

THE ENTANGLEMENT BETWEEN ANTI-LIBERALISM AND CONSERVATISM The INSISTS and MIUMI Effect within the “212 Movement” in Indonesia¹

Fachri Aidulsyah | Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) – Indonesia
Yuji Mizuno | Asia and African Studies (ASAFAS) Kyoto University – Japan
Corresponding author: fachryadul@gmail.com

Abstract: This paper delves into a new perspective on the spreading of Islamic populism in Indonesia. It maps the extent of the influence exerted by the network based on the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC) in Malaysia. In the post-authoritarian era, the ISTAC alumni have contributed to dynamizing Islamic discourse and movement in Indonesia. By engaging their connections throughout the whole country, they promote and spread Al-Attas' works (the idea of Islamization of Knowledge) by establishing an Islamic think-tank, Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought and Civilizations (INSISTS), as well as connect Islamic scholars and preachers from various Islamic organizations (including Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah) by establishing the Council for Young and Intellectual Ulama of Indonesia (MIUMI which played a substantial role during the “411” and “212 movement”). This paper argues that INSISTS and MIUMI are key actors behind the scene of the rise of Islamic populism. It further argues that the synthesis of conservatism and modern Islam among actors had resulted in INSISTS and MIUMI's agenda getting easily accepted by Muslim communities in Indonesia.

Keywords: INSISTS, MIUMI, Islamic populism, “212 movement”, Islamism.

Introduction

During the 2016 to 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election season, a series of massive demonstrations erupted in Jakarta. Led by several

¹ The paper was presented to The International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS-11), July 19th 2019 at Leiden University, Leiden, the Netherlands. Fachri Aidulsyah, specifically, would like to thank *Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia* (LIPI) that has granted him for attending the ICAS Conference.

Islamist groups, the demonstration called for the prosecution of the incumbent Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), who was charged with blasphemy case. Fuelled by his status as a double minority of Christian ethnic Chinese, the demonstration accused him of insulting Islam, garnering massive amount of support from the broader Muslim constituents. The largest of these demonstrations, held on December 2nd 2016, brought more or less 700,000 people out on to the streets under the name of the Action to Defend Islam (*Aksi Bela Islam*) or “212 movement”. The series of demonstrations is largely considered the most successful mass mobilisation in contemporary Indonesian history.²

This article provides a genealogical analysis on the origin of the “2012 movement”, focusing on one of the key actors behind the demonstration under the banner of MIUMI (lit. *Majelis Intelektual dan Ulama Muda Indonesia*, Indonesian Council of Young Intellectuals and Ulama). Although the presence of MIUMI is relatively underemphasized, they played a substantial role in the formation of the organizing committee of the demonstration, GNPf-MUI (*Gerakan Nasional Pengawal Fatwa-MUI*, National Movement to Defend the MUI Fatwa). GNPf-MUI was an alliance of several Islamist groups which took part in the protest. Considering the colossal size of the demonstration and impact it had made, the formation of such an alliance was not an overnight achievement. The movement consisted of substantially different strands of Islamists with differing origin, ideology, supporter base and goal,³ which require elaborate mechanism of consolidation.

As such, it is imperative to understand the historical build-up to the formation of the alliance. The focus on MIUMI provides a substantial insight, as their organizational structure and philosophy have capacity to strengthen the Islamist coalition building that has not been systematically attempted before. With the people behind the organization being considered as having a long-term and clear vision of Islamizing the society,⁴ their role within the so-called “conservative

² See Martin Van Bruinessen, *Indonesian Muslims in A Globalising World: Westernisation, Arabisation, and Indigenising Responses* (Singapore: RSIS Working Paper, 2018).

³ See Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), *After Ahok: The Islamist Agenda in Indonesia* (Jakarta: IPAC Report No. 44, 2018).

⁴ See *Ibid.*

turn”⁵ of Indonesian Islamic landscape is bigger than previously expected. The trajectory of MIUMI ulama and activism also provides an alternative take on the development of conservative Islam in Indonesia. Instead of looking at the development of conservative Islam as linear progress resulting from the increasing Islamic literacy and globalization, their success lies in a reaction to the liberal Islamic movement. The insight may provide the idea for reconsidering the nature of so-called “conservative turn” as well as the efficacy of progressive activism in Indonesia.

The “212 Movement” and Religio-Political Actors

Analyses of the “212 movement” have been made by a wide variety of scholars from different perspectives. In every frame of reference, the existence of religio-political actors is an important element. Religio-political actors here should be defined as a group of political players who utilizes ‘religio-political’ narratives to advance their political interest. Ufen, referring to Keddie illustrates that there are global trends of ‘religio-politics’ becoming the most important domain in society to address various societal malaise, i.e.; expansive developments in capitalism; economic crises; increasing migration; the growing power of the secular state; an expanding educational sector and continuing urbanisation; global cultural homogenisation; and improved health care with its demographic consequences.⁶ Reflecting upon Hiariej’s argument, the ‘religio-politics’ should be seen as part of a larger resistance against a particular structure of oppression and domination, and significantly, reflects social antagonism.⁷

⁵ See Greg Fealy, “A Conservative Turn”, *Inside Indonesia*, July 15th, 2007, <https://www.insideindonesia.org/a-conservative-turn>; Martin Van Bruinessen (ed.), *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the “Conservative Turn”* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2013).

⁶ See Andreas Ufen, “Mobilising Political Islam: Indonesia and Malaysia Compared,” *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 47, 3 (2009), pp. 308-333.

⁷ See Eric Hiariej, *The Politics of Becoming Fundamentalist in the Age of Consumer Culture*, (Ph.D Dissertation. The Australian National University, 2009); Eric Hiariej et. al., “Post-Fundamentalist Islamism and The Politics of Citizenship in Indonesia”, Eric Hiariej and Kristian Stokke (eds), *Politics of Citizenship in Indonesia* (Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia in cooperation with PolGov Fisipol UGM and University of Oslo, 2017).

From the perspective of political economy, Fauzi,⁸ Kusman,⁹ as well as Hadiz¹⁰ show that the “212 movement” should be defined as a new form of Islamist populism (or “mobocracy”) in Indonesia. Kusman and Hadiz consider the movement as a sign of the successful collaboration between Islamic preachers, oligarch, as well as nationalist-secularist politicians to adopt Islamic doctrines as a source to gain political-economic interests. Accordingly, the term “blasphemy” repeated by the protest was a product of manipulation by the small group of elite politicians who dominate Indonesian politics.¹¹ Here, referring to Buehler the existence of Islamic preachers are designated as political players who collaborate with secular players or manipulate religious languages for their political interest.¹² Similarly, Mietzner, Muhtadi, and Halida, referring to the theory of Islamist mobilization by Quinn, allude to the “religio-political entrepreneurs” who utilize political grievances in order to mobilize the society.¹³

Shedding a light on the religio-political actors of the “212 movement”, it shows the variety in role and strategy played by these religio-political actors, making it far from a static player behaving in a deterministic way. Within the religio-political actors, there could be a division of labour in order to maximize the efficiency of mobilization, simultaneously achieving political and intellectual requirements, as well as broadening their supporter base. The actors may also have an evolving capacity to adapt to the changing circumstances they belong to. Lack of any of these ingenuities may very well lead to the failure of

⁸ See Ihsan Ali Fauzi, “Mobocracy? Counting the cost of the rallies to ‘defend Islam’”, *Indonesia at Melbourne*, December 9th, 2016, <https://indonesiatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/mobocracy-counting-the-cost-of-the-rallies-to-defend-islam/>.

⁹ See Airlangga Priyadi Kusman, “Aksi Bela Islam, Populisme Konservatif dan Kekuasaan Oligarki,” *Jurnal MAARIF*, 11, 2 (2016), pp. 43-52.

¹⁰ See Vedi R. Hadiz, *Islamic Populism in Indonesia and the Middle East* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Idem, *Populisme Islam di Indonesia dan Timur Tengah* (Jakarta: Universitas Indonesia & LP3ES, 2019).

¹¹ See Tim Lindsey, “Blasphemy Charge Reveals Real Fault Lines in Indonesian Democracy”, *Indonesia at Melbourne*, June 15th, 2019, <https://indonesiatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/blasphemy-charge-reveals-real-fault-lines-in-indonesian-democracy/>.

¹² See Michael Buehler, *The Politics of Shari’a Law: Islamist Activists and the State in Democratizing Indonesia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

¹³ See Marcus Mietzner, Burhanuddin Muhtadi, and Rizka Halida, “Entrepreneurs of Grievance: Drivers and Effects of Indonesia’s Islamist Mobilization,” *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, 174 (2018), pp. 159–187.

the mobilization. History of Islam in Indonesia vividly shows how Islamist movements, starting from the time of the Masyumi Party, have managed to survive through different political conditions by changing its survival strategy to *dakwah*, transnational exchanges, and incorporations into the democratic institution.

In terms of the actual actors during the “212 movement”, highly detailed analysis by the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) shows that there are around three most important components, i.e. a) Islamic vigilantism which was represented by the Islamic Defenders Front (*Front Pembela Islam*, FPI); b) pan-Islamism which was represented by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Forum Umat Islam (FUI); c) Salafi-Modernist network which represented by MIUMI.¹⁴ In addition, elites of the Islamist and nationalist-secularist-politicians which were represented by the Prosperous and Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, PKS), National Mandatory Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional*, PAN), as well as the Movement of Great Indonesia (*Gerakan Indonesia Raya*, Gerindra) have contributed to the political leadership. The alliance among them is generally perceived as pragmatic and provisional, created primarily by the impetus of charging Ahok with blasphemy. Such an evaluation overlooks the dynamism of the religio-political actors and their latent ability of evolution and adaptation.

As an underlying discourse, the emergence of these groups has been collectively understood as a part of the broad “conservative turn” of Islam in Indonesia. On one aspect, it is an influx of globalized Islamic discourse that gives a sense of authenticity. Chaplin argues that the “212 movement” as a whole should be seen as emblematic of a broader rise of global Islamic doctrines within the political and public sphere over the past decade.¹⁵ Assyaukanie¹⁶ and Bruinessen¹⁷ specifically identified that the movement was inspired by Middle-

¹⁴ See Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), *After Ahok: The Islamist Agenda in Indonesia*.

¹⁵ See Chris Chaplin, “Political Protests, Global Islam and National Activism: Deciphering the Motivations behind Indonesia’s ‘Conservative Turn’”, *Middle East Institute*, January 23rd, 2018, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/political-protests-global-islam-and-national-activism-deciphering-motivations-behind>.

¹⁶ Luthfi Assyaukanie, “Unholy Alliance: Ultra-Conservatism and Political Pragmatism in Indonesia,” *Thinking ASEAN*, 19, (2017), pp. 6-9.

¹⁷ See Martin van Bruinessen, *Indonesian Muslims in A Globalising World: Westernisation, Arabisation, and Indigenising Responses* (Singapore: RSIS Working Paper, 2018).

Eastern doctrines - especially Wahhabism, Arabian lifestyle, or as Bruinessen called “Arabisation”- which have been developing in Indonesia since the 1980s. On another aspect of “conservative turn”, it is a declining authority of the local religious players. In this vein, Burhani argues that the “212 movement” was created upon the shifting religious authority from Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah – the two largest Muslim mass organizations in Indonesia - to “celebrity” *ustadz* who succeed to take a role promoting “conservatism” in social media based on pop-culture views.¹⁸ Referring to Gramsci’s theory, Ahnaf positioned the reality of shifting religious authority in Indonesia as a “war” which is fought over Islamic discursive and public space.¹⁹ Practically, according to Berenschot, the nature of *Aksi Bela Islam* has shown the increasingly closed character of Indonesia’s public sphere and points to the importance of informal, personal networks in spreading and legitimizing ideas.²⁰

In light of “conservative turn”, the alliance of the “212 movement” needs to be re-examined and re-evaluated genealogically. Mainstreaming of conservative Islam had already taken place in Indonesia since the 2000s. In the mid-2000s, Sidel has already positioned the rise of the Islamic movement in contemporary Indonesia as a new phase of articulating, representing, mobilizing, and promoting Islam.²¹ The first scholarly mention of “conservative turn” was made by Fealy and was developed by Bruinessen, during which the rejection towards Muhammadiyah and NU authorities began to occur much more frequently due to some elites in these organizations giving support to the progressive and liberal values.²² It is natural to assume the seed of the “212 movement” was already sown along with the

¹⁸ See Ahmad Najib Burhani, “Aksi Bela Islam: Konservatisme dan Fragmentasi Otoritas Keagamaan,” *Jurnal MAARIF*, 11, 2 (2016), pp. 15-29.

¹⁹ See Mohammad Iqbal Ahnaf, “Aksi Bela Islam, Akankah Mengubah Lanskap Muslim Indonesia,” *Jurnal MAARIF*, 11, 2 (2016), pp. 30-42.

²⁰ See Ward Berenschot, “Ahok’s defeats and public debate in Indonesia,” *New Mandala*, May 18th, 2017, <https://www.newmandala.org/ahoks-defeats-say-public-debate-indonesia/>.

²¹ See John T. Sidel, *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).

²² See Greg Fealy, “A Conservative Turn,” *Inside Indonesia*, July 15th, 2007, <https://www.insideindonesia.org/a-conservative-turn>; Martin Van Bruinessen (ed.), *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the “Conservative Turn”* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2013).

beginning of “conservative turn”. The capacity of the alliance should not be confined as a product of temporal political interest. By re-examining the religio-political players as more dynamic actors, the alliance can be evaluated as a built-in mechanism evolved long before the advent of the movement. Through MIUMI, this article examines how the dots of anti-liberal agenda, “conservative turn”, and the eventual culmination as the “212 movement” can be connected. Following chapters will follow three phases of “conservative turn”; starting from an anti-liberal intellectual discourse leading to the decline of liberal Islamic influence in Indonesia, and then build-up phase of the Islamist alliance, reaching climax at the height of the “212 movement”.

“Say No to Liberal Islam!” INSISTS and the First Phase of Conservative Turn in the Post-Authoritarian Era

Historically, the increasing prominence of fundamentalist interpretations of Islam had become visible since the mid to the late 1990s. This occurred simultaneously with the decline of liberal Islamic discourse which used to be dominant during the 1970s and 1980s.²³ In the *reformasi* era which is marked by the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule in Indonesia, both of liberal Islamic and Islamist circles had attempted to reform and institutionalize themselves into legal-formal institutions.²⁴

In the mid-1990s, the idea of liberal Islam was flourished among young NU-Muhammadiyah activists and stimulated some of them to established communities or institutions, i.e., LKiS (*Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial*, Institution of Islamic and Social Discussion) which was founded in Yogyakarta (1993) by young NU intellectuals, FSAS (*Forum Studi Agama dan Sosial*, Forum for Religious and Social Studies) was founded in Jepara in Northern part of Central Java (1997), *Desantara* was founded in Depok (1998), Resist (Centre for Religious and Social Studies) was founded in Malang (1999) by some Muhammadiyah

²³ See Bernhard Wolfgang Platzdasch, “Religious Dogma, Pluralism and Pragmatism: Constitutional Islamism in Indonesian Politics (1998-2002),” Unpublished MA Thesis. The Australian National University, 2005); Martin Van Bruinessen, *What Happened to the Smiling Face of Indonesian Islam?: Muslim Intellectualism and the Conservative Turn in Post-Suharto Indonesia* (Singapore: RSIS Working Paper, No. 222, 2011).

²⁴ See Greg Barton, “Indonesia: Legitimacy, Secular Democracy, and Islam,” *Politics & Policy*, 38, 3 (2010), pp. 471-496.

activists, as well as LAPAR (*Lembaga Advokasi dan Pendidikan Anak Rakyat*, Institute of the People's Children for Advocacy and Education) was founded in Makassar (1999).²⁵ However, these movements gravitated less resonance due to lack of capacity to conduct systematic public campaign.

The new phase of liberal Islamic movement was cultivated within the Indonesian society when some Muslim thinkers - mostly affiliated with NU, and inspired by the idea of liberalism - began affiliating themselves with JIL (*Jaringan Islam Liberal*, Liberal Islam Network). JIL, which was established since 2001, entered the broader Indonesian public sphere the following year when one of the organizers of the group, Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, wrote an article on the Paramadina edition of Charles Kurzman's anthology *Liberal Islam* for the prominent national newspaper *Kompas*. JIL's increasingly ambitious public assertion of liberal Islamic ideology to the mainstream platform had the effect of triggering a barrage of critiques by the Muslim and broader national media, catapulting Abdalla to public prominence.²⁶ Initially, critics towards Abdalla and JIL's perspectives were a variety of Islamist mass-based organization and political parties. In addition to aforementioned FPI, they included FUUI (*Forum Ulama Umat Islam Indonesia*, Indonesian Ulama' Forum), Laskar Jihad (Jihad Militia), MMI (*Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia*, Indonesian Mujahidin Assembly), Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan*, later transformed itself into, PKS), as well as DDII (*Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia*, Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council).²⁷

Among these groups, DDII deserves particular mention. Through its media platform known as Media Dakwah (MD), DDII had been focused since the 1970s on criticizing the idea of liberal Islam, which was formerly represented by Mukti Ali, Harun Nasution, Djohan

²⁵ Achmad Munjid, "Militant and Liberal Islam: The Unwanted Twin Children of Modernization - An Indonesian Experience," *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, 03, 01 (2009), pp. 59-60; Luthfi Assyaukanie, *Ideologi Islam dan Utopia: Tiga Model Negara Demokrasi di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Freedom Institute, 2011), pp. 256-9.

²⁶ R. Michael Feener, *Muslim Legal Thought in Modern Indonesia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 210; Luthfi Assyaukanie, *Ideologi Islam dan Utopia: Tiga Model Negara Demokrasi di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Freedom Institute, 2011), p. 259.

²⁷ See Akh Muzakki, *Contestation within Contemporary Indonesian Islamic Thought: Liberalism and Anti-Liberalism*, (Unpublished M. Phill Thesis. The Australian National University, 2005); Akh. Muzakki, "The Roots, Strategies, and Popular Perception of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia," *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, 8, 1 (2014), pp. 1-22.

Effendi, Ahmad Wahib, Abdurrahman Wahid, as well as Nurcholis Madjid. In *reformasi* era, MD was led by Hartono Ahmad Jaiz who paid more attention toward the ideas and activities of JIL thinkers in almost every single issue. In order to maintain their opposition to the liberalism of JIL thinkers, almost in every issue, MD thinkers continued criticizing JIL thinkers by discussing them in a wide range of columns.²⁸ MD specifically argued that JIL represents the local partner of global capitalism and politics which intend to destroy Indonesian Islam.²⁹ However, the focal point of MD and anti-liberal figures during the authoritarian era only problematized the terminology of “liberalism” based on scripturalist perspectives, and they failed to criticize the main idea of liberalism. Moreover, unlike JIL thinkers who strengthened their arguments based on academic research, the critics tended to be considered polemical and conspiratorial.³⁰

In the second phase, by 2003, a number of young Muslim intellectuals with anti-liberal slant and affiliated with DDII and the prestigious Pesantren of Gontor who were pursuing their study at the ISTAC, Malaysia, had established a think-tank known as the Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought and Civilizations (INSISTS). These include Hamid Fahmy Zarkasyi (Gontor), Adian Husaini (DDII), Anis Malik Toha (Nahdhatul Ulama), Ugi Soeharto (DDII), Henri Sholahuddin (Gontor), Syamsuddin Arif and Adnin Armas (both of them are Gontor alumni who would be a delegation of DDII for studying in ISTAC). Since the establishment of the institution, INSISTS activists who were mostly inspired by the idea of Islamization of Knowledge by Syed M. Naquib Al-Attas (prominent Muslim thinker and the former Rector of ISTAC) dedicated their works to oppose the ideas produced by JIL thinkers by writing scientific books and articles, making weekly discussions and workshop in various regions and universities, etc.³¹

²⁸ Ibid., p. 188.

²⁹ See Ibid.; Munjid, “Militant and Liberal Islam,” pp. 35-68.

³⁰ See Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000); Martin van Bruinessen, “Post-Suharto Muslim Engagements with Civil Society and Democratisation,” Hanneman Samuel and Henk Schulte Nordholt (eds), *Indonesia in Transition: Rethinking ‘Civil Society’, ‘Region’ and ‘Crisis’* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2004); Yudi Latif, *Inteligensia Muslim dan Kuasa: Genealogi Inteligensia Muslim Indonesia Abad ke-20*, (Bandung: Mizan Pustaka, 2005).

³¹ See Tiar Anwar Bachtiar, *Pertarungan Pemikiran Islam di Indonesia: Kritik-kritik terhadap Islam Liberal dari H.M Rasjidi sampai INSISTS* (Jakarta: Pustaka Al-Kautsar, 2017).

Interestingly, the co-founder of JIL, Luthfi Assyaukanie, was a colleague of some of these INSISTS founders during their ISTAC years, and had a long history of sharing their discussion sessions. This suggests that JIL and INSISTS, to an extent, shared their intellectual roots in the sophisticated educational setting provided by the Malaysian Islamic university, but they parted their ways with different outcomes on how to apply the intellectual framework acquired through ISTAC education. Today, however, the intellectual battle between JIL and INSISTS is mostly framed in the debate between “Fazlur Rahman school” vs. “Al-Attas school”, signaling the influence of ISTAC on JIL was overshadowed.

From the mid-2000s onward, the victor of this “Fazlur Rahman” vs “Al-Attas” debate seemed to be clear. While JIL was pushed to the margin of intellectual debate, INSISTS indirectly influenced the establishment of *fatwas* which it were issued by NU and Muhammadiyah in 2004 and 2005 on anti-liberalism.³² Subsequent to Muhammadiyah’s *fatwa*, Adian Husaini and Adnin Armas were requested to be a part of Muhammadiyah central executive board.³³ Shortly after, INSISTS’ views came to symbolize the new wave of conservative turn which had taken place in the heart of Islamic board of clergy in Indonesia, the Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*, MUI). In 2005, Adian Husaini, who was recruited by MUI’s central board since 2000s, took an important role by formulating the concept for the MUI fatwas, the “Banning of Islam towards Pluralism, Liberalism, and Secularism—SiPiLis” as well as “Religious deviation of Islam and violation of religious freedom”. It is noteworthy here that the abbreviation “SiPiLis” was coined and popularized by INSISTS. The MUI fatwa signaled the new trajectory of MUI which not only began actively recruiting conservative activists from various backgrounds, i.e. HTI, FPI, as well as INSISTS, but also began rejecting liberal activists, i.e. Masdar F. Mas’udi and Siti Musdah Mulia from MUI’s board.³⁴

³² See Ahmad Najib Burhani, “The 45th Muhammadiyah Congress: Contest between Literal-Conservative and Liberal-Moderate Muslims in Indonesia,” *Studia Islamika*, 12, 1 (2005), pp. 185-189.

³³ Bachtiar, *Pertarungan Pemikiran Islam di Indonesia*, p. 169.

³⁴ See Moch. Nur Ichwan, “Towards a Puritanical Moderate Islam: The Majelis Ulama Indonesia and the Politics of Religious Orthodoxy,” Martin van Bruinessen (ed), *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the “Conservative Turn”* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2013); Bachtiar, *Pertarungan Pemikiran Islam di Indonesia*, p. 169.

Furthermore, most of INSISTS thinkers expanded their ideas against liberal Islam by publishing more than 40 books, 22 journals, as well as 70s articles in newspapers. They also resumed the highest positions in various universities, i.e. Anis Malik Thoha (Rector of Sultan Agung Islamic University), Hamid Fahmy Zarkasyi (Vice Rector of Darrussalam Gontor University, UNIDA), Nirwan Syafrin Manurung (Vice Rector of Ibn Khaldun University, UIKA), and Adian Husaini (Director of Post-Graduate program in UIKA). More than that, they kept also maintaining courses and trainings in various universities, for instance Research Center for Middle-East Studies in the University of Indonesia (UI) (2007), University of Muhammadiyah Solo (UMS), UNIDA, Az-Zahra University, UIKA, STAI Persis, Gadjah Mada University (UGM), Brawijaya University (UB), Institute Technology of Surabaya (ITS). In addition, they also formed an Ulama' Regeneration Program (*Program Kaderisasi Ulama*, PKU) at UNIDA of Gontor at request of and collaboration with MUI. They also wrote periodicals on the media outlet *Republika* which is historically affiliated with ICMI (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia*, Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals).³⁵

By utilizing Gontor as well as ISTAC connections, INSISTS has stimulated the establishment of Islamic research centers in various regions, such as INPAS (*Institut Pemikiran dan Peradaban Islam*, Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization) Surabaya, PIMPIN (*Institut Pemikiran Islam dan Pembinaan Insan*, Institute of Islamic Thought and Human Resources Development) Bandung, PSPI (*Pusat Studi Peradaban Islam*, Research Center for Islamic Civilizations) Solo, Adab Institute of Yogyakarta, DISC (Depok Islamic Study Circle) in Depok, CGS (Center for Gender Studies) Jakarta, ISTAID (Islamic Thought and Information for Dakwah) Medan, MIUMI (*Majelis Intelektual Ulama Muda Indonesia*, The Council of Indonesian Ulama and Intellectuals), as well as #IndonesiaTanpaJIL (Indonesia without JIL, ITJ). Later, all of INSISTS canals transformed themselves as "Anti-Liberal Networks".³⁶ In term of MIUMI and ITJ, at a later time both of them had metamorphosed themselves as a new model of Islamist alliance and inherently took an important role in overthrowing Ahok's power and forming the "212 movement".

³⁵ See Bachtiar, *Pertarungan Pemikiran Islam di Indonesia*.

³⁶ Ibid.

From the Intellectual Forum to Organized Mobilization: MIUMI and the Modernist-Salafi Ulama

Most of the institutions inspired by the philosophy of INSISTS tended to confine themselves within the intellectual discursive space. This prompted a need to establish an organization that can influence wider audiences of the Muslim society in Indonesia. This includes higher-ups as well as masses of the so called mass-based civil societal organizations, also known as *ormas*, but it did not stop there. Landscape of Muslim civil society in Indonesia has always been highly fractured; prominently between the so-called traditionalist bloc dominantly represented by Nahdlatul Ulama, and the modernist spectrum exemplified by more mainstream Muhammadiyah, regional Persatuan Islam (PERSIS) and Hidayatullah, and transnationally inspired DDII (inspired by the Muslim World League as well as Muslim Brotherhood) and Wahdah Islamiyah (inspired by Salafism). The aim of propagating INSISTS' philosophy needed to be able to overcome such organizational and factional divides. This led to the formulation of an organization that serves the purpose of gathering ulama from multiple organizations into one commission.

The result was the foundation of MIUMI in 2012. Among the founding members of MIUMI are Bachtiar Nasir (AQL Islamic Center, formerly Muhammadiyah), Zaytun Rasmin (Wahdah Islamiyah), Jeje Zainuddin (PERSIS), Faridh Okbah (Yayasan al-Islam), Fadlan Gamaratan (Yayasan al-Fatih Kaafa Nusantara) and several INSISTS members such as Hamid Fahmi Zarkasyi, Adian Husaini, Adnin Armas, Syamsuddin Arief and Ugi Suharto. These members held several meetings to set up the organization, and it was officially inaugurated on February 28 2012 in the Grand Sahid Jaya Hotel in Jakarta. The inauguration was attended by several well-known figures including Bambang Widjojanto of the Commission of Eradicating Corruption (KPK), Mahfud MD of the Constitutional Court, Din Syamsuddin of Muhammadiyah and several members of MUI including Cholil Ridwan.³⁷

MIUMI is a loose organization of ulama and intellectuals from a variety of Muslim organizations based in Indonesia. It does not take a form of *ormas*, unlike most of the other civil societal Muslim organizations, and as such does not accept membership on a mass

³⁷ Ibid.

level. The membership consists of core members who direct and instruct most of the MIUMI's activity as well as religious orientation, and other loose members who appear on their preaching tours. The headquarter is located in Tebet of Jakarta, close to the location of the AQL Islamic Center, a dakwah organization led by Bachtiar Nasir who serves the secretary general and virtual frontman of MIUMI. Today, it has dozens of regional branches similarly operated by locally known ulama of various origins. Some of the most active regional branches include Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Bekasi, Malang, Surakarta, East Java, Medan, as well as South Sulawesi.

The background of the core members of MIUMI indicates its religious orientation that covers almost all the conservative Islamic spectrum in Indonesia. Members with Muhammadiyah background include Bachtiar Nasir (HQ), Fahmi Salim (Jakarta branch), Fathurrahman Kamal (Yogyakarta), Okrisal Eka Putra (Yogyakarta), Ayub Handrihadi (Tarakan). Members with Wahdah Islamiyah background include Zaytun Rasmi (HQ), Ridwan Hamidi (Yogyakarta), Beny Abdurrahman (Yogyakarta) and Rahmat Abdul Rahman (South Sulawesi). Prominent members with other organizations include Ahmad Zain an-Najah (HQ, DDII), Jeje Zainuddin (HQ, PERSIS), Tiar Anwar Bachtiar (West Java, PERSIS), Idrus Ramli (HQ, Nahdlatul Ulama), Syakir Syafi'i (Yogyakarta, Hidayatullah).

The background of the members also signifies its middle class origins that is distinctive from the Islamist vigilante organization FPI. FPI leadership as well as its supporter base mostly hail from the urban poor in Jakarta.³⁸ On the other hand, a substantial number of core members within MIUMI has an educational background in the prestigious Pesantren of Gontor, including Bachtiar Nasir, Adnin Armas, Asep Sobari, Henri Sholahuddin, and Fathurrahman Kamal. Not to mention the director Hamid Fahmi Zarkasyi is a grandson of Imam Zarkasyi, the founder of the pesantren in Gontor. The Pesantren of Gontor is well known for their intensive Arabic and English education, and their international academic network especially with the Islamic institutions in the Middle East. Another important educational institution that connects MIUMI members is the Islamic University of Madinah in Saudi Arabia. The Madinah alumni include

³⁸ Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), *After Abok: The Islamist Agenda in Indonesia*.

Bachtiar Nasir, Zaytun Rasmi, Ahmad Zain an-Najah, Fathurrahman Kamal, and Ridwan Hamidi. As a whole, the Gontor strand contributes to the modernist Islamic outlooks, while the Madinah alumni gives the Muslim Brotherhood-orientation as well as Salafi color.

The organizational function served by MIUMI can be relatively difficult to pin down, but its main purpose can be designated as political lobbying. MIUMI retains a capacity to issue fatwa, but this is already served sufficiently by MUI. MIUMI was never intended to compete with MUI, and from the initial stage, MIUMI acknowledged the authority of MUI within the Muslim society in Indonesia. MIUMI's declaration statement mentions MUI and the division of labour respected on MIUMI's part. Within the division of labour, MIUMI designates its intention to "assist" MUI. Closer analysis shows that the assistance comes on intellectual as well as political level. As MUI is a committee formed by representative ulama of all the Islamic *ormas* based in Indonesia, their decisions making structure inevitably includes ulama of differing religious orientations. Such differences in religious attitudes between the members can make MUI a contested ground. As such, ideological unification of a handful of ulama gives strong upper hand in swaying the outcome of their resolutions. From this perspective, MIUMI has organized itself to be able to consolidate the will of ulama of different backgrounds. The aforementioned list of ulama shows that MIUMI has managed to unite ulama from a broad array of the modernist as well as Salafist bloc, even though it does not reach the territory of mainstream Nahdlatul Ulama. Such capacity to consolidate the will of ulama does not limit the contestation within MUI. MIUMI has been proved highly successful in influencing the society on multiple occasions, through the course of its rapid expansion.

Other than the role as a political lobby, MIUMI also conducts weekly study group as well as occasional so-called "preaching tours" across the country. The study group often focuses on the issues related to family and gender, and tends to attract female audiences. This is in contrast with their preaching whose theme often tackles issues such as compatibility between Islam and nationalism. The selected topics suggest their versatility of providing relevant perspectives on political issues for different audiences. However, such comprehensiveness of the topic is in huge contrast with their glaring lack of presence on the

online public sphere. Not only MIUMI as an organization has a miniscule online supporter base, but their frontman Bachtiar Nasir also commands relatively few online followers in comparison with other high profile *ustadz*s such as Abdul Somad and Felix Siauw. This shows that their activity targeting mass audiences is not so much a priority in comparison with the higher level political lobbying.

MIUMI's capability for consolidating ulama for political lobbying stems from its INSISTS background. INSISTS' aim to promote an intellectual rebuttal to the liberal Islamic philosophy naturally leads to the affinity of MIUMI with the modernist as well as Salafist organizations. MIUMI, on the intellectual level, almost directly succeeds INSISTS, with members of INSISTS serving the leadership of MIUMI as well. With "anti-liberalism" as well as "anti-secularism" as a lowest common denominator, MIUMI provided easy access to the members of a varying organization that previously did not have channels to be able to make a systematic mobilization. A unique case of this is arguably the conservative strand of NU known as *NU Garis Lurus* with the track records of its members supporting Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) as well as FPI. MIUMI includes Idrus Ramli, an alumnus of Pesantren Sidogiri in Pasuruan of East Java, as well as Ahmad Fauzi Tijani, a director of Pesantren Al-Amien in Madura. Both pesantrens are considered among the centers of *NU Garis Lurus* strand. Ramli is a highly influential figure within the NU cadre, who shook up the NU congress of 2015 with the official declaration of *NU Garis Lurus* group.³⁹ While they are not mainstream as of now, it still retains strong influence among the NU cadres in regions such as Madura and Banten. A marriage between such an NU brand and Salafi inspired organizations such as Wahdah Islamiyah, although in theory seems more plausible, requires sophisticated and organized channels. The channel was never practically provided prior to the establishment of MIUMI. The foundation of MIUMI, as such, paved the way for the cross-over alliance between members of different organizations in order to mobilize for the certain Islamic causes.

The nature of the organizational structure proves especially efficient in the mobilization during the very specific occasion; that is, when the conservative segment of the Muslim society feels the need to

³⁹ See Alexander R. Arifianto, *Politics, Plurality and Inter-Group Relations in Indonesia - Islam Nusantara & Its Critics: The Rise of NU's Young Clerics* (Singapore: RSIS Commentaries, No. 018, 2017).

defend their religion. The occasion provides the supporters of MIUMI a call to unite broad Muslim society as one single *umat*, and to fight against the visible and single enemy. Although a unification of the Muslim society into one single *umat*, not separated by organizational affiliation, has never been collectively materialized in Indonesia, it is nevertheless retained as a normative virtue especially by the more modernist oriented Muslims. The call to unite against one single enemy is a call to realize such long-awaited religious virtue. It is a highly resonating act of achieving religious virtue, simultaneously working as a highly viable political strategy for mobilization. MIUMI in this scenario provides an intellectual platform for ulama of different origins. The intellectual consensus reached by the ulama will be resonated across each of the organizations where MIUMI ulama belong. MIUMI's organizational structure that favours such a reactive stance provides a quick process of reaching consensus. The organization's rich intellectual sources make it even easier when it comes to tackling issues regarding liberalism, secularism as well as religious pluralism.

The reactionary nature of the organization however, retains a substantial weakness when it comes to asserting religious ideology on a systematic level. MIUMI's religious ideology, albeit inclusive for Islamists of all kinds, can be fuzzy and unspecific. This is among the reasons why it has been difficult for scholars to pin down the organization's role within the "212 movement". This also contributes to MIUMI's relative decline in its influence after the momentum of the demonstration had died down. Case in point is the growing Salafist influence within the MIUMI, in spite of its INSISTS' neo-traditionalist origin that has no direct semblance with Salafism. For MIUMI, it was imperative to be able to accommodate Salafi group to enhance their lobbying capacity, and the inclusion of Salafi members had contributed greatly to the expansion of MIUMI across the archipelago. Yogyakarta branch of MIUMI for example, led by Ridwan Hamidi and Fathurahman Kamal, consisted mostly of their Salafi connection with Jogokaryan mosque as a hub of their activities. Within the structure, the presence of Gontor alumni is relatively low.⁴⁰ Such strategical move incurred the cost of MIUMI facing the difficult task of proving

⁴⁰ Interviewed with Fathurrahman Kamal, the Gontor Alumni, the Director of Tabligh Council of Muhammadiyah, as well as a higher rank member of MIUMI Jogja in Yogyakarta on June, 21th 2019.

their credential as an Islamist movement with clear vision for Islamizing the society.

The Formation of Islamist Alliance: From #IndonesiaTanpaJIL to GNPf-MUI

The development surrounding Islamists and anti-liberalism from the late 2000s illustrates a trajectory of how INSISTS' philosophy has forged a new alliance of Islamist factions, culminating in the "212 movement". Unlike previous cases of which Islamic organizations integrated only momentarily, i.e., Muslim Solidarity for Ambon Conflict (2000), Muslim Solidarity against the U.S. Invasion (2003), Islamic Mass Rally against Israel's aggression towards Palestine and Lebanon (2006), as well as Muslim Alliance for Ahmadiyah dissolution (2009), MIUMI and INSISTS actors managed to inspire inter-organizational coalitions that had lasting impact on the Islamist landscape.

Since 2012, INSISTS and MIUMI have been actively engaging and stimulating the establishment of various rallies and movements. Cases in point are #IndonesiaTanpaJIL (ITJ) in 2012, Parade Tawhid in 2015, MUI central board takeover in 2015 and the formation of GNPf-MUI in 2016 Ahok case. On a quick glance, these incidents seem to display another moment in the long "conservative turn" that has no direct correlation to one another. Closer look however, shows that these incidents have two things in common. Firstly, they are reactions to the liberal-pluralist movements that perceived to offend the conservative Islamic sensitivity. Secondly, they functioned as a build-up phase for the Islamist alliance to be able to form under the banner to fight common enemy and overcoming factional and ideological differences.

The #IndonesiaTanpaJIL is a populist anti-liberal movement that started out from the mass rally that took place on March 9 2012. The movement was directly in response to the #IndonesiaTanpaFPI rally on February 14 2012, which criticized the series of violent attacks by alleged FPI members on Ahmadiyah community. Due to the rally gathering dozens of crowds of progressive activists, with pro-Ahmadiyah, pro-feminist and pro-LGBT slogans, it attracted the social media users who concerned with the apparent growing JIL influence. Call for the counter demonstration was being made, and the rally was staged by the social media users with the dissemination of the

hashtag #IndonesiaTanpaJIL. The #IndonesiaTanpaJIL hashtag quickly overwhelmed the original anti-FPI campaign and engulfed the social media, prompting the similar rallies in several regional cities including Bandung, Bogor and Makassar.⁴¹

The mastermind of the movement is Akmal Sjafril, who majored in the study of Islamic Education and Islamic Thoughts under Adian Husaini at the Ibn Khaldoun University. He later joined INSISTS and became an active writer as well as researcher. His book *Islam Liberal 101* is considered a bible for the ITJ activists, within which reflects INSISTS' philosophy for anti-liberal and secular institutions as a first step of Islamist vision. The "ITJ movement" gravitated more inclusively and consisted of people from various religious backgrounds. Adherents of different Islamic ideologies joined the movement, such as Hizbut Tahrir, "Tarbiyah movement", Salafism, and even laymen who came from a non-Islamic activist background and did not have any form of clear connection to Islamic activism. After #IndonesiaTanpaJIL became a trending hashtag on twitter, numerous musicians and social media celebrity bandwagon with spreading of the hashtag and creation of twitter accounts dedicated to the cause. Till 2018, ITJ has more or less 21 chapters located in several cities and universities in Sumatera, Java, West Nusa Tenggara, as well as Sulawesi, which most of them are fostered by a number of INSISTS actors and the network of Gontor alumni, especially the PKU graduates.⁴²

Fast forward to 2015, MIUMI acquired strong momentum to disseminate and strengthen the alliance. The *Kirab Salib* parade, a Christian cavalcade which demonstrated hundreds of Christian crosses by Christian community in Solo on April 29, 2015 has aroused Muinudinillah Basri, the Director of DSKS (*Dewan Syariah Kota Solo*, Sharia Council of Solo City) as well as the Director of MIUMI Solo chapter initiated counter parade which called *Parade Tauhid*. The Parade Tauhid which held in Solo a month after *Kirab Salib* has successfully congregated more or less 10,000 participants from numerous Islamic movements. The congregation gathered a wide array of the Islamic

⁴¹ Imam Ardhianto, "Contemporary Islamic Movement, Popular Culture and Public Sphere in Indonesia: The #IndonesiaTanpaJIL Movement," *Archipel*, 95, (2018), pp. 151-171.

⁴² Ibid.; Interview with Wijang Prasongko Wibowo, The Director of #IndonesiaTanpaJIL Chapter Jogja in Yogyakarta at June 20th 2019.

spectrum in Indonesia, starting from mainstream organizations such as Muhammadiyah, NU, Persis, MTA (*Majelis Tafsir Al-Qur'an*, the Council of Qur'anic Exegesis), to a number of Islamic political parties, to Islamist vigilante or paramilitary movements such as FPI, LUIS (*Laskar Umat Islam*), Laskar Hizbullah Sunan Bonang, Gerakan Pemuda Ka'bah (GPK, Young Ka'bah Movement), to fundamentalist-radicalistic movements such as Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), Jamaah Anshoru Syariah (JAS), Isykarima, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Indonesian Mujahidin Council), as well as HTI. A few months later, a number of FPI and MIUMI elites established the parade on national level which is called "*Parade Tauhid Indonesia*". Afterwards, the rally inspired similar movements in various regions to replicate the action, including in Yogyakarta (2015, 2016), Medan (2017, 2018), and Padang (2015, 2018).

Concurrently, MIUMI members began increasing presence within the central board of MUI. MUI has a system of holding public forum to officially invite members of organizations outside MUI representation to discuss community-wide issue regarding Islam. Among the major forums are *Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia* (KUII) and *Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah*. These forums are held right before the national congress and agenda will be directly carried away. Such a forum has been an active ground of contestation by the Islamist organizations, as it is the major opportunity for non-mainstream organizations to confront mainstream organizations face to face. Although MUI had previously taken a stance not to invite "controversial" organizations during the KUII V in 2010, it met fierce backlash from the community. This led to the accommodation of such organizations in the 2015 forum. KUII VI was held in Jogjakarta during 8-11 February of 2015, and it had strong presence of Islamist organizations, including MMI, HTI, FUI and Wahdah Islamiyah, with MIUMI members such as Bachtiar Nasir and Zaytun Rasmin taking dominant role during the sessions.⁴³

The Islamist domination during the KUII IV had been translated directly to the subsequent national congress. The national congress on 25 August 2015 decided the management board of 2015-2020, within which included two of the MIUMI frontmen, Zaytun Rasmin as the deputy secretary general of MUI, Bachtiar Nasir as the deputy secretary

⁴³ Moch Nur Ichwan, "MUI, Gerakan Islamis, dan Umat Mengambang," *Jurnal MAARIF*, 11, 2 (2016), pp. 92-94.

of the advisory council as well as a member of the committee of dakwah and community development. Two more core members of MIUMI joined the MUI rank, who are Adnin Armas and Fahmi Salim who became members of the research commission. Among the works conducted by the commission include discussion on the “heretical” religious community. The Islamist members within the commission strived hard to issue anti-Shia fatwa, ended up in failure. Nevertheless, their effort to consolidate Islamist-Salafī voice within the MUI had achieved unprecedented level of success, and it solidify the Islamist influence within the MUI level.⁴⁴

On the political ground, MIUMI inaugurated MPJ (*Majelis Pelayan Jakarta*, Jakarta Servant’s Council) on June 10 2016 which functioned as an organization to form a coalition to elect an Islamist-friendly candidate anticipating the Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2017. At the time, the council endorsed seven Muslim candidates who thought to be an adequate alternative to Ahok in 2017, consist of Adhyaksa Dault, Nurdin Abdullah, Sandiaga Salahuddin Uno, Sjafrie Sajmsoeddin, Suyoto, as well as Yusril Ihza Mahendra. The declaration of MPJ triggered the formation of a number of other Islamic council to elect Islamist-friendly candidate by their own approach, such as GMJ (*Gerakan Masyarakat Jakarta*, the Jakarta People’s Movement) led by FPI, and MOI (*Majelis Ormas Islam*, Islamic Ormas Council) led by DDII. They held collaboration events to ensure an election of Islamist-friendly governor in Jakarta, such as *Mudzakaroh Ulama dan Tokoh Nasional* (Discussion of Ulama and National Figures) on September 14 2016, and *Risalah Istiqlal* (Istiqlal Manifesto) on September 18 2016. Thousands of people attended those events.⁴⁵

After Ahok was indicted of blasphemy charge towards Qur’anic verses in September 2016, MUI, led by Ma’ruf Amin and now dominated by Islamist figures, quickly issued a *fatwa* condemning the alleged blasphemy. Subsequently after, the alliances such as MPJ, GMJ, as well as MOI broadened its influences by embracing numerous Islamic movements and transformed itself into the GNPF-MUI with Bachtiar Nasir as its head. Formerly, the GNPF-MUI functioned as a council of *Ulama’* to defend the *fatwa* by MUI on Ahok’s charges. However, the slow response by police in arresting Ahok has ignited the

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 92-94.

⁴⁵ Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), *After Ahok: The Islamist Agenda in Indonesia*.

GNPF-MUI to organise a series of larger demonstrations called *Aksi Bela Islam*. At this point, the *Aksi Bela Islam* protest came straight from the MIUMI's playbook on political protest, by employing the inter-organizational infrastructure with other various Islamic organizations based on previous Parade Tauhid protests, and draw legitimacy from MUI. From this perspective, the protest against Ahok was a culmination of what they have previously accumulated in the past several years. The first demonstration was held on October 14th and drew a few thousand. The second was on November 4th, with estimate up to 300,000 protestors and rumored to be financed by Ahok's political rivals. In light of this event, the police, hoping to deflate the movement and avert violence, declared Ahok a suspect. But the Islamists and their political backers saw the opportunity to ensure Ahok's downfall, and announced a third rally on December 2nd. An estimated 750,000 protesters brought the capital to a standstill, prompted the government to announced that Ahok's trial would begin immediately.⁴⁶

Conclusion

Conforming to the illustration above, it is possible to suggest the “212 movement” is not entirely a unique phenomenon in the contemporary history of Indonesia. While some scholars consider the organizational form of the movement to be incidental and temporal, this paper showed that it has a historical precedence connected genealogically. The trajectory toward the formulation of the 212 alliance was seeded in the 2000s, with the resonance of liberal Islam in the early post-authoritarian era of Indonesia had prompted scholar from modernist-conservative backgrounds to undermine their influence by establishing Islamic think-tank, represented by INSISTS as well as anti-liberal networks connecting the archipelago. The narrative of anti-liberalism and purification of Islam was utilized by INSISTS members to form MIUMI and #IndonesiaTanpaJIL, a new movement with an effect of forming an Islamist alliance in Indonesia. MIUMI successfully took part in various Islamist movements and protests from 2012 to 2015 and laid a foundation for GNPF-MUI as well as the “212 movement” in 2016. []

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 2.

References

- Ahnaf, Mohammad Iqbal. "Aksi Bela Islam, Akankah Mengubah Lanskap Muslim Indonesia." *Jurnal MAARIF*, 11, 2 (2016), pp. 30-42.
- Ardhianto, Imam. "Contemporary Islamic Movement, Popular Culture and Public Sphere in Indonesia: The #IndonesiaTanpaJIL Movement." *Archipel*, 95, (2018), pp. 151-171.
- Arifianto, Alexander R. *Politics, Plurality and Inter-Group Relations in Indonesia - Islam Nusantara & Its Critics: The Rise of NU's Young Clerics*. Singapore: RSIS Commentaries, No. 018, 2017.
- Assyaukanie, Luthfi. *Ideologi Islam dan Utopia: Tiga Model Negara Demokrasi di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Freedom Institute, 2011.
- , "Unholy Alliance: Ultra-Conservatism and Political Pragmatism in Indonesia." *Thinking ASEAN*, 19, (2017), pp. 6-9.
- Bachtiar, Tiar Anwar. *Pertarungan Pemikiran Islam di Indonesia: Kritik-kritik terhadap Islam Liberal dari H.M Rasjidi sampai INSISTS*. Jakarta: Pustaka Al-Kautsar, 2017.
- Barton, Greg. "Indonesia: Legitimacy, Secular Democracy, and Islam." *Politics & Policy*, 38, 3 (2010), pp. 471-496.
- Berenschot, Ward. "Abok's Defeats and Public Debate in Indonesia." *New Mandala*, May 18th, 2017, <https://www.newmandala.org/ahoks-defeats-say-public-debate-indonesia/>. Accessed on June, 15th 2019.
- Buehler, Michael. *The Politics of Shari'a Law: Islamist Activists and the State in Democratizing Indonesia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
- Burhani, Ahmad Najib. "Aksi Bela Islam: Konservatisme dan Fragmentasi Otoritas Keagamaan." *Jurnal MAARIF*, 11, 2 (2016), pp. 15-29.
- , "The 45th Muhammadiyah Congress: Contest between Literal-Conservative and Liberal-Moderate Muslims in Indonesia." *Studia Islamika*, 12, 1 (2005), pp. 185-189.

- Chaplin, Chris. "Political Protests, Global Islam and National Activism: Deciphering the Motivations behind Indonesia's 'Conservative Turn.'" Middle East Institute, January 23rd, 2018, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/political-protests-global-islam-and-national-activism-deciphering-motivations-behind>. Accessed on June, 15th 2019.
- Fauzi, Ihsan Ali. "Mobocracy? Counting the Cost of the Rallies to 'Defend Islam.'" *Indonesia at Melbourne* December 9th, 2016, <https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/mobocracy-counting-the-cost-of-the-rallies-to-defend-islam/>. Accessed on June, 15th 2019.
- Fealy, Greg. "A Conservative Turn." *Inside Indonesia*, July 15th, 2007, <https://www.insideindonesia.org/a-conservative-turn>. Accessed on June, 15th 2019.
- Feener, R. Michael. *Muslim Legal Thought in Modern Indonesia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Hadiz, Vedi R. *Islamic Populism in Indonesia and the Middle East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
- . *Populisme Islam di Indonesia dan Timur Tengah*. Jakarta: Universitas Indonesia & LP3ES, 2019.
- Hefner, Robert W. *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Hiariej, Eric. "The Politics of Becoming Fundamentalist in the Age of Consumer Culture." Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation. The Australian National University, 2009.
- . et. al. "Post-Fundamentalist Islamism and The Politics of Citizenship in Indonesia." Eric Hiariej and Kristian Stokke (eds). *Politics of Citizenship in Indonesia*. Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia in cooperation with PolGov Fisipol UGM and University of Oslo, 2017.
- Ichwan, Moch Nur. "Towards a Puritanical Moderate Islam: The Majelis Ulama Indonesia and the Politics of Religious Orthodoxy." Martin Van Bruinessen (ed.). *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the "Conservative Turn"*. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2013.

- . "MUI, Gerakan Islamis, dan Umat Mengambang." *Jurnal MAARIF*, 11, 2 (2016), pp. 87-104.
- Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC). *After Abok: The Islamist Agenda in Indonesia*. Jakarta: IPAC Report No. 44, 2018.
- Kusman, Airlangga P. "Aksi Bela Islam, Populisme Konservatif dan Kekuasaan Oligarki." *Jurnal MAARIF*, 11, 2 (2016), pp. 43-52.
- Latif, Yudi. *Inteligensia Muslim dan Kuasa: Genealogi Inteligensia Muslim Indonesia Abad ke-20*. Bandung: Mizan Pustaka, 2005.
- Lindsey, Tim. "Blasphemy Charge Reveals Real Fault Lines in Indonesian Democracy." *Indonesia at Melbourne*, June 15th, 2019, <https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/blasphemy-charge-reveals-real-fault-lines-in-indonesian-democracy/>.
- Mietzner, M., B. Muhtadi, R. Halida. "Entrepreneurs of Grievance: Drivers and Effects of Indonesia's Islamist Mobilization." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, 174 (2018), pp. 159–187.
- Munjid, Achmad. "Militant and Liberal Islam: The Unwanted Twin Children of Modernization; An Indonesian Experience." *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, 3, 1 (2009), pp. 35-68.
- Muzakki, Akh. "Contestation within Contemporary Indonesian Islamic Thought: Liberalism and Anti-Liberalism." Unpublished M.Phil Thesis. The Australian National University, 2005.
- . "The Roots, Strategies, and Popular Perception of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia." *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, 8, 1 (2014), pp. 1-22.
- Platzdasch, Benhard W. "Religious Dogma, Pluralism and Pragmatism: Constitutional Islamism in Indonesian Politics (1998-2002)." Unpublished MA Thesis. The Australian National University, 2005.
- Sidel, John T. *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006.
- Ufen, Andreas. "Mobilising Political Islam: Indonesia and Malaysia Compared." *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 47, 3 (2009), pp. 308-333.

van Bruinessen, Martin. "Post-Suharto Muslim Engagements with Civil Society and Democratisation." Hanneman Samuel and Henk Schulte Nordholt (eds). *Indonesia in Transition: Rethinking 'Civil Society', 'Region' and 'Crisis'*. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2004.

----- . *What Happened To The Smiling Face of Indonesian Islam?: Muslim Intellectualism and The Conservative Turn in Post-Subarto Indonesia*. Singapore: RSIS Working Paper, No. 222, 2011.

----- . (ed). *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the "Conservative Turn"*. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2013.

----- . *Indonesian Muslims in a Globalising World: Westernisation, Arabisation, and Indigenising Responses*. Singapore: RSIS Working Paper, 2018.

Interviews

Interview with Anton Ismunanto, the PKU Gontor alumni as well as the member of MIUMI Jogja in Yogyakarta at June 20th 2019.

Interview with Jihad Wafda, the Gontor Alumni in Yogyakarta at June 20th 2019.

Interview with Wijang Prasongko Wibowo, The Director of #IndonesiaTanpaJIL Chapter Jogja in Yogyakarta at June 20th 2019.

Interview with Fathurrahman Kamal, the Gontor Alumni, the Director of Tabligh Council of Muhammadiyah, as well as the declarator of MIUMI Jogja in Yogyakarta at June, 21th 2019.