



저작자표시-비영리-변경금지 2.0 대한민국

이용자는 아래의 조건을 따르는 경우에 한하여 자유롭게

- 이 저작물을 복제, 배포, 전송, 전시, 공연 및 방송할 수 있습니다.

다음과 같은 조건을 따라야 합니다:



저작자표시. 귀하는 원저작자를 표시하여야 합니다.



비영리. 귀하는 이 저작물을 영리 목적으로 이용할 수 없습니다.



변경금지. 귀하는 이 저작물을 개작, 변형 또는 가공할 수 없습니다.

- 귀하는, 이 저작물의 재이용이나 배포의 경우, 이 저작물에 적용된 이용허락조건을 명확하게 나타내어야 합니다.
- 저작권자로부터 별도의 허가를 받으면 이러한 조건들은 적용되지 않습니다.

저작권법에 따른 이용자의 권리는 위의 내용에 의하여 영향을 받지 않습니다.

이것은 [이용허락규약\(Legal Code\)](#)을 이해하기 쉽게 요약한 것입니다.

[Disclaimer](#)

국제학석사학위논문

**Cooperation and Contradiction of Sino-
Russian relations in the Russian Far East:
Focusing on the Russian perspective**

러시아 극동지역을 둘러싼 중국과 러시아의 협력과 대치:
러시아의 입장을 중심으로

2019년 2월

서울대학교 국제대학원

국제학과 국제협력전공

최 현 정

Cooperation and Contradiction of Sino-Russian relations in the Russian Far East:

Focusing on the Russian perspective

러시아 극동지역을 둘러싼 중국과 러시아의
협력과 대치:
러시아의 입장을 중심으로

지도교수 신성호

이 논문을 국제학 석사학위논문으로 제출함

2019년 2월

서울대학교 국제대학원

국제학과 국제협력전공

최현정

최현정의 석사학위논문을 인준함

2019년 2월

위원장
부위원장
위원

김태균
송지연
신성호



(인)

(인)

(인)



Cooperation and Contradiction of Sino-Russian relations in the Russian Far East:

Focusing on the Russian perspective

Seong-Ho Sheen

Submitting a master's thesis of International Studies

February 2019

Graduate School of International Studies

Seoul National University

International Cooperation Major

Hyeunjung Choi

Confirming the master's thesis written by

Hyeunjung Choi

February 2019

Chair	<u>Taekyoon Kim</u>	(Seal)
Vice Chair	<u>Jiyeoun Song</u>	(Seal)
Advisor	<u>Seong-Ho Sheen</u>	(Seal)



A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Seong-Ho Sheen', written over the 'Seal' label in the signature line of the table.

© Copyright by Choi, Hyeun Jung 2019

All Rights Reserved

Abstract

Cooperation and Competition simultaneously existed in the Sino-Russian relations. As Russia turned its attention to Asia and prioritized the “Turn to the East” policy and tried to increase its political influence and economic presence in the Russian Far East (RFE). Sino-Russian economic relations were expected to develop. However, cooperation was not showing much progress. This paper analyzed the hindrance factors from the Russian perspective by dividing in to two approaches: RFE (Regional level) and Zarubino Port Development project (Sub-regional level). In the RFE, the main hindrance factors were 1) Balancing US pivot to Asia and resurging their status of super power, 2) Wary of China's emergence in the Asia Pacific region. In the Sino-Russian border areas, the hindrance factors were 1) Wary of China's domination in the Sino-Russian border areas, 2) Low commitment to develop the border areas.

In the China-Russia relations, we can observe two levels: Balancing against US on the international system and hedging to one another to its regional level. Both regional and sub-regional level approach show Russia is more concerned to security rather than economic cooperation when dealing with China in the RFE. Accordingly, Russia is trying to diversify its source of investment by inviting other main North East Asian (NEA) countries. For Korea, this is an opportunity to improve its influence in NEA and later attract North Korea(NK) to participate in the trilateral economic cooperation

between two Koreas and Russia. Therefore, it is important to consider participating the RFE development, if conditions allow.

Keyword: Russian Far East, Zarubino Port Development, Sino-Russian relations, Cross-border cooperation, South Korea, Regional cooperation in North East Asia

Student Number: 2014 – 24216

Table of Contents

I. Introduction	1
1. Research Purpose and Significance	2
2. Research Design	4
2-1. Literature Review	4
2-2. Research Question	8
2-3. Research Outline	9
II. China- Russia Relationship in the Russian Far East (RFE)	11
1. Strategic Value and Regional Development of Russia Far East	11
2. Strategic Partnership between China and Russia	18
3. China- Russia Interactions in the RFE	21
3-1. Hindrance Factors	25
3-1-1. Balancing US pivot to Asia	25
3-1-2. Wary of China's emergence in the Asia Pacific region	27
4. Assessment of Russia's position in RFE	30

III. Cross-border cooperation in the Russian Far East (RFE) ...

.....	31
1. Construction of transport network in the Sino-Russian border areas ·	31
2. China - Russia interactions in the Sino- Russian border areas ······	32
3. Sino - Russian cooperative project: Zarubino Port Development Project	37
3-1. Hindrance Factors ······	43
3-1-1. Wary of China's dominance in the Sino - Russian border areas ······	43
3-1-2. Low Commitment to develop the border areas ······	46
4. Assessment of Russia's position in border areas ······	47

IV. Implications for Korea and the Regional cooperation in NEA

.....	49
1. Regional cooperation in North East Asia ······	49
2. Implication for Korea ······	52

V. Conclusion ······ 55

VI. Reference ······ 59

VII. Abstract in Korean ······ 77

List of Figures

Figure 1. Location of Russian Far East	14
Figure 2. Location of Zarubino Port and Hunchun city	27
Figure 3. International Corridors of Primorye 1 and Primorye 2	29

List of Abbreviations

GTI	Greater Tumen Initiative
NK	North Korea
NEA	North East Asia
RFE	Russia Far East
SK	South Korea
US	United States

I . Introduction

In the past decade the Russia Far East (RFE) didn't receive much attention due to its poor economic conditions, cross-border troublesome with China and tensions between the center and local authorities. However, due to the political crisis in Ukraine and the shift of the geopolitical and geoeconomic center toward Asia Pacific region, Russia turned its attention to Asia and increased its political and economic presence in the RFE. Moscow prioritized the "Turn to the East" policy and sought more cooperation with China. For China this was a great opportunity since it needed RFE's natural resources and secured peace in its northern border areas facing Russia.

Recent interest grew over RFE and Northern east of Chinese border areas due to its new opportunity for creating a sea route which connects the northern part of East Asia. In May 2014, the administration of Jilin Province signed an agreement with Summa Group in the aim of working together on the construction of the Bolshoy Zarubino port located in Russia.¹ In economic terms, Russia's high vulnerability and low level of development in the RFE and China's landlocked northeast facilitates made

¹ Ivan Zuenko, "The Chimera of Chinese Investment in Russia's Far East Ports." *Carnegie Moscow Center Comment* May 05, 2017, <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/71427>.

both countries to cooperate. Despite its newly-fortified partnership and recent signs of cooperation, tensions and rivalry remained.²

1. Research Purpose and Significance

The economic and social conditions of RFE is lagging far behind which is generating serious challenges to the further development of Russia. In 2013, Russian president Vladimir Putin declared that the development of the Far East is the 'national priority for the entire twenty-first century.'³ China, having relatively sufficient capital and manpower, is one of the most promising market for RFE. One of Russia and China's primary test for their growth of planned cooperation which Lee and Lukin(2016) as coined as 'the most extensive intergovernmental dialogue mechanism that Russia maintains with any major country' is the Zarubino Port complex.⁴ If this plan succeed, China can get the access to the East Sea and Asia-Pacific and Russia can establish a transport hub in the Asia Pacific.⁵ However, interestingly Russia's pattern of foreign

² Nyshka Chandran, "‘Serious’ rivalry still drives China-Russia relations despite improving ties." *CNBC News* September 14, 2018, <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/14/china-russia-ties--more-rivalry-than-allaince.html>

³ Helge Blakkisrud, Elena W. Rowe and Roman Vakulchuk, "Russia’s Far East Initiatives in Troubled Geopolitical Times." *Valdai Papers*, no.92 (2018), pp. 3.

⁴ Gould-Davies Nigel, "Russia' Far East: new dynamics in Asia Pacific and beyond. By Rensselaer Lee and Artyon Lukin." Review of the *Russia' Far East: new dynamics in Asia Pacific and beyond*, by Rensselaer Lee and Artyon Lukin, *International Affairs* 92, 4 (2016). pp.1012-1013.

⁵ Ibid.

policy behavior is ambivalent which is undermining the bilateral cooperation with China. In other words, unlike the expected cooperation, Russia is not showing full support. This is interesting to unfold and this can demonstrate why Sino-Russian relations are always having both cooperation and distrust. Moreover, from the Russian perspective, by examining various aspects of the Sino-Russian relations at the international and regional level, it could demonstrate how dissatisfied Russia can balance its opposition to US unipolarity and also have its worries to a potential emerging power such as China.⁶

Moreover President Vladimir Putin, in the summit talks in Vladivostok on Sep .06, mentioned that “Korea is one of the most important partners” and welcomed stronger economic links with South Korea (SK).⁷ In response, SK president Moon Ja mentioned that “The Russian Far East is where Russia' New East Asia and Korea's New Northern Policy meet and the combination of RFE natural resources and Korea's advanced technologies will make the region a land of opportunity for the prosperity of Korea and Russia.”⁸ Two leaders discussed and agreed to expand their volume of bilateral trade up to \$30 billion dollars. South Korea's participation in the RFE will further the progress of South Korean-Russian economic relations and increase North Korea's (NK) willingness to participate which can foster the inter-Korean rapprochement

⁶ Brian G. Carlson, “Seeking Leverage: China-Russia Relations in World Politics, 1991- 2016.” PhD diss., (Johns Hopkins University, 2018). pp. 7.

⁷ Sojung Yoon, “Korea is best partner for developing Russian Far East’.” Korea.net, September 07, 2017. <http://korea.net/NewsFocus/policies/view?articleId=149018>.

⁸ Ibid.

in the future.⁹ So understanding Russia's position to RFE will show important implications to SK and its policy toward Russia and NK.

2. Research Design

2-1. Literature Review

Academic interest toward China-Russia relationship and Russia's "Turn to the East" have recently been growing. According to Kuchins(2014), the increasing demand for energy supplies from the international market has made Russia and China to jointly develop the oil fields in Siberia. But Russia used arms sales to Vietnam to constrain Chinese hegemony in the South China sea.¹⁰ In the Valdai Discussion Club (2014), Russia' annexation of Crimea and the Ukraine crisis has given Russia their direction change toward Asia. But this was the not the starting point to have interest toward Asia, it was rather an adding element of urgency. Moreover, Moscow should show consistent commitment to realize President Xi's optimistic declarations of Sino-Russian relations as a time of harvest and gathering the fruit.¹¹ According to Mankoff (2015), Russia's Asia Pivot and Russia's turn to China shows more than just an emergence of a new

⁹ Timothy Stanley, "The Growing Russia-South Korea Partnership: Economic links between South Korea and Russia are a welcome byproduct of the inter-Korea thaw." *The Diplomat*, May 24, 2018.

<https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/the-growing-russia-south-korea-partnership/>

¹⁰ Andrew C. Kuchins, "Russia and the CIS in 2013: Russia's Pivot to Asia." *Asian Survey* 54, no.1 (2014), pp. 129-137.

¹¹ Helge et al., *Op.Cit.* pp.10.

revisionist axis as both China and Russia share same sides on many international issues, but also a wary of excessive dependence on China as the relations between China and Russia get closer. Russia perceives this as a factor that can undermine Russia's great-power aspiration in Asia. For these reasons, Russia's Asia Pivot tries to seek other Asian powers to balance its relations with China. Moreover, US interest in the region and Russia's support for maintaining the balance in Asia converges which provides a chance for Washington to engage with Moscow in the Asia-Pacific. So Washington is showing interest for Russia being a constructive player in Asia.¹²

Moreover, Sutter (2018) mentions the strategic implications of Sino-Russian relations. Shared momentum between Russia and China has deepened the relationship. However, limitations remained in their cooperation because Moscow and Beijing continuously avoid to enter their relationship into a formal alliance and are hesitant to involve in support to others where their interests don't intersect. Moreover, China hopes to preserve the existing international order and oppose the regional expansion in Asia. On the other hand, Russia is dissatisfied with their reversal role from big brother to junior status regarding their relations with China.¹³

In addition, Lo(2014) has seen the “Turn to the East” policy as a secondary vector of Russian foreign policy. Russia is still with strong Western-centric world-view

¹² Jeffrey Mankoff, “Russia’s Asia pivot: confrontation or cooperation?” *Asia Policy* 19, no.1 (2015), pp. 65–87.

¹³ Robert. Sutter, “China-Russia Relations: Strategic Implications and U.S Policy Options.” *The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) Special Report*, no.73 (2018). pp. 1-10.

and retains a strongly and their main focus is to be an “independent” Eurasian center of power and tend to prioritize their international relations with Great Power relations.¹⁴ These literature are more pessimistic about the Sino-Russian bilateral relations because Russia is concerned with the possible takeover of their territories if it is not taking control of the remote RFE areas which is adjacent to China. But they are converging with the view that Russia is declining and China is emerging which increases the dependency on China and makes the ties with China closer.

Regarding the sub-regional cooperation in the border areas, literature focus mostly on the national level approach. According to Rozman (2010), China wants Sino-Russian-North Korean border cooperation to develop the Northern East cities of China and increase their influence in North East Asia (NEA).¹⁵ On the other hand, according to Lo(2002), Russia's central government emphasizes the development of the RFE and revival in Asia.¹⁶ Previous studies have focused more on the energy sector which is the primary source of RFE development. According to Kaplan (2014), due to the close linkage between energy and country's geopolitics, Russia and China's energy cooperation will go against the 'Democratic West.'¹⁷ However, Yang(2013) mentioned

¹⁴ Bobo Lo, “Russia's Eastern Direction -Distinguishing the Real from the Virtual.” *Russie Nei Reports* No.17 (2014). pp. 1-3

¹⁵ Gilbert Rozman, *Chinese strategic thought toward Asia*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

¹⁶ Bobo Lo, *Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp.53.

¹⁷ Robert D. Kaplan, “The Geopolitics of Energy.” *Forbes*, April 4, 2014. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2014/04/04/the-geopolitics-of-energy/#16ba0f573b39>

that the main factors that affect the Sino-Russian energy cooperation is their national interests and this affects the direction to their relations.¹⁸ In addition, Hsu (2014) mentioned that the cooperation in the energy sector have challenges. Neither countries want to provide a relative gain for the other party. Also Russia is wary of the increasing Chinese presence in RFE and Central Asia.¹⁹

However, with recent increase of investment and cooperation in transport infrastructure in the Sino-Russian border areas, examining the details of the construction of transport networks are important and it is likely to be subject to further research for revealing their regional characteristics and predicting the prospects of regional cooperation in NEA. According to the Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI) report in 2013, for increasing the connectivity and foster regional cooperation in the transport sector, infrastructure improvements should be practiced.²⁰ One of their main investments are Modernizing Zarubino port. This modernization will increase the transit capacity and support the key corridor which connects the transit between Jilin Province(China), South

¹⁸ Yang Chaoyue, "A study of Sino-Russian energy cooperation from the perspective of theories of International Relations." *Journal of China and International Relations* 1, no.2 (2013) pp. 87-94.

¹⁹ Hsu Wan-Chun, "The geopolitics of Russia's intensifying Energy Cooperation with China." Masters diss., (Radboud University Nijmegen, 2014).

²⁰ Greater Tumen Initiative(GTI) is an intergovernmental cooperation mechanism which has 4 member countries: China, South Korea, Mongolia and Russian Federation. The main vision is building great partnership for common prosperity in North East Asia(NEA) and they provide a platform for regional economic cooperation. The Greater Tumen Region have special features: Tied together at the crossroads of transport and energy routes and easy access to affluent markets in NEA. retrieved from <http://www.tumenprogramme.org/?list-1524.html>

Korea(SK) and Japan through Zarubino Port(Russia). This can create a transport network and facilitate trade.²¹ For improving the conditions of the infrastructure, Russia and China have been working together. Zarubino port development is showing relatively slow progress, but academically we can find some implications for the delay of Sino-Russian cooperation. This is why Zarubino port development was selected as the case study.

2-2. Research Question

In this paper, the research questions are the following: What is the basic trend shaping the overall Sino-Russian relations and its progress in the RFE and Zarubino Port Development Project? What is the hindrance internal/external factors in these areas? By looking upon the Russian Far East and Sino Russian border areas, this paper will determine multiple facets of Sino-Russian relationship at the regional and sub-regional level and see whether these converge or diverge. Moreover, this paper will analyze whether the Sino-Russian cooperation in these areas will be sustainable and can lead to regional cooperation in North East Asia and possible policy responses from Korea will be dealt at the end.

²¹ Greater Tumen Initiative , “GTI Regional Transport Strategy and Action Plan” (Paper, 2nd meeting of the GTI Transport Board, Sokcho, Republic of Korea, July, 2012).

2-3. Research Outline

This paper will examine the internal/external factors to find the hindrance for cooperation with China from the Russian perspective. It will use the multi-level approach: Russian Far East (Regional level) and the Zarubino Port development project (Sub-regional level). An analysis of China, Russia's common interest and mistrust will be dealt in development project (Sub-regional level). An analysis of China, Russia's common interest and mistrust will be dealt in attempt to understand the context of their relations and how states perceive each other. The study considers several independent variables that potentially affect the relationship, including both systemic and domestic factors. Following this, prospects for the regional cooperation in NEA and the implications for Korea will be provided.

In detail, Chapter 1 will start with a brief introduction and a guidance for the research which is conducted in this paper. Chapter 2 covers the regional level approach which is the Russian Far East (RFE). First, this paper will explain special dynamics of Sino-Russian relations since this is an important indicator to explain their bilateral relationship in the RFE. In order to understand these dynamics, this paper will examine the international factors of Russia's change in interest toward the East and their formation of strategic partnership with China. Moreover, detailed Sino-Russian interactions in RFE and their hindrance factors to cooperate in the RFE will be analyzed. This can identify how Russia is perceiving China and what major driving forces exist to compete and cooperate with China in the RFE. Chapter 3 covers the sub-regional level

which is the Sino-Russian border areas. This paper will focus on the areas which are located near North east part of China and Russia's Primorsky krai.²² First, it will examine the main factors for Russia's effort to construct the transport network in the border areas. In addition, Zarubino Port Development project will be used as a case study to understand how Russia and China is interacting and competing in these areas.

Emphasizing the fact that the Sino-Russian cooperation in the RFE is not only beneficial for the two countries, but also for the countries in NEA, Chapter 4 will provide implications for Korea and the future regional cooperation in NEA. Chapter 5 will conclude with Russia's position in the RFE and border areas. Accordingly, this paper will demonstrate Russia's main hindrance factors to cooperate with China and identify whether these factors converge or diverge according to each area. At the end of the paper, future prospects for Sino-Russian relations in RFE will be provided.

²² The main cities in the North east China is Hunchun and Primorsky krai is one of the regions in the Russian Far East. Retrieved from https://www.joc.com/port-news/asian-ports/russia-china-aim-boost-northeast-asia-trade-expanding-zarubino-port_20141007.html

II. China-Russia relationship in the Russian Far East

1. Strategic value and Regional Development of Russian Far East

“Together with Eastern and Western Siberia and the Russian Far East is a vast treasure house of natural resources, especially energy that can supply the enormous populations and booming economies of East Asia.”

*Gilbert Rozman.*²³

The Russian Far East (RFE), approximately 6.17 million square kilometers of landmass, is the largest region located in the East side of Russian Federation. Until January 1 2018, it had 6,165 million people which is about 4% of the total population.²⁴ The Far East was the source of materials for the Soviet Union and a military base against the U.S.-Japan alliance. Only a few military-related industries were developed. Economic conditions and infrastructure were relatively poor compared to other regions. Also, in terms of the industrial structure, the Far East developed its mining industry at a

²³ Gilbert Rozman, Strategic Thinking about the Far East: A Resurgent Russia Eyes Its Future in Northeast Asia, *Problems of Post-Communism* 55, 1 (2008), pp.36

²⁴ Dmitry Shcherbakov, “Charms of Blowing Up: Far East Plus 2.” *East Russia*, June 11, 2018. <https://www.eastrussia.ru/en/material/prelesti-razduvaniya-dalniy-vostok-plyus-2/>.

very rapid pace from the late 1960s, resulting in serious imbalances among the industrial sectors.²⁵ Figure 1 shows the location of the Far East of Russia.²⁶

Figure 1. Location of Russian Far East (RFE)



(Source : *Eurasia Daily Monitor vol.15 issue 105.*)

²⁵ 고재남, 「주변국 (중국, 일본, 미국)의 극동지역 정책」. 정여천(편) 『러시아 극동지역의 경제개발 전망과 한국의 선택』. KIEP 8 권 2 호 (2008). pp. 243-279.

²⁶ Vadim Shtepa, “Russian Federal Districts as Instrument of Moscow's Internal Colonization,” *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 15, 105 (2018), figure 1.

Due to population outflow and remoteness from Russia's center and the poor industrial technological structure, there was little attention from Moscow.²⁷ They suffered from what many called the “Siberian Curse” which meant “the irrational development policies in cold inhospitable areas with poor prospects under market conditions.”²⁸ Due to the collapse of Soviet regime and its financial struggle in the early 1990s, the central government neglected RFE and abandoned their obligation to provide subsidies to these areas. Since RFE had heavy reliance on subsidies from Moscow, there was an increasing frustration from RFE toward Moscow.²⁹

Despite the underdeveloped poor conditions, RFE's abundant untapped resources and strategic focal point of international market in NEA made RFE as a possible source for supplying populations and booming economies of NEA. According to Rozman(2008), Russia is a qualified as a member of the Asia-Pacific due to its geographical location near NEA. Moreover, the long shared frontiers with China allow trade and border cooperation that is a stimulating factor to improve the bilateral relations. It is also a key to establish infrastructure and initiate the step to NEA regional

²⁷ Valeria Markova, “Cross-Border Integration: Case of the Russian Far East and North-East of China.” Masters diss., (Lund University, 2014).

²⁸ Rozman, 2008, *Op.Cit.* pp.37.

²⁹ Artyom Lukin and Tamara Troyakova, “The Russian Far East and the Asia Pacific: State-Managed Integration.” In *From APEC 2011 to APEC 2012: American and Russian Perspectives on Asia-Pacific Security and Cooperation*, ed. Rouben Azizian and Artyom Lukin (Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies and Far Eastern Federal University Press, 2012), 189-204.

cooperation.³⁰ As a result, the interest of several major countries of NEA were intersected in this area.³¹ However, viewed as underdeveloped areas, Moscow had the fear of possible intervention from the outside powers and started to recognize the backwardness of RFE as a serious security threat for Russia and started to develop RFE and increase its political and economic presence in the RFE.³²

During this period, development program was lacking legal systems providing tax and other incentives for interested investors and it only remained at the declaration level. Poor infrastructure in RFE increased the transportation cost and weaken the price competitiveness of products in the market. Low population density increased serious shortage of working force in the RFE. This had faded the hopes for realizing the economic potential of RFE.³³ Acknowledging the priority to upgrade RFE, there was pivotal for the RFE. The Russian government approved to allocate more than 30 billion dollars for modernizing transportation infrastructure and launch a updated industrial complexes in six years. This was the RFE's socio-economic development. Accordingly, after the global financial crisis, 'Strategy for the Socio-Economic Development of the Far East and Baikal Region until 2015' which underlined the priority of the development

³⁰ Rozman, 2008, *Op.Cit.*, pp.36-48.

³¹ Lee Rensselaer, "The Russian Far East: Opportunities and Challenges." April 17, 2013. *Foreign Policy Research Institute (FRPI)*, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2013/04/the-russian-far-east-opportunities-and-challenges/>

³² Ibid.

³³ Dmitri Trenin, "Russia's Asia Policy under Vladimir Putin, 2000–5." In *Russian Strategic Thought toward Asia*, ed. Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo and Joseph P. Ferguson (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 111.

on the national level and the realization of a transit gateway to Asian and European markets was signed.³⁴

After the inauguration of Putin's third term, with the aim to develop infrastructure and generate growth in RFE, Moscow implied various political strategies and adopted investment plans.³⁵ For the host city for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 2012, Putin announced to be held in Vladivostok which is located in RFE, instead of choosing Moscow and Saint Petersburg.³⁶ The central government has invested more not only to make a host city comfortable but also for the future of Vladivostok and RFE to integrate economically, politically, socially and culturally with Asia countries.³⁷ This was seen as a signal for Russia's start in their regional development in the RFE and regional cooperation in Northeast Asia.³⁸ In 2012, the first separate ministry with both status of the federal government and decentralized structure in the Far East district was set up. The Ministry of Development of the Russian Far East was an institutional innovation.³⁹ Moscow has acknowledged the difficulties to manage

³⁴ Sergei Karphkhin, "Why Beijing and Washington are moving to the Russian Far East." November 8, 2016, *Russian International Affairs Council*, <http://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/why-beijing-and-washington-are-moving-to-the-russian-far-eas/>

³⁵ Helge et al., *Op.Cit.*, pp.5.

³⁶ Lukin and Troyakova, *Op.Cit.* pp.189-204

³⁷ Andrew C. Kuchins, "Russian Hosting in the APEC Summit in Vladivostok: Putin's "Tilt to Asia." September 5, 2012, *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-hosting-apec-summit-vladivostok-putins-tilt-asia>.

³⁸ 신범식. 2014. 「동북아 초국경 소지역협력과 지역의 발명: "유라시아 이니셔티브" 실천방향성에 대한 함의 『Jpi 정책포럼』 (제주평화연구원) 139 권. pp.1-25.

³⁹ Helge et al., *Op.Cit.*, pp.5.

the regions that are remote from the center and attempted to separate the sphere of responsibility: State enterprise to combine their centralized approach with decentralized approach to manage and formulate policy in RFE.⁴⁰

Unsatisfied with the work of the Ministry of Far East Development urged long-term strategy with measures to be reflected in national programs with consistency.⁴¹ In 2013, in his Federal Assembly address, President Putin emphasized the importance of “Russia's turn to the Pacific” and stressed developing RFE to be the “national priority of the 21st century.”⁴² New state program 'Social and Economic Development of the Far East and the Baikal Region' was adopted.⁴³ This was the extended line of developing the ‘The Far East Development strategy for 2015-2025’ which was approved in 2009. It represents long-term direction of strategic regional development for RFE: improving the living standards for residence living in this territory and enhancing the socio economic development to adequate levels. Other objective is developing the infrastructure regarding transportation and energy.⁴⁴ One of the strategic projects that were mentioned

⁴⁰ Ibid. pp.5

⁴¹ Alexander Kilyakov, “Putin unsatisfied with the Ministry of Far East Development.” December 04, 2012, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, https://www.rbth.com/articles/2012/12/04/putin_unsatisfied_with_the_ministry_of_far_east_development_20803.html

⁴² Karpkhin, *Op.Cit.*,

⁴³ N. M. Baykov, “How to live and manage in the Far East of Russia: new approaches and instruments of public administration” *Power And Administration In the East of Russia*, no.3 (68) (2014).

⁴⁴ Dmitry A. Izotov, “Characteristics and Significance of Socioeconomic Development of the Far East and Baikal Region in Russia for the Period till 2025.” In *2009 CRES Visiting Scholar's Paper Series*, ed. Kim Heungchong (KIEP, 2010), pp.176-221.

was the cross-border cooperation with north eastern China and Mongolia and other North East Asian countries. Investments are required, so linkage between Asia Pacific Region and building up conditions for attracting foreign investments are important for Russia.⁴⁵ So in 2014 Moscow passed a federal law on Special Advanced Economic Zones (ASEZ). Following next year, The Free Port of Vladivostok law has been passed and the status of porto franco was granted. This stimulated the regional growth by creating favorable conditions for investment and financing for infrastructure development.⁴⁶

Domestically, modernizing the RFE has two major tracks: strengthening Russia's administrative and economic footprint and avoiding possible intervention from the outside powers.⁴⁷ In other words, the socioeconomic development of RFE is interlinked with regional security concerns.⁴⁸ Under Putin's third term, Russia believed that developing the economy of RFE will not only help create new jobs and block the outflow of population and solve domestic problems, but also send a clear message that RFE is not vulnerable and it is strong enough to gain a status of Outlet to Asia.⁴⁹ Putin

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Helge et al., *Op.Cit.*, pp.7.

⁴⁷ Lee, *Op.Cit.* <https://www.fpri.org/article/2013/04/the-russian-far-east-opportunities-and-challenges/>

⁴⁸ Malin Østevik and Natasha Kuhrt, "The Russian Far East and Russian Security Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region." In *Russia's Turn to the East*, ed. Helge Blakkisrud and Rowe E. Wilson (Global Reordering. Palgrave Pivot, Cham, 2018), pp.78.

⁴⁹ Lee, *Op.Cit.* <https://www.fpri.org/article/2013/04/the-russian-far-east-opportunities-and-challenges/>

acknowledged that Russia needs to back up with economic strength in order to gain its status. This gave the rebuilding domestic economy in work.⁵⁰

2. Strategic Partnership between China and Russia

For US policy makers China and Russia are potentially a threat that can change the existing international order. China is an emerging power and competitor to US and weakened Russia is seeking resurgence to gain their great power status. Until the late 1980s, military tensions and several border skirmishes remained between China and Russia. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaders of China and Russia started their rapprochement as Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev visited to Beijing in order to resolve the border disputes with China. In 1994, the initial ‘normalization of relations’ developed to ‘constructive partnership’. Consequently in 1996, Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin officially agreed to form a ‘strategic partnership’ and consolidated their relationship.⁵¹ In 1997, China and Russia used the concept of multipolarity to show their opposition to U.S dominated international community. In the “Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order”, their vision of multipolarity is a world in which no single power dominates the international arena, but

⁵⁰ Richard Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society*. (London and New York: Routledge, 2008). pp. 372-383.

⁵¹ Ko Sangtu, “Strategic Partnership in a Unipolar System : The Sino-Russian Relationship.” *Issues & Studies* 42, 3 (2006), pp. 203-225.

great powers do.⁵² In other words, they have the convergence of national identities which shared the same antipathy toward the concept of a Western-led liberal international order and common desire to change the international environment to enhance their political role.⁵³

Sino-Russian relations continued to develop and they signed the ‘Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation’ on July 16, 2001.⁵⁴ Although there was Russia’s help in countering international terrorism and supporting for stationing US troops in Central Asia,⁵⁵ US-Russia relations continued to deteriorate due to the spread of color revolutions and the Arab spring. With the awareness that this kind of upheaval can threaten their regime stability, China and Russia intensified political and military cooperation.⁵⁶ Following the 2008 financial crisis and Russia’s steady economic growth from high gas price, Russia gained more confidence and growth in national power.⁵⁷ US power was waning and challenges were open to China.

Following the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea, Western sanctions were imposed and trust was damaged between Russia and US.⁵⁸ As a result, Russia

⁵² Alexander V. Sharyshev, “Strategic Partnership between Russia and China: Importance and Sustainability of Bilateral Relations.” *Comparative Politics* 2, 23 (2016), pp.112-117.

⁵³ Carlson, *Op.Cit.*, PhD diss., (Johns Hopkins University, 2018), pp. 3-5.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 45.

⁵⁵ Trenin, *Op.Cit.*, pp.29.

⁵⁶ Carlson, *Op.Cit.*, PhD diss., (Johns Hopkins University, 2018). pp. 336.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* pp.262.

⁵⁸ Zhao Huasheng, “Sino-Russian Economic Cooperation in the Far East and Central Asia Since 2012 ,” *Eurasian Border Review* 6, no.1 (2016), pp.121.

turned its attention to Asia and increased its political and economic presence in the RFE. The Sino-Russian relations developed rapidly and both leaders emphasized the necessity to develop economic cooperation in the RFE. Moscow accelerated its pivot towards Beijing. In 2014, two countries agreed to form “New Period of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.” This was a signal of new period of development and cooperation.⁵⁹ Despite the heightened joint projects and improved ties between Moscow and Beijing, serious rivalry still drove China-Russia relations.⁶⁰

Under the unipolar international system, common goal of counterweighting US and forming closer strategic cooperation and a stronger alliance of China and Russia were expected. However, unlike the traditional hard balancing, two countries limited their ability to balance against US and formed a more ambivalent form of cooperation which is “strategic partnership.”⁶¹ Even though the situations got better, the strategic partnership between China and Russia is coined by Lo as ‘Axis of convenience.’⁶² This means that China and Russia relationship is hard to form an alliance because it is often focused on the tactical issues.⁶³ So considering only international structure would be

⁵⁹ Ibid. pp.104.

⁶⁰ Chandran, *Op.Cit.*,
<https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/14/china-russia-ties--more-rivalry-than-allaince.html>

⁶¹ Carlson, *Op.Cit.*, PhD diss., (Johns Hopkins University, 2018). pp. 1.

⁶² Bobo Lo, *Axis of convenience: Moscow, Beijing and the new geopolitics*. (London: Chatham House, 2008), pp. 3.

⁶³ Ibid. pp. 107.

insufficient in understanding Sino-Russian relations and looking upon their domestic circumstances is important in order to figure out their foreign policy consideration.⁶⁴

3. China-Russia Interactions in the Russian Far East

Rich natural resources and a potential gateway to Asia offered new economic opportunities for both Russia and China in Russian Far East. However, RFE requires stable investment and Russian government cannot cover all of the investment. So Russia implemented the 'Turn to East' policy in order to attract investment and foster development of RFE. However, the meaning of the policy differed along the Yeltsin and Putin regime. When Yeltsin was in office in the 1990s, the meaning was simply understood as a tool to add Russia's clout when dealing with the West. The core interest was Europe and their traditional identification with Westernism remained. However, during Putin's regime, the shift of the international political, economic center toward Asia Pacific changed the meaning and Asia was perceived at the same level of importance with the West.⁶⁵ This shows the change of diplomatic thinking toward the East. It hopes to safeguard the geopolitical and geo-economic security of the Asian region of Russia and loosen the risks of being excluded and marginalized from the Asian-Pacific market.⁶⁶ China is a promising partner for RFE and represents a vital market due

⁶⁴ Carlson, *Op.Cit.*, PhD diss., (Johns Hopkins University, 2018). pp. 40.

⁶⁵ Zhao, *Op.Cit.*, pp.106-108.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* pp.106-108.

to its sufficient financial reserves and manpower. In other words, China is an indispensable partner for Russia in RFE.⁶⁷

During the beginning of the 21st century, RFE was lacking the functioning model for regional development in RFE which extensively restrained bilateral economic cooperation with China.⁶⁸ During the beginning of the 21st century, RFE was lacking the functioning model for regional development in RFE which extensively restrained bilateral economic cooperation with China. As Putin started his term in 2000, he made a speech “Condemning Moscow's past neglect and calling for immediate action in the Russian Far East.”⁶⁹ This showed his priority on this region for this term. This was a signal for increased expectations for the economic cooperation with China in the RFE. However, Russia's words and action didn't match as it dampened the economic cooperation in these regions. Concerns of the illegal migration of Chinese national were prevailed among Russians. This Ethnic stereotypes played a large part as Russians viewed Chinese migrants as distant socially undesirable.⁷⁰ The legacy of social and

⁶⁷ Sergey Luzyanin and Zhao Huasheng, “Russian-Chinese Dialogue: The 2015 Model.” 2015, *Russian International Affairs Council*, <http://russiancouncil.ru/en/activity/publications/russian-chinese-dialogue-the-2015-model>

⁶⁸ Trenin, *Op.Cit.*, pp.111.

⁶⁹ Lo, *Op.Cit.*, pp.58.

⁷⁰ Mikhail A. Alexseev, “The Chinese Are Coming: Public Opinion and Threat Perception in the Russian Far East.” January 1, 2001, *Program on New Approaches to Russian Security: Policy Memo 184*. Center for Strategic & International studies. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/ponars-policy-memo-184-chinese-are-coming-public-opinion-and-threat-perception-russian-far>

cultural factors hindered realizing a successful policy for RFE which was an obstacle for long term strategic economic cooperation with China.⁷¹

Russia's position toward China continued as they wanted to avoid the situation of being China's junior partner and a supplier of resources. They rather wanted full power to be an independent power in the Asia Pacific.⁷² Despite the potential for bilateral economic developments between two countries in RFE, bilateral trade still remained insufficient, compared to each country's trade with US.⁷³ However, after the 2008 global financial crisis, dramatic decline of Russian economy has posted awareness to Russian president Dmitry Medvedev as he acknowledged that RFE can be lost if there is no consistent policy and it needs China to resolve the region's economic depression.⁷⁴ There was a steady increase in trade. However, there were only in small-scale and urgency to develop large-scale projects were still high in RFE. During this period, Russia

⁷¹ Daniel W. Harkins, "Sino-Russian Relations in the Twenty-first century: Prospects and Issues." Masters diss., (Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), pp.20.

⁷² Marina Romanova, "Russia-China Cooperation: Too Well-Matched Not to Integrate." *Russia Briefing*, December 30, 2016, <https://www.russia-briefing.com/news/russia-china-cooperation-well-matched-not-integrate.html/>

⁷³ "When Dragons Dance with Bears: Russia and China." December 2, 2006. *The Economist*, <https://www.economist.com/international/2006/11/30/when-dragons-dance-with-bears>

⁷⁴ Stephen Blank, "Russian Writers on the Decline of Russia in the Far East and the Rise of China." *Russia in Decline*. September 13, 2016. *Russia in Decline*, <https://jamestown.org/program/stephen-blank-russian-writers-on-the-decline-of-russia-in-the-far-east-and-the-rise-of-china/>

supplied energy to China and China was showing rapid rise. This eventually heightened the risk of Russia being a junior partner.⁷⁵

As China's rapid rise in developing both the capacity and ambition to advance its interests at all levels - bilateral, regional and global, Russian government attached importance to develop RFE with China.⁷⁶ In 2012, Putin's calling on Russia “to catch the Chinese wind in the sails of our economy” was the signal of the beginning shift.⁷⁷ He believed the growth of Chinese economy is an opportunity and challenge for commercial cooperation and Russia should “knowledgeable utilize China's potential to open up Siberia and the Far East's economies.”⁷⁸ Efforts to clear up the ethnic sentiments and Chinese threats were done between two countries. In 2013, China and Russia became closer trading partners since their bilateral trade reached up to \$90 billion.⁷⁹

Western sanctions resulted from the Ukraine crisis in 2014 gave Putin's determination to move closer to China. During Putin's visit to Shanghai in May 2014, 46 documents were signed with the aim to achieve multilateral cooperation. In October,

⁷⁵ Andrei P. Tsygankov, “Foreign Policy and Relations with the United States.” in *Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain*, ed. Stephen K. Wegren (Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), pp.245.

⁷⁶ Moscow Kremlin. 2012. “Message of the President to the Federal Assembly.” Accessed December 20, 2018. <http://www.kremlin.ru/news/17118>

⁷⁷ A. N., Demyanenko and L. A. Dyatlova. “The Far East : Current Policies and the Lessons of the Past.” *Problems of Economic Transition* 59, no.10 (2017), pp.814-827.

⁷⁸ Pres. Vladimir Putin, “Vladimir Putin: “Russia and the Changing World”.” *Global Research*, September 22, 2012. <https://www.globalresearch.ca/vladimir-putin-russia-and-the-changing-world/5477500>

⁷⁹ Zhao, *Op.Cit.*, pp.110.

Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang visited Moscow and signed 38 additional documents while Putin signed 17 additional agreements in Beijing in November.⁸⁰ Now China and Russia has expressed strong desire for tightened ties and their opportunities for cooperation are quite real.⁸¹ Sino-Russian cooperation has risen their volume of to their joint projects of more than \$100 billion.⁸² But such cooperation belies the rivalry that defines that relationship between China and Russia. According to Robert Kaplan, Senior fellow at the Center for the New American Security, told that “What's below the surface is serious geopolitical competition between China and Russia.”⁸³

3-1. Hindrance Factors

3-1-1. Balancing U.S pivot to Asia

Russia's 'Turn to East' policy is aimed to check and balance the U.S pivot to Asia. Strategic competition grew between US and China in the Asia pacific region at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century. Washington were more proactive in the Asia Pacific region in order to dissuade China from making a bid for hegemony and

⁸⁰ Kim Deok Joo, “Current Status and Prospects of China-Russia Relations.” *Seoul: KNDA International Issues & Prospects 2015*, pp. 39.

⁸¹ Garnett Sherman, “ The Russian Far East as a Factor in Russian-Chinese Relations.” *SAIS Review* 16, 2 (1996). pp.1-19.

⁸² Chandran, *Op.Cit.*,
<https://www.cnb.com/2018/09/14/china-russia-ties--more-rivalry-than-allaince.html>

⁸³ Ibid.

maintain its own strategic predominance in these regions.⁸⁴ Amid the Ukraine crisis and the sanctions from the West, Russia's dependency on the West has weakened and intensified the pivoting to Asia. This situation tied Chinese-Russian relations closer. Holding the similar positions related to building international order and making multifaceted world politics had enhanced the rapprochement between Russia and China.⁸⁵

However, Russia's mindset of a multifaceted world politics order is different from China. Their vision of multipolarity is more of a revised form of bipolarity which uses China as a kindred spirit and the 'global multipolar order' a more equitable alternative to American 'hegemonism' and 'unilateralism'.⁸⁶ Their main objective is to mitigate the exercise of American power across the globe and resurge their great power. Russian foreign policy is focused mostly on the relationship with the US and the current status of this relationship affects Russia's actions on the world arena and how it prioritizes ties with other countries.⁸⁷ Russia wants to be acknowledged as a great power and a partner by the US. So it is trying to balance US by playing the "China card."⁸⁸ During Putin's 2000 presidential address, he viewed Russia as "the strongest Eurasian

⁸⁴ Nina Silove, 2016. "The pivot before the pivot: U.S strategy to preserve the power balance in Asia." *International Security* 40, 4 (2016), pp.45-88.

⁸⁵ Luzyanin and Zhao, *Op.Cit.*

⁸⁶ Jeffrey Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics*. (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012). pp.182-184.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Carlson, *Op.Cit.*, pp.336-342.

power” whose influence was undermined by the effort of other to create a unipolar world.⁸⁹ For Russia, the development of RFE can upgrade the role of Russia to be an Eurasian superpower and become a new engine for sustainable economic growth in Russia.⁹⁰ The policy on Asia-Pacific emphasizes the Russian uniqueness as a bridge between Europe and Asia, and the idea of Russia being indispensable in international politics.⁹¹ So by strengthening the economic linkage with China and Asia Pacific neighbors, it hopes to reaffirm and strengthen Moscow's sovereign control over RFE and resurge its great power status.

3-1-2. Wary of China's emergence in the Asia Pacific region

Serious economic and military weakness of RFE and China's rapid rise in both ambition and influence in the Asia Pacific region has generated serious threats to Russia.⁹² As China develops their military, economic influence in this area, Russia feels that this will counter the strong drive for the country to resurge its great power status in the international arena.⁹³ Federal reserves were main source of RFE development. However, due to the economic constraints and cut back, the necessity for foreign

⁸⁹ Richard F. Staar, “Russia Reenters World Politics.” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 11, 4 (2000), pp. 23.

⁹⁰ Jeh Sung Hoon and Min Jiyoun and Kang Boogyun and Sergey Lukonin, “Recent Development in the Russian Far East-Baikal Region and its Implication.” *KIEP Research Paper .World Economy Update* 5, 17 (2015), pp.1-6.

⁹¹ Lo, *Op.Cit.* 2014. pp.1-31.

⁹² Sutter, *Op.Cit.*, pp.1-19.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

investment heightened. Now China is a key investor which generates a longer term dilemma to Russia. China's investment is needed but this can give more leverage for China's economic hegemony in this area.⁹⁴ Thus Russia is wary of Chinese expansion because this can take away their control and sovereignty over its RFE regions. Concerns over China's rise can be shown in president Putin's meeting on the development of the Far East and Trans-Baikal region in Blagoveshchensk in July 2000. He stated that “I don't want to dramatize the situation, but unless we make every real efforts soon, than even the indigenous population will in several decades from now be speaking mainly.. Chinese.”⁹⁵ Moreover, despite the centralized and active tendency to develop RFE with China, Moscow wants to regulate the “bottom-up regionalization” and pursue the sense of “sovereignization of the region” due to the threat perception that China's rise will one day take over RFE. They didn't exclude China's presence in these areas but wanted to limit the economic impact from them. This shows that RFE is not only a matter of economic factors but also security.⁹⁶

Consequently, Russia wants to balance China by increasing their diversification with other countries, especially with Japan and South Korea.⁹⁷ With Japan, in July 2012,

⁹⁴ Malin, and Natasha. *Op.Cit.*, pp.88.

⁹⁵ Putin, V.V.. “Introductory Remarks at a Meeting on the Prospects of the Development of the Far East and the Trans- Baikal Region.” *Kremlin*, July 21, 2000.
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21494>

⁹⁶ Rousseau, *Op.Cit.*,
<https://www.diplomaticcourier.com/2013/02/20/the-russia-china-relationship-and-the-russian-far-eas>

⁹⁷ Kuchins, *Op.Cit.*, 129-137.

president Putin showed ambition to increase the bilateral trade with Japan and Nikolay Patrushev who is Putin's top aide visited Japan in his tour around Asia-Pacific. Moreover, in April 2013, Japanese Prime Minister Abe visited Moscow.⁹⁸

With SK, welcoming unification on the Korean peninsula, Russia is willing to improve the conditions of the railroad and piped gas projects reaching from RFE to NK and then to SK.⁹⁹ According to Jung Taik Hyun, President of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, he said that the SK- Russian trade and investment in the RFE is increased by 6% in the last year and the first half of 2017.¹⁰⁰ In November 2017, President Moon Jae-In and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev had a bilateral meeting at Philippine and agreed to facilitate the working level discussions of the South Korean-Russian Free Trade Agreement (FTA). SK has established the Northern Economic Cooperation Committee to stimulate economic cooperation with Russia and its major tracks are through shipbuilding, ports, rail, gas, and Artic sea routes. This is SK's main strategy to cooperate fully with the RFE and this is called the “nine bridges.”¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Jung Taik Hyun.. “Russia-South Korea Cooperation in the Far East: Still a Lot of Potential.” *Valdai Discussion Club*. June 9, 2017. 2018. <http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/russia-south-korea-cooperation-in-the-far-east/>

¹⁰¹ Seong Yeon-cheol. “South Korea agrees to take part in joint development projects in Russia's Far East.” *Hankyoreh*, November 15, 2017. http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/819159.html

4. Assessment of Russia's position in RFE

Russia's commitment to develop the RFE has increased as Russia faced the Western Sanctions from the Ukraine crisis and the major shift of international market toward Asia Pacific. Their promising market is China. However, this does not mean that it has turned entirely to China. Russia is concerning both the unipolar system of US and its relative power in the regional system. Russia sees China as a strategic partner to counterweight US leadership in the Asia Pacific. However, in terms of its relative power in the regional system and their national interest of returning to a great power status, China is a threatening counterpart.

The Sino-Russian strategic partnership could activate more in a short term because the present level of cooperation and contradiction with the US is deciding the intensity of this relationship. But when their political roles increase in the international arena, tensions will grow between Russia and China.¹⁰² With increased influence, Russia can use China to strengthen their negotiating positions with US and even attempt to resurge its great power status. Moreover, Russia is considering the development of RFE more to security issues which makes hesitant support to China for economic cooperation in the RFE.

¹⁰² Sergey Lukonin, 2017. "Redefining Russia' Pivot and China's Peripheral Diplomacy." In *China-Russia Relations and Regional Dynamics*, ed. Lora Saalman (SIPRI,2017), pp.3-7.

IV. Cross-border cooperation in the Russian Far East

1. Construction of transport network in the RFE border areas

One of the major challenges that the Russian government faced was constructing an integrated transport network for their transport long term strategy. Due to the inadequate investment and inefficient administrative systems, modernizing the transportation system was difficult. However, due to the possibility to connect North East Asia and become a transport hub in Asia Pacific increased the necessity to upgrade the system and construct a transport network for the future Russian economy.¹⁰³ The Russian government hoped to modernize its outdated ports and increase its port output capability and connect the logistics in Eurasia. If Russia can connect this , it can build the RFE as the center flow of goods in the Asia-Pacific market. In this regard, Russia decided to open up the Far East and constructing a transportation network that connects the RFE and NEA started to be their crucial national development strategies.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ Lee YongKwon and Lee SungKyu and Youn IkJoong. "The Strategy of Russia's Regional Development and the Dynamic Relations among Northeast Asian countries – focusing on Energy Resources in Far East and Siberia." *The East Asian Association of International Studies* 10, 2 (2007). pp. 1-26.

¹⁰⁴ Sung WeonYong and Yim Dongmin "Research on the Transport and Logistics of Russia," *Seoul: KOTI Policy Analysis* 5, 12 (2005).

In 2008, the “Russia 2030 Transportation Strategy” was signed which included developing railways and transportation in the RFE.¹⁰⁵ This federal document's main goal is to establish a national seaport infrastructure with high competitiveness at international level. The major tasks were providing sufficient capacities for cargo transshipment, efficient port infrastructure and solving social issues of the seaport infrastructure development.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, in the aim of improving favorable conditions for the investors, Moscow passed a federal law on ‘The Free Port of Vladivostok’ and this simplified the visa procedures which was a bothersome for the foreign investors in the past.¹⁰⁷ Russia is preparing to create several new transportation hubs in the future.

2. China-Russia interactions in the Sino-Russian border areas

The Sino-Russian border areas is now important due to the possibility to connect the northern part of East Asia and become the transportation hub in North East Asia. This is significantly important for China and Russia because they are two giant neighbors. This is not only a matter of bilateral cooperation, but also an issue of international cooperation. In other words, Sino Russian relations in the border areas generate special geopolitical features¹⁰⁸ Both countries have the advantage to develop

¹⁰⁵ Zhao, Op.Cit., pp.108.

¹⁰⁶ Andrey I. Fisenko., “Specifics and conditions of Russian Far East seaports development within the framework of international transport and logistic corridors.” *Asia- Pacific Journal of Marine Science & Education* 2, 1(2012). pp.59-65.

¹⁰⁷ Helge et al., *Op.Cit.*, pp.7.

¹⁰⁸ Zhao, Op.Cit., pp.105.

their shared border areas. However, the cooperation is not done. This section will analyze the historical background and answer the question of how Russia perceive China and what are the factors Russia unite and separate with China.

Starting from the 17th century, there were several border skirmishes in the Amur basin between the Qing Dynasty and Romanov Empire. This was started due to Soviet's expansion to the East. In 1689 both countries signed the Treaty of Nerchinsk which gave the Qing Dynasty the control over the Amur and Primorye areas.¹⁰⁹

However, during the 19th century, situations have changed. Qing was getting weaker by outside powers and this was a period which China named as "century of humiliation". Soviet seized an opportunity to put China in the negotiation table and signed three territorial concessions. First Soviet reversed the Treaty of Nerchinsk by signing the Treaty of Aigun in 1858. Later in 1860, the Treaty of Peking was signed and The Tarbagatai Treaty was signed in 1864. The Chinese territory over 665,000 square miles were transferred from Qing dynasty to Soviet. This has grown Russia's dominance in the Northern part of China and could achieve the sea access to Asia-Pacific.¹¹⁰ China perceives this as an "unequal treaty" and since then China has an ambiguity over the ownership of the Russia Far East.¹¹¹ These legacies have been continued and this

¹⁰⁹ Lo, 2008, Op.Cit., pp.20.

¹¹⁰ Bobo Lo, "China and Russia: Common interests, contrasting perceptions." *CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets Asian geopolitics Special report*. (2006) pp.11.; Bobo Lo, "How the Chinese see Russia." *Russie Nei Reports* No.6 (2010). pp. 1-10.

¹¹¹ Lo, 2010, Op. Cit., pp. 1-10

generated an erosion of Sino-Soviet relations in the border areas. Huge security concerns and the difference in ideology brought series of clashes along the Ussuri River in 1969.

However, there were signs of Sino-Soviet rapprochement in the 1980s. In 1982 Beijing and Moscow started a dialogue to reduce their mistrust and build normal bilateral relations. In 1986 Gorbachev made a speech in Vladivostok saying that Soviet Union will be flexible regarding border issues. He proposed a bilateral agreement to remove their border lines to the middle of the Amur River channel.¹¹² One of the conditions that China demanded for normalization of Sino-Russian relations was reducing the military presence along the Chinese borders.¹¹³ Under Gorbachev, he showed his strong will to normalize relations with China by following the conditions that China has suggested.¹¹⁴ China and Soviet Union concluded two agreements to resolve the contestation over their shared border areas. Regarding the areas of Ussuri and Amur Rivers, the agreement was ratified in 1992 and further agreements dealing with the western boundary was ratified in 1995.¹¹⁵ However, Yinlong (Tarabarov) island and Heixiazi (Ussuriyski) island were remained unsolved until the 2000s.¹¹⁶ After these efforts and the period of ending the

¹¹² Lo, 2006, Op. Cit., pp.8-11.

¹¹³ Lowell Dittmer, *Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications 1945-1990*. (University of Washington Press, 1992). pp.121.

¹¹⁴ James C. Moltz, "Regional Tensions in the Russo-Chinese Rapprochement." *Asian Survey* 35, 6 (1995). pp.516.

¹¹⁵ Vidya Nadkarni, *Strategic Partnerships in Asia: Balancing without alliances*. (Routledge, 2010). pp.64-65.

¹¹⁶ Zhao, Op.Cit., pp.106.

Cold War, in 1996 they signed an agreement that Sino-Russian relationship is developing into a “strategic partnership.”¹¹⁷

After Putin came to power, he resolved bilateral difference: the final demarcation of the common border in June 2005.¹¹⁸ This has upgraded a new level of trust between the two countries and tendency toward joint infrastructure construction developed even further. In 2009, the Chinese and Russian governments signed the “Northeast China Region and Far East and Siberian Russia Region 2009–2018 Cooperation Plan Outline.”¹¹⁹ This outline showed the direction of the future cooperation in Northeast of China, RFE and Siberia, including construction of port and border infrastructure, regional transit cooperation and regional cultural and service cooperation.¹²⁰ During the period, China faced harsh industrial growth imbalance between the West and Northern east side of their territory. Accordingly, China emphasized the importance of revitalizing the Chinese Northeast region and developing RFE in order to put their growth to proceed.¹²¹ So both countries showed concrete interest to cooperate. China was willing to invest in the construction of the border areas. In 2012, China's National Reform Commission took steps to open and reform the

¹¹⁷ Lo, 2006, Op. Cit., pp.8.

¹¹⁸ Ibid. pp.9.

¹¹⁹ Zhao, Op.Cit., pp.110.

¹²⁰ Ibid. pp.110.

¹²¹ Li Fangchao, “Plan to revitalize northeast region.” *China Daily* August 09,2007, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-08/09/content_6018172.htm

Northeast China and undertook the “Vigorous Promotion of the Northeast program[东北振兴]” within their 12th 5 Year Plan.¹²²

In May 2014, in the meeting between Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang and Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin and the announcement between President Putin and Xi Jinping have shown interest to stimulate regional cooperation by developing cross border infrastructure.¹²³ Russia suggested various proposals to China for investment. In February 2104, Russian and China declared the year 2018 and 2019 as the “Bilateral Years of Russian Chinese Interregional Cooperation.”¹²⁴ Ending the nine year plan of “Northeast China Region and Far East and Siberian Russia Region 2009–2018 Cooperation Plan Outline”, this year both countries signed a document on interregional cooperation which is the “New program on developing trade and economic cooperation in the Russian Far East 2018-2024.”¹²⁵

¹²² Lyle J. Goldstein, “Russia’s Relationship With China Will Change Northeast Asia.” *The National Interest* November 28, 2018. <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/russias-relationship-china-will-change-northeast-asia-37367>

¹²³ Zhao, Op.Cit., pp.111.

¹²⁴ Ivan.Zuenko, “A Milestone, Not a Turning Point: How China Will Develop the Russian Far East.” *Carnegie Moscow Center* November 8, 2018. <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/77671>

¹²⁵ Ivan Zuenko, “A Chinese- Russian Regional Program Ends With a Whimper.” *Carnegie Moscow Center* September 26, 2018. <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/77341>

3. Sino-Russian cooperative project: Zarubino Port Development

Project

The Zarubino Port is the largest ice-free commercial port located in the Sino-Russian border areas. It is adjacent to Northern East of China and North Korea: 43 miles from Hunchun which is a city in Jilin province and 18km distant from the Chinese borders.¹²⁶ The current status of port facilities has four docks and major processing cargoes are automobile and frozen marine products. Currently they are using 3 docks.


Significant importance in the Zarubino port has been highlighted as it is now considered as one of the trade hubs between Russia and China, and a possible gateway to Asia and Europe. Recent interest of economic cooperation grew over after the restoration of the 1,000 km Hunchun-Makhalino Railway which is linking Hunchun and Zarubino port. This rail line provides the shortest route between Northeast China and RFE.¹²⁷ Figure 2 below shows the geographical locations of the Zarubino Port along the Sino Russian border.¹²⁸

¹²⁶ Quingqing Chen, "Russia, China aim to boost Northeast Asia trade by expanding Zarubino Port," *JOC* October 07, 2014 https://www.joc.com/port-news/asian-ports/russia-china-aim-boost-northeast-asia-trade-expanding-zarubino-port_20141007.html

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

Figure 2. Location of Zarubino Port and Hunchun city



(Source: JOC)

China has emphasized the importance of developing the Northeast China due to its decaying industrial base.¹²⁹ However, this province has no outlet to the sea. Their main transport was done in Dalian Port which is located in South part of China. So China was interested in opening new export routes and constructing an international transport

¹²⁹ Lyle J. Goldstein, "Russia's Relationship With China Will Change Northeast Asia. *The National Interest* November 28, 2018. <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/russias-relationship-china-will-change-northeast-asia-37367>

corridor through Russian Zarubino Port and realizing the “borrowed port sea access.”¹³⁰ According to Hofstra University geography professor Jean-Paul Rodrigue, he mentions that Zarubino port will not only give China a gateway through the Pacific, but also enable Jilin province goods to reach to Southern east China and overseas market in Asia through shorter routes with cheaper price.¹³¹ Compared to the transfer through Dalian Port, it can reduce 3000 kilometers of transport distance and 5 day of transport port time.¹³²

However, Zarubino Port is lacking transportation infrastructure and development is needed. Due to the lack of equipment and infrastructure, procedures of customs were very complicated and longer compared to other countries. Moreover, cost of shipping is also high. In order to overcome these obstacles, China and Russia actively participated to construct infrastructure in the Zarubino Port. The two countries planned various trading routes which can connect the Northeast China and RFE. The most significant plan was to create two new international transportation corridors: Primorye 1 and Primorye 2. This route is directed linked to the areas of the RFE's Vladivostok which constitutes important trading areas of Vladivostok.¹³³ Primorye 2 stretches from

¹³⁰ Michael. Lipin, “China's Landlocked Northeast Turns to Russian Port as Trade Outlet” *VOA* September 28, 2014. <https://www.voanews.com/a/zarubino-russian-port-china-trade-tumen/2461442.html>

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Yang, Chen. “Russia port has big regional goals, especially for Northeast China.” *People's Daily* September 18, 2014. <http://en.people.cn/business/n/2014/0918/c90778-8784185.html>


¹³³ Goldstein, *Op.Cit.*,
<https://nationalinterest.org/feature/russias-relationship-china-will-change-northeast-asia-37367>

Changchun, Hunchun (China) to Kraskino (Russia) and arrives to Zarubino port (Russia). This connects the interior of the Northeast China to RFE ports.¹³⁴ Figure 3 shows Primorye 2 which includes the Bolshoy Zarubino project.¹³⁵

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ 강태호. “광역 두만 국제수송로와 환동해 협력을 위한 한중일의 ‘올림픽 루트’.” *Hankyoreh News*, October 29, 2015. <http://2korea.hani.co.kr/397192>

Figure 3. International Corridors of Primorye 1 and Primorye 2



(Source : *Hankyoreh News*)

The Zarubino port development project have 3 objectives: Handling cargo passing through Northeast China, Improving the Hunchun-Makhhalino Railway and

Constructing the Hunchun inland port.¹³⁶ It is planned to modernize the Zarubino Port and handle the cargo volume up to 60 million tons when construction is finished.¹³⁷ Terminals for grain, containers and bulk cargos will be included.¹³⁸ Over 60 percent of the total cargo volume is expected to be transported from China's Northeastern provinces to the central and southern regions. 30 percent will be exported to Asia Pacific countries and North America.¹³⁹ After the completion of the Zarubino Port development, its annual output capabilities could reach 100 million tons.¹⁴⁰ The estimated investment for modernizing the port is \$ 3billion. The year of full-scale development of Zarubino port will start at 2015 and the completion date is expected in 2018.¹⁴¹

In May 2014, at the 4th Conference on Interaction and Confidence - Building Measures in Asia (CICA), Northeast China's Jilin province and Russia's biggest logistics company Summa Group signed a joint agreement concerning the cooperation on the development of Russia's Zarubino Port.¹⁴² On November at the APEC Summit, Summa Group and Chinese Merchant Group signed a letter of intent for modernizing the

¹³⁶ Cho JungWon "Current Situation and Characteristics of Sino-Russian Trade and Investment after the International Financial Crisis in 2008." *The Korean Association of Russian Language & Literature* (Karll) 26, 1 (2016). pp. 219-253.

¹³⁷ "Sino-Russian port on North Korea's doorstep." *Port Technology International*. September 11, 2014.
https://www.porttechnology.org/news/sino_russian_port_on_north_koreas_doorstep

¹³⁸ Yang, *Op. Cit.*, <http://en.people.cn/business/n/2014/0918/c90778-8784185.html>

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Zhao, *Op. Cit.* pp.112.

¹⁴¹ Yang, *Op. Cit.*, <http://en.people.cn/business/n/2014/0918/c90778-8784185.html>

¹⁴² Port Technology International, *Op. Cit.*,
https://www.porttechnology.org/news/sino_russian_port_on_north_koreas_doorstep

Zarubino port.¹⁴³ In addition, Russian President Putin signed the Free Port of Vladivostok regime and designated the Zarubino port as a free port. They hope to provide special custom and taxation system in order to facilitate more investment in these areas.

3-1. Hindrance Factors

3-1-1. Wary of China's dominance in the Sino-Russian border areas

Zarubino Port Development is initiated by the Russian government. This shows Russia's intention to improve their relations with China and develop its remote and underdeveloped RFE.¹⁴⁴ However, from historical experiences, feeling the threat of Chinese expansion which Russia have experienced from the 17th century and the role reversal from being a 'big brother' to 'little brother' of China, Russia is not showing full support for the develop in the Sino Russian border areas.¹⁴⁵ Russia has always been aware of the rising Chinese economy and military capabilities along the shared 4,000 km border near the Northeast China and RFE.¹⁴⁶ Russia subconsciously concerns Chinese retake of its lost territory which always hinders the economic relations in the Sino-Russian border areas. For example, in the council meeting on economic affairs

¹⁴³ Cho, *Op. Cit.*

¹⁴⁴ Yang, *Op. Cit.*, <http://en.people.cn/business/n/2014/0918/c90778-8784185.html>

¹⁴⁵ Sutter, *Op. Cit.*

¹⁴⁶ Alexander Gabuev, "Deciphering China's Security Intentions in Northeast Asia: A View from Russia." *Carnegie Moscow Center* October 11, 2016. <https://carnegie.ru/2016/10/11/deciphering-china-s-security-intentions-in-northeast-asia-view-from-russia-pub-64822>

between the two government in 2003, China requested Russia for a 49 year rent of Zarubino Port. However, Russia rejected because China might take the control of Russian logistic corridor and challenge the Siberian railway.¹⁴⁷ After Russia rejected, Jilin turned its attention to North Korea and obtained the 10 year lease of Najin Port in 2008.¹⁴⁸ Now Russia is not only wary of China's dominance in the Sino-Russian border areas, but also the marginalization of these areas since the relations between North Korea and China gets closer. Now Russia is trying to get China's attention back to Zarubino, but worries of Chinese domination remain as they hesitantly support China. So Russia is eager to diversify its project with other major countries in North East Asia such as South Korea and Japan. Russia is alerted that they have too much dependency on China and they are hesitant to show full support or trust on bilateral relations with China.¹⁴⁹

Demographic imbalance between Northeast China and Russian Primorsky is also a threat to Russia as they believed that the large influx of illegal migration form Chinese provinces near the border areas will weaken the central control of RFE and threaten its sovereignty. From the perspective of securing Russian Far East, the demographic imbalance between China is a major problem. The population of the three Chinese provinces bordering Russia (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning) was about 100

¹⁴⁷ Yang, *Op. Cit.*, <http://en.people.cn/business/n/2014/0918/c90778-8784185.html>

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Mankoff, *Op. Cit.*, pp.213-214.

million, whereas in RFE there are only 6 million.¹⁵⁰ The three north eastern Chinese economies are growing dramatically, but RFE has problems of declining population and relative backwardness. Current demographic trends are worse because the leaving population are from the younger generation. The government claims that over 100,000 foreigners move to RFE and among them 90 percent are Chinese.¹⁵¹ Today the economic and demographic decline is continuing in RFE and people are leaving the region and Chinese migrants are filling the gap by immigrating to this region. So, this has generated Russia to think that China can expand and take over the border areas.¹⁵² As the influx of Chinese immigrants increase, they feel the Chinese as a major threat and more radically they consider this s a “hidden colonization” of the Far East of Russia.¹⁵³ They show suspicion and mistrust toward the agreements on strategic partnership and demarcation of the borders. However, now economic threat is more prevailing in this area.

¹⁵⁰ Maria Repnikova and Harley Balzer, 2009. “Chinese Migration to Russia: Missed Opportunities.” *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Kennan Institute and Comparative Urban Studies Eurasian Migration Paper 3*. (2009). pp.8-41.

¹⁵¹ Rousseau, *Op. Cit.*, <https://www.diplomaticcourier.com/2013/02/20/the-russia-china-relationship-and-the-russian-far-east/>

¹⁵² 홍현식. 「중국의 부상과 러시아의 극동정책」 『Jpi 정책포럼』 (제주평화연구원) 76 권. 2011. pp.1-29.

¹⁵³ Akihiro Iwashita, 2007. “The experience of border cooperation of Russia and PRC in the past 10 Years.” In *The Sino Russia Current View from the Border and Beijing*. ed. Iwashita, Akihiro. *Slavic Research Center*. pp.55-75

3-1-2. Low Commitment to develop the border areas

Russia's low commitment to develop the cross border areas delayed the Sino-Russian bilateral cooperation in these areas. In the regional level development plans of RFE puts priority to national level as they proceed. However, the newly signed agreement on “Developing trade and economic cooperation in the Russian Far East 2018-2014”, which was the replacement of “Northeast China Region and Far East and Siberian Russia Region 2009-2018 Cooperation Plan”, reverted its responsibility from head of states to ministers.¹⁵⁴ The plans were signed by Alexander Kozlov who is the Minister for Far East Development and Zhong Shan who is the Minister of Commerce. This reflects the priority of regional development in the border area is geopolitics and economic cooperation is dull.¹⁵⁵ Having little leverage on economic cooperation made low commitment from the government to develop these areas.

Moreover, the context of both intergovernmental border plans signed in 2009 and 2018 shows less progress of the development. Admitting the failure of 2009-2018 program, they decided to sign a new cooperation program which is not an extension of the 2009-2018 program. They signed the new program at the meeting of the Intergovernmental commission on development in the Far East and transborder region.¹⁵⁶ However, in context, there is no obligations imposed to specific Chinese

¹⁵⁴ Zuenko, Op.Cit., <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/77341>

¹⁵⁵ Zuenko, Op.Cit., <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/77671>

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

companies. Moreover, there is no concrete term for the completion of the projects.¹⁵⁷ They omitted many high-profile projects and there is no mention of “transborder priority development area.”¹⁵⁸ So this shows that the inertia of Russian bureaucrats and the low commitment is delaying the cross border cooperation.

4. Assessment of Russia’s position in border areas

After the demarcation of the border areas surrounding Northeast China and Primorsky krai of RFE, China and Russia started to push more cross-border cooperation in these areas. Development Plan outlines were signed and Zarubino port development project was initiated. However, the level of cooperation was low and it didn't show much progress. Russia is firstly aware of the geopolitical factors. This region is surrounded by China, NK and Russia. China is trying to use either NK's Najin Port or Russia's Zarubino Port to get access to the East sea and Asia markets. Russia is having a dilemma between the wary of Chinese dominance in these areas and the marginalization of these areas when China actively use NK's Najin port and closer their relations between NK. So Russia is attracting China by providing special tax systems by introducing the Free Port of Vladivostok regime which includes the Zarubino port. But on the other hand, Russia is concerned of providing a leverage for Chinese political influence in these areas. From

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

historical experience and demographic imbalance between the Northeast China and Russian Primorsky krai, Russia feels that threat and these concerns always caught up in economic relations and contacts in border areas.

Moreover, Russia is showing low commitment to develop these areas. The process of signing the new program on developing the border areas and the contents of the outline shows that Russia is not fully active in developing these areas. First the reversal of the role who is in charge has been downgraded and the contents of the outline show less concrete promises to develop these areas. These factors who what has hindered Russia from developing the border areas with China.

IV. Implications for Korea and the Regional cooperation structures in North East Asia

1. Regional cooperation in the North East Asia

Since 1991, countries highlighted the potential of regional cooperation in various fields: creating transport link between Northeast China, Russia and Mongolia, and seeking vast natural resources. Ice- free ports were considered special since China lacks the outlet to the Asia Pacific sea and using alternative routes are more time consuming and expensive.¹⁵⁹ The Tumen River region is surrounded by the border areas of NK, China and Russia. Thus recent interest grew over these areas. Thus Tumen river region formed the Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI) in 2006. This is the only “intergovernmental cooperation mechanism “supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in which China, Russia, Mongolia, South Korea are the member states.¹⁶⁰ One of their main tasks are improving the transportation connectivity and providing economic cooperation in NEA. The main provinces surrounding the Tumen River area are the following: China has Northeast provinces Jilin,

¹⁵⁹ Anselm Huppenbauer, “Economic Integration in the Tumen River Region.” *Asia Dialogue* April 12, 2017. <http://theasiadialogue.com/2017/04/12/economic-integration-in-the-tumen-river-region/>

¹⁶⁰ Ibid. /

Heilongjiang and Liaoning, Korea has Gangwon, Busan and Russia has the Primorsky krai cities.¹⁶¹ From their discussed project proposal from the working level and high level meetings, Zarubino Port Project was selected and members agreed to construct a specialized grain terminal as the top priority of the entire Zarubino Port Project. Now GTI is building a framework for economic cooperation and improve investment environment and they have built the Zarubino Free Trade Zone.¹⁶² From this multilateral cooperation platform it shows that multiple countries are considering Zarubino Port important. So the Zarubino port development project will provide the bases to establish an international shipping route and promote trade in remote regions.

According to the dean of Northeast Asian Studies at Jilin University Yu Xiao, he mentioned that “the Zarubino port development will raise China's involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative in their northeastern regions and the construction of Zarubino port infrastructure will open up the Changchun-Jilin-Tumen Development Zone in Jilin and this port will become a gateway for Jilin into overseas markets, particularly the China-Russia-South Korea joint rail and water transportation routes.”¹⁶³ In other words, the Zarubino port will connect the logistics of Asia-Pacific and develop into a transport

¹⁶¹ Scott Snyder, “Rajin-Sonbong: A Strategic Choice for China in Its Relations with Pyongyang.” *China Brief* 10, 7 (2010). <https://jamestown.org/program/rajin-sonbong-a-strategic-choice-for-china-in-its-relations-with-pyongyang/>

¹⁶² Yang, Chang Young. “GTI Development to Promote Economic Cooperation Across Northeast Asia” (paper presented at the GTI International Cooperation Forum, June 9, 2013).

¹⁶³ Yang Ziman and Liu Mingtai, “China Merchants, Summa to build Zarubino Port” *China Daily* November 19, 2015.
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-11/19/content_22483523.htm

hub which can unite three main NEA economies which are China, Japan and South Korea.¹⁶⁴ Northeast Asian countries are complementary in production factors. China is abundant with capital and labor, while Russia has large amount of resources and South Korea and Japan has high technology with good management experience.¹⁶⁵ Building an infrastructure require funding, technology and labor. For Russia, NEA countries are the promising markets for its large scale transportation infrastructure projects. In other words, it can combine labor from China, and capital, technology from Japan and Korea.

To sum up, the development of Zarubino is expected to be a project that can strengthen cooperation with neighboring countries, and it has great potential to change the structure of regional cooperation in Northeast Asia. Therefore, the development of Zarubino port is likely to develop an intermodal transportation system which link the key ports to continental logistic center.¹⁶⁶ In the future, it will promote mutual prosperity in North East Asia and establish the Northern Sea Route.¹⁶⁷ It could be used as a model for Northeast Asia cooperation in the future.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Batbayar, Ts. 1994. “ Regional Economic Cooperation in Northeast Asia.” *The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs* 1.

¹⁶⁶ Lee Jae-Young, “ The New Northern Policy and Korean-Russian Cooperation.” *Valdai Papers* 76, October 27, 2017. <http://valdaiclub.com/a/valdai-papers/valdai-paper-76-the-new-northern-policy-and-korea/>

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Igor Makarov, “Accelerated Development of the Russian Far East.” *Russia In Global Affairs* October 29, 2018. <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Accelerated-Development-of-the-Russian-Far-East-19805>

2. Implication for Korea

South Korea's place in the NEA has two geostrategic position. First the Korean peninsula is located at a crossroad in NEA. It is a bridge between the land power (Russia, China) and sea power (Japan). On the other hand, due to the division of the two Koreas, South Korea is missing link to the land.¹⁶⁹ The importance of logistics is increasing and South Korea needs to overcome the geographic limitation and ensure the utility of the international logistics for their economic growth. Economic cooperation with the RFE is strategically important for Korea because it can be a momentum of new economic growth.¹⁷⁰

From Korea's perspective, there are many strategic advantages to the development the Zarubino port. First, Korea can have a chance to acquire and utilize the logistics infrastructure of Northeast Asia. The reason is that the transport route which connects the Northeast of China and Zarubino port is leading to Sokcho and Busan which are cities located in Korea. Korea is a key geographic point for maritime traffic and it is the fastest route from Northeast China to Japan's west coast.¹⁷¹ Moreover, by using the Zarubino port, it can also achieve the inland route to Northeast China's Jilin province.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁹ Park, Sung Jun. “Korean Road to Developing Intermodal Transport System” (paper presented at the National Seminar on Integrated intermodal Transport Connectivity , Indonesia, September 08, 2015).

¹⁷⁰ 고재남, Op. Cit., pp.243-279.

¹⁷¹ “South Korea Contemplates Investment in Russian Far East Port.” *The Maritime Executive* October 18, 2018. <https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/south-korea-contemplates-investment-in-russian-far-east-port>

¹⁷² 고재남, Op. Cit., pp.243-279.

Now many South Korean companies are investing in these areas and one example is the POSCO Hyundai International Logistics Complex. It is opened in 2013 and it is now in Hunchun.¹⁷³

Second, South Korea's participation in the Zarubino port development will further the progress of South Korean-Russian economic relations and increase North Korea's willingness to participate which can foster the inter-Korean rapprochement. Trilateral projects between two Koreas and Russia is considered as a practical tool to increase the participation of North Korea in the regional economic cooperation.¹⁷⁴ This project is aligned with the “New Northern Policy” which was announced from South Korean President Moon Jae-in. Their main objective is to participate joint infrastructure projects with Russia and North Korea. From these projects, it can promote openness to North Korea through various infrastructure projects in the RFE, Northeast China.¹⁷⁵

Russia's fear of high dependency on China can be resolved by investment from other countries in the North East Asia. Korea have high competitiveness in port infrastructure modernization with high technology and many experts. So, Korea can invest more actively and provide technology in order to show active participation to these projects. Therefore, from Korea's perspective, starting from participating the

¹⁷³ Huppenbauer, *Op. Cit.*, <http://theasiadialogue.com/2017/04/12/economic-integration-in-the-tumen-river-region/>

¹⁷⁴ Lee, 2017, *Op.Cit.*, <http://valdaiclub.com/a/valdai-papers/valdai-paper-76-the-new-northern-policy-and-korea/>

¹⁷⁵ The Maritime Executive, *Op. Cit.*, <https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/south-korea-contemplates-investment-in-russian-far-east-port>

development of Zarubino is absolutely advantageous, and it is a project to consider joining if conditions allow.

V. Conclusion

In the wake of the Ukraine crisis, US-Russia relations deteriorated. So Russia turned its attention to Asia and prioritized the “Turn to the East” policy and increased its political and economic presence in the RFE. RFE is geographically adjacent to the Asia Pacific which is now perceived as a geopolitical pivot area. Closer Sino-Russian relations were initially anticipated and this will increase the political and economic ties to counterweight the preponderance of US. However, they rather formed a 'strategic partnership' which is an ambivalent form of cooperation.

Cooperation and Competition simultaneously existed in the Sino-Russian relations. The ambivalent cooperation is evident in the economic cooperation in the RFE. This paper analyzed this by dividing in to two approaches: Regional level and Sub-regional level. The Regional level is the RFE itself and the sub-regional level is the case of Zarubino port development project which is operated in the Sino-Russian border areas. Both areas are important to understand how Russia is positioning itself in these region against and with China. In the RFE, the main hindrance factors were 1) Balancing US pivot to Asia and 2) Wary of China's emergence in the Asia Pacific region. Russia has the same mindset with China of counterweighting US and hoping to establish the multipolar world where no single power dominates. However, Russia's national identity as a Eurasian power emphasis the resurgence of its great power status. Russia uses China

as a strategic partner and strengthen its economic linkage to mitigate US power but its main goal is to return its status in the international arena. Moreover, Russia is always wary of China's emergence in the Asia Pacific region. For Russia, China's rise is a threat to their sovereignty and central control of the RFE. Due to the economic imbalance between China and RFE, Russia is more concerned with security issues when dealing with relations with China in the RFE.

In the Sino-Russian border areas, cross-regional cooperation is suggested by both Russia and China. Zarubino port is located near the Northeast China and Russia's Primorsky krai. Due to its adjacency, the develop of Zarubino port is expected to connect the logistics of Asia Pacific and develop into a transport hub which can promote mutual prosperity in North East Asia and establish the Northern Sea Route. China and Russia are deepening their strategic partnership and created favorable conditions for the development at the sub regional level.¹⁷⁶ Several regional infrastructure projects are implemented. But we cannot see the full realization of the economic cross border cooperation in RFE. The hindrance factors are 1) Wary of China's domination in the Sino- Russian border areas and 2) Low commitment to develop the border areas.

Due to historical experience, Russia feels the threat of Chinese expansion which Russia once experienced in the 17th century. Moreover, rising economy and military

¹⁷⁶ Helge et al., *Op.Cit.* pp.3.

capabilities near the shared borders increased the worries that China will retake its lost territory. In addition, closer cooperation between North Korea and China in using the lease Najin Port has generated the concerns of Russia's marginalization in these areas.

Moreover, Russia has low commitment to develop the Sino-Russian border areas. In the newly signed cross regional cooperation plan outline, the ministerial level was in charge and signed the plan. This was a reversal of role in the cross border regional cooperation because the previous plan outline was signed by the head leaders of the state. In the context of the signed document, there was no specific obligations for Chinese companies and no concrete terms for the completion date for the project. So this shows that the inertia of Russian bureaucrats and the low commitment is delaying the cross border cooperation.

In the China-Russia relations, we can observe two levels: Balancing against US on international system and hedging to one another to its regional level. Both regional and sub-regional level approach shows Russia is more concerned to security rather than economic cooperation when dealing with China in the RFE. However, compared to higher commitment on the development in the RFE itself, the cross border develop downgraded and reversed its commitment which is showing the divergency of the hindrance factor in RFE and Sino-Russian border areas.

Nonetheless, with the lack of investment and money to develop, the only promising partner for Russia is now China. Russia is trying to diversify its source of investment by inviting other main NEA countries. For Korea this is an opportunity to

improve its influence in NEA and later attract North Korea to participate in the trilateral economic cooperation between two Koreas and Russia.

VI. Reference

<Books>

Dittmer, Lowell, *Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications 1945-1990*. University of Washington Press. 1992.

Iwashita, Akihiro, 2007. "The experience of border cooperation of Russia and PRC in the past 10 Years." *In The Sino Russia Current View from the Border and Beijing*, edited by Iwashita, Akihiro, 55-75. Slavic Research Center.

Lo, Bobo, *Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2002.

_____, *Axis of convenience: Moscow, Beijing and the new geopolitics*.
London: Chatham House. 2008.

Lukin, Artyom. and Troyakova, Tamara. 2012. "The Russian Far East and the Asia Pacific: State-Managed Integration." *In From APEC 2011 to APEC 2012: American and Russian Perspectives on Asia-Pacific Security and Cooperation*, edited by Azizian, Rouben, and Artyom, Lukin, 189-204. Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies and Far Eastern Federal University Press.

- Lukonin, Sergey, 2017. "Redefining Russia' Pivot and China's Peripheral Diplomacy." In *China-Russia Relations and Regional Dynamics*, edited by Saalman, Lora, 3-7. SIPRI
- Mankoff, Jeffrey. *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics*. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2012.
- Nadkarni, Vidya, *Strategic Partnerships in Asia: Balancing without alliances*. Routledge. 2010.
- Nigel, Gould-Davies, "Russia' Far East: new dynamics in Asia Pacific and beyond. By Rensselaer Lee and Artyon Lukin." Review of the *Russia' Far East: new dynamics in Asia Pacific and beyond*, by Rensselaer, Lee, and Artyon, Lukin, *International Affairs* 92:4. 1012-1013
- Østevik, Malin, and Natasha, Kuhrt, 2018. "The Russian Far East and Russian Security Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region." In *Russia's Turn to the East*, edited by Blakkisrud, Helge., and Rowe E. Wilson, 75-94. Global Reordering. Palgrave Pivot, Cham.
- Rozman, Gilbert, *Chinese strategic thought toward Asia*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2010.
- Sakwa, Richard, *Russian Politics and Society*, London and New York: Routledge. 2008

Trenin, Dmitri, 2006. "Russia's Asia Policy under Vladimir Putin, 2000-5." In *Russian Strategic Thought toward Asia*, edited by Rozman, Gilbert, Togo, Kazuhiko, and Joseph P. Ferguson, 111-135. New York : Palgrave Macmillan.

Tsygankov, Andrei P., "Foreign Policy and Relations with the United States." In *Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain*, edited by Wegren, Stephen K., 245. Rowman & Littlefield, 2015.

<Journals and Reports>

Alexseev, Mikhail A., 2001. "The Chinese Are Coming: Public Opinion and Threat Perception in the Russian Far East." *Program on New Approaches to Russian Security: Policy Memo 184. Center for Strategic & International studies*. January 1. Accessed July 20, 2016.

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/ponars-policy-memo-184-chinese-are-coming-public-opinion-and-threat-perception-russian-far>

Baykov, N. M., 2014, "How to live and manage in the Far East of Russia: new approaches and instruments of public administration" *Power And Administration In the East of Russia* 3(68).

- Batbayar, Ts., 1994. “ Regional Economic Cooperation in Northeast Asia.” *The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs* 1. 4-8
- Blakkisrud, Helge, Elena W. Rowe and Roman Vakulchuk, 2018. "Russia's Far East Initiatives in Troubled Geopolitical Times." *Valdai Papers* 92:1-11.
- Cho, JungWon, 2016. “Current Situation and Characteristics of Sino-Russian Trade and Investment after the International Financial Crisis in 2008.” *The Korean Association of Russian Language & Literature (Karl)* 26(1):219-253
- Demyanenko, A. N., and L. A. Dyatlova, 2017. “The Far East : Current Policies and the Lessons of the Past.” *Problems of Economic Transition* 59(10): 814-827.
- Fisenko, Andrey I. 2012. “Specifics and conditions of Russian Far East seaports development within the framework of international transport and logistic corridors.” *Asia-Pacific Journal of Marine Science & Education* 2(1): 59-65.
- Garnett, Sherman W. 1996. “ The Russian Far East as a Factor in Russian-Chinese Relations.” *SAIS Review Johns Hopkins University Press* 16(2):1-19

- Izotov, Dmitry A. 2010. "Characteristics and Significance of Socioeconomic Development of the Far East and Baikal Region in Russia for the Period till 2025." In *2009 CRES Visiting Scholar's Paper Series*, edited by Kim, Heungchong, 176-221. KIEP.
- Jeh, Sung Hoon, Min, Jiyoung, Kang, Boogyun, and Sergey, Lukonin, 2015. "Recent Development in the Russian Far East-Baikal Region and its Implication." *KIEP Research Paper World Economy Update* 5(17) :1-6.
- Jung, Doo Ho, 2017. "The Analysis of Driving Forces for Sino Russian Economic Cooperation in the Far East." *Korea Education and Research Information Service (KERIS)*.
- Kim Deok Joo, 2015, "Current Status and Prospects of China-Russia Relations." Seoul: KNDA International Issues & Prospects. pp 31-49.
- Ko, Sangtu, 2006. "Strategic Partnership in a Unipolar System : The Sino-Russian Relationship." *Issues & Studies* 42(3):203-225.
- Kuchins, Andrew C. 2014. "Russia and the CIS in 2013: Russia's Pivot to Asia." *Asian Survey*. 54(1): 129-137.

- Lee, YongKwon., and Lee, SungKyu., and Youn, IkJoong. 2007. "The Strategy of Russia's Regional Development and the Dynamic Relations among Northeast Asian countries – focusing on Energy Resources in Far East and Siberia." *The East Asian Association of International Studies* 10(2): 1-26.
- Lo, Bobo, 2006. "China and Russia: Common interests, contrasting perceptions." *CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets Asian geopolitics Special report*.
- _____, 2010. "How the Chinese see Russia." *Russie Nei Reports* 6 : 1-10
- _____, 2014. "Russia's Eastern Direction -Distinguishing the Real from the Virtual." *Russie Nei Reports* 17:1-31
- Lukonin, Sergey, 2017. "Redefining Russia' Pivot and China's Peripheral Diplomacy." In *China-Russia Relations and Regional Dynamics*, edited by Saalman, Lora. 3-7. SIPRI.
- Luzyanin, Sergey, and Zhao, Huasheng, 2015. "Russian-Chinese Dialogue: The 2015 Model." *Russian International Affairs Council*. Accessed July 19, 2018, <http://russiancouncil.ru/en/activity/publications/russian-chinese-dialogue-the-2015-model/>
- Mankoff, Jeffrey, 2015. "Russia's Asia pivot: confrontation or cooperation?" *Asia Policy* 19: 65–87.
- Moltz, James C., 1995. "Regional Tensions in the Russo-Chinese Rapprochement." *Asian Survey* 35(6):511-527.

- Nigel, Gould-Davies, 2016. "Russia' Far East: new dynamics in Asia Pacific and beyond. By Rensselaer Lee and Artyon Lukin." Review of the *Russia' Far East: new dynamics in Asia Pacific and beyond*, by Rensselaer Lee and Artyon Lukin, *International Affairs* 92(4) :1012-1013
- Repnikova, Maria, and Balzer, Harley, 2009. "Chinese Migration to Russia: Missed Opportunities." Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; *Kennan Institute and Comparative Urban Studies Eurasian Migration Paper* 3. 8-41.
- Rozman, Gilbert, 2008. "Strategic Thinking About the Russian Far East: A Resurgent Russia Eyes Its Future in Northeast Asia." *Problems of Post-Communism* 55(1):36-48
- Sharyshev, Alexander V., 2016. "Strategic Partnership between Russia and China: Importance and Sustainability of Bilateral Relations." *Comparative Politics* 2(23):112-117.
- Sherman, Garnett, 1996. " The Russian Far East as a Factor in Russian-Chinese Relations." *SAIS Review* 16(2):1-19
- Shtepa, Vadim, 2018. "Russian Federal Districts as Instrument of Moscow's Internal Colonization." *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 15(105), figure 1.
- Silove , Nina, 2016. "The pivot before the pivot: U.S strategy to preserve the power balance in Asia." *International Security* 40(4) : 45-88.

Staar, Richard F., 2000. "Russia Reenters World Politics." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 11(4): 23.

Sung, WeonYong., and Yim, Dongmin, 2005. "Research on the Transport and Logistics of Russia," *Seoul: KOTI Policy Analysis* 05(12)

Sutter, Robert, 2018. "China-Russia Relations: Strategic Implications and U.S Policy Options." *The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) Special Report* 73:1-19

Thornton, Richard C., and Dittmer, Lowell, 1993. "Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications 1945-1990." *The American Historical Review* 98(4): 1211.

Yang, Chaoyue, 2013. "A study of Sino-Russian energy cooperation from the perspective of theories of International Relations." *Journal of China and International Relations* 1(2): 87-94

Zhao Huasheng, 2016, "Sino-Russian Economic Cooperation in the Far East and Central Asia Since 2012," *Eurasian Border Review* 6(1): 103-121.

<News and Papers>

Anderlini, Jamil, 2018. "China and Russia's dangerous liaison." *Financial Times* August 9. Accessed August 25, 2018.

<https://www.ft.com/content/1b4e6d78-9973-11e8-9702-5946bae86e6d>

Blank, Stephen, 2016. "Russian Writers on the Decline of Russia in the Far East and the Rise of China." *Russia in Decline*. September 13. Accessed February 22, 2018.

<https://jamestown.org/program/stephen-blank-russian-writers-on-the-decline-of-russia-in-the-far-east-and-the-rise-of-china/>

Carlson, Brian G., "Seeking Leverage: China-Russia Relations in World Politics, 1991-2016." PhD diss., Johns Hopkins University, 2018.

Chandran, Nyshka, 2018. "Serious' rivalry still drives China-Russia relations despite improving ties." *CNBC News*, September 14. Accessed September 18, 2018. <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/14/china-russia-ties--more-rivalry-than-alliance.html>

Chen, Qingqing, 2014. "Russia, China aim to boost Northeast Asia trade by expanding Zarubino Port." *JOC* October 07. Accessed October 08, 2017. https://www.joc.com/port-news/asian-ports/russia-china-aim-boost-northeast-asia-trade-expanding-zarubino-port_20141007.html

Fangchao, Li, 2007, "Plan to revitalize northeast region." *China Daily* August 09, Accessed July 10, 2018. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-08/09/content_6018172.htm

- Gabuev, Alexander, 2016. "Deciphering China's Security Intentions in Northeast Asia: A View from Russia." *Carnegie Moscow Center* October 11. Accessed October 12, 2017.
<https://carnegie.ru/2016/10/11/deciphering-china-s-security-intentions-in-northeast-asia-view-from-russia-pub-64822>
- Goldstein, Lyle J., 2018. "Russia's Relationship With China Will Change Northeast Asia." *The National Interest* November 28. Accessed on November 29, 2018. <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/russias-relationship-china-will-change-northeast-asia-37367>
- Greater Tumen Initiative, "GTI Regional Transport Strategy and Action Plan"
(paper discussed at the 2nd meeting of the GTI Transport Board, Sokcho, Republic of Korea, July 2012).
- Harkins, Daniel W., "Sino-Russian Relations in the Twenty-first century: Prospects and Issues." Masters diss., Naval Postgraduate School, 2010.
- Hsu, Wan-Chun, "The geopolitics of Russia's intensifying Energy Cooperation with China." Masters diss., Radboud University Nijmegen. 2014.
- Huppenbauer, Anselm, 2017. "Economic Integration in the Tumen River Region." *Asia Dialogue* April 12. Accessed April 15. 2018.
<http://theasiadialogue.com/2017/04/12/economic-integration-in-the-tumen-river-region/>

- Jung, Taik Hyun, 2017. "Russia-South Korea Cooperation in the Far East: Still a Lot of Potential." *Valdia Discussion Club* June 9. Accessed June 15, 2018.
<http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/russia-south-korea-cooperation-in-the-far-east/>
- Kaplan, Robert D., 2014. "The Geopolitics of Energy." *Forbes* April 4. Accessed April 15, 2015. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2014/04/04/the-geopolitics-of-energy/#16ba0f573b39>
- Karphkhin, Sergei, 2016. "Why Beijing and Washington are moving to the Russian Far East." *Russian International Affairs Council*, November 8. Accessed November 20, 2016.
<http://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/why-beijing-and-washington-are-moving-to-the-russian-far-eas/>
- Kilyakov, Alexander, 2012. "Putin unsatisfied with the Ministry of Far East Development." *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, Dec 04. Accessed November 09, https://www.rbth.com/articles/2012/12/04/putin_unsatisfied_with_the_ministry_of_far_east_development_20803.html
- Kuchins, Andrew C., 2012. "Russian Hosting in the APEC Summit in Vladivostok : Putin's "Tilt to Asia." *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. September 5. Accessed November 09, 2018.
<https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-hosting-apec-summit-vladivostok-putins-tilt-asia>.

- Lee, Jae-Young, 2017. “ The New Northern Policy and Korean-Russian Cooperation.”
Valdai Papers 76, October 27. Accessed October 27,2018.
<http://valdaiclub.com/a/valdai-papers/valdai-paper-76-the-new-northern-policy-and-korea/>
- Lee, Rensselaer, 2013. “The Russian Far East: Opportunities and Challenges.”, *Foreign Policy Research Institute (FRPI)*, April 17. Accessed November 10, 2018. <https://www.fpri.org/article/2013/04/the-russian-far-east-opportunities-and-challenges/>
- Lipin, Michael, 2014. “China's Landlocked Northeast Turns to Russian Port as Trade Outlet ” *VOA* September 28. Accessed September 29,2017.
<https://www.voanews.com/a/zarubino-russian-port-china-trade-tumen/2461442.html>
- Makarov, Igor, 2018. “Accelerated Development of the Russian Far East.” *Russia In Global Affairs* October 29. Accessed October 29,2018.
<http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Accelerated-Development-of-the-Russian-Far- East 19805>
- Markova, Valeria, “Cross-Border Integration: Case of the Russian Far East and North-East of China.” Masters diss., Lund University. 2014.
- Moscow Kremlin, 2012. “Message of the President to the Federal Assembly.” Accessed December 20, 2018. <http://www.kremlin.ru/news/17118>

Park, Sung Jun, “Korean Road to Developing Intermodal Transport System” (paper presented at the National Seminar on Integrated intermodal Transport Connectivity , Indonesia, September 08, 2015).

Pres. Vladimir Putin, 2012. “Vladimir Putin: “Russia and the Changing World”.” September 22. Accessed February 25, 2017.

<https://www.globalresearch.ca/vladimir-putin-russia-and-the-changing-world/5477500>

Putin, V.V., 2000. “Introductory Remarks at a Meeting on the Prospects of the Development of the Far East and the Trans-Baikal Region.” *Kremlin*, July 21. Accessed July 15, 2017.

<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21494>

Romanova, Marina, 2016. “Russia-China Cooperation: Too Well-Matched Not to Integrate.” *Russia Briefing*, December 30, Accessed January 20, 2017

<https://www.russia-briefing.com/news/russia-china-cooperation-well-matched-not-integrate.html/>

Rousseau, Richard, 2013. “The Russia-China Relationship and the Russian Far East”.

Diplomatic Courier February 20. Accessed July 15, 2017.

<https://www.diplomaticcourier.com/2013/02/20/the-russia-china-relationship- and-the-russian-far-east/>

Snyder, Scott, 2010, "Rajin-Sonbong: A Strategic Choice for China in Its Relations with Pyongyang." *China Brief* 10(7). Accessed July 16, 2017.
<https://jamestown.org/program/rajin-sonbong-a-strategic-choice-for-china-in-its-relations-with-pyongyang/>

Seong, Yeon-cheol, 2017. "South Korea agrees to take part in joint development projects in Russia's Far East." *Hankyoren*, November 15. Accessed November 20, 2018.
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/819159.html

Shcherbakov, Dmitry, 2018. "Charms of Blowing Up: Far East Plus 2." *East Russia*, June 11. Accessed November 10, 2018.
<https://www.eastrussia.ru/en/material/prelesti-razduvaniya-dalniy-vostok-plyus-2/>

"Sino-Russian port on North Korea's doorstep." *Port Technology International*, September 11, 2014. Accessed September 20, 2015.
https://www.porttechnology.org/news/sino_russian_port_on_north_koreas_doorstep.

"South Korea Contemplates Investment in Russian Far East Port. " 2018, *The Maritime Executive*, October 18,. Accessed October 18,2018.
<https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/south-korea-ontemplates-investment-in-russian-far-east-port>

Stanley, Timothy, 2018. "The Growing Russia-South Korea Partnership: Economic links between South Korea and Russia are a welcome byproduct of the inter-Korea thaw." *The Diplomat*, May 24. Accessed May 27, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/the-growing-russia-south-korea-partnership/>

Weitz, Richard, 2012. "Superpower symbiosis: the Russia-China axis", *World Affairs*, November / December. Accessed February 28, 2014. <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/superpower-symbiosis-russia-china-axis>.

"When Dragons Dance with Bears: Russia and China." *The Economist*, December 2, 2006. Accessed February 22, 2016. <https://www.economist.com/international/2006/11/30/when-dragons-dance-with-bears>

Yang, Chen, 2014. "Russia port has big regional goals, especially for Northeast China." *People's Daily* September 18. Accessed September 20, 2017. <http://en.people.cn/business/n/2014/0918/c90778-8784185.html>

Yang, Chang Young, "GTI Development to Promote Economic Cooperation Across Northeast Asia" (paper presented at the GTI International Cooperation Forum, Gangwondo, South Korea, June 9, 2013).

- Yang, Ziman., and Liu, Mingtai, 2015. “China Merchants, Summa to build Zarubino Port” *China Daily* November 19. Accessed November 20, 2017.
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-11/19/content_22483523.htm
- Yoon, Sojung, 2017. “Korea is best partner for developing Russian Far East'.” *Korea.net*, September 07. Accessed September 15, 2017.
<http://korea.net/NewsFocus/policies/view?articleId=149018>.
- Zuenko, Ivan, 2017. “The Chimera of Chinese Investment in Russia’s Far East Ports.” Carnegie Moscow Center Comment, May 05. Accessed May 20. <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/71427>.
- _____. 2018a. “A Milestone, Not a Turning Point: How China Will Develop the Russian Far East.” Carnegie Moscow Center November 8. Accessed April 10, 2018. <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/77671>
- _____. 2018b. “A Chinese- Russian Regional Program Ends With a Whimper.” Carnegie Moscow Center September 26. Accessed April 10, 2018. <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/77341>
- 강태호. 2015. “광역 두만 국제수송로와 환동해 협력을 위한 한중일의 '올림픽 루트'.” 한겨레 10 월 29 일.
<http://2korea.hani.co.kr/397192> (검색일 2017.5.1).

- 고재남. 2008. 「주변국 (중국, 일본, 미국)의 극동지역 정책」. 정여천(편)
『러시아 극동지역의 경제개발 전망과 한국의 선택』. KIEP
8:2. pp. 243-279.
- 신범식. 2014. 「동북아 초국경 소지역협력과 지역의 발명:“유라시아 이니셔티브
”실천 방향성에 대한 함의」. 『Jpi 정책포럼』 (제주평화연구원)
139 권. pp.1-25.
- 홍현식. 2011. 「중국의 부상과 러시아의 극동정책」 『Jpi 정책포럼』 (제주평화
연구원) 76 권. pp.1-29.

국문초록

러시아 극동지역을 둘러싼 중국과 러시아의 협력과 대치:

러시아의 입장을 중심으로

서울대학교 국제대학원

국제학과 국제협력전공

최현정

중국과 러시아의 관계는 협력과 경쟁이 항상 존재해왔다. 러시아는 최근 아시아로 눈을 돌리면서 신동방정책과 함께 극동지역에서의 정치적, 경제적 입지를 강화하고 있다. 이에 따라 중국과의 관계는 발전될 거라 예상하였지만 실질적인 협력의 진전이 보이지 않고 있다. 본 논문은 이를 러시아 극동지역(지역차원)과 자루비노 항만 개발프로젝트(소지역차원)로 구분하여 두 국가간 협력이 지체되는 원인을 러시아의 입장에서 분석하였다. 우선 지역차원의 극동지역에서 러시아가 중국과 대치의 이유로는 1) 중국을 이용한 미국의 ‘아시아 회귀정책’ (Pivot to Asia)에

대한 견제와 이에 따른 자국의 강대국 입지 재확보와 2) 아시아 태평양 지역에서의 중국 부상 우려가 있다. 소지역 차원의 자루비노 항만 개발에서 러시아는 1) 접경지역에서의 중국 우세 우려와 2) 이 지역개발에 대한 낮은 수준의 책임감에 있다.

극동지역에서 러시아는 국제시스템의 미국에 대한 견제와 균형, 지역적 수준에서의 중국에 대한 위험분산(hedging)의 두 가지 단계가 관찰되어진다. 지역적 및 소지역적 차원에서 러시아는 중국과의 관계에 있어 경제적인 측면보다는 자국의 안보를 더 중시하고 있다. 그 결과 현재 러시아는 다른 주요 동아시아 국가들을 초청하는 등 투자를 다양화하는 노력을 하고 있다. 한국은 극동지역에서의 개발참여를 통해 동아시아에 대한 영향력을 강화하고 추후에 북한과 러시아간 3 국 경제협력에 동참할 수 있는 기회가 있기 때문에 적극적으로 개발참여를 모색할 필요가 있다.

주요 어: 러시아 극동지역, 자루비노항 개발, 중 러 관계, 접경지역 협력,
한국, 동북아의 지역차원의 협력
학 번 : 2014-24216