



# ANVIL Deliverable 5.1: Report on EU added-value for policy stakeholders

Project full title: 'Analysis of Civil Security Systems in Europe'

Grant agreement no.: 284678

Lead beneficiary for Deliverable 5.1: University of Essex (UEssex)

Dissemination level: Public

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Delivery date: February 28, 2014

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## 1. Introduction

This report constitutes Deliverable 5.1 of the FP7 Security Programme Coordination and Support Action 'Analysis of Civil Security Systems in Europe' (ANVIL, Grant Agreement no. 284678). Deliverable 5.1 is a report on work package 5, which is dedicated to providing policy stakeholders with an EU added-value contribution in civil security. The definition of EU added-value for ANVIL follows a dual rationale. In administrative terms, the concept means the added-value of the project itself for civil security policy-making communities in Europe. Simply put, it asks how beneficial the results of this EU-funded project are for the end-users in their everyday practice of drafting civil security and civil protection recommendations. A second definition of EU added-value draws on the nature of our study and its content, and explores whether additional EU actions related to crisis management can have a positive impact on the delivery of civil protection at national level. In WP5 we have taken both definitions into consideration. WP5's final evaluation workshop oscillates between both definitions.

### ANVIL project summary

Civil security systems in Europe display a wide variation in structures, policies, rules and practices: countries have organized differently in their efforts to protect citizens from a variety of threats to their security and safety. Each system evolved in a unique historical and cultural context. Each is bound by different legal/constitutional frameworks. Each system consists of different actors and is governed differently. Each system has different relations with private sector parties. And each system relates to its citizens in unique ways.

This project draws together existing data and collects additional information where necessary to map the variety and similarities in Europe's regional civil security structures, practices and cultures. It investigates if, and to what extent, variety affects the safety of Europe's citizens (for better or worse). In doing so, our results give policy stakeholders a clear view of which kind of systems that could successfully enhance the security in certain regions. Finally, by including policy stakeholders in all phases of the analysis process, we ensure that the project contributes to and gives EU-added value to the debate concerning "not one security fits all".

The project is based on country studies to be carried out in Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Additionally, a number of regional security associations are being studied, such as the Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Initiative for South-Eastern Europe (DPPI SEE); the International commission for the

This project is co-funded by the European Commission within the 7<sup>th</sup> Framework Programme

Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR); the Visegrad group; the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS); The Barents Regional Council, The Helsinki Commission (HELCOM), The Baltic Sea Maritime Cooperation and the International Sava River Basin Commission.

The ANVIL design framework for data collection and analysis provides a practical handbook for studying essential features and key indicators of civil security systems, with each feature and indicator clearly and simply defined. It starts with a comprehensive mapping along four analytical dimensions: cultural and historical aspects; legal/constitutional aspects; relations between the civil security system and the citizen; and the role of the private sector in maintaining civil security. The analysis part consists in looking at key indicators of effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy, and is based on an inductive evaluation of recent crises that have occurred in the different study countries. Finally, we examine the country or regional security system in the EU context: To what extent and how does the EU level have relevance for the civil security system in a given country?

The ANVIL investigations include desk studies and interviews with civil security system experts and experienced practitioners in crisis management and public administration. We look primarily and where possible at instances and evidence in which countries have evaluated themselves through professional assessments and/or political inquiries in the wake of these crisis incidents. This provides a basis for evaluation and comparison in our results that largely excludes subjective opinions, beliefs and biases that might cause ethical problems in carrying out the research. More information can be found at [www.anvil-project.net](http://www.anvil-project.net).




Figure 1 – ANVIL study countries shown in red.

## **2. Key informants identified for assessing EU added-value**

In the first part of WP5, the consortium members were asked to identify key stakeholders from their own countries who could provide expert judgement about whether the ANVIL project appeared to be doing anything with EU added-value, and who could be interested in using in their daily work the final results of the ANVIL project.

### **3. Reactions to ANVIL project from potential end-users**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

The consortium created an inventory of ANVIL's potential end-users in the countries covered by the project. Following this, the consortium attempted to establish solid channels of communication with these policy-makers to engage them further in the project, and also in order to ensure that ANVIL could continue to progress, not necessarily through the consortium's intervention but through the policy-makers' own initiative to spread the news about the project.

Preliminary estimations about interest in ANVIL were submitted from the following countries: UK, Ireland, Malta, Italy, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia, Norway, Romania, Poland, Germany, Serbia and the Netherlands. In what follows, we summarize some of the main reactions and points raised about the project, particularly from the initial stages. We subsequently present the contributions from individual partners with minimal editing so as to retain the emphasis put forward by fellow researchers and also to respect direct contributions from national policy-makers.

Starting with issues of content, policy-makers had expressed concern about the definition of civil security as proposed by the consortium. In their opinion, what ANVIL understands as civil security should have been better delineated and clarified (feedback from Italy, Romania, Finland and the Baltics). More precision was required about the role of the military in civil security (feedback from Italy, Finland and the Baltics) and about the overall role of the EU as civil security provider (feedback from Norway). One additional matter of significance for policy-makers was that of identifying the party responsible for the declaration of a civil crisis or emergency (feedback from Finland and the Baltics).

The Italian policy-makers and experts expressed an interesting opinion regarding the role of the private sector in civil crisis management. The issue of private property and how this is managed during emergencies (e.g., public handling of private property when the country is declared in a state of emergency) should be seen as an important aspect of a civil security system.

Due to the great complexity of the actors involved in civil security and civil protection in each of the countries under consideration, civil security stakeholders seem to greatly appreciate the mapping exercise that ANVIL promised to deliver. Towards this end, policy-makers proposed refinements in the mapping criteria set by ANVIL: first, that France should be included in the Mediterranean cluster

when examining regional regimes of cooperation (feedback from Italy); and second, that the cluster of Nordic countries should include Iceland, Denmark and Norway (feedback from Norway).

With regard to methodology, a significant observation was raised by a Romanian expert. The approach of the consortium in the early months of the project created some confusion about whether the nature of the study was qualitative or quantitative scientific inquiry. The consortium reflected on this observation and decided to make the methodological profile of the study more explicit for the following stages of the project (i.e. after Month 5). Feedback from the UK pinpointed another issue of methodology with reference to data collection: to what extent are the data necessary for describing civil security architectures public and accessible? Besides, a number of civil security crises, such as terrorist attacks or CBRN industrial accidents, may require delicate handling and involve the military, hence often rendering information classified.

In general, policy-makers expressed a positive stance towards ANVIL and a willingness to participate in research during the duration of the project. They were forthcoming in providing feedback and advice as well as interested in obtaining information about the project's progress and research findings (Croatia, Ireland).

In what follows, we present the impressions and feedback on ANVIL from national end-users of countries under consideration as these were given to the consortium members up to Month 5 of the project.

### **3.2 Interest in and feedback on ANVIL in selected study countries**

#### **Croatia (Institute for Development and International Relations, IRMO)**

##### *Step one – contribution to identification of key informants*

The wider group of key informants was identified in Croatia and included 45 potential respondents. The preliminary list included (i) civil servants from central state administration bodies (16 persons), (ii) representatives from legal entities (11 contacts); (iii) academic community (8 experts); (iv) NGOs and private sector (10 contacts). Furthermore, IRMO made an initial screening in the South-Eastern European countries (SEE) and identified about 20 potential contacts at national level (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Slovenia) and at regional level. Regional organisations, whose experts were selected, included the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Initiative for South Eastern Europe (DPPI SEE), the South-East European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) and the Central European Initiative (CEI).

### *Step two - verification of identified key informants*

The next step was verification of identified key informants. Through continued communication and informal contacts, the IRMO team tried to find out if there was some overlapping in terms of responsibilities or functional interest for the subject among the identified key respondents and, secondly, if there were any potential informants of crucial relevance that had not been identified in the first step. The channels of communication included targeted personal contacts with leading policy-makers and potential end-users. Other available ad-hoc communication channels were also used for this purpose.

A good example of an ad-hoc channel was the participation of the IRMO team in the 4th International Conference “Crisis Management Days”, organized by the University of Applied Sciences Velika Gorica in Croatia on 24–25 May 2012. It opened the possibility of identifying some key experts in Croatia and from the SEE region dealing with specific aspects of civil security, disseminating information and presenting the project. IRMO took part in the next conference (2013), presenting some project results and sharing the knowledge achieved through ANVIL with civil security experts.

Another possibility was to link the ANVIL goals with the regular IRMO activities, allowing relevant, high ranking experts or politicians to be informed about the project. One such example was the exceptional occasion when the Croatian president paid an official visit to IRMO in spring 2012. As an academic (professor of law) also, the president showed strong interest in being further informed about the project.

The above-mentioned efforts resulted in further information spreading about the project and in identifying about 20 new potential key informants or end-users for the project.

### *Step three - contacts established with major policy-makers*

Contacts with major policy-makers were established in Croatia and at the regional level through different channels in the period from May to July 2012 with the aim of informing them about the ANVIL project's content, methodology and the role of IRMO.

IRMO sent official requests to the most relevant central state administration bodies to identify key contact points (experts or decision-makers) for the project. Some relevant state bodies responded positively and nominated civil servants for this purpose (official responses were received from four institutions: the National Protection and Rescue Directorate, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Environmental and Nature Protection and Ministry of Agriculture).



The fact sheet of the ANVIL project and an invitation for eventual cooperation were sent in June 2012 via e-mail to approximately 50 key informants in Croatia. IRMO thus expressed its willingness to intensively cooperate with relevant stakeholders during the project cycle, aiming to share the insights and experiences of the project but also to include stakeholders in its implementation, where this was possible and appropriate. The response was moderate and only a few respondents sent back written comments. However, the information was disseminated, which laid a good groundwork for future contacts regarding interviews.

IRMO offered to share the knowledge and research findings from ANVIL with Croatian public administration institutions for the purpose of building an institutional framework for the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Initiative for South-Eastern Europe (DPPI SEE).

At SEE regional level, preliminary contacts were established with the most important regional initiative, DPPI SEE (located in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina), where the feedback and interest for some kind of their involvement was high.

#### *Response of policy-stakeholders*

Policy-makers and other stakeholders gave positive initial feedback on the ANVIL project. The general attitude had been that the project focused on an interesting and relevant topic for Croatia. Secondly, the reactions had shown that the project was timely in light of recent accidents and disasters in Croatia.

#### **Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Hellenberg International)**

Hellenberg International (HI) conducted fact-finding missions among key civil security operators, policy makers and stakeholders in Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. This first round of study was conducted during May-July 2012. The overall feedback concerning the ANVIL project was positive and encouraging; however, a few remarks need to be noted separately here.

It is important to recognize that most of the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) countries are member states of the EU, and Russia and Norway are closely connected with them. Secondly, there is ambiguity in the definition and substance of “civil security” among the BSR countries. While it is usually understood as being part of larger concepts such as “civil protection”, traditionally it refers to rescue activities in exceptional situations such as emergencies, disasters, crises or catastrophes. However, the dividing lines are still obscure. On the one hand, sometimes crises do not occur as sudden emergencies but rather are “creeping crises”, such as serious epidemics, which may require the attention of civil

protection authorities. On the other hand, all emergencies require some preventive and preparatory measures as well as post-disaster reconstruction. Thus, the range of activities and actors included in civil security can be rather wide. Moreover, the relation of civil security to military security is not always clear, because in many countries civil protection has traditionally been part of a “total defence” or “civil defence” structure, thus originally connected to wartime emergencies. In other countries, civil protection authorities consciously avoid the very connection to “security” and prefer using more positive and less threat-related terms, such as “safety” or “sustainable development”.

What is the BSR civil security system like at the present? First of all, it consists of several national subsystems, which are connected together with multiple bilateral and multilateral ties. Hence, describing the BSR countries’ civil security and civil protection systems is challenging and also a somewhat frustrating task. Dealing with the national systems of the ten BSR countries entails a vast network of administrative bodies, operational officials and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The participation of international organisations and transnational contacts in the field of civil protection further complicates the picture.

The BSR countries share a common interest in practising and developing civil security and emergency response cooperation. However, there are several underlying facts that partly hinder a more systematic approach and deeper cohesion in this matter. The most important in this regard is the cultural and historical context which varies heavily among these countries, particularly when comparing the Nordic (Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland) and the Baltic (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) countries. In this regard, the ANVIL project was welcomed and seen as a tool to overcome the differences and to pave the way for mutual understanding of heterogeneous systems.

A second key element mentioned by practitioners is the legal and constitutional system base, which is very different when comparing for instance the current Finnish civil security and crisis management mechanisms and the Baltic countries’ legal basis. In Finland, the current system was derived from the Cold War era and further developed since the experiences of the 2004 South East Asia tsunami disaster. In the Baltic countries, the legal basis has been inherited from the Soviet Union and has faced dramatic and comprehensive reform during the last two decades. In all three Baltic countries the essential legal question remains: which authority is in charge in case of a large-scale civil security crisis (for instance the Prime Minister’s office or the State Fire and Rescue Committee)?

The ANVIL project was welcomed by the key operational and strategic level actors and we were confident that we can get the necessary help and support along the way for implementing this project. What had been expected from us was a high level of information and exchange of viewpoints from the early stages of the project. Also a request for informal meetings had been raised to make sure that the information collected would be sufficient and balanced in order to cover the relatively

wide scope of topics and countries.

Moreover, the ANVIL project was regarded as a necessary gateway to transfer thoughts and proposals to the European Commission and EU agencies on behalf of the national authorities and agencies. During times of reform of national civil security systems, the member states welcome the independent, “external” evaluation and applied scientific research that the EU Commission financially supports. As such, ANVIL was regarded as an opportunity to do something new, with new methods and a fresh approach towards civil security issues in general.

### **Germany (Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy)**

Generally speaking, ANVIL met positive but limited feedback in Germany. Officials were supportive of the idea that more detailed knowledge about national civil security systems in Europe would be useful. However, national research projects on different aspects of the German civil security system attract far greater attention. This was evident in personal conversations as well as during a workshop on scientific research for national exercises. While the workshop allowed for extended and open-ended discussions between researchers and officials, it was clear that the latter prioritised research projects that speak to specific operational concerns of German emergency services. In addition, officials are strongly influenced by the bottom-up approach to the organisation of emergency management in Germany, which regularly hampers activities at the federal level. This adds to the fact that, to date, Germany has not requested external help for emergency operations. Therefore, EU initiatives can be seen as overly distant whereas the German security system is occupied with internal debates over division of competences and allocation of resources.

### **Italy (Istituto Affari Internazionali)**

#### *ANVIL's aim and impact*

The aim of the project was considered interesting but also rather ambitious. The fact that policy recommendations were to be formulated was very much appreciated.

The ANVIL project's added-value is not only to address an important issue, but also to consider what can be done at the European level. In this field there is national resistance to share responsibilities at the EU level, but steps forward have been made: for example the adoption of the EU directive on critical infrastructures which, among other things, pushed some member states to fill a legal vacuum on that issue.

It was very helpful to start the dialogue with stakeholders at the beginning of the project and not just at the end. The outputs could then be disseminated through the network of contacts established

through this dialogue. In Italy, ANVIL's outputs would be useful for the policy-makers, particularly at the level of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.<sup>1</sup>

#### *Definition of civil security*

Generally speaking, a clear definition of civil security should have been spelled out. Otherwise, key informants/policy-makers/stakeholders risked misunderstanding the focus of ANVIL, for example by thinking it is only about civil protection. There might be reluctance to explicitly talk about “defence” and “military”. However, such reluctance has decreased in recent years and will further decrease, as security challenges increasingly do not make distinctions about civil and military, or civil security and defence – for example cyber-security which, by definition, has no boundaries.

#### *ANVIL's methodology: analytical dimensions*

The four analytical dimensions to examine the case studies were considered appropriate. However, it was considered important that research would go further into details and such dimensions would not remain only general headlines.

#### *First dimension*

Within the first dimension (cultural and historical aspects), the events of 11 September 2001 (9/11) represented a change for the European approach to internal security and civil security. Culture is also very important, as it deeply influences the relations between the security system of a state and the citizens (third dimension).

#### *Second dimension*

Within the second dimension (legal and constitutional aspects), the role of the constitutional framework had to be clarified.

#### *Third dimension*

The third dimension (relations between a civil security system and its citizens) may be the most complicated to deal with. Factors specific to each nation, such as cultural and historical experiences (which may be the basis of different aspects of society today) affect any form of comparison. It was suggested that the relationship between citizens and civil security structures should be analysed along with past experiences to understand the evolution and trends of the civil security system.

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1 The Presidency of the Council of Ministers is the administrative structure that supports the Italian prime minister in dealing with various issues including matters of security, as well as in coordinating Italian ministries.

The societies of European countries are very different, e.g. the difference between Nordic/Anglo-Saxon and Mediterranean/Latin areas. It was suggested that the analytical framework should be modulated to take into account peculiar differences, in order to mitigate the risk of adopting benchmarks that claim to be too "comprehensive" and that in reality would not always be applicable to all countries and regional security associations.

What is more, security is a "relative" value as it depends on its "perception" among citizens. In fact, even if a country is considered insecure in the eyes of external observers, its citizens could consider themselves not at risk because they have always been exposed and got accustomed to dangerous situations.

#### *Fourth dimension*

The fourth dimension (the role of the private sector in maintaining civil security) was considered to rightly reflect today's reality because security is increasingly managed and operated by private actors. The analysis should take into account how private property is differently protected vis-à-vis the common good in different countries. For example, in Italy, according to some observers, private property has been subjected to protection for a relatively short period of time (a hundred years), and regulation is robust enough to restrain the right to private property in case of war, emergency and crisis. This aspect of private property is suggested in addition to those explored within the fourth analytical dimension.

An important factor is that, in the past, private actors were largely passive, i.e. they expected to be protected by the state. Nowadays the private sector is becoming aware that it should also act. For instance, there are specific tasks in Italy for private actors regarding the protection of critical infrastructures.

#### *ANVIL methodology: WPs*

##### *WP2 (Country studies)*

The WP2 mapping approach risked being obsolete or inadequate if France was not included in the Mediterranean cluster. For instance, cooperation and synergies regarding but not limited to fire prevention, search and rescue (SAR) activities at sea and naval control of the Mediterranean are well developed between Italy and France (e.g. more developed than those between Italy and Malta, with the latter being included with Italy in the Mediterranean cluster whereas France is not).

Talks and interviews should be less focused on the national level and more focused on the macro "functional" regions, where nations face the same issues and challenges regardless of national frontiers.

### *WP3 (Regional organization studies)*

WP3 mapping may provide added-value, even if the resulting assessment highlights the low relevance of the regional security associations examined. According to some observers, the most valuable organisations are those starting with a bottom-up approach. This is underlined in Europe by the fact that bilateral, mini-lateral and multi-lateral agreements often precede the EU ones; for instance, in Italy the regional civil protection took shape before the national one. The part of these structures that arises from national initiatives is very useful and functional in the early stages of a crisis. In the long term (e.g., post-crisis reconstruction), the strategic/higher parts of these organizations can work well, unless they are disadvantaged by too many bureaucratic and administrative layers and by budget management divergences among offices and countries.

WP3 mapping could perhaps also consider the reality of some private organizations and NGOs that operate at regional and international levels, not neglecting those private organizations and NGOs which are less often mentioned but powerful, such as the Catholic ones.

It was appreciated that the mapping would be instrumental to a comparison aimed at analysing how member states can work better at the EU level. It was not intended as a mapping *per se*: the WPs would be accurately connected.

### *Italian case study*

In Italy, “civil security” has not been formally defined by law. Italy has no official national security strategy even if politicians and scholars have shown interest on this topic in recent years. Different security areas such as energy security or food safety are not brought together in a comprehensive framework: these areas are rather treated with different normative tools without proper coordination, while a centralised overview (if not planning) should be in place. What is more, there are different opinions on the matter: for example, according to some civic observers, focusing on shared values should fall into civil security, but according to others a large part of civil security is about societal resilience.

The above concerns could make the analysis for Italy and the comparison with other countries difficult. An assessment of at least three points is suggested. First, the rules regarding public and private levels should be assessed, which means analysing what the state allows public and private sector/citizens to do in case of declaration of a state of an emergency. Second, how can the mechanisms of crisis management translate the potentiality provided by rules and institutional arrangements into effective response capability (effectiveness)? And third, concerning hierarchical structure, what is the weight of the top management and what is the weight of the operational level?

It was also suggested that civil-military cooperation should be considered. For example in the NATO civil protection and security framework, the president of the Italian delegation is a civil servant of the Ministry of Interior assisted by a military officer. In recent years elements of opposition between civil and military are decreasing.

It was thus suggested that the relationship between civil defence and civil protection – which recently changed in Italy with the renewal of the Civil Protection Department – should be evaluated, as well as the protection of critical infrastructures, cyber-security and the role of space assets in providing situational awareness. The latter is increasingly important: for example, space weather, i.e. solar storms, may disrupt electronic devices and communications.

### **Netherlands (Utrecht University)**

The project has been received enthusiastically in the Netherlands. Interview respondents and participants of the end user evaluation workshops were first of all very positive about the idea of comparable country studies in English. A study on their own country (the Netherlands) in English would be a welcome addition to the documents they use to inform colleagues abroad on how the Dutch civil protection system works, and which structures and policies are in place. Likewise they also appreciated such studies of crisis management policies and practices of other EU countries they frequently work with. They were a little more reserved about the possibility of actually comparing systems, because they knew how persistent and permeating the differences in the various national systems are. However they very much appreciated the effort of comparing both countries and regions, and looked forward to hearing of best practices and experiences from other European countries.

### **Norway and Romania (Swedish National Defence College)**

#### ***Norway***

*Comment by a senior policy stakeholder:*

Our first impression is that ANVIL seems to be a very interesting and useful project for enhancing knowledge concerning civil security systems in Europe. As mentioned in the description of the project, the security challenges that European states face now and in the future, are indeed daunting, broadening and deepening. The chosen approach within the six main objectives and the four analytical dimensions in the project therefore seems to cover the most important areas within this field to obtain a broader knowledge and understanding.

A short comment concerning mapping of regional security architectures:

The selection of cases, a number of geographic regions is selected. One of these is the Nordic countries, named by Sweden and Finland, due to the core similarities that these countries share. From our point of view, we think it is important to broaden this perspective, in the sense that there are, and over time has been a close cooperation within Search and rescue (SAR) and civil protection between the Nordic countries involving Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland and Norway. In this connection, we also find it important to mention the Haga Declaration, which the Nordic ministers with the responsibility for civil protection agreed upon in 2009. Since then, the ministers have had their annual meetings discussing topics of current interest, and have agreed upon conclusions in each meeting.

**Question:**

In what way will the proposal for a Union Civil Protection Mechanism be taken into account in this project? The reason for this question, is that the intention with this proposal is to secure a more efficient, structured and coherent disaster management, and to shift to a more pre-planned and predictable system. Furthermore, particular attention has been given to ensure close coordination between civil protection and humanitarian aid, as well as consistency with actions carried out under other EU policies and instruments, in particular in the fields of justice, liberty and security policy, including consular support and protection of critical infrastructure, environment, in particular flood management and control of major accidental hazards; climate change adaptation; health; marine pollution; external relations and development.

**Romania**

*Comment by a senior policy stakeholder:*

Civil security systems in Europe – critical/observation points

Overall, the initiative of the study is to be applauded and, if developed correctly, which is most likely given the quality of the project, shall be extremely useful for the quality of Europe's civil security systems. However, the general observation to be made is that the definition of the concept and objectives should be more detailed and in some places need to be reformulated.

The indicators used with regard to the concept – effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy – cannot measure the quality of an entire civil security system, as they are not quantifiable; suggestion: to replace the term “indicator” with a more appropriate concept, one which does not suggest a possible measuring and is more suitable to a qualitative study.

We are talking here about a qualitative approach, not a quantitative one, even though it could be useful to know the type of systems of civil emergency – fire-fighters, standard fire-fighters intervention cars, ambulances, etc. per 1000 inhabitants, or per 100 square km, but this only cannot cover a qualitative approach.

The initial description of the concept leaves unclear how the main aim stated, “if, and to what extent variety affects the safety of Europe's citizens” is linked to the stated objectives; the identification of similarities/differences between the systems does not imply an analysis of the way in which these differences may affect the efficiency of the systems or fit in the



cultural background and institutional framework in each of the countries, being known that the civil emergency is a local and regional based service, linked to local authorities, rather than a national one – even if rules are adopted nationally.

Regarding the selection of cases, selection only based on region and similarities at the national level will not give insight on the main aim, “if, and to what extent variety affects the safety of Europe’s citizens”, as it will not be possible to identify the larger and more significant varieties amongst national systems.

Please also do communicate the exact attributes and expectations as well as time frames for that activity.

### **Poland (Adam Mickiewicz University)**

In Poland, introductory letters were sent about ANVIL to a number of top administrators as potential end-users. As the Polish administration is based on a hierarchical structure, we focused on high-ranking administrators. The letters presented ANVIL and asked for the possibility of cooperation through meetings with experts of the institutions or agencies responsible for assessing the delivery of civil security in Poland. The responses were initially quite disappointing, but the consortium eventually received a letter from the Planning Department of the Government's Centre for Security. A member of the Centre was appointed by the director (to whom the initial letter was sent).

The Centre (<http://rcb.gov.pl/eng/>) is one of the few crucial institutions in Poland with regard to security (although civil security is only a small part of it).

What is more, the consortium members reached via email the director of the Department of Rescue Services and Citizen Protection in the Ministry of Interior, who is responsible for drafting new legislation on citizen protection, a task recently started. (At the end of June 2012, there was a critical report on the Polish civil security system, published by the Supreme Chamber of State Control. Following from this reviewing and auditing process, the Ministry of Interior had been mandated to draft new legislation.) The consortium members in Poland declared their willingness (as a part of ANVIL) to cooperate in this legislative procedure and the Ministry of Interior reacted positively.

### **Serbia (Faculty of Security Studies)**

The ANVIL project has encountered considerable interest among Serbian practitioners in the Ministry of Interior/ Emergency Management Sector and in the Ministry of Defense. Executives in the Emergency Management Sector showed a desire to translate the Serbian study and overall synthesis reports with comparison of countries into the Serbian language after the project is finished, in order to make it available to a wider range of professionals in Serbia. Also, the Serbian academic community showed interest in the results of the ANVIL project, primarily teachers and students of

master's and doctoral studies at the Faculty of Security Studies, Faculty of Political Sciences and The Academy of Criminalistic and Police Studies.

### **UK, Ireland and Malta (University of Essex)**

Since April 2012, the University of Essex has undertaken numerous efforts to publicize the ANVIL project and to spread the news about it among civil security stakeholders. We initially investigated the civil security systems of the three countries in order to find the key policy-makers in crisis management. We then scanned the field for public agencies as well as civil society organisations which are involved in the delivery of civil protection. In this way, ANVIL's long-term end-users were located. We tried to establish channels of communication with them by sending informative e-mails presenting the project and asking for their first impressions and advice.

More precisely, initial efforts unfolded as follows:

#### ***United Kingdom***

We attempted to establish channels of communication with civil servants from the Cabinet Office, the Home Office and the regional emergency services. The most promising contact was the *Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CSS)*, which is part of the Cabinet Office and the main governmental actor managing civil security in the UK. CCS commented positively on the ANVIL project and promised to interact with us during the duration of the project. Civil servants from CCS were interviewed, which provided much-sought clarity in the initial stages of our research. What is more, we sent emails promoting ANVIL to administrative units in the Home Office such as the *Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism* and the *Office for Cyber-Security and Information Assurance*. Last but not least, we successfully spread the news in specific "corridors" of the Ministry of Defence, namely the *MoD Counter Terrorism Science and Technology Centre*. Our contacts from the MoD considered ANVIL a fascinating study but they raised explicit concerns about the confidentiality of information. In short, they felt that part of the project deals with issues of restrictive access and classified information.

Concerning engagement with civil society, we informed the *British Red Cross* and *St. John Ambulance* about the aims of ANVIL. From an academic perspective, we had a thorough conversation with a leading, high profile UK expert on civil security.

Efforts to publicize the ANVIL project initially concentrated on central government, as part of the research task for completing the WP2 country report. We subsequently investigated possible contacts in parliamentary committees dealing with civil security, and more intensely informed civil

society organisations about the project. Our efforts to engage with policy makers during the summer of 2012 were affected by the organisation of the London Olympic Games 2012, an event that kept the policy-makers busy.

### ***Ireland***

In the case of Ireland, we tried to spread information about ANVIL within the Ministries of Defence, of Justice and of Health. We primarily approached the Irish *Office of Emergency Planning* and the *Civil Defence Ireland* (both within MoD), the two key organisations for delivering civil protection in the country. For the former, we ensured the participation of a representative at the Utrecht Workshop. With the latter, we initiated communication with a member of the Civil Defence Board. From the Department of Justice and Equality, we were provided with some positive feedback concerning ANVIL, and the remark that “in the Department we are always interested in security related issues”. Last but not least, correspondence was exchanged with the *Health Service Executive*, one of Ireland's Principal Response Agencies. This contact significantly facilitated the progress of our research in Ireland, helping us with further contacts and with the primary resources for mapping the Irish civil security system.

The ongoing recession of 2010-2012 resulted in a reduction of about 3,000 public civil servants in Ireland and the reorganisation of many of those remaining. This significantly hindered efforts to diffuse information about the ANVIL project to respective practitioners. Meeting a representative of the *Office of Emergency Planning* at the Utrecht Workshop helped us to consolidate our “information flow” from Ireland.

### ***Malta***

At the very beginning of the project, it was difficult to establish proper communication channels with the relevant Maltese policy-makers of civil security. This is not because policy-makers were not responsive to our emails but rather they initially provided very limited information, feedback and guidance of relevance for the ANVIL project. Our most promising contacts in Malta were academic experts at the University of Malta.

## **4. EU added-value at country level**

### **4.1 Introduction**

WP5 has been iterative exercise with dual objectives. The first, in line with the consortium needs, was to bring in and keep national civil security stakeholders informed about the usefulness of the project. Our intention has been to convince the potential end-users of the project that ANVIL's results are reliable and relevant and should be taken into consideration when drafting civil protection policy at the national level. A second WP5 objective has been to see what the EU can do for the member states (MS) in the field of civil security. Simply put, what can be the EU added-value in the area of civil security?

In WP5, we initially concentrated and critically commented on the section of the country reports that refers to the EU and its role for national civil security, indicating what the EU added-value contribution could be for each national civil security system. The purpose of this constructive criticism was to give an opportunity to the researchers to refine the WP2 country reports and in particular their sections referring to how national civil security systems operate within the EU context. In the second phase of this evaluative exercise, we asked the respective national researchers to communicate with national end-users and seek their reactions about the EU added-value in the delivery of civil security. The constant interaction with national end-users ensured that they were kept informed about ANVIL and interested in participating in the final evaluation workshop of the project. It also helped WP5 leaders to better organize the discussions and content of the workshop (see also concluding section).

In what follows, we present an assessment of what the EU added-value can possibly be for each examined national civil security system. All statistical references come from the Special Eurobarometer 383 on Civil Protection. After having communicated this initial feedback to the researchers, the national country reports were modified accordingly.

### **4.2 EU Added-value by country**

This section includes the ANVIL study countries: Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

#### **Austria**

As in the case of Germany (see below), Austria has demonstrated a strong EU orientation in civil security issues. The country frequently participates in the Civil Protection Mechanism's missions and it has been positive towards joint training and exercises with the other country members of the Mechanism. Austrian policy-makers believe that their country can deal with civil security challenges in its own capacity, thus envisaging EU cooperation mostly in the field of exchange of information and technical know-how. The reluctance of practitioners towards more integration is to a certain extent reflected by the cautious stances of the Austrian public opinion: 32 percent agree and 46 percent tend to agree that a coordinated EU action in civil protection is more effective than national efforts, whereas the EU averages are 42 percent and 40 percent respectively.

### **Croatia**

The Croatian government has made arrangements in the delivery of civil security and civil protection due to the country's EU accession in May 2013. In fact, the country has used the EU Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (EU IPA) inter alia to modernize the institutional perspectives of its civil security system. The Croatian government has been keen on furthering coordination with other EU countries in civil crisis management and especially in the field of preparedness by means of joint exercises and training. What is more, the country already participates in a number of regional schemes of cooperation regarding emergency response and disasters preparedness. In terms of EU added-value, the government needs to evaluate whether participation in various multilateral regional schemes does not result in overlaps nor inhibit the administrative obligations flowing from the membership of the country in the EU and the Community Mechanism.

### **Czech Republic**

The country has so far actively engaged with DG ECHO and the MIC, providing assistance to other nation-states through the Community Mechanism. Czech public opinion, however, is unaware of the EU coordination efforts in civil protection: only 23 percent know about the matter (Special Eurobarometer 383). Interestingly, the Czechs are not enthusiastic about the added-value of EU cooperation in civil security, with approximately only one third of the respondents in Eurobarometers stating the view that there should be an EU common civil protection policy. To win over the scepticism of the Czech citizens, the EU institutions need to increase the visibility and awareness of the Civil Protection Mechanism in the Czech Republic, showing exactly how the latter's efforts are more effective than isolated national endeavours.

### **Estonia**

Since getting full-membership in the EU and becoming a NATO member, Estonia has made considerable adjustments in the different mechanisms delivering national security. The Estonian government has shown willingness to cooperate with the EU institutions regarding preparedness (training, exercises). Furthermore, the country positively envisages the exchange of information between the European partners for the sake of disaster prevention. In WP5's perspective, though, it seems that the government has accentuated its accession in NATO and has considered the latter as the main security provider, hence limiting the cases where the involvement of the EU can have added-value.

### **Finland**

Finnish practitioners consider that the EU can play a fundamental role in the exchange of crisis-related information through the Monitoring Information Centre (MIC) and the Intelligence Centre (INTCEN). However, enhanced communication about potential emergencies still faces obstacles due to the lack of trust between MS that tend to treat the scarcity and exclusivity of information as strategic advantages. From WP5's perspective, the EU can become a source of added-value by providing the MS with a secure, fast and reliable network for communicating vital information to each other. Even though this exchange already happens, it should be intensified and become the norm for areas such as cyber-crime and terrorism. Last but not least, the Finnish people are supportive of coordinated actions within the EU framework (79 percent in Special Eurobarometer 383; EU average of 82 percent), as they feel that coordinated crisis management can more effectively address civil security challenges, in particular cross-border ones. From the perspective of WP5, the EU Commission could use these data to lobby the Finnish civil security stakeholders for more coordination under the aegis of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism or for the adoption of an EU Civil Security Strategy in the long term.

### **France**

France has many times addressed the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, either seeking assistance to cope with disasters or offering assistance to other countries experiencing civil crises. The country has a steady presence in the multilateral exercises organized by the Mechanism. 46 percent of French respondents are aware of the EU's coordinating role in civil protection and 82 percent (equal to the EU average) believe that an EU coordinated action will be more effective than distinct national endeavours in civil protection.

### **Germany**

Germany has many times granted assistance to countries experiencing disasters through the Community Mechanism whereas it has very rarely made use of the Mechanism for requesting aid, relying (at least so far) on its own resources to face civil crises. Importantly, and in comparison to other Europeans, German citizens are fairly well aware that the EU plays a role in coordinating MS' efforts in civil security and protection. Nonetheless, German practitioners have expressed doubts on whether further integration of Europe's civil security systems is either feasible or desirable. In short, they have highlighted that there might be a limit to how much European countries can cooperate in matters that have been traditionally regarded as concerns of the domestic order. In the current framework, German practitioners do not think about policy initiatives such as interoperability or "pooling and sharing" of capacities in emergency response. A point of convergence between the rather sceptical German side and the EU institutions could be to reserve EU coordinating endeavours for crisis prevention and risk management/reduction.

### **Hungary**

The country has benefitted from other countries' assistance channeled through the Civil Protection Mechanism. It has also shown interest and participated in the joint exercises organized by the Mechanism. The role of the EU in coordinating civil protection is still generally unknown by the population (according to Special Eurobarometer 383 only 28 percent of Hungarians know about the matter) even though public awareness has increased due to the Mechanism's involvement in the country's signature crisis in 2010. Attempts to increase EU added-value should first of all target the visibility of the EU as a promoter and coordinator of inter-state cooperation in civil protection.

### **Ireland**

The country has both offered and received assistance through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. Furthermore, it has participated in the training activities of the Mechanism. Nonetheless, the Irish administration has engaged more moderately than other European countries in the simulation exercises organised by DG ECHO. Whilst generally unaware of the EU civil protection activities, the percentage of Irish replying that they are well-informed about the EU civil protection activities (27 percent) is one of the higher in the EU, well above the EU average (19 percent).

### **Italy**

Italy, up to 2013, has demonstrated vigorous activity in the frame of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. The country has provided assistance to disaster-inflicted countries and also used the MIC's coordinating capacity in order to receive assistance from neighbouring EU MS (e.g. Spain and

France). What is interesting is that even though Italy has quite often used the Community Mechanism in the last few years, Italian citizens are unaware that EU MS cooperate with each other in civil protection through the EU institutions. Only 36 percent of Italians knew about this in Special Eurobarometer 383 (EU average of 38 percent). These findings indicate a need for the EU to collaborate with the Italian authorities in order to disseminate more information for civil protection occurring under the aegis of the Union and thus increase the visibility of EU action. A second interesting aspect is that, despite the knowledge deficit, Italians still feel that an EU-coordinated civil crisis management would be more effective than the efforts of a sole country (82 percent, same as EU average).

### **Latvia**

Latvia has cooperated with the European partners in the contexts of MIC (now the Emergency Response Coordination Centre, ERCC) and EUROPOL to tackle complex civil security challenges even though the country itself has not required external assistance to counter a crisis on its soil. Collaboration with other European countries on the exchange of information has been hindered, however, due to the poor technical equipment of the country in the domain of communication. This calls for further attention on how the EU added-value could be more beneficial for the technical assistance of the Latvian government. Turning to the issue of public opinion, the Latvians are slightly less aware that the EU can coordinate civil protection actions (36 percent) than the EU average (38 percent). From the perspective of EU added-value this entails a need to increase the visibility of EU activity in the country.

### **Lithuania**

Anticipating its accession to the EU, Lithuania proceeded in adapting its civil security system to the practices and institutions already commonly adopted by other European countries. Soon after its EU accession, Lithuania benefitted from the EU Solidarity Fund to cope with the impact of a winter storm in 2005. In a context of insufficient budgets, the country envisages both the EU and NATO as fora for discussing civil protection issues and cooperating with other European countries. And despite its limited capacities, Lithuania has actively participated in the European Civil Protection Mechanism. 50 percent of Lithuanian respondents answered that they are aware of EU's role in coordinating civil protection (Special Eurobarometer 383): one of the highest percentages in the EU. This combines with a strong consensus that a coordinated EU action is more effective than isolated national efforts (83 percent) and that some countries may have inadequate resources to deal with disasters (93 percent). In other words, the Lithuanian citizens seem generally favourable towards cooperation with EU partners in crisis management.



## **Malta**

Despite the fact that the country is small and with limited national capacities, the Maltese government has to date avoided asking other European countries for assistance to cope with civil security challenges. The country has even confronted the impact of the Libya crisis by itself, mobilising the whole of Maltese society. Despite the weaknesses of the country's civil security system presented in WP2, the Maltese authorities have offered assistance to other countries facing calamities. To improve the low awareness of Maltese citizens about EU civil protection action, further efforts by both the Maltese government and EU institutions are necessary.

## **Netherlands**

The Dutch civil security system has proved that it can operate effectively when facing calamities. The country has very rarely considered getting aid from other country members of the Community Mechanism (it activated the MIC only once in the last decade) whereas it has often sent out aid to countries experiencing disasters and emergencies. It appears that the country has enough capacities to deal with its typical crises (accidents, floods and attacks to natural persons). There is thus scepticism on the part of Dutch practitioners on whether it would be useful for the EU MS to intensify their collaboration in civil protection. The Dutch civil security has not been severely tested by cyber-crime and "cyber hacktivism" that can target the Dutch state's infrastructures, or bio-terrorism that can pose a threat for large groups of the population. In the view of EU added-value and with reference to these new types of civil security challenges, enhanced cooperation between the MS will eventually be insufficient unless it entails a stronger EU dimension. The exchange of information and know-how at the EU level could help the Dutch government to better prepare for these relatively new sources of civil insecurity. Turning to the citizens, the Dutch are in general positive towards EU coordination in crisis management (79 percent comparing to the EU average of 82 percent) especially for cross-border civil security challenges. With regard, then, to the EU added-value factor, the Dutch government enjoys a degree of public support (still not the highest in the EU) to make recommendations for more cooperation in the Union's framework – at least in the domain of cross-border challenges.

## **Norway**

As in the case of Switzerland, Norway's non-membership of the EU significantly limits the ways that the EU can have a added-value for the Norwegian civil security system. But, contrasting with Switzerland, Norway is a country member of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and it has already developed a very active role in the Mechanism even though still hesitant to fully engage with joint

exercises and training organized by the Mechanism. To redress this might necessitate more detail-specific bilateral agreements between the Norwegian government and the EU institutions to be signed in the future.

## **Poland**

Poland has developed a very active role in EU-coordinated civil protection. It has made use of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism by activating the MIC in 2010; it has very often contributed to emergency aid missions organised by the Mechanism; and it has even hosted an EU exercise funded by the Community Mechanism (Carpathex 2011). In general, the Polish government has supported policy initiatives for furthering MS coordination in civil protection. More precisely, the 2011 Polish presidency of the Council of the EU pushed forward in its agenda on MS cooperation in effective crisis communication and disaster prevention. Interestingly, and even though Poland is a relatively new MS of the EU, almost half of the Polish respondents in Eurobarometer surveys are aware that the EU does have an agenda on crisis management both within and outside the Union's borders. 40 percent of Polish respondents in Special Eurobarometer 383 are aware that the EU coordinates civil protection in and out of the Union; the percentage is higher than the respective EU average (38 percent).

## **Romania**

The country has so far demonstrated an active engagement in the frame of the Community Mechanism. It has provided assistance to other countries, mainly neighbours, and also received support when dealing with floods. The resultant agreements have been channelled through the MIC/ERCC. In addition, Romania has played an active role in EU-led training; it has participated in numerous exercises funded by the Mechanism and has even co-hosted an exercise with Hungary. What is interesting from an EU added-value point of view is that, in spite of participation in EU civil protection activities, 50 percent of Romanians are unaware that the EU coordinates civil protection; still a better score than the EU average of 57 percent. There is a lack of visibility of the EU's role in Romanian civil protection.

## **Serbia**

Due to its status as a candidate country and not a full member state of the EU, Serbia's involvement with the EU Civil Protection Mechanism is currently limited, mainly to exchange of information. Serbia's progress in the accession negotiations with the EU Commission will also affect the country's full integration in the activities of the Community Mechanism. As in the case of Croatia, the Serbian

government participates in a preparatory programme related to civil protection, funded by the EU IPA and established by the EU Commission. In the frame of this programme, candidate countries such as Serbia can participate in certain of the EU activities on civil protection and thus probe how their civil security systems will react in a mission or operation coordinated by the EU.

### **Slovakia**

Slovakia has so far shown moderate participation in the actions of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, but contributes financially to the humanitarian initiatives of the Mechanism. The country has not yet received assistance from the European partners during times of disaster, yet it has received financial aid from the EU Solidarity Fund. In general, Slovaks are unaware of EU civil protection activities: only 13 percent feel well-informed about it, compared to an equally low EU average of 19 percent. In terms of EU added-value, this visibility gap should be addressed. At the same time, 86 percent of Slovaks agree that EU coordination in civil protection is more effective than national efforts.

### **Sweden**

Sweden is one of the countries with – in principle – adequate resources to deal with the disasters within their borders. This is also apparent from the fact that the country has only once requested and received assistance through the Community Mechanism while it has often contributed to requests coming from other countries. The Swedish government has managed so far to confront the typical recurring crises with its own capacities. Nevertheless, cross-border challenges necessitate enhanced cooperation with neighbouring nations and other EU MS. In terms of the EU added-value perspective, EU institutions can work as a reliable platform for Sweden to exchange information and knowledge regarding crisis management with other European partners. The Swedish population remains uninformed about the role of the EU in civil crisis management: 79 percent of Swedes do not know about it in comparison to the EU average of 38 percent. The level of awareness of the EU's coordinating capacity in civil protection is the lowest in the EU.

### **Switzerland**

As the country is not a MS of the EU, Switzerland can only indirectly participate in EU policy initiatives concerning civil crisis management. The country has so far developed bilateral agreements with neighbouring EU MS to ascertain effective emergency response to cross-border civil security challenges (e.g. natural disasters). Nevertheless, the EU institutions can still initiate bilateral EU-Swiss agreements on civil security and in particular on tackling cross-border crises.

## **United Kingdom**

Despite the Eurosceptic tendencies in the UK, British practitioners see relevance in the EU agenda for civil protection. For instance, they have lobbied with other MS towards the adoption of an EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The country has often provided assistance to other countries through the MIC/ERCC; it has hosted the EU co-funded exercise ORION, and has participated in the training seminars organised by DG ECHO. In general, British practitioners favour cooperation in the EU framework in the phases of prevention and preparedness but are sceptical towards a more active EU role in the emergency response phase, for instance by pooling and sharing civil security capacities at the EU level. 76 percent of the British (slightly below of the EU average of 82 percent) deem an EU coordinated effort in crisis management as more effective than isolated national efforts.

## **5. EU added-value in regional organizations**

### **5.1 Introduction**

As in the previous section, we present here how regional organisations (ROs) in Europe cooperate with the EU. From a WP5 (EU added-value) perspective, we also investigate plausible suggestions on how the EU can further facilitate the work of these ROs in the field of civil protection.

### **5.2 EU Added-value by regional organisation**

This section includes the eight regional organizations studied in ANVIL: the Baltic Sea Maritime Cooperation, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC); the Barents Regional Council (BRC); the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS); the Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Initiative for South-Eastern Europe (DPPI SEE); the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM); the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR); the International Sava River Basin Commission (ISRBC); and the Visegrad Group.

#### **Baltic Sea Maritime Cooperation**

There are two important EU-affiliated agencies taking part in the Baltic Sea Maritime Cooperation; the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR). Based on the RO study, the two agencies are important factors of EU added-value for the work of the Baltic Sea Maritime Cooperation. EMSA provides the European Commission and the member states with technical assistance and support in terms of maritime security and safety. EUSBSR on the other hand attempts to develop an effective information sharing environment by streamlining and connecting existing concepts. Such activities on behalf of the EU Agencies are a clear sign of EU added-value.

#### **Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) & Barents Regional Council (BRC)**

The EU is seen as an important player in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region. Firstly the EU is one of the founding members of regional cooperation here and in addition provides funding through its policy framework on the Northern Dimension. On top of bilateral agreements between countries, civil protection in the Barents region depends a lot on these projects. In the case of BEAC and BRC the EU seems to be adding value by providing funding; the RO study does not specify where future efforts could be fruitful.

### **Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS)**

For the CBSS, the value of cooperation between large regional and international organisations is questioned in the RO study. Whilst the CBSS benefits from fruitful collaboration with sub-regional organisations in the Baltic area, the EU has not been accredited for bringing in any added-value. Nevertheless, the EU Baltic Sea strategy is acknowledged for attracting more stakeholders and international organisations.

The EU could promote added-value cooperation through several means; increasing public awareness, joint training, and creating synergies with the CBSS. The EU added-value could also stem from reducing the institutional complexity and overlapping bureaucracy, and from establishing a clear division of labour regarding civil protection in the Baltic Sea. This can be achieved through more centralization of civil security decision-making away from the national governments and towards the EU.

It is clear from the study of this organization that there could be more EU added-value for the RO by having a more effective supranational authority in terms of decision making in the area of maritime cooperation.

### **Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Initiative for South-Eastern Europe (DPPI SEE)**

The Initiative maintains good contacts and works closely with a number of intergovernmental organizations dealing with civil protection. Cooperation with the EU Civil Protection Mechanism is already well founded and it entails operational collaboration when crises emerge. The organisation is financially supported by the EU Pre-Accession Instrument (EU IPA). In practical terms, the Instrument supports the transition of candidate countries towards EU membership. Does this mean that the flow of funding will cease in the long run when all pre-accession and candidate countries participating in DPPI SEE become full EU members? If so, the EU institutions may have to employ other sources of sponsorship for the activities and projects of DPPI SEE. Probably, the Civil Protection Financial Instrument could be a viable solution (especially since by then it will be addressing EU MS). An additional comment should be made here. DPPI SEE is involved in a great number of synergies that inevitably result in an institutional network of remarkable complexity. The EU can have a added-value in this matter by facilitating the flow of information in this network.

### **Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM)**

HELCOM is primarily acting as a regional platform for the implementation of EU directives. In addition to this, the collaboration of EU and HELCOM has been largely based on projects that the EU

has funded and HELCOM has hosted. Based on informal discussions with representatives of the organisation, HELCOM itself is not functionally as important as it used to be in the Cold War setting, but the EU uses HELCOM as a platform for cooperation with external partners. In its current format, it is an important organisation in keeping EU connected to Russia in the issues of civil security.

The EU could have a considerable added-value for the work and objectives of HELCOM in terms of funding the collaboration with other outside parties such as Iceland and Norway, for example through the Northern Dimension policy framework. In practical terms this would most likely entail more funding for shared projects.

### **International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR)**

The ICPDR takes into serious consideration the EU directives regarding water management and tries to push their implementation. Currently, the decision-making procedures in the ICPDR are split between cases when the EU represents the MS (and votes on their behalf) and cases when the MS exercise themselves their right to vote and thus the EU cannot participate in the voting procedures. Decisions tend to be adopted by consensus which sometimes causes protracted negotiations. The EU's share in the ICPDR budget is small, but it frequently finances individual projects run by the organization. As EU administrators have in retrospect informed the ANVIL consortium, there is no official partnership between the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and ICPDR. However, from an exchange of notes with DG ECHO, the EU Commission thinks highly of ICPDR's work on promoting a regional dimension of crisis management and estimates that the cooperation between ICPDR and DG ECHO can intensify in the future depending on the nature of emerging crises.

### **International Sava River Basin Commission (ISRBC)**

The ISRBC takes the EU dimension into serious consideration. This is confirmed by the fact that the organization has tried to "align" its activity with relevant EU legislation.

The ISRBC collaborates with ICPDR, hence creating a network in Southeastern Europe that promotes safety of the river routes, dealing also with issues of environmental protection and flooding. As mentioned in this study, the ISRBC has not formalized cooperation with the EU. At this point, there might be room for EU added-value. First of all, there could be institutionalisation of the cooperation between EU and ISRBC. And secondly, the EU Commission could bring together the stakeholders which relate to safety of water routes in Central and Southeastern Europe, namely the Danube Commission, ICPDR and ISRBC, with the aim of concluding synergies and commonly funded projects.

## **The Visegrad Group**

Hitherto, the Visegrad Group has been closer politically to NATO than to the EU; the Visegrad countries have cooperated closely within the frame of NATO activities and decision-making. In the EU context, the Visegrad Group seems to be keen on issues of enlargement and how this is associated with stability and security in Central and Eastern Europe.

The EU added-value could be enhanced through a synergy between EU and Visegrad Group activities, bearing in mind any civil security threats that can come from the eastern borders of the EU (e.g., clandestine immigration, terrorism, radicalism, proliferation of CBRN material). However, the authors of the Visegrad Group RO study have offered a different understanding of the EU added-value. Since the Visegrad group is funded by its country members independently of the EU, it seems that it is actually the Visegrad countries that can contribute to the EU's work and not the other way around. This could be done by carrying out activities related to stability and security in regions such as Eastern and Southeastern Europe, activities which benefit the EU as a whole by stabilizing Europe's neighbourhood. The EU could add value in this case by providing funding to the group that is not currently a recipient of EU funds.



## **6. EU added-value in ANVIL synthesis reports**

The findings from the individual country studies provide overwhelming evidence of functioning diversity in the area of civil security. The EU's involvement in member states' civil security is welcomed to varying degrees, with some member states being openly reluctant to trust the protection of their citizens to a supranational institution. In the light of these findings, the EU should focus its efforts on promoting and facilitating cooperation. This could be done through the following measures.

The EU could act as a promoter and facilitator of best practices and lessons learned. Moreover, the EU can provide a framework and platform for such dialogue to take place between the member states. Whilst information sharing does already take place, it might be beneficial for the EU to collect such information into one database to facilitate communication, with easy access not only to central governments and their national contact points in the Civil Protection Mechanism but also to high-ranking sub-national emergency planners.

The latter chimes with the fact that national best practices and lessons learned should align with the bottom up approach that the EU is keen on in issues of civil security. Apart from the Committee on International Security (COSI), the EU could establish a working group consisting of national officials to ensure that their aims are reflected on the common policies and guidelines adopted in Brussels.

The concepts used in civil security are also subject to a lot of national variation and in this area the EU could bring some cohesion. Yet, common terminology is still difficult to achieve and subject to various national constraints. The standardization promoted by the EU Commission in this area could prove useful.

Participation in training exercises at the EU level is also subject to a large country variation. Smaller member states tend to send fewer emergency planners to be trained through the Community. One might speculate that smaller countries simply have fewer resources to do so and therefore the EU added-value in the area of training exercises could be more encouragement for participation both by effectively advertising these opportunities and perhaps by providing financial support for the participants. Moreover, DG ECHO pre-defines a specific number of vacancies for each training programme in the context of the Civil Protection Mechanism. Qualitative inquiry has shown that for some countries a placement in these programmes is very competitive. This surplus demand shows the growing interest in the EU-funded training for emergency planners. In the long run, the EU

Commission could improve the training opportunities offered by the Civil Protection Mechanism, with more programmes in the training cycle, which will be made available to more practitioners.

The EU could also act as a promoter in terms of providing new risk assessment guidelines. These guidelines can build on the existing guidelines by the Commission, but in addition highlight potential crises that can affect all the EU member states. Such compilation of risk assessment within the Union could also suggest necessary capacities for the member states to deal with transboundary crises.

Finally, the country level studies show that the majority of the respondents in a survey on the EU role in civil security believe that an EU coordinated action is better at dealing with civil security crises than the national response systems working separately. This is an interesting finding, given that knowledge of the EU's role in civil security by the respondents' self assessment is low. This highlights an area where the EU can have an added-value. In general, the EU is not a visible civil security actor and needs to publicly promote its role in this area. The EU could, for example, provide information packages at the local level to ensure citizens are aware of how the EU plays a role for their communities. Given that the view about the EU in civil security seems to be largely positive, being more active in promoting its contributions at local levels could signal effectiveness to higher levels. Moreover, the remaining scepticism about trusting civil security matters to a supranational institution might subsequently be reduced at the higher levels of political decision-making.

Even though the national civil security systems work well in general and the Solidarity Clause signed by the member states promises assistance in the event of crises and disasters in other member states of the Union, there is still a need to delineate the details regarding the implementation of the Solidarity Clause. Improvements are already under way through the EU Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) Arrangements. The main areas where the EU can add value are political coordination, monitoring and information flow. These aforementioned areas are also echoed in the ANVIL findings. More specifically to the Solidarity Clause, the role of the IPCR is to monitor and alert developing crises, activate political coordination, involvements and decision-making at the EU level, collect and exchange information as well as monitor the impact of the crises.<sup>2</sup> The implementation of the Solidarity Clause could be used as a platform for long term policy recommendations for the EU as a civil security actor; testing scenarios of when the clause might be triggered and how well the

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<sup>2</sup> See Council of the EU (2013) *Finalisation of the CCA Review Process: The EU Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) Arrangements*. Brussels.

national systems are equipped to respond to these scenarios. In addition the Solidarity Clause can be thought of as a tool to expand the notion of solidarity outside Europe, not just within the Union.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> See also Myrdal, S. and Rhinard, M. (2010) The European Union's Solidarity Clause: Empty Letter or Effective Tool?. *UI Occasional Papers 2*. Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs.

## **7. ANVIL final evaluation workshop with end-users: Meeting minutes**

This section is the minutes of the final evaluation workshop with end-users which took place in London on 25 November 2013. The organisation of the workshop is MS 25 due in Month 21 of the Project.

*Date of meeting: 25 November 2013*

*Location: London*

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### **7.1 Key findings of ANVIL**

The workshop started with a presentation of the key findings of the ANVIL project. Raphaël Bossong highlighted the following overall conclusions from the comparison of the 22 countries examined:

- The findings suggest very limited general similarities in the civil protection systems
- Administrative responsibilities, operational practices and legal frameworks differ distinctly
- There were no striking differences in (perceived) effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy
- No strong, generalizable correlations were found between the quality of performance and specific system properties
- There is room for improvement in specific areas but there is no indication of a single best or 'one-size-fits all' model for civil security.

### **7.2 Best practice**

*Notes on senior UK policy advisor's opening speech:*

As a policy-maker, the speaker would agree with a non-alarmist approach. Is there a common set of risk perceptions or can perceptions be explained by country characteristics? Does it take time for practices in civil protection to become the norm?

How good are we at sharing risk assessments? Possible future scenarios should be identified and organisations need to be tested on these scenarios.

Citizens trust and support their civil protection systems and have confidence that major risks will be appropriately dealt with. Is this risk blindness? Most countries cover a range of risks. Normality is seen as a test of success.

A wise emergency planner will make provisos not only for central scenarios but also for wild cards that will invalidate preparedness. Most countries distinguish between sudden emergencies and

'rising tide' crises. For the latter, early detection is key, and different to early warning. Some organisations, such as the WHO, have very advanced early detection systems.

There are very high levels of preparedness for sudden disaster across Europe. At a deeper level of analysis, path dependency can be detected. With the legacy of the past in mind, crises are fought at three levels: physical (number of devices); collective (laws, working practice and history of cooperation); and individual (learnt and perceived experiences of key actors). Effectiveness can be measured by considering all three levels: effectiveness results when they successfully combine.

The speaker agreed with the need for a common language but not with standardisation. Standard concepts are important, such as the ones NATO members have adopted despite diversity of institutional and administrative structures in the respective countries.

Structural differences are not important as long as you know where to plug in, with whom to communicate, and at what level. A good example of such collaboration is the Franco-British coordination for the Channel tunnel.

One possible improvement might be to standardise the role of the military in civil crisis management. When all else fails, military preparedness is important. Is the doctrine of civil control clear? Do different nations know how to operate if the military is needed? Should European nations make it their common task to standardise the role of the military in civil protection?

Internal fractionalisation of civil security can be problematic. This was exemplified by how politics got in the way of the responses to Hurricane Katrina. US national security was divided into two distinct bodies, the US Homeland Security Advisory Council and the International Security Council, which created further confusion about administrative responsibility during the management of the crisis. Post-Katrina, these two councils have been merged into one, which functions more cohesively, as also now in the UK.

The speaker identified the concept of resilience as another area of good practice in civil security. He pointed to three generations of resilience:

1. *Engineering*: this relates to the speed of recovery after a major disaster; for example, how quickly the lights go back on after a blackout. This can refer to mobile phones, standby generators etc. In this area, emergency planners can indicate to the government the best investment priorities in crisis response.

2. *Psychological*: all crises are local. Are local populations prepared to withstand calamities (e.g., a flood)? Are citizens frightened or reassured? Are they willing to tough it out and do they possess fortitude? All these questions relate to psychological resilience, which can be improved. For example, some countries utilise for these objectives third sector organisations at home and overseas, as well as local community structures. Government reaction is improved and as a result less panic is evident.

3. *Adaptive resilience*. This type of resilience is the capacity to see what did not work in past crises or might not work and to plan alternatives.

ANVIL countries vary in taking up the concept of resilience.

The UK country report stated that the civil security system is not significantly impacted by national culture. However, the UK has a talent for pragmatism derived from a common law tradition.

The application of the three categories of engineering, psychological and adaptive resilience may be helpful to understand the differences across the EU (e.g., one can check whether the police service has a connecting line to the government, is the independence of the service understood?).

The common thread in building resilient societies is the human dimension. Civil protection refers to real people, families, and businesses. They deserve our understanding and support.

## **Q&A**

1. *What is distinct about resilience as a term? What about the non-English speaking countries? What does this concept entail?*

Resilience is a powerful concept, for instance when thinking about risk equations related to terrorism for the purpose of reducing vulnerability or pursuing terrorists (e.g. dealing with the Al Qaeda threat). It is also about making society more robust. A duty of government is to think about national resilience and inform policy-making accordingly. There is nothing new in the term, but you can relate the concept to the responsibility of ministers.

2. *There is potentially more to be done about cooperation between countries. How can this be fostered? By networking on a personal level?*

Terrorism centres (such as the UK's Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre) are well networked. Maybe there is potential to develop more at the regional level, to develop a professional sense through

regular meetings. Following from that, one can then get groups of ministers involved at the political level.

*3. Would it be fair to say that key policy-makers do not always understand the pressure politicians are under, and politicians do not understand that practitioners do not have political interests? Is this further exasperated in a crisis?*

Professional civil servants at senior level are essentially political appointees (particularly in the US). Intelligence communities go into politics to change the world, not to get best advice. Mutual understanding of the two political tribes is needed: experts vs. policy-makers.

There are strategic, operational and tactical aspects to civil emergency management. The first priority is saving lives, an operational task. The person responsible needs to be able to focus on doing this without political considerations. In this sense the first 24 hours are simple, but when you relate that to the political issues there is a clear distinction between strategic and practical. In a devolved system the subsidiarity principle is important. Many crises have an international dimension and cannot be managed purely at the local level.

*4. Standardisation at the conceptual level was not enough for example to deal with cross-border flights during the ash cloud crisis. Could you specify areas where standardisation would be useful?*

There is already EU regulation in some areas, mostly non-security related in origin, for example safety of water supply. Could that be used and extended into security and resilience? Currently there is enormous disparity in approaches. It would be better not to standardise areas that you know in advance that different countries would take different views. The European arrest warrant has worked well and speeded up the transfer of alleged criminals/terrorists.

*5. Regarding terminology, do we really need another standard? ANVIL findings show that countries are not using the same standards.*

Would it help two countries operating together? In the London riots of August 2011 there was a lot of mutual support of services but no common definition of a 'firearms response team' across different UK police forces. There is a huge amount of work to agree on definitions – not just to define 'crisis', this is already done.

6. *Citizens trust their civil security systems, but the public is ill-informed. For practitioners, not just strategic but also individual resilience is important. Are schools and children the appropriate level of dealing with resilience?*

Maybe, I had not thought of that. It should not be the type of fear-inducing training as during the Cold War for nuclear blast (e.g., having pupils hiding under tables). Occasional exercises for instances such as flooding sounds like a best practice.

7. *So far the risks seem to be higher for those countries that have standardised education; they seem to be more concerned. There seems to be very little political support for the change of national curricula. In Germany people discuss how to educate the public, but there is limited higher political will.*

Some research was done in Canada on the impact if every household had a torch, bottles of water, batteries, candles etc. The results show it did not make an enormous difference. The UK government sent every household a booklet and in the follow up survey it was found that most people kept the booklet by the telephone. People are generally sensible, although the media response was not favourable.

8. *It is interesting to hear that for community resilience and response local authorities are key features. In the case of pandemic flu, people knew the main messages, though they did not always know what they were about.*

Will governments fund such public education? The mobile phone network and the Internet are probably the most vulnerable in a crisis. In the UK, the government has an arrangement with the BBC to take over local radio stations to broadcast advice. Who has the best practices on this in Europe?

9. *There are two different types of major crises: classic crisis when all goes down / classic crisis where the Internet does not go down. During the August 2011 riots in the UK, both sides used the Internet, the residents and the police used social media. It was effective. However, rioters were also using the web to communicate the location of the police and keep a step ahead.*

10. *Are there some elements of coordination systems that could be seen as best practice? One size does not fit all, but what elements are crucial for best practices in civil security?*



Coordination can be an element of best practice, both strategic and operational. Strategic direction means that a senior minister needs to be in control. An example of 'Command & Control' in the UK is the gold/silver/bronze structure developed after several unexpected crises. The chief officer of police takes the lead at gold level, coordinating with emergency services, transport, water stakeholders. Their coordination is rehearsed with table top exercises. Almost no-one from the other services is directly under his command, but they accept his lead in coordination. The silver level is a bit closer to the ground. Bronze refers to the tactical level of crisis management (in sight of the scene). This scaling in coordination does work. Regardless of the type of crisis, a gold level of crisis management means something to the people.

For example in preparation for the London Olympics table top exercises were conducted. At the end all participants knew each other's information requirements. There is no substitute for exercises and practice. The ANVIL report states that nobody has found a way of assessing efficiency and effectiveness, which is not surprising, but we did it for the Olympics. Everybody was involved, across the nation. Did it add up to sufficient capability to meet the prime minister's promise for safe games? Tactical evaluators from the Royal Air Force were brought in – people who knew how to evaluate, who have equipment, doctrine and experience – and provided an assessment for the home secretary and the PM.

*11. Thinking about the UK country report, how do we move between the collective and the individual? Is there collective thinking? Does resilience get to the heart of that?*

There is some evidence that a national self-image shapes behaviour, as, for example, military training leads to self-sacrifice. In the Blitz, mass opinion surveys showed public psychological resilience, but in 1944 public morale was near to collapse due to the randomness and unpredictability of the V2 attacks which had a disproportionate effect on the public mindsets.

### **7.3 EU added-value**

*EU national senior policy advisor's speech on EU added-value.*

The speaker highlighted the challenges the EU faces in adding value to the existing national civil security systems. In a nutshell these challenges can be summarized as follows:

- Existing mechanisms are mostly based on sector division and comprehensive approaches are difficult to implement
- There are several information sharing and warning systems and networks, rather than all the information being available in one unified platform

- The need for cooperation is sometimes challenged
- National systems are working quite well and can handle most crises
- Diversity in terminology for crisis management, emergency response, civil protection.

In addressing what possible value the EU could add, the speaker suggested that some lessons could be learned from the Nordic cooperation which is largely based on bilateral and multilateral meetings, training exercises, courses, and information sharing.

He concluded that the EU could provide support for civil protection through the Integrated Policy Crisis Response (IPCR) – ISAA concept, creating a network of National Crisis Management Centers, doing more training and exercises as well as organizing seminars, workshops and conferences. He ended the presentation by asking whether there is a need for a permanent working party on civil security.

#### **Q&A**

*1. What is the role of the presidency of the Council of the EU in IPCR? The IPCR has to rely on the support of EU bodies (preparatory role, but also gives political direction).*

The IPCR is coordinated by the EU rotating presidency, which is in charge of agenda setting. There have been debates whether the rotating presidency should deal with the role of the Committee on Internal Security (COSI), but no conclusive decision has been reached. It would be advisable to have the national parliaments involved in the activities of COSI.

*2. EU added-value: In practice - can a member state feel assured that other member states would come to help?*

With regard to civil protection mechanisms, yes. But political issues are behind these decisions. I cannot imagine a scenario when help would be denied.

*3. With regard to exercises (national and international), can some common denominator be found?*

The scenarios for joint exercises are difficult to create – one can use past crises as exercises and scenarios and test the responses.

4. *Can the EU share best practices? The Danube information pack was used in South Africa. Maybe these emergency response guidelines could be shared at the EU level? The original idea was that national officials would share experiences.*

*The Crisis Coordination Agreements (CCA) was never used because the threshold for activation was too high. Do we need the CCA or IPCR?*

Yes, we need it, but the threshold to trigger it must be lower. It used to be based on ad hoc groups- we do not need these but can use the existing groups. This has not been tested yet, but the plan looks promising.

## **7.4 Concluding remarks**

### *1. Military dimension*

The ability to plug the military in would be beneficial (as was the case in the Italian earthquake) but in some member states the connection between civil and military has disappeared. The military have resources and equipment and are used to large-scale planning. Should we also link the private actors to this equation? The EU is not the right actor in this; NATO is often looked to when military help is needed.

UK legislation requires that military resources are deployed externally. There is a protocol for internal deployment to support local communities but also provisos regarding availability of resources. The UK public is confused about this. Asking the help of the military in civil protection is a last resort. Authorities have tried to find alternatives. In the case of the Cumbrian flooding, only the military could do the engineering. But military resources are declining. The UK is currently undergoing a reframing of the defence mission. In the case of Finland their role is to defend the country, support other agencies, and respond to crisis management operations. They can provide support at the regional level. If the emergency services want to have support from the military, they have to allocate it specific tasks. In France and the UK, the military police are also involved and the reserve corps could be called out in 24 hours. There are specific units devoted to crisis management.

### *2. All hazards approach - could this be a best practice?*

This notion is pretentious. In practice in the Netherlands and Sweden the preference is *multi*-hazard. The question is how we can render an all-hazards approach operable. A pragmatic approach asks what the characteristics of the situation to be dealt with are. There needs to be both general and more specific planning. Flexibility is crucial. You need specific capabilities but you also need, for example, deployable hospitals. A risk register informs the approach.

### *3. Resilience*

The definition of resilience is a huge challenge. Is it country-specific? The objectives might be standardised, but the means to achieve it might be country specific, maybe with EU added-value. Member states need to be helped to better understand how they can build resilient societies.

Civil protection is very much a national priority. Resilience would be impossible if it was about setting strict criteria, but could work if it was a discussion aiding and facilitating an exchange of views and experience. What are the expectations of resilient communities?

Preparedness for recovery, not only for response. That is a strong policy message.

### *4. EU added-value: shared concepts?*

Member states want EC involvement in developing shared concepts (e.g. request for a common database) but this seems to fall through the cracks of the Commission bureaucracy.

The EU has a lot of safety standards. Instruments from other policy areas should be recognised. Discussion around concepts is also highly politicised. Maybe we could start with an umbrella concept, though, such as collective memory that heavily draws on lessons learnt from previous crises.

It might also be that in civil protection member states could follow the example of the employment policy, where the EU countries set goals and the underachievers are named and shamed (Open Method of Coordination).

Along these lines, the Hyogo Framework peer review process was a very positive experience for the UK, which was the first country to be reviewed concerning the implementation of the Hyogo Framework. Now the report has been handed to the minister. It engaged practitioners from local authorities with other countries. This review marked a change in attitudes: practitioners were engaged in the process to develop legislation.

Another good practice was education at school regarding civil protection, which NATO has already highlighted. The practice known as 'Resilient children' could be a driver to change things internally as well as externally.

Could the EU take the role that NATO has in evaluating civil security? The sharing of assessments, concepts, and storytelling of common history is needed. Should the EU have a register of capabilities

and competencies? The EU should have a role in funding macro-regional exercises. But, what is the optimal size of network for this?

Regarding the earmarking of national capabilities, has anything really changed? If we have a cross-border crisis in the Baltic Sea, what are the jurisdictions of each stakeholder and with which resources is the crisis going to be managed? Civil servants spend hours discussing what agreement to follow. A case in point was the crisis in Estonia, where Estonia was awaiting assistance (specifically a helicopter) and Finland was awaiting the Estonian request for this specific assistance.

##### *5. Profit and Non-Profit Private Organisations*

There was discussion about the value of involving private organisations in civil protection (e.g. Walmart in Hurricane Katrina). Big enterprises are often faster and better than the government. They could definitely help governments to improve resilience. But Europe does not really want that.

A different approach should be followed to involve private companies or NGOs in civil protection. For profit-oriented organisations some sort of economic incentive must be created. Standards may well be needed from the EU regarding the use of private organisations in crises. More precisely, contracts are important when outsourcing to private companies.

At the end of the day, are private companies part of the problem or part of the solution, meaning here do they increase or decrease the complexity of emergency response? They should be used as a part of the solution.