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LOYALISM IN MASSACHUSETTS:

THE CHARACTERISTICS AND MOTIVATIONS OF THE HARVARD LOYALISTS

Joshua L. Rosenbloom

April 25, 1981

I would like to thank everyone who has helped me with this project. In particular, I would like to express my gratitude to Carol Lasser and Steven Mintz for their advice, encouragement and enthusiasm.

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THE PROBLEM OF THE LOYALISTS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Historians have tended to approach the American Revolution from the perspective of its winners. They have tried to understand the causes and consequences of the war in terms of the attitudes, perceptions and actions of the revolutionaries. Although this approach had been very fruitful, the focus on the reasons for a revolution has obscured the possibility that any sensible, right-thinking American could have opposed the Revolution. There has long been an interest, however, in those colonists who did not support the Revolution. Recently, historians have sought to explain the motivation of these loyalists as a result of the characteristics and interests common to the social, economic, or geographical groups that were most frequently opposed to the Revolution.

William Nelson, for example, suggested that rank and file loyalists tended to be members of economic or cultural minorities. Thus, their loyalism could be explained by their greater fear of dominance by a local majority than their fear of continued British rule. Nelson also studied the leaders of the loyalists, finding them to be distinguished from their more patriotic contemporaries by a dependence on Britain for their political authority.[1] Other historians, like Wallace Brown and Leonard Labaree, have focused on the loyalists' occupations, government office holding and religious affiliations as important characteristics. Finding

that the loyalists were frequently merchants, lawyers, royal officials and Anglicans they have suggested that these were the significant factors in their loyalism. The loyalists were, in this view, motivated by a combination of close ties to Britain and economic and political self-interest.[2]

Studies of the development of revolutionary feelings have suggested, however, that a different approach to the loyalists' motivations must be taken. Pauline Maier's study of the pre-revolutionary period, for example, indicates that independence only became a goal of the radicals in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities, and that until this time almost everyone had been loyal to Britain. With the transformation of the radicals' goals "from resistance to revolution" the colonists were faced with the choice of remaining loyal or becoming revolutionary. She has suggested that, at this point in time, the question of political allegiance was

> not merely whether political ambition or economic interests caused loyalty or disloyalty, but how these or other relevant considerations encouraged, permitted or retarded adherence to a revolutionary argument that was in its own terms rational and compelling.[3]

Thus, the choice of some men to remain loyal despite the temper of the times must be studied in terms of the way their circumstances shaped their perceptions of the social and political issues surrounding the Revolution.

Several historians have looked at individual loyalists, and, in so doing, have pointed to the complexity of their

motivations. The recent biographies of Thomas Hutchinson by Bernard Bailyn, and Jonathan Sewall by Carol Berkin, for example, indicate that these men's loyalism was the result of a whole set of attitudes and opinions that they held, and not just of their self-interest.[4] Robert Calhoon and Mary Beth Norton have both considered the perceptions of larger groups of loyalists, finding that this approach to the loyalists' motivation is useful on a broader scale as well.[5] There have not, however, been any efforts to relate the group characteristics of the loyalists that Nelson, Brown, and Labaree have documented to this understanding of the loyalists' perceptions of the issues surrounding the American Revolution.

Combining a study of the group characteristics of the loyalists with a consideration of the way these characteristics were related to their understanding of the revolution is not only possible, but very enlightening. I will use both of these methods of studying the loyalists in the following case study of the Harvard graduates who became loyalists.

CHARACTERIZING THE HARVARD GRADUATES WHO BECAME LOYALISTS

Why should we study the loyalists who attended Harvard College? In and of themselves these men are worth studying because of the large number of influential figures and political leaders among them. In addition, I hope to show that insights into their characteristics and motivations can help to explain the larger question of loyalism in Massachusetts.

Harvard Students

The 206 loyalists who attended Harvard College in the classes graduating between 1722 and 1771 were members of a select and privileged group as a result of their liberal education. A total of only 1800 men attended Harvard College in these years, and the approximately 1,200 living in the mid-1770's constituted less than half of one percent of the population of Massachusetts.[6] Among that part of the population eligible to have attended college, white males over 16, they were still only about two percent.[7] How can we characterize the young men who attended Harvard College? And what was the effect of their education on their status within prerevolutionary Massachusetts?

To begin with, Harvard students tended to be more urban than the population as a whole. More than one-sixth of them were born in Boston and a similar number lived there (Table I). Over the course of the century the percentage of Boston-born students declined from about 20 percent to a low of 10.6 percent. The population of Boston declined similarly relative to that of Massachusetts, however, and the proportion of Boston born Harvard students remained about one and a half times as large as the proportion of Boston residents in the population of the Province (Table II).

Boston, the center of trade and government for the province, was the home of most of the political and economic elite of Massachusetts. These groups were well represented among Harvard students, but young men of "more common" origins also attended college. Samuel Eliot Morison recognized this diversity, characterizing the students' families as "fairly representative of the upper layers of New England. Merchants, magistrates and ministers furnished the large number, but there were a good many sons of plain farmers and artisans ..."[8] Morison did not, however, provide any measure of the relative numbers of these different students.

A means of more precisely measuring the status of the students is provided by the process of placing, by which each student was ranked within his class. While some of the details of the procedure used in placing remain unknown, there is general agreement about its broad outlines. Until 1712, seniority was determined on the basis of academic merit. After this, there was a period of transition in which students were placed more and more on the basis of the "presumed official or social rank" of their fathers. By 1749, familial prominence had become the sole criterion governing a student's place within his class.[9] Thus, we can use the class rank of Harvard students as a measure of their relative prominence.

The belief that the new students could and should be ranked according to their family status reflects a basic assumption in eighteenth century Massachusetts that runs counter to the image of an increasingly democratic society. The same belief that there was a real and necessary social order also found expression in the assignment of seats in the town meeting house, where the

position of a man's seat was a "symbolic indication of where he stood in the eyes of the community."[10] Although it is widely agreed that Massachusetts was quite democratic in the sense that most adult males were eligible to participate in the political process, recent studies suggest that there were widely accepted social distinctions that governed the political behavior of the "more common" men. For eighteenth century New Englanders, society was divided between "superiours and inferiours (sic), rulers and ruled, publick and private orders of men ..."[11] Men knew which of these groups they belonged to, and it seemed perfectly reasonable to express the recognized social order in the ranking of each new class.

There are some further clues which clarify the relationship between class rank and status in society as a whole. The College seems to have distinguished between three categories of students in placing: the sons of civil magistrates and justices of the peace were ranked highest; sons of college graduates, ranked in the order in which they had received their degrees, followed them; and finally the sons of "more common" types filled the bottom places in the class. James Axtell has suggested that approximately ten percent of each class came from the first group, 20 percent from the second, and the remaining 70 percent of each class was drawn from the "more common" sorts.[12] The fact that 20 percent of each class was made up of the sons of college graduates, a group which constituted less than one percent of the population of Massachusetts, provides one indication that the upper layers of

New England society were substantially overrepresented.

Placing was not simply a formality, but an important measurement of each student's relative prominence. The students were constantly reminded of their place: seniority governed the order in which the class would recite before the faculty, seat and serve themselves at meals, sit in chapel, march in academic processions and appear in the College Triennial Catalogue. These distinctions and other less tangible benefits derived from being placed nearer the top of the class were clearly seen by the College as desirable, since one of its standard punishments for breaches of the rules was the degradation of the guilty party one or more places until reformation and penitence were demonstrated. The comments of Paine Wingate show that the students shared this opinion. "The scholars," said Wingate, "were often enraged beyond bounds for their disappointment in their places, and it was some time before the class could be settled down to an acquiesence in their allotment."[13] Thus, the judgement of social status conveyed by a student's place was very important to all involved.

Although placing provides support for the conclusion that there were relatively many of the sons of the upper class among college graduates, it also shows that a significant part of each class was not drawn from the elite of the society. The recognition of the ability of young men from other strata of society is further suggested by the growth of scholarships in the eighteenth century. While there had been virtually no financial aid in the seventeenth century, almost half of each class received some

assistance in the 1750's and 1760's.[14] Thus, although Harvard students were frequently from prominent families, higher education was open to promising young men from other segments of society.

No matter what their social background was, however, the students were "socially ambitious and a college degree was the badge of their success."[15] Their education provided them with the training necessary to enter the ministry, law or medicine, and a very large number of them did. The occupations of all Harvard graduates in classes between 1722 and 1771 are shown in Table III. Close to 60 percent of the students entered one or another profession, and close to a third became ministers.

Despite the role that a liberal education played in advancing the social status of the sons of less prominent families, there are some indications that the opportunities available to them differed from those of their more prominent classmates. In particular, the less prominent graduates seem to have found the ministry more open to them than secular occupations.[16] The importance of inherited status is particularly clear in the effect it had on both election and appointment to public offices.

Harvard graduates were well qualified for positions of political leadership by virtue of their education, and all signs are that their communities did in fact elect them to these positions relatively frequently. One of every six Harvard graduates in the years from 1722 to 1771 was elected to the Massachusetts General Court.[17] Robert Zemsky has studied the patterns of leadership in the Massachusetts House of Representatives between

1740 and 1755, and his findings suggest that inherited status played a role in both election to the House, and leadership within the House.[18] In this time period, 70 college graduates, 13 percent of the Representatives, were elected to the House. Of the 62 that had attended Harvard, 44 had been placed in the top half of their class.[19] Thus, inherited status played a role in election to positions of political leadership.

Within the House, Zemsky found that 60 percent of the college graduates became "House leaders" while only 13 percent of the other Representatives reached this position. Among the Harvard graduates a much higher proportion of those placed in the top half of their class became leaders (73 percent) than was true for those in the bottom half of their class (28 percent).[20] Thus, while the less prominent college graduates still became leaders twice as often as the non-college educated Representatives, they achieved leadership positions less frequently than their more prominent classmates. Edward Cook found that a similar pattern prevailed in appointments to public office. Among the college graduates that he considered, two thirds of those who may be called prominent as a result of holding an appointed office were the sons or near relatives of prominent men.[21]

Harvard students were not representative of the full scope of the population of Massachusetts in the eighteenth century, being more frequently urban and prominent than was the norm, but they were drawn from a wide variety of different social and economic origins. Armed with a sense of how Harvard graduates

differed from the society they lived in, and the role they played in it, we are in a position to describe the loyalists who attended Harvard College.

The Harvard Loyalists

The loyalists who attended Harvard College shared many of the characteristics of their patriotic or undecided classmates, but the loyalists differed from other Harvard graduates in a number of significant ways. How they differed, and how they were the same is revealed in a detailed study of the biographies of 160 of the 206 identified loyalists who attended Harvard between 1722 and 1771.[22] The Harvard loyalists can then be placed in the larger context of Massachusetts loyalism through comparison with descriptions of the loyalists provided by the historians Nelson, Brown and Labaree.

Among a highly urban group, the Harvard loyalists were even more frequently of urban origin. More than one quarter of them were born in Boston, and a similar number made the city their home (Table IV). While the proportion of Boston born loyalists decreased during the century, they remained about one and a half times as likely as all Harvard students to be from Boston, and nearly three times as likely as all residents of Massachusetts. The loyalists born in Boston differed significantly in their social and economic origins and experiences from those born in rural communities, and a characterization of the

loyalists must take this into account.

Boston was the center of commerce and government for Massachusetts, and as such it was the home of many of the large merchants and political leaders of the Province. In the eighteenth century, Boston's economy expanded both horizontally and vertically, creating greater extremes of wealth and poverty, as well as a greater diversity of occupations than in the rural communities of Massachusetts.[23] The Harvard loyalists born in Boston came from more diverse social and economic circumstances than did those born in rural communities. Well over half of the loyalists born in Boston and surrounding communities were the sons of merchants, 32 percent, or government officials, 26 percent (Table V), while another 20 percent of the Boston-born loyalists were the sons of shopkeepers or craftsmen. Ministers' sons made up only a small fraction of the Boston born loyalists, whereas they predominated among the college-bound loyalists from other areas. Only the sons of shopkeepers and craftsmen appeared in any number from both urban and rural communities. The social and economic differences separating the urban and rural loyalists were reflected in many aspects of their experiences, including: their residences, occupations, political participation and religious views.

The more urban character of the loyalists meant that they came more frequently from prominent families than was true of Harvard students in general. This can be measured in the somewhat greater concentration of the loyalists in the upper half of their

class. Twenty percent of the loyalists were placed in the top ten percent of their class, while about half were placed in the top 30 percent (Table VI). The remainder of the loyalists were spread out fairly evenly throughout the other 70 percent of their class, confirming the fact that the loyalists were nonetheless drawn from a spectrum of different social classes.

A comparison of the loyalists relative class rank with their fathers' occupations (Table VII) provides a clearer understanding of the interrelationship of urban birth and inherited status. The sons of appointed government officials, the most strongly urban group, were almost always (80 percent) placed in the top fifth of their class, indicating a high degree of status. The other highly urban group, the sons of merchants, were also frequently from prominent families, as the fact that over half of them were placed in the top fifth of their class shows. The sons of ministers, doctors and lawyers came from rural areas more often, and occupied a position of somewhat lower status, being placed, for the most part, in the middle ranks of their class. In contrast to these other groups, the sons of shopkeepers and artisans were of markedly lower status, being placed in the bottom 40 percent of their class more than half of the time. Thus, among the loyalists, the men of urban origins seem to have been most frequently from the extremes of status, occupying the highest or lowest places in their classes. The men of rural origins tended, on the other hand, to fall closer to the middle of the

social spectrum of Harvard students.

Although the loyalists who attended Harvard College were more frequently professionals than their fathers (Table VIII), the occupations that they followed, and the communities that they lived in were strongly influenced by the interlocking factors of their social, economic and geographic origins. A high percentage of the Harvard graduates who became loyalists returned to the area that they came from (Table IX), but the strength of this correlation varied a great deal. Almost 70 percent of those born in Boston returned there, for example, while less than half of those born in communities between 15 and 30 miles from Boston settled in this area. For the most part, the men who left these outlying communities settled further west of Boston. This pattern was the result of the different sorts of opportunities that were open to the sons of rural ministers and professionals, and to those of urban merchants and government officials.

Almost all of the loyalists entered one of the professions or became merchants (Table X), but inherited status and wealth played a significant role in determining precisely what path they followed after Harvard. The sons of prominent and wealthy men frequently followed their fathers' footsteps. More than 60 percent of the sons of doctors and lawyers entered their fathers' professions, while 60.9 percent of the merchants' sons became merchants (Table XI). As these occupations were largely carried out in and around Boston, these men tended to remain where they

were born. In contrast, the sons of shopkeepers and craftsmen became ministers or schoolmasters twice as frequently as the other loyalists, and only rarely became merchants or lawyers.

Timothy Fuller, the grandfather of the feminist and transcendentalist Margaret Fuller, is typical of these men from less prominent families. Born in Middletown, Massachusetts, in 1739, he came from an undistinguished background. We know nothing of his father's occupation, and he was placed toward the bottom of his class. After receiving his B.A., Fuller kept the Lexington school for several years, until he received his second degree. Following this, he supplied several pulpits before accepting a call to Princeton, which Shipton described as a "raw frontier parish," and was ordained there in 1767.[24] Fuller's westward movement, and that of men like him, was the result of their choice of the ministry, and the fact that the greatest need for ministers was in the western part of the Province.

A comparison of the occupations of the loyalists with those of all Harvard students in this period provides a clear picture of the way in which the loyalists differed from their patriotic and their undecided classmates. It has been suggested that merchants and lawyers were prominent among the groups that were most strongly loyalist, and the Harvard loyalists provide some support for this idea.[25] The Harvard loyalists became merchants and lawyers at almost twice the overall rate for Harvard students. Thirty-one percent of the loyalists were merchants, and another 20 percent lawyers, as opposed to figures of 17 percent and 10 percent

respectively among all Harvard students. Similarly, there were fewer ministers among the loyalists (21.3 percent) than there were among all graduates (about 33 percent). Thus, the Harvard loyalists stand out as wealthy, urban merchants and secular professionals within a group which already contained a high concentration of these types. While these were the predominent characteristics of the group, they were not the only ones. Among the Harvard graduates who became loyalists there was a substantial minority who, like Fuller, came from less prominent families, frequently entered the ministry, settled in rural areas, and failed to conform to most generalizations about the loyalists.

The range of social types among the Harvard loyalists is particularly clear when we consider the extent of their involvement in government. Nearly half of the loyalists held either an elected or appointed political position. More than one-quarter held two offices and twenty-five, or 16 percent, held three or more.[26]

Most studies of the loyalists have found that royally appointed officials were quite consistently loyal. Their loyalism has usually been explained in terms of their close contacts with Britain, and their vested interest in maintaining order.[27] The number of royally appointed officials among the Harvard loyalists provides a good measure of the importance of this factor. Twenty-one of the Harvard loyalists (13 percent) held positions from customs officer on up to that of Lieutenant Governor and

Governor (Table XII). These men gained their positions and advanced within the royal government as a result of their trans-Atlantic connections and influence. The case of James Honeyman, in the class of 1729, illustrates how the system worked. His father was an Episcopalian minister, but he inherited land and a degree of social prominence from his mother's family. Honeyman presented Rhode Island's case before a board of royal commissioners in a boundary dispute with Massachusetts. His name was known in England, where the newly appointed Naval Officer and Judge of Vice Admiralty requested that he be appointed deputy Naval Officer, in 1743. Honeyman became closely associated with royal officers, eventually advancing to an appointment as "King's Advocate of the Court of Vice Admiralty."[28]

Patronage also operated within the Province, where the Governor's power of appointment to a number of offices was used to cement political ties and recognize prominent citizens. These offices included militia officers and judical positions ranging from justices of the peace to superior court justices.[29] Almost 15 percent of the Harvard loyalists had been appointed to governmental positions other than justice of the peace, and a huge proportion, almost 40 percent, were made justices of the peace.[30] Thus a significant portion of the loyalists were closely connected to the royal and provincial governments through appointments to government offices.

Traditionally, historians have cited the large number of loyalists who held appointed positions in the royal and provincial

governments as evidence that they lacked local political popularity and support. William Nelson, for example, argued that among the political elite of the colonies the loyalists were distinguished from the leaders of the revolutionary party by their need of support from Britain, "since they could not gain sufficient support in America to hold power."[31] In contrast to this picture, however, the Harvard graduates who became loyalists were also frequently elected to positions of leadership by their communities.

The number of Harvard loyalists elected to the House of Representatives or positions of town leadership, such as town meeting moderator or selectman, indicates that they were frequently respected and trusted members of their communities. The selectmen and town meeting moderator, for example, were chosen by election and were, almost invariably, members of a well known group of the most eminent men, "men whose worth was recognized by all the inhabitants of the town."[32] Twenty-three of the Harvard loyalists (14.4 percent) were elected to positions of town leadership; and 32 (20 percent) were elected to the House of Representatives, a slightly higher proportion than we found among all Harvard graduates. Although the loyalists had strong ties to the provincial administration, they were also men who were often viewed by their communities as qualified leaders of society.

Not only were the Harvard loyalists frequently among the recognized leaders of their communities, but a large number of those who held appointed offices, whom we might suppose to have been dependent on British support, were also community leaders.

Of the 52 Harvard loyalists who held more than one political office, 35 held at least one by appointment of the royal government or the Governor. Seventeen of these, nearly half, had also been elected to the House of Representatives or a position of town leadership.[33] Thus, we may conclude that a significant element of the provincial elite was grounded in popular support.

Although loyalists of all types held political offices, these offices were far from evenly distributed among the different social, economic and geographic types that we have identified. Among the lawyers and merchants there were a large number of office holders, 57 percent and 67 percent respectively, while only nine percent of the ministers held political positions (Table XIII). Once again, we see that there was no single loyalist experience reflecting the different social, geographic, and economic origins of the loyalists who attended Harvard College.

Although Anglicans did not make up a majority of the Harvard graduates who became loyalists, they were present in a much higher proportion (26.9 percent) than among all Harvard students (10.2 percent).[34] The loyalism of the Anglicans, like that of royal officials, can in part be explained by the connections with Britain that is adherents had. What, however, was the appeal of the Church of England to a Massachusetts born Congregationalist? Wallace Brown has suggested that Anglicanism had a social appeal for the fashionable, wealthy, urban classes, making conversion an indication of a desire to emulate British manners on the part of these classes.[35]

Almost one-third of the Anglicans among the Harvard loyalists were converts, and the reasons for their conversion provide an opportunity to investigate the relationship between Anglicanism and loyalism. The 13 converts may be divided into two groups of roughly equal size. In one group, we find men who seem to have taken the religious issues separating the two faiths fairly lightly. Supporting Brown's thesis, men like Thomas Bulfinch and John Boreland, both of whom married into Anglican families, seem to have been motivated by almost purely social concerns. In Boreland's case, "the charming society" of his wife's family drew him into the Anglican church.[36] This group was, by and large, wealthy, urban and prominent. Many of its members were government officials of some stature, and included several justices of the peace, the Sheriff of Suffolk County and the Naval Officer for Falmouth, Maine.

In contrast to these men, the other group was characterized by a much more religious and philosophical set of concerns. In this group we find pious and devoted men like William Clarke, who converted on entirely religious grounds. These more religious converts came largely from the less prominent, rural graduates, who made up the other part of the Harvard loyalists. They were, with the exception of Samuel Waldo, poorer than the men who converted for more social reasons, and were much less frequently office holders. While the number of cases we have examined is too small to be conclusive, the division of the Anglican converts

between urban and rural, and more and less prominent types illustrates some of the differences in outlook that separated these two groups.

From this examination of the characteristics of the Harvard loyalists several significant points become clear. First, within a group that already contained a relatively high concentration of men from the upper layers of society, the Harvard loyalists contained even more. This was reflected in a number of ways: they became merchants, government officials and lawyers more frequently than their patriotic or undecided classmates, they settled in Boston and its surroundings more frequently, and they were more often Anglicans. In all of these respects, they conform to the way most historians have described the loyalists. But, second, not all of the loyalists who attended Harvard may be described as urban, prominent, merchants, political leaders or secular professionals. A quarter of them settled in communities more than 30 miles from Boston, more than one-third were placed in the bottom half of their class, and more than one-fifth were ministers. While the proportion of these groups among the Harvard loyalists was smaller than among all Harvard students, it was far from insubstantial. To understand the motivations of the loyalists, the reasons why both of these social types became loyalists must be explained.

THE MOTIVATIONS OF THE HARVARD LOYALISTS

Thus far we have viewed the loyalists with the hindsight provided by two-hundred years. With the accomplished fact of the American Revolution it is easy to divide the colonists into groups that supported and opposed independence from England when this became an issue in the years immediately preceding the war. The possibility of American independence was not an issue until 1774, however, and "post-1774 affiliations and opinions cannot be projected backwards upon the prerevolutionary period."[37] To call someone a loyalist prior to 1774 is to say that he took a position which identified him with the positions of other men who would become loyalists, and which placed him in opposition to those men who led the colonial resistance and later the Revolution. Thus, the important questions about the loyalists' motivations are: What were the issues that divided the future loyalists and revolutionaries? And what distinguished the loyalists' perceptions of these issues from those of the radicals?

Until 1774, the loyalists were largely responding to the political and public actions of the radicals. As Table XIV shows, before 1774, more than 70 percent of the actions of the Harvard loyalists which can, with highsight, be identified as indications of future loyalism were of three kinds: criticism of the radicals, resistance to their protests, and political opposition to their initiatives. A number of future loyalists were critical, for example, of the unnecessary extremism of public protests like

the Stamp Act riots. Such protests were actively resisted by government officials who had to enforce unpopular British policies, and merchants who did not wish to take part in the non-importation movement. Finally, some of the Harvard loyalists indicated their positions by voting against radical resolutions in town meetings and in the House of Representatives. None of these actions implied a particular position on American independence, since at this time almost no one favored rebellion. Only after 1774, when a substantial number of people favored independence, did the loyalists begin to identify themselves explicitly through their opposition to this goal.

The early political issues that divided the future loyalists and revolutionaries centered around a growing conflict between Thomas Hutchinson, an important figure in Massachusetts politics and later governor of the province, and the leaders of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, particularly James Otis, Jr. and John Adams. Although the issue that divided the two factions in Massachusetts had to do with the degree of participation of the lower classes in political decisions, both factions were led by members of the upper strata of the society. Following the usual pattern of political conflict at this time, neither faction could be termed a "populist" movement on the basis of its leadership.[38]

Around the middle of the eighteenth century, a group of political leaders in Boston that centered around James Otis, Sr.,

Royall Tyler, and Oxenbridge Thatcher was advocating positions that "gave credence to laboring-class views and regarded as entirely legitimate the participation of artisans and even laborers in the political process."[39] They were opposed by a group of merchants and political figures that included Thomas Hutchinson, who wanted to reduce the chaos that they felt was inherent in the involvement of these classes in the city's governance. The Hutchinson faction wished to replace elected offices with appointed ones, and hand over management of the city to the wealthy and well-born.[40] When the newly appointed Governor, Francis Bernard, arrived in Massachusetts in 1760, he found the province "divided into parties so nearly equal that it would have been madness for me to put myself at the head of either of them."[41]

Bernard's actions did not, however, help to calm the political situation. In fact, fuel was added to the conflict in 1760, when he appointed Hutchinson to the chief justiceship that had become vacant as a result of the death of Stephen Sewall. As Bernard knew, but chose to ignore, this position had been promised to James Otis, Sr., by Governor Shirley. Of particular importance to Bernard in making this decision was his concern over Otis' political alliances and his seeming unwillingness to prosecute violations of the navigation laws. Hutchinson, on the other hand, seemed committed to maintaining close ties with England.[42]

Bernard's slight to Otis provoked his son, James, Jr., and John Adams to mount a series of vicious attacks upon Hutchinson over the years. Although these did not result in any immediate uproar, they began "the transformation of Hutchinson's reputation from that of an unimpeachable if conservative leader of the Anglo-American establishment to that of a sinister manipulator of secret forces."[43] This transformation would be a long time in the making, and no one could have judged its consequences at the time. Nonetheless, the men who were attracted to the provincial administration in the early 1760's, and who became Hutchinson's defenders in this dispute would eventually become loyalists.

Jonathan Sewall, a rising young lawyer who had graduated from Harvard in 1748, and a member of the provincial elite through his prominent relatives, was one of those who gravitated toward Hutchinson. His study of the law under Chambers Russell and his close connection with Edmund Trowbridge, both friends of Hutchinson, predisposed him to the administration side. With the political establishment of Massachusets divided into two competing factions, his decision was highly pragmatic.

> to move to Otis's camp would be to lose his patrons; to remain loyal would deepen their [the administration's] attachment to him. And surrounded by enemies, Bernard would be certain to take more immediate note of a talented young friend.[44]

Sewall was soon rewarded for his support of the administration with a commission as a justice of the peace. With the passing of time, his attachment to the administration would win him

the position of attorney general and several royal appointments.

Sewall, like other supporters of the administration, was forced to take a stand in opposition to the radicals in the ensuing imperial crises despite his fundamental agreement with them. The Stamp Act, in 1765, was the first such crisis which brought imperial issues into the domestic political debate. While almost all Americans opposed the Act, none advocated independence. Although a few people believed that the Act represented a concerted design against the colonies, the overwhelming majority felt that if this was so it was the work of people outside of Parliament. Thus, resistance was directed toward imperial reform, and not revolution.[45]

Political leaders were split, however, over the form that resistance should take.[46] While the provincial administration felt that the Act should be protested, they could not advocate disobeying it. Popularly elected leaders, on the other hand, favored carrying on business without the use of stamps, in defiance of the Act. This tactic forced the administration's supporters to remain silent rather than be associated with the means of protest of the radicals. Sewall, for example, did not approve of the Stamp Act any more than its vocal protestors, but he remained silent because the public opposition was directed against both the Act and its enforcement. In the increasingly critical atmosphere of the next few years, Sewall was an object of attack as a result of his growing ties to the administration.[47]

Sewall seems to be fairly typical of those Harvard graduates who first became identified as loyalists at this time. Four-fifths of the Harvard loyalists who first opposed the radicals between 1761 and 1767 held some political position, and 55 percent occupied at least one appointed office in either the provincial or royal government (Table XV). Thus, the early loyalists were predominantly government men who supported British authority despite their distaste for the measures it required.

The tactics of the radicals in the years following the Stamp Act further separated the executive and legislative branches of the Massachusetts government, and cemented the factional allegiances that had been formed. Continuing to believe in the benevolence of the King, the radicals attributed oppressive British policies to the evil designs of royal officials in the Colonies. They attacked these officials for their corruption and their efforts to subvert the colonists' freedom. Combined with appeals to the public to oppose tyranny, these attacks succeeded in making royal officials the objects of increasing animosity.

Governor Bernard, one of the subjects of these attacks, wrote bitterly to Lord Shelbourne about them:

> To the original system of humbling the government and weakening its authority by constant opposition to the governor and making his seat uneasy and precarious he [James Otis, Jr.] has added a malicious, virulent and unrelenting animosity against the persons employed in the government.[49]

As they attributed the radicals' attacks to private malice and a desire for personal political advancement, government

officials and their supporters could only feel unjustly slandered. To them the radicals appeared as base men intent on their own gain even at the cost of upsetting the stable political order; but with no sign of the coming revolutionary upheaval, it was still possible for the administration's supporters to believe that tempers would eventually cool and society would return to its rightful order.[49] Their efforts to protect the established, deferential political order would appear as loyalist acts only in retrospect.

The condemnation of appeals to the public by the supporters of the administration grew out of their entire political philosophy. Believing that deference to the well-born and capable was a necessary part of good government, they glorified the British form of government as the world's greatest political achievement. Jonathan Sewall exemplifies their thinking. Early in his life, Sewall developed a conviction that "the paternal care of the majority by a privileged but responsibility-laden minority was rational, necessary and productive of social harmony."[50] He developed and elaborated upon this view in the course of his published responses to attacks on Bernard and Hutchinson in the radical press. For Sewall there were only three political alternatives open to human society: anarchy, tyranny, and British constitutional government. By balancing the two extremes, British government arrived at the limits of perfection allowed by man's own imperfection. The real danger

to political liberty in the colonies, he believed, came not from the King, but from the possibility of anarchy that the efforts of popular political leaders threatened to bring about.[51]

Sewall's political position thus combined an abstract appreciation for the British form of government with a concrete set of aristocratic attitudes and perceptions. His loyalism was the result of his negative reaction to the radicals' tactics, growing out of his distaste for popular involvement in decisions that ought to be left to the leaders of the society. This same distaste for the tumult that the radicals created seems to explain the loyalism of a number of the other Harvard loyalists. Robert Auchmuty (Class of 1746), for example, criticized the radical leaders and their followers in 1770:

> Persons of the most abandon'd character, warmly espousing what is erroneously called the interest of the people are almost the objects of their adoration. Such, however before despised, as selfish and base, now have an arbitrary sway in the town of Boston. They, back'd by a wrong headed deluded populace, are the tyrants of the times.[52]

Thus, while the effect of these early "political" loyalists' views was to place them in support of British actions, it was largely as a result of their reaction to the domestic political conflict, and not because of their support for British policy.

In the years following 1767, political issues remained important, but the scope of the conflict expanded to include men with little or no connection to the provincial government. The radicals were institutionalizing their methods of resistance in these years, establishing communications between the committees

that had formed in different communities, and forming associations to enforce restrictions on imports. All of these actions would eventually result in the birth of an alternative source of political authority, a sort of publicly supported "revolutionary" shadow government.[53]

One aspect of this organizing process was the use of popularly elected bodies, including the Massachusetts General Court, and town meetings, as vehicles of opposition to the provincial administration. Many of the men who became loyalists in the late 1760's did so in reaction to these tactics. The men who were affected by these tactics were less closely tied to the administration than were the earlier loyalists. Only 5 of the 19 Harvard loyalists (26.3 percent) who emerged in this period were provincial officials, and only 1 (5.3 percent) was a royal official (Table XV). In contrast, these figures were 40 and 45 percent respectively for the loyalists who emerged before 1767.

In 1768, the House of Representatives wrote a Circular Letter to communities throughout the colonies encouraging their resistance to the Townshend duties. This effort to use the legislature as a forum for the radicals' views provoked the resistance of a number of the Harvard loyalists. Governor Bernard called upon the House to rescind the letter, which it refused to do, despite a core of administration supporters. One of the men who voted to rescind the letter was William Browne of Salem. Browne, who had graduated in 1755, came from an

extremely wealthy family and had been appointed a justice of the peace in 1760. In 1762, he had been chosen to represent Salem in the House of Representatives, where he was on good terms with both the Hutchinson and Otis factions.[54]

Although Salem had instructed him to oppose rescinding the Circular Letter, Browne voted in favor of rescinding it. This earned him the censure of the town, and lost him his seat at the next election. The administration did not let his support go unrewarded, however. In 1770, he was appointed to the Essex Court of Common Pleas and, in 1771, he was made a colonel of the First Essex Militia. From this point on he seems to have been drawn ever more deeply into the administration's circle. He warmly welcomed General Gage when he came to Salem in 1774, and entertained him, it was said, with tea purchased from Richard Clarke despite the radicals' boycott.[55]

Browne was not without his supporters in Salem, however. A number of men, including William Pynchon (Class of 1743) opposed the town meeting's censure of Browne. Pynchon, a son of the highly revered Pynchons of Springfield, settled in Salem, where he read law and became a member of the bar. In 1761, he was appointed a justice of the peace, but rose no further than that within the government. He does not seem to have suffered for his support of Browne in 1768, but his signature on the lawyers' testimonial to Hutchinson and a letter of welcome to Gage, both in 1774, made him an object of popular abuse. Despite withdrawing to Nantucket for a period to avoid

the violence directed at him, he later chose to return to Salem, and remained there throughout the Revolution.[56]

Pynchon's diary from the war years is revealing of the attitudes and perceptions that must have motivated his loyalism. He remained enough of a patriot to term word of a British victory at Ticonderoga as "bad news", despite harassment that prompted him to describe his situation in these dismal words:

> We crawl about and exist, but cannot be said to truly live. It is said we have full enjoyment of our liberty, but where is the proof of it?[57]

On the other hand, he was critical of the radical leaders, believing that their selfish interests were the cause of the Revolution, and doubtful about the possibility of a successful democratic government, believing that the people were neither wise nor virtuous enough to make one work.[58] On hearing of the Declaration of Independence, he wrote:

> Query, the consequences of this measure. God's chosen people, though governed by himself, desired a King of their own; he gave them a King in his anger. We Americans, 'God's favorite people,' desiring no King, have set ours aside; but wiser than the Israelites, who, having nothing did every man what was right in his own eyes, we have preferred many to one...[59]

His doubts about the possibility of a popular government unchecked by any other forces were only reinforced by his experience with inflation during the Revolution. He saw the failure of popular government in the economic anarchy of the era.

> The acts of state absolutely prohibit every kind of depreciation of the paper currency; either by words or actions; yet every trader, huckster, marketman and peddler with open mouths, unitedly declare and publickly (sic) say it is of little or no value...[60]

Pynchon's doubts about democratic government were similar to those of Sewall. They, and other men of similar views, came to oppose the radicals because they believed in the need for a stably organized deferential government, protected against the excesses of popular passion. As Pynchon's case suggests, these conservative political views were not limited to members of the provincial elite, but extended to men with only a peripheral involvement in the government.

In the years after 1767, the radicals' tactics also began to impinge upon men with no political involvement. These men, who held no political positions, were responding to a different set of issues than the "political" loyalists. Ministers of inland communities and seaport merchants made up most of the Harvard loyalists with little or no political involvement. Between 1767 and 1773, two Congregationalist ministers emerged as opposing the radicals (Table XV). Both of them came to public attention because of their criticism of what they believed to be the extremism of the radicals, and their advocacy of greater moderation. Rural ministers concerned with political issues outside of their own communities were the exception to the rule, however. Most rural communities were preoccupied with their own internal divisions in these years, and gave little if any notice to the imperial issues that

embroiled Boston politics.

The merchants who emerged in the years after 1767 shared the "political" loyalists' fears of popular excesses, but for different reasons. These merchants, as evidenced by their lack of political offices, and in some cases their avoidance of them, were not particularly interested in government. What concerned them, and impinged upon them enough to force them to choose sides in the political conflict was the growth and enforcement of non-importation agreements. The cases of Nathaniel Rogers (Class of 1755) and William Vassall (Class of 1733) suggest the range of impact that non-importation had on merchants, and their reactions to it.

Nathaniel Rogers was the son of a wealthy Boston merchant who was related to most of the prominent families in the province. After his parents' death, he was raised by his uncle Thomas Hutchinson. A convert to Anglicanism, the religion of his wife, he moved in the highest social circles of Boston. In the early 1760's, Rogers' position on trade restrictions imposed by the British placed him in substantial agreement with the radicals. He was responsible for the reprinting of a seventeenth-century essay by William Wood, entitled "New England's Prospect," for which he wrote an introduction that so closely paralleled the radicals' position on British tariffs that it has been attributed to James Otis. He was, however, growing more fearful of the radicals' use of mob violence. By September, 1765,

he was concerned enough that he wrote to Thomas Hutchinson supporting the employment of British Regulars to prevent violence.[61]

Rogers mostly wanted to be left alone to pursue his own fortune, as his advocacy of moderation in response to the Townshend Act in 1768 indicates: "Were we to adopt moderate and prudent measures," he wrote in a letter to the Boston News-Letter, "all our past warmth and heat would be forgot; and the Act would be repealed." When the radicals' efforts to block the importation of British goods became an obstacle to his financial activities, he simply ignored them. His defiance of the non-importation agreement was revealed, however, when the Boston Chronicle published the import records of a number of Boston merchants in 1769.[62]

As a result, Rogers, and several other merchants who were also named, came under intense public pressure to conform. A meeting of merchants resolved that they were "obstinant and inveterate enemies of their country, and subverters of the rights and liberties of this continent," and denied them all commercial dealings and common civility.[63] In addition, they made life miserable for Rogers in other ways, covering his house with what he described as the "vilest filth of the vilest vault." Rogers expressed a determination not to submit to the "arbitrary will of lawless tyrannical men," but he was convinced by his friends that he should give in to the mob's demands for his

self-preservation.[64] His death, in 1770, spared him further harassment.

In contrast to Rogers' rather militant resistance of the mob, William Vassall seems to have passed through the years of the non-importation movement silently and innocuously. Vassall was born into a very wealthy family. His father sent him and his brother to Harvard as Fellow Commoners, which, for the gift of two silver tankards and twice the ordinary tuition, entitled them to eat at the head table, and gave them several other minor privileges. Vassall showed little interest in political office, occupying himself with the management of his Jamaican plantation and the social life of the circle of Anglican immigrants in Boston.[65]

Living in affluence in his Boston mansion, and owning one of the 22 carriages in that city, Vassall seems to have been quite content to remain withdrawn from public events. Although he was named as an importer at the same time as Rogers, he seems to have avoided popular resentment, and it was later noted that his imports were intended for personal consumption. He was nevertheless concerned about the possible inconvenience that the non-importation movement could cause. In 1770, he wrote to his son-in-law, and London agent, James Syme: "We are here in a very disagreeable situation as to importing goods from England..." and advised him to exercise prudence in replying to any queries about his trade with America.[66] This concern soon passed, however, and the bulk of his letters in the following years deal with

managing his plantation and his son William, Jr., in London, whom he admonished for being overly fond of gaming and women.[67]

It was not until 1774 that public affairs again intruded in William Vassall's life, and this time they seemed very threatening. Writing to Syme in 1774 about the closing of Boston Harbor, he proposed to remove himself from that city to Bristol "...till near Christmass by which time we hope things will return to their former peaceable state. But if things should continue in their present unsettled state, we propose to remove to England this time twelvemonth."[68] Despite continued turbulence, Vassall maintained himself in style, importing finery from England through neighboring ports, since Boston was closed.[69] The situation continued to deteriorate, however, and he inched toward leaving for England, but he still hoped that an accomodation could be reached.

> I impatiently wait to hear the determination of the Continental Congress. If they should happily agree on an accomodation with [the] mother country I shall with great pleasure return to dear Boston ... But if the present distress and unhappy state continue I shall go to London ...[70]

An accomodation was not to be reached, however, and Vassall departed for London, where he could better supervise his Jamaican estate than in the unsettled situation of America.

Neither Rogers nor Vassall seems to have been motivated by a set of political ideals. Their primary concern was that they be able to carry on their own affairs with a minimum of interference. Rogers, for example, was a friend of the

resistance so long as it did not threaten his business, and Vassall only went to England because the unsettled situation made the management of his affairs impractical in America. The loyalism of these merchants was much more pragmatically based than that of the "political" loyalists. What is common to both groups, however, is that their opposition to the radicals came about because the radicals' tactics impinged upon their activities, forcing them to choose one side or the other. For the more stubborn merchants, like Rogers, this moment came earlier than for more retiring ones, like Vassall, but at some point they all had to make a choice based on their economic interests. The fact that the radicals' activities in the 1760's and early 1770's were most directly challenging to the political leaders and merchants who lived in Boston and other port cities explains the predominance of these groups among the loyalists of this period.

The transformation of the radicals' goal from reform to revolution that began with the closing of Boston Harbor forced many of the men who were still hoping for some accomodation to commit themselves to one side or the other. At the same time, the spread of radicalism outside of the port towns exposed conservative men to increased scrutiny, criticism, and harassment. Thus, in this late phase of the prerevolutionary era moderate men who had so far avoided conflict with either side, and rural men who had not been involved in earlier issues were forced to choose sides over the question of American independence.

Samuel Quincy (Class of 1754) was, like some of the merchants, a man who straddled the fence as long as he could, in hopes that reason would prevail, and an accomodation be reached. Quincy was, at first, close to the radicals' position and was elected to a committee to protest the appointment of the Board of Customs in 1768.[71] Yet, even at this date he was fearful of the consequences of the political protests of the mobs. Writing to Joshua Bracket in August, 1768, he expressed concern that the public protests in America and England might result in the fall of one, the other, or both countries. Such an event would, he wrote, result in the loss of the "most inestimable treasure of the world."[72]

During the early 1770's Quincy's connections with the administration were reinforced by his appointments as a justice of the peace and solicitor general.[73] However, he did not demonstrate the same commitment to the preservation of British authority that other provincial appointees did. His correspondence with his brother Josiah, a member of the radicals' circle, suggests the extent to which his loyalties were divided. In a letter written in 1774, Samuel lamented their differences and discussed the issues that divided them:

> The convulsion of the times is nothing more to be lamented, than the interruption of domestic harmony ...Our natural frame and constitutions, though cast in the same mold are not in all respects alike.[74]

While Samuel prefered "ease and retirement," he recognized that his brother was inclined through "zeal and fervor of

imagination, strength of genius & love of glory" to take part in the "turmoils of public action." These differences, he hoped could not be attributed to any "defect of conscience or uprightness of intention" on either of their parts. He closed the letter with this blessing of his brother and his cause: "God preserve you in health and longevity, the friend & patron, and at length the father of your country..."[75]

While Samuel Quincy could not bring himself to participate in the making of the American Revolution neither could he condemn it as loyalists like Sewall could. Preparing to leave Boston for England in 1775, he wrote to Henry Hill: "if I cannot love my country, which I shall endeavor to the utmost of my power, I will never betray it."[76] Leaving the scene was his way of withdrawing from the pressures of political division. After hearing of the Battle of Bunker Hill he expressed his inability to take a stand.

> I lament it [the war] with most cordial affection for my native country and feel sensible for my friends. But I am aware it is my duty patiently to submit the event, as it may be governed by the all-wise councils of that being "who ruleth in the heavens and is the God of armies..."[77]

Quincy's motivations differ from those of the other loyalists we have considered so far. He was only concerned by the radicals' tactics insofar as they endangered the British Empire and the political unity of Britain and America that this meant. He could not see an independent existence for either country. The dissolution of Anglo-American unity left him in a

quandary over which side to support, and unable to choose one over the other, he backed neither. Nonetheless, his position in favor of harmonious relations with Britain led him to identify himself with the loyalists in 1774, when he signed the lawyers' farewell to Hutchinson and welcomed Gage.

The increasingly clear division of the population over the issue of British authority helps to explain the emergence of a number of rural loyalists, particularly ministers, in the years after 1773. Until this time, the imperial issues that embroiled Boston and other ports elicited only mild response in the rural communities of Massachusetts.[78] Now, with the establishment of a provincial congress and other bodies challenging the authority of the provincial administration, the allegiances of the population were being tested. The ministers of several towns seem to have been placed in a particularly difficult situation by this development. With the calling of a fast day by the provincial congress, they were forced to take a position, either recognizing or denying the authority of this body to call such an action.

Ebenezer Sparhawk, the minister of Templeton and a graduate in the class of 1756, was one of the men who refused to set a fast in 1774. This, combined with his pointed prayer for the King led the town to appoint a committee to express their displeasure with his behavior. While he remained firm in his position, feelings were not so strong that he could not continue as the town's minister, which he did.[79] As with several other ministers, Sparhawk seems to have been involved in a certain amount of contention

with his community prior to the Revolution, suggesting that the question of loyalty was only the latest manifestation of a continuing dispute. For another of the ministers who first became identified as a loyalist as this time, Ebenezer Morse, this dispute had begun in 1745, when he denied George Whitefield the use of the town meeting house, and was continued over issues such as his attempt to introduce singing by note.[80]

It is hard to determine the reasons for these ministers' loyalism, but their reticence to acknowledge the authority of the Provincial Congress points to their support of established authority, as does the consistently anti-revival stance of those who were old enough to have been involved in it. In this sense, they may be described as conservatives. Their conservatism only became politically important at this late date, however, because it was only at this time that the radicals' tactic impinged upon them. Thus, their loyalism shares with the other loyalists the characteristic that it was only expressed when the radicals forced them to choose between supporting them or opposing them.

CONCLUSION

Although the Harvard graduates who became loyalists came from a wide range of social, economic and geographic backgrounds, they all enjoyed a privileged position in society as a result of their education. Their positions as political leaders, merchants and ministers meant that they were frequently well placed to observe the public tumult provoked by the radical leaders. The way that they reacted to the disturbances created by the radicals may be characterized as "conservative," that is, their loyalism was motivated by a desire to protect the established political order and a fear of the consequences of public protests. The basis of these conservative attitudes differed, however, depending upon the specific situation of each individual. What has emerged from the preceding consideration of the Harvard loyalists' perceptions of the issues surrounding the American Revolution is an understanding of how social, economic and geographic circumstances were related to the form of these conservative attitudes, and the timing of their expression.

The Harvard loyalists expressed their loyalism in reaction to the challenge that the radicals posed to them. As an examination of the ways in which loyalists became identified has shown, until 1774, these responses had nothing to do with opposing rebellion against Britain. It is only with hindsight that positions taken in the 1760's and early 1770's can be identified as signs of loyalism. The division of political leaders into groups of future

loyalists and revolutionaries began in the early 1760's and continued until the outbreak of war. Initially, the men who would become loyalists were familiar with politics, and responded to radical challenges within the framework of existing domestic political disputes. They believed that they were protecting the established political order from the danger posed by popular political leaders. They saw themselves as the proper guardians of "public virtue," protecting the greater good of the community from what they believed to be the selfish aims of their political opponents.

Merchants with little or no political involvement came to oppose the radicals later, beginning in the late 1760s. They were not reacting to specific political actions, but to the radicals' interference in free trade. They wished to carry on business with as little disturbance as possible from either side. Yet as the non-importation movement grew it began to seem more threatening to them than British regulations. Although the merchants and political conservatives shared a fear of the radicals' public protests, they did not recognize the identity of their interests for some time. As long as both groups were responding to the particular threats that the radicals posed to them, their goals were not clearly unified. Only when the radicals came to favor revolution were the merchants and political leaders unified by their opposition to American independence.

In 1774, the domestic issues that divided the future loyalists and revolutionaries were translated into the imperial issue of

American independence. This new understanding of the division of society forced a number of moderate men, who had so far avoided identification with either side, to declare their allegiances. Prior to this time, they had been able to maintain connections with both sides in the domestic political disputes, or to remain aloof from these disputes. These men only reluctantly identified themselves as loyalists, in 1774, because of their belief that Anglo-American unity was essential to the stability of their society. As long as the existence of the British Empire had not been threatened, they were able to avoid taking a stand on domestic issues, but the clarity with which independence became the radicals' goal after 1774 made it impossible for them to remain neutral any longer.

Another group of men who had not been forced to take a stand in earlier disputes was also confronted with the choice of supporting or opposing rebellion, in the years immediately preceding the Revolution. The spread of revolutionary organizing to previously quiescent rural communities, in 1774, forced the residents of these communities to take sides as well. At this time, the focus of attention shifted from local, to provincial and imperial issues, as the spread of non-importation agreements outside of Boston, and the formation of local committees of correspondence suggests. As this shift occurred, the residents of rural communities were faced, for the first time, with the choice of which side to support. Some men, motivated by their respect for established authority, opposed the radicals' efforts.

The number of rural men who joined the loyalists was small,

however, compared to the number of urban political leaders and merchants who became identified as loyalists. The short time span in which the rural loyalists could be identified, combined with growing public pressure to support the Revolution suggests that the number of rural loyalists may not be reflective of the number of rural men with conservative attitudes. After 1774, events moved quickly towards outright war, and the supporters of royal government outside of Boston became increasingly isolated from British protection, as the countryside became more radical. Expressions of their loyalism exposed them to harassment and abuse, from which they could expect little protection. The rural men who became loyalists in the years immediately before the Revolution may be just the most visible part of a much larger group.

This pattern of progressive reaction to the radicals' challenges helps to explain the strong urban, political and commercial bias that we have found among the Harvard loyalists, as other scholars have found more generally. The relative numbers of urban and rural, political and non-political loyalists reflect the extent of involvement of these groups in the domestic disputes that grew into the American Revolution. Since the radicals' efforts were primarily focused in urban areas prior to 1774, most loyalists were urban men, reacting to events close to home. Since the radicals' major challenges, in this time period, were directed against the political and business establishments, it was largely political leaders and merchants who responded to them. Only after 1773 and 1774, when the issue became revolution instead of resistance, were moderate merchants, political

leaders, and residents of rural communities, all previously uninvolved in domestic disputes, forced to make a choice. At this point, some of the men who valued continued unity, sided with the men who had earlier opposed the radicals, becoming identified collectively as loyalists because of their shared opposition to independence. Other conservative men did not respond to the challenge of the radicals in this late phase of the prerevolutionary period, however, because of increased public pressure to support the Revolution or remain silent.

The fact that the loyalists were, on the whole, reacting to the radicals' initiatives also helps to explain the weakness of the loyalist side which has been noted by other historians. Since the men who would become loyalists were initially responding to different issues, they did not see themselves as a unified group. Political leaders believed that they were acting to protect the greater good of the community, while merchants were mostly concerned with the interference of the mob in free trade. Thus, prior to 1774 no unified leadership developed as a viable alternative to the radicals. After this time, the radicals' challenge extended far beyond domestic disputes, attacking the British Empire itself, and the outnumbered loyalists, seeing themselves as just one part of this larger body opposing the radicals' goal of American independence, looked to Britain for leadership. The failure of men with conservative attitudes to assume leadership of the loyalist cause is underscored by the fact that we have observed this failure among the college-educated elite of New England. If Harvard

graduates, who were frequently the recognized leaders of their communities, failed to become the leaders of the loyalist side, who would?

NOTES

1. William H. Nelson, The American Tory. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 3, 85-115.

2. Leonard W. Labaree, "The Nature of American Loyalism," American Antiquarian Society Proceedings 54 (April 19-October 18, 1944): 15-58; Wallace Brown, The Good Americans. (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1969).

3. Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), p. xv.

4. Bernard Bailyn, The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, The Belknap Press, 1974); Carol Berkin, Jonathan Sewall, Odyssey of an American Loyalist. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

5. Robert M. Calhoon, The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 1760-1781. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1965); Mary Beth Norton, The British Americans: The Loyalists Exiles in England, 1774-1789. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972).

6. John Langdon Sibley and Clifford K. Shipton, Sibley's Harvard Graduates, 17 vols. (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1859-1975); Samuel Eliot Morison, Three Centuries of Harvard, 1636-1936. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), p. 147n; Evarts B. Greene and Virginia Harrington, American Population Before the Federal Census of 1790. (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1966), p. 17.

7. Greene and Harrington, p. xxii.

8. Morison, p. 102.

9. Ibid, p. 104.

10. Edward M. Cook, Jr., The Fathers of the Towns: Leadership and Community Structure in Eighteenth-Century New England. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 91.

11. Quoted in Robert A. Gross, The Minutemen and Their World. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976), p. 12.

12. James Axtell, The School Upon a Hill (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 220.

13. Ibid, p. 219; Sibley and Shipton, 14:533.

14. Axtell, p. 219.

15. Ibid, p. 218.

16. P.M.G. Harris, "The Social Origins of American Leaders: The Demographic Foundations," Perspectives in American History 3 (1969): 192.

17. Sibley and Shipton.

18. Robert M. Zemsky, "Power, Influence and Status: Leadership Patterns in the Massachusetts Assembly, 1740-1755," William and Mary Quarterly 26 (October, 1969): 502-520.

19. Ibid, pp. 508-11.

20. Ibid, p. 511.

21. Cook, p. 114.

22. Statistical information on the Harvard graduates who became loyalists is based on information contained in the biographies of 160 of the 206 identified loyalists in Sibley and Shipton, Sibley's

Harvard Graduates. If there were less than four loyalists in a class, all of them were included in the study. When there were more than four loyalists in a class, four were selected at random for inclusion. I have not sought independent verification of the data presented in these biographies.

23. Gary B. Nash, The Urban Crucible. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 161; Gary B. Nash, "Social Change and the Growth of Prerevolutionary Radicalism", in The American Revolution, ed. by Alfred F. Young. (Dekalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1976), p. 7; Jackson Turner Main, The Social Structure of Revolutionary America. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 37.

24. Sibley and Shipton, 14:601-02.

25. Brown, pp. 50-51; Labaree, p. 17.

26. Sibley and Shipton.

27. Brown, p. 44; Labaree, pp. 17, 32.

28. Sibley and Shipton, 8:587-88.

29. Christopher M. Jedry, The World of John Cleaveland. (New York: Norton, 1979), p. 120.

30. Sibley and Shipton.

31. Nelson, p. 3.

32. Cook, p. 22.

33. Sibley and Shipton.

34. Ibid.

35. Brown, p. 57.

36. Sibley and Shipton, 44:393-95, 12:18-19, 243.

37. Norton, p. 7.

38. Cook, p. 10; Calhoon, p. 105; Nash, "Social Change...", p. 18.

39. Nash, "Social Change...", p. 24.

40. Ibid, p. 25.

41. Quoted in Bailyn, p. 47.

42. Bailyn, p. 48.

43. Ibid, p. 50.

44. Berkin, p. 27.

45. Maier, pp. 100, 103.

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STATISTICAL TABLES

TABLE I

HARVARD GRADUATES BORN AND LIVING IN BOSTON

Classes	Born in Boston No. of grads.	Born in Boston % of grads.	Living in Boston No. of grads.	Living in Boston % of grads.
1722-33	91	20.0	94	20.6
1734-44	89	24.4	64	17.5
1745-55	59	21.1	53	19.0
1756-64	42	12.0	53	15.1
1765-71	37	10.6	45	12.9
Total	318	17.7	309	17.2

Notes: Information on birthplaces and residences of Harvard graduates from Sibley and Shipton, Sibley's Harvard Graduates. Classes have been grouped for comparison with the loyalist sample.

TABLE II

POPULATION OF MASSACHUSETTS AND BOSTON

Year	Massachusetts	Boston	Boston as a % of Mass.
1733	120,000	15,057	12.6
1765	240,000	15,520	6.47

Source: Adapted from Nash, pp. 407-409; and Greene and Harrington, pp. 15, 21-22.

TABLE III

OCCUPATIONS OF HARVARD GRADUATES: 1722-1771

	Merchants		Lawyers		Physicians		Row Totals	
Classes	No.	% of grads.	No.	% of grads.	No.	% of grads.	No.	% of grads.
1722-33	90	19.7	29	6.4	53	11.6	172	37.7
1734-44	42	11.5	17	4.7	47	12.9	106	29.1
1745-55	56	20.1	30	10.8	41	14.7	127	45.5
1756-64	68	19.4	56	16.0	49	14.0	173	49.4
1765-71	52	14.9	51	14.6	65	18.6	168	48.0
Total	308	17.1	183	10.2	255	14.2	746	41.4

Notes: Information on these occupations is from Sibley and Shipton. It was not, however, possible to determine the number of ministers in each class from this source. Data on ministers in selected classes is presented below.

Class	No. of Ministers	% of grads.
1725	20	42.6
1750	7	36.8
1760	7	25.9
1770	11	32.4
Total	45	35.4

Source: Adapted from Lawrence A. Cremin, American Education: The Colonial Experience, 1607-1783. (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p.554.

TABLE IV

BIRTHPLACES AND RESIDENCES OF THE HARVARD LOYALISTS BY DISTANCE FROM BOSTON

	Birthplace			Residence		
CATEGORY LABEL	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)	ABSOLUTE FREQ	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
DIST<7 MILES *	9	5.8	5.8	4	2.7	2.7
. BOSTON	45	28.8	34.6	42	28.2	30.9
. CAMBRIDGE	11	7.1	41.7	9	6.0	36.9
7<DIST<15 **	15	9.6	51.3	9	6.0	43.0
. SALEM	7	4.5	55.8	14	9.4	52.3
15<DIST<23	11	7.1	62.8	7	4.7	57.0
23<DIST<30	17	10.9	73.7	11	7.4	64.4
30<DIST	25	16.0	89.7	36	24.2	88.6
OUTSIDE MASS.	13	8.3	98.1	17	11.4	100.0
OUTSIDE AMER.	3	1.9	100.0	0	0.0	100.0
	1	MISSING	100.0	3	MISSING	100.0
	3	MISSING	100.0	8	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL	160	100.0		160	100.0	

* Does not include Boston or Cambridge

** Does not include Salem

Notes: This table is based on the results of a statistical study of the biographies of 160 loyalists who attended Harvard, in John L. Sibley and Clifford K. Shipton, <u>Sibley's Harvard Graduates</u>, 17 vols. (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1859-1975). Hereafter referred to as the loyalist sample.

TABLE V

HARVARD LOYALISTS' BIRTHPLACES BY THEIR FATHERS' OCCUPATIONS

BIRTHPLC : Distance from Boston

Father's Occupation (COUNT / ROW PCT / COL PCT)	DIST<7 MILES 1.	7<DIST< 15 4.	15<DIST <23 6.	23<DIST <30 7.	30<DIST 10.	OUTSIDE MASS. 11.	ROW TOTAL
1. GOVT APPT	10 71.43 18.87	0 .00 .00	0 .00 .00	1 7.14 10.00	1 7.14 8.33	2 14.29 16.67	14 13.59
2. GOVT ELECTED	4 57.14 7.55	0 .00 .00	0 .00 .00	1 14.29 10.00	1 14.29 8.33	1 14.29 8.33	7 6.80
3. MINISTER	4 16.67 7.55	5 20.83 50.00	3 12.50 50.00	4 16.67 40.00	5 20.83 41.67	3 12.50 25.00	24 23.30
4. MERCHANT	17 70.83 32.08	2 8.33 20.00	0 .00 .00	1 4.17 10.00	1 4.17 8.33	3 12.50 25.00	24 23.30
5. SECULAR PROFESS.	5 45.45 9.43	1 9.09 10.00	1 9.09 16.67	2 18.18 20.00	1 9.09 8.33	1 9.09 8.33	11 10.68
7. RETAIL,CRAFT	12 63.16 22.64	2 10.53 20.00	1 5.26 16.67	1 5.26 10.00	3 15.79 25.00	0 .00 .00	19 18.45
9. LRG FARMER	1 25.00 1.89	0 .00 .00	1 25.00 16.67	0 .00 .00	0 .00 .00	2 50.00 16.67	4 3.88
COLUMN TOTAL	53 51.46	10 9.71	6 5.83	10 9.71	12 11.65	12 11.65	103 100.00

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 57

Notes: Based on the loyalist sample.

TABLE VI
RELATIVE CLASS RANK OF THE HARVARD LOYALISTS

CATEGORY LABEL	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
90-99 PERCENTILE	32	20.0	20.0	20.0
80-89PERCENTILE	25	15.6	15.6	35.6
70-79 PERCENTILE	18	11.3	11.3	46.9
60-69 PERCENTILE	18	11.3	11.3	58.1
50-59 PERCENTILE	10	6.3	6.3	64.4
40-49 PERCENTILE	12	7.5	7.5	71.9
30-39 PERCENTILE	11	6.9	6.9	78.8
20-29 PERCENTILE	9	5.6	5.6	84.4
10-19 PERCENTILE	11	6.9	6.9	91.3
0-9 PERCENTILE	14	8.8	8.8	100.0
TOTAL	160	100.0	100.0	

Notes: Since class sizes varied a great deal during the eighteenth century, I have computed the percentile rank of each loyalist by dividing position in the class by the size of the class. Thus, in a hypothetical class of 100 students, those with percentile ranks of 80 to 89 would have been ranked between ten and twenty places from the top of their class.

The table is based on the loyalist sample.

TABLE VII

CROSSTABULATION OF THE HARVARD LOYALISTS' CLASS RANK
WITH THEIR FATHERS' OCCUPATIONS

Father's Occupation	COUNT ROW PCT COL PCT	RANK TOP 20% 0.	UPPER-MID 20% 1.	MID 20% 2.	LOWER-MID 20% 3.	BOTTOM 20% 4.	ROW TOTAL
GOVT APPT	1.	12 80.00 32.43	2 13.33 6.45	0 .00 .00	0 .00 .00	1 6.67 7.69	15 14.29
GOVT ELECTED	2.	1 14.29 2.70	5 71.43 16.13	0 .00 .00	0 .00 .00	1 14.29 7.69	7 6.67
MINISTER	3.	8 32.00 21.62	12 48.00 38.71	2 8.00 14.29	0 .00 .00	3 12.00 23.08	25 23.81
MERCHANT	4.	13 54.17 35.14	3 12.50 9.68	4 16.67 28.57	2 8.33 20.00	2 8.33 15.38	24 22.86
SECULAR PROFESS.	5.	2 18.18 5.41	5 45.45 16.13	3 27.27 21.43	0 .00 .00	1 9.09 7.69	11 10.48
RETAIL,CRAFT	7.	1 5.26 2.70	1 5.26 3.23	5 26.32 35.71	8 42.11 80.00	4 21.05 30.77	19 18.10
LRG FARMER	9.	0 .00 .00	3 75.00 9.68	0 .00 .00	0 .00 .00	1 25.00 7.69	4 3.81
	COLUMN TOTAL	37 35.24	31 29.52	14 13.33	10 9.52	13 12.38	105 100.00

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 55

Notes: Class rank has been normalized in this table by dividing actual position in the class by the size of the class.

The table is based on the loyalist sample.

TABLE VIII

COMPARISON OF HARVARD LOYALISTS' OCCUPATIONS WITH THOSE OF THEIR FATHERS

	Loyalists		Fathers	
Occupation	No.	% of Loyalists	No.	% of Fathers
Minister	34	23.9	24	23.5
Merchant	45	31.7	23	22.6
Lawyer	27	19.0	2	1.9
Physician	17	12.0	7	6.7
Retail & Craft	4	2.8	19	18.6

Notes: Based on information from the loyalist sample .

TABLE IX

HARVARD LOYALISTS' RESIDENCES BY THEIR BIRTHPLACES

Birthplc: Dist. From Boston	COUNT ROW PCT COL PCT	Residence: Distance from Boston DIST<7 MILES 1.	7<DIST< 15 4.	15<DIST <23 6.	23<DIST <30 7.	30<DIST 10.	OUTSIDE MASS. 11.	ROW TOTAL
DIST<7 MILES	1.	43 69.35 78.18	4 6.45 18.18	2 3.23 28.57	1 1.61 9.09	6 9.68 17.65	6 9.68 37.50	62 42.76
7<DIST< 15	4.	3 13.64 5.45	14 63.64 63.64	1 4.55 14.29	0 .00 .00	3 13.64 8.82	1 4.55 6.25	22 15.17
15<DIST <23	6.	0 .00 .00	1 10.00 4.55	4 40.00 57.14	1 10.00 9.09	4 40.00 11.76	0 .00 .00	10 6.90
23<DIST <30	7.	2 12.50 3.64	0 .00 .00	0 .00 .00	8 50.00 72.73	4 25.00 11.76	2 12.50 12.50	16 11.03
30<DIST	10.	0 .00 .00	1 5.00 4.55	0 .00 .00	1 5.00 9.09	16 80.00 47.06	2 10.00 12.50	20 13.79
OUTSIDE MASS.	11.	7 46.67 12.73	2 13.33 9.09	0 .00 .00	0 .00 .00	1 6.67 2.94	5 33.33 31.25	15 10.34
	COLUMN TOTAL	55 37.93	22 15.17	7 4.83	11 7.59	34 23.45	16 11.03	145 100.00

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 15

Notes: Based on the loyalist sample.

TABLE X

OCCUPATIONS OF THE HARVARD LOYALISTS

CATEGORY LABEL	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)
MINISTER	34	21.3	23.3
MERCHANT	45	28.1	30.8
LAWYER	30	18.8	20.5
PHYSICIAN	18	11.3	12.3
EDUCATOR	7	4.4	4.8
RETAIL,CRAFT	4	2.5	2.7
WEALTHY	8	5.0	5.5
UNKNOWN	14	8.8	MISSING
TOTAL	160	100.0	100.0

VALID CASES = 146 MISSING CASES = 14

Notes: Based on the loyalist sample.

TABLE XI

HARVARD LOYALISTS' OCCUPATIONS BY THOSE OF THEIR FATHERS

Father's Occupation (COUNT / ROW PCT / COL PCT)	Occupation: MINISTER 3.	MERCHANT 4.	LAWYER 5.	PHYSICIAN 6.	EDUCATOR 7.	RETAIL,CRAFT 8.	WEALTHY 9.	ROW TOTAL
1. GOVT APPT	1 10.00 5.00	4 40.00 12.50	1 10.00 5.00	4 40.00 33.33	0 .00 .00	0 .00 .00	0 .00 .00	10 10.31
2. GOVT ELECTED	0 .00 .00	5 83.33 15.63	0 .00 .00	0 .00 .00	0 .00 .00	0 .00 .00	1 16.67 16.67	6 6.19
3. MINISTER	5 20.83 25.00	4 16.67 12.50	9 37.50 45.00	1 4.17 8.33	1 4.17 25.00	2 8.33 66.67	2 8.33 33.33	24 24.74
4. MERCHANT	3 13.04 15.00	14 60.87 43.75	2 8.70 10.00	1 4.35 8.33	0 .00 .00	0 .00 .00	3 13.04 50.00	23 23.71
5. SECULAR PROFESS.	3 27.27 15.00	1 9.09 3.13	3 27.27 15.00	4 36.36 33.33	0 .00 .00	0 .00 .00	0 .00 .00	11 11.34
7. RETAIL,CRAFT	7 36.84 35.00	3 15.79 9.38	3 15.79 15.00	2 10.53 16.67	3 15.79 75.00	1 5.26 33.33	0 .00 .00	19 19.59
9. LRG FARMER	1 25.00 5.00	1 25.00 3.13	2 50.00 10.00	0 .00 .00	0 .00 .00	0 .00 .00	0 .00 .00	4 4.12
COLUMN TOTAL	20 20.62	32 32.99	20 20.62	12 12.37	4 4.12	3 3.09	6 6.19	97 100.00

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 63

Notes: based on the loyalist sample.

TABLE XII

PUBLIC OFFICE HOLDING AMONG THE HARVARD LOYALISTS

Type of Office	No. of Loyalists	% of Loyalists*
Town leader	23	14.4
Representative	32	20.0
Minor Town Office	32	20.0
Royal Appointment	21	13.1
Provincial Appt.	23	14.4
Held No Office	82	51.3

* Does not add to 100 because of multiple office holding

Notes: Based on information from the loyalist sample.

TABLE XIII

HARVARD LOYALISTS' GOVERNMENT POSITIONS

BY THEIR OCCUPATIONS

Occupation	COUNT ROW PCT COL PCT	Government Position TOWN LEADER 1.	REPRESENTATIVE 2.	MINOR TOWN OFF 3.	ROYAL APPT. 4.	PROV. APPT. 5.	HELD NO OFFICE 6.	ROW TOTAL
MINISTER	3.	0 .00 .00	1 2.94 6.25	1 2.94 6.67	0 .00 .00	1 2.94 10.00	31 91.18 38.27	34 23.94
MERCHANT	4.	3 7.14 50.00	5 11.90 31.25	8 19.05 53.33	7 16.67 50.00	4 9.52 40.00	15 35.71 18.52	42 29.58
LAWYER	5.	3 10.00 50.00	6 20.00 37.50	0 .00 .00	5 16.67 35.71	3 10.00 30.00	13 43.33 16.05	30 21.13
PHYSICIAN	6.	0 .00 .00	0 .00 .00	4 22.22 26.67	1 5.56 7.14	0 .00 .00	13 72.22 16.05	18 12.68
EDUCATOR	7.	0 .00 .00	0 .00 .00	2 28.57 13.33	0 .00 .00	1 14.29 10.00	4 57.14 4.94	7 4.93
RETAIL,CRAFT	8.	0 .00 .00	1 25.00 6.25	0 .00 .00	0 .00 .00	1 25.00 10.00	2 50.00 2.47	4 2.82
WEALTHY	9.	0 .00 .00	3 42.86 18.75	0 .00 .00	1 14.29 7.14	0 .00 .00	3 42.86 3.70	7 4.93
COLUMN TOTAL		6 4.23	16 11.27	15 10.56	14 9.86	10 7.04	81 57.04	142 100.00

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 18

Notes: Based on the loyalist sample.

TABLE XIV

DATE OF FIRST LOYALIST ACTION

BY TYPE OF ACTION

First Loyalist Action (COUNT / ROW PCT / COL PCT)	Date of First Loyalist Act: 1761-67 (1.)	1768-71 (2.)	1772-73 (3.)	1774-75 (4.)	1776-77 (5.)	ROW TOTAL
1. STATUS QUO	1 25.00 5.00	1 25.00 5.26	1 25.00 6.25	0 .00 .00	1 25.00 16.67	4 3.48
2. WEAK	3 50.00 15.00	2 33.33 10.53	0 .00 .00	1 16.67 1.85	0 .00 .00	6 5.22
3. CRITIC OF RADICLS	4 23.53 20.00	1 5.88 5.26	4 23.53 25.00	6 35.29 11.11	2 11.76 33.33	17 14.78
4. POLITICAL OPP	3 13.04 15.00	9 39.13 47.37	9 39.13 56.25	2 8.70 3.70	0 .00 .00	23 20.00
5. RESISTED POP MVT	8 33.33 40.00	4 16.67 21.05	2 8.33 12.50	10 41.67 18.52	0 .00 .00	24 20.87
6. SELF PROCLAIMED	0 .00 .00	2 5.88 10.53	0 .00 .00	29 85.29 53.70	3 8.82 50.00	34 29.57
7. ROYAL APPT	1 16.67 5.00	0 .00 .00	0 .00 .00	5 83.33 9.26	0 .00 .00	6 5.22
8. DIRECT ACTION	0 .00 .00	0 .00 .00	0 .00 .00	1 100.00 1.85	0 .00 .00	1 .87
COLUMN TOTAL	20 17.39	19 16.52	16 13.91	54 46.96	6 5.22	115 100.00

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 45

Notes: Loyalist actions have been grouped, and ordered by the strength of commitment that they represent. Appendix A provides examples of the sorts of actions that were included in each category.

The table is based on the loyalist sample.

TABLE XV

CHARACTERISTICS OF LOYALISTS IDENTIFIED
IN DIFFERENT YEARS

Public Office Holding

Years	Number Identified	Town Elected No.	Town Elected %*	Royal Appointed No.	Royal Appointed %*	Provincial Appointed No.	Provincial Appointed %*	Justice of the Peace No.	Justice of the Peace %*	No Office No.	No Office %*
1761-67	20	8	40.0	9	45.0	8	40.0	11	55.0	4	20.0
1768-71	19	6	31.6	1	5.3	5	26.3	9	47.4	8	42.1
1772-73	16	8	50.0	4	25.0	6	37.5	12	75.0	3	18.8
1774-75	53	11	20.8	4	7.5	11	20.0	19	35.8	23	43.4
1776-77	6	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	16.7	0	0.0	5	83.3
Total	114	43	37.7	18	15.8	31	27.2	51	44.7	43	37.7

*Percentage of the Harvard loyalists who became identified in each period. Percentages do not add to 100 along the rows because of multiple office holding.

(Continued on next page)

TABLE XV
(CONT.)
CHARACTERISTICS OF LOYALISTS IDENTIFIED
IN DIFFERENT YEARS

Number of Anglican and Congregationalist
Ministers identified in Each Period

Years	Anglicans No.	Anglicans %*	Congregationalists No.	Congregationalists %*	Total No.	Total %*
1761-67	3	15.0	0	0.0	3	15.0
1768-71	1	5.3	2	10.5	3	15.8
1772-73	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
1774-75	2	3.8	4	7.6	6	11.3
1776-77	1	16.7	4	66.7	5	83.3
Total	7	6.1	10	8.8	17	14.9

*Percentage of all Harvard loyalists that became identified in each period.

Notes: Based on the Loyalist Sample.

APPENDIX A:
CLASSIFICATION OF LOYALIST ACTIONS

The Harvard graduates who became loyalists identified themselves through a wide variety of actions. This appendix is included to clarify the ways in which these actions have been categorized in Table XIV. A selected group of the actions that were included in each category is shown below.

Status Quo

*Protested a town meeting proposal critical of Britain

*Urged non-resistance to British military force

*Opposed smuggling

Weak

*Opposed to political excesses of radicals

*Upset by popular violence

*Carried on correspondence critical of radicals

*Couldn't support either side

*Suspected of loyalism by a committee of safety or inspection, or other radical political group

Criticized Radicals

*Wrote critically of Stamp Act Riots

*Wrote critically of the Boston Tea Party

*Expressed criticism of radicals' cause or leaders

*Challenged authority of the provincial congress

Political Opposition

*Voted in House of Representatives to rescind the Circular Letter

*Supported those Voting to rescind the Circular Letter

*Protested town meeting support of a tea boycott

*Favored crown salaries for the Governor and judges

Resisted the Popular Movement

*Supported issuing writs of assistance

*Supported Stamp Act

*Was placed in conflict with popular protests as a result of official duties

*Imported British goods despite boycott

*Accepted salary from royal government for appointed office

*Resisted popular efforts to close the courts

*Refused to sanction fast called by provincial congress

Self-Proclaimed

*Associated with British officers

*Associated with other loyalists

*Signed farewell statement to Hutchinson and/or letter of welcome or farewell to General Gage

*Refused to omit prayers for the King

*Refused to sign oath of allegiance to new government after 1776

Royal Appointee

*Appointed stamp distributor

*Appointed to Vice Admiralty Court

*Appointed to Mandamus Council

Direct Action

*Aided British Army

*Enlisted in loyalist regiment

APPENDIX B:

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography contains a classified list of the sources that I have found to be the most useful in the preparation of this paper.

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I also used a number of unpublished manuscripts in the collections of Harvard University and the Massachusetts Historical Society.

Harvard University, Houghton Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts. The Sparks Papers 10, volumes II-IV, contain assorted documents relating to events in prerevolutionary Massachusetts, including letters by Nathaniel Rogers, Robert Auchmuty and Governor Bernard.

Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Massachusetts.

Letters by Samuel Quincy are contained in several collections, particularly the Quincy, Wendell, Holmes and Upham Papers, which are available on microfilm. William Vassall's Letter Book, Micro. PN 105, was another source of much useful information.