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THE KOREAN POLICY OF PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN
AND THE RECALL OF GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of Social Studies
Appalachian State Teachers College

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Donald William Leo
" "
July 1963

THE KOREAN POLICY OF PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN
AND THE RECALL OF GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

On April 11, 1951, President Harry S. Truman discharged General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, thus relieving him of his various posts, including that of Supreme Allied Commander in the Far East. The action provoked enormous public controversy since MacArthur was one of the greatest and most popular military heroes in American history; whereas Truman was an unpopular President.

As in most public controversies, the major facts and issues have been submerged by the emotional outcries of protest against and support for Truman's action. Even today the Truman-MacArthur dispute concerning Korean War policy arouses bitter controversy, generated mostly by subjective attachments to either Truman or MacArthur. In most cases the real facts are ignored. Extremely complicated, they have not, as yet, been presented to the public in a major work aimed at surveying and analyzing the issues.

This study, motivated by my desire to acquaint myself and my readers with the real facts of the Truman-MacArthur controversy, attempts to set forth and to examine these facts, not to reach any conclusions as to whether Truman or MacArthur advocated the wisest Korean policy. This question will be answered, if at all, by history, not by a thesis, the alleged purpose of which is to analyze, not to pass judgement.

In five chapter divisions I intend to analyze the personalities and political philosophies of the two men involved, to survey the policy of the United States toward Korea from the close of World War II to the recall of MacArthur in 1951, and to analyze the causative

factors of this dispute.

I have relied heavily upon original material from three major sources: the second volume of Truman's memoirs, Years of Trial and Hope; The New York Times; and the minutes of the Congressional hearings conducted by the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees concerning MacArthur's recall. Although I have obtained much of my information from Truman's memoirs, the reader is cautioned to remember that General MacArthur viewed Truman's memoirs as follows:

I had sincerely hoped that in his memoir narration of the Korean War and the facts and circumstances surrounding my relief from command in the Far East, Mr. Truman would be animated by a high sense of dedication to the historical record. . . .

I will not be so bold as to attempt to diagnose the animating impulses which have led him into such a labyrinth of fancy and fiction, distortion and misrepresentation. Suffice it to say that a well-known quotation may provide a clue to the answer: 'Everything looks yellow to the jaundiced eye.'¹

It is indeed unfortunate that General MacArthur has never published his memoirs.

Although this thesis is based primarily on original sources, I do wish to thank Mr. Alfred Steinberg for his excellent biography of Harry Truman. I found it most helpful since many of his observations of Truman were based on his personal contact with Truman during his presidency.

I would also like to thank my adviser, Dr. Max Dixon, whose encouragement and suggestions have been invaluable, and the Wake Forest College library staff which was most cooperative in helping me to locate research materials.

¹Excerpt of statement by Douglas MacArthur appearing in The New York Times, 9 February, 1956, p. 25.

CHAPTER I
THE PRESIDENT

EXCERPTS FROM
THE PRESIDENT'S
ADDRESS TO CONGRESS
ON JANUARY 12, 1941

CHAPTER I

THE PRESIDENT

On the morning of October 6, 1950, President Harry S. Truman was confronted with a personal crisis. Charlie Ross, his press secretary and lifelong friend, had died suddenly of a heart attack late on the afternoon of October 5. Truman had not been able to retire alone with his grief, because of the pressing complications of the Korean War. At that precise time the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee was in the United States for talks with the President about the military catastrophe facing the United Nations' forces in Korea, created by the recent aggression of the Red Chinese.

Despite these serious problems, however, Truman was more concerned about an article in the Washington Post. When he read the article, his state of mind changed from grief and consternation to extreme indignation. The article, written by Washington Post music critic Paul Hume, reviewed the previous evening's recital at Constitution Hall by Margaret Truman, the President's daughter. In part, the caustic review stated:

. . . Miss Truman cannot sing very well. She is flat a good deal of the time--more last night than at anytime we have heard her. . . . She has learned that she must work in order to make something of her voice. But she still cannot sing with anything approaching professional finish.

She communicates almost nothing of the music she presents. Schumann, Schubert, and Mozart were on her program last night. Yet, the performance of music by these composers was no more than a caricature of what it would be if sung by any

one of a dozen artists today.

And still the public goes and pays the same price it would for the world's finest singers.

It is extremely unpleasant to record such unhappy facts about so honestly appealing a personality. But as long as Miss Truman continues to sing as she has for three years, and does today, we seem to have no recourse unless it is to omit comment on her programs.¹

After Truman had read the review, he immediately wrote a denunciatory letter to Hume. It read as follows:

I have just read your lousy review buried in the back pages. You sound like a frustrated man that never made a success, an eight-ulcer man on a four-ulcer job, and all four ulcers working.

I never met you, but if I do you'll need a new nose and plenty of beefsteak, and perhaps a supporter below. Westbrook Pegler, a guttersnipe, is a gentleman compared to you. You can take that as more of an insult than a reflection on your ancestry.²

The letter was simply signed H. S. T. At first, Hume was not sure that Truman had written it, but when White House aids admitted that he had, the letter was widely publicized. Many editorials denounced the President's lack of propriety, but what shocked most people was Truman's crude verbal usage.

Nevertheless, to many people, Truman's letter did not come as a surprise, since Truman was famous for his brutal frankness. He himself admits in the preface to his book, Mr. Citizen:

Since I am given to plain speaking, especially on matters where I feel it necessary to point up

¹Excerpts from review by Paul Hume appearing in The New York Times, 9 December, 1950, p. 13.

²Letter by Harry S. Truman appearing in The New York Times, 9 December, 1950, p. 1.

an issue, there are some passages in this book that may be interpreted as harsh to certain individuals.³

Truman's letter to Hume, however, was not the only letter, arousing public furor, that he wrote during his Presidency. On one occasion he wrote a blistering letter to Bernard Baruch which so infuriated the latter that he publicly denounced Truman as "a rude, uncouth and ignorant man."⁴ On another occasion, Colorado State Senator N. Bishop's proposal that John L. Lewis be appointed Ambassador to the Soviet Union prompted Truman to write that he would never name John L. Lewis to the position of dog catcher.⁵ Truman even insulted the pride of the United States Marine Corps, calling it "the Navy's police force."⁶ In still another letter, in response to an appeal from Representative Edward Herbert of Louisiana, proposing that the churches set aside a day of prayer for guidance through the crisis presented by the Chinese intervention in Korea, Truman stated:

I am extremely sorry that the sentiments expressed in your letter were not thought of before November 7, when the campaign in your state, Utah, North Carolina, Illinois, and Indiana was carried on in a manner that was as low as I've ever seen and I've been in this game since 1906.⁷

³ Harry S. Truman, Mr. Citizen (New York: Bernard Geis Associated, 1960), p. 10. Hereafter referred to as Truman, Citizen.

⁴ Statement by Bernard Baruch appearing in The New York Times, 9 December, 1950, p. 13.

⁵ Alfred Steinberg, The Man From Missouri (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1962), p. 395.

⁶ Statement by Harry S. Truman appearing in The New York Times, 9 December, 1950, p. 1.

⁷ Excerpt from a letter by Harry S. Truman cited by Steinberg, p. 395.

Many scholars were not as upset with what Truman said, as they were with the way in which he said it. It was difficult for many Americans to accept the fact that a man with no college education and with such an extremely limited vocabulary could be elected to the office once held by such masters of the English language as Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln.

Not only in emphatic denouncements, but also in sincere social and political correspondance was Truman's verbal incapacity evident. In 1952 Truman invited the Republican Presidential nominee, Dwight D. Eisenhower, to the White House for briefings to insure a continued bi-partisan approach to foreign policy. Eisenhower sent a courteous reply, but declined the invitation, saying that

In my current position as standard bearer of the Republican party and of other Americans who want to bring about a change in the National Government, . . . I think it would be unwise and result in confusion in the public mind if I were to attend the meeting in the White House to which you have invited me.⁸

Though Truman was disappointed, his reply to Eisenhower was courteous, yet so very plain and simple for one who had occupied the Presidency more than seven years. He wrote in longhand:

Dear Ike:

I am sorry if I caused you any embarrassment. What I've always had in mind was and is a

⁸ Excerpts from telegram by Dwight D. Eisenhower cited by Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. 2 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1956), 512. Hereafter refered to as Truman, Years.

continuing foreign policy. You know that is a fact because you had a part in outlining it.

Partisan politics should stop at the boundaries of the United States. I'm extremely sorry that you have allowed a bunch of screwballs to come between us.

You have made a bad mistake, and I'm hoping it won't injure this great Republic.

There has never been one like it and I want to see it continue regardless of the man who occupies the most important position in the history of the world.

May God guide you and give you light.

From a man who has always been your friend and always intended to be.

Sincerely,

Harry S. Truman⁹

THE TRUMAN IMAGE

Whether it was his shocking frankness, his limited vocabulary, his ruddy five-foot-ten-inch frame, or perhaps his folksy ways of mixing with people, the fact remains that Harry S. Truman was an unpopular President while in office. Furthermore, he was considered by many to be a President by accident. Perhaps, however, the most devastating factor of his unpopularity was that he could not project a favorable image to the public. Time magazine depicted him as

⁹Telegram by Harry S. Truman cited by Truman, Years, p. 512.

. . . a professional little man, with the admirers who like the little man's courage, with many critics who despise a little man's inadequacies.¹⁰

In analyzing Truman's unfavorable image, Alfred Steinberg, his biographer, has said:

Truman had an enormous faculty for attracting loud, often coarse supporters and hangers-on. Whenever his old war mates of World War I showed up, he immediately reverted to the role of Captain Harry of Battery D. Down the street he marched in their parades with long, jaunty strides--not as President Truman, but as one of the boys.

Neither his enemies nor his friends could forget that he once lost his shirt in the haberdashery business, that he was the product of a nefarious political machine, and that he had been elevated to the national scene from a minor political office. This was the indelible image they used as reference in judging him.¹¹

Thus, when Truman relieved General MacArthur of his Far Eastern Command, national sympathy sided with MacArthur largely because Truman was unable to present an image that could be trusted. If MacArthur had "defied" the authority of a President who projected a trusted "father image," such as Franklin Roosevelt or Dwight D. Eisenhower, perhaps his removal would have been greeted with the wholehearted support of the American people.

One incident that illustrates the unfavorable reaction of the American people toward Truman, after

¹⁰"The Little Man Who Dared," Time, LVII (April 23, 1951), 24.

¹¹Steinberg, p. 14.

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his removal of MacArthur occurred at a baseball game at Griffeth Stadium in Washington. Truman and his wife attended the game in order to participate in the annual tradition of the President's throwing out the first ball. At the end of the eighth inning, a loudspeaker announcement requested the crowd to remain seated until the President had left the park. Immediately the crowd began to boo Truman, who, with his wife, was forced to sit through a half inning of constant jeering.¹²

When Truman left office on January 20, 1953, the Gallup Poll reported that only thirty-two percent of the people interviewed thought that Truman had done a good job. Truman's popularity index, in comparison with Eisenhower's index of sixty-one percent taken the day after the 1960 election, is an extremely low figure.¹³

In addition to the public's condescending attitude toward him, Truman suffered the wrath and humiliation of both political opponents and, occasionally, friends. For instance, in 1944, prior to his nomination for Vice-President, he had been a Senator for ten years; nevertheless, when President Roosevelt told Admiral William D. Leahy that he had decided on Truman for his running mate, Leahy looked astonished and asked, "Who the hell is Truman?"¹⁴

¹²"Brass Bands and Boos," Time, LVII (April 30, 1951), 27.

¹³The Knoxville News Sentinel, 10 November, 1960, p. 12.

¹⁴Statement by William D. Leahy cited by Steinberg, p. 13.

When Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, part of the emotional shock experienced by the American people stemmed from their sudden realization of who had succeeded him. But the main problem that confronted Truman was not the support of the people (the Gallup Poll showed his popular support to be very high¹⁵), but the growing hostility of men within the Roosevelt Administration who considered Truman too small for the job. Years later, when asked about this hostility he had faced from the Roosevelt Administration, Truman replied:

Yes, it's true. There was some of that, but it is only to be expected when there is a sudden change. I took very little notice of it because I understood exactly how people who were close to Roosevelt felt. They had lost their leader and they were down in the dumps. They were probably afraid that the country would go to the dogs with a new man whom they thought didn't know much about what to do. But after they found out--that is, the vast majority of them--that I was going to carry out the policies and ideals of Franklin Roosevelt to their logical conclusion, they began to feel differently. I never held a grudge against any of them, not even those who were indiscreet enough to voice their misgivings or disapproval of me publicly.¹⁶

The diplomatic master, Winston Churchill, confessed to Truman in January, 1952:

The last time you and I sat across the conference table was at Potsdam, Mr. President.

¹⁵Truman, Years, p. 177.

¹⁶Truman, Citizen, p. 183.

I must confess, Sir, I held you in very low regard then. I loathed you taking the place of Franklin Roosevelt.¹⁷

In 1948, Truman's mother-in-law, Mrs. Madge Gates Wallace, told her friends in Independence, Missouri, that it was a sheer waste of time and effort for him to campaign against Tom Dewey.¹⁸

Perhaps one of the reasons that Truman was so underestimated by everyone was that most people think of the Presidential office as being filled with a man more exalted than the average person. Harry Truman was not that kind of person. He did not feel it beneath him to talk to the man in the streets. This informality is further attested to by Alfred Steinberg, who states:

He could welcome Princess Elizabeth of England with heartfelt dignity when she visited the United States. Yet a few hours later he could throw his head back and laugh uproariously at a bawdy story. He insisted that the pomp attending the Presidency be maintained to the hilt, and the military band greeted him in the morning with "Hail to the Chief." Yet at night, once he was away from the limelight and within his own quarters, his valet sometimes could find him washing out his own socks and underwear.¹⁹

Although Truman, while President, was constantly underestimated by both friends and enemies alike, and although he left office with the confidence of only

¹⁷Statement by Winston Churchill cited by Steinberg, pp. 11-12.

¹⁸Steinberg, p. 12.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 13.

thirty-two percent of the American people, a most unusual thing has happened to the Truman image since he has returned to private life. Most historians agree that it is still difficult to tell what verdict history will reach concerning Harry S. Truman. It is interesting to note, however, that within Truman's own lifetime, many of the historians agree that he must be ranked with the strongest of American Presidents. The New York Times recently polled seventy-five historians as to their opinions concerning the United States Presidents. They rated Truman as a "near great" President, one coming after the "greats", Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, Woodrow Wilson, Thomas Jefferson, and Franklin Roosevelt.²⁰ Had this poll been published during Truman's Presidency, it would probably have been considered an exaggeration of Truman's capacity.

How much faith can be placed in this poll is another problem; but it does show that the Truman image has become more favorable as the years pass. Truman's changing image can be seen not only in polls, but also in newspapers and in magazines. In 1951, Time magazine described Truman's Administration as follows:

Harry Truman, completing his sixth year as President, last week had written a record of courage in crises--in enunciating the Truman Doctrine against the Communists in Greece and Turkey, in his firmness over the Berlin

²⁰ "Our Presidents: A Rating by 75 Historians," The New York Times Magazine, 26 (July 29, 1962), 13.

blockade, in the way he rallied his party and won the 1948 election, and in his quick decision to counter the Korean aggression. But the six years had provided increasing evidence of shabby politicking and corruption in his day-to-day administration, of doubts about his State Department, and cumulative distaste for his careless government by crony.²¹

When Truman was President, he was admired for his courage, but considered coarse, weak, and in many way incompetent. By 1960, however, people remembered only his courage. Life magazine, which had been mostly anti-Truman while he was President, sketches his post-Presidential image as follows:

From his burdens, from the loyal but ruthless opposition, the office gains strength, and for more often than not, so does the office holder. Once he served, then history in a tender forgetfulness, wraps a kind of cloak around him.

. . . Harry S. Truman stepped down in 1953 amid bitterness and cries of scandal. But these fade away into wry memories, while recollections remain of the brave decisions he made--the atom bomb, the Marshall Plan, the Berlin Airlift and Korea.²²

THE TRUMAN PHILOSOPHY

Truman's philosophic roots, as is commonly the case, lie firmly entrenched within his rural family soil. Born in Lamar, Missouri, on May 8, 1884, he was denied a college education because of his father's financial failures, which necessitated his helping

²¹"The Little Man Who Dared," Time, LVII (April 23, 1951), 24.

²²"Politics: A Great Game and a Sight to Behold," Life, 49 (July 4, 1960), 22-23.

presence on the family farm.

Politically, Truman's parents were Democrats, forever resentful of the Republican Party for its role in the Civil War and in the Reconstruction. In later years, Truman described the feelings of his parents when asked if he thought the South was "a drag" on the Democratic Party:

I think the South is coming around to where it ought to be. You see, the Southern bloc was brought about by the situation after the War Between the States. This situation arose from the Reconstruction Program, and a great many people in the South had a terrible time getting over their feeling about the North. My mother and father never did get over it, but I know that the best thing for the world, and for the United States, was what Lincoln did to make a nation out of this country. And we are gradually convincing the southerners that it was the best thing for them too, although, like my mother, they don't like Lincoln, Grant, or Sherman.²³

There are many reasons why Truman remained a Democrat even after he was old enough to rise above the political influence of his parents. Perhaps the most important one can be best told by Truman himself:

I assume everybody knows that I have always belonged to the Democratic Party. One of the deciding reasons for remaining a Democrat, after intensive study of the history of the United States, was that the Democratic Party, in the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, had always supported strong Presidents, while the Republican Party has been constantly suspicious of strong Presidents, even those of its own (Teddy Roosevelt), and timid about supporting Presidential powers and duties.

²³Truman, Citizen, p. 178.

The efforts in the past to hamper and restrict the office of the Presidency fall largely into two categories--attempts to contract the inherent powers of the President and attempts to cause him to lose prestige.²⁴

Being a Democrat, however, does not necessarily mean that a person is a liberal. Many Southern Democrats are more conservative than Republicans. Truman, unlike his parents, became a liberal Democrat. It is impossible to evaluate his political philosophy when he first entered politics, because his campaigning for the office of Eastern Judge in Jackson County did not require him to express his views on national issues. He first expressed his liberal viewpoint on national issues when he ran for the United States Senate in 1934, vigorously supporting Roosevelt and the New Deal. When elected to the Senate, his voting record from 1934 to 1940 indicates that he held to a liberal philosophy.

Nevertheless, President Roosevelt supported Truman's opponent in the 1940 Missouri primary on the grounds that Truman was not progressive enough.²⁵ By 1944, however, Roosevelt had changed his mind, choosing Truman as his running mate over many proclaimed liberals. Were there any doubt as to whether or not Truman would follow a liberal program when he became President, they were soon eradicated.

During the 1948 Presidential election he addresses his radio audience as follows:

I am happy to be on this program tonight to pay tribute to the liberal spirit of the forces of labor

²⁴Truman, Citizen, p. 235.

²⁵Steinberg, p. 13.

in the United States.

On such a program I want to reiterate my faith ²⁶ in the liberal philosophy of the Democratic Party.

Later in the program Truman explained what he meant by a "liberal philosophy."

For myself and for the Democratic Party, I completely reject the idea that we should eliminate the New Deal. Instead, we should build upon a better way of life. Let me be specific:

We should repeal the Taft-Hartley Act.

We should increase the minimum wage from forty cents an hour to at least seventy-five cents an hour.

Social Security insurance should be extended to large groups of people not now protected.

The insurance benefits should be increased by approximately fifty percent.

The federal government should provide aid to the states in meeting the educational needs of our children.

The Congress should provide aid for slum clearance and low-rent housing.

. . . This is the program you can expect from the Democratic Party. You can expect it only from the Democratic Party.²⁷

Although much of Truman's domestic legislation was blocked by Congress, Truman has always been respected for his willingness to fight for his programs. Truman believed that it is the duty of the President to fight for legislation, as can be seen by his attacks on the Republican Eightieth Congress (1947-1948). He has described his philosophy of Presidential leadership

²⁶ Excerpts from address by Harry S. Truman appearing in The New York Times, 22 October, 1948, p. 18.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 18.

as follows:

And so a successful administration is one of strong Presidential leadership. Weak leadership--or no leadership--produces failure, often chaos. It produces a period of government similar to that of other countries which we think of as being different from ourselves. These are countries where governments are continually falling--where no problem can be decided because the legislature will not support any government which proposes to face problems of real difficulty, where any decision will be unpopular.²⁸

When it came to foreign affairs, Truman believed in a strict bi-partisan approach, as has already been noted earlier in this chapter. Many people still insist that the Democrats and the Republicans have different principles and ideas with respects to foreign policy; however, since World War II, isolationism has become a dead issue, and there does not seem to be partisan differences in the basic goals of foreign policy. When there are basic differences, they are usually differences between individuals and not parties. The party in power will always be attacked by the party out of power; in recent years, nevertheless, the attack has been directed at the methods used, not at the basic goals.

When Truman made the decision to enter the Korean conflict in June, 1950, he had the wholehearted support of the Republican Party.²⁹ In his book Years of Trial and Hope, Truman describes his methods and his goals:

²⁸Truman, Citizen, p. 234.

²⁹Truman, Years, p. 338.

. . . As President, I have always tried to listen to all sides before approving what I thought was the most balanced approach.

I did not lose sight of this approach when Korea broke on us. In Korea, the Communists challenged us, but they were capable of challenging us in a similar way in many places and, what was even more serious, they could if they chose, plunge us and the world into another and far more terrible war. Every decision I made in connection with the Korean conflict had this one aim in mind: to prevent a third World War and the terrible destruction it would bring to the civilized world. This meant that we should not do anything that would provide the excuse to the Soviets and plunge the free nations into full scale all-out war.³⁰

Thus, the goal of Truman's Korean policy was the limited objective of removing the Communists from South Korea, but to do so without provoking a third World War.

SUMMARY

Harry S. Truman was an unpopular President while in office. In addition to being generally considered by most political leaders as a "little man",³¹ he was constantly underestimated by his friends and his enemies. Since he has left office, however, the Truman image has become widely respected and more appreciated by the American people.

Politically, Truman was a liberal Democrat, advocating a bi-partisan policy in foreign affairs. When the Korean War broke out, his entire policy was directed toward removing the Communists from Korea without provoking World War III.

³⁰Truman, Years, p. 345.

³¹"The Little Man Who Dared," Time, LVII (April 23, 1951), 24.

This is the man who in 1951 discharged his Far Eastern Commander, General MacArthur, one in sharp political and philosophic contrast to him.

CHAPTER II
THE GENERAL

SYMBOLS
LARGE-SCALE
EVOLUTION

CHAPTER II

THE GENERAL

At 8:29 P. M., on April 17, 1951, ten thousand people began cheering as the Constellation Bataan landed at the San Francisco Airport.¹ On board was General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, who had recently been stripped of his Far Eastern posts by President Harry S. Truman. As he reached the ground, hundreds of people broke past police lines in an effort to catch a close glimpse of, or perhaps to touch, this "old soldier" who was returning to the United States for the first time in over thirteen years.² While a cannon roared a seventeen-gun salute, MacArthur, with his wife and son, struggled for over twenty minutes to get to his car.

In all probability, most soldiers, if relieved of their command by a President, would return to America in national disgrace. MacArthur, however, was returning as a national hero. Time magazine described his arrival in San Francisco ". . . as though every man, woman, and child had been given a massive shot of adrenalin."³

¹"Hero's Welcome," Time, LVII (April 30, 1951), 24.

²The New York Times, 18 April, 1951, p. 1.

³"Hero's Welcome," Time, LVII (April 30, 1951), 23-24.

The news of MacArthur's dismissal inflamed the American public. Almost every bar and street corner was filled with people arguing. In New York two thousand longshoremen quit work for the day in order to demonstrate for MacArthur.⁴ Newsweek magazine reported that when a California housewife protested Truman's decision to her husband, Mr. Henry D. Newcombe, he became enraged and smashed a radio over her head.⁵ Three hundred thousand telegrams poured into Congressmen, while many Republican Congressmen began their plans to demand Truman's impeachment.⁶

On the day following his arrival in San Francisco, MacArthur was invited to address a large crowd in the San Francisco Civic Center. Mentioning the controversy which had brought him home, but being careful to save the defense of his position for his address before Congress, MacArthur said in part:

I have just been asked if I intended to enter politics. My reply was 'No'. I have no political aspirations whatever. I do not intend to run for any political office. I hope that my name will never be used in a political way. The only politics I have is contained in a simple phrase known to all of you--God Bless America.⁷

MacArthur next flew to Washington. On Thursday, April 19, he addressed a joint meeting of the House

⁴Newsweek, XXXVII (April 23, 1951), 24.

⁵Ibid., 24.

⁶Ibid., 24.

⁷Excerpt from statement by Douglas MacArthur appearing in "Hero's Welcome," Time, LVII (April 30, 1951), 24.

and Senate.⁸ He was warmly received by Congressmen of both parties, even though many of them realized that his speech, which had not been officially cleared, might result in severe damage to the Democratic Party. The first portion of his speech dealt with the progress made in Japan as a result of the United States occupation. When he turned to the Korean question, he was relatively mild in his attacks on the Truman administration; but he did not fail to defend strongly his policies which had conflicted with those of the President. In all, he was interrupted some thirty times for applause.⁹

After he had defended his policies, he was ready to make his farewell. He said:

I am closing my fifty-two years of military service. When I joined the Army even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all my boyish hopes and dreams. The world has turned over many times since I first took the oath on the plain at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished. But I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly that

Old soldiers never die; they just fade away.

And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and fade away--an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty. Good-by.¹⁰

⁸ See complete text of address in Appendix IV, pp. 144-151.

⁹ "The Old Soldier," Time, LVII (April 30, 1951), 21.

¹⁰ Excerpt from a speech by Douglas MacArthur appearing in Congressional Record, Vol. 97, part 3, 82nd Congress, First Session, April 19, 1951, 4125. Hereafter cited as Congressional Record with date.

The effect of his dramatic farewell on Congress was described by Time magazine as follows:

It was a spine-tingling and theatrical climax, audaciously beyond the outer limits of ordinary present-day oratory. In the wild crash of applause, many a legislative eye was wet. So were many other eyes across the land as the nation turned from radios and television screens back to office duties and neglected chores. Douglas MacArthur handed his manuscript to the clerk, waved to his wife in the visitors' gallery, then strode through the cheering rows of Congressmen. History would remember this day and this man, and mark him large.¹¹

Having completed his address to Congress, MacArthur then was given a triumphant parade down Pennsylvania Avenue to ceremonies at the Washington Monument. Before more than 250,000 people MacArthur spoke on the basic American principles which have made America a great nation.¹²

On April 20, MacArthur received an exuberant welcome from the City of New York. The parade began and ended at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, and covered a route of over nineteen miles. Time magazine described his New York welcome as follows:

From the moment the general's motorcade moved off, the city's great towers--which stood clean and glowing under a bright blue sky--resounded to a flowing torrent of sound. At the tip of Manhattan it increased. Ships and tugs lent their whistle to the din. Then, lower Broadway--the financial district's Canyon of Heroes began to resound to the clop of police horses, the crash of brass bands, as paraders moved out to lead MacArthur a mile to City Hall. History's greatest fall of paper, ticker tape, and torn

¹¹"The Old Soldier," Time, LVII (April 30, 1951), 23.

¹²The New York Times, 20 April, 1951, p. 1.

telephone books (2,850 tons) cascaded down, filling the street ankle deep. It fell so thickly for a time that it completely blurred the lenses of television cameras.¹³

Life magazine described the New York welcome as follows:

. . . As his [MacArthur's] car moved slowly through nineteen miles of the city streets, planes wrote 'Welcome Home' in the sky above him, . . . At City Hall eighteen people were bruised and trampled as the General stepped out to say a few words to the crowd of about 60,000.¹⁴

It would seem to most people that anything following the grandeur of the New York welcome would be anti-climactic; for MacArthur, however, it was merely the beginning. For the next year and a half, he made numerous appearances in various cities throughout the country. Each city provided its own tumultuous welcome. In July, 1952, MacArthur served as the keynote speaker for the Republican National Convention in Chicago, thus concluding his spectacular reception by the United States.

THE MACARTHUR IMAGE

As millions of Americans gathered on great avenues to welcome home General MacArthur, they were welcoming more than a war hero. Norman Vincent Peale explained what MacArthur meant to the American people when he said:

No man of our time is more authentically the

¹³"Hero's Welcome," Time, LVII (April 30, 1951), 24.

¹⁴"The Heartiest Welcome Ever," Life, 31 (April 30, 1951), 30-31.

voice of real America than Douglas MacArthur. To millions who lined the streets of our great cities to cheer and weep as he passed by, he is the personification of American tradition and history. . . .

In this stalwart, romantic figure, the great hopes, dreams, and ideals of our country came to life again. He stimulates renewed faith that the land of Washinton, Jefferson, and Lincoln still lives in the hearts of the people.¹⁵

Thus, General MacArthur can be viewed as an idealized, romantic figure representing to many people the pioneering spirit and courage which Americans have always revered as a part of their great heritage. Time magazine described the romantic effect of the MacArthur image as follows:

A good many in the crowd saw Douglas MacArthur as a symbol of a kind of patriotism that still existed for them even if sophisticates dismissed it as old-fashioned.¹⁶

Perhaps one of the major reasons why General MacArthur has represented the American ideal is that to most Americans he was a man of mystery, known to them only through pictures and through newspaper accounts. Prior to his recall, he had not been in the United States in over thirteen years. The American people had never been given the opportunity to cheer him for his heroic feats as Supreme Allied Commander in the Pacific during World War II. They had never had a chance to praise him for his work as head of the

¹⁵A Statement by Norman Vincent Peale appearing in the "Introduction" of Douglas MacArthur, Revitalizing A Nation, edited by John M. Pratt (Chicago: The Heritage Foundation, Inc., 1952), p. 5. Hereafter referred to as MacArthur, Nation.

¹⁶"Hero's Welcome," Time, LVII (April 30, 1951), 24.

United States Occupation Forces in Japan, which had turned a war-time enemy into a close ally. They had never been given a chance to see this great general who they knew was destined to take his place in history with other great heroes such as Washinton, Grant, Lee, Pershing, and Farragut. When MacArthur returned, their opportunity came, and they expressed their gratitude, mingled with nostalgic joy for MacArthur's deeds and with vitriolic contempt for Truman's act of dismissal. As millions poured out their heartfelt thanks to MacArthur, they praised not only his personal accomplishments, but also the accomplishments of many great men who had built a great America.¹⁷

While MacArthur was the personification of the American dream, he was also a strong, impressive-looking man. Time magazine described his general impression as follows:

Douglas MacArthur was the personification of the big man, with the many admirers who look to a great man for leadership, with the few critics who distrust and fear a big man's dominating ways.¹⁸

MacArthur's image, therefore, was not only a romantic, idealized image of a great American hero who represented the great heroes of the American tradition, but he was also a bulwark of strength-- the type of man that people naturally look toward for leadership. The problem was that Truman, not MacArthur, was in a position to provide the leadership.

¹⁷Norman Vincent Peale appearing in MacArthur, Nation, p. 5.

¹⁸"Little Man Who Dared," Time, LVII (April 23, 1951), 24.

MACARTHUR'S PHILOSOPHY

General Douglas MacArthur was born on an army post at Fort Little Rock, Arkansas, on January 26, 1880. Francis Trevelyan Miller quotes MacArthur as saying, "My earliest recollection is the sound of army bugles."¹⁹ His father, General Arthur MacArthur, provided him not only with a military environment, but also with the ideal of courageous attainment. The senior MacArthur was a veteran of the Civil War and was a personal friend of many Indian fighters, including Buffalo Bill.²⁰ In the Spanish-American War of 1898, he became a hero, and was made military Governor of the Philippines when the war was terminated. Recalling his father's influence on his political thinking, Douglas MacArthur stated at the 1952 Republican Convention:

I speak with a sense of pride that all of my long life I have been a member of the Republican Party, as before me was my father, an ardent supporter of Abraham Lincoln.²¹

Following his graduation at West Point in 1903, where he was first in his class with one of the highest grade averages in the history of the Academy, Douglas MacArthur served in various posts until World War I. Commissioned to lead his famous "Rainbow

¹⁹ Francis Trevelyan Miller, General Douglas MacArthur (Philadelphia: The John C. Winston Company, 1944), p. 31.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 32.

²¹ Excerpt from speech by Douglas MacArthur appearing in The New York Times, 8 July, 1952, p. 18.

Division" in France, MacArthur, by the end of the war, had been twice wounded and once gassed, had won thirteen medals, seven citations and twenty-four foreign decorations, and had been promoted to the rank of brigadier general.²²

After he arrived in the United States, he was appointed superintendent of West Point from 1919 to 1922. Throughout the 1920's he served in the United States and in the Philippines until 1930, when, at the age of fifty, he was appointed the youngest Chief of Staff in history.²³

Although he was a professed Republican, few people really knew the full extent of MacArthur's political philosophy until he openly expressed his opposition to Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal. Frazier Hunt describes his feelings about the New Deal as follows:

What alarmed MacArthur was the definite turning away by the new administration from certain old concepts of strict constitutional government with more and more power being concentrated in the hands of the Chief Executive. MacArthur had been brought up a strict Constitutionalist, and he was deeply concerned over the somewhat radical turn of affairs resulting from the growing power of the leftist New Dealers. He made little effort to hide his alarm from the President.²⁴

President Roosevelt soon learned that his Chief of Staff was a strong conservative. He frequently called MacArthur to the White House to ask his advice about various pieces of New Deal legislation.

²²"MacArthur's Career," Time, LVII (April 23, 1951), 24.

²³Ibid., 24.

²⁴Frazier Hunt, The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1954), p. 158.

When MacArthur asked Roosevelt why he always sought his advice on matters which did not pertain to military affairs, Roosevelt replied: "Douglas, you are my American conscience."²⁵

It was not merely on political matters that the President and his Chief of Staff disagreed. MacArthur was concerned about the military unpreparedness of the United States throughout the 1930's. Roosevelt was also concerned about America's military strength, but both were confronted with a Congress which was reluctant to grant a large budget for the Army and to pass legislation calling for compulsory military service. MacArthur was infuriated when Roosevelt failed to support his requests to Congress. On one occasion, MacArthur called on Roosevelt to protest the fact that the Army budget had been slashed in order to pay for the Civilian Conservation Corps. Frazier Hunt has described the incident as follows:

He [MacArthur] insisted that he was in no way usurping civil authority. Congress rightly held the purse strings of all expenditures. But this was a matter of life or death for the Armed Forces and the country. It was the President's duty to throw his great weight on the side of national security.

Sharp words were exchanged. MacArthur, who had prided himself all his life on his cool detachment in the face of conflict, now felt his self-control beginning to weaken. He was conscious of the significance of the fight he was making. He could not retreat in his arguments or in his demands. He felt that his country's safety was at stake, and that if necessary, he would sacrifice his own professional career. His sense of duty

²⁵Statement by Franklin Roosevelt cited by Hunt, p. 171.

was clear and undeniable.²⁶

Thus it was that General MacArthur became accustomed to expressing his views on political matters to the President. Indeed, Roosevelt encouraged him to do so; and, although the two disagreed violently on certain matters, it was MacArthur's will that occasionally prevailed. Roosevelt's great respect for MacArthur can be evidenced in his parting words to the General as the latter left for duty in the Philippines in 1935, after having completed his term as Chief of Staff. Roosevelt said:

Douglas, if war should suddenly come, don't wait for orders to return home. Grab the first transportation you can find. I want you to command my armies.²⁷

In 1951, MacArthur again risked his military career in order to express his views which he was convinced were right. Unfortunately, President Truman, unlike Roosevelt, would not acquiesce to his demands. The result was the end of MacArthur's career.

General MacArthur's conservative views were not only evident in his opposition to the New Deal, but also in his speeches which he made after his recall. His chief aide, Major General Courtney Whitney, quotes MacArthur as saying,

The past twenty years have witnessed an incessant encroachment upon the capitalistic system through the direction of our own public

²⁶Hunt, p. 152.

²⁷Statement by Franklin Roosevelt cited by Hunt, p. 171.

policy. This has left our free economy badly bruised and severely tried. . . . Another and yet more serious assault upon the capitalistic system has been the increasingly oppressive government levies upon both capital and profit. The principle underlying such levies has not been to equalize the burden of meeting the legitimate costs of government by a just and uniform assessment, but has followed instead a conspiratorial design, originally evolved by Karl Marx, to first weaken and then to destroy the capitalistic system.²⁸

At the 1952 Republican Convention MacArthur further expressed his concern about the spirit of America being crushed by oppressive taxation. He said:

Our people are desperate for a plan which will revive hope and restore faith as they feel the oppressive burden of the tax levy upon every source of revenue and upon every property transaction; as they see astronomically rising public debt heavily mortgaging the industry, the well-being and opportunity of our children and our children's children. . . . There is no plan to transform extravagance into frugality, no desire to regain economic and fiscal stability, no prospect of return to rugged idealism and collective tranquility of our fathers.²⁹

In Revitalizing a Nation MacArthur explained why he believed that "a return" to the forces of the past is desirable. He said:

Our great strength rests in those high-minded and patriotic Americans whose faith in God and love of country transcends all selfish and self-serving instincts. We must command their maximum effort toward a restoration to public and private

²⁸ Excerpt from speech by Douglas MacArthur cited by Major General Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 535.

²⁹ Excerpt from speech by General MacArthur appearing in The New York Times, 8 July, 1952, p. 18.

relationships of our age-old standards of morality and ethics--a return to the religious fervor which animated our leadership of former years to chart a course of humility and integrity as best to serve the public interest.³⁰

The unique aspect of MacArthur's philosophy is not his conservatism, but his willingness to express publicly his views, even when they conflicted with those of his superiors. Although many have severely criticized MacArthur for his public opposition to his superiors, he was adamant in his self-defense. He stated:

I have been warned by many that an outspoken course, even if it be solely of truth, will bring down upon my head ruthless retaliation--that efforts will be made to destroy public faith in the integrity of my views--not by force of just argument but by the application of the false methods of propaganda. I am told in effect that I must blindly follow the leader--keep silent--or take the bitter consequences. I had thought Abraham Lincoln had pinned down for all time this ugly code when he declared: 'To sin by silence when they should protest makes cowards out of men.'³¹

Thus, General MacArthur never kept silent when convinced he was right. Although MacArthur's political views contrasted with those of President Truman, it was MacArthur's views on war that caused him to publicly disagree with the President. Truman claimed that MacArthur's views on war could not be divorced from MacArthur's views concerning international relation; when MacArthur expressed his military views,

³⁰ MacArthur, Nation, p. 15.

³¹ Ibid., p. 13.

Truman considered him trying to influence American foreign policy.³²

It is true that MacArthur was opposed to Truman's foreign policy. After World War II, Truman had directed America's foreign policy toward rebuilding and restoring Europe, and defending it against Communism. MacArthur believed this approach to be misdirected. He said:

It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomats still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to Communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable, win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom.³³

This author is convinced that it was precisely this denunciation of Truman's "Europe First" policy that resulted in MacArthur's recall. In addition, MacArthur's staunch viewpoint toward war--total abstinence or total participation--might conceivably have been a contributive factor in his recall. In assessing the practicability of war in this modern age, MacArthur explained:

No man in the world is more anxious to avoid the expansion of war than I. I am a one hundred percent disbeliever in war. The enormous sacrifices that have been brought about by scientific methods of killing have rendered a war a fantastic

³²Truman, Years, p. 442.

³³Excerpt from a letter by Douglas MacArthur cited by Clark Lee, Douglas MacArthur (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952), p. 348.

and impossible method for the solution of international difficulties.³⁴

Yet, despite the fact that General MacArthur considered war a senseless solution to international problems, for him there was no concept of a "limited war." While Truman wanted to prevent a widening of the Korean conflict into World War III, MacArthur denounced the policy of limited war in his address to Congress, by saying:

. . . Efforts have been made to distort my position. It has been said in effect that I am a warmonger. Nothing could be further from the truth. I know war as few other men now living know it, and nothing to me is more revolting. . . . But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very object is victory--not prolonged indecision. In war,³⁵ indeed, there can be no substitute for victory.

SUMMARY

President Harry S. Truman and General Douglas MacArthur are extremely dissimilar. Truman has always been liberal; MacArthur has always been conservative. Truman believed that, as President of the United States, his orders and authority should not be publicly questioned by subordinates; MacArthur believed that it was his personal duty to protest the decisions of his superiors if he was convinced that they were wrong.

³⁴MacArthur, Nation, pp. 15-16.

³⁵Excerpt from a speech by Douglas MacArthur appearing in Congressional Record, April 19, 1951, p. 4125.

Truman was an unpopular President with the public image of a "little man"; MacArthur conveyed not only the image of a "big man", but also stood as a romantic, idealized figure in whom Americans saw America's great heritage. Truman believed in a foreign policy directed toward a "Europe First" philosophy; MacArthur believed that American foreign policy should be centered in Asia where the Communists were making their bid for world power. Truman believed in limiting the Korean conflict to Korea in order to avoid World War III; MacArthur believed in extending the war to the mainland of China in order to avoid defeat in Korea. Their Korean policies reflected Truman's hope for "containment," as opposed to MacArthur's hope for "complete victory."

When two such opposite men attempted to establish a policy in the Far East, the clash that followed seems quite inevitable.

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CHAPTER III

FREEDOM AND FRUSTRATION

CHAPTER III

FREEDOM AND FRUSTRATION

Prior to August, 1945, when the United States occupation forces landed in Korea, there were probably few Americans who knew anything about Korea other than that it was a distant land in Asia which was a part of the Japanese Empire.

Korea was originally an Asian kingdom, dependent on China until the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. Japan, the victor in that conflict, began to extend its influence in Korea until the Korean government became a puppet government controlled by the Japanese Emperor. In 1910, Japan annexed Korea and treated it as a conquered province.

In the years following the annexation, Japan pursued a policy of "assimilation",¹ an attempt to absorb the Korean people into the Japanese nationality and to make them forget that they were Koreans. This policy, however, extended for thirty-five years, did not accomplish its objective: Korean nationalism remained alive.²

In November, 1943, President Franklin Roosevelt

¹ Kenneth Scott Latourette, A Short History of the Far East (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1957), p. 513.

² Ibid., p. 513.

of the United States, Prime Minister Winston Churchill of England, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of China met in Cairo, Egypt, to discuss future arrangements in the Far East which would go into effect following the defeat of Japan. The three agreed that post-World War II Asia must include a free and independent Korea. The Joint Communique, which they issued at the close of the conference, said in part:

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill, together with their respective military and diplomatic advisers, have completed a conference in North Africa.

The following general statement was issued:

The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already rising.

The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. . . . The aforesaid Three Great Powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.³

Later, in December, 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill met with Premier Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union at Teheran, Iran. Stalin said that he approved of the Cairo Declaration, but he felt that Korea would need a period of apprenticeship before complete independence might be obtained.⁴

³"Joint Communique on the Cairo Conference of December 1, 1943," appearing in The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, edited by Samuel J. Roseman (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), pp. 530-531.

⁴Truman, Years, p. 316.

Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin met again at the Yalta Conference in February, 1945. Roosevelt brought up the subject of Korea and claimed that the best form of government for Korea, until they were ready for complete independence, would be a three-power trusteeship with the Soviets, the Chinese, and the United States represented. Because of the United States' experience in the Philippines, Roosevelt believed that it would take at least thirty years to prepare the Koreans for independence. Stalin agreed, but he thought that the British should be asked to join the trusteeship arrangement.⁵

Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945. Harry Truman, his successor, sent Harry Hopkins to Moscow to confer with Stalin in May, 1945. At that time, Stalin assured Hopkins that the Soviet Union was still in favor of a four-power trusteeship in Korea.⁶

Korea did not become a subject for discussion when President Truman met with Stalin and Churchill at the Potsdam Conference in July, 1945, but when the military chiefs of the three Allies conferred in that same month, they agreed that there should be a line of demarcation in Korea between American and Russian operations.⁷

The thirty-eighth parallel eventually became the line of demarcation. Truman later explained how the thirty-eighth parallel became the line that divided Korea. He said:

⁵Truman, Years, pp. 316-317.

⁶Ibid., p. 317.

⁷Ibid., p. 317.

The thirty-eighth parallel as a dividing line in Korea was never the subject of international discussions. It was proposed by us as a practicable solution when a sudden collapse of the Japanese war machine created a vacuum in Korea. We had no troops there and no shipping to land forces at more than a few locations in the southern half of the peninsula. The State Department urged that in all Korea the surrender of Japanese forces should be taken by the Americans, but there was no way to get our troops into the northern part of the country with the speed required without sacrificing the security of our initial landings in Japan. In view of the fact that Stalin had concurred in the idea of a joint trusteeship, we expected that the division of the country would be solely for the purpose of accepting the Japanese surrender and that joint control would then extend throughout the peninsula.⁸

The first sign that the Russians considered the thirty-eighth parallel more than merely a temporary line of demarcation came when they completed the surrender of Japanese forces in North Korea. It was suddenly announced that no traffic would be allowed to enter North Korea without special permission. Friction began rising between the United States and Russia, because now that the Japanese forces had surrendered, it was time to dissolve the thirty-eighth parallel division and begin arranging the joint trusteeship.⁹

Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, Commander of the United States forces in Korea, attempted to open talks with the Russians; however, after several rebuffs, it became obvious to him that the Russians were

⁸Truman, Years, p. 317.

⁹Ibid., p. 317.

not cooperating to bring about the four-power trusteeship.¹⁰ General MacArthur, the Supreme Allied Commander in the Far East, was also becoming increasingly concerned with the failure of the Russians to fulfill their promises. His monthly reports to the Chiefs of Staff on the progress of the United States occupation of Korea and Japan became so pessimistic concerning Korea, that by October, 1945, he pictured Korea as a "confused and helpless country."¹¹

By late 1945, General Hodge found that the idea of a four-power trusteeship was very unpopular with the Korean people themselves. Having been denied self-government for thirty-five years, the Koreans were in no mood to wait thirty more years. Concerning the trusteeship, Hodge wrote that ". . . if it is imposed now or at any future time, the Korean people will actually and physically revolt."¹²

In December, 1945, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes was scheduled to meet with the Russian Foreign Minister Molotov in Moscow. At the meeting, Byrnes proposed that the United States and Russian military zones be abolished, and that the four-power trusteeship begin at once. Truman described what happened as follows:

Molotov asked for time to study our statement, and it was not until December 20 that he returned to the subject. Then he agreed that the Soviet Union had agreed to the idea of a four-power trusteeship, but, he added this was a long-term

¹⁰Truman, Years, pp. 317-318.

¹¹The New York Times, 3 January, 1946, p. 2.

¹²Report by John R. Hodge, cited by Truman, Years, p. 318.

rather than an immediate question. He then proposed on behalf of the Soviet Government that a provisional government be set up in Korea to undertake all necessary measures for the development of industry, agriculture, and transportation of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people.¹³

Molotov also proposed that both the United States and Russian commanders should assist in forming this provisional government. These commanders would form a United States-Soviet Commission to construct the provisional government and would be in charge of establishing a four-power trusteeship to govern Korea until full Korean independence could be achieved. Having been promised once again that the Soviet Union favored a four-power trusteeship for Korea, Byrnes returned to the United States optimistic about United States-Soviet relations for 1946.¹⁴

1946: ANTICIPATIONS AND DISAPPOINTMENTS

When news of the Moscow agreement reached Seoul, capital of Korea, located in the United States zone, the Koreans began to protest the trusteeship by means of mass strikes and attacks on American soldiers.¹⁵

On January 16, 1946, the American and Russian commanders met in Seoul to discuss the establishment of a provisional government. Harry Truman described

¹³Truman, Years, p. 319.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 319

¹⁵"Korea," Time, XLVII (January 7, 1946), 20.

the meeting as follows:

As had been agreed at Moscow, the American and Russian commanders in Korea met on January 16, 1946, but almost at once it became clear that no results would come of their talks. The Russians insisted that the conference had no authority to discuss anything except minor accommodations between the two zones. Our representatives took the position that the discussions should point toward the eventual joining of the zones. In the end, by February 5, only limited agreements had been reached. . . .¹⁶

The hopelessness of the situation was obvious to everyone. In a sarcastic article in the January 28, 1946 issue, Time magazine referred to the meeting as a "circus."¹⁷

In his annual "State of the Union" address to Congress on January 21, 1946, Truman described the policy of the United States toward Korea as follows:

It is the purpose of the Government of the United States to proceed as rapidly as is practicable toward the restoration of the sovereignty of Korea and the establishment of a democratic government by the free choice of the people of Korea.¹⁸

Despite the failure of the January conference, the Joint Commission provided for in the Moscow Agreement began its work in Seoul on March 20, 1946. On the key questions concerning Korean independence, however, the Commission was deadlocked from the start. On May 8, the Commission adjourned without having solved the basic problems of Korea. Both the United States

¹⁶ Truman, Years, p. 320.

¹⁷ "Korea," Time, XLVII (January 28, 1946), 34.

¹⁸ Excerpt of message by Harry S. Truman, appearing in the The New York Times, 22 January, 1946, p. 16.

and Soviet delegations blamed each other for the Commission's failure.¹⁹

By the summer of 1946, people were becoming increasingly suspicious about the real aims and aspirations of Soviet foreign policy. In March, at Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill warned the American people that they must be aware of the new threat to democracy presented by imperialistic Communism. Pointing to the fact that Europe was divided between the forces of Communism and the forces of democracy, Churchill proclaimed: "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the continent."²⁰ In a series of articles for Life magazine, John Foster Dulles warned of the growing threat of Soviet foreign policy. He said in part:

. . . the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is world-wide in scope. Its goal is to have governments everywhere which suppress political and religious thinking which runs counter to their doctrines. Thereby the Soviet Union would achieve world-wide harmony--a Pax Sovietica.²¹

If President Truman had any doubts about Soviet motives, they were certainly removed when, in June, he received a report from Edwin W. Pauley, his personal representative, who had visited North Korea from May 29 to June 3.²² The report described the

¹⁹Truman, Years, p. 320.

²⁰Excerpt of speech by Winston Churchill appearing in "The Nation," Time, XLVII (March 18, 1946), 17.

²¹John Foster Dulles, "Thoughts on Soviet Foreign Policy and What to Do About It" part 2 Life, 26 (June 10, 1946), 119.

²²Truman, Years, p. 320.

Soviet occupation of North Korea as follows:

They are propagandizing and promoting a Communist Party and a Soviet type of program which would establish loyalty to Moscow as the highest form of loyalty to Korea. To this end they are riding rough-shod over all political factions which might oppose or even question such a philosophy. For example, the streets of Northern Korea are decorated with Soviet propaganda posters. Most of these posters publicize the Soviet Government and include large pictures of Lenin and Stalin. . . .

Communism in Korea could get off to a better start than practically anywhere else in the world. The Japanese owned the railroads, all of the public utilities including power and light, as well as all the industries and natural resources. Therefore, if it is suddenly found to be owned by "The People's Committee" (The Communist Party), they will have acquired them without any struggle of any kind or any work in developing them. This is one of the reasons why the United States should not waive its title or claim to Japanese external assets located in Korea until a democratic (capitalistic) form of government is assured.²³

Truman soon learned that the problem in Korea was more than Soviet infiltration into North Korea. South Korea also presented serious problems because the people in that area were becoming increasingly impatient with foreign occupation. Richard J. H. Johnson, a foreign news correspondent, reported to The New York Times that the Korean people were becoming disillusioned. He said in part:

One year ago next week Korea, the first large stepping stone in Japan's march of conquest in Asia, awaited freedom within her grasp.

Today the jubilation has been replaced by

²³ Selections from a report by Edwin W. Pauley, cited by Truman, Years, pp. 321-322.

disillusion, and most Koreans feel that they have exchanged one master for two, the United States and the Soviet Union. Geographically divided at the 38th parallel and politically bisected by two dissimilar systems of government, this nation of 28,000,000 is the unhappy testing ground of United States-Soviet relations.²⁴

During the fall, the Russians conducted elections in North Korea for local People's Committees, but there was only one slate of candidates.²⁵

In the United States' zone the situation was becoming increasingly tense. The Koreans were given freedom of speech, and they exercised that freedom to the utmost. Disorders and popular demonstrations against the United States were widespread. In a few instances the situation became so dangerous that United States troops had to fire into the mobs.²⁶ General MacArthur was preoccupied with events in Japan, but the increased tensions in Korea throughout the fall of 1946 caused him to direct his attentions there. MacArthur was intensely aggravated by the refusal on the part of the Soviets to cooperate. On October 26, he issued a statement in which he attacked the Soviet Union and claimed that no agreement could be reached in Korea as long as the Russians persisted in their attempts to suppress freedom of speech.²⁷

Perhaps the most outstanding spokesman for the Koreans after World War II was Dr. Syngman Rhee. This

²⁴Richard J. H. Johnson, The New York Times, 5 August, 1946, p. 5.

²⁵Truman, Years, p. 322.

²⁶Ibid., p. 322.

²⁷The New York Times, 28 October, 1946, p. 7.

seemed justified in view of the fact that Rhee had resisted Japanese imperialism in Korea prior to annexation. As leader of the movement for Korean independence, Rhee became well-known in the United States. Exiled from Korea most of his life, Rhee returned in 1945 following the defeat of Japan. He was eager to obtain control of the independent Korean government, but the strain in United States-Soviet relations appeared to be frustrating his ambition.

On December 5, 1946, Rhee suggested to General Hodge that the best solution to the Korean problem would be to divide Korea and to establish separate governments in the United States and Russian zones. Hodge was hostile to this suggestion; Rhee, however, eager for power, began to favor such a move publicly.²⁸

1947: INCREASED FRUSTRATIONS

AND AN APPEAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS

On January 4, 1947, General Hodge publicly denounced Rhee's suggestion that Korea be divided.²⁹ His reports to Truman were becoming increasingly pessimistic. Desiring to confer personally with Hodge about the political and economic crisis in Korea, Truman invited him to Washington.

Arriving at the White House on February 24, Hodge reported to Truman that he had recently received information concerning a vast Soviet military build-up

²⁸The New York Times, 6 December, 1946, p. 18.

²⁹The New York Times, 4 January, 1947, p. 1.

in North Korea. According to reports, the Soviets were building a North Korean army of 500,000 men.³⁰ Nevertheless, Hodge convinced Truman that dividing Korea would not solve any problems. Once again, he urged that increased efforts be made to obtain complete cooperation from the Soviet Union.³¹

In his reports from Tokyo, General MacArthur encouraged Truman to break the United States-Soviet deadlock by diplomatic means. Accordingly, on the basis of these reports from General Hodge and General MacArthur, Secretary of State George C. Marshall convinced Truman to make one more attempt to negotiate with the Soviet Union. Marshall quickly proceeded to make arrangements with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov for a new meeting of the United States-Soviet Joint Commission in Seoul on May 21, 1947.³²

As the Commission began its discussions, the question of a trusteeship became a major issue. Public opinion in Korea was against it, but the Russians would not consider free elections. In a typically angry mood, Syngman Rhee declared:

More good can come to Korea if the present conference breaks than if it comes to an agreement. If I were General Hodge. . . I would not waste time talking with the Russians.

The Commission got off to a good start, but by July, the delegates were once again deadlocked. The Russians were unwilling to begin organizing the

³⁰The New York Times, 25 February, 1947, p. 1.

³¹Truman, Years, p. 323.

³²Ibid., p. 323.

³³Statement by Syngman Rhee appearing in "Korea," Time, XLIX (June 2, 1947), 34.

provisional government and to allow free elections in North Korea to choose representatives of the trusteeship. The Russians argued that the terms of the Moscow agreement clearly included a promise that a trusteeship would be the first step toward Korean independence, and that no provision had been made to include freely-elected representatives from Korea to form a provisional government. By the end of August negotiations seemed hopeless.³⁴

Frustrated over the repeated intransigence of the Russians, Truman decided to turn the Korean problem over to the United Nations. On September 17, Secretary of State Marshall addressed the General Assembly in Lake Success, New York. He presented the United States' view of the Korean conflict and asked the General Assembly to take action. His speech clearly indicates that Truman's policy toward Korea was still basically the same as it had been at the close of the war. Marshall said in part:

I turn now to the question of the independence of Korea. . . .

For about two years the United States Government has been trying to reach agreement with the Soviet Government through the Joint Commission, and otherwise, on methods of implementing the Moscow Agreement and thus bringing about the independence of Korea. The United States representatives have insisted that any settlement of the Korean problem must in no way infringe the fundamental democratic right of freedom and opinion. That is still the position of my government.

Today the independence of Korea is no further advanced than it was two years ago. Korea remains divided at the 38th parallel, with Soviet forces in the industrial North and United States

³⁴Truman, Years, pp. 323-324.

forces in the agricultural South. There is little or no exchange of goods or services between the two zones. Korea's economy is thus crippled. . . .

It is therefore the intention of the United States government to present the problem of Korean independence to this session of the General Assembly. Although we shall be prepared to submit suggestions as to how the early attainment of Korean independence might be affected, we believe that this is a matter which now requires the impartial judgement of the other members. We do not wish to have the inability of the two powers to reach an agreement delay any further the urgent and rightful claims of the Korean people for independence.³⁵

The Soviet Union opposed bringing the Korean question before the General Assembly. When the motion was made to place Korea on the agenda for discussion, the Soviet delegation campaigned against it. On September 23, the vote was taken. The Soviet bloc voted solidly against it, but they were defeated as the motion carried.³⁶

In Seoul, on September 26, the Soviet representatives in the Joint Commission countered the United States proposal of turning the problem over to the U. N. by demanding that all occupation forces in Korea be withdrawn at the same time, sometime in early 1948.³⁷ Since the American delegation had no authority to agree to the proposal, the idea was communicated to the State Department, and since the principal issue was pending before the United Nations, the State Department

³⁵ Excerpt from a speech by George C. Marshall appearing in The New York Times, 18 September, 1947.

³⁶ The New York Times, 24 September, 1947, p. 1.

³⁷ Truman, Years, p. 324.

Department refused to consider entering such an agreement.³⁸

President Truman, however, had considered the possibility of troop withdrawals from Korea. Congress was pressuring him to cut military spending and many were suggesting that he review United States' commitments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had reviewed the military situation in the Far East and reported to Truman in September. The report said in part:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, from the standpoint of military security, the United States has little strategic interest in maintaining present troops and bases in Korea. . . .³⁹

Truman also received a report from General Albert C. Wedemeyer, who had undertaken a tour of South Korea at the President's request. Wedemeyer agreed that there was no strategic advantage to the United States in keeping troops in Korea, but he warned that if the United States were to withdraw from South Korea, that zone would be vulnerable to attack from the North Korean army. Therefore, Wedemeyer suggested that the United States should concentrate on building a strong South Korean army. Once the army is self-sufficient, the United States should withdraw. Truman decided to follow his advice.⁴⁰

On October 17, the United States introduced a resolution into the General Assembly calling for free elections under the sponsorship of the United

³⁸Truman, Years, pp. 324-325.

³⁹Selection from a report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, cited by Truman, Years, p. 325.

⁴⁰Truman, Years, p. 326.

Nations.⁴¹ The Russians debated the resolution and then charged that the United States and the Soviet Union should withdraw all occupation forces from Korea before outlining a program for unification.⁴² On October 30, a resolution calling for a United Nations Temporary Commission to study the question of free elections was introduced. Russian U. N. Ambassador Gromyko was absent when the resolution came to a vote. The Russian representatives abstained, along with the rest of the Soviet bloc, and the resolution carried 41-0. Shortly thereafter, Gromyko announced that the Russians would not cooperate with the Commission, since it was illegal for the United Nations to tamper with the internal affairs of Korea.⁴³ He also claimed that the United States had violated the Moscow Agreement by taking Korea to the United Nations.⁴⁴

1948: TWO GOVERNMENTS

The United Nations Temporary Commission arrived in Seoul on January 8, 1948, and began its work on January 12. The Commission was faced with immediate problems since the Russian commander in North Korea would not allow the Commission to cross the thirty-eighth parallel.⁴⁵

⁴¹The New York Times, 18 October, 1947, p. 1.

⁴²The New York Times, 29 October, 1947, p. 1.

⁴³The New York Times, 31 October, 1947, p. 1.

⁴⁴Truman, Years, p. 327.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 327.

In February, the Commission received word that the Soviet authorities and Communist Party chieftains were rushing to complete a North Korean government which would be pronounced the "Government of all Korea."⁴⁶ This was reported to the Interim Committee of the General Assembly, which then instructed the Commission to supervise free elections in whatever part of Korea it could reach.⁴⁷

On May 1, the North Korean puppet government defied the United Nations and adopted a constitution claiming jurisdiction over all Korea.⁴⁸ It appeared that Syngman Rhee's demand for a divided Korea would become a reality.

On May 10, 1948, free elections were held throughout South Korea for members of the National Assembly which would be the National Assembly of both North and South Korea alike.⁴⁹ The National Assembly met for the first time on May 31. After Syngman Rhee was chosen chairman, the Assembly proceeded to draw up a constitution, which was completed on July 12, and signed by Syngman Rhee on July 17.⁵⁰ On July 20, the National Assembly elected Rhee President of the Korean Democratic Republic.⁵¹

⁴⁶ The New York Times, 16 February, 1948, p. 1.

⁴⁷ The New York Times, 27 February, 1948, p. 1.

⁴⁸ The New York Times, 1 May, 1948, p. 1.

⁴⁹ Truman, Years, p. 327.

⁵⁰ The New York Times, 17 July, 1948, p. 4.

⁵¹ The New York Times, 20 July, 1948, p. 1.

The next step was to turn the government over to the Koreans. Truman ordered the State Department to create an "independent Korea," but he realized that, in reality, circumstances had forced him to modify his Korean policy. No longer was it possible for him to oppose a divided Korea. The only alternative to a divided Korea would be to force the Soviets from North Korea by means of a military confrontation. This, of course, would mean war.

Truman's decision to support a divided Korea did not mean that he had lost hope that Korea would eventually be united. On August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea was formally proclaimed. Speaking at special ceremonies, General MacArthur expressed the hopes of all government officials that Korea would eventually be unified. He said in part:

In this hour as the forces of righteousness advances, the triumph is dulled by one of the greatest tragedies of contemporary history-- an artificial barrier has divided your land.

This barrier must and will be torn down. Nothing shall prevent the ultimate unity of your people as free men of a free nation.⁵²

On September 9, the Soviet authorities in North Korea formally proclaimed the establishment of the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea."⁵³ Ten days later the Russians sent word to the State Department that all Russian troops would be withdrawn from North Korea.⁵⁴

⁵²Excerpt from a speech by Douglas MacArthur appearing in The New York Times, 15 August, 1948, p. 1.

⁵³Truman, Years, p. 328.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 328.

The big question facing Truman was not whether or not to withdraw United States forces from South Korea, but when to do so. Truman explained the problems which confronted him as follows:

We, of course, were in favor of troop withdrawals. I have always believed that there is nothing that more easily creates antagonisms than the presence of unwanted soldiers, foreign or domestic... .

We knew, however, that the Russians had built up a "People's Army" in North Korea. We knew that Communist infiltration into South Korea was considerable. We knew that the new government of Syngman Rhee would find it difficult to resist effectively if it were attacked. However, a careful estimate had been made by our experts of the chances of survival of the new Republic of Korea, and the conclusion had been reached that 'its prospects for survival may be considered favorable as long as it can continue large scale aid from the United States.'⁵⁵

Having decided to help build up a strong South Korean army, Truman planned on withdrawing United States troops from Korea sometime in 1949.

1949: NEGOTIATIONS CEASE AS TROOPS WITHDRAW

Soviet troops having been withdrawn from North Korea, Truman ordered the Seventh Infantry Division from Korea to Japan in January, 1949.⁵⁶ Truman began to speed up the withdrawals when, in February, he learned from Secretary of the Army Royall that General MacArthur needed more troops in Japan because of the spread of Communism throughout the Chinese

⁵⁵Truman, Years, p. 328.

⁵⁶"Korea," Time, LIII (January 10, 1949), 19.

mainland. Finally, on June 29, 1949, except for a small group of officers who stayed on in an advisory capacity, the last United States troops left Korea.⁵⁷

Truman realized that the only hope for Korean unity was that one of the two systems of government would prove more desirable to the Korean people than the other. All hope of negotiating with the Russians was lost. Therefore, the Republic of South Korea would need large amounts of economic aid from the United States.

In June, Truman asked Congress for one hundred and fifty million dollars in aid to keep Korea stable. He had trouble getting Congress to approve his program as he describes in his memoirs:

Shortly before the expiration of the military appropriations for Korea (for fiscal 1949), I sent a message to the Congress asking for economic aid to Korea in the amount of \$150,000,000. Unfortunately, the Congress took over four months to authorize this sum, and when I asked for another sixty million dollars for the same purpose in the budget for 1950-1951, the request was actually defeated in the House of Representative, with most of the negative votes coming from the Republican members. While it was later passed as a part of a combined Korea-China aid bill, it can be said that, generally, Congress was in no hurry to provide the aid which had been requested for Korea by the President.⁵⁸

SUMMARY

As 1950 began, Truman's Korean policy had

⁵⁷Truman, Years, p. 329.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 329.

evolved from a policy directed at establishing a free and independent Korea, to a policy directed at sustaining a regime in the southern portion of a divided Korea. The division of Korea was the direct result of several factors: the Soviet Union's failure to keep its promises and its failure to cooperate with the United States, and Syngman Rhee's desire for power.

Those who choose to criticize Truman's Korean policy from 1945-1950, might claim that the division of Korea must be regarded as a mark of Truman's failure; that he and Franklin Roosevelt should never have allowed the Russians to enter Korea in the first place; that a strong stand and the threat of a military confrontation would have forced the Soviet Union to withdraw from North Korea, since they did not have the atomic bomb until 1949.

Those who choose to apologize for Truman's Korean policy, from 1945-1950, might argue that the division of Korea was Truman's only alternative to war with the Soviet Union; that Truman was faced with this complex situation following the Second World War, when the United States, and, indeed, the whole world was not psychologically prepared to fight another war; that the only way a war with the Soviet Union could have been won in a short period of time would have been to use the atomic bomb, and, therefore, Truman was faced with a great moral decision as well as a political one.

There is no simple answer to this question. What the argument really boils down to is this: would the Soviet Union have been willing to fight a war to keep Korea, or any other territory acquired as a result of World War II. Many people can speculate, but

Stalin, the only person who really would know the answer to that question, died in March, 1953. With him, the answers died also.

When future historians begin to evaluate Harry Truman's Korean policy, they will be less concerned about his Korean policy from 1945-1950 than with his policies employed during the Korean War. The American people have all but forgotten Truman's post-World War II Korean policy because of the heated public controversy which surrounded his policy of "containment" which, he maintained, was the only way to prevent the Korean War from erupting into World War III. This policy will be considered in the following chapter.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CHAPTER IV
WAR IN ASIA

CONFIDENTIAL

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WAR IN ASIA

By 1950, Truman was concerned about Syngman Rhee's failure to democratize South Korea. Since millions of dollars in United States aid was pouring into South Korea, Truman felt that he could at least expect Rhee to allow freedom of expression. He described Rhee as follows:

Syngman Rhee is a man of strong convictions and has little patience with those who differ with him. From the moment of his return to Korea in 1945, he attracted to himself men of extreme right-wing attitudes and disagreed sharply with the political leaders of more moderate views, and the removal of military government removed restraints that had prevented arbitrary action against his opponents. I did not care for the methods used by Rhee's police to break up political meetings and control political enemies, and I was deeply concerned over the Rhee government's lack of concern about the serious inflation that swept the country. Yet, we had no choice but to support Rhee. Korea had been overrun and downtrodden by the Japanese since 1905 and had had no chance to develop other leaders and leadership.¹

Despite his dissatisfaction with Rhee, Truman realized that without aid from the United States the Republic of South Korea could not survive. However, United States aid to South Korea included more than economic aid. A South Korean army of sixty-five thousand men was trained and equipped, along with a four-thousand-man coast guard and a forty-five-thousand-

¹Truman, Years, p. 329.

man police force.²

Although the United States was committed to aiding South Korea, the big question was whether or not the United States would defend South Korea should it be attacked. The possibility of a North Korean attack on South Korea had not been discounted in view of the fact that North Korea had an army known to be superior to the South Korean forces, and a government which, like Syngman Rhee's, claimed jurisdiction over all Korea. The problem was that United States government officials were not specific on this question.

In January, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who had succeeded Marshall after the latter was forced to resign because of poor health, addressed the National Press Club. While describing the government's Korean policy, Acheson mentioned that America's first line of defense did not include Korea. He said: "No person can guarantee these areas against military attack." However, he added:

Should an attack occur. . . the initial reliance must be on the people attacked, and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations.³

Later when the North Koreans did attack South Korea, many influential Republicans, including Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, blamed the attack on Acheson for indicating to the Russians that the United States might not defend South Korea. Time magazine reported:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff--and Dean Acheson in his speeches--had been wary of promising specifically

²Steinberg, p. 375.

³Excerpts from speech by Dean Acheson cited by Steinberg, p. 376.

to defend Korea, with U. S. troops, from its enemy north of the 38th parallel. That vagueness gave Russia its opening: it could attack and fall back if resistance proved too strong; it might even hope to complete its conquest while the U. S. was still making up its mind.⁴

In the spring of 1950, Truman received reports from the Central Intelligence Agency that the North Korean forces were being strengthened. Nevertheless, Truman saw no particular cause for alarm since the reports also indicated the Communists were strengthening forces in a dozen other areas.⁵

THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

On Saturday, June 24, 1950, Truman was in Independence, Missouri spending a weekend with his family. Approximately at 10:30 P. M. the telephone rang. It was Secretary of State Acheson. "Mr. President," he said, "I have very serious news. The North Koreans have invaded South Korea."⁶ Acheson then informed Truman that there was no need for him to rush back to Washington until further details were available. He suggested that an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council be called immediately and that a declaration be introduced charging North Korea with an act of aggression. Truman agreed.⁷

⁴"A Dangerous Situation," Time, LVI (July 3, 1950), 7.

⁵Steinberg, p. 376.

⁶Statement by Dean Acheson cited by Truman, Years, p. 332.

⁷Truman, Years, p. 332.

Acheson phoned again at 11:30 A. M. on Sunday. He informed Truman that reports from Korea gave clear evidence that an all-out invasion was under way. The Security Council, he told Truman, had been called into an emergency session and would meet at three o'clock that afternoon. Truman immediately summoned his aides and left from Kansas City Municipal Airport at two o'clock.⁸

While Truman was en route to Washington, the United Nations Security Council met in Lake Success, New York. Ironically, the representative of the Soviet Union was absent from the meeting, due to a Russian boycott of the United Nations in protest to its failure to seat the delegates from Communist China. The declaration against North Korea was introduced to the ten members who were present, and was quickly adopted by nine affirmative votes, with Yugoslavia abstaining.⁹

Although the declaration against North Korea was anecessary step toward the solution of the problem, Truman realized that both Russia and North Korea had shown complete disregard for the United Nations in the past and that, in all probability, they would not comply with the declaration which demanded that hostilities cease at once. The question for Truman to decide was whether or not the United States should send forces to stop the North Korean aggression. He explained how

⁸Truman, Years, p. 332.

⁹The New York Times, 26 June, 1950, p. 1.

he reached that decision as follows:

In my generation, this was not the first occasion when the strong had attacked the weak. I recalled some earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I remembered how each time that the democracies failed to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores. If the Communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threats and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors. If this was allowed to go unchallenged it would mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on the second world war. It also was clear to me that the foundations and the principles of the United Nations were at stake unless this unprovoked attack on Korea could be stopped.¹⁰

Truman's mind was made up when he arrived at the airport. Acheson and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson were waiting for him. They hurried to the Blair House which was being used by Truman since the White House was being renovated. Truman then invited the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other advisers to a dinner conference in order to discuss what action should be taken immediately.¹¹

Truman told his advisers that he was dissatisfied with the resolution adopted by the Security Council since it did not threaten the North Koreans with any

¹⁰Truman, Years, pp. 332-333.

¹¹The New York Times, 26 June, 1950, p. 1.

intervention by the United Nations. His advisers agreed that a stronger resolution was needed. In the meantime, Truman ordered General MacArthur to evacuate by air the two thousand Americans living in Seoul. Believing that the South Korean army had a strong fighting capacity and was momentarily suffering from the initial shock of the invasion, Truman also ordered MacArthur to rush supplies to them by airdrop. As a third order to MacArthur, Truman asked that the United States Seventh Fleet, then off the Philippines, be rushed to the Formosa Straits in order to prevent the Communists from attacking Formosa. This would also prevent Chiang Kai-shek from attacking the Chinese mainland from which he had been driven seven months earlier.¹² As a result, Formosa was neutralized.

There was no question in the minds of most Americans as to who were the real aggressors in Korea. Although no proof could be obtained to determine the extent of Soviet participation in the war, it was commonly accepted by the public, as well as the American government, that it was the Russians, rather than the North Koreans, who really ran the show.

In 1960, Pawel Monat, an ex-Polish official who fled Poland with his wife and family in 1959, wrote an article for Life magazine entitled "Russians in Korea: the Hidden Bosses." In this article, Monat tells of his official activities in Korea as a Communist military adviser, and of his actual encounters with Russians who were in Korea to aid the Chinese Communist forces who by that time had entered the war.

¹²Truman, Years, p. 334.

He said in part:

. . . I boarded a Chinese train at Mukden, in Manchuria, for the ride to the Yalu River border. I travelled with a group of about two hundred men, all dressed in the green summer uniforms of the Chinese People's Volunteers. But they were not Chinese at all; they were Russians--and not just the Russian military advisers I had expected to see. These men were combat troops: MIG pilots from the Soviet air force, combat engineers, and anti-aircraft gunners. They were going to Korea to fight.

The secret of these Soviet fighters in Korea was so carefully kept from the West that, to my knowledge at least, the United Nations forces were never able to present any real proof of Soviet participation. . . .

Russian pilots did most of the Communists' fighting in the air battles between MIGs and U. S. Sabre jets. Soviet anti-aircraft batteries, planted all over North Korea, shot down U. S. planes. Soviet combat engineers constructed bridges, roads, and tunnels to keep ammunition and other supplies moving to the front. And whatever success the North Koreans had against the U. N. forces was due to the hundreds of Soviet advisers who trained them. When I was there, at least 5,000 Soviet officers and soldiers were on active duty either in Korea or just over the Yalu River on the MIG bases in Manchuria.¹³

On Monday, June 26, the news from Korea was extremely pessimistic. Truman received a message from General MacArthur which read in part:

South Korean units unable to resist determined Northern offensive. Contributory factors exclusive enemy possession of tanks and fighter planes. South Korean casualties as an index to fighting have not shown adequate resistance capabilities or the will to fight and our estimate is that a complete collapse is imminent.¹⁴

¹³ Pawel Monat, "Russians in Korea: the Hidden Bosses," Life, 49 (June 27, 1960), 76.

¹⁴ Excerpt of message of Douglas MacArthur cited by Truman, Years, p. 337.

Truman now realized that it would be impossible for the South Korean forces to hold their own. Rhee's government had been forced to flee from Seoul, and it looked as if South Korea would be lost if action was not taken immediately. At nine o'clock that evening Truman held another conference with his advisers at the Blair House. It was decided that General MacArthur would begin using air and naval forces to support South Korea, but specific instructions definitely were to be included in MacArthur's orders forbidding him to operate north of the thirty-eighth parallel. Although no mention was made of committing United States ground forces, Truman instructed Acheson to call another meeting of the Security Council.¹⁶

On Tuesday, June 27, the Security Council met once again in Lake Success, New York. United States delegate Warren Austin introduced a resolution recommending that member states

. . . furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace in that area.¹⁶

Again, Russia was not present due to the boycott. With Poland and Czechoslovakia also absent, the resolution passed by a vote of seven in favor to one against (Yugoslavia).¹⁷ Although Russia later challenged the legality of the resolution, the Security Council pledged to support whatever action Truman thought would be needed to repel the aggressors.

¹⁵Truman, Years, p. 337.

¹⁶The New York Times, 28 June, 1950, p. 1.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 1.

At four A. M., on Thursday, June 29, General MacArthur held a teletype radio conference with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He informed them that South Korea was about to collapse and that the only way to prevent such a catastrophe would be to send United States ground combat forces into the Korean area. Secretary of the Army Frank Page awakened Truman at five A. M. and told him of MacArthur's recommendation. "Inform MacArthur immediately," he said, "that the use of one regimental combat team is approved."¹⁸ The war in Korea was now on.

Since Truman had committed United States ground forces to support the South Korean troops, the next move was to establish a clear policy toward this conflict so that no one would have any doubts about the United States position. Truman explained this policy as follows:

The National Security Council met again Thursday, when Secretary of Defense Johnson introduced a proposed directive to General MacArthur. The final paragraph of this proposed directive, however, permitted an implication that we were planning to go to war with the Soviet Union. I stated categorically that I did not wish to see even the slightest implication of such a plan. I wanted to take every step necessary to push the North Koreans back behind the 38th parallel. But I wanted to be sure that we would not become so deeply committed in Korea that we could not take care of other such situations as might develop.¹⁹

Thus, Truman let it be known that it was not the policy of the United States to fight a war. The war in Korea was a limited war--in the sense that objectives were limited. The objectives of the United

¹⁸ Statement by Harry S. Truman cited by Steinberg, p. 378.

¹⁹ Truman, Years, p. 34.

States included driving the North Koreans back across the thirty-eighth parallel, and no more.

Truman was also concerned about an offer from Chiang Kai-shek to send thirty-three thousand Formosan troops to Korea. He was in favor of accepting the offer since he considered it essential that United Nations members be encouraged to participate. Acheson, however, considered it inconsistent to protect Formosa with the United States Seventh Fleet while its native defenders fought some place else.²⁰

By the end of the week, England, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands pledged to support militarily the United States in Korea.²¹ In addition to bearing the title of Supreme Allied Commander in the Far East, General MacArthur was later appointed Commander of United Nations Forces in Korea in order to help organize the troops from the various United Nations members into a constructive fighting force. MacArthur's title often confused many people as to where his ultimate responsibility lay. After his recall, MacArthur testified before joint hearings conducted by the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that his ultimate responsibility was to the United States State Department and to the President of the United States. In response to a question concerning this matter, MacArthur testified:

Senator, my connection with the United Nations was largely nominal. There were provisions made

²⁰ Truman, Years, p. 342.

²¹ "Council Reviews Members Response," United Nations Bulletin, IX (July 15, 1950), 49.

that the entire control of my command and everything I did came from our own chiefs of staff and my channel of communication was designed as the Army Chief of Staff.

even the reports which were normally made by me to the United Nations were subject to censorship by our State and Defense Departments. I had no connection with the United Nations whatsoever.²²

THE MILITARY SITUATION

The first American ground troops into Korea were members of the Twenty-fourth Infantry Division, who confronted the North Koreans at the city of Osan, directly south of Seoul. A communique from Tokyo, published in Time magazine best describes the outcome:

The isolated unit of less than one battalion supported by one battery of field artillery, which was at Osan yesterday, was attacked by the best Red division, supported by forty tanks, which were extremely skillfully maneuvered. The ratio of troops engaged was more than eight to one against the American forces. For more than six hours the American forces held off the invaders until their ammunition was exhausted, and then withdrew. . . . The American forces were being enveloped on both flanks. They were confronted with a resourceful Red commander who skillfully applied frontal pressure with envelopment.²³

After Osan fell to the North Koreans, the United

²² Testimony of Douglas MacArthur appearing in United States Senate, Eighty-Second Congress, First Session, Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East, part 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 10. Hereafter referred to as Hearings.

²³ Communique from Tokyo appearing in "Battle of Korea," Time, LVI (July 24, 1950), 20.

States commanders used road mines and bridge demolitions in a futile attempt to stop them from advancing any farther. Realizing that it would take troop reinforcements to stop the North Koreans, MacArthur and his field commander, Major General William F. Dean, agreed to retreat to the south.²⁴

Truman ordered the Second Infantry Division and the First Marine Division to prepare to move into Korea, but MacArthur complained to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he would need six allied divisions before the North Koreans could be effectively checked.²⁵ Later, when asked before the joint hearings of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees whether or not he had been supplied with sufficient troops, MacArthur testified:

I have constantly asked for more troops than I was able to obtain, Senator, from the very beginning of hostilities. The numbers that were available to me were limited, and I was informed to that effect; and with what I had I did the best I could.²⁶

While MacArthur waited for more troops, the situation for the United Nations forces was becoming desperate. The North Koreans were pushing rapidly toward Pusan, the heel of the Korean peninsula, and MacArthur was determined not to let it fall. The United Nations forces were withdrawn to what MacArthur called the "Pusan Perimeter," a line of defense around the Pusan area. In addition, he appointed

²⁴"Battle of Korea," Time, LVI (July 17, 1950), 17.

²⁵Ibid., 18.

²⁶Testimony of Douglas MacArthur appearing in Hearings, part 1, pp. 9-10.

Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker as ground commander in Korea with the title of Commanding General of the Far East Command's Eighth Army.²⁷ William F. Dean was placed in command of the Twenty-fourth Infantry Division.

MacArthur believed that he could trick the North Koreans into believing that he had a large force. If this could be accomplished, he might prevent the North Koreans from launching a major attack against Pusan until his reinforcements arrived. He decided to transport his troops to Korea by air in order to make the enemy think that these troops were merely reinforcing the troops being transported by sea. MacArthur later described his strategy:

I threw in troops by air in the hope of establishing a locus of resistance around which I could rally the fast-retreating South Korean forces. I also hoped by that arrogant display to fool the enemy into a belief that I had greater resources at my disposal than I had. . . The enemy. . . could not understand that we could make such an effort with such a small force. Instead of rushing rapidly forward to Pusan, which he could have reached within a week without the slightest difficulty, he stopped to deploy his artillery across the Han. We gained ten days by that process.²⁸

On July 31, while United Nations forces were defending the Pusan Perimeter, MacArthur flew to Formosa to confer with Chiang Kai-shek. Since he had been ordered by Truman to see that Formosa was adequately defended, MacArthur called his trip "a short

²⁷"Strategy," Time, LVI (July 24, 1950), 20.

²⁸Statement by Douglas MacArthur cited by Steinberg, pp. 379-380.

reconnaissance of the potential of its defense against possible attack."²⁹ The United States was now committed to the defense of Formosa, and MacArthur had promised to refuse politely Chiang's offer of troops for Korea on the basis that a Communist attack against Formosa might be imminent. MacArthur had a cordial meeting with Chiang and left him saying: "Keep your chin up, we're going to win."³⁰

Shortly after MacArthur had left, Chiang announced to the press that he and MacArthur opposed President Truman's policy of neutralizing Formosa. He also boasted that MacArthur had suggested that the Nationalist Chinese forces should be allowed to wage an aggressive campaign against the Chinese mainland.³¹ *

Truman was furious. While the Formosan question marked the initial policy dispute between Truman and MacArthur, the President felt that the problem was primarily caused by the fact that direct communication between himself and MacArthur had been too infrequent. In an attempt to establish better communication between the White House and MacArthur, Truman, on August 3, dispatched Averell Harriman to Tokyo to discuss the Far Eastern political situation with him. Harriman's report to Truman described MacArthur's attitude toward Formosa as follows:

In my first talk with MacArthur, I told him the President wanted me to tell him he must not

²⁹Statement by Douglas MacArthur appearing in "Reconnaissance in Formosa," Time, XLI (August 14, 1950), 22.

³⁰Ibid., 22.

³¹Truman, Years, p. 354.

permit Chiang to be the cause of starting a war with the Chinese Communists on the mainland, the effect of which might drag us into a world war. He answered that he would, as a soldier, obey any orders that he received from the President. He said that he had discussed only military matters with the Generalissimo on his trip to Formosa. He had refused to discuss any political subjects whenever the Generalissimo attempted to do so. The Generalissimo had offered him command of the Chinese National troops. MacArthur replied that that was not appropriate, but that he would be willing to give military advice if requested by the Generalissimo to do so. . . .

For reasons which are difficult to explain, I did not feel that we came to a full agreement on the way we believed things should be handled on Formosa and with the Generalissimo. He accepted the President's position and will act accordingly, but without full conviction.³²

On August 14, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued to MacArthur a statement of United States policy toward Formosa. Truman thought that since MacArthur was now familiar with Washington's official Formosan policy, no more would be said.

On August 26, the White House Press Room brought Truman a copy of a statement which General MacArthur had sent to the Commander in Chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. It seemed that MacArthur had been asked by the Veterans of Foreign Wars to send them a statement which would be read at their annual convention in Chicago. The complete text of the statement was printed in a weekly magazine which was already in the mails.

MacArthur's statement criticized the neutralization of Formosa from a military standpoint. This,

³²Excerpts from report of Averell Harriman cited by Truman, Years, pp. 351-352.

he felt, was a legitimate prerogative of his, since the Supreme Allied Commander in the Far East is most familiar with the military situation in that area.

He said in part:

Nothing could be more fallacious than the threadbare argument of those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific that if we defend Formosa we alienate continental Asia. Those who speak thus do not understand the Orient.³³ *

Although MacArthur considered it his right, as well as his duty, to express publicly on military affairs, Truman considered MacArthur's statement as an attack against his basic foreign policy rather than his military policy. Said Truman:

It was my opinion that this statement could only serve to confuse the world as to what our Formosa policy was, for it was at odds with my announcement of June 27, and it also contradicted what I had told the Congress. . . .

Of course, I would never deny General MacArthur or anyone else the right to differ with me in opinions. The official position of the United States, however, is defined by decisions and declarations of the President. There can be only one voice in stating the position of this country in the field of foreign relations.³⁴ *

Truman met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that morning. Acheson, Defense Secretary Johnson, John Snyder, and Averell Harriman were also invited. Truman read MacArthur's statement to them and announced that he had seriously considered relieving MacArthur of his Far Eastern Command, but still leaving him in charge of

³³ Excerpt from message of Douglas MacArthur appearing in "Two Voices," Time, LVI (September 4, 1950), 9. See complete text of MacArthur's statement in Appendix I, pp. 131-134.

³⁴ Truman, Years, p. 355.

the Japanese occupation. On second thought, he had decided that a demotion for MacArthur would damage his concern. He told the group that it must be known to everyone that MacArthur's statement did not represent the official policy of the United States. Defense Secretary Johnson was ordered to send MacArthur the following message:

The President of the United States directs you to withdraw your message for National Encampment of Veterans of Foreign Wars, because various features with respect to Formosa are in conflict with the policy of the United States and its position in the United Nations.³⁵

Although MacArthur still felt that he had the right to state his military views publicly, he complied at once with Truman's request. The damage was done, however, as far as Truman was concerned. MacArthur's statement was not read at the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention, but it was published in U. S. News and World Report. As Time magazine summarized the dispute,

Harry Truman did what not even Franklin Roosevelt had the temerity to do. He ordered Douglas MacArthur to shut up. The President's summary order arrived in Tokyo shortly after midnight Monday morning. There in his headquarters in the Dai Ichi building, General MacArthur made the only decision he could make. He silently saluted his commander in chief across 6,769 miles of land and ocean, and shut up. *

But for what Harry Truman intended to accomplish, the order had been given too late. A statement by MacArthur, drawn with the obvious intention of making military sense out of the Administration's strange, vacillating policy on Formosa, had already been sent to press in the U. S.³⁶

³⁵ Truman, Years, p. 356.

³⁶ "Two Voices," Time, LIV (September 4, 1950), 9.

INCHON AND WAKE ISLAND

Throughout August, the North Koreans continued their assault against the Pusan Perimeter. General Walker's Eighth Army could do no more than defend the Pusan Perimeter, but he managed to hold the area intact while reinforcements were obtained.

By September, MacArthur was ready to begin taking the initiative in Korea. He had decided that the best strategy would be to attack the enemy where he least expected it. MacArthur knew that General James Wolfe had captured Quebec from the French in 1759, because he attacked the city from the south after his troops had scaled the almost perpendicular river banks.³⁷ The move caught the French completely by surprise; and MacArthur believed that the best place to stage his Quebec would be at Inchon, located on the west coast of Korea, just south of the thirty-eighth parallel. Truman approved the Inchon invasion plan, calling it "a daring strategic conception."³⁸

On September 15, the X Corps, composed of troops from the First Marine Division and the Army's Seventh Infantry Division, under the leadership of Major General Edward N. Almond, went ashore at Inchon and established a beachhead. The landing had to be completed while the tide was high in order to avoid the ships being stranded on the rocks, but the move caught the North Koreans by surprise, as

³⁷Steinberg, p. 383.

³⁸Truman, Years, p. 358.

MacArthur had anticipated. The plan was a complete success.³⁹

The X Corps was then under orders to liberate Seoul. Although the resistance was strong, Seoul was liberated by September 28. On September 29, Rhee moved his government back to Seoul.⁴⁰

By capturing Seoul, the United Nations forces were able to cut off the North Korean supply lines. The North Korean army was in a helpless situation since its troops were surrounded by the X Corps in the north and by Walker's Eighth Army in the south. As they attempted to retreat to the north, the Eighth Army broke out of the Pusan Perimeter and followed. By the time South Korea had been liberated to the thirty-eighth parallel, 130,000 North Korean troops had been captured.⁴¹

Truman sent a message of congratulations to MacArthur which read as follows:

I know that I speak for the entire American people when I send you my warmest congratulations on the victory which has been achieved under your leadership in Korea. Few operations in military history can match either the delaying action where you traded space for time in which to build up your forces, or the brilliant maneuver which has now resulted in the liberation of Seoul. I am particularly impressed by the splendid cooperation of our Army, Navy, and Air Force, and I wish you would extend my thanks and congratulations to the commanders of those services-- Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, Vice Admiral Charles T. Joy and Lieutenant General

³⁹The New York Times, 16 September, 1950, p. 1.

⁴⁰The New York Times, 29 September, 1950, p. 1.

⁴¹Steinberg, p. 384.

George E. Stratemeyer. The unification of our arms established by you and by them has set a shining example. My thanks and the thanks of the people of all free nations go out to your gallant forces--soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen--from the United States and the other countries fighting for freedom under the United Nations banner. I salute you all and say to all of you from all of us at home, well and nobly done.⁴² *

Truman's initial instructions to MacArthur had ordered him to push the North Koreans back across the thirty-eighth parallel. Since Inchon had proved such an overwhelming success, however, Truman changed his mind. On September 27, he issued new orders in which he instructed MacArthur that his objective was "the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces."⁴³ MacArthur now was authorized to operate north of the thirty-eighth parallel, but Truman cautioned him to use only Korean troops in the vicinity of the Manchurian and Russian borders of Korea, and under no circumstances were any Korean troops to cross the border.⁴⁴

On October 1, Chou En-lai, the foreign minister of Red China, announced that his government would not stand by and see North Korea invaded. Therefore, MacArthur, realizing the advantage of having United Nations' support in this new crisis, waited for the United Nations General Assembly to pass a resolution authorizing him to proceed into North Korea. The resolution was adopted on October 7. MacArthur then ordered General Walker to advance the Eighth Army across

⁴² Truman, Years, p. 360.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 360.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 360.

the thirty-eighth parallel.⁴⁵

Truman became concerned about the increasing number of reports that Red China might intervene. He decided that a personal meeting with MacArthur was essential. General MacArthur agreed to meet him on Sunday, October 15, at Wake Island in the Pacific. Although MacArthur later admitted that he had been suspicious about Truman's motives for wanting the meeting, Truman explained his reasoning as follows:

The first and simplest reason why I wanted to meet with General MacArthur was that we had never had any personal contacts at all, and I thought he ought to know his Commander in Chief and that I ought to know the senior field commander in the Far East. . . .

The Peiping reports of threatened intervention in Korea by the Chinese Communists were another reason for my desire to confer with General MacArthur. I wanted to get the benefit of his firsthand information and judgement.⁴⁶

Truman's plane, the Independence, arrived at Wake Island at 6:00 A. M. MacArthur was waiting for him as he stepped down the ramp. "His shirt was unbuttoned, and he was wearing a cap which had evidently seen a good deal of use," Truman later recalled.⁴⁷ After allowing photographers to take pictures, MacArthur escorted Truman to the car he had waiting for him. It was a battered 1948 Chevrolet sedan, and the two men had to climb over the front seat since the rear doors were stuck.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ The New York Times, 8 October, 1950, p. 1.

⁴⁶ Truman, Years, pp. 362-363.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 364.

⁴⁸ "The General Rose at Dawn," Time, LVI (October 23, 1950), 19.

They drove to the office of the airline manager on the island and talked alone for over an hour, discussing the Japanese and Korean situations. MacArthur assured Truman that the victory in Korea was won, explaining that there was little chance of either Chinese or Soviet intervention in Korea, not denying, however, the remote possibility. He also extended an apology to Truman for his statement to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and Truman assured him that the case was closed.⁴⁹

At 7:45, the two men climbed back into the sedan and made a quick trip to Wake Island's administration building. There they met with advisers to discuss the Korean situation. MacArthur predicted that the war would end by Thanksgiving. He would then withdraw other forces in Korea until elections would be held sometime in January. Once again, MacArthur assured the group that Chinese or Soviet intervention was most unlikely. Other general topics were discussed, such as the aid Korea would need for rehabilitation when the war was over. The meeting ended at approximately 9:30.⁵⁰

Truman invited MacArthur to have lunch with him, but the general wanted to get back to the war front. At the airport, Truman awarded MacArthur a fourth Oak Leaf to his Distinguished Service Medal. The two then expressed their appreciation for the conference as Truman climbed on board the Independence. It was shortly after eleven o'clock when Truman left,

⁴⁹Truman, Years, p. 365.

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 365-366.

and five minutes later MacArthur was on his way to Tokyo.⁵¹

The joint communique issued by Truman and MacArthur stated that both were pleased with the results of the conference. Yet, there was much public skepticism, because 1950 was a mid-term election year, and many felt that Truman merely wanted to use MacArthur to help obtain votes for the Democrats. Time magazine reported:

What had been accomplished? The conference had been so short, the explanations of it so unrewarding, that, as Wake Island faded astern, many a correspondent felt he had witnessed nothing but a political grand-stand play. There was no doubt that the President--and the Democratic Party would benefit from the Wake Island meeting.⁵²

A NEW WAR

The offensive in North Korea moved throughout October at a rapid pace. On October 19, Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, fell.⁵³ The United Nations forces were now composed of units from many nations of the world including a Swedish hospital team.

As MacArthur's forces moved north, he was faced with an important decision. President Truman had ordered him to use only Korean troops in the vicinity of the Manchurian and Soviet borders of Korea. Yet, the Korean units were inexperienced. He therefore ordered American units to spearhead the

⁵¹The New York Times, 15 October, 1950, p. 1.

⁵²"The General Rose at Dawn," Time, LVI (October 23, 1950), 20.

⁵³The New York Times, 19 October, 1950, p. 1.

drive to the Yalu River which separates Korea from Manchuria. The Joint Chiefs of Staff disapproved, but MacArthur assured them that it was practical from a military standpoint.⁵⁴

On October 31, Truman received a report from the X Corps in the Wonsan sector of North Korea. Prisoners captured on October 26 had been identified as Chinese. Under interrogation, it was discovered that Chinese Communist units had been active in the Korean War since October 16. They claimed to be members of volunteer units. Although this did not necessarily mean full-scale intervention by Red China, Truman was deeply concerned. He became even more concerned when General Yu Jai Hung of the South Korean army announced that scattered reports indicated that approximately 40,000 Chinese Communist troops were in Korea. But, he added: "It may be that the Chinese have come in to save the big generator at Suprung. . . which serves both North Korea and Manchuria."⁵⁵

Truman asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to obtain an up-to-date estimate on the situation from MacArthur. The report received from MacArthur on November 4 read in part:

It is impossible at this time to approve authoritatively the actualities of Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea. Various possibilities exist based upon battle intelligence coming in from the front. . . .

⁵⁴Steinberg, pp. 388-389.

⁵⁵Statement by General Yu Jae Hung appearing in "War in Asia," Time, LVI (November 6, 1950), 26.

While it is a distinct possibility, and many foreign experts predict such action, there are many fundamental arguments against it and sufficient evidence had not yet come to hand to warrant its immediate acceptance.⁵⁶

Two days later, on November 6, Truman was back in Independence, Missouri. It was the day before elections. Suddenly, a telephone call came through from Dean Acheson. He had just received word that MacArthur had ordered ninety B-29 bombers to begin destroying bridges across the Yalu River. Truman was furious and demanded an explanation from MacArthur at once. He also ordered the bombing to be promptly cancelled. This was MacArthur's reply which confirmed Truman's fears of Chinese intervention:

6 November, 50

Men and material in large force are pouring across all bridges over the Yalu from Manchuria. This movement not only jeopardizes but threatens the ultimate destruction of the forces under my command. The actual movement across the river can be accomplished under the cover of darkness and our lines is so short that the forces can be deployed against our troops without being seriously subjected to air interdiction. The only way to stop this reinforcement of the enemy is the destruction of these bridges and the subjection of all installations in the north supporting the enemy advance to the maximum of our air destruction. Every hour that this is postponed will be paid for dearly in American and other United Nations blood. The main crossing at Sinuiju was to be hit within the next few hours and the mission is actually being mounted. Under the gravest protest that I can make, I am suspending this strike and carrying out your instructions. What I had ordered is entirely within the scope of the rules of war and the resolutions and directions which I

⁵⁶ Excerpts from report by Douglas MacArthur cited by Truman, Years, p. 373.

have received from the United States and constitutes no slightest act of belligerency against Chinese territory, in spite of the outrageous international lawlessness emanating therefrom. I cannot overemphasize the disastrous effect, both physical and psychological, that will result from the restrictions you are imposing. I trust that the matter be immediately brought to the attention of the President as I believe your instructions may well result in a calamity of major proportion for which I cannot accept the responsibility without his personal and direct understanding of the situation. Time is so essential that I request immediate reconsideration of your decision pending which complete compliance will of course be given to your order.⁵⁷

General Omar Bradley phoned the message to Truman. Realizing the situation MacArthur was faced with, Truman ordered Bradley to give MacArthur the go-ahead.⁵⁸

Reports from the Central Intelligence agency indicated that there might be as many as two-hundred thousand Chinese forces in Manchuria, and that their entry would probably force the United Nations to retreat.

Although it was not learned immediately how large the Chinese intervention would be, the two primary questions were the Chinese motives for intervention and the reason for MacArthur's lateness in discovering it. ➤

In 1960, Pawel Monat, the ex-Communist, gave his reasons why the Chinese Communists decided to intervene. Writing for Life magazine, he said:

⁵⁷ Report by Douglas MacArthur cited by Truman, Years, p. 375.

⁵⁸ Truman, Years, p. 376.

The Chinese were terrified of General MacArthur. They regarded him as a brilliant and unpredictable ~~★~~ enigma. For all they knew, if they didn't stop him, he might attack across the Yalu, just as he had swept unexpectedly past the 38th parallel.

They were also afraid that MacArthur might bring Chiang Kai-shek's troops into Korea from Formosa and let them attack across the Yalu. Mao was determined to defend and hold North Korea as a buffer state to guard his Manchurian border.

Even if the border were not in danger--the Chinese did not trust President Truman's assurances on this score--they reasoned that a small war would do them no harm. Fighting in Korea would help distract the population from China's domestic troubles. It would stimulate army training. Last, but not least, it would give Mao a good excuse to wheedle a new arsenal of guns and tanks out of the Russians.⁵⁹

At the joint hearings of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May, 1951, MacArthur was asked why he had not been aware of the Chinese intentions to intervene. He testified as follows:

We had knowledge that the Chinese Communists had collected large forces along the Yalu River. My own reconnaissance, you understand was limited entirely to Korea; but the general information which was available, from China and other places, indicated large accumulations of troops.

The Red Chinese, at that time, were putting out, almost daily, statements that they were not intervening, that these were volunteers only.

About the middle of September our Secretary of State announced that he thought there was little chance, and no logic in Chinese intervention.

In November, our Central Intelligence Agency, here, had said that they felt there was little chance of any major intervention on the part of the Chinese forces.

⁵⁹ Pawel Monet, "Russians in Korea: the Hidden Bosses," Life, 49 (June 27, 1960), 94.

Now, we ourselves, on the front realized that the North Korean forces were being stiffened, and our intelligence, made just before General Walker launched his attacks, indicated they thought from 40,000 to 60,000 men might be down there.

Now, you must understand that the intelligence that a nation is going to launch war, is not an intelligence that is available to a commander, limited to a small area of combat.

That intelligence should have been given to me.

The agencies that the controlling powers had, which received reports from all over the world-- from all the nations of the world, which had it-- the British Secret Service had every secret service of the allies at his disposal, which were not at mine, gave a much wider and a much broader basis upon which to make these concepts.⁶⁰

Once MacArthur had the Yalu bridges bombed, the movement of Chinese Communist into North Korea seemed to cease. The Chinese Communists began air attacks from across the Manchurian border, but it appeared as though there was no longer any real threat of a full-scale Chinese intervention.

MacArthur considered the initial movements across the Yalu as a setback, but he began a renewed drive to reach the Yalu. By November 21 scattered units of the United Nations forces arrived at the border. On November 24, MacArthur ordered General Walker's Eighth Army to begin a final offensive against remaining North Korean and Chinese resistance.⁶¹

Suddenly, on November 26, MacArthur's hopes for a quick victory were smashed by a sudden attack from across the Manchurian border. Two hundred thousand well-armed and well-trained Chinese Communist

⁶⁰Testimony of Douglas MacArthur, Hearings, part 1, pp. 18-19.

⁶¹Truman, Years, p. 381.

TYPED IN PHASE
5% COTTON FIBER

troops poured across what was left of the Yalu River bridges.

The assault continued for several days. On November 28, MacArthur reported that he was changing his plans from the offensive to the defensive. There was no longer any doubt about the intentions of the Chinese Communists--full scale intervention was underway and MacArthur was faced with a new war. In his report MacArthur said:

The resulting situation presents an entire new picture which broadens the potentialities to world embracing considerations beyond the sphere of decision by the theatre commander. This command has done everything humanly possible within its capabilities but it is now faced with circumstances beyond its control.⁶²

MacArthur requested that he be given the right to pursue enemy planes even if it meant crossing the Manchurian border. He warned that unless he was given the right of hot pursuit, the United Nations forces would suffer from heavy attack without any retaliation since the Manchurian border would provide a sanctuary for enemy planes. In addition to hot pursuit, MacArthur also requested permission to bomb enemy bases in Manchuria in order to cripple the Red Chinese Air Force and prevent enemy air attacks before they occurred.

In reply Truman rejected both requests on several occasions. As he saw it, such action would only extend the war to China, bringing the Soviet Union to its defense, and ushering in World War III.⁶³

⁶² Excerpt from report by Douglas MacArthur cited by Truman, Years, p. 384.

⁶³ Steinberg, p. 392.

On November 29, General MacArthur told Truman that he might have to plan a major retreat. He requested that Truman take up the offer of Chiang Kai-shek five months earlier when he offered thirty-three thousand Formosan troops for use in Korea. Truman informed MacArthur through the Joint Chiefs of Staff that his proposal would be considered.⁶⁴

Truman's policy was still the same as it had been since he decided to move north of the thirty-eighth parallel. He wanted to unite North and South Korea, but without a major military confrontation with Red China or Russia.

Faced with attack from superior forces, MacArthur began attacking Truman's policy. He complained bitterly to reporters, who promptly printed his views. Truman's temper flared as he read the reports of MacArthur's attacks, but he was determined to avoid an open conflict with his commander in light of the new crisis presented by the Chinese Communist intervention.⁶⁵

Truman ordered MacArthur to keep fighting, but soon the General had no choice but to retreat. The drive for the Yalu River was completely forgotten. As the Eighth Army and the X Corps retreated south, MacArthur began protesting bitterly that the sole reason for the retreat was the limitations placed upon him by his superiors in Washington. The two men differed sharply; whereas Truman wanted to do everything possible to limit the conflict to Korea, MacArthur claimed that to do so would make it militarily impossible to win the war.

⁶⁴Truman, Years, pp. 384-385.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 384.

In December, General J. Lawton Collins visited MacArthur in Tokyo. He reported to Truman that MacArthur now favored an naval blockade of the Chinese mainland. In addition, he favored using Chinese Nationalist troops in an all-out attack against the Chinese mainland. These two proposals would only be effective, however, if additional restrictions were lifted, namely, the right to hot pursuit of enemy planes and the bombing of enemy bases in Manchuria. MacArthur also stated that if his views were not acceptable, he would then suggest making a truce with the Communists at the thirty-eighth parallel resulting in a status quo ante bellum.⁶⁶ Truman realized that a truce at the thirty-eighth parallel would mean the virtual surrender of North Korea to the Communists, but he was not willing to even consider approving MacArthur's proposals.

In the joint hearings before the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, MacArthur was asked why the limitations placed upon him by Washington obstructed his military effort. He testified as follows:

The air and naval forces that were at my disposal out there were only operating at a fraction of their efficiency. They are in effect--by being confined to the narrow battleground of Korea--merely performing that function which would be regarded as tactical support of the infantry line.

The great strategic concept of stopping the supplies to troops, of preventing the build-up of troops to be thrown against them, of the disorganization of transportation lines--all of the uses which over the years and centuries the Navy

⁶⁶Truman, Years, p. 415.

and Air are supposed to do are not permitted over there.

If you would take off and permit them their full capacity, I do not believe it would take a very great additional component of ground forces to wind this thing up.

Now, actually if you do not permit the use of forces in their normal capacity, you would not be able to safely clear North Korea.⁶⁷

While MacArthur could not understand why Truman would ignore the military necessity of allowing him to carry the war out of Korea, Truman could not understand why MacArthur could ignore the political necessity of limiting the war to Korea. Truman said:

I have never been able to make myself believe that MacArthur, seasoned soldier that he was did not realize that the introduction of Chinese Nationalist forces into South China would be an act of war; or that he, who had a front-row seat at world events for thirty-five years, did not realize that the Chinese people would react to the bombing of their cities in exactly the same manner as the people of the United States reacted to the bombing of Pearl Harbor; or that, with his knowledge of the East, he could have overlooked the fact that after he had bombed the cities of China there would still be vast flows of materials from Russia so that, if he wanted to be consistent, his next move would have to be the bombardment of Vladivostok and the Trans-Siberian Railroad! But because I was sure that MacArthur could not possibly have overlooked these considerations, I was left with just one simple conclusion: General MacArthur was ready to risk a general war. I was not.⁶⁸

Throughout December the news from Korea was distressing. After Pyongyang fell to the Chinese Communists, MacArthur was forced to retreat south of

⁶⁷ Testimony of Douglas MacArthur, Hearings, part 1, p. 10.

⁶⁸ Truman, Years, pp. 415-416.

the thirty-eighth parallel. On January 4, 1951, Seoul was in enemy hands.⁶⁹ MacArthur began to re-group his forces about seventy miles below the thirty-eighth parallel and prepare for a new offensive. Although his retreat had been somewhat humiliating, MacArthur later testified at the Senate hearings as follows:

When we moved forward we struck him in tremendous force--or he struck us and we withdrew. The concept that our forces withdrew in disorder or were badly defeated is one of the most violent prevarications of truth that ever was made. These forces withdrew in magnificent order and shape. It was a planned withdrawal from the beginning. The forces in the northeast, the Tenth Corps, were withdrawn in the same way.

The losses that we had in that withdrawal were less than the losses we had in our victorious attack at Inchon.⁷⁰

As MacArthur prepared for his new offensive, he was aided by the fact that the Chinese had extended beyond their supply lines. The result was that they were slowed down. In the meantime, MacArthur sent a recommendation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff calling for the removal of restrictions upon him. He asked permission to pursue enemy planes into Manchuria, blockade the coast of China, and use Chinese Nationalist troops for an attack on the Chinese mainland. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent his proposals to George Marshall who had succeeded Louis Johnson as Secretary of Defense. They asked that MacArthur's views be considered, but the proposals were rejected since they were not in accord with the President's policy.

⁶⁹The New York Times, 4 January, 1951, p. 1.

⁷⁰Testimony of Douglas MacArthur, Hearings, part 1, p. 21.

Throughout the latter part of January and February, 1951, MacArthur's forces moved steadily forward. By early March the Chinese Communists were suffering heavy casualties. Seoul was re-captured by the United Nations, and by the middle of March, South Korea had been cleared once again.

While the Communists were in retreat, Truman decided to negotiate for a cease-fire. This did not mean an immediate change in his foreign policy, because MacArthur would still be under orders to unite North and South Korea. However, if the Communists would be willing to accept a cease-fire at the thirty-eighth parallel, he would then change his policy and once again proclaim that the limited objectives of the United States included only the liberation of South Korea.⁷¹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff then informed MacArthur that the President was preparing a proposal to discuss conditions of cease-fire with the enemy. Before Truman had a chance to issue his statement, however, MacArthur issued one of his own on March 24. MacArthur had flown to the front lines and issued his statement to the enemy. He said in part:

The enemy, therefore, must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea, through an expansion of our military operations to its coastal areas and interior bases, would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse. . . .

The Korean nation and people which have been so cruelly ravaged, must not be sacrificed. This is a paramount concern. Apart from the military

⁷¹Truman, Years, p. 438.

area of the problem where issues are resolved in the course of combat, the fundamental questions continue to be political in nature, and must find their answer in the diplomatic sphere. Within the area of my authority as the military commander, however, it would be needless to say that I stand ready at any time to confer in the field with the Commander-in-Chief of the enemy forces in the earnest effort to find any military means whereby realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no nation may justly take exceptions, might be accomplished without further bloodshed.⁷²

While Truman was planning to propose a cease-fire, MacArthur threatened Red China with attack. While Truman was planning to negotiate with the enemy, MacArthur proposed that North Korea surrender to him personally.

Truman considered this statement "extraordinary", for a military commander to make without the official clearance of the State Department.⁷³ MacArthur had been ordered on December 6, 1950, to clear all public statements with the "department concerned."⁷⁴ Whereas Truman considered this statement an act of insubordination, MacArthur considered it within his line of duty to issue the statement since it concerned military considerations. To the bitter end MacArthur never considered his dispute with the President as a case of insubordination. He insisted:

It was not the soldier who had encroached upon the realm of the politician, but rather it was the politicians who were encroaching on that of the

⁷²Excerpts from statement by Douglas MacArthur cited in Truman, Years, p. 441. See complete text of MacArthur's statement in Appendix II, p. 134-135.

⁷³Truman, Years, p. 441.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 442.

soldier.⁷⁵

Truman quickly ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to inform MacArthur that he had been under orders since December 6 to clear all public statements with his superiors. Nevertheless, much public sympathy was with MacArthur's statement. Time magazine reported the incident as follows:

For one day last week, the U. S. dared to hope that there might be a way to end the deadlock in Korea, put an end to the fighting that was costing so much, gaining so little. Douglas MacArthur, flying to the Korean front again, had made a proposition to the enemy. . . .

But hope for a solution in Korea was short-lived; though MacArthur's statement made perfect and obvious military sense, it had not been cleared with Washington. State Department planners, still publicly uncommitted to bring any peace to Korea, conferred with Pentagon planners and finally assembled themselves into an official position. Such matters, it was stated, were even now the subject of delicate negotiations with the U. S. allies (negotiations are always said to be delicate). . . . From Peking came nothing but cold and utter silence. The war went on.⁷⁶

Truman later admitted that MacArthur's statement convinced him that the general must be recalled.⁷⁷ Instead of firing him immediately, Truman weighed the issues carefully. He realized that MacArthur was determined to free all of North Korea whereas he was willing to accept a cease-fire at the thirty-eighth parallel. He knew that MacArthur was in favor of extending the war to the mainland of China whereas he

⁷⁵ Statement by Douglas MacArthur cited by Steinberg, p. 397.

⁷⁶ "MacArthur to Red China," Time, LVII (April 2, 1951), 15.

⁷⁷ Truman, Years, p. 442.

was not willing to risk a general war. He also was aware that MacArthur was determined to express his views publicly. Although MacArthur considered it his prerogative to speak out on military affairs, Truman felt that he was expressing views on issues which fitted into the realm of foreign policy. These views confused our allies as well as the American people.

The final incident which infuriated Truman occurred on April 5, 1951. On that day House Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin, a Republican, read a letter to Congress which he had received from General MacArthur. Martin had sent MacArthur a copy of a speech he had made on February 12. In this speech he had denounced Truman's Korean policy and called for the use of Chinese Nationalist troops in an attack against the Chinese mainland. The reply from MacArthur read as follows:

March 20, 1951

Dear Congressman Martin:

I am most grateful for your note of the eighth forwarding me a copy of your address of February 12. The latter I have read with much interest, and find with the passage of years you have certainly lost none of your old-time punch.

My views and recommendations with respect to the situation created by Red China's entry into the war against us in Korea have been submitted to Washington in most complete detail. Generally these views are well known and generally understood, as they follow the conventional pattern of meeting force with maximum counter-force as we have never failed to do in the past. Your view with respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces on Formosa is in conflict with neither logic nor this tradition.

It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue

thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomats fight it with words; that if we lose this war to Communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable, win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. As you point out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory.⁷⁸

Truman considered this letter an attempt to go over the head of the President in order to present MacArthur's views to the American people. It was a disagreement not only with Truman's military policies in Korea, but with Truman's basic foreign policy which had been designed to concentrate America's efforts toward saving Western Europe from the Communists.⁷⁹

At the Senate hearings MacArthur testified that he had a perfect right to express his views concerning foreign policy as a private citizen. He claimed his letter was a private letter to an old friend, and was not written with any idea that it would be read in public. When he learned that his letter had been read to Congress, and had infuriated the State Department, he had to look through his files for the letter, since he had not considered its contents worth remembering.⁸⁰

After many long sessions with his military advisers, Truman had his Press Secretary, Joseph Short, call a press conference at one A. M., on April 11. The announcements handed to reporters read as follows:

With deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations

⁷⁸Letter by Douglas MacArthur cited by Lee, MacArthur, p. 348.

⁷⁹Truman, Years, p. 442.

⁸⁰Testimony by Douglas MacArthur, Hearings, part 1, p. 47.

in matters pertaining to his official duties. In view of the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and the added responsibilities which have been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided that I must make a change of command in the Far East. I have, therefore, relieved General MacArthur of his commands and have designated Lieutenant General Mathew B. Ridgeway as his successor.

Full and vigorous debate on matters of national policy is a vital element in the constitutional system of our free democracy. It is fundamental, however, that military commanders must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and constitution. In time of crisis, the situation is particularly compelling.

General MacArthur's place in history as one of our greatest commanders is fully established. The nation owes him a debt of gratitude for the distinguished and exceptional service which he has rendered his country in posts of great responsibility. For that reason I repeat my regret at the necessity for the action I feel compelled to take in his case.⁸¹

MacArthur was having lunch in the American Embassy in Tokyo when an aide brought the news of MacArthur's recall to his wife. She then whispered the news in the general's ear. His face grew pale as he looked at her and said: "Jeannie, we are going home at last."⁸²

⁸¹ Press announcement by Harry S. Truman, Years, p. 449.

⁸² Statement by Douglas MacArthur cited by Steinberg, p. 398.

CHAPTER V

A POLICY DILEMMA

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A POLICY DIMEMMA

In the preceding four chapters it has been the purpose of this author to analyze the political and military philosophies of President Truman and General MacArthur, including a survey of Truman's Korean policy from 1945 to the recall of General MacArthur in April, 1951. Chapter five shall raise two major questions. First, was President Truman's recall of General MacArthur justified? Second, did President Truman pursue a wise policy in trying to limit the Korean War to Korea?

THE RECALL

President Truman's executive power to recall General MacArthur has never been questioned seriously. Article II, Section II of the Constitution provides that

The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States.¹

General MacArthur himself has never questioned Truman's authority to act as he did. When asked at the Senate hearings if he questioned the power of the Commander-in-Chief to remove his commander on the field, MacArthur replied:

¹Article II, Section II of the United States Constitution appearing in Sources and Documents Illustrating the American Revolution, selected and edited by Samuel E. Morrison (London: Oxford University Press, 1923), p. 3000.

Not in the slightest. The authority of the President to assign or to reassign officers is complete and absolute. He does not have to give any reasons therefor or anything else. That is inherent in our system.²

Since Truman's authority to recall MacArthur cannot be questioned legitimately, the recurrent public debate clearly hinged upon, not Truman's power to recall, but upon his judgement in exercising that power. In other words, could Truman's action be justified as the best possible action in this circumstance? When Truman announced to the public that MacArthur had been recalled, it will be remembered, he explicitly stated his reasoning:

. . . I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties.³

No mention was made of MacArthur's refusal to obey orders. When volume two of Truman's memoirs, Years of Trial and Hope, was published in 1956, however, he publicly charged MacArthur with insubordination, citing MacArthur's March 24 statement to the Chinese Communists as the decisive factor of his dismissal. Truman declared: "By this act MacArthur left me no choice--I could no longer tolerate his insubordination."⁴

²Testimony of Douglas MacArthur, Hearings, part 1, p. 26.

³Announcement by Harry S. Truman appearing in Truman, Years, p. 449.

⁴Truman, Years, p. 442.

This ex post facto revelation alters Truman's supposed uni-factor reasoning on the dismissal to a bi-factor one: first, MacArthur could not support the policies of the United States and the United Nations; second, he publicly expressed his disagreements with these policies, even when he had been ordered not to do so.

Although Truman did not make an immediate charge of insubordination, several other government officials did. Secretary of Defense George Marshall was asked at the Senate hearings whether or not MacArthur had been insubordinate in any way. He testified as follows: "In relation to the conduct of the campaign, no, he has not, not that I can recall. In relation to public statements, he has."⁵ Later he added:

By his public statement or statements that were made in public in the ordinary press, he set up a very serious reaction among our allies, which threatened our collective action with them, and which threatened our position in the world in relation to this great crisis, and which threatened to leave us in a situation of going it alone.⁶

MacArthur, however, while admitting the charge that he could not give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States and the United Nations, failed to understand why his disagreements would necessitate his recall, unless, perhaps, the President was planning to institute a new policy which he knew MacArthur would obviously not support. At the hearings, when asked why he had been recalled, MacArthur testified as follows:

⁵ Excerpt from testimony of George Marshall, Hearings, part 1, p. 341.

⁶ Ibid., p. 415.

I can only interpret that order that the administration, knowing the views I held, was going to act in a very contrary way, and believed it was advisable not to place any strain upon my loyalty, if you might put it that way, and relieved me of my command. It must have been based upon what they had in mind for the future. It could not possibly have been based upon anything in the past.⁷

MacArthur's contention that his recall must have been based on future plans, not on past performance, evidences clearly that he believed his recall was unjustified. MacArthur simply could not comprehend a military dismissal actuated upon one's public expression of policy objections, while that same policy was being executed fully in line with specific orders.

In Truman's view, however, the public statements of MacArthur were sufficient reason to recall him, for Truman interpreted them to be acts of insubordination, even overreaching the strict military realm into foreign policy. Clearly Truman did not interpret them to be expressions of opinion only, as MacArthur alleged them to be, since Truman stated: "Of course, I would never deny General MacArthur or anyone else the right to differ with me in opinions."⁸ The epitome of the recall seems to be, therefore, a discrepancy between MacArthur's intention and Truman's interpretation, intermingled with a dualistic conflict as to what constituted public opinion and public statement and as to what constituted military policy and foreign policy. The complexity of the problem was simplified when Truman charged MacArthur with insubordination.

⁷Testimony of Douglas MacArthur, Hearings, part 1, p. 282.

⁸Truman, Years, p. 355.

MacArthur, however, regarded the charge as something more than over-simplification. At the Senate hearings, when asked if he had been insubordinate, MacArthur testified as follows:

There isn't any possibility of my disagreeing with any order I might have received, whether I regarded it as good, bad, or indifferent.

What I was requesting was some directive. The lack of directives was what I was trying to bring to their attention and ask them for a decision.

Had any decisions whatsoever been reached, I would have, to the very best of my ability, carried it out.

I resent with every fiber in my body, any inference that can be drawn that I have been, in any degree, insubordinate or disrespectful of the President of the United States, or the policies of this country, or even the policies and directives of the United Nations.⁹

It is evident that there is a discrepancy, also, as to the definition of insubordination. In Truman's memoirs, the American people were told for the first time exactly what government officials had meant when they had charged MacArthur with insubordination. Truman not only charged that MacArthur had been insubordinate, but he mentioned three specific occasions in which MacArthur had publicly expressed his views on matters of foreign policy--an area which is traditionally defined by decisions and declarations of the President. By publicly expressing his own views on matters of foreign policy, twice after he had received the December 6 order instructing him to clear all public statements with the necessary departments, MacArthur, Truman alleged, had therein committed acts of insubordination.

⁹Testimony of Douglas MacArthur, Hearings, part 1, p. 284.

The first act of insubordination, Truman claimed, occurred in MacArthur's statement to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in August, 1950.¹⁰ Although MacArthur claimed that his statement concerned military affairs which it was his prerogative as Supreme Allied Commander in the Far East to express, Truman considered it a statement critical of the official United States Formosan policy. In Years of Trial and Hope, Truman wrote:

It was my opinion that this statement could only serve to confuse the world as to just what our Formosa policy was, for it was at odds with my announcement of June 27, and it also contradicted what I had told the Congress. Furthermore, our policy had been reaffirmed only the day before in a letter which, on my instructions, Ambassador Austin had addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie.

The subject of Formosa had been placed before the Security Council by the Russian delegation, which charged us with acts of aggression in our aid to Chiang Kai-shek, and I had approved a State Department proposal that we counter this charge with a declaration that we were entirely willing to have the United Nations investigate the Formosan situation. Mr. Malik, the Russian delegate, was trying to persuade the Security Council that our action in placing the Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Strait amounted to the incorporation of Formosa within the American orbit. Austin's letter to Trygve Lie had made it plain that we had only one intention: to reduce the area of conflict in the Far East. General MacArthur's message, which the world might mistake as an expression of American policy, contradicted this.¹¹

¹⁰ See complete text of General MacArthur's statement to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Appendix I, pp. 131-135.

¹¹ Truman, Years, p. 355.

In reply to Truman's allegation of insubordination in the memoirs, General MacArthur issued a five thousand word statement expressing his own views on the controversial issues concerning his recall. In answer to Truman's charge about the statement to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, MacArthur denied that he had any intention of attacking Truman's foreign policy. He maintained that the statement was a study of the military value of Formosa which he had every right as a military commander to express publicly. He said:

The message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars was a strategic study of the island of Formosa as a link in our defensive chain in the western Pacific which both explained and supported our government's enunciated policy concerning that island. It was a routine message which normally would have attracted little attention other than from those who might have secretly harbored the ultimate intent to surrender Formosa to Red Chinese control.¹²

It is evident that MacArthur and Truman did not agree as to what constituted a statement concerning matters of foreign policy. Therein lies the major reason why MacArthur was recalled.

The second occasion in which Truman claims MacArthur expressed his views on foreign policy which conflicted with official United States policy was his March 24 statement to the Chinese Communists, issued three days after he had received a message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff informing him that the President was planning to issue a statement proposing a cease-fire.¹³ Truman was firm in denouncing the March 24

¹²Excerpt from statement by Douglas MacArthur appearing in The New York Times, 9 February, 1956, p. 25.

¹³See complete text of MacArthur's March 24 statement in Appendix II, pp. 135-136.

statement. In Years of Trial and Hope he wrote:

It was a most extraordinary statement for a military commander of the United Nations to issue on his own responsibility. It was an act totally disregarding all directives to abstain from any declarations on foreign policy. It was in open defiance of my orders as President and Commander-in-Chief. This was a challenge to the authority of the President under the Constitution. It also flouted the policy of the United Nations. . . .

In effect, what MacArthur was doing was to threaten the enemy with an ultimatum--intimating that the full preponderance of Allied power might be brought to bear against Red China. To be sure, he said, this would be a political decision, but considering his high office, the world would assume that he had advance knowledge that such a decision would be made.

This was certainly the immediate effect among our allies. From capitals all over the world came inquiries: What does this mean? Is there about to be a shift in American policy?¹⁴

In answer to this charge, MacArthur replied that although he had been under orders since December 6 to clear all public statements with the necessary departments, twice before had he issued statements similar to the one of March 24 without any indication that his statements interfered with the official United States policy. Again, he reaffirmed his conviction that his was in accordance with the rights and duties of a military commander. He said:

The charge that I was insubordinate because I called upon the enemy to surrender and stop further bloodshed is even more grotesque. Twice before I had done so: after the Inchon victory and after our capture of Pyongyang, the enemy's capital city in North Korea. In neither instance had there been

¹⁴Truman, Years, pp. 441-442.

the slightest whisper of remonstrance from any source; indeed, quite the contrary. And actually how could there have been otherwise: From the beginning of warfare it has not only been a right but a duty for a field commander to take any step within his power to minimize the bloodshed by the soldiers committed to his command. . . .

Mr. Truman further complains that my proposal interfered with one he himself contemplated making for an armistice. Such a complaint is unexplainable. How could any offer of peace by me possibly interfere with a similar purpose or move on his part--unless of course he were secretly entertaining the idea of appeasing the Reds by an agreement short of the declared objectives of the United Nations in the unification of Korea.¹⁵

The third example of insubordination, Truman stated, was MacArthur's letter to Congressman Joseph W. Martin. Truman interpreted this letter to be an attempt on MacArthur's part to present his cause to the American people. The letter was used by Martin as an attack against Truman's entire foreign policy before the Congress. If Truman had any doubts about MacArthur's recall prior to April 5 when Martin read the letter, they quickly vanished. He described MacArthur's letter to Martin as follows:

The second paragraph of this letter was in itself enough of a challenge to existing policy. MacArthur had been fully informed as to the reason why the employment of Chinese Nationalist troops had been ruled out. He himself, only eight months earlier, had endorsed the merit of this decision. Later, when he had changed his position and reopened the subject, he had again been advised that this was part of the overall policy on which the President had decided. So, in praising Mr. Martin's logic and traditional attitude, he was in effect saying that my policy was without logic and

¹⁵ Excerpt from statement by Douglas MacArthur appearing in The New York Times, 9 February, 1956, p. 25.

violated tradition.

Now, the tradition of which he wrote--that of meeting force with maximum counterforce--is in itself not one that exists outside military textbooks. To be sure, it is a good rule for the employment of troops, but it has no bearing on the relations between peoples. The American people have accomplished much and attained greatness not by the use of force, but by industry, ingenuity, and generosity.¹⁶

MacArthur, of course, denied all charges that he had attempted, in any way, to go over the head of the President in order to express his views to the American people. He claimed that a military commander is required by law to present his views to Congressmen whenever he is called upon to do so; and he claimed the letter to Martin was routine, and made little impression on him when he wrote it.¹⁷ In presenting his defense of Truman's charge, MacArthur stated:

The third document which Mr. Truman calls insubordination was my letter in reply to Congressman Martin asking my views on the employment of Chinese Nationalist troops which had been offered for the Korean front. It has always been the practice and became the law that military officials, when called upon by members of Congress for information, shall give it without reservation; but here again Formosa loomed up as the focal point to Mr. Truman. For in that letter I agreed with Congressman Martin's logic that the loyal Chinese troops on Formosa should be utilized to support our own forces in the battle of Korea.¹⁸

The very idea that he had been insubordinate

¹⁶Truman, Years, p. 446.

¹⁷Testimony of Douglas MacArthur, Hearings, part 1, p. 47.

¹⁸Excerpt from statement by Douglas MacArthur appearing in The New York Times, 9 February, 1956, p. 25.

was repulsive to MacArthur. His main defense against Truman's charges of insubordination is based on the fact that Truman never publicly made such charges while he was President. He made them after he had left office. MacArthur explained why he thought Truman waited until his term of office was over before charging insubordination as follows:

Over the years many conflicting reasons have been given by Mr. Truman, or his supporters, for my abrupt relief when victory was within our grasp. Now, for the first time, he bases his action on what he terms insubordination, one of the most serious of all military offenses and one which throughout our military annals has never been made without the officer concerned being given a hearing and the opportunity to defend himself. Indeed, the code which the Congress enacted to establish the laws governing the military establishment specifically makes such a hearing mandatory. Had Mr. Truman made such a charge against me at the time of my relief, or even later during his tenure of office I would have had the right and privilege to ask that a Court of Inquiry sit in judicial judgement upon his allegations. . . .

The belated charge of insubordination is made by him not as a public official, but as a private citizen.¹⁹

It can be said, therefore, that the recall of General MacArthur was primarily motivated not by his unwillingness to agree with Truman's Korean policy, but by his public expression on matters which he considered military policy, but which the President considered foreign policy. It is true that MacArthur's unwillingness to agree with Truman's policy strained the

¹⁹Excerpt from statement by Douglas MacArthur appearing in The New York Times, 9 February, 1956, p. 25.

normal relations between the Commander-in-Chief and his commander on the field, but this would not have resulted in MacArthur's recall if both Truman and MacArthur could have agreed on what was military policy and what was foreign policy. Since the Constitution does not define the difference between foreign policy and military policy, the contrasting interpretations of Truman and MacArthur are legitimate.

The Constitution does provide, however, that the President shall determine the difference between the two areas, that he shall define that difference when necessary, and that he shall voice the highest military, as well as the highest foreign affairs statements. It is altogether possible that the President's definition of the two areas might be incorrect, but it is his decision, and must therefore be accepted as administrative policy.

Truman believed that his definition classified MacArthur's three public statements as being concerned with matters of foreign policy. According to MacArthur's definition, this was not so. The ultimate decision, however, was Truman's, not MacArthur's. Thus, in view of Truman's constitutional prerogatives, the recall of MacArthur was perfectly justified. This does not mean, however, that Truman's definition of foreign policy is or is not correct; it simply means that MacArthur had no choice in the matter. The President and Commander-in-Chief had spoken.

POSSIBLE OTHER FACTORS

The preceding analysis of General MacArthur's recall has been based on the assumption that all of the facts surrounding Truman's action have been released to the public. There is a possibility, however, that this is not so.

In MacArthur's five thousand word reply to Truman's memoirs, he charged that Truman had not released all of the facts. He pointed to the fact that Truman mentioned nothing in his memoirs about a letter which he had sent to Truman in January, 1951. The contents of the letter were described by MacArthur as follows:

But what may have well triggered my removal was my recommendation made in January shortly before my relief, that a treason trial be initiated to break up a spy ring responsible for the purloining of my top secret reports to Washington. My campaign plans, including those of the Eighth Army, were transmitted daily to Washington. General Walker complained constantly to me that the enemy was receiving prior information of his movements. We could find no leaks in Korea or Japan. Then suddenly one of my dispatches concerning the order of battle was published in a Washington paper within a few hours of its receipt. I insisted that those responsible be stopped, but the case was never processed and I was shortly relieved of my command.

It was not until the recent exposure of the British spies, Burgess and McLean, that the true facts began to unfold. These men with access to secret files were undoubtedly links in the chain to our enemy in Korea through Peking by way of Moscow. I believe that my demand that this situation be exposed, coming after the Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White scandals, caused the deepest resentment and that it was probably branded a political move

to embarrass the administration.²⁰

This author was unable to find any evidence that Truman ever attempted to answer this charge.

Another incident, which raises some doubt as to whether all of the facts surrounding MacArthur's recall have been made public, occurred on a television program in Chicago on December 17, 1960. Harry Truman was being interviewed by Irv Kupincet, a columnist for the Chicago Sun Times, on the program entitled "At Random." The following is an excerpt from that interview as reported in The New York Times:

Mr. Kupincet. Speaking Was there any pressure on you to release the A-Bomb again in the Korean conflict?

Mr. Truman. [Speaking] Yes, MacArthur wanted to do that.

Mr. Kupincet. [MacArthur] did?

Mr. Truman. Yes, he wanted to bomb China and Eastern Russia and everything else.

Mr. Kupincet. Use the atomic bomb?

Mr. Truman. Why, of course, that was the only weapon we had that they would understand.²¹

This was the first time Truman had ever charged MacArthur with pressuring him to use nuclear weapons in the Korean war. When later asked why he had not mentioned this in his memoirs, Truman replied: "I didn't want to do MacArthur any damage, but when a question is asked point-blank I have to answer it."²²

²⁰ Excerpt from statement by Douglas MacArthur appearing in The New York Times, 9 February, 1956, p. 25.

²¹ Excerpt of interview of Harry S. Truman by Irv Kupincet appearing in The New York Times, 23 December, 1960, p. 7.

²² Statement by Harry S. Truman appearing in The New York Times, 23 December, 1960, p. 7.

Although this interview provoked little curiosity from the American people, it provoked rage from General MacArthur. From his apartment at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York, MacArthur issued a statement describing Truman's charges as "completely false." He said in part:

The records are available and will show that atom bombing in the Korean war was never discussed either by my headquarters, or in any communication to and from Washington. . . .

We did not need the atom bomb here anymore than we did in the war against Japan.²³

MacArthur also described as "equally fantastic" Truman's charge that he had wanted to bomb Siberia.

Who was telling the truth? Perhaps nobody will ever know. At the Senate hearings MacArthur testified that he had not recommended that the bomb be used, but he had requested information about whether consideration was being given to its use. The following is an excerpt from the hearings:

Senator McMahon. [Speaking] Have you at any time advocated the use of the atomic bomb in your theatre?

General MacArthur. [Speaking] Of the atomic bomb?

Senator McMahon. Yes.

General MacArthur. The limit of--

Senator McMahon. [Cough] Pardon me.

General MacArthur. The limit of what I did was to ask for information as to whether there were any plans to use the atomic bomb in the Far East.

Senator McMahon. Did you recommend its use?

General MacArthur. I did not. As I understand

²³ Excerpt from statement by Douglas MacArthur appearing in The New York Times, 23 December, 1960, p. 7.

it, the use of the atomic bomb has, by fiat and order, been limited to the President of the United States.²⁴

It is quite possible that Truman might have interpreted MacArthur's request for information as a request for the bomb's use. However, this is highly speculative and without verifiable foundation.

Whether or not all of the facts concerning MacArthur's recall have been released to the public, this thesis must consider what has been made public. If any facts have been kept confidential, they may, or may not, be released some time in the future.

THE POLICY

This author now turns to the second major question to be analyzed in chapter five: did President Truman pursue the wisest policy by trying to limit the Korean War to Korea? The answer to this question would be absolute if there was no alternative. But, there was an alternative. It was offered by General MacArthur. Thus, in order to decide whether Truman did pursue the wisest policy, it will be necessary to analyze that policy in contrast to the alternative policy offered by General MacArthur.

When Truman had first made the decision to defend South Korea, he had declared that the limited objective of the United States and the United Nations was to repel the aggressors from South Korea. He had therefore ordered General MacArthur not to engage in any activities north of the thirty-eighth parallel.

²⁴Testimony of Douglas MacArthur, in response to questions by Senator McMahon, Hearings, part 1, p. 77.

But, Truman's major objective was to demonstrate to the Communists that aggression on their part would not be tolerated, thus discouraging them from attacking elsewhere. This approach, reasoned Truman, was the only way to prevent a third world war. With this objective MacArthur was in complete agreement.²⁵

MacArthur's successful landing at Inchon on September 15, 1950, gave Truman reason to change his mind. Instead of merely driving the North Koreans out of South Korea, Truman decided that the best way to prevent a third world war in Korea would be to reunite the country under the government of South Korea. He ordered MacArthur to destroy the North Korean armed forces which would necessitate crossing the thirty-eighth parallel. With that objective, MacArthur was in complete agreement.

The great conflict between Truman and MacArthur began when the Chinese Communists entered the Korean War in late November, 1950. MacArthur was still under orders to destroy the North Korean Armed Forces and unite North and South Korea, but Truman was determined that his major objective, that of preventing a third world war, would not be sacrificed even at the expense of allowing the Communists to keep North Korea. His immediate goal, therefore, was to prevent a widening of the conflict.

MacArthur agreed with Truman that all steps should be taken to prevent a third world war; all steps, that is, short of surrendering North Korea to the Communists again. He believed that Truman had made a commitment to

²⁵See complete text of MacArthur's address before the Joint Session of Congress in Appendix IV, pp. 144-151.

the Koreans to re-unite their country, and any abandonment of that goal would be appeasement.

In order to stop the advancing Chinese Communist forces, MacArthur had suggested four proposals: that he be given permission to pursue enemy planes across the Yalu River; that he be given permission to bomb Chinese bases in Manchuria; that an economic blockade of the mainland of China be instituted; and that Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces be utilized in an attack against the Chinese mainland. Truman had rejected all of these proposals on the grounds that the risks entailed would be too great.

In Years of Trial and Hope Truman stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had also agreed that the risks would be too great. They had recommended that

Every effort should be expanded as a matter of urgency to settle the problem of Chinese intervention in Korea by political means, preferably through the United Nations, to include reassurances to the Chinese Communists with respect to our intent, direct negotiations through our allies and the Interim Committee with the Chinese Communist Government, and by other available means.²⁶

Nevertheless, to MacArthur the risks were not too great. He argued that if his proposals were not accepted, the only alternative he could see was appeasement.

Truman had rejected MacArthur's proposals specifically because he felt they would result in a war with Red China. Although Red China did not have nuclear weapons, what Truman feared was the Soviet Union's possible entry into the conflict. If this had

²⁶ Excerpt from recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff cited by Truman, Years, p. 378.

happened, Truman's major objective would have been lost. Therefore, the big question was whether or not MacArthur's proposals would have brought Russia into the war. Truman was certain they would. He did not believe it was a risk worth taking. MacArthur, on the other hand, believed that it was a risk which had to be taken. He felt that too many Americans had been killed and were being killed to warrant anything short of complete victory.

At the Senate hearings MacArthur explained why his proposals were necessary to bring the Korean War to a halt. He said:

I stated that under the present conditions, the losses we are sustaining of Americans in Korea, cannot go on indefinitely, without bleeding this country white. . . .

I say that if you are trying to buy time, you are doing it in the worst way you can. You are buying time at the expense of American blood. I think that is too expensive.

There is no certainty that Russia will come in.

There is no certainty that Russia will not come in.

There is no certainty that anything that happens in Korea will influence her.

That is speculative.

You have to take a certain degree of risks on these things one way or another.

All I know is that our men are going by the thousands over there, every month, and if you keep this thing on indefinitely, nothing could happen that could be worse than that.

Therefore, I suggest that some plan be carried out that will bring this slaughter to a definite end; that we should not continue to buy time. . . . It is too expensive from my point of view.²⁷

²⁷ Testimony of Douglas MacArthur, Hearings, part 1, p. 66.

General MacArthur and Truman both did not want Russian intervention. The real question was what would be the likelihood of Russian intervention if MacArthur's proposals were adopted. It has already been noted several times in this thesis that Truman considered it quite likely that MacArthur's proposals would result in Russian intervention. Secretary of State Dean Acheson supported Truman's contentions at the Senate hearings when he testified as follows:

We know of Soviet influence in North Korea, of Soviet assistance to the North Koreans and to Communist China, and we know that understandings must have accompanied this assistance. We also know that there is a treaty between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists.

But even if the treaty did not exist, China is the Soviet Union's largest and most important satellite. Russian self-interest in the Far East and the necessity of maintaining prestige in the Communist sphere make it difficult to see how the Soviet Union could ignore direct attacks upon the Chinese mainland.²⁸

In his reply to Truman's memoirs, MacArthur maintained that although there were risks in his proposals, the President had accepted these risks the day America entered the Korean conflict. He further maintained that the chances of Russian intervention were most unlikely. He said in part:

Mr. Truman further attempts to justify his extraordinary military policy, which literally placed our arms in a strait-jacket, by arguing the possibility that if we had followed our tradition and had fought to win, it might have precipitated Soviet Russia's entry into the war. But the entry of Soviet Russia, or Red China, was a risk inherent in his original decision to intervene in Korea. Then is when he should have

²⁸ Testimony of Dean Acheson, Hearings, part 3, p. 1719.

weighed the possible consequences and taken his decision with full acceptance of all the circumstances involved. . . .

For myself, I have never felt because of the realities involved, that there was serious danger of active Soviet intervention. In Korea the Soviet would have been at his weakest. The long and tenuous supply lines and other difficulties inherent in fighting a Far Eastern War were coupled with Moscow's psychological tendency to back down before a determined show of force. Moreover, Russia's policy is not to sacrifice its own troops, but to use those of its friends. The enormous expansion of Soviet influence since the end of World War II has been brought about without the Russian soldier firing a shot.²⁹

At this point it would be wise to examine what other government officials, military advisers, and politicians had to say concerning the chances that General MacArthur's views would bring Russian intervention.

CONGRESS

In the House of Representative, General MacArthur's views were vigorously debated. His supporters and his critics were divided sharply according to party lines. The Republicans seized the opportunity to use MacArthur as a weapon with which to attack the Truman administration, while the Democrats went on the defensive in order to support Truman's action.

In the House MacArthur's views were defended on April 11, the day of his recall, by Congressman Walter Judd of Minnesota who viewed Truman's decision as a

²⁹Excerpt from statement by Douglas MacArthur appearing in The New York Times, 9 February, 1956, p. 25.

great victory for Communism. Judd said:

The removal of General MacArthur represents the Kremlin's greatest victory since Yalta. That deal, too, looked as if it brought peace with the Kremlin; but it brought war instead. It weakened the free world and built up the Soviet world, and led straight to the invasion of Korea. Because it was at Yalta that the Russians were brought into Manchuria. . . .

There is nothing we can give them in a political deal or compromise which will end the war; it would only move the conflict to another country and make it more difficult. This act of the President's will so weaken our position in Asia and the strength built up at such terrible cost that it will be a miracle if war does not soon spread all over the area. In short, I fear the action will do just the opposite of what the President is trying to do. That it will expand the war in Asia, rather than contain it in Korea.³⁰

Many Republicans rallied to support Judd in his contention that the removal of MacArthur, rather than MacArthur's proposals, would bring Soviet Russia into the war. The Democrats were in a majority in the House, but most of them preferred to remain silent for fear of political consequences. The few brave souls who did join the debates supported Truman's contention that a war with China would bring the Soviet Union rushing to its defense.³¹ Congressman Yorty of California attacked the Republicans on the basis that they had not supported MacArthur's candidacy for the Republican nomination for President in 1948. He said:

General MacArthur and many others apparently feel we should take the risk of seeing the controlled fire in Korea expanded into a world-wide

³⁰ Excerpt from speech by Walter Judd, Congressional Record, April 11, 1951, p. 3684.

³¹ Congressional Record, April 11, 1951, pp. 3675-3687.

conflagration by launching direct attacks against China, thereby bringing into operation the Chinese-Soviet agreement for mutual assistance which we believe to exist.³²

In the Senate the two chief Republican spokesmen were Senators William F. Knowland of California and Homer Capehart of Indiana. Although most Democrats preferred to remain silent, their cause was brilliantly defended by Robert Kerr of Oklahoma. Kerr debated with the Republicans almost single-handed for the entire afternoon of April 11. He presented the issues clearly and avoided going out on tangents. His defense of Truman's action was so successful that Time magazine referred to him as "Horatius on the floor."³³ Kerr said in part:

Mr. President, I do not believe that another world war is inevitable. I am opposed to any political, diplomatic, or military policy on the part of my government which assumes fatalistically that an all-out war with either Soviet Russia or Red China is inevitable; and I am opposed to any act on the part of any responsible government official calculated to encourage or permit such an all-out struggle.

We are not in Korea today to start a world war, or start to engage in an all-out war with Red China. We and many other countries who are our allies are in Korea for a very definite or specific purpose. We are there to stop aggression, to punish the aggressor, and to prevent the spread of the conflict into a third world war.³⁴

But, as Kerr and the responsible Republicans debated issues, others merely sought to use Truman's

³² Excerpt from speech by Congressman Yorty, Congressional Record, April 11, 1951, p. 3683.

³³ "The Little Man Who Dared," Time, LVII (April 23, 1951), 26.

³⁴ Excerpt from speech by Robert Kerr appearing in Congressional Record, April 11, 1951, p. 3640.

action as a political weapon for themselves; they chose to place emotion before the facts. Such was the case of Joseph Raymond McCarthy of Wisconsin. Although McCarthy had an ample supply of facts with which to debate, he chose to corrupt the facts and make it appear as though MacArthur's recall was an act of treason. He said:

Mr. President, the reason I am asking the Senator to yield at this time is that it is necessary for me to leave the floor in a few minutes. Before I leave I should like to say that I hope the fact that we are not discussing today on the floor of the Senate, at least at this time, the great victory which the Communists sustained last night does not mean that we are not aware that they have won such a victory. The reason I am not discussing it is that I am going to the town which was the former home of the greatest American I know, General Douglas MacArthur. I intend to discuss there the fact that the midnight potency of bourbon and benedictine may well have condemned thousands of American boys to death, and may well have condemned western civilization.

I intend to discuss the fact that the only crime of Douglas MacArthur was that he has always been against Communism and would not go along with the Yalta crowd for the sell-out in Asia. I intend to discuss the fact that his principal crime in the eyes of the State Department is that he felt and still feels that it was right and proper that others than American boys should have the opportunity to die in the fight against international Communism. I intend to discuss these subjects in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, the former home of General Douglas MacArthur. That is why I am not discussing it on the floor of the Senate today.

I would say further, Mr. President, that Democrats have a glorious opportunity today, if they will rise to the occasion. Unless the Democrats in the Senate and House--after all they are in control--stand up and let themselves be counted as being against treason they will forever, and

rightly, have labeled their party as the party of betrayal.³⁵

As a whole, the Congressional debates concerning General MacArthur's views helped clarify the issues involved in the general's recall, but at the same time, the debates failed to produce any conclusive evidence to indict or support Truman's Korean policy of preventing a widening of the conflict. The members of the House and Senate were really not as yet clear as to what MacArthur's views really were, and they did not possess the information necessary to evaluate properly Truman's policy.

THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

Secretary of Defense George Marshall was called before the Senate hearings to explain whether or not he supported or rejected Truman's Korean policy and his subsequent recall of General MacArthur. When asked if he had disagreed with the President in any way, Marshall testified as follows:

From the very beginning of the Korean conflict, down to the present moment, there had been no disagreements between the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that I am aware of.

There have been, however, and continue to be basic differences of judgement between General MacArthur, on the one hand, and the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the other.³⁶

³⁵ Statement by Joseph McCarthy appearing in Congressional Record, April 11, 1951, p. 3640.

³⁶ Excerpt from testimony by George Marshall, Hearings, part 1, p. 323.

He later explained the areas of disagreement between the President and MacArthur:

Our objective in Korea continues to be the defeat of aggression and the restoration of peace. We have persistently sought to confine the conflict to Korea and to prevent its spreading into a third world war. In this effort, we stand allied with the great majority of our fellow members of the United Nations. Our efforts have succeeded in thwarting the aggressors, in Korea, and in stemming the tide of aggression in southeast Asia and elsewhere throughout the world. Our efforts in Korea have given us some sorely needed time and impetus to accelerate the building of our defenses and those of our allies against the threatened onslaught of Soviet Imperialism.

General MacArthur, on the other hand, would have us, on our initiative, carry the conflict beyond Korea against the mainland of Communist China, both from the sea and from the air. He would have us accept the risk involvement in an extension of the war with Red China, but in an all-out war with the Soviet Union. He would do this even at the expense of losing our allies and wrecking the coalition of free peoples throughout the world. He would have us do this even though the effect of such action might expose Western Europe to attack by the millions of Soviet troops in middle and Eastern Europe.³⁷

Marshall's testimony evidences that what he and Truman really feared was the threat of Soviet intervention. That is the big question that must be considered--would the Soviet Union have intervened? Marshall shared Truman's view that the only way to really find out would be to take the risks involved. Both believed that these risks were too great.

In his reply to Truman's memoirs MacArthur

³⁷ Excerpt from testimony by George Marshall, Hearings, part 1, pp. 324-325.

maintained that General Marshall supported Truman's views for two reasons: first, he owed his appointment as Secretary of Defense, and previous appointment as Secretary of State, to Truman; second, he had always been hostile to MacArthur because of MacArthur's rapid promotions after World War I, whereas Marshall himself became a general twenty years after MacArthur. Thus MacArthur considered Marshall's support of Truman's action based upon loyalty to Truman and jealousy of his own position.³⁸

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was also called to testify at the Senate hearings. His testimony was extremely repetitious of what General Marshall had already said, because Bradley, as well as Marshall, was in complete agreement with Truman's policy of limiting the war to Korea.

When asked what he felt were the main issues in the debate for and against Truman's policy, Bradley read a prepared testimony. He said in part:

The fundamental military issue that has arisen is whether to increase the risks of global war by taking additional measures that are open to the United States and its allies. We now have a localized conflict in Korea. Some of the military measures under discussion might well place the United States in the position of responsibility for broadening the war and at the same time losing most if not all of our allies.

General MacArthur has stated that there are

³⁸ Douglas MacArthur, The New York Times, 9 February, 1957, p. 25.

certain additional measures which can and should be taken, and that by doing so no unacceptable increased risk of global war will result.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that these same measures increase the risk of global war and that such a risk should not be taken unnecessarily. At the same time we recognize the military advantages that might accrue to the United Nations position in Korea and to the United States position in the Far East by these measures.³⁹

The most interesting aspect of Bradley's statement is that he recognized that there was some validity in MacArthur's proposals from a military standpoint. Bradley, however, supported Truman and Marshall's contention that the political risks inherent in these proposals were too great. Why? Because they might have resulted in a war with China, thus causing Soviet intervention. Again, the primary concern was Soviet intervention.

In his reply to Truman's memoirs MacArthur maintained that he and Bradley had been hostile for a long time. During World War II Marshall had recommended Bradley for the post of senior ground commander in the Pacific. MacArthur had refused this recommendation in favor of one of his own men. This, in addition to the fact that Bradley had been appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Truman, constitutes MacArthur's justification of Bradley's agreement with the Presidential policy.⁴⁰

³⁹ Excerpt from testimony of Omar Bradley, Hearings, part 2, p. 730.

⁴⁰ Douglas MacArthur, The New York Times, 9 February, 1956, p. 25.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Little discussion is needed to explain how the State Department felt about Truman's Korean policy. That policy was based largely upon information and advice handed to Truman by the State Department. Indeed, many times opposition against Truman's policies was manifested in bitter attacks against Secretary of State Acheson rather than against the President.⁴¹ In Years of Trial and Hope, Truman described his relationship with Acheson as follows:

There was never a day during the four years of Dean Acheson's secretaryship that anyone could have said that he and I differed on policy. He was meticulous in keeping me posted on every development within the wide area of his responsibility. He had a deep understanding of the President's position in our constitutional scheme and realized to the fullest that, while I leaned on him for constant advice, the policy had to be mine--it was.⁴²

THE UNITED NATIONS

There is no question that the Communist bloc nations and the neutrals would have opposed General MacArthur's proposals had they been brought up for discussion. The question is how did the allies of the United States feel about them.

General Marshall was asked at the Senate hearings if the proposal to blockade the coast of China had been discussed among United States allies. He

⁴¹Truman, Years, p. 428.

⁴²Ibid., p. 430.

said:

My recollection to that, Mr. Chairman, is that we have been discussing it with them informally, and we have not brought the issue up as a formal proposition for them to refuse.⁴³

Since MacArthur's proposals were never officially introduced for discussion in the United Nations Security Council or General Assembly, there is no official evidence in The United Nations Yearbook to indicate whether or not United States allies would have supported them. However, Secretary of State Dean Acheson was certain they would not. He testified at the Senate hearing as follows:

To our embassies in certain countries we transmitted a message saying that at an early date we might permit United States aircraft to defend themselves in the airspace over the Yalu River, to the extent of permitting hot pursuit of enemy aircraft up to two or three minutes flying time over enemy territory. . . .

They discussed the question with those governments, and in all cases they got strongly negative responses from the governments, saying they thought it was dangerous and not desirable.⁴⁴

When General MacArthur was asked at the hearings whether he thought the United Nations would support his proposals, he answered that what they thought was irrelevant in shaping United States policy. Unlike Truman, he was not afraid of going it alone. He said:

I can give no testimony about the United Nations, Senator. . . . My hope would be of course that the

⁴³ Excerpt from testimony of George Marshall, Hearings, part 1, p. 328.

⁴⁴ Excerpt from testimony of Dean Acheson, Hearings, part 3, p. 1723.

United Nations would see the wisdom and utility of that course, but if they did not, I still believe that interests of the United States being the predominant one in Korea would require our action. . . alone, if necessary. If the other nations of the world haven't got enough sense to see where appeasement leads after the appeasement which led to the Second World War in Europe, if they can't see exactly the road they are following in Asia, why then we had better protect ourselves and go it alone.⁴⁵

THE VERDICT

Although Truman and MacArthur differed on several minor points, there was only one major reason why Truman could not agree to MacArthur's proposals to pursue enemy bases in Manchuria, to blockade the Chinese mainland, and to unleash Chiang Kai-shek. That overriding reason was the fear of Soviet intervention. If there was no fear of Soviet intervention, there is little doubt that MacArthur's proposals would have been quickly carried out. General Marshall testified to this fact at the Senate hearings. The following is an excerpt from his testimony:

Senator George. [Speaking] I would like to ask you this direct question: If you were assured that Soviet Russia would not come into the action in Korea, the war in Korea, would you be disposed to favor the recommendation of General MacArthur in the hope that it might bring a speedy termination of the war in Korea?

Secretary Marshall. [Speaking] Once the Chinese Communist troops had appeared in force in Manchuria, and if, from a hypothetical point of view, there

⁴⁵Testimony of Douglas MacArthur, Hearings, part 1, p. 42.

was no danger whatever from Soviet intervention, the bombing would begin immediately.⁴⁶

In order to evaluate Truman's Korean policy, therefore, it is necessary to know whether the Soviets would have intervened in Korea. That question has not been definitely answered and probably never will be. The ultimate decision of whether or not the Soviet Union would have intervened if the Korean War had spread to the Chinese mainland was a decision that only Joseph Stalin could have made; and, unless he discussed this question with other Soviet officials, his secret died with him in March, 1953.

Nevertheless, the question can be put another way: Even if there was no way of knowing whether or not the Soviets would have intervened, was that risk worth taking?

Truman would say no. In that contention he would be supported by all major government officials and the United Nations. Truman would no doubt say that history has proved him right. Although North Korea is not free, World War III has not become a tragic reality; and since Korea, the Communist world had not attempted to subjugate militarily a nation supported by the West.

MacArthur believed these risks were worth taking. With the exception of Republican politicians, he stood alone. Even though he stood alone, he profoundly believed and still believes that history will prove him right. He has stated his reasons why Truman's policy must be regarded as a failure as follows:

⁴⁶ Excerpt from testimony of George Marshall, in response to questions from Senator George, Hearings, part 1, p. 397.

Mr. Truman's relief of me on April 11, 1951, was important not because of the personalities involved but as a symbol of a basic change in his attitude toward Asia since entering upon the Korean War and the calamitous events which resulted therefrom. It set off a chain of reactions which has prejudiced to its very foundation the struggle between the free and the Red World. Mr. Truman's decision to meet Communist aggression in its military effort to seize Korea would have been a noble one indeed had it been implemented with unswerving courage and determination. But he proved himself unequal to the task. After Red China entered the conflict, he yielded to councils of fear and abandoned pledged commitments to restore to the people of Korea a nation which was unified and free.

Such abandonment of principles by a President in whom the people of Asia had placed such faith and trust was a catastrophic blow to the hopes of the free world. Its disastrous consequences were reflected throughout Asia. Red China promptly was considered the military colossus of the East. Korea was left ravished and divided. Indo-China was partitioned by the sword. Tibet was taken on demand. Other nations began to tremble toward neutralism. . . .

All of this destroyed oriental faith in our fortitude, in our determination and our belief that the Far East was comparable in importance to Europe. It confirmed their fears of allied concentration on the Atlantic Ocean and a much lower priority for the Pacific Ocean Area. This largely cost us the psychological results of the World War II victory in the Far East.⁴⁷

SUMMARY

The preceding survey and analysis of Truman's Korean policy and the facts and circumstances resulting in the recall of General MacArthur have led this author

⁴⁷ Excerpt from statement of Douglas MacArthur appearing in The New York Times, 9 February, 1956, p. 25.

to two major conclusions: first, President Truman's recall of General MacArthur was fully justified in accordance with his executive powers and his right to interpret the difference between military policy and foreign policy; second, history will eventually draw the most accurate conclusion as to whether Truman or MacArthur advocated the wisest Korean policy. All other conclusions are highly speculative, or, at least, merely problematic.

Because it is the purpose of this thesis to survey and analyze the facts, not to present definite conclusions concerning the effects of Truman's decision on history, the reader may tend to feel a sense of ambiguous frustration. Nevertheless, this author maintains that a thorough understanding of the personalities and philosophies of Truman and MacArthur, as well as a knowledge of United States-Korean relations from 1945 to 1951, are essential prerequisites to formulating conclusions. It is the purpose of this thesis to provide these prerequisites. Individuals must reach their own conclusions.

At some future date additional information may be made available which will make it possible for individuals to reach sound and definite conclusions concerning Truman's Korean policy. Until then, this thesis is an attempt to guide individuals in that direction.

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AFTERMATH

After MacArthur's recall Truman announced that the United States was ready to begin truce talks in Korea. Both Truman and United Nations Secretary General Trygve Lie felt that a cease-fire approximately along the thirty-eighth parallel would fulfill the purposes of the United Nations; namely, to "repulse the aggression against the Republic of Korea."¹

On July 7, 1951, truce talks began at Kaesong near the thirty-eighth parallel.² It soon became obvious that the Red Chinese representatives were not eager for peace. Their demands amounted to a virtual surrender of South Korea. The negotiations were also strained by frequent declarations from Syngman Rhee that he would not accept less than a unified Korea.³

As the negotiations continued, the Communists stalled for time by refusing to compromise on several issues. The most important of these issues involved the repatriation of prisoners of war. The Communists insisted that all prisoners of war be returned. Truman felt that those North Koreans and Chinese who did not wish to be returned to the Communists would be given an opportunity to retain their freedom. He later explained his feelings as follows:

Communism is a system that has no regard for human dignity and human freedom, and no right-thinking government can give its consent to the

¹Truman, Years, p. 455.

²Ibid., p. 459.

³Ibid., p. 459.

forcible return to such a system of men and women who would rather remain free.⁴

As the peace talks continued throughout 1952, the Korean War reached a stalemate. One side would remain on the offensive only until its supply lines were over-extended. It soon became obvious that Korea could not be united and that a cease-fire would be the only hope for peace.⁵

By the winter of 1952 the American people were extremely frustrated by the failure of the truce talks. In the Presidential election of 1952 Truman's party suffered an overwhelming defeat as Dwight Eisenhower became the first Republican President in twenty years. The Korean War proved to be a decisive factor in the outcome of the election.⁶

On January 20, 1953, Truman turned the Presidency over to Eisenhower, who had promised in his campaign to end the Korean War. There will always be a great deal of controversy concerning Eisenhower's influence on the peace talks, but soon after his election the Communists' stubbornness on the prisoner of war issue began to lessen. A cease-fire was finally signed on July 27, 1953.⁷ The Korean War had come to an end after three years.

⁴Truman, Years, p. 460.

⁵Steinberg, p. 400.

⁶Ibid., p. 400.

⁷The New York Times, 27 July, 1953, p. 1.

APPENDICES

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APPENDIX I

TEXT OF GENERAL MACARTHUR'S STATEMENT TO THE
VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS

APPENDIX I

TEXT OF GENERAL MACARTHUR'S STATEMENT TO THE
VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS¹

TO: CLYDE A. LEWIS, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE
UNITED STATES,
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Your inspiring message of the 17th has moved me deeply and I trust that you will convey to all of my comrades-in-arms of the Veterans of Foreign Wars assembled on the occasion of our 51st Annual National Encampment my assurance that their confidence and support will give this Command much added strength to meet the tests of battle which lie immediately ahead. Tell them that I am happy to report that their successors in arms now engaging the enemy along our battle lines in South Korea are exemplifying that same high standard of devotion, fortitude and valor which characterized their own march to victory when they themselves engaged in combat in the field. From senior commanders down through all ranks, their tactical skill, their invincible determination, and their fighting qualities against a fanatical foe, well-trained, expertly directed and heavily armed, have upheld our country's finest traditions. Toward victory, however difficult the road, they are giving an account of themselves which should make every American heart beat with pride and infinite satisfaction.

In view of misconceptions currently being voiced concerning the relationship of Formosa to our strategic potential in the Pacific, I believe it is in the public interest to avail myself of this opportunity to state my views thereon to you, all of whom having fought overseas understand broad strategic concepts.

To begin with, any appraisal of this strategic potential requires an appreciation of the changes wrought in the course of the past war. Prior thereto the western strategic frontier of the United States

¹U. S. News and World Report, 29 (September 1, 1950), 32-34.

lay on the littoral line of the Americas with an exposed island salient extending out through Hawaii, Midway and Guam to the Philippines. That salient was not an outpost of strength but an avenue of weakness along which the enemy could and did attack us. The Pacific was a potential area of advance for any predatory force intent upon striking at the bordering land areas.

All of this was changed by our Pacific victory. Our strategic frontier then shifted to embrace the entire Pacific Ocean, which has become a vast moat to a protective shield for all of the Americas and all free lands of the Pacific Ocean area. We control it to the shores of Asia by a chain of islands, extending in an arc from the Aleutians to the Marianas, held by us and our allies.

From this island chain we can dominate with air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore and prevent any hostile movement into the Pacific. Any predatory attack from Asia must be an amphibious effort. No amphibious force can be successful without control of the sea lanes and the air over those lanes in its avenue of advance. With naval and air supremacy and modest ground elements to defend bases, any major attack from continental Asia toward us or our friends of the Pacific would be doomed to failure.

Under such conditions the Pacific no longer represents menacing avenues of approach for a prospective invader--it assumes instead a natural one and can be maintained with a minimum of military effort and expense. It envisions no attack against anyone nor does it provide the bastions essential for offensive operations, but properly maintained would be an invincible defense against aggression. If we hold this line we may have peace--lose it and war is inevitable.

The geographic location of Formosa is such that in the hands of a power unfriendly to the United States it constitutes an enemy salient in the very center of this defensive perimeter, 100-150 miles closer to the adjacent friendly segments--Okinawa and the Philippines--than any point in continental Asia.

At the present time there is on Formosa a concentration of operational air and naval bases which is potentially greater than any similar concentration on the Asiatic mainland between the Yellow Sea and the Strait of Malacca. Additional bases can be developed in a relatively short time by an aggressive exploitation of all World War II Japanese facilities.

An enemy force utilizing those installations currently available could increase by 100 per cent the air effort which could be directed against Okinawa as compared to operations based on the mainland and at the same time could direct damaging air attacks with fighter-type aircraft against friendly installations in the Philippines, which are currently beyond the range of fighters based on the mainland. Our air supremacy at once would become doubtful.

As a result of its geographic location and base potential, utilization of Formosa by a military power hostile to the United States may either counterbalance or overshadow the strategic importance of the central and southern flank of the United States front-line position. Formosa in the hands of such a hostile power could be compared to an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender ideally located to accomplish offensive strategy and at the same time checkmate defensive or counter offensive operations by friendly forces based on Okinawa and the Philippines..

This unsinkable carrier-tender has the capacity to operate from 10 to 20 air groups of types ranging from jet fighters to B-29 type bombers as well as to provide forward operating facilities for short-range coastal submarines. In acquiring this forward submarine base, the efficacy of the short-range submarine would be so enormously increased by the additional radius of activity as to threaten completely sea traffic from the south and interdict all sea lanes in the Western Pacific. Submarine blockade by the enemy with all its destructive ramifications would thereby become a virtual certainty.

Should Formosa fall and bases thereafter come into the hands of a potential enemy of the United States, the latter will have acquired an additional "fleet" which will have been obtained and can be maintained at an incomparably lower cost than could its equivalent in aircraft carriers and submarine tenders. Current estimates of air and submarine resources in the Far East indicate the capability of such a potential enemy to extend his forces southward and still maintain an imposing degree of military strength for employment elsewhere in the Pacific area.

Historically, Formosa has been used as a springboard for just such military aggression directed against areas to the south. The most notable and recent example was the utilization of it by the Japanese in World War II. At the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, it played an important part as a staging area and supporting base for the various Japanese invasion convoys.

The supporting air forces of Japan's Army and Navy were based on fields situated along Southern Formosa.

From 1942 through 1944 Formosa was a vital link in the Japanese defense scheme. Should Formosa fall into the hands of a hostile power, history would repeat itself. Its military potential would again be fully exploited as the means to breach and neutralize our Western Pacific defense system and mount a war of conquest against the free nations of the Pacific Basin.

Nothing could be more fallacious than the threadbare argument by those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific that if we defend Formosa we alienate continental Asia. Those who speak thus do not understand the Orient. They do not grasp that it is the pattern of Oriental psychology to respect and follow aggressive, resolute and dynamic leadership--to quickly turn from a leadership characterized by timidity or vacillation--and they underestimate the Oriental mentality.

Nothing in the last five years has so inspired the Far East as the American determination to preserve the bulwarks of our Pacific Ocean strategic position from future encroachment, for few of its peoples fail accurately to appraise the safeguard such determination brings to their free institutions.

To pursue any other course would be to turn over the fruits of our Pacific victory to a potential enemy. It would shift any future battle area 5,000 miles eastward to the coasts of the American continents, our own home coasts; it would completely expose our friends in the Philippines, our friends in Australia and New Zealand, our friends in Indonesia, our friends in Japan, and other areas, to the lustful thrust of those who stand for slavery as against liberty, for atheism as against God.

The decision of President Truman on June 27th lighted into flame a lamp of hope throughout Asia that was burning dimly towards extinction. It marked for the Far East the focal and turning point in this area's struggle for freedom. It swept aside in one great monumental stroke all of the hypocrisy and the sophistry which has confused and deluded so many people distant from the actual scene.

APPENDIX II

TEXT OF GENERAL MACARTHUR'S MARCH 24 STATEMENT
TO THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS

APPENDIX II

TEXT OF GENERAL MACARTHUR'S MARCH 24 STATEMENT
TO THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS¹

Operations continue according to schedule and plan. We have now substantially cleared South Korea of organized Communist forces. It is becoming increasingly evident that the heavy destruction along the enemy's lines of supply, caused by our round-the-clock massive air and naval bombardment, has left his troops in the forward battle area deficient in requirements to sustain his operations. This weakness is being brilliantly exploited by our ground forces. The enemy's human wave tactics have definitely failed him as our own forces have become seasoned to this form of warfare; his tactics of infiltration are but contributing to his piecemeal losses, and he is showing less stamina than our own troops under the rigors of climate, terrain and battle.

Of even greater significance than our tactical successes has been the clear revelation that this new enemy, Red China, of such exaggerated and vaunted military power, lacks the industrial capacity to provide adequately many critical items necessary to the conduct of modern war. He lacks the manufacturing base and those raw materials needed to produce, maintain and operate even moderate air and naval power, and he cannot provide the essentials for successful ground operations, such as tanks, heavy artillery and other refinements science has introduced into the conduct of military campaigns. Formerly his great numerical potential might well have filled this gap but with the development of existing methods of mass destruction, numbers alone do not offset the vulnerability inherent in such deficiencies. Control of the seas and the air, which in turn means control over supplies, communications, and transportation, are no less essential and decisive now than in the past. When this control exists as in our case, and is coupled with an inferiority of ground fire power as in the enemy's case, the resulting disparity is such that it cannot be overcome by bravery, however fanatical, or the most gross indifference to

¹Truman, Years, pp. 440-441.

human loss.

These military weaknesses have been clearly and definitely revealed since Red China entered upon its undeclared war in Korea. Even under the inhibitions which now restrict the activity of the United Nations forces and the corresponding military advantages which accrue to Red China, it has been shown its complete inability to accomplish by force of arms the conquest of Korea. The enemy, therefore, must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea, through an expansion of our military operations to its coastal areas and interior bases, would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse. These basic facts being established, there should be no insuperable difficulty in arriving at decisions on the Korean problem if the issues are resolved on their own merits, without being burdened by extraneous matters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa or China's seat in the United Nations.

The Korean nation and people, which have been so cruelly ravaged, must not be sacrificed. This is a paramount concern. Apart from the military area of combat, the fundamental questions continue to be political in nature and must find their answer in the diplomatic sphere. Within the area of my authority as the military commander, however, it would be needless to say that I stand ready at any time to confer in the field with the commander-in-chief of the enemy forces in the earnest effort to find any military means whereby realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no nation may justly take exceptions, might be accomplished without further bloodshed.

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APPENDIX III

TEXT OF PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S TELEVISION ADDRESS

AFTER MACARTHUR'S RECALL

APPENDIX III

TEXT OF PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S TELEVISION ADDRESS

AFTER MACARTHUR'S RECALL

I want to talk plainly to you tonight about what we are doing in Korea and about our policy in the Far East.

In the simplest terms, what we are doing in Korea is this: We are trying to prevent a third world war.

I think most people in this country recognized that fact last June. And they warmly supported the decision of the Government to help the Republic of Korea against the Communist aggressors. Now, many persons, even some who applauded our decision to defend Korea, have forgotten the basic reason for our action.

It is right for us to be in Korea. It was right last June. It is right today.

I want to remind you why this is true.

The Communists in the Kremlin are engaged in a monstrous conspiracy to stamp out freedom all over the world. If they were to succeed, the United States would be numbered among their principal victims. It must be clear to everyone that the United States cannot--and will not--sit idly by and await foreign conquest. The only question is: When is the best time to meet the threat and how?

The best time to meet the threat is in the beginning. It is easier to put out a fire in the beginning when it is small than after it has become a roaring blaze.

And the best way to meet the threat of aggression is for the peace-loving nations to act together. If they don't act together, they are likely to be picked off, one by one.

If they had followed the right policies in the

¹Congressional Record, April 12, 1951, pp. 3842-3843.

1930's; if the free countries had acted together, to crush the aggression of the dictators; and if they had acted in the beginning, when the aggression was small, there probably would have been no World War II.

If history has taught us anything, it is that aggression anywhere in the world is a threat to peace everywhere in the world. When that aggression is supported by the cruel and selfish rulers of a powerful nation who are bent on conquest, it becomes a clear and present danger to the security and independence of every free nation.

This is a lesson that most people in this country have learned thoroughly. This is the basic reason why we joined in creating the United Nations. And, since the end of World War II, we have been putting that lesson into practice--we have been working with other free nations to check the aggressive designs of the Soviet Union before they can result in a third world war.

That is what we did in Greece, when that nation was threatened by the aggression of international communism.

The attack against Greece could have led to general war. But this country came to the aid of Greece. The United Nations supported Greek resistance. With our help, the determination and efforts of the Greek people defeated the attack on the spot.

Another big Communist threat to peace was the Berlin blockade. That too could have led to war. But again it was settled because free men would not back down in an emergency.

The aggression against Korea is the boldest and most dangerous move the Communists have yet made.

The attack on Korea was part of a greater plan for conquering all of Asia.

I would like to read to you from a secret intelligence report which came to us after the attack. It is a report of a speech a Communist army officer in North Korea gave to a group of spies and saboteurs last May, 1 month before South Korea was invaded. The report shows in great detail how this invasion was part of a carefully prepared plot. Here is a part of what the Communist officer, who had been trained in Moscow, told his men: 'Our forces,' he said, 'are scheduled to attack South Korean forces about the middle of June. The coming attack on South Korea marks the first step toward the liberation of Asia.'

Notice that he used the word 'liberation.'
That is Communist double-talk meaning 'conquest.'

I have another secret intelligence report here. This one tells what another Communist officer in the Far East told his men several months before the invasion of Korea. Here is what he said: 'In order to successfully undertake the long awaited world-revolution, we must first unify Asia. Java, Indo-China, Malaya, India, Tibet, Thailand, Philippines, and Japan are our ultimate targets. The United States is the only obstacle on our road for the liberation of all countries in southeast Asia. In other words, we must unify the people of Asia and crush the United States.'

That is what the Communist leaders are telling their people, and that is what they have been trying to do.

They want to control all Asia from the Kremlin.

This plan of conquest is in flat contradiction to what we believe. We believe that Korea belongs to the Koreans, that India belongs to the Indians--that all the nations of Asia should be free to work out their affairs in their own way. This is the basis of peace in the Far East and everywhere else.

The whole Communist imperialism is back of the attack on peace in the Far East. It was the Soviet Union that trained and equipped the North Koreans for aggression. The Chinese Communists massed 44 well-trained and well-equipped divisions on the Korean frontier. These were the troops they threw into battle when the North Korean Communists were beaten.

The question we have had to face is whether the Communist plan of conquest can be stopped without general war. Our Government and other countries associated with us in the United Nations believe that the best chance of stopping it without general war is to meet the attack in Korea and defeat it there.

That is what we have been doing. It is a difficult and bitter task.

But so far it has been successful.

So far, we have prevented World War III. So far, by fighting a limited war in Korea, we have prevented aggression from succeeding, and bringing on a general war. And the ability of the whole free world to resist Communist aggression has been greatly improved.

We have taught the enemy a lesson. He has found out that aggression is not cheap or easy. Moreover, men all over the world who want to remain free have been given new courage and new hope. They know now that the champions of freedom can stand up and fight and that they will stand up and fight.

Our resolute stand in Korea is helping the forces of freedom now fighting in Indo-China and other countries in that part of the world. It has already slowed down the time-table of conquest.

In Korea itself, there are signs that the enemy is building up his ground forces for a new mass offensive. We also know that there have been large increases in the enemy's available air forces.

If a new attack comes, I feel confident it will be turned back. The United Nations fighting forces are tough and able and well-equipped. They are fighting for a just cause. They are proving to all the world that the principle of collective security will work. We are proud of all these forces for the magnificent job they have done against heavy odds. We pray that their efforts may succeed, for upon their success may hinge the peace of the world.

The Communist side must now choose its course of action. The Communist rulers may press the attack against us. They may take further action which will spread the conflict. They have that choice, and with it the awful responsibility for what may follow. The Communists also have the choice of a peaceful settlement which could lead to a general relaxation of tensions in the Far East. The decision is theirs, because the forces of the United Nations will strive to limit the conflict if possible.

We do not want to see the conflict in Korea extended. We are trying to prevent a world war--not to start one. The best way to do that is to make it plain that we and the other free countries will continue to resist the attack.

But you may ask, why can't we take other steps to punish the aggressor. Why don't we bomb Manchuria and China itself? why don't we assist Chinese Nationalist troops to land on the mainland of China?

If we were to do these things, we would become entangled in a vast conflict on the continent of Asia and our task would become immeasurably more difficult all over the world.

What would suit the ambitions of the Kremlin better than for our military forces to be committed to a full-scale war with Red China?

It may well be that, in spite of our best efforts, the Communists may spread the war. But it would be wrong--tragically wrong--for us to take the initiative in extending the war.

The dangers are great. Make no mistake about it. Behind the North Koreans and Chinese Communists in the front lines stand additional millions of Chinese soldiers. And behind the Chinese stand the tanks, the planes, the submarines, the soldiers, and the scheming rulers of the Soviet Union.

Our aim is to avoid the spread of the conflict.

The course we have been following is the one best calculated to avoid an all-out war. It is the course consistent with our obligation to do all we can to maintain international peace and security. Our experience in Greece and Berlin shows that it is the most effective course of action we can follow.

First of all, it is clear that our efforts in Korea can blunt the will of the Chinese Communists to continue the struggle. The United Nations forces casualties on the enemy. Our forces are stronger now than they have been before. These are plain facts which may discourage the Chinese Communists from continuing their attack.

Second, the free world as a whole is growing in military strength every day. In the United States, in Western Europe, and throughout the world, free men are alert to the Soviet threat and are building their defenses. This may discourage the Communist rulers from continuing the war in Korea, and from undertaking new acts of aggression elsewhere.

If the Communist authorities realize that they cannot defeat us in Korea, if they realize it would be foolhardy to widen the hostilities beyond Korea, then they may recognize the folly of continuing their aggression. A peaceful settlement may then be possible. The door is always open.

Then we may achieve a settlement in Korea which will not compromise the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

I have thought long and hard about this question of extending the war in Asia. I have discussed it many

times with the ablest military advisers in the country. I believe with all my heart that the course we are following is the best course.

I believe that we must try to limit the war to Korea for these vital reasons: to make sure that the precious lives of our fighting men are not wasted; to see that the security of our country and the free world is not needlessly jeopardized; and to prevent a third world war.

A number of events have made it evident that General MacArthur did not agree with that policy. I have therefore considered it essential to relieve General MacArthur so that there would be no doubt or confusion as to the real purpose and aim of our policy.

It was with the deepest personal regret that I found myself compelled to take this action. General MacArthur is one of our greatest military commanders. But the cause of world peace is more important than any individual.

The change in commands in the Far East means no change whatever in the policy of the United States. We will carry on the fight in Korea with vigor and determination in an effort to bring the war to a speedy and successful conclusion.

We are ready, at any time, to negotiate for a restoration of peace in the area. But we will not engage in appeasement. We are only interested in real peace.

Real peace can be achieved through a settlement based on the following factors:

One. The fighting must stop.

Two. Concrete steps must be taken to insure that the fighting will not break out again.

Three. There must be an end to the aggression.

A settlement founded upon these elements would open the way for the unification of Korea and the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

In the meantime, I want to be clear about our military objective. We are fighting to resist an outrageous aggression in Korea. We are trying to keep the Korean conflict from spreading to other areas. But at the same time we must conduct our military activities so as to insure the security of our forces.

This is essential if they are to continue the fight until the enemy abandons its ruthless attempt to destroy the Republic of Korea.

That is our military objective--to repel attack and to restore peace.

In the hard fighting in Korea, we are proving that collective action among nations is not only a high principle but a workable means of resisting aggression. Defeat of aggression in Korea may be the turning point in the world's search for a practical way of achieving peace and security.

The struggle of the United Nations in Korea is a struggle for peace.

The free nations have united their strength in an effort to prevent a third world war.

That war can come if the communist rulers want it to come. But this nation and its allies will not be responsible for its coming.

We do not want to widen the conflict. We will use every effort to prevent that disaster. And, in so doing, we know that we are following the great principles of peace, freedom, and justice.

APPENDIX IV

TEXT OF GENERAL MACARTHUR'S ADDRESS

BEFORE CONGRESS

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APPENDIX IV

TEXT OF GENERAL MACARTHUR'S ADDRESS

BEFORE CONGRESS¹

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, and distinguished Members of the Congress, I stand on this rostrum with a sense of deep humility and great pride--humility in the wake of those great American architects of our history who have stood here before me, pride in the reflection that this forum of legislative debate represents human liberty in the purest form yet devised.

I do not stand here as an advocate for any partisan cause, for the issues are fundamental and reach quite beyond the realm of partisan consideration. They must be resolved on the highest plane of national interest if our course is to prove sound and our future protected. I trust, therefore, that you will do me the justice of receiving that which I have to say as solely expressing the considered viewpoint of a fellow American. I address you with neither rancor nor bitterness in the fading twilight of life but with one purpose in mind--to serve my country.

The issues are global and so interlocked that to consider the problems of the one sector, oblivious to those of another, is but to court disaster for the whole.

While Asia is commonly referred to as the gateway to Europe, it is no less true that Europe is the gateway to Asia, and the broad influence of the one cannot fail to have its impact upon the other.

There are those who claim our strength is inadequate to protect on both fronts--that we cannot divide our effort. I can think of no greater expression of defeatism. If a potential enemy can divide his strength on two fronts, it is for us to counter his effort.

The Communist threat is a global one. Its successful advance in one sector threatens the destruction of every other sector. You cannot appease or otherwise surrender to communism in Asia without

¹Congressional Record, April 19, 1951, pp 4123-4125.

simultaneously undermining our efforts to halt its advance in Europe.

Beyond pointing out these general truisms, I shall confine my discussion to the general areas of Asia. Before one may objectively assess the situation now existing there, he must comprehend something of Asia's past and the revolutionary changes which have marked her course up to the present. Long exploited by the so-called colonial powers, with little opportunity to achieve any degree of social justice, individual dignity, or a higher standard of life such as guided our own noble administration of the Philippines, the peoples of Asia found their opportunity in the war just past to throw off the shackles of colonialism, and now see the dawn of new opportunity, a heretofore unfelt dignity and the self-respect or political freedom.

Mustering half of the earth's population and 60 percent of its natural resources, these peoples are rapidly consolidating a new force, both moral and material, with which to raise the living standard and erect adaptations of the design of modern progress to their own distinct cultural environments. Whether one adheres to the concept of colonization or not, this is the direction of Asian progress and it may not be stopped. It is a corollary to the shift of the world economic frontiers, as the whole epicenter of world affairs rotates back toward the area whence it started. In this situation it becomes vital that our own country orient its policies in consonance with this basic evolutionary condition rather than pursue a course blind to the reality that the colonial era is now past and the Asian peoples covet the right to shape their own free destiny. What they seek now is friendly guidance, understanding, and support, not imperious direction; the dignity of equality, not the shame of subjugation. Their prewar standards of life, pitifully low, is infinitely lower now in the devastation left in war's wake. World ideologies play little part in Asian thinking and are little understood. What the peoples strive for is the opportunity for a little more food in their stomachs, a little better clothing on their backs, a little firmer roof over their heads, and the realization of the normal nationalist urge for political freedom. These political-social conditions have but an indirect bearing upon our own national security, but do form a backdrop to contemporary planning which must be thoughtfully considered if we are to avoid the pitfalls of unrealism.

Of more direct and immediate bearing upon our national security are the changes wrought in the

strategic potential of the Pacific Ocean in the course of the past war. Prior thereto, the western strategic frontier of the United States lay on the littoral line of the Americas with an exposed island salient extending out through Hawaii, Midway, and Guam to the Philippines. That salient proved not an outpost of strength but an avenue of weakness along which the enemy could and did attack. The Pacific was a potential area of advance for any predatory force intent upon striking at the bordering land areas.

All this was changed by our Pacific victory. Our strategic frontier then shifted to embrace the entire Pacific Ocean which became a vast moat to protect us as long as we hold it. Indeed, it acts as a protective shield for all of the Americas and all free lands of the Pacific Ocean area. We control it to the shores of Asia by a chain of islands extending in an arc from the Aleutians to the Mariannas held by us and our free allies.

From this island chain we can dominate with sea and air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore and prevent any hostile movement into the Pacific. Any predatory attack from Asia must be an amphibious effort. No amphibious force can be successful without control of the sea lanes and the air over those lands in its avenue of advance. With naval and air supremacy and modest ground elements to defend bases, any major attack from continental Asia toward us or our friends of the Pacific would be doomed to failure. Under such conditions the Pacific no longer represents menacing avenues of approach for a prospective invader--it assumes instead the friendly aspect of a peaceful lake. Our line of defense is a natural one and can be maintained with a minimum of military effort and expense. It envisions no attack against anyone nor does it provide the bastions essential for offensive operations, but properly maintained would be an invincible defense against aggression.

The holding of this littoral defense line in the Western Pacific is entirely dependent upon holding all segments thereof, for any major breach of that line by an unfriendly power would render vulnerable to determined attack every other major segment. This is a military estimate as to which I have yet to find a military leader who will take exception.

For that reason I have strongly recommended in the past as a matter of military urgency that under no circumstances must Formosa fall under Communist control. Such an eventuality would at once threaten the freedom of the Philippines and the loss of Japan, and

might well force our western frontier back to the coasts of California, Oregon, and Washington.

To understand the changes which now appear upon the Chinese mainland, one must understand the changes in Chinese character and culture over the past 50 years. China up to 50 years ago was completely nonhomogeneous, being compartmented into groups divided against each other. The war-making tendency was almost nonexistent, as they still followed the tenets of the Confucian ideal of pacifist culture. At the turn of the century under the regime of Chan So Lin, efforts toward greater homogeneity produced the start of a nationalist urge. This was further and more successfully developed under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, but has been brought to its greatest fruition under the present regime, to the point that it has now taken on the character of a united nationalism of increasingly dominant aggressive tendencies. Through these past 50 years, the Chinese people have thus become militarized in their concepts and in their ideals. They now constitute excellent soldiers with competent staffs and commanders. This has produced a new and dominant power in Asia which for its own purposes is allied with Soviet Russia, but which in its own concepts and methods has become aggressively imperialistic with a lust for expansion and increased power normal to this type of imperialism. There is little of the ideological concept either one way or another in the Chinese make-up. The standard of living is so low and the capital accumulation has been so thoroughly dissipated by war that the masses are desperate and avid to follow any leadership which seems to promise the alleviation of local stringencies. I have from the beginning believed that the Chinese Communists' support of the North Koreans was the dominant one. Their interests are at present parallel to those of the Soviet, but I believe that the aggressiveness recently displayed not only in Korea, but also in Indochina and Tibet and pointing potentially toward the south, reflects predominantly the same lust for the expansion of power which has animated every would-be conqueror since the beginning of time.

The Japanese people since the war have undergone the greatest reformation recorded in modern history. With a commendable will, eagerness to learn, and marked capacity to understand, they have from the ashes left in war's wake, erected in Japan an edifice dedicated to the primacy of individual liberty and personal dignity, and in the ensuing process there has been created a truly representative government committed

to the advance of political morality, freedom of economic enterprise and social justice. Politically, economically and socially Japan is now abreast of many free nations of the earth and will not again fail the universal trust. That it may be counted upon to wield a profoundly beneficial influence over the course of events in Asia is attested by the magnificent manner in which the Japanese people have met the recent challenge of war, unrest, and confusion surrounding them from the outside, and checked communism within their own frontiers without the slightest slackening in their forward progress. I sent all four of our occupation divisions to the Korean battle front without the slightest qualms as to the effect of the resulting power vacuum upon Japan. The results fully justified my faith. I know of no nation more serene, orderly, and industrious--nor in which higher hopes can be entertained for future constructive service in the advance of the human race.

Of our former wards, the Philippines, we can look forward in confidence that the existing unrest will be corrected and a strong and healthy nation will grow in the longer aftermath of war's terrible destructiveness. We must be patient and understanding and never fail them, as in our hour of need they did not fail us. A Christian nation, the Philippines stand as a mighty bulwark of Christianity in the Far East, and its capacity for high moral leadership in Asia is unlimited.

On Formosa, the Government of the Republic of China has had the opportunity to refute by action much of the malicious gossip which so undermined the strength of its leadership on the Chinese mainland. The Formosan people are receiving a just and enlightened administration with majority representation on the organs of government; and politically, economically and socially they appear to be advancing along sound and constructive lines.

With this brief insight into the surrounding areas I now turn to the Korean conflict. While I was not consulted prior to the President's decision to intervene in support of the Republic of Korea, that decision, from a military standpoint, proved a sound one as we hurled back the invaders and decimated his forces. Our victory was complete and our objectives within reach when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces. This created a new war and an entirely new situation--a situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against the North Korean invaders--a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the

realistic adjustment of military strategy. Such decisions have not been forthcoming.

While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China and such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old.

Apart from the military need as I saw it to neutralize the sanctuary protection given the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made mandatory:

1. The intensification of our economic blockade against China;
2. The imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast;
3. Removal of restriction on air reconnaissance of China's coast areas and of Manchuria;
4. Removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa with logistic support to contribute to their effective operations against the common enemy.

For entertaining these views, all professionally designed to support our forces committed to Korea and bring hostilities to an end with the least possible delay and at a saving of countless American and Allied lives, I have been severely criticized in lay circles, principally abroad, despite my understanding that from a military standpoint the above views have been fully shared in the past by practically every leader concerned with the Korean campaign, including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I called for reinforcements, but was informed that reinforcements were not available. I made clear that if not permitted to destroy the build-up bases north of the Yalu; if not permitted to utilize the friendly Chinese force of some 600,000 men on Formosa; if not permitted to blockade the China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds from getting succor from without; and if there were to be no hope of major reinforcements, the position of the command from the military standpoint forbade victory. We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver and at an approximate area where our supply line advantages were in balance with the supply line disadvantage of the enemy, but we could hope at best for only an indecisive campaign, with its

terrible and constant attrition upon our forces if the enemy utilized his full military potential. I have constantly called for the new political decisions essential to a solution. Efforts have been made to distort my position. It has been said, in effect, that I am a warmonger. Nothing could be further from the truth. I know war as few other men now living know it, and nothing to me is more revolting. I have long advocated its complete abolition as its very destructiveness on both friend and foe has rendered it useless as a means of settling international disputes. Indeed, on the 2nd of September 1945, just following the surrender of the Japanese Nation on the battleship Missouri, I formally cautioned as follows:

'Men since the beginning of time have sought peace. Various methods through the ages have been attempted to devise an international process to prevent or settle disputes between nations. From the very start, workable methods were found insofar as individual citizens were concerned, but the mechanics of an instrumentality of larger international scope have never been successful. Military alliances, balances of power, leagues of nations, all in turn failed, leaving the only path to be by way of the crucible of war. The utter destructiveness of war now blots out this alternative. We have had our last chance. If we will not devise some greater and more equitable system, Armageddon will be at our door. The problem basically is theological and involves a spiritual recrudescence and improvement of human character that will synchronize with our almost matchless advances in science, art, literature, and all material and cultural developments of the past 2,000 years. It must be of the spirit if we are to save the flesh.'

But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very object is victory--not prolonged indecision. In war, indeed, there can be no substitute for victory.

There are some who for varying reasons would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson. For history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. It points to no single instance where the end has justified that means--where appeasement has led to more than a sham peace. Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands, until,

as in blackmail, violence becomes the only other alternative. Why, my soldiers asked of me, surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field? I could not answer. Some may say to avoid spread of the conflict into an all-out war with China; others, to avoid Soviet intervention. Neither explanation seems valid. For China is already engaging with the maximum power it can commit and the Soviet will not necessarily mesh its actions with our moves. Like a cobra, any new enemy will more likely strike whenever it feels that the relativity in military or other potential is in its favor on a world-wide basis.

The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact that as military action is confined to its territorial limits, it condemns that nation, which it is our purpose to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full naval and air bombardment, while the enemy's sanctuaries are fully protected from such attack and devastation. Of the nations of the world Korea alone, up to now, is the sole one which has risked its all against communism. The magnificence of the courage and fortitude of the Korean people defies description. They have chosen to risk death rather than slavery. Their last words to me were 'Don't scuttle the Pacific.'

I have just left your fighting sons in Korea. They have met all tests there and I can report to you without reservation they are splendid in every way. It was my constant effort to preserve them and end this savage conflict honorably and with the least loss of time and a minimum sacrifice of life. Its growing bloodshed has caused me the deepest anguish and anxiety. Those gallant men will remain often in my thoughts and in my prayers always.

I am closing my 52 years of military service. When I joined the Army even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all my boyish hopes and dreams. The world has turned over many times since I took the oath on the plain at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished. But I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly that--

'Old soldiers never die; they just fade away.'

And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away--an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty.

Good-by.


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
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APPENDIX V

MAPS

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