



#### **Faculty of Commerce**

# Financing environmental sustainability for small landowners in Guatemala: The potential of the Carbon Banking Approach

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#### Forest owners and carbon markets



**Forest Carbon** 



Forest owners







**Industries** 



Offsets by paying






## Small Landholders (?)

- MARKET EXCLUSION: large land cover under management to provide a stable carbon stock over time
- LACK OF INFORMATION: Lack of access to carbon markets
- HIGH COSTS: Transaction costs tend to be high
- ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: It could reduce carbon reservoirs

**Sources:** (Cacho, et al., 2005; Roshetko et al., 2006; Roncoli et al., 2007; Pfaff, et al., 2007; Bigsby, 2009; Galiok, et al., 2009; Bigsby, 2009; Milder, Scherr & Bracer, 2010; De Pinto, et al., 2010; Beddoe, 2010)



#### Forest owners and carbon markets







New Zealand's specialist land-based university



#### **Research Questions**

What is the potential of the carbon banking approach to include the forestry and agro-forestry systems of small land owners in Guatemala into the carbon trading system, and through this provide payments for retaining forest?





What is the size of the effective carbon pool provided by small landowners, accounting for forest fire risk?

How much can the carbon bank afford to pay small landowners for sequestering carbon?





#### **Methods**

#### **Risk Analysis**

- Monte Carlo analysis
- Model risk of losing forest through fires in three Zones
- Probability
- 10,000 iterations

#### **Carbon Payment Analysis**

- Sensitivity analysis
- 3 scenarios



#### 2

#### Results

Zones	Area of forest land deposited in the bank (ha)	Volume of carbon deposited ( <b>tCO</b> <sub>2</sub> )	carbon available for	Bank annual revenue (USD4.80/tCO <sub>2</sub> )
Dry	1,454.94	37,807.42	97.13%	8,906.70
Montane	7,593.67	1,494,996.42	98.87%	358,511.69
Wet and moist	26,100.12	4,876,684.30	96.35%	1,139,685.24
TOTAL	35,148.73	6,409,488.14		1,507,103.63

Number of small forest owners = 6,734





#### **Cost of the Carbon Bank**



Fixed costs				
Operational costs	Type of cost	Units	Cost per unit (USD)	Total cost (USD)
3 carbon management experts	Administrative fee	3	40,000.00	120,000.00
Monitoring Plan	Consultancy fee	1	20,000.00	20,000.00
Monitoring at field level	Adminstrative fee	1	95,000.00	95,000.00
Verification of monitoring developed by third party	Auditor fee	1	45,000.00	45,000.00
	Subtotal			430,000.00



#### Variable costs

#### Variable cost per land owner

Other associated costs when issuing one contract (energy, printers, paper, etc)	Administrative fee	6,734	1.00	6,734.00
	Subtotal			6,734.00





### Scenario 1 with USD 430,000

(USD/tCO2/yr)

% landowners in the scheme

Minim f profit margin for the bank						
	0.00%	5%	10.00%	15.00%	20.00%	25.00%
100%	0.167	0 70	0.143	0.132	0.120	0.108
000/	0.160		0.136	0.124	0.113	0.101
000/	0.150	0.138	0.127	0.115	0.103	0.091
80%	0.138	0.130	0.115	0.103	0.091	0.079
000	0.122	0.111	0.099	0.087	0.075	0.063
50%	0.100	0.088	0.076	0.065	0.053	0.041
40%	0.066	0.055	0.043	0.031	0.019	0.008
30%	0.010	-0.001	-0.013	-0.025	-0.037	-0.048
20%	-0.101	-0.113	-0.125	-0.137	-0.148	-0.160



### Scenario 2 reducing 25% of fixed costs

(USD/tCO2/yr)

% landowners in the scheme

	Minimum of profit margin for the bank						
	0.00%	<b>5%</b>	10.00%	15.00%	20.00%	25.00%	
100%	0.184	3%	0.160	0.148	0.137	0.125	
90%	0.178		0.155	0.143	0.131	0.119	
	0.171	0.159	0.148	0.136	0.124	0.112	
80%	0.162	0.139	0.139	0.127	0.115	0.103	
	0.150	0.200	0.127	0.115	0.103	0.091	
50%	0.133	0.122	0.110	0.098	0.086	0.075	
40%	0.108	0.097	0.085	0.073	0.061	0.050	
30%	0.066	0.055	0.043	0.031	0.019	0.008	
20%	-0.017	-0.029	-0.041	-0.053	-0.065	-0.076	



## Scenario 3 reducing 50% of fixed costs (USD/tCO2/yr)

% landowners in the scheme

Minimum f profit margin for the bank						
	0.00%	5%	10.00%	15.00%	20.00%	25.00%
100%	0.201	370	0.177	0.165	0.154	0.142
0007	0.197		0.173	0.162	0.150	0.138
000/	0.192	0.40	0.169	0.157	0.145	0.133
80%	0.186	0.18	0.163	0.151	0.139	0.127
00.00	0.178	U	0.155	0.143	0.131	0.119
50%	0.167	0.155	0.143	0.132	0.120	0.108
40%	0.150	0.138	0.127	0.115	0.103	0.091
30%	0.122	0.111	0.099	0.087	0.075	0.063
20%	0.066	0.055	0.043	0.031	0.019	0.008
10%	-0.101	-0.113	-0.125	-0.137	-0.148	-0.160





## Is it enough money per Ha/yr? (USD/tCO2/yr)

		Maximum payment to small forest owners (USD/tCC <sub>2</sub> e/yr)			
Zones	Average of carbon sequestered	0.14 0.16		0.18	
	(tCO <sub>2</sub> e/ha/yr)	Scenario 1 (USD/ha/yr)   Scenario 2 (USD/ha/yr)		Scenario 3 (USD/ha/yr)	
Dry	25.99	3.59	3.90	4.68	
Montane	196.87	27.17	29.53	35.44	
Wet and Moist	186.85	25.78	28.03	33.63	



#### **Conclusions**

- •The three zones have more than 96% of forest carbon available for leasing in carbon markets when adjusted for fire risk.
- •The maximum price paid to small forest owners depends on the bank's profit rates, the level of small landowners' participation as well as a how effective the bank can manage fixed costs.
- •Considering 80% of participation of small landowners and 5% of profit for the bank, the best scenario for the bank is No. 3 as it can afford USD 0.18/tCO2/yr. However, from small landowner's perspective their level of involvement into the scheme will rely on whether they have additional economic activities or not.



### Thank you for your attention!

