

**IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF POLICY IN
CANADA (SASKATCHEWAN)
AND IN
AUSTRALIA (WESTERN AUSTRALIA)
1992-2017**

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By

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ABSTRACT

This study compares subnational immigration programmes for economic immigrants in Canada and Australia. Whereas for the first four or five decades in the post-WWII era Australian and Canadian national governments had total control over immigration policies and programs, during the most recent three to four decades the sub-national governments have become increasingly involved in the selection of some categories of immigrants destined for their respective territories. During the same time the national “Immigration Points System” has been converted into a policy instrument that helps subnational levels of government to select specific immigrants to live and work in their territories. The change has occurred because the national merit-based point system was not very useful in addressing the pressing needs for particular types of immigrants to Canadian and Australian territories. This has evolved into what is known as “immigration federalism,” which is a relatively new approach to formulating and implementing immigration policies through processes and agreements negotiated between the national and sub-national governments in these two countries. Using Hall’s “Paradigm Model”, this study investigates how in the past twenty-five years immigration federalism has altered immigration policy in Saskatchewan (SK) and Western Australia (WA). First, this research explores how policy instruments, policy goals and the political discourse of immigration federalism have changed in the last quarter century in Canada and Australia. Secondly, this research compares differences in the ways in which Canada and Australia have selected highly skilled individuals to immigrate to their countries, highlighting the differing roles of subnational governments in each. The study confirmed that in both Canada and Australia, the immigration programmes for economic immigrants are considerably different due to structural factors such as dependence and vulnerability, and institutional factors like constitutional mandate, nature of immigration agreements and integration. Finally, Hoppe’s three drivers—puzzling, powering and participation—are used to demonstrate that policy paradigms have changed immigration policy in the same way in both countries. This case constitutes a third order of change as the immigration point-system, multiculturalism policy, nature of agreements and the nature of residency all have evolved. Moreover, a second order of change occurred in response, with new roles for applicants, firms and credential agencies. This study is the first to compare policy paradigms across Canadian and Australian subnational jurisdictions, revealing how cities have become new immigration-policy innovators.

Keywords:

immigration federalism; provincial/state immigration role; national/sub-national power distribution; regional immigration agreements; policy puzzling and policy powering; provincial nominee programs; skilled workers; asymmetric vs symmetric immigration policy systems; immigrant selection; cities as immigration policy innovators.

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DEDICATION

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PERMISSION TO USE.....	i
ABSTRACT.....	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iv
DEDICATION.....	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vi
LIST OF TABLES	viii
LIST OF FIGURES	ix
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	x
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION	1
1. Introduction.....	1
2. The Problem.....	3
3. Background.....	4
3.1 Saskatchewan, Canada (SK)	4
3.2 Western Australia (WA)	6
4. Thesis objective	8
5. Organization and structure of thesis	8
CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW	10
1. Introduction.....	10
2. Domestic Politics, Interest Groups and Partisan Politics.....	12
3. Institutional and Bureaucratic Politics	16
4. Classical and Neo Realism.....	20
5. Liberalism and Neoliberalism.....	23
6. Globalization Theory	25
7. Immigration Federalism and Economic Immigration in Multi-level Systems	28
CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY	39
1. The research question	39
2. Conceptual framework: The Paradigm Shift Model	39
3. Case study approach	43
4. Comparative Document Analysis	44

CHAPTER IV: STRUCTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS AND THEIR IMPACT ON IMMIGRATION POLICIES	49
1. Structural Factors	52
1.1 Canada and Saskatchewan	52
1.2 Australia and Western Australia	57
1.3 Comparative Structural Factors	63
2. Institutional Factors	64
2.1 Canada and Saskatchewan	65
2.2 Australia and Western Australia	74
2.3. Comparative analysis of institutional factors	81
CHAPTER V: IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM IN SASKATCHEWAN AND WESTERN AUSTRALIA	83
1. Canada and the Saskatchewan Provincial Nominee Program (PNP)	83
2. Australia and the WA State Sponsored Regional Migration (SSRM) Program	93
3. Analysis.....	102
CHAPTER VI: PUZZLING, POWERING AND PARTICIPATION IN IMMIGRATION POLICY REFORMS	104
1. Third order changes: System Changes.....	105
1.1 Merit-based, Immigration Points Systems.....	105
1.2 Multiculturalism Policy	106
1.3 Agreements enabling immigration federalism	107
1.4 Nature of residency.....	108
2. Second Order Changes: Process Changes.....	109
2.1 Role of Applicants and EOI.....	109
2.2 Role of Firms	110
2.3 Credential Assessment.....	110
CHAPTER VII: FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS	113
1. Findings.....	113
2. Conclusions	116
3. Policy Implications	118
REFERENCES.....	122
APPENDIX.....	143

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1:	Domestic Politics Approach	13
Table 2.2:	Institutional and Bureaucratic Approach	18
Table 2.3:	Realism and Neo-Realism Approach.....	21
Table 2.4:	Liberalism and Neoliberalism Approach.....	24
Table 2.5:	The Globalization Approach.....	25
Table 2.6:	Key Immigration Concepts.....	36
Table 3.1:	Methodology & Methods.....	39
Table 4.1:	Canada and Australia Population and Resources	49
Table 4.2:	Canada and Australia PR- Population	50
Table 4.3:	Western Australia and Saskatchewan general information	52
Table 4.4:	GDP at basic prices by industry, Canada and the provinces and territories, average 2014-18	56
Table 4.5:	GDP at basic prices by industry, Australia and states/territory, average 2013-14 .	62
Table 4.6:	Introduction and Efficiency of PN programs to each province/territory	72
Table 5.1:	Total Provincial Nominee Program immigrants as percent of all economic immigrants, cumulative totals 2011-2017.....	84
Table 5.2:	Western Australian Skilled Migration Occupation List & Graduate Occupation List	98
Table 5.3:	Comparison between Canada (SK) and Australia (Western Australia) Educational Credential Assessments	99
Table 5.4:	Comparison between Canada (SK) and Australia (Western Australia) Settlement Funds Required	100

APPENDIX

Table A.1:	Information Regarding Immigration.....	143
Table A.2:	Immigrants to Canada by category, 1981 to 2011.....	144
Table A.3:	Immigrants to Canada by category, 1981 to 2011 (Percentage).....	145
Table A.4:	Immigration to Canada by Category (2015–17), Principal Applicants and Immediate Family Members.....	146
Table A.5:	Provincial Nominee Program Summary (2015–17).....	147
Table A.6:	Percentage distribution of landed immigrants by province of destination, Canada, 1981 to 2011.....	148
Table A.7:	Immigrants admitted, and number planned by category according to the immigration plan, Canada, 2009 to 2012.....	149
Table A.8:	Canada New Permanent Residents Admitted in 2016.....	150
Table A.9:	Immigrants distribution by province of destination and class, Canada, 2010 and 2011.....	151
Table A.10:	Percentage of Immigrants distribution by province of destination and class, Canada, 2010 and 2011 - Distribution by province.....	152
Table A.11:	Immigration distribution by province of destination and class, Canada, 2010 and 2011 - Distribution by province.....	153
Table A.12:	Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2011.....	154
Table A.13:	Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2012.....	155
Table A.14:	Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2013.....	156
Table A.15:	Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2014.....	157
Table A.16:	Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2015.....	158
Table A.17:	Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2016.....	159

Table A.18:	Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2017.....	160
Table A.19:	Australia General Migration Program 1984-85 to 2010-11.....	161
Table A.20:	Australia Migration Program 1989-90 to 2010-11 (Percentage).....	162
Table A.21:	Australia: distribution of population states and territories, 1881-2001.....	163
Table A.22:	Australia Temporary Skilled Immigrants 2000-01 to 2008-09.....	164
Table A.23:	Australia General Streams on Immigration - Outcome against planning level (percentage) 2010-11.....	165
Table A.24:	Comparison of Australia General Skilled Migration (GMS) 2008-09 to 2009-10.....	166
Table A.25:	Australia Skill Migration Program visa grants 2009–10 to 2010–11.....	167
Table A.26:	Comparison of Australia State-Specific Regional Migration (SSRM) 2008-09 to 2011-12.....	168
Table A.27:	Migration Program visa grants 2010–11: offshore and onshore.....	169
Table A.28:	Migration Program Skill stream 2013–14.....	170
Table A.29:	Temporary Business Entrants (subclass 457) and Permanent Arrivals in the Skill Visa Categories Compared.....	171
Table A.30:	Australia- State of intended residence 2003-13.....	172
Table A.31:	Australian states and territories: percentage distribution of the population by birthplace and overseas born 1996 -01.....	173
Table A.32:	Australian states and territories: natural increase, net overseas migration, net interstate migration and total population growth, financial years 1996-01.....	174
Table A.33:	Permanent residents, 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2003 grouped by visa category and location in Australia: Per cent by Migration Category.....	175
Table A.34:	States/Territories nominated vs RSMS Subprogram 2008-09 to 2016-17.....	176
Table A.35:	Australia Skill Stream in Detail (Places) 2012-13 to 2016-17.....	177
Table A.36:	WA- States/ Territories RSMS Outcome (In absolute terms and percentage)....	178
Table A.37:	State Specific Regional Migration (SSRM) Outcomes 2012-13 to 2016-17.....	179
Table A.38:	WA- States and Territories attracted largest number of migrants 2015-16.....	180
Table A.39:	WA-Australia- State of intended residence 2017-18.....	181

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: Unitary and Federal Countries Worldwide	30
Figure 4.1: Canada Economic Immigrant Destinations – 1997.....	68
Figure 4.2: Canada Economic Immigrant Destinations – 2015-2017	73
Figure 4.3: Australia Statistic- Regional Migration Program outcomes 1997-98 to 2009-10..	80
Figure 5.1: State-Specific and Regional Migration outcomes in Australia 2001-02 to 2010-11	94

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABS	Australian Bureau of Statistics
ANZSCO	Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations
BSVC	Business Skills Visa Category
CBSA	Canada Border Services Agency
CEDA	Committee for Economic Development of Australia
CIC	Citizenship Immigration Canada
CLB	Canadian Language Benchmark
CRICOS	Commonwealth Register of Institutions and Courses for Overseas Students
DAMA	Designated Area Migration Agreements
DIAC	Department of Immigration and Citizenship (AU)
DIMA	Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
ECA	Educational Credential Assessment
EMA	Enterprise Migration Agreements
EOI	Expression of Interest
EU	European Union
FPT	Federal-Provincial/Territorial
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GOL	Graduate Occupation List
GSM	General Skilled Migration
IPE	International Political Economy
IRCC	Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada
IRPA	2001-2002 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
ISW	International Skilled Worker
ISWOD	ISW-Occupation in Demand
LEED	Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
MLTSSL	Medium and Long-term Strategic Skills List
MODL	Migration Occupations in Demand List
MPO	Migration Policy Organization
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NOC	National Occupational Classification
PFRA	Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Administration
PN	Provincial Nomination
PNP	Provincial Nominee Program
PR	Permanent Residence
PT	Provincial Territory
RCBs	Regional Certifying Bodies
REBA	Regional Established Business in Australia
RMA	Regional Migration Agreements
ROLR	Regulated Occupations and Licensing Requirements
RSMS	Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme

SDAS	Skilled Designated Area Sponsored Visa Categories
SINP	Saskatchewan Immigrant Nominee Program
SIR	Skilled Independent Regional
SK	Saskatchewan
SOL	Skilled Occupation List
SSD	Skill Select Database
SSRM	State Sponsored Regional Migration
STNI	State and Territory Nominated Independent scheme
WA	Western Australia
WTO	World Trade Organization

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

1. Introduction

In the last 25 years, political actors have debated the economic and political advantages of federated systems of governance (Boushell & Gruetke, 2007; McKay 2001; Radin & Boase, 2000). Federalism studies generally examine two distinct claims about confederated power distribution. First, some assert that federalism reconciles the costs of regional commerce by decreasing transaction costs in the flow of labour and goods across state lines. Second, others see federalism as inherently a question of political power-sharing with a range of minority organizations at the provincial and local levels. These two threads—the efficiency-based argument and the normative policy imperative—co-exist in immigration policy.

Boushell and Gruetke (2007) assert that immigration is a key policy for nations: “as government policy, immigration programs shape both the economic performance and the ethnic composition of politics. Immigration policies recruit and distribute labour across all federations, and in doing so inevitably change the demographic composition of subnational units” (p. 207). Immigration policies are framed in the context of both national security and economic development, sometimes framed as control versus integration (Hammar 1985, 1990; Money 1990). While immigration control policies deal with keeping out unwanted immigrants, immigrant integration policy deals with the recruitment, selection, settlement and retention of desired immigrants.

Immigration is one strategic policy over which national governments have maintained control for many years. According to Boushell and Gruetke (2007), the high costs and deficiencies associated with maintaining immigration control policy at the subnational level lead to centralized systems. Despite having been dominated by national governments for decades, other aspects of immigration are now being shared. There are two main reasons why national governments have been decentralizing some of their immigration policies, one structural and one institutional. First, the specific structure and nature of the regions requires a different number and type of immigrants in different parts of continental economies. The level of development, the geographical conditions, and the wealth distribution in each area drive immigrant needs. Second,

most of the time, national governments do not have sufficient knowledge or control of all the information necessary to issue regulations consistent with the realities in each state, province or city. This does not mean that all aspects of regulation need to be discussed locally (e.g., the maximum quota of economic immigrants).

At root, the debate about the appropriate design of immigration policy is a specific case of the general theory of fiscal federalism. Tiebout (1956) suggests that public goods are best or optimally delivered when they fit most people, which usually requires subnational delivery. Differing levels of delivery then trigger people to vote with their feet, moving to the region with the best fit of policies with their needs and interests. While mobility is limited for most residents due to high moving costs, it fits the immigrants who are already mobile and searching for where to settle.

Subnational officials possess better information on “both local preferences and cost conditions than a central agency is unlikely to have” (Oates, 1999, p. 1123). Also, “there are typically political pressures ... that limit the capacity of central governments to provide higher levels of public services in some jurisdictions than in others” (Oates, 1999, p. 1123). Centralized systems often are not resilient enough to find a balance between subnational governments (Boushell & Gruetke, 2007). For all these reasons, governments in large heterogeneous countries have been exploring alternative delivery mechanisms.

Some political scientists have attempted to measure what degree of decentralization is appropriate to govern immigration through sub-national governments, especially in federal countries that traditionally attract large flows of immigrants (Caplan et al., 2000; Faguet et al., 2014; Wiginton, 2013). One common concern is to explore the conditions that lead political actors in federal systems to decentralize immigration policy.

The governments of Canada and Australia have been experimenting with alternate designs for immigration policies, giving their regions more opportunities to manage immigration regulations. This thesis seeks to sort through the policy dynamics in the two countries and search for paradigm shifts (i.e., the radical and simultaneous modification of policy instruments, policy objectives and political discourse) and second-order changes (i.e., the change of policy instruments).

2. The Problem

The world exists in what the American political scientist Mark Miller and the Australian sociologist Stephen Castles named “the era of migration” (Brown-Gort, 2016). The large-scale and extensive geographical reach of international migration over the past quarter-century has been substantial, if not wholly unparalleled by historical criteria. The number of foreign immigrants for the world as a whole — people living in a country other than where they were born — reached 244 million in 2015, up 41 percent over levels in 2000, according to the UN (UN, 2015).

Some developed nations, including governments, businesses and public opinion polling, want economic immigrants who will create wealth and consume goods, thereby increasing the country’s growth. Countries expect to attract individuals in society who will contribute to the nation’s economic stability. Similarly, people want to live in countries where they can get jobs, develop businesses, and be economically secure. Finding the right policy to attract the migrants most needed who will also want to live and work in that country is the overriding challenge.

“The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration,” a report written by The National Academy of Sciences in the US, investigates how harmful US immigration policy can be. The paper notes that, on average, the first generation of immigrants to the US are the costliest to governments, particularly to national and local authorities. However, immigrants’ descendants – the next generations – are among the most influential economic and fiscal providers in society (National Academies Press, 2017).

According to Andrew (2003), Australia (AUS) and Canada (CA) are the most receptive to immigration among western nations. Immigration is generally viewed as not harmful by itself. Two factors make immigration a critical success for both economies. First, efforts to integrate the best highly skilled immigrants into the economy and society are vital. Second, a process is needed to distribute migrants within provinces/states and locales.

Immigration is a core socio-economic policy for both Canada and Australia. These two OECD countries use a points-based system to attract millions of immigrants. The points-based tool, first developed by Canada, is an innovative instrument that countries are increasingly using to select highly skilled immigrants. Australia has adopted its version of a points-based system,

and a range of other countries are exploring it for their use, including the US (Doherty, 2017) and Germany, Sweden, and Norway, as each attempts to implement merit-based strategies to attract appropriate workers for their economies (Bauer et al., 2000). Australia and Canada, in particular, appreciate and value the talents, qualifications, and experiences of immigrants and both have been on the vanguard of designing more appropriate policies and processes to select and integrate immigrants.

3. Background

This thesis explores the applications and use of immigration federalization in two similar jurisdictions: Saskatchewan, a small province in the Great Plains of Western Canada, and Western Australia, the western, most remote state in Australia. In many ways, they are doppelgangers, both governed through constitutional monarchies from the British world and generally producing and selling into global markets many similar goods and services. Changes in federal regulations in both nations created opportunities for both jurisdictions to more aggressively use immigration policy. Canada and Australia have changed immigration policies to attract skilled immigrants so that immigration processes have played a significant role in both places. The two jurisdictions have similar yet divergent basic governance and immigration contexts.

3.1 Saskatchewan, Canada (SK)

Saskatchewan is an active actor in immigration. In its early years, the province attracted almost a million migrants in just 30 years, only to see a continued outflow from about 1930 until the early 2000s, as the economy lagged in other provinces. Overall, an estimated 500,000 Saskatchewan-born people migrated to other provinces. Since 2001, Saskatchewan has increased its number of economic immigrants (“SK’s fast-track,” 2015) in response to fast growth in its economy (Latimer, 2017). In fact, the agri-food industry, petroleum, and gas production have massively expanded the number of markets that are the basis of the provincial economy.

The opportunity for change emerged from changing national policy. A key factor in this story is the flexibility enabled in the Immigration Act of 1952, which provided the Department of

Citizenship and Immigration with vast powers. The ministry can use Orders in Council to set the particular rules and procedures of immigration policy. Historically, this has meant that immigration policies have not been deliberated very openly, for the last fifty years, either in the House of Commons or among the public. In 1994, the Canadian Department of Human Resources and Skills Development (HRSDC) described the purpose of its skill-related programs as follows: “New and updated skills are critical to the global competitiveness of the industry. Developed skills initiatives support worker jobs, simplify career development, and guarantee that businesses have the skills they need to meet competitive options” (Canada, 1994c). This foundation was used to justify a renewed immigration policy for the 21st century: “Canada needs people who are entrepreneurial, literate and able to adjust to a rapidly-changing labour market ... The suggested changes [in immigration policy] seek to enhance the skills, flexibility, and diversity of the Canadian workforce responding to Canada’s new, emerging economy” (Canada, 1994b).

This policy involved a number of innovations, including the development and implementation of a points-based, merit system for selecting applicants and a range of federal-provincial nominee programs (PNP), allowing provinces to have a more significant role in selecting and resettling economic migrants that most fit with local needs.

The benefits of the “SK Immigration Nominee Program” (SINP) could include faster federal processing of permanent residence (PR) applications and a new avenue for businesses looking to fill critical labour market shortages by recruiting foreign workers. The SINP includes some categories. For example, through the “SK Express Entry” category, potential migrants who have been accepted into the federal “Express Entry” pool can submit applications to the SINP for a provincial nomination. Those who obtain a designation will receive additional “Express Entry” benefits in the ranking process, which will result in them obtaining an invitation to apply to become a PR, providing that federal processing targets have not been met.

Immigration in Saskatchewan continues to play a critical role in developing Saskatchewan’s labour market and in growing the provincial economy. New nominees need to have had post-secondary education and to be classified as highly skilled workers, as well as other qualifications that will enable them to settle and successfully contribute to society.

The resulting “Saskatchewan Immigrant Nominee Program” (SINP), signed in 1998, began to be used in 2001 to select and bring in economic migrants. More than 62,000 migrants were attracted between 2001 and 2017, which equals about 150,000 migrants (including family). Saskatchewan is one of the most aggressive users of the provincial nominee programs, with about 90% of its skilled immigrants coming through that mechanism. Only Manitoba is a more prominent user. In contrast, provinces like Ontario, Alberta and BC use it selectively, with only 7%, 36% and 30% of migrants nominated by the respective provinces.

3.2 Western Australia (WA)

In Australia, the motivation of the Migration Program had been reformed since 1945, when the first federal immigration program began. What started as a narrowly targeted program considered to increase the country’s population after World War II, has evolved into a more extensive, more open set of policies intended chiefly to meet the economic needs of the Australian economy. Over the past 65 years, the focus has shifted from simply attracting migrants to increase Australia’s population, mostly from the United Kingdom, to attracting workers and temporary (skilled) migrants from a greater range of countries to meet the skilled labour needs of the economy. Australia’s Migration Program has changed over the years under the economic, political, and social regulations of the governments and the country’s history.

These changes are reproduced in the changing ethnic configuration of immigrants to Australia and the shift between the economic and family streams of immigration programs (Spinks, 2010).

Western Australia (WA) has received a significant number of economic immigrants in the last 15 years, at least partly driven by a mining boom. WA began a period of major economic growth in 2004, albeit with some dips due to market cycles (e.g. from 2015 to 2017) (Trigger, 2017). The composition of immigration in WA is more heavily skewed towards skilled workers than in other States. Almost 60 percent of the permanent additions to the state’s population in 2004-05 came from the Skills Stream of the Australian Government’s Migration Program (Trigger, 2017), and more than 40 percent of employed immigrants in WA are “Professionals.” Engineers, information technology professionals, and health professionals account for a large share of this group. Tradespersons also feature strongly among immigrants; they are considered

high skilled immigrants. The limited data on overseas migration by industry indicate that, relative to the structure of the state's labour market, immigration to WA is concentrated in the business services, hospitality, health, and mining sectors.

Emigration from WA has accelerated sharply since the mid-1990s, consistent with the national trend. Therefore, the concern this occasionally generates about the "brain drain" (i.e., the emigration of highly trained or intelligent people from a specific country) is almost certainly unwarranted. WA consistently attracts a large net inflow of young, skilled workers.

Net long-term migration in WA has expanded substantially over the past decade, reflecting an increase in overseas students and, to a lesser extent, a rise in the number of extended-stay business visas being issued. Some studies present a breakdown of the number of permanent settlers in WA by visa type and highlight a robust compositional change in favour of skilled migrants, since the early 1990s (in line with policy settings at the national level). Skilled migrants arriving in WA increased from about 1,800 people or 28 percent of the migration program in 1993-4 to a level of approximately 12,000 people or 65 percent of the migration program in 2004-5. Over the same period, the share of settlers arriving in WA under the family stream has fallen from 54 percent to 24 percent (Trigger, 2017). WA has a successful track record in attracting skilled migrants from the national migration program. For example, in 2004-5, WA captured 15 percent of the national pool of skilled migrations, compared to its population share of only 10 percent.

This study describes economic immigrant processes and programs in both Canada and Australia and how those economic immigrants are tied to the economic cycle and contribute to both societies. However, there are substantial questions to answer. What factors related to immigrants' programs changed the flow of immigration to Saskatchewan and WA? Have those factors increased the number of economic immigrants to both provinces? An additional question is essential: Which country or province has managed the best economic immigration policies? Consistently, what are the political and economic effects of economic immigrants in Saskatchewan and WA? Most likely, some factors are more crucial than others in determining the increase in the number of economic immigrants to Canada and Australia.

4. Thesis objective

One of the most significant changes to immigration processes pertains to “immigration federalization” or “immigration federalism.” These terms are associated with new immigration regulation that coordinates federal and provincial/state governments and their efforts to manage the immigration selection process jointly. Western Australia and Saskatchewan provide crucial cases to examine the relationship between federal and provincial/state government policy.

The central objective of this thesis is to use Peter Hall’s (1993) concepts of “policy paradigm” and “social learning” to explore the theoretical and cognitive processes in the social-political and economic systems that led to the development and implementation of immigration federalism in Canada and Australia.

The thesis uses an institutional analysis and comparative case studies of Saskatchewan and Western Australia. This framing offers insights into the drivers for policy and institutional change among the different levels of government in both Australia and Canada and offers lessons for other jurisdictions pursuing similar goals.

5. Organization and structure of thesis

The rest of the thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter II explores the literature, focusing on concepts and definitions related to immigration and immigration federalism. It critically assesses the immigration federalism concept in theory and practice. Chapter III identifies the methodology and method, and explains the mix of frames (e.g., Document Analysis Method, Comparative Case Study, Hoppe’s Governance Problems Theory and Hall’s Paradigm Model) and how they are applied to provide insight into the outcomes of immigration policy change from a multi-level governance perspective. Chapter IV compares Canada-SK, and Australia-WA over the past 25 years from a structural, historical, and institutional viewpoint. Chapter V explores the similarities and differences within and between policy innovation in both countries and sub-national regions, focusing on the institutional changes and multi-governance contributions. Chapter VI demonstrates how the second-order of change and the paradigm shift interact with three drivers—puzzling, powering and participation—altering immigration policy

in Canada-Saskatchewan and Australia-Western Australia. Chapter VII lays out some findings, conclusions and policy implications.

CHAPTER II:

LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Introduction

The literature review emphasizes how important it is to understand international immigration approaches and the immigration federalism perspective (i.e., in the US, Canada, and Australia). State and local governments are sometimes called sub-national governments and are increasingly important in some of these evolving systems.

Public policy analysis currently investigates the immigration policies of individual receiving countries. However, the immigration policy approach lacks, for the most part, debates linking various schools of thought and divergent approaches in different countries.

The objectives of this chapter are to explain the major approaches of the field of immigration policy and explore the concept of immigration federalism, highlighting explanations about what each approach means, and examining the influence of theories of comparative politics, international relations (e.g., International Political Economy) and sociology on immigration policy analysis. The seven general models are Marxism (i.e., socioeconomic class theory), Realism (e.g., humanitarian immigration), Liberalism (i.e., immigration federalism role and international institutions), the “National Identity” approach (i.e., a historical perspective), Domestic Politics (e.g., interest group politics, followers and elites), Institutionalism (e.g., the European Union’s institutions and cooperation), and the worldwide immigration policy theory (i.e., Globalization Theory).

Immigration produces a significant impact on the demography, culture, market, and governance of a nation. Immigration can contribute positively to population stability or growth, especially in several western societies, or undermine socioeconomic stability in source countries. A nation’s immigration policy (e.g., access and control) is a crucial element in determining immigration patterns: given a large number of people who would like to migrate to industrialized nations for economic or political reasons, and the limited possibilities to do so, immigration programs broadly define the scope of migration worldwide, including illegal migration. According to Zolberg (1989), all the states where people would like to go restrict entry, so

potential receivers decide whether the movement can take place. Also, receivers determine what kind of movement is allowed, using a wide range of programs targeted for temporary or permanent recruitment. Another aspect is the impacts and opportunities offered to potential immigrants.

In spite of widespread legal migration, illegal immigration continues, notwithstanding constraints. Developed countries, in particular, make great efforts to restrict unauthorized migration considerably. The massive illegal migration to the US, for example, has been facilitated by limited resources available for border control, as well as partisan efforts by pro-migration interest groups. Consequently, allowing legal entry and permitting illegal migrants is necessary for every country's immigration policy. Getting the balance right is core to socioeconomic development and effective security and defence.

Many schools of thought on immigration focus on political approaches. This stream assesses the political rationale for immigration, evaluating the main strengths and weaknesses of different processes and coalitions. Research strategies in this domain focus on 1) immigration law (i.e., the precepts adopted by immigrants and access of foreign citizens), and 2) the requirements governing resident migrants' conditions, welfare arrangements and educations (1985). The literature also includes a range of other approaches (e.g., Nation Building, Realism, and Idealism) that explain choices about access, control and integration. This study is explicitly directed to exploring immigration policies related to locating and relocating skilled immigrants, including a range of immigration processes (i.e., preferment, selection, attraction, settle and integration). Policy involves the admission of permanent migrants and temporary migrant workers, both for domestic development purposes and to attempt to reduce unauthorized immigration. Illegal immigration and asymmetric legal immigrants (i.e., unbalanced number of types of immigrants between Family Reunification Immigrants and Skilled Immigrants) can and do create unbalanced outcomes. While empirical investigations show the policymaking process, this study concentrates on the role of the various approaches in defining nation-states' strategies to admit specific migrants—e.g. which ones (e.g., ethnicity), where (e.g., western cities), when (e.g., economic periods) and of which type (i.e., temporary migrant workers, or permanent economic immigrants). The distinction between the types of immigration is often distorted and a source of conflict. For example, many “temporary migrant workers” stay in the country of destination for extended periods and sometimes permanently. At the other extreme, permanent

migrants sometimes end up returning to their country of origin. Complicating, this is the practical reality that political refugees are often difficult to separate from economic migrants.

This study primarily focuses on Australia and Canada. However, the theories are universal and have been applied widely, offering lessons for this study. Comparative analysis offers new insights. This review illustrates approaches to comparative politics, which improve on understanding of immigration federalism policies. This study focuses predominantly on the five main approaches to immigration federalism: Domestic Politics, Institutionalism, Realism, Liberalism, and Globalization Theory.

2. Domestic Politics, Interest Groups and Partisan Politics

Models of domestic politics (or “society-centred approaches”) accept that the state works as an impartial arena for societal interests, including interest groups and parties and sometimes subnational units such as provinces/states and cities. Policymaking is the result of bargaining and compromises between these interests; sometimes, policymaking reveals that one or more of these actors has prospered in capturing the state (Meyers, 2000).

According to (Meyers, 2000) many scientists of immigration policies, including those of Divine (1957), Craig (1971), Zolberg (1981), Hoffmann-Nowotny (1985), Shughart et al. (1986), LeMay (1987), Layton-Henry (1990, 1992), Hollifield (1992a) Freeman and Betts (1992), Freeman (1995b), Joppke (1998b, 1999), (1997, 1999), and Meyers (2001a), apply the domestic politics approach (table 2.1). These studies attribute changes in immigration policy to “situational” socioeconomic factors (e.g., recessions and large-scale immigration of different racial or ethnic composition contribute to restrictions on immigration) and the role of societal actors as shaping immigration policy (Meyers, 2000). Some investigations, including those by Zolberg (1978), Hollifield (1994), and Freeman (1995b), also include foundations of the National Identity Theory. Hollifield (1992a, 1994) and Joppke (1998b, 1999) analyze the formation of immigration federalism policy as a combination of the influence of domestic interests and rights-based politics or the courts, which introduces some elements of the institutional approach (Meyers, 2000).

Domestic Politics Approach			
Model	Approach	Concepts	Definition/Elements
Society-centred approaches. It assumes that the state serves as a neutral arena including interest groups and parties and sometimes subnational units such as provinces, states and cities. Its attributes change in immigration policy to "situational" socioeconomic factors, and large-scale immigration of different racial or ethnic composition contribute to restrictions on immigration (Meyers, 2000)	In the partisan political process, each political party proposes a program; during elections, people decide according to their proposals, and the party. In the interest group political model, created interest- or pressure-groups attempt to force parties, representatives, and administrators to implement specific programs	Partisan politics process, where policies are supposed to represent the majority of the public's attitudes, the interest group political process frequently yields systems that favour the interests of only small sections of the population.	Interest and pressure groups are most commonly associated: employers and ethnic groups, which tend to support immigration, and unions and nationalist groups tend to oppose it.
Table 2.1: Domestic Politics Approach			

In the partisan political process, each political party proposes a program; during elections, people decide among the parties according to their proposals, and the party (or coalition of parties) that gains power implements its policies (Meyers, 2000). Some studies focus on political parties as the source of immigration policy. Faist (1994), for illustration, reports statements by politicians of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian Social Union (CSU), and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) about immigration programs in Germany. Katznelson (1973), Freeman (1979) and Layton-Henry (1992) explain inter- and intra-party disputes over immigration in the UK. Schain (1988) examines the role of aristocracies in the evolution of the politics of immigration and racism in France, while Thranhardt (1995) addresses the rise of xenophobia in electoral politics in the UK, Germany, and France. Finally, many political scientists, including Husbands (1988), Layton-Henry (1992), Mayer and Perrineau (1992), Voerman and Lucardie (1992), Braun and Scheinberg (1997), Fennema (1997) and Kitschelt and McGann (1997), have studied the beginnings of anti-immigration parties in several European nations.

In the interest group political model, created interest- or pressure-groups attempt to force parties, representatives, and administrators to implement specific programs (Meyers, 2000). Conversely, in the partisan political model, programs are supposed to represent the majority of

voters (at least in two-party, median voter systems (Congleton, 2002); therefore, the interest group political model can deliver policies promoting the benefits of only small segments of the population as a result of coalition building.

The interest and pressure groups usually associated with immigration policy are firms and ethnic groups, both of which try to promote immigration federalism, and unions and nationalist organizations which try to resist it. The literature is rich with case studies of this. Collins (1988) explains how Australian firms in the mining industry suffered restrictions on Chinese immigration and how Australian unions rejected Italians' immigration during the 1920s to 1930s, while employers supported it (Meyers, 2000). Esser and Korte (1985) defined how German employers during the 1960s protested for the recruitment of foreign labour for agriculture and industry. Freeman (1979) reported how the cotton industry in the UK, disturbed by workforce shortages in the textile factories, raised the recruiting of foreign labour after World War II. Briggs (1984) described the opposition of American unions in the 1917-1922 period to the Bracero migrant-worker programs. Craig (1971) detailed how southwestern agricultural business interests pressed for the Bracero program in the US. Haus (1995) uses Hall's order of change to explain unions' attitudes and role in influencing US immigration policy during the 1980s and early 1990s. Hoffmann-Nowotny (1985) portrays the objections of Swiss unions to labour migration; de Wenden (1994) explains how the initiatives of immigrants' associations reformed the terms of the political rhetoric on immigration in France; and Reimers (1982) describes how ethnic associations condemned the 1952 Walter-McCarran Act, while "nationalist" groups protected it (Meyers, 2000).

Another variant of this domestic-pluralist model focuses on local politics and centre-periphery relationships within national politics. While Freeman (1995a) defines such studies as separate "spatial theories," they share many arguments with other pluralistic explanations (Meyers, 2000). Money (1997, 1999) introduces her model at the regional level, with an analysis of employers' support of labour and public opposition to immigration. She then explains "how such local pressures (i.e., Federalism) reach the national political agenda as a function of the national electoral margin and the size and safety of immigration constituencies". In the same sphere, Body-Gendrot (1992) and Schain (1998, 2012) explain how the different centre-periphery relationships in France and the US have influenced the interaction of local and national

politics over immigration policy. Several scholars also explain the impact of demands from the provinces and territories on Canadian immigration (Hawkins, 1991, 1998; Kelley and Trebilock, 1998).

Domestic politics is a widely employed approach to the study of the policy of immigration policy. Empirically, it seems evident that economic and social factors have a more significant impact on immigration policies than security and strategic considerations, which are highlighted by the realist approach. Changes in the economy and the volume of immigration are also easier to recognize than national identity debates (Meyers, 2000). Domestic politics approaches avoid several Marxist theory challenges by offering, for instance, immigration policy on different ethnic origins. Moreover, such models do not neglect the influence of politics.

Nevertheless, these models do have several weaknesses (which they share with some of the other approaches).

First, most studies that highlight domestic influences on immigration federalism policies are empirically oriented and lack a general theory. Zolberg (1978) addresses: “The specialists who deal with emigration policies (i.e., Immigration Federalism from settlement to cities’ integration immigration processes), forced population exchanges, expulsions, immigration policies and their concomitants such as naturalization law - tend to be a-theoretic” (p.242). According to Zolberg (1978), domestic influences are produced typically by historians or political scientists concerned with social representativeness within specified time restrictions and in specific nations; meanwhile, experts of international law and students of international organizations offer other insights.

The second weakness of domestic studies is that they mostly examine the policy of a single country pursuing a specific immigration policy (Zolberg, 1978). The focus on case studies places an unnecessary emphasis on each nation’s particularities, rather than identifying the main characteristics of immigration policy. The case study method also fails to describe simultaneous immigration programs in multiple nations. Meyers (2001b) proposes a model that connects worldwide socioeconomic trends and domestic politics to address these gaps.

Comparative studies of the domestic politics of immigration policy fall into one of three categories. Earlier studies – including Krane (1979), Kubat (1979), Rogers (1985) and LeMay

(1989) – are examples of studies that explore every nation independently without showing theoretical conclusions. Others—including Hammar (1985), Cornelius et al. (1994), and Brochmann and Hammar (1999)—are more integrative because the articles are based on a comparable set of questions, allowing them to offer some theoretical observations and discuss general tendencies. Nevertheless, this work does not amount to a developed theory. Finally, Freeman (1979, 1995b), Zolberg (1981, 1983, 1991), Hollifield (1992a), Hardcastle et al. (1994), Joppke (1999), and Money (1997, 1999) are theoretically adapted but are usually based on the comparison of a limited number of nations (i.e., two or three countries). This study of immigration federalism policies in Canada and Australia fits mostly with this approach but draws from others as well.

Third, a classic domestic politics model cannot easily explain immigration and refugee programs approved in the face of national opposition – such as the US admission of Chinese during the 1860s-1870s and of Eastern Europeans from 1947 to 1991 (Cold War), Australia’s acceptance of immigrants from Eastern Europeans post-WWII, and the UK admission of immigrants from the New Commonwealth since 1959. All of the examples mentioned above were mostly due to foreign policy influenced by the executive branch. Studies of immigration policies that emphasize domestic politics deal with this problem by adding foreign policy considerations (e.g., Mitchell, 1989; Tobin, 1989; Bach, 1990; Layton-Henry, 1994; Hardcastle et al., 1994). Other studies describe the influence of ethnic groups on the immigration policy of their adopted country vis-a-vis their country of origin (e.g., Cubans in the US, discussed in Teitelbaum and Weiner, 1990; Haney and Vanderbush, 1999). However, ethnic groups are not powerful enough to fully explain the immigration and refugee policies.

3. Institutional and Bureaucratic Politics

One perspective on immigration policy that brings the state back in as an actor, but still focuses on state-level interactions, is the institutional approach which focuses on activities in the bureaucracy. The simple institutional approach argues that political institutions can be autonomous (e.g., immigration federalism and provincial autonomy), effectively forming public policy unaffected by societal or interest group pressures. The specific bureaucratic model is sometimes defined as a domestic politics model, albeit with the state explicitly involved. Many

studies, including those by Dirks (1977), Birrell (1981), Schultz (1982), Abella and Troper (1983), Whitaker (1987), Roberts (1988), Hawkins (1991), Suyama (1991), Simmons and Keohane (1992), Calavita (1992) and Fitzgerald (1996), follow this perspective and focus on the role of the state (i.e., the administration/bureaucracy) in shaping immigration policy. According to Birrell (1981), the Department of Immigration in Australia has never been just a passive arm of government, faithfully implementing government policy; instead, it has aggressively encouraged the objective of population growth and the refinement of public support. Schultz (1982), Abella and Troper (1987) and Roberts (1988) explore the bureaucracy in Canada. Hardcastle et al. (1994) argue that “bureaucrats have substantially influenced Canada’s Immigration [Federalism] policies.”

Political choices made by earlier generations create institutions that shape both programs and ideas for later generations (Fitzgerald, 1996; Goldstein, 1988, 1989). In practice, the institutionalist model considers some variants that change according to the degree of autonomy and cohesion they connect to the state (Meyers, 2000). Some researchers represent the state as independent, acting according to its interests (variant I in table 2.2). Others argue that various state agencies promote specific societal interests (e.g., the Department of Agriculture is concerned with the interests of farmers) (variant II). According to Allison (1969), “researchers also differ about whether the state is monolithic, united in its view of its interest, or whether various bureaucratic agencies [e.g., provincial or states organizations] pursue their own, known as the bureaucratic model.”

Studies of immigration policy, which focus on the state, vary along similar lines. Whitaker, who analyzes Canadian immigration policy during the Cold War (1945-1991), views the state as (nearly) autonomous. He describes how “the policies and practices of immigration security have been deliberately concealed from the Canadian public, the press, members of Parliament, and even bureaucrats with no need to know” (Whitaker, 1987). One can trace the evolution of immigration federalism in Canada, at least partly to this period of development. However, most scholars picture a less autonomous state. Calavita (1992) borrows from the state-centred theorists who insist that the state, and the institutions that make it up, have their interests and periodically enjoy substantial autonomy (for example, immigration federalism and Quebec emancipation). However, Calavita accepts that policy can be explained by the interactions between state agencies and their “clientele.” Simmons and Keohane (1992), in their study of

Canadian immigration policy, argue that “the state has a significantly independent agenda, which includes the pursuit of economic security, a rational-bureaucratic agenda, and continued legitimacy.” At the same time, they also notice that several factors from the society — labour, capital, ethnic groups, humanitarian organizations, and the provinces— influence immigration programs (i.e., exhibiting moderate policy learning). According to Meyers (2000), structural studies of immigration programs differ in their view of the state’s cohesion. For instance, Bach (1978) describes it as relatively monolithic, while Calavita, in her studies of the Bracero policy in the US, observes “a ‘state’ that is extensive with internal divisions, as the policy agenda of the Immigration Service collides head-on with the policy goals of other state agencies, most notably the Department of Labor” (Calavita 1992, p.4).

The strength of the states is the key between the two variants of the institutionalist model. According to Katzenstein (1978), while “strong state” institutions are almost unaltered by societal influence and mostly shape the national interest, “weak states” allow more societal pressure that penetrates state institutions and affects public policies.

Variant I			
Model	Approach	Concepts	Definition/Elements
It focuses on state-level interactions which also includes the bureaucratic politics model.	Traditional institutionalist approach argues that political institutions can be autonomous.	Political choices made by earlier generations create institutions, which shape both policies and ideas for later generations.	It differentiates between "strong" states, where state institutions are relatively unaffected by societal pressures and shape the national interest.
Variant II			
The bureaucratic model is sometimes defined as a domestic politics model. However, it brings the state-level back in.	Public policy is formed by the state, but always it remains unaffected by societal or interest group pressures.	In practice, the institutionalist approach can differ according to the degree of autonomy and cohesion they attribute to the state.	States are "weak" and societal pressure successfully penetrates state institutions and influences public policies.
<p>Table 2.2: Institutional Approach <i>Source:</i> Author’s synthesis of Meyers’ (2000) summary of theories of international immigration policy.</p>			

For example, in the case of trade and industrial policies, the US and the UK are weak states, while Japan and France are strong states (Meyers, 2000). Hollifield (1989) argues that “the statistical and administrative approach to immigration in France has contributed to the politicization of immigration. Conversely, in the US, the federal nature of the political system, the stability of the party system and the pluralist approach to legislation have worked to fragment the issue and keep it off the national agenda for most of the postwar period” (at least up to the early 1990s). However, he concludes that, despite these differences, both nations have not altered a relatively liberal approach towards immigration (again up the last decade).

Fitzgerald (1996) presents a contribution to that model, termed “improvisational institutionalism,” which defines the US political system as a “sectoral state” rather than a “weak” one. Meyers (2000) also mentions that state power and autonomy vary from one type of immigration policy to another in the US immigration political system: it is strongest concerning refugee policy, weaker with regards to “front-gate” immigration policy and weakest about “back-door” policy (i.e., illegal immigrants). Each policy category has been regulated separately and has its policy network that includes a distinct set of actors, and logic, with limited cross-influences between the three categories of policies.

Complete examinations of bureaucratic policymaking, such as Whitaker (1987), Hawkins (1988, 1991), and Calavita (1992), show the difficulties driving immigration federalism. Studies based on the institutionalist approach are primarily active at revealing behind the scenes development of immigration policies for migrant workers. The institutionalist lens on immigration has tried to highlight the role of immigrant workers in policy formulation, while the institutionalist immigration approach focuses on the bureaucratic scene.

However, there are several problems with the institutional approach. Some relate to the approach in general (Meyers, 2000). The “weak state versus strong state” model, in particular, has been criticized for the vagueness of its definitions of “state,” “weak state,” and “strong state” (Skocpol, 1992).

The first variant (with an independent state) suffers from other difficulties. First, it is not well suited for clarifying the policy on permanent immigrants, which occurs in the public arena, and where pressures from outside the ‘state’—i.e., from ethnic groups, nationalistic organizations, and extreme-right parties—significantly influence policymaking. Secondly, the focus on political institutions, which differ from nation to nation and area to area, makes it

difficult to explain why different countries have assumed similar immigration policies at the same time. Also, thirdly, most institutional analyses of immigration policy examining specific nations employ comparative methodologies to explore internal dynamics (Meyers, 2000). Fitzgerald's analysis explains some of the difficulties discussed above, but it still suffers from various theoretical, empirical, and technical shortcomings developed in Barkan (1997) and de la Garza (1997).

In short, institutional approaches offer insights, but sometimes at the expense of overly specific stories that make every analysis unique.

4. Classical and Neo-Realism

The Realist model in immigration is arguably the most prominent method in the study of international relations and international political economy (IPE) (table 2.3). It “depicts international affairs as a struggle for power among self-interested states” (Walt, 1998).

According to Viotti and Kauppi (1987), realism is based on four key points. First, countries are the primary or most significant players and represent the central part of the analysis. Second, nations are characterized as a unitary actor, which challenges the external world as a unified component. Third, the nation is a rational actor. Fourth, national security concerns create significant debates on countries' international agenda (e.g., one can see aspects of that in Australia's immigration approach). The classical- neo-realist approach in international immigration focuses on current or potential disputes among nations. Concerns of security, defence and strategy are associated with “high” politics, but social and economic concerns are viewed as less critical, “low” politics (Hoffmann, 1960; Morgenthau, 1973; Waltz, 1979; Keohane, 1986). While some proponents of the realist approach, such as Gilpin, see the influence of economic elements in the international arena, they still view these elements as a political conflict between groups and countries (Gilpin, 1986). Those groups could also entail subnational efforts to equalize social and economic development.

Current or potential disputes between nations, including military ones, have changed immigration policies. They have contributed to immigration restrictions, such as the 1917 literacy examination in the US, the introduction of exceptional conditions of travel documents (e.g., passports and visas) during WW I, and a new law for foreigners and insurrection acts. On

the other hand, wars and other conflicts have led some countries to admit more immigrants and promote immigration. For example, France felt that it was vulnerable to another German invasion, and thus it encouraged immigration and settlement of Italians, Spanish, and Portuguese in the postwar period. Australia, “which experienced Japanese intrusions during the war and feared that its sparse population could not repel an Asian invasion, implemented the ...perish policy, attempting an annual intake of about one percent of the local population” (Meyers 2000, p. 1264). Security issues and demographic deficiency vis-a-vis its Arab neighbour have strengthened Israel’s commitment to Jewish immigration (Ben-Gurion 1969, p.469). During the Cold War, many Western democracies favoured refugees from communist nations to confirm their anti-communist and anti-Soviet ideological engagement.

The Realism Approach			
Model	Approach	Concepts	Definition/Elements
Realism ("classical" realism and neorealism) is perhaps the most prominent approach in the study of international relations (e.g., IPE). It "depicts international affairs as a struggle for power among self-interested states" (Walt, 1998)	Viotti and Kauppi (1987) postulate: first, states are the principal and represent the critical unit of analysis; second, the state is represented as a unitary player; third, the state is necessarily a rational actor; and fourth, national security issues are the most important ones in the international relationship.	Realists focus on actual or potential conflicts among states. Issues of security and strategic issues are sometimes referred to as high politics, whereas economic and social issues are viewed as less critical, low politics (see Hoffmann, 1960; Morgenthau, 1973; Waltz, 1979; Keohane 1986. On the other hand, Gilpin accepts the importance of economic factors in international relations.	The importance of economic factors in international relations, they still view these factors as working "in the context of the political struggle among groups and nations" (Gilpin, 1986). This model demonstrates how the actions or inactions of states vis-a-vis international migration influence the relation between states and how relations between states affect the rules regarding exit and entry (Weiner, 1985)
Table 2.3- Realism and Neo-Realism Approach			

The emphasis on national security and military disputes formally induced most political scientists of the realist school to ignore immigration concerns. Only of late (especially since the end of the Cold War) has neorealist theory paid more attention to migration policy by reframing it as a security issue. Realist thinking has influenced studies by Miller (1979), Miller and Papadimitriou (1983), Teitelbaum (1984, 1995), Loescher and Scanlan (1986), Mitchell (1989); Tucker (1990), Back (1990) and Teitelbaum and Weiner (1995). Hollifield (1992b) notes that

while this body of work explores the relationship between foreign policy and international migration, none of it pursues a purely realistic approach. Teitelbaum highlights the impact of US security and economic benefits on its immigration policies. Weiner (1985) confirms how countries' actions or inactions vis-a-vis international immigration change the relationships among nations and how relations between nations influence the laws about exit and entry. Zolberg (1981) notes that immigrants and non-immigrant populations "constitute, most obviously, assets and liabilities concerning the mustering of military power." Loescher and Scanlan (1986) conclude that from 1945 to 1985, foreign policy alternatives have crucially decided which refugees are permitted to enter the US.

Hartley and Pedersen (2015) argue studies show that international immigration (e.g., foreign policy) programs, especially humanitarian immigration, are more related to domestic support for social policy than due to emotional responses. This study of Canadian and Australian policies focuses on skilled international immigrants and how they have been driven by efforts to redistribute immigration to western provinces in both countries. Emotions and public attitudes are engaged but not obviously driving the policy choices or outcomes.

The center of the traditional-realist model to sovereign self-interested states is an important starting point for discussing immigration programs. Conversely to neo-Marxist theories, for example, realism does not ignore the impact of the country. Countries pursue national benefits when they reduce labour migration and permanent immigration during a severe economic crisis (e.g., recessions or depressions), admit labour migration during economic growth, give priority to business and skilled immigrants, and promote immigration in an attempt to balance demographics vis-a-vis potential enemies (Meyers, 2000).

However, this traditional approach has contributed only marginally to the examination of immigration programs, with the possible exception of refugee policy, for three reasons. First, the theory highlights security while considering social concerns as less significant. As a result, realist practices often overlook the issue of migrant workers. Weiner (1995) explains how migrants and refugees are perceived as potential threats to the security of countries and their regimes. According to Waever et al. (1993) "in Western Europe, societal insecurity has replaced state sovereignty as the key to prosperity or collapse of European integration, pushing concerns about identity and migration to the top of the political agenda." Nonetheless, many mainstream

realists resist expanding concepts like security, in case it "destroy(s) its intellectual coherence." (Walt, 1991).

Secondly, realism describes the state as a unitary and rational actor. However, such a perspective conflicts with economic study that analyzes immigration policy as incompetent or non-rational (Fitzgerald, 1996). In contrast, a domestic politics model that defines immigration programs as the result of negotiating between various domestic actors can illuminate such state-level, so-called irrational, behaviours (Freeman, 1995b). Consequently, even the political scientist who investigates the connection between international migration and foreign policy may include discussions of the role of interest groups and other political actors within the local arena (e.g., Weiner, 1985).

Third, realism focuses on power as a crucial concept (e.g., national or subnational power); but globally, power relations typically do not define immigration programs. Zolberg (1981, p. 10-11) argues that "On the one hand, formally independent states are distributed along a scale of strategic power... On the other hand, however, these same states are fundamentally equal as sovereignties... it is out of the formal equality among states... that each derives the right to maintain its integrity by controlling entry".

5. Liberalism and Neoliberalism

Liberals have a more optimistic view than the realists when it comes to immigration policy (table 2.4). Liberals maintain international economic interdependence, transnational interactions, international institutions, the spread of democracy, and the international immigration approach can promote cooperation and even peace between nations (Meyers, 2000). In contrast to the realists, liberals assume that non-state entities, such as international organizations and multinational corporations, are essential actors in international relations. The economic and social issues they advance are no less critical than military and defence concerns (Viotti and Kauppi, 1987). The liberal paradigm can be differentiated into economic liberalism, interdependence liberalism, and republican liberalism. Those paradigms have had little direct influence on immigration policy literature (see Meyers, 2001a). However, institutional neoliberalism and globalization theory has been applied to clear up on immigration policymaking.

The Neoliberal institutionalist model shows that regimes help overcome difficulties of shared interests and facilitate collaboration and coordination between countries (Krasner, 1983; Keohane, 1985; Haggard and Simmons, 1987; Baldwin, 1993). Significant examples of engaged international institutions or regimes are free or freer trade institutions (e.g., the World Trade Organization, North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA] and the European Union), international security (e.g., North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [NATO] and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]) and immigration issues (e.g., United Nations and International Organization for Migration). The institutionalist model combines, in fact, both realist and liberal arguments. Consequently, some scholars treat it as a liberal/neoliberal approach (e.g., Walt, 1998), while others treat it as separate (e.g., Moravcsik, 1997).

The Liberalism Approach			
Model	Approach	Concepts	Definition/Elements
<p>Liberals offer a more optimistic worldview than the realists. They maintain that international economic interdependence, transnational interactions, international institutions, and the spread of democracy can promote cooperation and even peace between nations.</p>	<p>In contrast to the realists, liberalism assumes that non-state actors, such as international organization and multi-national corporations, are essential actors in international relations and those economic and social issues are no less critical than military ones (Viotti and Kauppi, 1987).</p>	<p>The Neoliberal institutionalist model argues that regimes help overcome dilemmas of common interests and common aversions and facilitate collaboration and coordination between countries. (Haggard and Simmons, 1987)</p>	<p>The removal of obstacles to the free movement of people within the EU, and the increased cooperation among its member states with immigration, have made this theory more applicable to the study of immigration policy.</p>
<p>Table 2.4: Liberalism and Neo-Liberalism Approach</p>			

Zolberg (1991, 1992), Hollifield (1992b), Miller (1992), Meyers (1994) and Cornelius et al. (1994) conclude that supranational organizations and international regimes usually have had little impact on immigration policies of individual countries, with the partial exception of the EU and the refugee regime (on the refugee regime, see Salomon, 1991; Hartigan, 1992; Loescher, 1993; Skran, 1995). The influence of international organizations and regimes is mitigated by the high domestic political costs of immigration, the difficulty of distributing the benefits of immigration, and the almost unlimited supply of labour that has exempted the receiving countries

from the need to cooperate with the countries of origin or with other receiving countries.

However, the removal of obstacles to the free movement of people within the EU, and the increased cooperation among its member states about immigration, have made this theory more applicable to the study of immigration policy, especially in multi-level or federal systems (see Convey and Kupiszewski, 1995; Koslowski, 1998; Overbeek, 1995; Ucarer, 1997).

6. Globalization Theory

Globalization theory (e.g., Sassen) combines elements of the liberal approach with world system theory (Meyers, 2000) (see table 2.5).

The Globalization Approach			
Model	Approach	Concepts	Definition/Elements
The globalization theory combines elements of the liberal approach and the world system theory. Some scholars have argued that globalization is challenging the stability and territoriality of the state, as well as its capacity to control its economic and welfare policies (Sassen, 1996).	Sovereignty itself has been transformed, and scientists must accept the possibility that sovereignty itself has been transformed, and that exclusive territoriality—a distinctive feature of the modern state—is being undermined by economic globalization (Sassen, 1996a).	Migration is an essential part of globalization. Governments welcome the mobility of capital, commodities, and ideas Castles (1998). They are unlikely to succeed in the mobility of people. According to Meyers (2000), globalization focuses on immigrant and citizenship policy, which only indirectly influences immigration control policy.	Sassen (1996a) explains the combination of pressures, including the emergence of de facto regimes on human rights and the circulation of capital, as well as ethnic lobbies, institutions, unintended consequences of immigration policies and other kinds of political and economic internationalization, have restricted the sovereignty of the state and reduced its autonomy where immigration policy is concerned.
Table 2.5: Globalization Approach			

During the past decade, some scholars have argued that globalization is challenging the stability and territoriality of the state, as well as its capacity to control its economic and welfare policies (Cable, 1995; Strange, 1996; Holton, 1998). Such claims have influenced studies by Sassen (1996a, 1996b), Baubock (1994), Soysal (1994) and Jacobson (1996), all of whom point to recent trends that have diminished the state's capacity to drive immigration and naturalization policies (see Hollifield, 1998). Sassen (1996a) argues that we must accept the possibility that sovereignty itself has been transformed, and that exclusive territoriality—a distinctive feature of

the modern state—is being undermined by economic globalization. She concludes that a combination of pressures, including the emergence of de facto regimes of human rights and the circulation of capital, ethnic lobbies, EU institutions, unintended consequences of immigration policies and other kinds of policies and economic internationalization, have restricted the sovereignty of the state and reduced its autonomy to develop independent immigration policy.

The global theory focuses mainly on people and capital. Castles (1998) observes that international migration is an essential part of globalization and that if governments welcome capital, commodities, and ideas, they are unlikely to succeed without the mobility of people within and between different regions.

In practice, much of the globalization literature focuses on immigrant and citizenship policy, which only indirectly influences immigration control policy. Soysal, Jacobson, and Baubock (2005) explain how human rights norms, transnational migration, and transnational citizenship challenge state sovereignty about citizenship. Sassen explores both citizenship and immigration control policy. Regarding the latter, she highlights the difficulty of maintaining a liberal regime for trade in goods and a restrictive one for immigrants (1996) — states "must reconcile the conflicting requirements of border-free economies and border controls to keep immigrants out." Sassen points to specialized systems governing the circulation of service workers within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), World Trade Organization (WTO) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as examples where internationalization of trade and investment in services necessitated labour mobility.

Nevertheless, she acknowledges the more limited influence of globalization on immigration control policy. Labour circulation systems "have been uncoupled from any notion of migration, even though they involve a version of temporary labour migration." Only the EU has formalized a regime that combines the free mobility of trade, capital, and labour; in general, there is a consensus among states concerning the sovereign mandate of each country to control its borders (Sassen, 1996b).

Globalization has also been linked to domestic social changes, where the "national identity" approach helps to explain concurrent immigration policies, at least in the post-1960s period. Studies by Betz (1994), Kumar (1994), Richmond (1994) and Schnapper (1994) argue that globalization and post-industrial changes exert pressure on national cohesion and produce an emphasis on the politics of identity and citizenship (Freeman, 1995a), which can lead to

restrictions on immigration. According to Schnapper (1994), European debates on immigrants are caused by the nation-state's crisis, whose values and institutions are being challenged by subnational pressures and European construction and integration into the world economy. Richmond argues that the combined effects of post-industrialism, postmodernism, and globalization have generated a crisis of integration in contemporary societies. In reaction to the insecurity felt by many faced within a rapidly changing worldwide society, there is a global tendency towards stricter immigration regulations (Richmond, 1994). Betz (1994), starting with a globalization argument, anticipates a final breakthrough in capitalism and the arrival of a global economy, which would reduce governments' capacity to control national economies. He argues that the transition from industrial to post-industrial capitalism has created profound social tensions and left society deeply split. This process of fragmentation and individualization has caused the decline of traditional political culture and has opened up fresh opportunities for new parties—notably radical right-wing populist parties with anti-immigration platforms (Betz, 1994). In some senses, his description corresponds to the "national identity" approach.

The globalization literature contributes more to understanding of the causes of migration and immigrant and citizenship policy than to the study of the immigration control policy. The two primary examples of the influence of global trends on immigration control policy are—the EU regime that enables the free movement of labour and the impact of the UN human rights regime on refugee policy—overlap with the neoliberal institutionalist model. While globalization theory asserts the sovereignty of the state over immigration policy has declined, some are less convinced. Both Freeman (1998b) and Joppke (1998b) demonstrate that the country's capacity to control immigration has increased, and those liberal states admit immigrants more because of domestic pressures than other external considerations. Domestic needs inherently drive immigration federalism. Cable (1995) states that while globalization has reduced the room for national governments to maneuver in a growing number of fields, "controls over immigration could be said to represent a powerful break by the nation-state forces."

Finally, Hollifield (1998) argues that the most significant deficiency of globalization theory is its excessive reliance on economic and social forces while neglecting the influence of politics. According to Betz, (1994), the combining of the globalization theory and the "national identity approach" helps both theories by 1) adding a political component to the globalization theory (e.g., Betz, 1994); and 2) explaining concurrent immigration policies in various countries.

Many social researchers conclude that immigration policy changes in western countries can best be explained with the nation-building and globalization theories.

7. Immigration Federalism and Economic Immigration in Multi-level Systems

Since the 1960s, immigration regulations internationally have been built on a notion of an economy in which workers remain in a particular occupation, and there are limited possibilities for substitution among workers (Diewert, 1971). In that condition, a shortage of workers of any specific type could not be remedied from the existing labour force, and any deficit could severely impede the productivity of other workers. Immigration then played a vital role in filling the specific occupational and sectoral gaps and allowing growth to continue. By the 1990s, the primary economic model assumed that the production system was more adaptable, so immigrant workers needed to be skilled and were then assumed to adapt to changes in labour markets. Immigration policy then aimed to target a labour force with the right type of workers, namely flexible workers with a wide variety of skills and aptitudes. Modern immigration programs have three stated primary objectives: a) Increasing domestic productivity by welcoming well-trained and well-educated persons. b) Filling economic niches by importing labour to meet domestic market needs. c) Creating new businesses that improve employment rates (Li, 2003)

The point system enables governments to identify immigrants with the optimal balance of general skills rather than ones to fill specific current skill shortages. Receiving and adapting (i.e., settlement and integration) economic immigrants is as essential as attracting and selecting them (i.e., preferment). Li (2003), in *Canada Immigration Debates and Issues*, criticizes the historical, nationally directed economic approach for immigration goals. He argues that having highly skilled immigrants to support the Canadian economy is as important as measuring how skilled immigrants are incorporated into Canadian society. Li (2003) asserts that the extent to which immigrants are well incorporated within the country's cultural spectrum determines the effect of immigration. These arguments support the notion that effective immigration policy can only be realized with the knowledge and capacity of subnational regions.

Different models can be used to analyze immigration policies, especially in federal or multi-level governance systems. Most of the studies use an economic perspective to demonstrate how immigration policy affects labour markets (i.e. a Marxism and Neo-Marxism approach)

(Borjas, 1999; Card & Peri, 2016; Kahn, 2004). Other groups of researchers analyze immigration using history and law (i.e. a National Identity approach) (Flynn, 2005; Grey, 2014; Harvey, 2003) and from a perspective of power, linking immigration policies to institutional and political power (Heyman, 1995; Krammer, 2018; Wright, 2017). Immigration brings change; frequently, immigration policies are subject to economic and social pressures (Crawford et al., 2016; Boswell, 2004; Geddes, 2003, 2016; Hing, 1993). Most of the theories adequately explain the historical background, and socioeconomic and geopolitical context leading to the national policy change, but none conclusively shows why and how immigration becomes a vital issue to subnational governments.

Multi-level governance is essential for understanding immigration policy change worldwide. The specific concept of immigration federalism bridges this gap. It is particularly relevant for nations with multi-level systems. There are roughly 26 countries that have a federal instead of a unitary type of government in the world today, representing 40 percent of the world's population (figure 2.1). They involve some of the largest and most complex democracies, including India, the US, Brazil, Germany, and Mexico (Immigration Forum, 2017). Sovereignty-based federalism was the dominant model in the past, and some argue cooperative federalism is the future (Cox & Miles†, 2014; Kaczorowski, 1996; Levy, 2007; Saucedo 2018; Simmons, Graefe & Rodriguez, 2017). Many federal countries are traditionally high immigration countries, including Canada, the US, Australia, Switzerland and Germany (Baglay & Nakache, 2014; Bauer et al., 2000; Entorf & Minoui, 2005), which many argue is due to structural factors, such as geography and economy.

Federal states divide power between two or more levels of government. The national (or federal) level usually enjoys jurisdiction over matters of national concern while the regional (provincial/state and sometimes county or local governments) level have jurisdiction over matters of local concern (Botha, 2013; Gardner, 2017; Smiley, 1974; Thorlakson, 2003; Telford et al., 2008). Unitary states have just a single level of authority. Additionally, those states have different governance structures, institutions, and styles—e.g. republican, constitutional monarchies and theocracies. The competing styles and structures can create tension. Boswell (2004) argued that immigration brings change, and those variations often generate different meanings in response to economic and social pressures and problems.




Figure 2.1- Global Distribution of Unitary States & Federal Countries
Source: Local Profile, 2016

Governance structures vary widely across the federations. In the US, for instance, they include the White House, the US Department of State, the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the US Customs and Border Protection, but the Department of Homeland Security is the primary level in charge of immigration policies. Most recently, the US president issued a set of executive orders that provided the Homeland Security Department with extra resources. The focus is on safeguarding borders, enforcing the immigration rules, and confirming that individuals who pose a risk to state security or public safety cannot go into or stay in the US. Protecting the American population is the highest priority for the US government (www.dhs.gov). Drawing on Susan Strange (1994), one could conclude that there is a balance between a fortress society and a market economy in the US. In other OECD countries, like Brazil, immigration affairs are embodied in the framework of the Statute of Foreigners (Statute

of the Strangers). Before the Federal Constitution was enacted in 1988, the Immigration Law was developed to protect national security and protect the labour market for Brazilian professionals. In recent years, resolutions of the National Immigration Council, a board composed of representatives of various sectors of the Public Administration and the Class Federative Entities, triggered work on a new migration policy to address current migratory trends within both the national and regional socio-economic context. In some developing countries, such as Colombia, Ecuador, and the Philippines, the governance structure for immigration is too small to offer much insight into the interface between structure and style.

The two countries of particular interest to this study—Australia and Canada—have similar histories and systems, but with some significant differences. Canada is structured as a federal administration, born at Confederation through the Constitution Act, 1867, and operates as a constitutional monarchy. The Crown is thus the base of the executive, legislative, and judicial divisions of the Canadian government. The Governor-General of Canada personally represents the monarch. The Privy Council for Canada is the body that advises the sovereign on executive power; that system is mirrored at the provincial level. The structure of the Canadian immigration effort includes the Minister of Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship, who has the primary responsibilities for the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Passport Canada and language instruction for newcomers to Canada (www.gov.ca). Similarly, the government of the Commonwealth of Australia is a federal parliamentary Constitutional monarchy (www.australia.gov.au/). The Commonwealth of Australia was enacted in 1901 as a consequence of a contract between six self-governing British colonies, which became the six territories (www.australia.gov.au/). The terms of this agreement are personalized in the Australian Constitution. That agreement was drawn up at a Constitutional Convention and confirmed by the individuals of the colonies through plebiscites (<http://www.australia.gov.au/>). Queen Elizabeth II is currently the Head of State. The Governor-General of Australia represents the Queen with exclusive powers delegated by constitutional resolution to the Australian head of the regime, the Prime Minister of Australia. The Australian scheme of government is a conglomerate of elements of the structures of Westminster and Washington with unique Australian characteristics and has been characterized as a “Washminster mutation” (<http://www.australia.gov.au/>).

The Australian government consists of three divisions of the federal government of Australia: The Executive and a bicameral Parliament. The six states retain all remaining duties (previously separate colonies). Further, each state has a different constitution, so that Australia has seven sovereign Parliaments, none of which can impose on the functions of any other. The Commonwealth Parliament can suggest adjustments to the national Constitution, but those adjustments need the support of Australians of voting age by referendum, and the result needs to have a “double majority,” which means every change requires at least 66% of the electorate to support the measure. The Australian Constitution also offers that the States can agree to assign powers to the Commonwealth. Some power shifts may be reached by way of a modification to the Constitution through a referendum. A vote on whether the suggested shift of power from the Territories to the Central government or vice versa, should be implemented). The Cabinet of the Commonwealth is the assembly of senior Ministers of the Crown, responsible to the Federal Parliament. Ministers are selected by the Governor-General, on the guidance of the Prime Minister, who assists at the former’s pleasure. In 2017, there were eighteen departments of the Australian government, including the Department of Immigration and Border Protection. In Australia, the Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection is in charge of immigration, citizenship, and border control.

Canada and Australia have almost the same structure and institutions. It is essential to analyze the concept of “institutionalism” and how it is conceptualized in the complete study. Concepts and frameworks are crucial to explain and describe ideas, especially in public policy. Parsons’ (2007) logic in political science is one way to understand concepts such as “institutions” and “institutionalism.” Parsons argues that structural and institutional claims have two logics: 1) the logic of position related to ideational issues and 2) the logic of interpretation linked to the psychological view. Parsons (2007) argues that objective rationality depends on structural or institutional conditions to define specific actions as rational. Thus, all “rationalist” scholarship can be aligned into structural or institutional categories. According to Parsons (2007), institutions are human-made and have a logic of position.

Parsons (2007) argues that, in conventional social science, institutionalism and institutions emerge from a pattern of behaviour among collaboratively engaged individuals. Groups of individuals work together to adopt a formal organizational pattern. People refer to states, armed forces, and schools as legal organizations. But those patterns do not always create

legal organizations (Parsons, 2007). Social scientists tend to describe specific organizations as agreements supported by treaties, standards, and law. Sometimes those documents are not even explicit, they are informal rules or norms. The concept of the institution reflects both formal and informal elements.

Since the “new institutionalism” from sociology and economics in the 1980s, there has been no shortage claims (March and Olsen 1989; Hall and Taylor 1996). Three prestigious schools consider “institutions” a core actor. First, rational choice institutionalism supports the rationality assumption of structural logic but reiterates human-made institutional constraints in the material landscape (Williamson 1975; Moe 1984; Shepsle 1986; Weingast and Marshal 1989; Eggertsson 1990; North 1990; Martin 1992; Oye 1993; Hall and Taylor 1996; Weingast 2002). In principle, rational institutionalists see rational individuals channelled to specific choices by human-made obstacles such as organizations, rules, and flows of information that change actors’ cost-benefit estimations. ‘Sociological institutionalists, by contrast, see institutions affecting action through a dynamic of legitimacy or appropriateness (Fligstein 1990; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Dobbin 1994; Scott and Meyer 1994; Katzenstein 1996, Hall and Taylor 1996). People behave in patterned ways in line with organizational models, rules, and informal norms because they “take for granted” the legitimacy of these patterns (and assume the illegitimacy of alternatives, or never even imagine them). Historical institutionalism is usually described as standing between these two considerations, combining mechanisms of constraint and legitimacy (Skocpol 1979; Skowronek 1982; Zysman 1983; Hall 1986; Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992; Hattam 1993; Steinmo 1993; Hall and Taylor 1996). The choice of institutions at some point has the unintended consequence of subsequently steering actions along a particular historical path, in effect generating “path dependence” (North, 1990; Mahoney and Schensul, 2006).

This current study is influenced by rational choice institutionalism and its implied limitation on actors managing all the information. Canadian and Australian institutions do not have the computational capacity to manage all the provincial and state interests, suffering from bounded rationality (Simon 1955; Jones 1999) and both cognitive limitations (e.g., judgment, reasoning, perception and memory) and incomplete task environments (i.e., factors that affect its ability to achieve goals).

Historical institutionalism is valuable as most of the changes in immigration policy have been influenced by social learning and exhibit some path dependence. In Canada and Australia, decisions made in the past are significant and bound opportunities to develop new policy instruments, objectives and political discourse. Immigration federalism policy started with Quebec's demands for a greater role in immigration but has grown significantly in the past 60 years. The resulting Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) was launched in Canada at the end of the 1990s. Australia then borrowed from Canada some of the mechanisms to attract immigrants and even some policies related to immigration federalization.

In the 1980s, immigration federalism emerged as a new immigration approach to manage federal and provincial coordination and to improve the immigration selection process. The idea first emerged in the academy in the US (see, for example, particular issues of *Law and Policy* 2011; *Tulsa Journal of Comparative & International Law* 2008; *Harvard Law Review* 2005; *New York University Annual Survey of American Law* 2002). The basic concept of immigration federalism is "defined as the role of the states and localities in making and implementing immigration law and policy" (Varsanyi et al., 2012). Cameron and Simeon (2002) assert that collaborative federalism has become a fundamental concept in debates over public policy. The notion that immigration federalism embodies the contribution from subnational governments in immigration matters because it is connected to the move from a concentrated to a dispersed model of immigration programs (Spiro, 2002). This emerging, devolving trend is found in many federations, including Australia, Canada, and the US. In these three nations, in particular, immigration has traditionally been associated with nation-building, foreign policy, and other areas of national interest, which naturally associated with federal (i.e., centralized) rather than the local rule. However, in recent years sub-national concerns and interests have asserted themselves.

Although sub-national units have always participated in the immigration process, their influence was experienced typically at the level of the immigrant's actual ability to assimilate into a local community (e.g., depending on local employment, welfare, safety legislation). The essential questions of admission, membership in a country, border control, and enforcement have generally been determined in a centralized way by federal regulation. Thus, in Australia, Canada and the US, for most of the twentieth century, federal governments have been the dominant player regulating immigration, producing a unified model of immigrant selection and

enforcement, governed by the idea of immigration to a nation (rather than to a specific locality) (Baglay & Nakache 2014; Reitz 2005; Spiro 2002;).

Immigration federalism originally comes from the US. It is derived from the legal approach that defined the role of the states and localities in making and implementing immigration law and policy (Law Review 2005; New York University Annual Survey of American Law 2002; Particular Issues of Law and Policy 2011; Tulsa Journal of Comparative & International Law 2008). One aspect of immigration federalism looks at federal exclusivity (Huntington, 2008). Immigration federalism then explores the subnational limitations to immigration—, especially exclusionary lawmaking, focusing on the role of states and localities in developing laws to foster immigrants' inclusion (Elias 2014). Immigration federalism has become a social instrument of gradual institutional change (Paquet, 2017). Some of the problems of defining this phenomenon as a single idea are the differentiation in the forms, place, and aspects motivating immigration federalism in different jurisdictions (Baglay and Nakache, 2014; Su, 2007). For nearly 150 years, the US federal government has been pre-eminent in immigration policy (Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, 2013). American Federalism Theory embodies, at least implicitly, the corollary idea that federalism can undermine localism. Integrating local institutions into the national political and policy environment, the argument goes, can distort local politics and policies (Cox & Miles, 2014). Much of the US legislation between 2004 and 2012 was restrictive, making it more difficult for immigrants who resided in communities to work and live their daily lives. Meanwhile, states and localities have responded to the influx of immigrants (Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, 2013), becoming pro-immigrant due to the development of a broader coalition of supporters. Pro-immigrant groups and coalitions have teamed up with clergy, police chiefs, labour unions, and business groups to help pass pro-integration legislation, particularly as progress on the national front has stalled (Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram, 2013).

In 2014, President Obama pointed out how deadlocked a once-promising bipartisan Senate migration project had become; cities and countries have become the modern immigration-policy innovators (Policy Entrepreneurs by John Kingdon, 2011) (Singer & Wainer, 2014). Drivers for subnational involvement in immigration include increasing globalization, new international (including continental) trade agreements, the ongoing impact of federalism, nationalism, and the processes of decentralization (Spiro, 2001; Vengroff, 2013). Immigration

federalism represents the association of several government levels in immigration concerns, connecting with the shift from a centralized to a dispersed model of regulation (Schuck, 2007). Three Models of Immigration federalism have emerged: Central Hegemony, Cooperative Model, Devolutionary Federalism (Spiro, 2001) (table 2.6).

The rise of immigration federalism is first associated with the incapacity of national policies to address local needs. Secondly, at the subnational level, it involves the mobilization of political or administrative entrepreneurs. Thirdly, there are aspects of politics, nationalism, policy diffusion, and the recognition by subnational governments of the direct and indirect costs of federally controlled immigration in their jurisdictions (e.g., education or health in Canada) (Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, 2013; Hepburn & Zapata-Barrero, 2014; Newton, 2012; Paquet, 2015, 2017; Suro, 2015). Immigration federalism (Baglay & Nakache, 2014; Paquet 2014, Paquet 2017) is a mechanism where the federal state responds to subnational pressures and allows provinces/states in Canada and Australia to participate in the process of selecting immigrants.

Key Immigration Concepts
<p>Immigration-/Migration</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is no agreement on a particular meaning of a 'migrant.' Migrants might be defined by overseas birth, by foreign nationality, or by their migration into a new nation to stay provisionally (sometimes for as little as a year) or to settle for the long-term. • Migrants are not natives and they do not have citizenship in order to reside there, mainly as permanent residents (PR) or naturalized citizens, or to take up employment, as an immigrant employee, or provisionally, as a foreign worker.
<p>Economic Immigrant</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The definition by the UN tends to use the term "migrant worker," instead of economic immigrant. Economic migration is defined as a decision to move and to improve the standard of living by gaining a better-paying job • According to Salverda et al. (2013) economic immigration involves people selected for migration, based on their ability to contribute to the economy.
<p>Multilevel Governance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The classic accounts of cooperative federalism assume a subordinate role for the state in dutifully implementing national mandates, perhaps tailoring the particular practices to accord with local circumstances (Schapiro, 2019) • This concept appeared in the 1980s, but it did not work until 1990s. It comprises a legal approach to the role of states and localities in making and implementing immigration law and policy (Baglay and Nakache, 2014).
<p>Table 2.6: Key Immigration Concepts</p>

In the past, Australia and Canada national governments had total control over immigration policies. Currently, immigration processes involve a significant effort by subnational levels of government in Australia and Canada. The Points System in Immigration, conceptualized by scholars but first implemented in Canada, is a policy instrument that supports subnational levels of government to help select specific immigrants. However, the merit system does not help to answer where countries need immigrants and what type of immigrants each province or city needs. That requires the insights of local governments.

Currently, Canadian provinces determine the labour or human talent that each province requires. In the 1970s and the 1980s, immigration policy and immigration processes suffered from a lack of symmetry (Garcea, 1993). According to Garcea (1998), the bifurcated nature of the immigration system in Canada due to Quebec immigration policy has created negative impacts on the socio-demographic arena and the national identity in the country. However, the role of provinces in immigration to Canada, led by Quebec, has expanded dramatically since 1990 (Vengroff, 2013). Canada-Quebec stood out for an extended period as an “asymmetrical” federalist model, with other provinces not engaged (Vengroff, 2013). The provincial role in targeting immigrants as part of broader economic growth and the preservation of cultural identity has worked to make Quebec a place where both government and citizens generally favour immigration (Vengroff, 2013). The asymmetrical negotiation of a Quebec based immigration process opened the door for other provinces to engage more directly in immigration. The resulting nominee system is qualitatively different from the Quebec model and has been underexplored in the literature. This thesis works to fill that gap. Saskatchewan is chosen explicitly because it was one of the first and has been one of the most aggressive users of the nominee option.

One could argue that all the Provincial Nominee regulations made in the Canadian immigration policy in the past twenty-five years generated a second order of change; consistent with second-order change, the instruments have changed since 1967, but the policy objectives remained unchanged in their hierarchy (see Hall, 1993). On the other hand, Li (2003) and Tassioglou (2017) argue that immigration policies could have been improved through combined mechanisms between the two levels of government, but in the end, policies should complement other processes. Every immigration objective has a link to an immigration process. Now, most provinces and states are part of the immigration process, albeit not necessarily equally engaged;

Ontario, for example, only sparingly uses their selection opportunities while smaller provinces, like Saskatchewan and Manitoba, are aggressively using the program.

Baglay and Nakache (2014) argue for more investigation of the second level of government as a co-participant in decisions on immigration issues in countries such as Australia and the US. However, Campbell (2004) argues that determining the effects of changing the regulation or policy would take at least a decade so that only now is it appropriate to consider the evolving policies in Australia and Canada. They are just now passing the 10-year window. Another challenge is that the processes of “diffusion,” according to Campbell, requires evidence of success in another location, so innovation federalism has not been adopted universally so it cannot reasonably be assessed across all the provinces/states in Canada and Australia, as some led and some lagged. For all these reasons, the process of subnational participation in immigration policies has yet to be validated.

Immigration federalism is a relatively new policy tool that revolutionizes immigration policies by embedding these subnational efforts in national policy. The remainder of this thesis examines the evolution and use of this tool in Canada and Australia, probing its fit with overall governance, economic development, and security policy. Concepts such as International Political Economy (IPE) and Global Defense & Security are inextricably entwined with immigration policy and go a long way to help us understand the general framing of that policy. This thesis explores how immigration federalism provides incentives for policy change at the provincial and federal levels. Using Hall’s Paradigm Model, this study defines how, in the past twenty-five years, immigration federalism has altered immigration policy in two provinces, Western Australia and Saskatchewan. The first step of this argument is to reveal how the policy instruments, policy goals, and political discourses of immigration federalism evolved in Canada and Australia. This research then explores the differences between Canada and Australia’s immigration processes and how they are used to select highly skilled individuals. The goal is to highlight the differential role of subnational governments.

CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY

1. The research question

The research question in this thesis is this: *How have social learning and multi-governance) altered immigration policies to attract and integrate economic immigrants into Saskatchewan and Western Australia, between 1967 and 2017?* This question drives the choice of the conceptual framework, methods and technical analysis (summarized in table 3.1).

Hall's Model	Case Study	Document Analysis Method
<p>“[P]olicymakers customarily work within a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing. Like a Gestalt, this framework is embedded in the very terminology through which policymakers communicate about their work, and it is influential precisely because so much of it is taken for granted and unamenable to scrutiny as a whole. I am going to call this interpretive framework a policy paradigm” (Hall, 1993, p. 279).</p>	<p>It is best described as a rigorous study of a single case with a purpose to generalize across a larger set of cases. It follows from this description that case studies may be small-or large-N, qualitative or quantitative, experimental or observational, synchronic or diachronic (Gerring, 2007a, 2009). It also follows that the case study research design matched with any macro theoretical framework or paradigm (e.g. behavioralist, rational choice, institutionalism, or interpretivism). Flyvbjerg (2013) concludes that social sciences can be strengthened with the execution of a more significant number of useful case studies.</p>	<p>Triangulation requires documentary analysis of both printed and electronic materials (Bowen, 2009). A document is something that we can read that offers a perspective of the social world. Formal documents can be read as declarations of fact, albeit many facts are socially conceived. Analysis can be undertaken on a range of different types of documents, including government records, media reports, private documents, and an array of other records.</p>

Table 3.1: Methodology & Methods

2. Conceptual framework: The Paradigm Shift Model

Baglay and Nakache (2014) argue for the need for more examination on subnational levels of governments that make decisions about immigration. Conceptually we will draw on paradigms from Kuhn, Hoppe and Hall and Hall's work on social learning and orders of change. According to Hall (1993), social learning is policy evaluation in the central sense of the term.

Social learning involves evaluating existing policies because people cannot easily identify why and how we got the policies we now have.

Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions is based on a simple cycle of progress, whereby he uses paradigms to understand social and scientific changes. Kuhn posited, "a paradigm is a universal recognized scientific achievement that, for a time, provide[s] model problems and solutions for a community of researchers" (Kuhn 1962, p. x). A key aspect of this is the notion of a cycle, where ideas go through phases, moving from pre-science to normal science, model drift, model crisis, model revolution and paradigm change (Bird, 2014). Paradigm change could work at any point in the policy cycle, including the five stages from agenda-setting to policy evaluation, or on the cycle itself.

Hoppe (2011), with his puzzling, powering and participation model, in many ways is mapping onto Kuhn's paradigms and linking it to the governance challenges facing society. Hoppe offers two templates for unpacking policy systems. In one, he juxtaposes consensus or dispute over values and evidence or knowledge; the other transposes goals and evidence. Each is a pathway to seeing how agreements or disagreements on values, goals, and evidence drives policy. Later in this work, we will use the concepts of puzzling, powering and participation to assess the extent and scope of immigration federalism in Saskatchewan and Western Australia.

According to Hall (1993), a policy paradigm is an interpretive framework of ideas and patterns, which specifies not only the policy objectives and type of instruments that can be used to achieve them but also the nature of the problems and the way of thinking and communicating them through political discourse.

Although Hall's work has been criticized by some researchers, he has inspired and motivated thousands of scholars to understand paradigms and concepts. For instance, if we compare Hall's research with Rose (1991) and Jenson (1989), we realize Hall's work is a reference point for much of the work in this field. Daigneault (2014) reflects in his book *Reassessing the Concept of Policy Paradigm: Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Policy Studies* on Hall's contribution. Daigneault criticizes Rose and Jenson, arguing that they are less rigorous because, instead of studying ideas, they analyze actors (e.g., political actors, social actors) and assume policy change itself is a paradigm shift. In contrast, Hall focuses on

behaviorally-based explanations for change, where ideas (such as economic theory) drive choices. In this way, it is more a societal paradigm; according to Jenson (1989), “a societal paradigm is a shared collection of interconnected assumptions which make sense of many social relations. The societal paradigm’s definition is broad and quite abstract.” Jenson wrote more about identities and asymmetric power relations, with a focus on identity building within a Societal Paradigm (Jenson, 1989, p. 238).

Hall then introduces the concept of Social Learning, which is similar to Rose’s Drawing Lessons (Rose 1991), except Hall links lesson-learning with a paradigm shift to create social learning. Rose’s approach is more straightforward but makes general assumptions about how the world works, which are not explored fully. One result is that lesson drawing studies often are limited to an assessment of policies and plans and fail to explore the applications and impacts of programs. Conversely, Hall’s work is more holistic, which fits in the realm of paradigms and the purpose of this study.

Hall views the paradigm as an ideational factor (drawing on Parsons, 2007, and his logic of interpretation). Hall (1993) explores how systems move between policy paradigms, using his three orders of change framing. The first order occurs when governments need to adjust the available instruments. The second-order appears when governments change tools or techniques (based on learning from experience) without breaking the hierarchy of objectives. The full paradigm shift, a third-order of change, happens with a radical and simultaneous change of instruments and goals, including the evolution of political rhetoric and logic. Under standard conditions (Kuhn’s normal sciences), there is active lesson drawing, but that does not lead to a paradigm shift. Paradigms stay stable over long periods until some set of circumstances tips the system into crisis. When there is a growing number of empirical challenges to a paradigm, people search for an alternative paradigm, which better fits the new circumstances. Most of the time, a paradigm is hegemonic. It is dominant for an extended period. However, under some conditions, it becomes vulnerable to attacks, and the government can open the policy agenda to alternatives—which creates uncertainty. People are not sure that the assumptions they used for decades can still solve a problem or answer the question. At times, policies do not work the way they should. At a given point, people start to criticize policy settings and the policy instruments themselves. If the problems remain even when people change the policy instruments a bit, they

hold a higher level of uncertainty. At that moment, the government starts to question if the theory that people use to assess reality and the policies themselves threatened the assumptions about how the economy works.

Rose and Hall bookend the conceptual space of interest here. Hall emphasizes the goals of actors, policy instruments, the problems they face, how they are articulated and, ultimately, how they lead to change, whether iterative or disjointed. Hall came to this approach as he explored broad economic paradigms such as Keynesianism and monetarism, while Rose focused more on second-order changes in micro-level policy instruments, where the ideas remained unchanged. Rose discounts first-order change as too technical and limited and third-order changes as more of a philosophical or theoretical investigation. Rose was more interested in and wrote about middle-ground theory. In this context, Hall helps to deal with the broader set of issues involved in immigration policy reform.

In this study, the ideas of immigration federalism and its related policies are designed to contribute to a country's economy to generate innovation, business, and opportunities for everyone in society. Attracting economic and skilled migrants to Canada and Australia involved a change of paradigm.

Parsons' concept of structural and institutional factors is useful for unpacking the systems and their dynamics. According to Parsons (2007), a structural factor is extensive and related to exogenous material things; material is considered as structure, often not human-made (p. 51). Parsons explains structure as things that humans cannot control or can control only to a minor degree. For instance, money, geography, wealth distribution, and physical distribution of power are not directly altered by individuals or even institutions (at least in the short run) (Parsons 2007, p. 12). Parsons' institutional factors are claims made by institutions that define how people act within human-made formal or informal organizations under specific rules and norms. Parsons crucially differentiates an institutional factor from a structural factor, arguing that an institutional factor reacts vis-a-vis to a human-made organization. Parsons concept has a strong historical and institutional base, which leads to significant path-dependency. The dependency pattern theorem is based on the argument that previous events affect the later ones (North, 1994).

Social learning plays a role when politics and broader actors of society mobilize. Political parties, social movements, economists and bureaucrats are all epistemic communities that drive choice (Haas, 1992). This study uses Hall's framework of three orders of change to analyze the institutional change concerning Immigration-Federalism's policy in both Canada (SK) and Australia (WA). This study tries to identify if the third order of change occurred among the immigration policies in the last twenty-five years. According to Hall (1993), the third order of change, referred to as "paradigm shift," involves a radical and simultaneous adjustment of policy instruments and policy goals, including the evolution of political discourse. The challenge is that immigration regulations in Australia and Canada are "path dependent," so the key is to identify the triggers for change and the forces of inertia.

3. Case study approach

This work is structured around two comparative cases. A case study is a research approach comprising an up-close, in-depth, and critical analysis of a specific case. For example, a case study in Health Sciences may investigate a particular drug a doctor prescribed, and a case study in negotiation might study one specific business's strategy. About two centuries ago, Le Play was the pioneer of the case method, using numerous disciplines of the social sciences to create an extensive number of case studies, many of which have registered in the pantheon of notable investigations. Estimating by the massive volume of new scholarly output, the case study research design plays a central role in anthropology, archeology, business, education, history, medicine, political science, psychology, social work, and sociology (Gerring, 2009). Recent studies of economic growth have turned to case studies of different countries' comparisons such as Botswana, Korea, and Mauritius. Even in economics and political economy, areas not regularly remarked for their receptiveness to case-based work, there has been something of a renaissance.

According to Flyvbjerg, the "Case Study" as a method examines five fundamental misinterpretations concerning case studies research. The first supposed that theoretical information is more relevant than practical knowledge. Second, a case study itself cannot be generalized from a single case; consequently, the individual case study cannot contribute to scientific evolution. Third, Flyvbjerg (2006) mentions that the case study is more useful to produce hypotheses, while other methods often fit better for hypothesis measurement and theory

construction. Fourth, the analysis of a “Case Study” includes prejudice towards confirmation; and finally, it is usually challenging to compile particular case studies. Flyvbjerg (2013) reveals and reviews these disputes one by one and cites Kuhn’s argument regarding why a scientific discipline without a significant number of cases studies carried out in-depth is a discipline without systematization. Copy generation and a subject without copies is an unproductive one. As a result, Flyvbjerg (2013) concludes that social sciences can be strengthened with the execution of a more significant number of useful case studies.

The case method incorporates a mix of purposes. Some cases are used to illustrate what has been done in some context; some cases are exploratory (investigative) and offer factual evidence in a structured way; scholars tend to produce cumulative or critical cases that assess and interpret an event.

Regardless of the style chosen, every case is focused on some defined situation, is data and information rich, includes a full analysis of the situation and surrounding elements and comes to some conclusion (sometimes a solution and sometimes an insight).

4. Comparative Document Analysis

Social scientists argue that qualitative methods can be a highly appropriate and insightful way to analyze policy changes and political actors. Some research (Bowen, 2009; O’Leary, 2014) considers that evaluating documents is one of the most rigorous ways to find explanations of the research question. This research will use a Comparative Document Analysis Method to find how policy learning and multi-level governance affect immigration policy. This method is appropriate as Canada and Australia are similar countries, and Saskatchewan and Western Australia are comparable regions.

In effect, we have a natural experiment in immigration policy. This natural experiment has three macro drivers: security and defence, social issues, and economic impacts. It also involves two national governments and two subnational governments. In practice, then, this research explores twelve potential comparative factors (three drivers multiplied by four governments).

The first part of this analysis compares each country and province considering some points (e.g., national and provincial general data, immigration data). The second part focuses on

patterns of comparison (e.g., a specific time or periods of time, immigration regulations, immigration processes, and type of multi-level governance tensions, political actors, social learning issues, policy changes, and institutional changes). The third part explains degrees of influence of immigration federalism on governments from the national level to the provincial level and vice-versa (e.g., low, moderate, and high levels of influence). The fourth part explores degrees of influence of social learning on both levels of government, and effects on immigration policies (e.g., low, moderate or high levels of social learning). The fifth part shows how multi-governance and social learning affect different scenarios (e.g., political effects, social effects, economic consequences).

Analyzing the structure of documents becomes crucial for comparing policies and institutions. According to Bowen (2009), the analysis of the structure of documents is a qualitative model in which records will be deduced to give voice and meaning to a specific topic. Therefore, the information coming from different sources will be codified (i.e., give a code for every document). Indeed, documents incorporate coding content in similar issues to how transcripts of focus groups or interviews are examined (Bowen, 2009). In this research, a rubric will be used to evaluate documents. O’Leary (2014) proposed three types of documents. First, public records or official records may be used at different levels of government in Canada and Australia (e.g., annual reports, policy manuals, strategic plans). The second kind is personal documents (e.g., first-person accounts of actions, experiences and beliefs, incident reports, papers, reflections/journals and newspapers). The third type of document is the physical evidence: physical objects within the study environment (e.g., brochures, posters, agendas, manuals and training materials).

The method of document analysis is a valuable research tool in itself and is a valuable part of most triangulation schemes, combining methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon (Bowen, 2009). To look for convergence and validation, qualitative researchers often use at least two resources—that is, different data sources and methods. The objective of the triangulation is to provide evidence that generates credibility (Bowen, 2009). The findings corroborate the data sets and reduce the impact of the potential bias when examining the information.

The results validated that the data sets can reduce the potential bias's impact by reviewing the information collected through different methods. This research also uses quantitative data to confirm and codify some aspects of the story.

The structured process of document analysis started before the current analysis. This research will have a detailed planning process to guarantee reliable results. O'Leary (2014) proposed a planning method of eight steps to analyze documents and textual analysis. These are the eight principles that the investigation follows: 1. Create a checklist to examine (e.g., population, samples, respondents, participants). 2. Consider how the texts will be accessed with attention to linguistic or cultural barriers. 3. Recognize and address biases. 4. Develop appropriate skills for research. 5. Consider strategies to ensure credibility. 6. Identify the data one is looking for. 7. Consider ethical issues (e.g., confidential documents). 8. Have a back-up plan.

This research will seek a wide range of documents, but the papers should also be of quality to warrant evaluation. Bowen (2009) stated that quality is more important than the number of documents. O'Leary (2014) suggested two points be addressed before the analysis of reports: the bias of the subject from which the document originates; and the researcher's bias. The researcher must take into account the personal prejudices of the author that can detract from the investigation. Bowen (2009) argued that the researcher must evaluate the original purpose of the document, such as its target audience. It is essential to consider whether the author was a first-hand witness or was a social researcher using second-hand sources. It is also essential to define if the document was requested, edited, or anonymous (Bowen, 2009).

O'Leary's second significant suggestion is to consider "involuntary" evidence related to the style, tone, agenda, facts, or opinions in the text. This suggestion is important to take into account (O'Leary, 2014). According to Bowen (2009), documents must be evaluated for their integrity—in other words, how selective or complete the data is. Bowen (2009) recommends that content analysis be used as a "first-pass document review" for any investigation. In the context of this thesis, when the research focuses on the study of immigration policies and the pressures inherent in the politics of content analysis, it is used as a "revision of first-step documents" (Bowen 2009, p.32). This option can provide a means to identify significant and relevant passages. In addition to the content analysis, a thematic analysis should be considered to

recognize data patterns. This analysis takes emerging themes and converts them into categories that are used for a more in-depth analysis, making it a useful practice for grounded theory.

The proposed method includes careful and focused reading and re-reading of the data, as well as the coding and construction of categories (Bowen, 2009). Codes and emerging themes can help one to “integrate data gathered by different methods” (Bowen 2009, p.32). Bowen summarizes the general concept of document analysis as a process of “document evaluation in such a way that empirical knowledge is obtained, and understanding develops” (Bowen 2009, p. 33). It is not just a process of aligning a collection of abstracts that convey what the researcher wants. Maintaining a high level of objectivity and sensitivity is crucial to ensure that the analysis of the documents is credible and valid (Bowen, 2009).

There are many reasons why researchers choose the Document Analysis Method. First, document analysis is an efficient and effective way to analyze data because documents are manageable and practical resources. Documents come in various forms and the right classification of those documents, making them a very accessible and reliable source of data. Obtaining and analyzing records is usually much more beneficial and efficient than conducting experiments (Bowen, 2009). Secondly, documents are stable and “non-reactive” data sources, which means that they can be read and reviewed several times and remain unchanged by the influence of the researcher or the research process (Bowen 2009). Third, document analysis is frequently used because there are different ways in which social scientists support and strengthen research. Fourth, document analysis can be used in many various research fields, either as the primary method of data collection or as a complement to other methods. Fifth, documents can provide complementary research data. Sixth, reports can provide background information and massive data and, therefore, are helpful to contextualize the research within the subject or field (Bowen, 2009). Seventh, documents can contain data that can no longer be observed, offering insights that informants have forgotten and in recollecting might modify or redevelop. In addition, analyzing documents can uncover questions to be formulated or situations that should be recognized, making it a way to ensure that the research is critical and complete (Bowen, 2009).

However, it is also essential to consider and be aware of the disadvantages of using document analysis. A first concern is that documents are not created with research agendas in mind and, therefore, investigators require research skills to parse meaning. A record will not

correctly provide all the information necessary to answer a research question. Some documents may only offer a small amount of useful data or, occasionally, none. Other materials may be incomplete, or data may be inaccurate or inconsistent. Sometimes there are gaps in or shortages of documents, which forces the researcher to use other information to fill the gaps (Bowen, 2009). Also, some reports or records may not be available or easily accessible, leading to an uneven picture of an event. For these reasons, it is crucial to evaluate the quality of documents and face some challenges when using document analysis. Another concern to take into account before starting the study of documents is the possible presence of biases (e.g., in a record and by the researcher). Bowen (2009) and O’Leary (2014) claim that it is crucial to thoroughly evaluate and investigate the subjectivity of the documents and understand one’s data to preserve the credibility of the research.

The reason why issues related to document analysis are concerns and not disadvantages is that they can be easily avoided by having a transparent process that incorporates steps and evaluative measures, as mentioned above and exemplified in O’Leary’s two processes of eight stages (2014). As long as a social scientist begins document analysis knowing what the method entails and has a planned procedure, the benefits of document analysis far outweigh the pitfalls that may arise.

This technique will be used to clarify how Peter Hall’s theories of policy and social learning changes were manifested between the levels of national or provincial governments in Australia and Canada variously in conventional, intermediate or irregular manners.

For this thesis, the primary data sources to compare include government-authorized statistics (i.e., official information) about Canada and Australia’s economic immigration and its political and economic impacts. The secondary resources will be papers related to valuable immigration contributions, “Paradigm Shift” Model, immigration federalism, political and economic facts. The tertiary resource will be agendas and newspapers that will contribute to the systematic evaluation and the construction of truthful and more complete information, as Bowen (2009) suggested.

CHAPTER IV:

STRUCTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS AND THEIR IMPACT ON IMMIGRATION POLICIES

This chapter compares the structural and institutional factors driving immigration federalism in Canada and Australia in the last twenty-five years. Immigration federalism in both countries is characterized by the establishment of state/provincial/territorial immigrant selection programs) and its implications for the role of the subnational governments, policy change and multi-level governance. Given the limited literature on the subject, and the lack of previous comparative studies on immigration federalism in Australia (WA) and Canada (SK), this study, is one of the first approaches. As this whole investigation reveals, the influence of geographical, natural, and built structures, historical factors, and institutional design is important (table 4.1).

Canada (and rank in world)		Australia (and rank in world)	
Area		Area	
• Total	9,984,670 km (2nd)	• Total area	7,692,024 km ² (6th)
• Water (%)	8.92	• Water (%)	0.76
Population	36.54 million (2017)	Population	24.6 million (2017)
• 2018	37,067,011 (38th)	• 2018	25,081,300 (51st)
• 2016 census	35,151,728 (6)	• 2016 census	23,401,892(7)
• Density	3.92/km ² (10.2/sq. mi) (228th)	• Density	3.3/km ² (8.5/sq. mi) (236th)
GDP (PPP)	2018 estimate	GDP (PPP)	2018 estimate
• Total	\$1.847 trillion (15th)	• Total	\$1.313 trillion (19th)
• Per capita	\$49,775 (20th)	• Per capita	\$52,191 (17th)
GDP (nominal)	2018	GDP (nominal)	2018
• Total	\$1.798 trillion (10th)	• Total	\$1.500 trillion (13th)
• Per capita	\$48,466 (15th)	• Per capita	\$59,655 (10th)
Gini (2012)	31.6(8)	Gini (2012)	44.9(9)

Table 4.1: Canada and Australia land and people

Sources: Statistics Canada, various. Australian Bureau of Statistic, various.

While the state/provincial/territorial programs look quite similar, they differ in some essential design elements and deliver different outcomes. The Australian programs are in some ways more focused and flexible but give less access to permanent residence (PR), while the

Canadian system is more difficult for skilled migrants to navigate (table 4.2) but once pre-screened, they have lower barriers to admission and more opportunity for PR. Keeping this in mind, we use Parsons’s structural and institutional factors to explore the contexts for those diverging results.

Immigration of Permanent Residents in Context, Canada and Australia						
Year	Canada PR	Canada Population	Canada PR Rates	Australia PR	Australia Population	Australia PR Rates
1992	254,792	28,371,264	0.9%	76,330	17,284,000	0.4%
1993	256,641	28,684,764	0.9%	69,768	17,494,000	0.4%
1994	224,387	29,000,663	0.8%	87,428	17,667,000	0.5%
1995	212,865	29,302,310	0.7%	99,139	17,854,000	0.6%
1996	226,071	29,610,210	0.8%	85,752	18,071,000	0.5%
1997	216,035	29,905,948	0.7%	77,327	18,310,000	0.4%
1998	174,195	30,155,173	0.6%	84,143	18,517,000	0.5%
1999	189,951	30,401,286	0.6%	92,272	18,711,000	0.5%
2000	227,455	30,685,730	0.7%	107,366	18,925,000	0.6%
2001	250,638	31,020,596	0.8%	88,900	19,153,000	0.5%
2002	229,048	31,358,418	0.7%	93,914	19,413,000	0.5%
2003	221,349	31,641,630	0.7%	111,590	19,651,000	0.6%
2004	235,824	31,938,004	0.7%	123,424	19,895,000	0.6%
2005	262,241	32,242,364	0.8%	131,593	20,127,000	0.7%
2006	251,642	32,570,505	0.8%	140,148	20,394,000	0.7%
2007	236,754	32,887,928	0.7%	149,365	20,697,000	0.7%
2008	247,248	33,245,773	0.7%	158,021	21,015,000	0.8%
2009	252,172	33,628,571	0.7%	140,610	21,262,000	0.7%
2010	280,681	34,005,274	0.8%	127,458	22,183,000	0.6%

Table 4.2: Immigration of Permanent Residents in Context, Canada and Australia
Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC-CIRC)- Data for 1992 to 2010 (refer to fiscal years). Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship report 2011.

In the past decade, provinces/states have been developing new immigration regulations and agendas to deliver better labour market results, greater competitiveness in the worldwide market for immigrants, and increased governmental competence (Doomernik & Jandl, 2008; Hailbronner and Koslowski, 2008; Shachar, 2006; Transatlantic Academy Report, 2009). In some federal states, these changes have led to more active involvement of sub-national units (such as provinces, states and territories) in the realm of immigration. Catherine Xhardez (2020)

in *Immigration Federalism, Multinational States, and Subnational Communities* compares Flanders and Quebec reviewed arguments in favour and against immigration federalism. Xhardez (2020) explores how Flemish and Quebecois political elites implemented different models to attract and integrate economic immigrants considering claims for recognizing cultural-linguistic diversity, highlighting the asymmetrical power between national and subnational governments. This so-called immigration federalism raises multiple questions of policy and practice. Although specific factors motivating the development of immigration federalism vary by jurisdiction, immigration federalism is often seen as driven by two main interrelated factors: a) the increasing importance of efficiency of the immigration management; and b) perceived and actual difficulty of centralized immigration systems in responding to diverse regional needs/concerns (Baglay & Nakache, 2012). One concern that remains virtually unexplored in the current literature is immigration federalism's impact on the receiving regions and their cities. The analysis of the factors driving this change in policy study is divided into three main parts. Analysis in section 1 compares structural factors in both countries and provinces (e.g., geography, borders, and built systems). That analysis includes demographic characteristics, involving both the resident population and economic immigrants. Social scientists have until now paid only marginal consideration to the issue of isolation/ inclusion influences within the analysis of immigration federalism. Given the unique locations and cultures in the two jurisdictions, we can explore this here. Immigration is first about people, but also about how cities and states/provinces work together. This section explores how cities and states/provinces can offer an affordable place for both old and new residents.

Section 2 presents an analysis of the impact of the historically driven institutional design that drives policy in the two regions, particularly for attracting permanent skilled immigrants and temporary immigrant workers. The emergence and implementation of immigration federalism in these countries is examined—Canada developed regional/provincial immigrant selection while Australia created the skilled nominated migration stream. This thesis does not deal directly with refugee class or family reunification. Instead, it focusses on immigration processes related to settlement and integration. As shown, immigration federalism in these two countries provides provincial/state immigration programs with expanded or even unique immigration opportunities (i.e., as in the case of WA state nomination through State-Specific Regional Migration Program)

(SSRM). However, these opportunities pose new challenges for safeguarding people and cities. Section 3 presents an assessment of the relative importance of structural and institutional factors.

1. Structural Factors

According to Parsons (2007), a structural factor is extensive and related to exogenous material things and material things, which are considered to be structures and not human-made. This approach explains that structural factors are things that humans cannot control or control only to a minor degree (i.e., human-derived material things) (table 4.3).

	West Australia	Saskatchewan
Total area	1,021,478 sq. mi	251,700 sq. mi
Land area	976,790 sq. mi	228,450 sq. mi
Water area	44,687 sq. mi	22,921 sq. mi
Population 2017	2,640,000	1,098,352
Population Density	2.6/sq. mi	4.8/sq. mi
Table 4.3: Western Australia and Saskatchewan general information <i>Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics and Statistics Canada, Census of Canada</i>		

For instance, money, geography, distribution of wealth, and the physical distribution of power are not directly altered by humans (Parsons 2007). This study explains three main structural factors, such as borders influence, geographical position, and community isolation. In this context, Saskatchewan and Western Australia exhibit some similarities but some obvious differences.

1.1 Canada and Saskatchewan

Some have said that Canada (and probably by inference Australia) has too much geography. Hertz and others talk about the massive spans of land and water that have influenced the nation’s economic and social development. Saskatchewan is blessed—or cursed—by land and resources.

Saskatchewan occupies 651,900 square KM of land in the northern fringe of the Great Plains areas, with about 9% of the surface covered in freshwater and 45% covered in trees. The southern third of the province has topsoils suitable for dryland farming—Saskatchewan has 37

million acres of farmland, equal to about 47% of the national farm area. Under the surface, the province is endowed with extensive mineral resources, including uranium, potash, oil, gas, gold and other minerals and precision metals. Given its location, the climate is a major factor in development. As a continental territory, it has low average annual temperatures, with extremes of +40 degrees Celsius and -40 degrees Celsius, persistent winds and low annual precipitation. The annual frost-free growing season is only about 100 days. These factors have historically constrained immigration, but with recent resource booms, development has accelerated.

Saskatchewan is profoundly both isolated and integrated into the Great Plains area. The large urban centres are more than five hours driving or one hour flying from the nearest big urban areas in adjacent jurisdictions and more than three hours flying (and three days driving) from the commercial center of Toronto and the national capital, Ottawa. Saskatchewan shares borders in Canada, with Alberta to the west, Manitoba to the east, the Territories to the north, and two American northern tier states, North Dakota and Montana, to the south. Interprovincial and international mobility is significant.

Our proximity to the US is a significant challenge for Canada and immigration. Immigration policies in both countries allow Canadians and Americans to move from one country to another relatively quickly. The US is by far the leading target for most Canadian emigrants. About a million Canadian-born citizens lived in the US in mid-2017, with others settling mainly in the UK (92,000), Australia (57,000), France (26,000), and Italy (26,000), according to assessments by the UN Population Division (Alperin & Batalova, 2018). Most Canadians in the US who get legal PR—also known as obtaining a green card—do so either as direct relatives of US residents or as employer-sponsored newcomers. According to the Migration Policy Organization, in 2016, about 47 percent of Canadians in the US were naturalized as new Americans, contrasted to 49 percent of all foreign-born people in the US. In relation to the total foreign-born population, Canadians in the US have a favourable income average, are less likely to live in deprivation, and are more likely to pay the insurance and be college-educated. Canadian-born Americans are significantly older, on average, than the average immigrant or US-born citizen (Alperin & Batalova, 2018; Census Bureau 2016 American Community Survey). In effect, the US is a significant draw for high-flying Canadians. Canadian people migrate to the US more than Americans come to the north.

The structural reality is Canada is inextricably co-habiting with the US (95% of the population lives within 100 miles of the US border) but also challenged by being connected to US immigration policy, which is among the most radical of any country. This radicalism influences immigration outcome. Canada is a pathway for millions of people every decade who see us as a bridge to migrate to the US. The perception, if not the reality, is that US borders are less closed to people who come through Canada. However, skilled immigrants looking at that route do not choose to settle first in western Canada, especially Saskatchewan. The same is true of migrants in the US considering moving to Canada—they seldom settle in northern tier states, instead of settling in the South, East or far West. One driver for mobility is the different outlooks. The American Dream suggests equality of opportunity, a level-playing arena where everyone could uproot himself or herself; Canada also prides itself on equality of opportunity but not at the expense of redistribution policies. Canada's Gini Coefficient, an estimation of economic inequality, is significantly lower (signally more equal distributions) than America's (.44 vs .48 respectively), especially in the past decade and when measured in after-tax and after public services are counted (World Bank, 2015). Moreover, mobility between income groups is much higher. Canadians are twice as likely as Americans to shift from the most deprived quintile of the people to the most prosperous population. Likewise, the connection between the income of parents and children is more equitable in Canada. By virtually every measure, Canada has surpassed the US in striving for equity. People worldwide have started to notice. From the US, refugees and asylum seekers (especially from Africa) are now fleeing into Canada, expecting a sympathetic immigration hearing and a better future. In Latin America, there are records of economic immigrants travelling north, planning to cross the US border, and moving into Canada. In addition, international students are increasingly selecting Canada over the US, partly due to more restrictive immigration policies in the US, especially those from Muslim countries.

Garcea (2012) argues that Saskatchewan has tried to create different policies to attract and retain economic migrants to the province. After 2000 the province specifically targeted international students. The Canada-Saskatchewan Memorandum of Understanding on the Off-Campus Work Permit Program for International Students signed in April 2006 was a key policy that supported attracting international students (see International Students in Saskatchewan Policies, Programs, and Perspectives 2004-2014).

Canada has had many concerns about how to encourage permanent settlement. Provinces like Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and the Territories have designed some immigration policies to maintain and strengthen their skilled workforce. A particular challenge is that a significant number of skilled immigrants who see Canada as an option apply to settle in large cities where there are more opportunities and jobs and likely a broader host community with the same culture.

Because of the high cost of immigration, skilled immigrants make decisions and choices depending on where they think they can recuperate money for applying. The proximity to the US, in particular, is a critical structural factor that limits Saskatchewan's ability to attract and retain skilled workers.

Retaining skilled workers, both from abroad or within Canada, is challenging because of the easy mobility between provinces and proximity of Saskatchewan to the vibrant and growing centers of Calgary, Edmonton and Winnipeg. Saskatchewan historically has had more outmigration of skilled workers than in-migration, and in the early years of the decade, as many as 500,000 locally educated people had migrated. Calgary is Saskatchewan's third-largest city, based on the number of residents there with provincial birth certificates.

While Saskatchewan has ample resources in terms of land, bio-resources and natural resources, developing and exploiting those assets has taken more than a century to mature. Saskatchewan is probably the most resource and trade-dependent province in Canada, with more than half its GDP coming from goods production; in the rest of Canada, only 30% of output comes from goods activities. Saskatchewan differently relies on a range of primary resources, including grains, oilseeds, pulses, livestock, oil and gas, potash, uranium, wood and their spin-off industries (Government of Saskatchewan, 2009). In 1995, provincial uranium amounted to 30 percent of world uranium reserves (Phillips, 2006). In the northeast, the Paleoproterozoic greenstone belt around Flin Flon is mined for sort variety of minerals (e.g., copper, gold, and zinc). In the Estevan region, coal has been mined since 1880 (Government of Saskatchewan, 2007). In the early twentieth century, lignite coal for power and heating was an essential mineral. Potash mining was introduced in the 1950s near Saskatoon and Esterhazy and has an estimated 75 percent of the world's potash reserves, making it a leading producer of the mineral. Finally, oil and gas have developed, to the point that 23% of the provincial GDP is generated in exploration, development and production (table 4.4).

GDP at basic prices by industry, Canada and the provinces and territories, average 2014-18							
	Goods production						Services production
	All	Crop & Animal Production	Mining & Quarrying	Energy	Power Generation & Transmission	Manufacturing	All
CA	30	2	2	9	0	10	70
NL	49	0	7	28	2	3	51
PE	23	4	0	1	1	10	77
NS	19	1	0	3	2	7	81
NB	25	1	1	6	4	10	75
QC	27	2	2	4	3	14	73
ON	23	1	1	2	1	12	77
MB	30	5	1	6	3	10	70
SK	52	8	10	23	2	7	48
AB	44	1	0	28	1	7	55
BC	24	1	2	6	2	7	76
YT	21	0	6	2	2	1	79
NT	43	0	29	6	1	0	57
NU	39	0	21	2	2	0	61

Table 4.4: GDP at basic prices by industry, Canada and the provinces and territories, average 2014-18
Source: Phillips and Castle (2013), forthcoming; Statistics Canada. Table 36-10-0402-01 Gross domestic product (GDP) at basic prices, by industry, provinces and territories. Accessed 26-9-19 at: <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3610040201>

The majority of the province’s manufacturing firms process raw materials or inputs to the sectors. Saskatoon is home to a few large-scale world-leading firms, including Cameco and Nutrien, the leading world players in uranium and potash have corporate headquarters in Saskatoon, but for the most part, the firms developing resources are headquartered elsewhere. Instead, the province differentially uses family-owned enterprises (farms and industrial ventures alike), Crown corporations (e.g. SaskTel, SaskEnergy, and SaskPower and SGI, a public insurer) and cooperatives (e.g. Federated Cooperatives Ltd.)

All of these industries are highly capital intensive, with large built capacity on farms, in woodlots, in oilfields, at mineheads and in service and supply centres, all linked by extensive transportation infrastructure (e.g. roads, rails, pipelines and airports). This built structure has skewed job and population growth to a small number of centres, all linked to the two largest cities, Saskatoon and Regina, which provide the higher-order services to support these world-

class sectors. As a result, most new jobs, especially those requiring higher skills, are located in the cities or discrete places near resource operations.

Exports are the other big story. Without exports, Saskatchewan would have the economic prosperity of a developing country. More than 73 percent of the GDP depends on exports of goods and services (www.statcan.gc.ca), the highest of any province. Moreover, unlike the rest of Canada, a large and growing share of those exports are directed to non-US markets.

The province is a small, niche player in the innovation space, with two Innovation Place Research Parks contiguous to the Universities in Regina and Saskatoon that host various science and technology firms and labs undertaking research in the energy, mining, agricultural and high tech sectors. A third Innovation Place Research Park, the Forest Centre in Prince Albert, has received the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) award. Those three parks contribute approximately \$592 million to the provincial economy annually (web.archive.org, 2009).

Demographically, the province is more rural than Western Australia. While just less than half the provincial population lives in the two largest cities, Saskatoon and Regina, about one-third of the residents live in rural areas. The rest of the population is distributed across more than 750 small cities, towns, villages and hamlets. Population density is about 1.8 people per square kilometer, the lowest of any province except Newfoundland and Labrador.

The combination of a small population and high-intensity production of high-value export goods translates into high employment ratios and a correspondingly high GDP per capita in Saskatchewan. The province in 2014-18 earned, on average, 38% more than the national average, second only to Alberta. High employment, low unemployment and high income per capita all are robust attractors for highly skilled migrants.

1.2 Australia and Western Australia

Western Australia and Saskatchewan, while almost at the opposite ends of the world from each other physically, have many similar structural factors that affect their opportunities and constraints. Western Australia occupies 2.6 million square KM of land, about 4 times the size of Saskatchewan, spanning the entire Western third of Australia. The state has about 15 percent of the surface in the desert and less than 2 percent of the surface covered in freshwater. Roughly 42

percent of the land in the state is suitable for cultivation or grazing. Similar to Saskatchewan, under the surface, the state is endowed with extensive mineral resources, including iron ore, natural gas, gold, aluminum, bauxite, oil, and range of base and rare earth metals, some of which have yet to be developed.

Given its location as a coastal state, with more than 10,000 KM of shoreline mostly along the warm Indian Ocean, WA has a Mediterranean climate. However, the significant continental reach of the state complicates the climate. Overall, the natural setting is a key factor in development. The state has extremes, albeit at a higher average annual temperature than in Canada. Lows can go below freezing, but the average in the winter is about 12 degrees Celsius along the west coast. Summer highs average around 29 degrees on the coast and higher inland but can spike well over 45 degrees Celsius. Moisture is the biggest challenge, as hot, dry winds complicate the sparse and variable rainfall—averaging between 200 mm in the Darling Range and 1278 mm in the southwest, compared with 354 mm in Saskatchewan. The agriculture opportunity in WA is different from in the eastern states, in that the main growing season is during the winter months as the summer is too hot and dry for most crops. As in Saskatchewan, the growing season is limited to only about 100 days, but in WA that is due to lack of moisture and excessive heat while Saskatchewan faces frost. These factors have historically constrained immigration to the coastal fringe but with recent resource booms, development has accelerated in spots in the interior.

Western Australia is far more isolated than Saskatchewan, both physically and emotionally. While WA shares an eastern border with the Northern Territory and South Australia, the nearest community of any size is three days by train or more than four hours away by air. The nearest national capital is more than 5 hours distant by air, which makes Perth the most isolated capital in the world. Given the location, air and sea are the primary means of access to the rest of the world.

Australians have robust overseas links, and many who were born in Australia have spent some part of their lives in other nations; Australians live and work around the globe (The Committee for Economic Development of Australia CEDA, 2003). Statistics show that one million Australians at any time may be living and working outside the country, equal to around 4% of the population, making Australians one of the most itinerant societies in the world (Morgan, 2019). Although Australia still has a positive balance in permanent and temporary

entrants worldwide (Hugo, 2000), new economic forces such as globalization (i.e., globalization theory in immigration) might now be affecting this traditional pattern. Hugo et al., (2003) characterized this international exchange of people as a ‘brain circulation,’ a term that suggests significant benefits for Australia.

Australia is a traditionally high immigration country, and its immigration policies have targeted to attract economic immigrants on a sustained basis. However, an essential concern in Australia and some areas in WA is illegal immigration (Every & Augoustinos, 2007; Hartley & Pedersen, 2015; Kenny, 2016; Millbank, 1999). A significant number of low-skilled immigrants attempt to arrive in Australia by boats, especially from Africa, and other irregular immigrants and refugees arrive in Australia by boat from Indonesia and other parts of Asia. Those people are usually called “boat people.”

This dual challenge has generated significant debate in recent decades. The first part of the debate is about bringing people to sustain and develop the Australian economy and society. The second part is related to the actions of the Australian government and its treatment of “boat people.” The stories are sensationalized in the Australian press. For this sensationalism, Australia has come under international criticism, especially for how illegal immigrants have been arrested and detained in offshore island camps while their requests for refugee status have been processed. Lost in much of the debate is the plight of the migrants themselves. An unknown number of people die each year trying to make the crossing in unsuitable, overloaded boats—it is a dangerous, long journey, and the arrival points in northwestern WA are some of the most desolate and naturally inhospitable places of the world.

According to Paul Power, CEO of the Refugee Council of Australia, there is an enforced policy demanding people go back in the same direction that they have come (what might fit under the heading of enforcement of immigration federalism). Power argues, “Australian policy at no point has taken account of the need for security of immigrants trying to reach Australia by boat” (Farrell, 2015). This type of event opens a dangerous discussion for politicians in Australia. In 2015, the Australian government adopted tighter regulations related to immigration, which has worked to deter the flow of asylum-seeking boat people. The result was that only 16 boats made the journey to Australia in 2015, only one was successful, and no deaths were reported (Farrel, 2015).

The federal government, concerned by the risk of illegal entry, has created policies that tie immigration federalism into enforcement federalism. Immigration federalism in Australia is, to a significant extent, directed to enforcement rather than limited coordination and cooperation about selection and retention, especially with WA state governments (South Australia and Victoria have little interest in boat people as they are well situated to avoid any landings). WA has had direct experience with illegal immigrants. One notable example was the approach and seizure of the 44,000-ton ship Tampa in the waters north of WA, which had 433 irregular claimants for refugee status. During the eleven days before the Tampa's arrival, there were reports of more than 1,500 illegals landing in Australia on small boats, and reports that another 5,000 would-be immigrants were preparing to begin trips from Indonesia (The US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2001). That news made many Australians feel under attack—their island status affected their outlook. The Western Australian government employed military force to prevent their landing and requesting asylum. The decision about what to do with the immigrants turned into a minor international crisis until, weeks after, New Zealand agreed to take 150 of the asylum seekers and Nauru (a tiny, poor island state in the Pacific Ocean) accepted the rest of immigrants in return for an Australian cash settlement (Kneebone & Rawlings-Sanaei, 2007).

Predictably, the government's response was immediately censured by international leaders (i.e., “destroying its reputation”), international agencies (e.g., “unacceptable”), and criticized by elite media and academic opinion leaders in Australia. Nonetheless, surveys revealed that 78 percent of Australians supported Prime Minister John Howard's “resolve,” and his party jumped five percentage points in the polls. This tremendous support followed two public concerns. The first is a sizable increase of illegal immigration, mostly of Iranians, Iraqis, and Afghans. Second, a police report in 2015 cited crimes, such as Lebanese men gang-raping non-Muslim women, as rising threats. According to Pedersen and Thomas (2013), much of the support for the government attitude has been motivated by anti-Muslim sentiment rather than anti-boat people's attitudes. Australia is not unique: similar views are emerging throughout the west, most notably in Austria, where open access has triggered a backlash among the population actively responding to an influx of people with alien cultures.

Howard's response to calling out the military to close the frontiers to unauthorized immigrants may have been an exception, but it set a precedent that may be followed as

uncontrolled immigration becomes an ever-more central issue for Western societies. An island-country is an isolated country by nature, which creates a sense of security, but with more than 59,000 kilometers of shoreline (12,000 in WA), most of it undeveloped, this isolation creates the impression of being more permeable and at-risk relative to nations that have specific borders to control immigration. Immigration policies in WA thus are conflicted, with much effort focused on attracting high skilled immigrants, but other efforts were driven by the need to secure their natural frontier, an insurmountable structural factor.

WA's development is primarily driven by the extraction and processing of its natural endowment of different types of mineral and energy commodities. The structure of the economy is closely associated with these essential resources, providing a comparative advantage in resource extraction and processing. Goods production accounts for 47% of the state GDP, very similar to Saskatchewan (at 52%). WA mining is the biggest single sector, accounting for an estimated 58% of Australia's mineral and energy exports (Department of Mines and Petroleum, 2011) and 29% of the WA economy. Over the past 15 years, WA has provided more stable production support and become less dependent on just a few main export markets, protecting the economy from variations in world prices to some degree (WA Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2013). Finance, insurance, construction, and property services have grown steadily and have increased their share of economic output (WA Department of Treasury and Finance, 2006).

As for Saskatchewan, exports are vital. In the 2000s, growth in global demand for minerals and petroleum, especially in China (iron ore) and Japan (for liquefied natural gas), has assured economic growth raised the national average. WA's overseas exports accounted for 46 percent of the nation's total (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2008) (Curran, 2012). The states' leading export products are iron ore, alumina, nickel, gold, ammonia, wheat, wool, crude oil, and liquefied natural gas (LNG). WA is a leading extractor of bauxite, which is processed into alumina at four factories producing more than 20 percent of the world output. It is also the world's third-largest iron ore producer (contributing 15 percent of world output) and contributes 75 percent of Australia's 240 tons of gold annually. Agricultural production in WA is a significant contributor to this western state and the whole country, making up to half the nation's wheat crop annually (Crop Report, 2008) (table 4.5).

There is also high demand for WA exports of live animals to Southeast Asia and the Middle East, where cultural and religious customs and a lack of accommodation and

refrigeration facilities support live animal trade over imports of processed meat. WA also controls a significant fishing industry. Products for local consumption and export are western rock lobsters, prawns, crabs, shark, and tuna, as well as pearl fishing in the Kimberley area of the state. Processing is assigned along the west coast. Tourism has grown in influence, with significant amounts of visitors coming from Europe (42 percent) and Asia (34 percent) (WA at a Glance, 2008). Tourism is an active economic driver in several of the smaller community centers outside of Perth, particularly in coastal areas.

GDP at basic prices by industry, Australia and states/territory, average 2013-14						
	Goods production					Services
	All	Crop & Animal Production	Mining & energy	Utilities	Manufacturing	All
AU	27	2	8	5	6	73
WA	52	3	30	2	5	48
SA	28	5	4	4	8	72
VIC	21	3	2	3	7	79
NSW	17	1	2	2	7	83
QLD	30	2	9	3	6	70
TAS	27	8	1	5	7	73
NT	20	3	13	1	3	80

Table 4.5: GDP at basic prices by industry, Australia and states/territory, average 2013-14
Source: Author's calculations using Nicholls & Rosewall, 2015. *The Economic Performance of the States, Reserve Bank of Australia. Bulletin March Quarter 2015*

Perth is the biggest city, with about 78% of the state population, with most of the rest located along a narrow band along the southwestern coast. The main industrial area of Kwinana just south Perth has the nation's most significant oil refinery, with a volume of 146,000 barrels of oil per day, producing most of the state's petrol and diesel (Australia Institute of Petroleum, 2008; McKinnon, 2014), as well as alumina and nickel processing factories, port facilities for grain and other bulk exports, and inputs and supply industries for mining and petroleum (e.g., heavy and light engineering, and metal fabrication). Shipbuilding (e.g., Austral Ships) and associated maintenance industries are located at nearby Henderson, just north of Kwinana.

Important dependent industries include concrete and building product manufacturing, flour milling, food processing, animal feed production, automotive bodybuilding, and printing.

The geographic constraints and economic opportunities largely determine the demographic structure of WA. The state is the second-largest sub-national unit in the world. Only about 2.5 million residents live in the state – equal to 11 percent of Australia’s population – which makes it the fourth most populated state. However, WA has the fastest-growing population of all the Australian states (Sibma, 2016). Given the large landmass in WA – around 2.6 million square kilometers – and the relatively small population, the population density is just less than 1 person per square km or 2.5 people per square mile, which is even lower than in Saskatchewan.

Overall, the built capacity, even in the face of some negative structural factors, delivers high incomes and job growth. WA gross state product per person of \$102,232 is more than 52 percent above the nationwide average and higher than any other state in the Commonwealth (WA Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2013). This translates into higher family incomes, but the resulting immigration and population growth has stressed the housing market, so that Perth property prices are among the second highest in Australia behind Sydney, and high rental rates continue to be a problem.

Strong but selective economic opportunities, attractive incomes and rising demand for jobs, all based on exploiting abundant natural resources, are major attractions for skilled workers. Compared with Saskatchewan, which can easily be a stepping off point for relocation to neighbouring provinces or the US, Western Australia has few easily accessible nearby labour markets, so that those who are attracted to the state tend to stay longer, in spite of relatively high costs of housing and living.

1.3 Comparative Structural Factors

The economies of both Saskatchewan and WA are based on extractive industries, reliant on renewable and abundant non-renewable resources, including fisheries, forestry, agricultural

products, and minerals. Those factors create a bond between skilled workers and the region, generating a structural tie.

Saskatchewan in some ways is structurally more vulnerable. The volatile natural climate, high dependence on mostly primary production and exports, capital dependency and highly competitive adjacent territories means that none of the abundance in the province is secure. Disruptions in markets, climate change, trade disputes, volatile interest rates and competitive policies in neighbouring territories can adversely affect both attraction and retention of skilled workers. Moreover, the heavy reliance on small and medium sized family owned enterprises, locally-managed Crown and cooperative enterprises, narrowly-based large-scale joint-stock companies (e.g. Cameco and Nutrien) and foreign multinationals creates greater uncertainty. Many of those ventures either are less resilient or make decisions from afar based on circumstances that may not relate to local opportunities or conditions.

Conversely, WA has a wide range of locally managed firms with global scale, largely based in the mineral industry, including, iron-ore, alumina, nickel, gold, ammonia, crude oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG), wheat and wool. While still vulnerable to global events, WA is somewhat more insulated as it is larger and more efficiently structured around Perth, where economies of scale and scope would be expected to deliver up to 15% efficiency gains relative to the smaller centres of Regina and Saskatoon (saskatchewan.ca, 2006) (Venables 2006).

2. Institutional Factors

Historical factors drive the institutional context. Politicians, academics, and social groups have always been big actors in immigration debates in Canada and Australia. Both nations share a similar colonial history as members of the British Empire and have much in common in terms of traditions and norms. In that sense, they have developed on similar paths. However, there are key institutional factors that drive different immigration policies for both countries and their subnational programs. The process of defining the current system is analyzed by periods; almost every decade has a crucial historical development that changes economic immigration in each region.

2.1 Canada and Saskatchewan

Canada's immigration system has evolved over the past century in fits and starts. Until after the Second World War, Canada, and Australia, were essentially part of the British Empire, with full right of mobility anywhere in the British realm. There were no significant immigration rules or processes, as long as you were British born.

The Great War (1914-1917) produced a significant change in Saskatchewan's future. Demand for food production to be maintained and expanded to meet Imperial needs first exempted many farmers from the war, but then triggered a boom in wheat production. As farm incomes increased, migration soared, and the provincial population rose from 492,000 in 1911 to 757,000 in 1921 and a peak of 921,800 in 1931.

The Great Depression following the 1929 stock market crash coincided with a decade long drought in the 1930s, causing devastation in Saskatchewan's economy (Rowell Sirois Royal Commission, 1940). In spite of drought, the population continued to rise until it reached a peak in 1936 at 931,200 people. Drought continued and despite policies such as the Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Administration (PFRA) and relief programs, roughly 250,000 people left the region during the Dirty Thirties and Saskatchewan became one of the poorest places of Canada. The economy recovered a bit in the Second World War as Saskatchewan was tasked with growing grain for the war effort, but recovery was limited. Saskatchewan's population only recovered to its 1936 peak in 1966.

Saskatchewan from the beginning has used both federal and provincial powers to advance development. The first waves of immigrants, attracted to Saskatchewan by federal policies, were transported on railways constructed with federal support and provided free land from federal reserves. Within the province, the political parties in power, regardless of ideology, have sponsored and maintained public investment and ownership of key infrastructure, including all the key utilities, a bus company, an insurance company, publicly run hospitals and medical care, and many of the industrial sectors. One challenge of this strong public role is that sometimes developments were delayed due to lack of resources or policy direction. Phillips (2006) notes that Alberta, which had about 10% fewer citizens and a smaller and poorer economy in the 1940s

leapt ahead of Saskatchewan as it developed its oil, so that now it is both wealthier in per capita terms and has almost 4 times as many citizens as its neighbour.

Pre-Confederation the colonies had whatever authorities the Empire allowed and in the early years after Confederation in 1867 the new provinces both had constitutional authority ("under Section 95, Constitution Act, 1867, the federal and provincial governments share power over agriculture and immigration; either order of government can make laws in this area, but in the case of a conflict, federal law prevails") and exercised that authority. But as the Confederation matured, the federal government came to dominate the immigration process, all but squeezing out provincial efforts. For much of that period of federal dominance, Canada sponsored massive flows of unskilled immigrants to populate the underdeveloped country, and it was not until after the Second World War that provinces reengaged in immigration. In the 1960s, the dominant paradigm in attracting immigrants to Canada was to get more Europeans and people from the US. In 1967, the federal government adapted and adopted the point system to sharpen the criteria (specifically on education, age, language, and other factors) against which applicants for admission would be assessed and admitted. That was the first significant step to provide and establish a new class of immigrants, one that has been refined as the economic or highly skilled category (Green & Green, 1995). In the 1970s, one observes a gradual return of the provinces to the realm of immigration management. First, in response to the Quiet Revolution and sovereignty effort, Quebec acquired progressively more powers over selection and settlement, and from the 1990s onwards, other provinces followed suit (Baglay, 2012).

Three key immigration policies emerged in this period. First, the immigration regulations introduced in 1967 established new standards for evaluating potential immigrants. This policy enhanced the objectivity of admissions procedures, setting up a system in which independent immigrants are assessed points in specific categories relating to their education, occupational skills, employment prospects, age, proficiency in English or French and personal attitude. Applicants earning 50 points or more out of a possible 100 were allowed entry, regardless of their race, ethnicity, or national origin.


Second, the Canadian Multiculturalism Policy was a statement to the House of Commons in October 1971 by then Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau that proclaimed multiculturalism as an

approved government policy. Multiculturalism was designed to protect the cultural freedom of individuals and provide recognition of the cultural contributions of several ethnic groups to the Canadian community. The government committed to promoting multiculturalism by supporting cultural groups in their development, assisting people in overcoming discriminatory restrictions, fostering intercultural exchange, and helping immigrants in learning French or English. Garcea (2006) emphasized that multicultural is not just a federal goal; provinces have had an important role in advancing multiculturalism policy.

Third, the Immigration Act, 1976 (Lindsay Van Dyk, 2000) expressed an essential change in Canadian immigration law. It was the first immigration act to explicitly describe the objectives of Canadian immigration policy, determine refugees as a different class of newcomers and mandate the federal government to consult with other levels of government in immigration planning and management. The act was positively regarded as a progressive piece of legislation, and it received broad social and political support.

In Canada, for most of the twentieth century, federal governments have been the dominant player in immigration regulation, producing a unified model of immigrant selection and enforcement governed by an idea of immigration to a nation [rather than to a specific locality] (Baglay & Nakache, 2014; Reitz, 2005; Spiro, 2002). In the last two decades, however, Canada saw the emergence of new actors—sub-national units (provinces, states, even cities, and municipalities) — seeking to take a more active role in the immigration process.

Until the 1990s, there was an extreme concentration of immigrants in Ontario, British Columbia, and Quebec. The renewed role of provinces in immigration management in both countries can be primarily explained by settlement and labor market challenges that could not have been adequately addressed by the federal immigration program or domestic migration. In Canada, most new arrivals until then settled in British Columbia, Ontario, Quebec, and their metropolises (esp. Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal). Between 1995 and 2008 (Citizenship Immigration Canada, 2009), over 80 percent of newcomers settled in these provinces, while other regions often “starved” for newcomers (figure 4.1).



PNP Immigration Programs	Percentages
Ontario, British Columbia, and Quebec	90%
Rest of Canada	10%
Figure 4.1: Economic Immigrant Destinations – 1997	
Source: CIC 2018 Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration	

In addition, the federal selection criteria were not always responsive to local labour market needs. Provinces expressed severe frustration with the backlog in the Federal Skilled Worker Program (Alboim, 2009). In the 1990s, Canada applied a new immigration regulation in response to federal and provincial negotiations to improve the immigration selection process. The new regulation worked to implement the notion of immigration federalism. This concept, "defined as the role of the states and localities in making and implementing immigration law and policy, has become an increasingly relevant issue" in public policy (Varsanyi et. al, 2012).

Cameron and Simeon (2002) discuss how and why collaborative federalism has emerged as a fundamental concept driving debates over public policy. This literature has operated with an implicit understanding that immigration federalism denotes the involvement of multiple levels of government in immigration matters and is associated with a shift from centralized to the decentralized effort (Su, 2008; Varsanyi et al., 2012). While such a characterization captures the general nature of this new phenomenon, immigration federalism is associated with a developing, devolving trend common in many policy areas in Canada and the US. In these two nations, immigration has traditionally been associated with nation-building, foreign policy, and other

areas of national interest, which naturally aligned with federal (i.e., centralized) rather than local regulation. Now it is increasingly if not mostly directed to economic opportunity.

In 1992, the Canadian government focused more attention, or at least more debate, toward increasing the importance of the economic component of immigrants' admission. The new five-year plan involved an increased investment in language training in improving the assimilation of migrants into the markets and increased focus on "designated" occupations (Canada, 1992). Launched in May 1991, a nominated occupation list was formed, which contained jobs in short supply in specific provinces. Immigrants who matched this list were given added points and processed on a high-priority basis. The same year, the government introduced a new Immigration Act, designed to provide greater control over the inflow (i.e., a degree of powering policy). The Act gave the immigration department broad new regulatory powers, including the ability to set limits on components of the inflow and turn away applicants once specific numbers had been reached for a particular category. That regulation was an early first move toward increased use of immigration for economic policy. The Canadian government recommended using the new Act to decrease the percentage of the inflow who were in the family reunification category, which dropped from 52 percent in 1992 to 43 percent by 1995 (Green & Green, 1995).

In 1995, the then Liberal government added a new regulatory framework, *Into the 21st Century: A Strategy for Immigration and Citizenship*, which set immigration targets at 1 percent of the population level; however, target ranges rather than specific numbers were to be set for annual campaigns (Green & Green 2004).

Even though the Immigration Act of 1976 has reported clear immigration goals, it was not until the new program in 2002 that we get a clear preference for immigration's economic component. Separating refugee management from other immigrants and balancing economic and family class immigrants mean that economic immigrants are no longer a residual (Green & Green, 2004). The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) 2001 renewed the Immigration Act, 1976 was enacted on June 28, 2002. Controversially, the government missed implementing an element of the legislation that would have achieved a Refugee Appeal Division as part of Canada's immigration system. The Act formulates a high-level frame describing the

goals and guidelines the Canadian government uses for newcomers' immigration into Canada. The Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (IRPR) outline how IRPA's requirements are to be implemented. The Act is governed by Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) and the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA).

In the 2000s, there has been continuous demand for immigrants in Canada. This demand is in substantial part due to the aging population and Canada's inability to fill labour shortages. Without immigration, Canada's economy could experience challenges. In response, since 2003, there have been adjustments to Canada's Immigration System. Ten years ago, the focus was more on permanent immigration, while today, Canada's immigration policy is increasingly focussed on recruiting more temporary workers. Typically, these workers will do work that locals will not do. The number of immigrant workers in Canada in the last decade has tripled from 101,100 to 300,210. In 2013, Federal and Provincial governments designed new measures to allow some of those temporary foreign workers to get permanent immigrant status in Canada. The Canada Experience Class (i.e., federal immigration program) and Provincial Nominee Programs (i.e., every province has specific programs) in particular allow for some transition of temporary workers. These programs provide economic immigrants in Canada who have gained local work experience and have the opportunity to live in Canada permanently.

The effect of the increasing number of 'economic' class of immigrants is revealed in the numbers of newcomers being admitted to Canada, with increases from 137,860 to 156,120 per year over the past ten years. One result is a decrease in the number of immigrants coming under the family reunification program, with a decline from 62,300 to 56,450 per year over the same period. In the 2000s, immigration inflow from China and India was substantial, while in 2010s the Philippines have been the source of the highest number of immigrants in the economic class. In addition, people who want to escape high unemployment in their home countries—e.g., skilled Irish, French, and British—have arrived in Canada. Other changes over the past decade include a more significant focus on employment and more effort directed toward integrating newcomers into life in Canada. Those changes include a greater focus on language skills and a preference for younger skilled immigrants who can commit to the job market quickly.

Moreover, the evaluation of a person's education and qualifications has changed in the past decade. Currently, people applying for immigration to Canada need to have their education reviewed and get an Educational Credential Assessment (ECA) certifying their international educational credentials. Moreover, in the past decade, there has been a growing focus on filling the gaps in the labour market in Canada (a key driver in Saskatchewan in particular). Nowadays, there are particular eligible occupations for Federal Skilled Worker candidates. Before the 2010s, the high skilled immigration program assigned more emphasis on work experience and education, but in 2013, the Canadian government moved to make sure that the newcomers who arrive in Canada will be able to get jobs where employers are unable to receive workers—hence the focus on qualifications.

In the past decade, the focus of Canada's immigration policy has shifted from seeking highly educated professionals to recruiting more skilled workers who will be able to make a substantial contribution to the market workforce in the shortest amount of time. During the past decade, Canada was, on average, admitting 230,000–250,000 immigrants a year, with approximately 60 percent in the economic class (CIC, 2012a). Such a total annual intake constitutes roughly 0.8 percent of the country's population. Over the entire twenty-five years under discussion (1992-2017), the points system has focused this campaign on selecting highly skilled migrants. Including the main applicant and their spouses and dependents, economic migration overall continues to contribute about 60% of migrants (Hiebert, 2016).

Immigration policies in the mid-1990s began to respond to a new set of objectives, mainly to respond better to short-term regional labour market changes often associated with commodity cycles (especially shortages arising in booms) and to shift immigration away from the three most significant cities to areas of the nation seeking more economic immigrants. These objectives were reflected in the modification of the point system included in IRPA 2002 and implementation through a series of new immigrant programs, including the Canadian Experience Class, Ministerial Instructions, the Federal Skilled Trades program and the option to apply for PR as temporary immigrants from the Live-in-Caregiver program. Program performance improved radically in 2002. Nevertheless, more was needed, as none of these programs explicitly engaged the provinces.

The Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) was introduced in 1998 (see table 4.6) in response, with the forthcoming federal-provincial agreements empowering subnational governments in the Canadian immigration policy field (Schmidtke, 2014).

Introduction and Efficiency of PN programs to each province/territory						
PTPNP Efficiency	Signed Ranking	Starting Ranking	Time Implemented	Province/Territory	Date of First Signed PNP Agreement	Start of PN Program in P/T
8	5	3	0	Newfoundland and Labrador	1-Sep-99	1999
6	4	2	0	New Brunswick	22-Feb-99	1999
5	1	1	3	Manitoba	22-Oct-96	1999
11	6	5	0	Prince Edward Island	29-Mar-01	2001
9	2	4	3	Saskatchewan	16-Mar-98	2001
12	3	6	3	British Columbia	19-Apr-98	2001
15	8	7	0	Alberta	March, 2002	2002
16	7	8	1	Yukon	April, 2001	2002
19	9	9	1	Nova Scotia	27-Aug-02	2003
22	10	10	2	Ontario	21-Nov-05	2007
22	11	11	0	Northwest Territories	August, 2009	2009


Table 4.6: SINP Efficiency/ PN programs to each province/territory
Source: Author's compilation of data from CEIC, various.

Schmidtke (2014) observes that by 2007 eight provinces and one territory had signed some form of agreement with the Federal government, which then enable the coordination and application of immigration policies and agendas between the two orders of government. Li (2003) argues that the PNP created a “multi-tiered system of immigrant selection.” While Schmidtke (2014) suggests that the agreements threaten to undermine Canada’s immigrant recruitment system and its focus on stringent qualifications and professional expertise, the programs are accessible. The PNP platform has solved some difficulties but needs continual improvement to support federal-provincial and local immigration processes (e.g., preferment, attraction, selection, settlement) to continue to attract high skilled immigrants.

In January 2017, the Canadian government identified a range of concerns related to humanitarian and illegal immigration, which they wanted to address through innovation to the PNP. The Minister of Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship launched the Atlantic Immigration

Pilot to balance these issues with the economic migration program in the four easternmost provinces, enabling governments there to identify and contribute to refugee settlement and hosting of illegal migrants under review. By including these categories in PNP, the provinces have some role in what previously was solely at the discretion of the federal government.

A paradigm shift is working in the immigration field. After five decades of reform, this completes the implementation of immigration federalism, as now almost all discretionary immigration is managed through federal-provincial agreements. Saskatchewan has been a major beneficiary of this reform. The number of new immigrants arriving in Saskatchewan increased in the last decade and a half. Statistics Canada reports the provincial share of Canada’s recent immigrants expanded from just under one percent (about one-third of what would be a proportionate share) in 2001 to four percent in 2016 (which is more than the province’s share of the population, and hence driver for growth). The climb is part of a more significant trend. During the past 15 years, the share of recent newcomers in the Prairie Provinces has more than doubled. Saskatchewan moved its fast-track application process online, which has contributed to the success.



PNP Immigration Programs	Percentages
Ontario, British Columbia, and Quebec	66%
Rest of Canada	34%

Figure 4.2: Economic Immigrant Destinations – 2015-2017
Source: CIC 2018 Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration

According to Durst 2017, in the last few years, Saskatchewan has benefited by attracting many "people not only from outside Canada but also within Canada" (CBC News, 2017; StatsCan, 2000-2017). Nevertheless, Canada's birth rate is not likely to meet the province's growing demands. The country needs labour to maintain economic growth and compete in the international arena with other nations similar to Canada. Newcomers also bring families and children who attend school, rent apartments, and buy houses and cars, all which help sustain the overall economy (Durst 2017). Durst notes that "Saskatchewan previously saw a large number of immigrants coming from Asia, but now more are coming from the Middle East region and parts of Africa", which adds to the cultural diversity of Saskatchewan communities (CBC News, 2017; StatsCan, 2000-2017). While this has created some challenges with the older settler population, Durst notes there is a general agreement so far that it is important to "keep openness tolerance and acceptance of differences."

Indeed, the program is significant for Saskatchewan. Records show that immigrants accounted for about 10.5 percent of Saskatchewan's 2016 census population, up from 6.8 percent only five years earlier. A further 12.1 percent of the population are second-generation immigrants, while 10.8 percent identify as a visible minority in Saskatchewan. Approximately 110,000 immigrants have come to Saskatchewan since 2010.

2.2 Australia and Western Australia

In Australia, under ss. 27 and 51 of the Constitution Act, immigration and emigration laws are reserved uniquely to the national government (i.e., federal government). When Australian states were separate territories, they autonomously practiced immigration control, authorized immigration entrance, and provided settlement assistance (Jupp, 1998); the Australian states continued operating a somewhat productive role in immigration until the 1910s (Atchison, 1988; Jupp, 1998). Following WWI, the federal government took over the role, as immigration was viewed as key to achieving two main federal goals: economic expansion and protection (Jupp, 2002).

The center of the migration program shifted after 1945, as new federal immigration approaches were first conceived. Australia's immigration programs have shifted over those 65

years from concentrating on attracting migrants, mostly from the UK, to attracting skilled immigrants and temporary skilled immigrants to meet the specific labour demands in the economy (Spinks, 2010). After 1945, the federal government was able to expand the Australian population to motivate post-war economic progress and increase the number of people to protect the nation (Spinks, 2010). After a substantial rise in migration in the early part of the 1970s, there was a decreasing trend in the rate of in-migration through to 2005 (Sibma, 2006). By 1969, plans directed the recruitment of as many as 185,000 migrants annually. However, "by 1975, the planned intake for the year had been reduced to 50,000" (Spinks, 2010). Australia started mass immigration in 1947. Managing the integration of such a large overseas population has been an essential goal for successive Australian governments. Early settlement policies were predicated on assimilation, with immigrants being required to adapt to Australian norms and values (McAllister, 2018). From 1961 to 1971, the WA population in particular increased drastically. Statistics show that the WA population surpassed Saskatchewan's population in that period. In 1961, Saskatchewan had 925,181 compared with WA at 746,750, but by 1971, WA had 1,053,834 people, while Saskatchewan was virtually unchanged 926,242.

Questions of national identity are highly relevant to Australia. In earlier years, the focus was on maintaining the Britishness of society, but more recently, it has involved accommodating the highest proportion of foreign-born of any advanced society. As in Canada, since the 1970s, immigrant policies have stressed multiculturalism, with migrants being encouraged to retain their cultural beliefs and attitudes while at the same time needing only modest skills to gain citizenship and, therefore, achieve full political rights (Castles et al., 2003; Markus, Jupp, & McDonald, 2009).

Australia adapted and adopted the points system from Canada and introduced it in 1979 to select immigrants. The main difference between the Canadian and Australian points system was the specific conditions for selecting immigrants who obtained the best qualifications on youth, education, experience, and fluency in English (e.g., the minimum language requirements in Canada was lower than Australia on average). Other differences have had minor incidence.

Since the 1980s, Australian states have become more actively involved in the immigration process and mainly immigrant selection. The level of emigration (permanent departures) from Australia, measured by the number of residents who indicate on their outgoing

passenger cards that they are leaving Australia permanently, grew modestly from the early 1980s until the mid-1990s and then accelerated sharply (Sibma, 2006). More people were needed to meet the outflow. One challenge, as in Canada, is that in the post-war period, immigrants tended to gravitate towards the metropolises in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland (esp. Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane) (Hugo, 2008). Between 1988 and 2000, these states were destinations for, on average, more than 80 percent of newcomers (DIAC, 1999–2000, 9). Although their share of arrivals has decreased somewhat since 2000, in 2010–11, these states still accounted for almost three-quarters of new migrants (DIAC, 2011). At the same time, regional (rural) Australia suffered from outmigration and lack of arrivals, leading to noticeable labour shortages (Hugo, 2008, p. 558). While migration estimates are at comparable levels to what occurred in the previous period, the focus is now completely different. The primary determinant of migration programming since the 1980s has been a focus on the labour market results of immigrants (Birrell, 1981)

Admissions rose steadily after these changes in the early part of the 1980s; by 1988, there was another peak under the Hawke Government with a proposed admission of 145,000. However, migration targets were progressively lowered in the 1990s, to a low of 80,000 in 1992–93 (DIMA, *op. cit.*). While those numbers began to rise again, the main story in 1995–96 to 2008–09 is that skilled migrants grew from 29 percent to 67 percent of Australia’s total migration program. Conversely, the share of immigrants under the Family Stream sunk from 69 percent to 35 percent (Sibma, 2006). After Howard attained power in 1996, an initial decline was turned around, and a progressive increase in the planned migration admission occurred, with immigration closely tied to economic growth. In 1996–97, skilled migration moved to 47 percent of the migration program—on the way to a new peak in 2008–09 (Spinks, 2010).

Multiple policy measures worked to raise the probability that newcomers will be able to get a job and achieve economic autonomy, thus decreasing the risk of migrants becoming a drain on the public purse. Some of the policy measures introduced in the 1990s included the introduction of a nominated skills list, mandating the English language skills required and more rigorous rules concerning the recognition of qualifications from abroad to meet acceptability conditions for high skilled immigrants (Spinks, 2010). Particularly, the growing integration of

workers in the world labour market has been key to a sharp acceleration in immigration to and emigration from WA and the rest of the country (Sibma, 2006).

There have been three significant long-term improvements in immigration administration (Sibma, 2006). First, settlers, specifically those who moved to Australia after obtaining a PR visa abroad, are now included in the administration. This category also incorporates New Zealand citizens who declare on their passenger card when they land in Australia that they expect to stay in Australia permanently. The second category of movers is residents. Residents are described as people with the credentials to live in Australia permanently. They incorporate those born in Australia and those who were born abroad and who have received a PR visa or Australian citizenship. This visa may have been acquired by the overseas-born resident either before moving to Australia or as a settler. The third group involves people admitted onshore after the person arrived as a visitor.

The scale of the annual settler flow is determined mainly by the size of the overall migration program. The only element of settler admission outside the migration policy is New Zealand citizens, who since the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement of 1973 have free movement and right to work without a visa. The number of settlers has also improved because the migration program has been enlarged in the 1990s. However, there is a limited relationship between the migration program, and the settler flows because some PR visas can be given to people already in Australia, especially partners of migrants and international students. In the case of the latter, the growth in the numbers of people granted PR under the onshore international student visa subclasses under the General Skilled Migration (GSM) program works in such a way that their numbers, based on arrival statistics, reduce the available spaces in the rest of the migration program for Australia's workforce.

An important point to note is the high mobility of residents. Australia has faced persistent net losses of skilled workers, as many residents move overseas permanently for job or family reasons. It is also inevitable that a country like Australia with its very high overseas-born population (currently about 29 percent) may lose some of these residents because of the strength of their ties to family and careers abroad. In the 1990s, the scale of the losses increased significantly, generating concerns that Australia may be losing many of its most productive population. A confounding category of potential migrants is visitors. These people are in

Australia on a temporary visa or, if they are a New Zealand citizen, indicating that they are visiting Australia. The pattern for visitors offsets some of the domestic demographic trends; in some cases, visitors choose to stay in Australia for many years or, perhaps, permanently. Overall, the number of skilled immigrants revealing themselves to be visitors on arrival in Australia usually exceed those declaring that they are leaving Australia after a long-term visit. Near the end of the 1990s, the net gains of skilled visitors to Australia began. Visitors roughly compensate for the net losses of residents, thus in numerical terms, the ‘brain drain’ from resident losses is comparable to the ‘brain gain’ from visitor flows. As a result, settler inflows are, for the most part, net gains for Australia’s skilled workers.

Australia in the 1990s designed two major visa classes that enable temporary entry in Australia for more than one year. First, overseas student visas allow whereby non-Australians to study in full-time accredited and registered courses (generally as full-fee paying students). Overseas student visas are generally granted for the duration of the study. Second, business visitor visas (esp. 457 Visas) entitle businesses to recruit skilled personnel to fill positions that cannot readily be filled locally. Recipients of these visas can stay in Australia for up to four years. Since the mid-1990s, the number of temporary visas granted in Australia has risen dramatically. Student visas increased from around 53,000 grants in 1994-95 to around 175,000 grants in 2004-05, partly due to the Australian government’s decision in the late 1990s to allow successful overseas students to apply for PR under the Skills Stream of the Migration Program.

Driven by overseas migration, Western Australia’s population rose by over half a million people in the past decade (Lyly, 2018). Net overseas migration based on temporary skill migration) made up 59 percent of the growth (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016). The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) concludes that overseas immigration was the primary driver of WA’s population. The natural increase (births minus deaths) contributed 35 percent of growth, while interstate migration added 6 percent but decreased considerably with the slowing of the local economy after 2015 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017).

It seems that the original purpose for 457 Visas has not worked out precisely as expected. For example, the Barrow Island Project rose with a workforce of 8,000. The Temporary work visa has certainly become the fastest growing visa type used in both WA and Australia. In 2014-2015 alone, Australia provided only 205,000 permanent residence grants, compared to the

622,436 temporary visas (Anthony, 2017). This shift signals a move from Australia being a settler nation to a temporary-migrant nation (Collins, 2014), a major change in post-war immigration policy. That shift is observed in WA as well. After the federal government expanded the temporary visa program in 2010, it gave temporary overseas skilled immigrants higher processing priority than General Skilled Migration (GSM). As a result, temporary visas overtook permanent visas in West Australia for most the past decade. At the end of 2015, temporary work visas accounted for 29,960 out of 54,400 (or 55 percent) of total visa arrivals, while permanent visas made up 11,780 or 22 percent of total arrivals (irwas.org/west-Australia, 2017).

The challenge with temporary visas is that people fail to build attachments and tend to move on at the end of or before the expiry of their visas. As a result, the number of permanent departures has doubled in less than a decade, rising from under 30,000 in 1996-97 to around 62,000 persons in 2004-05 for Australia as a whole. The norm over the past few decades was that Australian residents born overseas accounted for the majority of permanent departures (Sibma, 2006). One concern is that mobility seems to be catching. The most striking feature in recent years is the massive rise in the number of Australian-born permanent departures. Australia has always had a significant population abroad, but in the past, this was temporary—Australia gained much from young Australians experiencing work in other countries and returning to settle. This fact suggests it will be in Australia's interests to develop policies that encourage brain circulation rather than brain drain among Australia's young people. Policy actions relevant to this group include establishing and maintaining contact with the diaspora, encouraging expatriates to return, and designing initiatives to keep talented Australians in Australia (CEDA).

In 2008–09, 55 percent of visas granted under the skills stream were granted to dependents of the primary applicant (Spinks, 2010). The Rudd Government for 2008–2009 in the wake of the economic challenges resulting from the Global Financial Crisis undertook a review of permanent skilled migration (Spinks, 2010). The review concluded the need to shift focus away from 'supply-driven' independent skilled migration towards 'demand-driven' efforts that link employers and the government to manage sponsored skilled immigration (Evans, 2012). Effective January 2009, skilled workers sponsored by an employer are given more powerful processing preference than independent migrants. Critical deficits in Australia, such as medical

and some IT professionals and engineers, were given priority (Spinks, 2010). A second set of related reforms in February 2010 sharpened the program’s focus to motivate settler offers to those skilled individuals immediately needed by the Australian industry rather than simply to make offers based on the supply of independent skilled migrants. The reforms involved the cancellation of almost 20,000 General Skilled Migration visas where the applicants remained offshore before September 2007, cancellation of the Migration Occupations in Demand List (MODL) and the phasing out of the Critical Skills List which was launched in 2009. The reforms also triggered a review of the points test, under which candidates for the general skilled migration program are granted points against particular rules (e.g., age, education, English language ability) and must reach a particular pass mark in order to qualify for the grant of a visa (Spinks, 2010).

In July 2010, Australia launched a new Skilled Occupation List (SOL) began, with 181 occupations identified as being in demand (DIMA, 2011) (Figure 4.3).




Figure 4.3: 2010-11 skill stream: SOL/Non SOL by program category (primary applicants)
Source: Australia Statistic- Migration Program outcomes 1997-98 to 2009-10

That list was designed to ensure the Skilled Migration Program is demand-driven rather than supply-driven. In order to be qualified for independent skilled migration, applicants must hold significant qualifications in occupations listed on the SOL. Occupations that have been recognized as no longer in demand, such as cooks and hairdressers, were excluded from the list.

The SOL is updated annually (Spinks, 2010). The 2010–11 Migration Program, announced in May 2010, allocated 168,700 places, made up of 113,850 places in the economic immigration program, 54,550 places in the family immigration program and 300 unique eligibility places (Spinks, 2010).

According to the 2011 Australian census, by then, 26 percent of the population were immigrants, with a further 20 percent first-generation offspring of immigrants (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012). Most immigrants to Australia come from the UK; in the 2011 census, around 1 in 20 Australian residents (or 1.1 million) had been born in the UK (2011 Australian census). Other large foreign-born groups include New Zealand (483,000), China (319,000), India (295,000) and Italy and Vietnam (185,000 each). Together, these six countries constitute almost half of all of the overseas-born population in Australia (McAllister, 2018). Combining first and second-generation immigrants, almost half of the Australian population, is either a migrant or the child of a migrant. This level of overseas born within the population easily surpasses all other immigrant societies, including Canada, the US, and Israel (<https://data.oecd.org>) (McAllister, 2018).

As in many other immigrant societies; therefore, Australia has progressively developed policies aimed at making it as easy as possible for immigrants to assimilate into the host society (Koopmans et al., 2012). Ensuring an inclusive sense of national identity is widely accepted as crucial to Australia's long-term stability and prosperity (McAllister, 2018).

2.3. Comparative analysis of institutional factors

Saskatchewan and Western Australia both look to have similar structural and institutional factors. Both are resource-based and export-dependent, and throughout their histories have depended on immigration for population and economic growth. Immigration federalism has also been a key part of the history in both jurisdictions. The introduction of the immigration point system and regional agreements to include subnational priorities and efforts in immigration management has been vital to both jurisdictions' economic and demographic progress in recent years. On the face of it, the two systems look very similar, but there are some key differences.

First, Saskatchewan is in a more vulnerable situation, with a higher dependence on a narrower set of primary resource exports accessible only through expensive land or air transportation systems, fewer local institutions with global reach and significant local and regional competition for skilled labour and business development. In contrast, isolation works in Western Australia's favour, as there is low competition regionally, and they can use their proximity to Asia and ocean access to serve the world's fastest-growing markets competitively.

Canada has been the innovator on immigration policy as the global first adopter of the point system, multiculturalism and immigration federalism. Nevertheless, often the first is not best. As the imitator, Australia has been able to transfer the learnings from Canada and create more tailored and responsive systems. The constitutional role for both federal and provincial efforts on immigration has narrowed the range of options. The capacity for diversity is relatively narrow in Canada.

In contrast, there was no real emancipation of the states in Australia—the constitution unambiguously and fully allocates authority for immigration policy to the Commonwealth. This clarifies who will drive the policy and in some ways facilitates diversity of effort. The Commonwealth government is able to do one-off deals with both states and cities/regions. Australia has added to the devolution of authority with Designated Area Migration Agreements (DAMA), such as with the City of Kalgoorlie-Boulder in WA, where the cities are part of the policy process. Chapter 5 will explore this divergence.

CHAPTER V: IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM IN SASKATCHEWAN AND WESTERN AUSTRALIA

This chapter examines the long-standing differentiation between Canadian and Australia driven by their immigration systems. Whether immigration federalism is likely to reinforce or reduce existing similarities between these two types of immigration systems is assessed.

1. Canada and the Saskatchewan Provincial Nominee Program (PNP)

The Canadian federal government and provinces /territories began co-operating on immigration as far back as 1976. Nevertheless, the early federal discussion with provinces and territories about immigration was limited. While the system had moved to use points for selection, it remained at a high level, and there were no patterns, checklists or processes about regional or sectoral demands to structure the discussion, so the federal-provincial engagement was weak and mostly ineffective (Schmidtke, 2014).

The Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) was introduced in 1998 to provide provinces with a mechanism to articulate to domestic economic growth needs. Each province and territory (PT) signed and started the PNP at different times. By 2007 the PNP effort included nine provinces and two territories, each which can nominate potential immigrants who meet specific provincial/territorial needs and who intended to remain in the nomination region. The PNP is a policy tool that assists federal and provincial governments to direct, control and manage economic immigration. In addition, PNP provides a structure for the federal government and PT governments to coordinate planning, administration and evaluation of the annual programs for economic immigrants into each PT.

Moreover, PNP helps the Federal Government and PT to work together to refine the technical requirements for potential high skilled immigrants (PNP Evaluation Report, 2012) (table 5.1). The 2009 PNP Logic Model provides four key objectives. The first objective attempts to increase the economic benefits of immigration to PTs, in full consideration of provincial and territorial economic development priorities and local labour market conditions. The second objective is to distribute the benefits of immigration more widely and equitably across all the regions. A third objective is to enhance Federal-Provincial/Territorial (FPT)

collaboration and coordination. Finally, the program is designed to encourage development and strengthening of official language minority communities (English in Quebec and parts of the Maritimes and Ontario and French almost everywhere except Quebec).

Total Provincial Nominee Program immigrants as percent of all economic immigrants, cumulative totals 2011-2017			
	Provincial Nominee Program	Total Economic Migrants	PNP as % total
Total	307,292	1,115,865	28
NL	2,521	4,075	62
PE	9,604	10,029	96
NS	11,056	15,852	70
NB	13,043	14,706	89
QC	179*	235,769*	0
ON	23,351	354,573	7
MB	72,562	77,937	93
SK	62,042	68,758	90
AB	65,271	181,774	36
BC	45,555	150,093	30
YT	219	319	69
NT	1,210	1,450	83
NU	243	516	47
Table 5.1: PNP Percentages			
<i>Source: Paul Trujillo calculations using CEIC data.</i>			
* Quebec has a separate system for selecting migrations other than the PNP program			

While the nominee program was initially primarily charged with attracting economic immigrants to support each jurisdiction's economic goals, several PTs have introduced other objectives, such as regional development, into their Provincial Nomination (PN) agendas. Since the PNP started, the atmosphere has transformed remarkably. Conflict and confusion reigned before the program; as the PNP processes evolved, provinces began to have a better appreciation for federal challenges, the federal system gained insights into the dynamics of local and regional labour markets, and both parties found grounds for compromise and success. Provinces, such as PEI, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and New Brunswick, have used the PNP as the primary channel through which they select immigrants to their region; in those provinces, about 90% or more of their migrants over the last decade were recruited through the PNP process.

The initial PNP incorporated the federal points system, with applicants being judged on their education, occupational skills, employment prospects, age, proficiency in English or French, and personal attitude. Applicants earning 50 points or more out of a possible 100 were allowed entry, with other selection criteria refined in specific programs developed under the PNP. As of 2020, the PNP operates five programs that manage different types of economic and skilled migrants.

Canada and Saskatchewan have signed a range of different types of agreements, all of which work to improve the collaboration between the federal and provincial governments. The most critical agreements were the Canada-Memorandum of Understanding on the Off-campus Work Permit Program for International Students in April 2006 and the Canada-Saskatchewan Memorandum of Understanding on Post-Graduation Employment for Foreign Students in May 2004. For this study, we focus on the Canada-Saskatchewan Immigration Agreement signed in May 2005, which includes the changes related to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), 2002. The purpose of the 2005 agreement is to determine the particular roles and obligations of the federal and provincial governments in the processes governing permanent and temporary newcomers being recruited to Saskatchewan under the IRPA.

The Canada-Saskatchewan Immigration Agreement, 2005, has ten objectives. The first objective fosters an active partnership between Canada and Saskatchewan within the immigration processes (e.g., promotion, recruitment, selection, admission, control, settlement, and integration) for all migrants seeking to come to Saskatchewan (www.canaca.ca). Second, the agreement provides Canada and Saskatchewan processes to consult and cooperate on the expansion and implementation of plans, programs, and tools to determine the levels and distribution of immigrants to Saskatchewan and Canada, including those to promote and support the expansion of minority official language communities in Saskatchewan. Third, the agreement sets the objective to cooperatively develop and implement new initiatives and projects that meet regional immigration needs. Fourth, the agreement lays out principles to coordinate the roles and responsibilities between Canada and Saskatchewan immigration processes. Fifth, the agreement sets expectations that the relationship will provide Saskatchewan with the opportunity to address its social, demographic, economic growth, and labour market needs, including skills shortages. Sixth, it lays out steps to foster cooperation in information sharing, investigation, and evaluation to guarantee the agreement's integrity between Canada and Saskatchewan. Seventh, the parties

agree to deliver programs and initiatives to settle and integrate immigrants in Saskatchewan, including appropriate, fair, and ongoing funding for settlement services provided in Saskatchewan. Eighth, the agreement sets an objective of developing cooperation in achieving humanitarian goals and family reunification. Ninth, the parties signalled intentions to cooperate in the construction and implementation of policies to address limitations to qualification verification and assimilation of immigrants into the labour market. Finally, tenth, the parties agreed to cooperate in facilitating movements of temporary workers and students to Saskatchewan.

While Saskatchewan signed its PNP agreement in 1998 and operationalized it in 2001, it wasn't until these refinements in the mid-2000s that the program got moving. Quebec started from the beginning in 1968 with some own immigration regulations, but Saskatchewan started to promote immigration in 2009. The first years saw few PNP selections, but by 2009, the program was functioning, and the number of economic migrants through the program started to grow.

In 2012, the Minister of Immigration, Jason Kenney, announced that Canada saw positive results from the PNP's perspective. The minister reported that nationally, Canada had gone from 5,000 admissions under the Provincial Nominee Program in 2005 to 45,000 planned for 2012 (Canada Archive Speeches, 2011). Kenney particularly singled out the sharp rise in immigration to the West and East. Immigration to Atlantic Canada doubled, to Manitoba tripled, to Saskatchewan quadrupled and to Alberta doubled over those five years. Of particular note, Saskatchewan went from only 2,000 permanent residents settling in 2005 to 9,000 in 2011 (Canada Archive Speeches 2011). The program helped fuel provincial population growth and turned Saskatoon into one of the fastest-growing urban centres in Canada for much of that period. That, in no small measure, was achieved by expanding the admission of provincial nominees through the Saskatchewan Immigrant Nominee Program, the specific PNP for the province, from 500 skilled immigrants in 2005 to 8,700 in 2011 (Kenney, 2012).

How do the Saskatchewan Immigrant Nominee Program (SINP) nominations work? SINP offers a skilled worker system to enter Canada. Through the SINP, Saskatchewan requests residency applications from skilled workers who want to come to Saskatchewan and nominate successful candidates to the federal government to gain permanent residency in Canada. The SINP is merely one of the stages of becoming PR in Canada and residency in Saskatchewan. All

potential candidates must also apply for PR through Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) Canadian Immigration Commission.

Nonetheless, it is very significant to understand who is not eligible to apply. First, refugee applicants in Canada who seek refugee status from the Government of Canada are not eligible. Second, individuals living illegally in Canada or their nation of residence are exempt. Third, people who have had a removal order issued against them by Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) or the Canada Border Services Agency are ineligible. Fourth, people who are prohibited from entering Canada for any reason are barred. Potential immigrants may be rejected for immigration to Canada if the applicant or any dependent family member (accompanying or not) does not meet IRCC's requirements. Those requirements are related to health and criminality, unresolved custody or child support disputes affecting any member of the applicant's family or their representatives intentionally misrepresenting the applicants in the application. When SINP administrators believe there has been a misrepresentation in an application, they will hold off on processing it until after SINP officers investigate. SINP administrators will send the applicant, their intended employer, and their representative, a "procedural fairness letter" with details. They will be able to send in evidence that they did not commit misrepresentation. The critical task for economic immigrants who desire to immigrate to Saskatchewan is to prove that they intend to live and work in Saskatchewan. Those potential skilled immigrants need to complete applications correctly and deliver valid documentation. Every potential skilled immigrant creates an account and completes the different sections. They need to scan and upload all the completed applications and backup credentials in PDF format onto their online submission. The final stage is to save and submit their applications online and keep the originals for supplementary review.

SINP administrators will then review applications in stages, to make sure they are complete. Complete applications will have all the requirements adequately submitted as per the checklist. Incomplete applications will not be accepted, and applicants may need to reapply and submit a new request. SINP administrators send a letter informing of any deficiencies in the candidates' application. Complete applications proceed to the review stage, at which point SINP officials may yet request more documentation. SINP officials provide potential migrants some time to submit supplementary documentation, and SINP immigration officials may, at times, send skilled candidates a reminder. After a given time, the application moves on in the process.

Potential immigrants will remain in the process if SINP immigration officials receive the required information in the given time. If applicants did not, they might be deemed ineligible. The detailed judgment is then communicated directly to the applicant or their agent—the SINP deems this important as it strives to be transparent and accountable. However, applicants do not know, and it is impossible to determine who makes the decisions—is it a board, a designated official or some more distributed set of decision-makers.

Once SINP administrators have checked all the information in the applications, they will make a recommendation on the nomination. There are only two types of decisions at this stage. If an application is approved, the candidate is deemed nominated. SINP administrators send the applicant a nomination package with information on the next steps. Applicants will have to apply to IRCC within six months of nomination for their visas. If applications are ineligible, SINP administrators send the applicant a notification letter. The applicant may ask for a secondary review. SINP has procedures and guidelines for each category. It is important to note that the SINP staff works through the Government of Canada embassies and consulates worldwide to promote, identify and recruit, but does not use immigration consultants or other commercial agencies or representatives. As an applicant, potential immigrants to Saskatchewan can choose to work with an immigration consultant or not, but they are their agents and have no special status with SINP. No immigration consultant is allocated any immigrant quotas of any sort from the province of Saskatchewan, or any other province in the program.

Each year, the SINP sets a maximum number of applicants in each of its recruitment categories to make the program more efficient. The program for Saskatchewan was finally launched in 2002, four years after the provincial PNP was signed. In 2006, the first cap was put on the number of people who can be nominated, and a specific occupation-in-demand profile was developed. Over the years, the SINP has developed multiple streams for entry of particularly skilled people, building flexibility into the immigration campaigns. A range of innovations has been developed in the system. In 2016, Saskatchewan adopted a pathway similar to the federal Express Entry stream to accelerate recruitment and admissions. At that point, the federal system required, and the province incorporated a requirement for proof of settlement funds and a settlement plan for all nominees in PNP related programs, except those who may be in-country and employed.

The SINP effort has changed over time. Currently, there are two main SINP categories for skilled immigrants. First, the International Skilled Worker Category (ISWC) targets three main types of skilled workers, those who are abroad and want to work and live in Saskatchewan and either have an employment offer or have demonstrated skills in an occupation in-demand (but do not need a job offer) and those living and working in the province at the time of application. Second, the Entrepreneur and Farm Category is open for entrepreneurs who plan to start a business or those wanting to own and operate a farm. This study focuses on the first category, the International Skilled Worker Category (ISWC).

The most innovative part of the International Skill Worker Category is the programs targeted on recruiting abroad: the ISW-Employment Offer, the ISW-Occupation in Demand, and the ISW-Saskatchewan Express Entry (SINP-EE).

The ISW-Employment Offer subcategory is for skilled immigrants who get a job offer for a skilled occupation in Saskatchewan. Applicants may be qualified for this subcategory if they live abroad or have evidence of formal status in the country, are not a refugee seeker, and in 2020 must score at least 60 points out of 100 on the SINP point evaluation framework. Points are granted based on five elements: education and training, skilled job experience; language proficiency; age; and, adaptability to the province labour market. Potential immigrants to Saskatchewan need at least one year of work experience in the applicants' proposed occupation in the past ten years. Also, applicants need to reach a literature score of at least Canadian Language Benchmark (CLB) 4, while employers and professional governing bodies may request language scores higher than CLB 4. Applicants need to be sure to provide documents to prove that they are eligible and meet the five factors above. For instance, if an applicant claims 20 points for having a university degree, the applicant must attach a copy of their university degree and complete transcripts. If their diploma or transcript is in a language other than English or French, they must also attach a verified translated version. Applications submitted where documents are missing or not appropriately translated will be considered incomplete, and the application will be closed. If an application is closed, applicants will be sent a letter and advised to reapply at a later date with a complete application. This system is quite flexible in some ways. The threshold points for nomination can and have been changed over the past years based on market needs; similarly, other criteria can be used flexibly (which is a concern to some). As a

result, any one province's criteria may vary from the rest (within bounds) and any federal targets in similar programs.

Potential skilled immigrants need to know about using Immigration representatives. Immigrant workers are not required to use an immigration representative or consultant to apply to the SINP. However, if they wish to hire a representative, candidates must make sure they are a lawyer in Canada in a good reputation with a provincial law society or licensed by the Government of Saskatchewan. There are online-lists of licensed/approved consultants and recruiters. Potential immigrants can study more about Saskatchewan's laws that protect foreign workers from exploitation and abuse through the recruitment and immigration process by visiting Protection for Immigrants and Foreign Workers. Applicants must show proof of eligibility for Saskatchewan licensure if their intended occupation is in a regulated profession or compulsory apprenticed trade; they will need this as part of applicants' SINP application. To see if their intended occupation is regulated in Saskatchewan, they can go to Regulated Occupations and Licensing Requirements (ROLR).

Immigrants through the Employment Offer sub-program need to have an offer of permanent, full-time employment in Saskatchewan. They require a robust SINP job approval letter as proof. There is no particular record of occupations in Saskatchewan. However, a candidate's application is expected to be part of the National Occupational Classification (NOC) Matrix level "A," "B," or "0", or in a designated trade in Saskatchewan (www.SK.ca). Food and beverage servers should apply to the Hospitality & Project subcategory, and health professionals should apply to the Health Professionals subcategory.

The ISW-Occupation in Demand (ISWOD) is for economic immigrants who do not hold a job offer in the province but are part of the highly-skilled in-demand occupation in the province and meet the subcategory criteria. Individuals may be eligible in the trade, regulated, or non-regulated occupational categories. Applicants may qualify for this subcategory if they live outside Canada or have proof of legal status in Canada. This subcategory asks the same requirements as a skilled international worker by employment offer subcategory: applicants should not be a refugee seeker; they need to score a minimum of 60 points out of 100 on the SINP point assessment grid, and they need to have a language score of at least Canadian Language Benchmark (CLB) 4. The main differences to the ISWEO are: applicants need to finish post-secondary education, training, or apprenticeships of at least one year in length similar

to Canadian education method, and applicants must have earned a diploma or a license, or degree related to the major that they have studied. If applicants have obtained degrees outside Canada, such as an academic or technical degree, diploma, or certificate, applicants must submit an educational credential assessment (ECA) from a designated organization, as per IRCC's list of recognized institutions. Applicants who have achieved trades or vocational training as part of their high school education are not required to submit an ECA (e.g., get an ECA certificate takes in average 10-12 weeks) but must instead apply for licensure as defined on the In-Demand Occupations List for SINP requirements related to professional status and licensure. The Minister of Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship has nominated ECA Assessment Service, a private educational credential assessment service, to assess credentials for individuals applying for immigration to Canada. Applicants in ISWOD need at least one of the following conditions in their field of expertise, over and above their education or training credentials: one-year experience in the past ten years in a skilled profession (non-trades); two years' experience in a skilled trade in the past five years; or twelve months of work in Canada in the past three years (non-trades and trades).

Moreover, they need work experience in a high skilled occupation in the National Occupational Classification (NOC) Matrix level "A," "B," or "0" that is included on the SINP In-Demand Occupation List. Applicants may be asked to present evidence of professional status or license (e.g., regulated occupations or those with professional certification standards in the country and Saskatchewan) for their occupation on the SINP In-Demand Occupation List for these requirements. If applicants are requested to provide proof of licensure, their applications are not processed until such proof is provided; otherwise, applications will be delivered as incomplete, and the application fee (currently \$300 per application) is not refunded. People skilled in occupations without licensing in Canada are exempt, even if they may be licensed elsewhere. SINP will advise applicants as appropriate.

Skilled workers looking to immigrate to Saskatchewan under the SINP Occupation In-Demand and Express Entry (EE) are required to submit an Expression of Interest (EOI) profile of their skills and qualifications. The EOI is an online pre-application process that allows candidates to register their interest in immigrating and disclosing their qualifications. Candidates can only hold one EOI profile. SINP assesses the EOI against local needs and criteria and invites candidates that satisfy the selection to submit a full application. While there is no limit on the

number of candidates who may submit an EOI, not all candidates who do so will be invited. The points scores linked with an EOI profile will determine the likelihood of receiving an invitation. Those with high scores inside the pool of nominees will hold a more prominent option of being invited to apply.

A particular example of the program in Saskatchewan is the recruitment of medical experts. The Medical Council of Canada must assess candidates planning to apply as a physician or specialist physician (NOC 3111 or 3112). Individuals expecting to get a PR as a pharmacist (NOC 3131) must have an assessment from the Pharmacy Examining Board of Canada. The matching process inside SINP determines which eligible candidates may get invitations. After applicants receive an invitation to apply through the EOI system, they must follow all the standard guidelines and processes.

The ISW-Saskatchewan Express Entry subcategory is for economic workers who want to live and work in Saskatchewan, but unlike other programs, they need to be in the Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) Express Entry Pool. They can apply simultaneously or sequentially. Candidates to immigrate to Saskatchewan in this category may qualify if they live outside Canada or have proof of legal status in Canada. Applicants accepted into IRCC's Express Entry Pool are assigned an Express Entry Profile Number and Job Seeker Validation Code, which clears the federal process. Express entry is a digital system that IRCC uses to deal with applications for permanent residence from skilled workers. Those applicants with high scores within the pool of candidates have a greater chance of being invited to apply. The benefit of this pathway is that processing times are capped at six months or less, and once a candidate has been assigned to the Express Entry Pool, they have more time to enter the country. In other programs, if they fail to match or take up an opportunity within six months, they have to reapply.

As noted, the differences between these three subcategories from the Immigration Skilled Worker Category' are explained in Annexes.

The SINP version of the PNP, a dynamic, flexible, user-friendly, focused, and most effective collaborative delivery of immigration policy in Saskatchewan, is one of the better examples of immigration federalism in Canada. The most obvious benefit is that Saskatchewan has graduated from being mostly disconnected from international migration (and a great place to come from) to being one of the larger and sustained hosts of skilled immigration. Before the program, the province attracted fewer than 2,000 migrants annually; in recent years, the SINP

has attracted upwards of 15,000 per annum. The dramatic turnaround in the provincial economy over the same period would have been limited if not truncated without access to these workers. Furthermore, the provincial population is rapidly diversifying, with more than 10 percent visible minorities in 2016, compared with only about 5 percent a decade earlier.

The program also has improved relations between the two orders of government. Both the federal and provincial governments are now more aware of each other's interests and, particularly for the province, their interests are advanced and realized in this new programming space. While the high-level conflict has diminished, and there are no significant disagreements about the program's principles and objectives, both parties would like improvements. At times, the federal government is concerned about the rigour of the provincial processes while the province regularly asks for larger quotas. Beyond the scope of the current programming, applicants themselves signal an interest in greater support. The current federal and SINP programming provides little or no support for applicants to meet the needs of the program itself; applicants are forced to rely upon third-party consultants and advisors. This fact has created an immigration consultation business that helps but also creates a wedge between the program and users, at some considerable cost.

2. Australia and the WA State-Sponsored Regional Migration (SSRM) Program

At times, Australia has been an imitator and, at times, an innovator, ultimately making immigration federalism a uniquely Australian program. While Australia moved as early as 1972 towards a merit-based selection process, it wasn't until 1989 that Australia implemented a points system. Once policy started to change, Australia went further and faster to a much more distributed system, with cities, sub-state regions and regions all having distinct roles in the system. Along the way, the country developed a range of visa classes tailored to local needs that differ markedly from the Canadian model. One outcome of the focus on tailored programming is that the Australian system is more about temporary labour-market management than permanent settlement.

Australia operated a largely race-based immigration process until the 1970s, as the goal was to populate and secure the territory with white, ideally British migrants. While merit increasingly drove selection after 1972, it took 17 years for the system to be formalized. Over the

years the number of criteria has grown so that currently the system assigns to applications based on their assessment against 11 criteria: age; English language ability; credentialed community language requirements; skills; partner skills; educational qualifications; Australian study requirements; professional year in Australia, and nominations by states or territories for one of the key visa subclasses (190 or 490). (Hereafter, we will only refer to states as the focus is on WA and not NT.)




Figure 5.1: State-Specific and Regional Migration outcomes in Australia
Source: Australia Statistic- Migration Program outcomes 1997-98 to 2009-10

Immigration federalism began formally in 1996 with the introduction of the State-Sponsored Regional Migration (SSRM) program, a program similar to the PNP system in Canada. Canada’s early stated goal was to distribute migration more widely in order to populate underdeveloped areas. The system was created mainly in answer to lobbying by states and territories as they looked for a solution to skill shortages that impacted their economy and social progress (Hugo, 2008). Most of the states were faced with difficulties of low population growth and struggling economies, partly complicated by and partly ignored by the population policy that routed immigrant settlement into large urban centres. With the introduction of the SSRM system,

the state, local government and employers could sponsor newcomers to meet their specific needs (Hugo, 2008). The preferred mechanism was to use different visa categories. A range of visas was included in the SSRM: Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme (RSMS); State and Territory Nominated Independent scheme (STNI); Skilled Designated Area Sponsored Visa Categories (SDAS); Skilled Designated Area Sponsored Overseas Student Category; Skilled Onshore Designated Area Sponsored New Zealand Citizen Visa Category; Regional Established Business in Australia (REBA); and Skilled Independent Regional (Provisions) Category (SIR).

The Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme (RSMS) was a critical component of the push to attract migrants to non-urban regions (migration.wa.gov.au). RSMS, launched in 1995, allows employers in a designated RSMS area to attract skilled workers from abroad. The program supports skilled immigrants from overseas to fill skilled vacancies for a minimum of a couple of years. Successful nominees who are qualified to live in these regions can apply to migrate permanently to Australia after two years of residency. The number of visas awarded under the RSMS is relatively low (only 8,811 places in 2008–09) but volatile (the targets rose 74 percent in both 2007–08 and 2008–09) (Spinks, 2010).

State governments may sponsor migrants under a range of other programs and visa categories. Spinks (2010) mentions "the Business Skills Visa Category (BSVC) enables states to sponsor entrants with business skills to set up businesses in regional, rural, or low-growth areas of Australia. In 2008–09, around 96.4 percent of all provisional business-skills-visa applications were state-sponsored" (Spinks, 2010).

The Australian government in 2010 added the Enterprise Migration Agreements (EMA) and Regional Migration Agreements (RMA). The first EMA allowed regional areas, states and territories to negotiate umbrella framework agreements. Those programs are intended to help employers access skills and technical expertise unavailable in Australia's regions. The Australian government wanted to encourage overseas businesses to establish Australian operations or to fulfill contractual obligations under Australian projects or contracts through local production. Australia's recent information indicates that regional migration initiatives are becoming more successful (www.aph.gov.au, 2010). In 2009, the total number of visas granted under all the State-Specific and Regional Migration (SSRM) initiatives was 33,474, a 28 percent increase from 2007–08, equal to 29 percent of the total skills stream for 2008–09 (DIAC, Report on Migration Program 2008–09, DIAC, viewed 30 August 2010). After more than a decade of

operation, in 2017, WA put a pause on processing state-level Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme (RSMS) 187 Visa subclass, although RSMS applications continued to be accepted in a number of regions in the state, including Gascoyne, Great Southern, Kimberly, Mid-West, Peel, Pilbara, South West, and Wheatbelt. The Perth metropolitan area is explicitly excluded from the definition of Regional Australia for the RSMS.

The Designated Area Migration Agreement (DAMA) is another immigration program for highly-skilled immigrants, and the program entails a formal agreement between the Australian government and a regional, state or territory authority. DAMA is a two-tier framework that operates in a specific regional area. The first tier is an overarching five-year deed of agreement (head agreement) with the region's representative. The second tier covers individual labour arrangements with specific employers under the head agreement for that region. DAMA provides access to more economic immigrants than the standard skilled migration program. Under the DAMA framework, employers in designated areas experiencing skills and labour shortages can sponsor skilled and semi-skilled overseas workers. The unique feature of DAMA is that it lets skilled immigrants nominated by their employers in the region live and work in Australia permanently—almost all the other skilled worker immigration classes offer temporary access, which requires further applications and reviews to be converted to permanent residence. DAMA provides flexibility for states, territories, or regions to respond to their unique economic and labour market conditions. For example, in WA, the Goldfields Designated Area Migration Agreement (Goldfields DAMA) is an employer-sponsored visa program, that comes under the Temporary Skill Shortage Visa Subclass 482 (labour agreement stream) and the Employer Nomination Scheme Visa Subclass 186 (labour agreement c) (www.migration.gov.au). "An individual worker cannot apply for a visa independently under the Goldfields DAMA; workers must look for a job with a Goldfields business who will sponsor them" (www.ckb.wa.gov.au/Doing-Business/DAMA).

Applicants sometimes cannot understand how the Australian Immigration System Works, which affects immigration to WA. One complication is that the Australian immigration system has two different lists of occupations. First, the Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO) is a combined list-code for every occupation, which gives information on the skill level of jobs, qualifications and experience needed to work in occupations. This list was introduced in the Australian Immigration System in 2006 and updated

in 2009 and 2014 with minor changes. Second, the general Skilled Occupation List (SOL), directed to migrants other than from NZ operated, identifies the genuine skill needs across Australia. These lists underpin the employer-sponsored, points-tested, state-nominated and training visa programs. The lists are revised regularly in response to changing market and skills needs. In 2017, the SOL was replaced by the Medium and Long-term Strategic Skills List (MLTSSL) and a corresponding short-term list. One of the significant changes in the MLTSSL was the expansion of the number of occupations to 212. Applicant's skills need to be assessed for skilled migration by the relevant assessing authority for the occupation they are nominated and applying for. There are a range of visa subclasses to segment migrants by their context: 186 – Employer Nomination Scheme; 187 – Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme; 189 – Skilled Independent (Points-tested stream); 190 – Skilled; 407 Training Visa-Nominated; 482 – Temporary Skill Shortage; 485 – Temporary Graduate; 489 – Skilled Regional (Provisional); and 186 – Employer Nomination Scheme..

WA actively nominates immigrants for the permanent Skilled Nominated visa (subclass 190) and the temporary Skilled Regional (provisional) visa (subclass 489), which authorizes economic immigrants to live in the state after entry (www.migration.wa.gov.au). The process for obtaining State nomination has three extended stages. First, applicants must submit an eligible Expression of Interest (EOI) profile to the Department of Home Affairs through the Skill Select Database (SSD). The EOI stage does not incur any fee but is also not a visa application. Applicants are immediately informed of whether they meet the pass mark for their chosen occupation and thus will not be invited to apply for a visa. Those applicants who meet or exceed the skills required for their chosen occupation will be contacted by the Commonwealth government or the specific state they have indicated an interest in of their success. At that point, they are eligible to be nominated for a skilled visa by either an Australian employer or one of the governments.

Applications with approved EIO profiles are sorted and selected based on a range of criteria. First, applicants eligible for the general stream are ranked by their points score; applicants may be eligible for the graduate stream if they have two years of full-time study at a WA university or other formal institution in WA, either at the undergraduate or graduate level. Second, applicants are then judged based on the amount of Australian work experience in their nominated or closely related occupation. Third, their English language proficiency is ranked.

Fourth, under specific programs, applicants may be required to participate in a skills assessment or appropriate test. Fifth, the current eligibility of an applicant’s intended occupation is checked. Sixth, applicants must have an available nominated occupation in the intended visa subclass on the specific state skilled migration occupation list (e.g. the Western Australia SMOL) if applicants are using the general stream or the graduate occupation list (GOL) if they are using the graduate stream (table 5.2).

2019/20 Western Australian Skilled Migration Occupation Lists							
ANZSCO code	General Occupation List	Visas	WA only	ANZSCO code	Graduate Occupation List	Visas	WA only
253513	Neurosurgeon	190 T 491 P		221111	Accountant	190 T 491 P	
252711	Audiologist	491 P	Y	254414	Registered Nurse	491 P	Y

Table 5.2: Western Australian Skilled Migration Occupation List & Graduate Occupation List
Source: WA Government.

Assessments need to be validated, confirming the candidate meets the threshold in each category. The skills assessment is key. An assessing authority checks that applicants meet the standards they set, including all university or trade qualifications for their occupation. Assessments are valid for three years from their issue date unless a shorter period is listed on the assessment. Assessing authorities cannot and do not provide migration advice or any updates regarding a candidates’ visa applications.

The first step to getting skills assessment is to check the list of eligible skilled occupations (list of eligible skilled occupations). This list tells applicants the relevant assessing authority for each occupation. Unlike in Canada, where third-party services do these assessments, the assessors in Australia are the actual regulatory authority for the profession or occupation. As a result, there is a higher chance that immigrants will be able to take up and practise their profession in Australia immediately—migrants to Canada often find that their foreign credentials, while sufficient for immigration, do not qualify them to practice in their field without some supplementary training or evolution. Each authority has its assessment procedures,

time frames, and the actual assessment of each applicant’s qualifications and experience can take some time (table 5.3).

Applicants who fail to get a positive assessment result cannot apply for a skilled migration visa (i.e., these applicants do not go to the pool). While there are general English proficiency requirements for all migrants, skilled applicants need to demonstrate at least the minimum English language requirements in all four components in a single test applicable to their occupation and stream. Those with a passport from the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, the US or Ireland are not required to take an English exam to be eligible for WA state nomination.

Canada (SK) Educational Credential Assessment (ECA)	Australia (WA) Assessment Authority by Occupation
International Credential Assessment Service of Canada (ICAS- ON) April 17, 2013	Architects Accreditation Council of Australia (AACA)
Comparative Education Service – University of Toronto School of Continuing Studies. (CES- ON) April 17, 2013	Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand (CAANZ)
World Education Services (WES- ON) April 17, 2013	Dietitians Association of Australia (DAA)
International Qualifications Assessment Service (ICES- BC). August 6, 2015	The Institution of Engineers Australia (IEA)
International Credential Evaluation Service (IQAS- AL). August 6, 2015	Institute of Public Accountants Ltd (IPA)
Table 5.3: Canada (SK) Educational Credential Assessment, 2019 Source: CEIC and Australian Immigration Department.	

All applicants in the most temporary-visa status need to be younger than 45 years of age and give evidence of work experience in their EOI. If applicants have completed a Master’s degree or Ph.D. in WA and are applying through the graduate stream, the work experience is waived for WA State nomination. If applicants are selected to receive an invitation, WA Migration Services email them with a link to the State nomination application form, which applicants have 28 days to complete. Interestingly, the application includes three multiple-choice questionnaires that test applicants’ knowledge of WA.

Applications must meet the State nomination criteria, which includes additional requirements depending on the stream that they intend to apply. Approved applicants not

currently residing in WA also need to demonstrate they have sufficient funds to cover their settlement costs in the state for at least their first three months (i.e., a similar condition in SK-Canada) (table 5.4).

Number of Persons in Household	Funds Required in SK-Canada (in CA\$)	Funds Required in WA-Australia (in CA\$)
One person	CA\$12,475	CA\$17,967
Two people	CA\$15,531	CA\$26,950
Three people	CA\$19,093	CA\$31,442
Four people	CA\$23,181	CA\$35,934
Five people	CA\$26,292	CA\$40,425
Six people	CA\$29,652	CA\$44,917
Seven people	CA\$ 33,014	CA\$49,409

Table 5.4: SK - WA Settlement Funds 2019
Source: CEIC and Western Australian Immigration Department. In Australia, for every additional dependent – \$5,000 (AUD). Author’s conversions from Australian Dollar to Canadian Dollar: 1 CAD = 1.11611 AUD

Once admitted, applicants need to live and work in WA for a minimum of two years, verified by a settlement survey every six months for these two years.

This study focusses on the Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme (RSMS), a Department of Home Affairs program that authorizes Australian employers in regions to nominate economic immigrants to fill job vacancies, where no local Australians are available to take the job. The RSMS visa authorizes economic immigrants to work in Australia under one of two streams: the Direct Entry stream and the Temporary Residence Transition stream. An RSMS certifying body must assess the Direct Entry stream that allows employers and nominated positions. Regional Certifying Bodies (RCBs) can be state government agencies, local chambers of commerce, local authority councils or provincial development as in companies. Regional certifying organizations advise the Department of Home Affairs on whether direct entry stream requests for the Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme satisfy specific needs. The RCB estimates only the business and the position being nominated. It does not assess the individual who is to be nominated for the position; it merely assesses the vacant position before recruiting someone to fill the role. Each assessment is valid for three months.

WA can nominate economic immigrants by two types of visas. Highly-skilled immigrants use visa 190 to immigrate to WA, including Perth and surrounding areas, while economic immigrants use Visa 489 to immigrate to other regions in WA (Perth is exempt under 489). Visa 190 is a Skilled Nominated visa for immigrants who wants to stay in Australia permanently. This points-tested stream costs around AU\$3500-4500, and around 75-90 percent of applications are assessed in 8-10 months. This visa allows economic immigrants to work or study anywhere in Australia, become Australian citizens, and sponsor eligible relatives for PR. Applicants need to have a suitable skills assessment for their intended occupation. If applicants' skills were assessed based on a qualification they got in Australia while the applicant held a student visa, the qualification must be from studying a course registered on Commonwealth Register of Institutions and Courses for Overseas Students (CRICOS). Furthermore, applicants must be aged under 45 when Australia invites applicants to apply for the visa, although they can turn 45 after they are invited to apply. A state can also withdraw their nomination after a candidate has started their application, at which time the candidates' application becomes invalid.

Visa 489 allows skilled workers to stay in Australia for up to 4 years from the date that applicants are granted, and there is no age limit for the applicants. The cost of this visa is currently about AU\$3750 for the principal applicant and more for dependents. This visa allows economic immigrants to stay in Australia for up to 4 years from the date WA immigration Department grants admission for applicants under visa subclasses 475, 487, 495 or 496 (the Extended Stay pathway). The visa provides applicants with the opportunity to live, work and study in the specified regional areas of Australia for which they applied. Visa applicants can travel to and from Australia as often as they want while the visa is valid. At the time they apply for this visa, applicants must hold a provisional visa and have complied with all conditions of that visa for at least two years (i.e. Skilled Regional Sponsored visa subclass 475, Skilled Regional Sponsored visa subclass 487; Skilled Independent Regional visa subclass 495; or Skilled Designated Area Sponsored Provisional visa subclass 496). Applicants must have never held more than one of these visas. Visas 190 and 489 ask for other requirements: character assessment, military and police certificates; health status; special requirements for ship workers; and full debt payments to the Australian government.

All applicants since 15 October 2007 must read and sign the Australian values statements, which confirms that they will respect Australian values and obey Australian laws. There are two versions of the Australian values statement: one for economic immigrants under a temporary visa and an extended values statement for applicants for a permanent or provisional visa. Applicants must sign or accept the Australian values statement every time they apply for a visa, so applicants might need to sign it more than once. If applicants do not sign the Australian values statement, their application might be delayed, or Australian Immigration Officers might refuse to grant the visa. The Australian Immigration Department can offer an exception only in compelling circumstances.

Australia has constructed a system similar to but qualitatively different than Canada's. While the points system is similar, the application of immigration federalism is not so much a state-Commonwealth process and more tailored to regions within the states. In Western Australia, for instance, Perth is exempt from the agreement. Moreover, most economic migrants are admitted under provisional or temporary visas and need to apply for permanent residence later. While the system has moved significantly away from the race-based system in force before 1970, the Australian values statement's imposition is a signal that everyone in the country does not fully embrace multiculturalism.

3. Analysis

Immigration federalism is flexible. In Canada, the constitutional mandate is jointly held between the federal and provincial governments while in Australia, it is a federal authority but has been managed more cooperatively. Australia's constitution does not provide any guidance on how devolved responsibility to states/regions/cities might work. Many goals can drive immigration federalism, so the pathway to impact is part of its nature. The adoption of greater federalism in this policy field is driven by the idea that federalism has a purpose—the unitary state is practically too large to govern effectively. Large pan-continental nations like Australia and Canada need regional representation. The need for a constitutional compromise between the two orders of government in Canada narrows the scope to the provincial level. At the same time,

the Australian model has been able to be more flexible, including regions, cities and firms in the definition and management of skilled immigration.

The real driver for immigration federalism is to open up the system to advice from others, which often includes the whole immigration process. Immigration federalism can promote changes and improvements in recruitment, selection, settlement and retention. The greater local role in selection usually is matched with greater local engagement with settlement and retention.

**CHAPTER VI:
PUZZLING, POWERING AND PARTICIPATION
IN IMMIGRATION POLICY REFORMS**

As discussed in chapter 3, Hoppe’s puzzling, powering, and participation model provides one way to assess the drivers, scope and impact of immigration federalism in Saskatchewan and Western Australia. The following analysis focuses on key examples where puzzling, powering and participation dominate, concluding that while one might see a higher purpose of some of the measures and processes, one can still see a fluid mix of might, right and practicality in each of the stories. The balance of the three drives explains some of the outcomes.

Hoppe defines “puzzling” as the intellectual exercise of policy design, where ideas drive the framing and structuring of both problems and their solutions. Where there is broad consensus on the underlying logic or theories of the policy problem, the goals are clear and accepted, and there is ample relevant evidence of the cause and effect relationships, ideas rule. According to Hoppe (2011), people can see “powering” as the internal political machinations of governments to implement their values and beliefs. Parties build coalitions that advance their ideas through policies. The values, goals and evidence homogenize within coalitions, but competing coalitions propose contrasting proposals as they fight for power. Wood (2015) asserted that while puzzling is the cognitive side of the politics and part of the social learning process, powering is a political conflict driven by the competition over different issues within the power relations of politicians. Here, ideas are a means to political power, and not valued for their purity. Hoppe’s proposal to explore the state through his puzzling, powering and participation framing is fundamentally about governance and how we better engage the governed into the system of governing society. In that sense, citizen engagement is a goal and end in itself. The administration of immigration federalism has contributed to that venture in a number of ways that we explain later in this chapter.

Those three drivers--puzzling, powering and participation--were analyzed to understand how policy paradigms have worked in the province of Saskatchewan, Canada, and the state of Western Australia, Australia.

1. Third-order changes: System Changes

A third order of change (effectively a paradigm shift) involves a radical and simultaneous change of instruments and goals, including the evolution of new political rhetoric and logic. This section explores some crucial changes in the goals and structure of the whole immigration policy system in Canada and Australia, including the development and implementation of the merit-based points system, multiculturalism, and agreements affecting fiscal federalism and new concepts of residency.

1.1 Merit-based, Immigration Points Systems

In 1967 Canada implemented the first immigration point system anywhere. The idea was developed and promoted in the scholarly space over the previous few decades, but it took Canada to implement it. As Canada passed its centenary, the need for more skilled workers became apparent, and the traditional supply of skilled immigrants from Europe was dwindling. The system met the challenge of broadening the focus of the national effort. The tool evolved and developed over the next thirty years, but the basic notion of adjudicating applications with points in a range of targeted categories drove national policy. After signing the PNP in 1998, Saskatchewan engaged with the points system, initially merely using it as defined by the federal rules. Since then, the point system has undergone an incremental change to reflect provincial priorities. Saskatchewan and all the provinces demanded more flexibility to accommodate their own needs. For example, truck drivers or machine operators might need more technical abilities than a higher level of English proficiency. Saskatchewan and other provinces with PNPs can use the flexibility and dynamic nature of the points tool to address their specific concerns while also conforming to the overall intent of the federal program.

In contrast, Australia didn't start using a modified merit system until 1979, and it wasn't until 1989 that Australia formalized a point-based immigration system similar to Canada. In contrast to the Canadian experience, states in Australia did not argue for more participation in immigration policy, so the merit system was developed primarily to help the national government improve its system, whereby Australia links different visas categories with the merit evaluation.

Typically, Western Australia and the local governments coordinate specific programs and immigration campaigns within the national points system.

On the face of it, the points systems in Canada and Australia operate similarly. Both countries assign points for age, language proficiency, work experience, education, and factors such as study in their respective countries and work in their region. Nevertheless, the requirements and criteria for those factors in both countries can change at any time. Therefore, the two systems exhibit significant practical differences, as the minimum points for admission through skilled immigration programs can change between years (e.g. from 60 points in 2017 to 65 in 2018 in WA), specific groups might be targeted (e.g. people under age 45 are targeted for temporary immigration via the 190 Visa in Western Australia) and specific skills might be emphasized (e.g. Saskatchewan offers up to 20 points for English proficiency of the applicants compared to only 18 in Western Australia. Most importantly, the key difference between Canada and Australia is the score that economic immigrants must reach. In Canada, a skilled immigrant should have a minimum of 67 points to be eligible, while Western Australian's program requires a minimum of only 60 points in 2017.

Conceptually, the merit-based points system used in Canada and Australia is probably a pre-condition for immigration federalism to function. In Canada, the point system was an example of puzzling, as the policy systems sought out ideas to create the appropriate tool to select economic immigrants to meet regional demand. In Australia, the merit system was officialised two decades after Canada as a way to mediate local needs in the national system. Effectively it was a participatory approach. In both cases, however, once the point system was in place, it both enhanced wider participation but also distributed new power to new actors (provinces and states, immigrants, employers and, in Australia, cities and regions). Local voices are now heard in the respective systems.

1.2 Multiculturalism Policy

Canada, under Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, declared in 1971 that Canada would adopt multiculturalism as a national policy. The Government of Canada recognized and respected that society was becoming more diverse, with new languages, customs and religions. In 1998 the Canadian Multiculturalism Act formalized the policy. Several studies discuss the relationship

between citizenship and modern immigration, highlighting processes of exclusion (e.g., physical appearance, obstacles to citizenship for immigrants) and processes for improving the relationship between citizens and immigrants (Griffit 2017; Lu et al., 2009; Tastsoglou, 2017).

In Australia, multiculturalism was first presented in 1973 through the speech “A Multi-Cultural Society for the Future”, delivered by the Minister for Immigration under the Whitlam Government. This was the first time the term ‘multi-cultural society’ was used in an official Australian Government policy statement, and it spurred an open debate about social cohesion and the adjustment of immigrants in Australia. Multiculturalism has also been far more controversial in Australia than in Canada, at least partly due to the dominance of British immigration to the country until the 1970s. As in Canada, that source of immigration dried up, forcing the country to look to more diverse sources for immigrants. As society became more diverse, a robust ethnic movement emerged in the 1980s, accompanied by a form of multiculturalism that advocated that Australia become an amalgam of separate ethnic communities. In the 1990s, the Commonwealth and state governments adopted a wide range of multicultural ideas, concepts and policies into their respective systems.

The rise of multiculturalism is a valid example of puzzling policy in both countries, as governments and society sought ways to manage concerns about the increasingly diverse population triggered by economic immigrants. While this policy has generated little political conflict in Canada (it is largely treated as an idea whose time had come), occasional anti-immigrant conflicts in Australia have generated greater powering around the policy. The recent Australian Values Test is one attempt to reconcile the majority’s concerns with the increasing diversity of society.

1.3 Agreements enabling immigration federalism

New mechanisms created a space to experiment with regional participation in immigration regulation. Agreements between the national governments, provinces/states/territories and specific regions have definitely been driven by a need to increase participation in the targeting, selection and settlement of skilled workers in both countries.

Indeed, one can trace the impetus for immigration federalism to the French Canadian fact. The decision in 1867 to provide for both federal and provincial immigration policy was a

compromise to address the needs and desires of Quebec to maintain its distinct society. As the Quebec government gained power and autonomy over immigration to the province, other provinces put pressure on Ottawa to provide them with some greater role. So, while the idea of immigration federalism emerged independently, implementation was an act of powering. Canada finally introduced The Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) in 1998, which worked to empower subnational governments (Schmidtke 2014). Those agreements enabled every province and now the territories to engage in the coordination and application of immigration policies and agendas. The debate around how immigration regulations could or should be fit to provincial interests was a “high politics debate”.

Conversely, in Australia, there is no constitutional mechanism to allow for political engagement on this policy matter. The only way that immigration federalism worked in Australia was built by the Commonwealth government deciding unilaterally to involve state governments in immigration. It is not clear how much Australia drew on the system working in Canada, but they are following the intent and went further, bringing regions and cities into the system along with the states. That goal in Australia was partnership and participation.

1.4 Nature of residency

Immigration historically was about permanent settlement. The policy agenda in Canada and Australia has added the new idea that immigrants may not be permanent. In Canada, most of the skilled migrants are still offered a pathway to permanent settlement, but increasingly foreign nationals completing degrees in Canada are offered temporary rights to work, and, in recent years, up to 300,000 lower-skilled temporary workers have been admitted dealing with regional shortages. Australia has gone much further with the notion of temporary access, with most applicants offered only time-limited rights to settle, which then must be converted through further action once the settler has demonstrated their fit.

The emergence of temporary and contingent immigration is an attempt to reconcile challenges in societies. Other countries have large temporary workforces (e.g. Germany and many Middle Eastern states), but in the two cases studied here, the temporary system is formally integrated into the immigration system. One can see it as an idea that solves the puzzle of creating

an adaptive and responsive labour market, but it also manages conflicts resulting from large scale migration and the social pressures it creates, which makes it a kind of powering solution.

2. Second-Order Changes: Process Changes

Second-order changes involve changes in tools or techniques (based on learning from experience) without breaking the hierarchy of objectives. This section explores three fundamental second-order changes, specifically the new roles for applicants, firms and external assessors of credentials in the immigration process. As one might expect from more technocratic innovations, most of these are more about puzzling and participation than about powering.

2.1 Role of Applicants and EOI

Applicants are now an essential part of the selection process. In the first instance, they now define where they would like to migrate. This idea about “preferences matter” allowed economic immigrants to have their voice heard (Hirschman, 1978). In the old system, immigrants who wanted to migrate to Canada or Australia were largely judged based on their national background and local support systems (e.g. family), and hence they mostly followed the path of those who went before, largely ending up in large urban areas. New models in immigration push economic immigrants to decide where they will live and work. Under this new concept, economic immigrants are required to construct an “Expression of Interest”. In 2015, Canada launched the EOI system to help switch from passive processing of applications to a prioritized system that gets in-demand people with the skills to succeed in Canada faster than before. EOI works in two stages. First, prospective immigrants indicate their interest in coming to Canada by providing information electronically about their skills, work experience and other attributes. Second, individuals who have met certain eligibility criteria have a chance to maintain their “expressions of interest” in a pool ranked against others already in the pool; IRCC then draws from that pool to invite the best candidates, including those with in-demand skills or with job offers, to apply for a work permit visa. The EIO encourages economic immigrants to choose a place where they can get employment, which has benefited provinces like Saskatchewan.

Similarly, in Australia, economic immigrants use SkillSelect to make an expression of interest (EOI), a two-step selection mechanism whereby applicants are pre-selected into a pool and then selected from the pool. Selection at both steps uses a changing set of parameters, weights and ranking to respond to shifting economic and policy priorities. In both countries, the EIO immigration tool comes from the ideas realm and is motivated to increase participation, in this case, of the migrants themselves.

2.2 Role of Firms

Firms are essential to developing demand-driven immigration in both Saskatchewan and Western Australia. They have information not available to national governments. Both countries directly involve firms in identifying needs and opportunities and in selecting applicants to fill those spaces. In the past 25 years, each country has increased economic immigrant inflows, expanded source countries, defined new and emerging fields, and dramatically expanded both permanent and temporary labour flows (driven by state and employer sponsorship).

In Canada firms work through provinces while in Australia they work directly with regional programs, such as the Enterprise Migration Agreements (EMA) and Regional Migration Agreements (RMA). Especially since 2010, Australian employers have aggressively sought to participate. But the result has been that Australian firms have gained more power than in Canada, as they are often large actors in smaller regions, compared with modest actors in a Canadian province. WA agreements generally exclude Perth and focus on smaller centers with relatively large employers needing immigrants. Even the largest employers in a province in Canada, such as Saskatchewan, are minor employers in any provincial total economy, which dilutes their power.

2.3 Credential Assessment

Matching the desire and capacities of potential migrants with the demand and needs of firms almost always involves assessing the international skills, experiences and credentials. Before the points system and the federal-sub-national agreements, this was only a minor issue. With the new participatory merit system, more assessment is needed.

There is one main difference in the processes for evaluating credentials of potential skilled immigrants between Saskatchewan and Western Australia. While in Australia economic immigrants must have their national credentials officially assessed before they apply to migrate, in Saskatchewan it operates differently. Canada has an early and late assessment process, with all assessments by third parties (not the professional regulators), so that applicants may be approved and accepted but not be able to work in their field. In Canada, and Saskatchewan, the credential assessment for degrees and professional accreditation is done by third party commercial assessors, and not by the professional governing bodies in Canada. This approach reduced the complications of the distributed authorities in professions, where some are uniquely federally governed, some are provincially governed, and some have mixed systems. So, third-party, arm's length assessments are the norm. The challenge with this is the immigrants may have their credentials confirmed by the assessors but still are unable to practice in their field as the domestic professional regulators do not accept foreign credentials as equivalent. This creates a mismatch in some professional spaces—many highly skilled and trained immigrants are simply unable to ever practice in their field in Canada. Moreover, because most of the professions are provincially regulated in Canada, a formal approval of a credential in one province does not necessarily mean recognition in another province or territory; multiple assessments may be required if the skilled worker intends to move within Canada.

In Australia, most of the key professions appear to be regulated by a single commonwealth level authority. The Australian system assigns the task of credential evolution to these national bodies so that if the credentials are validated, it meets both the immigration need and provides a pathway to professional practice. In Western Australia, for example, the assessments are done by the national professional governing bodies so that when economic immigrants arrive, they are already certified.

The divergence in systems between the two countries is partially a powering phenomenon. The power of the professions in Canada dominates. The professions are able to restrict access and select only the types and numbers of market entrants that meet their needs but do not destabilize incomes and job markets.

One other outcome of this divergence is that the Canadian system faces higher amounts of credential fraud, possibly because the third party assessors are unable or unwilling to undertake the detailed reviews required to sift out fraudulent cases. One knock-on effect is that the assessment

stage is longer in Canada, as the assessors invest more time and energy to confirm foreign credentials. All immigrants and the employers lose from this as all cases are slowed by the need to undertake more due diligence. In effect, the burden is passed from the fraudsters to the legitimate applicants and the firms seeking foreign workers.

CHAPTER VII: FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This thesis is focused on answering the question of “how have social learning and multi-governance altered immigration policies to attract and integrate economic immigrants into Saskatchewan and Western Australia, between 1967 and 1992.” This chapter summarizes the answer and explores some implications.

1. Key findings

Immigration policies in Canada and Australia have moved towards immigration federalism in the last quarter of the century, but in somewhat different ways and for different reasons. There are various structural and historical/institutional factors driving immigration federalism policies targeting economic immigrants in both countries and their provinces and states. Structural factors were analyzed in terms of each government’s geopolitical position. While Saskatchewan has had significant success in attracting economic immigrants because of its robust economy and the US border influence, WA has been distracted by illegal immigration.

Historical and institutional factors were reviewed to identify the nature of policy change. Canada engaged in exploration en route to immigration federalism while Australia and WA in particular, engaged in organizational learning to exploit the concept of immigration federalism developed elsewhere. While the stories differ in some important ways, both countries’ policies exhibited path dependence, with a set of critical third-order changes creating the precondition for a set of operational second changes. At root, the shared constitutional jurisdiction for immigration in Canada and the French fact in Quebec set the stage for profound immigration reform in Canada, which ultimately opened up the entire system to the provinces. In many ways, fiscal federalism in Canada was as much about normative power-sharing as program efficiency. Australia did not have a similar push, as the constitutional authority for immigration has been and remains assigned to the Commonwealth government. Reform there was triggered more by the efficiency argument.

It is possible to link these general conclusions to specific findings regarding the policy tools and mechanisms. We found that four significant policy innovations triggered a wholesale change in the immigration system for economic immigrants in both countries.

The merit-based points system in immigration has been one of the most influential tools that increased participation in immigration policies. In the beginning, the point system simply was used top-down to refine the type of immigrants the host country would select, but this instrument combined with other later innovations opened the system to bottom-up participation and engagement to drive greater skilled immigration to drive economic development in Saskatchewan and Western Australia.

Multiculturalism then changed the way the two countries welcome and retain economic immigrants. Support for multiculturalism has been a key tool for attracting economic immigrants, arguably more important than the economic opportunities themselves. This policy was tailored to fit the different predominant cultures in Australia, even coexisting with a values test. However, multiculturalism has absolutely affected the subnational societies as it has triggered and supported a large increase of immigrants from much more diverse cultures.

National-subnational agreements, including some with local regions in Australia, are the most obvious manifestation of immigration federalism, working to distribute economic immigrants more widely across Canada and Australia. Those agreements create a relevant and impactful role for subnational governments, regions and firms, as they identify needs and match with qualified applicants. In Canada, the provincial agreements have engaged in extensive “social learning” while Western Australia developed from powering politics and a focus on participation.

Three primary objectives have driven immigration policies in Canada. The first objective is to enhance the economic outcomes of entering migrants. The second objective is to better respond to short-term regional labour market shortages often associated with commodity booms. The third primary objective is to shift immigration away from the three most significant cities to other areas of the nation that are seeking new economic immigrants. These objectives were first fully reflected in the point system included in IRPA 2002 and then in the implementation of a series of new immigrant programs between the federal and provincial governments, including the Canadian Experience Class (i.e., Saskatchewan Experience Class), and the Federal-Provincial Skilled Trades Program. Those new objectives in immigration were finally aligned in the 2009 PNP Logic Model, which also sought to encourage the development of official language minority communities.

In contrast, in Australia, immigration policies have been differentially driven by national security concerns and an effort to preserve Australian jobs. A secondary concern, as in Canada, was that as recently as 2001-06, over 90 percent of migrants settled in the four capital cities of Sydney (39 percent), Melbourne (28 percent), Brisbane (14 percent) and Perth (13 percent); fewer than two

percent settled in non-capital regions (Hugo et al., 2003; WA Department of Local Government, 2012). As a result, current policies and policy tools needed to be improved. From late 1996, following the inauguration of the Howard Government, the migration agenda was re-balanced away from the family towards skilled immigration. Four key interests influenced how Australia and WA managed this transition. First, temporary residency has been the pathway to developing aggressive immigration of highly skilled workers, reconciling the career aspirations of residents with local firms' needs. Second, the top-down, central policy management by the national government has waned, with WA moving from an inflexible immigration policy 25 years ago to considerable flexibility. Third, the agreements were not limited to state-Commonwealth partnerships; there are a number of regional agreements that involve smaller cities and regions. Fourth, the active participation of local authorities and leading firms in specific regions make these partnerships more effective in attracting economic immigrants. For the past 25 years, skilled migrants have made up about 70 percent of Australian immigration. In 2012, WA had the fastest-growing population in Australia, rising by 2.9 percent per annum over the past year, more than double the national growth rate. More than 60 percent of the growth came from international immigration in the 2010s. One result is that around 31 percent of people living in WA are now overseas born, compared with 27 percent for Australia as a whole (Hunt, 2017).

Interestingly, skilled immigrants are, by their nature, migratory workers, so it is not unusual that those enrolling in the Australian labour market have more internal mobility than the Australian-born (Hugo & Harris, 2011). But this domestic flow is mostly between the larger cities rather than smaller centers and development regions.

The national and some state governments have taken a variety of actions over the past decade to tap into migrants' flow and promote innovative, skilled immigrants to live and settle in regional areas, including in WA. These efforts began in the 1990s when additional points were granted to people intended for sponsorship (by families, employers and regional organizations) to settle in designated regional areas. They have since developed into a broad range of projects that aim to attract skilled immigrants into the regions.

The other major innovation underlying immigration federalism is related to "the nature of residency", whereby selection and admission of both high and low skilled workers do not necessarily entail offers of permanent residence. Both jurisdictions have allowed temporary workers to fill the gap, leaving the question of on-going status for later governments.

The success of these third-order changes depends significantly on a number of second-order changes that redefine the role of firms, applicants and credential assessment in the immigration system. Firms are the first part of the equation. Australian's firms have a high capacity to sponsor almost as many economic immigrants as they can handle. In contrast, in Canada, firms have to work within the parameters developed by the national and provincial governments. The second part of the equation relates to applicants who play a crucial role in identifying their interests and ambitions. The third part of the equation is the process of credential assessment, which varies markedly between Saskatchewan and Western Australia. While in Western Australia, economic immigrants have official national credentials before they arrive, in Saskatchewan, economic immigrants often get a formal review of their professional status after they arrive in Canada, which in Canada leads to a disconnect between immigrants and their labour success.

2. Conclusions

This study is influenced by rational choice institutionalism. Historical institutionalism is the key that opens doors and turns light on. It shows how path dependence and social learning (e.g., participation) have influenced most of the second order of change and paradigm shifts in immigration policies.

In this study, immigration federalism is conceptualized from high-level dimensions to the operational elements. We explored the dynamics of multi-level governance and immigration processes and the impact of "economic immigrants and local governments participation" in Saskatchewan and Western Australia.

This study discussed the economic and political advantages of federated systems of governments. Some federal countries have maintained a centralized system to govern some specific areas (e.g., security) but are increasingly opening up to distributing power more widely, partly as a governance principle, but more often in pursuit of greater efficiency. Given the reality that over time immigration defines the population which has political ramifications, it is hard to separate these goals in any place. We identified two main factors driving this policy change. Social learning plays a significant role in both economies because politics and broader actors of society mobilize over new immigration processes. Devolution of power to Saskatchewan started in 2009 when political parties, social movements and bureaucrats created a strong epistemic community that began to discuss immigration participation through federal/provincial collaboration. Western Australia appears to

have benefited less from social learning. Australian states have been drawn in by the Commonwealth to engage with immigration; along the way, Western Australia adopted some conventional, intermediate or irregular measures to equalize social and economic development across the state. We then explored the concept of immigration federalism. New circumstances in both countries pushed them to explore and adopt the notion of immigration federalism. This concept, defined as the role of the states and localities in making and implementing immigration law and policy, has become increasingly relevant in public management. This literature has operated with an implicit understanding that immigration federalism represents the participation of multiple levels of government in immigration matters. It is connected with a shift from centralized governance to regional efforts to enhance immigration processes. While such a characterization captures the general nature of immigration collaborative federalism, this phenomenon is associated with a developing trend of devolution common to many policy areas in Canada and Australia. In these two nations, immigration has traditionally been associated with nation-building, but recently economic competitiveness, regional development and multiculturalism have assumed higher priority.

The concept of paradigm change permeates this work. Hall provides his assessments of the paradigm as an ideational factor, drawing on Parsons, 2007. Hall (1993) then explores how systems move between policy paradigms, using his three orders of change framing to describe the nature of the change. Both Australia and Canada undertook a range of third-order changes that worked to effect immigration federalism as the dominant policy; Saskatchewan and Western Australia were both parts of driving some of these while others were imposed upon them. These system-level changes then triggered a range of second order that the subnational governments were directly and actively engaged in defining and implement.

The research revealed a radical change of goals and instruments, including the Saskatchewan immigration Nominee Program (SINP) in Saskatchewan and the State Specific and Regional Migration (SSRM) schemes in Western Australia. Both are primarily directed to attracting the best economic immigrants to support local economic and industrial development in their regions. This new system began to demand more coordination and participation. Settlement immigration processes started to work first because the critical challenge for subnational governments. In the last decade, Saskatchewan began to develop infrastructure and better processes in immigration, especially in recruitment and settlement. In Western Australia, early participation by Perth has ended and now all of the focus is on participation of local governments in the immigration settlement process. This has led to much more diverse participation across the state compared to Saskatchewan.

Saskatchewan and Western Australia followed different types of pathways to select economic immigrants to apply for Permanent Residence (PR). Saskatchewan includes the International Skilled Worker program, the particular immigration program that we are interested in. Occupation In-Demand and Express Entry processes offer the opportunity for selected immigrants to be admitted into a pool of applicants who have an extended time to make a match and migrate. Australia's system, in contrast, is more about getting skilled people in quickly, usually without any offer of PR, and settling them more permanently later. It is too early to conclude which system will work better in the long run.

The concepts of puzzling, powering, and participation help unpack the story further. The first part of the analysis emphasizes how paradigm third-order changes have altered the immigration policy at the system level. The merit-based points system, multiculturalism, immigration federalism and a more flexible type of residence all have opened up the opportunity for quite flexible and targeted immigration campaigns. The second part of the chapter reviews the second-order changes that have increased participation of firms, applicants and assessment bodies. Those policy tools are the core of the system. Firms, as employers, are able to identify and directly recruit to support their commercial interests explicitly. Applicants who, 25 years ago, did not need to specify where or what they wanted to do now is key to defining where they will live and what job they will do. Professional assessments for economic immigrants are a significant factor because they mediate between employers and economic immigrants. While Canada relies on external organizations to assess credentials of economic immigrants, Western Australia uses the national professional unions to assign and regulate credentials to economic immigrants, which means labour market attachment is stronger in Australia.

3. Policy implications

Traditional high immigration countries have been recognized by their different social values, as they have had to balance security and economic development. When migrants arrive at a new place, they aspire to contribute to the host society. Success should be measured based on how well they achieve their aspirations. Canadian and Australian societies have the highest percentage of their populations foreign-born and seem to have also created healthy and vibrant societies. This is in part due to how they design immigration policies to meet the needs of newcomers and the host regions, communities and labour markets. When specific regions demand a particular type of economic

immigrant, those regions expect to get immigrants with qualified talents to contribute across those regions. This expectation for skilled immigrants and economic benefits is understood by the Canada and Australia governments. Collaborative federalism policies launched in the 1980s were only superficially implemented in the 1990s; this is a case where collaboration through immigration federalism has become the “immigration regional key.” Their enduring support is due to their ability to address the economic, demographic and social needs of specific Canadian and Australian provinces/states and cities and the firms that work there.

Governments everywhere can learn from this study about the importance of monitoring and assessing the economic immigration program performance and productivity, the re-evaluation of trends and directions, and the development of operational policy options for subnational and local program improvements. Immigration policy often is cast as “high” politics, but that often is a poor basis for creating systems to address other than security concerns. The need to attract highly skilled immigrants requires a new, collaborative immigration federalism basis for negotiation and management.

This study suggests that the recent innovations in Australia and Canada represent a new and potentially more successful approach to collaborative federalism. Two key elements worth exploring are the collaborative immigration processes and management of economic immigrants. The first sub-element of this new collaborative immigration federalism is more than the focus on skilled immigrants for new regions; it is the collaborative processes that each day support the inflow of economic immigrants to Canada and Australia. The asymmetric participation from local, provincial/state and national governments is one way this has worked. In the 1995-2008 period, when most new arrivals to Canada settled in BC, Ontario, Quebec, and their metropolises and other areas often “starved” for newcomers, the federal selection criteria were unresponsive to subnational labour market needs. Similarly, most economic immigrants in Australia tended to gravitate towards New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, and their metropolises in response to the standardized national criteria. The resulting highly diffused system in Australia offers some useful lessons for Canada (and perhaps many other federal and even unitary states)—cities, in general, have a great need and potential to contribute to immigration. The second sub-element of collaborative immigration processes highlights ways to manage intergovernmental, multi-level government conflicts. Recasting policy problems in their context of their puzzling, powering or participation context can open up new pathways to collaboration and reform.

While this study has focused on two jurisdictions with similar political and economic histories, similar governments and federal systems, some of the observations and conclusions may be relevant to unitary and microstates as well. Immigration, especially that of highly skilled workers, is increasingly becoming a key policy variable for almost every state. Few countries are able to uniquely train and supply all the workers and skills they need. So, recruiting, selecting, matching and retaining these highly sought-after individuals is going to become increasingly challenging. Experiences in Canada and Australia, two highly attractive and competitive countries, suggests that more voices are needed to make the system work. Moving towards merit systems (using points or some other objectified criteria), combined with a greater tolerance for diversity and inclusion of firms and communities in formal yet flexible processes of recruitment, selection, matching and settlement could go a long way to reducing tensions and increasing successful migration that supports economic and social development. Cities, subnational governments, professions, firms and sectors, among others, can and should be strong allies and partners to make immigration work for everyone.

4. Limitations

As a comparative case study over a limited time period, we can only partially explore the concept of immigration federalism. In some ways, the study was fundamentally narrowed by the limited experience the two countries have with the new policy. It takes years, if not decades, to accumulate enough experience and evidence to fully explore the potential of any new policy tool. Furthermore, the focus on two British Commonwealth colonies governed through federal structures, while allowing us to hold many confounding variables constant, narrows the scope of the lessons we can draw for other forms of government, including republics and unitary states.

5. Extensions

Future research could explore what some political scientists call collaborative immigration federalism and seek insights about collaborative immigration process in both unitary and federal nations. We limited the study to first and second-order changes; more work on third-order change would reveal nuances in the policy.

Some immigration regulations related to new public management in immigration (i.e., strong participation) could be investigated in-depth to determine if or how they could contribute to innovation, business growth, and development opportunities for all levels of governments.

New comparative case studies could expand the current literature on immigration federalism's impact on the receiving regions and their cities.

This study can also potentially provide greater theoretical (i.e. theory-developing and theory-refining) contribution to the novel approach called the "Most Similar Systems Design and puzzle-solving approach." This methodological approach was implicitly used to compare for similarities between Australia and Canada to help sort out how both countries defied the logic of path dependency in immigration policy, but more could be done to advance the theory itself.

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APPENDIX

Table A.1: Information Regarding Immigration

Immigration Policy	Mass Immigration	Sponsoring and Classification	Economic Immigration	Australia and Canada
The Era of Immigration	191 million 2005 214 million 2010 244 million 2015	United Nations UN (2005)	From low- to high-income economies:	Australia and Canada most receptive to immigration
Traditional Immigration Countries	US Canada Australia	Post-1970 immigrants have added between 35 and 45 million people to the US	US immigration system costs America’s taxpayers billions of dollars annually	Australia and Canada Merit-based immigration system
International Political Economy Approach	Reactions of humans dominated by different social values toward the creation of nations	Fortress: prioritizes order and security: Community: Society promotes equity: Market: Prefer wealth and efficiency (Strange, 1985)	Immigration policies mostly are the result of tensions between different levels of government and institutions within these countries	Strange (1985) described how some countries could design policies, and these policies will determine how some societies are built
Defense and Security Concerns	Immigration and Defense and Security agendas in North America and the European Union	Mass immigration itself is mismatched with [defense] and security national objectives	The terrorism of 9/11 showed immigration policies and processes needed to be revised	General essential lines that most of the time are repeated in each country
Immigration Issues	Merit-based immigration system	Some countries decide to attract migrants	Nations need to be aware of social, political and economic impacts	Those impacts will represent some new causes for policy changes
Immigration Processes	Preferment, Attraction, Selection, Settlement and Integration	Federal Level Federal Level Federal and Provincial Level Provincial Level	A significant change regarding immigration processes is related with “Immigration federalization” or “Immigration Federalism”	Those terms are related to a new immigration regulation, due to coordinating federal and provincial governments to improve the immigration selection process

Table A.1: Immigration General Information

Table A.2: Immigrants to Canada by category, 1981 to 2011

Immigrants to Canada by category, 1981 to 2011					
Year	Economic	Family	Protected persons	Others	Total
1981	60,238	51,359	14,981	2,063	128,641
1986	35,840	42,477	19,204	1,835	99,356
1991	86,500	87,970	36,180	22,159	232,809
1992	95,790	101,113	37,167	20,722	254,792
1993	105,652	112,644	24,946	13,399	256,641
1994	102,308	94,190	19,773	8,114	224,385
1995	106,626	77,386	27,800	1,054	212,866
1996	125,369	68,359	28,356	3,987	226,071
1997	128,349	59,978	24,226	3,482	216,035
1998	97,909	50,896	22,797	2,593	174,195
1999	109,248	55,274	24,380	1,049	189,951
2000	136,284	60,619	30,081	471	227,455
2001	155,717	66,795	27,914	211	250,637
2002	137,863	62,292	25,101	3,792	229,048
2003	121,047	65,123	25,982	9,197	221,349
2004	133,746	62,275	32,686	7,116	235,823
2005	156,313	63,375	35,776	6,778	262,242
2006	138,249	70,518	32,499	10,375	251,641
2007	131,244	66,243	27,953	11,313	236,753
2008	149,069	65,583	21,859	10,736	247,247
2009	153,491	65,208	22,850	10,623	252,172
2010	186,918	60,230	24,697	8,846	280,691
2011	156,118	56,451	27,873	8,305	248,747

Table A.2:- Immigrants to Canada by category, 1981 to 2011:

Source: Paul Trujillo Jácome from Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC): Note: Data available as of November 2012

Table A.3: Immigrants to Canada by category, 1992 to 2011 (Percentage)

Immigrants to Canada by category, 1992 to 2011 (percentage)					
Year	Economic	Family	Protected persons	Others	Total
1992	37.6	39.7	14.6	8.1	100
1993	41.2	43.9	9.7	5.2	100
1994	45.6	42	8.8	3.6	100
1995	50.1	36.4	13.1	0.5	100
1996	55.5	30.2	12.5	1.8	100
1997	59.4	27.8	11.2	1.6	100
1998	56.2	29.2	13.1	1.5	100
1999	57.5	29.1	12.8	0.6	100
2000	59.9	26.7	13.2	0.2	100
2001	62.1	26.7	11.1	0.1	100
2002	60.2	27.2	11	1.7	100
2003	54.7	29.4	11.7	4.2	100
2004	56.7	26.4	13.9	3	100
2005	59.6	24.2	13.6	2.6	100
2006	54.9	28	12.9	4.1	100
2007	55.4	28	11.8	4.8	100
2008	60.3	26.5	8.8	4.3	100
2009	60.9	25.9	9.1	4.2	100
2010	66.6	21.5	8.8	3.2	100
2011	62.8	22.7	11.2	3.3	100

Table A.3: Immigrants to Canada by category, 1992 to 2011:
Source: Paul Trujillo Jácome from Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC); Note: Data available as of November 2012:

Table A.4: Immigration to Canada by Category (2015–17), Principal Applicants and Immediate Family Members

Immigration to Canada by Category (2015–17), Principal Applicants and Immediate Family Members							
Year	Category	Female		Male		Total	
2015	Economic	83,834	19%	86,548	21%	170,390	20%
2015	Family	37,552	9%	27,838	7%	65,485	8%
2015	Refugees and H&C	17,922	4%	18,020	4%	35,958	4%
2016	Economic	76,183	17%	79,844	19%	156,030	18%
2016	Family	45,357	10%	32,640	8%	78,006	9%
2016	Refugees and H&C	30,515	7%	31,827	8%	62,343	7%
2017	Economic	77,302	18%	81,960	20%	159,262	19%
2017	Family	47,396	11%	35,070	8%	82,470	10%
2017	Refugees and H&C	21,664	5%	23,082	6%	44,747	5%
Total		437,725	100%	416,829	100%	854,691	100%

Table A.4: Immigration to Canada by Category (2015–17), Principal Applicants and Immediate Family Members:
Source: Paul Trujillo Jácome from 2018 Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration

Table A.5: Provincial Nominee Program Summary (2015–17)

Provincial Nominee Program Summary (2015–17)			
Year	Female	Male	Total
2015	21,143	23,388	44,536
2016	22,143	24,037	46,180
2017	23,680	26,044	49,724
Total	66,966	73,469	140,440

Table A.5: Provincial Nominee Program Summary (2015–17). Including applicants and Immediate Family Members)
Source: Paul Trujillo Jácome from 2018 Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration: Note: PNP has grown exponentially since its implementation in 1996 when only 233 people were admitted in the PN Program: In 2017, nearly 50,000 people immigrated through the PN Program, the highest number in its history.

Table A.6: Percentage distribution of landed immigrants by province of destination, Canada, 1981 to 2011

Percentage distribution of landed immigrants by province of destination, Canada, 1981 to 2011												
Year	NL	PEI	NS	NB	QB	ON	MA	SK	AB	BC	Territories	Total
	Percentage											
1981	0.4	0.1	1.1	0.8	16.5	42.8	4.2	1.9	15	17.2	0.2	100
1986	0.3	0.2	1.1	0.6	19.6	50.1	3.8	1.9	9.7	12.7	0.1	100
1991	0.3	0.1	0.6	0.3	22.3	51.6	2.4	1.1	7.3	13.9	0.1	100
1992	0.3	0.1	0.9	0.3	19.2	54.6	2	1	7	14.5	0.1	100
1993	0.3	0.1	1.2	0.3	17.5	52.6	1.9	0.9	7.2	17.9	0.1	100
1994	0.3	0.1	1.5	0.3	12.5	52.4	1.8	1	8	21.9	0.1	100
1995	0.3	0.1	1.7	0.3	12.8	54.5	1.7	0.9	6.8	20.9	0.1	100
1996	0.3	0.1	1.4	0.3	13.2	53	1.7	0.8	6.1	23	0.1	100
1997	0.2	0.1	1.3	0.3	12.9	54.5	1.7	0.8	5.9	22.1	0.1	100
1998	0.2	0.1	1.2	0.4	15.3	53.1	1.7	0.9	6.4	20.7	0.1	100
1999	0.2	0.1	0.8	0.3	15.3	54.8	2	0.9	6.4	19	0.1	100
2000	0.2	0.1	0.7	0.3	14.3	58.7	2	0.8	6.3	16.5	0.1	100
2001	0.2	0.1	0.7	0.3	15	59.3	1.8	0.7	6.5	15.4	0.1	100
2002	0.2	0	0.6	0.3	16.4	58.3	2	0.7	6.5	14.9	0.1	100
2003	0.2	0.1	0.7	0.3	17.9	54.1	2.9	0.8	7.2	15.9	0.1	100
2004	0.2	0.1	0.8	0.3	18.8	53	3.1	0.8	7	15.7	0.1	100
2005	0.2	0.1	0.7	0.4	16.5	53.6	3.1	0.8	7.4	17.1	0.1	100
2006	0.2	0.2	1	0.7	17.8	50	4	1.1	8.2	16.7	0.1	100
2007	0.2	0.4	1.1	0.7	19.1	47	4.6	1.5	8.8	16.5	0.1	100
2008	0.3	0.6	1.1	0.8	18.3	44.9	4.5	2	9.8	17.8	0.1	100
2009	0.2	0.7	0.9	0.8	19.6	42.4	5.4	2.7	10.7	16.4	0.1	100
2010	0.3	0.9	0.9	0.8	19.2	42.1	5.6	2.7	11.6	15.7	0.2	100
2011	0.3	0.7	0.9	0.8	20.8	40	6.4	3.6	12.4	14	0.1	100

Table A.6: Percentage distribution of landed immigrants by province of destination, Canada, 1981 to 2011
Source: Paul Trujillo Jácome from Citizenship and Immigration Canada CICI Report- Nov 2011

Table A.7: Immigrants admitted, and number planned by category- Canada, 2009- 12

Immigrants admitted, and number planned by category- Canada 2009-12				
Category	Planned			Observed
2009				
Economic	140,300	to	156,600	153,491
Family	68,000	to	71,000	65,208
Protected persons	23,600	to	27,200	22,850
Others Note 1	8,100	to	10,200	10,623
Total	240,000	to	265,000	252,172
2010				
Economic	156,300	to	166,800	186,918
Family	57,000	to	63,000	60,230
Protected persons	19,600	to	26,000	24,697
Others Note 1	7,100	to	9,200	8,846
Total	240,000	to	265,000	280,691
2011				
Economic	150,600	to	161,300	156,118
Family	58,500	to	65,500	56,451
Protected persons	23,200	to	29,000	27,873
Others Note 1	7,700	to	9,200	8,305
Total	240,000	to	265,000	248,747
2012				
Economic	150,000	to	161,000	-
Family	59,800	to	69,000	-
Protected persons	22,500	to	27,000	-
Others Note 1	7,700	to	8,000	-
Total	240,000	to	265,000	-
<p>Table A.7: Immigrants admitted, and number planned by category according to the immigration plan, Canada, 2009-12: <i>Sources:</i> Paul Trujillo Jácome From Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration, 2009 to 2012: Note 1: Includes deferred removal order class, post-determination refugee claimant class, temporary resident permit holders, humanitarian and compassionate/public policy cases and unknowns.</p>				

Table A.8: Canada New Permanent Residents Admitted in 2016

Canada New Permanent Residents Admitted in 2016					
Immigrant Category	2016 Plan Admission Ranges - Low	2016 Plan Admission Ranges - High	Number Admitted in 2016	Females Admitted in 2016	Males Admitted in 2016
Federal Economic – Skilled	54,000	59,000	59,999	28,340	31,657
Federal Economic – Caregivers	20,000	22,000	18,467	10,525	7,941
Federal Economic – Business	500	900	867	402	465
Provincial Nominee	46,000	48,000	46,170	22,139	24,031
Quebec Skilled Workers	25,500	27,000	25,857	12,476	13,381
Quebec Business Immigrants	5,200	5,500	4,634	2,274	2,360
Total Economic	151,200	162,400	155,994	76,156	79,835
Spouses, Partners and Children	57,000	62,000	60,588	35,314	25,271
Parents and Grandparents	18,000	20,000	17,041	9,832	7,203
Family-Other	-	-	375	211	164
Total Family	75,000	82,000	78,004	45,357	32,638
Protected Persons in Canada and Dependants Abroad	10,000	11,000	12,116	6,026	6,089
Government-Assisted Refugees	24,000	25,000	23,523	11,535	11,988
Blended Visa Office-Referred Refugees	2,000	3,000	4,434	2,168	2,266
Privately Sponsored Refugees	15,000	18,000	18,362	8,734	9,628
Total Protected Persons and Refugees	51,000	57,000	58,435	28,463	29,971
Humanitarian and Other	2,800	3,600	3,913	2,055	1,858
Total Humanitarian	2,800	3,600	3,913	2,055	1,858
TOTAL	280,000	305,000	296,346	152,031	144,302

Table A.8: Canada New Permanent Residents Admitted in 2016
Source: 2017 Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration

Table A.9: Immigrants distribution by province of destination and class, Canada, 2010-11

Immigrants distribution by province of destination and class, Canada, 2010-11										
P/T	2010					2011				
	Econ	Fam	Pp	Other	Total	Econ	Fam	Pp	Other	Total
NL	420	115	160	19	714	393	129	146	17	685
PE	2,487	47	56	—	2,593	1,607	47	79	5	1,738
NS	1,674	449	218	56	2,397	1,409	432	225	70	2,136
NB	1,727	211	157	30	2,125	1,473	283	179	32	1,967
QC	37,917	9,630	4,711	1,724	53,982	36,097	9,044	5,020	1,577	51,738
ON	69,498	29,346	13,914	5,353	118,111	51,402	27,374	15,921	4,761	99,458
MB	13,275	1,377	1,032	124	15,808	13,152	1,400	1,303	108	15,963
SK	6,243	726	574	72	7,615	7,658	689	547	61	8,955
AB	22,404	7,372	2,205	669	32,650	20,758	6,845	2,638	721	30,962
BC	30,877	10,868	1,667	776	44,188	21,903	10,128	1,810	944	34,785
YT	310	34	—	—	350	207	25	—	5	237
NT	74	48	—	15	137	43	36	—	—	85
NU	12	7	—	—	19	8	15	—	—	24
Unkno wn	—	—	—	—	—	8	—	—	—	14
Total	186,918	60,230	24,697	8,846	280,691	156,118	56,451	27,873	8,305	248,747

Table A.9: Immigrants distribution by province of destination and class, Canada, 2010-11:
Source: CIC Report 2012: Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration: Notes: Due to privacy considerations, some cells in the table have been suppressed and replaced with the notation “—”: As a result, components may not sum to the total indicated: Pp Protected Persons

Table A.10: Percentage of Immigrants distribution by province of destination and class, Canada, 2010 and 2011 - Distribution by province

Percentage of Immigrants distribution by province of destination and class, Canada, 2010 and 2011 - Distribution by province										
P/T	2010					2011				
	Econ	Fam	Pp	Other	Total	Eco	Fam	Pp	Others	Total
NL	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.3
PE	1.3	0.1	0.2	—	0.9	1	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.7
NS	0.9	0.7	0.9	0.6	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9
NB	0.9	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.8	0.9	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.8
QC	20.3	16	19.1	19.5	19.2	23.1	16	18	19	20.8
ON	37.2	48.7	56.3	60.5	42.1	32.9	48.5	57.1	57.3	40
MB	7.1	2.3	4.2	1.4	5.6	8.4	2.5	4.7	1.3	6.4
SK	3.3	1.2	2.3	0.8	2.7	4.9	1.2	2	0.7	3.6
AB	12	12.2	8.9	7.6	11.6	13.3	12.1	9.5	8.7	12.4
BC	16.5	18	6.7	8.8	15.7	14	17.9	6.5	11.4	14
YT	0.2	0.1	—	—	0.1	0.1	0	—	0.1	0.1
NT	0	0.1	—	0.2	0	0	0.1	—	—	0
NU	0	0	—	—	0	0	0	—	—	0
Unknown	—	—	—	—	—	0	—	—	—	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table A.10: Percentage of Immigrants distribution by province of destination and class, Canada, 2010 and 2011 - Distribution by province
Source: CIC Report 2012: Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration: Notes: Due to privacy considerations, some cells in the table have been suppressed and replaced with the notation “—”: As a result, components may not sum to the total indicated.

Table A.11: Immigration distribution by province of destination and class, Canada, 2010 and 2011 - Distribution by province

Immigration distribution by province of destination and class, Canada, 2010 and 2011 - Distribution by province										
P/T	2010					2011				
	Econ	Fam	Pp	Others	Total	Econ	Fam	Pp	Others	Total
NL	58.8	16.1	22.4	2.7	100	57.4	18.8	21.3	2.5	100
PE	95.9	1.8	2.2	—	100	92.5	2.7	4.5	0.3	100
NS	69.8	18.7	9.1	2.3	100	66	20.2	10.5	3.3	100
NB	81.3	9.9	7.4	1.4	100	74.9	14.4	9.1	1.6	100
QC	70.2	17.8	8.7	3.2	100	69.8	17.5	9.7	3	100
ON	58.8	24.8	11.8	4.5	100	51.7	27.5	16	4.8	100
MB	84	8.7	6.5	0.8	100	82.4	8.8	8.2	0.7	100
SK	82	9.5	7.5	0.9	100	85.5	7.7	6.1	0.7	100
AB	68.6	22.6	6.8	2	100	67	22.1	8.5	2.3	100
BC	69.9	24.6	3.8	1.8	100	63	29.1	5.2	2.7	100
YT	88.6	9.7	—	—	100	87.3	10.5	—	2.1	100
NT	54	35	—	10.9	100	50.6	42.4	—	—	100
NU	63.2	36.8	—	—	100	33.3	62.5	—	—	100
Unknow n	—	—	—	—	100	57.1	—	—	—	100
Total	66.6	21.5	8.8	3.2	100	62.8	22.7	11.2	3.3	100

Table A.11: Immigration distribution by province of destination and class, Canada, 2010 and 2011 - Distribution by province
Source: CIC Report 2012: Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration: Notes: Due to privacy considerations, some cells in the table have been suppressed and replaced with the notation “—”: As a result, components may not sum to the total indicated: Pp: Protected Persons

Table A.12: Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2011

Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2011															
Immigration Category	NL	PE	NS	NB	QC	ON	MB	SK	AB	BC	NT	NU	YT	N/S	Total
Skilled Workers	104	31	500	180	31,490	36,943	618	524	8,333	10,031	12	11	3	6	88,786
Business Immigrants	4	1	60	12	3,960	3,301	41	8	166	4,088	0	0	0	0	11,641
Provincial and Territorial Nominees	274	1,565	779	1,230	58	1,708	12,342	6,959	8,998	4,306	189	12	0	0	38,420
Live-in Caregivers	2	2	28	10	564	6,029	116	118	1,895	2,458	4	15	4	2	11,247
Canadian Experience Class	8	2	44	42	30	3,422	34	49	1,367	1,021	2	5	1	0	6,027
Total Economic Class (including dependants)	392	1601	1411	1,474	36,102	51,403	13,151	7,658	20,759	21,904	207	43	8	8	156,121
<p>Table A.12: Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2011 <i>Source: IRCC Report 2012</i></p>															

Table A.13: Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2012

Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2012															
Immigration Category	NL	PE	NS	NB	QC	ON	MB	SK	AB	BC	NT	NU	YT	N/S	Total
Skilled Workers	115	43	520	149	34,256	35,439	663	580	9,748	9,939	3	12	1	1	91,469
Business Immigrants	0	0	41	8	4,634	2,403	8	6	166	2,813	0	0	0	1	10,080
Provincial and Territorial Nominees	365	896	957	1,580	86	1,957	9,531	9,019	10,287	5,943	225	46	4	3	40,899
Live-in Caregivers	2	1	20	19	645	4,724	87	89	1,591	1,807	7	20	0	0	9,012
Canadian Experience Class	23	11	85	43	25	4,663	48	40	2,783	1,613	1	20	4	0	9,359
Total Economic Class (including dependants)	505	951	1,623	1,799	39,646	49,186	10,337	9,734	24,575	22,115	236	98	9	5	160,819
<p>Table A.13: Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2012 <i>Source: IRCC Report 2013</i></p>															

Table A.14: Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2013

Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2013															
Immigration Category	NL	PE	NS	NB	QC	ON	MB	SK	AB	BC	NT	NU	YT	N/S	Total
Federal Skilled Workers	90	38	414	139	-	33,906	618	512	9,661	7,490	7	2	0	0	52,877
Federal Business	0	3	20	8	-	2,547	20	11	101	2,387	0	0	0	1	5,098
Canadian Experience Class	7	10	32	29	14	3,895	39	39	2,132	1,005	7	7	0	0	7,216
Live-in Caregivers	8	6	12	23	517	4,759	71	68	1,607	1,698	3	23	2	0	8,797
Provincial and Territorial Nominees	440	775	1,202	1,330	13	2,516	8,854	8,182	9,144	7,155	249	54	1	0	39,915
Quebec-selected Skilled Workers	-	-	-	-	30,284	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30,284
Quebec-selected Business	-	-	-	-	3,994	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,994
Total Economic Class (including dependants)	545	832	1,680	1,529	34,822	47,623	9,602	8,812	22,645	19,735	266	86	3	1	148,181
Table A.14: Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2013 <i>Source: IRCC Report 2014</i>															

Table A.15: Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2014

Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2014															
Immigration Category	NL	PE	NS	NB	QC	ON	MB	SK	AB	BC	NT	NU	YT	N/S	Total
Federal Skilled Workers	101	25	284	92	0	23,932	389	492	7,960	5,279	3	5	1	0	38,563
Federal Business	0	13	41	10	0	1,846	21	9	172	2,352	0	0	0	0	4,464
Canadian Experience Class	31	25	172	125	51	12,932	150	364	6,693	3,208	10	24	1	0	23,786
Caregiver Footnote 1	16	3	49	42	549	9,410	102	224	3,537	3,728	12	13	7	0	17,692
Provincial and Territorial Nominees	454	1,432	1,399	2,107	19	2,727	12,188	8,789	11,171	7,042	227	70	3	0	47,628
Quebec-selected Skilled Workers Footnote	-	-	-	-	28,922	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28,922
Quebec-selected Business	-	-	-	-	3,896	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,896
Total Economic	603	1,502	1,952	2,376	33,437	50,888	12,850	9,889	29,591	21,625	252	112	12	0	165,089
<p>Table A.15: Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2014 <i>Source: IRCC Report 2015:</i> Notes: Includes Federal Skilled Tradespersons: Caregiver category includes admissions in all streams of the Caregiver Program: The permanent residents in the Ministerial Instruction Economic Programs category include people who are admitted through the Start-up Visa pilot for entrepreneurs (introduced in 2013): N/S: Not Stated:</p>															

Table A.16: Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2015

Permanent Residents Admitted in 2015 by Destination and Immigration: Economic Category															
Immigration Category	NL	PE	NS	NB	QC	ON	MB	SK	AB	BC	NT	NU	YT	N/S	Total
Federal Skilled Workers Footnote	107	39	835	116	0	28,926	720	721	10,558	6,691	15	15	1	0	48,744
Canadian Experience Class	25	7	180	71	1	9,541	116	370	7,007	2,701	15	16	9	0	20,059
Caregivers Footnote	17	3	65	78	1,107	14,434	146	287	5,385	5,620	14	55	14	0	27,225
Federal Business Footnote	0	4	7	0	0	547	7	8	55	346	0	0	0	0	974
Quebec-selected Business	0	0	0	0	5,417	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5,417
Quebec-selected Skilled Workers	0	0	0	0	23,370	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	23,370
Provincial and Territorial Nominees	533	953	1,394	1,765	3	3,550	10,262	8,663	10,411	6,785	153	61	0	0	44,533
Ministerial Instruction Economic Program	0	0	4	0	0	42	0	0	5	11	0	0	0	0	62
Total Economic	682	1,006	2,485	2,030	29,898	57,040	11,251	10,049	33,421	22,154	197	147	24	0	170,384

Table A.16: Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2015
Source: IRCC Report 2016: Notes: Includes Federal Skilled Tradespersons: Caregiver category includes admissions in all streams of the Caregiver Program: The permanent residents in the Ministerial Instruction Economic Programs category include people who are admitted through the Start-up Visa pilot for entrepreneurs (introduced in 2013): N/S: Not Stated.

Table A.17: Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2016

Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2016															
Immigration Category	NL	PE	NS	NB	QC	ON	MB	SK	AB	BC	NT	NU	YT	N/S	Total
Federal Economic – Skilled	171	25	720	163	0	31,363	624	848	16,510	9,517	29	9	22	0	60,001
Federal Economic – Caregivers Footnote	28	0	59	29	1,110	9,324	96	222	3,828	3,736	26	10	8	0	18,476
Federal Economic – Business Footnote	2	9	15	0	0	514	11	0	21	295	0	0	0	0	867
Provincial and Territorial Nominees	455	1,932	2,590	2,448	0	3,911	9,958	9,902	8,066	6,759	63	0	89	0	46,173
Quebec Skilled Workers	0	0	0	0	25,858	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	25,858
Quebec Business Immigrants	0	0	0	0	4,634	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,634
Total Economic	656	1,966	3,384	2,640	31,602	45,112	10,689	10,972	28,425	20,307	118	19	119	0	156,009

Table A.17: Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2016

Source: IRCC Report 2017. Notes: Includes admissions in the Federal Skilled Worker Program, Federal Skilled Trades Program and Canadian Experience Class. Admissions include applicants who applied prior to the launch of Express Entry on January 1, 2015 (i.e., applications on inventory), as well as those who made an application using Express Entry. Levels targets and ranges have not been established for each individual program as almost half of admissions in 2016 are expected to come from Express Entry. This approach reflects the new ways federal economic immigrants are selected under the Express Entry system. The Express Entry system determines which programs foreign nationals qualify for based on the information they provide and awards them points under the Comprehensive Ranking System for their ability to successfully enter the Canadian work force (e.g., age, education, official language proficiency and work experience).

Table A.18: Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2017

Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2017															
Immigration Category	NL	PE	NS	NB	QC	ON	MB	SK	AB	BC	NT	NU	YT	N/S	Total
Federal Economic - Skilled Footnote	222	83	487	197	0	34,896	552	779	9,903	9,997	23	8	18	0	57,165
Federal Economic - Caregivers Footnote	37	0	74	25	811	11,133	75	335	5,246	4,463	47	3	4	0	22,253
Federal Economic – Business Footnote	0	17	6	6	0	310	3	2	15	228	0	0	0	0	587
Atlantic Immigration Pilot Programs	0	20	15	47	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	82
Provincial and Territorial Nominees		2,051	2,735	2,583	0	6,982	9,427	10,528	7,194	7,565	104	0	122	0	49,724
Quebec Skilled Workers	0	0	0	0	24,862	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	24,862
Quebec Business Immigrations	0	0	0	0	4,589	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,589
Total Economic	692	2,171	3,317	2,858	30,262	53,321	10,057	11,644	22,358	22,253	174	11	144	0	159,262

Table A.18: Permanent Residents Admitted SK-PNP Destination and Immigration: Economic Category- 2017

Source: IRCC Report 2018. Notes: Includes admissions in the Federal Skilled Worker Program, Federal Skilled Trades Program and Canadian Experience Class. Admissions include applicants who applied prior to the launch of Express Entry on January 1, 2015 (i.e., applications in inventory), as well as those who made an application using Express Entry. This category also includes admissions resulting from a small number of applications in the Federal Immigrant Investor and Entrepreneur Programs, which were cancelled in 2014.

Table A.19: Australia General Migration Program 1989-90 to 2010-11

Australia General Migration Program 1986-87 to 2010-11				
Year	Family	Skill	Special Eligibility	Total
1989–90	66,600	52,700	900	120,200
1990–91	61,300	49,800	1,200	112,200
1991–92	55,900	41,400	1,700	98,900
1992–93	43,500	21,300	1,400	67,900
1993–94	43,200	18,300	1,300	62,800
1994–95	44,500	30,400	1,600	76,500
1995–96	56,700	24,100	1,700	82,500
1996–97	44,580	27,550	1,730	73,900
1997–98	31,310	34,670	1,110	67,100
1998–99	32,040	35,000	890	67,900
1999–00	32,000	35,330	2,850	70,200
2000–01	33,470	44,730	2,420	80,610
2001–02	38,090	53,520	1,480	93,080
2002–03	40,790	66,050	1,230	108,070
2003–04	42,230	71,240	890	114,360
2004–05	41,740	77,880	450	120,060
2005–06	45,290	97,340	310	142,930
2006–07	50,080	97,920	200	148,200
2007–08	49,870	108,540	220	158,630
2008–09	56,366	114,777	175	171,318
2009–10	60,254	107,868	501	168,623
2010–11(planned)	54,550	113,850	300	168,700

Table A.19: Australia Migration Program 1986-87 to 2010-11
Source: Paul Trujillo Jácome from Migration Program: DIAC advice supplied to the Parliamentary Library in July 2010 taken from Population flows: immigration aspects various editions since 1992; Migration Program Statistics web page; Report on Migration Program 2007–08 to 2009–10; and C Evans (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship) Budget: Migration Program media release 11 May 2010 for the planning figures.; Humanitarian Program: DIAC Population flows: immigration aspects 2008–09 source data chapter 4 2010; and C Bowen (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship) Migration program targeting skills media release 27 October 2010

Table A.20: Australia Migration Program 1989-90 to 2010-11 (Percentage)

Australia Migration Program 1989-90 to 2010-11 (Percentage)						
Year	Family	%	Skill	%	Special Eligibility	Total
1989-90	66,600	55%	52,700	44%	900	120,200
1990-91	61,300	55%	49,800	44%	1,200	112,200
1991-92	55,900	57%	41,400	42%	1,700	98,900
1992-93	43,500	64%	21,300	31%	1,400	67,900
1993-94	43,200	69%	18,300	29%	1,300	62,800
1994-95	44,500	58%	30,400	40%	1,600	76,500
1995-96	56,700	69%	24,100	29%	1,700	82,500
1996-97	44,580	60%	27,550	37%	1,730	73,900
1997-98	31,310	47%	34,670	52%	1,110	67,100
1998-99	32,040	47%	35,000	52%	890	67,900
1999-00	32,000	46%	35,330	50%	2,850	70,200
2000-01	33,470	42%	44,730	55%	2,420	80,610
2001-02	38,090	41%	53,520	57%	1,480	93,080
2002-03	40,790	38%	66,050	61%	1,230	108,070
2003-04	42,230	37%	71,240	62%	890	114,360
2004-05	41,740	35%	77,880	65%	450	120,060
2005-06	45,290	32%	97,340	68%	310	142,930
2006-07	50,080	34%	97,920	66%	200	148,200
2007-08	49,870	31%	108,540	68%	220	158,630
2008-09	56,366	33%	114,777	67%	175	171,318
2009-10	60,254	36%	107,868	64%	501	168,623
2010-11 (planned)	54550:00		113,850		300	168,700

Table A.20: Australia Migration Program (Percentage) 1989-90 to 2010-11 (Percentage)

Source: Paul Trujillo Jácome from Migration Program: DIAC advice supplied to the Parliamentary Library in July 2010 taken from Population flows: immigration aspects various editions since 1992; Migration Program Statistics web page; Report on Migration Program 2007-08 to 2009-10; and C Evans (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship) Budget: Migration Program media release 11 May 2010 for the planning figures.

Table A.21: Australia: distribution of population between states and territories, 1881-2001

Australia: distribution of population between states and territories, 1881-2001								
Year	1881	1901	1921	1947	1961	1976	1996	2001
New South Wales	33.3	35.9	38.6	39.4	37.3	35.3	33.9	33.8
Victoria	38.3	31.8	28.2	27.1	27.9	26.9	24.9	24.7
Queensland	9.5	13.2	13.9	14.6	14.4	15.2	18.2	18.7
South Australia	12.3	9.5	9.1	8.5	9.2	9.1	8.1	7.8
Western Australia	1.3	4.9	6.1	6.6	7	8.4	9.6	9.8
Tasmania	5.1	4.6	3.9	3.4	3.3	2.9	2.6	2.4
Northern Territory	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.7	1	1
Australian Capital Territory	0	0	0	0.2	0.6	1.5	1.7	1.6
Total percentage	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total number (million)	2.2	3.8	5.4	7.6	10.5	13.9	18.3	19.4
Table A.21: Australia: distribution of population between states and territories, 1881-2001 <i>Source:</i> Paul Trujillo Jácome from DT Rowland, <i>Population growth and distribution, 1982</i> , p: 25; ABS, <i>Australian Demographic Statistics: June Quarter 2000</i> , and <i>June Quarter 2003</i> :								

Table A.22: Australia Temporary Skilled Immigrants 2000-01 to 2008-09

Australia Temporary Skilled Immigrants 2000-01 to 2008-09		
Year	Overseas students	Temporary business (long stay) 457 visas
2002–03	162,575	36,800
2003–04	171,616	39,500
2004–05	174,786	49,590
2005–06	190,674	71,150
2006–07	228,592	87,310
2007–08	278,180	110,570
2008–09	320,368	101,280

Table A.22: Australia Migration Program (Percentage)
Source: DIAC, various years of annual reports, population flows publications and migration statistics web pages; and Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee, Migration Legislation Amendment (Worker Protection) Bill 2008 report, 2008, pp: 17–18 (for 457 visa grants)

Table A.23: Australia General Streams on Immigration - Outcome against planning level (%) 2010-11

Australia General Streams on Immigration - Outcome against planning level (%) 2010-11				
	Family	Skill	Special Eligibility	Total
Planning Level	54,550	113,850	300	168,700
Total Outcome	54,543	113,725	417	168,685
% Variation	-0,01%	-0,11%	39,0%	-0,009%

Table A.23: Australia General Streams on Immigration - Outcome against planning level (%) 2010-11
Source: Australian Immigration Department.

Table A.24: Comparison of Australia General Skilled Migration (GSM) 2008-09 to 2009-10

Comparison of Australia General Skilled Migration (GSM) 2008-09 to 2009-10		
Components	Skilled Immigrants	Comparison 2008-09
Skilled Independent	37,315	16,3 % decrease of 2008-09
State Territory Sponsored (STS)	18,889	34,4 increase of 2008-09
Skilled Australian Sponsored (SAS)	3,688	64,9 decrease of 2008-09
Table A.24: Comparison of Australia General Skilled Migration (GSM) 2008-09 to 2009-10 <i>Source: Australian Immigration Department</i>		

Table A.25: Australia Skill Migration Program visa grants 2009–10 and 2010–11

Australia Skill Migration Program visa grants 2009–10 and 2010–11				
Skill	2009-10	% of Program	2010-12	% of Program
Employer Sponsored	40,987	24.3	44,345	26.3
Business Skills**	6,789	4	7,796	4.6
Distinguished Talent	199	0.1	125	0.1
General Skilled Migration				
* Skilled Independent	37,315	22.1	36,167	21.4
* State/Territory Sponsored	18,889	11.2	16,175	9.6
* Skilled Australian Sponsored	3,688	2.2	9,117	5.4
Total Skill	107,868	63.9	113,725	67.4
Table A.25: Australia Skill Migration Program visa grants 2009–10 and 2010–11				
<i>Source:</i> Paul Trujillo Jácome from <i>Trends in Migration: Australia 2010–11 Annual submission to the OECD's Continuous Reporting System on Migration (SOPEMI)</i>				

Table A.26: – Comparison of Australia State-Specific Regional Migration (SSRM) 2008-09 to 2011-12

Comparison of Australia State-Specific Regional Migration (SSRM) 2008-09 to 2011-12		
Components	Skilled Immigrants	Comparison 2008-09 to 2011-12
State-Specific Regional Migration (SSRM)	36,568	9.2 % increase of 2008-09
State-Specific Regional Migration (SSRM)	47,733	27.6 % increase of 2010-11
<p>Table A.26: Comparison of State-Specific Regional Migration (SSRM) 2008-09-2011-12 <i>Source: Paul Trujillo Jácome from Australian Government, Department of Immigration and Border Protection 2008-09 to 2011-2 Migration Programme Report</i></p>		

Table A.27: Migration Program visa grants 2010–11: offshore and onshore

Migration Program visa grants 2010–11: offshore and onshore			
Skill	Offshore	Onshore	Total
Employer Sponsored	5,284	39,061	44,345
Business Skills**	7,538	258	7,796
Distinguished Talent	55	70	125
General Skilled Migration (GSM)			
* Skilled Independent	16,938	19,229	36,167
* State/Territory Sponsored	12,817	3,358	16,175
* Skilled Australian Sponsored	3,984	5,133	9,117
Total Skill	46,616	67,109	113,725
Table A.27: Migration Program visa grants 2010–11: offshore and onshore <i>Source:</i> Paul Trujillo Jácome from <i>Trends in Migration: Australia 2010–11 Annual submission to the OECD's Continuous Reporting System on Migration (SOPEMI)</i>			

Table A.28: Migration Program Skill stream 2013–14

Migration Program Skill stream 2013–14		
Components	Skilled Immigrants	Percentage
Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme (RSMS)	16,538	13.5
Employer Nomination Scheme (ENS)	30,912	25.3
State and Territory Government Nominated category	24,656	20.18
Skilled Independent category	44,984	36.81
Skilled Regional category	5,100	4.17
Table A.28: Migration Program Skill stream 2013–14 <i>Source:</i> Paul Trujillo Jácome from Australian Government, Department of Immigration and Border Protection 2013-14		

Table A.29: Temporary Business Entrants (subclass 457) and Permanent Arrivals in the Skill Visa Categories Compared

Temporary Business Entrants (subclass 457) and Permanent Arrivals in the Skill Visa Categories Compared						
Year	1997-98		1998-99		1999-00	
Type	Temporary	Permanent	Temporary	Permanent	Temporary	Permanent
Total Number	11,932	25,985	11,894	27,931	10,823	32,350
Intended Residence Comparison						
NSW	47.7	43.4	48.8	43.7	52.3	42.7
VI	21	17.5	25.3	17.5	25.5	19.6
QSL	10.9	13.8	9	13	9	12.1
SA	2.5	4.4	2.1	4.5	2.5	3.8
WA	16.2	19.1	10.9	19.5	7.4	20.1
TA	0.7	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.3
NT	0.3	0.6	2	0.6	1.1	0.5
<p>Table A.29: Temporary Business Entrants (subclass 457) and Permanent Arrivals in the Skill Visa Categories Compared <i>Source:</i> Paul Trujillo Jácome from Khoo, Voight-Graf and Hugo, <i>Temporary skilled migration to Australia, 2003</i>: Includes primary migrants and dependents: Skill visa categories include Independent, Employer Nomination Scheme, Business skills and (from 1997/98) Skilled Australian-linked: Based on country of citizenship for temporary migrants: based on country of birth for permanent migrants.</p>						

Table A.30: Australia State of intended residence 2003-13

Australia State of intended Residence 2003-13		
State	2003-2004	2012-2013
New South Wales	38.4%	30.2%
Victoria	27.2%	24.4%
Western Australia	7.3%	19.3%
South Australia	5.9%	7.5%
The Northern Territory	0.5%	1.5%

Table A.30: Australia State of intended residence 2003-13

Source: Paul Trujillo Jácome from Australian Government, Department of Immigration and Border Protection

Table A.31: Australian states and territories: percentage distribution of the population by birthplace and overseas-born 1996 -01

Australian states and territories: percentage distribution of the population by birthplace and overseas-born 1996 -01						
Australia-Born		Overseas Born		Persons Arriving in Last 5 Years		
(percent)		(percent)		(percent)		
S/T	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001
NSW	33.22	32.65	35.54	35.93	41.21	40.81
Vic	23.96	24.04	26.61	26.31	24.4	23.6
Qld	19.96	20.44	14.25	15.01	15.11	17.33
SA	8.15	8.07	7.74	7.22	4.52	4.1
WA	8.91	9.11	12.18	12.06	11.61	11.28
TAS	2.98	2.83	1.19	1.11	0.78	0.69
NT	1.13	1.16	0.75	0.72	0.73	0.72
ACT	1.68	1.68	1.71	1.63	1.61	1.47
Other Territories	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.01
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table A.31: Australian states and territories: percentage distribution of the population by birthplace and overseas-born arriving in the last five years, 1996-01
Source. Paul Trujillo Jácome from ABS 1996 and 2001 Censuses in *Implications for Migration Policy and Planning in Australia*, Graeme Hugo 2003-04

Table A.32: Australian states and territories natural increase, net overseas migration, net interstate migration and total population growth, financial years 1996-01

Australian states and territories natural increase, net overseas migration, net interstate migration and total population growth, financial years 1996-01							
Natural Increase		Net Overseas Migration		Net Interstate Migration		Total Population Growth No.	
No.	% of Growth	No.	% of Growth	No.	% of Growth		
NSW	244.414	60.9	243.869	60.8	-86.925	-21.7	401,358
Vic	166.298	53.6	141.572	45.6	2.332	0.8	310,202
Qld	149.510	41	88.129	24.2	126.659	34.8	364,298
SA	39.745	118.9	19.621	58.7	-25.950	-77.7	33,416
WA	84.107	47.6	79.144	44.8	13.361	7.6	176,612
Tas	14.184	385.1	1550	42.1	-19.417	-527.2	-3683
NT	16.662	87.4	4172	21.9	-1.773	-9.3	19,061
ACT	17.510	199.7	-453	-5.2	-8.287	-94.5	8770
Australia*	732.649	56	576.221	44	-	-	1,308,870

Table A.32: Australian states and territories natural increase, net overseas migration, net interstate migration and total population growth, financial years 1996-01
Source. Paul Trujillo Jácome from ABS, *Australian Demographic Statistics June Quarter 2002.*
 * Includes other territories.

Table A.33: Permanent residents, 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2003 grouped by visa category and location in Australia. Per cent by Migration Category

Permanent residents, 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2003 grouped by visa category and location in Australia. Per cent by Migration Category						
Location	Permanent Residents	RSMS and State/Territory Schemes	Regional Linked SDAS	Other Skill	Not Skill	Total
Sydney	52,421	8	5	38	38	37
NSW Remainder	3,969	5	2	2	4	3
Melbourne	35,011	21	67	21	26	25
Vic Remainder	1875	5	2	1	2	1
Brisbane	12,739	2	2	11	8	9
QLD Remainder	5,610	7	3	4	4	4
Adelaide	6,444	22	8	3	5	5
SA Remainder	374	3	0	0	0	0
Perth	18,063	9	3	18	9	13
WA Remainder	1181	6	2	1	1	1
Hobart	760	5	1	0	1	1
Tas Remainder	571	2	1	0	1	0
Darwin	643	1	1	0	1	0
NT Remainder	196	1	0	0	0	0
Canberra	1989	3	3	1	1	1
ACT Remainder	22	0	0	0	0	0
City total	128,071	70	90	93	88	90
Remainder total	13,797	30	10	7	12	10
Percentage		100	100	100	100	100
State total	141,868	1,937	3617	65,025	71,289	141,868
Not stated other	9178	238	160	7300	1480	9178
Total in category	151,046	2175	3777	72,325	72,769	151,046

Table A.33: Permanent residents, 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2003 grouped by visa category and location in Australia. Per cent by Migration Category
Source. Paul Trujillo Jácome from B. Birrell, *Redistributing migrants. The Labor agenda, 2003.*

Table A.34: States/Territories nominated vs RSMS Subprogram 2008-09 to 2016-17

States/Territories nominated vs RSMS Subprogram				
Year	outcomes	%	outcomes	%
2008-2009	14,055	7.32	8,811	7.43
2009-2010	18,889	9.83	10,213	8.62
2010-2011	-	-	-	9.38
2011-2012	22,247	11.58	16,471	13.90
2012-2013	21,637	11.26	20,510	17.31
2013-2014	24,656	12.83	16,538	13.95
2014-2015	26,050	13.56	12,380	10.45
2015-2016	24,650	12.83	12,269	10.35
2016-2017	23,765	12.37	10,198	8.61
Total	192,124	100	118,510	100

Table A.34: States/Territories nominated vs RSMS Subprogram 2008-09 to 2016-17

Source: Paul Trujillo Jácome from Australian Government, Department of Immigration and Border Protection 2008-09 to 2016-17 Migration Programme Report

Table A.35: Australia Skill Stream in Detail (Places) 2012-13 to 2016-17

Australia Skill Stream in Detail (Places) 2012-13 to 2016-17						
Immigration Skilled Programs and Sub-Programs	2012-13	2013-14	2014-15	2015-16	2016-17	Total
*State, Territory Nominated	21,637	24,656	26,050	24,650	23,765	120,758
*Skilled Independent Category	44,251	44,984	43,990	43,994	42,422	219,641
*Skilled Regional Category	8,132	5,100	2,800	4,196	1,670	21,898
General Skilled Migration Program	74,020	74,740	72,840	72,840	67,857	362,297
*Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme (RSMS)	20,510	16,538	12,380	12,269	10,198	71,895
*Employer Nomination Scheme (ENS)	27,230	30,912	35,870	35,981	38,052	168,045
Employer Sponsored Program	47,740	47,450	48,250	48,250	48,250	239,940
Business Innovation and Investment Programme (BIIP)	–	–	6,484	7,260	7,260	21,004
Distinguished Talent Program	–	–	200	200	200	600
<p>Table A.35: Australia Skill Stream in Detail (Places) 2012-13 to 2016-17 <i>Source.</i> Paul Trujillo Jácome from Australian Government, Department of Immigration and Border Protection 2012-13 to 2016-17 Migration Programme Report</p>						

Table A.36: WA- States/ Territories RSMS Outcome (In absolute terms and percentage)

WA- States/ Territories RSMS Outcome (In absolute terms and percentage)									
Year	State/ Territory	Outcome	%	State/Territory	Outcome	%	State/Territory	Outcome	%
2009-10	South Australia	9540	26.1	Victoria	8513	23.3	Western Australia	7895	21.6
2010-11	Victoria	9210	24.7	Western Australia	8310	22.3	South Australia	7456	20
2011-12	Western Australia	-	23.2	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table A.36: WA- States/ Territories RSMS Outcome (In absolute terms and percentage)
Source. Paul Trujillo Jácome from Australian Government, Department of Immigration and Border Protection 2009-10 to 2011-12 Migration Programme Report

Table A.37: State Specific Regional Migration (SSRM) Outcomes 2012-13 to 2016-17

State Specific Regional Migration (SSRM) Outcomes 2012-13 to 2016-17										
States or Regional Programmes	2012-13	%	2013-14	%	2014-5	%	2015-16	%	2016-17	%
State, Territory Nominated	21,637	41.67	24,656	49.4	26,050	61.8	24,650	61.5	23,765	65.12
Regional Skilled Migration Scheme	20,510	39.50	16,538	33.13	12,380	29.3	12,269	30.6	10,198	27.94
Business Innovation and Investment	6,596	12.70	3,628	7.27	1,490	3.5	696	1.7	943	2.58
Skilled Regional	3,181	6.13	5,100	10.22	2,263	5.4	2486	6.2	1,588	4.35
SSRM Outcomes	51,924	100	49,922	100	42,183	100	40,101	100	36,494	100
<p>Table A.37: State Specific Regional Migration (SSRM) Outcomes 2012-13 to 2016-17 Source. Paul Trujillo Jácome from Australian Government, Department of Immigration and Border Protection 2012-13 to 2016-17 Migration Programme Report</p>										

Table A.38: States and Territories attracted largest number of migrants 2015-16

States and Territories attracted largest number of migrants 2015-16		
State / Territory	Migrants	%
New South Wales	61,742	32.5
Victoria	47,516	25
Western Australia	22,488	11.9
Queensland	21,860	11.5

Table A.38: States and Territories attracted largest number of migrants (2015-16)
Source. Paul Trujillo Jácome from Australian Government, Department of Immigration and Border Protection 2015-16 Migration Programme Report

Table A.39: State of intended residence 2017-18

State of intended residence 2017-18		
State of intended residence	Outcome numbers	% of the total program
New South Wales	52,251	32.2
Victoria	41,005	25.2
Queensland	17,870	11
Western Australia	13,480	8.3
South Australia	12,017	7.4
Australian Capital Territory	3277	2.0
Tasmania	2775	1.7
Northern Territory	2483	1.5
Not Specified	17,259	10.6

Table 39: *State of intended residence 2017-2018*
Source: Paul Trujillo Jácome from Australian Government, Department of Immigration and Border Protection 2017-18 Migration Programme Report