

**The National Sufi Council: Redefining the Islamic Republic of Pakistan through a
discourse on Sufism after 9/11**

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Dedication

I dedicate this to my dad who passed away during the writing of this thesis.

Stop the words now.
Open the window in the centre of your chest,
and let the spirits fly in and out.

Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī
(interpreted by Coleman Barks)

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Statement of Authentication

The work presented in this thesis is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, original except as acknowledged in the text. I hereby declare that I have not submitted this material, either in full or in part, for a degree at this or any other institution.

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Table of Contents

List of Tables	i
List of Figures and Illustrations.....	ii
Abbreviations	iii
Abstract.....	v
1 Introduction.....	1
1.1 The struggle to define a nation	1
1.1.1 An Islamic state or a Muslim nation?.....	2
1.1.2 Heterogeneous Islamic traditions within Pakistani society	5
1.1.3 The consequences of joining the ‘war on terror’	8
1.1.4 Redefining the nation through a discourse on Sufism.....	9
1.2 Background to the complex relationship between Sufism and the state	13
1.2.1 Interpretations of Sufism.....	14
1.2.2 The arrival of Sufis in the Indian subcontinent.....	16
1.2.3 Sufism and the state in Pakistan.....	19
1.2.4 Integrative aspects of the Sufi tradition	24
1.3 Understanding contemporary politics and Islam through discourse analysis.....	26
1.3.1 Theoretical framework and a method for analysis.....	27
1.3.2 Source material	33
1.4 Chapter overview.....	36
2 Historical antecedents to contending identity narratives in Pakistan.....	38
2.1 Introduction	38
2.2 Initial encounters.....	38
2.2.1 Islam in early South Asia, AD 711 – 996	38
2.3 Towards ethnic, social, religious, and political diversity	41
2.3.1 Islam in early medieval South Asia, AD 997 – 1206.....	41
2.3.2 Islam during the Delhi Sultanate, AD 1206 – 1526	44
2.4 From diversity to nationalism	51
2.4.1 Islam in Mughal South Asia, AD 1526 – 1858	51
2.4.2 Islam in British South Asia, AD 1600 – 1947.....	57
2.4.3 Islam and the Pakistan Movement, AD 1940 – 1947	61
2.5 Independent Pakistan.....	66
2.5.1 Pakistan, AD 1947 – 1999.....	66
2.6 Conclusion	73
3 The early discourse of President Musharraf, 2001 – 2004.....	74
3.1 Introduction	74
3.2 Catalysts for change in Pakistan.....	75
3.2.1 The coup of 1999: Pakistan returns to military rule	75
3.2.2 The crisis of 9/11: Pakistan joins the ‘war on terror’	80
3.3 Official responses to the new socio-political challenges.....	84

3.3.1	Urging the nation to support the decision to join the ‘war on terror’	84
3.3.2	Persuading the nation to support the domestic campaign against extremism ...	91
3.3.3	Rallying the nation to non-violent action and socio-economic uplift.....	94
3.4	Conclusion	102
4	President Musharraf and the formation of the National Council for the Promotion of Sufism, 2005 – 2008.....	104
4.1	Introduction	104
4.2	Historical events, the expansion of discourses of moderation, and oppositional discourses	104
4.2.1	The religion column in passports controversy.....	106
4.2.2	Building a soft image of Pakistan through a discourse on Sufism and oppositional voices.....	110
4.2.3	The Hisba Bill (2005)	119
4.2.4	London bombings	120
4.2.5	The Danish cartoon controversy	124
4.2.6	The dissemination of discourses of moderation in the Pakistani press	127
4.3	The formation of the National Council for the Promotion of Sufism (NCPS).....	135
4.4	The decline of President Musharraf	141
4.5	Conclusion	146
5	Chapter Five: President Zardari and the reconstitution of the Sufi Advisory Council, 2008-2011	148
5.1	Introduction	148
5.2	Opportunities and challenges for the new administration, 2008 – 2009	149
5.2.1	A return to civilian rule	149
5.2.2	The PPP and Islam	150
5.2.3	Mumbai bombings	152
5.2.4	The increase in terrorist-related incidents and fatalities in Pakistan.....	153
5.2.5	The attack on the shrine of Rehman Baba.....	155
5.3	The formation of the National Sufi Council (NSC).....	156
5.4	Contestations over who is (and who is not) a Muslim in Pakistan, 2010 – 2011 ...	159
5.4.1	Targeting symbols of Sufi spirituality	159
5.4.2	The construction of a national Sufi identity in the Pakistani press.....	162
5.4.3	The increased threat to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.....	169
5.4.4	Targeting symbols of Sufi spirituality	170
5.4.5	The blasphemy law controversy	172
5.4.6	The assassination of Governor Salman Taseer.....	175
5.4.7	Promoting love, tolerance, and universal brotherhood.....	177
5.4.8	Negative perceptions of Pakistan increase	183
5.5	Conclusion	186
6	Conclusion.....	188
	Reference List	196
	Glossary	203

List of Tables

Table 1: Daily Times Headlines on the Subject of Sufism, March-August 2006.....128
Table 2: Newspaper Headlines on the Subject of Sufism, January-December 2010165

List of Figures and Illustrations

Figure 1: Religious groups in Pakistan	6
Figure 2: Terrorist-related attacks on Sufi shrines in Pakistan, 2005-2009	156
Figure 3: Terrorist-related attacks on Sufi shrines in Pakistan, 2010.....	160
Figure 4: Terrorist-related attacks on Sufi shrines in Pakistan, 2011.....	171

Abbreviations

AIML	All-India Muslim League
AL	Arab League
ANP	Awami National Party
ARD	Alliance for the Restoration of democracy
CFR	Council on Foreign Relations
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (USA)
CII	Council of Islamic Ideology
CMAG	Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on the Harare Declaration
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
DI	Dawat-e-Islami
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
HRCPP	Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
ISC	International Sufi Council
ISF	International Sufi Foundation
ISI	Inter Services Intelligence Agency
ITP	Islami Tehreek Pakistan
JA	Jamiat Ahle-Hadith
JASP	Jamaat-e-Ahl-e-Sunnat Pakistan
JeM	Jaish-e-Mohammad
JI	Jamaat-e-Islami
JUH	Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Hind
JUI	Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam
JUI-F	Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (Fazlur Rehman)
JUI-S	Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (Sami ul-Haq)
JUP	Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan
JUP-N	Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan (Ahmed Noorani)
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba (also known as Dama'at-ud-Da'awa)
LFO	Legal Framework Order
MI	Military Intelligence Agency
MMA	Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
MNA	Member of the National Assembly
MPA	Member of the Provincial Assembly
MQM	Mohajir Qaumi Mahaz
MQM-A	Mohajir Qaumi Mahaz (Altaf Husain)
MQM-H	Mohajir Qaumi Mahaz (Afaq Ahmed)
MRD	Movement for the Restoration of Democracy
NAP	National Awami Party
NAPA	National Academy of the Performing Arts
NCPS	National Council for the Promotion of Sufism

NEFA	North East Frontier Agency
NSC	National Sufi Council
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
PAL	Pakistan Academy of Letters
PATA	Provincially Administered Tribal Areas
PIA	Pakistan International Airlines
PILAC	Punjab Institute of Language, Art and Culture
PIPS	The Pak Institute of Peace Studies
PML-N	Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Sharif)
PML-Q	Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam)
PNCA	Pakistan National Council of the Arts
PPP	Pakistan Peoples Party
PTV	Pakistan Television
SATP	The South Asia Terrorism Portal
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organisation
SIC	Sunni Ittehad Council
SSP	Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
ST	Sunni Tehreek
TJP	Tehreek-e-Jafaria Pakistan
TNSM	Tanzim Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammad
TTP	Tehreek-e-Taleban Pakistan

Abstract

On September 11, 2001, the United States suffered four terrorist attacks on its soil by a group later identified as Al-Qaeda. The attacks, the worst in US history, resulted in immense destruction and loss of life. For the United States, and for a number of countries around the world, 9/11 constituted a major historical turning point which prompted a series of responses aimed at countering terrorism. For Pakistan, the pragmatic decision to join the US-led military campaign in Afghanistan immediately transformed the nation into a front-line state in the 'war on terror' being waged on its western border. In the years that followed, Pakistan experienced an escalation in terrorist-related incidents and fatalities across all four of its provinces and in the tribal areas. The rise in religious extremism and violence made Pakistan progressively less safe for its many citizens. Moreover, amidst media reports of ongoing terrorism in a nuclear-capable Pakistan, western audiences increasingly viewed Pakistan, and Islam, as synonymous with intolerance, militancy, and terrorism.

Within the climate of extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism, a new type of discourse began to emanate from the political leadership in Pakistan. For President Musharraf, the formation of a cohesive national identity was central to the establishment of political legitimacy and hegemony without the need for physical force. He believed this would allow effective revenue extraction, which could be reinvested in much-needed social and economic development. This in turn would result in a peaceful and prosperous civil society, and reverse negative world opinion of Pakistan. Following this Gramscian assumption, after 9/11 President Musharraf attempted to construct an enlightened and moderate identity for Pakistan by promoting the ethical and peace-building aspects found within Islam. By 2006, he had established the National Council for the Promotion of Sufism. Three years later, in 2009, President Zardari reconstituted the council and renamed it the National Sufi Council. With its ostensible message of philosophical, spiritual, and social harmony, Sufism was posited by both administrations as the first and foremost symbol of national identity for Pakistan, as well as a global panacea to terrorism.

In order to understand contemporary politics, and Islam, in Pakistan after 9/11, this thesis employed Critical Discourse Analysis as a theoretical framework and as a method for socio-political analysis. The main aim was to analyse and interpret government discourse on the subject of Sufism over a ten-year period following the attacks of 9/11 to demonstrate the ways in which Sufism was officially invoked and promoted. A further aim was to analyse and interpret the discourse of other political actors on the subject of Sufism during the same period to demonstrate the ways in which the official construction of Sufism was reproduced and resisted. Those narratives were then situated within the wider historical socio-political context. This approach was intended to allow a more nuanced understanding of the persistence of Islam as the first and foremost symbol of national identity, and of belonging, for Pakistani society despite the many theological differences that exist amongst the Muslims of Pakistan. It was also intended to reveal the complex and competing identity narratives

which continue to hinder government efforts to create a single cohesive and shared national identity for the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

This thesis demonstrates that, whilst Islam has been the ultimate source of identity and legitimacy for Pakistan since before its creation in 1947, the many complex and competing interpretations of Islam that exist in the nation continue to divide it. Most crucially, the inability of Muslims to form a consensus with regard to Islam at a theological level has had a significant impact on the nation's ability to establish a coherent ideology upon which to base a viable political system. Official attempts to construct a national identity through the lens of Sufism after 9/11 were a continuation of a wider, largely incomplete, and problematic struggle to build national unity in Pakistan. Ultimately, however, the turn to Sufism served to further complicate the issue rather than resolve it.

KEY WORDS: Cultural hegemony, critical discourse analysis, history, identity politics, ideology, Islam, nation, Pakistan, peace discourse, state, and Sufism.

1 Introduction

1.1 The struggle to define a nation

On September 11, 2001, the United States suffered four coordinated terrorist attacks on its soil. A group later identified as Al-Qaeda hijacked four planes: two were flown into the World Trade Centre in New York, one was flown into the Pentagon in Arlington County, Virginia, and a fourth crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. That major event triggered a series of responses, not only from the United States, but also from many countries around the world including Pakistan, aimed at countering terrorism. For Pakistan, the pragmatic decision to join the US-led military campaign against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan proved to be a significant turning point in its history. Pakistan was instantly transformed into a front-line state in the 'war on terror'.¹ It also became a victim of terrorism, and one of the most negatively viewed countries in the world. This proved a catalyst for the new political discourse that began to emanate from the political leadership in Pakistan after 9/11.

From that point onward, the Government of Pakistan attempted to redefine the Islamic Republic of Pakistan through a discourse on Sufism.² With its ostensible message of philosophical, spiritual, and social harmony, Sufism was posited as inclusive, peaceful, tolerant and, most crucially, a panacea to terrorism. That simplistic rhetoric, however, masked the reality, which is that not only do complex and competing identity narratives exist in Pakistan, but also that Sufism, like Islam, is itself a heterogeneous tradition. Subsequently, a space was created in which old and unresolved debates concerning Islam in Pakistan and the role it should play in the state and society were reignited. Whilst Islam has long been the ultimate source of identity for Muslims in Pakistan, their inability to form a consensus with regard to Islam at a theological level has had a significant impact on the nation's ability to establish a coherent national identity upon which to base a viable political system. This is a phenomenon the nation has been struggling with since before its inception and which was exacerbated by the events of 9/11. The turn to Sufism, however, served to further complicate the issue rather than resolve it.

This thesis seeks to understand contemporary politics, particularly the use of Islam as a source of national identity, political legitimacy, and popular mobilisation, in Pakistan after 9/11. First, this research analyses the political discourse of President Musharraf (r. 1999-2008) and his successor President Asif Ali Zardari (r. 2008-2011) on the subject of Sufism, over a ten-year period following the attacks of 9/11. This will demonstrate the ways in

¹ US President George W. Bush first used the term 'war on terror' in a televised address to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001. See, 'Text: President Bush Addresses the Nation', *The Washington Post*, 20 September 2001, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html, (accessed 12 December 2013).

² For a discussion of the principal scholarly definitions of the terms 'Sufism' and 'Sufi', how they have been used in recent academic literature, and how those terms are used, see section 1.2 in this chapter.

which Sufism was officially invoked and promoted by the government. Second, this research analyses the political discourse of other political actors on the subject of Sufism during the same period. This will demonstrate the ways in which the state-sanctioned construction of Sufism was reproduced and resisted. This two-fold approach allows a more nuanced understanding of the persistence of Islam as the first and foremost symbol of national identity, and of belonging, for the Muslims of Pakistan despite the many theological differences that exist amongst them. It also reveals the complex and competing identity narratives that continue to hinder government efforts to create a single cohesive and shared national identity for Pakistan.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section contextualises the research historically by outlining the difficulties faced by the Government of Pakistan in defining the nation of Pakistan since its creation in 1947. It includes a discussion of the contested relationship between Islam and the state of Pakistan, and the heterogeneous Islamic traditions within Pakistani society. The second section situates the research in the contemporary socio-political context. It includes an overview of the negative consequences of the decision to join the US-led 'war on terror' in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. It also includes a discussion of the official response, which was the construction of an enlightened and moderate identity based on the ethical and peace-building aspects found within Islam, the formation of the National Council for the Promotion of Sufism in 2006, and the reconstitution of the National Sufi Council in 2009. This chapter then provides a review of the literature on four key analytical themes: interpretations of Sufism, the arrival of Sufis in the Indian subcontinent, Sufism and the state in Pakistan, and the integrative aspects of the Sufi tradition. Following on from this is a discussion of the research methodology and theoretical framework. This chapter concludes with brief summary of subsequent chapters.

1.1.1 An Islamic state or a Muslim nation?

On August 14, 1947, Pakistan was brought into existence by the powerful yet paradoxical imaginings of Muslim nationalist leaders, led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1875-1948) of the All-India Muslim League (AIML). The leaders of the Pakistan Movement, requiring representative support to realise their vision for a separate Muslim homeland, based their territorial demand for 'Pakistan' on a non-territorial ideology known as the two-nation theory.³ The construction of a Muslim nation and a Muslim national identity were crucial in creating mass appeal and support for a separate political and spiritual homeland for India's largest minority community. This ideology privileged a monolithic homogeneous religious national identity (Islam) above the heterogeneous regional, ethnic, linguistic, and theological

³ The territorial demand for 'Pakistan' was based on a non-territorial ideology known as the 'two-nation theory'. Widely attributed to the nineteenth-century reformist figure Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-1898), the two-nation theory was based on the supposition that South Asian Muslims constituted a separate nation due to their common religious affiliation (Islam). In keeping with the two-nation theory, the political discourse of leaders of the Pakistan Movement, which consisted primarily of religious rhetoric such as 'Islam in danger', positioned a positive Muslim 'Self' in opposition to a negative Hindu 'Other'. This discursive strategy culminated in the creation of Pakistan in 1947. For a more detailed discussion of the Pakistan Movement, see Chapter Two, section 2.4.3.

differences that existed amongst the Muslims of India.⁴ Historically, South Asian Muslims have never been a monolithic homogeneous group united under a single consciousness. Culturally and socially, South Asian Muslims have long been separated by ethnic, linguistic, and class interests. Religiously, Islam is a diverse tradition with various schisms having occurred since its inception. Despite the heterogeneous traditions within the Muslim community, Jinnah's Pakistan would be established on the basis of: one nation (Pakistan), one culture (Muslim), and one language (Urdu).⁵

The problem of Muslim disunity in Pakistan was of particular importance when the question of the relationship between Islam and the state was raised. The Pakistan Movement, and the Muslim opposition to it, provides a particularly useful case study of identity discourses. At one end of the vast religio-political spectrum were nineteenth- and twentieth-century Muslim nationalist leaders, such as Syed Ahmed Khan, Muhammad Iqbal, and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who envisaged Pakistan as a unified and broadly secular democratic Muslim nation, rather than an Islamic state. These nationalist leaders acknowledged the importance of Islam in the identity of the state and in the private lives of Muslims. However, they aimed ultimately for the separation of the state from religious institutions. They also believed that all citizens were entitled to equal rights and privileges regardless of religious belief, and that citizens should ultimately determine how their nation should be governed. At the other end of the religio-political spectrum were nineteenth- and twentieth-century theologians such as Maulana Syed Abu a'la Maududi and Syed Husain Ahmad Madani who were initially opposed to the creation of Pakistan.⁶ Once Pakistan had been achieved, however, many of these *ulama* (religious scholars) moved to Pakistan and began to demand a stronger role for Islam in the state and in society. These Muslims envisaged Pakistan as an Islamic state, based on the inerrancy of divine revelation. They believed that, in order for Pakistan to act in accordance with the principles of Islam, sovereignty must rest with God, not with its citizens. Moreover, the state of Pakistan, and its laws, must be based on the revealed sources (Qur'an and Sunnah) as interpreted by eminent *ulama* and *mujtahids* (interpreters of religious law).

On August 11, 1947, Muhammad Ali Jinnah gave his first address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, three days before the formal transfer of power from the British Government to the soon-to-be independent nation of Pakistan. In that address, Jinnah pragmatically declared that citizenship would be the unifying principle for Pakistan, all

⁴ For an overview of the heterogeneous Islamic traditions within Pakistani society, see Section 1.1.2. For a detailed discussion of some of the dominant trends that helped shape Islam, politics, and identity in the Indian subcontinent and, inevitably, in Pakistan after its creation, see Chapter Two.

⁵ C. Jaffrelot. *Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation*. Manohar, New Delhi, 2002, p. 9.

⁶ In 1941, Maulana Syed Abu a'la Maududi founded an Islamic movement, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), in opposition to the Pakistan Movement led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Maududi, along with other conservative *ulama*, argued that the founding of Pakistan as a territorial nation would be contradictory to the idea of a universal Islamic brotherhood (*ummah*). Maududi also argued that Pakistan, established and administered as a sovereign and democratic nation under Jinnah's leadership, would be un-Islamic. Conservative *ulama*, with their focus on Islam based on a more narrow interpretation of the Qur'an and the Sunnah, argued that Jinnah and other leaders of the AIML were western-educated, unconcerned with true Islamic principles, and therefore could not represent the best interests of Muslims. Once Pakistan had been achieved, however, Maududi moved to Pakistan and agitated for a stronger role for Islam in the state and society.

citizens would have equal rights and privileges regardless of religious belief, and religion had no place in public life.

[E]very one of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste, or creed, is first, second, and last a citizen of this state with equal rights, privileges, and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make. [...] You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed -- that has nothing to do with the business of the state.⁷

That statement reignited unresolved debates concerning the role Islam should play in the newly formed state of Pakistan. Indisputably, a monolithic homogeneous Islam provided an important source of identity and legitimacy for the Pakistan Movement and helped make Pakistan a territorial reality in 1947. However, the complex and competing interpretations of Islam that existed in the subcontinent had the potential to divide the new nation, inasmuch as Islam had to unify it. Once Pakistan was created, rather than act as a unifying force, Islam instead became a topic of contestation.

In order to unravel the complex realities that surround the still-unresolved question concerning the place of Islam in the state, and to establish a broad conceptual framework, this thesis draws primarily on the work of Samina Yasmeen and John Esposito.⁸ Yasmeen argues that, despite the many differences in belief and practice that exist amongst the Muslims of Pakistan, the ideological struggle over Islam in the political arena has taken two broad directions: 'orthodox' and 'liberal'.⁹ At one end of the spectrum are 'orthodox' Muslims, who believe in the primacy of 'divine will' and advocate an Islamic identity for Pakistan based on 'absolutist' or strict interpretations of the Qur'an and Sunnah. At the same time, Yasmeen admits that some 'orthodox' Muslims acknowledge the importance of 'human will' in providing a 'time-relevant' interpretation of the sacred sources.¹⁰ At the other end of the spectrum are 'liberal' Muslims, who believe in the primacy of 'human will' in interpreting the sacred sources and advocate a Muslim identity for Pakistan. At the same time, Yasmeen admits that some 'liberal' Muslims acknowledge the importance of 'societal' Islam in determining the place of Islam in the state or political sphere.¹¹ Similarly, John

⁷ 'Presidential Address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan', *Government of Pakistan*, 11 August 1947, <http://202.83.164.29/quaid/speech03.htm>, (accessed 26 August 2011).

⁸ This thesis seeks to understand contemporary politics and, specifically, the use of Islam as a source of national identity, political legitimacy, and popular mobilisation, in Pakistan after 9/11. Following Samina Yasmeen, who makes an important distinction between 'state Islam' and 'societal Islam', the focus of this thesis is primarily the use of Islam in the political sphere. The terms 'conservative' and 'orthodox' are used to distinguish groups that subscribe to the notion of 'divine will' and tend to want a stronger role for Islam in the state and in society (Islamic state). The terms 'liberal' and 'moderate' are used to distinguish groups that subscribe to the notion of 'human will' and tend, on the whole, to want less of a role for Islam in the state and its relevant structures (Muslim nation). These categories, however, are neither fixed nor immutable. Political parties in Pakistan have a tendency to move along the religio-political spectrum, or reorient their religio-political rhetoric, depending on political and societal exigencies. See, S. Yasmeen, 'Pakistan and the Struggle for 'Real' Islam', in S. Akbarzadeh and A. Saeed (eds.), *Islam and Political Legitimacy*, Routledge, London, 2003; and S. Yasmeen, 'Pakistan, militancy and identity: parallel struggles'. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 67 (2), 2013, pp. 157-175.

⁹ Yasmeen, 2003.

¹⁰ Yasmeen, 2003.

¹¹ Yasmeen, 2003.

Esposito argues that the diverse ideological approaches to Islam in the political sphere range from 'religious' to 'secular' or from 'devout' to 'nonobservant'.¹²

For conservative religious leaders, fixated on the past, tradition is not so much a source of inspiration and direction as a literal map to be followed in all its details. This blueprint for Muslim society, contained in the traditional (classical) legal manuals, is not seen as a time-bound response to a specific sociohistorical period, a conditioned product hammered out by jurists in light of Islamic principles and values, but rather as a final, comprehensive guide.¹³

Both Yasmeen and Esposito agree that there are a multitude of interpretations and approaches between the two ends of the spectrum.

1.1.2 Heterogeneous Islamic traditions within Pakistani society

Muslims in Pakistan identify themselves in different ways depending on regional, linguistic, ethnic, historical, and religious determinants. According to government census data, the total population of Pakistan, as at December 2011, was 178,245,823.¹⁴ More than ninety-six per cent of those identified themselves as Muslim, making Pakistan the nation with the third-largest number of Muslims in the world after Indonesia and India.¹⁵ The census data, however, did not separate the category of 'Muslim' into the many groups and sub-groups that exist in Pakistan. Recent data from the CIA World Factbook suggests that approximately eighty-five to ninety per cent of the Muslim population in Pakistan are Sunni, and ten to fifteen per cent are Shi'a.¹⁶ These two main groups can be further broken down into numerous sub-groups. The Heritage Foundation classifies Sunni Muslims in Pakistan into three main sub-groups: Barelvi, Deobandi, and Ahle-Hadith (people of the Hadith).¹⁷ While exact figures are not available, it is thought that the population of Pakistan comprises: sixty per cent Barelvi, fifteen per cent Deobandi, five per cent Ahle-Hadith, fifteen per cent Shi'a, and five per cent other (Ahmadi, Ismaili, Hindu, Sikh, Christian, Buddhist, and Parsi).¹⁸ Amongst all of these religious groups and sub-groups are wide-ranging differences in belief and practice.

¹² Esposito identifies three 'religiously oriented' positions: conservatives, Islamic activists, and Islamic modernists. For a detailed discussion of the various methods and interpretations of each of these groups, see, J.L. Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, pp. 256-261.

¹³ Esposito, 2011, p. 252.

¹⁴ 'Census Data', *Population Census Organisation: Government of Pakistan*, 1998, <http://www.census.gov.pk/index.php>, (accessed 29 December 2011).

¹⁵ 'The Global Religious Landscape: Muslims', *Pew Research Religion and Public Life Project*, <http://www.pewforum.org/2012/12/18/global-religious-landscape-muslim>, (accessed 20 December 2013).

¹⁶ 'CIA World Factbook: Pakistan'. *Central Intelligence Agency*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html>, (accessed 28 May 2011).

¹⁷ L. Curtis and H.A.H. Mullick, *Reviving Pakistan's Pluralist Traditions to Fight Extremism*, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, 2009.

¹⁸ A. Mir, 'Just who is not a Kafir?', *Outlook India*, 19 July 2010, <http://www.outlookindia.com/article/Just-Who-Is-Not-A-Kafir/266157>, (accessed 15 March 2011).




Figure 1: Religious groups in Pakistan⁹⁹

While Sufis can be found within Sunni and Shi'a Islam, in Pakistan the majority of Sufis associate themselves with the Sunni Barelvi tradition. The Barelvi movement originated contemporaneously with the Deoband and Ahle-Hadith movements in the north of the Indian subcontinent in the nineteenth century, in the wake of Islamic revival and reform, the political ascendancy of the British, and the decline of Muslim political power. Each of these movements offered South Asian Muslims different ways of being Muslim in a changing environment. The Barelvi movement, unlike the Deoband and Ahle-Hadith movements, was distinctive in its resistance to the revival and reform currents of the period. In particular, Barelvis were in favour of preserving the unique forms of Islamic belief and practice that had developed over time in the subcontinent. Thus, Barelvis continue to place great importance on the many popular traditions associated with Sufism in the subcontinent including the intercession of saints, saint worship, the annual *urs* celebrations (death anniversaries of Sufi saints), and *qawwali* (Sufi devotional music).

At the same time, many Barelvis hold the Prophet Muhammad in particularly great esteem as they consider him to be, in a metaphysical sense, an emanation of the 'light' (*noor*) of God and the first Sufi or friend of God (*wali*) to have become a perfected being (*al-Insan al-Kamil*). Consequently, Barelvi Muslims are often referred to as *ashiq-e-rasul* or lovers of the Prophet Muhammad. However, alongside the reverence and profound love Barelvi Muslims have for the Prophet Muhammad is a fervent compulsion to protect his reputation. This has resulted in Barelvi activism and, at times, violence against any moves that are seen to threaten the sanctity of the Prophet. Recent examples include Barelvi responses to the Danish cartoon controversy (2005), the Blasphemy law controversy (2011), and the assassination of

⁹⁹ *Outlook India*, 19 July 2010, (accessed 15 March 2011).

Governor Salman Taseer (2011). These fervent responses spring from their deeply held commitment to protect the sanctity of the Prophet Muhammad. A number of Barelvis supported the creation of a unified and broadly secular democratic Muslim nation in the spirit of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Muslim nationalist leaders Syed Ahmed Khan, Muhammad Iqbal, and Muhammad Ali Jinnah. In 1949 the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) was formed to represent Barelvi political interests in Pakistan. More recently, Barelvi groups have attempted to persuade the government to implement a more Islamic system of governance in line with what they call the System of the Prophet (*Nizam-e-Mustafa*). The *Nizam-e-Mustafa* movement first appeared in Pakistan in the 1970s and aimed at establishing an Islamic system of governance in Pakistan, an Islamic constitution, and Islamic laws (Shari'a).

Conversely, the Deoband and Ahle-Hadith movements encouraged profound religious and social reform in the subcontinent. They attributed the political misfortunes of South Asian Muslims to the degeneration of Islam in the eighteenth century. In response, these reform movements aimed at effecting Muslim socio-religious uplift. They asserted that to achieve this required strict adherence to the Shari'a, based on a more narrow interpretation of the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and the purification of Islam of any elements considered not in conformity with the Shari'a.²⁰ Deobandis began the task of ridding Islam of so-called 'un-Islamic' elements such as the intercession of Sufi saints, saint worship, and the annual *urs* celebrations, which are much beloved by Barelvi Muslims. This was despite the fact that Shah Wali-Ullah (1702-1762) was himself an exponent of the Naqshbandi Sufi tradition. According to Deobandi tradition, the Prophet Muhammad is to be regarded strictly as a human being (*bashar*), albeit a perfect human being (*al-Insan al-Kamil*). Thus, Deobandi Muslims tend to be of the opinion that the Barelvi elevation of the Prophet to divine status as the light (*noor*) of God deviates from the concept of monotheism or *tawhid* (Oneness of God or monotheism) in Islam. Barelvi Muslims refute this and assert, to the contrary, that followers of the Deoband tradition do not show proper veneration of the Prophet Muhammad. While both the Barelvi and Deoband traditions follow the Hanafi school of thought, and accept Sufism, the *noor-bashar* doctrinal difference has been a perennial and problematic point of difference between the two traditions, spreading into the political domain. Unlike the Barelvis, Deobandis fervently opposed the creation of Pakistan because, in the spirit of conservative nineteenth- and twentieth-century theologians, they were committed to the primacy of Islam in the state and society. They believed the western-educated leaders of the Pakistan Movement would be unconcerned with 'true' Islamic principles and, therefore, could not represent the best interests of South Asian Muslims. In Pakistan today, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) represents the political interests of Deobandis, while the Jamiat Ahle-Hadith (JA) represents the political interests of the Ahle-Hadith.

²⁰ While many Deobandis advocate adherence to the Shari'a and to Sufism, they oppose Sufi traditions considered to be not in conformity with the Shari'a. Unlike adherents of the Deoband school of thought, followers of the Ahle-Hadith tradition advocate strict adherence to their narrow interpretation of the Qur'an and Hadith, reject the authority of the four schools of Sunni jurisprudence, and are opposed to Sufism. The terms Ahle-Hadith, Wahhabi, and Salafi are often used interchangeably and pejoratively in Pakistan.

1.1.3 The consequences of joining the 'war on terror'

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 marked a significant turning point for the United States, as well as for a number of countries around the world, including Pakistan. Its geopolitical importance, and its relations with the Taliban in Afghanistan, made Pakistan an important coalition partner in the 'war on terror'. Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia had been the only countries to recognise the authority of the Taliban in Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001. The UAE and Saudi Arabia severed diplomatic ties with the Taliban shortly after 9/11, but Pakistan initially refused.²¹ Pakistan made the pragmatic decision to join the US-led military campaign against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, on its western border, on September 14, 2001. For Pakistan, the decision immediately transformed the nation into a front-line state in the 'war on terror'. In the years that followed, it had serious political repercussions. Pakistan experienced a dramatic rise in religious extremism and religious and ethnic sectarian conflict. Pakistan also became a victim of terrorism. In its 2001 Annual Report, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan stated:

[T]he events of September 2001 and the war against terrorism again made the gun the pre-eminent instrument of determining human affairs and pushed human rights and basic needs lower in the table of priorities, especially in countries still struggling to establish democracy and rule of justice.²²

As discussed, the failure to establish a coherent national identity upon which to base a viable political system is a phenomenon Pakistan has been struggling with since its creation. Decades of political instability, together with heightened religious and sectarian conflict and violence, particularly after 9/11, have compounded the problem. In 2011 the BBC reported that 35,000 people had died as a result of terrorist bombings in Pakistan between 2001 and 2011.²³ A 2003 United Nations Human Development Report blamed the fragile law and order situation in Pakistan for exacerbating economic deprivation, particularly among poorer households.²⁴ This was supported in 2011 by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), which stated that sixty per cent of people in Pakistan live on less than US\$2 per day.²⁵ The CIA World Factbook described Pakistan as 'an impoverished and underdeveloped country'.²⁶ The poor law and order situation in Pakistan had an adverse affect on foreign and local investment, which contributed to a reduction in productivity, growth, and employment, and a rise in poverty. It also limited the government's capacity to reinvest in healthcare, education, and infrastructure development.

²¹ For a more detailed discussion of Pakistan's foreign policy towards the Afghan Taliban, see Chapter Three.

²² Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, *State of Human Rights in 2001*, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Lahore, 2002.

²³ O. Bennett-Jones, 'Pakistan: A failed state or a clever gambler?', *BBC News Online*, 7 May 2011, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-13318673>, (accessed 8 May 2011).

²⁴ A. Hussain, *Pakistan National Human Development Report: Poverty, Growth and Governance*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2003.

²⁵ 'Making Sense of Pakistan', *Council on Foreign Relations*, http://www.cfr.org/interactives/CG_Pakistan/index.html#/making-sense-of-pakistan, (accessed 21 December 2011).

²⁶ *Central Intelligence Agency*, (accessed 28 May 2011).

In the last decade, not only did religious and communal tolerance become increasingly fragile in Pakistan, but the country also experienced rising negative perceptions internationally. In 2011, the BBC World Service Country Rating Poll found that negative perceptions of Pakistan had risen. According to the survey, Pakistan was the second most negatively viewed country in the world, placing it between Iran and Korea, which ranked first and third respectively.²⁷

The worsening in views of Pakistan is particularly apparent in some key Western countries. Negative views of Pakistan jumped from 44 to 68 per cent in the United Kingdom, 58 to 75 per cent in the USA, [and] 54 to 74 per cent in Australia.²⁸

The Government of Pakistan's failure to overcome its problems of terrorism, internal disunity, and violence, implement effective governance, and achieve economic growth and development, exacerbated negative world opinion. Western audiences, viewing media reports of ongoing terrorism in a nuclear-capable Pakistan, together with the nation's political instability, and the dependence on aid to prop up the economy, tended to see Pakistan as authoritarian, intolerant, and regressive.

1.1.4 Redefining the nation through a discourse on Sufism

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 had a significant impact on the Muslim community, not only in the United States but across the world. Islam faced intense scrutiny and public attention, with many Muslims fearful of intimidation and reprisals. In this context, a number of leaders sought to make a distinction between terrorists and non-violent Muslims, and promote Islam as a religion of peace. For example, during a visit to the Islamic Centre of Washington only days after 9/11, President George Bush said:

These acts of violence against innocents violate the fundamental tenets of the Islamic faith. And it's important for my fellow Americans to understand that. The English translation is not as eloquent as the original Arabic, but let me quote from the Koran, itself: In the long run, evil in the extreme will be the end of those who do evil. For that they rejected the signs of Allah and held them up to ridicule. The face of terror is not the true faith of Islam. That's not what Islam is all about. Islam is peace. These terrorists don't represent peace. They represent evil and war.²⁹

After 9/11, the United States developed a number of strategies aimed at countering terrorism. In February 2003, President George Bush released the "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism".³⁰ The report outlined the nature of the terrorist threat against the

²⁷ 'BBC Country Rating Poll reveals positive views of Brazil on the rise in 2011', *BBC Press Office*, 7 March 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2011/03_march/07/brazil.shtml, (accessed 27 September 2011).

²⁸ *BBC Press Office*, 7 March 2011, (accessed 27 September 2011).

²⁹ G. W. Bush, 'Remarks by the President at Islamic Center of Washington, D.C.', *The White House*, 17 September 2001, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010917-11.html>, (accessed 12 September 2015).

³⁰ US Department of State, 'National Strategy for Combating Terrorism', 14 February 2003, *US Department of State Archives*, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf, (accessed 12 September 2015).

United States, and its goals and objectives to defeat terrorists and terrorist organisations. The US undertook to work with, and support, moderate Muslims and modern governments in the Muslim world. Notably, one of the objectives outlined in the report was to ‘win the war of ideas’:

Together with the international community, we will wage a war of ideas to make clear that all acts of terrorism are illegitimate, to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation, to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit in areas most at risk, and to kindle the hopes and aspirations of freedom of those in societies ruled by the sponsors of global terrorism.³¹

That same year, Cheryl Benard of the RAND Corporation wrote a report entitled “Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies”.³² The report was aimed at understanding the ideological struggles within Islam; identifying appropriate partners; and setting goals for development and democratisation. Benard identified four main ideological positions within Islam: fundamentalists; traditionalists; modernists; and secularists.³³ Benard made four policy recommendations: support the modernists first; support the traditionalists against the fundamentalists; confront and oppose the fundamentalists; and selectively support secularists.³⁴ Sufis were included in the ‘modernist’ grouping and were, therefore, considered a suitable partner against extremism. As the following extract demonstrates, emphasis was placed on the intellectual and cultural aspects within the Sufi tradition, specifically poetry, music, and philosophy.

Sufism represents an open, intellectual interpretation of Islam. Sufi influence over school curricula, norms, and cultural life should be strongly encouraged in countries that have a Sufi tradition, such as Afghanistan or Iraq. Through its poetry, music, and philosophy, Sufism has a strong bridge role outside of religious affiliations.³⁵

In 2007, Angel Rabasa, Cheryl Benard, Lowell H. Schwartz, and Peter Sickle of the RAND Corporation wrote another report entitled “Building Moderate Muslim Networks”. Following on from its earlier report of 2003, RAND further developed its strategy for constructing partnerships with moderate Muslim networks and institutions. Rabasa et al. identified three potential partners in the fight against extremism: secularists; liberal Muslims; and moderate traditionalists, which included Sufis.

Immediately relevant to this study is the fact that Salafis and Wahhabis are relentless enemies of traditionalists and Sufis. Whenever radical Islamist

³¹ *US Department of State Archives*, (accessed 12 September 2015), pp. 23-4.

³² The RAND Corporation describes itself as ‘a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous’. Its research is funded by US government agencies (including the US Secretary of Defence, the US Air Force, the US Army, and the US Department of Health and Human Services); non-US governments, agencies, and ministries (from Australia, Canada, Europe, and the United Kingdom); international organisations (including the United Nations World Food Programme and the World Bank); US state and local governments; colleges and universities; foundations; industry; professional associations; and other nonprofit organisations. See, *RAND Corporation*, <http://www.rand.org>, (accessed 11 September 2015).

³³ C. Benard, *Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies*, RAND Corporation, California, 2003, p. x.

³⁴ Benard, 2003, pp. xi-xii.

³⁵ Benard, 2003, p. 46.

movements have gained power they have sought to suppress the practice of traditionalist and Sufi Islam. Because of their victimization by Salafis and Wahhabis, traditionalists and Sufis are natural allies of the West to the extent that common ground can be found with them.³⁶

However, the report also noted that, whilst Sufis are generally considered to be moderate and tolerant, some Sufis have 'radical tendencies' and have supported 'militant groups', whilst others are 'militantly moderate'.³⁷

The National Council for the Promotion of Sufism (2006) and the National Sufi Council (2009) were both formed within this context. President Pervez Musharraf of the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid) (PML-Q) announced the formation of the National Council for the Promotion of Sufism (NCPS) in 2006.³⁸ Less than three years later the Government of Pakistan, under the leadership of President Asif Ali Zardari of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), announced its decision to reconstitute the Sufi Advisory Council and rename it the National Sufi Council (NSC).³⁹ The main aim of the Sufi councils was to:

bring forth the soft image of Islam through spreading the Sufi message of love, tolerance and universal brotherhood across the world and amongst the masses of the area by holding meetings, seminars, workshops and conferences of ulama, researchers, teachers, students, and intellectuals of Pakistan, Afghanistan and other neighbouring countries.⁴⁰

President Musharraf and President Zardari appear to have been influenced by the ideological currents flowing from the United States in this period. Both governments placed emphasis on promoting the intellectual and cultural aspects within the Sufi tradition. In order to achieve the aims set out in the terms of reference, the Sufi councils worked primarily with the Ministry of Culture, Pakistan National Council of the Arts (PNCA), and the Ministry of Education, Pakistan Academy of Letters (PAL). They actively promoted renowned Sufi saints such as Mast Tawakali (Balochistan), Data Sahib (Punjab), Lal Shahbaz Qalandar (Sindh), Rukn-e-Alam (Sindh), Madhu Lal (Punjab), Bari Imam (Islamabad), Sultan Bahu (Punjab), Rehman Baba (Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa), Bullah Shah (Punjab), Abdul Latif Bhittai (Sindh), Waris Shah (Punjab), Sachel Sarmast (Sindh), and Mian Muhammad Bakhsh

³⁶ Rabasa et al., 2007, p. 73.

³⁷ Rabasa, A., Benard, C., Schwartz, L.H., and Sickel, P. Building Moderate Muslim Networks. RAND Corporation, California, 2007, p. 73.

³⁸ Members of the NCPS included: Pervez Musharraf (president of Pakistan); Chaudhury Shujaat Hussain (member of the PML-Q and prime minister of Pakistan); Mian Yousaf Salahuddin (maternal grandson of Muhammad Iqbal); Mushahid Hussain Syed (member of the PML-Q and secretary-general PML-Q); Hameed Haroon (journalist and chief executive officer of the Dawn Group of Newspapers, and promoter of art and culture); Abbas Sraffaz; Jam Muhammad Yousaf (member of PML-Q and chief minister of Balochistan); and Naeem Tahir (actor, director, and chief executive and director general of Pakistan National Council of the Arts). See, 'Council formed to promote Sufism', *Daily Times*, 22 September 2006, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C09%5C22%5Cstory_22-9-2006_pg7_18, (accessed 23 September 2011).

³⁹ Members of the NSC included: Haji Muhammad Tayyab (member of Jamiat Ulema Pakistan and president of the Nizam-e-Mustafa party); Sahibzada Sajidur Rahman; Maulana Syed Charagh-ud-din Shah (chairman of Tehreek-e-Ittehad Ummat Pakistan); Dr Ghazanfar Mehdi (Doctorate in Sufism and founder of literary, social, and religious organisations); Dr Hafiz Muhammad Tufail (Islamabad); Iranmullah Jan (director general Ministry of Religious Affairs); Abdul Ahad Haqqani (deputy director R&S, Ministry of Religious Affairs); and Sajidur Rahman. See, 'Notification: Reconstitution of the Sufi Advisory Council', *Government of Pakistan: Ministry of Religious Affairs*, 1 June 2009, <http://www.mora.gov.pk>, (accessed 14 August 2010).

⁴⁰ *Government of Pakistan: Ministry of Religious Affairs*, 1 June 2009, (accessed 14 August 2010).

(Kashmir). Through their poetry, these poet-saints and philosophers conveyed Islam to the masses in a way not previously seen in the subcontinent.

Political leaders in Pakistan were once again relying on the familiar construction of a Muslim national identity to unify a disparate nation. However, this time the official focus was on Sufism and its message of 'love', 'tolerance', and 'universal brotherhood'.⁴ The turn to Sufism was an attempt to bring about national cohesion, and improve the nation's tarnished image abroad, without neglecting Islam. From that point onward a new space was created in which a multitude of voices reignited old and unresolved debates concerning Islam and the role it should play in the state and society. Discourse on Sufism became an important subject of debate, particularly with regard to its ability to unify the nation, arrest religious violence, and reconcile religious difference. Consequently, numerous and rival groups in Pakistan, including successive governments, politicians, policy advisors, scholars, religious and community leaders, and the media, all made their varying appeals on the basis of Islam to support or criticise Sufi doctrine. Each provided historical, socio-cultural, religious, and moral claims to support their assorted positions, and each relied upon the construction of a positive 'us'-presentation and a negative 'Other'-presentation in their assertion of power and identity.

The Musharraf and Zardari governments were supported in their endeavours to construct an enlightened and moderate identity through the lens of Sufism. Proponents included Sufi *pirs* and their devotees, *sajjada nashins*, moderate mainstream political parties, Sufi religio-political parties (including Bareilvi groups), civil society organisations, and arts and educational organisations. For the most part, these groups tend to view Islam, with both its inner (Sufi) and outer (Shari'a) aspects, as an important holistic guiding philosophy for Pakistani society. They also see Sufism as an essential part of the nation's heritage and culture, which is reflected in the region's poetry, music (*qawwali*), art, architecture, and film. English-language newspapers in Pakistan played a very important role in reproducing this new political consciousness and extending it to a wider audience.⁵ However, some groups in Pakistan want less of a role for Islam in the state. These groups feel that Islam, including Sufism, should remain in the private sphere. These groups argue that the politicisation of Sufism will increase religious hostility and violence in Pakistan, rather than counter it.

The most critical opponents of government efforts to construct a Sufi identity for Pakistan came from within the minority Sunni Deoband⁶ and Ahle-Hadith⁶ traditions. Unlike the

⁴ See, *Daily Times*, 22 September 2006, (accessed 23 September 2011); and *Government of Pakistan: Ministry of Religious Affairs*, 1 June 2009, (accessed 14 August 2010).

⁵ In 2010, the Pakistan Academy of Letters (PAL) announced it would be setting up the International Sufi Council (ISC) to spread the Sufi message of love, tolerance, and universal brotherhood, and highlight the soft image of Pakistan. Members of the ISC came from Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Canada, Chile, China, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, India, Ireland, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, Italy, the Czech Republic, and Tajikistan. See, 'Sufi council presidents nominated', *The News*, 28 May 2011, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=49452&Cat=5&dt=5/28/2011>, (accessed 24 June 2011).

⁶ According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, militant group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi 'aims to transform Pakistan into a Sunni state, primarily through violent means [and] is part of the broader Deoband movement'. See, 'Pakistan

Barelvis, who consider Sufism to be a crucial part of Islamic tradition and an essential feature of Pakistan's heritage and culture, followers of the Deoband and Ahle-Hadith traditions vehemently oppose certain aspects of Barelvi Sufi belief and tradition. In particular, they consider Barelvis un-Islamic or *kafir* in their veneration of Sufi saints and shrines, for their participation in *urs* ceremonies, and for dancing and playing music at shrines. Such long-standing theological differences have resulted in hostility and, at times, violence. The Pak Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS) in Islamabad, for example, reported a gradual rise in the number of attacks on Sufi shrines since 2005.⁶ The increased rise in targeted attacks on Sufi shrines is one physical example of the way in which the official construction of a Sufi identity was contested in Pakistan. At the same time, each of these groups engaged in their own discursive construction of who is, and who is not, a Muslim.

1.2 Background to the complex relationship between Sufism and the state

An investigation into Sufism in South Asia yields a vast array of scholarly writings from disciplines as varied as history, politics, religious studies, anthropology, sociology, as well as studies in poetry and literature. Within these disciplines, scholars have explored themes such as the use of religion for colonial domination and legitimacy during the British period in India, the use of religion for national integration, personal political advantage, and religious legitimacy in the post-independence period, and the important role of Sufi *pirs* in the political history of pre- and post-independence Pakistan. There is also much scholarly literature on the moral, peace-building, and integrative aspects of the Sufi tradition in the Indian subcontinent.

What follows is a review of the current literature on the subject of Sufism in order to provide an understanding of the complex relationship between Sufism and the state in Pakistan. This section is divided into four parts. The first part provides an overview of the principal scholarly definitions of the terms 'Sufism' and 'Sufi' and how they have been used in recent academic literature. It concludes with a discussion of how those terms are used in this thesis. Alongside the myriad of different interpretations and understandings of Sufism exist a considerable collection of scholarly writings on the topic of Sufism. The second part provides a brief history of Sufism in South Asia, beginning with the arrival of Sufis in the twelfth century. The third part provides a historical overview of the ways in which religion has been implicated in affairs of state. The review of the literature in this section is restricted to the immediate pre- and post- independence period in South Asia. The final part looks at the ways in which aspects of the Sufi tradition in South Asia have been presented as integrative, moral, and peace building in the literature.

Assessment 2011', *South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)*, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan>, (accessed 28 December 2011).

⁶ According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, militant group Lashkar-e-Toiba is part of the Wahhabi movement. This group is proscribed in Pakistan, India, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the United Nations. See, *South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)*, (accessed 28 December 2011).

⁶ 'Attacks on Sufi Shrines', *Pak Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS)*, 25 May 2011, <http://san-pips.com/index.php?action=reports&id=195>, (accessed 14 September 2011).

1.2.1 Interpretations of Sufism

In his book entitled *Sufi Orders in Islam*, J. Spencer Trimingham begins his historical account of Sufism through the etymology of the Arabic word 'Suf'.⁶ The term is commonly thought to refer to the woollen clothing worn by Muslim ascetics known as 'Sufis' in the early days of Islam. From that starting point, the literature reveals that the terms 'Sufism' and 'Sufi' have been interpreted in different ways and have been given different meanings. In fact, the differing ways that scholars have described 'Sufism' and 'Sufi' have made it particularly difficult to acquire a definitive understanding of the terms. Sufism has been described variously as mystical,⁷ spiritual,⁸ inner,⁹ humanist,¹⁰ esoteric,¹¹ and popular Islam,¹² concerned with matters of the soul, and conveyed by spiritual masters (*pir*, *shaikh*, *murshid*) to their disciples (*murid*). Sufism has also been contrasted with outer,¹³ legalistic,¹⁴ purist,¹⁵ and orthodox Islam,¹⁶ derived from the word of God (Qur'an), the example of the Prophet (Sunnah), and the consensus of the community (*ijmah*), put forward in the Shari'a, and conveyed to the Muslim community by religious scholars. This presents something of a false dichotomy, however, because Sufism is also derived from the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Nevertheless, some Sufis have been accused of not paying proper attention to the Sunnah or of disregarding it completely. This perceived neglect of Islamic scriptures has brought criticism from some *ulama*, as well as from Sufis and non-Sufis, and has caused contestation and division over correct forms of belief and practice.¹⁷

After 9/11, the Government of Pakistan attempted to distance Sufism from a more narrowly conceived legalist Islam. The first four aims of the NCPS, and its successor the NSC, provide a clear example of the government's preferred version of Islamic piety.¹⁸ Sufism was placed in direct contrast to more narrow interpretations of the sacred scriptures (Qur'an, Sunnah, and Hadith) and the sacred laws (Shari'a). This dichotomy is explored further by examining the aspects of the Sufi heritage that were discursively invoked and disseminated by the

⁶ J.S. Trimingham, *The Sufi Orders in Islam*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971.

⁷ See, A.T. Embree, *Sources of Indian Tradition, Volume One: From the Beginning to 1800*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1988; N. Green, 'Making Sense of 'Sufism' in the Indian Subcontinent: A Survey of Trends'. *Religion Compass*, 2 (6), 2008, pp. 1044-1061; R. Hassan, 'Religion, Society, and the State in Pakistan: Pirs and Politics'. *Asian Survey*, 27 (5), 1987, pp. 552-565; I. Talbot, *Pakistan: a modern history*, C. Hurst and Co. Ltd., London, 2009; and O. Verkaaik, 'Reforming Mysticism: Sindhi Separatist Intellectuals in Pakistan'. *International Review of Social History*, 49 (S12), 2004, pp. 65-86.

⁸ See, S. Ansari, *Sufi Saints and State Power: The Pirs of Sindh, 1843-1947*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992; P. Heck, 'Mysticism as Morality'. *Journal of Religious Ethics*, 34 (2), 2006, pp. 253-286; C. Liebeskind, *Piety on its knees: three Sufi traditions in South Asia in modern times*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998; and O. Verkaaik, 2004, pp. 65-86.

⁹ Heck, 2006.

¹⁰ See, Talbot, 2009; and P. Heelas, 'Transpersonal Pakistan'. *The International Journal of Transpersonal Studies*, 32(2), 2013, pp. 98-110.

¹¹ See, Embree, 1988; and M. Hassanali, 'Sufi Influence on Pakistani Politics and Culture'. *Pakistaniaat: A Journal of Pakistan Studies*, 2 (1), 2010, pp. 23-45.

¹² See, Hassan, 1987; and Talbot, 2009.

¹³ See, Embree, 1988; and Heck, 2006.

¹⁴ Heck, 2006.

¹⁵ See, Hassan, 1987.

¹⁶ See, Embree, 1988; and Talbot, 2009.

¹⁷ See, E. Sirriyeh, *Sufis and Anti-Sufis: The Defence, Rethinking and Rejection of Sufism in the Modern World*, Curzon Press, London, 1999.

¹⁸ *Government of Pakistan: Ministry of Religious Affairs*, 1 June 2009, (accessed 14 August 2010).

government, what was ignored, and the ways in which this process was reproduced and resisted by other political actors, political recipients, and the media in Pakistan.

In his informative article entitled "Making Sense of Sufism in the Indian Subcontinent", Nile Green notes that the definition coined by Cambridge scholar A.J. Arberry in 1950 is still widely used by academics today. Arberry defined Sufism as 'the name given to the mysticism of Islam'.³⁹ While the word 'mysticism' does appear frequently in scholarly writings on Sufism, Green argues that the term is itself problematic due to the fact it is both a theological and ideological category which does not adequately explain the living Sufi tradition. Equally, Julia Day Howell and Martin van Bruinessen write that it is simplistic to liken Sufism to mysticism because Sufism cannot easily be regarded as a consistent or cohesive tradition. Rather, Sufism includes various practices and social norms.⁴⁰ Indeed, the literature on Sufism shows that variation in Sufi tradition occurs both over time and as a result of local social, religious, and political circumstances making it difficult to acquire a definitive understanding of Sufism.

Notably, however, it appears to be the goal of drawing nearer to the divine, upon which scholars tend to be of the same opinion, and which draws the layperson closer to a more definitive understanding of Sufism. Scholars tend widely to agree that Sufis are searching for a greater encounter with the divine. Ainslie Thomas Embree, for example, writes that whilst for many Muslims life was:

bounded by the Shari'a and by the round of mosque, pilgrimage, fasting, alms-giving, and ritual prayer [others] craved for a more emotional religion, one in which God appeared as a loving, succoring [sic] friend rather than as an abstract definition of undifferentiated unity, incomprehensible in His essence, inscrutable and arbitrary in His decrees'.⁴¹

Similarly, Sarah Ansari refers to Sufism as the 'Islamic spiritual tradition'.⁴² She writes that Sufis seek 'to gain knowledge of God in their hearts', thereby placing more importance on spiritual intimacy than legal obligations.⁴³ Following on from this, Paul Heck writes of the 'inner' (*batin*) and 'outer' (*zahir*) aspects of Islam. According to Heck, the inner aspect of Islam is concerned with achieving a greater awareness of God, whilst the outer aspect is concerned with the adherence to Islamic legal obligations and norms.⁴⁴ Many Muslims, and especially Sufis, distinguish between the *batin* and *zahir* aspects of Islam. John Voll and Kazuo Ohtsuka refer to the innermost aspect of Islam as '*ihsan*'. They write that '*ihsan* is a deepened understanding and perception that [...] allows you to worship God as if you see him'.⁴⁵ Voll

³⁹ Green, 2008, p. 1046.

⁴⁰ J.D. Howell and M. van Bruinessen, 'Sufism and the 'Modern' in Islam', in *Sufism and the 'modern' in Islam*, J.D. Howell and M. van Bruinessen (eds.), I.B. Tauris and Co Ltd., London, 2007.

⁴¹ Embree, 1988, p. 447.

⁴² Ansari, 1992, p. 4.

⁴³ Ansari, 1992, p. 4.

⁴⁴ Heck, 2006.

⁴⁵ Voll, J. O and K. Ohtsuka, 'Sufism', *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World: Oxford Islamic Studies Online*, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com.ezproxy.uws.edu.au/article/opr/t236MIW/e0759?_hi=1&_pos=1, (accessed 28 October 2011).

and Ohtsuka argue that *ih-san* is generally manifested through Sufi tradition and belief, whilst the categories of 'islam' and 'imam' are manifested through 'correct activity' and 'correct understanding' respectively within Islamic tradition.⁶⁶ Notably, most scholars seem to agree that the legal (Shari'a) and the Sufi traditions within Islam are neither in conflict, nor at variance, but that both ultimately lead to God.

For the purpose of this research, Sufism is regarded as:

those tendencies in Islam which aim at direct communion between God and man. It is a sphere of spiritual experience which runs parallel to the main stream of Islamic consciousness deriving from prophetic revelation and comprehended within the *Shari'a* and theology.⁶⁷

A Sufi, therefore, is regarded as anyone who is searching for a greater encounter with the divine. In particular, a Sufi stresses 'inwardness over outwardness, contemplation over action, spiritual development over legalism, and cultivation of the soul over social interaction'.⁶⁸ This is a deliberately wide definition because of the difficulty in discerning just who is, and who is not, a Sufi. As Voll and Ohtsuka point out, Sufis are not confined to one Islamic tradition or school of law, so can be Sunni or Shi'a.⁶⁹ Sufis are not restricted by age or gender.⁷⁰ In fact, Werbner argues that Sufi orders 'not only welcome women supplicants, initiates and adepts, but historically, there have been quite prominent Sufi women saints or *shaykhs* and some have shrines'.⁷¹ Nor are Sufis fixed to any single geographic location, so can be found wherever there are Muslims. Neither are Sufis restricted by social stratification, so can be found at all socio-economic levels within the social hierarchy. Some Sufis are attached to a Sufi *tariqah* (order), whilst others have no particular affiliation. While some Sufis are not adverse to establishing links with rulers in the subcontinent, or being rulers themselves, others prefer to remain aloof from centres of power.⁷²

1.2.2 The arrival of Sufis in the Indian subcontinent

Sufis arrived in the Indian subcontinent almost contemporaneously with the Delhi Sultanate. Three Sufi orders were prominent at this time: the Chistiyya, the Suhrawardiyya, and the Firdausiyya. These orders gradually spread across the subcontinent, building shrines and retreats. The Chistiyya became popular in the north of the subcontinent (Delhi), the Suhrawardiyya in the north-west (Sindh), and the Firdausiyya in the north-east (Bihar). Sufi saints played an important role in the dissemination of Islam during the Sultanate period,

⁶⁶ Voll and Ohtsuka, (accessed 28 October 2011).

⁶⁷ Trimmingham, 1971, p. 1.

⁶⁸ J.O. Voll and K. Ohtsuka, 'Sufism', *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World: Oxford Islamic Studies Online*, <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com>, (accessed 28 October 2011).

⁶⁹ Voll and Ohtsuka (accessed 28 October 2011).

⁷⁰ Voll and Ohtsuka (accessed 28 October 2011).

⁷¹ P. Werbner, 'Beyond division: Women, pilgrimage and nation building in South Asian Sufism'. *Women's Studies International Forum*, 33 (4), 1 January 2010, p. 376.

⁷² Prime Minister Gillani claims a Sufi *pir* lineage. He was born into a prominent Shi'a Sufi family from Multan in the Punjab. Gillani's father traces descent from Syed Musa Pak, of the Qadiriyya order, whose shrine is located in Multan. Gillani's maternal aunt is married to Pir Syed Mardan Shah II (Pir Pagara), a prominent Sufi spiritual and political leader. Gillani's eldest son is connected by marriage to Pir Pagara. See, 'Leaders Profile', *Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation*, <http://www.tourism.gov.pk/primeminister.htm>, (accessed 28 May 2014).

popularising Sufism in the Indian context through hagiographical texts and narratives, shrines and retreats, charismatic religious leaders or *pirs* and their hereditary successors (*sajjada nashins*), and through the emphasis on one's personal relationship with God. Muhammad Hassanali writes that what began as an esoteric tradition, known only to a small number of individuals seeking to draw nearer to God, gradually became accessible to a greater number of people through popular, easy to learn, practices such as *dhikr* (remembrance), *sama* (listening), music, and poetry.²⁵ The popularity of Sufi saints, with their poetry written in the local vernacular, attracted both Hindus and Muslims alike. Through their musical poetry or *qawwali*, Sufi saints were able to convey Islam to the masses in a way not previously seen in the subcontinent. Notably, Sufi saints tended to be more successful in the dissemination of Islamic belief in the subcontinent than other religious leaders. This may have been due to the fact that some of the trends in Sufism, such as devotion, piety, asceticism, and tolerance, found resonance in local traditions and were not wholly unfamiliar in the Indian context.

Trimingham writes that between the twelfth and the fifteenth centuries a more organised Sufism became apparent in the Indian subcontinent, which began to take account of Islam and its legalist traditions.²⁶ Embree asserts this was because some Muslim theologians were fearful that Sufis, with their emphasis on achieving a personal relationship with the divine, would deny the authority of the Shari'a. He writes that Sufism was a 'potentially disruptive force emphasizing a direct personal relation between the individual and his God and tending to ignore, if not to denigrate, the rules of conduct and the credal [sic] formulations of the orthodox'.²⁷ According to Embree, it was of particular importance to the success of Muslim military expansion into the Indian subcontinent at this time that Islam present a cohesive tradition to the majority non-Muslim indigenous population. Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) reconciled the Sufi tradition with orthodox Islam by placing importance on man's ability to emulate the qualities of God. This avoided, for the time being at least, a rupture between Islamic theologians on the subject of the *batin* and *zahir* aspects of Islam.²⁸

Trimingham goes on to argue that the increased organisation of Sufism in the Indian subcontinent led to a decline in the Sufi tradition. He writes that 'through the cult-mysticism of the orders the individual freedom of the mystic was fettered and subjected to conformity and collective experience'.²⁹ In addition, some Sufi orders were highly criticised for their veneration of Sufi *pirs* as next in importance to God. Trimingham also identifies the existence of some features of the Sufi tradition which still exist in Pakistan today, such as the importance of Sufi *pirs* as the foremost spiritual authority, institutionalised and hierarchical Sufi orders, the importance placed on *dhikr*, and the rise of the cult of the saints.³⁰ Similarly, Voll and Ohtsuka write that, whilst some Muslims fervently supported shrine culture, other

²⁵ Hassanali, 2010.

²⁶ Trimingham, 1971, p. 1.

²⁷ Embree, 1988, p. 387.

²⁸ Embree, 1988, p. 387.

²⁹ Embree, 1988, p. 103.

³⁰ Embree, 1988, p. 103.

Muslims criticised it as *bidah* (innovation).⁷⁹ In fact, there has long been a level of tension between the Islam of the *ulama* and the Islam of Sufis, although the boundaries were fluid and some *ulama* were themselves Sufis.

In the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries there appears to have been a level of harmony between the Muslim and Hindu communities in the Indian subcontinent. This could be attributed to the success of Sufi *pirs* in disseminating Islamic belief to the local population, as well as to the writings of Al-Ghazali and Ibn al-Arabi (1165-1240). Notably, in his article entitled "Transpersonal Pakistan", Paul Heelas writes of the important influence of Ibn al-Arabi's theory of *wahdat al-wujud* (Unity of Being). He argues that 'rather than unity belonging to the Godhead, over-and-above this world, everything belongs to the unity of the "all". Human life is bound up with the sacred'.⁸⁰ Similarly, Annemarie Schimmel, in her book entitled *Islam in India and Pakistan*, writes that *wahdat al-wujud* 'was unceasingly repeated by the poets, who claimed that there is no difference between Turk and Hindu, between *ar-Rahman* and *Ram*'.⁸¹ In fact, many Muslims consider Arabi's *wahdat al-wujud* to be the most profound understanding of *tawhid* (Oneness of God).

During the sixteenth century there was a reaction to what have been regarded as the syncretistic religious tendencies of some Mughal rulers, Akbar (r. 1556-1605) in particular, and of some Sufi orders. The most prominent reformist writings on Islam and the Muslim community in this period can be attributed to Shaikh Ahmad of Sirhind (1563-1624) who, according to Embree, argued 'from within mystic experience itself against the pantheism of Ibn 'Arabi [and] recalled Muslims to a fresh realization of the religious value of traditional observance'.⁸² Similarly, Schimmel attributes Sirhind with responsibility for popularising the strict Naqshbandiyya order of Sufis in the Indian subcontinent. She writes that this order was heavily critical of music, dance, and Arabi's theory of *wahdat al-Wujud*. What is more, Schimmel connects this order with the sixteenth-century revivalist movement that aimed at reversing the previous 'rapprochement' enabled by Sufism and its supporters.⁸³

In the eighteenth century there was a second Naqshbandiyya reaction in the Indian subcontinent.⁸⁴ Building on the sixteenth-century writings of Shaikh Ahmad of Sirhind, Islamic scholar Shah Wali-Ullah aimed at reversing the perceived spiritual and political degeneration of Muslims in India, unifying the Muslim community, and reviving Muslim rule and education in response to increasing British political and economic power. Wali-Ullah also aimed at purifying Islam of any non-Islamic elements it might have acquired through contact with the indigenous population. He was particularly critical of what he considered the superstitions associated with the tombs of saints. Elizabeth Sirriyeh, in her article entitled "Sufis and Anti-Sufis: The Defence, Rethinking and Rejection of Sufism in the

⁷⁹ Voll and Ohtsuka, (accessed 28 October 2011).

⁸⁰ Heelas, 2013.

⁸¹ A. Schimmel, *Islam in India and Pakistan*, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1982, p. 9.

⁸² Embree, 1988, p. 464.

⁸³ Schimmel, 1982, p. 9.

⁸⁴ Schimmel, 1982, p. 9.

Modern World", writes that Wali-Ullah was 'disturbed by the popular regard for wonder-working Sufis, admiration for their ecstatic poetry to the neglect of the Qur'an and Sunna and obsession with the visitation of tombs for purposes other than the pursuit of spiritual progress'.⁸⁵ Accordingly, Wali-Ullah emphasised the concept of *ijtihad*, or the role of independent interpretation in legal decisions. *Ijtihad* was considered the means by which the Shari'a could be understood in order to meet new social conditions without neglecting Islam. The topic of reform and revival with regard to Sufism, which began in the sixteenth century, is still relevant in Pakistan today and is reflected in the political discourse of the Government of Pakistan.

1.2.3 Sufism and the state in Pakistan

The current government practice of defining the ideology of the state, and claiming a source of Islamic legitimacy, has precedents in the Indian subcontinent. During the colonial period (1600-1947), British rulers recognised the important position of Sufi *pirs* in society and attempted to co-opt and control them for political and ideological purposes. Indeed, the period of British rule in the subcontinent had, and arguably still has, a profound impact on the privileged position and role of Sufi *pirs* in Muslim society. In this regard, Ansari provides a comprehensive analysis of the interaction between indigenous elites (*pirs* and *zamindars*) and the ruling British colonial power.⁸⁶ While her focus is primarily on the province of Sindh in the pre-independence period, Ansari nevertheless provides an important understanding of politics and religion in Pakistan. She also presents important insights into the ways in which *pirs* became firmly entrenched in the socio-political structure of the countryside, which in turn has important ramifications for Pakistan today.

According to Ansari, the British relied upon local elites to help maintain and provide legitimacy for colonial rule, primarily owing to limited finances and manpower. Recognising the important role *pirs* had in local Muslim society, the British endeavoured to control them by granting or denying land rights and positions of prestige within the hierarchical colonial system.⁸⁷ Similarly, Ian Talbot in his comprehensive history of Pakistan agrees that the British, like the Muslim rulers before them, were a minority people attempting to establish and expand their rule over a majority Hindu population. As a result, the British relied heavily on local intermediaries to consolidate their rule. Talbot argues that the practice of indirect rule through local intermediaries, such as Sufi *pirs* and landlords for example, ensured a privileged position for the latter, whilst enabling the British to pursue the commercialisation of agriculture and the gradual introduction of political enfranchisement and devolution.⁸⁸ At the same time, Riaz Hassan emphasises the deep spiritual and social

⁸⁵ Sirriyeh, 1999, p. 2.

⁸⁶ Ansari, 1992.

⁸⁷ Ansari, 1992.

⁸⁸ Talbot, 2009.

influence Sufi shrines wielded over devotees, stressing that this did not go unnoticed by the ruling elite who recognised the political, religious, and economic importance of the shrines.⁸⁹

The practice of granting land was not just unique to the British in India, but was also customary for the Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal Empire.⁹⁰ According to Hassan, spiritual leaders 'were granted substantial *jagirs* by the state not only to obtain their cooperation in maintaining political and social stability, but also to use their influence and power over their disciples to provide military recruits for the state at short notice'.⁹¹ This system continued under British rule, with *pirs* receiving official patronage by way of land grants and honours in return for their loyalty and support. Equally, Arthur Buehler writes that by:

using an elaborate system of prestige, the British kept the rural landowners (often Sufis) at least passively supporting the colonial system. [...] Pirs did not upset the colonial status quo and the British did not disturb the local equilibrium of the rural landowner.⁹²

The social, political, and economic position of *pirs* during this period was further strengthened by the implementation of the Punjab Alienation of Land Bill of 1900, which deemed *pirs* 'landed gentry'.⁹³ Ansari points out, however, that this relationship was not one-sided but that *pirs* took advantage of the privileged relationship in order to acquire land rights and to ensure saintly succession.⁹⁴ It is important to note that, as intermediaries between the rulers and the ruled, the *pirs* were often caught between competing tendencies. Because *pirs* were reliant upon donations from the local population they tended to be influenced by local rather than British considerations. Similarly, local and national movements, such as the Hur rebellions in Sindh (beginning in the 1890s), the Khilafat Movement (1919-1924), and the Indian Nationalist Movement (1920-22; 1942-3), increasingly challenged and revealed the complexities in the relationship between the *pirs* and their devotees, and between the *pirs* and the British.

Within the context of the Indian Nationalist Movement, *pirs* played a key role in attracting votes for the Muslim League and the Pakistan Movement in opposition to the British in India. David Gilmartin explores this in depth in his article entitled "Religious leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab". He notes that, whilst much was written about the Deoband *ulama* who widely resisted the formation of Pakistan, little has been written to further our knowledge of what lay behind the widespread religious support for Pakistan in

⁸⁹ Hassan, 1987.

⁹⁰ See, C. Ernst, 'From Hagiography to Martyrology: Conflicting Testimonies to a Sufi Martyr of the Delhi Sultanate'. *History of Religions*, 24 (4), 1985, pp. 308-327; and M. Alam, 'The Mughals, the Sufi Shaikhs and the Formation of the Akbari Dispensation'. *Modern Asian Studies*, 43 (01), 2009, pp. 135-174.

⁹¹ Hassan, 1987.

⁹² A. Buehler, 'Currents of Sufism in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Indo-Pakistan: An Overview'. *The Muslim World*, 87 (3-4), 1997, p. 307.

⁹³ Hassan, 1987. See also, 'Provincial Assembly of the Punjab', *Government of Punjab*, <http://www.pap.gov.pk>, (accessed 26 May 2011).

⁹⁴ Ansari, 1992.

the years leading up to independence.⁹⁵ In order to understand this phenomenon, Gilmartin uses the province of Punjab, an area considered of prime importance in the movement for Pakistan, as well as a region of Sufis, as a case study. He begins by looking at the development and nature of religious leadership in the Punjab, with particular emphasis on the role of Sufi missionaries in the dissemination of Islam during the Delhi Sultanate period. He then explores the relationship between religious and political authority during the period of Mughal and British rule, and the impact this had on the association between religious leadership and the Pakistan Movement. Within this context, it is important to note the widespread religious influence of the *sajjada nashins* in rural Punjab who were closely connected to local political structures. This connection, in Punjab as in Sindh, 'produced a considerable unity of political and economic interests between the religious and the secular leaders of rural society'.⁹⁶

It is thus evident that, during the period of British rule, a patron-client relationship was formalised between the British and the landowning class, including Sufi *pirs*. This point is supported by Buehler who writes, 'the British became the formal patrons of the landowning (*zamindar*) class, protecting and legitimizing the Punjabi system of hierarchy and mediation. In this fashion, many members of Sufi families became rural administrators, honorary magistrates, and district board members'.⁹⁷ This patron-client relationship has continued in the post-independence period.

Since 1947, the *pirs* of Sindh have continued to flourish. Like other great landowners, they have survived attempts at land reform with their estates intact. They have become leading politicians at provincial and national levels, often with members of the same extended family strategically positioned in political terms to ensure that it does well whatever the nature of the administration'.⁹⁸

Many individuals belonging to Sufi orders can be found within the centres of power in contemporary Pakistan. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani, for example, was born into a prominent *pir* family of the Qadiriyya order. His eldest son is connected by marriage to Hazrat Pir Syed Mardan Shah II, a prominent religious and political leader of the Sufi Hur community in Sindh.⁹⁹ Critically, Talbot argues that British policy and practice towards Sufi *pirs* is the source of continuing social inequality in Pakistan today. He writes that 'although Pakistan emerged as a state with a new identity, its political culture and characteristics were profoundly influenced by historical inheritances from the colonial era'.¹⁰⁰ President Musharraf supported this theory, saying that Pakistan had inherited a society that was feudal, patriarchal, and ruled by a small group of autocratic elite.¹⁰¹

⁹⁵ D. Gilmartin, 'Religious leadership and the Pakistan movement in the Punjab'. *Modern Asian Studies*, 13 (03), 1979, p. 516.

⁹⁶ Gilmartin, 1979, p. 516.

⁹⁷ Buehler, 1997, p. 307.

⁹⁸ Ansari, 1992, p. 160.

⁹⁹ See, Ansari, 1992, p. 160.

¹⁰⁰ Talbot, 2009, p. 12.

¹⁰¹ P. Musharraf, *In the line of fire: A memoir*, Simon and Schuster UK Ltd., London, 2006.

The ways in which the state and religious institutions have interacted in the post-independence period up to 1988 are most fully captured by Katherine Ewing in her article entitled "The politics of Sufism: Redefining the saints of Pakistan". Ewing explores government policies towards Sufi shrines, with particular emphasis on the military and civilian administrations of General Muhammad Ayub Khan (r. 1958-1969), Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (r. 1971-1977), and General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (r. 1977-1988).¹⁰² Notably, Ewing demonstrates that state-sanctioned Sufism after 9/11 is not an isolated phenomenon in the recent political history of Pakistan. Rather, she shows that there have been ongoing attempts by leaders, albeit to varying degrees, to construct national identity and claim political legitimacy through a discourse on Sufism. She also shows that there have also been ongoing attempts by leaders to redefine and control Sufism and its symbols (saints and shrines) in ways consistent with their particular socio-political vision.

In Pakistan, a prominent and recurring theme is the reliance on Islam as a source of political legitimacy. Both Muhammad Ayub Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto aimed at shaping Pakistan into a modern secular nation state, although Bhutto's Pakistan would have socialist leanings. Ewing argues that, despite their largely secular agendas, both Ayub Khan and Ali Bhutto felt the need to link their governments to Islam in order to claim legitimacy. However, neither wanted to share political control with the *ulama*. Instead, they linked their administrations to Islam by way of the Sufi tradition.

The secular governments of Ayub Khan and Bhutto chose to identify themselves with the doctrine of Sufism in order to create for themselves a link with religious authority. The Sufi was the symbol these secularists chose to represent their position and to legitimate their position as leaders of a Muslim democracy.¹⁰³

Conversely, Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq aimed at transforming Pakistan into an Islamic state. He established laws that prescribed Islamic punishments for crimes, established Shari'a courts, banned the sale of alcohol and gambling, encouraged the use of Urdu over English in the government sphere, enforced traditional dress in educational institutions, and strengthened regulations governing religious institutions.¹⁰⁴ Indeed, his ten-year rule marked a period of increased religiosity in Pakistan. For that reason, Ewing argues that Zia-ul-Haq 'felt less need to identify [his] government with Sufism'.¹⁰⁵

Another recurring theme is the need to negotiate politics that is strongly influenced by the traditional relationship between the hereditary *pirs* and the elite land-owning classes, both of which are firmly entrenched in the socio-political structure of the countryside. Ewing argues that Muhammad Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq all attempted to reduce the political power of Sufi *pirs* by enforcing greater control over shrines.

¹⁰² K. Ewing, 'The politics of Sufism: redefining the saints of Pakistan'. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 42 (2), 1983, pp. 251-268.

¹⁰³ Ewing, 1983, p. 253.

¹⁰⁴ Ewing, 1983.

¹⁰⁵ Ewing, 1983, p. 253.

Despite their differing policies and political ambitions, 'through the vehicle of a newly founded Department of Auqaf, these leaders maintained a policy towards the shrines that was consistent with their ideologies and goals'.¹⁰⁶ Buehler also makes this point. He writes that post-independence governments in Pakistan, in line with their political policies, directly and/or indirectly assumed control over Sufi shrines'.¹⁰⁷ Each of these leaders did so by strengthening the regulations governing religious institutions. Ayub Khan implemented the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance (1959), which was later replaced with the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance (1961). Ali Bhutto implemented the Auqaf (Federal Control) Act (1976). Zia-ul-Haq maintained the regulations governing religious institutions that were introduced by his predecessors.¹⁰⁸

At the same time, Muhammad Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq all tried to reduce the political power of the *pirs* by diminishing their religious role and authority. These leaders did so by attempting to redefine the symbols of Sufism (saints and shrines).¹⁰⁹ Ayub Khan and Ali Bhutto both placed emphasis on the role of the early saints as important social reformers. They also reinforced the notion of shrines as centres of welfare, which is still the practice in Pakistan today.¹¹⁰ Ewing observes that 'the goal was to make the shrines centers of more general social welfare by building hospitals, schools, and other facilities for poor and rural people'.¹¹¹ In doing so, and in an attempt to establish a link between Sufism and their own socio-political objectives, both governments undermined the traditional role of the *pirs* as social reformers. Ayub Khan and Ali Bhutto also built research centres and libraries at popular shrines. Buehler observes that the government gradually took greater responsibility for the upkeep of shrines, transforming them into schools, hospitals, and libraries.¹¹² In doing so, the government undermined the traditional role of the *pirs* as hereditary custodians and benefactors of the shrine.

Interestingly, Ewing notes that Zia-ul-Haq's policies towards the saints and their shrines were not a major departure from those of the previous administrations, despite his Islamisation project. In fact, he continued many of the auqaf policies of his predecessors in an attempt to reduce the political influence of the *pir*.¹¹³ He also attempted to diminish the religious role and authority of the *pirs*. Zia-ul-Haq placed emphasis on the role of the early saints in the widespread conversion of the population through pious belief and behaviour. He also:

attempted to minimize the distinction between Sufism and *shari'at*. In defining Sufism and the significance of the saints, Zia's administration has emphasized

¹⁰⁶ Ewing, 1983, p. 251.

¹⁰⁷ Buehler, 1997, p. 307.

¹⁰⁸ Ewing, 1983.

¹⁰⁹ Ewing, 1983; and Hassan, 1987.

¹¹⁰ See, Hassan, 1987; and Ewing, 1983.

¹¹¹ Ewing, 1983, p. 261.

¹¹² Buehler, 1997, p. 307.

¹¹³ Ewing, 1983.

the idea that the original saints were themselves *'ulama*, trained religious scholars who followed the *shari'at*.¹¹⁴

In summary, Ewing, Hassan, and Buehler have identified the profound ways in which Sufism has been drawn upon, co-opted, and controlled by the government. They agree that the traditional relationship between the hereditary *pirs* and the elite land-owning classes is deeply entrenched in the socio-political structure of the countryside.¹¹⁵ The *pir-zamindar* relationship, together with ongoing attempts to define the state in terms of Islam, not to mention attempts by some *ulama* to break the dominant connection between the state and the representatives of Sufi Islam and promote their own purist brand of Islam, has had an impact on the government's ability to govern the country. Successive post-independence governments in Pakistan have all attempted to reduce the influence of *ulama* and *pir-zamindar* by increasing government control of Sufi shrines, and by linking the administration to Islam by way of the Sufi tradition.

1.2.4 Integrative aspects of the Sufi tradition

A number of scholars have presented aspects of the Sufi tradition in the Indian subcontinent as integrative, moral, and peace building in the literature. This helps provide one possible explanation for the formation of the Sufi councils after 9/11. However, it is important to note that, at times, aspects of the Sufi tradition have been drawn upon within Pakistani society and politics with divisive results. Some scholarly writings, as well as popular commentary in Pakistan and abroad, have supported the Government of Pakistan's claims that Sufism can assist in achieving religious and communal harmony in Pakistan and curb religious extremism. However, it is problematic to view peace as exclusive to Sufism.¹¹⁶ It is also problematic to argue the converse, which is to view a more narrowly conceived legalist Islam as combative and lacking in peaceable tendencies.

Scholars from varied disciplines have characterised Sufism as open and inclusive,¹¹⁷ egalitarian and tolerant,¹¹⁸ altruistic,¹¹⁹ a counter to inequality, social conflict, injustice, and violence,¹²⁰ and active in the moral formation of Muslim society.¹²¹ Heelas, for example, writes that Sufi saints 'cultivate sentiments of compassion, consideration, mercy; cultivate

¹¹⁴ Ewing, 1983, p. 264.

¹¹⁵ See, Ewing, 1983; Hassan, 1987; and Buehler, 1997, p. 307.

¹¹⁶ There are a number of examples of Sufi activism and violence in the Indian subcontinent which indicate that in the subcontinent, as elsewhere, Sufis are not always non-violent. Pir Pagara Shah Mardan Shah was the spiritual leader of the Hurs community in Sindh. He led the first Hurs rebellion against the British in the late nineteenth century. Pir Pagara Sibghatullah Shah II led the second Hurs rebellion. The British hanged him in 1943 and his son, Pir Pagara Syed Mardan Shah II, was sent to England to be educated. Mirza Ali Khan, also known as the *Faqir* of Ipi and *Haji Sahib*, was a Sufi *pir* from the Waziristan region (NWFP). Mirza Ali Khan led an unsuccessful rebellion against the British in the mid-twentieth century.

¹¹⁷ See, Werbner, 2010, p. 376.

¹¹⁸ See, R. Rozehnal, 'Faqir or faker?: The Pakpattan tragedy and the politics of Sufism in Pakistan'. *Religion*, 36 (1), 2006, pp. 29-47.

¹¹⁹ See, K. Akman, 'Sufism, spirituality and sustainability: Rethinking Islamic mysticism through contemporary sociology'. *Journal of US-China Public Administration*, 6 (004), 2009, pp. 47-55.

¹²⁰ See, Q. Huda, 'Memory, Performance, and Poetic Peacemaking in Qawwali'. *The Muslim World*, 97 (4), 2007, pp. 678-700.

¹²¹ Heck, 2006.

awareness of humankindness, the sheer value of life, the values of equality or mutuality'.¹²² Pina Werbner uses the annual Sufi pilgrimage to Ghamkol Sharif to demonstrate what she considers the 'open' and 'inclusive' aspects of the Naqshbandiyya Sufi order in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan.¹²³ Similarly, Robert Rozehnal uses the example of the shrine of Hazrat Baba Farid ud-din Mas'ud Ganjshakkar to demonstrate what he considers to be the egalitarian and tolerant aspects of the Chishtiyya Sufi order.¹²⁴ Following on from this, Heck explores the role of Sufism in what he refers to as the 'moral formation' of Muslim society. He writes that 'Sufism has played an integral role in the moral life of Muslim society [...] seeking ethical meaning in *Shari'a* beyond a simple implementation of its legal rulings'.¹²⁵ Thus, Heck believes that Sufism could make a valuable contribution to current debates surrounding the legal and ethical principles of Islam. Equally, Sufis and Sufi shrines as important sources of 'moral authority' are explored in an interesting collection of essays written by noted scholars Simon Digby, Francis Robinson, Katherine Ewing, Richard Eaton, David Gilmartin, and Barbara Metcalf. These scholars deal with the practice of *adab* (proper conduct, etiquette, moral behaviour), which they argue is most fully observed in Sufism.

Of particular relevance to this thesis is how the Sufi tradition might enable citizens of diverse orientations to interact peaceably. Equally important are the ways in which the tradition might help form a unified community in Pakistan. In this regard, Werbner notes that, although post-colonial governments have emphasised building national unity, the reality is that many such nations are linguistically, ethnically, and religiously diverse. This diversity creates difficulties for states in the process of nation building. This is true of Pakistan which is, arguably, still in the process of nation building or, as Werbner puts it:

creating spaces of public civility and a widely shared civic culture, the sense that the nation cares for all its citizens and that citizens extend moral obligations beyond their immediate family, tribe, village or ethnic group to the imagined community of the nation.¹²⁶

The nation-building process in Pakistan is also hampered by temporal problems such as a weak economy and lack of development, the subversion of law and order by various groups, and the presence of corruption and nepotism within government and civic institutions.¹²⁷ In this regard, Rozehnal argues that political and economic instability, corruption, a heavily politicised military, drugs, violence, gun smuggling, and the rise of extremist groups contribute to Pakistan's volatility.¹²⁸ In the wake of 9/11, the religious discourse in Pakistan, and specifically the discourse on Sufism, became increasingly politicised and mediated in the public arena. Numerous and rival groups including politicians, bureaucrats, secular

¹²² Heelas, 2013, p. 102.

¹²³ Werbner, 2010, p. 376.

¹²⁴ Rozehnal, 2006.

¹²⁵ Heck, 2006, p. 279.

¹²⁶ Werbner, 2010, p. 374.

¹²⁷ See, Talbot, 2009.

¹²⁸ Rozehnal, 2006.

nationalists, Islamists, *ulama*, and *pirs* all made references to Sufism in order to support or criticise some version of Islamic doctrine. As Rozehnal observes, 'in today's Pakistan, Sufism remains an emotive, multi-valent and highly contested symbol - a lightening rod in the contestation over Islamic identity, authority and authenticity'.¹²⁹

Within this unstable and frequently violent context, Werbner, focussing on elite women, argues that it has become increasingly difficult for groups to move and interact safely in society. Despite these challenges, Werbner identifies many arenas in which Pakistani citizens of diverse orientations can interact peaceably.¹³⁰ Some examples include private schools, universities, government departments, hospitals, weddings, cricket matches, public transport, and Sufi shrines and *urs* ceremonies.¹³¹ Werbner considers these arenas places of 'public civility' where people are able to interact across gender, class, and ethnic divisions. Moreover, she reasons that these arenas are important to the nation-building process due to their inclusive nature.

In connecting people and spaces across the whole of Pakistan, rich and poor, men and women, Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans, Baluchis and Muhajirs, Sufi orders thus reach out beyond the local to create the performative and embodied experience of moral relations between strangers, arguably the essential precondition and grounds of nationhood, without explicitly articulating ideologies of nationalism or of a global *ummah*.¹³²

Similarly, Heck argues that, despite challenges from authoritarian governments and fundamentalist groups that attempt to link the moral ideology of the state to the Qur'an and the Shari'a, Sufi groups have played an active role in upholding 'civil society'. He writes that Sufism, 'while far from incorruptible [has] offered a soundly Islamic alternative to the Islamism in power'.¹³³ Heck asserts that if modern Sufism is to countermand the influence of Islamists it will need to be progressive in its perspective, retain its spiritual vision, and remain faithful to Islamic law, but absent of negative aspects such as its former hierarchical inflexibility and its superstitions.

1.3 Understanding contemporary politics and Islam through discourse analysis

In order to understand contemporary politics and Islam in Pakistan after 9/11, this thesis employs Critical Discourse Analysis as a theoretical framework and as a method for socio-political and historical analysis. What follows in this section is a detailed discussion of CDA, focussing primarily on the scholarly works of Phil Graham, Rudolf De Cillia, Norman Fairclough, and Teun van Dijk.¹³⁴ The principal assumption of these CDA scholars is that

¹²⁹ Rozehnal, 2006, p. 29.

¹³⁰ Werbner, 2010, p. 374.

¹³¹ In Pakistan, Sufi shrines and *urs* ceremonies have become areas of contestation and targets of violence since 2005. See, *Pak Institute of Peace Studies*, 25 May 2011, (accessed 14 September 2011); and 'Attacks on Shrines in Pakistan', *Terrorism Watch*, <http://www.terrorismwatch.com.pk/Attacks%20on%20Shrines%20In%20Pakistan.html>, (accessed 15 May 2012).

¹³² Werbner, 2010, p. 374.

¹³³ Heck, 2006, p. 280.

¹³⁴ P. Graham, T. Keenan, and A.M. Dowd, 'A Call to Arms at the End of History: A Discourse-Historical Analysis of George W. Bush's Declaration of War on Terror'. *Discourse and Society*, 15 (2), 2004, pp. 199-221; R. De Cillia, M.

discourse and power are not only linked, but that power or social struggles are reflected in discourse. That assumption is particularly relevant for this thesis, which seeks to reveal the complex and competing identity narratives within Pakistani society and situate them within the wider contemporaneous and historical socio-political context. This section concludes with a note on sources.

1.3.1 Theoretical framework and a method for analysis

CDA is a widely used method for critically analysing discourse (spoken and written). This qualitative social science method can be used to analyse any written, verbal, and visual communication such as text, documentaries and films, and pictures. The objective of CDA scholars is to identify, describe, and compare key themes within the text in order to explain a particular social or political idea, situation, or problem. The fundamental premise of these scholars is that discourse can be critically analysed within specific socio-political and historical contexts to reveal the discursive strategies of dominance and control by those in power. This thesis follows Teun van Dijk's definition of CDA as 'a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context'.¹³⁵

There have been a number of different approaches in CDA, drawing from disciplines in the social sciences and the humanities, and from the writings of social theorists. As discussed, this thesis draws upon the works of Phil Graham, Rudolf De Cillia, Norman Fairclough, and Teun van Dijk. These scholars aim at determining the links between the discourse or text, discursive practices or social norms, and the socio-political context in the reproduction of power and ideology. De Cillia and Graham extend this to include a further level of analysis, the historical context. In combination, these approaches provide a particularly useful foundation upon which to study the reproduction of, and resistance to, power and ideology in Pakistan.

Fairclough's extensive work on CDA provides a valuable foundation for understanding CDA as a social science method.¹³⁶ In addition, the Political Discourse Analysis (PDA) approach taken by van Dijk offers helpful insights for the analysis of the combined topics of politics, ideology, and discourse. For van Dijk, 'most kinds of CDA will ask questions about the way specific discourse structures are deployed in the reproduction of social dominance'.¹³⁷ In his article entitled "What is Political Discourse Analysis", van Dijk argues

Reisigl, and R. Wodak, 'The Discursive Construction of National Identities'. *Discourse and Society*, Vol. 10 (2), 1999, pp. 149-173; N. Fairclough, 'Critical discourse analysis and the marketization of public discourse: The universities'. *Discourse and Society*, 4 (2), 1993, pp. 133-168; and T. van Dijk, 'Politics, Ideology, and Discourse', in *Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics*, K. Brown (ed.), Second Edition, Vol. 7, Elsevier, Oxford, 2006.

¹³⁵ T. van Dijk, 'Critical Discourse Analysis', in *Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, D. Schiffrin and H. Hamilton (eds.), Blackwell, Oxford, 2001, p. 352.

¹³⁶ Fairclough, 1993.

¹³⁷ T. van Dijk, 2001, p. 354.

that in the social sciences the areas of politics, ideology, and discourse are inextricably linked.

PDA is about political discourse, and it is also a critical enterprise. In the spirit of contemporary approaches in CDA this would mean that critical-political discourse analysis deals especially with the reproduction of political *power*, *power abuse*, or *domination* through political discourse, including the various forms of resistance or counter-power against such forms of discursive dominance.¹³⁸

Particularly important to this thesis is what De Cillia and Graham refer to as the Discourse-Historical approach.¹³⁹ In his article entitled "The Discursive Construction of National Identities", which draws on Benedict Anderson's notion of an 'imagined community', De Cillia investigates the construction of nation and national identity using Austria as a case study. De Cillia not only analyses discourse within a contemporaneous context, which is similar to the approach taken by van Dijk, but takes into consideration the historical background as well. According to De Cillia, the Discourse-Historical approach 'attempts to integrate all available information on the historical background and the original sources in which discursive 'events' are embedded'.¹⁴⁰ This approach allows a more complete analysis of the discursive reproduction of, and resistance to, political dominance in Pakistan, as well as the historical processes that influence and delimit the discourse, the discursive practice, and the social and political context.

As discussed above, this thesis focuses on two pivotal themes: a) the discursive construction of a national Sufi identity in the political discourse of the Government of Pakistan, and b) the ways in which the discursive construction of a national Sufi identity was enacted, reproduced, and resisted by political actors, political recipients, and the media. In order to critically analyse these themes in more depth, this thesis takes a two-fold approach. The first part of the analysis investigates the relationships between: a) the discourse, b) the discursive practice, c) the social and political context, and d) the historical context. The first three foci of this approach derive from Fairclough who argues that an analysis at this level will reveal 'how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power [and] how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony'.¹⁴¹ The fourth focus of this approach derives from De Cillia who argues that the inclusion of historical background information will allow a more complete analysis by situating the phenomenon in a wider context.¹⁴² These aspects, and how they are applied, are discussed in more detail below.

a) *Discourse*. The term discourse (spoken and written) is used to denote a record of communication, event, fact, or belief. Examples of discourse in the political arena

¹³⁸ T. van Dijk, 'What is Political Discourse Analysis', in *Political Linguistics*, J. Blommaert and C. Bulcaen (eds.), Benjamins, Amsterdam, 1997, p. 11.

¹³⁹ Graham, Keenan, and Dowd, 2004; and De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak, 1999.

¹⁴⁰ De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak, 1999, p. 156.

¹⁴¹ Fairclough, 1993, p. 135.

¹⁴² De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak, 1999, p. 156.

include parliamentary debates, bills, laws, government regulations and legislation, propaganda, political advertising, speeches, media interviews, and ballots. Two theoretical assumptions are made about discourse as a category. The first theoretical assumption, which draws on Fairclough, is that discourse is a form of 'social practice' or a 'mode of action'.¹⁴³ Discourse is used by political actors to exercise power and assert ideologies. Discourse is also used by political actors to resist power and dominant ideologies. The second theoretical assumption, which also draws on Fairclough, is that discourse is always 'socially and historically situated'.¹⁴⁴ Using these two theoretical assumptions as an underlying principle, this thesis critically analyses the discourse of government officials, other political actors, political recipients, and the print media in Pakistan in order to reveal the key themes and strategies used in the construction of national identity in the ten years following 9/11. A critical analysis at this level will reveal the tensions between the discourse of these political actors and the socio-political and historical context.

- b) *Discursive practice*. The term discursive practice, which is sourced from Fairclough, is used to denote the process involved in the production, distribution, and consumption of the discourse or text.¹⁴⁵ Discursive practice refers to the social norms and conventions that regulate how people behave within society and how they receive, interpret, and produce specific communications. Examples of discursive practice in the political arena include governing, ruling, legislating, protesting, dissenting, and voting. A critical analysis of discursive practice at this level will reveal the social norms and mental models that influenced the ways in which political discourse was produced, interpreted, and acted upon in the construction of national identity in Pakistan in the ten years that followed 9/11.
- c) *Social and political context*. The social and political context is the specific setting in which the discourse of political actors takes place. Drawing on Fairclough, this includes the 'context of situation', the 'institutional context', and the 'wider societal context'.¹⁴⁶ Examples include parliamentary sessions, cabinet meetings, election campaigns, rallies, demonstrations, and protests. Because the assertion of power and the promotion of ideology takes place in particular socio-political contexts, an analysis at this level will reveal the factors that influenced and delimited the discourse, and the discursive practice, of political actors in the construction of nation and national identity in Pakistan in the ten years following 9/11.
- d) *Historical context*. The historical context refers to the temporal background in which the discourse, discursive practice, and socio-political context is situated. Drawing on De Cillia, this thesis contends that discourse, as a form of social action, is a dynamic process;

¹⁴³ Fairclough, 1993, p. 135.

¹⁴⁴ Fairclough, 1993, p. 135.

¹⁴⁵ Fairclough, 1993, p. 135.

¹⁴⁶ Fairclough, 1993, p. 137.

it is determined by discursive practice, and is influenced and bound by the socio-political and historical context.¹⁴⁷ The historical background is particularly relevant because it enables a more complete analysis of 'very recent situations with an eye to how elements from the past are woven into sources of dominance, resistance and or opposition and how the emergent promises new social forms that may still be recuperated and contained'.¹⁴⁸ An analysis at this level will reveal the historical processes that influenced and delimited the discourse and discursive practices of political actors in Pakistan in the ten years that followed 9/11.

The second part of the analysis draws primarily upon the Discourse-Historical approach of Graham. In his article entitled "A Call to Arms at the End of History: A Discourse-Historical Analysis of George W. Bush's Declaration of War on Terror", Graham argues that throughout history political leaders have relied upon four generic strategies to successfully persuade people to make enormous personal sacrifices in the interests of greater good, such as risking their lives at war, and that these strategies are particularly apparent in societies that have experienced a profound crisis of political legitimacy.¹⁴⁹ In the case of Pakistan, the largely unpopular decision to join the US-led 'war on terror' undeniably heralded a deep crisis in the nation's political legitimacy, both domestically and internationally. Pakistan was transformed into a key ally of the United States, and a front-line state in the war, but it also became a victim of terrorism and one of the most negatively viewed countries in the world.

This thesis employs a converse form of Graham's 'call to arms' approach to critically analyse the discourse of political actors in Pakistan after 9/11. It contends that, in the climate of extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism, political leaders in Pakistan relied upon four generic strategies, not to encourage people to go to war, but rather to encourage them to form a unified community, interact peaceably, and progress socially and economically. In addition, Graham's fundamental premise is extrapolated to include not only exhortations that persuade people to behave in a particular way, or to accede to an appeal, but also exhortations that attempt to convince people to accept certain beliefs or attitudes. Graham's four generic strategies, and how they are applied, are discussed in more detail below.

An appeal to a legitimate power source

The first strategy is what Graham refers to as 'an appeal to a legitimate power source that is external to the orator and which is presented as inherently good'.¹⁵⁰ According to Graham, this strategy is used by political actors in discourse to positively invoke the 'ultimate moral force within the societal order of the discourse of the day'.¹⁵¹ These moral forces might also be adequately termed 'ideologies'. That is, a set of fundamental beliefs that reflect the collective

¹⁴⁷ De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak, 1999, p. 156.

¹⁴⁸ R. Johnson, 'Historical returns: Transdisciplinarity, cultural studies and history'. *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, 4, 2001, p. 280.

¹⁴⁹ Graham, Keenan, and Dowd, 2004, p. 200.

¹⁵⁰ Graham, Keenan, and Dowd, 2004, p. 201.

¹⁵¹ Graham, Keenan, and Dowd, 2004, p. 204.

social, political, cultural, or religious beliefs of a group or community. For many CDA scholars, ideologies, politics, and discourse are inextricably linked. Definitively, van Dijk describes political ideologies as ‘the basic belief systems that underlie and organize the shared social representations of groups and their members’.¹⁵² He deems ideologies political when they: a) are used by political actors, and b) function within the political domain.¹⁵³

This thesis contends that, after 9/11, political leaders in Pakistan relied upon discourses of peace to encourage people to form a unified community, interact peaceably, and progress socially and economically. This assertion can be effectively linked to Gramsci’s hegemony paradigm, whereby political actors appeal to the dominant ideologies or cultural norms within society in their political discourse in order to establish ideological control over that society by means of acquiescence rather than physical force. Pakistan is used as a case study to reveal the dominant ideologies relied upon by political actors, within a particular socio-political and historical context, in order to reproduce their own political power or domination. Critically, however, Graham notes that ‘the socio-historical consequences of investing legitimate political power in a source external to the actual locus of power is bound to present people with a contradiction between their lived experience and the orders of discourse in which they are embedded’.¹⁵⁴ An analysis of the ways in which political actors resisted the dominant ideology will expose contestations over identity and political power in Pakistani society.

An appeal to history

The second strategy is what Graham refers to as ‘an appeal to the historical importance of the culture in which the discourse is situated’.¹⁵⁵ This strategy also features in the writings of De Cillia, who refers to it as ‘the construction of a collective political history’.¹⁵⁶ According to both Graham and De Cillia, political actors use this strategy in their discourse to positively invoke a shared historical consciousness. For Graham, an essential element of persuasive political discourse is the close association between the exhortations of political actors and the shared historical consciousness of the public, whether real or imagined. He argues that ‘for an audience to understand what the orator is persuading them to do, it must be linked to popular perceptions of what has previously occurred within their social system’.¹⁵⁷ Additionally, for De Cillia, the appeal to a shared historical consciousness is an important part of the process of national identity formation.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵² Van Dijk, 1997, p. 17.

¹⁵³ Van Dijk, 1997, p. 11.

¹⁵⁴ Graham, Keenan, and Dowd, 2004, p. 203.

¹⁵⁵ Graham, Keenan, and Dowd, 2004, p. 201.

¹⁵⁶ De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak, 1999, p. 158.

¹⁵⁷ Graham, Keenan, and Dowd, 2004, p. 209.

¹⁵⁸ De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak, 1999, p. 158.

Both of these assumptions can effectively be linked to the 'imagined community' paradigm.¹⁵⁹ In this model, Anderson asserts that a nation is an 'imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign'.¹⁶⁰ The fundamental premise of this concept is that communities imagine themselves as members of a wider community or nation because they cannot know each other on a face-to-face level. According to Anderson, a crucial element of this official 'imagining' was the role of 'print-capitalism'. The printing press, together with the dissemination of printed literature, and the development of rapid forms of communication, gave rise to new or imagined communities that developed specific national formations and new ways of thinking about themselves. De Cillia has identified a number of topics that are relied upon by political actors to invoke a shared historical consciousness. These include 'myths of genesis and origin, mythical figures, political triumphs, times of flourishing and prosperity, decline, defeat, and crisis'.¹⁶¹ Using Pakistan as a case study, an analysis at this level will reveal the dominant myths relied upon by political actors, within a particular socio-political and historical context, to encourage the people of Pakistan to interact peaceably and progress socially and economically.

The construction of a negative 'Other'

The third strategy is what Graham refers to as 'the construction of a thoroughly evil Other'.¹⁶² The construction of a negative 'Other' is closely tied to the legitimising ideology. This demonisation strategy is a recurrent feature in the writings of many CDA scholars. For example, van Dijk has identified a number of ways discourse can be critically analysed in order to reveal discursive strategies of dominance and control of those in power on the one hand, and those of the marginalised on the other. These methods are mainly concerned with the positive presentation of 'Self' and the negative presentation of 'Other'. Teun van Dijk argues that, because ideologies are often polarised, competing or divergent ideological positions or categories (of the 'in-groups' and the 'out-groups') become apparent in political discourse. In order to uncover discursive strategies of polarisation, van Dijk employed a method called the 'ideological square' which: a) emphasises Our good things, b) emphasises Their bad things, c) de-emphasises Our bad things, and d) de-emphasises Their good things.¹⁶³ In this method, good things are attributed to the speaker's own 'in-group' and bad things are attributed to out-groups or the speaker's opponents and rivals.

Similarly, De Cillia argues that three theoretical assumptions are crucial to understanding the process of national identity construction. First, in keeping with Pierre Bourdieu's 'Habitus' paradigm, social practices or social imaginings become self-evident or universal within communities over time.¹⁶⁴ Within these social imaginings are stereotypical attitudes of in-groups and of out-groups. Second, in-groups have a tendency to be inclusive of members

¹⁵⁹ B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso, London, 1983, p. 6.

¹⁶⁰ Anderson, 1983, p. 6.

¹⁶¹ De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak, 1999, p. 158.

¹⁶² Graham, Keenan, and Dowd, 2004, p. 201.

¹⁶³ Van Dijk, 2006, p. 734.

¹⁶⁴ De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak, 1999, p. 154.

of their own group and exclude members of out-groups. Thus, the ideological construction of nation, and of national identity, always coincides with the construction of difference. In keeping with van Dijk, difference is discursively constructed by way of a polarising strategy of positive 'us'-presentation and negative 'Other'-presentation. Third, nations are always made up of groups or communities that identify themselves in different ways. According to De Cillia 'there is no such thing as the one and only national identity [...] but, rather, that different identities are discursively constructed according to context [...], the situational setting of the discursive act and the topic being discussed'.¹⁶⁵ Using Pakistan as a case study, an analysis at this level will reveal the ways in which the various political actors attempted to construct political sameness and difference to encourage people to interact peaceably and progress socially and economically.

An appeal for unification behind the legitimate power source

The fourth strategy is what Graham refers to as 'an appeal for unification behind the legitimating external power source'.¹⁶⁶ This strategy also features in the writings of De Cillia, who refers to it as 'the discursive construction of a collective present and future'.¹⁶⁷ The construction of a collective present and future is closely tied to the legitimising ideology. According to Graham, in order to convince people to unite behind the legitimising ideology, political actors present various incentives in their political discourse. Such rewards (or penalties) might be economic, spiritual, or political and include topics such as retribution, feudal and mercantile rewards, or political utopia.¹⁶⁸ Using Pakistan as a case study, an analysis at this level will reveal the dominant motivating factors that are relied upon to encourage people to interact peaceably and progress socially and economically.

1.3.2 Source material

One aim of this thesis was to document, analyse, and interpret attempts by the Government of Pakistan to redefine the Islamic Republic of Pakistan through the lens of Sufism after 9/11. A further aim was to investigate the ways in which the state-sanctioned construction of a national Sufi identity was enacted, reproduced, and resisted by political actors, political recipients, and the media. Subsequently, material was collected from three main sources: the Government of Pakistan, other political actors and recipients, and the media. What follows in this section is a more detailed summary of these sources and how they were used in the thesis.

The Government of Pakistan

¹⁶⁵ De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak, 1999, p. 154.

¹⁶⁶ Graham, Keenan, and Dowd, 2004, p. 201.

¹⁶⁷ De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak, 1999, p. 158.

¹⁶⁸ Graham, Keenan, and Dowd, 2004, p. 201.

The Government of Pakistan was the fundamental starting point for the investigation into the construction of an official national identity through the lens of Sufism. Data collection focussed specifically on the discourse of President Pervez Musharraf and President Asif Ali Zardari, as well as the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Culture, Pakistan Academy of Letters (PAL), and the Pakistan National Council of the Arts (PNCA), between 2001 and 2011. Official government sources included parliamentary debates, bills, laws, government regulations and legislation, propaganda, political advertising, speeches, media interviews, and ballots.

Other political actors and political recipients

The categories 'political actors' and 'political recipients' include politicians, political parties, the public, pressure groups, non-governmental organisations, cultural and religious groups, and demonstrators and protestors to name only a few. In Pakistan, these groups and organisations are both numerous and diverse. There are more than ninety political parties in Pakistan. Coalition governments are a regular occurrence, as are frequent shifts in political alliances in the quest to gain access to the centres of power. Pakistan is also home to numerous civil society organisations. In 2001, the Aga Khan Foundation (Pakistan) reported that there were between ten and twelve thousand registered, and up to sixty thousand non-registered, non-governmental organisations in Pakistan. There were also an estimated eight thousand trade unions.¹⁶⁹ In order to narrow these two categories, a review of Pakistani newspaper articles was conducted to uncover the relevant political actors and political recipients. The search parameters were limited to the discursive use of Sufism between 2001 and 2011.

Supporters of the official discourse comprise Sufi *pirs* and their devotees, *sajjada nashins*, political parties, Sufi religio-political parties (including Barelvi groups), civil society organisations, and arts and educational organisations. These groups tend, on the whole, to want less of a role for Islam in the state. They are particularly opposed to some of the penalties that can be enforced under Shari'a law, as well as some of the laws that affect minority groups such as the blasphemy laws. These groups tend to view Islam, with both its inner (Sufi) and outer (Shari'a) aspects, as an important holistic guiding philosophy for Pakistani society. They also see Sufism as an essential part of the nation's heritage and culture, which is reflected in the region's poetry, *qawwali*, art, architecture, and film. Such mediums are widely used by these groups and were collected for analysis together with propaganda, political advertising, speeches, and media interviews. This source material demonstrates the political and social agenda of these groups, their ideology, their opinions towards the official discourse, and their opinions towards the detractors.

¹⁶⁹ A.S.R. Baig, 'Civil Society in Pakistan: A preliminary report on the CIVICUS Index on civil society project in Pakistan'. *CIVICUS Index on Civil Society Occasional Paper Series*, Vol. 1. Issue 11, 2001, p. 1.

Detractors of the official construction of Sufism comprise *ulama*, religio-political parties, religious groups (including Deoband and Ahle-Hadith groups), and militant organisations wanting a stronger role for Islam in the Pakistani state and society. These groups, with their focus on so-called 'true' Islamic principles based on the sacred sources (Qur'an and Sunnah) and the sacred laws (Shari'a), tend to reject elements of Sufi belief and practice, such as the veneration of Sufi saints and shrines, *urs* celebrations, and music and dancing at shrines. They aim to rid Islam of what they consider to be 'un-Islamic' practices. While religio-political parties have not been widely successful in the political arena, some groups are very well organised and exert considerable street power to influence public opinion and political policy. Data collection centred on the discourse of these groups and included propaganda, political advertising, speeches, and media interviews. This source material demonstrates the political and social agenda of these groups, their ideology, and their opinions towards the official discourse.

The Media

Finally, the third arena for an investigation into the construction of a national identity through the lens of Sufism was the print media. As a primary source, newspapers perform an invaluable role in helping to build an understanding of a particular phenomenon within a specific socio-political and historic context. Newspaper articles and editorials provide useful facts about events, issues, and key people. Data comprised of newspaper articles and editorials from private and independent English-language newspapers including The Daily Times, Dawn, The Friday Times, Frontier Post, The News, Newsweek Pakistan, and Pakistan Observer on the subject of Sufism between 2001 and 2011. First, English-language newspapers were selected because English is regarded as the official language of Pakistan and the 'lingua franca of Pakistani elite and most government ministries'.⁷⁰⁶ Second, and most crucially, English-language newspapers were an important vehicle in the dissemination of the official discourse to an elite domestic audience, who might be regarded as having cultural and political influence, and an international audience, particularly the United States.⁷⁰⁷ The Dawn Group of Newspapers, for example, describes itself as the 'most widely circulated English newspaper of Pakistan', with a readership that is 'educated', 'affluent', and 'influential'. It claims that the on-line edition reaches an international audience and has ten million page views per month, with forty seven per cent of visitors from USA and twelve per cent from the UK.⁷⁰⁸ An analysis at this level provides information relating to contemporary issues, the social and political context, the actions and statements of the

⁷⁰⁶ In Pakistan the constitution is written in English, and English is used within the civil, legal, and military bureaucracy. By extension, proficiency in the English language is a prerequisite for obtaining admission into higher education and employment in both the public and private sector in Pakistan. See, *Central Intelligence Agency*, (accessed 28 May 2011).

⁷⁰⁷ Only forty-nine per cent of the population of Pakistan over the age of 15 years can read and write: thirty-seven per cent of men and sixty-four per cent of women cannot read and write. See, *Central Intelligence Agency*, (accessed 28 May 2011). There are 72 living languages in Pakistan. See, P.M. Lewis, 'Pakistan', *Ethnologue, Languages of the World*, <http://www.ethnologue.com/country/PK>, (accessed 7 October 2011). Pakistani languages with the most number of speakers, by percentage of the population, are Punjabi (48%), Sindhi (12%), Urdu (8%), and Pashtu (8%) respectively. See, *Central Intelligence Agency*, (accessed 28 May 2011). Based on these figures, newspapers cannot be considered a mass medium in Pakistan and are mainly aimed at educated urban readers.

⁷⁰⁸ 'Advertise with Dawn', *Dawn*, <http://dawn.com/advertise-dawn>, (accessed 7 October 2011).

government, other political actors, and political recipients, the point of view of the media, and the political and social agenda of the media.

1.4 Chapter overview

As discussed, the events of 9/11 constituted a major historical turning point which triggered a series of occurrences aimed at the transformation of existing social, economic, and political conditions in Pakistan. Within this context, the Government of Pakistan attempted to unify the diverse people of Pakistan under a single national identity by drawing on the ethical and peace-building aspects found within Islam. In order to contextualise this struggle to build national unity, **Chapter Two** provides a historical overview of some of the dominant trends that helped shape Islam, politics, and identity in Pakistan. The historical narrative begins with the arrival of the first Muslims to the subcontinent, the spread of Islam as a religion, a culture, and as a political force, the rise of a Muslim consciousness based on religion, the creation of Pakistan in 1947, and on-going attempts by Muslim politicians to embed Islam more firmly in the state and society in independent Pakistan. **Chapter Three** critically analyses the early political discourse of President Musharraf between 2001 and 2004. It investigates how the government attempted to urge the nation to support the decision to join the 'war on terror', persuade the nation to support the domestic campaign against extremism, and rally the nation to non-violent and socio-economic uplift after 9/11. It also considers the ultimate moral forces that President Musharraf chose to privilege in his struggle to redefine the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the historical narratives he chose to invoke in an attempt to create a shared historical consciousness, how he attempted to re-imagine society through the ideological construction of a national identity, and the dominant motivating factors he relied upon to convince the nation to form a peaceable unified community. Finally, the chapter examines the ways the social, political, and historical background influenced and delimited government discourse. Taking a similar approach, **Chapter Four** critically analyses the political discourse of President Musharraf during the latter half of his nine-year political tenure, 2005 to 2008. It examines the expansion of state-sanctioned discourses of moderation, the reproduction of those discourses in national English-language newspapers in Pakistan, and the formation of the National Council for the Promotion of Sufism in 2006. It also examines the main oppositional discourses, as well as the various domestic and international debates and agitation concerning the place of Islam in the state and society. Finally, this chapter charts the decline of President Musharraf, which came in the wake of a number of domestic and international challenges that weakened his political legitimacy and authority. **Chapter Five** critically analyses the political discourse of the new civilian administration of President Zardari between 2008 and 2011. It shows how President Zardari attempted to redefine the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in a period of increased religious conservatism. It also considers the ultimate moral forces that President Zardari chose to privilege in his struggle to redefine the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the historical narratives he chose to invoke in an attempt to create a shared historical consciousness, how he attempted to re-imagine society through the ideological construction of a national identity, and the dominant motivating factors he relied

upon to convince the nation to form a unified community. This chapter examines the reconstitution of the National Sufi Council in 2009, the reproduction of official discourses in national English-language newspapers in Pakistan, and the main oppositional discourses. Finally, the chapter examines the ways the social, political, and historical background influenced and delimited government discourse. **Chapter Six** restates the theoretical and methodological approach taken in this study, discusses the empirical findings of each of the chapters, the implications of the findings, the limitations of the research, and makes recommendations for further work.

2 Historical antecedents to contending identity narratives in Pakistan

2.1 Introduction

The inability of Muslims in Pakistan to establish a coherent and cohesive national identity upon which to base a viable political system is a phenomenon the nation has been struggling with since its creation. This is partly due to the fact that, historically, South Asian Muslims have never been a monolithic homogenous group united under a single consciousness. Culturally and socially, South Asian Muslims have long been separated by ethnic, linguistic, and class interests. Religiously, Islam is itself a diverse tradition with various schisms having occurred since its inception. Once Pakistan was created in 1947, rather than act as a unifying force in the new nation, Islam instead became a topic of contestation, in which questions concerning the place of Islam, and the role it should play in the state and society, became pervasive and highly divisive.

The attempt by the Government of Pakistan to redefine the Islamic Republic of Pakistan through the lens of Sufism after 9/11 was, arguably, a continuation of this wider, problematic, and largely incomplete struggle to build national unity. An exploration of the latest attempt by the government to define the official identity of Pakistan in terms of Islam after 9/11 would be incomplete without, first, a discussion of the antecedents of Islam in the subcontinent.¹⁷³ What follows in this chapter is a historical overview of some of the dominant trends that helped shape Islam, politics, and identity in Pakistan. The historical narrative focuses primarily on early Muslim settlement and growth in South Asia, the rise of a Muslim consciousness based on religion which led to the creation of Pakistan in 1947, and on-going attempts by Muslim leaders to embed Islam more firmly in the state and society. This chapter is arranged chronologically, beginning with the arrival of the first Muslims to the subcontinent, the spread of Islam as a religion, a culture, and as a political force, the rise of a Muslim consciousness based on religion, and the creation of Pakistan.¹⁷⁴

2.2 Initial encounters

2.2.1 Islam in early South Asia, AD 711 – 996

¹⁷³ The geographical scope of this thesis is the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The terms 'Pakistan' and the 'Islamic Republic of Pakistan' have been used interchangeably to refer to Pakistan after the nation was created in 1947. Equally, the term 'India' has been used to refer to that nation after it achieved independence from British rule in 1947. The terms 'South Asia', 'the Indian subcontinent', and 'the subcontinent' have been used interchangeably to refer to the region comprising of Pakistan (East and West) and India in the period up to 1947. The term 'India' has also been used when referencing historians who use the term to refer to the region in the pre- and post-independence period.

¹⁷⁴ For general histories of South Asia that have proven most useful in providing contextual background for this chapter, see, A.L. Basham, *The Wonder that was India*, Rupa, New Delhi, 1967; J. Keay, *India: A History*, HarperCollins, London, 2000; A. Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, Penguin Books, London, 2011; B. Metcalf, *Islam in South Asia in Practice*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2009; F. Robinson, *Islam and Muslim History in South Asia*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2000; and F. Robinson, *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989.

In the eighth century a group of people, who will be collectively referred to as Muslims, arrived in the Indian subcontinent. Historians generally date the first Muslim political presence in the subcontinent at 711, when the armies of Muhammad ibn Qasim conquered Sindh (in present-day Pakistan).¹⁷⁵ These Muslims were of Arabian origin. Qasim was born in Saudi Arabia in 695 and served as a General in the Umayyad Caliphate (661-750), which was established shortly after the death of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad and the first Shi'a imam (religious scholar or leader). At its greatest extent, the Umayyad Caliphate included Spain, southern France, North Africa, Arabia, central Asia, and parts of what is now Pakistan in its vast empire.¹⁷⁶

In the north-west of the Indian subcontinent these Arab Muslims first came as adventurers. They travelled across Central Asia into Afghanistan, through the Bolan Pass, and finally settled in Sindh where they eventually became rulers. The main priority of the Muslims of the Umayyad Caliphate was military and political expansion. The Arab forces under Muhammad ibn Qasim conquered Sindh and from there attempted further incursions into the subcontinent. These incursions, however, were successfully resisted by local regional powers, the Pratiharas and the Rashtrakutas, who were dominant in the north and north-west of the subcontinent.¹⁷⁷ As a result, Islam's political expansion was restricted in the north-west of the subcontinent primarily to the desert coastal regions of Sindh. This in turn limited Muslim settlement and, consequently, the spread of Islam as a religion in this period.

By the time Muhammad ibn Qasim's forces had conquered Sindh it had been a mere one hundred years since Islam was first revealed by the angel Jibreel to the prophet Muhammad (610) whilst he was meditating in a cave on Mount Hira (in present-day Saudi Arabia). At that time, Islam as a religion was still in its infancy and the Muslims in the subcontinent, as elsewhere, were guardians of a relatively new religion.

Islam, in 711, was still a religion composed of a few basic assertions about the oneness of God, the mission of the Prophet, the terrors of the Last Judgement, and the need to perform the five daily ritual prayers, to go on the pilgrimage (*hajj*) to Mecca, and to give alms (*zakat*) to the poor.¹⁷⁸

Not only were early Muslims in the Indian subcontinent custodians of a new religion but, finding themselves a long way from Islam's heartland in Arabia, they had relative freedom to interpret and practice Islam as they understood it at the time. This contributed to the unique development of South Asian Islam.

¹⁷⁵ Embree, 1988. For further discussions on Islam in early and medieval India that have proven most useful in writing this and the following two sections, see, R.M. Eaton, *India's Islamic Traditions, 711-1750*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2006; I. Habib, *The Cambridge Economic History of India, Vol. 1, c. 1200-1750*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982; J. Malik, *Islam in South Asia*, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 2008; Schimmel, 1982; and S.F. Dale, 'Conversion to Islam in Kerala' in *Religion in South Asia*, G. A. Oddie (ed.), Curzon Press, New Delhi, 1991.

¹⁷⁶ For a controversial revisionist study that calls into question the accuracy of sources upon which the early history of Islam is based, and whether the conquering Arabs were in fact Muslim, see, T. Holland, *In the Shadow of the Sword: The Battle for Global Empire and the end of the Ancient World*, Little, Brown Book Group, London, 2012.

¹⁷⁷ R. Thapar, *A history of India: Volume One*, Penguin Books, London, 1990.

¹⁷⁸ Thapar, 1990, p. 384.

The focus of these Muslim rulers, however, was military and political expansion rather than religious dissemination and conversion. On the whole, they tended to avoid attempts to convert the local population en masse to Islam. Consequently, Muslims in the subcontinent during this period remained a minority in relation to the indigenous population. Moreover, these early Muslim rulers, like their co-religionists who followed in later centuries, faced the difficult question of how a minority might successfully rule a majority non-Muslim population. Political expediency, therefore, depended on rulers maintaining favourable and stable relations with the local population. As a result, policy tended towards avoidance of any direct interference in the religious beliefs of the local population. Non-Muslims, comprising predominantly of Hindus, Jains, and Buddhists, were for the most part permitted to continue to practice their religion as before, without undue interference.

Meanwhile, in the south of the subcontinent Arab Muslims arrived as merchants and traders. They sailed across the Arabian Sea and settled in port cities along the south-western coast (in present-day Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Kerala).¹⁷⁹ The experience of these Muslims was somewhat different to their co-religionists in the north of the subcontinent, yet there were certain similarities. From a very early period, pre-Islamic Arab traders had long made use of the monsoon winds to facilitate their sea crossings from Arabia, via the Arabian Sea, to the south-western coast of India in search of spices and items to trade. The later Muslim Arab traders were able to utilise existing social structures put in place by their non-Muslim predecessors as a foundation for their own settlement and expansion. Owing to this long history of contact with the peoples along the south-western coastal regions of the subcontinent, Muslim Arab traders were more easily accepted into the local communities they encountered.

Like their co-religionists in the north, when Muslim Arab traders began settling in the port cities along the south-western shores of the subcontinent Islam was a new religion and these traders had relative freedom to interpret and practice it in their own way. Unlike their co-religionists in the north, however, the Arab traders were more concerned with trade than the acquisition of political power or territorial expansion. Economic ambition, and the fact that these Muslims were few in number and thus reliant upon favourable and secure relations with the local population to achieve their aims, meant that they too avoided direct attempts at religious conversion in this period. There was, however, some conversion to Islam from within the local population. Local women, the wives and companions of Muslim Arab traders, converted to Islam and their offspring were brought up Muslim. There was also some conversion amongst the local Hindu population.¹⁸⁰ Nevertheless, conversion in this region was a gradual process and was influenced by local specificities. It was also made possible to a certain extent by the geographic isolation of these communities. The coastal regions were largely cut-off from the rest of the subcontinent by the Western Ghats, a

¹⁷⁹ Thapar, 1990, p. 384.

¹⁸⁰ Thapar, 1990, p. 384. For further discussions on conversion to Islam in South Asia, see, Malik, 2008; and P. Hardy, 'Modern European and Muslim Explanations of Conversion to Islam in South Asia: A Preliminary Survey of the Literature'. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, No. 2, 1977, pp. 177-206.

mountain range that stretches from Kanyakumari at the southern tip of the subcontinent to Gujarat in the north. These factors limited the spread of Islam as a religion along the south-western coast and its hinterland. These factors also enabled the Muslim and non-Muslim populations living alongside one another to develop their own distinct regional culture, resulting in a level of fluidity and blending of socio-religious traditions that, over time, contributed to the linguistic, cultural, religious, and philosophical diversity of South Asian Muslims.

Muslims who made the Indian subcontinent their permanent home during this period lived and grew up alongside a predominantly non-Muslim population. As a consequence, Islamic thought and tradition was regularly subject to reflection, redefinition, and adaptation. Muslims learned to accommodate local customs and conventions, and even imparted some of their own traditions to the local community. Importantly, these early encounters between Muslims and non-Muslims began the process of a centuries-long blending of cultures, to various degrees, and laid the foundations for a cultural fusion that was to characterise later Indo-Muslim periods in the subcontinent.

2.3 Towards ethnic, social, religious, and political diversity

2.3.1 Islam in early medieval South Asia, AD 997 – 1206

The raids of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni (971-1030) into the Indian subcontinent, at the end of the tenth century, and those of Sultan Muhammad of Ghor (1150-1206), in the late twelfth century, marked the beginning of a new era in the history of Islam in South Asia. The presence of a new group of Muslims from Central and West Asia began to be felt in the subcontinent.¹⁸¹ This particular encounter was to last more than five centuries and, at its greatest extent, would include much of the territory that makes up India and Pakistan today.

As in the early period, the particular nature of the Muslim presence, together with local specificities, uniquely impacted Islamic belief and practice, and the spread of Islam, over the next five hundred years. The medieval period was a period of regionalism in South Asia, characterised by various competing regional dynasties. Religion too was localised in this period. This resulted in a continuation of the intermingling of cultures that led to new and unique innovations in art, architecture, and language. It also contributed to the linguistic, cultural, religious, and philosophical diversity of the Muslim population. Historian Peter Robb, however, contends that 'Islam wore both inclusive and iconoclastic faces' in this period.¹⁸² He states that some groups, such as the Sufis for example, worked towards religious and cultural pluralism in the subcontinent, whereas other Muslim scholars identified Islam as distinct and separate from indigenous beliefs and worked towards establishing a singular authoritative tradition based on the Qur'an and the Hadith.¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ Embree, 1988.

¹⁸² P. Robb, *A history of India*, Palgrave, Hampshire, 2002, p. 73.

¹⁸³ Robb, 2002, p. 73.

The first of the Turko-Afghan Sultans to arrive from Central and West Asia was Mahmud of Ghazni. Mahmud was born in present-day Afghanistan and was the son of a Turkish nobleman. Sultan Ghazni ruled over the Ghaznavid Empire from its centre in Ghazni (Afghanistan) between 997 and 1030.¹⁸⁴ Mahmud began his campaigns into the subcontinent at the end of the tenth century and, over a period of more than thirty years, the regions of Sindh, the Punjab, parts of north India, and Gujarat came under his influence. This laid the foundations for the establishment of a new set of Muslim rulers in the subcontinent and signalled the beginning of a very different type of encounter with the local population.

Historian Romila Thapar argues that Mahmud of Ghazni's initial forays into the subcontinent were motivated not by an ambition to expand his political territory, or to conduct trade, but by an intense desire for wealth stirred by the legendary stories he had heard of the riches to be found there.

[T]emples were depositories of vast quantities of wealth, in cash, golden images, and jewellery - the donations of the pious - and these made them natural targets for a non-Hindu searching for wealth in northern India.¹⁸⁵

Mahmud's most widely renowned exploit was the plunder and destruction of the temple at Somnath in 1025, one of the subcontinent's most revered places of worship. The temple is located on the shores of the Arabian Sea, on the west coast of the subcontinent, near present-day Gujarat. It is held sacred by Hindus as the abode of one of the twelve *jyotir-lingas* of Shiva, where the divine is represented materially, usually in the form of a stone object. In the early eleventh century this temple was reputed to contain vast stores of gold, silver, and precious jewels, as well as five hundred dancing girls.¹⁸⁶

The plunder and destruction of the temple at Somnath earned Mahmud the reputation as a fearsome zealot and iconoclast. However, he was also a keen patron of the arts and sciences. One of Mahmud's beneficiaries was Abu Rayhan Biruni (Al-Biruni), a noted Central Asian Islamic scholar who chronicled the Sultan's campaigns in the Indian subcontinent. Al-Biruni's most famous work, the *Tahqiq ma li'l-Hind* (Enquiry into India), provides an interesting account of Indian society as he saw it.

[The Hindus] totally differ from us in religion, as we believe in nothing in which they believe, and vice versa. [...] All their fanaticism is directed against those who do not belong to them - against all foreigners. They call them *mleccha*, i.e., impure, and forbid having any connection with them, be it by intermarriage or any other kind of relationship, or by sitting, eating, and drinking with them, because thereby, they think, they would be polluted. [...] This, too, renders any connection with them quite impossible and constitutes the widest gulf between us and them.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁴ Embree, 1988.

¹⁸⁵ Thapar, 1990, p. 232.

¹⁸⁶ Thapar, 1990, p. 232.

¹⁸⁷ Embree, 1988, p. 437.

Al-Biruni's account suggests a tendency towards separatism in relations between Muslims and Hindus in the subcontinent. He believed that the main obstacle to harmonious relations between them was the Hindu practice of segregation.¹⁸⁸ The caste system was ubiquitous in the subcontinent, governing all aspects of social behaviour. Al-Biruni's account also suggests that the Muslim community in this period was united under a homogeneous religious consciousness against a Hindu 'Other'. This, however, is doubtful due to the heterogeneous nature of the Muslim presence in the subcontinent and the corresponding complexity of identity associations. Moreover, later sources reveal that social stratification, based on ethnicity as well as on occupation and status, was characteristic of the Muslim community in the subcontinent.¹⁸⁹

Al-Biruni was one of many eminent scholars who produced intellectual works whilst receiving royal patronage from the court of Mahmud of Ghazni. He wrote a number of scientific, mathematical, and philosophical works, as well as numerous works on the history, literature, philosophy, and culture of the Indian people. Al-Biruni also wrote on the subject of Sufism, comparing Sufi beliefs with those of the Hindus. Similarly, the Persian poet, Abu'l Qasim Firdausi, wrote his monumental poem the *Shahnama* (Book of Kings) whilst in Mahmud's court. Ali bin Uthman al-Jullabi al-Hujwiri, popularly known as Data Ganj Bakhsh or Data Sahib,¹⁹⁰ wrote part of his most famous work, *Kashf ul-Mahjub* (Unveiling the Veiled), whilst residing in Lahore, the capital of the Ghaznavid Empire. It is considered the earliest Persian exegesis on Sufism.¹⁹¹ However, whilst Sufism began to appear in the north-west of the subcontinent in the eleventh century, it did not become prominent for another two hundred years.

Mahmud of Ghazni died five years after his raid on the temple of Somnath. Ghazni was succeeded by Sultan Muhammad Ghorī, or Muhammad of Ghor, named after his birthplace in present-day Afghanistan. Unlike his predecessor, Muhammad Ghorī was not primarily motivated by wealth or religious enthusiasm but by an ambition to extend his political control over the fertile regions of the Punjab and the Indus Valley. He gained suzerainty over the regions previously controlled by the Ghaznavid Empire: present-day Afghanistan, Pakistan, and much of north India. By 1192, Muhammad Ghorī had waged successful military campaigns across the plains of India and established Delhi as the seat of the Ghorid Empire.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁸ An ancient system, the caste system was first sited in the *Rig Veda*. It maintains that an ideal Hindu society be divided into four main occupational or status categories (*varna*): priests (*brahman*); warriors (*kshatriya*); traders (*vaishya*); and servants (*shudra*). A further group, which falls outside of the four-fold division of an ideal society, is the excluded or untouchable caste. Now referred to as *dalits*, people from this caste were engaged in occupations considered ritually impure.

¹⁸⁹ Thapar, 1990, p. 232.

¹⁹⁰ Data Sahib is one of Pakistan's most revered Sufi saints and his shrine, located in Lahore, is one of the nation's most important. On 1 July 2010, suicide bombers attacked the shrine as thousands gathered for weekly prayer, killing 45 people and injuring more than 175. See, *Pak Institute of Peace Studies*, 25 May 2011, (accessed 14 September 2011).

¹⁹¹ Embree, 1988.

¹⁹² Embree, 1988.

Muhammad Ghori was assassinated near the city of Jhelum, in northern Punjab, in 1206. His successor, Sultan Qutb-ud-din Aibak, a general and former slave soldier (*mamluk*), became the next ruler of Delhi. This period in the history of the Indian subcontinent is known widely as the Delhi Sultanate (1206-1526). The Delhi Sultanate comprised of five dynasties: the Mamluk or Slave Dynasty, the Khilji Dynasty, the Tughlaq Dynasty, the Sayyid Dynasty, and the Lodi Dynasty.

2.3.2 Islam during the Delhi Sultanate, AD 1206 – 1526

In the thirteenth century, the establishment of the Delhi Sultanate in the north of the Indian subcontinent saw the more permanent settlement of Muslims from Central and West Asia. The Delhi Sultanate comprised predominantly of Muslims of Turkish and Afghan origin. However, over time, Muslims from across Central and West Asia, including present-day Iraq and Iran, emigrated to South Asia in this period and made it their permanent home. As a result, there was an increase in the ethnic, social, religious, and political diversity of the Muslims of the subcontinent. In spite of the fact that these Muslims were bound by a common faith, they were by no means unified under a single consciousness.¹⁹³

Like their predecessors, the Delhi Sultans harboured imperial ambitions and, over the course of approximately three hundred years, attempted to consolidate their political and economic power across the length and breadth of the subcontinent. However, these new Muslim rulers also faced the difficult question of how a minority might successfully rule over a predominantly non-Muslim population. Political and economic expediency required that they too maintain favourable and stable relations with the local population. In order to realise their India-wide political ambitions, the Delhi Sultans relied upon the administrative systems already in place. The administrative system, which might largely be called feudal, was itself not wholly unfamiliar to the Delhi Sultans.¹⁹⁴ The peasants cultivated the land and paid a portion of their produce to the landowners. The landowners were required to pay a portion of the revenue to the Sultan, as well as maintain an army for the Sultan's disposal. Sultanate rule, therefore, could be said to constitute changes at the top level of the social structure, with little change at the lower levels. This system did not change greatly under the Delhi Sultans, even after they had firmly established their authority in the subcontinent. Moreover, whilst some Sultans made minor changes in economic organisation during their rule, for the most part, these changes were not maintained by their successors.

The Sultanate reached its greatest extent under Muhammad bin Tughlaq (1325-51), a Delhi Sultan born in Multan in present-day Pakistan. During his rule the political power of the

¹⁹³ For general histories of the Delhi Sultanate that have proved most useful in writing this section, see, R.M. Eaton, 'Indo-Muslim Traditions, 1200-1750: Towards a Framework of Study'. *South Asia Research*, Vol. 22 (1), 2002, pp. 1-19; R. M. Eaton, *Essays on Islam and Indian History*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2000; R.M. Eaton, *Sufis of Bijapur, 1300-1700: Social Roles of Sufis in Medieval India*, Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi, 1996; M. Hasan, *Historians of Medieval India*, Meenakshi Prakashan, Meerut, 1968; M.I. Khan, *Kashmir's Transition to Islam*, Manohar, New Delhi, 1997; T. Raychaudhuri and I. Habib, *Cambridge Economic History of India I: 1200-1750*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982; and A. Wink, *Al-Hind: the making of the Indo-Islamic World*, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1990-2004.

¹⁹⁴ Thapar, 1990, p. 232.

Sultanate stretched across the north of the subcontinent, from the Punjab in the west to Bengal in the east.¹⁹⁵ Notably, Sultanate political power tended to be weakest in the regions furthest away from its capital in Delhi. Nevertheless, the Delhi Sultanate was reasonably successful in establishing Muslim political power across the subcontinent. At the same time, however, there was much political variation and rivalry, and Muslim political power was in no way absolute. Nor were Muslims united under a single political consciousness in this period.

The Delhi Sultans were not immune to internal power struggles. Successor disputes within dynastic families, for example, were a familiar feature of the Sultanate period and Sultans had to be watchful of family members cherishing independent ambitions. Similarly, the Sultans also faced threats from within their own administration and were, on occasion, obliged to make concessions to the mainly Turkish and Afghan nobility in order to secure loyalty and prevent the assertion of independent authority. These concessions, however, could not be counted upon to be solid or lasting. The Sultanate also faced political opposition from regional Muslim and non-Muslim ruling elites. Tughlaq's failure to incorporate the south of the subcontinent into the Sultanate from his temporary base in Daulatabad, for example, resulted in the rise of a strong independent Muslim dynasty, the Bahmani Sultanate, which was dominant in the south for approximately two hundred years.¹⁹⁶ The Delhi Sultans also faced political opposition from Muslim rulers outside of the subcontinent. The Mongol armies of Central Asia, for example, made a number of raids into the north-west of the subcontinent during this period and posed a constant threat to Sultanate power. This demonstrates the very fragmented and fragile nature of Muslim political power in the subcontinent. It also shows that, while the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent were joined by a common faith, they were divided by political ambition.

The early phase of Sultanate rule occurred almost contemporaneously with the Mongol conquests of Asia. Over a period of more than one hundred years, the Mongols ruled over the largest empire in history, comprising eastern Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Russia. Under the leadership of Genghis Khan, the Mongol armies carried out a number of campaigns into the subcontinent but were largely restricted to the regions west of the Indus, in present-day Sindh and the Punjab.¹⁹⁷ Nevertheless, the Mongol conquests had an important impact on the specific development of Islam in the subcontinent during this period. During the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, many Muslims fled from Central and West Asia to the Indian subcontinent to seek sanctuary from the Mongol armies. These Muslims came from Turkey, Arabia, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan. This added a completely new dimension to the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, and philosophical composition of the Muslims of the subcontinent. However, their fusion into a

¹⁹⁵ Robb, 2002, p. 73.

¹⁹⁶ Thapar, 1990, p. 232.

¹⁹⁷ Thapar, 1990, p. 232.

single homogeneous group of Muslims was largely resisted, particularly amongst the higher social strata.

The court at Delhi in the early stages kept aloof from indigenous life in an attempt to preserve its dignity. It was kept in being by transfusions not of indigenous blood, but of immigrants from various parts of central and western Asia – Mongols, Afghans, Turks, Persians, and Arabs, and even by Abyssinians.¹⁹⁸

When the Sultanate introduced hereditary titles, Muslims with Turkish or Afghan ancestry relied upon extensive genealogies to prove descent to support their claims to nobility. In theory, the Qur'an conveys egalitarian principles to its community of believers. This, however, extends only to those in the sight of God as demonstrated in Sura 49, Verse 13 of the Qur'an: 'Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of Allah is (He Who is) the most righteous of you'.¹⁹⁹ In practice, Muslims in the subcontinent were divided hierarchically on the basis of ethnicity. The *ashraf* or high-born classes comprised primarily of Muslims whose origins lay outside of the subcontinent. Whereas the *ajlaf* or low-born classes comprised of indigenous converts to Islam. These two categories were further divided by ethnicity, status, and occupation in a manner similar to that of the Hindu caste system, possibly due to the history of contact with the non-Muslim population. The practice of attempting to protect and assert a particular ethnic and social identity suggests that the Muslim community in the subcontinent was by no means unified under a single consciousness in this period and that ethnicity, rather than religion, was a more powerful rallying category.

The history of contact between the Muslims and non-Muslims of the subcontinent was crucial to the unique development of Islam in South Asia. Muslims had always been a minority in the subcontinent. While many Muslims fled the Mongol campaigns in this period, South Asia was effectively cut off from Central and West Asia, and the number of Muslim émigrés moving into the subcontinent was relatively low. As Thapar notes, 'Islam therefore had to rely increasingly on Hindu converts'.²⁰⁰ There were some conversions to Islam from amongst the local population. However, Muslims in South Asia remained few in number. Moreover, the Hindus and Buddhists who did convert to Islam tended to retain many of their existing social and religious habits, particularly amongst the lower social strata, and this further added to the ethnic, cultural, and religious composition of the Muslims in the subcontinent.

Domestic ceremonies and rituals such as those connected with birth, marriage, and death became mingled. The converted Muslims were also heirs to long-standing rituals practiced by the Hindus. New ceremonies which had come with Islam, and which were regarded as auspicious, crept into Hindu ritual.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁸ Thapar, 1990, p. 266.

¹⁹⁹ A.Y. Ali, *The Meaning of the Holy Qur'an*, Amana Publications, Brentwood, 1992.

²⁰⁰ Ali, 1992, p. 289.

²⁰¹ Ali, 1992, p. 300.

The Mongol campaigns in the Muslim heartlands of Central and West Asia also had an important impact on the political and religious organisation of the Delhi Sultanate. The Delhi Sultans were, officially at least, the political and ideological representatives of the Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258). In practice, however, the authority of the Sultans in the subcontinent was absolute and subject only to the legal precepts of Islam. In 1258 the Mongol armies took Baghdad, the capital of the Islamic Caliphate, effectively isolating the Delhi Sultans from the leader of the Muslim *ummah* (universal Islamic brotherhood).²⁰² On the one hand, this gave the Delhi Sultans more freedom to govern in a manner more suitable for local conditions without undue external interference. On the other hand, amongst those Muslim scholars seeking sanctuary from the Mongol armies were a number of *ulama*. The Islam these new émigrés brought with them was more developed and institutionalised than previously known in the subcontinent. Embree argues that in this period there was an overt conservatism in Islam, with more importance placed on the Qur'an, Sunnah, Hadith, and Shari'a. These sacred sources were increasingly relied upon to guide the Muslim community on appropriate relations between Muslims, as well as between Muslims and non-Muslims. Embree explains the move towards a more conservative Islam in South Asia thus:

To re-establish ties with the old, rather than to embrace the new, was a reasonable desire in men who had barely escaped with their lives and who now found themselves precariously situated in an armed camp in North India, open to attack from the Mongols in the northwest and from Hindus all around them.²⁰³

While there was a level of conservatism within Islam not previously witnessed in the subcontinent, this tended to occur predominantly amongst the higher social strata and the *ulama* in an attempt to preserve their privileged socio-political and religious status. On the whole, Sultanate policy tended towards non-interference in the socio-religious and legal affairs of the local non-Muslim communities they ruled. This was due to the fact that the main priority of the Delhi Sultans was military and political expansion. Owing to the small number of Muslims in the Indian population, these rulers were obliged to rely on pre-existing administrative systems, and on local non-Muslim personnel, to realise their military and political ambitions. Sustaining favourable and stable relations with the non-Muslim population was crucial to their objectives, and one important way of maintaining good relations with the non-Muslim population was to refrain from any overt interference in their socio-religious customs.

Nevertheless, Sultanate political power rested wholly upon Islamic foundations and, in this, the Sultans were fundamentally guided by the *ulama*. The *ulama* who joined the Sultanate in this period were predominantly Sunni scholars from the Hanafi school of thought, which was the dominant jurisprudence (*fiqh*) of the Abbasid Caliphate.²⁰⁴ The Sultanate was, therefore, primarily Sunni. Islamic theology and laws were based on the Qur'an, Sunnah,

²⁰² Embree, 1988.

²⁰³ Embree, 1988, p. 386.

²⁰⁴ Embree, 1988, p. 386.

and Hadith. Emphasis was also placed on *ijmah*, the consensus of the community. The Delhi Sultans were obliged to respect Islamic law and Islamic institutions, and defer to the pronouncements of the *ulama* with regard to all religious and legal matters. This placed the *ulama* in a very important religious and political position. As protectors of the Islamic faith, it was their role to teach Muslims how to live according to Islam's sacred sources and to enforce the Shari'a.

While South Asian Muslims were joined by a common faith, in reality, Islamic belief and practice varied widely. Islam was by no means a unified tradition in South Asia in this period. Rather, it was made up of different legal and theological schools of thought. For example, the main schism within Islam occurred shortly after the death of the prophet Muhammad, during the Umayyad Caliphate (661-750), and resulted in the creation of Islam's two major traditions: Sunni and Shi'a Islam. Shi'a Islam first came to the subcontinent from Arabia in the ninth century. Over time, a number of different sub-groups arose from within Islam itself. The foremost difference between these groups was based on the question of who should be rightful successor to the prophet Muhammad and the leader of the Muslim *ummah*. Diversity amongst Muslims in this period prevented their coalescence into a homogeneous community under a single religious consciousness.

The Delhi Sultanate considered the main threat to its predominantly Sunni-dominated political and ideological authority, as well as to the unity of the Muslim community in the subcontinent, to be Shi'a Islam. In this period a Shi'a sub-group, Ismailis, opposed the Sunni Abbasid Caliphate and aimed at replacing it with an Ismaili Caliphate. The group later split and the Qarmatians, an Ismaili sub-faction, was formed. Both the Ismaili and Qarmatians were initially situated in Sindh, where they were a powerful force. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the Delhi Sultans attempted to actively suppress these and other non-Sunni groups, which they considered to be a threat to their political and ideological authority.²⁰⁵

The Ismaili and Qarmatian denial of the legitimacy of the sultanate, their egalitarian urges and their secret guild organizations caused the Delhi government as much alarm as their rejection of the orthodox caliphate, schools of law, and theology scandalized the Sunni *ulama*.²⁰⁶

Another perceived threat to the political and ideological authority of the Delhi Sultanate, and to the unity of the Muslim community in the subcontinent, also came from within Islam in the form of Sufism. Sufism was prominent in Persia in the tenth century and by the eleventh century Sufis had begun arriving in South Asia from Persia, travelling through Sindh and the Punjab, and across the north of India. By the thirteenth century, Sufi Islam had become an influential force in the subcontinent. Three Sufi orders and their *pirs* were prominent at this time: Suhrawardiyya, Chishtiyya, and Firdausiyya. The Suhrawardiyya

²⁰⁵ Embree, 1988, p. 386.

²⁰⁶ Embree, 1988, p. 389.

were popular in Sindh, the Chishtiyya in Delhi, and the Firdausiyya in Bihar. These orders gradually spread across the subcontinent, building shrines and *khanqahs* (Sufi religious institution, retreat), and disseminating their message: how to reach the ultimate goal of drawing nearer to the divine.

Initially, Sufism in South Asia drew primarily from the Persian Sufi tradition. However, over time, Sufism developed its own unique beliefs and practices that varied within the subcontinent and were profoundly influenced by the local context. Sufism, like Islam generally, was by no means a unified tradition. The Chishtiyya, for example, were deeply ascetic and austere, accepted non-Muslims into the order, and tended to distance themselves from temporal power. The Suhrawardiyya, on the other hand, only accepted Muslims into the order, and tended to be both affluent and involved in politics. The Suhrawardi *tariqah* was more overtly conservative in its rejection of the music and poetry that was much loved of the Chishti *tariqah*. Some Sufi orders absorbed customs that were widely practiced by Hindu converts to Islam and, as a result, were considered inclusive or syncretic. Conversely, religious scholars who were concerned lest non-Islamic elements be absorbed into Sufism were more exclusive in their religious observations. This diversity of belief and practice within Sufi Islam meant that Muslims were anything but a homogeneous community under a single religious consciousness.

Notably, Sufi saints tended to be more successful in the dissemination of Islamic belief in the subcontinent than other religious leaders. This may have been due to the fact that some of the trends in Sufism, such as devotion, piety, asceticism, and tolerance, found resonance in local traditions and were not wholly unfamiliar in the Indian context. One of these local traditions was the *Bakhti* Movement, a devotional tradition that had its precursors in the Tamil devotional cults of the fourth-century BC. Like Sufism, the *Bhakti* tradition placed emphasis on the close relationship between the devotee and his or her God. Also like Sufism, 'love' was a major feature of this relationship as demonstrated in this poem written by a Tamil poet-saint.

When you see his face praise him with joy,
worship him with joined palms bow before him,
so that his feet touch your head,
Holy and mighty will be his form
rising to heaven, but his sterner face
will be hidden, and he will show you
the form of a young man, fragrant and beautiful
and his words will be loving and gracious -
Don't be afraid - I knew you were coming.²⁰⁷

The popularity of these local poet-saints, with their poetry written in the local vernacular, attracted both Hindus and Muslims alike. Through their musical poetry or *qawwali*, Sufi saints were able to convey Islam to the masses in a way not previously seen in the subcontinent. As observed earlier, many of the Muslims in the subcontinent were converts

²⁰⁷ Thapar, 1990, p. 186.

from Hinduism or Buddhism. In urban areas, Muslim converts to Islam were chiefly drawn from artisan and trader classes. In rural areas, converts to Islam were drawn primarily from cultivator classes.²⁸ These converts tended to retain many of their existing socio-religious traditions, which resulted in a unique intermingling of Muslim and non-Muslim religious beliefs and practices, as well as serving to blur any pre-existing identity categories.

While there was a certain amount of mutual influence and accommodation between the Sufi and *Bhakti* traditions in this period, there was also a level of suspicion and concern amongst the Delhi Sultans and the *ulama*. As discussed previously, the political and ideological authority of the Delhi Sultanate rested firmly upon Islamic foundations. These foundations were based on the sacred scriptures (Qur'an, Sunnah, and Hadith) and the sacred laws (Shari'a). Political and ideological authority and the perceived, if not real, unity of the Muslim community in the subcontinent were essential to Sultanate political success. Within this context, the *ulama* had a very important socio-political and religious position within the Sultanate, as the sole protectors of the Islamic faith. Fearful they might lose their privileged status, and fearful that Sufism was being too accommodating to local mores, the *ulama* became more conservative than previously witnessed.

The *Sufis* in India dissociated themselves from the established centres of orthodoxy often as a protest against what they believed to be a misinterpretation of the *Quran* by the *Ulema*. They believed that the latter, by combining religious with political policy and cooperating with the Sultanate, were deviating from the original democratic and egalitarian principles of the *Quran*. The *Ulema* denounced the *Sufis* for their liberal ideas and the *Sufis* accused the *Ulema* of having succumbed to temporal temptations.²⁹

At the close of the Delhi Sultanate, the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent were culturally and ethnically diverse. They were made up of Muslims from Arabia, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Turkey, as well as of local Hindu and Buddhist converts. There was little consistency in patterns of rule amongst the five short-lived dynasties that made up the Delhi Sultanate. The constant threat of local fragmentation and the rise of independent Muslim dynasties, particularly in the south of the subcontinent, suggest that Muslim political power under a single political consciousness was by no means a monolith. Nor was there any uniformity in Islam as a religion during this period. Muslims may have been joined by a common faith, but Islamic belief and practice in the subcontinent was as varied as the Muslims themselves.

²⁸ Thapar, 1990, p. 186.

²⁹ Thapar, 1990, p. 306.

2.4 From diversity to nationalism

2.4.1 Islam in Mughal South Asia, AD 1526 – 1858

In the mid-sixteenth century, a new set of Muslim rulers entered the Indian subcontinent and made it their permanent home.²⁰⁰ These Central Asian Muslims traced their ethnic origins from the great Mongol emperor Genghis Khan (d. 1227) and the Turkic-Mongol founder of the Timurid Dynasty Timur Lang (d. 1405). This period in the history of Islam in South Asia signalled the continuation of Muslim rule and, at the same time, heralded the introduction of new Mongol, Turkish, and Persian elements into the cultural, administrative, and economic systems of the subcontinent. Like the Muslim rulers before them, the Mughal emperors shared a common faith with their fellow co-religionists and this provided a convenient platform from which to expand their political and ideological authority. However, the Muslim community in the subcontinent in this period, as in previous centuries, was by no means unified under a single consciousness. Politically, Muslim power was both fragmented and fragile. Socially and culturally, Muslims were separated by ethnic, caste, and class interests. Religiously, Islam was itself a diverse tradition with various schisms having occurred since its inception. Differences existed within the Islamic tradition, between Muslim émigrés and those indigenous Indians who had converted to Islam, between Muslims of different ethnic and linguistic groups, and between Muslims of divergent social status.

The Mughal period in South Asian history is generally placed at 1526 when the first Mughal Emperor, Zahir al-Din Muhammad Babur (r. 1526-30), defeated the last Delhi Sultan, Ibrahim Lodi, at the battle of Panipat in the Punjab.²⁰¹ Like their predecessors, each of the Mughal emperors harboured imperial ambitions and over the course of approximately three hundred years attempted to consolidate their political and economic power across the length and breadth of the subcontinent. In this, the Mughal emperors were by far the most successful of the Muslim rulers. The Mughal empire reached its greatest extent under Emperor Abul Muzaffar Muhi ud-din Muhammad Aurangzeb (r. 1658-1707) and included much of what is now present-day Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Nepal. As Johnson observes, 'at the height of their power, the Mughals would lay claim to 3.2 million square kilometres of territory and command a population of between 100 and 150 million people'.²⁰² While Aurangzeb is widely considered to be the last of the great Mughal emperors, the Mughal Empire continued up to 1858 when Emperor Bahadur Shah II (r. 1837-57) was

²⁰⁰ For general histories of Mughal India that have proved most useful in writing this section, see, M. Alam and S. Subrahmanyam, *The Mughal State, 1526-1750*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1999; M. Alam, *The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India: Awadh and the Punjab, 1707-48*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1986; C.A. Bayly, *Indian society and the making of the British Empire*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988; R.M. Eaton, *The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204-1760*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993; I. Habib, *The Agrarian System of Mughal India, 1556-1707*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1999; I. Habib, *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1983; H. Mukhia, *The Mughals of India*, Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass, 2004; J.F. Richards, *The Mughal Empire*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993; S.A.A. Rizvi, *Muslim Revivalist Movements in Northern India in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi, 1993; S.A.A. Rizvi, *Religious and Intellectual History of the Muslims in Akbar's Reign*, Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi, 1975; and R.P. Tripathi, *Rise and Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Central Book Depot, Allahabad, 1963.

²⁰¹ Embree, 1988.

²⁰² G. Johnson, *Cultural Atlas of India*, Time-Life Books, Amsterdam, 1995, p. 85.

deposed by the British Raj for his role in the Indian uprising of 1857. Bahadur Shah was exiled and sent to Rangoon in Burma where he died five years later, officially signalling the end of 1,200 years of Muslim rule in the subcontinent. Nevertheless, the Mughal empire left an enduring legacy: the idea of a politically united India under a single authority.

The fact that the subcontinent was already familiar with Muslim settlement and rule, to a certain extent facilitated the political and ideological expansion of the Mughal Empire. To their fellow Muslims, Mughal emperors legitimised their rule by citing established tradition and Islam as their main sources of authority.²³ However, Mughal emperors, like their predecessors the Delhi Sultans, faced the difficult question of how a minority with imperial ambitions might successfully rule an overwhelming non-Muslim population. In order to expedite their India-wide political ambitions, these new Muslim rulers were heavily reliant on existing administrative systems. In addition, political and economic necessity required that Mughal emperors accommodate their Muslim and non-Muslim subjects, particularly the powerful land-holding elite who were already firmly established in the region. Consequently, a number of Muslims and non-Muslims were to be found amongst the Mughal elite, as well as in the military. However, foreign-born Muslims dominated the majority of elite positions within the Mughal court, constituting changes at the top level of the socio-economic structure. In contrast, Indian-born Muslims and converts to Islam tended to occupy the lower levels of the socio-economic structure, thus reinforcing an already ethnically and socially diverse population.²⁴

Nevertheless, one of the main features of the Mughal court was its ethnic, social, and religious diversity. At this stage in the history of Islam in the subcontinent there was much ethnic variation amongst the, albeit minority, Muslim community. The Muslim men and women in this period could claim Afghan, Arab, Central Asian, and Turkish lineage. At the same time, the Mughal period ushered the introduction of new Mongol, Turkish, and Persian elements into the cultural, administrative, and economic systems of the subcontinent further adding to Muslim diversity.²⁵ The second of the great Persian Mughal emperors, Nasir ud-din Muhammad Humayun (r. 1530-40, 1555-56), returned to South Asia after reclaiming the territory he had previously lost to the Sher Shah Suri (r. 1540-45) of the Afghan Sur Dynasty. With him, Humayun took a retinue consisting of 'a small cadre of 51 officers, nearly all of whom came from outside the Indian subcontinent – there were 27 high-status Chaghatai or Uzbek clan leaders from Central Asia, and 16 Persian Shias'.²⁶ This situation was somewhat reversed under Humayun's son, Emperor Jalal ud-din Muhammad Akbar, who increased the number of Persians within the Mughal court in order to lessen the authority of Central Asian clan leaders, particularly rebellious Uzbek nobles. In an attempt to extend the Empire, and requiring additional manpower to do so, Akbar pressed Indian-born Muslims and Hindus into service. Akbar's grandson, Emperor Shahab ud-din

²³ Johnson, 1995, p. 85.

²⁴ Robb, 2002, p. 73.

²⁵ Robb, 2002, p. 73.

²⁶ Johnson, 1995, p. 86.

Muhammad Khurram or Shah Jahan (r. 1627-58) further added to the ethno-cultural diversity of the Mughal court. Muslims, the majority of whom were Persian, dominated elite positions within the Mughal Empire. The Muslim elite also comprised of Afghan nobles, as well as Indian-born Muslims from the south of the subcontinent. Similarly, Shah Jahan recruited a number of non-Muslims into the Mughal court, particularly Maratha and Rajput landed elite, in order to secure their political allegiance.²¹⁷

As discussed previously, the caste system was widely adhered to throughout the subcontinent by the majority Hindu population. However, the hierarchical division of society, embodied in the caste system, was not the sole preserve of the Hindu community. Muslims were themselves socially fragmented into two main groups: the *ashraf* and the *ajlaf*. The *ashraf* or high-born class claimed foreign ancestry and were further divided into the following socio-ethnic categories: *sayyids* or descendants of the prophet Muhammad (through his daughter Fatimah and her husband Ali ibn Abi Talib), *shaykhs* (descendants of Arab and Persian émigrés), Pashtuns (Pashto-speaking Muslims from Afghanistan), and Mughals (Muslims of Turkish or Central Asian origin). The *ajlaf* or low-born class were primarily made up of indigenous converts and were further divided by status and occupation very much like the Hindu caste system, with the focus being on ritual and pollution.²¹⁸ This social stratification demonstrates a contradiction between the egalitarianism of Islamic doctrine as stated in the Qur'an and the actual social practice of Muslims in the subcontinent. It also demonstrates that the Muslim community in the subcontinent was itself divided, with social and ethnic categories of identification and association predominant over religious categories.

While the Mughal Empire was notable for the idea of a politically united India, as well as its relative success in establishing a single political power across much of the Indian subcontinent from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, it also witnessed much political variation and rivalry. As previously observed, the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent may have been joined by a common faith but they had been long divided by political ambition. The situation was no different for the Mughal emperors, despite their successes. These emperors faced internal threats to their political power from within their own family and administration. They also faced threats from local regional powers, both Muslim and non-Muslim, as well as from Muslim leaders from outside the centres of Mughal authority. Muslim political hegemony under Mughal suzerainty, therefore, was by no means absolute. Nor did Muslims unite under a single political consciousness in this period.

Muslim disunity in this period was characteristic of relationships between Mughal rulers and their Muslim nobility, regional governors, landed-elite, and Muslim rulers from outside Mughal territories. Muslim disunity was also present within dynastic families themselves. As in the Sultanate era, succession disputes were a regular occurrence within the Mughal

²¹⁷ Robb, 2002, p. 73; and Johnson, 1995, p. 85.

²¹⁸ Thapar, 1990, p. 306.

court. Emperor Nur ud-din Muhammad Salim (r. 1605-27), or Jahangir as he is widely known, faced opposition to the throne from his eldest son, Khusrau. Jahangir had his son blinded, and his supporters executed, to prevent further dissention. Jahangir's second son, Shah Jahan, also faced opposition from within his own family when he was emperor. The fifth of the great Mughal emperors was incarcerated in Agra Fort by his politically ambitious son Aurangzeb (r. 1658-1707). Meanwhile, all four of his sons descended into a bloody succession battle for the title of emperor. Shah Jahan was renowned for the construction of the Taj Mahal (Agra), the Jama Masjid (Delhi), and the Lal Qila (Delhi). Mughal emperors, like the Muslim rulers before them, had to be constantly vigilant in case family members harbouring independent ambitions attempted to usurp their power.²¹⁹

At this stage in the history of Islam in the subcontinent the Muslim presence, and Islam as a religion, had been an established fact for more than eight hundred years. As in the Sultanate period, Mughal political power and authority rested firmly upon Islamic foundations. Within the ideal Islamic social order, God was the supreme divine power whilst kings, scholars, and prophets were responsible for exercising God's will on earth. Muslim rulers, therefore, had a duty to protect Islam and ensure that the Shari'a and the five pillars of faith were correctly observed. Muslim rulers were also required to ensure that Islamic religious and educational establishments, as well as charities and pilgrimages, were properly maintained and funded. In short, a good Muslim ruler was one who was the epitome of a pious and devoted Muslim and in all aspects of this Mughal emperors were guided by the *ulama*. Mughal emperors relied upon Islam, and the support of the *ulama*, to provide legitimacy to their rule. In theory, therefore, each of the Mughal emperors aimed at achieving an ideal Islamic social order for the Muslim community in the subcontinent. The reality, however, was somewhat different. The Muslim population in this period was by no means a homogeneous community, nor did it share a single religious consciousness. Instead, what is witnessed is a mix of accommodation, syncretism, and conservatism amongst Muslims, as well as between Muslims and non-Muslims.

Islam, nevertheless, was an important aspect of the Mughal Empire. Islam provided legitimacy of kingship to Mughal emperors and emperors carried out the duties and responsibilities of a good Muslim ruler.²²⁰ The religious policies and personal practices of Emperor Akbar, in particular, reflect the ways in which he attempted to balance his obligations as a Muslim ruler and his responsibilities towards his non-Muslim subjects. They also hint at the great vitality and diversity of the period. There can be little doubt that Akbar was a devout Muslim. He openly observed the five pillars of Islam, including the recitation of daily prayers. Akbar made regular pilgrimages to important places of worship, including the *hajj*, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. He also made pilgrimages to the shrines of Sufi saints. Akbar was a devotee of the Sufi saint Khwaja Muin-ud-Din Chishti and made regular visits to the saint's tomb at Ajmer. He was also a devotee of Shaikh Salim Chishti, a well-

²¹⁹ Robb, 2002, p. 73; and Johnson, 1995, p. 85.

²²⁰ Embree, 1988.

respected Sufi saint who prophesised the birth of Akbar's first son and heir, Salim, or Jahangir as he is most widely known. In honour of the saint, Akbar built Fatehpur Sikri and made it the capital of the Mughal Empire for a time. Later, Akbar built a tomb for Shaikh Salim Chishti within the walls of Fatehpur Sikri. This was a tolerant age and Akbar's religious policies, particularly towards his non-Muslim subjects, reflect this. He demonstrated tolerance towards other religions, abolished the tax on non-Muslims (*jiziya*), celebrated some non-Muslim festivals, and married outside of the Muslim faith. One activity Akbar was renowned for was the study of comparative religion. He constructed the *Diwan-e-Khas* at Fatehpur Sikri where he encouraged religious debate amongst various religious leaders including Muslims, Hindus, Jains, Parsis, and Jesuit priests. Notably, Akbar experienced criticism from some *ulama* for his so-called tolerant attitudes towards non-Muslims, the repercussions of which would be felt later.²²¹

Akbar's immediate successors quickly realised that it was more prudent to abstain from overtly pious religious policy in order to avoid inciting religious controversy. With this in mind, Emperor Jahangir adopted similar religious policies to those of his father. He showed tolerance towards other religions, whilst at the same time carrying out the duties expected of a good Muslim ruler. Like his father, Jahangir made regular pilgrimages to the tomb of Sufi saint Khwaja Muin-ud-Din Chishti and, in doing so, legitimised his own kingship and that of the Empire through association with the saint. However, despite the overall climate of tolerance and diversity, some *ulama* attempted to cultivate a religious consciousness amongst South Asian Muslims, a consciousness built on the idea of a Muslim 'Other'.

In this period, the most prominent reformist writings on Islam and the Muslim community in the subcontinent can be attributed to Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564-1624). Sirhindi was a leading Muslim theologian, scholar, and follower of the Sufi Naqshbandi order.²²² Sirhindi was fearful that Islam, the Shari'a, and the Muslim community in the subcontinent would be weakened as a result of the political and cultural concessions of the Mughal Emperors towards their non-Muslim subjects. He was particularly derisive of the policies of Akbar and Jahangir, who he criticised as having abandoned the religious principles of Islam. Sirhindi was also ideologically opposed to Shi'a Islam, as well as towards Sufi orders he believed had absorbed so-called non-Islamic elements. He was especially concerned by the syncretic tendencies found within Sufi poetry and *qawwali*, which resembled those of the *Bhakti* poet-saints, and which were practiced widely by the local Hindu converts to Islam.²²³ Sirhindi expressed his position towards the religious tolerance of Emperor Akbar as follows:

In the very early days of Islam the most successful pens were those that clarified problems of the Shari'a and that propagated theological opinions in accordance with the Qur'an, the Sunna, and the consensus of the community, so

²²¹ Robb, 2002, p. 73; and Johnson, 1995, p. 85.

²²² See, J.L. Esposito, 'Naqshbandi Tariqah', *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam: Oxford Islamic Studies Online*, <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1714>, (accessed 9 December 2013). For a discussion of the ideas of Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi, see, A. Schimmel, 'The Sufi Ideas of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi'. *Die Welt des Islams, New Series*. Vol. 14, Issue 1/4, 1973, pp. 199-203.

²²³ Embree, 1988.

that such errors and innovations as did appear did not lead people astray and end in their corruption.²²⁴

The reign of Emperor Shah Jahan signalled somewhat of a departure from the pluralist religious policies of his father (Jahangir) and his grandfather (Akbar). Whether out of personal piety, or at the behest of influential groups of *ulama* and Sufis, there was an increase in the religiosity of Muslim rulers. Shah Jahan actively patronised Muslim religious leaders and establishments, supported the *hajj* and pilgrimages to Sufi shrines, and placed much emphasis on the celebration of Islamic festivals.²²⁵ His successor, Emperor Aurangzeb, continued many of these religious policies. He actively promoted conversion to Islam, restored the tax on non-Muslims, and prohibited the building and maintenance of non-Muslim places of worship. Like his great-grandfather, Aurangzeb was also a follower of Naqshbandi Sufism.²²⁶ Under Aurangzeb, the Mughal Empire drew its authority and legitimacy from a more narrow adherence to Sunni Islam. According to Johnson, Aurangzeb 'pushed the Mughal empire into becoming more of an Islamic state, conforming more to the *sharia*, and having as its aim the benefit of the community of believers'.²²⁷

By the late seventeenth century, during the reign of Emperor Aurangzeb, the Mughal Empire had begun to show signs of decline. As a consequence, strong independent regional interests began to gradually reassert themselves across the subcontinent. This occurred during a period of increased religious piety on the part of both the emperors and the *ulama*. It also occurred during a period of religious controversy, where a 'pure' Islam was pitted against an Islam that had been infiltrated by so-called non-Islamic elements. The political misfortunes of the Mughal Empire in this period were simplistically attributed to the degeneration of Islam in the subcontinent by some *ulama*, and many political conflicts took on decidedly religious connotations. In this period, an Islamic scholar named Shah Wali-Ullah attempted to reconcile the conflicts within Islam. His main objective was to reverse the spiritual and political degeneration of Muslims in the subcontinent. Wali-Ullah aimed at unifying the Muslim community, as well as reviving Muslim rule and Muslim education, in response to increasing British political and economic power whose political presence had begun to be felt in the subcontinent. He also aimed at purifying Islam of so-called non-Islamic elements, such as the popular superstitions associated with the tombs of popular saints.²²⁸ According to Robb, Wali-Ullah 'prepared the ground for a revival of Sunni orthodoxy that stressed the importance of the prophet's *hadith* to Muslim conduct, and criticized popular devotional religion and the worship of saints'.²²⁹

At the height of the Mughal Empire, the Muslims of the subcontinent were ethnically, culturally, linguistically, and philosophically diverse. This diversity contributed to an

²²⁴ Embree, 1988, p. 429.

²²⁵ Robb, 2002, p. 73.

²²⁶ Robb, 2002, p. 73.

²²⁷ Johnson, 1995, p. 108.

²²⁸ Embree, 1988.

²²⁹ Robb, 2002, p. 144.

intermingling of cultures, which mark this period in the history of Islam in the subcontinent as a particularly golden age in art, architecture, language, and culture. This diversity is reflected in the composition of the Mughal Court, as well as in the tolerant religious policies of the Mughal rulers themselves. The climate of religious tolerance was resultant upon, but not limited to, the political and economic considerations of the Mughal emperors, the personal convictions of individual emperors themselves, and the Indian environment itself. Notably, it was not until the Mughal Empire began showing signs of political disintegration and decline that the early assertions of a Muslim consciousness based on religion were witnessed. Up until that time, ethnicity rather than religion was a more powerful rallying category but it was also one that served to divide the Muslim community rather than unite it. Some religious leaders, such as Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi and Shah Wali-Ullah, attempted to reverse the perceived spiritual, political, and economic degeneration of Muslims by reforming Islam and by attempting to establish a Muslim community under a single religious consciousness. However, they served to further divide the Muslim community by pitting a 'pure' Islam against an Islam that they argued had been infiltrated by so-called non-Islamic elements, thus relegating a large proportion of the Muslim population in the subcontinent to the pejorative category of *kafir*.

2.4.2 Islam in British South Asia, AD 1600 – 1947

In the seventeenth century, a small group of British traders arrived in the Indian subcontinent. In 1600 Queen Elizabeth I granted the East India Company a charter to conduct trade in the East Indies. When the British first arrived in the subcontinent, and over the next one hundred years, the Mughal Empire was at the height of its political power. The East India charter spanned the reigns of the great Mughal Emperors Akbar, Jahangir, Shah Jahan, and Aurangzeb. Company officials would have negotiated with these rulers for the commercial trading rights which permitted them to set up trading posts along the west and east coast of the subcontinent in Surat (1612), Madras (1639), Bombay (1668), and Calcutta (1690).²³⁰

The British were not the only Europeans conducting trade in the subcontinent at this time. They were competing with the Danish, Dutch, French, and Portuguese, as well as local traders, to protect and advance their commercial interests. In the early eighteenth century, when the Mughal Empire started showing signs of decline and disintegration, various regional powers began jostling for political control. In an attempt to expand and protect their commercial interests in the region, British and other European traders were increasingly

²³⁰ For general histories of British India that have proved most useful in writing this section, see, D. Arnold and G. Ramchandra, *Nature, Culture, Imperialism: Essays on the Environmental History of South Asia*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1995; C. A. Bayly, *Indian society and the making of the British Empire*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988; S. Bose, and A. Jalal, *Modern South Asia: history, culture, political economy*, Routledge, London, 2004; B. Chandra, M. Mukherjee, A. Mukherjee, K.N. Panikkar, and S. Mahajan, *India's Struggle for Independence: 1857-1947*, Penguin Books, New Delhi, 1989; B. Chandra, *Nationalism and Colonialism in Modern India*, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1979; P. Hardy, *The Muslims of British India*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1972; A. Jalal, *Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam Since 1850*, Routledge, London, 2000; D. Lelyveld, *Aligarh's First Generation. Muslim solidarity in British India*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1978; and F. Shaikh, *Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim Representation in Colonial India, 1860-1947*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989.

drawn into political struggles over territory. One of the major political conflicts was the Battle of Plassey (1757). The defeat of the Nawab of Bengal, and his French allies, marked the commencement of Company rule over Bengal. Shortly thereafter, further British success in the Battle of Buxar (1764) against the combined forces of the Nawab of Bengal, the Nawab of Oudh, and the Mughal Emperor, extended Company rule across Bengal to include Bihar. From this point onward, the British began gradually extending their political authority across the subcontinent until it became, in the mid-nineteenth century, part of a great empire upon which it was said that the sun never set.

The British period in the history of South Asia ushered in a host of changes that ultimately had a profound impact on the political, economic, and social composition of the subcontinent and its people. While religion had long been a major feature of Indian life, religion, and perhaps more significantly religious difference, came to be the foremost symbol of cultural and political identity not only for South Asian Muslims but for all Indians, particularly in the last decades of British rule. There can be no doubt that British policy played a significant role in the formation of a Muslim cultural and political identity based on religion, as well as the rise of Muslim nationalism, which culminated in the partition of the Indian subcontinent and the creation of Pakistan in 1947. This section demonstrates the ways in which the political, economic, and social policies of the colonial government institutionalised and popularised religious difference. It also looks at the role South Asian Muslims themselves played in the creation of their own consciousness, as well as the fundamental impact their agency had on elevating religion to one of the most important symbols of cultural and political identity. Significantly, an examination of the variety of Muslim responses demonstrates that Muslim political leaders, as well as the Muslim community itself, was by no means unified under a single consciousness in this period.

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the British in South Asia embarked on a program of reform in the subcontinent which was greatly influenced by the ideological currents of the age. Reforms were made across political, economic, and social spheres. Modifications were made to the way revenue was collected and administered in the subcontinent. Changes were also made to the legal system, and laws were gradually codified. English was made the official language, replacing Persian at the higher levels of the administration and courts, as well as in education. Indian responses to these reforms were varied. Some sections of Indian society embraced western ideas and made attempts to work within the new system. Others, including sections of the newly dispossessed Muslim elite, attempted to remain aloof from British rule. The imposition of British rule, and the subsequent loss of Muslim dominion and state authority, as well as the decision to replace Persian with English in government and in education, all contributed to Muslim dissatisfaction and roused various Muslim reform movements in this period.

As previously touched upon, the Islamic scholar and reformer Shah Wali-Ullah and his son Shah Abd al-Aziz (1746-1824) remained reserved towards the British presence in the

subcontinent. Father and son argued that Muslims living under British rule were 'living in a zone of war with infidels (*dar al harb*)'.²³¹ In response, Wali-Ullah and Abd al-Aziz aimed at uniting Muslims under a single religious consciousness based on a strict observance of the sacred scriptures and laws of Islam. While the pair were influenced by Sufi thought, they were critical of popular Sufism and the practice of saint-worship. Subsequently, they called for a reform of Islam to rid it of the so-called non-Islamic elements that they argued had crept into Muslim ritual as a result of the long contact with the majority non-Muslim population. Wali-Ullah and his son blamed these innovations for the spiritual and political degeneration of South Asian Muslims.

A number of other reformist movements shared the sentiments of Shah Wali-Ullah and Shah Abd al-Aziz in this period. Sayyid Ahmad Shahid of Bareilvi (1786-1831), founder of the Tariqah-e-Muhammadiya (The way of the Prophet), was greatly influenced by the ideologies of Shah Wali-Ullah and Shah Abd al-Aziz. His Tariqah-e-Muhammadiya began as a socio-religious reform movement but displayed decidedly political undertones in 1826 when Sayyid Ahmad called for a *jihad* against Sikhs in the Punjab. This movement was deemed 'Wahhabi' by the British administration, as well as by some *ulama* and Sufi *pirs*. In Bengal, another Islamic reformer called Hajji Shari'at-Ullah (1781-1840) founded the Faraizi Movement, which aimed at ridding Islam of any un-Islamic elements amongst the peasantry of east Bengal. Shari'at-Ullah was said to have been influenced by Wahhabi Islam following time spent in Saudi Arabia. Like Shah Wali-Ullah, he too was critical of the so-called non-Islamic elements that had crept into Muslim ritual.²³² All of these movements were intended to purify Islam and unite Muslims under a single religious consciousness in order to return them to their former political position. Despite the activities of these Muslim reform movements, the Muslim community in the subcontinent continued to remain fragmented. In fact, these reform movements served only to further divide South Asian Muslims. As Robb succinctly observes, 'the Islamic reformers were beginning to divide the Urdu-speaking elites, and attempting to separate the whole community, more distinctly along religious lines'.²³³

In 1858 the British Government assumed direct responsibility for administering British dominions in the subcontinent. The Government of India Act of 1858 called for the dissolution of the East India Company, following an uprising of Indian troops against Company rule in the north of the subcontinent, and a general loss of confidence in the Company's administration. This marked the beginning of a new phase in the history of the subcontinent. It also signalled the official end of approximately 1200 years of Muslim rule. For the next one hundred years, a large part of South Asia would be ruled by a European power whose centre of authority remained firmly outside the subcontinent.

²³¹ Hay, 1988, p. 174.

²³² Robb, 2002, p. 73; and Johnson, 1995, p. 85.

²³³ Robb, 2002, p. 144.

From the nineteenth century onward, two features of British policy in South Asia were to have a profound impact on the way in which Indians began to perceive themselves. First, the British administration embarked on an extensive project of counting and classifying the Indian population; with the first modern census commissioned during this period. Second, the British administration began to endorse the gradual participation of Indians in government; the Indian Councils Act of 1861 was the first of many efforts to devolve political power to Indians. Regardless of the intention, British census data served to create a sense of awareness of community, and of community separateness, within Indian society. It also made community groups aware of their numerical size. While British census data introduced the idea of Muslims and Hindus being two separate and distinct socio-religious categories, the establishment of separate electorates for minorities institutionalised the concept. The potential consequences of this were not lost on Muslim leaders who recognised that, if the Indian subcontinent were to achieve independence from British rule, the Muslim community would be a minority, albeit a very large minority, in a predominantly Hindu India. This triggered an increase in Muslim community association and identification. However, Muslims were by no means unified under a single consciousness in this period.

The latter half of the nineteenth century was characterised by the rise of a number of different reform and revival movements, which theorised and debated topics such as the Shari'a, the Sunnah, Sufism, Muslim education, and language to name only a few. Within this context two Muslim reform movements were prominent in the north of India: the Deoband Movement and the Ahle-Hadith Movement. These two groups shared similar features. Both emphasised a strict adherence to the sacred scriptures and laws of Islam. Both were influenced by Sufism, but drew predominantly upon the ideologies of the Naqshbandi *tariqah*. According to Robb, 'students were taught to know the *shari'a* and to follow the *tariqah* or path of religious experience, under the guidance of the *ulama*'.²³⁴ Both groups were greatly influenced by the writings of Shah Wali-Ullah. They called for the religious and educational reform of Muslim society, as well as the purification of Islam of so-called non-Islamic elements, to help restore Islam and the Muslim community it to its former predominance in the subcontinent. At the same time, the *Ahl al-Sunnat wa al-Jama'a* Movement (People of the tradition of Muhammad and consensus of the community) was prominent in the north of India. This movement was also known as the Barelvi Movement, after its ideological founder Ahmed Raza Khan Barelvi (1856-1921). Unlike the Deoband and Ahle-Hadith movements, the Barelvi Movement was supportive of the popular practices that had become associated with Sufism in the Indian subcontinent, such as shrine-worship.

At the same time, other Muslim reform movements gained prominence in the subcontinent. Elite Muslims such as Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-1898) became increasingly aware that democracy in an independent India would mean Hindu-majority rule. Initially, Khan was in favour of a continuation of British rule in the subcontinent. He believed that the British played an important role as arbitrator between Hindus and Muslims, who had gradually

²³⁴ Robb, 2002, p. 232.

become aware of their separate community status under colonial rule. Moreover, Syed Ahmed Khan believed that the best way Muslims could safeguard their interests was by working within the colonial system itself. In order to better equip Muslims to work within the changed socio-political environment he established the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh in 1875. This college combined a modern western curriculum with a traditional Islamic one. Syed Ahmed Khan was an important Muslim reformist figure in this period and is credited in Pakistan as being the founder of the two-nation theory. However, some Muslims were critical of Khan's promotion of western education. His response to that criticism provides an interesting glimpse into his attitude towards Islam and the Muslim community.

The Muslims have nothing to fear from the adoption of the new education if they simultaneously hold steadfast to their faith, because Islam is not irrational superstition; it is a rational religion which can march hand in hand with the growth of human knowledge. Any fear to the contrary betrays a lack of faith in the truth of Islam.²³⁵

By the early twentieth century it appeared that South Asian Muslims had coalesced into a single politico-religious community. In this period, events occurring outside the Indian subcontinent had an important impact on Muslim consciousness. The Balkan wars (1912-13) and World War I (1914-18) prompted a movement by South Asian Muslims to rise up against the British to defend the Caliph of Ottoman Turkey. The Khilafat Movement (1919-24) was initiated by Muhammad Ali and his brother Shaukat Ali and served to unite South Asian Muslims, for a time, under a single politico-religious consciousness. However, it also pitted the emergent idea of a territorial nationalism against a universal pan-Islamic ideology. The Khilafat Movement was later incorporated into the Non-Cooperation Movement (1920-22) led by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi against colonial rule in South Asia. These events reflect a brief period of Hindu-Muslim unity in the subcontinent. They also mark an important turning point for the British because it became manifestly apparent in this period that colonial rule in the subcontinent could not be sustained indefinitely.

2.4.3 Islam and the Pakistan Movement, AD 1940 – 1947

The problem of Muslim unity in the subcontinent was of particular importance when the question of Muslim nationalism was raised. When Mohammad Ali Jinnah first put forward his famous Pakistan Resolution in 1940 he was thought to be representative of the majority of South Asian Muslims. Seemingly, 'Pakistan' represented the social, religious, political, and economic ambitions of a quarter of the population. Neither the British government nor the Indian National Congress seemed able to prevent its apparent inevitability. However, there were a considerable number of Muslims who fervently opposed the movement for Pakistan. As discussed, South Asian Muslims were not a monolithic homogeneous group united under a single consciousness. Socially and culturally, Muslims were separated by ethnic, caste, and class interests. Religiously, Islam was itself a diverse tradition with various

²³⁵ Hay, 1988, p. 190.

schisms having occurred since its inception. The Pakistan Movement, and the Muslim opposition to it, provides a particularly useful case study of the disunity of the Muslim community in the subcontinent in the years leading up to the creation of Pakistan in 1947. It also provides an essential foundation for understanding the controversies that continue to confound efforts to establish a single unified consciousness for the Muslims of Pakistan today.

In March 1940, South Asian Muslims gathered near the Badshahi Mosque in Lahore to hear Mohammad Ali Jinnah, leader of the AIML, give his presidential address. It was there that Jinnah put forward what has widely come to be known as the Lahore or Pakistan Resolution. Within that resolution, Jinnah demanded the creation of separate Muslim states based on the notion that Muslims and Hindus in South Asia were two separate and opposed religious and cultural groups.

The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs and literature. They neither inter-marry, nor inter-dine together ... they have different epics, their heroes are different, and ... very often the hero of one is a foe of the other ... To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and the final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up or the government of such a state.²⁸⁶

Jinnah's objective was the establishment of autonomous and sovereign Muslim states to be located in the north-west and east of the subcontinent, where South Asian Muslims were in the majority albeit only marginally. However, beyond vague geographical references to where Pakistan should be founded, Jinnah was unclear as to what he meant by 'Pakistan' and how it would work in practice. Muslims represented a quarter of the overall population of the Indian subcontinent. In the provinces of Bengal and the Punjab, Muslims were in the majority. Throughout the rest of subcontinent, Muslims were in the minority. Because South Asian Muslims were so widely spread across South Asia, in practical terms a single territorial Muslim state would be difficult to achieve. This was, however, only one of the reasons why Jinnah was ambiguous in his definition of Pakistan.

²⁸⁶ I. Talbot, *India and Pakistan*, Arnold, London, 2000, p. 134. For further discussions on the movement for Pakistan that have proved most useful in writing this section, see, A.S. Ahmed, *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin*, Routledge, London, 1997; I. Bedford, 'Nationalism and Belonging in India, Pakistan and South Central Asia: Some Comparative Observations'. *The Australian Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 7 (2), 1996, pp. 104-120; S.P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2004; D. Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988; P. Hardy, *Partners in Freedom – and True Muslims: Some political thought of some Muslim scholars in British India 1912-1947*, Studentlitteratur, Sweden, 1971; M. Hasan, *Nationalism and Communal Politics in India: 1885-1930*, Manohar, New Delhi, 2000; A. Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985; S. Mahmood, *Pakistan: Political Roots and Development: 1947-1999*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000; H. Malik, *Pakistan: Founder's aspirations and today's realities*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2001; M.A. Malik, *The making of the Pakistan resolution*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2001; M. Mehta and T.C. Schaffer, 'Islam in Pakistan: Unity and Contradictions', *A Report from the CSIS Project Pakistan's Future and U.S. Policy Options*, October 7, 2002; B.R. Nanda, *The Making of a Nation: India's Road to Independence*, HarperCollins, New Delhi, 1998; F. Robinson, *Separatism among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces' Muslims, 1860-1923*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1974; I.H. Qureshi, *The struggle for Pakistan*, Uppal Publishing House, New Delhi, 1989; P. van der Veer, *Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India*, University of California Press, California, 1994; S.A. Wolpert, *New History of India*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993; and L. Ziring, *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997.

Jinnah's emphasis on the unity of the Muslim community, and the separateness of Muslim and Hindu communities, rallied much of the support for the Pakistan Movement in the decade preceding partition. In the climate of nationalism and home-rule, however, Jinnah was not the first to put forward the concept of a separate homeland for Muslims. In 1930, the poet Muhammad Iqbal (1873-1938), widely considered the spiritual father of Pakistan, wrote about communal separateness and the need for a political homeland for Muslims. He envisaged 'Pakistan' as the amalgamation of the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan into a single Muslim state within an independent India. Iqbal favoured a universal Islam, rather than a territorial nationalism based on religion, as demonstrated in the following poem entitled 'Muslims Profess no Fatherland'.

Our Essence is not bound to any place;
The vigor of our wine is not contained
In any bowl; Chinese and Indian
Alike the shard that constitutes our jar,
Turkish and Syrian alike the clay
Forming our body; neither is our heart
Of India, or Syria, or Rum,
Nor any fatherland do we profess
Except Islam.²⁷

Three years later, four students led by Cambridge law student Chaudhuri Rahmat Ali also advocated a separate Muslim homeland based on the amalgamation of the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Kashmir, and Baluchistan. However, one of the problems of achieving Muslim nationhood, apart from practical geographical considerations, was that South Asian Muslims were themselves not a homogeneous group unified under a single religious consciousness. This is evidenced by the fact that the idea of the creation of a separate Muslim homeland was, on the whole, rejected by a number of Muslim politicians, scholars, and clerics who instead worked towards attaining security, equal rights, and equal opportunities for Muslims within a united and free India. Thus confirming, to a certain extent, that there were Muslims in South Asia who did not think in terms of communal separateness.

The main opposition to the establishment of a separate Muslim homeland came from the two Muslim-majority regions in the west and east of the subcontinent: the Punjab and Bengal. Politicians in those regions were fiercely protective of the specifically regional flavour of their culture. Moreover, the different communities in those regions had worked in relative harmony to produce vibrant, competitive, and prosperous economies, particularly in the Punjab. In addition, regional politicians who had only recently begun to benefit from the British devolution of political power to Indians at a local level feared losing control over their specifically regional political and economic interests. Punjabi and Bengali politicians believed that the partition of their regions would be largely detrimental to Muslim interests therein. Nevertheless, despite the opposition, both of these regions were ultimately partitioned from India and incorporated into Pakistan in 1947.

²⁷ Hay, 1988, p. 211.

Some of the staunchest opponents of the Pakistan Movement had their origins in the Muslim-majority province of the Punjab. These included the National Unionist Party (1923), and its foremost leaders Fazl-i-Husain and Sikander Hayat, together with various Muslim organisations and institutions. The reasons for this can be found in the unique political, economic, and socio-religious history of the province. Putting aside the vested interests of Punjabi politicians, the province was a microcosm of South Asia itself. It encompassed the subcontinent's three major religious communities: Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh. These communities had lived and worked alongside one another for centuries. According to Talbot, 'the rural population shared a common language, songs, poetry and folklore. The tragic love tales of Hir Rajha, Sassi Punnu and Sohni Mahival were popular with all communities. Sufism acted as a cross-community focus of religious devotion'.²⁸ The focus was undeniably regional in character, rather than national or religious. Sikander Hayat, one of the leaders of the National Unionist Party, maintained that he was 'first a Punjabi and then a Muslim'.²⁹ Punjabi politicians believed that the creation of Pakistan would pose a danger to the cross-communal harmony of the Punjab and threaten to force its Muslims into a community in which there would be no binding factor other than a common religious belief that there is no God but Allah and that Muhammad is his messenger.

Bengal, the other major Muslim-majority province in the subcontinent, shared some of the features of Punjabi nationalism and opposition to the Pakistan Movement. Similarly, the province's political, economic, and socio-religious history played an important role. Between 1927 and 1937, Bengal politics experienced a medley of competing rivalries. Political success largely depended on obtaining majority support within a province where Muslims were a marginal majority. Obtaining majority support was dependent upon a party's readiness and ability to work cooperatively with its counterpart in the religious community, be it Hindu or Muslim. The most significant political party in Bengal, and one that worked towards Hindu-Muslim cooperation, was the Krishak Praja Party under the leadership of Fazlul Haq. The outcome of the provincial elections of 1937 reflects the specifically rural and provincial leanings of the provinces of Bengal and the Punjab, as the AIML failed to make any significant advances in either region.

Like the Punjab, Bengal had its own unique regional culture which formed the basis of a specifically Bengali identity. According to Mohammad Shah, a small group of Muslims were intensely protective of this identity with little regard for the concerns of Muslims outside the province.³⁰ Moreover, politically, these Muslims tended to favour the nationalist sentiment of the Indian National Congress Party rather than what they considered the divisive sentiment of the AIML. They argued that 'a Bengali Muslim was a human being first by the right of his birth, then a Bengali by being made of the soil of Bengal, and then a Muslim – a Bengali

²⁸ Talbot, 2009, p. 129.

²⁹ Jalal, 2000, p. 390.

³⁰ M. Shah, *In search of an identity: Bengali Muslims, 1880-1940*, K.P. Bagchi and Co., Michigan, 1996, p. 21.

Muslim last'.²⁴¹ The basis for Bengali opposition to the Pakistan Movement was that Muslims in South Asia were not a coherent homogenous group and therefore could not effectively be unified within an artificially created Pakistan.

Opposition to the Pakistan Movement did not come only from the Muslim-majority regions of the Punjab and Bengal. There were a number of other Muslims who worked towards gaining independence from the British for an undivided India. Such Muslims included the pro-Congress Abul Kalam Azad, Husain Ahmad Madani, Abu al-A'la al-Maududi, and Muslim associations such as the Deoband Movement, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind, Jama'at-i Islami, the Khudai Khidmatgars, and the Ahrar Movement. These groups had a number of features in common. First, they supported a combined Hindu-Muslim effort towards achieving freedom from British colonial rule. Second, they were opposed to what they considered the divisive communal politics of the AIML. Third, they believed that Pakistan would be damaging for Muslims, particularly those Muslim minorities that would remain in India after partition.

One notable Muslim who rejected the divisive politics of Muhammad Jinnah and the AIML was Abul Kalam Azad (1888-1958). Azad was one of the foremost Muslim leaders in the Congress party. He became President of the Indian National Congress in 1939 and remained in that position until his retirement in 1947. Azad was an important figure for Indian-nationalist Muslims in the face of growing support for the Pakistan Movement. A guiding principle in Azad's thinking, and one which influenced his political activities, was that a person could be both a Muslim and an Indian at the same time. He did not believe in the synthesis of religion and nationality, and he was hostile to what he considered the separatist politics of Jinnah.

As a Musalman I have a special interest in Islamic religion and culture and I cannot tolerate any interference with them. But in addition to these sentiments, I have others also which the realities and conditions of my life have forced upon me. The spirit of Islam does not come in the way of these sentiments; it guides and helps me forward. I am proud of being an Indian. I am a part of the indivisible unity that is Indian nationality. [...] I am an essential element which has gone to build India. I can never surrender this claim.²⁴²

A number of Muslim religious scholars shared Azad's pluralistic approach to nationalism in the subcontinent. Maulana Syed Abu a'la Maududi (1903-1979) was a Muslim theologian and journalist. In 1941 he founded an Islamic movement called the Jama'at-e-Islami (JI), in opposition to the Pakistan Movement led by Jinnah and the AIML. Similarly, a Deobandi theologian named Syed Husain Ahmad Madani (1879-1957) led the Deobandi movement against Pakistan under the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Hind (JUH). Indian-nationalist Muslims, such as Maududi and Madani, believed that the AIML was not representative of South Asian Muslims, and that the creation of Pakistan would be damaging for Muslims. They argued

²⁴¹ Shah, 1996, p. 21.

²⁴² Hay, 1988, p. 240.

that 'Pakistan' would be harmful for Muslims because territorial nationalism based on religion was the antithesis of universal Islam, as espoused by Muhammad Iqbal and Syed Ahmad Khan. In other words, they argued that the creation of Pakistan would be contradictory to the idea of a universal Islamic brotherhood. Moreover, theologians like Maududi and Madani argued that a Muslim state, established and administered under Jinnah's leadership, would be un-Islamic. The *ulama* in particular were focussed on a strict adherence to the sacred scriptures and laws of Islam. They believed that the western-educated Jinnah would be unconcerned with true Islamic principles and, therefore, could not represent the best interests of Muslims. They considered him to be nothing more than an 'infidel barrister' and that Pakistan under Jinnah would be an 'infidel state'.³³ These *ulama* argued that Islam needed political and religious freedom to effectively guide the Muslim community. They felt this would be best achieved under their direction within a united India. Moreover, the *ulama* argued that peaceable cross-communal cooperation in the freedom struggle might encourage non-Muslims to convert to Islam. They also argued that 'Pakistan' would be harmful for Muslims because the minority status of Muslims remaining in India after partition would be reinforced, and they would no longer have the support of their majority Muslim brothers.

By 1947 the idea of a territorial nation based solely on religion had culminated in the partitioning of the Indian subcontinent into two separate and distinct nations: one Hindu and the other Muslim. This partitioning ended a relationship of co-existence that had begun more than twelve hundred years earlier and which had influenced the people of the subcontinent in very meaningful and lasting ways. The construction of a Muslim nation, and a Muslim identity, was crucial in creating mass appeal and support for a separate political and spiritual homeland for the Indian subcontinent's largest minority community, the Muslims. This ideology privileged a monolithic homogenous religious national identity, Islam, above the heterogeneous regional, ethnic, linguistic, and theological differences that existed amongst the Muslims of South Asia. Muhammad Ali Jinnah's Pakistan was established on the basis of one nation (Pakistan), one culture (Muslim), and one language (Urdu).³⁴

2.5 Independent Pakistan

2.5.1 Pakistan, AD 1947 – 1999

The Pakistan Movement bestowed two indelible and challenging legacies on the nation. First, the movement established the foundation upon which Islam was regarded as the foremost national identity for Muslims in Pakistan. Second, the Pakistan Movement demonstrated that Islam could be effectively utilised for political mobilisation. These legacies have continued to hamper national integration, and socio-economic and political development in Pakistan. Since independence, the military, civilian leaders, and religious

³³ Jalal, 2000, p. 390.

³⁴ Jaffrelot, 2002, p. 9.

groups have all sought to mobilise a version of Islam in pursuit of their particular objectives. However, rather than act as a unifying force in the Muslim-majority nation, the complex and competing interpretations of Islam that exist in Pakistan continue to divide it. Moreover, on-going debates concerning Islam, and its role in the state and society, have been exacerbated by endemic incidents of sectarian violence. Alongside the bitter and recurrent rivalry between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims in Pakistan, is the enmity between the Sunni Deobandi and Sunni Bareilvi schools of thought. During the Pakistan Movement, Bareilvis supported Muhammad Ali Jinnah in his call for a Muslim nation in which the political, economic, and cultural interests of Muslims would be protected. Conversely, Deobandis fervently opposed the creation of Pakistan. The leader of the Deobandi opposition to the Pakistan Movement, Syed Husain Ahmad Madani, argued that territorial nationalism was the antithesis of united *ummah*. Moreover, Madani argued that a Muslim state, administered under Jinnah's leadership, would be un-Islamic.

In independent Pakistan, the ideological struggle over Islam has continued in two broad directions: liberal and conservative. Taking a predominantly liberal position, Bareilvi Muslims have tended, on the whole, to want less of a role for Islam in the state and society. According to Talbot:

Those steeped in Sufi tradition have expressed hostility to attempts to create a '*mullahocracy*' in Pakistan. The uneducated and hypocritical *mullah* has emerged as a stereotype in Pakistani literature and in the folklore of the region.²⁴⁵

In contrast, Deobandi Muslims have taken a largely conservative position and tend to work towards embedding Islam more firmly in both the state and in society. As discussed in Chapter One, Deobandis aim at effecting Muslim socio-religious uplift through strict adherence to the Shari'a and their narrow interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah. They eschew what they consider 'un-Islamic' elements, such as the intercession of Sufi saints, saint worship, and the annual *urs* celebrations, which are so beloved of Bareilvi Muslims. In the political arena, religio-political parties have never been widely successful in Pakistan. However, they are well organised and have been able to exert considerable street power with which to influence public opinion and political policy. Their rhetoric, and the public response to it, reflects the continuing functional role of Islam as a source of legitimacy.

Signalling a partial victory for the conservative position, the Objectives Resolution of 1949 firmly placed Islam as the guiding principle for Pakistan. Endorsed on March 12, 1949, by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan at the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, the resolution stated that sovereignty belonged to Allah and that Muslims should be able to live their lives in accordance with the Qur'an and the Sunnah.

I beg to move the following Objectives Resolution embodying the main principles on which the constitution of Pakistan is to be based:

²⁴⁵ Talbot, 2009, p. 29.

In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful;
WHEREAS sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust.²⁴⁶

The Objectives Resolution endorsed the primacy of religion in the state. With its passing, Pakistan became a more overtly religious state, rather than the democratic Muslim-majority nation conceived of by Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The principles of 'democracy', 'freedom', 'equality', 'tolerance', and 'social justice' were embedded in the resolution, insofar as they were consistent with the teachings and traditions of Islam.²⁴⁷ This resolution became the foundation upon which the Constitution of Pakistan would later be based. Crucially, the resolution created a space in which debates concerning Islam and its relationship to the state, as well as 'correct' forms of religious identity, belief, and practice in society, were contested.

The sectarian riots of 1953 marked the first violent rupture over the question of the role of Islam in the state, and what it means to be a Muslim in Pakistan. In March that year serious sectarian riots took place in the Punjab (West Pakistan) in response to the rejection by Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin (r. 1951-53) of a demand from some *ulama* to have Qadiani Ahmadis declared non-Muslim (*kafir*). The riots necessitated military intervention, and culminated in a declaration of martial law and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. A commission was set up to investigate the causes of the violence. Significantly, the resultant Report of the Court of Inquiry demonstrated the complete lack of doctrinal agreement amongst *ulama* regarding the definition of a Muslim and the role of Islam in the state and society.²⁴⁸ The report provided an ominous forewarning of the problems associated with combining religion and the state in Pakistan.

The net result of all this is that neither Shias nor Sunnis nor Deobandis nor Ahl-i-Hadith nor Barelvis are Muslims and any change from one view to the other must be accompanied in an Islamic State with the penalty of death if the Government of the State is in the hands of the party which considers the other party to be *kafirs*. And it does not require much imagination to judge of the consequences of this doctrine when it is remembered that no two *ulama* have agreed before us as to the definition of a Muslim.²⁴⁹

Despite this early recognition of some of the difficulties arising from combining religion and the state, Islam remained crucial to national identity and government legitimacy. The continuing importance placed on Islam, its relationship to the state, and the ways in which successive leaders have embedded Islam more firmly in the state, are most clearly demonstrated in the Constitution of Pakistan. The first constitution was adopted on March 23, 1956, under Major-General Iskander Mirza (r. 1956-58). In that constitution, Pakistan was

²⁴⁶ S.N. Hay, *Sources of Indian Tradition, Volume Two: Modern India and Pakistan*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1988, p. 388.

²⁴⁷ Hay, 1988, p. 388.

²⁴⁸ M. Munir, *Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953*, Supt. Govt. Print. Punjab, Lahore, 1954.

²⁴⁹ Munir, 1954, p. 219.

officially declared the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Pakistan was to be a democratic state based on Islamic principles. The president of Pakistan must be Muslim, and the laws of Pakistan must be in accordance with the Qur'an and the Sunnah.²⁵⁰ Since then, the constitution has witnessed numerous constitutional amendments and reforms.

General Ayub Khan was president of Pakistan from 1958 to 1969. He envisaged Pakistan as a broadly secular and democratic Muslim nation. In 1961 Khan introduced the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (MFLO), which aimed at the reform of Muslim customs such as divorce, marriage, and inheritance. His reformist agenda was influenced by the 'Westernizing' traditions of Syed Ahmed Khan.²⁵¹ Ayub Khan was a student at Aligarh University, which was founded by Syed Ahmed Khan in 1875. According to Talbot:

The modernist reformism of the Aligarh movement possessed a twofold aim; first to encourage Muslims to engage with Western scientific thought and second to reconcile the Islamic concept of the sovereignty of God with the nation state.²⁵²

Despite his largely secular agenda, General Ayub Khan recognised the need to link his government to Islam. In the Constitution of Pakistan (1962), Khan reiterated the government's commitment to Islam. The provisions of the constitution shared similarities with the previous constitution: it was based on the Objectives Resolution of 1949, Pakistan was to be a democratic state based on Islamic principles, the president must be a Muslim, and all laws must be in accordance with the Qur'an and Sunnah. Under the provisions of the constitution, Ayub established the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) and the Islamic Research Institute (IRI). The role of the CII was to ensure that the laws of Pakistan were in accordance with Islamic law. The role of the IRI was to assist in the reconstruction of an Islamic society. Despite his endorsement of Islam, Khan faced opposition from conservative religious leaders who were dissatisfied with what they viewed as government interference in their religious beliefs and traditions.

Khan also faced opposition from Sufi *pirs* and landowners who were unhappy with what they perceived to be attempts to reduce their religious and political authority in the countryside. As discussed in Chapter One, Ayub Khan implemented the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance in 1959 and the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance in 1961. Ewing argues that, in order to avoid sharing political control with conservative *ulama*, he instead attempted to link his administration to the Sufi tradition to construct national identity and claim political legitimacy.²⁵³ Khan also attempted to redefine and control Sufism and its symbols (saints and shrines) in line with his particular socio-political agenda. He placed emphasis on the role of the early saints as important social reformers. He also reinforced the notion of shrines as centres of welfare by building hospitals, schools, research

²⁵⁰ J.L. Esposito, 'Islam: ideology and politics in Pakistan', in *The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics: Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan*, A. Banuazizi and M. Weiner (eds.). Vanguard Publishers, Lahore, 1987, pp. 336.

²⁵¹ A. Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*. Penguin Books, London, 2011.

²⁵² Talbot, 2009, p. 28.

²⁵³ Ewing, 1983.

centres, and libraries at popular shrines.²⁵⁴ Saifur Rahman Sherani argues, however, that Ayub Khan's policies towards Sufi pirs served to strengthen their influence in the Pakistani countryside rather than diminish it.²⁵⁵

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was president of Pakistan from 1971 to 1973 and prime minister from 1973 to 1977. In the first year of his presidency, the Indo-Pak war and secession of East Pakistan caused an ideological crisis in Pakistan. When Pakistan was created in 1947, it comprised of East and West Pakistan. The Punjab had been divided to form West Pakistan and Bengal had been divided to form East Pakistan. Territorially, these two regions were separated by approximately 1,600 km of Indian territory. Culturally, both of these regions were fiercely protective of the specifically regional flavour of their culture. Politically, West Pakistan was dominant. Central government was based in West Pakistan, with Bengalis forming the majority in the legislative branch of government but not in the executive. In 1970, the Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in East Pakistan, won the elections, giving the party a majority in the National Assembly. In contrast, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in West Pakistan, was a minority. West Pakistan refused to recognise the election result, leading to widespread unrest in East Pakistan. In 1971, the West Pakistan army attacked East Pakistan. Rahman was arrested and taken to West Pakistan. Leaders of the Awami League sought exile in India, and from there declared independence. In December 1971, the Indian army entered East and West Pakistan. Pakistan surrendered two weeks later, and Bangladesh was established as an independent nation.

The succession of East Pakistan, and the creation of Bangladesh, demonstrates the failure of Islam to act as a coherent unifying principle with which to bind Muslims from different regional, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds. Despite this, what followed were increased attempts by the leaders of Pakistan to build a cohesive national identity based on Islam. In this period, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto increased the religious rhetoric in his political discourse. He also implemented a number of policies that seemingly conformed to conservative Islamic principles. In the Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Bhutto made salient provisions for Islam: Islam was deemed the state religion of Pakistan, the teaching of the Qur'an and *Islamiyat* were made compulsory, and it was required that all laws conform to the Qur'an and the Sunnah. According to Saeed Shafqat, the constitution of 1973:

Carried references to the Islamic way of life, compulsory teaching of the Holy Koran, *Islamiyat*, and encouraged learning of Arabic. It gave a commitment to promote the institution of zakat, organize mosques under the Auqaf department, and declared that no law repugnant to the Holy Koran and Sunna would be adopted.²⁵⁶

²⁵⁴ Ewing, 1983.

²⁵⁵ S.R. Sherani, 'Ulema and Pir in Pakistani Politics' in *Economy and Culture in Pakistan: Migrants and Cities in a Muslim Society*, H. Donnan and P. Werbner (eds). Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1991.

²⁵⁶ S. Shafqat, 'From Official Islam to Islamism: The Rise of Dawat-ul-Irshad and Lashkar-e-Taiba', in C. Jaffrelot (ed.), *Pakistan: Nationalism Without A Nation*. Manohar, New Delhi, 2002, p. 135.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto aimed at shaping Pakistan into a modern secular nation state, albeit with socialist leanings. However, like previous leaders Bhutto recognised the need to link his government to Islam. He was also obliged to make concessions to the conservative religious lobby in Pakistan. As discussed in Chapter One, Ewing argues that in order to construct national identity and claim religious legitimacy without having to share political control with the *ulama*, Bhutto linked his administration to the Sufi tradition.²⁵⁷ Bhutto, however, attempted to redefine and control Sufism and its symbols (saints and shrines) in line with his socio-political agenda. He implemented the Auqaf (Federal Control Act) in 1976 and reinforced the notion of shrines as centres of welfare.²⁵⁸ In doing so, his government undermined the traditional role of the *pirs* as hereditary custodians and benefactors of the shrines. At the same time, Bhutto's preference for Sufism impelled conservative religious groups to increase their demand for the primacy of Islam in the state and in society. In 1977 a coalition of religious parties, under the banner of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), contested the general elections against Bhutto and his PPP. The PNA advocated for the *Nizam-e-Mustafa* (System of the Prophet) and the enforcement of Shari'a. The PNA religious coalition performed poorly in the elections. After the elections, the PNA accused the PPP of rigging the elections and organised widespread demonstrations in protest. The military, under the leadership of General Zia ul-Haq, the protests necessitated military intervention to restore law and order in cities across Pakistan.

In 1977, General Zia ul-Haq deposed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and appointed himself chief martial law administrator. He was president of Pakistan from 1978 to 1988. His ten-year rule marked a period of increased religiosity. Zia ul-Haq continued the process of embedding Islam and Islamic principles more firmly in the state. He took up the slogan *Nizam-e-Mustafa* as part of his Islamisation project to transform Pakistan into an Islamic state. He established laws that prescribed Islamic punishments for crimes, established Shari'a courts, banned the sale of alcohol and gambling, encouraged the use of Urdu over English in the government sphere, enforced traditional dress in educational institutions, and strengthened regulations governing religious institutions. Lieven argues that General Zia ul-Haq's attempts to transform Pakistan into an Islamic state:

Reflected not only Zia's own profound personal religious convictions, but also a nationalist belief (which has been shared by some more secular figures within the military and civilian establishment) that religion is the only force which can strengthen Pakistani nationalism and national identity.²⁵⁹

The introduction of predominantly Sunni Islamic principles alienated the Shi'a community and left a lasting legacy in the form of sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shi'a groups in Pakistan. In addition, Zia ul-Haq's presidency was contemporaneous with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which transformed Pakistan into a front-line state in the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-89). In this period we witness increased US investment in Pakistan's

²⁵⁷ Ewing, 1983.

²⁵⁸ Ewing, 1983.

²⁵⁹ Lieven, 2010, p. 195.

military and its intelligence agencies, as well as increased investment from the US, the Gulf States, and Saudi Arabia in *madrassah* education in Pakistan. As previously discussed, many of the Afghan mujahedeen, the Afghan Taliban, and the Pakistani cadres who fought alongside them, were trained in Sunni Deobandi *madrassahs* in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas. The expansion of Deobandi *madrassahs* in Pakistan contributed to the deepening of sectarian identities in Pakistan, not only between Sunni and Shi'a but also between Deobandi and Barelvi.

As discussed, the leaders of Pakistan have also had to negotiate politics that is strongly influenced by the traditional relationship between Sufi *pirs* and the elite land-owning classes, which are firmly entrenched in the socio-political structure of the countryside. Ewing argues that Zia ul-Haq, like Ayub Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, attempted to reduce the political power of Sufi *pirs* by enforcing greater control over shrines.²⁶⁰ Thus, he retained the *auqaf* regulations that were introduced by his predecessors. In addition, his policies towards the saints and their shrines were not a major departure from that of Ayub Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, despite his Islamisation project. Zia ul-Haq attempted to reduce the religious role and authority of the *pirs* by placing emphasis on the role of the early saints in the widespread conversion of the population through pious belief and behaviour, and by reducing the distinction between Sufism and *shari'at*.²⁶¹

Muhammad Nawaz Sharif was prime minister of Pakistan from 1990 to 1993 and from 1997 to 1999.²⁶² He rose to political prominence under the military government of Zia ul-Haq. Like previous leaders of relatively mainstream political parties, Sharif was obliged to link his government to Islam, as well as negotiate politics that was strongly influenced by conservative religious leaders, *pirs*, and land-owners. In 1988 Sharif formed an alliance with the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), or Islamic Democratic Alliance, a coalition of parties that included diverse groups including the Pakistan Muslim League, Awami National Party (ANP), and the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). In 1990 the IJI passed The Enforcement of Shariat as a private members bill in the senate. Talbot argues that:

The support of IJI senators for a Shariat Bill in the closing months of Benazir Bhutto's government, together with the presence of religious parties in the subsequent IJI Government, meant that Islamisation which had been in abeyance since 1988 would re-emerge during Nawaz Sharif's premiership.²⁶³

In 1998, Nawaz Sharif put forward the Constitution (15th Amendment Act). The amendment provided for the implementation and enforcement of *Shariat-e-Muhammadi* or Shari'a laws. Significantly, the amendment gave the government powers of enforcement, including the authority to implement Shari'a, enforce *salat* (prayer), administer *zakat* (charity), promote

²⁶⁰ Ewing, 1983.

²⁶¹ Ewing, 1983.

²⁶² Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif is the leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N). He was elected prime minister of Pakistan in June 2013, previously holding this position from 1990-93 and 1997-99. According to its manifesto, the PML-N is committed to making Pakistan 'an ideal Islamic democratic state'. See, 'Our Constitution: Preamble', *Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)*, <http://www.pmln.org>, (accessed 20 December 2013).

²⁶³ Talbot, 2009, p. 317.

amr bil ma'roof (acknowledged virtues), and prohibit *nahi anil mumkar* (sin). According to Mubarak Ali:

Nawaz Sharif's concept of the shariat was confined only to the Islamic punishment provisions, since he believed that the Islamic penal code would eradicate all crimes from society. Speedy justice and exemplary punishments were viewed by him as the solution to all problems.²⁸⁴

Under the Islamic penal code, the penalty for theft is amputation, the penalty for adultery is public flogging, and the penalty for blasphemy is death. Sharif was criticised by human rights groups for attempting to implement harsh Islamic penalties in Pakistan. At the same time, some religious leaders accused Sharif of exploiting Islam for political ends. The Constitution (15th Amendment Act) was approved in the national assembly, but not in the senate.

Each of these attempts by Muslim politicians to embed Islam more firmly in the state and society, albeit to different degrees, demonstrate the continued importance placed on Islam in Pakistan.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter provides a general history of some of the dominant trends that helped shape Islam, politics, and identity in the Indian subcontinent and, inevitably, in Pakistan after its creation in 1947. In particular, this chapter demonstrates the unique ways in which the Indian environment influenced Islamic belief and practice over a period of approximately twelve hundred years: the results of which are reflected in the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, and philosophical diversity of the Muslims of Pakistan today. This chapter also illustrates that, whilst Islam is now widely considered to be the dominant tradition amongst the heterogeneous Muslims of the subcontinent, the persistent lack of doctrinal agreement has prevented the formation of an enduring national identity for Pakistan's Muslims. This historical narrative provides an essential background for a more complete understanding and analysis of the post-9/11 socio-political context in Pakistan, in which the Government of Pakistan posited its own construction of Sufism as the national identity in place of an understanding of Islam that had become synonymous with intolerance, militancy, and terrorism.

²⁸⁴ Ali, M., 'Pakistan's search for identity' in Competing nationalisms in P.R. Brass and A. Vanaik (eds.), *South Asia: essays for Asghar Ali*, Orient Longman, Hyderabad, 2002, p. 259-60.

3 The early discourse of President Musharraf, 2001 – 2004

3.1 Introduction

As discussed in Chapter One, political leaders use persuasive language (spoken and written) in the political arena for a variety of purposes. They use language to reinforce and reproduce their own political power, that is, the political power of the status quo.²⁶⁵ Political leaders use persuasive language to assert the dominant ideologies of the status quo.²⁶⁶ They also use language to convince people to make enormous personal sacrifices in the interests of a greater good.²⁶⁷ This type of persuasive speaking or writing is what scholars call discourse. Based on research into what he refers to as ‘call to arms discourses’, Graham argues that throughout history political leaders have relied upon four generic strategies in order to successfully persuade people to make enormous personal sacrifices in the interests of greater good, such as risking their lives at war. He further contends that such discourses typically occur in contexts that are ‘characterised by deep crises in political legitimacy’ or contexts that are ‘historical turning points’.²⁶⁸ This theory is supported in the work of William Sewell who argues that historical events, or transformative occurrences, usually begin ‘with a rupture of some kind – that is, a surprising break with routine practice’.²⁶⁹ Furthermore, Sewell states that such historical events trigger a series of occurrences that contribute to a fundamental transformation of existing social, economic, and political conditions.

If ‘call to arms discourses’ typically occur in societies that have experienced a profound rupture of some kind, then the military coup of 1999, followed by the decision for Pakistan to join the US-led coalition in the ‘war on terror’, undoubtedly provided the catalyst for the new discourse that emanated from the political leadership in Pakistan. On October 12, 1999, General Musharraf overthrew the democratically elected government in a military coup and appointed himself the dual role of chief executive of Pakistan and chief of army staff. Domestically and internationally this move triggered a deep crisis in his, and in Pakistan’s, political legitimacy. Two years later, the United States suffered four coordinated terrorist attacks on its soil. President Musharraf called September 11, 2001, the ‘day that changed the world’.²⁷⁰ The terrorist attacks of 9/11 constituted a major ‘rupture’ or ‘historical turning point’, which prompted transformative occurrences in the United States and in many countries around the world including Pakistan.

In order to critically analyse the new discourse that emanated from the political leadership in Pakistan after 9/11, this thesis employs a converse form of Graham’s Discourse-Historical ‘call to arms’ approach. The theoretical assumption is that, in the climate of terrorism,

²⁶⁵ D. Schiffrin, D. Tannen, and H.E. Hamilton, *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Blackwell Publishers Inc., Malden, 2001.

²⁶⁶ De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak, 1999.

²⁶⁷ Graham, Keenan, and Dowd, 2004.

²⁶⁸ Graham, Keenan, and Dowd, 2004, p. 200.

²⁶⁹ W.J. Sewell, *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2005, p. 227.

²⁷⁰ Musharraf, 2006.

extremism, and sectarianism, political actors in Pakistan relied upon four generic strategies, not to persuade people to go to war, as in Graham's model, but to encourage them to form a unified community, interact peaceably, and progress socially and economically. This chapter demonstrates how President Musharraf attempted to urge the nation to support the decision for Pakistan to join the US-led 'war on terror', persuade the nation to support the domestic campaign against extremism, and rally the nation to non-violent action and socio-economic uplift during the first half of his political tenure.

3.2 Catalysts for change in Pakistan

3.2.1 The coup of 1999: Pakistan returns to military rule

O Allah! The only thing I can promise my Army and my Nation is sincerity,
honesty, integrity, and unflinching loyalty.
You give me the vision to see and perceive the truth from the false.
The wisdom to comprehend the problem and find a solution.
The courage to speak and project and the clarity to express the right.
The chance to serve the Nation as I deserve.²²¹

The first historical turning point or rupture, which triggered a series of occurrences aimed at a transformation of the existing social, economic, and political conditions in Pakistan, was the coup d'état of October 12, 1999. General Musharraf removed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif from office, following what he called a 'counter-coup', and assumed the dual role of chief executive of Pakistan and head of government. It was Pakistan's fourth military coup in the nation's short history, with Musharraf following in the footsteps of military leaders President Muhammad Ayub Khan, President Muhammad Yahya Khan, and President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq.

Events began earlier that day when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced his decision to replace General Musharraf as chief of army staff on national television. At that time, Musharraf was en route from Sri Lanka following an official visit. Musharraf would later say that, despite the previous tension between himself and the prime minister over the Kargil conflict, he felt quite easy about his visit to Colombo and believed that he and Sharif had finally reached a 'truce'.²²² His ease, however, proved to be misplaced when the prime minister refused to allow the Pakistan International Airlines flight PK-805, carrying Musharraf and 198 civilian passengers, to land at Jinnah International Airport in Karachi. Instead, Sharif attempted to divert the airliner outside Pakistani airspace despite urgent requests by the pilot to be permitted to refuel. When the plane eventually landed, it had only seven minutes of fuel remaining.²²³ General Musharraf later said that during the harrowing incident he recalled a verse from a quatrain from the *Rubaiyat* of Omar Khayyam, an eleventh-century Persian Sufi poet and philosopher.

²²¹ Musharraf, 2006, p. 80.

²²² The Kargil conflict took place between May and July 1999 when India moved to militarily expel Pakistani forces that had crossed the line of control into Indian-administered Kashmir. The conflict was brought to an end when, upon the request of US President Clinton, Pakistan withdrew its forces.

²²³ Musharraf, 2006, p. 107.

The Moving Finger writes; and, having writ,
Moves on: nor all your Piety nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
Nor all your Tears wash out a Word of it.²⁷⁴

Three and a half hours after the initial televised broadcast announcing that General Musharraf was to be replaced, the Commander of the Rawalpindi Corps entered the prime minister's Islamabad residence and took him into custody. Sharif was charged with kidnapping, attempted murder, hijacking, and terrorism. Facing the death penalty, the deposed prime minister was later pardoned by General Musharraf and exiled to Saudi Arabia, where he remained until 2007. In 2009, the Supreme Court of Pakistan overturned the charges against Sharif due to insufficient evidence.²⁷⁵

Military leaders in Pakistan have frequently cited poor political leadership, corruption, socio-economic underdevelopment, and inefficient judicial and constitutional systems in order to justify the need for military intervention. As the following national address by General Musharraf demonstrates, his justification for the military coup was no different.

You are all aware of the kind of turmoil and uncertainty that our country has gone through in recent times. Not only have all the institutions been played around with, and systematically destroyed, the economy too is in a state of collapse. We are also aware of the self-serving policies being followed, which have rocked the very foundation of the Federation of Pakistan. Dear brothers and sisters, your armed forces have never and shall never let you down, Inshallah. We shall preserve the integrity and sovereignty of our country to the last drop of our blood. I request you all, to remain calm and support your armed forces in the re-establishment of order to pave the way for a prosperous future for Pakistan.²⁷⁶

Despite the initial popularity of Prime Minister Sharif, and the considerable public support that had brought him into power, by 1999 his national approval rating had dropped considerably. The economy was dangerously fragile, suffering high levels of unemployment, poverty, social inequality, and foreign debt. According to General Musharraf, 'all the social indicators – health, education, income – were shamefully low and were continually deteriorating. Between 1988 and 1999 absolute poverty – people who earn \$1 per day or less! – had risen alarmingly, from 18 percent to 34 percent'.²⁷⁷ A Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) report later revealed that Prime Minister Sharif, along with some of his family members and business associates, had amassed more than US\$400 million from corruption and money laundering schemes during his tenure as finance minister (1984-85) and prime minister (1991-93; 1996-99).²⁷⁸

²⁷⁴ Musharraf, 2006, p. 108.

²⁷⁵ Talbot, 2009, p. 375.

²⁷⁶ 'Address to the nation', *Pakistani.org*, 17 October 1999, http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/post_12oct99/musharraf_address_17oct1999.html, (accessed 4 May 2012).

²⁷⁷ Musharraf, 2006, p. 147.

²⁷⁸ The Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) report, compiled by Rehman Malik, was submitted to President Tartar on September 24, 1998. See, 'Malik dusts off 14-year old FIA inquiry report', *The News*, 30 April 2012,

The fragile political and economic situation was worsened when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif authorised a series of six nuclear tests in the Balochistan desert in response to the nuclear tests conducted by India in May 1998. Although India's decision to conduct the nuclear tests was regarded by Pakistan as a major security threat, Pakistan initially hesitated to respond in kind, waiting seventeen days before reacting. Thazha Varkey Paul suggests that Sharif appeared to have been willing to abstain from nuclear testing in return for 'substantial economic and military aid and security guarantees from the West'.²⁷⁹ That did not happen and, under increasing pressure from opposition parties and the army, Sharif gave the order for the tests. Hasan Askari Rizvi sites a number of reasons for Pakistan's ultimate decision to conduct nuclear tests.²⁸⁰

The major factors that shaped Pakistan's decision included the reluctance of the Western powers to impose tough sanctions against India; non-availability of credible security guarantees to Pakistan; Pakistani perception that the U.S. administration would not be able to deliver an attractive package of economic assistance and military sales; the hawkish and anti-Pakistan statements of India's Union ministers and the senior members of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, creating the impression in Pakistan that India might use its nuclear status to extend its military reach beyond the Line of Control in Kashmir; and the growing domestic pressure for testing in order to restore "strategic balance" in South Asia.²⁸¹

Many of these motivations were communicated by the prime minister to the Pakistani public in a televised address on May 28, 1998. Primarily, Nawaz Sharif stated that the nuclear tests were an 'inevitable' defence measure taken to protect Pakistan's national security from Indian aggression in the region. He further justified his decision by stating that he had wide support from the people of Pakistan. He also stated that he had the support of the 'great sons of the nation', the military. Sharif went on to criticise 'global powers' for failing to exert pressure on India to halt its nuclear program. He also criticised Indian leaders for their 'provocative statements' following the nuclear tests.²⁸²

The nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan in this period were widely condemned by the international community. The United Nations Security Council criticised the actions of both nations. The Security Council regarded the nuclear tests as a grave threat to international peace and security, and requested that India and Pakistan refrain from conducting any further tests.²⁸³ The United States went even further by imposing military and economic sanctions on Pakistan. These sanctions came at a time when Pakistan could ill afford to be isolated, diplomatically or economically, from the international community.

<http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-14266-Malik-dusts-off-14-year-old-FIA-inquiry-report>, (accessed 6 September 2012).

²⁷⁹ T.V. Paul, *Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons*, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 2000, p. 135.

²⁸⁰ H.A. Rizvi, 'Pakistan in 1998: The Polity under Pressure'. *Asian Survey*, 39 (1), p. 183.

²⁸¹ Rizvi, 1998, p. 183.

²⁸² 'World: Monitoring Nawaz Sharif's speech', *BBC News*, 28 May 1998, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/102445.stm>, (accessed 10 September 2015).

²⁸³ 'UN Security Council Resolution 1172 (1998)', *United Nations Security Council*, <http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/9022957.68260956.html>, (accessed 4 September 2012).

Nevertheless, the prime minister's determination for Pakistan to rival India's nuclear capability is reflected in his call for national austerity and sacrifice in the face of these sanctions.

Let us brace ourselves and if the need arises be ready to even go hungry. We have to change our lives in revolutionary style. Sanctions will be imposed. Hard and difficult times will come. Hardships will increase. But if you keep your morale high and accept the challenge boldly, there is no reason that we will not be successful in this test. This is a chance to show your capabilities.²⁸⁴

The following year, Pakistan came under further criticism from the international community for its role in the Kargil conflict. It is generally understood that, early in 1999, General Musharraf gave the final order for Pakistani forces to cross the Line of Control (LOC) into Indian-administered Kashmir where the army, together with Kashmiri militants, clashed with Indian troops. The Indian army suffered heavy losses, and tens of thousands of people were displaced during the three-month conflict. Pakistan repeatedly denied that its forces were conducting operations in Indian territory, claiming instead that the forces were pro-Kashmiri liberation groups. Under increasing pressure from President Bill Clinton, India and Pakistan held a series of talks in an attempt to ease tensions in the region between the two nuclear powers. The conflict officially ended in July 1999, with both sides claiming victory.²⁸⁵

Militarily, the operation was considered a success by Pakistan. Its army made significant strategic territorial gains in the Kargil Heights. Politically, however, the operation was a failure. Three months prior to the conflict, the prime minister of India, Atal Behari Vajpayee, and the prime minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif met in Lahore to sign a bilateral treaty. The Lahore Declaration aimed at building peace, stability, progress, and prosperity in the region. The treaty between the two long-term nuclear rivals was well received in South Asia and internationally. However some religio-political parties in Pakistan, namely the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (Fazlur Rehman) (JUI-F), were highly critical of the treaty, claiming Sharif had betrayed Muslims in Pakistan and in Kashmir. The hostilities between India and Pakistan during the Kargil conflict stalled the Lahore treaty. Economically, the military expenditure for the Kargil conflict further weakened the already frail economy.²⁸⁶

The on-going dispute over Kashmir has profoundly influenced foreign policy and public sentiment in Pakistan.

The failure to acquire Kashmir has been consistently represented to the Pakistani populace as an enduring hindrance to the consummation of the

²⁸⁴ *BBC News*, (accessed 10 September 2015).

²⁸⁵ Talbot, 2009.

²⁸⁶ Talbot, 2009.

Pakistani state and by extension its national ethos. Pakistanis have been fed a steady diet of “regaining Kashmir”.²⁸⁷

Many people in Pakistan expected a military victory in the struggle for the liberation of Kashmir, and were disappointed when Prime Minister Sharif decided to withdraw Pakistani forces upon the request of President Clinton. Consequently, anti-government and anti-US protest marches were held in major cities in Pakistan, including Lahore and Karachi, calling for the government to hold fresh elections.

Most critically for the Sharif government, the Kargil debacle served to alienate elements in the Pakistan army, who were already wary of increasing government interference in what they considered to be strictly military affairs. General Musharraf, in particular, was not pleased to have been named by Sharif as the instigator of the conflict, stating that ‘it was not credible for a prime minister to claim that something like Kargil could happen without his knowledge’.²⁸⁸ It is not entirely clear whether Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was aware of the operation, either fully or in part. However, Iftikhar Malik writes that ‘Sharif denied any Pakistani participation even as Kashmiri militants were holding funeral processions in Pakistani cities and basked in the glory of the initial Indian defeats with their Pakistani supporters’.²⁸⁹

Having ended what he called a ‘dreadful decade of sham democracy’, General Musharraf began the task of ‘putting the system right’.²⁹⁰ On October 17, 1999, Musharraf announced the strategy he planned to implement as leader of Pakistan. In that national address, Musharraf said his first thought was that Pakistan ‘must avoid another period of martial law’ because martial law is harmful to civilian and military institutions.²⁹¹ His intention was that Pakistan continue to be a constitutional state but that the constitution, which he believed had been damaged by former leaders, should be amended. Subsequently, Musharraf placed the constitution in abeyance and suspended the national assembly, all provincial assemblies, and the senate. He removed the prime minister, all federal and state ministers, secretaries, governors, chief and provincial ministers, and their advisors from office. The judiciary was permitted to function, provided it refrain from challenging his authority as chief executive and head of government. General Musharraf then went about installing a transitional government. He announced the continuation of Rafique Tarar as president, the formation of a six-member National Security Council, and the appointment of a cabinet of ministers that would work under the guidance of the council.²⁹²

The political philosophy of General Musharraf is clearly outlined in his October 17, 1999, address to the nation. In it, he revealed a seven-point program designed to rebuild national

²⁸⁷ C. Fair, ‘Islam and Politics in Pakistan’, in *The Muslim World after 9/11*, Rabasa, A., Waxman, M., Larson, E.V. The RAND Corporation, California, 2004, pp. 247-297.

²⁸⁸ Musharraf, 2006, p. 109.

²⁸⁹ I.H. Malik, ‘Pakistan in 2000: Starting Anew or Stalemate?’. *Asian Survey*, 41 (1), 2001, pp. 104-115.

²⁹⁰ Musharraf, 2006, p. 79.

²⁹¹ Musharraf, 2006, p. 143.

²⁹² *Pakistani.org*, (accessed 4 May 2012).

confidence and morale, strengthen the federation, remove inter-provincial disharmony, and restore national cohesion. He promised to revive the economy and restore investor confidence, ensure extensive accountability, depoliticise state institutions, devolve political power to local government, uphold press freedom, and guide Pakistan toward what he called 'true' democracy.²⁹³ Demonstrably, Musharraf's main political focus during the early phase of his leadership was on working towards national cohesion, socio-economic development, good governance, and democracy for Pakistan. These policy objectives appear frequently throughout his speeches and constitute the major leitmotifs of his rule.

Despite the commitment to devolve political power to local government, prevent corruption, revive the economy, and work towards 'true' democracy, Pakistan was formally suspended from the Commonwealth of Nations. At a special meeting of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on the Harare Declaration (CMAG), held in London on October 18, 1999, it was decided that the military coup constituted a serious breach of its central political principles.²⁹⁴ The group called for the Musharraf military administration to set a deadline for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan, and to ensure the safety of the former prime minister and all government detainees. At the same time, the United States prohibited all economic and military assistance to Pakistan under the Foreign Assistance Act (Section 508).²⁹⁵

3.2.2 The crisis of 9/11: Pakistan joins the 'war on terror'

The second historical turning point or rupture occurred on September 11, 2001. On that day, the United States experienced four coordinated terror attacks. Two planes were flown into the World Trade Centre in New York, one was flown into the Pentagon in Arlington County, Virginia, and a fourth crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. That event triggered a series of responses, not only from the United States, but also from many countries around the world including Pakistan, aimed at countering terrorism. President Musharraf later described that September day as:

an uneventful day in Pakistan, at least while the sun was high. Little did I know that on the other side of the globe [an event] was about to alter the course of my life, and the course of Pakistan. Little did I know that we were about to be thrust into the front line of yet another war, a war against shadows.²⁹⁶

The following day, President Musharraf made an official statement condemning the attacks as a 'barbaric act of terrorism, which will live in memory as a most heinous crime against

²⁹³ *Pakistani.org*, (accessed 4 May 2012).

²⁹⁴ 'Special Meeting of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on the Harare Declaration. (1999)', *The Commonwealth*, <http://thecommonwealth.org/history-of-the-commonwealth/pakistan-suspended-commonwealth-0>, (accessed 28 October 2011).

²⁹⁵ Some sanctions were lifted when President Musharraf agreed to assist the United States after 2001. Pakistan was readmitted into the Commonwealth in May 2004, following the restoration of the constitution. See, 'History of the Commonwealth', *The Commonwealth*, <http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/commonwealth/history>, (accessed 28 October 2011).

²⁹⁶ Musharraf, 2006, p. 199.

humanity'.²⁹⁷ Musharraf concluded by assuring President George W. Bush of his 'unstinted cooperation in the fight against terrorism'.²⁹⁸ The presidential statement was reinforced in a letter sent to the UN General Assembly Security Council from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan, Shamshad Ahmad.²⁹⁹ Despite Pakistan's initial assurances to the United States, the official decision to join the US-led coalition against terrorism was made on September 14, following a meeting with the military hierarchy. President Musharraf met with several army corps commanders and senior staff officers, as well as representatives from the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and Military Intelligence (MI) agencies, in order to discuss the list of demands put forward by the US State Department.³⁰⁰

For the military leadership, the most compelling reason for joining the US-led coalition against terrorism was that Pakistan could not risk having the United States as an adversary. In his memoirs, President Musharraf recounted that he had received a phone call from US Secretary of State Colin Powell, the day after 9/11, who told him 'you are either with us or against us'.³⁰¹ According to Musharraf, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage went even further, purportedly telling the director general of Inter Services Intelligence that if Pakistan chose to side with the terrorists then it should 'be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age'.³⁰² Musharraf professed that he initially 'war-gamed' whether Pakistan was able to resist US pressure. Ultimately, however, he decided that Pakistan was too weak militarily, economically, and socially to risk having the United States as an adversary. Fundamentally, Pakistan lacked 'the homogeneity to galvanize the entire nation into an active confrontation'.³⁰³

Equally compelling for the military leadership was that Pakistan could not risk Indian aggrandisement in the region. After 9/11, the Government of India offered to provide local and logistical assistance to support the US-led military campaign against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The offer of support from Pakistan's long-term rival, India, undoubtedly influenced President Musharraf's decision to join the US-led coalition against terrorism. In order to justify his decision to the people of Pakistan, Musharraf stressed that the decision was made in the national interest. First, he warned that India aimed to use the opportunity to harm Pakistan's sovereignty, economy, strategic assets, and the struggle for Kashmir.³⁰⁴ Second, as the below extract demonstrates, Musharraf warned that India aimed to have Pakistan declared a terrorist state and, thus, isolated internationally.

²⁹⁷ 'Address to the Nation', *President Musharraf*, 12 September 2001, <http://presidentmusharraf.wordpress.com/2006/07/14/musharraf-11-september-2001>, (accessed 4 May 2012).

²⁹⁸ *President Musharraf*, (accessed 4 May 2012).

²⁹⁹ 'Letter dated 13 September 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General', *United Nations Security Council*, <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/56/a56368.pdf>, (accessed 20 November 2014).

³⁰⁰ H. Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror*, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2005, p. 219.

³⁰¹ Musharraf, 2006, p. 201.

³⁰² Musharraf, 2006, p. 201.

³⁰³ Musharraf, 2006, p. 202.

³⁰⁴ Musharraf, 2006, p. 202.

We in Pakistan are facing a very critical situation. Perhaps as critical as the events in 1971. If we make the wrong decisions our vital interests will be harmed. Our neighbours [...] have promised US all cooperation. They want to isolate us, get us declared a terrorist state.³⁶⁵

As Musharraf predicted, the US reaction to the terrorist attacks was swift and resolute. On September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush addressed a joint session of congress. In the televised address, President Bush announced that evidence for the 9/11 attacks pointed to a group of 'loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda' and its leader Osama bin Laden.³⁶⁶ He went on to say that 'our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated'.³⁶⁷ Less than three weeks later, the United States and its allies launched a military campaign against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.

The events of 9/11, and the subsequent attacks on the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, dramatically altered Pakistan's international relations, and amplified its domestic issues. In particular, the crisis exposed the poor law and order situation faced by ordinary Pakistan citizens as a result of rising militancy, extremism, and religious intolerance and violence. A report by the HRCP stated:

The events of September 2001 and the war against terrorism again made the gun the pre-eminent instrument of determining human affairs and pushed human rights and basic needs lower in the table of priorities, especially in countries still struggling to establish democracy and rule of justice.³⁶⁸

The pragmatic decision to support the US-led military campaign against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan helped Pakistan avoid international political isolation and brought it back from the threshold of an economic crisis.³⁶⁹ Domestically, however, that decision triggered tense opposition within Pakistan. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, forty five per cent of Pakistanis opposed the US-led war against terrorism and thirty six per cent felt that the United States failed to consider the interests of Pakistan in its efforts to fight terrorism. Conversely, only twenty per cent of Pakistanis supported the US-led war against terrorism. In addition, a mere ten per cent of Pakistanis had a favourable opinion of the United States. The Global Attitudes Project revealed that the deep-rooted feeling of aversion

³⁶⁵ 'Address to the nation', *Islamabad Policy Research Centre*, 19 September 2001, <http://ipripak.org/journal/winter2002/doc11.shtml>, (accessed 4 May 2012).

³⁶⁶ 'Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress', *The Whitehouse*, 20 September 2001, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf, (accessed 4 September 2012).

³⁶⁷ *The Whitehouse*, (accessed 4 September 2012).

³⁶⁸ Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2002, p. 1.

³⁶⁹ In a summary of US aid to Pakistan between 1948-2010, the Guardian newspaper reported that Pakistan received over US \$228 million in 2001 compared to US \$45 million it received the previous year. In 2002, US aid to Pakistan tripled and has risen steadily since 9/11. See, 'Sixty years of US aid to Pakistan: Get the data', *The Guardian*, 11 July 2011, <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jul/11/us-aid-to-pakistan>, (accessed 24 April 2013).

towards the United States had more to do with US foreign policy and US failure to consider the interests of other nations in their approach to international issues.³⁰⁰

The widespread antipathy within Pakistan towards the United States had a negative impact on the legitimacy of the Musharraf administration, which was already struggling with a multitude of domestic challenges. Decades of political and economic instability, coupled with the fragile law and order situation, hampered government efforts toward economic and social development. After 9/11, the rise in religious extremism and violence in Pakistan made the nation increasingly unsafe for its many citizens. It also had an adverse affect on local and foreign investment. Musharraf claimed that, after 9/11, he was forced to concentrate government efforts on security rather than on restructuring Pakistan, which had a significant impact on the government's capacity to reinvest in much-needed healthcare, education, and economic development.³⁰¹ At the same time, despite its commitment to the 'war on terror', Pakistan experienced rising negative perceptions internationally. The failure of government efforts to overcome internal disunity, religious intolerance and violence, implement effective governance, and achieve socio-economic growth and development exacerbated negative world opinion. Western audiences, amidst media reports of ongoing terrorism in a nuclear-capable Pakistan, together with the nation's internal instability and dependence on international aid, increasingly viewed Pakistan as authoritarian, intolerant, and regressive.

September 11, 2001, therefore, constituted a significant 'rupture' or 'turning point' in Pakistan's history. Moreover, it triggered a series of occurrences that aimed to fundamentally transform existing social, economic, and political conditions in Pakistan. At the same time, it reignited unresolved debates concerning the place of Islam in the state and society. What became apparent in the political discourse of President Musharraf from this point onward was his attempt to build national cohesion and national identity within a heterogeneous Pakistani society in order to rally popular support for non-violent action. He did this by appealing to a territorial nationalism in combination with the ethical and peace-building aspects found within Islam, namely *itjihad* (independent interpretation) and Sufism. Elements of Antonio Gramsci's cultural hegemony paradigm are particularly evident in this strategy.³⁰² For Musharraf, the formation of a coherent and cohesive national identity was central to the establishment of political legitimacy and hegemony without the need for physical force. He believed this would enable the government to focus on investing in much-needed social and economic development, which would then result in a peaceful and prosperous civil society and, in turn, reverse negative world opinion.

³⁰⁰ 'What the world thinks in 2002', *Pew Research Global Attitudes Project*, 4 December 2002, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2002/12/04/chapter-4-global-publics-view-the-united-states>, (accessed 4 September 2012).

³⁰¹ Musharraf, 2006, p. 151. According to the World Bank, Pakistan's military expenditure in 2001 was four per cent of its GDP. That same year, almost three per cent of its GDP was spent on health. There were no expenditure figures reported for education in 2001 or 2002. See, 'Military Expenditure', *The World Bank*, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?page=2>, (accessed 24 April 2013).

³⁰² Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, International Publishers Co., New York, 1971.

3.3 Official responses to the new socio-political challenges

3.3.1 Urging the nation to support the decision to join the 'war on terror'

On September 19, 2001, President Musharraf made a national address to the people of Pakistan. The main aim of his address was to convince the Pakistani public to support the decision for Pakistan to cooperate with the United States in the 'war on terror'. Musharraf began by conveying his deep sympathy to the family members of the Pakistanis who were killed in New York on September 11. He then informed the nation what the main US targets were, and what types of support the US expected to receive from Pakistan. The main US targets were Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, and the Afghan Taliban in particular, and international terrorism in general. The US expected Pakistan to provide intelligence and logistical support, and permit the use of its airspace. To justify Pakistan's involvement in the military campaign against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and to persuade the Pakistani public to support him, Musharraf emphasised three important considerations. First, that the United States 'had the support of the UN Security Council'.³³³ Second, a 'UN resolution specifies punishment for those committing terrorism'.³³⁴ Third, that the resolution was 'supported by all the Islamic countries'.³³⁵

If Musharraf had concerns about his ability to persuade the nation to once again collaborate with its former ally then he had good reason. Historically, US-Pak relations have at times been difficult and challenging. Diplomatic relations between Pakistan and the United States were formed as early as 1947, in the months following Pakistan's creation as an independent nation. The collapse of World War II alliances, rising antagonisms between the Soviet Union and the United States, the Cold War threat, the unstable environment in Asia due to decolonisation, and the conflict on Pakistan's borders with India and China all heightened the threat to Pakistan's new-found sovereignty. In that political climate, a number of developing nations chose to take a neutral stance, rejecting affiliations with both the US-led western coalition and the Soviet-led eastern coalition. US policy, which at the time was to contain international communism, was demonstrated in the strategic need to establish military bases close to the Soviet Union and China. The Indian subcontinent was, therefore, of vital importance to US security interests. India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru chose to pursue a policy of non-alignment, which aroused US suspicion and hostility. In contrast, Pakistan aligned itself with the United States which, in return, gave the fledgling nation much-needed military and economic support.

US-Pak relations deteriorated shortly thereafter when the United States imposed economic and military sanctions on Pakistan during the Indo-Pak war of 1965. Relations between the two nations deteriorated again when Pakistan's then-prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, failed to persuade the United States to impose sanctions on India in response to its nuclear

³³³ *Islamabad Policy Research Centre*, (accessed 4 May 2012).

³³⁴ *Islamabad Policy Research Centre*, (accessed 4 May 2012).

³³⁵ *Islamabad Policy Research Centre*, (accessed 4 May 2012).

tests of 1974. Despite those setbacks, Pakistan worked closely with the US in the 1980s in joint military operations in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. However, once the Soviet threat was contained, and Soviet troops had withdrawn from Afghanistan, Pakistan's nuclear activities came under intense US scrutiny. The United States stipulated that Pakistan must refrain from developing nuclear weapons in order to receive economic and military assistance. At the same time, many in Pakistan believed that the US was an unreliable ally owing to its failure to assist in the rehabilitation of post-war Afghanistan. Relations soured even further when the US imposed full sanctions in response to the five nuclear tests Pakistan carried out in the Balochistan desert in 1998. The following year, US President Clinton requested that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif withdraw Pakistani forces from Indian-administered Kashmir and end the Kargil conflict. It was a move that saw widespread anti-US and anti-government protest marches in major cities across Pakistan.

Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source

In his national address of September 19, 2001, President Musharraf relied on an appeal to the ultimate moral forces within Pakistani society in order to convince the public to support the decision for Pakistan to join the US-led coalition in the 'war on terror'.

Our critical concerns are our sovereignty, second our economy, third our strategic assets (nuclear and missiles), and forth our Kashmir cause. All four will be harmed if we make the wrong decision. When we make these decisions they must be according to Islam. [...] Allah has said that he who has 'hikmat' has a huge blessing. We have to save our interests. Pakistan comes first, everything else is secondary. [...] At this time, we have to be make sure that our enemies do not succeed in their designs to harm us. Pakistan is regarded as a fort of Islam. If this fort is damaged, Islam will be damaged. [...] May Allah guide and protect us. Pakistan Zindabad!³⁶

In the above extract, President Musharraf privileged two ultimate moral forces within Pakistani society: the idea of the nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam). The first and foremost moral force for Musharraf, however, was nationalism. In this address, Musharraf repeatedly appealed to a national consciousness in order to legitimise his exhortations. This is demonstrated in statements such as: 'our critical concerns are our sovereignty', 'Pakistan comes first, everything else is secondary', and 'Pakistan Zindabad' (long live Pakistan). The second moral force emphasised by President Musharraf in this national address was religion. Statements such as: 'when we make these decisions they must be according to Islam', 'Allah has said that he who has 'hikmat' [wisdom] has a huge blessing', and 'may Allah guide and protect us' reveal that Musharraf was also appealing to a shared religious consciousness to give authority to his political exhortations. For even greater emphasis, Musharraf relied upon the combined moral forces of nationalism and religion. This is apparent in his statement: 'Pakistan is regarded as a fort of Islam. If this fort is damaged, Islam will be damaged'.

³⁶ Islamabad Policy Research Centre, (accessed 4 May 2012).

In Pakistan, nationalism and religion are undeniably the most dominant moral forces within society. This is perhaps unsurprising in a nation that was created in 1947 to safeguard the political, economic, and cultural interests of South Asian Muslims. The reliance on the moral forces of nationalism and religion, separately and in combination, reveal President Musharraf to be a nationalist in the tradition of twentieth-century Pakistani nationalist leaders such as Syed Ahmed Khan, Muhammad Iqbal, and Muhammad Ali Jinnah. As discussed previously, in order to rally popular support for the Pakistan Movement its secular nationalist leaders based their claims for a territorial Muslim homeland (Pakistan) on a shared Muslim identity (Islam). For Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan would be established on the basis of: one nation (Pakistan), one culture (Muslim), and one language (Urdu).³¹⁷ During his political tenure, Musharraf made frequent references to these leaders. Like the nationalist leaders before him, Musharraf relied upon religion in his political discourse to strengthen and legitimise his exhortations. Similarly, Musharraf also chose to privilege a monolithic homogeneous Islam as Pakistan's national identity. For the most part he, too, ignored the heterogeneous regional, ethnic, linguistic, and theological differences that exist amongst the Muslims of Pakistan. At this critical juncture, President Musharraf needed popular political support for the largely unpopular decision to support the United States in the 'war on terror'. His reliance on the ultimate moral forces of 'Pakistan' and a monolithic 'Islam' were intended to help him achieve this aim.

Discursive strategy: An appeal to history

In his national address of September 19, 2001, President Musharraf attempted to establish a link between the popular historical consciousness and the contemporary crisis in Pakistan in order to convince the public to support the decision for Pakistan to join the US-led coalition in the 'war on terror'. The following two extracts illustrate the dominant historical narratives President Musharraf invoked in this address to justify the unpopular decision.

We in Pakistan are facing a very critical situation. Perhaps as critical as the events in 1971. If we make the wrong decisions our vital interests will be harmed.³¹⁸

In the first extract, above, President Musharraf attempted to link the popular historical consciousness surrounding the events of 1971 to the crisis faced by Pakistan after 9/11. The short-lived but violent Indo-Pak war of 1971 came in the wake of increasing calls from the political leadership of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) for political independence from West Pakistan (now Pakistan). Crucially, the subsequent military defeat of West Pakistan marked the partial failure of the two-nation theory. As discussed in Chapter Two, this theory was first put forward by Syed Ahmed Khan in the nineteenth century and was the concept upon which Pakistan owes its existence. The two-nation theory was based on the assertion that South Asian Muslims constituted a nation, distinct and separate from the Hindus, with their

³¹⁷ Jaffrelot, 2002, p. 9.

³¹⁸ Islamabad Policy Research Centre, (accessed 4 May 2012).

own traditions, history, culture, and social organisation. This theory gradually crystallised into a demand for a separate Muslim nation within the wider anti-colonial Quit India campaign, and was translated into a political reality in 1947 with the creation of East and West Pakistan.

The success of the Pakistan Movement can primarily be attributed to the ability of nationalist leaders to effectively appeal to the ultimate moral forces in society: the idea of the nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam). However, nationalist leaders failed to reconcile the monolithic homogeneous identity they privileged (Pakistan/Islam/Urdu) with the rich diversity of South Asian Muslims and their corresponding multiple identity associations. This served to undermine the founding ideology of Pakistan as a homeland for all South Asian Muslims and as a model Muslim political nation. Two factors demonstrate this. First, rather than join their co-religionists in their newly established ideological homeland in 1947, many Muslims chose to remain in a predominantly Hindu India. Second, a mere two decades after independence, the Muslims of East Pakistan eventually chose to separate from their co-religionists in West Pakistan. Moreover, the resultant creation of Bangladesh was based on the privileging of specifically regional political, economic, and cultural interests, including the Bengali language and regional cultural traditions, over a monolithic religious identity (Islam). The events of 1971, therefore, form an essential part of the popular historical consciousness of Pakistani society.

We have to save our interests. Pakistan comes first, everything else is secondary. Some 'ulema' are trying to react on pure emotions. I want to remind them of Islam's early history. The move from Mecca to Medina (hijrat). Was this (God forbid) cowardice? This was wisdom to save Islam. Then when the Jews saw that Islam was getting stronger they started to conspire against the Muslims. When the Prophet (PBUH) saw this happening he signed a no war pact with his enemies in Mecca. I want to remind you of that pact. At the end of the pact, where his signature was required, the Meccans demanded that he cannot sign it as "Prophet Mohammed". The Prophet (PBUH) agreed. The Prophet explained later that its best for Islam, and it's the right thing to do. And time proved him right. Six months later there was a war with the Jews and the Meccans did not support the Jews and the Muslim forces won.³¹⁹

In the second extract, above, President Musharraf attempted to link an important juncture in the history of Islam to the contemporary crisis in order to justify the decision for Pakistan to support the United States in the 'war on terror'. In 622 AD, the Prophet Muhammad and his devotees migrated from the holy city of Mecca to Medina (City of the Prophet) to escape the religious persecution of the Meccans and to mediate between the warring Arab and Jewish tribes. This migration is known as the *hijrah* and it marks the beginning of the Muslim era in history. For the next thirty-nine years, Medina was the capital of the Islamic empire. Shortly after the *hijrah*, the Prophet Muhammad established the Medina Charter, or the Constitution of Medina, which was an agreement between all of the tribes and religious groups of Medina. The Charter was intended to solve the problem of social and political disunity in the region. It set out the fundamental principles upon which the region should be governed,

³¹⁹ Islamabad Policy Research Centre, (accessed 4 May 2012).

including methods for peaceful dispute resolution, the idea of an *ummah*, and the rights of non-Muslims. The Charter is considered to be the ultimate model for an ideal Muslim state.³²⁰ Six years after the *hijrah*, the Treaty of Hudaibiyah was formally ratified between the Prophet Muhammad (and the Muslims of Medina) and the Quraysh tribe of Mecca. The treaty signalled a ten-year suspension of hostilities between the rivals, and allowed Muhammad and his followers unhindered access to the holy Kabah in Mecca. According to Chrystie Flournoy Swiney, the 'forging of a mutually beneficial peace agreement with an enemy in the midst of an intense battle for power and territory is often upheld as an example of the Prophet's enduring patience, foresight, and ability to compromise'.³²¹

To illustrate to the people of Pakistan why they should support the decision for Pakistan to join the 'war on terror', President Musharraf chose to draw upon the popular perceptions within Pakistani society of a shared Islamic history. Paradoxically, it was a history that had its roots in a region situated firmly outside the territorial boundaries of Pakistan. Nevertheless, whilst Pakistan was founded as a territorial homeland for South Asian Muslims, it also shares a historical and ideological consciousness with the wider Muslim *ummah*. Moreover, Pakistan was originally intended to be the model of an ideal Muslim state. Although this was challenged in 1971 when Pakistan's east wing succeeded and became Bangladesh. Interestingly, President Musharraf attempted to link the early historical narrative, of the Prophet Muhammad's migration to Medina in 622, and the Treaty of Hudaibiyah to find a solution to its socio-political crisis, to Pakistan's own situation in the wake of 9/11. The Medina Charter resolved the crisis in Medina by setting out the fundamental principles upon which the region should be governed, including methods for peaceful dispute resolution, the idea of an *ummah*, and the rights of non-Muslims. Whilst the Treaty of Hudaibiyah enabled the Prophet Muhammad, and his Muslim followers, to make the pilgrimage to Mecca unimpeded. In making this link, President Musharraf was inferring that the political elite of post-9/11 Pakistan faced similar socio-political challenges. By drawing on the combined moral forces of nationalism and Islam, the message was that the decision for Pakistan to cooperate with the United States was taken to save Pakistan and, ultimately, to save Islam.

Discursive strategy: The construction of a negative 'Other'

In his national address of September 19, 2001, President Musharraf attempted to construct a negative 'Other' in order to convince the public to support the decision for Pakistan to join the US-led coalition in the 'war on terror'.

Lets look at our neighbors. They have promised US all cooperation. They want to isolate us, get us declared a terrorist state. They have met in Dushanbe with

³²⁰ F.E. Peters, 'Medina', *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World: Oxford Islamic Studies Online*, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com.ezproxy.uws.edu.au/article/opr/t236/e0525?_hi=1&_pos=, (accessed 10 April 2013).

³²¹ Swiney, C.F. 'Hudaibiyah, al-'. *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World: Oxford Islamic Studies Online*, <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com> (accessed 8 September 2013).

some other countries and plan to try and install anti Pakistani government in Afghanistan. So our neighbour is busy trying to harm us. If you see their television they are busy with propaganda against us.³²²

In the above extract, President Musharraf relied upon a combination of elements to construct a negative 'Other'. As discussed previously, the first and foremost moral force for Musharraf was nationalism. His construction of a negative 'Other', therefore, relied primarily on an appeal to nationalist sentiment. In the following examples, the negative 'Other' was presented to the public as such because it posed a danger to Pakistan: 'They want to isolate us, get us declared a terrorist state', '[They] are busy trying to harm us'. The 'Pakistan in danger' slogan is a familiar strategy and the message is clear: if Pakistan does not cooperate with the United States in the 'war on terror' it will be declared a 'terrorist state'. This was an outcome that the nation could ill afford. At best, Pakistan would, once again, be isolated from the international community and subject to military and economic sanctions. This, in turn, would adversely impact Pakistan's economy and, more importantly for the Pakistani administration, its foreign policy, which had for the most part been driven by strategic considerations with regards to India. At worst, Pakistan would be plunged into an unwinnable war against the United States.

Significantly, the negative 'Other' was not referred to directly in this extract. Instead, President Musharraf made an appeal to the nation's shared historical consciousness to reinforce his meaning. Indo-Pak relations had been less than favourable since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. In fact, the memory and trauma of partition is an extremely important part of the shared historical consciousness of both nations. Moreover, subsequent and frequent disputes between Pakistan and India since their separation into two nations had done little to reverse their mutual suspicion and hostility. Therefore, owing to the long history of animosity between the two nations, it was enough for President Musharraf to simply direct the public's attention to 'our neighbors [who have] promised US all cooperation'. When the Government of India offered to provide the United States with full support in the 'war on terror', it roused very real fears from within the Pakistani administration. Those fears undoubtedly prompted Musharraf to join the US-led anti-terrorism coalition, and were relied upon by him to construct a negative 'Other' in order to justify that unpopular decision.

To reinforce his message, President Musharraf stated: 'They have met in Dushanbe with some other countries and plan to try and install anti Pakistan government in Afghanistan'.³²³ Musharraf was referring to a meeting held in Dushanbe, the capital of the Republic of Tajikistan, in the wake of 9/11. Like Pakistan, Tajikistan had agreed to join the US-led coalition in the 'war on terror'. Strategically positioned on Afghanistan's northern border, the former Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic granted the United States access to its airspace from which the US could launch its offensive against the Afghan Taliban. The India-led

³²² *Islamabad Policy Research Centre*, (accessed 4 May 2012).

³²³ *Islamabad Policy Research Centre*, (accessed 4 May 2012).

meeting in Dushanbe was attended by an initiative comprising of representatives from India, Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and the Afghan Northern Alliance.³²⁴ The alliance, between Pakistan's long-term rival, India, and the India-backed Afghan Northern Alliance, was seen by the Pakistani administration as posing a grave threat to their strategic considerations.

In the late nineteenth century, the British put in place a 2,500 km-long border to separate British India from Afghanistan. This border, known as the Durand Line, separates Pakistan and Afghanistan. Both of these nations are home to large numbers of ethnic Pashtun or Pathan tribespeople. Conservative figures, owing to the political sensitivity of enumerating ethnicity in the region, have placed the Pashtun population of Pakistan at approximately fifteen per cent and the Pashtun population of Afghanistan at forty-two per cent.³²⁵ While the Durand Line officially separates the Pashtun community, the border is largely porous. According to historian Anatol Lieven, the Pashtun community forms a strong and, for the most part, united 'ethno-linguistic group with a very strong consciousness of common ethnic culture and identity [...] with an ancient ethnic code of behaviour (the *pashtunwali*)'.³²⁶ A large number of Pashtun tribesmen were trained in Sunni Deobandi *madaris* located in the Afghan-Pak border areas. Many joined the US-led anti-Soviet movement in the 1980s, with the support of President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. Moreover, Pashtun tribesmen formed the original base of the Taliban movement, which emerged as a political force in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. In Afghanistan, the Taliban's main rival was the US- and India-backed Northern Alliance, which comprised of ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazara Shi'a Muslims.

As discussed previously, the majority of Muslims adhere to the Sufi-inspired Barelvi tradition in Pakistan. It might safely be said, therefore, that they do not necessarily share the religio-political ideologies of the Afghan Taliban. What many Pakistanis do share is a strong ethnic kinship with their Pashtun brothers in Afghanistan. This is demonstrated by Pakistan's foreign policy which, prior to 9/11, took into consideration the interests of its large ethnic Pashtun community with regards to Afghanistan. Pakistan favoured a friendly Taliban ally on its western border, as a counter to a largely unfriendly neighbour on its eastern border. After 9/11, however, Pakistan was compelled to withdraw its support for the Afghan Taliban. What is clear in the above extract is President Musharraf's attempt to construct a negative 'Other', in the form of India and its ally the Afghan Northern Alliance, based on the inference that both posed a danger to Pakistan. This, in turn, was relied upon to further justify to the nation the unpopular decision to join the US-led 'war on terror' against Pakistan's former allies, the Afghan Taliban.

³²⁴ 'A Central Asian Initiative That Could Eliminate bin Laden', *New York Times*, 20 September 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/20/opinion/20iht-edray_ed3_.html, (accessed 29 April 2013).

³²⁵ *Central Intelligence Agency*, (accessed 28 May 2011).

³²⁶ Lieven, 2011, p. 1080.

3.3.2 Persuading the nation to support the domestic campaign against extremism

After 9/11, President Musharraf was compelled to make significant domestic reforms. On January 12, 2002, four months after the terrorist attacks on the United States, President Musharraf made a national address to the people of Pakistan. The purpose of the address was two-fold. First, Musharraf introduced the proposed Deeni Madaris (Voluntary Registration and Regulation) Ordinance (2002). Second, he announced a ban on five extremist organisations: Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Tehrik-e-Jaferia Pakistan (TJP), and Tanzim Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammad (TNSM). He placed a sixth organisation, Sunni Tehreek (ST), on a watch list. By way of justification, President Musharraf told the nation that the measures were necessary to 'rid the society of extremism, violence and terrorism and [...] to project Islam in its true perspective'.³²⁷

If Musharraf had concerns about his ability to persuade the nation to support these two policies then he had good reason. First, the Deeni Madaris Ordinance (2002) was contentious because it endorsed government reform of religious seminaries, which have long been important centres of social welfare in Pakistan. *Madaris* provide free education and accommodation for Pakistan's poorest children, particularly in the tribal areas where state-funded educational institutions are few in number. While President Musharraf recognised the important service these self-funded institutions provided, he argued that many graduates were entering society ill-equipped to compete successfully in the employment sector. Musharraf believed this was partly due to the lack of provision for mainstream subjects such as mathematics, science, and English. He noted that many *madaris* were funded by religious parties or groups and provided only religious education. Controversially, Musharraf said that such *madaris* 'produce only semi-literate religious scholars'.³²⁸ Moreover, he also said that some *madaris* 'promote negative thinking and propagate hatred and violence instead of inculcating tolerance, patience and fraternity'.³²⁹ As previously discussed, many of the Afghan mujahedeen, the Afghan Taliban, and the Pakistani cadres who fought alongside them, were trained in Deobandi *madaris* in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas.

Second, the decision to ban five extremist organisations, and place a sixth on a watch list, was also contentious in Pakistan. Two of the banned organisations were pro-Kashmiri liberation groups: Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). While it might safely be said that Musharraf did not share the religio-political ideologies of these groups he did, however, share their ideology with regards to Kashmir. For many Pakistanis, Kashmir has long been an essential part of the national historical consciousness. As discussed previously, Pakistan was carved out of the Muslim-majority areas in the east and west of the subcontinent. In 1947, the Hindu ruler of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, wavered in his

³²⁷ 'Address to the nation', *Islamabad Policy Research Centre*, 12 January 2002, <http://ipripak.org/journal/winter2002/doc11.shtml>, (accessed 4 May 2012).

³²⁸ *Islamabad Policy Research Centre*, (accessed 4 May 2012).

³²⁹ *Islamabad Policy Research Centre*, (accessed 4 May 2012).

decision to join the Indian Union or the Dominion of Pakistan, finally deciding on India. For India, Kashmir's accession to the Union represented the success of its secular, non-communal ideology. For Pakistan, because Kashmir was an integral part of its own national identity, its accession to India represented the partial failure of the two-nation theory. Kashmir Solidarity Day is an annual national holiday in Pakistan. On that day, Pakistan shows its solidarity and support for Muslims in Indian-administered Kashmir and what is regarded as their legitimate and principled struggle for self-determination. Prior to 9/11, Pakistan provided militant groups with moral, political, and diplomatic support in the struggle to liberate Kashmir from Indian control. The decision to ban these two extremist organisations after 9/11 marked a reversal of previous policy and left President Musharraf vulnerable to criticism that he was placing Pakistan's foreign policy above the nation's domestic interests.

To contextualise the January 12, 2002, national address, the anti-extremism, anti-sectarian, and anti-terrorism measures introduced by President Musharraf came not only in the wake of the terrorist attacks on New York, Washington D.C., and Pennsylvania but also followed other events that occurred outside Pakistan in the months after 9/11. On September 28, 2001, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1373, which endorsed the enforcement of strict anti-terrorism policies.³³⁰ On October 1, a car bomb was exploded at the main gate of the State Assembly building in Srinagar, the capital of Indian-administered Kashmir. According to the South Asian Terrorism Portal, Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) claimed responsibility for the attack in which three of their members were killed.³³¹ On December 13, the Indian Parliament building in New Delhi was attacked by a group of armed militants. The Indian government blamed Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) for the attack. The Government of Pakistan denounced the attack, denying any involvement. Shortly after the attack on the Indian Parliament, the Indian and Pakistani governments assembled troops on either side of the Line of Control in Kashmir, reigniting old tensions between the two nuclear-capable rivals. These events served to undermine the legitimacy of President Musharraf and Pakistan in the international arena. Pakistan was viewed as responsible for acts of violence committed by Pakistan-based militants on its western border in Afghanistan, and on its eastern border in India, and was widely considered a capricious ally in the 'war on terror'.

Domestically, President Musharraf faced a multitude of crises in legitimacy and authority. He was regarded as a self-appointed military leader heading an unelected and, therefore, undemocratic government. Musharraf was also widely criticised for capitulating to US pressure by aligning Pakistan with the US in the 'war on terror' being carried out in Afghanistan against the Taliban. This decision was opposed by many in Pakistan who

³³⁰ 'Resolution 1373 (2001)', *United Nations Security Council*, 28 September 2001, [http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/specialmeetings/2012/docs/United%20Nations%20Security%20Council%20Resolution%201373%20\(2001\).pdf](http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/specialmeetings/2012/docs/United%20Nations%20Security%20Council%20Resolution%201373%20(2001).pdf), (accessed 9 April 2013).

³³¹ 'Terrorists claim responsibility for terrorist attacks', *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/papers/Pakistan_report/Anex_D.htm, (accessed 15 May 2013).

considered the Afghan Taliban to be 'engaged in a legitimate war of resistance against foreign occupation'.³³² In addition, and under further pressure from the US and India, Musharraf's decision to ban two militant pro-Kashmiri liberation groups was opposed by many in Pakistan who considered their cause to be both legitimate and principled, including Musharraf himself. Within this context, the main aim of the January 12, 2002, national address was to convince the Pakistani public, en masse, to support the domestic anti-extremism, anti-sectarian, and anti-terrorism measures. However, this national address had a second audience. Under increased international scrutiny, particularly from the United States and India, President Musharraf would not have been unaware that his national address offered a forum in which to convince the global community that Pakistan was committed to the 'war on terror'. If he were successful in his exhortations, Musharraf would avoid damaging sanctions by the US and a war with India.

Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source

In his national address of January 12, 2002, President Musharraf relied upon a combination of strategies in order to convince the largely averse Pakistani public to support the proposed Deeni Madaris Ordinance (2002), and the ban on extremist organisations. First, President Musharraf appealed to the ultimate moral forces within Pakistan society: the idea of the nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam). The first and foremost moral force Musharraf chose to promote was nationalism.

We must remember that we are Pakistanis. Pakistan is our identity, our motherland. We be aliens outside Pakistan and be treated as aliens. Pakistan is our land. It is our soil, If we forsake it we will face difficulties. This lesson we must learn.³³³

In the above extract, President Musharraf appealed to a shared national consciousness in order to persuade the nation to support the controversial policies. Like the twentieth-century nationalist leaders before him, Musharraf privileged a territorial nationalism over cultural or religious nationalism, and citizenship over communalism. This is clear in the statements: 'We are Pakistanis', 'Pakistan is our identity, our motherland', 'We be aliens outside Pakistan', and 'Pakistan is our land. It is our soil'.

The objective was to take them [Ulema and Mashaikh] on board in our campaign against terrorism and extremism. These measures have been continuing since our government assumed office in 1999. I am explaining all this to you in great detail only because of the fact that the campaign against extremism undertaken by us from the very beginning is in our own national interest. We are not this under advice or pressure from anyone. Rather, we are conscious that it is in our national interest. We are conscious that we need to rid our society of extremism and this is being done right from the beginning.

³³² Lieven, 2011, p. 43.

³³³ Islamabad Policy Research Centre, (accessed 4 May 2012).

This domestic reforms process was underway when a terrorist attack took place against the United States on the 11th of September. This terrorist act led to momentous changes all over the world. We decided to join the international coalition against terrorism and in this regard I have already spoken to you on a number of occasions. We took this decision on principles and in our national interest. By the grace of God Almighty our decision was absolutely correct. Our intentions were noble and God Almighty helped us. I am happy to say that the vast majority of Pakistanis stood by this decision and supported us. I am proud of the realistic decision of our nation.³³⁴

Similarly, in the above extract, the appeal to a shared national consciousness is clear in statements such as: 'the campaign against extremism undertaken by us from the very beginning is in our own national interest', 'we are conscious that it is in our national interest', and 'we took this decision on principles and in our national interest'. In both extracts, President Musharraf relied upon the use of the pronouns 'we', 'us', and 'our' in order to construct national unity and identity. Because the ideological construction of nation, and of national identity, always coincides with the construction of difference, Musharraf employed a divisive strategy. President Musharraf and his supporters (we-group or in-group) were portrayed as acting in the national interest, whereas his opponents or rivals (they-group or out-group) were portrayed as acting against the national interest.

At the same time, President Musharraf appealed to a shared religious consciousness in order to give authority to his political exhortations. In the above extract, statements such as: 'I begin in the name of God, the most Beneficent, the most Merciful', 'My brothers and sisters, Pakistan is an Islamic Republic', 'By the grace of God Almighty', 'God Almighty helped us', 'Pakistan is the citadel of Islam', 'May God guide us to act upon the true teachings of Faith and Islam' are examples of this type of discursive strategy. As seen, pre- and post-independence political leaders in Pakistan frequently relied upon religion in order to rally popular support. Like the nationalist leaders before him, Musharraf privileged a monolithic homogeneous Islam persuade the nation to support the controversial policies. For the most part, he ignored the heterogeneous differences that exist amongst the Muslims of Pakistan.

3.3.3 Rallying the nation to non-violent action and socio-economic uplift

In the climate of extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism, what is apparent in this period are the early attempts of President Musharraf to encourage the people of Pakistan to form a unified community under a single national identity, interact peaceably, and progress socially and economically. As discussed, for Musharraf the formation of a coherent and cohesive national identity was central to the establishment of political legitimacy and hegemony without the need for physical force. He envisaged this would enable the government to focus on investing in much-needed social and economic development, which would then result in a peaceful and prosperous civil society. His aim was for Pakistan to become 'a progressive and dynamic Islamic Welfare State'.³³⁵ Musharraf believed that socio-economic

³³⁴ *Islamabad Policy Research Centre*, (accessed 4 May 2012).

³³⁵ *Islamabad Policy Research Centre*, (accessed 4 May 2012).

political strategy would help Pakistan avoid damaging sanctions by the US, a war with India, and reverse negative world opinion.

Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source

As discussed above, in his national address of January 12, 2002, President Musharraf relied on an appeal to a shared religious consciousness based on a monolithic Islam in order to convince the Pakistani public to support the proposed Deeni Madaris Ordinance (2002) and the ban on extremist organisations. At the same time, Musharraf also made a specific appeal to the moral and peace-building aspects found within Islam in order to rally the nation to non-violent action and socio-economic uplift. This was a new and salient feature of his political discourse from this point onward. Throughout his national address, President Musharraf reiterated that the people of Pakistan, and Pakistan itself, personified a number of essential values found within Islam, namely: 'love', 'tolerance', 'universal brotherhood', and 'peace'. These themes are not unfamiliar to Sufi philosophy. With its message of philosophical, spiritual, and social harmony, Sufism has often been interpreted as being inclusive, moderate, peaceful, and tolerant.

In Pakistan, the majority of Muslims belong to the Sufi-inspired Barelvi tradition. For Barelvi Muslims, love or devotion for the Prophet Muhammad is a particularly important theme. A devotee of the Prophet Muhammad is often referred to as an *ashiq-e-rasul* or a lover of the Prophet. Barelvi Muslims celebrate the Prophet Muhammad's birthday (*Eid Milad un-Nabi*). That day is an important public holiday in Pakistan, where people gather to recite *naat* or Sufi devotional poetry in veneration of the Prophet. *Naat* is also recited at *urs* celebrations to mark the death anniversaries of Sufi saints. Devotees of the Barelvi tradition believe that they are following 'true' Islam as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad by God and practiced by Muhammad, his companions, and Sufi saints. In the below extract, President Musharraf repeatedly relied on the moral force of 'true' Islam in order to appeal to the shared religious consciousness of the majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi population.

I [...] strived to project Islam in its true perspective. [...] I expect them [*Ulama*] to come forward and present Islam in its true light. [...] It is imperative we teach true Islam i.e. tolerance, forgiveness, compassion, justice, fair play, amity and love, which is the true spirit of Islam. [...] May God guide us to act upon the true teachings of Faith and Islam.³³⁶

As well as love for the Prophet Muhammad, and love for God (*Ishq-e-Haqiqi*), love of humanity (*Ishq-e-Majazi*) is another central aspect of the Barelvi tradition. As Mahmood Jamal puts it:

Since God is unseen and formless, most humans need to find him through his creation and through human love. In loving another human being one

³³⁶ Islamabad Policy Research Centre, (accessed 4 May 2012).

discovers the all-consuming power of love, while the astonishing beauty of the Beloved reduces the lover to a state of helpless abandon.³³⁷

Sufi poet-saints proclaimed their love of God, the Prophet Muhammad, and humanity as they disseminated the message of Islam to the people of the Indian subcontinent. To this day, Sufi saints are themselves beloved and revered by Barelvi Muslims throughout the subcontinent. When President Musharraf spoke of love of humanity as one of the essential values and peace-building aspects found within Islam, he was again appealing to the shared religious consciousness of the majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi population. The extract below provides one example of the way in which Musharraf relied upon the themes of 'love' and 'tolerance', in combination with an emphasis on 'true Islam', in order to rally the nation to non-violent action and socio-economic uplift.

We must rid the society of sectarian hatred and terrorism, and promote mutual love. [...] It is imperative that we teach true Islam i.e. tolerance, forgiveness, compassion, justice, fair play, amity and love, which is the true spirit of Islam. [...] If we want to normalise relations between Pakistan and India and bring love to the region, the Kashmir dispute will have to be resolved peacefully. [...] You must play an active role in solving the Kashmir dispute for the sake of lasting peace and love in the region. [...] and We should get rid of intolerance and hatred and instead promote tolerance and love.³³⁸

Discursive strategy: An appeal to history

In his national address of January 12, 2002, President Musharraf also attempted to establish a link between the popular historical consciousness and the contemporary crisis in Pakistan in order to justify the domestic reforms, and rally the nation to non-violent action and socio-economic uplift. The following two extracts illustrate the dominant historical narratives invoked by Musharraf.

When Islam was at its zenith, every discipline of learning, e.g. mathematics, science, medicine, astronomy and jurisprudence was taught at these institutions. Great Muslim luminaries such Al-Beruni, Ibn-e-Sina (Avesia) and Ibn-Khuldoon were the products of the same *madaris*. And if we study history, we see that from the 7th to the 15th century AD, transfer of technology took place from the Muslims to the rest of the world. Look at Muslims' condition today. Islam teaches us to seek knowledge, even if it involved travel to China. I am sure you are aware that the Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) had told prisoners of war in the Battle of Badr that they would be set free if each of them imparted education to ten Muslims. Quite obviously, this education could not have been religious education as the prisoners were non-Muslims. So the Prophet (Peace be Upon Him) was actually referring to worldly education. If we do not believe in education, are we following the teachings of Islam or violating them?³³⁹

In the first extract, above, President Musharraf highlighted an important event in the history of Islam. He recalled three prominent Muslim scholars who had received a *madaris*

³³⁷ M. Jamal, *Islamic Mystical Poetry*, Penguin Books, London, 2009, p. xx.

³³⁸ *Islamabad Policy Research Centre*, (accessed 4 May 2012).

³³⁹ *Islamabad Policy Research Centre*, (accessed 4 May 2012).

education but who went on to make important intellectual and academic contributions in non-religious fields. Abu Rayhan Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Biruni (al-Biruni) and Abu Ali al-Husayn ibn Abd Allah ibn Sina (Ibn Sina) were both prominent tenth-century Central Asian scholars, whilst Ibn Khaldun was a reputed fourteenth-century Tunisian scholar. Each of these scholars made valuable contributions in the fields of science, astronomy, mathematics, literature, philosophy, history, geography, jurisprudence, and medicine. Al-Biruni and Ibn Sina were both knowledgeable in theology, particularly Islamic theology, but their expertise was not limited to religion. These two scholars lived between the mid-eighth and mid-thirteenth centuries, a period widely considered a golden age in Islamic history. This era was contemporaneous with the Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258), in which many Muslim intellectuals made important scholarly contributions in various temporal fields. Thus, in order to justify his decision that *madaris* make provision for secular subjects such as mathematics, science, and English, President Musharraf attempted to link the popular historical consciousness surrounding the golden age in Islamic knowledge with the crisis faced by Pakistan in the sphere of education.

To further justify the controversial decision to regulate *madaris*, Musharraf highlighted another important event in the history of Islam. In 624 AD, two years after the Prophet Muhammad and his devotees migrated from the holy city of Mecca to Medina (City of the Prophet), Muhammad set out to intercept a Meccan camel train laden with merchandise. At the oasis of Badr, Muhammad and his forces converged with Meccan forces that were sent to protect the camel train. The ensuing battle, known as the Battle of Badr, is widely considered to mark the beginning of the spread of Islam as a political force, a religion, and a culture.³⁴⁰ The victory at the Battle of Badr has since become entrenched in the historical consciousness of Pakistani Muslims. The Kargil conflict of 1999, for example, was code-named 'Operation Badr'.³⁴¹ What Musharraf chose to emphasise in his re-telling of the Battle of Badr narrative was the legend of the non-Muslim prisoners of war who were offered their freedom in return for teaching ten Muslims to read and write. By placing importance on the secular teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, President Musharraf was attempting to justify the controversial domestic reforms.

Have we forgotten the example of the Holy Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) where Islam was spread by virtue of his personal conduct, true leadership and that is how changes in the world took place at that time. We have forgotten the teaching of revered personalities of Islam like Hazrat Data Ganj Bakhsh, Hazrat Lal Shahbaz Qalandar, Fareed Ganj Shakar, Baha-uddin-Zakria etc. Was Islam spread by them through force and coercion? No. They preached Islam by personal example. I give these examples because it hurts me to see where we have relegated ourselves now. We must restore that status of Madaris to what it originally was. We have to change the state of affairs and take them on the path of improvement.³⁴²

³⁴⁰ H. Ziad, 'Battle of Badr', *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World: Oxford Islamic Studies Online*, <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com>, (accessed 28 October 2011).

³⁴¹ 'Kargil: between dreams, realities and nightmares', *Daily Times*, 7 February 2013, <http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/editorial/07-Feb-2013/comment-kargil-between-dreams-realities-and-nightmares-dr-mohammad-taqi>, (accessed 18 November 2014).

³⁴² *Islamabad Policy Research Centre*, (accessed 4 May 2012).

In the second extract, above, President Musharraf invoked the personal example of the Prophet Muhammad in order to persuade the public to support the domestic campaign against extremism, and rally the nation to non-violent action and socio-economic uplift. Many Muslims believe that the Prophet Muhammad represents the epitome of ethical and spiritual virtue on earth, and his personal example serves as a worldly source of inspiration at both a *batin* and *zahir* level. The inner and outer aspects of Islam characterise, on the one hand, the achievement of a greater awareness of God and, on the other hand, the adherence to Islamic legal obligations and norms. As discussed in Chapter One, Sufism is widely considered the inner or esoteric aspect of Islam, concerned with matters of the soul and the attainment of a more profound understanding of the divine. In Sufism, the Prophet Muhammad is regarded as the ultimate source of divine wisdom. Over time, spiritual masters have passed this divine wisdom to their disciples through an unbroken chain of transmission (*silsila*).

Also in the above extract, President Musharraf invoked the personal example of four prominent Sufi saints to support his call for non-violent action and socio-economic uplift. Hazrat Data Ganj Bakhsh, Hazrat Lal Shahbaz Qalandar, Hazrat Baba Farid, and Hazrat Baha-ud-din Zakariya are all renowned poet-saints. Their shrines, which are located in the Punjab and Sindh, attract hundreds of thousands of devotees from across the nation. These saints are particularly venerated for their role in disseminating Islam in the subcontinent. As discussed in Chapter One, Sufi saints popularised Sufism through Sufi hagiographical texts and narratives, Sufi shrines and retreats, and charismatic spiritual leaders and their hereditary successors. Sufism also became accessible to a greater number of people through popular practices such as remembrance, listening, poetry, and music. Essentially, Sufi saints appealed to local communities in ways that the high culture of Islam could not. These popular poet-saints, with their poetry written and sung in the local vernacular, were able to transcend high Islamic culture and bring Islam to the masses. There is much scholarly literature on the moral, peace-building, and integrative aspects of the Sufi tradition in the Indian subcontinent. Consequently, Sufism is often considered an important force for religious and communal harmony.

Discursive strategy: The construction of a negative 'Other'

In his national address of January 12, 2002, President Musharraf also attempted to construct a negative 'Other' in order to justify domestic reforms, and rally the nation to non-violent action and socio-economic uplift. The following two extracts illustrate the dominant narratives used by Musharraf to create a negative 'Other' in the minds of the people of Pakistan.

These measures [against religious extremism] have been continuing since our government assumed office in 1999. I am explaining all this to you in great detail only because of the fact that the campaign against extremism undertaken

by us from the very beginning is in our own national interest. We are not this under advice or pressure from anyone. Rather, we are conscious that it is in our national interest. We are conscious that we need to rid our society of extremism and this is being done right from the beginning.³⁴³

In the first extract, above, President Musharraf relied upon an appeal to nationalist sentiment. In this narrative, the negative 'Other' was presented as negative because it posed a distinct threat to Pakistan. This is demonstrated in statements such as: 'the campaign against extremism [...] is in our own national interest. [...] We are conscious that it is in our national interest'. Once again, President Musharraf made repeated use of the pronouns 'our', 'us', and 'we' to construct national unity and identity. President Musharraf and his supporters (in-group) were portrayed as acting in the national interest, whereas his opponents or rivals (out-group) were portrayed as acting against the national interest. The reliance, too, on the familiar 'Pakistan in danger' slogan served to further delineate between the in-group and the out-group. At the same time, Musharraf took the opportunity to reinforce his own political legitimacy and authority by claiming that the anti-extremism, anti-sectarian, and anti-terrorism measures were not new but had been 'continuing since our government assumed office in 1999'. In the face of widespread criticism for capitulating to US pressure to join the 'war on terror', Musharraf asserted that his policies were taken in the 'national interest' rather than 'under pressure or advice from anyone'.

Ever since I assumed office, I launched a campaign to rid the society of extremism, violence and terrorism and strived to project Islam in its true perspective. In my first speech on October 17, 1999, I had said and I quote: "Islam teaches tolerance, not hatred, universal brotherhood, not enmity, peace and not violence. I have a great respect for the Ullema and expect them to come forward and present Islam in its true light. I urge them to curb elements which are exploiting religion for vested interests and bringing a bad name to our faith".³⁴⁴

In the second extract, above, President Musharraf emphasised the moral force of religion in order to give authority to his political exhortations. In this narrative, the negative 'Other' was presented as negative because it posed a distinct threat to 'true' Islam as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad by God and practiced by Muhammad, his companions, and Sufi saints. Statements such as: 'I [...] strived to project Islam in its true perspective', 'Islam teaches tolerance, not hatred, universal brotherhood, not enmity, peace and not violence', and 'I have a great respect for the Ullema and expect them to come forward and present Islam in its true light' demonstrate President Musharraf's attempt to appeal to the moral force of religion. In this instance, Musharraf avoided a monolithic Islam. Instead, he placed emphasis on the moral and peace-building aspects found within Islam in order to appeal to the shared religious consciousness of the majority Sufi-inspired Bareilvi population.

At the same time, President Musharraf employed a divisive strategy in order to construct a negative 'Other'. As discussed, the ideological construction of nation, and of national

³⁴³ *Islamabad Policy Research Centre*, (accessed 4 May 2012).

³⁴⁴ *Islamabad Policy Research Centre*, (accessed 4 May 2012).

identity, always coincides with the construction of difference. In this national address, President Musharraf and his supporters (in-group) were portrayed as acting in accordance with 'true' Islam, whereas his opponents (out-group) were portrayed as acting against 'true' Islam. The latter is demonstrated in the statement: 'I urge them [ulama] to curb elements which are exploiting religion for vested interests and bringing a bad name to our faith'. In addition, the negative aspects of the out-group were emphasised through the use of pejorative words such as 'extremism', 'sectarianism', 'terrorism', and 'violence'. At the same time, the negative aspects of the out-group were contrasted with the positive aspects of the in-group. Approbatory words such as 'tolerance', 'universal brotherhood', 'peace', and 'non-violence' were used to emphasise the positive aspects of the in-group. The underlying message was that the majority of Pakistanis are tolerant, integrative, non-violent, and peaceable.

Discursive strategy: An appeal for unification behind the legitimate power source

In his national address of January 12, 2002, President Musharraf made an appeal for unification behind the ultimate moral forces by presenting various incentives and rewards. The motivating sources Musharraf relied upon were closely tied to the ultimate moral forces within Pakistani society: the idea of the nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam). In his attempt to restore 'national cohesion', 'strengthen the federation', and remove 'inter-provincial disharmony', Musharraf adopted a hybrid appeal to both temporal and spiritual rewards. As discussed previously, in the climate of extremism and violence, Musharraf believed that the formation of a coherent and cohesive national identity was central to the establishment of political legitimacy and hegemony without the need for physical force. He envisaged this would enable the government to focus on investing in much-needed social and economic development, which would then result in a peaceful and prosperous civil society. His aim was for Pakistan to become 'a progressive and dynamic Islamic Welfare State'.³⁴⁵

Don't forget that Pakistan is the citadel of Islam and if we want to serve Islam well, we will first have to make Pakistan strong and powerful. There is a race for progress among all nations. We cannot achieve progress through a policy of confrontation and feuds. We can achieve progress through human resource development, mental enlightenment, high moral character and technological development. I appeal to all my countrymen to rise to the occasion. We should get rid of intolerance and hatred and instead promote tolerance and love.³⁴⁶

In the above extract, the construction of a collective present and future for the citizens of Pakistan was not only dependent on an economic and political utopian strategy, but was also contingent upon the social and moral development of Pakistani society. In this national address, President Musharraf used a number of different narratives to encourage the people of Pakistan to form a unified community under a single national identity, interact peaceably, and progress socially and economically.

³⁴⁵ Islamabad Policy Research Centre, (accessed 4 May 2012).

³⁴⁶ Islamabad Policy Research Centre, (accessed 4 May 2012).

The question is what is the correct path? First of all, we must rid the society of sectarian hatred and terrorism, and promote mutual love. Remember that mindsets cannot be changed through force and coercion. No idea can be forcefully asserted on anyone. Maybe the person changes outwardly but minds and hearts can never be converted by force. Real change can be brought about through personal example, exemplary character and superior intellect. It can be brought about by Haqooq-ul-Ibad (Obligation towards fellow beings).³⁴⁷

In the above extract, as in the aforementioned extract, President Musharraf focused on the ethical and peace-building aspects found within Islam in his appeal to the community for unity and peace. The appeal for unity and peace is particularly evident in the question to the Pakistani public: 'what is the correct path'. Significantly, the word 'path' is often used in Sufi phraseology. As discussed in Chapter One, the Sufi path is the means by which an individual can draw nearer to God, or achieve a greater awareness of the divine. The Sufi path is generally concerned with an individual's spiritual growth, which combines correct behaviour and correct belief. In the above extract, President Musharraf reasoned that the violence and hatred that existed within society could only be reversed through 'mutual love', 'personal example', 'exemplary character', and 'superior intellect'. For Barelvi Muslims, these character traits are epitomised in the Prophet Muhammad, who is regarded as the embodiment of spiritual and ethical virtue on earth and the ultimate source of divine wisdom. Moreover, for Barelvi Muslims, these qualities are also a distinguishing characteristic of Sufi saints, many of whom were renowned for their virtuous behaviour, knowledge, and their peaceful dissemination of Islam in the Indian subcontinent. Societal change, Musharraf argued, would be achieved through *huquq al-ibad* (obligations towards fellow beings). Fundamental to this concept is not only a basic notion of human rights but also love for humanity, which is a central aspect of the Barelvi tradition, and which allows for cooperation and respect beyond narrow religious or sectarian boundaries.³⁴⁸

I feel that in addition to Haqooq Allah (Obligation to God), we should also focus on Haqooq-ul-ibad (Obligations towards fellow human beings). At schools, colleges and Madaris, obligations towards fellow human beings should be preached. We know that we have totally ignored the importance of correct dealings with fellow human beings. There is no room for feuds in Islamic teachings. It is imperative that we teach true Islam i.e. tolerance, forgiveness, compassion, justice, fair play, amity and love, which is the true spirit of Islam. We must adopt this. We must shun negative thinking.³⁴⁹

Similarly, in the above extract, President Musharraf relied on two dominant narratives as a means by which to eliminate exclusivism and discrimination from Pakistani society. In the first narrative, President Musharraf reiterated the importance of *huquq al-ibad* for Pakistani

³⁴⁷ Islamabad Policy Research Centre, (accessed 4 May 2012).

³⁴⁸ It should be noted that whilst the notion of love for humanity is a central aspect of Barelvi tradition, which allows cooperation beyond sectarian boundaries, Barelvi Muslims have displayed long-standing antipathy towards Muslims from other traditions in Pakistan. For example, Barelvi Muslims deem followers of the Deoband and Ahle-Hadith traditions to be heretics because they do not show proper veneration of the Prophet Muhammad. Similarly, Barelvi Muslims consider followers of the Ahmadi tradition *kafir* for their failure to believe that the Prophet Muhammad was the last prophet and messenger of God. Barelvi Muslims were active participants in the sectarian anti-Ahmadi riots of 1953, and supported the call for Ahmadi Muslims to be declared non-Muslim and removed from all government positions.

³⁴⁹ Islamabad Policy Research Centre, (accessed 4 May 2012).

society. This is clear in the statements: 'we have totally ignored the importance of correct dealings with fellow human beings' and 'there is no room for feuds in Islamic teachings'. In this, Musharraf made an appeal to the community to practice love for humanity in order to eliminate exclusivism and discrimination. Again, the emphasis was on building national unity by appealing to the moral and peace-building aspects within Islam. However, Musharraf was careful not to neglect *huquq Allah* (obligation to God) in his exhortations. In the second narrative, President Musharraf linked the concept of *huquq al-ibad* with 'true' Islam as it was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad by God, and practiced by the Prophet, his companions, Sufi saints, and the majority Barelvi community. This is clear in the statement: 'it is imperative that we teach true Islam i.e. tolerance, forgiveness, compassion, justice, fair play, amity and love, which is the true spirit of Islam'.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates that, in the years immediately following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, President Musharraf attempted a fundamental transformation of existing social, economic, and political conditions in Pakistan. 9/11 proved to be an important turning point in Pakistan's history. Domestically, President Musharraf faced a multitude of crises in political legitimacy and authority. Only two years previously, he had overthrown the democratically elected government in what he referred to as a 'counter-coup' and appointed himself the dual role of chief executive of Pakistan and chief of army staff. As a result, Musharraf was regarded as a self-appointed military leader heading an unelected and, therefore, undemocratic government. At the same time, he was widely criticised for capitulating to US pressure by aligning Pakistan with the United States in the 'war on terror' being carried out in Afghanistan against the Taliban. The events of 9/11, and the subsequent attacks on the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, which saw many of its members taking refuge in Pakistan, dramatically amplified the nation's domestic issues. Moreover, Pakistan's economy was dangerously fragile, with the nation suffering high levels of unemployment, poverty, social inequality, and foreign debt. Ordinary citizens also faced a deteriorating law and order situation as a result of rising militancy, extremism, and religious intolerance and violence.

Internationally, Pakistan experienced rising negative perceptions after 9/11. Western audiences, amidst media reports of ongoing terrorism in a nuclear-capable Pakistan, together with the nation's internal instability and dependence on international aid, increasingly viewed Pakistan as authoritarian, intolerant, and regressive. The failure of government efforts to overcome internal disunity, religious intolerance and violence, implement effective governance, and achieve socio-economic growth and development exacerbated negative world opinion. At the same time, a number of events served to further undermine the legitimacy of President Musharraf and Pakistan in the international arena. Pakistan was viewed as responsible for acts of violence committed by Pakistan-based militants on its western border, in Afghanistan, and on its eastern border, in India, and was widely considered a capricious ally in the 'war on terror'.

The largely unpopular decision to join the US-led coalition in the 'war on terror' was based primarily on pragmatic considerations. President Musharraf recognised that Pakistan was too weak militarily, economically, and socially to risk having the United States as an adversary. In his words, Pakistan lacked 'the homogeneity to galvanize the entire nation into an active confrontation'.³⁰⁰ Instead, Musharraf attempted to rally popular support for non-violent action and socio-economic uplift within Pakistan. Musharraf reasoned that the formation of a coherent and cohesive national identity was central to the establishment of political legitimacy and hegemony without the need for physical force. He believed this would enable the government to focus on investing in much-needed socio-economic development, which would result in a peaceful and prosperous civil society and, in turn, reverse negative world opinion of Pakistan. The following chapter demonstrates how President Musharraf expanded his discourses of peace by appealing to a specific type of territorial nationalism, in combination with a moderate Islam, in a period of increased religious conservatism.

³⁰⁰ Musharraf, 2006, p. 202.

4 President Musharraf and the formation of the National Council for the Promotion of Sufism, 2005 – 2008

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter demonstrated how President Musharraf attempted to construct an enlightened and moderate identity for the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The particular focus of that chapter was to show how, in the climate of terrorism and extremism, Musharraf attempted to rally popular support for non-violent action and socio-economic uplift. Using a combination of strategies found within the 'call to arms' genre, rather than persuade people to go to war, Musharraf aimed to encourage the people of Pakistan to form a unified community under a single national identity, interact peaceably, and progress both socially and economically. He did so by appealing to a specific type of territorial nationalism in conjunction with a moderate Islam.

This chapter takes a similar approach. It critically analyses the political language of President Musharraf, and his supporters, during the latter half of his nine-year political tenure. The specific focus of this chapter is to show how Musharraf attempted to redefine the Islamic Republic of Pakistan through the lens of Sufism. Advancing his strategy of 'Enlightened Moderation', President Musharraf increasingly privileged Sufism as the ultimate moral authority within Pakistani society. His aim was the socio-economic uplift of Pakistani citizens, and the creation of an enlightened and moderate identity for Pakistan. The increased official preference for Sufism is most clearly demonstrated by the establishment of the National Council for the Promotion of Sufism in the latter half of 2006. However, actively resisting the state-sanctioned version of Islamic piety were religiously conservative Muslims, committed to the primacy of a narrowly conceived Islamic system of governance in Pakistan. In this period, tensions between groups advocating for an Islamic state and groups advocating for a moderate Muslim nation were revealed in a number of debates and agitation concerning the place of Islam in state and society. These, sometimes violent, contestations over the role of Islam in the state and society raised doubts as to whether Pakistan really was a moderate Muslim nation as President Musharraf and his supporters contended.

4.2 Historical events, the expansion of discourses of moderation, and oppositional discourses

Despite the early attempts of President Musharraf to encourage the people of Pakistan to form a unified community under a single national identity, interact peaceably, and progress both socially and economically by appealing to a specific type of nationalism in combination with a moderate Islam, a number of events served to undermine his discourses of moderation. For the first time in Pakistan's history a coalition of religious parties, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), won the provincial elections in the North West Frontier

Province (NWFP) and Balochistan.³⁰¹ The MMA was able to form a government in the NWFP and a coalition government in Balochistan. Despite their considerable theological differences, these religious parties were able to unite on an anti-US platform. The MMA aimed at implementing a more narrowly conceived Islamic system of governance in Pakistan. For the HRCP the success of the MMA in the October 2002 elections reflected the 'increased orthodoxy' in the country.³⁰² Paradoxically, the MMA alliance included the JUP; a political party largely considered moderate because it represents the interests of the majority Barelvi community. Also surprisingly, the Musharraf-led PML-Q joined forces with the MMA to form a coalition government in Balochistan.

Six months after the MMA came to power it announced its decision to establish Islamic law in the NWFP. The Shari'a Act was tabled in the Provincial Assembly in May 2003 and unanimously adopted in June. In December the following year the MMA organised anti-government rallies in cities across Pakistan to protest against the government's decision to remove the religion column from passports. The MMA argued that, because Pakistan had been created in the name of Islam, the decision to remove the religion column was an attack on both Islam and Pakistan. Conversely, civil rights groups argued that the religion column equated to religious discrimination, and would cause sectarian violence, damage relations with neighbouring countries, and spoil Pakistan's image. This debate continued into 2005 and became conflated with wider criticism of President Musharraf's decision to join the US-led 'war on terror', as well as his decision to continue in the role of chief of army staff. Conservative religious groups became increasingly anti-US and anti-government in their political rhetoric in this period. The controversy surrounding the religion column in passports, particularly the tensions between the government and conservative religious groups over the issue, raised the question of whether Pakistan really was a moderate Muslim nation as President Musharraf contended.

Amidst the renewed controversy surrounding Pakistan's national identity, with religious leaders once again claiming that Pakistan was intended to be an Islamic state, President Musharraf intensified his campaign to promote a 'soft image' of the beleaguered nation. Musharraf was supported in his endeavours by other political actors who reproduced the official construction of an enlightened and moderate identity for Pakistan and its citizens by drawing on aspects of Sufi tradition. English-language newspapers in Pakistan played a very important role in reproducing this new political consciousness and extending it to a wider audience.³⁰³ In 2005, for example, newspapers began publicising the *urs* of Sufi saints, as well as government participation in ritual ceremonies at Sufi shrines. National news

³⁰¹ The coalition of religious parties in the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) comprised of: Jamaat-e-Islami (JI); the Barelvi Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP); the Deobandi Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-S); the Deobandi Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F); the Shi'a Islami Tehreek Pakistan (ITP); the Wahhabi Jamiat Ahle-Hadith (JA); and the Shi'a Tehreek-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP).

³⁰² Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, *State of Human Rights in 2002*, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Lahore, 2003, p. 2.

³⁰³ Data comprised of newspaper articles and editorials from private and independent English-language newspapers including the Daily Times, Dawn, The Friday Times, Frontier Post, The News, Newsweek Pakistan, and Pakistan Observer.

coverage also included reportage and commentary on various activities and themes concerning Sufism. From this point onward, a space was created in which Sufism became an important subject of debate, particularly with regard to its ability to unify the nation, arrest religious violence, and reconcile religious difference. However, a space was also created in which opposing discourses attempted to counter the state-sanctioned discourse concerning whose Islam, the place of Islam, and Islam's role in the state and society. Notably, the PIPS in Islamabad reported a gradual rise in the number of attacks on Sufi shrines after 2005.³⁵⁴ The increased rise in targeted attacks on Sufi shrines is one physical example of the way in which the construction of a Sufi identity, and of who is and who is not a 'true' Muslim, was contested in Pakistan.

4.2.1 The religion column in passports controversy

In Pakistan, tensions between proponents of a state-sanctioned moderate Islam and the discourse of religious groups, one advocating for a progressive democratic Muslim nation, the other in favour of an Islamic state, were revealed in various domestic and international debates and agitation concerning the place of Islam in the state and society. In the opening months of 2005 the religion column in passports controversy dominated the headlines in the Pakistani print media. The debate began in late 2004 following the government's decision to exclude the column that specified the holder's religion from passports in order to comply with global standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The religion column was first included in passports at the behest of President Zia-ul-Haq as part of his policy to implement an Islamic system of governance in Pakistan. The decision to remove the religion column from passports was a firm reversal of this earlier policy and an important part of President Musharraf's strategy to create an enlightened and moderate identity for Pakistan and its citizens.

Proudly proclaimed to international audiences as an innovative philosophy, President Musharraf first announced the theory of 'Enlightened Moderation' in his address at the 58th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York in September 2003. It was then presented and adopted at the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Summit in Putrajaya, Malaysia, the following month. According to Samina Yasmeen, Enlightened Moderation was promoted by President Musharraf as the preferred identity for Pakistani Muslims. She writes:

Carving out a place along the spectrum of moderation and extremism, Pakistan was to be both enlightened and moderate. It was a value that Pakistanis, as well as Muslims globally, needed to aspire to.³⁵⁵

Designed to 'build love, promote moderation, oppose extremism, and ensure justice', Enlightened Moderation was a two-part strategy aimed at the social and economic uplift of

³⁵⁴ *Pak Institute of Peace Studies*, 25 May 2011, (accessed 14 September 2011).

³⁵⁵ Yasmeen, 2013.

the entire Muslim *ummah*.³⁵⁶ Part of his strategy was to reverse the tendency of non-Muslim nations to equate Islam with terrorism, as well as to engender an understanding between Muslim and non-Muslim nations to avoid a so-called 'clash of civilisations'.³⁵⁷ His strategy also aimed at protecting religious minorities in Pakistan and putting an end to religious discrimination and violence to achieve socio-economic uplift. Despite the efforts of President Musharraf to reorient Islam, Anatol Lieven writes that Enlightened Moderation was 'never systematically developed or implemented'.³⁵⁸ More critically, Najam Sethi, editor of *The Friday Times*, wrote that President Musharraf had failed to reverse the ubiquitous state political culture that promotes extremism in Pakistan. Sethi argued that this was a direct result of a Faustian bargain between the military and the mullahs.

In Pakistan, the military's Faustian bargain involved exchanging control of religion, education and culture with the mullahs for their support to the state's 'regional' objectives as well as to the army's requirement of blocking the development of a democratic, accountable and representative political system in which civilian supremacy is the norm rather than the exception.³⁵⁹

Addressing the United Nations General Assembly, Musharraf said:

Islam is a faith of peace, love and justice. Islam is democracy in action. It upholds human rights, social equality, non-discrimination, freedom of speech. The protection of minorities is an article of faith in Islam. It does not discriminate on the basis of colour, caste, creed or religion. Our Faith is dynamic, promoting constant renewal and adaptation, through the process of *Ijtihad* (or interpretation through consultations), Islam's vision is not trapped in any one period of history; it is modern and futuristic. Islam must not be confused with the narrow vision of a few extremists.³⁶⁰

Opposition to the decision to remove the religion column from passports came primarily from religiously conservative groups in Pakistan. However, some members of the Musharraf-led PML-Q also criticised the decision to remove the column from passports. PML-Q President Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain was critical of the decision and promised religious groups that the column would be restored to passports. The main leaders of the pro-religion column movement, the MMA, called for a nation-wide 'black day' to be observed on January 14, 2005, to protest against the government's decision. Reporting on the demonstration held in Lahore, the *Daily Times* stated:

³⁵⁶ 'Address by H.E. General Pervez Musharraf President of Pakistan at the 58th Session of the UN General Assembly', *United Nations Security Council*, 24 September 2003, <http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/pakeng030924.htm>, (accessed 4 May 2012).

³⁵⁷ An article entitled 'The Clash of Civilizations?' by Samuel P. Huntington was first published in the summer 1993 issue of the *Foreign Affairs* journal. Huntington's theory contended that future divisions and conflicts between civilisations would be cultural and religious.

³⁵⁸ Lieven, 2011, p. 178.

³⁵⁹ N. Sethi, 'Fate of 'enlightened moderation'', *The Friday Times*, 18 June 2004, <http://www.najamsethi.com/fate-of-enlightened-moderation/>, (accessed 8 September 2015).

³⁶⁰ *United Nations Security Council*, (accessed 4 May 2012).

MMA leaders vowed that no one would be allowed to take the country towards secularism. They warned the government of tough resistance if it did not add religion column in machine-readable passports.³⁶¹

Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source

The MMA relied upon a combination of strategies found within the 'call to arms' genre to counter the official discourse. To legitimise their own position, as well as to rally popular support behind their call to protect Pakistan's Islamic identity from what they saw as a move by the government to secularise the nation, the MMA appealed to the ultimate moral forces within society: the idea of the nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam). The MMA privileged a monolithic homogeneous Islam to construct national unity and national identity. However, theirs was a self-styled orthodox version of Islam, which placed greater emphasis on adherence to the Qur'an and the Sunnah alongside a more systematic application of Shari'a law. The dominant narrative was that Pakistan had been created in the name of Islam and the government's decision to eliminate the religion column was both an attack on Pakistan and an attack on Islam. This view is reflected in a statement by Hafiz Hussain Ahmed of the MMA who said that the move was 'an attempt to secularize Pakistan and strip it of its Islamic identity'.³⁶²

As discussed previously, nationalism and religion are the most important moral forces in Pakistan. This dates back to the early twentieth century when calls for the creation of a nation to safeguard the political, economic, and cultural interests of the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent were first voiced. At the same time, there were a number of Muslims who took a pluralistic approach to nationalism and were strongly opposed to the creation of Pakistan. These Indian-nationalist Muslims believed that Pakistan would be harmful for Muslims. They argued that the creation of a territorial nation-state was contradictory to the idea of an *ummah* and that such a nation, established and administered as a secular state, would actually be un-Islamic.³⁶³ Once Pakistan had been achieved, some Indian-nationalist Muslims migrated to Pakistan and began agitating for a stronger role for Islam in the state and society. The tensions that appeared in 1947, between groups committed to the primacy of Islam in the state and those committed to the ideal of a broadly democratic Muslim nation, remain unresolved in Pakistan today and repeatedly reappear in debates that trigger sometimes violent contestations over Pakistan's identity.

Discursive strategy: The construction of a negative 'Other'

In order to legitimise their demands to have the religion column restored to Pakistani passports the MMA relied upon a strategy of demonisation in their political discourse. The

³⁶¹ 'MMA anti-Musharraf rally in Lahore: MMA leader plans anti-govt campaign', *Daily Times*, 15 January 2005, <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk>, (accessed 10 April 2012).

³⁶² 'Pakistan: Religion Restored to Passports', *The New York Times*, 25 March, 2005, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/07/international/asia/07pakistan.html>, (accessed 27 March 2012).

³⁶³ Jalal, 1985.

rhetorical device of disparaging the 'enemy' is typical in political discourse that is aimed at justifying policy. This is particularly true when policy is contentious, as in the case of the religion column in passports where MMA demands to have the column restored drew widespread disapprobation from the government, civil rights groups, and the international community. The approach of the MMA, therefore, was to positively present their own position to the nation and negatively present the position of the government. They did so by appealing to the ultimate moral forces within society: the idea of the nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam). The MMA's construction of a negative 'Other' was one that was closely tied to and which, crucially, posed a distinct threat to Pakistan and Islam. The below extract from the Daily Times provides one example of the way in which the MMA relied upon an appeal to nationalist and religious sentiment to justify their own position and persuade the Pakistani public to help pressure the government into reversing its decision to remove the religion column from passports.

The Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) on Friday observed a countrywide black day against President General Pervez Musharraf for not shedding his military uniform and the government's decision to eliminate the religious column from the passport. MMA leaders vowed that no one would be allowed to take the country towards secularism. They warned the government of tough resistance if it did not add religion column in machine-readable passports.³⁶⁴

In the above narrative the MMA's construction of a negative 'Other' was rather wide and included the Musharraf-led government and anyone who wished to 'secularise' Pakistan. An all-encompassing negative 'Other' was presented to the Pakistani public as negative on the basis that it posed a distinct threat to Pakistan and, most importantly, to its Islamic identity. This is demonstrated in the statement: 'no one would be allowed to take the country towards secularism'. This view is also reflected in a comment by Qazi Hussain Ahmad of the JI, one of the coalition parties in the MMA religious alliance. Ahmad led the pro-religion column and anti-government demonstration in Lahore. In what he saw as a move to 'secularise' Pakistan by 'anti-state elements and people who were promoting western policies in the name of national development', Ahmad was reported to have vowed that the JI would not allow the government to exclude the religion column.³⁶⁵ In both of these examples, the reliance on the familiar 'Pakistan in danger' and 'Islam in danger' rhetoric was intended to negatively present the policy of the out-group, which acts against the national interest. It was also intended to positively present the policy of the in-group, which acts in the national interest. Here, the MMA negatively presented the Musharraf-led PML-Q government and anyone who wished to 'secularise' Pakistan as the out-group working against the interests of the nation by trying to divest it of its Islamic identity. In contrast, the MMA presented themselves as the in-group working for the good of the nation by trying to implement an Islamic system of governance in Pakistan in-line with its identity as an Islamic state.

³⁶⁴ *Daily Times*, 15 January 2005, (accessed 10 April 2012).

³⁶⁵ *Daily Times*, 15 January 2005, (accessed 10 April 2012).

At the same time, the religion column in passports controversy and the attendant debate over Pakistan's identity was conflated with wider criticism of President Musharraf's decision to continue in the role of chief of army staff. The Daily Times reported:

Addressing the protestors, Qazi said the MMA would not accept the army's involvement in the presidency and politics. "We will not accept the supremacy of Army over the Constitution, parliament and democracy," he said, adding that Musharraf had become controversial both as the president and the chief of Army staff after he violated his earlier pledge to step down as the army chief by December 31, 2004. He said the MMA would launch a street-to-street anti-Musharraf campaign after Eidul Azha.³⁶

The above extract illustrates the dominant narrative used by the MMA to further reinforce President Musharraf as a negative 'Other' in the minds of the Pakistani people. It is demonstrated in the statement: 'we will not accept the supremacy of Army over the Constitution, parliament and democracy'. In this example, Musharraf was negatively presented as not only attempting to divest Pakistan of its Islamic identity but as a self-appointed military leader heading an unelected and, therefore, undemocratic government. Conversely, the MMA positively presented themselves in favour of a constitutional parliamentary democratic system of governance for Pakistan, albeit as an Islamic state. The dominant narrative was that the MMA was acting in the national interest by supporting the democratic process.

A further narrative was that the MMA was acting in accordance with international norms, whereas President Musharraf was not. Pakistan was readmitted into the Commonwealth of Nations in May 2004 following its suspension in the wake of the military coup of 1999, which was deemed as constituting a serious breach of CMAG's central political principles. At the time of the suspension, CMAG called for Musharraf's military administration to set a deadline for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. President Musharraf was also urged to relinquish his military position. However, despite guarantees that he would step down as chief of army staff, by December 31, 2004, Musharraf had failed to do so.³⁷ The pro-democracy anti-military narrative was quite powerful in the contemporaneous context and was used by the MMA and various opposition parties to challenge the Musharraf administration.

4.2.2 Building a soft image of Pakistan through a discourse on Sufism and oppositional voices

Amidst the debates surrounding the religion column in passports controversy, and the concomitant struggle over Pakistan's contested identity, President Musharraf embarked on a campaign to create a soft image of the nation. On February 1, 2005, Musharraf formally

³⁶ *Daily Times*, 15 January 2005, (accessed 10 April 2012).

³⁷ The MMA was not the first party to oppose the military administration of President Musharraf. The Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) was formed in opposition to military rule under President Musharraf following the coup of 1999. The ARD was a multi-party alliance led by Pakistan's two major mainstream opposition parties, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N) and the PPP. It aimed to restore democracy to Pakistan.

inaugurated the National Academy of the Performing Arts (NAPA).³⁶⁸ Housed in the historic Hindu Gymkhana building in Karachi, NAPA was Pakistan's first performing arts academy, established to provide tertiary education in music, dance, and drama. The formation of NAPA was an important part of President Musharraf's socio-economic policy, one aspect of which was to build a soft image of Pakistan by presenting a culturally rich alternative to the image of Pakistan as a place of terrorism and extremism. Another aspect was to promote tourism, sports, and culture in Pakistan in order to develop the domestic tourism industry and hence strengthen the nation's economy.³⁶⁹

Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source

As part of his campaign to promote a soft image of Pakistan, both domestically and internationally, President Musharraf relied upon an appeal to the ultimate moral forces within Pakistani society: the idea of the nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam).

It is unfortunate that Pakistan's image abroad has been tarnished so badly that the world associates it only with terrorism and extremism. Many people think of our society only as intolerant and regressive. However much we plead that the vast majority of Pakistan is moderate and that only a fringe element is extremist - and that our national fabric has been damaged by the turbulence to our west in Afghanistan and to our east in Kashmir, not by anything inherent within our borders and society - the message does not get across. I have therefore tried to project a truer image of Pakistan, which I call a soft image, through the promotion of tourism, sports, and culture.³⁷⁰

In the above extract, President Musharraf repeatedly appealed to a shared national consciousness in order to project the nation as moderate and enlightened. This is demonstrated in his statements: 'Pakistan's image abroad has been tarnished', 'the vast majority of Pakistan is moderate', and 'our national fabric has been damaged'. Musharraf explained that the international community blamed Pakistan for the acts of violence committed by Pakistan-based militants in Afghanistan and in Kashmir. Further, he asserted that this negative image not only undermined Pakistan's reputation but hampered government efforts to revive the economy and restore investor confidence.³⁷¹

At the same time, President Musharraf also relied upon Islam to give moral authority to his political exhortations. At the inauguration of NAPA, Dawn Newspaper reported:

The President expressed the hope that the academy would carry forward the genius of Ustad Salamat Ali, Ustad Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan, melody queen Noor Jehan and unmatched Ghazal singer Mehdi Hasan.³⁷²

³⁶⁸ 'President envisions Pakistan's soft image - Art academy inaugurated', *Dawn*, 2 February 2005, <http://archives.dawn.com/2005/02/02/nat25.htm>, (accessed 27 March 2012).

³⁶⁹ Musharraf, 2006.

³⁷⁰ Musharraf, 2006, p. 318.

³⁷¹ *Pakistani.org*, <http://www.pakistani.org>, (accessed 4 May 2012).

³⁷² *Dawn*, 2 February 2005, (accessed 27 March 2012).

In the above extract, President Musharraf avoided a monolithic Islam in his attempt to convince the nation and the international community that being enlightened and moderate was an intrinsic part of Muslim culture in Pakistan. Instead, he relied on an appeal to the shared religious consciousness of the majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi population. This is evident in his praise of Ustad Salamat Ali, and Ustad Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan. Musharraf credited these renowned *qawwals* (Sufi devotional singers) with having popularised *qawwali* to audiences not only in Pakistan but internationally. Typically, a *qawwali* performance is a spiritual expression aimed at drawing listeners nearer to God through popular practices such as remembrance and listening. These spiritual gatherings often take place at Sufi shrines on the death anniversaries of saints. The lyrics sung by the *qawwals* are drawn predominantly from Sufi poetry, which has a long history in the Indian subcontinent. Notably, it was the popularity of the early poet-saints with their poetry and their songs written and sung in the local vernacular that enabled them to transcend high Islamic culture of the *ulama* and bring Islam more readily to the masses.

To further reinforce his message, President Musharraf went on to say that theatre, drama, and music 'are the cultural features of any civilised society'.³⁷³ This statement, together with his specific mention of Sufi devotional singers, reflects the preferred official notion of what it means to be a Muslim in contemporary Pakistani society. As discussed previously, the majority Barelvi community consider Sufism to be a crucial part of Islamic tradition, as well as an essential feature of Pakistan's heritage and culture. Thus, Musharraf chose to present a utopian vision of 'civilised society' made up of moderate Muslims who visit Sufi shrines and listen to Sufi devotional music. By inference, these Muslims were deemed to be acting in the national interest. Conversely, followers of the Deoband and Ahle-Hadith traditions, who are vehemently opposed to aspects of Sufi belief and tradition such as singing and dancing, were deemed not only uncivilised but also anti-state.

Attempts by President Musharraf to create a soft image of the nation, in the eyes of the nation and internationally, were undermined the month after his formal inauguration of NAPA. On March 19, 2005, a bomb was exploded at the shrine of Pir Syed Rakheel Shah in the Jhal Magsi Kachhi district of Balochistan. PIPS reported that forty people were killed and fifteen were injured in the attack.³⁷⁴ The shrine attracts both Sunni and Shi'a Muslims. Between 10,000 and 20,000 pilgrims had gone to the shrine for the annual *urs* festival and were congregating for their evening meal when the bomb exploded.³⁷⁵ The townspeople of Jhal Magsi announced that they would observe three days of mourning.³⁷⁶ HRCP reported that three members of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) had claimed responsibility for the attack. The SSP is a Sunni sectarian organisation, which was established in Jhang district (Punjab) in 1985. The South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) states that the main aim of the SSP

³⁷³ *Dawn*, 2 February 2005, (accessed 27 March 2012).

³⁷⁴ *Pak Institute of Peace Studies*, 25 May 2011, (accessed 14 September 2011).

³⁷⁵ '35 killed in Balochistan shrine blast', *Daily Times*, 20 March 2005, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_20-3-2005_pg1_5, (accessed 9 March 2011).

³⁷⁶ '25 killed in blast at Balochistan shrine', *Dawn*, 20 March 2005, <http://archives.dawn.com/2005/03/20/top1.htm>, (accessed 15 May 2012).

was to have Pakistan declared a Sunni state. It also states that one of its founders, Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, was a follower of the Sunni Deoband tradition.³⁷⁷ The SSP was one of the five extremist organisations banned by President Musharraf on January 12, 2002, as part of his measures to 'rid the society of extremism, violence and terrorism and [...] to project Islam in its true perspective'.³⁷⁸

In this period, national English-language newspapers in Pakistan increased their coverage on the subject of Sufism alongside official efforts to promote a soft image of the nation. Print media attention focussed on the presence of government officials, and their participation in religious and social-welfare activities, at Sufi shrines. Media attention also focussed on the *urs* festivals of prominent Sufi saints, Sufi conferences and seminars, Sufi music and arts festivals, and Sufi literature and film. This coverage reveals two things. First, the ways in which the Government of Pakistan attempted to construct a soft image of the nation by drawing on aspects of Sufi tradition. Second, how other political actors, specifically the media, discursively reproduced the state-sanctioned construction of a national Sufi identity.

Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source

On April 12, 2005, the Pakistan Times reported the upcoming *urs* of Bari Imam:

ISLAMABAD: The centuries-old ceremonies of the Urs of great spiritualist and saint Hazrat Bari Imam [RA] will begin at Noorpur, close to the capital city of Islamabad on Sunday, May-22. The ceremonies, which shall be attended by the followers of Hazrat Shah Abdul Latif, popularly known as Hazrat Bari Imam [RA] from all-over Pakistan and even from abroad, will continue till Thursday, May-26. Islamabad District Administration and Auqaf Directorate has started to make all the necessary arrangements for the sanctified event.³⁷⁹

The above extract illustrates a number of narratives the Government of Pakistan wished to popularise amongst the people of Pakistan, and which were typical of that reproduced in English-language newspapers in this period. Characteristically, two ultimate moral forces, the idea of the nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam), were privileged in combination. The shrine of Shah Abdul Latif Kazmi (1617-1705), or Bari Imam as he is more popularly known, is located on the outskirts of Islamabad, Pakistan's capital. Bari Imam is the patron saint of Islamabad and the Islamabad Capital Territory Administration, Auqaf Directorate, directly administers his shrine.³⁸⁰ Rather than present the *urs* as a regional event, the newspaper article emphasised it as being of national importance. This is clear in the assertion that the *urs* ceremonies will attract pilgrims from 'all-over Pakistan and even from abroad'. What is apparent in this statement is the attempt to build a shared religio-national consciousness

³⁷⁷ 'Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan', *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/ssp.htm>, (accessed 14 February 2014).

³⁷⁸ *Islamabad Policy Research Centre*, (accessed 4 May 2012).

³⁷⁹ 'Urs of Hazrat Bari Imam [RA] begins on May-22', *Pakistan Times*, 12 April 2005, <http://pakistanimes.net>, (accessed 14 June 2011).

³⁸⁰ In Pakistan, auqaf directorates or departments are directly responsible for maintaining and regulating shrines, dargahs, mosques, and other properties that have been dedicated for religious or charitable purposes. For an excellent discussion of the Government of Pakistan's policies towards Sufism, with specific reference to the management of waqf properties in the post-independence period, see, Ewing, 1983.

within Pakistani society by drawing on aspects of Sufi tradition. An important underlying theme, alongside the government's need to define the ideology of the state, was the need to claim political legitimacy and religious authority in terms of Islam. Both were achieved by means of control of Sufi shrines, and by linking the administration to Islam by way of the Sufi tradition. This is clear in the statement: 'Islamabad District Administration and Auqaf Directorate has started to make all the necessary arrangements for the *sanctified* [emphasis added] event.'

Discursive strategy: An appeal to history

As discussed previously, an essential element of persuasive political discourse is the close association between the exhortations of political actors and the shared historical consciousness of the public, whether real or imagined. In the article in the Pakistan Times on April 12, a number of dominant historical narratives were invoked. One narrative aimed to promote the historical importance of the *urs* ceremonies at the shrine. This is clear in the statement: 'The centuries-old ceremonies of the Urs of great spiritualist and saint Bari Imam [RA] will begin at Noorpur'. The implication was that the 'sanctified' traditions that take place at the shrine of Bari Imam have a long and renowned history in Pakistan. Moreover, continuity with the nation's valued past flows from devotion to Bari Imam and his shrine. Another historical narrative aimed to promote the important role Bari Imam played in bringing Islam to the Indian subcontinent in the seventeenth century.³⁸¹ According to the article, Bari Imam was a 'great preacher' who 'travelled through South Asia spreading Islam'.³⁸² In order to invoke a shared national historical consciousness, rather than a narrowly defined regional identity, particular emphasis was placed on the role of the saint in the widespread conversion of the population throughout the subcontinent.

Thieves and outcasts occupied Noorpur Shahan village at the edge of Islamabad. While travelling through the area, the great saint [...] was stunned by the habits of those living among the natural beauty of the Margalla Hills. He decided to stay and teach the people about Islam.³⁸³

At the same time, emphasis was placed on the saint's purported success at conversion through his own exemplary belief and behaviour. In the above extract, when Bari Imam encountered 'thieves and outcasts' in the Margalla Hills region, located at the foothills of the Himalayas, and north of Islamabad, he made the decision to 'stay and teach the people about Islam'. The inference was that Bari Imam holds an esteemed place in the nation's history because of the peaceable manner in which he and other Sufi saints were said to have brought Islam to the subcontinent. Moreover, Islam, with its message of philosophical, spiritual, and social harmony, then, as now, serves as an example with which to encourage the people of Pakistan to interact peaceably and develop socially.

³⁸¹ For an interesting discussion of the major scholarly theories of conversion to Islam in the subcontinent, see, R.M. Eaton, 'Approaches to the Study of Conversion to Islam in India', in *Approaches to Islam in Religious Studies*, R.C. Martin, University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1985, pp. 106-123.

³⁸² *Pakistan Times*, 12 April 2005, (accessed 14 June 2011).

³⁸³ *Pakistan Times*, 12 April 2005, (accessed 14 June 2011).

Five days after the Pakistan Times reported on the upcoming *urs* of Bari Imam, print media attention turned towards an event that was taking place at another venerable Sufi shrine. However, this shrine was not in Pakistan but more than one thousand kilometres away in neighbouring India. President Musharraf arrived in India on April 17, 2005, to meet with the prime minister of India, Manmohan Singh (r. 2004-2014). The meeting was part of a three-day diplomatic visit aimed at improving relations between Pakistan and India, particularly on the issue of Kashmir.³⁸⁴ The official twenty-member delegation from Pakistan included President Musharraf, his wife Sehba Musharraf, Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri, Information Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed, and the High Commissioner to India Aziz Ahmed Khan. The first stop on this official visit to India was the shrine of saint Muinuddin Hasan Chishti (d. 1236) in Ajmer (Rajasthan). President Musharraf's visit to the shrine, and his preference for Sufism generally, reflects a number of recurring themes such as the use of religion for national integration and religious legitimacy, as well as the use of religion for moral and peace-building purposes.

As discussed in Chapter Two, the Chishtiyya order was one of three prominent Sufi orders in the subcontinent in the thirteenth century. Muinuddin Chishti, whose genealogy is traced from the Prophet Muhammad, is regarded as the founder of the Chishti order. His shrine at Ajmer Sharif is one of the most popular Sufi shrines in India and is renowned for the special prominence given to 'love', 'tolerance', and 'brotherhood', as practiced and advocated by its founder. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Islam, Muinuddin Chishti:

Freely adopted local Indian practices into his order, including the use of music in Sufi rituals, which then became an important point of contact between Muslims and the indigenous people of India. His tomb in Ajmer is one of the most popular shrines in northwestern India, visited by Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus, and Christians alike.³⁸⁵

In his memoirs, President Musharraf wrote that he first planned to visit the 'highly revered' shrine of Muinuddin Chishti in July 2001 following the historic Agra Summit between himself and the former Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee (r. 1998-2004). However, the much hoped-for visit did not take place. Four years later, President Musharraf finally had the opportunity to pray at the historic thirteenth-century shrine.³⁸⁶ As a mark of respect, the custodians of the shrine performed the *dastar-bandi* or turban-tying ceremony, tying a pink turban around the head of the president. The *dastar-bandi* ceremony is normally carried

³⁸⁴ The dispute over Kashmir dates from 1947, when British India was partitioned and the former princely state was divided into Indian-administered Kashmir (Jammu and Kashmir) and Pakistan-administered Kashmir (Azad Jammu and Kashmir or AJK). India and Pakistan both claim sovereignty over the entire region. The 2005 talks were the first since the historic Agra Summit of 2001, in which the leaders of India (Prime Minister Vajpayee) and Pakistan (President Musharraf) failed to reach an agreement on Kashmir.

³⁸⁵ 'Chishti, Muin al-Din Muhammad'. *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam: Oxford Islamic Studies Online*, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com.ezproxy.uws.edu.au/article/opr/t125/e430?_hi=0&_pos=1, (accessed 5 March 2014).

³⁸⁶ The previous month, President Musharraf's rival, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, accompanied her husband Asif Ali Zardari on a personal visit to Ajmer Sharif where they both prayed and gave thanks for Mr Zardari's release from prison. Ms Bhutto was a devout follower of Muinuddin Chishti and had made several visits to the shrine, including a visit in 2003 to pray for Zardari's release from prison.

out when the hereditary spiritual and custodial responsibilities are passed down from a *sajjada nashin* to his successor. In the case of Musharraf, the ceremony symbolically marked his allegiance to the shrine. Gifts were exchanged. Musharraf was presented with a book of verses about the Sufi saint, as well as two ceremonial *chador* (sheet or veil) to be draped over shrines in Pakistan. Musharraf presented the shrine's custodians with a green velvet ceremonial *chador* and a calligraphed prayer that he had brought with him from Pakistan. Musharraf later wrote in his memoirs that he considered the visit to the Sufi shrine to be 'an auspicious beginning' to the diplomatic talks between the two nations.³⁸⁷ Notably, his visit coincided with *Fateha Chatti Sharif*, which takes place on the sixth day of each lunar month, and begins with a recitation of the Qur'an.

However, attempts by President Musharraf to create a soft image of the nation, and encourage the people of Pakistan to interact peaceably, were undermined on May 27, 2005, when a bomb was exploded at the shrine of Shah Abdul Latif Kazmi. The Bari Imam shrine is located near the diplomatic enclave in Islamabad, a short walk from the prime minister's residence. The attack came only two months after the attack on the shrine Pir Syed Rakheel Shah, in the Jhal Magsi Kachhi district of Balochistan. The much-publicised *urs* had drawn thousands of pilgrims to the shrine for a week of festivities and celebrations in honour of the saint. Dawn newspaper estimated that between eight thousand and ten thousand Shi'a and Sunni pilgrims had congregated at the shrine for the annual *urs* festival.³⁸⁸ The explosion occurred as Shi'a Muslims gathered for the Majlis-e-Aza, a special religious gathering held to commemorate the death of Hussain ibn Ali at the battle of Karbala. According to PIPS, twenty-five people were killed and one hundred people were injured.³⁸⁹ Reports of the attack reached international audiences. The United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan condemned the attack, saying he was 'outraged by repeated targeting of civilians at their place of worship'.³⁹⁰ Speaking to journalists in Karachi, Musharraf strongly condemned the attack.

President Gen Pervez Musharraf condemned the bomb blast at the shrine of Bari Imam here on Friday and appealed to people to join hands with the government in ridding the society of extremism. The president expressed deep sense of shock and sorrow at the loss of lives and said it was everyone's responsibility to eradicate extremism.³⁹¹

As discussed in the previous chapter, after 9/11 President Musharraf embarked on a campaign to prevent extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism, and to promote Islam in its 'true perspective'.³⁹² However, he faced a multitude of crises in legitimacy and authority. Musharraf was regarded as a self-appointed military leader heading an unelected and,

³⁸⁷ Musharraf, 2006, p. 300.

³⁸⁸ 'Suicide blast at shrine: 20 killed', *Dawn*, 28 May 2005, <http://archives.dawn.com/2005/05/28/top1.htm>, (accessed 27 March 2012).

³⁸⁹ *Pak Institute of Peace Studies*, 25 May 2011, (accessed 14 September 2011).

³⁹⁰ 'Annan condemns blast', *Dawn*, 28 May 2005, <http://archives.dawn.com/2005/05/28/top16.htm>, (accessed 27 March 2012).

³⁹¹ 'Joint efforts urged to eradicate extremism', *Dawn*, 28 May 2005, <http://archives.dawn.com/2005/05/28/top2.htm>, (accessed 25 May 2012).

³⁹² *Islamabad Policy Research Centre*, (accessed 4 May 2012).

therefore, undemocratic government. He was also widely criticised for capitulating to US pressure and aligning Pakistan with the US in the 'war on terror' being carried out in Afghanistan against the Taliban. The attack on the Bari Imam shrine in May, and on the Pir Syed Rakheel Shah shrine two months previously, served to reinforce the need for strong anti-terrorism measures in Pakistan.

Discursive strategy: The construction of a negative 'Other'

In order to convince the Pakistani public to support him in his campaign to eradicate extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism, President Musharraf relied upon a combination of familiar strategies which were directly associated with the ultimate moral forces within society: the idea of the nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam). First, Musharraf attempted to construct a negative 'Other'. In this strategy, the negative 'Other' was presented as harmful because it posed a distinct threat to the ultimate moral forces in society: Pakistan and Islam. Difference was constructed by way of a polarising strategy of positive 'us'-presentation and negative 'Other'-presentation. The implication was that the in-group (Musharraf and his supporters) was acting in the national interest whereas the out-group (his opponents) was acting against the national interest.

[President Musharraf] said Pakistan could achieve fast-paced socio-economic development if the entire nation made concerted efforts and proved with its actions that "we are a moderate Islamic country. Therefore, I appeal to all Pakistanis, each and every individual, that they should stand up against extremism; they should stop if they see anyone trying to incite hatred, publish and spread hate material or misuse the mosque for provoking hatred." He said police alone would not be able to contain extremism until the entire nation came forward with pro-active efforts.

The president said he could not say definitely at this stage whether the attack was an act of some extremist organization or sectarian violence or result of some rivalry. "But if this is a sectarian incident, I am deeply saddened. Pakistan should practise moderation in accordance with teachings of Islam so that we are able to achieve the goals of socio-economic development. This can only be possible if we show moderation and the world sees us as a moderate Islamic nation. Otherwise, it will be extremely difficult to materialize development at desired pace."³⁹³

The above extract illustrates the dominant narratives used by Musharraf to create a negative 'Other' in the minds of the Pakistani people. For Musharraf, the negative 'Other' was presented as anyone who posed a threat to Pakistan's religious identity. In this, his construction of a negative 'Other' was rather wide and included extremists and sectarianists. The use of pejoratives such as 'extremism', 'sectarianism', and 'violence' in President Musharraf's political discourse served to delineate the negative aspects of the out-group. In this narrative, 'anyone trying to incite hatred, publish and spread hate material or misuse the mosque for provoking hatred' was not acting in accordance with the principles of a 'moderate Islamic nation'. Similarly, the negative 'Other' was presented as anyone who

³⁹³ *Dawn*, 28 May 2005, (accessed 25 May 2012).

threatened Islam as practiced by the majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi community in Pakistan. In this narrative, Sufi shrines were emblematic of Islam's moderation and religious tolerance. This is clear in his repeated use of various forms of the word moderate in his discourse: 'we are a moderate Islamic country', 'practice moderation in accordance with teachings of Islam', and 'a moderate Islamic nation'. Thus, the in-group was acting in accordance with 'true' Islam as it was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, and practiced by the Prophet, his companions, Sufi saints, and the majority Barelvi community, whereas the out-group was acting against Islam.

Discursive strategy: An appeal for unification behind the legitimate power source

Second, to convince the nation to support the anti-extremism, anti-sectarian, and anti-terrorism measures, as well as to encourage people to interact peaceably, President Musharraf appealed for unification behind the ultimate moral forces in society: the idea of the nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam). In his attempt to rid Pakistani society of extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism, and project a moderate Islam, as part of his wider campaign to project a soft image of Pakistan, President Musharraf made his appeal based primarily on temporal rewards. As discussed in the previous chapter, in October 1999 President Musharraf overthrew the democratically elected government of Pakistan in a military coup. In the address to the nation, Musharraf cited the socio-economic underdevelopment of the nation to justify the need for military intervention. At that time, Pakistan's economy was dangerously fragile and the nation suffered high levels of unemployment, poverty, social inequality, and foreign debt. Musharraf told the nation that his main political focus was to work towards national cohesion, socio-economic development, good governance, and democracy for Pakistan. Musharraf also revealed the seven-point program he planned to implement as leader of Pakistan. The program was designed to overcome internal disunity, put an end to religious intolerance and violence, and implement effective governance to achieve socio-economic growth and development.

Pakistan could achieve fast-paced socio-economic development if the entire nation made concerted efforts and proved with its actions that "we are a moderate Islamic country". "Therefore, I appeal to all Pakistanis, each and every individual, that they should stand up against extremism."

"Pakistan should practise moderation in accordance with teachings of Islam so that we are able to achieve the goals of socio-economic development. This can only be possible if we show moderation and the world sees us as a moderate Islamic nation. Otherwise, it will be extremely difficult to materialize development at desired pace."³⁰⁴

In the above extract, President Musharraf directly linked 'moderate Islam' with the socio-economic development of Pakistan. This was in keeping with Gramsci's hegemony paradigm, whereby political actors appeal to the dominant ideologies or cultural norms within society in their political discourse to establish ideological control over that society by

³⁰⁴ *Dawn*, 28 May 2005, (accessed 25 May 2012).

means of acquiescence rather than physical force. This then allows for effective revenue extraction, and economic development, which ultimately results in a peaceful and prosperous civil society. Crucially for President Musharraf, the construction of a collective present and future for the citizens of Pakistan was dependent on an economic and political utopian strategy. Musharraf believed that the formation of a coherent and cohesive national identity, based on a 'moderate Islam', was central to the establishment of political legitimacy and hegemony without the need for physical force. He envisaged this would enable the government to focus on investing in much-needed social and economic development, which would then result in a peaceful and prosperous civil society.

4.2.3 The Hisba Bill (2005)

On July 14, 2005, the NWFP Provincial Assembly unanimously passed the Hisba Bill. The Hisba or Accountability Bill was an extension of the Shari'a Act, which was adopted by the MMA-led NWFP Government in 2003. The Hisba Bill permitted the supervision of the implementation of Shari'a Law by a *mohtasib* (ombudsman). Supporters of the bill, Muslims who wished to embed Islam more firmly in the state and society, described it as 'a first step towards establishment of a society based on Islamic principles'.³⁶⁵ Detractors of the Hisba Bill, such as Pakistan's minority religious groups, were fearful that the implementation of the Bill, with its emphasis on gradually establishing Islamic values across society, would have damaging consequences for them. In its annual report, HRCP described the bill as follows:

The bill envisaged the creation of what could be called a parallel administration/judiciary presided over by a Provincial Mohtasib enjoying immense powers. The ombudsmen were to be authorized to monitor adherence to moral values of Islam at public places, eliminate honour killings, swara and beggary, move against ostentatious and wasteful expenses in marriage and against child labour and hoarding and corruption, or any other matter suggested by the advisory councils headed by the ombudsmen themselves. No court could interfere with the working of the Mohtasib system. The ombudsmen were to be provided with police force required to enable them to achieve their purpose.³⁶⁶

Dawn newspaper ominously reported that the Hisba Bill was passed with a majority vote from the MMA-led provincial government. The two major mainstream opposition parties, the Pakistan Muslim League (N) and the Pakistan Peoples Party, offered little or no protest against the controversial bill. According to the article, MMA Provincial Assembly Members 'raised slogans of Allah-o-Akbar' after the bill was passed.³⁶⁷ The following month, President Musharraf filed Reference No. 2 of 2005 in the Supreme Court of Pakistan in order to ascertain whether the bill was in accordance with the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1973).³⁶⁸ The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that certain sections of the bill were

³⁶⁵ 'NWFP PA passes Hasba bill', *Dawn*, 15 July 2005, <http://archives.dawn.com/2005/07/15/top1.htm>, (accessed 27 March 2012).

³⁶⁶ Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, *State of Human Rights in 2005*, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Lahore, 2006, p. 19.

³⁶⁷ *Dawn*, 15 July 2005, (accessed 27 March 2012).

³⁶⁸ 'Reference by the President of Pakistan under Article 186 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973', *Supreme Court of Pakistan*, 18 August 2005,

ultra vires (beyond the powers) of the constitution. It was the opinion of the court that sections of the bill were 'vague, over broad, unreasonable, based on excessive delegation of jurisdiction, denying the right of access to justice to the citizens and attempting to set up a parallel judicial system'.³⁹⁸ The Supreme Court directed the Governor of the NWFP not to assent to the Hisba Bill in its present form.

4.2.4 London bombings

The passage of the controversial Hisba Bill by Pakistan's first elected coalition of religious parties, the MMA, in the face of little to no resistance from opposition members, served to further undermine the efforts of President Musharraf to create a soft image of Pakistan. What is more, its passage came a week after London suffered four coordinated suicide bomb attacks on its transport system at the close of the morning peak-hour rush. Three bombs were detonated on the London underground (Liverpool Street, Edgware Road, and Kings Cross stations) and one on a bus in Tavistock Square. More than seven hundred people were injured and fifty-two were killed.³⁹⁹ One of the bombers was of Jamaican origin who moved to Britain with his mother; both converted to Islam in 2000. The other three bombers were second-generation British-born Muslims whose parents were of Pakistani origin. The ancestry of those three bombers prompted much media speculation as to the possible role of Pakistani contacts and/or Al-Qaeda in the planning, preparation, and execution of the bombings. British Prime Minister Tony Blair firmly requested that President Musharraf 'curb extremists and radical madrassas in the wake of the London bombings of 7 July'.⁴⁰⁰ A Home Office report later found that, whilst two of the bombers, Siddique Khan and Shazad Tanweer, did visit Pakistan, it was unclear as to whether they received any logistical support from their contacts there. The report also found no clear evidence to support claims that the bombers received support from Al-Qaeda during their visits to Pakistan. However, the report did state that 'the target and mode of attack of the 7 July bombings are typical of Al Qaida and those inspired by its ideologies'.⁴⁰²

Following the attacks of 7/7, the widespread speculation regarding Pakistani involvement in the bombings, and the request from Prime Minister Tony Blair that stronger steps be taken to eradicate extremism, President Musharraf was compelled to make significant domestic reforms. On July 21, 2005, Musharraf made a national address to introduce new anti-terrorism measures. Under these measures: banned organisations were not permitted to operate under new names, there were to be no unlicensed weapons or their display in

http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/File/CJD_Reference%20by_the_President_of_Pakistan_under_Article_186.pdf, (accessed 8 March 2014).

³⁹⁹ *Supreme Court of Pakistan*, 18 August 2005, (accessed 8 March 2014).

⁴⁰⁰ 'Historical Disasters - London bombings 2005', *Australian Government, Attorney-General's Department, Australian Emergency Management Institute*, <http://www.em.gov.au/library/Onlineresources/Historicaldisasters/Pages/HistoricalDisastersLondonbombings2005.aspx>, (accessed 8 March 2014).

⁴⁰¹ 'Madrassa foreigners must leave', *BBC News*, 29 July 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4728643.stm, (accessed 8 March 2014).

⁴⁰² 'Report of the official account of the bombings in London on 7th July 2005', *Gov. UK, Home Office*, 11 May 2006, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228837/1087.pdf, (accessed 8 March 2014).

public, there were restrictions on inflammatory material, including hand-bills, journals, papers, pamphlets, audio-video cassettes and their writers, publishers, and distributors, extremist and banned organisations were not permitted to collect donations, hate sermons were not permitted in places of worship, and all *madaris* were to be registered by December 2005.⁴⁰³ By way of justification, President Musharraf told the nation that the measures were necessary to rid society of extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism, and to project Islam in its 'true' perspective.

If Musharraf had concerns about his ability to persuade the nation to support these controversial policies, then he had good reason. Opposition to his anti-terrorism policies came predominantly from the coalition of religious parties, the MMA. Leaders of the MMA, President Qazi Hussain and Secretary-General Maulana Fazlur Rahman, called for a nationwide protest against what they deemed a 'global conspiracy against Islam'.⁴⁰⁴ MMA leaders were particularly critical of the restrictions placed on *madaris*, alleging that the measures had been taken 'at the behest of the US and the UK'.⁴⁰⁵ Moreover, MMA leaders were offended at the implication that *madaris* propagate 'extremism and sectarianism'.⁴⁰⁶

Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source

In order to convince the Pakistani public to support the anti-extremism, anti-sectarian, and anti-terrorism measures, President Musharraf relied upon a combination of familiar strategies in his July 21, 2005, national address. First, President Musharraf relied upon the ultimate moral forces within Pakistan society: the idea of the nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam) in his political discourse.

My dear countrymen I ask for your support for Pakistan and for true Islam. Stand up and launch a Jihad against extremism and propagators of enmity and anarchy. Be proud Pakistanis and rest assured of its bright future. May God save us from extremists and help us to follow a true Islam. May God be Custodian of all of us. Pakistan Paindabad.⁴⁰⁷

In the above extract, Musharraf repeatedly appealed to a national consciousness to legitimise his exhortations. This is demonstrated in statements such as: 'My dear countrymen I ask for your support for Pakistan', and 'Be proud Pakistanis and rest assured of its bright future'. Musharraf also relied upon the combined moral forces of nationalism and religion to create a shared religio-national consciousness. This is apparent in his statements: 'I ask for your support for Pakistan and for true Islam', 'May God save us from extremists and help us to follow a true Islam', and 'May God be Custodian of all of us'. For Musharraf, Pakistan was

⁴⁰³ 'Address to the Nation', *President Musharraf*, 21 July 2005, <http://presidentmusharraf.wordpress.com/2006/09/12/musharraf-address-21-july-2005>, (accessed 4 May 2012).

⁴⁰⁴ 'MMA's gives call for protests on Friday: Countrywide arrests', *Dawn*, 21 July 2005, <http://www.dawn.com/news/148766/mma-s-gives-call-for-protests-on-friday-countrywide-arrests>, (accessed 9 March 2014).

⁴⁰⁵ *Dawn*, 21 July 2005, (accessed 9 March 2014).

⁴⁰⁶ *Dawn*, 21 July 2005, (accessed 9 March 2014).

⁴⁰⁷ *President Musharraf*, (accessed 4 May 2012).

an 'Islamic country' and the 'only ideological country carved out for the Muslims of the region'.⁴⁸ While President Musharraf was committed to the ideal of Islam as the official national identity of Pakistan, he aimed ultimately for a unified and broadly democratic Muslim nation (as opposed to an Islamic state). His moderate discourse is demonstrated in a number of ways including his theory of 'Enlightened Moderation', Islamic philosophy (*huquq al-ibad* and *huquq Allah*), and his preference for Sufism. This is clear in the following statement:

Islam is a 'deen' that is a way to lead a life that is more than a religion. It emphasizes on 'Haqooq-ul-Ibad' rather than 'Haqooq Ullah'. Islam leads us towards 'Ilm', contemplation, thought, review, 'Ijtehad' and 'Ijmah'. It teaches us peace, progress, prosperity, enlightenment, and moderation.⁴⁹

As discussed previously, President Musharraf faced a multitude of crises in legitimacy and authority throughout his political tenure. He was regarded as a self-appointed military leader heading an unelected and undemocratic government. He was also widely criticised for capitulating to US and UK pressure by aligning Pakistan with the US in the 'war on terror'. The domestic reforms that were implemented following the attacks of 9/11 and 7/7 led many of his more religiously conservative detractors to accuse him of attempting to make Pakistan a secular nation. Within that context, Musharraf took the opportunity in his national address to reinforce his political legitimacy by asserting his own Muslim identity and his personal commitment to Islam. He stated: 'I am a Syed and God has conferred upon me an honour which a few have had. The doors of Khana Kaba are opened when ever I visit there'.⁴⁰ *Syed* is an honorific title which indicates that a person is not only of the high-born or *ashraf* class but, most importantly in this instance, a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatimah and her husband Ali ibn Abi Talib. As a descendant of the Prophet, a *syed* is endowed with unique spiritual authority. Moreover, only descendants of the Prophet can be hereditary Sufi pirs.⁴¹ This was particularly pertinent as, earlier in the year, President Musharraf was made an honorary *sajjada nashin* in a *dastar-bandi* ceremony. The ceremony symbolically marked his allegiance to the shrine of saint Muinuddin Chishti in Ajmer (India).

Discursive strategy: The construction of a negative 'Other'

Second, to convince the public to support his anti-terrorism measures President Musharraf also relied upon the construction of a negative 'Other' in his political discourse. To build a negative 'Other', Musharraf emphasised the negative aspects of the out-group through the use of pejorative words such as 'terrorism', 'extremism', 'violence', 'anger', and 'intolerance'. The negative 'Other' was presented as anyone that posed a danger to Pakistan and anyone who threatened 'true' Islam. Alternatively, President Musharraf contrasted the negative

⁴⁸ *President Musharraf*, (accessed 4 May 2012).

⁴⁹ *President Musharraf*, (accessed 4 May 2012).

⁴⁰ *President Musharraf*, (accessed 4 May 2012).

⁴¹ Ewing, 1983, p. 256.

aspects of the out-group by emphasising the positive aspects of the in-group. He did this through the use of approbatory themes such as 'true Islam', 'enlightenment', 'moderation', 'tolerance', 'brotherhood', 'solidarity', 'peace', 'non-violence', 'progress', 'prosperity', and 'height of character'.

Discursive strategy: An appeal for unification behind the legitimate power source

Third, to encourage the Pakistani public to unite behind the moral forces of the day (Pakistan and Islam) against a negative 'Other', President Musharraf adopted a hybrid appeal to both temporal and spiritual rewards. As discussed, he believed that the formation of a coherent and cohesive national identity was central to the establishment of political legitimacy and hegemony without the need for physical force. Musharraf envisaged this would enable the government to focus on investing in much-needed social and economic development, which would then result in a peaceful and prosperous civil society. The below extract demonstrates that his vision for Pakistan was not only dependent on an economic and political utopian strategy, but was also contingent upon the social and moral development of Pakistani society.

My dear countrymen you should help me out in dealing with extremists and terrorists and strengthen me against such elements. Don't get in the words of extremists. They are rendering damage to Pakistan. They are creating problems for Pakistani people and defaming Pakistani repute. They are spreading enmities and turbulence in the society. I would request you to not cast your vote to such conservatives and extremists. Cast your vote to those who are moderate and want to lead people to prosperity and progress.⁴³²

Despite increased attempts by President Musharraf to encourage the people of Pakistan to form a unified community under a single national identity, interact peaceably, and progress both socially and economically, by appealing to a specific type of nationalism in combination with a moderate Islam, a number of events served to further undermine his call for moderation. At the end of 2005 an earthquake measuring 7.6 on the Richter scale killed thousands of people, primarily in the NWFP and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Human Rights Watch reported that 85,000 people had been killed and 75,000 injured.⁴³³ That disaster presented the Government of Pakistan with an extremely great humanitarian task. The BBC reported that the 'devastation [...] may take a decade to repair'.⁴³⁴ On October 10, 2005, President Musharraf made an appeal to the international community for assistance.

The following year offered little relief for the nation. To compound the environmental catastrophe, Pakistan faced a multitude of domestic challenges. In its annual report, HRCP stated that there was a 'climate of intolerance' in Pakistan which adversely affected the

⁴³² *President Musharraf*, (accessed 4 May 2012).

⁴³³ 'Human Rights Watch World Report 2006 – Pakistan', *Human Rights Watch*, 18 January 2006, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/43cfaea511.html>, (accessed 24 May 2012).

⁴³⁴ 'Overview: Quake aftermath', *BBC News*, 2 November 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4322624.stm>, (accessed 11 March 2014).

welfare of its people, particularly minority religious groups, women, and children.⁴⁴⁵ It described Pakistan as a 'country caught in a state of bitter internal strife'.⁴⁴⁶ Of particular concern was the increase in religious conservatism. In parts of the NWFP, religious groups attempted to forcibly impose their particular social and moral code on society. Girls' schools were closed, video and music shops were attacked, barber shops were forbidden from shaving men's beards, and women were instructed to avoid public places.⁴⁴⁷ In Islamabad, the MMA vowed to oppose any government reforms or amendments to the religious education curricula. They claimed that President Musharraf was attempting to 'secularise' education in Pakistan. In Lahore, the MMA threatened to prevent a mixed gender marathon from being held, alleging that government support for the marathon was both an attack on eastern culture and a demonstration of its plan to impose western culture on the nation. The MMA demanded the enforcement of Shari'a law across Pakistan. The MMA-led government again passed the controversial Hisba Bill in the NWFP Provincial Assembly. While the Supreme Court blocked the bill for the second time, it nevertheless raised national and international fears that it signalled the beginning of the 'Talibanisation' of Pakistani society.

4.2.5 The Danish cartoon controversy

By far the most compelling debate concerning the place of Islam in the state and society was demonstrated in the Cartoon Controversy, which dominated the headlines in the Pakistani print media in 2006. The debate began at the end of 2005 when a number of editorial cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad were published in the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten*. In Sunni Islamic tradition it is prohibited for an artist to depict images of: God, prophets, including the Prophet Muhammad and his relatives, and all living beings, including humans and animals. The artistic representation of God and the Prophet Muhammad is considered blasphemous. Most crucially, some of the more provocative cartoons directly associated the Prophet Muhammad and Islam with terrorism and violence. Four weeks after the images were published Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen received complaints from ten representatives from Muslim-majority countries.⁴⁴⁸ The images were then republished in the Norwegian newspaper *Aftenposten*, closely followed by newspapers in several other countries around the world. The publication of the cartoons seriously damaged diplomatic relations between a number of non-Muslim and Muslim-majority nations. The incident prompted the Arab League (AL) and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to seek a UN resolution and sanctions to protect religion against vilification. The publication of the cartoons triggered demonstrations across Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. In Pakistan, anger over the caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad was expressed in large-scale protests across the country in February 2006. These demonstrations, some of which turned violent, took place in Peshawar in the NWFP,

⁴⁴⁵ Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, *State of Human Rights in 2006*, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Lahore, 2007, p. 1.

⁴⁴⁶ Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2007, p. 1.

⁴⁴⁷ 'Pakistan Assessment 2006', *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/assessment2006.htm>, (accessed 11 March 2014).

⁴⁴⁸ 'Muslim cartoon row timeline', *BBC News*, 19 February 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4688602.stm>, (accessed 18 March 2014).

Islamabad, Lahore, Multan, and Gujranwala in the Punjab, and Karachi, Hyderabad, and Dera Ghazi Khan in Sindh.

Perhaps unsurprisingly for a Muslim nation whose majority population holds the Prophet Muhammad in great esteem, there was much opposition within Pakistan to the publication of the cartoons. Opposition came from many sections of Pakistani society. President Musharraf and the Government of Pakistan, political parties, religious groups, trade unions, traders, teachers, and students, spoke out against the publication of the cartoons. Leading the anti-cartoon movement in Pakistan was the MMA. This coalition of religious parties called for a nation-wide campaign against the publication of the cartoons. On February 19, the MMA pledged to stage a demonstration in Islamabad despite the ban on public rallies put in place by the local district administration. In response, the government placed MMA President Qazi Hussain Ahmed and MMA Secretary General Maulana Fazalur Rehman under house arrest, and put hundreds of MMA activists in protective custody.⁴¹⁹ The Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) announced it too would participate in the MMA-led demonstration in protest over the caricatures.⁴²⁰ Notably, the ARD included two of the largest mainstream political parties in Pakistan, the PPP and the PML-N. Both of these parties are generally regarded as representing the liberal-secular position. According to the Daily Times, the ARD was planning to participate in the MMA-led demonstration because the Musharraf government had not protested 'strongly enough' against the publication of the caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad.⁴²¹

Also voicing their strong condemnation of the publication of the cartoons was a collection of prominent religious scholars and groups that represent the interests of Barelvi Muslims, the nation's majority community. In Pakistan, Barelvi Muslims tend to have a reputation for being moderate, peaceful, and tolerant owing to their preference for Sufism. As discussed previously, love or devotion for the Prophet Muhammad is a particularly important part of Barelvi tradition. A devotee of the Prophet Muhammad is considered an *ashiq-e-rasul* (a lover of the Prophet). Barelvi Muslims believe that as devotees or lovers of the Prophet Muhammad they are following 'true' Islam as revealed by God. Alongside their profound love is an intense desire to protect the reputation of the Prophet Muhammad. Predictably, many Barelvi Muslims were offended by the cartoons, which they regarded as blasphemous. On March 12, a group of Barelvi scholars signed a *fatwa* (religious edict) proclaiming that anyone who blasphemes or disrespects the Prophet Muhammad can be executed. The *fatwa* was announced at a 2-day conference at Nishtar Park in Karachi, which brought together a number of Barelvi groups to celebrate the life and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad.

⁴¹⁹ 'Qazi, Fazl detained as MMA vow to rally today', *Daily Times*, 19 February 2006, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C02%5C19%5Cstory_19-2-2006_pg1_2, (accessed 12 April 2012).

⁴²⁰ The ARD was formed December 3, 2000, and comprises of: the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP); the Pakistan Muslim League (N) (PML-N); the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM); the Awami National Party (ANP); and the Pakistan Democratic Front (PDF). The party was formed in opposition to military rule under President Musharraf following the coup of 1999. It aimed to restore democracy to Pakistan.

⁴²¹ 'ARD calls APC, will join MMA's rally', *Daily Times*, 19 February 2006, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C02%5C19%5Cstory_19-2-2006_pg1_3, (accessed 12 April 2012).

Anas Noorani of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (Noorani) (JUP-N), a Barelvi political party, was reported to have said:

If the government of Pakistan is handing over Muslims to the West then why does it not demand the hand of the blasphemers to punish them and make them an example for the rest of the world. [...] This is a warning that no other system but Nizam-e-Mustafa (PBUH) would reign in the country.⁴²

In the above extract, the reference to *Nizam-e-Mustafa* (System of the Prophet) is particularly pertinent. The Nizam-e-Mustafa Movement first appeared in Pakistan in the late 1970s in opposition to the then-PPP government. Initially led by the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), the movement comprised of nine religio-political parties. This coalition of religious parties was committed to the primacy of Islam in the Pakistani state and society in the spirit of twentieth-century theologian Maulana Maududi, founder of the JI. The coalition believed in the inerrancy of divine revelation, as revealed through the sacred sources (Qur'an and Sunnah), and the Prophet Muhammad. The main aim of the movement was to establish an Islamic system of governance in Pakistan, with an Islamic constitution and Islamic laws (Shari'a). Paradoxically, the Nizam-e-Mustafa Movement included the JUP; a political party largely considered moderate because it represents the interests of the majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi community. The slogan *Nizam-e-Mustafa* was later taken up by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977 as part of his Islamisation project to transform Pakistan into a theocratic state. His ten-year rule marked a period of increased religiosity in Pakistan.

Liberal civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations in Pakistan condemned the cartoon-related violence. For the HRCP, the heated and at times violent protests reflected the increased levels of 'intolerance' in the country. In its annual report, the HRCP described the situation as follows:

The growth of intolerance in society was reflected by the angry protests in February 2006, over the publication of cartoons perceived as blasphemous, published in a Danish newspaper. While the protests had political and social dimensions, they also reflected an decrease in levels of tolerance.⁴³

The Danish cartoon controversy continued throughout 2006 and became conflated with wider criticism of President Musharraf, who was regarded as a self-appointed military leader heading an unelected and, therefore, undemocratic government, as well as attempting to divest Pakistan of its Islamic identity. Groups on both sides of the religio-political spectrum were increasingly anti-government in their political rhetoric in this period. The controversy surrounding the cartoons, in particular the widespread anger, the violent protests, and the government's own at times harsh response, again raised the question of whether Pakistan really was a moderate Muslim nation as President Musharraf contended.

⁴² 'Barelvi scholars want death for blasphemers', *Daily Times*, 13 March 2006, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C03%5C13%5Cstory_13-3-2006_pg7_47, (accessed 13 April 2012).

⁴³ Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2007, p. 142.

4.2.6 The dissemination of discourses of moderation in the Pakistani press

Against the background of heated, and at times violent, protests against the publication of the cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad, and the attendant debate over Pakistan's identity, the campaign to construct a soft image of the nation by drawing on aspects of Sufi tradition intensified. This is demonstrated by the increased official preference for Sufism in this period. There was a rise in the presence of government officials at Sufi shrines, particularly during the *urs* festivals of prominent Sufi saints. There was also rise in the presence of government officials at conferences and seminars on Sufism, and at Sufi music, art, and literature festivals. Notably, President Musharraf was supported in his endeavours by other political actors who actively reproduced the official construction of an enlightened and moderate identity for Pakistan and its citizens through the lens of Sufism. Alongside official efforts to promote a soft image of the nation, and non-official efforts to promote Sufism generally, national English-language newspapers in Pakistan intensified their coverage on the subject of Sufism. This included more extensive reporting on the *urs* festival dates of prominent Sufi saints, and on the festivities themselves, as well as on conferences and seminars on Sufism, and Sufi music and arts festivals. It also included more extensive reporting on the presence of government officials and their activities at Sufi shrines. The increased official and non-official preference for Sufism is reflected in the below table.

Daily Times Headlines on the Subject of Sufism, March-August 2006.

March 15, 2006.	Three-day Data Sahib urs begins from 19th.
March 16, 2006.	The saint will keep us here.
March 17, 2006.	Festivals of bygone days.
March 19, 2006.	Devotees throng Lahore for Data Sahib's Urs.
March 20, 2006.	Pushto poetry's greatest son celebrated: Remembering Shinwari.
March 21, 2006.	Data's Urs still presses message of tolerance.
March 25, 2006.	Madhu Lal's Urs begins.
March 28, 2006.	Conference on Shah Hussain starts tomorrow.
April 5, 2006.	Hazrat Mian Mir's urs from 6th.
April 8, 2006.	Mian Mir's Urs ends.
April 8, 2006.	Say it with Sufism.
April 9, 2006.	Mela Uch Sharif concludes.
April 9, 2006.	RPT bringing musical element of Sufism to 'life'.
April 13, 2006.	Sufi music festival beginning today.
April 14, 2006.	Take a look around, say Swiss tourists.
April 15, 2006.	Mystic music continues to delight audience.
April 16, 2006.	Spending 3 weeks in mystic touch.
April 17, 2006.	Sufi music festival mesmerises audience.
April 22, 2006.	World Punjabi Congress announces charter.
May 1, 2006.	International Conference on Sindh - Past, present and future.
May 2, 2006.	Shah Jamal's Urs begins today.
May 3, 2006.	Pappu Saen beats the drum for Shah Jamal.
May 14, 2006.	Bari Imam urs begins today.

Daily Times Headlines on the Subject of Sufism, March-August 2006.

May 19, 2006.	Bari Imam urs ends.
May 19, 2006.	'It's the main religious and recreational event in the region'.
May 20, 2006.	Bari Imam Urs closes with prayers for world peace.
June 3, 2006.	Mystic's truth? Military dictator fulfilled a saint's prediction.
July 19, 2006.	Waris Shah's Urs begins on July 23.
July 25, 2006.	Colourful night.
July 26, 2006.	Urs of Pir Waris Shah concluded.
August 17, 2006.	Death anniversary of Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan forgotten.
August 19, 2006.	Wasif Ali Wasif - a humanist in the true sense.
August 20, 2006.	Baba Bullay Shah's Urs.
August 21, 2006.	Daira Din Panah shrine set to recall past glory.
August 21, 2006.	Dreshak pays tribute to Wasif.
August 27, 2006.	Bulleh Shah's Urs begins in Kasur.
August 27, 2006.	5-hour 'protocol' shutdown leaves devotees stuck.
August 29, 2006.	Bulleh Shah's Urs ends in Kasur.
August 30, 2006.	Lahore Field of dreams.

Table 1: Daily Times Headlines on the Subject of Sufism, March-August 2006

The above table lists the headlines that appeared in one English-language newspaper, the Daily Times on-line edition, on the subject of Sufism in the six-month period between March and August 2006.⁴⁴ In this period, English-language newspapers regularly reported what political actors and commentators had to say on the subject of Sufism. However, the print media also played a more active role. The strategies used by the Government of Pakistan in the construction of a national Sufi identity were reproduced and disseminated in English-language newspapers.

Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source

Joining the campaign to foster moderate and enlightened interpretations of Pakistan's national identity, and contribute towards the creation of a soft image of the nation, English-language newspapers also relied upon an appeal to the ultimate moral forces within Pakistani society: the nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam). One of the most important moral forces in society for the majority of Pakistani citizens is religion. In the climate of extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism, what is apparent in this period are attempts to encourage the people of Pakistan to form a unified community under a single national identity, interact peaceably, and progress socially and economically. Like President Musharraf, the print media did so by promoting a shared religio-national consciousness

⁴⁴ The Daily Times is a leading English-language national newspaper in Pakistan and proponent of liberal-secular ideas. The newspaper was founded in 2002 by Salman Taseer, a long-standing member of the PPP, and Governor of the Punjab between 2008-2011. Taseer was assassinated on January 4, 2011, by his bodyguard Malik Mumtaz Qadri who was a member of Dawat-e-Islami, a non-political group inspired by the essentially non-violent Bareilvi ideology. Qadri and other religiously conservative Muslims were critical of Taseer's calls for a reform of the blasphemy laws, as well as his support of Aasia Bibi, a Christian woman who was sentenced to death for allegedly insulting the Prophet Muhammad and Islam.

based on the moral and peace-building aspects found within Sufism. Headlines such as: 'Education is the only way out', 'Data's Urs still presses message of tolerance', 'Say it with Sufism', 'Bari Imam Urs closes with prayers for world peace', 'Wasif Ali Wasif - a humanist in the true sense' are examples of this type of strategy.⁴²⁵ In addition, the themes of 'love', 'tolerance', 'universal brotherhood', and 'peace' appeared repeatedly in local, national, and international news articles, feature articles, editorials, columns, and opinion pieces.

The relevance of Sufism in the creation of a shared religio-national consciousness was also evident in the increased official presence at Sufi shrines, at conferences and seminars on Sufism, and at Sufi music, art, and literature festivals. This official preference for Sufism was widely reported in the Pakistani print media in this period. The *urs* festival of Abul Hassan Ali Hajvery or Data Ganj Bakhsh, as he is more popularly known, is a typical example. The Daily Times reported:

Devotees throng Lahore for Data Sahib's Urs [Headline]

LAHORE: Punjab Governor Lt General (r) Khalid Maqbool will inaugurate Data Ganj Buksh's 962nd Urs today (Sunday). Millions of devotees from all parts of the country have arrived in Lahore to attend the event, one of the country's largest spiritual gatherings, to pay tribute to the great Muslim saint. The Urs will continue for three days. Punjab government has allocated Rs 2.5 million for special arrangements for the Urs, including a 'langar' and a 'sabeel', and the City District Government Lahore (CDGL) has planned to announce a local holiday on the occasion. Punjab Governor Lt General (r) Khalid Maqbool will lay a floral wreath and chador at the shrine and inaugurate the milk 'sabeel' after Isha prayer.⁴²⁶

Data Ganj Bakhsh is a renowned eleventh-century Sufi poet-saint whose shrine is located in Lahore. In March 2006, the dates of his 962nd *urs* festival were widely published in the print media. The City District Government (Lahore) declared a local holiday to mark the occasion. The Punjab Government announced the allocation of 2.5 million rupees to assist in the arrangements, which included provision for a *langar* (communal kitchen) and milk *sabeel*. The Aquaf and Religious Affairs Secretary (Punjab) Syed Rais Abass Zaidi opened the informal *urs* ceremonies with a speech and Qur'an recitation competition. A seminar entitled 'Syed Hajwair Tasawuf' was held alongside the festivities. Lieutenant General (retired) and Governor (Punjab) Khalid Maqbool formally opened the *urs* with a traditional *chador-poshi* or sheet-laying ceremony. Notably, these spiritual and custodian ceremonies are customarily performed by the *sajjada nashin*. By firmly linking the administration to Islam by way of the Sufi tradition, the assertion was that religious legitimacy and authority flow from devotion to Data Ganj Bakhsh and his shrine.

Discursive strategy: An appeal to history

⁴²⁵ See, Table 1: Daily Times Headlines on the Subject of Sufism, March-August 2006.

⁴²⁶ 'Devotees throng Lahore for Data Sahib's Urs', *Daily Times*, 19 March 2006, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C03%5C19%5Cstory_19-3-2006_pg7_9, (accessed 13 April 2012).

As discussed previously, an essential element of persuasive political discourse is the close association between the exhortations of political actors and the shared historical consciousness of the public, whether real or imagined. A number of official historical narratives were reproduced in the print media in order to appeal to a shared historical consciousness amongst the people of Pakistan. For example, in February 2006 Chief Minister (Punjab) Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi addressed a two-day international conference History and Civilization of the Muslim World at the Pakistan Study Centre, University of the Punjab, Lahore. The Daily Times reported:

Education is the only way out [Headline]

LAHORE: Contemporary historians should follow the footsteps of sufis and play their role in ridding people of misconceptions about Islam, highlighting Islam's role in the evolution of learning and art, said Punjab Chief Minister Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi at a two-day international conference on Muslim civilisation and history on Tuesday. Elahi said that conflicts between civilisations were disrupting global peace, therefore historians should step forward to set things right. He said knowledge and piety held a significant position in Islam and historians could not do justice to the Islamic history without determining its values. The chief minister said that Baba Farid Shakar Ganj, Data Ganj Buksh, Baba Guru Nanak, Baba Bulleh Shah, Waris Shah and Hazrat Mian Mir were not only preachers, but also historians of social history.⁴²⁷

In the above extract, the narrative aimed to promote the important role Sufi saints played as social historians and educators in order to positively invoke a shared moderate and enlightened historical consciousness amongst the people of Pakistan. This is clear in the statements: 'Contemporary historians should follow the footsteps of sufis and play their role in ridding people of misconceptions about Islam' and 'Baba Farid Shakar Ganj, Data Ganj Buksh, Baba Guru Nanak, Baba Bulleh Shah, Waris Shah and Hazrat Mian Mir were not only preachers, but also historians of social history.' In addition, emphasis was placed on the role these Sufis played in imparting essential Islamic values to others. This is clear in the statement: 'Knowledge and piety held a significant position in Islam and historians could not do justice to the Islamic history without determining its values.' The implications were two-fold. First, that moderate and enlightened values had long been an intrinsic part of Muslim culture in Pakistan. Second, that Sufi saints were instrumental in disseminating those values.

In March, the *urs* festival or *mela* of Jalaluddin Surkh-Posh Bukhari was also widely publicised in the media. Bukhari is a thirteenth-century Sufi saint whose shrine is located in Uch Sharif (Punjab). The town is famous for its Sufi tombs which are on the UNESCO World Heritage Tentative List.⁴²⁸ The Daily Times reported:

Mela Uch Sharif concludes [Headline]

⁴²⁷ 'Education is the only way out', *Daily Times*, 1 March 2006, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C03%5C01%5Cstory_1-3-2006_pg7_11, (accessed 13 April 2012).

⁴²⁸ 'UNESCO Tentative Lists', *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation*, <http://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/1883>, (accessed 8 April 2013).

BAHAWALPUR: Mela Uch Sharif started on March 31 ended on Friday after weeklong celebrations. A large number of people from southern Punjab came to the historic town Uch Sharif to pay homage to the great sufi saint, Hazrat Jalaluddin Surkhposh Bukhari (RA), for spreading Islam. Following the centuries old tradition, people visited the shrine of Hazrat Jalaluddin Surukhposh Bukhari to start the mela. Majority of the people and devotees of Hazrat Syed Jalal spent the entire day at the shrine and offered Friday prayers at the historic Jamia Masjid built by the Abbasid rulers. The mela was held to mark the historic congregation of sufi saints held in 600 AH on the invitation of Hazrat Jalaluddin Surkhposh Bukhari.⁴⁹

In the above extract, a number of narratives were relied upon to positively invoke a shared historical consciousness amongst the people of Pakistan. The first narrative aimed to promote the important role Jalaluddin Surkh-Posh Bukhari played in promoting Islam in the Indian subcontinent. According to the newspaper article, 'a large number of people from southern Punjab came to the historic town Uch Sharif to pay homage to the great sufi saint, Hazrat Jalaluddin Surkhposh Bukhari (RA), for spreading Islam'. Bukhari is thought to be one of the legendary *chaar yaar*, four friends committed to converting the local population to Islam by way of the Sufi tradition. The second narrative aimed to promote the historical importance of the saint, the shrine, and the *urs* ceremonies held there annually. This is clear in the statement: 'Following the centuries old tradition, people visited the shrine of Hazrat Jalaluddin Surukhposh Bukhari to start the mela. Majority of the people and devotees of Hazrat Syed Jalal spent the entire day at the shrine and offered Friday prayers at the historic Jamia Masjid built by the Abbasid rulers'. It is also clear in the statement: 'The mela was held to mark the historic congregation of sufi saints held in 600 AH on the invitation of Hazrat Jalaluddin Surkhposh Bukhari'. The implication was that the 'centuries old tradition', which takes place at the shrine of Jalaluddin Surkh-Posh Bukhari, has a long and renowned history in Pakistan. In short, continuity with the nation's valued past flows from devotion to Bukhari and his shrine.

Discursive strategy: The construction of a negative 'Other'

The third strategy that was reproduced in English-language newspapers in Pakistan was the construction of a negative 'Other'. The negative 'Other' was closely tied to and, crucially, posed a distinct threat to the ultimate moral forces of nationalism and religion. Difference was constructed by way of a polarising strategy of positive 'us'-presentation and negative 'Other'-presentation. The implication was that the in-group was acting in the national interest whereas the out-group was acting against the national interest. Based on that premise, the following extracts illustrate the ways in which the print media attempted to construct a negative 'Other' in order to persuade the Pakistani public to form a unified community under a single national identity, interact peaceably, and progress socially and economically.

⁴⁹ 'Mela Uch Sharif concludes', *Daily Times*, 9 April 2006, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C04%5C09%5Cstory_9-4-2006_pg7_40, (accessed 13 April 2012). (2006, April 9).

As discussed, Chief Minister Elahi addressed a two-day international conference History and Civilization of the Muslim World at the Pakistan Study Centre, University of the Punjab, in February 2006. At the time, anger over the caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad was being expressed in large-scale, heated, and at times violent protests across the nation. His address contained two narratives: firstly, that moderate and enlightened values were an intrinsic part of Muslim culture in Pakistan, and secondly, that Sufi saints were instrumental in disseminating those values. Elahi urged contemporary historians to 'follow the footsteps of sufis and play their role in ridding people of misconceptions about Islam'.⁴³⁰ The Chief Minister was also quoted as saying:

[H]e was concerned about certain people who were trying to disrupt peace under the prevailing circumstances, but the world was not short of people that wanted to prevent a clash of civilisations. Common values should be promoted instead of contradictions and problems could be solved through dialogue, he said, adding that education was the only way out.⁴³¹

The above extract illustrates one of the dominant narratives used to create a negative 'Other' in the minds of the Pakistani people. Interestingly, the negative 'Other' was not referred to directly in this extract. Instead, the construction of a negative 'Other' relied primarily on an appeal to religio-nationalist sentiment. In this example, the out-group was anyone who was 'trying to disrupt peace' in Pakistan and anyone who wanted to engender a 'clash of civilisations' between Muslim and non-Muslim nations. Conversely, the in-group was anyone who supported 'peace' and 'wanted to prevent a clash of civilisations'. In short, the out-group was acting against the national interest, whereas the in-group was acting in accordance with the national interest. The implication of this address, which focussed on the positive role Sufi saints played in the dissemination of moderate and enlightened values, was that the out-group was a threat to Islam whereas the in-group was acting in accordance with 'true' Islam as practiced by the majority Sufi-inspired Bareilvi community.

Two months later, on the occasion of *Eid Milad un-Nabi*, Chief Minister Elahi addressed a gathering of *ulama* at a provincial Seerat Conference in Lahore.⁴³² The main theme of the address was the elimination of sectarianism from Pakistani society. The Daily Times reported:

Elahi urges clerics to preach tolerance [Headline]

[Elahi] said it was a matter of concern that patience and forgiveness had vanished from Pakistani society. He said sectarianism was dangerous for

⁴³⁰ *Daily Times*, 1 March 2006, (accessed 13 April 2012).

⁴³¹ *Daily Times*, 1 March 2006, (accessed 13 April 2012).

⁴³² *Eid Milad un-Nabi* is a festival held to commemorate the birth of the Prophet Muhammad. In Pakistan, this day is a public holiday. Government offices, many private businesses, shopping centres, and educational institutions are closed. The day is usually marked by an official gun salute and the national flag is hoisted on all governmental, non-governmental, and major public buildings. Seerat conferences are conducted to reflect on the Prophet's life, teachings, and philosophy. Devotional poetry written in praise of Prophet Muhammad (naat) is recited together with Qur'an recitations. While some Muslims believe this day should be celebrated, many Muslims do not believe in the celebration of birthdays or anniversaries.

Pakistan and urged clerics to play their role to eliminate the menace. Elahi said that Islam was a religion of peace and it did not allow anyone to impose his ideology on others. He said it was unfortunate that Islam was being presented as a religion of extremism, which was because Muslims had not been able to project their religion in its true perspective. He said that Prophet Muhammad's (peace be upon him) life was a practical manifestation of Islamic teachings and it was an article of faith for Muslims to follow the Holy Prophet's (pbuh) teachings.⁴³³

In the above extract, the construction of a negative 'Other' was rather wide and included sectarianists and extremists. The use of pejoratives such as 'sectarianism', 'dangerous', 'menace', and 'extremism' served to portray the negative aspects of the out-group. Chief Minister Elahi presented the negative 'Other' as anyone who posed a threat to Pakistan. This is demonstrated in the statements: 'sectarianism was dangerous for Pakistan', 'Islam was a religion of peace and it did not allow anyone to impose his ideology on others' and 'Islam was being presented as a religion of extremism'. For Elahi, the negative 'Other' was anyone who threatened Islam as practiced by the majority Sufi-inspired Bareilvi community in Pakistan. In this narrative, Sufism was presented as moderate and tolerant. This is clear in the statements: 'patience and forgiveness', 'Islam was a religion of peace', 'Muslims had not been able to project their religion in its true perspective'.

Discursive strategy: An appeal for unification behind the legitimate power source

As discussed previously, the motivating sources President Musharraf relied upon in an appeal for unification were the moral forces of the nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam). In his political discourse Musharraf adopted a hybrid appeal to temporal and spiritual rewards. He believed that the formation of a coherent and cohesive national identity was central to the establishment of political legitimacy and hegemony without the need for physical force. Musharraf envisaged this would enable the government to focus on investing in much-needed social and economic development, which would then result in a peaceful and prosperous civil society. A number of narratives were reproduced in the print media in line with President Musharraf's strategy to encourage the people of Pakistan to form a unified community under a single national identity, interact peaceably, and progress socially and economically. The Daily Times reported:

Data's Urs still presses message of tolerance [Headline]

Monday's ceremony began with recitation from the holy Quran. Speakers paid tribute to the great Muslim saint on the occasion and said Data Sahib preached Islam by practice. They said Pakistani society needed the tolerance, patience and inter religious harmony taught by the Sufi saint for Pakistan to progress.⁴³⁴

⁴³³ 'Elahi urges clerics to preach tolerance', *Daily Times*, 11 April 2006, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C04%5C11%5Cstory_11-4-2006_pg7_29, (accessed 13 April 2012).

⁴³⁴ 'Data's Urs still presses message of tolerance', *Daily Times*, 21 March 2006, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C03%5C21%5Cstory_21-3-2006_pg7_39, (accessed 13 April 2012).

In the above extract, the print media focused on the ethical and peace-building aspects found within Islam in its appeal to the community for unity and peace. This is evident in the statements: 'Data's Urs still presses message of tolerance' and 'Pakistani society needed the tolerance, patience and inter religious harmony taught by the Sufi saint for Pakistan to progress'. Notably, the themes of 'tolerance' and 'religious harmony' appeared frequently in the rhetoric of President Musharraf and constituted his major leitmotifs, particularly in the latter half of his political tenure. With its message of philosophical, spiritual, and social harmony, Sufism has often been interpreted as being inclusive, moderate, peaceful, and tolerant. This message is typical of that reproduced in the media in this period in an attempt to encourage the people of Pakistan to form a unified community and interact peaceably.

The annual *urs* festival of Abdul Latif Kazmi, or Bari Imam, was also widely published in the print media. The Islamabad District Administration and the District Auqaf Directorate arranged the event which was attended by 200,000 devotees. National Assembly Speaker Chaudhry Amir Hussain opened the ceremony, and the concluding ceremony was presided over by Senate Chairman Muhammad Mian Soomro. The Daily Times reported:

Bari Imam Urs closes with prayers for world peace [Headline]

ISLAMABAD: The five-day annual 'Urs' of the saint Syed Abdul Latif Kazmi, better known as 'Bari Imam', concluded after the Rasm-e-Charaghan ceremony at the Mazar, with prayers for the progress, prosperity and the solidarity of the Muslim Ummah and the Pakistani people. The ceremony opened with a 'chadar poshi' by National Assembly Speaker Chaudhry Amir Hussain on May 14 and the concluding ceremony presided over by Senate Chairman Muhammadmian Soomro underlined an increasing need for coordination and unity among the Ummah to overcome the challenges facing them at present. Soomro paid rich tributes to the religious and social services of the great saint and said that the world could be peaceful if people chose to follow in the footsteps of Sufis such as Hazrat Bari Imam. He also stressed on implementing the message of peace, love, fraternity, harmony and equity preached by Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). "Our religion is the most tolerant religion in the world and we need to project it as a moderate religion to the international community," he said.⁴³⁵

The above extract illustrates the familiar official narratives popularised by the print media in this period. In an attempt to rid Pakistani society of extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism, and project a moderate Islam, as part of the wider campaign to project a soft image of Pakistan, the print media chose to highlight temporal and spiritual rewards. This is clear in the statements: 'Soomro paid rich tributes to the religious and social services of the great saint and said that the world could be peaceful if people chose to follow in the footsteps of Sufis such as Hazrat Bari Imam' and 'Our religion is the most tolerant religion in the world and we need to project it as a moderate religion to the international community'. In this, the 'religious and social services' of Bari Imam and other Sufi saints provided a useful example with which to ensure the 'progress', 'prosperity', and 'solidarity' for not only the people of Pakistan but also the entire Muslim *ummah* and the international community.

⁴³⁵ 'Bari Imam Urs closes with prayers for world peace', *Daily Times*, 20 May 2006, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C05%5C20%5Cstory_20-5-2006_pg11_4, (accessed 14 April 2012).

4.3 The formation of the National Council for the Promotion of Sufism (NCPS)

In the latter half of 2006 the increased preference for Sufism was reflected in the creation of a council for the promotion of Sufism. In September, the Ministry of Culture announced the formation of the NCPS, with President Musharraf as its Patron in Chief. According to the Daily times, the main aim of the council was to 'spread the Sufi message of love, tolerance and universal brotherhood [to] integrate regional diversity with national unity'.⁴³⁶ In order to achieve the aims set out in the terms of reference, the government worked primarily through the Ministry of Culture, Pakistan National Council of the Arts (PNCA), and the Ministry of Education, Pakistan Academy of Letters (PAL). With an emphasis on culture and education, the NCPS aimed to promote and disseminate its official construction of Sufism at conferences, seminars, workshops, music, art and literature festivals, and through affiliations to educational institutions and scholars.

Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source

The NCPS held its inaugural meeting in Islamabad on October 12, 2006. The meeting was presided over by NCPS Chairman and PML-Q President Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain. Extracts taken from statements made by Chaudhry Hussain and other NCPS members were quoted in Dawn newspaper the following day:

Sufism to be promoted, says Shujaat [Headline]

ISLAMABAD Oct 12: Pakistan Muslim League president Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain has said that practical steps will be taken for disseminating the teachings of sufis in the country. Chaudhry Shujaat, who is chairman of the National Council of Sufism (NCS), was presiding over the first meeting of the council here on Thursday. He said mankind was united against coercion and "we need to adopt sufism in our lives to end oppression and suppression". Sufis, he pointed out, had given the message of peace, love and brotherhood and said steps would have to be taken towards that end. He said there was a need to propagate the message of Shah Abdul Latif Bhittai, Shah Hussain, Sachal Sarmast and Allama Iqbal, adding that an Iqbal festival would be held on Nov 9 at which an album titled Allama Iqbal's message of courage for youths would be released. In December, he said, a Roomi festival would be held.

Mr Mushahid Hussain suggested that the culture of brotherhood and tolerance could be promoted through sufi music. He said sufis could play an important role in creation of the inter-faith harmony. He said a PhD degree programme on teaching of sufis would be initiated in all universities of the country. He informed the meeting that there were 534 mazars in Punjab, 221 in Sindh, 159 in NWFP and 69 in Balochistan.⁴³⁷

In the above extract, the ultimate moral force that was privileged to convince the Pakistani public to support government efforts to unify the nation, reconcile religious difference, and arrest religious violence was Sufism. This is clear in statements such as: 'we need to adopt

⁴³⁶ *Daily Times*, 22 September 2006, (accessed 23 September 2011).

⁴³⁷ 'Sufism to be promoted, says Shujaat', *Dawn*, 13 October 2006, <http://archives.dawn.com/2006/10/13/nat15.htm>, (accessed 27 January 2012).

sufism in our lives to end oppression and suppression', 'Sufis [...] had given the message of peace, love and brotherhood', 'there was a need to propagate the message of Shah Abdul Latif Bhittai, Shah Hussain, Sachal Sarmast and Allama Iqbal', 'the culture of brotherhood and tolerance could be promoted through sufi music', and 'sufis could play an important role in creation of the inter-faith harmony'. Crucially, Sufism was positioned as the main source of moral authority for Pakistan at a time when Islam had become synonymous with intolerance, militancy, and terrorism.

Discursive strategy: The construction of a negative 'Other'

To convince the public to unite behind the ultimate moral force within Pakistani society, Sufism, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain attempted to create a negative 'Other'. His construction of a negative 'Other' relied primarily on an appeal to Sufism. This is demonstrated in the statements: 'mankind was united against coercion and we need to adopt sufism in our lives to end oppression and suppression', 'Sufis [...] had given the message of peace, love and brotherhood and [...] steps would have to be taken towards that end', and 'the culture of brotherhood and tolerance could be promoted through sufi music. [...] Sufis could play an important role in creation of the inter-faith harmony'. The negative aspects of the out-group were emphasised through the use of pejoratives such as 'coercion', 'oppression', and 'suppression'. Conversely, the positive aspects of the in-group were emphasised through the use of approbatory themes such as 'peace', 'love', 'brotherhood', 'tolerance', and 'inter-faith harmony'. Moreover, by emphasising the positive aspects of the in-group, Shujaat Hussain aimed to create, by implication, an image of what the out-group was not. In short, the negative 'Other' was presented as anyone who was neither peaceful nor tolerant. In essence, the negative 'Other' was presented as anyone who threatened 'true' Islam as practiced by the majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi community.

Discursive strategy: An appeal for unification behind the legitimate power source

To encourage the Pakistani public to unite behind the ultimate moral force within society, Sufism, against a negative 'Other', Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain chose to present a utopian vision of peace and national unity for Pakistan. This is clear in the statements: 'mankind was united against coercion and we need to adopt sufism in our lives to end oppression and suppression. Sufis [...] had given the message of peace, love and brotherhood and said steps would have to be taken towards that end', and 'there was a need to propagate the message of Shah Abdul Latif Bhittai, Shah Hussain, Sachal Sarmast and Allama Iqbal'. This is also clear in a statement from PML-Q Secretary-General and NCPS member Mushahid Hussain Syed who said: 'the culture of brotherhood and tolerance could be promoted through sufi music. [...] Sufis could play an important role in creation of the inter-faith harmony. [...] A PhD degree programme on teaching of sufis would be initiated in all universities of the country'. Crucially, the construction of a collective present and future for the citizens of

Pakistan was dependent upon the social and moral development of Pakistani society, which could only be achieved through Sufism.

On November 9, 2006, President Musharraf inaugurated the annual World Performing Arts Festival at the Alhamra Open Air Theatre in Lahore. The 10-day arts festival was organised by the Rafi Peer Theatre Workshop and the Lahore Arts Council. The formal launch of the festival by Musharraf was the president's first official effort to foster Sufism following the creation of the NCPS in September. At the launch, Musharraf announced that the government would be donating three million rupees to the Rafi Peer Theatre Workshop to assist in its efforts to promote Sufism through art and culture. By way of justification, the president was quoted as saying 'Sufism always gave a message of love and tolerance'.⁴⁸

Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source

The following day President Musharraf addressed the launch ceremony of the album *Apna Muqam Paidā Kar* (to create an identity for oneself) at Hazuri Bagh in Lahore. Produced by the NCPS, the album was based upon the Sufi-inspired poetry of Muhammad Iqbal, whose famous tomb is located adjacent to the gardens. The Daily Times reported:

Mystic poetry promotes tolerance, says Musharraf [Headline]

LAHORE: Sufi poets' teachings can help promote tolerance and peace in society, President Pervez Musharraf said on Friday.

"These sufis (saints) had always worked for the promotion of love and oneness of humanity, not for disunity or hatred," the president told the launch ceremony of musical album 'Apna muqam paida kar' at Hazoori Bagh.

The album, based on the poetry of Dr Allama Muhammad Iqbal and produced by the National Sufi Council, includes numbers by vocalists Fareeha Pervaiz, Abrarul Haq, Jawwad Ahmad, Shabnam Majeed, Humaira Arshad, Masuma Anwer and Rahat Fateh Ali Khan.

President Musharraf said that Islam emphasised the rights of the people, adding that people's rights had also been the hallmark of sufi poets' teachings. He said that Allama Iqbal always preached the oneness of humanity and tolerance. He said that it was the sufis who propagated Islam in South Asia.⁴⁹

In the above extract, President Musharraf again privileged Sufism as part of his efforts to promote it as the ultimate moral force within Pakistani society. This is demonstrated in the statements: 'Mystic poetry promotes tolerance', 'Sufi poets' teachings can help promote tolerance and peace in society', 'these sufis (saints) had always worked for the promotion of love and oneness of humanity, not for disunity or hatred', and 'Islam emphasised the rights

⁴⁸ 'Art does not clash with Islam, says Musharraf', *Daily Times*, 10 November 2006, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C11%5C10%5Cstory_10-11-2006_pg1_5, (accessed 18 April 2012).

⁴⁹ 'Mystic poetry promotes tolerance, says Musharraf', *Daily Times*, 11 November 2006, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C11%5C11%5Cstory_11-11-2006_pg7_48, (accessed 18 April 2012).

of the people [...] people's rights had also been the hallmark of sufi poets' teachings. [...] Allama Iqbal always preached the oneness of humanity and tolerance'.

Discursive strategy: An appeal to history

To further legitimise his political rhetoric, President Musharraf relied upon three strategies found within the 'call to arms' genre in an attempt to rally popular support for non-violent action and socio-economic uplift. First, Musharraf attempted to convince the nation that Sufism was an intrinsic part of Muslim culture in Pakistan. As discussed previously, there is a close association between the exhortations of political actors and the shared historical consciousness of the public, whether real or imagined. In the above extract, Musharraf emphasised the important role Sufi saints played as exemplars and educators of Islam, morality, and human rights to positively appeal to a shared moderate and enlightened historical consciousness amongst the people of Pakistan. This is clear in the statements: 'It was the sufis who propagated Islam in South Asia', 'These sufis (saints) had always worked for the promotion of love and oneness of humanity, not for disunity or hatred', and 'Islam emphasised the rights of the people, adding that people's rights had also been the hallmark of sufi poets' teachings'.

Discursive strategy: The construction of a negative 'Other'

Second, Musharraf contrasted some of the integrative, moral, and peace-building aspects of Sufi tradition, such as 'tolerance', 'peace', 'love', 'oneness of humanity', and 'the rights of the people', with groups that caused 'disunity' and 'hatred' within Pakistani society. This strategy was intended to create a negative 'Other' in the minds of the Pakistani public and is clear in his statement: 'Sufis (saints) had always worked for the promotion of love and oneness of humanity, not for disunity or hatred'. The implication was that the in-group, by acting in accordance with 'true' Islam as practiced by Sufi saints and the majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi population, was acting in the national interest, whereas the out-group was not.

Discursive strategy: An appeal for unification behind the legitimate power source

Third, Musharraf presented a utopian vision of peace and national unity for Pakistan in order to encourage the public to unite behind the ultimate moral force within society. This is evident in his statements: 'Sufi poets' teachings can help promote tolerance and peace in society' and 'Sufis (saints) had always worked for the promotion of love and oneness of humanity, not for disunity or hatred'. As discussed, Sufism is generally concerned with matters of the soul, which are conveyed by spiritual masters to their disciples. Emphasis is placed on correct behaviour and correct belief. Musharraf believed that the violence and hatred that existed within Pakistani society could only be reversed through 'the promotion of love and oneness of humanity', which is given its fullest spiritual expression in Sufi

poetry. Moreover, the lyrics sung by Sufi *qawwals* are drawn predominantly from Sufi poetry and are aimed at drawing listeners nearer to the divine.

Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source

These discursive strategies were also employed by PML-Q Secretary-General and NCPS member Mushahid Hussain Syed in his official address at a seminar on Sufism in February 2007. The Sufi seminar, which was organised by the NCPS and the National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research (NIHCR), was held in Islamabad. Extracts taken from statements made by Mushahid Hussain Syed and other prominent commentators on Sufism were subsequently quoted in the Associated Press of Pakistan the following day:

Love, learning provides path towards peace: Mushahid [Headline]

ISLAMABAD, Feb 20 (APP): Pakistan Muslim League Secretary General Mushahid Hussain Syed Tuesday said there are no boundaries for love and learning that provide a path towards peace and harmony in the world. He was addressing a seminar on Sufism organised by Pakistan Sufi Council in collaboration with the National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research here.

Mushahid said key to change is what is in one's heart for other human beings because "without purifying ourselves we cannot come up as a good human being." Arrogance is the core of all evils and one of the basic reasons for war and confrontation across the world, Mushahid said, adding that concerted efforts are needed to promote justice and generosity globally.

Mushahid said there are 800 million Muslims in South Asia and message of Islam was spread in this region by saints who came here from other regions. He said there are also a large number of non-Muslim followers of Khwaja Ajmair Sharif who contributed a lot to promote love and harmony in the region.⁴⁰⁰

As part of the official campaign to promote a soft image of Pakistan, both domestically and internationally, Mushahid Hussain Syed relied upon an appeal to the ultimate moral force within Pakistani society (religion). In the above extract, he privileged Sufism as an enlightened and moderate alternative to the image of Pakistan as a place of terrorism, extremism, and violence. At the same time, he also presented Sufism as the solution to the problems of conflict and discord internationally. This is clear in his statement: 'there are no boundaries for love and learning that provide a path towards peace and harmony in the world'.

Discursive strategy: An appeal to history

To persuade the Pakistani public to support official efforts to construct an enlightened and moderate identity for Pakistan and its citizens by drawing on aspects of Sufi tradition, Mushahid Hussain Syed invoked a shared historical consciousness. Syed reminded the

⁴⁰⁰ 'Love, learning provides path towards peace: Mushahid', *Associated Press of Pakistan*, 20 February 2007, http://app.com.pk/en_/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4297&Itemid=2, (accessed 28 January 2012).

nation that Sufism was an intrinsic part of Muslim culture in Pakistan. This is demonstrated in his statement: 'There are 800 million Muslims in South Asia and [the] message of Islam was spread in this region by saints who came here from other regions'. Again, emphasis was placed on the important role Sufi saints played as exemplars and educators of Islam. The fact that South Asia was home to eight hundred million Muslims was presented as evidence of the popularity of Sufism and the success of Sufi saints in converting the Hindu and Buddhist population to Islam. Mushahid Hussain Syed attempted to link the popular historical consciousness surrounding one particular conversion theory in order to justify his appeal to Sufism. Again, the predominant narrative was that continuity with the nation's valued past flows from devotion to Sufism.

Discursive strategy: An appeal for unification behind the legitimate power source

To further convince the public to support official efforts to promote Sufism, Syed made an appeal based primarily on utopian social and political rewards. This is clear in his statement: 'Key to change is what is in one's heart for other human beings because without purifying ourselves we cannot come up as a good human being. Arrogance is the core of all evils and one of the basic reasons for war and confrontation across the world'. Specifically, Syed emphasised the ethical and peace-building aspects found within Sufism such as 'love', 'peace', and 'harmony'. As discussed previously, the Sufi path is generally concerned with an individual's spiritual growth, which combines correct behaviour and correct belief. By linking Sufism with social and political change, the onus for peace and national unity was placed firmly on the social and moral development of the individual. The reward would be a peaceful and harmonious society, free from religious intolerance and violence.

Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source

One week after the seminar on Sufism the Rumi Forum held a *Turkish Whirling Dervishes* performance in honour of Jalal-ud-din Rumi, in conjunction with the NCPS, Pakistan National Council of the Arts, the Ministry of Culture, and the Capital Development Authority.⁴³ Performances were held at the Convention Centre in Islamabad, the Alhamra Art Centre in Lahore, and the Art Council in Karachi. According to the Rumi Forum, more than 2,000 people watched the whirling dervishes perform at the Islamabad Convention Centre. Performances at the Alhamra Art Centre in Lahore and the Karachi Art Council attracted audiences of eight hundred and five hundred people respectively.⁴⁴ Chief guest at the Islamabad performance was Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, who was accompanied by his wife Rukhsana. Also in attendance were PML-Q President and NCPS Chairman Shujaat

⁴³ 26 June 2007 marked the 800th birth anniversary of Jalal-ud-din Balkhi Rumi. To mark the occasion, H. E. Sheikha Haya Rashed Al Khalifa, President of the United Nations General Assembly, dedicated his address at the 61st session of the UN General Assembly to the renowned poet. See, '800th Anniversary of the birth of Jalal-ud-din Balkhi Rumi', *United Nations*, 26 June 2007, <http://www.un.org/ga/president/61/statements/statement20070626.shtml>, (accessed 16 May 2012).

⁴⁴ 'Sema: The Whirling Dervishes - Rumi Forum Function', *Rumi Forum Pakistan*, 26 February 2007, <http://rumiforumpk.blogspot.com.au/2012/03/sema-whirling-dervishes-rumi-forum.html>, (accessed 16 May 2012).

Hussain, PML-Q Secretary-General and member of the NCPS Mushahid Hussain Syed, as well as various cabinet members, diplomats, and the Turkish Ambassador.⁴³ Extracts taken from statements made by the prime minister of Pakistan and members of the NCPS were quoted in the Associated Press of Pakistan:

Maulana Rumi an icon of sufism, mysticism: PM [Headline]

ISLAMABAD, Feb 26 (APP): Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz describing Maulana Jalaluddin Rumi as an icon of sufism and mysticism said Monday sufism is spreading around the world and transmitting the message of love, tolerance and brotherhood.

"Maulana Rumi is the icon of sufism and mysticism and Konya - the city of Turkey - is the center of sufism," the Prime Minister said. He made these remarks while speaking as the chief guest at a night dedicated to Rumi through a magical performance by the world-renowned "Turkish Whirling Dervishes: Sema" here at the Convention Center.

Prime Minister Aziz said Pakistan is also a land of Sufis and Mystics like Data Gang Bakhsh, Khushhal Khan Khattak, Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai and others who devoted their lives to spread Islam and the message of love and brotherhood in this region. He said Sufism is getting popular even in the West, as it carries the message of peace, love, harmony and brotherhood.

Earlier, Mushahid Hussain Syed, member of the National Sufi Council speaking on the occasion said Sufism provides the essence of Islam, which promotes love, tolerance and harmony. He said, Allama Muhammad Iqbal, who is our national poet, considered himself as a student and pupil of Maulana Rumi and got all inspiration from Maulana Rumi. Mushahid said, the National Sufi Council was formed on the initiative of President General Pervez Musharraf, who is also patron-in-chief of the council.⁴⁴

In the above extract, Prime Minister Aziz clearly emphasised Sufism as the ultimate moral authority within Pakistani society. The essential values found within Sufism, namely 'love', 'tolerance', and 'universal brotherhood' appear repeatedly in his statements: 'Sufism is spreading around the world and transmitting the message of love, tolerance and brotherhood', 'Pakistan is also a land of Sufis and Mystics like Data Gang Bakhsh, Khushhal Khan Khattak, Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai and others who devoted their lives to spread Islam and the message of love and brotherhood in this region', and 'Sufism is getting popular even in the West, as it carries the message of peace, love, harmony and brotherhood'. These themes were echoed in a statement from PML-Q Secretary-General and NCPS member Mushahid Hussain Syed, who said: 'Sufism provides the essence of Islam, which promotes love, tolerance and harmony'. The dominant narrative was that Pakistan is 'a land of Sufis' who could help to foster a peaceful, tolerant, and harmonious culture both domestically and internationally.

4.4 The decline of President Musharraf

⁴³ 'Maulana Rumi an icon of sufism, mysticism: PM', *Associated Press of Pakistan*, 26 February 2007, http://app.com.pk/en_/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4718&Itemid=2, (accessed 28 January 2012).

⁴⁴ *Associated Press of Pakistan*, 26 February 2007, (accessed 28 January 2012).

A number of events served to overshadow the official discourses of peace in 2007. According to the HRCP, Pakistan's sixtieth year as an independent nation 'proved to be one of the worst years in Pakistan's history, if not the worst'.⁴⁴⁵ Events began in early January when US Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte told the Senate Select Committee that leaders of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban were rebuilding terrorist networks from within Pakistan.

Al-Qa'ida is the terrorist organization that poses the greatest threat to US interests, including to the Homeland. [...] They continue to plot attacks against our Homeland and other targets with the objective of inflicting mass casualties. And they continue to maintain active connections and relationships that radiate outward from their leaders' secure hideout in Pakistan to affiliates throughout the Middle East, northern Africa, and Europe.⁴⁴⁶

Pakistan's Foreign Ministry rejected the claims, reconfirming its commitment in the 'war on terror'.⁴⁴⁷ Similarly, President Musharraf was quoted as saying 'the allegation that the Pakistan government or the ISI may be helping the Taliban [was] preposterous'.⁴⁴⁸

At the same time, tensions between the Musharraf-led administration and religious groups, one advocating for a progressive democratic Muslim nation and the other in favour of an Islamic state, were demonstrated in the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) controversy. The controversy began in January 2007, when the Capital Development Authority demolished a number of mosques in Islamabad, claiming they were built illegally. Female students from the Jamia Hafsa Madrassah, located in the Lal Masjid complex, occupied the children's library in protest. The Lal Masjid management, headed by brothers Abdul Rashid Ghazi and Abdul Aziz Ghazi, which itself had ignored several government vacation notices for land encroachment, condemned the demolition of the mosques. Of particular concern to the government was the increase in religious conservatism from people with links to Lal Masjid. Abdul Aziz had given the government an ultimatum 'to enforce sharia in the country otherwise clerics will Islamise society themselves'.⁴⁴⁹ Aziz also threatened to take action against brothels and gambling dens in Islamabad and elsewhere, and to prosecute perpetrators according to Shari'a law. Some of the students attempted to forcibly impose their particular social and moral code. The CII, which advises the government on matters of Shari'a law, responded by requesting that the government move to prevent Jamia Hafsa students and clerics from conducting their own anti-vice campaign in Islamabad. Members of the CII feared the 'growing lawlessness and religious extremism in the country' and

⁴⁴⁵ Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, *State of Human Rights in 2007*, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Lahore, 2008, p. 1.

⁴⁴⁶ J.D. Negroponte, 'Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence', *Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, USA*, 11 January 2007, <http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/070111/negroponte.pdf>, (accessed 25 May 2014).

⁴⁴⁷ 'US says Al Qaeda leaders are in Pakistan, Islamabad denies', *Daily Times*, 13 January 2007, <http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/main/13-Jan-2007/us-says-al-qaeda-leaders-are-in-pakistan-islamabad-denies>, (accessed 28 January 2012).

⁴⁴⁸ 'Thus spake President Musharraf', *Daily Times*, 4 February 2007, <http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/editorial/04-Feb-2007/editorial-thus-spake-general-musharraf>, (accessed 23 September 2011).

⁴⁴⁹ 'Cleric gives govt a week to impose Sharia', *Daily Times*, 31 March 2007, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C03%5C31%5Cstory_31-3-2007_pg1_2, (accessed 4 May 2012).

appealed to religious leaders to denounce sectarianism, religious extremism, and lawlessness.⁴⁵⁰

The six-month long Lal Masjid controversy ended in July, when the Pakistan military entered the mosque complex. Security forces took the mosque, Jamia Hafsa, and the children's library by force following failed talks between a delegation of ministers and clerics. The operation resulted in the deaths of more than eighty people, whilst dozens more were injured.⁴⁵¹ Two days later, in an address to the nation, President Musharraf announced the 'Lal Mosque, Jamia Hafsa and the forced occupation of Children Library has been freed from the control of terrorists'.⁴⁵² He also reconfirmed his commitment to 'eradicate terrorism and extremism from the country'.⁴⁵³ Two weeks later alleged Taliban-affiliated militants attacked the shrine of Haji Sahab Turangzi in Lakaro, Mohamand Agency (FATA), forcibly occupying the shrine and renaming it Lal Masjid. The leader of the militants, Umar Khalid, said the shrine was 'the centre of the jihad launched by Haji Sahib Turangzai against the British rulers [and] we want to take forward the missions of Haji Turangzai and Lal Masjid's slain khateeb Ghazi Abdul Rashid'.⁴⁵⁴

In this period it became clear that President Musharraf would seek re-election for a second term as president of Pakistan. However, his failure to relinquish his position of chief of army staff drew much criticism from opposition political parties and the Supreme Court of Pakistan. In March, President Musharraf suspended Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammed Chaudhry under article 209 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1973) for alleged abuses of office.⁴⁵⁵ The suspension triggered a nation-wide movement led by Pakistani lawyers in protest against the government for undermining the independence of the judiciary. The government responded by making mass arrests, and detaining many lawyers on charges of terrorism. President Musharraf also imposed curbs on electronic media under the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (Amendment) Ordinance (2007). The implementation of the ordinance triggered further anti-government opposition from journalists, politicians, and lawyers across Pakistan.

On October 18, Benazir Bhutto of the PPP returned to Pakistan following an eight-year self-imposed exile in Dubai and London. President Musharraf had granted Bhutto an amnesty from previous corruption charges, thus enabling her to return to Pakistan to campaign in the 2008 general election. The Daily Times quoted Bhutto as saying:

⁴⁵⁰ 'CII asks govt to leash extremism', *Daily Times*, 31 March 2007, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\03\31\story_31-3-2007_pg1_1, (accessed 4 May 2012).

⁴⁵¹ 'Pakistan Timeline', *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/timeline/2007.htm>, (accessed 16 May 2012).

⁴⁵² 'President's Address to the Nation', *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, 12 July 2007, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/document/papers/prisident12jul07.htm>, (accessed 16 May 2012).

⁴⁵³ *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, (accessed 16 May 2012).

⁴⁵⁴ 'Another Lal Masjid surfaces', *Daily Times*, 30 July 2007, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C07%5C30%5Cstory_30-7-2007_pg1_7, (accessed 20 April 2012).

⁴⁵⁵ 'Article 209, Supreme Judicial Council', *Supreme Court of Pakistan*, <http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/page.asp?id=434>, (accessed 25 May 2014).

It's a historic and very emotional moment for me, I am overwhelmed. [...] I have learned a lot over the last 20 years but we are still fighting a dictatorship, we want to isolate extremists and build a better Pakistan.⁴⁵⁶

In Karachi, the city of her birth, hundreds of thousands of people turned out to welcome the former prime minister home. However, as her cavalcade slowly wound its way from Jinnah International Airport to the mausoleum of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, where Bhutto was scheduled to address a rally, suicide bombers with suspected links to Al-Qaeda, attacked her procession. Ms Bhutto survived the attack, but more than one hundred and thirty people were killed and hundreds more were injured.⁴⁵⁷

Tensions between President Musharraf and the Supreme Court of Pakistan intensified in October when, following his re-election as president earlier that month, the Supreme Court delayed ratifying the decision owing to Musharraf's failure to relinquish his position of chief of army staff. The Supreme Court deemed it unconstitutional for Musharraf to hold the position whilst also holding the office of president. On November 3, a day known as Black Saturday, President Musharraf issued a Proclamation of Emergency (POE).⁴⁵⁸ Television channels and telephone lines in many cities were suspended. In the address to the nation, President Musharraf cited 'judicial activism and interference of the judiciary', as well as threats to national security by way of justification for the emergency.⁴⁵⁹

As I speak to you today, Pakistan is facing a very dangerous situation. It is suffering from an internal crisis and whatever is happening now is related to the internal disturbance. During such moments for nations, a time comes when difficult decisions have to be taken. For Pakistan too, we will have to take certain important and painful decisions. And if we do not take timely action, then God forbid it could be dangerous to Pakistan's sovereignty. [...] I would like to ask the nation, as to why that happened? Why this situation developed? For me, it is judicial activism and interference of the judiciary, which is a pillar of the state with the other two pillars, the legislative and the executive pillar.⁴⁶⁰

The imposition of martial law triggered widespread opposition within Pakistan. Resistance came from mainstream political parties, lawyers, religious leaders, civil rights groups, and the general public. Benazir Bhutto, leader of the PPP, was twice placed under house arrest by Pakistani authorities for planning to lead an anti-martial law/anti-government protest march from Lahore to Islamabad. Despite earlier rumours of a possible deal between the president and Ms Bhutto, with Musharraf to retain his position as president and Bhutto to take up the position of prime minister, Bhutto publicly called on the president to resign. The

⁴⁵⁶ 'She came, she saw...', *Daily Times*, 19 October 2007, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C10%5C19%5Cstory_19-10-2007_pg1_1, (accessed 22 April 2012).

⁴⁵⁷ 'Mastermind of failed Bhutto assassination attempt arrested', *The Guardian*, 27 February 2008, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/26/benazirbhutto.pakistan>, (accessed 27 May 2014).

⁴⁵⁸ This was followed by the Provisional Constitutional Order No. 1 of 2007, the Provisional Constitution (Amendment) Order 2007, the Oath of Office (Judges) Order 2007, and the Pakistan Army (Amendment) Ordinance 2007.

⁴⁵⁹ 'Address to the Nation', *Islamabad Policy Research Centre*, 3 November 2007, <http://ipripak.org/journal/winter2008/documents.pdf>, (accessed 4 May 2012).

⁴⁶⁰ *Islamabad Policy Research Centre*, (accessed 4 May 2012).

imposition of martial law also triggered responses from the international community. On November 16, US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte arrived in Islamabad to urge President Musharraf to end martial law and hold elections. On November 22, Pakistan was again suspended from the Commonwealth of Nations after President Musharraf failed to meet the 10-day deadline to either lift emergency rule or resign as chief of army staff. Towards the end of November the Supreme Court of Pakistan declared President Musharraf to be the winner of the presidential election. Musharraf subsequently retired his position of chief of army staff and was sworn in as president for a second term on November 29. President Musharraf lifted the Proclamation of Emergency, repealed the Provisional Constitution Order, revived the 1973 Constitution, and announced that a general election would be held in February 2008.

While these moves promised some hope of respite from the political turmoil that had plagued Pakistan during much of 2007, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on December 27 put an end to those hopes. Ms Bhutto was killed during an election rally at Liaquat Bagh in Rawalpindi. President Musharraf condemned the attack, offering his condolences to Ms Bhutto's family. He went on to say, 'this is a big tragedy for the nation, which cannot be explained in words. I am deeply grieved and condemn it strongly'.⁴⁶¹ Musharraf blamed terrorists for Ms Bhutto's assassination. During the three-day mourning period, the province of Sindh experienced widespread lawlessness and violence. Karachi suffered the worst of the violence, forcing the Karachi Stock Exchange to suspend trading for three days. Violence also broke out in other parts of Pakistan, compelling President Musharraf to place the military on high alert only weeks after lifting the emergency. Bhutto was laid to rest beside her father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in the family mausoleum in the village of Ghari Khuda Baksh. Benazir Bhutto was survived by her husband Asif Ali Zardari and their three children Bilawal, Bakhtawar, and Asifa.

In its annual report, the HRCP called 2008 a year of 'opportunities and challenges'.⁴⁶² In terms of opportunities, a general election was held on February 18 in order to elect members to the national assembly (lower house of parliament) and the four provincial assemblies. The PPP won the largest number of seats in the national assembly, followed by the PML-N (Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz), the Musharraf-led PML-Q, the MQM (Muttahida Qaumi Movement), the ANP (Awami National Party), and the MMA. In the provincial assemblies, the PML-N was dominant in Punjab, the PPP in Sindh, the PML-Q in Balochistan, and the ANP in the NWFP.⁴⁶³ Significantly, the MMA coalition of religious parties was marginalised in the provinces of Balochistan and the NWFP, thus marking a dramatic reversal of the 2002 elections. On March 24, the national assembly elected the Sufi-leaning Yousuf Raza Gillani of

⁴⁶¹ 'Address to the nation', *Islamabad Policy Research Centre*, 27 December, 2007, <http://ipripak.org/journal/winter2008/documents.pdf>, (accessed 16 May 2012).

⁴⁶² Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, *State of Human Rights in 2008*, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Lahore, 2009, p. 1.

⁴⁶³ 'Election 2008 Results', *Associated Press of Pakistan Corporation*, <http://www.app.com.pk/election>, (accessed 28 May 2014).

the PPP prime minister of Pakistan. The following day, Gillani was sworn in by President Musharraf in an official ceremony.

On August 5, the PPP and PML-N coalition met to discuss the impeachment of President Musharraf, as well as the reinstatement of the dismissed judges. In the meeting, Musharraf was accused of 'undermining the transition to democracy', weakening the federation, bringing Pakistan 'to the brink of economic impasse', and causing the country to experience the 'worst power shortage in its history'.⁶⁴ Despite the threat of impeachment charges, President Musharraf vowed that he would not resign from the office of president. However, ten days later, in a national televised address, Musharraf stood down as President of Pakistan after almost nine years of rule. Shortly thereafter, the PPP unanimously nominated the widower of the Late Benazir Bhutto, Mr Asif Ali Zardari, to represent the party in the upcoming presidential election. On September 6, Zardari was elected president with an overwhelming majority. Three days later, he was officially sworn in as president of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in a ceremony held at the presidential palace in Islamabad.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter shows how President Musharraf expanded his discourses of moderation during the latter half of his nine-year political tenure. Between 2005 and 2008, Pakistan experienced a significant increase in religious conservatism. Tensions between groups advocating for an Islamic state and those advocating for a moderate Muslim nation were revealed in various domestic and international debates and agitation concerning the place of Islam in the state and society. The first of these contestations arose following the government's decision to remove the religion column from passports. The second contestation occurred when the Hisba Bill (2005) was unanimously passed in the NWFP Provincial Assembly. The third contestation arose following the Danish cartoon controversy, which triggered large-scale, and at times violent, demonstrations across Pakistan. Each of these events were viewed by domestic and international observers as indicative of increased religious conservatism within Pakistani society, and as precursors to the establishment of an Islamic system of governance in Pakistan. At the same time, these events raised doubts over whether Pakistan really was a moderate Muslim nation as President Musharraf and his supporters contended.

Within this context was an increased official preference for Sufism. This was reflected in the rise in the presence of government officials at Sufi shrines, conferences and seminars on Sufism, and at Sufi music, art, and literature festivals. At the same time, other political actors actively supported the official preference for Sufism. English-language newspapers intensified their coverage on the subject of Sufism. This included more extensive reporting on the *urs* festivals of prominent Sufi saints, conferences and seminars on Sufism, Sufi music and arts festivals, and on the presence of government officials at Sufi shrines. The expansion of these discourses of moderation was most clearly demonstrated by the establishment of the

⁶⁴ 'Charges against Musharraf', *Daily Times*, 8 August 2008, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\08\08\story_8-8-2008_pg1_2, (accessed 23 April 2012).

National Council for the Promotion of Sufism, by the Government of Pakistan, in the latter half of 2006. Notably, the main aim of the council was to foster a peaceful, tolerant, and harmonious culture within Pakistani society. In a period of increased religious conservatism, President Musharraf privileged Sufism as the ultimate moral authority within Pakistani society in an attempt to rally popular support for non-violent action and socio-economic uplift. The following chapter demonstrates how President Zardari intensified the discourses of moderation during his political tenure. Like his predecessor, Zardari promoted Sufism as an important force for peace and unity, as well as a panacea for terrorism and extremism in Pakistan.

5 Chapter Five: President Zardari and the reconstitution of the Sufi Advisory Council, 2008-2011

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter analysed the political language of President Musharraf, and his supporters, between 2005 and 2008. The specific focus of that chapter was to show how Musharraf attempted to redefine the Islamic Republic of Pakistan through the lens of Sufism. In that period, President Musharraf increasingly privileged Sufism as the ultimate moral authority within Pakistani society in order to rally support for non-violent action and socio-economic uplift. The increased official preference for Sufism was most clearly demonstrated by the establishment of the National Council for the Promotion of Sufism, in the latter half of 2006. The main aim of the council was to foster a peaceful, tolerant, and harmonious culture within Pakistani society. However, actively resisting the state-sanctioned version of Islamic piety were Muslims who were committed to the primacy of a narrowly conceived Islamic system of governance in Pakistan. Tensions between religious groups and proponents of the state-sanctioned identity were revealed in a number of debates and agitation concerning the place of Islam in the state and society. Tensions were also demonstrated in the rise in targeted attacks on Sufi shrines, which was one physical example of the way in which the official construction of a Sufi identity was contested. All of these events served to cast doubts over whether Pakistan really was a moderate Muslim nation, as President Musharraf and his supporters contended.

This chapter takes a similar approach to that of the previous chapter. It critically analyses the political language of President Zardari, and his supporters, between 2008 and 2011. The specific focus of this chapter is to show how Zardari attempted to redefine the Islamic Republic of Pakistan through the lens of Sufism. Like his predecessor, Zardari promoted Sufism as an important force for peace and unity, as well as a panacea for terrorism and extremism in Pakistan. The continued official preference for Sufism is most clearly demonstrated by the reconstitution of the National Sufi Council in 2009. Like its precursor, the aim of the council was to create a 'soft image' of Pakistan by encouraging its citizens to form a unified community under a single national identity, interact peaceably, and progress socially and economically. However, like his predecessor, President Zardari also faced opposition from groups that actively resisted the state-sanctioned version of Islamic piety. At the same time, a number of events served to present a contradiction between his discourses of peace and the socio-political realities. Pakistan experienced an increase in terrorist-related incidents and fatalities across all four of its provinces, and in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, as well as an increase in attacks on Sufi shrines. Most significantly, the assassination of Governor Taseer by his Barelvi bodyguard, and the considerable expressions of support from the Barelvi community for the assassin, deeply challenged official assertions that Sufism was a reliable force for peace, unity, and non-violent action against extremism in Pakistan.

5.2 Opportunities and challenges for the new administration, 2008 – 2009

5.2.1 A return to civilian rule

After almost nine years of military rule under President Pervez Musharraf, the general election of February 2008 returned the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to a civilian government. Yousuf Raza Gillani of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) was sworn in as prime minister on March 25. On September 9, Asif Ali Zardari was sworn in as president. President Zardari revealed his political philosophy in his inaugural presidential address to the joint session of parliament on September 20. In his address, Zardari promised to eliminate terrorism and extremism, strengthen the federation, build provincial autonomy, revive the economy and restore investor confidence, uphold the independence of the judiciary and freedom of the press, and develop democracy.⁴⁶⁵ In short, President Zardari's political focus during the early phase of his leadership was on working towards socio-economic development, national cohesion, good governance, and democracy for Pakistan. Interestingly, those policy objectives were not too dissimilar from those put forward by his military predecessor, President Musharraf. For the HRCP the return to a democratically elected civilian government was viewed as an opportunity for the leaders of Pakistan to provide meaningful civil and political rights protections to the nation's citizens.⁴⁶⁶

Shortly after President Zardari delivered his inaugural presidential address, a suicide bomber detonated a truck filled with explosives in front of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad. The explosion took place in the heart of Pakistan's capital, less than two kilometres from Parliament House where Zardari had given his address. The hotel was close to the Secretariat, the official residences of the president and the prime minister of Pakistan, the Intelligence Bureau, the headquarters of the National Bank of Pakistan, and the World Bank. The hotel was also close to the walled diplomatic enclave, which is home to a number of international embassies including the US embassy and the Australian and British High Commissions. The explosion, which killed approximately sixty people and injured hundreds more, served to further reinforce domestic and international concerns regarding the need for stronger anti-terrorism measures in Pakistan.⁴⁶⁷

Less than one week later, President Zardari addressed the 63rd session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. In his address, Zardari introduced the Benazir Bhutto Doctrine of Reconciliation, which he stated was intended to 'combat dictatorship and terrorism, while promoting social and economic reforms and justice for the people of

⁴⁶⁵ 'President Asif Ali Zardari: Address to the Joint Session of Parliament', *The Islamic Republic of Pakistan*, 20 September 2008, <http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/index.php?lang=en&opc=3&sel=1&pId=15&pNum=6>, (accessed 16 May 2012).

⁴⁶⁶ Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2009, p. 1.

⁴⁶⁷ 'Pakistan's 9/11 kills 60, injures 200; Nation mourns; Terrorists hit back hours after Zardari's warning', *Daily Times*, 21 September 2008, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C09%5C21%5Cstory_21-9-2008_pg1_1, (accessed 23 April 2012).

Pakistan'.⁴⁸⁸ For President Zardari, 'economic justice' and 'political democracy' were essential in the fight against terrorism and extremism. A consortium of foreign ministers from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as representatives from the European Union and United Kingdom, who met on the margins of the UN General Assembly to form the Friends of Democratic Pakistan, supported these policy objectives. The Friends agreed to work strategically with Pakistan in the areas of stability, development, border areas, energy, and institution building to 'promote peace and stability in both the country and the region'.⁴⁸⁹

5.2.2 The PPP and Islam

Like his predecessor, President Zardari faced the challenge of convincing the public to support his decision to continue the unpopular policy of cooperating with the United States in the 'war on terror'. Zardari also undertook to encourage a culture of unity and peaceable interaction within Pakistani society. In order to achieve those aims, Zardari relied upon a combination of strategies that were directly associated with the main sources of moral authority in Pakistani society: the nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam). As discussed previously, most political parties in Pakistan draw on Islam to claim legitimacy from a Muslim-majority population. After 9/11, however, the previous government privileged aspects of the Sufi tradition in order to claim religious authority and political legitimacy. At the same time, it attempted to distance Sufism from a more narrowly conceived legalist Islam. The government also claimed that aspects of the Sufi tradition could assist in achieving religious and communal harmony, and curb religious extremism. In this, the new Zardari-led PPP government continued the policies of its predecessor.

Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source

The below extract from the PPP Manifesto (2008) demonstrates the party's preference for Islam in general and Sufism in particular. It also demonstrates the continued reliance on Sufism by political parties for religious authority and political legitimacy, as well as national integration, and moral and peace-building purposes.

The first principle of the Party is: Islam is our Faith. Islam teaches brotherhood, love and peace. Our Faith places a responsibility on each citizen to reach out in a spirit of accommodation and tolerance to all religions and sects and to treat people of all faiths with respect, enabling them to enjoy religious freedom and equality before the law. The message of Islam is the message of Peace. It is a message of brotherhood and tolerance. These are symbolised in the words and verses of Data Sahib, Shah Abdul Latif of Bhattai, Baba Farid Ganj Shakar and Lal Shahbaz Qalander. The Sufi saints adopted a life of simple living and high

⁴⁸⁸ 'Address to the UN General Assembly', *The Islamic Republic of Pakistan*, 26 September 2008, <http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/index.php?lang=en&opc=3&sel=1&pId=16&pNum=5>, (accessed 16 May 2012).

⁴⁸⁹ 'Statement by the Chairmen of the Friends of Pakistan', *US Department of State*, 26 September 2008, <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/friends/131019.htm>, (accessed 23 April 2012).

thinking. It's time we did the same. By no means did they use or preach the use of force.⁶⁷⁰

While the manifesto clearly states that the foremost principle of the party is Islam, the PPP privileged Sufism as the ultimate moral force within Pakistani society. It did so by linking three dominant narratives. In the first narrative, Islam was presented as a religion of 'love', 'tolerance', 'brotherhood', and 'peace'. These approbatory themes appear repeatedly in the above extract. These themes, which are also a prominent feature of the Sufi tradition, were then directly linked to four of Pakistan's most renowned Sufi saints: Data Ganj Bakhsh, Abdul Latif Bhittai, Baba Fariduddin Ganj Shakar, and Lal Shahbaz Qalandar. In the second narrative, emphasis was placed on the exemplary belief and behaviour of these Sufi saints who, according to the manifesto, 'adopted a life of simple living and high thinking'. For Pakistan's majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi population these qualities are a distinguishing characteristic of many Sufi saints. In the third narrative, emphasis was placed on the peaceable manner in which these Sufi saints brought Islam to the subcontinent. According to the manifesto, 'by no means did they use or preach the use of force'. In this way, the manifesto aimed to firmly link the political and philosophical ideology of the PPP-led government to Islam by way of the Sufi tradition.

The official preference for Sufism was again demonstrated towards the end of 2008 when Fakhar Zaman, chairman of Pakistan Academy of Letters (PAL), and prominent member of the Zardari-led PPP, announced the intention to reconstitute the National Sufi Council (NSC).⁶⁷¹ As discussed in the previous chapter, the National Council for the Promotion of Sufism was first formed in 2006 under the Musharraf-led PML-Q government. The main aim of the council was to 'spread the Sufi message of love, tolerance and universal brotherhood [to] integrate regional diversity with national unity'.⁶⁷² Sufism was positioned as the main source of moral authority for Pakistan at a time when Islam had become synonymous with intolerance, militancy, and terrorism. The Musharraf-led government privileged Sufism as an enlightened and moderate alternative to the image of Pakistan as a place of terrorism, extremism, and violence. The NCPS worked primarily alongside the Ministry of Culture, Pakistan National Council of the Arts (PNCA), the Ministry of Education, and Pakistan Academy of Letters (PAL). Its objective was to promote and disseminate the official construction of Sufism at conferences, seminars, workshops, music, art and literature festivals, and through affiliations to educational institutions and scholars. According to Fakhar Zaman, the reconstituted NSC would follow a similar strategy.

Shortly after that announcement a two-day National Literature Conference and International Sufism Seminar, organised by Pakistan Academy of Letters and the Allama Iqbal Open University, was held in Islamabad. Federal Minister for Education Mir Hazar Khan Bijarani

⁶⁷⁰ 'Towards peace and prosperity in Pakistan: Manifesto 2008', *Pakistan Peoples Party*, <http://www.ppp.org.pk/new/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/manifesto2008.pdf>, (accessed 20 June 2014).

⁶⁷¹ 'Literary activities promotion: PAL to set up literary TV channel, FM radio station', *Daily Times*, 8 November 2008, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C11%5C08%5Cstory_8-11-2008_pg11_10, (accessed 3 August 2011).

⁶⁷² *Daily Times*, 22 September 2006, (accessed 23 September 2011).

addressed the opening ceremony. In his address the minister emphasised the important role of literature in the 'socio-cultural progress of society'.⁴⁷³ He then went on to praise the efforts of NSC Chairman Fakhar Zaman and PAL in promoting and disseminating Sufi literature in Pakistan. Significantly, Minister Bijarani said that literature 'can play a very important role in today's turbulent times, as it creates the atmosphere of dialogue and harmony in society'.⁴⁷⁴ Adding his support to these sentiments was Fakhar Zaman, who called for 'the revival of Sufi literature' which he said was 'essential for the promotion of tolerance and peace in the society'.⁴⁷⁵

5.2.3 Mumbai bombings

Renewed calls for tolerance and peace within Pakistani society followed in the wake of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India, which had important ramifications for Pakistan. On Wednesday November 26, 2008, Mumbai experienced several attacks on the Chhatrapati Shivaji Railway Terminus, Nariman House, Leopold Cafe, Cama Hospital, the Taj Mahal Palace, and the Oberoi Trident hotel, as well as explosions in two taxis. Approximately two hundred people were killed and more than three hundred were injured in the attacks.⁴⁷⁶ The attacks drew international condemnation and prompted much speculation as to the possible role of Pakistan-based militant groups. According to SATP, Mumbai police sources said that there was 'preliminary evidence that operatives of the Pakistan-based LeT carried out the *Fidayeen* (suicide squad) attacks in Mumbai'.⁴⁷⁷ Muhammad Ajmal Amir Qasab, one of the gunmen captured during the attack on the Taj Mahal hotel, and a suspected LeT activist, said that the group had travelled to Mumbai by boat from Karachi in Pakistan. Qasab was said to be a resident of Faridkot, near Multan (Punjab). LeT spokesperson Abdullah Gaznavai condemned the terrorist attacks in Mumbai and denied the group had any involvement.⁴⁷⁸

In his address to the Indian nation, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said:

The well-planned and well-orchestrated attacks, probably with external linkages, were intended to create a sense of panic, by choosing high profile targets and indiscriminately killing foreigners. [...] We will take up strongly with our neighbours that the use of their territory for launching attacks on us will not be tolerated, and that there would be a cost if suitable measures are not taken by them. We will take a number of measures to strengthen the hands of our police and intelligence authorities. We will curb the flow of funds to suspect organizations. We will restrict the entry of suspects into the country. We will go after these individuals and organizations and make sure that every perpetrator, organizer and supporter of terror, whatever his affiliation or

⁴⁷³ 'National Literature Conference: Literature plays vital role in socio-cultural progress of society: Bijarani', *Daily Times*, 20 December 2008, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C12%5C20%5Cstory_20-12-2008_pg11_7, (accessed 27 January 2012).

⁴⁷⁴ *Daily Times*, 20 December 2008, (accessed 27 January 2012).

⁴⁷⁵ *Daily Times*, 20 December 2008, (accessed 27 January 2012).

⁴⁷⁶ 'India Timeline – Year 2008', *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/timeline/2008.htm>, (accessed 2 June 2014).

⁴⁷⁷ *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, (accessed 2 June 2014).

⁴⁷⁸ *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, (accessed 2 June 2014).

religion may be, pays a heavy price for these cowardly and horrific acts against our people.⁴⁷⁹

With the Indian government placing responsibility firmly on Pakistan, the Mumbai attacks threatened to disrupt Indo-Pak relations and the possibility of a combined Indo-Pak anti-terrorism strategy for the region. While the Government of Pakistan pledged to cooperate with India in the investigation, it found itself under considerable domestic and international pressure to take stronger steps to rid Pakistani society of extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism. Like President Musharraf in the wake of the 7/7 attacks on London, President Zardari was compelled to make significant domestic reforms. As part of his reform policy, Zardari intensified his predecessor's campaign to encourage the people of Pakistan to form a unified community under a single national identity, interact peaceably, and progress both socially and economically. He did so by appealing to a specific type of territorial nationalism, in conjunction with a moderate Islam.

5.2.4 The increase in terrorist-related incidents and fatalities in Pakistan

In 2009, the new PPP government faced a number of opportunities and challenges. However, accounts from human rights agencies and other commentators suggest that the challenges faced by the government far outweighed the opportunities. In its annual report, Human Rights Watch described 2009 as 'another tumultuous year in Pakistan'.⁴⁸⁰ SATP went further, describing it as the 'bloodiest year yet'.⁴⁸¹ According to SATP, Pakistan experienced an increase in terrorist-related incidents and terrorist-related fatalities across all four of its provinces, as well as in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).⁴⁸²

The increase in terrorist-related fatalities was particularly acute in the FATA and NWFP, as the Pakistan Taliban (TTP) progressively imposed its authority across the Pashtun areas of Pakistan. FATA was pronounced the 'epicentre of lawlessness' by SATP.⁴⁸³ In early January 2009, the Taliban established Shari'a courts in Orakzai Agency (FATA) and demanded that the Sikh community pay the widely obsolete *jiziyah*. In April, the Taliban enforced Shari'a law in Bajaur Agency (FATA). Barber shops were forbidden from shaving men's beards and women were instructed to avoid public places unless in the company of a male relative.⁴⁸⁴ Also in April, Shari'a law was formally introduced in parts of the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA), including the districts of Swat and Malakand (NWFP). Controversially, President Zardari signed the Shari'a Nizam-e-Adl Regulation (2009) into the constitution following a resolution by the national assembly in its favour. The Regulation was the result of an agreement made in February between the federal government, the

⁴⁷⁹ 'PM's address to the Nation', *Press Information Bureau, Government of India*, 27 November 2008, <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=45116>, (accessed 2 June 2014).

⁴⁸⁰ 'World Report 2009 – Pakistan', *Human Rights Watch*, 14 January 2009, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49705f9555.html>, (accessed 24 May 2012).

⁴⁸¹ 'Pakistan Assessment 2010', *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/assessment2010.htm>, (accessed 4 June 2014).

⁴⁸² *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, (accessed 4 June 2014).

⁴⁸³ *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, (accessed 4 June 2014).

⁴⁸⁴ *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, (accessed 4 June 2014).

NWFP provincial government (ANP), and the TTP-backed Tanzim Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammad (TNSM), which allowed for Shari'a law in the region in return for peace. The TNSM, the TTP, and the NWFP provincial government all welcomed the passage of the regulation in the national assembly. Notably, members of the national assembly (MNAs) from the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) abstained from voting on the Regulation. MNA Farooq Sattar said the MQM was opposed to any agreement made at gunpoint.⁸⁵ The leader of the TNSM, Sufi Muhammad,⁸⁶ responded by saying that 'parliamentarians who opposed the promulgation of Nizam-e-Adl Regulation in the National Assembly are no longer Muslims'.⁸⁷ The debate on the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation reignited tensions over who is, and who is not, a Muslim in Pakistan.

Similarly, the provinces of Balochistan, the Punjab, and Sindh all experienced an increase in terrorist-related fatalities in 2009. In Balochistan, the Taliban and pro-Taliban supporters had made significant inroads into parts of east and west Quetta, the provincial capital. Notably, Quetta had become a refuge for many leaders of the Afghan Taliban who had fled Afghanistan after 2001. According to SATP, the so-called *Quetta Shura* (executive council) controlled Taliban activities in Afghanistan from its base in Quetta. Parts of the city had subsequently become extremely dangerous for Pakistani citizens.⁸⁸ At the same time, pro-independence Baloch-nationalist groups intensified their freedom struggle, further destabilising the security situation in Balochistan. Similarly, the Punjab experienced increased suicide attacks, which brought terrorism from the Pashtun-areas of Pakistan to the major cities of Islamabad, Lahore, and Rawalpindi.⁸⁹ The Pakistan Taliban and pro-Taliban supporters targeted the security forces, markets, religious processions, and mosques.⁹⁰ The Pakistan Taliban, in conjunction with Al-Qaeda and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), threatened to attack government buildings in the province.⁹¹ The province of Sindh also experienced an increase in terrorist-related incidents and fatalities. Reports of a Taliban infiltration into the province sparked fears that the Pakistan Taliban, in conjunction with Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), were planning terrorist activities in the nation's financial capital, Karachi.⁹²

⁸⁵ 'President signs Nizam-e-Adl after NA nod', *Daily Times*, 14 April 2009, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C04%5C14%5Cstory_14-4-2009_pg1_1, (accessed 25 April 2012).

⁸⁶ Maulana Sufi Muhammad was born in Lal Qila, Dir District (NWFP). His ancestors were Tajik tribal people who emigrated from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Muhammad received a religious education, completing his studies at Darul Uloom Haqqania, a Deobandi religious seminary in Saidu Sharif, Swat Valley (NWFP). Muhammad fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. He also fought with the Taliban in Afghanistan against the United States after 9/11. Sufi Muhammad was a member of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) in the 1980s. He established Tanzim Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammad (TNSM) in the early 1990s. President Musharraf proscribed the TNSM in 2002. Ideologically, Sufi Muhammad is influenced by both the Deobandi and the Wahhabi schools of thought. His primary aim is the implementation of the Shari'a in Pakistan. See, I. Ali, 'Militant or Peace Broker? A Profile of the Swat Valley's Maulana Sufi Muhammad', *The Jamestown Foundation*, 2009, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34758&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=412&no_cache=1#.VHfuqb6sjdk, (accessed 28 November 2014).

⁸⁷ 'MPs who opposed Nizam-e-Adl are no longer Muslims: Sufi', *Daily Times*, 18 April 2009, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C04%5C18%5Cstory_18-4-2009_pg7, (accessed 25 April 2012).

⁸⁸ *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, (accessed 4 June 2014).

⁸⁹ *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, (accessed 4 June 2014).

⁹⁰ Pak Institute of Peace Studies, *Pakistan Security Report 2009*, PIPS, Islamabad, 2010.

⁹¹ *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, (accessed 4 June 2014).

⁹² *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, (accessed 4 June 2014).

5.2.5 The attack on the shrine of Rehman Baba

On March 5, 2009, the shrine of Abdur Rehman Baba, located in the Hazar Khwani area on the eastern outskirts of Peshawar (NWFP), was badly damaged in a suspected Taliban attack. Rehman Baba is a popular seventeenth-century Pashtun poet-saint, often ascribed with 'opposing oppression and advocating peace and tolerance'.⁴⁹³ The HRCP condemned the attack on the shrine, saying that Rehman Baba was 'a national poet not only of the Pashtun people, but of the whole of Pakistan'.⁴⁹⁴ Similarly, the Daily Times stated that Rehman Baba was a 'cultural symbol of the Pashtun and Afghan people' and that the main Sufi orders of the subcontinent 'have claimed him as their own, so great was his appeal among the masses'.⁴⁹⁵

The attack on the shrine of Rehman Baba was the first of many attacks on Sufi shrines in Pakistan in 2009. In the two-month period between March and May of that year, the PIPS and Terrorism Watch reported that five shrines, including that of Rehman Baba, had been subject to terrorist-related attacks, primarily in the conflict-hit regions of the NWFP and FATA.⁴⁹⁶ This was a significant increase compared to the four-year period between 2005 and 2008 which experienced eight terrorist-related attacks on Sufi shrines in total. The terrorist-related attacks on Sufi shrines in Pakistan between 2005 and 2009 are shown in Figure 3 below.

⁴⁹³ 'HRCP slams Rehman Baba mausoleum bombing', *Daily Times*, 6 March 2009, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\03\06\story_6-3-2009_pg7_21, (accessed 25 April 2012).

⁴⁹⁴ *Daily Times*, 6 March 2009, (accessed 25 April 2012).

⁴⁹⁵ 'Editorial: Attack on Rehman Baba is attack on Pashtun identity', *Daily Times*, 7 March 2009, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C03%5C07%5Cstory_7-3-2009_pg3_1, (accessed 25 April 2012).

⁴⁹⁶ Between March and May, 2009, the shrines of Rehman Baba (NWFP), Bahadur Baba (NWFP), Khayal Muhammad (FATA), Omar Baba (NWFP), and Amir Hamza Shinwari (FATA) were attacked. See, *Pak Institute of Peace Studies*, 25 May 2011, (accessed 14 September 2011); and Terrorism Watch, (accessed 15 May 2012).




Figure 2: Terrorist-related attacks on Sufi shrines in Pakistan, 2005-2009⁸⁷

The custodians of the Rehman baba shrine said they had received a letter only days before the attack warning against allowing women to visit the shrine, and against the promotion of ‘shrine culture’.⁸⁸ As previously discussed, in Pakistan the greatest number of Sufis belong to the majority Barelvi tradition. Many Sufi shrines welcome women devotees who go to pray and celebrate rituals, often singing and dancing alongside men. Adherents of the Barelvi School of thought are also in favour of preserving the unique forms of Islamic belief and practice that had developed over time in the subcontinent. For example, Barelvis place great importance on the many popular traditions associated with Sufism, such as the intercession of saints, saint worship, annual *urs* celebrations, and devotional music. Conversely, Deoband and Ahle-Hadith groups criticise ‘shrine culture’ as *bidah* and aim to purify Islam of elements considered not in conformity with their own narrow interpretation of the Qur’an and the Sunnah. The attacks on these shrines is one physical example of the ways in which ‘correct’ forms of religious identity, belief, and practice, was contested in Pakistan.

5.3 The formation of the National Sufi Council (NSC)

Alongside the increase in terrorist-related incidents and fatalities, particularly in the major cities of Islamabad, Lahore, Rawalpindi, and Karachi, President Zardari intensified his discourses of peace in an attempt to transform existing social, economic, and political conditions. On June 1, 2009, the Government of Pakistan’s Ministry of Religious Affairs announced the decision to reconstitute the National Sufi Council. According to Notification

⁸⁷ See, *Pak Institute of Peace Studies*, 25 May 2011, (accessed 14 September 2011); and Terrorism Watch, (accessed 15 May 2012).

⁸⁸ ‘Taliban blow up 17th century sufi shrine in Peshawar’, *Daily Times*, 6 March 2009, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C03%5C06%5Cstory_6-3-2009_pg7_2, (accessed 24 April 2012).

No. 7(1)/09-DD(R&S), the Sufi Advisory Council was reconstituted with immediate effect and renamed the National Sufi Council (NSC).⁴⁹⁹ The function of the NSC was to:

- I. Bring forth the soft image of Islam through spreading the Sufi message of love, tolerance and universal brotherhood across the world and amongst the masses of the area;
- II. Propose steps to free religious thought from the rigidity imposed by some ulama;
- III. Emphasize in the Islamic teachings the element of God's love and mercy for His creation rather than His wrath and retribution;
- IV. Determine the ways of practice what one professes and not merely indulges in slogans and soliloquist stress the essence of faith rather than mere observance of formalities;
- V. Establish Sufi Centers of excellence and patronize research activities on various facets of Sufism, to confer national and international scholarships for research work on Sufism, recommend annual awards for promotion of Sufism and achievements in the related fields;
- VI. Glorify the revered Sufi Saints and their mausoleums not just as Centers of holiness but also as centers of learning and teaching;
- VII. Demolish the edifice of false values based on pelf and power and restore morality to its proper place in the niche of Muslim society;
- VIII. Combat the fissiparous tendencies and centrifugal forces which were spreading their tentacles in the Muslim world; and
- IX. Discourage parochial feelings and eliminate racial pride which had assumed primary importance in Muslim thinking relegating the ideal of brotherhood to a secondary place.⁵⁰⁰

Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source

The above terms of reference reveal the preferred state-sanctioned version of Islamic piety. The Zardari-led government privileged Sufism as the ultimate moral force within Pakistani society. Notably, the terms of reference were identical to that of its precursor, the NCPS,

⁴⁹⁹ Government of Pakistan: Ministry of Religious Affairs, 1 June 2009, (accessed 14 August 2010).

⁵⁰⁰ Government of Pakistan: Ministry of Religious Affairs, 1 June 2009, (accessed 14 August 2010).

which was formed at the behest of President Musharraf three years earlier. Like its predecessor, the government relied upon Sufism in order to appeal to the shared religious consciousness of the majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi population in Pakistan. The main aim was to create a 'soft image' of the nation by encouraging the Muslims of Pakistan to form a unified community under a single national identity, interact peaceably, and progress socially and economically. This is demonstrated most visibly by the first term of reference, which states that one of the functions of the council was to 'bring forth the soft image of Islam through spreading the Sufi message of love, tolerance and universal brotherhood across the world and amongst the masses of the area'. At the same time, Sufism was also ascribed with being able to engender tolerance 'across the world'.³⁰¹

Discursive strategy: The construction of a negative 'Other'

In order to convince the public to unite behind the ultimate moral force within Pakistani society, the government attempted to create a negative 'Other'. It did so by placing the *batin* aspects of Islam in direct contrast to the *zahir* aspects of Islam, in an attempt to distance Sufism from a narrowly conceived legalist Islam. The negative features of the out-group (opponents of the state-sanctioned discourse) were emphasised through the use of pejorative concepts. For example, one term of reference suggests that the rigid Islamic teachings of some *ulama* hinder the ability or willingness for tolerance in religious thought. Another states that some Islamic teachings focus solely on God's 'wrath and retribution'. Further terms of reference suggest that some Islamic teachings promote 'false values' based on ill-gotten gains and power, are divisive, and encourage parochial attitudes, thereby 'relegating the ideal of brotherhood to a secondary place'.³⁰²

Conversely, the positive aspects of the in-group (the government and supporters of the state-sanctioned discourse) were emphasised through the use of approbatory concepts. For example, the first term of reference states that the Sufi message of 'love, tolerance and universal brotherhood' will present a soft image of Islam both nationally and internationally. Another term of reference asserts that Sufism will 'free religious thought from the rigidity imposed by some *ulama*'. Further terms of reference state that Sufism places emphasis on 'God's love and mercy for His creation rather than His wrath and retribution', stresses 'the essence of faith rather than mere observance of formalities', and will 'restore morality to its proper place in the niche of Muslim society'.³⁰³ By emphasising the positive aspects of the in-group, the Government of Pakistan aimed to create an image of what the out-group was not. In short, the negative 'Other' was presented as anyone who was neither peaceful nor tolerant. The negative 'Other' was presented as anyone who threatened 'true' Islam as practiced by the majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi community.

³⁰¹ *Government of Pakistan: Ministry of Religious Affairs*, 1 June 2009, (accessed 14 August 2010).

³⁰² *Government of Pakistan: Ministry of Religious Affairs*, 1 June 2009, (accessed 14 August 2010).

³⁰³ *Government of Pakistan: Ministry of Religious Affairs*, 1 June 2009, (accessed 14 August 2010).

In order to encourage the public to unite behind the ultimate moral force within society, President Zardari chose to present a utopian vision of peace and national unity for Pakistan which could only be achieved through Sufism. The NSC terms of reference reveal the official narrative: that Sufism was an important means by which to bring about peace, unity, and non-violent action against extremism in Pakistan. According to the terms of reference, devotion to Sufism, and to certain revered Sufi saints and their shrines, would help 'bring forth the soft image of Islam', 'free religious thought from rigidity', 'emphasise God's love and mercy, stress the essence of faith', 'restore morality to its proper place in Muslim society', 'combat fissiparous tendencies in the Muslim world', and 'discourage parochial feelings'.⁵⁰⁴

Less than two weeks after the reconstitution of the National Sufi Council, a suicide bomber killed a leading Barelvi religious scholar after Friday prayers. Dr Sarfraz Naeemi, a vocal Taliban critic, was the principal of the Jamia Naeemia Madrassah in the city of Lahore, where the attack occurred. Dr Naeemi had openly criticised the Taliban for its particular application of Shari'a, declared a *fatwa* against suicide bombings, which he considered un-Islamic, and called for 'Ahle Sunnat clerics [to] come forward and protect Islam and Pakistan'.⁵⁰⁵ According to Dawn newspaper, the Pakistan Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack.⁵⁰⁶ In Lahore, hundreds of students and supporters came out in protest against his murder, blocking roads and chanting anti-Taliban slogans. Violence broke out in parts of Karachi, compelling many shops to close. Both President Zardari and Prime Minister Gillani condemned the attack. Governor (Punjab) Salman Taseer said that 'Dr Naeemi promoted the message of love, tolerance, brotherhood and sectarian harmony but his voice was silenced.'⁵⁰⁷

5.4 Contestations over who is (and who is not) a Muslim in Pakistan, 2010 – 2011

5.4.1 Targeting symbols of Sufi spirituality

In 2010, Pakistan experienced a further increase in terrorist-related incidents and fatalities in the provinces of Balochistan and Sindh, as well as in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). However, there was a slight drop in terrorist-related fatalities in the Punjab and in the NWFP owing to the cessation of military engagement between security forces and militants.⁵⁰⁸ In its 2010 annual report, the HRCP stated:

⁵⁰⁴ *Government of Pakistan: Ministry of Religious Affairs*, 1 June 2009, (accessed 14 August 2010).

⁵⁰⁵ 'Anti-Taliban views cost Mufti Naeemi his life', *Daily Times*, 13 June 2009, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C06%5C13%5Cstory_13-6-2009_pg13_5, (accessed 26 April 2012).

⁵⁰⁶ 'Suicide bomber kills anti-Taliban cleric Allama Naeemi', *Dawn*, 13 June 2009, <http://www.dawn.com/news/848443/suicide-bomber-kills-anti-taliban-cleric-allama-naeemi>, (accessed 15 July 2014).

⁵⁰⁷ 'Attack attempt to disturb peace, flare sectarian conflict: Ulema', *The Nation*, 14 June 2009, <http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Lahore/14-Jun-2009/Attack-attempt-to-disturb-peace-flare-sectarian-conflict-Ulema/1/1>, (accessed 28 January 2012).

⁵⁰⁸ *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, (accessed 4 June 2014).

The year was a particularly bad one for religious freedoms in Pakistan and all indications suggest that worse times are in store. There was a direct link between the rise of the Taliban and the suppression and oppression of the minorities and of all those whose beliefs differed with those of the extremists or who dared to expose hatred and violence in the name of religion.⁵⁰⁹

In the twelve-month period between January and December, the PIPS and Terrorism Watch reported that seventeen Sufi shrines had been subject to terrorist-related attacks in Pakistan in 2010.⁵¹⁰ The Pakistan Taliban and pro-Taliban supporters continued to attack shrines in the regions of the NWFP and FATA.⁵¹¹ While attacks on places of worship were not uncommon, particularly in the conflict-hit regions of Pakistan, the attacks on Sufi shrines in 2010 marked a ‘watershed’ according to the PIPS.⁵¹² In this period, the Pakistan Taliban and pro-Taliban supporters brought terrorism from the Pashtun-areas of Pakistan to the major cities of Pakistan, attacking beloved shrines in Lahore and Karachi. The terrorist-related attacks on Sufi shrines in Pakistan in 2010 are shown in Figure 3 below.




Figure 3: Terrorist-related attacks on Sufi shrines in Pakistan, 2010⁵¹³

On July 1, 2010, three suicide bombers attacked the shrine of Abul Hassan Ali Hajvery in Lahore, the capital of the Punjab, and Pakistan’s second largest city. The attack killed forty-five people and injured more than 175.⁵¹⁴ Thousands of pilgrims had gathered at the shrine on Thursday evening for the special weekly prayers when the attack occurred. The saint,

⁵⁰⁹ Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, *State of Human Rights in 2010*, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Lahore, 2011, p. 2.

⁵¹⁰ See, *Pak Institute of Peace Studies*, 25 May 2011, (accessed 14 September 2011); and Terrorism Watch, (accessed 15 May 2012).

⁵¹¹ The NWFP was officially renamed Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa in 2010.

⁵¹² *Pak Institute of Peace Studies*, 25 May 2011, (accessed 14 September 2011).

⁵¹³ See, *Pak Institute of Peace Studies*, 25 May 2011, (accessed 14 September 2011); and Terrorism Watch, (accessed 15 May 2012).

⁵¹⁴ *Pak Institute of Peace Studies*, 25 May 2011, (accessed 14 September 2011).

popularly known as Data Ganj Bakhsh or Data Sahib, is one of Pakistan's most revered Sufi saints and his shrine is one of the nation's most important. The Express Tribune reported:

The Darbar is a landmark in Lahore. More importantly, it is a symbol of a side of Islam that is dear to Pakistanis, especially in these times. It is the liberal peace-loving faith as practised by the Sufis, the mystics and indeed, generations of the subcontinent. This Islam that many believe to be the true aspect of the religion has been and is under threat by the extremists.⁵³⁵

The attack drew strong condemnation from President Zardari, Prime Minister Gillani, and the Pakistani public. In the days following the attack, thousands of people came out in protest across Lahore. A consortium of religious organisations led a major protest at the shrine after Friday prayers. The Sunni Ittehad Council also announced a nation-wide strike in protest against the attack.⁵³⁶ A red alert was declared across Lahore, with police assigned to sensitive buildings and installations, including minority and foreign installations, mosques, railway stations, bus depots, and airports.⁵³⁷ Despite the increased security, two people were injured when a bomb was detonated near the shrine of Baba Khaki Shah in the Green Town area of Lahore the following month.

The attacks on the shrine of Lahore's beloved saint prompted the Sindh Home Department, and intelligence and law enforcement agencies in the shrine-rich province of Sindh, to increase security at important places of worship, including eighty Sufi shrines.⁵³⁸ Despite this, on October 7, 2010, nine people were killed and seventy-five were injured in a suicide attack on the shrine of Abdullah Shah Ghazi in Clifton (Sindh). Clifton, an affluent coastal suburb of Karachi, is a designated red zone owing to the presence of a number of consulates, educational institutions, and sites of interest including Bilawal House, which belongs to one of Pakistan's most famous families, the Bhutto family. In the days that followed, political and religious leaders strongly condemned the attack. The Sunni Tehreek announced it would observe three days of mourning, and demanded the government make arrests within that time. As in Lahore, thousands of people staged demonstrations across Karachi, some of which turned violent, causing many businesses to close.

Less than three weeks after the attack on the shrine of Abdullah Shah Ghazi, a bomb, hidden in a milk container on the back of a parked motorbike, was detonated outside the shrine of Baba Fariduddin Ganj Shakar in Pakpattan (Punjab). While the shrine itself was undamaged, seven people were killed and twenty-five were injured in the explosion. Popularly known as Baba Farid, the poet-saint is another of Pakistan's most revered saints and is frequently

⁵³⁵ 'Nothing is sacred anymore', *The Express Tribune*, 3 July 2010, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/25459/nothing-is-sacred-anymore>, (accessed 28 January 2012). (2010, July 3). *The Express Tribune*.

⁵³⁶ 'City takes to roads in anger over attacks', *Daily Times*, 3 July 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C07%5C03%5Cstory_3-7-2010_pg13_6, (accessed 27 April 2012).

⁵³⁷ 'Red alert declared across provincial capital', *Daily Times*, 3 July 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C07%5C03%5Cstory_3-7-2010_pg13_10, (accessed 27 April 2012).

⁵³⁸ 'Security beefed up at shrines', *Daily Times*, 3 July 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C07%5C03%5Cstory_3-7-2010_pg7_23, (accessed 27 April 2012).

ascribed with spreading the Sufi message of love and tolerance in the subcontinent. The Daily Times reported:

Baba Farid was a pillar of Sufism in the subcontinent. He is revered by not just Muslims and Hindus but also by Sikhs. He is considered to be one of the 15 Sikh Bhagats within Sikhism and parts of his work can be found in the sacred Sikh scripture, Guru Granth Sahib.⁵¹⁹

Baba Farid's shrine, which is located in the north-east of the Punjab, is also one of the nation's most popular shrines. Rozehnal wrote that the tomb of Baba Farid 'has linked the local population to a wider universe of Islamic piety and Sufi spiritual hierarchy since the thirteenth century'.⁵²⁰ Every year thousands of devotees make the pilgrimage to the shrine to attend the annual *urs* celebrations. The attack on the shrine drew strong condemnation from President Zardari and Prime Minister Gillani, as well as from the US Embassy in Pakistan.⁵²¹

5.4.2 The construction of a national Sufi identity in the Pakistani press

The reconstitution of the National Sufi Council by the Zardari-led government occurred contemporaneously with an increased preference for Sufism, as it did in much the same way under President Musharraf. Government officials continued the policy of maintaining a presence at Sufi shrines, particularly during the *urs* festivals of prominent Sufi saints. Government officials were also present at conferences and seminars on Sufism, as well as at Sufi music, art, and literature festivals. At the same time, the Zardari-led government was supported in its endeavours by other political actors who actively reinforced and reproduced the official construction of an enlightened and moderate identity for Pakistan and its citizens through the lens of Sufism. Similarly, alongside official efforts to promote a soft image of the nation, and non-official efforts to promote Sufism generally, national English-language newspapers in Pakistan continued to publish on the subject of Sufism. This included more extensive reporting on the *urs* festival dates of prominent Sufi saints, and on the festivities themselves, as well as on conferences and seminars on Sufism, and Sufi music and arts festivals. It also included more extensive reporting on the presence of government officials and their activities at Sufi shrines. The below table lists the headlines, on the subject of Sufism, that appeared in English-language newspapers in Pakistan in 2010.

Newspaper Headlines on the Subject of Sufism, January-December 2010.

Date	Newspaper	Headline
January 11, 2010	The News	Lok Virsa Promoting 'Sufism in unique way

⁵¹⁹ 'Barbaric attack on Sufism', *Daily Times*, 27 October 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C10%5C27%5Cstory_27-10-2010_pg3_1, (accessed 27 April 2012).

⁵²⁰ Rozehnal, 2006.

⁵²¹ See, 'US condemns bombing at Sufi shrine', *Daily Times*, 26 October 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C10%5C26%5Cstory_26-10-2010_pg1_2, (accessed 27 April 2012); and 'Terrorists won't succeed, say president, PM', *Daily Times*, 26 October 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C10%5C26%5Cstory_26-10-2010_pg1_3, (accessed 27 April 2012).

Newspaper Headlines on the Subject of Sufism, January-December 2010.

Date	Newspaper	Headline
January 13, 2010	The Nation	Lok Virsa sets up 'Hall of Sufis and Shrines'
January 29, 2010	APP	President Zardari to inaugurate world conference on Sufism for Peace in March: Fakhar Zaman
January 30, 2010	The Nation	Bhitai's urs to be marked with traditional fervour
January 31, 2010	Dawn	Sufism can tackle extremism: minister
February 3, 2010	Daily Times	Rangers to be deployed in city from tomorrow : Security, traffic plan for chehlum and Data Sahib's urs finalised
February 5, 2010	Pakistan Times	966th Urs of Hazrat Data Gunj Bakhsh (RA) Begins
February 5, 2010	Daily Times	Culture dept planning to set up Sufism Research Cell
February 7, 2010	Dawn	Past present: Is Sufism relevant to our time?
February 7, 2010	APP	Promotion of Sufism can help eliminate terror: Sumsam Bukhari
February 26, 2010	APP	Zardari to inaugurate Int'l conference on 'Sufism and Peace'
March 1, 2010	The Nation	Islam has no room for terror: Gilani
March 4, 2010	APP	PAL to release 'In Defence of Peace, Poetry and Culture' on March 14
March 7, 2010	Dawn	NON-FICTION: Close connection
March 14, 2010	Daily Times	Writers' conference starts today
March 15, 2010	APP	Sufi teachings of love, peace can counter extremism, terrorism; Zardari
March 15, 2010	Daily Times	Writers vow to promote love and peace
March 15, 2010	Daily Times	Terrorists should not target Punjab: Shahbaz
March 16, 2010	Daily Times	Sufi teachings key to countering terror
March 16, 2010	Dawn	Sufi teachings can counter extremism: Zardari
March 16, 2010	APP	Sufism a better cure to terrorism, extremism: Assef
March 27, 2010	Daily Times	Local holiday for Madhu Lal's urs
March 27, 2010	Daily Times	Thousands gravitate to Lahore for Mela Chiraghan
March 27, 2010	Daily Times	'Promote Faiz's poetry to counter extremism'
March 27, 2010	Daily Times	PAL geared up to host 'Literary and Cultural Fest'
March 27, 2010	Dawn	To build pluralistic society: Teach Sufism in schools
March 28, 2010	Dawn	The city within, and Legends of the Indus
March 28, 2010	Dawn	A Sufi path in print
April 8, 2010	The News	Antithesis of Sufism
April 22, 2010	Daily Times	US puts up \$149,000 for Sufi shrines' preservation

Newspaper Headlines on the Subject of Sufism, January-December 2010.

Date	Newspaper	Headline
April 24, 2010	The News	Contra Sufism
April 26, 2010	The Express Tribune	The widening split
May 3, 2010	APP	Hamid Kazmi highlights mystics role in propagating Islamic teachings
May 9, 2010	Pakistan Observer	Sufi poetry can improve country's image: Kathia
May 28, 2010	Daily Times	National Literary Awards 2008 distributed: Govt to give writers due status, says Kathia
June 22, 2010	The Express Tribune	Militants bomb Sufi saint's shrine
June 22, 2010	Daily Times	Shrine blown up near Peshawar
June 22, 2010	The Express Tribune	Prayers, flowers and lots of cakes for Benazir's 57th
July 2, 2010	Daily Times	Lahore Terror-stricken
July 2, 2010	Daily Times	Triple suicide attacks kill 40 at Data Darbar
July 2, 2010	Daily Times	Enraged people stage protest, damage vehicles
July 2, 2010	Daily Times	Ispahani slams suicide attack on shrine
July 3, 2010	The Express Tribune	Nothing is sacred anymore
July 3, 2010	Daily Times	US blamed as shrine attack toll rises to 44
July 3, 2010	Daily Times	Shrines in Sindh easy prey for terrorists?
July 3, 2010	Daily Times	Security beefed up at shrines
July 3, 2010	Daily Times	Qureshi condemns shrine attack
July 3, 2010	Daily Times	Security beefed up at shrines, worship places
July 3, 2010	Daily Times	Chaos and shock the day after
July 3, 2010	Daily Times	City takes to roads in anger over attacks
July 3, 2010	Daily Times	Markets closed, traders protest across city
July 3, 2010	Daily Times	Red alert declared across provincial capital
July 4, 2010	The Express Tribune	PM Convenes nation conference on terrorism
July 4, 2010	Daily Times	Country shuts to mourn Data Darbar tragedy
July 4, 2010	Daily Times	City shuts down as violent protests continue
July 4, 2010	Daily Times	Lunger halts at Data Darbar for the first time ever
July 5, 2010	Daily Times	Candlelight vigil for Data Darbar victims
July 5, 2010	Daily Times	Sunni group forms 'volunteer force' to combat terrorism
July 5, 2010	Daily Times	VIEW: Extremists' war on people's Islam
July 5, 2010	The News	Rallies, shutdown in Punjab against Data Darbar blasts
July 9, 2010	Daily Times	Citizens, religious leaders oppose plan to shut shrines at night
July 9, 2010	APP	Country's first ever literary TV channel to be launched soon
July 16, 2010	Daily Times	Blast destroys mosque, shrine in Landikotal
July 20, 2010	APP	Govt encouraging tolerance to counter

Newspaper Headlines on the Subject of Sufism, January-December 2010.

Date	Newspaper	Headline
		sectarianism: PM Gilani
July 20, 2010	Daily Times	International Sufi Council to be set up: PAL
July 20, 2010	APP	Stage is set for Pakistani Sufi music show in New York City tonight
July 23, 2010	Daily Times	COMMENT: The saints evil men fear - Zaair Hussain
July 24, 2010	The Express Tribune	First Intl Council for Sufism and Peace
July 24, 2010	Daily Times	PAL all set to establish International Sufi Council
August 19, 2010	Pakistan Observer	PAL to publish series of 'Sufi Sanj'
August 26, 2010	APP	Promotion of Sufism vital to eliminate terrorism, extremism: Sumsam
September 25, 2010	The Express Tribune	Targeting symbols of spirituality
October 8, 2010	Daily Times	Eight killed in Karachi shrine suicide attacks
October 8, 2010	Daily Times	Twin blasts at Abdullah Shah Ghazi shrine
October 8, 2010	Daily Times	ST announces 3-day mourning
October 8, 2010	Daily Times	Shrine attack suicide bombing'
October 8, 2010	Daily Times	Religious, political leaders condemn Ghazi shrine blasts
October 9, 2010	Daily Times	Aftermath of twin blasts at Abdullah Shah Ghazi shrine
October 9, 2010	Daily Times	Karachi shuts down day after deadly shrine blasts
October 9, 2010	The Express Tribune	Security the saints' abodes
October 9, 2010	Daily Times	Twin blasts
October 15, 2010	Daily Times	Shrine blown up in Landikotal
October 25, 2010	Daily Times	Shrines at risk of terrorist attacks
October 26, 2010	Daily Times	Seven killed in blast at Baba Farid shrine
October 26, 2010	Daily Times	US condemns bombing at Sufi shrine
October 26, 2010	Daily Times	Terrorists won't succeed, say president, PM
October 26, 2010	Daily Times	Shrines under threat
October 27, 2010	Daily Times	EDITORIAL: Barbaric attack on Sufism
November 9, 2010	Daily Times	TTP plans to attack shrines on Eidul Azha
November 15, 2010	Newsweek Pakistan	Save Our Shrines
November 29, 2010	Daily Times	Latest issue of HU focuses on Sufis of Punjab
November 29, 2010	Daily Times	Exhibition on Lal Shahbaz Qalandar concludes at IVSAA
December 2, 2010	Dawn	Fearing diversity
December 4, 2010	Daily Times	Sindh Culture Day today
December 15, 2010	Daily Times	Taliban kill 3 custodians of shrine in Peshawar
December 15, 2010	The News	Three caretakers of shrine killed in Badaber firing
December 19, 2010	Dawn	Experimenting with a Sufi University

Table 2: Newspaper Headlines on the Subject of Sufism, January-December 2010

As the above table shows, English-language newspapers in Pakistan reported extensively on what political actors and other commentators had to say on the subject of Sufism in 2010. In particular, the question was raised concerning the ability of Sufism to enable the diverse citizens of Pakistan to interact peaceably and, consequently, improve the nation's tarnished image abroad. Sufism in this period again became an important subject of debate, particularly with regard to its ability to unify the nation, arrest religious violence, and reconcile religious difference without neglecting Islam. Thus, numerous and rival groups in Pakistan, including the Government of Pakistan, politicians, policy advisors, scholars, religious and community leaders, and the media, all made their varying appeals on the basis of Islam to support or criticise Sufi doctrine. Each group provided religious, moral, socio-cultural, and historical claims to support their assorted positions, and each relied upon the construction of a positive 'us'-presentation and a negative 'Other'-presentation in their assertion of power and ideology.

Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source

In the climate of extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism, with all four of Pakistan's provinces, as well as the FATA, having experienced an escalation in terrorist-related incidents and fatalities, what is apparent are the increased attempts by the Government of Pakistan to encourage its citizens to form a unified community and act peaceably. Once again, it did so by promoting Sufism as the ultimate moral authority within society. At the same time, the government also intensified its campaign to promote a 'soft image' of the nation. It was assisted in this by the media which reinforced, reproduced, and disseminated the official message of a shared religio-national consciousness based on the moral and peace-building aspects found within Sufism in English-language newspapers. To the nation's many citizens, the English-speaking elite, the Pakistani diaspora, and international observers, the official message was that socio-economic uplift and non-violent action against terror could come from within Islam itself. This is demonstrated in headlines such as 'Sufism can tackle extremism', 'Promotion of Sufism can help eliminate terror', 'Sufi teachings of love, peace can counter extremism', 'To build pluralistic society: Teach Sufism in schools', 'Sufi poetry can improve country's image', and 'Promotion of Sufism is vital to eliminate terrorism, extremism'.³² At the same time, the themes of 'love', 'tolerance', 'universal brotherhood', and 'peace' reappeared repeatedly in local, national, and international news articles, feature articles, editorials, columns, and opinion pieces.

Discursive strategy: An appeal to history

In this period, a number of historical narratives were reproduced in the media in order to encourage people to form a unified community and act peaceably. In March 2010, Prime Minister Gillani addressed a collection of government ministers and *sajjada nashin* at the

³² See, Table 2: Newspaper Headlines on the Subject of Sufism, January-December 2010.

closing *urs* ceremony of Muhammad Ismail Shah Bukhari at his shrine in Okara, 130 kilometres from Lahore. The Nation newspaper reported:

Islam has no room for terror: Gilani [Headline]

Gilani said Islam had no place for terrorism and pointed to Khankahi system (mysticism) as a vital source to purge the country of terrorism. [...] He said it were the saints and not the army generals, who spread Islam in Indonesia, Malaysia and other countries while the first ever Hadith in Hindustan was introduced by Sheikh Abdul Haq Mahaddith Dehlvi, who was a disciple of Hazrat Musa Pak (RA).⁵²³

In the above extract, Prime Minister Gillani attempted establish a link between the popular historical consciousness and the climate of extremism and terrorism in Pakistan. First, Gillani began by identifying Sufism as the means by which terrorism could be eliminated from Pakistan. Second, he went on to emphasise the successful role of Sufi saints in disseminating Islam to countries outside Islam's heartland in Arabia, including South Asia, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The purpose of the address was two-fold. Prime Minister Gillani aimed to encourage the people of Pakistan to unite and interact peaceably. He also aimed to disassociate Islam and Pakistan from terrorists. Terrorists, Gillani said, 'were following their nefarious designs to divide the people while portraying a distorted picture of Islam, which had no room for terrorism'.⁵²⁴

President Zardari took up the motif of Sufism being an effective solution to terrorism in Pakistan two weeks later in his official address at the International Conference of Writers and Intellectuals on Sufism and Peace. The conference, organised by the Pakistan Academy of Letters, was held at the president's official workplace and residence (Aiwan-e-Sadr) in the diplomatic enclave of Islamabad. Approximately eighty international delegates from more than thirty countries, and 250 delegates from Pakistan, attended the conference.⁵²⁵ The conference was widely reported in the print media.

Sufi teachings of love, peace can counter extremism, terrorism; Zardari [Headline]

Sufism has a crucial role to play in mankind's struggle for a peaceful world. [...] Pakistan was home of great Sufi saints who dedicated their lives to promotion of peace and harmony and the vast majority of people believe in peace and universal brotherhood as enshrined in the teaching of Holy Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) and Islam.⁵²⁶

In his address, President Zardari placed particular emphasis on the role of the saint in the widespread conversion of the population throughout the subcontinent. According to

⁵²³ 'Islam has no room for terror: Gilani', *The Nation*, 1 March 2010, <http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/01-Mar-2010/Islam-has-no-room-for-terror-Gilani>, (accessed 27 January 2012).

⁵²⁴ *The Nation*, 1 March 2010, (accessed 27 January 2012).

⁵²⁵ 'Sufi teachings of love, peace can counter extremism, terrorism; Zardari', *AAP*, 15 March 2010, http://app.com.pk/en_/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=98499&Itemid=2, (accessed 28 January 2012).

⁵²⁶ *AAP*, 15 March 2010, (accessed 28 January 2012).

Zardari, Sufi saints dedicated their lives to promoting 'peace', 'love', and 'tolerance'. The inference was that Sufi saints hold an esteemed place in the nation's history because of the peaceable way in which they brought Islam to the region, through their message of philosophical, spiritual, and social harmony. For this reason, Zardari said that Sufism could play a valuable role in countering extremism and militancy in Pakistan, and in 'mankind's struggle for a peaceful world'.³⁷

Discursive strategy: The construction of a negative 'Other'

In order to convince the public to support him in his campaign to eradicate extremism and terrorism from Pakistan, President Zardari attempted to construct a negative 'Other'. In this strategy, the negative 'Other' was presented as harmful because it posed a distinct threat to the ultimate moral force in society (Sufism). Difference was constructed by way of a polarising strategy of negative 'Other'-presentation and positive 'us'-presentation. Once again, the *batin* aspects of Islam was placed in direct contrast to the *zahir* aspects of Islam. The negative aspects of the out-group (opponents of the state-sanctioned discourse) were emphasised through the use of pejoratives such as 'extremism', 'militancy', 'terrorism', 'hatred', and 'violence'. Conversely, the positive aspects of the in-group (the government and supporters of the state-sanctioned discourse) were emphasised through the use of approbatory words such as 'peace', 'tolerance', 'harmony', 'universal brotherhood', and 'love'. The implication was that the in-group was acting in the national interest whereas the out-group was acting against the national interest. By emphasising the positive aspects of the in-group, the Government of Pakistan aimed to create an image of what the out-group was not. In short, the negative 'Other' was presented as anyone who was neither peaceful nor tolerant. The negative 'Other' was presented as anyone who threatened 'true' Islam as practiced by the majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi community.

Discursive strategy: An appeal for unification behind the legitimate power source

President Zardari relied upon the idea of the nation (Pakistan) and religion (Islam) in his appeal to the Pakistani public for unification. Like his predecessor, Zardari envisioned Pakistan as a progressive, moderate, and democratic Muslim nation, as opposed to an Islamic state. Moreover, like other Muslim nationalist leaders before him, President Zardari relied upon religion in his political discourse to legitimise his exhortations. He did this, primarily, by appealing to the ethical and peace-building aspects found within Islam to present a utopian vision of peace and national unity for Pakistan. This is demonstrated in the below extract from his official address at the International Conference of Writers and Intellectuals on Sufism and Peace, held in March 2010.

Sufi teachings of love, peace can counter extremism, terrorism; Zardari
[Headline]

³⁷ AAP, 15 March 2010, (accessed 28 January 2012).

ISLAMABAD, Mar 15 (APP): President Asif Ali Zardari Monday called for focussing attention on teachings of peace, love and tolerance of the Sufi saints so as to counter extremism and the militant mindset.

Addressing an International Conference on Sufism and Peace arranged by Pakistan Academy of Letters here at the Aiwan-e-Sadr, President Zardari said Sufism has a crucial role to play in mankind's struggle for a peaceful world. The President urged the gathering to play its part in making the world a better place to live.

"May we all live in peace throughout the world. The world needs the touch and care and the deep thought of sufism."

He said the conference shows Pakistan's commitment to the cause of peace and the deep bond of its people to the forces of love, harmony and brotherhood, which is the soul message of sufis.³²⁸

According to a press briefing by Fakhar Zaman, Chairman of Pakistan Academy of Letters (PAL), the Sufism and Peace conference successfully presented Pakistan as a 'citadel of Sufism' and highlighted the nation's commitment to 'universal peace' to an international audience. A decision was subsequently taken to form a permanent council in Islamabad. The International Sufi Council (ISC) was intended to provide international and domestic scholars and intellectuals with a permanent forum in which to exchange and debate ideas on the topic of Sufism and peace.³²⁹ Notably, Zaman stated that the main aim of the council was to 'help re-define the image of Pakistan as a land of the Sufis committed to peace and universal brotherhood, instead of wrongly perceived as a terrorist country'.³³⁰ At the same time, Sufism was presented as a comprehensive strategy for universal peaceful co-existence and as a solution to societal problems, such as religious extremism. To this end, PAL proposed to promote Sufism at conferences and seminars, as well as through the publication of research papers, books, and documentaries in all six of the recognised United Nations languages.

5.4.3 The increased threat to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion

In 2011, the Zardari-led government continued to face a number of opportunities and challenges. Once again, accounts from human rights agencies and other commentators suggest that the challenges faced by the government far outweighed the opportunities. According to Human Rights Watch, Pakistan 'had a disastrous year in 2011'.³³¹ Alongside increases in the price of food and fuel, and the floods in Sindh province which displaced hundreds of thousands of people, Pakistan experienced an overall deterioration in the law and order situation, which included an increase in the persecution of religious minorities

³²⁸ AAP, 15 March 2010, (accessed 28 January 2012).

³²⁹ In mid-July, 2013, Fakhar Zaman, the Chairman of the International Sufi Council, met with a number of ISC presidents in Europe. In a press statement, Zaman announced that 2014 would be the year of peace and tolerance. He also announced that a series of conferences would be held in Europe to mark the occasion. At the time of writing there was no evidence that these conferences took place. See, 'Fakhar Zaman returns from Europe', *The International News*, 23 July 2013, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-5-191643-Fakhar-Zaman-returns-from-Europe>, (accessed 11 December 2014).

³³⁰ 'International Council for Sufism and Peace', *Pakistan Academy of Letters*, 23 July 2010, http://pal.gov.pk/home/literary-activities/press-conferences/reports/cat_view/52-press-conferences/53-press-conference-22-07-10.html, (accessed 15 June 2011).

³³¹ 'World Report 2012 – Pakistan', *Human Rights Watch*, 22 January 2012, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f2007cac.html>, (accessed 24 May 2014).

and militant attacks on civilians. At the same time, SATP stated that ‘Pakistan’s continuing engagement with the production and export of Islamist extremism and terrorism continued to produce a bloody blowback at home’.³³² Pakistan continued to experience terrorist-related incidents and fatalities across all four of its provinces, as well as in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) with 6,142 civilians, security force personnel, and militants killed in 2011.³³³ The HRCP reported:

Threats to religious minority communities grew more potent and attacks occurred in places long considered to be much more tolerant of diversity of all shades. Anyone who believed in liberal Islam in Pakistan had to stay quiet or seek refuge abroad. [...] Lawlessness and political, ethnic and sectarian tensions were striking at the very heart of society as efforts to promote harmony and cohesion fail to gather steam.³³⁴

5.4.4 Targeting symbols of Sufi spirituality

In the twelve-month period between January and December 2011, the PIPS and Terrorism Watch reported that twelve Sufi shrines had been subject to terrorist-related attacks in Pakistan.³³⁵ In total, approximately sixty-five people were killed and 165 people were injured in attacks on Sufi shrines in this period.³³⁶ The Pakistan Taliban, and pro-Taliban supporters, continued to attack shrines in the conflict-hit regions of the NWFP and FATA, as well as attacking renowned shrines in the provinces of Sindh and the Punjab. The terrorist-related attacks on Sufi shrines in Pakistan in 2011 are shown in Figure 4 below.

³³² ‘Pakistan Assessment 2012’, *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/assessment2012.htm>, (accessed 9 September 2014).

³³³ *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, (accessed 9 September 2014).

³³⁴ Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, *State of Human Rights in 2011*, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Lahore, 2012, p. 2.

³³⁵ *Pak Institute of Peace Studies*, 25 May 2011, (accessed 14 September 2011); and Terrorism Watch, (accessed 15 May 2012).

³³⁶ *Pak Institute of Peace Studies*, 25 May 2011, (accessed 14 September 2011); and Terrorism Watch, (accessed 15 May 2012).




Figure 4: Terrorist-related attacks on Sufi shrines in Pakistan, 2011.⁵²⁷

Of those twelve Sufi shrines, three prominent shrines suffered a large number of casualties. On February 3, 2011, three people were killed and thirty were injured when a bomb was remotely detonated at the shrine of Haider Sayeen, popularly known as Haider Saint. Thousands of pilgrims had gathered at the shrine, which is located in the Larri Adda area of Lahore, for the first day of the annual *urs* celebrations. According to the Daily Times, the explosion occurred as food was being distributed to the devotees.⁵²⁸

The following month, the shrine of Abdul Wahab, popularly known as Akhwand Panju Baba, was attacked. Ten people were killed and thirty were injured when a bomb was exploded at the shrine. Hundreds of pilgrims had gathered at the shrine, which is located in the Nowshera district of the North West Frontier Province, for Friday prayers. As in the attack on the shrine of Haider Saint, the bomb was detonated just as the evening meal was being distributed to the devotees. President Zardari and Prime Minister Gillani ‘strongly condemned’ the attack, calling it an ‘abhorrent act’.⁵²⁹

One month after the attack on the shrine of Akhwand Panju Baba, the shrine of thirteenth-century Sufi saint Ahmad Sultan, popularly known as Sakhi Sarwar, was attacked. Fifty people were killed and one hundred people were injured in the twin suicide attack at the main entrance to the shrine. The shrine is located in the foothills of the Sulaiman Mountains

⁵²⁷ See, *Pak Institute of Peace Studies*, 25 May 2011, (accessed 14 September 2011); and *Terrorism Watch*, (accessed 15 May 2012).

⁵²⁸ ‘3 killed, 27 injured in Lahore shrine blast’, *Daily Times*, 4 February 2011, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C02%5C04%5Cstory_4-2-2011_pg1_5, (accessed 28 April 2012).

⁵²⁹ ‘Bomb explosion kills 10 in Nowshera mosque’, *Daily Times*, 5 March 2011, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C03%5C05%5Cstory_5-3-2011_pg1_3, (accessed 28 April 2012).

in the Dera Ghazi Khan district of the Punjab, and is a prominent feature of the region. Moreover, Sakhi Sarwar is a renowned Sufi saint who was 'given the title "Sakhi" (generous) for his philanthropy and affection towards Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims alike'.⁵⁴⁰ Thousands of pilgrims had gathered at the shrine to celebrate the annual *urs* festival. Prime Minister Gillani condemned the attack, saying that 'cowardly acts of terror clearly demonstrate that the culprits involved neither have any faith nor any belief in human values'.⁵⁴¹

According to The Nation newspaper, the TTP claimed responsibility for the attack. Ehsanullah Ehsan, a spokesperson for the Taliban, told Reuters news agency by telephone, 'our men carried out these attacks and we will carry out more in retaliation for government operations against our people in the northwest'.⁵⁴² SATP reported that one of the suicide bombers arrested for his role in the attack on the shrine of Sakhi Sarwar, Umar Fidayee (age 14), revealed that more than four hundred suicide bombers were being trained in North Waziristan Agency (FATA).⁵⁴³ Residents of Dera Ghazi Khan described seeing pro-Taliban and pro-Al Qaeda slogans written in chalk appearing on walls, fences, and roadside barriers in the district, including graffiti supporting the attack on the shrine of Sakhi Sarwar, which they said reflected the 'Talibanisation' of the province.⁵⁴⁴

5.4.5 The blasphemy law controversy

In 2011, the most compelling debate concerning the place of Islam in the state and society was revealed in the blasphemy law controversy, which dominated the headlines in the Pakistani print media. The debate began in late 2010 when a Pakistani Christian woman was convicted of making derogatory remarks about the Prophet Muhammad. Asia Noreen, or Asia Bibi as she is widely known, was sentenced to death by hanging under section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code by a trial court in the Nankana district of the Punjab. The so-called blasphemy law, under which Asia Bibi was convicted, is a set of rules in the penal code that deal specifically with offences relating to religion. The penal code was first drafted by the British government in the late nineteenth century and was intended to safeguard India's diverse religious groups from religious vilification. Pakistan inherited the penal code when it was formed in 1947. Sections 295 and 295-A are comprehensive and designed to protect 'the religious feelings of any class of the citizens of Pakistan'.⁵⁴⁵ However, General Zia-ul- made two significant additions to the penal code as part of his Islamisation project. These

⁵⁴⁰ 'Sakhi Sarwar: The shrine on the mountain', *Dawn*, 15 April 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1100057>, (accessed 10 September 2014).

⁵⁴¹ 'DG Khan shrine bombing: Death toll reaches 50', *The Express Tribune*, 4 April 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/142210/militants-attack-shrine-in-dg-khan-3-dead>, (accessed 10 September 2014).

⁵⁴² 'Suicide hits at Sakhi Sarwar shrine kill 41', *The Nation*, 4 April 2011, <http://www.nation.com.pk/politics/04-Apr-2011/Suicide-hits-at-Sakhi-Sarwar-shrine-kill-41>, (accessed 10 September 2014).

⁵⁴³ 'Detail of Terrorism Update', *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, 9 September 2011, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/detailed_news.asp?date1=4/9/2011&id=15#15, (accessed 10 September 2014).

⁵⁴⁴ 'Slaughter slogans: Taliban supporters paint the town red', *The Express Tribune*, 10 April 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/146736/slaughter-slogans-taliban-supporters-paint-the-town-red>, (accessed 10 September 2014).

⁵⁴⁵ 'Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860)', *Pakistani.org*, <http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/1860/actXLVof1860.html>, (accessed 11 September 2014).

two additions were designed specifically to protect the religious feelings of the Muslims of Pakistan. First, he introduced section 295-B to provide protection for the Holy Qur'an:

Whoever wilfully defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the Holy Qur'an or of an extract therefrom or uses it in any derogatory manner or for any unlawful purpose shall be punishable with imprisonment for life.⁵⁴⁶

Second, he introduced section 295-C to provide protection for the reputation of the Prophet Muhammad:

Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.⁵⁴⁷

Leading the movement to amend the blasphemy law were politicians, human rights agencies, minority groups, and other commentators. These sections of society comprised the most vocal critics of the blasphemy laws in Pakistan. They argued that the laws were frequently used to wrongfully accuse someone of a crime based on personal, political, or economic reasons. They also argued that the laws tended to be unfairly applied, particularly in the lower courts in Pakistan. Ali Dayan Hasan from Human Rights Watch said, 'not only do those charged under the blasphemy law suffer persecution, it is evident the ill effects of discriminatory laws are compounded by unsympathetic courts'.⁵⁴⁸ Also of this opinion were a number of prominent politicians, including Sherry Rehman (MNA) who submitted a private member's bill to the national assembly calling for an amendment to the blasphemy law. The bill sought to abolish the death penalty from section 295-C. The Zardari-led government also intimated that it planned to amend the controversial law.

In the case of Asia Bibi, her conviction was strongly condemned by Pakistani citizens, human rights agencies, and the Christian community, including Pope Benedict XVI who appealed for her release during his weekly public audience at the Vatican.⁵⁴⁹ Prominent politicians from the Zardari-led government, Salman Taseer (Governor of the Punjab), Shahbaz Bhatti (the Federal Minister for Minorities), and Sherry Rehman (MNA) all voiced their strong opposition to the blasphemy laws, and actively worked to secure Asia Bibi's release. This prompted President Zardari to request that the Ministry for Minority Affairs conduct a review of the Asia Bibi case. The ministerial review ultimately determined that the blasphemy verdict was 'legally unsound'.⁵⁵⁰ In spite of that, the Lahore High Court prohibited President Zardari from exercising his constitutional right to grant Asia Bibi a pardon. The court also prohibited Governor Salman Taseer and all other government

⁵⁴⁶ *Pakistan.org*, (accessed 11 September 2014).

⁵⁴⁷ *Pakistan.org*, (accessed 11 September 2014).

⁵⁴⁸ 'Pakistan: Allow Pardon for Blasphemy Victim', *Human Rights Watch*, 2 December 2010, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/12/02/pakistan-allow-pardon-blasphemy-victim>, (accessed 12 September 2014).

⁵⁴⁹ 'Pope Benedict XVI calls for release of Christian sentenced to hang in Pakistan', *The Telegraph*, 18 November 2010, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8142127/Pope-Benedict-XVI-calls-for-release-of-Christian-sentenced-to-hang-in-Pakistan.html>, (accessed 12 September 2014).

⁵⁵⁰ Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2012, p. 89.

officials from conducting any activity aimed at securing her release. Moreover, Chief Justice Khawaja Muhammad Sharif said that Salman Taseer had ‘undermined the sanctity of courts and [...] should be declared disqualified to hold the office of governor’.⁵⁵¹

Predictably, for a Muslim nation whose majority population holds the Qur’an and the Prophet Muhammad in great esteem, there was much opposition within Pakistan to government proposals to have the blasphemy laws reformed, and to pardon Asia Bibi. In an interview with Ali Dayan Hasan from Human Rights Watch, Farieha Aziz from Newsline said that it was not common knowledge that those sections of the law that deal with blasphemy were codified by General Zia-ul-Haq.⁵⁵² Many Pakistanis are of the understanding that the blasphemy law is the word of God, derived directly from the Qur’an, and therefore should not be touched. Pakistan’s vocal religious lobby have consistently promoted this view to encourage collective action against reforms to the law. This was true in the case of Asia Bibi, where the calls for her release were heard alongside warnings from religious groups against amending the blasphemy laws, or pardoning her.

Leading the pro-blasphemy law movement were a number of religious parties and groups, including the JI, JUI-F, and JUI-S. Protest rallies were held across Pakistan in the major cities of Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, and Quetta. The general response from the Pakistani public suggests that a large number of people not only support the law, but also believe that blasphemers should be harshly punished. In her memoirs, Asia Bibi wrote that ‘ten million Pakistanis would be willing to kill me with their own hands. A mullah in Peshawar has even promised a fortune – 500,000 rupees – to anyone who takes my life’.⁵⁵³ Dawn newspaper reported that Maulana Yousef Qureshi, from the Deobandi Mahabat Khan Masjid in Peshwar (NWFP), offered Rs 500,000 ‘to the person who kills Asia Bibi’.⁵⁵⁴ Salman Taseer, Shahbaz Bhatti, and Sherry Rehman all received death threats for their opposition to the laws, and for their support of Asia Bibi.

Also voicing their condemnation of government proposals to reform the blasphemy laws and pardon Asia Bibi was a collection of prominent religious scholars and groups, including the SIC, and ST, both of which represent the interests of Barelvi Muslims. As discussed previously, in Pakistan Barelvi Muslims have a reputation for being moderate, peaceful, and tolerant owing to their preference for Sufism. The Government of Pakistan had been actively promoting the ethical and peace-building aspects within Sufism to present a utopian vision of peace and unity for the nation. However, alongside the Sufi message of philosophical, spiritual, and social harmony is an intense desire to protect the reputation of the Prophet

⁵⁵¹ ‘LHC restrains president from pardoning Aasia’, *Dawn*, 30 November 2010, <http://www.dawn.com/news/587337/lhc-restrains-president-from-pardoning-aasia>, (accessed 12 September 2014).

⁵⁵² ‘Minorities are Collateral Damage in the Battle for Pakistan’s Soul’, *Human Rights Watch*, 25 April 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/04/25/minorities-are-collateral-damage-battle-pakistan-s-soul>, (accessed 3 August 2011).

⁵⁵³ A. Bibi, *Blasphemy: The True, Heartbreaking Story of the Woman Sentenced to Death Over a Cup of Water*, Little, Brown Book Group Limited, London, 2012, p. 1984.

⁵⁵⁴ ‘Peshawar cleric calls for Aasia to be killed’, *Dawn*, 3 December 2010, <http://www.dawn.com/news/588344/peshawar-cleric-calls-for-aasia-to-be-killed>, (accessed 12 September 2014).

Muhammad. Predictably, many Barelvi Muslims support laws that punish those who blaspheme against the Prophet. Sahibzada Fazal Kareem, the head of one of Pakistan's largest Barelvi organisations, the SIC, was reported to have said that the council would protest against any move by the government to pardon Asia Bibi. He said, 'the pardon would lead to anarchy in the country'.⁵⁵⁵ He also said the SIC would not allow the government to amend the blasphemy law. The remarks were made at a SIC-organised protest march against the government's failure to legislate against terrorism and against attacks on Sufi shrines. SIC supporters had gathered at the Bari Imam shrine in Islamabad to participate in the 'Long March' to Data Darbar in Lahore.⁵⁵⁶ However, the Government of Punjab refused to allow the march to proceed. SIC Secretary-General and NSC Chairman Haji Hanif Tayyab criticised the Punjab Government saying, 'they were organizing a peaceful long march for elimination of terrorism'.⁵⁵⁷

5.4.6 The assassination of Governor Salman Taseer

On January 4, 2011, Governor Salman Taseer was killed by his Barelvi bodyguard as he returned from lunch in the exclusive Kohsar Market area of Islamabad.⁵⁵⁸ Mr Taseer was a vocal critic of the Taliban, which was progressively imposing its ideology and authority in the FATA, NWFP, and parts of the Punjab. Taseer was also in favour of making amendments to the blasphemy law, and worked to secure the release of the convicted blasphemer Asia Bibi. Interior Minister Abdul Rehman Malik reportedly said Malik Mumtaz Hussain Qadri had 'confessed that he killed the governor because he had called the blasphemy law a black law'.⁵⁵⁹ Qadri allegedly admitted to planning to assassinate Governor Taseer after hearing sermons by Mufti Hanif Qureshi and Qari Ishtiaq Shah at a religious assembly in Rawalpindi on December 31, 2010, which was held in protest against amendments to the blasphemy law. The Rawalpindi protest was part of a broader, nationwide campaign by religious groups to show their opposition to government proposals to change the blasphemy law. On that day, mass protests took place across all four of Pakistan's provinces in the cities of Islamabad, Lahore, and Rawalpindi (Punjab), Hyderabad and Karachi (Sindh), Quetta (Balochistan), and Peshawar (NWFP). Qadri purportedly said, 'the clerics had compelled him to stand up against those (elements) who were demanding changes in the blasphemy laws'.⁵⁶⁰

⁵⁵⁵ 'Sunni Ittehad Council warns of anarchy if Aasia pardoned', *Dawn*, 26 November 2010, <http://www.dawn.com/news/585859/sunni-ittehad-council-warns-of-anarchy-if-asia-pardoned>, (accessed 13 September 2014).

⁵⁵⁶ 'We won't allow change in blasphemy laws: Sahibzada Karim', *The Nation*, 27 November 2010, <http://nation.com.pk/islamabad/27-Nov-2010/SICs-Pakistan-Bachao-long-march-kicks-off-hundreds-of-activists-arrested>, (accessed 13 September 2014).

⁵⁵⁷ 'Punjab govt bans SIC long march', *The News*, 26 November 2010, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-5929-Punjab-govt-bans-SIC-long-march>, (accessed 13 September 2014).

⁵⁵⁸ 'Punjab Governor martyred', *Daily Times*, 5 January 2011, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C01%5C05%5Cstory_5-1-2011_pg1_1, (accessed 28 April 2012).

⁵⁵⁹ *Daily Times*, 5 January 2011, (accessed 28 April 2012).

⁵⁶⁰ 'Taseer assassination: Self-confessed killer insists he was 'not influenced'', *The Express Tribune*, 11 January 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/102103/taseer-assassination-self-confessed-killer-insists-he-was-not-influenced>, (accessed 16 September 2014).

In an official press release, President Zardari strongly condemned the assassination of Governor Taseer and ordered an urgent high-level inquiry to be carried out under the supervision of Interior Minister Rehman Malik.

Describing the assassination as a 'most ghastly' crime the President said that no words were strong enough to condemn it. The perpetrators of this heinous crime must be punished, he said. Paying tributes the President said that Salman Taseer was endowed with great courage and energy who employed his gifted qualities in the service of the province and the country. He faced the vicissitudes of life with composure, resilience and courage, the President said.⁵⁶¹

The following day a state funeral was held for Governor Taseer at his official residence in Lahore. PPP Secretary-General (Ulema Wing) Muhammad Afzal Chishti led the prayers. In attendance were the family and friends of Governor Taseer, as well as President Zardari, Prime Minister Gillani, leading politicians from Pakistan's mainstream political parties, and a large number of PPP supporters. Governor Taseer was buried, with full state honours, in the Cavalry Ground graveyard, close to his family home in an exclusive part of Lahore.

The assassination of Governor Taseer, like the blasphemy law controversy itself, divided the nation. While many voices came out in condemnation of the assassination, there were a large number of voices that not only supported the actions of Malik Mumtaz Hussain Qadri but regarded him as a hero. In this, the two largest Sunni groups in Pakistan, the Barelvis and the Deobandis, were united. Some religious scholars in Pakistan openly condemned the assassination of Governor Taseer. Professor Sajid Mir, president of the JA, and Dr Fareed Ahmed Paracha, deputy secretary-general of the JI, said that 'Islam forbids people to punish even the criminals by taking the law into their hands'.⁵⁶² Most religious scholars, however, avoided any outright condemnation of Governor Taseer's assassination. Abdul Khair Muhammad Zubair of the JUP stated that, while Islam does not condone murder, Salman Taseer showed an 'utter disregard for the religious sentiments of the entire nation'.⁵⁶³ Similarly, leaders of the TNRN issued a statement saying that Governor Taseer had broken the law by supporting convicted blasphemer Asia Bibi. Mujahid Abdul Rasool, the leader of ST (Lahore division), agreed that Muslims should not attend the funeral of Governor Taseer due to his lack of respect for the reputation of the Prophet Muhammad.⁵⁶⁴ Prominent leaders of the SIC, Sahibzada Fazal Kareem and Haji Hanif Tayyab, were noticeable for their initial silence. However, SIC Secretary-General and NSC Chairman Haji Hanif Tayyab said religious scholars had 'urged the president, prime minister and Governor Taseer himself

⁵⁶¹ 'Press Releases and Communiqués', *Government of Pakistan*, 4 January 2011, <http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/index.php?lang=en&opc=3&sel=2&pId=241&pressReleaseYear=2011&pressReleaseMonth=01>, (accessed 21 May 2012).

⁵⁶² 'Ulema press not to offer Taseer's funeral prayers', *The News*, 5 January 2011, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=3126&Cat=13>, (accessed 28 April 2012).

⁵⁶³ *The News*, 5 January 2011, (accessed 28 April 2012).

⁵⁶⁴ *The News*, 5 January 2011, (accessed 28 April 2012).

that if their knowledge about the blasphemy law are limited, they should consult them and avoid debating over the issue'.⁵⁶⁵

Paradoxically, the responses from Barelvi religious scholars were particularly extreme. In a joint statement, the Barelvi-leaning JASP, together with five hundred religious scholars, asked Muslims not to conduct funeral prayers for Governor Taseer, nor express any sympathy for him. The Muslim cleric who led the funeral prayers received death threats, as did some of his family members, forcing him to flee the country, and his family to seek police protection.⁵⁶⁶ Moreover, according to JASP and its affiliates, Governor Taseer was deemed a blasphemer for his support of Asia Bibi. They stated that 'those favouring the person indulged in blasphemy are themselves blasphemous'.⁵⁶⁷ At the same time, Barelvi religious scholars praised Qadri as a champion of Islam. The JASP statement said, 'we pay rich tributes and salute the bravery, valour and faith of Mumtaz Qadri'.⁵⁶⁸ Notably, Qadri was thought to have links to Dawat-e-Islami, a non-political, non-violent Barelvi proselytising organisation.⁵⁶⁹ Muhammad Ilyas Attar Qadri, then-President of the Barelvi-leaning JUP (youth wing), founded Dawat-e-Islami in Karachi in the 1980s.

The widespread and at times violent expressions of public opposition to attempts by human rights agencies, minority groups, and politicians to have the blasphemy law amended, and Asia Bibi pardoned, served to contradict government claims that Pakistan was a moderate Muslim nation. At the same time, the substantial endorsement of the assassination of Governor Taseer, and the considerable support for his assassin Malik Mumtaz Hussain Qadri by the Barelvi community, raised the question regarding the extent to which followers of the Barelvi tradition were essentially non-violent. These events also challenged the notion, held by domestic and international observers, that Sufism was a reliable force for peace, unity, and non-violent action against extremism in Pakistan.

5.4.7 Promoting love, tolerance, and universal brotherhood

Against the background of heated, and at times violent, protests against changes to the blasphemy law, and the wide endorsement of the assassination of Governor Taseer, the campaign to promote a soft image of the nation by drawing on aspects of Sufi tradition continued in much the same way as it had the previous year. Government representatives continued to maintain an official presence at prominent Sufi shrines, particularly during *urs* festivals. Government representatives were also visible at conferences and seminars on Sufism, as well as at Sufi music, art, and literature festivals. The promotion of Sufism as a

⁵⁶⁵ 'Hardline Stance: Religious bloc condones murder', *The Express Tribune*, 5 January 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/99313/hardline-stance-religious-bloc-condones-murder>, (accessed 13 September 2014).

⁵⁶⁶ 'Taseer funeral prayer leader forced to flee from Pakistan', *The Express Tribune*, 19 August 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/235182/taseer-funeral-prayer-leader-forced-to-flee-the-country>, (accessed 16 September 2014).

⁵⁶⁷ *The News*, 5 January 2011, (accessed 28 April 2012).

⁵⁶⁸ *The Express Tribune*, 5 January 2011, (accessed 13 September 2014).

⁵⁶⁹ 'Assassin linked with Dawat-i-Islami', *Dawn*, 4 January 2011, <http://www.dawn.com/news/596213/assassin-linked-with-dawat-i-islami-2>, (accessed 16 September 2014).

vehicle for peaceful Islam also received considerable bipartisan support. Other political actors actively reinforced and reproduced the official construction of an enlightened and moderate identity for the nation through the lens of Sufism. At the same time, English-language newspapers continued the practice of reporting on the subject of Sufism, thus reinforcing and reproducing official efforts to foster a soft image of Pakistan. Again, newspapers actively published articles on the presence of government officials and their activities at Sufi shrines. Newspapers also continued to report on the *urs* festival dates of prominent Sufi saints, as well as on conferences and seminars on Sufism, and Sufi music and arts festivals.

On January 8, 2011, an International Sufi Conference was held at the Sindh Museum in Hyderabad (Sindh). The conference was jointly organised by the International Sufi Foundation (ISF) and Bazm-e-Bahu. The stated aim of these foundations was to disseminate and promote Sufi values within Pakistani society.⁵⁷⁰ The conference, which was attended by prominent writers and poets from the provinces of Sindh and the Punjab, was held to commemorate the seventeenth-century Sufi poet-saint Sultan Bahu. Sultan Bahu is considered one of Pakistan's most important Sufi poet-saints. His shrine is located in Garh Maharaja, approximately one hundred kilometres north of Multan (the City of Saints), in the Punjab. His annual *urs* festival attracts thousands of pilgrims from the Punjab and across Pakistan. Sultan Bahu wrote numerous literary works on Sufism, including Sufi poems that are repeatedly sung across Pakistan and India. Notably, Mahmood Jamal states that Sultan Bahu 'constantly questions orthodoxy and literal, legalistic interpretations of Islam' in his poetry.⁵⁷¹ The concept of Sufism being an effective solution to terrorism in Pakistan was taken up at the conference. This is demonstrated in the below extract from Dawn newspaper.

Teachings of great Sufiis can eliminate extremism [Headline]

HYDERABAD, Jan 9: Prominent writers and poets of Sindh and Punjab have stressed the need for promoting Sufiism to curb growth of extremism and fundamentalism. Sufiism is above the barriers of language, religion, colour and race and promotes peace, love and harmony among humans.

Renowned scholar and historian Dr. Nabi Bux Khan Baloch said that Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai in Sindh and Sultan Baahoo in Punjab were great exponents of Sufiism. Secretary of Sindhi Language Authority and noted writer Taj Joyo said that Sultan Baahoo, Bullhay Shah and Shah Latif were eminent Sufiis and poets of subcontinent who preached peace, love, harmony and unity. Dr. Anwar Figar Hakro said that Baahoo devoted his life to preaching Sufiism. Right from his childhood, Baahoo lived the simple life of a Faqir. Poetess Ms Aasia Aslam form Lahore said that Baahoo and all other Sufiis preached love, peace and human values.

Prof. Tehmina Mufti of Sindh University said that Sufi poets of the subcontinent preached love for humanity and their teachings could curb extremism and fundamentalism. Dr Sultan Altaf Ali, Prof. Qalandar Shah Lakhyari, Dr. Mohammad Ali Manjhi and Dr. Sagar said that Baahoo was a Sufi

⁵⁷⁰ See, *International Sufi Foundation*, <http://www.isf.20m.com>, (accessed 4 September 2014); and *Bazm e Bahu Sindh*, <https://www.facebook.com/pages/Bazm-e-Bahu-Sindh/128619457189517>, (accessed 4 September 2014).

⁵⁷¹ Jamal, 2009, p. 288.

poet and also a great philosopher. He was strongly opposed to fundamentalism, religious extremism and racism.⁵²

The conference passed a number of resolutions in line with the stated aim of the ISF and Bazm-e-Bahu, which was to disseminate Sufi values throughout Pakistani society. It was contended that Sufi philosophy, which does not make unjust distinctions in its treatment of people on the grounds of religion, ethnicity, gender, or language, would engender peace and tolerance within society in direct opposition to terrorism and extremism.

Shortly thereafter, Minister for Culture (Sindh) Sassui Palijo was in Karachi to review the official arrangements for the 267th *urs* festival of the seventeenth-century Sufi poet-saint Abdul Latif Bhittai. Shah Latif is another of Pakistan's renowned Sufi saints. He is particularly celebrated in Sindh, where he is regarded as 'one of the greatest poets in the Sindhi language'.⁵³ His most popular work, *Shah Jo Risalo*, a compendium of Sindhi verses, was said to have had universal appeal to both the Muslims and Hindus of the subcontinent.⁵⁴ The shrine of Abdul Latif Bhittai is located in the village of Bhit Shah, approximately two hundred kilometres north of Karachi. The annual *urs* festival, which is held there, attracts thousands of pilgrims from Sindh and across Pakistan.

Discursive strategy: An appeal to a legitimate power source

The arrangements for the *urs* of Abdul Latif Bhittai, and the *urs* festivities themselves, were widely reported in English-language newspapers in Pakistan. On January 17, 2011, the Daily Times reported:

KARACHI: Sindh Culture Minister Sassui Palijo said on Sunday that the message of Shah Abdul Latif Bhittai is a true source against the extremism and terrorism through which we could succeed to promote and project peace, love, brotherhood, unity and equality in the society.⁵⁵

In the above extract, the Government of Pakistan again privileged aspects of Sufism as the ultimate moral authority within Pakistani society. A number of Sufi-inspired narratives were reproduced to create a shared religio-national consciousness amongst the people of Pakistan. First, Sufism and the message of Latif Bhittai were promoted as an effective means by which to unify the nation. Second, Sufism and the message of Latif Bhittai were presented as a panacea for terrorism and extremism in Pakistan.

⁵² 'Teachings of great Sufiis can eliminate extremism', *Dawn*, 10 January 2011, <http://www.dawn.com/2011/01/10/teachings-of-great-Sufiis-can-eliminate-extremism.html>, (accessed 13 March 2011).

⁵³ Jamal, 2009, p. 312.

⁵⁴ A. Schimmel, 'The Martyr-Mystic Hallāj in Sindhi Folk-Poetry: Notes on a Mystical Symbol'. *BRILL*, Vol. 9, Fasc. 3, 1962, pp. 161-200.

⁵⁵ 'Arrangements for Bhitai's Urs celebrations reviewed', *Daily Times*, 17 January 2011, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C01%5C17%5Cstory_17-1-2011_pg7_2, (accessed 28 April 2012).

Minister Palijo went on to say that 'Sindh had always been leading role in lesson of love, peace, harmony and it was due to PPP and President Zardari's approach'.⁵⁷⁶ In the contemporaneous context of the blasphemy law controversy, the government was frequently challenged about its knowledge of the blasphemy law and its respect for Islam in general. Thus, an important underlying theme in her political discourse, alongside the need to define the ideology of the state, was the need to claim political legitimacy and religious authority in terms of Islam. As previously discussed, the relevance of Sufism in the creation of a shared religio-national consciousness was particularly evident in the increased official presence at Sufi shrines. This official presence was extensively reported in the print media in this period. The *urs* festival of Shah Abdul Latif Bhittai is a typical example. The first day of the three-day *urs* festivities was declared a public holiday by the chief justice of the Sindh High Court.⁵⁷⁷ Auqaf Minister (Sindh) Abdul Haseeb officially opened the *urs* by laying a floral wreath on the shrine.⁵⁷⁸

On the opening day of the annual *urs* festival of Abdul Latif Bhittai, Minister for Culture Sassui Palijo addressed a press conference at the Shah Latif Research Cell. The centre was established by the Culture Department, Government of Sindh, to conduct research into Sufism and the poetry of Shah Latif.⁵⁷⁹ At the press conference, Minister Palijo relied upon three additional strategies namely in an attempt to further convince the nation that Sufism was an important force for peace and unity, as well as a panacea for terrorism and extremism in Pakistan.

Discursive strategy: An appeal to history

Minister Sassui Palijo invoked a shared historical consciousness amongst the people of Pakistan in order to promote Sufism as an effective means by which to unify the nation, and as a panacea for terrorism and extremism.

Sindh Minister for Culture Sassui Palijo has said that Sindh has remained relatively calm and peaceful for decades because of the overwhelming influence of Sufi teachings spread by great Sufi saints and poets. Addressing a press conference at the Shah Abdul Latif Research Cell in Bhit Shah on Wednesday, she said that Sufi teachings had produced a rich tradition of tolerance and respect for different cultures and religions.⁵⁸⁰

In order to positively invoke a shared historical consciousness amongst the people of Pakistan, Minister Palijo used the province of Sindh as a national exemplar. Two familiar

⁵⁷⁶ *Daily Times*, 17 January 2011, (accessed 28 April 2012).

⁵⁷⁷ 'Shah Latif Day', *Daily Times*, 19 January 2011, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C01%5C19%5Cstory_19-1-2011_pg12_7, (accessed 1 May 2012).

⁵⁷⁸ 'Annual Urs of Shah Latif Begins', *Dawn*, 19 January 2011, <http://www.dawn.com/2011/01/19/annual-urs-of-shah-latif-begins.html>, (accessed 24 June 2011).

⁵⁷⁹ 'Culture dept planning to set up Sufism Research Cell', *Daily Times*, 5 February 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C02%5C05%5Cstory_5-2-2010_pg12_3, (accessed 24 June 2011).

⁵⁸⁰ 'Sufism keeps Sindh away from extremism: Sassui', *Dawn*, 20 January 2011, <http://www.dawn.com/2011/01/20/Sufiism-keeps-sindh-away-from-extremism-sassui.html>, (accessed 13 March 2011).

official narratives are apparent in the above extract: firstly, that Sufism was an intrinsic part of the culture of Sindh and, secondly, that Sufi saints were instrumental in disseminating moderate and enlightened values amongst the people of Sindh. According to the minister, Sufism and Sufi saints were responsible for producing the 'rich tradition of tolerance and respect' that had kept Sindh 'relatively calm and peaceful for decades'.⁵⁸¹ By drawing on the history of Sufism and the Sufi saints in Sindh, Minister Palijo attempted to rally popular support for non-violent action against 'religious extremism' and 'street terrorism', both in the province of Sindh and nationally.

Discursive strategy: The construction of a negative 'Other'

To further legitimise her exhortations, Minister Sassui Palijo attempted to construct a negative 'Other' in the minds of the Pakistani people. Like the construction of a shared historical consciousness, the construction of a negative 'Other' is closely tied to and, crucially, poses a distinct threat to the ultimate moral force in society (Sufism). Minister Palijo presented the negative 'Other' as anyone who posed a threat to Islam as practiced by the majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi community. The following extract illustrates the dominant narrative used by the minister to create a negative 'Other'.

Ms Palijo said people were bearing the brunt of street terrorism in Karachi. Everyone must condemn this menace and whoever was behind it must be taken to task, she added. [...] She said the country was facing several kinds of terrorism and extremism, including religious extremism and street terrorism but the people of Sindh had always been against religious extremism because of the influence of Sufism. She said that Sindh being a land of liberal values its people had traditionally kept religion separate from politics.⁵⁸²

In the above extract, an inclusive Sufism was once again placed in direct contrast to exclusive interpretations of Islam. The negative aspects of the out-group were emphasised through the use of pejorative concepts. For example, the minister blamed the 'menace' of 'street terrorism in Karachi' on religious extremists. Conversely, the positive aspects of the in-group (inclusive Sufism) were emphasised through approbatory concepts. For example, the minister stated that Sindh was 'a land of liberal values' and that the 'people of Sindh had always been against religious extremism because of the influence of Sufism'. By emphasising the positive aspects of the in-group, Minister Palijo was attempting to create an image of what the out-group was not. In short, the negative 'Other' was not liberal, peaceful, or tolerant. The negative 'Other' was presented as anyone who threatened Islam as practiced by the majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi community in Sindh and in Pakistan.

Discursive strategy: An appeal for unification behind the legitimate power source

⁵⁸¹ *Dawn*, 20 January 2011, (accessed 13 March 2011).

⁵⁸² *Dawn*, 20 January 2011, (accessed 13 March 2011).

In order to encourage people to unite behind the ultimate moral authority in society, against a negative 'Other', Minister Palijo chose to present a utopian vision of peace and tolerance.

Followers of Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai must spread his message of love and affection, she said. [...] Ms Palijo said people were bearing the brunt of street terrorism in Karachi. Everyone must condemn this menace and whoever was behind it must be taken to task, she added.⁵⁸³

In the above extract, in order to encourage people to unite behind the ultimate moral force within society (Sufism) Minister Palijo adopted a hybrid appeal to temporal and spiritual rewards. Palijo claimed that the social and moral development of Pakistani society was dependent upon the ethical and peace-building aspects found within Sufism. This is demonstrated in her statement: 'Followers of Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai must spread his message of love and affection'. Once again, Sufism was being drawn upon to rally popular support for non-violent action against terrorism. The reward would be the creation of a unified and peaceful province and, in turn, a unified and peaceful nation.

On the second day of the annual *urs* festival of Abdul Latif Bhattai, the Government of Pakistan reiterated its commitment to the construction of an enlightened and moderate identity for Pakistan and its citizens by drawing on aspects of Sufi tradition. The Pakistan National Council of the Arts, in conjunction with the Ministry of Culture, screened documentaries on the lives of three prominent Sufi poet-saints: Shah Hussain (Madhu Lal), Abdullah Shah (Bullah Shah), and Mian Muhammad Bakhsh. The documentaries were shown in the PNCA building, which is located in the heart of Islamabad close to the Secretariat and the official residences of the president and the prime minister of Pakistan. Those attending the function included 'art lovers, educationists, intellectuals, poets, writers and a number of students'.⁵⁸⁴ According to an official press release:

The objective of the production of the documentaries is to promote the Sufi Poets' message of humanity, love and peace in the society which is facing conflicting and trouble time and needs such spiritual and moral guidance.⁵⁸⁵

PAL first announced its decision to produce a series of Sufi documentaries in 2010 following the International Conference of Writers and Intellectuals on Sufism and Peace, which was held at Aiwan-e-Sadr, the official residence of the president. The documentaries were to be produced in English and subtitled in all six of the recognised United Nations languages for an international audience, and in Urdu for a domestic audience.⁵⁸⁶ Members of the International Sufi Council (ISC) had agreed to broadcast and market the documentaries

⁵⁸³ *Dawn*, 20 January 2011, (accessed 13 March 2011).

⁵⁸⁴ 'Documentaries on Sufi poets screened at PNCA', *Daily Times*, 21 January 2011, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C01%5C21%5Cstory_21-1-2011_pg11_11, (accessed 1 May 2012).

⁵⁸⁵ 'Press Release', *Pakistan Academy of Letters*, 20 January 2011, <http://pal.gov.pk/home/literary-activities/press-conferences/reports.html>, (accessed 13 March 2011).

⁵⁸⁶ 'Press release', *Pakistan Academy of Letters*, 22 July 2010, <http://pal.gov.pk/home/literary-activities/press-conferences/reports.html>, (accessed 15 June 2011).

internationally.⁵⁸⁷ Addressing the function, Fakhar Zaman, PAL Chairman and prominent member of the Zardari-led PPP, said:

We have a heritage of tolerance, fraternity and love and that's what we want to tell the world. [...] Pakistan is not a failed state. We are a liberal, forward looking and progressive people.⁵⁸⁸

5.4.8 Negative perceptions of Pakistan increase

In 2011, a number of events served to present a contradiction between government discourses of peace and the socio-political realities in Pakistan. The events also served to undermine Pakistan's legitimacy in the international arena. In the wake of the blasphemy law controversy, and the assassination of Governor Taseer by his Barelvi bodyguard, Pakistan faced its first 'open confrontation' with the United States.⁵⁸⁹ On January 27, 2011, Raymond Davis, a US official, shot and killed two Pakistani youths in Lahore. Davis claimed that he acted in self-defence when the men attempted to rob him. A third man, a pedestrian, was run over and killed by a car carrying Davis' colleagues when they tried to assist him. The United States requested that Raymond Davis be allowed to return to the US, claiming diplomatic status and citing the Vienna Convention (1961). The Pakistan Taliban warned of reprisals should the government release Davis.⁵⁹⁰ President Zardari and Prime Minister Gillani both refused to accede to US pressure to release Davis.⁵⁹¹ The incident reignited anti-US sentiment in Pakistan and had a negative impact on US-Pak relations.

On March 2, 2011, Minister for Minorities Shahbaz Bhatti was killed within the bounds of the Industrial Area Police Station in Islamabad. His assassination came only two months after the assassination of Governor Salman Taseer. Bhatti and Taseer were senior members of the Zardari-led PPP government, both had voiced their strong opposition to the misuse of the blasphemy law, and both had actively worked to secure the release of the convicted blasphemer Asia Bibi. Minister Bhatti had received a number of death threats over his stance on the blasphemy law. As in the case of Governor Taseer, Bhatti was deemed a blasphemer for his call to reform the blasphemy law, and for his support of Asia Bibi. According to the

⁵⁸⁷ In 2011, PAL was in the process of negotiating a commercial television deal with a view to having the Sufi documentaries aired on Pakistani television. This could be one possible reason why the chief executive officer of Stanza Arts, the company that produced the documentaries, was reluctant to release them for the purposes of this research. In 2013, PAL Chairman Fakhar Zaman announced in a press release that the documentaries would be screened at various conferences in Europe and in Pakistan in 2014 to mark the year of peace and tolerance. At the time of writing there was no evidence that these conferences took place. See, 'Fakhar Zaman returns from Europe', *The International News*, 23 July 2013, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-5-191643-Fakhar-Zaman-returns-from-Europe>, (accessed 11 December 2014).

⁵⁸⁸ 'Documentaries highlight Sufi poets' message of peace', *Dawn*, 21 January 2011, <http://www.dawn.com/2011/01/21/documentaries-highlight-Sufi-poets-message-of-peace.html>, (accessed 13 March 2011).

⁵⁸⁹ *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, (accessed 9 September 2014).

⁵⁹⁰ 'Pakistani Taliban warn govt against releasing Raymond Davis', *Dawn*, 15 February 2011, <http://www.dawn.com/news/606443/pakistani-taliban-warn-govt-against-releasing-raymond-davis>, (accessed 21 September 2014).

⁵⁹¹ 'Timeline: The Raymond Davis Case', 4 February 2011, <http://www.dawn.com/news/603788/timeline-the-raymond-davis-case>, (accessed 20 September 2014).

BBC, the Pakistan Taliban claimed responsibility for his assassination. TTP spokesperson Ehsanullah Ehsan said:

This man was a known blasphemer of the Prophet [Muhammad]. We will continue to target all those who speak against the law which punishes those who insult the prophet. Their fate will be the same.⁹⁹²

The Christian community in Pakistan, human rights agencies, and politicians, including President Zardari and Prime Minister Gillani, all voiced their condemnation of the assassination. Presidential Aide Farahnaz Isphani said, 'this is [a] concerted campaign to slaughter every liberal, progressive and humanist voice in Pakistan'.⁹⁹³ Prime Minister Gillani said, 'such acts will not deter the government's resolve to fight terrorism and extremism'.⁹⁹⁴ US President Barack Obama, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and US Ambassador to Pakistan Cameron Munter all denounced the assassination. President Obama was quoted as saying, 'Bhatti had most courageously challenged the blasphemy laws of Pakistan under which individuals have been prosecuted for speaking their minds or practicing their own faiths'.⁹⁹⁵ Two days later, a funeral mass was held at Fatima Church in Islamabad. Prime Minister Gillani, other ministers and officials, including US Ambassador to Pakistan Cameron Munter, and members of the Christian community attended the service. President Zardari did not attend the funeral service or the burial of Shahbaz Bhatti which was held in a cemetery in his home village of Khushpur, Faisalabad.⁹⁹⁶

Five days after the assassination of Minorities Minister Shahbaz Bhatti, the BBC Press Office released their annual Country Rating Poll. GlobeScan, a research consultancy with offices in London, San Francisco, and Toronto, and the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland, first conducted the poll in 2005. The poll was based on the opinions of people from twenty-seven different countries. The Country Rating Poll revealed that Pakistan was one of three most negatively viewed countries, along with Iran and North Korea.

The worsening in views of Pakistan is particularly apparent in some key Western countries. Negative views of Pakistan jumped from 44 to 68 per cent in the United Kingdom, 58 to 75 per cent in the USA, 54 to 74 per cent in Australia, and 49 to 67 per cent in Canada.⁹⁹⁷

Negative perceptions of Pakistan increased, and the already-strained US-Pak relations deteriorated, further in April 2011. A leaked US document listing the Government of

⁹⁹² 'Pakistan Minorities Minister Shahbaz Bhatti shot dead', *BBC*, 2 March 2011, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12617562>, (accessed 21 September 2014).

⁹⁹³ 'Minorities minister Shahbaz Bhatti assassinated in Islamabad', *Dawn*, 2 March 2011, <http://www.dawn.com/news/610105/minorities-minister-attacked-in-islamabad>, (accessed 21 September 2014).

⁹⁹⁴ *Dawn*, 2 March 2011, (accessed 21 September 2014).

⁹⁹⁵ 'Shahbaz Bhatti, Pakistan's sole Christian minister, is assassinated in Islamabad', *The Washington Post*, 2 March 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/01/AR2011030101394.html>, (accessed 21 September 2014).

⁹⁹⁶ 'Prayers for patience as Shahbaz Bhatti buried', *Dawn*, 4 March 2011,

<http://www.dawn.com/news/610621/security-tight-for-shahbaz-bhattis-funeral>, (accessed 21 September 2014).

⁹⁹⁷ *BBC Press Office*, 7 March 2011, (accessed 27 September 2011).

Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) as a 'terrorist organisation' was published on the Wikileaks website.⁵⁹⁸ According to Dawn newspaper, US officials considered ISI to be a threat 'alongside groups like Hezbollah, Al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood'.⁵⁹⁹

US-Pak relations deteriorated even further on May 2, 2011, when Osama bin Laden was killed by US forces in Pakistan. Osama bin Laden, founder of Al-Qaeda, the group responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks, was killed in Abbottabad, a garrison town approximately fifty kilometres northwest of the capital of Pakistan, Islamabad. In a televised address to the American public, US President Obama declared, 'on nights like this one, we can say to those families who have lost loved ones to al Qaeda's terror: Justice has been done'.⁶⁰⁰ Prime Minister Gillani endorsed the assassination saying, 'the elimination of Osama, a foreigner who had declared war against Pakistan and was responsible for killing over 30,000 Pakistani citizens and 5,000 security personnel, was a great victory of the alliance against terrorism'.⁶⁰¹ In an official press release, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged that the assassination of Osama Bin Laden was 'an important milestone in [the] fight against terrorism'.⁶⁰² At the same time, the government expressed concerns about the way in which the US carried out the unilateral and unauthorised operation, and strongly denounced the violation of sovereignty:

The Government of Pakistan expresses its deep concerns and reservations on the manner in which the Government of the United States carried out this operation without prior information or authorization from the Government of Pakistan. This event of unauthorized unilateral action cannot be taken as a rule. The Government of Pakistan further affirms that such an event shall not serve as a future precedent for any state, including the US. Such actions undermine cooperation and may also sometime constitute threat to international peace and security.⁶⁰³

Less than two weeks later, two suicide bombers attacked a Frontier Constabulary training centre in Shabqadar, approximately thirty kilometres north of Peshawar (NWFP). The attack killed eighty people and injured more than 140. Of the deceased, sixty-nine were paramilitary police and eleven were civilians.⁶⁰⁴ According to a SATP report, the Pakistan Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack. TTP spokesperson Ehsanullah Ehsan warned,

⁵⁹⁸ 'US places ISI on terror list: WikiLeaks', *Dawn*, 26 April 2011, <http://dawn.com/2011/04/26/us-places-isi-on-terror-list-wikileaks>, (accessed 2 May 2014).

⁵⁹⁹ *Dawn*, 26 April 2011, (accessed 2 May 2014).

⁶⁰⁰ B. Obama, 'Remarks by the President on Osama Bin Laden', *The White House*, 2 May 2011, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/02/remarks-president-osama-bin-laden>, (accessed 13 June 2014).

⁶⁰¹ 'Gilani hails a victory of anti-terror alliance', *Dawn*, 2 May 2011, <http://www.dawn.com/news/625644/gilani-hails-a-victory-of-anti-terror-alliance>, (accessed 13 June 2014).

⁶⁰² 'Latest Press Releases/Speeches', *Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Government of Pakistan*, 3 May 2011, <http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=995>, (accessed 21 September 2014).

⁶⁰³ *Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Government of Pakistan*, (accessed 21 September 2014).

⁶⁰⁴ 'Taliban kills 69 FC recruits to avenge bin Laden's death', *Daily Times*, 14 May 2011, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C05%5C14%5Cstory_14-5-2011_pg1_3, (accessed 2 May 2012).

'this was the first revenge for Osama's martyrdom. Wait for bigger attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan'.⁶⁰⁵

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates how President Zardari, and his supporters, attempted to redefine the Islamic Republic of Pakistan through the lens of Sufism between 2008 and 2011. Like his predecessor, Zardari promoted aspects of Sufism as an important force for peace and unity, as well as a panacea for terrorism and extremism in Pakistan. The official preference for Sufism continued in much the same way as it did under President Musharraf. Government representatives maintained a presence at prominent Sufi shrines, particularly during *urs* festivals. Government representatives were also visible at conferences and seminars on Sufism, as well as at Sufi music, art, and literature festivals. Supporters of the official discourse actively reinforced and reproduced the government narrative that Sufism was an important vehicle for peaceful Islam. At the same time, English-language newspapers intensified their coverage on the subject of Sufism, thus reinforcing and reproducing official efforts to foster a soft image of Pakistan. The print media published articles on the *urs* festivals of prominent Sufi saints, conferences and seminars on Sufism, Sufi music and arts festivals, and on the presence of government officials at Sufi shrines. The official preference for Sufism was most clearly demonstrated by the reconstitution of the National Sufi Council in 2009. Like its precursor, the aim of the council was to create a 'soft image' of Pakistan by encouraging its citizens to form a unified community under a single national identity, interact peaceably, and progress socially and economically.

However, like his predecessor, President Zardari faced opposition from groups that actively resisted the state-sanctioned version of Islamic piety. In this period, tensions between groups advocating for an Islamic state and those advocating for a moderate Muslim nation were revealed in a number of debates and agitation concerning the place of Islam in the state and society. The most compelling debate was the blasphemy law, which began in late 2010 when a Pakistani Christian woman was convicted of making derogatory remarks about the Prophet Muhammad. Asia Noreen, or Asia Bibi as she is widely known, was sentenced to death by hanging under a section of the Pakistan Penal code introduced by General Zia-ul-Haq to provide protection for the reputation of the Prophet Muhammad. Politicians, human rights agencies, minority groups, and other commentators called for a reform of the blasphemy law. Leading the movement to amend the law, and secure the release of Asia Bibi, was Governor Salman Taseer and Minister Shahbaz Bhatti. Governor Taseer was killed by his Barelvi bodyguard, Malik Mumtaz Hussain Qadri, in early January 2011. Minister Bhatti was killed two months later. The considerable support from the Sufi-inspired Barelvi community for Qadri deeply challenged the notion that Sufism was a reliable force for peace, unity, and non-violent action against extremism in Pakistan. Shortly thereafter, a BBC Country Rating Poll, based on the opinions of people from twenty-seven different countries,

⁶⁰⁵ *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, (accessed 9 September 2014).

revealed that Pakistan was one of three most negatively viewed countries in the world. Negative opinions of Pakistan increased when a leaked US document identified Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence Agency to be a threat, alongside Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, and the Muslim Brotherhood. Negative opinions of Pakistan increased further when Osama bin Laden was killed by US forces in Abbottabad, a garrison town approximately fifty kilometres northwest of the capital of Pakistan, Islamabad. These events, together with the increase in terrorist-related incidents and fatalities, presented a contradiction between the official discourses of peace and the socio-political realities in Pakistan.

6 Conclusion

The preceding chapters demonstrate that in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 a new type of discourse began to emanate from the political leadership in Pakistan. In 2001, the military administration of President Musharraf began its attempt to construct an enlightened and moderate identity for Pakistan by promoting the ethical and peace-building aspects found within Islam. Then in 2006 it established the National Council for the Promotion of Sufism. Three years later the civilian administration of President Zardari reconstituted the council and renamed it the National Sufi Council. Both administrations attempted to redefine the Islamic Republic of Pakistan through a discourse on Sufism. With its ostensible message of philosophical, spiritual, and social harmony, both governments posited Sufism as the first and foremost symbol of national identity for Pakistan and a global panacea to terrorism. From this point onward a space was created in which Sufism became an important subject of debate, particularly with regard to its ability to unify the nation, arrest religious violence, and reconcile religious difference. A space was also created in which opposing discourses attempted to counter the state-sanctioned discourse concerning Islam in Pakistan and the role it should play in the state and society.

The main aim of this thesis was to analyse and interpret the political discourse of President Musharraf (PML-Q) and his successor President Zardari (PPP) on the subject of Sufism over a ten-year period following the attacks of 9/11. A further aim was to investigate the ways in which the official construction of a national Sufi identity was enacted, reproduced, and resisted by political actors, political recipients, and the media. This two-fold approach was intended to allow a more nuanced understanding of the persistence of Islam as the first and foremost symbol of national ideology and of belonging for Pakistani society despite the many sectarian differences that exist amongst the Muslims of Pakistan. What follows in this chapter is a discussion of the empirical findings of each of the preceding chapters, the implications of the findings, the limitations of the research, and recommendations for further work.

In order to understand contemporary politics and Islam in Pakistan after 9/11, this thesis employed Critical Discourse Analysis as a theoretical framework and as a method for socio-political analysis. As discussed in Chapter One, the principle assumption of CDA scholars is that discourse and power are not only linked, but that power or social struggles are reflected in discourse. CDA scholars, therefore, critically analyse discourse within a specific socio-political context in order to reveal discursive strategies of dominance and control of those in power on the one hand, and those of the marginalised on the other. This method of analysis was fundamental to revealing the complex and competing identity narratives that exist in Pakistan. This thesis also employed the Discourse-Historical approach, which was essential in firmly situating those competing identity narratives within the wider historical socio-political context. This combined approach provided a particularly useful foundation upon

which to examine the reproduction of, and resistance to, power and ideology in Pakistan after 9/11.

Of particular importance to this work was the Discourse-Historical approach of Phil Graham. In his article entitled "A Call to Arms at the End of History: A Discourse-Historical Analysis of George W. Bush's Declaration of War on Terror", Graham argues that throughout history political leaders have relied upon four generic strategies to successfully persuade people to make enormous personal sacrifices in the interests of greater good, such as risking their lives at war, and that these strategies are particularly apparent in societies that have experienced a profound crisis of political legitimacy.⁶⁶ As the preceding chapters demonstrate, the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the subsequent decision to join 'war on terror', triggered a deep crisis of political legitimacy in Pakistan. Moreover, they proved a major catalyst for the new discourse that emanated from the political leadership in Pakistan. However, in the climate of extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism, the government relied on four generic strategies, not to encourage people to go to war, as in Graham's model, but rather to encourage them to form a unified community, interact peaceably, and progress socially and economically. This theory resonates with Gramsci's hegemony paradigm, whereby political actors appeal to the dominant ideologies within society in order to establish ideological control over that society by means of acquiescence rather than physical force. This then allows for effective revenue extraction, and economic development, which ultimately results in a peaceful and prosperous civil society.

As discussed, the main aim of this thesis was to analyse and interpret government discourse on the subject of Sufism after 9/11. A further aim was to investigate the ways in which the official construction of a Sufi identity was reproduced and resisted by other political actors. This thesis also sought to situate those narratives within the wider historical socio-political context. Thus, Chapter Two provided an important historical overview of some of the dominant trends that helped shape Islam, politics, and identity in the Indian subcontinent and, inevitably, in Pakistan after its creation in 1947. It demonstrated the unique ways in which Islamic belief and practice developed over a period of approximately twelve hundred years. Historically, South Asian Muslims have never been a monolithic homogenous group united under a single consciousness. Culturally and socially, the Muslims of South Asia have long been separated by ethnic, linguistic, and class interests. Religiously, Islam is a diverse tradition with various schisms having occurred since its inception. This is reflected in the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, and philosophical diversity of the Muslims of Pakistan.

Chapter Two also demonstrated that Muslim diversity in the Indian subcontinent became problematic when the question of Muslim nationalism was raised. The idea of a territorial homeland to safeguard the political, economic, and cultural interests of South Asian Muslims was first put forward in the late nineteenth century by Syed Ahmed Khan. The so-

⁶⁶ Graham, Keenan, and Dowd, 2004, p. 200.

called two-nation theory was based on the supposition that South Asian Muslims constituted a nation, distinct and separate from the Hindus, due to their common religious affiliation (Islam). This theory gradually crystallised into a demand for a separate Muslim nation, in the Pakistan Resolution of 1940. For the most part, a monolithic homogeneous Islam provided an important source of identity and legitimacy for the Pakistan Movement. At the same time, there were Muslims who fervently opposed the movement for Pakistan. A number of Muslim politicians, scholars, and clerics worked toward attaining security, equal rights, and equal opportunities within a united and free India. Moreover, theologians such as Maulana Syed Abu a'la Maududi and Syed Husain Ahmad Madani argued that territorial nationalism based on religion was the antithesis of universal Islam and, thus, contradictory to the idea of a universal Islamic brotherhood. The *ulama* in particular were focussed on a strict adherence to the sacred scriptures and laws of Islam, which they believed could best be achieved under their direction in a united India.

Chapter Two also demonstrated that, whilst Islam has always been the dominant tradition in Pakistan, the inability of Muslims to form a consensus with regard to Islam at a theological level has had a significant impact on the nation's ability to establish a coherent national identity upon which to base a viable political system. Ultimately, the two-nation theory was translated into a political reality with the creation of Pakistan in 1947. However, the complex and competing interpretations of Islam that existed in the subcontinent remained and had the potential to divide the new nation as much as Islam had to unify it. At one end of the vast religio-political spectrum were Muslims who were committed to the ideal of Islam as the official national identity in a unified and broadly democratic Muslim Pakistan. At the other end of the religio-political spectrum were Muslims who were committed to the primacy of Islam in Pakistani state and society. The first violent rupture concerning the question of the role of Islam in the state, and what it means to be a Muslim in society, was the sectarian riots of 1953. The resultant Report of the Court of Inquiry (1954) demonstrated the complete lack of doctrinal agreement amongst the *ulama* themselves regarding Islam and the role it should play in the Pakistani state and society, and provided an ominous forewarning of the problems associated with combining religion and the state in Pakistan.

Attempts by the Government of Pakistan to redefine the Islamic Republic of Pakistan through the lens of Sufism after 9/11 were a continuation of a wider, largely incomplete, and problematic struggle to build national unity. Chapter Three critically examined the early political discourse of President Musharraf between 2001 and 2004. As discussed, the military coup of 1999, followed by the decision to join the US-led coalition in the 'war on terror' after 9/11, constituted a major historical turning point for Pakistan which prompted a series of responses from the government. Fundamentally, President Musharraf acknowledged that, militarily, economically, and politically, Pakistan could not risk having the United States as an adversary. He also recognised that Pakistan lacked 'the homogeneity to galvanize the

entire nation into an active confrontation'.⁶⁰⁷ Consequently, a new type of discourse began to emanate from the government aimed at the transformation of existing social, economic, and political conditions. In his struggle to redefine the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, President Musharraf relied on four generic strategies. Crucially, those strategies were intended not to encourage people to go to war but, rather, to encourage them to form a unified community, interact peaceably, and progress socially and economically. Thus, four months after the 9/11 attacks, Musharraf began to make specific references to the moral and peace-building aspects found within Islam in order to urge the nation to support the decision to join the 'war on terror', persuade the nation to support the domestic campaign against extremism, and rally the nation to non-violent and socio-economic uplift.

First, President Musharraf privileged the moral force of 'true' Islam as it was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad by God, and practiced by Muhammad, his companions, and Sufi saints. He repeatedly stated that the people of Pakistan, and indeed Pakistan itself, personified the essential values found within Islam, namely: 'love', 'tolerance', 'universal brotherhood', and 'peace'.⁶⁰⁸ Second, he relied on a number of narratives in an attempt to create a shared historical consciousness amongst the people of Pakistan. Musharraf invoked the example of the Prophet Muhammad, who is regarded by Pakistan's majority Sufi-inspired Barelvi community as the epitome of ethical and spiritual virtue, the ultimate source of divine wisdom, and the first Sufi or friend of God. He also invoked the example of prominent Sufi saints, who are known for their peaceable dissemination of Islam in South Asia. They are also widely known for their love of humanity, tolerance, exemplary character, and superior intellect. Third, in his ideological construction of national identity, the Barelvi population were portrayed as acting in accordance with 'true' Islam. Approbatory words such as 'tolerance', 'universal brotherhood', 'peace', and 'non-violence' were used to identify and exalt this group. Whereas the negative 'Other' was anyone who posed a threat to 'true' Islam. The use of pejorative words such as 'extremism', 'sectarianism', 'terrorism', and 'violence' were used to identify and demonise this group. Finally, in his construction of a collective present and future for the citizens of Pakistan, President Musharraf promoted a utopian vision of peace and national unity that he claimed could only be achieved through the devotion to Sufism, and to certain revered Sufi saints and their shrines. Societal change, he argued, could only be achieved through *huquq al-ibad* (obligations towards fellow beings). Fundamental to that concept was not only a basic notion of human rights but also love for humanity, which is a central aspect of the Sufi-inspired Barelvi tradition, and which allows for cooperation and respect beyond narrow religious or sectarian boundaries.

Chapter Four critically examined the political discourse of President Musharraf during the latter half of his nine-year political tenure. Notably, the official preference for Sufism increased in the period between 2005 and 2008. This was demonstrated by the rise in the presence of government officials at Sufi shrines, particularly during the *urs* festivals of

⁶⁰⁷ Musharraf, 2006, p. 202.

⁶⁰⁸ Notably, these themes later formed the major leitmotifs of the National Council for the promotion of Sufism (2006) and the National Sufi Council (2009).

prominent Sufi saints. There was also a rise in the presence of government officials at conferences and seminars on Sufism, and at Sufi music, art, and literature festivals. However, the increased official preference for Sufism was most clearly demonstrated by the formation of the National Council for the Promotion of Sufism in 2006, with President Musharraf as its Patron in Chief. The main aim of the council was to ‘spread the Sufi message of love, tolerance and universal brotherhood [to] integrate regional diversity with national unity’.⁶⁹ In this period, President Musharraf continued his earlier practice of privileging Sufism as the ultimate moral authority within Pakistani society. Moreover, he increasingly drew upon, co-opted, and controlled Sufism in the construction of a shared historical consciousness, a negative ‘Other’, and a shared collective present and future for the people of Pakistan. Alongside official efforts to promote Sufism, national English-language newspapers in Pakistan increased their coverage on the subject of Sufism. This included reporting on the presence of government officials, and their activities, at Sufi shrines. It also included more extensive reporting on the *urs* festival dates of prominent Sufi saints, and on the festivities themselves, as well as on conferences and seminars on Sufism, and Sufi music and arts festivals.

Amidst the increased official preference for Sufism were those who actively resisted the state-sanctioned version of Islamic piety. These oppositional groups were committed to the primacy of a narrowly conceived Islamic system of governance in Pakistan. The most critical opponents of government efforts to construct a Sufi identity for Pakistan came from within the minority Sunni Deoband and Ahle-Hadith traditions. Unlike the Barelvis, who consider Sufism to be a crucial part of Islamic tradition and an essential feature of Pakistan’s heritage and culture, followers of the Deoband and Ahle-Hadith traditions vehemently oppose certain aspects of Barelvi Sufi belief and tradition. To counter the official discourse, oppositional groups privileged a self-styled orthodox version of Islam, which placed greater emphasis on adherence to the Qur’an and the Sunnah, alongside a more systematic application of Shari’a law, as the ultimate moral authority within Pakistani society. The dominant narrative was that Pakistan had been created in the name of Islam and any opposition to this was both an attack on Pakistan and an attack on Islam. Their construction of a negative ‘Other’ included anyone who aimed to secularise Pakistan, namely the Musharraf-led government and its ideological supporters. This group saw themselves as working for the good of the nation by trying to implement an Islamic system of governance in Pakistan in-line with its identity as an Islamic state.

Chapter Five critically examined the political discourse of President Zardari between 2008 and 2011. Notably, the new civilian administration that came to power not only continued the policies of the previous administration with regards to Sufism but also intensified the campaign to redefine the Islamic Republic of Pakistan through the lens of Sufism. Government representatives maintained a visible presence at prominent Sufi shrines, at conferences and seminars on Sufism, and at Sufi music, art, and literature festivals. As in the

⁶⁹ *Daily Times*, 22 September 2006, (accessed 23 September 2011).

Musharraf era, the increased official preference for Sufism in this period was most clearly demonstrated by the reconstitution of the National Sufi Council. Like its precursor, the aim of the council was to create a 'soft image' of Islam by disseminating the Sufi message of 'love', 'tolerance', and 'universal brotherhood'. The Zardari-led administration was supported in its endeavours by other political actors who actively reinforced and reproduced the official construction of an enlightened and moderate identity for Pakistan through the lens of Sufism. In particular, national English-language newspapers extensively reported on the *urs* festivals of prominent Sufi saints, conferences and seminars on Sufism, Sufi music and arts festivals, and the presence of government officials and their activities at Sufi shrines.

Like his predecessor, President Zardari relied on four generic strategies in an attempt to redefine the Islamic Republic of Pakistan through the lens of Sufism. First, Zardari privileged Sufism as the ultimate moral authority within Pakistani society. Second, he invoked a number of narratives in an attempt to create a shared historical consciousness amongst the people of Pakistan. Emphasis was again placed on the historical role of the saint in the successful, and peaceful, dissemination of moderate and enlightened Islamic values in South Asia. The main narrative was that continuity with the nation's valued past flowed from devotion to the Sufi saints and their shrines. Third, in his ideological construction of national identity, Sufism was distanced from a narrowly conceived legalist Islam by placing emphasis on the *batin* aspects of Islam in direct contrast to the *zahir* aspects of Islam. The inner and outer aspects of Islam characterise the achievement of a greater awareness of God on the one hand, and the adherence to Islamic legal obligations and norms on the other. The negative 'Other' was anyone who promoted rigid Islamic teachings, hindered tolerance in religious thought, and focussed on God's wrath and retribution. Finally, in his construction of a collective present and future for the citizens of Pakistan, President Zardari also promoted a utopian vision of peace and national unity. He ascribed Sufism as being an important force for peace and unity, as well as a panacea for terrorism and extremism in Pakistan.

In this period, as in the Musharraf era, President Zardari faced opposition from groups that were critical of government efforts to construct a Sufi identity for Pakistan. These groups actively resisted the state-sanctioned version of Islamic piety, insisting that Pakistan had been created in the name of Islam and should therefore have an Islamic system of governance in line with its identity as an Islamic state. Tensions between groups advocating for an Islamic state and those advocating for a moderate Muslim nation were revealed in a number of debates and agitation concerning the place of Islam in the state and society. By far the most compelling debate was the blasphemy law controversy, which culminated in the assassination of Governor Taseer by his Barelvi bodyguard. The assassination of Governor Taseer, together with the widespread and at times violent expressions of public opposition to attempts by human rights agencies, minority groups, and politicians to have the blasphemy law amended, served to contradict official assertions that Pakistan was a

moderate Muslim nation. At the same time, the substantial endorsement of the assassination of Governor Taseer, and the considerable support for his assassin Malik Mumtaz Hussain Qadri by the Barelvi community, raised the question regarding the extent to which followers of the Barelvi tradition were essentially non-violent. These events also challenged the notion, held by domestic and international observers, that Sufism was a reliable force for peace, unity, and non-violent action against extremism in Pakistan.

As the preceding chapters demonstrate, the Government of Pakistan, under the leadership of President Musharraf and President Zardari, ultimately failed to redefine the Islamic Republic of Pakistan through the lens of Sufism after 9/11. Both governments were unsuccessful in their attempts to encourage the diverse people of Pakistan to form a unified community and interact peaceably. This failure was demonstrated by the increase in terrorist-related incidents and fatalities across all four provinces, and in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, as well as the increase in attacks on Sufi shrines. Both governments also failed to promote a 'soft image' of the nation to the international community. This failure was demonstrated by a 2011 study that revealed that Pakistan was the second most negatively viewed country in the world. Nevertheless, the Discourse-Historical approach provided a useful framework with which to critically analyse the discursive strategies used by the Government of Pakistan in the construction of a Sufi national identity. It also provided a useful framework with which to critically analyse the discursive strategies used by other political actors to reproduce or resist the government discourse. At the same time, the framework enabled a critical analysis of the social, political, and historical context within which the discursive construction of a Sufi national identity took place in order to reveal factors that influenced and delimited the discourse.

Despite the benefits of employing the Discourse-Historical approach as both a theoretical framework and as a method for analysing the source material, this study encountered a number of limitations. First, the empirical findings in this study emerged as a direct result of the application of a set of preconceived theories to the source material. Further studies might benefit from taking a multi-layered approach, which would allow for more interaction between the source material and the theory in order to provide room for unexpected findings. Moreover, these preconceived theories had only previously been applied to 'call to arms' speeches from western societies. Allowing for more fluid interaction between the source material and the theoretical framework might also provide a space in which to understand how non-western nations attempt to construct political sameness and difference. It might also provide a space in which to re-think non-western methods of enquiry and analysis, as well as challenge normative conceptions of nation and national identity.

Second, the source material selected for analysis limited the empirical findings in this study. Material comprised predominantly of English-language sources such as government speeches and debates, laws, regulations, and legislation, and propaganda, and newspaper articles and editorials from private and independent English-language newspapers in

Pakistan. English language sources were selected because English is regarded as the official language of Pakistan and the lingua franca of the government. At the same time, English-language newspapers played a particularly important role in disseminating the official construction of a Sufi national identity to an elite domestic audience, who might be regarded as having cultural and political influence, as well as to an international audience. However, only forty-nine per cent of the population of Pakistan over the age of 15 years can read and write: thirty-seven per cent of men and sixty-four per cent of women cannot read and write. Further studies might benefit from the use of non-English-language sources in order to provide a space in which to analyse if, and how, the official construction of national identity was reproduced and resisted by subaltern political actors.

Third, the empirical findings in this study were limited to a certain extent by the lack of available source material on detractors of the official discourse. As discussed, this study attempted to analyse the political discourse of the government, other political actors, and the media in order to investigate the ways in which the official construction of a national Sufi identity was enacted, reproduced, and resisted. This approach was intended to allow a more nuanced understanding of the persistence of Islam as the first and foremost symbol of national identity, and of belonging, for Pakistani society despite the many theological differences that exist amongst the Muslims of Pakistan. Further studies might benefit from a more comprehensive and critical analysis of oppositional discourses in order to fully explore the ways in which political actors attempted to not only counter the state-sanctioned construction of a national Sufi identity, but also construct a competing yet parallel discourse.

Finally, Nawaz Sharif was elected prime minister of Pakistan in June 2013. Three months later, Mamnoon Hussain was elected President of Pakistan. This was the first time in the history of Pakistan that political authority was transferred from one democratically elected civilian government to another. Despite this major success for the democratic process in Pakistan, the challenges outlined in this thesis remain largely unresolved. The main concern for Pakistan is the continued failure of Islam to act as a coherent unifying principle with which to bind Muslims from different regional, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds. Whilst Islam is the dominant tradition in Pakistan, the inability of Muslims to form a consensus with regard to Islam at a theological level continues to have a significant impact on the nation's ability to establish a coherent national identity upon which to base a viable political system. Further work could extend this study by examining the political discourse of the new administration, and oppositional discourses, in the construction of nation and national identity.

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Terrorism Watch
The Commonwealth
The Human Sciences Honor Society: Kappa Omicron Nu
The Warwick Debates
The White House
The World Bank
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
United Nations Security Council
US Department of State
World History Sources

Glossary

This glossary is by no means a comprehensive list of non-English language words or phrases and their definitions contained herein. The range of Arabic, Persian, and Urdu words, with their vast array of different spellings and variants, is a major challenge for South Asia scholars. For the most part, Arabic, Persian, and Urdu words have been transliterated into English and simplified. With a few exceptions, common spellings found in recent English-language scholarship have been used. Plurals have occasionally been formed using the English 's' and adjectives have occasionally been formed using the English 'i'. Diacritical marks have been used infrequently.

Adab (Proper conduct, etiquette, moral behaviour)

Ahl-e Sunnat wal Jamaat or Ahl-e Sunnat (Followers of the Prophet Muhammad, his companions, and the majority community)

Ahle-Hadith (Eighteenth-century Sunni Islamic reform movement; People of the Hadith)

Ajlaf (Low-born class)

Al-Insan al-Kamil (The perfect being)

Alim (Religious scholar)

Ashiq-e-rasul (Lover of the Prophet)

Ashraf (High-born class)

Barelvi (Eighteenth-century Sunni Sufi-oriented Islamic movement)

Batin (Inner aspect of Islam)

Bidah (Innovation)

Chador (Sheet, veil; garment worn by women)

Dar al-harb (Abode of unbelievers, non-Islamic region)

Dar al-Islam (Abode of Islam)

Dastar-bandi (Turban-tying ceremony)

Deoband (Eighteenth-century Sunni Islamic reform movement)

Dhikr (See Zikr: Remembrance)

Din (Religion; way of life)

Eid Milad un-Nabi (The Prophet Muhammad's birthday)

Fatwa (Religious edict)

Fidayeen (Suicide squad)

Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence)

Hadith (Accounts of the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad)

Hajj (Annual pilgrimage to Mecca)

Halal (Permitted)

Haram (Prohibited)

Hijrah (Migration of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina; The beginning of the Muslim era in history.)

Hikmat (Wisdom)

Huquq al-ibad (Obligations towards fellow beings)

Huquq Allah (Obligation to God)
Ijma-i-ummat (Agreement of the ulama and mujtahids)
Ijmah (Consensus of the community)
Ijtihad (Independent interpretation)
Ilm (Knowledge)
Imam (Muslim religious scholar or leader)
Ishq-e-Haqiqi (Love for God)
Ishq-e-Majazi (Love for humanity)
Islam (Submission to the will of God)
Islamiyat (Islamic religious studies)
Jagir (Land grant)
Jiziyah (Tax on non-Muslims)
Kafir (un-Islamic, infidel, unbeliever)
Khanqah (Sufi religious institution or retreat)
Madaris (plural of Madrassah: Islamic educational institution)
Madrassah (Islamic educational institution)
Maulana (Honorific title for a Muslim religious scholar or leader)
Mohtasib (Ombudsman)
Mughal (Muslims of Turkish or Central Asian origin)
Mujtahid (Interpreter of religious law; person who practices ijihad)
Mullah (Honorific title for a Muslim religious scholar or leader)
Murid (Sufi disciple)
Murshid (Sufi master, pir)
Muslim (Person who submits to the will of God)
Naat (Devotional poetry in veneration of the Prophet)
Nizam-e-Mustafa (System of the Prophet)
Pashtun (Pashto-speaking Muslims from Afghanistan)
Pir (Sufi master)
Qawwal (Sufi devotional singers)
Qawwali (Sufi devotional music)
Quetta Shura (Afghan Taliban executive council based in Quetta, Balochistan)
Qur'an (Religious text of Islam; sacred word of God)
Sajjada Nashin (Hereditary successor of a pir; guardian of a shrine)
Salwar Kameez (Tunic and trousers)
Sama (Listening)
Sayyid (Syed) (Honorific title for descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, from Fatimah and Ali ibn Abi Talib)
Shaikh (shaykh) (Honorific title for prominent men and descendants of Arab and Persian émigrés; Sufi spiritual master)
Shari'a (Islamic law)
Silsila (Sufi spiritual lineage or order)
Sufi (Person who aims to achieve a direct experience with the divine; follower of Sufism)

Sufism (Path to achieve a direct experience with the divine)
Sunnah (Established custom based on the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad)
Talib (Student)
Tariqah (Sufi spiritual lineage or order)
Tawhid (Oneness of God)
Ulama (plural of Alim: religious scholar)
Ummah (Universal Islamic brotherhood)
Urs (Death anniversaries of Sufi saints)
Wahdat al-wujud (Unity of Being)
Wali (Friend of God; Sufi saint)
Zahir (Outer aspect of Islam)
Zamindar (Landowner)
Zikr (See Dikhr: Remembrance)