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#### THE TONGASS FUTURES ROUNDTABLE: DISTRUST, INEQUITY, AND

#### COLLABORATION IN SOUTHEAST ALASKA

By

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Thesis

presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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#### ABSTRACT

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**Resource Conservation** 

# THE TONGASS FUTURES ROUNDTABLE: DISTRUST, INEQUITY, AND COLLABORATION IN SOUTHEAST ALASKA

#### Chairperson: Dr. Laurie Yung

Collaborative processes are increasingly being used to address complex natural resource management challenges, and trust between participants has been highlighted as a key component of successful collaboration. However, little research has focused on why collaboratives fail and the role of distrust in collaboration. This study examined trust and distrust in the Tongass Futures Roundtable, a collaborative group in Southeast Alaska that attempted to address timber, conservation, and Alaska Native land management issues, but was widely perceived to have failed. The history of conflict between timber and conservation interests as well as between Alaska Natives and other stakeholder groups meant that many people joined the Roundtable with preexisting distrust towards one another. This study employed semi-structured interviews with Roundtable participants to gain insight into participant experience and relationships as well as the process and outcomes of the collaboration. Several procedural components of the Roundtable were problematic--despite organizers using best practices--indicating that there may be tradeoffs between components like inclusivity and consensus-based decision-making. Historic and continuing inequity between stakeholder groups was also a significant problem. Along with failure to sufficiently acknowledge and address historical trauma, inequity was a barrier to building consensus and trust. While previous research suggests that trust may lay the groundwork for building agreement amongst diverse stakeholders in a collaborative process, for Roundtable participants, building trust was not enough to overcome barriers to collaboration. Further, some dimensions of distrust undermined certain types of trust that were built. Therefore, conceptualizing trust and distrust as multidimensional helps to illuminate that it is possible to have one type of trust and not have another, and that different types of trust are not fungible. While trust is very important in collaboration, it does not ensure that participants can bridge fundamental disagreements or that they will necessarily invest in collaboration over other venues for accomplishing their goals if they have better alternatives. For practitioners, it will be important to consider which types of trust are most important in collaboration and the trade-offs involved in different kinds of collaborative process designs.

#### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY-INSIGHT INTO THE TONGASS CONFLICT

## THE TONGASS FUTURES ROUNDTABLE: DISTRUST, INEQUITY, AND COLLABORATION IN SOUTHEAST ALASKA

The Tongass Futures Roundtable in Southeast Alaska was a collaborative group formed as an attempt to move past years of conflict and litigation over management decisions on the Tongass National Forest and broker a "grand bargain" of land allocations that all stakeholder groups could agree to. The Roundtable consisted of nearly all of the primary stakeholder groups in the region including national and local conservationists, timber interests, Alaska Native corporate and tribal interests, the Forest Service, and the State of Alaska, along with tourism, and fishing representatives. Despite generous funding and widespread political support, the collaborative disbanded without achieving its original goals or making significant progress on forest management issues. This study interviewed 25 Roundtable participants in order to better understand the role of trust and regional history in the Roundtable's failure to reach its original goals, and the influence of the Roundtable on future conservation and collaboration efforts in the region.

The roles of trust and distrust in collaborative success and failure were the primary focus of this study, but findings pertaining to the Roundtable and Tongass extended beyond the trust framework. In terms of trust, this study found that trust stemming from building strong positive relationships between stakeholder groups was not enough to overcome distrust based on past history, procedural challenges, and participants general propensity to be distrusting of one another in the context of Tongass management. Another significant barrier to success was--despite a generally good process design using many best practices--the choice to require 100% consensus from the group in order to move an issue forward. Many participants reported single individuals stopping agreements that all the other members of the Roundtable had agreed to. This created frustration and distrust among participants and with the process itself and indicated that there is an important tradeoff between inclusion of all stakeholders and consensus-based decision-making.

Other challenges the group faced included extremely broad goals for a large area of public land; national and state political agendas and partisan decision-making; and stakeholder groups with better alternatives to potential agreements negotiated at the Roundtable. A prime example of political involvement creating better alternatives for a stakeholder group was the State of Alaska leaving the Roundtable and encouraging timber interests to do the same in order to create a timber task force. This greatly reduced the effectiveness of the Roundtable and ability to reach any large-scale agreements between the rest of the stakeholder groups.

Perhaps the largest barrier to successful collaboration was the failure to sufficiently recognize and unpack historic distrust, inequity, and trauma. While there was some level of failure to deal with historic distrust, conflict, and trauma present between conservationists and the timber industry, failure to address those dynamics was most prevalent and problematic between the Alaska Native community and other stakeholder groups. The history of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) played a large role in the Roundtable in many ways. For one, the imposition of corporate structure on Alaska Native communities encouraged clear-cut logging of ANCSA lands as a way to make a profit for Native corporate shareholders. This created conflict between conservationists and Alaska Natives over Native land management practices. Further, some conservationists and Roundtable organizers attempted to use the

Roundtable to settle the final ANCSA land allotment for the Sealaska Corporation. This proved to be an inadequate and inappropriate venue to address finalizing an existing agreement between the US government and sovereign Alaska Native group. The context of relations between Alaska Natives and other Tongass stakeholders and failure to adequately address that context ultimately drove Native members of the Roundtable to demand a reframing of the Tongass as a Native Place. This was in direct retort to conservationists calling the Tongass a "salmon forest" and perceived attempts by conservationists to minimize the human history and culture of Southeast Alaska. While this reframing was seen by most participants as an important step in the right direction to address historical dispossession and inequity, it also profoundly changed the trajectory of the Roundtable and derailed it from reaching its original goals.

Reflecting on the Tongass post-Roundtable, participants reported feeling that although the group failed to reach its original goals, relationships built during the collaborative were still in place today. Also, participants almost all agreed that the Roundtable provided a valuable way forward for more intentionally including and highlighting Alaska Native voices and starting conversations about historic and ongoing inequities and indigenous land rights. Finally, some participants felt that the issues brought to light during the Roundtable were the genesis for regional projects and organizations that focus much more holistically on community sustainability, equity, and human and ecological resilience.

It is important to note that while the Roundtable was unsuccessful by some standards, it did make a valuable attempt to provide a space for a more holistic rethinking of land use in Southeast Alaska outside of more formal decision-making spaces such as National Forest planning, NEPA processes, and litigation. Clearly the existing political decision-making frameworks and structures had been insufficient in addressing the complexity of the Tongass, and the Roundtable started the process of reframing the conflict and approach to managing the Tongass.

That being said, the challenges and issues highlighted during the Tongass Futures Roundtable in many ways continue to define the region. Many of the issues that were sources of conflict then are still contentious today. Examples include the attempt by the Trump Administration to exempt the Tongass from the National Roadless Rule and regional conflict over returning land to several Alaska Native tribes in Southeast that never received land under ANCSA. These contemporary efforts reflect the primary conflicts of the Roundtable: timber harvest management and indigenous land rights and inclusion. While the Roundtable improved relationships between stakeholder groups, the broader durability of the work done during the Roundtable seems minimal in that the same lines of conflict are being seen between the same stakeholder groups.

In recognition of the durability of these problems, this study provides insights into many of the components of resource conflict in Southeast Alaska. Further, this study shows that the status quo in terms of conservation advocacy and messaging is failing to effectively enact significant change in how mainstream conservation addresses justice issues-particularly in regard to indigenous land rights and colonial approaches to conservation. While many conservation organizations are attempting to apply more of a social justice lens to their work and include indigenous and other historically marginalized voices, there is much more work to do. Specifically, fully embracing indigenous groups as partners in conservation requires allowing rural Alaska Native communities to determine what they need from outside conservation interests, rather than conservationists trying to use indigenous voices to further pre-existing conservation goals. This may prove to be challenging as those needs may not always be in line with conservation interests, but these types of compromises are essential to a just conservation movement.

#### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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My parents' unwavering support and faith in my ability to see this process through means everything to me. Thank you for being my biggest cheerleaders. My partner and our fluffy dog have been incredibly patient and loving over the last two years, even when I've had to skip ski days and been grumpy and overwhelmed. You guys are the very best. I am also so grateful for the incredible friends I made in Missoula, as well as my dear pals from home who commiserated with me and cheered me on every step of the way. I love you all so much.

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#### **Chapter I: INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT**

One of the biggest scientific, political, and social challenges we currently face is managing natural resources in a manner that is sustainable and satisfies the needs of diverse stakeholders. Decisions about how to use resources ranging from timber to water to minerals are nearly always a source of conflict between industry, conservation groups, and myriad other interests such as local community members and indigenous peoples. Often decisions are made without consulting or considering many of those interests, which ultimately results in costly legal battles that potentially tie up a resource for years at a time, deepen animosity, and make it difficult to reach a compromise between competing factions.

In recognition of this problem, the use of collaborative groups in natural resource management and decision-making has become increasingly popular at a variety of scales. At its core, a collaborative process ideally brings all of the stakeholders in a resource to meet in the same physical space and by using ground rules and a moderator, attempts to find a management solution that is acceptable to all parties. This process usually involves many meetings over a relatively long period of time (months or years). Collaboratives have been used at the national level in attempts to influence National Forest management policy, as well as by local organizations to make relatively small-scale management decisions and have been successful in both cases and at a variety of scales in between (Cheng & Randall-Parker, 2017). Proponents of collaboration argue that the process ultimately saves time and money because decisions reached will be acceptable to relevant parties and therefore litigation will be avoided (Bjarstig, 2017).

Much research has been done on what factors are most important in the success of a collaborative group, (e.g the presence of a neutral facilitator, feelings of ownership by the group, and trust in the process (Belton & Jackson-Smith, 2009, Cheng & Randall-Parker, 2017)).

However, relatively little work has been done to identify why collaboratives fail, which they often do. There are many ways to define the success or failure of a collaborative group, but collaborative literature is consistent in describing the components that are necessary to achieve any level of success. Extensive research shows that one of the most important components in a successful collaborative is trust between members as well as trust in a fair process (Coleman & Stern, 2018, Davenport, et al., 2007, Young, et al., 2015). In contrast, collaboratives whose participants actively distrust each other may be more likely to ultimately fail (Davenport, et al., 2007, Stern & Baird, 2015). This is largely due to the challenge of overcoming distrust. Distrust may dissipate over time with significant efforts at relationship-building, potentially leading to more successful collaboration (Coleman & Stern, 2015). Despite its importance, relatively little research has explored the role of distrust in collaboration. In order to help identify which natural resource management decisions are ripe for collaboration, and to avoid costly investments of time and money, examining what does not work is just as important as looking at what does.

Further, as this study shows, failure to account for regional history and existing relationships can be detrimental to success. Particularly in the case of indigenous stakeholders, failure to sufficiently recognize longstanding indigenous rights and relationships in a collaborative group can lead to frustration with the process and inability to reach original goals. To this end, striving for equal representation of stakeholders (similar numbers of representatives from each group, etc.) is certainly crucial for representatives to have procedural trust or trust in the process. However, beyond that, prioritizing equity in a collaborative, while extremely difficult to achieve, deserves the utmost effort, attention, and care. Not only is this important in terms of justice, as the following study shows, it may also make or break collaborative efforts as failure to have an equitable process may further alienate previously marginalized groups.

In the following literature review, I discuss the challenges to and components of successful collaboration, as described in the literature. I then propose to investigate the role of distrust in collaboration, through an examination of the Tongass Futures Roundtable. Based on findings from interviews with Roundtable participants, I further suggest that the Roundtable failed to sufficiently acknowledge and incorporate indigenous perspectives, and that the history of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act played a much larger role in the dissolution of the Roundtable than previously considered. I will also examine how trust might increase after a failed collaborative process, if relationships were improved and rapport established

#### **Chapter II: LITERATURE REVIEW**

The following review summarizes and synthesizes literature on collaborative processes and the ways in which success or failure is measured. I also delve into the factors identified in the literature as salient in collaborative processes and explore the idea that trust or distrust is an important component of success or failure. I also address issues of Alaska Native sovereignty and the impacts of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act on the region's indigenous communities, and the role they play in the collaborative's success or failure.

A systematic approach was used to identify the most relevant literature for this review. First, I searched for studies on collaborative natural resource management processes, identifying those that appeared relevant, and then examined the relevant sources referenced in those papers. While this is not an exhaustive review of the extensive literature on collaborative processes, I found that many of the same themes were addressed across the following studies, the authors referenced the same foundational literature, and overall I was able to build an understanding of the current state of the field. After analyzing my data, I reevaluated the literature used in my proposal and concluded that it provided relevant theoretical background for the study. The same process was used for the literature on indigenous sovereignty and colonial influence.

#### **Collaborative Processes**

Collaborative approaches to problem solving have become popular in the field of natural resource management, largely because more traditional ways of making resource management decisions have often failed (Hossu, et al., 2018). The more "traditional, top-down, expert-driven style of decision making in the U.S" (Davenport, Leahy, Anderson & Jakes, 2007, p. 353) has left out many individuals and organizations with a stake in resource management decisions. In the western United States, both rich natural resources and extensive public lands create often-

conflicting interests in recreation, resource extraction, and ecosystem services and integrity. This creates an environment ripe for attempts at collaborative decision-making between federal and state agencies, tribes, and local stakeholders (Kemmis, 2001). Accordingly, the most commonly mediated resource disputes are between stakeholders and government entities (Bingham, 1986). Collaborative groups may be operating on almost all of the national forests in most western states (Davis, Cerveny, Ulrich, & Nuss, 2018).

Collaboration can generally be defined as a tool for problem solving among diverse stakeholders with often conflicting priorities to create mutually agreed-upon solutions through deliberative processes (Davis, Cerveny, Ulrich & Nuss, 2018). However, it is important to note that not all so-called collaboratives are created equal. Leach (2006) identifies several components that are necessary for a collaborative process to be democratic and to create a sense of legitimacy both for the participants and their constituents. These consist of inclusiveness, representativeness, impartiality, transparency, deliberativeness, lawfulness, and empowerment. Inclusiveness and representativeness imply that there is no exclusion of some entities and that the interests of all relevant stakeholders are successfully recognized. Impartiality attempts to mitigate power imbalances by treating all parties equally, while transparency makes the method of doing so clear and accessible. Deliberativeness "allows participants to brainstorm, critically examine each other's arguments, identify common interests, and build a base of shared knowledge and social capital" (Leach, 2006, p. 103). To embody lawfulness, a group must operate within the existing regulatory and statutory framework. Finally, an empowered group actually has the ability to affect policy outcomes, rather than just coming up with ideas. An ideal process should lead to policy and management outcomes that represent a diversity of perspectives (Bjarstig, 2017) and will hopefully be more durable over time. Some research has

also noted the challenge of applying an appropriate scale to collaborative decision-making process. Starting with too large a scale (i.e. a Forest Plan) can make it challenging to build trust and reach a successful outcome (Schultz, et al., 2019). Therefore, starting off with smaller projects can help a group learn to work better together, build trust, and be more prepared to tackle larger issues.

Collaborative decision-making groups are seen as a way to avoid expensive and timeconsuming litigation, which often occurs when a stakeholder group feels that their needs or concerns are not addressed in a management decision (Kemmis, 2001). Nie argues that the U.S. has a culture of "adversarial litigation," often an automatic response to natural resource conflicts (2006, p. 456). Further, Bingham states that,

Reaching an agreement does not mean that it sticks. The problem with litigation and administrative proceedings usually is not that decisions are not reached, but that those decisions frequently are appealed. In theory, if the parties themselves have voluntarily agreed to a decision, they are more likely to be satisfied with it. Thus, agreements reached through an environmental dispute resolution process should be more likely to be implemented (1986, p. xxi-xxii).

Theoretically, addressing the concerns of stakeholders early in the management decision-making process, and building relationships and clear, open lines of communication can lead to positive collaboration outcomes (Belton & Jackson-Smith, 2010). However, even when all of those factors are considered, it may not be possible to overcome fundamental disagreements regarding how a resource should be managed. For example, some public land users may highly value motorized recreation in a certain area, while others argue that snowmobile use in that same place is detrimental to mountain goat health in winter. This potential for conflicting needs and priorities combined with the inherent complexity of human relationships, creates a challenging path forward for collaboration.

Finally, in order to begin to understand the challenge of reaching agreement about natural resource management, the character of the problem must be understood. Natural resource managers and scholars commonly describe these problems as "wicked' in that they go beyond scientific, economic and techno-rational analysis and methods of problem solving. They are often value-based political conflicts grounded in competing deep-core human values" (Nie, 2004, p. 307). Rittel and Webber (1973) describe wicked problems as social problems that differ from natural science problems because where natural science problems can generally be defined and isolated from one another, and a solution can be settled upon, social problems are much more difficult to define. Separating out different components of a social problem and even agreeing upon the definition of the problem is subjective and based on the individual's perspective. Rather than managers or policymakers reaching a solution or final answer for a wicked problem, they can only reach *resolution* or understanding of a problem and decision about future action or a path forward. Further, consequences of inaction are generally high and often unpredictable. Behavior change is often required and implementing a policy resolution is therefore difficult. The process of resolution continues to evolve, as does the problem, and herein lays the wickedness and challenge of natural resource management.

#### **Measuring Collaborative Success**

According to Conley and Moote (2003), there is an idealized narrative surrounding collaboration rooted in the desire to present it as the solution to the common critiques of traditional decision-making processes. However, determining whether or not collaboration is actually worth the time and money it requires is quite challenging (Belton & Jackson-Smith, 2010). One of the biggest challenges is agreeing on an appropriate metric for measuring success. Metrics can include specific social and/or ecological outcomes, be based on the perceptions of involved parties, or attempt to evaluate the processes as a whole (Conley & Moote, 2003).

As laid out by Cheng & Randall-Parker (2017), defining collaborative success depends on the goals and motivations of the individuals studying or participating in the process. Thus, the metrics for success can vary widely. For example, as a researcher and founder of a program studying collaborative management, to Cheng success looked like a study showing his program's value-added to a Forest Service collaborative group. Cheng's hope was to receive more funding and the opportunity to test theoretical concepts in a real-world situation. On the other hand, Randall-Parker, a Forest Service District Ranger, hoped to replicate past success in building trust between her agency staff and the public in order to create a long-term forest restoration program. This difference in goals for individuals working together on the same project, as well as the difference in perspectives between an academic and a practitioner, demonstrates the importance of clearly defining what success will look like for a specific process. If there are uncommunicated differences in definitions of success, one or more parties is likely to reach the end of the collaborative group feeling unsatisfied with the process or perceiving it as a failure.

Once success is defined, figuring out how to measure it is a challenge in and of itself. If the agreed upon goal is an ecological change, it could take decades for environmental effects to be seen from a particular management decision. If one were to try and measure concrete policy outcomes by comparing two or more collaborative processes, the uniqueness and complexity of each one makes for unlimited variables that cannot be controlled for, making counterfactual (if, then) testing difficult (Bingham, 1986). Therefore, evaluation often focuses on the social outcomes of a relatively small number of cases and extrapolating broader claims from there (Conley & Moote, 2003). While the intent of this literature review is not to be an in-depth discussion of methods for measuring collaboration, it is important to acknowledge the challenges inherent in evaluating success. With respect to quantitative research in this field, the difficulties in finding statistically comparable processes to make broad claims about collaborative processes create a significant knowledge gap, which, if filled, would increase legitimacy of the field of collaboration as a whole (Conley & Moote, 2003). Because of the complexity of each collaborative process, Conley & Moote (2003) argue that despite a desire to measure the "success" of collaboration, trying to do so is perhaps impossible and ultimately not particularly helpful. However, the prevalence and popularity of collaborative decision-making processes indicate that while they may be far from perfect, many stakeholders and managers see them as worthwhile. Therefore, continued study and attempts to measure components of collaboration are needed.

#### Factors Contributing to Collaborative Success or Failure

Much research has been done on the factors that contribute to the success or failure of a collaborative process. While there are myriad ways to measure or define success in a collaborative group as discussed previously, there are several factors that have emerged as important to most collaborative success. The following is a list of some of the factors that were most prevalent in the literature (i.e. explained extensively by two or more sources).

| Factors Contributing to<br>Collaborative Success | Explanation  | Prevalence (in the literature)        |
|--|--|---------------------------------------|
| Sense of Ownership/Authority                     | Recommendations from collaborative group are likely to be implemented.                     | Very Common                           |
| Equitable Distribution of Power                  | Each stakeholder has equal opportunity to voice opinions and vote on decisions.            | Very Common                           |
| Impartial/Transparent<br>Leadership              | Using a neutral moderator to manage the process.   | Very Common                           |
| Clear Channels of<br>Communication               | Sufficient ways to share/receive relevant information e.g. maps of a protected area.       | Common, if varied in exact definition |
| Adequate Stakeholder<br>Representation           | No obvious stakeholders left out of the process.   | Common, if varied in exact definition |
| Incentive to Reach Agreement                     | Avoiding litigation, access to additional funding, moving management actions forward, etc. | Bingham, 1986; Hossu, 2018            |

#### Access to Resources

Table 1: Factors Contributing to Collaborative Success\*

\* Sources defined as very common are discussed in most if not all sources and common factors are those found in 3+ sources. This is not an exhaustive list, but condenses the most relevant factors prevalent in collaboration literature.

Three components of ownership and authority in a collaborative group have been identified as important. The first is a sense of ownership over the process, in that the participants help to decide ground rules and other procedural aspects (Belton & Jackson-Smith, 2010; Beierle & Konisky, 2000; Bingham, 1986). Second, the group must feel that they have authority within the community (Belton & Jackson-Smith, 2010; Beierle & Konisky, 2000; Bingham, 1986). In other words, their constituents will support decisions made by the collaborative group. Finally, authority with the agency or political body making final management decisions is very important because participants must feel that their deliberations actually carry weight and are capable of driving policy decisions (Belton & Jackson-Smith, 2010; Beierle & Konisky, 2000; Bingham, 1986). Otherwise, a collaborative attempt may feel like nothing more than an exercise, and participants will be less likely to fully commit to the process.

Attempts to create equitable distribution of power between all entities involved in collaborative processes helps to build trust. In fact, power imbalances can lead to failure of the process (Orth & Cheng, 2018; Levesque, Calhoun, Bell & Johnson, 2017; Blumenthal & Jannink, 2000). Situations in which an agency or other stakeholder is perceived to have more power in a collaborative group can lead to distrust (Schuett, Selin & Carr, 2001; Levesque, Calhoun, Bell & Johnson, 2017). Therefore, presence of a neutral facilitator and strong, transparent leadership that is perceived as fair helps promote open communication and a willingness to participate in good faith (Belton & Jackson-Smith, 2010; Bingham, 1986; Lachapelle & McCool, 2012; Hossu, et al., 2018; Beierle & Konisky, 2000; Young, et al., 2016;

Frentz, Burns & Sperry, 2000). Attempting to equalize historical or existing power imbalances between stakeholders cannot be accomplished with only procedural components of a process and is exceedingly difficult if not impossible in many contexts to create true equity. However, it is crucial to create as equitable a process as possible and to fairly represent *all* stakeholder interests and voices (Davenport, Leahy, Anderson & Jakes, 2007).

There are a number of other factors influencing success described in the literature. Appropriate representation from all affected parties was identified as an important factor (Schuett, Selin & Carr, 2001; Blumenthal & Jannink, 2000; Frentz, Burns & Sperry, 2000) along with quality and clarity of communication (Beierle & Konisky, 2000; Schuett, Selin & Carr, 2001). Incentive to reach an agreement between parties, whether that was financial, for environmental protection, or some other motivation was also identified (Bingham, 1986; Hossu, 2018). Collaborative groups also require resources, including mechanisms for resolving conflict, avenues for teambuilding, information to increase common understanding of the resource, and sufficient financial backing (Blumenthal & Jannink, 2000; Schuett, Selin & Carr, 2001).

The factor that was identified by nearly all of the studies in this review as being crucial to collaborative success or failure, however, was trust (Lachapelle & McCool, 2012; Beierle & Konisky, 2000; Davis, Cerveny, Ulrich, & Nuss, 2018) or its antithesis, distrust (Coleman & Stern, 2014, 2018; Davenport, Leahy, Anderson & Jakes, 2007). Stern and Coleman (2014) suggest that, in many senses, ownership, power balances, facilitation and leadership, incentive to collaborate, appropriate representation, and provision of necessary resources are influenced by trust. The following section will discuss in more detail the roles that trust and distrust play in collaborative processes.

#### **Trust and Distrust**

Trust (and the lack thereof) is a complex and difficult-to-define concept. Trust has been defined as "a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviors of another" (Davenport, Leahy, Anderson & Jakes, 2007, p. 354). While previous research has examined the impact and importance of trust in collaborative natural resource management, there is still much to learn about the role of trust (Davis, Cerveny, Ulrich & Nuss, 2018; Metcalf, et al., 2015). Further, trust, lack of trust, and distrust are all different and thus play different roles in collaboration. Lack of trust is defined as the "absence of a specific judgment about trust" (Coleman & Stern, 2014, p. 120), but distrust is specifically defined as the trustor believing that the trustee will act in a manner negatively affecting the trustor (Coleman & Stern, 2014). These concepts can be understood to be a continuum from distrust to lack of trust to active trust.

Many studies of trust in the context of natural resources identify and operate under the assumption that there are two types of trust: procedural trust or trust in a fair and consistent process (e.g. ground rules, ways of communicating respectfully) or in a broader legal or institutional system that allows for action and decision-making (Coleman & Stern, 2014; Davenport, Leahy, Anderson & Jakes, 2007; Davis, Cerveny, Ulrich, & Nuss, 2018) and affinitive or relational trust which is based on repeated interactions involving reciprocity, a sense of shared identity, and met expectations between parties (Davis, Cerveny, Ulrich, & Nuss, 2018; Lachapelle & McCool, 2012). However, Stern and Coleman (2014) identify two additional dimensions as well as a more specific conceptualization of affinitive trust. Affinitive trust, according to Stern and Coleman (2014), is based more specifically on emotional connection and response to the trustee, along with shared beliefs, experiences, and values. Affinitive trust could

be built over multiple fieldtrips, over interest in the same sport, or simply due to the charisma of the other party. Sharing goals and values has been identified as an important component of trust in collaborative processes both between agencies and collaborative groups (Orth & Chang, 2018), and among group members themselves.

The other two forms of trust, rational and dispositional, overlap somewhat and in this study the two were often related. Rational trust, as defined by Stern and Coleman (2014), is "trust in an entity based primarily on a calculation of the perceived utility of the expected outcome of placing one's trust in another entity" (p. 122) or in the integrity that they have shown in the past. In other words, with what a potential trustor already knows about a potential trustee, what is mostly likely to come from trusting them? Are they an individual with whom it is wise to be vulnerable? Rational trust can be influenced by past history between groups or individuals—a component often at play in natural resource issues. If, for example, there was a long history of betrayal between two parties (i.e. indigenous communities and the U.S. government), then levels of rational *distrust* mightbe high among individuals of that group. Dispositional trust, the other form not acknowledged by much of the trust literature, is based on an individual's personality or character tendencies, personal or relational history in terms of generally whether or not they've had experiences that makes them a more or less trusting person, and cultural norms or cues from the current environment and generally can be considered a "baseline" (p. 214) propensity of one entity to trust or distrust another (Coleman & Stern, 2014). While dispositional trust focuses on the general tendencies of the trustor, rational trust is based on information gathered from specific interactions and is more likely to change from situation to situation. For the remainder of this proposal, distrust will be conceptualized as having the same dimensions as trust, but opposite in effect.

These various forms of trust build upon each other, and the presence or absence of one kind can create or inhibit another. Cheng & Randall-Parker (2017) and Davenport, Leahy, Anderson & Jakes (2007) both show that a lack of trust consistently slows down collaborative efforts and impedes efficient decision making and project implementation. Further, distrust can increase the likelihood of potential litigation (Levesque, Calhoun, Bell & Johnson, 2017), which is important because many collaborative groups are trying to avoid lawsuits. Trust is often lacking among participants before the process even starts and can be seen as a cause or a result of long-term natural resource conflicts (Nie, 2004; Coleman & Stern, 2014; Davis, Cerveny, Ulrich, & Nuss, 2018). This creates a challenging position from which to start collaboration or build trust.

Evening getting relevant stakeholders to the table in the first place, let alone finding common ground and cultivating a shared sense of ownership requires strong leadership (Bingham, 1986; Hossu, 2018) to promote a level of procedural trust. In the case of dispositional distrust at the start of a collaborative process, creating procedural trust might help to overcome initial challenges. Indeed, creating a kind of contract regarding how a process will be managed and what its goals are can put participants at ease and build trust in the process (Davenport, Leahy, Anderson & Jakes, 2007). Failure to provide productive leadership at the beginning of a process can be a significant obstacle to successful collaboration (Nie, 2004).

An example of historical lack of trust, or in many cases distrust, can be found in many timber-reliant communities. Frentz, Burns & Sperry (2000) argue that in the 1970s, passage of environmental laws (e.g. National Environmental Policy Act, Endangered Species Act) resulted in economic losses in communities dependent on timber harvest, public lands grazing, and agency-based funding for local public works projects. Although the connection between passage

of environmental laws and economic downturn is tenuous, many communities dependent on timber expected that the Forest Service would provide ongoing timber supply to support jobs in logging and milling. As timber harvesting practices and economies changed due to market fluctuation, increased automation, and environmental policy, many communities suffered significant economic and social hardships. The Forest Service was seen as responsible for these changes by failing to provide sufficient timber to sustain local economies, essentially rescinding what communities saw as a social contract. Although now there are many collaborative groups spearheaded by the Forest Service (Davis, Cerveny, Ulrich, & Nuss, 2018), in many communities that relational history is still a barrier to building the trust necessary for successful collaboration. Therefore, when collaboration is initiated by agencies, it is imperative that the agencies acknowledge the existence and extent of current and historical conflict (Young et al., 2016) in order to be fully transparent and demonstrate a desire to move forward and operate in good faith.

#### Conclusion

As this review demonstrates, there is extensive literature on the components of successful collaboration, and the role that trust plays in the process. Trust and distrust are certainly different sides of the same coin, and to an extent studying one produces knowledge about the other. However, very little research has focused specifically on distrust in collaboration and how and under what conditions distrust might lead to failure. In particular, the roles that dispositional and rational distrust play from the start of many collaboratives warrants more study. While collaborative processes have helped resolve many natural resource problems, in some places with a history of distrust, collaboratives may not be the most effective way to approach natural resource management because reaching agreement is so challenging. It may be that processes

that successfully build trust when it is lacking are often insufficient or ineffective with cases of active distrust.

The Tongass National Forest in Southeast Alaska is an excellent place to study the role of distrust in collaboration because it is a particularly wicked example of attempted collaboration potentially affected by historical conflict and distrust. The timber industry, Alaska Natives, conservationists, and the Forest Service, among other stakeholders, have been engaged in a bitter conflict over Tongass forest management since at least the 1950s (Beier, 2008). Tongass stakeholders have been in conflict for so long that attempts at collaboration have often been met with suspicion about the ulterior motives of other participants or refusals to even consider compromise (Nie, 2006). Interestingly, some collaborative efforts in the Tongass have failed despite including many of the factors described above as important to successful collaboration (USFS, 2010).

#### **Research Focus and Questions**

To address knowledge gaps related to the role of distrust in collaboration and based on background research on the Tongass Roundtable, I developed the following questions to guide my research:

- How did distrust contextualized by regional history influence the failure of the Tongass Futures Roundtable?
- 2. What can pre-existing or historical distrust teach us about collaborative processes and the potential for success?
- 3. How did the Roundtable influence subsequent conservation and collaboration efforts in the region?

By studying the following questions, I hope to add to the understanding of when and where collaboration is or is not appropriate and aid practitioner understanding of the role of collaboration in solving natural resource management questions. I also hope to shed light on the importance of considering and incorporating relevant historical conflict and marginalized voices with sufficient care and acknowledgement.

#### **Chapter III: THE TONGASS: STUDY SITE BACKGROUND**

The following section provides background for some of the most complex conflicts in the region and ends by explaining the value of the studying Southeast Alaska and the Tongass Futures Roundtable in exploring issues of historical distrust, conflict, and collaboration. One of the most well-known and prevalent conflicts in the Tongass has existed primarily between timber interests and conservationists over what and how much to log. Harvest of the Tongass--starting in 1907 with the creation of the Forest--ramped up in production and increased conflict between the logging industry and conservations in the 1950s. By 1964 under the Alaska Region Multiple Use Plan, the Forest Service recommended logging nearly a million board feet annually on the Tongass (Nie, 2006), drawing the ire of the Sierra Club and encouraging local conservationists to push back against development (Durbin, 2005). By 1971, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) was passed, and as will be discussed in depth later, removed approximately 550,000 acres from the Tongass to be given to the Alaska Native corporations formed under the Act (Berardi, 1998). Along with the existing history of colonization and subjugation of the Alaska Native peoples by Russians and Americans, the corporate structure introduced by ANCSA further complicated relationships within the Alaska Native community as well as with other entities, adding to modern day conflict between Tongass stakeholders (Thomson & Roberts, 2012).

Through the 1970s and '80s, timber harvest continued at extremely high volumes, dramatically reducing old growth forest, and escalating conflict between timber and conservation interests. Two pieces of legislation, the 1980 Alaska Nation Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) and the 1990 Tongass Timber Reform Act (TTRA) were seen by many as good compromises, but also increased distrust between conservationists, timber interests, and the Forest Service (Durbin, 2005). ANILCA set aside 5.4 million acres of designated Wilderness in the Tongass, among many other land protections. However, it also included the "no more" clause, which stated that the Act set aside sufficient land in Alaska for environmental and natural values and that effectively no more land should be designated thus. Finally, it exempted the Tongass from many otherwise ubiquitous Forest Service mandates, effectively allowing for timber as dominant use on much of the Tongass and increasing conflict with conservationists (Nie, 2006).

These components of the legislation--particularly the "no more" clause--have increased distrust between Tongass stakeholders long term. Many pro-timber interests and politicians feel that ANILCA compromises settled conservation land designations once and for all, and any attempts to federally protect more land since equate to conservationists reneging on an agreement (Nie, 2006). This was particularly seen with the passage of the TTRA and an attempt to correct ANILCA's dominant use paradigm. The TTRA updated Tongass harvest protocols so that harvest was intended to meet market demand rather than the 450 million board feet annual harvest regardless of other factors required under ANILCA. Thought it was and was seen by many as an honest compromise, many timber interests saw it as a direct conflict to the "no more" clause of ANILCA and felt that it was indeed a breach of the agreements made only 10 years earlier (Nie, 2006). This tiers to findings in the following research in which timber interests described distrust stemming from compromising over and over again and giving ground to conservationists without substantive compromise in return.

By the early 2000s, with the election of Barack Obama, the Forest Service began to consider transitioning timber harvest in the Tongass away from old growth towards second or new growth harvest. This became a topic of heated debate between the timber industry and

conservationists, who wanted to transition immediately, while the industry argued that second growth was not ready to be harvested and therefore not economically viable for the industry. However, much of the original old growth forest that had been logged was starting to reach a level of maturity where it could be harvested (Heller, 2019). Therefore, to keep the industry alive, they needed to be able to keep harvesting some old growth or 'bridge timber' until the second growth was ready. This was a major topic of discussion during the Roundtable and colored much of the collaborative group's debate over timber harvest.

This history of conflicts set the stage for the Tongass Futures Roundtable, in an attempt to bring warring parties together to craft a more holistic and less conflict-filled future (USFS, 2010). However, the Roundtable may have suffered from an overly broad and sweeping charter with goals such as "reach consensus on which areas of the Tongass will allow timber harvest" and "assess feasibility of second growth timber" (USFS, p. 1, 2010). This led to challenges in retrospectively identifying areas where the Roundtable was a success or failure in meting those goals and meant that participants had differing perceptions about the outcomes of the Roundtable. Specifically, during interviews participants did not want to call the Roundtable a failure, although they also did not consider it a success. Instead they pointed to a variety of unintended positive outcomes that averted the collaborative group from total failure despite not meeting the group's broad original goals.

The original (approximately) 35 members of the Roundtable included all of the relevant forest management stakeholders in the region. Participants included representatives from Alaskan Native tribes, village and regional corporations, timber industry leaders, government agencies (including for a time Undersecretary of Agriculture under the Bush Administration, Mark Rey), local communities, conservation groups, tourism businesses, and commercial

fisheries (Shoenfeld, 2013). Many participants explained that the idea for the collaborative group was largely based on a successful attempt at reducing conflict on land management issues between timber interests, conservationists, and First Nations in the Great Bear Rainforest in British Columbia, Canada. Many of the same funders were involved in the Great Bear Rainforest agreement and felt that a similar approach might work on the Tongass, providing much of the catalyst for the Roundtable. According to one participant, the first Roundtable meeting occurred in Washington State, on the home turf of the timber industry and without total transparency about the long-term goals and make-up of the collaborative. Distrust across and within stakeholder groups was present from the beginning of the process (Koehler, 2013). The unsurprising conflict between the timber industry and conservation groups was defined by the fundamental difference in priorities of maximizing timber harvest versus maximizing protected habitat and intact forest ecosystems. There is further evidence that there may have been distrust between many different stakeholder groups based on historical resource and cultural conflict. Anthony Mallot, President of the Sealaska Native Corporation describes how:

We call the Tongass a Native place. Most of the conservation community still doesn't respect the Native reality of living here for 10,000 years. They don't respect our history and how we think about and interact with the environment ...The US Forest Service burned our smoke houses in the 1960s. Even as I sit here in this office at this desk, I can tell you that the land claims settlement doesn't make up for that history (Forbes, 2018, p.11-12).

Examples like this demonstrate a deep-seated animosity and potential distrust that different Tongass stakeholders felt for one another based on historical relationships and land management policies.

The Roundtable shut down in July of 2013 after approximately 7 years of attempted negotiations. The original goal of the collaborative group was to create compromises and management proposals on a variety of regional land-use issues relating to timber harvest, habitat

protection, and land allocation. According to some members, there was hope of finding "the grand bargain" or "the golden key" to more permanently resolve conflict in the Tongass without the constant natural resource lawsuits and other conflict that have defined the region since statehood. There is relatively little written information available about the Roundtable process, and therefore some of the background has come from conversations with Roundtable participants and others with extensive experience in the region as well as my own experience living and working in the Tongass National

Forest.




Figure 1: Roundtable Events Timeline

Almost no research exists on collaborative efforts regarding the Tongass National Forest in Southeast Alaska. This is despite it being the largest and one of the most productive national forests in the country (Shaw, Allen, Robertson, & Schaefers, 1998) and the location of some of the most complicated stakeholder relationships and natural resource conflicts in modern history (Nie, 2004). The Tongass, and particularly the Roundtable is a valuable window into the role of distrust and the challenges of collaboration in natural resource management for several reasons. First, the Roundtable was a landmark process for the region in that it brought together Tongass stakeholders who had often literally refused to be in the same room with each other before the start of the Roundtable. Second, huge financial investments by national conservation funders, professional facilitators, thousands of hours of stakeholder time, and other important components of successful collaboration were poured into the project, demonstrating a genuine commitment to its success.

Yet despite all of these efforts, the Roundtable disbanded without crafting any large-scale agreements for the Tongass. News coverage at the end of the Roundtable demonstrated a general perception of failure. In an article publish by CoastAlaska News, the State Forester is quoted saying that the Roundtable "didn't work" despite extensive honest efforts from many individuals and organizations (Schoenfeld, 2013). In another article, a participant said that the Roundtable "did not… accomplish most of what it set out to do" (Schoenfeld, 2014). A third story on the Roundtable reports a timber representative stating that "timber was not one of the areas where we felt that there would be any future progress made" in response to a decision for that organization to leave the collaborative group (KFSK Community Radio, 2011). Thus, the Roundtable provides an excellent opportunity for examining what happened, and how lessons learned might apply to other natural resource conflicts and collaborative work.

Perhaps one of the most unexpected outcomes of this study was the degree to which the historical and cultural context created in large part by ANCSA profoundly affected conflict over land management practices and ultimately shaped the trajectory of the Roundtable. Therefore, it is important to understand some of the nuance and context that the history of ANCSA brought to the Roundtable. Further, there has been almost no research done on the effects of ANCSA on current land management issues and stakeholder relationships in Southeast Alaska. The

Roundtable both intentionally (as seen in its charter) and in unexpected ways brought these conflicts and challenges to light. It provides valuable insight into some of the root sources of conflict, as well as lessons learned for making future land management decisions in a more equitable and culturally inclusive manner.

ANCSA was the outcome of a long-delayed need to settle aboriginal land claims in Alaska harkening back to the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867 and eventual Statehood in 1959 (Berardi, 1998, Thomson & Roberts, 2012, Swense, 2015). In a unique and previously untested method of settling those land claims, the US Government, the State of Alaska, and Alaska Native leaders (as the entity of the Alaska Federation of Natives or AFN) reached an agreement that included the transfer of approximately half a million acres of public land to Native corporations, along with a nearly \$1 billion cash settlement (Nie, 2006, Chaffee, 2008, Hensley, 2016). ANCSA specified that 12 regional corporations be created to manage these new resources along with village corporations that would provide support and benefits to new shareholders under each regional corporation (Berardi, 1998, Chaffee, 2008, Hensley, 2016). While there was a need to settle Native land claims, it is also important to note what motivated the settlement to happen when it did. In 1968 oil was discovered on the North Slope (Anders, 1989). A pipeline to bring the oil to the market required building across lands whose ownership was contested which led to years of ligation (Berardi, 1998, Nie, 2006, USFS, n.d.). Therefore, the impetus for ANCSA was largely economic, which influenced the Act's capitalist framework.

ANCSA required that Native corporations "under the laws of Alaska...conduct business for profit" (Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, p. 692, 1971). This directive was largely supported by AFN leadership, and those leaders played a key role in crafting the legislation and negotiating for unprecedented concessions from the US Government (Chaffee, 2008, Hensley,

2016). However, there has been substantial scholarship, as well as reflections from the Alaska Native community, that have acknowledged the problematic nature of ANCSA in regard to cultural integrity, sovereignty, and colonial structures.

There is disagreement between scholars about the whether or not ANCSA increased Alaska Native sovereignty. Conflicting analyses of the law are presented by Huhndorf and Huhndorf (2011) saying that ANCSA diminished sovereignty and Chaffee (2008) arguing that it increased sovereignty. While that debate is largely outside the scope of this research, the influence of ANCSA on sovereignty is relevant to this study. While most Native American land in the United States is held in trust by the US Government, and therefore cannot be sold by tribes, the title to ANCSA land is held by Alaska Native corporations, who have total control and ownership over it. This provides a unique opportunity for self-determination and economic independence from the federal government not enjoyed by other Native Americans. Corporations can also be considered institutions for cultural preservation and political power because they serve as an enduring central organization with substantial resources encompassing and connecting Alaska Native communities throughout entire regions (Chaffee, 2008).

However, Huhndorf and Huhndorf (2011) argue that ANCSA diminished Alaska Native sovereignty in two important ways. First, the authors of ANCSA purposefully avoided using tribal governments as the institutional vehicle for receiving the land settlement. Tribal governments in the rest of the US are considered to have sovereignty and government-togovernment relationships--with some large power imbalances and caveats (Flanders, 1998). However, because Alaska Natives did not experience outright warfare and conquest in the same way that American Indians did, there were no official treaties signed with the federal government acknowledging Alaska Native sovereignty or establishing Indian Country. Creating corporations

to be the managing bodies of ANCSA land continued the status quo of no official acknowledgement of tribal sovereignty, or of tribes as a governing body at all (Huhndorf & Huhndorf, 2011). Second, the Act extinguished aboriginal hunting and fishing rights on public lands. This further removed control from Alaska Natives because they were no longer allowed to practice traditional land use activities on public lands (Thornburg & Roberts, 2012) that were beyond the scope of a regular hunting license. The question of whether ANCSA's corporate structure was positive and empowering for Alaska Natives or problematic because it failed to address sovereignty issues and removed subsistence rights undergirds many regional land management conflicts. These include conflict between tribal governments and corporations over management of land for cultural versus economic uses, as well as conflict between Alaska Natives and conservationists, who are sometimes at odds over corporate land use practices.

In terms of cultural integrity, ANCSA has been problematic in several significant ways. As Thornburg & Roberts (2012) point out, introduction of the corporate structure created conflict between traditional values based in communal resource and property management and corporate promotion of individual wealth and private property ownership. Alaska Natives were, for all intents and purposes, forced into operating within the corporate structure, which requires management for profit. However, they also lacked capacity in terms of qualified and experience executives to make the corporations successful. This required extensive hiring of non-Native upper management in the early years of ANCSA (Thornburg & Roberts, 2012). The combination of the constrains placed on Native communities by the requirements of the Act, along with decision-making by non-Natives, led to failure of traditional values being incorporated into corporate decision-making (Anders, 1989, Kruger & Ecthart, 1994).

Another negative cultural effect of ANCSA, as mentioned previously, was the termination of indigenous hunting and fishing rights on all public lands in Alaska (Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 1971), which threatened subsistence harvesting (Case & Dorough, 2006). This undermined food security for many Native communities, as well as traditional values and connection to the land (Berardi, 1998, Thornburg & Roberts, 2012). Particularly in Southeast Alaska with the Sealaska corporation, there is an on-going tension between subsistence harvesting and development of those same areas for corporate profit (Anders, 1989). According to Hundorf and Hundorf (p. 395, 2011), "pressures for profitable development can undermine community uses of land for cultural and subsistence purposes. Such conflicts underlie controversies surrounding timber harvesting in southeast Alaska (especially the Tongass National Forest, traditional Tlingit territory)." A specific example of this conflict is the negative effect that clearcutting of old growth forest has on Sitka black tail deer populations, an important subsistence food for many Southeast Alaskans (Longhurst & Leslie, 1981). Sealaska corporation engaged in clearcutting to maximize profits for shareholders, while at the same time damaging their subsistence resources.

For the Alaska Natives who did enter into corporate leadership, this conflict became an internal one. As Chaffee (p. 134, 2008) says, "directors and officers are burdened with corporate fiduciary duties to achieve financial success while trying to represent traditional interests, such as conservation of the land and preservation of subsistence rights." Navigating this tension continues to be a challenge for corporations. Although many corporate dividends that allow Alaska Natives to continue subsistence activities, there is still an inevitable tension between corporate and cultural interests that has yet to be gracefully resolved (Hundorf & Hundorf, 2011).

In 1980, ANICLA restored subsistence rights to federal lands in Alaska (Nie, 2006). State subsistence land management policy was for a time at odds with ANILCA, but regulation passed in 1982 put Alaska Board of Fisheries and Game in compliance with federal law (Department of the Interior, n.d.). However, ANILCA does not specify indigenous subsistence rights, instead giving *rural* residents preference in hunting and fishing (Berardi, 1998). This failure to specifically acknowledge the cultural and spiritual importance of subsistence harvest to Alaska Natives is seen by many as problematic, and not addressing the concern over the loss of subsistence rights under ANCSA. This is exemplified in the way that ANILCA refers only to rural residents rather than Alaska Natives. This provision has been interpreted to exclude Alaska Natives living in urban centers, underlining the need for more specific legislation in regard to Alaska Native subsistence rights (Hundorf & Hundorf, 2011, Hensley, 2016).

A final ANSCA issue is the way that the Act may function as a modern-day tool for colonialism and assimilation of Alaska Natives (Chaffee, 2008, Hundorf & Hundorf, 2011, Thornburg & Roberts, 2012). While not explicitly stated in the law, ANCSA was structured to incorporate Alaska Natives into modern western culture (Jones, 2010). According to Berardi (1998), Alaska Natives were considered to be a "culture of poverty" (p. 91) that required help and motivation from market forces to survive. Further, Berardi states that according to a report created during the drafting ANCSA, "to change the economic situation…one needed to change the culture" (p. 91). This acknowledgement of a perceived need to change Alaska Native culture is an excellent example of the continuation of the values of assimilation and colonization applied to Native Americans. Some even argue that the introduction of corporate structure is on par with guns and disease that guided earlier assimilation efforts in the United States (Thornburg & Roberts, 2012). Thornburg and Roberts (2012) further argue that, "[the corporate] method of

settlement could embed western notions of progress and markets into the daily routines and thought processes of Alaska Natives" (p. 206). This "embedding" frames ANCSA as an attempt to assimilate and fundamentally change Alaska Native culture to reflect modern capitalist values over more traditional communal ones.

In some ways the original ANCSA legislation was only the beginning of the process of settling indigenous land claims. While it created a framework to settle such claims, and the general terms of what was owed, the Act did not convey all land promised in an expedient manner and underwent many amendments. The most significant of these in the context of this study is the delayed conveyance of 70,075 acres to the Sealaska Corporation of Southeast Alaska from the Forest Service. It was not until 2014 that the final settlement was reached, and the corporation received its final ANCSA allotments (USFS, n.d.). The Tongass Futures Roundtable was one arena in which collaborative resolution of these land claims was attempted, in part because the specific selection of which lands were to be conveyed to Sealaska was a source of much regional conflict and debate among nearly all Tongass stakeholders. This was largely because Sealaska petitioned to select lands outside of the original ANCSA withdrawal areas with land use change implications for Forest Service land not previously considered for transfer (Nethercut, 2014). However, the Roundtable may have been an inappropriate venue to address the ANCSA allotment since it was an agreement between Sealaska Corporation and the US Government. Including other Tongass stakeholders in the decision-making process certainly complicated the issue and added to conflict, as the following research shows.

This complex historical context and the enduring nature of the conflicts in the Tongass create a valuable environment to address questions about trust, collaborative success or failure, and equity and justice. Although the Tongass is certainly a very unique socio-political

environment, it provides the opportunity to learn broader lessons about how to move forward in the face of such extreme conflict. Further, as the largest National Forest in the country, management decisions on the Tongass have ramifications for public lands throughout the United States. Learning how to move past conflict in these environments will certainly prove useful for ecologically and socially responsible public land management going forward.

#### **Researcher Positionality**

I am from Juneau and have worked in the area and on Tongass conservation issues in the past. I had many of the interpersonal connections built that were relevant to this research. In many cases, those relationships helped facilitate access to interviewees and I believe added additional depth in analysis. However, my extensive personal history with Tongass management regarding timber issues has certainly shaped my perspectives. I am not neutral with respect to the Tongass in my personal life, and my passion for the well-being of both the natural ecosystem and communities of the region may influence the way in which I understand others' perspectives.

## **Chapter IV: METHODS**

I used in-depth, semi-structured interviews to develop a detailed understanding the perspectives of Roundtable participants on the complex process of collaboration, the relationships that formed, and the roles that trust and distrust played in the process. The format of semi-structured interviews enabled flexibility, in that I was able to pursue specific topics brought up by respondents that I did not necessarily anticipate based on the literature, thereby helping me to gain more nuanced insight into the situation and to focus in part on emergent phenomenon.

#### **Interview Sample**

I attempted to interview as many Roundtable participants as possible to capture a range of viewpoints and experiences. In total, I interviewed 25 individuals (8 female and 17 male). The participants consisted of two Alaska Native leaders, one Sealaska Corporation representative, three Roundtable staffers (TNC employees who helped administratively support the Roundtable), three Forest Service employees, two non-participant conservationist observers, one facilitator, four conservation organization representatives, four community representatives, three timber industry representatives, and two funders (See Table 2). To identify these individuals, I used two methods. I used publicly available documentation from the Roundtable meetings to identify participants and began by reaching out to those members. During interviews with those participants, I used chain referrals to gather names of additional Roundtable members or relevant individuals. However, while news stories and other participants said that there were 35 members, the list I ultimately compiled included more than 50 individuals. In some cases, it was unclear if someone had actually been an official Roundtable participant or if others just remembered them being active in land management issues at the time of the Roundtable. To the best of my ability, I

interviewed people who participated in the Roundtable, although I also interviewed two

individuals who attended most of the Roundtable meetings but were not official participants.

| Stakeholder         | Alaska | Native      | Roundtable | Forest  | Conservation  | Facilitator | Conservation* | Community | Timber   | Funder |
|---------------------|--------|-------------|------------|---------|---------------|-------------|---------------|-----------|----------|--------|
| Group/Role          | Native | Corporation | Staff      | Service | observer/non- |             | Organization  | Rep       | Industry |        |
|                     |        | (non-       |            |         | member        |             |               |           |          |        |
|                     |        | Native)     |            |         |               |             |               |           |          |        |
| Gender (F,          | 1, 1   | 0, 1        | 0, 3       | 1, 2    | 0, 2          | 0, 1        | 2, 2          | 2, 2      | 1, 3     | 1, 1   |
| <b>M</b> )          |        |             |            |         |               |             |               |           |          |        |
| # of                | 2      | 1           | 3          | 3       | 2             | 1           | 4             | 4         | 3        | 2      |
| <b>Participants</b> |        |             |            |         |               |             |               |           |          |        |

Table 2: Sample Characterization

\*the higher number of conservation representatives to other stakeholder groups approximately mirrors the stakeholder distribution on the Roundtable. There were far more conservation advocates than other stakeholders. Rou

Despite my intent to interview all Roundtable participants, I was unable to do so for several reasons. Some individuals I contacted were unwilling to participant in an interview, expressing distrust of me and general frustration with the Roundtable process. A few simply did not respond to multiple emails and phone calls. A couple of Roundtable participants were either deceased, or I could find no up-to-date contact information for them despite asking other participants, calling organizations for which they had worked, and looking up phone numbers in directories. Some people agreed to an interview but then never committed to a specific date. Of the list of approximately 50 individuals at least somewhat connected to the Roundtable according to chain referrals, 10 had only attended one or two meetings or said they were not actually involved, and I did not interview them, leaving a total of 40. Of 15 who were more involved who I was unable to interview, one was a commercial fisherman representative, one was a tourism representative, one was the primary Roundtable coordinator, two were community representatives, three were Alaska Native tribal representatives, one was the State Forester, two were conservation advocates, one was a funder, and three were timber industry members.

While I feel that my sample is generally representative of Roundtable participants, there is one area in particular where representation is lacking. Using the chain referral method, I quickly established a list of Roundtable participants that was nearly complete, given that interviewees listed nearly all of the same people as participants. However, when I was nearly done with data collection, I received a newly unearthed list of participants from The Nature Conservancy, which included several Alaska Natives whose names I had not yet heard, including tribal leaders and representatives from representatives from village corporations. My understanding is that many of them did not attend a significant number of Roundtable meetings and were therefore not seen by other members as important players in the process. But this indicates that their voices are likely not well-represented in the Roundtable or in this study.

Other stakeholder groups that are not included in this study are the State of Alaska, and the fish and tourism industries. While it is unfortunate to have anything less than a full representation of perspectives, since commercial fishing and tourism were not a large focus of the Roundtable, missing these two likely has a less dramatic effect on results than missing, for example, additional Alaska Native perspectives. Further, the tourism company was described as being closely aligned with the most far left of the conservationists, and thus may have shared the views of conservationists, who are well-represented in the sample.

Most of the Roundtable participants, as well as many individuals who were in some way involved at various points throughout the process, are currently still in Southeast Alaska and have continued to work on Tongass National Forest management. Therefore, although the collaborative has been disbanded for some time, the experience was still fresh and relevant to the people I interviewed.

#### **Interview Guide**

I used an interview guide (see appendix 2) because it allowed me to have the same questions answered by each participant, creating a dataset that allowed for comparison and analysis across individuals. At the same time, I also had flexibility to ask probes to follow-up on interviewee responses, to ask questions in whatever order felt most productive, and to skip over questions that the interviewee had already answered. When interviewing the two individuals who did not actually sit on the Roundtable, I largely used the same interview guide, prefacing questions that might not have been strictly relevant to a non-participant with an acknowledgement of that but still inviting the participant to answer. There was little difference in the questions asked between participants and non-participants.

## **Data Analysis**

I taped and transcribed each interview verbatim in order to have the most accurate account of what was said during the interview. There was only one individual who did not consent to being recorded nor being directly quoted despite my assurances of anonymity. After the interview, this person said that I was welcome to use the information from our conversation as context as long as it was not a specific quote, so responses from that interview provided background and insight for developing my coding scheme but is not included as data. The interviews ranged in length from 30-75 minutes, with 45 minutes being an approximate average.

I coded the interviews using Dedoose. Coding can be understood as a way to "classify or categorize individual pieces of data" (Babbie, 2016, p. 387). I began my analysis by coding five interviews that I felt represented a range of perspectives in order to create an initial coding scheme. I then created a document with short descriptions of each code. After creating a coding scheme of approximately 30 codes, I continued with the rest of the interviews. After I had done

an initial coding of all interviews, I reexamined the excerpts I had placed in specific codes and refined my coding scheme to 27 by combining and revising some codes. I then moved all of the excerpts associated with each code into individual Word documents and conducted a cross-interview analysis within that code. I organized the data in each document into subthemes. For example, within the code "failure," I organized excerpts into categories such as "inability to reach agreement" or "lack of incentive to collaborate" based on the specific themes emerging from the data. For each subtheme, I then wrote a brief summary of the general ideas and perceptions shared by participants as well as noting my own observations. I took those summaries and reorganized them into a single document to categorize and outline my findings as a whole.

The literature on trust and collaboration helped to shape my coding scheme and later analysis by providing a framework through which to understand and organize my data. My initial coding was grounded in the data and the perspectives of the interviews, but later stages of analysis incorporated specific concepts from the literature. Specifically, I used Coleman and Stern's four dimensions of trust framework from *The Multidimensionality of Trust: Applications in Collaborative Natural Resource Management* (2015) to analyze and understand my data after initial coding. As discussed in my literature review, this framework includes two more dimensions of trust (rational and dispositional) than are commonly described in the literature as well as providing more specific definitions of affinitive and procedural trust. I felt that this framework provided the appropriate level of complexity and detail needed to distinguish between different dimensions of trust emerging from my data and understand the myriad ways in which these different dimensions of trust interact. However, as discussed in my conclusion, I also found that in many cases, a particular event, behavior, or action could be interpreted as more than one dimension of trust. Therefore, I use this framework with the caveat that while it does help to organize and understand what happened with the Tongass Futures Roundtable, that it was not a perfect fit for every trust-related component of my findings.

Finally, the quotes I selected for inclusion below were chosen because I felt that they best represented concepts and themes that were recurring in my data. Each quote conveys an important part of the Roundtable story and helps provide evidence to support the interpretations and conclusions I make. Because there was far more rich data than was reasonable to include in my results section, I have included more relevant data in appendix 1. It is organized thematically according to each section of my results chapter.

## **Chapter V: RESULTS**

The following sections outline the dynamics at play in the successes and failures of the Roundtable and how those contributed to trust. Section I compares procedural components of the Roundtable to collaborative best practices identified in the literature and identifies areas in which the Roundtable might have been lacking. Section II focuses on relationships, political interests, and lines of conflict in relation to trust and distrust. Section III examines the substantial role that Alaska Native issues played in the Roundtable, and how failure to adequately address historical trauma and conflict changed the trajectory of the collaborative. Finally, section IV discusses the social, cultural, and political landscape of the Tongass since the Roundtable and examines what has and has not changed.

## **Roundtable Process Design and Challenges**

The following section briefly compares the Roundtable process to the best practices outlined in collaboration literature, acknowledging that well-designed procedural elements are crucial to collaborative success. Identifying areas where the Roundtable process may have been lacking can reveal potential causes of failure. Below I lay out the ways in which process design both succeeded and failed to help the collaborative reach productive outcomes. The components below that are were prevalent in the collaboration literature will be discussed only briefly. Those components that were not identified by previous studies will be explored in more depth. While some of these findings are explored in greater detail later in the results, the purpose of this section is to briefly outline how the Roundtable process compared with the best practices outlined in the literature. This analysis is summarized below in Table 2.

In most ways, the Roundtable was a thoughtfully and well-designed process based on current best practices in the field. In keeping with the need for a collaborative to have a sense of authority and ownership (see Belton & Jackson-Smith, 2010, Beierle & Konisky, 2000, and Bingham, 1986), Roundtable participants were involved in creating the ground rules and group procedures, which were adjusted several times during the process as the group saw fit. Further, as one Forest Service participant described (referring specifically to the Obama administration), "the administration at the time…finally said, if you can get this group to agree, we'll support it. And they didn't care what the outcomes were." In this way, the group also had authority in that any decisions they made would likely be considered in the development of future regulations and administrative decisions.

A component of authority and ownership defined in the literature as important is that the group must feel that they have authority within the community and within the rest of a stakeholder group (Belton & Jackson-Smith, 2010; Beierle & Konisky, 2000; Bingham, 1986). In other words, their constituents will support decisions made by the collaborative group. However, some participants shared concerns that some of the Roundtable participants lacked the support of the broader communities or organizations that they represented. As one staffer said, "People…have to have support in their community. Or the consensus that would come around…all…the people just say well who put you in charge of making this happen…there was probably not enough done to get that support at the local level." The lack of broader community or stakeholder support likely made it challenging to reach durable compromises, which is discussed in more detail in later.

Equitable distribution of power and adequate stakeholder representation are also considered crucial to success since a power imbalance can disrupt a process (Orth & Cheng, 2012; Levesque, Calhoun, Bell & Johnson, 2017; Blumenthal & Jannink, 2000 & Schuett, Selin & Carr, 2001). Nearly all Roundtable participants felt that there was at least a meaningful

*attempt* to have fair representation (all of the important stakeholder groups present, but not equal numbers from each) in the group, while acknowledging that no process could be perfect or fully encompass all the views of Southeast Alaska. One Forest Service employee said, "I feel like it was...a pretty good representation. And I do believe that they worked hard at that when they set the Roundtable up, I don't think it would have gotten as far as it did without [it]." However, as will be discussed in Chapter III, despite these efforts, Alaska Native representation was lacking. This had a dramatic negative effect on the Roundtable, and potentially played a significant role in its ultimate discontinuation without significant outcomes. In terms of other power differentials, while there was an important conflict of interest because funding and staffing came primarily from pro-conservation organizations and foundations (addressed in Chapter II), participants generally felt that they had ample opportunity and voice while participating in the process.

However, an issue overwhelmingly brought up by Roundtable participants was the consensus model. According to the literature, stakeholders having equal opportunity to voice opinions and vote on issues is crucial to collaborative success. The Roundtable attempted to create that environment using a 100% consensus model in which all participants had to agree to move an issue forward. This was nearly unanimously described by participants as—in the words of two individuals--a "fatal flaw" or the "death knell" of the Roundtable. As one Alaska Native leader explained, "I have no use for consensus…what I saw there was you'd have a whole roomful of people agreed and one person, one single person, could hold up the process. And I thought that was not…productive…" The fact that a single individual could stop an agreement from moving forward was a frustration for members of every stakeholder group. A Forest

Service employee said, "I don't think everybody coming to consensus will ever work on the Tongass. In fact, I'm convinced of it."

A conservation advocate further described how, "The biggest flaw...and I think that most people would agree, was that it operated on consensus...there was no way in hell we would ever get them to agree on anything...it was...an exercise in futility." The reasoning for 100% consensus was to help encourage reluctant stakeholders to join the Roundtable by giving them the sense that they had the power to stop a decision if they simply could not agree to it. However, as the previous quoted points out, Roundtable members quickly realized that there were certain parties who likely would never be able to find a substantive compromise on any large-scale decisions. And as the Alaska Native leader quoted in the previous paragraph said, a single person could stop an agreement from proceeding, forcing the group to start over in their negotiations. Despite the best intentions, this attempt at total equity and power-sharing ending up being a substantial roadblock.

Impartial and transparent leadership is a third component necessary to successful collaboration (see Belton & Jackson-Smith, 2010; Bingham, 1986; Lachapelle & McCool, 2012; Hossu, et al., 2018; Beierle & Konisky, 2000; Young, et al., 2012 and Frentz, Burns & Sperry, 2000). Formal leadership for the Roundtable was seen as coming primarily from foundations, The Nature Conservancy staff, and the facilitators. Most participants felt that there was a reasonable level of transparency about where funding for the collaborative was coming from. In terms of facilitation, most felt that the facilitators were professionals with extensive experience. A few participants felt that there was lack of transparency in intentions from foundations and larger conservation organizations. For the most part, however, participants felt that the

facilitators and staffers were fair and unbiased or had little to say other than that leadership was generally sufficient.

Some participants felt that the Roundtable potentially suffered from a lack of significant and concrete motivation to reach agreement. This is another important component of collaboration described in the relevant literature by Bingham (1986) and Hossu (2018). Aspects of this are more closely explored in Chapter 2, with participants most notably feeling in some cases that they could potentially more effectively reach their outcome goals in a context outside of the Roundtable process due to State and National political agendas and priorities. Relatedly, the scope of the original Roundtable goals was extremely broad and for the most part did not include specific benchmarks (USFS, 2010). This likely made it hard to feel motivated to collaborate when there weren't specific issues to work on or goals to work towards.

Finally, the Roundtable enjoyed sufficient access to resources, an important component of successful collaboration as defined in the literature by Blumenthal & Jannink, 2000 and Schuett, Selin & Carr, 2001. The Roundtable, particularly in the beginning, enjoyed substantial financial support from multiple conservation foundations to cover meeting and travel costs for participants and pay professional facilitation staff among other expenses. It also had staffers from The Nature Conservancy to organize meetings and associated events and coordinate with individual stakeholders. Although financial support diminished somewhat later in the process, overall the Roundtable did not suffer from lack of resources.

It is important to analyze the procedural framework when studying any collaborative group because process design plays a central role in collaborative success or failure. Therefore, this section laid out how the Roundtable operated. The following table provides an initial assessment of how the Roundtable fits with the criteria for collaborative success outlined in the

literature. As this assessment demonstrates, in many ways the Roundtable was initially set up for success in terms of procedural trust as well as enjoying other key components identified as important in collaborative literature. However, community authority and motivation to reach agreement were both insufficient, and equitable distribution of power and impartial leadership were also potentially problematic, compounding challenges later in the process, as explored below.

| Criteria for Success                          | Present in Roundtable?                        | Evidence  |
|---|---|---|
| Management Decision Authority                 | Yes: decisions likely                         | "the [Obama] administration at the timefinally said, if you   |
| (Belton & Jackson-Smith, 2010; Beierle &      | considered for legislative                    | can get this group to agree, we'll support it. And they didn't care   |
| Konisky, 2000; Bingham, 1986)                 | implementation                                | what the outcomes were." -Forest Service Employee .   |
| Community Authority (Belton & Jackson-        | Insufficient: lack of broader                 | "Peoplehave to have support in their community. Or the  |
| Smith, 2010; Beierle & Konisky, 2000;         | community/ stakeholder                        | consensus that would come aroundallthe people just say  |
| Bingham, 1986)                                | support to be decision-maker                  | well who put you in charge of making this happenthere was<br>probably not enough done to get that support at the local level."<br>-Roundtable Staffer . |
| Sense of Ownership                            | Yes; participants involved in                 | The process the Roundtable used: "it's a process that allows the  |
| (Belton & Jackson-Smith, 2010, Beierle &      | creating the ground                           | participants to determine what are going to be breakout   |
| Konisky, 2000, and Bingham, 1986)             | rules/group procedures,<br>adjusted as needed | sessions, what are gonna be focal areas of discussion, and a process that puts them in charge rather than the convener in charge" -Facilitator .        |
| Equitable distribution of power               | Yes (with expectations                        | "I feel like it wasa pretty good representation. And I do   |
| (Orth & Cheng, 201; Levesque, Calhoun, Bell   | discussed in Ch 2 & 3);                       | believe that they worked hard at that when they set the   |
| & Johnson, 2017; Blumenthal & Jannink,        | participants felt there was a                 | Roundtable up, I don't think it would have gotten as far as it did  |
| 2000 & Schuett, Selin & Carr, 2001)           | meaningful attempt at fair                    | without [it]." -Forest Service Employee   |
|   | representation (all of the                    |   |
|   | important stakeholder groups                  |   |
|   | present, but not equal                        |   |
|   | numbers from each)                            |   |
| Impartial and transparent leadership          | Yes (with exceptions); most                   | "To me the leadership wasn't piss-poor, no, I don't think so at   |
| (Belton & Jackson-Smith, 2010; Bingham,       | felt there was reasonable                     | all. I think it was adequate for what we were trying to do. And   |
| 1986; Lachapelle & McCool, 2012; Hossu, et    | transparency about funding                    | really there was trying to maintain open discussion so they were  |
| al., 2018; Beierle & Konisky, 2000; Young, et | sources. Most felt facilitation               | able to keep people in line and you had your turn to talk and   |
| al., 2012 and Frentz, Burns & Sperry, 2000)   | leadership was adequate                       | that was helpful." -Community Representative  |
|   | professionals with extensive                  |   |
|   | experience                                    |   |
| Motivation to Reach Agreement                 | Insufficient; participants felt               | "In the Great Bear Rainforesteverybody was at the point   |
| (Bingham, 1986 and Hossu, 2018)               | that there were other,                        | where they had nothing to losesomething had to givethe  |
|   | potentially more effective                    | time was right for some kind of solution <b>In the Tongass</b>  |
|   | ways to achieve desired                       | there was no real incentive to participate. Other than you  |
|   | outcomes, i.e. litigation,                    | know you wanted to make sure that you stay in the good<br>graces of these foundations and you know I know I'm guilty                                    |
|   | lobbying                                      | as charged. But you know there's litigation there's legislation   |
|   |   | there's all kinds of safety netsSo, the commitment that was   |
|   |   | made by the participants wasn't whole-hearted   |
|   |   | Conservationist   |
| Access to Resources                           | Yes; funding from                             | "But you know [it] wasappreciated and understood that if  |
| (Blumenthal & Jannink, 2000 and Schuett,      | foundations covered costs for                 | [The Roundtable] was going to work, foundations were going to   |
| Selin & Carr, 2001)                           | participants, hired                           | have to pony up some money to make whatever work, work." -  |
| ,   | professional facilitation staff,              | Roundtable Staffer  |
|   | staffers from TNC organized                   |   |
|   | meetings, etc.                                |   |

Table 3: Criteria for Collaborative Success

## **Relationships and Lines of Conflict**

The following section explores the arc of trust, as described by some participants, that occurred during the Roundtable. To summarize some of the results, Figure 2 lays out the different dimensions of trust and distrust as they emerged throughout the Roundtable. Events increasing distrust are below the arc, while events increase trust are above the arc. This figure is meant to approximately mirror the "arc of trust" described by some participants who felt that trust increased for a time before decreasing again towards the end of the Roundtable. The following results discuss the events described on this arc and frames them according to the different dimensions of trust described by Coleman and Stern (2015).




Figure 2: Roundtable Arc of Trust Dimensions

| <b>Dimension of Trust</b> | Definition                               | Example                           |
|---------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|
| Affinitive                | Built through emotional connection and   | Shared value of hunting and       |
|                           | cognitive or subconscious assessment and | fishing; social connection over a |
|                           | judgement of the trustee                 | shared meal                       |

| Procedural    | Trust in a process being fair and consistent,<br>reduces vulnerability of the trustee when other<br>dimensions of trust are absent; trust in a broader<br>legal or institutional system   | Ground rules for a collaborative<br>group agreed on by everyone;<br>consensus-based decision-making  |
|---------------|---|--|
| Rational      | Based on a calculation of the utility of placing<br>trust in another; perceived likelihood of a<br>positive outcome often based on past experience  | A participant trusting another based<br>on them keeping their word during<br>a previous meeting  |
| Dispositional | A general propensity to trust or distrust others;<br>tendency to trust or distrust someone with a<br>specific title, representing a specific entity based<br>on an individual's perceptions and past<br>experiences. Often sets a baseline of trust or<br>distrust. | Distrust of the Forest Service going<br>into the Roundtable from a saw mill<br>owner who has felt repeatedly<br>misled by Forest Service<br>employees. |

Table 3: Dimensions of Trust (Adapted from Stern & Coleman, 2015 and Coleman & Stern, 2018)

In the following section, I present data on a variety of relationship challenges and successes, as well as sources of conflict in the Roundtable. First, I present perceptions from the beginning of the Roundtable about goals, initial relationships, and feelings towards other participants and how that set the stage for trust dynamics during the rest of the collaborative group. I then lay out how relationships and trust were perceived to change for both good and bad as the process progressed. I explore perceptions about outside interests; specifically, the roles of funders, politics, and national conservation organizations and how they added to distrust. Finally, I delve more deeply into some specific conflicts including those between the timber industry and conservationists, as well as within the conservation community.

# Distrust and Hope at the Outset: "It was hard for me to just set all that aside"

This section explores dimensions and levels of trust present early in the process. Dispositional and rational distrust were particularly prevalent, or and general propensity to trust one another at the start of the process and distrust based on past history between participants. Despite high levels of distrust, many participants also expressed feeling hopeful about what the Roundtable might be able to achieve. The Tongass Futures Roundtable was established with the lofty goal of finding a compromise to reduce natural resource conflict—specifically over timber management on the Tongass. As one Roundtable staffer described it:

The question was whether a group of stakeholders could come up with a solution to the endless wars and lawsuits and bad feeling that there was between industry and communities, conservation groups and others who live in Southeast and whether it was possible to have that discussion and to come to some conclusions.

Participants expressed that they felt uncertain, from the outset of the Roundtable process, that there could be a single "solution" or "grand bargain," given the history of conflict in the region. The Roundtable was encouraged and funded by several large national conservation organizations, including The Nature Conservancy. The inspiration for the Roundtable came from the 2006 collaboration success on the Great Bear Rainforest in British Columbia. The Great Bear Rainforest Agreement was the result of collaborative planning and resolution of a conflict-specifically a set of lawsuits--between natural resource stakeholders (Affolderbach, et al., 2012) that many considered somewhat analogous to those in the Tongass. One funder described this, saving:

I had seen what was possible in B.C. I knew how difficult the issues were in B.C. even though it's a very different, it's a different social and political context. But the basic outline of the conflict was pretty similar to Southeast and so I didn't feel any sense of guarantee that it was going to work, but I wasn't skeptical or pessimistic. I just thought okay this is really worth a shot.

Because of the similarities between the two contiguous regions both socially and ecologically, funders described feeling eager to try a new approach to help shepherd the Tongass away from decades of conflict.

However, most participants were skeptical that the same structure would work on the Tongass. One conservationist explained:

I was super skeptical, and I think I was right...based on my experience as a grassroots organizer and being someone that had experienced firsthand a lot of the ugliness like having your life threatening and working with amazing people that were told to get out of town despite living there their entire lives, and threatened and harassed, it was hard for me to just set all that aside and sit down with the timber industry. Especially folks in the timber industry who are pathological liars.

This participant described how their skepticism of the process and their views of the timber industry were based in long-term conflict in the region and in threats and harassment of specific individuals. Further, they perceived the timber industry as consistently dishonest, which influenced their interest in collaborating with them. The extreme nature of this historical conflict also underlines what a feat it was to get some participants to even come to an initial meeting. While not all participants described it such dramatic terms, a general skepticism at the beginning of the Roundtable was discussed by nearly all participants. A pro-industry NGO representative said:

I was skeptical that it was going to accomplish...what they felt it was going to accomplish. Because it can't be accomplished...I mean I don't think it's ever bad to have opposing sides sit around the table and talk about their opposition and their position and what they think and how they feel...If you can get people willing to sit there and actually have that conversation, that's never bad. But I did know in my heart that it was not going to accomplish what they thought they could accomplish.

Both of these participants are long-time Southeast Alaskans who have worked on opposing sides of many conservation and resource management issues. However, they were in agreement at the beginning of the Roundtable was that reaching a "Grand Bargain" seemed an unlikely feat.

Skepticism about finding the "Grand Bargain" was partially rooted in historical distrust that participants felt towards one another. In response to a question asking if participants trusted each other at the beginning of the Roundtable, a Forest Service employee said: "Absolutely not, they wouldn't even sit in the same room. There were times where you almost felt like a referee rather than somebody to facilitate some kind of consensus group." One Roundtable staffer described how this animosity stemmed from most stakeholders' long history in the Tongass. He explained that, "Well certainly the background...because there have been years and years of litigation and the pulp mills have been shut down. Depending on who you talk to for one reason or another. You know that distrust, the past history, it certainly manifested itself." As that participant describes, many Roundtable participants felt that they were generally entering the process with preexisting distrust stemming from negative past experiences with one another. These ranged from blaming one another for economic downturns from decreased timber harvest to court battles over the legality of timber sales. Many participants specifically discussed distrusting the Forest Service. As this participant described: "One of the biggest flaws in those kinds of processes is that nobody trusted the Forest Service. Not everyone would trust The Nature Conservancy, although more people trusted the Nature Conservancy than the Forest Service."

Several participants described how coercion was used to get some individuals to come to the first meeting. A conservationist described:

I'd heard, I don't know if it's true, that [a specific timber industry stakeholder] came to the first meeting without knowing who was going to be in the room. That they couldn't tell him, they just said it was going to be a Forest Service meeting, because if he had known who was going to be in the room, that it was an effort to get conservation and timber to work together, he wouldn't have showed up. So, I don't know if it, in hindsight whether it was set up for success because it wasn't like a thought process that came out of the groups that were entrenched and working on these issues on either side.

A Forest Service employee confirmed that some members of the timber community did not realize what they were joining at first. He explained, "I called [a specific timber industry stakeholder] up one day and asked him to come to this meeting unbeknownst to him what he was getting into. And he agreed to it and as soon as he walked in and saw the group, he was a bit surprised." And as the conservation advocate explained above, the fact that some participants had to be tricked into participating was perceived as a sign that the Roundtable was unlikely to succeed.

Alongside this extensive distrust, many participants also described feeling hope that the Roundtable could reduce conflict, build good will, and potentially build trust. One participant was explicit about this tension, saying "bottom line [was] distrust, everybody had a certain amount of distrust over things or apprehension" and then later described feeling "real hopeful we could do something because the energy level was high. People were speaking optimistically from day one." Thus, despite significant skepticism, some participants saw the Roundtable as a chance for a "clean, fresh, high note." As a community representative described the first Roundtable meeting:

There was a lot of good will generated at the meeting, enthusiasm in fact that there might actually be some common ground to go forward. I can recall a couple of people; one [specific timber company] and I can't remember who the environmentalist was. Neither of them would sit across the table from each other and the revelation was 'you're not a monster.'

Participants explained how some initial momentum and hopefulness came after the first meeting with the recognition of common ground and the realization that their opponents were not inherently bad people. One funder described their experience at the first meeting in response to a question about trust at the beginning of the Roundtable:

I just thought about the energy at the end of that meeting, that while I wouldn't go so far as to say that people fully trusted each other, that there was a real sense that most of the people there were willing to take a leap of faith, that they were willing to try, in the hope that we could get to something better...I would say in the very early days there was this sense of the possibility of getting to something bigger and better that was motivating people to find that kind of trust.

While this funder did not feel that trust was present at the first meeting, they also thought that

participants were willing try to work together. They further explained that they thought trust was

an important part of being able to move forward with the process and that the goal of achieving some something positive was a catalyst for trying to build trust.

#### Timber Wars Forever: "This is what we're fighting over"

The following section explores in-depth some of the sources of conflict between participants and what role they played in various dimensions of distrust. While these dynamics do not entirely tier temporally to the arc of trust framework, they did play a significant role in rational, dispositional, and procedural (based on distrust in the political systems and legal framework that had definied Tongass management in the leadup to the Roundtable) distrust at the beginning of the process and continued to contribute to rational distrust throughout. Some participants explained that not enough acknowledgement of the historical context of the Tongass conflict in terms of the timber wars (the era of heavy old growth clear cutting which conservationists were desperate to stop) was incorporated into the Roundtable. As one participant said,

I think one of the...big...things that we're missing is this acknowledgement of [the timber wars]. There's a little bit of lip service that went into the Tongass timber wars, and it's described as having an impact on people but that was never unpacked, not sufficiently. You would need a different kind of facilitation to unpack that and I think that's something that we're thinking is much more important to do than we thought it was, there was a full-on need for truth and reconciliation.

This participant felt that there was failure to sufficiently deal with the impacts of the timber wars on Roundtable participants. Specifically, while there was superficial acknowledgement, true reconciliation between parties engaged in a long-term conflict required time and space for extended dialogue to heal trauma from decades of animosity. This participant's observation about the need for truth and reconciliation also applies to conflict with Alaska Native communities—as will be discussed in depth later--indicating the need for an expansive unpacking of historical conflict and trauma in the region. Beyond a broader perceived need to more directly address conflict and trauma from the timber wars, participants consistently highlighted several other key areas of conflict. First, as one conservationist described it: "when you get right down to it, they're not fighting over 16.7 million acres. They're fighting over a few hundred thousand." A timber industry representative explained that:

We ended up talking about a little piece which is minute in the grand scheme of the Tongass National Forest. And that's all we talked about was what to do with that little piece...So we made a map. And we took out all of the different pieces. The wilderness and restricted and the green and...had this map and it ended up that...you couldn't even see the orange dots of what was available for logging on this map. I mean they were like pins, the head of a pin. Scattered throughout. And everything else was taken up and we thought: that's powerful. Look at that. That's all, this is what we're fighting over is these little pin drops. And [they felt] that's too many pin drops.

This pro-timber participant explained that when all of the conservation and protected areas were

removed from negotiations over possible areas to log, there was almost nothing left-that the

request of the timber industry felt insignificant within the entirety of the Tongass. However, they

perceived that conservationists still felt it was too much.

Conservationists and timber interests reported having very different perceptions of

Tongass numbers. One conservationist described that:

[Timber representatives] would often say that we're logging less than one tenth of one percent of the Tongass every year...and they would say...you the environmental community, has 6 million acres of Wilderness and we're debating over one point five million acres of area available for timber and this isn't fair. We're cutting a very small amount of timber. So, the argument...depended on how you used statistics.

This was a recurring area of conflict. On the one hand, the timber industry argued that they were

logging 0.001% of the Tongass per year, using the total 16.7-million-acre land base of the

Tongass to make their calculation. One the other hand, conservationist argued that this framing

was problematic:

The classic refrain was that 'we're only asking for one tenth of one percent of the Tongass', from the timber perspective. And that sounds pretty reasonable. But then the greenies would say, 'but if you subtract rock and ice and you subtract muskeg it's really a lot bigger percentage.' And, of course that wasn't even very well informed because again the data wasn't used very well. And so by the time you start to actually have a conversation about the reality at that scale, everybody's lost.

While the timber industry made the argument that there is an unfair percentage of the Tongass reserved as protected areas, conservationists argued that very little of that is ecologically valuable forest habitat. This created the conflict between the two groups over the portion of the Tongass that is forest, and therefore how much timber harvest is reasonable. This sense that other stakeholders are being manipulative with the numbers contributed to procedural distrust because each group felt that the other was not using accurate and consistent evaluation methods.

As discussed in the site description, participants also disagreed about when second growth forests would be ready to harvest. Some participants wanted to transition immediately, but others felt that second growth was not ready to be harvested and therefore not economically viable for the industry. A Native corporation representative explained the confusion behind the conflict, saying:

In some cases, there was just not enough information. You know people were arguing over things...they needed a second growth inventory, they needed a better old growth inventory, they needed to get sustainable timber sales out to keep the timber industry alive while this process was going on... we needed this other information before we could make the case, whether it be a transition to second growth right away or you have to wait longer and that part of it just wasn't there.

This participant explained that there was not sufficient information for the Roundtable's deliberations, specifically with regard to the potential harvest of second growth. A related debate over facts and data was described by the director of a pro-industry NGO who explained:

We've got people that haven't worked for years because there's no work to be had. There's nothing for them to do. "Well they can be in tourism." No, they can't. Tourism was always put back in, thrown in there as a replacement industry. Not even close. You know tourism is a half year thing, it pays ten dollars an hour. You know they're part time jobs.

Even if there is tourism. And, you know, Prince of Wales Island doesn't even have tourism.

This participant's frustration was based on the way that tourism is put in conflict with timber interests because, as the argument goes, tourism in Alaska relies on pristine nature and healthy wildlife habitat, which is negatively affected by logging. However, pro-logging representatives argued that tourism provided insufficient work for some smaller communities. This participant explained the perspective held by many pro-industry individuals that tourism jobs are an insufficient replacement for timber jobs because they are seasonal and do not pay well. They also argued that some of the communities that have suffered the most economically from the reduction of the timber industry do not have a tourism industry as a replacement. In both the case of the second growth debate and merits of tourism versus timber jobs, Roundtable participants were arguing over theoretical numbers without much actual data and they therefore did not trust each other's data or analyses. This proved to be problematic because the rational trust based on disagreement over the data meant that participants could not effectively move on to attempting compromise on those topics.

The timber industry consistently used the argument about the superiority of timber jobs to claim that conservationists did not care about people, only trees. One pro-development NGO representative said:

We tried so hard to personalize the trees, put a face on a tree and say this is someone's livelihood...You cut it down and it'll grow right back...so we really tried really hard to personalize that image and say...to tell these people they can't have a job is like stunting their growth. But you couldn't break through...the religion if you will.

In this case, the perceived "religion" that this participant referred to is conservationists' prioritization of stopping old growth logging. This participant painted their fellow timber stakeholders as advocates for jobs in small communities while villainizing conservationists as

being dogmatic and uncompassionate. This framing likely grew animosity and affinitive distrust between participants by attacking and misrepresenting conservationists' values.

#### Building Relationships and Trust: "We wound up being friends"

Many participants felt that one of the most productive outcomes of the Roundtable was formation or improvement of relationships and a level of affinitive trust, or trust based on individual social connection and attraction. This affinitive trust was a primary driver of overall increase in trust during the first part of the process and the upward movement of the arc. The primary mechanism for relationship and trust-building that participants described was having the opportunity to spend extended periods of time together to get to know one another, in particular in informal settings. However, as this section will explore, the trust and relationships that were built were specific to the time, place, and individuals. Further, not all Roundtable members shared the trust they built equally with other participants. Certain individuals built strong, trusting relationships while continuing to distrust others in the group. Some participants also felt that the Roundtable created more respect and understanding but were hesitant to describe these relationships as trusting.

Although they knew who most of the other participants were, many participants said that they had not actually met each other or had only interacted in a context such as a lawsuit before the Roundtable. A Forest Service employee said:

Most of the people on that list, I had probably never met before, but had dealt with them through various lawsuits and various other means of contact. So once we go to a list of names, made the contacts and got the individuals agreement on participation, that was the first time that that entire group had met and actually sat face to face with industry folks, environmental groups, Alaska Native groups, and a wide variety of interests.

This individual pointed out that stakeholder groups or even individuals had been in conflict for decades while never experiencing extended face-to-face contact. Further, according to one community representative:

There were a lot of personal relationships that were established and that's crucial. That allowed people to talk with each other. And if there is any value at all in the Roundtable, it's the fact that this was the first time people were really talking with each other and not doing it across courtrooms or battling it out in front of Congressional committees.

For this participant and many others, building relationships was seen as very important. Rather than interactions having a concrete, and often adversarial goal, participants had the time and space to have extended, apolitical conversations which allowed them to build relationships. These personal relationships then created the opportunity to talk across groups in ways that had not happened in the past.

Building relationships was also important because many participants came to the Roundtable with preconceived ideas about the other parties. Some describe that they already knew what other stakeholders' agendas would be, implying that others would be inflexible. This representative of a Native Corporation described how many participants felt that they knew each other's positions beforehand:

Everybody that was participating had a long history with the Tongass. So, when you said somebody's name, there was a good chance that everybody in the room knew who that was. So they all knew each other and everybody knew the issues fairly well. Now was the data and the information agreeable to both parties, not necessarily. But all the arguments were kind of known.

This participant explained that almost all of the stakeholders had been involved in Tongass issues long before the Roundtable and while they were often in disagreement, they were familiar with one another's perspectives and arguments. The same individual went on to describe that as the Roundtable progressed, however, "they built a respect for each other. There was an ability to describe each other's mutual goals and objectives, but most important was the willingness for them to communicate with each other." Getting to know one another and build relationships, this participant felt, helped to build respect and understanding between stakeholders of one another's perspectives and needs. It also encouraged them to communicate with one another in ways they had not before the Roundtable.

Participants felt that understanding *why* a fellow Roundtable member might feel so strongly about a certain issue helped to build empathy and a willingness to compromise. A conservationist explained how:

What happened and what was accomplished was almost all about relationship building...people got to know each other and liked each other sincerely even when they couldn't agree. And that is a real testament to the process and its capacity to create relationships that were real. At least for most. I mean there's definitely some folks that always seemed like they were they were really holding their cards close to their chest and didn't really fully buy in to the process...maybe it wasn't going to reach consensus but we could we could go ahead and agree to support whatever did come out of this group.

This participant felt that relationship building was the key to any successes the Roundtable did achieve, as well as an achievement in and of itself thanks to good process. While they did not think that these positive outcomes extended to all participants, they did feel that the Roundtable

as a whole generally began to buy in to and support group proposals.

Other participants elaborated on how having multi-day meetings in small communities

around Southeast Alaska played an important role in building relationships. According to one

conservationist:

[During the Roundtable], I wasn't just writing letters to [the Regional Forester], but I was sitting down and I was hearing from him whatever he was...officially saying as well as you know being able to have dinner...and just getting to know him and other Forest Service people.

This participant felt that being able to have unstructured time with other Roundtable participants was helpful in getting to know each other beyond what occurred in more formal communications. A Native corporation representative further described this: We would be in places like Hoonah, staying in the same place. You had breakfast with each other, you had dinner with each other. So instead of yelling at each other at the end of a court session or during a legislative hearing, there was actually dialogue created.

Extended interaction in a relatively isolated place helped participants to have more informal conversation with other participants compared with the aggressive and combative formal interactions many participants had in the past. As one Forest Service employee stated, "Typically, when we'd show up at the meeting you were kind of held captive because there wasn't a whole lot of places to go. So, you had to meet with the group. That worked very well." A rural, timber-based community representative also explained this idea, saying "him and I used to be ferocious adversaries and we wound up being friends at the end of the day after being around each other so much. We kind of know how we think and what not." Some participants explicitly linked these informal interactions to decreasing distrust. A Roundtable facilitator explained:

We'd come in late in one day, have dinner, have two days of meetings, and go home, that meant that there were dinner times and receptions and opportunities for people to sit down and share a beer and whatever and people got to know each other meeting six times a year at the beginning. And it's much harder to distrust someone you know than to distrust somebody you've never met.

This participant's linkage of informal interactions such as mealtimes to participants getting to know one another better exemplifies increasing affinitive trust.

Participants who were from Southeast Alaska were perceived as having a shared sense of community and place, which likely contributed to building affinitive and perhaps helping to overcome participants' dispositional and rational distrust. As one of the facilitators explained, "Southeast is cohesive…even though…every community in Southeast has it's unique characteristics…there's enough integration of activities among the communities and among the people and Southeast Alaskans wear that brand. That's who they are." A conservationist said,

people who were all from Southeast Alaska "shared that we're all from here and we all want good things to happen here...we all like to hunt and fish." This shared identity was seen as helping to build relationships and find common ground between some participants. The same facilitator went on to say, "particularly the loggers and the greens, they loved being in the outdoors...They had different things they wanted to do there, but...they love the land and what's growing on it and everybody wanted to see a robust...economy." However, another participant described the region as, "it's kind of a family thing. Your family, you know you've got to get along but there's some things that, you know, your first cousin or your sister...you're mad as hell at them at the time." This participant alluded to the tight-knit communities of the region creating dynamics much like a family unit that shared an important identity but also experienced much conflict.

One facilitator credited these shared values and identity with some of the success the

Roundtable did achieve:

Part of what built the level of collaboration [we saw] goes back to...the goals of the group and the discussion of the quality of life and a sustainable economy for Southeast. And the fact that everybody agreed on those really helped because what they...understood was even though we have different ideas for...the economy...we all care about that, we share some values there. And...when you share values then it's easier to move forward and to find agreement on areas that you don't agree on. Find compromise on things you don't agree on...that they had those values and...they wanted to reach a consensus on what's going to happen to what lands...gave them room to really try hard.

The facilitator felt that there was significant collaboration during the Roundtable due to agreement on the desire for a high quality of life and sustainable economy for the region. While, as the facilitator described, there was not agreement about how to reach shared goals, and what exactly they would look like, the participants were committed to the viability of the region and the place and people. These perceived shared values encouraged participants to work hard to try and reach consensus on Tongass management.

There was broad agreement that most people understood one another better as a result of the Roundtable and that even if they disagreed, they believed that others were being honest. According to this funder:

I think what ended up happening is that individuals learned to trust other individuals based upon their behaviors and the perceived integrity of those behaviors. Like do they keep their word? Did they hold their cards close to their chest? Did they promise to go back to their people and try to get a commitment for something and even if they failed at getting the commitment, did they make a good effort that they promised they would? So I think on an individual level trust was built. And you know it wasn't all that sectoral. So, for example, as a result of this process, individuals in the green community built really good trust with individuals in forestry or government or the Native community.

As this person described, participants began to trust one another by seeing over time that others did what they said, negotiated in good faith, and were upfront about their needs and goals. This exemplifies increasing rational trust, in that participants felt that it was worthwhile to trust another entity. It also shows affinitive trust in that the cultural norms and cues from the group began to dictate positive actions towards one another due to more shared experiences and acknowledgement of shared interests and values. Further, they described individual trust-building occurring between a variety of different stakeholder group representatives. Finally, it is important to highlight that this participant described trust and relationship-building between individuals, which is not synonymous with trust between organizations or stakeholder groups.

A different conservationist also explained this this increased understanding of others as a dimension of trust:

That's the kind of trust that evolved. That they actually knew what to expect from one another. They could probably answer questions for each other by the time they were halfway through the Roundtable...They knew what they were going to say so that's a form of trust. But do I trust that you're gonna take care of me? That's a different kind of

trust and that's the trust that they never achieved. Do I trust that we can have a good time together if we sit down and have a beer? Yeah okay.

This participant suggested that different types of trust evolved during the Roundtable. First, they felt that participants gained an understanding and therefore trust based on knowing how others were going to act based on past experience as well as trust based on positive relationships (affinitive). However, importantly, this participant said Roundtable participants *did not* build trust that other participants would take care of them or their needs (rational) based on how they had acted in the past, which might limit the ability to come to agreement across the group.

Other participants were not sure that the relationships that were built translated to trust. A

Forest Service employee explained that:

I don't know if they trusted each other, but they would listen to each other. [An individual with a specific logging company] was one of the primary recipients of one of the projects that we were working on trying to keep communities like Prince of Wales alive. He was very straightforward, very down to earth. And there was no gamesmanship in what he said...that resounded very well with a lot of individuals. They'd ask him a question; you got a straight answer which was not the case with a lot of other individuals.

While this participant was hesitant to say that Roundtable members trusted one another, they did feel that they were willing to engage in hearing about and trying to understand each other's interests and positions. Further, some participants enjoyed credibility because they were considered honest (being a "straight shooter"), although this did not apply to every Roundtable

member. As one conservationist explained,

I didn't ever 100% trust, say Sealaska for example. I didn't 100% trust some of the conservation people when they stood up and said something...But I do feel like I began to...at least understand...I don't want to say I trusted all the information I was getting...but I could put it into context.

This conservationist described that while they were never willing to trust some other participants completely, they were able to understand where their perspectives were coming from. Overall,

participants reported a range of perceptions about trust-building, but generally felt that most relationships did improve even if they did not lead to full trust.

## Politics and Outside Interests: "People from other places...say[ing] how life should be"

While Roundtable participants reported trust being built through process design and relationship-building, among other things, the role of outside interests served to compromise that trust and encourage the downswing of the arc of trust later in the process. Many Roundtable participants expressed rational and proceedural distrust about the intentions of the organizations and funders who were present. As one conservation organizer pointed out:

I guess in the view of the conservation funders, there had been a very successful outcome on the Great Bear Rainforest. I think they thought they could model that work on the Tongass, so they kind of picked up that model and built the Roundtable. So it wasn't organically developed from the people that were brought to the table.

Some participants found it problematic that the Roundtable was not created by the people of the Tongass, who understood the dynamics intimately and had worked on it for--in some cases—decades. One staffer further explained this, saying, "there was distrust about what are these people in San Francisco or Palo Alto or wherever they're from. Why are they telling us what to do?" Another conservationist explained a specific reason for those feelings, saying, "I think there was a colossal failure to understand that the dynamics of Southeast Alaska were a lot different than what they had on the central coast of B.C." Many participants felt that the funders did not sufficiently understand the socio-political context of Southeast Alaska and were incorrect in assuming that it was analogous to the Great Bear Rainforest.

Some participants reported that funders claimed that the Roundtable was going to be the primary avenue forward for management decisions in the Tongass and that in order to have a say, people must participant in the Roundtable. A conservation advocate shared that: I feel like everybody was brought to the table because they felt like they had to get to the table, not because they wanted to get to the table. The conservation groups, their funders were saying this is the direction we want to go...it was a case of "you shall do this."

Many participants expressed that this may have led to including stakeholders who never intended to collaborate, but did not want to be left out of negotiations. A Roundtable staffer explained, "I think it was more that there were some people there who felt...they had to live through [it], they had to do it. By being involved they could stop what they didn't want to have happen." This perception of somewhat forced or unwilling participation was further addressed by one funder who said:

I think we tried really hard to keep the whole tent at the table regardless of whether people were there to try to do something or to ultimately tear it down. And I think it was a little bit of that philosophy of if the choice is between having somebody inside the tent kicking versus outside the tent throwing rocks, better to have them inside...there was a little bit of maybe missing that in hindsight...misjudging how much people really were willing to come to the table. I think in retrospect some people...it was clear that they really were only there to just keep things from moving forward.

This funder clarifies that the goal of getting and keeping all stakeholders at the table did end up being problematic even though the intent was good. Further, they acknowledged that the funding community did not fully understand the level of resistance that some Tongass stakeholders felt toward the idea of collaborating with long-time adversaries.

Although the funders themselves had less on-the-ground experience in the Tongass and were perhaps more optimistic than other participants, they also recognized the preexisting distrust between stakeholders and the challenges of trying to overcome it. As one funder described:

described:

We always knew it was a risk and frankly we sort of knew that we were at risk of making people angry on all sides of it. I would say that there were both folks in the environmental camp who were very open with us...about basically saying that they saw no reason to sit down with the people who were advocating for logging on the Tongass and that some of them I think would have also said the Forest Service cannot be trusted, that you really shouldn't be sitting down with these folks. And then obviously we knew that there were

already many on the kind of pro-industrial logging side of it that that viewed the environmentalists as the enemy. So we knew that we were putting ourselves squarely in the crosshairs by proposing something like this.

This funder presented several factors that played into early distrust and skepticism. First is the idea that the Roundtable would only serve to make all stakeholders angry, potentially exacerbating distrust. They also described conservationists expressing distrust of the Forest Service and hesitation to work with them or with the timber industry. Finally, despite many participants' reported skepticism about the funder's intentions and understanding of the Tongass, this funder acknowledged that convening the Roundtable risked wasting time, money, and social capital.

An illustration of the work funders did despite opposition to collaboration was explained by one community representative who said, "I'm pretty sure...whoever...worked on trying to get this group together cut a lot of deals. Just to get everybody in the room." The 'deals,' this participant went on to explain, were compromises on the number of seats environmental groups got versus timber interests, for example. Striking this balance of interests so that it was palatable to the participants was another way in which outside interests helped bring the group together. This point is made not to criticize the choices that the Roundtable organizers made, but to highlight one of the many challenges that the Roundtable faced from its beginning.

Besides the Roundtable funders, the primary groups considered outsiders by many participants were some of the conservation representatives—particularly those from outside the region. One Roundtable staffer said: "there was…people on the conservation side that…were new to the Tongass and…may not have grasped the nuances or the differences in the…region." While a Forest Service employee further explained that:

What really surprised me was of all the people that were on the Roundtable, the number of people that actually still live in Southeast Alaska that were gonna actually see the

results of the Roundtable, it's a pretty small group. There was a lot of people that had house payments out of State and were getting paid while they were running the Roundtable, and ultimately whatever came out of the Roundtable really didn't affect them whatsoever, which to me is sad.

This participant described how they felt that relatively few Roundtable participants would actually have to live with the decisions that the collaborative made because they did not actually live in Alaska. He alluded to the fact that the participants from out of State were mostly funders and conservationists from national organizations since those were the individuals "getting paid" in their roles as professional advocates. The implication is that outside participants had a different sort of interest or stake in the outcome of the Roundtable as compared with participants from Southeast Alaska.

One community representative described their frustration with a tourism representative living outside Alaska who was running a business in the Tongass:

You couldn't pass a resolution or anything unless it was unanimous. And there were certain people who sabotaged everything. One of them was the man that...lived in Washington...And see he had a tourist-based boat business. And he didn't live here. So he didn't care about the people in Alaska. Just his own personal business. I mean he didn't want logging, no mining, no nothing. He just wanted it left the same for his clientele. That was one of the big drawbacks.

This participant was explicit in her view that other people's outside interests meant that they were not taking into account the people who would be impacted by the decisions of the Roundtable, and how that dynamic impacted the group's ability to reach consensus.

Another way in which outside interests were perceived to play a large role in the Roundtable was through the influence of both state and national political agendas. Participants felt that the Tongass, as the largest National Forest in the country, had often been used as a political bargaining chip. One Forest Service employee described the Tongass' political relevance: History has shown that politics have been a significant player in Southeast Alaska. And I don't think that's going to end anytime soon. A lot of politicians, a lot of administrations get their environmental vote by what they do or don't do for Southeast Alaska and it doesn't cost [them] anything.

This participant explained that many presidential administrations make policies in the Tongass in order to gain support from either pro conservation or resource harvest constituents outside of Alaska, alluding to rational and procedural distrust of political motivations and systems on multiple levels related to past experiences with different presidential administrations. Another Forest Service employee explained that, "Some people would say...under the Obama administration...that was a politically driven agenda...I probably wouldn't disagree. I think with the Tongass...the administration has a very strong political influence on what happens as far as policy. And it's very politically driven." This perception of national political agendas influencing local National Forest management is related to the rational distrust that participants had towards federal government involvement in forest management, and specifically of the Forest Service. It also exemplifies procedural distrust or distrust in the political and legal system in which the process existed. Relatedly, one community representative said, "I have a real hard time with somebody who sits at a desk in DC...throwing arguments out there against somebody who's actually involved in the industry and actually does market the product and has boots on the ground." This participant echoed the sense that political appointees did not understand the region or the needs of local industry.

Participants also felt that pro-timber politics in the state of Alaska played a central role in the Roundtable. This was in direct contrast to the Obama Administration's efforts to transition away from old-growth clearcutting on the Tongass. During the early years of the Roundtable, then Governor Sarah Palin--described by one staffer as "kind of lik[ing] the idea of the whole Roundtable" and by another staffer "a disinterested governor" --was in office. As the participants

describe above, Palin was perceived as either disinterested or only somewhat supportive of the Roundtable. However, in 2009 Palin resigned and Lieutenant Governor Sean Parnell took office. Parnell was seen by some participants as far less supportive of the Roundtable and interested in aggressive timber harvest. Parnell directed the State to cease participation in the Roundtable and formed a timber jobs task force in 2011, citing insufficient progress on timber issues (KFSK Community Radio, 2011). One conservationist described the State's departure, saying:

The State was...Murkowski, Palin, Parnell. I mean these are not friends of the environment...so the State and [then] the industry walked out of the ring...basically said you're not addressing our needs quick enough...f\*\*\* you. People had been making efforts and it wasn't going fast enough and it certainly wasn't making logging economical and you know folks have this [idea that] if we could just get rid of those environmentalists but that wasn't necessarily the problem. The problem was that the industry had already taken the most economical logs.

A Roundtable staffer similarly described that, "Parnell's folks...were more partisan with the

timber industry. So, when there weren't timber industry results...they left, and that was a pretty

big blow." These participants felt that the State offered pro-industry individuals the opportunity

to operate without needing to compromise with conservationists. A KFSK Community Radio

(2011) story announcing the State's departure explained that the Task Force:

will look for new logging lands to add to the Southeast State Forest, which is managed for harvests. And it will work with the federal government on its timber sales. 'This is obviously still a partnership to try to come up with some different approaches to how the state can manage its lands and suggestions on how to continue implementing the 2008 Tongass Land Management Plan' Parnell says.

This departure of the State and many other participants from the Roundtable in order to focus exclusively on timber harvest increased distrust within the group.

An Alaska Native leader described this, saying "the Parnell...administration...pulled the plug on State involvement and essentially boycotted the Tongass Roundtable, and so the State voice went away...and created some mistrust among...some...groups because they have to live

and deal with the State." Specifically, the state withdrawal from the process increased procedural and rational distrust by delegitimizing the process itself and suggesting that there was no value in trusting the State to take care of non-timber needs. While the tension between outside interests, political motivations, and local perspectives fluctuated, the State leaving the Roundtable shifted the group toward more distrust. The State demonstrated to this participant that partisan timber issues took precedent over broader community well-being, reinforcing rational and procedural distrust of State entities from both conservationists and potentially some timber interests.

# Conflict and Distrust within the Conservation Community

A final way that interests outside the Roundtable increased distrust was through the fraught relationships between many conservationists and their organizations. Many conservation participants had minimal decision-making power and thus were unable to effectively negotiate on behalf of their organizations. Several conservationists described feeling betrayed by their own organizations when compromises they made during negotiations were not supported. Other participants, meanwhile, described the similar feelings of betrayal and increasing distrust in the motivations of conservation organizations. This was particularly problematic when conservationists who had built trust within the Roundtable were removed or forced to go back on their word by the organization they represented. A conservationist described the internal turmoil and lack of agreement in their organization:

So within [my organization] and the board, there were still those folks that were like 'why are we talking to the loggers, we need to fight every single [timber] sale.' And other folks were like 'I'm a logger, what are you talking about?...You know we said we wanted a sustainable small-scale timber industry and now it's time to live up to our word and this is our opportunity.' So organizationally there was internal...conflict even at board level. At that point in time we didn't have a strong leader organizationally who built a lot of trust and cohesion and that added to the turmoil. So, I was trying to navigate that and also...the nonprofit partners.

This participant highlighted the conflict and a lack of trust within that board, along with poor

organizational leadership, which limited their ability to function in good faith within the

Roundtable.

A conservationist described how lack of agreement within and between conservation

organizations increased distrust within that community:

That was ultimately one of the things that drove me out of the Roundtable and out of conservation was I took a risk and stepped out and talked about areas I would be okay with seeing continued timber industry in exchange for areas where I thought there would be some industry support for conservation. But...[my organization] or my conservation colleagues, they weren't letting me know I was getting out ahead of whatever bounds they had...it created rifts of distrust. One of the things that was hardest...was I felt like people who really trusted me within the conservation community...When I was in there advocating for conservation in a different way, and trying a different avenue to get to success, I felt like I lost their trust...all of a sudden all of my street cred of being very conservation oriented...You know it's like as if I just turned it off and no longer had those values anymore. And it was really hard for me to take that, sometimes direct, sometimes hearing through the grapevine that I was getting criticized for a lot of this. Not "you've got the wrong strategy" but criticizing values.

This participant explained how other conservationists no longer perceived them as trustworthy

and doubted their dedication, and how that distrust "drove them out of the Roundtable."

A representative from a timber reliant community explained how conflict within the

conservation community impacted trust within the Roundtable:

Unfortunately, and I'm not gonna mention names, but there were some of them...those people in the green organizations that actually did develop some trust with industry and stuff like that, they were virtually run off by their own organizations. And that's when people are concerned too much about the culture of this thing and not the reality of it. The green culture is that we don't want logging...they believe that the other end of it wants to log everything. And I know some people that would. But there are very few of them around. There are mostly people that want there to be enough to have a responsible industry.

Thus, the removal of specific participants due to conflict within the conservation community was

problematic because the trust established was affinitive between individual participants and did

not necessarily translate to trust between organizations or different interests. Another community representative described how these changes impacted trust and set back negotiations:

One of the other drawbacks was...with multiple environmental groups...that guy at Audubon Society...finally you could make him see that there needed to be some give. And the same with SEACC...where they were willing to compromise. And then...they'd go to a board meeting and they'd replace them. So, then you'd have to start all over again with a whole new person...you lost months and months of dialogue.

Thus, according to this participant, the impact of these decisions reached beyond affinitive trust

and impacted rational trust as well, because participants saw little utility in placing their trust in

organizations with high turnover on the Roundtable and inconsistent or ever-changing positions.

Further, it increased procedural distrust as it showed a lack of integrity with the Roundtable

system and design.

Relatedly, Roundtable participants recognized that consensus would be difficult to

achieve if participants did not have the support of the communities that they represented.

According to one Roundtable staffer:

In this era of how do you get consensus, people have to have grassroots, they have to have support in their community. Or the consensus that would help them come around or all the people would just be saying 'well who put you in charge of making this happen.' And there was probably not enough done to get that support at the local level. It was expected that the people who were on the Roundtable would go back to their communities and take that on. But I don't think that they did.

This staffer expected participants to report back to their communities and organize support for

Roundtable decisions. In the absence of these efforts, trust in some participants decreased.

Some participants described a specific instance of error--perceived by many as

manipulation--that resulted in an increase in skepticism from other participants towards

conservationists. A Roundtable Staffer described the event:

The environmental community really made a mistake at one Roundtable meeting. A [coalition of national conservation groups] did a big press release opposing the Sealaska exchange, and they released it in Washington DC the morning the Roundtable convened

in Juneau and nobody knew. None of the Native people knew, none of the environmental groups who weren't part of the groups who did the press release knew. So that issue was pretty, pretty sketchy, right?

The staffer framed this event as a mistake made by conservationists, particularly in that there was failure to communicate within the conservation community. They acknowledged that it was "pretty sketchy," implying that the decision to publish the article without letting others know was bad for those conservation organization's credibility. They further implied it was a betrayal of Alaska Natives. An Alaska Native leader described their reaction to the letter, confirming the staffer's perception that the event negatively affected stakeholder relationships:

One vivid thing I remember is when the environmentalists all signed a letter opposing our land legislation. And you know the process was that...we were supposed to talk about it and out comes a letter...But I do remember...challenging SEACC...And I asked why...that I thought we had agreed that we were going to...have discussions and then then they all signed this letter. So, I think that's probably when [my skepticism] all started.

Thus, while trust was built early in the process, events like this compromised that trust.

Although many Roundtable participants felt that they established trust and built relationships, distrust and conflict never completely disappeared. Several Roundtable members described trust following an arc, and levels changed throughout the process. One Roundtable staffer said:

It seemed to me that there was a little bit of an arc to the trust. That trust tended to be built and built and built and then there was...somewhere along the way kind of an optimum moment...and then it started to dissipate a little.

Several participants described initially having "hope" and thinking that they "were actually going to make progress" but that "trust dissipated" when it became clear that some groups were "not acting in good faith." One Roundtable staffer explained that, "It got to a point where...it just seemed like they hit a wall and they just couldn't make any more progress...they couldn't come to any kind of agreement...And when that occurred...basically the interest started to fall away

pretty quickly." One conservationist explained that knowing "they could not expect compromise from a number of people" meant that "there was no point in doing it anymore except for if you just thought it was a good time." At this point in the process, rational trust decreased quickly, overcoming affinitive and even procedural trust that had been built and the arc "dissipated" as a staffer described above.

# **Alaska Natives and Tongass Management**

The following section explores how historical trauma from the recent history of colonization in Alaska created distrust and frustration in the Alaska Native community. This context greatly influenced the arc of trust throughout the Roundtable process from dispositional, rational, and procedural distrust present in the beginning, to rational, affinitive, and procedural trust and distrust later in the process. Specifically, I discuss the ways in which the repercussions of colonization and ANCSA shaped perceptions and trust coming into the Roundtable and ultimately the trajectory of the collaborative as a whole. I also explore the repercussions of these feelings on settling a land allocation for Alaska Natives and the ways that it stoked conflict between Alaska Natives and other participants moving forward, as well as changed perspectives about land management frameworks in the region.

# Repercussions of Colonization and ANCSA: 'A legal claim...nothing to do with justice"

Both Native and non-Native participants described the Roundtable through the lens of historic dispossession, injustice, and trauma in Alaska Native communities, connecting Roundtable negotiations to ongoing challenges related to ANCSA. One conservation and community advocate described some of these impacts of those challenges and the failure to sufficiently address them early in the Roundtable process:

Not enough at all attention was given to the historical trauma delivered by the colonization of this region. And that leads to ANCSA...the good and the bad of

ANCSA...still happening today...The villages are in very, very rough shape. Suicide and family abuse, drug and alcohol addiction. It's off the charts and it has everything to do with historical trauma. So, imagine going into a community and assembling a roundtable to figure out how to fix the ferry [system]. And not dealing with the trauma that has led to the conditions, the social, psychological, and economic conditions in these villages. You might come up with a ferry plan but...I don't know how meaningful that really is going to be...to the actual stability of the community going forward.

This participant felt that meaningful acknowledgement and attempts at healing the trauma caused

by the colonization of Southeast Alaska to its original inhabitants was largely missing at the start

of the Roundtable. They further explained that failure to address the trauma in any context

historically has largely created the serious social and economic problems many small

communities in the region face and that specific fixes to address issues like transportation in

small communities were largely overlooking causality of bigger issues. The Roundtable started

off using the same model of finding a specific fix, an approach that may have led to some of the

challenges it faced later on.

This perspective from a non-native participant largely mirrored what an Native leader

described as their experiences and perspectives in light of ANCSA:

[There is the whole] Native [cohort] that came out of a village and didn't have Native spirituality...[we] spent our whole lives as corporate executives trying to make ANCSA work. You know there's a very different sensibility...and I still carry some resentment...now granted there was some progress...You know we're viable socially, we're viable traditionally, we're viable culturally. And Native communities aren't gonna go away. But they've been stripped in many ways of their ability to have viable long-term economies that are scaled to their needs and their culture. And so it's very much a justice issue. All of these institutions have consciously ignored that reality. And you can look at the Native Claims Settlement Act and say well shit, you guys got yours. Well that was a legal claim to land that had nothing to do with justice. At least the justice for people who continue to have needs that are built not upon their lack of capacity, but on the lack of institutional and societal response that has gone on since contact. And at the very least since the creation of the Tongass National Forest.

Among other things, this participant pointed out that with ANCSA, appropriate economic drivers

have been taken away by non-Native institutions and community needs ignored, creating a social

justice issue. Finally, they argue that ANCSA was not a just settlement, only resolution of a legal claim. It failed to provide for community needs by not providing systematic support, which likely increased procedural distrust. These frustrations all came to light during the Roundtable, fundamentally shifting power dynamics and discussions in the collaborative.

While there continues to be debate both within and outside the Alaska Native community about the dynamic between Native corporate structure and traditional cultural values, another

Alaska Native leader argued that Sealaska does reflect traditional Native values:

We have our core cultural value of haa aani and haa aani talks about protecting and honoring and it's actually even more than that. It's almost revering...the land. But...we didn't want people to think that we were worshipping the land. So we were very careful in in the words that we used...we talked about protecting our land, honoring our land but at the same time also utilizing our land. And then we tie it together with our other core cultural value of haa shuka that talks about our ancestors, our bonds to our ancestors and then our obligations to our future generations. So when you take those two core cultural values together haa aani and haa shuka, we know that it's our job to protect our land so that our future generations will also have access to the same resources... then the other the other core cultural value that we applied was haa latseen, our strength or strength of body mind and spirit, and strength of mind became the strength of science. Having an education, learning applying science to our utilization of the land, that's what we did. Sealaska ended up adopting our own land policy based on these core cultural values and it talked about sustainability and we actually went through the metrics of saying well how do we ensure that our timber harvests are sustainable.

While this participant described alignment between Sealaska management strategies and Alaska

Native cultural values, many participants described them being at odds in practice. One

conservationist explained:

I would go into Prince of Wales Island when Byron was still the head of Sealaska, or responsible for Sealaska. And they were cutting 5 million board feet a year or something...And I had a really difficult time reconciling that with...speeches about how every tree in the forest is sacred. 'We ask for permission before we cut it down.' I mean Rosita Worl would say that stuff at the Roundtable. It just didn't ring true to me personally. And I think that had a huge impact on my perspective.

This perceived dichotomy between what was said by Alaska Native leaders about land

stewardship and how the land was actually managed colored many conservationists'

perspectives. According to this participant, a sense of dishonesty or misrepresentation on the part of Sealaska had a big impact on conservation views about corporate management. However, a Forest Service employee explained some of the social context behind Sealaska's timber management policies:

With ANCSA...corporations...there are some 2000 to 3000 acre...clearcuts that happened during that time. And I'm not blaming anybody because the Native corporations, they got this chunk of land and there is nothing there to create income and if they don't have some sort of income then the corporation can't survive. So, there was some...over-cutting done there, a lot, ok...to have economic viability.

This participant described how ANCSA corporations did lots of overcutting of areas of their settlement land. However, they clarified that it is important to consider the historical context of this action, as the corporations had to create income in order to survive, and timber was the resource available to them.

The implication that Sealaska Corporation was being managed primarily according to cultural values of the Tlingit people and was synonymous with traditional spirituality was seen by some participants as problematic in other ways. As one conservation advocate said, "I don't necessarily view Sealaska as particularly [Alaska Native]. Representatives there at that time...I think they were representative of the corporation which is different than Native views. Native values." A similar sentiment was echoed by a Forest Service employee who said, "the tribes and the corporations are very different, and they don't always see eye to eye on issues." It is important to reiterate that the Alaska Native leaders interviewed for this thesis had previously been or are currently in high-level management positions within the Sealaska corporation. They were not specifically representing Sealaska on the Roundtable and there was a non-indigenous Sealaska representative, but to many participants these Alaska Native participants were considered synonymous with the Sealaska corporation.

The tension between the Sealaska corporation and broader Alaska Native interests and conservationists came to a head again during the Roundtable partially due to ANCSA. During the Roundtable, Sealaska was in the process of getting the last of their promised ANSCA land from within the Tongass (approximately 70,000 acres not selected during the initial passage of the legislation) (USFS, n.d.). Some conservationists felt that the actions Sealaska took with regard to this final land allotment --exchanging lands as well as selecting new ones during the time of the Roundtable--were problematic. A conservationist described this tension:

Sealaska comes in and goes well we want to give up some of these lands and take these [other] lands because we were unfairly treated and you stole the Tongass from us...On the one hand I mean yes people understood we need to fulfill the ANCSA deal and give them what [was agreed on]...[But] the fact that they wanted to do something different than that and that it would...benefit them economically and harm us environmentally was problematic, was... complicated.

This conservationist described their perception of Sealaska's argument, saying that they felt they should be able to exchange lands because the whole Tongass had been stolen from Tlingit, Haida, or Tsimshian tribes. They further said that while conservationists understood that the ANCSA deal needed to be honored, they also did not feel comfortable with the deal because of the economic benefit to the Sealaska and ecological cost. This disagreement over the legal and political process for addressing the land claims issue demonstrates procedural distrust from both Alaska Natives and conservationists.

Many participants, however, reported their perception of this issue shifting dramatically partway through the Roundtable. One Alaska Native leader described what they shared during the Roundtable that instigated this shift:

After several years, I began to become disenchanted with the process because as a Native Alaskan I feel very strongly that the Tongass is...very much about, the place, the time, the traditions, the history, the future of the Tlingit and Haida people who live in the Tongass. And I look at it from the perspective of justice, where during...the development of the Tongass, Native communities...have seen over generations...their rights and their

capacity to live a traditional life in the Tongass be continually diminished...and I...was pretty adamant...that the Tongass is a Native place. And, I saw...a conscious effort to dehumanize the Tongass in the larger context of the environmental community...and make it have no human face...It was from the Tongass Roundtable that the whole notion of the Tongass as a Salmon Forest resulted. With the advent of a book...funded by one of the NGOs...to explain the history of the Tongass...The name of the book was *Salmon in the Trees*. And...the Native perspective...was consciously and grossly diminished...So my view of the result of the Tongass Roundtable was that salmon became the face of the Tongass, not Native people. And I believe that that was consciously done...to keep nature, nature.

As the Roundtable continued, this Alaska Native leader felt less positive about the process due to the failure to sufficiently acknowledge the regional history and the status of the Tongass as the homeland of Southeast Alaska Natives, further demonstrating procedural distrust. Also, as they further explained, there was the perception that conservationists were specifically framing Tongass issues as solely about ecological and Wilderness values, in particular as a salmon forest. The idea that the conservation agenda at the time was purposefully excluding a Tongass narrative that adequately included indigenous communities was a criticism this participant brought forward during the Roundtable, causing a dramatic shift in the collaborative group's priorities.

Many participants described the particular meeting, calling it "the famous Anchorage meeting," in which one of the Alaska Native participants made an "impassioned" speech, or as several participants described it, a "blow up," that was a "game changer" for the Roundtable.

One staffer described the circumstances of the meeting:

There was an attempt at a big land allocation recommendation from the Roundtable. This was really a pivotal moment...there was a working group looking at land allocation...It came up with a recommendation to...the full Roundtable that was going to be presented. And at that meeting to the surprise of the members of the working group...Sealaska essentially blew up the presentation...The Native people there did. And some incredible speeches were made about it...[two Alaska native particiants] both spoke to address the recommendation. And I think the timber industry and the environmentalists...I think we were all kind of stunned because we didn't see it coming.

As this participant explained, a Roundtable working group made a recommendation of land allocations to the other participants which was derailed unexpectedly by Alaska Native leaders. The shock this staffer described demonstrates how unaware other stakeholders were of the Alaska Native community's frustration with the existing Roundtable narrative.

The frustration of Alaska Natives was described by one community representative:

[It was a] shocking discussion that fundamentally changed the orientation of the working group. And the blowup was really an outburst by an [an Alaska Native leader], who, looking around the room and seeing all these predominantly white folks who were either environmentalists or with the industry talking about Southeast Alaska and not acknowledging that Southeast Alaska was fundamentally a Native place. And that was somewhat of an ah ha moment that we realized we needed to address both directly in making sure that we were hearing Native voices, that we were going to Native communities, but more importantly that we would see the Tongass through Native eyes.

This community representative explained that this "blowup" or "outburst" changed the trajectory

of the land allocation conversation dramatically because it introduced the theme of colonization

and removal of Native peoples from their lands. One Roundtable staffer described it as:

It hit me about two days later...the whole Tongass timber issue was essentially a colonialist debate. It was the euro-American timber industry, white environmentalists, white-run agencies...So the 20th century issue was essentially about what white people wanted to do with the Tongass...A great deal of it was their land, they had ties to all this land that everyone else is drawing lines on maps.

Previously the conversation had centered on how to divvy up the Tongass for timber and

conservation interests, but this trajectory refocused on the discussion on incorporating Native

perspectives and experiences in Tongass management decisions.

Participants responded in a variety of ways to this demand for a reframing of Tongass

National Forest management. Some participants felt frustrated, arguing that while this Alaska

Native leader's arguments had merit, they did not belong in the context of the Roundtable. A

Roundtable staffer explained that:

I think that it created some challenges for the group to move forward...Some people felt like that was inappropriate...the whole idea of the Roundtable...was to try to come to some kind of terms...for timber and that was interjecting a whole different subject into it. Not that there wasn't a basis for it but, I think that that's...when some of the groups started to fall away, and the tone of the Roundtable did take a turn...towards...cultural and Native issues.

This staffer explained their perception that some participants were unhappy with the elevation of

Alaska Native justice issues in the Roundtable because it was "changing the focus...the initial

purpose." They further explained that some participants became less involved as the Roundtable

focused more on cultural and Alaska Native issues. Another participant explained how the idea

of "the Tongass as a Native place" was not received well by all participants. A non-Native

Sealaska representative said:

There was a lot of controversy. There were people going, wait a minute, I live here too. As soon as [someone says] this is a Native place, if you're not Native, you feel excluded...There was a lot of dialog around that and some very heated discussions...there was a lot of resistance and people were going wait a minute, what the hell, what are you talking about?

This participant explained that this reframing was contested by many participants, and new lines

of conflict emerged as a result. However, just as some participants "didn't get it" other

participants described profound changes in their perspectives. One conservationist said:

The Sealaska stuff and the realization that, how many times [have] I said we're protecting the integrity of public lands? What fucking bullshit because we stole those public lands...from people who had a right to them. And we've given them shit. And now how do you address it...that's a whole other question and a difficult problem, but...for me who's worked as a conservationist for [so long], to acknowledge the lie that public lands for public benefit was premised on stealing. It makes me feel uncomfortable.

This participant explained questioning and rethinking the premise on which they had based most

of their career-the importance of protecting public lands. This raised complex and

uncomfortable questions for them as they considered how to move forward.

# Sealaska Lands Bill: 'Every acre of the Tongass is precious to someone'

The conflict over reframing the Tongass as Native land, and rethinking colonial structures came to head over the Sealaska Lands Bill--the settlement of the final ANCSA land allocations mentioned in the previous section. Reflecting back on the process, participants disagreed about whether or not the passage of the bill should be considered a success of the Roundtable. Specifically, there was disagreement about whether or not the final bill used recommendations from the Roundtable or largely ignored them. While this was not a topic covered by many participants, it does merit a brief discussion as some participants said deciding what lands were available for the Sealaska Land allocation was a topic of great conflict during the Roundtable. The following is an excerpt from a Roundtable participant and Alaska Native leader testifying to the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee during a hearing about the Sealaska Lands Bill. One Senator expressed concern that the Roundtable was not playing a more central role in the resolution of conflict over the bill since it represents most regional stakeholder views. The participant responded thus:

After 3 years of effort, at its last meeting...last week the Tongass Futures Roundtable had presented to it by a working committee the conceptual draft of what is called the grand solution [of land allocation]...Any thinking person would recognize that this is a multi-year process, that if it were to be approved by the Tongass Futures Roundtable at its next meeting, which it surely would not, that it would take probably 5 or 6 years for us to get to a point where some or all of it were to be made into law, because almost all of it would require action by this Congress. The Sealaska Land Selections Act, as you pointed out, is ready now. We have had some 150 meetings with communities, institutions, significantly affected individuals within the Tongass...We have made clear in the [Roundtable] process that we very much desire and will act as aggressively as possible to make sure that our bill, which is significantly different from what the [Roundtable] is trying to achieve in that it is a settlement of our land claims and that it is based upon prior existing obligations—in spite of that, Sealaska has continued to work very extensively with every interest, both at the table and in the communities of Southeast, and will continue to do so (Miscellaneous Lands Bills, 2009).

As this Alaska Native leader clearly stated in his testimony, Sealaska felt that the Roundtable was not an appropriate venue for setting the terms or agreeing upon the final land settlement--it

was an issue outside its scope. He also implied that the decision should not be subject to the Roundtable and require the group's agreement or buy-in. He explained that while perspectives from the Roundtable were important, the timetable of the Roundtable as a forum for the settlement was too inefficient and required too much debate and Sealaska would do whatever was needed to make sure the bill passed.

There was a perception from conservationists that Sealaska should have used the Roundtable as the venue for the land settlement. As one conservationist explained,

When it became pretty clear that [Sealaska was] not planning to use the Roundtable process to craft their legislation it was just like, well, now what's the point [of the Roundtable]. Now it's just asking the loggers. And there's like really nothing that either of us gains [from continuing to participate in the process].

This participant believed that because there was little progress being made on other fronts, the Sealaska Lands Bill was one of the last big potential areas where the Roundtable might forge a compromise. However, as the Alaska Native leader explained in his testimony, and this conservation advocate confirmed, ultimately Sealaska dashed hopes that Roundtable stakeholders would have extensive input in the final bill. This conservationists' perspective also reflected the continuing tension between colonial public land management and Native sovereignty. While the Alaska Native leader pointed out that the lands bill was based on previous legal obligations between the State and the Native community, conservationists seemed to feel that it should be addressed in the same way that other allocations were during the time of the Roundtable.

Some participants felt that the Roundtable had some influence on the bill, and even that it could be considered a success of the collaborative. As one community representative said,

I think...particularly resolving the Sealaska lands issue was actually a major milestone. And I was disappointed in [Senator] Murkowski cherry-picking basically what was emerging as...a helpful deal, basically saying 'we'll do the Sealaska lands portion of it but we will not counterbalance it with a major extension of protection of other lands'...Nevertheless, [it] has allowed for a lot more peace in the valley.

This participant explained that Sealaska's push to be able to choose lands outside the original ANCSA selection area (which included substantial old growth forest) caused conservationists to push back and demand an increase in conservation protections for other parts of the Tongass. The Sealaska lands working group recommended a land allocation that was generally amenable to conservationists, but it partly instigated the Alaska Native leader's speech at the Anchorage meeting and received strong push back from the Alaska Native community. This participant further mentioned, however, that although the outcome was disappointing to conservationists, they felt that overall it was positive in that it reduced conflict between stakeholders. Another participant associated with Sealaska felt that the bill was a major success of the Roundtable:

The [Roundtable] became the foundation by which Sealaska was able to actually come together with a land bill package that was acceptable to most people. The saying 'every acre of the Tongass is precious to someone'...that was just something you had to battle for and you had to work through. So, what we were able to do was...find a way that the conservation organizations and Sealaska could reach an agreement and...the timber industry and the Forest Service could all reach a general agreement on what land would be acceptable for conveyance to Sealaska...And [that] ultimately became the foundation of the final land bill.

This participant's perception was that the Roundtable played an integral role in shaping the land bill by outlining what was generally acceptable to most participants. Although the Roundtable's exact recommendation was not used, this participant felt that it did have influence on the final bill and can be considered a positive outcome of the collaborative group. This suggests an interesting reversal in how the federal government generally consults with indigenous communities when making decisions about land allocation and use. In this case, rather than the government receiving input from a Native population and then making a decision, Sealaska corporation received input from the Roundtable. Some of this they used, some they did not, indicating a unique power dynamic that continues to play out in the region today.

### Aftermath of the Roundtable

#### Post-Roundtable Reflections: "Solving the Tongass...that was never going to happen"

Participants had varying perspectives on the whether or not the Roundtable was a success or failure. While there was nearly unanimous agreement that the Roundtable disbanded without meeting its original goals, some participants felt that there were still generally positive outcomes that are still helping steer the region in a direction of more equitable and diverse economic and environmental management. Many participants were hesitant to call it a failure, but felt that beyond building better relationships, little came of the process. A few others felt that it accomplished next to nothing or even had more negative outcomes than positive ones. Conservationists seemed to feel the most positive about the process while the timber industry associates felt the most negative.

In terms of finding the "grand solution" or the "golden key" for Tongass management, one conservationist said, "the real goal was to try to reform management of the Tongass writ large...we're still fighting to come up with some grand bargain to pass through Congress. And that's just not happening." Most participants felt that the Roundtable made no progress toward changing Tongass management. Further, they felt little progress had been made since the Roundtable. As an Alaska Native leader said, "I think if you look at the [current] Roadless issue it says we're still as divided as when we first got together." The lines of conflict largely remain the same, according to many participants.

One representative from a Native corporation explained their perceptions on the outcomes of the Roundtable:

The main thing is that I don't think it failed. I think it was the right thing to do at the right time, and that...it then built the foundation...to some other things. Now some things have failed...we're still litigating over timber sales, there's still no sustainable timber program, there's still a debate over when and how to transition to second growth, but some of those probably weren't going to get solved anyhow because they're so complex and the economics are so difficult...in the grand scheme of things of solving the Tongass and making everybody happy, that was never going to happen anyhow...What was accomplished may not have been in the initial goals of the group, but...these sidebars that came off...were very positive to the region.

As this participant explains, the Roundtable may have laid the groundwork for natural resource

management and collaborative successes that have happened in the region since by starting to

build some positive relationships.

Relatedly, a conservationist described how there was perhaps also better understanding

built by conservation interests about what their priorities were as well as understanding needs of

other stakeholders:

I don't know if there was ever an actual breakthrough, but...I really appreciated in particular [some members] consistently presenting the science. But it was kind of like while they might not have agreed with it, at least there seemed to be an understanding of why the conservation groups were looking to have these certain areas protected... I [also] gained a much better understanding of what it meant to have an economical timber sale on the Tongass. Really what the needs of the timber industry were from their perspective.

This conservation representative's description of creating better understanding through

presentation of information underlines what the Native corporation executive said in the previous

paragraph. While there was never agreement on a "grand bargain," there was mutual

understanding built over why conservation groups were pushing protections where they were,

and what the timber industry needed in order to stay viable.

Several participants had a much more negative view of the Roundtable overall.

Generally, they were timber industry representatives or from communities that had historically

relied on the timber industry. As one community representative described:

A lot of people had put a lot of themselves into this thing and the end result, there was a couple of positive things that came out of it, but it was an exercise in futility...I've had people who come up to me with a big smile on their face and say oh, we want to run this just like the Tongass Roundtable and I look at them like, are you serious? Do you know anything about the Tongass Roundtable?...Anybody that's telling you that that thing went smooth either has brain damage or is lying.

This participant highlighted the common sentiment the Roundtable was an exercise in frustration and "futility." Another community representative said, "I think things have pretty much gone back to the way they were. And they've pretty much killed the logging industry because most of the infrastructure is gone," suggesting that any progress made by the Roundtable has not been durable. Specifically, this participant believes that conservationists work during the Roundtable was partially responsible for the continued reduction of the timber industry in Southeast Alaska. Yet another community representative said that there are still "lawsuits [with]...anything that the Forest Service does. There's still opposition to any kind of timber industry...I don't think anything's changed. The way the Forest Service is doing things might have changed [because the new] Forest Plan...made it more restrictive. This participant implied that the arc of Tongass management has been towards a more environmentally restrictive regulatory environment at the cost of the timber industry. Further, they saw the Forest Service as becoming less friendly to the timber industry. While some of these perceptions were perhaps not directly blaming the Roundtable, they were certainly seen as happening in conjunction with or being encouraged by it.

#### Alaska Natives and Changing Dynamics: "The conversation itself was important"

Many participants agreed that one of the most important outcomes of the Roundtable was the shift in broader acknowledgement and appreciation of Alaska Native history and involvement in the Tongass, as discussed in Chapter 3. As one conservation advocate said: The original goals...a grand bargain to put all the Tongass Wars to bed through federal legislation: I think if you ask most of the funders that were involved...if you look at the amount of resource and the amount of energy they put into it...on that level, that standard it was an abject failure. But...if you look at it from a long-term view it may have been pretty successful in some interesting, totally unintended ways...maybe the most important thing is...that we've moved beyond this sort of binary relationship with the primary landowner in the region which also happens to be a group of people that have lived here forever. So maybe that's the best thing.

This participant explains how, although using the metric of the original goals of the Roundtable,

it was a failure, there were some long-term, unplanned successes. They particularly highlight the

shift in the relationship between Native corporations and non-Natives due to the Roundtable. An

Alaska Native leader further described how the Roundtable at least somewhat helped to further

their community's agenda:

I did not...come away from the process with a feeling of dejection. I was very upset that none of the things that many of us in the Native leadership at the Roundtable [hoped to achieve, we] were able to achieve, but we did plant some seeds, as I said. And we did create some relationships with the environmental community and agencies that are still there. And I think over time will be important.

This participant confirmed the perspective of the conservationist that the Roundtable achieved

some unexpected outcomes through better relationships and new ideas.

A non-Native Sealaska representative described their perceptions about how the

Roundtable helped to shape a regional culture that is more inclusive and celebratory of Alaska

Native presence:

I just walked the river trail [in Juneau], and they [have signs with] river trail names and they're basically using Native names to describe the area because Natives used the place. So, people have generally accepted [the idea of the Tongass as a Native place], and...part of that was because of...the Forest Service leaders going, you know you're right. We haven't really paid respect to the original inhabitants here and the fact that all these historic sites and cultural sites that we're protecting aren't really historic sites, they belong to these people and this is a very dynamic...Native Culture...I would take some of that back to the [Roundtable].

This participant explained a perception of some of the way that regional attitudes and culture have shifted since the Roundtable. They specifically tied these shifts to work done during the Roundtable to improve acknowledgement and understanding of regional history, highlighting a specific outcome of the collaborative.

Participants also discussed an institutional shift that was gaining traction within Sealaska as the Roundtable progressed. One conservation advocate described this, saying:

There was a [Roundtable] subcommittee that [a specific Alaska Native leader] precipitated in. This is when [the organization] Haa Ani was born...It's a Tlingit phrase that means our land...Byron was pitching to the Sealaska board that they needed to create a subsidiary within Sealaska that was more grounded in their cultural traditions and values. And they ended up doing that and they called it Haa Ani. And that was happening during the Roundtable...Byron was giving voice to that and basically saying...Sealaska is changing and trying to sort of lead the group toward change as being an ok place to go.

As this participant described, during the Roundtable, Alaska Native corporate leadership was

recognizing the need for a more concrete avenue to celebrate and encourage traditional cultural

values. The participant further explained that this Alaska Native leader recognized the need for

change in how Sealaska was run and began to lead the organization in a better direction.

# Other Outcomes and Regional Changes in Perceptions: "A lot has borne fruit"

Some participants described other, smaller scale accomplishments credited to the

Roundtable. One staffer explained that:

All these agreements [that the Roundtable did make]...There were things like how to spend money on restoration, how to deal with the money that came in in the stimulus act to create jobs on the Tongass and in the woods. Things about particular collaborative stewardship efforts, things that the Roundtable suggested the Forest Service should do to further recognize and empower Native history in the Tongass. There were about 15 things that we put a lot of time into, getting everybody comfortable with a joint recommendation and they were significant, but they were small to medium-sized items and they didn't get to security and economy of timber supply or big new conservation designations or things like that...but...the things the Roundtable agreed on were instrumental to bringing jobs to communities...And...money to do collaborative work on thinning and watershed restoration and forest inventory.

This participant described a variety of accomplishments of the Roundtable that gained little attention because they were not "the grand bargain." However, these agreements demonstrate that participants were able to work together and collaborate to some extent, despite not meeting original goals. This implies that there was some level of trust retained through the process.

A conservation advocated described a specific organizational outcome of the Roundtable and their perceptions about success:

I do believe that the Roundtable was extremely important to our region's social evolution and was not a failure...it was just a step in the direction we needed to go. And we're still going in that direction...for me what it looks like today is called the Sustainable Southeast Partnership (SSP)...And it now includes a lot more diversity in terms of ethnicity, social background, economic background, what size community you live in. Which is the point of the work: it's just much more holistic, much more inclusive. It's still is missing on many fronts but it's much better than what we were trying to do back then, much more relevant to both the social and ecological resilience of our region.

As this participant explained, the Roundtable did help to inspire work that was more focused on broad community sustainability and inclusivity. It provided an arena for reflexivity that has led to more representative and community-focused work that incorporates lessons learned from the Roundtable.

Another outcome mentioned by a few participants was that "we got an agreement that

bridge timber was important." Bridge timber refers to the idea that in order for the timber

industry be economically viable, some old growth forest must be harvested until second growth

forest is ready. As another community representative further explained:

I remember presentations in silviculture that Sealaska put forward for example. How does one transition from an old growth to new growth harvesting, and at what point could one rely on the new growth to keep the industry alive? And how much was one willing to sacrifice old growth to get to that transition? So there was a lot of discussion on that level. A lot of discussion about trying to keep watersheds intact as a way of [compromise]...and coming up with projects like thinning...I think part of it was trying to demonstrate to some of the die-hard timber folks that there was an industry that could take place but it was on a different scale and that also it could mean local employment...

And the Roundtable helped informed the Forest Service about the viability of these kinds of projects and I think it's become pretty standard now.

The participant described how there was some compromise and mutual understanding created in that it was, in fact, not economically viable for the industry to immediately stop all old growth cutting and transition instantly to new growth harvest. According to this participant, generally, that became an accepted fact in the region and some conservationists were willing to agree to less strict transition guidelines in order to help support the regional timber industry.

Finally, a participant mentioned that an important outcome was the formation of the Tongass Advisory Committee or TAC. The TAC was an official Federal Advisory Committee under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). According to one funder:

I think there was...some sense...from the side of the Feds that it needed to be more official. So...they set up the official [FACA] committee. And so I think there was some of that and there was also some sense that...to the extent that there had been progress in forming...coalitions of the willing--basically people that had found common ground on specific things that they could do together, that in many ways they could do it without continuing the broader vehicle of the Roundtable. And I think some of those things did seem to bear fruit in a good and useful way.

This participant described how the TAC was in many ways a continuation of the work of the Roundtable, but in a more officially sanctioned setting. According to the USFS website, "emphasizing the need for collaboration, creative and publicly owned solutions to forest management on the Tongass, USDA formally established a Federal Advisory Committee to advise the Secretary and Chief on transitioning the Tongass NF to young growth forest management" (USFS, n.d.). The TAC, which included some of the more "coalitions of the willing" participants from the Roundtable, along with many new stakeholder representatives worked together to craft solutions for the Tongass Forest Plan Amendment. The focus on new growth transition was, as previously mentioned, brought to light as an important regional issue during the Roundtable.

# **Chapter VI: CONCLUSION**

The results of this study suggest that there were a number of factors at play in the ultimate failure of the Tongass Futures Roundtable to reach its goals-despite some perceived positive outcomes cited by participants, and that trust and distrust ebbed and flowed throughout the process. Further, this study demonstrated that some dimensions of trust may be present without others (i.e. affinitive without rational) and sufficient levels of one may not be enough to overcome levels of another type of distrust. There were also findings in this research in which trust was only a component of an issue or irrelevant. Therefore, while the trust lens provides insight into the Tongass conflict, it is not sufficient for understanding the conflict or failure of the Roundtable on its own. These findings include lack of motivation to participate or reach consensus in the first place, lack of legitimacy for many participants who were not the decisionmakers for their organizations and the resulting lack of agreement within stakeholder groups. Also, the legal context and goals of the gubernatorial and presidential administrations, and inappropriately using the Roundtable to address ANCSA land claims rather than setting up a venue specifically to address that issue were problematic in ways far beyond trust issues. However, understanding the role of trust within the context of all of these issues does provide new insight into the Tongass conflict and adds to practitioner understanding of the role of trust and distrust in collaboration.

Procedural trust or trust in a fair and consistent process (e.g. ground rules, ways of communicating respectfully) (Coleman & Stern, 2014; Davenport, Leahy, Anderson & Jakes, 2007; Davis, Cerveny, Ulrich, & Nuss, 2018) was generally present, particularly at the beginning of the process. As previously discussed, the Roundtable in many ways operated according to current best practices for collaborative groups. Beierle & Konisky (2000) found that good process can build trust and resolve conflict despite poor preexisting relationships. For example, the decision to operate based on consensus took into consideration the importance of equitable representation, inclusivity, and control over decision-making (Orth & Cheng, 2018; Levesque, Calhoun, Bell & Johnson, 2017; Blumenthal & Jannink, 2000). Participants reported wanting to know that they could stop something if they did not agree with it, and 100% consensus was the only way for them to feel confident that they would be able to do so during the Roundtable process.

Roundtable participants described a variety of types of trust (and distrust) throughout the process, and trust was perceived to increase at the outset before decreasing later on. One of the biggest challenges was overcoming preexisting distrust based on decades of adversarial relationships and the legal and political systems within which the Tongass conflict existed, creating preexisting procedural distrust. Participants did not trust each other coming into the process largely based on past history and interactions. This could be characterized as rational distrust (Stern & Coleman, 2018; Davis, Ulrich and Nuss 2018) in which knowledge about a participant that leads people to believe there is a high likelihood of a negative outcome from trusting that individual. There were also components of dispositional distrust at play early in the Roundtable. As Stern and Coleman (2018) describe, "it can be context or trustee specific, as in the tendency to trust someone with a particular title or outer form of authority...for no other reason than that person's position" (p. 122). In the case of the Roundtable, many participants described what could be considered their own dispositional distrust based on a long-term propensity to distrust of individuals representing the Forest Service, conservationists, and timber based on the organization they represented because of career-long negative interactions. However, at the same time, there was also a level of rational trust present from the beginning

since participants did after all agree to join the Roundtable. In other words, many participants felt that there was something to be gained by working with one another and participating in the collaborative process.

Affinitive trust or trust based on emotional connection, shared values and likability is a crucial component of collaborative success according to many sources (Davis, Cerveny, Ulrich, & Nuss, 2018; Lachapelle & McCool, 2012). It was described by many participants as developing as the process progressed and individuals got to know one another. This was achieved through the extended periods of time participants spent together during weekend-long meetings getting know one another and discovering shared values and interests. However, despite its importance, affinitive trust was insufficient to overcome different interests and positions. Participants described how they went from disliking another participant to really enjoying their company, but they still fundamentally disagreed on most issues and were unable to reach agreement.

The inability of affinitive trust to overcome differences in interests and positions mirrors findings from Rudeen et al. (2012) suggesting that although participants may gain understanding, empathy, and respect for one another, if their values and positions are fundamentally at odds, substantive compromise may be unachievable. While Rudeen does not apply the same trust framework to their research, they describe affinitive trust, supporting my finding that building strong affinitive trust was not enough to overcome other barriers to collaboration and demonstrating an important exception to the body of research claiming the importance of trust in collaboration success. For the Roundtable, affinitive trust may not have been enough to overcome barriers due to the dogmatic nature of some timber and conservation organizations and the long-held, entrenched positions and lines of conflict.

A similar barrier to collaboration as pointed out by Schultz, et al. (2019), was the importance of appropriate project scale in successful collaboration. As discussed at previously, the Roundtable's goals were broad, wide-ranging, and applied to the Tongass as a whole. Literature on collaboration demonstrates that starting with smaller pilot projects helps build relationships between stakeholders and increases likelihood of collaborative success with larger projects later on (Metcalf, et al., 2015). This finding implies that the Roundtable might have been more successful if it had begun with smaller projects to build relationships and trust between participants before diving into large, landscape scale projects and decision-making. By starting with the most fraught and complex projects, participants were forced back into existing lines of conflict without ever having a chance to work together on more neutral projects.

The Roundtable also failed to achieve consensus because conservationists, timber interests, and Sealaska corporation all had better alternatives to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). Therefore, they may have lacked sufficient motivation to reach an agreement, which might have decreased rational trust as participants may have seen decreasing utility in trusting one another to work toward compromise. Motivation to reach agreement is important component of successful collaboration (Bingham 1986, Hossu 2018).

The departure of the State from the Roundtable in May of 2011 and subsequent creation of a timber task force was described as the "beginning of the end of the Roundtable" since that removed a significant portion of stakeholders, making widespread agreement impossible. The task force provided a BATNA to timber industry stakeholders that seemed more viable than any work the Roundtable was accomplishing. Meanwhile, some conservationists discussed that retrospectively they probably had the social capital and political support during the Obama administration to achieve bigger conservation gains through litigation and legislation. There were

several conservation representatives who were seen as never willing to compromise or agree to anything proposed by the group. Specifically, one participant even discussed that the amount of money which conservation funders put into the Roundtable could have achieved more if it had been used in more traditional advocacy ways.

Sealaska's action with the final ANSCA land settlement--making final decisions about land selection outside the purview of the Roundtable--demonstrates that Sealaska also had a BATNA that was preferable to an agreement forged by the Roundtable. This action was described with frustration by some Roundtable participants, who framed it as a continuation of poor stewardship practices during the height of the old-growth logging area and manipulation of legislation for financial gain. However, as discussed in the results, the fact that some Roundtable participants felt that they should have influence over the land settlement was a major point of contention that catalyzed deeper recognition of Alaska Native history and rights. Ultimately, analysis of the different BATNAs demonstrates how they influence power dynamics in potentially unexpected ways in a collaborative process, and therefore merit careful consideration throughout process design and implementation.

As the Roundtable progress, design elements that initially fostered trust became problematic. For example, while consensus-based decision-making helped to build procedural trust early on, ultimately it created more rational distrust because people perceived others as using the consensus model to block proposals that most stakeholders had agreed on. By trying to maximize inclusivity, individuals and stakeholder groups were included in the Roundtable who were perhaps never planning to compromise. This compounded the effects of the 100% consensus rule because those individuals could easily stop compromise at every turn, effectively sabotaging the collaborative group. These findings mirror research by Rudeen, et al. (2012)

demonstrating mixed outcomes from another consensus-based collaborative group that failed to reach its original goals. In both studies, many participants felt that consensus was necessary for perceived legitimacy at the start of the collaborative group, but also ultimately led to failure due to some participants using their veto power to stop group agreements. This catch-22 presents a potential challenge for practitioners going forward and merits careful consideration during process design. It also shows that some of the criteria for good collaboration might be in conflict, and thus there are potentially trade-offs between the criteria that are not acknowledged in the literature.

The ability of individual participants to block Roundtable proposals became particularly problematic later in the process as members tried to reach agreement on substantial issues and disagreement within the conservation community became more obvious. Participants reported that almost everyone would agree to something and then often a conservation representative would veto it. This lack of agreement within the conservation community was considered a barrier to building trust with non-conservationists and reaching consensus. Particularly, this behavior increased rational distrust because the conservation community demonstrated inconsistency in how they approached compromise and because some stakeholders questioned their integrity (as with the surprise letter coming out again the Sealaska land settlement). This resulted in other participants not trusting conservationists because it was unclear what the outcome of that trust would be.

Several Roundtable participants felt that conservationists attempted to manipulate the process to further their agendas. However, there were also many different conservation organizations with very different positions and approaches present on the Roundtable, and most participants felt that inconsistencies in the conservation agenda were due to lack of agreement

and coordination. This lack of agreement, however, was described as a manipulative act or "good cop, bad cop" by some participants and increased distrust between the conservation community and other stakeholders who reported being distrustful of the conservation community's motives. Also, none of the conservation representatives on the Roundtable were the actual decision-makers for their organizations. As the data shows in Chapter 2, when a participant did detour from their organizational directives, they were sometimes replaced, which undermined participant credibility and therefore rational trust between stakeholders. The role of foundations--whether intentional or not—exacerbated this challenge because conservation organizations may have taken particular positions to keep their funders happy.

The Quincy Library Group (QLG), a 1990s collaborative group in Northern California, was also challenged by conflict within conservation organizations. In a case study of the QLG Pralle (2006) reports lack of agreement between local and national environmental groups as well as between local representatives of national groups. Specifically, national groups criticized the local conservation representatives for being too willing to compromise when bigger conservation gains could be made through legal action. This closely parallels lack of agreement described between and within conservation organizations during the Roundtable, highlighting how national or regional organizations may seek control over local-level collaborations, which sometimes leads to conflict within or between the groups participating in a collaborative process. To the extent that these conflicts are perceived as manipulative, they can derail collaboration and increase procedural or rational distrust.

Finally, failure to adequately incorporate or address Alaska Native concerns and land claims was perceived by most participants as an important weakness of the process and as the catalyst for increased recognition of indigenous history and rights. The history of dispossession,

injustice, and trauma was not initially addressed by the Roundtable. The failure of the conservation community and the Roundtable organizers to adequately understand the unresolved political and social challenges remaining in the region from colonialism through ANCSA meant that preexisting rational, dispositional, and procedural distrust, particularly between Alaska native community members and conservationists, was not addressed at the outset. But later in the process, Alaska Native leaders brought these issues to the fore in such a compelling manner that the entire framing of the Tongass shifted for the group. Alaska Native did this by highlighting the way that conservation positions erased indigenous history and voices. For example, the conservation framing of the Tongass as a "salmon forest" was criticized by Alaska Natives as almost completely erasing regional Native history. However, while this conversation altered the trajectory of the Roundtable, it did not result in agreement on any substantive issues. Instead, this conflict underlines that attempting to equalize historical or existing power imbalances between stakeholders cannot be accomplished by good process alone and requires a more in-depth exploration and attempt at reconciliation and truth-telling than was considered within the scope of the Roundtable at the time. It is also important to note that there were important parallels between what participants described as the need for truth and reconciliation between conservation and timber as well as between Alaska Native community and other stakeholders. Participants noted that the history of conflict between conservation and timber interests likely had also incurred some level of trauma and needed to be addressed in a more significant way in order to move forward effectively.

Sealaska's unwillingness to use the Roundtable as the primary venue for the final land settlement demonstrated that some issues may not be appropriate for negotiation within a collaborative process. For Sealaska, which had political support outside the Roundtable to make

the ANCSA selections, their BATNA potentially created an unexpected power dynamic.

Conservation groups had no real control over the land allocation, which called into question the Roundtable as THE venue for resolving conflicts over land allocation and management on the Tongass. Perhaps by acknowledging the nature of Alaska Native claims and ANCSA in the first place, and not trying to approach it as simply another land divvy between different interests, the Roundtable may have been able to acknowledge that indigenous rights are not something that can or should be negotiated by a collaborative group.

The choice to include decisions about the final ANCSA allotment in the Roundtable is particularly interesting when compared with the choices made about how to address conflict and injustice between First Nations and the Canadian government during collaboration on the Great Bear Rainforest. Despite funders and other participants noting many similarities between the two locations, the Great Bear Rainforest conflict addressed and incorporated First Nations' voices in a very different manner. In the Great Bear process, while a conflict resolution and forest management negotiation was going on between logging and environmental interests, a parallel but separate government-to-government process was occurring between Canada and First Nations communities. That process focused on reconciliation and shared decision-making along with addressing forest management and economic issues (Greenpeace, 2016). This creation of two processes acknowledged and made space for the complexity and historical conflict between the Canadian government and First Nations, increasing acknowledged sovereignty and aboriginal land titles (Affolderbach, Clapp & Hayter, 2012). This might indicate an understanding that broader forest management decisions could not be made without addressing that context in an intentional and in-depth manner.

As my research showed, an intentional and sufficient process for addressing Alaska Native issues was conspicuously missing from the Roundtable. While there were certainly myriad other factors contributing to the success of the Great Bear Rainforest Agreement, it would seem that the way in which First Nations were acknowledged, heard, and involved in the process was an important part of that success. This provides valuable comparisons suggesting what does and does not work when indigenous communities are involved in forest management decision-making. It also underlines the findings of this research that the Roundtable's approach to including Alaska Native voices and addressing the ANCSA land settlement issue were insufficient and therefore a barrier to successful collaboration.

This study also found that the Roundtable influenced conservation and collaboration efforts in Southeast Alaska after it ended. This occurred both through the relationships cultivated between stakeholder groups and because of initiatives that subsequently emerged to focus on culture and justice. Many participants cited improved professional relationships across stakeholder groups and referenced specific cultural and economic development organizations that they believed were direct outcomes of needs identified during the Roundtable. It is outside the scope of this study to attempt to directly attribute specific events and organizations' genesis to the Roundtable. However, there have been important cultural and socio-economic shifts in the region that tier to issues brought up during the Roundtable. In regard to my research question asking how the events of the Roundtable have affected conservation and collaboration efforts in the region since, I submit the following examples.

Specific changes cited by participants include an evolution of thought about timber harvest practices and needs in historically timber-reliant communities, and broader incorporation of Alaska Native place names, land acknowledgements, and art into public spaces. Participants

reported that post-Roundtable, people had more negative perceptions of timber harvest due to local observations of the ecological impacts of some harvesting practices (i.e. decreased deer hunting success). Nonprofits focused on holistic community wellbeing and sustainable development formed in the region, and there was more explicit acknowledgement and inclusion of indigenous perspectives in conservation work. Further, the relationships built during the Roundtable inspired some stakeholders who had been engaged in decades of conflict over forest management to have interest in and empathy for one another's positions, potentially sowing seeds for future collaboration or at least functional working relationships.

The Alaska Native community has experienced a "cultural revival" according to one Alaska Native participant. Specific examples include construction of the Sealaska Heritage Institute's Walter Soboleff building in the heart of downtown Juneau, part of a planned 6,000 ft Arts Campus (Sealaska Heritage, n.d). According to a 2016 *Anchorage Daily News* article, there is increasing support for restoring Alaska Native place names in conjunction with or as a replacement for existing post-colonization names. Relatedly, some participants felt that the creation of organizations such as the Sustainable Southeast Partnership and Spruce Root (a community development financial institution) originated largely from Roundtable members who recognized a need for a different way of working in the region. These organizations work directly in partnership with Sealaska, Alaska Native village corporations, and tribes on a variety of social and economic issues.

While some conservationists might argue that Sealaska is still not doing enough in terms of sustainability, there is evidence of corporate and cultural self-reflectivity and changing dynamics (Forbes, 2018). As the initial financial pressures put on Alaska Natives from ANCSA fade, perhaps there will be more space for increasing cultural and economic stability for Alaska

Native corporations and shareholders. While it is important to acknowledge that Sealaska has been pushed to make changes in a large part because of little remaining harvestable old growth and changing timber markets, change also seems to be inspired by a desire to re-center around traditional cultural values and move forward in a way that is ecologically and culturally sustainable (Sealaska, n.d.).

Finally, in considering the outcomes of the Roundtable, it is important to acknowledge that different participants and stakeholder groups had fundamentally different views of what a successful Roundtable process would look like and therefore had different perspectives on ways in which the Roundtable was considered a success or failure. As addressed in the literature review, there are many different ways to define collaborative success (Conley & Moote, 2003) and perceptions of success depend on the goals and motivations of the individuals studying or participating in the process (Cheng & Randall-Parker, 2017). The cultural, political, and historical context of each stakeholder group influenced these perceptions. For example, for Alaska Natives, part of the goal for participation was creating broader acknowledgement of the Tongass as a Native Place (among the other justice issues discussed in this research). However, for the timber industry, increased stability of the timber base and an increase in allowable harvest were goals. While these definitions of the problem and successful resolution gained some traction with other stakeholder groups, it was not enough to make those goals priorities for the whole group. Further, while the Roundtable certainly did not meet its original goals according to participants, the fact that most participants specified that they did not consider the Roundtable a failure indicates definitions of success and failure beyond the scope of the group's charter. However, despite not perceiving the group a failure, they also did not consider it a success because it did not reach its original goals. Rather, some participants categorized it as an

important step in the social evolution of the region instead of an end goal. This perception highlights the challenge in measuring success or failure because of its ambiguity and the potential for a collaborative group to have positive outcomes different from those that were planned for.

In summary, this study contributes to research on collaboration and trust in several ways. First, the finding that building strong affinitive trust was not enough to overcome other barriers to collaboration demonstrates an important exception to the body of research claiming the relative importance of trust in collaboration success. Rational and procedural distrust played an important role throughout the process and likely counteracted affinitive trust. Further, given the recent history of colonization of Alaska and introduction of a capitalist, corporate paradigm to indigenous communities, failure to sufficiently acknowledge that history and reconcile historical trauma was a substantial barrier to collaboration, bringing elements of rational and procedural distrust into play. Procedural components of the collaborative group were also problematic, despite organizers using best practices and generally cultivating procedural trust. This indicated that there may need to be tradeoffs between components like inclusivity and consensus-based decision-making for a collaborative process to work. Overall, this research indicates that it is possible to have one type of trust and not have another, and that different types of trust are not fungible. Further, some types of trust might be more important to natural resource collaboration as compared with others. While trust is very important in collaboration, it does not ensure that participants can bridge fundamental disagreements or that they will unequivocally invest in collaboration over other venues for accomplishing their goals.

## **Lessons Learned: Relevance and Application**

Utility and Shortcomings of the Trust Framework

This research did not focus on understanding the drivers of conflict in the Tongass National Forest. Rather, this study employed a trust framework to gain insight into part of the Tongass story that was missing from existing research. The trust framework helped illuminate how trust influences and is influenced by a variety of components, including in decision-making processes, with issues of indigenous rights and justice, in organizational and stakeholder group dynamics, and the significant effect that individuals and their feelings and perspectives can have on a collaborative group. These findings add to the already existing understanding about the legal and political frameworks that have defined Tongass management decisions. While those more political and governmental systems-based dynamics are hugely important and not sufficiently understood, this research highlighted that those dynamics are only one component of many in understanding natural resource conflicts and successes and failures in collaboration. The trust framework allowed me to explore those individual perspectives and fit them into the broader Tongass narrative. However, many of my findings did not fit within the trust framework and therefore highlight its inadequacy for analyzing the conflict more holistically.

### The Value of the Roundtable and Moving Forward in the Tongass

While there are many ways to consider the successes and failures of the Roundtable, it is important to note the value of the collaborative group more broadly in the context of the Tongass. The Roundtable attempted to provide a space for a more holistic rethinking of land use in Southeast Alaska outside of more formal decision-making spaces such as National Forest planning, NEPA processes, and litigation. Clearly the existing political decision-making frameworks and structures had been insufficient in addressing the complexity of the Tongass, and the Roundtable started the process of reframing the conflict and approach to managing the Tongass. Specifically, the Roundtable created space for the "Tongass as a Native Place" paradigm shift, as well as allowing for more creative problem solving when addressing long term, intractable conflict in the region.

That being said, the challenges and issues highlighted during the Tongass Futures Roundtable in many ways continue to define the region. Many of the issues that were sources of conflict then are no less contentious now. More recent examples of ongoing conflict in the region include attempts to exempt Alaska National Roadless Rule and open up the Tongass to increased timber harvest (USFS, 2018) and the renewed push to allocate land to communities known as the "Landless" villages that wrongfully did not receive land entitlement under ANCSA (Leffler, 2019). These contemporary efforts reflect the primary conflicts of the Roundtable: timber harvest management and indigenous land rights and inclusion. While there has been some progress in relationships between stakeholder groups in conflict and organizational capacity focused on including Alaska Native perspectives and providing sustainable and equitable community development in rural villages as discussed in Chapter 4, the broader durability of the work done during the Roundtable seems minimal in that the same lines of conflict are being seen between the same stakeholder groups. This is exemplified by better relationships between individuals, despite continued conflict and lack of resolution over many of the same issues that shaped the Roundtable.

In recognition of the durability of these problems, this study provides insights into many of the components of resource conflict in Southeast Alaska. Further, this study shows that the status quo in terms of conservation advocacy and messaging is failing to effectively enact significant change in how mainstream conservation addresses justice issues-particularly in regard to indigenous land rights and colonial approaches to conservation. While many conservation organizations are attempting to apply more of a social justice lens to their work and include

indigenous and other historically minimized voices, there is much more work to do. Specifically, fully embracing indigenous groups as partners in conservation might require allowing rural Alaska Native communities to determine what they need from outside conservation interests, rather than conservationists trying to use indigenous voices to further pre-existing conservation goals. This may prove to be challenging as those needs may not always be in line with preferred conservation actions, but these types of compromises are essential to a just conservation movement.

#### **Recommendations for Practitioners**

Practitioners designing collaborative groups may benefit from keeping the lessons learned in this study in mind. These findings are relevant when deciding whether or not collaborative decision-making is an appropriate path forward or designing a collaborative process. Particularly, a better understanding of the relationships between different stakeholders and the root causes of conflict could provide insights into whether compromise is possible and what kinds of issues need to be addressed directly at the outset. This knowledge could save time and money in the long run by helping determine which collaboratives are worth the effort and designing processes that adequately unpack and address deep, historic conflicts. As this study demonstrated, successfully building some dimensions of trust does not necessarily lead to agreement when participants' positions are mutually exclusive and difficult to change.

Envisioning the evolution of the Roundtable through the lens of an arc of trust, this study provides a deeper understanding of the role of trust in collaboration. Mapping Stern and Coleman's (2015) multiple dimensions of trust onto the Arc reveals the ways that trust ebbed and flowed, enabling practitioners to understand how trust changes over time during collaboration. Further, the arc of trust provides insight into the moments during the collaborative process when

it is particularly important to focus on a specific dimension of trust. For example, at the beginning of the process, addressing historical conflict more explicitly might help to overcome rational distrust. Or, encouraging participants to alter process design if the agreed upon process is not working well may help to increase procedural trust.

Also, process design decisions--specifically, in the case of the Roundtable--balancing the need for 100% consensus which gave participants a sense of control over the process, and the desire of Roundtable organizers to focus on inclusiveness and "keeping everyone inside the tent" may have stopped agreements that were generally supported by a collaborative group by including participants that never intended to compromise or collaborate. Therefore, it is important for practitioners to carefully consider the pros and cons of consensus-based decision making and the trade-offs between consensus and inclusiveness. Relatedly, carefully examining the potential BATNAs of each stakeholder group can further help practitioners decided if collaboration is a viable option and which stakeholder groups are appropriate to include. If each group has a better alternative at their disposal, it might be difficult to reach any kind of worthwhile agreement.

Finally, despite important trade-offs related to inclusion, this study demonstrates that representation and elevation of marginalized voices must be prioritized *throughout* (not just in the initial selection of participants) the process in order to begin to address historical trauma, injustice, and rights. Failure to sufficiently understand and acknowledge historical trauma and conflict with Alaska Native communities challenged the Roundtable on many fronts. While the Roundtable eventually refocused on those issues, if that conversation had occurred at the beginning of the Roundtable started or was incorporated in a more intentional or meaningful

way, perhaps the collaborative would have been able to more effectively address its original primary goals as well as perhaps revising what those goals should have been.

### **Future Research**

The results of this study suggest several areas for future research. More research should be done on how to identify an appropriate balance of participants feeling a sense of ownership and procedural trust in a process that also allows groups to move agreements forward while also balancing the need for inclusiveness. Specifically, how does one counteract obstructionist participants who use process design as a way to slow progress? Or, what are the benefits and disadvantages of consensus-based decision-making? What is an appropriate balance between representing different interests and not involving parties who are unwilling to compromise and may intend to be a destructive force for a collaborative group?

Also, this study brought to light the interactions and relative strengths of different dimensions of trust and distrust and how they interact. More research into what dimensions of trust are most important to cultivate in a collaborative group as well as what dimensions of distrust practitioners should be most aware of would be a valuable area of focus. How to counteract those would provide more insight into how to best set a collaborative group up for success. Finally, more research should be done to understand how trust in collaborative groups changes over time and the ways in which practitioners can use that information to better manage trust issues and increase likelihood for successful collaboration.

# APPEDECIES

# Appendix 1

The following tables consist of additional data and are organized thematically according to the

sections in the Chapter 5: Results.

Roundtable Process and Design Challenges

| Component of        | Participant     | Quote  |
|---------------------|-----------------|--|
| Collaboration       |                 |  |
| Sense of            | Forest Service  | In order to get the administration at the time to support that, was not an   |
| Ownership/Authority | Employee        | easy task. But they finally said, if you can get this group to agree, we'll  |
|                     |                 | support it. And they didn't care what the outcomes were.   |
| Sense of            | Pro-Timber      | we changed the process a few times throughout that whole thing   |
| Ownership/Authority | Advocate        |  |
| Sense of            | Facilitator     | At that point they had developed by consensus what the purpose of the  |
| Ownership/Authority |                 | Roundtable would be, what would be the convening values, what  |
|                     |                 | would be some specific goals for the group. And then what were some  |
|                     |                 | working groups that would try to work through these issues.  |
| Sense of            | Community       | And there was a I think initially reluctance to do anything formal in  |
| Ownership/Authority | Representative/ | terms of fashioning motions, or whatever. We got around that. And  |
|                     | Facilitator     | eventually it was a matter and I ended up frequently in the role of  |
|                     |                 | trying to draft a statement that captured where folks were and where   |
|                     |                 | we would eventually find language that would do the job. But we  |
|                     |                 | devoted too much time to crafting, recrafting, and recrafting our  |
|                     |                 | ground rules as it were. And those were very important, but they   |
|                     |                 | consumed much of the time that could have been spent dealing with  |
|                     |                 | more substantially with issues.  |
| Sense of            | Roundtable      | it was designed from the beginning to only achieve its objective if  |
| Ownership/Authority | Staffer         | there was consensus. And that that was something we talked a lot   |
|                     |                 | about being you know either a fundamental flaw or being the essence  |
| ~ ^                 | ~ .             | of what kept it alive for so long.   |
| Sense of            | Conservation    | the facilitator was a master and he knew how, he started out asking  |
| Ownership/Authority | Advocate        | people to give their general impressions of what they thought was  |
| <u> </u>            | D 1.11          | important and what direction they wanted to go in.   |
| Sense of            | Roundtable      | But I think that there more could have been done between meetings to   |
| Ownership/Authority | Staffer         | move things forward. The staff were tasked with making maps or   |
|                     |                 | doing analysis and stuff. But I think and taking the message of the<br>Roundtable around to Southeast more would have been a useful                |
|                     |                 |  |
|                     |                 | because you had it. It just seemed to me all along that you really had to<br>build a support for the whole affort in communities right. And if the |
|                     |                 | build a support for the whole effort in communities right. And if the  |
|                     |                 | Roundtable members weren't going to do that then somebody had to go<br>out and do it and we never had the authority to go do anything. And so      |
|                     |                 | as I recall. And so I think that that would have been helpful.   |
| Sense of            | Community       | And you know my community has been supporting me coming to this  |
| Ownership/Authority | Representative  | and I don't see any good coming from it so how can I justify it to   |
| r                   | r               | them. You know the City of Craig was picking up a huge part of the   |
|                     |                 | bill on it, you know they weren't paying me to show up. My   |
|                     |                 | community was paying me to show up. And I just didn't think it was   |

|                                       |  | the best use of our resources. And you know towards the end there  |
|---------------------------------------|--|--|
| Equitable                             | Community                                | especially.<br>I got on there because I was pro-growth. And they didn't, they, when  |
| Distribution of<br>Power              | Representative                           | the Tongass Futures Roundtable, first started, everybody looked at as<br>another environmental movement. So they tried to broaden out some<br>of their representation. So it wasn't viewed as, wasn't that's the whole<br>reason I was on Seatrails too. They'd say, yeah you're just another<br>green group and they'd say no, we've got Elaine.  |
| Equitable<br>Distribution of<br>Power | Forest Service<br>Employee               | We had sort of a number of community members whether they were<br>involved in like community planning, I believe there was a mayor on<br>the Roundtable, NGOs were well-represented, industry, primarily<br>through the Alaska Forest Association but also Sealaska and their<br>timber corporation, the Forest Service, so I feel like it was pretty well,<br>you know a pretty good representation. And I, I do believe that they<br>worked hard at that when they set the Roundtable up, I don't think it<br>would have gotten as far as it did without having that broad<br>representation on there because people were really, they were hungry<br>for a venue to actually put issues on the table to discuss them robustly,<br>to bring science to bare, to bring the social aspects, economic aspects<br>of all of that together, to have it done in a way that was open, you<br>know the public participated. They could come in, there was the<br>opportunity for public comment, they rotated the venues where they<br>held the meetings. So I think it was done in a way that tried to<br>maximize public involvement as well as a broad representation on the<br>table so that you could start to build that trust and that report between<br>members of the Roundtable. |
| Equitable<br>Distribution of<br>Power | Community<br>Representative              | I felt like there was pretty good, I think there is very broad<br>representation and you know so many people could attend and then<br>you had ways to participate informally. I don't know I mean it just it<br>was so there were so, it was such a large group and you can always<br>find a specific group or organization or something that that wasn't<br>represented but, or you felt like you know I mean you can have<br>recreation but you can have multiple facets of recreation. You can have<br>industry, multiple facets of industry that might not have felt like they<br>were represented but I think there was, I think it was such a large<br>group.  |
| Equitable<br>Distribution of<br>Power | Community<br>Representative              | So I mean no I felt like there was very good representation for what<br>our original purpose was.  |
| Equitable<br>Distribution of<br>Power | Facilitator                              | And then tried to think well are there, how do we avoid having too<br>many of any one stakeholder group so that others felt ganged up on. So<br>that led to a limitation in the number of environmental organization<br>participants. But basically the Roundtable included the environmental<br>NGO community, the loggers, and their Association, it included<br>fishermen, it included Alaska Native leadership from the region, it<br>included community representation. It included the primary funders of<br>the environmental NGOs, and then it included the US Forest Service<br>and the State of Alaska. And I'm probably leaving one out but those<br>are the primary groups represented.  |
| Equitable<br>Distribution of<br>Power | Non-Native<br>Sealaska<br>Representative | there was plenty of freedom for them to talk. You know somebody<br>from point Baker or Point Protection. They could stand up and talk.<br>You know it was pretty loosely structured. And if they had a<br>constructive comment and stuff you know they were able to make their<br>case and make their point  |

| Equitable<br>Distribution of          | Community<br>Representative | I think it was such a large group it became, that was another reason<br>why the consensus was so difficult because we had what, we had 30  |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------|--|
| Power                                 |                             | people? I don't remember.  |
| Equitable<br>Distribution of<br>Power | Forest Service<br>Employee  | I don't think everybody coming to consensus will ever work on the<br>Tongass. In fact I'm convinced of it after 20-something years that<br>that's probably not in the cards for the Tongass and it man not really<br>be for any National Forest or Public Land.  |
| Equitable<br>Distribution of<br>Power | Forest Service<br>Employee  | Yes, he's phenomenal and I think having somebody like a Bruce<br>Botelho, with his background and his diplomacy and his ability to get<br>people to work together really helped that group. So I see it as being a<br>success in many respects, but I think the model itself, the consensus<br>based model for moving issues, moving items forward was very<br>difficult for that group.   |
| Equitable<br>Distribution of<br>Power | Roundtable<br>Staffer       | It seems like there was a couple of people on each end of the spectrum<br>that you know whenever things did get close to maybe being able to<br>take a step forward they as often as not they, because the Roundtable<br>had kind of one of the processes that they had to do in order to get<br>people to commit to doing it was that everything had to be done by<br>consensus. That's a that's a pretty high bar. When you got that diverse<br>of a group working together. I think that, I think it was well intended<br>but certainly looking back I think all of us would recognize now that<br>that's that's pretty tough expectations of that environment.   |
| Impartial/Transparent<br>Leadership   | Community<br>Representative | And so my sort of natural skepticism I have about people involved in<br>the green industry, [Erin Dovichin] and I kind of butted heads for a<br>while, but I began to, you know she was a pretty genuine person and I,<br>I actually enjoyed working with her. You know I didn't agree with<br>everything she thought, but I thought she did things in a reasonable<br>manner. And so she, you know helped get this diverse group together.  |
| Impartial/Transparent<br>Leadership   | Community<br>Representative | Yeah I mean to me the leadership wasn't piss-poor, no, I don't think so<br>at all. I think it was, it was adequate for what we were trying to do.<br>And really there was trying to maintain open discussion so they were<br>able to keep people in line and you had your turn to talk and that was<br>helpful.  |
| Impartial/Transparent<br>Leadership   | Conservation<br>Advocate    | I think [the leadership was good]. It's very fuzzy. So and I was new to<br>those types of processes. So I didn't have a lot to compare it to. I do<br>remember being like, whoa we get served breakfast? This is a freaking<br>an awesome job. There was a little bit of cush factor that I wasn't used<br>to that I think. that people in different fields who attend many<br>conferences are just like Of course. Yeah. It felt a little bit funny to me<br>at the time. Used to be like we need to be saving the world instead of<br>eating eggs Benedict. Yeah I think like. A lot of people we're really<br>well intentioned and put a lot of time and energy into trying to make it<br>work. You know, Erin also being a huge one who was really dedicated.<br>Like it wasn't it wasn't just a job for her. Like she put her whole self<br>into it, was an amazing relationship builder. |
| Impartial/Transparent<br>Leadership   | Roundtable<br>Staffer       | You know I felt like, I felt like all those three really put a huge amount<br>of effort in. They were very sincere in their efforts ad there was many<br>times that easily could have just blown up and fell apart. It was really<br>great, great work by all three of them just to try to keep it going on<br>several occasions.  |
| Impartial/Transparent<br>Leadership   | Community<br>Representative | I thought the facilitators did a good job. We had a couple different<br>ones. The Nature Conservancy did, they did good setting it up and<br>everything you know.  |
| Impartial/Transparent<br>Leadership   | Conservation advocate       | Yeah they were they were pretty sharp they were pretty sharp it was it<br>was a guy it was a guy who had been a vice president for the   |

|                     |  | University of Alaska and SEACC had worked with him on Yakutat State Game Refuge.   |
|---------------------|--|--|
| Access to Resources | Non-Native<br>Sealaska<br>Representative | But you had people leading it like Brian Rogers who was the Dean or<br>actually Chancellor at University of Alaska Anchorage. And he had<br>another consulting firm, so we had lots of professionals leading the<br>discussion. And I should say not leading but helping set agendas.<br>Helping choose places to meet. And making sure that the resources<br>people needed were there. And that there were minutes. And things<br>like that that were being collected so we kind of had the ability to build<br>on the foundation. So I think it was for such a large group and for such<br>a set of diverse opinions and needs it was probably about as good, I<br>mean there were fully capable people there. |
| Access to Resources | Funder                                   | I thought that we who represented the funders were both respected and appreciatedfor the funding the whole thing   |

# **Relationships and Lines of Conflict**

| Participant                  | Quote   |
|------------------------------|---|
| Conservationist              | So you know there was an interest in seeing if [the Great Bear Rainforest Agreement] could be replicated<br>in the Tongass. If, you know, basically those who were interested in conservation could get what they<br>wanted out of a deal that would also provide timber interests with what they wanted, which you know<br>everybody wants security and stability. And so that's, that's generally what it was about is, can this group<br>of folks come together and figure out a way to provide each other security and stability?   |
| Conservation<br>Advocate     | It was either, it was either a big messy way to get to a different way of doing business on the Tongass or it was a colossal strategic mistake. And I haven't quite figured out which yet.  |
| Timber Industry<br>Advocate  | You know with the round table, the leaders of it told us over and over that they were trying to find a way to try to stabilize our timber supply and keep the timber industry healthy and yet protect areas that other people thought were needed in need of protection and they they're looking for some kind of a balanced approach.  |
| Conservation<br>Advocate     | It was we said so maybe if there's a way we all you know maybe if we all kind of got together then we could identify shared interest and maybe come up with a solution that could satisfy all of our interests. Which is a very broadI mean because you had small governments: community governments, Native interests, you had corporate interests, you had industry interests and they're not all the same.   |
| Foundation<br>Representative | I guess from my perspective it was an opportunity for many of the groups that had traditionally been in conflict around the management of the Tongass, right including you know obviously the official managers of the Tongass and the US Forest Service and then all of the various stakeholder groups to come together really to see if we could find some common ground and to work through towards something that would be of benefit for all. And I guess I should say that I'm sure you've heard this already but at least from the donor or from the philanthropic community side part of the impetus for this you may have heard was a number of us had also participated in the Great Bear Rainforest agreement on the central coast of British Columbia which was an example of successfully moving from conflict to resolution you know and I think the but the question that at least animated a lot of us was wow you know could something like that be possible here. |
| Foundation<br>Representative | I was more hopeful than skeptical. I think initially because I had seen what was possible in B.C. I knew how difficult the issues were in B.C. even though it's a very different, you know it's a different social and political context but the basic outline of the conflict was pretty similar to Southeast and so I didn't feel any sense of guarantee that it was going to work but I wasn't skeptical or pessimistic. I just thought OK this is really worth a shot.  |

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| Roundtable<br>Staffer        | Because I got hired only because Gordon Betty put money into this. And that was nice of them right. And<br>they kept putting money in until I left. So I was, hey, they aren't doing it anymore, so it was a pretty good<br>deal for me. But you know there was to some degree appreciated and understood that if this was going to<br>work foundations were going to have to pony up some money to make whatever work, work. On the other<br>hand there is distrust about what are these people in San Francisco or Palo Alto or wherever they're from.<br>Where are they going to, why are they telling us what to do. So there was that. Then there was Campion<br>and Hewlett which were engaged for a while but decided that the approach of the roundtable and TNC<br>approach was much too conciliatory and we needed to shut this thing down, the old growth down. And that<br>was the way it needed to be.   |
| Conservation<br>Advocate     | I guess initially I was going yes, [the Roundtable] seems like a good idea and I'm gonna do it because I was in direct communication with funders. A lot of funders funded us and then we then sub granted out to organizations to get different work done. So I kind of said yes at first, I'll be honest and then there was a lot of pushback from the coalition [of conservation organizations]  |
| Foundation<br>Representative | Yeah well the only other thing I would share with you that I know was in my head back then is just<br>highlighting the distinction between the funder community and the green community because it is you<br>know it was always kind of unusual that philanthropic funders, professional grant makers would have<br>several designated seats at a table like this. All of them from outside because the one Alaskan<br>philanthropy, Rasmussen was not that interested in this at the time. And essentially all of us who worked<br>for a foundation were funding environmental interests. Therefore, we represented environmental interests<br>but we had seats that were different from our grantees or the actual people working toward the<br>environmental interests. So, in some ways green perspectives were overrepresented because we as funders<br>were seen as separate from the green groups who were our grantees. And I always found that fascinating.<br>Even though I was part of the group that was arguably overrepresented if you added the funders to the, you<br>know to the regular green NGOs. So that's, I don't know what to make of that but that was always<br>something that was in my mind from the moment I joined until my last meeting.   |
| Community<br>Representative  | Well and it was interesting to have like the Wilburforce Foundation and the Moore Foundation and some<br>of the really big dogs sitting there and we're explaining to them what's going on here and saying if you<br>guys want to invest in something, invest in something in productive that's not killing us and there are<br>different ways to approach this without being so hurtful. I do think that that message, that was one of the<br>positives that we took out, again, a lot of them took a step back and said wow, wait a minute. Let's think<br>about what we do before we jump into this I don't think that the green organizations had been forthcoming<br>with the information about what they were actually doing was causing pain. And I know it was pretty<br>surprising to some of the large Foundations. When were sitting down there talking to them at the<br>beginning they were pretty quiet. So, that was what we were trying to do in the first place. You know, you<br>guys, what they were actually saying was come in you've got to take a look at this. I've got to admit<br>though, too many of them were too willing to jump into this great social experiment that some people<br>wanted to get into and I said man, you try to bring that to my community you're going to be in trouble.<br>Yeah, I said you know we're trying to survive and you're getting in our way. |
| Foundation<br>Representative | I would have expected the potential for that animosity [from non-conservation groups about funders having seats on the Roundtable] and I never saw it. Instead what I always felt was you know among everybody really is I thought that we who represented the funders were both respected and appreciated not only for the funding the whole thing but also being distinctive voices from our grantees. And I do think that we as individuals who represented the foundations tried to be really careful about when we opened our mouths and what we said and we tried to play a kind of you know I think we really did try to play a kind of you know nudging or guiding centrist conflict resolution role rather than the kind of advocacy voices that some of the people we were funding. And it was pretty, I think it was reasonably well known that we were representing. And so I feel like there was a distinct way that we were seen and a distinct set of behaviors that we mostly displayed that hopefully created better behavior by everybody. I can't prove that but it's just something I you know I think that's worth reflecting especially if you're talking to other people who were funders at the table in those years.   |
| Community<br>Representative  | And we wound up, I think our first meeting was—I don't think, I know for sure—it was in Bothell,<br>Washington. I can remember it well because I can remember Kirk Dahlstrom, who owns the sawmill in<br>Klawock here on the Island, and I we walked into the room where this was at and we looked around and<br>we almost walked out because it was you know, about 3:1 or 4:1 green concerns versus industry concerns.<br>And part of the industry concerns were the Forest Service and they weren't quiteAnd we just looked at<br>each other and thought gosh, what have we gotten into. And I did talk to a couple of Forest Service people   |

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|                | to tackle you and not let you leave', and, there was some of the large green concerns and they were there to |
|                | kill us, that's obvious.   |

| Forest Service<br>Employee  | So putting this group together to start, I didn't have a whole lot of faith in seeing much production<br>come out of it, especially on the timeline that I needed to work on. But having them together, there<br>was some glimmer of hope of trying to reach some kind of consensus on some, either individual<br>aspects or the Forest Plan outcome as a whole. But as time went on, it was great to form the<br>relationships with these individuals but it became very apparent that there was a lot of interest in<br>actually that under no uncertain circumstances were they ever going to form any kind of consensus on<br>what outcomes were going to be.   |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Roundtable Staffer          | I didn't think it was going to be able to accomplish what it wanted to accomplish. Yeah I was skeptical<br>and proven to be correct in some of my assessments as to why I was skeptical that it would be able to<br>and you know and you know some unrealistic sort of expectations of what you can do when you're not<br>under a, one if you're under or you're not under a mandate to resolve something.  |
| Conservation<br>Advocate    | Yeah it was a little bit likeAnd I think I also, I didn't feel like I could change the trajectory of things.<br>I think there was some writing on the wall of like how is this actually going to come together. I didn't really know and I didn't really see it. And just, as I'm talking I'm trying to like reflect on what was kind of what was going on in my head. Feeling both like that that conflict but also being like I don't really want me or the organization to walk away from this either like I think that the vision that was of a sustainable, you know Southeast or sustainable industry where we all figure out how to get along and live within our community, it's something I really believe in. So you know that part of me really wanted it to work, but I just didn't quite see how the pieces were going to add up to get there. |
| Roundtable Staffer          | Well I became inherently skeptical after a long, long time of working on things. Not that you couldn't accomplish things but I became skeptical of a grand Kumbaya of any particular kind but that doesn't mean you can't hammer out steps forward over time which a lot has been done in that regard. I was optimistic about the Roundtable, not having been in on the first part of it, coming in in the second year just because it existed. Just because people had come together and formed this commitment to work together for a while which nobody had ever really done before. I thought that was impressive enough and I think I probably described to Erin Dovichin who hired me that I'm not sure if this is a grand venture or if I am just a moth to the flame.   |
| Forest Service<br>Employee  | To be honest there's never, there's never a sure thing when it comes to dealing with this kind of a process. I had a bit of skepticism, but it wasn't to the point that I didn't want to try it, I don't think that like I say, I was all for it. At least try it, let's at least try it. Nothing else, the planning isn't working right so let's try that.   |
| Community<br>Representative | I was] very skeptical from the very beginning. Yeah but you've got to try. You've got to try right.   |
| Community<br>Representative | We met in Bothel, 2006 and um and I think it's fair to say everyone who arrived was skeptical that anything would come of it but intrigued enough to participate.   |
| Community<br>Representative | Um, I didn't have high expectations coming down. And I think in that respect shared the same view that most everyone who came shared. I was delighted that there was enthusiasm to continue, I felt flattered to be able to sink my teeth into this um because clearly, it's one of the most important and thorniest issues continues to be to a certain extent today in trying to fashion where southeast AK is going.   |
| Facilitator                 | So, you know I had high hopes that there would be some meeting of the minds. I don't think I had in mind that this would turn into a long-term discussion. We probably had some, it would be nice if we got a longer term discussion going. I think we had a little bit of talk about that, but I don't, it was,  |

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|                    | things had been so contentious for so long, it wasn't obvious that we would develop into anything that   |
|                    | lasted. Certainly if you look at other models of timber stakeholder consensus process or environmental   |
|                    | stakeholder consensus processes, it's worked in some places and that have been long term processes in  |
|                    | place elsewhere in the West.   |
| Pro-Development    | Well I became involved just because I became executive director of Southeast Conference. I mean that   |
| NGO Representative | was part of the job. Reluctantly I entered into it. Just because I'd been in the timber wars for so long I   |
|                    | just, and I knew, I knew that, I shouldn't say the outcome, but I knew the process, I was familiar with  |
|                    | the process. But it was part of my job so I figured OK and this was supposedly a new thing. I mean, I  |
|                    | went, I missed the first meeting but then I started with then at the second meeting. So and supposedly   |
|                    | this was like the newest thing the greatest thing you're all gonna sit around this table and compromise  |
|                    | and talk to each other.  |
| Conservation       | We talked about that quite a bit on the sidelines how there were certain individuals on the round table  |
| Advocate           | that you would say you know I don't think they're ever going to give in. And so, this doesn't look   |
|                    | promising.   |
| Facilitator        | Not at all [did people trust each other at the beginning]. Well, people from their own clan, yes. But  |
|                    | each other, no.  |
| Community          | But it's hard to trust, what I noticed with SEACC and I said this meeting so it's nothing new. But you   |
| Representative     | know, we'd start out, when the logging controversy started. We were like this (hands stretched far   |
|                    | apart) And then, and then we compromised. And we compromised with both compromised. And then   |
|                    | the loggers compromised. And then the loggers compromised. And then the loggers compromised.   |
|                    | And then SEACC a little bit. And before you knew it, it is way over here. You know, they're  |
|                    | relentless, in their, their mission, their goal, whatever. You know, it put a lot of people out of work. It's  |
|                    | hard to trust someone like that then when you've been to meetings and they say well you know we'll   |
|                    | agree to this. No, maybe not. You know. But. And. The Wilderness league I think they were based in   |
|                    | Washington D.C. Because Laurie used to go back there quite a bit. And she was actually a little bit  |
| ~ .                | more successful with her board.  |
| Community          | Not entirely no. There has been too long of distrust between the industry and the environmental  |
| Representative     | organizations. So there was I don't think there was ever trust there to begin with.  |
| Facilitator        | Well, [distrust] played out particularly at the first meeting when people werebody language  |
|                    | included some arms folded across the chest at the very beginning of the meeting. The Natural   |
|                    | Resource Defense Council lawyer who was there hadn't met somebody he had sued half a dozen   |
|                    | times. You know there were, it, it created a lot of work I think for Erin to even get people to even   |
| D 1/11 0/ 00       | come to the table. I don't know if I want to meet with that person kind of a thing.  |
| Roundtable Staffer | Well certainly the background there you know because there have been years and years of litigation   |
|                    | and the pulp mills have been shut down. Depending on who you talk to for one reason or another. You  |
|                    | know that that distrust of the of the past history, it certainly manifested itself to some degree. I think   |
|                    | that there were some people that were willing to move beyond that. But there was, there was others   |
| Communita          | that you know could never get beyond it.   |
| Community          | Well Graham didn't trust anybody you know and that was because of the nature of his job and stuff so   |
| Representative     | it was very hard to talk Owen into compromising. And now Owen represented the logging. Now I   |
| Forest Service     | came in with a lot of baggage against SEACC and a lot of the environmental groups and stuff.   |
|                    | Absolutely not [different stakeholder groups not trusting each other at the beginning of the Roundtable], they wouldn't even sit in the same room. There were times where you almost felt like a |
| Employee           |  |
| Foundation         | referee rather than somebody to facilitate some kind of consensus group.<br>I mean people came into this with decades of either explicit mistrust or at least stereotyping one                   |
|                    | another not based on great knowledge, right. And so I think you know it might not have been deep   |
| Representative     | mistrust so much as wariness and some curiosity and some measure of open mindedness. But I   |
|                    | wouldn't say it was dripping with pre-existing trust.  |
| Regional Native    | We were actually one of the founding members of the Roundtable and it was actually before it was the   |
| Corporation        | Roundtable it had a moniker being the Hemlock Society, which you know people, as it started was  |
| Representative     | more of a joke, you know. But the idea was, see that we were tired of fighting and was hoping that   |
| Representative     | maybe there was a way to find some solutions. We had a large number of issues affecting Sealaska   |
|                    | because it still had the main land entitlement, it had land selections and municipal watersheds, you   |
|                    | know, for drinking water, high-value recreation, sportfishing areas, commercial fishing areas, so  |
|                    | Sealaska recognized that those were not good places for it to be selecting land and so it was looking  |
|                    | bearaska recognized that mose were not good places for it to be selecting faild and so it was fooking  |

|                      | for options to find alternative places from within the withdrawal boundaries or the selection               |
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|                      | boundaries. So, we were dealing with those issues, our associates in the timber industry were               |
|                      | struggling with sustainable timber program and trying to have sustainable timber sales and so it was        |
|                      | originally just a calling of a group of people together saying we need to do something different than       |
|                      | talking to each other through lawyers.  |
| Pro-Development      | Yeah I mean I think I think people in the beginning, like I said I missed the first meeting, and that was   |
| NGO Representative   | the one where everybody just said we've had enough is enough. You know we've got to do something            |
|                      | right. And like I said I think people started out really wanting this to work and positive about it. And    |
|                      | because the industry was on its last leg anyway. I mean they'd been beat to death. They were done.          |
|                      | One mill. Maybe a half a dozen logging companies in Southeast Alaska. In all of Alaska. And they            |
|                      | were desperate for something to happen. So I guess historically it's just the last hurrah. This is our last |
|                      | chance, ok. We're on the edge. And this is our last chance. You people say you want to work with us.        |
|                      | Let's work.   |
| Alaska Native Leader | There were those of us in the Native community that were saying this may be an opportunity for us to        |
|                      | shine some light on that history. And to possibly create greater economic opportunity for communities       |
|                      | through collaboration with NGOs and government agencies and so forth.                                       |
| Alaska Native Leader | I was hopeful that we could create a conversation that would lead to negotiations and hopefully some        |
|                      | understandings and possibly even results that could avoid litigation and still allow some timber harvest    |
|                      | to take place in the Tongass National Forest. But nowhere at the level that had taken place for example     |
|                      | during the pulp mill days. So that was my hope.   |
| Conservation         | Well I was idealistically thinking that with good science, we could provide tools, decision-support         |
| Advocate/Mapping     | tools using maps that the timber industry could identify and see the places that they could find timber     |
| Specialist           | that already had an infrastructure and that they would and the Forest Service would see these really        |
|                      | high value ecological areas that could be put aside for conservation. So I was hopeful you know and I       |
|                      | had some skepticism but I was hopeful that using science tools we could find some kind of                   |
|                      | compromise.   |
| Timber Industry      | I think, well people, for my part I was real hopeful we could do something because the energy level         |
| Advocate             | was high. People were speaking optimistically from day one.   |
| Community            | There was a lot of good will generated at the meeting, enthusiasm in fact that there might actually be      |
| Representative       | some common ground to go forward. Um I can recall you know a couple of people; one Viking                   |
|                      | Timber and I can't remember who the environmentalist was. Both, neither of them would sit across            |
|                      | the table from each other and the revelation was you know you're not a monster. Yeah and it led that        |
|                      | two-day meeting or maybe it was three. Maybe spread over three days but it was a two-day meeting.           |
|                      | Resulted in a um decision that there should be another meeting. and I would say that during the course      |
|                      | of the following year, it was um a meeting to meeting kind of thing.  |
| Community            | And anyway, he was interested in getting a group of stakeholders together to sit down and talk about        |
| Representative       | timber issues and particularly the issues of the large foundations you know that were funding               |
|                      | environmental groups, and bringing them into the fold so that they actually understood what impacts         |
|                      | they were having on the communities you know, that were involved with the timber industry. So it all        |
|                      | seemed good to me, so I said yeah, I'll go ahead and participate.   |
|                      |   |

| Regional Native             | And then as you work back, I think there were major accomplishments because first of all you had the   |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Corporation                 | lawyers for the Wilderness Society. You had the lawyers for Sierra Club, you had executives from the   |
| Representative              | timber industry, the native corporations all participating in these meetings. And they built a respect for each other. There was an ability to describe each other's mutual goals and objectives, but most important was the willingness for them to communicate with each other.  |
| Roundtable Staffer          | I think the relationships are really big deal because a lot of people developed a lot of really good relationships. At a personal level. And a professional level.   |
| Community<br>Representative | So you know at the end of the day we did get a couple of positive things out of it. And actually, some of the relationships that were developed there, even between the green organizations and people that are involved with the [timber] industry, they were pretty interesting. Because those people got a chance to sit down and find out what the hell it is they were causing. |

| Regional Native<br>Corporation<br>Representative | Oh yeah, well what it really was, was understanding how to talk to different people in different ways.   |
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| Regional Native<br>Corporation<br>Representative | It was sort of a Ronald Regan phrase, you know, "trust but verify". Yeah, I think that there were<br>personal relationships built and even when there was litigation, and there were points in time where<br>you'd say look, I can't talk to you about it because there is active litigation, but they, you know they<br>were honest about that and they could explain why. And if there wasn't litigation, so there were just a<br>lot of private conversations that occurred. You know people sitting down and talking to each other.<br>Loggers and environmentalists all sitting there, and they go, you know, I can trust this guy. You know,<br>what this guy is saying, I can trust. I mean when he says this, number one he's serious about it.<br>Number two, going back to his representative organization, he's going to make the case that they<br>should, or their organization should adopt or accept whatever kind of consensus was reached between<br>these individuals.   |
| Community<br>Representative                      | Lindsay. You know Lindsay and I got to be good friends. And you know we could agree to disagree<br>on almost everything. Yeah. And I got to, I really like Laurie Cooper. And. I'm trying to remember the<br>name of the guy from the. Audubon Society. Him and I could really get into heated arguments and<br>then we could talk at lunch and try and, you know we really worked at trying to not dislike somebody.<br>And not, I've always hated it when somebodyI've been on. In city government for a long time. And I<br>had one person who was against it just because I was for it. You know. And that's something you can<br>never overcome. And I didn't want to be one of those. And I think that others. Shelley and Carol and<br>Carol Rushmore and Shelley. And. A bunch of us. Didn't want to do that either. We got to be, more<br>like, Neal. You know we could joke around and everything. Neal you are so full of shit. You know<br>you don't live here. That's one of my big things you know you don't live here. And. And. Well this is<br>our land too. Well but you don't live here. But I thought that there got to be some, I don't know if trust<br>would be the right word. But we got to kind of respect where other people were coming from on stuff. |
| Community<br>Representative                      | And so my sort of natural skepticism I have about people involved in the green industry, [Erin Dovichin] and I kind of butted heads for a while, but I began to, you know she was a pretty genuine person and I, I actually enjoyed working with her. You know I didn't agree with everything she thought, but I thought she did things in a reasonable manner. And so she, you know helped get this diverse group together.   |
| Conservation<br>Advocate                         | So we started these discussions andyou did get to know folks in a way that we just didn't before.<br>Forrest Cole. You knew what you were getting with Forest Cole. You might not get what you wanted<br>with Forest Cole. But you knew you weren't going to get a song and dance. Unlike this guy that we've<br>got now, you know this Earl Stewart.  |
| Community<br>Representative                      | There was one guy John Schoen. And he was he was probably one of the most reasonable people in the roundtable. He had a lot of information, a lot of statistics. He is very grounded in Alaska. And he thought of some interesting compromises and things like that. I really respected his point of view. I always listen closely whenever he talked.   |
| Community<br>Representative                      | Well I think that there were a few [relationships that improved]. And whether or not they agreed, they at least believed that they were getting straight talk from each other. And, fluff or BS. And you know those were very few.   |
| Conservation<br>Advocate                         | Forrest, I mean that was one of the real positives. You knew what you were getting with Forrest and the guy for Viking. Kurt. He was a little more standoffish but some of the folks in the process got to be pretty close with him.   |
| Conservation<br>Advocate                         | Neil Lawrence from NRDC got along pretty famously I think with the Viking owner Kurt. I think part of it was you know Neil went out of his way to open himself up and to try to have a conversation.   |

| Staffer                     | So you know and you know that was a little easier for me but it was because I'd been doing that for the State, but it was really interesting to watch that happen among a lot of the participants. One of the more, you see a lot of these very interesting things happen. One of them the local Sierra Club guy in Juneau and this owner of The Sawmill in Klawock who are about as different in outlook on life and appearance and speaking style issues positions as you could get, ended up really liking each other. Because what they really likes his they realize the other guy was a straight shooter.  |
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| Staffer                     | But I felt like you know after a year or so, it looked like to me that a certain level of trust did develop, where for a while you know there was some pretty objective discussions and you know I think that the trust levels got stronger as time went by for a while.   |
| Community<br>Representative | Except again it's fair to say people trusted Kirk Dahlstrom. That he waspartly because Kirk would<br>say exactly what he thought. He could sometimes change his mind and be persuaded, and um, um so I<br>think that there's a lot of trust. I think he had it in his own circle. And I think looking at it across the<br>divide and there was certainly a divide. I think he was someone who um who garnered a lot of respect.<br>I'm not sure one could say that about anyone else in the Roundtable.  |
| Conservation<br>Advocate    | It felt to me like [trust] changed to some extent. I was able, I didn't ever like 100% trust, say Sealaska<br>for example. I didn't 100% trust some of the conservation people that when they stood up and said<br>something it wasn't with a—I don't want to say ulterior motive, but with a longer motive involved.<br>But I do feel like I began toI mean the personalbeing able to talk and engage with people in that<br>setting, whether it was, you know I got a better sense of Forest Cole who was the Forest Supervisor at<br>the time. I'd never met Kirk Dahlstrom and so I began to at least understand, be able to have<br>conversations at a different level with those folks. So in some sense I trusted that it wasI don't want<br>to say I trusted all the information I was gettingbut I could put it into context. |

| Participant                           | Quote   |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| Foundation<br>Representative          | At the same time, individuals in the green community made have trusted other people in the green<br>community less than they did at the beginning because every one of those sectors or bundles had<br>variation within it. And some of that variation got amplified in the dialogues and I would say<br>especially, especially among the Greens. Yeah because there were some greens, mostly they weren't at<br>the table but they were at the meeting sort of you know skulking in the corners you know observing.  |
| Staffer                               | It seemed to me that there was a little bit of an arc to the trust. That trust tended to be built and built<br>and built and then there wassomewhere along the way kind of an optimum momentand then it<br>started to dissipate a little. I think when the state walked awayyou know we couldn't really trust the<br>State anymoreThey're not going to stay with us on this or why did they walk away? Can we really<br>trust the timber guys because they kind of convinced the state to walk away? They're still here but can<br>we really are they really committed anymore? And then the thing where the native Community felt<br>like they were kind of kept in their boxes that you know that was a trust erosion thing. It wasn't it<br>wasn't a result of the round table at all but it was something going on contemporaneously with the<br>round table you know. And then the working group and then the issues weren't contemporaneous<br>about Sealaska but that working group kind of fell into it. So there might have been a, if I was a<br>facilitator I would probably watch for if there is a place which that might be the high point of trust<br>building and try to capture good things there. Because it can't go on it may not go on in any process it<br>may not go on it may diminish after a certain point just because life causes you know. It's just not the<br>easiest thing in the workid to achieve in the first place. |
| Alaska Native<br>Regional Corporation | [Trust] began to erode towards the end like when you said all of a sudden there's a push, people out, you know they're part of the group but they're starting to talk to people outside of the group or they  |
| Representative                        | tried to go to third parties. Powerful, influential 3rd parties such as Senators and Congressmen to influence a result. And also to talk to people in the Forest Service. And so when that honesty kind of eroded, then that's where problems began to arise.   |
| Community                             | Part of the frustrationand it gets to this trust issueis thatit led to consensusbeing blocked. So   |
| Representative                        | whether someone or some group was acting in good faith or not, of course, that fundamentally is a question of trust. And the conclusion was that they did not operate in good faith. I don't think that they may have seen it that way, but others did  |

| Conservation   | And again that that we talked about that quite a bit on the sidelines and how you know there were  |
|----------------|--|
| Advocate       | certain individuals on the round table that you would say you know I don't think they're ever going to   |
| The vocate     | give in. And so this doesn't look promising.   |
| Conservation   | And because any single person had veto power I, it you know in hindsight that, that was you know the   |
| Advocate       | death knell of the Roundtable. I think I can, without naming names I can think of probably four  |
|                | people, certainly, certainly two people that never intended the Roundtable to reach a successful   |
|                | compromisethey came from, one or two came from the conservation community and one or two   |
|                | came from the timber industry.   |
| Staffer        | It just didn't have people who were committed to an agreement. Yeah there was people who joined up   |
|                | in order to make sure that nothing happened. And that is not a good situation that that in the end was   |
|                | too much for it to overcome.   |
| Conservation   | But so. So I think we all gained insights but we didn't have the final, and we got tired and I think we  |
| Advocate       | didn't have that final tool to get us to some kind of a compromise. And the people that were left out  |
|                | were very angry that this group sitting at tables had the ability to move the process on without them  |
|                | and they were very distrustful of that process. And I have, I can understand that. I'm not saying they   |
|                | were wrong but it was it was a challenging time.   |
| Community      | You know I thought it had gone too far overboard. And, you know maybe now a days it seems like it  |
| Representative | might have been good if we had locked in on some of that. But we found out through the years that  |
|                | whenever we'd lock in on something, everybody says boy, we're gonna stop all this craziness and this   |
|                | is the way it's gonna be from now on, the next year we have a whole new series of lawsuits and   |
|                | nonsense going on again. So taking a large step back, of course that's a pretty hard thing to do after   |
|                | sitting there for years and years and watching what can happen when you do that. You know.   |
| Community      | And unfortunately, and I'm not gonna mention names, but there were some of them that happened,   |
| Representative | and those people in the green organizations that actually did develop some trust with industry and stuff   |
|                | like that, they were virtually run off. You know. By their own organizations. And that's, you know   |
|                | when people are concerned too much about the culture of this thing and not the reality of it. The green  |
|                | culture is that we don't want logging, you know they believe that the other end of it wants to log   |
|                | everything. And I know some people that would. But there are very few of them around. You know,  |
|                | there are mostly people that want there to be enough to have a responsible industry and should be able   |
|                | to go to the bank and say well you know I've got timber for the next five years, and you know I want   |
|                | to make some modifications to my sawmill and it's gonna cost a couple million dollars and the bank's   |
|                | not going to be able to lay down a couple of million dollars unless you can say ok, I've got this much timber I'm going to be able to have access to so I've got all I need and it's this percent of profit. You |
|                |  |
|                | have to, if you're going to have a business plan you're going to have to know what you can realistically count on to work with.  |
|                |  |

| Quote        | Participant   |
|--------------|---|
| Conservation | Well so, I mean the data that was available to the roundtable was really squishy. And you know that had been          |
| Advocate     | demonstrated through a lot of different perspectives. One would be you know hey we're going to plan a                 |
|              | timber sale for a hundred fifty million board feet and then you know after seven years of NEPA work there's           |
|              | only 40 million board feet. Because the project area didn't actually include as much economical timber as             |
|              | everybody thought. Or at least that at least many people thought. And so that's one way that it was clear that        |
|              | there was a lot of Squishy, squishiness in the data is that it would say there was lots more than there actually      |
|              | was when it came time to be economical. And then just the fact that you use something like economical                 |
|              | timber versus timber. You know economics change every day and certainly every year. And so what's                     |
|              | economical today is not tomorrow and what's not today could be tomorrow and so that adds a lot of squishing           |
|              | as to the data. So you could say for example there just isn't enough economic timber to sustain the mill for          |
|              | more than 10 more years. And you know the people who wanted to know that these sustain for 30 years                   |
|              | would say yeah but the economy can change. So the data wasn't conclusive enough, ever and I'm really                  |
|              | curious to see how things go when we start to have data that's much less squishy. The the LIDAR data you              |
|              | know is really a pretty accurate picture of reality. I had an experience with a mill owner in a Hoonah. Do you        |
|              | know Wes Tyler? Well that's the mill owner from Hoonah and they'd been in business for a long time. They              |
|              | were with Whitestone logging when the boom was happening in the northern Tongass at least, has logged all             |
|              | over the place. He doesn't really have a good sense for how much wood is out there. Like a lot of people from         |
|              | all sides they look at the hillside and they're just like well it's green. So it must be an infinite supply of timber |

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| Conservation                                | right. And even folks who know a lot about milling wood logging wood they look at a hillside and they can't tell whether or not that's economic timber or not. Or even know very much about the timber until they actually walk around in the woods and they don't walk around in the woods because they don't have time except for the places that they've got a timber sale already planned and so they, they feel like they're only being shown a small fraction of what's out there all the time and the Forest Service is like this gatekeeper that doesn't actually show them the whole picture of what's out there just the little picture that you know whoever the string-pullers are letting them see. Yeah and the LIDAR data you know like I sat down with Wes on a ferry ride from Hoonah to Juneau. And said to Wes you know we can we can basically light up every single tree on the road system that's over one hundred and fifty feet just like it was a Christmas light. Let's do that and see what it looks like. And we did that with the data from the LIDAR. And he was absolutely shocked to learn how few trees were that tall on the road system. It was actually very depressing for him because you know he was able to believe that there was more there than there really was because of the squishness of the old data. And this data was telling them you know that there's this is no joke that if you want a tree over 50 feet you got to go someplace else.   |
| Advocate                                    | a scale to know what's really going on because you know the classic refrain was that we're you know, we're<br>only asking for one percent of the Tongass, right from the timber perspective. And you know that sounds<br>pretty reasonable. But then the greenies would say Oh yeah but if you subtract rock and ice and you subtract<br>muskeg and you know it's really a lot bigger percentage. And of course that wasn't even very well informed<br>because again the data wasn't used very well. And so by the time you start to actually have a conversation<br>about the reality at that scale you're, everybody's lost. So it's too much.   |
| Pro<br>Development<br>NGO<br>Representative | Yeah. We tried so hard to personalize the trees, put a face on a tree and say this is someone's livelihood. And it grows back. You cut it down and it'll grow right back. I cut a big huge tree out of my front yard. I cut it down and it was probably ten years ago. I have a forest in my front yard and two or three different kinds of trees ferns bushes and all I did was cut the tree down and get rid of it. I didn't plant anything. I didn't do anything. And I've got a forest in my front yard. I know it grows back. So. So. We we really tried really hard to personalize that image and say this is, you know to tell these people they can't have a job is like stunting their growth. And you couldn't break through. It couldn't break through the religion if you will.  |
| Community<br>Representative                 | Well and and tourism is taking such a toehold in Southeast Alaska. And I grew up in Florida. And it was a tourism economy right. And that's good as long as the economy's good. The nation. National economy. But when the economy goes sour. People quit traveling. And my big my big complaint about tourism versus mining, logging, you know. Is tourism is 10 weeks in the summer and people who don't even live here own the businesses generally. And so in the winter when it comes to school travel and and somebody in the community getting real sick and need this for none of those people there to help. Our little community we had a young man get mental cell carcinoma. And he needed a bone marrow transplant. Two hundred thousand dollars. And. Our little community raised thirty five thousand dollars. But none of the summer people were there to help. And and so that's part of the thing with tourism, and it has turned into a big tourist place too now huh. But. But the mining and the logging. Those are year round jobs with benefits. You can raise a family. You can buy a car. You know you can plan for the future because you know you're going to have a job next year. And the tourism economy is just iffy. Right now it's booming, and you know hopefully it'll stay that way and people will continue to have jobs. But generally what it's good for is either young people or people who like their husband or wife works for the state or has a good job with benefits and it's just an extra added in. Unless you're one of the owners and generally most of them leave in September. And I don't think that's good for Southeast Alaska. I think we need those some basic jobs. And you know then talk about the Tongass. I don't know if you've gotten to travel much lately but I used to be on the Southeast school board and we had originally we had 19 schools all of herself. Sealaska. And we had a plan and we travelled from one school to another. And I drive on the road somewhere and somewhere else of course we were in loging and we were road construction. A |
| Forest Service<br>Employee                  | There were some notable events that occurred during the early days of the Roundtable. One like I said was actually meeting the people that were fighting over opposite issues in terms of what we had to manage. But the early days of the Roundtable, there were several schools, the State of Alaska had curtailed funding on several schools in small communities in Southeast Alaska because the student population got to a point where they wouldn't fund it anymore. And there was one community on Prince of Wales that was right on the   |

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|                | border of staying open or not an individual from that community actually had invited the Roundtable to meet<br>in that community. And during that time they brought all the kids in the school to do a presentation to the<br>Roundtable about what they were actually learning, how important jobs were to their community and how<br>important it was to keep the school open and that one presentation actually bought us some support for a<br>timber sale project we were trying do on the island. Keep some of those kids' parents, you know, employed.<br>So that was one.  |
| Forest Service | Some of the oldest timber was cut where access was available and that's along the beach. It's probably 80 or   |
|                |  |
| Employee       | 90 years old but those areas under the forest plan as we know today are in a protected status because it's the most important over wintering spots for things like deer. So they're stuck with a wood supply that you can't  |
|                | touch for another 30 years and people expect you to stop the press and wait for it to show up and that's where<br>Kirk came in and said you can't expect us to you know close up shop and wait around for 30 years in order to<br>keep this industry alive and the communities that, if you take these jobs out of these communities then kids<br>go away. And the schools shut down. So expecting somebody to restart an entire industry and rebuild these<br>communities 30 years from now it's not going to happen.   |
| Conservation   | And here is the punch line. You know the Tongass is almost 17 million acres in size. They're logging a   |
| Advocate       | relatively small amount of timber certainly now there's a very small amount of timber and there's a lot of old growth on the Tongass. OK superficially that's the overview. Right. But the real key issue is that the big tree old growth, the high-volume old growththose terms kind of mean the same thingwas always rare on the Tongass. And if you know your work at Park Creek and going around Admiralty Island, you know you know that much of Admiralty Island is high elevation Alpine and sub-alpine or avalanche slopes and the Northern Mansfield Peninsula for example has a lot of muskeg. Peat bog. So let's just look at the six million acres of wilderness. Well Admiralty is the best of the wilderness. But even on Admiralty there's a lot of muskeg and high elevation, non-forest land. Misty Fjords South Prince of Wales Island, West Chichagoff, Southeast Baranoff, Tracy and Endicott arm. Those are all spectacular wilderness areas. They have very very low timber values. They also have relatively low ecological value and diversity. And that was one of the key elements that Dave Albert and I did in our conservation assessment. We laid that out so everybody could look at that. So the problem is and let's just take Prince of Wales Island as an example. Prince of Wales Island is the largest island in Southeast Alaska. It had the greatest timber resources in all of Alaska. Based on the work that Dave and I did, we determined that 94 percent of the big tree forest, the big tree old growth forest on Prince of Wales Island has been logged. That's pretty amazing. You know so, so for the last 30 years the wildlife profession through the Wildlife Society and other organizations have documented what we called higrading that's you know taking the low hanging fruit. It's targeting the very best watersheds, the very best finder dus within the watersheds for logging and leaving the rest. And so that's where statistics can be misleading and you know our concern on the Tongass through the Roundtable was that we wanted to see entire watershe |
|                | value lands out of balance for them. But ironically some of the conservation organizations didn't like that because they felt that all lands were of equal value.  |
| Conservation   | I mean I never saw Neil in the woods once. I mean we did, we did a, we did a field trip with the roundtable in   |
| Advocate       | Hoonah and took him out to see some stuff. It kind of was a freak show in a lot of ways. Ron Wolf just kind  |
| - Iu , ocale   | of hijacked the whole thing and and took people on a cruise to see how amazing Sealaska was it at  |
|                | stewardship. Which you know which felt pretty disingenuous of course to those who are actually tracking  |
|                | this stuff. But today you know I would say that there was some aspiration there that was real. It just was you   |
|                | know sold as more than it really was at the time. And Neil certainly wasn't buying it because he didn't spend  |
|                | a lot of time in the woods anyway. And then it was clear Ron was just selling snake oil.   |
| Community      | Well, it was, because there was very little focus on Northern Southeast for example because there wasn't a lot   |
|                |  |
| Representative | •  |
|                | as a town in the Roundtable even though it wasn't necessarily Juneau being represented, it was the fact that people lived in Juneau but you know whether you're with SEACC or TNC, they're headquartered here, so it's not surprising that you would see that level of participation. So, you know on a landscape scale the Tongass is big piece to bite off but in part because of the way it's managed it really needed to be dealt with as  |
| Representative | of timber activity outside of Haines and a little bit out of Hoonah, and I think there were some who at the Roundtable who resented the fact that Northern Southeast was—specifically Juneau—was overly represented as a town in the Roundtable even though it wasn't necessarily Juneau being represented, it was the fact that people lived in Juneau but you know whether you're with SEACC or TNC, they're headquartered here, so it's not surprising that you would see that level of participation. So, you know on a landscape scale the  |

|                       | a single entity. And also because it really is all part of one larger coastal system. it would be hard to imagine   |
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|                       | one trying to develop policies that would be good for half of it and not the other half.  |
| Community             | maybe [the environmentalists] ought to think a little bit before they just go out there casting lawsuits and  |
| Representative        | injunctions and whatever, and you know think about the impact of what you're doing is. And what you   |
|                       | expect to get out of it. So you know, that's kind of where it went.   |
| Roundtable            | Well I was just going to say, you know it did, you know it did give me quite a broad perspective. You know  |
| Staffer               | that's something that I think that's certainly helped me see things from different you know the different   |
|                       | perspectives that I had. And I think that that's you know something that TNC was interested in being able to  |
|                       | have that kind of diverse background was something that helps, you know my relationship and working with  |
|                       | people here and you know with the background how I certainly had some standing that you know like you   |
|                       | know the reality is some of these conservation groups, they get young, idealistic young people which is fine  |
| Dre                   | but the they send them out into the field to a place like this and they can't get the time of day.  |
| Pro                   | Well I have worked in jobs that involve the economic development of Southeast Alaska for probably forty   |
| Development           | years now. I worked for a logging company and we did logging all across the Tongass. We had seven logging   |
| NGO<br>Representative | camps. It was a good economic driver. A lot of families had jobs and homes and it was wonderful. And then when I got into Southeast Conference, I got on the political side of it. More so than just the actual working |
| Representative        | side of it and felt like I had a sort of a better understanding than some people of the value of the logging  |
|                       | industry.   |
| Community             | Well it was a good idea and the Nature Conservancy spent a lot of money. And I think. I think in the end it   |
| Representative        | did do some good. We were debating a timber sale on Prince of Wales island called The Big Thorne I think it   |
| Representative        | was. And that, that really affected the community I was a from and so we had meetings in Coffman Cove and   |
|                       | I think everybody came and you know we catered it all and really put on a good showing and we were all we   |
|                       | were in the gym one day and the school kids came over and did a presentation you know and a little program.   |
|                       | We thought that was really cute. So I stood all the kids up, there was eleven of them. And you know in  |
|                       | Alaska if you don't have 10 kids you don't get funding. So I lined up all eleven kids and I say you know if   |
|                       | this timber sale doesn't go through, I said these two kids will leave because their Father, stepfather. Was in  |
|                       | the timber industry. Was a cutter. And he'll have to go where the work is. So now you have nine students.   |
|                       | You have nine students and you're no longer going to fund the school, the state won't. Then the teacher will  |
|                       | go away. And he has two students. And I said So what's going to happen to the other seven kids? Home  |
|                       | school? That does work for some people. Do they, does their education just quit?Do they have to be bussed   |
|                       | for an hour and a half to a different schools? You know what about in the winter when the roads are bad and   |
|                       | stuff. I said so these are things that you' aught to think about. And so if the school closes all these families  |
|                       | have to leave. Well this is a small community and it takes the heart out of the community. And another thing  |
|                       | that you don't think about is if these two kids leave, I leave too because they're my grandkids and I said I  |
|                       | want to be with my grandkids. And they went gee, wow. You know they hadn't really given any thought to  |
|                       | how their policies affected real people. You know their demands so to speak. And SEACC still like that, you   |
|                       | know. And their thing is always, oh we'll support timber sales. Oh wait. Not this one. Oh wait we want to be  |
|                       | involved in laying out the timber sales. Oh well. Well you know this isn't an economically feasible as you  |
|                       | want us custom feasible. You know what. And eventually there's nothing. Nothing they're agree to but they'll  |
|                       | always say we support timber. Yeah, you support the little guy going out there and cutting firewood. Or the   |
| Stoffor               | man that cuts three trees a year and makes music wood.  |
| Staffer               | You know this was also what during the Palin administration. And so you know you have a disinterested   |
|                       | governor right. And so you're dealing at this point with you know you know Chris Maisch was totally engaged and totally helpful and tried to be get stuff done. So but you know in terms of the larger political        |
|                       | support there really wasn't. There wasn't from the administration you know and I don't know what role Balish  |
|                       | played in some of these other guys who were you know big wigs in the Trump administration.  |
| Staffer               | The Roundtable ultimately kind of wound down. The State pulled out. Chris Maisch, who was the State   |
| Starler               | Forester it still is the state Forester maybe. Or he might have recently retired up in Fairbanks. Great guy very  |
|                       | knowledgeable super experienced and was a steady hand for the state during the Palin Parnell  |
|                       | Administration. He was really the Steady Hand on the tiller at the round table. But he would know the year.   |
|                       | But the state pulled out because it wasn't. The timber industry had more of the ear of the state after Parnell.   |
|                       | Palin kind of liked the idea of the whole Round Table and then she got Stardust in her eyes and ran off with  |
|                       | John McCain and Parnell's folks didn't have the they were more partisan with the timber industry. So when   |
|                       | there weren't Timber industry results they pulled, they backed they left and that was a pretty big blow   |
|                       | because they took the agencies all the agency's left.   |
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| Companyation   | The other thing is the industry and the State and an interview in the State of the State of the Mail and 'D I'   |
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| Conservation   | The other thing is the industry and the State, now remember who the State was. It was Murkowski Palin  |
| Advocate       | Parnell I mean these are not friends of the environment and just politically it was a challenge and so the state   |
|                | and the industry walked out walked out of the ring I mean they basically said you're not addressing our needs  |
|                | quick enough you're not address in our needs f <sup>***</sup> you. people have been making efforts and it wasn't going fast enough and it certainly wasn't making logging economical and you know folks have this if we could just |
|                | get rid of those environmentalists and that wasn't necessarily the problem. The problem was that the   |
|                | industrial already taken the most economical logs.   |
| Forest Service | I know that was kind of one of the hopes for the Roundtable, you know going back to the Roundtable. There  |
| Employee       | had been so much litigation, so much discord sort of post the decisions that had been made in the late '90s  |
| Employee       | and that need to get people to the table to really kind of chart the future for the Tongass and the region. And  |
|                | you know I think we were making some good progress. I mean there will be some that say that they think it  |
|                | wasn't enough, and I know the industry will say that they were losing too much ground and seeing what was  |
|                | once a vibrant but not a sustainable industry you know really decline. And there's no doubt it did decline, but  |
|                | there's a lot of reasons for that and I don't it was solely a political, I think there were some real economic   |
|                | issues that were driving that and continue under this current administration too to drive the industry. But  |
|                | there was also, it wasn't sustainable back in the 70s and 80s into the early 90s so there was a need for some  |
|                | change. And people's values change. What people want for the Tongass is so different today than it was 30  |
|                | years ago.   |
| Staffer        | So that's the, I mean I think the industry has been maybe a little short sighted in not at least recognizing that  |
|                | they need to continue to work towards some kind of a transition and they just have kind of dropped the ball  |
|                | on that like, oh you know I know there's been a number of times where they've you know questioned or bad   |
|                | mouthed the New Forest plan and attacked the process. Well we didn't really agree with that we didn't  |
|                | support that but that's they're saying all this only after an administrative change and a different perspective.   |
|                | And now they kind of have the upper hand. So it's a bit disingenuous.  |
| Staffer        | Well you know there had been the attack process and the forest, you know the new Forest Plan and   |
|                | everything was kind of set up into a standard time frame a stage transition to young growth. And then you  |
|                | know, well then once we had what nobody expected to happen certainly, three or four years ago. You know  |
|                | we had a change of administration and a completely different perspective. And you know I think that there's  |
|                | been some entities that have reverted back to well the good old, you know we want to revive the good old   |
|                | days again and we have an administration that's willing to support that right, and they've kind of taken that on   |
|                | as the way to go forward. And my personal belief is this that that's going to come back to bite them really bad  |
|                | at some point because I think that staying on a transition trajectory is the appropriate thing to do. And now  |
|                | that there is this push to kind of try to revive at least some concept of you know of course the good old days.<br>Let's just suggest that maybe we have a change of administration and get in about a year and a half. I don't    |
|                | think that, matter of fact, I know that there's some entities out there on the conservation side, they're not  |
|                | going to be looking for transition any longer. They're going to be looking to say, F you, you're done.   |
| Staffer        | You know. I think that certainly for a while it kind of helped with conversations and people were able to talk   |
| Statici        | to each other and see different perspectives a little better. I think it helped for a while. But then. You know  |
|                | things kind of I think during the Obama administration when more pressure was put on the timber industry to  |
|                | slow down and cut back on high risk stuff. I think that that really alienated the industry. And then obviously   |
|                | the last two and a half or so years we've had a 180 degree change in philosophy and you know that's created a  |
|                | lot of, oh, I think my personal belief is that some people of, some entities have taken advantage of that  |
|                | probably outside of the scale that is appropriate. And it probably is going to come back to bite them.   |
| Forest Service | After going through the presentation and hearing some comments and then the aftermath of those comments  |
| Employee       | was how many degrees from what we were actually trying to accomplish. So from that multiple more trips   |
|                | back to D.C. and the outcome was that I was going to do a forest plan we had to have some kind of consensus  |
|                | on what the outcome was going to be. So I was under a timeline to get the forest plan done. It has to be done  |
|                | before the next administration changed because nobody knew what the outcome of that was going to be.   |
|                | Which was about three and a half years, three years from this point till the time the forest plan had to be done   |
|                | and we had to come up with some kind of consensus model to buy into what the forest plan was going to be.  |
|                | So hence this roundtable came about. About which I had absolutely no idea how to put one together or what  |
|                | the mechanics that was going to be. So we spent some time with some individuals that were familiar with us   |
|                | working on how they operated and how you put them together. One was which was the Nature Conservancy   |
|                | and the other one was this group out of uh, Washington State and I was trying to remember names this   |
|                | morning but I have to go back and look at some of my records but Eileen Lee's name came up she was part of   |
|                | a group out of the Pacific Northwest. And Erin Dovichin was the principal contact with the Nature  |

| Forest Service                       | Conservancy. This group went through a whole host of things about how to set it up and what would take place and how it was going to operate. Once I had an idea on what the background was going to be and how they operated we actually had several Roundtable-type forums across country and, you know, started to launch one of our own. So the Regional Forester at the time, Beth Pendleton and I guess Denny Bischord at the time, we got together for some kind of understanding of putting this group together and off we went. By the time we got down to physically putting the Roundtable together and going through the mechanics of doing an advisory group like this, it'd been about another year and a half, trying to put the group together. At the same time, we're busily working on forest plan revisions. That was contrary to what the administration, the outcome was contrary to what the administration was looking for. So we had a whole host of things going a lot of different directions that were, you know somewhat difficult to manage at times. |
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| Employee                             | don't think changing too many aspects of the Roundtable would have helped. What would have helped, and<br>I've met with several senators and several congressmen and too many administration folks to count, but had<br>an outcome come out of the round table that was supported by that group, the only way to make it work into<br>time would have been through legislation and there was some support to do that. And recent history meaning<br>early in 1950s to president, the only thing that has survived in terms of management on this forest is<br>legislated fixes. Like, Wilderness. Once new Wilderness proposals were legislated, those weren't changed.<br>Land exchanges like the most recent one was Sealaska. Once that was legislated there was no fight after the<br>fact. But everything that was decided that could be changed by the next administration, you know I'd say it's<br>this cycle, you're heading down one path, a new administration shows up and overnight they're heading 180<br>degrees different than where you were the day before.       |
| Forest Service<br>Employee           | If you look at how you do environmental documents. It takes about four years from the day you decided to start one until you actually implement in on the ground. Well every four years the administration could possibly change right. And if it doesn't change, you're in lawsuits which take another three or four years or settle. So what you decide to do today you know could go through two or three administration changes and you know it's very difficult to implement the wishes of your undersecretary that's doing oversight on the Forest Service because by the time you get that project to fruition you could have two or three more undersecretaries that absolutely don't support what you're doing.  |
| Forest Service<br>Employee           | No I think you've covered it or I covered it but I would, I guess I think, having that group and they think I told them several times, they could have been the most powerful group in the state of Alaska, they could have been the most powerful group in the nation, had they actually been I guess putting their cards on the table and actually trying to come up with a solution rather than staying in their camps. So somebody, a group like that should actually have the huge benefit for this group as long as they're willing to come together and try and actually reach a consensus. But history has shown that politics have been a significant player in Southeast Alaska. And I don't think that's going to end anytime soon. A lot of politicians a lot of administrations gets their environmental vote by what they do or don't do for Southeast Alaska and it doesn't cost anything.   |
| Forest Service<br>Employee           | Well after an administration change from Republican to Democrat, we were about ready to come out with the Forest Plan and it wasn't until about six months ago I heard what was going on behind the scenes, but I had been asked to come to D.C. to explain where we were heading with this forest plan and what some of the outputs were going to be. I went back there and did a presentation to literally a packed house, a very large room full of a lot of people I was familiar with, and a lot of people had absolutely no idea who I was talking to. Everybody at the end of the presentation you know glad handed you said what a great job we were doing right. I left, and the ensuing discussion was how can we stop that individual that was left in the room, a friend of mine explained to me that it was one of the oddest meeting that he'd ever been in.  |
| Community<br>Representative          | And I did talk to a couple of Forest Service people and I won't mention their names, who said 'yeah it's our job, if you and Kirk try to go out of the building to tackle you and not let you leave', and, there was some of the large green concerns and they were there to kill us, that's obvious.   |
| Timber<br>Industry<br>Representative | You know I noticed the Forest Service during the last administration there were basically anti timber and wanted to shut the timber industry down. In some ways they acted like some other radical environmental groups. I remember meeting with the undersecretary at the time of agriculture, basically the Forest Service boss, and we'd talk to him I talked to him about these issues but particularly this, he wanted to transition to young growth management to 30 or 40 years before the trees were mature. And we explained to him why that wouldn't work. And his response initially was that it would work, and he'd tell me why and so I'd go investigate that and go back and tell him well look I looked into this and you're not correct, this is the reality. Finally he just said look, we have the social license to do this and we're going to do it and I don't care if it makes sense or not but we're going to do it. Just accept it. Of course I didn't accept it but they crammed it   |

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| Conservation<br>Advocate                    | down our throat anyway and that's kind of where we are now, that that's what's happening. And I know the current administration decided they were going to revise the Roadless rule. They put together what was basically a phony collaborative process where they handpicked people who were either in favor of or who were really in agreement with or not opposed to the transition and and put them on the collaboration group and anybody that was like me that wanted a timber supply you know was not voted to participate. And then they set up these rules and they said we didn't have to have consensus we just had to have people like mostly people agree on and then they railroaded through whatever they wanted. They had a group that wasn't going to oppose them in the first place so that's kind of the way they've been operating since then, recognizing that they don't meet everybody's needs, they are going to get agreement. And least not meet everybody's needs who isn't right with us, doesn't meet everybody's minimum needs.<br>And just to just follow up on that. In 2011 I think it was or 2010, the secretary, our Secretary of Agriculture said we're going to transition quickly out of clear-cutting old growth. And we're going to do that in the next |
|   | four or five years. And you know that was almost 10 years ago and now they're going to go on on Prince of Wales Island with the biggest clear cutting of old growth in a generation. So that's why I say that I don't trust the Forest Service Administration especially under their current state and federal administrations.   |
| Conservation<br>Advocate                    | The State, you know the State administration and who was going to staff it out for the State. And you know that kind of stuff was really difficult. And then. You know we never ever were able to get much of the delegation's bandwidth, especially Lisa Murkowski she kind of sat back and watched the whole thing probably laughed a lot. But you know we never they never found a way to really hook them in a meaningful way.  |
| Timber<br>Industry<br>Advocate              | You know, I don't know what else I would have done because at the time, with the big, one of the big<br>frustrations at the time, we were trying various legislative and administrative ways of increasing the timber<br>supply. But when we started the Roundtable effort we had something like 500 million board feet of timber<br>installed, timber product manufacturing capacity and when the round table ended we're down a little over 100<br>million. We lost 80 percent of our manufacturing facilities and we couldn't get the Forest Service or the<br>Congress to take action. Every time we go to them and say look, this has to be done. They would say well<br>we're waiting to see the outcome of the Roundtable. And so for five years we spun our wheels while our<br>timber supply dwindled. So from that standpoint we would have been better off to, you know from that one<br>standpoint we would have been better off not to be on the Round Table. On the other hand if we just refused<br>to participate in the Roundtable, then the people that aren't timber people would have said well you're just not<br>being reasonable right.  |
| Forest Service<br>Employee                  | It's always a problem for somebody that comes from outside of Alaska and doesn't understand how big it<br>really is. And context was all about my perspective coming from the Pacific Northwest. We were over-<br>cutting the Pacific Northwest. We, not We the Forest Service. I mean we just everybody. And so so when I<br>got to the Tongass, you know we got lots of room to work this and work it in a way that you'll hardly notice,<br>and even even with with the 10 or 15 percent or whatever it was it was was already harvested. Like I say<br>most of it, you could hardly tell 10 years later because it was so productive up there. But that's the good news<br>and bad news is you may lose sight of that what you're doing more you don't recognize it as fast because it's<br>just the context of it, you know.   |
| Timber<br>Industry<br>Advocate<br>Community | You know it's not different than what happened on the Roadless, the Forest Service wanted a particular outcome. They told their facilitator what it was and the facilitator went out and got it, you know. That that's not what I call a true collaborative process. It was a process, you know, but it was just kind of a fake one.<br>Um the Roundtable itself blew up when and I would say engineered to a certain extent by Southeast   |
| Representative                              | Conference but when Parnell decided that all State participants had to be withdrawn and that he was going to come up with his own Timber Task Force and it would obviously not include any conservationists, it would just be people that were based in pro-industry and his decision again which I believe was engineered in part by Southeast Conference allowed Southeast Conference itself to withdraw and I should say there were five or six different points where one or more groups would threaten to withdraw but would continue to show up or be persuaded to stick around. And uh I'm kind of just all over the map here and not particularly chronological. But once the state folks had left and along with it the timber advocates at Southeast Conference and Alaska Forest Association um and Dahlstrom himself, withdrawing.  |
| Forest Service<br>Employee                  | There were other events that took place that also showed some glimmer of hope, but as soon as the<br>Roundtable would depart, people would go off into their corners again and a lot of conspiracy theory<br>discussions about I wasn't being honest or the government wasn't being honest. Inevitably we were going to<br>go do what we wanted to do. But the offer was made that said we will support whatever this group comes out   |

|                             | of, we'll incorporate it in the Forest Plan. We'll make that decision on how we're going to manage the forest  |
|-----------------------------|--|
|                             | as long as five minutes after that decision came out everybody didn't turn around and become anti-Forest   |
|                             | Service again, or anti Forest Plan decision again. Which history shows in this forest has occurred on more   |
|                             | than one occasion.   |
| Community                   | The whole character of the Roundtable changed [after the withdrawal of Southeast Conference, the State, and  |
| Representative              | timber representatives. It was no longer a Roundtable in one respect. It continued to do some work, uh, both   |
|                             | on um a proposal that the FS had worked out with the Mental Health lands trust and they'd asked basically  |
|                             | for our sign off. First for the concept, and we'd tested it we gave our blessing to it and I think that was  |
|                             | somewhat helpful. The long and short of it was that land exchange did take place and in Ketchikan and then   |
| ~                           | the second issue that we decided to tackle was to deal with the Landless issue.  |
| Community                   | Yeah, so I have May of 2011 when Parnell ordered all State departments drop out of the Roundtable.   |
| Representative              |  |
| Pro                         | Yes. Southeast Conference decided that it wasn't in our best interest to spend time and money on the   |
| Development                 | roundtable anymore because they just weren't, it just wasn't, it was by that time it was just sitting around chit  |
| NGO                         | chatting every three I think it was once a month and you had to fly to a different village or a different  |
| Representative              | community every time and it's expensive. It was a huge time commitment, and we just decided the board  |
|                             | decided that it just wasn't worth it anymore. We were, we were dead in the water. And they had actually  |
|                             | compromised us completely off of the board. So we just said forget it. We're done with it. Do what you gotta   |
|                             | do.  |
| Timber                      | And after that I decided, well that's it for me. So a number of us went to Governor Parnell at the time and  |
| Industry                    | explained to him what was going on. We're, we're not accomplish anything and every year we meet with this  |
| Advocate                    | roundtable group we end up with less and less timber and more and more litigation. And we're not making a  |
|                             | lot of friends, we're not coming to agreement on much of anything and it's getting desperate for the timber  |
|                             | industry and we'd rather spend our time doing something productive and so we proposed to the governor that   |
|                             | he establish a temporary Timber Task Force that was focused solely on on what it would take to get, to   |
|                             | restore a timber supply. We don't need, we're not trying to come up with the, a social socially desirable or   |
|                             | acceptable outcome we just wanted to identify a timber supply that would keep our industry alive. We   |
|                             | weren't trying to return back to the days of the pulp mills and twelve thousand acres a year of timber harvest,  |
|                             | but we wanted to be able to have more than we had so that we could be sustainable. And the governor agreed   |
|                             | and then shortly after that the state withdrew from the roundtable and formed this timber task force. And after  |
|                             | that other groups started, started Southeast Conference dropped out and Forest Association dropped out,  |
|                             | others dropped out. My recollection is that the roundtable tried to move forward with what was left but that   |
|                             | kind of fizzled out on them, it didn't seem to pan out. I don't know that I ever heard that it officially  |
|                             | disbanded but that was, for me, that was the killer when it became apparent that they wouldn't agree to let us   |
|                             | continue with the amount of timber we had at the time which in that amount of timber wasn't enough for the   |
|                             | existing industry that we had. And so we changed our focus and just went to the governor and said we want  |
|                             | to do this task force and he did do the task force, we worked for two years. Chris Maisch, the State Forester  |
|                             | headed it up. He did a great job. After two years he came up with a list of recommendations for the state to implement across the state not just in Southeast and many of those were implemented, not all of them, you |
|                             | know like in Southeast it doesn't result in the additional timber but it did help in other areas. I think it was   |
|                             | partially successful and we accomplished something anyway, so we accomplished more in two years than we  |
|                             |  |
| Community                   | had five years on the, for me it was about five years on the Roundtable.<br>And we go right back to the old consensus thing. Because the pinball action that was going on in there, that                               |
| Community<br>Representative | was the most frustrating thing to me. Everybody in the room it seems like would be coming to a, yeah, it   |
| Representative              | looks like we can run with this let's put this down on paper and see what we can do with it and then one of  |
|                             | those guys waves their hands and says well I just can't be part of this. And out the door it went.   |
| Community                   | You know I thought it had gone too far overboard. And, you know maybe now a days it seems like it might  |
| •                           | have been good if we had locked in on some of that. But we found out through the years that whenever we'd  |
| Representative              | lock in on something, everybody says boy, we're gonna stop all this craziness and this is the way it's gonna   |
|                             | be from now on, the next year we have a whole new series of lawsuits and nonsense going on again. So   |
|                             | taking a large step back, of course that's a pretty hard thing to do after sitting there for years and years and   |
|                             | watching what can happen when you do that. You know.   |
| Forest Service              | There were other events that took place that also showed some glimmer of hope, but as soon as the  |
|                             | Roundtable would depart, people would go off into their corners again and a lot of conspiracy theory   |
| Employee                    | discussions about I wasn't being honest or the government wasn't being honest. Inevitably we were going to   |
|                             | uscussions about I wasn't being nonest of the government wasn't being nonest. Inevitably we were going to  |

|                             | go do what we wanted to do. But the offer was made that said we will support whatever this group comes out<br>of, we'll incorporate it in the Forest Plan. We'll make that decision on how we're going to manage the forest<br>as long as five minutes after that decision came out everybody didn't turn around and become anti-Forest<br>Service again, or anti Forest Plan decision again. Which history shows in this forest has occurred on more<br>than one occasion.   |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Conservation<br>Advocate    | And you know I talked with Erin Dovichin like a couple of years ago. I saw her at like a random place. We were both kind of on to different things. And she reflected that, you know that like internal alignment, was something that, she had spent a lot of time building external alignment. But among the conservation organizations it was just like come on guys we gotta do this, we're like on the same team. Rather than building that trusting relationship and shared vision and so forth. It was just kind of an assumption, like that everyone would get it together. And so you know ultimately the, the drive to be at the table was funder driven. Which funded driven is not necessarily a bad thing. I mean I'm in the role as a funder. So I'm not necessarily critiquing it for that but like I think the reason to sit at the table was for the money. You know, otherwise you were going to be cut out of the funding pie. Then how would your organization continue to do the good work that must be done, right? But you know that's very different than working on a shared vision toward clear goals. And deep personal buy-in, you know deep organizational buy-in. So I remember being in when one meeting and there is a number of like, so I was deputized to participate in the smaller group meetings on behalf of SEACC which I think was both maybe strategic and not. In part because I wasn't the decision maker for like, you know, we had an executive director right. But as I mentioned there was a trust issue and so I think that's kind of the reason why I was like, okay we'll send to Emily but I wasn't empowered to speak for the organization. And. Even if I was empowered, I don't know that I could have, or like what I was being asked to do, I didn't know if my board would go along with it. |
| Conservation                | But there was a lot of internal disillusionment and like the flip side of the campaign from before on the road  |
| Advocate                    | issue. And I think part of that internal disalignment. I've thought a lot about this, right. Like what was that,<br>and why was that different? Because there wasn't a really clear goal that everyone wanted to get to on the<br>same way together as they did on the road issue. We know, we know what it looks like, it looks like Berners<br>Bay without a road. I envision that, there's a whole bunch of different ways and things we can do to get there.<br>We know what that is. And with the Tongass Futures Roundtable, it was less clear, it was more mushy. And<br>everyone was kind of projecting their own world view on just broad goals as well as their fears.  |
| Community<br>Representative | But. Yeah. And he was you know he came in with his little check sheet there with all of his numbers and everything and actually and he wasn't, originally, he wasn't going to budge at all. But he did come around and then they replaced him. And that happened a lot because that's what happened with SEACC. They had Buck. And Buck was a little bit more amenable. And then when of course when Lindsey came in. It was like Here we go we go start all over again because she just was from Vermont. She knew absolutely nothing about the Tongass. And her board's telling her one thing and we're telling her another. I had a young man who came out to Coffman Cove one time that was working for SEACC and he'd come out to go round to some of the logging communities trying to get some support for SEACC and stuff like that. And he spent some time in Coffman Cove. And when he left he went back and told them, I don't want nothing to do with you guys. Those are real people out there with real lives and you guys, you're just messing them up. And he quit.   |

| Community      | So I thought it was especially helpful for the people who didn't live in Alaska. They represent a different      |
|----------------|--|
| Representative | group. You know and like the National Forest Foundation and very different things like that and meeting face     |
|                | to face, it was interesting to sit down with people you know, having been on the development side. You know      |
|                | the logging the road building and all that it was it was really interesting to talk to the people who had such a |
|                | negative view on all that stuff and why.   |
| Community      | Their whole board and they their board just went in with a set idea and sent them as a representative thinking   |
| Representative | that they would but they'd never heard the conversation. They'd never heard how it affects people. And you       |
|                | know my big resentment I guess my biggest resentment about the Tongass Futures Roundtable was all the            |
|                | people who don't live here who feel like they know more and should have a say on how Southeast Alaska            |
|                | runs, how the area is controlled, is developed and they don't live here. You know they can go home. I            |

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|                                       | remember Sierra Club, years ago, they were trying to shut down logging and the President of the Sierra Club<br>had a thirty-five hundred square foot house in Anchorage. It was all redwood for just him and his wife.   |
| Forest Service<br>Employee            | Yes, and now it's completely flip-flopped the opposite direction and I have no doubt that it will flip-flop in<br>another direction depending on the outcome of future elections. So it's unfortunate for the Tongass and really<br>for the people of the Tongass because I think that's who really probably in these scenarios has the greatest<br>impact is the communities, because the forest itself, barring what may continue to transpire with climate<br>change and the effects on forest health and the species diversity, it's the people who really have the greatest<br>effect right now. Because it's still a pretty healthy forest all in all. You know there are disturbing things that<br>are starting to rear their ugly head, I think with some of the climate issues and insect and disease issues and<br>what's happening with salmon and those kinds of things. But it's still a pretty healthy, a relatively healthy<br>system. But there's a lot of unknowns there.   |
| Forest Service<br>Employee            | The other thing that happened during this time, and it was solely by accident was that we had been, I have been contacted by an individual an environmental community that had an interest in Roadless implementation on the forest and they didn't have a whole lot of background on what it was and they wanted to be brought up to speed on exactly what we were doing and what effect Roadless would have, wanted to decide whether to support this idea. Well there's probably the most significant was the national interest in what we were doing and what really surprised me was the misunderstanding of what it was we were trying to accomplish versus what others said in the forum with some of national interests of what we were doing, once we got face to face with individuals that had these opinions on what it was trying to accomplish there was a lot more support for it. Well that was usually short lived because of the rapid turnover of individuals in some of these positions. It was constant. There was one time I was gonna go back and brief state delegations on what it was we were trying to accomplish. Well you spent a significant amount of time in D.C. going from both the Senate and the House offices from state to state. You know, explaining what it was we were trying to do. So a lot of politics were involved and a lot of misunderstandings over the time of what it was we were actually doing versus what they thought we were doing. |
| Community<br>Representative           | And ultimately, I quit. And all of the timber involved people bailed out. I mean because the premise of what we were doing had been highjacked and it was becoming some kind of a social experiment. And you know I didn't want anything to do with that crap. If there's one thing that small communities don't like it's someone coming in from the Outside, telling us how we should live. And, it was really edging towards that.  |
| Forest Service<br>Employee            | I mean people that actually had a stake in the game the Kirk Dahlstroms of the world, Sealaska. Those people are still here and they're still trying to make a living but a lot of people have come and gone and they probably don't even think about or what affect the outcome of that group had on southeast Alaska which if I was king for a day I'd probably rewrite some of the FACA group language to you've got to have some kind of stake as to whether or not it's going to have benefits in the future for you which I hear is about all of.  |
| Roundtable<br>Staffer                 | Oh sure. I mean being the largest forest in the country. All of the activity on a timber basis is southern<br>Southeast, Petersburg and south. But basically, it's Prince of Wales Island it's got to, I mean maybe there's a<br>little around Ketchikan and so to have a you know, but there are stakeholders and a lot of them are in Juneau<br>and some are in Anchorage and some are in Seattle and Olympia. And so it's you know how do people who<br>you know I mean it happens all the time that people make decisions for you who don't live in the area but you<br>get a lot more you know the more that you're sort of localized decision-making you know the better off you<br>are. I mean yes if you go to the meeting in Coffman Cove or something and it's this guy from Portland who<br>comes up and says well you know we have decided that wood energy is not going to count towards<br>renewables or you've got some groups in Juneau coming down and saying this is the way it should be here. I<br>think that that the POW KAK grew by Prince of Wales, in the end it just was you know those were virtually<br>all POW people who were involved in the whole thing showed that on a local scale you probably can, people<br>are willing to go along with locals making the decision. But having people from these other places come<br>down and say how life should be.   |
| Forest Service<br>Employee            | But probably the most significant to me, and I've probably told this to a million people, but my interest wasn't<br>in the timber industry it wasn't in the mining industry it wasn't in the environmental community. My interest<br>was in the communities of Southeast Alaska and trying to keep schools open and keep jobs in these<br>communities trying to keep these communities to where they were self-existent rather than being dependent<br>on state or federal government.   |
| Forest Service<br>Employee            | Because I think ultimately it's the people and it's the land and I just, I just hope that we'll do the right thing for both. And you know I think we can if people work, work together.  |

| Facilitator              | When they talked about the quality of life in Southeast Alaska, everyone cared about that. Everyone wanted a sustainable economy, everyone recognized that timber had a role and that tourism and ecotourism had a role and there might be new businesses and new economic activity that could come out of the Tongass as a result of this.   |
|--------------------------|---|
| Facilitator              | You know particularly the loggers and the greens, they loved being in the outdoors. They loved being out<br>there. They had different things they wanted to do there, but they were, you know, they love the land and<br>what's growing on it and um everybody wanted to see a robust Southeast economy. They wanted to not spend<br>all their time arguing, and they found some areas that they might be able to work on and over time in these<br>meetings people got to know each other well, and I think some true friendships developed between people<br>who might have been at each other's throats absent this. |
| Conservation<br>Advocate | I was working as a representative of Trout Unlimited, and as a resident of Southeast because I loved the place, lived here for 17 years.  |
| Roundtable<br>Staffer    | I mean that's because they had, people that had long standing before being in the Tongass had been here for a long time and they were involved in the Tongass in terms of whether it was conservation or industry stuff. So there was just really good understanding of the scale of what they were discussing and the scale of the Tongass so that that number to me was never an issue.   |
| Roundtable<br>Staffer    | The thing about the Roundtable and looking at working on an issue that's this complicated is that nobody is bullshiting. Nobody is making stuff up people are bringing their truth as they've experienced it and just that people experience and interact with the Tongass in such different ways. And so what's and so they're bringing that truth to the table and so people can seem to be saying outlandish things but if you question them and dig a little deeper they've reacted and blown it up or they're playing a different angle but there's a kernel in there that's really legitimate.                    |
| Conservation<br>Advocate | I mean you know we're living you know as neighbors to people that they bitterly argued with on things. I think those perspectives are really important. They were taken very seriously. When you tell people to get over stuff, it's really easy to say, but it's not very fair.  |

# Alaska Natives and Tongass Management

| Participant  | Quote  |
|--------------|--|
| Conservation | Yeah well I think, I don't want to assume that I can even appreciate where they're coming from but yeah I      |
| Advocate     | don't think you become a native corporate leader without fighting that battle you know addressing [historical  |
|              | trauma and distrust]. Jaeleen Kookesh I mean in her I mean and her family I mean they there's a lot of yeah    |
|              | that trauma. But you know compare that to folks like the Ketchikan Indian Community or the Wrangell            |
|              | Cooperative Association that didn't receive recognition and ANCSA because the white man decided that           |
|              | they weren't native enough their Community was urban in character and therefore they weren't entitled but      |
|              | then okay let's make a special deal for Juneau how did you know get a special deal you know they were a        |
|              | corporation. And Kodiak got a special deal and Sitka may have may have been one of the urban                   |
|              | corporations there's only three or four urban corporations and do you know sick has had a long but I don't     |
|              | think their Community qualified it wasn't that different than Ketchikan it wasn't that different than Wrangell |
|              | they were both Mill towns right so why did Sitka? You know, well there were exceptions.                        |

| Alesles Meters Les 1 | I don't he are North and the almost the set of the set of the distance of the Darman Market and the Art the set |
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| Alaska Native Leader | I don't know. You know I've always thought, you know I kind of gave up on Roundtable actually. And what,        |
|                      | what I always tell people is that I would like to do a study of our, our Sealaska land legislation and how we   |
|                      | were able to you know I mean if we were able to get that well it took us 10 years to get that legislation but.  |
|                      | But it was at a time when indigenous people weren't moving things in in Congress. I think it would be a         |
|                      | good public policy analysis to figure out. I mean we met with environmentalists up and down the coast and       |
|                      | across the country. And I don't know how many meetings we had. We had community meetings you try to             |
|                      | garner support for for our land legislation. And we were able to achieve that. But I'm always reminded too      |
|                      | that we only got so many thousand acres. But the environmentalist got like a I don't know two hundred           |
|                      | thousand acres you know put in and designated you know environmental areas. But I still think you know          |
|                      | I'd like to take a look at that you know how we were able to accomplish that and how was it that the            |
|                      | environmentalist you know jumped on our bandwagon and got their you know their areas set aside.                 |
| Roundtable Staffer   | [Sealaska] stayed. Till the very very end. And it was because the way they approached it was very smart I       |
|                      | thought. They said we're going to be here forever we've been here forever when these important issues are       |
|                      | happening you know we sign up to work on them. We are going to stay with them. We're not going to get           |
|                      | mad and walk away. So it was a very interesting so they maintained a very steady presence all the way           |
|                      | through I mean towards the end I think Rick was there less and Jaylen was there more. Who is in another         |
|                      | role at Sealaska currently.   |
| Conservation         | I remember Byron doing that at least five times. And that's what I mean by playing 3D chess. I mean they        |
| Advocate             | made fools out of a lot of us right. Yeah I mean because they're running their Sealaska legislation and then    |
|                      | they got it passed and they got what they wanted. And you know Byron it was like just masterful at like         |
|                      | putting his foot to the floor of a gas scuttle and that it easing off at the perfect moment you know like you   |
|                      | know like where we're at one minute he's volcanically angry at meAnd then, you know, put his arm                |
|                      | around and say you know how much he liked working with you. I don't know. I mean it was, I learned a lot        |
|                      | from Sealaska and Byron in particular and it was a very impressive performance of you know keeping their        |
|                      | eye on the ball making sure they were always working towards their goal and keeping all of us sort of either    |
|                      | confused or titillated or worried or downright scared shitless of it.   |
| Conservation         | It gets back to like the question of like is the existence of the Tongass equitable. So there is that           |
| Advocate             |   |
| Alaska Native Leader | Well I think the objective really was to get all of the different interest groups together to come up with      |
|                      | how're we going to work together, how we were going to set the stage for the Tongass for the future. Where      |
|                      | all of our interests could be met but my specific goal was to you know to have the recognition that this is our |
|                      | homeland. This is the homeland of the Tlingit and Haida people, and it's our homeland and we have a             |
|                      | special tie to this and we've lived here for 10,000 years. We know that scientifically as well as through our   |
|                      | own oral traditions and it's our intent you know to remain here in perpetuity, and we want to remain here as    |
|                      | native people. And that's what I wanted recognition of and that it's our homeland that we have our own          |
|                      | values about how our relationship to the Tongass is structured. And I just wanted to ensure our cultural        |
|                      | survival. And so I thought it was really important to be involved with with the Tongass Futures because it      |
|                      | seemed like that would be the platform for bringing the different interest groups to plan for the future.       |
|                      | seemes and and be the platerin for eringing the unrefert interest groups to plan for the future.                |

| Sealaska       | I think that, how would I answer that. There was a lot of controversy. You know, there were people going, wait a     |
|----------------|--|
| Representative | minute, I live here too. As soon as I see this is a Native Place. If you're not Native, you feel excluded. So there  |
|                | was that kind of push, but there was a lot of dialog around that and some very heated discussions. I mean I          |
|                | watched hot, hot debates occur between Audubon Society and Byron as an example. And I watched they Mayor             |
|                | of Craig and Byron just, you know, they had no problem telling each other what they thought of each other at the     |
|                | time. And so there was a lot of resistance and people were going wait a minute, what the hell, what are you          |
|                | talking about. And it was, to say that was it makes some of the people feel excluded, and then when they feel        |
|                | excluded some of the other people are saying see, this is the way you've always been for 200 years kind of thing.    |
|                | But as they started to work through it and listen to it, what it was about was you have throughout the Tongass       |
|                | you have native names but they're not recognized as Native names, you know it was the name of the forest is a        |
|                | Native name, and so if people begin to kind of understand that, then that uneasiness began to sort of soften and it  |
|                | continues to this day. You see a lot of effort, I mean walk around Juneau. I just walked the river trail, while they |
|                | got river trail names and they're basically using native names to describe the area because natives used the place.  |
|                | And so you start to see more, it's not as exclusionary as it was in the beginning. I mean people, the Alaska         |
|                | Native Claims Settlement Act was one that created a separation. It all of a sudden would go, why do they get it      |

|                            | and we don't? We have no sense of history. Representative Rhinehold. I don't know if you watch the Juneau Collective but she went on and said, you Natives, why are opposing the Governor's vetos? You got all this stuff and you should be taking care of your people and you've been given stuff that nobody else was given. And I mean that just happened. So it's still there. But to a very large degree I think a lot of progress was made. It's not so in your face and I think people like the idea of it. When you travel around you think you're in a place that nobody's been until you walk along the beach and go oh geez, here's a culturally modified tree. Here's an old village site. You know you don't have to walk very far to find those kinds of things. So, people have accepted it, and I think it's accomplished a lot and part of that was because the Forest Service sitting there and the Forest Service leaders going, you know you're right. We haven't really paid respect to the original inhabitants here and the fact that all these historic sites and cultural sites that we're protecting aren't really historic sites, they belong to these people and this is a very dynamic culture. Native Culture. So, it's strong, has a strong presence, you can see it everywhere in every town, you're gonna see totem poles or formline design art, so those things all kind of were accepted. So I would take some of that back to the Roundtable of people just going you're right, this doesn't cost us anything. And we can go a long ways to better define this area and what it's history was and where it came from. So there was a lot of challenges among each other, but the key thing is after they were done, they still talked to each other. The Watson-Mallott, because Dennis is, he has a strong, forceful personality as well. And I'll deny I said this but each of them has sort of a ready, shoot, aim personality. Sometimes you just go oh my god, here we go. You know, and the first time it happens you freak out and go this is gonna blow this who organization apa |
|----------------------------|--|
| Conservation<br>Advocate   | [ANCSA] came up during [the Roundtable] and complicated that process. It was, it made, you know that's always been the challenge you've got such a variety of interests right oh I'm sure if we had kept talking the miners would have come in so you know everybody has you know to have everybody have a seat at the table and two bounces interest and you know I mean for the natives particularly after what happened the fact that we stole the land I mean how can a nation of law rest on or how can we claim the US is a nation of laws when our wealth is built on Stolen land?  |
| Forest Service<br>Employee | So when I came to Alaska, I had kind of a jaundiced view of natives, and it took a number of years for me to I guess really realize what the value of the Alaska Natives were. And I guess after working on a lot of fires up north for a lot of diverse native groups. And then the amount of time I spent Southeast Alaska actually understanding the value of the natives in Southeast Alaska and what they'd been through, some of the knowledge behind them. But when Byron gave his talk, and it kinda rung true with what I'd been seeing in Southeast Alaska, I really believe that it opened up a lot of eyes about, you know other people have a stake in this and probably weren't adequately represented on this group, and Byron's support for Alaska Native's came out very true. We had actually been trying to incorporate a lot of that thought or idea or or at least interest in the forest plan. But the Forest Service on the Tongass, the group on the Tongass the time spent a huge amount of time with the wide variety of Native interests in Southeast Alaska.   |

| Sealaska<br>Representative | But there are still unresolved Native land entitlement issues like the landless which was sort of part of that discussion but never could quite get addressed because the fundamental legal principles underneath it were still in dispute or in debate. |
|----------------------------|--|
| Sealaska<br>Representative | And there were also major [successes] like I think the Sealaska land bill was one of them.   |

| Funder | As one funder explained, "the whole management of forests for carbon which was all kinda pie in the sky back there then now is a serious revenue driver for Sealaska with a new generation at the helm." |
|--------|--|
|        |  |

# Aftermath of the Roundtable

| Participant | Quote |
|-------------|-------|
|             |       |

| Alaska Nativa               | I've always been a honeful person. Honeful is sometimes not positive. And I think that there were code planted  |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Alaska Native<br>Leader     | I've always been a hopeful person. Hopeful is sometimes not positive. And I think that there were seeds planted<br>and there are some people nurturing them. And when Trump's effort to do away with the Roadless Rule and then<br>ramp up larger scale logging in the Forest fails, which it is doomed, well not doomed, but halleluiah, rightfully<br>going to happen. That just proves that in many ways we're still running in place. My personal belief from my<br>experience at Sealaska was that the regeneration of second growth on both Native, and Forest Service, and even<br>State lands and other institutional lands like the University of Alaska and the Mental Health Trust, that in the next<br>20 years, there is some second growth harvesting already taking place on a smaller scale, for example in my<br>home town of Yakutat. That we can have a viable but scaled forest industry in Southeast that could produce you<br>know as much as 200 million board feet a year, maintain the integrity of the Tongass, allow for community<br>development and community growth.  |
| Timber Advocate             | I mean that, it's hard to believe even now that most of the groups were sincere about a middle ground. I think that they, I'm not sure what their expectation was, but it had no hope of a being achieved anyway. The only way they could have achieved something would be if the timber industry just agreed to go out of business.  |
| Community<br>Representative | I mean I think processes have changed. But you're still going to have lawsuits and objections, and everything filed. Anything that the Forest Service does. There's still opposition to any kind of timber industry. I mean I don't think anything's changed. The way the Forest Service is doing things might have changed some by virtue of you know they changed the forest plan and made it more restrictive. So now they have a new process it's sort of it's harder to file a lawsuit. More of this objection type process but you can ultimately still file a lawsuit. I mean in some way I don't think. I don't think anything really changed.  |
| Community<br>Representative | So, we're trying to keep the industry going and so, no I don't think it's better by any means. I think the struggle is<br>on. When I talked to Bryce, you know, he said more of the same. More stalling and futzing around and you know<br>I have a lot of issues with the Forest Service because they would lay out sales properly sometimes and I would<br>take the sticking points and get rid of them because you know that way if the greenies want to come in and stop<br>you you can say well look we've taken care of that. You let the contractor decide whether the timber's going to<br>be helicopter timber or it's going to be timber that you're going to need roads for because the Forest Service<br>certainly doesn't have any expertise in that. The contractors know what it's going to cost, what the helicopter's<br>going to cost, what it's going to cost to build roads. And maintain them and do things in that direction, the Forest<br>Service needs to listen to them a little bit more before they put out a sale because it's ridiculous to lay out a sale<br>that has a whole bunch of timber in it that's just not economical to get at. You know, take that part out of the sale.<br>I said it's not doing anybody any good to go in there and build a road back to it if it's economically faulty timber.<br>It's just uh, you know I think they're trying to run this business reasonably and it's hard to find people in the<br>Forest Service who know what the hell they're talking about anymore because most of the guys that do timber<br>have gone out. And the very few that they have let are stretched really thin. And I can remember when Forrest<br>Cole, poor guy, he had so much stress in the last five years of his life, you know I'm surprised he lived through it.<br>With developing Tongass Land Management Plans and dealing with timber people and dealing with green people<br>and dealing with the Washington, D.C. bureaucrats. It's been a pretty unruly mess. |
| Funder                      | No I thought the whole thing. I mean you may have a final question about this but just I have found that<br>experience to be one of the most important formative experiences of my entire professional career and you know<br>life as a person too. I mean it had moments of frustration and it didn't have the outcomes people wanted. It was<br>confusing. It was stressful. It was all of those things but it was also just an incredibly cool and ultimately useful<br>thing to have tried. It's easy to look back and throw stones but I wouldn't give up anything you know to, I mean<br>I'm so glad I got to be part of it. And in the middle of all that. Those are memorable, memorable meetings and<br>conversations and meals, experiences. It was great.  |
| Community<br>Representative | Trust building is critically important to reaching agreement and we didn't. I don't think it translates into failure.<br>Because what work we did for better or worse ended up being part of the legislative package that Murkowski put together. And to that extent that it brought some closure   |
| Conservation<br>Advocate    | And you've got a lot of cool projects going on in other places. But a bunch of the big stuff isn't resolved. I mean you know. The governor and a Senior Senator are trying to take Tongass out of the roadless rule which is you know flat out stupid.  |
| Conservation<br>Advocate    | And I think for some people who are still engaged it feels really clear like they're still putting out these timber sales with board feet and you know that's still happening and that shouldn't really be happening right now. So I'm glad like people I watched that and being like um no. But I think, social change organizations if they do their job should actually go away. So there's that question to of like has this job been accomplish and then does it go away. I feel like I struggled a lot with that too personally. But then it also begs the question then who then who do you call when the PFAS issue comes up in Gustavus and that like, there's an element, there's value there to having   |

|                             | that like watchdog organization, but it maybe focuses on different things or it's a little less cohesive. All of those things. Definitely things that I think about a lot.  |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Conservation<br>Advocate    | Maybe that's why they never could come up with a solution because it wasn't actually grounded in anything but a few people who had very specific agendas and not really on like what do the communities and Southeast need to thrive? Maybe it was the wrong question. Like we were asking how do we do the tit for tat thing and create a legislative package that remapped the Tongass and we should have been asking something like what do communities need to thrive in this region that has forests and rivers and oceans to work with?   |
| Community<br>Representative | I think that the other reality is that despite best efforts, the timber industry is never going to be what it was. And the generation that continues to hope for itare slowly fading from the landscape. And um, in the meantime were getting more new growth.  |
| Community<br>Representative | But, when you have, I think the good things that came out of the Roundtable is that people got to know each other. And that's always good, right? Some education things came out of it. There was a, there's a vocational training building that was built in Haidaburg and they didthey may still be doingtimberwhat's the word? Lost the word where they go out and check inventory. Oh and they actually attempted to get folks from the communities to go and learn about timber inventorying and how to work in the forest and that would have probably not happened if that roundtable hadn't been there. So a few good things came of it. But all in all, exactly what I expected to happen happened. We lost the timber industry. |

| Participant    | Quote  |
|----------------|--|
| Sealaska       | And then the other things that came about were you know, like say from Byron's perspective was a very strong       |
| Corporation    | voice in naming the Tongass as a Native Place and out of that, so there were just there was a long dialog but I    |
| Representative | think some of the accomplishments that were measurable were that you know first of all collaboration,              |
|                | communication with people, the second you know the place in the Sealaska land bill, the recognition of the         |
|                | Tongass and it's role and it's historic, social, emotional, fabric as a native place. So those were all            |
|                | accomplishments that come out of the Tongass, rather the Roundtable process.                                       |
| Alaska Native  | And the Nature Conservancy in particular has worked with Sealaska Corporation for example to help fund and         |
| Leader         | deal with trying to create viable, small-scale economies in the Tongass. And so, you know, there were seeds        |
|                | planted that hopefully will bloom into something meaningful.   |
| Conservation   | There was a [Roundtable] subcommittee that Byron precipitated in. This is when [the organization] Haa Ani was      |
| Advocate       | bornIt's a Tlingit phrase that means our landByron was pitching to the Sealaska board that they needed to          |
|                | create a subsidiary within Sealaska that was more grounded in their cultural traditions and values. And they ended |
|                | up doing that and they called it Haa Ani. And that was happening during the roundtable. And so Byron was           |
|                | giving voice to that and basically saying that you know Sealaska is changing and trying to sort of lead the group  |
|                | toward change as being an ok place to go. And then Haa Ani ended up getting changed to spruce root. And you        |
|                | may know people who work at spruce root now or have heard of Spruce Root but that's, Spruce Root CFI got its       |
|                | start as Haa Ani. And again you know that's what really came out of that group that seemed to have some life       |
|                | resulted in you know sort of more interest in Indigenous engagement and and the Haa Ani thing, which you know      |
|                | in a way kind of became the SSP. Yes. And also the cluster group initiative which JEDC I think is still running.   |

| Participant  | Quote   |
|--------------|---|
| Conservation | I don't know. I think a little bit? I think a little bit, somewhat but enough years have passed and people when the |
| Advocate     | Roundtable quote on quote failed to get the golden key or the brass ring or whatever. You know it's not people      |
|              | generally dissed it you know sort of like that sucks let's move on. And I don't know that the dynamic right now is  |
|              | all that different you know I see Jim Clark and Meredith Trainor and Win Greening today doing what they've          |
|              | been doing forever. But you know that's part of that's part of human nature maybe. I also see Meredith working      |
|              | with the native communities dramatically differently than anybody before her ever did. So I think there have been   |
|              | some changes I think Jaylene Kukesh and respect and a little bit of coordination and then the native world are      |
|              | much better. yeah that's a good question. Somebody's who's in the throes of it right now might be interesting to    |
|              | see if, things are just I will say this though when it comes to Timber things are just so much better from a        |
|              | conservation and stewardship point of view. Then they were in the 80s and 90s that it's just like it seems so       |
|              | doable to keep kind of you know now it could slip it any moment with the government like this but the kinds of      |

|                          | issues and debates and conversations are dramatically different and some of that is probably the passage of times<br>but I think the round table made a difference to some of that.   |
|--------------------------|---|
| Community                | and one of the other biproducts of the Roundtable I think but again, could very well have happened without the  |
| Representative           | Roundtable. Was the and this gets back in part to looking at smaller economic development activities and that was stream restoration, coming up with projects like thinning. We say thinning operations on POW and Yakutat. That offered and I think part of it was trying to demonstrate to some of the die-hard timber folks that there was an industry that could take place but it was on a different scale and that also it could mean local employment as opposed to people coming up from down South. And the Roundtable helped informed the Forest Service about the viability of these kinds of projects and I think it's become pretty standard right now. Again, would that have happened without the Roundtable? Probably. Probably wouldn't have happened as fast. For a couple reasons. One |
|                          | of which was that I don't think the Forest Service on its own was that creative about it to begin with. And um the<br>Roundtable created a regular opportunity for interaction between the conservation community and forest service<br>leadership. And um, so again I would say that's another bi product that certainly wasn't planned. And I can't   |
| Sealaska                 | remember your question now that you've got me on this.<br>It was, I'm not sure that there was [anything that could have made the process better]. I mean it was very  |
| Corporation              | inefficient. But by its nature the inefficiency was what allowed the communication to occur and you know we   |
| Representative           | would sit down and we would have a meeting and somebody would kind of pen something and say ok, we agree<br>to this and you know technically we'd say ok, it's done. We're not going to bring it up again. But because of its<br>open structure it would come up again and it would get re-debated. And you know in some cases we really  |
|                          | weren't making progress, but you have to decide how you're measuring progress. And you can sit there and say<br>well we made progress here and not for the reason that we thought we did but because there was something else<br>happening that was very beneficial to the group or the organization or the region.   |
| Conservation             | There was a lot of interesting things that emerged from the roundtable like I would submit that Southeast   |
| Advocate                 | Sustainable Partnership is probably some kind of unintended brainchild of the Roundtable.   |
| Facilitator              | Oh, it was, um, so the Nature Conservancy led that project [a specific restoration project] working with locals and   |
| raciiitatui              | a very harmonious process. Not inexpensive to clean up a totally screwed up creek. But um, the fish are back so it worked. I'm thinking it was like two or three million dollars but I wasn't involved directly in that.  |
| Roundtable               | Prince of Wales has changed immeasurably. From a place that said yes to every single thing that timber and  |
| Staffer                  | Forest Service wanted to do to now very representative of everybody else which is a mixture of opinion. But   |
|                          | definitely people who are not interested in timber harvest as the sole core of their community are willing to say   |
|                          | enough is enough and get mad at some of this stuff that's going on. So thinks you know these dynamics and things change and who knows.  |
| Funder                   | And you know I think the outcomes were a much-improved mutual understanding among parties and where they were coming from and what the constraints and values they brought were. I feel like there were some more tactical things that happened that were significant, not trivial. You know, such as more serious, evidence-based dialogues about the readiness of young growth trees and about the economic potential of restoration economy, tourism economy, and fishing economy. And I also feel like there were, you know, lasting individual relationships that continued to bear fruit for many years. What there was not was that sort of holy grail grand solution despite efforts to make that happen by some people.  |
| Conservation<br>Advocate | <ul> <li>Well, I was finding some, I was seeing sort of the collaborative around restoration that got, you know evolved out of it. That's where I would say I could see the successes were. I don't think there were any big successes on hard conservation. Well no, I take that back. So yeah, I think I look at what's happened since, like with the Tongass 77 and the TNC-Audubon areas being incorporated into land management planning and being discussed relative to the Forest Plan POWLA. Roadless Rule even. That those concepts were first introduced at the Roundtable. And so, so I think that was a success. So I don't know where it really ended.</li> </ul>  |
| Funder                   | So I think there is a kind of a culture of collaborative contribution that has taken hold in parts of the Southeast<br>Environmental community that resulted from the promise of those years. Even if you can't attribute it to those<br>years.   |
| Funder                   | So I would say that there were definitely pockets where relationships improved significantly. So you know I'm sure you've heard about for example some of the partnerships that emerged between I think TNC, Sealaska and the Alaska Conservation Foundation around some of the Haa Ani and some of the social economic development. You know that those to me were really positive developments that if you had asked me you know if you had told me that that was going to happen when we first started I would have said wow just that alone I would be really   |
|                          | impressed. Because you know that that was a real sign of progress. I think I've heard from a number of people too that would say that if you look at a place like Craig, which was sort of the heart of the industry and with   |

|              | communities that were pretty devastated you know both sides meaning both people who felt devastated because<br>of what had happened to the industry and also devastated because of the clear cut logging that had you know<br>changed the landscape that you know that that the concrete projects that that they were able to do around things<br>like restoration and watershed management, that those were all really positive. So I think at those levels there<br>were some really positive things. And people who have stayed engaged at least report to me that you know they<br>feel like that things really are, that they would say that a lot of that has borne fruit. |
|--------------|--|
| Conservation | They have something called the Innovation Summit. You've probably heard of that and then part of that was this   |
| Advocate     | thing called the cluster group initiative and that was basically group of people who kind of came out of the   |
|              | Roundtable who were interested in sort of what can we do if we can't agree to a giant legislative package that   |
|              | gives everybody millions of acres of everything they want. What can we do? And so there was an initiative  |
|              | around recreation and tourism, there was initiative around the arts. There was initiative around sustainable timber  |
|              | management, ocean products a variety of things. And you know I think it's fair to say that a lot of those relationships that were initiated on the roundtable resulted in those two branches of ongoing collaboration  |
|              | basically.   |
| Conservation | You know I think that the way things happen is the way things happen and that that's the way it's supposed to  |
| Advocate     | happen. And so were the right people in the room to come up with a solution? Obviously not. They didn't come   |
|              | up with a solution. But was that really what that was about? Maybe it was about you know the Innovation Summit   |
|              | and Haa ani and the SSP. And so if you take a broader view of things that includes like evolution of social  |
|              | relations etc. as part of what's actually going on then you know I think obviously the right people were there   |
|              | because we are where we are now today.   |

# **Appendix 2: Interview Guide**

## Introductory Questions

- 1. Can you tell me a little bit about your involvement with management issues in the Tongass?
- 2. Can you tell me a little bit about the Roundtable?
- 3. How did you become involved with the Roundtable?

Probe: How were you selected? Who were you representing?

4. When the Roundtable first started, what did you think it would be able to accomplish?

# Roundtable Trajectory Questions

5. What ultimately happened with the Roundtable?

Probe: What do you think about that outcome? Why do you think that happened? (use

their terminology i.e. "disaster" "fizzled" as appropriate in probes)

6. What do you feel changed along the way?

Probe: Did your perspective on the Roundtable change along the way? Did your perspective on management of the Tongass change along the way? Did relationships between participants change along the way? In what ways? What were the implications of those changes?

7. How long did you participate?

Probe: Why did you stop?

## **Elements of Collaboration**

8. Did you think the right people were at the table?

Probe: Who wasn't invited/chose not to participate/left early? How did that effect the process?

9. What did you think about the process itself, for example the way issues were raised and discussed, and the decision-making process?

Probe: Did you feel it was fair and effective or not? In what ways?

10. What did you think about the leadership of the Roundtable?

11. How did scientific debates and data factor into the work of the Roundtable?

Probe: on conflicts about the ecological value of second growth and ecological impacts of cutting old growth

12. How did the scale of the Tongass, the fact that it's such a large, diverse area, influence the

Roundtable?

#### Trust and Distrust

13. Did people trust one another at the outset?

14. How did trust change over time?

Probe: How and why did trust increase or decrease during the process?

15. How did historic conflict influence trust between participants?

16. Some of the people I've interviewed have mentioned Byron Mallot's talk at the Anchorage meeting. How did that change things?

Probe: Do you feel that affected the relationship between Alaska Natives and other

Roundtable participants?

17. How did trust or distrust influence the process?

Probe: Did it affect the way people discussed issues or the way decisions were made?

18. Do you think the Roundtable helped build trust between groups or do you think it increased distrust?

Probe: How so?

19. Do you think there was any part of the Roundtable process that could've been done differently to better build trust?

20. How did trust or distrust influence the ultimate outcome of the Roundtable?

Roundtable Influence on Current Relationships/Collaboration

21. Do you think that participating in the Roundtable changed relationships between people/stakeholders long-term?

Probe: How are things better and how they are worse than they were before the Roundtable? How do stakeholders work together today compared to how they worked together before and during the Roundtable?

### Wrap-Up

22. Is there anything else you'd like to share about the Roundtable?

23. Is there anyone in particular you think I should talk with as part of this project?

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