, that is, they have understood the causes of their poverty, misery and humiliation and they have come to the conclusion that it is possible that by organizing they can change the system and improve their condition. They are no longer unconsciously searching for the solution to a problem only half-understood. This level of understanding is the essence of class awareness. In addition, population growth on the reserves makes living there more and more impossible. With Europeans flaunting the luxuries development has brought, the Melanese -- who lack decent living conditions on the reserves (most Melanese homes do not even have electricity) are naturally resentful of their underprivileged status. Knowledge of a better way of living means they are utterly dissatisfied with the old status quo. A Melanese intelligentsia have given voice and leadership to the aspirations of their people. With no organic link to the system -- with no material stake in it -- this elite has proven to be the unshakable opponent of the imperial state. The colonial capitalist system actually creates its own "monster". Repression and denial of independence way past the time it should have been granted -- all these have favoured the development of a potentially revolutionary situation at this particular time.

But acute revolutionary situations are not a constant feature of any society, even a colonial one. While proletarianization, social inequality, an increasingly complex division of labour, demographic change, etc., are all necessary correlates of capitalist development, they do not necessarily nor "automatically" lead to revolutionary situations -- usually revolutionary potential remains latent. But in the rare historical conjuncture when the development of capitalism does generate revolutionary situations, the state is prepared and willing to take defensive (and offensive) measures. Very acute class conflict that endangers the state will provoke a state declaration of "class war". The structural characteristics of white-settler colonies -- the unique political and economic dimensions of such social formations -- present a special challenge to both the national liberation forces and a state seeking to impose its hegemony, legitimate itself, and preserve its long-term interests. White settler colonialism conditions a unique pattern of development and complicates the political situation before and after independence. Under such social conditions revolutionary potential has a strong likelihood of becoming manifest.

French policy in New Caledonia has had a lot to do with causing the present crisis the state faces there. The state plays a major role in causing or preventing revolutionary situations in society. The New Caledonia crisis could have been prevented. It was not prevented only out of sheer neglect, which was certainly at odds with the state's avowed aim to make New Caledonia a permanent part of France. But there was a lag

between the relatively advanced level of capitalist development achieved in New Caledonia and the creation in civil society of the social institutions that are characteristic, typical (and indispensable) features of any "modernizing" society. The present crisis would have been prevented had the state created the structures that are required to channel and institutionalize conflict in non-egalitarian societies. In this way, class conflict -- a constant feature of class societies -- while not eliminated, is rendered harmless to the state or at least incapable of overthrowing it. As Barbara Salert puts it: "It is entirely possible that an enlightened bourgeoisie can grant premature concessions to other groups that actually hinder the development of revolutionary potential" (1976:123). Yet only now France is embarking on a "crash program" of reforms in an attempt to put a new face on colonialism. These efforts to secure hegemony for French control of New Caledonia have an excellent chance of succeeding where they could not have succeeded in the decolonization of Africa, for demographic reasons, for instance.

Whatever our theories about the sources/causes of rebellion and revolution, it is evident by the nature of the state's policies that relative deprivation is viewed as a major factor. While officially the state sees the insurgents as criminals and has applied the law accordingly, there is a recognition that this alone cannot solve the problem. A key policy initiative has been to improve the material condition of the colonized by creating opportunities for upward mobility for them. It is not necessary that opportunities for upward mo-

bility really in fact exist and they need not be available immediately, although some real material improvements will have to be felt, even if only by a minority. Thus the state's major undertaking in opening channels to upward mobility has been in expanding educational opportunities specifically for the colonized.

Schooling performs numerous functional political services for the state. Schooling is not indispensable in capitalist societies because a highly skilled labour force is essential to the economy as is sometimes alleged: on the contrary, the development of capitalism creates a majority of jobs that require only the simplest skills from workers (Braverman, 1974). The political functions of education are what is really important. It sanctions and legitimates social inequality by making it appear that all have equal opportunity for upward mobility. "Losers" can, therefore, be blamed for their situation: the "fault" for failure can be shifted from the system to the individual. Society can be made to appear meritocratic because schooling provides a supposedly "fair" and "equal" opportunity for individuals to compete for and obtain the best jobs and positions in society. Those who do "make it" are presented as the most able and deserving. Thus, the system is just, and those who do not "make it" should submit to the way things are and accept their "place" in the system. It thus appears that upward mobility is open to all.

Of course, on closer examination, it is plain that in class societies, where inequalities are structural, not everyone can be upwardly mobile. Even if every person in a

capitalist society achieved advanced levels of education, the economy is structured such that not everyone will receive good wages or even a "living" wage. Many will receive no wages at all as a certain percentage of people will find themselves redundant: relegated to the reserve army of labour. No amount of education can change these structural features of capitalist social formations. But history shows that even the appearance of a chance for upward mobility -- however small -- is enough to channel peoples' efforts and energies into non-revolutionary and time-consuming activities, such as "getting an education". People who continue to complain about their poverty can be dismissed as "troublemakers" who have no one but themselves to blame for their condition. They can then be managed simply as ordinary deviants by being singled-out for further victimization.

Furthermore, schooling allows the state to instill in children the values of capitalist society and the world-view of the ruling class. Thus, schooling not only destroys revolutionary potential -- even before it can be developed -- in the working class and those "thrown-off" by the on-going development of the capitalist mode of production, it helps to propagate pro-status quo ideologies and thus contributes significantly to the hegemony of the ruling class. Education cannot eliminate classes/groups that constitute a potential threat to the prevailing order but it can help to "regulate and contain" them (Spitzer, 1975, p. 645). In these ways, schooling helps to pull the wool over people's eyes and prevents them from perceiving the real causes of the social problems that effect

their lives. To illustrate the point: relative deprivation is certainly not objectively done away with by education, but it ceases to generate revolutionary understanding in those effected because, through education, people have been taught to blame themselves for their poverty or to view inequalities as "normal". Relative deprivation remains but the subjective response to it is now non-revolutionary (and may well be reactionary or, typically, some form of self-destruction). Thus, a public education system open to all children is an essential social institution to channel conflicts away from revolutionary activities thereby serving a very important social control function (Bowels and Gintis, 1976; Galper, 1978).

Education is, of course, only one of the reforms that can be applied to nip revolutionary potential in the bud. The function of education in class societies is the same everywhere, but more on the specifics of educational reforms in New Caledonia will be discussed below. Since education reproduces the contradictions of capitalist societies, the effects of its expansion in New Caledonia remain to be seen and analyzed. For instance, can education overcome the "Law of Colonial Ingratitude"?

Melanese' Role in the Colonial Economy

Besides the role of reforms in impeding revolutionary change there are the problems in New Caledonia of the economic role played by the Melanese in the colonial economy and their growing minority status in terms of actual numbers. On these

two points, New Caledonia's situation is unlike any that had ever existed in white-settler colonies in Africa. Throughout colonial Africa, it was African labour that was the basis -- the source -- of capital accumulation and hence profits. Capitalists considering investing in Africa were (and are) attracted by -- among other things -- some of the cheapest labour in the world.

But in New Caledonia this has never been the case with native labour. Europeans and "imported" labour from other colonies and underdeveloped regions have been used instead. Most Melanese are underemployed -- really unemployed -- on their reserves. Thus, striking has no meaning. Not being employed as productive (surplus-value) creating workers, the strike weapon could have no effect in helping to drive out the settlers or bring down the state. Thus, on the one hand the Melanese, being marginalized, have no stake in the system and have every reason to oppose it and support revolutionary change, but on the other hand they are unable to weaken it by depriving it of functionally necessary labour.

Spitzer (1975) explains the problem of being "functionally dispensable" to the capitalist class:

Although problem populations are defined in terms of the threat and costs that they present to the social relations of production in capitalist societies, these populations are far from isomorphic with a revolutionary class. It is certainly true that some members of the problem population, may under specific circumstances possess revolutionary potential. But this potential can only be realized if the problematic group is located in a position of functional indispensability within the capitalist system. Historically, capitalist societies have been quite successful in transforming those who are problematic and indispensable (the proto-revolutionary class) into groups who are either

problematic and dispensable ... or indispensable but not problematic On the other hand, simply because a group is manageable does not mean that it ceases to be a problem for the capitalist class. Even though dispensable problem populations cannot overturn the capitalist system, they can represent a significant impediment to its maintenance and growth. (p. 642)

The case of New Caledonia shows that a collectivity (such as the Melanese) which is part lumpenproletariat, part middle peasant, part poor peasant, part proletariat (reminiscent of the "fantastic forms" that Lenin described as the result of the effects of the development of capitalism in Russia), can in fact achieve class consciousness and undertake revolutionary activity. But no group/class, even if it is in the majority, can bring down the state as long as it is economically dispensable to the ruling class. This is the profound problem faced by the Melanese and that comes out the historic development of capitalism in New Caledonia. But as Spitzer points out above, this does not mean that they are utterly powerless in the situation either. They can still cause sufficient "trouble" that the state will be forced to grant reforms.

But again, it is evident that throwing the doors of educational institutions open to Melanese will likely have the desired effect (from the state's viewpoint): the "problematic and dispensable" can be rendered unproblematic -- even as they remain dispensable. In this and other ways a group's potential to initiate radical social change can be neutralized.

As for the ability of education to increase social mobility for Melanese, this will likely occur, but only to a very small degree. Education often increases inequality within

a minority group and between ethnic groups. Lopreato and Hazelrigg (1972:408) found that "the better educated a person is, the more likely he (sic) is to either experience mobility from a lower to a higher occupational position or retain a high initial occupation position". On the other hand, many sociologists of education have argued that the structure of social mobility is not altered by education (Jencks, 1972; Boudon, 1973; Collins, 1971 and 1974; Carnoy, 1974; Rocher, 1975; Richardson, 1977a; Lockhart, 1979; Gilbert and McRoberts, 1977). As Martin and Macdonell (1982:268 - 269) point out:

It has been argued that the cultural and economic obstacles to social mobility are such that education not only helps maintain social inequality, but also creates wider discrepancies in the present social stratification within society.... Educational systems are shaped by the prevailing patterns of social inequality and, rather than causing social mobility, educational qualifications help to legitimate inequality.

The affects of social class on educational achievement and social mobility are further complicated by the affects of ethnicity on these. In New Caledonia, like other white-settler colonies, social and occupational stratification has a very strong ethnic basis. Most high-paying, high-prestige jobs are held by Europeans and most low-paying, low-prestige jobs are held by the colonized. According to Lionel Jospin, French Minister for National Education in 1988, only 38 per cent of Melanese go to highschool, and only 14 per cent of these students go on to university (see Keesing's Record of World Events, p. 36702). It seems very unlikely in the highly-prejudiced, discriminatory colonial setting that the educational system can single-handedly eliminate cultural, ethnic, and class dis-

tinctions and their negative effects on academic achievement even inside the classroom let alone in society-at-large. And even if it could, experience shows that dominant classes have many methods of advancing their own interests. Perhaps most important, education alone cannot make up for the material disadvantages that children experience at home from the time of their birth.

Educational reform in New Caledonia will not have a major positive impact on intragenerational or intergenerational social mobility, at least not as long as white settlers remain in the country. But, as in the advanced capitalist countries of the center where educational reform was also the historic by-product of class and ethnic conflict and of the ongoing development of capitalism, it will have served its latent function in New Caledonia if it succeeds in institutionalizing conflict and rendering "problematic" groups/classes "unproblematic". Education, predictably being projected as a panacea for the Melanese by the state, will very likely not lead to their structural assimilation into white-settler-dominated society. Even in the present transitional phase of change in New Caledonia, promises of reforms have already lessened support for more radical social change. Still, such reforms may not necessarily legitimate or make possible the territory's perpetual colonial status.

Demographic Factors

The demographic situation of New Caledonia is also

unique (compared to that in former colonies) and may permit the imperial country the option of not granting independence. In New Caledonia the Melanese are now outnumbered by the combined populations of the Europeans and "others" (mainly Pacific Islanders from other French colonies and former French colonies, but also Indonesians and Vietnamese). But in the colonies of settlement in Africa the colonized always remained the overwhelming majority. For instance, the ratio of colonizers to colonized was 1:130 in Kenya, 1:10 in Algeria, 1:23 in Rhodesia, and is 1:5 in South Africa (Good 1976:610).

These demographics made decolonization imperative when the preconditions for anti-colonial movements coalesced. The current situation of being a numerical minority is why the indigenous people have never been able to get independence by the half-dozen or so referendums held so far. France points out that under the French constitution, all people living in a French colony are permitted to vote on such questions. But under the UN regulations, only genuinely colonized people have the right to vote on the question of colonization (UN Resolution 1514, see Dornoy 1984:43). France anticipated growing demands for independence starting in the 1960s. In preparation for this problem the state took defensive measures by encouraging an influx of settlers (Europeans and people from other parts of the Pacific). Europeans and "others" have always voted against independence as it is conceived of by the Melanese. Plainly, voting will never get independence for the Melanese in New Caledonia, because they are a numerical minority and they are cur-

rently the only group that supports independence at present. The state can point to the results of referendums as "proof" that French rule in New Caledonia is by democratic consent.

On the other hand, the Melanese, who have had little stake in the system and plenty of incentive to want to change it, are not about to go away. They reject the suggestion that they are French citizens with the same rights and obligations as someone born in France to French parents. Their numbers are growing at a faster rate than the European population due to their higher fertility rate -- they will have to be "pacified" in some way and the only really effective way to do that is to integrate them into the political, economic and social life of society. This implies a major structural change of colonial society. And that inevitably implies confronting settler opposition, which is the real problem as far as the long-term interests of imperialism are concerned. Whatever happens, it is evident that the old colonial system in New Caledonia is no longer tenable. If France intends to make good on its vow to retain a presence in New Caledonia "forever", it has to make an all-out effort to legitimate itself and/or prepare the country for neo-colonial independence.

The Problem of Land Ownership And State-initiated Land Reform

The problem of land ownership is a critical immediate issue in New Caledonia. It is a major factor determining the militant outlook of the anti-colonial movement. Land ownership is highly concentrated in the hands of a few European

settlers. European occupation of the land has, of course, long aroused the bitterness and resentment of the indigenous population who naturally view the occupation of their ancestral land as illegal. In light of the present crisis, the state has recognized that land reform is an essential element in stopping the "tidal wave" of revolution. But land reform throughout the Pacific is an extremely complicated issue as pre-contact conceptions of land rights conflict with the capitalist conception of land ownership (Crocombe, 1971).

The situation is especially complex in New Caledonia because a system of reservations was created in 1868 (Saussoi, in Crocombe, 1971:240). This served the needs of the colonial system well -- at the time -- when it was thought that the Melanese were a dying race anyway: it made policing and controlling the colonized easy and it cleared the land for settlement and later for mineral prospecting, mining and forestry. But the reservation system has come back to haunt the state and the local land-owning bourgeoisie; it is no longer the best way to deal with the "native problem". This is due to demographic change and to the fact that the Melanese are adamant that all of their lands must be returned to them as the original inhabitants of the islands. In the opinion of the Melanese, true independence can only be realized when they have regained all of their lands and when only they decide to what use the land will be put. The old way of eking out a bare hand-to-mouth subsistence on the reserves, which have always had very limited potential for agricultural development, is no longer going to be passively accepted by the Melanese

people. The state recognizes clearly this aspect of the crisis and in response to it has initiated a type of land reform that has, nevertheless, not met with the approval of the leadership of the anti-colonial movement.

Since colonization and the institution of the reserve system, occasional enlargements of the reserves (one-tenth of the land area of the main island), have been granted by the state. (Reservation lands have also been taken away, and people have been moved to other lands all over the island at the government's discretion). As Alan Ward (1982) reports:

At the end of the Pacific war there were at least two very distinct and separate communities in New Caledonia: about 31,000 Melanesians living on the reserves, without political rights, following a version of their traditional custom, prone to epidemic disease, to demoralisation and drunkenness, and some 18,000 French who enjoyed in varying degree the fruits of the land and the nickel mining. [p. 8] ... The reserves on the Grande Terre were increased from 127,000 hectares in 1946 to 162,000 in 1969, but much of the land granted was poor and mountainous. In addition, a further 20,000 hectares, approximately, were made over in leases or grants to individual smallholders. None of these measures kept pace with Melanesian population growth or with rapidly mounting Melanesian aspirations to leave the reserves and find salaried employment. (p. 13)

And, according to Marion Dornoy (1984):

By the 1970s, 25,000 (sic) Kanaks were living on 165,000 hectares in reserves while less than 1000 settlers owned 370,000 hectares, and half of this land surface was in the hands of 40 of these owners (many of whom were absentee owners) in the form of vast holdings of 2000 or more hectares. (p. 3)

Judging by the current land reform policies being enacted in New Caledonia, the state favors gradual abolition of the reserves and a transition to individual, private ownership of land according to French laws. This is "Stolyin" land reform par excellence. While some land is going to Melanese,

this is actually a multi-ethnic land reform. Europeans and other ethnic groups are also becoming private landowners. The object of this land reform is to create a class of kulaks who will support the state. This type of land reform is being undertaken for purely political purposes: to coopt those who have opposed the state and to create a class that will allow the state to legitimate itself into the next century. This emerging new configuration of land ownership will contain the present hegemonic crisis and may prevent same in future. It will also permit a neo-colonial solution. Either way, the long-term interests of imperialism are not threatened.

Predictably, both the small landholding settlers and the large land holders have opposed reform. It is the settler's bitter and obstinate opposition to reforms, including especially land reform, that has been the single-biggest obstacle standing in the way of the state's efforts to deradicalize and contain the anti-colonial movement. Thus, the state has directed appeals and proposals specifically to settlers in an attempt to win their approval or at least to get their cooperation with the state's policies. Settler cooperation, the state has recognized, is absolutely essential if a neo-colonial solution is to be possible for New Caledonia. And land reform is a central feature in engineering a neo-colonial set-up, as is plainly understood by the state. One French statesman flatly explained the reality of the situation in an address to a settler group:

change is necessary ... there is no other way which leads to internal peace and security. The past 40 years in the world teach us that from the moment when plans for sovereignty are expressed by an authentic people, they can only finish with independence. [The statesman asked that the

settlers accept his proposals] which [would] allow them to stay on the land they love and which [they] have made fertile. France would guarantee independence, and independence would guarantee continued French presence. (Edgar Pisani quoted by Dornoy 1984, p. 29)

The case of New Caledonia appears to confirm Good's (1976) theses on the political significance of white settlement: it not only radicalizes an independence movement but the resulting crisis subsequently leads to the intervention of the imperial parent-state with preparations to decolonize.

By the late 1970s the land problem had reached open crisis proportions. A Marxist-inspired Melanese political party, known as PALIKA (Party for the Liberation of the Kanaks), and led by Nidoish Naisseline, a Melanese chief who had been a university student in France during the 1968 uprising and who was influenced by Marxist-Leninism and the black power movement, began organizing the systematic occupation of settler-held land. Under the leadership of this party, young Melanese set-up road blocks, broke settler's fences, burned some farm houses, and killed cattle. This led to confrontations between Melanese and police and several Melanese were shot to death. This turn of events convinced the state that land reform could no longer be put off indefinitely. These violent confrontations between Melanese and settlers and between Melanese and the police, and also a Melanese organized protest to the settlers' annual celebration of "colonization day" (known officially as New Caledonia Day) in September 1977 that turned violent, mark the turning-point between the gradual, peaceful, constitutional methods of achieving independence that had been favoured throughout the 1960s and early 1970s and the new grow-

ing radicalized thrust of the anti-colonial movement.

The proposed land reform led to differences of opinion immediately over the form it should take. Alan Ward (1982) reports:

[In the early 1980s] land reform became the subject of increasing debate. The pro-independence parties developed claims consistent with their assertion of Melanesian culture and Melanesian primacy -- that is, for all land to be returned to the clans on the basis of traditional association with it. The approved method in the interim was the enlargement of the reserves, not the allocation of land to individuals ... because this was seen as a further threat to the Melanesian culture. The administration, on the other hand, while willing to enlarge some reserves, argued that traditional Melanesian tenure favored subsistence rather than commercial agriculture and wanted to return the land either to cooperatives of Melanesian farmers or to individual small holders of all races, including Wallis Islanders, not just Melanesians. To many independence leaders this multi-racial approach threatened a renewed colonisation -- a "black colonisation" -- and their continued subordination in their own country. (p. 18)

A "socialist" government in power in France with the election of Mitterrand in 1981, that paid lip-service to the demands of the Melanese, brought a brief wait-and-see attitude to the independence movement, which by that time had formed an "independence front" -- a coalition of political parties, church groups, women's and cultural organizations -- that supported immediate independence to be granted to the Melanese. But the continued lack of movement toward acceptable land reform and to independence led the independence movement to step up its occupation of land and in general brought increased radicalization.

The state response was to bring in more police and to step-up land reform. The intent, according to Ward (1982) was to "transfer land at about three times the pace and scale

of that already legislated for" (p. 30). Decisions concerning land reform were now solely in the hands of the metropolitan state. As Ward points out:

It is one of the ironies of the land reform that at a time when greater devolution of responsibility to New Caledonia is essential in the process of decolonisation that the French state has aggregated power to itself in a crucial area. This is clearly necessary to overcome local resistance to land reform on any scale likely to satisfy Melanesian demands. (p. 34)

The failure of the state's land reform to satisfy the Melanese led the latter to continue their policy of harassment of settlers. According to Ward, this has been successful especially on the east coast, where the population is predominantly Melanese (p. 39). The purpose of this was to get as many settlers to abandon the land as possible. As Eloi Machoro, a leader of the anti-colonial movement explained:

The reconquest of New Caledonia will begin here. When we have cleaned up this area we will move on to Thio, La Foa and Boulapari. Each tribe must draw up a list of those they want to leave. This is going to be a trial of strength. Everyone should know that we are determined to use guns if necessary. (quoted by Ward, p. 39)

This "clean up" has led to a situation of increasing geographical segregation and ideological polarisation between the two groups. It also provoked the wrath of the state: more policing, the arrests of Melanese, and unprovoked attacks by the police. Meanwhile, land reform did not proceed at anything near the expectations of the independence movement.

The 1980s brought the rapid radicalization of the anti-independence forces. First, Vanuatu (New Hebrides) became independent from Britain and France in 1980, convincing the Melanese in New Caledonia that they too must become in-

dependent. Land reform was too slow. And even the minimal program of land reform being administered by the state resulted in dangerous settler reaction. "Dangerous" to the state because of the growing radicalism of the anti-colonial forces. To show disapproval of the state's slowness to produce the demanded "clear timetable" for transition to independence, the Independence Front formed a "parallel government". Leaders of the independence movement appealed to the Organization of African Unity, the Non-aligned Movement, the South Pacific Commission, etc., to support the independence Front's bid to have their country placed back on the list of the UN Special Committee on Decolonization. Violence spread throughout the territory, mostly initiated by the forces of reaction. According to Ward (1982:40):

Regular exercises involving amphibious naval landings, helicopter-borne troops, supporting heavy artillery, and mobile armored cannon, are held in the bush. These kinds of conventional forces have not been able to prevent covert harassment of the outlying settlers, but they could certainly contain an overt rising.

Hegemonic Crisis and State Reaction: The "Third Path" to Independence

By the mid 1980s there were almost 10,000 French military and police stationed in New Caledonia. At the end of 1986, when the Melanese declared a provisional government, the UN finally had to respond to the crisis. It placed New Caledonia on the list of the Special Committee -- to the chagrin of France, which continues to deny that New Caledonia is still a colony, and to the alarm of the anti-independence settler par-

ties. A full-blown hegemonic crisis was now in effect and a well-known harbinger of revolution had occurred: "dual sovereignty".

The state's reaction has since proven the situation "manageable" nonetheless, at least until 1998, when the next (and the state hopes, the last) referendum on independence will be held. If a majority vote for a continued "French presence" is obtained, the state will put the matter to rest -- "permanently". And even if the 1998 referendum legitimates the state's neo-colonial solution with a majority vote for "Independence within the French Community", "A Treaty of Association", "Associated Statehood", "Associated Independence", "Enlarged Autonomy", "Independence in Association with France", or any other euphemism for neo-colonialism the state can offer, history has clearly demonstrated that independence in the periphery does not result in "any marked impoverishment of the great imperial parent states or any reduction in their capacity to exploit the rest of the world" as Arghiri Emmanuel (1972:35) has put it. This is the purpose of the famous "troisiem voie" (third path) that France sought to lead Algeria and Vietnam on during their decolonization crises: neither revolution nor white-settler independence but a non-revolutionary nationalist-reformist post-independence state with a conservative native elite in political power backed by an equally conservative middle class of kulaks who will support the state. This is the ideal political solution as far as the requirements of ruling classes in the advanced capitalist countries are concerned.

Summary and Conclusions

A concrete historical analysis of the special features of the development of capitalism in New Caledonia is necessary in order to gain an understanding of the political, economic and social forces that have contributed to the genesis of revolutionary consciousness and action in the indigenous population. New Caledonia markedly exhibits the relatively advanced capitalist development and class formation that is often typical of territories of white settlement. As mentioned above, it is by far the most developed country of the South Pacific Islands, even though it is one of the last remaining colonies in the region. This fact is counter to the expectations of bourgeois development theory in which results and causes are frequently confused and appearance is taken for reality and only in commonsense terms can it be viewed as paradoxical.

One of the main features of the economy of New Caledonia that makes it unlike any of the former white-settler colonies in Africa (Kenya, Rhodesia, Algeria), is that native labour in New Caledonia has not been, for the most part, functionally integrated into the dominant (capitalist) mode of production. This has resulted in the marginalization of the indigenous population. But submissive acceptance of "fringe-dweller" status and -- for all intents and purposes -- near-landlessness on almost-barren reserves was not destined to go on indefinitely. The world-wide trend to decolonization, the inevitable demographic change (rapid population growth on

the reserves), the nickel boom of the late 1960s and early '70s (caused by the increased demand for nickel on the world market used primarily for the manufacture of armaments during the Vietnam War) that widened the socio-economic gulf between the European and indigenous populations (Ward 1982:14), and the belated appearance of educated native people who were not organically linked to the system and thus able to act as catalysts and leaders of the anti-colonial struggle, all contributed to the decolonization crisis of the 1980s. Thus, "collectivities which are highly organized and have weak links to the power structure will be most rapidly and intensely mobilized to collective action" (Himelfarb and Richardson, 1982:371). While these changes contributed to the rebellion by transforming a formerly non-problematic population into an embittered and enraged group of people, the "functional dispensability" of the Melanese as a collectivity render them incapable of carrying through revolutionary social change alone. Social segmentation along ethnic lines means that the "proto-revolutionary" classes: the proletariat, "poor peasants" and lumpenproletariat remain divided and impotent. As long as the bonds of "race" are stronger than the bonds of class, social revolution is not possible. As Himelfarb and Richardson (1982) argue:

Ethnic conflicts inhibit class consciousness by making cultural (and racial) what is most often, at base, economic.... Ethnic conflicts might be viewed as a kind of primitive political expression of what are ultimately class conflicts.... Ethnicity may be a useful resource in expressing the collective discontent of disadvantaged groups, so too is it a resource available to the powerful to minimize and channel social discontent... Ethnicity is a resource which can be used either to organize dissent or to divide and rule.... (pp. 318 - 319)... Segmentation ... [means] social cleavages in society, cleavages which

inhibit communication and cooperation between groups. Such cleavages often serve to divide the working class and to inhibit the formation of broadly based working class movements ... While ... the recognition of common interests in terms of ethnicity may eventually lead, for some, to class consciousness, ethnic identification may also serve to inhibit the development of class consciousness, and co-operative relationships among the working class. Such internal divisions may often lead to competition and suspicion within the dominated class. (p. 372)

Furthermore, the broad "loose negative coalition", (a collectivity that cuts across class and ethnic distinctions) that Dix (1984) and Shaw (1989), above, identify as an essential precursor to a revolution, is far from existing in New Caledonia. In the very segmented milieu (along class, color, national, "life-style", cultural, language, and gender lines) of the colonial society, it is highly unlikely that such a collectivity will come into being. Defacto segregation and little integration between the two main ethnic groups since the beginning of colonization has resulted in a huge gulf of social distance between black and white people who objectively may well be of the same social class. And while the state certainly faces a chronic inability to legitimate itself, this only applies to the indigenous population. Thus, there seems little chance that a broad negative coalition can form around the issue of the legitimacy of the rule of the French state. For its part, the state is taking every advantage of this complex social segmentation and class forces to play one group off against the others, for its own political purposes.

For instance, while the state has promised that it will do everything it can to protect the sanctity of the property and way-of-life of its settlers in post-independence New

Caledonia, this claim is only slightly true. In reality, the vast majority of the settlers are, in fact, expendable, as far as the long-term interests of the state are concerned. Small settlers are already being "sacrificed". It is not, for the most part, (as far as I have been able to determine) the big landowners who are having their land expropriated. The settler bourgeoisie will continue to maintain its productive property and positively privileged status after independence as a very important class ally to French imperialism in the region.

In sum, it was out of the on-going development of colonial capitalism in New Caledonia that the particular social/structural forces emerged that in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s coalesced to favour the appearance of a potentially revolutionary movement. Nevertheless, the state's by far superior capacity to mobilize social resources (including ethnicity) and to apply more nakedly coercive tactics (new military installations with nuclear capabilities are planned for New Caledonia and elsewhere in the region) in order to counter the challenge will, in all probability, bring a non-revolutionary resolution to the decolonization crises.

The too-long colonial status of New Caledonia and France's apparent attempt to avoid granting independence indefinitely while all of the other Melanese countries have independence, has been a major contributing factor to the present crisis. Feelings of cultural nationalism are very real and very strong and cannot easily be gotten rid of. But they can be coopted by being functionally integrated into the existing system. The state clearly recognizes this and has attempted

to integrate nationalism by creating opportunities for Melanese to enter into formal institutionalized study of indigenous culture and by offering the education of children in their own native languages. Thus, as Obershall (1973:44) has argued, social conflict may originate "from the demands for greater authority, rights and recognition by those who are excluded from the polity and from full citizenship rights" (quoted by Himelfarb and Richardson, 1982:366). But the creative policies of the state can turn cultural nationalism around actually to serve its own interests. The present demographic trends mean that the old method of colonialism of simply ignoring and suppressing native culture can no longer work. Oppression of people's legitimate and understandable needs and demands to keep, value and express their own culture as an important source of identity can only lead to the unintended (and unwanted) radicalization of those people. The French state's pathetic gerrymandering of several referendums on independence during the eighties -- which the insurgent leadership denounced as an "anti-democratic swindle, not in accordance with UN regulations" -- can only avoid the issue in a very temporary way. Again, Himelfarb and Richardson stress this important point:

Allen Grimshaw (1970) points out that as excluded groups gain in number, as they become organized and recognize their strength, they will increasingly participate in the struggle for power. The attempts of the ruling group to block them will only serve to increase their discontent. Political turmoil and collective violence are most likely to result if the ruling groups are perceived to be abusing their power -- rigging elections, the continued use of force -- in their attempts to block the excluded groups' demands. (p. 366)

Educational reforms provide one of the clearest ex-

amples of a state's capability to coopt and to ostensibly provide an avenue for the upward mobility and structural assimilation of disadvantaged and radicalized ethnic groups or other collectivities. In this way, conflict can be institutionalized and directed into activities that help to form non-revolutionary consciousness so that supporting and participating in militant action becomes virtually unthinkable. When education appears to provide a modality for improving one's material situation, in which every group supposedly has the equal opportunity to compete, "people may strive individually rather than collectively to improve their position through [this] legitimate channel for upward mobility" (Himelfarb and Richardson, 1982:364).

While education can provide a path to upward mobility for a few individuals from lower-class backgrounds, it remains, after all a reform within the system and as such it can do nothing to "cure" the larger structural contradictions that are the bases of social conflict and inequality and which are merely the "symptoms" of these contradictions. Significantly, the French state is currently putting a very high priority on instituting its educational reforms for the indigenous people. As experience demonstrates, the resulting new native elite will be simply another group of social climbers, cut-off from their own people, seeking to identify and ingratiate themselves with the dominant (white) group. The political effect: "upward mobility siphons off the most articulate and competent of the lower and working classes, thus leaving them without effective leadership or spokespeople" (Himelfarb and Richardson, 1982: 285).

The political functions of land reform must also be understood. In buying out small settlers -- most of whom are leaving the colony to retire elsewhere -- the state is freeing-up land for Melanese, Wallis Islanders, and Javanese. These people will simply take the place of the departing white settlers as private-property owners who will become the new social/class basis for the legitimacy of the state. In this way, as in Russia during the Stolypin period, a "restless, rebellious" group (the Melanese) as well as other ethnic groups (who already firmly oppose revolutionary change) will be transformed into reliable allies of the status quo. Land reform implies, of course, a redistribution of the surplus and of income. But the mere fact that money will be "changing hands" is not what is of essence in the situation. It is not an end in itself. The essential purpose of the reforms is "protest absorption". With this accomplished, it is likely that further serious political conflict and violence can be avoided for the foreseeable future. Thus, with political complications aside, permitting at least a modicum of social peace and consensus necessary for the continued extraction of nickel and other minerals -- the demand for which is expected to rise -- phenomenal profit-making opportunities are on the horizon. (For projections on the future demand and increasing profitability of various minerals -- "if developing nations accelerate their industrialization pace" -- see "Non-living Resources of the Oceans" in Ocean Yearbook 1, Elisabeth Mann Borgese and Norton Ginsburg, eds., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

I have singled out for somewhat lengthy analysis the examples of educational and land reforms in New Caledonia mainly to show how reforms within the system invariably have the ultimate effect of impeding fundamental structural change. This is, in fact, what such reforms are intended to do; this is why they take the form they do; and this is why the state is the agency and originator of the reforms. Many other reforms -- of an economic, political and social nature -- are being proposed and implemented in New Caledonia in an attempt to accommodate the demands of the colonized and to prepare for the changing social forces that will be brought by continued demographic shifts. The French state's reforms cannot end -- or even reduce -- inequalities in New Caledonia. But, as mentioned above by Weber, how oppressed people actually react in the face of class inequalities has a lot to do with their perceptions of society. Where the conditions exist that allow people to clearly perceive class oppression and exploitation, where people have subsequently "named" their problem, the first prerequisite to their undertaking deliberate activities to obtain change also exists. As I have argued, and as numerous historical examples seem to confirm, white-settler colonial societies have a marked tendency to generate the kinds of social forces that permit at least some sectors of the colonized people to develop class consciousness. With colonial capitalism comes increasing inequalities and social tensions. This eventuates in a decolonization crisis -- frequently with revolutionary potential. A decolonization crisis is a manifest

hegemonic crisis -- a crisis of legitimacy -- for the imperial state. If the demands of the oppressed masses are more than the state and local elite groups are willing or able to tolerate, the real (coercive) character of the state reveals itself. This is overt class warfare. As Antonio Gramsci described the source of the hegemonic crisis: "... huge masses ... have passed suddenly from a state of political passivity to a certain activity, and put forward demands which, taken together, albeit not organically formulated, add up to a revolution" (Gramsci quoted by Taylor, 1983:9). The only real long term solution to the crisis is to construct the appearance of a democratic society. Only in this way can political stability and social peace be achieved.

The type of post-independence state coming out of the decolonization crisis has enormous implications for future economic and political developments and for this reason is of paramount concern to the imperial "parent-state". In the face of the crisis, the state's actions will be designed to prevent a "radical break" -- a termination -- of core-periphery relations. This necessitates -- perhaps above all, but not only -- deradicalizing a native revolutionary insurgent movement with co-opting "protest absorbing" bourgeois reforms, it also requires preventing the declaration and establishment of an independent "white state". The imperative of decolonization for the imperial state is that post-independence development continues to be within the logic of core-periphery economic relations. Thus, reforms are designed to "stack the deck" in

favour of a neo-colonial outcome to the crisis: the "third path". This "new face" of core-periphery relations ends neither inequality nor exploitation -- nor necessarily even social conflict -- but it can and frequently does change people's perceptions of these fundamental realities that continue to characterize society and that underlie the system -- both "internally" and "externally".

New Caledonia's great mineral wealth, the "choke-point" situation with nickel in particular, the likelihood of increasing demand and prices for these minerals on the world market, growing demands for independence in France's "nuclear colony" French Polynesia, the growing economic value and political importance of the Pacific region, and the competitive and contentious nature of advanced "core" state relations in the Pacific, are all very relevant factors effecting the decolonization of New Caledonia. Because of all this, France had to become more aggressive and more sophisticated in the drive to establish its hegemony in the region. Ian Taylor (1983) explains how and why the state pursues this goal:

Hegemony ... is achieved by displacing the reality (or the essence) of capitalist domination with the appearance of liberal democracy. The successful accomplishment of this ideological prioritization of the political realm over the economic obviously requires an adequate performance by the capitalist mode of production, and also the successful construction of the appearance of real democracy. Real concessions of economic and political resources are required on the part of ruling groups in order to ensure the long-term reproduction of capitalist domination as a whole. The only alternative form for capitalist rule ... [is] to resort to the use of naked coercion over the subordinate, labouring classes, and that always carries with it the danger that it could provoke mass resistance and/or rebellion.... [Hegemony necessitates] the expansion of state provision in areas of health, education and

welfare, and for a substantial reduction of earlier levels of class [in New Caledonia -- ethnic] inequality. In a social-democratic hegemony ... labour [thinks] that it [is] ... represented in the State. (pp. 8 - 9)

Achieving imperial-state hegemony in the colonial setting is highly problematic. The state's challenge is the chronic inability to legitimate colonialism and the "Law of Colonial Ingratitude". The result: granting national independence becomes all but unavoidable. But this is the preferable political solution when those at the bottom have become militant. Yet, before nominal political independence can be conceded the state must not only "break the back" of the militant movement but also take steps to prevent its future reappearance. This is the all-important function of the state's educational reforms: to neutralize revolutionary potential by providing the appearance of equal opportunities for upward mobility. Describing the political consequences of social mobility Himelfarb and Richardson argue:

Social mobility ... dilutes social conflict and undermines the forces of social change.... Mobility has, among other consequences, the effect of retarding the development of class consciousness and awareness of class interests. Mobility striving deflects people away from collective action to improve the lot of everyone towards privatized or individual efforts to raise oneself and one's family in the existing class structure. (pp. 284 - 285)

If the state's policies succeed -- and there is every indication that this will be the case -- the achievement of a broad negative coalition -- recognized as essential for the successful revolution -- seems a dim possibility. Instead, the successful institutionalization of conflict will create new groups and social forces entrenched against fundamental social

change and the on-going development of capitalism in New Caledonia will continue in a new, more complex form.

CHAPTER 3
THE STATE AND THE "SOCIAL BASIS OF OBEDIENCE AND REVOLT"

The Metropolitan State's Role in Colonial Development

The state has played and continues to play a central, even leading role, in capitalist development, both within the boundaries of the metropolitan nation-state and overseas in its "spheres of influence". The "peripheralization" of the Third World -- the penetration of formerly self-sufficient "natural" economies and their structural subordination to the advanced economies -- is the basic source of underdevelopment. Due to the forces generated by capitalism's internal contradictions, the advanced capitalist states created the Third World and now must seek aggressively to maintain this unequal, exploitative economic relationship between themselves and the periphery as a whole. But broad movements of opposition were bound to emerge in the periphery because of the terrible misery the system causes for the majority: the exploited, oppressed and marginalized. For these reasons, the political and economic functions of the state are focused on and directed by the necessity of preventing fundamental structural change within the global capitalist system.

The imperialist state, according to the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the theory of capitalist development, arose historically in the several decades before the first world war. Coming out of the crisis of the "long depression" of the 1870s, the early years of the present "monopoly" stage of capitalism were characterized by the very rapid increase

in the rate of the concentration and centralization of capital -- an ongoing phenomenon. The era was distinguished especially by the export of capital and the search all over the world for markets, raw materials and cheap labour. A related phenomenon of the time was the competitive "scramble" for colonies resulting in the colonial subjugation of 1,300 million people in 1945 (Barratt Brown, 1960:42). This early era of monopoly capitalism -- high competitive imperialism with inter-imperial wars and formal colonialism -- was born out of the need of each respective imperial state to defend the interests of its ruling class against its imperial rivals but importantly also to forcibly transform indigenous modes of production and thereby establish capitalist class relations in the colonies. All this could only be accomplished by a militarily aggressive and economically powerful state. As John Rex observes: "Capitalism always moves towards being a world-wide phenomenon and the capitalist system always has to be understood as a world economic system".*

Nowhere is the various functions of the modern capitalist state so obviously illustrated as essentially inherently contradictory than in the colonial context. The political and economic functions of the state must reinforce and complement each other. But contradictions in the economic sphere -- within the mode of production itself -- lead to conflicts and crises within society: social problems of all kinds and class

* "Race", John Rex, A Dictionary of Marxist Thought, Tom Bottomore, ed., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983, p. 405.

conflicts. If these problems are very acute and wide-spread, a legitimacy crisis is a likely prospect for the state. Dealing with the resulting disorder is a political as well as an economic challenge to the state. The state is constantly struggling with a "balancing act" of trying, on the one hand, to facilitate the rapid, orderly, and ever-increasing rate of capital accumulation, and, on the other, of coping with the serious social problems that arise as a result. Colonies must play the role of efficient generators of surplus value which is then "drained" out of the colony and appropriated as profits by capitalists elsewhere. If wages are low, as they usually are in colonial (and neo-colonial) settings, purchasing power remains very limited as does the market for consumer goods. This means both a "realization" crisis for capitalists, in which goods cannot be sold and so profits cannot be made, and possibly a political challenge to the state's continued rule.

The familiar situation in the periphery of "economic growth without development" is bound to lead to demands for reforms by disadvantaged groups, and possibly even a revolutionary situation. Reforms cost money; and local entrenched reactionary classes may not be willing to tolerate this. Or, if the metropolitan state and local elites cannot "afford" welfare-state reforms, due to crisis, they will repress instead. Thus, underdevelopment may and often does, cause revolutionary situations in the periphery.

The recurrent and worsening economic crisis of the capitalist system, on a world scale, has resulted in the appearance of authoritarian military regimes throughout the decolon-

ized world (Clive Thomas, 1984). The state needs legitimacy to perform its economic functions, yet cannot legitimate itself because of on-going economic crises.

Claus Offe (1975) points out that the capitalist state does not directly control the production process. But the state will "fall" if accumulation does not continue without major interruptions. Offe argues: "The state does not only have the authority, but the mandate to create and sustain the conditions of accumulation" (Offe, 1975:126). But crises of accumulation are inevitable and the resulting social conflicts can escalate, in certain circumstances, to full-blown hegemonic crises and revolutionary situations. It is often pointed out that since the advent of the monopoly stage of capitalism, many of the major contradictions of the capitalist mode of production have been transferred to the periphery and with them, the potential for revolution (Stavrianos, 1981: 431). Thus, the imperial state is characteristically interventionist and overtly anti-revolutionary in the periphery. Its chief political function is counter-revolutionary. Thus, there is a relationship, albeit a very complex and indirect one, between underdevelopment (caused in the last instance by imperialism), and revolutionary situations. As Royce Quinton Shaw points out:

Uneven economic development and inequalities caused by the world-historic development of capitalism do not by themselves create "revolutionary situations." However, if one distinguishes between background variables and precipitants as causes of revolution, then clearly ... uneven economic development (and the resulting inequalities) [is] a principal background variable (Shaw "Dependency and Revolution" in Boswell, ed., Revolution in the World System, 1989, p. 84).

Stavrianos (1981) explains "economic growth without development" -- characteristic of peripheral capitalist societies -- and argues that this economic phenomenon generates the economic and social pre-conditions for revolutionary situations:

The dependent and underdeveloped economy ... has the distinctive quality of economic growth without development -- growth in the volume of raw materials exported and of manufactured goods imported, but no integrated national economic development... (p. 328)... Third World countries ... experience economic growth without economic development... This form of industrialization everywhere involve(s) foreign control of the key sectors of the national economy, and the enrichment of foreign investors and the small local elite at the expense of the masses of the native population... (pp. 341 - 342) ... Whereas the earlier revolutions were predominantly nationalistic, those of the future, because of the demonstrated unviability of neocolonialism, will be predominantly social revolutionary.... (p. 456)

However, this has to be qualified; the particulars of each country and of the background variables of each revolutionary situation differ in important ways. A somewhat different economic pattern is observable in (at least some) white-settler colonies. In addition to the usual horizontal linkages between colony and parent-state that fetter comprehensive local economic development in the colony, is an extremely "lopsided" economic pattern between ethnic groups within the colony. In most white-settler colonies, the indigenous population functioned as cheap labour -- so cheap that their wage was less than what a wage, scientifically speaking, is supposed to do (that is, provide for the reproduction of the worker's labour power and for the biological reproduction of the worker's family), as Marx and Woodis (above) pointed out, -- providing the basis of accumulation for not only the metropolitan bourgeoisie

but also the white settler "ethno-class". This "polarized accumulation" (as Stavrianos calls it, see also Ehrensaft in Gutkind and Wallerstein, 1976, p. 58 - 89) can permit accumulation "on the spot" and thus allows a more extensive capitalist development in the white settler colony than in the non-white settler colony. Stavrianos points out, for instance, that the independent white-settler state of South Africa "achieved an independent, comprehensive and self-generating economic development, in direct contrast to the foreign-dominated, lopsided and encapsulated economic growth typical of Third World countries" (p. 571).

The metropolitan state provides the repression that maintains this extremely inegalitarian system -- at least until the inevitable decolonization crisis necessitates a "change of the regime in order to save the state". This becomes unavoidable because under these socio-economic-political conditions the metropolitan state cannot legitimate itself. If it cannot legitimate itself, it cannot carry out its economic functions of facilitating capitalist accumulation. In the extreme and manifestly visibly unjust system of white settler colonialism (and especially in those where indigenous labour is the source of surplus value production), revolutionary crises are a virtual certainty, and as such this social formation poses a serious danger to imperialism. This is what Good (1976:619) means when he says: "The South African state today represents a great latent threat to imperialism in Africa and the Third World".

Stavrianos offers several examples of polarized ac-

cumulation to illustrate the political consequences this economic situation has and the effects of all this on the subsequent actions of the state. The end result was the same in each case: the end of settler colonialism with neo-colonialism. Since the presence of settlers radicalizes the colonized, the former must go, and since the metropolitan state cannot legitimate itself it must (appear to) withdraw from the scene. Stavrianos gives some examples of "polarized accumulation" in Africa:

In Northern Rhodesian mines, European truck drivers received thirty pounds per month as against seven shillings paid to African drivers doing the same work.... In Southern Rhodesia in 1949, Africans employed in municipal areas were paid a minimum wage of 35 to 75 shillings a month, as against white workers (working 8 hours a day to the 10 to 14 hours of the Africans) who received a minimum wage of 20 shillings a day plus free quarters and other benefits.

Of course, wages were low for African workers all over the continent, including in the non-settler colonies. But in the non-settler colonies, capitalist development was less extensive and so, therefore, was class formation. Also, in cases where low-paid African workers were not working alongside highly-paid white workers doing the same jobs, the extreme injustice of the colonial system may not have been as obvious and thus the exploited may not have become as enraged and radicalized as African workers in settler colonies. And, though independence movements did eventually arise, these were mostly conservative nationalist, led by native elites, with much less overt or latent revolutionary potential than in the settler colonies. (For example: Kenya, with white settlers, was much more developed and had much more proletarianization of Africans than neighboring Uganda and Tanganyika, which had few settlers.

The two latter colonies made relatively peaceful transitions to independence -- there were very violent strikes in the years leading up to independence in Uganda and Tanganika -- but Kenya had a war lasting several years in which many thousands of people died -- (most of them Africans.)

The state finds itself in a much more politically complex dilemma and contradictory situation in a settler colony than in non-settler colony (or for that matter than it normally does in a neo-colonial country or within its own boundaries). This is not to say that chronic turmoil disappears for good with the simple granting of independence. It does not because, in the words of Stavrianos (1981:185): "The colonial pattern of dependence upon, and exploitation by, the European metropolis was continued into the post-colonial era". But the frequent economic and legitimation crises, settlers threatening to secede, the appearance of revolutionary movements, regional inter-imperial conflicts over colonies -- all these are serious, immediate potential threats to the imperial state and thus require special "coping strategies" in order to preserve core/periphery relations. It is within the context of this political-economic bind that the actions of the imperial state during the decolonization crisis must be analyzed and understood.

Raw Material Extraction and The Imperial State in New Caledonia

Since the colonization of New Caledonia almost one-hundred and fifty years ago, the French state has played a foremost role in "creating the universe" in which capitalist in-

vestment, production and development can take place. As Brookfield (1972:81) observes: "There is almost no stage from 1860 on during which we can say that the government had no role in the economy anywhere in Melanesia. Its role was of major importance in New Caledonia." Today, this situation still obtains. Currently, one of the French state's major activities is in the field of repression of anti-colonial dissent and in active counter-revolution, not only in New Caledonia but also in French Polynesia and throughout Francophone Africa. According to Stavrianos (1981:470), France is one of the most active counter-revolutionary states in the world today. This is evident in its policies in New Caledonia's decolonization crisis. Here too is illustrated just how contradictory are the state's various functions: in defending the rights of capitalists to accumulate unencumbered by concerns for the conflicting interests and needs of the indigenous population, it has created the unwanted by-product of a disruptive anti-imperialist movement with revolutionary potential. Now the dilemma facing the French state is how to create consensus and stability in a very valuable colony and in a region where all of the countries disapprove of France's policies and activities, particularly its unwillingness to decolonize and its nuclear experiments.

The major reason for French imperialism's interest in New Caledonia is its extraordinary mineral wealth. Geological surveys reveal that the island is a treasure trove of mineral resources: iron, cobalt, chrome, coal, manganese, antimony, copper, lead, gold, and especially nickel which has been declared a "strategic material" by France. New Caledonia has

the largest known nickel reserves in the world. It is not just that the mineral wealth is there that is important; but that there are certain features about it that make it especially attractive to capitalists given the realities of the international political economy of mining. These realities have a great impact on France's reluctance to decolonize and on the state's categorical rejection of both settler-led independence and native-led socialist revolution independence.

What is important to understand about New Caledonia's mineral wealth is that it is of a quality and quantity that makes it particularly profitable to extract. Also, the nickel especially is easy to access, again making it particularly profitable. Nickel mining in New Caledonia is open pit and is considered easy to excavate.* Mines are located near the coastline (and on the east coast -- where mostly Melanese live). Here the nickel mining is very highly mechanized: power shovels and bulldozers remove the ore and it is trucked short distances to conveyer belts which dump it directly into the holds of ships for transport to France, Japan and the U.S. Furthermore, as mentioned above, nickel is found in few places in the world (in economically-worthwhile quantities). Significantly, it is

* For more about mining see, for instance: "Is mining in Canada collapsing? All easily accessible deposits developed", Mail-Star, Tuesday, March 3, 1992, p. B3; Susan Yellin, "Mining risks losing competitive edge", Mail-Star, Thursday, August 31, 1989, p. 9; Theodore Moran, "International Political Economy of Cuban Nickel Development" in Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, eds., 1979; B.W. Mackenzie, Nickel: Canada and the World, 1968; Guy de Rothschild, 1985, pp. 219 - 231; and Elisabeth Mann Borgese and Norton Ginsburg, 1978.

thought to be depleted, or nearly depleted, in First World countries. Or, if it is there, it is not profitable to mine the ore. This is the "chokepoint" phenomena: a commodity that capitalists must have that can not easily be substituted by alternative materials and that is geographically situated predominantly in one region. Under these circumstances imperialism will be especially aggressive: it is imperative that it has secure control of strategic "chokepoint" materials. This is one reason why pro-imperialist regimes are installed and supported throughout the Third World, and why nationalist or social-revolutionary regimes that seek to gain control of their own natural resources in order to finance local social and economic development are opposed and vilified by imperialism.

Nickel mining and smelting are necessarily capital-intensive industries. Certainly, nickel, in usable form, cannot be obtained in an "artisanal" manner, like lead, bronze and gold, for example, can. Enormous sums of capital are required to get into the nickel business and for this reason oligopolistic transnational corporations control the world market for nickel. In fact, according to Moran (1979:258) "Nickel is the most highly concentrated major natural resource industry in the world.... Three companies controlled more than 60 percent of capacity outside the Soviet Union in 1975." In New Caledonia, 75% of the nickel industry is now conducted by transnational corporations while 25% is owned by local (settler) capitalists, the petit mineurs -- several millionaire families. Since nickel was discovered in New Caledonia in the late 1800s, the French mining corporation Société Le Nickel,

owned principally by the Rothschilds, had dominated the industry there until recent corporate changes, in both extraction and local smelting operations.

All of these facts about mining and mineral resources in New Caledonia have had -- and continue to have -- a great impact on the course of economic and political developments in the colony and in the region. These are highly relevant factors in understanding the course of development, the role of the state in development, the political and economic considerations of the state in decolonization, and the factors that have contributed to the radicalization of the anti-colonial struggle. The actions and motivations of all actors involved in the decolonization crisis in New Caledonia -- that is, the French state, the indigenous population, the settlers, the other ethnic groups, Australia and New Zealand -- are related directly and indirectly to the economic and geopolitical realities of the mining industry.

Transnational corporations have enormous political and economic power in their own right. And the state has not failed to facilitate the interests of the mining corporations in New Caledonia. In the present decolonization crises, it is clear whose "side" the state is on: that of the big mining interests. It has not failed to defend mining interests against those who demand reforms. In theory, the French state owns all of the mineral resources in New Caledonia. The state grants licenses -- "soft property" -- to companies wishing to engage in mining there. Thus the state reserves the right to decide who profits and benefits from the New Caledonia's nat-

ural wealth. Not only that, it coerces and disciplines those who disagree with this form of development, namely the indigenous population.

Under the circumstances, it is no wonder that the indigenous people of New Caledonia have become the enemies of the mining capitalists and of the state that represents them. Due to the present system of resource ownership, the mineral wealth of New Caledonia and the mining industry have been a curse for the indigenous population. It can truly be said that it has caused them nothing but suffering since the minerals were discovered. Policy has always been not to hire Melanese for jobs in the industry. The Melanese have had their land taken out from under their feet so that mining could be conducted. The open-pit method of mining has been very destructive of the natural environment: it has destroyed unique plant-life and has polluted rivers on which many Melanese on reserves depend for water and food (fresh-water prawns, for instance). On balance, Melanese have suffered much more than they have benefited from the mineral resources of their own country, due to capitalist property relations. Interestingly, environmental damage caused by the mining corporations has helped the Melanese to get international attention and support in their struggle for independence. "Green" (ecologist) organizations, such as the Green Party in West Germany, have declared their support for the FLNKS (French initials for the Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front).

Raw Materials, Inter-imperial Rivalry
and Decolonization

According to Stavrianos (1981:668) competition among the advanced capitalist states (inter-imperial rivalry) is "one of the three factors determining the time and place for conferring independent statehood". Denying independence to the bitter end can be interpreted as a sign of imperial weakness in certain circumstances. Portugal's inability to grant its African colonies independence, which led to protracted war, is a case in point.

A certain element of inter-imperial rivalry is definitely an important factor in the case of New Caledonia. But this is not because France is a weak imperial force in the world in general or the Pacific region in particular. Nevertheless, state relations between France and Australia have been decidedly tense concerning French activities in the region. Australia has declared its support for the decolonization of New Caledonia and has voted for the colony's re-enlistment on the UN Decolonization Committee's list. (The Australian and New Zealand governments also favour the granting of independence to French Polynesia where thirty years of constitutional attempts to gain self-government have so far failed). France subsequently accused Australia of "interfering in the internal affairs of France" (a reference to the Australian government's disapproval of French policies in New Caledonia). At one point, diplomatic relations between Australia and France broke down completely over the decolonization crisis in New Caledonia when foreign ministers were recalled.

French nuclear testing in the region has been a major cause of bad relations with Australia and New Zealand for many years. Both Australia and New Zealand (as well as small island states) are in complete opposition to French nuclear testing on Mururoa and Fangataufa Atolls in French Polynesia (see "France resumes nuclear testing" Mail-Star, Friday, May 12, 1989). There is strong scientific evidence that shows the underground explosions are causing serious environmental and economic damage (to the fisheries, for instance) and rising rates of cancer deaths throughout the Pacific -- a result also of the explosions in the atmosphere in the 1960s and early '70s (see Danielsson, "Poisoned Pacific: The Legacy of French Nuclear Testing", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1990, pp. 22 - 31).

France has a strong military presence in the Pacific which it is bolstering in the face of anti-colonial opposition in New Caledonia and French Polynesia and increasing antagonism toward France by New Zealand and Australia. (There are no anti-colonial movements in France's other territories in the Pacific: Wallis and Futuna with a population of 10,000 and the Antarctic Territories -- which are uninhabited of course). France and the United States "are the powers most directly involved in the security of Oceania" (Craig and King, 1981:213). France has the second largest armed forces in the region. This is so despite the fact that France is not a signatory on the Pacific Security Treaty of 1952 (also known as ANZUS) in which the United States', Australia's and New Zealand's security interests are seen as one (Bello, et al, 1985:270). France is

clearly taking steps to preserve its long-term interests throughout the Pacific, in spite of regional opposition to its initiative.

What accounts for New Zealand and Australia's apparent growing antagonism toward the French presence in the Pacific? The Australian government has declared its moral outrage at the condition of the indigenous population of New Caledonia and has condemned France for perpetuating the atrocity. Yet, (and France has not failed to point out) New Zealand and Australia are blatantly hypocritical in criticizing France's treatment of "its" indigenous people (see Keesing's Record of Word Events, p. 35777). Australia can hardly be proud of the treatment of its indigenous population: over seventy per cent of aboriginal Australians live in shanty towns (The Big Book of The Pacific, p. 266). It would be naive to assume that Australia's conflict with France is simply due to ethical concerns for native people.

In addition to Australia's and New Zealand's concern over the negative environmental and health impact of nuclear testing (for which the two countries brought charges against France in the International Court of Justice), there may be economic competition between the "imperial satellites" on the one hand and the "imperial metropolis" on the other. Australia may well view that part of the Pacific as its "backyard". Australian hegemony in the region is impaired by France's imperial interests. Regional antagonism among the advanced countries, probably have, at bottom, a very strong connection to competition over raw materials. It is not unreasonable to

suspect that France's efforts to hold on to its colonies are based, at least in part, on its fear of Australian designs on usurping France's considerable control of raw materials in the region. Just as inter-imperial rivalry was a major factor in the taking of colonies in the last century, it continues to play a major role in considerations on decolonization. As such, it often contributes to the appearance of revolutionary class action in oppressed countries.

France is currently facing challenges to its imperial domination in two of its Pacific colonies, in at least a half dozen of its former colonies in Africa, and in its Caribbean colonies. Libya, an actively anti-imperialist state, has provided moral and material assistance to some of these anti-imperialist movements. Twenty Melanese from New Caledonia attended a "summit of liberation movements" in Tripoli in July, 1987 and are thought to have received training in guerrilla warfare techniques (see Kessing's Record of World Events, p. 34999 and p.35777. France and Libya do not have "friendly" relations in any case: the two have been in indirect war concerning a territorial dispute in Chad. The fear of "Libyan terrorism" in the Pacific increased calls from all sides for France to move quickly to resolve the decolonization crisis in New Caledonia. The FLNKS relations with Libya also got the former branded "communist" and "terrorist".

In sum, New Caledonia's unique endowment of mineral resources, especially nickel, a "chokepoint" raw material, has certainly contributed to France's avoidance of granting inde-

pendence. This too-long colonial status -- way past the point when independence should have been given historically -- and the state's persistent stalling and diversionary tactics in response to the initial constitutional efforts to achieve independence -- have caused the progressive radicalization of the independence movement. From the beginning, the state has been very nakedly coercive of the indigenous population; the highly profitable nickel industry had top priority and the market-place had to be "cleared" of any impediments in this endeavor. This is how the Melanese with their traditional culture and subsistence stone-age mode of production were viewed by the state and the settlers alike: as an impediment to "progress". The social closure maintained by the settlers has ensured that the Melanese would find all paths to upward mobility effectively blocked. Thus, the indigenous population was marginalized: left behind and excluded from the benefits of capitalist development in their own country. The recognition by the state, after the second world war, of the Melanese as full French citizens has not resulted in their structural assimilation into the dominant society and economy. Now the state finds itself confronted by an angry, class conscious, and embittered people. As Stavrianos (1981:792) observes:

The new permanently unemployed are manifestly less willing to accept their lot in life than were their parents. The psychological factors behind current global disorders are as important as the economic factors.

The old, out-moded colonial-style class and ethnic relations do nothing to contribute to the legitimacy of the state or to the hegemony of the ruling class. The result has been

constant latent class conflict and ethnic antagonism. The inevitable political consequences came to a head in the 1980s when the situation blew-up into open violent class and "race" confrontation, if not all-out class warfare. In order to fulfill its foremost function -- guarding the permanent interests of capitalism -- the state will have to modify the former system of internal class and ethnic relations, or at least the superficial, outward appearance of these. Reforms can go a long way, as the state is evidently well aware, of changing people's perceptions of the real nature of the state, and of the socio-economic system it represents. This is the only way to achieve the social peace needed by capitalism; otherwise the orderly pursuit of capital accumulation will continue to be severely compromised by regular disruptions. A careful analysis of the decolonization crisis in New Caledonia supports the contention that the state is not an autonomous, neutral, bureaucratic actor. On the contrary, the workings of the state are very much linked to the class structure and are "determined" by the imperatives of the mode of production -- with all its contradictions -- and as such the state acts in the defense of the ruling (property-owning) class. In so doing, the state itself sometimes inadvertently creates the "background variables" that favour the occurrence of revolutionary situations.

The actions of the state during political legitimacy crises illustrate the decisive role the imperial state plays in world development. For this reason, it is important to understand the functions the state must serve and how these func-

tions are constrained by the permanent needs of the economic system itself. For instance, all state "top-down" reforms will be limited within the logic of the requirements of capitalism. But as Marx pointed out, while people make their own history, they do not do so just exactly as they wish. The state's efforts to realize its intentions -- to "get its way" -- are never unproblematic. From the state's point-of-view, challenges from "below" are not the only social force that periodically necessitate modifications in its policies and constrains its behavior. "Outside pressures" are a more or less constant threat in the contemporary era. Inter-imperial rivalry and anti-imperialist states also place limits on the imperial state's ability to act in the way that would be most expedient to the requirements of the economic system. Furthermore, the state that suffers a chronic inability to legitimate itself cannot easily carry out its economic functions. The state that cannot carry out its economic functions cannot legitimate itself. Thus, instituting neo-colonial reforms -- in order to preserve core/periphery relations -- becomes unavoidable if the state is to defend its long-term interests. Imperial self-interest is the ultimate origin of the state's colonial and foreign policies. It is out of all these contradictory social forces that have originated decolonization crises and that have given rise to revolutionary anti-imperialist movements throughout the Third World.

The State and the "Social Basis of Obedience and Revolt"
in New Caledonia (The State's Role as Mediator in
Internal Social Conflicts -- Maintaining the Social Peace)

As discussed above, the state's major function is to create the political conditions that permit capitalists to accumulate. Thus, the state must preserve capitalist class relations -- there must be a class of productive wage laborers. The state must take steps to maintain the social peace -- so that the orderly pursuit of profit is possible. In order to do all this, it helps if the state is viewed as legitimate by those who are subject to its authority. The state must have the consent, or at least the passive cooperation, of the ruled. However, no state can function without having powerful, and preferably disguised, means of social control at its disposal. Thus, the question is not "Does the state rule by coercion or consent"? The state must constantly maintain a delicate balance in its application of coercion. Forcible coercion, when necessary, has to be employed carefully, selectively -- only in "emergency" situations. "Too much" coercion, too naked, too open is counter-productive: it risks radicalizing the exploited and other "problem populations". If all else fails, the state will declare "class war". But, skillfully hidden "soft" coercion is much more functional for the long-term preservation of the state and the class relations of capitalism.

Ideological domination, mystifying people, instilling and encouraging false consciousness: this is the "first line of defense" of any ruling class. This is one of the major latent (unstated) functions of the educational system in advan-

ced capitalist societies. Through schooling, via the hidden curriculum (the very manner by which the knowledge is "delivered", the unquestioned assumptions of the teachers and the texts, the often active discouraging of critical modes of thinking), and the formal curriculum, children's minds are formed such that the system is taken for granted -- social inequalities are seen as "natural". The mass media serve a similar function; they fill people's heads with a bourgeois worldview. As Cohen and Young (1973) point out:

The mass media provide a major source of knowledge in a segregated society of what consensus actually is and what is the nature of the deviation from it. They conjure up for each group, with its limited stock of social knowledge, what "every one else" believes.

Of course, ideological domination is seldom "complete". But, once mystified, people tend to be highly resistant to re-education.

Ideological domination of the colonized masses -- through the mass media and formal schooling -- is conspicuous by its absence in colonial societies. Imperial states have tended to undertake very little "investment" in developing the human capital of their colonies through education. In most cases, well under ten per cent of the colonized ever received much in the way of education during formal colonialism. For one thing, formal education is a very expensive way of socializing the costs of production. Apparently, this was not an expense parent-states were willing to carry. Coercion was probably cheaper -- and more profitable. So instead, the state's domination was (and is) maintained through fairly open

coercion in the colonial context. But this is not a viable mode of rule for the long term: failure to construct the institutional means in civil society for ideological domination and instead resorting to open repression is an ideal formula for creating a "proto-revolutionary" class. If the other pre-conditions are right, a revolutionary situation may well ensue.

The ever-worsening dilemma for the imperial state is how best to pursue its self-interests across national boundaries, i.e., in its spheres of influence in the periphery -- colony or neo-colony -- while still maintaining the social peace. So, in practice, varying degrees and different types of coercion -- "soft" and hidden or brutal and naked -- are employed to obtain the acquiescence of oppressed and exploited groups depending upon what each situation calls for at the time. People can be -- and are -- coerced without clearly perceiving it.

Maintaining the Social Peace

The state's ability to fulfill its various functions has historically proven very problematic in the settler-colonial setting. New Caledonia is no exception. Imperialism's primary economic interest in the colony is as a provider of raw materials, mainly minerals, (this does not mean that its other functions -- as a market for consumer and capital goods, and as a place to invest capital at a high rate of return -- are unimportant. However, New Caledonia does not function as a provider of cheap labour: it has the highest wages of any island in the Pacific.) New Caledonia's long-time status as

a colony has enabled the state to have direct political control of the island's natural resources to the benefit of French mining corporations.

Here the state is acting expressly in the interests of TNCs. In New Caledonia, direct political control by the imperial state has functioned impressively well for TNCs doing business there; albeit at the expense of contributing to the creation of revolutionary anti-colonialism. In any case, the state -- acting in the interests of TNCs -- has been instrumental in helping the latter to keep competitors out of the nickel industry in New Caledonia. This is very beneficial to TNCs: in an oligopolistic market, prices -- and therefore profits -- can be kept "artificially" high (see Moran's discussion of oligopoly strategy in Blasier and Mesa-Lago, 1987:258).

Guy Rothschild, former chairman of Société Le Nickel, relates in his autobiography his corporate strategy in New Caledonia. He reveals the kind of power the corporation held in the colony's economy:

Since 1884, my family had also had a stake in nickel. It had been associated with the founding of the Société Le Nickel for explorations in New Caledonia....

From the beginning of 1972, one could see a new depression coming in the metals market, and it became an urgent matter for us to obtain from the New Caledonian government a major change in the archaic and illogical tax system....

During the prosperous 1960s, we had formed an association with Kaiser Aluminum for the purpose of considerably increasing the production capacity of our nickel foundry in Nouméa. At the time, extracting nickel from the rich mines in New Caledonia was very profitable.... At the first signs of another economic crisis, the Kaiser management became alarmed and decided to pull out...

Our purpose [in our strategy of expansion] was three-fold: to find a replacement for Kaiser; to prevent the arrival in New Caledonia of a competitor; and to obtain from the government ... a new tax statute in New Caledonia.... The government gave its blessing by granting

the tax modification we had been seeking...

At the time these complicated negotiations were going on, nickel was a highly coveted metal and our high-grade deposits were greatly envied...

The world situation of nickel has taken a most unfavorable turn [by 1980].... [We] thus suffered all the ups and downs of the particularly cyclical raw-material industry, aggravated by a recession in the nickel sector, which had been so long considered the crown jewel.*

The point is, that while the state facilitated the SLNs' oligopolistic rents in New Caledonia -- thereby fulfilling its economic function -- it unwittingly helped to bring into existence a serious legitimacy crisis. The SLN certainly benefited by its business in New Caledonia and during the boom the colony experienced rapid economic growth. But none of the benefits of this growth "trickled down" to the indigenous population. Rapid economic growth combined with no improvement in the living standards of the colonized (in fact they only suffered); an increasing sense of relative deprivation by the indigenous population as inequalities increased within the colony -- only "outsiders" were benefiting from the nickel industry while the Melanese themselves got nothing: these were the economic conditions that brought about the rebellion of the Melanese by providing concrete evidence that their poverty was neither "natural" nor "inevitable".

Thus, in the '980s, the state faced in New Caledonia -- for the first time in the modern sense (there had been primary resistance movements to colonization) -- the challenge of wide-spread rebellion by the indigenous population. New Cale-

* Guy de Rothschild, The Whims of Fortune, New York: Random House, 1985, pp. 222 - 231.

donia was no longer "the land of the good neggar": passive, fatalistic acceptance of the status quo and patient waiting for "things to get better" was out; mass mobilization of political resources to force the state to change the system was in. Colonialism had lasted intolerably long in New Caledonia and material conditions were getting worse -- not better -- for the indigenous population. Capable people who had acquired a scientific understanding of society finally appeared to lead a sustained challenge to the authority of the state. It what is probably the last white-settler colony remaining in the world, the French state now has a complex problem: how to preserve its own interests -- the interests of the imperialist state. In order to do this, it has to find a way to win the support of the indigenous population. It has to find a way to deradicalize them. In short, the challenge is how to find a way to regain the social peace; to prevent revolution. The achievement of sustained popular action against imperialism is a major turning point in the development of capitalism in New Caledonia. It is the origin of the state's well-known strategy often applied during hegemonic crises: pacification of the oppressed with limited material benefits.

White-Settler Reaction Against Reformism

There is a positive relationship between the presence of white settlers in a colony and the degree of violence of the decolonization struggle (Stavrianos, 1981; Chaliand, 1977; Smith, 1984; Emmanuel, 1972; Good, 1976; Guiart, 1982).

The main reason for this is that settlers invariably oppose reforms intended to better the material condition of the colonized. They do this, as Good (1976:603) says, "not simply out of sadistic racist fury". They do it because their positively privileged situation in colonial society requires the oppression, exploitation, and often landlessness of the colonized. As Good points out: "Stark inequalities necessarily result in social change under settler colonialism" (p. 607). But in opposing reforms -- even in the face of violent collective action by the colonized -- the white settlers are, in fact, opposing the long-term interests of their "own" state, that is, the imperial parent-state. This is the predicament of the white settler. Good sums up the behavior of white settlers in Africa:

Through its rigidity and wide-ranging intransigence, aided by the non-intervention of the metropole, the settler state itself ensures that the new African classes have no way forward other than by a revolutionary path. The achievement of popular armed struggle, however, causes a significant reassessment of metropolitan interests and, on this basis, brings about the overthrow of the settler state. (p. 613)

New Caledonia is not a Third World country as far as the settlers' experience is concerned. This contrasts sharply with the material situation of the colonized, which will be discussed below. Sixty per cent of settlers now live in the capital, Nouméa. Nouméa is a modern city in every way with a developed infrastructure: state-of-the-art hospitals, good schools and housing, clean streets, safe water, etc. The settler in New Caledonia does not do without the necessities (and some of the luxuries) of life. Nouméa is overwhelmingly a

"white" city: very few Melanese can afford to live there. The settlers who remain in the countryside, known as "bush settlers" own their own land; many own and operate small tourist facilities, others are petty commodity producers of agricultural products for the local market. According to Britannica Book of the Year, 1987:715, the average annual income per household in New Caledonia was 20,600 (US \$) in 1980 -- very high by world standards -- most of it accruing to the settler population. Going by the physical quality of life of the settler community, one hesitates to call New Caledonia a "Third World country", even if it is a colony. In short, most settlers live very well in New Caledonia by world standards. Otherwise, one supposes, they would not be there, since they have the option of "returning" to France whenever they choose. (Of course, many were born in New Caledonia, have never seen France).

Considering all of this it is not surprising that almost all settlers oppose the Melanese version of independence. They have faithfully voted against independence in every referendum so far. Seventy-five per cent of settlers vote right in territorial and French national elections. Fifteen per cent of them vote ultra-right. These people feel that they benefit by colonialism -- and they do. This is why they do not want it to end. (Except for a small ultra-reactionary fringe group, many of whom were one-time Algerian settlers, and who want a "Rhodesian-style" i.e. white-settler-led independence). The settlers of New Caledonia put one in mind of an observation by Strindberg:

To be conservative as a speculation is the worst sin a

man can commit. It is an attempt against world development for the sake of a few shillings, for the conservative tries to hinder progress, he plants his back against the whirling earth and says: stand still! It has only one excuse: stupidity. Poor circumstances are no excuse, but certainly a motive.*

Not only do the settlers staunchly oppose independence -- which as far as they are concerned would be the end of them -- few have been willing to accept reforms. This is the greatest danger to the state -- and to themselves. Their reluctance to "compromise", resulting in the progressive radicalization of the independence forces, has made them their own worst enemy. Knowing from experience the danger of settler reaction, the French state has stepped in to impose reforms whether the settlers like it or not.

Proposals for "sweeping reforms" were broached by the state in 1979, as the anti-colonial movement was growing and consolidating its political resources. The next decade saw the progressive escalation of social conflict in New Caledonia. It went like this: the Melanese grew ever more vociferous in their demands for independence (they were the only Melanese country without independence, one of the last colonies in the world, and their "emiseration had remained steady if not increased" as Good (1986:609) says). The French state responded by increasing the range of the reform package and by delaying -- holding referendums which they knew the Melanese could only lose. Each new proposal for more reforms brought increasing settler reaction -- they would brook no re-

* August Stindberg, The Red Room, London: Dent, 1967, p. 265.

froms. The state's stalling and the settlers' reaction caused the radicalization of the Melanese. Violence in the colony increased to unprecedented proportions. The state response: thousands of military and police re-enforcements were flown into the territory. The following news reports give an indication of the growing level of Melanese militancy, state repression, and settler reaction:

In August and September 1979 anti-French demonstrations in Nouméa by supporters of the Independence Front [FI] parties resulted in 100 extra riot police being brought in from metropolitan France, the unrest developing into serious clashes between police and demonstrators on September 24 (the 126 anniversary of the establishment of French rule). Further tensions arose in January 1980 after a Melanesian youth had been shot dead during the night of January 6-7 by an off-duty police inspector... Speaking in Paris on Oct 29, 1979, the FI leader ... denounced "French colonialism and imperialism in the Pacific" and declared that "by its obstinate refusal to grant the Kanak people sovereignty in their own country" the French government bore full responsibility for the "inevitable" confrontation to come. (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, June 1981, p. 30900)

Rioters broke into the legislative assembly of New Caledonia ... and attacked politicians there July 22 [1982]. Later they clashed outside the building with police in what was described as the worst disturbance the island territory had ever witnessed.

The rioters had broken off from a demonstration of perhaps 4,000 right-wingers, chiefly of European descent, who were protesting against ... reforms.... The reforms backed by the Paris government called for expropriating some of the worthwhile land -- almost all of which was held by whites -- and returning it to the Melanesian native. (Facts on File, August 1982, p. 570)

In renewed violence in New Caledonia early in 1983, two policemen were killed and four injured in a clash near Sarraméa on January 10, when a large contingent of Melanesian tribesmen ambushed a lorry convoy carrying equipment to a timber plant in the La Foa area some 60 miles to the north of Nouméa.... This incident served to heighten inter-communal tensions within New Caledonia, which were further exacerbated when a Melanesian pro-independence activist was killed on May 11 [1983] and a European was subsequently charged with his murder. (Keesing's Record of World Events, pp. 32386 - 32387)

The most serious incident to date occurred on December 5 [1984], when nine Kanaks were killed at a Caldoche [settler] roadblock in Hienghène, on the Kanak-dominated eastern coast of the main island. Another three were seriously wounded, one dying of his injuries on December 7....

Six Kanaks were arrested on December 19 and charged with the arson of a store at Bourail, on the west coast, on December 16. One man died in the blaze and five were injured, including two who died later...

It was later reported that, in the period from November 13 to December 31 [1984], a total of 107 roadblocks had been erected ... 15 bombs had exploded, 96 buildings or cars had been burnt, 41 buildings had been ransacked and 16 people, including 12 Kanaks, had died in political violence. (Kessing's, p. 33725)

A substantial force of police raided three villages in Thio on March 5 and 6 [1985] and detained 30 Kanaks, eight of whom were charged with sabotage, arms offences and the January 11 murder. The raids were followed by stoning attacks on police and by further arson at houses and at the nickel mine; the FLNKS called a "day of protest" on March 8, with a demonstration in Nouméa ...and several roadblocks. A gendarme ... was killed on March 8 by a machete thrown during a clash with Kanaks manning a roadblock at Pouébo.

On April 6 fighting broke out on the northern island of Belep between Melanesian supporters and opponents of the FLNKS. One man ... was killed.

A teacher was killed on April 8 when her car, along with several others was stoned by Kanak youths.... Six others were injured in the stonings.... The FLNKS condemned the killing, which occurred as an anti-independence demonstration was taking place in Nouméa, with 5000 attending. The territory's teacher staged a one-week strike, joined by petroleum workers, and a protest meeting on April 11 attracted 2,000 people.

The next demonstrations in Nouméa took place on April 20, when heavy policing prevented contact between 1,500 FLNKS supporters and 3,000 people ... at a rally organized by the anti-independence [supporters].

Several right-wing activists were arrested [in] June ... and a quantity of arms, ammunition and explosives were seized. Three of those arrested, reportedly connected with a clandestine "crisis committee" formed ... by expieds noirs [Algerian settlers], were charged in connection with three bombings. (Kessing's, p. 33727)

Several violent clashes and bombings had occurred in the months and days leading up to the election.... On September 25 [1985], shortly after loyalist settlers rallied at city hall in Nouméa, three bombs exploded. One of them demolished two floors of a French government building. Police and firefighters described that explosion as the worst in the city's history.... (Facts on File, p. 744)

Several bombs exploded in Nouméa on September 25 [1986], destroying the Land Office (which was largely responsible for procuring land for Kanak development) and the Office of the Development of the Interior and the islands (which encouraged development projects in Kanak-dominated areas. Although no group claimed responsibility for the bomb, the choice of targets indicated that it had been planted by elements opposed to the independence movement.

During the night of October 25-26, 1985, the building containing the newly situated Land Office was destroyed in an incendiary attack. Several small explosions in the capitol preceded the complete destruction of the main courthouse in the early of hours of December 3, in the largest and most adroitly conducted bombing to date.... (Keesing's, p. 34999).

The worsening violence and increasing radicalization of the independence forces seems to have persuaded the UN to finally agree to officially recognize New Caledonia as a colony by re-enlisting it with the Special Committee on Decolonization in December of 1986. But this recognition did not end the violence. Settler-initiated violence continued. As Keesing's (July 1985) reports: "Despite its unilateral proclamation of independence, the FLNKS generally maintained better relations with the representatives of the French state than did the anti-independence movement" (p. 33727). Here are some examples of the worsening violence, some of it state-repression of the independence movement, and much of it perpetrated by settler groups opposing reforms:

[In August 1987] some 7,300 soldiers and riot police were sent to New Caledonia to prevent ... the recurrence of violence of the kind that broke out in the elections of 1984, when about 20 people were killed in violent clashes between French settlers and Kanaks.

There were violent clashes between police and demonstrators in Nouméa ... when about 300 FLNKS supporters defied the ban on demonstrations and staged a peaceful but illegal sit-down protest. The demonstrators were forcibly dispersed by riot police using tear gas and truncheons.... (Keesing's, p. 35776).

A 17-year-old Kanak ... was shot dead by police on November 6, 1987.... The shooting was followed by a confrontation between police and Melanesian youths and two policemen were injured. (Keesing's, p. 35778)

... On February 22, 1988 ... Kanak militants, armed with only clubs, stones and petrol bombs, overpowered [some] gendarmes, injuring 15 of them and taking hostage the remaining 10. The hostages, were, however, freed within a matter of hours.

At least 28 people were killed in New Caledonia in late April and early May 1988, in a series of violent clashes between the French colonial authorities and representatives of the indigenous Melanesian population. The violence ... was the worst since 1984. (Keesing's p. 35976)

Disruption of the Social Peace, the Economic Effects and State Response

A decade of severe disruptions of the social peace put a severe strain on the economy: nickel mining and logging operations were negatively effected by bombings and roadblocks. Tourism dwindled and was reduced to a standstill in early 1985 when France declared a state of emergency -- the first time since 1961 during the Algerian decolonization crisis. (Travel insurance cannot be purchased by travels going to countries under a state of emergency). Capital accumulation in the lucrative tourist industry was seriously disrupted throughout the 1980s.

Settlers have been extraordinarily obtuse in grasping the realities of the political situation in New Caledonia. They themselves have suffered greatly because of it. For one thing, settlers who owned tourist accommodations lost business. All manner of retail shops and restaurants also lost business, not just by the absence of tourists but because of a curfew

imposed during the state of emergency. Yet even though they had a material reason to give at least some half-hearted support for reforms -- to keep the social peace -- most remained steadfastly opposed to reforms.

The French state, on the other hand, has had a much more realistic view of the crisis. It is ironic that while the independence movement wants France out of New Caledonia the crisis has had the opposite effect. France has dismissed locally elected officials (for refusal to follow French policies), and has instead appointed officials in France who were dispatched to oversee the implementation of reforms. In December, 1981, it was announced that France would rule by decree for a period of one year to permit the reforms. French involvement in New Caledonia is, in fact, stronger than it ever was. This was the only way to overcome the resistance of the settlers to reforms in an attempt to deradicalize the anti-colonial movement.

The Material Conditions of Life of the Indigenous Population

For the indigenous population New Caledonia is a Third World country. For the vast majority the physical quality of life is poor. Compared to the settler population, it is deplorable. According to statistics from a few years ago, sixty per cent of Melanesian households had no electricity. That means, of course, no electric lighting, no refrigeration, no washing machine, no television -- conveniences most settlers take for granted. On the reserves, the typical dwelling is a

cane hut. The huts have no indoor plumbing, no indoor hot and cold running water. People have outdoor privies. Water is hauled by bucket from rivers. Perhaps some (more fortunate) people have wells and pumps. Cooking is done outdoors over an open fire. And, as with poor people almost everywhere, transportation is a problem. In all, life is very hard for the 80% of the Melanese population who live on the reservations. With very little purchasing power they do not have the money to buy better housing, modern conveniences, etc. Those few who live in towns generally live in low-quality rented housing. In Nouméa, there is a slum area of rental housing where some Melanese and other poor people live. The Melanese were poor before the Europeans came -- but they did not know they were poor. Now, the knowledge of a better way, and experience of great suffering, of pain and humiliation, and understanding of the social causes of their misery have engendered revolutionary understanding and action in the colonized population.

These bad material conditions have taken their toll on the people's health. A Melanese person in New Caledonia is much more likely to become seriously ill than a European person. There are still (or were until very recently) tuberculosis and leprosy sanatoriums in New Caledonia. Given the extreme inequalities there, most of the patients are (and were) certainly Melanesians. Leprosy is one of the least contagious of all the contagious diseases: one has to be in really poor health to get this disease. Well nourished people with access to proper sanitation and housing do not contract TB or leprosy. These are diseases of extreme poverty: they are associated with over-

crowded living conditions, poor nutrition, and poor hygiene. Also, Melanese have a higher fertility rate and a higher infant/maternal death rate than do the Europeans. Even if Melanese have equal access to medical care as Europeans -- and they probably do not -- their poor material conditions mean that over all, their health is much poorer than the average European's.

As for education, Melanese suffer here too. Of the older generation, many are illiterate in the colonizer's language. Some older people cannot understand spoken French well. Many of these people had virtually no formal schooling. It is a little better for younger people. Most can read, write, speak and understand French. Still, they do not have equality in education. Lionel Jospin, French Minister for National Education, Youth and Sport has reported in 1988 that: "Only 38 per cent of young Melanesians currently entered into secondary education, and of these only 14 per cent went on to university" (Keesing's Record of World Events, p. 36702). The educational reforms are aimed at (among other things) redressing this situation.

According to Susanna Ounei, a founding leader of the Kanak and Exploited Women's Group in Struggle, a component organization of the FLNKS, in 1984 only 7000 Melanese had paid employment (out of a population then of about 60,000, probably about 25,000 of whom were of working age). Thus, the majority of indigenous people were either unemployed or underemployed on the reserves obtaining a subsistence from agriculture or subsisting on welfare payments.

Only colonized people themselves can really understand the psychological damage caused to them by colonialism. Susanna Ounei, (who mentions that as far as she knows, she is the only Melanese from New Caledonia who is speaking English and living in the English-speaking world -- in New Zealand as an English student under the sponsorship of Corso and as the official representative of FLNKS in New Zealand), writes about the devastating psychological harm colonialism is doing to her people.* Poor people everywhere -- including in the advanced capitalist world -- suffer great psychological damage and problems because of their poverty. The problem is not simply just being poor; that condition is exacerbated by the fact of social inequalities. Seeing how other people have more causes deeply-ingrained feelings of inferiority in most poor people. As Stindberg put it: "[This is] earth's most bitter misfortune, the humiliation of poverty".** How much worse it must be still for a colonial people whose very minds have been colonized; who have been told in a thousand ways that they are nothing, they never were anything, and they never will be anything, that their culture is worthless, that they have contributed nothing to human civilization, that -- on the contrary -- they have been a drag on human progress, that they are so naturally inferior that they were meant to die out. All of this shocking misery visited upon the majority of the world's people by

* "The Kanak people's struggle for independence in New Caledonia", 1985.

** The Red Room, London: Dent, 1967, p. 255.

colonialism -- which effects must still be felt despite decolonization -- is the well-spring of the rage, bitterness (remember that scene from "A Raisin in the Sun" where the hero is accused of being bitter and he replies: "Bitter!? I'm a volcano!"), frustration, desire for revenge that can move people to revolutionary action. Steinbeck is right when he says that the causes (of revolution) "lie deep and simply, the causes are a hunger in a single stomach, multiplied a million times" etc. And as Frantz Fanon wrote of the colonized, marginalized masses:

It is within this mass of humanity, this people of the shantytowns, at the core of the lumpenproletariat, that the rebellion will find its urban spearhead. For the lumpenproletariat, that horde of starving men (sic), uprooted from their tribe and from their clan, constitutes one of the most radical revolutionary forces of a colonized people.*

Aside from its political effects, certainly colonialism is one of the greatest tragedies of the human race.

Oscar Lewis (1966) has written how colonialism has created a subculture of poverty in the colonized masses. He argues:

The subculture of poverty is likely to be found where imperial conquest has smashed the native social and economic structure and held the natives, perhaps for generations, in servile status.**

Taking all these sorts of things into consideration, one can see more clearly some of the logical errors Lawrence

* Fanon quoted in Poverty in Canada, John R. Hopley and John Harp, eds., Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1971, p. 227.

** Lewis quoted in Poverty in Canada, 1971, p. 228.

Harrison made in his book Underdevelopment is a State of Mind. Perhaps Harrison has not experienced the psychological effects of class and racial oppression nor the poverty caused by economic exploitation. If he has, he has not, apparently, perceived it. But just because Lawrence Harrison, or anyone else, has not perceived oppression and exploitation does not mean these social phenomena do not exist. Unfortunately they do exist, and they are very real in their consequences. He mentions laziness, lack of trust in others, lack of drive to achieve, a present-time orientation -- an "unwillingness to defer gratification", absence of a willingness to invest time, money and effort in bettering one's condition ("nothing ventured, nothing gained" as the old cliché says), holding on to "traditional values", etc., as major causes of poverty in the Third World. What Harrison does not seem to understand is that these are the deplorable results of poverty and not the causes of it. In class societies, that is, almost everywhere in the world today, people are poor because they are exploited and oppressed by the ruling (capitalist) class. Monopoly capitalism, including the phenomenon of imperialism, has caused and is perpetuating the underdevelopment of the Third World.

Of course, these notions about the alleged causes of poverty as Harrison sees it are common middle class beliefs. It would seem that most Europeans in New Caledonia, if they have thought about it at all, hold these beliefs about the causes of the poverty of the Melanese people. If pressed, they might agree, begrudgingly, that certain reforms are need-

ed. But they would probably express outrage at the use of "violence" on the part of the Melanese and insist that change can and should be sought within the legal channels provided by the state. Hypocritically, they would claim that any violence on the part of the settler population is purely in self-defense. They would probably not understand that a system that perpetuates poverty is the greatest violence of all. They would certainly be horrified by any suggestion that revolutionary change -- a change of the system and not merely a change within the system -- is the only real way to get rid of poverty, inequality, social conflict, etc. Obviously, settlers cannot countenance any termination of colonialism. Nor can they easily tolerate reforms that would actually go so far as to "even the score" between colonized and settler. Perhaps it is for all these reasons and many others, that middle class people, when confronted by evidence that the world is not a just place, always invoke some idealistic myth that amounts to blaming the victim. This seems to be an almost universal element of middle class psychology. This class is, in the vast majority of cases, profoundly anti-revolutionary. Of course, in New Caledonia, as in most of the other white-settler colonial social formations, there are, objectively, class divisions and inequalities within the European community. And, no doubt, the white elite is manipulating, for its own political purposes, the white middle-class and the white proletariat. The European population in New Caledonia, despite objective class divisions, is "sticking together", four-square against the indig-

enous population. As Good (1976:611-612) argues:

Though it may be divided along class lines ... the white community has a common and overriding interest in continuing the exploitation of the black majority.... Europeans collectively, if unequally, derive their wealth and position from the exploitation of the colonized. [Substitute the word "marginalizaion" for the word "exploitation" in the case of New Caledonia.]

The Economic Position of the Other Ethnic Groups in New Caledonia

New Caledonia is an exemplar of the "plural" colonial society that Gail Omvedt (1973) has described. Wallisians, Tahitians (French Polynesians), Indonesians (Javanese), ni-Vanuatu, and Asians (mainly Vietnamese) make up over twenty per cent of the population of New Caledonia. Most are recent immigrants -- a part of the flow of people from the smaller, less developed islands of the Pacific to the more developed areas -- in search of work. Some are the descendents of those who came decades ago to New Caledonia as contract labourers.

According to Harold Brookfield (1972), this traffic in human labour, in human beings, directed and controlled by the state, and available only for the use of French nationals, took place into the 1920s. New Caledonia suffered a labour shortage so imported workers were needed. This system of labour recruitment had the advantage of providing very low-paid workers to the mines and to the planters (for instance). (Brookfield quotes wages of one to three dollars per month! in 1935). Also, in "bust" times, when they were no longer needed, the workers could be deported. They were not allowed

to own land and were not thought of as permanent settlers. New Caledonia was to be "white man's country". The immigrant workers functioned as a docile, highly-exploitable labour force. They often lived in even worse conditions than the indigenous population.

Today the immigrant population numbers about 30,000. Most still do not own land. Some (generally Indonesians) are share-croppers on European-owned land. Some own restaurants and small shops in Nouméa. Some are employed in the nickel industry. Many are unskilled, manual labour, but some are skilled and mental labour. In any case, they have at least one thing in common: they have generally been opposed to independence.

Overall, they have played the role of the "bribed tool of reactionary intrigue". Wallis Islanders, for instance, have been "employed" by settlers as "guards" -- with orders to shoot to kill any Melanese seen encroaching on their property. The Wallis and Futuna Islands are a French colony in the Pacific and one of the few French colonies that does not have an anti-colonial movement. France keeps a military airport there. It is very underdeveloped and Wallis Islanders fear that if the Melanese obtain independence they will be repatriated -- and on Wallis there are absolutely no jobs. The ni-Vanuatu people fear the same prospect, as do the other ethnic groups. Back on Vanuatu, where 80 per cent of the population lives hand-to-mouth subsistence, there are few -- if any -- jobs paying the kind of wages they can get in New Caledonia.

Of course, the other ethnic groups have been encouraged by the local bourgeoisie and imperialist-controlled media to believe that they would be repatriated if independence ever comes. But the leaders of the independence movement have insisted that people would not have to leave New Caledonia after independence. As Jean Marie Tjibaoui, (assassinated in 1988 as were two of his brothers in 1984) former leader of the Independence Front said in 1982:

We want an independent country based on our historic rights to the land. The Europeans are perfectly welcome to stay if they accept that we want to control our own destiny. We are not a racist movement, we want economic justice. (quoted in Facts on File, August 1982, p. 507.)

Colonial pluralism (ethnic divisions) has proven a serious political problem for the independence movement. There has been a tendency for the non-European immigrant population to vacillate between siding with the settlers and siding with the Melanese. The state has been practicing the well-known strategy of "divide and conquer". Ethnic differences have been compounded by the fact that the Melanese are not structurally integrated into the wage-labour force, so that forging solidarity among ethnic groups has been very difficult. Here is an excerpt from Susanna Ounei's* account of the FLNKS inspiring efforts to overcome the ethnic divisions that were crippling the anti-imperialist forces:

The majority of workers in New Caledonia are against our

* "The Kanak people's struggle for independence in New Caledonia", Auckland: CORSO, 1985, pp. 11 - 12.

struggle because the French brought them there from their own countries and gave them good jobs. And when they have good jobs they forget where they came from and what has happened in our country. We have got Wallisians... Tahitians, Vietnamese, Chinese, Javanese, and others. They all have good jobs while the Kanaks have nothing. We have no jobs.

... These people voted for the organization of the right. To help overcome this problem we created a Kanak trade union, the Kanak and Exploited Workers Union in 1981, because we felt that we must try and explain to these people that we are not racist. We see the problems of international imperialism and we must work together with them.

When we talked to the people, the mass media said that we were communists, we were Marxists. [A daily newspaper at the time was La France Austral owned by Société Le Nickel]. The right went on a campaign against us in their newspapers, telling the people never to follow those who talked about independence because they were communists. They said that when we talked against capitalism, we were against God. And the people from Wallis are a strongly Christian people.

But on November 18, 1984, in the elections, the FLNKS in Thio [a mining town on the Kanak-dominated east coast] were in control of this area. The majority of the people who work in Thio are Wallisians, Tahitians or whites. The FLNKS, led by Eloi Nachoro [a former school teacher and public servant, he was assassinated in 1984], went to meet the Wallisians to tell them that they were not our enemies. We explained the problem of capitalism and colonialism to them -- how it divides us in order to control our resources. We also explained this to the whites who have no resources, no riches, in New Caledonia and who work for a boss. We said to them that we are not racist, and that we want to build up New Caledonia with them...

We wanted the people of Wallis to understand our problem because, ... if they have some resources in Wallis the French will probably bring the Kanaks to Wallis to take the jobs of the Wallisians. So we must work together and make the international links against capitalism, and build solidarity between the workers and those of us in the tribes who have no jobs.

The caldoches [settlers] refused to follow us and the army came to Thio with their helicopters and took them away to Nouméa. But the majority of the Wallisians, the same people who voted against our movement last year, came in to support our struggle. They came to help in the barricades. That was really encouraging for us...

Chapter 4
THE STATE'S REFORMS: NEW CALEDONIA'S
NEO-COLONIAL FUTURE

The development of capitalism in New Caledonia has been characterized by the marginalization of the indigenous population, that is, by their exclusion from enjoying the benefits of relatively advanced development; and by "polarized accumulation", that is, by the monopolization of these benefits by some sectors of the settler and immigrant communities. This internal class/ethnic inequality combined with the state's delay in redressing these problems and its insistence on maintaining an antiquated colonial system have led to a serious legitimacy crisis for the state that during the 1970s and 1980s escalated to a revolutionary situation.

Constitutional attempts to gain reforms and independence throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s failed. The 1970s witnessed the simultaneous appearance of some of the first Melanese who had the opportunity to study Marxism in Paris and develop a scientific understanding of imperialism and capitalism; the end of the nickel boom with the end of the Vietnam War; and the beginnings of active protests against colonialism through acts of civil disobedience. The imperial state and the settler regime answered the demands for reforms with reactionary repression. The 1980s saw the subsequent radicalization of the independence movement. This process unfolded as a response not only to reaction but because of the independence in 1980 of Vanuatu and because of population growth on the reserves. The indigenous population felt the need for independence and

for the return of their land more and more urgently.

The 1980s was a decade of almost constant violence, protests, overt class and ethnic conflict that seriously disrupted the social peace and thereby had a negative effect on the process of capital accumulation. The French state quickly intervened with a counter-insurgency program of reforms and repression in order to coopt the revolutionary forces in New Caledonia. The current "development programs" underway in New Caledonia are actually a product of the decolonization crisis. These neo-colonial reforms constitute a "passive revolution" through which the material basis of capitalist class hegemony will be constituted.

There is no such thing as non-political reforms. All reforms have political motives and political consequences. But it takes a certain period of time to implement reforms, especially in the colonial context where settler reaction presents steadfast oppositions to any reforms that attenuate their privileges. It also takes a while for reforms to have the desired effect, that is, to deradicalize the supporters of revolutionary change through improvements in their material conditions of life, and to channel social conflicts into institutional forms that serve to preclude the achievement of revolutionary views and class action. Reforms within the logic of capitalism need not bring a really major change in the lives of the oppressed and exploited groups in order to serve the state's purposes. But they must change the perceptions these people have about the nature of society, the state and the system. It may take several decades for the state to

install the appropriate institutions and to defeat the forces of revolutionary change. These are the reasons for the state's various stalling tactics during a decolonization crisis.

The State's Reforms in New Caledonia

The counter-revolution is well underway in New Caledonia. In fact, remodeling the old obsolete bare-faced colonial system and replacing it with a more sophisticated, insidious -- and effective -- method of political control is a region-wide project. France has interests to protect in Wallis, (where no real opposition to colonialism yet exists), neo-colonial interests in Vanuatu, and continues to hold New Caledonia and French Polynesia despite decades of demands for independence. The imperative of maintaining imperialist interests have prompted some really major "development projects" in both New Caledonia and French Polynesia.

In New Caledonia, landlessness has contributed much to the breakdown in social peace. The state has marked 10,000 hectares for re-distribution, at least for now. As mentioned above, this land is not all going to indigenous people. The intention of the land reform is obviously to create a multi-ethnic class of landowners -- "kulaks" -- on whom the state can count as a social base of support. The state's version of land reform is the complete opposite of the land reform the independence movement had been seeking. The independence forces have long suspected that the state is intending to gradually phase-out the reserves. This is opposed on the grounds that it will

severely undermine native cultural traditions and values by destroying tribal institutions -- hence the term "black colonisation". What many Melanese had envisioned by land reform was the return of the ancestral homelands to each tribe. Of course, the revolutionary leadership is well aware of the state's political motives and of what the political consequences will be.

Also, these new farmers -- petty commodity producers -- resulting from the reform, are not going to be like the old-style white-settler with his/her archaic, money-losing, unprofitable methods. The old-style settler mode of production has long-since fallen by the way-side, really. Relatively high wages in the nickel industry and its "spin-offs" had lead many small settler-farmers to abandon farming years ago. These are reasons that land ownership had fallen into fewer and fewer hands. The point is that the counter-revolutionary reforms actually involve a whole new model of development. More on this will be discussed below. In farming, the new model of development involves the application of up-to-date scientific advances in the production of agricultural commodities, including livestock, fruits, vegetables, rice, wheat and corn. Now, "intensive" methods of production as opposed to the old "extensive" techniques are being developed. Land will be used much more efficiently: more food will be produced more cheaply. In agriculture, the new model of production is being described as "import substituting". Before, much of New Caledonia's food-stuffs were imported from Australia and New Zealand.

Fishing and forestry are also being developed through

applications of aquaculture and silviculture -- no more "cut and run". If all this development of non-mineral primary commodity production is successful, non-urban employment will return to New Caledonia after its virtual disappearance with the expansion of the nickel industry since the second world war. This apparently is what the state means by its proposals for the "development of the interior" and "job creation". In fact, it promises to create 10,000 new jobs -- well paying permanent jobs over the next few years.

The state has obviously recognized the need to diversify the local economy. Dependence on the nickel industry made the economy too vulnerable to the extreme and frequent fluctuations in nickel prices and in the demand for nickel on the world market. In short, the economy was too narrowly based. Booms and busts in the nickel industry translated into economic and political crises in New Caledonia. The new model of development is being designed to eliminate this problem. The economy of New Caledonia is not only in for a major re-vamping, it is going to become a veritable show-case of capitalist development in the Pacific region.

Income tax was not introduced to the French colonies of the South Pacific until 1982 -- despite furious settler protest. The state explained this was necessary in order to finance the development of the interior and in order to provide a wider distribution of mining revenue. The state has also expressed its intentions to embark on a major construction project of highways, housing, hospitals and schools. Highway construction has involved completing and improving the coastal

highway and building roads to connect the east and west coasts which have been largely cut-off from each other physically (by the central mountain range) as well as in ethnic, social, and economic terms. Improvements in transportation will of course benefit the tourism industry as well. Tourism, which had been neglected in favour of nickel development, is being expanded, with the intention that in the future it will constitute a mainstay of the economy. Construction of better housing is said to be taking place all over the islands, but especially in towns. This is described as "habitation loyer modéré" (moderate rent housing) and "habitation bon marché" (low rent housing). The state is preparing for an irreversible trend: the influx of more and more young Melanese to urban areas as they leave the reserves and seek jobs in towns.

Thus, the new model of development coming out of the decolonization crisis involves the diversification of the economic base with the development of tourism and non-mineral primary commodity production; creating a new multi-ethnic petty-bourgeois class of landowners as a social base for the hegemony of the ruling class (settler and metropolitan); and deradicalizing the Melanese by structurally integrating them into the dominant society and economy, really for the first time.

These new structural arrangements were formally institutionalized with the ratification of the Matignon Accord in June, 1988. Keesing's describes the accord as a "programme of institutional, social, and economic measures" (volume 35, number 5, p. 36702). The accord, signed by French "Socialist" Prime Minister Rocard, Tjibaou of the FLNKS and La Fleur,

head of the settler bourgeoisie party and a millionaire petit mineur, was worked out in Paris and was approved by a French national referendum. After the signing, France ruled New Caledonia directly for one year. Three new provincial assemblies were created and the FLNKS are dominant in two of these. FLNKS representatives have since been elected in these areas to oversee the reform measures in their area. This is in "preparation" for a referendum on "self-determination" scheduled for 1998. In other words, the independence movement is well on its way to being coopted and deradicalized.

Tjibaou, a former Catholic priest, who had not renounced his vows, agreed to the accord against the wishes of most FLNKS supporters. It appears that he wanted to end the violence which was getting even worse leading up to the accord. The political situation was escalating, in the words of one observer, to a "war-like situation", and Tjibao recognized the accord as the quickest way of stopping it. He was assassinated May 1989, apparently by a "left wing communist". Nevertheless, the reforms appear to be working: there is a noticeable improvement in the social peace. As one French statesman put it, the signing of the accord marked a new era of "fraternity, justice and progress" for New Caledonia.

Educational expansion is an important aspect of the pre-emptive counter-revolution. This is, in fact, only a part of a region-wide initiative of the French state's efforts to secure its hegemony in the Pacific. This effort includes the establishment of new military and navel bases throughout the region. A naval base and another military base are being built

in New Caledonia. Others are planned for French Polynesia. In January 1986, France also created its own "Council of the South Pacific" staffed by experts on South Pacific issues and apparently designed to act as a counter-organization to the South Pacific Forum, the South Pacific Commission and the Melanesian Spearhead Group, and to promote French interests in the region. Régis Debray was appointed secretary-general of the council, which also includes, according to Keesing's the "French President, leading members of the Cabinet, senior diplomats and military officers with experience of the region" (March 1987, p. 35001). An interesting aspect of the Council's work is the founding of a new university with campuses in French Polynesia and New Caledonia:

The Council emphasized its determination to accelerate creation of a South Pacific university based in Tahiti and New Caledonia. This university, M. Debray suggested, would help to counter the "Anglo-Presbyterian morality" emanating from the regional University of the South Pacific based in Fiji, which he held to be responsible for the growing regional hostility towards France, particularly with regard to its policy of continuing to conduct nuclear tests on Mururoa atoll. (Keesing's Record of World Events, March 1987, p. 35001)

Soon colonized people will be able to receive a French University education without leaving the region and from a pro-status quo ideological perspective. This will permit the creation of a basically pro-imperialist native elite in the Pacific. With about a dozen Pacific countries having now ratified the Treaty of Rarotonga (the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), including Australia, New Zealand, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu, France is increasingly coming to be seen by indigenous and European people alike as an aggressive out-

side force. France continues to defy the treaty, which has been operative since 1986, by continuing to conduct nuclear tests. France's policies in the Pacific are clearly aimed at preserving core/periphery relations between itself and its colonies and former colonies and at counter-opposition from the regional imperial satellites. (As of April 1992, France has announced it is suspending its nuclear-testing program in the Pacific for at least the remainder of the year.)

CONCLUSION

An historical analysis of the development of capitalism in New Caledonia is necessary for an understanding of the present decolonization crisis. The "export of capital" to New Caledonia and the establishment of a white-settler colony has transformed the territory from a pre-class stone-age society and economy into the most developed island in the South Pacific. For French imperialism, New Caledonia is a highly-valued raw-material-producing colony that is only a part of its world-wide imperial network.

The relatively advanced capitalist development and class formation of the colony are typical of colonies of white settlement. Everywhere, colonies of exploitation and conquest remained much more underdeveloped than the colony of settlement. But New Caledonia's capitalist development has been more unlike the development of the African colonies of white settlement than it has been similar. In New Caledonia, native labor was not the basis of imperialist profits, unlike

in Africa. The indigenous population of New Caledonia was divested of its land but it has been transformed into a wage-labor force only incompletely. Relegation to reserves has left the indigenous people marginalized in a subsistence economy -- not structurally integrated into the dominant capitalist economy -- in their own country. European settlers and immigrant ethnic groups are the principle beneficiaries of the present model of development. In this plural society it is these "outside" ethnic groups that have been allied against the indigenous population's efforts to obtain reforms and to achieve national independence.

The indigenous population of New Caledonia came late to the anti-colonial struggle compared to the situation of African colonialism. This can be explained by the extreme oppression suffered by the Melanese and by the negative effect of direct colonialism on the creation of a native elite. There was no Melanese in New Caledonia with a university education until 1971, and no Melanese had graduated from high school until the 1960s. Several other reasons account for this: the indigenous population is not long back from the brink of extinction; extreme French repression well into the 1950s made the formation of modern anti-colonialism all but impossible; and being that the colony consists of islands, New Caledonia's indigenous population has been isolated. Not until the 1960s did a modern anti-colonial movement appear. In the early years, a gradualist reformist approach was pursued. The 1970s and 1980s witnessed a rapid escalation of violence in the colony as reformism failed. State and settler reaction to the

independence movement caused the rapid radicalization of the the latter. Despite thirty years of efforts to obtain independence, New Caledonia will remain a colony of France at least until 1998.

The decolonization crisis in New Caledonia has taken the form of a revolutionary situation. The appearance and timing of the crisis and its social-revolutionary form can be explained by the following factors: (1) Direct colonialism and white settlement precluded the creation of a conservative native elite to whom independence was granted peacefully elsewhere. (2) Colonialism in New Caledonia has lasted well past the time most of the world was decolonized and the indigenous population is not content with this anomaly. (3) Rapid population growth on the reservations without accompanying enlargements of the reserves has made subsistence more and more precarious. (4) All constitutional attempts to achieve independence were rebuked. (5) Rapid economic growth during the nickel boom of the 1960s and early 1970s was characterized by "polarized accumulation" and increasing relative deprivation and social inequalities. The indigenous population, with a skilled revolutionary leadership, did not view their poverty and marginalization as a "normal" situation. They subsequently organized against vested interests. These were some of the objective and subjective forces that contributed to the revolutionary anti-colonial crisis.

The increasing social conflict among the many ethnic groups in the colony brought an almost total breakdown of the social peace. The smooth operation of the capital accumulation

process was threatened. In the face of this serious hegemonic crisis the French state responded with a well-planned counter-insurgency program. The anti-imperialist movement has been repressed and reforms have been introduced to deradicalize and gradually coopt the movement. These reforms, in fact, constitute a new model of development for the colony that will permit the continued development of capitalism while allowing the structural integration of the indigenous population. This will create the socio-economic conditions for the further development of the productive forces and for neo-colonialism in the next century.

The analysis of the development of capitalism in the white-settler colonial setting and of decolonization crises allow us to see some of the social forces that can contribute to the appearance of revolutionary understanding and action. But racial divisions and racist ideology in the colonial context and the superior coercive capability of the imperialist state spell the defeat of the progressive forces. It remains to be seen if the state's reforms and new model of development can prevent the resurgence of the revolutionary movement. If the state succeeds in creating the social, economic, political and institutional features of center capitalist formations, social conflict -- ubiquitous in class societies -- will be channelled into non-revolutionary "peaceful" paths.

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