



저작자표시-비영리-변경금지 2.0 대한민국

이용자는 아래의 조건을 따르는 경우에 한하여 자유롭게

- 이 저작물을 복제, 배포, 전송, 전시, 공연 및 방송할 수 있습니다.

다음과 같은 조건을 따라야 합니다:



저작자표시. 귀하는 원저작자를 표시하여야 합니다.



비영리. 귀하는 이 저작물을 영리 목적으로 이용할 수 없습니다.



변경금지. 귀하는 이 저작물을 개작, 변형 또는 가공할 수 없습니다.

- 귀하는, 이 저작물의 재이용이나 배포의 경우, 이 저작물에 적용된 이용허락조건을 명확하게 나타내어야 합니다.
- 저작권자로부터 별도의 허가를 받으면 이러한 조건들은 적용되지 않습니다.

저작권법에 따른 이용자의 권리는 위의 내용에 의하여 영향을 받지 않습니다.

이것은 [이용허락규약\(Legal Code\)](#)을 이해하기 쉽게 요약한 것입니다.

[Disclaimer](#)

국제학석사학위논문

**The Determinant of Perception to
The Confucius Institute
: The Five Eyes and Security Threat**

공자학원에 대한 인식과 결정요인
: 파이브 아이즈(Five Eyes)와 안보위협

2019년 8월

서울대학교 국제대학원

국제학과 국제협력전공

조 정 현

The Determinant of Perception to The Confucius Institute : The Five Eyes and Security Threat

A thesis Presented

By

Junghyun Cho

to

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Master
of International Studies in the subject
of International Cooperation

**Graduate School of International Studies
Seoul National University
Seoul, Republic of Korea**

August 2019

공자학원에 대한 인식과 결정요인
: 파이브 아이즈(Five Eyes) 와 안보위협

지도교수 이 근
이 논문을 국제협력전공 석사학위논문으로 제출함

2019년8월

서울대학교 국제대학원
국제학과 국제협력전공
조 정 현

조정현의 석사학위 논문을 인준함
2019년 8월

위 원 장 박 태 균 (인)

부 위 원 장 아이한 카디르 (인)

위 원 이 근 (인)

© Copyrights 2019 by Junghyun Cho

All Rights Reserved

Abstract

This study investigates the determinants of the Five Eyes member governments' responses towards the Confucius Institute. It is shown that countries took different positions based on its comprehensive threat analysis, including security and economic risks, from China. The results suggest that even within the Five Eyes security alliance, member states show a different level of security concerns towards China. This research used each government's attitude towards the adoption of Huawei equipment for the rollout of the 5G network as a measurement to determine the level of the perceived security threat from China. This study first categorized each country into three groups using 'the Huawei Barometer' provided by Bloomberg and explain why and how the perceived level of security threat differs by analyzing the characteristics of its bilateral relationship with China. And the degree of containment towards the Confucius Institute was observed by reviewing law enactments, regular inspections, various governmental reports, media coverage, and collective actions taken by the public. The results suggest that the Five Eyes nations' response to Confucius Institutes and perceived security threat represented as Huawei equipment adoption are positively correlated.

Keyword: Confucius Institute, Five eyes, security threat, Huawei 5G, soft power

Student Number: 2015-25156

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT	I
TABLE OF CONTENTS	III
I. INTRODUCTION	1
1. PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH	1
2. LITERATURE REVIEW	2
3. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY	8
II. FIVE EYES' RESPONSE	11
1. FIVE EYES NETWORK	11
2. BAN IN EFFECT	13
<i>1-1. United States</i>	<i>13</i>
<i>1-2. Australia.....</i>	<i>27</i>
3. LIKELY TO BAN.....	37
<i>1-1. Canada.....</i>	<i>37</i>
4. ON THE FENCE.....	48

<i>1-1. New Zealand</i>	48
<i>1-2. United Kingdom</i>	55
III. CONCLUSION	64
1. CONCLUSION	64
2. LIMITATION.....	69
IV. BIBLIOGRAPHY	70

I. Introduction

1. Purpose of the Research

Confucius Institute is a non-profit public institution, established to promote Chinese language and culture in foreign countries, which has benchmarked the success of various cultural centers such as British Council of the United Kingdom, Alliance Française of France and Goethe Institut of Germany. Confucius Institutes are funded by the Office of Chinese Language Council International (Hanban), an affiliated organization of the Ministry of Education. Unlike other cultural centers, Confucius Institutes usually are established inside universities, co-hosted by a partnering Chinese university. Each contract is made individually between partner schools under the guidance provided by Hanban. Hanban also provides half of the cost in the first year of the establishment. Since the first establishment in Seoul, South Korea 2004, Confucius Institutes have successfully proliferated worldwide. According to Hanban's website, there are 525 Confucius Institutes globally; 118 in Asia, 54 in Africa, 161 in the Americas, 173 in Europe, and 19 in Oceania.

Confucius Institute identifies itself as a Chinese language education

center and a platform for cultural exchanges between China and hosting countries, aiming to build friendships and deepen cooperation. However, hosting governments show diverging views on the role of the organization as the number sharply increased over the past decade. While some nations view Confucius Institute as an excellent opportunity to develop its foreign language education and strengthen the bilateral relationship with China, some nations perceive it as Chinese propaganda with the suspicion that more significant influence of China in the education sector could lead to higher risk on their national security. Such difference could be correlated to each hosting nation's perceived security threat from China. This research will identify each nation's degree of the perceived threat from China and how the threats are related to each government's response towards the Confucius Institute.

2. Literature Review

Previous works of literature on Confucius Institutes mainly focused on the soft power aspects of the organization, explaining the strategy of the Chinese government to construct a positive international image. Various comparative analyses with other cultural and language centers were conducted to compare the management method and program operation. Regarding

hosting nation's responses and the causes for the different attitudes were mainly categorized into three directions. First, studies focused on the inherent limitation of the Confucius Institute for being a state organization and how that contributes to forming concerns over academic freedom issues. Second, studies analyzed the way media has been portraying Confucius Institutes and the impacts of media in creating positive or negative perceptions of the public. Third, there were attempts to explain the correlation between Confucius Institutes and economic relationship with China. Studies calculated the degree of impact of the establishment of the Confucius Institute has on the bilateral economic relationships, and how the existing economic relationship impacts the attitudes of the nation towards Confucius Institutes.

First, studies explained the reasons why suspicion towards the Confucius Institute was created in the first place. According to Switzer, this perception was formed because of the unique aspect of the Confucius Institute. As Confucius Institutes partner with and reside in existing academic institutions, universities are more likely to be under the Chinese government's influence, receiving funding, teachers, and teaching materials from Hanban (Switzer 2017). These resources provided by the Chinese government can be attractive to cash strapped universities facing struggles to provide high-quality Chinese language education for students. With academic institutions being dependent

on the money from the Chinese government, academics and students believe that it will be difficult for the school to maintain its academic freedom even when there is no direct interference from Hanban (Luqiu and McCarthy 2018). For instance, The Toronto District School Board, the largest public school in Canada terminated its relationship with the Confucius Institute after a massive protest organized by academics and parents. The collective actions were taken after the evidence of Chinese government interference were identified, which was restricting the critical discussion of sensitive topics such as the status of Tibet and Taiwan or the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. The research mentioned that the attempts of Confucius Institutes to shape a positive image of China collided with the spirit of a Canadian university to promote freedom of thought and expression (Wu 2017)

Second, researches focused on the influence of the media coverage on the formation of the public's perception towards the Confucius Institute. Luqiu and MacCarthy explain the way U.S. media frame the cooperation between Hanban and U.S. universities and how it is highly relevant to the legitimacy given to the Confucius Institutes. The paper mentioned the importance of media framing because of its effects on how people understand and evaluate specific issues and analyzed how it can be applied to explain the case of Confucius Institutes. When media focused on the negative aspects of

cooperation, such as doubts about the institute's legal legitimacy or the potential harm to academic integrity, more negative reactions were created from the public, making it more difficult for universities to host the Confucius Institutes. Contrarily, when the media paid more attention to the positive or neutral aspects of Confucius Institutes, less resistance was found in accepting Hanban's offers. It was also noted as a contributing factor in the closure of the Confucius Institute of the University of Chicago, which occurred after the negative newspaper coverage on the Congressional hearings about Confucius Institutes (Luqiu and McCarthy 2018).

Another study by Leuk, Pippis, and Lin analyzed the New York Times reports on Confucius Institutes. The study shows the history of the coverage and how the characteristics of the coverage changed over the past years evolved. In the initial periods of the Confucius Institutes establishments, the New York Times had minimal coverage. However, in the following five years, the New York Times started to use the typical Western stereotype on viewing Confucius Institute alongside other U.S. presses (Leuk, Pippis and Lin 2014). Lim has compared the media coverage about China in South Korea with that of the New York Times, saying that the U.S. press is using the political and ideological framework which disturbs creating a positive image on Confucius Institutes. He mentioned that because South Korean domestic newspapers are

free from the influence of particular ideological framework, perception on Confucius Institutes could be maintained positive and neutral in South Korea (Lim 2017).

Third, studies focused on the economic effects of the Confucius Institutes and how they are correlated with the economic trade volume or foreign direct investments. Literature analyzed both sides of the causal relationship, looking into the economic benefits that Confucius Institutes might bring, and how the attitudes towards Confucius Institutes differ by the hosting country's level of economic dependence to China. Lien, Oh and Selmier used the gravity model to analyze the influence of Confucius Institutes on outward trade, and FDI flows from China, which was the first paper to examine the relationship of economics and soft power initiative. They have found significant increases in both Chinese exports and FDI in developing countries through the establishment of Confucius Institutes, but less or no discernable change for developed Anglo-American economies (Lien, Oh and Selmier 2011).

Using the same gravity model, Lien, Lo and Bojanic conducted another study comparing the economic effects among different language and cultural center including Goethe Institut, Instituto Cervantes, and Confucius Institute. Out of the three institutes, Confucius Institute had the least impact on

increasing trade and FDI, almost one third the effect of Goethe Institut. They pointed out the cultural disparity as a substantial contributing factor on why the Chinese government has not been as successful as the German Goethe Institut and Spanish Instituto Cervantes (Lien, Lo and Bojanic 2018).

Hsiao and Yang compared the Confucius Institute in Southeast Asia in relation to economic dependency and security relationship. The study analyzed that economic dependency had less importance on the establishment of the Confucius Institute, saying how economic incentives were merely a contributing factor. Furthermore, the study highlighted the importance of how government and public perceive China, stating that government-to-government and society-to-society ties between China might be more critical in the establishment of the Confucius Institute. The paper provides a case study of Myanmar, which has preferred to engage rather passively towards establishing the Confucius Institute in its country. Despite being highly dependent economically, the government of Myanmar had doubts on the institutes, perceiving Confucius Institute as a security threat to the regime viewing it as great external propaganda. Myanmar government was afraid it might reinforce the influence of local ethnic Chinese and challenge its own authority (Hsiao and Yang 2014).

As shown in previous literature, there were efforts to explain the

responses Confucius Institute was receiving and to find the determinants for the difference. When analyzing the diverging responses from hosting nation's governments, most studies conducted case studies by grouping western nations into one category and compared it to developing nations. Studies analyzed how western countries as a whole was viewing Confucius Institute negatively while developing countries are on the favorable category. Different degrees of attitudes were found among these Anglo-American nations. This paper will delve into these differences.

3. Scope and Methodology

This research will analyze the member nations of the Five Eyes, which is the joint intelligence cooperation composed of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, to compare the different responses towards Confucius Institute. The Five Eyes member states were selected in this research to control variables such as cultural dissimilarity with China and economic development status, which were identified as major contributing factors to explain the different response to Confucius Institute. With such factors controlled, the primary visible factor that could influence responses is the perceived security threat from China as can be seen from Hsiao and Yang's

Myanmar case.

The adoption of Huawei equipment in the rollout of a 5G network is used as a barometer to measure the level of the perceived security threat from China. The concerns on Huawei and its possible threat to national security have been an ongoing issue in many countries as a series of reports suggested that Huawei equipment had a backdoor to collect confidential data and could possibly share it with the Chinese government. Such accusation on Huawei was amplified since Chinese law requires organizations and citizens to support, assist and cooperate with intelligence work, which can make Huawei's equipment a conduit for espionage (Slezak and Bogle 2018). Even though Huawei has denied the accusation that it poses a national security risk, cybersecurity issues around Huawei and its alleged links to the Chinese Communist Party and its military still remains.

Five countries will be classified into three groups according to the stance each government is taking towards Huawei equipment adoption. The three levels of stances are 'ban in effect,' 'likely to ban' and 'on the fence,' that is from the Huawei Barometer provided by Bloomberg (Nicola 2019). Each nation's government response to the Confucius Institutes will then be measured and observed whether it is positively correlated to the actions taken in response to Huawei inclusion.

To measure the degree of perceptions towards both Confucius Institute and security threat, we have analyzed documents and reports from various sources, including white papers, newspaper articles, and academic papers. This research puts the highest authority to the publications and actions taken by the government in determining the level of threat.

II. Five Eyes' Response

1. Five Eyes Network

The member states take a diverging position on security towards China, even though the Five Eyes is a robust security intelligence-sharing alliance. To explain this divergence, to understand the network dimension of the five eyes alliance and bringing international relations perspective on the analysis should be preceded.

The Five Eyes network is an asymmetric form of alliance, with the United States being the leading partner, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand take the role as junior partners to Washington, distinct from the United Kingdom who's established global intelligence capabilities and historical role in Europe make it more of a senior partner in the network. Junior members participate in this alliance to maximize the gains they receive by being allied to stronger members while seniors exert their influence (O'Neil 2017).

Historically, junior allies often found themselves bending towards the will of the major powers, but there were some occasions which they took different foreign policy choices from the senior allies. In instances where the policy decisions are at odds with their sovereign interests and create

vulnerability, member countries took diverging measures from their allies. For example, Canada and New Zealand chose not to participate in the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq although both countries had access to the same intelligence source from the network that was mostly gathered by the U.K. and US. On the other hand, Australia chose to join the US-led coalition with many other reasons, not least the quest for FTA with the United States (O'Neil 2017).

It is shown that under the situation that could bring significant security risks or substantial economic benefits to their sovereign interest, individual member states calculate whether the benefits to the country exceeds the costs they have to assume to come up with the most appropriate policy decision. This is also noticed within the specific measures on recent Huawei equipment adoption on the rollout of the 5G network, which became controversial with suspicion on Chinese espionage.

We will first analyze why and how the individual five eyes members are taking such positions on this issue by explaining the characteristics of the relationship each nation has with China. In addition, the response to the Confucius Institute will be explained in detail. By looking at the position, each government takes on Huawei equipment adoption and Confucius Institute; this study will be able to capture the relationship between the perceived security threat and response towards the Confucius Institute.

2. Ban in Effect

1-1. United States

1-1-1. Response to China

The United States is at the center of the movement of banning Huawei equipment for the rollout of the 5G network. The Trump administration has been persuading other countries, including the Five Eyes and its allies throughout Asia and Europe, from adopting Huawei's equipment. U.S. government emphasized the dangers of the equipment as the Chinese government could use it for espionage purposes. U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo has warned explicitly that U.S. government might hold back intelligence-sharing with NATO allies and the Five Eyes nations if they choose to use Huawei equipment for 5G network infrastructures (Wroughton, Szakacs 2019). Furthermore, the Trump administration added Huawei to a Commerce Department blacklist on May 17, requiring U.S. companies to consist an exclusive license to sell their product to Huawei along with limiting Huawei to buy the parts from U.S. companies. Qualcomm, Intel Corp., Google, and others soon announced to freeze the supplies of critical software and components to Huawei, which could retard the rollout of 5G networks

worldwide. Slow down caused by the blacklist is considered to be crucial for Huawei as it could possibly work to change the decisions of the countries that have been planning to adopt Huawei equipment (Donnan 2019).

United States government officials and industry have long been concerned about Chinese espionage in general and Huawei's role in particular as non-traditional information collectors that serve the Chinese government's military and strategic ambitions. Those concerns were first introduced by the report in 2012 by the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, which warned U.S. companies against using equipment made by Chinese telecom companies, tagging Huawei and ZTE Corp. According to the report, Huawei did not fully cooperate with the investigation and was unwilling to explain its relationship with the government, while credible evidence exists that Huawei fails to comply with U.S. laws.

The report also highlighted Huawei's corporate history, suggesting its ties to the military, mentioning the background of Ren Zhengfei, the founder of Huawei in 1987, who also served in the People's Liberation Army as an engineer. In 2018, another bill was passed to ban phones made by both Huawei and ZTE Corp. in U.S. government agencies. The government also suggested that companies who want to do business with the government in the future should cut their own Huawei ties (Reuters 2018). Soon after the ban, Sabrina

Meng Wanzhou, the CFO and daughter of its founder and CEO Ren Zhengfei was arrested in Vancouver in December 2018. She was alleged for lying to U.S. banks in order to clear the transaction with Iran, violating American sanctions on Iran (Rapoza 2019). Huawei had repeatedly been denying U.S.'s doubt on Huawei as a potential security threat, helping Beijing spy on other governments or corporations. Huawei pointed out that there is no proof to support such charges that Huawei is working for the espionage of the Chinese government.

The Huawei ban could be explained by a decade prolonged escalation of security tension between the U.S. and China. In November 2011, then U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had announced a U.S. "Pivot" to Asia, in her essay for Foreign Policy. This marked a start of new excellent power competition since the end of the Cold War. Since then, the U.S.-China relations underwent a fundamental change in commerce to the South China Sea. Since his inauguration in January 2017, President Donald Trump vowed to modify existing unfair U.S.-China relations, especially in the field of trade. In accordance with his promises, President Trump has imposed a tariff to ignite trade negotiation to bring concessions from China. Furthermore, the U.S. government increased military presence by establishing Indo-Pacific Command and enhanced military budget and capability and approached to

nations to rally against China and its Belt and Road Initiative.

The recent escalation of the U.S.-China tension could be seen as the result of President Trump's own initiative since authoritative documents and papers by the executive branch explicitly state the current administration's hawkish stance against China. Updated National Security Strategy (NSS) published under White House, National Defense Strategy (NDS) by Department of Defense, and United States Trade Representative's (USTR) annual special 301 report also contain hawkish statements toward China. However, this attitude was not limited to the White House. Despite suffering from an unseen level of divisive politics, the Capitol also had shown bipartisan support for current China Policy, which is notable as Democrats have been showing consistent opposition towards President Trump's major policies and commitments.

Two leaders of Democrats, the Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, and the Speaker of the U.S. House Representative Nancy Pelosi are also China Hawks. Senator Chuck Schumer has been referred to as the closest Democratic ally of President Trump's tariff policy (Everett and Caygle 2019). Senator Schumer referred to China as 'the great danger' and emphasized the needs to strengthen the coordination against China by modifying current multifront tariff strategy (Everett and Caygle 2019). Speaker Pelosi agreed to President

Trump's action, saying that something needs to be done (Rapoza 2018). She also made a Press Release in March 2018, criticizing China's unfair trade policies including 'Made in China 2025' and endorsed Trump Administration's New Tariff on China (Pelosi 2018). Many Democrats in House and Senates also join the president's China Policy, despite their concern for bipartisan cover (Everett and Caygle 2019).

Moreover, the bipartisan support against China can also be inferred from the annual reports by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC). The USCC is the commission founded to submit annual reports on the national security implication and recommendation regarding the U.S.-China Relations to Congress for both legislative and administrative action. Its members are composed of 12 members including Majority and Minority Leaders or Speaker from both Senates and House, who represents both sides of the political spectrum. In its 2018 Report to Congress, the commission made a comprehensive review on China encompassing U.S.-China Economic, trade and Security relations, China's foreign policy and initiatives and China's high-tech development. Through the analysis, the commission made 26 recommendations, including ten key recommendations with particular significance, highly resembling President Trump's policies and rhetoric.

Recommendations were made to USTR to identify the possible trade-distorting practices by China. It also directed the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to find details of existing facilities built through Belt and Road Initiative. The report also made recommendations to the Congress to request the Office of Management and Budget's Information Security Officer to prepare an annual report including existing departmental procurement and security policies and guidance on cyber and data security, which could affect IT, IoT, and 5G networks. In addition, the report requested the National Telecommunications and Information Administration and Federal Communications Commission to focus on the security threat posed by the equipment and services manufactured from China and to identify potential statutory authorities to ensure the security of the domestic 5G network (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2018). These specific recommendations are aligned with president Trump's policy, particularly its effort to ban and investigate Huawei for security reasons.

Such consensus between the executive and legislative branches on the security threats from China is expected to extend the ongoing disputes between the U.S. and China. In response to the U.S.'s action, the Chinese government is bracing for a more protracted fight. According to Financial Times, On May 20, 2019, Chinese movies on the Korean War, "War to Resist

America and Aid Korea," were released during the primetime on the state television. Furthermore, on May 22, President Xi called for a 'New Long March' (Li and Chen 2019), a reference to the desperate journey that Red Army took under Mao's leadership. There are views predicting that Beijing is waiting for Trump's defeat in Next year's presidential election hoping for a favorable negotiation with Democrats. However, it is unlikely for Democrats to be more lenient with China.

According to Pew Research Center, in 2017, both Democrats and Republicans had stronger concerns for cyber attacks from China, 60% of Republicans and 55% for Democrats, suggesting that security issues could continue to hinder the bilateral relations. Democratic candidates for 2020 presidential election, including Joe Biden, Bernie Sanders, and Elizabeth Warren, share a hawkish view towards China with President Trump. All candidates have shown consensus on the idea that China should be contained (D. Scott 2019).

In accordance with the perceived threat from China, Trump administration requested universities to join the anti-Huawei movement and took measures to scrutinize Huawei's research collaboration with American universities. In recent years, Huawei has been building partnerships and joint centers for high-end research with universities around the world, especially in

North America and Europe. Huawei Innovation Research Program (HIRP) had covered 300 universities worldwide with 1200 project funding (Sharma 2019). The research topics included artificial intelligence, deep learning, machine learning, computer vision, natural language processing, and reinforcement learning, which all have essential future military applications (WHOTMP 2018).

The 'Protect Our University Act' was introduced in February 2019, to establish a task force led by the US Department of Education to create a list of researches of such topics. The act also called for the intelligence director to create a list of foreign entities that pose a threat of espionage and stipulates that Huawei be included. Schools including, Stanford University, University of California's flagship Berkeley campus and other schools made their decisions to join the movement and cut ties with Huawei on HIRP. Princeton cut new funding ties with Huawei, and the University of Minnesota cut ties with both Huawei and Confucius Institute (Yu 2019).

1-1-2. Confucius Institutes

The United States has the largest number of Confucius Institutes than any other country. According to the Hanban Website, there are 105 Confucius Institutes and 501 Confucius classrooms located in 44 of the 50 states. The

first U.S. Confucius Institute was opened at the University of Maryland in 2004. The Confucius Institutes in the United States are supported by Confucius Institute U.S. Center (CIUS) in Washington D.C. According to CIUS, its goal is to provide resources and supports to school districts that wish to develop a Chinese language curriculum. It also gives professional development opportunities to teachers in U.S. Confucius Institutes. Hanban opened CIUS in 2013 and designated CIUS as its overseas representative in the U.S. CIUS received suspicion on its role as an organization that conducts surveillance on Confucius Institutes, but CIUS identifies itself as a subsidiary organization without any authority in individual Confucius Institutes.

In 2018, the CIA issued a classified report on China's influence operation in the U.S., with a section dedicated to Confucius Institute, warning that China is using financial incentives to permeate universities as a way of promoting a positive view of Beijing and deterring research that could cast China in a negative way. USCC has also warned the danger of the Confucius Institutes as an essential platform for a more extensive program to increase China's soft power, advancing Beijing's version of history. The commission also mentioned that China is actively carrying out international propaganda battles to combat Western and other foreign narratives. According to the report, Confucius Institute has been documented to eliminate topics that deemed

threats to the stability of Chinese government rule (USCC 2018).


In addition, an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act was passed in August 2018. A new requirement says that no institutions receiving funding from the Pentagon can host a Confucius Institute. University of Minnesota, Indiana University and Rhode Island have already closed its institute because its credit-bearing Chinese Language Flagship Program is financed by the Defense Department and many more universities are expected to cut the ties due to this amendment. Three more universities in April 2019 announced their plan to close the Confucius Institutes. San Francisco State University, the University of Oregon and Western Kentucky University said that the Department of Defense declined their requests for waivers that would allow them to continue to operate both programs (Redden 2019). There are more universities that are under this situation, such as the University of Hawaii at Manoa, and Arizona State University. They have both confirmed their request for waivers were denied, but have not made concrete decisions yet. They are in the process of finding other options.

In 2019, United States Senate released a report condemning Confucius Institute. The report was issued by the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs calling for stringent controls to be placed on these centers. The report warned that the Confucius Institutes should be closed

unless they are overhauled. The report has pointed out the transparency issue as a problem to fix. These include the visa reviews on Chinese teachers that are selected by China, and revealing unspecified and spending and bylaws online. Since 2017, the State Department issued four Letters of Concern to U.S. schools to find inappropriately used J-1 visas related to the Confucius Institutes and revoked 32 visas for Confucius Institute exchange visitors. The State Department has conducted two field site reviews of Confucius Institute in 2018 in response to this visa violation and is planning to double the visit, conducting four field site reviews in 2019.

The first closure of the Confucius Institutes in the U.S. was taken independent of the government intervention. The University of Chicago announced in September 2014 that it would not be renewing its contract, citing a statement made by Xu Lin, the Hanban's Director General as the reason for the split. During the early stages, the closing of the Confucius Institutes was mainly due to the criticism from the academics similar to the cases in Canada. In early 2014, more than 100 professors at school signed a petition requesting the closure of its Confucius Institute, mentioning the universities' lack of controls over the hiring and training of Confucius Institute teachers. Also, Pennsylvania State University ended the relationship, with the dean of the school's College of the Liberal Arts remarked in a written statement that

"several of our goals are not consistent with those of Hanban." Later in 2018, four other universities, including Texas A&M University closed, due to the amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act as mentioned previously. The timeline below shows all of the U.S. schools that have closed their Confucius Institute.



Collective actions against Confucius Institutes were taken earlier than the government. The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) has released an official statement criticizing Confucius Institutes in 2014. The AAUP's Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure recommended that universities cease their involvement in Confucius Institute unless they can

renegotiate the contracts. AAUP has described the relationship as “partnership that sacrificed the integrity of the university and its academic staff.” In case universities still chose to host Confucius Institute, AAUP set forth three criteria that should meet before they form the contract: 1) renegotiate the contract to ensure the university enjoys "unilateral control", consistent with principles articulated in the AAUP's Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities, overall academic matters, including recruitment of teachers, determination of curriculums and choice of texts; 2) ensure that Confucius Institute teachers enjoy the same academic freedom rights as all other faculty members, as defined in the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure; and 3) make the university's agreement with the Hanban “available to all members of the university community” in order to promote transparency (AAUP 2014).

The National Association of Scholars also published a report “Outsourced to China- Confucius Institute and Soft Power in American Higher Education” in 2017 (Peterson 2017). The organization has gathered concerns from the academia on the external threat on academic freedom and conducted case studies at twelve Confucius Institutes in New Jersey and New York. The report categorized the causes for concerns in four areas, including intellectual freedom, transparency, entanglement, and soft power and ended the report by

recommending all universities to close their Confucius Institutes. In case the colleges or university refuses to close the relationship, NAS has recommended the faculty and administration to push the reforms including the requirement that all Confucius Institutes to offer at least one public lecture or class each year on the topics that are important in Chinese history that are currently neglected, such as the Tiananmen Square protests or the Dalai Lama's views on Tibet. NAS recommended that these lectures should be free from external pressure, fair and balanced (Peterson 2017).

However, some universities professors said the relationship with Confucius Institute is positive, and there are no concerns over academic freedom. Some of the schools have included noninterference on academic freedom in their written contracts and assured that there was no sign of the Chinese Government's influence over the selection of the topics that were dealt in the classes. Many teachers said they were free to use any materials of their own and there was no interference on that. However, NAS claims even though there were no signs of direct interference from the organization found, schools will not be free from the self-censorship issues unless universities are receiving funding from the Chinese government (Peterson 2017).

1-2. Australia

1-2-1. Response to China

Australia is the only member of the Five Eyes, apart from the U.S., to ban the use of Huawei equipment in the rollout of 5G infrastructure over national security concerns. While other Five Eyes countries have not made definite public statements on the exclusion of Huawei equipment, the Federal Government said it would be interpreting the Telecommunications Sector Security Reforms (TSSR) reform announced in 2017 to disqualify any company that was “likely subject to extrajudicial direction from a foreign government that conflict with Australian law”. The TSSR came to an effect on September 2018 and included a security obligation requiring vendors to protect their networks against threats to national security (Skezak and Bogle 2018).

In the statement from Prime Minister Scott Morrison, then Home Affairs Minister, and Senator Mitch Fifield confirmed that carriers might be restricted from buying equipment from companies operating in certain countries (Finley 2018). The statement did not explicitly name Huawei or China, but Huawei Australia confirmed by Twitter that it had been told by the Government that it would be banned. The company also mentioned that it is an extremely

disappointing result for customers, saying it has 'safely and securely delivered wireless technology in Australia for close to 15 years (Skezak et al. 2018).'

After the government's announcement, economic retaliation was followed by China. Dalian has reported restricting coal imports from Australia. Even though Chinese government said the inspections for coal imports were for environmental purposes, with China having the history of using trade as leverage, banning import is interpreted as another signal of China pressuring Australia regarding the 5G network rollout. China's foreign ministry also did not say it was specifically targeting Australia, but Australia is the world's largest coal exporter, and it accounts for more than 20% of China's coal imports, making Australia an obvious target (Scott and Murtaugh 2019)

Although there is a certain degree of economic risk it has to assume, the Australian government did not reverse their decision on excluding Huawei. This was not difficult to predict, because when the Australian government was forced to choose between the two, it had shown a tendency to choose security over the economy, as security also plays an integral role in ensuring the health of the economy. Geographically, due to the inhospitable landscape, Australia has a small population compared to its size, therefore unable to create a self-sufficient domestic market. In addition, it has a very long coastline, which limits its military capabilities. Australia had to both secure sea routes and

spurred economic activity through trade. While China was the largest trading partner (export 85B USD) in 2017, Australia still had, U.S. (import 20.5B USD), Japan (export 34.6B USD) and India (export 14.8B USD) within its security alliance to fall back on, to compensate the economic risks caused by China (Fedirka 2018). Under these geopolitical circumstances, security awareness had grown more prominent in 2010 when China was pushing its power over the territorial claims in the South China Sea. US Marines in Darwin was endorsed in 2011, making an even stronger commitment to the U.S.'s emerging military strategy in Asia (Ayson 2012).

For example, Australia participated in the re-established Quadrilateral Security Dialogue involving the U.S., Japan and India since 2017 and Defense Minister Christopher Pyne highlighted the needs to resolve disputes in the South China Sea to military leaders in Singapore during the 2019 Fullerton Forum. Along with forming a stronger military alliance to protect the trade routes, the government sought to expand their defense capability by announcing to invest 90 billion AUD in the Royal Australian Navy and plans to grow its defense budget to over two percent of its GDP by 2021 (Medcalf 2019).

Australia's 2017 foreign policy white paper also explicitly states its influence and economic opportunities in Papua New Guinea, other Pacific

states and Timor-Leste, and recognizes to counter 'increasing competition' and 'growing aid and loans from other sources' that could 'strain the capacity of countries to absorb assistance and manage their debt levels'. The statement considered to be directed against China and can be interpreted as an attempt to reassert Australia's influence in the region.

Within the Five Eyes alliance, Australia has shared the burden in the area of signals intelligence (SIGINT) in Indonesia, southern China, and the nations in Indo China. Such roles are divided between the members in accordance with their national priorities (Richelson 2012). According to Snowden disclosures, most of the collaboration between Australian Signals Directorate and the National Security Agency has focused on China and Indonesia encompassing military and political intelligence gathering as well as economic espionage. The Australian government has made significant policy decisions influenced by the U.S. intelligence assessment, as being allied to a stronger military power is perceived as the alliance's most important benefit for Australia.

This explains how, even within the Five Eyes network, Australia had been paying more attention to the security threat from China in particular, and how the government had been working within the alliance, more like the country's bilateral intelligence relationship with the U.S., rather than the equal

engagement with other partners. (O’Neil 2017). In the 2017 government foreign policy white paper, the government explicitly stated that the alliance with the U.S. is central to Australia and that without active U.S. political economic and security engagement, it will be more difficult for Australia to achieve the level of the security and stability they seek (Whitepaper 2017).

The decision made by the Australian government on banning Huawei from 5G network building had been influenced significantly by the U.S.’s request, but the government had also taken independent actions to contend Huawei before for their own security concerns. In 2012, the country blocked Huawei from tendering contracts for its 38B AUD National Broadband Network (NBN) citing cyber security concerns (Horwitz 2018). The decision to ban Huawei in the involvement of NBN building was not changed even after the change of the government from the previous Labor government to conservative government in 2013 (Yueyang 2013). This proves the security concerns on Huawei are bipartisan and solid.

The Australian government has interfered in the Solomon Islands contract with Huawei as well. In 2016, Huawei won the contract to build the 4000km underwater cable connecting the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, and Australia (Horwitz 2018). It made Australian Department of Foreign Affairs offer to run a new tender and to pay for two-thirds of the link

if Huawei was excluded. The decision of the government cost Australia's foreign aid budget upwards 100 million AUD (Chirgwin 2018). Despite the high costs they had to assume, the Australian government signed the contract. Foreign Minister Julie Bishop announced that "We offered them an alternative to an undersea cable project; we believe is cheaper, faster, more reliable than the competitor" (Chirgwin 2018).

To counter the suspicion on reliability, Huawei Australia also made a statement on Solomon Island undersea cable in August 2017, through their website. Huawei rejected the allegations and announced that there is no basis in fact, and Huawei has never given, implied, nor promised any political donations in relation to the project (Hooley 2017). Also, Huawei tried to explain that it is not involved with politics and cybersecurity remains a top priority in all of their business projects and remains open to working with governments and industry to address global cyber security challenges together (Hooley 2017). Despite their effort, Huawei failed to participate in the underwater cable project, becoming another example of showing how Australia perceives Chinese participation in the Pacific region as a threat to their security.

1-2-2. Confucius Institutes

According to Hanban Web page, there are 14 Confucius Institutes on Australian university campuses and 67 Confucius Classrooms. Confucius Institutes operates following the guideline provided by Hanban, and provide Chinese classes to the University. Not only the students but the wider community takes credit of the courses. The institute organizes cultural performances, public lectures, speech competitions and exchange programs with partner universities in China. Confucius Institutes also organize translating and interpreting services, administer Chinese language proficiency test, coordinate language competitions, and arrange study tours to China. The activities are quite identical to the other Confucius Institutes, while some Confucius Institutes conduct individual courses. For example, the Queensland University of Technology in Brisbane focuses on professional development for teachers and supports Chinese language and culture education in schools. Also, Griffith University on the Gold Coast, the institute focuses on language and culture training for tourism. The Confucius Institute at RMIT University in Melbourne mainly teaches Chinese medicine (Gil 2019).

The view on Confucius Institute is very similar to that of the United States, believing there is high risk in the relationship. Looking at how the Australian government is being highly dependent on the bilateral relationship

with the U.S. on security alliance, the attitude towards the Confucius Institute is aligned with policy decisions it has made on Huawei, represented as the equipment of Chinese espionage. In addition, concerns over Chinese influence on tertiary education have been escalated due to the continuous increase of Chinese students.

By 2017, a number of international students recorded 753,000 and 380,000 of them in tertiary studies and numbers are growing continuously. In several universities, such as University of Sydney, Melbourne University, UNSW, Monash University, and RMIT, international students make up nearly forty percent of the student body, with over a third of total revenue derived from their tuition fees. Chinese students consist of 30 percent of all students. Thus the concerns on being overly reliant on China was escalated as it was perceived as putting Australia's education at risk of political and economic repercussions. The government received criticism from the public and academia because they had been gradually cutting the funding to universities over decades, making universities to rely on Chinese student's fees to support their operation (Burton-Bradley 2018).

With criticism towards the government about Chinese influence over the education industry, the Australian government has taken direct steps to monitor the Confucius Institutes. The Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme

Act was commenced in December 2018, with its purpose to provide the public and government decision-makers with visibility of the nature, level, and extent of foreign influence on Australia's government and political process (DFAT 2018). According to the website, the scheme introduces registration obligations for persons and entities who have arrangements with, and undertake certain activities on behalf of, foreign principals. Moreover, it reports that whether a person or entity is required to register will depend on whom the foreign principal is, the nature of the activities undertaken, the purpose for which the activities are undertaken, and in some cases, whether the person has held a senior public position in Australia (DFAT 2018). It has been reported that the Attorney General's Department has written to universities that host Confucius Institutes, asking them to register the institutes under the scheme (Gil 2019).

The inspection has been projected to Confucius Classrooms as well. In May 2018, The New South Wales Government decided to review the Confucius Classroom program amid claims it could expose children to propaganda. A spokesman for Education Minister Rob Stokes confirmed that Chinese Government-funded travel program for NSW school principals had been postponed and the Government was now investigating Confucius Classrooms due to the raised concerns. The spokesman said "The Department

of Education's relationship with the Confucius Institute is currently under review to ensure that there are no inappropriate influences from foreign powers," and "It would be inappropriate to comment further until this review has concluded." (Gerathy and Kozaki 2018)

Before these recent government measures, a critical debate of these institutions has occurred primarily among academics (Kwok 2018). The most common criticisms raised during the early phases on the establishment of the Confucius Institutes were on a threat to academic freedom. In 2007, Jocelyn Chey, a visiting professor at the University of Sydney, was one of the first academics to take a critical public stance to Confucius Institutes. She warned that if Confucius Institutes were responsible for research as part of the university's mainstream activities, this would lead to a "dumbing down" of research or even to the production of propaganda supportive of the Chinese government (Kwok 2018).

Also, John Fitzgerald of Swinburne University of technology warned that allowing the establishment of a Confucius Institutes on campus is in itself an unacceptable compromise. He said, "It marks a breach in the battlefield with Western liberal values." It is difficult to identify any specific evidence and instances where a Confucius Instituted has overstepped its boundaries. In Australia, no case of infringement upon academic freedom has been publicly

reported, but the Australian government has been keeping their eyes on the institute with the suspicion that more significant influence of China in the education sector could lead to higher risk on their national security (Kwok 2018).

3. Likely to Ban

1-1. Canada

1-1-1. Response to China

The Canadian government is still reviewing its policy on procurement contracts in the communications and IT sector, whether to ban on Huawei competing for 5G(Sharma 2019). Canada was expected to move more quickly in banning Huawei, with the U.S. wanting its allies to restrict the firm. However, Canada declined to speculate on when a decision would be made (Bloomberg 2019). According the spokesman for Ralph Goodell, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency, the government is carefully assessing the security challenges and potential threats involved in future 5G technologies, while recognizing the potential it holds for Canadians and that will be taking

appropriate decisions in due course to ensure that our networks are kept safe for Canadians (Wingrove 2019). The government is carefully deciding the timing of any announcement as Canada has been at diplomatic odds with China after the arrest of Meng Wanzhou, the CFO of Huawei in Vancouver on an American extradition request since December 2018 (Leigh and Li 2019).

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is expected to delay the decision as long as possible to avoid jeopardizing two Canadians detained in China appears to be retaliation for the arrest of Meng Wanzhou. Michael Kovrig, a former diplomat who was detained while visiting Beijing, was arrested on suspicion of “gathering state secrets and intelligence for abroad,” and Michael Spavor, a business consultant who was detained in northeastern China, was accused of “stealing and providing state secrets for abroad.” In May 2019, these two Canadians were formally arrested on espionage. Following the diplomatic tensions, economic tensions were triggered between the two countries. China has halted shipments of 2.7B CAD worth of Canadian canola oilseeds they bought from Canada in 2018, saying they were contaminated (Buckley and Hernandex and Bilefsky 2019). China buys typically 40 percent of Canada’s canola seeds, one of the key Canadian products, leaving Canadian farmers facing stockpiles of oilseeds with a falling price. Soybeans have piled along with canola, after the deterioration of relationship (Powell 2019). Furthermore,

20 percent of Canadian companies have been negatively impacted by the ongoing dispute between the two countries (CCBS 2019). The Canadian government has double the canola aid loans to one million CAD to help the farmers (Powell 2019). However, the fundamental resolution to the heightened economic tension is far-fetched.

Canada's major telecommunication industry is expected to be negatively influenced by the ban as well. For the past decade, Huawei has been somewhat successful in Canada, unlike in the United States and Australia. Its equipment is used in telecommunications infrastructure run by the country's major carriers, and some have sold Huawei's phones (Braga 2018). Out of the three major telecommunication companies, Telus Corp. and BCE Inc.'s Bell Canada are most heavily invested with Huawei and will be profoundly impacted by the government's announcement. Rogers Communication is only one out of the three to be free from the decision, as it uses Ericsson AB of Sweden. Despite the foreseen economic losses, many analysts still expect that Canada will eventually ban Huawei, bending to the decision made by the U.S. (Wingrove 2019). When it comes to economic relationship, U.S. is the largest trading partner for Canada in export (247B USD), ten times larger than from that of second largest trading partner China (18.4B USD), showing high dependency on the U.S. economically. Trudeau is anticipated to make the

decision before the upcoming elections scheduled in October; the decision is not likely to be reversed even after the change of the ruling party. Conservative Leader Andrew Scheer, who is higher in polls than Trudeau's Liberals also revealed his stance on blocking Huawei (Donaldson 2019).

However, the Canadian government has so far not asked universities to stop working with Huawei (Sharma 2019). Unlike the case of the United States, the research collaboration with universities remained still. Huawei had contributed around 30 million CAD to 13 research universities in Canada and estimated that more than 100 professors and graduate students had worked on Huawei projects in Canadian universities in recent years. In 2017 Huawei said it would spend 10 million USD until 2020 in Canadian universities. The University of British Columbia in Vancouver signed in October 2017 for new projects and "ongoing 5G research initiative" over the consecutive three years. In Jan 2018, Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario, accepted new research funding from Huawei. However, things could change if the U.S. government puts more pressure Canada (Sharma 2019).

Compared to the U.S. and Australia, Canada shows less concern over the security threat from China but places a strong emphasis on ensuring international security alliances. Within the Five Eyes network, Canada is in charge of SIGINT in the polar regions of Russia, taking an only supplementary

role in intelligence collection from China. In 2017 Canada's defense policy report, the word 'China' is mentioned only three times, unlike other countries in the Five Eyes network who dedicates the whole chapter for China. Canada briefly mentions the importance of balancing the relationship and a need to engage with emerging powers but does not mention China specifically. Instead, Canada pays most attention to the rise of activities in the Arctic region where issues of climate change, international trade and global security meet, and how to bolster its ability to operate in North and work with allies and partners. Although China is not the primary security concern to Canada domestically, U.S. led traditional alliance such as the Five Eyes, NATO and NORAD have significant importance in forming the defense policy of Canada.

Canada's defense partnership with the U.S. is integral to continental security. The U.S. is Canada's most important military ally; sharing a land border close to 9000 km. Canada is exercising its strategic vision for securing North America with the U.S. by being committed to a defense partnership in North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) that was created in 1957. Furthermore, Canada shows a strong commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a founding member. Canada identifies itself as a leadership role within NATO and prioritizes interoperability in the planning and capability development to cooperate with the member countries.

With U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo warning that the U.S. might hold back intelligence-sharing with NATO allies if they use Huawei equipment for 5G network infrastructure, it is evident for Canada to make a decision to follow U.S.'s request in excluding Huawei.

1-1-2. Confucius Institutes

There are 12 Confucius Institutes and 35 Confucius Classroom currently opened in Canada according to the Hanban website. China opened the first Confucius Institute in Canada in 2005 in the British Columbia Institute of Technology jointly with the Southwest University in China (Wu 2017). Confucius Institutes in Canada provides services based on the characteristics of each university and have shaped some unique traits. Chinese course in Vancouver's Confucius Institute puts more attention to the exchange of economy and culture, teaching Chinese-related communication skills and specializing in Chinese language courses for business people. The Confucius Institute in Quebec set up two branch institutes at Dorothy College and the University of Sherbrooke, the former teaches in English and provides Chinese short-term training courses, while the latter teaches in French and offers postgraduate courses in Chinese literature, law, and medicine (Wu 2017).

In 2013, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) held a

conference in collaboration with the Department of National Defence and released a report on the security threat from the rising power of China in the international community. The report dedicated a chapter on Confucius Institute, saying that the institution is more of a political entity rather than a cultural and language education center, and how it can be a threat to Canadian education. According to the report, the Confucius Institutes' primary goal was to project the political agendas of the Chinese Communist Party, as they are funded and controlled by the Chinese Ministry of Education. The report summarized the dangers of Confucius Institutes mainly in three: 1) Hanban, which provides budgets in establishment of Confucius Institute is affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Education, an organization that works according to the Higher Education Law that is designed to uphold the ideological orthodoxy of “Marxism-Leninism, Deng Xiaoping Theory and Mao Zedong Thought; 2) teachers of Confucius Institutes are selective to spread the prejudicial and undemocratic idea of Chinese government and 3) Confucius Institutes do not allow critical discussion of topics that the Chinese government deems sensitive, such as the status of Tibet and Taiwan or the 1989 Tiananmen massacre (CSIS 2013).

However, no direct actions, including regular inspections or law enactment, were taken from the government towards Confucius Institutes after


the event. The Canadian government took a less aggressive form of response towards Confucius Institute, different from the governments of U.S. and Australia. On the other hand, non-governmental organizations' participation in coercing Confucius Institute was more active than the government. Negative opinions were raised from academia, civilians, and media with several collective actions taken in these groups. Non-governmental participation in contending Confucius Institutes was most active in Canada amongst the Five Eyes nations, thus ended up being the first hosting country to cut ties with the Confucius Institutes on campus.

In 2013, the first collective action from academia was initiated. The Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) passed a resolution calling on the Canadian universities to end the relationship with Confucius Institutes due to the concerns over fundamentally violating academic independence of students and limiting the autonomy of the university operations. Many universities took actions after the awareness of the institution was raised (NAS 2017). McMaster University was the first to close its Confucius Institute in 2013 after Chinese counterpart refused to erase the clauses, which were considered to be violating human rights, in its hiring practices for teachers that would come to Canadian universities to teach students (Ghoreishi 2019). The University of Sherbrooke also canceled its

contracts in the same year. In 2014, other actors besides school officials and professors joined the protest to close down Confucius institutes in the Toronto District School Board (Fowler 2019).

In April 2014, the Toronto District School Board (TDSB) signed an agreement with the Hanban to build the fifth Confucius Institute in Ontario and set to operate its programs in September. TDSB is the largest public school boards in Canada, with 232,000 students included. With its vast presence in the community, hundreds of people including students, parents, and teachers protested in rallies against the agreement outside the door of TDSB, to break the agreement. Parents of students filed a petition online with 13,000 supporters, demanding a TDSB trustees vote to cancel a contract with Confucius Institute altogether, saying the partnership was not aligned to the community values as it restricts academic freedom and promotes political aims of Chinese Communist Party (Reuters 2014). In October, the TDSB finally voted 20 to 2 vote on ending the planned partnership with Confucius Institutes (Wu 2017). Most recently, New Brunswick announced to end the program by June 2019, saying that the program provides a restricted and one-dimensional view of China, influencing students, so they only have a positive image of China. The decisions were followed by students' complaints about the programs. Five students who were enrolled to the program revealed that

saying specific topics such as Taiwan were off-limits in the classrooms, restricting the freedom of speech of both students and teachers who were hired by the Chinese government (Ghoreishi 2019).



※ List of Confucius Institutes closed in Canada by May 2019

A number of mainstream broadcasting companies, including Canadian public media CBC reported negative news on Confucius Institute continuously, excluding the efforts or amendments made in the contracts by the Chinese counterpart to deal with the previously raised conflicts. In addition to the mainstream media coverage, the documentary ‘In the Name of Confucius’ was filmed in Canada in 2017, exposing the controversies surrounding the Confucius Institutes. It was the first documentary film dealing with Confucius Institutes featuring the exclusive personal story of Sonia Zhao, a former Confucius Institute teacher, whose defection initiated the debate on

establishing Confucius Institute in TDBS in 2013. In the Name of Confucius has won a number of international awards and nominations, including Outstanding Achievement Award of Humanitarian at the IndieFEST Film Awards. As of August 2018, it has successfully screened in 12 countries, including screenings in the parliaments of the United Kingdom and New South Wales (Doris 2018). The film screening took place in all Five Eyes member countries, mostly in places where Confucius Institutes were already controversial. This film has been used as one of the evidence for both governmental and non-governmental organizations to back up their opinion how Confucius Institute pose a threat to the society, alongside the loss of academic integrity, violations to human rights codes, and even potential infringements on national security (Doris 2016).

Compared to the U.S. and Australia, where coercive actions towards Confucius Institutes are stronger by the governmental entities, Canada's responses mainly comes from the public. Although Canadian Intelligence agencies have conducted several seminars and prepared reports on the dangers of institutions, government's role remained relatively small. Instead, collective actions were taken by the academics, communities, and media that have caused to shut down the Confucius Institutes. According to the national opinion poll of Asia-Pacific Foundations, more than 60 percent of respondents

have shown concerns over the cultural influence from Asia, mainly from China. Also, they expressed more significant opposition with adding Asian language courses in public schools, which was demonstrated as an example in TDDBS (Wu 2017). Concerns were less about the security but instead focused on academic freedom and human rights violation, that invoked public opposition to the institution.

4. On the Fence

1-1. New Zealand

1-1-1. Response to China

New Zealand had previously announced to exclude Huawei's participation in the 5G network, along with Australia, but has taken its words back saying no final decisions are made. In New Zealand, any telecommunication provider that wants to adopt new technology to the network has to notify New Zealand's government security agency and undergo an assessment under the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Act 2013 (TICSA). In November 2018, GCSB blocked New

Zealand's major mobile company Spark's proposal on using Huawei equipment in its 5G upgrade, citing national security risks. GCSB Minister Andrew Little said the decision was made as the technology itself was too risky, and it had nothing to do with Huawei being Chinese company (RNZ 2018).

Despite the efforts to disassociate the ban with the ongoing U.S.-led coercion on a Chinese company, the announcement was quickly followed by an intense backlash from China. Huawei responded by conducting an advertising campaign in newspapers, internet websites, and billboards across New Zealand with the slogan "5G without Huawei is like rugby without New Zealand" (Manhire 2019). Chinese state media Global Times published an article alleging it had been "stabbed in the back," and Chinese tourists are abandoning their travel plans to 'punish' New Zealand over the ban (Burton-Bradely 2019). A few days later a state visit by Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern was delayed. Furthermore, the launch of tourism initiative '2019 China-New Zealand year of tourism' was postponed by Beijing abruptly despite being planned for years (Wibawa 2019).

To stop Sino-NZ relationship from further deteriorating, the New Zealand government has been actively engaged to recover the damage in the relationship. Prime Minister made an announcement in February 2019 that

there was a misreporting by the government, and it was not true that Huawei has been ruled out in the 5G competition. She added that New Zealand makes its decision independently of the Five Eyes and Huawei could still be involved if Spark can satisfy the GCSB's concerns (Westcott 2019).

While its closest ally Australia is facing the similar dilemma of balancing security relations with its traditional partners amid economic dependence on China, New Zealand has taken a different approach in dealing with the problem, being a smaller nation with a different set of geopolitical priorities. In 2017, a Chinese-born member of parliament Jian Yang was investigated by New Zealand's intelligence service. He has been MP for National party since 2011 and was accused of his links to Chinese intelligence service as his background on 15 years working at elite Chinese military training academies was revealed. However, Prime Minister Bill English defended his party's MP, saying he was aware of Yang's background and there is no doubt on his loyalty to New Zealand (BBC 2017). Such response from the government was in contrast to that of Australia when Labor Senator Sam Dastyari was pressured to resign after his allegations of links to the Chinese government. The Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act was enacted in Australia the following year to keep Chinese influence in its domestic politics, disregarding the fierce criticism from Beijing. However, Wellington remained reluctant to speak

publicly on the issue, fearing it could damage the commercial ties with China, as it seeks to upgrade its free trade agreement deal (Smyth 2017).

Despite sharing similar geopolitical conditions with Australia, New Zealand has been more reluctant to counter the perceived threat from China. Such a difference is coming from differing overall capabilities of the two nations. Based on 2019 Asia Power Index formulated by Lowy Institute, Australia ranked 7th, and New Zealand ranked 12th, below Indonesia, for overall power. The gap is wider for military capability, where Australia ranked 8th, and New Zealand ranked 15th. Also, according to global firepower, Australia ranked 19th, while New Zealand ranked 87th for 2019 Military Strength Ranking. With larger capabilities and geopolitical importance, Australia has been actively engaging in regional initiatives and exerted its influence in the region. For example, Australia has been hosting numerous and major initiatives with ASEAN member states, including ASEAN-Australia Forum, ASEAN-Australia Special Summit. Such level of assertion and initiatives with the regional countries cannot be found in New Zealand. New Zealand's Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018 states that its direct interest is 'stability on the Antarctic continent and in the Southern Ocean.' The Policy statement also recognizes recent development in the region caused by the tension between the U.S. and China. However, New Zealand remains

relatively silent on taking countermeasures due to its limited capabilities

New Zealand's economic dependence on China is another reason for its protracted approach. According to government statistics in 2019, about 19% of total two-way trade is from China (31.24B NZD out of 165.55B NZD) and has a trade surplus of 5.06 billion NZD while overall surplus for New Zealand remains at 1.67 billion NZD. It suggests that China is not only the largest trading partner, but also it is the largest source of trade surplus. Also, China is the 2nd largest source of tourist and the largest source of international students in New Zealand. These statistics show how New Zealand is economically vulnerable to China once the bilateral relations face risks.

1-1-2. Confucius Institutes

Unlike previous nations, the Confucius Institute has been welcomed by the government and used as a symbol of deepened NZ-China relations. Currently, there are three Confucius Institute and 30 Confucius Classroom operating in New Zealand. The first Confucius Institute opened in March 2007 by University of Auckland co-held with Fudan University as a Chinese institution. It also received the Pioneer awards, which was given to only ten universities amongst five hundred Confucius Institutes worldwide (TNSG 2017). Joint Forum on One Belt One Road initiative was co-organized with

the New Zealand China Council. Consul General Xu Erwen gave an opening speech at the Welcome Dinner for the joint forum and stressed the importance of the Confucius Institutes as it plays a crucial role in promoting bilateral cultural exchanges and cooperation, and it has been a great success so far.

In 2018, the University of Auckland Confucius Institute was announced as one of the most successful Confucius Institute globally and awarded the status of a Model Confucius Institute, the only Model Institute in Australasia. Alongside the launch of the Model Confucius Institute, the University of Auckland and Fudan University also signed the MOU to establish the Fudan-UoA Centre for China Studies in Oceania. The Centre is expected to foster multi-disciplinary collaborations between academics at Fudan and Auckland with an ambition to collaborate with other universities in the Oceania region and in China (TNSG 2017).

On the other hand, scholars from two other hosting universities have criticized the operation of the Confucius Institutes. In 2017, Victoria University had co-established Confucius Institute by receiving 360,000 NZD from Beijing, which was more than half of the programs total budget of 620,000 NZD. Duncan Campbell, a professor at Victoria University School of Language and Cultures, said funding received from the Chinese government was inappropriate, and school should be using the money in the more proper

study of China. He further described Confucius Institute as outsourcing New Zealand's education on the Chinese Communist Party. Professor Anne-Marie Brady at Canterbury University also said that because all of New Zealand universities are public, New Zealand citizens are paying for the Chinese government to spread its agenda overseas.

In September 2018, Professor Brady also wrote an open letter to protect her, addressed to Prime Minister Jacinda co-signed by other professors and various human rights organizations, including Amnesty International New Zealand (Amman 2018). In the open letter, she revealed that she had been a target of a sustained harassment campaign by Chinese agents, related to her academic work on overseas influence campaigns by the Chinese government. She wrote that her house and office on campus were broken into twice and her car was sabotaged. She added that the thief or thieves at her home had stolen her cell phone and laptop that was cheap and old, ignoring valuables in her house (Graham-McLay 2019). A second open letter was published in December 2018, co-signed by 169 academics, journalists and politicians all around the world calling on New Zealand government to protect her and speak up in support of academic freedom (Amman 2018). An investigation was conducted by New Zealand police, for seven months with Interpol and New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) involved. However, the

investigation ended in February 2019, failing to determine the culprit (Graham- McLay 2019).

Meanwhile, the politicians were more reserve about the incident. While the investigation was still ongoing, the Prime Minister said it would not be appropriate for her to comment on an active police investigation, through her spokesperson (Graham- McLay 2019). National Party Education spokeswoman Nikki Kaye responded to the open letter that there need to be specific examples of the erosion of academic freedom. She also said it was not unusual for other countries' government to fund foreign language teaching, citing the cases of France and Japan (Walters 2018).

1-2. United Kingdom

1-2-1. Response to China

The United Kingdom is leaning towards accepting Huawei to supply 5G infrastructure with partial restriction, despite pressure by its closest ally on security ground. The approach of the British government on this issue was initially planned to be secretive until April 2019 when the newspaper Telegraph reported that the cabinet decided to allow Huawei in building its infrastructures next generation of communication technology. After the reveal,

Prime Minister Theresa May dismissed her defence minister Gavin Williamson over a leak of discussion in the National Security Council (Euractic 2019). It appears that the initial plan of the government was to keep the decision as a secret in the National Security Council and inform the U.S. when the 2020 presidential campaign starts off. The attempt was to minimize the risk of a future trade deal between the U.S. and U.K., as president Trump will be more distracted by domestic politics (Kabasi 2019).

After the leakage, the British government announced that Huawei could provide equipment for non-core parts of the network. Even though Huawei kits cannot be used in the core parts of the network, Huawei expressed support for the government saying they were pleased with the UK's evidence-based approach to the issue and they will continue to work cooperatively with the government and the industry (Merriman 2019).

The UK was the first major nations in Europe to welcome China's telecommunication equipment. In 2005, BT Group signed a contract with Huawei to supply telephone switches, including other infrastructure buildings. As of 2019, BT, O2, and Vodafone, three of the most prominent phone carriers in the U.K. used Huawei equipment in existing 4G networks (Woo 2018). The National Cyber Security Center (NCSC) mentioned cybersecurity risks in its annual report and said there were some defects found in the Huawei equipment.

However, the report concluded saying that NCSC does not believe the defects identified as the result of Chinese state interference, and the problems found are manageable. The findings of this report stand in contrast to that of other Five Eyes' intelligence agencies, legitimizing the actions of the British government to disregard U.S. concerns (Porter 2019).

On May 31, EE, a unit of BT launched UK's first 5G network using Huawei's wireless antenna in six cities: London, Edinburgh, Cardiff, Belfast, Birmingham, and Manchester. EE's CEO Marc Allera said that Huawei was essential in its rollout of 5G in the U.K. (Yelin, Zhangqi 2019). Another operating company Three UK also announced to cooperate with Huawei to launch 5G networks till August along with offering Huawei Mate X 5G handsets in their product lines, which EE and Vodafone temporarily stopped supplying after the U.S. listed Huawei on their blacklist (Artashyan 2019).

While the U.S. government was recommending its universities to cut research partnership with Huawei, the British government did not take any measures. After the security concerns were raised, the University of Oxford banned further research grants from Huawei, but a number of universities in the U.K. have reiterated their commitment to Huawei contracts. Seventeen universities, including the University of Edinburgh, the University of Surrey, Imperial College London and others, chose to receive funding from Huawei

continuously. This was primarily contributed by the Brexit, where universities stand to lose substantial EU research funding, thus finding China as their new research partners (Sharma, 2019).

Current attitudes of UK towards China, especially the case of Huawei leak reflects the growing importance of China as a partner for post-Brexit Britain. At the moment, China is not the largest trading partner of the U.K., unlike the case in the U.S., Australia, or New Zealand. China (58.9B USD) is placed fifth in UK's export destination, behind U.S. (45.2B USD), Germany (38.6B USD), the Netherlands (24.9B USD) and France (24.8B USD). Chinese investment in the U.K. is minimal, less than one percent of current stocks (Brown 2019). However, with China's desire in the U.K.'s expertise in financial and corporate governance, the post-Brexit trade relations; especially in the service area is expected to grow. Bilateral FTA agreement will also be arranged after the departure from the EU is completed, implying the deeper economic relationship with China (Kuo 2018). Also, the long-delayed connection between London and Shanghai stock exchange were finally established in June 2019 to facilitate access between the two robust stock markets (Hancock and Kynge and Espinoza and Parker 2019).

Although the U.S. is the most important ally for the U.K. as mentioned in the UK's white paper, the U.K. had taken different positions than the U.S.

in relationship with China, before Huawei became a more significant issue. In 2015, the U.K. joined the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as the first major G7 member, disappointing the U.S., as European countries including France and Germany joined AIIB followed the UK's suit. Beijing is also hoping the UK to take a similar initiative for the Belt and Road Initiative (Kuo 2018).

As the Brexit deadline is approaching, the UK is preparing for reclaimed autonomy along with challenges over its trade policy. Under article 207 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union, the EU exclusively reserves the right to manage its trade and investment relations with non-EU jurisdiction. In other words, the individual member states, such as the UK, do not have the power to create its own trade laws or agreements. Such autonomy over the trade policy is one of the freedoms that Brexiteer's promised (Berry 2019). While Theresa May's withdrawal deal with EU 27 could potentially restrict this autonomy (Boffey and Rankin, 2018), Boris Johnson, the most likely candidate for a next prime minister and the hardline Brexiteer is less likely to compromise Britain's autonomy over its trade policy.

Autonomy comes with a consequence. The U.K. will no longer be a member of the EU Customs Union, losing all of its preferential status within the EU. This not only means that the UK's future import and export will be

harmed but also means that the UK has to put considerable efforts to sign new trade agreements with both EU and Non-EU countries. These circumstances will lead the UK to find a new trading partner who is large enough to compensate for the loss of an EU market. China seems to be the best candidate for the UK, considering its market size and the UK's less reliance on the Chinese market.

The UK is less concerned about the ongoing security threat by China and more concerned about Russia. Even within the Five Eyes, the UK is the only country that is not located in the Asia-Pacific, and it has been responsible for Africa and former Soviet Union west of the Urals (Richelson 2012). Although it announced to play a more active role in the Asia-Pacific, the UK remains at the sideline. The UK is not a member of ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus, the ASEAN-led security consultative body, and its bid for observership is not going smooth. However, the Royal Navy in September 2018 conducted Freedom of Navigation Operation on the contested water of South China Sea, which reaffirmed the UK's security commitment in the region along with the US (Tuan 2018).

However, the UK's commitment was partially revoked after China's protest. In February 2019, the Royal Navy announced to deploy its new aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, along with two squadrons of F-35B to

the contested waters of South China Sea. China immediately responded by canceling the prearranged trade talk with Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Hammond. Later, in a BBC radio program, Hammond addressed the concern from Chinese and labeled the deployment as 'premature' in an effort to ease China (Zhou 2019). Kerry Brown, director of the Lau China Institute, also emphasized in his article in 2019 that the UK can no longer risk the relationship with China as it did in 2012 when former Prime Minister David Cameron met Dalai Lama. Under these circumstances, the UK is less concerned about China's threat and views China as an economic opportunity for the future. It is comprehensible for the UK to be lenient on both Huawei and Confucius Institutes.

1-2-2. Confucius Institutes

There are 29 Confucius Institutes in universities and 157 Confucius Classrooms in the United Kingdom with the second highest number in the world next to the United States (Doris 2018). Confucius Institutes in the U.K. were more welcomed than contained. In 2013, Prime Minister David Cameron encouraged to learn Chinese, instead of French and German, which are the traditional second language options for British students (Han 2015). According to the BBC report on Chinese language speakers in 2014, only 1%

of the UK's adult population could speak Chinese fluently.

Elizabeth Truss, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, stressed the needs for the change saying China's growing economy brings business opportunities for the U.K. and it is vital that more young people should be able to speak Mandarin to be able to expose them to the global market and develop successful companies (ICEF 2014). John Worne, Director of strategy at the British Council, UK's own government-sponsored language and cultural center, agreed to Truss's idea that Chinese is one of the most important languages for the UK's future. He also said the number of students learning the language needs to grow faster for the students to move on to the world's stage. In addition, the Confederation of British Industry announced that Mandarin was the second to the French as the language British employers most wanted to see in their future employees (ICEF 2014).

With the growing importance of China in the U.K., no recognizable conflicts occurred between the Confucius Institutes and hosting schools, unlike in most Five Eyes nations. No movements were formed by the government to scrutinize the organization. However, in February 2019, The Conservative Party Human Rights Commission has raised a question on Confucius Institute for the first time as continuous coercive actions were taken by the U.S. The Conservative Party Human Rights Commission has published

a report suggesting British schools to suspend further partnerships with Confucius Institute until a review on the institutes was completed (Cheng 2019).

Most of the arguments from the report were backed up by the evidence found in schools from the United States, Australia, and Canada that has been hawkish towards Confucius Institutes, rather than focusing on the U.K.'s cases. Although the Commission made a recommendation to the government to pass laws requiring transparency from Confucius Institutes, no official statement or criticism was made by the government, and no universities terminated the relationship with its Confucius Institutes.

III. Conclusion

1. Conclusion

As Confucius Institute expands its presence over the world, different responses from hosting nations were observed. Even the Five Eyes member states, who share common Anglo-American values with a developed economy, have shown diverging attitudes toward the Chinese language and cultural institution. Also, regarding the ongoing controversies over adopting Huawei equipment in the rollout of the 5G network, the Five Eyes nations made different policy decisions as well. Despite the U.S.'s effort to convince its allies to join the anti-Huawei movement by accusing Huawei of the conduit of espionage, countries took different positions based on its comprehensive threats analysis including security and economic risks. It proves that even the Five Eyes nations have differing perception toward China; based on this observation, this paper suggests that the Five Eyes nations' response to Confucius Institutes and Huawei equipment adoption are positively correlated.

The governments those have banned Huawei equipment were most hawkish to Confucius Institutes, enacting of laws directly aiming the organization. The United States had the most robust containment policy

towards the Confucius Institutes. Various governmental agencies published reports condemning the Confucius Institutes by pointing out its linkage with the Chinese government. An amendment to The National Defense Authorization Act was passed in 2018 that banned universities with Confucius Institutes from receiving Pentagon funding, which contributed to terminating several partnerships with Hanban. The number of the State Department led field site reviews were also doubled from last year, followed by the heightened tension between the U.S. and China.

Australia also commenced The Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act in 2018 to monitor Confucius Institutes. In the same year, the New South Wales Government postponed the programs in Confucius Classrooms and reviewed the schools to find inappropriate influence from the Chinese government. It correlates with the Australian government's increasing alignment towards the United States.


The Canadian government is under a category of 'likely to ban' towards Huawei and has shown mild-aggression to Confucius Institutes. The Department of National Defence held the conference with the CSIS on security on the security threat from China's rising power and defined the Confucius Institute as a political entity projecting agendas of the Chinese Communist Party. However, the government's role remained relatively

minimal compared to the governments in ‘ban in effect’ category, with no regular inspections or law enactments taken place. Instead, the more aggressive response was raised from the public with collective actions organized by non-state actors including academics, mainstream media, and parent organizations, which led to the first closure of the Confucius Institutes.

Confucius Institutes established in the ‘on the fence’ nations were more welcomed than contained. Although New Zealand and the United Kingdom have a different type of relationship with China, both governments positively view the Confucius Institutes and even attempt to appease negative public sentiment towards China. The New Zealand government has been utilizing the Confucius Institutes as a platform to enhance a bilateral relationship with China as its economy is highly dependent on China. The U.K. government has emphasized the importance of Chinese language learning, as it considering China as a prominent economic partner for the post-Brexit era.

	Security Concern	Huawei	Confucius Institute
United States	High , consider China as the strategic competitor	Ban in Effect	Hostile , enactment of law, conduct regular inspections against CI
Australia	High , aligned with the U.S. to counter China's influence in Asia-Pacific	Ban in Effect	Hostile , enactment of law, conduct regular inspections against CI
Canada	Moderate , put emphasizes on the Western values, but less intention to involve	Likely to Ban	Mild , expressed concern towards CI but lacks substantive action
New Zealand	Moderate , Concerns about China's influence, but priorities economic relations	On the Fence	Positive , utilize CI as a platform to facilitate bilateral relations with China, acts to appease negative public sentiments towards CI
United Kingdom	Low , geographically far away from China and more concerned about Russia, consider China as a future economic partner after Brexit	On the Fence	Positive , Put emphasis on the Chinese language education, no negative actions by the government

* Table 1-1. Five Eyes' responses towards Huawei and the Confucius Institutes



※ Dashed arrow: Chinese Government's accused influence

※ Width of arrow: Level of perceived security threat

* Figure 1-1. Summary in diagram

The Confucius Institutes did contribute to Chinese language education and enhanced bilateral relation between China and hosting countries. However, no matter how their curriculums are tightly controlled, the institutes are assessed based on the government-to-government relations rather than its actual contribution to the public. As security tension between the U.S. and China deepens, countries will be forced to take a side, and the changing attitude towards the Confucius institutes will be the first signal to this adjustment.

2. Limitation

As a measure to determine the level of the perceived security threat from China, the attitude taken towards the adoption of Huawei equipment was used as a standard to categorize nations into three groups. However, this paper was written when the United States and China were in the middle of a trade war, with constant updates made by two countries which possibly have influenced other government's decisions on Huawei adoption. Huawei dispute is still an ongoing issue, with many countries undecided on which policy to take. While we have used the Huawei barometer provided by the Bloomberg in 2018, to reduce the level of uncertainty, but it is also a prediction made by the analysts, which is prone to change in accordance to the actions taken by the U.S. or China. For instance, New Zealand was initially categorized in the 'likely to ban' category and was moved in this paper as the New Zealand government changed its stance after the economic retaliation by the Chinese government. As an ongoing issue, new reports were mainly referenced to infer the stance of the government, and since the government statements and the press include bias, the analysis always involves inherent limitations.

IV. Bibliography

- ABC. "Christopher Pyne says China has raised regional 'anxiety' over its activities in the South China Sea." *ABC*. 1 28, 2019. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-01-28/christopher-pyne-says-china-is-raises-anxiety-in-region-over-scs/10756224> (accessed 6 16, 2019).
- Artashyan, Agram. "THREE UK WILL USE HUAWEI'S 5G EQUIPMENT TO BUILD 5G NETWORK." *Gizchina*. 6 13, 2019. <https://www.gizchina.com/2019/06/13/three-uk-will-use-huaweis-5g-equipment-to-build-5g-network/> (accessed 6 21, 2019).
- ASEAN. *31st ASEAN-Australia Forum Co-Chairs' Summary*. Forum Summary , Putrajaya: ASEAN, 2019.
- ASEAN. *Joint Declaration of the ASEAN Defence Ministers on Strengthening Cooperation, Building Resilience*. Joint Declaration, Singapore: ASEAN, 2018.
- ASEAN. *Joint Statement of the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit: The Sydney Declaration*. Joint Statement, Sydney: ASEAN, 2018.
- Australian Government. *2017 Foreign Policy White Paper*. Policy White Paper, Canberra: Australian Government, 2017.
- Ayson, Robert. "Choosing Ahead of Time?: Australia, New Zealand and the US-China Contest in Asia." *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs*, 2012: 338-364.
- Bair, Jason. *Observations on Confucius Institutes in the United States and U.S. Universities in China*. Testimony, Washington D.C.: United States Government Accountability Office, 2019.

- BBC. "Huawei: Why has UK not blocked Chinese firm's 5G kit?" *BBC*. 11 28, 2018. <https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-46370014> (accessed 6 21, 2019).
- Berry, Craig. "Theresa May's Brexit deal is almost exactly what the UK voted for." *The Guardian*. 11 19, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/19/theresa-may-brexite-deal-political-reality> (accessed 6 21, 2019).
- Bloomberg. "Huawei likely faces 5G ban in Canada, security experts say – but the trick will be how and when to announce it." *South China Morning Post*. 2 7, 2019. <https://www.scmp.com/news/world/united-states-canada/article/2185229/huawei-likely-faces-5g-ban-canada-security-experts> (accessed 6 18, 2019).
- . "New Zealand says China's Huawei hasn't been ruled out of 5G role." *The Straits Times*. 2 19, 2019. <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/australianz/new-zealand-says-chinas-huawei-hasnt-been-ruled-out-of-5g-role> (accessed 5 10, 2019).
- . "New Zealand's Ardern Visits China as Countries Look to Reset Relations." *Yahoo! News*. 4 1, 2019. <https://news.yahoo.com/zealand-apos-ardern-visits-china-031614516.html> (accessed 6 26, 2019).
- Boffey, Daniel, and Jennifer Rankin. "Brexit deal explained: backstops, trade and citizens' rights." *The Guardian*. 11 25, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/nov/25/may-brexite-deal-explained-eu-withdrawal-agreement-trade-backstop-citizens-rights> (accessed 6 21, 2019).
- Bowe, Alexander. *China's Overseas United Front Work*. Staff Research Report, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2018.

- Braga, Matthew. "Huawei's latest attempt to enter U.S. worries lawmakers — but Canada doesn't share its concern." *CBC News*. 1 19, 2018. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/huawei-att-national-security-concerns-canada-uk-china-2018-1.4494348> (accessed 5 10, 2019).
- Brook, Anne-Marie. "OPEN LETTER." Letter, 2018.
- Brown, Kerry. "Britain's Empty South China Sea Gesture." *The Diplomat*. 2 20, 2019. <https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/britains-empty-south-china-sea-gesture/> (accessed 6 21, 2019).
- . "Huawei leak reflects China's growing importance as a partner for post-Brexit Britain." *South China Morning Post*. 4 29, 2019. <https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/3007819/huawei-leak-reflects-chinas-growing-importance-partner-post> (accessed 5 9, 2019).
- Buckley, Chris, Javier C. Hernández, and Dan Bilefsky. "China Arrests 2 Canadians on Spying Charges, Deepening a Political Standoff." *The New York Times*. 5 16, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/16/world/asia/china-canadian-arrested.html> (accessed 6 18, 2019).
- Burton-Bradley, Robert. "China's Confucius Institutes have spy agencies and governments increasingly alarmed." *ABC*. 3 10, 2019. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-10/confucius-influence-around-the-world-in-question/10875960?pfmredir=sm> (accessed 5 9, 2019).
- . "New Zealand's Government divided ahead of pivotal report on Chinese political interference." *ABC*. 5 14, 2019. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-14/new-zealand-struggles-withhow--to-deal-with-china/10892446> (accessed 6 26, 2019).

- . "Poor English, few jobs: Are Australian universities using international students as 'cash cows'?" *ABC*. 11 27, 2018. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-25/poor-english-no-jobs-little-support-international-students/10513590> (accessed 6 16, 2019).
- Canadian Security Intelligence Service. *China and the age of Strategic Rivalry*. Report, Ottawa: Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2018.
- Cheng, Kris. "UK schools should halt further deals with China's Confucius Institutes until review completed, Conservative Party watchdog says." *Hong Kong Free Press*. 2 18, 2019. <https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/02/18/uk-schools-halt-deals-chinas-confucius-institutes-review-completed-conservative-party-watchdog-says/> (accessed 6 21, 2019).
- Chirgwin, Richard. "Australia, Solomon Islands to ink Huawei-free cable contract today." *The Register*. 6 13, 2018. https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/06/13/australia_solomon_cable_contract_no_huawei/ (accessed 5 28, 2019).
- CSPAN. "Global Threats and National Security." *CSPAN*. 2 13, 2018. <https://www.c-span.org/video/?440888-1/fbi-director-rob-porter-background-check-completed-july&start=4174> (accessed 5 9, 2019).
- Delaney, Robert. "Shutting the gates of academia: American universities cut ties to Huawei and Confucius Institute." *South China Morning Post*. 3 19, 2019. <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3002218/shutting-gates-academia-universities-cut-ties-huawei-and> (accessed 5 9, 2019).
- Department of Defence. *2016 Defence White Paper*. Policy White Paper, Canberra: Australian Government Department of Defence, 2016.

- Department of Defense. *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy*. Policy Paper, Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2018.
- Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. "Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme." *Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade*. 2019. <https://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/pages/foreign-influence-transparency-scheme.aspx> (accessed 5 9, 2019).
- . *Why ASEAN matters: our shared security*. 2019. <https://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/regional-architecture/asean/Pages/why-asean-matters-our-shared-security.aspx> (accessed 6 27, 2019).
- Donnan, Shawn. "U.S. Places Huawei and Scores of Affiliates on Export Blacklist." *Bloomberg*. 5 17, 2019. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-17/u-s-places-huawei-and-67-affiliates-around-world-on-blacklist> (accessed 6 21, 2019).
- Doris. "China Defends Confucius Institutes as 'In the Name of Confucius' Premieres and Tours in the UK (UK)." *In the name of Confucius*. 7 7, 2018. <https://inthenameofconfuciusmovie.com/uk-premiere-and-tour/> (accessed 5 10, 2019).
- Erwen, Xu. *China/New Zealand: Remarks by Consul General Xu Erwen at the Welcome Dinner for Joint Forum on One Belt One Road by Auckland Confucius Institute and New Zealand China Council*. Remarks, Bangkok: Asia News Monitor, 2017.
- Everett, Burgess, and Heather Caygle. "Trump loses Dem backing as China crackdown grinds on." *Politico*. 5 14, 2019. <https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/14/trump-trade-china-1322691>

- (accessed 6 25, 2019).
- Fedirka, Allison. "Australia Weighs Its Relationships With the US, China." *Geopolitical Futures*. 2 2, 2018. <https://geopoliticalfutures.com/australia-weighs-relationships-us-china/> (accessed 6 15, 2019).
- Gan, Nectar, and Owen Churchil. "The FBI director taking aim at China." *Inkstone* . 5 3, 2019. <https://www.inkstonenews.com/politics/fbi-director-christopher-wray-takes-aim-beijing-drawing-scathing-criticism-chinese-state-media/article/3008675> (accessed 5 9, 2019).
- Gerathy, Sarah, and Danuta Kozaki. "NSW Government reviews Confucius Classrooms program amid 'propaganda' concerns." *ABC*. 5 8, 2018. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-05-08/nsw-government-reviews-confucius-classrooms-program/9739396> (accessed 5 9, 2019).
- GHOREISHI, OMID. "Canadian Province Closing China's Confucius Institute." *The Epoch Times*. 2 22, 2019. https://www.theepochtimes.com/canadian-province-to-shut-down-chinas-confucius-institute_2811723.html (accessed 5 28, 2019).
- GIL, JEFFREY. "Do Confucius Institutes teach Chinese propaganda?" *Asia Times*. 3 30, 2019. <https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/03/article/do-confucius-institutes-teach-chinese-propaganda/> (accessed 5 28, 2019).
- Global Firepower. *2019 Military Strength Ranking*. 2019. <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp> (accessed 6 27, 2019).
- Government of Canada. "Canada-United States relations." *Government of Canada*. 2019. https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/country-pays/united_states-etats_unis/relations.aspx?lang=eng (accessed 6 19, 2019).

- Hooley, Brent. "Statement on Solomon Islands undersea cable." *Huawei*. 8 21, 2017. <https://www.huawei.com/au/press-events/news/au/2017/statement-on-solomon-islands-undersea-cable> (accessed 5 28, 2019).
- Horwitz, Josh. "No, China won't be building an internet link to this Pacific island nation." *Quartz*. 6 13, 2018. <https://qz.com/1304269/australia-instead-of-huawei-will-help-build-an-underwater-internet-link-to-the-solomon-islands/> (accessed 5 28, 2019).
- Hsin-Huang, Michael Hsiao, and Alan Hao Yang. "Differentiating the Politics of Dependency: Confucius Institutes in Cambodia and Myanmar." *Issues & Studies*, 2014: 11-44.
- Johnson, Christopher K. "Xi Jinping's Trade Conundrum." *Foreign Affairs*. 6 20, 2019. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-06-20/xi-jinpings-trade-conundrum> (accessed 6 25, 2019).
- Klein, Jodi Xu. "US and China will have many more battles to fight when the trade war ends." *South China Morning Post*. 4 29, 2019. <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3008133/us-and-china-will-have-many-more-battles-fight-when-trade-war> (accessed 5 9, 2019).
- Knigge, Michael. "Why hoping for Donald Trump's election defeat could backfire for China." *DW*. 5 22, 2019. <https://www.dw.com/en/why-hoping-for-donald-trumps-election-defeat-could-backfire-for-china/a-48839015> (accessed 6 25, 2019).
- Kutulakos, Sarah, Walid Hejazi, and Daniela Stratulativ. *Canada-China Business Survey 2018/2019: Summary*. Summary, Canada China Business Council, 2019.

- Kwok, Jackson. "Is there a problem with.... Confucius Institutes in Australia?" *China Matters*, 5 2018.
- Kyoo-Seob, Lim. "Korea's Awareness of Confucius Institute - Focused on Newspaper, Ordinary People and Researchers." *China and Sinology*, 2017: 25-52.
- Li, Dandan, and Yilun Chen. "China's Xi Calls for 'New Long March' as U.S. Tensions Rise." *Bloomberg*. 5 22, 2019. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-22/china-s-xi-calls-for-new-long-march-as-u-s-tensions-worsen> (accessed 6 25, 2019).
- Lien, Donald, Chang Hoon Oh, and W. Travis Selmiee. "Confucius institute effects on China's trade and FDI: Isn't it delightful when folks afar study Hanyu?" *International Review of Economics and Finance*, 2011: 147-155.
- Lien, Donald, Melody Lo, and David Bojanic. "Asymmetric effects of cultural institutes on trade and foreign direct investment." *Wiley The World Economy*, 2018.
- Lowy Institute. *Lowy Institute Asia Power Index*. 2019. <https://power.lowyinstitute.org/> (accessed 6 27, 2019).
- Luc, Tuan Anh. "Are France and the UK Here to Stay in the South China Sea?" *The Diplomat*. 9 14, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/are-france-and-the-uk-here-to-stay-in-the-south-china-sea/> (accessed 6 21, 2019).
- Lueck, Therese L., Val S. Pippas, and Yang Lin. "China's Soft Power: A New York Times Introduction of the Confucius Institute." *Howard Journal of Communications* (Howard Journal of Communications), 2014: 324-349.
- Lulu, Jichang. "Open letter on harassment campaign against Anne-Marie Brady." *Sinopsis*. 5 12, 2018. <https://sinopsis.cz/en/open-letter-on-harassment-campaign-against-anne-marie-brady-2/> (accessed 5 9, 2019).

- Luqiu, Luwei Rose, and John D. McCarthy. "Confucius Institutes: The Successful Stealth "Soft Power" Penetration of American Universities." *The Journal of Higher Education*, 2018.
- Manthorpe, Jonathan. "Now is a pivotal moment to revisit Canada's China syndrome." *Vancouver Sun*. 1 25, 2019. <https://vancouver.sun.com/news/national/now-a-pivotal-moment-to-revisit-canadas-china-syndrome> (accessed 6 18, 2019).
- Merriman, Chris. "May's last hoorah is a hooray for Huawei to provide 'non-core' parts of UK's 5G network." *The Inquirer*. 4 24, 2019. <https://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/3074505/huawei-non-core-uk-5g-network> (accessed 6 21, 2019).
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *2017 New Zealand and China : Diplomatic Milestones*. 2017. <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/FTAs-agreements-in-force/China-FTA/NZ-China-2017-infographic.pdf> (accessed 6 27, 2019).
- . *Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)*. 2019. <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/countries-and-regions/south-east-asia/association-of-south-east-asian-nations-asean/> (accessed 6 27, 2019).
- . *China*. 2019. <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/countries-and-regions/north-asia/china/> (accessed 6 27, 2019).
- National Defence Canada. *Canada's Defence Policy*. Policy Paper, Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2017.
- New Zealand Government. *Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018*. Policy Statement, Wellington: New Zealand Government, 2018.
- New Zealand Statistics. *New Zealand Trade Dashboard*. 6 2019. https://statisticsnz.shinyapps.io/trade_dashboard/ (accessed 6 27, 2019).

- Nichola, Stefan. "Trump Campaign to Restrict Huawei Runs Into Global Opposition." *Bloomberg*. 3 26, 2019. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-26/trump-campaign-to-restrict-huawei-runs-into-global-opposition> (accessed 6 26, 2019).
- NSW Government. "Confucius Institute at NSW Department of Education." *NSW Department of Education*. 5 22, 2019. <https://education.nsw.gov.au/teaching-and-learning/curriculum/key-learning-areas/languages/confucius-institute-at-nsw-department-of-education> (accessed 5 22, 2019).
- O'Neil, Andrew. "Australia and the 'Five Eyes' intelligence network: the perils of an asymmetric alliance." *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 2017: 529-543.
- Office of the United States Trade Representative. *2018 Special 301 Report*. Report, Washington D.C.: Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2018.
- Ong, Lynette. "China Is Shooting Itself in the Foot Over Huawei." *Foreign Policy*. 1 7, 2019. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/07/china-is-shooting-itself-in-the-foot-over-huawei/> (accessed 6 18, 2019).
- Orchard, Phillip. "Containing China on the Open Seas." *Geopolitical Futures*. 11 2, 2017. <https://geopoliticalfutures.com/containing-china-open-seas/> (accessed 6 15, 2019).
- Pan, Su-Yan. "Confucius Institute project: China's cultural diplomacy and soft power projection." *Asian Education and Development Studies* (Asian Education and Development Studies), 2013: 22-33.
- Pelosi, Nancy. "Pelosi Statement on Trump Administration's New Tariffs on China." *Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi*. 3 22, 2018.

- <https://pelosi.house.gov/news/press-releases/pelosi-statement-on-trump-administration-s-new-tariffs-on-china> (accessed 6 25, 2019).
- Pentchoukov, Ivan. "US Bars Pentagon From Funding China-Backed Confucius Institutes." *The Epoch Times*. 8 16, 2018. https://www.theepochtimes.com/us-bars-pentagon-from-funding-china-backed-confucius-institutes_2625992.html (accessed 5 10, 2019).
- PETERSON, RACHELLE. *OUTSOURCED TO CHINA: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education*. Report, THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SCHOLARS, 2017.
- Portman, Rob, and Tom Carper. *China's impact on the U.S. Education System*. Staff Report, Washington D.C.: United States Senate PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2018.
- Powell, Naomi. "Quickest route to China trade relief for Canadian farmers likely through Washington: analysts." *Financial Post*. 6 13, 2019. <https://business.financialpost.com/news/economy/quickest-route-to-china-trade-relief-for-canadian-farmers-likely-through-washington-analysts> (accessed 6 20, 2019).
- Rapoza, Kenneth. "Dear Chinese Government, The Democrats Won't Save You." *Forbes*. 11 5, 2018. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2018/11/05/dear-chinese-government-the-democrats-wont-save-you/#65572ea85f51> (accessed 6 25, 2019).
- . "Further Investigations Show Ties of China's Huawei To Iran." *Forbes*. 1 8, 2019. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/01/08/further-investigations-show-chinas-huawei-broke-iran->

- sanctions/#24d67d743d6d (accessed 6 21, 2019).
- Redden, Elizabeth. "3 More Universities Close Confucius Institutes." *Inside Higher ED.* 5 1, 2019. <https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2019/05/01/3-more-universities-close-confucius-institutes> (accessed 5 28, 2019).
- Reuters. "White House mulls executive order to ban Huawei and ZTE equipment in U.S." *Venture Beat.* 12 27, 2018. <https://venturebeat.com/2018/12/27/white-house-mulls-executive-order-to-ban-huawei-and-zte-equipment-in-u-s/> (accessed 6 21, 2019).
- Richelson, J. *The US Intelligence Community.* Boulder: Westview Press, 2012.
- Rogers, Mike, and Dutch Ruppertsberger. *Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE.* Report, Washington D.C.: U.S. House of Representatives, 2012.
- Sanders, James. "Evidence of backdoors in Huawei equipment collapse under light scrutiny." *TechRepublic.* 5 2, 2019. <https://www.techrepublic.com/article/evidence-of-backdoors-in-huawei-equipment-collapse-under-light-scrutiny/> (accessed 5 10, 2019).
- Scott, Dylan. "Trump's trade war with China is an attack on Biden." *Vox.* 5 21, 2019. <https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/5/21/18628128/trump-tariffs-2020-presidential-election-joe-biden-bernie-sanders> (accessed 6 25, 2019).
- Scott, Jason, Dan Murtaugh, and Bloomberg. "China Restricts Australian Coal Imports in Likely Retaliation to Huawei 5G Ban." *Fortune.* 2 21, 2019. <https://fortune.com/2019/02/21/china-australia-coal-imports/> (accessed 6 16, 2019).

- Sharma, Yojana. "Huawei research ties with world's top universities at risk from US advice." *University World News*. 1 25, 2019. <https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20190125061623487> (accessed 5 9, 2019).
- Shekar, Shruti. "Conservative Leader Andrew Scheer would ban Huawei if he was prime minister." *Moblie Syrup*. 12 24, 2018. <https://mobilesyrup.com/2018/12/24/conservative-party-leader-andrew-scheer-would-ban-huawei/> (accessed 6 18, 2019).
- Slezak, Michael, and Ariel Bogle. "Huawei banned from 5G mobile infrastructure rollout in Australia." *ABC*. 8 23, 2018. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-08-23/huawei-banned-from-providing-5g-mobile-technology-australia/10155438> (accessed 5 10, 2019).
- South China Morning Post. "American universities cutting ties to Huawei and Confucius Institute." *asiaone*. 3 19, 2019. <https://www.asiaone.com/world/american-universities-cutting-ties-huawei-and-confucius-institute> (accessed 5 9, 2019).
- . *How US-China relations have changed over time*. 2018. <https://multimedia.scmp.com/widgets/timeline/index.html?id=Na7FrJVAG1&style=scmp> (accessed 6 21, 2019).
- Switzer, Andrew. *THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES: UNDERSTANDING THE OPPOSITION*. Master's Thesis , Washington D.C.: Graduate School of Arts and Science of Georgetown University, 2017.
- Taylor, Jessica. "Trump Set To Officially Launch Reelection Bid, But Hasn't He Been Running All Along?" *npr*. 6 18, 2019.

- <https://www.npr.org/2019/06/18/733505037/trump-set-to-officially-launch-reelection-but-hasnt-he-been-running-all-along> (accessed 6 25, 2019).
- The Conservative Party Human Rights Commission. *A Report of the Conservative Party Human Rights Commission*. Report, The Conservative Party Human Rights Commission, 2019.
- The Economist. "Huawei is at the centre of political controversy." *The Economist*. 4 27, 2019. <https://www.economist.com/briefing/2019/04/27/huawei-is-at-the-centre-of-political-controversy> (accessed 5 9, 2019).
- The White House. *National Security Strategy*. Policy Paper, Washington D.C.: The White House, 2017.
- The World University Rankings. "UK universities are already China's best partners in the West." *The World University Rankings*. 10 20, 2015. <https://www.timeshighereducation.com/blog/uk-universities-are-already-chinas-best-partners-west> (accessed 6 21, 2019).
- Thomson Reuters. "TDSB votes to end Confucius Institute partnership." *CBC News*. 10 29, 2014. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/tdsb-votes-to-end-confucius-institute-partnership-1.2817805> (accessed 6 20, 2019).
- U.S. Department of State. *U.S. Relations With New Zealand*. 8 23, 2018. <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-new-zealand/> (accessed 6 27, 2019).
- U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. *2018 Reports to Congress*. Report, Washington D.C.: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2018.
- . *Fact Sheet*. 2019. https://www.uscc.gov/about/fact_sheet (accessed 6 25, 2019).

- Vergun, David. "China a Rising Threat to National Security, Say DOD Leaders." *U.S. Department of Defense*. 3 13, 2019. <https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1784442/china-a-rising-threat-to-national-security-say-dod-leaders/> (accessed 6 22, 2019).
- Walters, Laura. "China-funded centres spark freedom concerns." *newsroom*. 12 17, 2018. <https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2018/12/09/356417/china-partnership-research-centre-appears-at-uoa-with-little-fanfare#> (accessed 5 9, 2019).
- Westcott, Ben. "Canada's relations with China were already bad. Then Trudeau fired his ambassador." *CNN*. 1 28, 2019. <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/01/28/asia/china-canada-ambassador-huawei-intl/index.html> (accessed 6 18, 2019).
- . "New Zealand PM denies rift with China after Huawei ban." *CNN*. 2 13, 2019. <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/02/12/asia/new-zealand-china-huawei-intl/index.html> (accessed 5 10, 2019).
- White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy. *How China's Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World*. Report, Washington D.C.: White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, 2018.
- Wibawa, Tasha. "New Zealand gets 'punished' by Chinese tourists following Huawei ban, according to state media." *ABC*. 2 19, 2019. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-02-19/china-tourists-punishing-new-zealand-over-huawei-decision/10825340> (accessed 6 27, 2019).
- Wike, Richard, and Kat Devlin. "As Trade Tensions Rise, Fewer Americans See China Favorably." *Pew Research Center*. 8 28, 2018. <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/08/28/as-trade-tensions-rise->

- fewer-americans-see-china-favorably/ (accessed 6 21, 2019).
- Wingrove, Josh. "Canada Puts Huawei 5G Decision on Back Burner With Allies Split." *Bloomberg*. 5 9, 2019. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-08/canada-puts-huawei-5g-decision-on-back-burner-with-allies-split> (accessed 5 10, 2019).
- . "Top Rival to Trudeau Pledges a Tougher Line on China 'Threat'." *Bloomberg*. 5 8, 2019. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-07/top-trudeau-rival-scheer-pledges-tougher-line-on-china-threat> (accessed 6 19, 2019).
- Woo, Stu, and Dan Strumpf. "All but Banned in the U.S., Chinese Giant Huawei Is Welcomed in Britain." *The Wall Street Journal*. 1 23, 2018. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/huaweis-u-k-relationship-raises-u-s-concerns-1519416947> (accessed 6 21, 2019).
- Worthington, Elise, Sharon O'Neill, and Naomi Selvaratnam. "Universities ignoring own English standards to admit more high-paying international students." *ABC*. 5 6, 2019. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-05-06/universities-lowering-english-standards/11063626> (accessed 6 16, 2019).
- Wroughton, Lesley, and Gergely Szakacs. "Pompeo warns allies Huawei presence complicates partnership with U.S." *Reuters*. 2 11, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-pompeo-hungary/pompeo-warns-allies-huawei-presence-complicates-partnership-with-u-s-idUSKCN1Q0007> (accessed 6 21, 2019).
- Wu, Ting. "Canadians' Perception of Confucius Institutes: Culture Experience or Political Propaganda?" *Advances in Social Science, Education and*

Humanities Research, 2017: 404-407.

Yeo, Mike. "Shanahan: Chinese relationship with Huawei, companies is a security risk for DoD." *Defense News*. 6 1, 2019. <https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/06/01/shanahan-chinese-relationship-with-huawei-companies-is-a-security-risk-for-dod/> (accessed 6 21, 2019).

Yeonsoo, DOH. *Confucius Institute and China's Soft Power*. Master's Thesis, Seoul: Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University, 2018.

Yueyang, Maggie Lu. "New Australian government upholds ban on China's Huawei." *Reuters*. 10 29, 2013. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-australia/new-australian-government-upholds-ban-on-chinas-huawei-idUSBRE99S01820131029> (accessed 5 28, 2019).

Zhou, Laura. "Chinese-British relations 'complicated' by South China Sea military plans." *South China Morning Post*. 2 21, 2019. <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2187118/chinese-british-relations-complicated-south-china-sea-military> (accessed 6 21, 2019).