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DAVID DEMERITT

CUBAN ANNEXATION, SLAVE POWER PARANOIA,
AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY
IN MAINE, 1850-1854

“The extensive business connections which exist between the citizens of our whole State and Cuba make the invasion of that island a matter of great importance.” So spoke the *Portland Advertiser* on May 29, 1850 as it reported the latest news of the Cardenas Expedition, a privately organized assault on the Spanish colony launched from New Orleans with American money, men, and munitions. Despite a number of strong commercial interests in Cuba, Mainers, except for a few newspaper comments like the above, expressed little concern about the first two such annexationist efforts in 1850 and 1851. Several years later, however, rabid sectional paranoia colored their reaction to a similar effort in 1854. In that year, the Pine Tree State’s impassioned outcry against Cuban annexation not only helped to defer American imperial designs on the island, but also served as a lightning rod for rhetoric which emerging party leaders used to cement a new political synthesis that pushed the nation closer to Civil War.

This transformation of sentiment poses several important historical questions. Why did Maine, a northern state, favor Cuban annexation at all? What happened in three short years that changed people’s minds so completely? How could their reactions have affected the destinies of both the United States and Cuba so dramatically? The answers to these questions might reveal something about antebellum political life.

Early rumors of the Cardenas Expedition filtered back to Maine in late May of 1850. The first dispatches conflicted widely, but by the middle of June the true composition of this filibustering mission, as such invasions were termed, and its eventual result had become apparent to the Pine Tree State’s anxious observers.¹ In callous disregard both of U.S. and international law, Narciso Lopez, a Cuban revolutionary, aided by the Havana Club, a New York based umbrella organization for



The entrance to the harbor at Havana. Maine's extensive trade with Cuba — an exchange of wood and agricultural products for sugar and molasses — left the state vulnerable to deteriorating diplomatic relations with Spain and its colony. Repeated attempts to annex Cuba, coupled with the incendiary slavery issue, were the shoals upon which the Democratic party was wrecked in Maine. Ballou, *History of Cuba* (1854).

exiled Creoles and southern annexationists, recruited an army of some six hundred mercenaries and sailed from New Orleans for Cardenas. There, the arrival of Spanish reinforcements forced the filibusterers to beat a hasty retreat back to Key West, where the Spanish could only protest their escape.²

Undaunted by this first failure to incite Cubans to rebellion, Lopez set about organizing another invasion. Influential southerners, like Mississippi Governor John Quitman, not only offered financial assistance but also helped the filibusterers evade neutrality laws.³ The section's vehement expansionists, who were popularly known as "Young America," saw Cuba and Central America as an opportunity to extend their peculiar institution, which, by the 1850s, appeared to have reached its natural limit. If annexed, the Spanish colony, with its flourishing slave plantations, would have provided the South with more power in Congress. Moreover, its fully stocked slave markets offered a solution to chronic labor shortages, which were the greatest obstacle to increasing cotton production.⁴ *De Bow's Review*, published in New Orleans, the

center of the filibuster movement, outlined these arguments in a series of influential articles on Cuban annexation. This line of reasoning rendered “the acquisition of Cuba ... the only measure of policy in regard to which the people of the South feel any special and present interest.”⁵

Although the filibusterers were greeted with warm feelings in the southern United States, their reception in Cuba rendered this support immaterial; the second invasion failed even more disastrously than the first. Lopez and almost all of the men in the Bahia Honda Expedition were captured and executed by Spanish authorities. Their failure was inevitable. As William Crittenden, nephew of U. S. Attorney General John J. Crittenden, noted bitterly in the letter he was allowed to compose before his execution and subsequent dismemberment at the hands of a Havana mob, “We have been grossly deceived ... During my short sojourn in this island I have not met a single patriot ... I am sure that ... Lopez has no friends.”⁶ Annexation to the United States had few advocates in Cuba.

In the Maine press, however, annexation was popular and received considerable support, although opinion on the filibuster missions was generally divided along party lines: Democrats were sympathetic and Whigs critical. The *Republican Journal* of Belfast was typical, presuming “that not one American out of one hundred would be sorry to see the adventurers succeed.”⁷ The Democracy’s standard carrier and its oldest paper in Maine, the *Eastern Argus* of Portland, followed with an article listing “a portion of the grievances of which the Cubans complain,” and adding, “We do not think they greatly over-state them.” Such statements were as vehement as any in the South. Later, both papers were also loud supporters of the ill-fated Bahia Honda mission.⁸

Maine’s Whigs, on the other hand, were more reserved. They “distrust[ed] the motives of these new invaders, and cannot rejoice at their prospective success.” The *Bangor Whig and Courier* elaborated a “conviction that the present movement ...

is not ... so much in behalf of human freedom as of human slavery." Nativist sentiments lay at the heart of *Portland Advertiser* objections to Cuban invasion: "We do not want a million of slaves added to those we already have." The Whig organ closest to proceedings in the state capitol, the *Kennebec Journal*, summarized both these arguments. Distrust of the "private, sinister and sectional motives" of the filibusterers and an "aversion to any more slaves" added grist to complaints about expeditions "in violation of law and of repeated promises ... to the Spanish government by ours."⁹

Such partisan fidelity, however, was often difficult to maintain when, as in the case of filibustering, the institution of slavery was at issue. In Bangor, the *Jeffersonian* broke from Democratic regulars in its belief that the invaders' "flag of Free Cuba ... would be more appropriately styled the 'Flag of Cut-throat Bandits,' if it is intended to be the symbol of the expedition to invade Cuba." Its editors, Joseph Bartlett and Benjamin Burr, earned the scorn of their neighbor, the *Democrat*, which loudly endorsed the "liberators of Cuba" and fiercely defended the rights of the filibusterers.¹⁰ Under pressure, Bartlett and Burr soon stepped back from complete opposition and acknowledged "the oppressive yoke of tyrants in Cuba," but maintained that "there is a right way and a wrong way to aid the downtrodden."¹¹ Whigs, in Bangor at least, were no more unanimous. In this city, the *Mercury* and the *Whig and Courier*, two sheets pledging loyalty to Clay's party, quarreled over filibustering. The *Mercury* endorsed Cuban annexation, while its rival was critical.¹² Such intraparty conflicts grew increasingly common under the strain of continued slavery agitation.¹³

Nonetheless filibustering remained only a relatively minor issue. In fact, distance from the coast of Maine and its robust trade with Cuba reduced interest in this matter considerably. In Portland, the center of this commerce, news and editorials about filibustering were prominently featured in both the *Portland Advertiser* and the *Eastern Argus*. The latest information consistently appeared, with bold headlines, in the first

column of these two sheets. Nestled among them was the Havana market news which gave these bulletins their overriding importance. Farther inland, the *Oxford Democrat* also reported dispatches from Lopez's expeditions, but they appeared on the back pages and received little emphasis. In fact, its South Paris editors took no position on either invasion.¹⁴ Indifference to Cuban affairs was also the reaction in Farmington. Bulletins in the *Chronicle* were placed at the bottom of the last columns with neither headlines nor boldface. No editorials appeared, but hints of antipathy towards the Bahia Honda mission and its idea of "extending slavery" emerged in a feature on presidential hopefuls.¹⁵ In Dover-Foxcroft, the *Piscataquis Observer* waited until late June 1850 to join regular Democrats in advocating "a radical reform in the mode of governing Cuba." It was a little quicker to hop on the bandwagon for the second invasion, but the event received little attention. Generally, the death of former New Hampshire governor Levi Woodbury seemed far more important to these inland editors.¹⁶

Controversy over filibustering was further minimized because most editors accepted the prevailing expansionist doctrine of the era: Manifest Destiny. The *Saco Democrat* invoked this very phrase: "Most people believe that it is Uncle Sam's manifest destiny to possess all the land that joins him. The only question is, as to the time and manner of occupying the land."¹⁷ Americans felt deeply that conquest had been preordained, and the recent past certainly seemed to bear this out. The huge Louisiana Purchase was supplemented by the purchase of Florida. Later, Texas was annexed, and California conquered. Cuba would come next.¹⁸

Sitting only ninety miles offshore, the island was seen by Americans as a natural addition to the republic. A lecturer in Bangor described to his attentive audience "the day when Cuba will be annexed to the United States and its resources developed fully, its population increased and ... [the island] made the garden of the world."¹⁹ Mainers like J. C. Humphreys, a Brunswick box shoo manufacturer with interests in the

island, were confident that “Cuba is undoubtedly ours ... if we want it.”²⁰ Another New Englander, John Quincy Adams, appealed to science to explain the inevitability of the island’s annexation.

There are laws of political as well as physical gravitation, and if an apple, severed by the tempest from its native tree, cannot choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of self-support can gravitate only towards the North American Union, which by the same law of nature, cannot cast her off from its bosom.²¹

None of these men were supporters of the slavery extension that lay behind southern filibustering. They saw other reasons for the United States to shake the tree. Astraddle sea-lanes into the Gulf of Mexico and around Cape Horn to the Pacific, Cuba occupied a position from which a hostile navy could interdict traffic between the eastern seaboard and ports in the Gulf and Pacific. Its strategic importance was remarked upon by such different American presidents as Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Quincy Adams, Polk, Pierce, and Buchanan.²² Such a rationale could not have escaped Maine’s many sailors and sea-captains.

Repeated slights by Spanish officials towards American citizens and their flag gave annexationists further impetus and helped blur the partisan divisions that stood in their way. Although such actions were the inevitable result of deteriorating relations caused by filibustering, Americans were unsympathetic to Spanish explanations. Most believed that such behavior could not be tolerated. Even the Whig press complained of “the firing at American steamers” and warned ominously that Americans “cannot be molested with impunity.” Meanwhile Democrats made hay of such events in their calls for the island’s acquisition.²³

In Maine, tariffs created a powerful economic motive for picking the Cuban apple. ²⁴ In retaliation for the Cardenas



As chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, Hannibal Hamlin was a powerful spokesman for the shipping and shipbuilding interests of his home state. Hamlin's committee condemned Spanish duties that discriminated against American products shipped to Cuba; others called for annexation of the island colony. Maine Historical Society Collections.


Expedition, Spain raised its already high tariffs on American products and instituted new carrying duties that discriminated heavily against vessels flying the Stars and Stripes.²⁵ A Treasury Department report requested by the Senate Commerce Committee, chaired by Maine's Hannibal Hamlin, concluded that these duties and U. S. measures to retaliate against them "caused a large portion of a valuable trade which legitimately belonged to the United States to pass into other hands."²⁶ Many of these ships would have carried the products of Downeast loggers, farmers, and fisherfolk.

The deleterious effect of these fees was, in fact, of particular interest to Hamlin's constituents. In general, shipowners were among the leading northern advocates of Cuban annexation.²⁷ Maine's bountiful forests and many harbors made shipping and shipbuilding two of the state's most important industries. For most of the nineteenth century, Downeast shipyards built more ships with greater tonnage than those of any other state. In 1850, "no other state built half as many, except New York."²⁸ Many of these vessels stayed in Maine or operated out of its ports. Bath and Portland were fifth and ninth respectively in an 1857 list of American cities where the greatest amount of registered shipping was owned.²⁹ The state's press complained bitterly about the new Spanish tariff, estimated to have cost the American merchant marine \$60,000,000 annually.³⁰

At the same time, American tariffs were of the greatest concern to the state's sugar merchants. Despite her canefields in Louisiana, the United States was one of the world's largest sugar importers; most of this came from Cuba.³¹ Between 1840 and 1860 the consumption of sugar increased two or three times as fast as the population, and by 1860 reached close to thirty pounds per capita. Americans quickly grew even hungrier for sweets: By 1880 they were eating thirty-eight pounds of sugar per person per year.³² In Maine, sugar products in the form of molasses were an essential part of the lumber camp diet, considered "as a [more] necessary part of the supplies than almost any other article."³³

Sales of sugar and molasses were constricted by tariffs paid on these articles when they were imported. The tariff of 1846 set sugar duties on a scale ranging from two and a half to twelve cents per pound; imported molasses paid five cents per gallon.³⁴ Such fees added considerably to the price of this article of everyday consumption. Hannibal Hamlin expressed a view common in Maine when he said, "We have our molasses, sugar, etc. from Cuba, and these are strong reasons why it [Cuba] should belong to this country."³⁵ These imports were at the heart of a chronic trade deficit with the island that between 1854 and 1858 had reached a whopping \$88,556,299. This worrisome drain on American gold reserves warranted Congressional investigation.³⁶ The *Portland Advertiser* also acknowledged, though somewhat begrudgingly, that "the great cry of 'cheap sugar' ... has made the annexation of Cuba an acceptable if not popular measure with so large a proportion of all political parties and sections of this country."³⁷

Portland, at the center of a huge re-exporting business, enhanced its wealth in the sugar trade. Its position as the leader of the box and barrel trade to Cuba gave its commission merchants, like W. W. Woodbury, who employed agents on the island both selling lumber and buying sugar, a huge advantage over those in other cities.³⁸ Such men helped make the city second only to New York in the sugar trade. In 1857 alone, Portland imported 3,961,689 gallons of molasses and 6,639,744



John Bundy Brown's huge sugar refinery in Portland served as an impressive symbol of Maine's commercial links to Cuba — links that were increasingly threatened by Spanish tariffs. Maine Historical Society Collections.

pounds of sugar, worth \$1,350,901.³⁹ Much of this went to John Bundy Brown, whose sugar refinery used 40,000 barrels of molasses a year to manufacture higher grades of sugar.⁴⁰ His eight-story factory, covering more than an acre of ground, employed two hundred hands and was by far the state's largest single employer. The refinery annually produced \$1,350,000 in sugar, an article which was quickly becoming a vital part of the American diet.⁴¹ Brown's enterprise was not unique. One 1858 voyage of the *Diligence*, from Matanzas to Portland, carried sugar and molasses to three different commission merchants as well as smaller quantities to three other individuals.⁴²

The state's farmers also suffered at the hands of Spanish customs officials, who singled out American flour for particular attention: American flour paid \$10.81 a ton while Spanish paid only \$2.50 a ton. With the new tariff, the value of U. S.

flour exports to Cuba sank from \$528,635 in 1847 to a virtually nonexistent \$6,665 in 1850. One of America's largest exports was thus excluded from a market of 800,000 to 900,000 barrels a year, which "would be enjoyed," the Treasury Department noted with dismay, "almost exclusively by the United States."⁴³ Although Downeast wheat harvests had been steadily declining, it remained a staple of considerable importance for frontier areas of northern and eastern Maine.⁴⁴ Exclusion was particularly galling because South America and the islands of the Caribbean had long been markets of paramount importance to American farmers. Without them, grain and particularly "flour exports would have approached the vanishing point in much of the period between 1820 and 1845."⁴⁵

Maine's most important economic tie, however, was a vigorous trade exchanging lumber for Cuba's sugar and molasses. Between 1854 and 1858 sawmills in the Pine Tree State cut almost a third of the \$15,413,771 in lumber sent from the United States to the Spanish colony. Much of this was in the important barrel and box markets where Downeast merchants, led by those from Portland, controlled well over half of all such exports.⁴⁶ The *Bangor Mercury*, a Whig sheet, thought that "accession of the Island of Cuba ... will benefit Maine, ... and Bangor more particularly, [because] ... it would have a vast effect on our lumber trade, and add largely to our prosperity."⁴⁷ Given these important economic interests in Cuba, particularly in the lumber trade, it is no surprise that annexation found its leading supporters in Maine in the lumber entrepôts of Portland and Bangor.

While Cuban annexation offered an end to these onerous commercial restrictions and promised increased sales and profits, at least in the eyes of its enthusiastic promoters in Maine, supporters of filibustering chose instead to play on the general sympathy for an "oppressed people" that even their opponents shared.⁴⁸ They cast American intervention as "the infusion of a sterner, more self denying, and enterprising race."⁴⁹ High taxes and tyranny from abroad were but "a portion of the grievances" which the *Eastern Argus* did "not think they [the Cubans]

greatly over-state.”⁵⁰ Spain’s harsh reprisals against revolutionary activity evoked memories of Valley Forge and Bunker Hill, and Americans hoped to play France to Cuba’s thirteen colonies.

Democratic sheets exploited this image to dispel the notion that filibusterers were buccaneers who exclusively represented the slavery interests of the South. The *Piscataquis Observer* fiercely defended foreign interference by “individuals who feel a love of liberty.” Lopez and his men were favorably compared with the Founding Fathers. To call them bandits, the *Republican Journal* explained, “would make our forefathers rebels deserving of hanging, and of Lafayette, Rochambeau ... and Count Pulaski, ‘freebooters and pirates,’ terms which are continually applied to the Cuban army.”⁵¹

Such efforts by Democrats in the Pine Tree State were largely successful. Although the Democracy’s national platform was silent on Cuban annexation, speakers touted the merits of the island’s acquisition at mass meetings throughout the country.⁵² During a New York stop on his stump tour for the national party, Senator Douglas declared it “the duty of the United States to seize it [Cuba] and hold it at all odds.” Such a policy, he told his enthusiastic followers, “is the destiny of the great Democratic party.”⁵³ Two weeks earlier Douglas and another loud representative of Young America, Senator Pierre Soulé of Louisiana, visited Augusta to deliver this standard stump speech. There, in the fading warmth of the summer of 1852, their addresses were applauded by an enthusiastic crowd of Maine supporters.⁵⁴

In the September elections of 1852, the Maine Democratic party fared well. Democratic Governor Hubbard was re-elected, and President Pierce captured the state by 12 percent of the popular vote. In the presidential tally, where any concerns about a foreign policy issue like Cuban annexation would have been expressed, Pierce recaptured many of the swing voters that his party had lost to the Whigs in the 1848 election. Apathy

among Free-Soil voters was another characteristic of the election.⁵⁵ If the Democrats' Caribbean policy was a political liability, clearly it was not a debilitating one.

Their continued good fortune, however, was dependent upon confidence in peaceful relations. Filibustering was not an explosive issue because it seemed unlikely to precipitate hostilities. The importance of foreign trade and shipping to their prosperity made Downeasters particularly sensitive to such a prospect. Since the government was not officially involved in the attacks, there was little fear. Spain was too weak to fight and thus only resorted to fierce protests lodged with the State Department.⁵⁶ The *Portland Advertiser* considered and then dismissed the possibility of intervention by the formidable British navy.⁵⁷ The Democratic press also tried to discount the possibility of war.⁵⁸ The "total and ridiculous failure" of the Cardenas Expedition inclined some to conclude that it was "not probable we shall see another soon."⁵⁹ The failure of the Bahia Honda landings and the execution of Lopez seemed to assure the end of the filibustering and continued peace.

At the start of President Pierce's term, leaders of his party could see no end to their ascendancy. Mainers viewed his administration with a large measure of optimism. The Grand Trunk Railroad was nearly finished, and the state, particularly the Portland area, was entering a period of unprecedented growth.⁶⁰ The new president had graduated from Bowdoin and was a familiar quantity. From neighboring New Hampshire, he offered not only Yankee common sense but the possibility of a healthy portion of the federal spoils. In fact, the Downeast coalition had been among the first to throw its support to Young Hickory at the Baltimore convention.⁶¹ When he delivered his inaugural address, Pierce was secure in the knowledge that Maine, which had long been a Democratic state, remained securely in his party's grasp. Its legislature had, with few exceptions, been controlled by the Democrats since the early days of the Jacksonian Democracy. Beneath this placid surface, however, lay deep divisions over patronage, slavery extension, and temperance. Rancor over the Maine Law precipitated an 1852

gubernatorial rupture, but the sectional calm offered by the Compromise of 1850, the unifying effects of federal patronage, and the almost total defeat of the Free-Soil and Whig parties seemed to herald a renewed vigor for Jackson's adherents.⁶²

In his inaugural address President Pierce spoke forcefully on the subject of Cuba. Vowing that his administration would "not be controlled by any timid forebodings of evil from expansion," he promised continued American expansion. Speaking specifically of Cuba, he reiterated its importance to American security and trade: "The acquisition of certain possessions not within our jurisdiction [is] eminently important for our protection ... [and] essential for ... commerce." Pierce followed his discussion of expansion with a pledge to conduct foreign affairs "in a manner entirely consistent with the strictest observance of national faith and the cultivation of relations of peace."⁶³ Pierce promised Cuba at no cost.

The address received almost universal praise in the Pine Tree State; even Whig papers took up the chorus. Pierce's calm insistence that foreign affairs be conducted with honor calmed fears that filibustering missions would lead to war. "It is plain that ... no filibustering will be allowed under this administration. This is a good and gratifying doctrine," was the satisfied remark from the *Kennebec Journal*.⁶⁴ The state was further reassured by the president's first State of the Union address on December 5, 1853. In it, the New Hampshire man reiterated his claim that "all means at my command will be vigorously exerted to repress" any filibustering attempts against Cuba.⁶⁵ For Downeasters, this promised calm, both with Spain and the explosive slavery issue.

The Kansas-Nebraska Bill, introduced on January 4, 1854, re-ignited passions on this tender subject. The most controversial portion of Senator Douglas's bill allowed territorial governments to determine for themselves the legality of slavery. Acceptance of this doctrine of "squatter sovereignty" included an explicit repeal of the Missouri Compromise, which in 1820

had banned slavery from Louisiana Purchase land north of 36° 30'.⁶⁶ Downeast, the measure evoked particularly strong passions because the Pine Tree State, in tandem with Missouri, had been admitted to the Union as a part of the compromise which maintained the balance between slave and free states. For this reason Mainers felt personally involved in the Nebraska debate. The bill's progress in Congress and the various speeches made there occupied the center of attention in the state for the next four months. During this time, scarcely a newspaper appeared without some editorial or bulletin on the subject. As a result, the issue of Cuban annexation largely disappeared from print, except as it related to the extension of slavery.

Despite the administration's efforts to enforce party unity, the bill divided the Pine Tree State as it did the country.⁶⁷ Its effect, the *Farmington Chronicle* explained, "must be to weaken the ... democratic party and to draw greater numbers from a middle course to a decided stand on one or the other of the extreme wings."⁶⁸ These two extreme factions, known as the Wildcats and Woolheads, had existed within the Democracy since the early 1840s, but previously, they had always been able to compromise. Over the Nebraska bill, they broke — Wildcats for, and Woolheads against.⁶⁹ Many Woolheads were still smarting from Pierce's division of election spoils, which gave two of the sweeter plums to prominent Wildcat newspaper men. Isaac C. Haynes of the *Democrat* was appointed Bangor postmaster while Benjamin Kingsbury of the *Eastern Argus* received the collectorship for the port of Portland; both men had been strong supporters of the filibusterers.⁷⁰ While patronage insured their continued loyalty, it added bitterness to attacks against the Nebraska legislation from the Woolhead press.

Most Downeasters shared the negative sentiments of the Woolheads. Huge rallies, "irrespective of party," convened to protest the act.⁷¹ Maine Congressman Israel Washburn, a Whig, helped fan the flames when he corresponded with Charles Chandler, a leader in his party, to arrange a series of

such mass meetings in Somerset and Piscataquis counties.⁷² Protestant organizations also spoke out against the Nebraska bill.⁷³ By the end of February, the *Kennebec Journal* claimed that only five of the almost fifty Maine newspapers still supported Douglas's initiative.⁷⁴ Opponents complained that the measure was designed to spread slavery over more territory. Some, like Orono's Washburn, actually believed that the bill was evidence of the aggressiveness of slavery.⁷⁵

Such rhetoric in the Woolhead and Whig press created fears of a conspiracy among southerners, designed to dominate the free North. This cry of conspiracy was first uttered in a widely circulated manifesto by Salmon P. Chase of Ohio, titled "The Appeal of the Independent Democrats in Congress to the People of the United States." Signed by several prominent Free Soilers, his letter identified the Nebraska bill as "an atrocious plot" and "a bold scheme against American liberty." Chase called "on the people to come to the rescue of the country from the domination of slavery."⁷⁶

Chase's warnings of a slavery conspiracy were echoed in Maine. The threat of the "Slave Power," in the words of a Dover-Foxcroft convention of Nebraska opponents, "summons the free North to rise in its might."⁷⁷ The Nebraska Act would open huge tracts of land to the peculiar institution; the free states, they said, would be swept aside in a tide of black slavery. The theme was picked up in the press. The *Chronicle* warned of the "ascendancy of slavery."⁷⁸ Such paranoid visions not only sold papers but also became a rallying cry for the Nebraska opposition and a symbol for the nascent Republican Party.⁷⁹ The simplicity of the Slave Power argument was accessible to the normally indifferent masses, and they responded in a great outpouring of emotion.⁸⁰ Chase's "Appeal" was so successful in mobilizing opposition to the Nebraska Bill and slavery expansion in general that he would later call it "the *most valuable* [his italics] of my works."⁸¹

Maine Woolheads blamed their split with the national leadership on the existence of this Slave Power cabal, which had turned them out for adhering to the true principles of the

Democracy — principles which were now being subverted by the South. With his resignation from the Senate, Downeast Woolhead Hannibal Hamlin cited its effort to make “the flag of the Federal Union ... carr[y] slavery wherever it floats.” This gospel gave the Woolheads the moral high ground in their bitter feud with the Wildcats for control of the party.⁸²

In the midst of this internecine controversy, the seizure of the *Black Warrior* gave Pierce and the “Young America” circle within his administration an opportunity to press for Cuban acquisition. The vessel was owned by the New York and Alabama Steamship Company and was part of a regular service between New York and Havana. On February 28, 1854, she was confiscated by Spanish authorities, and her captain, James D. Bulloch, was arrested for entering Havana with a manifest that declared her to be carrying only ballast when in fact she had a cargo in transit.

In response to the seizure, Secretary of State William L. Marcy instructed Pierre Soulé, his minister to Spain and formerly a strong advocate of the filibusterers in the Senate, to negotiate for the island’s purchase. In Madrid, the Louisiana man tightened the vice on his hosts by issuing an ultimatum demanding “immediate satisfaction from the wrong-doers at ... Havana” and threatening that Americans, if denied, would then take “the redress in their own hands.”⁸³ The president also hinted, though more obliquely, at war. “It is vain to expect that ... the adoption of a policy threatening the honor and security of these states can long consist with peaceful relations.”⁸⁴

Saber rattling was echoed by the regular Democratic press of Maine. The *Eastern Argus*, always a staunch advocate of the Pierce administration, cheered Soulé’s ultimatum and the war that it threatened to create. “Well, let it — A war with Spain would take from her the brightest of ... jewels. She holds Cuba by a frail tenure.”⁸⁵ Southerners were also ecstatic at the prospect of war. Pierce’s maneuvers promised finally to deliver what three failed filibustering missions had not: annexation of Cuba.



Maine's newspaper editors saw Pierce's belligerence toward Spain as a sign of a growing "slave conspiracy" — part of an "infamous system of slavery agitation of which the Nebraska Bill was the first step and the dissolution of the Union is intended to be the last." Maine Historical Society Collections.

Downeast, the concurrence of the Nebraska Act and threats of war with Spain added credence to fears of a slavery conspiracy.⁸⁶ The *Whig and Courier* saw Cuban conquest as part of an "infamous system of slavery agitation of which the Nebraska Bill was the first step and the dissolution of the Union is intended to be the last."⁸⁷ Passage of the Nebraska Act changed the political climate completely and fused the connection between Douglas's bill, Cuban annexation, and the slavery conspiracy. Its surprise victory in the House, despite a majority held there by the northern states, indicated the strength of the

slave power. “Perfidious Slaveocracy Triumphant,” declared Bangor’s *Jeffersonian*.⁸⁸ Woolhead organs like the *Chronicle of Farmington* and the *Oxford Democrat* of South Paris, which had largely been supportive of, or at least indifferent to Cuban annexation and the *Black Warrior* affair, saw this incident in a new light after the victory of the Nebraska bill. The *Oxford Democrat* explained that it was simply “preparation for ... [further] aggrandizement of the slave power, the wresting of Cuba from Spain ... [and] the creation of yet other slave states.”⁸⁹

This nightmare was shared by Whigs as well. Former governor Edward Kent referred specifically to Cuba as he warned Orono’s Israel Washburn of “the manifest schemes of the Southern leaders to extend the area of slavery, indefinitely by conquest, or purchase, or robbery.”⁹⁰

The actions of Young America certainly seemed to be moving in this direction. On May 1, Louisiana Senator John Slidell delivered a stirring address in which he advocated a suspension of the neutrality laws which barred filibustering.⁹¹ Many in Maine worried that the address was “the invitation of a war between the United States on the one part against Spain, England, and France on the other.”⁹² Pierce’s proclamation on filibustering, an attempt to quell fears about a new expedition being organized, was scoffed at in the Maine press.⁹³

His effort failed because Downeasters questioned his sincerity. Many reasoned that Young Hickory and his cabinet were “puppets set in motion by the South to do its will.”⁹⁴ On this note at least, their cynicism was largely justified since Pierce intimated to the former Louisiana governor that “the government would not see them sacrificed.”⁹⁵ At the Royal Court in Madrid, the behavior of another Young American from the Delta state, Pierre Soulé, and persistent “rumors of his indiscretions” with Spanish revolutionaries, complicated the already strained relations with that country and fanned war fears still further.⁹⁶

The Whig and Woolhead press exploited anxiety about the slavery conspiracy and its war to get “Cuba at all costs.”

Reports about the imminence of war, the latest mission against the Spanish colony, and the role of the slave power in “forcing the present administration into ... the programme of damning iniquities” accelerated the panic.⁹⁷ The opposition press printed dire predictions of British intervention “to save Cuba” leaving Yankee shipping ruined and “our commerce destroyed.”⁹⁸ That this propaganda represented a reversal of earlier opinions expressed about the likelihood of war during Lopez’s missions was of little concern to leaders of the anti-Nebraska movement. With the British and French occupied in the Crimea, such intervention was in fact unlikely. War fear, however, was a valuable tool in forging a new political coalition that would become the Republican party of Maine.⁹⁹

The specter of war was vivid among Downeasters, who could still remember the ruination caused by the British blockade of the War of 1812. Even Pierce’s loyal supporter, the *Eastern Argus*, conceded that “peace is of much consequence to the development of our natural resources.”¹⁰⁰ The business community of Brunswick became so concerned that it appointed J. C. Humphreys to write to their senator, Hannibal Hamlin, “to avert so disastrous consequences [as] would result from what we consider an unnecessary collision with Spain.” Humphreys, a lumber dealer himself, reminded the chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee of what he already understood: “The disastrous consequences that would result to the whole commerce of this country is [sic] incalculable. Our state, the 1st in No. of tons built and 3 in ownership in the Union, would be the *greatest sufferer!* [his italics].”¹⁰¹

Fears generated by the Nebraska Act, the slavery conspiracy, and the prospect of war and commercial disaster created a volatile political chemistry in Maine and throughout the North. In the autumn election, Anson P. Morrill, a Woolhead, carried the Pine Tree State with fifty percent of the vote, one and a half times the total of the regular Democrat, Albion K. Parris. Morrill received the support of Whigs and a legion of voters normally silent at the polls who, moved by newspaper hysteria and the repeal of the sacred Missouri Compromise,

flocked to him in droves.¹⁰² Significantly most of these new votes were cast in towns “engaged primarily in manufacturing and maritime activities.”¹⁰³ These areas were most sensitive to war and the pronouncements of the Woolhead and Whig press; here, Pierce’s Cuban policy and the opposition it solicited certainly played an important role in defeating the regular Democratic candidates.

For the president, elections in other northern states brought equally grim news. His party lost in Connecticut, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Iowa, Ohio, Illinois, Wisconsin, New Jersey, and Indiana. The most demoralizing loss, however, was New York, where not a single Democrat was returned to Congress. Two thirds of the northern Democratic seats in Congress were lost, along with the party’s majority. Pierce, who in 1852 had carried all but two of the northern states, faced the prospect of a hostile Congress.¹⁰⁴

On November 4, 1854, the same day that the Democracy lost the Empire State, Secretary of State Marcy first received, and the *New York Tribune* first published, the proceedings of the infamous conference at Ostend between Soulé and the U. S. ministers to England and France, James Buchanan and John Mason.¹⁰⁵ This document, the Ostend Manifesto, represented in the words of one scholar, “the highwater mark of the movement to annex Cuba before the Civil War.” It repeated the standard strategic and economic logic of annexation. Its assertion that “by every law, human and Divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain” was the most vigorous antebellum effort to effect it.¹⁰⁶

Soulé’s manifesto, advocating war with Spain, was ill-timed, given the administration’s “crushing rebuke” at the polls. With his popularity waning, Pierce could not even contemplate war.¹⁰⁷ Marcy, his secretary of state, repudiated Soulé, who promptly resigned.¹⁰⁸ Nonetheless, the damage to Pierce’s popularity was done.

News of the Ostend Manifesto was, in the words of the *Portland Advertiser*, “the last nail” in the coffin of a political corpse.¹⁰⁹ Maine’s vigorous shipping and commercial interests,



Courtesy of the author.

which had once favored Cuban annexation, trembled at the threat of a destructive war to seize Cuba. For Downeasters, the prospect of war was further evidence that the dangerous Slave Power dominated the Democratic Party. New leaders emerged in this tense atmosphere and fanned these fears. The resulting partisan realignment destroyed the old Democratic party in Maine. Though Pierce tried to reform the remains of his party with a series of purges, the Maine organization would not be strong enough to cast its electoral votes for a Democrat until 1912, and even then only because of divisions in the opposition.¹¹⁰ Restrained by electoral developments in Maine and elsewhere in the North, the president stepped back from his aggressive campaign to take Cuba; its acquisition would have to wait until 1898, a full fourteen years before the Pine Tree State would again go for a Democrat. Though economics had stoked interest in annexation early on, the threat of war and a heightened concern about slavery extension won out, as Mainers contemplated Cuban annexation before the Civil War.

NOTES

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¹Filibusterer is the word commonly used to describe the Americans involved in this and several other antebellum invasions of Cuba and Central America. On September 11, 1851, the (Dover-Foxcroft) *Piscataquis Observer* succinctly explained its origin: "It was familiarly used in the French and other languages, as a description of a class of adventurers of all nations, who, during the last half of the seventeenth century, infested the W[est] I[ndian] Islands and the coasts of Central America, for the purpose of piracy, and who were in England more commonly termed Buccaneers." Its usage in the Senate comes from this piratical lineage.

²This account relies heavily upon Robert Granville Caldwell, *The Lopez Expeditions to Cuba: 1848-1851* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1915), 57-74.

³Robert E. May, *John A. Quitman: Old South Crusader* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985), 236-252.

⁴For arguments about the natural limits of slavery extension see Lewis C. Gray, *History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860* (Washington: Carnegie Institution, 1933), 2: 642, 888; Charles W. Ramsdell, "The Natural Limits of Slavery Extension," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 16 (September 1929): 151-71.

⁵*De Bow's Review* 14 (January 1853): 63-66; 14 (March 1853): 197-208; 14 (May 1853): 417-422; 15 (December 1853): 647-648; 17 (July 1854): 43-49. The quotation is from the *Richmond Enquirer*, June 20, 1854; quoted in *New York Herald*, June 22, 1854.

⁶Letter from W. L. Crittenden to Dr. Lucien Hensley, August 16, 1851; printed in *New Orleans Bee*, September 3, 1851; *Bangor Democrat*, September 16, 1851.

⁷The (Belfast) *Republican Journal* observed the strict partisan division on this issue in two articles. The first, printed July 30, 1851, was reprinted on September 2 in the *Bangor Jeffersonian* and rebutted by its neighbor, the *Bangor Mercury*. The *Republican Journal* responded on September 12 with a second, more comprehensive discussion of the partisan divisions. The quotation is from the May 24, 1850, edition.

⁸See in particular (Portland) *Eastern Argus*, August 21 and August 28, 1851; *Republican Journal*, September 5 and September 23, 1851.

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⁹*Bangor Whig and Courier*, May 31 and May 28, 1850; *Portland Advertiser*, June 1, 1850; (Augusta) *Kennebec Journal*, August 28, 1851, and June 6, 1850.

¹⁰*Bangor Jeffersonian*, May 28, 1850; *Bangor Democrat*, June 11, 1850, and September 16, 1851.

¹¹*Bangor Jeffersonian*, June 4, 1850.

¹²*Bangor Whig and Courier*, September 3 and September 11, 1851; *Bangor Weekly Mercury*, September 2 and September 9, 1851.

¹³Richard R. Wescott, *New Men, New Issues: The Formation of the Republican Party in Maine* (Portland: Maine Historical Society, 1986).

¹⁴For the Cardenas Expedition see: (South Paris) *Oxford Democrat*, May 28 and June 4, 1850; for the following attack, *Oxford Democrat*, September 5, September 13, and September 19, 1851.

¹⁵(Farmington) *Chronicle*, September 15, 1851. Unfortunately the May 30 and June 6, 1850 issues are not extant on the microfilm version at Fogler Library, University of Maine, but other issues and the full run of September 1851 demonstrate the prevailing apathy.

¹⁶The quotation comes from (Dover-Foxcroft) *Piscataquis Observer*, June 20, 1850. The first news of the Bahia Honda Expedition appeared in the *Piscataquis Observer*, September 4, 1851. After short bulletins on September 11 and September 18, the issue quickly faded into obscurity.

¹⁷Quoted in *Bangor Democrat*, August 19, 1851. The *Bangor Whig and Courier*, September 9, 1851, also used this expression in its description of "an undeniable public impression of a 'manifest destiny' wrapped up in the folds of the future which will cause Cuba to become one of our family of States."

¹⁸For more on Manifest Destiny see: Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History* (1935, reprint, Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1963); Frederick Merk, *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), *passim* but especially the speech of John Wentworth on page 28.

¹⁹*Bangor Whig and Courier*, March 24, 1854.

²⁰Letter from J. C. Humphreys to Hannibal Hamlin, June 5, 1854, Hannibal Hamlin Papers, Butler Library, Columbia University, New York. George Adams, *The Maine Register for the Year 1855* (Portland, 1855), p. 304 identifies John C. Humphreys & Company as a sugar box manufacturing concern.

²¹Letter from John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Hugh Nelson, U. S. Minister to Spain, April 18, 1823, quoted in U. S. Congress, *Message from the President of the United States in Reference to the Island of Cuba*, H. ex. doc. 121 (32-1) 648.

²²Frederick Merk, *The Monroe Doctrine and American Expansion: 1843-1849* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 235-243.

²³*Kennebec Journal*, August 28, 1851; *Bath Eastern Times*, April 5 and 16, 1855.

²⁴Such economic criteria motivated American leaders in their attempts to purchase the land. See James W. Cortada, "Economic Issues in Caribbean Politics: Rivalry between Spain and the U. S.," *Revisita de Historia de America*, 78 (July 1978): 233-267. Right up until 1898 flour tariffs were on the minds of American policy makers. See Howard B. Schonberger, *Transportation to the Seaboard: The Communication Revolution and American Foreign Policy: 1860-1900* (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Publishing, 1971), 193-194.

²⁵*Hunt's Merchants' Magazine* 24 (February 1851): 230-1.

²⁶U. S. Congress, *A Report of the Secretary of the Treasury ... in Relation to the ... Tonnage Duty on Spanish Vessels Trading Between the United States and the Islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico*, S. ex. doc. 53 (32-1) 619.

²⁷Basil Rauch, *American Interest in Cuba: 1848-1855* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), 191.

²⁸Maine: Its Early History," *De Bow's Review* 12 (1852): 609.

²⁹S. B. Beckett, *The Portland Directory and Reference Book for 1858-9* (Portland, 1858), 273.

³⁰*Belfast Republican Journal*, May 31, 1850.

³¹In 1857 for instance, 79 percent of U. S. sugar and molasses imports came from Cuba. *Reports of the Secretary of the Treasury on the Commerce and Navigation of the United States: 1857*, S. ex. doc. (35-1) 931.

³²Victor S. Clark, *History of Manufactures in the United States: 1607-1860* (Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1916), Arabic: 491; Sidney W. Mintz, *Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History* (New York: Viking Penguin, Inc., 1985), 188.

³³John S. Springer, *Forest Life and Forest Trees* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1851), 152. For the variety of ways that molasses was integrated into the logger's diet, see David C. Smith, *A History of Lumbering in Maine: 1861-1960* (Orono: University of Maine Press, 1972), 15; also C. D. Woods and E. R. Mansfield, *Studies of the Food of Maine Lumbermen* (Washington: U.S.D.A., Office of Experiment Stations, Bulletin No. 149, 1904).

³⁴U. S. Congress, *Report of the Commercial Relations of the United States with All Foreign Nations*, H. ex. doc. 47 (34-1) 855.

³⁵(Bangor) *Democrat*, June 11, 1850; also *Portland Advertiser*, June 1, 1850.

³⁶U. S. Congress, *Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on Trade with Cuba for the Last Five Years*, S. ex. doc. 45 (35-2) 984.

³⁷*Portland Advertiser*, November 5, 1858.

³⁸Lumber not only gave Maine merchants a cargo to fill their ships on the way down, but it provided their agents a currency of exchange and an inside position in dealings with sugar plantations. See Letters from George Guild to W. W. Woodbury, April 14, May 12 and 14, 1853, W. W. Woodbury Papers, Baker Library, Harvard University.

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³⁹Beckett, *Portland Directory*, 268; William Hutchinson Rowe, *The Maritime History of Maine* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1948), 117.

⁴⁰*Portland Advertiser*, January 20, 1859. For his prodigious Cuban sugar imports, see the account book of J. B. Brown and Sons, Baker Library.

⁴¹S. B. Beckett, *Portland Directory and Reference Book for 1869* (Portland, 1869), 319; U. S. Congress, *Eighth Census of the United States (Manufactures)* H. mis. doc. (38-1), 1204, pp. 206-07.

⁴²*Portland Advertiser*, July 2, 1858.

⁴³U. S. Congress, *Commercial Relations of the United States with All Foreign Nations*, H. ex. doc. 47 (34-1), 854, pp. 180-82.

⁴⁴Clarence Albert Day, *A History of Agriculture in Maine, 1604-1860* (Orono: University of Maine Press, 1954), 162; U. S. Congress, *Eighth Census of the United States (Agriculture)*, H. mis. doc. (38-1) 1203; S. L. Goodale, *Fifth Annual Report of the Secretary of the Maine Board of Agriculture, 1860* (Augusta, 1860), 177-8; also Jamie H. Eves, "The Poor People Had Suddenly Become Rich: A Boom in Maine Wheat 1793-1815," *Maine Historical Society Quarterly* 27 (Winter 1987): 114-41.

⁴⁵George Rogers Taylor, *The Transportation Revolution: 1815-1845* (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1851), 187.

⁴⁶David Demeritt, "Downeast Lumber in Cuba: Deforestation and the Coming of Dependence" (Honors Thesis, University of Maine, 1988), 27, 34.

⁴⁷Quoted in *Belfast Republican Journal*, September 12, 1851.

⁴⁸*Kennebec Journal*, August 18, 1851. Other opponents were also ambivalent. On May 28, 1850, the *Bangor Whig and Courier* confessed that it felt some "enthusiasm ... for a revolutionary movement in Cuba." Also see *Bangor Jeffersonian*, September 23, 1851.

⁴⁹*Bath Eastern Times*, April 19, 1855.

⁵⁰*Eastern Argus*, May 31, 1851.

⁵¹*Piscataquis Observer*, September 18, 1851; *Republican Journal*, September 5, 1851. A year before, on June 18, 1850, the *Eastern Argus* had tried this same tack. "Was Lafayette a pirate?" it asked rhetorically.

⁵²The 1852 Democratic Platform was printed in many newspapers including the (Portland) *Eastern Argus*, June 9, 1852.

⁵³*New York Herald*, September 3, 1852.

⁵⁴*Eastern Argus*, August 25, 1852.

⁵⁵Wescott, *New Men*, 83-84; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A History of American Presidential Elections* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1971), 1003; William E. Gienapp, *The Origins of the Republican Party, 1852-1856* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 483.

⁵⁶See the demands for punishment of "those who have taken part in the piratical enterprise," Angel Calderon de la Barc, Spanish Minister to the United States, in his letter to John M. Clayton, U. S. Secretary of State, May 31, 1850, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States: Inter-American*

Affairs, ed. William Manning (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1939), 9: 485.

⁵⁷*Portland Advertiser*, May 29, 1850. The impossibility of war was repeated by *Bangor Whig and Courier*, May 28, 1850 and *Portland Advertiser*, May 29, 1850.

⁵⁸*Bangor Democrat*, June 18, 1850.

⁵⁹*Kennebec Journal*, June 6, 1850.

⁶⁰Edward Wesley Potter, "Public Policy and Economic Growth in Maine: 1820-1857," Ph.D. diss., University of Maine, 1974, 250. See also *Bath Eastern Times*, October 18, 1855, for the Grand Trunk and growth in Portland.

⁶¹Allan Nevins, *Ordeal of the Union: A House Dividing* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947), 17.

⁶²Wescott, *New Men*, 15-28.

⁶³James D. Richardson, ed., *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents* (Washington: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1908), 5: 197-203.

⁶⁴*Kennebec Journal*, March 3, 1853.

⁶⁵Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, 5: 207-226.

⁶⁶For the origin of the Nebraska Act, see: Roy F. Nichols, "The Kansas-Nebraska Act: A Century of Historiography," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 43 (September 1956): 187-212.

⁶⁷Nevins, *Ordeal*, 12-157.

⁶⁸(Farmington) *Chronicle*, May 25, 1854.

⁶⁹Wescott, *New Men*, 114-123.

⁷⁰Louis C. Hatch, *Maine: A History* (New York: American Historical Society, 1919), 2: 363; for Pierce's national difficulties with patronage see Roy Franklin Nichols, *The Democratic Machine: 1850-1854* (1923 reprint, New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1967), *passim*.

⁷¹See *Kennebec Journal*, March 10, 1854, and *Piscataquis Observer*, April 6, 1854, for the proceedings of two such rallies.

⁷²Letter from Israel Washburn to Charles Chandler, August 19, 1854, Chandler Papers, Maine Historical Society, Portland, Maine.

⁷³Reverend W. H. Pilsbury, *History of Methodism in Maine* (Augusta: Charles E. Nash, 1887), 143; The Reverend Austin Willey, *The History of the Anti-Slavery Cause in State and Nation* (Portland: Brown & Thurston, 1886), 465-6. The Catholic Church, which maintained silence and thus its national unity, was an exception. See Madeline H. Rice, *American Catholic Opinion in the Slavery Controversy* (1944, reprint, Peter Smith: Gloucester, 1964), *passim*.

⁷⁴*Kennebec Journal*, February 24, 1854.

⁷⁵Gailihard Hunt, *Israel, Elihu and Cadwallader Washburn* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1925), 31.

⁷⁶Gienapp, *Origins*, 73-74.

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⁷⁷*Piscataquis Observer*, April 6, 1854. Also, *Oxford Democrat*, June 2, 1854; *Kennebec Journal*, February 10, 1854.

⁷⁸*Chronicle*, March 23, 30, April 20, 1854.

⁷⁹Eric Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War* (1970, reprint, New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 95-98; William E. Gienapp, "The Republican Party and the Slave Power," in Robert H. Abzug and Stephen E. Maizlish, eds., *New Perspectives on Race and Slavery in America* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1986), 53.

⁸⁰David Brion Davis, *The Slave Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969); Richard Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), 3-40.

⁸¹Gienapp, *Origins*, 73-74.

⁸²Hamlin quoted in Howard Carroll, *Twelve Americans* (New York: Harper & Rowe, 1883), 139-143. On this martyrdom strategy, see *Chronicle*, May 4, 11, 18, 1854; *Bangor Jeffersonian*, May 30, 1854; Andrew Wallace Crandell, *The Early History of the Republican Party: 1854-1856* (1930, reprint, Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1960), 44.

⁸³Letter from William H. Robertson, Acting U. S. Consul at Havana, to William L. Marcy, Secretary of State, March 3, 1854; letter from Marcy to Pierre Soulé, U. S. Minister to Spain, April 3, 1854; letter from Soule to Angel Calderon de la Barca, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, April 8, 1854. All in *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 2: 743-747; 175-178; 751-752.

⁸⁴U. S. Congress, *Presidential Message with Report on the Seizure of the Steamer Black Warrior*, H. ex. doc. 76 (33-1) 723.

⁸⁵*Eastern Argus*, March 15, 1854.

⁸⁶Foner, *Free Soil*, 95.

⁸⁷*Bangor Whig and Courier*, June 16, 1854.

⁸⁸*Bangor Jeffersonian*, May 30, 1854.

⁸⁹*Oxford Democrat*, June 2, 1854; *Chronicle*, May 25 and June 1, 1854; *Piscataquis Observer*, July 13, 1854.

⁹⁰Letter from Edward Kent to Israel Washburn, June 21, 1854, quoted in Hunt, *Washburn*, 36. Also, *Kennebec Journal*, May 26, 1854, quoting the *Bangor Mercury*.

⁹¹*Congressional Globe*, 33rd Congress, 1st Session, May 1, 1854, 1021-24.

⁹²*Bangor Jeffersonian*, May 9, 1854. See also *ibid.*, May 16, 1854, and *Chronicle*, May 18, 1854.

⁹³Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, 5: 272-273; *Piscataquis Observer*, June 15 and July 13, 1854.

⁹⁴Letter from Humphreys to Hamlin, June 5, 1854, Hamlin Papers; *Chronicle*, June 1, 1854; *Bangor Whig and Courier*, May 31, 1854.

⁹⁵May, *Quitman*, 284.

⁹⁶Amos Aschbach Ettinger, *The Mission to Spain of Pierre Soulé: 1853-1855* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932), 250-338; *Kennebec Journal*, May 18, 1854; *Bangor Whig and Courier*, September 18, 1854.

⁹⁷*Bangor Whig and Courier*, June 1, 1854; *Piscataquis Observer*, July 13, 1854; *Bangor Jeffersonian*, May 16, 1854.

⁹⁸*Bangor Whig and Courier*, March 22, 1854; *Kennebec Journal*, April 7, 1854.

⁹⁹Wescott, *New Men*, 129-139; Crandall, *Republican Party*, 81-91.

¹⁰⁰*Eastern Argus*, January 26, 1854.

¹⁰¹Letter from Humphreys to Hamlin, June 5, 1854.

¹⁰²Gienapp, *Origin*, 502; Wescott, *New Men*, 121-2.

¹⁰³Wescott, *New Men*, 121-2.

¹⁰⁴Gienapp, *Origins*, 161; Ettinger, *Mission to Spain*, 378.

¹⁰⁵*New York Tribune*, November 4, 1854.

¹⁰⁶Rauch, *American Interest*, 292; letter from James Buchanan, John Mason, and Pierre Soulé, U. S. Ministers to Great Britain, France, and Spain to William Marcy, October 18, 1854, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 7: 579-585.

¹⁰⁷Roy Franklin Nichols, *Franklin Pierce, Young Hickory of the Granite Hills* (2nd ed., Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958), 366-371; *Bangor Whig and Courier*, September 12, 1854.

¹⁰⁸Letter from Marcy to Soulé, November 13, 1854, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 9: 196-201; Ettinger, *Mission to Spain*, 379.

¹⁰⁹*Portland Daily Advertiser*, March 16, 1855.

¹¹⁰Letter from Franklin Pierce to George Shepley, October 6, 1855, 5-1, Misc. Box 5/18, Maine Historical Society, Portland, Maine; Schlesinger, *Presidential Elections*, 2240. William B. Lapham and Silas P. Maxim in their *History of the Town of Paris, Maine* (1884, reprint, Sommersworth, N.H.: New England History Press, 1983), 180, emphasized that the defeat of the Democratic party was so complete in their town that "it has never voted democratic in September election since."

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