CONCEPTUALIZING NARRATIVES OF RELIGIOUS GENERATIONAL GAP BETWEEN
MUSLIM IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR FRENCH-BORN DESCENDANTS.

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ABSTRACT

Shreya Parikh: Conceptualizing Narratives of Religious Generational Gap between Muslim Immigrants and their French-Born Descendants.
(Under the supervision of Dr. Charles Kurzman)

One of the odd paradoxes of the study of religious gap between Muslims of first-generation of immigration and those belonging to second- or later generation of immigration in the European context is that quantitative studies show little evidence for difference while qualitative studies point out significant differences. Why is it so? By focusing on the French case and taking a mixed methods approach, I reflect on this paradox. First, I analyze data from three quantitative surveys: Pew Global Attitudes Survey (Pew 2006), Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO 2008), and French Institute of Public Opinion study of the Muslim population (IFOP 2019). Then, I use primary qualitative data (25 interviews and field observations) collected in the Greater Paris region over six months (May-July 2018 and February-April 2019) to outline five themes that I noted when my interviewees talked about religious generational gap. These themes include: choice versus inheritance of Islam; Islamic epistemologies; religious attitudes towards gender and ethnic differences; dividing the sacred from the profane; and claiming Islamic identity. I show that many of the religious differences that French Muslims of different immigrant generations talk about are not measured by the quantitative surveys currently available. In conclusion, I use the five themes to propose survey questions that can be used in future quantitative surveys to measure the existence of as well as the nature of religious generational gap among Muslims at a generalizable scale.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Finally, I would like to thank all my interlocutors in France who shared intimate details from their lives with me. They remain the motivation of all my current research undertakings. It is to them that I dedicate this work.

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Section 1: Introduction

Every Friday after the afternoon prayer, a women's group meets at the Grand Mosque of Paris. Quranic verses are discussed and thoughts are shared, in a mixture of French and North African Arabic dialects, about ways in which to apply Quran's lessons in daily life. Many of these women are first-generation immigrants, and a popular discussion is the religious generational differences they have with their French-raised children or grandchildren. During my Friday visits to the mosque, many complained that the "younger" generation of Muslim women and men in France wore hijab or grew "Islamic" beard while "knowing nothing about the essence of Islam" (Houda's words).[1] Second-generation women who frequented the mosques usually chatted with those of their own immigrant-generation, complaining about the "incomprehension of Islam among the parents" who had not read the Quran and did not understand that Muslim women "could marry any man as long as they are pious Muslims [and that] it did not matter what ethnic background they came from" (Nesrine's words, fieldnotes from March 2019).

That religious generational gap with members of other immigrant-generation exists was a *social fact* for many Muslim women and men I met both within and outside the mosques (Durkheim

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[1] The second- and third-generation immigrants were collectively referred to as "youth" or "younger (wo)men" by first-generation immigrants. Also note that all names have been changed to protect the identities of those interviewed.

1982).[2] Among the first-generation men I conversed with at the immigrant-dominated cafes in northern Paris, and among second- and third-generation women and men I shared meals with during religious association meetings, many agreed with the women I met at the Grand Mosque about the existence of a religious generational gap between first-generation immigrants and French-raised descendants of these immigrants.[3]

Scholars who employ qualitative methods agree that there *is* a generational gap in religiosity, i.e. the religiosity of first-generation Muslims in France is different from that of their second- and third-generation descendants; however, those employing quantitative surveys have discovered little consistent evidence of a generational gap in religiosity among Muslims in either France or elsewhere in Europe.

For example, a survey carried out by IFOP (French Institute of Public Opinion) in 2019 asked Muslim women and men of age 50 years and above if they would "say that in your family, your entourage or your neighborhood, the young Muslims you know are today more religious, less religious or neither more nor less religious than your generation was at the same age?"[4] Around

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[2] In this paper, I borrow from Danièle Hervieu-Léger's definition that "a religion is an ideological, practical, and symbolic device by which a consciousness (individual or collective) of belonging to a particular believing line is constituted, maintained, [and] developed" (cited in Kakpo 2005: 140).

[3] In the context of this paper, I define first-generation immigrants as those who immigrated to France, and second- and third-generation immigrants are those who were born in France to (at least) a parent or grand-parent who immigrated to France. It should be noted that second- and third-generation as categories are not used by my interviewees; rather, they prefer to be called first- or second-generation French respectively. In following the general practice in sociological literature on immigration, I use the terms "second-generation immigrant" and "third-generation immigrant." I also refer to the second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants as French-born or French-raised Muslims collectively.

[4] The question asked was "*Diriez-vous que dans votre famille, votre entourage ou votre quartier, les jeunes musulmans que vous connaissez sont aujourd'hui plus religieux, moins religieux ou ni plus ni moins religieux que ne l'était votre génération au même âge?*" Unfortunately, a similar question was not asked to the younger Muslim population and hence we have no proxy for whether second- and third-generation Muslims thought that there was a generation gap with first-generation.

half of them agreed that there was a religious gap, 40 percent said that there was no difference, and around 9 percent did not respond. Of those who agreed, 55 percent said that the younger generation was "more religious" and 45 percent said that the younger generation was "less religious."[5]

This paper takes this discrepancy in evidence related to religious generational gap as the starting point. Using a mixed methods approach, I reflect on how results from qualitative case studies can be bridged with those from quantitative survey data to understand religious generational gap as a sociological phenomenon. I argue that new quantitative survey data is needed to capture the varied manifestations of religious generational gap that are identified in the qualitative literature and in my interviews with Muslims in France. These issues are important because many Europeans view religiosity among Muslim immigrants and their descendants as a proxy for integration into the society (Alba 2005; Zolberg and Woon 1999), i.e. lower religiosity among French-raised Muslims compared with that among first-generation immigrants is often interpreted as integration into largely secular societies in Europe.

The paper is organized as follows: The first part of the paper sketches out the debates and propositions in the literature in relation to the presence (or the absence) of religious generational gap. Second, I examine results from available quantitative surveys – I compare indicators of religiosity for foreign-born (or first-generation) and French-born (second- or third-generation) Muslims in France to see if we can find significant differences in religiosity between the two generational groups, especially for observables/outcomes mentioned in the qualitative studies. I

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[5] Here, I am taking age group as a proxy for immigrant-generation, assuming that those who are aged 50 and above are mostly (if not all) first-generation Muslims. I remain aware of the limitations of this assumption, in that this group might consist of Muslims of other generation as well as converts.

find that while quantitative survey data provides no generalizable evidence of the presence of religious generational gap, many among my interviewees as well as others I interacted with while collecting qualitative data talked about the existence of a religious generational gap (in many cases without me prompting them to). Third, I use this primary qualitative data (interviews and observations) collected among Muslims of immigrant origin in France to outline five key themes of generational differences identified by my interlocutors. In conclusion, I propose survey questions based on these themes that might be used to collect better-quality survey data on religiosity among European Muslims.[6]

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[6] It remains true that census-level data related to religious affiliation, religiosity, and ethnicity cannot be collected in France. As Michael Cosgrove writes, "A law dating from 1872 forbids the collection by the state of census data based on questions about religious beliefs, because the Third Republic considered that kind of information to be private. This principle was reaffirmed in a law passed on 6 January 1978 (Article 8) which states that "It is forbidden to collect or process data of a personal nature related to racial or ethnic origins as well as political, philosophic or religious opinions."" (See Michael Cosgrove. 2011. "How does France count its Muslim population?" *Le Figaro*. http://plus.lefigaro.fr/note/how-does-france-count-its-muslim-population-20110407-435643 for more details on the topic.) Yet, the door remains open for smaller representative surveys like Trajectories and Origins (2008) to ask questions related to this topic.

Section 2: Religious generational gap in the literature

In this section, I review evidence on religious generational gap among Muslims of immigrant origin, primarily in France but also in other European countries with significant Muslim population of immigrant origin. I start with a review of studies that make use of quantitative survey data, and then review evidence from qualitative studies.

2.1 Evidence from Quantitative studies

Quantitative studies use shifts in religiosity of immigrant-origin Muslims over immigrant generation to measure integration into the predominantly secular societies of European countries. These studies ask: Is there a secularization of Muslims from first-generation to second-generation? Secularization in these studies is understood as "the decreasing importance and impact of religion in modern societies" (Phalet, Gijsberts, and Hagendoorn 2008:412).

Studies from around Europe agree that there is a significant intergenerational transmission of religiosity among Muslims from first- to second-generation (Brouard and Tiberj 2011; Güngör, Fleischmann, and Phalet 2011; Soehl 2017).

One of the earliest surveys to study trajectories of immigrants in France, titled "Geographical Mobility and Social Inclusion" (MGIS), was fielded in 1992 by the French Institute for Demographic Studies (INED) and National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). This study allows us to compare religiosity of first-generation with that of second-generation immigrants from Algeria. Data for this study were analyzed by Michèle Tribalat (1995, 1996), who also directed the collection of data. In terms of religious practice, we see a decrease over

immigrant generation. We see that, in the first-generation, around 47 percent of men and 58 percent of women indicate that they practice religion either regularly or occasionally. On the other hand, among those of second generation with two Algerian parents, 32 percent of men and 42 percent of women indicate practicing religion regularly or occasionally. This proportion is even less among children of one Algerian and one French parent. Among the first-generation, between 70-80 percent respect Ramadan fasting and religious restrictions on consumption of pork meat. The proportion of those who respect restriction on consumption of alcohol is around 55 percent (men) and 76 percent (women) (1996:240). Among the children of two Algerian parents, around 60 percent respect Ramadan fasting and religious restrictions on consumption of pork meat and about half of them respect religious restriction on the consumption of alcohol (1996:248). In terms of language used, around half of the first-generation population declare Arabic as their maternal language and an additional 24 percent declare using a mix of Arabic, Berber, and French (1996:190). On the other hand, only 10 percent of those born of two Algerian parents declare Arabic as a mother tongue and an additional 28 percent declare speaking a mixture of French and Arabic (1996:203). Hence, overall, we see a decline in the use of Arabic language over immigrant generation.[7]

In 2005, Sylvain Brouard and Vincent Tiberj fielded data in order to compare "the new French" with "French" people who lack direct links to immigration. Their findings do not allow us to compare the two immigrant generations, unfortunately; yet, they compare age cohorts and conclude that there is a move toward "reislamization" among the younger cohort. They use data for the question that asked Muslims "if they accord more, as much, or less importance to religion

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[7] Arabic language knowledge and fluency are used to make claims of religious authenticity and authority among Muslims and hence is an important indicator of transmission of Islam over generations.

today than they did before" and find that, overall, the distribution for the three categories was at 42 percent (more), 41 percent (as much), and 17 percent (less). The percent of those who indicated that the importance of religion for them is higher at the time of the interview than it was before was highest among 18-24 year old individuals (Brouard and Tiberj 2011:17).

Hakim el Karoui (2016) published a report titled "A French Islam is possible" using data from a quantitative survey on Muslim religiosity that was fielded in 2016. Data from 1,029 individuals of "Muslim faith or culture" was obtained (of which 874 self-identified as Muslim). El Karoui concludes that those "far removed from religion" comprise about half of respondents aged 40 and above, as compared with a third of younger respondents to conclude that there might be a trend of "strengthening of religious identity among the new cohorts (compared to their elders at the same age)" (p.19).[8] He cautions that "[a]t this stage, it is not possible to statistically verify that this impact is linked to age rather than to a generational effect" (p.19) yet argues that overall there is a rise in fundamentalism especially among those of younger generation.

Several recent works on the study of immigrant religiosity in France have used data from the Trajectories and Origins (TeO 2008) survey, which I analyze later in this paper. Using TeO (2008) data, Thomas Soehl (2017) shows that "the offspring of religiously non-homogamous families are significantly less religious" (p.1001). He concludes that there is a possibility of an overall "non-trivial decline in religiosity of the third-generation" because of decline in religious in-partnering in the second-generation (p.999).[9] Hugues Lagrange (2013) studies shifts in the

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[8] The data used for this report remains private, given that it was collected by two private institutions: Montaigne Institute and French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP). I have attempted to get access to this data, but received no response from the institutions.

[9] Simon and Tiberj (2013) also come to a similar conclusion using the same dataset – that intermarriage over generation rather than immigrant generation itself (directly) is contributing to decrease in religiosity over immigrant

religiosity of immigrants in France overall. Among others, he compares data on the religiosity of first- and second-generation immigrants of Algerian descent using data from MGIS (1992) and TeO (2008). He shows that while there was a significant difference between the proportion of those who declared themselves to have a religious affiliation in 1992 in both generations (around 85 percent among first- and 70 percent among second-generation), in 2008 this gap is almost non-existent (around 90 percent of both groups declare having religious affiliation) (p.13). This can be understood as a potential sign of Islamic "identity affirmation" among the descendants of immigrants from the region (p.34). In terms of frequency of practice of religion, around 15 percent of second-generation of Algerian descent in both 1992 and 2008 declared practicing frequently, while the proportion has fallen from around 20 percent to around 15 percent in the first-generation from 1992 to 2008 (p.13). What remains to be known is whether these trends can be generalized for the whole of the Muslim population (including those of third- or fourth-immigrant generation).

Another analysis of shifts in religiosity among immigrant origin population (belonging to all religious denominations) in France is offered by Patrick Simon (one of the directors of the TeO 2008 survey data) and Vincent Tiberj (2013). They write that the survey data itself concentrates on "elements revealing the beliefs and personal practices" of religion and that they cannot provide analysis of "differences in *values* based on religious affiliation" (emphasis is mine). They conclude that while religious transmission remains strong among immigrant-origin individuals in France, there is also a significant proportion of those who experience "religious reinforcement" (i.e. increase in religiosity of second-generation compared to their first-

generation. Yet, they caution that religious endogamy remains rather high among Muslims in France overall (around 80 percent).

generation parents) (p.25). Yet, the proportion of those who undergo "religious reinforcement" is significantly smaller than the proportion of those who undergo "secularization" (i.e. decrease in religiosity compared to their parents). In addition, they reject the thesis of "radicalization" based on the analysis of the dataset (p.26) and conclude that (like in the case of Lagrange 2013):

> "[T]here is no [evidence of] generational rupture that signals a more intense relation to religion among the youth born in France, but rather [an evidence of] a more general affirmation of religion among immigrant populations since the 1980s, which is a part of a more global movement of the evolution of the function of religion in the Muslim countries" (Simon and Tiberj 2013:27)

Continuing on the question of religious identity, evidence about the existence of "practicing and believing Muslims", "believing Muslims", and individuals "of Muslim origins" as separate categories of self-identification appears in surveys of Muslim communities undertaken by IFOP between 1989 and 2011 (IFOP 2011).[10] However, the IFOP report does not break the findings based on immigrant generation for us to know how self-identification differs by immigrant generation.

Outside of the French context, the study of shifts in religiosity using quantitative studies is slightly more developed because of availability of better-quality data for multiple years. Quantitative studies related to religious generation gap between foreign-born Muslims and European-born Muslims of immigrant origin for other countries in Europe describe two trends

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[10] For example, in 2011, those of Muslim origins who were surveyed categorized themselves as follows: 41 percent as "practicing and believing Muslims", 34 percent as "believing Muslims", and 22 percent as "of Muslim origins."

overall: no change from first- to second-generation or a decrease in religiosity over immigrant generation.[11]

Multiple studies have emerged from the study of Muslim religiosity in the Netherlands. Phalet and colleagues use data on the religiosity of Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch Muslims (for years 1998, 2002, and 2005) in the Netherlands and conclude that "the second generation practices less and attaches less importance to religious schools than the first generation" (2008:431). Van de Pol and van Tubergen (2014) study trends in transmission of religiosity from first- to second-generation of the same Muslim population. They conclude that while religious practices (like reading Quran, following halal dietary restrictions, or wearing headscarves) continues to have the same frequency from first- to second-generation in majority of the cases (between 60-90 percent), "it is more often the case that people are less religious as opposed to more religious than their parents" (p.97). This conclusion is similar to that made by Simon and Tiberj (2013) in the French case.

Another study, again in the case of Netherlands, seeks to understand the transmission of ethnic and religious identity from first- to second-generation and the shift in the relation between the two identities over generation. Like in the previously mentioned studies, they conclude that "second generation reports weaker ethnic and religious identities, and engages less in ethno-cultural and religious practices." For example, the percentage of first-generation immigrants of Turkish and Moroccan origins who *do not* call themselves Muslims is lower than that found among second generation (around 5 percent in first- to around 12 percent in second-generation) (Maliepaard, Lubbers, and Gijsberts 2010). In addition, the authors also argue that "the

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[11] See Voas and Fleischmann's (2012) paper "Islam Moves West: Religious Change in the First and Second Generations." *Annual review of Sociology* 38(1): 525-545 for an excellent review on this topic.

differences in religious identity between the recent migrants and the second generation are due to the fact that the former are more attached to their ethnic group" and that "for the second generation, feeling Moroccan or Turkish plays a stronger role in maintaining a religious identity than it does for the first" (p.464). The high correlation between ethnic and religious identity among second-generation goes against the evidence of the de-linking of religious and ethnic identity among European-raised Muslims compared to first-generation that has been presented in multiple qualitative studies (that I outline later).

Breaking from the trends of either decrease in or maintenance of first-generation religious practices evidenced in previous quantitative works, Maliepaard et al. (2012) show that there has been a recent rise (since 2004) in the frequency of mosque attendance among second-generation Muslims of Moroccan and Turkish origin in the Netherlands compared to the first-generation Muslims of their ethnic origin. It remains to be known if such increase is observable in other indicators of religious practice, religiosity, and religious identity.

2.2 Evidence from Qualitative studies

Some of the earliest studies that pointed to a difference between the religiosity of first-generation Muslims and their European-raised descendants were qualitative studies undertaken in the context of France. An interest in the study of the evolution of religiosity among immigrants and their descendants has been around since 1980s, when Muslims became more "visible" in the French public space.[12] In a majority of these studies, starting with the works of Jocelyne Cesari (1997, 1998), Gilles Kepel (1991), Farhad Khosrokhavar (1997), Olivier Roy (1999), and Nancy

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[12] This increased visibility has been attributed by many authors to the increase in media coverage of the "riots" in the French suburbs, where most of the immigrant families lived in public housing. The mediatization of the March of the Beurs, which took place in 1983 and comprised primarily of immigrant-origin youth marching to demand equality in the French society, has been pointed out as being of primary importance in contributing to this visibility.

Venel (1999) in the 1990s, a common argument has been that the religiosity of the first-generation Muslims *is* different from that of French-raised Muslims. At the European level, an edited volume compiled by Steven Vertovec and Alisdair Rogers (1998) demonstrated similar trends in religious generational gap across multiple countries including Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

Four key theories are found in the qualitative literature on shift in Muslim religiosity over immigrant generation: individualization of religion; de-ethnicization, deterritorialization, and deculturalization of religion; reislamization; and radicalization of religiosity among French- (or European-) raised Muslims compared to first-generation Muslim immigrants. These theories are proposed, in many cases, as interrelated with each other, as I outline below.

One of the prominent theories in the qualitative literature on difference in religiosity between first-generation Muslims and French-raised Muslims is the idea that Islam in the later generation is more "individualized" compared to that found among the first-generation Muslims. Jocelyne Cesari, one of its key proponents, writes:

> "The European Muslims advance an individualized logic of decision-making and choice that fits well in the growing subjectification of religious affiliation (*appartenance*). It is not sufficient to believe and to practice because one is born into this or that belief tradition, rather [it is important] to express one's individuality by making a choice of practicing [a religion] and to give a personal meaning to the revealed message" (Cesari 2002a:20).

The importance of individualized choice in relation to religion, especially religious practices, among the French-raised Muslims has been described in qualitative literature since 1980s. For example, Yves Gonzalez de Quijano mentions an interview where a young 15 year-old boy of Moroccan origin describes that the French-raised Muslims are "lucky" to be in France because

"if we don't want to do [Ramadan], we don't do it", unlike in "*bled*" (country of origin) where they would have social pressure to fast (Gonzales De Quijano 1987:824).

This "chosen" Islamic identity, that Farhad Khosrokhavar (1997) terms as a "bricolage" of identity, is contrasted to the "inherited" Islam of the first-generation (also mentioned in Tietze 2000:263). As Adis Duderija writes:

> "Islamic identity for many western-born/raised Muslims is based upon a conscious choice of religious identity reconstruction and not merely on the basis of reproduction of an inherited aspect of their ethnic heritage or tradition" (Duderija 2007:146).

The importance of "choice" among the Western-raised Muslims compared to first-generation immigrants when talking about religion has also been pointed out in studies outside of France. For example, Garbi Schmidt's (2004) work has shown the importance of "choice" and "rationality" among Muslim youth of immigrant origin in Denmark, Sweden, and the United States when talking about religious affiliation and adoption of religious practices.

Developing on the concepts of agency in relation to religion, and placing it in the context of the shift in citizenship over generation, Caitlin Killian (2007:305) demonstrates that "while many immigrants affirm that Islam should be kept at home, in private, an increasing number of their children seek visible symbols of religious/ethnic identity, such as the headscarf, suggesting the emergence of generational differences in the experience of Islam in Europe." Given that many French-raised Muslims have French citizenship (because of the *jus-soli* citizenship policy in France) and because many of them are socialized and educated in France, this generation feels more French compared to the earlier generation of Muslims (Maxwell and Bleich 2014) and seeks to assert their rights (like freedom of religious expression) in the French context.

At the same time, evidence about the younger generation showing more "visible symbols" relating to religious identity compared to the first-generation remains debated. Jean Beaman (2016) argues against Killian's (2007) proposition to show that middle class second-generation Maghrebi Muslims don't show religiosity in public and, instead, seek to maintain the secular norms of the French society by keeping religion in the private.[13]

The desire to have agency in religious matters also manifests itself in terms of differences in sources used to gain information about religion among French-raised Muslims, as compared with first-generation immigrant Muslims. One of the most important contemporary sources of Islamic knowledge is the internet, which Olivier Roy calls the "virtual *ummah*" (Roy 2004:183).[14] Kaltenbach and Tribalat (2002) write that the internet becomes a handy tool for young French Muslims because it provides a great variety of sources on Islam and also allows them to communicate with other fellow Muslims in online forums. The difference between the two generations emerges because "the children of those 'Muslims' who came to work in France…are in search of information that their parents are frequently incapable of providing [because the first-generation] practice a popular Islam that they got to know in their country of origin" (p.269).

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[13] In most studies on shifts in religiosity over immigrant generation, difference is made between individualization and privatization of religion. There is evidence of the former process taking place over immigrant generation (i.e. increase in importance of agency in relation to religious practices and construction of religious identity over generation); there is general agreement that religion among Muslims of first-generation is more "private" and "quiet" in that that demands for religious accommodation in public space are less present among the first-generation rather than among those who are born or raised in Europe.

[14] *Ummah* is an Arabic term that means 'community.' It has come to be used to refer to the Muslim community in a global context.

Another important source of Islamic knowledge that qualitative studies have identified among younger generations is the Quran and other holy texts. As Jørgen Nielsen writes:

> "[T]here is growing evidence that young people are meeting formally and informally in small groups on a regular basis to discuss the source texts. Qur'an and Hadith are explored as fresh texts, without the intervention of centuries of Islamic scholarship. In consequence, the texts are interpreted in the light of current needs and with methods which are based on the intellectual tools acquired through education in European schools" (Nielsen 2016:130).

This reading of the holy texts by European-raised Muslims is contrasted with "traditional" ideas about Islam that first-generation parents have and which, the literature argues, are derived from religious authorities in their country of origin. Nielsen (2016) mentions the use of Islam as a form of legitimizing factor by first-generation parents to control the behavior (especially marriage and partner choice) of their European-raised children. At the same time, Islam is also used by the younger generation to legitimize their perceptions of gender roles, especially in the familial context; choices like shared domestic and childcare responsibilities, for example, are "explained as being legitimately Islamic, even as being more correct, in Islamic terms, than the practices of their parents" (Nielsen 2016:130).

The presentation of "true Islam" as "gender equal" by European-raised Muslims is a trend observable in many countries in Europe. The younger generation, especially women, use this to challenge gender roles imposed upon them by their parents, as Dounia Bouzar (2003) has shown. Bouzar gives the example of Nouria, a second-generation Muslim of Turkish origin, who says:

> "When I found my religious sources and I could study them, I realized that Islam gave me rights that my father forbade me: [for example] studies [and] my consent to choose my husband who might not be Turkish" (cited in Bouzar 2003:47).

Developing on Bouzar's work, Chantal Saint-Blancat writes that "the women use veil, that they might choose or refuse, as a symbol of quest for liberty and parity" (2004:241).

Bouzar (2003) also mentions the trend of "de-ethnicization" of Islam among the younger generation of Muslims who make a "separation between their geographic origin and their religious belief" in order to break from the "Arab or French" dilemma, i.e. having to put two identities in opposition with each other and being forced to choose one over the other. This separation allows the younger generation to keep links with their ethnic community while also allowing them to live a fully French life (p.47). Instead of relying on ethnic identity, many French-raised Muslims come to rely on religion as a criterion for community building (termed as *Ummah* in Arabic). This tendency has been termed as "neo-communitarianism" (*néo-communautarisme*) by Nancy Venel (2004).

For Olivier Roy, de-ethnicization of Islam among the younger generation of immigrant origin is linked to "deculturalization" and "deterritorialization" of Islam away from the country of origin of their parents. This process generates for him a shift towards religion as "faith and authenticity, not academic knowledge or scholarly training," and where boundaries of religiosity are marked by "signs of belonging (such as styles of clothing, wearing of hijab or growing a beard) and performative actions or declarations (such as dotting a speech with Arabic expressions)" (2004:166).

While Jørgen Nielsen agrees about the importance of Arabic language among the European-raised Muslims, he disagrees about religion not being about "academic knowledge." He gives the example of a high proportion of British-born Muslims (of immigrant origin) enrolling in universities to get their degree in Arabic language (Nielsen 2016:130).

The idea of separating Muslim identity from ethnic identity (especially Arab identity) developed among the second-generation over time. The tendency to de-link "Arab" and "Muslim" identity was documented among young Muslims by Gonzales de Quijano (1987) and continues to be manifested at a higher rate today, according to the cases documented by the qualitative literature. For example, Nathalie Kakpo's work demonstrates that sons of first-generation Maghrebi immigrants from a small city close to Geneva chose to dissolve the links between "naturalized genealogy" (being Maghrebi) and "symbolic genealogy" (Islam) because of the situation of marginalization that they faced in everyday life. She writes:

> "The [symbolic genealogy] is mobilized by the youth because the [naturalized genealogy] is "defective." As a historical religion, Islam signifies permanence, power and greatness whereas naturalized linkages - embodied by the father or the land from which he came - is synonymous with domination and humiliation" (Kakpo 2005:152).

De-ethnized Islam is also used by younger generation of Muslims, especially women, in order to contest arranged marriages with Muslims of the same ethnic group. As in the case of Nouria (quoted earlier) studies among Muslims raised in the United States have also demonstrated the presence of de-ethicized religiosity, especially in the instances of marriage and spouse selection (Grewal 2009).

The separation of ethnic and religious identity over time developed in parallel with the separation between French-raised Muslims who simply believe and those who both believe in and practice Islam (Beaman 2016; Cesari 2002b). Nancy Venel (2004) identifies frequency of ritual prayer as the distinction made between practicing and believing Muslims, with the former group performing it with higher frequency than the latter group.

Gilles Kepel, writing about Islam in the French suburbs in 1991, pointed towards potential shifts taking place in mid-1980s in the religiosity of the French-raised children, in contrast to that of their parents. He writes that the youth of immigrant origin "were in a large majority distant from Islam and did not define themselves as Muslims in a spontaneous fashion, until the first signs of reislamization began to manifest itself in Parisian suburbs and especially in Lyonnais suburbs starting in 1985" (Kepel 1991:353). Olivier Roy, who agrees that there is a form of reislamization among Western-raised Muslims overall, defines it as such: "a way of appropriating [the process of acculturation], of experiencing it in terms of self-affirmation, but also of instrumentalizing it to 'purify' Islam" (2004:23).

On the other hand, Vincent Geisser and Khadija Mohsen-Finan (2005) disagree with the proposition of "reislamization" of the youth and propose that the identity claims made by the younger generation should be seen plainly as "display Islam" (*islam d'affichage*) rather than representing a concrete experience.

Figure 1: HLM (*Habitation à loyer modéré*; low-income housing) buildings on the periphery between Paris and the suburbs.

*Many of these were built to house immigrant-origin families and continue to contribute in urban segregation of immigrant-origin families from those without immigrant origins in France. All photos in this thesis were taken by the author.

The idea that Islam is used for "self-affirmation" among French- (or European-) raised Muslims is not new. Jocelyne Cesari (1997) has pointed out that individualization of religion means increase in importance of "choice" in relation to religion among French-raised Muslims; this also results in a public affirmation of religious identity and desire for religious accommodations among these individuals. In contrast to the "individualized" religiosity of the French-raised Muslims, Cesari describes Islam as present among the first-generation immigrants as being "popular and quiet," in that that the elements of religious practice and religious identity are

derived not out of choice but rather from a relation with others of the same religion and ethnic community (Cesari 1997; also noted in Lamchichi 1999:78). Among these first-generation Muslims, a desire for accommodation of religious practices and religious identity in France is comparatively absent (Cesari 1994).

The "quiet" first-generation immigrants are contrasted with European-raised Muslims who claim religious identity in the public space. One of the popular methods of claiming religious identity in the public space is the use of *haram-halal* division to mark what is sacred or permissible in the society, and what is not. Using the case of Turkish-origin Muslims in Germany, Nikola Tietze stresses that plural Muslim identities develop among German-raised Turkish-origin Muslims because of the context specific to living in the diasporic community (2000). She points, among others, to the use of religion to order life in the "disorder of the [German] society" – clarity of "frontiers between *haram* and *halal*" provide ways of ordering the society to German-born Muslims (p.258).

Elaborating on his ideas of "de-ethnicized" Islam, Olivier Roy argues that some Western-raised Muslims (second- or third-generation immigrants) have come to adopt what he calls "neo-fundamentalism." Neo-fundamentalism for Roy is a form of radicalization which is manifested as "support for Al Qaeda, but also a new sectarian communitarian discourse, advocating multiculturalism as a means of rejecting integration into Western society" (Roy 2004:2).

The theory that Western-raised Muslims of immigrant origins are undergoing radicalization has been presented in multiple works. Robert Leiken's book "Europe's Angry Muslims: The Revolt of The Second Generation" uses examples of acts of "jihadi" terrorism committed by Western-raised Muslims to demonstrate widespread radicalization (Leiken 2011; see also Kepel 1997, 2017). A popular term used in the literature to designate European-raised Muslims of immigrant

origin who commit acts of terrorism is "homegrown terrorists" (Kastoryano 2017). Basing his arguments on observations and interviews with radicalized men inside and outside of prison, Farhad Khosrokhavar argues that "the most formidable supporters of radicalization are not grandfathers or fathers but the sons," and that these "generational differences" are found both inside and outside the prisons in France (2017:74). Kaltenbach and Tribalat (2002) argue that the increasing use of internet as a source of religious information among French-raised Muslims opens up the opportunity to be "seduced by radical discourses" (p.270).

Figure 2: A Hammam (Turkish bath) located in north-eastern district of Paris.

While religious radicalization and desire for "sacred violence" is one path adopted by Muslim youth of immigrant origin who face continuous marginalization in the French society, another path manifests itself in a form of "internal exile" where "subjects cut themselves off from society

by embracing forms of Islamic identity" like Salafism or membership of Tablighi Jamaat (Khosrokhavar 2017:94–96; see also Parvez 2017:Chapter 5-6).

Adis Duderija writes that because of the "processes of immigration", two types of Muslim identities have emerged among the Western-born descendants of Muslim immigrants: "Neo-Traditional Salafis (NTS) and Progressive Muslims (PMs)" (2007:150). What he describes as the former is similar to the radicalized identities described earlier, while the latter group consists of those who "are observant Muslims [and] who view Western norms, popular culture, and lifestyles as mostly compatible with Islam. They do not see inherent conflict in their dual identities as Muslims and Europeans" (Mandaville 2002:220).

One can see three main limitations to most qualitative evidence on religious generational gap: first, most of the theorization of this gap is built on interviews and observations with French- (or Western-) raised Muslims. First-generation Muslim immigrants are less well-represented in qualitative works, especially more recent works. Second, qualitative studies – including this one – are undertaken mostly in the context of urban spaces in either France or elsewhere in Europe. Hence, we do not have qualitative data about the difference in religiosity between first-generation Muslims and French- (or European-) raised Muslims living in rural areas.

Third, many qualitative works talk about concepts I described above – like individualization, de-ethnicization, reislamization, or radicalization of Islam among French-raised Muslims compared to their first-generation counterparts. Yet, in much of the work, attempts to provide a list of observable religious differences that can be used to design quantitative surveys have not been made. One might explain this absence of observable outcomes of religiosity by the fact that many of these authors have argued that the presence of a uniform discourse (like individualization of Islam among the younger generation) allows for an inclusion of a plurality of

religious practices (Tietze 2002). For example, Chantal Saint-Blancat writes that "a demand for individualization of the interpretation of religious practice…leads in the long term to the inclusion of a pluralism of behavior within the community" (2004:241). Yet generational difference in variation of religious practice could itself potentially be analyzed with large-scale survey data.

This paper takes it as its goal to bridge this gap between the findings of qualitative and quantitative studies of the religious generation gap. In the sections that follow, I highlight some observables or outcomes of religiosity using both secondary quantitative survey data and primary qualitative data. I focus on the case of Muslims of immigrant origin in France.

Section 3: Religious generational gap: Evidence from quantitative survey data

In this section, I make use of data from three quantitative surveys: Pew Global Attitudes Survey (Pew 2006), Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO 2008), and French Institute of Public Opinion study of the Muslim population (IFOP 2019). The three surveys were selected because they contain a significantly sized sample of Muslims as well as measures for country of birth (in France versus in a foreign country) and religiosity.[15] Here, I take foreign-born status to be synonymous with first-generation and French-born status to be synonymous with descendants of immigrants, given that a large majority of the Muslim population in France has immigrant origins.[16]

The Pew Global Attitudes Survey oversampled Muslims in four European countries in 2006; in each of these four countries (France, Germany, Great Britain, and Spain), around 400 Muslims were surveyed. In the case of France, quota sampling design was used and adults aged 18 years or above were interviewed over phone. This means that the data is representative of telephone households. Of the total interviewed, half were foreign-born (200) and the other half were French-born (199).

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[15] Recent waves of European Social Survey data for France have data on religious denomination as well as country of birth. Yet, the sample size of those who identify as Muslim in each wave (between 50-100 respondents) is too small for meaningful statistical analysis.

[16] The proportion of native converts to Islam in France remains low. According to an estimate in 2013, there were 100,000 converts in a total Muslim population of six million, amounting to around 1.7 percent of the Muslim population. See https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/04/world/europe/rise-of-islamic-converts-challenges-france.html for more details (last accessed on 27 January 2020)

Trajectories and Origins (TeO) survey data was collected in 2008 by the National Institute of

Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) and the National Institute for Demographic Studies

(INED). Data was obtained in metropolitan France (excluding the overseas French departments

and territories) between September 2008 and February 2009 through face-to-face interviews.

TeO (2008) contains the largest sample of Muslims among all existing surveys and is

representative for ages 18-50 years overall. I make use of data for 5,071 individuals who self-

identified as Muslim, out of a total of 21,761 respondents. As in the case of Pew survey data, I

differentiate the generational groups based on country of birth (2,674 are foreign-born and 2,397

are French-born). Both Pew (2006) and Teo (2008) survey datasets provide probability weights;

they are used in the data analysis that I undertake in the rest of the paper.

The French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP), a private survey institute in France, published a

survey report in September 2019 measuring the opinion of the Muslim population in France on

various subjects, most of which concern religiosity.[17] A total of 1,012 of those having "Muslim

religion or origin" were interviewed over phone in August and September 2019. Of these, 540

are either foreigners or French nationals by acquisition (I categorize them as foreign-born or

first-generation) and 472 are French by birth (I categorize them as French-born Muslims who are

descendants of first-generation immigrants). The raw data for this survey is not made available

publicly, hence I make use of the data from the published report to analyze differences in

religiosity of both generational groups.

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[17] The survey was undertaken to mark the 30th anniversary of the "Headscarf Affair" (1989) and produced for *Le Point,* a magazine, and Foundation Jean-Jaures. The report can be accessed at https://www.ifop.com/publication/les-musulmans-en-france-30-ans-apres-laffaire-des-foulards-de-creil/ (last accessed: 26 January 2020)

I analyze differences in religiosity between the two generational groups for the three surveys in

Table 3.1 (for Pew (2006) data), Table 3.2 (for TeO (2008) data), and Table 3.3 (for IFOP (2019)

data). We see that religion remains important for Muslims of both generations in the two surveys

that ask about importance of religion in life (Pew 2006, TeO 2008). Below I analyze key

indicators measuring religiosity to understand trends in generational differences.

3.1 Religious practices

Visit to the mosques, especially for Friday prayers, remains an important sign of commitment to

religion among Muslims around the world. Yet, more than half of the Muslim population in

France does not "usually go to the mosques" for Friday prayers (IFOP 2019). Contrary to the

popular discourse that the French-raised Muslims have a higher frequency of religious practices

like mosque attendance, a higher proportion of first-generation immigrants "usually go to the

mosques" for Friday prayers compared to the French-born Muslims (45 percent compared to 30

percent; see IFOP 2019). We see a similar trend in frequency of mosque attendance or other

religious services in TeO 2008 and no significant difference in Pew 2006. What remains to be

known is whether there is a generational gap in frequency of prayers, given that prayers can be

undertaken outside of the mosques.[18]

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[18] Most of my interviewees who prayed indicated that they prayed in their homes in a majority of the cases. Men indicated that they tried to attend prayer services in the mosque on Fridays. Overall, men showed higher frequencies of mosque attendance than women.

Figure 3: A mosque located in northern suburbs of Paris.

* Many of these mosques were built in recent years, some through funding from governments or institutions in Muslim-majority countries.

In addition to regular prayers, fasting during the holy month of Ramadan is considered one of the five pillars of Muslim faith. A significantly higher proportion of first-generation Muslims (72 percent) indicated that they fasted for the "entirety" of last Ramadan, as compared to the French-raised Muslims (60 percent) (IFOP 2019).

Table 3.1: Differences is religiosity between foreign-born and French-born Muslims (using Pew 2006).

<div align="center">

Pew (2006) survey containing data on 200 foreign-born and 199 French-born Muslims

</div>

	Variable	Foreign-born	French-born	Difference	Sample size
1	Importance of religion in life				399
	Very important	0.60	0.55	0.05	
	Somewhat important	0.29	0.37	-0.08	
	Not too important	0.05	0.05	0	
	Not at all important	0.06	0.02	0.04	
2	Do you generally cover your head while going out? How frequently? (women only)				204
	Everyday	0.20	0.08	0.12	
	Almost everyday	0.03	0.02	0.01	
	Once or twice a week	0.03	0.02	0.01	
	A few times	0.07	0.10	-0.03	
	Never	0.67	0.78	-0.11	
3	On average, how often do you attend the mosque for salah or Juma'ah prayer?				397
	More than once a week	0.05	0.04	0.01	
	Once a week for Juma'ah	0.20	0.14	0.06	
	Once or twice a month	0.06	0.04	0.02	
	A few times a year	0.13	0.23	-0.10	
	Seldom	0.11	0.10	0.01	
	Never	0.45	0.45	0.00	
4	Please tell me which one of these you trust the most to offer you guidance as a Muslim.				397
	your local Imam or sheikh	0.21	0.31	-0.1***	
	National religious leaders	0.19	0.16	0.03	
	Religious leaders on television	0.10	0.02	0.08	
	Imams and institutions outside your country (such as al-Azhar or the Saudi Imams of Mecca and Medina)	0.26	0.38	-0.12	
	None of the above	0.25	0.13	0.12	

Note: The significance for difference between religiosity outcomes for first-generation and that of French-born Muslims is indicated as follows: *** indicated $p < 0.01$; ** indicated $p < 0.05$, and * indicated $p < 0.1$.

Table 3.1: continued

Pew (2006) survey containing data on 200 foreign-born and 199 French-born Muslims

Variable	Foreign-born	French-born	Difference	Sample size
Overall, do you think that the quality of life for Muslim women in France is better, worse, or about the same as the quality of life for women in most Muslim countries?				398
Better	0.57	0.68	-0.11***	
Worse	0.24	0.08	0.16	
About the same	0.19	0.24	-0.05	
Please tell me how worried you are about each the following issues related to Muslims living in France: Muslim women in France taking on modern roles in society				390
Very worried	0.15	0.18	-0.03	
Somewhat worried	0.35	0.27	0.08	
Not too worried	0.17	0.19	-0.02	
Not at all worried	0.33	0.37	-0.04	
Please tell me how worried you are about each the following issues related to Muslims living in France: The influence of music, movies, and television on Muslim youth in France				399
Very worried	0.19	0.14	0.05**	
Somewhat worried	0.30	0.19	0.11	
Not too worried	0.19	0.25	-0.06	
Not at all worried	0.32	0.41	-0.09	
Please tell me how worried you are about each the following issues related to Muslims living in France: A decline in the importance of religion among France's Muslims				398
Very worried	0.22	0.2	0.02	
Somewhat worried	0.39	0.33	0.06	
Not too worried	0.17	0.24	-0.07	
Not at all worried	0.23	0.24	-0.01	

Note: The significance for difference between religiosity outcomes for first-generation and that of French-born Muslims is indicated as follows: *** indicated $p < 0.01$; ** indicated $p < 0.05$, and * indicated $p < 0.1$.

Table 3.1: continued

Pew (2006) survey containing data on 200 foreign-born and 199 French-born Muslims

Variable	Foreign-born	French-born	Difference	Sample size
9 Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is...				395
Often justified	0.05	0.08	-0.03	
Sometimes justified	0.08	0.13	-0.05	
Rarely justified	0.20	0.18	0.02	
Never justified	0.67	0.61	0.06	
10 Do you think there is a struggle in France between moderate Muslims and Islamic fundamentalists or don't you think so?				395
Yes	0.57	0.57	0	
11 Which side do you identify with more in this struggle, moderate Muslims or Islamic fundamentalists?				217
Moderate Islam	0.88	0.92	-0.04	
Islamic fundamentalism	0.12	0.08	0.04	
12 Do you think there is a natural conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society, or don't you think so?				398
Yes, there is a conflict	0.35	0.21	0.14***	
No, there is not a conflict	0.65	0.79	-0.14	

Note: The significance for difference between religiosity outcomes for first-generation and that of French-born Muslims is indicated as follows: *** indicated $p < 0.01$; ** indicated $p < 0.05$, and * indicated $p < 0.1$.

Consumption of halal diet is another important marker of religiosity among many Muslims, especially in France, given the importance of consumption of alcohol and pork as indicative of Frenchness in the popular discourse. Halal diet consists of prohibition in consumption of alcohol and pork; in addition, only meats obtained from animals killed in a prescribed manner are considered "halal" (which means 'permissible' in Arabic). In terms of consumption of halal diet, French-born Muslims show a significantly higher frequency of respecting food prohibitions

compared to the foreign-born Muslims; 86 percent of French-born Muslims indicated "always" consuming halal food compared to 83 percent of foreign-born Muslim (TeO 2008). In addition, the difference in frequency at which French-born Muslims buy halal meat compared to foreign-born Muslims is statistically higher, yet not large (IFOP 2019). There is no significant difference by generation in response to frequency at which Muslims "look at the composition of [food items] to assure that they do not contain non-halal ingredients like gelatin, alcohol, or pork" (IFOP 2019).

Consumption of alcohol is also considered haram, or not permissible, by many Muslims. About 20 percent of both generational groups indicate that they consumed alcohol sometimes, and there is no generational difference in that respect (IFOP 2019).

3.2 Markers of religiosity

One of the popular discourses in France suggests that the French-born Muslims use religious markers, especially in the form of clothing, more frequently than the first-generation immigrant Muslims. This is especially true for discourses related to wearing of hijab among women.

TeO (2008) allows us to understand trends in usage of different types of markers of religiosity. Overall, the frequency at which religious signs (of any type) are used is similar in both the generations. What we see is differences in the type of religious signs preferred by those of different generations. French-born Muslims have a preference for religious jewelry while first-generation Muslims have a preference for headcovers (hijab or skull caps for example; see TeO 2008).

Table 3.2: Differences is religiosity between foreign-born and French-born Muslims (using TeO 2008).

TeO (2008) survey containing data on 2,674 foreign-born and 2,397 French-born Muslims

Variable	Foreign-born	French-born	Difference	Sample size
1 What importance did religion have in the upbringing you received from your family? (r_impedu)				5045
Not important at all	0.06	0.10	-0.04***	
Moderately important	0.15	0.18	-0.03	
Important	0.28	0.29	-0.01	
Very important	0.52	0.43	0.09	
2 What importance does religion have in your life? (r_impvie)				5046
Not important at all	0.05	0.02	0.03***	
Moderately important	0.18	0.18	0	
Important	0.28	0.31	-0.03	
Very important	0.49	0.49	0	
3 Do you attend religious services...? (r_culte)				5044
At least once a week	0.12	0.09	0.03***	
Once or twice a month	0.07	0.07	0	
For religious events	0.20	0.28	-0.08	
Only for family events like births, marriages or funerals	0.23	0.25	-0.02	
Never	0.39	0.31	0.08	
4 In your daily life, do you respect your religion's food prohibitions? (r_miam)				5057
Always	0.83	0.86	-0.03***	
Sometimes	0.08	0.1	-0.02	
Never	0.09	0.04	0.05	
There are none	0	0	0	
5 Are you a member of a religious association (i_assrel)				5069
Yes	0.02	0.02	0	

Note: The significance for difference between religiosity outcomes for first-generation and that of French-born Muslims is indicated as follows: *** indicated $p < 0.01$; ** indicated $p < 0.05$, and * indicated $p < 0.1$.

Table 3.2: continued

TeO (2008) survey containing data on 2,674 foreign-born and 2,397 French-born Muslims

Variable	Foreign-born	French-born	Difference	Sample size
6 In everyday life, do you wear clothing or jewelry in public that evokes your religion? (r_ostent)				4957
Always	0.13	0.14	-0.01*	
Sometimes	0.07	0.10	-0.03	
Never	0.80	0.76	0.04	
7 Which kind? (multiple options allowed)				5071
Jewels	0.04	0.15	-0.11***	
Clothing	0.04	0.03	0.01	
Headcover	0.13	0.06	0.07***	
Other signs	0.00	0.01	-0.01*	
Use of at least one sign	0.19	0.24	-0.05*	
8 Which kind? (multiple options allowed; women only)				2709
Jewels	0.07	0.22	-0.15***	
Clothing	0.03	0.02	0.01	
Headcover	0.24	0.12	0.12***	
Other signs	0.00	0.00	0	
Use of at least one sign	0.32	0.35	-0.03	
9 Language of reference (lref_gr)				5071
Arabic and related dialects (not Berber)	0.56	0.57	-0.01***	
10 What is your level in Arabic (if Arabic is reference language) (l_nivlr)				2316
Understand a few words	0.01	0.04	-0.03***	
Understand well but you have trouble speaking	0.04	0.19	-0.15	
Understand and speak easily but without reading or writing	0.25	0.58	-0.33	
Fluent (speak, read and write)	0.71	0.19	0.52	
11 In France, have you taken lessons in Arabic in France (if Arabic reference language) (l_courlr)				2317
Yes	0.08	0.35	-0.27***	
12 Would you like to be buried in...? (r_tombe)				4358
Wishes to be buried outside of France	0.57	0.45	0.12***	

Note: The significance for difference between religiosity outcomes for first-generation and that of French-born Muslims is indicated as follows: *** indicated $p < 0.01$; ** indicated $p < 0.05$, and * indicated $p < 0.1$.

Since the "Headscarf Affair" in 1989, which was started by a heavily mediatized controversy over the suspension of three female students from their middle school because of their hijab, all forms of headscarves have become a common aspect of media coverage in France. One discourse that has been popularized and that was used to support the banning of hijab from the French public schools starting 2004 is that hijabs were a sign of increasing "radicalization" among French-born Muslim girls. By contrast, analysis of survey data shows that less than a quarter of all Muslim women wear a hijab (Pew 2006, TeO 2008, IFOP 2019). All three surveys indicate that first-generation women are more likely to wear a hijab than French-born Muslim women (around a quarter among first-generation women wear a hijab while between 10-15 percent of French-born Muslim women wear a hijab according to the three surveys).

3.3 Source of Islamic knowledge

Arabic language has a high importance among Muslims around the world because the Quran, the holy text revealed to the Prophet Mohammad, is written in Arabic and is considered the foundation of Islamic knowledge. In addition, knowledge of Arabic is important because many Muslims in France have origins in Arabic-speaking countries. Yet, most countries use an Arabic dialect that is different from Quranic Arabic.

Figure 4: A street corner in Barbès, in the northern part of Paris.

* Barbès is filled with commerce catering to immigrant-origin families from North Africa.

Around 57 percent of the Muslim population, according to TeO (2008) data, calls Arabic or related dialect their "language of reference" (in addition to French in some cases). There is no significant generational difference in the proportion of those who call Arabic their reference language. Yet, first-generation respondents report a higher level of fluency compared to the French raised Muslims (71 percent compared to 19 percent; see TeO 2008). At the same time, a higher proportion of French-raised Muslims with Arabic as reference language report attending Arabic language courses in France (35 percent compared to 8 percent among the first-generation; see TeO 2008). What remains unknown is whether higher rate of fluency in Arabic among the

first-generation indicates knowledge of standard Arabic language (or Quranic Arabic) and whether the courses in Arabic language teach Quranic Arabic or one of the Arabic dialects.

Scholars like Olivier Roy (2004) have talked about the increasing use of internet as a source of Islamic knowledge among the younger generation, especially in the case of French-born Muslims. What quantitative evidence do we have about this difference? There is a significant difference in both the generations in terms of sources they prefer to get knowledge about Islam. When asked to indicate "which [authority] you trust the most to offer you guidance as a Muslim," French-born Muslims showed a higher preference for a "local Imam or Sheikh" who is based in France (31 percent compared to 21 percent among foreign-born) but at the same time, they also showed a higher preference for knowledge derived from "Imams and institutions outside your country (such as al-Azhar or the Saudi Imams of Mecca and Medina)" (38 percent compared to 26 percent; see Pew 2006).[19] We do not know what proportion of those who consult authorities outside of France consult with those who are based in their country of origin. We also do not know if the choice of the source is based on shared ethnicity of the imams (like Arab or Sub-Saharan African, for example).

Religious associations are also indicated as important source of Islamic knowledge for French-raised Muslims (Nielsen 2016:13–14), yet we see that both generations of Muslims show negligible participation in religious associations (about 2 percent in both generational groups; TeO 2008).

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[19] The choices offered by the survey question included "Local imam or sheikh," "national religious leaders," "religious leaders on television," and "imams and institutions outside" of France. "None of the above" was a voluntary category.

Table 3.3: Differences is religiosity between foreign-born and French-born Muslims (using IFOP 2019).

<p align="center">IFOP (2019) survey containing data on 540 foreign-born and 472 French-born Muslims</p>

Variable	Foreign-born	French-born	Difference	Sample size
1 Do you usually go to the mosque on Fridays?				1012
Yes	0.45	0.30	0.15***	
2 During the last Ramadan, did you…?				1012
fast during entirety	0.72	0.60	0.12**	
fast some days	0.09	0.14	-0.05	
not fasted	0.19	0.25	-0.06	
3 Do you sometimes drink alcohol?				1012
Yes	0.20	0.23	-0.03	
4 The frequency at which you buy halal meat				1012
systematically	0.55	0.58	-0.03***	
most of the time	0.17	0.12	0.05	
time to time	0.13	0.12	0.01	
rarely	0.06	0.05	0.01	
never	0.07	0.09	-0.02	
doesn't buy meat	0.02	0.03	-0.01	
5 When you buy food items, do you look at the composition of it to assure that it does not contain non halal ingredients like gelatin, alcohol, or pork?				1012
systematically	0.47	0.5	-0.03	
most of the time	0.19	0.17	0.02	
time to time	0.11	0.13	-0.02	
rarely	0.06	0.06	0	
never	0.17	0.14	0.03	
6 Outside of the meat, do you buy…? (multiple options possible; proportion represents those who said "yes")				1012
Oriental or traditional Maghrebi food items	0.68	0.7	-0.02	
Desserts, chocolates, sweets that are halal	0.58	0.55	0.03	
Pre-cooked meals (fresh, conserved, frozen) that are halal	0.52	0.42	0.1***	

Note: The significance for difference between religiosity outcomes for first-generation and that of French-born Muslims is indicated as follows: *** indicated $p < 0.01$; ** indicated $p < 0.05$, and * indicated $p < 0.1$.

IFOP (2019) survey containing data on 540 foreign-born and 472 French-born Muslims

	Variable	Foreign-born	French-born	Difference	Sample size
7	Do you wear the veil, whether it's the hijab or the niqab? (frequency of wearing of veil)				1012
	yes, always	0.24	0.14	0.1***	
	yes, except at work	0.03	0.07	-0.04	
	yes, but rarely	0.1	0.05	0.05	
	no, but used to before	0.12	0.08	0.04	
	no, and have never worn	0.51	0.65	-0.14	
8	Would you say that the law banning "integral veil" (niqab) on the streets and in other public spaces is…?				1012
	mostly a good thing	0.32	0.31	0.01*	
	mostly a bad thing	0.56	0.62	-0.06	
9	Which of the two options do you feel closest to?				1012
	The practice of Islam must be adapted and fitted on certain points to be in conformity with French secularism	0.43	0.39	0.04	
	The French secularism must be adapted and fitted on certain points to be compatible with the practice of Islam	0.35	0.38	-0.03	
	none of the two	0.2	0.19	0.01	
10	Here is a list of sentences. For each of them, can you tell me if you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree (related to adherence to various statements on political, economic and societal issues; proportion represents those who "agreed")				1012
	Secularism allows Muslims to freely practice their religion	0.76	0.64	0.12***	
	The homosexuals should be free to live their life as they wish	0.62	0.73	-0.11***	
	In France, Islamic law, sharia, should prevail over the laws of the Republic	0.36	0.18	0.18***	
11	I am going to read you a list of affirmations. For each of them, can you tell me if you agree? (related to adherence to various claims about Islam in France; proportion represents those who "agreed")				1012
	Children should be able to eat halal in school canteens	0.82	0.82	0	
	Girls should have the right to wear the veil in middle and high school	0.68	0.69	-0.01	
	We should be able to assert our religious identity at work	0.56	0.52	0.04	
	The employer must adapt to the religious obligations of their employees	0.51	0.46	0.05	

Note: The significance for difference between religiosity outcomes for first-generation and that of French-born Muslims is indicated as follows: *** indicated $p < 0.01$; ** indicated $p < 0.05$, and * indicated $p < 0.1$.

3.4 Islam and gender

Integration into the French society would imply adoption of values about gender equality over immigrant generation. On the other hand, popular discourse, especially around wearing of hijab among French-raised Muslims, describes the Muslims in France as "radicalizing" and potentially undergoing a "regression" in terms of freedom for women (Marine Le Pen's words).[20] The idea that is put forward in these discourses is that Muslims overall want to maintain "traditional" gender roles rather than adopt French ideas of gender roles (assumed to be more egalitarian). Yet, we see that a higher proportion of French-born Muslims find that the "quality of life for Muslim women in France is better than the quality of life for women in most Muslim countries" (68 percent compared to 57 percent among foreign-born Muslims) (Pew 2006).

In addition, a significantly higher proportion of French-born Muslims agree that "the homosexuals should be free to live their life as they wish" (73 percent compared to 62 percent among foreign-born Muslims) (IFOP 2019).

There is no generational difference in response to whether those interviewed are worried or not about "Muslim women in France taking on modern roles in society" (Pew 2006). In both groups, around half are "worried" and the other half are "not worried."

3.5 Dividing the sacred from the profane

Pew (2006) asked Muslims in France: "Do you think there is a natural conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society, or don't you think so?" The popular discourse (where more French-raised Muslims are described as radicalizing than the first-generation)

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[20] Duchemin, Remi. 2019. "Marine Le Pen : "Le voile n'est pas un bout de tissu anodin, c'est un marqueur de radicalité"" *Europe1*. https://www.europe1.fr/politique/marine-le-pen-le-voile-nest-pas-un-bout-de-tissu-anodin-cest-un-marqueur-de-radicalite-3925985 (last accessed on 9 February 2020).

would dictate that more French-raised Muslims agree to the existence of the conflict. Rather, we find that a majority of Muslims disagree and that a significantly higher proportion of French-born Muslims than foreign-born Muslims disagree (79 percent compared to 65 percent) (Pew 2006).

Many Muslims and non-Muslims in France attribute the so-called increase in radicalization among the "youth" to media influence. We see a significant difference between the two generations in response to whether individuals are worried about the "influence of music, movies, and television on Muslim youth in France" – a higher proportion of foreign-born are worried compared to the French-born (around half of the formed compared to about a third of the latter group) (Pew 2006).

Pew (2006) asked Muslims three questions than can be used to see if there is a rise of fundamentalism and radicalized behavior. We see no significant differences between the two generations in responses to these questions. A majority of the Muslims *do not* think that "suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies" (between 80-90 percent). A majority of the Muslims also identify with "moderate Islam" compared to "Islamic fundamentalism" (around 90 percent).

Demand for bringing "Sharia" (or Islamic law) to France is also seen as a sign of radicalization. A majority do not want Sharia to "prevail over the laws of the Republic." A significantly lower proportion of French-born Muslims want Sharia compared to foreign-born Muslims (18 percent compared to 36 percent) (IFOP 2019).

3.6 Claiming Islamic identity

Popular discourse has presented French-born Muslims as placing higher importance on Islam as an identity compared to first-generation immigrants. One discourse that has been proposed is that French-born Muslims ask for more accommodations of their religious practices compared to the foreign-born Muslims. IFOP (2019) survey asked a set of opinion questions to measure opinions on religious accommodations at school, at work, and in the French society overall.

While a majority of Muslims agree about desirability of making religious accommodations at schools (allowing wearing of headscarf, and provision of halal food in school canteens), there is no significant generational gap (IFOP 2019). Around half of the Muslims in both generational groups agree to accommodations at workplace (agreement with "We should be able to assert our religious identity" and "The employer must adapt to the religious obligations of their employees"). These work-related accommodations form a part of highly-publicized debates in France, especially on topics like allowing wearing of headscarves, having prayer spaces, and accommodating work hours during Ramadan. Yet, there is no significant generational difference in opinions about these accommodations.

A slightly higher proportion of French-raised Muslims think that "the law banning the 'integral veil' (niqab) on the streets and in other public spaces" is "mostly a bad thing" (62 percent compared with 56 percent). The differences are not very significant (IFOP 2019).

In France, Islam gets talked about in contrast to secularism in the media as well as in the public discourse. Two questions related to secularism in France were asked in the IFOP survey. One question related to accommodations in France asks whether "French secularism must be adapted and fitted on certain points to be compatible with the practice of Islam" or vice versa. No clear trend emerges from the responses, and we observe no generational differences. Yet, in the

question that asks opinion on whether "secularism allows Muslims to freely practice their religion," a significantly higher proportion of foreign-born Muslims agree that it does allow this freedom (76 percent compared to 64 percent among French-born) (IFOP 2019).

In addition, choosing the site of burial is also a question that links religion and desires for accommodation in France. Overall, around half of the Muslim population in France wishes to be buried outside of France (the survey does not specify whether they want to be buried in the country of origin or elsewhere; see TeO 2008). A significantly higher proportion of foreign-born Muslims wish to be buried in France compared to French-born Muslims (57 percent compared to 45 percent; see TeO 2008).

In sum, these surveys find no consistent evidence of generational differences among Muslims in France. On many survey items, immigrant and French-born Muslims are indistinguishable; on some items, immigrants appear to be more religious than Muslims born in France, while on others they appear to be less religious.

Section 4: Qualitative Evidence of Religious Generational Gap from the Field

What accounts for the contrast between qualitative studies, which emphasize religious generational difference, and quantitative studies that find little generational difference?

This section identifies five key themes that emerge in conversations with Muslims in France on the religious generational gap. These themes are linked to a set of observable outcomes that indicate differences in religiosity between the two immigrant generational groups. Among those interviewed are individuals who are either practicing Muslims or 'cultural' Muslims.[21] I conducted a total of 25 semi-structured interviews with Muslims in the Greater Paris region over a total of six months (May-July 2018 and February-April 2019).[22]

Among the 25 individuals I interviewed, 15 are women and 10 are men; 13 are first-generation immigrants and 12 are French-raised descendants of immigrants (8 are second-generation and 4 are third-generation).[23] The average age of my interviewees at the time of the interview was around 40 years. French-raised Muslims I interviewed were younger on average (around 34 years of age) than the first-generation immigrants I interviewed (around 45 years of age). My

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[21] In order to have a more nuanced picture of narratives of religious generational gap, I interviewed individuals who identify as Muslims (those who believe in and practice their religion) as well as those who are 'cultural' Muslims in the sense that they were exposed to Islam in their childhood through family but who do not identify as Muslims. I refer to them all, as a group, as 'Muslims' in the context of this paper.

[22] See Appendix A for the questionnaire.

[23] Of the 8 second-generation immigrants, two of my interviewees arrived in France at age three and one arrived at age seven. They are included in the sample of second-generation immigrants because they went to school in France and underwent a religious socialization similar to other French-born Muslims.

interviewees varied in terms of demographic characteristics like country of origin, socio-economic class, level of education, and occupation at the time of the interview.

The Greater Paris region was chosen because it has the highest proportion of Muslims in France; about 40 percent of the total immigrant-origin Muslim population in France lives in this region.[24] Individuals were contacted through religious associations or made acquaintance with at mosques or immigrant-majority spaces where I also collected observation data. Given that I relied on snowball sampling for a part of the sample, the final set of cases should not be considered random or statistically representative. In addition to the interviews, observations at mosques and immigrant-majority spaces allowed me to witness discussions that brought to light the popularity of conversations on religious generational gap.[25]

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[24] This is based on the analysis of TeO (2008) survey data – around 41% of first-generation Muslims and 36% of French-born Muslims of ages 18-50 years lived in the Greater Paris area in 2008.

[25] Given that these conversations were not recorded (in the light of the impromptu nature of many events that I would stumble upon), the quotes gathered from these conversations as well as from interviews not recoded on audio-recorder do not represent the exact wordings of my interlocutors. I traded exactness of words for access to spontaneous events; these events have significantly added to the data available for this project.

Figure 5: A store catering to local Sub-Saharan African origin Muslims in Goutte d'Or area in northern part of Paris.

A majority of Muslims of immigrant origin with whom I interacted during my fieldwork agreed that a general religious generational gap exists between first-generation immigrants and French-raised Muslims.[26] French-raised Muslims commented on the gulf between their religiosity and that of first-generation immigrants (especially first-generation parents). At the same time, first-generation immigrants felt that there was a significant difference between their own religiosity and that of those belonging to the generation of their children or grandchildren. Many of them

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[26] Two interviewees, whose cases are not examined here, did not agree that there was a difference between religiosity of first-generation and French-raised Muslims. They include Karim and Hilal, both first-generation of Tunisian origin. I believe that two factors may be contributing to their opinion: first, that they had both arrived in France very recently, and second, that they did not have family or children in France in order to experience the kind of tensions that my other interlocutors mentioned when talking about generational gap.

cited examples from their own families, talking about the relation they have with their parents and/or children and sharing details about their own religiosity in comparison to that of members of the other generational group. Many brought up religious generational differences without me prompting them.

When asked about differences in religiosity, my interviewees understood the term in different ways, including religious practices, religious belief (especially the authenticity of it), religious identity, as well as values derived from religion. The vagueness of the term "religiosity" might explain the results of a survey question in IFOP (2019) that asked Muslim women and men of age 50 years and above if they thought that the religiosity of the younger generation was different from their religiosity (and which I referred to in the introduction).[27] As I show below, my interviewees indicated that different aspects of religiosity show different trends in both generations. I observed five themes across my interviewees' observations about generational difference in religiosity:

1. Choice versus inheritance of Islam

2. Islamic epistemologies

3. Religious attitudes towards gender and ethnic differences

4. Dividing the sacred from the profane

5. Claiming Islamic identity

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[27] Muslim women and men of age 50 years and above were asked if they would "say that in your family, your entourage or your neighborhood, the young Muslims you know are today more religious, less religious or neither more nor less religious than your generation was at the same age?" Around half of them agreed that there was a religious gap, 40 percent said that there was no difference, and around 9 percent did not respond. Of those who agreed, 55 percent said that the younger generation was "more religious" and 45 percent said that the younger generation was "less religious."

<u>4.1 Choice versus inheritance of Islam</u>

When asked about how they came to wear religious clothing or started to pray, many of my French-raised Muslim interviewees described to me their relationship with Islam; they stressed that they had come to Muslim faith and related practices out of their own "choice" during adolescence. Many contrasted this with the process through which their first-generation parents had become Muslim – they talked about religion among first-generation immigrants being "inherited" from their family members back in the country of origin.

When talking about her religious trajectory, Fareeda (second-generation of Pakistani origins) said:

> "I am the only one in my family who wears [a hijab]. My father did not want me to wear it…I wore it against his advice…I am a typical example [of someone belonging to second generation who wears a hijab]. I was never forced by my father to wear the hijab, nor by my mother or my brothers. My sisters don't wear it, my mother doesn't wear it at all."

French-raised Muslims contrasted their choice to wear religious clothing with religious clothing of first-generation Muslims that was described as "inherited," "traditional and not religious," or "forced." Asma (third-generation of Moroccan origin) contrasted her "choice" of wearing a hijab during adolescence with the hijab that her mother and women in her maternal family wear:

> "In my family the hijab is more tradition than religion. We cover hair because of the tradition more than religion. Because in the Berber tradition, you don't show your hair to men. They do this because in Morocco the women worked outside in the farms. [This] tradition was there before religion. Because people, they don't read, they don't write, they don't go to school, [so] they know more tradition than religion. That is why they confuse between them!"

Sophie (third-generation of Algerian origins), who does not practice Islam but is "sensitive" to it, told me that she was "against everything that is forced," and that for her, "the women who wear headscarf here [in France] and the women in Saudi Arabia [who wear headscarf] have no link between them." The difference between them, she said, was French Muslim women's freedom to choose to wear the headscarf.

French-born interviewees also noted generational differences in the style of religious clothing, which they attributed to their freedom to choose. French-raised hijabi women expressed pride in their "chosen" clothing styles and in the variety of styles from which they could choose, as opposed to the "inherited" styles of first-generation women.

While French-raised Muslims believe in the importance of "choice" in relation to religious belief and practices, first-generation Muslims did not agree. For example, Sami (first-generation of Algerian origin) rejected this idea of "choice":

> "The young folks, they say stupid things. I do not believe when they say, 'Oh I am not a Muslim.' When one is born a Muslim, one stays a Muslim. One might [deviate from religious norms like] drink alcohol, go out with women [outside of marriage], or not wear a headscarf. But we stay Muslim."

While many French-raised women proudly talked about their "chosen" hijab and its "chosen" style, many first-generation and some French-raised Muslims commented that this "chosen" hijab was not in compliance with the more "modest and traditional" method of wearing hijab. Overall, there was a difference in what the first generation considered clothing that was modest and compliant with religious prescriptions, and that considered modest by French-raised Muslims.

At a Friday afternoon women's Quran reading class that I attended at the Sociocultural Institute mosque in north of Paris, our teacher Aïcha, a second-generation woman of North African origin, commented on the lack of modesty in the clothes that younger generation hijabi women chose to wear (from fieldnotes, April 2019). She talked about the importance of wearing one's hijab loose and one's blouse and skirt loose, not tight, so that it "hides all the shapes." The mostly first-generation crowd in the class giggled over the conversation, with many making jokes about the "bling-bling hijabs" they had seen among the younger generation that didn't entirely cover the women's face and neck (to their satisfaction), or the "tight dresses" they saw among younger hijabi women. All these they considered "haram" or not religiously permissible.

Many of my first-generation interviewees commented that the younger generation's choices of clothing were a result of their "bad comprehension" of Islam, which meant that "appearances" were given more importance rather than "good behavior" (*bon comportement*) towards others in the Muslim community (Cheikh Hamza and Houda). Many mentioned that the French-raised Muslims had "too much freedom without the supervision of first-generation parents" who were sometimes working multiple jobs to provide for their families (Hakim, first-generation of Algerian origin) and that they were becoming corrupt (Fatima, first-generation of Moroccan origin). Hakim had chosen to not bring his family to France because of the overwhelming presence of "delinquency" like "high consumption of drugs and alcohol" among French-raised children of his first-generation Muslim colleagues. In France, he was "scared that my children would lose their faith (*iman*)."

Others, like Fedi (first-generation of Algerian origin), reclaimed the "inherited" aspect of their religiosity and described it as what made religiosity of first-generation Muslims as well as those in the country of origin more "authentic." Fedi was proud of the genealogy through which he had

inherited his affiliation to Islam (that was rooted in his village in Algeria) and contrasted it with the "lack of" religious learning environment like the kind that French-raised Muslims had experienced. He saw Islam of his parents and grandparents in Algeria as being "solid" compared to his own as well as compared to what he saw among the French-raised Muslims of his age. He talked about how his great-grandfather had been a chief of a local Muslim brotherhood (*mazawiya*) and spoke with nostalgia about the "inherited" ways of learning and teaching Islam that existed in his family and in his community back in Algeria and which were passed on from one generation to another. He concluded: "our generation of Facebook, of social media, of Star Academy, of globalization, of torn jeans, I don't think [that we have a solid religion]."

4.2 Islamic epistemologies

Houda (first-generation of Moroccan origin) and I met at the Grand Mosque in Paris, a space dominated by others of first-generation like her. Houda was working part-time as a teacher in primary school when I met her; her work arrangement allowed her to be present at the mosque for the Friday afternoon prayers.

Houda didn't wear a hijab outside of the mosque. Dressed modestly in a loose long shirt and pants, she told me about the differences between the Islamic knowledge that she acquired in Morocco and that acquired by French-raised Muslims:

> "The Islam that the Muslims born here in France, [the Islam] they know, it isn't at all what we learnt back in our home in Morocco. I see these young French women who wear headscarves and I ask them, 'What do you know about Islam?' The true Islam, it's in the behavior."

A number of my interviewees (like Houda) suggested that Islamic epistemologies differed across the generations.

Salah (first-generation of Algerian origin), like many first-generation Muslims I met, was very doubtful of the general direction that religiosity among the French-raised Muslims was taking. Referring to the "rise in radicalization" among the younger generational group, he said:

> "For the first time in the Muslim history, after the death of the Prophet, we have the liberty of expression. True liberty! We can talk, discuss, criticize. But the youth here, they believe that the era of the Umayyads [and] the Abbasids was the golden era of Islam. But in that era, they killed for nothing. In France, they don't kill for nothing…There is nothing in the Quran that tells you not to doubt - on the contrary. But instead of reading Quran and thinking, these young folks have made Saudi Arabia their Islam. Everything that folks in Saudi Arabia do must be true Islam."

Like Salah, many first-generation Muslims mentioned that the French-raised Muslims "falsely" considered Saudi Arabia to be the location of authority on Islam. They mentioned that French-raised Muslims took Islam and its interpretation coming from Saudi Arabia, especially Wahhabism and Salafism, as authentic.

Cheikh Hamza (first-generation of Tunisian origin), who worked as an imam at multiple mosques in the north-eastern suburbs of Paris at the time of the interview, said that the "youth" attribute the sacredness of the Kaaba, the holy site located in Saudi Arabia, to the entirety of Saudi Arabia:

> "The Salafist trend comes from Saudi Arabia. One believes that what comes from there is extraordinary. One believes that everything is sacred. One mixes up the place and that which is sacred. The Kaaba and the mosque, from the time of the Prophet, they are sacred. All this is sacred, no problem! But we find a bit of mixing between the sense of sacredness, and the interpretation and the manner of religious practice. That's it! I see that everyone has fallen into

the same track. They think that whatever they believed over there it's extraordinary. But that is false!"

For Houda (mentioned earlier), the site of authentic knowledge on Islam was located in her country of origin (also indicated by Nada and Fedi). At the same time, the French-raised Muslims did not agree that the location of "authentic" Islam was either in the country of origin or in Saudi Arabia. For them, their own understanding of Islam had developed in the context of France (a point that I explore in section 4.5). In addition, according to them, French values and Islamic values were both "universal" and based on the "Cartesian ideas of rationality" (Camille and Yassine) and required educating oneself in both secular and religious texts.

For example, in the words of Fareeda (second generation of Pakistani origin):

> "I am very glad that I was born in France, of having emancipated, of having studied, of the possibilities [I had] to discover other cultures, of the possibility to find the core of religion and realize that the tradition is very wrong. Because when we were young, we learnt [these traditions]. For example, my sister has a lot of negative stereotypes about Muslim religion because my parents inculcated an education that was rather traditional than religious."

Fareeda added that it is in France that she has had the opportunity to read and learn from the Quran, which she considers as containing the essence of Islam. If she had grown up in Pakistan, like her mother, she would not have had the "freedom" to undertake her study in Islam. She told me about the gender-mixed "Islamic science" classes that she enjoyed, an opportunity that exists for her because of her location in France (a similar point was also made by Camille).

French-raised Muslims contrasted their sources of Islamic knowledge with that of the first-generation Muslims. Many of them reported attending a private institute or a mosque for classes on Islam (this included, among others, Camille, Souleymane, and Asma).

French-raised Muslims considered knowledge of Quranic Arabic important in order to understand the Quran, their preferred source of Islamic knowledge. Many commented how first-generation immigrants had grown up memorizing Quranic verses in their home country, without knowing its meaning.[28] Hence, many first-generation Muslims speak a local Arabic dialect. Lina (third-generation of Algerian origin) commented on the knowledge of Quranic Arabic of her first-generation grandparents:

> "For them it's like a tradition. You know, they don't know how to read or to write Arabic. They have never read the Quran. They have learned it. They have learned the verses (*sourate*) while the people were telling them. So for them it is more cultural because they have never read [the Quran]. They don't know how to read or write Arabic, but they know [the verses] by heart because, since they are young, they are [exposed to] religion."

Lina was proud of the fact that she, unlike her grandparents, could read and understand Quranic Arabic, in addition to being fluent in French and the Algerian Arabic dialect. She took classes in Arabic language while in university. For Lina and for other French-raised respondents, France was a better source of Islamic education than the Muslim-majority countries of her grandparents.

Asma told me about her first-generation mother who had grown up in south of Morocco without any knowledge of Arabic. Inspired by the fluency in Arabic and knowledge of Quran held by both Asma and her second-generation Muslim father, Asma's mother had recently started to attend classes at the local mosque and study Quran through sources popular among French-raised

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[28] Quranic Arabic is different from Arabic spoken in many parts of the Middle East, especially in North Africa where local Arabic dialects mix French as well as Amazigh languages.

Muslims. Asma mentioned: "My mom doesn't know Arabic…She [instead] watches an imam on YouTube explain Arabic verses (*sourates*) in Amazigh [language] instead."

In addition to courses on Islam and Quranic Arabic, knowledge on Islam acquired via internet is popular among French-raised Muslims. Many sought knowledge on Islam from the "learned" (*savants*) online in addition to the imams in their local mosques. Some of them suggested that I watch sermons of imams they liked online when I asked them questions about their religiosity.[29]

Farid (second-generation of Algerian origin) who was a part of the Muslim Brotherhood and who identified as "ex-Islamist" at the time of the interview said that he had experienced first-hand the implications of these differences in sources of Islamic knowledge. Like many French-raised Muslims, he began to look for Islamic knowledge away from his first-generation family, rejecting the knowledge of religion that came from his family. He said that he stopped singing and listening to music, and sharing humor like other members of his family.

Farid attributed the failure of organizations like UOIF (Union of Islamic Organizations in France; known as *Muslims of France* today) to generational differences. He said that this "organization of the old" has no presence on the internet, and therefore had no influence on the Islam of the younger generation.

First-generation Muslims agreed that they had learnt about Islam in their family in their country of origin and felt that the French-raised Muslims were rejecting their "traditional" knowledge of Islam. For example, at a meeting related to a religious association I volunteered for, Rim (first-generation of Moroccan origin) said:

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[29] Suggestions to watch sermons by Zakir Naik and Tariq Ramadan were made frequently.

"It is sad when the folks they say that we should throw away the traditions, the traditions that come usually from the parents, from the country of origin of the parents. It is maybe because I come from Morocco, that I grew up in Morocco, that I appreciate the importance of traditions in the religion."

Yasmine (second-generation of Algerian origin) told me that she frequently saw tensions arising in the families because of this difference in sources of Islamic knowledge:

"The parents are on a traditional application [of religion], because of [their] culture, in the sense that they do what they saw their parents doing. And the youth want to return to the text, to the source…Because this older generation did not have access to reading material, there is a form of distrust towards them [among those of the younger generation]."

4.3 Religious attitudes towards gender and ethnic differences

When Asma (French-born, of Moroccan origin) was admitted to attend a prestigious French school outside of Paris, her first-generation mother was not happy. Her mother commented on Asma's ambitions for higher education by saying that Asma was "a woman only in body, [but] a man in head." According to Asma, this was because her mother was "conservative" and not "open-minded", unlike her second-generation father who did not have the same ideas about ideal roles for Muslim women as her mother had.

Like many of my French-born respondents, Asma recounted stories of differences in attitudes towards gender and ethnic differences that she encountered in her relations with first-generation immigrants. She recounted to me stories of how her father, who was born in France, would play football with her along with a group of boys while her mother, who was born in Morocco, was against any form of "mixing of boys and girls." She attributed this to the "traditional" ideas of

the first-generation population overall, because, according to her, they "mixed" religion with the culture of the country of origin.

Fareeda (second-generation of Pakistani origin) told me that in Islam, there is a fundamental equality between all Muslims, irrespective of their gender or ethnicity (a point that was also made by Asma): "In no instance does my religion oppress me or my status as a woman, on the contrary." When it came to practices like pre-marriage virginity tests for women, French-raised Muslim women said that first-generation immigrants "confused religion and tradition" (Asma).

Some of my first-generation respondents accepted this critique. In the words of Safa (first-generation of Tunisian origin):

> "Families use religion to control their children, because they fear that they would give up everything that is important to their parents. So a lot of them say that the patriarchal hierarchy in the family is religious, in order to gain legitimacy, [in order to have] their power and control [over] the children."

In addition to gender attitudes, attitudes related to Muslims of other ethnic groups varied over immigrant-generation. Several French-raised Muslims commented about the "amalgamation" that their first-generation parents (like other first-generation Muslims) made between religion and ethnicity.

Nesrine (second-generation of Algerian origin) advised both Hadia (also second-generation of Algerian origin) and me: "Never listen to parents! Listen to Allah!" We were in the Grand Mosque of Paris one afternoon while she told us how her first-generation parents were not accepting of her marriage with a man of Togolese origin who has converted to Islam because, for them, "Islam demanded marriage with a man of the same ethnicity" (field notes, 15 March

2019). She repeated many times how the Quran demands that Muslim women marry pious Muslim men irrespective of their ethnic background.

A similar comment was also made by Fareeda (second generation of Pakistani origin) who said that her parents would have wanted her to marry a Muslim who is from the same region in Pakistan as her parents. But Fareeda had decided that she would marry any Muslim man of her liking, irrespective of ethnicity.

French-raised Muslims indicated that first-generation Muslims conflated ethnic-affiliation (usually Arab) with religious-affiliation. Sophie (third-generation of Algerian and Tunisian origin), whose first-generation grandparents were practicing Muslims but who did not identify herself as a Muslim, told me that many in her ethnic community had difficulty in accepting her Arab identity:

> "On one hand I have a Maghrebi family and on the other hand I am called Sophie [a French name]. But the Arabs [of first-generation] do not understand [my Arab identity] because I am not religious. They tell me, 'You are not an Arab because you eat pork.'"

Sophie told me that first-generation Muslims of Arab origin did not understand that being Arab did not always mean being Muslim and that "there are also Arabs of Jewish or Christian faith."

A similar equating of affiliation to Islam and Arabness also took place in the mosques. Many of my French-raised interviewees complained about the first-generation imams in mosques who, in many cases, only spoke Arabic. For example, Camille (second-generation of Algerian origin) told me that during her recent visit to a Parisian mosque to hear the Friday sermon, the imam spoke mostly in Arabic and little French. Camille was sad that many first-generation women with sub-Saharan origins couldn't understand the sermon. Souleymane (second-generation of

Senegalese origin) shared his experience of feeling discriminated, as someone of Sub-Saharan African origin, in a local mosque committee where he volunteered. Most mosques in France, he mentioned, were run by first-generation Muslims who wished to maintain ethnic majorities in their mosques.

Most mosques in France have a dominant ethnic group; the language of the sermon, and the provenance of the imam depends on which ethnic group dominates. These mosques are largely run by and frequented by first-generation Muslims, according to my interviewees as well as my observation.

Farid (second-generation of Algerian origin) indicated that mosques were built by the first-generation and are run by them even today (this was also noted by Souleymane). When the mosques were built, he said, they were meant for migrant Muslims who would remain temporarily in France; this meant that sermons took place in Arabic (and do so even today) in most of the mosques across France.

In addition, French-raised Muslims (especially women) indicated that they prefer to have religious places that allow for mixing of genders as well as for women to take up leadership positions in leading prayers. Camille gave me the example of some mosques in the United States that she had visited and liked because of the possibility of diverse genders and ethnicities to congregate in the same space to talk about religion and spirituality. Safa (first-generation of Tunisian origin) also indicated that the "ugliness of women's prayer spaces without any sunlight," prayers in Arabic, as well as "domination of first-generation women, especially of Algerian descent" at the Grand mosque of Paris was driving away the younger generation.

The popularity of associations that organize Islamic gatherings open to all genders and ethnicities, as well as the popularity of social media groups that bring French-raised Muslims of mixed ethnicities and genders to organize alternative spiritual activities, reinforces respondents' suggestion that the younger generation associates religious activities with gender and ethnic mixing, unlike first-generation immigrants.[30]

4.4 Dividing the sacred from the profane

In a post-performance discussion of the play "*Lettres à Nour*" (Letters to Nour) which I attended, Farid (second generation of Algerian origin) mentioned that he was troubled by the conversations among Muslims of younger generation which he saw as being "too much religion but not enough of God." He talked about the "obsession" of the French-raised young Muslims to place things in a "binary relation" (*rapport binaire*) (fieldnotes, April 2019).[31] He gave the example of the use of two binary divisions popular among this younger population – "the *Ummah* against the West" and "haram versus halal." My first-generation interviewees like Houda and Salah added "believers versus unbelievers (*kafir*)" to the list while Yasmine (second generation) mentioned the use of "believing only versus practicing Muslim" as a binary among French-raised Muslims.

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[30] Two popular social media groups among French-raised Muslims are "Iftar Networking" and "Muslim Initiatives" on Facebook. See https://www.facebook.com/groups/Iftar.Networking/ and https://www.facebook.com/groups/1893897954260075/. One devoted member of these groups started "Salatsurfing" recently. It is an app based on the idea of Couchsurfing and allows Muslims to find local Muslims to pray together, many times in homes or other private spaces. See https://www.facebook.com/salatsurfing/ (last accessed on 20 January 2020)

[31] Farid Abdelkrim's play "Letters to Nour" is aimed to combat radicalization among the youth. He stages it around France for middle- and high school students. The one I attended was staged for high-school students in a norther suburb of Paris. I had the occasion to interview him after the play.

Many of my interviewees commented on the recurrent use of "binaries" by French-raised

Muslims. Yasmine (second generation of Algerian origin) said:

> "The new generation that is young wants to return to the sources and demonstrate to these older
>
> folks their ignorance [related to Islam]. Sometimes it is said in a [socially] violent manner. For
>
> example, they keep saying - this is *bid'ah*, this is *bid'ah*, that is *bid'ah* (heresy)."

Bid'ah (heresy) is used as a close equivalent to "haram" in conversations among French-raised

Muslims noted by my interlocutors. In its everyday usage, "haram" refers to that which is not

religiously permissible while "halal" refers to that which is permissible. Among Muslims I spoke

with, it was used (in most cases) either in reference to dietary restrictions (pork and alcohol

consumption are considered haram) or to refer to acts that are considered haram (like stealing or

pre-marital sex).

My interviewees noted higher importance placed on the consumption of "halal" food among

French-raised Muslims. Camille, a second-generation Muslim of Algerian origin, mentioned that

her French-born cousins are obsessed with haram-halal binary to an extent that "if you don't eat

halal and you are Arab, they would start making fun of you (in a harassing manner)."

For Cheikh Hamza (first-generation of Tunisian origin), the use of binaries among French-raised

Muslims "has become a trend, a label, to catalog other people…and to judge other folks." He

commented on the equivalence made between "West, *kafir*, and enemies" among the younger

generation of Muslims, and tried to deconstruct this in the Islamic science class that I attended

before the interview.[32]

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[32] Farid's play also raised similar points. I do not believe that Cheikh Hamza's class was framed in anticipation of my attendance given that he had agreed to be interviewed without knowing the exact topic of my research.

In addition to continuous use of binaries to "catalog" people, many of my interviewees commented that the French-raised Muslims have stricter ideas of what consists of haram and halal dietary practices and what consists as "correct" religious practices. The younger generation, according to my interviewees, also made a distinction between "believing only" Muslims (*croyant*) and Muslims who also practice (*praticant*). Among practicing Muslims, belief in God was assumed.

Figure 6: An "oriental" grocery store selling food products from the Levant and North Africa regions.

* All food products, including meats, sold in such stores are halal.

Yasmine (second-generation of Algerian origin) told me about an observation she had made at various Muslim gatherings. She had noted that during gathering among older generation folks, a

public call to prayer was made at the time of the prayer and everyone got up to pray even if they might not have otherwise prayed. But during the gatherings with younger generation Muslims, those who made the call to prayer would ask "who will do the prayers?" It was only those who "practiced" that would leave to pray.

That this division between "believing only" versus "practicing" did not exist among the first-generation Muslims is demonstrated in the case of Camille's (second-generation of Algerian origin) first-generation father of Algerian origin. Camille described her father's Ramadan practices as follows:

> "During Ramadan, my father won't drink alcohol, he won't have his *apero* [pre-meal drink and snack] before having his meal. He waits for the *adhan* [call to prayer, in this case indicating that the sun has set and the fast may be broken] before his *iftar* [fast-breaking evening] meal, [and] he really respects it. He fully lives Ramadan [with its rules] in a serious manner. He wakes himself up early to eat, it's just that he doesn't pray…So I asked him – Why do you do this? And he said it makes him feel better, he eats well but not too much, he thinks about those who have little [resources]. This man is a perfect Muslim, but not a Muslim. Bizarrely, father has always fasted for Ramadan. Because we are Algerians, and traditionally it is like this."

Camille's father consumed alcohol and pork meat outside of the month of Ramadan and does not believe in God, according to Camille. This lack of belief disqualified her father from being a Muslim in Camille's view.

First-generation Muslims, like Nada, contrasted their religiosity with that of French-born Muslims by calling it "not as constraining." Nada (first-generation of Algerian origin) described her and her family's religious practices as follows:

"I love my values and my traditions. They are the best…My Islam does not prevent me from living. We do the prayers. We don't do anything strange. We don't steal. We do our best! But [we are] not religious-religious [like the younger generation]."

In addition, Salima, a first-generation Moroccan student who I met at an Eid event in the summer of 2018 told me about her first-generation friends who ordered pork-based burgers for iftar (to break the fast) by mistake and ate them while having full knowledge that they were haram. She also told me stories of other first-generation Muslims who would say "Bismillah" and then drink alcohol.[33] That strict guidelines related to haram versus halal were not followed among first-generation Muslims was noted by several of my French-raised Muslim interlocutors and confessed by first-generation Muslims (like Sami and Salah).

Some of my first-generation interlocutors saw the use of binaries as a sign of "radicalization" among French-raised Muslims. Commenting on the use of believer-unbeliever binary, Houda (first-generation of Moroccan origin) said:

"Their [French-raised Muslims'] heads are empty and then they leave to join ISIS…But to kill is not Islam. They say 'Oh they are all unbelievers.' But it isn't for you to decide who is an unbeliever. It is for Allah to decide."

In contrast to this form of religiosity among French-raised Muslims, many first-generation Muslims described their religiosity as being "moderate" (Salah and Nada).

While some saw the use of binaries as a sign of radicalization, others saw it as a form of "identity crisis" and linked this "crisis" to "not fitting into either the French society or the society in the country of origin" (Yasmine). Camille described the use of haram-halal binary among her

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[33] It is a common practice among Muslims to say "Bismillah" (In the name of Allah) before starting a meal.

French-born cousins as being a "way of cultural overcompensation" linked to a lack of sense of belonging in either France or their country of origin.

4.5 Claiming Islamic identity

I met Cheikh Hamza (first-generation of Tunisian origin) at a mosque in a north-eastern suburb of Paris on a Saturday after the afternoon prayer. I attended the class on Islamic sciences that he gave every Saturday to French-raised Muslim students of all genders and ethnicities before the interview. Cheikh Hamza (first generation of Tunisian origin) was convinced that there is a wide gap between religiosity of first-generation Muslims and French-raised Muslims. One of the differences, for him, is that the Islam practiced by the French-raised Muslims was an Islam of "appearances":

> "Today, there has been a return to religion starting with the second generation and third generation. It is this that I have remarked, that they [French-raised Muslims] demonstrate a religious practice that is pretty special [and] which concentrates itself on appearances. Today [among the younger generation] it is the religious practices specifically that are based on appearance."

Like Cheikh Hamza, many first-generation immigrants I interviewed remarked about the rise of "identity Islam" (*Islam identitaire*) among the French-raised Muslims that gave importance to "appearance" or "labels" associated with Islam.

One manifestation of this "identity Islam" was that the French-raised Muslims talked "too much" about religion. Aziza (second-generation of Algerian and Tunisian origin), who identifies as an atheist, told me how she gets annoyed when the younger generation of Muslims bring up Islam. "One doesn't need to vomit all the time [about religion]," she told me. Moussa (first-generation of Libyan and Malian origin) also mentioned that "I do not scream all the time that I am Muslim"

especially since France is a "secular country," contrasting his behavior to other Muslims of the younger generation.

The idea that secularism in France entailed not speaking about Islam or demanding religious accommodations was present among many first-generation Muslims and contrasted with what they saw among French-raised Muslims. This came up especially in debates related to hijab.

Fedi, a first-generation of Algerian origin and a practicing Muslim, finds it "not logical" that Muslims wear religious clothing in France. When asked whether he wears any religious signs, Fedi said:

> "No, here in France, no! In Algeria, yes! In Algeria I wear special clothes to do the Friday prayers, but not here in France. Sometimes one should be intelligent. One should respect. In my country (*chez moi*), I do it, okay. But I am in a foreign country, in a secular country, I go to the mosque of the Islamic center and do my prayers, but without these [religious signs or clothing]....About those who wear religious signs, I see that it is not logical…well, this is a secular country, and secularism bans the wearing of religious signs in the public space, so one should not [wear them]."

Some of my interviewees interpreted the reclaiming of Islamic identity among French-raised Muslims as linked to "victimization" or "resistance" to Islamophobia. Sophie (third generation of Algerian and Tunisian origin) said that religion becomes a form of "provocation, a fashion, a sentiment of belonging" among French-raised Muslims against the "French-style anti-Islam" sentiments. On a similar note, Negar (first-generation of Iranian origin) said:

> "In France, this can be a form of reclamation of identity (*revendication identitaire*), like 'I differentiate myself from the others,' or to resist the dominant current [of Islamophobia]. [It is also] a form of victimization among certain Muslims."

A key difference between first-generation Muslims and French-raised Muslims is citizenship. This played a crucial role in differentiating the formation and manifestation of religious identity between the two generations. While first-generation Muslims were either not French citizens or had become naturalized French citizens, French-raised Muslims (in most cases) were French by birth.[34] This meant that French-raised Muslims were comfortable asking for religious accommodations and reclaiming Islamic identity in the public space, acts which many belonging to the first-generation saw as "not logical," "too loud," or "making too many identity claims."

Souleymane (second generation of Senegalese origin) described his Islamic identity as follows: "My Islam, I learned it here in France. And the constraints we face are related to being in France." He contrasted it with the Muslim identity of the first-generation:

> "Our parents considered themselves as foreign Muslims in a foreign country, so the relation with religion remains discrete. So the first generation didn't make a political project out of religion. At the residence halls for the migrants, they had a small room to do prayers, that's how it was! Later political Islam developed, because everyone was like 'oh you shouldn't have to pray alone in your house.' The second generation was like 'we are not foreigners, we are French.'…It is the second generations' claims that lead to confrontation with the secular French folks. For our parents it was more important that we go to public schools and become engineers rather than go to a Muslim school and do prayers on time."

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[34] Some of my first-generation Muslim interlocutors indicated that they were not French by citizenship; others talked about becoming naturalized citizens of France – a process that many described as humiliating. On the other hand, birth in France meant access to citizenship for French-born Muslims.

French-raised Muslims, like Asma (third generation of Moroccan origin), considered first-generation immigrants as the "silent generation" because of their reluctance to demand political rights related to religious accommodation:

"The first generation of immigrant people, they do not show their religion, their culture. They try to keep this in the home…For example, they don't have too many mosques in here [when they arrived in 1960s]…They don't show religion. They try to integrate in France. But our generation, they show more."

Lina (third generation of Algerian origin) told me a similar story about the generation of her grandparents:

"I think, because my grandparents, when they came to France, they didn't want to make people notice them and they didn't feel like at home, so they were not trying to catch the attention, you know, and their children, they are the ones who did this, you know, the March of the Beurs [a North African rights movement in the 1980s]. They were like, we are from here, we are French, we are born in France and raised here, we have rights, like any other citizens."

The difference in citizenship was also reflected in the institutionalization of Islam in France, according to my French-raised interviewees. For example, Farid (second-generation of Algerian origin) mentioned that the mosques and other religious organizations in France were set up by first-generation Muslims in order to maintain ties with the country of origin to which they hoped to return to at some point in their lives. Souleymane also raised a similar point, adding that the presence of Islam, for the first-generation, was supposed to remain "foreign" and "temporary," unlike for the French-raised Muslims – a matter that was reflected in the continued use of Arabic for sermons and reliance on imams brought to France from the countries of origin. This, together, meant that these organizations were not able to bring support of the French-raised Muslims. That

the first-generation imams in mosques only stuck to explanation of Quranic texts rather than talk about how to apply Quranic lessons in the French context was a popular complain among the French-raised Muslims I interacted with and they attributed this to the generational gap they felt with the first-generation immigrants.

Section 5: Conclusion and discussion

My goal in this paper is to contribute to the conceptualization of differences in religiosity between first-generation Muslim immigrants and their French-raised Muslim descendants. This paper takes discrepancy in the literature in evidence related to existence of religious generational gap as the starting point. I used a mixed methods approach to reflect on this discrepancy, i.e. I analyzed secondary quantitative survey data (where there is little evidence of a religious generational gap) and compared it primary qualitative case studies (where I higlighted the themes my interviewees used to talk about the existence of a religious generational gap).

I examined results from available quantitative surveys (i.e. Pew 2006, TeO 2008, IFOP 2019); I compared indicators of religiosity for first- (foreign-born) and second-generation (French-born) Muslims in France to see if we could find significant differences in religiosity between the two generational groups, especially in observables/outcomes mentioned in previous qualitative studies. I find that while quantitative survey data provided no generalizable evidence of the presence of religious generational gap, many among my interviewees as well as others I interacted with (as a part of collection of qualitative data) talked about the existence of religious generational gap (in many cases without me prompting them to). I used this primary qualitative data (interviews and observations) collected among Muslims of immigrant origin in France to shed light on aspects of religiosity where generational differences were identified by my interlocutors and which are not measured in available quantitative surveys.

The qualitative data allowed me to theorize five general themes around which Muslims agreed that religious generational gap exists:

1. Choice versus inheritance of Islam

2. Islamic epistemologies

3. Religious attitudes towards gender and ethnic differences

4. Dividing the sacred from the profane

5. Claiming Islamic identity

It is a truism that the differences that we see in religiosity between first-generation immigrants and their descendants are not solely due to immigrant-generational gap. Differences may exist because of differences in age (with first-generation immigrants as a group being overall older than second- or third-generation immigrants), period effects (for example, younger Muslims of all generations have some common religious identity traits because of a specific political experience they had that their older peers didn't), and cohort effects (for example, second-generation Muslims who did not experience the 2004 hijab ban in public schools may have a different religious identity than those who did).

In addition, the narratives of religious generational gap that I noted during my field research are heterogenous, can be internally contradictory, and use tropes from public discourse on Muslims (including tropes that portray Muslims negatively).[35] As shown in the conversations around religious generational gap, multiple themes can coexist at the same time and can be presented sometimes in contradictory terms during the same conversation. In addition, religion and

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[35] For example, one popular narrative among first-generation Muslims was that second- and third-generation Muslim "youth" were radicalizing. This is similar to the popular discourse in the French media that Muslim youth overall are undergoing high rates of radicalization.

religiosity are not the sole references for identity-making among Muslims in France. Immigrant-generational differences related to citizenship and belonging, education, and socio-economic status are also present among Muslims in France (as well as elsewhere in Europe).

At the same time, many of my interlocutors agreed that immigrant generation remains a salient category along which differences in religiosity and religious identity are found. For example, Camille (second-generation of Algerian origin) mentioned during the interview that she was quite surprised when she figured that folks of second-generation who have the same age as her parents have similar religiosity and religious identity as she has, given similarities in immigration trajectories. Many of the French-raised Muslims felt affinity with others of their immigrant generation, especially in terms of how they understood and practiced religion.

Third-generation immigrants indicated the validity of combining second- and third-generation Muslims in one group while understanding generational differences in religiosity. For example, while Lina (third-generation) talked about some differences in life experiences between herself and her second-generation parents, she said that her religiosity was similar to that of her parents. A similar remark was also made by Asma and Sophie (both belonging to third-generation) in relation to their second-generation parents.

What emerges from the comparison of available survey data and primary qualitative data is that the general gap might not necessarily exist in the frequency of religious practices, such as wearing of religious signs overall, or attendance at mosques. Rather, generational gap might exist in the *motivation* for performing religious practices (with French-raised Muslims performing religious practices out of "choice" in contrast to "imitating" their elder family members); in *sources* through which information about "authentic" religion is obtained; in *attitudes* towards gender and ethnic differences (with religion representing different sets of values for different

generations); in desires to "catalogue" the world into sacred versus profane (like halal versus haram); and in the claims to religious accommodation made by different generations (with French-raised Muslims potentially showing higher rates of demands for accommodation compared to first-generation immigrants, given difference in citizenship and socialization).

In order to claim that these differences exist, the findings from this research will need to be tested through systematic evidence that is more thoroughly representative of Muslims in France. Qualitative case studies have shed light on the complexities of religiosity and religious identity that could be used to collect better-quality survey data on religiosity among European Muslims. In Table 5.1, I propose survey questions that make use of the insights gained from the mixed-methods nature of this paper. Given the highly mediatized nature of conversations of religious generational gap, the experience of this gap as a social fact among Muslims of immigrant origin, and the political use of religious generational gap as an indicator of integration into the European society, accurate, representative information on the existence and nature of this generational gap is important for both scholarly and public debates.

Table 5.1: Observable generational difference in religiosity and possible survey questions.

	Theme	First-generation immigrant Muslims	French-raised Muslims	Possible survey questions
	CHOICE VERSUS INHERITANCE OF ISLAM			
1	Religious clothing - importance	Wearing of religious clothing is *not* considered important.	Wearing of religious clothing *is* considered important	According to you, how important is it for a Muslim to wear religious clothing? (scale 1-10; with 10 very important)
2	Religious clothing - motivation	Hijab (or other forms of religious clothing) are considered *inherited* from the country of origin.	Hijab (or other forms of religious clothing) are considered as *chosen* after personal reflection.	If you do wear a hijab or other forms of religious clothing, which of these best reflects your motivation behind it? - Personal reflection; Inherited traditions from family or religious community.
3	Religious clothing - style of hijab	Hijab (or other forms of religious clothing) reflect styles from the country of origin.	Hijab (or other forms of religious clothing) are worn in styles that *reflect personal taste* and do not reflect styles from the country of origin.	If you are currently wearing a hijab, what kind of style does it reflect? - Style of ethnic group (like that worn by female family members); Personal taste
4	Religious clothing - modesty of hijab	*Stricter* (and more uniform) guidelines about what kind of hijab is considered modest.	*Varied* guidelines about what kind of hijab is considered modest.	Do you think that a colorful hijab worn in the form of a turban is…? - Pretty modest, modest enough, not modest enough, not modest at all.
	ISLAMIC EPISTEMOLOGIES			
5	Authentic knowledge - location	Knowledge of authentic Islam considered to be received in the *country of origin* .	Knowledge of authentic Islam considered to be received in *Saudi Arabia* OR Knowledge of authentic Islam considered to be received in *France.*	Imagine that you have a choice to hear a sermon from imams with following background: a French imam, an imam from Saudi Arabia, an imam from your country of origin. Who would you choose to hear?
6	Authentic knowledge - source	Current knowledge about Islam obtained through family and religious community in the country of origin.	Current knowledge about Islam obtained through study of Quran and through internet.	From where does the *majority* of your knowledge about Islam come from? (multiple choices possible) - family and community in country of origin, family and community in France, Quran, Internet.
7	Authentic knowledge - religious school	Did not attend a religious school in addition to general K-12 education.	Attended a religious school in addition to general K-12 education (can include a mosque, private Islamic school, university studies on religion).	Have you attended, for a significant period of time, one of the following for religious education - courses at mosque, private Islamic school, or university?
8	Authentic knowledge - Quranic Arabic	Knowledge of Quranic Arabic is largely absent, even though many may speak Arabic dialect.	Knowledge of Quranic Arabic is present.	Can you speak, read, and write in Arabic? If yes, what kind? - Fus'ha, Shaami, Masri, Darija, other
		Do not consider knowledge of Quranic Arabic as important in acquiring knowledge about Islam.	Considers knowledge of Quranic Arabic as important in acquiring knowledge about Islam.	Do you think it is important to speak Quranic (or Fus'ha) Arabic in order to understand Islam?

Table 5.1: Continued

Theme	First-generation immigrant Muslims	French-raised Muslims	Possible survey questions
RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES TOWARDS GENDER AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES			
9 Gender - segregation	Presence of idea that gender segregation in public and religious spaces is prescribed by Islam and that it should be upheld.	Presence of idea that gender segregation in public and religious spaces is *not* prescribed by Islam and that it should *not* be upheld.	Do you think that individuals of different genders should be…? - segregated OR allowed to mix in public and religious spaces.
			Do you think that segregation of individuals by gender in public and religious spaces is prescribed by Islam?
10 Gender - traditions	Presence of idea that marrying a virgin bride is recommended by religion.	Presence of idea that marrying a virgin bride is recommended by traditions in country of origin and not linked to religion.	Do you think that marrying a virgin bride is…? - not linked to and not recommended by religion OR linked to and recommended by religion.
11 Gender - mosques	No desire for female leadership in mosque spaces.	Desire for female leadership in mosque spaces.	Would you consider it desirable for your local mosque to have women in leadership positions, like having a female imam?
12 Ethnicity - marriage	Considers that one should marry a Muslim in one's ethnic community.	Considers that one can marry a Muslim belonging to any ethnic community.	Do you think that it is okay to marry a Muslim who does not belong to your ethnic group?
13 Ethnicity - mosques	Considers that mosques should cater to one specific ethnic community.	Considers that mosques should cater to an ethnically diverse Muslim community.	Imagine you had two mosques close to your place. One mosque caters to your ethnic community and the other is diverse. Which one would you go to?
DIVIDING THE SACRED FROM THE PROFANE			
14 Cataloguing the world	Absence of belief in binaries like "Us versus the West," "haram versus halal," or "believer versus unbeliever."	High importance given to binaries like "Us versus the West," "haram versus halal," or "believer versus unbeliever."	Do you think that non-Muslims, especially those in the West, are different from Muslims?
			Do you think that non-Muslims, especially those in the West, are enemies of Islam?
15 Halal-Haram	Eating halal diet not as important	Eating halal diet important	How would you rate the importance of eating halal food in Islam? (scale 1-10; with 10 very important)
16 Halal-Haram	Halal diet not strictly followed	Halal diet strictly followed	How often do you consume alcohol? - never, rarely, OR frequently.
17 Believing-Practicing	Idea of division between "believing" and "practicing" Muslims does not exist.	Idea of division between "believing" and "practicing" Muslims exists.	Would you categorize a person who does not believe in Allah but who fasts regularly during Ramadan as a Muslim?

Table 5.1: Continued

	Theme	First-generation immigrant Muslims	French-raised Muslims	Possible survey questions
	CLAIMING ISLAMIC IDENTITY IN SOCIETY			
18	Islam in France	Considers that Islam is a foreign religion	Considers that Islam is a French religion	According to you, the Islam that you practice is a..? - foreign religion OR French religion.
19	Religious accommodations	Does not ask for religious accommodation in the public spaces.	Does not ask for religious accommodation in the public spaces.	Would you go out to protest against the 2004 law banning the wearing of hijab in public schools? Would you write to your local politician asking for halal food options in school canteens?
20	Religious organizations	Considers that mosques and other religious organizations should help maintain links with country of origin.	Considers that mosques and other religious organizations should help address questions pertaining to living as Muslims in France.	Which of these two, according to you, should be one of the main purposes of mosques in France? - Maintaining links with country of origin OR Addressing questions pertaining to living as Muslims in France.

APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE.

The following questions guided the semi-structured interviews that I undertook with first-generation and French-raised descendants of immigrants who were either practicing Muslims or 'cultural' Muslims in the sense that they had been exposed to Islam in their family while growing up but did not necessarily identify as Muslim at the time of the interview.

1. Do you have an (im)migrant background? If yes, who in your family migrated to France?
   a. From where?
   b. In which year?
   c. What was the purpose of (im)migration of [self/family members]?
2. What were the religious beliefs, practices, or traditions that you were exposed to in your childhood? (add: this could be in your family, in your ethnic community, or in your religious community)
3. Do you continue to have the same beliefs and follow same practices and traditions as you did in your childhood today? What remains same and what has changed? (note to self: check whatever applies from the list below)
   a. Mosque attendance
   b. Prayer frequency
   c. Ramadan
   d. Hajj
   e. Religious Associations (affiliation)
   f. Consumption of halal food
   g. Religious markers (clothing, jewelry, etc)
   h. Language (Arabic/Berber/other)
   i. Courses in Islam (at a mosque for instance)
   j. Other
4. Difference in religiosity in family (note to self: ask for examples for each question and use the list above (a-j) to guide the responses)
   a. [If first-generation] Do you think that there is a generational gap in religiosity between you and your children? Between you and your grandchildren?

b. [If second-generation] Do you think that there is a generational gap in religiosity between you and your parents? Between your siblings and your parents?

c. [If third-generation] Do you think that there is a generational gap in religiosity between you and your grandparents? Between your grandparents and your parents?

5. Do you think that there is a religious generational gap overall in your ethnic Muslim community between first-generation and French-raised descendants of first-generation?

6. Do you think that there is a religious generational gap between first-generation Muslim immigrants and French-raised Muslim descendants of first-generation overall in France?

Demographic details

1. Age
2. Gender
3. Education
4. Employment status
5. Occupation
6. Marital status
7. Number of children
8. Religion (of self; type of religious tradition and/or sect)
9. Religion of family members

APPENDIX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES.

Name	Gender	Age	Origin	Religion	Migrated to France	Education	Occupation
First generation							
1 Ahmed	Male	25	Mali	Muslim	In his early 20s	High school	Unemployed
2 Cheikh Hamza	Male	mid 50s	Tunisia	Muslim	-	-	Imam at multiple mosques in Paris region
3 Fatima	Female	late 50s	Morocco	Muslim	In 1989	High school	Unemployed
4 Fedi	Male	mid 20s	Algeria	Muslim	In 2016	Master's degree	Student
5 Hakim	Male	80	Algeria	Muslim	At age 21	Primary school	Retired
6 Houda	Female	mid 40s	Morocco	Muslim	In 1990s	Undergraduate	Teacher (kindergarten)
7 Moussa	Male	25	Mali	Muslim	In his early 20s	Master's degree	Student and part-time application developer
8 Nada	Female	43	Algeria	Muslim	At age 30	High school	Domestic help provider
9 Negar	Female	late 20s	Iran	Agnostic	In her early 20s	Master's degree	Researcher finishing doctoral degree
10 Safa	Female	34	Tunisia	Muslim	In 2012	Master's degree	Student
11 Salah	Male	mid 40s	Algeria	Muslim	In 2003	High school	Truck driver
12 Sami	Male	early 50s	Algeria	Muslim	In 1992	Professional degree	Fire-fighter
13 Zeineb	Female	74	Algeria	Muslim	In 1960	Primary school	Retired
Second generation							
14 Aziza	Female	late 50s	Algeria	Atheist	At age 3	Master's degree	Communication manager for local radio
15 Camille	Female	27	Algeria	Muslim	At age 7	Undergraduate	Student
16 Fareeda	Female	32	Pakistan	Muslim	Born in France	Doctor of Medicine	Practicing medical doctor
17 Farid Abdelkrim*	Male	52	Algeria	Muslim	Born in France	Master's degree	Comedian
18 Leila	Female	30	Algeria	Muslim	Born in France	Doctor of Medicine	Practicing medical doctor
19 Souleymane	Male	38	Senegal	Muslim	Born in France	Undergraduate	Heads multiple non-religious associations
20 Yasmine	Female	28	Algeria	Muslim	Born in France	Master's degree	Part-time lecturer
21 Yassine	Male	33	Morocco	Muslim	At age 3	PhD	Heads a religious association
Third generation							
22 Asma	Female	27	Morocco	Muslim	Born in France	Master's degree	Teacher (high-school)
23 Lina	Female	26	Algeria	Muslim	Born in France	Master's degree	Junior lawyer in private firm
24 Marie	Female	30	Algeria	Atheist	Born in France	Professional degree	Artist
25 Sophie	Female	29	Algeria	Atheist	Born in France	Master's degree	Communication manager in private company

Note: The information above was obtained at the time of the interview and is valid for 2018-19.

*Indicates use of real name. All other names have been changed to maintain anonymity of my interviewees.

APPENDIX C: LIFE STORIES OF INTERVIEWEES.

In this section, I present stories of the lives of my interviewees as they were narrated to me. I have hoped here to capture their diverse experiences of being of immigrant-origin and practicing Muslim (in most cases).

C.1: First-generation immigrants

Ahmed (25) is a first-generation immigrant of Malian origins who was educated in Libya. He moved to France after obtaining his high-school diploma, like his friend Moussa (described later in this section). Unlike Moussa, he did not continue into higher education and was unemployed at the time we met for the interview.

I interviewed Ahmed in a southern suburb of Paris in his state-subsidized apartment where he lives with his white partner belonging to Jehovah's witness, their baby son, and multiple pets. He was wearing a dark long *jellaba* and spoke at length about his "conversion" to Islam and the increase in his piety in recent years. Because of the French education he received in a school frequented by the children of French expats in Libya, his religious trajectory and relation to Islam lay somewhere in between that found among first-generation immigrants and that found among second-generation immigrants. He grew up being a "deist" like his father; his mother is a practicing Muslim. It was while his partner was pregnant with their child that he began to read the Quran and decided that he was Muslim.

Ahmed agrees that there is a generational gap in religiosity. Like other first-generation Muslims, he thinks that there is widespread radicalization among the younger generation and attributes it to "bad comprehension" (*mauvaise compréhension*) of the Quran.

Cheikh Hamza (mid-50s) worked as an imam in multiple mosques in the north-eastern suburbs of Paris. He has Tunisian origins and goes back frequently to Tunisia to serve as an imam in mosques there.

Cheikh Hamza sees many differences between religiosity and religious practices among the first-generation of immigrants and their younger descendants. For example, he agreed that the first-generation have religious practices that are "more or less traditional" while it is only recently that those belonging to the younger generation are "turning toward religion and toward [religious] practices more than before." Yet, he is not happy with what he found in this younger generation; he sees that their religiosity is more about "appearance" and that they are more interested in "cataloguing the people and judging the people." Like Ahmed, he attributes this to the "bad comprehension" of religion among the younger generation. What the younger generation needs, according to Cheikh, is "a positive [religious] discourse that is distant from hatred and which gives hope and shows how to succeed in studies" for "religion is not limited to the mosque."

Fatima (late 50s) first came to France in the 1980s as a part of a classical dance troupe from Morocco. In 1989, she decided to permanently stay in France. She faced many issues for the following decade in relation to regularizing her status in France, which meant that she could not travel outside of France during this period. She told me that the loneliness she faced in this period made her belief in Allah stronger.

I met Fatima multiple times, including at the Grand Mosque as well as at a café for an interview. She was always dressed modestly and wore a winter hat even in warm weather; this tactic to cover one's head without wearing a hijab is popular among many French Muslims given the increasing marginalization of women who wear a hijab in public. Like many first-generation women, she feels like she is policed by other Muslims especially because she is single and

without children. When I spoke with her, Fatima was supported by disability welfare, and spent her time frequenting mosques and praying – an act that made her "feel good". She mentioned how she has to make an extra effort to pray in France, unlike in "*bled*" (home country) where praying was a part of a communal routine.

Overall, she saw the Muslim Arab youth in France as "corrupted". She talked about how the children of many of her friends had "run after money" and "lost their *deen*" (faith). She compared these young Arabs with Black immigrants, whom she saw as more dedicated to their families back in their country of origin; she told me how she saw many of them regularly sending remittances back home at local Western Union offices.

Fedi (late 20s) was born and raised in Algeria in a village close to Béjaïa until he arrived in France a year before we met for the interview. At the time of our interview, he was doing his master's degree in Arabic literature and marketing; it was for the purpose of studies that he had arrived in France.

Fedi identifies as Muslim, and does his five prayers a day. On the days when he has classes and has to miss his prayers, he makes sure that he makes up for these during his night prayer. He makes a division between being in France (a country that he considers as foreign to him) and being in Algeria: he wears religious clothing on Fridays in Algeria while he doesn't do this in France because France is a "secular country." He finds those who decide to wear religious clothing in France as "not logical" and lacking in "respect [towards] the entourage."

Fedi believes that the generation of folks who arrived in 1960s-70s, like his parents and grandparents back in Algeria, had a "solid religion" which he thinks is no longer the case for the

"generation of 2000s" in France. He attributes this to both socialization of the younger generation of Muslims as well as the phenomenon of globalization.

Hakim (80) arrived in France in 1960 at the age of 21 from a village in Algeria, pushed by the poverty both in his family and in his village. He worked all his life in restaurants, starting as a cleaner and moving up to become a cook until his retirement. He was responsible for cooking the main dishes and added that he never mastered the desserts.

We spoke in a park in Barbès, an immigrant-majority area within Paris where Hakim had worked all his life. He had decided to not bring his children to France and to keep his family in Algeria; Hakim told me about the disintegration of immigrant families that he had seen around him. He explained the process as such: Since the financial situation of the immigrant families was difficult, the fathers would work all day, juggling multiple jobs. These men would have no time for their children or their family. Their wives would have little interaction with the society outside of their home and speak little French. Together, the parents would remain uncapable of raising children in the new environment. This would mean that the children would not inherit religious values and adopt deviant practices like doing drugs, drinking alcohol, and committing petty crime.

At the time of the interview, Hakim spent most of his time in Algeria, frequenting France for medical procedures and managing retirement pensions. He is proud of his three children and 18 grandchildren and very content of his decision to establish family in Algeria.

Houda (mid 40s) migrated with her husband from Rabat in Morocco in 1990s. I met her, like many other women, at the Grand Mosque in Paris on a Friday afternoon after the *khutba* (sermon). At the time of the interview, she was working as a teacher in a primary school, a work

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she seemed to enjoy. She told me how she was forced to never talk about religion and remain "neutral" about the topic in the classrooms. She did not wear a hijab outside of the mosque.

While most women were undertaking individual prayers or Quranic readings, Houda was chatty and happily initiated a conversation with me. She complained about the women's space in the basement of the mosque with no esthetic value, unlike the space for men upstairs.

As someone who does not wear a hijab, Houda regularly confronted French-raised Muslim hijabi women; she felt that her authenticity as a Muslim was questioned by these Muslim women who, according to her, knew little about the "*vrai*" (true) Islam. She commented on the behavior of these "young" Muslims who, according to her, did not have respect towards others, especially their first-generation parents. Houda was aware that one of the reasons why religious authority of the first-generation immigrants was questioned by the French-raised youth was that the former had little education and hence their capacity to read the Quran or other religious texts was limited.

Moussa (25) was, like his friend Ahmed, born and raised in Libya to Malian parents. He moved to France after getting his high school diploma from a French *lycée* (high school) in Libya. At the time of our interview, he was finishing his Master's degree and doing an internship in a small firm specializing in information technology, where he hopes to have a more permanent position.

We met for an interview in his studio located in the 18th district of Paris. He talked at length about the forms of discrimination he had faced while seeking employment, which he attributed primarily to his Muslim faith (and to his skin color to a lesser extent). He sees France as a "hypocritic" country because of its tension-filled relation with religion. For example, he told me how sad he was when a beautiful historical church in his neighborhood was destroyed to make

place for commercial and residential buildings; he attributed the destruction to the lack of state support for religion.

Moussa thinks of himself as a believing and practicing Muslim, even though (as he mentioned) he does not adhere to the popularly accepted definition of being Muslim. He tries to pray when he can, consumes alcohol, and is fine having relations with women before marriage. He was critical of the French Muslims, in contrast with whom he defined his own religiosity: "I do not cry out loud all the time that I am a Muslim." He told me that he had read the Quran but that he has always "live[d] my religion based on how I feel."

Moussa feels culturally French because of his education in French schools. Yet, at the same time, renewing visas to stay has made him realize that he is not French.

Nada (43) arrived in France at the age of 30 from Algeria. Her migration to France was motivated by the conditions that her brother had faced in Algeria; he could not find a job in Algeria after getting two undergraduate degrees and he eventually fell into depression.

Since her arrival, Nada has worked either as a private baby-sitter or as a domestic helper in the Paris region. Because of her undocumented status, she finds it difficult to find a formal employment. I interviewed her while she was working as a domestic help; I followed her through the house of an acquaintance with my recorder on, attempting to help her along the way. She mentioned that she had recently married a French man (second-generation) of Algerian origins and that she has received calls from the municipal office suspecting that her marriage was undertaken for the sake of French papers (*marriage blanc*).

Nada does not wear a hijab but hopes to wear it someday. She does her Ramadan and considers herself religious. She agrees that there is a generational gap between the first-generation and

French-raised Muslims and attributes it to bad socialization (*mauvaise frequentation*) of the latter group. For her, both "Arabs and French" can be a bad influence on descendants of Muslim immigrants raised in France.

Negar (late 20s) was born in Iran into a practicing Shia Muslim family. At the time of our interview, she was finishing her doctoral degree in pedagogy for teaching French and Persian as second-languages.

At the time of the interview, Negar spoke "accent-less French", a factor that contributes to her being identified as a second-generation Muslim by other French-raised Muslims. Between the ages 13 and 15, Negar spent time with her family in France, attending the local public school; this makes her experiences more like a 1.5 generation immigrant rather than a first-generation immigrant. For Negar, her experience of schooling and linked socialization has had a profound effect on her current religious beliefs. For example, she cites the example of the "*honte*" (shame) she felt when her mother continued to wear a traditional Iranian headscarf along with modest clothing while in France. While she became a practicing Muslim on her return to Iran, she has transitioned to having more agnostic views after her arrival in France in 2013. She does not see herself as Muslim and does not want to be seen as such. She has a lot of problems when Muslims in France assume that she is a Muslim, especially because they assume her to be Shia Muslim – an Islam that the Sunni-majority Muslims in France usually see as "less serious" (according to Negar).

In spite of her non-affiliation with Islam today, it is clear that Negar is invested in how Islam is viewed in France and how it is debated within the Muslim community in France, because of her past religious beliefs as well as the recurrent assumption by others that she is Muslim. Negar is critical of how French-raised Muslims respond to the stereotypes about Muslims and Islam that

pervade the French public discourse: for example, she said that many of the Muslims have not read the religious texts and/or come to accept the presence of some "*sourate*" (verses) in the Quran that promote (according to her) hatred and which are potentially dangerous. At the same time, Negar understood that it was difficult to undertake this internal critique in the anti-Muslim political environment of France.

Safa (34) was born and raised in Tunisia. She immigrated in 2012 with her husband who was offered a job in the engineering sector. We met at the Grand Mosque of Paris on a Friday after the afternoon prayer and we conversed over mint tea and pastries in the mosque's café.

In Tunisia, Safa was studying for a doctoral degree in biology which she left mid-way and then decided to enroll herself in an undergraduate program to study Arabic literature in Paris. She had two very young children (aged 1 and 3 years) at the time of the interview.

Safa wore a hijab regularly and recounted to me the kind of police harassment she as well as her mother (who also wears a hijab) had faced in Tunisia before the revolution in 2011. Hijab was banned in the public space, and secular laws like the ones in France had existed there since the rule under Habib Bourguiba. We talked about the generational gap between first- and second-generation Muslims in France, which she agreed exists. She exhibited empathy for both the generations, explaining to me that tensions between both the generations are common in immigrant Muslim families.

Salah (mid 40s) is a first generation of Algerian origin. I met Salah at the same café in Barbès where I first met Hakim; like many small cafes in the area, this café was frequented by first-generation immigrant men from North and West Africa.

At the time of our interview, Salah had been in France for 16 years. He was not married. He worked as a taxi driver or undertook deliveries of wholesale grocery stocks. Salah was very curious about world political events, leading to our conversations comparing India with Algeria for example.

While Hakim considered himself very religious and carried himself in a manner that brought him a lot of respect in his community (he is also older than Salah, which might influence the level of respect he gets), Salah considered himself a "moderate" Muslim. His 'moderateness' was contrasted to the "extreme" religiosity that, according to him, was present among the French-raised Muslim "youth" – he talked about the unfortunate radicalization of these youth. He said that the "youth" harbored ideas about Islam that made little historical or textual sense to him. He highlighted the stories of violence during the pre-modern period while Islam was spreading in Asia to drive his point that tit was pointless to be nostalgic about what is considered by youth to be the "golden" era of Islam.

Sami (early 50s) is a first-generation man of Algerian origin. He left Algeria in 1992 after deciding to quit his position as a ship captain that he had held for 17 years.

When I met him, he was working as firefighting "*formateur*" (trainer) and was very proud of his work. He talked at length about how he had moved to France with no resources, slept in parked cars, gained training as a firefighter, and received respect; his story sounded like a French version of 'American dream come true.' I met Sami in a café frequented by mostly first-generation men of Maghrebi origin. The café also served as a spot where he would meet some of his students who had gone on to become his mentees.

Sami recounted to me many stories from his travels, the main theme of which was his deviance from the religious and social norms imposed upon him in Algeria. For instance, he mentioned how he has "known many women around the world", and had walked away from an unhappy marriage in Algeria. Yet, he never forgot to repeat that he was and always will be a Muslim. He contrasted this to the beliefs of many French-raised "youth" of immigrant origins who would grow up in Muslim families and declare that they were not really Muslim. Sami did not see 'being Muslim' as choice; if one if born a Muslim, he said, one remains a Muslim. He added that deviating from religious norms and prescriptions did not mean that one stopped being a Muslim; he provided his own example as someone who regularly deviated yet continued to remain a Muslim.

Zeineb (74) is a first-generation Muslim woman of Algerian origin. I met her on a Friday after the *khutba* (sermon) at the Grand Mosque in Paris while she was visiting one of her sons and his family based in Paris. She was dressed in a manner associated with women of her age and generation from Algeria – her head was covered in a tight headscarf and a loose white scarf over it, and she wore a loose white cotton dress.

Zeineb arrived in France at the age of 15 with her husband in 1960. Both of them worked in blue collar jobs in Clermont-Ferrand, like many immigrants from Maghreb. She described their working conditions as extremely hard. She had three children with her husband who had passed away a few years before we met. Her children were all married and living all around France, and had children of their own. Zeineb was proud of the socio-economic success of her children. For example, one of her sons was working as an engineer in Nice. She was glad as well that they were all Muslim. But she complained about their religious practices; she saw that they did not

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necessarily pray at a frequency recommended in Islam (five times a day). She hoped that

someday they would find the "right path" and become better practicing Muslims.

Aziza (late 50s) is a second-generation of Algerian origin. At the time of our interview, she was working as a coordinator for a francophone radio association. Aziza arrived in France from Tunisia (where her family had migrated before from Algeria) at the age of three with her parents. She was raised in a non-religious environment by her parents, unlike her cousins who grew up religious in Algeria. Once in France, she kept little contact with either Tunisia or Algeria. Her father died when she was 18. Her Muslim mother had become more religious in the later years of her life.

When asked if she has any Muslim friends, she responded saying that she does not define her friends (or anybody else) as having a certain religious affiliation. Overall, she does not like to talk about religion. She faces a lot of awkward situations where Muslims around her assume that she is a Muslim (because of her darker features). For example, she recounts her encounter with a young (probably French-raised Muslim) woman at the canteen where she works – the woman mentioned that one of the preparations that she was serving contained pork. "*Et alors?*" (And so what?) – responded Aziza. She mentioned many times during our interactions that she eats pork, drinks alcohol, and smokes (activities not prescribed in Islam).

While Aziza sees her upbringing as not religious, her mother maintained some religious practices. Like with other Muslims around her, Aziza regularly attempted to confront the religiosity of her mother. For instance, while she would try to not consume it around her mother, Aziza would keep a piece of pork in her fridge when her mother was visiting. Aziza also made sure that her daughter, who was dating (at the time of interview) a practicing Muslim man, did not fast for Ramadan; she would make her daughter consume alcoholic cocktails and pork during

Ramadan whenever she visited. This was to assure herself that her daughter was not "converting."

Camille (27) moved from Algeria at the age of 7 in late 1990s with her mother and two older sisters to join her father in France. Her father, who worked as a sports coach in Algeria, was threatened by Islamists groups and this led him to seek political asylum in France in early 1990s.

Given this family history, all the members of her family had an "apprehension about Islam" which Camille did not have since she was too young at the time of the incidents. She grew up around agnostic parents, and her father "bizarrely" continued to fast during Ramadan because for him "traditionally, it was like this."

Camille "converted" to Islam at the age of 15 after reading the Quran and decided to wear a hijab at the age of 17. While she had excellent grades at school, the fact that she had to remove her headscarf, which she saw as a "part of herself", before entering the doors of the school, was lived by her as a form of "violence." She ended up marrying at age 20, having a daughter, and later separating from her partner. At the time of our interview, she was enrolled in an undergraduate program to study philosophy and attended classes on Islamic sciences at a private religious institute.

Camille agrees that there is a generational gap overall, including a religious generational gap. She described her surprise when she found her experiences resonating with folks who were her parents' age but were, like her, of second-generation.

Fareeda (32) was born in France to parents who migrated from Pakistan. She grew up in a family where she was always "more religious than the rest"; for example, while her family members were all practicing Muslims, her mother never wore a hijab and they never did the

obligatory prayers daily. In her childhood, Fareeda had wished her family would pray together often.

I met Fareeda for an interview in her apartment in a north-eastern suburb of Paris. At the time of our meeting, Fareeda wore a turban hijab and was working as a doctor of general practice like her friend Leila (described later in this section).

Fareeda sees a generational gap between the religiosity of her parents and that among her generation. She talked about the religious education she got at home as a child, which "made the amalgam between religion and traditions." She attributed this to the religious and secular education that her parents had received – both of them had little or no secular education and had received religious education through their respective families in Pakistan.

Fareeda is very glad to have been born in France because it is there that she has the "liberty" to learn about her religion. She contrasts this to the hypothetical situation of her being raised in Pakistan; she says that she would have needed authorization from male elders to enroll herself in religious course while in France she can do what pleases her, be "emancipated", and have access to religious education without anyone controlling her decisions.

Farid Abdelkrim (52; real name used) is a French public figure known for his past links with the Muslim Brotherhood and his present mobilization against Islamism and radicalization in France. I met Farid at a local theatre where he was performing an anti-radicalization play titled *Lettres à Nour* (Letters to Nour) for high school students in the northern suburbs of Paris.

Farid was born in Nantes to parents of Algerian origin. When a dear friend of his died during his adolescence, he turned to Islamism. He talked about how this shift had meant an important rupture in his life – he stopped singing (an activity he enjoyed) and he stopped having humor.

When he did quit the Brotherhood, he became a comedian while at the same time remaining Muslim. Today, he calls for "going towards internal Islam, towards prayers, [and] meditation."

Farid is critical of the Islamic institutions set up by first-generation Muslims in France. He sees their structural organization as fundamentally different from what is needed to fulfill the demands of the younger generation of Muslims. For him, Union of Islamic Organizations of France (UOIF) and Muslim Brotherhood in France are "*organisation des vieux*" (organization of the old) who are absent on the social media and out of touch with the younger generation. They have failed to transfer power to the younger generation. This has meant, according to Farid, that these institutions were surprised by the "departures to Syria" of French Muslims. The first-generation Muslims set up Islam thinking that they were going to return to their country of origin, and hence, Farid pointed, the mosque sermons were in Arabic rather than in French.

Leila (30) was born and raised in France to parents who moved from Algeria. All the members in her family are practicing Muslims. At the time of the interview, Leila wore a hijab tied around her head like a turban and was dressed formally in a loose shirt and pants. Leila studied medicine and worked as a general practitioner at the time of the interview.

Leila considers herself as someone with a "double culture" and she is proud of her Algerian origin. She attributes this to the fact that she has a genealogy she can be proud of – her maternal grandfather was an imam in the village in Algeria and became an important figure in resistance to French occupation.

While many of those whom I interviewed talked about the privileged position of the French-raised Muslims in terms of their French citizenship (compared to first-generation immigrants) Leila was skeptical. She told me that she doesn't not feel completely French because the society

demands of her to "always do more, to adapt myself more and even then, it is not sufficient." She added that this is because "the question of origin always comes up but then I am not really Algerian either." But in terms of racism faced, she agrees that those of her parents' generation faced more racism than their descendants – they were discriminated "everywhere they went" because in many places, they were the only minority family or individual present.

Overall, Leila thinks that it is hard to feel a complete sense of belonging as a Muslim in France because the "ethnic French" (*français de souche*) have come to frame the drinking of alcohol, eating of pork, and wearing short skirts with "French values" in a way that alienates practicing Muslims.

Souleymane (38) was born in France to parents who migrated from Senegal. His great-grandfather already had French citizenship papers considering that where he lived in Senegal was a French department.

According to Souleymane, his parents moved to France in order to find work and open up opportunities for their children. His family considers themselves "Pan-Africanists" and have remained loyal in their heart to the continent. "Anti-African politics" of France for Souleymane remains a continuous memory; yet, in everyday life, he reconciles it with his French citizenship by arguing that most French individuals are neither aware of nor implied in the politics of the French state.

Souleymane sees many differences between Islam of the first-generation immigrants and that of the French-raised Muslims, in terms of practices as well as institutions. While Islam of the former is a "foreign religion of foreigners in France," Islam of French-raised Muslims is a "French religion." This he attributes to the difference in education received by the first

generation in their country of origin, versus the education received by their descendants in France. The latter group, while being privileged, face discrimination in the education system because of immigrant descent.

Souleymane is aware of the bad reputation of the French-raised Muslims, especially men raised in the *banlieues* (suburbs). Many first-generation Muslims, Souleymane tells me, wish that they had never arrived in France after knowing what happened to their children's generation. They see all French-raised children of immigrants as either turning to crime (for men) or to prostitution (for women). But he argues that the failure of this generation is not a majority trend: "*Un arbre qui tombe fait plus de bruit que toute une forêt qui pousse*," (a tree that falls makes more noise than an entire forest that is growing) says Souleymane about the negative reputation of French-raised Muslims. That a few French-raised Muslims are "falling" doesn't mean that *all* of them are falling, he added.

Yasmine (28) was born and raised in France to parents who moved from Algeria. Her father had moved with her mother to undertake doctoral studies in mathematics but never managed to finish his degree. In her childhood, the family lived in residences reserved for immigrant families in the suburbs of Paris. Because of the uncertainty of her father's employment as a school teacher, they had few resources.

Yasmine had a master's in literature and was preparing to apply for a doctoral program at the time of our interview. She attributes her love for literature to her father taking her and her siblings to public libraries in her childhood.

In addition to seeing the first-generation religiosity as "traditional" and linked to "culture" of the country of origin, Yasmine also sees another difference between the religiosity of first-

generation and French-raised Muslims: those of first-generation do not differentiate between those who are simply "believing" Muslims (*croyant*) and those who are "practicing" Muslims (*pratiquant*). For example, first-generation Muslims would never say "I am not a practicing Muslim" even if they do not pray frequently. She attributes this to the community-facing values of the first-generation in contrast to the individualized values of French-raised Muslims.

Yassine (33) moved to France from Morocco at the age of three with his parents. At the time of our meeting, he was heading a religious association, quitting his work as an engineer, and going back into higher education to study social sciences. We met for an interview in a café in Paris where he talked at length about the philosophy of religion and the link between Cartesian thought and Islam.

Yassine is very critical of the institutionalization of Islam in France, an enterprise run mostly by first-generation Muslims in France. It is to respond to his spiritual needs and that of his generation that he set up a religious association. He sees the importance of the "Cartesian rationality" and "doubt" as fundamental to the development of a spiritual being and, to this end, he along with his association members organize religious discussions and debates about key issues faced by Muslim youth. In our later interactions, he mentioned that he was setting up a research group to reconceptualize mosques in France; he is interested in making them spaces that are more inclusive, have gender-mixed spaces, are not dominated by singular ethnic group, and are environmentally friendly and esthetically beautiful.

Yassine dislikes Muslims who appear to be "cool Muslims" and who appear integrated in the society ("*qui montre une patte blanche*"; someone who shows a white paw) by saying things like "I am Muslim, but I drink alcohol." He finds it unfortunate that many of these Muslims go to the extent of "eating pork even if it tears them inside."

Asma (27) is a daughter of a second-generation immigrant father and a first-generation immigrant mother, both of whom come from the south of Morocco. We met in a café in a northern suburb of Paris close to where she spent her childhood and where she currently lives with her parents.

At the time of the interview, Asma had a master's degree and was working in a French public school. She wears a hijab, except when she teaches because the French law prohibits the wearing of hijab by students and staff in French public schools. She had grown accustomed to this process given that the 2004 law banning the hijab was passed while she was herself in school.

Asma told me about the differences between her first-generation mother and her second-generation father; for her, their relation with religion was an important aspect of the difference. She told me how her father kept religion "private" and "at home" while her mother liked to discuss religion with others at her local mosque. For her, this was linked to the kind of upbringing her parents had received: her mother having grown up in Morocco while her father having grown up in France. Asma complained that her mother and members of her maternal family were "traditional" and didn't "like to mix people" of different genders while her father would let her play football as a child with other children of different genders. She reasoned that this was linked with the "confusion" between "religion and tradition" that her mother and others in her maternal family had inherited from their Moroccan upbringing. Her own opinions regarding religion are closer to her father's according to Asma.

Asma is proud of her Berber heritage and added that her family, overall, is more tolerant: "We are not Arab people [and] that is why the mentality is very different."

Lina (26) describes herself as a "second-generation French" of Algerian origins and rejects the term "third-generation immigrant." Both her parents were born in France to parents who had moved from Algeria to find work. At the time of the interview, Lina was working in the legal department of a private company and held a master's degree.

For Lina, the life trajectories of first-, second-, and third-generation immigrants are different from each other: the first-generation do not want to "catch attention" either politically or religiously because they "don't feel at home" in France; the second-generation assert their political rights because they "are French"; and the third-generation like her are "more religious" because they are "a bit lost and [so] they need to identify with something." She also added that almost all French-born children and grandchildren of immigrants face a similar sense of being "lost" and feeling "rejected by the French society"; this can have an effect of them turning to religion with more intensity.

Lina talked extensively about her family, describing the religious generational gap between her paternal grandparents and her father as significant while that between her mother and her maternal grandparents as non-existent. She attributes this to the difference in religious education each parent received: her paternal grandfather, Lina mentioned, is a "traditional" and "paternalistic figure" who is very religious while her mother's father is the kind "you can call anytime" and is not as religious as the paternal grandfather.

Marie (30) is a third-generation of Algerian origins. She divides her time making and teaching art. She lives with her Buddhist German partner who works at a center teaching meditation.

Marie's maternal grandmother arrived in France in 1950s with three children, with little material and social capital. As someone who was "darker than the Arabs," she faced a lot of

discrimination. Marie compares the lives of Muslims in France with the life of her grandmother, who was a practicing Muslim. For example, she feels angry when the "bourgeoise" French-raised Muslim women go to Algeria and "come back wearing a headscarf." She sees that these women have the "*luxe*" (luxury) to *choose* to wear a headscarf while many women are *forced* to wear them. She narrates how the freedom to choose that women in France have is not what her grandmother had; her grandmother faced a lot of familial resistance when she decided to marry a German soldier, for example. At the same time, Marie recognizes that many women in France wear headscarves as a form of "rebellion" against the anti-Muslim sentiments in France.

While her grandmother was a practicing and believing Muslim, Marie and her mother did not inherit the religious affiliation. Yet, they did not choose the path of atheism either, with both maintaining a form of "*croyance*" (belief). Marie's father has no immediate immigrant origins.

Like Negar and Aziza, Marie is confronted by many Muslims who assume that she is a Muslim because of her Afro hair. She feels that they seek to govern her behavior, judging her when they feel that she is not following the norms demanded by Muslim faith. As a result of this, she said that she cut her hair very short so that no one could notice her Afro.

Sophie (29) is a third-generation woman of Algerian origins. Sophie has a master's degree in communication and was working as a communication manager for a company at the time of our interview.

Sophie's maternal grandparents arrived in France via Tunisia when Sophie's mother Aziza (see interview in the earlier section) was a child. Her maternal grandmother was a practicing Muslim who, according to Sophie, started wearing hijab after a trip to Mecca. Her Tunisian grandfather, on the other hand, was not very religious; Sophie mentioned that he drank alcohol, for example.

Like many other French-raised Muslims, she sees first generation Muslims as "more into [religion] because of tradition" while the French-raised Muslims are "freer [than the first-generation and] free to make our choice." Her father, she told me, is a non-religious French man of "Catholic background" who has separated from her mother.

At the start of our conversation, Sophie identified herself as an atheist. But she later revealed that she had said the *shahada* (attestation of her faith in Allah) for her partner who is a second-generation Muslim and with whom she had been in couple for ten years at the time of the interview. She added that she was "not serious in her religious convictions" and suspects that her partner knows about it.

Sophie breaks the stereotypical association between Arab name, Maghrebi origins, and affiliation to Islam. As someone who has Maghrebi features and identifies as Arab yet at the same time has a French-sounding name and does not have a clear affiliation with Islam, she faces many judgmental comments from the Arabo-Muslim community. For example, she has been told that she "is not Arab because you eat pork." While Sophie doesn't define herself as Muslim, she has "more sensibility towards this religion and when it is attacked, it gets on my nerves."

APPENDIX D: LOGIT REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR PEW (2006) and TeO (2008) DATA

Pew (2006) survey containing data on 200 foreign-born and 199 French-born Muslims

	Importance of religion in life	Do you generally cover your hair? (women only)	Frequency of mosque attendance	Which of these do you trust the most to offer you guidance as a Muslim? (sample: 397)					Quality of life for Muslim women in France compared to most Muslim countries
				Your local imam or sheikh	National religious leaders	Religious leaders on television	Imams/ institutions outside France	None among those mentioned	
Gender		-					ref.		
Male	ref.		ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.		ref.	ref.
Female	-0.172		1.371***	-0.324	0.147	0.572		-0.095	-0.285
Age	0.029**	-0.068**	0.033**	-0.005	0.051***	0.04*		0.061***	-0.016
Education level	0.159*	-0.209	0.075	0.034	0.39***	0.246		0.236**	-0.063
Married	-0.286	0.856*	0.043	0.0452	0.364	-0.143		-0.365	0.051
Generation									
First-generation	ref.	ref.	0	ref.	ref.	ref.		ref.	ref.
Second-generation	0.288	-0.748*	0.173	0.011	-0.15	-2.127***		-0.609*	-0.725**
Sample Size	399	204	397						398

Note: The significance is indicated as follows: *** indicated p < 0.01; ** indicated p < 0.05, and * indicated p < 0.1.

Pew (2006) survey containing data on 200 foreign-born and 199 French-born Muslims

Worried about following issues related to Muslims living in France

	Muslim women in France taking on modern roles in society	Influence of music, movies, and television on Muslim youth	Decline in the importance of religion among French Muslims	Opinion: Is suicide bombing and other forms of violence justified?	Is there struggle between moderate Muslims and Islamic fundamentalists?	Do you identify with: moderate or fundamentalist Islam?	Conflict between being devout Muslim and living in modern society
Gender							
Male	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Female	-0.192	-0.09	-0.189	-0.239	0.520*	0.13	-0.307
Age	0.011	0.008	0.024*	0.008	-0.011	0.014	-0.011
Education level	0.083	0.335***	0.097	0.195*	-0.022	0.278	-0.237**
Married	0.328	0.415*	-0.132	0.439	-0.369	0.13	0.021
Generation							
First-generation	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Second-generation	0.29	0.618**	0.402	-0.167	-0.291	0.535	-0.737**
Sample Size	390	399	398	395	395	217	398

Note: The significance is indicated as follows: *** indicated $p < 0.01$; ** indicated $p < 0.05$, and * indicated $p < 0.1$.

TeO (2008) survey containing data on 2,674 foreign-born and 2,397 French-born Muslims

	Importance of religion in upbringing	Importance of religion in life	Religious service attendance	Respect food prohibitions	Member of religious association	Frequency of wearing ostensible religious signs	Arabic as language of reference	Level in Arabic (if reference language)	Taken lessons in Arabic (if language of reference)	Wishes to be buried outside of France
Gender										
Male	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Female	0.151	0.416***	0.778***	-0.394***	0.811***	-1.604***	0.221*	-0.169	-0.052	0.264**
Age	-0.01	-0.037***	0.039***	0.042***	0.027	0.068***	0.032***	0.004	-0.033**	-0.022**
Education level	-0.026	-0.047**	-0.01	0.066**	0.024	0.096**	0.064**	0.092***	0.112***	-0.042
Married	-0.017	0.399***	-0.339***	-0.515***	-1.104***	-0.315	-0.250*	0.417***	0.032	0.507***
Employment										
Unemployed	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Employed	-0.187	-0.289**	0.17	0.569***	-0.21	0.904***	-0.129	-0.234	0.146	-0.202
Student Status	0.118	-0.162	0.05	0.195	-0.897*	0.955***	0.017	-0.017	0.299	-0.039
Generation										
First-generation	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Second-generation	-0.426***	-0.022	-0.045	-0.24	-0.234	-0.073	0.084	-2.211***	1.616***	-0.432***
Sample size	4885	4884	4882	4895	4907	4801	4909	2286	2286	4217

Note: The significance is indicated as follows: *** indicated $p < 0.01$; ** indicated $p < 0.05$, and * indicated $p < 0.1$.

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