

Indigènes after *Indigènes*: Post-war France and its North African Troops

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Abstract: This article focuses on North African soldiers who served in the French army of occupation in western Germany after its liberation in 1945. Taking as its starting point Rachid Bouchareb's 2006 film, *Indigènes*, the article contrasts claims the film made about the memorial exclusion of the colonial soldier with his surprising centrality to French accounts of their own military exploits. Using publications issued by the army for its internal readership and archival records of the military occupation's day-to-day activities, the author argues for a modified understanding of the French Republican notion of assimilation, that is able to take account of the prolific representation of the North African soldier, and his accommodation, in cold war Germany.

Keywords: Colonial soldiers, Zone Française d'Occupation, *Indigènes*, assimilation, representation

Towards the end of Rachid Bouchareb's epic war film, *Indigènes* (2006), after a long and violent urban battle in which three of the movie's four North African soldier heroes are killed, a French news cameraman arrives on the cold, wet streets of a wintry Alsace to film civilians who have just been liberated from nazi rule.¹ In the scene – which has been called the film's "strongest card"² – the newsman ignores the heroic Abdelkader, sole survivor of the awful battle, to concentrate instead on some recently arrived white French soldiers whom the audience knows missed the entire episode. The film was well received by general audiences (its five lead actors collectively won the best actor prize at the 2006 Cannes film festival) for its vivid highlighting of the extent to which colonial troops had fought in the French army during the Second World War, and then been forgotten. Since its release, it has become difficult for popular discourse to disregard the large number of African foot soldiers who fought for France during the

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last two years of the war (though the south-east Asian, Madagascan and Pacific Islander soldiers remain sidelined). This is especially the case since it was apparently this film which provoked Jacques Chirac's government to unfreeze the pensions that veterans from the former colonies had been owed since 1959 – which in any case, were at levels far below those routinely paid to veterans from the Metropole. The director's didactic approach and deliberate intervention into contemporary politics³ is brought home during the final scene in which the now elderly Abdelkader visits the graves of his fallen comrades before returning to his miserable room in a lonely *foyer*. This is immediately followed by a screen that incites audience indignation with information about the non-payment of pensions.⁴ Such was the outcry about this seemingly unknown injustice that here was a definite case of film “trigger[ing] public negotiations of nationhood”.⁵

Given its release into an academic world well-versed in assessing the merits and memorial impact of historical film in France, as well as one expressing a rapidly burgeoning interest in the French colonial past, the movie attracted more than a little scholarly commentary. Much of this was critical of the epic Hollywood genre via which Bouchareb explored his theme and, in a postcolonial context, of the paradoxical representation – and thus affirmation – of a rather conventional version of Republican unity.⁶ In this vein, some also queried Bouchareb's choice of the Second World War as a frame in which to focus attention on France's treatment of its colonial subjects, as opposed to the politically more challenging war of 1954-62 (to which the director turned a few years later in *Hors la loi*),⁷ though some of the most recent scholarship has attributed the film with an importance “dans la conjoncture politique actuelle en France en montrant comment ce long métrage participe à la réécriture de l'histoire républicaine en proposant une alternative historique du discours dominant.”⁸ For a historical film though, it is noteworthy how few commentators have engaged with the history that it

represents; most also confirmed the director's rhetoric of immediate political change that the film provoked with respect to the veterans' pensions.⁹ On seeing the film at a special preview, so the highly gendered story goes, Bernadette Chirac turned to her husband Jacques, then president of the Republic, and insisted that the policy dating from 1959, of refusing to pay pensions to soldiers from former French colonies, be lifted. This cosy tale of wifely intervention in the sensitive domain of postcolonial economic relations contrasts with the published letter from Jacques Chirac to a military campaigner from 2002, calling the "crystallisation" of pensions "un système injuste" and announcing that the payment of pensions "est pour notre pays un devoir moral en raison des sacrifices consentis au service de la France par ses anciens combattants. Il convient donc aujourd'hui de mettre en oeuvre la 'décristallisation'."¹⁰ It would seem strange for the president to have forgotten all about these pensions so quickly, yet only one of the academic reviews of *Indigènes* dares call the story of Bernadette Chirac's mediation in national policy, a "fable".¹¹

Bouchareb says he spent more than two years on historical research for the film, during which he found barely any visual images of the North African troops he wanted to portray.¹² It is difficult to know what he consulted, but there certainly exist several commemorative volumes of photographs,¹³ newsreel from journalists embedded with the French army,¹⁴ and of course the French military archives at Vincennes, which all contain substantial amounts of material, some of which is strikingly similar to images in the film. His statement was more likely to have been designed to feed publicity for his film, than be picked apart by academic historians: like the soldiers portrayed in the movie, he too had faced an epic struggle. What these books and archives demonstrate is that, far from being hidden and reviled, the autochthon North African soldier serving in the Second World War army in the last two years of the war, as well as in the ZFO

immediately after it, was a familiar and even glorified figure.¹⁵ This is the case in materials designed for consumption by other soldiers, as well as the several memorial volumes about different army units published for a wider audience in the years after the war.¹⁶ This article will use the scene of the French cameraman as a starting point to explore how North African soldiers were represented and what position they were accorded in the French army at, and immediately after, the end of the Second World War, contextualising these with their experiences in the French Zone of Occupation (ZFO) in western Germany. It sets out to explore the forms that these representations took in such publications, alongside the perception of the colonial soldier in the Zone by his officers. There are certain limitations to this method, as we do not reach the colonial soldier himself (there were no female soldiers from Africa by this time, though 2,200 French settler women had been recruited in 1942).¹⁷ Nonetheless, in stark contrast to the official media – and hence, State – silencing of the autochthon's story presented in *Indigènes*, I suggest that he was in fact central to the French army's representation of itself in Germany after 1945, an argument that parallels recent claims that the literary story of the colonial soldier during the Second World War has never gone away.¹⁸

Troops from across the French empire comprised about 9 per cent of the army which fought in the French army in 1939-40. The victorious Wehrmacht in France in the summer of 1940 immediately differentiated between their captives, who numbered up to 1.7 million, taking those they designated as European to prisoner of war camps in Germany, and depositing African soldiers in the *Frontstalag* camps in occupied France. About 60,000 North Africans were taken prisoner. By mid-1944, prisoner release, escape and death meant that about 40,000 remained.¹⁹ Two exceptions should be noted: first, the 10,000 North African men immediately freed and returned to North Africa in 1940.²⁰ Second, the 1,500 to 3,000 West Africans who were separated from the rest by

the Nazi invaders, and massacred. This event was noted and even memorialised at the time; indeed, it was central to the radicalisation of Jean Moulin who was severely beaten for refusing to sign an attestation confirming that it was the French who had brutalised the Black men. But, in failing to prosecute Germany for these war crimes after 1945, the restored French Republic misplaced their memory and it became one of the “forgotten” episodes of the fall of France.²¹

This terrible chapter aside, we have become familiar with the West African troops, the “*Tirailleurs sénégalais*” (recruited throughout the colonial territories of West Africa), especially during the First World War.²² Less is known about the North African soldiers, particularly Algerians and Tunisians, partly because their units were more mixed,²³ but partly also because documentation on the *Tirailleurs sénégalais* and Moroccan units is better archived.²⁴ No precise figures for the autochthon troops who fought in the French armed forces during the Second World War have been established; in the campaigns from late 1942 to 1945, the figure of 330,000 is generally accepted, of whom about 250,000 were from North Africa. After the armistice in 1940, the North African armies remained loyal to Pétain, and it was with some effort that generals de Gaulle and Giraud raised armies from across French colonial North Africa to fight from November 1942 in the Allied Tunisian campaign. Colonial divisions formed the backbone of the French army which fought for the rest of the war, with autochthon soldiers comprising as much as 50 per cent of the men, overwhelmingly clustered in the infantry and systematically excluded from heavy armoured units.²⁶ After the Axis defeat in North Africa, what became the French expeditionary corps transferred to southern Italy, landing in Naples at the end of 1943. Under overall US command, they fought their way northwards, reaching Rome on 5 June 1944 (an event almost entirely eclipsed in French popular memory by the Normandy landings the next day) after extremely

difficult fighting in often atrocious conditions. The struggle for Italian liberation completed, many men believed they would return home; instead, they were shipped to France, landing near Toulon on 15 August 1944, while others went to liberate the Italian island of Elba, and a minority to Britain to enter France from the north. Most of the Africans, though, participated in the liberation of Marseilles, Lyons and Besançon, before reaching the Vosges in the autumn of 1944. It was here that the West Africans' participation in the war was ended via a process called the "blanchiment de l'armée", whereby lines of West African soldiers faced lines of young ex-resisters from the internal French resistance (Forces françaises de l'Intérieur, FFI), and surrendered their equipment, uniforms and weapons. This was justified on grounds of an essentialised environmentalism: it was said that West Africans were unable to stomach the cold,²⁷ and was indeed in line with the military policy of *hivernage* that, since 1915, had aimed to quarter west African soldiers in warmer parts of France between December and March, a rule which had been followed during the phony war winter of 1939-40.²⁸ It is true that the winter of 1944-45 was unusually bitter, and in the mountainous areas of eastern France in 1944 the chill and snow began to arrive as early as October; yet the troops, not demobilised, poorly fed and clothed, and unable to be repatriated while war continued, were forced to endure the winter in camps in extremely cold parts of France. French leaders also claimed a desire to protect Black soldiers from the sort of racism that had confronted them during the occupation of the Rhinlands after the First World War. More to the point, the United States refused to equip the additional 100,000 recruits that de Gaulle demanded. Most fundamental of all was the political desire to incorporate former members of the internal French resistance (who were already equipped, if rather haphazardly) in order to ensure that the French army that would finally win the war against nazi Germany was "French", and perhaps to undermine any

French Communist Party aspirations to recruit them instead.²⁹ This proviso did not apply to the North Africans. Had it done so, what was now known as the First French Army would have been tiny and virtually untrained in regular army combat and discipline. As it was, the French forces that fought their way through eastern France and into Germany in the spring of 1945 consisted of about one third former FFI, and two thirds North Africans.³⁰

Still wearing the old British uniforms and footwear remaindered from 1918 that they had been issued in Tunisia two years earlier, autochthon North African infantry and their mules (in units of *goumiers*, *tabors*, *tirailleurs* and *spahis*, among others) could access the icy Alsatian mountain paths that were closed to heavy vehicles.³¹ Much of the fighting was on foot and it lasted all winter. On 19 March 1945, French troops crossed into Germany over the river Lauter, a tributary of the Rhine, which itself was crossed on 30-31 March. French units spread along the southern stretches of the Rhine and beyond, liberating Karlsruhe, Stuttgart and Baden-Baden, and were the first Allies to reach Hitler's southern headquarters at Berchtesgaden.

“Ici l'Allemagne”. Two words painted on a rough wooden sign in a photograph taken just over the river Lauter where French troops first arrived in Germany. This sort of way-marking was part of a visual discourse of war that had emerged during the army's movements from the moment it arrived in Italy. The sign's importance is not just geographic; it is not akin to the existing signpost against which it leans, directing the traveller to the village of Berg, since its intended viewer will already know that they have indeed arrived in Germany. As Rod Kedward judged in connection with a similar sign (“ici commence la France libre”, in Paulhac, Haute Loire, 2 June 1944), it could mean “a specific place, an encounter, a boundary, a crossing, a spatial beginning”.³²

This sign contains all these meanings, as well as designating a historical beginning (ici

l'Allemagne française) and laying a claim: that of its makers, clearly defined by the insignia of the three crescents in bleu blanc rouge, of the 3^{me} Division d'Infanterie Algérienne (DIA).³³ It insists that its makers have passed through, and expect others to follow, and in that sense acts also as a warning to the German civilian and military population. The unmistakable colonial patriotism of this sign, with its combination of French national colours and Muslim crescent shapes, underlines the allegedly reciprocal unity between “French” and “Muslim” that was such an explicit part of French colonial discourse. And for our purposes, it is significant that it was this colour photograph marking the presence of the colonial army that was chosen for the front cover of a 72-page commemorative magazine from 1946 that celebrates the French role in liberated Germany.

Figure 1



Source: *Images de l'occupation – vérités sur l'occupation: De Baden-Baden à Berlin* (Paris: Société des éditions modernes, n.d., c.1946), 1.

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Of what, then, did this military presence consist? Immediately after the war, promises implied or assumed were going awry: despite the valour the army claimed to have displayed during the war, officers' salaries plummeted relative to their British and American counterparts and other professionals in France, and the army felt it had insufficient public support.³⁴ And hopes for decolonisation raised at the Brazzaville conference of winter 1944 went sour as the colonial authorities "back-pedalled".³⁵ At the same time, the transformation of the empire into the French Union "conveyed the rights of the [1946] constitution to people in the empire and its language of equivalence quickly proved a springboard for claims to give substance to that language".³⁶ Officers in Germany endeavoured to make the Zone a bastion against such change, and it is within this context that the materials discussed below should be understood. The memorial presence of the colonial army does not, of course, compel an automatic place for the autochthon soldier. But in the army's reflexive representations, he is abundantly present, as he was in the military's day-to-day concerns. In the French Zone of Occupation that was carved out after May 1945, such was the significance of the colonial army that three of its first four commanding generals (de Monsabert, Sevez and Guillaume) had led colonial divisions during the war. Despite occupying not much more than 10 per cent of the area within the redrawn German boundaries plus a sector of Berlin, the French authorities installed no fewer than 750,000 military and civilians to govern its jurisdictions, a significant proportion of whom were colonial troops: autochthons, preponderant among the men apart from several Moroccan officers and some Algerian trainers, and French *colons*, generally officers or junior officers.³⁷ It is the autochthons, whose numbers varied considerably from a high at VE Day, as units were demobilised and incorporated into others and their members sent home, or as men were transferred to Indochina, that interest me most here.³⁸

It is via their superiors' reports that we can begin to understand the position of the North African soldiers in Germany. Officers clearly took divergent views of their men, with some displaying a degree of compassion that others lacked. General de Monsabert was explicitly hostile to their presence and wanted all the "indigènes" sent home, charging them with minor criminality and too much sex with German women.³⁹ He did not succeed; although many soldiers were demobilised, several units disbanded or incorporated into others from 1945 onwards, and there was a large-scale diminution in the number of soldiers from Algeria in 1949 (for political reasons beyond the scope of this article), troops from North Africa were still being sent to Germany well into the 1950s.⁴⁰ In the early months, an overall picture emerges of a somewhat downtrodden set of men, who were often homesick, or whose unusual uniforms, particularly the woollen djellabas of the goumiers, made them a target of other soldiers' mockery.⁴¹ They were sometimes regarded as "bonnes à tout faire" – and we should be alert to the gendered slur contained in that idea, as well as the social one – and were billeted in small, unwelcoming villages where they went short of food, shoes and waterproof coats.⁴² Even in the times of absolute shortage at the beginning of the occupation of Germany, officers contrasted the way that the North African soldiers were treated by other soldiers and the local population with the overall reception given to troops perceived as "French", though for all, life in occupied Germany was rather dull.⁴³ After the intensity of the war, over-manning in the Zone led to a sense of timeless pointlessness.⁴⁴ Officers tended to moan, about the quality of the recruits they were being sent,⁴⁵ and the number of transfers imposed on officers already there,⁴⁶ both complaints seemingly impervious to the French defence ministry's priorities while a war was being fought in Indochina. Morale among the North African soldiers was enlivened by ceremonial activity and occasional trips to France, particularly when they marched down the Champs Elysées in

1945 on 18 June (to commemorate General de Gaulle's call for resistance in 1940) and 14 July. On that occasion, special remembrance services were organised for the soldiers at Notre Dame cathedral, the synagogue in rue de la Victoire, the Protestant Temple de l'Oratoire and the Mosquée de Paris.⁴⁷ Some officers related the autochthon troops' ecstatic welcome by Parisians; others, displaying a long-standing right-wing tendency to disapprove of the capital's population, reported their dismay at the anarchy and laziness their troops encountered in Paris, which was accompanied by a general lack of knowledge of the North Africans' role in the liberation of France.⁴⁸


There is even equivocation in the most serious charges levelled against soldiers. Aside from the 3me DIA, officers in charge of the North African troops charged other French soldiers, as well as the local population, with propagating the idea that autochthon soldiers were rapists and thieves.⁴⁹ We still lack a clear picture of rape by the western armies of liberation in Europe to compare with those in the Soviet zone or Berlin, but it is to be expected that all the liberating armies raped women in all the countries they liberated.⁵⁰ According to Jill Stephenson's study of Württemberg under nazi rule (rather than after it), the archives contain several mentions of rape at liberation, apparently by Moroccans.⁵¹ In the context of a population emerging from twelve years of enthusiastic support for its officially racist regime, and memory of the racist reception accorded Black French soldiers in the Rhinlands after the First World War still fresh,⁵² such sources need to be treated with caution and problematised in terms of race, as well as of gender.⁵³ French officers believed that action had to be taken to "détruire d'urgence par une contre propagande venant des échelons supérieurs la légende du goumier pillard et violeur de femmes allemandes. Obtenir [pour eux] un secteur d'occupation bien déterminé et organique."⁵⁴ Further study is needed to uncover the perpetration of rape by white, as well as autochthon, troops in Germany in 1945.

These inconsistent reports allow us some glimpse into the position of the autochthon soldier, but they do not detract from the need to explore other types of representation too, or undermine the necessity that the ministry of defence perceived to retain autochthon troops in Germany. Nor do they form a convincing reason to comply with demands that historical accounts of people be retrieved from the “stranglehold” of cultural historians whose concentration on discourse sets them at odds with issues that had real impact on historical individuals.⁵⁵ According to Naomi Davidson, North Africans under French rule from around the beginning of the twentieth century were inscribed with a saturating “Muslimness”, in much the same way that women were saturated with femininity, and this did much to revoke any claims they might have had to rational individuality of the sort endorsed by the Republic. In promoting a universal version of Islam drawn from Moroccan orthodox practice that became recognisable via a set of “embodied practices and aesthetics” (that Davidson calls *Islam français*), French politicians, social scientists, architects and colonial officials collapsed what were originally imagined religious identities into racialised ones. At the same time, this type of uniform Muslim identity was made containable and approachable, as well as immutable and innate.⁵⁶ These attributes are recognisable in the publications produced in the Zone for consumption by the occupiers, to which I now turn.

After its inception in May 1945, it was quickly decided that the sizeable and, by and large, static population that administered the Zone needed their own magazine. The glossy monthly, *Revue d’Information des Troupes françaises d’occupation en Allemagne* (hereafter, *Revue d’Information*), following a rich army tradition,⁵⁷ began publication in October 1945, and continued without a break for a decade. This large-format magazine of between 32 and 64 pages regarded itself as a medium to unify the different elements of the occupying forces, and inform them about their location.⁵⁸ To

this end, it published information on and history of the army itself, and German history and the resources of the Zone; news of the Zone; reviews of French literature, cinema and theatre; and sports pages and local news, often presented as “les images du mois”. For its first three years, the *Revue d’Information* seems to have been aimed at an educated, officer readership, before becoming more populist, with flashier headlines, greater focus on sport, and shorter articles. Right from the start, though, story after story focused on the heroic exploits of the colonial and autochthon soldier during the last two years of the war, the first article of this type appearing in the very first issue. Thereafter, colonial soldiers are present either visually or in written texts in 60 per cent of the issues published between 1945 and 1950. The cornerstones of this abundant representation fall into several distinct genres.

Figure 2: Spahis parade in Speyer at first anniversary of the Rhine crossing, 31 March 1946.



Source: *Revue d’Information des Troupes françaises d’occupation en Allemagne*, May 1946.

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First are images of these soldiers at the many ceremonial occasions by which the French occupiers marked their presence in liberated Germany. The distinctive uniforms of colonial units, whose members wore turbans (the spahis and the tirailleurs algériens, among others) or djellabas (for example, the goums and the tabors) were on mass public display on the unbombed streets of Baden-Baden, or other towns in the Zone.⁵⁹ The oriental flourishes to both uniforms and activities, most notably the horsemanship of the spahis (a mounted unit noted for their virtuostic equestrianism), were on parade at every fête nationale, anniversary, unit's departure, or general's retirement. The stories that accompany the photographs often evoke the soldiers' rural origins. In an article marking the departure of a Moroccan unit in late October 1945, for example, we learn that,

le Général de Monsabert faisait ses adieux au 2^{ème} GTM [Groupe des Tabors Marocains]: éprouvé par sa rude et glorieuse campagne, et près de quitter ses cantonnements de Lindau et de Lindenberg pour rallier ses nids d'aigle de l'Atlas... Le Colonel ... capuchon de la djellaba en arrière, et veillant sur ses fils comme un berger regardait défiler sa tribu... coiffés du turban noir, gantés de blanc... djellabas brunes, les Berbères, derrière leur fanfare, prirent l'Alpenstrasse, transformée pour la journée en voie royale.⁶⁰

The romanticisation of the geographic origins of these soldiers often slips into sentimentality and nostalgia, forming an insistence on the shared ownership of missed colonial space. At the same time, the troops turn from being shepherds at home into the sheep themselves. Above all, the special clothes worn by the troops and their officers are made visible in photographs and the text.

Second are the abundant stories of the army's own exploits. These illustrated tales of the activities of particular units at singular moments provided a literary space in which the army could perform memorially to itself.⁶¹ During an often tedious and, to

many men, incomprehensible occupation whereby the former enemy was precipitously transformed into a sort of friend,⁶² this literary remembering could remind the reader of who they were. The arduous journey under fire from Africa to Germany and the struggle it demanded is unpacked again and again, itself encapsulated in the erection of the “Ici l’Allemagne” sign. The heroism of the North African men also becomes nativist essentialism, whereby their ability to endure hardship is naturalised. Represented as simpler and hardier than white men, they could be relied on to plod their way beside their mules (which transported materials, not men) through cold, snow, danger and death. “Les outils ordinaires de notre tirailleur étaient, outre ses armes, ses jambes,” explained one long and celebratory article.⁶³ Elsewhere, the valiant exploits of an almost entirely autochthon unit during the “époque angoissante” when fighting the Afrika-Korps in 1942, presents the soldiers as “presque sans armes et sans munitions, sans chaussures et le ventre vide” (without mentioning the poorly-equipped condition in which they fought the rest of the war).⁶⁴ It was this type who became the *Revue d’Information*’s hero of military liberation and personification of the French armies’ embattled trajectory, from Tunisia, through Italy, into France from the south, liberating Marseilles, Lyons, Besançon, Belfort, the Vosges in winter, Strasbourg and Colmar, the Rhine crossing, through Germany and into Austria. This journey and the battles it entailed becomes a repeated litany, a geographic imprinting, that was marked through writing, photography, drawings and commemoration.

Reminders of the men’s spiritual faith form the third type of article in the *Revue d’Information*. This was not only a matter of religious practice, but of character formation too: the men’s devotion to Islam provided them with a sense of fate and acceptance of their (lowly) position, though respect was also owed their Muslim identity and practices.⁶⁵ Obligations placed on officers in their treatment of autochthon men

were elaborated in a handbook, whose post-war version strongly resembled the 1941 edition, though some of its grosser racist stipulations were removed.⁶⁶ Above all, it was the North African soldier's religion that formed the focus. Islam should be respected – but not deferred to: on the question of mosques within a cantonnement, for example, the advice was unequivocally against. These broad stipulations were borne out in much representation of the North African autochthon soldier in the *Revue d'Information*, and are linked to its fourth element, which centres on the visual, social and urban cultures produced by Islam, whose architecture, clothing, weaponry and decorations should, it suggests, be both admired and copied.⁶⁷

From this description of the contents of the *Revue d'Information*, it would seem that representation of the autochthon soldier conformed to what we have come to know about French views of its colonies and the religion practised by many of their inhabitants. In line with the nostalgic tales of African spaces printed in the *Revue d'Information*, Davidson suggests it was in the built environment that Islam was regarded as being especially prone to express itself.⁶⁸ She explores these facets in relation to the Mosquée de Paris, constructed in the 1920s. But a built Islamic space was also a feature in many parts of the Zone, and I will now turn to that element peculiar to the French military cantonnement that was the *café maure*.

The *café maure*, a centuries-old feature of urban Algeria was, in the context of military life, a designated place in the cantonnement where North African troops could relax. Its tiled walls and arabesque apertures were intended to remind the troops of home, although as home might have been anywhere in French colonial territories, design was generic. For Davidson, the Mosquée de Paris, designed by French architects who drew on Moroccan ideas, “provided the means for the proponents of *Islam français* to instantiate their ideas about the innate physicality of Islam in a site in the middle of

Paris.”⁶⁹ I suggest that the provision of a *café maure* in a cantonnement in south-west Germany had other, or additional functions. In one important sense its very existence, that was repeatedly promoted and constructed across the Zone, is noteworthy. Davidson suggests that it was an especially Moroccan form of Islam that took precedence in French eyes, but despite its name, the *café maure* had nothing to do with Morocco. Its name derived after the sixteenth century from that part of the Algerian population composed of a mix of indigenous urban elite and new arrivals who had escaped from reconquista Spain. Where the Turks held political power, the Maures formed an intellectual elite, and it was they who established the spaces – run in line with Muslim dietary and leisure requirements, and often in the vicinity of the mosque – in which debate and discussion could take place.⁷⁰ The Turks left after the French invasion in 1830, but the “Maures”, and their cafés, remained, in both urban centres and as an important element within the army of resistance under the leadership of Emir Abdelkader. As the French military took power, they spread these cafés along the new roads that they constructed, bringing a novel kind of social space to rural districts for the first time. It would appear that, along with the incorporation into the Armée d’Afrique of pre-existing Algerian units such as the spahis, the French also adopted these army cafés. As a space already restricted to use by men, there was a gendered logic to its maintenance and development in the masculine society of the army. By the time of the First World War, the *café maure* had become a widespread military space,⁷¹ and updated instructions for its establishment across the armed forces were issued in 1936;⁷² it was therefore not the innovation of the war in Indochina that Orwin claims.⁷³

In their communiqués to the Ministry of Defence in Paris, officers in the French Zone of Occupation in Germany seem at least as likely to request the equipment necessary to establish a *café maure* as they were to ask for a mobile brothel (bordel

militaire de campagne).⁷⁴ Like its original incarnation in seventeenth-century Algeria, it was to serve tea, coffee and other non-alcoholic drinks, pastries and fruit, and offer board games and music, either recorded or played by soldiers themselves.⁷⁵ It was familiar across the Zone.⁷⁶ Initially, officers emphasised the need for the *cafés maures* as distraction from the meagre rations (which in 1945 were in some districts providing only one meal a day, forcing soldiers to go begging for potatoes door-to-door).⁷⁷ Whereas in Algeria, rugs on which customers would recline had yielded in the 1920s and 1930s to tables and chairs, and musicians to the wireless and gramophone,⁷⁸ in Germany, officers were requesting from their superiors in Paris not only “quelques objets marocains tels que: plateaux, theières,” but “nattes ainsi que quelques instruments de musique; tebels [sic], Rhaita, etc, [qui] contribueraient à placer les Goumiers dans leur cadre familial.”⁷⁹ That these requests were being sent to Paris just two months into the occupation, when soldiers lacked shoes, bedding and food, provides some indication of the importance the cafés were accorded. An absolute necessity was extra sugar, tea and coffee, which were in extremely short supply in the early months of the occupation, along with other, not on the face of it particularly North African requirements, such as footballs and basketballs.⁸⁰ It should be noted, however, that in Algeria, sports teams were often formed from a café’s clientele,⁸¹ and here too, in Germany, is the apparent continuation of this tradition. The building of *cafés maures* in Germany was not confined to the initial years of the French occupation. Even after the establishment of the Federal Republic, and when many autochthon soldiers had been transferred to Indochina, the cafés were still being demanded and built, giving us some idea of the continuing importance of autochthon troops in the Zone.⁸²

Arguably, the provision of a corner of a cantonnement for North African soldiers’ recreational use kept them segregated and separate; in Germany, however,

soldiers lived in requisitioned billets, often dispersed in villages, so any idea that they were confined to one small area must be abandoned. Officers sometimes suggested that North African soldiers would be better off being barracked together rather than spread among different units,⁸³ but it is not at all clear that the *café maure* was conceived as a segregated space, and these demands may in part have been motivated by more general complaints that the army was being atomised, and subject to too many transfers.⁸⁴ Indeed, other facets of colonial life in south-west Germany were, I will argue, specifically designed to blend European and African soldiers, across the ranks from conscripts to senior officers, up to and including the Zone's commanding general. The singular place for the Islamic cultures of soldiers serving in this western European army was further developed in the celebratory dinner in the form of the *méchoui*.

I have suggested elsewhere that the French military presence in post-war Germany consisted in large measure of the performance, rather than the practice, of militarism.⁸⁵ Weapons were in such short supply that soldiers did not understand their use, and many of the uniformed "military" were in fact civilians accorded military rank, designated by over-elaborate outfits that career military scorned. While it served as a site for the preparation of a war in Indochina in which the autochthon soldier would again play a crucial role, no war was being fought in Germany itself. Instead, the French military announced themselves to the local population via spectacular parades, honourings of flags and presentations of arms. This sort of ceremonial had a confirmatory and productive function on both an internal, French, and an external, German civilian or other Allied level. Participation in the lavish staging of the *méchoui*, the outdoor roast lamb dinner that originated in North Africa, on the other hand, was entirely internal.⁸⁶ Here, the commanding officer, or even the commanding general's ceremonial carving of the whole lamb which had been roasting for hours over an open

fire, provided a moment for European officers and autochthon men to come together, even if it would appear that autochthon soldiers did the serving. It may be that the excuse for these special dinners were Muslim festivals, and this further served to accentuate the Islamic identity of the soldiers. If that had been their sole *raison d'être*, however, there would have been greater logic to organise entirely separate meals, especially given the junior military and social status of the men concerned.

More is at stake here, then, than an occasion that would confer a sense of military unity on men gathered to eat. It has been established that French colonial practice labelled the autochthon African, “Muslim”. This all-encompassing designation defined not an individual’s religion, but their racial and ethnic status.⁸⁷ In Germany, for example, soldiers being reintegrated after a minor misdemeanour were to swear on the Qur’an in the presence of a commanding officer and two Muslim NCOs whose piety was especially marked.⁸⁸ This sort of practice and labelling managed to exist in tandem with the, in many ways contradictory, dictates of assimilation, whereby all that was not recognisably French should be gallicised. Only that already determined as “assimilable” could undergo this process, however: hence the coexistence of these other identities, particularly the apparently powerful one of “Muslim”. For all that official policies on assimilation for the colonised were supposed to be shifting after 1945, within the Metropole itself, assimilation has generally been interpreted as a route via which the non-French could, and should, acquire “Frenchness”,⁸⁹ and we are most used to regarding it as the imposition of Frenchness on to a population, and asking whether French claims to permit assimilation were in fact honoured.⁹⁰ That which is already “French”, on the other hand, is regarded as particularly resistant to external influence and adaptation. This was especially the case in the immediate post-war era of national reinvigoration. The *méchoui* and, to a lesser extent, the *café maure*, though, in the

context not of colonial space or even metropolitan France, but post-nazi Germany, makes this impervious French assimilationism look a little less solid. With *goumiers* and *tabors* dressed in African clothes as they attended the French military's day-to-day business sending out a message of French diversity to the German population (along with a message of immutable Muslimness), precisely what was French in this context becomes rather blurred.

This article has argued that the prolific representation of the North African soldier functioned as more than a means of insisting on the unity of the French empire at a moment when it was threatened from within and without. Representations of the North African soldier, and his position in occupied Germany, while stereotyped and limited, were framed in ways that went beyond a demand for his complete assimilation and submission to the Republican army; they were also tenaciously present. How the French army adapted to and celebrated their North African troops, displaying their oriental splendour on ceremonial occasions, and itself assimilating the autochthon's customs such as the *café maure* and the *méchoui*, suggests a rather more differentiated form of French Republican universalism than the one to which we are accustomed.⁹¹ Within the confines of the army, no less, the patriotic, "ideological state apparatus" that was representing the French nation abroad and enforcing its rule over an erstwhile enemy, the "one and indivisible republic" practised what looks a little like multiculturalism, conventionally regarded as anathema to the Republic.

The figure of the North African soldier was thus a key part of the story that the French armies narrated to itself about its own endeavours during the Second World War.

Within the optic of colonial dependency and proprietorship, the necessity to record in words and images the exploits and the personages of the autochthon North African who fought for France was, in the years immediately after the war, part of the national duty

that the army assumed. Far from the film, at the specific moment of the cameraman scene, constructing, in Ayo Coly's words, "a permanent archive and historiography,"⁹⁴ as we have seen, not only has an archive long been in existence, but its contents provide a more nuanced story than the one we have to date expected to absorb. In triangulating the memorialisation of these soldiers in 1945-50 with later post-colonial acts of forgetting, this article has confronted what Panivong Norindr calls *Indigènes*'s insistence on *reconnaissance*, recognition, of the soldiers' courageous deeds which stifles a more complex *connaissance*, knowledge, of the past.⁹⁵ This anti-intellectual and sentimental demand for recognition paralyses examination of the historical processes whereby the colonial soldier was in fact permitted a strong media presence at the very moment that Bouchareb's cameraman episode proclaims that he ceased discursively to exist.

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¹ Rachid Bouchareb, *Indigènes* (Algeria, Belgium, France, Morocco, 2006), released in Britain and the United States as *Days of Glory*.

² Nicola Cooper, "'Days of Glory'? Veterans, Reparation and National Memory," *Journal of War and Culture Studies* 1, no. 1 (2007): 99.

³ Laurent Tessier, "La Place des films de fiction dans les dispositifs de lutte pour la reconnaissance: Les cas de *Platoon* et *Indigènes*," *L'Année sociologique* 58, no. 2 (2008): 439.

⁴ Alec G. Hargreaves, "*Indigènes*: A Sign of the Times," *Research in African Literatures* 38, no. 4 (2007): 204-16.

⁵ Hugo Frey, "Cannes 1956/1979: Riviera Reflections on Nationalism and Cinema" in *Narrating the Nation: Representations in History, Media and the Arts*, eds Stefan Berger, Linas Eriksonas and Andrew Mycock (Oxford: Berghahn, 2011), 199. See also Marc Ferro, *Cinéma et histoire* (Paris: Gallimard, 1993), 14.

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- ⁶ Panivong Norindr, “Incorporating Indigenous Soldiers in the Space of the French Nation: Rachid Bouchareb’s *Indigènes*,” *Yale French Studies* 115 (2009): 126-40; Cooper, “Days of Glory?”
- ⁷ Steven Ungar, “Two Films and Two Wars in the Public Sphere,” in *France and its Spaces of War: Experience, Memory, Image*, eds Patricia M.E. Lorcin and Daniel Brewer (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 283. *Hors la loi* (France, Algeria, Belgium, Tunisia, Italy, 2010), about the struggle for Algerian independence, is in many ways a counterpoint to *Indigènes*. It stars the same group of actors, uses similar dramatic devices and takes off a few months after the earlier film ends.
- ⁸ Mohammed Hirchi, “Le Film *Indigènes* et le modèle républicain,” *International Journal of Francophone Studies* 14, no. 4 (2011): 590.
- ⁹ Michael F. O’Riley, “National Identity and Unrealized Union in Rachid Bouchareb’s *Indigènes*,” *The French Review* 81, no. 2 (2007): 278-88.
- ¹⁰ Jacques Chirac to Colonel André Sibilio, 29 March 2002, in Charles Onana, *La France et ses tirailleurs: Enquête sur les combattants de la République 1939-2003* (Paris: Duboiris, 2003), 5, 190.
- ¹¹ Sylvie Thénault, “Indigènes, un film contre l’oubli,” *Vingtième siècle*, 93 (2007): 205.
- ¹² Norindr, “Incorporating Indigenous Soldiers”: 129.
- ¹³ See e.g., Paul Gaujac, *L’Armée de la victoire*. Vol. 1: *De la Provence à l’Alsace 1944*; vol. 2: *Du Rhin au Danube 1944-45* (Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle, 1985 and 1986). See also the illustrated educational book aimed at school students which appeared the same year as the film, Isabelle Bournier and Marc Pottier, *Paroles d’indigènes: Les soldats oubliés de la Seconde Guerre mondiale* (Paris: Libro, 2006).
- ¹⁴ E.g., *Actualités françaises*, 4 January 1945 reporting on a visit by M. Puaux, Moroccan Resident General, to Moroccan troops in eastern France. See General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, *Histoire de la première armée française Rhin et Danube* (Paris: Plon, 1949), 616.
- ¹⁵ I use the term “autochthon” as it is perhaps less loaded than others and, in contrast to “indigène” or “French Muslim”, for example, not one that was instrumentalised quite as much by the French colonial state. My use of the term “North African” refers to geographic origins, not political status. That said, all terms are problematic in their own way, because they seek to define and categorise what is a highly diverse and nebulous group of people.
- ¹⁶ See e.g., *Historique de la Neuvième Division d’Infanterie Coloniale de l’AFN au Danube* (Marseille: Daniel Lao, n.d. c.1946); *Le Sixième Régiment d’Infanterie Coloniale dans la campagne de France et d’Allemagne* (Paris: 1946); Capitaine Heurgon, *La Vie, les peines et les gloires de la Troisième Division d’Infanterie Algérienne en Italie* (Algiers: Pierre Vrillon, 1946).
- ¹⁷ Adler, “Indigènes after *Indigènes*”, forthcoming in *European Review of History*, 2013

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- ¹⁷ Benjamin Stora, *Histoire de l'Algérie coloniale (1830-1954)* (Paris: La Découverte, 1991), 89.
- ¹⁸ Nina Sutherland, "Trois continents, une guerre, un empire: Francophone Narratives of War and Occupation in the French Empire," *French Cultural Studies* 22, no. 3 (2011): 187-96.
- ¹⁹ Belkacem Recham, "Les Indigènes nord-africains prisonniers de guerre (1940-1945)," *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains* 3, no. 223 (2006): 109-125.
- ²⁰ Armelle Mabon and Martine Cuttier, "La Singulière Captivité des prisonniers de guerre africains (1929-1945)," in *Les Prisonniers de Guerre dans l'histoire: Contacts entre peuples et culture*, eds Sylvia Caucanas, Rémy Cazals, and Pascal Payen (Toulouse: Privat, 2003), 139.
- ²¹ Though see *Histoire et épopée des troupes coloniales* (Paris: Les Presses Modernes, 1956), 381. Raffael Scheck, *Hitler's African Victims: The German Army Massacres of Black French Soldiers in 1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
- ²² See e.g., Myron J. Echenberg, *Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857-1960* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1991).
- ²³ See Belkacem Recham, *Les Musulmans algériens dans l'Armée française (1919-1945)* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1996).
- ²⁴ As recent work in this field may suggest: see M'Bark Wanaim, "Goumiers, spahis et tirailleurs marocains de l'armée française: Engagement, parcours et oubli (1908-2006)," unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Paris 1 (2008); Peter Coffey, "Afrikanische Soldaten im französischen besetzten Vorarlberg 1945-46," unpublished master's dissertation, University of Vienna (2010), which concentrates on Moroccan soldiers.
- ²⁶ Belkacem Recham, "Les Musulmans d'Afrique du nord dans l'armée française," 2004. <http://felina.pagesperso-orange.fr/doc/hist/recham.htm>. Accessed 24 June 2012.
- ²⁷ *Historique de la Neuvième Division d'Infanterie Coloniale*, 45-7.
- ²⁸ Martin Thomas, "The Vichy Government and French Colonial Prisoners of War, 1940-1944," *French Historical Studies* 25, no. 4 (2002), 681; Martin S. Alexander, "Colonial minds confounded: French colonial troops in the battle of France, 1940," in *The French Colonial Mind: Violence, Military Encounters, and Colonialism*, ed. Martin Thomas (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011), 253.
- ²⁹ Gilles Aubagnac, "Les Troupes noires dans le contexte de l'Armée B en 1944 entre gestion politique et gestion des effectifs," in *Les Troupes de Marine dans l'armée de terre: Un siècle d'histoire*, ed. Centre d'Etudes d'histoire de la Défense (Panazol: Lavauzelle, 2001), 193-4.
- ³⁰ de Lattre de Tassigny, *Histoire de la Première armée française*, 204.
- ³¹ Michel Delaveau, *Nos Derniers Cavaliers: Le 7e Groupe de Spahis Algériens* (Paris: Editions du Centaure, 1949), 11.

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- ³² H.R. Kedward, "Ici commence la France libre," in *The Liberation of France: Image and Event*, eds H.R. Kedward and Nancy Wood (Oxford: Berg, 1995), 2.
- ³³ General Juin, Preface to Capitaine Heurgon, *La Victoire sous le signe des trois croissants*. Vol. 1: *La Vie, les peines et les gloires de la Troisième Division d'Infanterie Algérienne*, 12. See also Razik Menidjel, *Les Tirailleurs algériens* (Paris: Publibook, 2007), 362.
- ³⁴ Alistair Horne, *The French Army and Politics, 1870-1970* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984), 74; Koenig to Minister for Armies, 30 March 1946. Service Historique de la Défense, Vincennes (SHD): 3U 154.
- ³⁵ Tony Chafer, *The End of Empire in French West Africa: France's Successful Decolonization?* (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 60.
- ³⁶ Frederick Cooper, "Reconstructing Empire in British and French Africa", *Past and Present*, Supplement 6 (2011), 201.
- ³⁷ Moshe Gershovich, "A Moroccan Saint-Cyr," *Middle Eastern Studies* 28, no. 2 (1992): 244; General Guillaume, 14 August 1948. SHD: 3U 79.
- ³⁸ Constant troop transfers make it difficult to establish precise figures. According to Edgar Wolfrum, "Die französische Politik im besetzten Deutschland: Neue Forschungen, alte Klischees, vernachlässigte Fragen" in *Deutsche und Franzosen im zusammenwachsenden Europa 1945-2000*, ed. Kurt Hochstuhl (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2003), 65, the French governed with 18 administrators per thousand German population, compared to the British ten, and the US three.
- ³⁹ Commander in Chief to Armed Forces Minister, 26 July 1946. SHD: 3U 154.
- ⁴⁰ Ambassador in Bonn to Minister Pinay, 11 January 1956. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Archives, La Courneuve (MAE): Europe 1956-60: RFA 1303; Commander Gateau, Paris, to Commander in Chief, ZFO, 25 February 1954. SHD: 3U 154.
- ⁴¹ Colonel Hogard, 15 and 16 July 1945. SHD: 3H 2480 D6; Lt-Col. Parlange, 4th Tabors marocains, to General Command, 13 August 1945. SHD: 3H 2476.
- ⁴² Lt Troyes, 88th Goum marocain, 29 May 1945. SHD: 3H 2517.
- ⁴³ See Reports on morale from 1945. SHD: 3H 2517.
- ⁴⁴ Edgar Morin, *Allemagne, notre souci* (Paris: Hier et aujourd'hui, 1947).
- ⁴⁵ Lt Col. De Champvallier, 5th Spahis marocains, 26 July 1948; Koenig to Minister of National Defence, 27 Sept 1948. SHD: 3U 79.
- ⁴⁶ Morale in July 1946. SHD: 3U 154; Morale in November 1945. SHD: 3U 156.
- ⁴⁷ Colonel Hogard, 15 and 16 July 1945. SHD: 3H 2480 D6.
- ⁴⁸ Report on morale, July 1945. SHD: 3H 2479 D7.
- ⁴⁹ Lt Troyes, 88th Goum marocain, 29 May 1945. SHD: 3H 2517
- K. H. Adler, "Indigènes after *Indigènes*", forthcoming in *European Review of History*, 2013

⁵⁰ See e.g., Pascale R. Bos, “Feminists Interpreting the Politics of Wartime Rape: Berlin, 1945; Yugoslavia, 1992-1993,” *Signs* 31, no. 4 (2006): 995-1025; Norman M. Naimark, “The Persistence of the ‘Postwar’: Germany and Poland,” in *Histories of the Aftermath: The Legacies of the Second World War in Europe*, eds Frank Biess and Robert Moeller (Oxford: Berghahn, 2010), 13-29. See also J. Robert Lilly, *Taken by Force: Rape and American GIs in Europe during World War II* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Mary Louise Roberts, “The Price of Discretion: Prostitution, Venereal Disease, and the American Military in France, 1944–1946,” *American Historical Review* 115, no. 4 (2010), 1010-11.

⁵¹ Jill Stephenson, *Hitler’s Home Front: Württemberg under the Nazis* (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2006), 339. See also the ambiguous reference to violence in Thierry Moné and Mary Moné, *Les Burnous bleus sur les chemins du devoir: Les Spahis du 1er Marocains de 1939 à 1947* (Valence: La Gandoura, 2007), 142n.

⁵² See e.g., Julia Roos, “Nationalism, Racism and Propaganda in Early Weimar Germany: Contradictions in the Campaign against the ‘Black Horror on the Rhine’,” *German History* 30, no. 1 (2012): 45-74.

⁵³ This has not always happened. Despite some excellent detail, Tommaso Baris, “Le Corps expéditionnaire français en Italie: Violences des ‘libérateurs’ durant l’été 1944,” *Vingtième Siècle* 93 (2007): 47-61, seems to take Italian (post-)fascist accounts of violence by Moroccans serving in the French forces at their word.

⁵⁴ Lt Troyes, 88th Goum marocain, 29 May 1945. SHD: 3H 2517

⁵⁵ Mark Fenimore, Review of Hester Vaizey, *Surviving Hitler’s War: Family Life in Germany, 1939–48* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), *Journal of Contemporary History* 47 (2012): 657.

⁵⁶ Naomi Davidson, *Only Muslim: Embodying Islam in Twentieth-Century France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), 3-4.

⁵⁷ Colonel Rives, “La Presse militaire coloniale,” in *Les Troupes de Marine dans l’armée de terre: Un siècle d’histoire*, ed. Centre d’Etudes d’histoire de la Défense (Panazol: Lavauzelle, 2001), 273-83.

⁵⁸ *Revue d’Information des Troupes françaises d’occupation en Allemagne*, October 1945.

⁵⁹ See e.g., *Revue d’Information*, August 1946.

⁶⁰ *Revue d’Information*, November 1945.

⁶¹ E.g., “Le Passage du Rhin par le 3^{me} Régiment de Tirailleurs Algériens,” *Revue d’Information*, February 1946.

⁶² Goislard de Monsabert, Reports on Morale, 13 June 1946. SHD: 3U 154.

⁶³ “Tirailleur 1942-45,” *Revue d’Information*, February 1948.

⁶⁴ K. M. Adler, “Indigenes after Indigenes,” forthcoming in *European Review of History*, 2013

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- ⁶⁵ Compare the First World War: Richard Fogarty, *Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the French Army, 1914-1918* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 170.
- ⁶⁶ *Notices à l'usage des gradés appelés à commander des militaires musulmans nord-africains* (Vichy: Ministère de la Guerre: Section des Affaires Musulmanes, November 1941); *Notice à l'usage des gradés appelés à commander des militaires musulmans nord-africains* (Paris: Secrétariat d'Etat aux Forces armées (Guerre), 1949).
- ⁶⁷ See e.g., *Revue d'Information*, October 1950.
- ⁶⁸ Davidson, *Only Muslim*, 6.
- ⁶⁹ Davidson, *Only Muslim*, 7.
- ⁷⁰ Omar Carlier, "Le Café maure. Sociabilité masculine et effervescence citoyenne (Algérie XVIIe-XXe siècles)," *Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 45, no. 4 (1990): 979.
- ⁷¹ Ali Hadjar, *La Chaire à canon: Histoire des Algériens dans l'armée française 1854-1954* (Toulouse: Association pour l'Art et l'Expression, 1999), 134.
- ⁷² Delaveau, *Nos Derniers Cavaliers*, 34.
- ⁷³ Ethan M. Orwin, "Of Couscous and Control: The Bureau of Muslim Soldier Affairs and the Crisis of French Colonialism," *Historian* 70, no. 2 (2008): 271.
- ⁷⁴ Report on morale, 11th Tabor Marocain, 25 June 1945. SHD: 3H 2517.
- ⁷⁵ *Notice à l'usage des gradés appelés à commander des militaires musulmans* (1949), 31.
- ⁷⁶ *Revue d'Information*, February 1950, 120.
- ⁷⁷ Report on morale of Tabors marocains, July 1945. SHD: 3H 2479 D7.
- ⁷⁸ Carlier, "Le Café maure," 991.
- ⁷⁹ Report on morale, July 1945. SHD: 3H 2479 D7.
- ⁸⁰ Report on morale, 4th Tabors Marocains, 18 October 1945. SHD: 3H 2480 D6.
- ⁸¹ Carlier, "Le Café maure," 994.
- ⁸² Veit, to Head of Allowances (Disputes), 13 December 1952. MAE: Haut Commissariat de la République française en Allemagne: Affaires Budgétaires AB 88.
- ⁸³ Report on morale, November 1945. SHD: 3U 156; Commander, 4th Tabors marocains, to General command, 13 August 1945. SHD: 3H 2476.
- ⁸⁴ Goislard de Monsabert, Synthesis on morale, 13 June 1946. SHD: 3U 154.
- ⁸⁵ K.H. Adler, "Selling France to the French: The French Zone of Occupation in Western Germany, 1945-c.1955," *Contemporary European History* 21, no. 4 (2012): 575-95.
- ⁸⁶ *Revue d'Information*, March 1946; November 1948.
- ⁸⁷ Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).
- ⁸⁸ Minister of War to Superior Commanding General, 19 March 1947. SHD: 3U 79.
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⁸⁹ Alice Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1939* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997).

⁹⁰ Jonathan K. Gosnell, *The Politics of Frenchness in Colonial Algeria, 1930-1954* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2002).

⁹¹ See e.g., Jacques Frémieux, “L’Union française: le rêve d’une France unie,” in *Culture impériale 1931-1961: Les colonies au cœur de la République*, eds Pascal Blanchard and Sandrine Lemaire (Paris: Autrement, 2004), 164.

⁹⁴ Ayo Coly, “Memory, History, Forgetting: A Review of Rachid Bouchareb’s *Indigènes* (2006),” *Transition: An International Review* 98 (2008): 150.

⁹⁵ Norindr, “Incorporating Indigenous Soldiers”.