

**EXPLAINING STATE DEVELOPMENT: INDONESIA FROM
ITS PRE-INDEPENDENCE ORIGINS TO CONTEMPORARY
DEMOCRACY**

**A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science at the
University of Canterbury**

By

Dodik Ariyanto

**S.IP. (B.A.) Universitas Gadjah Mada, 1998
D.E.A. (Master) l'Université Montesquieu, Bordeaux IV, 2004**

Adviser:

**Professor Mark Francis, Ph.D.
Associate Professor Alexander Tan, Ph.D.**

**Department of Political Science
2010**

LIST OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
	LIST OF CONTENTS	ii
	LIST OF APPENDICES	v
	ABBREVIATIONS	vi
	DEDICATION	x
	ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	xi
	ABSTRACT	xii
	INTRODUCTION	1
1	TOWARD A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS	9
	1.1. A debate on the idea of state: classic and modern	9
	1.2. Developing the 'modern' State: Complexity and capability	17
	1.3. Mechanically developing democratic and dictatorial versions of the State: Indonesia's four versions, 1950-2010	28
	1.4. The four versions' capabilities: Dealing with Legitimacy, the Military and Political Disorder	37
2	PRE-INDEPENDENCE ORIGINS OF THE FIRST VERSION OF THE STATE	39
	2.1. Disunited nationalism <i>versus</i> the "Unity in diversity"	40
	2.2. Polarization of perspectives among elites	47
	2.3. Two competing models of constitution: the shari'a versus secularism	51
	2.4. Mixed constitution: The middle way	60

3	SEEKING LEGAL LEGITIMACY	68
3.1.	Version I : Post-colonial attempt of democratic legal legitimacy	68
3.2.	Version II : Sukarno's charismatic legitimacy	74
3.3.	Version III : Suharto's claim to performance legitimacy	80
3.4.	Version IV : Democratic legal legitimacy	93
3.5.	Conclusion	100
4	THE MILITARY AND THE STATE	104
4.1.	Perlmutter's Revolutionary, Praetorian and Professional Types	107
4.2.	Version I : Legacy of the Revolutionary Type	112
4.3.	Version II : Sukarno's mixed Type	129
4.4.	Version III : Suharto's version of the Praetorian Type	133
4.5.	Version IV : Towards Professional Military	140
4.6.	Conclusion	145
5	DEALING WITH POLITICAL DISORDERS: DEGREE OF DIFFICULTY	148
5.1.	Version I : Early-independence episode	149
5.2.	Version II : 1950-1965 and 1965-1966 episodes	150
5.3.	Version III : 1997-1998 episode	152
5.4.	Version IV : post-1998 trend of communal violence and separatism	153

6	DEALING WITH POLITICAL DISORDERS: DEGREE OF SUCCESS	166
6.1.	Version I: Post-colonial dealing with disorder	166
6.2.	Version II: Sukarno's revolutionary approach	172
6.3.	Version III: Maintaining order through power consolidation	177
6.4.	Version IV: Democratic consolidation	195
6.5.	Conclusion	197
7	PRE-DEMOCRATIC ORIGINS OF THE PRESENT VERSION OF THE STATE	199
7.1.	Economic crisis	201
7.2.	Political crisis	209
7.3.	Weaking support from the military	215
7.4.	Rallying opponents amongst elites	218
	CONCLUSION	231
	REFERENCES	241
	APPENDICES	274

LIST OF APPENDICES

	PAGES
Appendix 1 Anderson's View of the Indonesian State	274
Appendix 2 French state mechanical development	279
Appendix 3 Assesment on Indonesian state capability	283
Appendix 4 Economic Indicators (1955-1971)	285
Appendix 5 Garnadi Document	287
Appendix 6 Suharto's Resignation Speech	291
Appendix 7 Main Operational Commandos of the Indonesian Armed Forces	293

ABBREVIATIONS

ABRI	The Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia
AMPERA	The Carrier of People's Suffering
APBN	State Annual Budget
Aspri	Personal Assistant
Babinsa	Village Development Non-Commissioned Officers
BAIS	The Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Agency
BKR	People's Security Organization
BP	Vanguard Corps
BPKKP	Organization for Aid to Families of War Victims
BPUPKI	Investigating Body for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence
CNRS	French National Center for Scientific Research
DI	The House of Islam
DOM	The Military Operation Region
DPRGR	People's Representative Assembly
FBSI	The Federation of Indonesian Labour
FKM	The Front of Sovereign Moluccas
Gakari	Bureaucrats Grouping and Civil Servants
GAM	Aceh Liberation Movement
GAPI	Federation of Indonesian Political Parties
GBHN	State's Guidelines
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
Gerindo	The Indonesian People's Movement
Gestapu	The Communist operation of the 30 th of September (1965)
Golkar	Functionalist Group
HKTI	Indonesian Farmers Union

HNSI	Indonesian Fishermen Union
ICMI	Indonesian Intellectual Muslim Association
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JIB	Muslim Youth Union
JSE	Jakarta Stock Exchange
KASAD	Army Strategic Division
Kasgab	Joint Staffs
Kaster	Commander of Territorial Staff of the Army
KKN	Corruption, Complicity, and Nepotism
KNI	Indonesian National Committee
KNIL	Dutch Army at the East Indische
KNIP	Central Indonesian National Committee
KNPI	National Youth Committee
Kodam	Regional Military Command
Kodim	District Military Command
Kopassus	Special Forces
Kopkamtib	Command for the Operation to Maintain Order and Security
Koramil	Sub-District Military Command
Korem	Sub-Regional Military Command
KORPRI	Indonesian Civil Servants Association
Kosgoro	United Multi-Purpose Organisation
KOWANI	Indonesian Women Congress
Litsus	Special Investigation
Lol	Letter of Intent
Masyumi	Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslim
MIAI	Great Islamic Council of Indonesia
MPR	National Assembly/National Consultative Assembly

MPR	National Assembly
MPRS	Provisional National Assembly
MUI	Indonesian Ulema Council
Murba	People Consultative Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEFO	New Emerging Forces
NU	Traditional/Conservative Muslim Party
OLDEFO	Old Emerging Forces
P3TT	Taskforce on Referendum at the East Timor
Pangab	Commander-in-Chief
Pangdam	Commanders of Regional Military Commands
Parindra	Great Indonesian Party
Parkindo	Indonesian Christian Party
Partindo	Indonesian Party
PDI	Indonesian Democratic Party
PDIP	Indonesian Democratic Struggle Party
Permi	Indonesian Muslim Union Party
PETA	The Defenders of the Motherland
PII	Indonesian Islamic Party
PKB	National Awakening Party
PKI	Communist Party
PNI	Indonesian Nationalist Party
PNI Baru	Indonesian Nationalist Education
PPKI	The Committee for Preparation of the Indonesian Independence
PPP	Development Union Party
PPPKI	Union of National Political Association
PSI	Islamic Association Party

PSIHT	East Indies Islamic Association Party
PSII	Indonesian Islamic Association Party
Putera	Centre for People's Power
PWI	Indonesian Journalist Union
RIS	Federal State of Republic of Indonesia
SDI	Islamic Trade Association
Sekber	Joint Secretariat
Seskoad	The Army Staff and Command School
SI	Islamic Association
SIL	Summer Institute of Linguistic
SOKSI	Indonesian Workers Union
TII	Indonesian Islamic Forces
TJADEK	Four Obligation Towards One Purpose
TKR	The Army of People's Security
TNI	Indonesian National Army
TNI-AD	The Army
TRI	The Army of the Republic of Indonesia
UNAMET	United Nations Mission on the East Timor
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
ZILS	The Industrial Zone of Lhokseumawe

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my mother, my wife, and my three boys

Without their patience, understanding, and most of all love, the completion of this work would not have been possible

And also to my beloved country, Indonesia

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

It is still hard to believe that finally I'm writing on this page and is therefore a great pleasure to thank those who have made this thesis possible.

For their assistance, advice, encouragement, guidance I owe my sincerest gratitude to:

Professor Mark Francis,

Dr. Alexander Tan,

Dr. Paul Brooker,

Jill Dolby, James To, Brad Taylor, and Dave Clements.

I would also like to thank for their financial assistance:

New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade,

NZAID and in particular Dr. Sarah Beaven.

For their vision and support, I would like to convey my sincere thanks to:

The State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia,

The Indonesian Embassy at Wellington, and,

Colleagues and peers that I cannot mention one by one.

ABSTRACT

Explaining State Development: Indonesia from Pre-Independence Origins to Contemporary Democracy.

This thesis uses the Indonesian case to present a new paradigm for explaining the state development of new or relatively new (post-World War II) states. The first chapter describes this paradigm of organic and mechanical types of state development, argues that the development of the Indonesian state from the 1950s to 1990s is a good example of the mechanical type of development and shows how this can be confirmed by assessing and comparing the capabilities of the four different versions of a modern state developed by Indonesia since independence. The next chapter examines Indonesia's pre-independence debates about the form of state to be adopted, which led to Indonesia accepting a Western model of the state that has since undergone a development process involving four different versions of a 'modern' state. These four versions of the state are defined according to their type of regime and policymaking institutions: I) parliamentary democracy, II) Sukarno's civilian presidential monarchy, III) Suharto's military presidential monarchy and IV) presidential democracy. Chapters Three to Six assess and compare these four versions' capability in three key areas: 1) achieving legal legitimacy, 2) control of the military and 3) dealing with political disorder – a crucial area of state capability that requires two chapters. Then Chapter Seven examines and explains the pre-democratic origins of the present version of the Indonesian state, the presidential democracy of Version IV. The Conclusion collates the findings of Chapters Three to Six on capabilities and summarises the arguments of Chapters Two and Seven regarding the 1940s acceptance of the Western model of the state and the late 1990s opportunity for democratisation. Finally, there is a concluding assessment of the potential of the organic/mechanical typology as a new paradigm for studying state development in other countries, regions and eras.

INTRODUCTION

To start, it is important to say that the state, as an excellent place for the practice of power, used to be an absent character of the contemporaneous political science. It is since very lately, in other words, since the last few decades, that the thinking about the state construction developed considerably. In 1962, the UNESCO put in place a wide research programme related to comparative historical sociology of the state formation and the nation construction in which Shmuel Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan being the programme's pioneers. In the early 1970s, the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council gave Charles Tilly the responsibility for a comparative survey about the 'Formation of the nation state in western Europe'. In 1984, the CNRS also undertook a thematic study on the modern state genesis. These efforts were dominated by historical sociology as the mentioned studies emphasized on the various approaches been developed by the twentieth century sociologist/philosophers such as Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber. Thus, from being a neglected object of the social sciences, the state became the main concern of numerous research and projects.

Focus and Purpose of the Thesis

This thesis is titled: 'Explaining State Development: Indonesia from Pre-Independence Origins to Contemporary Democracy', or, to say this in a simpler way, 'explaining state development in Indonesia'. This would explain *what* and *why*, but mainly it would focus on explaining the phenomenon by addressing three fundamentals:

- 1) The 'state' defined as a set of organisations and other institutions whose purpose is making and implementing public policy (Easton's definition of political system) for the inhabitants of a specified territorial area over which it claims a monopoly of the legitimate use of force (Weber's definition of the state).
- 2) State 'development' defined as a change in the state's complexity and capability (Strayer's perspective on the historical development of the modern state).

- 3) State development as a mixture of two different types of development: the mechanical and the organic.

These three fundamentals will be described in more detail in the theory section of this Introduction and in the theory chapter of the thesis—Chapter 1: Toward A Framework of Analysis. It will also discuss four other conceptions of the state that provide alternative views of the state and will be discussed in the form of a ‘debate on the idea of the state: classic and modern’. However, it will be shown that they are not as applicable to the topic of state development in Indonesia from the 1940s to 1990s as are the definition of the state and state development that will be used in this thesis.

Despite their significance, these four conceptions of the state will not be employed in this thesis,

- a. The classics (Hobbes, 1996, Rousseau, 1986) do not carry much weight because states, in terms of concept and practice, have developed significantly during the last few centuries, even though concepts from classical sources such as sovereignty have become embedded in the language of contemporary political science.
- b. Wittfogel (Wittfogel, 1957) is an example of state theory that is focused on explaining a particular structural type of state (despotism) in a particular region of the world (Oriental) and, like the classics, in a *pre-modern* era of history.
- c. Geertz’s (Geertz, 1980) is an example of state theory that is focused on a particular cultural type of state (the Balinese theatre state) in the Indonesian region, and in ‘the nineteenth century Bali’-like Wittfogel, Geertz does not address the models and sub-models of the state that in modern times have developed in post-colonial countries, such as Indonesia.
- d. The analytic theorists, Morris (Morris, 1998a) and Krasner (Krasner, 1999), are examples of contemporary state theory with a global perspective but they were not used in this thesis because they have little to say on the development of different administrative and political practices within a state.

Morris, for example, talks of development of a concept, not of development of an actual state in practice.

In contrast to these four conceptions of the state, the modern and globally applicable Easton-based definition of the state (Easton, 1967) provides a basis for describing development of the state in terms of the nature of—and changes to—its policymaking and policy-implementing organizations and other institutions. Strayer's theory (Strayer et al., 2005) is also preferred because:

- a. It explains the origins of the modern model of the state that has been adopted by post-colonial countries such as Indonesia
- b. It explains the historical development of the model of the state in practice, and, therefore, is easy to adopt as the basis for a paradigm concerning the state as it develops different versions or 'sub-models' during a historical period though this thesis covers only 50 years, rather than the 150 years covered by Strayer.

Strayer's theory emphasizes that a particular state's development can be classified as an example of either organic or mechanical development. More specifically, the new states created in post-colonial countries, such as Indonesia, can be classified as examples of the mechanical type of state development. This thesis will *argue* that Indonesia is indeed a *prime example* of the *mechanical* type of state development because its development shows the rapidity and unpredictability of state's characteristic of such a type (compared to the organic type's gradual increase in complexity and capability). In particular, mechanical development was displayed in Indonesia by the rapid sequence of four different versions of the state developed from the 1950s through to 1990s: namely parliamentary democracy, civilian presidential monarchy, military presidential monarchy and presidential democracy.

Specifically, these versions:

- a) display unpredictability in the changes to the complexity of the state, with the high complexity of democratic policy-making institutions being followed by a marked reduction in complexity through the shift from the democratic rule of

the people to the dictatorial personal rule of a presidential monarch, then by a minor reduction in complexity of policymaking institutions through the shift from a civilian to a military dictator and finally by a marked increase in policymaking institutions' complexity through a return to the competitive elections of democracy but in the new form of presidential democracy.

- b) display unpredictability in the relationship between complexity and capability, such as when the high complexity of parliamentary democracy was *not* associated with a similarly high capability or when the marked reduction in complexity from parliamentary democracy to civilian presidential monarchy was associated with some *increase* in state capability
- c) display a lack of predictable 'proportionality' between state complexity and capability. This is evident in three areas that were crucial for the Indonesian state and other new, post-colonial states: 1) leadership and legitimacy, 2) control of the military and 3) the capacity to deal with political disorder

As a confirmation of this argument about unpredictability, disproportionate capability is *the main focus of the thesis* and the subject of the core chapters, Chapters 3 to 6, because the relative levels and changes in state capability are much more difficult to identify and 'prove' than the relative levels and changes of complexity associated with the four different versions. E.g. version 1 (parliamentary democracy) obviously has a higher level of policy-making complexity than version 2 (civilian personal dictatorship), and there will obviously be a marked decline in complexity when version 1 is replaced by version 2.

The secondary focus of the thesis is to explain why: a) Indonesia imitated a western rather than Islamic model of the state when it became independent and therefore created the opportunity for the western-style parliamentary democracy of the first version of the state, and; b) Indonesia democratized in the 1990s and therefore created the opportunity for the presidential democracy of the fourth version of the state. The first of these explanations is presented in chapter 2 and the second in chapter 7.

A further and largely implicit focus of the thesis is that the organic/mechanical typology is a useful new paradigm of state development. An attempt is made to be

more explicit about this in the thesis' Conclusion, after the collation and summing up of the findings of Chapters 3 to 6.

Research Sources and Presenting the Findings

Inasmuch the basis of this thesis is predominantly using primary sources such as Indonesian government documents and political direct observation as well as Indonesia-related news from Indonesian and foreign media since the time of pre-independence. However, this thesis also includes English-language secondary sources.

The findings of this research will be presented mainly through the four chapters on capability: “*Chapter Three: Seeking Legal Legitimacy, Chapter Four: The Military and the State, Chapter Five: Dealing with Political Disorder: The Degree of Difficulty and Chapter Six: Dealing with Political Disorder: The Degree of Success*”. The research findings will be presented in these chapters by allocating separate sections of the chapter to each of the four versions: parliamentary democracy (version 1), Sukarno’s civilian presidential monarchy (version 2), Suharto’s military presidential monarchy (version 3) and the present presidential democracy (version 4). However chapter four will also include an introductory section in which they will describe the conceptual framework that will be used for analysing and presenting their findings – chapter four opens with a section on Perlmutter’s concepts of the revolutionary, praetorian and professional types of military.

The research findings that help explain the origins of versions 1 and 4, namely chapters two and six, will be presented in a quite different way – “*Chapter Two: Pre-Independence Origins of the First Version of the State*” will describe the pre-independence debate over what form the new state should take, that is, whether it should in fact copy the Western model of a ‘modern’ state – and “*Chapter Six: Pre-Democratic Origins of the Present Version of the State*” will describe the factors that led to the demise of version 3 and its replacement by the presidential democracy of version 4.

The theory chapter, “*Chapter One: Toward a Framework of Analysis*”, will have a different structure from the research-oriented chapters and will explore several different aspects of the theoretical background to the thesis as well as providing a more in-depth view of the mechanical/organic typology of state development described in the final section of the Introduction.

Theory: Mechanical and Organic State Development

These two terms were inspired by Durkheim’s ‘mechanical’ and ‘organic’ social solidarity (Durkheim, 1997)– otherwise these types of state development would have been labelled mechanical and ‘biological’. There are obviously big differences between these two mechanical/organic typologies: Durkheim’s types of social solidarity historically speaking states can develop *from* the mechanical *to* the organic type, even though historically develop mechanically *or* organically. Another difference is that state development of the mechanical type is the ‘newer’ type because: a) it became prominent only in the twentieth century, and b) it is typical of ‘new’, post-colonial states, such as Indonesia. The key theorist of state development is Strayer as his *The Medieval Origins of the Modern State* was one of the series of works during the 1960s and 1970s on historical state formation that set a new direction in the study of the state. This book was similar in its ‘functionalist’ approach to work of earlier theorists of the state, such as Marx, Durkheim and Weber, in being concerned with the state’s increasing *capability* to do things. For contemporary scholarship, Strayer’s book was a pioneering one in the study of state development because it merged the earlier focus on the social function of the state with the more recent focus on the historical formation of the state. In the study of state development, this functional/formation mixture is represented by its concern with historical change (formation) in the complexity and capability (function) of the state. Strayer’s book described a gradual increase in the complexity and capability of the monarchical states of medieval Europe in the period 1100 to 1450 (and beyond this medieval period into the early modern period 1450-1600 and beyond into the 1600s-1700s). Therefore, his book pioneered the study of what is now labelled the *organic* type of state development because it is analogous to the biological, life-cycle development of an individual from egg, to embryo, to baby, to infant and then to adult, with the organism increasing in complexity and capability as it progresses

through these stages. In the case of a state's development, the life-cycle extends over centuries or even thousands of years, because Strayer's description of the 'origins' extends for 250 years and clearly the 'modern state' emerges as the adult stage in the process as late as the nineteenth and/or the twentieth centuries, some four or five centuries after 1450 (and presumably states will eventually enter the old-age stage of the life-cycle and begin to experience a gradual decline in complexity and capability). Strayer's book went a step further in this formulation, and demonstrated that the form of state that emerged in Europe in the nineteenth/twentieth centuries was, and should be, regarded as the 'modern' state and as a model to be copied by countries outside. In other words, the historical development of the modern state in one part of the world was followed by the geographical spread of this model of the state to other parts of the world that had not historically developed this form of state. The countries copying this model were therefore 'saving themselves the trouble' of centuries of historical development when they created a 'modern' state with its complex set of organisations and institutions, such as professional military and civil service, parliament, electoral system and written Constitution. Many of these countries were actually creating their first state because they were former colonies achieving independence with different, colonial-era territorial boundaries from any state that had previously existed in that part of the world. They were very 'new' states when compared to the 'old' states in Europe that had taken centuries to develop the modern form of state. However, these post-colonial, new states would soon begin their own process of historical development and a very different type of development from the organic type described by Strayer. They experienced a more rapid and unpredictable development process in which: a) change was not a gradual progression but a rapid shift from one format (or design) to another and; b) there was often a lack of proportion between the levels and changes in complexity and the levels and changes in capability, especially when it was complexity in the state's policymaking institutions and involves such marked changes as shifting from democratic to dictatorial versions of the state. This type of state development has been labelled 'mechanical' because it is analogous to the mechanical development of new versions of a piece of machinery that do not necessarily have a proportionate relationship between their complexity and capability, as when a more complex version may be less capable (or vice versa) because it is not suited (or is well suited) to the difficult conditions in which it is

operated. The new state of Indonesia would be one of the prominent examples of this type of state development and indeed the thesis's argument, as described earlier, is that modern Indonesia is a particularly good example of the mechanical type of state development as is confirmed by its unpredictable, disproportionate levels and changes in state capability.

CHAPTER ONE

TOWARD A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

1.1. A debate on the idea of state: classic and modern

The term 'state' is often interchangeable with 'sovereignty'. This was originally found in Aristotle's *politics*, expressed as the idea that, 'There must be a supreme power existing in the state, and that this power may be in the hands of one, or of a few, or of many' (Aristotle, 1923, p.121). Passing through different traces of history, from the Roman and Mediaeval periods of European history, and even further to early modern times, this idea has proven itself to be persistent that 'there is and must be (in all of forms of government) a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in which the *jura summi imperii*, or the rights of sovereignty, reside'¹. This rubric implies that, in addition to the state being ultimate source of political authority in a territory, there are no theoretical limits to the demands that a state can impose on its subjects and that the authority must be absolute and indivisible. This fundamental thesis has been elaborated comprehensively by classic theorists such as Thomas Hobbes.

For those who were traumatized by the *Leviathan*, Hobbes' name seems notorious. From his perspective, the sovereign can commit no breach of the social covenant, and cannot be judged by the people for a breach of the constitution; the sovereign cannot be punished; he himself is judge of matters such as the means necessary for the defence of the state; Further, the sovereign can do no injustice; he has the right to decide what doctrines shall be taught among the subjects; he is the law-making power; the judicial power; he posses the right to carry on war; the right to appoint officers; the rewarding and punishing power. In his words '*.....there can be no room remaining for another independent authority. Even the church should be regarded as subordinate to the sovereign, since he is the vicegerent of God, and determines the validity of doctrine, even the authenticity of inspirations*' (Hobbes, 1996, chapter XVIII). For this end, Hobbes preferred the Monarch to be the ultimate source of authority.

¹ Taken from Morris's citation of "The sovereignty of the law, selections from Blackstone's commentaries on the Laws of England" MORRIS, C. W. (1998b) *An essay on the modern state*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, BLACKSTONE, W. S. (1973) *The Sovereignty of The Law: Selections from Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England*, London, MacMillan., p.178-79

Similar notions on the sovereignty of the state were forwarded by Jean Jacques Rousseau when he declares that '*as nature gives every man absolute control over all his members, so the social contracts gives to the body politic an absolute power over all its members*' (Rousseau, 1986, Book II, chapter 4). According to this philosopher, the sovereign has unlimited control over all that affects the general welfare, and the indisputable right to judge as to what falls under this category; no rights are reserved to the individual; the sovereign cannot bind himself; limits are set to the sovereign power to the extent that it shall always act for the general good and it shall not discriminate between various classes of citizens, but of this restrictions the sovereign is the final judge since the sovereign finds its source in an original contract and abides permanently in the body politic, Rousseau credited the people with the power that Hobbes had given to the Leviathan.

Though sovereignty was conceived as absolute and indivisible for both classic philosophers, there is a significant difference between Hobbes and Rousseau. While both argue that the sovereignty is indivisible and unlimited, they mean quite a different thing by this. Hobbes signifies that all state activities must come under a single-decision making authority, and that the sovereign can and may do anything he or she or it wants to do with its subjects. Rousseau merely argues that the sovereign is indivisible because he thinks that executive and judicial functions are conceptually speaking not functions of the sovereign at all. The sovereign is and can only be a legislative entity, and this, for Rousseau, precludes it acting as an executive or as a judicial branch. Furthermore, though Rousseau says that the sovereign is unlimited, he means this too in a special sense. For Rousseau, anything that attempts to treat individuals in a way that is not necessary to advance the common good is not the sovereign (Rousseau, 1986, *Ibid*).

Indivisibility and absoluteness of the sovereign led to critical notions among the modernist. Along this line, Christopher Morris argues that the classical conception of state as absolute and indivisible is invalid. He says state authority is often limited and frequently fragmented or divided (Morris, 1998b, section 7.4.). By saying this, Morris does not seem to challenge the attribution of the ultimate source of authority into states. At the contrary, he avows with F.H. Hinsley that, '*At the beginning, the idea of*

sovereignty was the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in the political community.....there is no final absolute authority exists elsewhere (Morris, 1998b, p.173). However, he emphasizes the fact that the concept of sovereignty has historically developed. He writes, *'I consider states that are legitimate, on my view, they are reasonably just and minimally efficient'* (Morris, 1998b, p.179). In his *Essays on the Modern State*, Morris does not give a clear position on what form of political organization might reasonably replace and improve upon the sovereign state, but his theoretical examination provides a deep analysis on how the form of political organizations endowed with the supreme authority are supposed to function. This is an important question with regard to the notion of legitimacy. The queries are, what form the state must take in order to be justified? How minimal or extensive should the state be? How responsive to groups within its territories and to people should it be?

These statements should function as the basic foundation of the modern thinking on state theory: viz, we should accept that justice and efficiency are sufficient criteria of a state's acceptability, and that other complex elements such as territoriality are marginal. According to Morris, territorial state must be justified, and that in a justified state, most of the administrative and judicial functions of modern states will also be legitimized. However, this last notion leads to a contradiction in the attribution of sovereignty upon states. By distinguishing sanctions from force, Morris has questioned Weber's thesis that the state has monopolized legitimate force within its territory. *'States'*, he writes, *'may possess significant amounts, or influence significant concentrations of legitimate force, but we should not expect them to be able to monopolize it'* (Morris, 1998b, p.204). Morris also argues that state's claim to limited sovereignty is lack of credibility. He says, *'...even reasonably just and efficient, states lack most of the attributes commonly associated with absolutist theorists of sovereignty'* (Morris, 1998b, p.212). This discussion leads to the question: What might authority relations be like in non-sovereign states? By examining such issues as conflict resolution, sources of political authority, and social order, Morris argues that states are not, and need not, be sovereign. He writes, *'It would be better to suggest that we detach sovereignty from the idea of a state'* (Morris, 1998b, p.223).

This conclusion is fortified by Morris's other notion in regard to the distinction between internal and external sovereignty. States typically claim to be the ultimate source of political authority within their territories (internal sovereignty), to be independent of other states (external sovereignty), and to hold a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within their polity. Relating to this notion, Morris forwards an argument that state legitimacy does not give it internal sovereignty, whether this is absolute and indivisible or limited (Morris, 1998a, p.224). Nor does it provide it with monopoly on legitimate force, or does it account for any general obligation for citizens to obey. Sovereignty, Morris argues, is not necessary for social order. Further, Morris claims that there is no clear justification for the territorial claims of existing states, and that '*it is not evident that there are any general solutions for the question of determining the boundaries of states*' (Morris, 1998a, p.265). What legitimate state may possess, in Morris view, is '*Political Power*': a limited 'right to rule', to make and enforce rules, to adjudicate disputes, support useful practices and mechanism for collective decision, establish standards, and so on' (Morris, 1998b, p.292). This is, in Morris's point of view, less than states claim for themselves, but it is still a considerable moral power, (once again), justified by simple considerations of justice and efficiency.

To have a better understanding on the kinds of state's sovereignty, especially those of internal and external, the polemic been produced by Stephen Krasner is enlightening in some ways. In his *Sovereignty: organised hypocrisy*, Krasner is trying to test the validity of the conception of Sovereignty in the modern context by dividing it into four categorisations: (1) international-legal sovereignty, a form of sovereignty connoted by mutual recognition of independent international entities; (2) domestic sovereignty, understood as the ability to exert effective control within the state itself; (3) interdependence sovereignty, defined as the ability to control trans-boundary flows from people to goods to pollution; and (4) Westphalian sovereignty, defined as political organization based on the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a given territory (Krasner, 1999, chapter one). Among these four, only domestic sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty that been emphasized by Krasner, from which he concludes that states have never been as sovereign as most of us assume they are, especially those of the Westphalian system (Krasner, 1999, *ibid*). However, people still believe to the myth of sovereignty despite the frequent

violations over it, thing that is labelled by Krasner as 'organised hypocrisy' (Krasner, 1999). With regard to the notion of sovereignty, a very interesting point to be underlined in this context, that 'surrendering sovereignty could be in any state's rational self-interest'. Such a thing is possible, according to Krasner, because the international system is characterized by power asymmetries among nations, the existence of multiple and conflicting norms on the international level, the absence of authoritative structures to resolve these conflicts, and the fact that ruler's actions are driven by domestic constituency interests (Krasner, 1999).

Among the "Modernists", Morris and Krasner more or less adopt the same stance on the notion of state's sovereignty, but Karl Wittfogel does not. Wittfogel conceived the view that the sovereignty must be imposed upon the state as a necessity. According to him, a society where irrigation was a matter of life and death to the people and their crops, and where the control of the water courses was in the hands of the ruler and his bureaucracy, so the sovereign must not in the hand of many otherwise will end to chaos (Wittfogel, 1957). Basically, Wittfogel use the term 'hydraulic society' for an economy which involves large-scale and government-managed works of irrigation and flood control, to contrast with hydro-agriculture (small-scale irrigation).

The ideological grounds of Wittfogel's concept of the decisive role played by political institutions, rather than economic factors, is opposed to Karl Marx's methodology that '*Economic structure of the society is the fundament on which all political and judicial superstructures are established*' (Badie and Birnbaum, 1979). Wittfogel bypasses this economic relationship by deriving the state forms of 'oriental despotism' notably from the characteristics of the geographic environment. The logic is more less like this: In a certain natural setting, agriculture requires irrigation; the construction of dikes and canals requires cooperation, such teamwork, in turn, requires leadership; so, there is a need for submitting to authority supposedly leads to despotism of the ruler and to general enslavement of the population (Wittfogel, 1957).

In relations with the notion of state and sovereignty, a summary can be taken from Wittfogel's conception. Firstly, the natural setting determines the nature of states, a notion that to some extent could serve us an answer to Morris; Secondly, all

governments fulfil a number of general functions which (in Marx's notion) were essential for the origin and maintenance of power of production while for Wittfogel serve as giving the oriental states its specific quality. That is, Wittfogel writes, '*it was not a political superstructure overlying an economic foundation, but an essential part of this foundation*' (Wittfogel, 1969), and; Thirdly, its officials were not the political agents of social masters who control the means of production. '*They*', Wittfogel notes, '*themselves were the masters*'--'*Politically and economically they dominated the mass of the immediate producers, the peasants, no matter whether these producers lived under a communal village system*' (Wittfogel, 1969). This essay sounds like a justification of Weber's definition, '*A compulsory political organization with continuous operations will be called state insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in the enforcement of its order*' (Weber, 1968).

That 'states are actually not as sovereign as they claimed' is also argued in an indirect way, by Clifford Geertz. States, in Geertz's view, were not necessarily political organizations endowed with sovereignty. They could be as they were in nineteenth-century Bali, an extension of social life where the state and the ruling powers, located at the geo-cosmological centre of the Balinese universe, constituted an empire of the spiritual meaning. The locus of theatre-state was not that of Tyranny; it was a non-sovereign entity. Ceremonial splendour, whether for life-crisis ceremonies, or royalty/temple festivals, was of the same level as rent-collecting, trade and land-leasing, treaty-making, temple and palace building, and feast-preparation. Nineteenth-century Bali did not have a sovereign state, it was a theatre-state (Geertz, 1980). Daily life for most of the Balinese people was located around a number of various associations and alliances, forming a series of interlocking cells ranging over the Balinese countryside. How were then the relations between the court and the people? Geertz explains that the king was a 'king-bee' and the workers were the Balinese people who organized themselves into villages, irrigation societies, kinship groups, temple congregations, and the like. The inter-section of the two worlds, that of Negara (the court) and desa (the village), according to Geertz, was accomplished through the interrelations of specific people but also through a particular symbology of power that was both a model 'of and for' both dimensions. Geertz also insisted that Balinese social organization had local variations such as

those of king-priest, *dadia* clientships (kin groups), *perbekels* (state functionaries) and so forth, through which the live of courtier and villager were linked. Through dramatic ceremonial ties, life and death rituals, the power and social order had been formed. For Geertz, hence, some sovereignty exists, but it is practiced in a different way than it was in Western sovereign states.

Two facts, however, need to be taken into account when undertaking further study on state: *first*, the concept of state indeed develops, means across the time and geographical landscape, 'state' should have been perceived in different ways despite terms and institutions remain indifferent, and; *second*, the definition of 'state' must rest on various perspectives and has therefore been treated differently by the hands of multiple stakeholders such as philosophers, political theorists, historians, anthropologists, sociologists and so on. Stakeholders who are political scientists, especially the neo-institutionalists, have a viewpoint on the state that is focused on the modern state, wherever it is found in the world, the institutions that it uses, and the public policies that it makes and implements. Such a 'political science' perspective on the state prefers a definition of the state that is not so concerned with theories or concepts of sovereignty but with more practical matters of structure and process. And such a definition also provides a better basis for studying state development than do conceptions of the state, whether classical or modern, that are: a) concerned with the pre-modern state and/or particular structural/cultural/regional types of state (the Classics and Wittfogell and Geertz) or; b) concerned with the modern form of state and from a global perspective but not concerned with the state's institutions and policymaking (Morris and Krasner).

A political science definition of the state can be derived from Easton's famous definition of 'the political' in his classic work, *The Political System*, first published in 1953. Easton's most famous definitions are perhaps that 'political science' is 'the study of the authoritative allocation of values for a society' or 'the study of the authoritative allocation of values as it is influenced by the distribution and use of power' (Easton, 1967, p.129, 146). However, this formula of 'authoritative allocation of values for a society' was a clumsier way of phrasing what Easton initially described as: 'political life concerns all those varieties of activity that influence significantly the kind of *authoritative policy adopted for a society* and the way it is put

into practice. We are said to be participating in political life when our activity relates in some way to the *'making and execution of policy for a society'* (Easton, 1967, p.128). It would, therefore, be better to use this definition of 'political life' as relating in some way 'to the making and execution of policy for a society' or, instead, to a society's *policy making and policy implementation* (with 'policy implementation' being a more modern description of what Easton termed 'policy execution'). Then, this definition of political life can be added to Easton's definition of the *state* as 'a particular institutional form that political life takes at some historical moments' (Easton, 1967, p.142). This would mean that the state is a particular institutional form of 'policy making and policy implementation for a society' that is found in particular historical eras, namely in the modern era of world history and in a few older historical eras in some parts of the world.

The particular 'institutional form' of a modern state includes complex organisational institutions, such as bureaucratised administrative organisations and highly professional military organisations, as well as the group institutions of a cabinet or a representative assembly and the 'rules of the game' institutions expressed formally in written Constitutions and informally in the processes that have been institutionalised as informally recognised 'rules of the game'. This concept should supplement Easton-derived definition with *Weber's* point about importance of *territorial* nature of the state in his classic definition of the state as an institution that claims the monopoly of legitimate violence within a territorial area. The boundaries of this territorial area delineate the boundaries of the 'society' for which policy is made and implemented (if necessary, by using the state's monopoly of legitimate violence).

Problem of this territorially delineated 'society' being a new society because the state itself is new and also problem of this new society containing sources of potential disunity, such as ethnic, religious and territorial divisions e.g. in 1940s-to 1960s over a hundred new states were created by decolonisation of European colonial empires in Africa and Asia. Meanwhile, the new states' societies had usually existed only since the European colonial power had 'formed' them by the boundaries of its colonial administration perhaps less than a hundred years earlier. Two most prominent examples of the decolonisation era were ex-British colony of *India* and the ex-Dutch colony of *Indonesia*: two largest new states in terms of territory and

population and also both these new states had very diverse societies, with marked ethnic, religious and territorial divisions. However, contrast between India's state stability in retaining parliamentary democracy from independence in 1948 to 2010, Indonesia has experienced parliamentary democracy in the 1950s, President Sukarno's civilian dictatorship in 1960s, General Suharto's military dictatorship in 1970s-1990s and presidential (not parliamentary) democracy from 1999 to 2010 i.e. such marked changes in the policymaking institutions of the state that can be described as *four different versions* of the state. Therefore, in the case of Indonesia (and many other post-colonial new states that have experienced more than one version of the state since independence) there is a need for a concept of state *development* to explain at least *what* happened to the state and perhaps to help explain *why* this happened.

1.2. Developing the 'Modern' State: Complexity and Capability

Since the nineteenth century, historians have worked to dispel the "mystery" surrounding the emergence of the modern state. They paid particular attention to questions such as, 'What was the origins of the modern state as thus is conceived today?', and "How has this conception developed over time?". Hegel (1770-1831), for instance, identified the modern state both as '*sui generis*' and as a specifically European product. This observation is based on his comments on the general attitudes of the 'new' state entities, especially as to the kind of authority bestowed to, and the kind of loyalty required by, the modern state (See: Hegel and Friedrich, 1999). This basic argument of Hegel is similar to later ideas of social scientists such as Max Weber--famous for defining the modern state as claiming a monopoly of legitimate violence within a specified territorial area. However, Hegel and Weber also realised that the 'modern' state had developed in parts of Western Europe in the medieval and post-medieval eras and had then spread to other parts of the world as the model of a 'modern' state.

The phenomenon is therefore similar to Anderson's theory of nationalism: spreading from Western Europe to the rest of the world, first to 'Creole' nations of the United States of America and Latin America, and then much later in the 'last wave' of nationalism, post-World War II 'colonial nationalism', spreading to parts of Asia and

Africa that had been under Western colonial rule. Anderson, however, “did not use the same approach” when discussing the spread of the Western model of the *state* to Indonesia and this will be noted later in this chapter when describing the versions of the Indonesian state. Therefore, by focusing his attention on the emergence of multiple national consciousness in the medieval Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and relate these to the consequential phenomenon during the later centuries, Anderson was trying to say that the medieval Europe is the ‘metropole’ of nationalism ‘religion’---the ideology which then spread to the rest of the world at the later periods. As he argues in chapter 7 entitled with ‘*The Last Wave*’: “*The New states of the post World War II period have their own character, which nonetheless is comprehensible except in terms of the succession of models we have been considering.....a very large of these (mainly non-European) came to have European languages-of-state. If they resembled the ‘American’ model in this respect, they took from linguistic European nationalism its ardent populism, and from official nationalism its Russifying policy-orientation*” (Anderson, 1983a, p.47).

If such nationalism was ‘modular’ in the sense of following Western models, so too is the spread of Western model of the state which became global model of the ‘modern’ state. However, there was a problem of accommodating or adapting this model of the state to societies that have inherited non-Western institutions and culture – problem that concerned theorists of ‘political development’ in 1960s and is still concerning theorists of economic development, who realise the importance of such ‘political’ factors.

Strayer on State Development: The European Model of the ‘Modern’ State

The key theorist of such state development is Strayer who pioneered the notion that the historical development of the state in Europe produced a model of the ‘modern’ state that had then spread geographically to other parts of the world. The European model of the state became the ‘fashionable model’ and the non-European states ‘imitated the European model in order to survive or else went through a colonial experience which introduced large elements of the European system. The modern state, wherever we find it today, is based on the pattern which emerged in Europe in

the period 1100 to 1600' (Strayer et al., 2005, p.12). However, the 'fashionable' model imitated by the rest of the world as the 'modern' state was *not* the *basic* pattern that emerged in Europe in 1100-1600, but the *more highly developed* pattern that had emerged by the time that the imitating occurred in the 1800s and 1900s. In fact, most of the imitating took place after the 1940s when there was decolonisation in the European colonial empires in Asia and Africa. Certainly, non-European states in this period would never have considered themselves as imitating Europe's monarchical institutions of 1100-1600 - as they regarded only the *latest* version of the model as being 'fashionable' and worth imitating.

The latest version of the model would be described by Strayer in terms of the state's increased complexity and capability. As was noted earlier, Strayer's study of state development was a merging of: a) earlier theorists' focus on the social function of the state, as in the case of Marx, Durkheim and Weber, and; b) the more recent theorists' focus on the historical formation of the state. In Strayer's study of state development this functional/formation mixture produced a focus on historical change (formation) in the complexity and capability (function) of the state. As early as the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the 'latest version' of the model not only had bureaucratic administrative organisations and professional military organisations but also had most of the formal institutions of a *parliamentary democracy*, even if this early version had yet to develop fully democratic elections to its parliamentary representative assembly. As Tilly points out in his 2005 foreword to Strayer's book, the 'compelling mystery' is 'how *unprecedented* forms of government including *representative institutions* took shape at a relatively poor periphery of the Eurasian land mass, and eventually spread widely throughout the world' (Strayer et al., 2005, p.xvii) and it is the imitation of such 'unprecedented' forms as the use of representative institutions that is the 'compelling' feature of the spread of the European model to other parts of the world. Even non-European states that were already or later became dictatorships would outwardly imitate the parliamentary representative institutions of the European model, even if these formal institutions were informally operated in an undemocratic way, such as by staging non-competitive or semi-competitive elections. Therefore, it is not surprising that Strayer extends his analysis of the 'medieval origins' of the modern state into *post-medieval* periods of European history. He extends it into the early modern period of 1450-

1600, with a further extension into the 1600s-1700s, and in fact by 1799 an infant form of parliamentary democracy had emerged in Strayer's two favourite examples, England and France, hence he is providing an analysis of not only the 1100-1450 origins but also the 1450-1799 *early development* of the European model of the state. Nevertheless, Strayer's analysis of the early development of the European model of the state is selective or 'biased' in its coverage because it focuses so much on the state's *administrative organisations*. Very little is said about the state's *military organisations*, even though the European professional armies and navies were a key part of the European model of the state imitated in other parts of the world. Also, not much is said about the early development of the European state's 'unprecedented' *policymaking institutions* of cabinet government and an elected representative assembly.

The Biological-like, Organic Development of the European Model

Typical of Strayer's bias towards administrative organisations that the only occasion he explicitly uses an analogy with biological development is when he refers to functionally specialised administrative departments being in an *embryonic stage* in 1700: 'many departments were still in an embryonic stage' (Strayer et al., 2005, p.110). Describing this as an 'embryonic' stage is making the analogy with the biological development of an organism through the various stages of its life-cycle, such as a human's development through the stages of embryo, baby, infant and adult. Strayer did not extend this explicit biological-development analogy to the whole state and refer to the medieval 1100-1450 as the embryonic stage of the European model of the state, to the early modern period 1450-1600 as the nascent or 'birth' stage and to the 1600s-1700s period as the 'infancy' stage. However, he did use an implicit biological analogy by occasionally referring to a) the 'developing' or 'development' of the state and b) a 'stage' or the 'stages' in this development. This implicit analogy with biological development is also evident in the way he depicts the development process as a *gradual* progression that involves a *predictable* and *proportionate* increase in complexity and capability. These three features are characteristic of a biological organism's development through the stages of its life-cycle from embryo to maturity (after which the cycle involves a decline in complexity and capability during old age) while it is not difficult to find evidence of the three

features in Strayer's analysis of what might be termed the 'organic' development of the European model of the state.

Evidence and examples of *gradual progression* from the 1100 to the eighteenth century

i) 1100-1300 medieval period

1. establishing the basic elements of a state after the 800-1100 feudal decentralisation i.e. now establishing permanent institutions with professional officials, especially in the kingdoms of England and France (Strayer et al., 2005, p.35-36).
2. Judicial institutions of the King's judges and courts
3. Financial institutions for 'financial management' of King's revenues and expenditure
4. French King's creation of a territorial-control administrative bureaucracy to exercise some central control over France's provinces (territorial control meant implementing the King's decisions, extracting the military and financial resources that the King was entitled to claim, and preventing political disorder by suppressing rebellions and maintaining 'law and order')
5. King's creation of representative assemblies, such as England's Parliament: 'an assembly of the magnates, knights elected by the shires, and representatives of the boroughs' (Strayer et al., 2005, p.45). At this stage, however, England's Parliament and other kingdoms' representative assemblies were merely an institutional means of displaying the kingdom's 'consent' whenever the King wanted to go beyond the customary limits on his powers by increasing taxation and/or creating new laws--'The idea of political representation is one of the great discoveries of medieval governments' and became structurally institutionalised as representative assemblies because 'all governments had to find a way by which the politically active, propertied classes could give consent' (Strayer et al., 2005, p.64, 66).

ii) 1300-1450 late medieval period

1. Lack of development of the states' administrative organisations and the preference for ad hoc solutions because of the strain of famines, plague, war and other problems (Strayer et al., 2005, p.57).
2. significant development in functions of *representative assemblies*. Strayer noted that the English Parliament developed new functions, with the convening of Parliament being used by the King's subjects as 'convenient occasions for voicing grievances, for demanding investigations and reforms' (Strayer et al., 2005, p.67).
3. in addition to this accountability function, Parliament was also developing into an independent source of legislation as members of Parliament began petitioning the King to approve *their* proposals for new laws (Brooker, 2009, p.54-55).

iii) 1450-1600 early modern period and beyond to 1600s-1700s

1. Marked structural development of administrative organisations through the emergence of new, functionally specialised departments dealing with 'foreign affairs, war and so on' (Strayer et al., 2005, p.104).
2. This was a new form of structural complexity, because these new, functionally specialised departments were located in the capital city and were very different from the layers of territorial-control bureaucracy.
3. A *gradual* process of development, for 'it took the new bureaucracy two or three centuries to develop solidly organized departments with clearly defined areas of responsibility' and 'the full array of new departments can scarcely be said to have appeared before the beginning of the nineteenth century' (Strayer et al., 2005, p.104), so that the development of a 'full array' of 'solidly organized' functionally specialised departments was still continuing as late as 1799.
4. The other key development in this period was the creation and development of an institution that was functionally specialised to handle what Strayer terms the 'policymaking process' (Strayer et al., 2005). This was the birth and infancy of *cabinet government* as the state's primary *policymaking* institution.

This policymaking institution began as a small ('inner' or 'working') Council of full-time and often long-term councillors, including history's first Secretaries of State, who helped the King make the 'few hundred policy decisions' that needed to be made every year (Strayer et al., 2005, p.92-95).

5. These small Councils developed into cabinet governments that would take over the King's policymaking and *depersonalise* the monarchy's rule. In the 1500s-1600s Kings still retained *personal* control of the state's executive power: 'Most rulers asserted that they alone had the right to make whatever decisions were necessary to preserve and strengthen the state. They resented any attempts to limit or control this power. It was an intensely *personal possession*; others could advise but only the ruler could decide' (Strayer et al., 2005, p.102).
6. However, by the 1700s the Kings of England were being gradually and informally *dispossessed* of executive power by their Cabinets of Secretaries/Ministers. The King no longer attended meetings of 'his' Cabinet of Secretaries/Ministers and indeed 'his' Prime Minister had become the real head of the government, with the King becoming a largely ceremonial head of state i.e. he was becoming a merely *reigning*, not ruling, monarch (Brooker, 2009, chapter 2).

Strayer pointed out the European state of the seventeenth century was 'far from being a despotism ruled by a monarch and a few cronies' and that by 1700 'monarchy had been weakened' in England (Strayer et al., 2005, p.110-11, 108) but he did not discuss the continuing *depersonalising* of rule that occurred during the 1700s with the development of cabinet government. Similarly, England's Parliament, *the representative assembly*, was developing during the 1700s into the other important *policymaking* institution of the English state and was the foundation upon which cabinet government was being built. It was the foundation of cabinet government because the King literally could not afford to veto or dismiss 'his' Cabinet of Ministers if they had the support of a majority of the elected representatives in Parliament, for then Parliament would respond by refusing to supply the King with the taxation revenue that he needed to finance the state's administrative and military organisations. In fact, England was gradually progressing towards a parliamentary democracy, even if the elections to Parliament still involved

only male property-owners and were certainly not 'free and fair' elections. Therefore, if Strayer had chosen 1799 rather than 1700 as the point by when 'the West European state had developed its own characteristic political patterns' (Strayer et al., 2005, p.110), he could have used England as an example of the gradual progression towards Europe's most characteristic political pattern: parliamentary democracy

Evidence and examples of the predictability of development

The period between 1300 and 1450 was one the continual warfare between England and France and 'was so exhausting for both sides that it discouraged the normal development of the apparatus of the state'; there was a 'tendency to postpone structural reforms, to solve problems on an ad hoc basis rather than by the creation of new agencies of government' (Strayer et al., 2005, p.60). Hence Strayer apparently considers that the creation of new agencies of government is the normal development process that has been 'postponed' because of the strain of continual war. In other words, it is a *predictable* development that would have occurred in normal times, i.e. times when the state was not under abnormal strain.

Another example from the 1300-1450 period is that 'many functions of a modern state were either not being performed at all, or were being performed badly. One would scarcely expect a medieval government to concern itself with problems of health or education. But one would expect ... that specialized agencies would have emerged to regulate the economy, to suppress crime and disorder, to organize the armed forces, and to conduct inter-state relations' (Strayer et al., 2005, p.77-78) hence Strayer is again implying that the emergence of increased structural complexity (functionally specialized agencies) is a *predictable* (expected) development that would have occurred in normal times, and in fact he noted that these functionally specialised agencies did emerge in 1300-1450 in Italy, where times were more normal than in England and France because in Italy 'wars were fought on a smaller and less devastating scale' (Strayer et al., 2005, p.78,60).

Evidence and examples of proportional relationship between complexity and capability

Strayer, for instance, links increased complexity to increased capability in his description of France's development of a complex territorial-control bureaucracy in 1100-1300. The French King's local officials were supervised by the King's provincial officials who were in turn supervised by his regional officials who were 'supervised by councils, courts, and chambers sitting in Paris. There was a constant flow of orders, rebukes, judicial decisions, and requests for information running from central to local officials' (Strayer et al., 2005, p.52). This was a *complex* administrative structure for a medieval state but the Kings of France needed 'to develop a many-layered administrative structure' if they were to be *capable* of exerting territorial control over their diverse provinces – in fact 'the bureaucracy was the cement which held all the pieces together' and made it 'possible to create a state out of provinces and regions with widely divergent characteristics' (Strayer et al., 2005, p.52,53). Another example of how the complex French territorial-control bureaucracy increased its state's capability comes from the later period of 1300-1450. Strayer implies that if this bureaucracy had been made even more complex by adding a sub-local layer of officials, the bureaucracy would have been capable of exerting direct control over the whole population: 'the French had increased the size of their bureaucracy enough to make the government more complicated but not enough to make it capable of dealing directly with the people' (Strayer et al., 2005, p.73). Yet another example of how administrative complexity could produce a proportionate capability in territorial control is that in the 1450-1799 period the states' increasingly large administrative organisations were capable of dealing with the increased demands being made upon them. In 1450-1799 a European state's thousands of territorial-control bureaucrats were making 'tens of thousands of routine judicial, financial and administrative rulings' every year and maintained 'reasonably effective' control over the provinces: regional rebellions were suppressed; the orders of the judicial courts were enforced; there was an increase in the security of the individual; and taxes 'were collected regularly' (Strayer et al., 2005, p.92,101).

Although Strayer described the 'administrative systems' of the European states as 'barely adequate' in the 1450-1799 era, he emphasised that being barely adequate

was 'quite different from failure', noting the contrast with a number of 'new', post-colonial states of the 1950s-2000s which have become 'failed states' or have been unable to achieve a 'barely adequate' capability. However, it is the state's *policymaking institutions* that provide the most important example of the proportionate relationship between complexity and capability. During the 1700s England's complex policymaking institutions of cabinet government and parliamentary representative assembly had given the kingdom an increased capability in policymaking by removing two of the major weaknesses associated with monarchical despotism and other forms of personal rule: 1) a personal ruler has too much power to inflict damage on state and society if that person is an incompetent policymaker, and; 2) a personal ruler cannot be bloodlessly removed from power until he decides to retire or, more often, until he dies of natural causes. The removal of these weaknesses gave the English state an unprecedented advantage in policymaking that made up for any remaining weaknesses in its administrative organisations. Strayer acknowledges that in the 1700s the 'Asian empires' in Turkey, Persia, China, and Japan could rival the European states in 'organization and power' (Strayer et al., 2005, p.105) but clearly no Asian state could rival England's policymaking institutions. For example, the 'Oriental despotism' of Imperial China had an impressive administrative bureaucracy that exercised territorial control throughout the provinces of this vast country but this form of despotism had policymaking institutions that appear simplistic and primitive when compared to those of England in 1799 (see: Wittfogel, 1957). The only state in the world that could rival the complexity of England's policymaking institutions was the new state established in North America in the 1770s-1780s by some English settler colonies, i.e. the newly independent United States of America.

The American Version of the Modern State

Strayer does not mention the development of the state in the English settler colonies in North America, even though they developed a different version of the modern state (and also produced the first example of a Western state being imitated by new, post-colonial states when in the 1800s the newly independent Spanish settler colonies in Central and South America imitated the USA's policymaking institutions).

The republican USA created and developed the office of *President* as an elected and temporary monarch who is: a) the real head of government as well as ceremonial head of state but; b) shares power with an elected representative assembly like the Kings of England did in the late 1600s (but with a much larger proportion of the population having the right to vote than was the case in England in the 1600s or 1700s). In other words, the USA was developing a *presidential democracy* rather than a parliamentary democracy, and this presidential form of democracy would be imitated throughout Central and South America and in a few post-colonial states outside America, such as Nigeria in 1970s. This American, presidential version of the modern state had policymaking institutions that were no less complex than those developed in Europe, but the executive power of the President was *depersonalised* not by cabinet government but by the President being elected and temporary (no more than two terms of office) and having his powers limited by a written Constitution interpreted by an independent Supreme Court. The American invention of a *written Constitution* interpreted by a Supreme Court can be viewed as a separate policymaking institution, for it would be imitated by many European parliamentary democracies and by most non-European states imitating parliamentary democracy. Similarly, some European and most non-European parliamentary democracies would use the title/office of *President* to give themselves a *non-monarchical ceremonial head of state* (Malaysia's creation of a reigning monarchy for its parliamentary democracy was one of the rare exceptions). Therefore, the 'fashionable' model of the modern state in the 1800s-1900s should be labelled not the 'European' but the 'Western' model, with *two* different but overlapping *versions*: a) European parliamentary democracy and b) American presidential democracy. The two versions are distinguished from each other by the differences in their *policymaking institutions*, not by any differences in their administrative and military organisations, but there is also some overlapping caused by such 'American' institutions as the Presidency and a written Constitution being frequently imitated by states that are imitating parliamentary rather than presidential democracy. Next section of chapter looks at how the new state of Indonesia first imitated the European, parliamentary-democracy version of the modern state before developing two new versions of the state that reduced its policy-making complexity by establishing the personal rule of a presidential-monarch dictator and then finally developed a fourth version of the state

that returned to the policy-making complexity of democracy but in the form of an Indonesian-developed version of presidential rather than parliamentary democracy.

1.3. Mechanically developing democratic and dictatorial versions of the State: Indonesia's four versions, 1950-2010

Mechanical versus Organic Development

The previous section of this chapter described the development of the Western model of the modern state as being analogous to biological development and termed it 'organic' development. Organic state development is characterised by increasing complexity and capability plus three other characteristic features: i) gradual progression through stages of development and periods of history, ii) a predictable development path and iii) a proportional relationship between complexity and capability, such as when increases in complexity bring proportionate increases in capability. Organic development, however, is not the only type of development and it is usually combined with another type, the mechanical, during the historical development of a state or a model of the state. The mechanical type of state development is analogous to the mechanical development of new versions of a piece of machinery and is a more rapid and unpredictable development process than the organic type, i.e. in mechanical development: a) change may involve a rapid replacement of one design by another, b) the new version may or may not be more complex than the previous version, and c) the levels and changes in complexity may or may not be proportionate with levels and changes in capability. Analogously, when a piece of machinery is being operated in difficult conditions, a highly complex design may be less capable of handling these conditions than a less complex version of the machinery.

The particular combination or 'mix' of the two types, organic and mechanical, varies from case to case of historical development, as is illustrated by three famous examples of Western model of the state that were mentioned in the previous section: the USA, England and France. The USA's element of mechanical development occurred only its origins, i.e. emerged through a war of independence that led to the

rapid and unpredictable development of the American version of the Western model of the state. In contrast, the other English settler colonies in North America (i.e. those in what is now the state of 'Canada') would become independent through a gradual and predictable progression towards English-style parliamentary democracy with Governors-General deputising for the reigning English monarch as the ceremonial head of state. After its mechanical beginning, the USA shifted to an organic type of state development and, apart from a civil war in the 1860s, has maintained an organic gradualness and predictability for more than two centuries. Also in contrast, the Spanish settler colonies in South America continued to experience mechanical state development after their wars of independence in the early 1800s. Although these new states imitated the developing presidential democracy in the USA, they soon began to experience periods of military dictatorship and, in fact, some political scientists have argued that from the 1820s to the 1980s South America experienced 'a cyclical pattern of alternating periods of democracy and dictatorship, with each period lasting about 20 years' (Brooker, 2009, p.9).

The military dictatorships were developing new designs during this century and a half of largely mechanical development. In addition to personal rule by a military leader holding the title/office of President, they developed rule by juntas (councils of military leaders representing the military as an organisation) and also ways of disguising military rule behind the formal institutions of presidential democracy, such as staging one-candidate, non-competitive elections or multiparty, semi-competitive elections. England, too, has experienced a period of mechanical development, even though very short and long ago, that produced a military dictatorship. In the 1640s-1660s England's organic development of parliamentary democracy was interrupted by a period of mechanical development that saw the overthrow of the monarchy, its replacement by a parliament-ruled republic and then the creation of Cromwell's military dictatorship, which included a brief period of military rule over the regions by Generals of his New Model Army. Although monarchical rule was restored in the 1660s, England had experienced some typically mechanical development during this short period of rapid and unpredictable changes to the state, especially the two pioneering redesigns of its policymaking institutions into a parliament-rule republic and into a military dictatorship with regional as well as central military rule.

These versions are related to the state's policymaking institutions, especially to the parliamentary representative assembly and to the public office of President. So this perspective differs markedly from Anderson's well-known theory of Indonesian state development, which is focused on the *policy-implementing* institutions of civil service and military organisations (as is discussed in Appendix 1: Anderson's view of the Indonesian state). In contrast, the four versions of the Indonesian state described below are categorised in parliamentary/presidential and democratic/non-democratic terms, with a parliamentary version of democracy being replaced by two different versions of presidential dictatorship that are themselves replaced by a presidential version of democracy.

Indonesia's Mechanical Development of Four Versions of the Modern State 1950-2010

Indonesia is a former Dutch colony and experienced mechanical historical development of the state as it imitated the Western model of the modern state. Subsequently, gained independence through the 1945-1949 war against Dutch colonial rule, and underwent a contested painful process when it imitated the Western model of the modern state: especially during the drafting of the pre-independence 1945 Constitution (see Chapter 2). In 1950 the state adopted parliamentary-democracy version of the 'modern' state i.e. European-style administrative and military organisations and European-style policymaking institutions in the form of a parliamentary democracy.

Version 1 – Parliamentary Democracy

The Indonesian parliamentary democracy is a French-style (Third and Fourth Republics) republican parliamentary-democracy policymaking institutions with Western-style bureaucratic and functionally specialised administrative organisations and professional military organisations (see Chapter 4, Appendix 2), but the first version of the state proved incapable of performing even territorial-control function of the state (see : chapter 5). The 1950 Constitution clearly specified cabinet government responsible to parliament – and official interpretation/commentary on the Constitution pointed out that responsibility to parliament was clear-cut and that the

Constitution could not be interpreted to mean instead a government of Ministers assisting the President, i.e. a presidential rather than parliamentary democracy. In addition, this official interpretation/commentary declared that the constitutional position of the Indonesian Prime Minister was to be interpreted as the same as the *Dutch* Prime Minister in the Dutch parliamentary democracy. This was a clear case of the imitation of a former colonial power's version of the state. However, Indonesia's first version of the state proved incapable of performing even territorial-control function of the state as is remarked by Brooker:

'In the later 1950s army commanders on some of the outer islands rebelled against the central government, leading it to impose martial law on the whole country. Although rebellion was militarily defeated in 1958, this did not bring an end to the state of martial law. Instead, President Sukarno declared in 1959 that the military role in administering the country would continue and that the presidential 1945 Constitution would replace the existing Constitution. Indonesia had entered an era of what Sukarno called 'Guided Democracy', which eventually saw him declared President for life' (Brooker, 1995, p.182).

The revival of the *mechanical* development almost began in the pre-independence era, but was replaced by organic post-colonial imitation of European version of the modern state. This was return to 1945 Constitution which was being used to establish a *dictatorship*; therefore this was a *marked reduction in complexity* of policymaking institutions. This was a typical unpredictability of mechanical development, and, was made even more unpredictable because Indonesia was shifting to dictatorship in a different way than other ex-colonial new states, i.e. Indonesia shifted not through a military coup or a misappropriation of power by the party that has won elections or even through an *autogolpe* (self-coup). Indonesian case closest to an *autogolpe* but Sukarno's 'self-coup' carried out by the President of a *parliamentary* democracy instead of by the President of a presidential democracy.

Version 2 – Dictatorship in the form of Civilian Presidential Monarchy

The return to pre-independence 1945 Constitution meant shift to presidential policymaking institutions but dictatorial. President Sukarno goes even further by

interpreting that Constitution to deprive parliament of power and making it appointed rather than elected. The personalisation of his power became very obvious when he was declared President 'for life' which is typical of 'presidential monarchy', defined as 'the dictator's personal appropriation of the public office of President, with the dictator typically being viewed as his country's president for life, sometimes quite explicitly (even legally) and otherwise involving only ritualistic re-elections by the public or legislature' (Brooker, 2009, p.71). However, it is not evident that Sukarno was a populist presidential monarch like Louis-Napoleon in France in 1851-1852 before he became Emperor. Sukarno was a civilian, like Louis-Napoleon, though he did have some military support. He also had the support of two political parties, which meant he is something like a presidential monarch in a Communist state or an African one-party state but there are two 'official' parties in Sukarno's Indonesia. *'His dictatorial rule over Indonesia was based upon the support of the military and of two major political parties – his own PNI party and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The military was given a major role in running the country, not only through the administration of martial law and holding a number of provincial Governorships, but also in the form of several Cabinet posts and substantial representation in the new, appointed parliament. However, the army became increasingly hostile towards another of Sukarno's allies – the outwardly moderate but large and rapidly expanding Communist movement'* (Brooker, 1995, 182-3).

Version 2 – Dictatorship in the form of Civilian, Populist-like Presidential Monarchy

Within a decade of independence, Indonesia's policymaking institutions had been redesigned into a *dictatorial version of the modern state*. The return to the pre-independence 1945 Constitution meant that the formal institutions of policymaking 'modernity' were retained, such as the written Constitution, the title/office of President, and the representative assembly (though Sukarno's interpretation of the 1945 Constitution produced an appointed rather than elected parliament). However, the form of dictatorial version was a monarch-like *personal* rule by President Sukarno, not dictatorship by the state's professional military or by a political party, and this personalisation of power is best described as a *presidential monarchy*. According to Brooker, 'presidential monarchy' is defined as 'the dictator's personal

appropriation of the public office of President, with the dictator typically being viewed as his country's president *for life*, sometimes quite explicitly (even legally) and otherwise involving only ritualistic reelections by the public or legislature' (Brooker, 2009, p.71). In addition, Sukarno was declared President 'for life' and did not interpret 1945 Constitution to mean direct elections for President so he could not claim that direct link to the electorate which is typical of populist presidential monarchs, after the president Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte (see : Appendix 2). 'The populist presidential monarch has reversed the principal-agent relationship with *the people* as an electorate of voters. Instead of the elected President being their agent, he has made the electorate *an instrument of his rule*, in the sense of providing him with a claim to democratic legitimacy, which he strengthens by having himself reelected through semi-competitive elections' (Brooker, 2009, p.79). In distinction Sukarno relied on his claim to *charismatic* legitimacy as political leader of the war of independence as well as first President. He entitled himself as 'founding father' of Indonesia comparable to Jefferson, Washington etc as 'founding fathers' of the USA (see : Chapter 3). Nonetheless, Sukarno's dictatorship was more like a populist presidential monarch than another kind of presidential monarch: e.g., i) the military form, where the President is a military leader, and ii) the one-party-state form, where the President is leader of the 'official' political party, such as a communist party . In contrast to these two forms, President Sukarno was *not a military* leader, and was party leader of only one of the *two* 'official' parties in his dictatorship:

'His dictatorial rule over Indonesia was based upon the support of the military and of two major political parties – his own PNI party and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The military was given a major role in running the country, not only through the administration of martial law and holding a number of provincial Governorships, but also in the form of several Cabinet posts and substantial representation in the new, appointed parliament. However, the army became increasingly hostile towards another of Sukarno's allies – the outwardly moderate but large and rapidly expanding Communist movement' (Brooker, 1995, p.182-183).

It was because Sukarno was neither leader of the military nor leader of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), that he could not intervene effectively to reduce this tension within his support base, the situation which escalated into a virtual civil war in 1965 that ended in the army's destruction of the PKI. Indonesia then

experienced more mechanical development as again a version of the state survived for less than a decade and was replaced by a new design. In 1966, '*Sukarno was pressured into signing over his presidential powers to the army's supreme commander, General Suharto, who became 'acting' President in 1967 and then in 1968 'was appointed President for a five-year term by the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly'* (Brooker, 1995, p.183). This is typical unpredictability of mechanical development and even more unpredictable because Indonesia was shifting to *military* dictatorship in a different way from other ex-colonial new states in the immediate post-colonial period and would produce a significantly different version of personal military dictatorship's military form of presidential monarchy. Some facts may justify this argument: *First*, the seizure of power in Indonesia was not gained through a normal military coup, or threat of a coup, leading to the overthrow of the government, and its replacement with military men or military appointees. This was because the 1966 pressuring of President Sukarno to transfer his powers to General Suharto was a 'disguised coup' in which the military denied having exerted any pressure on the President (Brooker, 2000, p.68). In addition, General Suharto acquired the actual title of President *two years after* he acquired the powers of President from Sukarno ; *Second*, General Suharto's military form of presidential monarchy was *unlike* personal military dictatorships in other post-colonial new states because even when they were military presidential monarchies, they did not use the democratic disguise of multiparty, *semi-competitive elections* as General Suharto did in Indonesia from the 1971 parliamentary elections. As a matter of comparison, Brooker mentioned that only in South and Central America did personal military dictators use semi-competitive multiparty elections, and there 'new' states became independent in the *1800s*, not the period from the 1940s to the 1960s².

² See how Brooker, in Chapter 9 'pairs off' Suharto's regime with Peron's regime in Argentina as 'Third World "Multi-Party" Cases'-- BROOKER, P. (1995) *Twentieth-Century Dictatorships: The ideological One-Party States*, Macmillan. ; and how Brooker, in Chapter 9 of his other book describes Latin America as 'The historical stronghold' of semi-dictatorships and their characteristic semi-competitive elections, with the 'classic example' being Mexico 1920s-1990s and other notable examples being Peron's Argentina 1940s-1950s, Brazil 1960s-1980s, Nicaragua 1960-1970s and the '*Asian example*' of Suharto's Indonesia--BROOKER, P. (2000) *Non-Democratic Regimes*, St martin's Press.

Version 3 – Dictatorship in the Form of Military Presidential Monarchy

General Suharto's redesign of presidential monarchy was a less complex version of dictatorship than President Sukarno's because the new presidential monarch was a military leader and could base his version of personal rule solely upon the support of the military. For example, he did not feel the need to strengthen his populist credentials by having himself directly elected by the people, whether in a one-candidate or semi-competitive election. Suharto was content to have himself re-elected unopposed every five years by the People's Consultative Assembly. General Suharto not only retained the 1945 Constitution, but increased the complexity of the *formal* policymaking institutions by allowing parliamentary elections to be held in 1971 – though these were only semi-competitive elections, and a 1975 law specified that only three, 'officially recognised' parties were allowed to take part in parliamentary elections: the nationalist PNI, the moderately Islamist PPP and the government party, Golkar. The last of these, 'secured' around two-thirds of the vote in the 1977, 1982, and 1987 elections (see : Chapter 7, section 7.4). In contrast, the *informal* policymaking institutions *decreased markedly in complexity* when compared with the situation in President Sukarno's dictatorship. It is noteworthy that informal institutions can limit the personal power of a modern presidential monarch in a similar way that the customary 'rules of the game' limited the personal power of a medieval monarch, such as English King John when he faced rebellion in 1215 because he did not keep to customary rules, and, therefore had to sign Magna Carta as his formal, written agreement that keep to rules. Under President Sukarno's personal rule, the informally institutionalised 'rules of the game' meant his policymaking had to involve or satisfy the three different components in the President's personal support base: the military, the communists and his own party while the new presidential monarch's policymaking processes (under Suharto) had to involve and satisfy only the military. Even this informal institution (rule of the game) was simplified as General Suharto gradually strengthened his leadership position over the military and eased it out of policymaking as by the mid-1970s he had 'succeeded in confining (the military) to policy-implementation' (Sundhaussen, 1976, p.192).

The reduction in the complexity of informal policymaking institutions was partly offset by the *formal* institutions being allowed more influence in policymaking than they had been allowed under Sukarno. This was especially the case for the now 'elected' parliament: 'The government's legislation was sometimes subjected to heated debate and prolonged deliberation, with amendments and even an occasional withdrawal being wrung from the government as the price for maintaining the image of consensual Panca Sila democracy' (Brooker, 1995, p.189). However, the overall effect of General Suharto's redesign of Sukarno's presidential monarchy was a further, though *mild* rather than *marked, reduction* in the complexity of the state's policymaking institutions. General Suharto's dictatorial version of the Western model of the 'modern' state would last much longer than Sukarno's version, a whole generation, until in the 1990s mechanical development produced a marked *depersonalisation* of policymaking institutions through a return to a democratic version of the modern state. The return to democracy, however, was a *presidential* democracy instead of the parliamentary democracy of Indonesia's first version of the modern state.

Version 4 – Presidential Democracy 1999

The fall of Suharto's regime in 1998 did not only mark the end of long-lasting monarchies (which were surviving and glorious for nearly 40 years under *version 2* and *3*) but also opened the way for Democracy that had been awaiting to emerge since 1980s while, in fact, a global trend of the 1990s (see: Huntington, 1991; see also: chapters 3 and 7). However, despite the adoption of new state machinery, the democratization in Indonesia since 1999 did not bring a new constitution as what was happening in 1950 (the *transition* from pre-independence to *version 1*) and in 1959 (the *transition* from *version 1*, parliamentary democracy, to *version 2*, presidential monarchy). The 1945 Constitution is retained but with important amendments: firstly on October 1999, secondly on August 2000, thirdly on November 2001, and lastly on August 2002. In addition, the democratization also did not bring a return to version 1, parliamentary democracy, but instead a democratizing of version 2 and 3 that *depersonalized* their presidential monarchies and converted them into a presidential *democracy, version 4*, by introducing three new features: i) a constitutional amendment limited the time that any person

(Indonesian citizen) can hold the public office of president - According to the 1999 constitutional amendment, the president has a five-year term of office and can be re-elected once *only* as in the USA (see: Indonesia, 1999a - 1st amendment of the Constitution). This was a strong evidence that Indonesia since 1999 has been wanting depersonalized presidency, not 'for life' and seems to be a top priority because the first constitutional amendment was undertaken in 1999, only a year after Suharto's fall, and, during the administration of Habibie, the figure which was widely believed to be Suharto's crony (see: chapters 3 and 7); ii) a constitutional amendment introduced election of the president *by the people* instead of by a People's Consultative Assembly – This was a clear indicator that Indonesian state machinery was following the Western model of democracy (see: Indonesia, 2001 - 3rd amendment of the Constitution); iii) elections for presidents and for parliament are not semi-competitive but instead 'free and fair', fully competitive elections – Again, following the Western model of democracy. Therefore, Indonesia created version 4 of the state, first of all, in order to make sure that the post Suharto/Habibie president is not a monarch, and next because it preferred to democratize by modifying the presidential (1945) Constitution of version 2 and 3 instead of by returning to the parliamentary (1950) Constitution of version 1 – in which Cabinet Ministers were responsible to parliament, not to the President, and the head of government was the prime minister, not the President (who is largely ceremonial head of state).

1.4. The four versions' capabilities: Dealing with Legitimacy, the Military and Political Disorder

This thesis is seeking further confirmation through further research that Indonesia's state development is clearly of the mechanical type. It is because mechanical-like changes in the versions of the state are the obvious structural evidence of mechanical development but also an evidence based upon the processes and 'outputs' of the state. Therefore, this thesis will seek confirmation by looking for evidence of the typically 'mechanical' *lack of proportion* between levels/increases of complexity and *capability*, for example dictatorial versions' reductions in policymaking institutions' complexity were not accompanied by reductions in

capability. However, the analysis will not focus on *polycymaking* capabilities because the evaluation of *polycymaking* is too 'subjective' and contentious for a research project on the theoretical structure of state development.

Achieving legal legitimacy is crucial for a new state because it is needed for efficient policy-implementation. The more a state can rely on legal legitimacy (citizens' duty to obey legal commands), the less the state has to rely on more costly (financially and/or politically) means of implementing policies, such as the use of state coercion or the use of local allies. The use of state coercion requires an effective and therefore expensive state apparatus of officials, police etc, while the use of local allies, such as local community leaders, requires financial and political 'pay offs' to the local allies in exchange for their assistance in implementing the policy. In fact many new states may be: a) unable to pay these costs or; b) unable for other reasons to develop sufficient state coercion or local allies to implement policies effectively. And in these cases legal legitimacy is needed for effective (because there is a lack of alternative means) as well as efficient policy implementation.

Controlling the military is crucial for a new state because the main threat to democracy – or even only semidemocracy – in new states has come from the military. From the nineteenth century new states of Latin America to the mid-twentieth century new states of Asia and Africa, democracy or semidemocracy has most frequently been overthrown by the military rather than by revolutions or 'self coups' by elected governments.

Dealing with political disorder is crucial for a new state because the main threat of it becoming a 'failed' state – or even only a 'weak' state – is through some form of rebellion, such as insurgency, secession or warlordism, taking away the state's control of some part of the society within its territorial boundaries.

This thesis, therefore, will focus on the state's capabilities in performing functions that are relatively 'straightforward' to assess and are also particularly important to Indonesia as a new, post-colonial state since it is clearly important in Indonesian case that: a) Problems with political disorder led to the end of version 1; b) Problems with the military led to the end of version 2, and; c) Problems with legal legitimacy have affected all four versions.

CHAPTER TWO

PRE-INDEPENDENCE ORIGINS OF THE FIRST VERSION OF THE STATE

In a relatively recent publication dedicated to better understanding³ about Indonesia, Donald K. Emmerson published an article entitled “What is Indonesia?” in which he attempted to offer an “alternative definition” of the country in question. His endeavour basically portrayed the image of Indonesia in space rather than exclusively tracing her over time. It focused on four aspects of identity: a unique Indonesia depicted along physical, social, and political lines; a centrifugal Indonesia lying on a great range of diversity; the historical identity of Indonesia variously influenced by its pre-colonial, colonial and nationalist past; and a personal Indonesia as imagined or experienced by individual Indonesians, which overall, may bring intellectual satisfaction to its readers (Emmerson, 2005, pp. 7-73).

Considering Emmerson’s long dedication to his speciality, his article is an important reference point for those who have a special interest in Indonesia, and his latest thoughts should have been expected to clarify the ‘mystery’ of this former Dutch colony. However, instead of feeling enlightened, readers find themselves considering an even more ambiguous situation. Emmerson’s arguments are reassuring but, at the same time, they justify the old slogan that to understand Indonesia well requires a parallel use of rationality and wisdom.

Our goal in this chapter is more or less similar to that is of Emmerson: to elaborate specific aspects of “Indonesia”. However, while Emmerson focus was a broad one, this chapter limits itself to a very specific focal point: the constitution and its relations to the State. Emmerson portrayed Indonesia as an image on a certain space, but our analysis will examine the specific foundations of this image, and, at the same time, observe interactions between the foundations and the image. Some questions taken into account include: How was the Indonesian Constitution formulated, and under what circumstances did this formulation take place? If the Constitution is considered

³ Emerson, meanwhile, denies his own postulate by saying that “*In selecting certain ways of seeing Indonesia for a brief treatment here, I did not try for comprehensiveness.*” See: EMMERSON, D. K. (2005) What is Indonesia ? IN BRESNAN, J. (Ed.) *Indonesia: The Great Transition*. Oxford, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., p.8

as the foundation of state, does this have the minimum requirement to ensure the stability of this structure? How, from the perspective of the Constitution, is the state supposed to exist and behave? Does the Indonesian State always behave in accordance with principles conveyed in the Constitution, or does it tend to violate them? How does the Constitution cope with different situations in the Indonesian political dynamic?

Detailed answers to these questions could be very lengthy and unattainable unless a “clue” is found that clarifies the enigma of whether the Constitution adopted by Indonesia serves to strengthen the state, or brings about instability. To start with, two basic ideas of the state are presumed to have had a great impact in the formulation of the Indonesian Constitution: the ‘*raison d’être*’ of the Indonesian nation which is the concept frequently called ‘Nationalism’,⁴ and the social setting of the Indonesian state.

2.1. Disunited nationalism versus the “Unity in Diversity”

Some Western scholars who focus on Indonesian nationalism seem to share the views that Indonesia had no real root in nationalism in the pre-twentieth century period. Benedict Anderson for example, had grave doubts that nationalism existed in the past by saying: “*If one studies its brief global history, one can say that it (Nationalism) is not something inherited from the ancient past, but is rather a ‘common project’ for the present and the future*” (Anderson, 1999, p.2). Therefore, in Anderson’s view, nationalism should not be associated in a direct way with State. He provided the argument that the Indonesian state existed long before the notion of nationalism had even been conceived by saying that “*The genealogy of the state in Indonesia goes back to early seventeenth century Batavia. Its continuity is quite apparent even though the stretch of its territory increased vastly overtime....Furthermore, we should always bear in mind that in its last days, during the 1930s, 90 percent--I repeat 90 percent--of its officials were ‘natives’.* There were

⁴ History about the Indonesian nationalism can be found in some excellent studies such as: KAHIN, G. M. (1952) *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*. , Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press.; BENDA, H. J. (1958) *The crescent and the rising sun : Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945*. , The Hague, Van Hoeve.; ABDULGANI, R. (1973) *Nationalism, Revolution, and Guided Democracy in Indonesia*, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University.

of course some changes--extrusions and additions--during the revolution, but for the greater part the personnel of the young Republic's state was continues with that of the colonial state. The first post-1950 parliament was also full of former collaborators with colonialism and the new Republican army also included plenty of soldiers and officers who had fought against the Republic during the Revolution" (Anderson, 1999, p.2).

Anderson's 'pre-modern' thesis is supported by other scholars, including Emmerson. However, despite his agreement on the significance of the past, Emmerson was more direct in rejecting the existence of Indonesian pre-Independence nationalism by stating "*Indonesia was state before it became a nation. In consequence, rather than the nation straightforwardly growing a state through which to organize itself, the Indonesian nation has been called into being by—and substantially for—a pre-existing state" (Emmerson, 2005, p.8-9).*

In addition, another perspective about this issue is worthy of inclusion. On August 1945, a few days after the declaration of defeat by the Japanese during the Pacific War, Sukarno and others declared the birth of the Indonesian state - historically marking their action with a document containing a brief statement later known as *Naskah Proklamasi 1945*⁵:

"Kami, Bangsa Indonesia, dengan ini menyatakan kemerdekaan Indonesia. Hal-hal yang mengenai pemindahan kekuasaan, d.l.l. diselenggarakan dengan cara seksama dan dalam tempo yang sesingkat-singkatnya.

Jakarta, 17-8-1945

Atas nama bangsa Indonesia

(Signed) Sukarno-Hatta-----"We, the Indonesian people⁶ hereby declare the independence of Indonesia. Matters concerning the transfer of power, etc., will be carried out in a conscientious manner and as speedily as possible.

Jakarta, 17 August 1945.

*In the name of the people of Indonesia,
[signed] Sukarno-Hatta" (Ricklefs, 1981a, p.198).*

⁵ The text was collectively drafted by Sukarno, Hatta, and Ahmad Subarjo. Other individuals such as Sayuti Melik, BM Diah, Sukarni, and Sudiro were present but admittedly didn't contribute on the drafting of the text. See: HATTA, M. (1969) *Sekitar Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945*, Jakarta, Tintamas.

⁶ Ricklefs translates the Indonesian word "Bangsa" into English as "People", whereas in this context Indonesians would rather use the word "Nation" instead of "People". This needs to be clarified as in certain circumstance, especially for an analytical objective, "People" is not parallel with "Nation".

Observing this text from a literal perspective, at least two important points stand out: *The first* is that the new state called Indonesia was declared by a nation named “*Bangsa Indonesia*”---the Indonesian Nation; *the second* is that Sukarno, Hatta, or whoever were involved in this milestone (those most likely considered as the “project-makers”) were declaring themselves to be acting on behalf of that nation. At least for Sukarno and his circle, Indonesian nationalism pre-existed the state and not vice-versa.

The question of whether the so-called Indonesian nation existed prior or post August 1945 causes us to look at conceptual debates on ‘Nation’ and ‘Nationalism’ (and eventually ‘State’). To this end, Ernest Gellner’s “Nation and Nationalism” serves as a representative analysis. According to Gellner, the difference between nation and nationalism unambiguously lies in their basic definition. The first refers to a group of individuals living in certain boundaries (not necessarily a state), while the second refers to sentiments blossoming among these individuals (Gellner, 1983, p. 1-7). In relation to the state, Gellner’s next argument provides an explanation that sounds favourable to Sukarno’s position while giving an additional space for further discussion. He wrote “.....*the problem of nationalism does not arise for stateless societies. If there is no state, one obviously cannot ask whether or not its boundaries are congruent with the limits of nations. If there are no rulers, there being no state, one cannot ask whether they are of the same nations as the ruled. When neither state nor rulers exist, one cannot resent their failure to conform to the requirements of the principle of nationalism*”. Due to the fact that the Indonesian state didn’t (officially) exist before August 1945, this debate is void unless the attention is focused on “sentiments” rather than on the “people” as noted by Gellner. To bring clarity to his argument, related and supporting material can be brought into the analysis – Kartini’s legacy.

Raden Ayu Kartini (1879-1904), was a prominent Javanese and Indonesian national heroine and well-known as a pioneer in the area of women’s rights for native Indonesians. As a *Ningrat*⁷, she had an exclusive opportunity to study at a Western

⁷ The member of Javanese aristocrat

school from which she learned things such as Dutch language and western culture⁸. Based on her awareness of inequality between westerners and local people, she produced a number of manuscripts and correspondence that led to her being regarded as one of the pioneers of Indonesian nationalism. However, many tend to regard her values as local (Javanese) in character rather than national (Indonesian)⁹. For example Watson made the following comment:

Reading what has been written about Kartini in this accounts brings strong confirmation that in history, interpretations are far more significant than facts. In Kartini's case there are the bald facts of dates of birth 1879 and death 1904, and the fact that we are speaking about a woman, but these in isolation tell us nothing than we want to know; they have to be contextualized: where was she born? who were her parents? what did she achieve? And it is already in answering these apparently simple questions that biographers and myth makers have immediately encountered difficulties and offered very different interpretations. Take for example her country of birth. Should we call it Java, Indonesia, or The Dutch East Indies?.....and her parents? One description of her has her of royal blood. Her letters in English translation are titled Letters from a Javanese Princess. But giving her such a title involves a misconception of stratification in Javanese society, and the term "princess" is simply not appropriate. She was a member of aristocratic Javanese society, and her father was a senior official in the Dutch colonial government. Thus she was of high status within native society.....One of her biographers, the well-known Pramoedya Ananta Toer, anxious to rescue Kartini from her incarcerations and incarnations within myths constructed by liberal Dutch intellectuals and by post-independence ideologues, has emphasized her commons origins. The title of his book, *Panggil aku Kartini Sadja*, is taken from one of the letters Kartini wrote to a Dutch friend disavowing any aristocratic pretentions. The friend had asked how to address her, thinking that she was an aristocrat, and Kartini had replied saying "Simply call me Kartini". To Pramoedya, this response is emblematic for her desire to identify with the common people. And indeed it is this alleged identification of her with the common people that he makes the principal theme of his biography, stressing that Kartini was an Indonesian nationalist *avant la lettre* and hostile to the feudal and hierarchical structure of Javanese society, which she constantly attacked (Watson, 2000, p.18-19).

Returning to Gellner's definition, it seems that the sentiments required by the notion of 'Nationalism' obviously did exist in Indonesia before the birth of the Indonesian state. There may be some hint of this idea in Anderson and Emerson as well, but it should be enough here to say that the origins of nationalism in Indonesia are unclear, fragmented, and subjective, but, nonetheless, useful.

⁸ A good reference about Kartini can be found in FAN, K.-S. (1982) *Women in Southeast Asia: a bibliography*, Boston, G.K. Hall.

⁹ It is more or less in the same sense that Pattimura of Ambon (1783-1817), Prince Diponegoro of Java (1785-1855), Teungku Cik Di Tiro of Atjeh (1836-1891), Pangeran Antasari of Kalimantan (1797-1862), and many more, were regarded as "The Progenitor" of Indonesian Nationalism".

These different perspectives are congruent with the establishment of the modern Indonesian state. Since August 1945, in the declaration of Independence, there is a slogan referring to the wide archipelago: *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*—Unity in Diversity (various, yet one; diverse, but united). This national motto represents and reflects accurately the most profound reality of Indonesia. It expresses a strong desire to achieve unity despite the immense heterogeneous character of this state. The existence of this common will in turn presupposes the existence of common cultural characteristics underlying the apparent heterogeneity.

The most impressive thing to say about this country is the fact that Indonesia is highly fragmented both geographically and ethnically. Consisting of not less than 13,667 (big and small, inhabited and uninhabited) islands (Simatupang, 1977, p311-322), the Indonesian archipelago is certainly the most scattered country in the world. Although the land area covers only about 735,000 square miles, its total land and sea area amounts to nearly four million square miles – a million square miles more than the area of the continental United States of America (Pelzer, 1963, p. 1-2). Indonesia's islands are spread over an expanse of more than 3,000 miles, equal to the distance between San Fransisco and the Bermuda Islands; and about 1,000 miles wide, a distance equal to that of Buffalo, New York to Key West, Florida (Pelzer, 1963, p.1, Vlekke, 1943, p.x). Accounting for half of the area of Southeast Asia, Indonesia's land area is exceeded only by India and China (Peacock, 1973, p.1). It is dominated mainly by five major islands: Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua.

Ethnically and culturally, Indonesia is also one of the more heterogeneous countries in the world (Geertz, 1963, p.24). Its population is basically of Malay-race origin – the product of a large, but unverified, number of migrations from the Asian mainland¹⁰ dating back between 2500 B.C. and 1000 B.C. An amalgam with other racial elements over many centuries has produced various ethnic variations within that

¹⁰ Mohammad Ali said that the ancestors of Indonesian Malay-race were migrants from the valleys of Mekhong, Irawady and Saluen in Indo-China (currently is Vietnam) who came to the archipelago at around 2500 B.C. See: ALI, M. (1963) *Perjuangan Feodal*, Bandung, Ganaco., p.9-11

common racial framework and hence making its population difficult to classify¹¹. Raymond Kennedy, as cited by Legge, noted that there are at least fourteen ethnic groups which are prominent in Indonesia: Atjehnese, Batak, Minangkabau, Coastal Malay, Sundanese, Javanese, Madurese, Balinese, Dayaks, Makassarese, Buginese, Torajas, Menadonese, and Ambonese (Legge, 1964, p.4). Scholars such as Hefner, believe that there are at least 300 ethnic groups existing in Indonesia (Hefner, 2005, p.75). Such communities occupy their own particular region, speak its own language, and possess its own form of social organization. They have a sense of distinctness and sense of local pride that, in certain circumstances, take precedence over feelings of national loyalty (Legge, 1964, *ibid*). According to a comprehensive study by the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) cited by Emmerson, a total of 726 indigenous languages were spoken as mother tongues in Indonesia in the 1980s and early 1990s (Emmerson, 2005, p. 23)¹². To this mix, we must add the presence of the Chinese, the Arabs, the Indians, and the Eurasians with their own languages and cultures. Some of them have lived in the archipelago for many generations (Skinner, 1963, p.97-117).

With regard to religious life in Indonesia, we can say that, with the exception of Judaism, and with the addition of a wide range “Indigenous religions”, all the major and important world religions are represented, most of them alive and strong. According to the 1971 national census, Islam comprised 87.5% of the total population, Christianity (Protestant and Roman Catholic) 7.4%, Hinduism 1.9%, Buddhism 1.7% and others 1.4% (BPS, 1973). Furthermore, around 1.5 million (including much of the Chinese minority) are Confucianists (Van Der Kroef, 1953, p.121). Other statistical analyses may show some difference in percentage, but it is believed that Moslems count for at least 90 percent of the total Indonesian population (Peacock, 1973, p.147), and most of these live on the island of Java. Christianity is practiced mostly in the northern part of Sumatra and the eastern parts such as in Sulawesi, Maluku, and Papua; while Balinese and Lombokese are mostly

¹¹ Excellent historical studies about the movement of people and cultures around the Indonesian archipelago can be found in Anthony Reid and Denys Lombard. See: REID, A. (1939) *Southeast Asia in the age of commerce, 1450-1680*, New Haven, Yale University Press.; LOMBARD, D. (1990) *Le carrefour javanais : essai d'histoire globale*, Paris, Editions de l'Ecole des hautes etudes en sciences sociales.

¹² Different information, however, were provided by some different scholars. Robert Cribb, for instant, put the number more than 350. See: CRIBB, R. & KAHIN, A. (2004) *Historical Atlas of Indonesia*, Lanham, Scarecrow Press., p. 260

Hindu. However, the kinds of Mohammedanism, Christianity, and Hindhuism that are practiced are hardly “pure” versions. The Javanese, for example, who are almost all Moslem, still possess fundamental belief about spirits, life after death, magic, and pagan concepts. In addition, their practices are mixed with Hindhuism and Buddhism as a result of the political dominance of the Hindu-Buddhist Kingdom of Majapahit during the fourteenth and early fifteenth century. The ‘Agama Jawa’ (Islam but Pagan-like) dominates in rural villages, and consists of a balanced integration of Animistic, Hinduistic, and Islamic elements. In Geertz’s words, this basic Javanese syncretism is the island’s true folk tradition (Geertz, 1976, p.5). The remainder follow a relatively unmixed form of Islam – distinguished by strict rituals and practices, depth of religious comprehension, and rejection of Animistic and Hindu beliefs. The group known as *Santri* under Geertz’s classification, possibly counts for more than a quarter of the total Javanese population.

Heterogeneity and diversity are also present when we speak about the Indonesian economic, social, and political landscape. The various levels of human technology that developed over many centuries in the archipelago have produced various civilizations. The greater part of Java, especially the central and eastern part of the island, has been cultivated for many centuries before, and is an agricultural society. This, combined with the density of the population and agricultural village life of Inner Java (which is based on a closed economy) eventually created a feudalistic social pattern¹³. Under these circumstances, the rural life of peasants continued relatively unchanged with trade and interactions with outsiders monopolized by village leaders. The latter, in turn, were dominated by imperial rule – as such, their mansions and palaces became the centres of Javanese civilization. The society itself, as a consequence, remained stratified, creating extreme levels of heterogeneity.

Northern Java, Sumatra, and the eastern coastal parts of Kalimantan, meanwhile, showed a different social pattern. The harbour principalities that flourished in these coastal towns facilitated close contact with outside traders for many centuries (notably merchants from Hinduist-India, China, the Middle East and Japan) who

¹³ This kind of pattern is very close to the reconstruction of hydraulic society dedicated by Karl Wittfogel, See: WITTFOGEL, K. A. (1957) *Oriental despotism : a comparative study of total power.* , New Haven Yale University Press.

bartered precious commodities such as spices, camphor, gold, silver, and sandalwood along the sea roads (See: Reid, 1939, Lombard, 1990). In these parts of the archipelago, the social distance between the aristocratic rulers and the urban population was much less pronounced than those of Javanese inland states.

The hinterlands away from the harbor principalities of Sumatra and Kalimantan, however, showed yet another different social pattern. On these huge islands, the population was extremely sparse compared with that of Java, with vast tracts of land and jungle available for occupation. Farmers moved from one place to another, clearing jungle, burning it off and planting rice, cassava, maize and pepper (revealing a pattern of shifting cultivation). As a consequence, in a society without integration of the rural regions with larger political units, this was another factor of heterogeneity for the archipelago. All these factors caused the “Unity” mentioned in the national slogan to be doubted, making ‘Unity’ seem only an aspiration rather than a concrete reality.

2.2. Polarization in perspectives among elites

The different perspectives on Indonesian nationalism and its national setting have produced consequences: *First*, a common understanding about the genuine “*raison d’être*” of the Indonesian nation is not shared by all Indonesians; *Second*, different elements of the nation tend to use this concept to serve sectarian interests; *Third*, certain groups claim association with the genuine founders, or to be the righteous inheritors of nationalism, thus asserting the privilege and right to determine the future of the nation. These two last consequences were significant in the tensions between Islamic and secular nationalists during the first half of the twentieth century when the Indonesian constitution was being formulated.

Sukarno and the secular nationalists often took their nationalism from ‘Budi Utomo’, an organisation founded by Sutomo in 1908. This organisation was initially a provincial movement (not a national one) though it covered the whole of Java (Nasution, 1965, p. 117). Furthermore, as far as its socio-cultural outlook and interests were concerned, it appealed only to the population of Central Java (Pringgogido, 1967, p. 8). Despite its early parochial origins, the Indonesian state

commemorated the Budi Utomo's establishment as National Awakening Day, justifying the secular nationalist's claim to the state. There are at least two connotations with this public symbol: *First*, despite its local character, Budi Utomo was crucial because with it, the struggle against Western domination was for the first time organised in a "modern" way (Pringgodigdo, 1967, p.11); *Second*, from these early roots, secular nationalist movements developed (including the *Partai Nasional Indonesia*---PNI-Indonesian Nationalist Party---on July 4, 1927; the *Partai Indonesia*---*Partindo*-Indonesian Party---on April 1931; the *Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia*---PNI Baru-Indonesian Nationalist Education---on December 1933; the *Partai Indonesia Raya*---*Parindra*-Great Indonesian Party---on December 26, 1935, and; the *Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia*---*Gerindo*-The Indonesian People's Movement---on May 24, 1937) (Pringgodigdo, 1967, p.55-62 and 105-144).

This group of nationalists can be considered as the fanatic defender of pluralism and democratic liberal views in Indonesia. While struggling over equality between Westerners and local people, organisations under this category idealized a new republic---not necessarily self-governed---but one with preference for the parliamentary-model of governance emphasizing the multi-cultural dimension of nationalism. It tended to omit any differing factors among elements of the nation, including those of religion. In their view, any privilege associated with certain religion-groups, which is in this case is the Islam-majority, was not tolerable, and the notion of state had to be separated from any religious discourse. By consequence, during the first period of the new republic, this group became a shelter for Indonesian minority-groups – most notably the Christians, who mostly lived in the eastern part of the archipelago¹⁴. Among the prominent leaders of this group were Dr. Radjiman Wedyodiningrat, Wurjaningrat Djiwosewodjo, Sukarno, AA. Maramis, Muhammad Yamin, Ahmad Soebardjo, and Mohammad Hatta.

State-justified nationalism was not shared by all Indonesians, especially not by the Islamic nationalists. The latter regarded the establishment of the *Sarekat Islam*---*SI*

¹⁴ In the later period, this geographical cleavage was used by the Christian leaders to warn Hatta that the eastern part of the archipelago would not join into the new republic if the Constitution of that republic gives its privilege to the Moslem majority.

Islamic Association (the continuation of Sarekat Dagang Islam-SDI¹⁵ founded by Hadji Samanhudi in 1905) as the starting point of the modern Indonesian nationalist movement (Nasution, 1965, p.1). There were two arguments that supported this position: *First*, unlike Budi Utomo (which focused its attention around Java and claimed fewer than 10 thousand members) Sarekat Islam had a much vaster scope of operation across the archipelago. In 1916, there were at least 181 Branches of SI scattered over the archipelago, with no fewer than 700,000 members, and later rising to 2 million people by 1919 (Pringgogidgo, 1967, p.18); *Second*, Indonesia's population was by nature divided into various ethnic groups, each with its own language, history, social structure, and tradition, so that the history of nationalism that appeared in the country prior to the twentieth century had a strong ethnic character. In this situation, Islam (notably the *SI*) was often regarded to be the major force capable of transcending these sectarian and primordial boundaries. As stated by Nasution: "*It was mainly Islam...that created in them consciousness of belonging to the same group. Islam was their rallying point of identity. It was through Islam that different ethnic groups were united into a large comprehensive community. Islam was able to break the power of local nationalism* (Nasution, 1965, p.180). It was not by accident that during the nineteenth century Moslem Indonesian national heroes such as Diponegoro, Cut Nya Dien, Cut Meutia, Pangerang Tirtayasa, Teungku Cik di Tiro, Sultan Baabullah, and Pangeran Antasari were frequently referred to as 'complementary justification' to the Islam nationalists' claim.

Unlike the Budi Utomo who focused only on Java, the concern of *SI* was for the whole archipelago. As such, *SI* transformed itself several times: as *Partai Syarikat Islam* (PSI-Islamic Association Party) in 1923; in 1927 that was altered again to the *Partai Syarikat Islam Hindia Timur* (PSIHT-East Indies Islamic Association Party); and finally it became *Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia* (PSII-Indonesian Islamic Association Party) (Pringgogidgo, 1967, pp.35, 40). Together with the *Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia* (*Permi*-Indonesian Muslim Union Party) established in Sumatra in 1932, and the *Partai Islam Indonesia* (*PII*- Indonesian Islamic Party) established in Java in 1938 (Pringgogidgo, 1967, p.124), the *SI* formed the Islam nationalist group.

¹⁵ Initially was aimed to give protection to local-Moslem-traders from the expansion of monopolistic-Chinese-traders.

Similar to objectives of the secular nationalists, this party also stressed its struggle for equal rights with Westerners, and more radically expressed their feeling of anti-colonialism. This sentiment was based not only on the fact that colonialism had caused suffering among local people, but it was also nourished by the religious sentiment that the colonialists were foreigners with beliefs that made them infidels¹⁶. Unlike secular nationalists, a self-governed republic was the non-negotiable political objective for this group¹⁷. The SI declared that their objective was “*To achieve the real development of local people by the way of brotherhood, unity, and mutual help among Moslems...self governance (zelfbestuur) as the final objective of the struggle against colonialist’s politics, and to contend any forms of exploitation by the nasty-Capitalism*”¹⁸ (Pringgodigdo, 1967, p.18).

Another distinguishing factor that split the secularists from Moslem nationalists was the relations between state and religion. For Islamists, the state could not be separated from religion because the purpose of the state system included maintaining the proper connections between the human world and the Divinity on which equilibrium and the well-being of the Indonesian people and the Cosmos depended. The reasoning here was more or less like that of Deliar Noer, who stated“(Islam)... *does not separate the spiritual and the worldly affairs of man, but includes teaching on secular as well as religious activities. Islamic Law, Syari’at (Shari’a), governs both aspect of life, man’s relations with God and his relations with his fellows* (Noer, 1973, p.1). This group was expecting the Islamic *shari’a* to become the foundation of the new state, though in general they could also be categorized as nationalist and democratic in their views. Among the prominent leaders of this group were: Hadji Samanhudi, HOS Tjokroaminoto, Natsir, Abikoesno Tjokrosoejoso,

¹⁶ The similar arguments are forwarded by among others Harry J. Benda. See: BENDA, H. J. (1958) *The crescent and the rising sun : Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945.* , The Hague, Van Hoeve.

¹⁷ For Sukarno and secular nationalists in general, the struggle for independence should be based on pragmatism rather than radical approach defended by Islam nationalists and Socialists group. This difference of approach then frequently leads to conflicts between these two latest ideology and secular nationalists. It is quite often, hence, Sukarno et.al were regarded as colonialist’s collaborators because their moderate, and sometime cooperative, behaviour vis-à-vis the Colonial authorities during the period of 1920-1945.

¹⁸ This Declaration must be the key explanation of political proximity between Islamists and the ISDV (Socialist group in the Volksraad---the embryo of Indonesian Communist Party). It is therefore the later *SI* is often associated with Socialist-and not the Islamists, especially after the admission of Ki Semaun and Darsono (two prominent Socialists) into the *S* in 1918I, since then the popularity of *SI* among Moslems has sharply declined. About this topic, See: BRACKMAN, A. C. (1963) *Indonesian communism : a history*, New York, Praeger.

Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Abdul Wahid Hasyim, and Haji Agus Salim.

As the discussion above suggests, bipolarisation was evident in Indonesian since the beginning of the twentieth century. With reference to the Budi Utomo which was in contrast to the Sarekat Islam, another party, Jong Java (Java Youths, established in 1915) had its counterpart in Jong Islamiten Bond (JIB-Muslim Youth Union, 1925). Alongside, the Permusyawaratan Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia (PPPKI-Union of National Political Associations of the Indonesian People, 1927), and the Gabungan Politik Indonesia (GAPI-Federation of Indonesian Political Parties-1939) were both dominated by secular groups, but at another side there was a federative body of Islamic organisations which was the Majelis Al-Islam A'la Indonesia (MAI-Great Islamic Council of Indonesia, 1937). Alongside, the Java Hokokai (People services Association on Java, 1944) stood as the rival to Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masyumi-Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslim, 1943) (Pringgodigdo, 1967, p.19-34, Anshari, 1997, p.9), and later between Individuals Sukarno and Natsir.

2.3. Two competing models of constitution: The Shari'a versus Secularism

The friction between Islamist and Secular groups become apparent around 1940, as was reflected in the polemic discussion between Sukarno¹⁹ and Muhammad Natsir²⁰. Concerning the relationship between state and religion (Noer, 1973, p.294), Sukarno (as the spoke-person of the Secular Nationalists) wrote articles entitled “*Memudahkan Pengertian Islam-To Rejuvenate the Understanding of Islam*”, “*Masyarakat Unta dan Masyarakat Kapal Udara-The Camel and Aeroplane Society*”, and “*Apa Sebab Turki Memisahkan Negara dari Agama-Why does the Turk separate religion from the state*”. In his articles, Sukarno was trying to persuade Islamic nationalists that it was plausible to separate the notion of state from religious matters. According to

¹⁹ Sukarno was born in 1901, was the founder and president of the PNI (1927) and the President of Indonesia for the Period of 1945-1966. A biography about Sukarno can be found among others in LEGGE, J. D. (1972) *Sukarno: A Political Biography*, London, Allen Lane the Penguin Press.

²⁰ Natsir was born in 1908, was a leader of PII (1938) and the President of the Masyumi political party (1952-1959) and the first Prime Minister of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia (1950). A very brief biography about Natsir can be found in FEENER, R. M. (2007) *Muslim legal thought in modern Indonesia*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press., p. 83-84

Sukarno, Indonesians must: *First*, be aware of their backwardness; *Second*, be gentle, avowing their misperception of the holy books as well as of the ancestral tradition, and; *Third*, free themselves from mistakes of the past otherwise they would not be able to step forward. Natsir (the spokesperson for Islam Nationalists) responded by publishing a series of nine articles entitled "*Persatuan Negara dan Agama*"-Union of Religion and State, in which he contended against all the arguments forwarded by Sukarno.

In brief, secular Nationalists and Islamists were, at the time, in agreement that achieving Indonesian independence was just a matter of time, hence preparation for it was essential. However, both parties disagreed on the foundation of the state. The first was the preference of secularism, while the latter expected an Islamic state with Shari'a law as the constitution.

Developments in the international arena quickly modified this ideological map, with the events of World War II bringing about changes in the competition between rival Indonesian nationalist factions. Soon after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on the 8th of December 1941, the United States declared war against the Japanese, which was followed by a similar declaration by the Dutch government two days later. However, this declaration of war was not accompanied with the necessary preparations by the Dutch Army in the East Indies. As a result, the territory quickly fell under Japanese rule in less than a year.²¹

For Indonesians, the capitulation of the Dutch and the introduction of Japanese rule made little difference. Although the Japanese continued the policies that had been established by the Dutch, they caused even greater hardship and stricter official control. However, as the tide turned by the beginning of 1944, the Japanese realized that they needed all the support they could possibly get in order to slow down the continuing progress of the Allied Forces on the Pacific Front. In September 1944, Prime Minister Koyso publicly promised to give Indonesia its independence

²¹ The story around the World War II can be found in a large number of references, to cite one of them is BENDA, H. J. (1958) *The crescent and the rising sun : Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945.* , The Hague, Van Hoeve., especially Chapter 3 and 4.

“sometime in the future”²². Some goodwill gestures were also made in order to convince the Indonesian people that the Japanese were serious with their promise. These included allowing Indonesian nationalists to take part in state affairs and giving them a greater freedom of movement. Indonesians was also allowed to form their own armed organisations such as PETA-*Pembela Tanah Air*—the Defenders of Motherland on 1943 and *Hizbullah* on 1944. On September 9, 1944, the song *Indonesia Raya* (which later become the Indonesian national anthem and was prohibited up to that time) was permitted to be sung again. The Red and White flag was allowed to fly side by side with the Japanese flag (Panitia Lima, 1977, p.29). Finally, the Indonesian leaders were given more freedom to express their ideas in public, as long as they did not discredit Japanese authority.

The term ‘future independence’ and all kinds of freedom rendered by the Japanese authority provoked a wide range of interpretation amongst Indonesians, as the announcement did not specify when the independence will be granted.²³ In Anderson’s and Kahin’s words, this promise “...*should not be interpreted as ‘in the near future’*” (Anderson, 1961, p.2) or ‘*in the very near future*’ (Kahin, 1952, p.115). However, it was widely believed that most Indonesians at this time put their trust and hope on this promise. Consequently, Sukarno and other secular nationalists preferred to wait and see, while cooperating with the Japanese authorities. In contrast, many Socialist youth activists gained some support from Islam nationalists who were in favour of a quick reaction²⁴. These factors encouraged Indonesian nationalists to challenge Japanese control over the Dutch East-Indies territory and to declare it an independent state. Slogans such as “*Independence must not be a gift*” was frequently sounded among the activists with regard to this development. This

²² The original text of Premier Koiso published in Asia-Raja edition 8 September 1944 says “...kelak pada kemudian hari---someday in the future” DAHM, B. (1969) *Sukarno and the struggle for Indonesian independence* Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press. p.276.

²³ This fact serves as the background to the long debate during the period of post-independence on the issue whether the Indonesian independence is the grant of the Japanese Empire of merely the ultimate-result of long-nationalist-struggle against foreign domination.

²⁴ An exception is the group of Abikusno Tjokrosujoso. In the days following the Dutch surrender, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso threw himself with verve into the activities of a section of the Indonesian political community aimed at forming Indonesian government to assist the Japanese war administration. This behaviour, according to Van Dijk, might be driven by his misunderstanding of the intentions of the Japanese. See: VAN DIJK, C. (1981) *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam : the Darul Islam in Indonesia*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff., p.42

difference in perspective, however, did not persist, as Sukarno's approach received more support from the shifting circumstances.

Indonesian leaders got their first real chance to sit together and formulate their ideas more clearly when a committee was established by the Japanese authority²⁵ on the 29th of April 1945 (Yamin, 1960, p.239) . The committee was named the *Dokuritsu Zyunbi Tyoosakai* (The Investigating Body for the preparation of an independent Indonesia), with 62 members and chaired by DR Radjiman Wedyodiningrat (Anderson, 1961, p.2). It had two Vice-Chairpersons, one of which was Japanese, and the other an Indonesian. Besides the 62 members there were also seven other Japanese as extra-ordinary members (Pantjasila 1964, p.10). Thus, not only were the proceedings of this body conducted under the close scrutiny of the Japanese occupying authority, but they also had to work quickly under severe time constraints.

During its existence, this Committee conducted only two meetings. The first meeting began on the 29th of May and lasted until the 1st of June 1944; the second meeting was held from the 10th to 16th July 1945, during which the Investigating Body discussed the basic principles upon which the future state would be founded. The first and most important issue they had to deal with was raised by Dr. Radjiman who in his opening address, asked the committee members: What is the basis or the foundation of the Indonesian state which we are about to form?

The members of the Investigating Body were soon divided into different groups with different ideas. Some thought that this question was too philosophical. They worried that by trying to answer this question the Body would fall into an irrelevant, abstract and endless debate. That is why they proposed to proceed directly to finishing the

²⁵ Soon after the statement of Premier Kyoso "Instruction issued simultaneously from Tokyo to local commanders in the area, specified that the date of independence should be kept indefinite, and that the use of national symbols might be encouraged" ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (1961) *Some aspects of Indonesian politics under the Japanese occupation : 1944-1945.* , Ithaca, N.Y. , Cornell University. Dept. of Far Eastern Studies., p.2. Following this instruction, Lt. Gen. Keimakici Harada, the commander of 16th Army in Java, then declared the establishment of *Dokuritsu Zyunbi Tyoosakai* with the purpose of granting independence to Indonesia. On paper, this body was intended to consider the basic questions and to draft major plans for an independent state of Indonesia. The result of this would then be handed, via the Japanese, to another body called the Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PPKI-The Preparatory Committee for the Independence of Indonesia)—a later body established by the Japanese authority.

draft of the constitution which, according to them was more practical, realistic, relevant and urgent – especially under the heavy pressure of time.

Most members, however, agreed that the issue raised by Dr. Radjiman was indeed a very important problem that had to be undertaken first before they could proceed to the following steps. But the agreement amongst the members of this group did not go beyond that and were soon divided into two opposing camps. One group defended Islam as the basis of the state, and the other group strongly rejected that idea, and favoured a secular basis. There were more conflicting ideas during the debate within the Investigating Body, as pointed out by Sukarno, “*The sophisticates of Java, the traders of Sumatra, the peasants from outer islands found no common ground. During siesta time from one to five, the Islamic group met separately, the Nationalist group met separately, the Federalist and Unitarians met separately. Those who claimed that our territory constituted exactly the boundaries of the former Netherlands East Indies formed one group. Others who claimed more or were satisfied with less formed another group. Orthodox Muslims pushed for a State on an Islamic theocratic basis. There were moderates who decided we were too immature to govern ourselves at all*” (Adams, 1966a, p.299).

On June 1, 1945, after three days of “sharp conflict” amongst the members of the Investigating Body, Sukarno delivered his famous speech, known as “The birth of Pancasila”—the Philosophical foundation which is the soul of the Indonesian constitution.

Paduka Tuan Ketua yang Mulia,

“...menurut anggapan saya, yang diminta oleh Paduka Tuan Ketua Yang Mulia ialah, dalam bahasa Belanda: philisophische gronslag daripada Indonesia merdeka. Philisophische gronslag itulah fundamen filsafat , fikiran yang sedalam-dalamnya, jiwa hasrat yang sedalam-dalamnya untuk di atasnya didirikan gedung Indonesia Merdeka yang kekal dan abadi –

Honourable Chairman,

“...in my opinion, what is Your Honourable is expecting from us is what is called, in the Dutch language: the *Philosopische Grondslag*—philosophical foundation—of the independent state of Indonesia. Philosophical basis is the fundamental, the philosophy, the underlying reason, the spirit, the deepest desire, on which to build the structure of a Free Indonesia, enduring and age-long. (Soekarno, 1961, p.5).

In this speech, Sukarno proposed a compromise:

“...*Indonesia merdeka bukanlah negara Islam dan bukan pula negara sekuler, tetapi sebuah negara Pancasila*”---“...Independent Indonesia would neither an Islamic nor a secular state, but a Pancasila state” (Soekarno, 1961, *Ibid*).

According to Sukarno, Pancasila—literally means “five pillars” or “Five Principles”—consisted of the following principles, arranged in the following order:

1. *Kebangsaan Indonesia*---Indonesian Nationhood, or, Indonesian nationalism
2. *Internationalism/Perikemanusiaan*---Internationalism/Humanitarianism
3. *Mufakat/Demokrasi*---Unanimous concensus/Democracy
4. *Kesejahteraan Sosial*---Social welfare
5. *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*---The One Lordship

(Pantjasila 1964, p.22-34)

According to Sukarno, these five principles could be compressed into three (*Trisila*): Socio-nationalism, Socio-democracy, and One Lordship; and then again further compressed into one (*Ekasila*): The principle of *Gotong Royong* (Mutual Cooperation).

“If I compress what was five into three, and what was three into one, then I have a genuine Indonesian term, gotong royong, mutual cooperation. The state of Indonesia which we are to establish must be a gotong royong state. How wonderful that is: a Gotong Royong state” (Pantjasila, 1964, p.35)

Sukarno’s speech received an enthusiastic response from the audience as it was seen as a solution to the deadlock between members of the investigating body, who were obliged to finish their task as quickly as possible. A small committee was soon appointed in an ad-hoc capacity with the tasks of: Reformulating Pancasila as the foundation of the state based on the speech given by Sukarno on the 1st of June, 1945; and using the document as the text to proclaim Indonesian independence (Panitia Lima, 1977, p.31). The committee known as “Panitia Sembilan” included 9 members: Sukarno (Islam-Secular), Muhammad Hatta (Islam-secular), AA Maramis (Christian-Secular), Abikusno Tjokrosujoso (Islamist), Abdul Kahar Muzakir

(Islamist), Haji Agus Salim (Islamist), Ahmad Subardjo (Islam-Secular), Wahid Hasyim (Islamist), Muhammad Yamin (Islam Secular)²⁶.

The result of the work of this ad-hoc committee was known as the Jakarta Charter (and hence the embryo of The Indonesian Constitution) and was signed by its members on June 22, 1945. The text of the Jakarta Charter was as follows²⁷:

Truly, freedom is the right of all nations, and therefore colonialism throughout the world must be eradicated, because it is not compatible with humanitarianism and justice.

And the struggle of the Indonesian independence movement has come to a happy moment to lead the people of Indonesia safely to the threshold of an Indonesian state, which is free, united, sovereign, just and prosperous.

With the blessing and the mercy of Allah the Almighty, and moved by a noble ideal for a free national life, the people of Indonesia hereby declare their independence.

And therefore, in order to form a government of the state of Indonesia which protect the whole nation of Indonesia and the entire territory of Indonesia, and in order to promote public welfare, to sharpen the mind of the nation, and to participate in the realization of a world order which is based on freedom, eternal peace, and social justice, and the independence of the Indonesian nations is formed in an Indonesian Constitution, manifested in a democratic state of the Republic of Indonesia, which is based on: (the principle) of **Lorship**, **with the obligation to carry out the Islamic Syari'a for its adherents**; according to the principle of a just and civilised humanity, the unity of Indonesia and of peoplehood guarded by the spirit of wisdom in (the form of) deliberation (and) representation, and the realization of social justice for the whole people of Indonesia.

Jakarta, 6-22-1945

Signed by:
Ir. Sukarno
Drs. Mohammad Hatta
Mr. A.A. Maramis
Abikusno Tjokrosujoso
Abdulkahar Muzakir
H.A. Salim
Mr. Achmad Subardjo
Wachid Hasjim
Mr. Muhammad Jamin

From this text, we can see that there are some differences between the formulation of Pancasila as proposed by Sukarno, and the formulation of Pancasila as proposed by Panitia sembilan.

²⁶ The composition shows that Moslem is 90% represented but the Islamists count only 45%, while secular is 55% represented. This map is not only explanative to the product of the committee, especially with regard to the result of the 'fight' between Islamist vs. Secularists reflected in the draft of the Constitution, but also serves as the basis of arguments to be discussed below.

²⁷ The Translation from the original text was cited from SIDJABAT, W. B. (1965) *Religious Tolerance and the Christian Faith*, Jakarta, Badan Penerbit Kristen., p.19

The most noted difference is the redaction and the ordering, as can be seen in the following table:

Sukarno's version		Panitia Sembilan's version	
1	Indonesian nationalism	1	One Lordship, <i>with the obligation to carry out the Islamic Shari'a for its adherents;</i>
2	Internationalism	2	A just and civilized humanity
3	Unanimous Concensus/Democracy;	3	The Unity of Indonesia
4	Social welfare	4	Peoplehood Guarded by the spirit of wisdom in deliberation and representation
5	The One Lordship	5	Social Justice

The second difference is the focal point. If according to Sukarno, the five principles of Pancasila can be compressed into one principle, namely *Gotong Royong---mutual cooperation*, Panitia Sembilan used the principle of *One Lordship* instead.

A provocative question is then unequivocal: "Why was the outcome (Sukarno's version) different with the output (the Panitia Sembilan's version) which is far from pluralistic in terms of character?"

The first analysis can be found in the composition of the membership. As 90% of the *Panitia Sembilan* members were Moslems while 50% of this majority were orthodox, the Pancasila of the later version was the result of tyranny from the majority. The original concept proposed by Sukarno clearly reflected a pluralist point of view – a perspective certainly not shared by the dominant Islamic majority. Despite Sukarno also belonging to this majority (as a Moslem), his perspective did not serve the group's interests. To a certain extent, hence, Sukarno's stance might have been regarded as a trait by the Islam nationalist group.

The second analysis relates closely with the aspiration of those who formerly defended Islam as the foundation of state. This judgement is based on two considerations: *Firstly*, the ordering of the five principle of Pancasila places One Lordship at the top. Putting the principle of Lordship first within the order has a

significant implication for the entire meaning of Pancasila. As pointed out by the Panitia Lima:

“The principle of One Lordship has become the principle which guide the aspiration of our statehood. It gives the spirit to our effort for doing all that is right, just, and good. While as the principle of a Just and Civilized Humanity becomes the practical implication of the guiding principle we have said earlier. In the present order, the principle of Just and Civilized Humanity has to follow, and is related to, the first principle, because it has to be viewed as a practical follow-up the ideal and the practice of the principle of the One Lordship. Using this principles as guidance basically means that our government may not deviate from the straight route, if it wants to work for the security of our state and society, for world order and for brotherhood (and sisterhood) along nations. Whenever we lost our way, there is always a mysterious pressure to lead us back to the right path. The implication of the change of order of the five principle is that, although the ideology of the state does not change with the changes of words, the politics of the state will be given a strong moral foundation. The principle of One Lordship will not merely mean mutual respect for each other’s religion, but it will become a foundation which leads us to the ways of truth, justice, goodness, honesty, human brother-(sister)hood, etc. With it, the state strengthens its own foundation” (Panitia Lima, 1977, p.42), and;

Secondly, the inclusion of the sentence “*with the obligation to carry out the Islamic Shari’a for its adherents*” after One Lordship brought about a specific meaning. “One Lordshipness” is one of the basic principles of Islamic religion: Tauhid. Surat Al Ikhlas---the Purity of Faith (Taken from the Qur’an, Surat 112) said:

1. Say: He is Allah, the One;
2. Allah, the Eternal, Absolute;
3. He begetteth not, Nor is He begotten
4. And there is none Like unto Him

The first Ayat (Clause) is to negate the idea of polytheism, which is opposed to the fundamental conceptions of Islam (as well as Abrahamic religions including Christianity and Judaism) – for unity in design proclaims the Unity of the Maker. At the same time, the words “*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*” do not offend other major religions despite other religions (such as Hinduism and Buddhism) being able to adopt Polytheism regarding the concept of God and divinity to some extent. As pointed out by Nieuwenhuijze:

“.....*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa. Untransable for its compactness, this sentence asserts that He Who is The Absolute One is the Lord. It distinctly evokes the Islamic*

creed, except that the wording deviate on purpose, so that the adherents of other religions may equally well agree with the assertion” (Nieuwenhuijze, 1958, p.21-26).

The third analysis is complementary to the second one. The words of “*With the blessing and the mercy of Allah the Almighty...*” in the third paragraph of the Charter is a clear indicator of the Panitia Sembilan’s accommodation of Islamist aspiration. The word “Allah” refers to a personal God, specifically that of Islam. However, the first principle of Pancasila was formulated in a neutral form: Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa (The One Lordship) instead of Allah Yang Maha Esa (Allah Who is The One) which also means The One Lordship. Because *Pancasila* was proposed and accepted as a compromise between those who were in favour of a religious state and those who preferred a secular state, the formulation tried to satisfy both parties while at the same time could not accept any of those ideas in their entire context.

2.4. Mixed Constitution: The middle way

Was the Jakarta Charter then adopted as the constitution of the new state? The answer is “No”. The content of the Jakarta Charter was only partially included by the Indonesian Constitution. Some crucial elements have been omitted in the new draft, creating an even sharper conflict between Islamists and Secular Nationalists during the later period.

In the second plenary meeting of the Investigating Body (July 10 to July 17, 1945), a special committee was formed consisting of 19 members with Sukarno as chairperson. This committee was in charge of forming a constitutional draft which was to be used as the basic material for the state constitution. Among these 19 members, seven were appointed as members of a working committee headed by Supomo²⁸, a member of the Budi Utomo board.

²⁸ It is interesting to note that Supomo---in the meeting of the Investigating Body on May, 31, 1945---one day before Sukarno’s historical speech---has made clear his rejection of an Islamic state. In that meeting he said: “*To establish an Islamic State in Indonesia means to establish a state whose unity is based on the largest group, namely the Islamic group. If an Islamic state is to be established in Indonesia, “minority problems” will surely come up, i.e., the problems of small religious groups, the Christian group, etc. And even though the Islamic State will try its best to guarantee and to protect the well-being of the other-groups, still those small-groups definitely will not be able to conform themselves to the goal of the united states which all of us are longing for*”. See: YAMIN, H. M. (1959) *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, I-III*, Jakarta, Yayasan Prapanca., Vol 1, p.117

Supomo's working committee had its draft ready on July 13, 1945. In this draft of the Constitution, an article on religion was included – Article 29, which consisted of two sections. The first section read as follows: “The State is based on One Lordship, with the obligation to carry out the Islamic syari'a for its adherents”. It repeated what had been formulated in the Jakarta Charter. The second section mentioned: The State guarantees the freedom of every person to profess and to worship according to his/her own religion and belief²⁹.

The above formulation of Section 2, was actually an amended version from the previous formulation proposed by Supomo's working committee, which read: “*The State guarantees the freedom of every person to embrace another religions and to worship according to his/her own belief*” (Yamin, 1959, *Ibid*). This original formulation was strongly rejected by the Islamic group, because according to orthodox Islamic belief, change of religion from Islam is regarded as apostasy. Therefore, the final formulation was a kind of compromise wherein neither the Islamic group nor the Secular group totally rejected or accepted it.

Another significant issue is Article 6 (previously was Article 4 Section 2) of the 1945 Constitution. Supomo's working committee proposed an article that reads “The President must be a native Indonesian citizen”, to which Wahid Hasyim added the words “...and Moslem”. However, this clause was declined by Haji Agus Salim who was also an Islamist. He said “*Dengan ini kompromi antara golongan kebangsaan dan Islam akan mentah lagi: Apakah hal ini tidak bisa diserahkan kepada Badan Permusyawaratan Rakyat? Jika Presiden harus orang Islam, bagaimana halnya terhadap wakil presiden, duta-duta dan sebagainya. Apakah artinya janji kita untuk melindungi agama lain? - With these, the compromise between nationalists and islamists would be useless: Why don't we just leave this to the House of Representatives? If the president must be a Moslem, how about the vice-president, ambassadors, etc. What is the meaning of our promise to protect other religions?*” (Yamin, 1959, p.262)

Meanwhile, the situation was changing very quickly. As a further commitment to their initial promise, the Japanese authority established Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan

²⁹ The addition of the words “and belief” was suggested by Wongsonegoro, one of the prominent of the *Kebatinan* (Javanese Superstition).

Indonesia—PPKI—The Committee for Preparation of the Indonesian Independence-- on August 7, 1945, to replace the former Investigating Body. However, before this committee even began functioning, the Japanese defeat in the Pacific front was so evident that it was clear they could not fulfill their promise of granting independence to the Indonesian people. As a result, on August 17, 1945 – two days after the Japanese declaration of submission to the Allied Forces, the Indonesian people unitarily declared their own freedom without official consent from the Japanese authority. Sukarno (the chairperson of PPKI) and Hatta (the Vice-chairperson off PPKI) issued this declaration on behalf of the Indonesian nation.

A day after this declaration of independence, the PPKI held its first meeting, during which the Jakarta Charter was agreed to be used as the preamble of the Constitution, while the draft proposed by Supomo's working committee was to become the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia – or more popularly known as the 1945 Constitution. However, competition between the conflicting nationalists arose soon after the first session started. As noted by Panitia Lima:

“...the serious objection from those whose religion was not Islam. According to them, it was inappropriate if within a principle statement with concerned the whole nation there was a regulation with was applied only to a particular part of the whole Indonesian people, even though that part was the biggest part.....in order to guard the unity and the harmonious totality of the entire Indonesian territory, the phrase “with the obligation to carry out the Islamic syariah for its adherents” was omitted from the preamble of the Constitution” (Panitia Lima, 1977, p. 32).

Learning from their previous experience of confronting critical situations (in particular the threat of the Dutch return after the Japanese defeat) members of the PPKI then worked hard not to get trapped in another prolonged debate. Sukarno himself, in his opening speech, gave his warning to the members of PPKI to “React fast” and not to debate on detailed matters due to the critical circumstances (Yamin, 1959, 399). This suggestion seems to receive a positive response from the audience as it resulted in a quickly negotiated set of compromises reflected in three issues: a new composition of Pancasila; agreement of Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution; and the modification of Article 6 of the Constitution.

The new composition of Pancasila, read as follows:

1. *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*---One Lordship
2. *Kemanusiaan Yang Adil dan Beradab*---Just and Civilized Humanity
3. *Persatuan Indonesia*---Unity of Indonesia
4. *Kerakyatan yang Dipimpin oleh Hikmat Kebijaksanaan dalam Permusyawaratan/Perwakilan*---Peoplehood which is Guarded by the Spirit of Wisdom in Deliberation/Representation
5. *Keadilan Sosial*---Social Justice

Note: The words “*with the obligation to carry out the Islamic Shari’a for its adherents*” has been omitted

The second is the Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution read as follows:

1. *Negara berdasarkan atas Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*---The State is based on the Principle of One Lordship;
2. *Negara menjamin kemerdekaan tiap-tiap penduduk untuk memeluk agamanya masing-masing dan untuk beribadat menurut agamanya dan kepercayaannya itu*---The State guarantees the freedom of every person to profess his/her own religion and to worship according to his/her own religion and belief.

Note: The words “*with the obligation to carry out the Islamic Shari’a for its adherents*” has also been omitted from section 1.

The word “*belief*” was added to section 2, giving acknowledgement by the state to non-religious superstitions

The third compromise was the omission of the requirement that the President of the Republic of Indonesia should be a Moslem (article 6). The new redaction reads “*Presiden adalah orang Indonesia asli*” – “The president shall be a native Indonesian citizen”.

These modifications were read by Hatta in front of the members of the Committee, finishing with a brief statement “*Inilah perubahan yang maha penting menyatukan segala bangsa*---*These are very important changes unifying every nation*”. Soon after Hatta finished his speech, Sukarno made the remark “...*this Constitution is temporary, swift constitution, revolutiegrondwet...later when we are living in a more*

conducive environment, we will assemble people representatives to create a better constitution (Yamin, 1959, p.410, Boland, 1971b, p.37). This latest formulation was then endorsed as the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, entitled the Constitution 1945³⁰.

This fact that the constitution was not a hundred percent reflected the appeal of the majority is alone adequate to justify the presumption that actually the Indonesian-Moslems (the majority group) had never fully accepted the Constitution 1945 in the form as currently adopted by the state despite their endorsement on the compromise formula of the Constitution on the 18th of August 1945. As pointed out by Nasution “*The day of the revolution were not the appropriate time (for the Islamic nationalist) to press on with realization of their Islamic ideas. For them, the defence of the independence of Indonesia must have the priority*” (Nasution, 1965, p.76).

Another explanation is that the agreement from the Islamists was given with conditions regarding Sukarno’s ‘Promise’ that “*...later, when we are living in a more conducive environment, we will assemble people representatives to create a better constitution*”. This assumption becomes more relevant when the reference is put what Sukarno said on the first of June 1945 during which he elaborated his conception regarding the principle of *Permusyawaratan*—Wisdom in deliberation—to be adopted in the *Pancasila*. Sukarno said, “*Untuk pihak Islam, inilah tempat yang terbaik untuk memelihara agama. Dengan cara mufakat, kita perbaiki segala hal, juga keselamatan negara, yaitu dengan jalan pembicaraan dan permusyawaratan di dalam Badan Perwakilan Rakyat. Apa-apa yang belum memuaskan, kita bicarakan di dalam permusyawaratan. Badan perwakilan inilah tempat untuk mengemukakan tuntutan-tuntutan Islam---*For Islamists, I would like to say that this is the most appropriate place to preserve religion. With the wisdom in deliberation, we can repair anything, including the safety of the state, which is conducted through debates in the house of representative. Any unsatisfactory issues, whatever they are, can be discussed in deliberation. This body is the place where Islamists may forward their

³⁰ There have been four period of the Indonesian states that have consequently brought about such a pause to the implementation of the 1945 Constitution: The first one from August 18, 1945 until December 27, 1949 (Constitution 1945); the second from December 27, 1949 until August 15, 1950 (Federal Constitution of 1949); the third from August 15, 1950 until July 5, 1959 (Temporary Constitution of 1950); and the fourth one from July 5, 1959 until today (Constitution 1945).

aspirations” (Soekarno, 1961, p.18). Without no doubt, hence, the Constituent Assembly established on November 1956 is the ‘golden opportunity’ been long awaited by Islamists, the opportunity through which Sukarno (and his alliance along the Nationalist line) were expected to realize their promise³¹.

By leaving the creation of the final constitution to the Constituent Assembly, in fact Sukarno and his nationalist front had shown a good faith despite doubts about their sincerity. This doubt was tested during the later period when certain secularists from the nationalist front, including Sukarno, showed their reluctance to agree with ideas along the Islamists’ aspirations, such as what was said by Sukarno at the beginning of 1953. He said, “*Negara yang kita susun dan yang kita ingini ialah negara nasional yang meliputi seluruh Indonesia. Kalau kita dirikan negara berdasarkan Islam, maka banyak daerah-daerah yang penduduknya tidak beragama Islam akan melepaskan diri, misalnya Maluku, Bali, Flores, Timor, Kai, dan juga Irian Barat yang belum masuk wilayah Indonesia tidak akan mau ikut dalam Republik---*The state that we wish to establish and that we longed for is a unitary state covering the whole Indonesian territory. If we wish to establish an Islamic state, many regions whose population avowed to non-Islamic religions such as Maluku, Bali, Flores, Timor, Kai, and Papua would certainly not be happy and prefer to separate from the republic” (Feith, 1962, p.281, Anonymous, 1953, p.2-3).

Such a statement had not only provoked a vast reaction among the Islamists but also given an impression to the Islamic front that the Nationalists were not sincere with their promise. The Presidential Decree later issued by Sukarno³², therefore, was regarded by the Islamists as a political maneuver in the favor of Secularists rather than a wise solution in the interests of the whole nation. Some have even had more negative perception, those who regarded the Decree merely as the manifestation of

³¹ The members of this body were elected through the popular vote being conducted in 1955. The Islamists grabbed 230 seats (40%) while other parties consisting altogether Nationalists, Christians, Socialists, and Communists claimed 286 seats (60%). A complete reference about the 1955 election, See: FEITH, H. (1957b) *The Indonesian elections of 1955* Ithaca, Modern Indonesian Project, Southeast Asia Program, Dept. of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University.

³² On July 5, 1959, Sukarno, in his capacity as the President of Indonesia, issued a Presidential Decree which put an end to the Constitutional Democracy adopted by the republic since 1955. The Decree basically contains two subject matters: the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and return back to the Constitution 1945. An excellent reference of this topic is FEITH, H. (1962) *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*. , Ithaca, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University Press.

Sukarno personal ambition, passing over the Islamism-secularism issue. As asserted by Boland “*The 1945 Constitution could open the way to his “guided democracy” and could thus legalize his ‘conception’. So, he decide to enforce a ‘return to the Constitution of 1945’ passing over those of 1949 and 1950 and setting aside the work of the Assembly. If this interpretation is correct, it must be concluded that Sukarno’s real aim was to bring about ‘guided democracy’ via a ‘return to the Constitution of 1945’ and not that was looking for a way out of the deadlock in which the Assembly found itself and then decided to force the issue by a ‘return to the Constitution of 1945’, which then ended up in ‘guided democracy’*”.(Boland, 1971b, p.91)

However, it is not easy to rely too much on Boland’s assumption as the Decree had in fact a solid reasoning which was the ineffectiveness of the Constituent Assembly during the period of 1956-1959. What was happening is that the members of the Constituent Assembly tended to waste the time³³ and eventually didn’t prevail to complete their main task to create a new constitution³⁴. For almost three years, the Body was always repeating the same prolonged debates as that of the period of 1944-1945 while the central issue remains the same: whether the state must stand

³³ This kind of opinion was not defied by the Islamists but they were very in disagreement with the opinion that the Constituent Assembly didn’t make any significant progress regarding their task. For them, the finalisation of the new Constitution was just a matter of time when Sukarno authoritatively dissolved the Assembly. About this polemic, see: ANSHARI, E. S. (1997) *Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945: Sebuah konsensus nasional tentang dasar negara Republik Indonesia 1945-1949*, Jakarta, Gema Insani Press., p.91-107

³⁴ At the beginning, three options were available to be chosen by the Constituent Assembly as the philosophical foundation of state: *Pancasila, Islam, and Socialism*. Pancasila was supported by PNI (116 representatives), Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party—PKI—80), Partai Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Christian Party—Parkindo—16), Partai Katholik (Catholic Party—10), Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party—PSI--10), Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Indonesian Independence Supporters Bond—IPKI—8) and other small parties that counted in total 272 members. The Shari’a option was defended by Masyumi (112 representatives), NU (91), Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Shari’a Party—PSII—16), Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti—7) and other four small parties which count in total 230 members of the Constituent Assembly. While the third option, Socialism, was supported by only 9 members, five are members of Labour Party, and four members are from Murba Party, See: SIMORANGKIR, J. C. T. & SAY, M. R. B. (No year) *Konstitusi dan Konstituante Indonesia*, Jakarta, Soeroengan., p.169-173. Basically the polarization was centered into two groups: the Islamist and the the Nationalist Secular; but none of them come up as the champion the adoption of an ideology required at least two thirds of total 470 members of the Body. To avoid deadlock and to respond to the proposition of the government to return to the Constitution 1945, the Assembly conducted three votes. The first took place on May 30, 1959 with results: 269 for and 199 against. The second vote was on June 1, 1959: 264 for and 204 against. The latest vote was conducted on June 2, 1959 resulted: 263 for and 204 against YAMIN, H. M. (1959) *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, I-III*, Jakarta, Yayasan Prapanca.. Since according to the Assembly’s rule a principle decision required a two – thirds majority of present members, this drama finally ended in another deadlock – which was then resolved by Sukarno’s Decree.

upon Islamic or Secular base; and the competing parties were also indifferent: Islamist versus Nationalist secular. As pointed out by Alisjahbana, “.....*the debates on political and philosophical principles, inevitably provoked in the writing of any constitution, revealed the Constituent Assembly as a whole as divided into two: one group wanting an Islamic basis for the state, the other demanding the acceptance of the Pancasila* (Alisjahbana, 1961, p.151-152). In brief, through the Presidential Decree of the 5th July 1959, the Constitution 1945 was adopted by the Indonesian state without any alteration under Sukarno’s regime, being preserved with mystification³⁵ by the State under Suharto, and being adopted with four amendments by Indonesian state over later periods.

³⁵ During the period of *Orde Baru*, *Pancasila* and the Constitution of 1945 were regarded as a sacred symbology of state despite the flexibility of interpretation towards their contents. Any attempts to amend and alter these two symbols would, therefore, be regarded as a threat to the existence of state.

CHAPTER THREE: SEEKING LEGAL LEGITIMACY

“A basic problem faced by all new nations and post-revolutionary societies is the crisis of legitimacy. The old order has been abolished and with it the set of beliefs that justified its system of authority. The imperialist ogre upon whom all ills were blamed has now disappeared, and there has been a slackening of the great unifying force, nationalism, under whose banner private, ethnic, sectional, and other differences were submerged. The new system is in the process of being formed and so the question arise: to whom is loyalty owed? And why?” (Lipset, 1963, p.16)

3.1. Version I: post-colonial attempt of democratic legal legitimacy

The surrender of the Japanese following the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had not only put an end to the war in Asia and Pacific, but had also determined the fate of ‘nations’ in this region including those who were living in the *East Indische* which later formed a state known as ‘Indonesia’. On the 17th of August 1945, several days after the declaration of defeat by the Japanese, some Dutch-educated inhabitants took advantage of the vacuum of power by declaring independence. Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta, two figures who read the text of the declaration of independence, were designated as the first president and vice-president of the new state.

As soon as it was declared independent, the ‘newly-born’ state was confronting a series of immediate problems, in particular the urgent need of international recognition of her sovereignty and the threat of the Dutch’s return following the departure of the vanquished Japanese. Internally, the problem was more related to the question of legitimacy, as there did not yet exist a mechanism to justify a fully legitimate government. The regime and its political leaders were still self-designated and not elected nor appointed through a constitutional procedure. Furthermore, institutions were unilaterally established by consensus among a very few number of elites in Jakarta, while these few elites had to act on behalf of the entire elements of the state. Meanwhile, the critical situation of the time required the existence of an

'independent' and 'legitimate' government expected to be capable and efficient enough to handle the on-going uncertainties. This 'urgency' was realized by the founding fathers of the republic. Sukarno and his companions then quickly undertook several actions, notably: (1) establishing the ideology of the state; (2) forming the state's constitution; (3) Installing a political mechanism appropriate to the nation's social setting which was indeed a melting-pot of various ethnics, religions and languages, and; (4) consolidating any possible resources to support the infant state.³⁶ To carry on these 'burdens', the then-adopted constitution, the Constitution of 1945 chose 'presidential' system as the form of regime.

Soon after, an effective government was obviously far from feasible, especially because it lacked the minimal amount of essential resources required by a state. Moreover, the central authority had to immediately deal with the eroding factors (such as rebellious movements provoked by conflicting ideological factors that eventually led them to question the legitimacy of the government³⁷). In fact, the continuity of the regime and the internal cohesiveness of the new state were maintained only by the popularity of Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, two figures supported by the majority of the people living within the territory.

In the mean time, the Dutch launched a propaganda campaign amongst the triple alliance – saying that Indonesia would be used as a fascist's 'puppet' in Southeast Asia. For Sukarno and his comrades, this development was crucial because this propaganda encouraged the triple alliance to deploy a new wave of foreign troops into the archipelago. In November 1945, three months after the declaration of independence, Indonesia aligned with the ideology of the triple alliance state by adopting the system of liberal democracy based on 'multi-party' parliamentary

³⁶ The first three 'actions' has been elaborated comprehensively in Chapter 2. The fourth action is elaborated along this chapter, chapter 4, 5, 6, and 7. A comprehensive story around the situation during the early period of Indonesian Independence can be found in many works. See among others: MAS'OED, M. (1989) *Ekonomi dan Struktur Politik Orde Baru 1966-1971*, Jakarta, Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3ES)., and also BASTIN, J. & BENDA, H. J. (1968) *A history of modern Southeast Asia : colonialism, nationalism, and decolonization*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall.

³⁷ Most of the rebellious movement (except in Sulawesi) involved ideological issues. The rebellions were mainly started by the rejection of certain groups to Pancasila that then led to their resistance to the authority of the secular government. Some even as simple as according to Shari'a, the loyalty is supposed to be rendered only to *Imam*—pious Muslim leaders. See: chapter 5 on 'Maintaining Political Order'.

government³⁸. A prime minister was elected as the head of the government³⁹, and assisted by ministers in the cabinet who were responsible to Parliament. While Sukarno himself played the role as head of state, his power in the government was not significant. Obviously, this model did not bring about a solid government because of the intense conflicts between the political elites – especially between those who preferred a Marxist-revolutionary approach and those who preferred using diplomacy to obtain a full and recognized independence⁴⁰. In addition, the government was very weak owing to a lack of economic resources required for efficient operation. The majority of resources (such as mining and plantations) were still under the control of the Dutch, while other resources (such as taxes) were impossible to rely upon because the government did not really ‘exist’. As a consequence, cabinets were always falling soon after their establishment, resulting in failure to address the problems. For instance, between November 1945 and December 1949, the year of the Dutch recognition of Indonesian independence, only a single cabinet out of five was able to stand for more than two years (See: Feith, 1962).

The agreement between Indonesia and the Dutch in 1949 brought about new consequences to the Indonesian state through a constitutional alteration. As an imposed condition by the Dutch within the agreement, Indonesia had to adopt the federal system under a new constitution--the provisional Constitution of 1950--through which a new state entitled ‘The Federal State of Republic of Indonesia’ (RIS) was proclaimed. This model was accepted with suspicion amongst the Indonesian people--that the federal system was part of the Dutch’s strategy. The logic was that the model would divide the Indonesian territory into states, and when the territory is

³⁸ Scholars such as Feith believed that this decision was taken as a strategy gain international support, especially to show to the triple alliance that Indonesia was not the part of fascism as was propagandized by the Dutch. See: FEITH, H. (1962) *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*. , Ithaca, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University Press.

³⁹ As for the emergency circumstances, prime ministers were elected not through a popular vote but by consensus among political elites. See:*Ibid.*, p.58

⁴⁰ In ‘The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia’, Feith analyse several factors explanative to the failure of the federal government that ended up at authoritarianism under Sukarno’s guided democracy. Feith explain this failure from the perspective of elites. He said, the main factor contributed to the failure of the federal government was the conflict between the ‘administrator’ (who preferred to adopt western-way to achieve the national goal) versus the ‘solidarity maker’ (who emphasized national unity and freedom). This argument, however, is rejected by Benda, who explain the failure from the perspective of culture—that Indonesian society is culturally patrimonial and favor to paternalism/authoritarianism rather than democracy. See: BENDA, H. J. (1964) Democracy in Indonesia: A Review Article. *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol 23, 3, May 1964.; FEITH, H. (1962) *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*. , Ithaca, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University Press. See also: MAS’OED, M. (1989) *Ekonomi dan Struktur Politik Orde Baru 1966-1971*, Jakarta, Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3ES).

not 'united', it would be easier for the Dutch to return to their old colony (*divide et impera*). Obviously, the federal government was not able to neither implement its programs nor ensure stability, particularly due to the short-life of its cabinets.

Among the major factors causing these cabinets to fall was the party system – marked by extreme polarization in platforms and ideologies amongst parties that prevented them from finding a common base for cooperation in the parliament as a solid government. From a theoretical perspective, to establish a stable government in a democratic state would require a ruling party that claimed the majority of support, or at least the support from a solid coalition in the parliament, which was not the case at that period. As a result, a permanent deadlock among political parties also escalated into extra-parliamentary conflicts and friction⁴¹.

The reasons behind the adoption of the multi-party system (in November 1945) were practical. Elites in Jakarta shared the position that the Indonesian society, which is very heterogeneous, required a system of representation that was capable of accommodating best such diversity. As was declared at *Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat*—Central Commission of National Indonesia (KNIP), the embryo of the Indonesian parliament, the government 'welcomes *the establishment of political parties as by these parties, aspirations of the all elements of the society can be channeled through regular activities*'⁴². Unfortunately, this system was applied directly onto a 'young state' with a plural society and extreme cultural distance. Even in the 1930s, when the concept of an independent state was still only an 'imagination' amongst Indonesians, groups and parties that existed in the archipelago tended to represent different political interests that made it impossible for them to reach a compromise. In 1950, for example, there were 50 political parties representing not only very different interests, but potentially antagonistic forces (see: Feith, 1957a).

⁴¹ The overall map of political parties at the period is theoretically known as 'centrifugal' that lead to political instability--will be partly elaborated in chapter 5 on 'Maintaining Political Order'. Classifications on political parties can be seen in many works, for example: DUVERGER, M. (1950) *Sociologie des Partis Politiques Traité de Sociologie*. Paris, PUF.,

⁴² Cited from SOEDJATMOKO (1956) *The Role of Political Parties in Indonesia*. IN THAYER, P. W. (Ed.) *Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia*. Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press., p.130

Since the majority of the political parties were representing radical sectarian interests, religions, and the political ambitions of elites, it is then very understandable how difficult it was to find a spirit of compromise amongst them. The general election of 1955 (which was expected to be able to 'defrost' political deadlocks during the period) was obviously becoming another source of political uncertainty despite its democratic significance. In fact, this election was only beneficial to the stability of the government in term of its contribution into the moderation the political parties. As revealed by Feith, four parties came up as the major parties in the parliament: *Partai Nasional Indonesia*--the Nationalist Party (PNI); *The Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia*—progressive moslem party (Masyumi); Nahdlatul Ulama—traditional/conservative moslem party (NU), and *Partai Komunis Indonesia*—the communist party (PKI). However, none of these parties obtained the status of single majority while a coalition in the parliament was essential⁴³. However, as the interest represented by these parties was very 'distant', the quest to create a solid government with the support from the parliament remained unachievable.

The extreme multipolarity of the Indonesian society was also reflected by the conflict between political parties with regards to the creation of a state constitution. Although ten years since the declaration of independence had passed, these political parties had never reached an agreement on this fundamental question. As elaborated in the previous chapter (chapter 2) the prolonged debate mainly focused around the question of 'What ideology should be adopted by the Indonesian state?' – represented by two competing alternatives: *Shari'a* and *Pancasila*. The Constituent Assembly (the state institution produced by the election of 1955 with a mandate among others to create a new constitution) had obviously failed to reach consensus on this problem.

This situation brought Indonesia into the period of permanent political deadlock. Disagreement among elites was intense. The government lacked both legitimacy and the economic resources required for its operation. Political parties did not play their role as the democratic articulator of the multicultural elements of the society, but

⁴³ A complete report on the general election of 1955 can be seen in FEITH, H. (1957a) The Indonesian Elections of 1955. *Interim Report Series, Modern Indonesia Project* 1957 ed. Ithaca, Southeast Asia Program Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University.

became an additional source of political chaos. Sukarno, a popular figure of the revolution, was politically neglected by the democratic and liberal political system. The army, another important actor of the revolution, was also politically neglected⁴⁴. These two main actors, therefore, often contributed to the destabilization of the liberal system. In October 1952 for example, the army tried to dissolve the parliament – an action far beyond its constitutional habitat. In June 1955 with Sukarno's support, the army also refused the appointment of commander of the Army Strategic Division (KASAD) designated by the Cabinet⁴⁵. As mentioned earlier, Sukarno himself often showed his dissatisfaction to the existing political system, arguing that the liberal democratic system was 'not-Indonesian' and tended to fragment an already 'severely fragmented' Indonesian society. To this, Sukarno made his famous cynical statement that the parliamentary liberal democracy was the 'Democracy Fifty Plus One'⁴⁶.

The liberal government was exhausted – a situation that brought about disaster for Indonesia's economic sector that was already devastated by the obligation to repay debts inherited from the colonial government as well as the need to finance the project of national integration. The economy was therefore threatened by an extreme level of inflation, zero monetary reserves, and a chronic deficit in the state budget. Worse still, a number of political parties were also declared corrupt, and accused of abusing public money to finance sectarian interests. In all, the extractive capacity of the state was very weak – not only because of the rare availability of conventional resources such as taxation, but also the fact that the majority of the economic sectors (mines, plantations, foreign trades, and transports) were still controlled by

⁴⁴ According to the Provisional Constitution of 1950, the army was positioned as an instrument of state hence has no authorities except the defense hence did not give any space for the army to get involve in political activities. This status, cohabitated with the civilian incapacilities in creating political stability, then dissuate dissatisfaction among the generals of army. This topic will be analysed in next chapter on 'The Role of the Military and the Weakness of the State'.

⁴⁵ About the dynamic of the Indonesian army in the period, See among others: CROUCH, H. (1978) *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press., and BLANCHARD, F. C. (1991) *L'Indonésie, l'armée et le pouvoir: De la Révolution au développement*, Paris, Asian Research L'harmattan.

⁴⁶ The intervention of these two extra-parliamentary actors become more extensive especially when the election of 1955 did not bring about strong cabinet as been expected by the public. The parliament and the cabinet were always imprisoned by conflicts and inconsensus, mainly dominated by two groups (PNI and Masyumi) in relations with the fundamental problems of the state's ideology. See: FEITH, H. (1963) *The Dynamics of Guided Democracy*. IN MCVEY, R. T. (Ed.) *Indonesia, Human Relations Area*. New Haven, Files Press., p.316

foreign companies⁴⁷. As a consequence, Indonesia was not an attractive place for investors, indicated by the capital flight which became endemic up to the end of 1957, and furthermore preventing the liberal government to execute effective economic programmes.

On top of this crisis, the political situation was increasingly fragile: prolonged debate on the ideology of state; the increase of communist influence; the shortness of cabinets' life; the split between Sukarno and Hatta; the weakness of central government's capacity of control towards peripheries; and the emergence of new separatist movements in Sumatra and Sulawesi – altogether which brought about disaster to the state's legitimacy.

3.2. Version II : Sukarno's charismatic legitimacy

The fall of the liberal cabinet on March 14, 1957 opened the way for Sukarno's 'guided democracy.' Through his ideological concept, Sukarno asserted a kind of corporatist-style political system based upon two traditional Javanese principles: the *gotong royong* (collective and voluntary work) and the *musyawarah mufakat* (democracy with the spirit of deliberation, with consensus as the expected outcome). According to Sukarno, this kind of 'democracy' was suitable to the Indonesian political society and consequently would be more efficient to mobilize support from the people⁴⁸. Further, Sukarno also proposed the establishment of the '*Gotong Royong*' cabinet (composed by the members of all political parties) and also a national assembly made up of members from functional groups, representative of the regions, commanders of the army, commanders of the national police force, representatives of the public prosecutor and several ministers of the cabinet (Feith, 1962, p.542). This design was supported by the PNI and the communist party (PKI),

⁴⁷ About the Indonesian economic performance during the period, See: HEINZ, A. (1967) *Economic Disorder and the Task Ahead*. IN TAN, T. K. (Ed.) *Sukarno's Guided Indonesia*. Brisbane, Jacaranda., also: MAS'OEED, M. (1989) *Ekonomi dan Struktur Politik Orde Baru 1966-1971*, Jakarta, Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3ES).; MACKIE, J. (1967) *Problems of Indonesian Inflation*, Ithaca, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project.

⁴⁸ This ideology was also used by Sukarno as a campaign against the adoption of Western-style democracy that he cynically called as 'Democracy 50+1'.

but not by Masyumi. The army, meanwhile, took a 'wait and see' profile but later declared its support to the establishment of the national assembly.⁴⁹

When the PNI failed to form a cabinet based on 'proportional balance' at the parliament, with pretext of 'provisional', Sukarno took advantage from the situation by setting up his own cabinet, entitled as *Kabinet Karya*, composed of ministers from political parties but excluded those from the PKI. Sukarno, however, didn't take any action against the national assembly despite its major contribution to the failure of the cabinet formation. Instead, Sukarno used this assembly to carry out his great ambition, which was to form a sentiment of 'nationalism' among the Indonesian people. In fact, Sukarno was doing this because the national assembly could be used as a political vehicle to gain a wider base for his legitimacy. Because the body was composed by members representing the key elements of society (including those from regions/peripheries) Sukarno was the central national figure who enjoyed popularity among the people and was capable of bridging frictions among elites. Consequently, the national assembly gave significant support for Sukarno's legitimacy, and at the same time would provide support for his political maneuvers. Sukarno's formal position outside the assembly had also given him even more freedom to make important decisions that sometimes were 'extra-ordinary' and beyond the constitutional authority assigned to him. For example, when the constituent assembly (parliament) failed in its attempt to create a new state constitution, Sukarno, with support from the army and certain political parties, overrode the state constitution by launching the controversial decree of July 5, 1959, through which he dissolved the constituent assembly whose members were elected democratically by the people through a popular vote in 1955⁵⁰.

⁴⁹ It is believed that this decision was taken based on pragmatical reason as the national assembly would give the army a space to play 'political role' which was evident later for a long period until the end of the Suharto's order. This decision, however, seems to be an ambiguity for the army was still opposing the existence of communist ministers in the cabinet while these ministers were among the members of the national assembly.

⁵⁰ The presidential Decree of July 5, 1959 became a very important stage in Indonesian political history because this Decree had put an end to the debate in connection with the ideological bases of the State and at the same time became the legal base for the re-application of the Constitution of 1945 which is still adopted by the Indonesian state until today—See: Chapter 2. This Decree contains three important points: a) the dissolution of the constituent assembly; b) economic rehabilitation; c) return to the constitution of 1945

The reactivation of the Constitution of 1945 brought about radical change in Indonesian politics. Initially, it had put an end to the long debate on the ideological base of the state because the Constitution of 1945 contained *Pancasila* principles that by consequence override any other ideologies – including the *Shari'a*. There was also an alteration in the model of government--from one being centralized in the parliament to one with the government concentrated around the president, with Sukarno as the central figure. Furthermore, the National Assembly was now re-elected, reinforced and also confirmed as the National Consultative Assembly – resulting in an even more solid powerbase for Sukarno. In addition, a national planning body (with the main task of creating Indonesian-style socialism that fit Sukarno's ideology) was also established. Finally, after the old parliament rejected the state budget proposed by Sukarno, he designed a new provisional parliament (*Gotong Royong-DPRGR*) as the state institution with the highest authority after the constitution.

In addition to these political innovations, a more moderate party-system was to follow. Of the 25 existing political parties, Sukarno merged them into 10: three nationalist parties (PNI, Partindo, IPKI), three Islamic parties (NU, PSII, and Perti), two Christian parties (Parkindo and Catholic) and two Marxist parties (Murba and PKI). In order to control these parties, Sukarno created the Front National. Even though this organization was declared with the intention of mobilizing support from the people, for Sukarno the body was actually aimed to be an instrument to integrate all political power into one political party.⁵¹ Moreover, it was an institution under his direct power.

These changes marked the establishment of an authoritative regime in Indonesia with the power of the state mainly in the hands of Sukarno, despite intense competition between the army, the president, and the communist party (PKI). When the power of most of the political parties (except PKI) and that of the parliament decreased, the power of the president increased significantly. The army also finally

⁵¹ A comprehensive story on political changes in Indonesia after the publication the presidential Decree of July 5, 1959, See: ABDULGANI, R. (1973) *Nationalism, Revolution, and Guided Democracy in Indonesia*, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University.; and also MAS'OEED, M. (1989) *Ekonomi dan Struktur Politik Orde Baru 1966-1971*, Jakarta, Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3ES).

obtained legitimacy for its engagement in the political and economic sphere of the State – and consequently became more and more powerful (Lev, 1966, p.206). The political dynamics were therefore dominated by the very competitive alliance between Sukarno and the commanders of the army; accordingly the power relations between these two actors determined the destiny of the political parties. In fact, Sukarno was playing the role of guardian of the political parties from the army's aggressive political strategy⁵². There are at least two points that can be interpreted from Sukarno's political behaviour at this stage: first, Sukarno did not want to see these political parties disappear, for they were the only possible alternative to counterbalance the growing threat from the army's increasing political influence; and secondly, these political parties were the pillars supporting Sukarno's charismatic legitimacy for three important institutions: the parliament, in the national assembly and in the Front National.

Another important phenomenon in Indonesian politics during this period was the fast growing influence of communism. Different in terms of ideology from other political parties, and despite becoming the main target of the army's aggressive maneuvers, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) gained vast popular support across the archipelago. There were at least two factors determinant to this phenomenon: the organizational efficiency of the party and, most importantly, its brilliant strategy of 'constituent-mobilization'. Like Sukarno's nationalist party (PNI), PKI was developing institutional structure in accordance to the Western standard of modern organization, but with some modifications⁵³. The PKI elites, for instance, considered that the Indonesian political circumstances at the time were not favourable to a 'pure' type of revolutionary ideology that was usually the main feature of communist parties in other parts of the world. Although the platform of the PKI in 1950s was not similar to

⁵² The Army, for example, used to try to demolish the old system of political representation based on parties and instead to create a new system based on functional representation. It used also try to cut off the political parties' ties with their mass-bases by encouraging them to join into an organization called "*Sekretariat Bersama Golkar—Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups*" established and dominated by the army. In many occasion and in certain areas, the army also prohibited the activities of political parties. See: KAHIN, G. M. (Ed.) (1964a) *Government and politics in Southeast Asia*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press., in particular the article of Herbert Feith on 'Indonesia'.

⁵³ About the organizational and management aspects of PKI have been elaborated comprehensively by many scholars. See, among others: MORTIMER, R. (1974) *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press., and BRACKMAN, A. C. (1963) *Indonesian communism : a history*, New York, Praeger.

those in the Soviet Union or in China, its organization and bureaucracy were. In addition, the PKI did not apply the same standard of ideology as in the Soviet Union or China, especially when Aidit was appointed as the leader of the party. Since 1950, it chose the 'peaceful way' when pursuing power and playing its role in the political system (Palmer, 1973, p.159). After all, the parliamentary system and political circumstances of the time gave the PKI an opportunity to develop itself as a mass-based party under the concept of 'guided democracy'.

This last phenomenon explains Sukarno's inclination towards such a popular-base party despite himself officially being the leader of the PNI. The skill and capacity demonstrated by the PKI elites impressed the president, and at that time it was very clear to the public that Sukarno was not only very imminent to PKI's leaders such as Aidit, Nyoto, and Darsono but it was also believed that Sukarno began giving his personal 'blessing' to the party despite the poor image surrounding the PKI only two years earlier.⁵⁴ As a result, the party developed incredibly quickly after 1950, and confirmed itself as one of 'the Big-Four' in the election of 1955. The PKI then became the 'primadonna' in the parliament, and enjoyed massive support amongst the people. According to Mortimer, the number of its official members was very high (approximately 3 million in the 1960s), consolidated through several satellite-organizations led by professional leaders – altogether making the PKI the most efficient organization after the army (Rex Mortimer, 1974, p.366-367).

Sukarno therefore regarded the PKI as an important alliance, especially *vis-à-vis* the army – for during the period of guided democracy, the Indonesian *realpolitik* was reflected through the dynamics of power relationships between three major actors: president Sukarno, the army and the PKI. While the PKI and the army were in constant conflict, it was Sukarno who played the role of "balancer" between the two competing forces. The PKI required Sukarno as its 'guardian' against the threat from the army; while for the army, Sukarno was important because, as a president, he was expected to give his continuous support for its engagement to their political

⁵⁴ In 1948 PKI launched a rebellious action against the Republic known as '*Pemberontakan PKI Madiun—PKI Madiun Rebellion Movement*'. This insurgency has brought about negative image to the party as well as severe suspicious feeling among elites in Jakarta to PKI's leaders. Sukarno's blessing was therefore regarded as 'extraordinary', especially as Sukarno was among the decision maker when Jakarta sent troops to crush the rebels that was concentrated in the eastern part of Java.

objectives; Sukarno, meanwhile would need the army to prevent the potential uncontrollable influence of the PKI, but at the same time he would also need the PKI as an effective organization to mobilize the level of mass support demanded by his 'charismatic' legitimacy⁵⁵.

This competitive relationship of power had brought about a negative impact to the performance of the government during 1959-1965. Certain sectors of development (including the economy) were often neglected for the sake of political interest, or merely been put aside because of the intense political competition among the elites. Thus, when the problem of separatism had been relatively 'under-control' at the beginning of 1960s, the government obviously did not give enough attention on economic development. Instead, it placed emphasis upon other issues – such as the 'Penyelamatan Papua Barat operation —The 'West Papua Rescue'. In fact, Sukarno had used those issues to increase his own power through the mobilization of the people. The army and the PKI, meanwhile, did not show any resistance to Sukarno's offensive policies. Presumably, these two actors also took advantage from the situation – the operation provided an opportunity for the army to modernize its equipment; while for the PKI, this issue had become a means to express its patriotism, in particular its loyalty and obedience to the president. When the problem of West Papua was resolved successfully in 1963, the people wished the government concentrate on economic development. Later, this aspiration was accommodated by Sukarno, who proclaimed an "Economic Declaration" through which the government set up an economic program of stabilization in order to restore the nation's economy through an open policy toward capitalism and liberalism (Thomas and Panglaykim, 1973, p.59).

This commitment, however, did not last long, as Sukarno then sought to engage with other issues that were more interesting to him and more suitable to his 'revolutionary approach' that aimed to strengthen the base of his charismatic legitimacy through mobilization of the people. Again, Sukarno's wish found a good moment during another massive operation known as "Ganyang Malaysia" (confrontation against

⁵⁵ See: REX MORTIMER, R. (1974) *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press., p.79; About the relations between Sukarno-PKI, p.86-88; About the relations between PKI-the Army, p. 102-107; The relations between Sukarno-the Army is elaborated in CROUCH, H. (1978) *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.. p. 49-54

Malaysia). Dissatisfied with the decision of the British Empire – specifically the establishment of the Malaysia Federation under British authority – Sukarno considered this as ‘negligence’ towards Indonesia’s aspirations, and saw it as a ‘threatening’ sign. Within the country, Sukarno therefore launched a radical campaign against British and American interests, including those of nationalizing properties and plantations owned by the two countries. The attention of the Indonesian people, as a consequence, was diverted from a program of economic stability that had never been given priority by the government.

From this brief analysis, it can be seen that during the period of Guided Democracy, the major political actors did not consider the economic sector as well as another aspects of development as ‘important’. They were more concerned with military campaigns and operations that gave Sukarno and the army opportunities to increase their legitimacy and political power. As remarked by Mackie, ‘.....*the political balance was preserved by sacrificing the economic equilibrium*’ (Mackie, 1967, p.10).

3.3. Version III : Suharto’s claim to performance legitimacy

Neglecting the economic sector brought Indonesia into a state of bankruptcy. The national budget (which had been in deficit since 1955), fell day by day. For example, the deficit of the national budget dropped from 14% in 1955 to 174% in 1965⁵⁶. In addition, inflation became a serious threat – reaching 635% in 1966, while the government had to settle its international debt, which exceeded 530 million dollars. Moreover, economic growth was stagnant, falling down to less than zero percent between 1960-1963. Consequently, the foreign debt increased to 358 million dollars. The industrial capacity decreased by up to 20% because of the lack of parts for machinery.⁵⁷ This economic shock was exacerbated by costly military operations launched during the period of guided democracy (such as the operation against the separatist movements in Sumatra and Sulawesi, the ‘West Papua Rescue’ and ‘*Ganyang Malaysia*’).

⁵⁶ The data in relations to the economic condition during the period of guided democracy, see: Tables (Appendix 2).

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*—For a more comprehensive description, See : GLASSBURNER (1971) *The Economy of Indonesia*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

At the international level, Indonesia became more and more isolated as the result of her policy regarding the nationalization of Dutch, British, and American companies began in the 1960s⁵⁸. This decision ruined Indonesia's image among capitalist countries. The situation worsened with Sukarno's political orientation – that international politics was an arena of ideological competition between the Soviet Union and America. Instead, Sukarno raised a discourse proposing the possibility of a new type of political landscape: competition between *New Emerging Forces* (NEFO) and the established *Old Emerging Forces* (OLDEFO). This situation was one that encouraged Indonesia to forge alliances with China, Cambodia, Vietnam, and North Korea⁵⁹.

At the domestic level, the crisis became increasingly intense by 1965 as the competition between the army and the communists had turned into open friction and violent action. Sukarno (who was expected to be an impartial balancer between these two competing forces) started to interfere with the army's internal affairs by assigning some strategic posts within the army to his close 'friends'. This was regarded as a 'threat' by the army (Crouch, 1978, *chapter 2*). The communists, meanwhile, also decided to leave the peaceful political strategy and instead launched an aggressive campaign against its rival enemies – mainly the Islamists—and demanded radical 'concessions' from the government, including those of the typical communist 'revolutionary' strategy, namely land reform. The tense political circumstances finally culminated with a *coup de etat* in October 1965 (known as Gestapu) – later declared by the army as being organized by the PKI with support from the air force⁶⁰. With most of the activity in Jakarta and Yogyakarta (middle Java), the coup involved the assassination of top-rank army leaders (6 army

⁵⁸ Analysis around the politics of 'nationalization' under Sukarno's guided democracy can be seen in WEINSTEIN, F. (1976) *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

⁵⁹ Scholars such as Mas'Oed and Tjokroamidjojo argue that Sukarno's politics of creating new alliance with communist forces in Asia was mainly motivated by his international ambition to repeat the success of Asia-Africa Conference (the embryo of Non-aligned movement) held at Bandung in 1955. See: MAS'OED, M. (1989) *Ekonomi dan Struktur Politik Orde Baru 1966-1971*, Jakarta, Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3ES)., p.50. See also TJOKROMIDJOJO, B. (1965) Peranan Poros dan Pembangunan Ekonomi dalam Politik Luar Negeri. IN NITISASTRO, W. (Ed.) *Masalah-masalah Ekonomi dan Faktor-faktor IPOLEKSOS*. Jakarta, Lektas/LIPI., p.19

⁶⁰ Sukarno was indicated by the army to be involved in the coup despite the absence of assuring evidence. The coup is mysterious and controversial even up to this day, especially with regard to the real actor behind the coup. Among interesting analysis around the coup, see: ANDERSON, B. R. O. & MCVEY, R. T. (1971) A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia. *Interim Report Series*. Ithaca, Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University.

generals including general-in-chief Ahmad Yani) and brought about radical change onto the Indonesian political landscape⁶¹. Soon after the coup the triple alliance of Sukarno-PKI-army broke up; Sukarno's power and his political influence decreased significantly; the communist disappeared from the political scene; and the army became the sole dominant actor in the politics. Suharto, who was playing an important part in the mission '*sauvegarde de la nation*' then became a prominent figure within the army despite Nasution still alive⁶². Several months after the coup in 1966, Suharto acted as a 'presidential caretaker' and then later confirmed as the Indonesia's second president in 1967.

Suharto was an important actor for '*sauvegarde de la nation*' – the period following the failed coup of 1965. In addition, he had been a 'hero' since the revolution — a status that gave credibility to his familiarity with applying military strategies to economic development and assuring political stability for his regime.⁶³

Soon after his assignment as presidential caretaker in 1966, Suharto came up with a new regime named '*Orde Baru*' (New Order) – literally aimed to distinguish his regime with Sukarno's '*Orde Lama*' (Ancient Order). Since its first days in power, this regime had to deal with severe problems inherited from the *Orde Lama*:

1. Economic crisis resulting from an extreme deficit in balance of payments and precarious inflation after 1949.
2. Political crisis caused by intensive conflicts between the elites regarding the ideological base of the state and the best system to govern society.
3. Splits among groups of various levels, social instability and violence following the coup of 1965.

⁶¹ This topic will be widely elaborated in the next chapter on 'Military' and on Chapter 5 on 'Political Order'.

⁶² Hierarchically, Nasution was Suharto's superior as well as his commander within the army. He was actually among the target of the coup but luckily escaped from the attempt of his assassination. However, his existence and role in the post-coup period was not so clear hence being part of the controversies around the coup. He was also the creator of Dual-Function ideology of the military during Sukarno period (See: Chapter 4).

⁶³ Although Suharto also implemented strategies in politics, they must not be the priority of his regime. Later in this section and everywhere else we will see that efforts to stabilize the politics are merely aimed to provide a base for economic development which was believed to give a more sustainable base for his legitimacy.

4. Spreading sentiments that Sukarno and the communists were the key actors behind the instability during and after the coup — a situation which had the potential to end up in horizontal conflict with Sukarno's supporters.

The emergence of the *Orde Baru* cannot be separated from the series of political and economic crises produced by the disastrous orientation of the *Orde Lama*, which emphasized politics over anything else. In fact, the orientation and priorities of the *Orde Baru* were simply the opposite to those of the *Orde Lama*. The first and the main objective of the *Orde Baru* was to consolidate Suharto's power – who, as soon as he had acceded to the presidency, had to confront multiple crises. Facing such a challenging situation, Suharto formulated policies that can be categorized into three steps:

Initially, he launched efforts to gain legitimacy from the people by giving priority to economic development; secondly, Suharto consolidated the national elements of the state (through nationalist-rhetoric) with the objective of assuring the political stability required by the government in order to efficiently create and implement economic policies; and finally, Suharto tried to regain the international support (particularly from non-communist countries) that had been devastated during the *Orde Lama* period. All these measures determined the performance of Suharto's regime, while serving as the sources of legitimacy to his long-lasting rule.

Economic development as the main source of legitimacy

Economic development was given priority by the *Orde Baru* because the regime had a big interest to gain instant support from the majority of people. However, there were specific reasons for choosing economic development as the priority of the regime. The first was that economic development could be expected to bring new hope to a society that had been suffering for a long period of time of multi-dimensional crisis. As stated by Lipset, *all questions in relation to the government's right of control finally must deal with the question of gaining support from the people by showing its effectiveness; while for new countries, the demonstration of the effectiveness would mean economic development* (Lipset, 1968). Secondly, when Suharto replaced Sukarno as president, Sukarno was still alive while his supporters

and ideology were still enjoying significant influence across the archipelago. If Suharto's regime could not bring a significant progress to people's lives, there would be a fear of Sukarno's return. Thirdly, the decision was based partly on the army's sectarian interest (proven during the later period of Suharto's regime) that economic development could give space to the army for engaging in economic activities under the pretext of 'stabilization'. These facilities would later help the army to finance its political wing (the Golkar) which dominated Indonesia's politics for almost three decades until 1997. Fourthly, Suharto must have learned from Sukarno's experience of what Stein Rokkan terms as 'nation and character building' – that the sense of 'Indonesian nationalism' envisioned by Sukarno could not be created through political development alone. Suharto understood that too much emphasis on 'politics' would only bring about quarrels amongst the elites and hence not always effective to gain legitimacy from the people. Finally, Suharto understood that revolution could not last forever. Sukarno was a prominent leader during the period of revolution and remained in that profile in 1965, twenty years after the heyday of the revolutionary era. Suharto found Sukarno's speeches and radical policies had not only failed to bring about sustainable legitimacy, but had also created negative image for Indonesia at the international level.

Based on these conclusions, Suharto wanted to manage the state and his regime by using strategies different to Sukarno—the economy (and not politics) came first. Rhetorical speeches on nationalism, ideology and revolution were replaced with measures to mobilize national resources in order to support economic development. There was a strong belief that if the basic needs of the people were satisfied, then there would be a positive 'spill over' to other sectors –eventually bringing about political stability and the prosperity to the nation.

The first dilemma faced by Suharto was related to the question of economic strategy – two alternatives were available: a 'radical strategy'---which promised a quick achievement of legitimacy; or else a 'cooperative and moderate strategy'⁶⁴ which

⁶⁴ The radical economic strategy relies on the capacity of each individual hence encourages the reinforcement of this capacity as the best way out from crisis. According to this model, the government should demolish in a radical way the economic structure inherited from the previous regime and refuse foreign investment. This model has an advantage in term of gaining a rapid and vast support at the domestic level, especially from those who get a direct profit from the nationalization of foreign companies and the farmers who

Suharto ultimately decided upon as the national economic strategy. Initially, “the New Order” was founded on three major pillars: the army, the students and the technocratic anti-communists. These three social groups could not accept a radical economic strategy that reflected the Marxist approaches as preached by Sukarno. In particular, a plan of redistribution of resources through land reform or graduated income structure (similar to that implemented during the 1960s) was likely to constitute a serious threat for the unity of the new coalition. The landowners (who were in the anti-communist majority) would not accept this, nor would the intellectuals and the army. Furthermore, the radical strategy would cause capital flight, as the government would find itself with an obligation to provide the basic needs of the people by spending enormous financial resources that it did not have, and moreover, constrained to ask for help from external partners. Lastly, the radical strategy would have slowed down economic growth and cause inflation.

Hence, the “New order” adopted a capitalist national development model that encouraged private sector initiatives by establishing an open market system, and by offering facilities to foreign investors. This policy was made official and formalized at the 23rd provisional General meeting entitled “Renewal of the base of the economic policy, financial and of the development.” This assembly specified three stages of economic development (MPRS, 1966):

1. A ‘rescue’ stage whereby the causes and effects of economic decline were anticipated so that it did not worsen.
2. Economic stabilization and rehabilitation through control and improvement of the economic infrastructure.
3. Economic development itself

would get advantage from land reform policy. In addition, in short term the government will find an instant alternative of financial resources required to implement its programmes of development. However, this kind of strategy is risky toward external as the countries whose companies were nationalised would launch a counter-attack against the Indonesian interests overseas. Contrarily, moderate strategy relies on the active involvement of foreign investment in the national economy. Towards external, this strategy would create a positive image on Indonesia especially from foreign investors and international companies. Towards internal, however, this strategy had frequently to oppose the nationalist groups of the society as usually the government efforts to attract investors would involve certain facilities that may disappoint these groups. Scholar such as Mas’Oed, therefore, called the Indonesian economic strategy at the beginning of the New Order period as ‘*Towards-external*’. See: MAS’OED, M. (1989) *Ekonomi dan Struktur Politik Orde Baru 1966-1971*, Jakarta, Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3ES).

The first stage aimed to remove Indonesia from the economic crisis that had already overflowed onto other sectors by addressing two factors:

- 1) the significant increase of Indonesia's budget deficit.
- 2) the uncontrollable expansion of bank credit⁶⁵.

By the beginning of 1960, significant increases in state spending were not matched by increases in its income. According to economic theory, a budget deficit can be controlled by two means: either to increase its income through tax revenue, or to print new money. The government chose the second means without taking into account measures for the supply of goods and services. This situation was worsened by the flow of bank credit in an expansive way, which meant that even more money entered circulation. Consequently, the nation's economy suffered a double negative effect: domestic inflation continued because of the increase of money in circulation, and the increase of imports to satisfy domestic demand. This last aspect, however, was necessary, for Indonesia had great need for industrial machines, spare parts, rice, textiles – all items of capital that could restart the economy. Nevertheless, these factors contributed to the budget imbalance, insufficient economic infrastructure, a decline of the currency reserve, weakness of the capacity to produce – all which decreased the activity and the sources of export, sending the country into a vicious circle.

The other objective of the economic rescue was to eliminate both the short-term and (as much as possible) the negative effects of the crisis. It was necessary, therefore to ensure efficient provisioning of things such as rice, textiles, machines and other factors of production, as well as controlling imports through a series of governmental measure – for example, policies concerning currency and import licensing. But these measurements were not effective because of the existence of an enormous variation in the international exchanges between income from exports and the price of

⁶⁵ See for example: NITISASTRO, W. (1965) *Masalah-masalah Ekonomi dan Faktor-faktor IPOLEKSOS*, Jakarta, Leknas/LIPI., p.7-11, 28-50, 103-110, 134-135; KAMI (1966) *The Leader, The Man, and The Gun. Artikel Seminar KAMI, 10-20 January*. Jakarta, KAMI., MAS'OED, M. (1989) *Ekonomi dan Struktur Politik Orde Baru 1966-1971*, Jakarta, Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3ES)., p. 62-67

imports⁶⁶. In 1966, the income from exports reached \$600 million, while import prices reached \$600-\$700 million. Moreover, the payment of foreign debt reached \$530 million in 1966 and \$270 million in 1967 (Panglaykim and Thomas, 1973, p.689-690).

To regulate variation in its currency, the “New order” government required access to credit which, in the short run could not contribute to a further increase in domestic funding. *Vis-a-vis* this situation, the West, Japan and other capitalist countries offered a solution to Indonesia, whereby loan conditions and distribution of debts were relatively flexible. But in the long run, Indonesia required not only financing to regulate the variation of the currency, but also foreign assets and their investment to ensure the continuity of national development. In short, Indonesia needed the support of capitalist countries, as well as banks and multinational corporations.

The leaders of the “New order” realized that it was not easy to obtain the support of the community and the international institutions. Foreign investors were already traumatized by the policies of Sukarno that opposed international assistance. Moreover, his expansionist strategy and confrontation with Malaysia were not appreciated by the international community. Therefore, Suharto and his economic advisors tried to show the international community the changes of the new government.

They initially tried to demonstrate its capacity to control existing economic problems. With an aim to gain international support, the government revealed its new policy under seven points in April 1966⁶⁷:

1. They acknowledged that Indonesia was confronted with chronic inflation, budget deficit and foreign debt. If the government was committed to settling the foreign debt that year as it had envisaged, they would need to exhaust all foreign-exchange reserves to pay for the importation of necessary items. For

⁶⁶ Elaborated by CORDON, W. M. & MACKIE, J. A. C. (1962) The Development of the Indonesian Exchange Rate System. *Malayan Economic Review*, Vol. VII.; THASAN, K. (1966) Multiple-Exchange Rates: The Indonesian Experience. IMF papers.

⁶⁷ The Ministry of Communication of Indonesia, ‘*Statemen-statemen Politik Waperdam Bidang Sospol/Menteri Luar Negeri dan Waperdam Bidang Ekubang*’, Jakarta, 1966, cited by Mohtar Mas’Oed, See: MAS’OED, M. (1989) *Ekonomi dan Struktur Politik Orde Baru 1966-1971*, Jakarta, Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3ES)., p.68

this reason, the government made a proposal with its creditors to discuss the possibility of a delay in the debt servicing.

2. The rehabilitation of the economic infrastructure could be possible through the importation of the parts and machinery.
3. Effective research of Indonesia's economic rationale would become the basis for policy of the government both internally and externally. This engagement meant that the government would accept foreign aid without imposing its own political conditions.
4. Active association and consultation with the peripheries during economic decision making. In other words, the central government preached a policy of decentralization allowing the peripheries to exploit local resources within the limits and laws of the State.
5. The government would stop all subsidies.
6. The removal of taxes would be carried out after a reform of the tax system.
7. Short-term measures to stabilize and rehabilitate the economy would quickly be taken by the government in order to give to private companies an opportunity to develop and organize themselves.

After this declaration of intent, the next stage was the stabilization and the rehabilitation of the economy. This aimed to soften the pressure of inflation and to reinforce the balance of payments through two means: to decrease monetary flows in circulation in order to slow down inflation and thus stabilize the budget deficit, and to increase public income through foreign aid and increase in taxation. In accordance with that, the government made a series of fiscal/tax and monetary reforms and policies⁶⁸.

Fiscal/tax reforms:

a. reduction of the national expenditure

⁶⁸ Cited and analysed based on materials from various sources such as: Mas'Oed, *Ibid.*; ANONYMOUS (1968) Far Eastern Economic Review Yearbook ; WHITE, L. J. (1970) Problems and Prospects of Indonesian Foreign Exchange System. *Journal Indonesia*, October 1970., Chapter 18; PALMER, I. (1978) *Indonesian Economy Since 1965*, London, Frank Class.; SUMAWINATA, S. (1970) Economic Situation and Economic Policies in Indonesia. Jakarta, No Publisher.; HIMAWAN, C. (1980) *Foreign Investment in Indonesia*, Jakarta, Gunung Agung.

Considering the national budget was the greatest source of expenditure, reducing it was effective to slow down inflation. Moreover, the government determined that the current expenditure had to be financed by the current income. For that, it was necessary to reduce the budget to conform with income, so that a point of balance could be reached.

b. Increase in income tax

This policy was carried out through an improvement of tax mechanisms and a fight against corruption. The government carried out an increase in income tax through an increase of customs duties and increase of taxes on petroleum products.

c. Suppression of subsidies and adaptations to pricing system

Subsidies granted to state enterprises would be removed with an aim of making these companies more autonomous, effective, rational and beneficial. This policy, as a consequence, increased tariffs for electricity, water and telecommunications. However, the government tried to guarantee the price stability of essential products. For that, the subsidies for the procurement of such products were maintained, and an institution established to manage their distribution.

The monetary policy:

a. Financial tightening

The central bank took measures to tighten financial distribution by determining a high level of interest between 5% and 9% per month.

b. 'Deposito' Saving

When the program to control inflation began to produce results, the banks introduced a new range of saving plans through which the money in circulation within the country could be controlled.

Moreover, in accordance with the intention of the "New order" to adopt a capitalist system, the government also applied co-operative policies in connection with

overseas investors and international exchange. Suharto's regime created a program to address this:

International assistance and foreign investment

a. To set out debt structure and to seek new appropriations

The government took active measures to redesign the debt structure and to seek long term financial solutions with low appropriations in terms of interest rate management.

b. Overseas investment

To attract the attention of international investors, the government offered facilities and stimulants. For example, in 1967, the government announced a new law concerning overseas investment which granted tax relief for the first six years for certain projects; release customs taxes for the importation of machines and capital; as well as the right to take profit back to their country.

c. Privatizing those companies that were previously nationalized.

The objective was to show to investors the "serious" intentions of the new government. The "new order" privatized those companies that had been nationalized by Sukarno and gave them compensation. To these companies, the government also offered the same facilities as to those new foreign companies that had been just been established.

Liberalizing international exchange

a. Currency Regulation

The decree of the government of October 3, 1966 became the basis of the reformed currency exchange market. Through this new system of payment, the government increased the allowance of currencies for exporters and gave them other facilities to

support their activities. In addition to this liberalization, the government also determined a new rate of exchange – 75 rupees for 1 US\$⁶⁹.

b. Stimulants for International Exchange

On July 28, 1967, the government continued to offer facilities to exporters and importers, including the reduction of export duties, and streamlined export/importation processes.⁷⁰

Reducing Bureaucracy and Decentralization policy

Through this directive, the government promised that it would avoid acting as an “economic commando” as it did during the time of *Orde Lama*. Instead, it transferred most of its economic decision making capacity to the ‘market’. As a result, certain payments to the government were removed and market institutions rationalized and made more effective.

The third stage was directed toward long term market solutions. Overseen by expert economists from the University of Berkeley (known as the ‘Berkeley Mafia’), Suharto built a national macroeconomic development program. This program called “Pelita,” facilitated an economy that was structured, planned, and evaluated every five years, with priority sectors renewed during each period. “Pelita” was essentially an adaptation of the theoretical framework regarding company development, as proposed by W.W. Rostow.⁷¹

⁶⁹ The sharp decline of exportation during the period of Orde Lama was caused coherently by the complexity of regulation and the double standard in the currency system adopted by the regime. In practice, these brought about disadvantages to exporters because they had to rely on the currency level determined by the government who gave a low value to the foreign currency resulted from their trade. As the consequence, exporters had less incentives to export their commodities, and when they were doing so, they don’t change their foreign currencies into rupiah but instead ‘trade’ them in the ‘black market’. The double rates-system had also brought about difficulties for the rates applied to export/import were 30 rupiah per 1US\$, whereas the formal rates were 10 rupiah per 1US\$. In the ‘black market’, meanwhile, the rates were 140 rupiah per 1US\$. See: SUMAWINATA, S. (1970) *Economic Situation and Economic Policies in Indonesia*. Jakarta, No Publisher., p.67

⁷⁰ *Far eastern Economic Review Year Book 1968*, p.199

⁷¹ In the “*Politics and the Stages of Growth*”, published by Cambridge University Press in 1971, Rostow elaborated steps of social development with reference mainly the economic development in Western Europe since the medieval period. These steps, according to Rostow, work in a linear way in accordance to a pattern of development: traditional society → pre-condition for take-off → take-off towards maturity → high

To carry out all these changes, on July 25, 1966 Suharto established a new Cabinet sentimentally named Cabinet AMPERA (Amanat Penderitaan Rakyat – meaning mandate of the suffering of the people) which aimed to address the problems of prosperity and economic development. The latter involved the installation of a special team within the cabinet called the Committee of the Economic Stability, a unit directly under the direction of Suharto. Members of the Berkeley Mafia were designated as special advisers to him and consequently become major technocrats of the “New order.”

Consequently, many Indonesians accepted the arrival of Suharto and had several reasons to recognize his legitimate leadership. For example, Suharto imposed social order, restored the economy, and removed the threat of communism as well ideological conflicts from social life. He also brought a fundamental change in the quality of life to Indonesian people through economic development. As an illustration, in 1965 Indonesia was the poorest country in Asia, with approximately 60% of its population (around 55 people million) lived below the poverty line (Bresnan, 1993, p.1, 286, Schwartz, 1994, p.58-59), which was so different with the situation during the *Orde Baru* period. As a result of Suharto’s development policies⁷², the annual growth of the GDP continuously exceeded 6% for the next thirty years. Until 1996, poverty had been reduced to 11%, (22 million people). Impressive results were also recorded for life expectancy, agricultural output and food self-sufficiency.

Furthermore, with an abundant labour source and immense natural resources, Indonesia seemed assured for sustained growth. In brief, despite certain underlying factors that prevented Indonesia from achieving success, under Suharto’s leadership Indonesia found stability, hence very few people were concerned when his party, Golkar, gained a quasi-plebiscite after the 1971 election – a political trend that brought him an ‘authoritative’ image around the world. Even so, at the domestic level Suharto gained a very significant level of legitimacy – seen as the saviour of the

consumption. Using this model, Suharto and his technocrats wish to bring more rapidly ‘western’ standard of national development to Indonesia.

⁷² In addition to these, an important factor should be taken into account: 1973 records a boom oil revenue which brought more economic prosperity to the country and made it possible for Suharto to even consolidate his legitimate power and rule.

country *vis-a-vis* communism, secessionism, and poverty – hence entitling himself as ‘The Father of Indonesian Development’.

It was only towards the end of the 1980s that questions surrounding the long reign of Suharto began to arise when a series of deficiencies started to appear: disparity of income, urban misery, environmental degradation and human rights violations. Most serious was the problem of corruption. An examination of the Indonesian leadership system, makes it obvious that entire economic sectors were structured as channels for benefiting the Suharto family, close relations of the president and their associates (such as military officials). Rather than serving the community, the majority of the state apparatus was mobilized for the elite. Consequently, the poor suffered terribly. By 1996, dissatisfaction amongst society had reached its highest level after almost three decades of stability. These negative trends led to loss of support for Suharto from the people, as well as the army and political elites (these topics will be analyzed in chapter 4 and chapter 5), and resulted in the collapse of his regime in 1997, and brought a new era of leadership under the presidency of Habibie.

3.4. Version IV: Democratic legal legitimacy

When Habibie took leadership of Indonesia, the morale of the state had never been so low. Widespread disorder reigned throughout the country after Jakarta and other major cities were traumatized following the May riots that year. Moreover, the economy was in crisis and the financial sector was totally in ruin. Millions of Indonesians had been thrown into poverty (see Chapter 1 section 1.5.1). Meanwhile, the task of the new president was made even more difficult as Habibie also inherited serious political and economic crises just like his predecessor. However, unlike Suharto in 1965, Habibie did not have enough support from the people nor the political elites, and the army only half-heartedly accepted his rule. The political elites, students and the army were in an alliance against any kind of leadership that could be regarded as a “continuation of the New Order,” and Habibie’s regime was suspected to be such. Even the constitution could not be expected to give legitimacy to the regime. In brief, Habibie’s regime was in a position of acute political weakness with an extremely low level of legitimacy. Nevertheless, Habibie’s civilian regime was able to stand more than one and half years without military intervention and without

fatal resistance from the elites, students and the people — altogether, this meant a significant but limited form of legitimacy for the regime.

How Habibie had been able to secure this precious aspect of state legitimacy during his short rule is, therefore, analytically interesting. For example, Habibie had made extraordinary and daring strategic decisions such as granting independence to the press, releasing political prisoners and solving the issue of East Timor.

Establishing a New Government and Setting-up a Democratic Election

Left with little choice, Habibie tried to manage the unfavorable situation by setting up a number of measures which would later be the basis for all regimes after 1998. Among Habibie's urgent tasks was to establish a new government in the shortest time possible in order to alleviate any possibility of intervention from the army due to the chaotic political circumstances. A cabinet was then created with multiple objectives – most important of which was to ease tensions amongst reformer-elites. At the beginning, however, it seemed that Habibie was unable to please the reformers as the new cabinet was still dominated by prominent figures from the previous regime. The majority of the 36 ministers were from Golkar (Suharto's party) or from the army. Twenty ministers came from Suharto's last cabinet – including the 'Group of Ten' who signed the 'letter of refusal' for Suharto's leadership prior to his resignation⁷³. Habibie also maintained the four 'anti-reform' ministers from the previous government, including Faisal Tanjung who was assigned to a strategic post as the coordinating minister for politics and security. Habibie's sectarian allies were also represented in this cabinet. Some were his collaborators in the ministry of science and technology (such as the minister of industry and trade, Rahardi Ramelan), while others were his companions from Habibie's hometown Sulawesi (such as the minister of state enterprises, Tanri Abeng). These moves were suspected as efforts to form a clan in the cabinet. Even though the cabinet also included a certain number of politicians from Islamist groups they still came from Habibie's proxy at the ICMI, in particular the minister for the co-operatives, Adi

⁷³ As we will see in Chapter 5, the reform suggested by Suharto during its last days of reign was refused by the people. Even its own ministers were turned over against him. Directed by the Minister for the economy, Ginandjar Kartasmita, 10 Ministers for the "New order" signed a "Memorandum against Suharto", this last had thus lost the support of half of its last government the day before its decision to resign.

Sasono. Due to this composition, the cabinet gave only little satisfaction to the demands for reform. Therefore, the political elites then urged the government to conduct a popular vote rather than supporting the new regime. From their perspective, only an election could be expected to put an end to the political uncertainty, and later lead to the creation of a legitimate government.

Facing this new political pressure, Habibie did not appear to be reluctant. His objective was to give the impression that the new regime was not operating under the influence of Suharto's *Orde Baru*, so he immediately expressed his willingness to prepare for democratic elections earlier than necessary⁷⁴. To make this willingness more apparent, on May 23, 1998, the president gathered key reformers (such as Amien Rais, Nurcholish Madjid, Emil Salim and Adnan Buyung Nasution) to discuss the possibility of an election⁷⁵. After these discussions, a spokesperson announced that the president wished to hold a new legislative election as soon as a new electoral law could be adopted. Since this task would take some time, the president stated that he would examine this question further before fixing a date for the election.

Habibie had apparently decided on this tactic after 'discreet' consultation with the army, as the spokesperson for the army also held a press conference at more or less the same time as Habibie's statement. "A precondition to solve the economic crisis was", said the spokesperson, "a government which is elected by the people"(Suara Pembaharuan, 1998a). From this brief statement, the army thus approved the call from Habibie to conduct a legislative election. This was really extraordinary as it was declared by an institution that had defended Suharto's military presidential monarchy for three decades. Nevertheless, the declaration also contained certain

⁷⁴ Constitutionally, Habibie was not obliged to organize an election. Article 8 of the constitution of 1945 stipulates that if the president had a permanent hindrance and failed to accomplish his tenure, the vice-president would continue the remainder of his mandate. Habibie thus had a constitutional mandate until 2003. However, the tension in the country did not enable him to be prevailed of this 'constitutional legitimacy'. Ginandjar Kartasasmita was the first member of the cabinet who advised an earlier election in order to produce a new 'democratic' government with direct mandate from the people. Amien Rais, the leader of the reformists, was even giving an ultimatum that legislative election had to be held within six month.

⁷⁵ Habibie included retired General Rudini into this meeting. It was not so clear what was Habibie's real intention behind the involvement of this prominent figure of the army, but it may be worth to speculate that this decision was because Rudini known as 'liberal' in perspective despite his strategic position within the army. When Rudini was the minister of internal affairs during Suharto's cabinet of 1988-1993, he used to alter without success the 'draconian' election law which privilege Golkar for the sake of political stability, an effort that had made Rudini fired from the cabinet.

preconditions. Many Indonesians wondered whether the army was simply waiting for the best moment to intervene while trying to ease dissatisfaction from the people and political elites⁷⁶. Another suspicious feeling amongst society was that perhaps the army hoped that a democratic election would bring general Wiranto, the chief-commander of the army to the presidency (in fact, he later showed his intention to put forward his candidacy).

Meanwhile, Habibie's real intention was still unpredictable – whether he wished to be a candidate in the next presidential election, or if he would be satisfied to act only as a transitional president. Another fear was that he might try to reinstate Suharto's reign later in the future, or at least maintain his previous influence. However, Habibie's famous 'intelligence' convinced many elites that he would prefer to lead a peaceful transition in order to privilege himself later as the 'father of the democracy,' rather than taking an opposite stance. Nevertheless, Habibie's proximity to Suharto was the main reason that the public was anxious of knowing what approach he would choose.

Criticism and skepticism amongst the elites started to emerge when Habibie gave the sign of a non-immediate election. From his speech of June 22, 1998, Habibie mentioned that an election would be possible only if a new political law was available, and he envisaged that it would not be until December 1998 that new political laws could be drafted; moreover, such processes would be subject to the lengthy delay of an extraordinary session of the parliament that would determine the election date. Habibie proposed that this legislative election would be conducted by mid-1999, and thus the presidential election would not take place before December 1999. This process (taking eighteen months after the resignation of Suharto) was considered as too long by the reformers. For example, Emil Salim claimed that this decision would slow down the Indonesian economic recovery. In comparison, Thailand and South Korea had responded to the financial crisis by instituting rapid

⁷⁶ Even though the legislative election was important, the more crucial stage would take place within the National Assembly which would elect the next president. There was therefore a certain level of fear that the election would only be used as a means to give a new form of legitimation to the army. While elected deputies in the parliament altogether would make only the half of the National Assembly, the other half would be the representatives of regions and certain institutions of the state including the army. This means an election, no matter how democratic it would be, still provide a huge space for the army to intervene hence there was a fear among elites that the election would be an inefficient way to accommodate the reforms (see: chapter 4)

political change. This caused turbulence amongst the elites. In October 1998, radical students demonstrated against military units, sometimes with violent consequences. However, as Habibie's reason for the delay was technical, political elites and students could not be too 'insistent' on this matter. In addition, the three main leaders representing the reformers---Amien Rais (intellectuals), Megawati Sukarnoputri (Nationalist), and Gus Dur (Islam)---would hardly think to confront the army only to precipitate the election, especially since Habibie himself had promised to hold a free election in 1999. Their moderate strategies were based on their confidence to gain victory in the election, and to use the time to make preparations for this. Megawati and Gus Dur (who were quite passive at the beginning) later declared the establishment of their political parties at the end of 1998. Gus Dur created a traditional Islamist-based *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*—National Awakening Party (PKB) while Megawati created a nationalist-based *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan*—Indonesian Democratic Struggle Party (PDIP).

Enforcing the Law

The next important measure taken by Habibie's regime to gain legitimacy was through law enforcement. It had been widely believed that the fundamental stumbling block constraining the Indonesian economic recovery was the lack of respect for the law amongst the people. There was hence a popular cynical statement saying that Indonesia was governed by what was called "Ruler's Law" – a term which in fact tried to negate the "Rule-of-Law". For more than four decades after 1945, the legal system had always been designed to defend the supremacy of the ruler (leader), rather than the supremacy of the law itself. However, this did not mean that the legal system in Indonesia did not function at all. In fact, it functioned very effectively for the interests of the elites, but did not, however, deliver justice amongst the people. Moreover, the system was rife with corruption within the legal infrastructure. Judges, prosecutors, the police force and lawyers were not loyal to their professionalism or their principles and ideals of public services, as the entire system placed little value on these qualities. Instead, their professional activities were structured by their loyalty to their superiors, the rich or the power-holders. Over time, the practices of enriching themselves through loyalty had conditioned the bureaucracy and the military with a culture of corruption. It was common for civil servants to sell their

services to the highest bidder. Therefore, the legal system became a mechanism whereby the rich and powerful could exploit the poor and the weak. Habibie, therefore, wanted to buy people's support by promising to reform the legal system. To do so, Habibie appointed Muladi, a leading figure of justice at the time, as the minister of justice⁷⁷.

The nomination of Muladi was welcomed by the reformers with high expectations because of the integrity shown by the minister during his time as a chancellor at the University of Diponegoro in central Java. Muladi was obviously capable of pleasing reformers' demands – most notable of which was his decision to release political prisoners as well as cleaning up corrupt judicial institutions previously headed by retired general Sarwata. As such, the reformers applauded Muladi's initiatives and committed themselves to supporting the new minister in his project for reformation within his institution, and hence a positive indicator for Habibie's legitimacy.

Reforming the army

Soon after Habibie's appointment as head of state, the army commander-in-chief, general Wiranto approved the institutional reforms applied to the armed forces. Initially the reform began with the reduction of soldier's representatives in the parliament from 75 to 38 seats. Then the army was asked to be politically neutral by pulling out of its active involvement in business as well as in political parties (such as Golkar). In addition, army officers who were previously in charge of bureaucratic positions and public administration were now replaced by civilians.

Supplementary to these reforms, structural changes within the armed forces were also applied in April 1999, when the national police force was separated from the armed forces. The police force was now in charge of internal security and placed under the direct command of the president rather than the Minister of defense. In doing this, Habibie promised to give 'professional' protection to the society while expected to gain even more support from the people for his quest of legal legitimacy.

⁷⁷ Analysis about Habibie's efforts to win the legitimacy for his regime is partly based on direct observation by the researcher who, during the Habibie's presidency, served as his assistant at the State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia.

Managing the problem of 'East Timor' to regain international support

Despite state's independent status, history has shown that Indonesian regimes have not always been capable of being 'fully-independent' – especially during periods of crisis. Suharto was trying to regain international trust in order to support his efforts to gain legitimacy at the domestic level after Sukarno's reign. Habibie's situation was not so different as can be seen in the following story.

East Timor had long been a burden for Indonesian diplomacy. In 1975 Indonesia forcibly annexed this tiny territory after Portugal withdrew itself. The refusal of the United Nations to recognize this annexation combined with years of human right abuses involving the Indonesian army, had drawn considerable attention from the international community. During his rule, Suharto had rejected the repeated attempts of the international community to peacefully resolve the difficult question of Timor. While Suharto's firm internal legitimacy was capable of easing these international concerns, Habibie (whose legitimacy was suffering an intense attack and pressures at the domestic level) could not do the same. During a time of economic crisis, the international community was a potential ally when there were no better alternatives available. Hence, daring initiatives to review the question of East Timor appeared at the top of Habibie's agenda.

Initially, Habibie's initiative was aimed to give more flexibility to East Timor than during Suharto's period. He promised to grant the territory 'special autonomy' while reducing the number of Indonesian troops based in the area. He wished that this initiative would be welcomed by the Timorese who had lived under 'iron-law' for more than two decades (See: Appendix 3-Garnadi Document); by the Indonesian elites and army for East Timor as doing so would not hurt national integrity; and the international community, as the policy was a 'break-through' after a long period of being 'idle'.

This initiative was challenged by the elites – especially the conservative groups. They had fears that these concessions would encourage secessionist sentiments in certain areas like Aceh and Papua. In addition, with the nation being so diverse and

multicultural and which had suffered from previous multicultural conflicts and secessionism, questioning national integration would be politically taboo. Suharto had ardently used nationalist sentiments to keep this territory as part of the national unity – a project that proved to be effective despite the absence of international recognition. There were, however, certain actors capable of assuring Habibie's different perspective. One of them was a woman (who like Habibie, was a pious moslem intellectual) Dewi Fortuna Anwar.

In her official role of assistant to the state secretary for foreign affairs, Anwar had seen how the imbroglio of East Timor had harmed Indonesia's foreign relations with its international counterparts, donors and the United Nations. Her advice that the review of East Timor issue could mean extending good will from the regime, and also be greatly welcomed by the international community, ultimately convinced Habibie. In a press conference held on January 27, 1999, the president announced that Jakarta could organize a 'referendum' to accommodate the 'purest intention' of the Timorese (State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia, 1999).

Habibie held the belief that a referendum for the Timorese was the best solution available for the island, and also a brilliant way to win the international support significant to his quest for legitimacy. Moreover, due to its tiny size, East Timor might have been regarded as relatively unimportant by Jakarta. As the territory accounted for only one percent of the total Indonesian population, Habibie thought that the loss of Timor would have little impact to Indonesia. He had even put forward an argument to persuade conservative groups that East Timor was not worth preserving by saying: "*East Timor, what have that territory given us? Natural resources? No. Technology? No. Abundance gold? No. Stones? Yes*" (Strait Times, 1999). The policy was hence considered as in the interests of the Indonesian majority and a rational requirement considering the political realities of the post-Suharto era.

Conclusion

The political behaviour and orientation under the different forms of leadership from Sukarno to Habibie, is related to an important aspect of how and why a state enjoys legitimacy. This aspect is determined by the capacity of each leader to deal with political and economic circumstances. The quest for legitimacy by each regime was

mainly undertaken through championing support from subjects at the domestic level, and sometimes combined with support from the international community.

During Sukarno's period, the 'power' of the state was concentrated around a legitimate charismatic leader. Sukarno's vision of the future of the Indonesian state was executed through speeches on topics of 'nationalism' and 'revolution' – and was proven to be effective in gaining enthusiastic obedience from the domestic level. Furthermore, this charisma had influenced other actors in the political arena – despite the intense competition between the army and the communists, the president remained at the center of power, and in some cases, gave him an unchallenged extra-constitutional power. Thus, when the British established a federation for Malaysia, Sukarno used this issue as a political tool to divert the attention of the people from the intense internal conflict; moreover, the people obeyed him voluntarily. Sukarno hence played role as a “balancer” that not only assured the stability of the whole political system, but also provided a guarantee of the people's support.

Sukarno also made 'nationalism' and 'unity' as the foremost priorities of his regime, by virtue of which voluntary support and obedience were harvested from his audience (the Indonesian people). The widespread concerns regarding the possibility of Dutch return to power in his old colony gave him additional opportunities to develop his nationalist rhetoric. Meanwhile, as international politics were dominated by ideological competition between the West and the East, Sukarno had successfully led Indonesia into the non-alignment bloc – a successful strategy of mobilizing 'Third World' countries that gave even more charismatic power to Sukarno at the domestic level. Despite an arrangement that had led the state towards aggressive politics with the international community, this political orientation was effective for diverting internal quarrels and turning social poverty into the 'common enemy'.

The leadership during the “New Order” period behaved in a completely opposite direction to that of Sukarno's. The strategic problems that Suharto faced at the beginning of his reign were related to the failure of the preceding regime. Sukarno's political style put too much priority on '*ombrageux*' nationalism, resulting in severe

economic bankruptcy at the domestic level and significant loss of support from the international community. Learning from this failure, Suharto then tried to achieve legitimacy at the domestic level by restoring the economy and setting up a suitable development program. Over a course of more than 30 years, Suharto had successfully rectified the nation's economy and brought Indonesia towards a significant level of development. In the political dimension, Suharto strictly controlled the power of state by initially eliminating any potential political rivals (especially the communists) and giving the army more access to power while neutralizing the nationalist groups.

During the period of New Order, Suharto's authoritative style of leadership had set directions with a 'military standard' of operation, so that the regime was able to secure its legitimacy and reinforce martial Law through the manipulation of the political process at the domestic level and the proposition of a progressive formula of economic development based on capitalism. To address the external situation, the national economy was opened up to the market and supported by politics of co-operation with the international community – in particular those capitalist countries that were ready to provide political as well as financial support for Suharto's development programmes. Moreover, every element of the state accepted these arrangements – their obedience being obligatory and coerced by the regime.

The circumstances faced throughout Habibie's leadership were much less favorable in comparison with his two predecessors. Habibie had also inherited serious political and economic crises, but unlike Sukarno or Suharto, Habibie was not surrounded by significant popular support. The political elites, the students and the army were resistant to the 'New Order' as well as its continuators, while Habibie's regime was considered by the people as a continuation Suharto's regime. Amidst this multidimensional crisis, the regime had also lost confidence from international donors as a consequence of Suharto's radical stance during his last days in power.

Under these circumstances, legitimacy based either on constitution, charisma or authority was not effective. Hence, Habibie tried to find support wherever he could – from inside as well as from outside. Habibie, therefore, ended up taking extraordinary and daring decisions – such as granting independence to the press,

releasing political prisoners, and especially reviewing the problem of East Timor. Despite all these efforts, Habibie's leadership lasted for only one and half years. Nevertheless, these efforts become standard of legal legitimacy which were to be adopted and practiced by later regimes from 1999 until the current period.

CHAPTER FOUR:

THE INDONESIAN MILITARY AND THE STATE

“.....the military has taken over power in a large number of developing countries: in Egypt (1952), in Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, Iraq and the Sudan (1958), in Turkey (1960), in Korea (1961) and again in Burma in 1962. In other countries, too, the military have tended to play an increasingly important role, as in Vietnam, the Phillipines, Indonesia, and less prominently as yet, in Jordan and Ethiopia”
(Daalder, 1962, p. 9)

“More than two-thirds of the countries of Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East have experienced varying levels of military intervention since 1945”
(Nordlinger, 1977, p. xi)

Scholars often argue that the twentieth century saw witnessed the rise of the nation-state, with the military being a ‘required’ institution behind this development and establishment⁷⁸. In this kind of arrangement, the military is assigned one major function in social organization: that of national defence. In theory, a military should be politically impartial, economically withdrawn, and focused on its main task of defending the nation from any threats. However, at the practical level, such an arrangement is not always the case. Within a state’s evolution, the military has often played multiple roles which were far beyond its primary one and involved in political and economic activities. In Russia during the liberation from the Marxist-Leninist regime, the military played the part of a ‘liberator’ not of the people or the state, but of a particular party. From the 1950s, militaries have intervened in the politics of various developing countries, seizing power and using it as an instrument serving their particular interests. At other times, militaries have taken ‘necessary steps’ to put an end to the existing civilian-deadlock or radical measures to alter the status quo. Militaries have also been involved in the social and economic development of nation-states, and have even determined the development of the whole system of the state through the formation of military-based leadership at various levels of government. Further, in these countries, militaries have been assertive in

⁷⁸ See, for example: HUNTINGTON, S. (1957) *The Soldier and the State*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.; FINER, S. (1976) *The Man on Horseback*, Harmondsworth, Penguin.

economic and social life, identifying themselves initially as the 'savior' of the nation, but then as the 'true' agent of development and modernization, taking on a role that traditionally belonged to civilians in monarchies, aristocracies, and political parties in democracies.

The involvement of the military in the politics of modern nation-states, especially in the third-world, is certainly not a new object of scholarly attention. For some time, prominent scholars such as Samuel Huntington (See: Huntington, 1957), Harold Morris Janowitz (See: Janowitz, 1960), S.E. Finer (See: Finer, 1976), Amos Perlmutter (See: Perlmutter, 1969, Perlmutter, 1977), H. Daalder (See: Daalder, 1962), Robert W. Jackman (See: Jackman, 1976) and Eric Nordlinger (See: Nordlinger, 1977, Nordlinger, 1970) have analysed comprehensively this kind of intervention in conjunction with a more or less parallel question: why is it that in many countries the military have taken (or tried to take) state power? Various answers have also been offered by those scholars. Daalder, for instance, suggests four logics behind this phenomenon. First, the military have often been one of the earliest Westernized institutions in traditional societies. Traditional elites, on the other hand, have thought it possible to borrow the "cutting edge" of Western civilization while insulating their societies as much as possible from Western influences in other respects and, in doing so, have contributed to making the army into a potential revolutionary force *par excellence* (Daalder, 1962, p.12). Second, in traditional societies, a military career has often been a means of upward social mobility for groups which otherwise occupied an inferior status, since the military men in many countries have been recruited from relatively low-status segments of society. According to Daalder, the army has consequently become one of the few channels of upward mobility in societies which have been marked by a very rigid stratification (Daalder, 1962, p.13). Third, the military is in fact not a completely homogeneous force but a single 'corporate' body with a collective interest. Apart from natural division of the military into armies, navies, and air-force, each division is further divided into multiple strata within the profession. This produces a diversified outlook and experience that, according to Daalder, may lead to various behaviours of the military, including that of intervention into domestic political sphere (Daalder, 1962, p.13-15). Fourth, Daalder also explains military revolts in the light of civilian failures. Daalder argues that national independence, by itself, raised expectations

which it would have been impossible to fulfil even under the most favourable conditions. Meanwhile, political leaders have been uncomfortably perched between the social forces of traditionalism and their desires for modernity. In this situation, according to Daalder, the military would have the tendency to intervene, given that it has both weapons and a vision of itself as the guardian of the nation which, it feels, might easily fall prey to imperialist designs if internal anarchy persisted (Daalder, 1962, p.16).

These dynamics should be kept in mind for the remainder of this chapter, since they show that military-civilian relationships around the world have been complicated. Further, they also provide an explanation of why the military tends to engage itself in the political sphere of third world states. This chapter, therefore, attempts neither to add salt to the seawater nor to polish the already-sophisticated treatises on why the military intervenes in the political sphere. The question addressed here is rather, 'How does the military established itself in a particular society?' As the Indonesian state is the focal point of the study, the inquiry is based, more specifically, on the question of 'How has the Indonesian military place itself within the Indonesian state?' The observation and assessment will be concentrated on the empirics from the period of early independence until today. Some points, therefore, need to be underlined at this initial stage. First, military intervention is a general phenomenon of the 'relatively new states' in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The Indonesian state falls within this category. Second, as 'corporate' institutions, the militaries of these states follow certain organizational patterns that have been developed in the West and adopt certain orientations similarly copied from the West. It is in this respect that the assessment of the Indonesian military is based on Western concepts. Third, a military is not a fully independent entity with a fixed orientation; its existence is always attached to a 'client', and it also suffers from the influence of its environment. Consequently, it can take different forms and orientations over time. Based on these three considerations, the model most relevant to the Indonesian case is that of Perlmutter, which distinguishes between professional, praetorian, and revolutionary militaries.

4.1. Perlmutter's, Professional, Praetorian, and Revolutionary Types

Among the many studies of the military in third-world states, Perlmutter's '*Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*' deserves particular attention. Perlmutter is an expert whose concentration is on the military in Middle Eastern countries, and the majority work concerns the military intervention in Egypt and Israel (see, for example: Perlmutter, 1978, Perlmutter, 1974). This regional focus provides a distinctive advantage, since it is a theoretical analysis of non-Western phenomena from a non-Western perspective. Another promising fact is that Perlmutter is considered as the pioneer of a non-traditional approach, for he has created an alternative to the functionalist and ideological approaches to civilian-military relations developed by his predecessors. Perlmutter concentrates on the 'corporate character' of the military establishment, which is also the focal point of this chapter. We will therefore begin by looking at Perlmutter's classification of the military before dealing with the main quest: analysing the Indonesian military.

Perlmutter identifies at least three types of the military in developing as well as in developed nation-states, each of which, according to Perlmutter, come about as a result of external 'stimuli' rooted within the civilian authority. The first type, *the professional*, is linked to a society in which the civilian government is successful in maintaining social order and political stability. The second type, *the praetorian*, is at the other end of the spectrum, arising within societies where the minimal requirement of social security cannot be assured by the civilian government--the situation generally associated with social disorder and political instability. The third type, *the revolutionary*, is associated into 'states-in-transition' and establishes itself within a society where the sustainability of political stability by the civilian government remains 'in question' despite the existing social order (see: Perlmutter, 1977, p. 9).

The Professional Soldiers

Literally, the term 'professional' refers to a person who has obtained a degree in a professional field hence its broad definition is related to certain criteria such as: academic qualifications; expert and specialized knowledge; manual/practical and

literary skills; high quality of work; certain standard of ethics and behaviour; and also certain level of moral and motivation.

The definition of 'Professional military', meanwhile, is not really clear-cut but scattered in accordance to various objectives and perspectives. Even the scholars mentioned earlier do not have a common definition despite their being the mainstream sources. Perlmutter, for instance, only emphasizes Huntington's criteria of professionalism: (1) expertise⁷⁹; (2) clientship⁸⁰; (3) corporateness; and (4) ideology⁸¹; while adding his two own criteria: 1) secularity⁸² and 2) social mobility⁸³ (Perlmutter, 1977, p.9).

The Praetorian Soldier

The term 'Praetorianism' found its origins in the Roman history⁸⁴, the concept being defined by Perlmutter as "*.....a situation where the military class of a given society exercises independent political power within it by virtue of an actual or threatened*

⁷⁹ The expertise of the military, according to most scholars, depends on the skills associated with the military organization, and in this case have something to do with the ability to manage any threats by using force and violence, an expected standard of conduct that can only be achieved through training. As was suggested by Machiavelli, "*.....In every country, good soldiers are made by training, because where nature is lacking, the industry supplies it, which, in this case, is worth more than nature*"—see MACHIAVELLI, N. (1521) *The Art of War*, Feedbooks., p.18

⁸⁰ The clientship criterion of the military refers to the rationale that any profession should serve specific clients. Doctors require patients, a lawyer would not be a lawyer without clients, and teachers require students. Likewise, there can be no professional military in the absence of user such as a state, society, monarch, empire, party or other client chosen by the military

⁸¹ A set of doctrines containing values, rules and procedures which all military officers are supposed to use as their main point of reference.

⁸² Being independent from sectarian groups such as church, class, caste and the like, while maintaining its organization based on rational principles

⁸³ Selection and advancement of officers on the basis of skill rather than according to class or other distinctions

⁸⁴ According to Bingham, the imperial praetorian guard was an elite unit of the Roman army whose primary responsibility was initially to safeguard the emperor and his family. Later, this military unit became the personal army of the emperor, and its power and responsibility were much greater than that of a regular defence force. They became responsible for specialized military tasks involving issues of security and for various administrative duties in Rome. This evolution, still according to Bingham, occurred because of the close relationship between the guard and the emperor, who saw the potential for a large number of soldiers to be put to good use for his own benefit and that of the state. The praetorians would not only assist in the management of the capital, but would also serve as a constant reminder to the populace of the substantial armed force underlying imperial rule—see: BINGHAM, S. (1997) *The Praetorian Guard in the Political and Social Life of Julio Claudian Rome. Department of Classical, Near Eastern, and Religious Studies*. Ottawa, The University of British Columbia., p.ii. The praetorian, therefore, is simply defined as emperors' guardians who turn into the real rulers of the empire. Nordlinger said, "*They ended up using their military power to overthrow emperors and to control the Roman senate's 'election' of successive emperors*"—see: NORDLINGER, E. (1977) *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, Enlewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall., p.2-3

use of force" (Perlmutter, 1977, p.89). A praetorian military, thus, is a type of the military that shows a dominant involvement in the politics within a state as was seen in the period of the Roman state⁸⁵. However, praetorianism of the modern context is understood in a slightly different way from that of the Roman period. According to Perlmutter: 1) Modern praetorianism tends to create a military-style regime in which political leadership is allocated to military members or to pro-military groups; 2) Instead of interfering indirectly in the political processes, modern praetorians' intervention is executed through direct affiliation with the organs of state such as parliament or executive branches; 3) modern praetorianism appeared not because of the ruler's privilege or the legitimacy from the senate/parliament but because of the weakness of civilian institutions; and 4) In contrast to the praetorian guard whose main motivation was to gain supremacy over the provincial armies, modern praetorianism tends to appear whenever the civilian leadership is decaying (Perlmutter, 1977, p.93).

With regard to Perlmutter's categorization, the praetorian is associated with a number of characteristic: Firstly, for praetorians, professional knowledge is not very strictly observed, and training is not considered the primary criteria of a military career despite the existence of military colleges and training centres; Secondly, the loyalty of the Praetorians is directed towards a 'master' which could be the nation, a certain ethnic group or tribe, military commanders, junta-government, or the state. The main criterion of this loyalty is simply the ability of the master to secure the interests of the military; Thirdly, the praetorians defend corporateness as the exclusive property of the military just as the Professional Military does; Fourthly, the subordination principle operates in the praetorian military may shift in accordance to the changing environment; Finally, in terms of ideology, the praetorian military is more traditional, materialist, and anti-socialist, while the Professional Military is usually very conservative (see: Perlmutter, 1977, p.12-13).

⁸⁵ Military intervention into politics had actually been approached by scholars with multiple terms. Borrowing Nordlinger's description, "The military officers who have intervened in the political sphere have been called 'Men on Horseback' in reference to the traditional mounted position of army officers; 'Soldiers in Mufti' because they often substitute civilian titles and clothing (mufti) for their military insignia and khaki uniform; 'Iron Surgeons' in recognition of the public justification for their intervention, namely the need for decisive action in regenerating the politics and economy; and 'Armed Bureaucrats' because their political attitudes and governing style approximate those of the higher civil servants"--NORDLINGER, E. (1977) *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, Enlewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall., p.2

Revolutionary Type

In specific circumstances, revolution is identical with crisis as the term is generally used to address a fundamental change in a short period of time, during which crises are likely to exist. In political science, for instance, the term is used to denote the change of power or of socio-political institutions which often involves confrontations between the revolutionary forces and the defensive status quo, between the reformers and the incumbent, between the progressives and the conservatives, or, in the case of a new state, between a movement party and the colonial power. The first group would normally take measures to bring about radical change or reform of the system which is defended by the second group, while the latter would try to preserve the status quo. When both parties were relatively equal in terms of power, confrontation would be the most likely result.

Despite the close relationship between revolution and crisis, between crisis and security, and between security and the military, the revolutionary type of military is actually a different object of analysis which is not necessarily directly related to the revolution itself. Even when a co-relation exists, the discussion would tend to have something to do with the behavioural aspect of the military: whether they would be part of the revolution or leave the business in the hands of civilians. This logic may lead a different analysis of the military, and needs to be clarified at the beginning⁸⁶. According to Perlmutter, the revolutionary type of military “.....*is certainly one of the finest, best disciplined professionals*” (Perlmutter, 1977, p.205) hence can be considered as a variant of the professional one. However, the revolutionary military is professional in a different way. Using the criteria of professionalism elaborated earlier, there are at least six differences which can be extracted from Perlmutter’s observation: First, the specific knowledge associated with the professional type is based on objective standards of competence, which makes the level of expertise relatively high. In the case of the revolutionary type, the professional knowledge is oriented towards social-political values and the level of its expertise is usually less

⁸⁶ The revolutionary military that we are trying to analyse in this chapter is an ideal type with certain characteristics which persist regardless of how soldiers behave. As a consequence, this type of the military refers to the military which is part of the party movement—and not one which defends the status quo.

measurable. Second, the client of the professional military is the state, while the client of the revolutionary military can be any group, institution, or even individuals who are in charge in the revolution. This is normally referred to as the “party-movement.” Third, the professional military defends corporateness as the exclusive property of the military, while the revolutionary type refuses to do so. According to Perlmutter, this refusal is the main difference between professional and revolutionary militaries. He said, “*The Orientation, organization, and inclination of the revolutionary soldier are anticorporate or non-corporate* (Perlmutter, 1977, p.205). Certain indicators of corporation – such as hierarchy, cohesive-organization, collectiveness, and subordination – would therefore be neglected by, or even entirely absent in, the revolutionary military. Fourth, conscription within the professional military is very restrictive and even conservative, and this would change to universal only in the case of emergencies such as war. The conscription within the revolutionary type, meanwhile, is always universal regardless the circumstances. Fifth, from the perspective of ideology, it is obvious that the revolutionary type will subscribe to the revolutionary ideology. The professional type, meanwhile, is conservative in ideology. Sixth, the disposition of the professional type to intervene into politics is low regardless of the state of civilian politics. The revolutionary type is slightly different. The disposition to intervene amongst the soldiers is very high before and during the revolution, but then becomes low once the revolution is completed.

The revolutionary military’s rejection to corporateness leads to what Perlmutter calls ‘inclusivity’, a character which is not only unique to the revolutionary military but also made this type of military less formal, less hierarchical, less corporate, and sometimes seems to neglect the basic criteria of professional military (see: Perlmutter, 1977, p.206). As the consequence, a figure can be recruited or promoted into the strategic military posts or leadership without necessarily considering his formal education, training, medical condition, and the like. Recruitment is open, means that whoever is able to fight and ready to provide a high level of loyalty can join the military and climb its ranks, while title and status can be given to soldiers even without external recognition (Perlmutter, 1977, p.14).

It is based on these unique characteristics that Perlmutter identified certain behavioural characteristics which can be used to help identify the revolutionary type

of military. The first indicator is its submission to the party movement during the revolution. At the initial stage, this seems to be a 'standard of behaviour' for the revolutionary type hence tends to be temporary. When the revolution is over, however, this would transform itself into other kinds of behaviour or, in Perlmutter's term, behavioural cycle (Perlmutter, 1977, p.13-14). The next indicator is related to clientship. According to Perlmutter, the loyalty of the revolutionary military is to the state or to the nation but this loyalty will shift as time passes. It is because, still according to Perlmutter, the real client of the revolutionary soldiers is the revolution itself. "The client of the professional soldier is the state and, hence, the nation.....Once the party movement becomes identified with the state or regime, he experiences ambivalence and he may become more loyal to the nation than to the regime" (Perlmutter, 1977, p.14-15).

Perlmutter's classification of the military is used to explain the Indonesian military during five different periods: 1) post-colonial Indonesian state (version I); 2) late-period of post-colonial Indonesian state (version I); 3) the period of Guided Democracy (version II); 4) Suharto's era (version III), and; 5) post-1998 Indonesian democratic state (version IV). As we will see in sections below, Perlmutter's model fits the Indonesian military of each period except that of Sukarno's Guided Democracy.

4.2. Version I: Legacy of the Revolutionary Type

The Indonesian military was the product of a revolution. It was not created by an established civilian state, but the soldiers themselves had contributed to the creation of the state to which the military would then attach its loyalty. Its appearance can be traced up to the Japanese mass-mobilization policy in the Netherlands Indies during World War II.

The story started in 1940 when Nazi Germany invaded the Netherlands and brought about significant change to the war map of both Europe and the Pacific⁸⁷. On the European front, the Dutch hopelessly struggled to defend its territory against the Nazi invasion but could stand only for several days (Shirer, 1960, chapter 21). Very soon after the invasion, on the 15th of May, the Dutch government confirmed its submission and then sought refuge in British territory. Even though mainland Netherlands was left to the control of the Nazis, the Dutch government maintained control of its colonies in Southeast Asia, primarily because the war had not yet finished and there was hope that the Dutch would be able to regain control of its territory with the help from the Allied Forces. An unconfirmed speculation was that the Dutch government might want to use one of its colonies as a temporary base for reinforcement, especially because the Dutch government-in-exile had few resources of its own (Shirer, 1960, *Ibid.*). Having relatively high autonomy to take necessary measures following the Dutch defeat at home, the Dutch authority in the *East Indische*⁸⁸ declared a state of siege in the territory and put the Netherland Indies under the status of war (Benda, 1958, chapter 4)⁸⁹.

As the consequence of this status, the Dutch authority also applied a tight policy to the Netherlands Indies' trade with potential enemies, which included Japan. All exports from the Netherland Indies to Japan were stopped by July 1940, a decision which was responded to negatively by Japan (Benda, 1958, *Ibid.*). Up to that year the Japanese still did not show any intention of launching a military expansion to the south⁹⁰. Instead of launching a military campaign to restore trade, the Japanese sent

⁸⁷ The invasion of the Netherlands by Germany was started on the 10th of May and lasted until the 14th of May 1940. This military invasion is recorded in a wide range of references. See for example: SHIRER, W. L. (1960) *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany*, New York, Simon & Schuster.

⁸⁸ Also known as Netherlands Indies, the term used to point the Netherland's colonies in the Southeast Asia, especially the territory called today as Indonesia.

⁸⁹ An also excellent reference containing historical analysis on the circumstances in Southeast Asia around 1940s, see: BASTIN, J. & BENDA, H. J. (1968) *A history of modern Southeast Asia : colonialism, nationalism, and decolonization*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall.

⁹⁰ The Japanese might still be suffering from the trauma resulting from the Russo-Japanese war in Manchuria two decades earlier, while a military would exhaust the empire's resources. The Japanese understood that its victory in the war could have left hatred amongst the Russians who may launch an act of vengeance as soon as the Japanese empire was weak. This concern found evidence later when Russia resumed a military invasion to Manchuria in 1945. The story about the Russo-Japanese War, See: CHAPMAN, J. & NISH, I. (2004) *On the Periphery of the Russo-Japanese War*. Suntory Toyota International Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD), London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).; Also: COX, G. P. (2006) *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero*. *Journal of Military History*, Vol 70. No.1.

a mission to Netherland Indies led by Kobayashi with the main task of negotiating a trade deal the Netherland Indies. After a series of difficult talks with Van Mook⁹¹, the mission achieved a significant result. Trade was opened on the condition that Japan excluded the Netherlands Indies from its project of co-prosperity sphere⁹². Kobayashi accepted the condition and was ready to cooperate, indicated by a joint declaration on October 26th saying that the Indies would not be part of the co-prosperity sphere, marking a peace agreement between the Japanese empire and the Dutch (Nomura, 2007, p.2).

The peaceful situation, however, did not last long. The Japanese broke off the joint declaration and applied more pressure to the Dutch on the issues related to the co-prosperity sphere. Not too long after Kobayashi left the Indies, in January 1941, a new mission under Yoshizawa arrived in Batavia (Jakarta) with the objective of forcing the Dutch to allow the Netherlands Indies to join the Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere, a proposal which was again rejected by Van Mook⁹³. The Dutch stated that there would be no more trade concession for Japan and that the Netherlands would freeze Japanese assets in the Indies (See:Dick, 1989). This marked the collapse of diplomacy between Van Mook and Kobayashi, and in anticipation of possible military

⁹¹ Van Mook, or Governor Huvertus Van Mook was the latest head of Dutch administration in the Netherlands Indies. He was famous as liberal in perspective. During the 1940s, Van Mook was very active in advocating Dutch interests in the Netherlands Indies, including negotiating with the Japanese and discretely pleading with the British and the US for defense supplies--KAHIN, G. M. (2003) *Southeast Asia: A Testament*, London, Routledge., p 23-25

⁹²Since the 1930s, the Japanese had encouraged French Indochina and the Netherlands Indies to cooperate willingly into the Southeast Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. This project was part of 'The Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere', the concept created and promulgated by the Emperor Hirohito together with the Japanese military. The main objective of this concept was to achieve a self-sufficient block of Asian Nations led by the Japanese that, in the Japanese point of view, would be capable of counter-balancing Western domination in Asia during the period. In fact, the concept had been manipulated by the Japanese to exploit local populations and economies for the benefit of imperial Japan--See: LEBRA, J. C. (1975) *Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II: Selected Readings and Documents*, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Presumably, this concept had inspired Sukarno during the later period as there are some similarities between this concept and Sukarno's idea of Non-Alignment Movement in 1950s.

⁹³ For some scholars who work on the Indonesian history, Van Mook's rejection on Yoshizawa proposal was regarded as a triggering factor to the Japanese military expansion to Southeast Asia in 1942. The argument said that from the Dutch perspective, accepting the proposal would mean giving the Netherlands Indies to the Japanese protectorate scheme or literally surrendering without first engaging in war. See, for example: BENDA, H. J. (1958) *The crescent and the rising sun : Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945.* , The Hague, Van Hoeve., especially chapter 4.

action by the Japanese, Van Mook fled to the United States to find reinforcements (Tarling, 1999, p.13-18)⁹⁴.

By July 1941, the Japanese decision to expand its military campaign to the South had become clear. The empire announced on the 25th of July that the Indochina should be its protectorate⁹⁵. Japan invaded Malaya in December, landing troops on the Southern Coast of Thailand and also in the northern part of Malaysia. Later in that month the Japanese launched a major attack on the Philippines and at the same time they also openly confronted the British in Kuching, Serawak. By January 1941, the Japanese gained victories on these fronts and took over Manila, Sabah, and Brunei. Next, Japan continued its military campaign to the Netherland Indies, marked by their attack on Borneo (Kalimantan) and Celebes (Sulawesi). These military invasions as well as the wave of the Japanese attacks on Tarakan, Manado, Balikpapan, Kendari, and Ambon could not be resisted for too long by the Dutch in the Netherland Indies, especially since their allies in the region had little hope of defending their own colonies. America had lost the Philippines and the British were forced to abandon Malaya and Singapore. This departure from the region left the Dutch alone defending the wide archipelago. Within a month, the Japanese had taken over Pontianak, Makassar, Surabaya, Cilacap, Palembang, and most other regions in the Indies except West Papua at the eastern end of the colony (see: Dower, 1986). By the end of 1941, the Japanese had completely taken over the Netherlands Indies from the Dutch (Dower, 1986).

Soon after taking control of the major part of the archipelago, the Japanese started to consolidate their grip in the Netherland Indies by implementing a series of measures. At first they tried to persuade the people that they were not a colonial power but a 'liberator' to free Asian nations from Western exploitation, a statement

⁹⁴ Van Mook understood that America might not provide the reinforcements required by the Dutch. It might be based on this understanding that the Dutch hurriedly created a military academy in Bandung, West Java, with the purpose of recruiting and training locals who could be used any time the Japanese attack. Nasution, the creator of the Military's double function, was amongst the products of this Dutch-created academy. The history about the establishment of this military academy, see: INDONESIA (1972) *Cuplikan Sejarah Perjuangan TNI-Angkatan Darat*, Jakarta, Dinas Sejarah Militer, Angkatan Darat.

⁹⁵ Records on the Japanese military activities in Southeast Asia during 1942-1945 can be traced in a wide range of sources. To cite among the most recommended reference is DOWER, J. W. (1986) *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*, New York, Pantheon Books.

which proved effective as propaganda. The Japanese arrival was therefore welcomed, and when the Japanese asked for voluntary support for its war against the Allied forces, the people immediately showed their enthusiasm. This can be seen in Hamka's testimony: "Many thousands of us gathered in front of the Great Mosque, to welcome (the Japanese) with shouts of 'Banzai'" (Hamka, 1943, p.25).

To show more commitment to their good intentions, the Japanese authority summoned Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir, the most prominent nationalist figures during the Dutch colonial period, to Jakarta⁹⁶. During this meeting, the Japanese explored possible plans for the archipelago, including the offer of Sukarno becoming the head of the Indonesian government⁹⁷. Six months after the meeting, the Japanese created *Pusat Tenaga Rakyat* (Putera), a political organization created with the purpose of mobilizing the support required by the Japanese in its war against the Allied forces. In order to gain support amongst the indigenous populace, control of this organization was also given to local nationalists. Sukarno was appointed as the chairman, while Hatta⁹⁸, Ki Hadjar Dewantara⁹⁹, and KH Mas Mansyur, held senior positions in the *Putera* (Legge, 1972, p.191).

This strategy proved effective in gaining the trust and sympathy of the locals, especially after the speech by Prime Minister Tojo on July 7, 1943, which promised a

⁹⁶ This opportunity was used by Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir to discuss a discreet agenda on the Independence of the archipelago. These three figures then agreed to cooperate on an 'Operation towards Independence'. Sukarno was responsible for rallying the masses, Hatta was responsible for handling diplomacy towards foreign countries and parties which had sympathy for Indonesian independence, and Sjahrir was responsible for the coordination of 'underground' activities—See: THE JAKARTA POST (2009) The Little Known Prime Minister. *The Jakarta Post*. 10 March 2009 ed. Jakarta.

⁹⁷ From any perspective, the circumstances of the first half of the 1940s did not leave any choice for the Indonesian nationalists but to cooperate with the Japanese—Even the Dutch who had resources could not resist the Japanese invasion. Later, the nationalists' decision to cooperate with the Japanese was used by the Dutch to accuse Sukarno and Hatta of being Japanese collaborators. See: ADAMS, C. (1966b) *Sukarno: An Autobiography as Told to Cindy Adams.*, p.168

⁹⁸ Muhammad Hatta proclaimed the Indonesian independence together with Sukarno on August 1945, from then he was the Vice President of the new republic. Hatta was among the indigenous who had benefited the Dutch elite politics. About Muhammad Hatta, see: NOER, D. (1990) *Mohammad Hatta: Biografi Politik*, Jakarta, LP3ES.

⁹⁹ Ki Hadjar Dewantara was a nationalist and independence activist during the period of revolution and the pioneer of modern education for the indigenous. He was also the most prominent figure of Muhammadiyah, the second largest Muslim organisation in Indonesia. About Ki Hadjar Dewantara, See: ARISANDI, S. (1983) *Ki Hadjar Dewantara*, Ibu Sejati.

limited self-government for the Indonesian people¹⁰⁰. As a result, these people were very enthusiastic in their support for the Japanese at war. When the Japanese began to organize Heiho, a military organization recruiting locals as armed militias on April 1943, a huge number of Indonesians were willing to participate¹⁰¹.

The establishment of the Heiho was initially aimed to provide the Japanese Army with backup on the battlefield. They were in charge in secondary tasks such as building barracks, bridges, logistics, and the like. However, as the war continued and even became more severe, the Japanese Authority let the Heiho fight for Japan in the archipelago as well as overseas such as at Burma and Morotai (Cipta Adi Pustaka, 1989). Later, the Japanese found that the militias served its interests well, and they had no reluctance in creating other militias similar to the Heiho. In October 1943 the Japanese organized *Pembela Tanah Air*—The Defender of the Fatherland (PETA). On December 1943, an armed forces of Muslim youths associated with the Majelis Syurah Muslimin Indonesia (Masyumi)¹⁰² was also established under the banner of Barisan Hizbullah¹⁰³.

¹⁰⁰ For many Indonesians at the time, Prime Minister Tojo's promise was regarded as the commitment of the Japanese sincerity towards Indonesian independence in the future, especially with reference to the 1941 fact when the Dutch rejected the rights of independence for the people living in the Netherlands Indies despite its ratification of the Atlantic Charter on August 1941. Whereas the Charter called for the right of all peoples to chose the form of governments under which they live. When Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands gave a speech in London on the 6th of December 1942 promising a reformed relationship with the colonies after the war, Indonesians regarded this promise as the Dutch's strategy to get support from the indigenous—see: BENDA, H. J. (1956) The Beginnings of the Japanese Occupation of Java *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. 15, pp. 541-560

¹⁰¹ By the end of 1945, not less than two millions Indonesian joined the Putera and the Heiho. The data about the Heiho can be found at MAEKAWA, K. (2006) The Heiho during the Japanese Occupation in Indonesia. IN KRATOSKA, P. H. (Ed.) *Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire*. Singapore, NUS Press., p.192. There is no exact data about the number of locals who joined the Putera. However, as the Putera consist of several satellite-organizations such as *Persatuan Guru Indonesia*, *Perkumpulan Pegawai Post, Telegraph dan Radio*, *Isteri Indonesia*, *barisan Banteng*, *Badan Perantara Pelajar-Pelajar Indonesia*, and *Ikatan Sport Indonesia*, it can be estimated that the number of its personnel was at least one million.

¹⁰² Masyumi was a social organization founded by the Japanese with the purpose of controlling Islam in the archipelago, See: RICKLEFS, M. C. (1981b) *A History of Modern Indonesia, c. 1300 to the present*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press., p.194. After the declaration of independence in 1945, this organization transformed into the Masyumi Party which later became one of the four Largest parties in the 1955 election (See: chapter 3). Detailed information about the Masyumi, see: LUCIUS, R. (2003) *A House Divided: The Decline and Fall of the Masyumi (1950-1956)*. California, US Naval Postgraduate School.

¹⁰³ The majority of members recruited into these organizations came from the group known as *Pemuda* which actually did not belong to specific categories within the society as they come from various social strata—the upper, middle, and lower classes—in the urban as well as in rural areas, and also from various ethnic and ideological backgrounds. Literally, *Pemuda* means the youths even though this term has not always anything to do with age. In the Japanese perspective, *Pemuda* simply means those who were physically able to fight in war

From the Japanese perspective, the essential purpose of these organizations was to mobilize resources in support of the war effort. In fact, this policy was a double-edged sword. While these organizations did provide support to the Japanese, the Indonesian nationalists also used them to advance the cause of revolution towards independence. The organizations were crucial for the nationalists for at least two reasons. First, these organizations could be used to show the nationalists' support for the Japanese war effort, which allowed them to undertake their 'clandestine' activities without much concern for Japanese suspicion, and; Second, they saw military training, basic understanding of administration, and access to modern strategy as an advantage in the preparation for possible independence in the future. By mid-1945, there were around 120,000 armed fighters in Peta, a number large enough to later form a national military unit during the period of independence¹⁰⁴.

It is at this point that the story of the Indonesian military begins. After three years of application, the Japanese mobilization policy had distributed 'military skills' amongst the Pemuda, and also, caused a kind of politicization of society. In 1945, the majority of people living in the Indies were becoming aware of the significance of independence for their own country, which required a struggle as strongly as did the liberation of the Asian people from Western imperialism stressed by Japanese propaganda. This feeling became even stronger due to the growing conviction that the Japanese Authority was actually no different from any other imperialist¹⁰⁵. A few

and had not yet been contaminated by the Netherlands. About Pemuda, see: SIMATUPANG, T. B. (1981) *Pelopop dalam Perang, Pelopor dalam Damai*, Jakarta, Sinar Harapan.

¹⁰⁴ Many prominent figures of the Independent Indonesia's army such as Soedirman and Suharto used to sign up to Peta. About the Peta, See: NOTOSUSANTO, N. (1979) *Tentara Peta Pada Jaman Pendudukan Jepang*, Jakarta, Gramedia.

¹⁰⁵ There were at least three facts that served as factors in the emergence of anti-Japanese sentiments amongst these people: 1) Forced labor---Many Indonesian men were forced to do hard work such as doing constructions for the Japanese army at the battle fields such as in Burma and Suriname. They were reported to be in a terrible conditions while thousands of them were killed or disappeared; 2) Forced requisitioning-The Japanese took food, clothes and other supplies by force without any compensation with the pretext of supporting the war. This had contributed to the massive hunger and poverty-related disease spread in Java during the period, and; 3) Forced slavery of Women---The Japanese took women and kept them as 'comfort women' for the amusement of the Japanese soldiers. These war crimes were recorded in a number of classified and declassified references. For quite detailed records, see for example: DREA ET.AL. (2006) *Researching Japanese War Crimes Records: Introductory Essays*, Washington, DC, National Archives and Records Administration for the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group.

nationalists who had gained access to education during the Dutch Ethical policy¹⁰⁶ had the confidence to lead the Indies people in a revolution. Soon after the submission of the Japanese at war, the Pemuda, which had been transformed into a well-trained force, easily became an important actor within the new republic along with a number of new elites who played roles as political leaders.

On the 14th of August 1945, the American air force dropped atomic bombs on the Japanese's cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a major strike that led to the surrender of the remnant of Japanese empire in Southeast Asia and the Pacific (see: Hasegawa, 2007). This news arrived to the Indies without delay and brought about uncertainty regarding the future of the Indies while the Japanese Army and Navy still held control on the territory¹⁰⁷. Anticipating any possibilities, Sukarno and Hatta fled to Vietnam on the same day in order to meet Marshall Terrauchi, the top commander of the Japanese authority in the Pacific, from whom they heard the confirmation of the Japanese defeat¹⁰⁸. At this meeting, Terrauchi also admitted his concern about the future of the territory and therefore promised to grant Indonesia independence by the 24th of August (Shunkichiro, 1996). This promise, however, was looked upon with mistrust by the majority of nationalists except Sukarno¹⁰⁹ (Legge, 1972, p.203). In fact, Sukarno and the civilian leaders were uncertain about the real situation and were reluctant to take any major action. Meanwhile, Pemuda who had heard about the defeat of the Japanese in the Pacific War decided that it was the time to act without delay. On the 15th of August, they started to force the Japanese military units

¹⁰⁶ The Ethical Policy was a policy applied in the Indies since the beginning of the twentieth century as a response to the growing demands from the nationalists in the Netherlands Indies as well as from intellectuals in Netherlands. The background of this policy was the social conditions of natives living in the Netherlands colonies--they were very poor and under-developed while for centuries their resources had been transferred to the Netherlands. The ethical policy hence was an idea to improve the welfare of the native people through, among other things, education. In fact, the Dutch brought education to the archipelago in order to fulfil their need for skilled and semi-skilled workers in their plantation companies and bureaucrats to meet the requirement of expanding bureaucracy. Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir, were among those who had benefited from this policy. About the ethical policy, see: SCHMUTZER, E. (1977) *Dutch Colonial Policy and the Search for Identity in Indonesia 1920-1931*, Leiden, E.J. Brill's Archive., chapter three; and also BENDA, H. J. (1958) *The crescent and the rising sun : Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945.* , The Hague, Van Hoeve., p.35-39

¹⁰⁷ For the story about the circumstances around the end of Japanese occupation , see: BENDA, H. J. (1958) *The crescent and the rising sun : Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945.* , The Hague, Van Hoeve., chapter 8

¹⁰⁸ The content of Sukarno's meeting with Terrauchi was recorded by Miyoshi Shunkichiro who served as the interpreter—See: SHUNKICHIRO, M. (1996) My Recollections of the Military Occupation in Java, No 14. *Kokusai Mondai* 80, 67, November 1996.

¹⁰⁹ According to Legge, Sukarno trusted Terrauchi too much. He was so anxious to get Japanese Authority, and so sure that he would get it, that he would have procrastinated until it was too late.

in the Indies to surrender and intimidated the Japanese using an assortment of weapons such as bamboo spears and swords while mobilizing the masses to encircle the Japanese camps (Cribb, 2008, p.163-167). They also urged civilian leaders to declare independence, but Sukarno and Hatta refused to do so, a decision that led to an incident that took place on the 16th of August 1945, just a day before independence was proclaimed by Sukarno and Hatta. In the early morning of August the 16th, the Pemuda 'kidnapped' Sukarno and Hatta and forced them to immediately make a declaration of independence¹¹⁰. Apparently unfazed by the pressure from the Pemuda, later in the day, Sukarno and Hatta met General Yamamoto and spent the next night at vice-admiral Maeda Tadashi's residence (Wirasoeminta, 1995, p.61). After they were told that Japan no longer had the power to make decisions regarding the future of Indonesia, in the morning of the 17th of August 1945 Sukarno read a brief declaration marking Indonesian independence, taking the risk of being arrested by the Japanese authorities (Wirasoeminta, 1995, p.63). When the political leaders declared Indonesian independence, the Pemuda was ready to defend the newly-born republic.

At this time, however, Indonesia had neither a government nor an army, while there were millions of Pemuda who had risen from the Japanese's ruins and awaited a role to play. They were scattered across the archipelago, disorganized, armed with various, but limited, weapons. These people were highly patriotic, but in urgent need of leadership and guidance. As was described by Syahrir,

The present psychological condition of our youth is deeply tragic. In spite of their burning enthusiasm, they are full of confusion and indecision because they have no understanding of their potentialities and perspectives of struggle they are waging. Thus their vision is necessarily very limited. Many of them simply cling to the slogan of Freedom or Death. Whenever they sense that Freedom is still far from certain, and yet they themselves have not faced death, they are seized with doubt and hesitation (Syahrir, 1968, p.21).

¹¹⁰ This incident is known as *Peristiwa Rengasdengklok*, during which some Pemuda figures such as Wikana, Soekarni, and Chaerul Saleh took Sukarno and Hatta from their residents and arrested them in a house at Rengasdengklok, an area at the eastern part of Jakarta. The Pemuda forced Sukarno and Hatta to immediately proclaim independence otherwise they threatened to take over the power from the nationalist leaders. For details about Peristiwa Rengasdengklok, see: WIRASOEMINTA, S. (1995) *Rengasdengklok, Tentara Peta dan Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945*, Jakarta, Yayasan Pustaka Nusatama.

Meanwhile, the civilian leaders were still preparing to create the institutions required for the operation of the new state. On August 29, the new republic confirmed the adoption of the constitution that had been drafted by the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence--PPKI (see: chapter 2). On August 18, Sukarno and Hatta were declared president and vice-president. The PPKI was then transformed into the *Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat*—Central Indonesian national Committee (KNIP) which functioned as a central parliament; In the regions, similar bodies were also established and titled *Komite Nasional Indonesia*—Indonesian National (but actually local) Committee (KNI) which functioned as regional parliaments¹¹¹. Sukarno and his colleagues also created a new government with a list of ministers intended to be members of cabinet. Surprisingly, in this list there was no mention of the defense minister¹¹², a fact which produced speculation regarding the reluctance of Sukarno to raise an army. The creation of *Badan Keamanan Rakyat*—People's Security Organization (BKR) on the 22nd of August disappointed the Pemuda. Even though the BKR was declared a national army and its members were mainly the former Peta and Heiho, this organization was attached to *Badan Penolong Keluarga Korban Perang*—Organization for Aid to Families of War Victims (BPKKP), a decision which was less than Pemuda's expectation (Raliby, 1953, p.17). In addition, the BKR was clearly not a national army as it was not centrally organized, had no headquarters, and its formations were dependent on the initiatives of the KNI (Bhakti et al., 2009, p.6). The clearest indicator that the government was reluctant to raise an army was the absence of measures by the government to explore possibilities towards the creation of an army despite the existence of a cabinet, the state institution which actually had the competence and authority to do so. In addition, although the central government circulated the news to regions about the establishment of the BKR, there was no firm guidance for the Pemuda in the regions, and they therefore tended to neglect the news (Cribb, 2008, p.60). The government seemed to concentrate more on diplomacy and the creation of governmental machinery while disregarding the military.

¹¹¹ About the PPKI, KNIP, and KNI, see: ARCHIVE (1974) Indonesian Serial 1942-1950. Yogyakarta, Perpustakaan Negara.

¹¹² See: INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT Archive: Susunan Kabinet Presidensial 2 September 1945-14 November 1945. Jakarta.

When the Pemuda realized that they were not about to get orders and guidance from the central government, they took it upon themselves to create armed forces and to defend themselves¹¹³. They began to seize arms from the Japanese troops across the country because they needed resources for their defence, especially weapons. They also organized themselves into armed units known as *Laskar*¹¹⁴. Those associated with a certain group of society also organized themselves into sectarian military groups. Two examples of these are the Barisan Pelopor—Vanguard Corps (BP) and Barisan Hisbullah—The Army of God—who were associated with Islamists and very popular during the early days of the revolution; both were products of the Japanese mobilization policy (see: Kahin, 1952p.161-164). Thus, even before Jakarta instructed the Pemuda in regions to form regional BKR, the armed organizations were already on their way to becoming military forces. By the time the order to form BKR reached the regions, the effective command was merely to re-name the armed organizations which already existed¹¹⁵.

The government's hesitation in raising an army suddenly disappeared following a statement on the 29th of September by General Sir Phillip Christison, the commander of the Allied expeditionary forces in Indonesia. A moment before departing to Indonesia from Singapore, General Christison said in a radio broadcast that he did not see Sukarno and other Indonesian leaders as the Japanese's collaborators and that his troops 'would not interfere in Indonesia's internal problems—for the Allies would enter the country only as a guest to fulfil a mission which was to disarm the Japanese army, to secure the release of prisoners of war, and then to return home' (Raliby, 1953, p.43)¹¹⁶. A few days later, when Christison was already in Jakarta, he also made more positive remarks for Indonesia, saying that he personally recognized

¹¹³ It needs to be underlined that the term 'Pemuda' does not refer to a single-corporative entity. The term is actually too general so a classification within this term is simply impossible. However, due to the significance of this term to our analysis, along this chapter it is used to denote a certain social group during the period of revolution without any intention of oversimplification. To make it clear, the Pemuda should be understood as 'the majority' amongst the Pemuda.

¹¹⁴ Laskar or Lasykar, according to Anderson, is a 'struggle organization' that is described as 'emerging from the organizational debris of the Japanese period, formed from the bottom up on the basis of common aliran, ethnic origin, geographic propinquity, or simple friendship—See: ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (1967b) *The Pemuda Revolution: Indonesian Politics 1945-1949*. Cornell University., p.338.

¹¹⁵ This remark is borrowed from Anderson-see: ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (1972) *Java in Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance 1944-1946*, Jakarta, PT Equinox Publishing Indonesia., p.235

¹¹⁶ According to Anderson, the Dutch protested the statement of Christison and requested the Allied Forces to compel him, a demand which was met by the British government on January 1946—See: ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (1967a) *The Pemuda Revolution: Indonesian Politics 1945-1946. Unpublished PhD Dissertation*. Ithaca, Cornell University., p.190

the de facto government of Sukarno and Hatta (Raliby, 1953, p.47). For Sukarno, this statement was a clear sign that the establishment of a formal army by the republic would not be regarded as a threat by the Allies. Without much delay, Sukarno stated that he would no longer resist the expectation of Pemuda and then declared on the 5th of October the formation of the national army known as *Tentara Keselamatan Rakyat*—The Army of People’s Security (TKR). However, similar to the BKR’s case, the formation of TKR by the government was not well received by the Pemuda, especially because it was not followed by clear instructions for its realization and implementation. In Anderson’s words, “The announcement of the formation of the TKR hardly had more effect than to rename the local BKR and other armed groups without changing their relationship to Jakarta” (Anderson, 1972, p.235). The declaration thus had little impact on the fighting in the regions as, by the time of this declaration, the Pemuda and Laskars seemed to act on their own and neglected the civilian leaders’ orders. As the result, the civilian government had no control of the army, and confrontations between the Laskars and the Japanese as well as the Allied Forces had broken out in many regions such as Surabaya, Magelang, Solo, and Yogyakarta¹¹⁷. All these incidents took place without any instruction from the political leaders (Wehl, 1948, p.51). Even when a bloody confrontation took place for several days in Surabaya between the armed Pemuda and Allied troops, the Allied Forces used Sukarno to persuade the Pemuda to retreat¹¹⁸.

¹¹⁷ These confrontations and their results are a clear indicator that the Pemuda and Laskars were effective military units despite their tiny size and being relatively disorganized. Accordingly, most of the armed groups of Pemuda which emerged throughout Java during this period were composed of members who in majority have had military training in Peta, Heiho, and various organizations that the Japanese had established as part of their mobilization policy. According to Nasution, following these moves to disarm the Japanese, there were 10,000 arms in Sumatra, 10,000 in West Java, and 30,000 in central and east Java—With this huge amount of arms in the hands of 150,000 Japanese-trained Indonesians, in Nasution’s account, “we could have operational military power far more powerful than that which the Allies and the Dutch could mobilize in Indonesia between 1945-1949--NASUTION, A. H. (1955) *Tjatanan2 Sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia*, Jakarta, Pembimbing., p.18

¹¹⁸ For the Indonesian military, Sukarno’s compliance to the Allied forces’ wish during the Surabaya confrontation was often regarded as the weakness of the civilian government *vis-a-vis* the colonial powers. This presumption partly found its evidence around a year later when Sukarno and his civilian government decided to ‘surrender’ to the Allied Forces and left the Army continued fighting on their own—see: later part of this chapter.

Soon after the TKR was established, Sukarno named Amir Syarifuddin, an underground activist¹¹⁹, as the Minister of Information within the cabinet who was also in charge in security matters. During his underground activities, Syarifuddin used to have close contact with former KNIL¹²⁰ officers such as Urip Sumohardjo and Didi Kartasasmita. These two names were the product the Dutch policy of recruiting a very limited number of locals of distinguished family backgrounds in order to maintain close relationship with local feudal lords (see: Kahin, 1952, chapter III). When the Japanese were about to launch a war against the Allies in the Pacific, the Dutch extended the scope of the policy to recruit locals from lower social backgrounds through the establishment of military academy in Bandung, the main city in West Java (Simatupang, 1981, p.50-56). Amongst the graduates of this military academy were Abdul Harris Nasution¹²¹, Tahi Bonar Simatupang, and Alex Kawilarang. It was presumably because of friendship, or because of their military experience and training, that Syarifuddin asked these former KNIL officers to join the TKR, and it might be based on seniority considerations that the top position of the Army, the Chief-of-Staff, was given to Urip Sumohardjo (see: Soebroto, 1971, p.100). As Urip became the Army Chief-of-Staff, other KNIL former officers held strategic positions in the military headquarters in Yogyakarta as well as being territorial commanders in the regions. At this point, we can conclude that the formation within the TKR was based on the professional military standard because the strategic commanders were elected based on their professional military skills and knowledge. However, the leadership of the TKR was not yet as cohesive as is normally found in a professional military. A clear factor in this was that Urip Soemohardjo, the Chief-of-Staff, and Didi Kartasasmita came from different social strata from Nasution, Simatupang, and Kawilarang, a fact which led to different perspectives and ideology. In addition, while Urip and Didi tended to identify themselves as professional soldiers, Nasution and his friends felt more comfortable calling themselves *Pemuda Pejuang*—Youth Freedom Fighters (See: Nasution,

¹¹⁹ Amir Syarifuddin was imprisoned by the Japanese during the period of occupation because of his clandestine activities. He was also a leftist who had a close relationship with other socialists in Sukarno's circle such as Sjahrir. Later in 1948, Syarifuddin was killed in the PKI Madiun Affair. On Amir Syarifuddin, see: VICKERS, A. (2005) *A History of Modern Indonesia*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press., chapter 4

¹²⁰ The Army of Netherlands in the Netherland Indies.

¹²¹ Apart from military training at KNIL, Nasution had also benefited from Japanese military training for three months as part of the requirement to be an instructor of Seinendan, one of the Japanese-created organizations—See: NASUTION, A. H. (1982) *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Vol.1*, Jakarta, Gunung Agung.

1982). This situation meant that the army was less effective than it might have been, and was exacerbated by the fact that the civilian government was not imposing effective control on the military. As was noted by Kartasasmita,

In October 1945 I got instructions from the republican government to organize one division of TKR in West Java.... Thus I created the division by following a process of top to bottom. But in reality the process went in the other direction, namely from bottom upwards. The commander of each unit was elected by his own troops, each section selected its own section commander, and so on. The requirement for election as commander was not whether or not one had sufficient knowledge for the job. Popularity was the only requirement. Hierarchical relationship were almost non-existent. Thus, the TKR at the time was not an army but just a grouping of Pemuda of diverse qualities. The cost of sustaining this division came from the people around us¹²².

Similar to Didi's, Nasution's experience is no less interesting. He said in his memoir,

The selection of the commanders was not always smooth, because the units had already been there, created by local initiative, and almost nothing could be done to change them. I had instructions to make the composition of their commanders 'more military'. But what I could do was just to confirm the already elected commanders. I once went to Garut with the intention of appointing a new man to the post of regiment commander—a post that was already in the hands of a former judge, who had as a chief-of-staff a former police chief. My candidate for this regiment, a former Peta company commander, came together with me to Garut. Here again, I had merely confirmed the existing commander, since my candidate was refused by the troops¹²³.

As the Pemuda and the Laskars tended to ignore Urip's instructions, the de facto army was not controlled by the political leadership. The actual power of the military thus remained in the hands of the Pemuda and Laskars who organized themselves

¹²² Taken from: DUTCH GOVERNMENT (1948) Interrogation of Didi Kartasasmita of 9 November 1948. Batavia, Royal Dutch Archive, General Secretary Box VII No.24.

¹²³ See: NASUTION, A. H. (1982) *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Vol. I*, Jakarta, Gunung Agung., p.216

in BKR and were loyal to local commanders. Included in this category was Sudirman, who was popular among his troops in Central Java¹²⁴.

Facing this troublesome situation, especially after the Surabaya bloodshed between the Pemuda and the Allies, Urip took the initiative of gathering the representatives of Pemuda and Laskars in a dialogue with his army (TKR). This dialogue was intended as a way of finding a common perspective on the military strategy against the Allies and the returning Dutch, and could also be used to reduce the gap in perspective between the political leadership and the de facto military¹²⁵. A conference was finally held in Yogyakarta on the 11th of November, attended by military commanders in Java and Sumatra as well as representatives of the government in Jakarta which ended up at the election of Sudirman as the top leader of the Army (see: Nasution, 1982).

For Sukarno, the election of Sudirman as the 'army' Commander-in-Chief had left him no better choice but to accommodate the soldier's aspirations. In fact, Sukarno and other political leaders would need support from the 'army' more than from any others, even the British Army, and he therefore decided to endorse the decision taken at the Yogyakarta conference. As the consequence, the TKR was then reorganized and its name was changed to Tentara Republik Indonesia—The Army of the Republic of Indonesia (TRI). Sudirman was sworn in as Panglima Besar TRI on the 21st of May 1946 and promoted to full General, while Urip remained in his old position as the Chief-of-Staff (Nasution, 1970, p.265). The divisional commanders

¹²⁴ Sudirman is an important factor in understanding the Indonesian military during this period. His significance is not only due to the fact that he was more popular and charismatic among the Pemuda and the Laskar than the government, but also because his approach and policies have confirmed the revolutionary status of the Indonesian military until the mid 1950s. The Indonesian military's position under Sudirman of acting independently from the political leadership while acknowledging the authority of the civilian government must have also inspired Nasution when he created the ideology of Dual Function, which was adopted by the Indonesian military during the later period. For the story of Sudirman, see: MACFARLING, I. (Ed.) (1995) *General Sudirman: The Leader who Finally Destroyed Colonialism in Indonesia*, Canberra, Australian Defense Studies Center.

¹²⁵ While the Pemuda and Laskars kept fighting the Allies throughout Java and Sumatra, the political leadership in Jakarta had its own policy towards the Allies. In their calculation, the Allied Forces were too strong to combat, and were also of the belief that the Allies had no intention of making Indonesia their enemy. By being on the British side, Sukarno and friends were hoping that the Allies would not help the Dutch to re-colonize Indonesia.

had the rank of Major-General while their chiefs-of-staff were given the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel (Nasution, 1970, *Ibid*).

Sudirman's acceptance of being sworn in and promoted by Sukarno, as well as his willingness to re-organize the TKR (along with Pemuda and Laskar) and then to form the TRI, all signify a shift of the Indonesian military from revolutionary towards professionalism. First, the Pemuda and Laskars were now becoming more corporate within the TRI; Second, Sudirman was now General Sudirman, an officer, while others were Lieutenant General, Major General, Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel and so on, which signified the existence of a structural hierarchy within the TRI; Third, the formal client of the military was now the state, which was represented among others by the civilian government, and; Fourth, rank and promotion within the TRI was now based on training and knowledge. All these facts brought the Indonesian Army toward professionalism until at least 1959, when Sukarno removed liberal democracy from the Indonesian political landscape.

On the 18 of December 1948, the Dutch surprised the United States and the Republic by declaring that they were cancelling the Renville Agreement¹²⁶. The declaration was followed by a massive attack on the Republic on the 19th of December 1948, which brought about significant change to the strategies and arrangement within the Republic. Members of the civil government, including Sukarno, Hatta, and Syahrir, decided to surrender to the Dutch and allowed themselves to be captured (Kahin, 1952, p.341). The army, however, refused to do so. Instead of following civilian leaders, the army decided to continue fighting the Dutch by using guerrilla tactics and continuing to operate the state in the absence of civilian leaders. Sudirman instructed Colonel Nasution, his deputy, to reorganize the army into two forces, the mobile army and the territorial army, while he himself

¹²⁶ In order to comply with the protest from the US, India, Australia, and the Soviet Union following the Dutch police action in July 1947, the Dutch agreed to talk with the representatives of the Republic. On December 8 of the same year, a meeting was organized on board the U.S.S. Renville, a US Navy transport in the Phillipines. Under the UN's auspice, this agreement drew a ceasefire line favourable to the Dutch. The major parties in the Republic such as PNI and Masyumi opposed this agreement. About the Renville Agreement, see: KAHIN, G. M. (1952) *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*. , Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press., chapter IX

prepared the people for a total war¹²⁷. Even though Sudirman's strategy to a certain extent demonstrated the autonomy of the army *vis-a-vis* the civilian government, the military's loyalty was still to the state and its orientation remained professional. This can be seen in Simatupang's testimony regarding the instruction:

First, the republic would continue to resist as a state and by using the instruments of a state. Second, no matter how difficult the circumstances of the war became, the administration would have to continue—even for instance, in regions which had become isolated, were frequented by Dutch's patrols, or in which permanent Dutch military posts had been established. To this end, civil servants at all levels would have to be paralleled by military personnel, and extensive authority should be delegated to the regions. Third, the military administration was first of all a means of resistance, that is, a means for mobilizing and organizing all fighting forces and a means for using local resources in the resistance (Simatupang, 1972, p.130).

This pattern towards professionalism continued even more strongly in the 1950s, during which time the Indonesian military was undoubtedly of the professional type. There were at least three factors that may have made this trend sustained:

1. Following the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch to the Indonesian government in December 1949, Indonesia had to adopt a new constitution known as the provisional constitution of 1959. This constitution was clearly based on Western standards of liberal democracy, according to which the military is subordinated to the civilian authority (see: chapter 2).
2. The command of the army was in the hands of figures with a modern way of thinking, such as Nasution and Simatupang. In 1950, Nasution took the position as the army's Chief-of-Staff, while Simatupang replaced Sudirman as

¹²⁷ The mobile army would function as a shock force which would concentrate on attacking the Dutch establishment wherever they were, while the territorial army would remain in definite locations to be the nucleus of the people's resistance against the enemy. In fact, the territorial army would function exactly as a bureaucracy whose operation superseded the existing civilian machinery. This territorial role of the Indonesian military then became the main justification to Nasution's Double Function ideology—See: SIMATUPANG, T. B. (1972) *Report from Banaran: Experiences during the People's* (Translated by Benedict Anderson and Efinbeth Grave), New York, Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University., p.128-129

Panglima Besar TRI, which had changed its name once more to *Tentara Nasional Indonesia*-Indonesian National Army (TNI)¹²⁸. Nasution and Simatupang hoped to create a smaller, but more modern and professional, army. In 1952, they decided to adopt a policy of restructuring and reorganizing of the army to achieve this goal (Sujatmoko, 1997).

3. After the death of General Sudirman in January 1950, the military lost its irreplaceable leader—Sudirman was famous as a unifier of the heterogeneous army, while it was the lack of unity that made the Army the object of civilian interventions, especially during the parliamentary democracy era when political power was mostly in the hands of political parties.

This trend, however, began to decline from 1957 when Sukarno started to remove the institutions of liberal democracy from the Indonesian political system.

4.3. Sukarno's Mixed-Type Military: Version II

The period of 1956-1957 is the most critical period of political turbulence in Indonesia since the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch in December 1949. The coalition government of PNI-Masyumi-NU under Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo obviously brought nothing but corruption and inflation and finally collapsed in March 1957¹²⁹. The Constituant (the parliament resulted from the 1955 general election), which was given a mandate to create a permanent constitution, ended up in deadlock over the issue of whether the state should be based on Shari'a or Pancasila (see: chapter 2). At more or less the same time, Army officers from Siliwangi Division (West Java) attempted a coup d'état but failed (see: Van Dijk, 1981). Colonel Sumual took control of the eastern part of Indonesia, marking the beginning of the Permesta rebellion in Makassar, South Sulawesi (See: Harvey, 1977). In Manado (North Sulawesi), army officers declared the autonomous state of North Sulawesi (Harvey, 1977, *Ibid*).

¹²⁸ This change was part of another re-organization attempt initiated by the government in August 1947 intended to bring the Army under the control of the Defense Ministry. This reorganization had little impact on the progression towards a professional military except a change of name. For this reason, it is not elaborated in this chapter.

¹²⁹ On the situation under Ali Sastroamidjojo's government, see: FEITH, H. (1962) *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*. , Ithaca, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University Press., chapter VIII

Rebellious movement in Sumatra and Aceh became more active, further eroding the public's confidence in the capability of the civilian government to maintain order (see: chapter 5, section 5.2). Nasution ordered the arrest of many politicians involved in corrupt activities and blamed the civilian government for the growing instability¹³⁰. Before stepping down, the Ali Sastroamidjodjo government declared Martial Law throughout the country, a decision which was based on two considerations: 1) The June Affair¹³¹, and; 2) Tensions between the regions and Jakarta¹³². This declaration not only signified the state of siege within the country but, in fact, was also an opportunity for the Army to exercise more power over its political adversaries. The army proposed an initiative to return to the strong presidential system that existed prior to 1950¹³³.

This proposition was obviously not without purpose. Due to the decay of civilian government, Nasution, who had experienced the civilian intervention during his leadership of the Army, had been trying to find a way to formalize the Army's socio-political role within the country. Meanwhile, taking over the state power was never a good choice if one valued survival, and Sukarno seemed the most powerful potential backup for this plan. According to the Provisional Constitution of 1950, the President had less significant power even though Sukarno was actually a very influential figure. In brief, the Army would need Sukarno to support its socio-political role, while Sukarno would need the army's support to gain more power within the state (see: chapter 3, section 3.3).

¹³⁰ Lev described this situation—“the military were angry at the confusion of political parties, the corruption, the ideological strife, the political instability, all of which they believed,....was to blame for the lack of progress in the country”—see: LEV, D. S. (1966) *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics 1957-1959*, Ithaca, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University., p.59

¹³¹ Following the establishment of a new cabinet on July 1953, Iwa Kusuma Sumantri, a leftist, was appointed as the Defense Minister. During his time, he applied policies which irritated the Army, such as the sympathetic policy to the actors of 1948 Madiun Affair who were arrested and executed by the Army and some policies which were regarded as deepening the cleavage within the army regarding its attempt to dissolve the parliament on the 17th of October 1952. This irritation continued for years and reached its peak when Iwa (on behalf of the government) appointed Bambang Utojo as the Army Chief-of-Staff without consultation with or consent from the army leadership. This decision was regarded by the Army as an unacceptable civilian intervention in its internal affairs. The result was a total boycott by the Army of the government known as June Affair. About this affair, see: SASTROAMIJOYO, A. (1979) *Milestone on My Journey: The Memoirs of Ali Sastroamidjodjo, Indonesian Patriot and Political Leader*, Queensland, University of Queensland Press.

¹³² Since 1953, dissatisfactions spread across the archipelago and created tensions between regions and Jakarta—the most severe was the PRRI/Permesta Rebellion (see: chapter 5)

¹³³ Certain facts might lead to suspicion that there might be discreet negotiations between the army and Sukarno prior to this initiative. Among others was the appointment of two colonels (Sambas Atmadinata from the Army and Nazir from the Navy) as ministers in the cabinet since April 1957. See: NOTOSUSANTO, N. (1984) *Pejuang dan Prajurit*, Jakarta, Sinar Harapan., p.76

This conspiracy theory found its first evidence in the Army's declaration on November 12, 1958 of the 'Middle Way' principle, a new ideology which more or less articulated the Army's view of its place in society. According to Nasution's interpretation of the concept, "(In order)... to regain the unity and the spirit of national struggle, to cultivate a stable government ideally and structurally after the liberal system failed to bring about stabilization" (Nasution, 1971, p.18)¹³⁴. Next, the Army proposed the idea of abandoning liberal democracy through the re-adoption of the revolutionary constitution of 1945 (See: Feith, 1962, chapter X). This suggestion can be considered as the ultimate confirmation of the conspiracy theory mentioned above¹³⁵.

Responding to this idea, in July 1959 Sukarno formally declared the return of the Republic to the Constitution of 1945, accompanied by the dissolution of the National Assembly¹³⁶. Sukarno also banned several major parties such as Masyumi and PSI on the pretext that the leaders of these parties were involved in certain rebellions in the regions (See: Van Dijk, 1981). While the PNI was divided under Sukarno's shadow, the PKI was the only significant political party which then become the main rival of the Army during the Guided Democracy period (see: chapter 3)¹³⁷. Therefore,

¹³⁴ Lev interprets Nasution's speech as "not just the 'civilian tool' like in the Western Countries nor a 'military regime' which dominates the state power, but as one of many forces in the society, the force for the struggle of the people which works together with other people's forces"--LEV, D. S. (1966) *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics 1957-1959*, Ithaca, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University., p.172

¹³⁵ From the Army's perspective, the re-adoption of the Constitution of 1945 had at least two potential advantages: 1) it could be used to show to the public and political parties that the Army was at Sukarno's side; and 2) it could give the military a legal socio-political role within the republic. Following Nasution's interpretation, under the 1945 Constitution, there are political representations such as political parties, functional groups, and the representatives of the regions. For Nasution, the Armed Forces was clearly a functional group no different from peasants, artists, journalists, religious scholars, workers, women, youth, and intellectuals—see: NASUTION, A. H. (1964) *Toward The People's Army*, Jakarta, CV Delegasi., p.20

¹³⁶ Following the Konstituante deadlock on its November 1956 session, Sukarno had informally called for the end of the political party system and proposed Guided Democracy to replace it. This idea was intended to unify the Cabinet by including representatives of all political parties and to create an institutional alternative to the unstable Assembly. This idea had given the state power to Sukarno as an individual leader—See (chapter 3, section 3.3).

¹³⁷ Feith made a similar analysis of this matter. According to Feith, "President Sukarno and the army leadership under Major General (subsequently Lieutenant General and later General) Nasution were the principal power elements in the government.....Sukarno continued to lack a political organization of his own. In order to maximize his influence vis-a-vis the army, therefore, he needed to find support from political groups hostile to the army....but it was the PKI which provided Sukarno with his best organized, most vociferous, and most reliable body of support against the army leaders. Hence it was that the President repeatedly shielded the PKI against the effort of Nasution and his associates to reduce its power"—see: FEITH, H. (1962) *The Decline*

Sukarno's decree not only reflected the civilian leadership's accommodation to the Army's wish, which was to minimize the role of political parties and to maximize the role of functional groups in the political system, but also provided a more space for the Army's intervention in politics.

Loyalty to Pancasila and Sukarno as the state leader

Since Sudirman's acceptance of the position of officer in 1946, the Army had always been unreservedly loyal to the state. This loyalty was manifested in soldiers' obedience to the military as well as political leaders who represent the state authorities. The soldiers also kept themselves away from conflicts amongst political elites regarding the ideology of the state. Even when the parliamentary Democracy was applied in the early 1950s, during which time political parties were mushrooming and came up with various ideologies, the orientation of the military remained unaltered--The Army kept away from politics and left the issues in the hands of political parties. This orientation, however, started to change from 1957. The trend became more intensive during just prior to Sukarno's Decree in 1959, and was conclusively confirmed after the Decree was announced. This shift in orientation was clearly reflected in Nasution's speech at Seskoad on the 7th of August 1961, saying that the Army support Sukarno's decision to eliminate political parties and their ideologies. This speech also confirmed the Army's support to Pancasila as the sole ideology in Indonesia¹³⁸.

The new orientation of the Army was then formalized when *Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat*—the Army Staff and Command School (Seskoad) on March 1962 announced a new doctrine for the Army based on the Middle-Way principle¹³⁹. In brief, the Army maintained its professional character, but its loyalty

of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia., Ithaca, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University Press., p.591-592

¹³⁸ The English version of Nasution's speech, see: PAUKER, G. J. (1973) *The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management*, California, The Rand Corporation., p.170

¹³⁹ Quoting Pauker's translation of the doctrine, "For the successful implementation of territorial warfare, attention must be given to the following: 1) Stabilization in the political field; 2) Consciousness that the Pantjasila is our only ideology and that it has but one official interpretation; 3) A single authoritative leadership which is constantly felt; 4) Complete integration of the three services (land, sea, and air) and their utilization in territorial warfare on the basis of the capability of the state; 5) Planned over-all development which in turn will

was now directed towards one ideology, the Pancasila, and towards one leader, Sukarno.

4.4. Version III: Suhartos's version of the Praetorian Type

Following the failed coup *d'état* organized by the leftists in 1965, the political situation in Indonesia changed considerably. The PKI, which used to be the main rival of the Army, soon disappeared from the Indonesian political landscape. President Sukarno, who was believed to be sympathetic to the communists, also lost a considerable amount of power. The political parties and the Islamists had not yet recovered from the blow of Sukarno banning them in the late 1950s. On the 11th of March, 1966, Sukarno transferred the state's authority to maintain order to Suharto, a decision which would give even more power to the Army (see: chapter 5, section 5.2). This entire situation left the Army with an unparalleled degree of power in the country.

Creating a new doctrine and military commands

Being aware of its position as the dominant political force, the Army then organized a seminar in Sekoad at Bandung, Western Java, from the 25th to the 31st of August 1966 to create a new doctrine which was more relevant to the current situation¹⁴⁰. The result of the seminar was the doctrine of Tri Ubaya Cakti (Three Sacred Efforts), according to which the Army had to deal with three main tasks: 1) *Pertahanan Darat Nasional*—National Earth Defense; 2) *Kekarya-an*—Functional duties; and 3) *Pembinaan*—Control. The first task was to deal with threats from enemies, the second was to conduct intelligence and investigation operations, and the final was related to measures in order to control and maintain regions and territories¹⁴¹. As a conceptual level, this new doctrine maintained the principles contained in the old doctrines of *Perang Rakyat Semesta*—Guerrilla Warfare and *Pembinaan Wilayah*--territorial management which had actually been adopted since Sudirman's era. The

maximize the resources for territorial warfare; 6) Territorial management which will permit self-sufficiency in carrying out territorial war" Ibid., p.56

¹⁴⁰ Another seminar was actually held at the same place a year before. This seminar, however, was no longer considered relevant, since the result was highly influenced by the Guided Democracy ideology. In addition, when this seminar was held, the army was only one among other political forces, whereas in 1966 it was the dominant political force.

¹⁴¹ About this doctrine, see: DINAS SEJARAH TNI ANGKATAN DARAT (1979) *Sendi-Sendi Perjuangan TNI-AD*. Bandung, Disjarahad.

difference was that the Army was now prepared to actively guide the rule of the country¹⁴². Reading the background of this new doctrine should be enough to arrive at this conclusion:

In these days all of the people's hopes are addressed to ABRI (Armed Forces) in general and TNI-AD (Army) in particular. Hope for ABRI there is only one alternative. That is to realize what the people have entrusted to ABRI. And because of that ABRI is compelled to construct and cultivate a respectable government, a government which is powerful and progressive (Angkatan Darat, 1966, p.10).

This doctrine was detailed in the guidance labelled *Tjatur Dharma Eka Karma* –Four Obligation Towards One Purpose (TJADEK), which justified the dual function of the Indonesian military. According to this guidance, the Indonesian defense force's coverage was classified into seven strategic areas¹⁴³:

1. The element which is capable of eliminating the enemies at their front door
2. The element which is capable of destroying the enemies at the sea and in the air before landing on Indonesian territory
3. National air defense which is capable of destroying the enemies before they reach vital objects
4. National maritime defense which is capable to destroy enemies at the sea
5. Joint armed forces (army, navy, and air force)
6. Territorial elements and Guerrilla warfare which is capable of assuring a long term defense, operating on the ground, air, and sea
7. A special element which is capable of handling domestic disorder such as subversion and infiltration

¹⁴² In the doctrine of territorial management conceptualized by Nasution, the involvement of the military in politics was limited to the Army's capacity as one out of many functional groups in the country.

¹⁴³ Translated by the researcher from the original document: INDONESIA (1978) Doktrin Territorial Nusantara. Jakarta, Departemen Pertahanan dan Keamanan.

This new doctrine and guidance was affirmed through Suharto's decree 'Kepres RI No.132/1967'¹⁴⁴ which at the same time established seven operational commandos as the manifestation of the doctrine (see: Appendix 7). A new special unit was also created: *Komando Operasi Pemulihan Ketertiban dan Keamanan*—Command for the Operation to maintain Order and Security. Suharto himself affirmed the establishment of this military unit through the President's decision number 9/1974 and then used this unit as a means of penetrating all aspects of the political system¹⁴⁵. Reading the decree, the Kopkamtib is...“*Sarana pemerintah yang bertujuan memelihara dan meningkatkan stabilitas dan keamanan dan ketertiban, dalam rangka mewujudkan stabilitas nasional*—the government's tool which is aimed to increase stability, security, and order in order to create national stability” (Ricklefs, 1981b, p.287).

Next, the territorial management system developed by Nasution was transformed into a more sophisticated military bureaucracy, in the form of military commands parallel to the civilian bureaucracy.

1. *Komando Daerah Militer* or Regional Military Command (Kodam) at provinces
2. *Komando Resort Militer* or Sub-Regional Military Command (Korem) at residences
3. *Komando Distrik Militer* or District Military Command (Kodim) at regencies
4. *Komando Rayon Militer* or Sub-District Military Command (Koramil) at sub-districts, and

¹⁴⁴ The complete text, see: INDONESIA (1967) Keppres RI No.132/1967 tentang Pokok-Pokok Organisasi dan Prosedur Bidang Pertahanan dan Keamanan. Jakarta, Sekretariat Negara RI.

¹⁴⁵ The creation of Kopkamtib marked the beginning of dominant military engagement in Indonesian politics. In fact, this unit not only became the government's tool to maintain order and stability, but had also made the military the dominant actor able to affect every policy and strategy related to the national security as well as other aspects of the state. In 1998, Kopkamtib changed its name into Badan Koordinasi bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional—Coordinating Committee for Assisting the National Stability Measures—BAKORSTANAS—but in terms of character in responsibility, it was unaltered. On Kopkamtib or Bakorstanas, see: MCDONALD, H. (1980) *Suharto's Indonesia*, Melbourne, Fontana & Collines. On the main tasks and function of Bakorstanas, see: INDONESIA (1988) Keppres No.29/1988 tentang Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional. Jakarta, Sekretariat Negara RI.

5. *Bintara Pembina Desa* or Village Development Non-Commissioned Officers (Babinsa) at villages¹⁴⁶.

All of these measures were justified by citing the experience of civil-military relations since the period of revolution, a tactic aimed mainly at questioning the capability of civilians to run the state. To some extent, this was also projected to show the disintegrative nature of party-based democracy while building public impression that the military was the only element capable to run the state¹⁴⁷.

The logical consequence was Nasution's Dual Function ideology that the Indonesian military should be heavily involved in every single aspect of the state, since the army is not only the 'Pemersatu'—Unifier of the country, but also the 'Penyelamat'—the savior of Indonesia¹⁴⁸. In addition, the military regarded itself as the *dinamisator* willing to develop the country. As was explained by Suharto in 1969, the Army wants to make the society dynamic by '*Ing Ngarso Sung Tulodo, Ing Madya Mangun Karso, Tut Wuri Handayani*'—leading by example in the front, inspiring in the midst of the people, and encouraging from behind¹⁴⁹.

Depoliticizing and reorganizing the Armed Forces

Suharto seems to have learned about managing the Indonesian military from his predecessors, especially from the experience of Nasution, the military figure who was dominant in 1950s and 1960s. In 1950s, for instance, Nasution used to develop a military structure that led to a highly politicized army, the situation that brought about extreme difficulties to civilian leaders because the military was very difficult to control, especially during the period of guided democracy under Sukarno. Suharto

¹⁴⁶ See: JENKINS, D. (1984) *Suharto and His Generals*, Ithaca, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University., Chapter II

¹⁴⁷ A political adviser of Suharto, for example, said "ABRI is the only group in society which was born together with the new institution, namely the state based on Pancasila....It is because ABRI has the ability and tradition to overcome groups ideologies and interest that make it the leader of the country" MOERTOPO, A. (1974) *Strategi Politik Nasional*, Jakarta, Yayasan proklamasi, CSIS., p.109

¹⁴⁸ Experiences mentioned to justify this argument included the war against the Dutch during the revolution period, the communist rebellion of 1948, the war against Darul Islam/TII in the 1950s, the war against PRRI rebellion from 1957, and the operation against the communists at the 1965 coup d'état—See: NASUTION, A. H. (1971) *Kekaryaan ABRI*, Jakarta, Seruling Masa. , p.41

¹⁴⁹ For a detailed explanation of this concept, see: LIDDLE, R. W. (1985) Suharto's Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol 58 No.1 (Spring 1985)., p.84-85; NOTOSUSANTO, N. (1984) *Pejuang dan Prajurit*, Jakarta, Sinar Harapan., p.288

was well aware of this deficiency, and he therefore quickly reorganized the military after he was confirmed as President in 1967.

The first measure targeted the military's top command. The position of Chief-of-Staff was downgraded from the highest military command to a secondary level without any direct power over the troops¹⁵⁰. In addition, Suharto also eliminated the intelligence units controlled by the Chief-of-Staff and disbanded their planning, budget, and the elite troops which previously had access to political affairs (Ramadhan, 1994, p.174-181). In undertaking the measures, Suharto hoped to be able to depoliticize the military. Additionally, by transferring power from the Chief-of-Staff to the Army's headquarters and the Ministry of Defense in Jakarta, Suharto was able to concentrate the power of the military in his own hands¹⁵¹.

In addition to attempting to pacify and control the military, Suharto was also trying to eliminate certain figures within it whom he considered potential opponents. Officers such as HR Dharsono¹⁵², Kemal Idris, and Sarwo Edhi Wibowo, all Java-commanders who used to provide Suharto with major backup during the operation against communist coup *d'état* in 1965, were expelled by Suharto during the second half of 1960s (Crouch, 1978, p.235). All these efforts culminated in the massive reorganization of the Indonesian military in 1969, in which the majority of military posts in Jakarta and all the regions were reformed and massive personnel changes were made. Strategic positions were stacked with officers amongst Suharto's circle or at least the officers he considered politically reliable. This period can therefore be considered as part of Suharto's effort to consolidate his power (see: chapter 3, section 3.4).

By the 1970s, there was no doubt that Suharto had become a strong military as well as political leader. All his opponents had less significant power to influence the political system. The Dual Function Doctrine had been modified and applied to serve the interests of the regime. Nasution, the figure who presumably had the clearest

¹⁵⁰ See: EDITORS, T. (1969) Current Data on the Indonesian Army Elite. *Indonesia*, Vol 7, April 1969.

¹⁵¹ A similar analysis is also put forward by Crouch—See: CROUCH, H. (1978) *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press., p.240

¹⁵² HR Dharsono of the West Java Army Division, for example, was known to be allied to the leftist PSI and developed his own idea about New Order Indonesia which was different from Suharto's—See: LIDDLE, R. W. (1973a) Modernizing Indonesian Politics. IN LIDDLE, R. W. (Ed.) *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia, Monograph Series*. New Haven, Yale University., p.177-206

idea about the doctrine, was started to be neglected by the regime. Instead, to maintain this strong position, Suharto promoted his most loyal servants such as Major General Ali Murtopo¹⁵³ and General Soemitro¹⁵⁴ in more strategic position. This combination, however, did not work as smoothly as Suharto had expected, because both generals ended up at conflict in their competition to be close to the center of power (Sundhaussen, 1978, p.71-72). This conflict culminated in a major riot in Jakarta at the beginning of 1974 during the visit of Japanese Prime Minister, the incident known as *Peristiwa Limabelas Januari-Malari* (see: Crouch, 1974). Nevertheless, Suharto's effort to consolidate his power had succeeded to a considerable extent, meaning that the conflict between his closest assistants did not have an impact on the already controllable military. Soon after ending Soemitro's military career following the riot, Suharto again restored full control of the military by giving important positions to military officers he trusted, such as General LB Moerdani, Admiral Soedomo, General Yoga Sugama, General Maraden Panggabean, General Mohamad Jusuf (Wiwoho and Chaeruddin, 1990, 219-222, Pour, 1993, p.306-307).

Serving the regime at all cost

In choosing these figures to fill strategic military posts, Suharto seemed to use at least two criteria: 1) Suharto had a certain amount of trust in them, or 2) they were unlikely to challenge him. General Murdani, General Sugama, and Admiral Sudomo fulfilled the first criteria, for they had been known to be close to Suharto since he served in the Army during Sukarno's reign (see: Wiwoho and Chaeruddin, 1990, *Ibid*).

It was especially under Murdani and Sudomo that the Indonesian military was, in General Soemitro's words, 'a tool of power'¹⁵⁵ rather than the instrument of state. In

¹⁵³ Suharto said in his memoirs, 'Some people thought that Ali Moertopo was the man who decided everything. Why? Perhaps because he was a good speaker, courageous, and as my special assistant, he was supposedly close to me and they thought that everything depended on him....That just wasn't true'—See: SUHARTO, SWIPAYANA, G. & RAMADHAN, K. (1991) *Soeharto, My Thoughts, Words, and Deeds*, Jakarta, Lamtoro Gung Persada., p.378

¹⁵⁴ These changes were part of Suharto's effort to bring the *Panitia Sosial Politik* from the Army's headquarters to Suharto's circle which would then function as Suharto's think tank (see: chapter 3 on 'Asisten Pribadi')

the first place, the military was 'cleaned', depoliticized, and used as the guardian of the regime's policies. In 1966, when Suharto inherited a military which was highly contaminated by Guided Democracy ideology, the military was very difficult to control, even by President Sukarno¹⁵⁶. From 1969, when Suharto launched his reorganization policy, the military was 'neutralized'. The leftist or Sukarnoist sympathizers were imprisoned, while potential opponents amongst the active as well as retired officers were either disciplined or dismissed from service (Crouch, 1978, chapter 9). The activities of retired officers were also closely supervised (as Murdani was controlling the Intelligence force). The command of the military was centered in the Army's headquarters in Jakarta and was directly controlled by Suharto. Even so, this subordination did not really bother the military as Suharto was an Army General who became President with the support of the Army. Psychologically, the soldiers regarded Suharto as their leader and not as an outsider, especially since Suharto often identified himself as a military man rather than as a civilian¹⁵⁷.

Further, the selection of leadership positions within the Army was not tightly constrained. Not long after Murdani was promoted, he transferred most of the command posts within the Army from the generation of 1945 to young graduates of the military training centers in Magelang (central Java) and Bandung (West Java), but expertise was actually not the real consideration (Vatikiotis, 1994, p.80). Rather, this recruitment exercise was aimed at eliminating older generals sympathetic to Sukarno. In addition, Murdani's efforts to concentrate the Army's power in its headquarters would be easier when fresh officers held the commands rather than

¹⁵⁵ At an occasion long after his retirement as the Commander of the Armed Forces, Sumitro said that the Indonesian military was degrading from being the tool of the state towards the tool of power which, according to him, was due to an 'uncertain political situation as well as provisions of the 1945 Constitution that have not yet been transformed into clear legal rules'—see: GATRA (1995) *Untuk Apa Soemitro Menggebrak? Gatra*. July 8, 1995 ed. Jakarta.

¹⁵⁶ Following the coup d'état of 1965, Sukarno gave a series of orders to the military to take measures, but the military neglected these orders. Instead, the army took its own initiative and 'forced' Sukarno to follow this initiative. This was similar to the disobedience of Sudirman in 1949 when Sukarno ordered the Army to surrender to the Dutch—see: CROUCH, H. (1973) *Another Look at the Indonesian Coup*. *Indonesia*, Vol 15 (April 1973).

¹⁵⁷ Suharto admitted in his memoirs, "...my retirement from active military service does not mean that I have ceased to serve as a member of the Army. Moreover, the law states that a retired soldier carries on as a member of the reserve corps of the Armed Forces"—SUHARTO, SWIPAYANA, G. & RAMADHAN, K. (1991) *Soeharto, My Thoughts, Words, and Deeds*, Jakarta, Lamtoro Gung Persada., p.279

senior officers¹⁵⁸. At the top level, meanwhile, the main criterion of promotion was Suharto's blessing. As long as Suharto did not show any resistance, an officer was entitled to a promotion regardless the expertise, rank, age or seniority (See: Crouch, 1988).

4.5. Version IV: Towards Professional Military

The 21st of May 1998 was the last day of Suharto's 32 years of service as the President of the Republic of Indonesia. In the credential room of his palace, he delivered his last speech as President in front of a small audience of his entourage and the media. It was during this speech that he gave his resignation (See: Appendix 6).

On the same day, Wiranto, the Pangab and the Minister of Defense, made a public statement saying:

- 1) Recognizing the situation and the people's aspirations, the Armed Forces support and welcome the decision of Mr Suharto to step down as President and, based on the constitution, support Vice-President BJ Habibie as the new President of the Republic of Indonesia
- 2) The Armed Forces remains solid and encourages the Indonesian people to accept President Suharto's resignation which is in accordance with the principles of the constitution of 1945
- 3) The Armed Forces will be active anticipating any possible threats to the unity of the nation
- 4) Respecting the nation's culture and tradition, the Armed Forces is committed to protecting the safety and dignity of former presidents, including Mr Suharto and his family

¹⁵⁸ According to Vatikiotis, this approach was a strategy driven by Murdani's background in intelligence—see: VATIKIOTIS, M. R. J. (1994) *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: Order, Development, and Pressure for Change*, London, Routledge., *Ibid.*

- 5) The Armed Forces encourages all parties to restrain from undertaking possible violence which may lead to chaos¹⁵⁹

General Wiranto's statement that the Armed Forces "support and welcome" Suharto's resignation revealed that the Indonesian military had started to change its orientation. As was analyzed in the previous section, in 1966 the Military decided to establish a 'respectable government, a government which is powerful and progressive', the position which was manifested by its support for General Suharto's presidency under which the military played a dominant role as the guardian of the regime for the next 32 years. With Wiranto's statement, this role was simply over, for the military was now letting Suharto and his regime fall without offering any resistance whatsoever¹⁶⁰. The military's final commitment to the regime was a mere promise to protect the safety and the dignity of Suharto and his family. The loyalty of the military had now also shifted from the regime to the state/nation, as is reflected in point 3 of the statement.

This change of orientation was confirmed with General Wiranto's speech in West Java on the 17th of July, 1998, which introduced the new paradigm of the military and contained some fundamental principles:

- 1) ABRI does not have to be on the front line;
- 2) ABRI should no longer dominate but only influence;
- 3) ABRI must change its way in influencing;
- 4) ABRI is ready to share power with civilian politicians (see: *Republika*, 1998).

Following this statement, since 1999 the Indonesian military distanced itself from politics and attempted to return to the original principle of Dual Function ideology as was developed by Nasution, with the military being only "one out of many forces in society, the force for the struggle of the people which works together with other

¹⁵⁹ Translated from the original text (Indonesian version) as published by KOMPAS (1998a) *Kompas*. 22 may 1998 ed. Jakarta.

¹⁶⁰ This kind of behaviour may lead to speculations related to the question "Why did the military not instead take over the state power from Suharto and continue its domination?" However, this topic is not our focus of analysis in this chapter.

people's forces"¹⁶¹. This new 'limited' paradigm was then adopted and implemented by the Indonesian military with an objective of bringing the military back under the civilian control within a democratic system.

Military reform

Consistent with the new paradigm, the Indonesian military made a series of step by step adjustments, starting with the structural reform of its organization. The very first measure was returning to the pre-1980s seventeen Komando Daerah Militer- (Regional Military Command) system, announced by Wiranto on May 1999 based on the argument that the military should be closer to the people (Editors, 2000, p.132)¹⁶². A new Kodam, the Kodam XVI Pattimura, was established in Moluccas soon after Wiranto's announcement, while six other Kodams were planned to be newly created or upgraded from the existing Korems¹⁶³. On March 2000, President Abdurrahman Wahid made two Presidential Decrees to dissolve Bakorstanas (Previously Kopkamtib) and Litsus¹⁶⁴. Again, in April 2000 the military announced a total abolition of the Military's existence at the village level (Babinsa) and sub-district level (Koramil) which was followed by reduction in the territorial structure (Editors, 2000, p.133). In May 2000, the Minister of Defense Juwono Sudharsono announced plans to abolish the position of Military Commander-in-Chief (Pangab) and replace it with a *Kepala Staf Gabungan*—Chief of the Joint Staffs (Kasgab), which would no longer have ministerial rank but be placed under the Minister of Defense (Editors,

¹⁶¹ This conclusion is borrowed from Lev—see: LEV, D. S. (1966) *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics 1957-1959*, Ithaca, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University., p.191-192

¹⁶² The Editors, however, argued that the creation of new Kodams was mainly aimed at creating new posts and additional jobs which were required to accommodate officers and troops who lost their jobs due to the abolition of *Kekaryaan* (the secondment of active-duty officers to the civil service, local legislatures and regional executives)—see: EDITORS, T. (2000) Civil-Military Relations since The Fall of Suharto. *Indonesia*, Vol 70 (October 2000)., *Ibid.*

¹⁶³ For example, Korem 161 Wirasakti at Kupang, East Nusatenggara, would be upgraded to the status of Kodam—cited from the Editors' citation on MEDIA INDONESIA (1999) Korem 161/Wirasakti NTT Dijadikan Kodam. *Media Indonesia*. September 29, 1999 ed. Jakarta.

¹⁶⁴ Litsus or Penelitian Khusus—Special Check, was a requirement of all civil servants which allowed the military to reject the appointment of civilians, state apparatus or even certain political parties deemed to have 'unclean' backgrounds, and hence to justify the continued appointments of military personnel to these posts—see: EKLOF, S. (2005) *Power and Political Culture in Suharto's Indonesia: The Indonesian Democratic Party and the Decline of the New Order (1986-1998)*, NIAS Press., p.146; EDITORS, T. (2000) Civil-Military Relations since The Fall of Suharto. *Indonesia*, Vol 70 (October 2000)., p.134. According to the media reports, the liquidation of Bakorstanas brought about loss of jobs for 271 colonels and 3 generals. This may be related to the expansion of military structure undertaken at more or less the same time. See, for example: MEDIA INDONESIA (2000) Kelompok Cilangkap Dominan. *Media Indonesia*. June 11, 2000 ed.

2000, *Ibid*, Jawa Pos, 2000)¹⁶⁵. At the National Assembly meeting in August of the same year, a new bill was passed requiring that the selection of the Military Commander be approved by the parliament and granting the Vice-President the right to play a role in military appointments (*Suara Merdeka*, 2000, *Ibid*). On July the 1st, 2000, the national police force was separated from the Armed Forces and placed directly under the President's control, while plans were also announced to increase significantly the number of police officers and to replace the existing military-style rank system of the police with a more internationally conventional police system (*Editors*, 2000, *Ibid*). The Armed Forces also announced a significant reduction in the number of the Special Forces (Kopassus) personnel, as well as a decrease in combat forces of its three branches, despite expansion of military organization through the creation of new specialized roles within these branches¹⁶⁶.

This structural reform was also accompanied by change in the military elites. During Habibie's presidency until October 1999, General Wiranto was still controlling the majority of the military power, since he was serving as both Commander of the Armed Forces and Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security. When Abdurrahman Wahid came to presidency as a result of political bargaining, the power of the military was multi-polarised for, in the new cabinet, Wahid placed several generals and Wiranto himself in ministerial positions: General Wiranto was Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security; Lieutenant General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as Minister of Mines and Energy; Lieutenant General Agum Gumelar as Minister for transportation; Rear Admiral Freddy Numbery as Minister for Administrative Reforms, and Lieutenant General (ret) Soerjadi Soedirdja as Minister of Home Affairs (Barton, 2006, part 5). The post of Minister of Defense was given to a civilian, Juwono Sudharsono, while the Armed Forces Commander post was filled by Admiral Widodo Adi Sucipto from the Navy (Barton, 2006, *Ibid*). At the Army's headquarters, the Army Chief-of-Staff, General Soebagyo HS was replaced by

¹⁶⁵ According to Juwono's concept, the position of Kasgab would be rotated every three years amongst the three forces (Army, Navy, and Air Force) in order to 'prevent one service branch from feeling left out' -- *SUARA MERDEKA* (2000) Jabatan Kasgab Digilir Tiap 3 Tahun. *Suara Merdeka*. 2 June 2000 ed.

¹⁶⁶ The Marine Corps would be expanded from its then two brigades with a total of 13.000 personnel to three brigades with the same total number of personnel; The Air Force Special Force (Paskhas) would be increased from six squadrons to ten; The Kostrad would also be expanded but without a detailed expansion plan—see: EDITORS, T. (2000) Civil-Military Relations since The Fall of Suharto. *Indonesia*, Vol 70 (October 2000), *Ibid*.

General Tyasno Sudarto on December 1999, and this was followed by personnel changes in the Army high commands during March and June of the following year in order to shift the Army leadership from senior to more junior classes. Rationalization was not restricted to the top levels of the military, but also applied to lower levels. Since 1998, a series of personnel changes have been undertaken. From March to May 1998, seven commanders of Kodam (Pangdam) were replaced: Kodam I, III, IV, VI, VII, VIII, and IX (Editors, 2000, p.127).

These measures were accompanied by a number of other reforms which could not possibly be detailed in a single chapter. However, in order to simplify, John Haseman's observations of the Indonesian military might give a rough idea of the extent of the reforms. Haseman, who used to serve as defense attaché in Indonesia during the post-1998 period, noted in 2000 that there were at least 9 significant military reforms effective since 1999:

1. Removing the national police from the military chain of command
2. Abolishing staff positions in socio-political affairs at TNI headquarters and subordinate regional commands
3. Abolishing the post of assistant for security and order at TNI headquarters (who was usually a national police officer)
4. Requiring that all military personnel in civil government posts either retire from the armed forces or return to normal military duties
5. Reducing dedicated military seats in Parliament from 100 to 75 in 1990 and to 38 in 1998, and totally eliminating them by 2004
6. Prohibiting any role by the military in day-to-day political activity
7. Prohibiting political party bias
8. Maintaining neutrality in the 1999 general election and all future elections
9. Revising doctrinal publications and instruction to reflect the changing role of the military in society (Haseman, 2000, p.23-30).

These measures signify a major shift in the Indonesian Military's orientation towards professionalism which continues today.

4.6. Conclusion

The characters and orientation of revolutionary type offered by Perlmutter match those of the Indonesian military during the post-colonial Indonesian state (version I). In the 1950s, the Indonesian army retained revolutionary features as a legacy of its nationalist revolution against the Dutch. Initially, the Pemuda (the youths), who were trained during the Japanese mobilization policy, created Laskars (armed units) which then organized themselves into a national corporation out of the ruins of the Japanese occupation. During this period, the Indonesian military was very efficient in small and regional units, loyal to the state, but extremely disorganized at the national level and not under the control of the civilian government. The reluctance of the civilian political leadership to raise a formal army at the end of the Japanese occupation and the high-level of uncertainty during the period of revolution made this self-created organization relatively independent of the civilian government. As a result, the Indonesian army had dual loyalties during this period: (1) to the military commanders who believed that independence had to be achieved through physical struggle and thus favoured attacking the Japanese and Dutch head-on, and; (2) to the civilian leaders who opted for peaceful diplomacy and a measured approach towards independence. Up until the mid-1950s, the soldiers actively intervened in the politics of the Republic. In the second half of the 1950s, however, the army began moving towards becoming a professional army with the new democratic state as its client, so that Perlmutter's criteria of professional type were relevant to explain the Indonesian military at this period.

The only exception to Perlmutter's model was during Sukarno's civilian presidential monarchy (version II). When Sukarno established 'Guided Democracy' and a civilian presidential monarchy, he attempted to transform the army into an unusual form of the revolutionary type which would be loyal to his Pancasila ideology and to him personally as the leader of the revolution. This pattern was unlike the usual revolutionary type as is found in Perlmutter's model, in which loyalty is to the revolutionary party-movement rather than an individual leader. This leads to a

conceptual problem in attempting to classify and analyse the Sukarno era in which the military was being pushed into a revolutionary type, because Perlmutter's concept is simply not applicable to this phenomenon. In the meantime, it might be worth speculating that this shift was due to a weakness of the Indonesian military compared to itself during the first half of the 1950s, since it was a shift away from possible professionalism even if it was going towards the revolutionary, rather than praetorian, type of military. However, it does not seem to be such a large negative shift as the change to praetorianism when the army replaced Sukarno with Suharto. When the army replaced Sukarno with Suharto and allowed him to establish a military presidential monarchy (version III), the army was changing into a praetorian type of military hence this phenomenon provides support for Perlmutter's theory. In spite of its professionalism in the past, the Indonesian soldiers gradually transformed themselves into mere instruments of Suharto's authoritarianism. By the beginning of the 1970s, the Army became the most powerful political institution in Indonesia and the principal pillar of the regime. Its political role was rationalized through the re-adoption of the double-function doctrine according to which the military is the armed wing of the nation, being responsible for the defense of the state and at the same time an instrument of the nation's development. In fact, the double function ideology was an obvious anachronism because the military, rather than becoming the armed wing of the nation, played the role of guardian of Suharto's policies. However, this praetorianism shows legacies of the revolutionary-type role contained in the middle-way and dual-function doctrines, which continued to be the official justification of the military's role. The difference was simply that the military was now under the Suharto regime rather than the Sukarno regime.

Perlmutter's criteria of professional type were also equivalent to the characters of the Indonesian military of the post-1998 Indonesian democratic state (version IV). When the army politically abandoned Suharto in the 1990s and supported democratisation, they were beginning to become a professional type of military while the present democracy has continued to show progress towards this goal of professionalism. In addition, since 1998 the Indonesian military has decided to 'back to barracks'. It has not only detached itself from politics by giving up its claim of reserved seats in the central parliament as well as in regional assemblies, but as an institution, it has also withdrawn from day-to-day political activities in the country. Active officers must

choose to get retired from their military service when taking non-military posts, or, to remain becoming military officers but have to leave any civilian-government assignments, the situation which is very contrast to that of under Suharto's administration, during which active military officers were persistent in controlling strategic posts in the civilian bureaucracy and dominating the cabinet as well as societal occupations at all levels. Even though civilian political parties keep seeking supports from the military as well as from influential figures within the army, the military officers' involvement into the political sphere of the society were limited within individual capacity because the TNI has now refused institutional support to any political parties as it did to Golkar during Suharto's New Order. The gradual reform been applied since 1998 had assured civilian control over the military and brought about wide transparency related to military budget and activities.

CHAPTER FIVE:

DEALING WITH POLITICAL DISORDERS: DEGREE OF DIFFICULTY

“Lycurgus is one of those who have earned no small measure of praise.....For in the Laws which he gave to Sparta, he assigned to the kings, to the aristocracy, and to the populace each its own function, and thus introduced a form of government which lasted for more than eight hundred years to his very great credit and the tranquillity of that city” (Machiavelli, 1970, p.109).

“Sparta.....was governed by a king and by a small senate. It was able to maintain itself in this way for long time, because in Sparta there were few inhabitants and access to outsiders desirous of coming to dwell there was forbidden. Moreover, it had adopted the laws of Lycurgus and, as the laws were observed, they removed all occasion for tumult, so that Spartans were able to live united for a long time” (Machiavelli, 1970, p.120).

Giving such a statement, Machiavelli must have been very impressed by the political formula adopted by Sparta and to consider it as significant to the state's success. He admired the law system of Lycurgus which, he maintained, was capable of guaranteeing the stability of the city state for more than eight centuries. Then, his inquiries were extended to the point that Sparta adopted a specific form of government in which the realm was governed by two elements: the king and the senate.

Considering those two findings as a matter of fact, Machiavelli offered three explanations. First, law enforcement was essential to Spartans, by virtue of which a durable system could be secured while internal threats were effectively diminished; second, the power of the state was distributed among three distinct elements of the realm: the ruler, the wise, and the ruled, an arrangement presumably capable of minimizing the “struggle for power” among the grunts, and; finally, Sparta was thoroughly mono cultural that was a characteristic maintained by authority. In brief, Spartan state was solid and durable by virtue of: *efficient and enforced laws; equal distribution of power among the elements of the state, and; the absence of multicultural-problems*. These features provide Machiavelli's reader with a model of a permanent state, and a unique method with which to understand it.

A different picture of order and stability, however, is shown by a state typical of the modern age; namely, Indonesia. Since her existence as an independent state

(declared unilaterally on 1945, recognized internationally in 1949), she has appeared not as a sustainable harmonious new nation, but as an arena of bitter struggle among contending individuals and social forces. This struggle can be categorized into a number of episodes.

5.1. Version I: early-independence episode

Indicators of disorder had been obvious since the early period of independent Indonesia (between 1945 and 1949). The tension was initially dominated by the rivalry between Islam and secular nationalists over the philosophical foundation, or more concretely the ideological basis, of the new state. As has been elaborated in a previous chapter (see: chapter 2), both parties were in a bitter contest to determine what kind of ideology under which the new state would be established. The Islamic nationalists, with their 'majority' status, insisted on the adoption of *Shari'a* (the Islamic Law); the secular nationalists, in contrast, holding the ideal of the plurality of the Indonesian society, strove for *Pancasila* (Sukarno-style Secularism) as the ideological basis of the state, manifested by the adoption of 1945 Constitution by the new republic. The success of the nationalists did not put an end to the contest, which continued among parties within both the elite (political) and mass (social) arenas. Friction between the elites was especially strong over the *Konstituante*.¹⁶⁷ This struggle saw the contestants polarized into two competing poles: with the integralist group (or *Pancasila*-ist) and Indonesian Communists on one side against the Islamists on the other. The subjects of dispute were many, ranging from the choice of national flag to the proper relationship between the organs of the state, but the debates were mainly preoccupied by the classic issues relating to the ideology of the state: whether the state should be based on *Shari'a* or on *Pancasila*. A second

¹⁶⁷ The three constitutions adopted by Indonesia: the 1945 Constitution announced on the 18 of August 1945 (37 Articles, provides for powerful presidency); The Constitution of Federal Republic of Indonesia of 1949, announced in 1949 as the result of negotiations with the Dutch over a cease-fire, and; the 1950 Constitution, adopted from 1950 to 1959 (146 Articles, provides guarantees for Individual freedoms and stipulates a parliamentary system of government with the president holding ceremonial powers); all were meant to be provisional—hence Sukarno's promise emphasized the need for a permanent constitution to be created by a more representative body—so that Article 134 of the 1950 Constitution called for a constitutional assembly to be convened (as soon as the situation permits) in order to enact a permanent constitution. The *Konstituante* is this meant-representative body, whose members were elected through a universal suffrage held in late 1955—the first election in independent Indonesia. Being dominated by four main parties: PNI (Nationalists), Masyumi (Islamists), Nahdatul Ulama (Islamists-traditional), and PKI (Communists); this Assembly was bestowed with a task which was to create a permanent constitution for the republic.

contest, meanwhile, was found among the populace throughout the archipelago and involved a variety of issues, ranging from dissatisfactions among people of certain regions to radical criticisms over the conduct of the young republic made by those hostile to the state as well as by supporters of secularism. In certain parts of the archipelago, these tumults were often dominated by pogroms targeting people of Chinese descent (See: chapter 6). There are many significant examples of social and political mayhem during this period. Among them are the Social Revolution (against state authorities) on Java's North Coast—Brebes, Tegal, and Pemalang Regencies in 1945; the rebellion of the Muslim Guerrilla organizations *Hizbullah* and *Sabilillah* in West Java in 1948; Amir Fatah's Darul Islam Movement in Central Java—Tegal, Brebes, Bumiayu, Purwakarta, Majenang, and Cilacap Regencies in 1948; The Islamic state of Indonesia proclaimed by the Darul Islam under Kartosuwiryo of 1949.¹⁶⁸

5.2. Version II: 1950-1965 and 1965-1966 episodes

The next events were between 1950 and 1965, a period of disorder that, to a certain extent, can be considered as the continuation of the post-independence struggle. Rejecting *Shari'a* as the base of the Indonesian state, during the period of 1950-1962 Sukarno and his fellow nationalists worked intensely for the unity of the nation. The adoption of the 1945 Constitution by the state with *Pancasila* as its soul had not only been an interim victory¹⁶⁹ for the secularist group, but had created a deep disappointment among Muslim nationalists and other ideological elements of the republic. Not long after international recognition was gained (1949), social tumults and rebellious movements once again rampaged through the nation. The most significant among these were the revolt of the troops of the Islamic Communities in

¹⁶⁸ Darul Islam rebellious movement was the most significant among others in term of coverage and durability. It was proclaimed on the 7th of August 1949 in West Java by *Darul Islam* (literally means: the house—the home—the territory—of Islam) under the leadership of Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo. The movement spread quickly across the archipelago soon after its declaration, especially in areas of Central Java, South Sulawesi, South Kalimantan, and Aceh, and only by the year of 1962 that this movement was overcome by the state. A comprehensive story about this movement, See: DIJK, V. (1981) *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff., and NIEUWENHUIJZE, C. A. O. V. (1958) *Aspects of Islam in Post Colonial Indonesia*, The Hague, Bandung, W. Van Hoeve.

¹⁶⁹ To repeat what was mentioned at the previous Chapter, despite the acceptance of the 1945 Constitution, Muslim Nationalists has actually never fully accepted *Pancasila* as the foundation of the Indonesian state. This assumption need to be reemphasized as it gives explanations to the features of relationship between main actors in the independent Indonesia and also a base of arguments along this thesis.

Kebumen Regency of 1950; Kahar Muzakkar Islamic State Rebellion in South Sulawesi province of 1953-1955; The rebellion of Ibnu Hadjar's Islamic Kingdom in South Kalimantan Province of 1950-1953; The Social Revolution and Mujahidin revolt in Aceh of 1951; and the Daud Beureuh's Islamic State in Aceh of 1953. There were also many other disturbances all signifying serious challenges to the established *Pancasila* state¹⁷⁰.

The strict competition between political elites, Sukarno, and the army--combined with Sukarno's political manoeuvres during the period of federal democracy (see: Sukarno's charismatic legitimacy, chapter 2)--culminated in a coup d'état in 1965 organized by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), which had been believed to operate with the blessing of Sukarno. Soon after the failure of the coup, an orchestrated civil war occurred between 1965 and 1966, during which an army-sponsored alliance of Muslims, Christians and Hindus undertook widespread killings of their own compatriots who were accused of having 'affiliated' with the PKI. The coup itself remains mysterious; even today, there is no clarity of who was the real actor and for what purpose they had undertaken the coup¹⁷¹. Some speculations and analysis around this coup are of interest, but our concern in this chapter is the contest between elements of the nation which eventually brought about political disorder and catastrophes against humanity. A day before the coup, there were only a small number of casualties; six army generals and a lieutenant were taken by a group of leftists under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Untung (the commander of *Cakrabirawa*---President Sukarno's special guards). The counter-revolutionary movement led by Suharto, (Commander of *Kostrad*--- The Strategic Reserve Command) being deployed shortly after the declaration of action by Untung, had also brought only about hundreds of casualties among the *PKI* members and those who

¹⁷⁰ Stories about those social tumults and rebellious movements can be found in many scholarly works such as: HORIKOSHI, H. (1975) The Dar-ul-Islam Movement in West Java (1948-1962). *Indonesia*, Vol 20, October 1975, 58-86.; ARIWIADI (1965) *Gerakan Operasi Militer VII: Penyelesaian Peristiwa Atjeh*, Jakarta, Mega Bookstore.; BOLAND, B. J. (1971a) *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff.; BARDOSONO (1956) *Peristiwa Sulawesi Selatan*, Jakarta, Jajasan Pustaka Militer.; ANWAR, R. (1951) Peristiwa Kahar Muzakkar Hanja Satu Aspect Sadj. *Indonesia Merdeka*. 18 September 1951 ed. Jakarta.; JACKSON, K. D. & MOELIONO, J. (1971) Participation in Rebellion: The Darul Islam in West Java. IN LIDDLE, R. W. (Ed.) *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia*. New Haven, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph Series Vol 49.

¹⁷¹ A sophisticated 'theory' about the massacre, See: ANDERSON, B. R. O. & MCVEY, R. T. (1971) A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia. *Interim Report Series*. Ithaca, Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University.

were defending *Halim* Air Force Base, where the drama initiated. The real catastrophe, however, began a month later. In three main islands of Indonesia (Java, Sumatra, and Bali), no less than half a million people were butchered between October 1965 to January 1966¹⁷², while hundreds of thousands more were imprisoned without trial and tortured by state institutions during the followed years.¹⁷³

5.3. Version III: 1997-1998 episode

In 1997, an economic crisis injured Southeast Asia and brought about economic disasters to some countries in the region, including Indonesia. While other countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines were struggling to recover from the economic crisis, Indonesia experienced an extra upheaval, which ended with the overthrow of Suharto from power (see: chapter 8). A sad story, meanwhile, was accompanying this milestone. Riots and looting spread across the main cities of Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Solo, Surabaya, and Makassar, targeting public facilities, business centres, and members of Chinese minority: another tragedy that brought about thousands of casualties¹⁷⁴.

During this disorder, stresses of the broader political issues were also growing, especially in the period from 1998 to 2001. Some of them were 'purely' social disorders, but some others showed clear indicators of separatist intentions. Their significance in the analysis of the Indonesian state was mainly due to these 'disorders' had brought about radical change in the state's policies since 1998 (see: chapter 7).

¹⁷² There is no official record telling the exact number of the casualties. Scholar such as Anderson, estimates 600,000 to 2,000,000 of Indonesians had been executed, but the number frequently cited is around half a million. Thus, to make it simple, we would say at least half a million lives were claimed by the humanitarian catastrophe during this period.

¹⁷³ Stories around the 1965 coup can be found in some excellent studies such as VITTACHI, T. (1967) *The fall of Sukarno*, London, A. Deutsch, ANDERSON, B. R. O. & MCVEY, R. T. (1971) A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia. *Interim Report Series*. Ithaca, Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, SUNDHAUSSEN, U. (1982) *The road to power : Indonesian military politics, 1945-1967*, New York, Oxford University Press., and PALMIER, L. H. (1973) *Communists in Indonesia*. , London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

¹⁷⁴ Some scholars have dedicated their time to compile facts as well as to create analysis on social and political circumstances in Indonesia around 1998. To cite among the most prominents: HANDERSON, C. (1998) *Asia Falling : Making Sense of the Asian Crisis and its Aftermath*, New York, McGraw-Hill.; BHAKTI, I. N. (1998b) Chronology of events leading to the fall of President Suharto. IN FORRESTER, G. & MAY, R. J. (Eds.) *The fall of Soeharto*. Bathurst, Crawford House.; MANNING, C., AND DIERMEN, V. (Ed.) (2000) *Indonesia in Transition : Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis*, London, Zedbooks.

5.4. Version IV: post-1998 trend of communal violence and separatism

1. Mysterious Killings in Banyuwangi

In rural, impoverished and over-populated regions of the East Java province, religious traditions were part of the daily-life of local society. This is particularly true in Banyuwangi, one of the 37 districts of the province, where the populations practice cultural and religious principles indifferently. Located at about 830 kilometres from the capital city Jakarta, this region lies on the eastern end of Java island, which has a predominantly Moslem population. This region is separated from Bali (where Hinduism is dominant) just by a narrow strait. As a crossroad between the two islands, Banyuwangi has then been a melting pot of the Moslem cultures of Java and the Hindu tradition of Bali. This situation has created a hybrid culture and a religious syncretism¹⁷⁵. In the island of Java, Islam was strongly interpreted with certain aspect of mysticism while Hindu Bali strongly emphasized the role of the spirits. Combining the elements of the two traditions, around two millions of Banyuwangi population then live in proximity with supernatural qualifications and practices. They believe in *Santet* (magic spells), *Sihir* (sorcery) and *Tenung* (Black Magic). The *Dukun* (experts) often occupy important positions of the villages, being respected but also feared for their malefic capacity. Such fear sometimes reaches the point of hysteria, as happened in 1998 when a group of locals assassinated *Dukun Santets* who were accused of using magic to harm members of the society. In July 1998 alone, among the victims were five *Dukuns*, and people started to seek refuge in other regions (Forum Keadilan, 1998a, p.12).

When similar murders occurred within a month, there could be no doubt that these were not just 'ordinary' crimes. During September, the frequency of the killings increased, reaching three murders per day. These murders were now reported not only in Banyuwangi but also in the regions across East-Java peninsula and even further up to Madura Island (Jawa Pos, 1998b). By the end of the month, the number of deaths had exceeded 100, while more than two thirds of the victims were the members of NU (traditional-Islamists) (Al-Zastrouw Ng, 1999, p.98-105). With the massacres continuing

¹⁷⁵ This term is borrowed from Clifford Geertz's comprehensive study on the Religions of the Javanese. See: GEERTZ, C. (1976) *The Religion of Java*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

in October, violence and terror increased. At the beginning of November, investigations indicated that the '*Dukun Tenung*' were not the only target of the mysterious murders as the majority of the murdered were NU-affiliated¹⁷⁶. In addition, in term of coverage, the tragedy was now overwhelming¹⁷⁷. The army and police force, meanwhile, seemed incapable of stopping the continuous violence (Jawa Pos, 1998b, Ibid).

2. Riots at Ketapang

The Northern area of Jakarta is a known place of drug trafficking, prostitution, gambling and general crime. Many of the inhabitants of this area had engaged in these illegal practices, especially those who resided in the area of Ketapang which was notorious as one of the biggest gambling zones in the Southeast Asia. The gamblers in general were Chinese, while the workers were Christian migrants from the ethnic group of Ambon (Ambonese). Even though the practices had operated for years without significant turbulence, it was in 1999 that these practices arrived to irritate the Moslems who were the major inhabitants of Ketapang (Ministry of Defense, 1999). On November 22, a conflict erupted between local Moslems and Ambonese. Initially, the clash was insignificant but very quickly escalated. Following the minor tension, hundreds of Ambonese gathered and prepared to confront the Moslem inhabitants. They engaged in provocation--undertaking vandalism along the streets of Ketapang. When a mosque was destroyed, this was interpreted by the Moslems as an act of war by the Christians (Sabili, 1998). Within hours, hundreds of armed men were deployed from Tangerang, the nearest big city around twenty kilometres from the Western part of Ketapang. These men then set fire to a church where the Ambonese were hiding. Not content with burning a church, the riot would further escalate thereafter as the crowd attacked Christian churches and schools in the northern area of Jakarta.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ An NU figure said "There are many victims from the NU" See: JAWA POS (1998b) Jangan Tutup-Tutupi Kasus Banyuwangi. *Jawa Pos*. 13 October 1998 ed. Surabaya.; a NU official stated "Seventy percent of them were NU people, See: SURABAYA POST (1998) Soal Investigasi NU Jatim Tentang Santet: Pertemuan PB NU-Muspida Jatim Ditunda. *Surabaya Post*. 7 December 1998 ed. Surabaya.

¹⁷⁷ Initially, the murder cases were reported in only three *Kecamatan* (sub-district) of Banyuwangi Regency, but later, they were reported to have happened in the entire Regency (which consists of 21 sub-districts) and even in other regencies proxy to Banyuwangi.

¹⁷⁸ The Ketapang riots marked the appearance of Front Pembela Islam—The Islamic defender front (FPI), a pro-government militia. Structured itself as a paramilitary group, the FPI has a close relationship with figures in charge of the national security in Jakarta, such as the commandant of Garrison and the head of police department. See: SUAEDY, A. (1998) *Premanisme Politik*, Jakarta, Institut Studi Arus Informasi.

3. Riots at Kupang

Located on the western half of Timor Island, approximately 1900 kilometers from Jakarta, Kupang is a provincial city with around 300,000 inhabitants, 90% being Christian. On November 29, 1998, a crowd attacked mosques in Kupang in what was presumably an act of vengeance against Moslems for their rampage on churches during the Ketapang riot a week earlier¹⁷⁹ (Forum Keadilan, 1998b, p.15). This anti-Moslem crowd ransacked the city for two days, took three lives, left 27 wounded, and damaged 100 buildings including nine mosques(The Asian Wallstreet Journal, 1998).

4. Civil war in Moluccas¹⁸⁰

The most violent conflict in the archipelago after 1998 was the civil war in Moluccas, where confrontations between Moslems and Christians happened on a massive scale. These clashes, which started in January 1999, killed more than 10,000 and created 500,000 refugees from a total population of 2.4 million (The Jakarta Post, 2001a). The two principal sites of conflict were Ambon, the capital city of Moluccas in the province of Central Moluccas, and in Halmahera, a region in the northern island of Moluccas. Presumably with the objective of gaining supports from Jakarta, both Moslems and the Christians in central Moluccas claimed that the other group had secessionist inclinations. When the Moslem forces gained significant victories by mid-2000, the chiefs of the Protestant militia created the Front Kedaulatan Maluku—The Front of Sovereign Moluccas (FKM) in December 2000, claiming independence for Ambon and surrounding islands (The Economist, 2001). However, separatism should not be seen as the real issue of the Moluccas civil war: the roots of this conflict stretched back the colonialism, which produced great local antagonism. As the result of Dutch-colonial ‘missionary’ program, most of the Moluccas population was Christian, a group which monopolized not only the administration but also the

¹⁷⁹ The background of this riot was believed to be religious since at the more or less same time, bombs were blasted on churches at Sabang Street (Central Jakarta) and at Karawang (West Java). The government, meanwhile, kept persuading people for not to get provoked by wicked campaign to confront Moslems and Christians See: . Analysis about religious conflicts in Indonesia can be seen in, among others:

¹⁸⁰ The conflict in Ambon was particularly concerning as this conflict continued for several years and was becoming an inter-religions conflict. This tragedy has been studied by many scholars and can be found in a big number of published books. The list of references about the Moluccas civil war can be consulted for example in <http://media.isnet.org> . In addition, the information involved in the analysis of this conflict was also based on the researcher’s direct involvement in conflict-resolution measures undertaken by the Indonesian government during the period of 1999-2001.

local army. Understanding the potential problems of such a concentration of Christians, Jakarta attempted to create an exact balance between Christians and Moslems in 1971. However, because of the 'transmigration' program propagated by the government during 1980s and differences in birth rate, Moslems constituted 57% of the population in 1991 (Klinken, 2001, p.12). Since that time, the Moslems have become more and more dominant in the provincial bureaucracy, holding three quarters of the 38 administrative stations in 1999 (Klinken, 2001, *Ibid*). There was often severe competition between Moslems and Christian when seeking jobs in government offices in the city, a situation which intensified in the period following the economic crisis (Klinken, 2001, p.10-11). The intensified social transformation since 1980s had also contributed to inter-community tensions. Local elites tried to use the (national) political parties to set up their domination as well as patronage networks. This provoked religious tension which reached its paroxysm in December 1998 when Protestant troops who had been defeated in the 'northern-Jakarta' war (cf. the Ketapang riot) were now returning to Ambon. All of these factors contributed to the Ambon civil war which started in January 1999.

The war in Ambon and surrounding islands continued until July 1999, when the victory of the PDIP (representing the Christian interests) at the provincial election triggered the second riot. In response to the ongoing pressures on Muslims in Ambon, thousands of people from various Islamist organizations gathered in Jakarta demanding that President Abdurrahman Wahid (who was also the Leader of the NU-Traditional Islamist) take immediate measures to give more protection to Moslems in Moluccas. It was mainly due to the fact that the government did not give an immediate response to this demand that from May 2000 radical Moslem groups undertook unilateral action. Around 6000 members of the Islamic armed militia labelled *Laskar Jihad* (the Jihadist) from Java were sent to Moluccas, bringing more complexity to the troubled island (See: Kompas, 2000). The massive arrival of *Laskar Jihad* changed the 'balance of power'. The Christian group was now in a defensive position (Klinken, 2001, p. 20-23), and at the conflict now looked like it would last for a longer time. Meanwhile, there were also sporadic conflicts in proxy islands such as Seram, Saparua and Buru. In March 2001, around 1,500 representatives of Moslems and Christians met to discuss the reconciliation and to accept a certain number of local traditions and habits adapted to their differences

(*The Jakarta Post*, 2001b). The conflict decreased significantly by 2001, but serious tension remained until 2002.

5. Civil war in Halmahera (Northern Moluccas)

The social conflict in the northern part of the Moluccas Island was no less violent. It erupted in August 1999 with the creation of Halmahera as an administrative region by the central government. The source of conflict was quite clearly that Halmahera was a district where the Moslems¹⁸¹ were dominant, with the reforms being directly aimed at influencing the provincial elections to be held by June 2000 and therefore rejected by certain groups within the province. Clashes between Protestants, supported by the Sultan (local king) of Ternate, and Moslems led to some deaths. However, when the Makian Moslems in Halmahera expelled the Christians from Ternate and Tidore (two regions of Halmahera) in October 1999, the number of casualties grew rapidly. In December 1999, Protestants troops launched an attack on villages populated by Makian Moslems and massacred hundreds (Kearney, 2001, p.5-7). These atrocities could only cause more reprisals against Protestants not only within Halmahera but also in other regions of the archipelago. In June 1999, Moslem combatants ransacked a Christian village killing more than 100 villagers. Elsewhere, riots burst simultaneously in Sumatra, Kalimantan, Poso, Ujung Pandang and Western Java (Klinken, 2001, *Ibid*)¹⁸².

6. The East Timor Crisis

East Timor was a 'game' that had to be played by Indonesia. As partly analysed in previous chapter (see: chapter 3), Habibie's regime began to play this game in 1998 by offering to the people of East Timor a referendum of 'self-determination', a decision mainly based on the argument that East Timor was of great significance for Indonesia while issues related to the status of this territory were important for Indonesia's diplomacy. In fact, by organizing the popular consultation, Habibie (as

¹⁸¹ The majority of Moslems who reside in Halmahera were migrants from Makian Island, a small island nearby.

¹⁸² The Habibie's administration considered the increase of violence in the country within this period was not a coincidence. In certain region such as Moluccas, the social setting was favourable for religious tension and conflicts but elsewhere like in the northern Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Poso, the social landscape tend to negate any possibilities of conflicts that can be related to religious issues. There is therefore a strong suspicion that the spreading social conflicts during this period were 'engineered' by certain parties with the objective of weakening the regime (Based on the researcher's personal knowledge).

well as the majority of Indonesian elites) was of the belief that the vote would produce a result favourable to national integration, thus confirming the status of the troubled territory as an Indonesian province. For Habibie, such a possibility would amplify his personal prestige at an opportune time: the presidential election was looming, and his regime faced a crisis of legitimacy. Even if the referendum favoured the independence of the territory, Habibie believed that this still would give him advantageous external supports. By making such a rational calculation, the president had enormously underestimated the internal opposition to the independence of Timor. Like the United Nations, the third party deeply involved in the process of the referendum, Habibie had taken an 'expensive' option in terms of human lives.

General Wiranto, as well as the majority of the army generals, opposed the popular consultation proposed by Habibie. The army had fought the guerrillas in Timor for 25 years and had lost thousands of men. This produced a profound resistance to the independence of Timor, and the military chiefs were also fearful of the domino theory that the 'independence' concession on the East Timor would encourage secessionist movements in Aceh and Papua¹⁸³. In fact, the army had its proper interests in the game.

The Indonesian army had significant financial independence. It was mainly because the government's budget for the defence covered only around a quarter of the total required for its regular operation. Unlike military chiefs elsewhere in the world, Indonesian generals would rarely ask for increases in the defence budget. This was because the Indonesian military, especially the army, were involved in the economic activities in Jakarta and other regions, including East Timor. Therefore, a few weeks before Habibie launched the idea of a popular consultation for the Timorese, the commanders of army were alarmed. While Habibie regarded the vote as the best way for Indonesia to get rid of its diplomatic burdens and the economic crisis, the army, on the other hand, regarded East Timor as a strategic battlefield and a gold mine. Wiranto thus announced a rapid response on behalf of the military.

¹⁸³ In fact, the fear of domino effect was over-estimated as there were important differences between the three most alarming provinces of Indonesia, especially for the independence of Aceh and Papua was unlikely to happen. Different from Aceh and Papua which were colonized by the Dutch, the East Timor had been a Portuguese colony until 1974. While the United Nations (the representative of the international community) recognized the integration of Papua to Indonesia in 1965, it has never approved the Indonesian annexation of the East Timor in 1975.

Wiranto discreetly established a new military unit within a government's official Taskforce later known as *Satuan Tugas Pelaksana Penentuan Pendapat di Timor-Timur*—Taskforce on Referendum at the East Timor (P3TT). Even though this taskforce officially had no offensive objectives, it had capacities exceeding any military operations in the occupied territory. To direct the P3TT, Wiranto chose general Zacky Anwar Makarim, who was famous of his involvement in secret military operations since 1970s¹⁸⁴.

The nomination of Makarim coincided with the period when paramilitaries in Indonesia were particularly a trend. From Jakarta's point of view, the militias were organized militarily to secure the special session of General Assembly to be organized on November 1998 and at the same time as a less-risky alternative to establish social order following the May 1998 riots (See: chapter 8). As Makarim took his assignment at Dili (the capital city of the East Timor), the existence of the paramilitary groups was still relevant as Makarim launched a program to increase the involvement of pro-Indonesia armed militia in East Timor (Kingsbury, 2000, p.70). This military program was never a secret. Colonel Tono Suratman, the commandant of the East Timor military zone, indicated to journalists at the beginning of December 1998 that his troops would recruit five to ten volunteers in each village to be used as civil militia to fight the guerrilla fighters. According to Suratman, it was the will of the villagers, expressed through their local representatives, that the military form the militia in order to defend their villages (Sydney Morning Herald, 1998). In addition, Suratman denied that the Indonesian military would arm these militias by saying that if they were to carry firearms, it would be on their own initiative (Sydney Morning Herald, 1998). At a later time, Wiranto rejected any implication of military involvement in the armed militia, saying that the paramilitaries in the East Timor had developed spontaneously¹⁸⁵. However, a certain number of members of the militia

¹⁸⁴ Informations about Major General Zacky Anwar Makarim, See: <http://www.yayasanhak.minihub.org/mot/cons92z%20-%20Zacky%20Makarim.htm>

¹⁸⁵ Wiranto's denials about the involvement of the Indonesian military in the supports on the pro-Indonesia paramilitaries had harmed the credibility of the general at the international level as, in fact, the Indonesian soldiers had employed the paramilitaries in the East Timor since more than a decade. In 1999. This was clearly indicated by the number of personnel in these paramilitary forces—approximately 6000 civilian Timorese had been recruited to give an ardent support for the East Timor's integration to Indonesia. See: SUAEDY, A. (1998) *Premanisme Politik*, Jakarta, Institut Studi Arus Informasi., p. 128-129

and the chiefs of the pro-Indonesia groups admitted to have received weapons and finance from the Indonesian military¹⁸⁶.

On April 4 in Liquica town, a known pro-Indonesian militia under the banner of *Besi Merah Putih* (red and white steel) killed five people. Officers in Jakarta denied that the security forces were implied (Agence France Presse, 1999). As Jakarta promised to hold an investigation, reactions followed. Xanana Gusmao, the leader of the Fretilin, declared that the Indonesian army would undertake every single effort to prevent the vote and that the People of the East Timor would never have a chance of self-determination (Suaedy, 1998, p.135). He threatened to launch a armed campaign if the United Nations did not set up a guarantor of peace in the territory (Suaedy, 1998, *ibid*). Gusmao had succeeded in alerting the international community to the gravity of the situation in East Timor, and the United Nations then obtained a commitment from Wiranto that the Indonesian army would disarm the militia (ANTARA, 1999).

In the following days, Gusmao faced a new adversary: Eurico Guterres, the leader of *Besi Merah Putih* militia. Guterres attracted attention for a virulent speech that he gave in Dili on April 17, 1998. In front of thousands of sympathizers and defenders of integration with Indonesia, he declared "*From this day, I order all the pro-integration militia to lead a complete clean-up against the traitors of the integration, to capture and kill them*" (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1999b). Within hours of speech, the militia of Aitarak attacked the house of an important figure of the independence movement, Manuel Carrascalo, whose brother had been a popular governor in the 1980s (Asian Wallstreet Journal, 1999).

Another incident caused by the Aitarak militia also broke out on August 17. This left five dead among the freedom fighters in Dili and produced significant consequences. Immediately, Habibie and Wiranto were contacted by the Prime Minister of Japan, Keizo Obuchi, the American Foreign Minister and the Secretary of Defense, as well

¹⁸⁶ See, for example: FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW (1999a) Indonesian Military Looks Set to Sour Independence Plans. *Far Eastern Economic Review*. 18 February 1999 ed. Hongkong, THE ECONOMIST (1999) Crossbows and Guns in East Timor. 13 February 1999 ed. London, The Economist Newspaper Ltd. THE WASHINGTON POST (1999) Residents of East Timor Weigh Independence Autonomy. *The Washington Post*. 14 February 1999 ed. Washington D.C.

as the Foreign Minister of Australia, Alexander Downer¹⁸⁷. The United Nations secretary general Kofi Annan also emphasized the need for the Indonesian security forces to restore the law and order in Timor. Finally, a few days before the vote, Wiranto recalled Makarim to Jakarta. Wiranto also dismissed the commander of the zone of Maliana, Lieutenant colonel Burhanudin Siagian (Sydney Morning Herald, 1999).

On the day of voting, observers predicted attacks by the militia on voters in the polling stations. Some attacks in fact occurred; of particular note was the open fire by the militia on a polling station which was visited by the US ambassador, Stapleton Roy (Klinken, 2000, p.64). Apart from this incident, the overall process of the vote was peaceful, confirming the Indonesian military's promise to 'discipline' the militias. A new wave of disorder, however, started again soon after the votes were counted. Ninety eight percent of the enlisted voters made it to the polling stations, and the majority of them voted for Timorese independence. Even before the counting process finished, the chiefs of pro-Indonesian militias had denounced the poll as unjust. The (pro-Jakarta) governor of the East Timor, Jose Abilio Soares, also blamed the United Nations Mission on the East Timor (UNAMET) for having given incentive to hatred and violence amongst the Timorese (Suara Pembaruan, 1999). It was because of this disappointment that the violent actions of the pro-Indonesian militias were now aimed to local officers of the UNAMET. The militias took some UNAMET officers hostage in the zone of Ermera and killed three of them (Klinken, 2000, *Ibid*). A similar hatred against the UNAMET spread quickly across the East Timor territory and forced all the officers of UNAMET and journalists to withdraw to Dili (Klinken, 2000, p.65). In Maliana, the militia opened fire and burned houses. The capital Dili itself became chaotic with militia wandering in the streets, blocking transportation, burning houses and attacking the United Nations' symbols and public facilities¹⁸⁸.

¹⁸⁷ Some information was based on the researcher's personal knowledge gathered during his affiliation into the Indonesian president's office in 1999.

¹⁸⁸ Resumed from various sources

7. Separatism in Aceh

The feeling of being exploited (economically) combined with a strong sentiment of 'local-nationalism' since the end of 1980s had produced resistance amongst the Acehnese to the authority of Jakarta. During the period of national revolution (1945-1949), the Acehnese supported the Indonesian nationalist movement with the expectation that an independent Indonesian state would show more respect to the Acehnese's local tradition and aspiration (Kell, 1995, p.8-10). The pursuit of national interests had led to a neglect of local aspirations, including those of the Acehnese, by the center. The desires of the Acehnese (which tended to be the Shari'a-like) were not fulfilled by the secular-Indonesian state. As a consequence, the relationship between Jakarta and Aceh since 1949 has tended to be tense and even violent¹⁸⁹. In 1953, a separatist movement was established in Aceh under the banner of Darul Islam, symbolising the unresolved disappointment amongst the leaders of local *santris* (devout Moslems). Responding to this 'separatist' development, Jakarta tried to cut off the separatists' link with the Acehnese by making Aceh a semi-autonomous province in 1957 (Peoesponegoro, 1992, p.361). Two years later, Jakarta made a further concession to the province by assigning it the new status of *Daerah Istimewa Aceh*—Special Region of Aceh— giving a high degree of freedom to the region in term of religion, common law and education. Most of the Acehnese welcomed this policy and praised Jakarta even more when Suharto took steps combat communism in the mid-1960s¹⁹⁰. Suharto's economic policies and authoritarianism during the 1970s and 1980s, however, had caused a new form of resentment amongst the Acehnese. The most significant complaint was related to the exploitation of the enormous stock of natural gas in the province which the Acehnese saw as providing a profit to Jakarta but not to the Acehnese. This dissatisfaction was mainly focused on the *Zona Industri Lhokseumawe* – the Industrial Zone of Lhokseumawe (ZILS) – created by Jakarta at the beginning of the 1970s to facilitate the exploitation of oil and gas in the area. In fact, the industrial zone had brought about significant destruction of Aceh's environment during the first decade of its operation. Apart from

¹⁸⁹ An excellent reference about Jakarta-Aceh relationship since the early independent period, See: REID, A. (2006) *Verandah of Violence: The Background of the Aceh Problem*, Singapore, National University of Singapore Press.

¹⁹⁰ The communists had been the biggest rival of the Islamists in the Indonesian politics since the period of revolution. As the majority of the Acehnese were Moslems, Suharto's strike against the communist was regarded by the Acehnese as the state's favour to the Islamists.

this, the zone was regarded by the Acehnese as having created an economic enslavement of the local people as the majority of labourers involved in this zone were imported from other provinces. Combined with large scale pollution and the exhaustion of Aceh forest resources, all of these dissatisfactions ended up producing Acehnese resistance (Kell, 1995, p.13-16).

In 1976, Hassan Tiro, a former delegate of Darul Islam, created the Front Pembebasan Aceh-Sumatra—the Front of Aceh-Sumatra Liberation, the embryo of the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka—Aceh Liberation Movement (GAM) (Aspinall, 2002, p.19). As this separatist movement started to attack the members of Indonesian military in 1998, Suharto responded by deploying six thousand troops from the Army's Strategic Reserve (Kostrad) and from the special forces until mid-1990 (Aspinall, 2002, p.11). This offensive measure continued until 1998, when the province was placed under the status of *Daerah Operasi Militer*—The military operations are (DOM) (Kell, 1995, p.74-75).

Even though sporadic attacks from the GAM remained frequent, it can be said that by the end of 1991, the Indonesian forces had crushed the rebellion. The relations between the Acehnese and Jakarta, however, remained tense, especially due to humanitarian issues arising during the military operation period (Aspinall, 2002). It was only in 1998, following the collapse of Suharto regime, that the reconciliation between Jakarta and Aceh seemed possible. In August 1998, the army ceased military operations in Aceh and withdrew its non-regular forces, including of the Special Forces, from the territory (The Jakarta Post, 1999a). All these efforts, however, did not relieve the resentments of the Acehnese. In November 1998, the GAM launched terror attacks against local government officials and military members. This situation forced Jakarta to re-deploy a new wave of military strike (The Jakarta Post, 1999b). In spite of the promise from Habibie that Jakarta would send only troops strictly following procedures of human rights, atrocities continued. Of particular salience was the murder of a religious teacher and his 57 pupils in July 1999. By mid-1999, violent incidents between the GAM and the Indonesian military had created more than 100,000 refugees (Sukma, 2001, p.390). Disappointed with Jakarta, most of the Acehnese boycotted the elections of June 1999.

8. Rebellious Movement in Papua

At the other end of the archipelago, in Papua, Indonesia was also troubled by a persistent separatist movement similar to that which revolted in Aceh.

Inclinations toward secession in this province had started when the Dutch authorities had prevented New Guinea from joining Indonesia in 1949. Based on Sukarno's claim in 1945 that the Indonesian territory includes the land and the water in *East Indische* (the ex-Dutch colony in the Southeast Asia), the majority of the Indonesian nationalists at that time were of the opinion that the territory legitimately belonged to Indonesia. Sukarno then launched a military operation aimed at liberating Papua in 1962¹⁹¹.

The Indonesian military-political campaign against the continuous control of this territory by the Netherlands had to face diplomatic interposition from the United States. This continued until an agreement between the conflicting parties was reached in 1962 that the territory would be transferred under the UN's authority in October of that year (Van der Veur, 1961, p.54-55). Six months later, on May 1963, the status of the territory changed to 'protectorate' under UN jurisdiction. This status was to remain in place until 1969, when 'The Act of Self-Determination' would confirm Papua as the integral part of Indonesia (Van der Veur, 1961, p.56).

Meanwhile, the local political leaders unilaterally declared the independence of Western New Guinea (Papua) in 1961 by denying the legitimacy of United Nations' process. Since 1963, hence the Indonesian government consider the supporters of the 1961 declaration of independence as irredentist. Even though there were frequent armed incidents between the separatists and the Indonesian military, the agitations were well controlled by Suharto's regime. After the fall of the New Order in 1998, however, they began to reappear and intensify.

¹⁹¹ The crisis began in 1959 (see: the next section). For a comprehensive history of this military operation, See: VAN DER KROEF, J. (1961) Nasution, Sukarno, and the West New Guinean Dispute. *Asian Survey*, Vol. 1 No. 6 (August 1961). For further history about the relations between Indonesia, Papua, and the Dutch, See: LIJPHART, A. (1961) The Indonesian Image of West Irian. *Asian Survey*, Vol 1. No. 5 (July 1961).

9. Secessionist movement in Riau

The increase of political freedom in Indonesia since 1998 had led to the expression of dissatisfaction in certain provinces. Especially in Riau, the discontent even inclined towards secessionism. The complaints among inhabitants of Riau were mainly related to the exploitation of natural resources in the province. Riau is one of the richest provinces in Indonesia due to its forest resources and reserves of oil and gas. Further, two of Indonesia's largest industrial zones, Batam and Bintan, were located in this province, and its geographical proximity to Singapore should also have been an economic advantage. Like Aceh, though, these natural blessings¹⁹² do not prevent almost half of the population from living under the poverty-line (The Jakarta Post, 2001). From the beginning of 1999, the demands from local activists increased, exceeding the special autonomy which had been offered by the central government. Some demanded greater autonomy within a federal state; others wanted full independence¹⁹³. Blockades of oil reservoirs and tourist sites as well as anti-Chinese riots and attacks against migrants from other provinces spread until 2004 (The Jakarta Post, 2004, Menon, 2001). However, despite intensive secessionist propaganda in the province, there is little evidence of the existence of active armed groups.

¹⁹² To show the significance of Riau to the Indonesian economy, the production of oil in the area contribute to 14% of national GDP. See: BULLETIN (2008) Laporan Utama. *Bulletin*. October 2008 ed. Jakarta, BPMigas.

¹⁹³ See for example: RAB, T. (1999) *Menuju Riau Berdaulat: Penjarahan Minyak Riau*, Pekanbaru, Yayasan Penerbit Sosial Budaya Riau.

CHAPTER SIX:

DEALING WITH POLITICAL DISORDERS: DEGREE OF SUCCESS

The previous chapter analysed political order in the sense of difficulties faced by the Indonesian regimes of four versions of state machinery. This chapter will analyse the same topic with different emphasize: the degree of success. The attention, therefore, will be focused on measures undertaken by the regimes when facing the challenges while the overall argument is based on presumption that national and international systems function in such a way as to continuously reinforce each other. "*Politics everywhere,are related to politics everywhere else. Where the functioning of any political unit was once sustained by structures within its boundaries, now the roots of its political life can be traced to remote corners of the globe*" (Rosenau, 1969).

Following this postulate, the Indonesian regimes' effort to maintain order is assumed to have correlations with external factors while 'order' will not be treated only as the outcome of a regime's policy, but also as a kind of self-adaptation to its environment.

6.1. Version I: Post-colonial dealing with disorder

To partly sum up what was elaborated in the previous chapters, disorders and instability during the period of parliamentary democracy stemmed mainly from three factors: 1) the complexities resulting from the uncertain political situation at both the domestic and international levels; 2) the disagreement amongst elites as well as social groups on the issue of state ideology, which ultimately produced political tensions and rebellious movements from orthodox Islamist, and; 3) the tense competition between political elites and the inability of civilian leaders to control the military. Facing these challenges, the parliamentary government and President Sukarno applied measures aimed mainly at solving the on-going problems and more particularly to unify the elements of the nation by, among others: 1) creating Revolution ideology in addition to the *Pantjasila* and; 2) launching direct strikes against rebels.

Creating a 'unifying' ideology

At least until 1957, political life in Indonesia was dominated by the theory and practice of revolution. During this period, the republic had marched forward and sought to transform society by a complete political, economic, and social reordering (See: Kahin, 1952). At the same time, the founding fathers of the new republic were engaged in an act of nation building, for which an ideology was always crucial. However, this quest by the state for an ideology was obviously much more complex than had been predicted. Even though the *Pantjasila* was accepted as the ideology of the state, it was not enough to unite the nation, especially since the majority of subjects (the Islamists) were in favour of the *Shari'a* (See: chapter 2). Meanwhile, Sukarno was fully aware that his charismatic leadership meant a majority of the Indonesian people would obey him while in reality he had less significant political power within the parliamentary system. The fact on his charismatic popularity hence gave Sukarno a kind of confidence to engage in a bold political experiment while the existing political system also gave him more incentives to impose his charismatic leadership. Sukarno then connected the revolutionary tendency of Indonesian politics with his project of nation-building, creating a 'supplementary' ideology labelled as 'Continuous Revolution'. Thus, in addition to his position as the head of state, Sukarno styled himself as 'The great leader of the Indonesian revolution' (See: Legge, 1972, chapter 12).

In Sukarno's term, however, the revolutionary ideology did not have exactly the same meaning as that of the generally-accepted definition of revolution, despite the flexibility of the word¹⁹⁴. According to Sukarno, Indonesian Revolution was the political-economic process that would culminate in a modern Indonesian society, the goal of which was not so different from other revolutionary ideologies elsewhere in the world. The uniqueness of Sukarno's ideology was mainly related to the means by which this goal was to be achieved. For Sukarno, the essence of revolution is confrontation, as he said in one occasion "*Oleh karena kita berada pada masa revolusi, kita harus menerapkan konfrontasi guna menghancurkan tatanan lama dan*

¹⁹⁴ Carl J. Friedrich, for instance, remarked that there are features of revolutions going far beyond the strictly political dimensions ".....*the creative and spiritual aspirations, involving values and beliefs*", See: FRIEDRICH, C. J. (1966) An Introductory Note on Revolution. IN FRIEDRICH, C. J. (Ed.) *Revolution: NOMOS VIII*. New York, Atherton Press., p.4

membangun tatanan baru. Dalam konfrontasi tersebut, kita akan memiliki musuh baik di dalam maupun di luar yang ingin mempertahankan tatanan lama. Dengan kata lain, akan ada benturan antara tatanan lama dan tatanan baru atau antara the New Emerging Forces (NEFO) dan the Old Established Forces (OLDEFO) ---Since we are in a revolution, we should launch a confrontation to destroy the old order and create a new order. In launching a confrontation, we will have enemies at home and abroad who want to preserve the old order. In the broader sense of the word, there will be a collision between the old and the new forces or between the new emerging forces (NEFO) and the old established forces (OLDEFO)"(Sukarno, 1963)¹⁹⁵.

To emphasize the 'significance' of his leadership in the revolution, Sukarno's position was affirmed by his statement at another occasion "*Tanamkan, wahai rakyat Indonesia, tanamkan di dalam hati and pikiran kalian—Sebuah revolusi hanya akan berjalan dan berakhir semestinya apabila ada satu pemimpin revolusi yang revolusioner, satu ideology dan konsep nasional yaitu revolusioner, jelas, tegas, and terinci*"---"Implant it, oh People of Indonesia, implant it in your hearts and minds—a revolution can proceed and end properly only if there is one revolutionary leadership for the revolution; one national ideology and concept which is revolutionary, clear, firm, and detailed" (Sukarno, 1960a). Under Sukarno's leadership, the Indonesians often shouted bravely to the world '*Ever Onward ! Never Retreat !*' (Suryadinata, 1997, p.116).

This ideology relied upon the popular/mass support for effective, centralized leadership¹⁹⁶. On many occasions, Sukarno emphasized that the inspiration for revolution had its source in the aspiration of the people, for whom he acted as '*Pemegang Amanah Penderitaan Rakyat*—The carrier of the people's suffering

¹⁹⁵ According to Sukarno's 'theory', the two groups, NEFO and OLDEFO, were mutually antagonistic. Their irreconcilability and the inevitable future conflict in which ultimate victory will be gained by the NEFO were the principal theme of the extensive view of international relations. These symbols were used by Sukarno as a doctrine to explain and justify Indonesia's place in the world and the role of its leadership. However, this theory was imperfectly articulated and internally inconsistent—as if to vent the frustrations of the domestic revolutionary process, Sukarno's regime took militant and aggressive steps to give substance to the ideology (See: 'Diverting internal conflicts towards external enemies'—later sub-section).

¹⁹⁶ This explains why Sukarno chose PKI as one amongst main pillars to support his power—because PKI is a mass-base political party with wide popular support.

(AMPERA)¹⁹⁷. By saying this, Sukarno tried to convince the Indonesian people of his commitment to address the physical, material, political, economic, social, cultural, and mental suffering which had been forced on them by centuries of imperial oppression and later from sectarian interests in the period of independence. The task of the revolution, according to Sukarno, was to alleviate the suffering by destroying the old order and create a new order of political, economic, and social justice for a people with a new confidence and identity¹⁹⁸. However, from Sukarno's perspective, the people's suffering was inarticulate; the people were incapable of translating their suffering into concrete demands, their aspirations into revolutionary program, or their discontent into action. This made leadership necessary (See: Legge, 1972, chapter 12). This was Sukarno's self-determined role: the spokesman of the people charged with articulating their suffering. Citing Anderson's remark, "One well-known solution was Sukarno's claim that he was the *Penyambung Lidah Rakyat*—literally, "the extension of people's tongue' perhaps more concisely, *vox populi*" (Anderson, 1990, p.62)

In this ideology, the revolution was therefore conceived to be the locus of sovereignty to which everyone, including Sukarno, was subject. As Sukarno said:

"Thus the political-economic-social ordering (the revolution) is actually the main power—the highest holder of power—of our national life. Every person, every citizen, every group, yes everything that lives on the soil of Indonesia, should be subordinated to the authority of this highest power.....It is clear that the highest authority is a person, not the President, not the Government, not a council, but a concept of life which animates our revolution. In brief, and to put it simply, everything that is the ideal of the 1945 revolution, that is the highest authority, that is the highest power, that is the Tjakrawati (*cakravartin*)—the

¹⁹⁷ Sukarno's statement that he was the carrier of the people's suffering was found in his speech in 1960. See: SUKARNO (1960b) *Nasionalisme Kita adalah Nasionalisme Amanat Penderitaan Rakyat* (An Address before the Congress of Murba Party at Bandung, December 15, 1960). Jakarta, Departemen Penerangan RI.

¹⁹⁸ This was the essential element of Sukarno's thought later known as *Marhaenism*. For Sukarno, *Marhaenism* should be the ideology of people who had been impoverished by the colonial system, imperialism, feudalism, and capitalism. To understand *Marhaenism*, according to Sukarno, requires knowledge of the Indonesian situation and knowledge of Marxism. In many occasion Sukarno emphasized the importance of understanding Marxism before understanding *Marhaenism*, so that it can be assumed that *Marhaenism* was a modified-type of Marxism or Marxism which was adjusted to the Indonesian situation. See: LEIFER, M. (2001) *Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Southeast Asia*. Taylor & Francis.

highest ruler). That is what we must put into practice, that is what we must be loyal to, and that is what we must serve. We must direct and subordinate all the layers of our national life to the realization of the ideals of the revolution. And whoever refuses to be directed there, or whoever does not want to be subordinated, is an obstructor of the revolution" (Sukarno, 1959)¹⁹⁹.

The Indonesian revolution, then, was not without purpose. The next question is 'how can that purpose be achieved?' Or, borrowing Sukarno's term, how can the message of the people's suffering be answered?

Since Sukarno's ideology encompassed the aspirations of all living within the Indonesian territory and was 'congruent' with the conscience of the Indonesian people, these objectives could only be achieved in a utopian and idealistic way. However, Sukarno came up with an impressive formulation answering all queries. This was labelled the 'Framework of the Revolution' and consisted of:

1. The establishment of a State of the Republic of Indonesia with the structural form of a Unitary State, which is democratic, with a territory under its authority stretching from Sabang to Merauke (from the western tip of Sumatra to the eastern border of West Irian);
2. The establishment of a society which is just and prosperous, materially as well as spiritually, within the bounds of that Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia;
3. The establishment of good friendship between the Republic of Indonesia and all the states of the world, in the very first place of all with the states of Asia-Africa, upon the basis of mutual respect, and upon the basis of cooperation to create a New World free from imperialism and colonialism marching towards perfect World Peace. (The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1961)²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁹ Text as printed in 'The Political Manifesto' (MANIPOL), THE INDONESIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1961) Toward Freedom and the Dignity of Man. Jakarta.

²⁰⁰ Based on Sukarno's Speech 'MANIPOL', the original version is SUKARNO (1959) Menemukan Kembali Jalan Revolusi Kita. Address on the Indonesian Independence Day Celebration, 17 August 1959 ed.

The ultimate result was therefore easy to predict. This framework became the main reference (guidelines) for the regime's approach and policies, and since the defense of the state and revolution was given the highest priority, the ideology would simultaneously justify Sukarno's offensive efforts to maintain order in the face of threats from rebels and dissidents, including orthodox Islamists (See: the next section). Externally, the guidelines contributed to the formulation of an aggressive foreign policy towards Western-capitalist countries, which were regarded as imperialist powers. Sukarno's ideology of revolution obliged his regime to struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism but, in fact, was Sukarno's strategy to maintain order through the creation of common enemies²⁰¹. This position partly explains the regime's confrontational policies in West Irian and with Malaysia, which will be elaborated upon below.

Direct strikes against rebels

The efforts to maintain order by the parliamentary government was also undertaken through military operations against rebels. Since 1945, Indonesia has been the site of a number attempts to change the government or the ideology of the state by forcible means, most being motivated by the same thing: ideology. While there have been a small number of rebellious movements driven by concrete disagreements with government conduct or policy (such as the rebellion of Captain Andi Aziz, KNIL/Westerling troops rebellions, and PRRI/Permesta—The United Republic of Indonesia), the vast majority were purely ideological. These ideological rebellions involved the Communist Party (the Madiun Affair of 1948 and the *coup d'état* of 1965) and the Islamists (Darul Islam, the Islamic state of Indonesia, Amir Fatah, the Troops of the Islamic Community, the 426 Battalion, The Troops of Islamic Community, Kahar Muzakkar, the Islamic Kingdom, the Islamic State of Aceh, and so on). Facing these internal threats to stability, Sukarno often stressed the importance of national unity in the multicultural setting of the Indonesian society²⁰² while promising democratic settlements to disputes (See: chapter 2 and 3). However, not all of these measures produced a peaceful resolution between the government

²⁰¹ Sukarno's famous term for Western-capitalist countries were NEKOLIM—which stands for Neo-colonialism.

²⁰² Especially towards the Islamist leaders, Sukarno was always confronting them with the fact that, although the large majority of the Indonesian population (about ninety percent of the total) is Muslim, a considerable proportion is fairly lax in the discharge of its religious duties and is decidedly in favour of a secular over an Islamic state.

and the rebels and created even further hatred amongst the Islamists. This explains the continuous military operations²⁰³ during the later regime under Sukarno's presidential monarchy.

6.2. Version II: Sukarno's Martial Approach

When Sukarno declared martial law through presidential decree of 1959, maintaining order through violent military operations had been standard response to dissidents hence does not need to be elaborated further in this section despite its significance. Meanwhile, the domestic political circumstances was too complicated (see: chapter 3, section 3.3) hence Sukarno arrived to a conclusion that common enemies are required to overcome the prolonging domestic disorders.

Diverting internal conflicts toward external enemies: West Irian and Malaysia

The West Irian (Papua) was an unfinished project, left over since the 1949 settlement of the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. The future of West Irian, therefore, had been a bone of contention between the Dutch and Indonesia since the agreement, the status of which was yet to be determined by negotiations between the two countries (See: Van Der Kroef, 1958). Since each party had a different interpretation of the terms of agreement – following each party's own interests – disputes over the territory become a stumbling block to harmonious relations between the countries throughout the 1950s, a time during which Indonesia experienced strong nationalist sentiment and intense competition between elites and masses. All the elements of the realm were united in demanding the last remnant of the Dutch's East Indische's colony be ceded to the new republic (Feith, 1962, p.155-164). Sukarno and his radical nationalist allies saw this problem as central in 'uniting' the nation, using the pretext of the 'completion of the revolution'. For Sukarno, the resolution of the problem through a revolution would also bring about pride among the Indonesian people; this would increase his charismatic legitimacy (See: chapter 3). In the second half of the 1950s, therefore, this issue become a major source of political conflict and agitation, leading in the foreign policy sphere to deteriorating relations

²⁰³ The details about these military operations can be traced, for example, in VAN DIJK, C. (1981) *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam : the Darul Islam in Indonesia*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff.; HARSONO, G. (1985) *Cakrawala Politik Era Sukarno*, Jakarta, Inti Idayu Press.

with the Netherlands and a more anti-Western orientation by the Indonesian government (Feith, 1962, 450-456).

This campaign started to become hostile in 1960 and reached its height in 1961. In August 1960, Indonesian diplomatic relations with the Dutch were cut off, and by the end of the year the Indonesian army entered west Irian, marking a new stage in the conflict. In January 1961, an arms purchasing mission to Moscow led by Defense Minister General Nasution concluded with 400 million dollars worth of modern military equipment for the West Irian campaign and the promise of further aid of a similar kind (Pauker, 1961, p.13-22).

This result was decisive for Sukarno and his project of national unity but in fact proved a disappointment for the army. As analysed in chapter 3 and 4, the political system during Sukarno's reign was built on a competitive coalition of the army, the communists and Sukarno himself as the balancer. For the army, the commitment of assistance from the Soviet Union would push Indonesia closer to the communist orbit, a situation likely to strengthen the position of its internal rival. In fact, Army leaders wanted Indonesia to be within the Western orbit (in order to minimize the communist influence) and had struggled to persuade the American government to meet Indonesia's needs for modern weapons and training. In 1960, Nasution and other generals had repeatedly attempted to obtain aid from Washington but without much success. America's suspicions of Sukarno's motives and ties to Holland under the NATO treaty not to aid Indonesia's bid to oust the Dutch from West Irian (Pauker, 1961, *Ibid*).

The change of American leadership altered the conflict between the Dutch and Indonesia over West Irian. In January 1961, John F. Kennedy became the new American president and immediately showed himself to be more concerned than his predecessor about the importance of Indonesia to America's strategic foreign policy position. As marked by Schlesinger "*The President regarded Indonesia, this country of a hundred million people, so rich in oil, tin, and rubber, as one of the potentially significant nations of Asia. He was anxious to slow up its drift towards the Communist bloc; he knew that Sukarno was already turning to Moscow to get the military equipment necessary for invasion. And he was also anxious to strengthen*

the anti-communist forces, especially the army, in order to make sure that if anything happened to Sukarno, the powerful Indonesian Communist Party would not inherit the country" (Schlesinger Jr., 1965, p.464). Such a concern was visible in Kennedy's decision in February 1961 to send United States representatives to the opening of the New Guinea Council, a new legislative body regarded by the Dutch as a landmark in their policy of granting 'self-determination' to the people of West Irian (Van Der Kroef, 1963, p.129-130). For Indonesia as well as for the Dutch, this decision was clearly signalled a shift in American policies from impartiality on the issue toward an active intervention favourable to Indonesia's interests. However, in April 1961, Sukarno ordered the Indonesian Armed Forces to prepare a military plan for the 'forced' liberation of the West Irian, putting pressure on Nasution and other army leaders who were opposed to a major military effort²⁰⁴. In this situation, it was clear that the power and ultimate choice was completely in Sukarno's hands, for Indonesia finally took offensive action through the deployment of troops to the territory. Meanwhile, the Dutch forced another UN debate on the issue²⁰⁵. This bold move by Sukarno is the major piece of evidence for our argument that Sukarno had ulterior motives for his military operation in the West Irian: the national unity and prestige project so significant to his charisma. If we analyse Sukarno's approach more deeply, we can see that he should have been well aware that his aggressive actions had the potential to change Washington's opinion. Even though it can be speculated that a serious armed clash between the Dutch and Indonesia may precipitate American moves for a settlement of the problem, an offensive attack amidst an on-going peaceful settlement would normally be seen rather negatively by the international community. In addition, Indonesian aggression would quite possibly create nationalist sentiment amongst the West Irian people, being further encouraged by Dutch promotion of self government for West Irian. Finally, the spreading rebellious movements across the archipelago and the domestic economic situation in 1961 should have been a clear sign that Indonesia was in no situation for a military operation against the Dutch in the West Irian. However, Sukarno's regime's efforts to maintain order and the continuous project of national unity at all cost. It was fortunate for Indonesia that after a difficult negotiation in the United Nations (partly by

²⁰⁴ Nasution had not only urged caution so far as hostilities were concerned but had also taken a personal hand in several initiatives to settle the dispute peacefully--See: VAN DER KROEF, J. (1963) *The West New Guinea Settlement: Its Origins and Implications*. *Orbis*, Vol VII, No.1 (Spring 1963)., *Ibid*.

²⁰⁵ For the full account of the UN debate, See; *Ibid.*, p.134-136

virtue of Kennedy's diplomacy), any further military action could be avoided. The problem of West Irian was solved peacefully through a referendum, the result of which favoured Indonesian interests.

In the aftermath of the successful campaign in West Irian, it appeared that the Sukarno regime might return their attention to the task of economic stabilization and development, as this had been the major concern outside and within the country (See: chapter 3). The United States, especially, had been intent on encouraging Indonesia to take such measures which, it believed, would promote stability in Indonesia, combat Russian influence, and undercut the appeal of the communism (Bunnel, 1969, p.60-148)²⁰⁶.

The PKI Leaders were well aware of what was developing. From the time that serious negotiations on the issue of the West Irian had been initiated, they began to worry that the United States mediation would mean a significant threat to the existence of Communist ideology in the Indonesian political system. The PKI, therefore, warned Sukarno that the United States' aid was linked to neo-colonialist plans to dominate the Indonesian economy and promote the interests of reactionaries among the political elites (The US Government, 1963, p.58-61). In the strategic calculation of the communist leaders, once the right wing policy course had been set in, there would be no certainty of when it would end. From the ideological perspective, meanwhile, the PKI and its socialist approach would tend to be neglected, since such neglect would be considered 'necessary' to reassure Western powers and foreign investors²⁰⁷. With powerful enemies anxious to block its future growth and with martial law still in force, the PKI's position was under serious threat if President Sukarno decided to sacrifice the party for the sake of national economic rehabilitation²⁰⁸. As the result, the competition between the Army and the

²⁰⁶ In 1961, President Kennedy sent a delegation led by Professor D.D. Humprey with the mission of looking into Indonesia's needs, and after the investigation the team had issued a report recommending United States' assistance of between \$200 million and \$235 million, together with multinational finance to the order of \$125-155 million, See: THE US GOVERNMENT (1963) Indonesia: Perspectives and Proposals for United States' Economic Aid: A Report to the President of the United States. Southeast Asian Studies, Yale University.

²⁰⁷ This argument was proven correct when Suharto launched exactly the same strategy. See: chapter 3 sub-section 3.3 "Suharto's claim to performance Legitimacy".

²⁰⁸ It is therefore worth speculating that the formation of NASAKOM (Nationalist-Islamist-Communist) cabinet in 1962-1963 was part of this scenario, for this cabinet was in fact a new coalition that

Communists became more intense, which left Sukarno in a difficult position. On one side, he would need the aid of the capitalist bloc, as the people had endured too much suffering due to Indonesia's dire economic situation. In addition, Sukarno would need total commitment from the army, especially to suppress rebellious guerrillas in the country. Receiving Western aid, however, raised a significant possibility of a splitting of his coalition, with Sukarno's main pillar – the PKI – being likely to break away.

Amidst this delicate situation, a revolt broke out in Brunei in 1962 followed by the formation of Malaysia Federation by the British authority. Presumably, President Sukarno was in two minds about how far Indonesia should react to this development at her front door, and for sure, he was conflicted over the relative importance of economic stabilization and maintaining his coalition. Obviously, Sukarno chose the latter for a new confrontation would always be a golden opportunity for him to divert conflicts at the domestic level. At the very least, the army and the PKI would forget for a while their conflicts and maintain loyalty to Sukarno. This choice was signalled by Subandrio, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the 20th of January, when he said that the Indonesian position on the Malaya Federation was one of confrontation, and that learning from Indonesian confrontation in West Irian, there would be a calculated shift from diplomatic to economic or even military pressures against the proposed Federation (Indonesian Herald, 1963). On February 13, Sukarno expressed an anti-Malaysian attitude in a speech. He said that the proposed federation was a neo-colonialist enterprise intended to encircle Indonesia and expressed his support of the struggle of the people of North Kalimantan (Bunnel, 1969, p. 287). At the same time, Sukarno demonstrated that stabilization had no strong hold over his affections (Bunnel, 1969, *ibid*). In response to the action of the International Olympic Committee in suspending Indonesia for its exclusion of Israel and Taiwan from the Asian Games, Sukarno announced an ambitious and inevitably expensive plan to organize a Games of the New Emerging Forces later in the year as a rival sports festival to the Olympics (Bunnel, 1969, p.287-297). As expected, the support for confrontation appeared widely across the country. People were inspired by the spirit of revolution, which was had imperialism and neo-colonialism as its targets. By 1963,

included the Islamist group which was known to be the eternal enemy of the PKI. The logic was, facing the pro-Western army, the PKI would need strong allies while the Islamists were the only available alternative.

the masses created paramilitary units ready for physical confrontation with Malaysia, with the slogan 'Ganyang Malaysia'—Swallow Malaysia—becoming popular²⁰⁹.

This evidence may be used to investigate Sukarno's motives. According to Bunnell, Sukarno's motives were multiple. In his words, "*While Sukarno ultimately envisioned Indonesia supplanting the British—and the Americans—as the dominant influence in the region, his short term goal seems to have been to harass and humiliate the British in the hopes of not only expediting their withdrawal but magnifying Indonesia's (Sukarno's) importance in the eyes of his own people. For apart from the political benefits from twisting the lion's tail, Sukarno saw himself engaged in the most fundamental task of national-building—sowing self-respect and national feeling*" (Bunnell, 1969, p.499). Whatever the external motivation behind the confrontation²¹⁰, what was certain is that by launching an aggressive campaign against Malaysia, Sukarno was able to divert conflict at the domestic level towards a common external enemy, just as he did with his similar campaign in West Irian. The final result was that order was preserved along with his other 'agenda' at the domestic level.

6.3. Version III: Maintaining order through power consolidation

In chapter three, it was argued that Suharto had learned from Sukarno's quest for legitimacy, so that this former army general sought a different form of legitimacy through a different strategy from that of Sukarno. Similarly, it seems that had also learned from Sukarno's experience in his quest to maintain order and stability, again applying a different strategy. At this time, Suharto was of the belief that the capacity of the state was the key answer to the intensive disorders within the archipelago. Increasing the state's capacity was therefore among the top priorities of his regime which was pursued through a series of measures, starting from economic development.

²⁰⁹ The story about people's reaction to the Malaysia confrontation in 1963 can be traced in TUCK, C. (2004) Borneo 1963-66: Counter-insurgency Operations and War Termination. *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol 15, No 3, Winter 2004.

²¹⁰ For other interpretations of Sukarno's and Indonesia's motives in confrontation, See: GORDON, B., K. (1963-1964) The Potential for Indonesian Expansion. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XXXVI No.4 (Winter 1963-1964), p378-393; GORDON (1966) *The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia*, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall., chapter 3; HINDLEY, D. (1964) Indonesia's Confrontation of Malaysia. *Asian Survey*, Vol. IV No.6 (June 1964), p.904-913; KAHIN, G. M. (1964b) Malaysia and Indonesia. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XXXVII No.3 (Fall 1964), p253-270

At the beginning of Suharto's rule (1966), a strong public aspiration towards economic modernization emerged. The public's expectations of the new regime were expressed in the popular slogan '*Ekonomi Sebagai Panglima*'---the economy first. The main argument was that economic development was the only possible means to realize the hope of the people who had been suffering and who had long been dreaming of an economic re-establishment²¹¹. That the economic sector must be the first and the main task of the new regime, hence, was presumably the consensus amongst the elites as well as the majority of the people within the realm. It was partly due to this aspiration that the New Order then adopted capitalism and created economic development programmes to realize to people's dream.

This wide consensus, however, was not firm enough. The partially-implemented economic modernization programmes revealed negative impacts to certain segments of society, especially the *Pribumi*—local/indigenous economic actors²¹². From Suharto's strategic perspective, this development was politically risky, especially as he anticipated the general election that had been envisaged by the (provisional) National Assembly on July 5, 1968²¹³. Facing the risk, Suharto had two available alternatives: (1) to establish a coalition with one or more political parties able to help him mobilize supports from the people or; (2) to reform the constitution and create a new consensus which was supported by the *Pribumi*.

The first option required Suharto to make more concessions to political parties by giving them wider freedom to mobilize the support from the people and to let them compete in the election. If this arrangement worked out, Suharto's regime would benefit from a kind of popular legitimacy. In addition, if this alternative was supported by the army, a co-operation between the civilian elites and soldiers based on democratic participation was also possible. For Suharto to realize his target, two

²¹¹ As was analysed in chapter 3, Sukarno's emphasis on political development in his quest for charismatic legitimacy had neglected the economy and brought Indonesia into the state of bankruptcy (See: Sukarno's charismatic legitimacy, chapter 3).

²¹² The debate on the issue of *Pribumi versus Non-Pribumi* had always been dominant during the second half of 1960s. See, for example: SIDDIQUE, S. & SURYADINATA, L. (1981-1982) Bumiputra and Pribumi: Economic Nationalism (Indiginism) in Malaysia and Indonesia. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 54 No.4 (Winter 1981-1982).

²¹³ For some reasons, the election was delayed until 1971.

major political parties would be potential allies: the NU (which gained massive support from the Islamists), and the PNI (which was defended mainly by the bureaucrats and nationalist groups).

However, a different argument may have led Suharto to reject this alternative. The fact that the two main political parties, due to their political platforms, would tend to defend the *Pribumi's* interests at all cost²¹⁴ would make impossible the implementation of capitalist-style economic policies (the economic policy 'towards external'—will be analysed in the later section). Indeed, the success of national economic development and the high level of growth were already perceptible with the assistance of the capitalist countries, especially the United States and Japan. A justified speculation was that the regime could not rely too much on the *Pribumi*, so that Suharto would not really need, at least in the short term, to seek support from them as well as from the existing political parties. In other words, to choose *Pribumi* and political parties as allies in Suharto's coalition would involve the risks to the capitalist-style development programmes that had already been planned. In addition, there were fundamental problems which would need to be solved by Suharto before such an alliance could be realized, since there were still loyal defenders of Sukarno within the NU and PNI leaderships²¹⁵.

These considerations were enough to push Suharto towards the second alternative: restoring a new consensus through the manipulation of the constitution. For Suharto, this option was simpler and less risky, especially because the articles of the 1945 Constitution are in general less detailed and more flexible, which provided ample enough space for re-interpretations. In other words, Suharto tried to manipulate the constitution, using it as legal backup for the policies being designed to give maximum support to his economic development programmes, and at same time to counter any opposition that could interfere with the implementation of the programmes.

²¹⁴ About the dynamics and political parties during the period preceding the 1971 general election, See: LIDDLE, R. W. (Ed.) (1973b) *Political participation in Modern Indonesia*, New Haven, Yale University Press.

²¹⁵ On political circumstance and dynamics among political parties during this period, See, for example: GREGORY, A. (1976) *Recruitment and Factional Patterns of the Indonesian Political Elite*. Columbia University. Information about Sukarno's defenders in the elites of the NU and the PNI especially can be found in pages 586-588

This strategy first manifested itself with the establishment of a controllable political system in order to create political stability, the condition considered most essential to the implementation of an effective economic program. These measures can be separated into steps: (1) to create an ideology which legitimated the capitalist-style development programmes and the role of the army in politics, and; (2) to set up new political structures which were easier to control.

The New regime understood that an ideology was pivotal for any political system, as it would give not only the basis to the State but would also legitimate the state's objectives as well as the means to achieve them. As Liddle said:

“...Ideology has a number of uses: it provides a map of social reality, distinguishing important from unimportant determinant of human behaviour, explaining how the past shaped the present and how the present might shape the future; to the extent that its explanation of the past and present and its vision of the future conform to the aspirations of a significant segment of the politically active (or activable public), it confers legitimacy upon its formulators and proponents; it contains or can prescribe a course of action designed to attain the desired future; and, of course, it may in varying degrees, and more or less consciously, provide a cover for a politics of personal or group interest and ambition” (Liddle, 1973a, p.177).

Suharto had decided that prosperity through economic development was one of his regime's main objectives. This objective, meanwhile, required a wide consensus amongst the people, and in this case, ideology would be an effective way of unifying people behind the state. Based on this belief, Suharto then introduced an ideology called *Ideologi pembangunan*—the ideology of development—which was based on pragmatism, rationalism and internationalism. The root of this ideology was in the thought of Indonesian intellectuals trained in Western countries during 1940s and 1950s whose concepts and principles regarding modernity were neglected by Sukarno during the previous regime. Among these intellectuals were Muhammad Hatta, Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, and Sutan Sjahrir. Amongst the most explored by Suharto was the thought of Sjahrir, who argued that the ultimate objective of the Indonesian government should be the creation an economy based on industry and a

welfare state based on democratic principles (Liddle, 1973a, p.179). Starting from this postulate, Sjahrir believed that “...*the ultimate objective that he sought for Indonesia---an industrialized economy, an egalitarian society, and an activist welfare state founded on democratic principle*” (Liddle, 1973a, *Ibid*) ; This pragmatism gave him the conviction that the achievement of this goal would require the support of “...*the already industrialized West...with which he was therefore prepared to cooperate*” (Liddle, 1973a, *Ibid*).

Finally, in order to assure the support from the army on the implementation of these intellectual thoughts, the ideology of ‘dual-function’ which justified the military role in politics and had been adopted by previous regime was re-affirmed (see; chapter 4).

The next stage was to create a political structure which was able to control all elements of the society. This effort was undertaken through certain measures such as the following:

1. Control on bureaucracy

One of the main issues confronted by the New Order was how the programs of the government could be applied in an effective way across the Indonesian territory. The answer at which the regime arrived was the creation of an effective bureaucracy capable of delivering public services as well as imposing the power of the central government. Meanwhile, the bureaucracy inherited from the previous regime was too bloated, ineffective, poorly paid and corrupt (Legge, 1957, p.61-62). In addition, during the reign of Sukarno, the bureaucracy had often become the arena of competition amongst politicians (See: chapter 3). For the New Order, therefore, it was natural that the reform of the bureaucracy was given priority.

This reform was aimed at transferring the government’s authority to the highest level of the bureaucracy, which meant the centralization of the decision-making process. It was also aimed at creating an effective bureaucracy specially designed to transfer orders from the center (top-down). Finally, the bureaucracy would be used as an effective machine to impose the authority of the center and to control the peripheries (Maryanof, 1959, chapter VI).

The first measure was taken by centralizing all of the important policies of the government through the creation of the *Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara*—State's Guidelines (GBHN), *Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun*—Five-yearly plan of the national development (Repelita) and *Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara*—State Annual Budget (APBN). All these administrative but political-tools would serve to centralize the mobilisation and allocation of the state's resources (Jakti, 1981, p.133).

The second measure consisted of positioning technocrats and army personnel in strategic positions. Since the creation of the Cabinet Pembangunan I in 1968, the majority of the departments and government institutions had been occupied by officers of the army and civilian technocrats (general inspector, general secretary and managing director). Less important posts were allocated to members of political parties²¹⁶.

The third measure undertaken by the New Order was placing pro-Jakarta figures as governors and mayors in provinces and districts. In 1968, for example, 68% of the Indonesian provincial governors and 59% of district mayors were retired or active army officers (Tinker and Walker, 1973, p.104).

2. Consolidation of the Army

Another problem that had to be resolved by the regime was the conflict between the factions within the Army as well as the competition between the three forces (the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force). As was analysed in chapters 3 and 4, the dissensions were politically used by Sukarno to prevent the over-growing influence of the Army which may threaten his regime and it was therefore in his interest that conflict remained. Soon after assuming power with the title of 'president-in-charge' in 1967, Suharto realized that these conflicts must cease, and he gradually applied resolutions by establishing the unification within the Army through: (1) the dismissal of army officers who were considered as leftist and disobedient; (2) the transfer of

²¹⁶ On the composition of the cabinet and ministries in this period, See: KEMENTERIAN PENERANGAN RI (1970) *Susunan Kabinet Republik Indonesia 1945-1970*. Djakarta, Pradnja Paramita.

factions' leaders away from Jakarta or by assigning them new posts within the Indonesian embassies in foreign countries, or even by assigning less important posts in the civil administration; (3) the usage of the institutions and military traditions to channel criticisms and divergent opinions; (4) giving favourable treatment to the military factions who defend Suharto; (5) the alteration of the military hierarchy.²¹⁷

The reforms were applied to all three forces (the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces) which were then unified through the creation of a single military academy and the suppression of the Ministry of Army (See: chapter 4). At the same time, Suharto announced a guideline which was to unify the three forces and the national police force under a single command (Sundhaussen, 1972, p.57).

All these changes conferred the entire power of the military forces on Suharto as he was now in control of the minister of defence while Suharto (the now-president-in-charge) himself was also the *Panglima Tertinggi TNI*---the commander-in-chief of the Indonesian military.

3. Control on Legislative

Since the time Sukarno dissolved the Parliament resulting from the general elections of 1955, there was no independent and critical legislative power in Indonesia until the fall of Suharto in 1998. Thus, when Sukarno established the Parliament *Gotong Royong* (DPR-GR) and the Provisional National Assembly (MPRS), the political system was dominated by the president, with the executive controlling the legislature in many ways. In a typical situation, the Parliament would be considerably in favour of the executive institutions and would tend to obey the latter. This practice was reinforced when Suharto dismissed certain members of the parliament (the partisans of Sukarno and those who had affiliations with communist) and replaced them with his 'puppets'. The situation, however, considerably changed when certain members of Parliament saw the fall of *Orde Lama* as a golden opportunity to restore the power of the Parliament and free it from the domination of executive. Suharto certainly saw

²¹⁷ Analysed and summarized based on various sources. A comprehensive reference, See: CROUCH, H. (1978) *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press., especially chapter 9

this inclination as a threat to his centralized power, prompting him to take a series of measures²¹⁸ by:

- introducing the 'List System' as the mechanism of the legislative election;
- increasing the number of Parliamentary membership from 347 to 460;
- creating a new law that gave privilege to the government--that the government has the right to nominate 100 members of Parliament (of which 75 seats were allocated to the Army, and 25 seats for the civil servants);
- giving to the members of the Indonesian military the 'right to vote' in the general election planned to be held on March 27, 1968.

On the 27th of March 1968, the provisional National Assembly officially endorsed Suharto as the second president of the Republic of Indonesia. This latest development meant Suharto had considerably more power to implement his programmes and in particular to make Parliament his 'wished' institution. Suharto then introduced the 'recall' mechanism, through which the leaders of political parties were given authority to 'discipline' their members whenever they were considered disloyal to the party's direction. At the practical level, the executive used this mechanism to control the behaviour of the members of the Parliament. As the result, the Parliament was under the government's control.

4. Moderation of the Party System

For the New Order, it was quite clear that the majority of the political parties in Indonesia since 1945 were ideology-oriented and tended to neglect the platform/program. The government, therefore, could not rely on them in implementing its development program. Moreover, Suharto had decided to use the constitutional framework by launching political reforms within which the political system was based on 'controllable' electoral participation. In brief, the political parties were useful, but they should not threaten the economic program of the government. Later, Suharto announced another strategy of creating political groupings within the Parliament whose members were made up of non-party

²¹⁸ From various sources. The particular reference is SAMSUDDIN (Ed.) (1972) *Sari Berita dan Pendapat: Pemilihan Umum 1971*, Jakarta, Lembaga Pendidikan dan Konsultasi Pers.

politicians. The result of this strategy was the creation of corporatist representatives in the parliament followed by a reduction in the number of political parties through a forced consolidation (Ward, 1974, p.10).

This reform started with the reorganization of *Sekretariat Bersama Golkar*--General Secretariat of Golkar (Sekber Golkar). In chapter 3, it was explained how Sukarno had established the Guided-Democracy with the Army, Sukarno, and the communists as the competing pillars. Since October 20, 1967, this coalition was managed by *Sekber Golkar* but excluded Sukarno and the communists (Pratigny, 1974, p.155). The new organization was now supported by 7 social and professional organizations: Kosgoro, MKGR, SOKSI, Ormas Hankam (veterans and members of family of the Army), Gakari (bureaucrats grouping and civil servant), Karya Profesi (professional body) and Karya Pembangunan (Nishihara, 1972, p.19). Even though this organization did not form itself as a political party, during the period of the New Order this organization and its satellites had become a very effective machine for Suharto to impose his influence across the Indonesian territory. This success was mainly due to the fact that the organization had maximum support and facilities of the government, and especially due to the law which prohibits civil servants from becoming members of political parties (the mono loyalty principle of the Indonesian civil servants and their families)²¹⁹. Finally, the nomination of army officers as officials within the *Sekber Golkar* and within every strategic post in the executive branch was also a major factor in the success of the *Sekber Golkar*.

The creation of this 'political party'²²⁰ was then followed by the establishment of corporatist groupings who then become 'satellites' within the Golkar's network. The objective was to control the representation of interest groups and at the same to prevent those groups' engagement in social conflicts. In fact, these corporatist organizations were also used by the government to support its policies and

²¹⁹ This Law obliged all civil servants to quit from any political parties to which they previously affiliated and then join into the Sekber Golkar. See: KEMENTRIAN DALAM NEGERI RI (1970) Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri (The Regulation of the Minister of Internal Affairs) No. 12/1969., and INDONESIA GOVERNMENT (1970) Peraturan pemerintah (Government's Law) No. 6/1970. Jakarta.

²²⁰ The role of the Sekber Golkar was similar to that of political party but the New Order government insisted that Golkar was not a political party. Instead, in the government's argument, Golkar was a functional organization that overrides the interests of all elements of the society which is different from political parties, which represent sectarian interests.

programmes. As a bonus, this strategy had taken the political parties away from their potential sympathizers.

The first target was the civil servants. In 1966, the ministry for internal affairs created a single organization in his department and developed the monopoly of representation of the ministry into the body. After the 1971 general elections, this organization led to the appearance of another organization which was now much larger in term of size and included the civil servants of all departments, government institutions, and state enterprises in its membership: The Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia—Indonsian Civil Servants Association (KORPRI).

The next target was trade unions and labour associations. Since 1950, political parties were generally mass-organizations, like labour associations and trade unions, the number of which more or less matched that of political parties (Sukarno, 1980, p.5). In 1973, when nine political parties were reorganized and forced by the government to fuse into two new parties, these labour associations and trade unions lost their patron organizations. This situation was politically beneficial to the government, but the new parties could not be co-opted by the Golkar. For the interest of Suharto, a meeting was held on February 20, 1973 to establish a new trade union named *Federasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia—the Federation of Indonesian labour* (FBSI). In March 1974 the government recognized this new organization as the only trade union in Indonesia and forced all companies operating in Indonesia to create branches of the FBSI in their offices and required membership of all their employees. Under the direction of the government, the FBSI was able to control the movements and political behaviour of labour. This meant that the creation of FBSI had suppressed any potential conflicts between social classes without the need to adopt the theory of Karl Marx.

The next targets were the social groupings within the business and professional sectors. In 1971, the government established *Kamar Dagang dan Industri—The Chamber of Commerce and Industry* (KADIN) aimed at organizing the employers' syndicates which were now playing the role of mediators between their members and the government. The state's corporatism was also manifested in *Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia—Indonesian Journalists Union* (PWI), *Majelis Ulama*

Indonesia—Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), *Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia*—Indonesian National Youth Committee (KNPI), *Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia*—Indonesian Farmers Union (HKTI), *Himpunan Nelayan Seluruh Indonesia*—Indonesian Fishermen Union (HNSI), *Konggres Wanita Indonesia*—Indonesian Women Congress (KOWANI) and so on.

The strategy of controlling political parties in Indonesia had actually been used by the previous regime. In 1960, Sukarno reduced the number of political parties from 25 to 10, each representing an element of Indonesian society: the nationalists (PNI, Partindo, IKPI), the Islamists (NU, PSII, Perti), the Christians (Parkindo, Catholic Party) and the Marxists (PKI, Murba). Following the change of regime in 1966, the PKI was removed from the Indonesian political landscape. These nine parties took part in the general elections of 1971. In February 1971, Suharto organized a meeting with the leaders of the nine parties to discuss the government's upcoming plan to reduce the number of the political parties and to unify them within two groups. This meeting led to the creation of two groups within the Parliament: (1) The group of *Demokrasi Pembangunan* (Democracy of Development) being composed by the PNI, IPKI, Murba, Parkindo, and of the Catholic Party and; (2) The group of *Persatuan Pembangunan* (Union of Development) being composed by NU, Parmusi, PSII, and Perti (Murtopo, 1974, p.74-76). More pressure was placed on political parties after the general election of 1971. After suffering significant losses in the election while being under intensive pressure from the government, the nine parties now had no choice but to amalgamate into two 'pre-designed' parties. In January 1973, the groups which represented Islamists aspirations amalgamated into the *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*—the Development Union Party (PPP) while the groups which represented the aspirations nationalists and Christians amalgamated into the *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*—the Indonesian Democratic party (PDI) (Murtopo, 1974, p.77). From this moment on, Indonesia had only two political parties, the PDI and the PPP, plus a functional organization, Golkar, which took part elections.

In this type of party system, control of political parties operates through a number of mechanisms. The first mechanism is the 'Recall', by which the leaders of the political parties can at any time impose a disciplinary action on their members of parliament.

The other control mechanism is applied through the manipulation of direction/party guidelines, which obliged the parliamentary candidates of political parties to first obtain the 'green light' from the government. There was also obvious intervention by the government at political parties' congresses aimed at preventing dissensions from parties' leadership. This meant certain figures who tended not to cooperate with the government were usually disqualified. Finally, the government prevented the political parties from organizing their activities outside the set political campaign periods, which were several days in every five years.

5. To reinforce the prerogative of the president

The new order felt that it was necessary to establish an effective government. Motivated mainly by the existence of major constraints at the beginning of the regime's establishment as well as the absence of an effective bureaucracy essential for an economic transformation, Suharto arrived at the conclusion that he would need a small, unified and reliable group to help him make and apply policies and decisions. In 1966, Suharto transferred the *Panitia Sosial Politik*---the Committee of Social and Politics---from the Army headquarters to the office of the President (Mas'oed, 1989, p.177). This commission, established in 1965, was initially designed to support the war against the Communists. Functioning just like a political 'think-thank', its operation seemed to be democratic, with policies and strategies decided through discussion and debates amongst the army generals. Suharto interacted with other generals in this committee when he was an Army commander, and he therefore saw the potential of this group to perform more or less the same function of creating policies and strategies in his presidential palace, but now on a wider scale. Placing this Committee in his office also placed it under his direct command. However, there was no mention of this committee in the Indonesian constitution and thus nothing giving it legal legitimacy to perform on behalf of the state. Because this kind of commission was extra-state, Suharto classified the members of this commission as *Asisten Pribadi*---personal assistants (Aspri). However, in 1974 Suharto started to regard *Aspri* as counter-productive, especially after a number of demonstrations broke out during 1973 and 1974. The protests were mainly concerned with the corruption in Suharto's regime, the rise of foreign domination on

the economy, the economic growth without significant development, and so on²²¹. It was at this point that Suharto showed his skill as a tactician. He reorganized the *Aspri*, transforming it into a ministry which was part of the cabinet. However, this ministry was different from others in the cabinet as it was not in charge of any particular departmental area, but instead acted as the center of coordination which was powerful but politically independent. In fact, this ministry was a 'machine' by which the president controlled the various elements of political system that he established²²².

Winning international support

From Suharto's point of view, Indonesia could endure the crisis and recover only with political stability at the domestic level (possible through internal power consolidation) with significant external supports. This would be achieved through the adoption of an open foreign policy.

To explore the most effective development strategy in accordance with open foreign policy, a seminar was organized in Jakarta on May 1966 with the theme of *Kebangkitan Angkatan 66: Menjelajahi Traces Baru* (Resurrection of the generation of 1966: to explore new ways). This produced a number of recommendations for change in the orientation of the Indonesian foreign policy. These recommendations included centering Indonesian foreign policy around:

- resolving economic problems at the domestic level;
- ending irrational economically nationalist practices and prestige-oriented policies such as the nationalization policies, the politics of confrontation with neighbouring countries, and the radical revolutionary foreign politics of New Emerging Forces (NEFO);
- launching the peaceful resolution of the conflict with Malaysia;

²²¹ The Indonesian political and social circumstances during the years of 1973 and 1974 can be found in many studies, among others: CROUCH, H. (1974) *The 15 January Affairs in Indonesia. Dyason House Paper*. August 1974 ed., p.1-5; MCDONALD, H. (1980) *Suharto's Indonesia*, Melbourne, Fontana & Collines., p.135-136

²²² This machine is the Ministry of State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia, being confirmed as part of the Cabinet through the INDONESIA (1973) Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia (Presidential Decree) No. 30/1972 and No.15/1973. Some information related to the *Panitia Sosial Politik*, the *Aspri* and the Ministry of State Secretariat is based on the researcher's personal knowledge--as his affiliation to this institution.

- re-establishing Indonesia's membership of the United Nations and their institutions, and;
- restoring Indonesian adhesion in the other international organizations for the sake of the national economic modernization (Universitas Indonesia, 1966).

The government of the New Order positively responded to these recommendations by announcing its new policies which gave significant incentives to creditors, in particular Japan and Western countries. The government also stated that it would adopt an open foreign policy with those countries which were, for the most part, non-socialist²²³. Presumably, Suharto strongly believed that these non-socialist countries would offer their unqualified support to Indonesia, since Indonesia had previously combated communism at the domestic level without significant assistance from capitalist countries. This optimism was particularly strong because at the global level during the second half of 1960s, the ideological competition between the socialist and the capitalist blocks was reaching its culminating point. This can be seen, for example, in a statement by an Indonesian army officer after his visit to the American Congress in September 1966:

“Bagi para pengamat, pendekatan mereka sulit dimengerti karena anggapan yang tidak dinyatakan tetapi mendasar bahwa Indonesia terlalu vital bagi kepentingan Amerika dan Barat untuk dibiarkan larut dalam kekacauan, menyiratkan bahwa Negara-negara lain pasti akan datang untuk menyelamatkannya. Orang-orang militer tersebut mungkin juga telah menyampaikan perasaan, baik langsung atau tidak langsung, bahwa sementara Amerika telah menghabiskan berjuta-juta dollar untuk membunuh orang-orang komunis di Vietnam, orang-orang Indonesia telah membunuh ratusan ribu komunist di negaranya sendiri tanpa sepeserpun bantuan dari Amerika. Dalam arti tersebut, Amerika berhutang pada Indonesia satu atau dua milyar dollar dalam bantuan luar negeri” (Mas'oed, 1989, p.72)—For many observers, their approach might seem difficult to understand because there was a significant but implicit opinion that leaving Indonesia in a prolonged chaos was too risky for the American and Western countries' interests. It signifies that these countries will certainly come to save her. These military people might have also

²²³ Indonesian economic diplomacy during this period was analysed comprehensively by Sullivan. See: SULLIVAN, J. (1969) *The United States and the New Order in Indonesia*. The American University.

mentioned to the (American) Congress, directly or indirectly, that America had spent millions of dollars to kill a communist in Vietnam, while Indonesians had killed hundreds thousands of communist in her country. In this logic, America should have been indebted one or two billion dollars to Indonesia in the form of foreign aid (Researcher's translation on the text).

This sounds like an example of cynical frankness. Apart from this presumption, there was also an opposing view that the chance of Indonesia obtaining support from the international community was not as high as had been estimated by the first group²²⁴. Despite the second group's agreement on the significance of the United States, the Western countries, Japan and international institutions (such as the IMF and the World Bank) to the Indonesian economy, they saw danger in over-estimating the likelihood of external support. The group was particularly concerned by Sukarno radical policies during the previous years²²⁵ which, they thought, were too serious to be forgotten so quickly (Thomas and Panglaykim, 1973, *Ibid*). In addition, the American Congress began to debate the Indonesian regime's capacity to allocate the aid. Certain Congressmen were of the opinion that Indonesia would quickly waste the aid (Posthumus, 1971, p.13). Finally, the situation in 1966 was generally uncondusive to massive foreign assistance for the third world countries, especially for Indonesia which had previously scared off 'rare' foreign investors (Mas'oed, 1989, p.73).

These doubts, however, were countered by the announcement by Adam Malik (the Minister for Foreign Affairs) on April 4, 1966 that Indonesia would review its foreign policy and apply certain measures such as:

- Extending international cooperation with all nations and seeking to participate in the international activities in the various fields such as economic, social, and cultural.
- Restoring its membership within the international organizations, especially the United Nations and its institutions.

²²⁴ This argument was put forward, for example, by Soedjatmoko (Indonesian Ambassador for the United States in 1966). See: THOMAS, K. D. & PANGLAYKIM, J. (1973) *Indonesia: The Effect of Past Policies and President Suharto's Plans for the Future*, Canberra, CEDA., p.141-143.

²²⁵ In 1965 (a year earlier), the foreign creditors had been gotten rid of by Sukarno during his nationalization policy while, in 1966, Sukarno was virtually always a president even though the power of the state was in Suharto's hands.

- Undertaking peaceful conflict resolution with Malaysia (Kementrian Penerangan RI, 1966).

As the manifestation of this 'new approach' to foreign policy, the government sent missions to foreign countries with the main objective of reassuring the creditors of the New Order regime's commitment to its new orientation (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1966, p.519). Among these missions were: a delegation to the European countries directed by Umaryadi Nyotowiyono with the additional mission of debt rescheduling and obtaining new loans; a delegation to Japan directed by Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX with an identical objective; a mission to Malaysia in August 1966 to negotiate a peaceful agreement²²⁶; a mission to build a comprehensive relations with Singapore, and so on²²⁷.

International creditors responded positively to these missions. The mission of Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX obtained the Dutch's commitment to support Indonesia's membership within international institutions; the mission to Malaysia obtained peace with this country; the mission in Singapore obtained the resumption of the diplomatic relations between the two countries plus Singapore's commitment to back up Indonesia's economic development program by promising foreign investment; in April 1966, the United States granted assistance in the form of 50,000 tonnes of rice with the value of US\$ 9 million dollars plus another loan to purchase cotton valued of US\$ 10.5 million (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1967a, p.459); the Umaryadi mission also secured a new loan from Germany of 7.5 million dollars in the form of credit. Finally, Japan promised assistance of up to 30 million dollars (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1967b, p.222).

These commitments were significant but not yet optimal. The disadvantages were mainly in the economic commitments in the form of commercial loans which would in fact become a new burden for Indonesia in the future. In addition, the missions to Europe, America, and Japan did not achieve the debt-rescheduling goal or the new non-commercial loans. The United States, for example, fixed the interest rate at 4.9%, and Japan at 5.5% for their loans. In addition, the two countries required

²²⁶ On negotiations towards peaceful agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia, See: WEINSTEIN, B. (1969) *Indonesia Abandons Confrontation*, Ithaca, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project.

²²⁷ Discussions on these missions were elaborated in (Mas'Oed, 1989, chapter 3)

Indonesia to fulfil certain strict conditions, among which was the obligation to end economic assistance from the Soviet Union, the largest creditor for Indonesia during Sukarno's period (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1967a, p.460). Finally, these new creditors required certain improvements in domestic economic performance before realizing the promised assistance (Weinstein, 1976, p.232). No doubt, these were serious challenges for the New Order, as at the domestic level these had reinforced the public's commitment to economic nationalism (which was adopted by Sukarno during the previous regime). In a speech on the 1st of September 1966, Sukarno reminded his audience of the essential meaning of independence. He mentioned that being an independent state, Indonesia should *berdiri di atas kaki sendiri*--be independent—and that the economic rehabilitation should not be applied through 'mengemis'—begging—and 'mempermalukan diri sendiri'---self-humiliating (Sekretariat Negara RI, 1966). This challenge became even stronger when the Soviet Union and other communist countries refused to reschedule the debt as proposed by Indonesia. However, all these disappointments were quickly forgotten when the Minister for foreign affairs prevailed in his efforts to restore Indonesia's membership of the United Nations and its institutions. In addition, a long time later, two international financial institutions, the IMF and the World Bank, agreed to renew their aid programmes to Indonesia. The New Order's diplomatic efforts to seek external supports for its program of economic development intensified from that time on.

The peace agreement with Malaysia on August 11, 1966 was an important starting point for Indonesian diplomatic efforts. In a memorandum addressed to President Johnson, the American Secretary of State proposed US assistance in great quantity for Indonesia. This memorandum mentioned that there were positive signs in the Indonesian transition such as the peaceful resolution of her problems with Malaysia and especially the change in the orientation of Indonesian foreign policy after the end of Sukarno's reign. The memorandum recommended the restoration of bilateral economic relations with Indonesia, which had been 'low-profile' since the beginning of 1965²²⁸. This memorandum was then followed by the US government through the disbursement of a new assistance-package in the form of donation valued at US\$ 40

²²⁸ Cited from Sullivan's citation on New York Times, 27 August 1966. See: SULLIVAN, J. (1969) The United States and the New Order in Indonesia. The American University., *Ibid.*

million starting from 1966 (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1967a, p.136). On the 19th and 20th of September, 1966, a consortium of seven creditor-countries (the United States, England, France, West Germany, Italy, and Holland) plus non-creditor countries (Australia, Canada, the New Zealand, and Austria) together with the IMF organized a conference in Tokyo to comprehensively discuss the Indonesian problem (Sullivan, 1969, p.342). With an expectation that this conference would lead to a new commitment for Indonesia, Suharto sent a special mission who delivered a 'letter of intention' signed by Suharto, explaining that the new government would make the stabilization programme and economic rehabilitation as its first priority. This declaration detailed step by step measures to achieve these goals, such as the following:

1. To stimulate the market by granting opportunities to state enterprises and foreign companies;
2. To restore the balance between the incomes and the expenditure of the government;
3. To pursue a policy of strict management of credit and foreign exchange rates, and;
4. To establish harmonious relations with other nations and to promote international trade (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1966, p.11).

However, this conference did not live up to Indonesia's expectations. The creditors agreed to a rescheduling of the debt due between 1st of July, 1966 and December 31st, 1967 but they refused to give new loans. The reason behind this refusal was the Soviet Union's refusal to reschedule Indonesia's debt. Presumably, the new creditor countries were worried that the loans would be used by Indonesia to pay her debt to Russia (See: Heinz, 1967, p.136).

Nevertheless, in the later period, Indonesian efforts finally prevailed in gaining the confidence of the international financial institutions, of significant importance to the on-going economic program. This new commitment became manifest at the end of December 1966 when an IMF team came to Jakarta with information about Indonesia's real economic situation while offering an evaluation about the requirements for foreign assistance. The IMF also assisted Indonesian technocrats

in the formulation of the economic stabilization policies. Since the adhesion of Indonesia to the IMF in February 1967, this institution even placed a permanent representative in the Indonesian central bank to provide technical advice, especially within the framework of economic stabilization and rehabilitation programs (Tomasson, 1976, p.311-312). Since then, Indonesian economic policy was always dependent on the recommendations and warranty of the IMF through its *stand-by* agreement²²⁹.

Finally, the 'open door' strategy had obviously strengthened Indonesian position at the international forum. Being combined with the political stability at the domestic level and significant support from the international community (especially from Capitalist-countries), for three decades the Indonesian economy grew by an average of 7% per annum and the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) were significant²³⁰. Export growth was healthy and the balance of payments was secured and, if to be compared with other countries in the region, Indonesia had one of the lowest current account deficits and the highest ratios of international reserves, so that by the early 1990s the World Bank was calling it one of the East Asian "miracle" economies (Hill, 1998, p.94)

6.4. Version IV: Democratic consolidation

The fall of Suharto on May 1998 opened the way for democratization across the country. In chapter 3 (subchapter 3.5.) it has been analysed how the Habibie's administration, the first government since the fall of the New Order, tried to secure its legitimacy through the implementation of 'daring' policies such as granting independence to the press, releasing political prisoners, and reviewing the problem of East Timor. At the same time, the administration also started to implant democratic culture into the Indonesian political system by institutionalising just and

²²⁹ The standby agreement usually played a role as one of requirements to be fulfilled when Indonesia wanted to get a foreign loan or financial assistance. For the creditor, this agreement was more or less a warranty that Indonesian economic infrastructure and policies of the time were conducive enough for their investment/donation. See: GOLD, J. (1970) *The Stand-by Arrangements of the International Monetary Fund*, Washington., especially chapter 1

²³⁰ About the Indonesian economic performance during this period, see for example: HILL, H. (1998) *The Indonesian Economy: The Strange and Sudden Death of A Tiger*. IN FORRESTER, G. & MAY, R. J. (Eds.) *The Fall of Soeharto*. Bathurst, Crawford House., p.93-103kl

fair democratic election, enforcing Laws, and reforming the army while make it as a professional military which (according to democratic culture) is fully under civilian control (see: chapter 4). These efforts towards democratization keep rolling over, and being fortified from time to time during the later period under several governments led by three different presidents: Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Sukarnoputri, and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Order during presidential democracy period was, hence, parallel with the measures applied by the post-1998 regimes to establish democratic cultures within the republic. In addition to these, the regimes also implemented a policy which was designed to respond massive disorders caused by dissatisfaction amongst regions: decentralization policy.

Re-establishing order through larger regional autonomy

Efforts to develop the cause of decentralization in Indonesia have actually been put on trial long before 1999. In the earlier dates of the republic, some attempts to de-concentrate government functions were made to satisfy diverse needs of regions for example by the issuance of Laws 1 of 1945, Law 22 of 1948 and Law 1 of 1965 (See: Asanuma, 1999). In 1970's state showed more serious effort for decentralization by issuing Law 5 of 1974 that provided significant roles to local governments. This Law was part of the implementation of State Guidelines and Government Development Plan 1973-1978 but had never been followed by any governmental regulations for implementing it (Asanuma, 1999, *ibid*). In 1980s a limited commitment was made by decentralizing the provision of urban infrastructure to local governments. The level of the commitment was quite significant but this choice was made presumably because the central government alone would not be able to provide for the growing needs of rapidly growing urban areas at the time (?). In 1992, again, Suharto's government issued Government Regulation number 45 of 1992 to implement Law 5 of 1974, the regulation which devolved certain functions previously held by central government to the second level of local governments of *Kabupatens/Kotas* (Regencies/Municipals). This policy was later confirmed by the People Assembly as State Policy Guidelines, which is significant in term of principle as it was the first time that the government appeared to accept the "Fiscal Federalism" argument that public services could be more efficiently provided by local governments. Even a further regulation to this commitment was passed with the

issuance of Law 18 of 1997 which widened the tax power of local governments to enable them to discharge the certain functions to be transferred.

All those efforts did obviously not eliminate regional hatred to Jakarta that accumulated especially during the previous period of state machinery (version II and III) that the spreading disorder in the regions since 1998 were partly motivated by the regions' dissatisfaction against Jakarta such as in Riau, Central Kalimantan, Papua, Aceh, and East Timor (see: chapter 5). It is based on the belief that a bigger autonomy may ease the tension between the center and peripheries that in 1999, a serious effort to decentralize power is made, while commitments on its implementation are noteworthy. The Habibie government enacted two Laws that significantly committed to decentralize governmental functions and authorities in Indonesia: Law 22 of 1999 and Law 25 of 1999. The first devolves certain powers to local government and set up regional political processes in regions while the second supports such devolution of power by providing fiscal resources at the disposal of local governments.

6.5. Conclusion

During the early period of Independent Indonesia, nationalism and the unity of the archipelago were regarded as the first priority of the government, due to Indonesia's extreme diversity and the polarized aspirations amongst the country's elements. The intensive conflicts among those elements and the state's limited capacity to resolve comprehensively the disorders across the archipelago had left the parliamentary government and Sukarno in a difficult position. While the parliamentary government sequentially rise and fall, Sukarno played role as a 'balancer' within the sharp competition within the elites (Army, Communists, and Nationalists) and within the masses (Islamist, and Secularist), but in the later period Sukarno had to apply an 'Iron Fist' at the domestic level and pursue an aggressive foreign policy at the international level to divert the domestic conflicts to 'common enemies'. The reluctance of the Dutch to release its control over Papua had left Sukarno with opportunities to realize his strategy. A similar opportunity for Sukarno was available when the British planned to create the Malaya Federation, by virtue of which Sukarno was, again, successfully able to divert internal conflicts to an external

confrontation. Sukarno had even been successful in realizing one of his grand-strategies at the global level when he mobilized the third-world countries to join into the Non-Alignment movement. Even though Sukarno's regime ended with the state's bankruptcy and a violent coup d'état by one of the regime's main pillars (PKI), for a period of around 20 years Sukarno had been successful in maintaining 'limited' order, and especially in overcoming problems related to the state's existence.

Order and stability during the New Order period was maintained through power consolidation along two dimensions: internal and external. Suharto tightly controlled state power by eliminating the communist group, mobilizing the army behind him, and crushing the nationalist groups and political parties under his boots. To support the regime, Suharto manipulated the constitution and the political system at the domestic level, proposed a gradual 'capitalist' formula of economic development and, as a consequence, implemented the politics of cooperation at the systemic level. The regime sought relations with capitalist countries in particular, which guaranteed the financial assistance required to support Suharto's economic development programmes. As the result, the state had not only been able to maintain order and stability but had also gained further results: 1) conflict between political elites as well between social/communal groups were rare; 2) the state was adept in implementing 'authoritarian' control over its subjects and territory; 3) the exploitation and mobilization of resources were effective; 4) economic growth was significant; 5) national development was sustainable; 6) foreign relations were harmonious; 7) national unity was preserved; 8) support from the military was assured by virtue of the state's political and economic 'concessions' to the military; 9) relations between the center and peripheries were relatively stable but dominated by the center, and; 10) external pressures related to Indonesia such as the issue of East Timor were relatively "manageable" despite the absence of international recognition.

CHAPTER SEVEN:

PRE-DEMOCRATIC ORIGINS OF THE PRESENT VERSION OF THE STATE

1989 was a remarkable year in the world politics. The Berlin Wall came tumbling down and marked the end of the Cold War. There was an intense struggle for democracy in many parts of the Third World; sometimes resulting in real processes of democratization but sometimes, as in China, violently repressed. Most of this events I followed from the Asian horizon, travelling in China and especially in Indonesia (Uhlin, 1997, p.vii)

The testimony above comes from a book partly dedicated to the trend of democratization in Asia around the time when the book was published in 1997. In 1999, two years after Uhlin made this remark and ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, an obvious confirmation of the trend can be seen in Indonesia. A democratically significant popular vote ended 40 years of authoritarian rule. Indicators seen prior, during, and after the election were all favorable to democracy: while authoritarian constraints were absent, political parties were allowed to conduct nation-wide campaigns, regulations were made impartial, management was transparent, and contestants accepted the rules and procedures²³¹. Together, these factors indicate the fulfillment of democratic requirements with the exception that members of representative body (parliament) were only partly elected²³². This flaw, however, was compensated by further implementation of democratic principles during the two subsequent public participations: the elections of 2004 and 2009, which combined the indicators mentioned above with a parliament in which all members were elected through direct ballots²³³. Yet, the president and the vice-president, who used to be appointed by the National Assembly (MPR²³⁴), were now, due to the third amendment of state constitution of 11 November 1999, elected through a direct but separate popular suffrage. All of these changes took place within

²³¹ A comprehensive report on Indonesian 1999 Election, See: INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTION SYSTEM (2000) Republic of Indonesia: Report on the 7 June 1999 Parliamentary General Election and Recommendations for Electoral Reform. February 2000 ed. Washington DC, IFES.

²³² See: INDONESIA (1999b) Law Number 3/1999 on Election.

²³³ See: INDONESIA (2003) Law No.12/2003 on Election.; INDONESIA (2008) Law No.10/2008 on 'Pemilihan Umum Anggota DPR, DPD, dan DPRD'

²³⁴ A body comprising 695 members: 462 elected and 38 appointed members of parliament from the Indonesian Armed Forces plus 130 indirectly elected regional delegates and 65 appointed representatives of social groups. Up to 1999, this body had two key responsibilities: to enact state guidelines and to elect the President and vice president.

the framework of the constitution, virtually supported by the majority of the state's subjects; the transition was relatively peaceful and ultimately producing a legitimate democratic government. Indonesian statehood since 1999, hence, is believed to be approaching a mature democracy, in which the collective ruler's "right to issue commands" is acknowledged by the subjects of the polity.

Indonesian democracy did not stand in a vacuum or appears instantly like magic. It was started in 1998, the year which was then regarded as the third milestone in the history of the Indonesian state. The first milestone was 1945 when the long period of colonization and revolution ended with the appearance of the new state marked by a declaration of independence in that year (See: chapters 2 and 3). The second milestone was 1966, when a long period of economic crisis and intense political competition led the army to replace Sukarno and his political system. This was followed by the establishment of the *New Order* operating under a single regime led by Suharto (See: chapter 3). This last milestone emphasized by 'people power', and was followed by the emergence of several democratic 'regimes' living under the curious title of 'Reformers'.

In the shadow of these three milestones certain analytically interesting patterns can be identified. The first milestone saw Sukarno criticizing colonial political and economic policies, blaming the Dutch state for suffering and injustice amongst the inhabitants of the archipelago, using the blame as the seeds of nationalist sentiment and then manipulating and using them as materials to create a base for his charismatic legitimacy (see: chapter 3, section 3.2). Obviously, these materials were also used by Sukarno as the main reference determinant to the orientation of his regime (see: chapter 3, *Ibid.*). During the second milestone, Suharto was also criticizing the political and economic orientation of Sukarno's regime, blaming the latter for conflicts among elites, economic bankruptcy within the state, suffering amongst the people, political instability, and conflictual relations with other states (see: chapter 3, section 3.3). Suharto was then using them as a justification for his performance legitimacy and at the same time as his main reference when creating strategies of 'economic development' determinant to the state's capability under his leadership (see: chapter 3, *Ibid.*). Notwithstanding the importance of the 'third wave of democratization' which was a 'global trend' during the end of the twentieth

century, the orientation of the post-Suharto Indonesian regimes is assumed to be no different from the situation of the first and the second milestones; that the democratic regimes Indonesia were using deficiencies during the *New Order* period as their base of legitimacy and later as their reference to create strategies determinant to state's capability since that year. It is based on this assumption that the situation that led to the collapse of the New Order is worthy of analysis, as this would provide a base to analyze the state's orientation and capability of the post-1998 Indonesian democratic regimes.

7.1. Economic crisis

In 1971, Indonesia had adopted 'open-market' capitalism (Chalmers and Hadiz, 1997, p.16). This system was designed to attract foreign investment and gave investors a high level of flexibility, meaning they could withdraw their money from the country whenever they considered their business unprofitable. During the initial stage of the New Order, the adoption of this economic policy was important as it was considered to be a significant indicator of the anti-communist or anti-socialist orientation of Suharto's regime (see: chapter 3, section 3.4). The key point here was to re-assure the capitalist countries who were expected to provide the support required by Suharto's economic development programs. However, from 1980s there were practical problems resulting from the policy as the foreign investments were relatively rare, a trend which was anomalous compared to the healthy operations of national companies which had grown fast since the end of 1970s (Wie, 2006, section 3). The problem here was securing financial capital at the domestic level was expensive. The Indonesian central bank (BI) applied policies to limit the level of inflation as well as speculative loans by setting a high rate of interest. It was, therefore, cheaper for Indonesian companies to borrow capital 'offshore,' since the 'open market' system did not restrict these practices²³⁵. However, borrowing foreign capital involved big risks, especially when the value of rupiah fell against the US

²³⁵ From 1980 to 1990, not less than 800 major Indonesian companies had borrowed direct 'offshore' capital or loans from the local banks denominated in US dollars; these non-government debts added up to 80 billion dollars, or approximately four times higher than the reserve of the central bank and even much higher than the liquid reserve available at the BI. See: O'ROURKE, K. (2002) *Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post-Suharto Indonesia*, New South Wales, Allen&Unwin., p.41

dollar. Nevertheless, the borrowers and the creditors had the same faith in the 'implicit guarantee' of currency rates provided by the Indonesian government²³⁶.

In Southeast Asia, meanwhile, different currency systems were adopted by countries in the region²³⁷. As Indonesia adopted the free-floating system, several countries put their faith in the Currency Board System, through which the governments of these countries simply 'peg' the currency to American dollar while their national monetary policies were kept independent from the United States' monetary policy. In practical terms, these countries get the immediate benefit of certitude in their currency level amidst the potential instability of the floating system of their neighbors. Despite this benefit, however, the system is embedded with several disadvantages. Among the obvious is the tendency for 'pegged' currencies to become 'overvalued' hence potential to invite massive 'foreign' capitals. Unfortunately, this capital has an 'abrupt' characteristic as the capitalist system operating in these countries provided an instrument known as 'easy-liquidity', a mechanism making it easy for investors to withdraw their capital and convert them to US dollar before leaving the countries with their capital. When investment conditions deteriorated, due for example to an unstable political situation, a massive local currency selling in these countries would be evident. Such turbulence would, unfortunately, also affect countries with free-floating currencies in the region as the fleeing investors would find US dollar wherever they could, putting pressure on the currency rates of these countries.

²³⁶ The non-fixed currency rate adopted by Indonesia until 1997 was the base on which Suharto's regime established its monetary system. This system was operating in accordance to the 'free-floating' mechanism hence the pressures resulted from selling and purchase of US\$ would have a direct effect on the rate of the currency. This system has made the currency level unpredictable while national business, especially those who were involved in exports and imports, would need a kind of stability on the currency rate. In this mechanism, the central bank may interfere into the currency market to determine the expected level of the currency by using monetary policies such as changing the interest rates or flooding the currency market with US \$ taken from the reserve of the BI. Another available system (but one not adopted by Indonesia even to this day), meanwhile, was the Currency Board System (CBS), where the government and its central bank should stay away from the currency market and instead attach the currency level to a chosen foreign currency (for example US\$) while issuing monetary policies like devaluation and revaluation to stimulate their national economy or to handle economic turbulence---so that the main principle is, when the market believed that the central bank has sufficient liquidity of US\$ to back up its currency, businesses would not need to concern themselves with US\$ buying by speculators. The point is: they rely on the government's monetary intervention.

²³⁷ About the various currency systems operating in Southeast Asia, see, for example: DAQUILA, T. (2005) *The Economies of Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand*, Nova Publishers.

Following the devaluation policy taken by the Thai government, the economies of neighboring countries were becoming the victims of an 'irrational' financial market system which had destroyed the region like a contagion (domino-effect). The Asian crisis was thus regarded as an inescapable epidemic, for this crisis was the result of factors driven not by the real economy but merely by speculation and sudden panic. In fact, the massive capital withdrawals occurring in Thailand in 1997 were triggered by foreign investors' distrust due to Thailand's domestic economic deficiencies, such as raging inflation, poorly allocated finance, and the inadequate servicing of its foreign debts²³⁸. Being combined with frequent domestic political instability, these factors contributed to the devastating crisis of 1997, which was marked by the massive withdrawals of foreign capital from the country (Kamesaka and Wang, 2004). It was unfortunate for Indonesia that the same distrust was extended to the other 'similar' economies of the region. When evaluating Indonesia soon after the wake of Thailand economic crisis, they arrived at the conclusion that the economic miracle created by Suharto's regime was actually as fragile as Thailand, for it shared the common patterns with the latter. The predicted future of Indonesia's economy at the time was even worse as Indonesia has been mingling with serious problem of corruption, complicity, and nepotism---*Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme* (KKN)--the famous jargon been used by the reformists to criticize the regime (Sharma, 2003, p.124). The investors saw the Indonesian economy as less stable and deemed the high and sustainable economic growth in Indonesia since 1980 as only 'at the surface' and only possible due to the abundant contributions of foreign donors²³⁹. In other words, Indonesia had lived on a borrowed wealth and investors concluded that their investments would be threatened when Suharto was not in power anymore.

²³⁸ This argument was forwarded by many scholars. See, among others: KAUFMAN, G., KRUEGER, T. & HUNTER, W. (1999) *The Asian Financial Crisis: Origins, Implications and Solutions*, Springer.

²³⁹ The Suharto regime had declared itself to have a strong commitment to capitalism but this commitment was considered as 'false' for the economic practices in Indonesia at the time were missing some important ingredients required of a capitalist system, such as free competition and the rule-of-law. In fact, Suharto had implemented a range of instruments aimed to assure political stability for the sake of 'planned' economic development. Very often, these instruments were used by the regime as its mechanism to allocate resources and 'fortune'. Hence, state enterprises, banks and governmental departments played the role of the state's tools for the resource allocation. As a consequence, the executive branches of the government often created rules and regulations specifically designed to benefit Suharto's families and cronies. Such a pattern is known as Ersatz capitalism—a term introduced by Yoshihara Kunio. See: KUNIO, Y. (1988) *The Rise of Ersatz Capitalism in Souteast Asia*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

To deal with the high demand for US\$ in the region by the beginning of 1997, and especially to anticipate speculations on the rupiah, BI applied a monetary strategy known as 'downward crawling peg' (gradual stabilization)²⁴⁰. This strategy allows the depreciation of the currency value in a slow way by determining a monetary margin of 8% (see: Rajan, 2010). In this corridor, the figure can respectively increase or decrease, but cannot go outside the maximum and minimum limit determined by the BI. In order to make this policy work, BI would interfere indirectly in the currency market, by deploying and withdrawing US\$ to buy or sell the rupiah for example, or by increasing the interest rate to reduce the rupiah in circulation. In July 1997, the great demand for the US\$ and the high selling-buying speculation in the currency market forced the BI to increase the maximum and minimum limit to 12.5% (see: BIS, 2005, p177-187). The negative trend obviously continued until the decision of BI on August 14th that definitively release these limits because of the limited reserve of US\$ in this central bank (BIS, 2005, *Ibid*). As a consequence, the rupiah immediately fell by up to 6% against the dollar (BIS, 2005, *Ibid*). As if this were not enough, in a few weeks the rupiah would suffer a 'fall-free' disaster, from 2.449 per US\$ on June 30th, 1997, to 3.800 per US\$ by the 15th of October of the same year (See: Handerson, 1998, p.88-90).

Towards the end of August 1998, the index of the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSE) had shown that Indonesia had lost up to 75 percent of her total economic values which led to a most critical condition during that year (Mann, 1998, p.87). In the past, when the economy encountered a difficult time and the confidence of the investors was falling, the technocrats usually revealed a list of reforms in order to stimulate investment and economic productivity, issuing a 'commitment' to avoid interference in the market²⁴¹. Since 1990, however, such practices of de-regulation have become rare. On September 3, the market was surprised by a chain of fiscal regulations

²⁴⁰ About the strategies of Asian countries to maintain their exchange rate and especially about the downward crawling peg strategy, see: RAJAN, R. S. (2010) *The Evolution and Impact of Asian Exchange Rate Regimes. ADB Economic Working Paper Series No. 208*. Manila, Asian Development Bank.

²⁴¹ In Indonesia, there exists a theory that 'Bad Times made Good Policies' which is contradictive to another theory that 'Good Times made Bad Policies'. This theory was introduced by an ancient minister of the New Order: Muhammad Sadli. In the 1960s, Indonesia used to experience similar economic crises, during which the technocrats were successful in addressing problems caused by a crisis resulting from the 'bad' economic policies of *Orde Lama*. In the 1970s, the technocrats were also successful in stabilizing the economy after a period of fiscal turbulence and inefficiencies within the state petroleum companies. In the 1980s, again, the technocrats were able to co-opt the radical fall of oil price and used the opportunities to invigorate the manufacturing sector; the policy which brought Indonesian exportation into non-oil based international trade.

produced by the principal technocrat of the cabinet, the Minister of Finance Mar'ie Muhammad. With the main objective of tightening government spending amidst the deficit of the state budget, Mr. Muhammad ordered a cessation of the majority of large-scale projects as well as the public works (see: Muhammad, 2005, p.335-338). He also increased taxes on the import of luxurious goods while promising to provide liquidity in order to alleviate spreading worries amongst national banks (Muhammad, 2005, *Ibid*). In the end, these policies only added insult to injury.

Among the currency-related problems were businesses at risk of failure. Hundreds of companies with un-hedged (not-protected) debts in US\$ suddenly incurred great losses due to the extreme fall of the rupiah²⁴². This was only part of the problem, because the majority of the Indonesian companies earned income in rupiahs but incurred costs in dollars. The fall of the rupiah *vis-à-vis* the dollar would mean a decrease in their incomes relative to costs, while at the same time the devaluation had already tightened their profit margins. The incomes were also affected by the general economic deceleration and the companies suddenly found that their interest payments (in rupiah) were three times as great as they had been. Many companies fell into bankruptcy, which in turn had serious implications for the banking system. Many banks were concerned about the solvency of their debtors (Mann, 1998, p.52). Now, the rupiah floated freely and incomes had fallen. The problem was not restricted to companies with debts in foreign currency; there was an obvious threat to those borrowing in the local market due to the 'insolvency' problems. Meanwhile, the BI's policy of increasing interest rates (to encourage the investors to hold the rupiah) had the side-effect of asphyxiating the borrowers of local currency under high interest rates.

In the trade sector, the exportation was also less plausible. Soon after the economic crisis hit the country, exporters would immediately encounter difficulties. The degradation of the financial system would mean that the international banks had a

²⁴² Many of these losses were life-threatening, since they swept these companies' total capital. According to Mann, by the beginning of 1998, 80 percent of companies listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange were technically bankrupt—see: MANN, R. (1998) *Economic Crisis in Indonesia: The Full Story*, London, Gateway Books., p.244-245

little 'trust' in Indonesian local banks²⁴³. For the exporters, this situation was catastrophic as the banks are their partners and often their only source of financial aid for their imports of raw materials. In a normal situation, the devaluation of the currency gives extra benefits to exporters, but in the situation of credit disappearance, many companies faced serious problems of 'cash-flow'. As a consequence, in 1997 potentially profitable Indonesian companies which exported clothes, shoes and electronics component were forced to stop their operations and lay off their workers (Bernas, 1998b, Kompas, 1998g). Combined with the collapse of the national currency and the index of the JSE, this forced investors admit that the value in dollars of their capital had dropped by up to two thirds in a period of three months (Mann, 1998, p.73). In brief, the Indonesian economy was devastated by a vicious cycle of pessimism, capital flight and devaluation.

Desperate to stop this vicious cycle and to reconstitute confidence, the ministers of Suharto recommended that Indonesia follow the example of Thailand and Philippines in calling for assistance from the International Monetary Fund (Kivimaki, 2003, p.220). But Suharto (who was 76 years old at the time and had just lost his wife), encouraged by the advice of an anti-American policy economist Steve Hanke, was reluctant to resort to the office of Michel Camdessus (IMF) and the department of finances of the United States (US Treasury) (Emmerson, 2001, p.324).

Nolens volens, on October 8, 1997, the IMF and the Indonesian government agreed to assistance of 43 billion dollars on behalf of three multilateral institutions and five countries (see: International Monetary Fund, 1997). This assistance was provided on the condition that Indonesia would carry out a series of reforms (International Monetary Fund, 1997, *Ibid*). Facing reluctance and opposition from certain groups within the country regarding the conditions required by the IMF, the second agreement was signed by Indonesia on January 15, 1998 (International Monetary Fund, 1998c). This contained 50 measures of reforms (Letter of Intent - Lol) which had to be realized by the regime in order to receive the promised aid in a step-by-

²⁴³ The impact of the economic crisis to the banking sector in Indonesia in 1997 was much more severe as the crisis had led to the bankruptcy of these banks. For example, the Indonesian government followed the IMF's recommendation to close 16 out of 42 local banks as part of IMF-Indonesia agreement to the overcome the crisis, the decision that had provoked a 'rush' on banks (the massive withdrawals of money in banks by their customers) About this issue, see: *Ibid*.

step fashion. Up to this point, however, Indonesia still showed her hesitation and in fact delayed the implementation of the engagement with the IMF, while there was a strong impression that the relations between the IMF and Suharto's regime were becoming conflictual (McGlynn and Sulisty, 2007, p.328-333). On April 10, 1998, another agreement was signed. This included more serious conditions from the IMF; it contained 117 measures which needed to be applied by the Indonesian government (see: International Monetary Fund, 1998b). Because of these hesitations and hitches, of the 43 billion dollars promised by the IMF five months earlier, only 3 billion dollars (7%) was received²⁴⁴.

The conflict between The Indonesian government and the IMF culminated in the 1st of March 1998. During a session of the National Assembly, Suharto reminded his audience of the successes of his regime during the earlier period, such as the increase of income per capita, the sustainable growth of GDP, and the low morbidity-rate (Suharto, 1998). At different occasions, Suharto complained about the fact that the reforms required by the IMF did not produce the expected results and that the majority of the structural reforms were simply unrealizable (Hanke, 2007, p.100-1001). Suharto's unease at the IMF presence can be seen, for example, in his remark that "*a number head-of-governments visited me or telephoned.....and they expressed their opinions on this solution that they think would be a good solution to solve our problembut, me, I refer to a more suitable concept, it is the IMF Plus..... I am, carefully and with precaution, contemplating on the possible adoption of the 'currency board system'*"(See:The Republic of Indonesia, 1998).

In the middle of the conflict, Steve Hanke, an economist at John Hopkins University insisted that Indonesia should adopt the currency board system as the best way out of the economic crisis (Mann, 1998, p.15). This would mean that the value of rupiah would be automatically converted into US\$ at a fixed rate. In addition, this currency board would replace policies previously issued by the BI, means that the currency market would operate independently and free from the government's direct

²⁴⁴ The main participants of this engagement were (in billion \$) : The IMF (\$10), The World Bank (\$4,5), The Asian Development Bank (\$3,5), Japan (\$5), The United States (\$3), Brunei Daersalam(\$1,2), Malaysia (\$1), Indonesian Foreign capitals (\$5)—see: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (1998a) Annual Report of the Executive Board for the Financial Year Ended April 30, 1998. Washington DC, International Monetary Fund.

intervention. BI's interference in the market, as the consequence, would only be possible indirectly through the mechanism of 'interest'.

The IMF and the United States opposed the formula offered by Hanke (which, in fact, had the approval of Suharto), further degrading the relationship between the IMF and Suharto's regime²⁴⁵. The IMF announced the reasons for its rejection of Hanke's formula: (1) the success of a currency board system requires a high level of credibility while the New Order at the time was regarded as 'not-credible'; (2) Suharto was going to regard this board system as an instant formula and cosmetic solution to safeguard the rupiah but at the same time the formula would free Indonesia from her obligation to implement 'reforms' signed in the letter of intent, and; (3) The currency board system requires sufficient reserve of US\$ at the central bank and also a strong currency, which was not the case of Indonesia²⁴⁶.

During first half of March, the fact that the foreign currency reserves which had fallen up to 16 billion dollars was the only factor prevented the adoption of the currency board system (TempoInteraktif, 1998b). On March 18, one day after the visit of an IMF special envoy, Hubert Neiss, in Jakarta, a senior official of the government, Ginandjar Kartasasmita, declared that the foreign currency reserves at the BI were insufficient to back up the immediate 'test' of the currency board system (Bisnis Indonesia, 1998a). However, several prominent members of the government expressed a different attitude. The Minister for Finance, Fuad Bawazier, announced a potential disaster to the government's revenue from the tax sector along with the capital flight (Shiner, 1998); the Minister of Trade and Industry, Bob Hassan, refused

²⁴⁵ As was remarked by Goldsborough, 'Professor Hanke advised Indonesia to scrap the IMF plan and create a currency board, tying the rupiah firmly to the U.S. dollar. This plan successfully combated inflation in Argentina and Chile. But the IMF didn't like Professor Hanke or his plan. Both the IMF and U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin vehemently opposed the establishment of a currency board. We learned that in Jakarta, Professor Hanke and his wife had round-the-clock government bodyguards because a hit team had been hired to assassinate the professor. Even the *Wall Street Journal* recognized the IMF as an engine of revolution'—see: GOLDSBOROUGH, R. H. (1998) *Indonesia's Wealth: Who Will Control it? Personal Update NewsJournal*, July 1998.

²⁴⁶ Following Suharto's speech on the 1st of March, on the 6th of March the IMF declared that it would have to delay the 3 billion US\$ amount of credit which was promised to be allocated as a 'security' loan to Indonesia. Two days later (the 8th) Suharto responded to this decision by declaring that certain conditions in the Letter of Intent proposed by the IMF were against the state constitution hence should not be applied. Suharto cited especially article 33 of the constitution, saying that "*Perekonomian disusun sebagai usaha bersama berdasar atas asas kekeluargaan*---the national economy should be organised in accordance to collective efforts based on the principle of familial system" See: O'ROURKE, K. (2002) *Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post-Suharto Indonesia*, New South Wales, Allen&Unwin., p.75

the IMF's Letter of Intent, especially with regard to the obligation to release the monopolies which had been under government control (Ries, 2000, p.215). Hassan even regarded the structural reforms required by the IMF as an effort aimed at weakening Indonesia, declaring "*the foreigners are nice only if they want something from Indonesia....When they cannot any more draw benefit from our products, or when they feel threatened by our exports, they start to attack us*"²⁴⁷. These denunciations were even worse in the following weeks. "*We are not the Republic of the IMF.....This is an expression that should end up at a demonstration*" (Harian Neraca, 1998). Soon, Suharto himself would express a similar sentiment. In April, the president stated that after the realization of independence in politics, Indonesian economic independence was compromised by foreigners who sought to exploit the national capital (Kompas, 1998b).

Simultaneous with the fall of the rupiah, a natural disaster (El Nino storm) struck the country, causing significant damage to crop production and hence contributing even more to soaring prices. In November 1997, the index of the consumer prices observes a rise of 17.3%, while the general increase of the annual index of the consumer prices reached the dangerous level of 29.7% at the first quarter of 1998; on average, this index was of 8.8% during the period from 1990 to 1996 (Handerson, 1998, p.204). The economic crisis also generated an unprecedented wave of unemployment²⁴⁸. As a consequence, chaos settled gradually in the Indonesian cities (see: chapter chapter 5, section 5.4); from the first months of 1998, continuous student demonstrations spread across the archipelago (chapter 5, *ibid*).

7.2. Political Crisis

At the domestic level, political support for Suharto's regime was decreasing. This started in 1988 with the debate on his succession soon after his re-election as president by the National Assembly. With the tacit support of the army, protests from students burst across Java towards the end of 1988 and became worse at the

²⁴⁷ Bob Hassan declared "Which monopolies are we talking about? If they provide us with the needs for the people, no problem" See: HARIAN NERACA (1998) *Harian Neraca*. 17 March 1998 ed. Jakarta.

²⁴⁸ According to the data of National Survey of Social-Economic 1998 as cited by Firdausy, it was estimated that the number of unemployment by end of 1998 was about 4.5 million people—see: FIRDAUSY, C. M. (1998) *The Social Impact of Economic Crisis on Employment in Indonesia*. Centre for economic and Development Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences.

beginning of 1989 (see: chapter 4 and 5). In intellectual circles, aspirations for greater political freedom and of an equitable economic growth also started to appear. These aspirations were based on arguments that an alteration to the tight control of the government on the economy would help to faster achieve the prosperity of the people (Saunders, 1998, p.29-36). Certain members of the government even demanded this liberalization, which was backed up by the statement from army officers that Indonesia should look towards the future²⁴⁹.

After his re-election as president with B.J. Habibie as the vice president, Suharto constituted his seventh cabinet, entitled 'Cabinet Development-7', on March 14. Without a doubt, this cabinet is the greatest manifestation of KKN (See: the previous part of this chapter) of the New Order regime. Amidst the spreading student demonstrations demanding that the regime end nepotism, Suharto named his daughter, Tutut Suharto, as the minister of social services. An army general who was closely associated with Tutut was appointed as the Minister of Internal Affairs. The minister of state enterprises was Tanri Abeng, the director of Bakrie & Brothers, a figure closely associated with Tutut in her business projects. The substitute to Mar'ie Muhammad as Minister for Finance was Fuad Bawazier, formerly managing director of the Department of Tax who was very close with Suharto's sons²⁵⁰.

Other examples of the state allocating resources to Suharto's family could also be cited: Subiako Tjakrawerdaya was maintained as the Minister for Co-operatives, where he continued to defend the monopoly of the clove trade by Tommy Suharto (Schwartz, 1994, chapter 6); Sanyoto Sastrowardoyo was kept as the Minister of Investments despite persistent complaints in business circles about his 'hidden-cost'

²⁴⁹ Critics of Suharto were actually reflected in every level of society. However, as Suharto's regime was so powerful at any rate, the appeals for political liberation and democratic popular participation were only the initial sign of political change in Indonesia. The issues were therefore more related to the succession of leadership when Suharto (who would be 70 years old in 1991) could no longer handle state leadership. The debate was concentrated around the figure of the next leader as well as the successional mechanism best fit to the Indonesian political circumstances.

²⁵⁰ Bawazier's proximity with Suharto's sons can be seen, for example, in the tax exemptions given to the company of Tommy Suharto for the 'fake' national automobile project of Timor whose products were actually imported from the Korean automobile manufacturer KIA Motors co. in the form of completely built-up units (CBU). Bawazier had also been assisting Bambang Tri Hadmojo (another son of the president) as a treasurer in an operation which diverted 2% of taxpayer's money. He also sits as a commissaris at PT Satelindo, the communication satellite company owned by Bambang Trihadmojo. See, for example: HOFMAN, B. (2004) Indonesia: Rapid Growth, Weak Institution. Jakarta, World Bank.

policy which involved investment licensing²⁵¹; Abdul Latief, who admitted to having abused public money (i.e. diverted more than 3 billion rupiah of pension funds into his personal account) was also kept as the Minister of Labour (Robison and Hadiz, 2004, p.82); Haryanto Danutirto, the former Minister of Transport who had helped manage the incomes of the Suharto family by restructuring the state air lines (McGlynn and Sulisty, 2007, p.328), was maintained as a minister responsible for stocks and drugs. But the most contestable and controversial choice of Suharto was related to the principal economic post of the government, the Minister of Industry and Trade, which was given to Bob Hassan. The irony was remarkable: the man who was considered as amongst the most responsible for the national economic crisis was now had a central role to play in the state's economy. Though Bob Hassan had been the main target of the structural reforms imposed the IMF, he was now the principal figure in the negotiations between the Indonesian government and the IMF.

The selection of the cabinet members coincided with the issuing of 'emergency powers' by the National Assembly. The body granted special rights to Suharto, allowing him to take measures such as dissolving parliament or proscribing political parties if he considers them 'necessary'. This caused fears of the reactivation of the *Kopkamtib*, the secret organization established by Suharto in 1965 which was initially aimed at combating Communism in the country but eventually became one of the regime's tools to suppress notorious criminals or even political opponents without trial²⁵².

Before March, student demonstrators had hope that progress towards the reform would be made by the parliament, the members of which they saw as the people's representatives expected to express the people's aspiration. However, the re-election of Suharto (with Habibie as vice-president), the launching of the 'emergency powers' by the National Assembly, and the composition of the new cabinet put an

²⁵¹ See, for example WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2001) Dispute Settlement Report 1998. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press., p.2408

²⁵² By February of 1998, the possible re-appearance of Kopkamtib became a 'hot' issue, especially because the National Assembly had granted 'special right to maintain social order' to the president. The later developments, such as the assignment of big number of strategic posts to civilian and military figures from the president's circle were seen as a clear indicator towards the realisation of Kopkamtib. See: ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (Ed.) (2002) *Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia*, Ithaca, Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, SIEGEL, J. T. (1998) *A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: Counter-Revolution Today*, Durham, Duke University Press.

end to all these hopes. As the consequence, protestors seized campuses through the country. Even the most conservative group of students was now joining the demonstrations against the government (Widjodjo, 1999, p.168). Towards the end of March, massive demonstrations took place regularly in Yogyakarta, Jakarta and in the provincial cities throughout the archipelago. It was not surprising then that the aspirations from the students were not only related to the end of corruption and control of (soaring) prices, but also the departure of Suharto and his family from the government. The protesters seemed convinced that, because political authority was centralized in the hands one person (Suharto), the departure of this person would end corruption, abuse and unjust practices. This antagonism towards Suharto galvanized the students of all religions and social classes.

A demonstration on April 2nd, 1998 at the campus of the University of Gadjah Mada of Yogyakarta brought about 38 casualties amongst protesters (see: Media Indonesia, 1998). This tragic incident triggered remarkable violence between the protesters and the military elsewhere in the country. Suharto responded by ordering his Minister of Education to prohibit students from taking part in the political gatherings, but this effort was obviously not effective in preventing disobedience from students or those in intellectual circles (Bisnis Indonesia, 1998b). On April 15, 25 campuses throughout the country conducted simultaneous demonstrations while Suharto's regime did not show any indication of bending (see: Kompas, 1998e, Kompas, 1998c). On the contrary, these demonstrations prompted the president to dismiss his Minister of Information and blame the media for their propagation of 'false reports' (Kompas, 1998c, Ibid, Suara Pembaharuan, 1998b). He repeated his call for students to return to their classes and study (Suara Pembaharuan, 1998b). Later, this call became more stern; in an annual celebration honouring the special forces, Suharto threatened by saying: "*I hope that the general situation of order will be controlled by the people themselves, otherwise it will be controlled by the local governments and the police force*" (Kompas, 1998f). However, he indicated that the participation of the special forces to suppress the student's demonstration would not be necessary²⁵³.

²⁵³ In fact, an element of the Special Forces (Kopassus) had been profoundly involved in the incidents as there were many cases of torture been reported. A judicial inquiry had concluded later that there were at least

The president had, meanwhile, punished an eminent figure of the army, General Edi Sudrajat, who was considered as ‘too soft’ on the protesters²⁵⁴. As the Minister of Defense, Suharto expected Sudrajat to be more stern with the students who had organized continued anti-government demonstrations. Suharto’s expectation could not be fulfilled by the general, and Suharto excluded him from the government in March (see: Indonesian government, 1998). However, towards the end of April, a number of other generals seemed to follow Sudrajat’s example, although cautiously, as they explicitly expressed their approval of the student protests, though none adopted an intransigent position towards Suharto. General Syarwan Hamid, a figure considered as among the hard-liners by students, showed his ‘understanding’ to students’ action, for example. Specifically, Hamid encouraged students “to feel free in expressing their aspirations but”, he continued, “*with the condition that their action would not to create security issues*” (Mann, 1999, p.133). General Wiranto²⁵⁵ also took the same position by declaring that “*the soldiers will accept and support any aspirations...since these aspirations are required for the progress of the nation*” (Jawa Pos, 1998c). Through the country, the military commanders underlined “the importance of dialogue” and agreed to recognize that it was possible to tolerate “*differences in opinion*”²⁵⁶. Other generals took even more explicit positions. General Agum Gumelar, the former commandant of Special Forces who was now the commandant of Sulawesi garrison, stated on April 24 that the students’ demands were “*right and represented the aspirations of all levels of the society*” (Suara Pembaruan, 1998b).

The uncertainties of the army were quickly reported by the leader of Muhammadiyah (the second largest islamist organization), Amien Rais. After having several meetings

14 students disappeared—kidnapped by the Kopassus. See: SUARA PEMBARUAN (1998a) Kassospol ABRI: Tidak Ada Perintah Pangab untuk Menculik Aktivis. *Suara Pembaruan*. 26 April ed. Jakarta.

²⁵⁴ Sudrajat used to be the Army Chief-of-Staff, the Armed Forces top commander, and the minister of Defense at the same time. He was also known as a figure who encouraged the military to ‘back to barrack’ and becoming professional.

²⁵⁵ Wiranto had been known as amongst Suharto’s loyal generals, nevertheless, he now seemed to be reluctant to take a radical position against the protesting students. Instead of deploying an open force (as Suharto had apparently wished), Wiranto conducted a series of dialogues with student activists. One of the major dialogues took place on the 25th of April, when a big number of student activist came to Jakarta to meet and had a dialogue with territorial general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono

²⁵⁶ On the 18 of April 1998 for example, General Wiranto held a meeting with students to discuss best solution to the worsening political circumstances—see: TEMPOINTERAKTIF (1998a) Krisis Mengantarkan Indonesia ke Jurang Kehancuran. *Tempo*. 29 December 1998 ed.

with the chiefs of the army during April and March, Rais seemed to feel that the soldiers hesitated in their support for Suharto. Conscious of the fact that this could mean the end of Suharto's regime, Rais vigorously sought to associate with and encourage the students to intensify their attacks against Suharto (Kompas, 1998d). By doing this, Amien distinguished himself from other dissenting "reformers" such as Megawati Sukarnoputri and Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur)²⁵⁷

Towards the end of April, the students gained support from intellectuals, professionals, and almost all other social groups, while demonstrations continued to occur at almost every city at the archipelago, from Aceh to Papua (see: Saunders, 1998, Appendix D). Violence was not rare, inasmuch as students had learned how to deal with the security forces, who made use of teargas (Suara Merdeka, 1998). In fact, the students were particularly difficult enemies for Suharto as they were too numerous to be crushed, too idealistic to be co-opted and too persistent to be neglected.

Suharto acknowledged the deteriorating situation on May 1, gathering more than 30 leaders of political parties and factions within the parliament. At this gathering, Suharto underlined that he was constitutionally obliged to apply the five-year-plan development program (Pelita) that the parliament had adopted seven weeks before (Bhakti, 1998a, p.241). This plan already contained elements of reforms but, again, Suharto threatened to take measures against the parties who were attempting to advance reform (Bhakti, 1998a, *Ibid*).

The first week of May involved major violence propagated in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Bogor and Medan (Saunders, 1998, *Ibid*). In the second week, Suharto faced increasing pressure, in particular from the demonstrators who were now also focused on the issue of the reduction of energy subsidies in a situation of high inflation. When Suharto went to a conference of Heads of State to Egypt in May 1998, his regime was hopelessly staggering. The troops ended up drawing their arms and killed several demonstrators in Jakarta, starting riots which would produce

²⁵⁷ The latter two figures had for many years been known as 'anti-Suharto'. Megawati is the daughter of the former president Sukarno and used to be the president of PDI-Indonesian Democratic Party, while Gus Dur was the leader of NU--the biggest Moslem organisation--which had been struggling for democracy in Indonesia.

more than 1000 casualties²⁵⁸. On his return to Jakarta, Suharto noted that even his own ministers had turned against him and that he could not form a new government (See: Maley, 1998). On May 21, he made the decision to resign.

7.3. Weakening support from the Military

It is too simplistic to explain the collapse of the New Order by reference only to the events immediately prior to Suharto's resignation. This argument assumes that the economic and political crises in Indonesia in 1997 and 1998 were only a 'triggering-detonator' of the time-bomb which had long been waiting to explode. Indeed, while Thailand, Philippines and Malaysia, three countries in the region which underwent the same crisis, were beginning to recover within a year, Indonesia had to deal with a multidimensional crisis which seemed to end only with the collapse of a celebrated regime. Indonesia's extraordinary development and how the New Order arrived at its tragic end is a puzzle for many observers. Based on this assumption, analysis on the army and political elites should give a more significant explanation to our task in this chapter.

To secure the regime against any possible threats, Suharto installed instruments which he could systematically use to suppress criticisms from his adversaries. These were mainly the police force and a judicial system used to maintain public order (See: chapter 6). When facing more serious threats, however, Suharto relied on the fidelity of the army.

As has been analyzed in chapter 4, in spite of its prestigious past, the Indonesian army gradually transformed itself into an instrument whose institutions and personnel were at the service of Suharto's authoritarianism. Starting from the beginning of the 1970s, the army became the most powerful political institution in Indonesia and the principal pillar of the regime. Its political role was rationalized through the doctrines of the '*double function* of the military', under which the army played double role as the armed guardian of the nation and at the same time as an instrument of the

²⁵⁸ The violent clash between student demonstrators and security forces during April-May 1998 and the number of claimed casualties were recorded in a wide range of reports and news. See, among others: JAWA POS (1998a) Aksi di Sejumlah Kota Turun ke Jalan dan Bentrok. *Jawa Pos Online*. 3 May 1998 ed.; BERNAS (1998a) Aksi Makin Deras, Korban Jatuh lagi. *Harian Bernas*. 3 May 1998 ed.; ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (Ed.) (2002) *Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia*, Ithaca, Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications.

development of the country (see: chapter 4). In fact, the 'double function' ideology of the Indonesian army was an obvious anachronism for the army. Instead of playing role as the guardian of the nation, it was in fact the armed guardian of Suharto's policies. Up to 1993, thousands of active or retired army officers were still in charge in the executive branch of the state at various levels (chapter 4). They even took the lead in a wider range of the state's institutions such as the parliament, the supreme court, Golkar 'party', and in state enterprises (Lowry, 1996, p.188).

The priority given to the political role of the army (to the detriment of other units of the armed forces), can be seen especially from the structure of command of the armed forces. Hierarchically, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces was a general of four stars assisted by a chief-of-staff superior to the four composing 'units' of the armed forces (the army, the marine, the air force and the police force). But beside the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, two generals of three stars were in charge in the army but not of the other forces (see: chapter 4). One is the commander of the strategic reserve of the army (Kostrad) and the other one is the commander-of-territorial-staff of the army (Kaster). While the commander of Kostrad had purely military functions, the Kaster had an exclusive function because he is responsibility for political affairs (which is not the function of professional military). The *Kaster* often implemented strategies for the army's intervention in the socio-political sphere favourable to Suharto. The political instruments at the disposal of Kaster were *Badan Intelijen Strategis*--The Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Agency (Bais) and the Special Forces (*Komando Pasukan Khusus*--Kopassus)²⁵⁹. Suharto thus had formidable and well grounded instruments within the army which not only gave him control of the entire armed forces, but also enabled him to face any challenges towards his authority. However, despite this significant support from the army, certain 'disatisfaction' grew amongst the generals, especially those who had been 'isolated' by Suharto. In fact, looking more closely at the matter, the loyalty of the army to Suharto had never been really proven.

²⁵⁹ The *Bais* set up a monitoring system by installing a web of intelligence at every level of the territorial system. Its main task was concentrated on internal threats to the regime such as political dissidents or secessionist movements at peripheries. In order to make effective these secret operations, the Bais worked closely with one unit of the special force known as the 'Commando-elite' which was attributed with an authority of 'counter-terrorism'.

The major wave of anti-Suharto inclination within the army was effectively suppressed when Suharto 'disciplined' certain groups of the army at the beginning of 1980. A document called as 'Petisi 50' had been forwarded to the parliament containing a complaint from 50 prominent national figures, including some army generals²⁶⁰. The document stated that Suharto's regime had abusively used Pancasila as a 'weapon' to crush his political opponents by interpreting critics of the regime as critics of Pancasila (See: chapter 7). Being aware that the soldiers were not solid in their backing-up of his manouvers, Suharto had fears that this would be 'dangerous' to his political operations, to stability, and (presumably) to his chances of re-election as president in 1982. The indicator which alerted Suharto was the fact that the army seemed to distance itself from the government's Golkar 'party' and started a tacit gathering with the moslem party, the PPP. In March 1980, at a meeting at Pekanbaru of Riau province, Suharto threatening to apply a '*coup de foudre*' to anyone in the army renouncing their loyalty to the state, the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution (see: Jenkins, 1984, chapter seven). In addition, as the parliament was dominated by the Golkar 'party', Suharto's later authoritative action²⁶¹ against the petition's signatories was backed up without any constraints from the parliament. Specific to the army, Suharto was saying even more explicitly during a preparatory meeting of the *Kopassus*' birthday that he would divide the army if it showed disloyalty to the regime. He envisaged using the intelligence units of the special forces to 'discipline' all the 'infidels' (Crouch, 1978, *Ibid*). To preserve the unity of the army and especially to maintain its political position, up to 1997 the army had no other choice but to stand for and give loyalty to Suharto, but in fact, a

²⁶⁰ H.M. Kamal, Letjen Ahmad Yunus Mokoginta (army), Suyitno Sukirno, M. Jasin (army), Ali Sadikin (army), Prof. Dr. Mr. Kasman Singodimejo, M. Radjab Ranggasoli, Bachrun Martosukarto SH, Abdul Mu'thi SH (Bandung), M. Amin Ely, Ir. H.M. Sanusi, Mohammad Natsir, Ibrahim Madylao, M. Ch Ibrahim, Bustaman SH, Burhanuddin Harahap SH, Dra S.K. Trimurti, Chris Siner Key Timu, Maqdir Ismail, Alex Jusuf Malik SH, Julius Hussein, SE, Darsjaf Rahman, Slamet Bratanata, Endy Syafruddin, Wachdiat Sukardi, Ibu D. Walandouw, Hoengeng, M. Sriamin, Edi Haryono, Dr. A.H. Nasution (army), Drs. A.M. Fatwa, Indra K. Budenani, Drs. Sulaiman Hamzah, Haryono, S. Yusuf, Ibrahim G. Zakir, Ezra M.T.H Shah, Djaliil Latuconsina (Surabaya), Djoddy Happy (Surabaya), Bakri A.G. Tianlean, Dr. Yudilherry Justam, Drs. Med. Dody Ch. Suriadiredja, A. Shofandy Zakariyya, A. Bachar Mu'id, Mahjuddin Nawawi, Syafruddin Prawingegara, SH, Manai Sophiaan, Moh. Nazir, Anwar Harjono, Azis Saleh dan Haji Ali Akbar. See: SISWOYO, B. (1983) *Sekitar Petisi 50*, Solo, CV Mayasari., p.27-28

²⁶¹ Soon after Suharto delivered his speech, the regime removed the signatories' right to travel, forced the media to not quote their words or publish their pictures, and also banned the signatories from any banking contracts. See: CROUCH, H. (1978) *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press., p.356. This decision had made the signatories to lose their political and economic opportunities. Even socially they were isolated as none would take risks to be seen of their sympathizers. The group had been quasi-imprisoned until 1998 when the political reformation began.

significant resistance within the army to Suharto's regime did exist despite their 'clandestineness'.

7.4. Rallying opponents amongst elites

Apart from this 'failed' opposition, the 1980s also saw another agitation against Suharto's regime. Following the collapse of oil prices in 1983, the elites' support for Suharto's regime was drastically declining. The opposition, however, did not make much effort to gain political benefit from the situation. Perhaps this was because the crisis was due to world economic conditions and therefore difficult for the opposition to blame on the regime. In addition, the political pressure on Suharto was only provisional. When the debates on the succession of leadership started to appear by the end of the 1980s, the negative impacts of the crisis were little used by Suharto's opponents. In fact, it was not easy from any perspective to conclude that the economic crisis would lead to a loss of support for the regime from people who had enjoyed almost everything they wanted under Suharto's leadership.

All these factors were duly used by those who estimated that Suharto should be able to be persuaded to resign in 1993 after the legislative election. The general election of 1992 saw the vote for Golkar decreasing slightly from 73% in 1987 to 68% in 1992, while the minor parties, the PPP (Moslems) and the PDI (nationalist) had modest additional votes (see: table 1). Even though the additional votes were not particularly significant, the gains brought about more self confidence amongst elites within the PPP and the PDIP, and hence a series of dissensions against the political system designed by Suharto started to appear.

Table 1 : Result of Indonesian General Election 1971-1997
(in percentage)

Party	1971	1977	1982	1987	1992	1997
Golkar	62.80	62.11	64.34	73.16	68.1	74.51
PDI	10.09	8.60	7.88	10.87	14.9	3.06
PPP	27.11	29.29	27.78	15.97	17.0	22.43

Source : (Suryadinata, 1998, p.199)

Within the PDI, the resistance to the New Order started when the regime used the army to interfere in the internal affairs of the party. During the party's congress held by mid-1993, Feisal Tanjung (the commander of the armed forces) intervened the process of the congress by giving order to Kaster and the intelligence officers of BAIS to approach the members of PDIP and intimidate them in order to blockage a figure who later become Suharto's major political adversary, Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Sukarno (Schwartz, 1994, p.266). Despite the intimidation lasting for months, members of PDI still inclined towards Megawati despite the army's manipulation.

The election of Megawati had made Sukarno-ism popular for the second time, despite public doubts over whether she had enough capability in politics²⁶². Indeed, while Suharto regarded Megawati Sukarnoputri as his 'aggressive' niece (implied not to be dangerous), the latter was in fact a real threat due to Sukarno's lasting charisma and public support; Megawati was the only alternative available within Sukarno's dynasty. With the crucial support of the reformers in the PDI, Megawati used her popularity to criticize the government and even to call for political and economic reforms (McIntyre, 1997, *Ibid*). Despite minimal publication of these criticisms, they were actually very intense throughout the years of 1994-1995, particularly on Java island, where 60% of the population reside. In 1996, it was already clear that the PDI intended to make the legislative election of the following year (1997) a major turning point in Indonesian political dynamics. In fact, the PDI was not trying to have an illusion by expecting 'transparency' during the election, but Megawati promised to her constituents that she was willing to make an active campaign and would openly express anti-government sentiment, which was obviously effective in mobilizing massive support from the people.

Of course, Suharto was 'annoyed' by this latest development. Letting Megawati hold a massive campaign across the country would mean humiliation for his regime, but

²⁶² Megawati is Sukarno's daughter, a status that gave her an extraordinary benefit regarding the support from the nationalist groups (the traditional supporters of Sukarno). However, many people were in doubt of her capability to be a leader due to issues related to gender (which is potential to raise resistance amongst the Islamist groups) and especially her lack of confidence as well as experience in politics. Controversies related to Megawati can be found in, among others, MCINTYRE, A. (1997) *In search of Megawati Sukarnoputri*, Clayton, Monash Asia Institute. See also: REPUBLIKA (1999) Memperta: Untuk jadi presiden, tak cukup bermodal kharismatis dan popularitas *Republika*. 12 June 1999 ed. Jakarta.

stopping the figure who was now becoming a national icon would be imprudent as well. Facing this complicated situation, Suharto chose an intermediate solution: he would dethrone Megawati from the PDI leadership, while he had enough power to do so. Even though Megawati's mandate as party leader was not yet completed, but it would not be the first time that Suharto would illegally eliminate an opponent from the Indonesian political arena (see: chapter 6). This time, Suharto relied on Feisal Tanjung, the commander of the armed forces.

Tanjung then entrusted this project to lieutenant general Syarwan Hamid who was notorious mainly as his role in the imprisonment of several pressure groups' leaders since 1992 and as the man who made a severe public warning about the latent threat of the 'new left' to be associated with communism (See: Asiaweek, 1996). Hamid perceived that a significant number of PDI delegations could be persuaded to oppose Megawati. A key part of the plan was finding the most appropriate figure to replace Megawati; he realized that to interfere for a second time would make the 'secret' operation of the army transparent to the public. He thus chose an ancient figure with considerable popularity within the PDIP: Suryadi. Hamid indicated to Suryadi that if he accepted the condition proposed by the army, he would be granted the leadership of the party by usurping Megawati (Schwartz, 1994, p.322). Suryadi accepted this offer as later Suryadi called for the 'dissenting' faction within the PDI to hold an extraordinary party congress to be held in Medan by June 1996. Being manipulated once again, the congress withdrew the party leadership from Megawati and gave it to Suryadi.

Being the victim, however, it was very clear that Megawati was not willing to surrender despite intense pressure from the army. Approximately 200 students held a demonstration in her favour, while her supporters refused to leave the headquarters of the PDI in Jakarta (see: Edy, 1996). The students maintained a sit-in action in front of the building, denouncing the 'dirty' operations around Medan congress while blaming the treachery of Suryadi (Edy, 1996, *Ibid*). The protest movement developed and attracted widespread sympathy for her courageous criticisms of the government. The gatherings quickly became more numerous and violent (Edy, 1996, *Ibid*).

Facing these deteriorating circumstances, Hamid needed an urgent solution. But the problem was accumulating as the amount of violence was increasing. In this situation, Hamid understood that using the police force would not be beneficial, for an obvious attack would only reinforce public sympathy towards Megawati at the expense of the army and of Suharto. Hamid was thus turned to a conventional solution for such a situation: using of *preman* (gangsters) instead of the regular troops²⁶³. The latter were disguised by Hamid like the partisans of Suryadi who were in anger against the occupation of their rightful headquarters, with an aim of giving the impression that the attack was strictly the internal business of the party led by the defenders of the Suryadi faction. The result was effective: the students were dislodged, killed or wounded (see: Edy, 1996).

Vis-à-vis the Islamist group, Suharto had to deal with two figures with the potential to be a real threat to the regime: a religious leader and the chief of NU Abdurrahman Wahid (known as Gus Dur) and Amien Rais, the chief of Muhammadiyah. The significance of NU in the Indonesian political landscape has its explanation in history. In 1920, Hasyim Ashari (the grandfather of Gus Dur) founded a religious doctrine which synthesized the indigenous mysticism of Java with Middle Eastern Islamism²⁶⁴ (Federspiel, 1998, p.124). The doctrine itself was not new, but the contribution of Ashari was in his establishment of the organization of pesantren (traditional religious boarding schools), which quickly developed a socio-religious organization at various levels of the society under the name of Nahdlatul Ulama (literally means the rebirth of the religion—the NU ideology). In the mid-1990s, the NU claimed more than 40 million members (The Jakarta Post, 1998). Although this number sounds ‘exaggerated’, it is undeniable that the NU is the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia. Furthermore, as Indonesia is the largest Moslem country of the world, the NU also could pride itself on being the greatest Islamic group in the world. Although

²⁶³ See for example : TEMPO (2000) Soeyono: Ada Duplikasi Komando antara Faisal Hartono. *Tempo*. 20 February 2000 ed.

²⁶⁴ NU was established on January 31, 1926 by Wahab Chasbullah with support from Hasyim Asy'ari—who also sat as the first a chairman within the organization. Despite its central operation in the Eastern part of Java, NU also developed in the other areas of Indonesia. In 1942, the organization has 120 branches in Java and South Kalimantan. In 1965, the group took sides with the General Suharto-led army and was heavily involved in the mass killings of Indonesian communists. However, the NU later began to oppose Suharto's regime. In 1984, Abdurrahman Wahid, the grandson of NU founder Hasyim Asy'ari, inherited the leadership from his father and was later elected President of Indonesia in 1999 (Some information about NU was taken from the WIKIPEDIA (2007) Wikipedia Indonesia Wikipedia Foundation Inc. <http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia>. Also a good reference: RICKLEFS, M. C. (1981b) *A History of Modern Indonesia, c. 1300 to the present*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press.

Gus Dur generally abstained from taking an active role in politics, the size of the organization under his control undeniably made him a prominent political figure. Gus Dur was not, however, without rivals. In spite of the size of NU, the major part of its membership was living in rural Java. Anywhere else, especially in the cities and on other islands, the dominant organization was Muhammadiyah.

Founded in 1912, Muhammadiyah reflected the Middle Eastern movements that sought to reconcile Islam with an increasingly modern and secular world. In religious terms, this implied the promotion of Middle Eastern orthodoxy rather than indigenous belief. In the educational terms, Muhammadiyah underlined the teaching of science and technology rather than the 'Western' liberal philosophy (Federspiel, 1998, Ibid). Even though Muhammadiyah repudiated any political participation, its organization was, in fact, intensely political. Like the NU, Muhammadiyah also had a significant number of adherents (by the mid-1990s, it claimed to have about 30 million active members). However, the size of organization was not the only factor of Muhammadiyah's prominence within the Indonesian political landscape as there is another factor which is the 'modernist' brand of Islamic ideology. In fact, this organization appeared partly as a result of the modern Islamist movement in Indonesia, which had grown since the beginning of the twentieth century as an alternative to the existing 'traditional' Islamist groups (See: Jainuri, 1997). Indonesian history has shown Muhammadiyah to be an organization which always worked towards political ends even though these goals changed considerably over time. In term formal, the main target of this organization was to improve the practice of the government by moral values derived from Islam (See: Maarif, 2007). Many modernists, including the chiefs of Muhammadiyah, believed that this creditable goal could be carried out without offending the other Moslem ideologies or other religious minorities²⁶⁵.

The ardent partisans of 'modernist Islam' generally rejected the separation of state and religion, regarding this as illogical. In fact, this group has always been expecting to join more closely these two concepts (the state and the Shari'a). Some have even

²⁶⁵ About the platform, leaderships and orientations of the Muhammadiyah can be seen in BURHANI, N. Muhammadiyah Studies: Dedicated to Boosting Research and Scholarship on The Muhammadiyah and Strengthening this Movement. <http://muhammadiyahstudies.blogspot.com>.

preached the 'Islamization' as their main project of the government, while others wanted the state to be entirely based on Islamic law. The approach of the first was progressive while the second was militant (known as Political Islam ideology—See: (Federspiel, 1998). Political Islam in Indonesia thus contained divergent ideologies which sometimes coexisted within a single organization. Despite the minority status of this group within Muhammadiyah, it had affected national policy since the foundation of the republic in 1945. In the final years of Suharto's regime, this group again had an important role to play as the principal lever to bridge Muhammadiyah with the NU, the two largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia.

Since the Indonesian archipelago is incontestably among the most heterogenic countries in the world, Gus Dur believed that tolerance of religious differences was essential for national unity, and he thus applied this 'secular' principle to the NU. Therefore, rather than being an 'exclusive' organization with a rigid dogma, Gus Dur wanted the NU to be a tolerant organization despite its traditional character. Across the archipelago, therefore, Gus Dur promoted religious tolerance (See: Suaidi, 2009). This made him even more popular, not only amongst the Islamist groups but also amongst non-Islam religions existing in Indonesia. In doing so, Gus Dur also denounced the 'Political Islam' ideology as intolerant and having the potential to alienate religious minorities in Indonesia (with reference of insurgencies orchestrated by radical Islamist in West Java during 1950s and in Aceh of the contemporary period)²⁶⁶.

Perhaps, in primordial terms, there was a demagogic threat. Like any other ideological movement, political Islam had the cynical propensity to deliberately exploit religious sentiments to support their own search for power. In a country like Indonesia with a long history of authoritarianism, there were sufficient reasons for the people to fear that any ideology starting as a sincere moral movement could later be diverted and misused once the defender of the ideology had stayed in power for some time. The vehement opposition of Gus Dur to 'political Islam' was focused on the radical approach of this group, while he seemed unaware of the possibility that

²⁶⁶ In terms of numbers, religious minorities in Indonesia altogether account for no more than 15% of the total population, but in certain regions of the archipelago, some of these minorities were dominant (See: Chapter 6). Political Islam was, therefore, considered by many as worsening the potential for secessionism and hence as dangerous to the unity of the nation.

the group could have institutional interests. In fact, Gus Dur was opposed not only to Political Islam, but actually to the Islamic modernists as a whole. This position distinguished NU from other existing Islamist groups in Indonesia, especially Muhammadiyah.

Actually, as a puritan-reformist movement, Muhammadiyah also sought to resolve the apparent conflict between indigenous belief and Middle Eastern orthodoxy. Among these beliefs was a symbolic mystical belief in relations with the 'Javanese Islam', a typical religion which syncretized the middle eastern orthodoxy and the native Javanese culture (See: Geertz, 1976). Even though in doctrinal terms Muhammadiyah defied the principles defended by the NU, in more practical terms, it obviously encroached on the traditional syncretism of the NU. These factors made the two organizations aggressively compete to recruit new members in Java. Undoubtedly, this situation had also contributed to Gus Dur's unfailing opposition to modernist Islam and Muhammadiyah. In the 1980s, however, the two organizations had the same 'enemy': Suharto.

By the beginning of the 1980s, the New Order had practically been successful in co-opting political activities in practically all layers of the society, the strategy that was canalized through schools, media, associations and professional groups (see; chapter 6, section 6.2). Meanwhile, the increasingly educated Moslem youths faced a shortage of establishments sufficiently independent to express their ideas on the political future of the country. Many thus turned to a place of 'refuge', using the mosque for political purposes with the pretext of religious activities. Thus, Suharto in spite of his strict control towards every layer of the society still allowed a political space in which 'Political Islam' could thrive.

In the later period, however, such freedom of religious activities transformed themselves into the more political ones as the networks of modern Islam mosques developed very quickly throughout the country²⁶⁷. In addition to the attractive religious speeches that they developed, these networks now set up other

²⁶⁷ About the development of political Islam in Indonesia since 1980s, see: ELIRAZ, G. (2007) *Islam and Polity in Indonesia: An Intriguing Case Study*, Washington, Hudson Institute.; also: EFFENDY, B. (2003) *Islam and the State in Indonesia*, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

possibilities: 'religious' organizations within communities which were at the same time sophisticated channels for their messages, ideas, as well as communication media. Being aware of the Islamic revolution which had shaken Iran, Suharto wished to thwart such a development amongst Modernist Islam. This mission would be entrusted to General Benny Moerdani.

As well as being an expert in secret operations, and especially 'underhand tactics' (see: chapter 4), Moerdani was also a devout catholic with a major aversion to Islam. The intelligence units of Moerdani had effectively carried out a bloody campaign against the Islamists throughout 1980s, and this policy brought about widespread hostility towards radical Moslems, including within the armed forces themselves (Aspinall, 2005, p.33-40). In the later period, the campaign of Moerdani produced a result opposite to that expected: while the objective of the operation was aimed to destroy the organizational capacity of modernist Islam, the result was of the contrary for it also led the moderate Moslems within this group to radicalize themselves²⁶⁸. Despite Moerdani's intensive 'attack', Political Islam was developing unrelentingly.

By 1990, Suharto started to become aware that the awkward approach of Moerdani was a dead end and had the tendency to create martyrs, radicalized critics of his regime, and perhaps growing dissent within the army. Giving up with the use naked force, Suharto chose a better strategy, namely co-optation²⁶⁹. After almost a decade of antagonism with respect to the leaders of Political Islam, the president started to support them by offering facilities, advantages and power. The showpiece of this tactic was the creation of *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia-the Association of the Islamic Intellectuals (ICMI)* in December 1990.

The idea of creating ICMI came from a varied group of influential Islamic thinkers. Discussions were intensive and frequent, with the dominant issue being whether the new organization would help modernist Islam to influence the government or vice versa (Vatikiotis, 1994, p.133-134). Suharto, for his part, clearly envisaged being able to manipulate the ICMI to suit his own political interests and chose a figure

²⁶⁸ About the development of Political Islam, See: AL-CHADAR & AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (2000) *Bencana Muslimin di Indonesia 1980-2000*. Amnesty International.

²⁶⁹ The similar strategy had been used by Suharto to control the political system—see: chapter 6 section: 6.2.

amongst his most loyal circle to direct this 'high profile' organization: the Minister for research and technology, B.J. Habibie. Habibie's appointment was greeted with suspicion among Modernist Islamists, but in fact this decision was politically brilliant. It was obvious that Habibie's accession to the ICMI's leadership was due to the fact that he was one of the most dedicated 'servants' of Suharto, while he would not be considered as a threat by the Islamists. He was known as a figure with no political ambitions so that the Modernist Islamists were of the belief that he would not play the same game as Moerdani²⁷⁰. In fact, Moslem intellectuals of ICMI understood that in order to survive, they needed the support of Suharto and sought to maintain harmonious relations with the regime. The ICMI and Habibie, thus, were well matched. Although the ICMI is a relatively moderate organization, Habibie (who was the Minister for technologies in Suharto's sixth cabinet) in practice had to make frequent incursions into Political Islam and intensive interactions with this group, the activities which sooner or later affirmed him as a prominent figure amongst the Islamist groups at the national scene.

The creation of ICMI had also helped certain figures gain national prominence; among them a professor of Political Science from a prestigious university in the central part of Java: Amien Rais. During his career as a lecturer, Rais had vigorously defended Islamic modernism while at his initial career in politics, occasionally Rais launched statements of anti-Christians and anti-Chinese (Forrester, 1999, p.68). These occasional remarks were of course polemical in nature, but they also helped Rais to understand the mobility of Political Islam in the archipelago. When the ICMI was formed, Rais was among the Modern Islamist politicians who clearly intended to make use of the organization as a lever for his political ambitions (Forrester, 1999, *ibid.*). This reinforces the truism that one serves an institution only insofar as it serves oneself.

While entering into Suharto's game, Rais used his attachment to the ICMI to create a national platform in support of Islamic modernism. In 1995, he was rewarded by what was unquestionably the most influential position in the community of Modernist Islam: the president of Muhammadiyah. In exchange of his engagement with the

²⁷⁰ Based on common sense

political force which was to abstain from criticizing Suharto, he obtained at the same time considerable support from Modernist Islam through Muhammadiyah. This development had also reinforced his status, which now rivaled that of Gus Dur from the NU.

Until the beginning of 1990s, Gus Dur and the NU had remained 'remote' from national policy making, the same position as during the pogrom of Moerdani in the 1980s. In such a situation Gus Dur had shown himself and his organization to be neither the defender nor the opponent of Suharto. However, this political posture changed immediately with the appearance of the ICMI in 1990. Gus Dur warned Suharto of the existence within the ICMI of certain groups who used to support the Modernist Islam—who were threatening national unity by promoting intolerance--- but since 1990 (the year of ICMI's establishment), these groups would end up at haunting them (Hefner, 2000, p.50). Irritated by this warning, Suharto started to threaten those who did not support the establishment of the ICMI, an approach which made Gus Dur become more 'talkative' and take a less moderate stance (Purdey, 2006, p.17). At the beginning of 1991, he founded his own organization, the Democratic Forum (Barton, 2002, p.184). As a reaction to the adhesion of modern Islamist intellectuals to ICMI, despite the threatening statements from Suharto, the Democratic Forum of Gus Dur started to weave close relations with the reformer-leaders of the PDI (Barton, 2002, p.184-186).

Suharto took action without delay to respond to this development in the political landscape. In 1994, when the NU prepared to re-elect Gus Dur for his third tenure as NU leader, the political advisers of the president pulled the strings to prevent his re-election and to support a more obedient figure. This operation almost succeeded: Gus Dur was re-elected by only a very narrow margin (See: Barton, 2002, p.204). At this moment, Suharto suffered another failure, that of the 'Megawati operation'. Together, Gus Dur and Megawati continued to agitate against Suharto.

Suharto's decision to directly intervene in PDI had obviously brought a significant 'evil' to the political balance in Indonesia during his later period. For more than two decades, the president had intelligently used the PDI and the Islamic party, PPP for his political ends. During the general election to be held once every five years, these

political parties usually obtained a vote which never reflected a real threat to the regime. During this time, meanwhile, the PDI and the PPP gave the impression to the public of their independence (relatively like the opposition parties). In the mean time Suharto could use this ‘illusion’ to maintain his authoritative regime within a democratic ‘standard’ which Brooker called ‘disguised democracy’ (See: Brooker, 2009) . But when he usurped Megawati’s position by force in 1996, Suharto destroyed the last vestiges of the PDI’s independence. It was very clear that the voters would be diverted into Non-Golkar parties or to abstain at the next legislative election. To abstain from the vote, however, was illegal and thus the sympathizers of the PDI (which was now under Suryadi’s leadership) tended to vote an alternative ‘party’ in order to express their opposition to government’s ‘Golkar’ party. The only available alternative was the PPP, the Islamist party which did not have relations with either Gus Dur or the ICMI.

The PPP was born at the end of 1970s as the result of the forced regrouping of various Islamic parties (including the NU²⁷¹) as part of Suharto’s efforts at political stabilization (See: chapter 3). But in the mid-1980s, Gus Dur had to withdraw his support for this party. Since that time, the party had fallen under the influence of Modernist Islam as well as other figures of the ICMI (who were the traditional adversaries of Gus Dur). In the 1997 election, however, Gus Dur’s support for this party had the possibility of returning. Even though the PPP seemed to be far from capable of becoming a coherent opposition party, it had a unique opportunity due to the political dynamics of the country: it had the potential to be a significant political force as it gathered figures and factions dissatisfied with the regime.

Later political developments, however, showed this prediction to be wrong and revealed that the golden opportunity of the PPP was only temporary. Being obliged to take a political stance, Gus Dur oscillated between support of the PPP against Suharto’s regime; support of Golkar against modernist Islam; and neutrality. In a decision which distilled doubts about his commitment to democratic principles, Gus Dur gave up his pro-democratic rhetoric and lined up with Golkar-- supporting Suharto. In Java East, the home of NU’s major constituency, enigmatic

²⁷¹ Gus Dur withdrew NU’s support from the PPP by the mid-1980s—known as ‘*Kembali ke Khittah 1926*—Back to the Original Platform as was decided in January 31, 1926.

ecclesiasticism (Gus Dur) was seen on a platform accompanied by the oldest daughter of Suharto (Tutut Suharto) and general Hartono, the chief of the army. Later, Gus Dur also took part in the election of the members of the National Assembly, the 'chosen' body to re-elect Suharto as president every five years (Barton, 2002, p.290-293).

The co-optation of Gus Dur by Golkar constituted another windfall for Suharto. The results of the next legislative election, announced in June 1997, came without much surprise---Golkar gained its sixth victory (see: table 1). Previously, Suharto had wedged Gus Dur and forced him to capitulate in spite of the dissatisfaction of political elites, but now Suharto was co-opting political elites and the state with outstanding success.

When the National Assembly held a session in 1998, there was not even the slightest doubt that the 77 year-old Suharto was going to be re-elected for his seventh reign. The only question was whom Suharto would choose as his vice-president. Suharto's decision on this matter was very important, as the chosen vice president would have a big opportunity to be his successor. Meanwhile, entering the last half of 1997, the Indonesian economy continued to fall and Suharto's power started to dwindle (see: chapter 5, section: 5.4). However, the president always refused to choose a successor, while, in his absence, the physical health of Suharto became the main object of speculation amongst the public (chapter 5, *Ibid.*). The major concern was that Suharto's sudden disappearance might provoke a political crisis which would damage the economy.

By the end of 1997, the American government started to take a sterner stance towards Jakarta. This was partly because a number of conservative members of the congress did not see any hope of Suharto regime implementing serious reforms despite the fact that American taxpayer money had been channeled into the Indonesian economy (Kivimaki, 2003, p.219-227). At the other pole, liberal activists within the congress emphasized the importance of applying more pressure to Suharto over human rights and specific issues such as the problem of East Timor (Kivimaki, 2003, p.228-230)

The American official pressures on Suharto came too late and had little impact on the events in Jakarta. When the Secretary of State of the United States, Madeleine Albright, encouraged Suharto to resign within several days of the statement (Tuesday May 20), the reformers in Indonesia considered the announcement an additional 'insult' from the American government, seeing as for more than thirty years Washington had been giving full back-up to Suharto's regime (during which time the Indonesian reformers were ignored) (Kivimaki, 2003, p.2). The impression became stronger, especially in the last minutes of Suharto's reign, that America's actions were nothing more than official pressure on Suharto to stabilize the economy. In fact, the majority of foreign powers were worried by the prospect of greater political and economic chaos if Suharto left power (Kivimaki, 2003, *Ibid*). Despite all pressures, from inside and from outside, the end of the reign of Suharto seemed still irreversible on the 20th of May. It was only at 9am in the morning of May 21st, when Suharto announced his resignation, that the 'Wind of change' was obvious for the stakeholders of Indonesian politics²⁷².

From the analysis of the factors leading to the fall of Suharto's regime, there is a strong impression that an alliance between political elites, students and the army against the regime did exist, but there is so far no clear evidence of this 'conspiracy theory'. Even though there were no signs of interaction between these three actors, the soldiers seemed to support the change of regime²⁷³. As mentioned in chapter 4, the doctrine of the 'double function' gave political rights to the army to interfere whenever the 'safety of the State' was 'in danger', while the instability from the beginning of May should have provided more than enough reason for a 'praetorian' intervention. Therefore, it might be worth speculating that the support of the soldiers for the people's mobilization (by abstaining) was amongst the main factors which led to the fall of the regime; or, that this kind of position was taken merely because the army did not want to further provoke the people's anger following certain incidents in the previous period; or, that the soldiers might simply want to preserve their prestige

²⁷² That Suharto's resignation happened on the 21st of May and that Indonesians celebrate the 'national awakening day' on the 20th of May must be a historical accident. The moment, however, was used by the reformers as a symbol of victory so that the collapse of the regime constituted the 'Second national awakening' - --The first Awakening was related to nationalist movement of Budi Utomo in 1908 (See: chapter 2).

²⁷³ The most assuring indicator was the unwillingness of the army to intervene despite the political situation being chaotic. This stance might be driven by the trend toward the professionalism of the military (See: chapter 4) or the army themselves being resistant to Suharto's regime.

and power in the case of regime change. The elites, especially those from the progressive-wing, seemed to face a situation similar to that of the army. There was no doubt that the reformers wanted the soldiers to remain distant from the political '*soubresouts*'—as there was political certainty despite instability. So, the reformers expected the soldiers to stay where they were, but wished them to make efforts to ensure the stability after the departure of Suharto. Nevertheless, up to the day of Suharto's resignation, nobody was sure which role the soldiers would, or even could, play.

As a transitory successor, vice-president Habibie was going to take an oath a few moments after Suharto read his statement of resignation. However, as the transition was 'confusing' and abrupt, the end of Suharto's regime left Indonesia in political chaos. The only hope was that, after the departure of Suharto, political reform and the economic re-establishment would follow. The immediate problem was that Habibie's reign lacked legitimacy (See: chapter 3).

To end this chapter, it is worth to have a look into Dan Slater's unpublished thesis on Southeast Asian state and to give a brief comment on it.

"Like the postcolonial world more generally, Southeast Asia exhibits tremendous variation in state capacity and authoritarian durability. *Ordering Power* draws on theoretical insights dating back to Thomas Hobbes to develop a unified framework for explaining both of these political outcomes. States are especially strong and dictatorships especially durable when they have their origins in 'protection pacts': broad elite coalitions unified by shared support for heightened state power and tightened authoritarian controls as bulwarks against especially threatening and challenging types of contentious politics" (Slater, 2005, no page).

If such a 'protection pact' existed in Indonesia during Suharto's presidential monarchy, then it would have been disrupted by the factors and crises that have been presented as explanations for the late 1990s collapse of Suharto's dictatorship and so for the opportunity to democratise Indonesia's state.

CONCLUSION

This conclusion collates and sums up the findings of the research in the previous chapters, and then briefly evaluates the usefulness of the paradigm developed for this project and applied in the research. The collating of the research findings on capabilities will confirm the thesis's argument that Indonesia was a prime example of a 'new' state experiencing the mechanical type of development and will therefore have confirmed the thesis's explanation of *what* occurred to the Indonesian state after the 1950s. The summation will deal with: 1) the controversies involved in the pre-independence era and 2) the factors involved in the pre-democratisation period will confirm that these controversies and factors help to explain *why* Indonesia imitated a Western model of the 'modern' state during the 1940s and 1950s and returned to democracy in the 1990s after some forty years of dictatorship.

Collating the Four Versions' Capabilities

As was described in chapter one, the first version of the Indonesian state, the parliamentary democracy of the 1950s, had highly complex policymaking institutions. However, Version 1 showed a *low* capability in the three areas of: 1) achieving legal legitimacy; 2) controlling the military and; 3) dealing with political disorder (see Appendix 3, Fig. 1). So this overall markedly low capability was *very disproportionate* to the highly complex nature of its policymaking institutions – and very typical of mechanical rather than organic state development.

The low capability of Version I for achieving legal legitimacy was described in chapter three and was indicated mainly by the state's inability to implement programmes and display governmental stability, particularly due to the short life of Indonesian cabinets. The government was not stable because it lacked support from a ruling party claiming the majority of support or support from a solid coalition in the parliament. The result was permanent deadlocks among political parties often escalating into extra-parliamentary conflicts and frictions causing ruling cabinets to fall.

Version 1's low capability for controlling the military was described in chapter four. Despite a high degree of efficiency and loyalty to the state, the Indonesian military during this period was extremely disorganized and not under the control of the civilian government. The soldiers were 'in the hands' of military commanders in regions or units rather than being commanded by the formal government: a) because these military units were 'self-created' amidst the reluctance of the civilian political leadership to raise a formal army following the end of the Japanese occupation and; b) because of the high level of political uncertainty from the period of revolution until mid-1950s. As a result, the Indonesian military under Version 1 was relatively independent from the civilian government, and, in fact, were more loyal to the military commanders than to civilian leaders.

The low capability of Version 1 for dealing with political disorder was described in chapters five and six. The state was incapable of handling the on-going disorders, especially in the regions, because of the complexities resulting from the uncertain political situation at both the domestic and international levels, and also because of the intensive disagreement amongst elites and social groups over the fragmentation of state ideology. Combined with the inability of civilian leaders to control the military, those weaknesses produced political tensions and rebellious movements across the country during this period, culminating in the separatist revolts that led to martial law and the replacement of parliamentary democracy by the personal rule of President Sukarno as a civilian presidential monarch.

As was described in chapter one, the shift in the late 1950s to Version 2 of the Indonesian state, a civilian presidential monarchy produced a marked reduction in the complexity of the policymaking institutions – That is, there was a marked reduction in the complexity of the formal policymaking institutions, but the informal 'rules of the game' of Sukarno's presidential monarchy were not markedly less complex than those of the parliamentary democracy that it replaced, so the overall reduction in complexity was only noticeable rather than very marked. However, Version 2 showed an *increased* capability in three areas: achieving legal legitimacy; controlling the military; and dealing with political disorder (see Appendix 3, Fig. 2). So this overall increased capability was *very disproportionate* to the marked

reduction in the complexity of the state's policymaking institutions and, as with the case of Version 1, was very typical of mechanical rather than organic state development.

Version 2's capability for achieving legal legitimacy was described in chapter three as higher than that of Version 1, but not as great as what might have been achieved by a presidential democracy rather than presidential monarchy. Sukarno's charismatic leadership as the 'founding father' and presidential monarch of Indonesia increased the legitimacy of the state as well as the legitimacy of his personal rule. Nonetheless, because he made himself a presidential monarch – a President 'for life' – he did not strengthen the legal legitimacy of the state in the way that, for example, the similarly charismatic George Washington strengthened the legal legitimacy of the newly created USA by serving only two four-year terms as President, and then refusing to seek another term.

Similarly, Version 2's capability for controlling the military was described in chapter four as being higher than that of Version 1 but not as great as might have been attained by transforming the military into a professional army. The civilian President Sukarno attempted to transform the Indonesian military into an unusual form of the revolutionary type of army which would be loyal to his Pancasila ideology, and to him personally as the leader of the revolution and the country's presidential monarch. The limits of this personal loyalty were revealed in 1965-1966, when the military replaced Sukarno with one of its commander, General Suharto.

The capability of Version 2 for dealing with political disorder was described in chapters five and six as being higher than that of Version 1, but again not as high as that which might have been attained by different methods. Despite Version 2's higher capability in controlling the military, its capability for dealing with political disorder was undermined by political factors, especially Sukarno's failure to reduce the disappointment among Islamists and leftists with his attempt to create national unity by re-adopting the 1945 Constitution and its commitment to Pancasila. The country therefore continued to experience social tumults and rebellious acts which culminated in 1965 with the communist-backed attempted coup d'état by a small faction within the military. Although the army dealt with this threat by defeating the

coup and destroying the communist movement, it was a tragic event that led to Sukarno being removed from the throne of his presidential monarchy and being replaced by a military man – General Suharto.

As has already been described above, this shift in the late 1960s to Version 3 of the Indonesian state produced a *minor reduction* in the complexity of the state's policymaking institutions. However, General Suharto's presidential monarchy showed a significant overall *increase* in capability across the three areas, a pattern that was more complicated than those of the previous two versions (see Fig. 3 in Appendix 3). The capability of Version 3 for achieving legal legitimacy was about the same as Version 2's, the capability for controlling the military was markedly higher than Version 2's and the capability for dealing with political disorder was higher, not markedly higher, than Version 2's. Therefore it was typical of mechanical rather than organic state development but was not as obviously mechanical as in the case of Versions 1 and 2.

The capability of Version 3 for achieving legal legitimacy was described in Chapter Three as being about the same as Sukarno's civilian rather than military form of presidential monarchy. Although General Suharto lacked the charismatic legitimacy of Sukarno, he achieved some performance legitimacy – through political stability and economic growth – that increased the legitimacy of the state. However, like Sukarno, by establishing a presidential monarchy he was personalising rather than legalising the government's 'right to rule'.

Version 3's military rather than civilian form of presidential monarchy was predictably more capable of controlling the military and Chapter Four described how it attained a markedly higher capability than Version 2. General Suharto became the leader of the military, reduced its policymaking influence and emphasised military professionalism more than President Sukarno had during his short reign as a presidential monarch. During the General's long reign as a presidential monarch he seems to have been unknowingly preparing the military for the professional role it is supposed to have in Version 4 of the Indonesian state.

The higher capability of Version 3 than Version 2 for dealing with political disorder was not as marked an increase as the increase in capability for controlling the military. Chapters Five and Six described how General Suharto's presidential monarchy had continuing problems with political disorder, even if the dilemma of East Timor is viewed as a special case and one that would have been more problematic for Versions 1 and 2 if they had been faced with it. Perhaps the best evidence of Version 3's higher but not markedly higher, capability for dealing with political disorder is that the fall of General Suharto's presidential monarchy in 1998 was not associated with the sort of violence seen in 1965 during the failed factional coup and its anti-communist aftermath, but was associated with some political disorder. Indonesian politics were still not very 'orderly' even after nearly half a century of independence and three different versions of the state.

As was described in chapter one, the shift in the late 1990s towards democratisation led to the presidential democracy of Version 4 and a *marked increase* in the complexity of the state's formal and informal policymaking institutions. However, Version 4 of the Indonesian state has shown about the same capability overall as the military presidential monarchy of Version 3, even if the pattern of capability across the three areas is more complicated than in the case of that earlier version. The new democracy's capability for achieving legal legitimacy was higher than Version 3's but the capability for controlling the military was lower than Version 3's, and the capability for dealing with political disorder was about the same as Version 3's (see: Appendix 3, Fig. 4). So the overall capability was about the same and therefore not proportional to the marked increase in the complexity of the policymaking institutions but was *not very* disproportional. Again, this was typical of mechanical rather than organic state development, but was not as obviously mechanical as in the case of Versions 1 and 2.

The capability of Version 4 for achieving legal legitimacy was higher than that of General Suharto's presidential monarchy because, as was described in chapter three, it was replacing his personal rule with the legally legitimate rule of democratically elected Presidents – who have also avoided the political problems that prevented Version 1's parliamentary democracy from achieving much legal legitimacy. In contrast, chapter four described how Version 4's capability for

controlling the military has been *lower* than that of General Suharto's military presidential monarchy, because the new democracy's elected civilian leaders have not been leaders of the military and because the Indonesian military is still not as professional as those in Western democracies or in India, Malaysia and Singapore. Finally, chapters five and six described how the capability of Version 4 for dealing with political disorder has been about the same as that of General Suharto's presidential monarchy, for the new democracy has not had to face the special case of East Timor but has still had to deal with separatist and Islamist insurgencies.

To conclude this collation of the research findings on capability, it will be argued that they have provided strong evidence that Indonesia's state development from the 1950s to the 1990s was indeed a prime example of the mechanical type of state development. It is strong evidence because all four versions of the Indonesian state show a lack of proportionality between: 1) *complexity* of policymaking institutions and; 2) *capability* in the three important areas for a new state of achieving legal legitimacy, controlling the military and dealing with political disorder. This might not appear to be *very* strong evidence because there is some variation in the degree of disproportion, both within and among versions, but such variation is only to be expected and is also typical of mechanical development – which differs from the organic in its *lack* of predictability, not in having a predictable degree of disproportionate relationship between complexity and capability.

Summing up the pre-independence controversies and pre-democratisation factors

A summing of chapters two and seven is concerned with explanations of *why* particular things occurred in the development of the Indonesian state rather than with explaining *what* occurred to this new state during its half-century of development from the 1950s to the 1990s. Chapter two described the pre-independence debates and controversies that help to explain why Indonesia adopted a Western, not Islamic, model of the state. These debates and controversies were related to two major issues or problems: the basis for a unitary rather than federal state and the secular versus Islamic nature of the new state's Constitution.

The controversy over the basis for a unitary Indonesian state involved an extreme polarisation in the perspectives of elites and other elements of Indonesian society because: 1) Indonesia had no real nationalist roots in the pre-colonial period and; 2) Indonesia is one of the most heterogeneous countries in the world in terms of ethnicity, religion, culture, and territorial divisions – and this extreme heterogeneity and diversity is also obvious in politics, society and the economy.

The debate over the secular versus Islamic nature of the state Constitution involved arduous competition between two dominant groups within the new state: Islamists and nationalists. The debate between exponents of the Shari'a and exponents of secular ideologies led to the creation of a 'compromise' ideology, Pancasila, which was enforced – despite the opposition of the Islamist majority – under the pretext of protecting national unity. The Islamist majority accepted Pancasila but only half-heartedly and only: 1) because the state of emergency meant that a new state had to be established in the shortest possible time; 2) because of the critical circumstances related to the possible return of Dutch colonial power through intervention by the United Nations and 3) because the secular 1945 Constitution, with its declaration of support for Pancasila, was stated by Sukarno to be '*temporary, swift, and revolutivegrondwet*' and he promised to create a more comprehensive constitution at a later date.

The 1945 Constitution was indeed replaced in 1950 by a new constitution, which was the constitutional basis of Indonesia's new, independent state and of its first version of a Western model of the state. This seems surprising because the 1950 Constitution was secular, did not refer to Pancasila, and was a parliamentary-democracy version of the Western model of the state. The question then becomes, why did Indonesia opt for the 1950 Constitution instead of adopting the presidential-democracy version that it had developed, with 'local' modifications, in the Pancasila-supporting 1945 Constitution? However, this is a topic for further research in another thesis or book. The key question here is why pre-independence Indonesia opted for a Western, not Islamic, model of the state and therefore created the *opportunity* for adopting in 1950 the parliamentary-democracy version of the Western model – and for later adopting three other versions of the Western model of the state. It is this

question that chapter two answers in its description of the pre-independence controversies and debates concerning the nature of the new state that would be created when Indonesia became independent.

Similarly, chapter seven describes some factors that help to explain why Indonesia democratised in the late 1990s and therefore created the *opportunity* for adopting the presidential-*democracy* version of the Western model of state. The chapter has not attempted to explain why democratising Indonesia chose a presidential rather than parliamentary version of democracy or, in other words, why Indonesia developed a new, presidential-democracy version of the state instead of returning to the parliamentary democracy of version 1. Instead chapter seven identifies factors that were crucial in bringing about the democratisation that brought down Suharto's presidential monarchy and ensured that it would be replaced by a democratic version – whether presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary – of the Western model of the state.

These democratising factors can be summed up as four different but interacting crises afflicting Suharto's presidential monarchy: 1) an economic crisis; 2) a political crisis; 3) a crisis in the presidential monarchy's military support and; 4) a crisis in the presidential monarchy's use of semi-competitive elections to provide it with a democratic disguise. The economic crisis arose from the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis, which led to low investment, capital flight, a failed banking system, a KKN (corruption, complicity, and nepotism) pandemic, decreasing international monetary backup, a wave of unemployment, and a drop in economic productivity. The political crisis arose from a rapid decrease of political support for Suharto's regime, with increasing pressure from students and intellectual circles and even from elites within the Parliament and National Assembly. The crisis in military support arose from an anti-Suharto inclination amongst the generals, the military's re-orientation towards professionalism, and tacit military support for the political opposition to Suharto. (This crisis was particularly threatening to stability because the military had been the key supporters of Suharto, who had become the leader of the military and had relied on their support as his loyal followers not merely as self-interested allies who supported him for the same sort of self-interested reasons that they had supported Sukarno until they removed him in 1966). The crisis in the use of semi-competitive elections

arose from the disintegration of three-party semi-competitive system because two of the three parties, the PPP/Islamists and PDI/Nationalists, were losing their supporters after : a) the two biggest Muslim organizations in the country (NU and Muhammadiyah) had withdraw their support from the PPP and; b) the growth of a new nationalist party (led by the daughter of the long-dead Sukarno) that had become the main rival of President Suharto's political status quo.

The factors associated with these four interacting crises were more than sufficient to bring down Suharto's presidential monarchy and it is perhaps surprising that his dictatorship had a lengthy survival from the 1970s to the 1990s global wave of democratisation. With Indonesia finally following the global democratizing trend, it was a question of what form of democracy would be introduced to replace Suharto's presidential monarchy. The choice of a presidential rather than parliamentary form of democracy may have been predictable but chapter seven was not concerned with explaining why Indonesia developed a new, fourth version of the Western model of the state instead of returning to the parliamentary democracy of the first version: That too is a topic for 'further research'.

Evaluating the paradigm

The usefulness of the organic-versus-mechanical typology of state development is limited to explaining what form of state development occurred in Indonesia from the 1950s to the 1990s. It may not be as useful in explaining *why* state development took this form, and indeed why it produced these four particular versions of the state and in this particular sequence – parliamentary democracy, civilian presidential monarchy, military presidential monarchy and presidential democracy. In fact the paradigm has been a disappointment as a means of explaining the sequences of these developments, and clearly it needs more articulation so that it will provide some theories about why state development took this form, produced these particular versions and produced them at these particular times in the modern history of Indonesia.

This development of the paradigm seems to be in line with what Thomas S. Kuhn suggested in the classic definition of a scientific paradigm that he provided in his

book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. 'A paradigm is an accepted model or pattern' and in a science 'is an object for further articulation and specification under new or more stringent conditions' (Kuhn, 1970, p.23). So the organic-mechanical paradigm of state development should be subjected to the 'further articulation and specification' of developing some theories that explain why this form, in these versions and at these times. Clearly such theories are also testing the paradigm 'under new or more stringent conditions' but another way of adding new or more stringent conditions would be to apply the paradigm to a broader range of examples and issues than just the Indonesian case and the issues that arise from it. For example, the paradigm might be applied to the many *other* post-colonial 'new' states that, like Indonesia, became independent in the 1940s-60s era. Or it might be applied to *another historical era*, such as the creation and development of post-colonial 'new' states in the American hemisphere in the 1700s-1800s or even the creation and development of the *European* states – the 'old' states – by explaining why France experienced that predominantly mechanical type of state development in the 1789 to 1958 era of the First to Fifth Republics that is described in the thesis's Appendix 2.

REFERENCES

BOOKS

- ABDULGANI, R. (1973) *Nationalism, Revolution, and Guided Democracy in Indonesia*, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University.
- ADAMS, C. (1966) *Bung Karno Penyambung Lidah Rakyat Indonesia*, Jakarta, Gunung Agung.
- ADAMS, C. (1966) *Sukarno: An Autobiography as Told to Cindy Adams*.
- ALI, M. (1963) *Perjuangan Feodal*, Bandung, Ganaco.
- ALISJAHBANA, S. T. (1961) *Indonesia in the Modern World*, Michigan, Office for Asian Affairs, Congress for Cultural Freedom.
- AL-ZASTROUW NG (1999) *Siapa Sih Sampeyan?: Tafsir Teoritik atas Tindakan dan Pernyataan Gus Dur*, Jakarta, Erlangga.
- ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (1961) *Some aspects of Indonesian politics under the Japanese occupation : 1944-1945.* , Ithaca, N.Y. , Cornell University. Dept. of Far Eastern Studies.
- ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (1972) *Java in Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance 1944-1946*, Jakarta, PT Equinox Publishing Indonesia.
- ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (1983) *Imagined communities : reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*, London, Verso.
- ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (1990) *Language and Power: Exploring political cultures in Indonesia*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
- ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (1999) *Indonesian Nationalism Today and in the Future*, Ithaca, N.Y., Southeast Asia Program Publications, Cornell University
- ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (Ed.) (2002) *Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia*, Ithaca, Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications.
- ANONYMOUS (1964) *Pantjasila the Basis of the State of the Republic of Indonesia*, Jakarta, National Committee for Commemoration of the Birth of Pantja Sila.
- ANSHARI, E. S. (1997) *Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945: Sebuah Konsensus Nasional Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia 1945-1949*, Jakarta, Gema Insani Press.

- ANTLOV, H. & CEDERROTH, S. (2004) *Elections in Indonesia: The New Order and Beyond*, London, New York, Roudledge Curzon.
- ANWAR, D. F. (1999) The Habibie Presidency. IN FORRESTER, G. (Ed.) *Post-Soeharto Indonesia : renewal or chaos?* . New York, St. Martin's Press.
- ARISANDI, S. (1983) *Ki Hadjar Dewantara*, Ibu Sejati.
- ARISTOTLE (1923) *Politics*, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- ARIWIADI (1965) *Gerakan Operasi Militer VII: Penjelesaian Peristiwa Atjeh*, Jakarta, Mega Bookstore.
- ASPINALL, E. (2005) *Opposing Suharto: compromise, resistance, and regime change in Indonesia*, Chicago, Stanford University Press.
- BADIE, B. & BIRNBAUM, P. (1979) *Sociologie de l'Etat*, Paris, Bernard Grasset.
- BAMUALIM, C. S. (Ed.) (2002) *Communal Conflicts in Contemporary Indonesia*, Jakarta, Pusat Bahasa dan Budaya IAIN Jakarta & Adenauer Foundation.
- BARDOSONO (1956) *Peristiwa Sulawesi Selatan*, Jakarta, Jajasan Pustaka Militer.
- BARTON, G. (2002) *Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid* Jakarta, Equinox Publishing.
- BARTON, G. (2006) *Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid*, Jakarta, PT Equinox Publishing Indonesia.
- BASTIN, J. & BENDA, H. J. (1968) *A history of modern Southeast Asia : colonialism, nationalism, and decolonization*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall.
- BENDA, H. J. (1958) *The crescent and the rising sun : Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945.* , The Hague, Van Hoeve.
- BHAKTI, I. N. (1998) Chronology of Events Leading to The Fall of President Suharto. IN FORESTER, G. & MAY, R. J. (Eds.) *The Fall of Suharto*. Bathurst, Crawford House Publishing.
- BHAKTI, I. N. (1998) Trends in Indonesian Student Movements in 1998. IN FORRESTER, G. & MAY, R. J. (Eds.) *The fall of Soeharto*. Bathurst, Crawford House.
- BLACKSTONE, W. S. (1973) *The Sovereignty of The Law: Selections from Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England*, London, MacMillan.
- BLANCHARD, F. C. (1991) *L'Indonésie, l'armée et le pouvoir: De la Révolution au développement*, Paris, Asian Research L'harmattan.

- BLONDEL, J. (1987) *Political Leadership: Towards a General Analysis*, London, SAGE Publications.
- BODIN, J. (1962) *The Six Books of A Commonwealth (translation)*, Massachusetts, Harvard Univ. Press.
- BOLAND, B. J. (1971) *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff.
- BRACKMAN, A. C. (1963) *Indonesian Communism : A History*, New York, Praeger.
- BRESNAN, J. (1993) *Managing Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy*, New York, Columbia University Press.
- BROOKER, P. (1995) *Twentieth-Century Dictatorships: The ideological One-Party States*, Macmillan.
- BROOKER, P. (2000) *Non-Democratic Regimes*, St martin's Press.
- BROOKER, P. (2009) *Non-Democratic Regimes*, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan.
- BROOKER, P. (2010) *Leadership in Democracy: From Adaptive Response to Entrepreneurial Initiatives*, Palgrave Macmillan.
- BURNHAM, P., GILLAND, K., GRANT, W. & LAYTON-HENRY, Z. (2004) *Research Methods in Politics*, Hampshire, Palgrave Mcmillan.
- CHALMERS, I. & HADIZ, V. R. (1997) *The Politics of Economic Development in Indonesia: Contending Perspectives*, New York, Routledge.
- COCHRANE, A. & ANDERSON, J. (1986) States and Systems of States. IN ANDERSON, J. (Ed.) *The Rise of The Modern States*. Sussex, Wheatsheaf Books Ltd.
- COHEN, R. (1988) Legitimacy, Illegitimacy and state formation. IN COHEN, R. & TOLAND, J. D. (Eds.) *State Formation and Political Legitimacy: Political Anthropology* New Jersey, New Brunswick&Oxford.
- COHEN, R. & TOLAND, J. D. (Eds.) (1988) *State Formation and Political Legitimacy: Political Anthropology*, New Jersey, New Brunswick&Oxford.
- COLOMBIJN, F. & LINDBLAD, J. T. (Eds.) (2002) *Roots of Violence in Indonesia: Contemporary Violence in Historical Perspective*, Leiden, KITLV Press.
- CRIBB, R. (2001) Independence of Java? New National Project for An Old Empire. IN LLOYD, G. & SMITH, S. (Eds.) *Indonesia Today : Challenges of History*. Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- CRIBB, R. (2008) *Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People's Militia and the Indonesian Revolution 1945-1949*, London, Equinox Publishing.

- CRIBB, R. & KAHIN, A. (2004) *Historical Atlas of Indonesia*, Lanham, Scarecrow Press.
- CROUCH, H. (1978) *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
- CROUCH, H. (1998) Indonesian Democracy. IN FORRESTER, G. & MAY, R. J. (Eds.) *The fall of Soeharto*. Bathurst, Crawford House.
- DAALDER, H. (1962) *The Role of The Military in the Emerging Countries*, S-Gravenhage, Mouton & CO.
- DAHM, B. (1969) *Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence* Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press.
- DAQUILA, T. (2005) *The Economies of Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand*, Nova Publishers.
- DIJK, V. (1981) *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff.
- DJIWANDONO, S. (1999) The Rupiah: One Year After Its Float. IN FORRESTER, G. (Ed.) *Post-Soeharto Indonesia : Renewal or Chaos?* . New York, St. Martin's Press.
- DOWER, J. W. (1986) *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*, New York, Pantheon Books.
- DREA ET.AL. (2006) *Researching Japanese War Crimes Records: Introductory Essays*, Washington, DC, National Archives and Records Administration for the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group.
- DUFFY-TOFT, M. (2003) *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press.
- DURKHEIM, E. (1950) *Leçons de Sociologie*, Paris, PUF.
- DURKHEIM, E. (1960) *De la division du travail social*, Paris, PUF.
- DURKHEIM, E. (1975) *Textes, Vol. III: Fonctions Sociales et Institutions*, Paris, Maisons des Sciences de l'Homme.
- DURKHEIM, E. (1997) *The Division of Labour in Society*, Illinois, Free Press.
- DUVERGER, M. (1950) *Sociologie des Partis Politiques* *Traité de Sociologie*. Paris, PUF.
- EASTON, D. (1965) *A Framework for Political Analysis*, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall.

- EASTON, D. (1967) *The Political System: an inquiry into the state of political science*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf.
- EFFENDY, B. (2003) *Islam and the State in Indonesia*, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- EKLOF, S. (2005) *Power and Political Culture in Suharto's Indonesia: The Indonesian Democratic Party and the Decline of the New Order (1986-1998)*, NIAS Press.
- ELIRAZ, G. (2007) *Islam and Polity in Indonesia: An Intriguing Case Study*, Washington, Hudson Institute.
- ELSON, R. E. (2001) *Suharto: a political biography*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- EMMERSON, D. K. (2001) *Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Negara, Ekonomi, Masyarakat, Transisi*, Jakarta, The Asia Foundation.
- EMMERSON, D. K. (2005) What is Indonesia ? IN BRESNAN, J. (Ed.) *Indonesia: The Great Transition*. Oxford, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- FAN, K.-S. (1982) *Women in Southeast Asia: A Bibliography*, Boston, G.K. Hall.
- FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW (1967) *Far Eastern Economic Review Yearbook*.
- FEDERSPIEL, H. M. (1998) *A Dictionary of Indonesian Islam*, Ohio, Ohio University Press.
- FEENER, R. M. (2007) *Muslim Legal Thought in Modern Indonesia*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- FEITH, H. (1962) *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*. , Ithaca, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University Press.
- FEITH, H. (1963) The Dynamics of Guided Democracy. IN MCVEY, R. T. (Ed.) *Indonesia, Human Relations Area*. New Haven, Files Press.
- FEITH, H. & CASTLE, L. (1970) *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
- FINER, S. (1976) *The Man on Horseback*, Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- FORRESTER, G. (1998) A Jakarta Diary, May 1998. IN FORESTER, G. M., R.J. (Ed.) *The fall of Suharto*. Bathurst, Crawford House Publishing.
- FORRESTER, G. (1999) *Post-Suharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos?*, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

- FRIEDRICH, C. J. (1966) An Introductory Note on Revolution. IN FRIEDRICH, C. J. (Ed.) *Revolution: NOMOS VIII*. New York, Atherton Press.
- FUKUYAMA, F. (2004) *State-Building: Governance and World Order in The 21st Century*, Ithaca 2004, Cornell University Press.
- GEERTZ, C. (1976) *The Religion of Java*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- GEERTZ, C. (1980) *Negara : the theatre state in nineteenth-century Bali*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- GEERTZ, H. (1963) Indonesian Cultures and Communities. IN MCVEY, R. T. (Ed.) *Indonesia*. New Haven, HRAF Press.
- GELLNER, E. (1983) *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell Ltd.
- GLASSBURNER (1971) *The Economy of Indonesia*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
- GOLD, J. (1970) *The Stand-by Arrangements of the International Monetary Fund*, Washington.
- GORDON (1966) *The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia*, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall.
- GURR, T. D. & MCCLELLAND (1971) *Political Performance*, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications.
- HAMKA (1943) Sikap dan Kewajiban Kaoem Moeslimin di Zaman Baroe. *Moeslimin Soematra Baroe*. Medan, Badan Penjiaran Bunka-Ka.
- HAMMOND, M. (1951) *City-state and World-state in Greek and Roman Political Theory until Augustus*, Massachusetts, Harvard Univ. Press.
- HANDERSON, C. (1998) *Asia Falling : Making Sense of the Asian Crisis and its Aftermath*, New York, McGraw-Hill.
- HARRIS, S. (1999) *Indonesia di Ambang Perpecahan*, Jakarta, Penerbit Erlangga.
- HARSONO, G. (1985) *Cakrawala Politik Era Sukarno*, Jakarta, Inti Idayu Press.
- HARVEY, B. S. (1977) *Permesta: Half A Rebellion*, Ithaca, SEAP Publications.
- HASEGAWA, T. (2007) *The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals*, California, Stanford University Press.
- HATTA, M. (1969) *Sekitar Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945*, Jakarta, Tintamas.

- HEFNER, R. W. (2000) *Civil Islam : Muslims and democratization in Indonesia*, Princeton, NJ Princeton University Press.
- HEFNER, W. R. (2005) Social Legacies and Possible Futures. IN BRESNAN, J. (Ed.) *Indonesia: The Great Transition*. Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- HEGEL & FRIEDRICH, G. W. (1999) *Political Writings*, London, New York, Cambridge University Press.
- HEINZ, A. (1967) Economic Disorder and the Task Ahead. IN TAN, T. K. (Ed.) *Sukarno's Guided Indonesia*. Brisbane, Jacaranda.
- HILL, H. (1998) The Indonesian Economy: The Strange and Sudden Death of A Tiger. IN FORRESTER, G. & MAY, R. J. (Eds.) *The Fall of Soeharto*. Bathurst, Crawford House.
- HILL, H. (2000) *The Indonesian Economy in Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Lessons*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- HIMAWAN, C. (1980) *Foreign Investment in Indonesia*, Jakarta, Gunung Agung.
- HOBBS, T. (1996) *Leviathan*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- HUGHES, J. (1967) *Indonesian Upheavals*, New York, David McKay.
- HUNTINGTON, S. (1957) *The Soldier and the State*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
- HUNTINGTON, S. (1968) *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press.
- HUNTINGTON, S. (1991) *The Third Wave: Democratization in The Late Twentieth Century*, London, University of Oklahoma Press.
- HUXLEY, T. (2002) *Disintegrating Indonesia? Implication for Regional Security (Adelphi paper 349)*, Oxford, Oxford University Press for The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
- INDONESIA (1972) *Cuplikan Sejarah Perjuangan TNI-Angkatan Darat*, Jakarta, Dinas Sejarah Militer, Angkatan Darat.
- JACKSON, K. D. & MOELIONO, J. (1971) Participation in Rebellion: The Darul Islam in West Java. IN LIDDLE, R. W. (Ed.) *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia*. New Haven, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph Series Vol 49.
- JANOWITZ, M. (1960) *The Professional Soldier*, Chicago, Free Press.

- JENKINS, D. (1984) *Suharto and His Generals*, Ithaca, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University.
- KAHIN, G. M. (1952) *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia.* , Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press.
- KAHIN, G. M. (Ed.) (1964) *Government and politics in Southeast Asia*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
- KAHIN, G. M. (2003) *Southeast Asia: A Testament*, London, Roudledge.
- KAUFMAN, G., KRUEGER, T. & HUNTER, W. (1999) *The Asian Financial Crisis: Origins, Implications and Solutions*, Springer.
- KELL, T. (1995) *The Roots od Acehnese Rebellion*, Ithaca, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project.
- KINGSBURY, D. (2000) TNI and The Militias. IN KINGSBURY, D. (Ed.) *Guns and Ballot Boxes*. Victoria, Monash Asia Institute.
- KIVIMAKI, T. (2003) *US-Indonesia Hegemonic Bargaining: Strength of weakness*, Burlington, Ashgate Publishing Co.
- KLINKEN, H. V. (2000) Taking the Risk, Paying the Price. IN KINGSBURY, D. (Ed.) *Guns and ballot Boxes*. Victoria, Monash Asia Institute.
- KRASNER, S., D (1999) *Sovereignty : Organized Hypocrisy*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press.
- KRISHNA, B. A. (1999) *Bersama Bung Karno Menggapai Jiwa Merdeka*, Jakarta, Gramedia Pustaka Utama.
- KUHN, T. S. (1970) *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.
- KUNIO, Y. (1988) *The Rise of Ersatz Capitalism in Souteast Asia*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- KYMLICKA, W. (1995) *Multicultural Citizenship : A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- KYMLICKA, W. (2001) *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship* Oxford [England] ; New York, Oxford University Press.
- LEBRA, J. C. (1975) *Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II: Selected Readings and Documents*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- LEGGE, J. D. (1957) *The Problems of Regional Autonomy in Contemporary Indonesia*, Ithaca, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project.

- LEGGE, J. D. (1964) *Indonesia*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall.
- LEGGE, J. D. (1972) *Sukarno: A Political Biography*, London, Allen Lane the Penguin Press.
- LEV, D. S. (1966) *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics 1957-1959*, Ithaca, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University.
- LIDDLE, R. W. (1973) Modernizing Indonesian Politics. IN LIDDLE, R. W. (Ed.) *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia, Monograph Series*. New Haven, Yale University.
- LIDDLE, R. W. (Ed.) (1973) *Political participation in Modern Indonesia*, New Haven, Yale University Press.
- LIDDLE, W. (1970) *Ethnicity, Party and National Integration*, New Haven Yale University Press.
- LIPSET, S. M. (1963) *The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective*, London, Heinemann.
- LOMBARD, D. (1990) *Le Carrefour Javanais : Essai d'Histoire Globale*, Paris, Editions de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales.
- LOWRY, R. (1996) *The Armed Forces in Indonesia*, Sidney, Allen & Unwin.
- MACFARLING, I. (Ed.) (1995) *General Sudirman: The Leader who Finally Destroyed Colonialism in Indonesia*, Canberra, Australian Defense Studies Center.
- MACHIARELLI, N. (1521) *The Art of War*, Feedbooks.
- MACHIARELLI, N. (1970) *The Discourses*, Harmondsworth, England, Penguin Books.
- MACHIARELLI, N. & BULL, G. A. (1961) *The Prince*, Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- MACKIE, J. (1967) *Problems of Indonesian Inflation*, Ithaca, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project.
- MAEKAWA, K. (2006) The Heiho during the Japanese Occupation in Indonesia. IN KRATOSKA, P. H. (Ed.) *Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire*. Singapore, NUS Press.
- MAIR, P. (1996) Comparative Politics: An Overview. IN GOODIN, R., AND KLINGEMAN, H.D. (Ed.) *A New Handbook of Political Science*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- MAKKA, M. (1999) *Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie : His Life and Career, Biography*, Jakarta, CV Inti Surya.

- MALLEY, M. (2001) Daerah: Sentralisasi dan Perlawanan. IN EMMERSON, D. (Ed.) *Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Negara, Ekonomi, Masyarakat, dan Transisi*. Jakarta, The Asia Foundation.
- MANN, R. (1998) *Economic Crisis in Indonesia: The Full Story*, London, Gateway Books.
- MANN, R. (1999) *Plots and Schemes that Brought Down Suharto*, Jakarta, Gateway Books.
- MANNING, C., AND DIERMEN, V. (Ed.) (2000) *Indonesia in Transition : Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis*, London, Zedbooks.
- MARX, K., ENGELS, F. & LEVITSKY, S. (1996) *Das Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, Regnery Gateway.
- MARYANOF, G. S. (1959) *Decentralization in Indonesia as a Political Problem*, Ithaca, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project.
- MAS'OED, M. (1989) *Ekonomi dan Struktur Politik Orde Baru 1966-1971*, Jakarta, Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3ES).
- MCDONALD, H. (1980) *Suharto's Indonesia*, Melbourne, Fontana & Collines.
- MCGLYNN, J. H. & SULISTYO, H. (2007) *Indonesia in the Soeharto years: issues, incidents and images*, Singapore, NUS Press.
- MCINTYRE, A. (1997) *In search of Megawati Sukarnoputri*, Clayton, Monash Asia Institute.
- MCVEY, R. T. (1996) Building Behemoth: Indonesian Constructions of the Nation-State. IN LEV, D. S. & MCVEY, R. T. (Eds.) *Making Indonesia: Essays on Modern Indonesia in Honor of George McT. Kahin*. Ithaca, Cornell University.
- MCVEY, R. T. & FEITH, H. (1963) *Indonesia*, New Haven, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University.
- MELLOR, R. E. H. (1989) *Nation, State, and Territory*, London, Routledge.
- MIGDAL, J. S. (1988) *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in The Third World*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- MOERTOPO, A. (1974) *Strategi Politik Nasional*, Jakarta, Yayasan proklamasi, CSIS.
- MORGENTHAU, H. J. & THOMPSON, K. W. (1948) *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York, Alfred A.Knoft.

- MORRIS, C. W. (1998) *An essay on the Modern State*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- MORTIMER, R. (1974) *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
- MUHAMMAD, M. (2005) Kebijakan Fiskal di Masa Krisis 1997. IN SOESASTRO, H., BUDIMAN, A., TRIASWATI, N., ALISJAHBANA, A. & ADININGSIH, S. (Eds.) *Pemikiran dan Permasalahan Ekonomi di Indonesia dalam Setengah Abad Terakhir*. Jakarta, Isei-Penerbit Kanisius.
- MURTOPO, A. (1974) *Strategi Politik Nasional*, Jakarta, CSIS.
- NASUTION, A. H. (1955) *Tjatan2 Sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia*, Jakarta, Pembimbing.
- NASUTION, A. H. (1964) *Toward The People's Army*, Jakarta, CV Delegasi.
- NASUTION, A. H. (1970) *TNI Vol. 1*, Jakarta, Seruling Masa.
- NASUTION, A. H. (1971) *Kekaryaan ABRI*, Jakarta, Seruling Masa.
- NASUTION, A. H. (1982) *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Vol. 1*, Jakarta, Gunung Agung.
- NATSIR, M. (1968) *M. Natsir Versus Soekarno: Persatuan Agama Dengan Negara*, Padang, Jajasan Pedidikan Islam.
- NIEUWENHUIJZE, C. A. O. V. (1958) *Aspects of Islam in Post Colonial Indonesia*, The Hague, Bandung, W. Van Hoeve.
- NISHIHARA, M. (1972) *Golkar and the Indonesian Elections of 1971*, Ithaca, Cornell Indonesia Modern Project.
- NITISASTRO, W. (1965) *Masalah-masalah Ekonomi dan Faktor-faktor IPOLEKSOS*, Jakarta, Leknas/LIPI.
- NOER, D. (1973) *The modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942*, New York, Oxford University Press.
- NOER, D. (1990) *Mohammad Hatta: Biografi Politik*, Jakarta, LP3ES.
- NORDLINGER, E. (1977) *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, Enlewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall.
- NOTOSUSANTO, N. (1979) *Tentara Peta Pada Jaman Pendudukan Jepang*, Jakarta, Gramedia.
- NOTOSUSANTO, N. (1984) *Pejuang dan Prajurit*, Jakarta, Sinar Harapan.

- NOTOSUSANTO, N. & SALEH, I. (1968) *The Coup Attempt of the 'September 30th Movement' in Indonesia*, Jakarta, Pembimbing Masa.
- O'ROURKE, K. (2002) *Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post-Suharto Indonesia*, New South Wales, Allen&Unwin.
- PALMER, I. (1978) *Indonesian Economy Since 1965*, London, Frank Cass.'
- PALMER, L. (1973) *Communists in Indonesia*, New York, Anchor.
- PANITIA LIMA (1977) *Uraian Pancasila*, Jakarta, Mutiara.
- PAUKER, G. J. (1973) *The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management*, California, The Rand Corporation.
- PEACOCK, J. L. (1973) *Indonesia :An Anthropological Perspective*, Pacific Palisades, California, Goodyear.
- PELZER (1963) Physical and Human Resources Patterns. IN MCVEY, R. T. (Ed.) *Indonesia*. New Haven, HRAF Press.
- PEOESPONEGORO, M. D. (1992) *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia: Jaman Jepang dan Jaman Republik Indonesia*, Jakarta, PT Balai Pustaka.
- PERLMUTTER, A. (1974) *Egypt: The Praetorian State*, New Jersey, Transaction Inc.
- PERLMUTTER, A. (1977) *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On professional, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press.
- PERLMUTTER, A. (1978) *Politics and the Military in Israel 1967-1977*, F. Cass.
- POGGE, T. W. M. (2002) *World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms*, Cambridge, Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers.
- POSTHUMUS, G. A. (1971) *The Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia*, Rotterdam University Press.
- POUR, J. (1993) *Murdani: Profile of A Soldier's Statesman*, Jakarta, Yayasan kejuangan Panglima Besar Soedirman.
- PRINGGODIGDO, A. K. (1967) *Sejarah Pergerakan Rakyat Indonesia*, Jakarta, Dian Rakyat.
- PURDEY, J. (2006) *Anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia, 1996-1999*, University of Hawaii Press.

- RAB, T. (1999) *Menuju Riau Berdaulat: Penjarahan Minyak Riau*, Pekanbaru, Yayasan Penerbit Sosial Budaya Riau.
- RALIBY, O. (1953) *Documenta Historica*, Jakarta, Bulan Bintang.
- RAMADHAN, K. (1994) *Soemitro: Dari Pangdam Mulawarman Sampai Pangkopkamtib*, Jakarta, Pustaka Sinar Harapan.
- REID, A. (1939) *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680*, New Haven, Yale University Press.
- REID, A. (2006) *Verandah of Violence: The Background of the Aceh Problem*, Singapore, National University of Singapore Press.
- RICKLEFS, M. C. (1981) *A History of Modern Indonesia, c. 1300 to the present*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
- RIES, P. (2000) *Asian Storm: The Economic Crisis Examined*, Tuttle Publishing.
- ROBISON, R. & HADIZ, V. R. (2004) *Reorganizing Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchi in an Age of Market*, Routledge
- ROSENAU, J. N. (Ed.) (1969) *Linkage Politics*, New York, The Free Press.
- ROUSSEAU, J. J. (1986) *The Social Contract* Markham, Ont, Fitzhenry & Whiteside.
- SAID, S. (1991) *Genesis of Power: General Sudirman and the Indonesian Military in Politics 1945-1949*, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Allen & Unwin.
- SAID, S. (2006) *Suharto's Armed Forces: Problems of Civil Military Relations in Indonesia*, Jakarta, Pustaka Sinar Harapan.
- SAMSUDDIN (Ed.) (1972) *Sari Berita dan Pendapat: Pemilihan Umum 1971*, Jakarta, Lembaga Pendidikan dan Konsultasi Pers.
- SASTROAMIJOYO, A. (1979) *Milestone on My Journey: The Memoirs of Ali Sastroamijoyo, Indonesian Patriot and Political Leader*, Queensland, University of Queensland Press.
- SAUNDERS, J. (1998) *Academic Freedom in Indonesia: Dismantling Suharto-era Barriers*, Human Rights Watch.
- SCHLESINGER JR., A. M. (1965) *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin.
- SCHMUTZER, E. (1977) *Dutch Colonial Policy and the Search for Identity in Indonesia 1920-1931*, Leiden, E.J. Brill's Archive.

- SCHWARTZ, A. (1994) *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability*, New South Wales, Allen&Unwin.
- SHARMA, S. D. (2003) *The Asian Financial Crisis: Crisis, Reform, and Recovery*, Manchester University Press.
- SHIRER, W. L. (1960) *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany*, New York, Simon & Schuster.
- SHRIEKE, B., JOHANNES, OTTO (1966) *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, The Hague, Van Hoeve.
- SIDJABAT, W. B. (1965) *Religious Tolerance and the Christian Faith*, Jakarta, Badan Penerbit Kristen.
- SIEGEL, J. T. (1998) *A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: Counter-Revolution Today*, Durham, Duke University Press.
- SILLS, D. L. (Ed.) (1968) *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, USA, Crowell collier & Mc Millan Inc.
- SIMATUPANG, T. B. (1972) *Report from Banaran: Experiences during the People's (Translated by Benedict Anderson and Efinbeth Grave)*, New York, Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University.
- SIMATUPANG, T. B. (1980) *Role of the armed forces in the development of Pancasila, the Indonesian national philosophy (Original text: Peranan Angkatan Perang dalam Negara Pancasila yang Membangun: Ceramah tanggal 2 Pebruari 1980 di Gedung Kebangkitan Nasional Jakarta)*, Jakarta, Yayasan Idayu.
- SIMATUPANG, T. B. (1981) *Pelopor dalam Perang, Pelopor dalam Damai*, Jakarta, Sinar Harapan.
- SIMORANGKIR, J. C. T. & SAY, M. R. B. *Konstitusi dan Konstituante Indonesia*, Jakarta, Soeroengan.
- SISWOYO, B. (1983) *Sekitar Petisi 50*, Solo, CV Mayasari.
- SKINNER, G. W. (1963) The Chinese Minority. IN MCVEY, R. T. (Ed.) *Indonesia*. New Haven, HRAF Press.
- SOEBROTO, R. S. (1971) *Urip Soemohardjo Letnan Jenderal TNI*, Jakarta, Gunung Agung.
- SOEDJATMOKO (1956) The Role of Political Parties in Indonesia. IN THAYER, P. W. (Ed.) *Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia*. Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press.

- SOEKARNO (1961) *Lahirnya Pancasila: Tujuh Bahan Indoktrinasi*, Jakarta, Dewan Pertimbangan Agung.
- SOEMARDJAN, S. (1999) *Kisah Perjuangan Reformasi*, Jakarta, Pustaka Sinar Harapan.
- SOLHEIM, W. G. (1971) *The "New Look"*.
- STRAYER, R. J. (1970) *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press.
- STRAYER, R. J., TILLY, C. & JORDAN, W. C. (2005) *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State (Paperback)* Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press.
- SUAEDY, A. (1998) *Premanisme Politik*, Jakarta, Institut Studi Arus Informasi.
- SUAIDI, A. (2009) *Nalar Politik NU dan Muhammadiyah: Over Crossing Jawa Sentris*, Yogyakarta, LKIS.
- SUHARTO, SWIPAYANA, G. & RAMADHAN, K. (1991) *Soeharto, My Thoughts, Words, and Deeds*, Jakarta, Lamtoro Gung Persada.
- SUKARNO (1964) *Di Bawah Bendera Revolusi*, Jakarta, Panitia Penerbit Di Bawah Bendera Revolusi.
- SUKARNO, M. (1980) *Pembaharuan Gerakan Buruh di Indonesia dan Hubungan Perburuhan Pancasila*, Bandung, Alumni.
- SUKMA, R. (2001) The Acehese Rebellion: Secessionist Movement in Post-Suharto Indonesia. IN TAN, A. & BOUTIN, K. (Eds.) *Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia*. Singapore, Select Publishing.
- SUNDHAUSSEN, U. (1976) Decision Making Within the Indonesian Military. IN SCHIFFRIN, H. Z. (Ed.) *Military and State in Modern Asia*. Transaction Publishers.
- SUNDHAUSSEN, U. (1978) The Military: Structure, Procedures, and Effects on Indonesian Society. IN JACKSON, K. D. (Ed.) *Political Power and Communications in Indonesia*. Berkeley, University of California Press.
- SURYADINATA, L. (1989) *Military Ascendancy and Political Culture: A Study of Indonesia's Golkar*, Ohio, Ohio University Press.
- SURYADINATA, L. (1997) *Political Thinking of the Indonesian Chinese 1900-1995: A Sourcebook*, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- SURYADINATA, L. (1998) *Interpreting Indonesian Politics*, Singapore, Times Academic Press.

- SURYADINATA, L. (2002) *Elections and Politics in Indonesia*, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- SURYAHADI, A. (1998) *The Economic Crisis: Effects and Policy Framework for Its Solution*. IN FORESTER, G. & MAY, R. J. (Eds.) *The Fall of Suharto*. Bathurst, Crawford House Publishing.
- SWIFT, E. A. (1989) *The Road to Madiun: The Indonesian Communist Uprising of 1948*, Ithaca, Modern Indonesia Projects, Cornell University.
- SYAHRIR, S. (1968) *Our Struggle*, Ithaca, Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Programme, Cornell University.
- TARLING, N. (1999) *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia: From World War II to the Present*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- TEICHMANN, I. (2005) *Understanding Immigration: A Multicultural World*, London-Sydney, Franklin Watts.
- THE HOLY QUR'AN.
- THOMAS, K. D. & PANGLAYKIM, J. (1973) *Indonesia: The Effect of Past Policies and President Suharto's Plans for the Future*, Canberra, CEDA.
- TILLY, C. (1975) *The formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- TILLY, C. (1985) *War Making and State Making as Organized Crime*. IN EVANS, P. B., RUESCHEMEYER & SKOCPOL, T. (Eds.) *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- TIVEY, L. (Ed.) (1981) *The Nation State, the formation of modern politics*, Oxford, Martin Robertson.
- TJOKROMIDJOJO, B. (1965) *Peranan Poros dan Pembangunan Ekonomi dalam Politik Luar Negeri*. IN NITISASTRO, W. (Ed.) *Masalah-masalah Ekonomi dan Faktor-faktor IPOLEKSOS*. Jakarta, Leknas/LIPI.
- TOER, K. S. (1999) *Kronik Revolusi Indonesia, Volume 1*, Jakarta, Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia.
- UHLIN, A. (1997) *Indonesia and the "Third Wave of Democratization": The Indonesian Pro-Democracy Movement in a Changing World*, New York, St. Martin's Press.
- VAN DER KROEF, J. (1958) *The West New Guinea Dispute*, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations.
- VAN DIJK, C. (1981) *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam : the Darul Islam in Indonesia*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff.

- VATIKIOTIS, M. R. J. (1994) *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: Order, Development, and Pressure for Change*, London, Routledge.
- VICKERS, A. (2005) *A History of Modern Indonesia*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- VITTACHI, T. (1967) *The Fall of Sukarno*, London, A. Deutsch.
- VLEKKE, B. H. M. (1943) *Nusantara: A History of the East Indian Archipelago*, Harvard University press.
- WAHID, A. (1986) Islam, the state, and development in Indonesia. IN ENGINEER, A. A. (Ed.) *Islam in Asia*. Lahore, Vanguard.
- WALLACE, W., L. (1971) *The Logic of Science in Sociology*, Chicago, Aldine.
- WARD, K. (1974) *The 1971 Election in Indonesia: Monash Paper on Southeast Asia*, Clayton, Monash University Press.
- WATSON, C. W. (2000) *Of Self and Nation : Autobiography and the Representation of Modern Indonesia*, Honolulu University of Hawai'i Press.
- WEBER, M. (1968) *Economy and society : an outline of interpretive sociology* New York, Bedminster Press.
- WEHL, D. (1948) *The Birth of Indonesia*, London, Allen & Unwin.
- WEINSTEIN, B. (1969) *Indonesia Abandons Confrontation*, Ithaca, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project.
- WEINSTEIN, F. (1976) *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
- WERTHEIM, W. F. (1950) *Effects of Western Civilizations on Indonesian Society*, New York.
- WIDJODJO, M. S. (1999) *Penakluk Rejim Orde Baru: Gerakan Mahasiswa '98*, Jakarta, Pustaka Sinar Harapan.
- WIRASOEMINTA, S. (1995) *Rengasdengklok, Tentara Peta dan Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945*, Jakarta, Yayasan Pustaka Nusantara.
- WITTFOGEL, K. A. (1957) *Oriental Despotism : A Comparative Study of Total Power.* , New Haven Yale University Press.
- WIWOHO & CHAERUDDIN (1990) *Memori Jenderal Yoga: , Jakarta, Bina Rena Pariwara.*

YAMIN, H. M. (1959) *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, I-III*, Jakarta, Yayasan Prapanca.

YAMIN, H. M. (1960) *Pembahasan Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia*, Jakarta, Yayasan Prapanca.

THESIS AND CONFERENCE PAPERS

ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (1967) *The Pemuda Revolution: Indonesian Politics 1945-1949*. Cornell University.

BINGHAM, S. (1997) *The Praetorian Guard in the Political and Social Life of Julio Claudian Rome. Department of Classical, Near Eastern, and Religious Studies*. Ottawa, The University of British Columbia.

BUNNEL, F. P. (1969) *The Kennedy Initiatives in Indonesia 1962-63*. Ithaca, Cornell University.

GREGORY, A. (1976) *Recruitment and Factional Patterns of the Indonesian Political Elite*. Columbia University.

JAINURI, A. (1997) *The Formation of the Muhammadiyah Ideology, 1912-1942*. Canada, McGill University.

JAKTI, D. K. (1981) *The Political Economy of Development*. Berkeley, University of California.

KAHIN, A. (1979) *West Sumatra in the Indonesian National Revolution: 1945-1950*. Ithaca, Cornell University.

LUCIUS, R. (2003) *A House Divided: The Decline and Fall of the Masyumi (1950-1956)*. California, US Naval Postgraduate School.

NASUTION, H. (1965) *The Islamic State in Indonesia: The Rise of the Ideology, the Movement for Its Creation and The Theory of the Masyumi. The Institute of Islamic Studies*. Montreal, McGill University.

PRATIGNYO, I. (1974) *Lahirnya Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya Menjadi kekuatan Sosial Politik*. Project of Thesis, No Publisher.

SLATER, D. (2005) *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics, State Building, and Authoritarian Durability in Southeast Asia*. Emory University.

SULLIVAN, J. (1969) *The United States and the New Order in Indonesia*. The American University.

- BOOTH, A. (2001) Indonesia : Will Decentralisation Lead to Disintegration ?
addressed at EUROSEAS Conférence. London.
- CHAPMAN, J. & NISH, I. (2004) On the Periphery of the Russo-Japanese War.
Suntory Toyota International Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines
(STICERD), London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).
- CROUCH, H. (1974) The 15 January Affairs in Indonesia. *Dyason House Paper*.
August 1974 ed.
- FIRDAUSY, C. M. (1998) The Social Impact of Economic Crisis on Employment in
Indonesia. Centre for economic and Development Studies, Indonesian
Institute of Sciences.
- LLOYD, K. (1998) Indonesia in Crisis: A Macro-Economic Update. *Indonesia:
Preliminary Program*. World Bank-NBER Project on Exchange Rate Crises in
Emerging Market Countries.
- UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA (1966) Hasil-Hasil Symposium 6-9 Mei 1966 Bidang
Politik Luar Negeri RI. Universitas Indonesia Press.

JOURNALS

- ALHADAR, S. (2000) The forgotten War in North Maluku. *Inside Indonesia*, July-
September, No. 63 <www.insideindonesia.org/edit63/alhader.htm>.
- ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (1983) Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in
Comparative Historical Perspective. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 42,
No. 3, pp. 477-496.
- ANDERSON, L. (2004) Antiquated Before They Can Ossify: States that Fail Before
They Form. *Journal of International Affairs*, 58.1 Fall 2004, 1-16.
- ANONYMOUS (1953) Suara Progresif Berhaluan Radikal. *Aliran Islam*, VII/February.
- ANONYMOUS (1968) Far Eastern Economic Review Yearbook
- ASPINALL, E. (2002) Soverignty, the Scessor State, and Universal Human Rights:
History and the International Structuring of Acehnese Nationalism. *Indonesia*,
Vol 73, April 2002.
- ASPINALL, E. & BERGER, M. T. (2001) The Break-up of Indonesia? Nationalism
After Decolonisation and The Limits of the Nation-state in Post-Cold War
Southeast Asia. *Third World Quarterly*, No. 6 vol 22, 1003-1024.

- BACHTIAR, H. (1974) The Indonesian Nation: Some Problems of Ingtegration and Disintegration. *Southeast Asian Perspective*, No.2.
- BENDA, H. J. (1956) The Beginnings of the Japanese Occupation of Java *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. 15, pp. 541-560
- BENDA, H. J. (1964) Democracy in Indonesia: A Review Article. *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol 23, 3, May 1964.
- BHAKTI, I. N., YANUARTI, S. & NURHASYIM, M. (2009) Military Politics, Ethnicity, and Conflict in Indonesia. *CRISE Working Paper No. 62, January 2009*.
- CAMERON, L. (1999) Survey of Recent Developments *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, Vol.35, N°1 April.
- CHEYETTE, F. (1971) Untitled. *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 76 No.4, pp.1140-1141.
- CORDON, W. M. & MACKIE, J. A. C. (1962) The Development of the Indonesian Exchange Rate System. *Malayan Economic Review*, Vol. VII.
- COX, G. P. (2006) The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero. *Journal of Military History*, Vol 70. No.1.
- CROUCH, H. (1973) Another Look at te Indonesian Coup. *Indonesia*, Vol 15 (April 1973).
- CROUCH, H. (1988) Indonesia: The Rise and Fall of Suharto's Generals. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.10 No.1 (January 1988).
- DICK, H. (1989) Japans Economic Expansion in the Netherlands Indies Between the First and Second World Wars. *Journal of Souteast Asian Studies*, Vol NN No.2 , September 1989.
- EDITORS, T. (1969) Current Data on the Indonesian Army Elite. *Indonesia*, Vol 7, April 1969.
- EDITORS, T. (2000) Civil-Military Relations since The Fall of Suharto. *Indonesia*, Vol 70 (October 2000).
- EIZENSTAT, S., PORTER, J. E. & WEINSTEIN, J. (2005) Rebuilding Weak States. *Foreign Affairs*, 84.
- EMMERSON, D. K. (2000) Will Indonesia Survive? *Foreign Affairs*, vol 79, pp. 95-106.
- GOLDSBOROUGH, R. H. (1998) Indonesia's Wealth: Who Will Control it? *Personal Update NewsJournal*, July 1998.

- GORDON, B., K. (1963-1964) The Potential for Indonesian Expansion. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XXXVI No.4 (Winter 1963-1964).
- HANKE, S. (2007) On the Fall of the Rupiah and Suharto. *GlobeAsia*, February 2007.
- HASEMAN, J. B. (2000) To Change A Military: The Indonesian Experience. *Joint Force Quarterly*, JFQ Forum, Summer 2000.
- HINDLEY, D. (1964) Indonesia's Confrontation of Malaysia. *Asian Survey*, Vol. IV No.6 (June 1964).
- HORIKOSHI, H. (1975) The Dar-ul-Islam Movement in West Java (1948-1962). *Indonesia*, Vol 20, October 1975, 58-86.
- INDONESIA (All year) Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite. *Indonesia*, All Volume, Cornell Southeast Asia Program.
- JACKMAN, R. W. (1976) Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the Third World. *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 70 No 4 (December 1976), pp. 1078-1097.
- JENKINS, D. (1983) A Guard Against Change. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 21, 1983.
- JENKINS, D. (1983) Operations Regenerasi. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 15, 1983.
- JOHNSON, C. (1998) Survey of Recent Development. *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, vol.34, N°2, August.
- KAHIN, G. M. (1964) Malaysia and Indonesia. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XXXVII No.3 (Fall 1964).
- KLINKEN, G. V. (2001) The Moluques Wars : Bringing Society Back In. *Indonesia*, Number 71 April.
- LIDDLE, R. W. (1985) Suharto's Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol 58 No.1 (Spring 1985).
- LIJPHART, A. (1961) The Indonesian Image of West Irian. *Asian Survey*, Vol 1. No. 5 (July 1961).
- LIPSET, S. M. (1968) New Nation and Political Legitimacy. *Dialogue*, Vol.1.
- MALEY, M. (1998) The 7th Development Cabinet: Loyal to a Fault? *Indonesia*, Vol. 65 (April 1998), 155-178.
- MIGDAL, J. S. (2004) State Building and The Non-Nation-State. *Journal of International Affairs*, 58.1 Fall 2004.

- NORDLINGER, E. (1970) Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-Western States. *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 64 No 4 (December 1970), pp.1131-1148.
- PANGLAYKIM, J. & THOMAS, K. D. (1973) The Road to Amsterdam and Beyond: Aspects of Indonesia's Stabilization Program. *ASEAN Survey*, Vol. VII.
- PAUKER, G. J. (1961) General Nasution's Mission to Moscow. *Asian Survey*, Vol. 1 No.1 (March 1961).
- PERLMUTTER, A. (1969) The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil Military Relations in Developing Polities. *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 1 No 3 (April 1969), pp. 382-404.
- SHAW, A. (1904) The Progress of the World - Japan's Swift Action. *The American Monthly Review of Reviews*, Vol. 29 No. 3.
- SHEPARD, W. E. (1987) Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 19 No. 3, pp. 307-335.
- SHUNKICHIRO, M. (1996) My Recollections of the Military Occupation in Java, No 14. *Kokusai Mondai* 80, 67, November 1996.
- SIDDIQUE, S. & SURYADINATA, L. (1981-1982) Bumiputra and Pribumi: Economic Nationalism (Indiginism) in Malaysia and Indonesia. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 54 No.4 (Winter 1981-1982).
- SIMATUPANG, T. B. (1977) This is My Country. *International Review of Mission LXIII*, 251, July.
- SUNDHAUSSEN, U. (1972) The Military in Research on Indonesian Politics. *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 31 No. 2 (February 1972).
- TAMIR, Y. (1995) The Enigma of Nationalism *World Politics*, Vol. 47 No. 3, pp. 418-440.
- THINKER, I. & WALKER, M. (1973) Planning for Regional Development in Indonesia. *Asian Survey*, Vol 13 (December 1973).
- TOMASSON, G. (1976) Indonesian Economic Stabilization: 1966-1969. *Finance and Development*, December 1976.
- TUCK, C. (2004) Borneo 1963-66: Counter-insurgency Operations and War Termination. *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol 15, No 3, Winter 2004.
- UMAM, S. (2006) Radical Muslims in Indonesia: The Case of Ja'far Umar Thalib and the Laskar Jihad. *Explorations in Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 6 No.1.

- VAN DER KROEF, J. (1953) Conflicts of Religious Policy in Indonesia. *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 22 No.10.
- VAN DER KROEF, J. (1961) Nasution, Sukarno, and the West New Guinean Dispute. *Asian Survey*, Vol. 1 No. 6 (August 1961).
- VAN DER KROEF, J. (1963) The West New Guinea Settlement: Its Origins and Implications. *Orbis*, Vol VII, No.1 (Spring 1963).
- VAN DER KROEF, J. M. (1951) The Term Indonesia: Its Origin and Usage. *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. 71 Number 3, July-September, 1951.
- VAN DER VEUR, P. W. (1961) The United Nations in West Irian: A Critique. *International Organization*, Vol. 18 No. 1 (Winter 1961).
- WHITE, L. J. (1970) Problems and Prospects of Indonesian Foreign Exchange System. *Journal Indonesia*, October 1970.
- WITTFOGEL, K. A. (1969) Results and problems of the study of Oriental Despotism. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 28 number 2.

REPORTS

- AL-CHAIDAR & AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (2000) Bencana Muslimin di Indonesia 1980-2000. Amnesty International.
- ANDERSON, B. R. O. & MCVEY, R. T. (1971) A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia. *Interim Report Series*. Ithaca, Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University.
- ANONYMOUS (2000) Aceh: Escalating Tension. *Indonesia Briefing*. 7 December 2000 ed. Banda Aceh/Jakarta/Brussel, International Crisis Group.
- ANTARA (1999) Indonesia: East Timor Tripartite Meeting Crucial--New Zealand Minister. 22 April 1999 ed. Jakarta, ANTARA (The Indonesian News Agency).
- BAIRD, M. (1999) Indonesia: From Crisis to Opportunity. *Economic Report*. World Bank.
- BIRO PUSAT STATISTIK (1971) Indikator Ekonomi Indonesia 1955-1971. Jakarta, Indonesia Bureau of Statistics.
- BIRO PUSAT STATISTIK (1998) Statistik Indonesia 1998. Jakarta.

- BIS (2005) Foreign Exchange Intervention and Policy: Bank Indonesia Experiences 1997-October 2004. *Foreign Exchange Market Intervention in Emerging Markets: Motives, Techniques, and Implication*. Switzerland.
- CNRS (1984) Génèse de l'Etat moderne en Europe. Paris.
- FEITH, H. (1957) The Indonesian Elections of 1955. *Interim Report Series, Modern Indonesia Project 1957* ed. Ithaca, Southeast Asia Program Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University.
- HOFMAN, B. (2004) Indonesia: Rapid Growth, Weak Institution. Jakarta, World Bank.
- INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (2000) Aceh: Escalating Tension, Indonesia Briefing. Banda Aceh/Jakarta/Brussel, International Crisis Group.
- INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (2001) Why Military Force Won't Bring Lasting Peace. Banda Aceh/Jakarta/Brussel, International Crisis Group.
- INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTION SYSTEM (2000) Republic of Indonesia: Report on the 7 June 1999 Parliamentary General Election and Recommendations for Electoral Reform. February 2000 ed. Washington DC, IFES.
- INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (1997) IMF-Indonesia Letter of Intent: . 31 October 1997 ed. Jakarta.
- INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (1998) Annual Report of the Executive Board for the Financial Year Ended April 30, 1998. Washington DC, International Monetary Fund.
- INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (1998) Indonesia Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, April 10, 1998 -- Letter of Intent. Jakarta.
- INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (1998) Indonesia: Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies. 15 January 1998 ed. Jakarta.
- MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (1999) Peristiwa Ketapang. *Internal report, unpublished* http://www.dephan.go.id/fakta/p_ketapang.htm. Jakarta, Ministry of Defense of Indonesia.
- RAJAN, R. S. (2010) The Evolution and Impact of Asian Exchange Rate Regimes. *ADB Economic Working Paper Series No. 208*. Manila, Asian Development Bank.
- THASAN, K. (1966) Multiple-Exchange Rates: The Indonesian Experience. IMF papers.

THE US GOVERNMENT (1963) Indonesia: Perspectives and Proposals for United States' Economic Aid: A Report to the President of the United States. Southeast Asian Studies, Yale University.

WIE, T. K. (2006) Policies for Private Sector Development in Indonesia: ADB Institute Development Paper No.46. Asian Development Bank.

ARCHIVES, DOCUMENTS, AND REGULATIONS

ANGKATAN DARAT (1966) Doktrin Perjuangan TNI-AD "Tri Ubaya Cakti". Jakarta, Seskoad.

ANONYMOUS (1999) Press Release. 27 January ed. Jakarta, State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia.

ARCHIVE (1974) Indonesian Serial 1942-1950. Yogyakarta, Perpustakaan Negara.

BIRO PUSAT STATISTIK (1973) Sensus Penduduk 1971 (Population Census of 1971). *Seri D*. Jakarta, Biro Pusat Statistik

DINAS SEJARAH TNI ANGKATAN DARAT (1979) Sendi-Sendi Perjuangan TNI-AD. Bandung, Disjarahad.

DUTCH GOVERNMENT (1948) Interogation of Didi Kartasasmita of 9 November 1948. Batavia, Royal Dutch Archive, General Secretary Box VII No.24.

INDONESIA (1945) Indonesian Constitution of 1945.

INDONESIA (1950) Indonesian Provisional Constitution of 1950.

INDONESIA (1967) Keppres RI No.132/1967 tentang Pokok-Pokok Organisasi dan Prosedur Bidang Pertahanan dan Keamanan. Jakarta, Sekretariat Negara RI.

INDONESIA (1973) Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia (Presidential Decree) No. 30/1972 and No.15/1973.

INDONESIA (1978) Doktrin Territorial Nusantara. Jakarta, Departemen Pertahanan dan Keamanan.

INDONESIA (1988) Keppres No.29/1988 tentang Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional. Jakarta, Sekretariat Negara RI.

INDONESIA (1999) Law Number 3/1999 on Election.

INDONESIA (1999) Indonesian Constitution of 1945: First Ammendment.

INDONESIA (2000) Indonesian Constitution of 1945: Second Ammendment.

INDONESIA (2001) Indonesian Constitution of 1945: Third Ammendment.

INDONESIA (2002) Indonesian Constitution of 1945: Fourth Ammendment.

INDONESIA (2003) Law No.12/2003 on Election.

INDONESIA (2008) Law No.10/2008 on 'Pemilihan Umum Anggota DPR, DPD, dan DPRD'

INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT (1945) Archive: Susunan Kabinet Presidensial 2 September 1945-14 Novermber 1945. Jakarta.

INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT (1970) Peraturan pemerintah (Government's Law) No. 6/1970. Jakarta.

INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT (1998) Archive: Susunan Kabinet Pembangunan VII, 16 Maret 1998-21 Mei 1998. Jakarta.

KEMENTRIAN DALAM NEGERI RI (1970) Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri (The Regulation of the Minister of Internal Affairs) No. 12/1969.

KEMENTRIAN PENERANGAN RI (1966) Statement-Statement Politik Waperdam Bidang Sospol/menteri Luar Negeri dan Waperdam Bidang Ekubang. Jakarta.

KEMENTRIAN PENERANGAN RI (1970) Susunan Kabinet Republik Indonesia 1945-1970. Djakarta, Pradnja Paramita.

MPRS (1966) Ketetapan-Ketetapan dan Keputusan-Keputusan Sidang Umum IV MPRS. Jakarta, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara Republik Indonesia.

NOMURA, M. (2007) The Dutch East Indies and the Japanese Armed Forces. IN MILITARY HISTORY DEPARTMENT, N. D. C. (Ed.) 4 December 2007 ed. Tokyo.

SEKRETARIAT NEGARA RI (1966) Naskah Pidato Presiden, 1 September 1966. Jakarta, Unpublished.

STATE SECRETARIAT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA (1999) Press Release, 27 January 1999. Jakarta.

SUHARTO (1998) Suharto's Accountability Speech in Front of the People Assembly 1 March 1998. Jakarta.

SUKARNO (1959) Menemukan Kembali Jalan Revolusi Kita. Address on the Indonesian Independence Day Celebration, 17 August 1959 ed.

SUKARNO (1960) *Djalan Revolusi Kita ---The March of Our Revolution (DJAREK): Independence Day Address*. Jakarta.

SUKARNO (1960) *Nasionalisme Kita adalah Nasionalisme Amanat Penderitaan Rakyat (An Address before the Congress of Murba Party at Bandung, December 15, 1960)*. Jakarta, Departemen Penerangan RI.

SUKARNO (1963) *Remarks at Installation ceremony for secretaries and assistances to ministries and for deputies to the armed services chiefs*. 17 July 1963 ed. Jakarta.

SUMAWINATA, S. (1970) *Economic Situation and Economic Policies in Indonesia*. Jakarta, No Publisher.

THE INDONESIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1961) *Toward Freedom and the Dignity of Man*. Jakarta.

THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA (1998) *Report on the Session of the General Assembly*. March, 1998 ed. Jakarta.

NEWS AND MEDIA

AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (1999) *Hundreds of Pro-Indonesia Militia launch Attack in East Timor*. *Agence France Presse*. 5 April ed. Paris.

ANWAR, R. (1951) *Peristiwa Kahar Muzakkar Hanja Satu Aspect Sadja*. *Indonesia Merdeka*. 18 September 1951 ed. Jakarta.

ANWAR, R. (1980) *Kesan-Kesan dari Rapim ABRI 1980*. *Kompas*. 5 April 1980 ed. Jakarta.

ASIAN WALLSTREET JOURNAL (1999) *Vigilantes Kill at Least 14 in East Timor*. *Asian Wallstreet Journal*. 18 April 1999 ed. Hongkong.

ASIAWEEK, T. (1996) *Suharto's Tough Guy: A Hardliner Takes Over A Powerful Post*. *The Asiaweek*. 23 February 1996 ed.

BERNAS (1998) *Aksi Makin Deras, Korban Jatuh lagi*. *Harian Bernas*. 3 May 1998 ed.

BERNAS (1998) *Selama Krisis, 63 Perusahaan di Jateng Rumahkan Karyawannya*. *Bernas*. 20 July 1998 ed. Yogyakarta.

BISNIS INDONESIA (1998) *Presiden Suharto: Kita akan Konsisten Terapkan Reformasi*. 14 April 1998 ed. Jakarta, Bisnis Indonesia.

- BULLETIN (2008) Laporan Utama. *Bulletin*. October 2008 ed. Jakarta, BPMigas.
- CHOMSKY, N. (1999) Timor Oriental, 'l'Horreur et l'Amnésie. *Le Monde Diplomatique*.
- EDY, B. (1996) Kronologi Peristiwa 27 Juli 1996. *Tempo*. 10 August 1996 ed. Jakarta, Tempo.
- FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW (1999) Indonesian Military Looks Set to Sour Independence Plans. *Far Eastern Economic Review*. 18 February 1999 ed. Hongkong.
- FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW (1999) Second Thought of East Timor Independence. *Far Eastern Economic Review*. 29 April 1999 ed. Hongkong.
- FORUM KEADILAN (1998) Darah Mengalir di Tapal Kuda. *Forum Keadilan*. 2 November ed.
- FORUM KEADILAN (1998) Saat Angin Tak Sejuk Lagi. *Forum Keadilan*. 28 December ed. Jakarta, Yayasan Keadilan.
- GATRA (1995) Untuk Apa Soemitro Menggebrak? *Gatra*. July 8, 1995 ed. Jakarta.
- HARIAN NERACA (1998) *Harian Neraca*. 17 March 1998 ed. Jakarta.
- INDONESIAN HERALD (1963) Editorial. *Indonesian Herald*. 30 January 1963 ed.
- JAWA POS (1998) Aksi di Sejumlah Kota Turun ke Jalan dan Bentrok. *Jawa Pos Online*. 3 May 1998 ed.
- JAWA POS (1998) Jangan Tutup-Tutupi Kasus Banyuwangi. *Jawa Pos*. 13 October 1998 ed. Surabaya.
- JAWA POS (1998) Tersenyum Saat Diinterupsi. *Jawa Pos*. 26 April 1998 ed. Surabaya.
- JAWA POS (2000) Juwono Soal Rencana Perombakan Struktur Militer: Pnglima TNI Digusur, Diganti Kasgab. *Jawa Pos*. 23 may 2000 ed. Surabaya.
- KEARNEY, M. (2001) Over 100 Killed in New Moluques Violence. *Strait Times*. 21 June ed.
- KOMPAS (1998) *Harian Kompas*. 21 April 1998 ed. Jakarta.
- KOMPAS (1998) *Kompas*. 22 may 1998 ed. Jakarta.
- KOMPAS (1998) Kegiatan Politik dilarang di Kampus. *Kompas*. 5 April ed. Jakarta.
- KOMPAS (1998) Kekerasan Pecah di UGM dan IAIN Yogya. *Kompas Online*. 3 April 1998 ed.

- KOMPAS (1998) KSAD: Kalau Tak Puas Tak Perlu Demonstrasi. *Kompas*. 20 February 1998 ed. Jakarta.
- KOMPAS (1998) Masyarakat Diharapkan Pelihara Keamanan dan Ketertiban. *Kompas*. 17 April 1998 ed. Jakarta.
- KOMPAS (1998) PHK Sudah Mencapai 15,4 Juta Orang. *Kompas*. 21 July 1998 ed. Jakarta.
- KOMPAS (2000) Enam Wakil Laskar Jihad Bertemu Presiden. *Kompas*. 7 April 2000 ed. Jakarta.
- KOMPAS, H. (1998) Amien Rais Siap Jadi Presiden Ke-4 RI. *Kompas*. Sabtu, 23 Mei ed.
- KOMPAS, H. (1998) Majelis Amanat Rakyat Desak BJ Habibie Nyatakan Pemerintahan dalam Peralihan. *Kompas*. 25 May ed. Jakarta.
- MEDIA INDONESIA (1998) 38 Hilang Setelah Demonstrasi. *Media Indonesia*. 6 April 1998 ed. Jakarta.
- MEDIA INDONESIA (1999) Korem 161/Wirasakti NTT Dijadikan Kodam. *Media Indonesia*. September 29. 1999 ed. Jakarta.
- MEDIA INDONESIA (2000) Kelompok Cilangkap Dominan. *Media Indonesia*. June 11, 2000 ed.
- MENON, R. (2001) Another Year of Living Dangerously. *The National Interest*. 22 September 2001 ed.
- REPUBLIKA (1998) Wiranto: ABRI Kembangkan Paradigma Peran baru Sospol. *Republika*. 18 July 1998 ed. Jakarta.
- REPUBLIKA (1999) Memperta: Untuk jadi presiden, tak cukup bermodal kharismatis dan popularitas *Republika*. 12 June 1999 ed. Jakarta.
- SABILI (1998) Laporan Utama. *Sabili*. 9 Decembre ed.
- SHINER, C. (1998) Suharto Ignores Criticism, Names Cronies to Cabinet. *Washington Post*. 14 March 1998 ed. Washington.
- STRAIT TIMES (1999) East Timor is Nothing but Rocks: Habibie. 25 February 1999 ed.
- SUARA MERDEKA (1998) Semprot Gas Air Mata, Bakar Ikan Asin. *Suara Merdeka Online*. 12 March 1998 ed. Semarang.
- SUARA MERDEKA (2000) Jabatan Kasgab Digilir Tiap 3 Tahun. *Suara Merdeka*. 2 June 2000 ed.

- SUARA PEMBAHARUAN (1998) Kasospol: ABRI akan Dukung Pelaksanaan Pemilu. *Suara Pembaharuan*. 25 may 1998 ed. Jakarta.
- SUARA PEMBAHARUAN (1998) Presiden: Kampus Dibangun untuk Mendidik. *Suara Pembaruan*. 18 April 1998 ed. Jakarta.
- SUARA PEMBARUAN (1998) Kassospol ABRI: Tidak Ada Perintah Pangab untuk Menculik Aktivis. *Suara Pembaruan*. 26 April ed. Jakarta.
- SUARA PEMBARUAN (1998) Wirabuana: Aspirasi Mahasiswa Benar dan Mewakili Rakyat. *Suara Pembaruan*. 25 April 1998 ed. Jakarta.
- SUARA PEMBARUAN (1999) Akbar: Habibie Calon Tunggal dari Partai Golkar. *Suara Pembaruan*. 11 April 1999 ed. Jakarta.
- SUARA PEMBARUAN (1999) Gubernur Timtim Tak Sependapat dengan Melu Alatas. *Suara Pembaruan*. 2 September 1999 ed. Jakarta.
- SUJATMOKO, B. (1997) Dwifungsi di Tiga Zaman. *Gatra*. 8 March 1997 ed.
- SURABAYA POST (1998) Soal Investigasi NU Jatim Tentang Santet: Pertemuan PB NU-Muspida jatim Ditunda. *Surabaya Post*. 7 December 1998 ed. Surabaya.
- SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (1998) Army Plan to Devide and Rule. *Sydney Morning Herald*. 8 December 1998 ed. Sydney.
- SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (1999) ABRI Inc.: Unmasking the Interests Behind the Pro-Jakarta Militias. *Sidney Morning Herald*. 5 may 1999 ed. Sidney.
- SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (1999) World Pressure Brought Indonesian Military Shake Up. *Sydney Morning Herald*. 30 August 1999 ed. Sydney.
- TEMPO (2000) Soeyono: Ada Duplikasi Komando antara Faisal Hartono. *Tempo*. 20 February 2000 ed.
- TEMPOINTERAKTIF (1998) Krisis Mengantarkan Indonesia ke Jurang Kehancuran. *Tempo*. 29 December 1998 ed.
- TEMPOINTERAKTIF (1998) Wawancara Imam Sugema: Jangan Terus Menerus Menerapkan Kebijakan Zig Zag. 04/03 28 March 1998 ed. Jakarta, Tempo.
- THE ASIAN WALLSTREET JOURNAL (1998) Indonesia Mobs Burn Mosques in Rampage Targeting Muslims. *Asian Wallstreet Journal*. Hongkong, Dow Jones & Co.
- THE ECONOMIST (1993) Indonesian Survey: Engineering the future. *The Economist*. 17 April ed.

THE ECONOMIST (1999) Crossbows and Guns in East Timor. 13 February 1999 ed. London, The Economist Newspaper Ltd.

THE ECONOMIST (2001) Holy War in the Spice Islands. *The Economist*. 15 March 2001 ed.

THE JAKARTA POST (1998) NU Sets up New Political Party. *The Jakarta Post*. 22 July 1998 ed. Jakarta.

THE JAKARTA POST (1999) Habibie Says Aceh Referendum Impossible. *The Jakarta Post*. 31 August 1999 ed. Jakarta.

THE JAKARTA POST (1999) Wiranto Denies Opression in Aceh. *The Jakarta Post*. 30 June 1999 ed. Jakarta.

THE JAKARTA POST (2001) Riau Legislative Council Rejects New Oil and Gas Law. *The Jakarta Post*. 13 November 2001 ed. Jakarta.

THE JAKARTA POST (2004) Oil Firms Temporarily Settle Dispute *The Jakarta Post*. 23 September 2004 ed. Jakarta.

THE JAKARTA POST (2009) The Little Known Prime Minister. *The Jakarta Post*. 10 March 2009 ed. Jakarta.

THE JAKARTA POST (1998) Troops to be Reduced Gradually in East Timor. *The Jakarta Post*. 25 June ed.

THE JAKARTA POST (2001) Maluku Conflict Has Claimed 9,000 Lives. *The Jakarta Post*, . 6 Septembere ed.

THE JAKARTA POST (2001) Moluques Dialog Ends with Peace Commitment 22 March ed. Jakarta.

THE JAKARTA POST (2001) No Tolerance of Separatism in Maluku: Pattimura Military Chief. *The Jakarta Post*. 26 Agustus ed. Jakarta.

THE STRAIT TIMES (1998) Laid-up Buses and Cars Stripped for Spare Parts. *The Strait Times*. Septembere, 4 ed. Singapore, Singapore Press Holdings.

THE STRAIT TIMES (1999) East Timor is Nothing but Rocks: Habibie. 25 February ed.

THE STRAIT TIMES (2001) Indonesia Risks Becoming Like Balkans: Mega *The Strait Times*. 29 October ed. Singapore, Singapore Press Holdings.

THE STRAIT TIMES (2001) Irian Jaya Leaders Declare Independence. *The Strait Times*.

THE TIMES (1999) Indonesia Army Accused of Massacre. *The Times*. 13 August ed. London.

THE WASHINGTON POST (1999) Residents of East Timor Weigh Independence
Autonomy. *The Washington Post*. 14 February 1999 ed. Washington D.C.

OTHERS

(Unpublished Works, Electronic Sources, Blog, Web Page, Dictionary)

BURHANI, N. Muhammdiyah Studies: Dedicated to Boosting Research and
Scholarship on The Muhammadiyah and Strengthening this Movement.
<http://muhammadiyahstudies.blogspot.com>.

CIPTA ADI PUSTAKA (1989) Ensiklopedi Nasional Indonesia. Jakarta, Cipta Adi
Pustaka.

CRIBB, R. & KAHIN, A. (2004) Historical Dictionary of Indonesia. Landham,
Scarecrow Press.

KAMESAKA, A. & WANG, J. (2004) The Asian Crisis and Investor's Behavior in
Thailand's Equity Market.

KAMI (1966) The Leader, The Man, and The Gun. *Artikel Seminar KAMI, 10-20
January*. Jakarta, KAMI.

LEIFER, M. (2001) Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Southeast Asia. Taylor &
Francis.

MAARIF, A. S. (2007) Strategi Dakwah Muhammadiyah: Masa lalu, Kini dan Masa
Depan dalam Perspektif Kebudayaan. 23 August 2007 ed.

RIAU GLOBAL (2000) Locals Ignore 'Free Riau Forces' Warning on Flag Raising. 20
August ed., accesible from <www.RiauGlobal.com>.

THE WORLD BANK (1998) Indonesia in Crisis: A Macro-Economic Update,
accessible at <<http://web.worldbank.org>>.

WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY (1981) *Webster's 3rd International Dictionary of the
English Language*. Springfield, Masseurhussets, Miriam Webster.

WIDJAJANTO, A. (No year) Evolusi Doktrin Pertahanan Indonesia.

APPENDIX

Appendix 1

ANDERSON'S VIEW OF THE INDONESIAN STATE

Though this thesis has touched upon recent secondary literature, it is important to mention one of the earlier analysis as well. In particular it should be remembered that Benedict Anderson's classic 1983 paper on Indonesia's state development, 'Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective', focused on the state's policy-implementing rather than policymaking institutions – on the civil service and military organisations rather than on institutions such as the Presidency and parliament. Anderson viewed the state as a single institution consisting of administrative and military organisations, that he could readily use to make local historical comparisons with the *colonial* state apparatus used for centuries by the Dutch imperialists to rule the territories that later became the independent country of Indonesia (Anderson, 1983b, p.477, 478-80). The Dutch colonial state that ruled pre-independence Indonesia had administrative and military organisations that are comparable to the independent state of Indonesia's civil service and military organisations, but the Dutch colonial state lacked anything comparable to an elected (directly or indirectly) President or an elected parliamentary representative assembly.

From Anderson's perspective, policymaking and *representational* institutions such as an elected President and an elected parliament express the nation's or society's general interests – as distinct from or even opposed to the general interests of the state (Anderson, 1983b, *Ibid*). For example, he described Indonesia's 1950s experience with parliamentary democracy as a case of the 'preponderance of nation and society over state', with the 'weakness of the state' arising from the lack of a 'coherent civil bureaucracy' and of 'centralized, professionalized armed forces' (Anderson, 1983b, p.482). In terms of the Western model of the state, the 1950s saw its parliamentary and Cabinet policymaking institutions operating more effectively than its policy-implementing institutions of civil service and military organisations. But in terms of Anderson's perspective on the state this period was one of state

weakness that ended only after President Sukarno and his military supporters cancelled parliamentary democracy in the late 1950s and replaced it with a form of non-democratic rule. Anderson described this late 1950s shift from democracy to dictatorship as ‘two powerful forces’, the army and Sukarno, coming ‘to the rescue of the state’ and being responsible for a relatively smooth ‘transition from “parliamentary” to “Guided Democracy”’ (Anderson, 1983b, p.483, 484).

In the late 1960s General Suharto and the army replaced Guided Democracy and President Sukarno with the New Order and President Suharto – with even better results for the state’s policy-implementing institutions. Anderson argued that the New Order policy outcomes ‘are best understood as maximal expressions of state interests’, and the ‘consistent *leitmotiv* of New Order governance has been the strengthening of the state-qua-state’ (Anderson, 1983b, p.478, 488). However, he also pointed out that the state’s *military* policy-implementing organisations did not benefit as much as the civil service from the New Order:

One of the most curious aspects of New Order policy – given the regime’s domination by the military – has been its neglect of the armed forces as armed forces, both in terms of basic amenities for the lower ranks and in terms of equipment and training. ... The fact is that for a nation of Indonesia’s size, population and strategic location, her 250 thousand or so strong military remains remarkably small, under-armed, and under-trained (Anderson, 1983b, p.492).

In contrast, the civil service’s administrative officials were certainly not neglected by the new regime. The New Order’s anti-inflationary and other economic successes provided the basis for ‘reconstituting the discipline, cohesion, efficacy, and power of officialdom’ and indeed Anderson compares the New Order spending on the civil service with ‘the outlays on officialdom in the calm, autocratic days of the colonial *beamtenstaat* [civil servants’ state]’ developed by the Dutch imperialists (Anderson, 1983b, p.488). This implies that when Anderson pointed out that during the 1970s President Suharto had built ‘the most powerful state in Indonesia since Dutch colonial times’, he was referring primarily to the state’s civil service rather than military policy-implementing organisations (Anderson, 1983b, p.489).

A perspective on state development that includes the state's policymaking institutions can provide a simple and very realistic (based on the ruler's political self-interest) explanation for why Indonesia's military regime favoured the civil service rather than the military. As is described in the first chapter of this thesis, during the 1970s President Suharto personalised the state's policymaking, particularly by easing the military out of policymaking and confining it to policy-implementation. General Suharto had therefore established a *personalist* military regime, which was dominated by him personally rather than by the military as an organisation. Anderson described the New Order as an example of Nordlinger's 'ruler-type praetorianism' category of 'military-dominated regimes' (Anderson, 1983b, p.490). However, Nordlinger's ruler-type category of military regime included cases of personal rule by a military leader as well as cases of organisational rule by the military – and Suharto's Indonesia was an example of personal rather than organisational rule (Brooker, 2009, p.154). Such personal rule by a military leader may well result in surprisingly little outlay by the state on the military as armed forces, as in the classic example of the Spanish military under General Franco's 1940s-1970s absolutist personal rule of Spain (Brooker, 1995, p.146). General Suharto never established a Franco-like absolutist leadership position over the Indonesian military, but in fact he was a leader and, at the same time, the agent or ally of the military and therefore he was politically able to favour the civil service rather than the military in his New Order spending policies.

President Suharto's politically self-interested *reason* for favouring the civil service was his search for some performance legitimacy to strengthen his newly established presidential monarchy, as is described in chapter three of the thesis. Providing the Indonesian people with a less corrupt and more effective civil service was an obvious way of achieving some performance legitimacy. Another way in which performance legitimacy was achieved was through the end of the Sukarno-era hyperinflation and by making some progress towards economic development. The economic successes of the New Order not only were the basis for its strengthening of the civil service, but also directly contributed to Suharto's claim to some performance legitimacy.

Suharto's politically self-interested search for legitimacy also explains the effort that he made to establish a democratic disguise for his presidential monarchy. Anderson

described at some length the way in which the 'state leadership has attempted to persuade its audiences that this "no change" [no reintroduction of democracy] future is legitimate by insisting that a peculiarly Indonesian form of democracy is already in place' and by having introduced a system of semi-competitive elections and creating an official party, Golkar, to win these elections with a suitably large majority of the vote (Anderson, 1983b, p.490, 491-492). The question here is why did the 'state leadership' (Suharto) make such a major institutional effort to bolster the regime's claim to democratic legitimacy? In contrast, the previous regime (President Sukarno) had merely claimed to be a 'Guided Democracy' and had not made any institutional effort to bolster that claim to democratic legitimacy – for example, instead of instituting a semi-competitive form of parliamentary elections it had introduced a non-elected form of parliament.

A simple and realistic explanation for this contrast is that Suharto's newly established presidential monarchy had to make an effort to achieve legitimacy, including some democratic legitimacy, because it lacked the charismatic legitimacy of Sukarno's Guided-Democracy presidential monarchy. Sukarno was a nationalist 'founding father' of Indonesia and, as Anderson pointed out, a 'charismatic figure' (Anderson, 1983b, p.484). The charismatic legitimacy of his presidential monarchy was strengthened in the 1960s by his nationalist foreign policies, and in fact these policies may well have been motivated by his search for more charismatic legitimacy.

As Anderson noted, there was clearly a personal aspect to the creation as well as policymaking of Sukarno's Guided Democracy non-democratic regime:

This is not deny that Sukarno had long chafed under the limits imposed on him by the parliamentary constitution of 1950 or that he enjoyed the vastly increased powers assigned the presidency under that of 1945. Moreover, in protecting the parties and popular organizations ... he was certainly motivated by a need for organized political support as a counterweight to the army. Indeed so concerned was he about the army's intentions that he went out of his way to show favour to the navy, air force and police (Anderson, 1983b, footnote 5).

Anderson's point about Sukarno's favouring of the navy, air force and police suggests that the Guided Democracy era was similar to the New Order era in terms of personalised policymaking having a major effect on the development of the state's policy-implementing organisations. In Sukarno's case a civilian organisation, the police force, was favoured over a military organisation, the army, and *within* the military itself the navy and air force organisations were favoured over the army.

So Anderson's classic paper on the Indonesian state highlights the importance of the changes in the policymaking institutions that occurred in the shift from parliamentary democracy to Sukarno's civilian presidential monarchy and then to Suharto's military presidential monarchy. These changes were important not only because they were dramatic changes in key institutions but also because they had marked indirect effects on the development of the state's policy-implementing organisations – the civilian administrative and policing organisations and the military's army, navy and air force organisations.

FRANCE'S MECHANICAL DEVELOPMENT 1789-2010

France has been undergoing a predominantly mechanical type of development since 1789, with a long organic interlude during the Third Republic (1871-1940) and a period of organic development during the present Fifth Republic (1958-2010). With the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789, the state went through rapid change that transformed a monarchy without cabinet government or even a representative assembly (since the seventeenth century) into the parliamentary-ruled republic of 1793. Although there was a conservative shift in the revolution to government by the Directory, France in 1799 was still at least an 'infant' parliamentary democracy, with a much larger proportion of the male population than in England being entitled to vote in elections to the representative assembly.

The mechanical development continued in the 1800s with the establishment of General Napoleon Bonaparte's military dictatorship in the 1800s. There was an increasing personalisation of his rule as he became First Consul 'for life' and then 'Emperor Napoleon'. This means reintroduction of a hereditary monarchy, with Emperor Napoleon intending that his young son would eventually succeed him as 'Napoleon II', but both steps in the personalisation were 'democratically' legitimised by a plebiscite/referendum. *'Napoleon Bonaparte's use of plebiscites (referendums) to legitimise his military dictatorship and eventual assumption of the title of Emperor'* has been described as the beginning of a global modernisation of dictatorship: *'Bonaparte had put forward a new answer to problem of how to legitimize a military seizure of power; he had hypocritically adopted the "will of the people" principle espoused by the democratic ideology of the American and French revolutions'* (Brooker, 2009, p.4). Therefore, the use of plebiscitary or semi-competitive elections to legitimise dictatorship would become a standard feature of dictatorial versions of the modern state, whether they were military or civilian dictatorships and whether or not they involved a personalisation of rule like that instituted by Napoleon.

The 1815 restoration of monarchical rule by a King from the pre-1789 dynasty brought a change only in the family that personally possessed power and not until

the democratising revolution in 1830 was there some development towards parliamentary democracy. However then the 1848 democratising revolution produced a shift towards presidential democracy, as the new Constitution replaced the monarchy with an elected President as head of government as well as head of state. France, therefore, might have imitated the American version of the Western model of the state if the first President of France had not instead established a dictatorship. The President was the nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte and was named Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte so it is perhaps not surprising that he would try to follow in his uncle's footsteps and transform an infant democracy into a dictatorship. However, it was certainly an unpredictable development that Louis-Napoleon would create a new design for dictatorship by establishing history's first example of the populist presidential monarchy. But it will be noted here that the populist form created by Louis-Napoleon: 1) does not involve rule by the leader of a military or party organization but instead is one-person rule by an elected public official who has converted a democracy or democratization into a presidential monarchy. It arises from an *autogolpe* or 'self-coup' by an elected President; 2) relies more on popular than military or party support, and it has a distinctively populist tinge to its policies, such as conferring benefits on the labour movement and/or the poor. It was pioneered by Louis Napoleon, the nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte, after he was elected President of France in the aftermath of the 1848 democratizing revolution (Brooker, 2009, p.77-78).

In 1851 President Louis-Napoleon staged the *autogolpe* (self-coup) that transformed him into a dictator and created this new design for dictatorship but in 1852, he converted himself into a real monarch by exchanging his republican title/office of President for that of 'Emperor Napoleon III'. This was a very obvious personalisation of rule but keeping such 'modern' institutions as a representative assembly and a written Constitution. The new, 1852 Constitution increased the power of the executive and reduced the legislative power of the representative assembly but guaranteed that its lower house would be elected and that all adult males would continue to have the right to vote (though the elections were biased in favour of the government's 'official' candidates and therefore no more than semi-competitive). Napoleon III intended to be succeeded by his son the Prince Imperial but a disastrous war with Prussia in 1870 produced the Emperor's military defeat and

capture by the Prussians, the siege of Paris, France's surrender and the deposing of the monarchy. In 1871, France did not return to the presidential democracy of 1848 (Second Republic) but instead to the republican parliamentary democracy of the 1790s (First Republic), though with the addition of the title/office of President to act as the largely ceremonial head of state of what would be termed the Third Republic, so from 1789 to 1871 France's policymaking institutions had undergone a 'redesign' on several occasions and at least two of these new designs had (been pioneering efforts) created dictatorial versions of the modern state that would spread to other parts of the world, namely Napoleon's plebiscitary (military-based monarchy) military dictatorship and Louis-Napoleon's populist presidential monarchy. In addition, there had been three different moves towards republican democracy (the first and third towards parliamentary democracy and the second towards presidential democracy) that had been separated by two long periods of monarchical rule and two short periods of military or populist dictatorship. A more important feature from a state-development perspective is that this rapid and apparently haphazard, unpredictable sequence of changes was unpredictable because it was not progressing towards increased complexity and capability. On at least two occasions there was a decrease in the complexity of policymaking institutions i) when General Napoleon Bonaparte reintroduced personal rule through his personalisation of power as First Consul and then Emperor and ii) when President Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte reintroduced personal rule through his personalisation of power as a presidential monarch and then as Emperor. It is true that in the first case there was a counterbalancing increase in the complexity of administrative organisations during the early 1800s but that still leaves the case of Louis-Napoleon as a clear-cut and marked reduction in the complexity of the state through the personalisation of its policymaking institutions. The Louis-Napoleon case also provides an example of another characteristic feature of mechanical development as there may be a lack of proportionality between complexity and capability.

This characteristic feature of mechanical development is evident during Louis-Napoleon's personal rule of 1851-1870 because the marked reduction in complexity of the state's policymaking institutions was not accompanied by a marked reduction in the capability of its policymaking or of its performance of such state functions as territorial control. In fact, historians tend to view the economic and social policy of

Napoleon III quite favourably and, certainly, France's policymaking and administrative-military organisations were not markedly less capable than those of England or USA during the same period, until the Emperor's foreign-policy blunder of being drawn into a war with Prussia in 1870. Furthermore, the parliamentary republic established in 1871 does not appear to have markedly increased the capability of the French state even though it had markedly increased the complexity of the policymaking institutions. France experienced another period of mechanical development from 1940 to 1958. During this period: a) the Third Republic was militarily defeated and destroyed by Germany and replaced by the dictatorial Vichy regime in the parts of France not occupied by Germany in 1940-42; b) there was a post-war, 1945 restoration of parliamentary democracy as the Fourth Republic; and c) in 1958 there was a redesign of policymaking institutions into a semi-presidential form of democracy as the Fifth Republic. However, it needs to be underlined that this semi-presidential system was a new form of democracy for France and had appeared only twice before in Europe or the rest of the world.


During the 1940s-60s period many French colonies became independent, especially in Africa, and imitated the Western model of the modern state. However, if they were imitating France's latest version of the modern state in pre-1958 it would have been a republican parliamentary democracy and in post-1958 a semi-presidential democracy. In fact, France's 'model' of the development of a modern state was so 'mechanical' that it is perhaps not surprising these former French colonies would often experience a mechanical rather than organic type of state development in the decades after their new states were established.

Appendix 3

ASSESSMENT ON STATE CAPABILITY


Chapter 3: Legitimacy

Type of Regime	Complexity (of policy making institutions)	Capability
Version I	High complexity	Low capability
Version II	Markedly lower complexity	Higher capability
Version III	Somewhat lower complexity	Very high capability
Version IV	Markedly higher complexity	Very high capability




Chapter 4: Military

Type of Regime	Complexity (of policy making institutions)	Capability
Version I	Low complexity	Low capability
Version II	Markedly higher complexity	Higher capability
Version III	Somewhat lower complexity	Very high capability
Version IV	Very High complexity	High capability




Chapter 5&6: Political order

Type of Regime	Complexity (of policy making institutions)	Capability
Version I	High complexity	Very low capability
Version II	Markedly lower complexity	Very low capability
Version III	Somewhat lower complexity	Very high capability
Version IV	Markedly high complexity	Very high capability



Total capability of 3 combined areas

Type of Regime	Legitimacy	Military	Order	Total
Version I	Low	Low	Very Low	Low
Version II	High	High	Very low	Low
Version III	Very high	Very high	Very high	Very high
Version IV	Very high	High	Very high	Very high



Appendix 4

ECONOMIC INDICATORS (1955-1971)

Revenue and spending of the government (in million rupiah)

Year	Revenue	Spending	Deficit/ surplus	Percentage of deficit to revenue
1955	14	16	-2	14%
1956	18	21	-3	17%
1957	21	26	-5	24%
1958	23	35	-12	52%
1959	30	44	-14	47%
1960	50	58	-8	16%
1961	62	88	-26	42%
1962	75	122	-47	60%
1963	162	330	-168	104%
1964	283	681	-398	141%
1965	923	2.526	-1.603	174%
1966	13.142	29.433	-16.291	124%
1967	84.900	87.555	-2.655	3%
1968	185.283	185.283	-	-
1969	334.762	334.671	+91	-
1970	465.137	457.929	+7.208	-
1971	563.548	544.995	+18.553	-

Foreign debt until 31 December 1965 (In Million US\$)

Donors	Long term	Short term	Sum	Total percentage
Communist countries	(1.361)	(43)	(1.404)	(59,5%)
Soviet Union	980	10	990	41,9%
Yugoslavia	108	7	115	4,8%
Poland, Tczekoslovakia, East Germany, Hongaria, China	228	26	299	12,6%
Western Countries	(539)	(48)	(587)	(24,8%)
United states	172	7	179	7,5%
West Germany	112	10	122	5,1%
France	113	2	115	4,8%
Italia, England, Dutch, Swizerland	142	29	171	7,2%
Asian countries	(176)	(85)	(261)	(11,0%)
Japan	168	63	231	9,7%
India, Pakistan	8	22	30	1,2%
African countries				
Egypt	3	1	4	0,1%
International Institution				
IMF	102	-	102	4,3%
Total	2.181	177	2.358	100,0%

Money in circulation

(in billion rupiah)

End of year	Sum	Percentage of increase
1954	11	-
1955	12	10%
1956	13	9%
1957	19	46%
1958	29	52%
1959	35	20%
1960	48	37%
1961	29	42%
1962	131	93%
1963	263	101%
1964	675	157%
1965	2.580	282%
1966	20.550	696%

Exports 1956-1965

(in million US\$)

Years	Coton		Petrol and petroleum products	Difference	Exportation
	Plantation	Non-plantation			
1956	154,4	206,2	255,2	308,6	924,4
1958	108,7	153,2	315,1	213,7	790,7
1960	133,9	243,2	220,7	242,2	840,7
1962	101,6	196,9	215,8	167,3	681,6
1964	98,6	137,2	267,3	221,1	724,2
1965	87,6	135,3	270,6	212,4	705,9

Source : Indonesian National Bureau of Statistic (BPS), accessible at <www.bps.go.id>

Appendix 5

GARNADI DOCUMENT

The report of the Politics and Security Team in Dili

Memo

Number: M.53/Tim P4-OKTT/7/1999

To: Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security

From: Assistant Coordinating Minister I/Home Affairs

Subject: General Assessment if Option I loses

Attachments: None

Date: July 3, 1999

The report of the Politics and Security Team in Dili, hereby respectfully submitted, is as follows:

For the past more or less 23 years that East Timor has been integrated with Indonesia, East Timor has noticeably and quickly progressed especially in the physical/material aspects. The infrastructure truly developed in a surprisingly short time but this was not accompanied by the mental/spiritual development of the society.

The armed resistance of the Security Disturbing Movement continued throughout and there was a tendency for it to expand further. Its regeneration has taken place in a good way, so that there has been a growth of resistance groups that are better educated and more militant, that are able to carry out clandestine activities so that their terrorizing is fairly effective and can attract, create, and politicize public opinion, to establish an anti-integration society. Openly, the anti-integration society could create a tense life, to the point that there was a large exodus especially of those not native to East Timor.

The pro-integration group, spread fairly widely in all the districts, was meanwhile asleep and became the target of the anti-integration group. The TNI was cornered, even terrorized by the anti-integration group. The situation became chaotic, to the point that the government thought that there was no use in keeping East Timor, since it was constantly creating problems, and out of this emerged Option 2.

The birth of Option 2 startled and woke up the pro-integration group that felt as if it would be wiped up if East Timor was released from Indonesia. Since the awakening of the pro-integration group was able to reverse the situation to become dominant very quickly. Although the security situation is already under control, the outsiders have not, perhaps can not, yet come back, except later if Special Autonomy wins in the Consultation.

World opinion was already so influenced that the UN took the initiative to come to East Timor after the Tripartite agreement in New York agreed to hold a Consultation with the East Timorese people whether they accept or reject the Special Autonomy that was conceptualized by the UN. If they accept, the people of East Timor will remain integrated with the Indonesian nation, and if they don't accept they will be released from Indonesia.

The United Nations Assessment [sic] Mission on East Timor (UNAMET) came to East Timor before the Central and the Provincial administrations were ready to receive them. UNAMET was welcomed with great fanfare by the anti-integration group because they consider UNAMET like a god coming to save them, while the provincial government was spellbound and didn't make any sound, though the Central Government, with Presidential Decree no. 43, had already taken many steps to coordinate between Departments.

With the coming of UNAMET, the situation again became worrisome because the anti-integration group got a second wind, while the Indonesian government which was given responsibility to guarantee security for the Consultation instructed all sides (in this case, the instruction can only reach the TNI and the pro-integration groups) to do nothing that could be seen as intimidation. The fresh wind pushed the anti-integration group that committed acts of intimidation and then took shelter behind UNAMET.

[4] At the start when the Political and Security Team (as part of the Satgas P3TT) arrived, many sides

were optimistic that the Special Autonomy would become the people's choice. But after the arrival of UNAMET, there were many contributing factors which encouraged the anti-integration to be inspired. It's too skeptical if we say that UNAMET takes sides, but the fact that we are always left behind in responding to the maneuvers from the unfriendly sides, our initial optimism which seemed to be convincing has become less firm. This is because first our space for movement is so restricted and then our helplessness in counterbalancing the maneuvers of UNAMET, inside of which is supported by local personnel from the anti-integration group. The UNAMET is dominated by anti-integration groups and there is a tendency that its task is not merely to hold the popular consultation, but is more than that.

The task to win Special Autonomy for the people of East Timor is actually not too difficult because what is being fought for is a floating mass whose demand is very simple, that is, for the availability of food and medicine. Whoever can provide food and medical treatment, the people will follow them. Even the anti-integration group is waiting for this type of help but unfortunately we are always late while the anti-integration side can make use of the chance of UNAMET's presence with its additional task, as if it is a savior.

In Dili at this point, there are 32 NGOs waiting ready to help "refugees". The limit between refugees and hungry people is not clear, even those hungry people can quickly be led to become refugees under the pressure of the anti-integration group. Many more funds will immediately flow from outside the country, all of this can change the constellation of forces. In such a constellation, the initial optimism which was so great will become doubtful especially if the promises from the central government are not yet fulfilled. The local government and the TNI can only watch other people give food to our people while the pro-integration people are not touched.

To respond to this kind of situation, it is true that there is still time, but time continues moving without any sign beneficial for winning the first option. Therefore, it will not be wrong if we predict the worst possibility, that Option 1 will not be accepted.

What is the assessment if Option 1 fails?

a. The anti-integration group will have a big party, like what happened when non-organic troops were withdrawn from Aceh last August 1998. While the Acehnese already felt victorious, people threw stones and cursed the TNI which was still undergoing a ceremony to return to its home base. This kind of thing can happen in East Timor on a more sadistic scale. Even though several agreement meetings have been held between the armed groups with the militant pro-integration groups, both at the Center and at the province, there is no guarantee that both sides will accept each other if Option 1 fails. Maybe the Indonesian government will be relieved of the heavy burden of bearing the set of problems of East Timor which has never been finished except losing face in the world. The pro-integration group is prepared to take a position similar to the anti-integration now. The Indonesian government in this case cannot wash its hands if the pro-integration followers are massacred in the future. From the monitoring that has been going until now, it can be predicted that if Option 2 becomes the people's choice, the pro-integration group will continue its resistance, but first they will secure their families in NTT. From this aspect itself, it can be assured that the Indonesian government will not be able to wash its hands of this matter.

b. How will the attitude of the anti-integration group be toward outsiders, especially TNI, POLRI, and all Indonesian civil servants and other outsiders. If Option 1 wins, TNI/POLRI non-organic, and non-native civil servants will have to leave East Timor in an honorable manner. If Option 2 becomes implemented, a horrifying thing will happen to the Indonesian civil servants. The most intense moment will be at the announcement of the result of the popular consultation. The pro-integration groups who are the most tense, without ignoring the Indonesian civil servants. Is it possible for the Indonesian civil servants to continue carrying out their tasks until the announcement of the results of the consultation? They will ask for a guarantee from the Indonesian government and the TNI for their safety, not merely promises but can also foresee an evacuation plan for those who are spread all over East Timor territory.

c. The attitude of the East Timor soldiers who were recruited from the supporters of integration can not be ignored. They are the heroes of integration. Will they join the main body of troops or maybe they don't want to leave East Timor which will mean that they will choose to raise arms. They are sons of the soil who have children, wives, and relatives in East Timor. At least, they can send their children, wives and relatives to NTT [Nusa Tenggara province, meaning West Timor in particular].

d. It is certain that the society's life will be disturbed. The economy will be paralyzed because the businessmen are generally outsiders even though at this time they are still active. But until when this will go on? Possibly they will flee to NTT several days before D-Day. There are some signs that the anti-integration groups have already drawn up a list of new ownership for the assets which will be left by the government and the outsiders. They of course unable or not yet able to operate the management of the society, they will not be able to run the hospital. Even though the anti-integration civil servants are many, they are generally incompetent. At the most, they will be controlled by the church meanwhile the others will be controlled by UNAMET or Australia and its volunteers.

Responding to the above matters we only have six weeks more to win Special Autonomy, but if it fails the period of six weeks is very short to draft a contingency plan for the pro-integration personnel and other assets. Therefore, the drafting of the contingency plan in response to Option Two has to be developed as early as possible. The government has to spare some funds to support this alternative plan. If at this point the government already faces difficulties in supporting the victory it can be said that if the government faces the unexpected possibility without this alternative plan, the integrity of the government in the eyes of the world will be degraded further, especially in the eyes of the Indonesian people in general.

Alternative possibilities which can be carried out are:

a. Maintain a commitment to win Special Autonomy. We have been left behind in the attempt to win the hearts of the people. Aid from foreign NGOs is waiting and it can be assured that political elements will be attached and it will be used by the anti-integration groups. Therefore, the commitment of the government has to be manifested by empowering the pro-integration group further. They really hope that there will be a new capacity to carry out the Operation Sympathy.

To create an alternative plan (contingency plan) in order to face the situation if Option 1 is not accepted.

Plan to expedite evacuation for Indonesian civil servants and outsiders (before the announcement of the result of the ballot) to NTT.

To prepare elements of the TNI (Army, Navy, Air Force) both the personnel and the equipment near the areas for evacuation.

Prepare the NTT territory to receive massive refugees including their security

Planning and securing the withdrawal route, if possible destroying vital facilities or objects.

According to the information, the anti-integration armed forces received a significant dropping of weapons and it is certain that they will not be surrendered even though there is a peace agreement. This indicates that if Option 1 is successfully fought for, the anti-integration groups will remain with another plan to fight for their interests.

Hereby, this report is presented to become a material for consideration to decide the follow up.

Assistant Coordinating Minister I/Home Affairs (H.R. Garnadi)

Appendix 6

SUHARTO'S RESIGNATION SPEECH

(Unofficial Translation)

In the name of God the All-Mighty,

Fellow members of the nation and the motherland,

Assalamualaikum Warrahmatullahi Wabarakatu,

During these recent times, I have been following carefully the development of our national situation, especially the aspirations of the people for reforms in all sectors in the life of our nation and state.

Based on my deep understanding of these aspirations and prompted by the conviction that these reforms need to be implemented in an orderly, peaceful and constitutional manner for the sake of maintaining the unity and cohesion of the nation, and the continuity of the national development, I declared a plan to form the committee for reform and to change the composition of the Seventh Development cabinet.

But, the reality to date has shown that the said committee for reform cannot be materialized because there was no adequate response to the plan to form that committee.

In the wish of implementing these reforms in the best manner possible, I deem that faced with the impossibility of forming the committee, changes in the composition of the Seventh Development Cabinet are no longer necessary.

Considering the above development, I am of the opinion that it would be very difficult for me to implement in a good manner, duties in governing the state and in development.

Therefore, in line with article 8 of the 1945 Constitution and after earnestly taking into consideration the views of the leadership of People's Representatives Council and the leadership of the factions in it, I have decided to declare that I have ceased to be the president of the Republic of Indonesia as of the time I read this on this day, Thursday, May 21, 1998.

I have conveyed this statement, about me stepping down from the post of president of the Republic of Indonesia, to you, leaders of the People's Representatives Council who are also the leaders of the People's Consultative Assembly, during the opportunity for a meeting.

In line with article 8 of the 1945 constitution, the vice president of the Republic of Indonesia, professor, doctor, engineer B.J. Habibie is the one who will conclude the remainder of the presidential term, holder of the mandate of the MPR, for 1998–2003.

For the assistance and support of the people while I led the nation and state of Indonesia, I express my thanks and I seek forgiveness if there was any mistakes and shortcomings.

May the Indonesian nation remain victorious with Pancasila and the 1945 constitution.

As of this day too, the Seventh Development Cabinet is outgoing and to the ministers I express my thanks.

Because conditions do not allow the taking of oath in front of the People's Representative Council, to prevent a vacuum of leadership in implementing the governing of the state, the vice president should now take his oath before the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia.

Jakarta, 21 Mei 1998

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

SOEHARTO

Appendix 7

MAIN OPERATIONAL COMMANDOS OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES

Operational Commandos	Character and Responsibility
Komando Antar Daerah Pertahanan-Inter-territorial defense Commands--KOANDAHAN	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. a unit responsible for wide and continuous defensive-strategic efforts 2. a joint commando force composed of two or more forces 3. Established based on regional strategic concept
Komando Pertahanan Udara Nasional-Air Defense Command--KOHANUDNAS	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. a joint commando force composed of two or more forces responsible for continuous defensive-strategic efforts (in the air)
Komando Pertahanan Pantai (Maritim) Nasional-National Maritime Defense Command—KOPPAN(MAR)NAS	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> a joint commando force composed of two or more forces responsible for continuous defensive-strategic efforts (at sea)
Komando Pasukan Komando-Special Forces	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. responsible for influencing the strategic environment 2. composed of members from across the entire forces to perform special missions
Komando Cadangan Strategis-Strategic Reserve Command--KOCADSTRAT	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. a reserve commando force which is ready to be used in battle whenever required 2. composed of Army, navy and Air Forces
Satuan Tugas Gabungan-Joint Task Force--SATGASGAB	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. a joint force composed of the Army, the Navy and Air Force to perform limited and non-permanent tasks 2. created only when required by the Panglima TNI or Chief-of-Staff of each force
Mandala Luar Nasional—National External Command	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. responsible for defensive as well as offensive operations 2. composed of the Army, the Navy and Air Forces 3. Created based on regions

Cited and translated from Widjajanto (Widjajanto, No year).

REFERENCES

- ABDULGANI, R. (1973) *Nationalism, Revolution, and Guided Democracy in Indonesia*, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University.
- ADAMS, C. (1966a) *Bung Karno Penyambung Lidah Rakyat Indonesia*, Jakarta, Gunung Agung.
- ADAMS, C. (1966b) *Sukarno: An Autobiography as Told to Cindy Adams*.
- AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (1999) Hundreds of Pro-Indonesia Militia launch Attack in East Timor. *Agence France Presse*. 5 April ed. Paris.
- AL-CHAIDAR & AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (2000) *Bencana Muslimin di Indonesia 1980-2000*. Amnesty International.
- AL-ZASTROUW NG (1999) *Siapa Sih Sampayan?: Tafsir Teoritik atas Tindakan dan Pernyataan Gus Dur*, Jakarta, Erlangga.
- ALI, M. (1963) *Perjuangan Feodal*, Bandung, Ganaco.
- ALISJAHBANA, S. T. (1961) *Indonesia in the Modern World*, Michigan, Office for Asian Affairs, Congress for Cultural Freedom.
- ANDERSON, B. R. O. & MCVEY, R. T. (1971) A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia. *Interim Report Series*. Ithaca, Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University.
- ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (1961) *Some aspects of Indonesian politics under the Japanese occupation : 1944-1945*. , Ithaca, N.Y. , Cornell University. Dept. of Far Eastern Studies.
- ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (1967a) *The Pemuda Revolution: Indonesian Politics 1945-1946. Unpublished PhD Dissertation*. Ithaca, Cornell University.
- ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (1967b) *The Pemuda Revolution: Indonesian Politics 1945-1949*. Cornell University.
- ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (1972) *Java in Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance 1944-1946*, Jakarta, PT Equinox Publishing Indonesia.
- ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (1983a) *Imagined communities : reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*, London, Verso.
- ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (1983b) Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 477-496.
- ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (1990) *Language and Power: Exploring political cultures in Indonesia*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
- ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (1999) *Indonesian Nationalism Today and in the Future. Indonesia*. Ithaca, N.Y., Southeast Asia Program Publications, Cornell University
- ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (Ed.) (2002) *Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia*, Ithaca, Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications.
- ANGKATAN DARAT (1966) *Doktrin Perjuangan TNI-AD "Tri Ubaya Cakti"*. Jakarta, Seskoad.
- ANONYMOUS (1953) *Suara Progresif berhaluan radikal. Aliran Islam*, VII/February.
- ANONYMOUS (1964) *Pantjasila the Basis of the State of the Republic of Indonesia*, Jakarta, National Committee for Commemoration of the Birth of Pantja Sila.
- ANONYMOUS (1968) *Far Eastern Economic Review Yearbook*
- ANSHARI, E. S. (1997) *Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945: Sebuah konsensus nasional tentang dasar negara Republik Indonesia 1945-1949*, Jakarta, Gema Insani Press.

- ANTARA (1999) Indonesia: East Timor Tripartite Meeting Crucial--New Zealand Minister. 22 April 1999 ed. Jakarta, ANTARA (The Indonesian News Agency).
- ANWAR, R. (1951) Peristiwa Kahar Muzakkar Hanja Satu Aspect Sadja. *Indonesia Merdeka*. 18 September 1951 ed. Jakarta.
- ARCHIVE (1974) Indonesian Serial 1942-1950. Yogyakarta, Perpustakaan Negara.
- ARISANDI, S. (1983) *Ki Hadjar Dewantara*, Ibu Sejati.
- ARISTOTLE (1923) *Politics*, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- ARIWIADI (1965) *Gerakan Operasi Militer VII: Penjelesaian Peristiwa Atjeh*, Jakarta, Mega Bookstore.
- ASANUMA, S. (1999) Decentralization and Public Finance in Indonesia. IN ISHI, H. E. A. (Ed.) *The Roles of the Central and Local Governments: With Special Tokyo*, Hitotsubashi University.
- ASIAN WALLSTREET JOURNAL (1999) Vigilantes Kill at Least 14 in East Timor. *Asian Wallstreet Journal*. 18 April 1999 ed. Hongkong.
- ASIaweek, T. (1996) Suharto's Tough Guy: A Hardliner Takes Over A Powerful Post. *The Asiaweek*. 23 February 1996 ed.
- ASPINALL, E. (2002) Sovereignty, the Scissor State, and Universal Human Rights: History and the International Structuring of Acehese Nationalism. *Indonesia*, Vol 73, April 2002.
- ASPINALL, E. (2005) *Opposing Suharto: compromise, resistance, and regime change in Indonesia*, Chicago, Stanford University Press.
- BADIE, B. & BIRNBAUM, P. (1979) *Sociologie de l'Etat*, Paris, Bernard Grasset.
- BARDOSONO (1956) *Peristiwa Sulawesi Selatan*, Jakarta, Jajasan Pustaka Militer.
- BARTON, G. (2002) *Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid* Jakarta, Equinox Publishing.
- BARTON, G. (2006) *Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid*, Jakarta, PT Equinox Publishing Indonesia.
- BASTIN, J. & BENDA, H. J. (1968) *A history of modern Southeast Asia : colonialism, nationalism, and decolonization*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall.
- BENDA, H. J. (1956) The Beginnings of the Japanese Occupation of Java *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. 15, pp. 541-560
- BENDA, H. J. (1958) *The crescent and the rising sun : Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945.* , The Hague, Van Hoeve.
- BENDA, H. J. (1964) Democracy in Indonesia: A Review Article. *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol 23, 3, May 1964.
- BERNAS (1998a) Aksi Makin Deras, Korban Jatuh lagi. *Harian Bernas*. 3 May 1998 ed.
- BERNAS (1998b) Selama Krisis, 63 Perusahaan di Jateng Rumahkan Karyawannya. *Bernas*. 20 July 1998 ed. Yogyakarta.
- BHAKTI, I. N. (1998a) Chronology of Events Leading to The Fall of President Suharto. IN FORESTER, G. & MAY, R. J. (Eds.) *The Fall of Suharto*. Bathurst, Crawford House Publishing.
- BHAKTI, I. N. (1998b) Chronology of events leading to the fall of President Suharto. IN FORRESTER, G. & MAY, R. J. (Eds.) *The fall of Soeharto*. Bathurst, Crawford House.
- BHAKTI, I. N., YANUARTI, S. & NURHASYIM, M. (2009) Military Politics, Ethnicity, and Conflict in Indonesia. *CRISE Working Paper No. 62, January 2009*.
- BINGHAM, S. (1997) The Praetorian Guard in the Political and Social Life of Julio Claudian Rome. *Department of Classical, Near Eastern, and Religious Studies*. Ottawa, The University of British Columbia.

- BIS (2005) Foreign Exchange Intervention and Policy: Bank Indonesia Experiences 1997-October 2004. *Foreign Exchange Market Intervention in Emerging Markets: Motives, Techniques, and Implication*. Switzerland.
- BISNIS INDONESIA (1998a) *Bisnis Indonesia*. 19 March 1998 ed.
- BISNIS INDONESIA (1998b) Presiden Suharto: Kita akan Konsisten Terapkan Reformasi. 14 April 1998 ed. Jakarta, Bisnis Indonesia.
- BLACKSTONE, W. S. (1973) *The Sovereignty of The Law: Selections from Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England*, London, MacMillan.
- BLANCHARD, F. C. (1991) *L'Indonésie, l'armée et le pouvoir: De la Révolution au développement*, Paris, Asian Research L'harmattan.
- BOLAND, B. J. (1971a) *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff.
- BOLAND, B. J. (1971b) *The struggle of Islam in modern Indonesia / [By] B. J. Boland.* , The Hague, Nijhoff.
- BPS (1973) Sensus Penduduk 1971 (Population census 1971). *Seri D*. Jakarta, Biro Pusat Statistik
- BRACKMAN, A. C. (1963) *Indonesian communism : a history*, New York, Praeger.
- BRESNAN, J. (1993) *Managing Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy*, New York, Columbia University Press.
- BROOKER, P. (1995) *Twentieth-Century Dictatorships: The ideological One-Party States*, Macmillan.
- BROOKER, P. (2000) *Non-Democratic Regimes*, St martin's Press.
- BROOKER, P. (2009) *Non-Democratic Regimes*, Hampsire, Palgrave Macmillan.
- BULLETIN (2008) Laporan Utama. *Bulletin*. October 2008 ed. Jakarta, BPMigas.
- BUNNEL, F. P. (1969) The Kennedy Initiatives in Indonesia 1962-63. Ithaca, Cornell University.
- BURHANI, N. Muhammadiyah Studies: Dedicated to Boosting Research and Scholarship on The Muhammadiyah and Strengthening this Movement.
<http://muhammadiyahstudies.blogspot.com>.
- CHALMERS, I. & HADIZ, V. R. (1997) *The Politics of Economic Development in Indonesia: Contending Perspectives*, New York, Routledge.
- CHAPMAN, J. & NISH, I. (2004) On the Periphery of the Russo-Japanese War. Suntory Toyota International Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD), London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).
- CIPTA ADI PUSTAKA (1989) Ensiklopedi Nasional Indonesia. Jakarta, Cipta Adi Pustaka.
- CORDON, W. M. & MACKIE, J. A. C. (1962) The Development of the Indonesian Exchange Rate System. *Malayan Economic Review*, Vol. VII.
- COX, G. P. (2006) The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero. *Journal of Military History*, Vol 70. No.1.
- CRIBB, R. (2008) *Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People's Militia and the Indonesian Revolution 1945-1949*, London, Equinox Publishing.
- CRIBB, R. & KAHIN, A. (2004) *Historical Atlas of Indonesia*, Lanham, Scarecrow Press.
- CROUCH, H. (1973) Another Look at te Indonesian Coup. *Indonesia*, Vol 15 (April 1973).
- CROUCH, H. (1974) The 15 January Affairs in Indonesia. *Dyason House Paper*. August 1974 ed.
- CROUCH, H. (1978) *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
- CROUCH, H. (1988) Indonesia: The Rise and Fall of Suharto's Generals. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.10 No.1 (January 1988).
- DAALDER, H. (1962) *The Role of The Military in the Emerging Countries*, S-Gravenhage, Mouton & CO.

- DAHM, B. (1969) *Sukarno and the struggle for Indonesian independence* Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press.
- DAQUILA, T. (2005) *The Economies of Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand*, Nova Publishers.
- DICK, H. (1989) Japans Economic Expansion in the Netherlands Indies Between the First and Second World Wars. *Journal of Souteast Asian Studies*, Vol NN No.2 , September 1989.
- DINAS SEJARAH TNI ANGKATAN DARAT (1979) *Sendi-Sendi Perjuangan TNI-AD*. Bandung, Disjarahad.
- DOWER, J. W. (1986) *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*, New York, Pantheon Books.
- DREA ET.AL. (2006) *Researching Japanese War Crimes Records: Introductory Essays*, Washington, DC, National Archives and Records Administration for the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group.
- DURKHEIM, E. (1997) *The Division of Labour in Society*, Illinois, Free Press.
- DUTCH GOVERNMENT (1948) Interogation of Didi Kartasasmita of 9 November 1948. Batavia, Royal Dutch Archive, General Secretary Box VII No.24.
- DUVERGER, M. (1950) *Sociologie des Partis Politiques* *Traité de Sociologie*. Paris, PUF.
- EASTON, D. (1967) *The Political System: an inquiry into the state of political science*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf.
- EDITORS, T. (1969) Current Data on the Indonesian Army Elite. *Indonesia*, Vol 7, April 1969.
- EDITORS, T. (2000) Civil-Military Relations since The Fall of Suharto. *Indonesia*, Vol 70 (October 2000).
- EDY, B. (1996) Kronologi Peristiwa 27 Juli 1996. *Tempo*. 10 August 1996 ed. Jakarta, Tempo.
- EFFENDY, B. (2003) *Islam and the State in Indonesia*, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- EKLOF, S. (2005) *Power and Political Culture in Suharto's Indonesia: The Indonesian Democratic Party and the Decline of the New Order (1986-1998)*, NIAS Press.
- ELIRAZ, G. (2007) *Islam and Polity in Indonesia: An Intriguing Case Study*, Washington, Hudson Institute.
- EMMERSON, D. K. (2001) *Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Negara, Ekonomi, Masyarakat, Transisi*, Jakarta, The Asia Foundation.
- EMMERSON, D. K. (2005) What is Indonesia ? IN BRESNAN, J. (Ed.) *Indonesia: The Great Transition*. Oxford, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- FAN, K.-S. (1982) *Women in Southeast Asia: a bibliography*, Boston, G.K. Hall.
- FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW (Ed.) (1966).
- FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW (1967a).
- FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW (1967b) *Far Eastern Economic Review Yearbook*.
- FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW (1999a) Indonesian Military Looks Set to Sour Independence Plans. *Far Eastern Economic Review*. 18 February 1999 ed. Hongkong.
- FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW (1999b) Second Thought of East Timor Independence. *Far Eastern Economic Review*. 29 April 1999 ed. Hongkong.
- FEDERSPIEL, H. M. (1998) *A Dictionary of Indonesian Islam*, Ohio, Ohio University Press.
- FEENER, R. M. (2007) *Muslim legal thought in modern Indonesia*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- FEITH, H. (1957a) The Indonesian Elections of 1955. *Interim Report Series, Modern Indonesia Project 1957* ed. Ithaca, Southeast Asia Program Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University.

- FEITH, H. (1957b) *The Indonesian elections of 1955* Ithaca, Modern Indonesian Project, Southeast Asia Program, Dept. of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University.
- FEITH, H. (1962) *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia.* , Ithaca, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University Press.
- FEITH, H. (1963) The Dynamics of Guided Democracy. IN MCVEY, R. T. (Ed.) *Indonesia, Human Relations Area.* New Haven, Files Press.
- FINER, S. (1976) *The Man on Horseback*, Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- FIRDAUSY, C. M. (1998) The Social Impact of Economic Crisis on Employment in Indonesia. Centre for economic and Development Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences.
- FORRESTER, G. (1999) *Post-Suharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos?*, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- FORUM KEADILAN (1998a) Darah Mengalir di Tapal Kuda. *Forum Keadilan.* 2 November ed.
- FORUM KEADILAN (1998b) Saat Angin Tak Sejuk Lagi. *Forum Keadilan.* 28 December ed. Jakarta, Yayasan Keadilan.
- FRIEDRICH, C. J. (1966) An Introductory Note on Revolution. IN FRIEDRICH, C. J. (Ed.) *Revolution: NOMOS VIII.* New York, Atherton Press.
- GATRA (1995) Untuk Apa Soemitro Menggebrak? *Gatra.* July 8, 1995 ed. Jakarta.
- GEERTZ, C. (1976) *The Religion of Java*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- GEERTZ, C. (1980) *Negara : the theatre state in nineteenth-century Bali*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- GEERTZ, H. (1963) Indonesian Cultures and Communities. IN MCVEY, R. T. (Ed.) *Indonesia.* New Haven, HRAF Press.
- GELLNER, E. (1983) *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell Ltd.
- GLASSBURNER (1971) *The Economy of Indonesia*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
- GOLD, J. (1970) *The Stand-by Arrangements of the International Monetary Fund*, Washington.
- GOLDSBOROUGH, R. H. (1998) Indonesia's Wealth: Who Will Control it? *Personal Update NewsJournal*, July 1998.
- GORDON (1966) *The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia*, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall.
- GORDON, B., K. (1963-1964) The Potential for Indonesian Expansion. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XXXVI No.4 (Winter 1963-1964).
- GREGORY, A. (1976) Recruitment and Factional Patterns of the Indonesian Political Elite. Columbia University.
- HAMKA (1943) Sikap dan Kewadajiban Kaoem Moeslimin di Zaman Baroe. *Moeslimin Soematra Baroe.* Medan, Badan Penjiaran Bunka-Ka.
- HANDERSON, C. (1998) *Asia Falling : Making Sense of the Asian Crisis and its Aftermath*, New York, McGraw-Hill.
- HANKE, S. (2007) On the Fall of the Rupiah and Suharto. *GlobeAsia*, February 2007.
- HARIAN NERACA (1998) *Harian Neraca.* 17 March 1998 ed. Jakarta.
- HARSONO, G. (1985) *Cakrawala Politik Era Sukarno*, Jakarta, Inti Idayu Press.
- HARVEY, B. S. (1977) *Permesta: Half A Rebellion*, Ithaca, SEAP Publications.
- HASEGAWA, T. (2007) *The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals*, California, Stanford University Press.
- HASEMAN, J. B. (2000) To Change A Military: The Indonesian Experience. *Joint Force Quarterly*, JFQ Forum, Summer 2000.
- HATTA, M. (1969) *Sekitar Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945*, Jakarta, Tintamas.
- HEFNER, R. W. (2000) *Civil Islam : Muslims and democratization in Indonesia*, Princeton, NJ Princeton University Press.

- HEFNER, W. R. (2005) Social Legacies and Possible Futures. IN BRESNAN, J. (Ed.) *Indonesia: The Great Transition*. Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- HEGEL & FRIEDRICH, G. W. (1999) *Political Writings*, London, New York, Cambridge University Press.
- HEINZ, A. (1967) Economic Disorder and the Task Ahead. IN TAN, T. K. (Ed.) *Sukarno's Guided Indonesia*. Brisbane, Jacaranda.
- HILL, H. (1998) The Indonesian Economy: The Strange and Sudden Death of A Tiger. IN FORRESTER, G. & MAY, R. J. (Eds.) *The Fall of Soeharto*. Bathurst, Crawford House.
- HIMAWAN, C. (1980) *Foreign Investment in Indonesia*, Jakarta, Gunung Agung.
- HINDLEY, D. (1964) Indonesia's Confrontation of Malaysia. *Asian Survey*, Vol. IV No.6 (June 1964).
- HOBBS, T. (1996) *Leviathan*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- HOFMAN, B. (2004) *Indonesia: Rapid Growth, Weak Institution*. Jakarta, World Bank.
- HORIKOSHI, H. (1975) The Dar-ul-Islam Movement in West Java (1948-1962). *Indonesia*, Vol 20, October 1975, 58-86.
- HUNTINGTON, S. (1957) *The Soldier and the State*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
- HUNTINGTON, S. (1991) *The Third Wave: Democratization in The Late Twentieth Century*, London, University of Oklahoma Press.
- INDONESIA (1967) Keppres RI No.132/1967 tentang Pokok-Pokok Organisasi dan Prosedur Bidang Pertahanan dan Keamanan. Jakarta, Sekretariat Negara RI.
- INDONESIA (1972) *Cuplikan Sejarah Perjuangan TNI-Angkatan Darat*, Jakarta, Dinas Sejarah Militer, Angkatan Darat.
- INDONESIA (1973) Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia (Presidential Decree) No. 30/1972 and No.15/1973.
- INDONESIA (1978) Doktrin Territorial Nusantara. Jakarta, Departemen Pertahanan dan Keamanan.
- INDONESIA (1988) Keppres No.29/1988 tentang Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional. Jakarta, Sekretariat Negara RI.
- INDONESIA (1999a) Indonesian Constitution of 1945: First Ammendment.
- INDONESIA (1999b) Law Number 3/1999 on Election.
- INDONESIA (2001) Indonesian Constitution of 1945: Third Ammendment.
- INDONESIA (2003) Law No.12/2003 on Election.
- INDONESIA (2008) Law No.10/2008 on 'Pemilihan Umum Anggota DPR, DPD, dan DPRD'
- INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT Archive: Susunan Kabinet Presidensial 2 September 1945-14 November 1945. Jakarta.
- INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT (1970) Peraturan pemerintah (Government's Law) No. 6/1970. Jakarta.
- INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT (1998) Archive: Susunan Kabinet Pembangunan VII, 16 Maret 1998-21 Mei 1998. Jakarta.
- INDONESIAN HERALD (1963) Editorial. *Indonesian Herald*. 30 January 1963 ed.
- INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTION SYSTEM (2000) Republic of Indonesia: Report on the 7 June 1999 Parliamentary General Election and Recommendations for Electoral Reform. February 2000 ed. Washington DC, IFES.
- INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (1997) IMF-Indonesia Letter of Intent: . 31 October 1997 ed. Jakarta.
- INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (1998a) Annual Report of the Executive Board for the Financial Year Ended April 30, 1998. Washington DC, International Monetary Fund.

- INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (1998b) Indonesia Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, April 10, 1998 -- Letter of Intent. Jakarta.
- INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (1998c) Indonesia: Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies. 15 January 1998 ed. Jakarta.
- JACKMAN, R. W. (1976) Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the Third World. *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 70 No 4 (December 1976), pp. 1078-1097.
- JACKSON, K. D. & MOELIONO, J. (1971) Participation in Rebellion: The Darul Islam in West Java. IN LIDDLE, R. W. (Ed.) *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia*. New Haven, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph Series Vol 49.
- JAINURI, A. (1997) The Formation of the Muhammadiyah Ideology, 1912-1942. Canada, McGill University.
- JAKTI, D. K. (1981) The Political Economy of Development. Berkeley, University of California.
- JANOWITZ, M. (1960) *The Professional Soldier*, Chicago, Free Press.
- JAWA POS (1998a) Aksi di Sejumlah Kota Turun ke Jalan dan Bentrok. *Jawa Pos Online*. 3 May 1998 ed.
- JAWA POS (1998b) Jangan Tutup-Tutupi Kasus Banyuwangi. *Jawa Pos*. 13 October 1998 ed. Surabaya.
- JAWA POS (1998c) Tersenyum Saat Diinterupsi. *Jawa Pos*. 26 April 1998 ed. Surabaya.
- JAWA POS (2000) Juwono Soal Rencana Perombakan Struktur Militer: Pnglima TNI Digusur, Diganti Kasgab. *Jawa Pos*. 23 may 2000 ed. Surabaya.
- JENKINS, D. (1984) *Suharto and His Generals*, Ithaca, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University.
- KAHIN, G. M. (1952) *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*. , Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press.
- KAHIN, G. M. (Ed.) (1964a) *Government and politics in Southeast Asia*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
- KAHIN, G. M. (1964b) Malaysia and Indonesia. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XXXVII No.3 (Fall 1964).
- KAHIN, G. M. (2003) *Southeast Asia: A Testament*, London, Roudledge.
- KAMESAKA, A. & WANG, J. (2004) The Asian Crisis and Investor's Behavior in Thailand's Equity Market.
- KAMI (1966) The Leader, The Man, and The Gun. *Artikel Seminar KAMI, 10-20 January*. Jakarta, KAMI.
- KAUFMAN, G., KRUEGER, T. & HUNTER, W. (1999) *The Asian Financial Crisis: Origins, Implications and Solutions*, Springer.
- KEARNEY, M. (2001) Over 100 Killed in New Moluques Violence. *Strait Times*. 21 June ed.
- KELL, T. (1995) *The Roots od Acehese Rebellion*, Ithaca, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project.
- KEMENTRIAN DALAM NEGERI RI (1970) Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri (The Regulation of the Minister of Internal Affairs) No. 12/1969.
- KEMENTRIAN PENERANGAN RI (1966) Statement-Statement Politik Waperdam Bidang Sospol/menteri Luar Negeri dan Waperdam Bidang Ekubang. Jakarta.
- KEMENTRIAN PENERANGAN RI (1970) Susunan Kabinet Republik Indonesia 1945-1970. Djakarta, Pradnja Paramita.
- KINGSBURY, D. (2000) TNI and The Militias. IN KINGSBURY, D. (Ed.) *Guns and Ballot Boxes*. Victoria, Monash Asia Institute.

- KIVIMAKI, T. (2003) *US-Indonesia Hegemonic Bargaining: Strength of weakness*, Burlington, Ashgate Publishing Co.
- KLINKEN, G. V. (2001) The Moluques Wars : Bringing Society Back In. *Indonesia*, Number 71 April.
- KLINKEN, H. V. (2000) Taking the Risk, Paying the Price. IN KINGSBURY, D. (Ed.) *Guns and ballot Boxes*. Victoria, Monash Asia Institute.
- KOMPAS (1998a) *Kompas*. 22 may 1998 ed. Jakarta.
- KOMPAS (1998b) *Harian Kompas*. 21 April 1998 ed. Jakarta.
- KOMPAS (1998c) Kegiatan Politik dilarang di Kampus. *Kompas*. 5 April ed. Jakarta.
- KOMPAS (1998d) Kekerasan Pecah di UGM dan IAIN Yogya. *Kompas Online*. 3 April 1998 ed.
- KOMPAS (1998e) KSAD: Kalau Tak Puas Tak Perlu Demonstrasi. *Kompas*. 20 February 1998 ed. Jakarta.
- KOMPAS (1998f) Masyarakat Diharapkan Pelihara Keamanan dan Ketertiban. *Kompas*. 17 April 1998 ed. Jakarta.
- KOMPAS (1998g) PHK Sudah Mencapai 15,4 Juta Orang. *Kompas*. 21 July 1998 ed. Jakarta.
- KOMPAS (2000) Enam Wakil Laskar Jihad Bertemu Presiden. *Kompas*. 7 April 2000 ed. Jakarta.
- KRASNER, S., D (1999) *Sovereignty : Organized Hypocrisy*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press.
- KUHN, T. S. (1970) *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.
- KUNIO, Y. (1988) *The Rise of Ersatz Capitalism in Souteast Asia*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- LEBRA, J. C. (1975) *Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II: Selected Readings and Documents*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- LEGG, J. D. (1957) *The Problems of Regional Autonomy in Contemporary Indonesia*, Ithaca, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project.
- LEGG, J. D. (1964) *Indonesia*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall.
- LEGG, J. D. (1972) *Sukarno: A Political Biography*, London, Allen Lane the Penguin Press.
- LEIFER, M. (2001) *Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Southeast Asia*. Taylor & Francis.
- LEV, D. S. (1966) *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics 1957-1959*, Ithaca, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University.
- LIDDLE, R. W. (1973a) Modernizing Indonesian Politics. IN LIDDLE, R. W. (Ed.) *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia, Monograph Series*. New Haven, Yale University.
- LIDDLE, R. W. (Ed.) (1973b) *Political participation in Modern Indonesia*, New Haven, Yale University Press.
- LIDDLE, R. W. (1985) Suharto's Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol 58 No.1 (Spring 1985).
- LIJPHART, A. (1961) The Indonesian Image of West Irian. *Asian Survey*, Vol 1. No. 5 (July 1961).
- LIPSET, S. M. (1963) *The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective*, London, Heinemann.
- LIPSET, S. M. (1968) New Nation and Political Legitimacy. *Dialogue*, Vol.1.
- LOMBARD, D. (1990) *Le carrefour javanais : essai d'histoire globale*, Paris, Editions de l'Ecole des hautes etudes en sciences sociales.
- LOWRY, R. (1996) *The Armed Forces in Indonesia*, Sidney, Allen & Unwin.
- LUCIUS, R. (2003) *A House Divided: The Decline and Fall of the Masyumi (1950-1956)*. California, US Naval Postgraduate School.

- MAARIF, A. S. (2007) Strategi Dakwah Muhammadiyah: Masa lalu, Kini dan Masa Depan dalam Perspektif Kebudayaan. 23 August 2007 ed.
- MACFARLING, I. (Ed.) (1995) *General Sudirman: The Leader who Finally Destroyed Colonialism in Indonesia*, Canberra, Australian Defense Studies Center.
- MACHIAVELLI, N. (1521) *The Art of War*, Feedbooks.
- MACHIAVELLI, N. (1970) *The discourses*, Harmondsworth, England, Penguin Books.
- MACKIE, J. (1967) *Problems of Indonesian Inflation*, Ithaca, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project.
- MAEKAWA, K. (2006) The Heiho during the Japanese Occupation in Indonesia. IN KRATOSKA, P. H. (Ed.) *Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire*. Singapore, NUS Press.
- MALEY, M. (1998) The 7th Development Cabinet: Loyal to a Fault? *Indonesia*, Vol. 65 (April 1998), 155-178.
- MANN, R. (1998) *Economic Crisis in Indonesia: The Full Story*, London, Gateway Books.
- MANN, R. (1999) *Plots and Schemes that Brought Down Suharto*, Jakarta, Gateway Books.
- MANNING, C., AND DIERMEN, V. (Ed.) (2000) *Indonesia in Transition : Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis*, London, Zedbooks.
- MARYANOF, G. S. (1959) *Decentralization in Indonesia as a Political Problem*, Ithaca, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project.
- MAS'OED, M. (1989) *Ekonomi dan Struktur Politik Orde Baru 1966-1971*, Jakarta, Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3ES).
- MCDONALD, H. (1980) *Suharto's Indonesia*, Melbourne, Fontana & Collines.
- MCGLYNN, J. H. & SULISTYO, H. (2007) *Indonesia in the Soeharto years: issues, incidents and images*, Singapore, NUS Press.
- MCINTYRE, A. (1997) *In search of Megawati Sukarnoputri*, Clayton, Monash Asia Institute.
- MEDIA INDONESIA (1998) 38 Hilang Setelah Demonstrasi. *Media Indonesia*. 6 April 1998 ed. Jakarta.
- MEDIA INDONESIA (1999) Korem 161/Wirasakti NTT Dijadikan Kodam. *Media Indonesia*. September 29. 1999 ed. Jakarta.
- MEDIA INDONESIA (2000) Kelompok Cilangkap Dominan. *Media Indonesia*. June 11, 2000 ed.
- MENON, R. (2001) Another Year of Living Dangerously. *The National Interest*. 22 September 2001 ed.
- MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (1999) Peristiwa Ketapang. *Internal report, unpublished* http://www.dephan.go.id/fakta/p_ketapang.htm. Jakarta, Ministry of Defense of Indonesia.
- MOERTOPO, A. (1974) *Strategi Politik Nasional*, Jakarta, Yayasan proklamasi, CSIS.
- MORRIS, C. W. (1998a) *An essay on the Modern State*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- MORRIS, C. W. (1998b) *An essay on the modern state*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- MORTIMER, R. (1974) *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
- MPRS (1966) Ketetapan-Ketetapan dan Keputusan-Keputusan Sidang Umum IV MPRS. Jakarta, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara Republik Indonesia.
- MUHAMMAD, M. (2005) Kebijakan Fiskal di Masa Krisis 1997. IN SOEASTRO, H., BUDIMAN, A., TRIASWATI, N., ALISJAHBANA, A. & ADININGSIH, S. (Eds.) *Pemikiran dan Permasalahan Ekonomi di Indonesia dalam Setengah Abad Terakhir*. Jakarta, Isei-Penerbit Kanisius.

- MURTOPO, A. (1974) *Strategi Politik Nasional*, Jakarta, CSIS.
- NASUTION, A. H. (1955) *Tjatatatan2 Sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia*, Jakarta, Pembimbing.
- NASUTION, A. H. (1964) *Toward The People's Army*, Jakarta, CV Delegasi.
- NASUTION, A. H. (1970) *TNI Vol.1*, Jakarta, Seruling Masa.
- NASUTION, A. H. (1971) *Kekaryaan ABRI*, Jakarta, Seruling Masa.
- NASUTION, A. H. (1982) *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Vol.1*, Jakarta, Gunung Agung.
- NASUTION, H. (1965) *The Islamic State in Indonesia: The Rise of the Ideology, the Movement for its creationand the Theory of the Masyumi. The Institute of Islamic Studies*. Montreal, McGill University.
- NIEUWENHUIJZE, C. A. O. V. (1958) *Aspects of Islam in Post Colonial Indonesia*, The Hague Bandung, W. Van Hoeve.
- NISHIHARA, M. (1972) *Golkar and the Indonesian Elections of 1971*, Ithaca, Cornell Indonesia Modern Project.
- NITISASTRO, W. (1965) *Masalah-masalah Ekonomi dan Faktor-faktor IPOLEKSOS*, Jakarta, Leknas/LIPI.
- NOER, D. (1973) *The modernist Muslim movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942*, New York, Oxford University Press.
- NOER, D. (1990) *Mohammad Hatta: Biografi Politik*, Jakarta, LP3ES.
- NOMURA, M. (2007) *The Dutch East Indies and the Japanese Armed Forces*. IN MILITARY HISTORY DEPARTMENT, N. D. C. (Ed.) 4 December 2007 ed. Tokyo.
- NORDLINGER, E. (1970) *Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-Western States. The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 64 No 4 (December 1970), pp.1131-1148.
- NORDLINGER, E. (1977) *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, Enlewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall.
- NOTOSUSANTO, N. (1979) *Tentara Peta Pada Jaman Pendudukan Jepang*, Jakarta, Gramedia.
- NOTOSUSANTO, N. (1984) *Pejuang dan Prajurit*, Jakarta, Sinar Harapan.
- O'ROURKE, K. (2002) *Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post-Suharto Indonesia*, New South Wales, Allen&Unwin.
- PALMER, I. (1978) *Indonesian Economy Since 1965*, London, Frank Class.
- PALMER, L. (1973) *Communists in Indonesia*, New York, Anchor.
- PALMIER, L. H. (1973) *Communists in Indonesia*. , London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- PANGLAYKIM, J. & THOMAS, K. D. (1973) *The Road to Amsterdam and Beyond: Aspects of Indonesia's Stabilization Program. ASEAN Survey*, Vol. VII.
- PANITIA LIMA (1977) *Uraian Pancasila*, Jakarta, Mutiara.
- PAUKER, G. J. (1961) *General Nasution's Mission to Moscow. Asian Survey*, Vol. 1 No.1 (March 1961).
- PAUKER, G. J. (1973) *The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management*, California, The Rand Corporation.
- PEACOCK, J. L. (1973) *Indonesia: An Anthropological Perspective*, California, Goodyear Publishing Company, Inc.
- PELZER (1963) *Physical and Human Resources Patterns*. IN MCVEY, R. T. (Ed.) *Indonesia*. New Haven, HRAF Press.
- PEOSPONEGORO, M. D. (1992) *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia: Jaman Jepang dan Jaman Republik Indonesia*, Jakarta, PT Balai Pustaka.
- PERLMUTTER, A. (1969) *The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil Military Relations in Developing Polities. Comparative Politics*, Vol. 1 No 3 (April 1969), pp. 382-404.

- PERLMUTTER, A. (1974) *Egypt: The Praetorian State*, New Jersey, Transaction Inc.
- PERLMUTTER, A. (1977) *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On professional, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press.
- PERLMUTTER, A. (1978) *Politics and the Military in Israel 1967-1977*, F. Cass.
- POSTHUMUS, G. A. (1971) *The Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia*, Rotterdam University Press.
- POUR, J. (1993) *Murdani: Profile of A Soldier's Statesman*, Jakarta, Yayasan kejuangan Panglima Besar Soedirman.
- PRATIGNYO, I. (1974) *Lahirnya Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya Menjadi kekuatan Sosial Politik*. Project of Thesis, No Publisher.
- PRINGGODIGDO, A. K. (1967) *Sejarah Pergerakan Rakyat Indonesia*, Jakarta, Dian Rakyat.
- PURDEY, J. (2006) *Anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia, 1996-1999*, University of Hawaii Press.
- QUR'AN, T. H.
- RAB, T. (1999) *Menuju Riau Berdaulat: Penjarahan Minyak Riau*, Pekanbaru, Yayasan Penerbit Sosial Budaya Riau.
- RAJAN, R. S. (2010) *The Evolution and Impact of Asian Exchange Rate Regimes*. *ADB Economic Working Paper Series No. 208*. Manila, Asian Development Bank.
- RALIBY, O. (1953) *Documenta Historica*, Jakarta, Bulan Bintang.
- RAMADHAN, K. (1994) *Soemitro: Dari Pangdam Mulawarman Sampai Pangkopkamtib*, Jakarta, Pustaka Sinar Harapan.
- REID, A. (1939) *Southeast Asia in the age of commerce, 1450-1680*, New Haven, Yale University Press.
- REID, A. (2006) *Verandah of Violence: The Background of the Aceh Problem*, Singapore, National University of Singapore Press.
- REPUBLIKA (1998) Wiranto: ABRI Kembangkan Paradigma Peran baru Sospol. *Republika*. 18 July 1998 ed. Jakarta.
- REPUBLIKA (1999) Memperta: Untuk jadi presiden, tak cukup bermodal kharismatis dan popularitas *Republika*. 12 June 1999 ed. Jakarta.
- REX MORTIMER, R. (1974) *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
- RICKLEFS, M. C. (1981a) *A History of Modern Indonesia*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
- RICKLEFS, M. C. (1981b) *A History of Modern Indonesia, c. 1300 to the present*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
- RIES, P. (2000) *Asian Storm: The Economic Crisis Examined*, Tuttle Publishing.
- ROBISON, R. & HADIZ, V. R. (2004) *Reorganizing Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchi in an Age of Market*, Routledge
- ROSENAU, J. N. (Ed.) (1969) *Linkage Politics*, New York, The Free Press.
- ROUSSEAU, J. J. (1986) *The Social Contract* Markham, Ont, Fitzhenry & Whiteside.
- SABILI (1998) Laporan Utama. *Sabili*. 9 Decembre ed.
- SAMUDDIN (Ed.) (1972) *Sari Berita dan Pendapat: Pemilihan Umum 1971*, Jakarta, Lembaga Pendidikan dan Konsultasi Pers.
- SASTROAMIJOYO, A. (1979) *Milestone on My Journey: The Memoirs of Ali Sastroamijoyo, Indonesian Patriot and Political Leader*, Queensland, University of Queensland Press.
- SAUNDERS, J. (1998) *Academic Freedom in Indonesia: Dismantling Suharto-era Barriers*, Human Rights Watch.

- SCHLESINGER JR., A. M. (1965) *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin.
- SCHMUTZER, E. (1977) *Dutch Colonial Policy and the Search for Identity in Indonesia 1920-1931*, Leiden, E.J. Brill's Archive.
- SCHWARTZ, A. (1994) *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability*, New South Wales, Allen&Unwin.
- SEKRETARIAT NEGARA RI (1966) Naskah Pidato Presiden, 1 September 1966. Jakarta, Unpublished.
- SHARMA, S. D. (2003) *The Asian Financial Crisis: Crisis, Reform, and Recovery*, Manchester University Press.
- SHINER, C. (1998) Suharto Ignores Criticism, Names Cronies to Cabinet. *Washington Post*. 14 March 1998 ed. Washington.
- SHIRER, W. L. (1960) *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany*, New York, Simon & Schuster.
- SHUNKICHIRO, M. (1996) My Recollections of the Military Occupation in Java, No 14. *Kokusai Mondai* 80, 67, November 1996.
- SIDDIQUE, S. & SURYADINATA, L. (1981-1982) Bumiputra and Pribumi: Economic Nationalism (Indiginism) in Malaysia and Indonesia. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 54 No.4 (Winter 1981-1982).
- SIDJABAT, W. B. (1965) *Religious Tolerance and the Christian Faith*, Jakarta, Badan Penerbit Kristen.
- SIEGEL, J. T. (1998) *A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: Counter-Revolution Today*, Durham, Duke University Press.
- SIMATUPANG, T. B. (1972) *Report from Banaran: Experiences during the People's* (Translated by Benedict Anderson and Efinbeth Grave), New York, Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University.
- SIMATUPANG, T. B. (1977) This is my country. *International Review of Mission LXIII*, 251, July.
- SIMATUPANG, T. B. (1981) *Pelopor dalam Perang, Pelopor dalam Damai*, Jakarta, Sinar Harapan.
- SIMORANGKIR, J. C. T. & SAY, M. R. B. (No year) *Konstitusi dan Konstituante Indonesia*, Jakarta, Soeroengan.
- SISWOYO, B. (1983) *Sekitar Petisi 50*, Solo, CV Mayasari.
- SKINNER, G. W. (1963) The Chinese Minority. IN MCVEY, R. T. (Ed.) *Indonesia*. New Haven, HRAF Press.
- SLATER, D. (2005) *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics, State Building, and Authoritarian Durability in Southeast Asia*. Emory University.
- SOEBROTO, R. S. (1971) *Urip Soemohardjo Letnan Jenderal TNI*, Jakarta, Gunung Agung.
- SOEDJATMOKO (1956) The Role of Political Parties in Indonesia. IN THAYER, P. W. (Ed.) *Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia*. Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press.
- SOEKARNO (1961) *Lahirnya Pancasila*, Jakarta, Dewan Pertimbangan Agung.
- STATE SECRETARIAT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA (1999) Press Release, 27 January 1999. Jakarta.
- STRAIT TIMES (1999) East Timor is Nothing but Rocks: Habibie. 25 February 1999 ed.
- STRAYER, R. J., TILLY, C. & JORDAN, W. C. (2005) *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State (Paperback)* Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press.
- SUAEDY, A. (1998) *Premanisme Politik*, Jakarta, Institut Studi Arus Informasi.
- SUAIDI, A. (2009) *Nalar Politik NU dan Muhammadiyah: Over Crossing Jawa Sentris*, Yogyakarta, LKIS.

- SUARA MERDEKA (1998) Semprot Gas Air Mata, Bakar Ikan Asin. *Suara Merdeka Online*. 12 March 1998 ed. Semarang.
- SUARA MERDEKA (2000) Jabatan Kasgab Digilir Tiap 3 Tahun. *Suara Merdeka*. 2 June 2000 ed.
- SUARA PEMBAHARUAN (1998a) Kasospol: ABRI akan Dukung Pelaksanaan Pemilu. *Suara Pembaharuan*. 25 may 1998 ed. Jakarta.
- SUARA PEMBAHARUAN (1998b) Presiden: Kampus Dibangun untuk Mendidik. *Suara Pembaruan*. 18 April 1998 ed. Jakarta.
- SUARA PEMBARUAN (1998a) Kassospol ABRI: Tidak Ada Perintah Pangab untuk Menculik Aktivis. *Suara Pembaruan*. 26 April ed. Jakarta.
- SUARA PEMBARUAN (1998b) Wirabuana: Aspirasi Mahasiswa Benar dan Mewakili Rakyat. *Suara Pembaruan*. 25 April 1998 ed. Jakarta.
- SUARA PEMBARUAN (1999) Gubernur Timtim Tak Sependapat dengan Melu Alatas. *Suara Pembaruan*. 2 September 1999 ed. Jakarta.
- SUHARTO (1998) Suharto's Accountability Speech in Front of the People Assembly 1 March 1998. Jakarta.
- SUHARTO, SWIPAYANA, G. & RAMADHAN, K. (1991) *Soeharto, My Thoughts, Words, and Deeds*, Jakarta, Lamtoro Gung Persada.
- SUJATMOKO, B. (1997) Dwifungsi di Tiga Zaman. *Gatra*. 8 March 1997 ed.
- SUKARNO (1959) Menemukan Kembali Jalan Revolusi Kita. Address on the Indonesian Independence Day Celebration, 17 August 1959 ed.
- SUKARNO (1960a) Djalan Revolusi Kita ---The March of Our Revolution (DJAREK): Independence Day Address. Jakarta.
- SUKARNO (1960b) Nasionalisme Kita adalah Nasionalisme Amanat Penderitaan Rakyat (An Address before the Congress of Murba Party at Bandung, December 15, 1960). Jakarta, Departemen Penerangan RI.
- SUKARNO (1963) Remarks at Installation ceremony for secretaries and assitances to ministries and for deputies to the armed services chiefs. 17 July 1963 ed. Jakarta.
- SUKARNO, M. (1980) *Pembaharuan Gerakan Buruh di Indonesia dan Hubungan Perburuhan Pancasila*, Bandung, Alumni.
- SUKMA, R. (2001) The Acehese Rebellion: Secessionist Movement in Post-Suharto Indonesia. IN TAN, A. & BOUTIN, K. (Eds.) *Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia*. Singapore, Select Publishing.
- SULLIVAN, J. (1969) The United States and the New Order in Indonesia. The American University.
- SUMAWINATA, S. (1970) Economic Situation and Economic Policies in Indonesia. Jakarta, No Publisher.
- SUNDHAUSSEN, U. (1972) The Military in Research on Indonesian Politics. *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 31 No. 2 (February 1972).
- SUNDHAUSSEN, U. (1976) Decision Making Within the Indonesian Military. IN SCHIFFRIN, H. Z. (Ed.) *Military and State in Modern Asia*. Transaction Publishers.
- SUNDHAUSSEN, U. (1978) The Military: Structure, Procedures, and Effects on Indonesian Society. IN JACKSON, K. D. (Ed.) *Political Power and Communications in Indonesia*. Berkeley, University of California Press.
- SUNDHAUSSEN, U. (1982) *The road to power : Indonesian military politics, 1945-1967*, New York, Oxford University Press.
- SURABAYA POST (1998) Soal Investigasi NU Jatim Tentang Santet: Pertemuan PB NU-Muspida jatim Ditunda. *Surabaya Post*. 7 December 1998 ed. Surabaya.
- SURYADINATA, L. (1997) *Political Thinking of the Indonesian Chinese 1900-1995: A Sourcebook*, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

- SURYADINATA, L. (1998) *Interpreting Indonesian Politics*, Singapore, Times Academic Press.
- SYAHRIR, S. (1968) *Our Struggle*, Ithaca, Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Programme, Cornell University.
- SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (1998) Army Plan to Devide and Rule. *Sydney Morning Herald*. 8 December 1998 ed. Sydney.
- SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (1999) World Pressure Brought Indonesian Military Shake Up. *Sydney Morning Herald*. 30 August 1999 ed. Sydney.
- TARLING, N. (1999) *The Cambridge History of Souteast Asia: From World War II to the Present*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- TEMPO (2000) Soeyono: Ada Duplikasi Komando antara Faisal Hartono. *Tempo*. 20 February 2000 ed.
- TEMPOINTERAKTIF (1998a) Krisis Mengantarkan Indonesia ke Jurang Kehancuran. *Tempo*. 29 December 1998 ed.
- TEMPOINTERAKTIF (1998b) Wawancara Imam Sugema: Jangan Terus Menerus Menerapkan Kebijakan Zig Zag. 04/03 28 March 1998 ed. Jakarta, Tempo.
- THASAN, K. (1966) Multiple-Exchange Rates: The Indonesian Experience. IMF papers.
- THE ASIAN WALLSTREET JOURNAL (1998) Indonesia Mobs Burn Mosques in Rampage Targeting Muslims. *Asian Wallstreet Journal*. Hongkong, Dow Jones & Co.
- THE ECONOMIST (1999) Crossbows and Guns in East Timor. 13 February 1999 ed. London, The Economist Newspaper Ltd.
- THE ECONOMIST (2001) Holy War in the Spice Islands. *The Economist*. 15 March 2001 ed.
- THE INDONESIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1961) Toward Freedom and the Dignity of Man. Jakarta.
- THE JAKARTA POST (1998) NU Sets up New Political Party. *The Jakarta Post*. 22 July 1998 ed. Jakarta.
- THE JAKARTA POST (1999a) Habibie Says Aceh Referendum Impossible. *The Jakarta Post*. 31 August 1999 ed. Jakarta.
- THE JAKARTA POST (1999b) Wiranto Denies Opression in Aceh. *The Jakarta Post*. 30 June 1999 ed. Jakarta.
- THE JAKARTA POST (2001) Riau Legislative Council Rejects New Oil and Gas Law. *The Jakarta Post*. 13 November 2001 ed. Jakarta.
- THE JAKARTA POST (2004) Oil Firms Temporarily Settle Dispute *The Jakarta Post*. 23 September 2004 ed. Jakarta.
- THE JAKARTA POST (2009) The Little Known Prime Minister. *The Jakarta Post*. 10 March 2009 ed. Jakarta.
- THE JAKARTA POST (2001a) Maluku Conflict Has Claimed 9,000 Lives. *The Jakarta Post*, . 6 Septembre ed.
- THE JAKARTA POST (2001b) Moluques Dialog Ends with Peace Commitment 22 March ed. Jakarta.
- THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA (1998) Report on the Session of the General Assembly. March, 1998 ed. Jakarta.
- THE US GOVERNMENT (1963) Indonesia: Perspectives and Proposals for United States' Economic Aid: A Report to the President of the United States. Southeast Asian Studies, Yale University.
- THE WASHINGTON POST (1999) Residents of East Timor Weigh Independence Autonomy. *The Washington Post*. 14 February 1999 ed. Washington D.C.
- THOMAS, K. D. & PANGLAYKIM, J. (1973) *Indonesia: The Effect of Past Policies and President Suharto's Plans for the Future*, Canberra, CEDA.

- TINKER, I. & WALKER, M. (1973) Planning for Regional Development in Indonesia. *Asian Survey*, Vol 13 (December 1973).
- TJOKROMIDJOJO, B. (1965) Peranan Poros dan Pembangunan Ekonomi dalam Politik Luar Negeri. IN NITISASTRO, W. (Ed.) *Masalah-masalah Ekonomi dan Faktor-faktor IPOLEKSOS*. Jakarta, Leknas/LIPI.
- TOMASSON, G. (1976) Indonesian Economic Stabilization: 1966-1969. *Finance and Development*, December 1976.
- TUCK, C. (2004) Borneo 1963-66: Counter-insurgency Operations and War Termination. *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol 15, No 3, Winter 2004.
- UHLIN, A. (1997) *Indonesia and the "Third Wave of Democratization": The Indonesian Pro-Democracy Movement in a Changing World*, New York, St. Martin's Press.
- UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA (1966) Hasil-Hasil Symposium 6-9 Mei 1966 Bidang Politik Luar Negeri RI. Universitas Indonesia Press.
- VAN DER KROEF, J. (1953) Conflicts of Religious Policy in Indonesia. *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 22 No.10.
- VAN DER KROEF, J. (1958) *The West New Guinea Dispute*, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations.
- VAN DER KROEF, J. (1961) Nasution, Sukarno, and the West New Guinean Dispute. *Asian Survey*, Vol. 1 No. 6 (August 1961).
- VAN DER KROEF, J. (1963) The West New Guinea Settlement: Its Origins and Implications. *Orbis*, Vol VII, No.1 (Spring 1963).
- VAN DER VEUR, P. W. (1961) The United Nations in West Irian: A Critique. *International Organization*, Vol. 18 No. 1 (Winter 1961).
- VAN DIJK, C. (1981) *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam : the Darul Islam in Indonesia*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff.
- VATIKIOTIS, M. R. J. (1994) *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: Order, Development, and Pressure for Change*, London, Routledge.
- VICKERS, A. (2005) *A History of Modern Indonesia*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- VITTACHI, T. (1967) *The fall of Sukarno*, London, A. Deutsch.
- VLEKKE, B. H. M. (1943) *Nusantara: A History of the East Indian Archipelago*, Harvard University press.
- WARD, K. (1974) *The 1971 Election in Indonesia: Monash Paper on Southeast Asia*, Clayton, Monash University Press.
- WATSON, C. W. (2000) *Of self and nation : autobiography and the representation of modern Indonesia*, Honolulu University of Hawai'i Press.
- WEBER, M. (1968) *Economy and society : an outline of interpretive sociology* New York, Bedminster Press.
- WEHL, D. (1948) *The Birth of Indonesia*, London, Allen & Unwin.
- WEINSTEIN, B. (1969) *Indonesia Abandons Confrontation*, Ithaca, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project.
- WEINSTEIN, F. (1976) *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dillemma of Dependence*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
- WHITE, L. J. (1970) Problems and Prospects of Indonesian Foreign Exchange System. *Journal Indonesia*, October 1970.
- WIDJAJANTO, A. (No year) *Evolusi Doktrin Pertahanan Indonesia*.
- WIDJODJO, M. S. (1999) *Penakluk Rejim Orde Baru: Gerakan Mahasiswa '98*, Jakarta, Pustaka Sinar Harapan.
- WIE, T. K. (2006) *Policies for Private Sector Development in Indonesia: ADB Institute Development Paper No.46*. Asian Development Bank.

- WIKIPEDIA (2007) Wikipedia Indonesia Wikipedia Foundation Inc.
<http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia>.
- WIRASOEMINTA, S. (1995) *Rengasdengklok, Tentara Peta dan Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945*, Jakarta, Yayasan Pustaka Nusatama.
- WITTFOGEL, K. A. (1957) *Oriental despotism : a comparative study of total power.* , New Haven Yale University Press.
- WITTFOGEL, K. A. (1969) Results and problems of the study of Oriental Despotism. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 28 number 2.
- WIWOHO & CHAERUDDIN (1990) *Memori Jenderal Yoga:* , Jakarta, Bina Rena Pariwara.
- WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2001) *Dispute Settlement Report 1998*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- YAMIN, H. M. (1959) *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, I-III*, Jakarta, Yayasan Prapanca.
- YAMIN, H. M. (1960) *Pembahasan Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia*, Jakarta, Yayasan Prapanca.

