



저작자표시-비영리-변경금지 2.0 대한민국

이용자는 아래의 조건을 따르는 경우에 한하여 자유롭게

- 이 저작물을 복제, 배포, 전송, 전시, 공연 및 방송할 수 있습니다.

다음과 같은 조건을 따라야 합니다:



저작자표시. 귀하는 원저작자를 표시하여야 합니다.



비영리. 귀하는 이 저작물을 영리 목적으로 이용할 수 없습니다.



변경금지. 귀하는 이 저작물을 개작, 변형 또는 가공할 수 없습니다.

- 귀하는, 이 저작물의 재이용이나 배포의 경우, 이 저작물에 적용된 이용허락조건을 명확하게 나타내어야 합니다.
- 저작권자로부터 별도의 허가를 받으면 이러한 조건들은 적용되지 않습니다.

저작권법에 따른 이용자의 권리는 위의 내용에 의하여 영향을 받지 않습니다.

이것은 [이용허락규약\(Legal Code\)](#)을 이해하기 쉽게 요약한 것입니다.

[Disclaimer](#)

Degree of Master of International Studies
(International Area Studies)

The role of Algeria in mediation for the resolution
of regional and international conflicts (1975-2015)

August, 2019

Graduate School of International Studies
Seoul National University

Lakehal AIDLI

The role of Algeria in mediation for the resolution of regional and international conflicts (1975-2015)

A thesis presented

By

Lakehal AIDLI

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of International Studies

**Graduate School of International Studies
Seoul National University**

Seoul, Korea

August 2019

The role of Algeria in mediation for the
resolution of regional and international
conflicts (1975-2015)

Lee, Geun

Submitting a master's thesis of Area Studies

August 2019

Graduate School of International Studies

Seoul National University

International Area Studies Major

Lakehal AIDLI

Confirming the master's thesis written by Lakehal AIDLI

August 2019

Chair Kim, Taekyoon

(Seal)

Vice Chair Byun, Oung

(Seal)

Advisor Lee, Geun

(Seal)

Handwritten signatures and seals of the Chair, Vice Chair, and Advisor. The signatures are written in blue ink and are positioned to the right of the names. The seals are circular and contain the names of the individuals.

ABSTRACT

The role of Algeria in mediation for the resolution of regional and international conflicts (1975-2015)

Lakehal AIDLI

International Area Studies

Graduate School of International Studies

Seoul National University

Algeria has evolved considerably to become a key player on the international scene (Maghreb region, MENA region, Africa, Western Mediterranean countries, etc.). Algerian diplomacy has always privileged the pacific settlement of crises and conflicts through inclusive dialogue and reconciliation. The present thesis aims to study and analyze the role of Algeria in mediation for the resolution of international conflicts and determine the success factors. It can show that Algeria as a regional power plays a leading role in mediation, conflicts resolution and international relations.

Keywords: Algeria, Mediation, Diplomacy, Pacific Resolution of Conflicts.

Student Number: 2017-28855

TABLE OF CONTENTS	Page
List of illustrations.....	V
List of abbreviations and acronyms.....	VI
Introduction.....	01
Chapter I: Algerian diplomacy at the service of peace and its active role (1962- current)	13
1. A foreign policy based on ideological orientations: 1962- 1965.....	14
2. A very active and influential diplomacy: 1965-1978.....	17
3. Beyond its ideological orientations, a more pragmatic foreign policy: 1979-1992.....	19
4. The foreign action of Algerian diplomacy handicapped by an unstable domestic context: 1992-1999.....	24
5. From 1999 to the present: A foreign policy based on dynamic diplomacy and contributing to peace	26
Chapter II: An overview of the history of Algerian mediation (1975- 2015).....	32

1.The settlement of territorial disputes between Iran and Iraq on March 1975.....	33
2.The settlement of the Iran hostage crisis in 1981	35
3.The conclusion of peace treaty between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000	39
4.The resolution of the Mali’s politico-military crisis in 2015	42
Chapter III: Analysis of the success factors of Algerian mediations	49
1- Success factors related to the context of the mediation process.....	49
1-1. The case of Iran and Iraq dispute.....	50
1-2. The case of American Embassy's hostage taking in Tehran.....	53
1-3. The case of Ethiopia and Eritrea conflict.....	58
1-4. The case of the politico-military crisis of Mali	62
1-4.1. Algeria, leader of the region and the need to maintain its	

leadership.....	62
1-4.2. Algeria's proactive foreign policy on the Mali conflict...	66
2- Other factors of success.....	69
2-1. The objective attributes of power in Algeria: material conditions of influence in its international role.....	69
2-1.1. The geopolitical situation.....	70
2-1.2. Economic and financial assets	72
2-1.3. Military forces.....	78
2-1.4. A strong diplomatic presence in regional and international organizations.....	82
2-2. Mediation: a tradition and an ancient practice very present in Algerian society.....	86
2-3. Mediation: a promoter of the national interest and national security.....	91
Conclusion.....	94
Bibliography.....	99

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

TABLES

TABLE 1. ALGERIA: GEOGRAPHICAL DATA.....	71
TABLE 2. ALGERIA: MAIN SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS.....	73
TABLE 3. RANKING OF TOP 5 AFRICAN STATES BY TOTAL MILITARY FORCE IN 2017.....	80
TABLE 4. ALGERIA AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.....	85

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS.....	105
---	------------

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AfDB	African Development Bank
AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
ALN	National Liberation Army (Algeria)
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
ANC	African National Congress
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AU	African Union
AWI	Arab World Institute
BoA	Bank of Algeria
CARIC	African Capacity For Immediate Crisis Response
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIEC	Conference on International Economic Cooperation
CMA	Coordination of Azawad Movements
CME	Coordination of Movements of the Entente
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ENA	National School of Administration
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FLN	National Liberation Front
G77	Group of 77 developing nations
GCTF	Global Counterterrorism Forum
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPRA	Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency

IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICSID	International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
IDB	Islamic Development Bank
IDA	International Development Association
IEMed	European Institute of the Mediterranean
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFRI	French Institute of International Relations
ILO	International Labor Organization
IMF	International Monetary Found
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IO	International Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
MENA	Middle East North Africa
MIGA	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission In Mali
MISAHEL	Mission of the African Union for Mali and Sahel
MNLA	National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
NAM	Non Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OAPEC	Organization of Arab the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation

ONS	National Office of Statistics (Algeria)
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
Platform	Platform of the signatory movements of June 14
PNC	Palestinian National Councils
SADR	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic
UGEMA	General Union of Algerian Muslim Students
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNO	United Nations Organization
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WHO	World Health Organization
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WTO	World Tourism Organization

I. INTRODUCTION

1. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTION

Algeria which played, just after the independence, a pioneering role in serving just causes and liberation movements in the third world continues to carry great weight in the promotion of peace and reconciliation. Algeria has always promoted peace, stability and cooperation in the region of the Maghreb, Mediterranean, Sahel-Saharan area, Africa and the Arab World.

Mediation appears as a central pillar of Algerian diplomacy and its foreign policy. The active attitude, which is the matter of Algeria to occupy the role of "net exporter of peace", is a fact showing this place occupied by mediation in the external action of Algeria. Today, it is worth to Algeria to be a key player on the diplomatic scene of peace.

The main purpose of this thesis is to understand the real potential of Algerian mediation in the pacific settlement of conflicts. At the end, the study must make it possible to know the causes of the success of the signing of the peace

agreements by the states in conflict under the aegis of Algeria and, to better understand the interests of Algeria in its implication in the resolution of these disputes.

Alongside these topics, the following investigation will tackle the main question:

What factors contributed to the success of the Algerian mediation approach to conflict resolution?

In order to address this question, there are other sub research questions as follows:

- i. What is the specificity of the Algerian approach to peaceful conflict resolution through mediation?
- ii. What is the degree of involvement of Algerian diplomacy in promoting peace?
- iii. Are Algerian's foreign policy principles a source of strength to resolve the regional/international conflicts?

2. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TOPIC

The importance of this study lies in the attempt to explain and understand international mediation, which is a particular modality for implementing conflict resolution policies. Especially since these are two types of conflicts: intrastate and interstate conflicts. On the academic level, it is a question of making our modest contribution to the understanding of a mechanism highly prized by the international community: a successful mediation by a state of middle power.

3. DELIMITATION OF THE TOPIC

Why Algeria ? On the topic of mediation, the attention of analysts (scholars) and experts (diplomats) remains captivated by the role of traditional international actors such as great powers, international organizations (IO) and non-governmental organizations (charitable, religious, philanthropic). In other words, studies, relative to the role of small powers (or simply small states) and middle powers in the international management of conflicts through mediation, are very limited. For this reason, our contribution will focus in middle power in its mediation.

Why mediation ? In the period 1945-90, there were 241 conflicts in the world of which 137 (57%) used a mediation process. 55% were a failure because without effects on the parties, 20.4% were partially successful in initiating negotiations, 16.8% led to a ceasefire and only 7.8% to full settlement (Dieckhoff 2011, 14). Furthermore, two thirds of post Cold War conflicts have used mediation process to settle them (just one third between 1918 and 1996) (Ramsbotham and al. 2011, 180). Mediation appears as an adapted method of resolution of intra-state and interstate conflicts. Thus, international mediation is of real importance. Indeed, mediation processes can prevent the outbreak of a conflict or reduce its intensity, thereby limiting the intervention of forces on a foreign territory.

Why 1975-2015 period? This study aims to cover the period from 1975 to 2015. The year 1975 is the decisive moment of the beginning of the first successful mediation. But I will cover, sometimes, certain events prior to the period chosen to understand the genesis of certain facts. The year of 2015, which is the date of the last conflict settled by an Algerian mediation, is essential to the extent that it will allow me to have a little perspective on events, as recommended by the method in

social sciences. Through this period, which includes 4 case studies, my objective is to establish, as far as possible, an exhaustive list of all the success factors of Algerian mediation.

4. LITERATURE REVIEW

First and in order to develop this topic, it is useful to understand the meaning of these key words: conflict, mediation, foreign policy, international negotiation, regional power, middle power. The literature is abundant on the clarification of these terms.

Second, we will focus on the topics related and contribute directly to this research.

Many contributions analyze the Algerian foreign policy:

Daguzan (2015) gave an overview of Algerian foreign policy in its multilateral and bilateral dimension in the period 2000-2015. He asserts that Algerian foreign policy in its recent period is only an extension of the policy of the Boumediene years based on the principles defined under his leadership, and which are the

following: support for decolonization, non-intervention beyond borders, cooperation and multilateralism, liberation of Palestine; Western Sahara. He states that, the "Arab Spring, economic globalization, the economic and financial crisis," now constrain Algeria "to redefine its strategic choices" to shape its foreign policy. In short, Algeria must make a vast review of its foreign policy.

Hanzel (2015) gives a brief outline and succinct overview of the history of Algerian foreign policy, the elements that control the foreign policy making and, as a final point a comparison mainly with Morocco. He claims that the Algerian authorities have an intimidating mission to unite three aspects in Algerian politics: the military, the Islamists, and the civic associations and concluded that all these issues have their own position in determining the foreign policy.

Chikhaoui (2015) approached the doctrinal principles of Algerian foreign policy and the historical context; Algeria's relationship with the Maghreb, Africa, the European Union, and the United States of America; at the end he examined Algeria's perspective for the development of its foreign policy. As a conclusion, the

author claims that in a new international context, Algeria has to revisit its foreign policy doctrine and assert itself in the face of new actors.

Third, the complexity of conflicts and the growing interest in peaceful modes (mediation, conciliation ...) to their settlement, led to the multiplication of research efforts, justifying the wide range of hypotheses and explanatory factors for their success. Mediation in conflict has significant effects on countries in conflict with the gradual return of peace and security.

Analysts have generally taken as indicators of success the ability of mediation to generate an agreement, reduce the occurrence of conflicts in the future, or reduce intensity. It is true that we should not consider these criteria alone, because certain elements are essential (such as the nature of the contact between the protagonists after the settlement of the conflict).

A successful mediation is one that resolves a conflict and/or ends the dispute. Moreover, a conflict is resolved when its deep origins have been understood and made harmless. More clearly, an objective assessment of the success of mediation

could be based on criteria such as the reduction of violence, the reduction of the number of victims or the existence of dialogue between the parties.

According to Lecoutre (2005) in his contribution on the mediation of the OAU in the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998-2000), he explains the success of this mediation by: the charisma of the Algerian president Bouteflika, the qualities that holds the latter and the credibility of Algeria.

Allouche (1994), on the other hand, in his article on the mediation of small states, states that for a small state the defensive adaptation strategy is equivalent to insurance, to protection at a lower cost.

In addition Dris-Aït Hamadouche (2013) in her reference to the case study on Algerian policy towards the conflict in Mali, she explains that the active foreign policy based on the multiplication of initiatives and constant commitment, participated in settlement of the conflict in Mali.

These most important success factors will be repeated in this work, according to the link they have with the objective of my thesis, with a view to detailing them, adding the context of each mediation, foreign policy (practiced at each period level). The originality of my thesis lies in the fact that I will determine the other factors (geopolitical, economic, historical and cultural) of success for a country as middle power as a mediator.

5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

- **The historical approach:** I propose to refer to one theory: historical analysis. Essentially, I will use the historical approach as a guide to my analysis: historical causality is indicative of change, metamorphosis, creation or disappearance. As a result, the historical approach will be adapted to my analysis, as international mediation proves to be a predominant Algerian approach to external implications in conflicts. It becomes a historical fact that cannot escape a causal explanation of past and future events. It allows me to take a necessary step back to address the study of the resurgence of international mediation in regional and international conflicts.

• **Data Collection:** To accomplish the research objectives two data collection techniques were used to organize the present work. First, the empirical research, which consisted in observing the social fact based on interactions between Algerian actors involved in the mediation and reconciliation to settle conflicts. This is in particular by means of media (analysis of the speeches of the main actors).

The consultation of the official documents of the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will have helped me.

Access to the documents of research centers giving special treatment to the problems of the North Africa sub-region in general and Algeria particularly has been invaluable to me, namely: The European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) and the Arab World Institute (AWI), which offers an abundant literature on Algeria.

The use of secondary data such as relevant documents related to Algerian Government policies, international organizations working papers or reports, academic journals correlated to the present topic, will allow the development of analytical solution to my work.

6. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

This work is the occasion to deepen a little more the debate on the Algerian experience in the resolution of regional and international conflicts. I will try to analyze the active role of Algeria in the mediation for the resolution of the conflicts and the factors of success in its mediation. To achieve this I intend to divided into three chapters: The *first chapter* will deal with **the active role and longue experience of Algerian diplomacy and the principles of Algerian foreign policy** based on the pacific resolution of conflicts. It was an opportunity to recall some facts marking Algeria's anti-colonial and post-colonial diplomatic action, a course which allowed, without exaggeration, a deep redefinition of the world balance. The *second chapter* will recall succinctly the **historical background of Algerian mediation (1975-2015)**. We will focus particularly on the different conflicts

resolved via Algerian mediation from **1975** until the recent period. In the *third chapter*, finally, we analyze in detail the different **success factors of Algerian mediation**. As a conclusion, this thesis will bring together the main results we will have reached with regard to Algeria's success factors in its approach to mediate conflicts.

CHAPTER I: ALGERIAN DIPLOMACY AT THE SERVICE OF PEACE AND ITS ACTIVE ROLE (1962- CURRENT)

Admitted to the UN in October 1962, Algeria pledged to work for peaceful cooperation among all countries on the basis of mutual respect among peoples. Thus, it has established diplomatic relations with almost all the countries of the world¹.

Participating in multiple international conferences, Algeria has, on several occasions, helped to solve complex situations. The dynamism it displays has allowed Algeria to clarify and strengthen its foreign policy since its accession to independence. This policy is determined by a set of factors that define the fundamental elements on which the choices of the country are articulated.

In this chapter, I will explore in detail the historical evolution of Algerian foreign policy since 1962 until the current period. Furthermore, this chapter will examine

¹ Algeria has a large diplomatic presence with 94 diplomatic missions (embassies) around the world.

and highlight the importance of the mediation as a main component of Algerian foreign policy and the active role of diplomacy to succeed those mediations.

1. A foreign policy based on ideological orientations: 1962-1965

With the independence of Algeria in 1962, the political and ideological choices are determined. Four principles prevail: solidarity with the national liberation movements, anti-imperialism, strengthening of independence and national sovereignty, and finally, non-alignment (Mernache 2012, 1).

The solidarity shown by newly independent Algeria with the national liberation movements is a logical consequence of its recent experience of colonization and war. The sympathy for these movements is natural, which is why Algeria has never hesitated to provide support, since 1962, to the most diverse movements in Africa (counting the African National Congress [ANC] in South Africa), the Middle-East (especially the Palestinian movements) and Asia (Ait-Chaalal 2002, 66).

Anti-imperialism is also an essential orientation of Algerian diplomacy. In this context, a sign of sympathy manifests itself vis-à-vis the USSR, which diffuses at this time the idea that it would be the natural ally of the nationalist movements of the Third World. However, this orientation will not go too far: the memory of the prudence of the USSR during the Algerian war on the question of the official recognition of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA, founded in September 1958) acts for to limit this sympathy with Moscow. In addition, the desire of Algerian leaders to maintain their freedom of action intervenes to keep distances with the USSR.

The strengthening of independence and national sovereignty is also a continuation of the period of war. Algerian leaders sought to recover the attributes of national sovereignty politically, economically and culturally:

- Politically, by conducting an active foreign policy;
- Economically, by the reappropriation of the Algerian economic potential;

- Culturally, by the restoration of Algerian national heritage, particularly in linguistic matters. Arabic, the national language, now occupies an important place and a process of Arabization is implemented.

The active non-alignment is reflected in the Algerian desire to promote an effective and demanding third-world policy in order to promote the visions, interests and socio-political choices of developing countries. Algerian diplomacy is particularly active at the international level to make its voice heard. It presents itself as the spokesman of the Third World. The new Algerian leaders also proclaim the need to fight against the nuclear arms race and the development of the nuclear tests².

These options remain valid beyond the first years of Algerian independence. On the personal level, Ahmed Ben Bella, the first president of independent Algeria, is marked by the war, which he spent from 1956 to 1962 in French prisons, where he established a political cultural base Marxizing trend. His entourage and some of his

² France conducted 17 nuclear tests between 1960 and 1966 in the Algerian desert (in the localities of Reggane and In Ecker).

advisers are also quite marked by this ideological orientation. A. Ben Bella was excluded in 1965 from the Algerian political staff (Ait-Chaalal 2002, 63).

2. A very active and influential diplomacy: 1965-1978

Under the presidency of Houari Boumediène, the principles of national independence, anti-imperialism and non-alignment are reaffirmed. They form the pillar of Algerian foreign policy.

National independence, international cooperation based on the respect of the sovereignty of the partners, rejection of the politics of the blocs (Western Bloc vs. Eastern Bloc) and the military bases, refusal of the economic exploitation of the Third World by means of the foreign trade, the international capital or the sale of "technology", are the priorities that Algeria should defend and respect through its foreign policy, to contribute to the establishment of international relations that serve all peoples instead of enriching more richer countries and impoverishing the poor countries more and more (Ait-Chaalat 2001, 485).

In addition, foreign policy must reflect domestic politics. Algerian diplomacy, embodied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, and his team, highlights some domestic actions for dissemination to the Third World, particularly in the field of recovery of hydrocarbon resources³.

The year 1967 affirmed the strong presence of Algeria on the international scene through: support to the Arab countries during the June 1967 war, the subsequent rupture of diplomatic relations with the United States and the meeting in Algiers Group of 77 (developing countries). Algeria participates actively in diverse organizations such as the United Nations Organization (UNO), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Non-Aligned Movement, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). These events are combined with an internal dynamism with, in particular, the nationalization of hydrocarbons in February 1971 (Belkaïd 2009, 339).

³ A. Bouteflika became minister of Foreign affairs in 1963, at the age of 26.

At the international level, the dynamism of Algerian foreign policy is reflected in the organization in Algiers of the summit of non-aligned countries in September 1973; the Arab summit of November 1973 (following the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973); the convening of a UN Special General Assembly on Commodity and Development Issues in April 1974; the organization of an OPEC summit in March 1975; and Algeria's participation in the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) from 1975 to 1977, a conference known as the "North / South Dialogue".

3. Beyond its ideological orientations, a more pragmatic foreign policy:1979-1992

The foreign policy of Algeria under Chadli Bendjedid is marked by the loss of some important issues inherited from the previous period of their importance. Thus, the issue of North / South dialogue and that of non-alignment are no longer priority issues on the international scene. The failure of the conference on international economic cooperation, concluded in June 1977 on a finding of disagreement, marks the decline of this question. The last important event on this issue is the

Cancun (Mexico) summit⁴ in October 1981, which brought together the leaders of 22 developed and developing states, in which the Algerian president is participating. The non-aligned movement is losing its coherence, and events like the Iran-Iraq war are weakening it even more (See Nicole GRIMAUD 1991).

In the Middle East, the June 1982 is marked by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Algeria continues to signify its commitment to the Palestinian cause by hosting, in Algiers, numerous Palestinian National Councils (PNC), including the one of November 15, 1988, by which the independent State of Palestine is proclaimed. Algeria is, thus, the first country to recognize this State.

In the first years of the arrival of President C. Bendjedid, the problem of Western Sahara is still important. However, interest in this issue is gradually declining to eventually move it to a secondary priority (Ait-Chaalat 2001, 483). The Maghreb integration is seen by the Algerian president as, on the one hand, a priority, and on the other hand, by synergy effect, likely to provide a solution to this question of Western Sahara. This view prevails with the restoration of diplomatic relations

⁴ The Cancun Summit brought together 22 heads of state. Algeria and Saudi Arabia were the only two Arab states.

between Algeria and Morocco, in May 1988, and the organization of the first Maghreb summit of Zéralda (Algeria), in June 1988. The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) was created in February 1989 in Marrakech, bringing together Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia.

This choice was that of the Algerian president, and not that of some important Algerian officials, especially at the level of Foreign Affairs. The diplomatic community considered that the settlement of the Saharawi question was the necessary precondition for the Maghreb integration process.

The Algerian foreign policy of this period is often described as "rationalist" and more "pragmatic", much less ideological, despite the commitment to certain basic principles.

The 1979-1991 period is marked by a certain "normalization" of Algeria's foreign policy. It appears that Algeria's internal developments are affecting its foreign policy. Thus, the serious economic and social problems it faces, accentuated in the mid-1980s by the fall in the price of hydrocarbons and the depreciation of the

dollar, have a negative impact on its foreign policy. In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is losing some of its most experienced members during tragic events (Minister Benyahia's plane and his collaborators were shot down in the Middle East in 1982). The arrival of many people unfamiliar (members of the FLN party, the army and other state agencies) with the diplomatic function, especially as ambassadors, is losing a significant part of its cohesion and coherence to Algerian diplomacy⁵. In addition, budgetary restrictions, sometimes significant, are applied, which reduce the capacity of embassies (Ait-Chaalat 2001,)

Several changes confirm the pragmatism displayed by Algeria in its foreign policy. For example, three events mark the relations between Algeria and the United States.

In the early 1980s, Algeria played the role of mediator between the United States and Iran, which led to the release of American hostages in Tehran. In September 1983, Vice President George Bush paid a visit to Algiers. This visit, although without immediate concrete results, allows rapprochement between the two

⁵ An attempt to professionalize Algerian diplomacy is implemented. New generations of diplomats appear from the National School of Administration (ENA). This trend grew and consolidated in the nineties. Thus, a growing number of ambassadors and diplomats come from the ENA.

countries. Finally, in April 1985, the Algerian president paid an official visit to the United States, the first of an Algerian head of state. This visit is described as a success, and one of its first concrete results is the inclusion of Algeria on the list of countries likely to acquire US military equipment. Algiers has managed to diversify its suppliers in terms of defense equipment. Some American official circles now qualify Algeria as a "friend" when it is described as "radical" a decade ago. Some even speak of "complementarity" between the foreign policies of the two countries.

With France, this period was marked by a relative improvement of the bilateral relations with the will to overcome the recurring problems. Indeed, a few months after his election, President François Mitterrand paid an official visit to Algiers in December 1981, followed by the official visit to Paris of C. Bendjedid in November 1983 - the first of an Algerian head of state in France. Until the beginning of 1992, which marks the resignation of President C. Bendjedid, the relations between the two countries continue at the rate of the fluctuations that follow successive phases of improvement and phases of degradation.

In general, following the riots of October 1988, Algerian leaders, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have as their main concern to ensure the stability of the State and the revival of a destabilized economy. The more classic foreign policy issues become secondary in such a context. The period of the crisis and the Gulf War (from August 1990 to February 1991), however, marks a relative return of Algerian diplomacy to the forefront, without resulting in durable effects.

4. The foreign action of Algerian diplomacy handicapped by an unstable domestic context:1992-1999

The 1990s are marked by events of great violence that affect the country. Algeria is facing armed groups. On the political side, Algeria saw the succession of, since Chadli Bendjedid's resignation in January 1992, four heads of state: Mohamed Boudiaf (from January to June 1992)⁶, Ali Kafi (from June 1992 to January 1994.), Lyamine Zeroual (from January 1994 to April 1999) and A. Bouteflika (since April 1999).

⁶ The head of state, Mohamed Boudiaf, was murdered in June 1992.

During this period of political instability, insecurity and violence, Algerian diplomacy has been disadvantaged to conduct an intense activity on the international scene. Indeed, the external management of its internal crisis monopolizes its external action to the detriment of other international issues. Algerian diplomacy then limited itself to preserving Algeria's relations with its foreign partners and avoids the isolation of the country (Belkaïd 2009, 342).

From 1992 to 1994, there was a real expectation of the regime, its strength and its ability to cope with the situation; caution is required. From 1995 to 1997, there was a gradual change of attitude towards the Algerian government, with a more favorable inclination towards it, particularly from the election of L. Zeroual in November 1995. Since 1998, there has been a marked appreciation significantly more advantageous to the Algiers authorities and their ability to manage the situation.

Unlike the previous two decades 1970s and 1980s, it is clear that the diplomacy of mediation has moved into second place in this period of instability and isolation in the country.

5. From 1999 to the present: A foreign policy based on dynamic diplomacy contributing to peace

The election of A. Bouteflika, in April 1999, and his first acts on the international scene (Algiers OAU summit in mid-July, travel to the funeral of King Hassan II, end of July, participation in the UN General Assembly in September, presence in the international media), as well as the evolution of the internal political situation (approval by popular referendum of the law on civil concord⁷, September 16, 1999) contribute to reintegrate Algeria on the international scene. This reintegration is reflected, in particular, in the integration of Algeria into the Mediterranean Dialogue of the NATO in 2000, and in the signing of an Association Agreement with the European Union, in 2001. At the bilateral level, it is also reflected in

⁷ Law No. 99-08 of 13 July 1999 on civil concord is a law of amnesty proposed by Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. It aims to reintegrate into civilian life those who have shown their willingness to renounce armed violence and to amnesty those who have been involved in networks of support for terrorist groups during the dark decade. It provides for three separate regimes:

- Exemption from criminal prosecution where the offense did not result in death or permanent disability, excluding rape and the use of explosives in public places (Articles 3 and 4).
- Put on probation for a maximum of three to ten years, excluding those who have committed mass killings or used explosives in public places (Article 8).
- Mitigation of sentences (sections 27 to 29).

numerous official visits abroad, including a state visit to France in June 2000, and two meetings with President George W. Bush, in 2001, at the White House (Mernache 2012, 14)

Currently, Algeria's foreign policy is focused on pursuing dynamic diplomacy, prioritizing the affirmation of the country's sovereignty, contributing to peace, defending just causes, promoting fraternity, and the development of cooperative relations.

Algeria will remain committed to the construction of the Maghreb Union and support the question of Western Sahara for the self-determination of its people. It also supports the efforts of the UN Special Representative for Libya to restore the peace and security of that country. At the bilateral level, at the level of the Maghreb, Algeria will continue to build relations of dialogue, fraternity, solidarity, cooperation and good neighborliness, and wishes to expand its relations to all its Maghreb countries.

As far as the Arab world is concerned, Algeria remains committed to the strengthening of unity, and Arab common action, particularly within the Arab League. With regard to the Palestinian cause, Algeria will always stand in solidarity with the Palestinian people for the restoration of an independent and sovereign State with El Quds as capital.

With regard to the Sahel region, Algeria reiterates its solidarity with the countries of the region in the fight against terrorism and transnational crime, and in the building of development. Algiers will continue to fully assume its obligations under the peace and reconciliation agreement in Mali. In Africa, Algeria will still be active in the African Union. In the context of mutual aid, African solidarity, and the political will to fully assume its commitment to the socioeconomic promotion of the continent, Algeria canceled the debt (1.5 billion US dollars) of 14 member countries⁸ of the African Union (AU).

⁸ These are the following countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles and Tanzania.

In the Mediterranean area, Algeria will contribute for the promotion of peace, dialogue and cooperation. The country will continue to work with the European Union to achieve the partnership it has entered into with this economic entity (EU), and will participate in the political and strategic dialogue. Algiers will promote bilateral relations with EU member states in the framework of fair mutual interests.

Algeria is also committed to being an active member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum [GCTF] (of which it is a member), and will also contribute to strengthening international cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Since the beginning of the 2000s, the fight against terrorism has produced diplomacy of advocacy, consisting of convincing the international community of the merits of Algerian counterterrorism policy. This diplomacy can be considered as having security legitimacy (Dris-Aït Hamadouche 2013, 3).

At the bilateral level, Algeria will continue to maintain the traditional friendly relations, dynamic dialogue and cooperation it has established with its partners, on the European continent, in Asia and in the Americas⁹.

It is true that Algerian diplomacy has succeeded in promoting and defending an exact image of Algeria, faced with any external attempt to distort it, in the media or in international forums. However, this intense international activity is sometimes criticized in Algeria, as being conducted at the expense of the priority issues of domestic politics. But in another side, the economic diplomacy remains a foreign concept to the actors of the foreign policy of Algeria, at a time when Algeria is facing serious economic difficulties.

Conclusion of chapter I

During the last fifty years, Algeria's foreign policy has been crowned by prominent achievements. It is dynamic and militant in its period from 1962 to 1978 (A. Ben Bella and H. Boumediène). The beginning of the next presidency (C. Bendjedid, 1979-1992) benefits from the “passive resistance” of previous years. Thus, Algerian diplomacy, taking advantage of the experiences of the Boumediène period, plays a decisive role in several international mediation cases. But the internal transformations of Algeria and international developments combine to diminish its

external action. From 1985-1986, domestic and global economic constraints reinforce this trend. The phase following the riots of October 1988 reveals a gradual erasure of Algeria on the international scene, its political leaders focusing on the management of internal difficulties. From 1992, Algeria experienced a political, economic and social crisis of extreme gravity. Its international action is clearly affected. After a phase of absence, Algeria is gradually re-entering the international arena, starting in the mid-1990s. However, internally, it still faces major structural difficulties. From 1999 and in order to promote the place and the role of Algeria in the world, the foreign policy of Algeria is focused on pursuing a dynamic diplomacy under the leadership of President A. Bouteflika. Foreign policy now focuses on affirming the country's sovereignty, contributing to peace and international security, defending just causes, promoting fraternity and developing cooperative relations.

CHAPTER II: AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF ALGERIAN MEDIATION (1975-2015)

With its continental credibility and large experience in mediation, Algerian diplomacy has been called upon several times to find peaceful solutions to disputes between countries or even to end armed conflicts between neighboring countries (border conflict) or other conflicts of a different nature (intrastate conflicts). This has been the case, for example, in the case of US hostages held in Iran, the Iraq-Iran, Ethiopia-Eritrea and Mali-armed group's conflicts. Intuitively, it is strong of the aura of its Revolution (1945-1962), its credibility and the quality of the relations that it maintains with all the members of the international community, that Algeria managed to carry out negotiations.

The purpose of this chapter is to focus on four empirical cases (conflicts that Algeria has been able to resolve), relying on the Algerian reference to clarify the main features of the international mediation of a state of middle power. Otherwise, it proposes an approach of historical analysis of the Algerian mediation since 1975 until the recent period 2015.

1. The settlement of territorial disputes between Iran and Iraq on March 1975

International recognition was expressed following the Iraq-Iran agreement signed in Algiers in 1975 during the OPEC summit, after an effective and discreet mediation by President Houari Boumediene (Merrills 2012, 36).

This conflict, at the origin of which is the question of sovereignty over the Chatt El Arab river, is a great source of tension in this region of the world and threatens, between 1969 and 1975, to end with the outbreak of a war between the two countries. This permanent tension is exacerbated by a clash over Kurds in northern Iraq, which accuses Iran of using the community as a means of pressure on Iraq and also, the rivalry for regional leadership (Michael and al. 2012, 137).

The relations between Baghdad and Tehran are deteriorating continuously: dismissal of ambassadors, rupture of diplomatic relations, war situation in Kurdistan and border clashes. Turkey and Jordan are repeatedly trying to settle the dispute. Unsuccessfully. At the time of the 1st OPEC summit in Algiers, which will

devote the sovereignty of the oil producing countries to their natural resources, the Iran-Iraq relations are still execrable and have just been aggravated by a resumption of the war in Kurdistan and a massive influx of Kurdish refugees to Iran.

It is in absolute discretion, that President Houari Boumediene initiates mediation between the Shah of Iran Mohamed Reza Pahlavi and Saddam Hussein, then Vice President of Iraq, present at the summit. President Boumediene announced at the closing session of the OPEC summit that an agreement, sponsored by Algeria, was concluded the day before between Baghdad and Tehran. The agreement, fruit of a negotiation, carefully conducted by President Boumediene and Abdelaziz Bouteflika, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, establishes a definitive demarcation of land and water borders between the two countries.

Algeria's mediation thus ends an old conflict and will allow normalization of relations between the two countries until September 1980, when Iraq denounces the Algiers agreement and attacks Iran. This war lasts eight years (from 1980 to 1988).

To put an end to the war, Algerian diplomacy is once again committed to resolving the conflict. This is one of his brilliant diplomats, Mohamed-Seddik Benyahia, who takes charge of the case. On May 3, 1982, at the entrance of the Iranian space, the plane - which transports the Algerian peace missionary and fifteen other passengers - is shot down (Michael and al. 2012, 138).

2. The settlement of the Iran hostage crisis in 1981

Among the negotiations that have been given to Algerian diplomats to take an active part, we quote the case of US hostages held for 444 days in Tehran and released after long and hard negotiations.

The competence of the Algerian negotiators, their courage, their perseverance and their impartiality allowed a peaceful resolution of the conflict. It was not easy for those who have lived through this event to find a peaceful solution to this crisis. The positions were diametrically opposed and the situation made very complex by the great hostility in the relations between Tehran and Washington, especially that

the United States had, shortly before the entry into the contest of Algeria on April 24, 1980, attempted intervention military to free its hostages.

The intervention, based on an article of the United Nations Charter on Self-Defense, had been a complete failure and turned to disaster. Eight American soldiers had been killed. The break-up of diplomatic relations between the two countries in April 1980 was going to remove any option for direct negotiation and deadlock.

To unblock this situation, Washington and Tehran had to turn to Algiers, which became for many countries a hub of international negotiation.

Algeria had managed, indeed, a few years before, in 1975, to bring Iran and Iraq to put an end to a long border conflict thanks to the fruitful mediation of the H. Boumediene president. This role, Algeria would assume it all the time that lasted the negotiation. And here again, it admitted, according to many diplomats, great abilities to master the techniques of international negotiation. Already invested with the confidence of Iran which had chosen it to represent its interests in the United States, Algiers was naturally appointed by the United States to play this role

of mediator because having good relations with the one and the other and having observed strict neutrality in this conflict.

It was, however, respect for its revolution, the aura of its leaders, and the talent of its diplomats that would determine this choice, noted political circles. Algiers became the trading headquarters between Tehran and Washington marked by an incessant diplomatic comings and goings between November 1980 and January 1981. Warren Christopher then US Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made several visits to Algiers to meet the late Mohammed Seddik Benyahia, at the time, in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the same time as the efforts of the three Algerian negotiators, Abdelktim Ghraieb, ambassador in Tehran, Redha Malek, ambassador in Washington and Seghir Mostefai, governor of the Bank of Algeria¹⁰.

The negotiation was very tight because of the demands made by the Iranian side. But the Algerian mediators managed to bend the positions to bring them back to the acceptable threshold. All this long and painstaking process would lead to the

¹⁰ Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *la diplomatie algérienne au service de la paix*, internal document.

signing of two declarations on January 19, 1981. The dispute was to end with the United States' commitment not to interfere in Iran's internal affairs, repatriation of frozen Iranian funds and cancellation of sanctions against Iran.

Algeria had actively mediated and paved the way for a peaceful solution by minimizing divergences between the two protagonists. It was also the assurances given by Algiers on the terms of release, reception and protection of the hostages that had allowed the application of the terms of the agreement with the highlight of their release on January 21, 1981, transported by two aircrafts of the Algerian national carrier.

The role of Algeria in 1981 in the crisis of American hostages held in Iran for more than a year; gave a memorable page in the history of the United States. It is worth mentioning that this crisis precipitated the fall of President Jimmy Carter. The hostage (This crisis accelerated its downfall by losing the 1980 election to Ronald Reagan).

3. The conclusion of peace treaty between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000 at Algiers

In Africa, President Bouteflika has invested himself in the search for a solution to the border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a conflict that has left tens of thousands dead and ruined the economy of both countries.

In 1999, while holding the presidency of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Algeria is mandated to find a pacific solution to the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which has degenerated into armed conflict in May 1998.

The occupation of the Badme region by Eritrean soldiers, then under Ethiopian occupation, exacerbates the conflict between the two countries, already at odds over the border areas. In order to prevent the situation from escalating, the OAU had to prepare a settlement plan in 1998 as well¹¹. The United Nations was also called to the rescue, as was the US, which had developed a settlement plan, but without any convincing results.

A framework agreement devised by different actors had come up against the intransigence of both parties, especially with regard to the origin of the conflict and the membership of the disputed regions. In July 1999, the OAU presidency moves to Algeria, which is mandated by Africa to continue efforts to reach a peaceful resolution of the conflict. On the basis of the framework agreement endorsed by the pan-African organization, Algeria has rushed to first obtain a cessation of hostilities before moving on to a compromise between the two parties to the conflict.

Then followed a series of visits of the President of the Republic, Abdelaziz Bouteflika himself in the Eritrean and Ethiopian capitals, A. Ouyahia, special envoy of President Bouteflika, A. Messahel, Minister Delegate for Maghreb and African affairs. Indirect talks are taking place in Algiers and technical meetings are being held in Washington.

As early as July 1999, Algeria took the initiative of convening in Algiers a group of experts including Algeria, the OAU, the UN and the USA to discuss a

peacekeeping operation, the institution of a military coordination commission and the redeployment of troops to the previous positions. The negotiations are extremely difficult. They will last more than a year and a half.

A peace agreement was lastly signed in Algiers on 12 December 2000 by the foreign ministers of both countries in the presence of President Bouteflika, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, as well as representatives of the OAU and the UN.

Algeria has conducted intense mediation between the two countries, with its American and European partners to bring the peace process to a successful conclusion in the Horn of Africa. This eight-page peace agreement provides, among other things:

(i) The cessation of hostilities, where the antagonists shall abstain from any threat of use of force or, the use of force against the other party (Art. 1). (ii) The parties will proceed without delay to the liberation and repatriation or sending back to their previous place of residence, of all persons detained as a result of the armed

conflict. In addition, (iii) agree to establish a five-member neutral border commission with the mandate to demarcate and differentiate the colonial border on the basis of the colonial treaties (1900, 1902 and 1908) and international law applicable. Finally, (iv) the two countries may convert at any time to settle outstanding claims, individually or in categories, through direct negotiations or through recourse to another mutually agreed settlement mechanism¹².

4. The resolution of the Mali's politico-military crisis

Since January 17, 2012, an internal conflict has emerged between Tuareg movements (the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad: MNLA) and the government of Bamako. Several events are followed one another progressively to worsen the situation: the dismissal by a military coup of the Malian president, on March 23, 2012, the presence of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Timbuktu, the proclamation on April 6 of a secular independent state in northern Mali by the MNLA, which has allied itself with the jihadist Ansar Eddine movement led by Iyad Ag hali, former leader of the Tuareg rebellion of 1991.

¹² Algiers Peace Agreement. Accessible at :: <https://unmee.unmissions.org/algiers-peace-agreement>

In terms of the typology of the actors involved in the Malian conflict, the most relevant are (Keita 2018, 26):

- National actors: the parties (Government, as well as the Platform for self-defense movements and, the CMA: Coordination of Azawad Movements). The CMA and the Platform are part of a collective but keep their capacity for action. They are all composed of several subgroups even more diversified;
- The informal actors are those who felt at a particular time cramped in the peace process: they are sub-groups that were part of either the CMA or the Platform and have just regrouped in the Coordination of Movements of the Entente (CME);
- Actors outside the peace process but who have a great capacity for harm and who did not participate in the Algiers process, from the moment they were not eligible (armed groups from the region resulting from the process of Algiers so-called of the center namely: the "Islamists" of the Macina Liberation Front - FLM - and Nusrat al-Islam Wal-Muslimin - Support Group for Islam and Muslims - under the aegis of Iyad Ag Ghaly);

- Regional and international actors who participated in the negotiation process (Sahel groups);
- The international community (UN, MISAHÉL: Mission of the African Union for Mali and Sahel, EU, etc.);
- Permanent members of the UN Security Council (France, United States, etc.).

As for mediation, the government of Bamako and international experts (African and Western diplomats) are leaning for a panel of mediators involving Algeria, the African Union, ECOWAS and the UN. But after reading the armed groups' roadmap proposals, there is a significant divergence between the parties on the definition of mediator. For some, it is the role of Algeria that will have to be highlighted before starting negotiations.

In the Malian conflict, this is the fourth time that Algeria has presented itself as a major mediator between the Malian government and the Tuareg separatist movements. The reintegration of Algeria in the Malian case has, therefore, relied on its long experience of mediating past crises, with the agreements of Tamanrasset (Algeria) in 1991, National Pact in 1992 and, Algiers Accord in 2006. However,

the Tamanrasset Agreement negotiated under the auspices of Algeria, signed on January 6, 1991, was never implemented because of the coup d'état of March 26, 1991. The signing of the National Pact, April 11, 1992 in Bamako, negotiated under the auspices of Algeria and facilitation by strong personalities such as: Edgar Pisani and Baba Miske. While the signing of the Algiers Accord in 2006, supposed to make practical corrections, could not eradicate social divisions or tribal reconfigurations in Kidal.

Through the existing literature, the causes of the failure of previous peace agreements are: the deficit in institutional governance characterized by the loss of state authority; widespread corruption and lack of transparency in the management of public funds; non-respect of the rule of law (injustice and impunity); failure in government communication. Other factors also explain this failure (Keita 2018, 30):

- the violation of the commitments, approved by the signatory parties, of the previous agreements for the settlement of the various crises and armed rebellions;
- lack of monitoring and evaluation of previous agreements;

- non-involvement of civil society in the implementation and monitoring of the Agreements;
- inadequate management of precedent crises;
- Slowness in the political and institutional reforms resulting from the signature of the Agreements and their implementation.

In April 2013, the United Nations Security Council has created a United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) with a total strength of about 15,000 peacekeepers¹³.

Algeria as a mediator, favors decentralization over autonomy, the central government should detain more power. Algiers supports the idea of making the institutions of Bamako more inclusive and representative of the populations of the north, but rejects giving their local institutions greater autonomy. In addition, Algiers has, tirelessly, supported the territorial integrity of Mali. It strongly contested this idea of Tuareg separatism in Mali.

¹³ Accessible at : <https://minusma.unmissions.org>

After nearly eight (8) months of negotiations, the Government of Mali signed between May and June 2015, the Agreement for peace and reconciliation in Mali with rebel armed movements. The Agreement contains a preamble, seven (7) Titles, 68 Articles and four (4) Annexes referring to the themes of the negotiations conducted (Political and Institutional Reforms, Defense and Security, Development, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice).

The analysis of this peace agreement concluded at the end of the process of mediation allow us to highlight certain pro-African originalities established by Algeria, such as the formulas of power sharing, transitional government, transitional justice, disarmament, reintegration of ex-combatants, and monitoring mechanisms (setting up monitoring committees for the implementation of the Peace Agreement).

Finally, an African solution to African problems was successfully experienced in the peace agreement that was concluded in the context of this political crisis in Mali.

Conclusion chapter II

It is recognized that Algeria has long been a crossroads of international negotiation. By their abilities, Algerian diplomats have, very often, unlocked complicated situations putting their talent at the service of peace in the world. Algeria has been particularly active in the field of mediation, whether it is taking the initiative, supporting ongoing mediation efforts, or exerting pressure to obtain results consistent with its vision. To summarize, Algeria has affirmed its effective role of international mediator (we can mention: the settlement of the crisis of the hostages of the American embassy in Tehran in 1981, the peace treaty between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000, the treaty on the settlement of territorial disputes between Iran and Iraq in 1975, the Peace and Reconciliation Accord on 2015 in Bamako). Algeria achieved this undeniable diplomatic prestige thanks to its experienced diplomacy.

CHAPTER III: ANALYSIS OF THE SUCCESS FACTORS OF ALGERIAN MEDIATIONS

For Algeria, mediation appears as a privileged method of pacific settlement of inter-state and intra-state conflicts. Mediation is a valuable tool for conflict prevention, management and resolution, an effective instrument of pacification for states marked by multiform conflicts and crises.

In this chapter, careful consideration must be given to determine as far as possible an exhaustive list of all success factors of Algeria's mediations.

1- Success factors related to the context of the mediation process

As mentioned before, it is clear that every mediation is unique and has its own peculiarities. In practice, the success of mediation most often depends, on: (a) the intrinsic qualities of the mediator, (b) the adherence of parties to the mediation process, (c) aspects regarding the conflict itself, and (d) features belonging to negotiation behavior (J. Bercovitch & al. 1993, 290)

1-1. The case of Iran and Iraq dispute

Some events have made this mediation an uneasy task to undertake. Firstly, from April 1969 until March 1975, relations between the two countries Iran-Iraq were the worst. After the dismissal of the ambassadors in January 1970, Iraq completely broke off relations with Iran on November 30, 1971. Secondly, "The Cold War" between the two countries increased. On the psychological level, a vast campaign of propaganda was undertaken on both sides. Thirdly, the armed forces were concentrated on the border areas and many clashes took place, sometimes causing the death of soldiers and even civilians. While Baghdad supported opponents of the Iranian regime and expelled Iranian residents, Tehran gave support to Kurds in rebellion (Djalili 1975, 282).

However, because of its high-quality relations with the two protagonists to the resolved conflict, this factor seems to be the main element of success that could favor a victorious mediation for Algeria.

Indeed, after Algeria's independence, political relations between the two countries have been of good quality. Indeed, Tehran was one of the first countries to recognize Algeria's independence from the French occupation in 1962. Iran opened an embassy in Algiers in 1963. Three years later, Algeria opened similarly its Embassy in Tehran in 1966. The Algerian mediation between Iraq and Iran was thus the first result of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries during the 1960s.

On the Iraqi side, the country has played a role in supporting the Algerian resistance against French colonialism through military and financial aid during the period 1954-1961 or through the United Nations conferences and Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. Iraq was the first country to recognize Algeria's independence in 1962.

In another angle, Iraq exhausted its forces during the years 1972-1975, years of great importance in the Arab-Israeli conflict¹⁴, because the October war broke out

¹⁴ The conflict is the name given to the tense relations and military conflicts between the surrounding Arab states (Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Palestine) and Israel, since the creation of Israel on May 14, 1948. It has had as its organ of seven armed conflicts: the 1948 war,

against Israel in 1973. Iraq believed that it should participate to this war. At that time, Iraqi forces were standing on the eastern front of the country in anticipation of an eventual Iranian aggression on Iraqi territory. For Iraq and in order to provide the necessary conditions for its participation in the October war, it declared itself ready to resolve its conflicts with Iran by pacific means.

Moreover, while there are clear cultural differences between Persian-speaking Iran and Arabic-speaking Iraq, they share the fact that the majority of Muslims are Shiites. Almost 90 % Iranian, and between 60 and 65 % of Iraqis are Shiites¹⁵. Algeria, Iraq and Iran are Muslim countries, allied by a membership to the Islamic religion. Under these conditions, a minimum of cooperation exists between the countries.

the Suez war in 1956, the Six Day War in 1967, the war of attrition in 1967, the Yom Kippur war in 1973, the first Lebanon war in 1982, and the second Lebanon war in 2006.

¹⁵ International Crisis Group. Iran in Iraq: How much influence? Report No. 38 on the Middle East - 21 March 2005. p.9

https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/27457/038_iran_in_iraq_how_much_influence_arab.pdf

Long discussions were held with the presence of Algerian President Houari Boumediene to achieve a durable and final solution to the problems that persist between the two countries. The recourse by the Algerian side to the principles of: good neighborliness, territorial integrity, the inviolability of international borders and non-interference in the internal affairs of the two countries, has most probably accelerated the rapprochement of the two protagonists.

Led in absolute secrecy and discretion, the Algerian mediation was thus free from any influence on the part of the public opinion and the media who are kept out of the way during the negotiation process. Unexpected reactions (biased comments, subjective press coverage) are discarded, which is partly and probably responsible for this success.

1-2. The case of American Embassy's hostage taking in Tehran

The complexity and difficulty of this case can be expressed in two points:

- In September 1980, economic sanctions did not produce the desired effects; the US military intervention ended in a disastrous failure.
- Official contacts are therefore a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the realization of any agreement. However, the establishment of official contacts was hampered by the fact that diplomatic relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran had broken off in April 1980.

Also to mediate in this context two constraints have emerged. The first constraint was of a legal nature: the third State had to maintain diplomatic relations with both the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran. This legal constraint was easily surmountable. The second constraint was of a political nature: the third State had to show strict and constant neutrality in the conflict between the United States and the Islamic Republic. This political constraint was less easily surmountable.

We may wonder why Algiers agreed to provide this effort, especially since the conflict did not involve any direct and immediate interest of the Algerian state, and that a possible failure would have been a negative effect to its international prestige.

The choice of Algeria as a mediator was essential both on the American side and on the Iranian side. On the side of the United States, first, for reasons of pure efficiency, preferred direct contacts. But this possibility was excluded. The only possibility was the use of the services of a third State. The United States made it clear that Algeria represented the best choice for them. There are, at least, three reasons for this (Juillard 1981, 27):

First reason: the political relations between the two governments, despite many divergences in their respective views, remain however in a satisfactory state. Algeria, which after the rupture of the diplomatic relations between Washington and Tehran, had been charged to represent the Iranian interests in the United States.

Second reason: Algeria had observed an attitude of strict neutrality in the conflict between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. But it was known that

if it had not made any formal condemnation of the actions of the Iranian students, it did not hesitate to denounce it in these unofficial conversations. It was clear, therefore, that it would do what was necessary to try to resolve an embarrassing situation for the Arab world, on which it made an unfavorable judgment.

Third reason: the attitude of the Algerian government, throughout the crisis, had earned him the sincere recognition of the US government. Algeria had indeed been associated with both the humanitarian missions and diplomatic attempts that marked the year 1979 and the year 1980. It had thus demonstrated its deep concern to avoid any irreparable action and its constant desire to promote a pacific settlement.

On the side of the Islamic Republic of Iran, secondly, for reasons of domestic policy, did not want the resumption of direct contacts with the United States. But it nevertheless came to the definite conclusion that a quick solution would best serve the national interest. Recourse to the services of a third State was therefore the only possibility. And the choice of Algeria was necessary, for reasons of objective order as for reasons of subjective order. For objective reasons, on the one hand, both

Algeria and Iran are Third World countries, and this common membership helps to create a certain identity of international sensibilities. Both Algeria and Iran are Arab countries, that is to say, both are part of a whole that seeks its political unity both internally and externally.

Algeria and Iran are Muslim countries, bound by a strict obedience to the Islamic religion. For subjective reasons, on the other hand, the revolutionary similarities, as a common denominator, will certainly have contributed to the establishment of privileged relations between Algeria and Iran. For although it is obvious that the source of inspiration for the Algerian Revolution (1954_1962) and the Iranian Revolution is not the same, the fact remains that any revolutionary experience is expressed first of all by the rejection of previous system that is to say the Western model, also abhorred by Algeria and Iran. Above all, Algeria has been able to observe an attitude of strict neutrality in the conflict between Iraq and Iran: and it is perhaps above all this attitude that made it fit to play the mediator between the United States and the Islamic Republic (EL Moghir 2016, 27).

Finally, Algeria's role has not been that of a passive mediator, but that of an active mediator. Algiers knew how, when the time came (well-timed intervention), to modify the course of the event by using the influence which it was worth its privileged position to bring, in turn, each of the two parties to modify its positions. The action of Algerian diplomacy constitutes effective techniques of international negotiation. It has been perceptible in four forms (www.crisisgroup.org):

- i. Algeria has attempted to make an inventory of points of agreement and points of disagreement, so as to delimit the scope of negotiation in a strict manner.
- ii. Algeria has been keen to ensure that each party formulates its proposals so as to eliminate elements that would not be acceptable to the other party.
- iii. Algeria focused on finding the means for resumption when the negotiation faced seemingly insurmountable obstacles.
- iv. Algeria sought to sort out the various options submitted to it by each party so as to submit to the other party the option that it could accept.

1-3. The case of Ethiopia and Eritrea conflict

Algeria has encountered several political and technical constraints to mediation, which has made its task difficult. The first constraint was that the Eritrean government alleged the OAU's partiality, given the presence of its headquarters in Addis Ababa. Neutrality conditions the acceptability of the intermediary by all parties. As a second constraint, the problem of confidentiality arose in that the OAU host country potentially had greater access to information; any information given to an international organization generally entered the public domain. The third constraint was that Algeria was hardly confronted with inter-state conflict in the strict sense of the word, but in fact faced with a conflict of personalities between the two leaders - Zenawi and Issayas Afeworki - which limited its ability to intervene. The fourth constraint is the fact that Algeria was facing the Ethiopian and Eritrean parties, who obviously developed strategies to try to maximize their diplomatic gains in the context of mediation: Ethiopia has constantly readjusted its objectives and its diplomatic strategy to demand "ever more" concessions from its Eritrean enemy while the Eritrean strategy was difficult to understand (Lecoutre 2005, 42).

The process of Algerian mediation has been reinforced by the credibility of the Algerian presidency. Algeria inherited the annual presidency of the OAU at the

35th ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Algiers from 10 to 12 July 1999. Algerian President Bouteflika had essential qualities to the success of its mediation by the OAU¹⁶.

First, his charisma as a head of state involved in a high level of responsibility in the affairs of the African continent since the early 1960s, earned him a continental and international credibility. In fact, A. Bouteflika was the youngest African Minister for Foreign Affairs, serving from 1963 to 1978. He presided over the Twenty-ninth General Assembly of the United Nations in 1974, the most glorious time of the third world, and the world has retained the image of a militant, among others, particularly committed to apartheid, non-aligned countries and G77 developing countries¹⁷.

¹⁶ Currently President Bouteflika has always been the master of the external affairs. The Algerian diplomatic effort throughout his reign was a personal effort both in drafting and implementation, in the nature of the means used and the tools through which to carry out foreign policy. The President of the Republic is always present in person in international seminars, meetings, summits and permanent visits to countries. This process has always been particularly prominent during his first term (1999-2004), where it found that he made 32 official visits within two years.

¹⁷ See «General Assembly of the UN - President of the 68th Session - Abdelaziz Bouteflika (Algeria)». Accessible at : <http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/bios/bio29.shtml>

Second, Algeria, unlike many African countries, had a genuine diplomatic tradition and institutions that functioned effectively. As one of the first contributors and leaders of the OAU (and the AU afterwards), Algeria has borne the financial and logistical cost of this mediation. Algiers has, permanently, put at the disposal of the personal representative of the Algerian president a plane to make his numerous and tireless trips back and forth between Algiers, Addis Ababa and Asmara.

Third, this mediation was perhaps an opportunity for Algeria to recognize Ethiopia's mediation, in so far as Emperor Haile-Selassie had obtained the signing of a cease-fire between Algeria and Morocco in 1963 and then proposed to lead a meeting between President Ben Bella and King Hassan II on neutral ground, Bamako (Mali) as part of the mediation of the OAU at the time (Lecoutre 2005, 40).

Furthermore, these two presidencies used a different way of operating (Burkina Faso chaired an ad hoc committee while Algeria acted solo) and benefited from dissimilar circumstances (ignorance of the precise power relationships during the Burkinabe presidency gave way to their clarification during the Algerian presidency due to developments on the ground). These two elements certainly

contributed to increasing the credibility of the Algerian presidency in its management of the dispute. It is also legitimate to specify that Algeria retained the monitoring of the conflict until the signing of the Algiers Accords in December 12, 2000. The credibility of Algeria and its president had the faculty to reassure the protagonists.

Despite persistent tensions between the two countries, the war has not resumed. On July 9, 2018, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed signed a peace treaty between the two countries in Asmara (after about 18 years of the signing of the Algiers Agreement).

1-4. The case of the politico-military crisis in Mali

1-4.1. Algeria, leader of the region and the need to maintain its leadership

The exercise of mediation, in the broad sense, is a demanding task. Algeria has encountered during its mediation several complicating factors and many difficulties that combine. Thus, on the one hand, there is, between the parties themselves:

- Breakdown of dialogue and communication;

- Breach of trust;
- Increased misunderstanding and suspicion;
- Demonization of the intentions of the other;
- Exaggeration of the magnitude and scope of the differences;
- Overheating of the psychological climate with the prevalence of the confrontational spirit; and
- Tendency to refuse compromise.

In parallel, Algeria is found, often in a narrow scope of evolution whose constraints are due to the:

- Multiplication of actors involved in the conflict;
- Confusion and overlapping approaches;
- Duplication of efforts;
- Tendency to manipulate stakeholders by the parties;
- Rigidity of conventional procedures; and
- Slow and cumbersome traditional dispute and conflict resolution mechanisms.

Also, in Mali's situation, terrorism and cross-border crime are active enemies of Algerian mediation. The popular uprisings that gave rise to foreign military interventions have been accompanied by the proliferation of terrorist groups. This has accentuated the difficulties and complexities of this case.

Faced with such complicated situation, Algeria has always displayed commitment, discretion, know-how and perseverance because they are particularly suited to the design and conduct of works of peace that embrace complexity and sensitivity problems posed.

The diplomatic choice of Algiers is made since Algeria was a mediator during many conflicts in the Sahel. It was during two Tuareg revolts in Mali between 1991 and 1995 as well as in 2006 until 2009 that Algeria helped to establish a peace process between its southern neighbor and its Tuareg populations.

At the turn of the 2000s, at the end of the black decade in Algeria, the country wished to play the role of leader of the fight against terrorism in the region¹⁸. Algiers then signed in 2010 the Tamanrasset plan with Niger, Mali and Mauritania. This was the beginning of a joint military cooperation. At the same time, Algeria has granted development aid of around 10 million euros to Bamako¹⁹.

Despite this desire for rapprochement, relations between the two countries remain tense. According to Algiers, Bamako was lax with AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), especially during the presidency A. T. Touré (2002 -2012). In addition, Mali is deemed unable to protect the confidential information that the two countries share. On the Malian side, some soldiers strongly criticized Algeria's refusal to deploy its army. Beyond the reproaches, the Tamanrasset plan did not give concrete and effective actions. Algeria especially wanted the agreement in order to prevent a Western presence. But other countries in the Sahel want western help. Moreover, a military mission was sent by the UN, the AU and the ECOWAS

¹⁸ This mediation was perhaps an opportunity for Algiers to recognize Mali warring assistance to Algeria against the GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) in 2004.

(Economic Community of West African States) to make an assessment for an intervention of the neighboring African military forces.

While northern Mali is becoming a stronghold of terrorists and its political situation is worsening, Algeria's diplomatic strategy is not changing. It finally maintains its position not to deploy its armed forces while wanting to maintain its leadership position in the region (an area that Algeria considers to be within its sphere of influence).

1-4.2. Algeria's proactive foreign policy on the Mali conflict

Algeria has adopted a very active foreign policy in the case of the Malian conflict, in particular by the multiplication of initiatives and a constant commitment. Moreover, the conflict was perceived by Algiers in a global and multidimensional point of view: socio-economic, political and security. In addition, Algiers has always advocated and supported a political solution for the settlement of the conflict. The perception of the military solution: yes, but...

Finally, this ambition to remain a military force in the region led it to play an important role during Operation Serval²⁰ in Mali. Algeria first strengthened security at its borders with Mali in order to prevent any withdrawal of jihadists during the operation and then ensured that the supply of fuel to the groups in Mali was cut by reducing smuggling channels. However, the strongest gesture was the authorization given to french fighter aircrafts to fly over Algerian territory, something that had never been done since the end of French military bases in Algeria²¹ shortly after independence, but without involving its troops on the Malian soil. However, the fact that Ansar Dine left suddenly the negotiating table in January 2013 to embark on the offensive to the south a few days later, compels Algeria to support French intervention. In addition, the taking of hostages at the In Amenas gas site (Illizi province, Algeria), on January 16, 2013, by Belmokhtar's islamist armed group, is creating an unexpected rapprochement with France (d'Evry 2015, 19).

²⁰ Military action conducted in Mali by French troops. This intervention launched, in January 2013 and completed in July 2014, to support the national army of Mali to repel armed Islamist groups that have taken control of Azawad in northern Mali. The goals of this intervention are to stop the advance towards Bamako of jihadist forces, secure the capital of Mali and recover the territorial integrity of the country.

On the other side of its mediation, Algeria has granted several grants and loans to Mali. It also proposes major investments in infrastructure (gas pipeline, trans-Saharan road, etc.) for the development of the Sahel, in order to reduce crime and instability in the region. Algeria thus puts at the service of its foreign policy and its diplomacy the gas wealth which allows it to carry out a policy of mediation. Thus, Mali receives financial aid from Algeria.

In its domestic policy, Algeria has also adopted a pragmatic position by taking into account vulnerabilities located in southern Algeria, particularly to strengthen the security of its borders with Mali.

Significantly, Algeria emphasized the inclusiveness and collegiality of mediation as distinctive features of this collective effort which brought, for nearly a year, Mali's neighboring countries together with the Universal organizations (UN/MINUSMA), regional organizations (AU, EU, OIC) and sub-regional organizations (ECOWAS). France and the United States have also contributed to this effort within the framework of a so-called enlarged mediation team and through their respective interactions with the Malian parties. The latter, as well as

representatives of civil society, have been constantly available in Algiers, staying in the same places (Hotel El Aurassi in Algiers) for, important for mediation, facilitating human and social exchanges and building trust.

2- Other factors of success

This section will limit analysis on others factors that determine the success of Algerian mediation. I will look for geopolitical, economic and cultural/religious features.

2–1. The objective attributes of power in Algeria: material conditions of influence in its international role

Algerian foreign policy also owes its political identity to objective attributes of power, which constitute the material conditions of influence (Dris-Aït Hamadouche 2013, 2). By material conditions of influence, we mean the geopolitical situation, the economic and financial assets, military forces, and its active multilateralism. We will review in details these elements.

2-1.1. The geopolitical situation

The geopolitical position represents a considerable asset insofar as it makes Algeria the gateway to Africa and the Arab world and a crossroads between three geopolitical eras (Africa, Arab World and Mediterranean). Its many and penetrating borders, of 6,343 km shared with 7 bordering countries, make it possess a strategic depth which raise up its interest for the regional events (Table 1).

The Algerian territory covers 2,381,741 km² (four times the size of France or 60 times Switzerland). It outperforms all European countries (except Russia). It is the first vast African, Arab, Muslim state and the Mediterranean basin. On the contrary, it is more or less far behind the largest states of Asia (Russia, China, and India), America (United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina) and by Australia. Algeria is simply the 10th big country in the world. Its geography combines many assets including a coastline of more than 1,600 km and a huge Sahara of more than 2 million square kilometers (84% of the territory) rich in hydrocarbons.

TABLE 1 : ALGERIA : GEOGRAPHICAL DATA	
Area	2,381, 741 km ²
Coastline	1,622 km
Length of land borders	6,343 km
List of land borders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 1,559 km with Morocco ○ 1,376 km with Mali ○ 982 km with Libya ○ 965 km with Tunisia ○ 956 km with Niger ○ 463 km with Mauritania ● 42 km with Western Sahara
Source : CIA World Factbook	

The Algerian population reached, in 2017, a little more than 41. 3 million inhabitants. It is very little for such a large country: 18 inhabitants per square kilometer on average.

In fact, the resemblance of natural and human data justifies the comparison of Algeria with the Maghreb countries. The Algerian population is approximately equivalent to that of Morocco (35.7 million). It represents three times that of Tunisia (11.5 million) and six times that of Libya (6.3 million)²². So Algeria is also a demographic power of North Africa with a very young population since the under 30 years represent 70% of the population. The regional power of the Maghreb also

²² Accessible at : <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sp.pop.totl>

benefits from hydrocarbon revenues and the prestige that its rich history brings to it. Algeria is thus one of the largest Maghreb states.

2-1.2. Economic and financial assets

Algeria is fairly well endowed with natural resources, energy and minerals, thanks to the riches of its Saharan territory. Algeria has Africa's first gold and currency reserves. Official foreign exchange reserves (excluding gold) rose from \$ 6. 14 billion in 1999 to \$ 114.14 billion in 2016. It is the fourth largest economy in terms of GDP in Africa (after Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt), the third in the MENA region and the first in the Maghreb.

According to the Bank of Algeria, the GDP is estimated at 148. 8 billion US\$; in terms of volume, GDP grew by 3.3%, slightly down on 2015 (3.7%). Growth is steady - of the order an average of 3% a year for a decade - and Algeria has one of the largest economies in the Arab world. It is the third largest oil exporter in Africa (after Nigeria and Angola), and 1st exporter of natural gas from Africa.

TABLE 2: ALGERIA: MAIN SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS	
Indicators	figures
Population (ONS, 2017)	41.3 million
Population growth	2.17%
density	18 hab. / km ²
Official languages	Arabic and Tamazight (Berber)
Government	Unitary semi-presidential people's republic
Legislature	Parliament ● Upper house : Council of the Nation ● Lower house: People's National Assembly
GDP, PPP (constant 2011 international \$)	565,28 billion US\$
Composition of GDP by sector (%)	● Agriculture : 13.32% ● Industry : 37.78% ● Services : 48.9
Economic growth (2016)	3.3%
GDP per capita(constant 2011) in 2016	14,000 US\$
Exports (2017, 10 first months)	28.7 billion US\$
Imports (2017, 10 first months)	38.1 billion US\$
Foreign exchange reserves	114.14 billion US\$
Inflation rate (2016)	5,8%
External debt	3.85 billion US\$ (2% GDP)
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP)	1.03%
Urban population (% of total)	70%
Unemployment (2017)	10.1%
Life expectancy (2016)	● Male : 75 yeas ● Female: 77 years
Access to electricity (% of population in 2016)	99.44%
Net ODA received in 2016 (% of GNI)	0.1%
HDI (83 th out of 191, PNUD 2015)	0,745 (High)
Literacy rate	86%
Source: World Bank, IMF, CNIS, ONS, Central Bank of Algeria.	

Algeria has also long been a mono-exporter of hydrocarbons (over 98% of total exports) to the European Union, the Maghreb and the USA, which purchase a significant fraction of its LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas). Even though Algeria is a mediocre producer in comparison with the Middle East region states, its oil, and particularly its gas, play a significant role in the Mediterranean geopolitical and economic relations, especially since the 1990s. The substance of Algerian hydrocarbons is due to a number of reasons:

- The oil is of very high-quality.
- Algeria has large reserves of natural gas, a source of energy that is less polluting than oil or coal, and Algeria's traditional relations with the countries of the northern Mediterranean, whose gas consumption is rising increasingly (Algeria is the 3rd gas supplier of the EU)²³ make Algiers has partners of choice to sell its hydrocarbons (importers must be able to rely on reliable sources supply, which is the case of Algeria). The hydrocarbon reserves are spread over a little over 200 oil and gas deposits, located in the basins of Oued

²³ Accessible at : <https://www.ritimo.org>

Mya and Hassi Messaoud (67%), Illizi (14%) - where is the complex gas of In Amenas - Rhourde Nouss (9%) and Ahnet Timimoun (4%).²⁴

- Algeria could count on shale gas reserves that would represent nearly 17,000 billion cubic meters, that is to say four times the current conventional reserves of the country. This would make it the world's 3rd largest reserve. But Algeria is expected to produce half as much conventional gas in twenty years, because of declining reserves, while its domestic consumption increases by 15% per year on average. Unconventional hydrocarbons could therefore represent an opportunity in a country where oil and gas account for 98% of exports and 17.4 % of GDP in 2016 (www.bank-of-algeria.dz). To continue to insure its local needs and maintain its ability to export, the country wants to turn to the exploitation of shale gas.

In terms of development, the country has achieved tangible results in many sectors (infrastructure, universities, transport networks...) and Algeria, can display encouraging statistics. Since 2001, there has been a gradual reduction in

²⁴ Audrey Garric, « *L'Algérie, tournée vers l'exportation de ses hydrocarbures* », in *Le monde*, 17/01/2013.

unemployment as a result of government measures to create jobs - especially for young people - financed in part by the rise in oil prices (between 1998 and 2014 the prices have risen from \$ 13 per barrel to over \$ 140). In terms of employment, the unemployment rate is estimated at 10.1% of the active population (1.27 million people in 2017) against 27.3% in 2001. The youth unemployment rate (16-24 years) remains 26.7% (40% in 2009), although down 3.2 percentage points from 2015. As a result, government revenues have risen sharply and foreign exchange reserves have reached record levels (See Table 2). According to the World Bank, Algeria has also attained 20% poverty decrease in the precedent twenty years.

With its small level of indebtedness, Algeria was ranked in 2017 by the IMF the least indebted country of the 20 countries of the MENA region with an external debt of 2% of the GDP and a public debt of 20% of GDP (Bank of Algeria). As regards the external debt, after the substantial repayment by anticipation in 2006, the total external debt of Algeria, which recorded in 2015 its lowest level (\$ 3.02 billion), experienced a slight up to \$ 3.85 billion at the end of 2016 (BoA 2018, <http://www.bank-of-algeria.dz/>).

Despite the decline in total goods imports, the trade deficit widened by \$ 2.04 billion from \$ 18.08 billion in 2015 to \$ 20.13 billion in 2016. This is the second deficit after more than eighteen (18) years of consecutive surpluses.

After two consecutive years of strong disinflation (2013 and 2014), the average annual rate of inflation accelerated in 2015. In 2016, it continued and reached 5.8% for the national Consumer Price Index.

In addition, literacy is up (more than 96% in elementary school) while the connection to the electricity network is more 99% and we attended the launch of 4G in October 2016.

The country has made these last years massive investments in the country's infrastructure (roads, airports, universities, etc.) - which have also largely benefited foreign companies, especially Chinese - while the modernization of means of transport materializes: opening of the metro of Algiers, trams in major cities or renewal of the air fleet of Air Algeria national company. The gigantism of large public works does not seem to stop any more since Algiers is about to inaugurate

the largest seawater desalination plant in the world near Oran province with a capacity of 500,000 m³ of water per day thus gradually putting an end to the crises of drinking water supply in the big cities of the country.

2-1.3. Military forces

According to the World Bank²⁵, Algeria ranks 5th in 2017 in terms of the ratio of military spending to 5.7% of GDP (in comparison, Morocco is in 16th position with 3.2% of GDP) in the world. On the material side, Algeria is among the best-endowed countries with some 985 battle tanks, 1,085 armored infantry fighting vehicles and 36 modern combat aircraft (and 71 older ones). Algeria is investing in the development of independent intelligence. The AlSat-2A satellite, whose optics allow imaging with a medium resolution (compared to US satellites) of 10 meters, was launched in July 2010. AlSat-2B was launched also on September 26, 2016.

A voluntary defense policy and massive purchases of armaments, as well as modernization of the army, make Algeria the largest regional military power today.

²⁵ Accessible at :

<https://donnees.banquemondiale.org/indicateur/ms.mil.xpnd.gd.zs?end=2017&start=2007>

With a defense budget estimated at \$ 10.07 billion in 2017 (\$ 3.9 billion in 2007), the eighth largest arms importer in the world (\$ 905 million in 2017) has acquired modern means, including air. As a traditional customer of Russia, Algeria has however diversified its suppliers (United States, South Africa, France, Germany) over the past few years while gradually acquiring a military industry (Algiers has already built for example, armored infantry vehicles). Algeria also wants to increase its maritime military capabilities - it already manufactures corvettes - which shows that the country is aware of security challenges in the Mediterranean.

In 2018, Algeria is ranked second among African states by military power index after Egypt, and ahead of South Africa, Angola and Ethiopia. By total military force (active forces, reserve forces, paramilitary forces) the most important in Africa, Algeria still occupies the second place with 467,200 soldiers, after Egypt (1,314,500 soldiers) and, in front of Morocco (395,800 soldiers). It is ranked 22nd in the world in the same year (Table 3).

Indeed, Algeria's international role began as early as 1954, before independence, before it fully enjoyed its territory, its population and its resources. Diplomatic and

military action is not a consequence of the existence of the Algerian state: on the contrary it is the diplomacy of the FLN and the fight of the ALN that provoked the independence of Algeria. From 1954 to the present day, Algeria has based its international action on its membership of several blocks, in relation to which it is defined: the Maghreb, the Arab world, the Muslim world, Africa, the Third World, Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Mediterranean.

Rank	State	active	reserve	paramilitary	Total
1	Egypt	438,500	479,000	397,000	1,314,500
2	Algeria	130,000	150,000	187,200	467,200
3	Morocco	195,800	150,000	50,000	395,800
4	Sudan	244,300	85,000	20,000	349,300
5	Eritrea	201,750	120,000	0	321,750

Source: The military Balance 2017, International Institute for strategic Studies, Routledge, London, 8February 2017, 504p. *In* Global Fire Power

The magnitude of this great ambition inevitably comes up against the modest means of the country, which imposes on Algeria a double dependence: strategic dependence on Russia and, economic and technological dependence on OECD countries, major customers of Algerian gas and oil and minerals, and major suppliers of industrial equipment, high technology and food products.

The example of Algeria invites us to distinguish between the potential power (the potential) of the effective power. Algeria has shown that it has an effective power far above its own potential. Conversely, many developed countries, allied with the United States, do not have an international political action commensurate with their potential or their economic power (the case of Italy, Germany and Japan).

As a middle power country, Algeria is a great Maghreb power, since it has held the leadership since 1975 by declassifying Morocco in the Western Sahara war (1975–1991)²⁶, without it daring to fight back on the Algerian territory, and can to be an African power.

The distinction between the great powers and the middle powers among the developed states seems to Algeria less important. Between the developing States, Algeria does not want to make distinction of power: it presents itself as the representative of the small countries against the big countries.

²⁶ The conflict of Western Sahara pits this former Spanish colony in Morocco since the Polisario Front declared it independent in 1976 under the name Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). The war with the Polisario Front ends in 1991. Morocco controls about 80% of the territory, while the Polisario Front controls 20% left by Morocco behind a long belt of security, the "Moroccan wall».

2-1.4. A strong diplomatic presence in regional and international organizations

Just after independence, international organizations are perceived by Algiers as the expression of international solidarity and a mean to facilitate technical and economic cooperation. More recently, international organizations have become a privileged place for the Algeria's diplomatic action, which takes advantage of these forums not only to protect its interests, but also to try to make prevail its conception of international life, to formulate messages, to elaborate global and regional strategies or tactics.

In order to have a rapid and suggestive image of the main international organizations (The list is not complete) to which Algeria has acceded, reference should be made to the table N 4 below, which distinguishes according to the nature (political, economic or technical) and the universal or regional character of the organization with which it is affiliated with an indication of the year of ratification of the accession.

Currently, Algerian multilateral diplomacy is active in making its voice heard in international forums, particularly on Arab, African and international issues (Organization of the Islamic Cooperation reform, NEPAD, Conference on Disarmament, climate change, fight against terrorism, nuclear energy, immigration, etc.). Algeria retains a central role in the African Union (AU) and reflects the Organization's thinking on the establishment of an African capacity for immediate crisis response (CARIC)²⁷. The question of Maghreb (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) construction is still pending blocked by the thorny Western Sahara issue and subject to the evolution of the Algerian-Moroccan relationship.

Member, since the year 2000 of the Mediterranean Dialogue, Algeria participates in several joint exercises²⁸.

²⁷ An initiative announced on 27 May 2013 on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the African Union in Addis Ababa, CARIC (African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises) is launched in November 2013 to make the African Union a capable actor to respond effectively and credibly to crises and conflicts on the African continent. Of the 54 African countries only 12 countries have actually joined the project (South Africa, Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Niger, Uganda, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania and Chad).

²⁸ Accessible at: https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natolive/news_17867.htm?selectedLocale=fr

Algeria is also engaged in dialogue in the Western Mediterranean (“5 + 5” initiative): Algiers chaired the work of the “5 + 5 defense” in 2016 and holds the presidency of the initiative for the southern Mediterranean countries for the 2016-2018 bienniums. France and Algeria co-chair the 5 + 5 Foreign Affairs Dialogue until the end of 2017 and, through its involvement in the WTO accession process (Chikhaoui, 236).

Founding member of the Global Counter Terrorism Forum launched in September 2011 in New York. In 2013, it hosted an international meeting aimed at defining specific strategies and programs to combat the expansion of Al Qaeda and affiliated organizations, particularly in the Maghreb and the Sahel²⁹.

Furthermore, Algiers has always invested in the cooperation, security and stability of its neighbors and the African continent. Algeria has an advantageous position in the institutions and financing of the African Union. It is still part of one of the major political and diplomatic powers of the continent.

²⁹ Algeria, for example, does not negotiate with terrorists and, calls for universalization of the ban on ransom payments.

Table 4 : Algeria and International Organizations			
Nature of the IO	Universal IO		Regional IO
International Political Organizations	• UNO.....	1962	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AUO..... 1963 • Arab Ligue... 1964
International Economic Organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IBRD..... • IDA..... • IMF..... 	1963	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AfDB 1964 • OPEC..... 1964 • OAPEC..... 1970 • IDB..... 1970
International Technical Organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ILO • FAO • ICAO • WHO • IMO • WMO • ITU • UNESCO 	1962	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OIC..... 1964 <p>Specialized institutions of the Arab League (they are progressively created)</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WIPO..... 1975 • WTO..... 1976 • IAEA..... 1963 • OPCW..... 1997 • IOM..... 		
Source: collected from different sources based mainly on the website of the organizations.			

In spite of the difficulty of the task, Algeria is endeavoring to ensure a combination of these different strategic options (geopolitical, economic and financial, military and diplomatic) available to it, to guide its foreign policy with some autonomy vis-à-vis the rest of the world.

2-2. Mediation: a tradition and an ancient practice very present in Algerian society

In Algeria, the judicial mediation was introduced recently as an alternative method of dispute settlement at the time of implementing the new Code of Civil and Administrative Procedure. Mediation in its modern conception appeared in Algeria (law of 25 February 2008 entered into application in 2009). Book V of the Algerian Code of Civil and Administrative Procedure, deals with the question of alternative methods of settling disputes. The parties then have three extrajudicial possibilities to settle their differences: conciliation, arbitration and mediation. Mediation is codified under Articles 994 to 1005 of the Algerian Code of Civil and Administrative Procedures.

It is expected that the judge must in all matters to propose mediation to the parties in conflict. If the parties agree to this type of settlement, the judge appoints a mediator to hear their point of view and try to bring them together to enable them to find a solution to the dispute. Are excluded from the mediation, however, family,

labor court and public order cases. The mediation may relate to all or part of the litigation³⁰.

The duration of the mediation has been fixed at three months, renewable for the same duration, at the request of the mediator and after agreement of the parties (Article 996). It is intended that the mediation be entrusted to a natural person or to an association. The text has specified conditions for individuals. These must be known for their probity and righteousness and meet the following conditions³¹:

- not to have been convicted of an infamous offense and not to be deprived of his civil rights;
- enjoy the qualification required for the examination of the dispute submitted to it;
- Being impartial and independent.

³⁰ Code of Civil and Administrative Procedures (2008), Book V: Alternative methods of dispute resolution, chapter II: mediation, Art. 994, p.112

³¹ Ibid. Article 998.

The executive decree of March 10, 2009 set the terms of appointment of the judicial mediator. The mediator is chosen "among the persons who by their social position are known by their integrity, competence and ability to handle and settle disputes". An annual list of mediators is established by a commission composed of the president of the court, the attorney general and the presidents of the courts. He is required to take an oath. A mediator not on the list may be called upon, but to fulfill his mission he must take an oath.

But these provisions did not make disappear customary law in certain regions of Algeria (Kabylie³², M'zab³³, etc.). Customary law is the predecessor of mediation in the country. In other words, mediation is a tradition and a very old practice present in Algerian society.

Indeed, in the tribal areas, the settlement of the conflicts by the village chief is still very present. The dispute is settled according to the principles of customary justice,

³² Kabylie region include numerous provinces of Algeria: the whole of both provinces of Tizi Ouzou and Bejaia, the majority of Bouira and parts of the provinces of Boumerdes, Jijel, Setif and Bordj Bou Arreridj.

³³ M'zab region is a territory of the Ghardaïa Province in Algeria. It is situated at 600 km south of Algiers.

following the traditional rules (urf: us and custom) that define the relations of tribal people among themselves, as opposed to Islamic law and state justice. Intra-tribal and intertribal social relations are marked by permanent tension. The customary system is based on three pillars: a compensation system, the mutual consent of authorities of regulation and the involvement of the whole clan in the settlement of a dispute.

Customary law is a set of practices and written rules that classify and prioritize the offenses or infringements committed. While oral transmission of customary law remains crucial, some of these rules have been written down. Customary law, based essentially on the two tribal concepts of shame and honor, is distinctly different from laws derived from religious texts (Islam law). The sanctions contained in customary law are aimed first of all at reconciling and restoring the honor and dignity of both parties. The punishment is above all a repair. Islamic law condemns, for its part, infringements and violations of the norm.

With regard to the prevalence of mediation in the administration of public affairs in general, it is interesting to note that the management of social conflicts is an

ancient and omnipresent practice in Algerian society. For example, several passages mentioning cases of mediation were noted in the Qur'an³⁴. In addition, it is also established that in some old cultures (e.g. Berber), mediation as a mode of social regulation was widely used in a highly institutionalized form, and occupied a prominent place in the animation of community life (strong mediation mind-set).

Under these conditions, Algeria has been able to transpose this method of regulation in the field of international relations. Indeed, the generalization of the use of mediation in the resolution of international conflicts and its strong presence among one of the pillars of its foreign policy can be explained from this angle of analysis.

2-3. Mediation a promoter of the national interest and national security

It is obvious that successful attempt by providing mediation in an international conflict can directly benefit its initiator because of the honorific impacts:

³⁴ In Algeria, Islam is the religion of the State (Article 2 of the Algerian Constitution of 2016) and more than 98% Algerian are Muslims.

international prestige, international credibility, brand image, good reputation and so on (Allouche 1994, 236). The considerations of political and strategic gains surrounding the mediation are fundamentally important for a middle-power mediator state like Algeria. Generally, the benefits are tangible. For instance, Algeria's involvement in the peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea signed on December 12, 2000, facilitated the gradual return of Algeria to the international arena and the resumption of its leadership actions on the African continent³⁵, after a decade of absence on the international scene. Nevertheless, the gains are sometimes purely symbolic and are related to the promotion of international peace and security, negotiations in international relations, prevent wars, etc.

Furthermore, the interests of the mediator and those of the parties to the conflict are sometimes linked and prove to be decisive for the resolution of the conflict in question. The Algerian mediation in the case of Mali conflict illustrates this idea perfectly. Algeria has always adopted a security strategy that essentially relies on its own resources. This makes it one of the most committed countries in regional

³⁵ Thanks also to: (1) the gradual return of peace and internal stability of the country from the 2000s, thanks in particular to a policy of Civil Concord and national reconciliation and, (2) the improvement of domestic economy.

security. Although it is not involved in the two Libyan and Malian conflicts, the effort it provides to protect its borders makes it one of the most committed countries in terms of the means mobilized to peacefully settle border conflicts including that of Mali crisis. Algeria's strategy is to strengthen cooperation and security coordination with its neighbors as an alternative to foreign intervention.

In addition, Algeria has developed a foreign policy to the extent, and several times beyond, its means (physical, human and material) to preserve its national sovereignty and avoid being engulfed under the influence of other state actors significantly more powerful and more aggressive. It is also about reducing its dependence on the outside: economic, technological and military dependence. This is a question here in particular of avoiding the symptom of "downgrading" the country, both from the diplomatic point of view and from the economic side. In this situation, preventing the decline of State sovereignty can only be achieved by exerting a diplomatic influence.

CONCLUSION

By way of conclusion, the present work has attempted to explain the factors of success of the mediation of international conflicts orchestrated by a state of middle power: Algeria. To achieve this, I took 4 cases studies in order to be more exhaustive in determining the factors of success in Algeria mediations from 1975 to 2015.

However, if we consider conflict resolution as a major objective of mediation, Algeria, which we hear rarely on the international scene, has been able to resolve conflicts and succeed where so many other contributors have failed.

However, successful mediation is far from being tied to just one or two factors. In the case of Algeria, several factors: political, economic, historical, power and influence have given rise to very successful mediations. In addition, every mediation has endogenous factors of success depending on the context of the mediation process. Sometimes, objective / subjective reasons intervene to determine the course of the negotiations.

Algeria's foreign policy is focused on pursuing dynamic diplomacy, contributing to peace, defending just causes, promoting fraternity, and the development of cooperative relations. The impartiality and strict neutrality displayed by Algeria, the material and logistical resources allocated to mediations (Algeria has borne, incessantly, the financial and logistical cost) and the monitoring of its execution also largely explain the success of these mediations. The choice of intervention time in some cases is conducive to settlement.

If some authors and experts claim that Algeria has to revisit its foreign policy doctrine, I think rather than that, its commitment and the constancy of the principles, on which foreign policy is based on, give it certain homogeneity, coherence, stability and clarity (unambiguous policy) of the Algeria's positions on international issues.

Very pragmatic approach: respect of the principles of good neighborliness, territorial integrity, the inviolability of international borders and non-interference in the internal affairs of the two countries, has most probably accelerated the rapprochement of the two protagonists. Because of its high-quality political

relations with the protagonists to the resolved conflict that raise the level of trust on mediator, this factor seems to be the main element of success that could favor a victorious mediation for Algeria.

A mediation to gain support for Algerian foreign policy goals: Algeria sees in a successful mediation as a channel to facilitate its gradual return of to the international arena and the resumption of its leadership actions on the African continent. It is clear that without the settlement of these conflicts by its mediation, Algeria will not be able to have significant regional and international visibility nowadays.

The very long land borders (around 6400 km) difficult or impossible to cover appropriately; the itinerant and transnational nature of the terrorist threat; the weakness of some neighboring states; foreign interventions (in Libya and Mali) and their destabilizing effects contributing to stimulating terrorist activity; political processes (inter-Libyan negotiations) sponsored by Algeria that are struggling to succeed in support of national security action; forced Algeria to combine an active foreign policy with its domestic policy. It is a two level strategy: security-military

and political (mediation efforts between different protagonists in neighboring countries in crisis).

Algeria has also managed to combine these different strategic options (geopolitical, economic and financial, military and diplomatic) that are offered to it, in order to guide its foreign policy with a certain autonomy compared to the rest of the world, and to support its objective of pacific conflicts resolution through mediation.

A legal and cultural framework favoring mediation: The omnipresence of mediation in domestic level in Algerian society as a culture, as well, can be seen as a foundation for a "learning by doing" approach that is gradually moving towards the norms of international mediation.

Also the charisma of President A. Bouteflika (1999 current) as a head of state involved in a high level of responsibility in the affairs of the African continent since the early 1960s, earned him a continental and international credibility. In fact, A. Bouteflika was the youngest African Minister for Foreign Affairs, serving from 1963 to 1978 (almost 16 years). In that capacity, he presided over the Twenty-ninth

General Assembly of the United Nations in 1974, the most glorious time of the third world, and the world has retained the image of a militant, among others, particularly committed to apartheid, non-aligned countries and G77 developing countries.

In general, the secret of Algeria's success lies mainly in its commitment to principles, ideals and not to narrow national agendas or egotistic interests. Algeria's mediations manage to combine the credibility of its long experience with the determination, the will and, the confidence that all parties invest in Algeria.

Finally, the international role of Algeria is, paradoxically, far beyond its means. Algeria is a recent sovereign state, but yet endowed with diplomacy with strong traditions. Its relative political stability has enabled the generation of young militants trained during the war of national liberation (1954–1962) to remain in the ranks of the ALN (National Liberation Army) and the FLN (National Liberation Front) and the student union, UGEMA (General Union of Algerian Muslim Students).

BIBLIOGRAPGY

1. JOURNAL ARTICLES

- Ait-Chaalal A. (2002), *l'Algérie depuis 1962 : retour sur une histoire contrastée*, Revue internationale et stratégique, 2002/2 n° 46, pp. 61-72.
- Ait-Chaalat A. (2001), *la diplomatie algérienne et l'Occident de 1965 à 1991*, Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord. (Tome XXXIX, 2000-2001. CNRS Éditions, p.483-498.
- Ait-Chaalal A. (1998), *Algérie- Etats-Unis: des relations denses et complexes. Centre d'études et de recherches sur le monde arabe contemporain*, Louvain-la- Neuve : Cermac.- 70 p.
- Allouche B. (1994), *la médiation des petits États : rétrospective et perspective* (Note). Études internationales, 25 (2), 213–236.
- Belkaïd A. (2009), *La Diplomatie Algérienne A La Recherche De Son Age D'or*, Politique étrangère /2 (Été), p. 337-344.
- Bercovitch J. & al. (1993), *The process of international mediation: An analysis of the determinants of successful and unsuccessful outcomes*, Australian Journal of Political Science, 28:2, 290-305, DOI: 10.1080/00323269308402242

- Chikhaoui A. (2015), *les Paradigmes de la Politique Étrangère de L'Algérie*, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
- Chikhaoui A., *les défis de la politique étrangère de l'Algérie dans un contexte régional d'évolution démocratique*, pp. 233 -242.
<http://www.nesa-center.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Politique-Etrangere-et-Droit-International-July-2017.pdf>
- Digvijaysinh T. (2013), *Conflict and Conflict Management*, IOSR Journal of Business and Management (IOSR-JBM) e-ISSN: 2278-487X. Volume 8, Issue 6 (Mar. - Apr. 2013), pp 07-16.
<http://www.iosrjournals.org/iosr-jbm/papers/Vol8-issue6/B0860716.pdf>
- Djalili (1975), *Le rapprochement irano-irakien et ses conséquences*. In: Politique étrangère, n°3 - 1975 - 40^eannée. pp. 273-291; doi : <https://doi.org/10.3406/polit.1975.1771>
https://www.persee.fr/doc/polit_0032-342x_1975_num_40_3_1771
- Dris-Aït Hamadouche L. (2014), *l'Algérie et la sécurité au Sahel : lecture critique d'une approche paradoxale*, Confluences Méditerranée, 2014/3 N° 90, pp. 105-121.
- Dris-Aït Hamadouche L. (2012), *l'Algérie face au printemps arabe : pressions diffuses et résilience entretenue*. Accessible at:
www.iemed.org/observatorifr/areesdanalisi/arxius...2012/hamadouche_fr.pdf

- Daguzan J.-F. (2015), *la politique étrangère de l'Algérie : le temps de l'aventure ?*, Politique étrangère 2015/3, p. 31-42.
- d'Evry A. (2015), *l'opération Serval à l'épreuve du doute : Vrais succès et fausses leçons*, IFRI. Focus stratégique n° 59.
https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/fs59devry_0.pdf
- Grimaud N. (1991), *La Diplomatie Sous Chadli Ou La Politique Du Possible*, Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, tome XXX, CNRS Editions, pp. 401- 435
- Juillard P. (1981), *Le rôle joué par la République populaire et démocratique d'Algérie dans le règlement du contentieux entre les États-Unis d'Amérique et la République islamique d'Iran*. In: Annuaire français de droit international, volume 27, pp. 19- 44;
https://www.persee.fr/doc/afdi_0066-3085_1981_num_27_1_2430
- International Crisis Group (2005), *Iran in Iraq: How much influence?*, Report No. 38 on the Middle East - 21 March 2005.
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/27457/038_iran_in_iraq_how_much_influence_arab.pdf
- Hanzel M. (2015), *Algerian Foreign Policy in Perspective*, Accessible at:
<http://matthewhanzel.com/2015/04/12/algerian-foreign-policy-in-perspective>
- International Crisis Group (2015), *l'Algérie et ses voisins. Rapport Moyen-Orient/Afrique du Nord*, N°164.

- Lecoutre D. (2005), *la médiation de l'OUA dans le conflit entre l'Éthiopie et l'Érythrée (1998-2000)*, In: Annales d'Ethiopie. Volume 21, année 2005. pp. 31-72;
https://www.persee.fr/doc/ethio_0066-2127_2005_num_21_1_1092
- Mernache A. (2012), *la diplomatie algérienne, la nostalgie d'une gloire perdue*, Dynamiques Internationales ISSN 2105-2646, 18pages.
- Milena Dieckhoff (2011), *la médiation internationale dans la résolution des conflits : un regard théorique*, Fiche n° 6, janvier 2011, 14 pages
- Keita N. (2018), *l'Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation au Mali issu du processus d'Alger : entre euphorie ou doute, la paix en signe de traces !* Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES).
<http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/fes-pscc/14325.pdf>
- Sali B. O., *La Médiation des Conflits Politiques Violents en Afrique: «Une Niche Diplomacy» Pour Le Burkina Faso*.
<http://semestrale-geografia.org/index.php/sdg/article/download/49/50>
- Sikander T. (2011), *Conflict And Conflict Resolution*, Margalla papers, National Defense University, Pakisatan, Vol. XV, Issue II. pp.155-172
https://ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/margalla-paper/Margalla-Papers-2011/Margalla-Papers-2011.pdf

- Zakane V. (2017), *Médiation Et Règlement Pacifique Des Conflits En Afrique : Analyse Théorique*. Revue CAMES/SJP, n°001/2017, pp. 243-268
<http://publication.lecames.org/index.php/jur/article/download/918/621>

2. BOOKS

- Collier J. & al. (2009), *The Settlement of Disputes in International Law: institutions and procedures*, Oxford University Press, 395Apages.
- Juergen K. (2010), *Diplomatic Practice: Between Tradition and Innovation*, World Scientific Publishing, 480p.
- Meerts P. (2015), *Diplomatic Negotiation: Essence and Evolution*, Clingendael Institute, The Hague, 2nd edition. 403p.
- Michael J. & al. (2012), *International Mediation: War and Conflict in the Modern World*, Polity Press, 224 p.
- Merrills J. G. (2011), *International Dispute Settlement*, Cambridge, 5th edition, 359 pages
- Ramsbotham O. & al. (2011), *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 3rd edition, Polity Press, 507 p.
- General Secretariat of the Government (2008), *Code of Civil and Administrative Procedures*, Book V: Alternative methods of dispute resolution, chapter II: mediation, 118p.

Accessible at: <https://www.joradp.dz/TRV/FPCivil.pdf>

3. DOCTORAL THESIS

- EL Moghir (2016), *the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988)*, The Islamic University of Gaza - Palestine, Supervised by Prof. Dr. Akram Mohammed Odwan, 320p.

4. ARTICLE IN A NEWSPAPER

- Audrey Garric (2013), *l'Algérie, tournée vers l'exportation de ses hydrocarbures*, in *Le monde*, 17/01/2013.

5. WEBOGRAPHY

- www.mae.gov.dz
- www.bank-of-algeria.dz
- www.crisisgroup.org
- <http://www.iemed.org>
- <http://www.sudoc.abes.fr>
- <http://www.ifri.org>
- <http://www.imarabe.org>
- <https://www.crisisgroup.org/>

ANNEX 1: DEFINITIONS OF TERMS

In order to facilitate a better reading and understanding of this thesis, it is necessary to clarify certain terms that can lead to confusion. Indeed, I will define the terms: (a) international negotiation; (b) pacific settlement of conflicts; (c) Mediation. My objective will therefore not be to discuss the hundreds of definitions that have been given of these different terms. It will be indispensable to define the key words.

a. International negotiation

International negotiation is a process of interactions between two or more actors whose purpose is to resolve their divergences or conflicts of interest. At least five variables involve always in international negotiation: The actors or protagonists; the structure of the negotiation; the strategy of each actor; the negotiation process; the results of the negotiation (See Merrils 2012).

Negotiation is one of the oldest functions of the diplomatic mission. Diplomatic negotiations usually aim at signing international treaties of a bilateral or multilateral nature.

But given the complexity of international issues, negotiations are conducted by experts belonging to specialized State administrations; such as officials from the Ministries of Trade, Labor, Finance, Environment, Energy, Industry, etc (Meerts 2015,).

An embassy also negotiates when it discusses with the receiving State certain matters of interest to the two states, for example when it presents a claim, protects the interests of its nationals, a non-double taxation agreement, and so on. A political discussion on specific issues between the Head of Diplomatic Mission and the Foreign Minister of the host country constitutes a negotiation, including a high-level official visit or participation in an international conference organized by the receiving State. In fact, it can be said that the Embassy negotiates with the authorities of the receiving State whenever it has a matter to settle with them. Negotiation takes the form of formal discussions and meetings.

b. The pacific settlement of conflicts

Conflict settlement indicates this ability to generate an agreement, anticipate and end a political/armed conflict between parties (Ramsbotham and al. 2011, 31).

The UN Charter in its article 2(4) prohibits the use of threat or the use of force. Pacific methods of conflict settlement can be classified into various categories. Various solutions may be used where the dispute could not be settled by direct negotiations between the two States in conflict. Negotiations are conducted indirectly by a third party acting as an intermediary to resolve the dispute diplomatically. A variety of procedures are used which can be divided into two broad categories (Sikander 2011, 161):

In the first type of procedure, it is simply proposed three (3) modes of settlement to parties who are not required to accept them: **mediation, conciliation** or **good offices**. The processes here are characterized by the interposition, with the agreement of the parties, of a third party likely to facilitate the solution of the conflict, but without the power to make a decision binding on the parties to the conflict.

The second type of procedure is characterized by the binding nature of the solution provided: **arbitration** and **judicial settlement**. The purpose of these proceedings is the settlement of disputes by mandatory sentences for the parties, delivered on the basis of respect for the law. The arbitration differs from the judicial settlement by

the fact that the parties choose the arbitrators, while the judges are appointed by a procedure involving either an international organization (IO) or at least a large circle of States (International Court of Justice in the framework of the UN, European Court of Human Rights attached to the Council of Europe, Tribunal United Nations for the former Yugoslavia, United Nations Tribunal for Rwanda).

The use of a particular mode of pacific settlement depends not only on the conventions in force between States but also on the nature of the dispute. The dispute may be of a legal or political nature. Legal disputes are likely to be settled by means of a binding solution for States, in the form of an arbitration settlement or a judicial settlement. Political conflicts can instead be handled through mediation, conciliation or good offices. The United Nations Charter provides for pacific procedures for the settlement of international disputes in its Chapter VI, notably in Article 33 (1).

c. Mediation

Under this title, the reader should be clarified on the definition of international conflict mediation, the conditions for effective mediation and how this conflict management method is different from other peace promotion strategies.

Mediation or international mediation³⁶ is a particular form of negotiation; characterized by the intervention of a third party or parties to assist, with their consent, two or more parties to prevent, manage or settle a conflict by helping them to develop an agreement mutually acceptable (Digvijaysinh 2013, 14).

Mediation is useful as soon as there is a blockage between the parties involved in the dispute. The mediator's role varies from case to case, ranging from strict neutrality to characterized pressure. Far from being systematically impartial, the mediator can act as a "communicator" to foster communication and restore trust between the parties. The mediator can also suggest as creative as possible formulas to reach an agreement. In a third case, the mediator goes as far as to modify the power relationships involved by intervening himself in the negotiation (by the granting of a financial aid for example).

³⁶ For reasons of simplification on this topic, we affirm that our object is not to provoke a controversy as to the acceptance or not of the use of the adjective "international", but on the contrary to decide. Our position is clear; we will adopt it throughout our thesis interchangeably with the terms: "mediation", "international mediation" and even "diplomatic mediation", without this leading to confusion.

Many NGOs, such as the Carter Foundation, the Ford Foundation and the Sant'Egidio community, have the specific objective of acting as mediators and facilitating an agreement between the protagonists of a conflict. For example, members of the Sant'Egidio community have contributed to renewing the dialogue in Mozambique, Guatemala and the Balkans (Ramsbotham O. and al. 2011, 182).

Mediation has been precisely regulated by the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and has been confirmed in the UN Charter on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes chapter (Collier & al. 2009, 28).

Mediation is distinguished from good offices by the greater role of the third State, its intervention being more precise, active and more continuous.

Some examples of mediation can be mentioned: the intervention of the USSR in the conflict between India and Pakistan in 1965, the Vatican in the territorial conflict between Argentina and Chile in 1978-1979. US President Theodore Roosevelt mediated to end the Russo-Japanese war and lead to the Portsmouth Treaty (1905).

It is optional to follow the recommendations of the mediator. But in some cases, it can be accompanied by political pressure such as to seriously limit the freedom of those who resort to it (United States mediation between Egypt and Israel, 1978-1979).

Guidelines are set by the UN for an effective mediation³⁷. We summarize them as follows:

- **Preparedness:** Good preparation, all-inclusive inventory of stakeholders, detailed analysis of the conflict, adopting flexible strategies, etc.
- **Voluntary consent of the protagonists:** the protagonists in the conflict should give their consent...
- **Impartiality:** Treat all parties in conflict fairly. The mediator must have the ability to converse with all parties.
- **Inclusivity:** Opening the process to all involved parties, inclusive negotiation process...

³⁷Accessible at : <https://peacemaker.un.org/guidance-effective-mediation>

- **National ownership:** The warring parties and society as a whole adhere to the mediation process and work to implement the resulting agreements and, the obligation to adapted the mediation to local cultures and norms,
- **International law and normative frameworks:** Mediation can only gain legitimacy and the peace agreement in viability in the context of respect for international law.
- **Coherence, coordination and complementarities of mediation activities:** Concerted or coordinated approaches must be adopted and tasks must be clearly divided among the actors involved at various levels.
- **Peace agreements of quality:** Successful peace agreements must put an end to hostility and create the conditions for permanent peace, justice, security and reconciliation.

논문 요약

알제리는 마그레브 지역, 중동과 북아프리카영역 내지는, 아프리카, 서유럽 지중해 국가 등의 국제 무대에서 핵심적인 역할을 하도록 진화해왔다. 알제리의 외교는 포괄적인 대화와 화해를 통해 태평양의 위기와 분쟁의 해결에 항상 수혜를 주어왔다. 본 연구의 목적은 국제 분쟁의 해결을 위한 중재에 있어서의 알제리의 역할을 분석하고 그 성공 요인을 밝히는 것이다. 이는 지역 강국으로서의 알제리가 중재, 분쟁 해결, 그리고 국제적 관계에서 선도적 역할을 하고 있음을 보여줄 수 있다.

주요어: 알제리, 중재, 외교, 태평양 분쟁의 해결

학번: 2017-28855