

‘Working the Border’

Risk and Interagency Communication

At an International Airport

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to answer the ‘key question’: ‘how is the border worked at an international airport?’ To answer this key question the author, who is employed as a Customs officer, uses participant observation to provide material for an anthropological analysis of this question. The primary anthropological focus that will permeate throughout this thesis is interconnectedness of human and non human actors.

This focus on interconnectedness will be linked to the ability of the workers of the border to communicate about risk to one another. Risk at the border is highly political following the terrorist attacks of September 11 (9/11). The attacks are not a focus of this thesis but a study of the border network will shed some light on how the workers of the border make sense of external factors such as these attacks (9/11) in their work world.

The thesis accounts for links between the border workers of different government agencies and uses the idea of an occupational community to do so. The thesis will attempt to account for technologies within the border network. The account of technologies will demonstrate through an actor network approach their hybrid nature, and their ability to negotiate and renegotiate the border network. Power is analysed at the border through the ideas of Foucault. Though the idea of occupational community, actor network theory and the ideas of Foucault on power are not linked outside of this thesis in any way, they provide an honest account of the border network as expressed through the case study of risk and interagency communication at an international airport.

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Mason

Chapter One: Introduction

Aims of this thesis and Key Question

Traditionally borders were looked upon as walls around city states or lines on a map 200 miles off the shoreline of a country. These ideas are no longer applicable and perhaps never really were an appropriate way to think of borders. There are so many lines of communication at the border that the idea of zone or network is in many ways better than any idea of a border being a line. “Border management should be seen in terms of a zone and a process” (Ladley and White, 2006: 17). A border, where passengers go through a zone or process is an area of risk, both to the country the passenger enters, the staff who work the border and the passengers themselves.

A key aspect of borders and border management is that borders are porous. Borders are where states project their power onto those who are wanting to enter their area of governance and those who are wanting to move away from it. Border management “represents the empirical manifestation of a state’s adaptation to its external environment” (Hills 2004: 5). Borders are where states project power onto the people crossing into and out of their area of their control.

The border becomes a place where power is contested between the people crossing the border and the agents of the government who work at the border. Before it was discussed how the border could be seen as a network, Aaltola believes that the airport can be seen as a central node of a network and states in relation to power that

the more or less explicit lesson from the past seems to be that a modern world power should rely on a network of nodes and linkages rather than on extensive and direct occupation of territory (2005: 268).

Technically speaking as to the theories that will be used later in this thesis networks do not have a centre and the border will be presented as a network as opposed to a zone. The

focus of these introductory comments on the border and power is to illustrate that traditional lineal and bounded concepts of borders are not applicable. Aaltola is arguing that modern states such as New Zealand no longer need to rely upon traditional occupation of territory to project their power, instead the central hubs of networks are a good point for them to project their power. Aaltola argues that state power at the border is projected on the travelling public through the use of metal detectors, x-rays and other technologies, which drive home to the public that their survival is at stake when crossing the border. Throughout this thesis some other examples of state power at the border will be used that take more of a middle ground when it comes to the projection of state power on the public, such as Salter who explores the pragmatic difficulties that states face when using new technologies to project power at the border (2007).

Power contestations and the exertion of power at the border also exist between as well as among the workers of the border and the agencies that they work for. Foucault explores power and some of his discussions on the projection of state power being ad hoc as opposed to all encompassing will be used later in the chapter of this thesis that deals directly with power at the border.

This thesis asks the question **‘how is the border worked at an international airport?’** Which is to say, what do the workers of the border do to effectively police the border network? Policing the border network can be described as exerting the government of New Zealand’s will on the entry and exit of people and things into and out of New Zealand. Being an anthropological study this thesis looks at the workers of the border themselves and what they do as opposed to their operating procedures and manuals to determine how the border is actually worked. The key question is one that will highlight the interconnected nature of the human and non human actors within the border network.

The answer to the question of how the border is worked can be framed by saying that the border workers fall into two different groups, one of which constructs its identity in opposition to the other. The two groups are border workers and passengers. Border workers can be further broken down into workers who are members of the occupational community of border workers and those who are not. The border workers all work in alliance with various technologies and can under a particular theoretical approach be seen as actors within the border network.

The workers of the border who are members of the occupational community go about working the border in a different way than those who are not members of the occupational community. Communication between members of the occupational community is often negotiated through the technologies of the border. The technologies of the border also illuminate conflict between members of the occupational community and those outside of it.

When travelling across the border passengers are given the impression that they are under the eye of the panopticon. The panopticon is the concept of an all seeing 'eye'. It is in the interest of the workers of the border and the government of New Zealand for passengers to be under this impression. The argument that is determined from the findings and analysis of this research is divergent from this concept. In actual fact, passengers when crossing the border, are under the many eyes of the border workers who are not 'above' like a panopticon would be, rather they are in the same network. At ground level the workers of the border are policing the border and going about their work in a public space. The workers of the border are in many ways under the eye of the travelling public as much as the travelling public is under their eye. The difference is that the border workers have the power over the passengers even if this power is exercised from ground level as opposed to from 'above' in a panoptical sense.

This thesis breaks the argument that is presented into three chapters. Intentionally the three chapters each focus upon a different theory or idea rather than one ‘all encompassing theory’. This is because the argument that is presented could not honestly and accurately represent the border workers or demonstrate how the border is worked using just one theory or idea used herein. The first chapter will look at the idea of an occupational community to describe one of the groups of border workers. The second chapter will focus upon the actor network theory of Bruno Latour to describe and analyse the alliances between the human and non human actors within the border network. Though not related to the idea of occupational community, actor network theory allows the links between the human actors that are on the inside and outside of the occupational community to be explored. Rather than focus on the conflict between the actor network theories of Latour and the idea of an occupational community, which are very different in their focus and intent, the chapters will use these theories and ideas to complement one another so as to analyse the whole concept of working the border. The final chapter explores power. This exploration of power is conducted using some ideas from Foucault such as the already mentioned panopticon as well as ideas of the power of government. Ideas of occupational community address power, in a worker vs. management structure. To supplement and readdress ideas of power in a more effective manner, a Foucauldian focus of power in the later part of this thesis will explore power in a more appropriate way to the border context.

Occupational community, actor network theory, and Foucault’s ideas of power are not theoretically linked in any way outside of their use in this thesis. Within the argument presented by this thesis the ideas do have a utility and aspects of the different arguments or ideas will be demonstrated to complement each other as the argument progresses between chapters.

Border Sector Governance Group

The key focus of this thesis is the communication between border workers that allows the border network to effectively mitigate risk. This is not a focus or area that has been studied academically but it has been a focus of the government following September 11 2001. Post September 11 terrorist attacks the various intelligence, Police and border agencies of the United States were widely criticised for their failures in detecting and preventing the attacks. One of the main criticisms was that all the information required to have prevented the attacks was available to the United State's government as a whole. The problem was that the information was held in small chunks by an assortment of agencies, including border agencies, who did not communicate information with each other effectively.

The direction taken in recent years by many western nations has been to amalgamate border agencies, one such agency being 'Immigration and Customs Enforcement' or 'ICE', which is the lead enforcement agency in the United States department of homeland security. ICE works with the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency, which has the main uniformed presence at international airports in the United States. Recent arguments have been put forward that further amalgamation of these agencies may be required.

Recognizing that partnerships are essential, ICE worked closely across agency boundaries with law enforcement colleagues at the local, state and federal levels and across international boundaries to form a united front against criminal enterprises and terrorist organizations that threaten public safety and national security. (ICE, 2009)

The New Zealand government was not faced with the same immediate risk post September 11 as the United States government. However, it also introduced projects to review the way border agencies work together. A key driver of this was the post September 11 demand from the United States to secure exports going to the United States from the point

of export. The Customs magazine talks of two projects that are linked to the need to have the diverse border agencies working together.

The job of protecting the border against people, pests and products that could harm New Zealand has become a whole lot harder in recent years due to the resurgence of international terrorism, pandemic threats, the globalisation of the world economy and the growth of overseas travel and tourism... (Contraband 2007: 5)

The New Zealand ‘Border Sector Governance Group’ (BSGG) is made up of CEO’s from the border related agencies and its working group the ‘Border Sector Co-ordination Project’ (BSCP) involves staff from all the border agencies. One of the main difficulties faced by the BSCP has been the need to “get agreement on a common definition of the border and border management across agencies” (Hing, 2007: 4). The project is attempting to:

map then analyse the operational processes used by each of us (border agencies) to see where there is scope for better co-ordination and shared investment. This work is now a key reference point for identifying potential opportunities for alignment in both operations and information systems... The first stage is to bring together a picture of the current state of information systems, and their integration and overlap across agencies. A myriad of systems – including paper based systems – exists across our border management processes for people, goods and craft. (Contraband 2007: 5)

The border network of New Zealand is influenced by requirements set down by the United States border network in response to a breach of that network in the form of the September 11 attacks. The BSGG and the BSCP are both looking at how agencies work together at strategic, operational and tactical levels. This thesis is not directly linked to these projects but it is a timely opportunity to look at what actually happens amongst the workers of these different agencies ‘on the shop floor’ or at a tactical level.

The Fieldwork Site

The international airport where the fieldwork for this thesis was conducted was based near to one of the three main cities in New Zealand. The airport catered to flights

from Australia as well as ‘long haul’ international flights. The airport were it not called an airport could be aptly described as a small town, having restaurants, pharmacies, hairdressers and 1000s of people working, shopping or sleeping there at all hours of day and night.

The airport studied had all the essential elements that make it an airport, runways, a control tower, passenger terminals, aeroplanes, passengers and most importantly for the purposes of this thesis, workers. The workers at an international airport can be roughly split into two main categories, those who work for the government and those who work for private enterprise including the airport itself. This thesis focuses upon the workers of the border who work for the government and are in some way involved in policing the border.

The international airport must be policed in a way that a normal domestic or private airfield does not have to be. This is because an international airport is the point where travellers first enter a country. Travellers and crew first have to enter New Zealand at an international port due to an act of legislation, specifically, section 24 of the Customs and Excise Act 1996, which states:

- 1) Subject to sections 21 and 25 of this Act, the person in charge of a craft —
 - (a) That arrives within New Zealand on a journey from a point outside New Zealand; or
 - (b) That is carrying —
 - (i) Persons; or
 - (ii) Goods subject to the control of the Customs — brought in that craft or any other craft from a point outside New Zealand —
 must ensure that the craft lands, anchors, or otherwise arrives only at the Customs place, which in the case of a craft to which section 21 of this Act applies, shall be the Customs place nominated by that person in accordance with that section.
- (2) On arrival at the nominated Customs place or Customs controlled area within that place, and until an inward report in accordance with section 26 of this Act has been made, no person shall leave or board the craft unless authorised to do so by a Customs officer.

As such when arriving in New Zealand a passenger does not simply land at an airport because it is a long strip of concrete with fewer obstacles for the pilot to avoid than a

farmer's paddock. Passengers land at an airport because it is where the border agencies police and administer their arrival into New Zealand. This section will provide an account of these different agencies, their approximate numbers at the airport studied and the status of their employees (full time or part-time) as well as their prime outputs, which is to say what the government of New Zealand expects them to do. Importantly these outlines will describe what the workers of these agencies wear, as this for most passengers is the key difference between them. This section will account for the five agencies that all have staff at the international airport studied, and will mention the agencies that have links to policing the border, as well as the unions that represent staff across the spectrum of the border workers.

New Zealand Customs Service

The New Zealand Custom Service at the international airport studied employs around one hundred staff, split between approximately two thirds full-time to the remainder part-time. Full-time workers work a pattern of six days on three days off, or six nights on, three days off then three early shifts and three day shifts followed by three days off. The part-time workers are called Variable Hours Officers (VHOs) and work five days on three days off, often they work split shifts with start and finish times depending upon the incoming and outgoing flights. Customs officers wear dark blue pants, light blue shirts with black and gold epaulettes and Customs badges and a dark blue tie; to the average traveller they look like a Policeman without the anti stab vests and weapons.

Customs is tasked by the government with enforcing the Customs and Excise Act 1996, which involves enforcing duty and GST collection at the border as well as stopping prohibited imports entering New Zealand. Duty and GST collection at the airport studied

varied over the course of the fieldwork I conducted from \$30,000 worth of cameras being bonded to frequent collections of \$70 duty and GST on an extra carton of cigarettes.

Customs officers act as Immigration officers, which is to say when a person enters or leaves New Zealand it is a Customs officer immigrating or emigrating them on behalf of the Immigration Service. If any issues from this process arise the Customs officer transfers the responsibility to the immigration service who make decisions around issues such as visas and permits as well as deportation and refugee claims.

Customs also enforces the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 and is actively involved in searching people's possessions and their persons for drug importations. The Misuse of Drugs Act is linked to certain prohibition orders that Customs also enforces. These prohibit items over a wide spectrum from stun guns and pepper spray to cannabis and methamphetamine pipes. At the international airport studied Customs officers worked closely with Police and Customs investigators after the drugs had been detected entering New Zealand. Customs officer use specially trained drug detector dogs at the airport to detect large amounts or trace amounts of illegal drugs.

Customs also administers a variety of other legislation at the border, such as the Medicines Act 1981. This act prohibits and controls un-prescribed medication entering New Zealand. This medication is stopped from entering New Zealand to reduce the chance of dangerous counterfeit medicines entering the country as well as to ensure people are not taking pills that are not suitable for them or not endorsed by New Zealand authorities. Of a similar safety vein Customs enforces the Consumer Standards Act and stops items like unsafe cigarette lighters entering New Zealand. Customs enforces the Department of Internal Affairs (DIA) standards for movies and intercepts objectionable material such as child pornography. Customs also plays a role in airport security, non proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction, intellectual copyright, financial crime reporting and anti fraud activities.

On a day to day basis at the airport studied officers also frequently enforced assorted Department of Conservation (DOC) legislation. The DOC legislation regulates endangered species or products from them entering New Zealand as well as species leaving New Zealand along with non living heritage things like pounamu (greenstone). Much of this enforcement around environmental products is based on the CITES Act (convention on international trade in endangered species) which is also administered by MAF. MAF's focus is not on the processed products but animal or plant products in unprocessed form. This processed versus unprocessed state is the line between Customs and MAF when it comes to environmental issues. For example, Customs will seize a box of 'po chi pills' a product of the endangered plant 'Aucklandia lappa', but MAF would seize the actual plant if encountered at the border.

MAF - Biosecurity New Zealand

The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is what is traditionally known as the quarantine service. Over the course of the fieldwork, MAF became MAF Biosecurity New Zealand and changed their uniforms as well as staffing structure. MAF officers are split into quarantine enforcement officers and quarantine assistants. MAF staff who are full time workers work a pattern of five nine hour days and then three days off. This pattern rotates between a month of night shift and a month of day shift. MAF officers at the outset of the fieldwork wore green shirts and MAF badges with dark grey pants but have since changed and have yellow and black Biosecurity New Zealand badges on more business like green, white and brown pinstripe shirts.

MAF officers look to stop biosecurity risks entering New Zealand such as food items of risk like uncooked vegetables and meat, as well as flora, fauna, reptiles and insects. The MAF officers at the airport are also involved in clearing cargo when they are not involved in processing flights. MAF relies upon biosecurity detector dogs, of which most are beagles, to detect food at the airport.

MAF operates under a variety of legislation including the Biosecurity Act 1993, the Hazardous Substances and new Organisms Act 1996, the Agricultural Compounds and Veterinary Medicines Act 1997 and has linkages to a variety of conservation acts.

Aviation Security - AVSEC

The Aviation Security Service or AVSEC is the agency responsible for screening people and their luggage as well as cargo on flights into and out of New Zealand's domestic and international airports. AVSEC is also responsible for the physical security of the airports and the planes when they are on the ground. To do this AVSEC uses officers at checkpoints that passengers must pass through before they fly as well as officers on roving foot and vehicle patrol. AVSEC officers also utilise dogs to sniff out explosives. At the international airport studied there were a similar number of AVSEC staff to Customs staff.

AVSEC wears a light blue uniform and officers often wear peaked light blue hats and high visibility vests when they are on tarmac patrols. Unlike all the other border agencies mentioned, AVSEC is essentially self-funding, which is to say that the funds that AVSEC uses to carry out their screening of passengers comes from charges levied to airlines who then charge passengers as part of their ticketing.

During the course of the fieldwork that was conducted at the international airport a relatively major incident occurred at the domestic part of the airport where a plane landed that had been allegedly 'hijacked' on a domestic route. Incidents such as this bring AVSEC

very much to the forefront of public consciousness. Border workers from other agencies are aware that outside of their workplace, most people will think of AVSEC when they tell them that they work for MAF or Customs. At the international airport studied there were over one hundred AVSEC officers working who rotated between the international and domestic terminals. AVSEC operate under the jurisdiction of the Civil Aviation Act 1990, the Aviation Crimes Act 1972 and a variety of civil aviation rules as well as trespass legislation.

Police

The airport Police due to international air travel conventions are present at all times during the processing of international flights. Under international air travel regulations the airport Police also have to be armed. As such the airport Police with their holstered pistols and anti-stab vests are a very visible part of the border network. Aside from the requirement to be present and to be armed airport Police operate under the same wide variety of laws that Police outside of the airport operate under. Their appearance is the same as any other Police officer in New Zealand aside from the fact that they are armed at all times which is not the case for Police outside the confines of the airport.

At the international airport studied the number of airport Police officers varied as they were often deployed on other jobs or secondments, but for the most part their number remained at about twenty staff who rotated through a shift pattern. Airport Police are the main people involved in arresting offenders at the airport. If Customs or AVSEC catches an offender in most (but not all) instances a Police officer will actually make the arrest under advice of the another border worker and take the suspect into custody. The airport Police are the only airport staff with the tools required for long term detention, such as handcuffs and holding cells. The airport Police work closely with the Immigration service

(INZ), and will often escort them when they leave the airport to go and find a person who needs to be deported. INZ also calls on the Police regularly to take into custody arriving passengers who have been refused entry and who are to be deported.

Immigration New Zealand

Immigration New Zealand (INZ) is part of the Department of Labour. It's officers at the border are involved in the border security aspect of immigration rather than the processing of applications for residency and work etc. The international airport studied has a team of approximately ten border security group officers who are the resident experts in travel documents. INZ staff at the airport have the tools and training to detect false passports and the visa labels and stamps within them. INZ staff at the airport conduct interviews with persons who may pose a risk to the New Zealand border such as potential workers coming in on visitor's permits or people who have declared (or not declared) criminal convictions. Immigration officers wear 'corporate uniform', which is essentially business type shirt and pants, with a label on each item identifying the person as INZ. The Immigration officers at the airport studied operate under the Immigration Act 1987, Immigration Act Commencement Order 1987, Immigration (Refugee Processing) Regulations 1999 , Immigration Regulations 1999, Immigration (Special Regularisation) Regulations 2000 and the Immigration (Transit Visas) Regulations 2002.

Border Linked Agencies

Many government agencies are linked to the border without actually having staff who work there on a constant basis. This is because government agencies, as apparatuses of the state have a need to assert control (such as through the gathering of knowledge) over

the population of the state. Without the ability to police the border the state loses a veneer of control over its population.

Agencies such as Inland Revenue (IRD) and the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) have links to the border to stop or keep track of persons with debt or fines or warrants for their arrest who may attempt to leave or re-enter New Zealand. The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and Maritime New Zealand (MNZ) also have links to the border through the regulation of travel and the 'Secure Export Scheme' agreement with the United States. Various intelligence agencies such as the Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) have an interest in who crosses the border. The New Zealand Defence Force, especially the Air Force and Navy have a role in protecting the offshore borders of New Zealand and work with border agencies in this capacity. The Ministry of Fisheries (MAF) and the Department of Conservation (DOC) also have links to agencies that police the border at the airport as they enforce various laws that prevent certain species from leaving New Zealand. The Ministry of Health (MOH) also has strong links to agencies that police risk at the border as SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) and other global pandemics have become more of a risk to New Zealand. There are MOH plans in place should a pandemic be detected at the border that involves liaison between core border agencies such as Customs and the MOH.

These departments and agencies mentioned are only the main ones with links to the border and border specific agencies, whose workers are the focus of this thesis.

Ladley and White in reference to the SARS epidemic sum up the benefits of the various government agencies having links to the border

The border is also a useful opportunity to disseminate information as well as to collect it. (2006: 48)

These various agencies all have one factor in common when looking at their link to the border and this is a focus on preventing a risk manifested or apparent at the border.

Unions

Many of the workers of the border belong to Unions that are linked to all the different border agencies such as the Public Services Association. Other agencies also have unions that are specific to their organisation alone such as the Police Association and the Customs Officers Association. Some agencies at the border are very well represented in certain unions (100% membership in some workplaces) whereas other agencies union representatives see their workplace as under represented. The unions forge links between the workers of the border from different agencies, and their role in the communication of information between the workers of different agencies, especially around terms of pay and employment conditions cannot be under estimated.

Theoretical Background

Latour and Actor Network Theory

Bruno Latour's theories will be a key method used in this thesis to analyse the hybrid assemblages workers of the border composed of the multiple technologies mobilised in the performance of their work. Latour's Actor Network Theory (Latour 2005) focuses on the maxim of "follow the actor." This following of the actor looks at how new technologies are introduced to a network. Latour acknowledges the importance of objects and persons as networks. In this view the border is a network though Latour has not done any specific work on state borders, as it is made up of a range of actors who can be defined as "entities that do things" (Latour, 1992: 241).

Other studies of workplaces have used actor network theory to look at and supplement their analysis of the relationship between human and non human participants

within a network. Orr used the theory to look at the relationships between photocopier technicians, photocopiers and the customers:

This analysis is based on Bruno Latour's assertion (1986, 1988) that machines participate in society; the interactions of people and machines are interpreted by the human participants through a form of social bricolage, with actions and meanings negotiated in context by the participants. (1996: 3)

This thesis will similarly use actor network theory to look at the relationships between different border workers and the machines they use to mitigate risk. The third chapter will analyse different ethnographic examples in which social bricolage occurs. Bricolage can best be described as

the reflective manipulation of a closed set of resources to accomplish some purpose. The set is the accumulation of previous manipulations, one's experience and knowledge and, in literal bricolage, physical objects. The manipulation is done in the context of a specific goal, which influences the process. The items in the set are not limited to a single use or a single meaning, but their properties limit their possible applications. (Orr, 1996: 121)

The theory outlined here is appropriate to use at the border as the border is best understood as a network. Latour's various works have accounted for the role of certain actors within networks and their appearance or in the case of the work 'Aramis' the death of technologies before they arrive. The use of this theory allows the border workers to be studied on an equal footing with the technologies that are present at the border and for both to be understood as a hybrid entity. As both human and non-human workers are involved in policing the border this is important. Due to the border network being in a constant state of change the use of this theory allows for an account of change within the network as opposed to a black and white ethnography of a site in a fabricated state of limbo.

The key literature of Latour's that was used in this thesis was focused upon his work on technologies and their place within actor networks. The two main books used were 'Reassembling the Social' (2005) and 'Aramis or the Love of Technology'(1986).

'Reassembling the social' focuses upon actor network theory and it has been used as a core text to complement his earlier and diverse articles and chapters on actor network theory that have also been used. 'Aramis' is a pseudo detective story that tracks the demise of a new technology and how it was 'killed'. These articles and chapters are various works of Latour and others such as Laurier (2004) who discuss Latour's theories on actor networks in the context of specific examples and general applications.

One of the main criticisms of actor network theory is that it does not account for existing structures and their power dimensions. In this thesis rather than bringing in the critics I have introduced other approaches that do account for power such as Foucault. These are individual arguments that are used such as Foucault's application of power upon the public, which I use to describe aspects of the border workers world. Organisational culture also addresses power as it looks at groups that shape their identity in opposition to one another.

Occupational Community

Occupational community is an applicable description of a specific group of border workers discussed in this thesis. Unlike actor network theory which can analyse human / non human hybrids, occupational community simply accounts for one group's identity and the consequences of this identity being expressed. Occupational community in this light does have a place within the arguments presented in this thesis. Occupational community does not describe all border workers, but does accurately represent a large group effective at policing the border.

The idea of an occupational community is drawn from industrial sociology and was popular initially as a means of understanding how modern workers share cultural and social values. Salaman wrote on the topic extensively in the 1980s and traces the decline in its use to lack of sociological concern concerning a "vanishing form of work/

community connection” (1986: 75). Salaman argued that an occupational community is constituted through

people who work together (and) choose to form a relationship amongst themselves, which can sensibly be described as an occupational community. They may or may not live together... But whether they live together or not spatially, they live together socially and culturally. They inhabit the same world of meaning and identity; share a language; a vocabulary of symbols, knowledge of the work world, a world taken for granted and shared references, mythic figures, incidents, jokes, in short a culture. (1986: 75-76)

Full time workers, who have been in their positions or have had a variety of diverse experiences at the airport, make up this border occupational community. They do not live together in the ‘army officer’ type scenario that Salaman talks of, but most do live in close proximity to the airport, and interestingly during the research I found a disproportionate number tended to live outside the traditional suburban limits of the city either on rural properties or lifestyle blocks. This large number of rural dwelling border workers is a source of amusement for those border workers who live in suburbia. The occupational community studied meets all the other defining point;, they share cultural values, a vocabulary, jokes etc but the key facet in separating them from their other border workers is seen in the way they have a special ‘knowledge of work’. The border workers studied all understand work in a different way to those outside of the occupational community, and I would argue that this makes them more effective at policing the border as they can communicate between the various border agencies in a effective manner.

This leads on to the question as to why when using this concept all the border workers studied do not meet the criteria outlined above. The reason that the other border workers are not part of this occupational community is that they cannot join due to not having learned the procedures or not having demonstrated a willingness to accept the authority of the community

Joining such an occupational community involves not simply or primarily learning the formal procedures and skills, but becoming an insider to the highly restricted social code which is incomprehensible to the outsider, and which is not open to entry until the newcomer has demonstrated his/her willingness to accept the authority of the community. (Salaman 1986: 76)

This will be discussed in more detail in the chapter on the workers of the border but it is important to note as Salaman does that “studies of occupational communities are more interested in describing in what such communities are like than they are in explaining them or analysing their consequences” (1986: 77). While I will focus on what the occupational community is like and talk about the shared identity I will also draw upon two other main theorists who use occupational community in a pragmatic way.

Zaloom (2006) looks at what could be described as an occupational community of brokers, but she looks beyond their shared identity to how they exploit risk to shape their identity and also how risk attitudes shapes them. In a similar vein is Kondo (1990). Kondo writes of communities of Japanese artisans and how their work shapes their identity. Kondo looks at the effect their work identity has on the work itself, especially as to efficiency and coping mechanisms.

Foucault’s views of Power

Foucault’s ideas on power and governmentality will be the basis of my arguments in chapter four of this thesis. These arguments and the chapter will not be as comprehensive as occupational community and actor network theory as the points that will be analysed will have already have been raised in earlier chapters. Chapter four focus on power therefore seeks to frame how power is involved in the way the border workers go about ‘working the border’. Foucault’s view on power is split into three focuses, one on the power of disciplinary, controlling power this is in the context of the border seen as state power and knowledge. The second focus is on relational, interactional forms of power

between two or more entities, and the ways in which one entity tries or succeeds in disallowing the other certain things or behaviours. The border workers can be seen as instruments of state power. Border workers can also be seen as actors in relational competitions for power between each other and people crossing the border. The third focus is on the pastoral power of the state and its duty of care towards its citizens.

This thesis is concerned with communication between border workers and how this communication makes the border work. As mentioned earlier power at the border is expressed between the complicated relationships of workers, passengers and technologies. Simple polarities of power such as ‘all border workers wield absolute power over the travelling public’ or ‘the x-ray machines, ion scanners and metal detectors allow the border workers to control passengers’ are not appropriate to this study. Rather power must be acknowledged as Jermier and Knights do

Relations of power and resistance operate in more complex ways than can be depicted in simple all or nothing polarities (1994: 3).

Foucault’s views of power are wide ranging and linked to his studies of governmentality. Foucault study of power and governmentality of which his work ‘Governmentality’ (2006: 131-143) provide a good example of the way in which he accounts for the historical aspects of governmentality and looks at aspects of the exertion of control and power from the individual governance of self to state governance. Power at the border is linked to governmentality which in Foucault’s views was not necessarily top down power and was also not necessarily linked to the creation of identity.

Power then does not directly determine identity but merely provides the conditions of possibility for its self-formation – a process involving perpetual tension between power and resistance or subjectivity and identity (Jermier and Knights, 1994: 8).

Power to Foucault is not automatically held by the individual subject nor is it always held in centres of government in the case of the border this could be seen as the workers

management. Power is best viewed as a relationship within a society, there can be in his discussions no grand theory of power as one would perhaps expect in a traditional concept of border management. In a traditional concept of border management the border is a wall with the gates presided over by all powerful workers who convey the states will over those who wish to pass through. Knights and Vurdubakis summarise Foucault's argument concisely and say that

Power... is the name given to a certain coherency of social relations which in turn make possible the construction of a 'grid of intelligibility' of the social order: 'one needs to be nominalistic no doubt; power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with, it is the name one attributes to a complex strategic relationship in a particular society.' (1994: 172)

A criticism of this argument is that it is Eurocentric which can mean that it does not account for the realities faced in parts of the world where individuals and states do apparently hold tangible and all encompassing power over the actions of those they govern. Rather than critique Foucault's arguments in this was a better way to understand them would be to realise that Foucault is instead saying that the mechanisms of power do not necessarily

tend to convey the exercise of a will over others in the most homogenous, continuous and exhaustive way possible. It is a matter rather of revealing a level of the necessary and sufficient action of those who govern (2007; 66).

An appropriate way to talk of power in relation to workers mitigating risk at an international airport is to twist the metaphor of the panopticon that Foucault in his 'College de France lectures' refers to. The panopticon is a concept based upon a central eye of governance that sees all and thus ensures compliance through the behaviour of those under observation, assuming that they are always possibly under observation.

The idea of the panopticon is a modern idea in one sense, but we can also say that it is completely archaic, since the panoptic mechanism basically

involves putting someone in the centre- an eye, a gaze, a principle of surveillance- who will be able to make its sovereignty function over all the individuals [placed] within this machine of power (2007: 66).

The panopticon at the border is in fact made up many all seeing eyes from below rather than above. This is an argument that will be presented in chapter four of this thesis. The argument is facilitated through the use of Foucault's concepts of power, which complement the description of the border workers in an occupational community and the theory of how these workers relate to the technologies at the border as viewed through Latour.

Risk

Risk refers to... external dangers... The systems for communicating risk- its people, rules, formats, and technologies- is a part of the social meaning of risk. That is, threats and dangers are recognised, responded to, and made real through the human intervention and use of risk classifications and technologies. (Erickson and Haggerty 2002: 238)

Risk at the border can be defined in two ways. The first way, individual risk is not the principal focus of this thesis but will be addressed on occasions as part of the ethnographic detail. Individual risk can be defined as the risk to workers of the border as they go about their work. This risk to quote two informants thinking at opposite ends of the individual risk spectrum can be viewed as follows

“I run the risk of being dismissed from my job or personal prosecution should I do something unlawful at work”

to

“a jumbo jet might run over my foot if I am not looking out carefully enough!”

Like every worker going about their job the workers of the border face some degree of risk in their day. The main risk focus of this thesis is the risk that the workers of the border are paid to mitigate, that is risk to the border itself. Risk to the border can come from, drugs, people, flora and fauna or any number of potential things that the New Zealand

government has deemed cannot come into, or leave the country at all or without revenue being collected off it for the crown. The community of border workers can therefore be understood as a risk community, it is made up of

institutions that organize on the basis of knowledge of risk. These institutions expend a significant proportion of their resources on the production and distribution of knowledge of risk. This knowledge is used to manage populations, provide security and take risks. (Erickson and Haggerty 2002: 238)

Other risk theorists that are useful in the discussion and study of risk include Lupton (1999) and Joffe (1999) both of whom look at the way in which risk is externalised. Externalisation of risk is a useful albeit obvious way to understand risk at the border. Caplan is a contemporary risk theorist and usefully outlines Beck's argument that risk has increased as a side to the "productive forces in the modernisation process" (2000: 2). The growth and production of risk will be a core concern in the third and fourth chapters of this thesis in relation to technology and power at the border.

Research Methodology – situating myself “you are not the border”

Instead of studying the work, they report on its organization and administration; instead of describing what the men do, they examine their feelings and values. These may be worthwhile things to do, but they cannot be done properly unless the observer understands the nature of the work whose administration he is examining, and the constraints and contingencies which effect the men who do it.
(Orr 1996: 155-156)

Orr conducted his fieldwork on photocopier technicians through participant observation. He worked as a photocopier repair man and observed interesting and mundane events that occurred during his work time. Following the incident when opportunity arose, Orr would conduct interviews and discussions with those involved in the incidents. These incidents and the participants feedback were recorded and then analysed in the context of his writing at a later time. The benefits of conducting fieldwork in this way are described

by Orr in the quote above. The fieldwork for this thesis was conducted in the same way. The fieldwork was able to be conducted in this way as the author is a full time border worker, who wrote this thesis in his time off over several years. The benefits of fieldwork conducted in this manner is an intimate understanding of the research area, and open and honest relationships with participants based upon shared experiences. These relationships could be used to conduct revealing interviews and 'on the record' discussions.

The downside of conducting fieldwork in this way is outlined by Orr who faced the same problems as were encountered in this thesis: "I also found that I had a tendency to regard certain phenomena as unremarkable which was not really so to outsiders" (1996: 7). This tendency was often apparent in meetings with my supervisors, when I would casually mention that last week I had been involved in a strip search that had ended up in a person's prosthetic limb being x-rayed. To them incidents such as these were remarkable but to me the incident was an everyday occurrence in a day at work.

The method of research that was conducted falls under the umbrella of participant observation. Specifically my role within the airport is on the Customs enforcement team and I tend to spend much of my time roving¹ and trouble shooting² as well as working in the control room. As such, a large part of a workday is spent liaising with other agencies airport staff.

Through work relationships I have been able to conduct a range of formal interviews and casual 'on the record' conversations that have provided me with a range of information pertinent to my topic. The formal as well as the informal interviews were conducted in accordance with the 'University of Canterbury Sociology and Anthropology

¹ Roving- involves patrolling the arrival hall and 'profiling' passengers for search activity as well as observing known targets of interest to Customs.

² Trouble Shooting – being the officer in charge of the 'primary line' processing staff. This involves managing the passenger queues and taking passengers to immigration officers or contacting immigration officers if they do not meet the requirements to enter NZ.

Department Human Ethics Committee' guidelines and approval from Customs management. All participants who have been quoted or mentioned have either not been given names, or have been given false names and in some instances their gender was changed in the text so as to maintain their privacy.

The number of formal and informal interviews conducted ran into the thirties over the course of the research. Most of these interviews were 'informal' rather than formal and were probably only differentiated from a professional conversation by the fact that I would be taking notes or recording the conversation. Often the interviews would run into subject matter that is not published in this thesis for reasons of privacy and security. In general the interviews however allowed me to see incidents that I had myself observed from another border worker's perspective, to understand the risk they focused on and how they communicated it. Questionnaires were also distributed to staff which provided valuable ethnographic material to gauge what kind of incidents staff had been involved in (see appendix one).

Throughout the thesis the use of the phrase 'I' gives my account of an event or incident that was observed. This I believe does not detract from an impartial ethnography as I have not given my personal account of what I do or look for in regards to risk. Accounts of what staff look for and how they go about their work or what they believe when doing so are not prefixed with 'I', but they are "*italicised*" and put in quotation marks.

An international airport is a place of security and law enforcement. So in the course of the fieldwork various incidents that occurred have in some cases been adjusted slightly, so as not to divulge organisational security for the agency concerned. In other instances, for example where a staff training table is used, that shows the ability of staff to detect a range of risks, the specific risk had been ##### out so as not to divulge specific intelligence.

This is particularly applicable with respect to incidents or intelligence around drugs and counter terrorism. This does not detract from the arguments or analysis in relation to the workers of the border, as this thesis focuses on their behaviour towards, and ability to communicate about risks to the border and themselves rather than the specific risks.

Throughout this research the awareness that criminal and terrorist groups are just as willing to gather intelligence on the governments policing agencies as the agencies are on these illegal groups has been a consideration. As such, specific descriptions of processes and methods of enforcement have in a few instances left some aspects out. This thesis, while making a study of the workers of the border will not reveal the non-public methods that they use any more than a television episode of the series 'Border Patrol' would.

Over the course of the research phase of this thesis my standing at the airport meant I was invited to a variety of interagency meetings of direct relevance to this thesis. One such example was a BSGG meeting, which involved the local managers of different border agencies being briefed by a national steering group manager on the BSGG. Similarly I was also involved in a meeting and ongoing project in which MAF was trying to bring in a new biosecurity enforcement process and utilise roving officers, a practise familiar to officers like myself but unfamiliar to MAF. At this meeting with MAF I was involved in putting into place Customs 'tools' and 'methods' to be used to mitigate an entirely different risk set. Exposure to meetings such as these, and my work relationships with officers of other agencies at the border has meant that I have had, what I believe to be, a large amount of access to information, people and research material to do justice to the topic of 'working the border.' In doing so I wish to follow in the footsteps of the only anthropologist that I encountered in the course of my fieldwork, Robert Lee Maril, who conducted participant observation with the Texas Border Patrol and who argued:

The objectives and the goals of the Border Patrol can clearly be advanced by employing social scientists (2004: 301-302).

Through only accounting for the opinions of other border workers and using their observations as the core of my fieldwork rather than my own, this thesis will present a balanced account of the border workers 'policing' the border. This account is separated from my acknowledged desire to provide a meaningful and useful analysis of their work, through theoretical analysis and the previously mentioned stylistic differentiation between my accounts of events and informants opinions.

Can someone within the border network research and write about it in a reflexive manner? This is a question that the author has kept at the forefront throughout this research due to his dual role as worker and researcher. My honours dissertation looked at 'humour within the navy' of which I was a serving officer at the time. As such I have experience in writing about the area in which I am working. It could also be argued that the actor network approach allows for or perhaps even forces the author to 'step back', and in the course of acknowledging the importance of non human actors within a network he or she must also therefore look at the importance of himself or herself as a member of the network.

It is worth mentioning 'sick days', the author was forced by to take a sick day during the course of the research and in the course of complaining that he should go to work because he had jobs to do was told "*you are not the border, and it will go on without you...*" The focus therefore that has been taken is that the author is indeed not the border and as such he has withdrawn himself from as many emic opinions or ruminations as possible.

A 'Typical' Border Crossing

As a one of the final components to this introduction a fictional but altogether typical border crossing will be presented to illustrate how the border is crossed by a 'routine traveller'. This is presented in order to escape the risk that is presented by the writer's active participant observation in the border network, of taking the border network for granted. As the thesis progresses various ethnographic examples and accounts will be given that will talk of workers at various places and conducting various activities. It is only in this introductory chapter that opportunity exists to give an account of the arrival process in action in order to frame latter non fictional but 'fragmented' accounts and examples.

The border is legally defined, it is enforced, it defines a place of work, but it is not a physical entity. The border is an assemblage of things and people and ideas. Miller asks how one might

define the swarming multiplicity of actors, agents, practises, tools, instruments, inscriptions and ideas that form from time to time, and that is defined by the temporarily stabilized networks of relations between it's constituent parts, the abstract lines that pass between it's components, rather than the contours that surround them (1997: 355).

If we look at the border and those who work it and communicate in the medium it provides we must answer this question. Miller states that Bruno Latour "offered a deceptively simple answer to such questions: follow the actors!" (1997: 355).

So here for an example early in the piece let us do just that, follow a fictional actor as he arrives at the border and travels through the border of New Zealand.

Mr T. Raveller from Mexico wants to come to New Zealand for a holiday to see some sheep. Fortunately for Mr. T Raveller, he is from one of the 55 countries that do not require a visa to enter New Zealand for a visit of three months or less. If Mr T. Raveller was from a country that did require a visa for a visit or if he wanted to come to New

Zealand to work or study for a period of time he would have to apply to a New Zealand embassy or consulate or go online, to be issued with a visa to come to New Zealand.

It is worth noting at this point that a visa allows one to come to the border. When one arrives at the border and if immigration authorities (or Customs staff enacting their legislation) are satisfied they will be granted a permit to enter the country. Mr T. Raveller reads the New Zealand Immigration Service website (www.immigration.govt.nz) and sees that all he needs to come to New Zealand is an outward ticket within three months of his date of arrival, a clean criminal record including no deportations and evidence of sufficient funds for his maintenance whilst in New Zealand. Mr T. Raveller comes from a very wealthy Mexican importation / exportation family, so is therefore comfortable in the knowledge that his entry into New Zealand will be a smooth process.

Already in this example there has been a potential for the New Zealand border to be stretched far offshore. If Mr T. Raveller was from India rather than Mexico he would have had to have gone to a New Zealand embassy or consulate to apply for his visa to come to New Zealand. The embassy or consulate far away from any typical notion of the border of New Zealand, would have conducted background checks on Mr T. Raveller similar to or more thoroughly than would be conducted in New Zealand.

Mr T. Raveller flies to Singapore where he boards a connecting flight to New Zealand SQ123. This flight leaves Singapore 12 hours before it arrives in New Zealand at 15:30 local time. When checking in at Changi airport the diligent Singapore airline staff check that Mr T. Raveller has indeed got an outward ticket, lest Singapore airlines get a notice of infringement and a possible fine for not ensuring passengers they bring into NZ are complying with NZ immigration requirements. Singapore airlines, once all passengers are onboard, will then send a passenger list of names and nationalities to New Zealand Customs and Immigration (electronically). This list of names is checked both automatically

and manually against lists of known Immigration, Customs and other agencies' people of interest, who will be stopped and searched or questioned on arrival in New Zealand, and unless they are New Zealanders potentially turned away to return to their previous point of departure at theirs or the airline's expense.

Fortunately, Mr T. Raveller is not on any of these lists, but an eagle eyed officer of the airport or one of the Customs or Immigration intelligence teams checking the list sent by Singapore airlines notices that there is only one Mexican on the flight. The officer does some further checks and finds that the ticket was purchased in what appears to be a normal fashion for a traveller from Mexico, so decides to leave Mr T. Raveller unmolested for the time being and let normal risk assessment in New Zealand takes its course.

Due to the success of his import/ export business Mr T. Raveller is travelling business class, and is therefore at the front of the plane when it lands, where he gets to observe a MAF officer come onboard to spray the plane because this was not done in Singapore. Once the plane has been sprayed and the insects have been fumigated the Customs officer, who has been waiting by the gate, observes the passengers get off the plane, looking for any adverse reaction to his presence. Mr T. Raveller smiles politely as he gets off the plane and notices that unlike in his native Mexico, or America or even Singapore the officers here do not carry weapons, apart from one Police officer that he notices down by the wheels of the plane talking with an AVSEC team patrolling the tarmac.

After walking down from the gate Mr T. Raveller stops in to the duty free shops and buys a carton of cigarettes and a bottle of tequila. After queuing for some time he gets to the front of the queues where he meets a Customs officer who is immigrating passengers into New Zealand sitting in a raised booth. Mr T. Raveller presents his arrival card which he filled out on the plane and his passport to the officer who notes his occupation as

importer and exporter, and asks him what exactly it is he imports and exports from Mexico. Mr T. Raveller explains that his company imports and exports surveillance equipment much like the camera that he is standing in front of, mounted in an obvious fashion on top of each immigration booth, as well as the many cameras placed more discreetly throughout the airport being manned presently by Customs officers in the 'control room.' The officer in the booth accepts this and thinks that Mr T. Raveller seems to know too much about cameras to be involved in the importation of anything illegal out of Mexico. She then asks Mr T. Raveller for his ticket out of New Zealand, Mr T. Raveller explains that he is here for fourteen days but that he left his ticket in his packed in luggage after showing it to the airline in Singapore.

The officer in the booth calls over the trouble shooter who takes Mr T. Raveller to an Immigration officer who has an office just down from the booths. Mr T. Raveller takes a seat alongside several Malaysians, who are also waiting to see an Immigration officer due to having come to New Zealand as 'visitors' but having displayed no knowledge of any typical tourist intentions. The Malaysians also have all put Timbuktu as their intended destination which the Customs officers in the immigration booths know is a typical destination for illegal workers who go there to pick fruit.

After a short wait Mr T. Raveller is seen by an Immigration officer who checks that he does indeed have an outward ticket on his computer which interfaces directly with the airlines. Mr T. Raveller is then taken back to a booth by the Customs trouble shooter and his passport and arrival card are stamped with a three month visitor permit. As he walks away from the booth towards the baggage conveyor a Customs officer asks him to stop as his drug detecting Labrador sniffs Mr T. Raveller for any drugs before moving on to a group of backpackers.

While waiting for his bags to come off the conveyor another dog sniffs Mr T. Raveller, this time it is a Beagle, and a MAF officer asks Mr T. Raveller if he has fruit in his bags. Mr T. Raveller says that he does not but that he did have some yesterday. The MAF officer looks in Mr T. Raveller's day bag and sees no fruit but does notice a carton of cigarettes. The MAF officer then goes to the Customs rover and tells him that he has noticed that the Mexican businessperson waiting for his bags has a carton of cigarettes in his day bag and a carton in a local duty free bag as well. The rover makes a mental note of Mr T. Raveller's face and when he notices that Mr T. Raveller has picked up his bags and has been spoken to by a MAF officer at the exit, before the x-rays, he asks him to follow into the Customs search area.

Mr T. Raveller takes a seat next to the backpackers that he saw the drug dog sniffing earlier and is eventually taken to a bench where a Customs officer explains that you are only allowed one carton of cigarettes duty free. Mr T. Raveller apologises for his oversight and says that he forgot about the one in his day bag, which he had purchased in Singapore. The Customs officer believes Mr T. Raveller, and is more interested in searching one of the backpackers that have been indicated as being a drugs risk by the drug dog. The Customs officer asks Mr T. Raveller to pay the \$70 duty and GST on the cigarettes which Mr T. Raveller duly does before being taken to the MAF x-rays where his bags are screened by a MAF officer for quarantine risk items and also any Customs risk items.

In this short example there have been five kinds of border workers already mentioned working together and communicating with one another to mitigate any potential risk posed by Mr T. Raveller. The following chapter looks at some real examples of these border workers working together and communicating or attempting to communicate with

one another about the risk posed by people and things passing through their border network.

Direction of Chapters

The second chapter of this thesis will address the human workers of the border and will break them into two distinct categories, those within the occupational community of border workers, and those outside of this. The third chapter will focus on the hybrid human worker / non human border technologies and look at their role within the border network in much the same way as the human workers of the border are looked at. Chapter four will address power within the border network in it's various manifestation. Chapter five will readdress and reinforce the framing argument of this thesis that has been outlined in this introduction. The key question of 'how is the border worked at an international airport', and issues that arise from this question will be analysed and answered in this final concluding chapter.

Chapter Two, Workers of the border

“The border was at least in part this: an enormous, dark brown, hairy tarantula.... a beast moving at it’s own pace through time and space , oblivious and amorphous, hideous yet compelling, it’s sweaty infectious bite the front edge of decay and death. Although not human, this border creature was a product of human society, a scumbag nightmare from the Freudian deep.”
(Maril, 2004, 116).

Framing (not literally) the workers of the border

The workers of the border negotiate their understanding of their world in the border network in which they work. These workers are often faced with a sense of isolation that comes from working in this environment and not what they would view as a ‘normal’ 9-5 office based existence. In this light, the workers of the border see themselves as members of something more than their various job titles implies. The border as opposed to their job title is the boundary that helps define who they are and what they do to affirm this.

It could be said the nature of the enforcement work required at the border dominates the nature of the people employed there. Certainly, the nature of the work dominates the gender bias at the border. Customs for example has to have a certain number of female staff employed on any given shift so as to be able to undertake the Section 149 – strip searches of female suspects and children and young persons. Police, AVSEC and Customs officers, who may be involved in physical confrontation in their work, also require a certain level of fitness to perform their work effectively, though this is a matter of some contention. At an intellectual level the workers of the border require foreign language skills and staff from many different agencies are recruited ahead of those without language skills. Certain agencies within the border environment also require a higher level of

education in order to be recruited into the position such as MAF, who requires its enforcement officers to hold science degrees.

The workers of the border can be broken into two main groups, those within the occupational community and those outside of it. Those outside of the occupational community are generally made up of the staff, who are not fulltime or who do jobs that are not considered to be as enforcement focused. This distinction is important in framing the workers of the border, as it allows us to understand the way in which the border is actually worked. The workers outside of this occupational community are better viewed as sharing an organizational culture. Organizational culture

in common usage the term refers to a shared system of ideas (including assumptions, beliefs, values, collective interpretations and meanings), and related patterns of behaviour, that are distinctive or unique to the members of a particular institution or formal organization. (Baba 1996: 891).

Organizational culture like risk, can be seen as an important factor in the workers of the border communicating with one another effectively. Each worker of the border, whether or not they are a part of the occupational community, will be exposed to their departments' organisational culture and will have an awareness of other departments' organisational cultures.

All the different workers of the border are looking to mitigate various risks and it is going about this that provide the workers with a sense of identity. It is important to acknowledge the degree of agency that the border workers have whilst going about their work, but also it is equally important to bear in mind the way in which the discretionary power that they wield is part of the state apparatus expressed at the airport. This dual approach will complement the analysis of the links between border workers and herald later arguments in this thesis about the roles of human and non-human actors, and it will wilfully blur the distinction between them.

This chapter will initially focus on the identity and community of the border workers, and will then look at what the border workers do when they work the border. The consequences of this identity will be shown as the ethnographic examples are explained. The connections that the border workers share through risk will be demonstrated as the key way in which power is exerted at the border. Rather than power being demonstrated as an ongoing all encompassing aspect of international travel, power will be seen operating in the context of communication between the workers of the border. This communication is about risk, and in this chapter the focus will be on the positive elements of risk and the way in which it allows a level of communication between otherwise disparate groups of workers. As Zaloom says “when we define risk as synonymous with danger, the orientation towards hazard occludes theoretical attention to the productive dimensions of risk” (2006: 109). This chapter will present these productive dimensions to a word otherwise imbued with negative connotations. In the context of this chapter we can draw from this that the benefit of risk to the border is that it allows border workers to have a shared language of risk. This shared language allows them to mitigate not just their departments’ risk but all risks to the border.

There are some strong arguments that risk can be used to shape identity, be it through risk taking sports in one’s spare time or occupations that are focused on the mitigation of risk to the public, such as border workers. Zaloom studied workers in the Chicago ‘pits’ or trading floors and states that

analysts have characterised high-risk activities as ways of escaping the routinized contemporary world. Sky-divers and mountain climbers report their attempts to escape social constraint to draw closer to their “true” selves. Traders participate in this Romantic understanding. They take on risks that are generated in modern institutions through the exercise of rationalised control (2006: 109).

Several important aspects come from Zaloom’s assertions that are relevant to border workers and their collective identity.

The first aspect of Zaloom's assertion is that high risk activities are a way of escaping the 'normal world'. Like the trading pits discussed by Zaloom the airport is in itself a 'risk filled' location outside of the normal world. In the introduction to his book 'The Naked Airport' Gordon (2008) quotes Arthur Hailey "in the main passenger terminal, chaos predominated". Workers of the airport tacitly acknowledge this, and it is even accepted by the mainstream media who use this to publicise the successful 'Border Patrol' TV shows. One of my informants said to me in an interview that "*the border is basically a chaotic environment, you can never anticipate what will happen next.*" Another informant stated to me that the border is a chaotic environment due to the passengers who "*determine how chaotic it will be*". Maril's (2004) book on the Texas Mexican border is aptly titled "Patrolling Chaos."

Secondly Zaloom argues that risk filled environments are used to "escape social constraints". The airport is a place where workers live a risky existence based on the work they perform in order to enforce social constraints. Workers will detain and strip search passengers and have no second thoughts about asking a person what religion they are, or if they use drugs (or is more often the case "*what drug did you use last*" – to elicit a more honest response). This questioning and behaviour is common across all uniformed border workers.

The third relevant aspect of Zaloom's assertion is that the workers will "take on risks that are generated in modern institutions through the exercise of rationalised control." All the workers at the airport are employed to 'take on risks'. It is important to note that for most this is a lifestyle choice. For the most part the workers of the border I interviewed in my fieldwork worked at the airport through choice. On one occasion a border colleague was most upset at being transferred to a work area outside of the airport (without being consulted) for six months. The officer referred to the transfer as akin to detention.

The risks the border workers seek to mitigate in themselves cannot always be rationalised, for example methamphetamine is made in New Zealand from ‘Contact NT’ (similar to concentrated cold and flu medicine) capsules imported from China. Which means that all cold and flu medication containing pseudoephedrine is a risk. Border workers have to exercise discretion over this risk and must adapt a flexible cultural approach when dealing with people importing it. A Chinese student may for example bring in more of this medicine than would a student from Australia, as the Chinese student has as one of my informants put it an “*ambulance at the top of the cliff vs. ours at the bottom of it approach to medicine*”. Therefore although the risks to the border cannot be arbitrarily rationalised and most importantly communicated to other workers of the border, the processes by which they are identified and mitigated can be. Like traders having a hunch about stock and acting on this hunch, which fellow traders recognise as an action they can identify with, so too must border workers recognise the relevant behaviour towards the rationalised identification of risk and take action to mitigate it.

Those within and those without

The workers of the border are divided into two main groups, those within the occupational community and those outside of it. A key concept in occupational community is based on the idea that there have to be people on the ‘outside’ of it to give those within it a sense of identity. This difference between the groups is not a marked one, indeed to the causal observer at the border there are no differences between the workers. Salaman argues in relation to the work force that groups do not have to be markedly different: “many groups can differ more gradually, by degree of their differences” (1986: 95).

The occupational community of border workers does not include the part-time and new border workers as well as staff who do not work ‘proper shifts’ – for example staff

who work six on three off, but only during the day. The occupational community does include staff, who are mostly set to day work but who are on call such as Immigration officers. The only workers who are an exception to this criterion are very long serving part time workers, or part time / day shift workers who used to be full time shift workers. Examples of workers outside of the occupational community of border workers are: variable hours Customs officers, MAF quarantine assistants who load the x-ray machines, and AVSEC part time officers, who do not work in the international terminal frequently or who are not involved in patrolling the tarmac.

The reason that these workers are not part of the occupational community is that they do not share the same values as those within it, because their experience of work is very different from those within the occupational community. As such these workers outside of the occupational community by nature of the hours they work do not share the requisite requirements of being a part of the occupational community, or to fall back on Salaman's definition "identity, share a language, a vocabulary of symbols, knowledge of the work world " (1986: 75-76). The key aspect that border workers outside of the occupational community do not share is the 'knowledge of the work world.'

The way in which the members of the occupational community work is markedly different from the way in which the workers of the border outside of the occupational community work. This difference comes in part from the different hours that members of the occupational community work. The working of the shifts means that the workers within the occupational community spend more social time with each other such as, dinner and breakfast, as opposed to lunch, which due to arriving flights is generally short and rushed.

Members of the occupational community engage in a different kind of work than those outside of it in the respect that they are not for the most part only engaged in the processing and screening of flights which those outside of the occupational community are.

Members of the occupational community are more frequently involved in the processing of the private, commercial and military flights, as well as other wider Customs, quarantine and security tasks. This work generally involves communication and liaison between members of different agencies. For example, during my fieldwork the arrival of a military flight from Antarctica would involve liaison between MAF, AVSEC and Customs. This kind of liaison between the agencies occurs on a regular basis outside of the 9-5, hours which are covered by members of the occupational community and it relies upon the common language that is shared as a feature of the occupational community. The workers of the occupational community share hours which those workers outside of the occupational community do not. The sections of this chapter will explore aspects of the border workers' identity and will look at how border workers as observed during the fieldwork are members of the occupational community or outsiders to it.

Playing the Risk Game: Hide and Seek at the Border

The workers of the border are involved in what could be described as a game of hide and seek. They believe that the travelling public are trying to hide something from them, be it drugs, weapons or intentions, and that it is their job to find it. This gives all border workers a sense that they are different from the travelling public, but it also gives the workers of the border themselves a sense of commonality. The workers of the border value the ability to find things that are hidden. In doing so I argue that the workers of the border take on the risks to the border and personalise them. Customs officers become passionate about finding drugs, Immigration officers with illegal workers and so on. This game that the workers of the border play revolves around the ability to identify, find and deal with, risks to the border.

A sense of identity comes from partaking in this game at the border and I argue that this 'game' is an aspect of the organisational culture of border workers. It is only the members of the occupational community of border workers that take this game a step further and make it a shared value that they talk about in ways that can only be understood amongst themselves.

Success in Talking About Policing Risk

Success in the border network is measured through the management or policing of risk and the ability to convey this to other border workers. This is true at individual and agency level. Success in this way allows workers of the border to become full members of the occupational community as Orr states "the primary status within the community is that of member. One participates in the community by becoming and remaining a competent practitioner" (1996: 147). The following discussion will focus on success in talking about risk mitigation within the border network as opposed to agency success. It will demonstrate how success in talking about successful risk mitigation opens the door to becoming a member of the occupational community. In order to become a member of the occupational community and remain a member, one must be a component practitioner.

On the surface the workers of the border measure success as agency related, that is to say Customs officers are successful if they find drugs and AVSEC officers are successful if they find knives. Success within the occupational community is in fact the ability to talk about and describe these achievements to members of other agencies. This is the common language of the border, and it is through this communication that the true networks of power to police the border are created. An example of this, encountered during my fieldwork, was observed when a variety of full-time Customs positions were appointed from amongst part-time staff. One staff member, who got the job, had been widely

acknowledged as having made several 'finds'. A 'find' being border worker terminology for discovering prohibited or restricted goods that had been concealed or smuggled to avoid detection. After it was announced that the staff member had been appointed to the position, other staff members were heard to comment: "*'Rupert' was the obvious choice after all his finds, he would have had a lot of examples of his finds to talk about in the interview.*" This demonstrates two things. The first was that whether or not 'Rupert' was successful based upon his prior finds, it was perceived to be so at ground level. Secondly and importantly, for the arguments that will follow in this chapter the staff members implicitly acknowledged that being able to "*talk about*" risk mitigation was as important as actually mitigating risk. This was especially important when it came to progressing one's career and justifying this progression to colleagues within the border network. From an analytical perspective building up this kind of reputation is the way into the occupational community for workers outside of it.

At the border network level ways in which organisational success is judged upon risk mitigation can be seen every time the newspaper is opened. If there has been a successful border intercept, the headlines will laud it "Customs seize \$1m of Ice" (Stuff.co.nz 2008). Alternately, if a border agency has been perceived to have failed even if it was a policy failing rather than organisation failing, the media and government is quick to notice it, such as was seen in the news follow up to the light airplane (alleged) hijacking out of Nelson in February 2008.

Police and Transport Minister Annette King says she has asked NZ Police and the Aviation Security Service to provide her and the Minister for Transport Safety, Harry Duynhoven, with urgent reports (Stuff.co.nz 2008).

Interestingly success is often deemed as being attributable to an individual within the network but failure is associated with an agency or the network as a whole.

The way in which risk is managed can lead to financial reward but it can also lead to social recognition, again this is at both the organisational level and individual level. Successful government departments are given bigger budgets and more standing, and staff, who perform their job descriptions and find items of risk, contribute to organisational success and are given pay rises. Despite this, success in managing border risk cannot be succinctly defined and demarcated. The border is a zone where the government tasks the workers to protect it from outside risks whilst also facilitating entry and departure. This dichotomy is summed up by Salter who believes that: “The problem of borders is a result of two powerful government desires: security and mobility” (2004: 72). This dichotomy also means it is difficult to measure success. Maril in his work on the Texas Mexico border and the border patrol agents acknowledges this difficulty in measuring success, as has been discovered by border patrol management and the US government:

For years the efficacy of the US Border Patrol was measured by rates of apprehensions... Chief Reyes turned this logic upside down. Declining numbers of apprehensions now validated the newest strategy against the entry of undocumented workers (2004: 162).

In this light success could be measured in both high and low numbers of seizures making numbers and statements like “More than a thousand people were stopped from boarding planes to New Zealand in the year to June 30” in reference to refused entry to suspected illegal workers, meaningless (stuff.co.nz 2008). Therefore an argument of this chapter is that while measuring organisational success is difficult or impractical, observing the way individuals talk of successful risk management will yield results.

During my research, every border worker interviewed believed that they looked for ‘collective risks to the border’ as opposed to the specific risks that their agencies were tasked with mitigating. An informant advised me in regards to how border workers ‘work’ and by that, I mean what they actually do as opposed to what they are supposed or perceived to do by management namely

“we have a great vantage point to be 100% active with regards to all risks to the border- I do not narrow my scope when working but feel I am open to all possibilities. I believe risk to the border is shared but as an individual we must take ownership of the risk at hand.”

When I asked another border worker if she believed risk to the border was shared she replied:

“Customs, MAF, Aviation Security, INZ, Police amongst other agencies share the same belief that to minimise risk we work together sharing similar values and the exchange of new information and ideas.”

This shared view and ownership of risk fits neatly into the theories of occupational community which can be surmised by Orr’s account of occupational communities among photocopier repair technicians.

The technicians should be viewed as an occupational community (van Maanen and Barley 1984) they are focused on the work not the organisation, and the only valued status is that of full member of the community. That is being considered a competent technician. In pursuit of this goal they share information, assist in each others diagnoses, and compete in terms of their relative expertise. Promotion out of the community is thought not to be worthwhile. The occupational community shares few cultural values with the corporation (1996: 76).

In a similar way the workers of the border studied could be seen as an occupational community focused around the work of incoming and outgoing international flights. Status as a full member of the community is what is valued, as this allows members to effectively and efficiently perform their jobs. As in the photocopier technical community, promotion out of the community to other positions is to a degree looked down upon. Furthermore, the occupational community of the border has values of its own distinct from the values of the individual organisations that the workers are employed by.

An example of these points in action occurred during my fieldwork when one hundred historic medals including Charles Upham’s Victoria Cross and Bar were stolen from the Waiouru army museum in December 2007. Through liaison between various government border agencies border workers were quickly able to put a profile in place

through liaison with officers of Customs, Police and AVSEC using existing Customs and AVSEC tools such as x-rays, and human methods such as profiling, as well as Police intelligence. Though the risk to the border was in this instance a new risk, the language that was used to describe the risk, its repercussions and a method of mitigating the risk was familiar to all parties concerned. This discussion allowed a informal network of human actors in alliance with non human tools, to be prepared to intercept the medals and their couriers. It was only possible through the interaction between experienced members of the occupational community.

In discussion with an officer involved in the case I asked him how this network came to be so rapidly put into effect. He described to me that an existing framework for managing another classified risk was put into place and this was able to be adjusted following some discussions with the concerned groups, such as Customs, Police and AVSEC and a sharing of information as to the capabilities of staff and realities of legislation. This was never tested, as the medals never left New Zealand, but the staff involved in putting the network into place was confident that it would have worked. The staff who were only aware of their specific job within the network were doubtful of its ability to succeed with comments such as *“well I doubt they will come through departures with the medals on their chests.”* The difference between the two groups being those who doubted the efficacy of the network were only aware of a small part of it, those aware of the wider network were more confident in it as they were able to communicate the risks across several existing networks.

From this example, we can see that risk is the common language between workers of the border, who are fully-fledged members of the border worker occupational community. Until these workers are full members of the occupational community they are restricted to speaking in a language of risk relevant only to their specific work area. Full

members of the occupational community will happily approach other members for instance and point out to them items or people who they believe may be of concern to their colleagues agency rather than their own. In my fieldwork an AVSEC officer approached a Customs officer with an x-ray image from a bag on an outgoing flight showing some sea-horses (dried) and advised the Customs officer of the bag they were in. The Customs officer was able to have the bag stopped and the sea-horses were seized under CITES (Convention on trade in endangered species) legislation which Customs administers. The AVSEC was a full member of the occupational community, as he could identify risks for other workers outside of his job description and convey the relevant information such as which passenger, which bag, which flight, and possible risk, to the right person, in this case a Customs officer.

Workers of the border also demonstrate that they are not yet full members of the occupational community through a failure in the ability to use the correct discourse of risk. One occasion on which this was observed during my fieldwork was when a new Customs officer had searched a bag and was taking the passenger out to the public area. Normally full members of the occupational community will just let a MAF officer know that there was no food or biosecurity risk items in the bag and take the passenger straight out. Generally during searches I have conducted, I would tell a MAF officer that there was no food or biosecurity items and he or she would say "*if you are happy I am happy*". On this occasion, the new officer took the passenger to the MAF x-ray. At this point the Customs officer was asked if there was any food in the bag by the MAF officer and the Customs officer answered in the negative and put the bag through the x-ray. Throughout this interaction I had been observing, having been at the x-ray waiting to intercept a particular target of an operation being run. From my vantage point, I could see that there was clearly an apple on the x-ray image and I winked at the MAF officer. The MAF officer asked the

Customs officer again, “*are you sure there is no fruit in there... you did say you searched it didn’t you?*” The Customs officer replied that he *didn’t think* there was any fruit in there. At this point the MAF officer opened the bag, showed the apple to the very embarrassed Customs officer and warned the passenger that they were lucky that the Customs officer was not switched on or they would have a \$200 fine. This serves to illustrate that new Customs officers searching bags will not be thinking or communicating in terms of the wider risks that the occupational community is looking for and communicating about. Nor will an inexperienced Customs officer be trusted in the way that experienced officers such as myself would be. Similarly, an inexperienced MAF officer is even more unlikely to be aware of much smaller items like deal bags of drugs that have been deliberately concealed that may be of interest to Customs.

This analysis of the ability to talk about risk at the border shows that the workers of the border, who are members of the occupational community, are able to identify colleagues, who are not, and will treat them in a different way than they would members of the occupational community. Tension between members of the occupational community and those outside of it is avoided as demonstrated in scenarios like the one outlined above, where it is an officer from a different agency that is treating a non occupational community member differently. Were it officers of the same agency making as apparent the exclusion from the occupational community, tensions would be more obvious. This was witnessed on various occasions during my fieldwork, when for example part time staff would say things like “*full time shift workers get all the courses*”. This was said in reference to full time staff, who did proper shifts, being perceived as being put on career progressing courses ahead of day shift and part time staff.

During the fieldwork sentiments that illustrated the different work that members of the occupational community did were also noted. On one occasion after flight processing

had finished, which is to say the passengers had all left the arrivals hall, some staff had begun to clear some mishandled bags for the airlines to release. This is a process involving Customs and MAF staff making sure the bags that have arrived separately from passengers do not need to be looked at for prohibited or restricted goods. On one occasion in my fieldwork a part time staff member said to another part time staff member who had started to clear the mishandled bags *“we don’t do that, that is a job for the full timers”*. Any manager or senior staff member would in fact know that it is every one’s job, and part time staff would generally be more than welcome to stay ‘signed on’ as to assist with clearing a large number of mishandled bags. This does illustrate that the work actually done by the members of the occupational community is different to the work done by those outside of it. Differences that occur in the practises of workers and the actual work that they undertake leads to differences in how they identify themselves as border workers, and members or non members of the occupational community.

Private worlds in public spaces and “the look”

The ‘look’ is a fine example of the way in which the workers of the border share an embodied ‘private’ world in a very public arena. The workers of the border when processing flights are doing so under the eye of the travelling public. Looks and communication between workers of the border are designed to transfer information, intelligence or intuition in a public space but in a private manner are one of the most important forms of interagency communication. In later chapters a section will discuss the lack of shared audio networks at the border in the form of radio communication. At this stage however the focus is the way in which informal modes of communication such as ‘the look’ allow the transmission of information between the workers of the occupational community, under the noses of the travelling public without the need for coded radio

communication. All the workers of the border share the need to communicate in private in a very public space, however only the workers of the border who are members of the occupational community are able to communicate with workers from agencies other than their own with any success in a private manner.

At the 'MAF x-ray exit, which is the point where passengers wait to be spoken to by a MAF officer before either being directed to the MAF or Customs search area or a MAF x-ray, an interaction was observed during my fieldwork that illuminates the non verbal communication between workers of the border. Customs officers often choose to wait at this point and listen to MAF officers interact with passengers. The MAF officers will be asking questions specific to their work area such as "*do you have any food?*" or "*were you in any rural or wilderness areas while you were away?*" Sometimes the MAF officer's questions are more specific such as during times of biosecurity scares such as a bird flu pandemic or mad cow disease outbreak. At times such as these questions like "*which countries did you visit, which provinces there?*" and "*what is your occupation?*" may be asked so the MAF officer may better assess a passenger's bio-security risk.

In this particular incident a MAF officer was talking to a passenger about his bio-security items of which he determined there were none. The MAF officer, I later interviewed, happened to be an ex-police officer and the passenger's answers led the MAF officer to believe that there was no biosecurity risk to the border. As he finished his 'risk assessment' of the passenger he turned around and gave the nearby Customs officer, who was not appearing overly interested in the passenger, what he would later describe to me to be "*the look*". Just a glance, just for a fraction of a second, but "*the look*" for an experienced Customs officer as opposed to the inexperienced Customs officer in this instance would have been enough to have pulled the passenger aside and at the least have questioned him to ascertain his Customs risk to the border. Probably "*the look*" from a

trusted member of the occupational community should have been enough to take the passenger to the search area for a baggage search. Later the MAF officer told me about this incident and how the new Customs officer had let the passenger walk straight past. He said to me *“I gave him the look, you know? The look!”* The MAF officer advised me that through his talk with the passenger he had been given the distinct impression that the passenger was either under the influence of drugs or had been so recently, based on his eye’s dilated pupils, appearance and speech. The risk to the border that the MAF officer could not mitigate, but that the Customs officer potentially could, is that the passenger may have had personal use amount of drugs on him or in his luggage. Personal use being in contrast to a large scale professional importation could be a party pack of a dozen or so pills such as ecstasy.

The organisations of Customs and MAF have no set down standard operating procedures where MAF officers or Customs officers at the exit select passengers for each other for agency specific intervention. Instead, actions like “the look” are best viewed as informal practices that embody the community and cover for the absence of rules. Informal practices like this are noted by Kondo as being important, in that they allow workers to ‘get the job done’, and facilitate and reinforce a workplace identity. Kondo talks of the way in which the “variety of institutional and informal practises... make work life more pleasant in accordance with meaningful, accepted cultural practises, but it is also intended to make work more efficient and productive” (1990: 203). ‘The look’ is a way in which the workers of the border can communicate effectively as it allows them to communicate amongst each other without passengers being privy to their hunches. Maril researched the gulf between border workers and the public and argued that:

Their spatial isolation from those whose interests they represented was embodied to some degree in the language they invented and employed; this language was part of the shared agent culture from which civilians were excluded (2004: 229)

This unspoken language in the context of an analysis of 'the look' serves the purpose of collectively mitigating risk at the border but it can also be seen as reinforcing the shared border worker culture.

'The look' is one of many unspoken gestures within the border workers culture, and it has yielded positive results on many occasions for allied agencies. In the course of my research one of the biggest seizures was of 7500 codeine phosphate tablets which were the result of MAF screening being referred to Customs. Seizures such as this come from an understanding of the risks that other agencies at the border look for. Were it not for the workers of the borders ability to communicate this between each other the tablets would have got through.

Other unspoken bodily gestures that are used by members of the border worker occupational community include 'the nod', which is used between border workers when a passenger comes to their attention as being a bit different in their answers or appearance. Border workers are also acutely aware of where they are standing in relation to each other and to passengers and what this indicates about other officer's intentions towards passengers. MAF officers for instance are aware that a Customs officer that has put him or herself between a MAF officer and a passenger and the exit to the x-rays could be waiting to intercept the passenger.

During Section 149 'personal' searches, when two officers are strip searching a passenger for prohibited goods, unspoken communication becomes a safety issue as officers need to second guess the actions of each other as to present a 'united front' to the suspect who is being searched. During a Section 149 search the risk of a passenger attacking an officer is at its highest and any window of opportunity that demonstrates to a suspect that officers are not 'watching each others back' could be seized upon. During the fieldwork, I was the lead officer in a Section 149 search. The officer who was witnessing

the search was not a member of the occupational community (he is now); he was not full-time (he is now), and he did not speak the unspoken language or share the common values shared by other members of the occupational community. This was demonstrated when we undertook a Section 149 search. The officer who was witnessing the search, and myself had been briefed prior to the search that the suspect was 'volatile' and could be considered to be high risk when it came to our personal safety. Normal procedure dictates that the searching officers have chairs available in the search room and that these are used by the witness if the officers conducting the search believes that the suspect is being compliant and is unlikely to jump up and attack the officer conducting the search. In this instance I believed that the suspect was being 'compliant' and in order to 'de-escalate' the situation I subtly nodded to my witness to take a seat so as not to be standing over the suspect being searched. Unfortunately, and I argue that this comes from not being a part of the occupational community as opposed to a lack of comprehension due to inexperience, the witness did not pick up on this and further non-verbal communication attempts and I was forced to have to tell him in front of the suspect to take a seat. The suspect was then privy to what should in normal circumstances be the 'private world' of Customs officers. An informant at another regional airport advised me that he had once had a passenger ask him if he could skip the baggage search and go straight to the '#####' ³. This showed that the passenger, who had been searched many times, had been exposed to border terminology such as '#####' which means a Section 149 strip search. The argument presented here is that when open forms of communication such as radios are used in front of passengers, such as must have been observed by this passenger the private world of border workers becomes public. By drawing on understandings of the occupational community, closed modes of communication are used amongst the members, who can therefore keep their

³ Edited out for organisational security.

world private and in doing so more effectively perform their duties in public and police the border.

Shared sense of time – shifts and decision making

The workers of the border share a sense of time outside of their family and friends in social networks and also in 'normal employment networks'. This is an aspect of border worker identity that is commented on by all border workers, not just members of the occupational community. This is apparent in two main ways. Firstly the social networks of most workers of the borders' family and friends are based on a 9-5 Monday to Friday week. Most of the workers of the border do a six days on three days off pattern or similar. 'Days on' is a misnomer because on days could be 4 am-1235 or 1730-0205. Secondly, the sense of time is also different due to the amount of time that workers can have to decide on whether or not people or goods are of risk to the border. This split second decision making is required at all hours of the day and night when normal decisions of a far less important nature are not made. The workers of the border are well aware of this and it is one of the key factors in them sharing a sense of identity at the border.

Risk is certainly the main factor in the creation of the occupational community of border workers and at the border risk and time are inextricably linked. All workers at the airport, especially those working in enforcement in the international terminal, are regulated by the international flight schedule, both arriving and departing. This schedule is published far in advance and the industrial realities mean that though tasked to do different things the workers are all there for 8-10 hour periods over a six or five day shift period. This means that workers of MAF shift teams will often see more of workers of a particular Customs shift team than they will of members of another MAF team let alone their families, who

may be asleep when they get home from work. During his fieldwork on the Texas Mexican border Maril came to the realisation that

The shift structure at the McAllen station, in contrast to that of many other law enforcement agencies throughout the nation, served to isolate agents not only from their own families and friends but also from community social networks (2004: 214).

Throughout my fieldwork it was readily apparent that the workers of the border were isolated from other social networks. For instance getting leave over school holiday periods was at a premium as many staff wanted to have the opportunity to be around their families. Christmas in particular, which is a day most workers spend at home was not as easily adjusted to at the border where workers still had to cover flights leaving from 4 am and arriving through until 2 am the next morning.

As a way of adjusting to this the workers of the border build up close friendships with other border workers; staff working night shift do not have an evening meal with family, instead they have it with other border workers. They inevitably often talk about work because while on night shift they have slept during the day and may not have much else to talk about. This builds up a sense of *communitas* across the workers of the border.

It is worth mentioning that all the border workers are affected by the fact that on night shift, if serious incidents have occurred or if work has been particularly busy, the border workers will return home and it will be unrealistic to go straight to sleep. The workers all share this frustration of getting home at three in the morning and knowing as an informant told me that:

“tomorrow the sun will be burning through the curtains at 7 am and the children will be up and awake, and I will be exhausted because I made it home and lay in bed thinking about whether or not I should have searched that last passenger of that last flight that just didn't seem quite right.”

This echoes Maril's account in his research, when he talks about border agents going home at the end of a shift, and are applicable to my own research experience minus the high speed pursuit and about \$950,000 worth of drugs

Agents could not spend time in a high speed pursuit of a van loaded with \$1 million worth of drugs, then immediately return home after the shift ended, drink a glass of warm milk and go to bed. Blood chemistry would not allow it (2004: 213).

This is a sentiment that all the workers of the border I spoke to could share and it links in with the effect divergent times and the workers having to make important high-risk decisions in a matter of seconds.

Officers at the border are measured by management in the way they 'process' passengers. All interactions with passengers are linked in some way to a measurable and checked by head office for quality assurance and surety. Officers face the realisation that they cannot devote all their time to dealing with one issue (aside from the exceptional issues that arise only occasionally – like large-scale importations). Furthermore, officers generally interact with passengers, when they are walking out the door, and both passengers and officers know there is a legal and practical limit to the amount of time they can spend deciding if a person is of risk to the border. This means many decisions that border workers make are risky decisions based upon the fact that they only have a limited amount of time to make them and have little recourse for follow up. This was explained to me by an informant who is an experienced border officer:

“Basically working at the airport we have to make then and there decisions... are you going to search him or her, if not they are gone and whatever they had on them will be gone out the door and into NZ, it is not like working at a mail centre or inspections base, you can't put a person or a bag on a shelf and come back to it after lunch or even a coffee, it is then and there that the decision is made and risk is defined.”

A Customs drugs investigator stated that a major difference in the work he did as an investigator as opposed to the enforcement work done at the airport was timeframe; airport

work is controlled by the flight schedule and enforcement could be limited by it. He stated: *“in investigations you work to the operation or to the clock when operations are not going on, but at the airport you work to flights.”* The reality of the work for the border workers at the airport is restraint imposed by time and also by the sheer quantity of passengers passing by and the multitude of decisions that have to be made. For example, on an average day shift one can expect to have around 1200- 2000 passengers being processed in a seven hour period. The average baggage search takes around twenty to thirty minutes. The number of staff responsible for searching bags or persons in any of the border agency as opposed to those who are involved in risk assessing them is roughly a 25% ratio. For every four Customs officers working roughly three will be immigrating passengers and one searching the risky ones. For every four AVSEC officers screening passengers there will be three operating x-rays or loading baggage onto x-rays and one will be searching bags. Similarly, for MAF the majority of staff are based in a role, where passengers are risk assessed rather than searched. Officers of the border all manage a virtually limitless scope of risk to the border posed by large passenger numbers in comparison to small numbers of staff policing (through physical intervention) the border. The workers of the border are united by the magnitude of their tasks.

The workers of the border are aware that their work environment that they are in is unique and shared only amongst them. Workers manage the risks they face at the border in a unique way. There is more similarity in the way the workers of the border manage risk across their agencies than there is between workers of the same agencies in different areas. For example, Customs officers at the airport risk management is more closely aligned with airport MAF officers than the work of airport MAF officers to mail centre MAF officers.

Shared concept of the use and abuse of Power

Workers of the border share a sense of power at work that they do not carry home, save perhaps the Police officers who work at the border. This shared concept of power at the border is an aspect of the organisational culture at the border as opposed to a facet of the smaller occupational community. When working the border all workers are well aware that if they ask a passenger to do something such as “*step this way please*”, or “*take a seat here please*”, or “*hand me your passport please*” – the passenger will likely acquiesce to the request, be it lawful or not. During the course of my fieldwork workers of the border did not abuse their power in any way. As discussed in earlier chapters the ability to get a passenger to wait for instance at an x-ray while a MAF officer fetched a Customs officer was not a legal power that the MAF officer had, however the Customs officer on his arrival would have certain powers that he or she could exercise over the passenger. This use of perceived power over passengers, who were probably unaware that they had an option to stay or go, allows workers of the border to collectively mitigate risk to the border.

All workers of the border share the understanding of the ‘collective’ power that they wield over passengers, but they are also acutely aware of where that power stops spatially (outside the airport) and territorially (between agencies areas of jurisdiction). As an example of this awareness of the limits of power shared by border workers, a discussion over the problems of youth drunkenness and violence in the inner city came up as a group of Customs and MAF officers were talking at the entrance to the MAF queues. This position is where MAF officers ‘risk assess’ and direct passengers into x-ray or search areas depending on their answers to the quarantine questions on their arrival cards. As such it is a popular spot for Police and Customs officers to wait and listen to the conversations as information that the MAF officers extract can be very useful for them in assessing risk to the border from their agencies perspectives. On this occasion a MAF officer, whilst

waiting for passengers to come through, was describing a situation when in town recently on a Saturday night he was accosted by a group of three female teenagers who threatened him with a knife and demanded his wallet. The MAF officer stated that the girls were advancing on him until he shouted at them to back off as he was a Police officer. This convinced the three girls to run away rather quickly! All officers present were well aware that within the bounds of the airport their uniforms would guarantee compliance from passengers in 99% of cases but in town on a Saturday night would much rather shout “*back off I am a Police officer*” rather than “*back off I am a MAF officer!*” Salter would argue that this power over the public that border workers hold comes from the fact that the public, both visitors and residents, understand that at the border they have

a greatly circumscribed set of rights” and that “Border officials have wide powers of search, seizure, detention, and of course the ability to exclude travellers from the country (2004: 78).

The awareness of this shared power within the border environment is a facet of the occupational community of border workers as well as being something that separates them from social networks outside of their workspace. Border workers will often not tell people in social situations outside of work what they do because outside of their border work their power is questioned. Furthermore, the power that is generically held at the border is also questioned by those outside of it who have experienced it directly or indirectly. All border workers in social situations cringe when someone says to them “*you guys make old people take their shoes off before they go through immigration!*” The workers of the border cringe because this use of power that is being ascribed to them is both incorrect and only used in limited contexts (mostly overseas). In New Zealand it is rare for shoes to be removed for screening unless there is metal in them and this is not done at immigration, it is done pre-boarding when a person passes through security. The point being that within their occupational community when working the border workers are used to having a large

amount of unquestioned power, but outside of the airport this power is perceived as ineffective and questioned. This is not something limited to border workers in New Zealand, Flynn argues that border workers “as representatives of the state who regularly attempt to restrict and control cross-border movement... bear the brunt of local anti state antagonisms” (1997: 317) . In this sense the job could be said to be stigmatised in some ways.

As a concluding remark to this section, it is reasonable to say that collective power at the border is one of the key factors in the creation of an occupational community over and above the power of individuals and individual agencies at the border. This power that is used at the border however causes tensions between the border workers and the travelling public, which are generally manifested outside of the border. As such these tensions are also experienced by the workers of the border when not at work, and serve to make the workers more acutely aware of their separation from normal society and their membership of the border occupational community.

Every decision being a risk decision

When confronting the various risks to the border the workers face a dichotomy of risk. The first is that they fail to identify a risk to the border and this risk object or person then enters or leaves New Zealand. The second is the risk they face as professionals in failing to perform their jobs properly. This is a perception of risk shared by other occupations such as Police and money traders, as it is illuminative on the way they go about their work. This is because all workers of the border, whether making ‘risk decisions’ about fruit, drugs or security, make the decisions under an umbrella of risk to them personally and to the border. When money traders or Police take on risk, they do so

individually, the risk of injury or death or prosecution for Police and the risk of losing money or face for money traders.

Like the decisions of money traders every decision a border worker makes is imbued with potentially catastrophic risk. This risk derives from the fact that decisions border workers make are about locating and stopping risk objects and people from entering New Zealand or leaving New Zealand and posing a risk to other travellers or other nations. Zaloom states “the norms of risk taking in the pits shape the habitus of the traders who work there” (2006: 189). The workers of the border work in a risk imbued environment, where the language that they talk is the language of risk. All workers of the air border are aware that although certain legislation is held by their respective agencies allowing follow up after a person has left the airport, they generally have to make a here and now decision as to a person’s risk, as discussed in the earlier section as to time constraints at the border. The language that the workers of the border speak pertaining to human and non human actor’s risk is a language that defines and creates a shared community.

The reality of workers of the border having to make instant decisions as to risk on a constant basis came clearly through in my fieldwork. Participants were acutely aware that a moment’s inattention at an x-ray could lead to a bomb being smuggled onto a plane or a potentially catastrophic biosecurity outbreak. Others talked of their biggest fear being “*searching a bag and overlooking some hard drugs*” or even issues like “*making an unlawful decision – such as illegally detaining a person*”. These are all fears that come from the fact that workers of the border have to make spot decisions based on risk assessments of people and things. All the different workers of the border face the risk of making a wrong decision with major consequences when attempting to define and mitigate risks to the border.

Policing Risk

The workers of the border, who are member of the occupational community as opposed to simply being part of the organisational culture, are all involved in ‘policing the border’. This is in opposition to the concept that they are just policing the risk(s) defined by their agency. One of Orr’s key questions and a question that is key to this chapter is the question “what do the workers of the border actually do?” What is it about this that makes the workers of the border more than their specific job titles implies? Orr asks

What is almost completely missing from most of the studies discussed so far is a focus on the work itself. What role do the events of a day’s work play in the process of defining identity? What are the relationships between work and the worker... Authors may presume that modern jobs are in some sense known, perhaps from formal job descriptions (1996: 152).

The various workers of the border, whose agencies have been separately defined and whose focus as to what they do at prima facia value, appears clear cut, in fact all do one thing, and they do this one thing together, they police the border. A study of what this policing involves is important, not insomuch as it reveals to us what happens when they work as it reveals what happens at the border. A study of what the workers of the border actually do tells us about how power is exerted and contested at the border and how the border network actually works (or not).

This assertion fits neatly into Orr’s argument as management, passengers and sometimes even the workers are not actually aware of the exact work that they are doing. The workers of the border all go about their day making decisions that mitigate risk to the border. Essentially their work is going about defining risk and communicating it, and in doing so they are all doing the same thing as other border workers who work for ‘different agencies’; they just happen to be looking for different things. The workers of the border, especially those who are members of the occupational community, communicate the information about risk to each other through formalised and informal methods of

communication. Formal methods of communication between border workers include: databases, briefings, codeword's, radios, pagers and telephones. Informal modes of communication between border workers who are members of the occupational community include looks, body language, jokes, casual briefings and reminiscences about shared experiences.

Ericson and Haggerty talk of Police as

the fulcrum of risk communication among institutions. They are first and foremost knowledge workers who think and act within the risk-communication systems of other institutions (2002: 238).

The border workers can be seen in this light. For example, the work done by all border workers in regards to enforcement is stored in databases, which communicate information nationally and internationally. Through using these databases the workers of the border communicate their assessment of risk to others. Eventually through the accumulation of names and information the databases in themselves begin to police the border in alliance with the human workers.

My various interviews with border workers about what they did all shared a common theme. That is that they believed their job to be about looking for 'people' as opposed to the distinct 'things' or prohibited commodities that their agency defined as being of risk to the border. The following table was copied during my research and showed the results of a test given to Customs officers as to their ability do define objects of risk to their agency such as drugs and counter terrorism, and to other agencies such as MAF, and INZ. The table in lay terms demonstrates officers ability to look for 'things'.

Item	Identified /56	%	Correct Seizure Reason	%
Drugs				
LSD	34	60	34	60
White powder in	52	92	52	92

false bottom				
Pseudo ⁴ disguised as 100/1000s	56	100	54	96
Pseudo in sock	55	98	53	94
Objectionable				
#### DVD	56	100	56	100
#### magazine	53	95	53	95
#### DVD	53	94	47	83
Psilocybin Guide	51	91	16	28
Counter Terrorism				
#### ⁵	52	93	49	87
####	53	95	51	91
####	56	100	53	94
####	52	93	51	91
####	47	83	46	82
Ties/Cites				
Snake/Scorpion in bottle	56	100	56	100
Po Chai pills	56	100	52	92
#### #### book	53	94	48	85
INZ				
CV	56	100	56	100
Job Vacancy	53	95	53	95
MAF				
Beef lollies	56	100	56	100
Eucalyptus seeds	56	100	56	100
Hacky sack	48	85	45	80
False documents				
Nokia labels	54	96	42	75
#### Drivers Licence	56	100	52	93
Visa card	56	100	52	93
Certificates	53	95	48	85
Other				
##### #1 (Intel)	3	5	2	3

From this we can see that the role of workers at the border is blurred from what would at prima facia value be their job. Though focused on people the workers of the border are able to identify items associated with risk activities at and away from the border. Workers are identifying, and then communicating the risk to appropriate agencies or persons across a whole range of commodities. The initial drug items would be easily recognisable as being of Customs concern, but the list progresses into objectionable material, counter terrorism, trade in endangered species items, items in relation to immigration risk, MAF

⁴ Pseudo – pseudoephedrine – the precursor ingredient to make methamphetamine or ‘p’ or ‘meth’.

⁵ ### = edited out for security reason

quarantine items, fraudulent items and assorted other risk items. This example shows the workers of the border policing the border as opposed to performing their individual 'job descriptions' as Orr critiqued at the start of this section. It can be said that the workers of the border are an occupational community centred around policing risk above all else. In justification of this claim it is necessary to look at what the workers of the border actually do. The primary focus within the occupational community that was observed during my fieldwork was a focus on communication with other members of the occupational community. While members of the occupational community did focus on facilitating passengers into and out of New Zealand their primary focus was on policing these passengers. The members of the occupational community did not talk about facilitating the passengers in their lunch break, they did not talk about the fastest 'screening' (checking a person or bag for prohibited items) they had conducted, instead they talked about their 'finds' or their detections of some breach of legislation amongst themselves. In doing so the members of the occupational community showed their shared focus of policing the border and educated other members of the occupational community as to the risks that could be found at the border.

An apt quote to finish this section on policing the border comes from Caplan's 'Risk Revisited'. The quote pertains to the way in which we can see that the border workers share the policing of the border and are not in fact limited to their job descriptions. They share the common fears of threats to the border and look to identify these and communicate the risk to other agencies should the need arise. Policing is the common value and the common fear is risk itself at the border:

Common values lead to common fears, thus the choice of risks and the choice of how to live are linked and each form of life has it's own typical risk portfolios (2000: 9-10).

Concluding remarks on the workers of the border

There are two kinds of border workers at the international airport studied, both manage the risks to the border, and the risks posed to themselves by failing to manage these risks appropriately in different ways. These two kinds of border workers can be broken into the group that makes up the occupational community of border workers and the group outside of this occupational community. Those within the occupational community are for the most part made up of experienced full time shift workers. Those outside of the occupational community are made up for the most part of part time or day working newer staff.

The workers of the border who collectively police the border are best viewed as an occupational community, as they are not what their job description or title limits their capacity to mitigate risk to. There are also workers at the border who also police the border but who are not part of this occupational community. This group outside of the occupational community share the organisational culture of border workers but are limited through their relative experience, and often their employments status, such as 'part timers', to policing only one set of risks. The set of risks that those outside of the organisational culture police are those defined by their agency, such as MAF officers only policing MAF bio-security risks.

The definition provided by Orr as to an occupational community's workers is an appropriate one for the members of the occupational community discussed in this chapter.


The workers are typically

focused on the work not the organisation, and the only valued status is that of full member of the community... In pursuit of this goal they share information, assist in each others diagnoses, and compete in terms of their relative expertise (1996: 76).

Examples of this in action have been demonstrated throughout this chapter. To name but one, AVSEC officers can help Customs officers identify and treat risk as outlined in the

example of the sea horses that AVSEC found, Customs seized and then passed on to DOC. As such the workers of the border are best viewed as nodes of the network/s that are centred around the larger node, that is the international airport. The workers have a high degree of reflexivity within the network, in that they understand, and can identify the risks of other actors in the network.

The AS/NZS 4360:1999 Risk Management Standard outlines risk management as the ability to identify, monitor, treat and communicate risk. A worker of the border, who can identify a risk (even if not his own), monitor it, and then pass on appropriate information to someone able to treat it, is a full member of the occupational community.



NZCS, AS/NZS 4360: 1999 'Ad Hoc Risk Management Group, 1999.
'*The New Zealand Customs Service Risk Management Framework*',
Published Internally pp. 10.

This membership is because he is following the same process to mitigate risk that the person, whose 'job' it is to mitigate that particular risk, would. This reflexivity and agency within the border network is for the most part limited to members of the occupational community. Salaman states that one of the key requirements of an occupational community

is that members must share an identity (1986: 77). The members of the border worker occupational community share an identity based around mitigating collective risk to the border.

The important question as to the consequence of this aspect of the identity is that collective risks to the border are effectively mitigated by members of the occupational community, even though this is not their 'core' or perceived job. A secondary consequence of this is that members of the public, who see this 'private' world played out in the 'public' space of the airport perceive that risk is mitigated in a fluid fashion by all workers of the border. Tension in this arises, when border workers, who are not members of the occupational community, cannot mitigate all risk to the border in this fluid fashion in a public space. Then for members of the occupational community and for perceptive members of the public (or nefarious travellers observing the border network for weaknesses) the use of power to police risk in this public space appears ad-hoc and less effective.

The workers outside of this occupational community work in a slightly different way and though they still police risk to their agency they do not share the generic ability to police risk across agencies. As such tensions between these workers and the members of the occupational community arise. These tensions can be expressed in a light hearted fashion, as was illustrated in the section on 'the look', but the tensions can also have more antagonistic repercussions between border workers. For the most part members of the occupational community will always be working alongside those who are not members. Therefore the workers have the ability to communicate within their agency at most times and draw upon other officer's knowledge of divergent agencies risks.

There are two groups of border workers, those within and those outside of the occupational community. Having an occupational community means that there must be a

group outside of the occupational community in opposition, identity wise, to it. Both groups, both those inside the occupational community and those outside of it, share equal success in policing the border. The fickle nature of border policing means that a border worker outside of the occupational community is just as likely to open up a bag and find a prohibited item as a member of the occupational community. Questions of effectiveness come down to questions of effective communication, border workers outside of the occupational community are forced to rely upon mediators to communicate with members of other agencies. These mediators are often the machines that also police the border and these machines and their ability to be mediators as well as actors within the border network are the focus of the following chapter.

Chapter Interlude:

Occupational Community to Actor Networks?

Going from a discussion on the idea of an occupational community of border workers to the actor network theories of Latour may seem a big jump. At this point therefore it is necessary to reflect on the introductory comments as to the complimentary use of this idea and this theory. In the second chapter the idea of an occupational community argued that the workers of the border can for the most part effectively police the border because they share a world. This holds true throughout this thesis. Unfortunately actor network theory makes has no space for ideas like occupational community and doubtless its proponents would scoff at the idea of using it alongside a 1980s idea used in the study of the labour market.

In the introductory comments of this thesis I outlined how my prime method of research was participant observation and the author therefore cannot leave this idea of occupational community behind when it is a 'best fit' method to describe a group of border workers that were studied. As one of my informants an experienced and senior customs officer said to me "*some people work here, and stay here out of a sense of vocation.*" Sentiment such as this is best accounted for within the idea of an occupational community.

In the same way through my participant observation I cannot ignore the fact that border workers are as much intertwined with the machines that police the border as much as they are with the other human border workers. Therefore it is necessary to explain the major disparity between occupational community and actor network theory that will come to light, which is the question of what holds the workers together. Actor network theory would argue that it is the mediators and intermediaries which will be discussed in the following chapter that holds the network of the border workers together, or more precisely

that constitute the border network. Occupational community on the other hand would focus on the core groups shared values and work life world in which they collectively exist.

To bring the idea and this theory together it is important to look at the wider argument that the border is collectively policed by the many workers of different agencies as well as the human – machine hybrids that police the border. The border is in effect policed through a many eyed panopticon and made effective by lateral communication within the border network. This lateral communication is made possible for some border workers by the occupational community in which they work. These members of the occupational community have perhaps lesser reliance upon the human machine hybrids and technologies of the border to communicate at this lateral level. Workers of the border outside of the occupational community rely upon the technologies of the border and the human technology hybrids to communicate amongst themselves and also to effectively police the border.

Occupational community can explain why one group of border workers is successful at communicating laterally within the border network. The border network as a whole is best explained and illustrated through the actor network theories which will give as much importance to the technologies of the border as it will to the humans within this network. Neither the idea of occupational community nor actor network theory will effectively address the issues of power within the border network. Both occupational community and actor network theory will however bring out examples of power in action which chapter four will attempt to frame using the ideas of Foucault.

Chapter Three:

Working the Border Together, the Technologies of the Border and Risk

1982 Time Magazine Person of the Year – “*The Computer*”

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“Computers are useless. They can only give you answers”
Pablo Picasso.

The non-human workers of the border

The previous chapter focused on the human workers of the border, and explored how they go about their ‘work’ policing the border as members of an occupational community and as workers outside of it. This chapter will focus upon the alliances between the human and non-human workers of the border.

Pablo Picasso, quoted above, argues that computers are useless because they can only give answers. This chapter will argue that standing alone the various technologies of the border are ineffective. The previous chapter acknowledged that unless they communicate with each other the human workers of the border are also ineffective. A critical focus of this chapter will be upon what answers the technologies of the border give their human colleagues, and how these answers are interpreted by humans. Latour advises readers of his actor network theory

Every time you want to know what a non human does, simply imagine what other humans or other non humans would have to do were this character not present (1992: 229)

This question is pertinent, as this chapter will look at the technologies of the border and will ask the same question that was asked of human workers: “what do the non human workers of the border actually do?” This chapter will trace the difference in what the public and workers alike take to be the prima facia job of a border technology and unravel constantly shifting configurations and reconfigurations of workers at the border.

The technologies that make up the non-human workers of the border can be divided into three main types of technology: visual technologies, tracing technologies and audio technologies. These three technology types serve different purposes within the border networks. Visual technologies include cameras and x-rays, allowing humans to observe people or items in a way that they could not do with the human eye. Visual technologies relate to surveillance, which can be roughly described as “a mode of ordering” (Donaldson and Wood, 2004: 373). Tracing technologies from the highly advanced itemiser to the mundane notebook allow the people and commodities within the border network to have their pathways traced in a way that can be referred back to by human agents. Audio networks within the border such as pagers and radio communication allow the workers to transmit messages of and about risk to each other covertly and through obstacles.

The various technologies of the border all have certain perceived roles within the border network. These roles are not always what they would be at face value. The following chapter explores these different roles and acknowledges that the only certain eventuality that comes from the introduction of new technologies into the border network is the expansion of the network; “as the actors multiply, so the network expands.” (Miller 1997: 359)

Biometrics as a technology of (in)security

The politics of security becomes a technology. One such technology is biometric identification. Biometrics refers to the automatic verification of

individual identity on the basis of their physical / behavioural characteristics, including finger printing, facial and iris scanning, signature recognition etc (Fierke 2007: 116).

The technologies at the border cannot arbitrarily mitigate risk, however new technologies through political promotion are often linked to the concept of providing greater security. The new biometric technologies that are gradually being introduced are a good example of erroneous interpretation of the utility of new border related technology. These new technologies and their possible introduction have been established by the popular press as technologies that will streamline air travel and at the same time make it more secure and cheaper for governments:

Customs and Border Protection officers can more quickly match the biometrics to verify that visitors do not pose a threat... if the person in line is a criminal, immigration violator or requires further questioning, the officer will know this more quickly and remove them from the line for additional screening without delaying legitimate visitors... Collecting biometrics also helps protect visitors against identity theft Delay times and inefficient security procedures had put off many travellers. However, he (CBP spokesman) said passengers were not averse to biometrics because they were concerned about their safety and protecting their identity (Travel Trade, 2008: 2).

The practise is that unless a passenger is on a wanted list, meaning they would be detected anyway at a biometric screening point border workers will be in no better position to detect an 'under the radar' terrorist or criminal than was previously the case. Delay times for passengers will not be reduced by this new technology, this is apparent when considering new aeroplanes' passenger carrying ability. One such new high capacity aircraft will be the A380-900 aircraft, which according to Leahy

would have a seating capacity of 650 passengers in standard configuration, and around 900 passengers in economy-only configuration (2008 online).

Even the proponents of the biometric technology acknowledge that biometrics cannot necessarily keep up with large numbers of passengers arriving at once.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) already has its back up about wait times, claiming that they can't control and can't predict delays. However, a spokesperson for DHS admitted that there would be severe delays at times, especially when several planes land at once (Travel Trade 2008: 1).

Salter would agree with this sentiment (2007: 59). Salter's comprehensive study of the dynamic of balance between mobility and security at a Canadian airport (mentioning a whopping 82 enforcement agencies), which he analysed using Foucault's 'heretopia and confessionary complex,' argues of biometrics that

the introduction of biometric measures has done nothing to diminish either the examination or the reliance on documentation (2007: 59).

The introduction of biometrics at the international airport that I studied is still in an early phase, some new passports are equipped to be biometric capable with e-chips, but there are no biometric scanners yet for passengers or documentation. Latour (1986) asks the famous question who killed Aramis, the new technology for mass individual transport. Though not yet dead the technology of the biometric scanner and travel document is certainly in the process of not so much being killed as mutilated into a new shape. This new shape will make an appearance within the border network in future and doubtless be the cause for translation and negotiation in much the same way the events of 9/11, which heralded and 'necessitated' the arrival of 'new' and 'secure' technologies such as the biometrics. Fierke has a similar argument to that presented here in regards to biometric technology:

Against the backdrop of the War on Terrorism, government elites have hailed biometric technologies as a tool for confronting new security challenges. The incorporation of biometrics into all travel and identification documents is currently a subject of discussion in intergovernmental forums. Since 9/11, forms of biometric identification have been deemed critical to increased security (2007: 117).

In the context of 9/11 the argument could be presented, and this would fit within the securities studies approach taken by Fierke, that biometrics would not have prevented the 9/11 attacks happening, rather they would have simply provided more certainty that the

attackers were, who they claimed to be upon arrival at the airport. This technology is not yet active within the border network studied, so we will turn to some technologies that are and endeavour to track them within the border network and examine 'what they do'.

X-ray Machine – a visualising Technology

At the international airport, where the fieldwork for this thesis was conducted, the x-ray machines are owned and operated by both MAF and AVSEC. These machines are relied upon by MAF, AVSEC and Customs directly, and a myriad of other agencies indirectly. The x-ray machines are visualising technologies. The x-rays allow human operators to see what is within or behind objects and AVSEC workers use them to look for weapons being smuggled or inadvertently taken onto planes. MAF uses their x-rays to look for bio-security risk items being taken into New Zealand. Customs who does not own the x-ray machines uses the MAF x-ray to screen for specific items they have identified as being of risk. Some MAF officers are also attune to certain Customs items that are easily detected such as cannabis pipes and will alert Customs when they come across them.

X-ray machines are now synonymous with air travel. They allow what was in the past impermeable spheres of privacy around personal items, within baggage, to be looked through. X-rays open the private world of a traveller's possessions to border workers, who use the revealed contents of the baggage to make risk assessments about the traveller. They are an Orwellian artefact that the majority of people put as much thought about putting their baggage into as they do about putting it into their car boot, when they leave the airport. In the future x-ray machines may progress from looking through luggage to looking through layers of clothing and even, under the human skin. This not so distant technology will determine if people are carrying weapons or explosives onto aeroplanes, and if people are internally carrying drugs or other contraband on or within their bodies

across the border. This future technology will open up a vast field of ethical questions and moral issues which should first be resolved, but will probably not come into public consciousness until the technology is well entrenched. During my research there were rumours amongst the border workers that a scanning machine such there are mentioned above, had been trialled, but was abandoned as a technology (despite being successful from a technical perspective). This project was abandoned because the people, who were part of the trial process, had to step into a small cubicle that would then close around them. Those trialled took issue to being treated like cattle at a drench.

The x-ray can be seen as a visual technology of classification. Burrows and Gane look at how technologies of classification through geodemographic software and class are interlinked. Their work explores classifications, and though not policing or border related it provides some interesting insights into classification software which is of a kind used at the border in database form. They believe that “technologies of classification have long been an endemic feature of modernity” (2006: 803). Perhaps most importantly given my focus on the border and goods and people crossing the border, they state:

the growth of such technologies should not necessarily be viewed as forms of oppressive control; rather the drivers of such development tend to be an institutional fixation with the smooth flow of objects, goods and services (2006: 804).

X-rays as a technology of classification can also change the flow of objects and people, as will be shown in the following example.

Covert searching using x-rays

When a traveller departs New Zealand he or she will progress past Customs and through the AVSEC screening point. The first stage of this is a metal detector which relies upon magnetic technology to detect the presence of metal, then that traveller’s luggage will

go through an x-ray machine. The x-ray machine looks for metal weapons as well as explosives, which can now be in liquid form. AVSEC is tasked with looking for dangerous items that may be taken on to a plane either with innocent intent or criminal / terrorist intent. Other agencies also use AVSEC's departure x-ray machines:

At the request of Customs, the Service (AVSEC) will carry out targeted screening where there are suspicions that illicit substances have been concealed (AVSEC online 2008).

During my fieldwork I was tasked with undertaking a covert WEG search. WEG is the wild-life enforcement group. The goal of this search was to determine if a passenger was smuggling any wildlife out of New Zealand. Certain New Zealand species such as tuatara and native birds are endangered and are therefore unfortunately highly sought after by overseas collectors. These endangered species will fetch a high price on the illegal wildlife markets overseas, and smugglers will go to great lengths to steal them from New Zealand wildlife reserves.

In this incident during my fieldwork I was able to assess that the passenger leaving New Zealand did not have any wildlife in his carry on luggage. This was done covertly through the use of the AVSEC x-ray, which I unobtrusively used to observe the passengers bags whilst he went through AVSEC security screening. In its use in this manner the x-ray is not limited to looking for items that are of danger to the security of the flight.

It is not the ability of the x-ray machine itself that is the key focus here. We have to ask the key question what is the x-ray doing? The x-ray has the ability to look through bags, but without a Customs officer who is able to interpret the image within the risk context that he is seeking to mitigate an AVSEC x-ray is simply an expensive ornament. Similarly, the AVSEC officer operating the x-ray and looking for craft knives and not native species is also of no use (to WEG). Were it not for the x-ray this covert search would not have been so easily achieved, so it can be said that it is the human Customs

officer and x-ray working in alliance that provide the level of surety within the border network in this instance. The x-ray is limited in the respect that it can indicate that there are no native birds in a bag, but it cannot indicate if the books in the bag are entitled “smuggling native reptiles on your body for dummies”, which a human searcher could determine as indicative of risk.

The final interaction around this WEG covert search occurred sometime later when I was privy to a seizure made at AVSEC. The AVSEC officers had found some WEG items, which they had passed on to a colleague in Customs. This occurred through individual AVSEC staff being aware of previous Customs use of their x-ray to look for wildlife with their x-rays. If the Customs officer on previous occasions had taken the bags covertly to their arrivals search area, the AVSEC staff may not have been aware of Customs interest in these WEG items. In the previous chapter the communication between the workers added layers to the networks when it came to mitigating risk. This is an example of human interaction with machines generating new practises that add layers to the border network.

It is important to note in examples such as this that the x-ray technology allows the workers of the border to carry out discrete policing work in a very public space. The workers of the border go about their work in a public space but they maintain their private world through the use of technologies like the x-ray.

The x-ray technology is inherently a highly flexible one as it is not designed to look for specific things, it is simply designed to look through the material of luggage and reveal what is inside. In this light it is not as effective as a human searcher who can make suppositions as to risk based on what is not there. An x-ray can however look within objects that a human would have to break into to see inside. This flexibility is seen through the way in which the x-ray machine is often used for other agencies outside of the

immediate airport border environment. Other agencies include the Ministry of Fisheries and the Department of Conservation. The government tasks the Customs service with making sure excessive amounts of pounamu (greenstone) are not exported from New Zealand. Mitigating this risk in departures is a task that Customs, within its current budgeting, resource and staff constraints could not do without the x-ray machines that are owned and operated by AVSEC. Ladley and White discuss Customs role in liaison with agencies such as the Ministry of Culture and Heritage to prevent

the illicit trade in endangered species and Maori taonga...from an operational perspective, however, the Customs service has taken the lead role in detecting and responding to the emerging threat, as the point of border control both defines the offence and in many cases provides a controlled detention and detection opportunity.” (2006: 24)

This detection opportunity for the most part relies upon intelligence outside the airport to target screening and AVSEC technology being used to maximum effect by operators, who are aware of other agencies’ risk and who have been exposed to screening for it.

At this point in the discussion as to what the technology of the x-ray actually does it is necessary to refer back to Latour who talks of visualising technologies and the dichotomy of old and new science. The first example given about what x-rays do, when used by human operators, is a simplistic example, best understood as a stepping stone to the following more layered example. The next example will elaborate on this discussion as to what x-ray technologies actually do. Pertinently to the discussion as to what non human actors can do Latour states:

We must admit that when talking of images and print it is easy to shift from the most powerful explanation to one that is trivial and reveals only marginal aspects of the phenomena for which we want to account. Diagrams, lists, formulae, archives, engineering drawings, files, equations, dictionaries, collections and soon, depending on the way they are put into focus, may explain almost everything or almost nothing (1986: 32).

This is pertinent to the following argument as it serves to provide for the explanation above as to the adaptation of AVSEC x-ray technology to Customs needs. This adaptation occurs through communication and observation between agencies and strengthens the enforcement capabilities of the border network. An x-ray image would fit within Latour's definition of an inscription; as it is something which different actors can use to negotiate a meaning from a level playing field so to speak. Latour in his work on visualisation and configuration uses the example of a map being able to be interpreted by both the French explorers and the 'primitive':

Strictly speaking, the ability to draw and to visualize does not really make a difference either, since they all draw maps more or less based on the same principle of projection, first on sand, then on paper (1986: 5).

In this light an x-ray image can also be seen as something in which all border actors, be they, Customs or AVSEC or MAF can visualise and utilise to detect certain risks. Some readers of the image may not read all risks, as they may lack in particular skills to be able to read certain aspects of the image, much like the way a London local would read a map of the tube as opposed to a tourist.

X-rays re-assembling strip searches

X-rays are a technology that initially travelled from the medical world to the airport. In this section the example shows how the x-ray is able to bring the medical world to the airport. In the Customs controlled arrivals area, where there is no AVSEC presence, MAF operates x-ray machines to screen the baggage of incoming passengers. All passengers, unless they have been fully searched by Customs or MAF, put their bags through the x-ray machine. The MAF operator of the x-ray machines is primarily looking for fruits and risk biological items or matter that may pose a risk to New Zealand's bio-security. If the MAF x-ray operator has a working knowledge of Customs (gained through

experience or briefings) he or she will also endeavour to keep an eye open for items that may be of interest to Customs, the most obvious being narcotics, but more frequently being the more noticeable cannabis pipes and commercial quantities of goods in passenger's bags. If a Customs officer has searched a passenger's suitcase, the officer will then put the empty suitcase through the MAF x-ray machine to determine, if there is anything concealed in the suitcases lining or frame.

During my fieldwork an incident was observed that involved a S149 search or in common parlance a 'strip search'. This is defined under the Customs and Excise Act 1996 as

149 Searching of persons if reasonable cause to suspect items hidden

(1) A Customs officer or a member of the police may cause to be detained and searched a person to whom this subsection applies if the officer or member has reasonable cause to suspect that the person has hidden on or about his or her person—

(a) any dutiable, uncustomed, prohibited, or forfeited goods; or

(b) evidence relating to any such goods; or

(c) any thing that is or might be evidence of the contravention or possible contravention of this Act (2009 Online).

It is also important to note this following section which pertains to the use of various technologies used when policing the border. Interestingly the nonhuman actors such as x-rays are put in the same category as living animals (dogs):

172 Use of aids by Customs officer

(1) In exercising any power of boarding, entry, or search conferred by this Act, a Customs officer or any member of the Police may have with him or her, and use for the purposes of searching, a dog, a chemical substance, x-ray or imaging equipment, or some other mechanical, electrical, or electronic device.

In this incident I was in the control room operating the cameras, so I had a good vantage point to observe the interactions. The incident panned out over the period of about two hours. I observed a roving officer talking with a female passenger that I had noticed was walking awkwardly. Often from the control room, passengers who walk awkwardly are

profiled and are pointed out to staff on the ground to talk to, as they could have illicit items strapped to their body⁶.

The female passenger was taken to the search area where a searching officer questioned her for some time about her drug use and associations with drugs users. I then observed the searching officer get out a 'Form 3A' which is a legal declaration that a passenger fills out before being searched, in which they declare any dutiable or commercial goods, or anything they may want to declare. It is often at this point that passengers declare non-prescribed prescription drugs, they have picked up overseas, such as Valium and Viagra. This is a good example of what Salter refers to as Foucault's concept of the airport being a confessional complex:

anthropological studies of administrative discretion at the border illustrate that anxious confession becomes readable by border agents... Suspicion by a border guard, which is derived from their discretionary power of examination, is enough to warrant further questioning, detention and expulsion from the country (2007: 59).

The passenger in this incident must have succumbed to the confessional complex, because a later interview with the searching officer revealed the passenger had admitted extensive drug use including 'P'⁷. Once the form had been completed, the searching officer began to search her bags and evidence of the drug use was found in the form of deal bags and 'P' utensils.⁸

As the baggage search was completed the searching officer was observed using her notebook. This is usually a fair indicator that things of consequence (such as drug admissions) have been said by the passenger, and the officer wants to transcribe them to refer back to, in case the passenger changes their story later in the search or in court. The

⁶ Body packing is one of the main methods used for importing drugs into NZ through the airport. Drugs are wrapped in sealed or vacuum-packed plastic bags and then cling filmed to the body. This technique is also used by wildlife smugglers leaving New Zealand.

⁷ P – also known as Methamphetamine, meth, ice.

⁸ P utensils can include 'P pipes' – specifically made or ad hoc utensils such as a light bulb with the metal filament removed and spoons.

searching officer began filling out additional S149 forms, which set out to a passenger that they are being legally detained for the purpose of a personal (strip) search and that they have the right to consult with a lawyer. The searching officer also read the passenger her bill of rights that set out the person's right to a lawyer, right to silence and so forth.

Normally the process from the forms being completed to the strip search is a fast one. This is because the passenger is legally under detention and the longer they sit around waiting, the more likely they are to become aggressive, and this increases the likelihood of a confrontation. To clarify at this point, a S149 search involves a passenger removing all their clothes one item at a time and then lifting up arms, running hands through hair etc to show that no items are concealed about the body. At no stage in the search will a passenger be touched by the searching officer or the witness, nor will they be asked to open their mouth or any other orifice. In some situations, if an officer believes that a passenger has drugs concealed internally they can be held for a period of time to 'wait out' the contraband leaving their body. During my fieldwork, whenever I conducted a personal search, I always said to the passenger about to be searched: *"you need to know I will not touch you at any point in this search nor will the witness. However I do require you to follow my instructions implicitly and to only take off one item of clothing at a time, place the items on the ground and do not throw them to or near me, if you do this we will not have any problems."*

In this instance the delay was caused by the searching officers and passenger having to wait for a doctor to arrive. This is not normal procedure, however in this instance the doctor was necessary because the awkward movement that I had noted in the passengers gait was due to her having a prosthetic leg. As such the passenger 'has' to have the leg removed under medical supervision so that it can be x-rayed. In the past in most cases a personal search would be the limit of Customs intervention with a passenger. The

passenger in this instance had been observed, questioned, had her bags searched, personally searched by a human actor then as an additional step had the prosthetic leg removed and x-rayed. The example outlined here shows that just as the workers of the border must have their network reshaped by the arrival of new technologies into it, so to must the travelling passengers, who are subject to the application of these technologies upon them.

Within the border network the x-ray machine is mostly used by MAF to screen for quarantine items. The presence of the x-ray links Customs to MAF in situations where they would normally be separated. Due to its presence and ability to mitigate risk to a level that a human actor cannot (unless they saw the prosthetic leg in half) the x-ray machine becomes a 'vital' part of the border network through its ability to x-ray the leg. Latour describes humans and nonhumans as "equally actors, that is entities that do things" (1992: 241). The x-ray in this example is doing the same thing as the human Customs officer, which is analysing an object or person of risk to the most detailed level it can.

The machine works in what Latour calls assemblages, working one way for MAF and another way for Customs. The different functions work based around different things that the human actors are focused on looking for; food or drugs or weapons. The x-ray has the ability to introduce other actors such as doctors and MAF quarantine staff to the network that has expanded around the risk posed by the prosthetic limb. Traditionally during serious events such as personal searches any non-essential outsiders are kept well away from what is occurring. The x-ray machine predicates the introduction of new actors to the border network. Latour as a litmus test for his actor network theory states that

you have to 'follow the actors themselves' that is try and catch up with their often wild innovations in order to learn from them what the collective existence has become in their hands, which methods they have elaborated to make it fit together, which accounts could best define the new associations that they have been forced to establish (2005: 12).

The use of the x-ray in this manner reinforces the collective existence of the border workers. Without the x-ray a search, such as the one in my example, would involve only Customs officers. Due to the advent of the x-ray machines' widespread use and an anomaly in the border network in the form of the prosthetic limb new associations are established within the network.

As part of the research for this section, I had a discussion with one of my informants about how searches were conducted prior to the arrival of the x-ray, whether prosthetic limbs were x-rayed or not. He replied "*prior to the x-ray we would not have looked inside a leg. In many ways around here (the border) technology is the driver of policy and procedures.*" This topic was also discussed with Police and Corrections Department informants outside of the border network, in regards to how they conducted strip searches. Both parties advised that due to the absence of available x-ray machines they would not be able to look inside prosthetic limbs as a matter of policy for contraband.

The diverse use of the x-ray machine within the border networks and its ability to shape the network depending on the context in which it is used fits within Latour's arguments of the nonhuman being shaped by the human, then the impact of society on machine, followed by humans being shaped by machines (1992: 63). Initially designed for medical purposes, the x-ray is used in the airport environment to screen for weapons (departures) and fruits and other quarantine risks (arrivals) as a primary function by AVSEC and MAF.

The x-ray machines potential in the arrival hall was quickly realised by Customs, who could use the x-ray to detect prohibited imports such as hookah pipes in packed bags and hidden narcotics in emptied luggage. The x-rays ability to screen large numbers of people meant the travelling public became used to having bags x-rayed and not searched. Importantly from an enforcement perspective drug smugglers also adjusted their behaviour

to avoid this new technology and started to body-pack drugs. Drug runners are widely acknowledged as being able to constantly and quickly adapt to the changing technologies in the border environment:

One informant claimed that the drug smugglers owned sniffer dogs that had undergone the same training as those of the border patrol. If one of the dogs smelled the drugs hidden aboard a tractor rig, the contraband was removed, repacked and hidden again until the sniffer dog could no longer detect it (Maril, 2004: 276)

The travelling public, criminals and the border workers are all effected by this new technology in the border network. The x-ray changed the way that MAF officers actually went about their jobs.

Since the arrival of the x-ray MAF officers are split between searching passengers that have been profiled by their staff as likely to carry risk items and searching passengers who the x-ray has detected as having risk items. Prior to the arrival of the x-ray MAF was dependant on having larger numbers of staff to profile and to search bags. When a passenger goes to leave the terminal, they are directed by a MAF officer either to another MAF officer for screening or to a x-ray for screening. Both the officer and the machine that the passenger could be directed to are screening. The x-ray has changed the way the workers of the border go about their jobs, but it has also changed the way in which passengers are screened.

In the final stage Latour talks of we see “humans shaped by the machine”. At this point, the actions of human actors are changed by the x-ray machine, positive returns on fruit or items in the lining of bags turn passengers into ‘border risks’ and bags into ‘exhibits’. Latour refers to this ability to be able to determine “the faithfulness of an ally” and continues “an actor is an actant endowed with a character (usually anthropomorphic)”. In the case of the x-ray and itemiser machines the anthropomorphic ability is one of decision-making.

X-Ray machines linking actors

Latour uses the example of ‘guns not killing people’ and ‘people not killing people’, instead the ‘citizen-gun kills’. In a border network example that I came across during my fieldwork, Customs officer Glover was searching the suitcase of passenger Crook, who was a ‘drugs risk’. Customs officer Glover fully searched the suitcases and wanted to put them through the x-ray machine in an empty state to check for any internal concealment of drugs, so he did not have to drill into the suitcase. The x-ray machine is owned and operated by MAF to mitigate quarantine risk so Customs officer Glover approaches MAF officer Apple at x-ray B and requested him to “*put this through on drugs mode to check there are no drugs hidden inside the frame?*” MAF officer Apple replied “*yes*”. The suitcase goes through MAF x-ray B and MAF officer Apple stated “*no, nothing in there apart from the glue that shows up red*”. In the mind of Glover, who has brought the bag to MAF x-ray B the Customs risk posed by the suitcase has been mitigated. In Customs officer Glover’s activity report he will write “All suitcases x-rayed at MAF x-ray B – NEGATIVE result – On this occasion passenger Crook appears of a low risk to the border.” The network is not reassembled or changed in any meaningful way by the human and non-human actors involved.

Prior to being x-rayed the passenger was of an unknown risk to the border (from a Customs perspective), but post search and x-ray the passenger became ‘low risk’. This new status has come about through the alliance between MAF x-ray B and MAF officer Apple, to mitigate a Customs risk conveyed by Customs officer Glover. The ‘man x-ray machine’ actor has mitigated the Customs drug risk in a way that neither, Customs officer, MAF officer or x-ray machine could independently.

Speaking generally to this specific example the risk posed by the suitcase is unlikely to be fully understood by the MAF officer Apple, who is used to using MAF x-ray

B to look for items like hiking boots and fruit. Even Customs officer Glover's description of "drugs" inside the frame: is not specific to the risk that the Customs officer is looking to mitigate. Customs officer Glover, if searching a backpacker, may be thinking in terms of a trace amount of cannabis in the lining of the pack. Alternatively, if searching a high-risk passenger who may be a professional drug courier, he may be looking for heroin expertly and densely packed into the frame, or even painted on the lining of the suitcase. This world or network that the Customs officer is working in is based upon his prior search of the passenger and previous passengers that the MAF officer has not been privy to.

It is not until the suitcase is brought to MAF x-ray B that the competing networks, one looking to mitigate quarantine risks and one looking to mitigate drugs risks, converge. At this point of merging it is the tool, in the form of the MAF x-ray B, that allows the human actor from the Customs network to use the visual technology in the form of x-ray B and its human operator to mitigate a Customs risk. At no point in this example is a quarantine risk mitigated. When talking of security clusters Fierke looks at the relationships between people and objects in a similar way to Latour and states:

a subject or object does not stand alone, but is surrounded by other subjects or objects which contribute to its contextual meaning."

The core of security, the protection from harm, assumes a field of relationships, including a threatner, the threatened, the protector or means of protection and the protected (2007: 46).

The border can be seen as a network, where the object, in this example a suitcase, has its contextual meaning defined through the relationships between the 'protectors' of the border (Customs and MAF) and their 'means of protecting'. In this example the 'means of protecting' is two fold, through inter departmental liaison and, also through the alliance between the MAF officer and the MAF x-ray. Neither has the technical skills or knowledge to mitigate risks, but their technical skill, when applied to a machine or process that only they can use means, their networks can converge to mitigate risk in a complementary way.

Itemiser – a tracking technology

Akin to the x-ray machines in the respect that it is used both in arrivals and departures the itemiser is described by it's maker General Electric

Itemiser is the first trace detector in the world that simultaneously detects positive and negative ions, enabling the detection of the broadest range of explosives while also detecting narcotics. Detection of both positive and negative ions allows for effective identification of even the most difficult substances from a single sample. Extremely easy to operate, Itemiser delivers fast, simultaneous explosives and narcotics detection in a package that is ergonomic, robust, and portable (GE Security 2008).

Both Customs and AVSEC own and exclusively operate itemiser machines in arrivals and departures sections respectively. AVSEC use the itemiser to look for explosives and Customs uses the itemiser to look for narcotics and explosives. It is important to note that while the itemiser gives an indication that a trace of explosives or narcotics is present it does not actually identify that a dangerous or illegal amount, is present. In the case of AVSEC screening departing passengers a trace of explosives is a risk. For Customs in arrivals a trace of explosives is an indicator of possible terrorist related links whilst a positive result for drugs is simply an indicator that a person may have been around drugs. A positive narcotics result could mean a passenger is, in order of highest to lowest risk, a drug courier, a personal use carrier or simply a drug user that has no drugs on or in his or her person.

To briefly explain how the itemiser is used it is important to understand the context that the machine creates. The machine creates different contexts for different agencies. AVSEC's contexts are limited to explosives. When searching for explosives there are less shades of gray in the context of positive results than there are for drug detection. There are only a few 'reasonable excuses' for a passenger having an item that gives a positive result for explosives contact, such as a mining engineer who has clothing with him that he wears

when conducting blasting operations. Generally, the context that the itemiser creates for AVSEC, if a positive result for explosives is present is one of immediate high risk. The contexts that the itemiser can create for Customs are much more diverse.

Customs officers using the itemiser look to find ‘indicators’ for a passengers drug use, or alternately that they are carrying drugs. Before using the itemiser a passenger is asked if they use, or have been around drugs. If a passenger admits that they are a habitual user or that they have drugs on them the machine does not really need to be used as it is confirming a known, though some officers will still do so. An example of this occurring was seen during my fieldwork when I profiled in a passenger from the luggage pick up area. I suspected the passenger was of a risk to the border. The passenger was taken by me to the search area where a searching officer asked him the following questions in regards to the itemiser.

CUSTOMS OFFICER: *“do you use drugs or are you around drug users?”*

PASSENGER: (hesitates)..... *”no”*

CUSTOMS OFFICER: *“Have you ever used drugs, or been around drugs? It is important that you are honest because that machine will analyse the swab to the billionth particle and if you have been around drugs it will indicate this to me.”*

PASSENGER: *“I may have smoked some marijuana in the past”*

CUSTOMS OFFICER: *“How long ago? Have you used any other drugs?”*

PASSENGER: *“Years ago and that’s all I have ever used, I am a professional, I am not into that scene.”*

CUSTOMS OFFICER: *“Okay I am going to take a swab from your laptop here. This is your laptop and it hasn’t been around drugs, aside from marijuana years ago?”*

PASSENGER: *“Yes of course its my laptop- and no it’s never been around any drugs.”*

MACHINE: *“Beep! Beep!”* – Sounds of printing.

CUSTOMS OFFICER: *“The machine printout here shows me that the swab I took from your laptop came up positive for cocaine and methamphetamine.....”*

The reason, as shown here as to why the machine is still used even if a passenger confirms that they are using drugs or are around them is that the machine, while giving a yes - no

indication for drugs, also gives a risk indication. This is because the machine will, as shown in the dialogue above, demonstrate that a drugs trace is present. In itself the drugs trace is not an indication that a passenger has not answered questions truthfully. However when used in context with a human operator's questioning this can demonstrate a passenger is in fact lying.

The machine will also show what drugs a person has been around and give a strength reading on the drugs presence. This information presented by the machine can be added to what is known about a passenger. For example a high strength reading for marijuana from a passenger arriving from Amsterdam would be lower risk than a low strength reading for cocaine from a passenger arriving from South America. The machine use is always used in context of the passenger, where they have come from, what they admit to having been around, their social demographics etc. In some situations where everything at face value appears low risk, a positive result can create a risk context by itself. This is best seen in cases of professional drug couriers, who will appear legitimate, have good cover stories, be relaxed, and appear honest.

The x-ray machine, which is used to screen all passengers, is in general use, the itemiser is only used on specific passengers. All passengers if targeted could be deemed to be of risk as all bank notes have been found to be contaminated with cocaine due to cocaine users using rolled up notes to inhale their cocaine and then the notes come into contact with other notes in ATM machines etc. Morelle states in an article for the BBC on this subject:

Almost every UK banknote in circulation is tinged with drugs such as cocaine and heroin, the research finds... We are talking traces - these are amounts we cannot see or feel, these are amounts that require sensitive instrumentation to detect. They are in the order of nanograms - billionths of a gram (2007 online).

It is at the level of billionths of a gram that itemisers work and it is at this level that risk is detected. Therefore Customs officers have to eliminate certain procedures such as swabbing banknotes and wallets or money clips in order to accurately assess risk. Positive drugs readings are not always high risk for Customs when using the itemiser, however a positive explosives reading for AVSEC, when using the itemiser, certainly is. The different uses of this same technology within the relatively small physical limits of an international airport depend on the agencies core focus.

It can be argued that the use of the itemiser as a specific screening device rather than a general screening device is influenced by things that move into the network from outside of it such as banknotes. The fact that all bank notes and as a result wallets are contaminated with drugs, means that a machine that is intended by its makers simply to detect drugs and explosives has to be used in specific contexts and specific ways when searching for drugs. Explosives are not as widely used in society as drugs and the responses that a positive explosives hit would instigate in a human operator as opposed to a positive drugs hit are very different. The machine's use is shaped by a societal context which influences the machine's human operators response to the machine detecting specific commodities as well as the human operators subsequent actions towards the 'subject', whose property has been tested by the itemiser.

The workers of the border look at the itemiser in conflicting ways. During the fieldwork, I would often feel frustration at not getting positive 'hits' off passengers, who I was certain were concealing something from me, and then the next day getting positive results from a passenger who appeared to be in no way affiliated with any drug scene or use. When the itemiser has played up during the fieldwork, team leaders would say that the key to using the itemiser was not so much the result that the machine gave, instead it should be the way in which an officer questioned a passenger when using the machine.

Explaining the capability of the machine and waiting to see a passenger's reaction was just as important as actually using the machine. In this way the itemiser can be seen as an 'mediator'. This is because although it should give a simple yes no answer as to the presence of narcotics or explosives, it in fact gives much more unpredictable and complex result. Latour talks of mediators:

Their input is never a good predictor of their output; their specificity has to be taken into account every time. Mediators transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry (2005: 12).

At the international airport studied in this fieldwork there were many mediators. The foil of mediators are intermediaries which are described by Latour as "what transports meaning or force without transformation; defining its inputs is enough to define its outputs" (2005: 12).

To more specifically focus on mediators and intermediaries, the itemiser which is best viewed as a mediator when used to detect drugs, can sometimes be seen as an intermediary depending on the context. In the fieldwork conducted, I observed the itemiser being used for the most part to look for drug traces. By contrast, on the occasions where the itemiser was used to look for or found explosive traces, it could be argued that the machine is best viewed as an intermediary. An example of the machine's use that demonstrates it as an intermediary occurred during a baggage search being conducted by a colleague. The search was on a passenger who had previous recordings in the computer system Customs referred to as Cusmod that were of concern. This led to the passenger being brought into the search area where a baggage search was conducted. Halfway through the search the searching officer took out a cellular phone and scanned a sample from it using the itemiser. The familiar beep-beep sound that usually accompanies a positive drugs hit was heard. The searching officer rushed straight into the room with the printout, which is the opposite of what happens for a drugs hit.

Generally when getting a hit for drugs the officer goes straight to the search bench and asks the passenger: *“I just received a positive return for drugs, what drugs will this printout tell me you have been around”*. This is to give the passenger minimal time to make up a false story after hearing the beep-beep. On this occasion, the officer raced straight into the ops room and said, *“I have a positive hit for explosives”*. The supervising officer immediately called the airport Police. Due to operational security I will not go further into the response from this point, but it is important to note that the response is similar to an actual suspected IED (Improvised Explosive Device) being found and also that the response was exactly the same as every other response to a positive hit for explosives observed throughout my fieldwork.

During my fieldwork, when explosives were detected, no matter what passenger, what explosive or what item it was found on, the response was the same. With drug returns the response to the machines positive result varied, depending on passenger, drug type returned and where the sample came from. As such the itemiser when dealing with drugs is to be understood as a mediator, as opposed to its occasional use for explosives where it is always a intermediary. This difference in use is also illustrated when comparing Customs and AVSEC, whose itemisers are only used to look for explosives and are only ever intermediaries.

Miller talks of technologies and people being linked by the former:

So, no technology without the flexible technologies of rules, signatures, bureaucracies and stamps. Actors are supplemented by the modest technologies of writing, registering, verifying, and authenticating that make it possible to link together and align people and statements (1997: 356).

Miller is talking of the context of engineers and their projects based upon his critique of Latour's Aramis. If taken in the context of the argument presented here, we can align this statement with the idea that the agents of the border are all working to prevent very

different risks. In doing so the artifacts of the border such as the itemiser with its printouts are necessary to verify the statements of passengers crossing the border to the questioning by the actors working the border and policing it. Again to further reinforce the theoretical argument and reinforce the importance of focusing upon non-human actors and actants within the border, we can look at Dodier who states that Boltanski and Thevenot believe “people refer to objects. That is, they refer to a common world” (1993: 558). When border workers question passengers about drugs, and then using the itemiser, the workers of the borders are linking the passengers unseen actions and contacts of the past (such as drugs) to the here and now of risk at the border, through the itemiser.

Latour mentions that sociologists have difficulty in crossing “the sacred barrier that separate human from nonhumans” (1992: 240). During my research, the following text came from an email about the Itemiser machine when it was not working

“Well you can all sleep well tonight knowing that the ITEMISER has had a complete makeover and is on its way home 😊... for those of you upset at its departure dry your eyes as before you know it u will be swabbing swabbing swabbing... so thanks everybody for your kind words, and well wishes when the itemiser left.”

This email is ironically suggesting that the itemiser is missed, as a human border worker would be if they were away sick. Though not necessarily indicative of the human border worker treating a machine such as the itemiser as an equal it is certainly indicative of the emphasis on the importance of the machine in creating a shared world. This shared world is created in the context of the passenger’s risk of having been around explosives or drugs, that are not present or are concealed, during their interaction with border workers when the itemiser is used. The machine allows this shared world to be created. The machine has the ability to introduce the risk of items like drugs or explosives into the border network even if they are not present in a physically visible amount.

Border Databases – tracking and visualising

Databases can be seen as a form of mobile technology in the respect that they allow information to be taken from one domain to another to be analysed. This fits within Latour's definitions of mobility as well as his understanding of visualisation, which serves the purpose of bringing together different realms of reality. At the border, many different realms of reality come together. Imagine each agency that is linked to the border as a realm of reality akin to Latour's comparison of "mechanics, economics, marketing" (1986: 25), the different border agencies all have their own databases.

The argument of this section on databases is not so much on what the workers of the border see the databases as doing, which appears to be simply recording information that they enter into them. Instead this section will focus on the change in the databases of the border since a significant event occurred that was linked to international border networks. This significant event was the September 11 attacks. This section will trace the change in border databases by looking at the Customs database Cusmod, and how it had information from other networks added to it, then the change from Cusmod to Cusmod II which later became the Joint Border Management System. The section will explore how a significant event outside of the immediate border network changes the databases of the network studied and will then trace the innovations of the actors within the border network to this 'new' technology. The databases of the border were traditionally focused on sorting, but are becoming increasingly focused on their ability to link agencies to information held by other agencies. This is not happenstance and the transition of the role of the databases tells us as much if not more about the border workers as the workers themselves can.

Power is linked to border databases in so much as having the databases allows workers of the border to wield considerable power (the disciplinary power of the state) over those who the databases record information on. Latour says

a man is never much more powerful than any other- even from a throne: but a man whose eye dominates records through which some sort of connections are established with millions of others may be said to dominate. This domination however, is not a given but a slow construction and it can be corroded, interrupted or destroyed if the records, files and figures are immobilized, made more mutable, less readable, less combinable or unclear when displayed (1986: 26).

What the managers of the border agencies aspire to is power, as this power is used to allow them to facilitate mobility of people across the border while at the same time enforce compliance within it. The databases at the border can give them this power, but, as Latour, says the ability to access and combine this information influences the power they wield. The use of databases at the border fits into the government promoted approach of “high assurance, light touch... to reduce physical intrusions and better facilitate legitimate passage.” (Ladley and White 2006: 34). This means that the border agencies endeavour to facilitate movement and have enforcement happening in a way that limits physical intrusions on passengers – such as searching. In this way the technologies of the border allow for the public work they conduct to be conducted in a covert manner.

There are numerous arguments about the risks posed to individual privacy and human rights by the advent of these new technologies. Biometric technologies are hotly debated in academia and the media, as are the less glamorous database technologies. Problems in Canada with border security and databases are the topic of one such current debate, technologies such as “inadequate watch lists, outdated technology, and poor record checking” are but some examples of the issues presented by these technologies (Lyon, 2008: 42). Though the intent of the border agencies is high assurance light touch, enforcement is not guaranteed by the use of database technologies.

Lyon argues that database technologies are a product of the late-modern “capitalist world system” (2008: 29) and that “in the 21st century surveillance is a global phenomenon”. The database systems, be they product or not of this day and age and be

they surveillance focused or not, are pitched to the public as a tool to facilitate travel by the users of the databases.

Customs chief information officer Peter Rosewarne said last year that the new system should cut the red tape for both freight and passengers. It may do away with the need for departure and arrivals cards for passengers and would see sophisticated technologies such as neural networking and artificial intelligence used to assess risks to border security (Pullar-Streckar, 2008: 9).

Rosewarne is talking of the Cusmod II database system and its capabilities over and above those of the system that is currently used by Customs to police the border. Based upon my observation of the use of Cusmod during my fieldwork a travelling passenger will have their name and passport details sent to Cusmod by the airline before they fly, where it will be checked manually by a human operator against recordings of that name in the Cusmod database. In this way Customs officers can see for example if the last time a passenger travelled they were stopped and found to have a cannabis pipe etc in their luggage.

Following September 11 databases that simply worked on the information contained only within themselves were found to be of limited value. Cusmod prior to September 11 did draw on limited information from other databases, such as Immigration and the Police. Agencies such as the Ministry of Justice and IRD are not (post September 11) expanding information in their databases into Cusmod, to be used to place border alerts on specific people. This fits within Fierke's description on the use of technologies and the "war" on drugs and terror

The liberal way of war is preoccupied with knowledge networks, complexity and the operation of organizational and social technologies, which populations are required to possess if they want to survive within an environment defined by global capital and governance (2007: 117).

It was planned that Cusmod would be replaced by Cusmod II that would allow for more effective policing of the border from a Customs perspective. This however changed during its development phase and Cusmod II was changed to become the JBMS, which is

designed to better amalgamate the systems of Customs, Immigration and MAF. An informant who was on the project team for the development of the JBMS, described it to me

“Providing border risk management. The integration of the information held by the New Zealand border agencies, external border partner agencies and the New Zealand compliance community enables federated identity management and border risk management to manage risk in real time. This reduces compliance costs whilst improving risk management.”

It appears from this statement that JBMS will be an impressive tool with many capabilities such as the ‘integration of information, reduced costs, increased risk management and identity management.’ The question for the border workers in the context of this section is, how will the technology actually be used upon arrival at the border by the workers? What will their innovations with the technology be and what impact will it have upon the border network?

At this point in time these questions are obviously moot but during my fieldwork the uses of Cusmod that were noted were often in contrast with the context that it’s creators intended it would create. An example of an innovation in use that will not breach any security protocols about the discussion of the use of Cusmod is the liaison between Police and Customs to use Cusmod to retrieve lost passports. Often if a passport is lost the Police who are usually given the lost passports will come to Customs who use Cusmod to check the passport number and then correspond this with an incoming flight. Once the incoming flight is known the arrival cards for the flight can be checked which should reveal a contact address or phone number for the Police to track the passenger down to.

The use of databases at the border is highly political, but what is important to bear in mind from the perspective of this thesis is that these databases allow for tracking and visualising both within the border network and outside of it. The databases allow for people and things outside of the border network or unknown to the border network, as in

the example above, to be brought into it and to have their risk assessed and treated by the innovations of the workers within it.

Border Networks Databases, Communicating Risk?

Much work has been done on technologies such as databases that allow data on and about people to be sorted and analysed for the exercise of governments and their power. For various reasons including of course legality and privacy rights, the argument could be made that a Customs officer at Auckland airport would find it easier to share database information on a risk passenger with a Customs officer in Christchurch than a Immigration officer in the office next to his in a way that was mutually understandable. A brief literature survey will reveal information on databases and power, pertinent to border security from the work on Police reporting in the 1960s by Ericson and Haggerty to the work on Biometrics and Privacy done by van der Ploed (2003) and Burrows and Gane's (2006) work on Geodemographics, Software and Class. Fierke directly attributes the increase in technologies such as biometrics and associates technologies such as the databases that record this data to

The fact that the individuals who carried out the attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon were foreign nationals living in the United States... has led to an increased scrutiny of those crossing US borders and the deployment of forms of biometric identification (2007: 50).

Likewise in New Zealand the use of these technologies has increased since September 11 attacks. The sharing of these technologies between border agencies however has not markedly increased. Though agencies at intelligence levels do communicate certain information, some agencies at the border do not have intelligence teams. Therefore information that one agency stores and uses is not necessarily transmitted to other relevant agencies. At ground level, which is what this thesis is focusing on, the communication between agencies via technologies such as databases is limited. Fierke would argue that

technologies such as these allow actors to share an understanding of risks and the way actors interpret them:

people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them (2007: 101).

Officers from one agency all make sense of objects and persons through the meanings that are in part endowed through the technologies and databases they have access to. These meanings can be with high-risk associations and they can be meanings that are narrowed through the technology in question. A technological network exists across these database technologies as the database is a nonhuman actor that links human actors via information recorded or produced therein.

The information at the border that is transmitted across these networks is risk information. Within these networks risk communication that exerts the most power over passengers requires “assemblage involving the combination of different technologies and social arrangements into particular configurations” (Farnsworth and Austrin, 2005: 15-16). This can be applied to my fieldwork at the border and will be demonstrated, but firstly it is appropriate to cite an example of this in action in a technological network. Erickson and Haggerty looked at 1960 Police databases and said of these risk communication networks

Risk communication systems are not simply conduits through which knowledge of risk is transferred. Rather, they have their own logics and autonomous processes. They are themselves the producers of new risks, because it is through them that risks are recognised, subject to calculation, and acted upon. They govern institutional relations, and they affect what individuals and organizations are able to accomplish (2002: 238).

This summation fits neatly into actor network theory and an example they use of this is Police reporting forms. These forms changed from being recorded as a page or two of narrative to a series of tick boxes that allowed incidents to be statistically analysed. This new technology binds the officer to “report the collision (or incident) within the constraints imposed by the risk relevant-criteria of external institutions” (2002: 243).

An applicable example in my fieldwork of a similar vein is the database recording technology of the Cusmod computer system. This technological network records all interactions an officer has with passengers in an enforcement capacity for the Customs service. As with the revised Police databases examined by Ericson and Haggerty the Cusmod system is heavily dependant on tick boxes and builds reports on the assumption that they will be about people. This does not always fit with the situation, as observed during my fieldwork when after evening flights, a MAF officer and Customs officer went 'airside', that is past the arrival booths into the arrival hall, to look for passengers and discarded contraband (Customs) and food or biosecurity items (MAF) in the airside toilets and rubbish / amnesty bins. On this occasion the Customs officer found a small can of pepper spray and complained bitterly about the fact that at 2 am in the morning he was filling out the Cusmod and database recordings. The work he was doing included bar-coding the pepper spray and photographing. Meanwhile the MAF officer had walked past with a large sack full of collected biosecurity risk items that he was simply going to put in the incineration bin on his way out. The existence of the bar-coding and interlinked image storing in the database meant that the job required was much more than just a simple job sheet report. The officer involved confided in me that to him it seemed:

“MAF have it sweet, no paperwork, no irate passengers, no hanging around at 2 in the morning, and their bag of bio-security material is a way bigger risk than one can of pepper spray which has probably been carried by a young female backpacker for her own protection.”

Previously it had been that when seizing something like pepper spray, a hard-copy job-sheet would be completed. The advent of the Cusmod database and existing legislation meant a matching Cusmod report needed to be completed and following the introduction of an electronic bar-coding system the bar-coding now needed to be completed. Finally the introduction of digital cameras with the ability to store images into Cusmod and shared computer drives, meant an electronic and hard copy image was needed. The key phrase

here is needed. The pepper spray had been abandoned by a passenger. It is highly unlikely that a person will be able to be linked to it and less likely that a prosecution would be mounted. All the data entry and bar-coding and photographs are linked to getting a prosecution. However the driver is the technology in itself which creates the need to do these things even when there is no foreseeable need at ground level. The Customs technological network has been reassembled as time progressed. Until now an officer treats a can of pepper spray found in a bin in the same way as a can of pepper spray that had just been found in a passengers bag after the passenger stated “only clothes and toiletries in there, no nothing like a stun gun or pepper spray.”

As a final note as to the power of technologies and the tensions that they cause within the border network is a ‘tick box’ technology within the Cusmod database system. This simple ‘tick box’ that comes up on electronic reports is worth mentioning due to a comment made by a senior information technology staff member giving a briefing on a Cusmod update. The tick box function had been expanded to include more options to tick and much to the frustration of officers it stays up and comes back if different screens were scrolled between, much like a pop up page on the internet. The information technology officer said to staff at the briefing “*well its there to stay and don’t forget it’s that box that pays you!*” He explained that it was from this box of actions completed (such as questioned, searched, risk assessed, items detained etc) that the government was given it’s run down of the tasks performed by staff and as such it was the source of funding and resource allocation for the department. The technology designed for law enforcement, to exercise power over travellers for the purposes of governance had over the workers of the border (pay-wise) a considerable amount of influence if the words of the I.T professional were to be taken as true. It is therefore in the interests of border workers to tick as many of the task boxes as possible in the pesky ‘pop up’ task completed bar. Whether or not this

influences the power they then choose to exert over the travelling public and the requests of other agencies that they make to exert their power remains to be seen.

Camera Surveillance System – A Visualising technology

CCTV is considered here as a Sociotechnical device that involves science and technology, cultural and legal aspects, as well as social representations. This amounts to CCTV not as a lifeless and inert object but rather as a dynamic sociotechnical system that is constantly in the making

(Klauser & Ruegg & November 2008: 106).

This sub-chapter on the border workers use and adaptation of surveillance cameras, which are understood as a visualising technology, argues that the workers of the border through the influence of power and events outside of the border will through their ‘wild innovations’ use the cameras not simply for surveillance and the recording of people and places. The subchapter will endeavour to track the way in which the “sociotechnical system is constantly in the making” . The workers of the border use the camera technologies to shape subjects that cross the border and transform actions into evidence and commodities into exhibits. The border is in essence through this use turned into a kind of panopticon where those transiting the border confess to those working it

More recently, Michael Foucault (1975) has described the Panopticon as a paradigm of modern self discipline under the gaze of authority. The design was applicable to prisons, schools and factories... because the subject never knew for certain they were being watched they had to assume at all times they were, and monitor their actions; that is the subject always acted as if they were under observation (Fierke 2007: 183).

Within the airport, there are hundreds of surveillance cameras. Both Customs and AVSEC as well as the Police, use the cameras to monitor people (not just passengers), and things such as planes and fences in the airport and around it. This monitoring serves the obvious purpose of watching or observing known risks to the border, detecting risks to the border through action, body language and behaviour as well as providing evidential surety

and the safety of staff. This is the case when drugs are discovered in a bag and the passenger claims that they are not his. The cameras, which are constantly recording, prove to be a reliable witness that cannot unlike Customs officer's statements and notebook records be cross-examined by defence lawyers. Similarly, if a passenger claims that an officer took money from his bag, the cameras should be able to verify that this was not the case. In this way cameras are used to mitigate the risk posed by both people and things. The adaptation that has occurred is that the cameras, which were initially intended to monitor passengers, are now used to monitor staff and their actions. This adaptation occurred through the demands of parties in the border network (the passengers), who were the ones who were supposed to be observed. Instead the border workers themselves have become the directed focus of this technology.

The use of cameras at the airport is useful as a study of how the same technology is used in very different ways within the same space, by border workers focused on different contexts of risk that they are looking to mitigate. AVSEC uses the cameras to look for things like unattended packages, and to guard the physical space of the airport. AVSEC will also use the cameras to monitor people around high security areas or prevent people gaining unauthorised access to certain areas. Customs uses cameras to covertly assess large numbers of passengers and how they behave in the public spaces, and what they assume to be the private spaces of the airport (areas where they do not see human border workers). Both agencies however use the cameras to differentiate between people and objects of risk and people and objects not of risk.

One of the most important uses of the cameras for Customs is in monitoring body language. It is far more frequently heard over the radio "*Rover from control room, will you have a talk to that passenger at the end of carousel three, his body language doesn't look right.*" This is different from a call from an officer that is not behind a camera, to ask

another officer to talk to a passenger, based upon their body language observed through the human eye as opposed to the camera lens.

One of my informants advised me *“one of my greatest fears is in reading body language incorrectly, people often appear like they are concealing something when they are afraid, or may appear stoned when they are tired.”* Cameras allow body language to be appraised from a distance. Officers when approaching a passenger will often use the phrase *“the cameras have noted that you appear very anxious to leave, why is this?”* Despite this benefit, cameras as shown by my informant also create anxiety amongst border workers, who fear that they have read body language wrongly through the camera. Cameras do not allow the operator to go and ask a passenger, why they are anxious to leave. A camera operator cannot find out from a passenger that they are anxious to leave because they have flown in to see a dying relative. To create and resolve a context of risk a human agent able to talk to the passenger is also necessary, this supplements the technologies capabilities and involves procedures for talking.

Cameras allow officers of the border agencies read bodies of passengers and translate this into something that they can enforce. The awareness that passengers have of the cameras around them is because the border agencies make no real effort to hide them. Similarly, the large screens of one-way mirror glass that passengers walk past contribute to the feeling of being under surveillance. This cameras have the capacity to view all passengers all the time but human operators behind the cameras do not have the same capacity

the majority of screening technology operate under capacity because of the relative slowness of human operators to clear alarms... The human is the weakest, and the most adaptive element of secure flow management (Salter, 2008: 8).

In this way the border would appear at outward projection to passengers within the network who see cameras everywhere to be like a panopticon. This is not in fact

the case as every camera noted by a passenger does not have an officer watching it. In the first chapter the way in which the border workers communicated was shown to be an effective 'many eyed panopticon' working on the same level as the passengers rather than an all seeing panopticon eye of surveillance cameras from above.

As part of my role during the fieldwork, I was a member of the enforcement team, discussing the placement of a new security camera in a previously un-surveilled area was discussed. It was agreed that it was important to have the area covered and this could be done through a camera or through the use of roving patrol officers randomly checking it. The discussion came to the conclusion that officers randomly patrolling the area would be a better option than cameras permanently recording the location's activities. This was because of the fact that the area was one with a high level of human traffic and lots of cover for people to be concealing things, therefore if an offence did occur it would still be hard to detect on rewind camera footage. The best defence would be the human officers randomly checking on the area. The irony of this is that the human officers would be working in the same way as the cameras, their unannounced ability to observe would hopefully mitigate the thought of illegal behaviour before it occurred. In a similar way the visualising technology of the camera is enhanced by the mundane artefacts of signage that announces the presence of cameras.

The argument could be presented that within the border network the signage announcing the cameras is just as important as the cameras themselves, when it comes to the protection of secure spaces. The difference between border agencies becomes apparent when this is considered, as for AVSEC the camera's presence is the key deterrent in stopping people breaking into secure areas. For Customs the cameras ability to silently and inconspicuously record and allow human operators to observe the actions of passengers is

paramount. For both Customs and AVSEC, and all other border agencies, the use of cameras has been adapted so as to allow the agencies' management to observe staff – passenger interactions should complaints or accusations arise.

With no camera surveillance system roving and fixed point officers would have to be in every secure hallway, at the end of each gate and mounted around the airport in numerous checkpoints to achieve the same level of projected surveillance. Without cameras an impartial witness would need to be present at every high risk search and officers would need a considerable amount more protection and self defence training as they would not be assured of swift backup should a confrontation arise. Despite the many advantages of cameras in the border environment their role is often far more complicated than simply recorded surveillance.

The Arrival card – a tracking technology

The arrival card is another vital but mundane artefact within the border network that will be explored in the following sub chapter. Of note like the cameras within the border network, the arrival card is another non-human actor that contributes towards making the border network a confessionary complex. The arrival card is a two-sided piece of A4 paper the bottom third of which is filled out following instructions on the top two thirds by all passengers arriving into New Zealand. The arrival card has questions that must be answered by all arriving passengers including New Zealanders and Australians. The arrival card has some questions on it that New Zealanders and permanent New Zealand residents do not have to answer, such as whether or not they hold criminal convictions, or have been deported from any country. Customs, Police, Immigration, the Department of Statistics and assorted other agencies all use the arrival card to assess the risk of people arriving into New Zealand, to record statistics of arriving passengers, to

assess larger scale trends that may pose a risk to the border, and for general statistical purposes.

The New Zealand ‘passenger arrival card’ is a mundane artefact and a tracing technology. The arrival card should allow officers of both MAF and Customs to quickly risk assess through passengers answers to whether they are carrying prohibited or restricted goods. This is unfortunately not the case as drug smugglers and international criminals rarely fill out the occupation space with ‘international criminal’, and rarely declare the drugs they are carrying. As such, the card is instead used to create a context between the passenger and the border worker to allow the border worker to question the passenger on precisely the things he has not declared on the arrival card. The border worker is adapting the use of the arrival card within the context of the border network, and his training and prior experiences within the network with other passengers and other arrival cards. The card is a selection device that provides an assessment profile of passengers that allows the workers to proceed it with questions.

The card provides a myriad of information when correctly filled out by an arriving international passenger. Much to the chagrin of officers cards are as often as not incorrectly filled out and officers of different agencies are faced with passengers questions that direct a risk assessment to them that they are not trained to make. The following example will illustrate this. It takes the true form of a question put to any Customs officer who is processing passengers hundreds of times over their career.

CUSTOMS OFFICER: *“You have ticked here (officer points to Q4 first box) that you have goods that are prohibited or restricted?”*

PAX: *“Yes..... (Guilty pause... the first time this happens the officer may briefly contemplate that the big drug bust of his career may have walked into his arms)... I have some peanuts”*

CUSTOMS OFFICER: *“peanuts”*

PAX: *“Yes, I am sorry, should I have thrown them out..., they are cooked and I didn’t even think that they may be illegal?”*

CUSTOMS OFFICER: *“That questions in blue refers to goods that may be prohibited or restricted, for Customs, so do you have any drugs, drug*

paraphernalia, weapons, even stun guns or pepper spray, objectionable material and things like that...?”

PAX: *“Heavens no, just the peanuts.”*

CUSTOMS OFFICER: *“Well, it’s always good to ask, just around the corner a MAF officer will ask you about the peanuts, don’t throw them out like most people do before then as they may be fine and as long as you have declared them which you have done it is not a problem, even if they are prohibited for quarantine.”*

It is important to note on the second page of the arrival card, which is where this dialogue would come from, that Customs questions in the top right corner are in blue, and quarantine questions on the left hand side are in green. Customs Officer wear blue shirts and pants and MAF officers wear green shirts and uniforms. The form in this way carried the transference of a Customs officers’ and a MAF officers’ authority. For a passenger arriving into New Zealand for the first time their first contact with these authorities will be through a mundane artefact as opposed to a human actor. Finally, in the bottom left hand corner of the form there is in red ink the statement that:

Failure to make a correct declaration may result in an instant fine of \$200 or prosecution resulting in a fine of up to \$100,000 or up to five years imprisonment.

It is an offence to lie on the arrival card and it is an offence to mislead a Customs officer in respect of certain questions put to a passenger. There is no instant fine for a false statement to a Customs officer but there is for a false declaration on this ‘mundane artefact.’

Sorting Passengers

Arrivals cards mitigate risk for the border agencies is through sorting passengers. The arrival card must be completed by all passengers arriving in New Zealand (there are also departure cards, and crew cards). In this way the passenger arrival card risk assesses all passengers coming into New Zealand and importantly ties them to a commitment. If something that is not on the card is later found, such as a prohibited weapon the passenger

has committed two offences. Bringing a prohibited weapon into New Zealand, and not declaring the prohibited weapon on the arrival card.

During my fieldwork I had a discussion with a colleague about the passenger arrival card and why he thought people filled them out correctly or incorrectly. He told me about a card that he had himself filled out when travelling to the United States.

“I was reading the questions and they were similar to our (New Zealand) arrival card apart from a couple. The one that really grabbed my attention was asking ‘were you involved in the Nazi Germany leadership between 1939 and 1945 or something to that effect.’ It struck me that any self respecting Nazi war criminal that had been on the run, hiding out in South America since 1945 is highly unlikely to slip up and tick yes in 2007. So I guess they (the Americans) feel that people will somehow feel compelled to answer the question truthfully. Just like ours that asks people if they have criminal convictions.”

To further build the sorting picture in relation to arrival cards it is worth mentioning two other instances that occurred during my fieldwork that relate to sorting and arrival cards. The first involved a man, whom I was questioning and who I noted had put down ‘*pirate*’ as his occupation.’ I asked the man if he understood that this was a serious form and if he was in fact a pirate. The man, who was from the United States and had been visiting New Zealand, said that yes he was a pirate. I flicked through the man’s passport and said *“well I don’t see any travel to Somalia or the Indonesian islands in this passport, do you have another passport, or are you lying to me, because I am not aware of pirates working outside of these areas!”* The man said to me that this was his only passport and that he in fact worked as a pirate at Disney land. I asked the man if this answer to the question caused him grief in the United States and he said *“yes – every time, especially at Los Angeles which is where Disney land is, but then if you don’t answer it correctly they give you a hard time!”* The man was sent on his way with instructions from me that he should watch out for the Royal Navy if he didn’t want to be hung from the yard arm.

A second example that relates to stated profession or occupation on an arrival card was related to me by a colleague who ‘profiled’, an arriving passenger to be searched due to her answer on her arrival card.

“A lady came up to me at the booth and I noted her occupation was; ‘dealer’. So I asked her what kind of dealer she was thinking car, card (croupier) etc and she replied to me ‘what do you think – drug dealer!’ Well, I sent her around for a search.”

These two examples and the discussion as to the American arrival card do not demonstrate that I have a sense of humour and my colleagues do not, they instead demonstrate the power that the arrival card has over people as a self-sorting mechanism. The examples also demonstrate the way in which border workers enforce this aspect of the arrival card by exercising their powers to search and question those, who answer the questions, or in this case the questions about arrival card answers spuriously. The power of the arrival card as a technology far outweighs its apparent mundane appearance when compared to more ‘advanced’ technologies that have been discussed. The arrival card allows border officers to create a context with passengers from alien cultures and social backgrounds. The arrival card is another aspect of the confessionary complex that the airport and the border network can be described as. The card is marked with stamps, border workers initials and passenger signatures, all of which ascribe consent and legitimacy to it. This legitimacy adds weight to the sovereign power of a nation expressed at the border and through border workers. Though the border workers have no power to refuse entry to returning New Zealanders, the arrival card does give them a context in which they can trace the movements and activities of the person and search and question them based upon this.

Another apparently mundane artifact with tracking powers within the border network is the notebook, which is carried by officers of the border and carries a large amount of agency and power over travelling passengers and the workers of the border themselves.

Notebook – a tracking technology

Every Police, Customs, AVSEC and some MAF officers within the border network studied carry a notebook. They are simple flip cover notebooks, with some pertinent legislation and quick reference facts at the front of them. These facts include such information as relevant sections of the Customs and Excise Act and information on the detection of persons under the influence of different drugs. This 'mundane artefact' records everything an officer does that may later have to be referred to. Similar to Xerox machines copying an inscription of data placed under them, notebooks, in theory, record a border worker's impartial sequence of events that occur when he or she interacts with passengers or their luggage. An example of this is that if a passenger's bag is searched, an officer will record all date and time details, all the passenger's details and the answers to questions put to the passenger as well as what was found or not found in the luggage. The notebook is used to turn what a passenger would consider a conversation into a 'risk assessment'. When an officer talks to a passenger in the arrivals hall while they are waiting for their bags, their details are recorded and even if they are not later searched that conversation is recorded (not against their details) as a 'risk assessment'. In this way the government has a quantifiable measurable as to the work being undertaken in border compliance enforcement. All notebooks have a margin down the side of the page that encourages officers to record a time for the start of a shift, a search or the discovery of an exhibit. This margin encourages a practise on forgetful officers who may otherwise not record the time of important incidents.

Certain details, such as a passenger or item being looked for, are also recorded at the start of the shift in officers' notebooks so that the details can be recorded for later reference. This is a way of managing risk and recording information that officers could potentially forget. Risk is also managed through a notebook progressively. As a search

progresses to a more serious conclusion, for example a baggage search progressing to a personal search, notes will reflect smaller facts than would otherwise be recorded. An example of this progression can be seen in a personal search where the details of a belt buckle will be recorded as opposed to a bulk baggage search where all of the baggage could collectively be described as ‘standard travel clothing.’

Perhaps one of the most important facts about notebooks is that they are fully discoverable in court. This means, defence and prosecution lawyers will look at the notebook entry relevant to the case and refer back to it in their cross examination of the officer involved. If an incident occurs, that results in a prosecution being undertaken, a Customs Officer could end up in court as a witness for the prosecution. In this scenario an Officer would only be able to refer to his notebook to refresh his memory on an incident that could have occurred over twelve months ago. Without a notebook an officer’s credibility as a witness could be minimal as it is unlikely that small but important facts such as times and location or even descriptions of people could be remembered.

During my fieldwork a situation arose that illustrates differences in the ways a notebook is used. As I was waiting for an international flight to arrive at an air bridge gate, I struck up a conversation with two AVSEC officers who were also waiting for the flight. Like me border workers involved in policing generally hang back from airline staff, who were also waiting for the flight, as border workers such as Customs and AVSEC have to ‘police’ the actions of airline staff as well as passengers. The AVSEC officers I was talking to mentioned their notebooks and how little they used them. One showed me his, which was half full and said he had been at AVSEC for three years, the other was on his second notebook and had been there for seven years. I was able to check the front of my notebook and see the consecutive number, which I had written on it, and advise them that it was my ninth notebook in three years with Customs. The two AVSEC officers were suitably

impressed with this and we began to discuss what they actually used their notebooks for. The AVSEC officers told me that they used them if for example they found someone in a restricted area, who should not be there, but not if they searched a passenger's bag or scanned them for explosives or metals. I was able to advise the AVSEC officers that I used my notebook on a constant basis for every passenger I questioned, every bag I opened, every person I strip-searched or even to just record certain names or details to watch out for.

Within the same border network two technologies that were the same, used to 'protect and police' the border, are used in very different ways. AVSEC was only using their notebook to track certain people, who had been found in certain places whereas my notebook was used to track all people and items that I dealt with for anything longer than it takes to say "*how was the flight? Good holiday? Yup, the exit is over there.*" This was not out of necessity, I have yet to refer back to my notebook in court, it is out of practise and training certainly, but the practise, as opposed to the training is driven by certain contexts created by other non-human actors within the border network. Some of these non-human actors are linked to the border workers such as ion scanners and databases and others such as the actual items that Customs is looking for. These are not directly linked until the notebook is used to create a context or link between the item and the border worker. For example a positive return for drugs is recorded in the notebook and this then links the passenger, who the ion scan was taken from, with the positive drugs detection. The notebook turns a positive ion scan taken from a person into a person who has been around or is carrying drugs.

Other technologies within the border network also mean that the notebook for Customs is used differently than for AVSEC. Cusmod the border database that Customs uses requires that certain information be entered into it such as a person's name and

passport details, addresses etc, if a person is searched. This is a database used by Customs and AVSEC does not have a comparable database system. The two technologies of database and notebook mean that a Customs officer will use his notebook more frequently than an AVSEC officer. The nature of the items that Customs is looking for means the notebook is used in a different way to the context created by the items or people other agencies are looking for.

AVSEC and Customs officers are both playing a game of hide and seek within the border network. That is in many ways to say they are doing the same thing, looking for items that are prohibited to enter or leave New Zealand that the travelling public has hidden from them or has inadvertently travelled with. Due to the nature of the Customs officer looking for items that are generally illegal, as opposed to simply prohibited on flights, a Customs officer when he finds these items must trace their ‘chain of evidence.’ This means the Customs officer has to account for where and in whose bag an item was found and who handled it and where it was stored once it was seized or detained.

Audio Networks

*“We worked right alongside each other but not with each other,
I didn’t really know what they (Customs) were doing.”*

– Former AVSEC officer.

The above quote came from a discussion about how the different border agencies manage the various risks posed by passengers and crew departing New Zealand. When leaving the international airport international passengers check in with their airline, then pay any applicable departure tax, and present proof of this to an airport company representative who grants them access to the ‘upstairs’ international departure zone. The passenger then fills out a Customs departure card, and presents this with a passport and boarding pass to a Customs officer who ‘emigrates’ them out of NZ and assesses their risk

to the NZ border via database checks and other methods. After Customs processing the passenger proceeds through the AVSEC checkpoint where they are screened for sharp and dangerous objects, explosives and liquids aerosols or gasses (LAGS). Finally, the passenger enters the waiting area full of cafes and duty free shops around the boarding gates. At this point they cannot leave unless they board their flight or there is an emergency of some kind.

Along the way observant passengers will notice the airline check-in staff, airport company staff, Customs officers, roaming airport Police officers and AVSEC officers working with radios and ear pieces. Of these people the later three are all the enforcement agencies that will be wearing similar uniforms, badges and doubtless tools of their trade such as gloves, knives and keys etc in pouches attached to their belts. These three agencies can all communicate with members of the other agencies in person but there is no shared radio network in operation.

The absence of machines that can facilitate direct communication between human actors mitigating risk, such as all these agencies have within themselves (radios, computer alerts and messages) plays a role, but what of an audio network that does exist but not in a way that can communicate in two way mode? The important thing to bear in mind with an actor network approach is though it is concerned with the role of the non human actors it's principal concern is the way in which the network is disassembled and assembled as described by Farnsworth and Austrin

We highlight three processes involved: the first is assemblage involving the combination of different technologies and social arrangements into particular configurations. The second is the problem of how such configurations are stabilised or destabilised. ...

The third is the assembly and disassembly of networks. Here, we use the term actor networks (2005: 15-16).

The case study below of a one- way audio network and it's assembly and disassembly will illustrate the third step mentioned by Farnsworth and Austrin. As on a constant basis the

network centred around the beeper is assembled and reassembled depending on that network's success or failure in cutting networks built up around risk items or persons.

The only area where there is a direct line of communication between two agencies is in the arrivals hall where the Customs control room and the chief Customs officer on duty are linked to the MAF quarantine x-ray via a pager that beeps when an officer at the MAF x-ray activates his pager. This is one-way communication and simply notifies Customs that one of their officers is needed at the x-ray or MAF search bench. The assumption that one could draw from this by using it is that the machine, ergo the pager, is narrowing the MAF officers knowledge of Customs risks into a Customs risk. The pager through its simple beep or not beep mode will not define the risk in any way, as opposed to say a Police radio network with different codes for different incidents. A Customs officer could be walking to the x-ray to find the worlds largest drugs concealment or alternately to the MAF officer who wants to startle the Customs officer by putting a fake pistol cut-out through the x-ray. The latter was observed repeatedly throughout my fieldwork. Farnsworth and Austrin talk of audio technologies and the way in which they

rework the boundaries not only of public or private space, but of the actors, technologies and networks that assemble each other (2005: 20).

The pager concedes to a MAF officer that all Customs risks are the same and should be treated accordingly, while at the same time assembling a MAF- Customs – passenger – x-ray network. This new network can contain tensions as seen when Customs and MAF officers are involved in incidents where drugs are found. This could be because MAF officers do not follow the 'chain of evidence' approach that Customs officers are bound to in their 'world'.

An example of this that occurred during my fieldwork that involved the audio network and tensions between Customs and MAF due to the context that the call from the pager immediately creates, occurred when a MAF officer called a Customs officer to the

MAF search area. The Customs officer 'Gluver' was advised by MAF officer 'Pear' that she had found some pills in a passengers bag in the course of conducting a biosecurity search. 'Gluver' took a look at the pills and questioned the passenger and satisfied herself through this process that the pills were prescribed to the passenger and that they were in a reasonable amount for the passengers visit to New Zealand. This is operating under the instructions given to Customs by 'Medsafe New Zealand'. As 'Gluver' went to leave 'Pear' asked her *'oh, so those kind of pills are okay, I won't call you in future for them?'* 'Gluver' had to educate 'Pear' about the fact that Customs would need to be called each time as each passenger needed to have their risk assessed in regards to the pills or items that MAF had located and that even if the pills were the same the context next time might be different. The pager allows Customs officers to be rapidly present within the MAF search area and creates a context of risk that MAF acknowledges needs to be addressed. Based upon the interactions that occur MAF staff may be lulled into believing that they understand the context of risk as being based upon the individual items that are located. If for example 'Pear' came across some codeine tablets and 'Gluver' talked to the passenger and checked she had the prescription and said they were okay, would not mean that the next time 'Pear' discovers codeine tablets and a passenger they would be able to be released.

The Customs officer makes a decision on the risk posed by the medicines in the context of the passenger, the medicines, their prior experience and knowledge and the likelihood that the medicines are not going to be used for a legitimate or lawful purpose. 'Pear' believed she had assembled enough knowledge so as to be able to make a decision when these elements were present again where in actual fact the Customs officer believes in order for the network to function correctly their presence is required. As such the

Customs officer in this instance and in similar instances has to impart on the MAF officer that they cannot make risk decisions such as this without Customs being present.

The following subchapter will conclude this chapter's discussion of the role played, and significance of the non-human actors within the border network that police the border in alliance with the human actors.

Conclusions – risk as a product

The technologies of the border shape a context in which the workers of the border and the technologies of the border do their job in mitigating risk. Risk is also a product of these technologies working in alliance with human actors at the border.

Border enforcement work for the most part goes on the assumption that all passengers crossing the border are of risk and lack either common sense or morals or both. Smith states that specially trained

behaviour detection officers at 40 airports in the United States since 2003 in the SPOT programme (screening passengers by observation techniques)... have stopped 43,000 people for questioning resulting in 278 arrests (2008: 28).

Sadly, Smith seems impressed with these statistics. From 43,000 questioned people for 272 arrests it appears that even at 'high risk' US airports the amount of passengers breaching as opposed to obeying the regulations and getting caught is a small fraction. Latour using the simple example of a non-functioning doorway groom with a sign saying "please close the door" states "people are not circumspect, disciplined and watchful" (1992: 245). So we can conclude that people do require policing, in the same way they need to be reminded to close the door as they will intentionally or inadvertently breach border regulations. However even the discussed 'highly trained' 'behaviour detection officers' are not that good at detecting risk passengers.

The first chapter of the thesis looked at border workers' identities, and how through some members of the border workers being part of an occupational community they were able to increase their effectiveness at policing the border. Not all border workers were members of the occupational community and even within the occupational community success much of the time was rather fickle within the border network. In light of this failing of humans to 'effectively' police the border we turn to the machines and artefacts that are also actors at the border.

These non-human actors at the border the x-rays, ion scanners, databases, cameras, arrival cards, notebooks and hitherto unmentioned dogs also police the border. They create contexts that make it easier for the human workers of the border to interact with passengers. In alliance with the border workers, the non-human actors also police the border and shape the human workers of the borders understanding of their workplace.

At this point, it is appropriate to touch on how border agencies management monitor the risks to the border. These concluding remarks reinforce the theoretical focus of this chapter, actor network theory. In the Risk Management AS/NZS 4360:1999 'Seven step cycle' we can see that the previously discussed 'advanced machines' and 'mundane artefacts' are a vital part of the mitigation of risk at the border. It is not only at the final stage of 'treat risks' that the discussed 'machines' and 'artefacts' at the border come into play. Initial 'establishment of context and the identification of risks' at an intelligence and operations level is reliant on the Cusmod system. The 'analysis of risk' is done through the x-rays, itemisers and cameras used to analyse and evaluate risk and the risk is traced through tracking technologies such as arrival cards and notebooks. These technologies also contribute to the airport being a space of 'confession' where due to the various technologies such as arrival cards and cameras passengers feel compelled to reveal to agents of the border details of their lives that they would not otherwise disclose.

The decision as to whether or not to ‘accept risk’ is often undertaken at this level based upon a yes / no answer given by a non-human actor in alliance with a border worker. For example a passenger may be a drug risk but if successive swabs of their luggage give consistently negative results they will likely be released based as much upon this as any human decision. The sidebars of ‘communicate and consult and monitor and review’ are also dependant on the impartial language provided through the technologies. Cusmod provides a method of communication between those, who work to mitigate risk, such as border officers at the airport and those who monitor it, such as intelligence and operations analysts. An intelligence officer is more likely to be swayed by the sentence “*itemiser scans and x-rays negative, no unusual behaviour noted on cameras in arrival hall*”, in a report an airport officer has submitted, than an opinion-based report on a risk passenger. An opinion-based report could say something like: “*I felt that passenger BLOGS is of a low risk to the border and he said that any information we had about him dealing drugs was just lies fabricated by his ex-wife.*”

Caplan talks of risk and how it also bonds through common values and fears

Common Values lead to common fears, thus the choice of risks and the choice of how to live and be linked and each form of life has its own typical risk portfolio (2000: 9-10).

The collective mitigation of risk at the border network through numerous agencies primarily endeavouring to mitigate ‘their risk’ is something that happens through the shared world view of human actors shaped by nonhuman actors, from advanced machines to mundane artefacts. Perhaps to tie together the arguments presented here it is worth noting the approach of Joffe in that there is an unprecedented sense of risk in contemporary societies (1999: 2). As one of the core areas of research of this topic it is apparent that there is an unprecedented sense of risk at the border. Many of my informants have described the border as ‘*chaotic*’ and everyone interviewed has described how they from

time to time *rely* upon the non-human actors of other agencies to mitigate risk at the border. Recalling the statistics of 43,000 questioned people for 272 arrests being pitched as a success it is no surprise that we look to non human actors to “*give us a sense of mastery*” (1999: 2) over the unpredictable border network.

In order to stabilise the border network that can be seen by its human actors as *unpredictable* and *chaotic*, workers draw upon both human and non human actors to mitigate risk. These workers within the border are employed by agencies who compete for funds, status and power. This exertion of power to mitigate risk and the competitions for power within the border network are the focus of the following chapter.

Chapter Four

Highlighting Power at the Border

As sites of multiple vectors of authority,
airports present fascinating illustrations of network power
(Salter 2008: 54)

Power and working the border

Power is able to be analysed at the border in three main ways, which conveniently relate to three of the ways Foucault looks at power. The first is ‘disciplinary controlling power’ which relates to a states power of knowledge and control and the other type of power is relational forms of power between entities. The third way is ‘pastoral power’ and this will feature at the end of this chapter.

Power at the border can be visualised as a kind of fork, the handle of the fork is the disciplinary power of the state, this is the obvious line of power at the border. Below are the multiple prongs of interactional power, exerted by the states workers on passengers and sometimes, other workers. These lines of individual power can be seen in action between border workers but also between border workers and passengers when they exert their discretionary power to select the targets of the states power. Each agency at the border is a different fork of state power with the workers as the prongs of interactional power exerting the power of the state. Sometimes like two diners each reaching for the same piece of food on a plate the prongs of the forks will clash. Unfortunately for passengers in this metaphor, they tend to be the food. Sometimes however the food is harder than the fork and the prongs can get bent. This can be seen for example, when passengers complain about their

treatment at the border, and their complaint is upheld by a reviewing ombudsman or similar.

One of the first aspects of power that must be considered is that power needs to be protected, this is of course referring to the state's power of legitimacy. Foucault says of this in regards to his analysis of "the Prince" that the link between the ability to rule and the actual ruler is "fragile and continually under threat" (2006: 133). As a corollary to this: "the objective of the exercise of power is to reinforce, strengthen and protect the principality" (2006: 133). The border is a good place to see the state attempting to protect its power through its rules and procedures and the implements of its power, the workers of the border who interpret and enforce the power and will of the state.

Another key aspect of power according to Foucault is what he would earlier call the 'capillary' nature of power. We can see this understanding of power in his discussion on the practices of government:

practices of government are, on the one hand, multifarious and concern many kinds of people: the head of a family, the superior of a convent, the teacher or tutor of a child or pupil; so that there are several forms of government among which the prince's relation to the state is only one particular mode; while on the other hand, all these other kinds of government are internal to the state or society (2006: 134).

Within the border network the practises of government can be seen as split between different government agencies. These agencies in turn delegate power down through their own hierarchies. Border workers that I talked to even had a personal webpage within the agencies intranet that would tell them which "*delegated powers*" they held. Where one worked and ones place in the hierarchy, would influence the power that a worker had delegated to them.

A successful government controls "the right disposition of things" (2006: 135). This is to say in the words of Foucault that the "object and, in a sense, the target of power are things" (2006). The border network has been shown in many examples earlier in this

thesis, to arrange the targets of power at the border through the management and creation of risk. An example where this was shown was the itemiser which turns a passenger into a 'drugs risk' therefore they become a person of risk which must have power exerted on them by the states tool, the border worker. The border workers exercise the states' power through searching and questioning the 'drugs risk' passenger. The border network has the ability to order people and artefacts, therefore the border network enables the government to be successful in one respect to Foucault's arguments on power.

This ordering of people and things within the border network is done through the exercise of power. One form of power that was mentioned earlier is that of the disciplinary controlling power of the state over the border network which is expressed in chapters two and three. These chapters give many examples of the border being worked by the human and non-human actors who exert the will of the government over the passengers who cross the border and come into the government's jurisdiction. This will of the government is not however a smooth exertion of seamless power. This aligns with Foucault's views on the of the mechanisms of security which was mentioned in the introduction and can be said to "not tend to convey the exercise of a will over others in the most homogenous, continuous and exhaustive way possible" (2007: 66).

Foucault is arguing that the mechanisms of security do not in fact tend to exercise a will over others in the most effective way possible. One of the arguments of this chapter in relation to the question - how is the border worked, is the argument that many of the workers of the border are members of an occupational community who communicate risks to one another. Non-human technologies also communicate risk and therefore work the border. Power in a Foucauldian sense is exerted on behalf of the state through workers as they 'work' the border. The way that the workers 'work' the border is in fact not the most "homogenous, continuous and exhaustive way possible". The border is worked with the

workers as eyes of a twisted panopticon at the same level of the passengers. This is a mutilation of the traditional concept of the panopticon as an all seeing eye above the subjects of it's' power. It is a metaphorical mutilation that Foucault would agree with. This chapter will give some examples aligned with the idea of an occupational community and the theories of an actor network that will analyse power in an appropriate way.

'Relational power' is seen at the border in the ways border workers individually compete for personal power as to what they are allowed to do. Workers at the border compete for power in this way though it may appear that they are competing for their agency. For the most part the most obvious power contestations at this level are between the workers of the border using their discretionary power and the passengers crossing the border. In these instances the workers of the border are using relational power to disallow the actions or objects of each other or of passengers, when using their discretionary power or state power.

Disciplinary power of the state

The following example illustrates the disciplinary controlling power of the state exerted in a kind of twisted panopticon where the many eyes of the border workers can observe threats to the border and communicate this risk to one another so as to project the power of the state. The example that shows this metaphor of a twisted panopticon in action that occurred when drugs were detected by a MAF officer at the x-ray machine, along with a large amount of other items of interest to Customs not mentioned in this article and still under investigation. When discussing this case with my informants (it was my team that led the investigation, but I had been on study leave at the time), the comment was made "*It wasn't our find really, we just looked where MAF told us to.*" The statement that a senior officer had made was greeted with assent from the rest of the team present. The feeling

was that the person had got through Customs primary line risk assessment, and later assessment via camera surveillance and roving officers and possibly dogs, but had been caught by a quarantine-screening tool and an operator both focused on looking for bio-security risks. The incident was summarised in the court news several months later.

Prescription drugs found in passenger's luggage

A Cheviot sickness beneficiary was found with thousands of pills in his luggage when he arrived at Christchurch Airport from Thailand.

... pleaded guilty to the charges of importing prescription medicines without a reasonable excuse, when he appeared before Judge Stephen Erber in the Christchurch District Court today.

He had been found with 30 packets of 100 tablets – that's 3000 tablets – of the analgesic Amadol, sometimes known as Tramadol,

He also had 7500 codeine sulphate tablets.

The drugs were discovered when he flew in to Christchurch Airport from Thailand on August 27 (Christchurch Court News, 2008).

Though a successful result in protecting the border (prescription drug abuse in the USA now resulting in more fatalities than illegal drug abuse and motor vehicle accidents), the result left Customs officers aware that their network by itself, of human and non human actors alike could not be relied upon to stop every risk. Maril in his study of the US – Mexico border argues that agents working the border realise they cannot prevent all risks crossing the border

every agent ... knew from the very marrow of their bones what no one else, every nonagent, cared to admit. Real control of these lands along the Rio Grande was a pipe dream, a vicious illusion, and a wicked pretension (2004: 117).

Maril is arguing that the policing and control of the border is a pipe dream and that agents acknowledge this. Agents he argues are aware that they cannot exercise power over every border crossing. Similarly border workers in New Zealand cannot expect their agency to achieve complete control over the risks it is tasked with protecting. However they can rely upon the workers of other agencies, in alliance with their various technologies such as x-rays to project their power for them at the border. In this way the disciplinary power of the

state is exerted and the workers as implements of this disciplinary power appear to the public to be in complete control of the border network.

Some officers reveal a remarkable amount of reflexivity about their networks role in protecting the border. I have had officers from competing agencies tell me how they felt the work of another agency was more important, for example

“MAF has a lot of responsibility, if they miss a dirty boot that brings mad cow disease into NZ our whole economy is wrecked. No one will trade with us for the next ten years... even AVSEC, if they miss a guy with a knife and he boards a plane and crashes it, heads will roll, politicians will be tearing in to them left right and centre. But if Customs misses some drugs, who will ever know? They are always coming in.”

Another situation from my fieldwork illustrates the disciplinary power of the state through the twisted panopticon metaphor of the many eyes of the border workers exerting state power. Customs officer Glover was called to the MAF x-ray via the MAF beeper. A garden gnome went through the MAF x-ray and the MAF operator was concerned that the image was not consistent as would be expected. To his mind a possible drugs risk existed as a result of the visual image presented by the x-ray machine. The x-ray machine did not say yes, there was a drugs risk, or no there was not. The gnome had gone through the MAF x-ray and been picked up by a passenger at the end before another MAF officer had asked the passenger to put it back down by the x-ray. The MAF officer then put the gnome through the x-ray again and it was paused in the machine and further x-ray images were taken, but none were saved to the x-ray's hard drive. At this point the gnome had been handled by two different MAF officers and the passenger.

On arrival Customs officer Glover looked at the images and decided to bring the passenger and the gnome to a Customs search bench for questioning and further examination of the gnome. Eventually the gnome was taken back to the x-ray where images were taken and were stored to the hard-drive of the x-ray. Throughout the later Customs process, the gnome was only handled by Customs officer Glover. Eventually a

decision was made to drill into the gnome and some of the internal substance that had showed up inconclusively on the x-ray was tested with two Customs machines. The first, a ion scanner, gave a negative result for drugs. The second, a NIK chemical test, gave an inconclusive result.

Customs here had used two technologies, one which gave a negative result the other which gave an inconclusive result. The decision was made by Glover's supervisor to detain the gnome and further examine it using a device at the Customs base that is similar to a device used to perform keyhole surgery. The passengers were released and subsequent examination revealed the gnome not to be filled with any narcotics.

The MAF officer had detected a possible drugs risk in the border network that was handed to the Customs. The networks lateral communication had allowed for the power of the state to be exerted on the passengers. Liaison between the agencies following the detention of the Gnome followed and, as a result of this Customs requested that MAF take a photograph of the x-ray image in the first instance (in future) for evidential purposes. Despite the fact that the initial detection of a possible transgression of the states rules had been detected by a MAF officer, Customs the agency with the power to legally police the transgression was called and able to exert it's power over the passenger and detain the Gnome. The subsequent liaison between the two agencies within the network about future action (saving an image) meant that the future ability of these actors within the network to exert the states power over passengers was enhanced.

This detection and lateral communication within the border network meant that the MAF network had to be reassembled around future possible risk items. This reassembly falls under Latour's Litmus test for actor network in action in that

You have to 'follow the actors themselves' , that is try and catch up with their often wild innovations in order to learn from them what the collective existence has become in their hands, which methods they have

elaborated to make it fit together, which accounts could best define the new associations that they have been forced to establish (2005: 12).

To Customs, the technology of the x-ray is a risk mitigating technology that allows for the power of the state to be exerted over the travelling public. However in itself the x-ray presents new risks to the network. A new risk that the x-ray introduces is the risk of a failed prosecution, if images of possible ‘exhibits’ such as Gnomes are not saved when first discovered.. The acknowledgement of this risk creation fits with contemporary risk theories such as those of Joffe, who states

Even though the advancement of technology has supposedly added a sense of mastery over the natural world it has spawned an unprecedented sense of risk (1999: 2).

These two examples have shown state power in action over the passengers who cross the border. This disciplinary power relies upon knowledge being transferred between the workers of the border. It is argued that to passengers crossing the border the power of the state appears to come from an all seeing panopticon. In actual fact the power of the state is exerted through the workers of the border communicating laterally. The panopticon in effect become ‘the all seeing eyes of many border workers – both human and non human’ who communicate their knowledge of risks to each other.

The other type of power at the border that we can analyse through the ideas of Foucault is relational power contested between the workers of the border and between the workers and passengers. This is seen in instances where it is not the power of the state being exerted so much as the discretionary power of the border workers between themselves and passengers.

Relational power at the border

In the border network negotiation between actors over meaning illustrates relational power. In the following example two border workers were debating how to treat an object

in order to determine risk. In the end it was the MAF officer who was working in alliance with a technology (x-ray) that mediates risk that was able to exert relational power over the Customs officer so as to modify his behaviour and acceptance of the meaning of an object

Customs officer *“can you x-ray this please.”* Customs officer is referring to a backpack that he has searched and brought down to a MAF officer at an x-ray machine in empty form.

MAF officer *“Sure”* The backpack is x-rayed and the MAF officer frowns at the Customs officer. *“There are still pens and keys and junk in this, I can’t get a clear return on what’s in the frame.”*

Customs officer *“Oh, I didn’t bother clearing them out, its not a drug search, its just to see if he has stuffed the lining with cigarettes as he has done in the past. I didn’t ask for drugs mode.”*

MAF officer *“That’s not how it works I need it empty to be able to tell you if there is anything concealed inside, items left in it obstruct things.”*

Customs officer *“Oh, sorry, I’ll do it your way in future.”*

The Customs officer said no more to the MAF officer but later confided in me that he was unsure how MAF could detect fruit in packed luggage, which is how they normally checked it, but could not notice cigarettes. He also said he intended to look for himself at the image as he felt he would be able to identify cigarettes in the lining.

The drugs mode that the x-ray has, changed the behaviour of the MAF officer, the human actor now responds to Customs x-ray requests by putting all empty suitcases through on ‘drugs’ mode even if the Customs officer is not looking for drugs. In situations like this MAF officers exert relational power over Customs officers so as to ensure the inputs to the machines that they work in alliance with, are consistent to their demands whatever the context that the Customs officer may be working in. Thus Customs officer may be searching in different contexts, such as drugs, alcohol and tobacco or counter terrorism but for MAF staff involved in this through x-raying items for Customs the context of the search remains the same. To ensure this context remains the same MAF officers need to exert relational power over Customs officer.

The concept of ‘chain of evidence’ provides a good platform to discuss examples of relational power interactions between border workers and passengers. ‘Chain of evidence’

is a law enforcement concept that ensures that exhibits, such as seized or detained weapons, are handled by as few officers as possible and are appropriately stored, tracked and recorded, so that when the item is produced in court there can be no question of tampering or falsification of evidence. At an international airport the actors most exposed to this concept are the Police and Customs officers. Actors such as MAF officers, AVSEC officers and Immigration officers all seize items but due to them rarely taking the matter to court, unlike Police and Customs, they do not have the same need for a chain of evidence. International air travellers will have been exposed to the latter groups' technological response to this situation in the form of yellow quarantine amnesty bins and red AVSEC amnesty bins.

Neither the Police nor Customs, due to the nature of what they look for, drugs, weapons, objectionable material etc can use amnesty bins. Though the focus of this work is on the border networks of workers, a point of interest is seen in the fact that passengers who have dealings with Customs are often horrified to find that they cannot just put offending articles (a common one being stun guns) into an amnesty bin and must instead go through a process of having it legally detained. Often the passengers try to negotiate with the Customs officers to be able to bin the item as they have seen the amnesty bin for another agency in the area. This item in their network means that the Customs officer and passenger must reinvent the border network into one that aligns with the legal definition that the Customs officer has to enforce. Often the negotiation involves explaining how the non human actor – the amnesty bin, is not an applicable part of the network to the passenger. To do this another nonhuman actor in the form of a NZCS334 'Notice of Detention' or a copy of the applicable legislation is often used to reassemble the officer – passenger border network.

Through my fieldwork I have noted that tension between passengers and officers is most apparent in instances such as this, as opposed to officers dealing with serious offenders having drugs seized. This is because relational power is being exerted by the border worker over the passenger. The passenger is being told they cannot have something that has been in their possession before they travelled. Worse still they are told that importing the item is an offence and they cannot simply just put it in an amnesty bin like they want to. Because passengers are used to being able to do so the border worker is forced to use relational power over the passenger and argue with them as to the place of the item in the border network.

Interactional or relational power provides examples of the workers of the border competing for power amongst themselves. To fall back on the fork metaphor the workers of the border are not always able to see the world of risk through the point of view of the other workers and can come into relational conflict as they exert the states power. Though occupational community is an applicable idea not all border workers are members of the occupational community and even if they are they will still due to the nature of the work, and human nature, come into conflict with one another. An example of this that came to note during my fieldwork was when an AVSEC officer called a Policeman over to his work area to advise the Policeman that he had seized cannabis from a passenger. The Police officer on discovering that the AVSEC officer had not held the person until his arrival, threatened to charge the AVSEC officer with possession of a Class C drug. This informal joking on the exercise of power of one individual over another is relational power and came about due to the different methodologies, in regards to chain of evidence, that the agencies use.

Pastoral Power at the border

A third kind of power that is mentioned by Foucault and would not warrant a mention in so brief a discussion of power were it not for the borders inherently ‘movement’ based nature is the concept of pastoral power. Pastoral power is linked to the movement of a flock, be it people such as the crew of a ship or a flock of animals. It is also readily applied to static populations and is defined as:

pastoral power is, I think, entirely defined by its beneficence; its only *raison d’être* is doing good, and in order to do good. In fact the essential objective of pastoral power is the salvation (*salut*) of the flock....

Pastoral power is a power of care. It looks after the flock, it looks after the individuals of the flock, it sees to it that the sheep do not suffer (Foucault 2007: 126-127).

In the course of my fieldwork I jokingly heard large groups of passengers being referred to as sheep when they couldn’t follow the ‘Disney Land queues’ to get to the immigration booths and had to be ‘rounded up’ and pointed in the right direction by the trouble shooting officer in charge of the queues. Surely within the border network this is where any metaphor of state power and beneficence would end? Not so.

The border network and the artefacts and workers that make it up exert the pastoral power of the state over the passengers who travel through the network as regularly as they exert the disciplinary power of the state or get involved in contests for and around interactional power. It could be argued that from the moment that passengers are handed their arrival cards on the plane they are shown the pastoral power of the state. The arrival cards give passengers the opportunity to declare ‘restricted and prohibited items’ without fear of repercussion. In this way passengers surrender hundreds of cans of pepper spray, stun guns, knives assorted weapons and even drug paraphernalia on a monthly basis at the border. The cards take the time to outline in many languages and in great detail what passengers must

declare, not what they must not bring in. In this way the cards can be seen as an artefact of pastoral power.

Distributed throughout the international departures area and also through the internationals arrival area are AVSEC and MAF amnesty bins. These amnesty bins again represent the pastoral power of the state. A passenger could walk right up to a bin holding an apple that they had not declared or a knife that was in their bag and place it in the bin with no fear of repercussion for their oversight. In this way the bins cost the border agencies hundreds of dollars in potential fines that they could otherwise collect. This fits with Foucault's definition of pastoral power and the shepherd metaphor that he applies to it "he does not even consider his own advantage" (2007: 128).

An aspect of pastoral power that is not present at the international airport studied is the red / green lanes. Instead, and of a similar vein and another example of pastoral power at the airport studied, is the signage which advised passengers to proceed to certain areas if they have something to declare. Passengers that fail to declare items were also sometimes seen during the fieldwork as being subject to the pastoral power of the state rather than disciplinary power. An example of this during the fieldwork was an elderly British couple who had failed to declare an apple to MAF. The apple was detected in a handbag by a MAF beagle and theoretically the passengers should have been given a \$200 instant fine. The passengers were asked: "*is this your arrival card? Did you read this card? Did you understand this card?*" Seeing as the passengers had answered in the affirmative (and even if they had not) the MAF officer could have issued a \$200 fine. Instead the MAF officer let the passengers off with a warning and advice as to the best way

to get to their hotel, thereby demonstrating at an individual level the pastoral power of the state.

These examples of pastoral power represent this larger concept of power on a much smaller scale. Foucault's discussions on power are wide ranging and variable and it is not the intention of this thesis to show the full range of his ideas. Rather the aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the three kinds of power that are mentioned by Foucault that are applicable to the border network. All three kinds of power are in use within the border network and all can be related to one another through asking: who is the subject and object of the power being exerted? Interestingly the answer to this question is that the subject and object can vary, mostly it is the passengers who are subject to power at the border, but it can also be the border workers themselves.

Power and working the border, concluding remarks

“At an airport, public world order interests converge with the private traveler's interest” (Aaltola 2005: 275)

Power of the state as a potential force is omnipresent at the border. Customs officers as part of their work will strip search passengers and charge people for taking photographs, airport Police officers carry Glock pistols at all times; ergo, deadly force is always present at the border, where it is not amongst Police officers outside the airport. AVSEC officers take non-illegal items such as aerosols and nail clippers and MAF officers issue thoughtless ageing tourists with \$200 fines for breaching bio-security regulations.

The major risk, and as such the main justification for the brash projection of state power at the border that is in the forefront of border workers minds as well as the travelling public's, came into the public consciousness on September 11. No book or article related to

the topics of airports in recent years will fail to mention this event at length. To surmise this event in relation to the international airport I argue that the events of September 11 were pitched as a failure of the airport as described by Gordon who says of the terrorists and their attack

There was no flag waving or fanfare: they were simply exploiting the shoddy banality of the system. Minicams at ATM machines and twenty four hour surveillance cameras recorded their movements before they boarded. x-ray machines scanned their belongings. A barely perceptible line was crossed and nineteen hijackers were waved past security checkpoints (2008: 260)

The attack had brought into popular consciousness the idea of the “threatened member of society”. The airport as a mechanism ensures that passengers feel two things; the first and foremost is that they are threatened and need to be protected, the second is that they are potential threatners. It is in this dichotomy that the role of the border agencies across the spectrum unite, and come to light. Be it an Immigration officer stopping a foreign worker, or a Policeman shooting a terrorist, the role of border agents is to determine the threatened and threatner. Fierke defines this concept of threatner and threatened

The core of security, the protection from harm, assumes a field of relationships, including a threatner, the threatened, the protector or means of protection and the protected (2007: 46).

Discussions of power at the border in regards to state disciplinary power fall back in this day and age to the threat of terrorism that we are told we live under. As such modern governments in the interests of reinforcing their authority need to project their disciplinary power to the border. The workers of the border are their implements in projecting this power. The government rather than relying upon these workers and their technologies which were critiqued by Gordon above in regards to September 11 is happy to maintain the traditional idea of the border being protected by a panopticon like power.

The reality of this research is the disciplinary power of the state at the border in fact relies upon the many eyes of the border workers and their ability to communicate laterally

within the border network. As a side effect to this lateral communication within the border network is the relational power that is contested between individuals, be they border worker – border worker, or border worker – passenger.

Power is an important aspect of the border and this chapter raises some key issues around power in relation to the workers of the border. Unfortunately the scope and ethical dilemmas posed by a worker of the border such as the author conducting participant observation based research into passengers' perceptions of power at the border are untenable.

Too much power at the border?

The concern of many who study the border is that it is a network in which power can be readily abused, by the state and also by the implements of the state itself, the workers. This is a concern of civil libertarians the world over, perhaps rightfully so, as has been demonstrated throughout this thesis, the workers of the border and the machines that they work in alliance with can be extremely invasive towards the travelling public. This is a concern even of border agencies such as customs who commissioned a book on the border

Who can exercise the power? Is it conferred on a particular group or levels of officials, or can any border control official or police officer exercise it? (Ladley and White 2006: 55)

It can be argued in mitigation of the idea that too much power is wielded at the border, that a consequence of the power relations that come about from their being numerous agencies that 'police' the border is that no one agency has all the power. As such no one group of workers, even the occupational community that was discussed, are all knowing and all seeing. The occupational community may have the ability to communicate what it sees effectively, but there is not one all seeing panopticon above the border

network. The border control apparatuses therefore are not a part of the “cold monster in history that has continually grown and developed as a sort of threatening organism above civil society” (Foucault 2007:248). This is to refer back to Foucault’s concerns that governments and their policing instruments become all encompassing. This is certainly not reflected in the conclusions drawn in this chapter. Finally the exercise of pastoral power at the border demonstrates that all power is not necessarily negative in nature.

Chapter Five: Conclusions

Over the two years that have passed since this thesis began the border network has changed considerably. A new government is in power and the new government will no doubt have intentions to change the shape of the network and introduce new technologies that will themselves cause the network to be reassembled in ways that neither government, nor border workers expect.

What has not changed is the central argument and focus of this thesis which is the focus on the interconnectedness of human and non human actors within the border network. The place where this fieldwork was conducted was an airport but it is acknowledged that even at this field site a 'full' all encompassing view of the border is not achievable or realistic.

The Airport

The workers of the border, the tools that the workers of the border use and the power that is centred at this hub of international travel are all dependant on the existence of the airport. Any analysis of the workers of the border is also an analysis of the airport itself. A study of the workers of the border becomes a study of the power exerted by the modern air travel process. Salter talks of the modern airport as "a system of systems that functions as a single node in a complex global network" (2004: 22). This node in the global network (to draw from AS/NZS 4360:1999 Risk Management Standard) is able to identify, monitor, treat and communicate risk, through the human and nonhuman actors working in alliance.

It is interesting and relevant to this study of the workers of the border to note the way in which the various technologies in air travel have influenced the shape and internal

dynamic of the airport as well as its workers. Gordon gives an example of the Boeing 747 jumbo jet

The 747 changed the scale of everything on the field and in the terminals... The planes could carry four hundred passengers, so departure lounges and concourses needed to be twice as big... The stylish restaurants and cocktail lounges of the 1960s gave way to self service food courts and fast food franchises where herds of rumpled travellers waited in line to buy processed snacks (2004: 22).

It can be expected that future changes in aeroplanes will have similar effects.

To roughly trace Alistair Gordon's excellent history of the airport we can see that air travel went through a golden phase in the 1920s, which was then followed by buildings constantly being behind the demands put on them by ever increasing passenger numbers (2008). Gordon refers to a period in the 1960s when "airports would reach an almost supernatural level of temporality, leaving little time between conception and demolition" (2008: 217). This is still seen throughout the world's airports, and at the site of the fieldwork. Finally and presently came the securitised age which followed the events of September 11 which I have addressed in this thesis in the accounts of the management of risk at the border.

Though this thesis has focused upon one node in this network; the workers in a modern airport and the relatively modern technologies that they use to police the border, the mutually constitutive nature of borders is not limited to modern air travel. Flynn studied the Benin- Nigeria border and identity, exchange and the state and came to some interesting conclusions on this border zone that are applicable as much to this third world land border as they are to a first world airport border (1997). Flynn looked at the way the people living in the border zone used the border to draw boundaries around themselves and situate themselves in relation to the border

Because borderlands are inherently zones of mediation and ambiguities, I will throughout this article try to distinguish clearly among Beninois border residents, Nigerian border residents, Customs guards, and nonlocal

traders. Only by doing so can we understand how these groups draw boundaries around themselves and how they situate themselves in relation to the border. (1997: 314).

A conclusion of this thesis is that the workers of the border at the international airport studied also draw boundaries around themselves. These boundaries separate them from those who cross the border as passengers, as well as those who do not work the border in a policing capacity, or only do so on a part time basis. Risk crosses these boundaries and contributes to the interconnectedness of the actors at the border.

Air travel is for the majority of the public something to be endured rather than enjoyed as it once perhaps was, Aaltola described the cause and effect of this modern airport

Stemming from the partly conflicting demands of economy and security, the airport's political space is tense, nervous and, occasionally, highly dramatic.... The airport exposes people to what the average Westerner regards as either a nuisance or a reassurance – drug-sniffing dogs, x-ray machines, metal detectors, mandatory searches, restrictions on movement, security inspections, and intense screening. Staring Customs officers, sharp questioning, bio-identifiers, computerized facial recognition and other technological marvels are meant to produce an environment in which people's intentions are 'revealed' and suspicious behaviour is recognized (2005: 263).

The public travel with the human and non human agents of the border all around them, policing their actions and watching them. The public 'endure' the border workers and the border technologies as they travel, it is therefore an appropriate anthropological question to look at what these workers are doing.

'How is the border worked at an international airport?'

The Introduction to this thesis showed that there are many different border agencies at the international airport studied. All of these agencies are looking to mitigate certain risks set down for them by the government. Sometimes the agencies look to mitigate the same risk, such as endangered species, but in different ways. Risk at the border is

ambiguous and the role of border workers is often blurred, as is the public's perception as to the roles of border workers. Risk is also the commonality between border agencies, all of them seek to identify risk and mitigate it.

As a result of September 11, changes to travel and trade legislation and practises mean different projects are underway that look at how the border is operated from a facilitation and security perspective. These projects will impact upon the workers of the border but the workers of the border will reshape and renegotiate any changes that come to their network be they new technologies or new procedures. As such the border network cannot be defined in a future state any more than it can be described in its current state. This is because the triad of border workers, border technologies and passengers are constantly changing and as such the border network is constantly changing. The focus of this thesis can therefore be seen as not so much describing the border network as it is, rather it seeks to account for and track changes to the network.

Chapter two of this thesis looked at the way the workers of the border go about their work on a day-to-day basis as members of the occupational community who have refined their ability to talk to other workers of the border from different agencies about different risks to the border. What the border workers actually did at work did not necessarily fit with their formalised position descriptions. This chapter showed that the workers of the border outside of the occupational community were also able to police risk to the border but were not so effective at policing 'collective' risk to the border. Risk was the common aspect of border workers identity and the workers of the border all based their workplace identity on their ability to effectively mitigate and communicate about risk.

Chapter three looked at the way in which these border workers use the various technologies at the border to communicate these risks and detect and mitigate the risks in alliance with one another. These technologies like the workers of the border themselves are

not necessarily what their 'position description' would have them to be. A MAF x-ray machine being loaded by a worker outside of the occupational community has a completely different contextual interaction with a passenger than the member of the occupational community operating the x-ray who notices contraband in a passenger's bag. The machine creates the context in which the worker interacts with the passenger and also potentially with other border workers depending upon what is in the bag. Chapter three also looked at the way in which these technologies impacted upon the border network. The technologies and workers in alliance police the border and in doing so exert power over the people who cross the border as well as demonstrate discrepancies between the power that the workers of the border project and the power they actually have. Farnsworth and Austrin talk of the way in which human actors and objects become a hybrid identity

Human and their objects become in effect, a hybrid entity themselves- an entity connected to, and connecting up, other communities and worlds. For this reason it makes sense to speak of actor-networks because each half of the term engages with, and assembles, the other. Actor networks then become a way to track how humans and technologies constantly assemble and reassemble chains of actors, technologies and practises into fluid networks of interaction (2005: 15).

This was demonstrated in chapter three where the assemblies and reassemblies of networks at the border of which objects such as itemiser , x-rays and surveillance cameras were all involved in connecting the networks of border workers from different agencies as well as connecting passengers to border workers. The artefacts of the border from mundane arrival cards and notebooks to sophisticated itemisers and x-ray machines, all appear to the travelling public to have a simple 'job'. In point of fact the roles of these artefacts and what they actually do and transform are far from what would be apparent to the causal observer.

Chapter four looked at the role of power within the border network, the power the border workers competed for, the power of government that they enacted and exercised over the travelling public. This power was shown to be collectively used by the border

workers in a way that to the passengers crossing through the border network made it appear that the border is a kind of all knowing all seeing panopticon. The all seeing panopticon is in fact a many eyed panopticon constituted through border workers and technologies communicating laterally within the network.

Traditionally the idea of a border is one where power is arbitrarily enacted upon the travelling public. Interestingly this has been shown to be not the case. The workers of the border are also subject to the power of the state and compete for power amongst themselves. If the state decided that all passengers from a certain nation are a 'risk' then the border workers are forced to interact with all passengers from that nation. Both the passengers arriving from the 'risk' nation, and the border workers themselves are forced by the states power to do certain things.

Another interesting issue that arouse from the study of power at the border is that while some passengers and workers are subject to the disciplinary power of the state or relational power interactions with border workers, all are subject to pastoral power. This kind of soft power is very visible but often disregarded at the border. The pastoral power is not a threatening kind of power that the travelling public need to be concerned about. Pastoral power is only really talked about in studies such as this and it is neglected in most of the literature studied during the production of this thesis.

Anthropology as an academic discipline traditionally went to a 'far away' location so as to understand the 'familiar' human existence better. As a site of study, an international airport is a place where far away people and things come into the 'familiar' domain. I argue that these far away people and things allow us to understand the border network effectively and what this tells us is surprising and unfamiliar. Insights into the border network of New Zealand give us insights into the workers of the border as well as into New Zealand itself.

Essentially this thesis does in a unique way what contemporary anthropology does best, it looks at the interconnectedness of actors. In this thesis the interconnectedness of human actors, and non human actors was the focus. It is through this interconnectedness that the border is worked. Communication and risk are a central tenet of this interconnectedness. This thesis makes neither a structuralist argument nor an argument which focuses upon agency. The thesis acknowledges that the whole border cannot be looked down upon to give an 'all encompassing account' this is because networks have no boundaries, no small irony in a study of the border.

Appendix One – ‘Questionnaire’

Information, Consent form and Questions

**University of Canterbury
Department of Anthropology**

INFORMATION

You are invited to participate as a subject in the research project:

Working the Border: Risk and Inter-Agency
Communication at an International Airport.

- The aim of this project is to better understand and analyze through anthropological methods how risk and inter-agency communication are linked at the border.
- Your involvement in this project will be through a brief questionnaire that will take 5-15 minutes. If you so wish at a date following the questionnaires completion you have the right to review your answers and the right to withdraw from the project at any time, including withdrawal of any information provided.
- The results of the project will be published, but you may be assured of the complete confidentiality of data gathered in this investigation: the identity of participants will not be made public. To ensure anonymity and confidentiality:
 1. *All interview transcripts/ material will be kept under lock and key.*
 2. *You will not be identifiable in the text of the thesis – through use of non-specific quotations and aliases, where and as necessary.*

The project is being carried out as a requirement for Mason Tolerton’s Masters of Arts Degree – Anthropology, under the supervision of Associate Professor Martin Fuchs, who can be contacted at +64 3 364 2987 and Associate Professors Terry Austrin who can be contacted at +64-0-3-364 2188. They will be pleased to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project.

The project has been reviewed and approved by the School of Sociology and Anthropology Ethics Committee.

Mason Tolerton.
BA Honors 1st Class Anthropology
Masters of Arts Candidate
Phone: ### #####
Email:
####

Consent Form

Mason Tolerton
C/O School of Sociology and Anthropology,
University of Canterbury,
Private Bag 4800,
Christchurch,
New Zealand,

17 August 2007

Working the Border: Risk and Inter-Agency
Communication at an International Airport.

I have read and understood the description of the above-named project. On this basis I agree to participate as a subject in the project, and I consent to publication of the results of the project with the understanding that anonymity will be preserved.

I understand also that I may at any time withdraw from the project, including withdrawal of any information I have provided.

NAME (please print):

Signature:

Date:

1/

The ‘border’: which of the following metaphors best describes the border where you work (please circle one):

A/ Wall / line in the sand

B/ A Sector

C/ A Network / web of agencies and laws

D/ Checkpoint

E/ Other – (please describe)

If you wish please describe why you chose you answer:

2/

Is the border where you work a:

A/ Calm and ordered environment

B/ Chaotic environment

C/ Other – (please describe)

If you wish please describe why you chose you answer:

3/

From a professional perspective what is the biggest risk you look for / to mitigate through your work:

A/ People and their actions such breaking laws – smuggling immigration breaches and terrorism etc.B/ Things (plants, contaminated food stuffs, LAGS, knives, drugs, explosives etc.

C/ Other – (please describe)

If you wish please describe why you chose you answer:

4/

What mistake that you could make while working at the border concerns you most?

For example – for me it is searching a passenger and deeming them to be of a ‘low risk’ but in fact that passenger is an extremist who leaves NZ and launches a terrorist attack on Australia.

5/

Do you believe that you:

A/ Attempt to only mitigate risks to the border as defined by your agency,

B/ Go to work and attempt to mitigate all risks to the NZ border,

Eg: I am a Customs officer but I attempt to stop all risks to the NZ border such as immigration and biosecurity and air security risks.

C/ Other – (please describe)

If your answer is (B) could you please give an example of how you have done so and your motivation:

6/

Do you:

A/ Only use the tools and colleagues of your agency to mitigate risk to the border?

B/ On occasion use the tools and people of other agencies to mitigate risk to the border?

If your answer is (B) could you please give an example of how you have done so:

7/

Do you believe that risk to the border is:

A/ Shared

B/ Individual

C/ What my immediate manager tells me it is, each shift.

D/ Other – (please describe)

If you wish please describe why you chose you answer:

8/

Can you think of an occasion when you have been un-able to convey to a colleague from a border agency other than your own that a person or object is a risk to the border – from your perspective?

Yes / no

If yes please describe the occasion in general terms:

9/

If any issues arise that I feel may be worth further discussion for my research would you mind being approached for an interview?

10/

Finally:

Please circle your work area: NZCS – MAF – INZ – POLICE - AVSEC

OTHER _____

Thank you very much for your time and please feel free to add any comments, opinions or examples on the reverse of the page about this topic / research area.

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