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This study examines Edmund Burke's reliance upon the philosoph-
ical assumptions of the Scottish "Common Sense" school of critical
realism. Scottish realism was articulated in the writings of Thomas
Reid, Dugald Stewart and James Beattie, and constituted a significant
part of the generally-accepted intellectual phenomenon of the Scottish
Enlightenment, which reached its zenith in the last half of the eigh-
teenth century. By identifying the various forms which Burke's Scottish
connections took, this study seeks to narrow the gap between Burke studies
and recent historiography of the Scottish Enlightenment. The Scottish
Enlightenment is now seen as second only to the French Enlightenment
as a formative influence upon the course of thought in eighteenth-
century Europe. Older writings have established the "critical" nature
of the Scottish Common Sense school and of the Scottish Enlightenment
in general. A number of commentators have noted the philosophical
similarity between the critical cast of the thought of the Scottish
school and that of the contemporary critical idealism of Immanuel Kant.
This study suggests that the historical and philosophical connection
between Burke and the Scottish Enlightenment, as well as the philosoph-
ical similarity between Scottish and Kantian critical realism and
idealism, together indicate a philosophical kinship between critical
realism, critical idealism, and some of the assumptions in Burke's
thought.

EDMUND BURKE AND THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT

by

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This thesis explores the place of thought of Edmund Burke in the Enlightenment. It does not seek to deny the portrait of Burke painted by those historians and commentators of "the" "Natural Law" school who have followed the lead of Peter Stanlis (Edmund Burke and the Natural Law, 1957) and others. On the contrary, the Burke who emerged from the writings of this school seems to be both coherent and logically and philosophically, correct. What this thesis questions is the historical coherence of Burke, as an eighteenth-century man whose thought was supposed by some to have originated in the classical/medieval tradition of "the" Natural Law. What is suggested here is that a Burke similar to that figure described by the natural law school of commentators on Burkean thought could well have been formed by contemporary eighteenth-century British thought, especially by the "critical" philosophy of Scottish realism (or "Common Sense"), which in turn resembled the critical philosophy of Kantian idealism. This study was written, therefore, in the same spirit which Norman Suckling announced was the purpose of his essay on "The Enlightenment and the Idea of Progress" (1967). Suckling wrote:

> This paper is not a work of erudition. It does not announce the discovery of any new facts. I offer it--tentatively--because it may be of use as casting facts already known into a different perspective . . .[1]

While only a philosophical similarity between the Scottish and German schools of the eighteenth century is suggested here, the connection

between Burke and the Scottish realist school is shown to be both philo-

sophical and historical. A "Natural dualism" which characterized the

Scottish and German schools' reconciliation of previous schools of phi-

losophy, rather than a classical/medieval tradition of Natural Law,

seems to be a more historically appropriate explanation in part of the

origins of Burke's thought. Once this Natural dualism is recognized

as a characteristic of Burke's thought, Burke's theories of reality and

of our knowledge of reality (including his notions of prescription and

of prudence) become more understandable; given this recognition, one

recognizes the philosophical and/or historical proximity of his thought

to the various and diverse schools of thought flourishing in the British

Isles during the last third of the eighteenth century. The most

important comparison point to be kept in mind through the descrip-

tions here of Burke and his contemporaries is the critical nature

of the philosophies of these contemporaries. Whether considering

the critical idealism of Kant or the critical realism of Reid and

the Scottish school when drawing a possible parallel with Burke's

thought, we are always elaborating upon the critical element and all

its implications of the idealist philosophy or the realist philosophy,

not idealism or realism in themselves. That is, while the "Copernican

Revolution" in philosophy which Kant inaugurated ". . . asks us to assume

in revolutionary fashion that objective reality, to be known at all, must

conform to the essential structure of the human mind,"[2] and while the hall-

mark of (Scottish) realism is the direct perception of the real and per-

manent existence of external objects, the characteristics of the philoso-

phies which allow suggestion of their similarity with Burkean thought

are those which are inherently part of each of the philosophies: re-
spectively, Kantian idealism considers external objects and experience
to be as real as the perceiving subjects, and, on the other hand,
Scottish realism considers (mind) equally as real as the objects of
the perceived world.

Bernard Peach's explanation of the critical implicitness of the
idealist and the realist philosophies may serve here to give a partial
understanding of the phrase, "Natural dualism." Such a dualism rejects
one-sided views which reduce reality and our knowledge and judgments of
it to one origin and meaning. Natural dualism rejects such reductionist
theories without succumbing to that cleavage of mind and matter, subject
and object, which characterizes Cartesian dualism and which actually re-
sults in reductionist theories of knowledge (if not of ultimate reality)
because of the impossibility of bridging the declared "bifurcation" of
nature[3] between mind and matter. Peach sees a difference merely in
"approach" between the substantially kindred doctrines of Kant and Reid.[4]

The moderation of Reid and Kant was based on their respective
positive and complex philosophies rather than upon any eclectic or plural-
istic amalgam of others' views. Therefore, a comprehensive judgment is
required to distinguish and weigh the competing claims of subject and
object, mind and matter, and by just what chemistry or art they combine
to give us knowledge of reality. Our actions are then based upon our
knowledge and our judgments of a complex reality.[5] Not only were Reid's
and Kant's views not an amalgam of other views, but an early twentieth
century historian of philosophy believed that the Kantian and Scottish
views of a complex reality and of, consequently, the heterogeneous

components of our knowledge of that reality represented between them the confluence of all the previous major philosophical systems. John T. Merz said that ". . . the teaching of Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, and Hume had given way to specific developments, chiefly in the Scottish and German schools." The Scottish school represented a concern for the problem of the reality of, and relation between, subject (or perceiving mind) and object (perceived matter)--in Merz's words, "Scottish philosophy cultivated the field of psychological research." On the other hand, "German philosophy centered in metaphysics," or the problem of the relation of ideal and real (or, in Kantian terms, between noumenon and phenomenon).[6]

But the critical philosophies of the Kantian and Scottish schools made the twin distinctions between (and also the complementarity between) the ideal and the real and between mind (subject) and matter (object). Such distinctions avoid the reduction of reality and of knowledge to a narrow, formalistic (Cartesian) dualism, and to a confused monism, whichever form such monism assumed in eighteenth century philosophy. The rigid dualism of the Cartesians neglected the distinction between ideal and real. This distinction would have allowed the participation to a certain extent of the ideal in the real and vice versa. The distinction did in the Kantian and Scottish views serve as an explanatory preparation to hetorogeneous epistemological and ethical views which require the use of the active judgment to assign the respective elements the proper weight in the formation of epistemological, ethical and moral problems. Such a distinction between ideal and real

would otherwise have allowed the building of a bridge across the chasm
left by rigid Cartesian dualism separating mind and matter, subject and
object. But given the rigid Cartesian bifurcation of nature into the
two antagonistic and mutually exclusive spheres of mind and matter, the
insurmountable problem existed of bringing the two spheres together in
order to make possible an objective knowledge of the whole of reality.
Because the Cartesians could not in fact build a bridge between mind
and matter, ". . . men's minds become so preoccupied with this world
of nature . . . with the totality of physical things, the matter in
motion [and with] that vast geometrical drama of the universe," that
concern with "the mind's furniture" was gradually eroded behind a
mechanistic materialism, a "cobwebby curtain of neglect"[7] drawn down
before the mind's eye by among others, the French materialists,
d'Holbach, Helvetius et al. Cartesian dualism historically ended in
a materialistic monism.[8]

CHAPTER I

NOTES

1

Norman Suckling, "The Enlightenment and the Idea of Progress," Studies on Voltaire & the Eighteenth Century (Transactions of the Second International Congress on the Enlightenement, IV), Vol. LVIII (1967), p. 1461.

2

Greene, Theodore Meyer, ed., Kant Selections (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), p. xxxvii.

3

This is Andrew Seth's phrase. See Andrew Seth (A.S. Pringle. Pattison). Scottish Philosophy. A Comparison of the Scottish and German Answers to Hume. ("Balfour Philosophical Lectures." University of Edinburgh). (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1899), pp. 75-77.

4

Peach wrote: ". . . . there is a significant difference in approach. Kant was by training and inclination more rationalistic than empirical. Reid [was] more empirical than rationalistic. Indeed, if one characterizes Kant's response to Hume [Hume's skeptical empiricism] as an attempt to reestablish reason, one ought to describe Reid's as an attempt to re-establish experience. Yet neither man succumbed to an extreme in either of these directions. They were both, therefore, philosophers of moderation. They both reject extreme empiricism on the one hand, extreme rationalism on the other. They both, for example, regard the 'preanalytic' data of experi-ence as a complex unification of sensation and judgment. They both, there-fore, also needed to identify components of knowledge that are not the results of either experience or reasoning . . ." (Bernard Peach, "Common Sense and Practical Reason in Reid and Kant." Sophia (Padova), Vol. XXIV (1956), p. 66). Peach's description of Reid's and Kant's views is consis-tent with Goethe's (see infra., Chapter III, p.18) and with Burke's (see infra., Chapter III, p. 18) characterizations of the Scottish school of Common Sense realism as embodying a philosophy of moderation.

James McCosh, the last direct philosophical descendent of Reid's school of realism, perceived a difference in degree between Reid's and Kant's answer to Hume's skepticism: ". . . Kant was strong where Reid was weak; that is, in power of dissection and construction: but was deficient where Reid excelled, in patient observation." James McCosh. The Scottish Philosophy - Biographical, Expository, Critical. From Hutchenson to Hamilton. (New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 1875), p. 160. Further on, McCosh noted a more precise kinship between Reid and Kant.

"In one respect indeed, the two, the Scotch and German philosophies, were alike: both stood up for principles which did not derive their authority from experience.' But the Scottish metaphysicians discovered these by a careful inquiry into the operations of the human mind; Kant, by a process of logical deduction." The differences between Reid and Kant which McCosh points out, seem to be partially based upon McCosh's own wrong-headed view of Kant as a rigid subjective idealist, no different from his pupil, Fichte, who was "only advancing a few steps farther on the same road [as Kant] when he made the whole universe a projection of the mind." Ibid., p. 274. Fichte's philosophy was a perversion, or inversion, of Kant's Critical philosophy, not an extension of it (See Appendix B).

One author, D. Daiches Raphael, comments upon Reid's philosophical proximity to Kant, and in particular, hints of Reid's possible superior answer to Hume's premises (including the "whole philosophy of ideas or presentations") that Kant's answer to the deductions Hume drew from his (Hume's) premises. Referring to A. Campbell Fraser's work, Thomas Reid, "Famous Scots Series," (Edinburgh & London: Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier, c. 1900), Raphael says: "Reid's admirers have sometimes placed him on a level with Kant. This doubtless is an extravagant judgment. Yet Reid has this virtue in common with Kant, that he has for Hume both a respect and a reply. . . . Kant professes to find flaws in Hume's deductions; Reid denies his premises. Of the two I am not sure that Kant's method of reply is the right one. It would be extravagant to judge Reid's own system of philosophy, taken as a whole, to be on a par with Kant's; but taken simply as an answer to the sceptical conclusions of Hume, it is perhaps more useful than the Critique of Pure Reason. . . ." D. Daiches Raphael, The Moral Sense (London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University, Press, 1947), p. 147.

[5]Lewis White Beck summarized Kant's thought in a sentence: "In order to know and to act, it is necessary both to see and to think." Beck does not say that this "insipid statement is the sum and substance of Kant's philosophy," but "there is merit in this as a summary if one insists upon post card brevity in the history of philosophy." Lewis White Beck, "Kant's Strategy," Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. XXVII, No. 2 (April-June, 1967), p. 236.

[6]John Theodore Merz, A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Vol. III, p. 41 (New York: Dover, 1965; original, London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1904-1912).

Giorgio Tonelli (University of Pisa) referred recently to Reid and Kant, together, as constituting one of the major lines of thought in the eighteenth century. Tonelli wrote: ". . . although I am personally inclined to assume an even greater prevalence of eighteenth-century scepticism than Professor [R.H.] Popkin does, . . . scepticism cannot be considered as a general (and much less as a typical) eighteenth-century attitude; the anti-sceptical trend was, of course, of capital

importance too, climaxing in England in the Common Sense School, and in Germany in Kant." Giorgio Tonelli, "The 'Weakness' of Reason in the Age of Enlightenment." Diderot Studies, Vol. XIV (1971), p. 218.

7

Harry Prosch, The Genesis of Twentieth Century Philosophy. The Evolution of Thought from Copernicus to the Present (Garden City, New York: Anchor, 1966, 1964, p. 47).

8

McCosh referred to the French materialists' (Condillac, Helvetius, Cabanis, d'Holbach) one-sided interpretations of Locke. "The French looked exclusively at . . . the experimental side . . . of Locke's philosophy, carrying Locke's theory a stage farther; they left out reflection, made little use of observation, betook themselves to analysis, and exerted their ingenuity to derive all ideas from sensation." McCosh, op. cit., p. 272.

CHAPTER II

NORTHERN LIGHTS

Burke showed a philosophical kinship with the thought of the Common-Sense Scottish realists in his various lengthy and favorable book reviews of the works of the leading representatives of the Scottish Enlightenment in general. Burke's review-essays included the following: (1) (Burke), Review of An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism, by James Beattie, in The Annual Register for 1771, 4th Edition (London: 1786), 252-260; (2)(Burke), Review of An Account of Dissertations Moral & Critical, by James Beattie, in The Annual Register for 1783 (London: 1785), 207-223; and (3) (Burke), Review of Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, by Dugald Stewart, in The Annual Register for 1793 (London: 1810), 153-171.

Apart from the above reviews, the historical prominence and proximity of a critical, progressive-minded Scottish Enlightenment, in relation to the eighteenth-century milieu in which Burke flourished, suggests, at the least, that Burke was exposed to the general thought of the northern Enlightenment.

J. H. Brumfitt characterized the eighteenth century as the age which "saw the beginning of [Scotland's] greatest period of intellectual and literary enlightenment," an age "when the Scottish renaissance was bearing fruit [and which] was for England a period of relative decline."[1] Peter Gay wrote in his recent work on the Enlightenment of

the differences of English thought in the eighteenth century, as distinguished from the more articulate and cohesive schools of thought in Scotland at that time.

> The English Enlightenment was far less well organized than its Scottish counterpart. . . . If there is no single comprehensive study on the 'English Enlightenment,' as there are numerous studies on the French Siecle des lumieres, and the German Aufklarung, this may have a single cause; more than elsewhere the boundaries between rationalist, Anglican, Armenian dissent, tepid Christianity, and outright deism are so thin and so porous that it is nearly impossible to discern a distinct grouping of men, even if there is, as I should insist there is, a distinct set of ideas [Gay's emphases] that makes for an identifiable anti-Christian English Enlightenment. . . .[2]

Franklin L. Ford placed the Scottish and English Enlightenments on an equal standing regarding the question of whether or not there was a "European Enlightenment." Ford wrote: "The real question is whether we could adequately discuss the European Enlightenment leaving out the English and Scottish thinkers. The answer, quite clearly, is that we could not."[3] Hugh Trevor-Roper went further than Ford, when the former gave the Scottish Enlightenment the preeminent place, as representative of Enlightenment thought, in the "Anglo-Saxon world," as French-speaking Geneva could serve as the representative of the French or Mediterranean Enlightenment. Trevor-Roper declared in 1967:

> The first International congress on the Enlightenment took place in Geneva. It is appropriate that the second should be in Scotland. For if French-speaking Switzerland was the crucible of the Enlightenment, the meeting-place of those intellectual emigres of Europe who inspired it, Scotland, another Calvinist country, was its outpost in the Anglo-Saxon world. By the later 18th century, the universities of Geneva and Edinburgh could be described by Thomas Jefferson as the two eyes of Europe.[4]

Burke could hardly have been unaware of the presence of the northern philosophies and of the significance of the Scottish Enlightenment in general.

Part of the significance of the Scottish renaissance is
the critical and progressive nature of the thought of the Scottish
Enlightenment. That thought is partically formed by the "general
dissemination of the ideas of the French Enlightenment in Scotland,"[5]
which, going back a step further, "may also owe something to the
continued influence--literary, philosophical and political--of Scot-
land's old ally, France."[6] It was especially during the decades of
the 1760's (when Burke was on the threshold of his long public career)
that "the output of French Enlightenment works [especially those of
Voltaire] becomes more striking" in Scotland. Brumfitt concluded:
"From all these contacts, articles and publications it becomes apparent
that a knowledge of the thought of the French Enlightenment was fairly
widespread in the Scotland of the second half of the eighteenth century."[7]

R. G. Cant declared, with Brumfitt: "The fact is that by the
mid-eighteenth century the atmosphere of Scottish society had become
remarkably liberal and tolerant."[8] Cant believed that this liberal
attitude reflected Scotland's own history and traditions, that the
Scottish Enlightenment thought was a "fulfillment in a new form, of
certain deeply cherished aspirations of the Scottish people, above all,
a desire for liberty . . ." which was "the great theme of Scottish
history" even during the Reformation in Scotland.[9]

In contrast to the dormant English universities, Oxford and
Cambridge, during the eighteenth century,[10] Cant pointed to the Scots'
general regard of their universities--St. Andrews, Glasgow, Old Aberdeen,
Edinburgh, and New Aberdeen[11]--as "part of a national system of educa-
tion,"[12] a broad-bottomed, non-exclusivist system in which "any pupil

of reasonable ability--the 'lad o'pairts' of Scottish tradition--could proceed to a university without undue difficulty."[13] The system drew its members from a society which, "even before the end of the [seventeenth] century, . . . must have been one of the most literate of its age."[14] Cant then went on to show how the fact that these universities were located in urban centers, saved the universities in Scotland (unlike those in England) from becoming "backwaters of privileged indolence, or that they would be swept out of touch with reality by any new wind of intellectual change."[15] The Scottish Enlightenment was therefore the most prominent focus for the most progressive and critical intellectual climate of thought which existed in the "Anglo-Saxon world" in the last half of the eighteenth century.

CHAPTER II

NOTES

[1]J. M. Brumfitt, "Scotland and the French Enlightenment" in
The Age of Enlightenment. Studies presented to Theodore Besterman,
eds., W. H. Barber, J. H. Brumfitt, R. Shackleton and S. S. B. Taylor,
(Edinburgh and London, Oliver and Boyd, 1967), pp. 318-329, esp. p. 318.
Scotland and the Scottish Enlightenment were something more than
what Bernard Bailyn and John Clive called Scotland (together with America)
--"England's 'cultural provinces' feeling intellectually and aesthetically
[??] inferior to England and especially to London, and were both places
where middle-class professional men hungry for distinction and recogni-
tion made up the intellectual leadership." Cited in Robert M. Calhoon,
The Loyalists in Revolutionary America 1760-1781, Founding of the American
Republic Series (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1973), p. 203.
Calhoon was citing John Clive and Bernard Bailyn, "England's Cultural
Provinces: Scotland and America." William and Mary Quarterly,
(April, 1954) 200-213. The point that Calhoon, Clive and Bailyn put
forward of Scotland as England's cultural province in the eighteenth
century, is hopefully qualified in the next few pages of the present
study. For the second point made by Calhoon here--of the middle-class
Scottish entrepreneurs on the make as composing the intellectual lights
of the Scottish Enlightenment--see Appendix B. There it is shown that
the leading lights of Scottish Enlightenment thought were not alienated
from their community, that they were, in fact, many of them "establish-
ment" types, but who, on the other hand, did not necessarily seek to
justify any personal material success or any general status quo, but
rather sought to improve their society along progressive lines, lines
which would not have clashed with the French philosophes' suggestions
for reforms within their society. For the recent historiography on the
moderate, non-alienated tone of the philosophes' thought, see Appendix B.
One of the factors in the moderate-liberal tone of Scottish
Enlightenment thought was no doubt the fact that Scotland was, on the
whole, economically prosperous, especially during the last half of the
century. See Malcolm P. Gray, The Highland Economy, 1750-1850 (Edin-
burgh: 1957); Henry Hamilton, An Economic History of Scotland in the
Eighteenth Century (Oxford: 1962); Marjorie Plant, The Domestic Life of
Scotland in the Eighteenth Century (Edinburgh: 1952); Andrew N. L. Hodd,
"Runrig on the Eve of the Agricultural Revolution in Scotland," Scottish
Geographical Magazine, (Great Britain), Vol. XL, No. 2 (1974), 130-133;
Malcolm Gray, "Scottish Immigration: The Social Impact of Agrarian Change
in the Rural Lowlands, 1775-1875," Perspectives in American History, Vol.
VII (1973), 95-174. Sir Walter Scott's reaction to the accelerated econ-
omic changes in Scotland after 1750, perhaps reflects the moderate tone
of Scottish Enlightenment thought. Scott's attempt to reconcile Scottish
tradition and the swift changes of the first Industrial Revolution in

Britain was similar, for instance, to the eighteenth-century Scots'
historians' "conjectural history" which sought to reconcile past and
present, or, nature and civilization, etc. (see Chapter III). See
John J. MacQueen, "Scott and 'Tales of My Landlord.'" Scottish Studies,
(Great Britain), Vol. XV, No. 2, 85-87.

"During Sir Walter Scott's lifetime, the appearance of the Scottish
countryside and the customs and manners of its people were substan-
tially altered, while Scott, the conservative, regretted the disap-
pearance of distinctly Scottish traditions, Scott, the pragmatist,
recognized the changes to be inescapable and often beneficial. Scott
was concerned with the continuous process and development linking
past with present in his prose of the 1810's and 1820's . . ."

See Historical Abstracts, Part A. Modern History. Abstracts
1450-1914. (Santa Barbara, California: American Bibliographical Carter-
Clio Press; Oxford, England: European Bibliographical Carter-Clio Press,
1975), p. 71.

See also T. C. Smout, A History of the Scottish People 1560-1830
(New York: Scribners, 1969), espec. Part Two, "The Age of Transformation,
1690-1830," Chapters XIV and XV, pp. 332-390.

[2]Peter Gay, The Enlightenment. An Interpretation. Vol. 1, The
Rise of Modern Paganism. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), pp. 431-432.
Hiroshi Mizuta recently said that:

". . . there was no English equivalent to the Scottish or Continental
Enlightenment except the thoughts of some forerunners in the seven-
teenth century [Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Newton] and of the English deists
at the beginning of the eighteenth. . . ." (Hiroshi Mizuta, "Towards a
definition of the Scottish Enlightenment," Studies on Voltaire and
the Eighteenth Century. Ed., Theodore Besterman [Transactions of the
Fourth international congress on the Enlightenment, VI], Vol. CLIV
[1976], 1459.)

For the early eighteenth-century English deists--hardly a cohesive school
of serious philosophical writers--see Norman Torrey's short study, Voltaire
and the English Deists (New York: Archon Books, 1967; Yale University
Press, 1930). Torrey discusses the thought of the following deists: John
Toland, Antony Collins, Thomas Woolston, Matthew Tindal, Thomas Chubb,
Bolingbroke, Conyers Middleton, and Peter Arnet.

[3]Franklin L. Ford, "The Enlightenment: Towards a Useful Definition"
in Studies in the Eighteenth Century. (Papers presented at the David Nicol
Smith Memorial Seminar, Canberra, Australia, National University Press,
1968), pp. 17-30, espec. p. 22.

[4]Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The Scottish Enlightenment." Studies on Voltaire
and the Eighteenth Century (Transactions of the Second international congress
on the Enlightenment IV), Vol. LVIII (1967), p. 1635). See also: William
Law Mathieson. The Awakening of Scotland: A History from 1747 to 1797
(Glasgow: 1910).

Ian Simpson Ross referred to "the opening of a golden Age of intel-
lectual activity in Scotland" in the 1750's (Ian Simpson Ross, Lord Kames
and the Scotland of His Day [Oxford, At the Clarendon Press, 1972], p. 166,

especially Chapter 9, "The Modern Athens" [Edinburgh], pp. 166-181, and Chapter 10, "Works and Days," pp. 182-201.) displaying the spirit "of the Athens of the age of Pericles with its freedom of thought and keen delight in the clash of minds," and enjoying "an intellectual eminence somewhat reminiscent of that won by Athens in the ancient world . . ." (idem). The "intense intellectual activity" in Scotland during this period matched that of the Enlightenemnt on the Continent, which in turn was witnessing in the '50's the "most illustrous" decade "of the whole course of the Enlightenment in point of the publication of works of far-reaching significance" (ibid., p. 182). Ross mentioned, to this point, the work of d'Alembert, Diderot, Rousseau in France, Johnson in England, and in Scotland: the work of Hume, William Robertson, Sir James Steuart (1713-80, a political economist), Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, John Millar, George Campbell, among others. But it was David Hume and Robertson whom Voltaire saluted "in a way which marks the impact of the Scottish contribution to the Enlightenment":

'Il y a quatre jours que j'ai recu le beau présent dont vous m'avez honoré. Je le lis malgré les fluxionx horribles que me font craindre de perdre entièrement les yeux. I me fait oublier tous mes mauz. C'est à vous et a M. Hume qu'il appartient d'écrire l'Histoire. Vous êtes eloquant, savant, et impartial. Je me joins à l'Europe pour vous estimer' (ibid., p. 190).

George S. Pryde wrote that ". . . there was some truth in Voltaire's comment made at the start of the period (1762)--'it is from Scotland that we receive rules of taste in all the arts--from the epic poem to gardening.'" (George S. Pryde, Scotland from 1603 to the Present Day [London, Edinburgh, Paris, Melbourne, Johannesburg, Toronto, N.Y.: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1962] p. 176.)

[5]J. M. Brumfitt, op. cit., p. 319.

[6]Idem.

[7]Idem. See: Alison K. Howard, "Montesquieu, Voltaire and Rousseau in Eighteenth-Century Scotland: A check list of editions and translations of their works published in Scotland before 1801," The Bibliothek, Vol. II (1959), 46-63; O. M. Brack, Jr., "William Strahan: Scottish Printer and Publisher," Arizona Quarterly, Vol. XXXI, No. 2 (1975), 179-191; A. R. Turnbull, "The Antecedents of Edinburgh," Scholarly Publishing, Vol. V, No. 2 (1974), 111-120.

[8]R. G. Cant, "The Scottish universities and Scottish Society in the eighteenth century," Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (Transactions of the Second international congress on the Enlightenment IV), Vol. LVIII (1967), pp. 1953-1966, p. 1960. For the critical thought of one of the leading representatives of the Scottish Enlightenment, Lord Kames, see Nelson S. Bushnell, "Lord Kames and Eighteenth-Century Scotland," Studies in Scottish Literature, Vol. X, No. 4 (April, 1973), 241-254. Bushnell dealt especially with the critical progressive legal thought of the representative Kames.

[9]Ibid., p. 154. Cant referred to the "egalitarian dogmas of Calvinist theology," Idem, p. 1972. See also Arthur Donovan, "Chemistry and philosophy in the Scottish Enlightenment," Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (Transactions of the Fourth international congress on the Enlightenment, II), Vol. CLII (1976), p. 597. Donovan wrote of the differences between, on the one hand, the centralized hierarchical structure of the Established Anglican Church and the Crown's assumption of Papal authority during the English Reformation, and, on the other hand, the location of authority of the Scottish Kirk (restored as the national church, after the end of the Restoration in 1690) "in the congregation rather than in an episcopal hierarchy."

"To instruct the members of the church and insure that they were prepared to discharge their duties, the Scottish reformers proposed a comprehensive system of education culminating in theological training in the national universities. Although never fully implemented, this educational plan was cherished throughout the seventeenth century as one of the religious and national liberties the Scots were fighting for. After the Glorious Revolution the Kirk was able to retain only a small portion of its former control but the universities nevertheless continued to serve as the centres of intellectual life and provided the most advanced instruction offered within a national system of education [emphasis added]" (Idem).

See also: Sir A. Grant, The Story of the University of Edinburgh, 2 vols. (London: 1884); D. B. Horn. A Short History of the University of Edinburgh 1556-1889 (Edinburgh: 1967); Henry W. Meikle, Some Aspects of Later Seventeenth Century Scotland (Daniel Murray Lecture, Glasgow: 1947); Alexander Law, Education in Edinburgh in the Eighteenth Century (Publications of the Scottish Council for Research in Education, No. 54) (London: University of London Press, 1965); William Ferguson, Scotland 1689 to the Present (N.Y., Washington: Frederick A. Praeger Pub., 1968) ("The Edinburgh History of Scotland," General Editor, Gordon Donaldson), Chapter 7, "Education and Culture in the Eighteenth Century," pp. 198-233; Douglas Sloan, The Scottish Enlightenment and the American College Ideal (N.Y.: Teachers College Press, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1971), espec. Chapter I, "The Scottish Universities in the Enlightenment," pp. 1-35; Robert Noyes Smart, "Some observations on the provinces of the Scottish universities 1560-1850" in The Scottish Tradition. Essays in Honor of Ronald Gordon Cant, edited by G. W. S. Barrow. (St. Andrews University Publications, No. LX) (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1974) pp. 91-106. See also, Douglas Young, "Scotland and Edinburgh in the eighteenth Century," Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (Transactions of the Second international congress on the Enlightenment IV), Vol. LVIII (1967), 1967-1983. See also: Cant's earlier book, The University of St. Andrews: A Short History (Edinburgh: 1946).

[10]See Hugh Trevor-Roper, op. cit., p. 1636. See also: Lawrence Stone, ed. The University in Society, Vol. I, Oxford and Cambridge from the Fourth to the early Nineteenth Century, and Vol. II, Europe, Scotland, and the United States from the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Century (Written under the auspices of the Shelby Cullom Davis Center for Historical Studies, Princeton University). (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975).

[11]Ibid., pp. 1956-58.

[12]Ibid., p. 1955.

[13]Idem. George S. Pryde wrote that one of the reasons "Edinburgh
. . . was hailed as 'the Athens of the North'" was that the city was not
an island in the sea of darkness, but the apex or the focal point of one
of the most highly literate societies of the time. "The broad base of
the intellectual, literary and scientific achievements of the time was
provided by a system of elementary education which, with many gaps and
defects, was a credit to the nation, for at long last the Knoxian ideal
of a school in every parish was within sight of realisation. . . ."
(George S. Pryde, op. cit., p. 162).

[14]Idem.

[15]Ibid., p. 1956.

CHAPTER III

BURKE AND THE "ART VS. NATURE" PROBLEM

John Plamenatz speaks in his work, Man and Society (1963), of the visions of the future common, he believes, to all utopias.

> . . . We may not trouble to criticize them on the ground that their visions of the ideal society are unrealistic. We may think it wasted labour to object to those visions on specific grounds; we may object more generally that it is unreasonable to prepare schemes for the future because men, being limited by the ideas of their own time, cannot predict what the future will be like, since those who come after them will have ideas different from theirs. Marx and Engels, when they called the more speculative of the early socialists Utopian, also had this objection in mind. Now, it might be held that this is one objection which would come better from such a man as Burke [emphasis added] than from them. If what is to come after cannot be foreseen, is not the revolutionary the man who wants society completely transformed, merely destructive? He aims at putting an end to what exists without knowing what will take its place. What reason can he have for believing that the unknowable future will be better than the past? . . .[1]

Plamenatz has a no more broad-minded view of the role and meaning of the concept of utopia than did the Immanuel Kant, as described by Ernst Cassirer; in addition, Plamenatz associates Burke--wrong-headedly--with his own narrow view of utopia, equating utopia with unreality and prophecy rather than with the hard-arrived-at and closely-ranged prediction by use of the intellect. Burke--and in similar ways the Kantian and Scottish views--recognized the reality of the internal world (of, for instance, a human nature constant in some things) and the reality of the external world (of, for instance, the historical events themselves), and the interplay between internal and external, between subject and object.

Cassirer, on the contrary, expresses his broader concept of

utopia in his Essay on Man (1944):

> The writings of Plato and of his followers have always been liable
> to objection that they refer to a completely unreal world. But
> the great ethical thinkers did not fear this objection. They
> accepted it and proceeded openly to defy it. The "Platonic
> Republic," writes Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason, "has been
> supposed to be a striking example of purely imaginery perfection.
> It has become a byword, as something that could exist only in the
> brain of an idle thinker. . . . We should do better, however, to
> follow up his thought and endeavor to place it in a clearer light
> by our own efforts, rather than to throw it aside as useless, under
> the miserable and very dangerous pretext of its impracticability. . . .
> For nothing can be more mischievous and more unworthy of a philos-
> opher than the vulgar appeal to what is called adverse experience
> [emphasis added], which possibly might never have existed if at
> the proper time institutions had been formed according to those
> ideas, and not according to crude conceptions which, because they
> were derived from experience only, have marred all good inten-
> tions . . ."[2]

Contrary to Plamenatz's view of Burke, Burke was not imprisoned by his

particular historical setting, although Burke was aware of the circum-

stances which even ideally would contribute to the fulfillment of

principle and extra-historical (not ahistorical) influences on an

individual's thought (or upon a state's existence).

Burke was, in his own words, the occasionalist, but not the

server of occasions. Burke could judge the singular importance of the

French Revolution, the universality of its ideological assumptions,[3]

and could therefore foresee the course of the Revolution. Thus Burke

could lament all the more the absence of what would today be called

"contingency plans" by the British state and her Allies to control the

expansion of the Revolution state. More generally, he could advocate

the use, whenever and to the greatest extent possible, of the active

policy-making intelligence of Allied statesmen to shape the near

future to the extent to which present possession of empirical data and
general knowledge of the fundamental principles of morality and of the
constant factors of human nature in society, would allow.

One important instance of the extra-empirical and extra-
historical dynamic and activist view Burke had of the faculties of the
mind, and the possibility of shaping experience rather than merely
being shaped by it--was his notion that "art is man's nature." This
concept was expressed in the "Vindication of Natural Society" 1756,
Burke's ironic[4] satire of Bolingbroke's deism and analytic Cartesian
rationalism.   Stanlis wrote of Burke here:

> As an Aristotelian, he believed that man is by nature a political
> or social animal, that "art is man's nature." To Burke, civil
> society however imperfect was superior to any hypothetical simple
> "state of nature" without organized institutions. . . .   Burke
> showed that Bolingbroke's attacks on artificial religion applied
> equally to political institutions and to organized society it-
> self: "Show me an absurdity in religion, and I will undertake to
> show you an hundred for one in political laws and institution . . ."
> In short, without irony, Burke believed that "artificial" institu-
> tions such as Church and State are "natural" to man, and that a
> state of "natural society," without institutions, was a fictitious
> and dangerous illusion when applied to man. . . .[5]

But Stanlis went on to describe Burke's opposition to Bolingbroke as
aimed primarily at the rationalism, or the methodology, of Bolingbroke,
by which he had made the antithesis between art and nature as a prelude
to an assumed superiority of the state of nature.   Stanlis in describing
Burke's position, seems to assume of Burke's thought the same anti-
thesis which Burke was satirizing, that of art vs. nature; but in
Stanlis' Burke, the form of the antithesis is the impotence of individual
reason within "his subordinate place in the moral universe."[6]   Stanlis'
commentary on Burke's "vindication" is important because of Stanlis'

preeminent place in contemporary Burke studies, and his belief that

the philosophical assumptions of the "Vindication" spoke "the grand

themes that ran through almost everything he ever wrote. . . ."[7]

Stanlis seems to have Burke equate individual reason with the "clear

and distinct" ideas of dogmatic Cartesian rationalism, and both as

conflicting with the performance of "moral duties" in the "moral uni-

verse." But it is Bolingbroke's rationalism, his methodology, not

so much as his antithesis between art and nature per se, which Burke

attacks. Burke

> . . . attacked Bolingbroke's rationalism, and argued seriously
> that the civil world of man would be destroyed "if the practice
> of all moral duties, and the foundations of society, rested upon
> having their reasons made clear and demonstrative to every individ-
> ual. His satire attacked the theory that if every individual was
> free to speculate upon political and moral subjects, with no sense
> of self restraint arising from an awareness of the limitations and
> fallibility of his private reason, and from his subordinate place
> in the moral universe, then everything among all the excellent
> achievements of man throughout history was subject to the destruc-
> tive analysis of rationalistic criticism. Burke perceived that
> this is precisely what the rationalistic philosophers of the
> Enlightenment encouraged men to do. . . .[The following themes
> run throughout Burke's writings; Burke's] . . . attacks on a priori
> reasoning in politics, his contempt for metaphysical abstractions,
> his fear of "the contagion of project and system," his deep skep-
> ticism toward the "species of delusive geometrical accuracy in
> moral arguments. . . .[8]

But the above antithesis between individual reason and the almost

deterministic "moral universe" which Stanlis describes, does not

correspond to Burke's own views on the "art vs. nature" problem.

In the Preface to the 2nd Edition of the "Vindication" (1757),

Burke explained the defect of Bolingbroke's nature worship.

> . . . the same engines which were employed for the destruc-
> tion of religion, might be employed with equal success for
> the subversion of government . . .[9]

Bolingbroke's rationalism is unlike that species of "vulgar reasonings
and notions, taken from the beaten circle of ordinary experience [and]
admirably suited to the narrow capacities of some, and to the laziness
of others."[10] Burke then goes on to describe the correct use of "vul-
gar" reason, and a methodology (for discerning the art in man's nature)
which is anything but vulgar. It requires the active use of the intel-
lect and an intermediate knowledge of objects removed from the subject's
setting. But in order for the active mind to reach out beyond any
immediately perceived or felt objects, it must at the same time retain
the notion of the limitation of reason, a limiting concept which turns
about and, in a heuristic fashion, allows more play for the application
of reason by the active mind within reason's proper sphere. Burke
wrote that "this advantage" of a "vulgar" reason

> . . . is a great measure, when a painful, comprehensive survey
> of a very complicated matter, and which requires a great variety
> of considerations, is to be made; when we must seek in a profound
> subject, not only for arguments, but for new materials of argument,
> their measure and their method of argument; when we must go out of
> the sphere of our ordinary ideas and when we can never walk surely,
> but by being sensible of our blindness. And this we must do, or we
> do nothing, whenever we experience the result of a reason which is
> not our own . . .[11]

The facile and incomplete rationalism of Bolingbroke is in fact the vulgar
way of thinking. It seeks to win itself over by a persuasion built upon
those points which it thinks represent a philosophical vacuum created by
the limitations of reason (or of reason's paradoxes), not realizing that
these limitations are an inherent part of the right use of reason itself.
Burke wrote:

> It is an observation which I think Isocrates makes in one of his ora-
> tions against the Sophists, that it is far more easy to maintain a
> wrong cause, and to support paradoxical opinions to the satisfaction
> of a common auditory, than to establish a doubtful truth by solid and

conclusive arguments. When men find that something can be said in favor of what, on the very proposal they have thought utterly inde- fensible, they grow doubtful of their own reason; they are thrown into a sort of pleasing surprise; they run along with the speaker, charmed and captivated to find such a plentiful harvest of reason- ing, where all seemed barren and unpromising. This is the fairy land of philosophy.[12]

The difference between the establishment of a "doubtful truth" on the

one hand, and of "paradoxical opinions" on the other, is the difference

between Burke's limited reason which recognizes the heterogeneous com-

pound of art and nature in man, as against Bolingbroke's rationalism

which cannot tolerate the accumulated givens of the historical/phenomenal

world (of "art"), viewing the realm of "art" not as a real and indepen-

dent reality, but merely as a strawman, a paradox, to be explained

(away) exclusively in terms of the "natural." [13]

In his extensive review of Adam Ferguson's Essay on the History

of Civil Soviety (1767) in the Annual Register for 1767, Burke referred

to the study of man, "so various a being," as a "subject . . . so exten-

sive that it can never be exhausted."[14]   It is further the study of man

in society, with which Ferguson--and the general Scottish inquiry into

the study, now called sociology, of "Man and Society"[15] --is concerned,

and which offers the "most fit" instance of studying the moral duties

of man.[16]   Hobbes and Rousseau[17] have both therefore given incomplete

pictures of man, both anthropologically and morally, when they assumed

the nature of man to be complete in, respectively, a malevolent or a

benevolent, solitary state of nature. But the heterogeneity of man's

nature and of his moral duties is only fulfilled in society. "Mr. Fer-

guson," Burke wrote in the Annual Register," . . . has refuted them both

[Rousseau and Hobbes] in the most masterly manner . . ."[18]

No one [Burke continued] can be more fully calculated for examing thoroughly into, and describing expressively, man in that state, than he who is chosen by a learned body, as the most fit to point out and enforce those moral duties, of which the social form is so principal a part. The learned author has accordingly handled this subject in the most masterly manner; the work abounds with subtle thought, ingenious sentiment, and extensive knowledge. . . .[19]

That the study of the moral duties of man in society necessitated

"subtle thoughts, ingenious sentiment, and extensive knowledge" is

partially due to Ferguson's belief that man was a "moral actor" whose

"political activity, promoting the moral development of actors and bene-

ficiaries alike, is the highest command of moral science." Just as the

natural law was defined by A. P. d'Entrèves as "the intersection between

laws and morals,"[20]

The political and moral angles of vision overlap, according to Ferguson, but they do not comprehend fully identical segments of reality at most times. In his Essay on the History of Civil Society, then, Ferguson portrays a world complicated and full of tensions in these as in other respects. His groping for a language able to dis-cuss such complexity leads him often into imprecision and this helps to account for neglect of his work. . . .[21]

But Ferguson's contemporaries, and especially Burke, did not neglect him.

Man, as a complex moral actor applies his wider moral vision in order to

shape and form his environment (including his historical environment or

traditions), rather than passively allowing it to shape him. Burke

cited Ferguson:

"We speak of art as distinguished from nature; but art itself is natural to man. He is in some measure the artificer of his own frame, as well as his fortune, and is destined, from the first age of his being, to invent and contrive. He applies the same talents to a variety of purposes, and acts nearly the same part in very different scenes. He would always be improving on his subject, and he carries this intention wherever he moves, through the streets of the populous city, or the wilds of the forest. . . ."[22]

The "moral universe" is not set against the conscious individual reason

of man,[23] but rather man as a moral actor and therefore as a complex being,

is continually attempting to reconcile, or as Burke said elsewhere, "insinuate"[24] morality into political life.

The realization that the complex affairs of men were such because characterized by an overlapping of the "political and moral angles of vision," saved the eighteenth-century Scottish social scientists from constructing strictly hypothetical speculative or deductive theories of human behavior. At the same time, the Scottish attempt to articulate a science of society was recognized by contemporaries as significant. In a similar manner, Burke thought it desirable to consider morals a science--in order to avoid the moral confusion of the philosophes--but, at the same time, did not wish morals to become a "theorical" or speculative exercise either (see infra., Chapter IV, p.104). Douglas Adair wrote that before the French Revolution caused the word "philosophy" to be "equated with the guillotine, atheism, the reign of terror," and made "philosophy" and "philosophizing" a pejorative "smear-word" synonymous with the "fuzzy-minded and dangerous social theorist" or "social engineer,"[25] the notion of "philosophy" had a positive and optimistic meaning. Adair portrayed George Washington as philosophe when the latter said in his circular letter to the state governors in June, 1783:

> "The foundation of our Empire was not laid in the gloomy age of Ignorance and Superstition . . . but at an Epocha when the rights of mankind were better understood and more clearly defined than at any former period [one is reminded here of Burke's idea of the way in which, by a "liberal descent, ... our liberty becomes a noble freedom."[26]]; the researches of the human mind after social happiness have been carried to a great extent. . . ." [In the 1780's,] "scientist [or philosopher, meant] a man deep in knowledge, either moral or natural."[27]

Although the Scottish sociologists drew a more precise line between moral and natural knowledge or science,[28] still,

Washington's assurance that already scientific knowledge about government had accumulated to such an extent that it could be immediately applied to the uses of 'legislators,' pointed less toward France than toward Scotland. There, especially in the Scottish universities, had been developed the chief centers of eighteenth-century social science research and publication in all the world. The names of Frances Hutcheson, David Hume, Adam Smith, Thomas Reid, Lord Kames, Adam Ferguson, the most prominent of the Scottish philosophers, were internationally famous. . . .[29]

Adair's description of the Scottish assumptions about the constancy of human nature matches that of David Kettler. Adair continued:

The Scottish system, as it had been gradually elaborated in the works of a whole generation of researchers, rested on one basic assumption, had developed its own special method, and kept to a consistent aim. The assumption was 'that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains still the same, in its principles and operations. The same motives always produce the same actions; the same events follow from the same causes. . . .'[30]

The complexity and the constancy of human nature, taken together, let the scientific study of man in society proceed without degenerating into theoretical speculation. Burke wrote (infra., p. 37) as if he believed in the same assumptions which guided the enquiries of the Scots (see Appendix C) for the moderate character of the Scottish Enlightenment.

Actually the Scottish social scientists were so confident they had formulated a comprehensive and workable science of society, that the idea of an omnipotent legislator as applying the laws of society (let alone as correcting or improving the society) became superfluous and external or even alien to the understanding and maintenance of society. Society (or the people in a society) could correct and improve

itself by its own "autonomous mechanism,"--now discovered by the Scots.[31]
The "'destruction [of the legislator myth] was perhaps the most original
and daring coup of the social science of the Scottish Enlightenment.'"[32]
The laws of society replaced the laws of any Solons. The coup was spear-
headed by Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), which "solved
for the first time" the old controversy among British moral philosophers
"from Hobbes to Hutcheson"[33] of the contradiction between private inter-
est and public interest or stability.

The crux of the old controversy is most clearly seen in the title
of the most notable eighteenth-century representation of one side of
the argument: Bernard de Mandeville's popular "Fable of the Bees, or
. . . Private Vices, Public Benefits." The historiography on Mandeville's
views does not seem to have changed much in the last century; Sir Leslie
Stephen wrote in 1876 of Mandeville:

> With Mandeville nature is a power altogether inscrutable to our
> feeble intelligence. . . . Nature is a dark power, whose [contra-
> dictory] action can only be inferred from facts, not from any
> a priori theory of design, harmony and order.[34]

The following words were written in 1976:

> Mandeville leaves us with his paradox [of private vices and public
> benefits], offering no resolution, no counsel, proclaiming the
> true religion only to render it inoperative, while he demonstrates
> the mystery of our confused being. [35]

It should be pointed out, though, that a recent author has taken a little
of the dark mystery and confusion out of Mandeville's paradoxes. M. M.
Goldsmith saw Mandeville as attacking the hierarchical, closed class
structure in England, a structure in which those private virtues equated
with the public good, were those virtues commonly regarded as charac-
teristic exclusively of the high-born. Goldsmith wrote:

> Although it [Mandeville's system of paradox] may be partly a self-regulatory system, I believe that the skillful politician enters to emphasize that it is a conventional system; it is built up from previous actions and it might be changed by human decisions [emphasis added; for instance,] . . . The beneficial harmony which results from private vice depends upon laws. . . .[36]

The difference between Adam Smith as one of the leading social scientists of the Scottish Enlightenment, and Mandeville, was that while the self-regulation in Mandeville's scheme was largely a mysterious phenomenon, akin to Pope's teleological argument in his Essay on Man, that "partial evil is universal good,"--Smith's idea of "sympathy" and the self-regulation, or "self-preservation" of society, reflected the critical formulations by the Scottish sociologists of the laws or mechanisms of society. Much in the vein of a Kantian moral imperative, Smith's notion of "sympathy" demanded the agent, in his moral and economic conduct, consciously step outside himself and imagine himself in the other fellow's shoes, before taking one or another course of action. Smith's notion of sympathy represents

> The most advanced idea of civil society as autonomous mechanism [and his] . . . happy union of moral philosophy and political economy was a specific product of the Scottish Enlightenment. . . .[37]

Perhaps Burke's notion of prudence as a social virtue reflected some of the influence of Smith's notion of "sympathy."[38]

Burke did favorably review Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments in the 1759 issue of The Annual Register. Sympathy was for Burke here, not a facile sentiment, but a conscious, critical and reconciling virtue with which Smith sought, wrote Burke,

> . . .for the formulation of the just, the fit, the proper, the decent, in our most common and allowed passions . . .[39]

An example of the "fit, the proper, the decent," (as opposed to the

"paradoxes" of Mandeville's scheme) sympathy of Smith in the economic field, was his distinction between poverty and misery. This distinction served as a justification for continual restructuring of society, because the distinction becomes in Smith "the distinction between that condition which is inevitable and irremediable and that which is unnecessary and capable of cure."[40] Sympathy is a complex virtue of practical morality which requires that the agent not intrude himself into a largely unseen whole by equating his conduct (whether virtuous or vicious) as an inherent (and unseen) part of that whole. Rather, sympathy requires the agent step outside himself both spatially and temporally. He is capable not only of imagining the other fellow's moral and economic reason for being (the other motivations, conduct) in a given and real situation, but the sympathetic agent, wrote Burke, can sympathize with the dead.[41]

This sympathy of which Burke said existed in all men for the dead,[42] is the widest-ranging of this critical and virtuous sentiment. Yet it is tethered to the criteria of the "just, fit and proper" and as such is a sympathy which will in fact enlarge the human understanding by its very fitness and articulate distinction between itself and the objects of sympathy and among the objects themselves.

Perhaps Burke was referring to Mandeville's narrow paradoxes, or confusions, as Burke would consider them, when he wrote a letter to Smith praising the Theory of Moral Sentiments. Burke wrote in 1759 to Smith of the false paradoxes of past moralists: "I have even thought that the old Systems of morality were too contrasted and that this Science could never stand well upon any narrower Basis than the whole of Human Nature."[43] Because falsely paradoxical, these moralists before Smith

were narrow; to this point, Burke continued, referring to "All the writers who have treated this Subject before you were like those Gothic Architects who were fond of turning great Vaults upon a single slender Pillar . . ."[44] Sympathy was an imaginative faculty in man whereby the individual could regulate or improve himself. Thereby, the cohesive bonds of society could be maintained in a conscious and critical manner.

Louis Schneider, in his anthology of The Scottish Moralists On Human Nature and Society[45] cited the works of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Dugald Stewart on the "Uniformity of Human Nature"[46] But the complexity of the history of human nature in society was realized by the eighteenth-century Scots in the form of their notions of "Individual Actions and Unintended Social Outcomes."[47] Although the Scots shared the general "Enlightenment stress on the uniformity of human nature [which] could and did sometimes go to the point where the representation of men and women, as in historical writings, involved a sameness of portrayal that was certainly challengeable,"[48] the Scots realized that laws could not be applied to express our knowledge of human nature in society as for instance, the Newtonian laws of gravitation and motion had described the realm of physical nature. Schneider, in explaining the latter characteristic of the thought of the Scottish moralists, referred to the

> development of the theme [of the] . . . Scots' analysis to show how the larger 'objects' [of any intended action] are brought about indirectly but effectively through the pursuit of more restricted goals that men can set for themselves. In the development of the theme it is argued repeatedly that human reason is too frail a reed to rely upon to bring about a variety of 'results.'[49]

Schneider cited to this effect Reid, Lord Monboddo, Hume, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, and Dugald Stewart. But it is Schneider's Reid who is similar to both Burke and Kant on the subject of the unintended

consequences of individual actions. Schneider wrote of Reid:

> By instinct and habit, Reid argues, man is led to 'many actions necessary for his preservation and well being which, without instinct and habit, all his skill and wisdom would not have been able to accomplish.' There are at work in man 'inferior principles of action' and these 'with little or no aid of reason or virtue, preserve the species.'[50]

Reid's notion of instinct and habit here as aids to the reason, or, as aids to man's purposeful action, resemble Kant's reconciliation (see Appendix B) between a purposeful Nature and the absolute Purpose of the moral realm. Man (his judgement), with his feet in both camps--as both a creature of purposive Nature (as an instinctual creature of habit, for instance), and as a free moral agent--brings the realms together in such a way as to show their mutual complementarity. The Scottish moralists saw both the constancy of human nature (representing the moral realms) and the accidents of the historico/phenomenal realm to which man, as a creature of nature, is susceptible. As for Burke, Schneider cited[51] J. G. A. Pocock's article on "Burke and the Ancient Constitution . . ."[52] as a variation on the theme of "unintended consequences," but Pocock was speaking of "institutions as incorporating 'wisdom,'"[53] that is, of the "unintended consequences" of institutions. (For Burke and Pocock, see immediately below.)

Contrary to the traditional interpretations of the ahistoricity of Enlightenment thought (see Appendix C) and contrary to the Burke portrayed as a prisoner of history--past (as a traditionalist or reactionary Burke as seen, for example, by Burke's contemporary James MacIntosh,[54] or, Burke as seen as a member of "the" natural law school) or present (Burke as positivist/utilitarian)[55]--Burke here would come closer to what J. B. Black called the "modern" temper. Black wrote in his 1926 study

of The Art of History: A Study of Four Great Historians of the Eighteenth
Century (Voltaire, Hume, Robertson and Gibbon): ". . . what the modern
mind craves is not the reduction of all events and characters to a common
denominator, but their differentiation!"[56] Burke, representing the
moderate, comprehensive, complex thought of the Enlightenment (see Appen-
dix C), did not only differentiate, but tried to reconcile the different
realms with one another.

Burke's attempt to reconcile the constant and the changing, after
the pattern of the Scottish sociological historians, is seen in his views
on the nature of prescription and custom, as part of the common law.
Burke's views on prescription and custom offer here an evident comparison
between his thoughts on this subject and the Scottish methodology. Two
authors, Paul Lucas and J. G. A. Pocock[57] have recently agreed in their
respective studies regarding the content of Burke's thought on this
matter, but have, at the same time, each drawn different interpretations
of the meaning of the relation of Burke's views to the common law tradi-
tion. Lucas and Pocock differed in their interpretations of Burke's
thought not because the former two had opposing views of what certain
principles of the common law meant, but rather because Lucas would
disqualify an historicist Burke from the natural law tradition on the
basis of Burke's views on the common law. On the other hand, Pocock,
and Francis Canavan, S.J., in a 1973 article,[58] on the same basis, did
not see Burke as historicist. Neither did Pocock and Canavan deny (or
affirm) Burke's thought here as reflective of any natural law tradition.
Canavan, though, did explicitly admit Burke into the natural law frater-
nity on the basis of Burke's views on custom and prescription.

Paul Lucas seemed to have followed in the Leo Strauss/Peter
Stanlis school, which interpreted the eighteenth century as a blank
tablet upon which was written their ahistorical schematic version of the
victory of the natural rights tradition over the natural law tradition.
Lucas saw Burke as representing the "new sense of time" of eighteenth-
century thought, in which "once supra-temporal truths became embodied in
time and thus also subject to the computation of prescription."[59] This
was so because prescription also arose in time, and it was this develop-
ment of prescription throughout time which served as its justification.[60]
Although Burke confused prescription and custom,[61] when he described the
constitution as a prescriptive one, the truth is that "prescription is
an individual and personal privilege arising in time," whereas "at
common law, custom is a group and territorial right existing since time
immemorial. . . ."[62] What was Burke's notion of a gradual evolutionary
constitution is seen by Lucas as evidence of the immanentism of Burke's
natural rights position, and evidence of Burke's relativistic historicism.
Burke is now set against the lawyers of the common law tradition and
their notion of a static constitution of custom, a constitution whose
origins stretch back to time immemorial (that is, a timeless constitution).
Lucas wrote:

> . . .Burke had to call the constitution a prescriptive instead of a
> customary one; for prescription was essentially a dynamic, historical
> conception of new rights arising in time and, as Burke stressed, both
> preserving an inherited antiquity and allowing growth and future
> acquisitions. Prescription also eliminated anachronisms and encom-
> passed a modern sense of historical progress, for prescriptive
> beginners were known and were within the time of legal memory. For
> all these reasons, Burke relied upon rather a prescriptive constitu-
> tion than the immemorial custom of the common lawyers.[63]

This merely represented for Lucas prescription's "historicist tinge"[64] --a prescription which had "no transcendent basis,"[65] but which rather "possessed an immanent justification" devoid of any "positive, ethical norm" except the passage of time. The transcendent (the original principles of the immemorial constitution, which were lost in Saxon myths approaching a "state of nature") was immanentized. "The Great Chain of Being became a great chain of becoming,"[66] in which the presumptive constitution was shaped according to the manner in which men justified the past and manipulated the present. What the common lawyers had viewed as a value-laden constitution now became a history-, or time-laden, constitution. Such an historicist prescriptive constitution no doubt directly flies in the face of the natural law tradition.[67] Likewise opposed to the natural law tradition, is the denial, as Lucas claimed was Burke's, of a "supernatural revelation"to aid right reason and to provide a standard and guide for judging human laws and traditions and prescriptions "and the denial" (Burke's supposed denial) or "mistrust of the individual person's faculty of reason [which characterizes] . . . the Scholastic's intellectualistic process of cognition by which the natural law may be made known."[68] Also anathema to Natural law principles is the presumption of Lucas's Burke that "man's mind was such that time alone became the material and efficient cause of prescription."[69]

But Francis Canavan has shown that Burke's explicit belief in a transcendent moral order[70] inherently involves a dynamic, elastic history-laden notion of prescription as Burke's (and as Lucas described accurately enough): prescription for Burke "meant that God willed the historically evolved social and political order,"[71] or,--"The universal

moral order is the order of a real, historically existing world."[72]   To

Burke, as for the Scottish sociological historians,[73] this flexible moral

order involved "a cultural, but never an ethical, relativism."   In terms

of a theory of the British constitution, this meant a dynamic combination

of the universal and the particular, the constant and the changing.

Canavan cited Burke on the constitution:

> 'The foundation of government is there laid, not in imaginary rights
> of men . . . but in political convenience, and in human nature; either
> as that nature is universal, or as it is modified by local habits and
> social aptitudes.' (Burke's "Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs,"
> 1791).   'In the created universe, the necessary is realized in the
> contingent, the universal in the particular, the natural in the con-
> ventional. . . .'[74]

Burke's prescriptive constitution, reflecting a complex and flexible moral

order, would reconcile continuity and reform,[75] and this, together with

the presumption of the rational (not arbitrary) consent of the governed[76]

to a "good" government which has long flourished under a constitution,

is evidence of the fact that "Prescription of government is a part of

the law of nature."[77]   Lucas had seen Burke's reconciliation between the

past (an "inherited antiquity") and the present (Burke's theory of

constitutional growth through "future acquisitions" and Burke's theory

of "historical progress") as part of Burke's "ahistorical conservatism"

and Burke's prescription with its "historicist tinge."[78]   J. G. A. Pocock

also referred to Burke's "pragmatic" prescription as a "conservatism

without traditions."[79]   Lucas had said Burke's notion of a prescriptive

constitution was a relativist-historicist idealization (or justification)

of history; Lucas had said that Burke's was a notion denying the need for

any objective (transcendent) ethical standards (such as the original

principles, existing since "time immemorial" in the form of inherited,

or presumed, custom). Pocock also saw Burke's new "pragmatic prescrip-
tion" as combining the past and the present. But Pocock, unlike Lucas,
held that such a prescription was not untrue either--explicitly--to the
common law custom or to the natural law tradition as that tradition has
been described in this study. The use of human reason as a tool to
consider the complexities of history and man in society and to attempt
to reconcile them with the absolutes of a transcendent law is part of
the natural law itself.

Pocock has shown that such a methodology is not alien to the
tradition of the common law. To accept Lucas' distinction or opposition
between Burke's prescription and the custom of common law, one would be
bound to accept his narrow view of the static, immemorial custom of
common law and of tradition in general. What Lucas referred to as the
customs of the common law, Pocock called the "traditions" of the common
law. These were presumptive--"an indefinite series of repetitions of
an action, which on each occasion is performed on the assumption that
it has been perfomred before.[80] Traditions were prescriptive because
they represented a continuity with the immemorial timeless "original
principles" of "the common law [which] was common custom."[81] But even
immemorial traditions (or, the customs of common law), presumptive and
prescriptive as Burke pointed out,[82] required for their "full exposition"
"a sophisticated mind and highly subtle language."[83] An argument "more
subtly traditional"[84] than the seventeenth/eighteenth century cult of
the ancient immemorial constitution seeking to return to the "original
principles" of an idealised pre-Conquest constitution, characterized
Burke's "conservatism without traditions." Burke pointed out in the

first place the simple illogic of the notion of the immemorial constitution.

> Burke pointed out that an immemorial constitution can have no
> original principles, since a system whose knowledge of its own
> past is based exclusively on the presumption of transmission
> can never arrive at knowledge of them.[85]

Because he opposed the cult of the immemorial constitution, Burke did

not throw principle completely overboard. His position was described by

Pocock as holding to pragmatic prescription minus presumption. Burke's

pragmatic prescription, or "conservatism without traditions," combined

both past in the form of precedent, and present realities in the form

of necessity. Pocock explained Burke's two-edged theory:

> A pragmatic action must have a [historical] context and make sense
> in that context. A prescriptive style, which appeals constantly to
> precedent, may have much in common with a pragmatic style, which
> appeals only to necessity; this is how the conservatism of the
> eighteenth century could reflect the thought both of those who
> thought the Revolution justified by precedent and of those--the
> so-called de facto Tories--who thought it justified only by
> necessity. Burke was able to unite these lines of thought by
> demonstrating that neither entailed, and each rejected, the estab-
> lishment of an abstract and recurrent principle of dethronement.
> Pragmatism is the establishment of a continuous style of behavior
> which cannot any longer be presumed; this is the sense in which it
> is conservatism without traditions.[86]

Burke's position seems "historical" rather than historicist or ahistorical,

as Lucas had argued. It is those supporting the notion of a narrow

received traditionalism, including the presumed transmission of the

"original principles" of a mythical constitution, who are ahistorical

(much as were the original states of nature in the thought of Hobbes and

Rousseau) in their thinking.

This is all apart from the fact, as Pocock pointed out, that the

common law itself, although implying that custom was immemorial, "need

not . . . . imply a static and unchanging content."[87] The common lawyers

realized that "custom was constantly being subjected to the test of experience, so that immemorial it was, equally, always up to date."[88] This view of the common law coincides with Burke's historical-laden pragmatic prescription.

Lastly, the use of the individual reason in interpreting the law, which use Lucas minimized in his description of the presumptive prescription of the law (and of "original principles"), was shown by Pocock to be in fact an inherent part of common law, and of Burke's views regarding the continuous reinterpretation of the law. Pocock wrote that Burke was both alike and opposed to Chief Justice Sir Matthew Hale. Hale wrote "one of the standard books of the eighteenth century, History of the Common Law."[89] Hale's "empiricist and traditionalist" view of the common law is written in opposition to "individualistic rationalism."[90] Rather, for Hale, the law was a series of particular decisions. Law, as a matter of "applied morals," is so infinitely complex, Hale believed, that "there were no universally valid rules, only accumulated experience. . . ."[91] "Experience" included the "complexity and the instability of the social context [which] render it impossible 'for the wisest Council of men at first to foresee.'"[92] But because certain laws have weathered the instabilities of past ages "furnishes the prescription" of the original goodness of the law, but also of the good effects of the law.[93] So, at the last, for Hale, the law is "instructable."[94] Burke agreed, up to a point, with the empirical side of Hale. In fact, Burke wrote in his "Essay towards a History of the Laws of England" (cir. 1760), that Hale failed to recognize the truly "'very mixed and heterogeneous mass'" which the common law represented, including the influence of elements from

foreign nations.[95] Burke, though, did not believe the law to be so complex as to be inscrutable.

The "difference between Hale and Burke" is that Burke was thoroughly an eighteenth-century man in that he sought to shape the phenomenal (historical/empirical) world and not have it shape him. Burke went completely outside common law proper in order to find influences upon legal decisions which possibly could be seen in the wider perspective of a social pattern or of a broader law of human behavior. It is at this point which Pocock compared Burke to the Scottish "historical sociologists" (or, as they have been referred to by others--the Scottish sociological historians). Referring to Burke's use of the phrase, "spirit of the laws," Pocock wrote:

. . .Here is thoroughly eighteenth-century language: the idea that peoples or their institutions possess a 'spirit', or historical character, which may be understood by relating it to just such things as 'the manners, the religion, and the commerce of the people', might come direct from Montesquieu or any of the Scottish historical sociologists with whom Burke was later to be acquainted. The words prefigure the 'Speech on Conciliation with America' and the orator who was to depict the 'spirit' of the American colonists in as impressive a passage as eighteenth-century historiography contains. . . .Burke is thoroughly of his age in believing that laws can be understood by reference to the operation of general social factors, and he rejects the empirical mystique of the immemorial partly on these grounds. He implies clearly that the history of the law can be made intelligible.[96]

Another role in which the Scottish social scientists avoided both flights into speculative fancy onthe one hand, and merely descriptive catalogues of the history and/or the (mechanical) motivations and behavior of human nature on the other hand, was their role as "primitivists." That is to say, the Scottish sociologists as primitivists neither idealized the noble savage and his noble traits, nor did they disregard him

altogether. In the debate over the primitive as opposed to the civilized
(poetry, society, law, etc.), the Scots did not "take sides" between nature
and art, or, an ideal primitive Rousseauian primitive state and civiliza-
tion. (Nor did the writers of the Scottish Enlightenment subsume one
into the other--the latter confusion--in the more general form of the
confusion between nature and reason--was noted by Paul Hazard as a distin-
guishing trait of the French philosophes.)[97] Robert C. Elliott noted that
Adam Ferguson was one of the few eighteenth-century figures who maintained
a balance between the primitive and the civilized.

> . . .that luminary of enlightened Edinburgh, carefully balanced
> the gains and losses entailed by man's advance from a savage
> to a civilized condition. No primitivist, Ferguson still found
> things to admire [such as an heroic literature] in the savage
> state as he and his contemporaries conceived it.[98]

Those who could not accept Ferguson's natural dualism which saw good and
bad in both the primitive and the civilized, emphasized the exclusive
ideality (and reality) of either the primitive or the civilized, accord-
ing to their respective prejudices. Those who saw the price of progress
to civilization as too high were Rousseau and Sigmund Freud. The latter,
in his Civilization and Its Discontents, suggested that "the whole
agonizing effort to establish civilization has not been worth the pains."[99]
Those who would complacently accept "the future impoverishment of the
life of the imagination,"[100] of (heroic) literature, etc., to the progress
toward civilization included Condorcet, Turgot, Restif de la Bretonne,
Morelly, Louis Sebastian Mercier in the eighteenth century, and, in the
twentieth century, Aldous Huxley, the Marxists (Trotsky), Herbert Marcuse
and the American "New Left" radicals. This group would do away with
literature and with history itself as merely "embarrassments" left over

from man's primitive state (that is, any state which had preceded the present state). Mercier asked rhetorically in his Memoirs of the Year 2500 (published in France, 1771, and translated into English in 1772): "Why should we read Plato or Socrates?, he asks, when progress has left them so far behind,"[101] or, as recent jargon would phrase it, when progress has made them "irrelevant". "For Mercier [as for Condorcet], the price to be paid for progress is history. . . ."[102] This is so because for Mercier and Turgot and the group of which they were members, progress, or civilization, including "the knowledge of nature and of truth, is infinitely cumulative. . . ."[103] The most highly civilized is the most recent and the most immediate, and that which is removed from the most immediate epoch is, to that extent, not civilized, but primitive. In the eighteenth century, the utopias in Restif de la Bretonne's fantasy (translated into English as The French Daedalus, 1781),

> . . . outlaws myth and allegory [as heroic, but primitive literature]--modes of saying that which is not--as obstacles to truth.[104]

What was true and civilized was the relevant and the immediate and the real. "'We want only the real'" was the byword of de la Bretonne's characters.[105] In the twentieth century, this attitude of ethical intuitionism and epistemological reductionism, was represented in Huxley's utopia, Island. There Huxley

> . . . denigrate[d] literature savagely [seeing it as] . . . incompatible with human integrity, with philosophical truth, with a decent social system--incompatible with everything he says, 'except dualism [emphasis added], animal lunacy, impossible aspiration, and unnecessary guilt. Huxley was convinced like so many others, that the negative correlation between literature [the primitive] and the good life [civilization, which, in the sense Huxley uses it, the true life] was absolute. One had to choose between them; and for him, as for his eighteenth-century predecessors, only one choice was possible.[106]

Because Ferguson and the Scottish social scientists saw civilization
as more than the immediate and real, they did not see other historical
events (including a primitive state) which were removed in time and
place, as merely derivative and/or irrelevant.

Ferguson and the Scots would have mounted the rostrum in
support of President Kingman Brewster, Jr.'s famous address on "relevance"
given to the freshman students at Yale in 1972. Huxley and his eigh-
teenth-century predecessors who would confuse civilization and the
primitive, art and nature (as Hazard's philosophes did)--they could have
been the student subjects of Brewster's advice. The very definition
of relevance, Brewster said, assumed the real to require more than that
which was within the immediate proximity of the present subject:

> . . . relevance is a dependent word; it prompts the question:
> 'relevant to what?' [and also, for what? that is, why even
> bother to consider relevance if not to include "something out
> there" removed in either time or space from the immediate and
> the present?]. Such slogans as 'the only purpose of learning
> is action' left no room for the search for truth or beauty or
> goodness for its own sake. . . . There was an impatience [among
> students] to work on the immediate [problems of society] . . .
> Most particularly the demand for relevance was scornful of
> history. . . . [and part of this scorn is included] in the
> glorification of the 'happening'. Anything was good as long
> as it expressed the real, now self [emphasis added].[107]

The dualistic theory of reality which "relevance" (that is, genuine
relevance) assumes, goes hand in hand with a theory of knowledge which
assumes the immediate present's capability of an intermediate percep-
tion and knowledge of things and events (including the primitive)
removed in time and place from itself. The present state of civiliza-
tion is not necessarily the apex of past greatness; the present is not
necessarily the latest step of a neat cumulative, linear development
of history. History is not necessarily all siphoned off into the

narrow channel of the "real" of the here and now. Some of it is and

some of it is not so siphoned off. The dualistic theories of reality

and of an intermediate knowledge, such as the Scots assumed, would

offer a discriminating view of history. This view would neither

become, as one recent commentator put it, a "captive" of the past nor

would it distort or overwhelm that past. On the other hand, by shaping

the past, the present can, to a certain extent, have some control over

the future. Civilization, in this sense, is not a state, but a process,

an attitude, a way of thinking. It might even be called synonomous with

a dualistic theory of reality and an intermediate theory of knowledge

capable of corresponding with the past and shaping the future. The

historian of cities, Lewis Mumford, referred in 1921 to civilization in

these terms. He wrote:

> Civilization is the magic instrument by which men live in a
> world of time that has three dimensions: the past, the
> present, and the future.[108]

In another address to another freshman class in another year (Columbia

University, 1975), Peter R. Pouncey (dean of Columbia College) gave a

balanced view of history much like that of the eighteenth-century

Scottish thinkers. Pouncey said:

> We are all captives of our past, personal and collective. Just
> as we often seem limited and defined by the expectations others
> have had of us, so society as a whole seems limited and defined
> by the expectations for it which one generation foists on to
> another.
>   The past can, if we allow, become a retarding force. . . .
>   However, we should not be frightened that in dealing with
> the past, it will act on us deterministically, imprinting on
> our minds . . . its outworn ideas and theories. . . .
>   What you are asked to do is to follow the progress of human
> intelligence as it grapples with changing circumstances, and as
> it tries to make sense of its world, shifting its presuppositions,
> reshaping its ideals and from time to time forming from its experi-
> ence some statement of particular force and imaginative power, so

that instead of being merely an expression of an age, it seems to have a lasting validity, and to speak cogently to us still.[109]

This is the attitude by which the eighteenth-century Scots hoped to elicit a cogent response from history, while at the same time maintaining a discriminating respect for Clio.

In contradiction to the confusion of Hazard's philosophes, and the confusion of Mercier, Condorcet, Huxley and the American "New Left," all of whom equated the real (civilization) with the immediate and the now, the social scientists of the Scottish Enlightenment accepted the duality implicit in Brewster's remarks, and applied that duality to the study of the historical and scientific development of society. (See Chapter V and Appendix D for Burke and the problem of intermediate knowledge.)

The notion shared by the writers of the Scottish Enlightenment of a "conjectural" history (including the idea of an ideal primitive society) and "a kind of cultural relativity" allowed them to show that each stage of history has its merits and defects. See also, Roy Harvey Pearce's work.[110] Pearce wrote: "Thus it was not a matter of the superiority of primitive to civilized life. It was a matter of analyzing the virtues and defects, necessary in the very scheme of things, of a given stage of social evolution."[111] Pearce's words on the Scots touch the same chord as Peter Pouncey's when the latter said, in the same speech cited above,

> . . .The past, then, not merely tells us its gloomy story of decline and falls, of society spinning its web ever thicker to strangle itself, but it also offers us the encouragement and confidence of a tradition of intelligent activity and initiative, which takes the materials of an age and an environment and makes something positive out of them.[112]

The Scots confirmed the past without denying the present.

Hence, the Scottish writers were not exclusively primitivists as Lois A. Whitney had said.[113] But, as will be shown immediately below, Burke had a heterogeneous view of the art vs. nature problem, a complex view expressed in the many roles which man as a social animal adopted. The Scottish writers were, on the contrary, "constrained to demonstrate, even when they were dissatisfied with certain aspects of civilized life, that there was no question of preferring savage to civilized life."[114] Pearce cited the works of a number of prominent Scottish Enlightenment writers who held this two-edged view--Dugald Stewart, Adam Ferguson, John Gregory, James Dunbar, William Robertson[115]--and three figures, Lord Monboddo, Hume, and Adam Smith,[116] who saw nothing whatsoever of worth in primitive man.[117] But the "most important"[118] figures Pearce considered to be those who reconciled the savage virtues with the greatness of civilization and man in society. Adam Ferguson's and Dugald Stewart's positions represent the acceptance of the reality of both historical evolution (of the various stages of civilized society) and an ideal, primitive "Homeric" state of "conjectural history."

If we take the ideal primitive to be the "moral" and the civilized to be the "political," we have an instance of the overlapping --but not confusion--of the "political and moral angles of vision," an attitude conducive to the balanced Scottish methodology described above. But Pearce described the "general methodology of the Scottish writers" which Stewart represented in his role as a limited primitivist: the Scottish writers ". . . studied and conjectured upon the evolution of society; and they attempted to analyse the various characteristics of society in each of its historical stages and to relate those characteristics

to the circumstances in which they developed. For most of the Scots this led to a cultural—never an ethical—relativism, which, in turn, enabled them to perceive the cause and effect relationship between the good and the bad in both primitive and civilized society."[119] The "limited" primitivism of the Scottish writers might be looked upon as an instance of their distinction between moral and natural knowledge, between ideal primitive and real historical, between art and nature, or between conjectural history (using the notion of an ideal primitive state in what Kant called a regulative, heuristic manner) and a cultural relativism combined with an evolutionary historical viewpoint.

The figure of John Millar, the "notable historical sociologist," may serve as a last instance of the balanced Scottish methodology of combining art and nature and denying neither realm. Millar held the chair of Civil Law at Glasgow from 1761 to the end of the century and beyond.[120] Millar believed in an evolutionary "parallelism" by which different societies go through the "same phases or stages" in their respective developments. Millar as "materialist" saw a Harringtonian-like coincidence between certain "property forms" and certain forms of government—the latter "induced" from the former.[121] This half of Millar would represent what might be called Millar's argument from nature. On the other hand, and representing the argument from man or of art or of civilization, Millar saw "no rigid evolutionary scheme," but, as the "realist" was "aware that accident can play an important role in historical events."[122] The study of the science of man involved the attempt to distinguish between the forms, property and governmental, through which the evolutionary process expressed itself, and the "accidents" which were not necessarily part of natural evolution.

The "limited primitivism" of the Scottish writers assumes, with Burke, the existence of a "concrete, complex, and moral" order,[123] as opposed, for instance, to the "moral calculus" of Hutcheson. But the "limited primitivism" of the writers of the Scottish Enlightenment still assumed, in the general eighteenth-century manner, that a science of man was possible to a certain extent, a science which would lead beyond relativism (see Appendix C).

Burke recognized the limited role of "accidents" in history. In November of 1792, he wrote:

> . . . we may be looking in vain in the regions of politics for what is only the operation of temper and character upon accidential circumstances. But I never knew accidents to decide the whole [Burke's emphasis] of any great business. . . .[124]

But it is his first "Letter on a Regicide Peace" (1796), that Burke wrote as if he had absorbed the teachings of Millar and the inquiries of some of the other Scottish social scientists. Burke, while recognizing the fickleness of history and the sometimes disingenuous causes of great events, sees this as not a hindrance to the scientific study of society or of history, but as part of the necessary "concrete, complex and moral" order with which such a study must contend.

It is impossible to convey Burke's comprehensive and balanced view of the outlines of history itself--as a part of the concrete, complex and moral world--of history's "accidents" and of history's substantial (predictable) structural reality, and of the degree of preciseness with which man can know this history--it is impossible to convey Burke's views on this subject without extracting a considerable chunk of his first "Letter on a Regicide Peace." An appeal can only be

made to the reader's patience by way of yet another citation, this one
from William Hazlitt's famous warning to would-be students of Burke that,
in order to fully understand Burke nothing less than the whole corpus of
Burke's works must be read. The following is merely one page of that
body, but a representative page. Burke wrote in 1796:

> . . . Not to lose ourselves in the infinite void of the conjectural
> world, our business is with what is likely to be affected, for the
> better or for the worse, by the wisdom or weakness of <u>our plans</u>. <u>In
> all speculations upon men and human affairs, it is of no small moment
> to distinguish things of accident from permanent causes, and from
> effects that cannot be altered</u>. It is not every irregularity in our
> movement that is a total deviation from our course. I am not quite
> of the mind of those speculators who seem assured that necessarily,
> and by the constitution of things, all states have the same periods
> of infancy, manhood, and decrepitude that are found in the individuals
> who compose them. Parallels of this sort rather furnish similitudes
> to illustrate or to adorn than supply analogies from whence to reason.
> The objects which are attempted to be forced into an analogy are not
> found in the same class of existence. Individuals are physical beings,
> subject to laws universal and invariable. The immediate cause acting
> in these laws may be obscure: the general results are subjects of
> certain calculation. But <u>commonwealths are not physical, but moral
> essences. They are artificial combinations, and, in their proximate
> efficient cause, the arbitrary productions of the human mind</u>. We are
> not yet acquainted with the laws which necessarily influence the
> stability of that kind of work made by that kind of agent. There
> is not in the physical order (with which they do not appear to hold
> any assignable connection) a distinct cause by which any of those
> fabrics must necessarily grow, flourish or decay; nor, in my opinion,
> does the moral world produce anything more determinate on that subject
> than what may serve as an amusement (liberal, indeed, and ingenious,
> but still only an amusement) for speculative man. I doubt whether
> the history of mankind is yet complete enough, if ever it can be so,
> to furnish grounds for a sure theory on the internal causes which
> necessarily affect the fortune of a state. <u>I am far from denying
> the operation of such causes</u>; but they are infinitely uncertain, and
> much more obscure, and <u>much more difficult to trace</u> [but not impossi-
> ble to trace, Burke seems to be saying], than the foreign causes that
> tend to raise, to depress, and sometimes to overwhelm community.
>   It is often impossible, in these political inquiries, to find any
> proportion between the apparent force of any moral causes we may
> assign and their known operation. We are therefore obliged to deliver
> up that operation to mere chance, or, more piously, (perhaps more
> rationally), to the occasional interposition and irresistable hand
> of the Great Disposer. . . .
>   [Regarding the unexplained rise and fall of nations, Burke contin-
> ued:] . . .All this has happened without any apparent previous change

> in the general circumstances which had brought on their distress.
> The death of a man at a critical juncture, his retreat, his dis-
> grace, have brought innumerable calamities on a whole nation. A
> common soldier, a child, a girl at the door of an inn, have changed
> the face of fortune, and almost of Nature.
>
> Such, and often influenced by such causes, has commonly been the
> fate of monarchies of long duration. They have their ebbs and their
> flows. . . .
>
> Difficult indeed is our situation. In all situations of diffi-
> culty [men can shape events rather than allowing events to shape them],
> men will be influenced in the past they take, not only by the reason
> of the case, but by the peculiar turn of their own character. . . .
> . . .If we command our wealth, we shall be rich and free; if our
> wealth commands us, we are poor indeed. . . .[emphases added][125]

This passage could be interpreted as a rebuttal against the radical social

scientists in France (such as d'Holbach, Helvetius, Turgot, Condorcet,

etc.) and a qualified, cautious yea-saying to the moderate social scien-

tists of the Scottish Enlightenment. However that may be, the bare out-

lines of Burke's notion of history become visible here. Just as the

historian or social scientist should be able to discern the accidential

from the substantial within historical development, so the statesman

contending with the present crisis of the Revolution in France, should

distinguish between the substantial "wealth" of the nation (wealth is

used here by Burke in its broadest sense--that is, Britain as having a

wealthy, or healthy, political tradition and condition) and the accident

of history which the upheaval in France represents.[126] Burke opposed

both a rigid evolutionary or cyclical determinism, and history as arbi-

trary, reasonless catalogue of accidents. Burke looked to an ever-

increasing knowledge of the structure of historical development, while

avoiding a sceptical view of history as the playground of arbitrary

accident.

Burke's distinction between "change and reformation," implies a

critical use of the judgement as necessary in order to recognize and

analyze the distinction. The "essential" must be sifted out from the "accidential,"[127] the spontaneous "novelty" of change reflecting the passing public fashions and passions of the moment from positive, and genuinely progressive, reform. Burke wrote of the "French Revolutionists" in his "Letter to a Noble Lord" (1796):

> . . .I know that there is a manifest, marked distinction, which ill men with ill designs, or weak men incapable of any design [emphasis added] will constantly be confounding, -that is, a marked distinction between change and reformation. The former alters the substance of the objects themselves and gets rid of all their essential good as well as of all the accidental evil annexed to them. Change is novelty. . . .Reform is not a change in the substance or in the primary modification of the object, but a direct application of a remedy to the grievance complained of. . . . [128]

Burke wrote in the "Reflections" of the English policy of an "entailed inheritance" of constitutional liberties ". . .derived to us from our forefathers, and to be transmitted to our posterity. . . .By this means our Constitution preserves unity in so great a diversity of its parts. . . ."[129] When Burke said that such a policy was the "result of profound reflection--or rather the happy effect of following nature (which is wisdom without reflection, and above it,"[130] he is setting against it the "spirit of innovation" or of change. Such a spirit substantially and therefore wrongly alters the object which it aims to improve, instead of improving the object itself (or, in Vincent Luizzi's scheme, Burke here represents the "argument from nature"). True reformation does not necessarily follow nature, but does respect its autonomy (that is, the autonomy of both phenomenal nature and of man as a creature of nature with a history) and seeks to learn from it--after the active Kantian fashion--here, to improve the constitution by combining the best of the old with the givens of the present, or, as

Burke said in the "Reflections": ". . . .the same plan of conforming to
nature in our artificial institutions" which constitutes "this idea
of a liberal descent. . . ."[131] Burke continued in the "Reflections"
and wrote that innovation, which did not follow Nature:

> . . . .is generally the result of a <u>selfish</u> temper and confined
> views [These words seem to coincide with Burke's strictures
> (see Chapter IV. p. 98, n. 112) against the monists who confuse
> vice and virtue, seeing them as defined only in relation to one
> another, rather than as positive moral ends in themselves. The
> common eighteenth-century equation of private vice and public
> virtue (Mandeville), or private interest with the public good
> (Hutcheson, Bentham, the classical economists), represents the
> same confusion of monism. See infra., Chapter IV, p. 98, n. 111].
> People will not look forward to posterity who never look backward
> to their ancestors. Besides, the people of England well know that
> the idea of inheritance furnishes a sure principle of conservation,
> and a sure principle of transmission, without at all excluding a
> principle of improvement. It leaves acquisition free; but it
> secures what it acquires. . . . By a constitutional policy working
> after the pattern of Nature, we receive, we hold, we transmit our
> government and our privileges, in the same manner in which we enjoy
> and transmit our property and our lives. . . . Our political
> system is placed in a just correspondance and symmetry with the
> order of the world, and with the mode of existence decreed to a
> permanent body composed of transitory parts [we are following the
> <u>form</u> of nature, not its substance or its minute mechanical workings],
> wherein, by the disposition of a stupendous wisdom, moulding together
> the great mysterious incorporation of the human race, the whole at
> one time is never old or middle-aged or young, but in a condition of
> unchangeable constancy, moves on through the varied tenor of perpetual
> decay, fall, renovation, and progression. Thus, by preserving the
> <u>method of Nature</u> in the conduct of [emphasis added] the state, in
> what we improve we are never wholly new, in what we retain, we are
> never wholly obsolete. . . .[132]

Not only does reformation, as distinguished from change, not alter substan-
tially the reality and autonomy of nature (see supra., p. 50)--and in this
way does, so to speak, serve nature or makes the "argument from nature"
--but it states the "argument from man". This is so because the end of
imitating the "method of Nature" is to combine the stability of a
received institution with the continual improvements of the state. Burke's
views on this particular point are expressed in the following passage

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from the "Reflections":

> That he may obtain justice, he gives up his right of determining
> what is in point the most essential to him. That he may secure
> some liberty, he makes a surrender in trust of the whole of it
> . . . .natural rights . . . their abstract perfection is their
> practical defect.[133]

Burke respects Nature and natural rights so that man may be able to

carry forward substantial improvements upon substantial realities.

In her recent study of "Burke, Freud and the Gothic," Pamela

Kaufmann saw Burke as an anti-romanticist in his use of reason as a

brake on or as a guide for the unpredictable instincts.[134]   Just as

reform, unlike change, does not alter the substance of the objects to

be redirected, so Burke's critical reason and judgement guides the

instincts in a Madisonian-like manner without distorting the instincts.[135]

Kaufmann compared Burke's reason with Freud's notion of "civilization".

Both notions represent, so to speak, both nature and art, or, the inertia

of history on the one hand, and human freedom on the other (much like

Burke's notion of the "refracted rays" of natural rights entering

society.[136]   In his Civilization and Its Discontents (1929), Freud,

> . . . muses upon the price man has to pay to society in exchange
> for the social and cultural advantages of civilization--'civili-
> zation alternately limits and prohibits instinctual satisfaction
> . . .Wisdom is comprised of lowering our expectations of life, of
> accepting human limitations, of finding sublimations for the
> instincts, or of repressing or controlling them. It means "quiet
> happiness"' [Burke used a similar phrase to correctly characterize
> the philosophical assumptions of Newton's "mathematical way". See
> Appendix A]. Yet in our heart of hearts our atavistic natures still
> cherish that uninhibited wild impulse--gratification which we
> secretly call pleasure. Our Ego [Burke's reason] keeps our instincts
> in line, and at best gives them token opportunities for expression,
> little by little and always controlled. . . .[137]

Although the "quiet happiness" of wisdom entails acceptance of human

limitations, wisdom is not necessarily "following nature", but is

accepting the reality of nature (phenomenal/empirical and historical)

and of using it as a fulcrum to discover human limitations. There-

fore, Freud's civilization and Burke's "Ego [reason]" are, to use

Luizzi's phrases, "arguments from man" rather than "arguments from

nature".[138] Further, they are, to keep the analogy, arguments from

individual man--Kaufmann wrote: "Both Burke and Freud agree that the

fundamental human desire is to live, and to live as individuals as

opposed to living as a species,"[139] and, as opposed to the "Gothic

fantasy" which "deals with today's helpless individual (the weak hero

or heroine) overwhelmed by his alien world of existential absurdity."[140]

Another application of Burke's notion of art and reflective

reason as man's nature is his double-edged notion of actual and virtual

representation. Actual representation represents, in the terms used

above, an argument from nature, or, a respect for the substance of the

object, whether that object be a given of phenomenal or historical

reality. The notion of virtual representation, on the other hand,

represents the argument from man, of reason's ascendence over the

instincts and over the inertia of tradition (the latter two dovetail-

ing in the Romanticist, Gothic fantasies of the felt past). Hanna

Fenichel Pitkin wrote of Burke's notions of a double-edged representation

in a 1967 study.[141] Stanley N. Katz wrote in a review-essay of Pitkin's

book that she noted the formalistic sense of representation:

> One is authorization, in which the representative is specifically
> empowered to act for his constituents, and the other is accountability,
> in which the representative is held to account for his actions. . . .
> [In natural law terminology, authorization would perform a prescrip-
> tive role, while the role of accountability would be a descriptive
> one.] . . .Mrs. Pitkin discovers a multi-faceted conception of
> representation in Burke's writings: elite representations of the

nation, and both actual and virtual representation of the constitu-
encies. She shows how Burke made sense of these seemingly contra-
dictory versions of representation by arguing that the legislative
process requires both the careful deliberation characteristic of an
elite and the accurate reflection of popular feelings provided by
the presence of interested representatives. Thus for Burke the
ancient method of representation could be synthesized with the
concept of interest representation for the good of the nation as
a whole.[142]

David Kettler's description of Ferguson's ideal statesman is

similar to the Burke who refused to characterize the maintainence of

either permanence or of change as the exclusive purpose of the constitu-

tion or of the state operations

> Ferguson's kind of thought also puzzles those who like to classify
> political thinkers according to s0-called 'ideological' patterns.
> Ferguson supports existing governments in almost all situations;
> he is sceptical if not hostile towards [sic] projects for reform;
> he believes that real changes come gradually and by degrees; he
> fears the masses in commercial societies; he seeks to secure
> property and privileges as obstacles to political despotism; and
> he worries constantly about national spirit and threats of moral
> decay. But he will not repose quietly within a 'conservative' clas-
> sification of the conventional sort. Not the inevitability of war
> nor even its social utility authorizes the moral theorist to stop
> looking for peace. Real change may be gradual, but revolution
> cannot be excluded: Ferguson's arguments are primarily designed
> to show that wild fears and hopes both misjudge the possible
> consequences of such events. . . .[143]

In the same pages of Ferguson's Essay on the History of Civil Society

which Burke had cited in his book review, but which he did not cite

directly (for reasons of space no doubt), Ferguson wrote of the specific

need of recognizing, as part of a complex human nature, the presence of

both permanence and change, tradition and reform in the nature of man

and society. Ferguson wrote:

> At once obstinate and fickle, he complains of innovations, and is
> never sated with novelty. He is perpetually busied in reformations,
> and is continually wedded to his errors. If he dwell in a cave, he
> would improve it into a cottage; if he has already built, he would
> still build to a greater extent. But he does not propose to make

rapid and hasty transitions; his steps are progressive and slow; and his force, like the power of a spring, silently presses on every resistance; an effect is sometimes produced before the cause is perceived; and with all his talent for projects, his work is often accomplished before the plan is devised. It appears, perhaps, equally difficult to retard or to quicken his pace; if the projector complain he is tardy, the moralist thinks him unstable; and whether his motions be rapid or slow, the scenes of human affairs perpetually change in his management; his emblem is a passing stream, not a stagnating pool. We may desire to direct his love of improvement to its proper object, we may wish for stability of conduct; but we mistake human nature, if we wish for a termination of labour, or a scene of repose.[144]

Ferguson here is echoed in Burke's words in the "Reflections": ". . . A disposition to preserve, and an ability to improve, taken together, would be my standard of a statesman. Everything else is vulgar in the conception, perilous in the execution. . . ."[145] That Burke might have gotten his comprehensive view of the complex nature of man and society, and man as not merely serving, but actively participating, in the moral order, that Burke saw the need for both permanence and change, reform and tradition, and might have gotten this view from a reading of the natural law tradition is remotely possible. The possibility that the origins of Burke's thought here are partially the influence of the prominent "sociologists" and moral philosophers of the eighteenth century Scottish Enlightenment is less than remote, in terms of intellectual content, and of physical and temporal proximity.

The refusal of Burke and Ferguson to separate art and nature, coincides with the classicist Goethe's praise of Kant's reconciliation of art and nature of morality and freedom with nature and necessity in the latter's Critique of Judgment (1790). Goethe was similar to Fichte in rejecting Kant's unknowable noumenal thing-in-itself, and Goethe assumed the immanence of the divine within the world, while Kant believed

in the transcendence and immanence of the divine in relation to the world.[146] Goethe also believed, in opposition to Kant's notions, of the possibility of man's knowledge of the immanent in the world. Goethe believed in the possibility of an "intellectual intuition" of transcendent (or rather, immanent) values, of the "inner creative nature" of the knowledge process.[147] Goethe nevertheless declared that he owed to Kant "a most highly joyous era of life"[148] for reconciling art and nature in the Critique of Judgment. For Goethe, it was "'an exceeding great deed . . . that Kant placed art and nature in his Critique of Judgment side by side' so that they could 'illuminate each other'"[149] The "exceeding great deed" of Kant in his 3rd Critique that "occupied Goethe constantly" was that

> . . . 'art and products of nature' are seen here as interrelated. 'A work of art should be treated like a work of nature and a work of nature treated like a work of art, and the value of each should be developed out of itself and subjected to the same power of judgement.'"[150]

In Goethe's view, the judgement seems to perform more of an underwriting or a descriptive function in the outlining of the realm of nature (necessity) and the realm of art (freedom, morality) and their interpenetration, or rather, their fusion with one another. Kant's distinction of the "reflective judgement's a priori regulative concept of the purposiveness of Nature serves as a connecting link between the domain of the concept of Nature on the one hand, and the domain of the concept of freedom on the other."[151] Nature and art remain apart and retain their identities and, the judgement is more than a catalyst or umpire overseeing and describing the connection between the two realms. The judgement constitutes neither nature nor morality,[152] yet is

inherently that part of both which serves to bring them together. The essential agreement among Burke, Ferguson and the eighteenth-century classical tradition as represented by Goethe regarding the "art-vs.-nature" problem, supports Henry V. S. Ogden's view of the age as characterized by such a consensus.

CHAPTER III

NOTES

[1]John Plamenatz, Man and Society. A Critical Examination of
Some Important Social and Political Theories from Machiavelli to Marx,
(London: Longmans, 1963), p. 55.

[2]Ibid., p. 66.   See Appendix D for the similarity between the
Burkean and Kantian approach to a complex reality, and Appendix A, esp.
p. 34.   For the similarity between Burke and Kant and Reid, regarding
the epistemology based upon the complex reality (an epistemology which
assumes in both cases a "complex act of perception"), see Appendix D.

[3]In his "Thoughts on French Affairs" (1791), Burke "pointed
out that the French Revolution was unlike any previous political change
in Europe. He likened it only to the Protestant Reformation, for 'it
is a revolution,' he said, 'of doctrine and theoretic dogma. [Burke
predicted what is called nowadays, the exportation of revolution.]   It
has a much greater resemblance to those changes which have been made
upon religious grounds, in which a spirit of proselytism makes an
essential part,' and its principle is such as 'by its essence could not
be local or confined to the country in which it had its origin.'   Burke,
cited in Perez Zagorin, "Prolegomena to the Comparative History of
Revolution in Early Modern Europe," Comparative Studies in Society and
History, Vol. 18, No. 2 (April, 1976), 155. See also, (Burke), Writings
and Speeches of Edmund Burke, Beaconsfield Edition (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1901), IV, pp. 3-55.   In his second "Letter on a
Regicide Peace" (1795/96), Burke wrote of the French Directory: "What
now stands as government in France is struck out as a beast. The design
is wicked, immoral, impious, oppressive; but it is spirited and daring
. . ." [emphasis added]. (Burke), ibid., V, p. 375. Gerald Chapman
wrote: "Burke was probably the first man in history ever to grasp,
certainly the first to give cogent expression to, the idea of revolu-
tionary liberalism as a cultus (a view commonly recognized since)."
Gerald W. Chapman, Edmund Burke. The Practical Imagination (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 227. It is not unlikely
that Burke's view of the French Revolution as reflective of certain
constant springs in human nature itself, and the Revolution as a prel-
ude to a broader development in the history of human society--that
Burke's views here were influenced to an extent by his readings of the
Scottish "sociological historians" and social scientists. (See p. 25,
Chap. III).

[4]For the "Vindication," see Works. Burke elsewhere wrote of
Bolingbroke as "a presumptuous and superficial writer." Writing and
Speeches (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1901), III, p. 398. On
the "vindication" as irony, see: Murray N. Rothbard, "A Note on Burke's

'Vindication of Natural Society,'" Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (January, 1958), pp. 114-118, and John C. Weston, Jr., "The Ironic Purpose of Burke's 'Vindication' Vindicated," Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. XIX, No. 3 (June, 1958), pp. 435-441.

[5]Peter J. Stanlis, ed., intro., Edmund Burke: Selected writings & Speeches (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1968, 1963), pp. 40-43.

[6]Idem.

[7]Idem.

[8]Idem.

[9](Burke) Writings & Speeches (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1901), I, p. 5.

[10]Ibid., p. 6.

[11]Ibid., I, pp. 5-6. David Cameron recently wrote: ". . . The evidence suggests that Edmund Burke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau as well, were attacking the apparently imperial ambitions of the rational faculty, and not reason's busy activity within what they regarded as its proper province." David Cameron, The Social Thought of Rousseau and Burke. A Comparative Study, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), p. 37.

[12]Ibid., p. 5. One is put in mind of Augustine Birrell's characterization of the "Via Media" of Anglicanism as "after all . . . a blind alley, leading nowhere." The Via Media represented for Birrell a credulous creed of compromise. This is in contradistinction to Cardinal Newman's ratiocination which "is the great principle of order in thinking: it reduces a chaos into harmony, it catalogues the accumulations of knowledge." Augustine Birrell, "The Via Media," in Birrell, Obiter Dicta, First Series (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894), pp. 178-199, p. 179). "Though it does not go so far as to ascertain truth; still, it teaches us the direction in which truth lies, and how propositions lie towards each other." (Ibid., pp. 179-180.) According to at least one author (Giorgio Tonelli), this is explicitly the method of Kant's philosophy and the thought of the Enlightenment in general. See Giorgio Tonelli, "The 'Weakness' of Reason in the Age of Enlightenment," Diderot Studies, Vol. XIV (1971), pp. 217-232. But the "Englishman's creed is compromise" and "looks for safety in our opinions," opinions which do not demand logic, or, in Burke's words, "solid and conclusive arguments," but which, on the contrary, are the "paradoxical opinions" supported by the "common auditory." Birrell echoed Burke when the former wrote: "But talk as we may, for the bulk of mankind it will always remain true that a truth does not exclude its contradictory . . . the too apparent absurdity of this is pressed home when the baffled illogician, persecuted in one position, flees into another . . . (Ibid., p. 181), and selects his next opinion "in the same fashion as ladies are reported, I dare say quite falsely, to do their afternoon shopping--this thing because

it is so pretty and that thing because it is so cheap"(Ibid., p. 191).
Burke thought Bolingbroke's rationalism too cheap and the nature-worship
of Hobbes (a malevolent nature) and Rousseau (a benevolent nature) too
pretty and simple to account for the complex and heterogeneous nature
of man.

It was the thesis of Donald Greene's 1971 essay on the Via Media
of eighteenth-century Anglicanism, that this form of Christianity "is to
be taken seriously as a highly important force in the social and intellec-
tual history of England in the eighteenth century" (Donald Greene, "The
Via Media in an Age of Revolution: Anglicanism in the 18th Century," in
The Varied Pattern: Studies in the 18th Century, Eds., Peter Hughes and
David Williams, [Toronto: A. M. Hakkert, Ltd., 1971], pp. 301-302).
Greene noted that latitudinarianism within the Anglican Church was a sign
of strength, not of weakness, of the faith. But Victorian historians who
played the "baffled illogicians" gave a doctrinal significance to the
terms, "latitudinarian," when in fact the term has not, and did not have
in the eighteenth century, any such significance (Ibid., p. 312). Such
historians used until recently such an interpretation of eighteenth-
century Anglican latitudinarianism in order to support their subjective/
negative views of the general laxity--doctrinal and personal--or the
"worldliness" and "venality of eighteenth-century [Anglican] prelates"
(Ibid., p. 303). Some historians have seen Anglican divines flirting with
the traditionally supposed English heresy, Pelagianism, when the latter
supposedly "reject the Augustinian doctrine of original sin, as stated in
Article IX of the Anglican church (Ibid., p. 311). "From a rejection of
Article IX follows [in the latter-day historians' minds] a rejection of
Articles XI to XIV, which state the doctrine of justification by faith
alone and deny the doctrine of justification by works" (Ibid., p. 312).
But, more to the point here, latitudinarianism was supposed by one of the
historians who "disturbed" Greene, Ronald Cranes, to have been the impetus
of "the popular triumph of 'sentimentalism' toward 1750." Sentimentalism
stemmed from, in Crane's view, "'the combined influence of numerous
Anglican divines of the Latitudinarian tradition, who from the Restoration
onward into the eighteenth century had preached . . . essentially the
same ethics of benevolence, good nature. . . (Ibid., p. 310). Greene
then pointed to the resemblance between this supposed representative
Anglican latitudinarian thought to the thought of Shaftesbury, but citing,
on the way, the "sturdy Anglican Samuel Johnson's scathing comment on the
Shafteburian philosopher" in Johnson's Rasselas (Ibid., p. 311). Johnson
then, and the poet W. H. Auden in this century, are more representative of
Anglican doctrine as preached and practiced in the eighteenth century.
These are those Anglicans who could be latitudinarians, but turn away from
the vague, confused and lazy naturalism of the Shafteburian philosophy.
Greene cited Auden's lines: "'You shall love your crooked neighbor/With
your crooked heart'" as parallel to the "orthodox Anglican attitude,
throughout the century, as earlier in Donne and Herbert" (Ibid., p. 312).
Only the Shaftesburian would be pleased at the alteration of Auden's
lines: "The moment you alter it to 'You should love your crooked neighbor
with your intrinsically pretty admirable and meritorious heart,' you are
in a different and highly dangerous world, as not only every Anglican
clergyman, but every intelligent Anglican layman of the (eighteenth)
century brought up on the Book of Common Prayer, was well aware" (Idem).

This shared culture of the eighteenth-century English did not assume a pretty and simple or "admirable and meritorious" human nature. Rather, it could live comfortably with the realization that, in Birrell's words, "a truth does not exclude its contradictory"; they keep to a latitudinarian faith without succumbing to the self-sufficiency or self-absorption of the Pelagian heresy, or that heresy's variant, the Shaftesburian ethic and view of a simple benevolent human nature and moral order (or rather moral confusion). See infra., Chapter IV, p. 96 et passim, for Burke's strictures against the Shaftesburian philosophy.

[13]It is perhaps not too far-fetched to say that Burke's animus here toward Bolingbroke's confusion of art and nature, reflects Burke's attacks upon that ethical confusion between virtue and vice which Burke found in Rousseau (see infra, Chapter IV, p.102 et passim). Further, Burke's 1769 pamphlet defending the Rockingham Whigs, his "Observations on 'The Present State of the Nation,'" represents an attack on that political confusion which characterized Bolingbroke's thoughts on parties. Issac Kramnick wrote of the views of the sceptic, Sir William Temple, who equated party with devisive factionalism. Kramnick wrote: "'Nothing besides the uniting of parties upon one common bottom can save a state in a pempestuous season.' Temple is much closer here to what would be Bolingbroke's attack on parties [Bolingbroke's famous "Patriot King"] than he is to Burke's defense." Issac Kramnick, Skepticism in English Political Thought: From Temple to Burke," Studies in Burke and His Time, Vol. XII, No. 1 (Whole No. 39) (Fall, 1970), pp. 1649-1650. For a general historical background, see Henry V. S. Ogden, "The Rejection of the Antithesis of Nature and Art in English Political Writings, 1760-1800," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1936.

[14][Burke], Review of Essay on the History of Civil Society, by Adam Ferguson in The Annual Register . . . For the Year 1767, 4th Edition, (London: J. Dodsley, 1784), pp. 307-316.

[15]See Gladys Bryson, Man and Society. The Scottish Inquiry of the Eighteenth Century, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945).
For Ferguson, see: John Small, "Biographical Sketch of Adam Ferguson," Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, Vol. XXIII (1864), pp. 599-665. See Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The Scottish Enlightenment," Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (Transactions of the Second international congress on the Enlightenment IV), Vol. LVIII (1967), 1635-1658. Trevor-Roper referred to the particular "social character" of Scottish thought in the later eighteenth century (Ibid., p. 1640), of the figures of Hume, Ferguson, Adam Smith, Francis Hutcheson, William Robertson, John Millar, among others, who were all "so preoccupied with the problem of social change" (idem) and "of the new science of sociology, that peculiar contribution of the Scottish Englightenment. . . ." (Ibid., pp. 1655-1656.)
Some of the recent work on the Scottish sociologists and historians of the Scottish Enlightenment includes the following: Roy Pascal, "Property and Society: The Scottish Historical School of the Eighteenth Century," The Modern Quarterly, Vol. I (1938), pp. 167-179; R. L. Meek, "The Scottish Contribution to Marxist Sociology," in Economics and Ideology (London: 1967),

pp. 34-50; A. C. Macfie, The Individual in Society: Papers on Adam Smith (London: 1967); Duncan Forbes, "'Scientific Whiggism': Adam Smith and John Millar," Cambridge Journal, Vol. VII (1953-1954), pp. 643-670; William C. Lehmann, Adam Ferguson and the Beginnings of Modern Sociology, (N.Y.: 1930), and by the same author: John Millar of Glasgow, 1735-1801, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), espec. Chapter X "Eighteenth-Century Scottish Thought," and also by Lehmann, Henry Homes, Lord Kames, and the Scottish Enlightenment: A Study in National Character and in the History of Ideas, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971).

   See also: Andrew Skinner, "Economics and History--The Scottish Enlightenment," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. XII (1965), 1-22, and Skinner, "Natural History in the Age of Adam Smith," Political Studies, Vol. XV (1967), 32-48, and Lastly, Skinner's Introduction to Parts I-III of Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations (London: Penguin Classics, 1970); Hugh Trevor-Roper's article, "The Scottish Enlightenment," Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, Vol. LVII (1967), 1635-1658, and Trevor-Roper's book, Religions, the Reformation and Social Change, and Other Essays (London: 1970), pp. 231-232. Also see Peter Gay, The Enlightenment. An Interpretation, Vol. II, The Science of Freedom (N.Y: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), Chapter 7, "The Science of Society"; T. C. Smout, A History of the Scottish People 1560-1830 (N.Y.: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), espec. chapter XIX, "The Golden Age of Scottish Culture," pp. 480-517.

   See also: Louis Schneider, The Scottish Moralists on Human Nature and Society, "The Heritage of Sociology" series, edited by Morris Janowitz, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

   [16] Annual Register (1767), p. 308.

   [17] Idem.

   [18] Idem. Burke's favorable review of Ferguson occurred (1767) in the latter's more "liberal" early period. Caroline Robbins wrote that Ferguson's ". . . continued emphasis on inequalities or rank and his strictures upon slavery have led to a sometimes exaggerated estimate of his liberalism. He modified his views as he grew older. The Institutes (1769), first product of his Edinburgh classroom, laid much more stress on the equality of man than his later Principles, published in 1792 after his retirement." Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman. . . . (N.Y.: Atheneum, 1968 [1959]), p. 199.

   [19] Idem.

   [20] A. P. d'Entrèves, Natural Law. An Historical Survey, (New York, N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1965 [1951]), p. 116.

   [21] David Kettler, "The Political Vision of Adam Ferguson," Studies in Burke and His Time, Vol. IX, No. 1, Whole No. 30 (Fall, 1967), p. 775.

   [22] [Burke], Annual Register . . . for the Year 1767, 4th Edition, (London: J. Dodsley, 1784), p. 311.

[23]Robbins wrote that Ferguson in his Essay on Civil Society (1767), on the one hand "believed in an evolution, was a philosopher of gradualness and disclaimed any credence in the accomplishments of single lawgivers like Numa or Lycurgus. Frequent and drastic changes were undesirable." Robbins, op. cit., p. 200. Nevertheless, Ferguson "was by no means pessimistic about the result of the efforts of gifted and industrious individuals to improve their fortunes and the laws and policies of the state under which they lived." Idem.

[24]See Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1901), XI, 69.

[25]Douglass Adair, "'That Politics May be Reduced to a Science': David Hume, James Madison and the Tenth 'Federalist,'" The Huntington Library Quarterly, Vol. XX, no. 4 (August, 1957), p. 344.

[26]Burke wrote in the "Reflections" of the use to which the present generation could put the past in its (the present's) definition of its own liberties. "Always acting as if [emphasis added] in the presence of canonized forefathers, the spirit of freedom, leading in itself to misrule and excess, is tempered with an awful gravity. The idea of a liberal descent inspires with a sense of habitual native dignity, which prevents that upstart insolence almost inevitably adhering to and disgracing those who are the first admirers of any distinction. By this means our liberty becomes a noble freedom." [Burke], "Reflections on the Revolution in France . . . ," Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1901), III, pp. 275-276.

[27]Adair, pp. 343-344.

[28]See Roger L. Emerson, on the "Select society·of Edinburgh," the "Society" whose collective thought and methodology was representative of the Scottish Enlightenment in general; see Appendix C.

[29]Adair, p. 345. See supra, n. 15.

[30]Ibid., pp. 345-346.

[31]Hiroshi Mizuta, "Towards a definition of the Scottish Enlightenment," Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (Transactions of the Fourth international congress on the Enlightenment, IV), Vol. CLIV (1976) p. 1461.

[32]Ibid., p. 1460.

[33]Idem.

[34]Sir Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, (N.Y.: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1927 [1876, Smith, Elder & Co., London]), Vol. II, p. 32.

[35]Philip Pinkus, "Mandeville's paradox," Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (Transactions of the Fourth international congress on the Enlightenment, IV), Vol. CLIV (1976), p. 1635; see also: for the most recent historiography on Mandeville in regard to the private-vice-public-virtue controversy: H. T. Dickinson, "Bernard Mandeville: an independent Whig," Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (Transactions of the Fourth international congress on the Enlightenment, II), Vol. CLII (1976), pp. 559-570, and Bernhard Fabian, "The Reception of Bernard Mandeville in eighteenth-century Germany," ibid., pp. 693-723.

[36]M. M. Goldsmith, "Public Virtues and Private Vices," Eighteenth-Century Studies, Vol. 9, no. 4 (Summer, 1976), p. 510. For the most recent historiographical studies on the Mandeville problem, see Malcolm Jack, "Progress and Corruption in the Eighteenth Century. Mandeville's 'Private Vices, Public Benefits,'" Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. XXXVII, No. 2 (April-June, 1976), pp. 369-376.

[37]Hiroshi Mizuta, ibid., p. 1461.

[38]See Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1901), II, pp. 268-269; IV, pp. 22-23. Burke's use of prudence as a social virtue here, (as distinguished from the notion of prudence as a narrow calculation of self-interest and expediency) coincides with W. D. Falk's recent description of the common eighteenth-century use of the term, prudence. Falk wrote: "Prudence in [Bishop Joseph] Butler's time, as throughout the ancient world, was not yet the cheap commodity which it is with us; and the price of virtue varies with the market." W. D. Falk, "Prudence, Temperance, and Courage," in Moral Concepts, ed. Joel Feinberg, (London: Oxford University Press, 1970 [1969]), p. 115. In the eighteenth century, the price, or notion, of prudence as a social virtue was high, or high-minded.

[39]Burke, Review of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, by Adam Smith in The Annual Register . . . for 1759 (London: R. and J. Dodsley, 1760), p. 485.

[40]Harry C. Payne, "Pauvreté, misère, and the aims of enlightened economics," Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (Transactions of the Fourth international congress on the Enlightenment, IV), Vol. CLIV, (1976), p. 1583.

[41]Burke, ibid., p. 489.

[42]See also Burke's special notion of the social contract, that is, the contract between the living, the dead, and the yet to be born, in the "Reflections." See Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1901), III, pp. 359-360.

[43]Burke, Correspondence, (Cambridge, England & Chicago, Illinois: 1958), I, p. 129.

[44]Idem.

[45]Louis Schneider, The Scottish Moralists on Human Nature and Society, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

[46]Ibid., Chapter II, pp. 39-65.

[47]Ibid., Chapter IV, pp. 99-119.

[48]Ibid., p. xxii.

[49]Ibid., p. xxx.

[50]Ibid., pp. xxxi-xxxii.

[51]Ibid., p. xlvi.

[52]J. G. A. Pocock, "Burke and the Ancient Constitution--A Problem in the History of Ideas," The Historical Journal, Vol. III, No. 2 (1960), pp. 125-143.

[53]Schneider, p. xlvi.

[54]Sir James MacIntosh, "Vindiciae Gallicae. A Defense of the French Revolution and Its English Admirers, against the Accusations of the Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke . . . ," The Miscellaneous Works of the Rt. Hon. Sir James MacIntosh, 3 vols. in one, (Boston: Phillips, Simpson and Co., 1856), pp. 404-457.

[55]Peter Stanlis wrote that Ross J. S. Hoffman, in the latter's preface to the 1948 anthology of Burke's writings (Burke's Politics) was the first to question the nineteenth-century positivist/utilitarian/pragmatist view of Burke. According to Stanlis, these interpretations of Burke were put forward by the following writers throughout the 150 years following Burke's death: the Victorian liberals, Henry Buckle, John Morley, Lord Acton, and, "with some slight variations," by W. E. H. Lecky, and by the militant agnostic, Sir Leslie Stephen, and, in more recent times, by Charles E. Vaughn, John MacCunn, Elie Halevy, Lois Whitney, Henry V. S. Ogden, John Herman Randall, Annie M. Osborn, John A. Lester, Richard M. Weaver, Georges Gurvitch, Oscar Handlin, George Sabine, etc. See Stanlis, Edmund Burke and the Natural Law (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1965 [1958]), Chapter Three, "Burke and the Natural Law," Part I, "Burke's Supposed Utilitarianism," pp. 29-34.

[56]Schneider, p. xxiii. See also, J. B. Black, The Art of History. A Study of Four Great Historians of the Eighteenth Century, (London: Methuen & Co., 1926).

[57]See J.G.A. Pocock, "Burke and the Ancient Constitution--A Problem in the History of Ideas," The Historical Journal, Vol. III, No. 2 (1960), pp. 125-143, and Paul Lucas, "On Edmund Burke's Doctrine of Prescription; Or, An Appeal from the New to the Old Lawyers," The Historical Journal, Vol. XI, No. 1 (1968), pp. 35-63.

[58]Francis Canavan, S.J., "Burke on Prescription of Government," The Review of Politics, Vol. 35, No. 4 (October, 1973), pp. 454-474.

[59]Paul Lucas, ibid., p. 62.

[60]Lucas was here repeating the earlier view of Burke's prescription by Elie Halevy nearly half a century before. Halevy seemed to be saying that Burke's science or philosophy of empiricism was not totally alien to the "philosophic radicalism" of Benthamite utilitarianism, and, one might say, built upon the same empiricist base (if not carried to the same conclusions) as the later, nineteenth- and twentieth-century positivism and radical empiricism. Halevy wrote in 1928:

". . .Burke's political philosophy is an empiricism, a philosophy of experience: the duration whether of an idea or of an institution, its mere persistence through time, is a presumption in favour of that idea or of that institution. The theory of prejudice [which, translated into its "juridicial form," "becomes the theory of prescription"] is this: between an ancient opinion which has not been shaken by long experience, through a series of generations, and a new idea, born in the brain of a solitary thinker, the presumption is in favour of the ancient idea or prejudice. The theory of prescription is as follows: between an ancient right sanctified by a prescription which has endured for an age and perhaps for many ages, and a new right based on supposedly rational principles, the presumtion is in favour of the ancient right which claims its origin from prescription, that is to say from experience." (Elie Halevy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, Translated by Mary Morris, Preface by A. D. Lindsay. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1966 [1955; 1928], pp. 162-164. For Burke as historicist, see also: Reinhold Aris, History of Political Thought in Germany. From 1789 to 1815, Forward by G. P. Gooch, London, Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1965, pp. 257; 260-262.)

In Kantian language, Halevy's Burke may be said to have held to the justification of an a fortiori systematization of experience, as distinguished from the Kantian systematization of experience (of the Critique of Pure Reason) and the further shaping of that substantial phenomenal realm according to the moral categorical imperatives of the second Critique.

[61]Ibid., p. 58.

[62]Idem.

[63]Ibid., p. 59.

[64]Idem.

[65]Ibid., p. 40.

[66]Ibid., p. 62.

[67]Ibid., pp. 41-46.

[68]Ibid., pp. 36-37.

[69]Ibid., p. 62.

[70]Canavan, Ibid., p. 461.

[71]Ibid., p. 461.

[72]Ibid., p. 462.

[73]See infra, p. 29.

[74]Canavan, ibid., p. 461.

[75]Ibid., pp. 468-470.

[76]Ibid., p. 472.

[77]Ibid., p. 473.

[78]Lucas, ibid., p. 59.

[79]J.G.A. Pocock, "Time, Institutions and Action; an essay on traditions and their understanding," in Preston King and B. C. Parekh, eds., Politics and Experience: Essays Presented to Michael Oakeshott, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 235.

[80]Pocock, ibid., p. 129. "Its tradition is authorised . . . by the knowledge, or the assumption, of previous performance . . . such a tradition is without a conceivable beginning; each performance presupposed a previous performance, in infinite regress." Pocock, idem.

[81]Pocock, "Burke and the Ancient Constitution," ibid., p. 129.

[82]Pocock, in Politics and Experience, p. 212.

[83]Idem.

[84]Ibid., p. 220.

[85]Idem. See also: Pocock, "Burke and Ancient Constitution," ibid., pp. 129-130.

[86]Ibid., p. 235; Pocock elsewhere explained this methodology in terms of eighteenth-century British political alignment. ". . . if we may look on the constitutional debate of eighteenth-century England as a dialogue between a Country interpretation which blended Machiavelli and Harrington [the return to original principles--see Pocock, in Politics and Experience, p. 220], and a Court interpretation addicted to historical criticism and de facto empiricism, then it is strange to see, standing at the end of the spectrum, that figure of many complexities, Edmund Burke. For Burke was neither Court nor Country. . . ." J.G.A. Pocock, "Machiavelli, Harrington, and English Political Ideologies in the Eighteenth Century," The William and Mary Quarterly, (Third Series), Vol. XXII, No.4 (October, 1965), p. 580.

[87]Pocock, "Burke and the Ancient Constitution," ibid., p. 131.

[88]Idem.

[89]Ibid., p. 138.

[90]Ibid., p. 134.

[91]Ibid., p. 135.

[92]Idem.

[93]Idem.

[94]Idem.

[95]Ibid., p. 136.

[96]Ibid., p. 139.

[97]See Paul Hazard, European Thought in the Eighteenth Century. From Montesquieu to Lessing, (Cleveland and N.Y.: Meridian Books, The World Publishing Co., 1967 [1946]), pp. 285 et passim.

[98]Robert C. Elliott, "The Costs of utopia," Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (Transactions of the Fourth international congress on the Enlightenment, II), Vol. CLII (1976), p. 679; for Ferguson, see also Rene Wellek, "The Price of Progress in eighteenth-century reflections on literature," Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (Transactions of the Fourth international congress on the Enlightenment, V), Vol. CLV (1976), p. 2277. Wellek equated the tolerance and understanding of Ferguson and other literary critics and belle-lettrists as preparing the way for the more systematic historicism of the nineteenth century, which sought to justify everything simply because it was and/or it had, happened. Ferguson's careful balancing of the gains and losses in the advance to civilization is reminiscent of Cassirer's discussion of "Life" and "Spirit" and the "holding back of Life at certain points" in order to give Life form--see Appendix D.

[99]Idem.

[100]Ibid., p. 685.

[101]Ibid., p. 683.

[102]Ibid., p. 684.

[103]Idem.

[104]Ibid., p. 685.

[105]Idem.

[106]Ibid., p. 687.

[107]Kingman Brewster, Jr., "The Decade of Short Cuts," in the New York Times, October 5, 1972, p. 29.

[108]Lewis Mumford, Findings and Keepings: Analects for an Autobiography (1921), cited as Mumford, "The Collapse of Tomorrow," in the New York Times, October 18, 1975, p. 29.

[109]Peter R. Pouncey, "Keeping the Past at Arm's Length, But Seeing Its Worth," in the New York Times, November 29, 1975, p. 27.

[110]Roy Harvey Pearce, "The Eighteenth-Century Scottish Primitivists: Some Reconsiderations," ELH. A Journal of English Literary History, Vol. XII, No. 3 (September, 1945), pp. 203-220. Espec. p. 203.

[111]Ibid., p. 204.

[112]Peter Pouncey, loc. cit.

"Looking back at the achievement of the Scottish Enlightenment, Dugald Stewart emphasized its special interest in what he called 'Theoretical or Conjectural History,' meaning by that term an attempt 'to account from the changes in the condition of mankind which take place in the different stages of their progress [emphasis added], for the corresponding alterations which their institutions undergo.' Stewart held that the attempt was first made by Montesquieu, who readily found successors in Scotland. . . ." (Ian Simpson Ross, Lord Kames and the Scotland of His Day, [N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1972], p. 203.)
See also Donald Foerster, "Mid-Eighteenth Century Scotch Criticism of Homer [Homer as representing the primitive]," Studies in Philology, Vol. XL (1943), pp. 425-446, and by the same author, "Scottish Primitivism and the Historical Appeal," Philological Quarterly, Vol. XXIX (1950), pp. 307-323; Friedrich Engel-Janosi, "Bemarkungen Über Hypothetische Geshiehtschreibung (Remarks about conjectural history). Mitteilungen des Osterreichischen Staatsarchivs (Austria), Vol. XXV (1972), pp. 528-538; Ian Simpson Ross, op cit., pointed to Lord Kames' Historical Law-Tracts (1758) and Hume's History of England as prominent eighteenth-century "conjectural histories." Part of Hume's "acute historical analysis" are intended "to explode various fictions about the ancient [Saxon] freedoms of the English and the nature of their institutions" (Ian Ross, ibid., p. 188), that is, to explode the myth of an ideal, primitive Saxon state from the heights of which modern civilization has supposedly fallen. See Ross, ibid., Chapter 11, "A Mixture of Wormwood and Aloes: Historical Law-Tracts" (1758) for Kames as a conjectural (philosophical) historian, and also William Lehmann, Henry Home, Lord Kames and the Scottish Enlightenment, Chapter XII, "Through the Eyes of Clio: The Historical Approach," pp. 177-194. See also: Louis Schneider's The Scottish Moralists on Human Nature and Society, (Chicago: 1967), p. xxxvi, regarding Hume's strictures against the ahistorical myth of a constitution based on an idealized Saxon freedom undermined by the Norman Conquest.

[113]Whitney had had a one-sided view of Burke's thought as strictly of the positivist/utilitarian/empirical brand; see Chapter III, p. 21, ft. 54.

[114]Roy Harvey Pearce, loc. cit.

[115]Ibid., pp. 204-214.

[116]Ibid., pp. 217-218.

[117]For Adam Smith, see Hiroshi Mizuta, op cit., pp. 1462-1464.

[118]Pearce, ibid., p. 219.

[119]Ibid., p. 205.

[120]See Louis Schneider, "Tension in the Thought of John Millar," Studies in Burke and His Time, Vol. XIII, No. 2 (Winter, 1971/72), pp. 2088-2098.

[121]Ibid., p. 2086.

[122]Idem.

[123]See (Burke), Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1901), X, p. 69.

[124]Burke, "Heads for Consideration on the Present State of Affairs" (November, 1792), in Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1901), IV, p. 401.

[125]Burke, "Three Letters addressed to a Member of the Present Parliament on the Proposals for Peace with the Regicide Directory of France" (1796/1797), Letter I, "On the Overtures of Peace," in Burke, Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1901), V, pp. 235-242.

[126]Given Burke's famous predictions of the course of the French Revolution (see supra., p.19), it could be said here that while accident is itself inherently unpredictable, nevertheless, once given the "accident" (the French Revolution), that accident, now outside history and outside the "concrete, complex and moral" world of which history is a part, forfeits its talismanic charms of unpredictability, and becomes quite predictable in the eyes of the "sociological historian" or of the moderate social scientist.

[127]For Burke's application of this rule to historical studies, see infra., Chapter IV, p. 78.

[128]Burke, "Letter to a Noble Lord" (1796), Writings & Speeches of Edmund Burke (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1901), V, p. 186. Burke's strictures against change here parallel those disagreeing with Heisenberg's "principle of indeterminancy" and with the epistemological/ historiographical assumptions of "indeterminancy." See infra., Chapter V. Further, Burke's negative view of reform in respect to it altering of the "substance of the objects themselves" is a view coinciding with what Lewis White Beck called Kant's "natural piety," in which "knower and known [are to be considered as] facts not to be compromised. Lewis White Beck, "Kant's Theoretical and Practical Philosophy" in Beck, ed., Studies in the Philosophy of Kant (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965). See Appendix B.

[129](Burke), Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1901), III, p. 274.

[130]Idem.

[131]David K. Weiser, "The Imagery of Burke's 'Reflections,'" Studies in Burke and His Time, Vo. XVI, No. 3 (Whole no. 53) (Spring, 1975), p. 220; see also Appendix D.

[132](Burke) Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1901), III, p. 275.

[133](Burke), Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1901), III, p. 310.

[134]Pamela Kaufmann, "Burke, Freud and the Gothic," Studies in Burke and His Time, Vol. XIII, No. 3 (Whole no. 44) (Spring, 1972), pp. 2179-2192.

[135]Ralph L. Ketchum, "James Madison and the Nature of Man," Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (January, 1958), pp. 62-76.

[136]See Francis P. Canavan, The Political Reason of Edmund Burke, (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1960), pp. 116-117.

[137]Kaufmann, ibid., p. 2188.

[138]See supra, Chapter III, p.

[139]Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 2190.

[140]Ibid., p. 2191.

[141]Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1967).

[142]Stanley N. Katz, "The Origins of American Constitutional Thought," in Perspectives in American History, Vol. III (1969), p. 487.

[143]David Kettler, op. cit., p. 776.

[144]Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, 7th Edition (Boston: Hastings, Etheridge & Bliss, 1809) pp. 10-11.

[145](Burke), Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1901), III, p. 440.

[146]Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen, "Kant and Goethe," in Proceedings of the 3rd International Kant Congress, ed., Lewis White Beck (Dordrecht, Holland: 1970), p. 477. See also: John R. Silber, "Kant's Conception of the Highest Good as Immanent and Transcendent," The Philosophical Review, Vol. LXVII (1959), pp. 469-492.

[147]Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen, op. cit., p. 473.

[148]Ibid., p. 472.

[149]Ibid., p. 471.

[150]Ibid., p. 473.

[151]Frederick Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy, Vol. 6, Modern Philosophy, Part II, Kant (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, A Division of Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1964), p. 147.

[152]Idem.

CHAPTER IV

THE KINSHIP BETWEEN SCOTTISH, BURKEAN AND KANTIAN

THEORIES OF (HISTORICAL) REALITY

Andrew Skinner neatly correlated Burke's explicit awareness
of the Scottish thinkers of his day, those Scots' historians' (Robert-
son, Adam Ferguson, Lord Kames, John Millar, Adam Smith, Hume, Dugald
Stewart, and Sir James Steuart) balanced analytic/historical (organic)
approach to their subject matter. Such assumptions or methodology
reflected their belief in the constant springs of a human nature play-
ing upon an ever-changing environment. It also mirrored the open door
such a methodology and such assumptions afforded of creating the possi-
bility of the prediction of events. The Historians (Skinner's name
for the Scottish school of historians in the eighteenth century) were
to Skinner, more of an experiential rather than of a crude empirical
cast, that is, they used or shaped the given facts of history to reveal
"principles and causes" without detracting from either the reality of
the facts themselves or from the principles and causes after which the
Historians sought to reveal. Nevertheless, the facts of the empirical/
historical world are used as tools by the reason of the Historians in
order to draw out the principles. This is, of course, the experiential
methodology of Kant also, and as described by Peter Gay:

> [To Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason] . . . intelligence is an
> active force in the world. Reason, he wrote, with its principles
> in one hand, and experiment in the other, approaches nature to
> learn from it, but not in the passive attitude of the pupil; rather,
> it acts like a judge who 'compells the witnesses to answer questions
> which he himself has formulated'.[1]

Thomas Reid opposed the empiricist idea of "representative perception" or the notion that we passively receive sense-based impressions on the brain and then "perceive" the "ideas" that these impressions had made on the brain. Reid thought that such an assumption of the direct influence of the body on the mind detracted from the complex unique-ness of the mind and its operations,[2] and, to the point here, involved an unacceptable passivity of the mind. S. S. Grave described Reid's views on this point:

> 'We know nothing whatever about the nature of the connexion between body and mind, and any ways of speaking that mask this ignorance have to be repudiated.' In particular, Reid will not have 'impressions' made upon the mind. There is no neutrality in this word as a philosopher's word. It is dangerous long before it acquires the formidable powers it has in Hume's vocabulary. Impressions are made on wax and things like wax, and what Reid is resisting is the suggestion that the mind is in any way a thing like wax [both in its passiveness and its simplicity]. . . .[3]

The Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth's reaction to Hobbes was compared by A. O. Lovejoy to Kant's reaction to Hume (and F. Copleston compared to Reid's reaction to Hume with Kant's reaction[4]). Cudworth expressed identical views to those of Reid on the primacy, not the passivity, of the mind vis-a-vis the body and the phenomenal world. Cudworth made the point that the mind or thought in man is "not dependent on body." This initial point of Cudworth's is roughly analogous to what S. A. Grave called the "metaphysical committment of common sense,"[5] the a priori element of common sense which allows for the possibility of an extra-empirical intermediate knowledge of data removed in time and place from the perceiving subject (see Appendix D). Cudworth's criticism of Hobbes' theory of knowledge stands on the mind's awareness of "seemings"

apart from the immediate perceptions or "premises of perception" which can in fact be "analyzed into motions in matter, but which can not explain our awareness of those motions."[6] Cudworth does not deny that "Every seeming may have behind it a 'certain configuration of material particles.'"[7] Cudworth maintains a theory of realism, that the objects of perception are real--but he does say that "only in a certain setting--namely, in a conscious being--do these configurations generate 'seemings.'"[8] Cudworth wrote against what Hobbes

> ' . . . hath publicly [said]' . . . that 'mind is nothing but local motion in the organic parts of man's body.' Cudworth went on to write that this argument did not account for 'the consciousness of it' . . . 'if there were any other action besides local motion admitted, there must needs be some substance acknowledged besides body.' Cudworth developes his theory into a denial of the passivity of the mind in the act of perception and an assertion of our freedom in Volition. . . . Human knowledge . . . 'is not a mere passion from sensible things' [and not] merely the inevitable response of one group of particles to a stimulus from another group. . . .[9]

Specifically, Cudworth's notion of "seemings" resembles Reid's notion of "suggestion" in regard to the latter's theories of the nature of perception. To understand Reid's notion of "suggestion," one must be aware of the three-fold distinction which Reid made in his common-sense notion of perception. The three divisions of perception for Reid were: "(1) 'sensation,' (2) 'original perception,' and (3) 'unacquired perception.'" P. G. Winch cited Reid's On the Intellectual Powers of Man (1783) on the three divisions: " . . . 'Sensation. An act of the mind, which hath no object distinct from the act itself. . . .'" In the earlier Inquiry into the Mind on the Principles of Common Sense (1764), Reid had written:

> 'Original Perception. Our perceptions are of two kinds: some are natural and original; others acquired and the fruit of experience. When I perceive that this is the taste of cyder, that of brandy;

that this is the smell of an apple, that of an orange; that this
is the noise of thunder, that the ringing of bells; this the sound
of a coach passing, that the voice of such [and such] a friend:
these perceptions and others of the same kind are not original--
they are acquired. But the perception which I have by touch, of
the hardness, or softness of bodies, of their extension, figure
and motion, is not acquired--it is original [emphases added].'
Having made this distinction, Reid's task is to account for the
relation which holds between these three 'ingredients' of percep-
tion, and for this purpose the notion of 'suggestion' is invoked.
. . . [The use,] which is most characteristic of Reid's theory
[is that which serves] . . . to describe the relation between
'sensation and original perception.'[10]

In the same general manner by which Cudworth's "seemings" in the active

human intellect take into account both the empirical and the extra-

empirical factors in the act of perception, Reid believes his notion of

"suggestion" is an "original perception"[11] or as "'an original principle

of human nature,'"[12] and not an acquired perception.[13] Given this

assumption, together with Reid's view that his divisions of perceptions

should be ". . . understood as referring to real entities in the observ-

able world, and not merely to logical differences between different

types of linguistic expression,"[14] that "we are concerned to find out

what is objectively the case in the world outside us,"[15] the function of

"suggestion" serves as a bridge, so to speak, between the sensational

and the extra-empirical ("suggestion" as an "original perception") realms

becomes evident.[16]

Further, as Cudworth denied the passivity of the mind in his

two-fold theory of a heterogeneous perception, Reid could likewise

claim (although Winch thought, wrongheadedly,) that he had discerned

by "'accurate attention and reflection' to the operations of his own

mind. . . ."[17] Winch admitted that a "legitimate" use of the word

"suggest," a use which Reid (merely) believed to be applied to the

word (but such a belief by Reid is all that this present study is
concerned with) causes us to "conclude that nothing is either
entailed or excluded regarding the occurance of conscious reflection"
[emphasis added].[18] Copleston is more explicit on this point of the
role of the active intellect in the act of perception and knowledge in
general. Copleston wrote that Reid's "'first principles of contingent
truths'" demonstrated the mind's control over our actions and our will.

> That we have some degree of power over our actions and over
> the determinations of our will, and that there is life and
> intelligence in our fellowmen with whom we converse, are also
> among the first principles mentioned by Reid.[19]

Cudworth, the Cambridge Platonist, and Reid, the Scottish critical
"Common-Sense" realist, and Kant, the German Critical idealist, all
shared a heterogeneous view of reality and of man's knowledge of that
reality--combining in fact elements of empiricism or realism, and
idealism, and, in the mind, of reason and feeling or sentiment. These
different views of reality and of knowledge, and these assumptions of
the heterogeneous faculties of the mind together call for the active
use of the intellect in order to reconcile the different levels of
reality and the various elements which constitute our combining,
critical knowledge.

The same comprehensive and critical attitude toward the
forming and shaping of the givens of reality without distorting that
reality was represented, in historiographical terms, by the "Scottish
Historians" and, by Burke himself through the latter's favorable
reviews in the "Annual Register," of the works of William Robertson,
the leading light of the historians of the Scottish Enlightenment.

In the Critical Kantian fashion, the Scottish Historians rejected facts as such, or rather rejected "too great a concentration on facts and 'singular events.'" Skinner wrote:

> The approach . . . was analytical as well as historical; they sought principles and causes so that if it is necessary to start from the facts of history [Skinner next cited Robertson's History of Charles V] 'it is not necessary to observe the order of time with a chronological accuracy.' [It was a matter of the active intelligence, or reason, acting on real facts:] . . . The study . . . involved the thoughtful [Skinner's emphasis] consideration of the facts. . . . The Historians attempted to unite the techniques of the philosopher and the philologian in the search for principles and common elements at work at all times and in all places.[20]

Burke's historical thought is of the same critical analytical cast as the thought of the Scots.

Burke's lengthy and favorable review of William Robertson's History of America in the Annual Register for 1777 (pp. 214-234), reflects Burke's admiration in Robertson of the kind of critical thinking described by Skinner. Burke began his review by debunking the "supposed" "golden age" of "the state of simplicity, innocence, and nature, the origin of society and the source of law."[21] But, thanks to Robertson, we now discover that age to have been a Hobbesian state, not one peopled by Rousseau's noble savages.

> . . . it affords only a state of weakness, imperfection, and wretchedness, equally void of innocence, and incapable of happiness. If we find man without property, and feeding on acorns, we also find him a sullen, suspicious, solitary, and unhappy being. . . .[22]

But the discovery and exploration of the New World produced revolutions in "the affairs of both the hemispheres[23]--changed the face of Nature" in the New World and, on the whole, "has caused a wonderful change in the manners, habits, modes of life, and state of policy" of the

European states.[24] Just as Burke applauds man for having shaped

nature and the course of his own history, Burke celebrates also the

active role of the historian (Robertson) himself in shaping the

subject matter of history and not allowing such a vast panorama of

the story of the cultivation of a new continent to overwhelm his

critical faculties. Burke wrote:

> It required the ability of a great master to arrange the
> different parts of this magnificent picture in their proper
> places, to bestow on each its due proportion of light, shade,
> and coloring, and to oblige the smallest to contribute its
> exact share, and no more, to the great effect of the whole.
> The delineation of human nature in such a variety of new
> situations, and the nice discriminations of those shades that
> mingle imperceptibly in so many different gradations of savage
> life, required no common combination of qualities. Besides a
> great degree of penetration and sagacity, and an extensive
> knowledge of man in his artificial state, this part of the
> subject required a mind turned, and accustomed to philosophical
> disquisition, an acute, critical, and discriminating spirit,
> with a temper capable of the most patient investigation and
> research. . . . [In Robertson's work] . . . the majesty of
> history is blended with the truth, philanthropy, and discern-
> ment of philosophy. . . .[25]

Burke's praise here for Robertson's critical/analytical historiography

coincides with the new "philosophical history" of the Enlightenment,

and of the Scottish Enlightenment. This "new history" is distinguished

from the simple descriptive historiography of the seventeenth-century

erudites (see Appendix D).

Peter Hans Reill's recent article on a representative of the

new "philosophical history," the German historian, Johann Christoph

Gatterer (1727-1799),[26] could have taken Burke, and the Scottish

historians (including Robertson), as also representative of the

critical "philosophical history" of the Enlightenment. Reill's

comments on Gatterer coincide not merely with Burke's philosophy of

history, but with other areas of Burke's thought.

Reill wrote that for Gatterer,

> . . . the ultimate purpose of historical understanding . . .
> was 'not the learning of facts but the increased understand-
> ing of human nature' [through a] . . . critical-analytical
> methodology.[27]

The attempt to understand human nature (so as to be better able to

prescribe the future actions motivated by that nature), rather than

merely describe past events, is implicit in Burke's special notion of

prudence as foresight, or an active, critical shaping of events and

policy according to a predetermined end.[28] In Reill's description of

the contemporary eighteenth-century philosophical basis of the new

"philosophical history"--Newton's "Rules of Philosophizing"--lies

also a source of Burke's method of thinking. That Burke followed the

"Rules of Philosophizing," unlike many of his contemporaries, has been

shown to be the case elsewhere in the present study (see Appendix A).

Lastly, the methodology of the "philosophical history" taken by itself,

resembles the critical approach to the natural realm (historical/

phenomenal) of Kantian philosophy. Reill explained the aversion of

the Aufklarungers to both the fact-gathering erudites and to the

speculative system-builders of Cartesian rationalism. Only when

history could be "suffused" with philosophy, "could the seemingly

chaotic collection of facts made by countless seventeenth-century

erudites take on form and meaning."

> A basic tenet of the Aufklärung was its distrust of abstract
> speculation; during the early eighteenth century, there had
> been a decided shift away from the method outlined by Descartes's
> Discours to Newton's 'Rules of Philosophizing.' This shift had
> resulted in the rejection of the primacy of deductive reasoning,
> but it had not eventuated in a radical empiricism; for, in fact,
> the magpie instinct of the seventeenth-century polyhistorians
> had itself demonstrated the bankruptcy of random and undirected
> fact gathering.[29]

Applied to the study and stuff of history, the avoidance of dogmatic
(Cartesian) rationalism and radical empiricism, allowed the historian
to use instead the critical, forming, but non-distorting reason to
gain an intermediate knowledge of past events, to approach the
historical realm in the same manner in which Kant approached nature:
"not in the passive attitude of the pupil (but armed with "reason and
experiment") . . . like a judge who 'compells the witnesses to answer
questions which he himself has formulated'" (see supra., Chapter IV, p. 73).

> . . . eighteenth-century thinkers turned to an emphasis upon critical
> analysis, which posited a mutual interaction between theory and
> empirical observation; each informed and mutually qualified the
> other. Hence, especially in the writing of history, the materials
> had to be ordered in such a manner as to answer a set of well-defined
> questions. The historian's task gradually came to be conceived as
> the posing of a set of intellectual questions, the search for materials
> pertaining to the questions [and not to form the questions around the
> materials; the occasionalist, but not the server of occasions], and
> their arrangement of it in such a manner that the whole became compre-
> hensible. . . . No longer was the historian 'the simple narrator of
> events,' the passive and objective mirror of the past. Now he was
> charged with the task of interpretation. . . .[30]

That the particular interpretative "philosophical history" which Burke
had praised in Robertson was characteristic of Enlightenment historio-
graphy, is supported by the likemindedness which Hugh Trevor-Roper
pointed out existed between Robertson, Voltaire, Gibbon and Montesquieu.

In his review of "The Historical Philosophy of the Enlightenment,"[31]
Trevor-Roper equated the new philosophical history with "'critical his-
tory,'"[32] which "rejected the mere accumulation of detail and fact," and
instead "looked for explanation."[33] Part of this explanation, the "new
philosophical content" which would "reanimate the mass of historical data
into which the old ideological structures had decomposed,"[34] were the
double concepts of the dynamic idea of progress and the concept of the

"organic nature of society." The latter was "the idea that human
societies have an internal dynamism, dependent on their social
structure and articulation. . . ."[35] Taken together, these two
concepts were made "explicit" by and did form the basis of thought
of the critical "philosophical historians" of the Enlightenment:
Montesquieu, Turgot, Hume, Voltaire, Robertson and Gibbon.[36] Gibbon
recognized the especial significance of the "Scottish Historians" as
leaders of the new critical history, when he wrote:

> 'Machiavelli and Guicciardini . . . were justly esteemed the first
> historians of modern languages till, in the present age, Scotland'
> --that is, Hume, Robertson and Adam Smith--'arose to dispute the
> palm with Italy herself.[37]

The "interdependence" among the critical historians of the Enlightenment
was evident in the unqualified praise which Robertson bestowed upon
Voltaire,[38] the "same basic assumptions" shared by Montesquieu, Robert-
son and Gibbon,[39] and the mutual admiration between Montesquieu,
Voltaire, Robertson and Gibbon.[40] The critical _and_ comprehensive
trait of the new history was evident in the kinship between Voltaire
and Gibbon, who were "alike in their scale of values, in their humanity,"
and most important to the point of a balanced critical history, "in
their combination of a quest for purpose with a refusal to systematise."[41]
Again, the comprehensive side of the critical history is seen in Voltaire's
remark that his Essai sur les moeurs

> . . . required of him, ideally, he said, 'la patience d'un
> bénédiction--that is, of a Mabillon or a Montfaucon [erudites]
> --et la plume d'un Bousset' [Bishop Bousset, the late seven-
> teenth-century "universal," but not critical, historian, who
> saw history as the progress of Christianity and of Christian
> principles].[42]

Trevor-Roper then traces a rift between "Montesquieu and his disciples on the one hand [and] the French encyclopedists on the other."[43] The former group, including Gibbon and Burke, "the most influential of all Montesquieu's disciples,"[44] represented the exclusive concern with the organic (historical) theory of society--they were the "German conservatives and English Whigs" who adopted Burke's 'Reflections' as their Bible."[45] The latter group represented an equally exclusive focus upon and extension of the extra-, or ahistorical, idea of the linear progress of society and of man in society (or of human nature itself)--these were the followers of Voltaire who "became more radical" after 1789. The followers of Montesquieu--Gibbon and Burke--adopted an essentially passive attitude toward the reformation of society and toward the events that shaped society and men's lives. The followers of Voltaire were "activists" (my word), if not entirely "critical," and believed they could shape events.

> Where the radicals had seen the state as the necessary reformer of society, the new conservatives now saw society [or the organic laws of society, or, of history] as the necessary corrector of the state.[46]

Although C. P. Courtney in his work, Montesquieu and Burke. stated the same historical/philosophical brotherhood of Montesquieu and Burke as did Trevor-Roper here, Colm Kiernan in his recent (1973) study of "The Enlightenment and science in eighteenth-century France"[47] saw only an "incongruity" between Montesquieu's use of history and science as supports for his ideas."[48] Kiernan's use of "history" or "the life sciences" in order to describe Montesquieu's balanced or comprehensive position, is roughly analogous to Trevor-Roper's use of, respectively, the passive "organic theory of society" and the active "idea of progress"

as a way to describe the comprehensiveness of the new philosophical

history. Kiernan wrote that

> The use of an historical rationale has both conservative and
> reactionary implications. These were carefully worked out by
> Edmund Burke. [Kiernan cites C. P. Courtney to this effect.]
> The use of the life sciences, on the other hand, has radical
> implications. These were developed by Rousseau who, in the
> interests of political radicalism, placed far less reliance on
> history. . . .[49]

Yet,

> It was Rousseau, more than Edmund Burke, who understood the spirit
> of Montesquieu's laws. Du contrat social represents Montesquieu's
> political principles carried to their logical conclusion. . . .[50]

because Montesquieu combined the historical argument with the philosoph-

ical,[51] or the biological argument taken from the life sciences. Montes-

quieu's Esprit des lois represents an attempt "to synthesize a rationalist

and an empirical approach as they refer to society."[52]

To the extent to which it is true, Kiernan's portrait of a

critical and comprehensive Montesquieu (as reflected in Rousseau, and as

set against Burke and his followers) qualifies Trevor-Roper's catalogue

of the split among the "philosophical" historians, with the Montesquieu/

Burke camp pitted against the followers of Voltaire. On the other hand,

Kiernan's Montesquieu would resemble the Montesquieu whom Trevor-Roper

describes as one of the new "critical, philosophical" historians before

his (Montesquieu's) break with Voltaire. It is to these latter critical

philosophical historians, including the "Scottish Historians," whom

Burke, in the "Annual Register" reviews, praises. Burke and Montesquieu

may be kindred spirits, as admirers and/or practitioners of the new

history, but not in the passive, uncritical sense by which Trevor-Roper

brought them into alliance.

The "philosophical history's" thoughtful and critical considera-
tion and measuring of the given facts according to objective principles,
is contrary to the tyranny of "facts standing around" which the late
Richard Weaver (in his The Ethics of Rhetoric, 1965) thought a passive
Burke allowed to exert over himself. Weaver saw in Burke's thought
only a "philosophic vacuum:"

> 'Of clear rational principle,' Weaver noted, Burke 'had a
> mortal distrust.' [Rather] . . . Weaver found only a bowing
> to the pressures of 'facts standing around,'[53]

that is, to the circumstantial argument which

> . . . refuses to look beyond things as they are and to offer
> an alternative vision of society. . . .[54]

Angus Campbell makes some Kantian noises when he disagrees with Weaver's
estimate of the supposed hollow center of Burke's thought:

> Burke's confinement to the category of circumstance, however,
> is not absolute, for he does not simply report circumstance,
> but shapes it. [Emphasis added; see supra., Chapter IV, p. 73.]
> His own practical imagination at once grounds him in the
> historical social order and enables him to see beyond its
> details to its inner spirit or character. . . .[55]

The argument from circumstance which Burke uses, then, far from resting
on (as Weaver said) a "'love of quietude [and] relish for success'"
[in the Wolffian/Shaftesburian teleological sense],[56] rests upon the
reason of the individual, who shapes circumstances according to objec-
tive a priori principles. "It is not Burke's use of circumstance, but
the principles governing his selection of circumstance which reveals
the bent of his thought. . . ."[57] It is this thoughtful consideration
of past circumstances and events which led to the discovery by the
Scottish Historians (all, or most, reviewed favorably by the periodical
co-founded by Burke, the "Annual Register") of "the uniformity of the

human constitution. . . . [The] peculiar nature of their [the Historians']
history lies in the link which it establishes between the constant princi-
ples of human nature and the changing environment of man."[58] Beyond
methodology and analysis, the "Historians" sought to dwell on the problems
of the present rather than attempt to chart the future by the past. Skin-
ner maintains that this "choice of problem--the interest in order rather
than prediction--may simply reflect the conditions of the time [and there-
fore] . . . is not possessed of great analytical significance."[59] Skinner
at the best reasons backwards from the Historians' "functional" concern
with the present order rather than future predictions, or improvement
possibly of that order, to the Historians' analyses, to their methodology,
and concludes that their concern with the complexity of method, made
necessary by the inherent complexity of history itself, caused them to
preclude any prediction and concentrate instead on description of the
present order. Skinner concludes:

> Lovers of system, the Historians were acutely conscious of its
> dangers; sensitive to the problem of method, they had a profound
> respect for the complexity of History. This respect and sensitivity
> to the problem of method may have confined them to the question of
> order rather than prediction and probably would have so confined
> them even in a different historical context. . . .[60]

However, it is one of the aims of this study to show that Burke, while
respecting the complexities of history and human nature, did not let
this respect confine him, as Skinner says it did the (Scottish) Historians,
to immediate concerns.[61] This respect, on the contrary, set Burke to
write of the foreseeable, open future. This was a method of statecrafts-
manship which allowed for reformation without revolution, for descrip-
tive and prescriptive accounts and analyses--and syntheses--of the past
as prologue to the present and to the future.

Burke's doctrine of prescription and reformation allowed for
present action not being based on that rigid and submissive and almost
exclusive dependence on a past assigned by Russell Kirk and his school
to Burke wherein the dead hand of the past made Burke its passive
emissary to the present (see supra., Chapter III, p. 48 et passim). As
Burkian prescription was not based on the democracy (or tyranny) of the
dead (past) over the living present, neither was it based on what might
be called the democracy of the present, i.e., on that Scottish school
of Common Sense which, misinterpreted (as it has been), becomes a simple
appeal to the intuitive sentiments of the vulgar crowd--a kind of philo-
sophical Gallup poll, a consensus philosophy forming itself upon the
lowest common plebiscitory denominator, "to the universal belief or
persuasion of ordinary people,"[62] without consideration for the actual
Scottish 18th century Common Sense distinction between sensation and
perception, subject and object, necessary truths and contingent truths,
and the other sub-categories, of self-evident principles, first princi-
ples, secondary principles, etc. All of these epistemological distinc-
tions aid the individual reason, guided by objective "first principles,"
to shape experience, to shape events and not merely act upon experience
alone or react to events. One avoids a reductionism in philosophy
(monism) and epistemology (the crude sceptical empiricism of Hume) and
thereby avoids a political reductionism (a teleological faith in the
rightness of the past because it is the past, because it exists).[63]

For instance, the Scottish "methodological tradition" of the
second half of the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-centuries was
characterized by an almost incomprehensible dualism or pluralism, but

yet constituted a coherent whole. G. N. Cantor recently[64] described
the Scottish philosophers' refusal to categorize themselves in any one
of the prominent methodological traditions of the times. Their refusal
kept them following a "middle path,"[65] which avoided alike an exclusive
concern with simple Baconian empiricism or with a speculative a priori
reason. Rather, the Scots combined the Baconian and the Newtonian
traditions into a "rigorous type of induction modelled on Newton's
Opticks" (see also, Appendix A, for the Scots as proper Newtonians).
This "rigorous" induction laid less stress on the Baconian "gathering
of experimental data" and required fewer, but more "judicious," experi-
ments.[66] Cantor described this special form of induction as

. . . more accurately described as a posteriori reasoning
based on a small amount of empirical data [which] served
the function of directing the progress of science when
used in conjunction with 'crucial' experiments.[67]

Thomas Reid is an example of this hybrid, empirically-based a posteriori
reasoning. Reid, following Newton's "'Rules of Philosophizing,'"
would deny hypotheses in order "to explain the phenomena of nature,"
but would "by a just and copious induction . . . get to the top
[but not] at once [as would] the ingenious men [who] . . . invent
hypotheses . . . ."[68] Further, Reid, who "reiterated in epistemological
debates"[69] Newton's methodological rules, represented at once the two
seemingly conflicting methodological traditions among the Scottish
philosophers.

Just as Hume's "metaphysical scepticism," which set "a limitation
on man's knowledge" of final causes in nature[70] was complemented by his
"demand for physical continuity in nature in order to make the actions of

a cause comprehensible,"[71] so Reid, in following Newton's "Rules,"
represented first, the "anti-conjectural" tradition which "rejected
conjectures, hypotheses and theories with 'just contempt' from all
brnaches of science."[72] But Reid also represented a second tradition
in Scottish philosophy. This tradition, although not reductionist,
did seek, "as one of the aims of science [and epistemology, see above],
the reduction of knowledge to a few general principles."[73] Reid saw
that the

> . . . business of natural philosophy 'is, from particular
> facts in the material world, to collect, by a just induction
> the laws that are general, and from these the more general,
> as far as we can go'. . . .[74] [Emphasis added.]

Building up generalizations from experience by a "just induction . . .
as far as we can go," demanded the eventual application of a general-
ization induced from demonstrable evidence to "a new situation in
which its existence had not yet been demonstrated."[75]

Roger L. Emerson in his recent article on the "Select society"
of Edinburgh illuminati during the early (1750's) Scottish Enlighten-
ment described the "methodological norms" of the Society.[76] These
norms were a hybrid of empiricism and extra-empiricism. The norms
were " . . . in some sense empirical."

> Locke and Newton received applause in their [the Scots']
> published works. . . . Experiments were their guide in the
> physical sciences. Yet most had a committment to a systematic
> ordering of beliefs which was academic if not quite scholastic
> in appearance. The ghost of rationalism haunted them as it
> did most of their contemporaries; Thomas Reid, not Hume, became
> in time their philosophical guide.[77]

On this point of the balance in Scottish Enlightenment thought between
systematic yet not scholastic thought, on the one hand, and empirical
enquiry on the other hand see supra., Chapter III.

The Scots' use of the notion "generalization" here would have the same effect as that of the application of an hypothesis or conjecture to the givens of the empirical world. In fact, " . . . the Scots themselves were often unclear in which sense they were using the word."[78] Cantor summarized the "middle path" which the Scots adopted in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; such a path sought to reconcile experiment and critical observation and judgement, or, in Kantian terms, nature and freedom.

> The scientific method used by the Scottish natural philosophers may be characterized as a subtle heuristic interplay between the cautious use of inductive generalizations and powerful reasoning. . . . The most adequate expression of the interplay between theory and judicious experimentation was given by [John] Playfair [a minor, though representative, early nineteenth century natural philosopher of the Scottish tradition(s)]. He rejected conjectures which were unsupported by empirical evidence, yet he considered that lack of a theory 'does not secure the candour of an observer, and it may much diminish his skill' in practising science. . . . Having rejected simplistic induction on the one hand and blatant hypothesizing on the other, the Scottish natural philosophers found a middle path calculated to assist the progress of science more effectively.[79]

The method which Playfair represented also characterized the general Scottish attitude to mathematical theory, as recently described by Richard Olson.[80] The Common Sense realists and most Scottish philosophers could not accept the "Platonic" view of mathematics. The Platonic view was the "dominant attitude toward the nature of mathematics" in Scotland and England "during the period immediately prior to the rise of Common Sense philosophy. . . ."[81] It held that

> . . . mathematical ideas were divorced from physical existence and mathematical certainty was seen as independent of any need for a capability of empirical verification."[82]

A second position, which was "discussed but not adopted by the Scottish philosophers, . . . tied mathematics directly to physical experience

and demanded an empirical verification of any mathematical state-
ment."[83] This notion was taught by one James Ferguson, who was, for
that, "far out of the main stream of Scottish thought."[84] But "most
Scottish philosophers took a third position,

> . . . arguing that mathematical ideas are tied to experience
> insofar as the original suggestions for mathematical concepts
> could come only from sense data, but also contending that
> mathematical ideas are separated from that sensory context
> by a process of abstraction which somehow transforms the
> nature of the entities under consideration" [emphasis added].[85]

In terms reminiscent of Reid's notion of "suggestion" (see supra.,
Chapter IV, p.75), an anonymous essay on mathematics denied that either
empirical sense data or abstract speculation exclusively determined our
knowledge of geometrical axioms.

> . . . the author claims, our inability to find perfect geometrical
> shapes in sense data does not hinder our ability to reason about
> them: '. . . from this we see no hindrance in pure, abstract
> geometry. . . . We reason neither from a real, not apparent,
> but a supposed [or suggested] construction. And we are satis-
> fied that a demonstration is just, when the conclusion depends
> only on what is required in the supposition.'"[86]

This anonymous paper represented, said Olson, both sides of the

> . . . Common Sense attitude to the nature of mathematics . . .
> --the belief that the ultimate source of mathematical ideas,
> lies in physical reality and the insistence that the process
> of abstraction somehow frees mathematical reasoning from the
> necessity of empirical verification and inductive reasoning.
> . . .[87]

In regard to the "moral side of Scottish philosophy," the demand for
a sensory referent with respect to the objects of mathematics,[88]
including those of geometry, was balanced by the views of "Reid, for
instance [who] wrote that the objects of mathematics 'are things con-
ceived without regard for their existence. . . .'"[89] Further, the
Scots' preferred geometry over algebra because the latter served to

better train the reason and the use of the intellectual powers of the mind than the former.

>According to the Scots, one had to be aware of the individual processes and their functioning in order to effectively train them. Geometry kept one aware of the steps of reasoning involved in a mathematical argument and algebra did not; therefore, geometry was better for training the intellect than algebra.[90]

While serving the training of the intellect, geometry, unlike algebra, avoided abstract speculation by its "constant reference to diagrams which served to keep the reasoning powers under control."[91]

Reid and the Scottish school of common sense, and the Scottish Enlightenment in general exhibited that happy balance described by Goethe above and in the balanced dualism of the Kantian Critical philosophy in Germany. David Daiches sees a "paradox" in the whole of contemporary Scottish society in the 18th century, a paradox which might or might not reflect or be reflected in the Scottish philosophy: " . . . another paradox of Scottish culture [was] the co-existence of a cooly rational tone and method with a belief in the moral value of feeling."[92] More precisely, Daiches quotes Thomas Reid's disciple, Dugald Stewart, as holding to a belief in progress, or, a confidence in the ability of the active intelligence to affect--by a thoughtful consideration of the real and complex empirical world--the course of events (without at the same time detracting from the reality of these events), a consideration based upon the realization of the constant factors of human nature and the "universal applicability of common sense":[93]

>. . . to illustrate that the belief in a humane reasonableness, so characteristic of the period, goes side by side not only with a belief in progress but also with a deep belief in the uniformity

of human nature and the universal applicability of common sense, I quote this characteristic praise of William Robertson by Dugald Stewart . . .[94]

If, as Charles E. Vaughn contends,[95] "it was because Burke never reached the conception of progress that the principles of justice and expediency jostle each other uneasily in his system," such a supposed deficiency in Burke was not caused by any contact Burke had with the ideas of the Scottish Common Sense school or with the Scottish Enlightenment in general. At the least, if one assumes Burke to have had an awareness of the balanced Common Sense philosophy of Reid, Stewart and Beattie, one may better understand why, for example, John MacCunn could say that the central problem in Burke study is the "reconciliation of Burke's notions of 'organic' and providential national development and of man's mind as a proximate efficient cause or change."[96]

If justice and expediency jostle each other uneasily in Burke's thought, it is partially because Burke did not think to let the mass of empirical data and facts, past and present, and their myriad inter-relationships distract or intimidate him to inaction and to an Adullamite-like or worse, a Panglossian teleological acceptance of the status quo for its own sake. "He exerted himself not for the status quo, but for its [vitalistic] principle, its fundamentals."[97] One of these principles inherent in the status quo is that of not merely the collection, collation, and interpretation of the given facts themselves, but of the interrelation-ships among the empirical facts and between the facts and the forming human intellect which interprets them. Gerald Chapman quotes Dr. Johnson on Burke's insatiable appetite and love of facts and the colour Burke

gives to the facts. Johnson said of Burke:

> 'His stream of mind is perpetual'--he [Samuel Johnson] went on
> to define Burke's peculiar quality as 'copiousness and fertility
> of allusion; a power of diversifying his matter, by placing it in
> various relations.' This gets to the point. Burke's metier and
> special calling is his urgent, passionate, almost obsessive aware-
> ness of the interrelatedness of things in actual life, combined
> with the power to let all sectors of his knowledge freely intersect
> and cross-fructify, after a literary fashion, in the interest of a
> humane practicality. 'Reading, and much reading, is good,' Burke
> wrote to his son [in February, 1773]; 'but the power of diversifying
> the matter infinitely in your own mind [my emphasis], and of apply-
> ing it to every occasion that arises, is far better, so don't sup-
> press the vivida vis.' It is this assimilative side of his intelli-
> gence which keeps resistance to theory from being merely negative.
> Burke fed upon theory and upon knowledge of all kinds as a plant
> upon light, taking what he could use, assimilating, transforming,
> while his main energies were engaged by the world of solid and
> growing [my emphasis] actuality.[98]

The Burke described by Chapman above is worlds apart from the

Burke portrayed by Sir Ernest Barker. Barker, after noting Burke's

famous phrase echoing Pope--"'The individual is foolish . . . but the

species is wise,'" proceeds to say: "Profound words, on which one can

build a whole philosophy,"[99] and proceeds to describe Burke as having

done just that. Burke would seek to "justify" how "in every society

the collective mind of man . . . has been active throughout the

generations in building a fabric of social and political experience

and a system of social and political values."[100] However,

> . . . this fabric of past experience, this system of inherited
> values, also needs to be criticized, in each generation, for
> each generation, by each generation, if it is ever to be carried
> to a higher stage; and this is a necessity which Burke tended
> to minimize and even to ignore. . . . Burke was prior to Hegel,
> but he had an Hegel within him and he well knew . . . the working
> of 'objective mind' . . . .[101]

Barker's Burke seems closer to, in terms of the history of philosophical

thought of eighteenth century England, the passive Shaftesburian school.

Although with Hegel Reason, or the Ideas, might be immanent
in history and with Shaftesbury God is "an immanent and all-pervading
force,"[102] the result regarding use, or non-use, of the active intellect,
the "vivida vis," is the same--history or nature is objectified or
deified and the conscious use of the intellect to shape the empirical
world is lost as a motive to action. With this motive is lost the
attempts at reconciliation of subject and object, or at least of a
belief in the reality of subject and object as two independent, but not
autonomous and self-sufficient realities. Whether the result is an
objective idealism of a Hegel or the subjective idealism of Shaftesbury
and the English Moral Sense school, whether the form of such philosophi-
cal impreciseness and non-discrimination is the pantheism of a Spinoza,
the rationalism of a Leibniz, or the Panglossian optimism of a Shaftes-
bury and a Pope, the result is that the categories of subject-object
become irrelevant and lose their identity as respective ends; instead
everything and every individual is merely derivative of some universal
Force or Idea or Deity operating in this monistic universe by its own
inertia of mass, cunning of reason, or the moral sense of Shaftesbury
which is "merely a particular application of the faculty by which we
apprehend the harmony" or the "'universal mind,' by which the whole is
animated [and which] is the keystone of Shaftesbury's writings."[103]
Burke may seem to have been at times overawed, like a good Shaftesburian,
with the complex world and the impossibility of the human intellect to
act in it, let alone upon it. In Burke's treatment of, or use of, the
British empirical tradition (below), he is both (1) aware of the incom-
pleteness of his explanation of the "problem of induction," the problem

of causation in relation to our ideas on the sublime and the beautiful, and of man's futile attempt at knowing the "chain of causes" that leads ultimately to God. Yet, Burke (2) does not hesitate at discussing God's plan for man, and the great potentialities for the use of reason by man within the province God has laid out for man's activity (see Appendix A).

Such a misinterpretation of Burke as presented above may be given to his statement in "Thoughts on French Affairs," in which he admits:

> The world of contingent and political combination is much larger than we are apt to imagine. We never can say what may or may not happen, without a view to all the actual circumstances. Experience, upon other data than those, is of all things the most delusive.[104]

However, Burke fed upon the mass of empirical data. He did not let it overwhelm him, in the sense that he did not fall back upon a monistic system such as the continental rationalism of Leibniz and Wolff, or upon the early eighteenth-century "Moral Sense" school in England; both the continental schools and the English school concluded in the "whatever is, is right" nostrum--a position which minimized participation in the system by the active human intellect, if it recognized such participation by the reasoning faculties at all.

Burke believed that the consequences of such a monism as Shaftesbury's--or any form of monism--would negate morality, or the moral problem, of the reconciliation of the "is" and the "ought," or the real and the ideal, or the particular and the universal.[105] The complexity of Burke's assumptions--his heterogeneous ethic reflecting a dualistic world-view--is seen in a bit of conversation toward the end of his life and recorded by Mrs. Crewe. Burke says that morality

should be acknowledged as a science, but not systematized by the human intellect. Customs (or the mass of empirical data coming out of history) are an arena in which morals are translated into visible acts, as transiently and artificially manufactured (by the whimsies of men) fashion is not.

> Morals. Should be acknowledged as a science, and not be subject to doubtful Laws--Customs for this reason only should be preferred to Fashions. Theorical [sic] Virtue leads to systematical Vice, and therefore dangerous.[106]

The theoretical virtue of Shaftesbury's universe of harmony and benevolence would of itself--that is, the simple belief of such a monistic universe--serve vice by assuming responsibility or justification for vice. This is so, because virtue in the long run represents vice, or vice versa. Virtue is confused with vice--like Dante's thieves, virtue and vice melt into one another.[107]

Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), a disciple of Shaftesbury and one of the leading figures of the Moral Sense school, was a transition figure in that his finished ethical system used the criteria of the utilitarian pleasure-pain calculus. In the broad terms of theories of reality, the substance of Hutcheson's argument reflects the monism of the Moral Sense school (and indirectly the monism of the Leibniz/Wolff continental rationalism), a monism which assumes everything to be related to everything else, and the easy and significant conclusion that everything eventually runs into everything else. The epistemological upshot of this view of reality is a passive, non-forming epistemology in which moral ideals are confused with clear and distinct actions, and perceiving subject with the moral objects of perception.

In Hutcheson's scheme, the passivity of the moral sense is like the passivity which Locke had assigned to the external senses whereby we receive simple empirical data. The moral sense also receives the moral data, so to speak, from the observed external moral world, just as the external senses received sensations from the physical world. Hutcheson follows the same line of thought in his concept of a "more passive reception of beauty, reflecting the eternal harmonies."[108] The moral sense itself reflected an "omniscient natural reason,"[109] but was yet the affection acquired when we perceived others' "benevolence manifested in action."[110] Only perceived benevolent actions are morally good. Thus virtue here becomes synonymous with perceived benevolent actions.[111] But since there are so many different actions taking place in so many varied settings and forms, actions which might be interpreted as benevolent (i.e., morally virtuous), the internal moral sense or senses corresponding to the different kinds of benevolent actions grow in number until the moral sense simply represents a psychological enumeration, or at most cataloging, of the fait accompli of the various benevolent actions. The moral sense becomes in a sense an imitation, a mirror of perceived actions. The object is confused with the subject.

> . . . once we begin to distinguish [as Hutcheson did] senses and faculties according to distinguishable objects and aspects of objects, there is hardly any limit to the number of senses and faculties which we can postulate.[112]

We are not judging the objects, but the objects are, so to speak, judging or controlling us. So, while Hutcheson's utilitarian calculus may aim at a "moral" end--the greatest happiness of the greatest number--

the determination of this morally desirable end rests upon an epistemo-
logical confusion between subject and object, a confusion resulting in
the predominance of object over subject and the equation of certain
kinds of perceived actions with morality itself, the equation of is
with ought. The utilitarian ethic is merely a quantitative rearrang-
ing or maneuvering of received empirical data. How this data is to
be rearranged is determined by facile assumptions of the moral correct-
ness of the consequences of actions rather than a critical study of the
causes or motivations of the actions--whether the causes be some trans-
cendent ideal or Idea, or an immanent force, or some natural process,
or some particular set of historical, social, political, etc. settings
and/or developments, or a combination of some or all of these causes
and conditions.[113]

Burke explicitly attacks the form of monism expressed in
Hutcheson's works. In his "Essay on the Sublime and the Beautiful,"
Burke criticises the monism of Locke, but Burke's strictures could
reflect a disagreement with Hutcheson and the Moral Sense school just
as well. The substance of the argument against monism remains if the
word, virtue, is substituted for the word, pleasure (or pain), and
vice substituted for pain.

> Many are of the opinion [Burke writes], that pain necessarily
> arises from the removal of some pleasure; as they think pleasure
> does from the ceasing or diminuation of some pain. For my part
> . . . pain and pleasure, in their most simple and natural manner
> of affecting, are each of a positive nature, and by no means
> necessarily dependent on each other for their existence. . . . I
> can never persuade myself that pleasure and pain are mere relations,
> which can only exist as they are contrasted. Nothing is more cer-
> tain to my own feelings as this.[114]

The epistemological/psychological confusion of the pleasure-pain formula
is paralleled by the moral confusion of Rousseauian revolutionary polemics.

Burke sees Rousseau's confusion of vice and virtue as a practical example of the results of an indiscriminate monism. The Jacobins who have taken Rousseau as their model "infuse into their youth an unfashioned, indelicate, sour, gloomy, ferocious medley of pedantry and lewdness--of metaphysical speculations blended with the coarsest sensuality."[115] Rather, as Burke says a few years later, the "subordination of mind" is necessary to avoid extremes (and, to avoid an indiscriminate monism, for subordination is discrimination). Burke tells Mrs. Crewe (1797):

> A tone of fastidiousness too often substituted for true taste which ought to consist of Indulgence as well as refinement. All societies apt to run into opposite extremes if affectation be not kept under properly. . . . Common sense would avoid such fastidiousness.[116]

But the fastidious "Modern Authors" mix virtue with vice and refinement with indulgence. Burke complained to Mrs. Crewe that

> Many of them were very dangerous from their flattery to Vice--all characters are by nature morally in Tune, and do not like to have discords played upon them--for which reason, the new Philosophers when they would persuade must blend virtuous sentiments in their poisonous compositions. . . . Mr. Burke frequently spoke with great disgust of the new fashioned feelings introduced into the World by Rousseau, Sterne, etc. . . .[117]

The Jacobins corrupt their youth by exposing them to the "mischevious" works of Rousseau

> . . . and all the more mischevious for the mixture . . . for perfect depravity of sentiment is not reconcilable with eloquence; and the mind (though corruptible not complexionally vicious) would reject and throw off with disgust a lesson of pure and unmixed evil. These writers make even virtue a pander to vice. . . .[118]

Burke believed that only political chaos and disorder could and would result if this philosophical confusion were to be accepted by a national leader in time of crisis.

Burke pointed out that Henry IV of France, unlike his successor,
Louis XVI, avoided such confusion in thought and deed, and, to the
extent he did avoid such confusion, was a successful monarch. Further,
Burke warned in a letter of October, 1790, the present King of France
would prove to be an unsuccessful ruler and would become a slave to
the tyranny of events and immediate circumstances if he failed to avoid
such confusion in his thoughts. If Henry IV of Navarre had confused
the virtues of mercy, benevolence and the honoring of past obligations
to one now become his and the state's enemy, Henry would have thereby
served the vice of civil war. But Henry rightly saw the positive
function--characterized by "vigour, activity and foresight of a
Henry 4th"--of virtue in this setting to be that of exterminating the
vice. The "virtue" of the present French King, Louis XVI, lacks the
positive and purposeful policy of the old king. Lacking a grasp of
positive virtue, the present king allows events, accidents, trifles to
shape him and his policy and he not them. The "accidents" which Burke
points to might be seen here as events not tested or touched by a
positive virtue, and therefore as "false" events, in the sense that
they have arbitrarily entered upon the stage of history without having
been opposed by any corresponding and/or forming virtue, without a
nay-saying to their intrusions, without that "holding back at certain
points"[119] by an opposing number of an event or train of events which
might not have otherwise occurred. Burke wrote in his letter of the
benevolence of Henry IV in quickly and decisively crushing a revolt by
the Duc de Biron, whose ambition had led him to plot with his country's
enemies against his king. Burke wrote:

He [Henry IV] would not have deserved the Crown, which he won
and wore with so much glory, if he had scrupled by all the
preventive mercy of rigorous Law to punish those Traitors and
Enemies of their Country and of mankind. For believe me, there
is no Virtue where there is no Wisdom. A great, enlarged,
protecting, and preserving Benevolence, has it, not in its
accidents and circumstances, but in its very essence, to exter-
minate Vice, and disorder and oppression from the World. Good-
ness spares infirmity; Nothing but weakness a congenial thing
is tender of the Crimes that connect themselves with power to the
destruction of the Religion, Laws, polity, morals, industry,
Liberty and prosperity of your Country? Henry the 4th if he had
such men as his subjects, would have done his duty I doubt not.
The present King is in the place of the Victim not of the avenger
of these Crimes. That he did not prevent them with the early
Vigour, activity, and foresight of an Henry the 4th is rather his
Misfortune than his Offence. He has, I hear, and believe, a good
natural understanding, as well as a mild and benevolent heart; and
these are the rudiments of Virtue. But he was born in purple; and
of course was not made to a situation which would have tried a Virtue
the most fully perfected. By what steps, by what men, by what means,
on what pretexts, thro what projects, by what a series of mistakes
and miscalculations of all kinds he has been brought to the State,
in which he is obliged to appear as a sort of instrument in the
ruin of his Country, is a subject for History.[120]

Benevolence for Burke's Henry IV was not (as it seemed to be for Louis XVI)

the facile yea-saying to the givens of history and/or (as the Shaftes-

burian Moral Sense school would have it) the immediately and directly

felt sentiments. Benevolence was a "great, enlarged" application of

the virtuous wisdom of a monarch who weighed past loyalties and obliga-

tions, and present realities on the scale of reasons of state. Benevo-

lence as a virtue encompassed both the sentiment and understanding of

historical events and human actions, but benevolence also included the

wisdom which would not confuse the "natural understanding" with benevo-

lence in the latter's true "enlarged" and virtuous sense.

More recently, Hans Barth has described Burke's thought in terms

similar to the impressionistic portraits of Burke by Samuel Johnson and

Gerald Chapman. But Barth, in addition, offers an interpretation of

Burke's phrase--"the species is wise, the individual is foolish"--

which coincides with Chapman's view of Burke and which conflicts with

Barker's interpretation of the phrase and Barker's view of Burke in

general. It is Burke's essential dualistic view of reality which helps

him avoid confusion of ideal and real, subject and object--such a

confusion marked historically for example, by the immanent, monistic

cosmology and reductionist epistemology and ethics of Shaftesbury and

his school in eighteenth-century England. Barth, with Chapman and

Samuel Johnson, realizes Burke's special concern for the variety and

complexity of the objective empirical and historical world, and yet

Burke's confidence in the human intellect to shape this objective

world according to that world's own laws and the laws of the universal

moral order. Barth cites the nineteenth-century German scholar, Heinrich

von Sybel's view of Burke's thought as characterized by

> . . . the instinct 'of giving himself up to things, of penetrating
> into the wealth of life, and of beginning his own mental activity only
> after being sated (but not overwhelmed) with an abundance of observa-
> tions.' This is reverence toward that which is. But it alone would
> hardly suffice to make Burke a discoverer of the historical world
> and the specifically historical way of thinking and observing. For
> the respect of the past would only justify the defense of the status
> quo. Status quo is purely static. But history is not only the
> permanent, but also the changing, which, while changing, retains its
> identity.[121]

Barth then cites the phrase, "the species is wise," but draws a different

meaning from it than did Barker. Barth interprets it to mean the active

formative intellect of successive past generations each molding their

respective objective settings in accordance with the objective principles

of the moral order. Human reason interprets the objective principles and

applies them to the respective settings and circumstances. This dualism

of Burke avoids, for example, the relativistic ethic of Shaftesbury,
an ethic based upon an assumed monism, a cosmology of universal
harmony, and reflected in the immanentization of objective moral
values. The immanentization results in an assumed identity of the
moral values with certain human psychological traits, especially,
certain felt (passively received) benevolent sentiments. Barth argues,

> . . . the traditional political institutions and customs are
> not venerable and valuable simply because they are historical,
> because they have existed and have been accepted for a long
> time. Their acceptance rests rather on the fact that they
> represent the reason [emphasis added] of earlier generations.
> That is the meaning of Burke's assertion that the species is
> wise. The historical view of man and of the forms of social
> life [serve] . . . the basic principles of moral order. 'The
> great law of change' had to be reconciled with the 'principles
> of original justice.' Burke would have insisted, as Herder did
> in his consideration of Shaftesbury's ethics, that there can
> never be 'a plurality of reasons within the human species' [the
> various felt benevolent sentiments] and that 'several highest
> principles of morality' are not 'ever thinkable.' Not a trace
> of the relativism of value and truth, which resulted from the
> radical historication of thought in the latter part of the
> nineteenth century [and which Barker sees as characteristic of
> Burke's thought, see supra, page 94], is to be found in Burke's
> speeches and writings. For him, only abstract and general reason
> is fatal, because, compared with concrete reason which deals with
> real, given situations, it is inferior precisely because of its
> abstractness and exerts a destructive influence on the concrete
> political and social reality to which it is applied. . . .[122]

The jostlings of justice and expediency, or of objective (moral) values
with the laws or norms of the objective empirical world, of the ideal
with the real, all serve the moral order. Human reason must accept the
objective reality of the givens--of a priori moral principles and of the
empirical world (abstract reason is unacceptable to Burke, because it
intrudes upon, in an unmoral manner, "the concrete and political and
social reality to which it is applied"). But having done so, human
reason must then appraise and mold, not justify, the givens of objective,

moral principles and of the objective empirical/historical realm.

In the language of the natural law tradition viewed by a recent

commentator, the reason carries out the function of the Natural Law,

which

> . . . both describes and prescribes. On the one hand, its
> principles [whatever they may be] describe the [moral, not
> physical] regularities which are to be discovered in the
> universe. On the other hand, its principles set forth norms
> in accordance with which men are morally obligated to live.[123]

But the point of the present study is to note that in the same manner

by which the reason of the natural law would both describe and prescribe,

so the philosophical assumptions of certain eighteenth-century schools

of thought--specifically, those of the "Scottish Historians" and of

the Scottish Common Sense realists-- would describe and prescribe.

That is, these assumptions would take into account, for example, both

"justice and expediency" (see supra., p. 93). They would, so to speak,

describe expediency--that is, describe and not distort the independent

reality of the phenomenal-historical world, and, given this, would

prescribe certain moral rules in order to guide human actions beyond

the immediate and particular (historical) settings and circumstances.

CHAPTER IV

NOTES

[1]Peter Gay, The Enlightenment. An Interpretation, Vol. II,
The Science of Freedom (N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), pp. 7-8. See
two articles by Skinner: "Economics and History--The Scottish Enlight-
enment," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. XII (February,
1965), 1-22, and Skinner's more recent article, "Natural History in
the Age of Adam Smith," Political Studies, Vol. XV (1967), 32-48.

[2]Seth, Pringle-Pattison referred to the "Natural Dualism" of
Scottish Common-Sense realism, a dualism which included a number of
elements which maintained the separate reality of matter and mind
repectively, while at the same time avoiding a mechanistic philosophy
capable of degenerating, for example, into associationism, the psycho-
logical basis of utilitarianism. See Andrew Seth (A. S. Pringle-Pattison),
Scottish Philosophy. A Comparison of the Scottish and German Answers to
Hume ("Balfour Philosophical Lecture," University of Edinburgh) (Edinburgh
and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1899), pp. 76-77. More recently,
D. Daiches Raphael has explained the Natural Dualism of Reid's Common-
Sense realism: "Reid insists that mind and matter are wholly different
and subject to wholly different processes and conditions. Yet, there is
no need, he thinks, for the Cartesian perplexity concerning the possibility
of contact between these two different forms of being. There clearly is
contact between mind and matter, Reid holds, but we must not view the
relation between them as we view the relation between two pieces of matter
in contact; the word 'contact' is but a metaphor taken by analogy from a
relation that is usually required for matter to interact with matter."
D. Daiches Raphael, The Moral Sense (London: Oxford University Press,
1947), pp. 146-147. See also the late Jerome Weinstock's article, "Reid's
Definition of Freedom," Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. XIII,
Number 3 (July, 1975), pp. 335-345.

[3]S. A. Grave, The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense (Oxford: at
The Clarendon Press, 1960), p. 19.

[4]See Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. IV, Modern
Philosophy: Descartes to Leibniz (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, A
Division of Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1963, 1960), p. 49.

[5]S. A. Grave, op. cit., pp. 94-109.

[6]See Basil Willey, The Seventeenth Century Background.Studies in
the Thought of the Age in Relation to Poetry and Religion (N.Y.: Columbia
University Press, 1967, 1934), p. 155.

[7]Ibid., pp. 155-156.

[8]Ibid., p. 156.

[9]Idem.

[10]P. G. Winch, "The Notion of 'Suggestion' in Thomas Reid's Theory of Perception," The Philosophical Review (U. of St. Andrews), Vol. III, No. 13 (October, 1953), p. 328.

[11]Ibid., p. 340.

[12]Ibid., p. 337.

[13]The resemblance of Reid to Kant here is easily demonstrated. As a self-evident (Copleston, op. cit., V, ii, p. 170) "original perception" "not the result of 'custom' or 'habit' as in the case of 'acquired perception'" (P. G. Winch, op. cit., pp. 340-348), the notion of suggestion was one of the "common principles which are the foundation of all reasoning and of all science" (Copleston, op. cit., V, ii, p. 171).
"Such common principles seldom admit of direct proof [for example, of the direct proof of local matter in motion which Hobbes relied upon and which Cudworth denied], nor do they need it. Men need not to be taught them; for they are such as all men of common understanding know. . . ."(Idem.)
Whether "suggestion" be one of the subdivisions of these self-evident, first "common principles"--either "necessary truths, the opposite of which is impossible," or "contingent truths, the opposite of which is possible" (idem)--is less to the point here than it is on this point that, as Bernard Peach said,
". . . the greatest similarity between Kant and Reid is to be found, in the principles that Reid considers to be 'first principles' and those which Kant attempts to establish as a priori synthetic principles of the pure science of nature. Reid asserts as a 'first metaphysical principle of necessary truth . . . that whatever begins to exist must have a cause which produced it.' He asserts that the principle cannot be drawn from experience any more than from abstract reasoning. . . . [Reid chooses] . . . to regard it as self-evident and in need of no proof but to be received as an axiom which cannot, by reasonable men, be called in question. . . . [Although] . . . Reid does not draw the distinction between theoretical and practical principles [respectively, principles concerned with the realms of nature and with the realm of morality] as sharply as Kant, nor does he work out the details. But he does make the distinction explicitly [in Essay on the Active Powers of Man]
'To judge of what is true or false in speculative points, is the office of speculative reason; and to judge of what is good or ill for us upon the whole, is the office of practical reason.'"[For Burke's distinction between speculative and critical reason, see Francis P. Canavan, The Political Reason of Edmund Burke (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1960), Chapter 2, "Reason and Theory," espec. pp. 28-29.]

Peach referred to the practice of Kant and Reid
> . . . of regarding certain principles as 'innocent until proven
> guilty' [as] . . . characteristic not only of their approach to
> questions of knowledge generally, but also in morals. (Bernard
> Peach, "Common Sense and Practical Reason in Reid and Kant,"
> Sophia [Padova], Vol. XXIV [1956], p. 67.)

Reid's and Kant's similar doctrines regarding knowledge or the act of
perception assumes an active intellect sifting out not only the world
of sense from the world of principle, but drawing distinctions among
various types of "first principles" themselves.

[14]Ibid., Winch, p. 339.

[15]Ibid., p. 330. Reid denied "suggestion" was an acquired
perception, but did not deny that our perceptions begin in sensations
of the external world. Reid will not " . . . admit that any theory
which asserts that the notions of external qualities are arrived at by
any means of some sort of habitual association between different sorts
of sensations can be satisfactory. On the other hand, he remains firmly
convinced that our possession of concepts of objects of perception does
depand on the fact that we have sensations. . . (ibid., p. 337).

[16]This is, of course, Kant's aim. A. C. Genova reminds us that
Kant's Copernican Revolution involved " . . . the turn to the agent, the
recognition . . . that before we can give an account of the character of
objects, we must first take account of what and how it is that the knower,
in his use of intelligence, contributes [emphasis added--contributes, not
overwhelms] to the epistemological context. This critical self-awareness
is the central idea underlying Kant's 'Critical philosophy' and it is only
through such resulting 'transcendental [a priori] knowledge' that we can
assess ourselves of both the objective extents and limits of human culture
. . . the notion of 'objectivity' is the most fundamental idea in this
thesis . . . " [emphasis added].   A. C. Genova, "Kant's Enlightenment,"
Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (The Voltaire Foundation,
Thorpe Mandeville House, Banbury, Oxfordshire), Vol. LXXXVIII (1972), 578.
The Copernican Revolution is a revolution precisely because it does avoid
the internalization of the external world--a step involved in any subjec-
tive idealism. The Copernican Revolution does, on the contrary, partially
measure the extent and the limits of the influence of the forming, shaping
critical human intellect, according to considerations which the intellect
must give to the objective laws of the external empirical (phenomenal)
realm. This measuring is what saves the intellect from the subjective
idealism of Berkeley or the subjective rationalism of the Cartesians, or
of the Leibnizian/Wolffian school.

[17]Ibid., Winch, p. 340.

[18]Ibid., p. 332.

[19]Copleston, op. cit., Vol. V, Part ii, pp. 171-172. Gavin
Ardley recently distinguished Reid and George Campbell's Common Sense
realism from that of James Beattie, on the basis of their respective
views on the use of the reason. Whereas Beattie's Essay on the nature
and immutability of truth, in opposition to sophistry and scepticism
(1770) may be seen as "preaching the imbecility of the intellect, . . .
there is little ground for bringing this charge against Reid." (Gavin
Ardley, "Hume's Common Sense Critics," Revue Internationale de Philo-
sophie [Commemorative issue: David Hume 1776-1976], Vols. 115-116,
fasc. 1-2 (1976), p. 119.) Even Reid's critics, notably the "Scholastic
commentators" from the late eighteenth to the twentieth centuries admit
that " . . . the resort to common sense as blind instinct is not Reid's
authentic doctrine; that, in fact, Reid is a champion (though sometimes
confused) of the rational philosophy of being" (ibid., p. 111). Reid
is with Oswald and against Beattie here. " . . . Reid and especially
Oswald, are quite clear in their affirmation. They do not believe that
common sense is confined to deftness in everyday action; they do not
admit a disjunction between practice and theory, between the life of
action and the life of speculative thought. They recognize in common
sense a rational power of discernment of the first principles of know-
ledge, an access to being" (ibid., p. 113). Even Reid's use of the
word "instinct" is an instance of a distinction of the reasoning faculty.
"If, at times, Reid speaks of common sense as an instinct of our nature,
he does not thereby mean that it is a blind or irrational instinct. For
in Aberdeen circles, as Campbell explains, the term 'instinct' was used
for self-evidence in contingent matters, in order to distinguish that
operation from self-evidence in abstract relations" (ibid., p. 119).
Oswald held that "Common sense is rational judgement, and all too often
common opinion, perverted by prejudice and passion, falls below the
rational standard" (ibid., p. 122). "Oswald is perfectly clear where
he stands: the appeal to common sense is the appeal to our rational
perception of first principles, whether in the material or the moral
orders; it is quite distinct from all blind propensities and instincts;
to deny this is to take away our distinctive humanity" (ibid., p. 121).

[20]Andrew Skinner, "Economics and History:--the Scottish Enlight-
enment," Scottish Journal of Political Economy (February, 1965), pp. 3-4.
Peter D. Garside has recently written of the influence of the "philosoph-
ical historians" of the Scottish Enlightenment upon the thought of Sir
Walter Scott. It was Scott who, in remembering in his later years his
teachers at the University of Edinburgh in the late eighteenth century,
referred to the Edinburgh of his student days as containing "' . . . a
circle . . . which has perhaps at no period been equalled, considering
the depth and variety of talent which it embraced and concentrated.'"
(Peter D. Garside, "Scott and the 'Philosophical' Historians," Journal
of the History of Ideas, Vol. XXXVI, No. 3 [July-September, 1975], p. 499.)
Scott had been either student or friend to Robertson, Ferguson and Dugald
Stewart, among others. Stewart had been Ferguson's successor as Professor
of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh (idem). Garside sees
in Scott;s novels evidence of the Scottish "philosophical" historians'
" . . . deep sense of the essentially social nature of history, the

sophisticated determinism, the sharp awareness of the effects of
historical environment on behavior" (ibid., p. 497), and the "main
themes of 'philosophical' history"--"The inevitability of progress,
the importance of property in development, the power struggle between
classes, the effect of social environment on 'manners' . . ." (ibid.,
p. 500). If Scott was directly exposed to the thought of some of the
leading lights of the Scottish Enlightenment, then so was Burke. Skinner
stated the case for Burke's Scottish connection, as Garside did for Scott.
Skinner wrote that "Edmund Burke was installed as Lord Rector of Glasgow
University in April of 1784; an office . . . [which] enabled him to make
direct contact with some of the leading academic thinkers of the day--
Adam Smith, William Robertson and John Millar"(A. Skinner, op. cit., p. 1).
Skinner did not pursue the Burke side of the equation, but wrote of the
Scottish side, and scene. The present study's purpose has been to place
both the Burkean and the Scottish "sides" together as part of the same
spirit of a particular historical period--a purpose motivated in part
by suggestions offered by a reading of some of the assumptions of the
French "Annales" historiographical school. (For "Les Annales" school,
see J. H. Hexter, "Fernand Braudel and the 'Monde Braudellien . . . '"
The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 44, No. 4 [December, 1972], pp. 480-
539, and Traian Stoianovich, "Theoretical Implications of Braudel's
'Civilisation materielle,'" The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 41, No. 1
[March, 1969], pp. 68-81.) For the Scottish "philosophical" historians,
see Duncan Forbes, "'Scientific' Whiggism: Adam Smith and John Millar,"
Cambridge Journal, Vol. VIII (1954), pp. 643-670; see also, Roy Pascal,
"Property and Society: the Scottish Historical School of the Eighteenth
Century," The Modern Quarterly, Vol. I (1938), pp. 167-179. Forbes saw
the figures of the Scottish Enlightenment as cosmopolitan philosophes.
Adam Smith was such a philosophe rather than merely or exclusively an
economic theorist. Adam Smith, wrote Forbes, " . . . was one of the
pioneers of the idea of progress of society in this country, at least,
that his was the seminal mind in those researches into the history of
civil society that play as large a part in the intellectual history of
eighteenth-century Scotland" (Forbes, "'Scientific' Whiggism," ibid.,
p. 644). Forbes characterized the writings of the Scottish philosophical
historians--including those of Lord Kames, Adam Smith, John Millar, and
Dugald Stewart--as representing that "'sociological evolutionism'" (ibid.,
p. 645) which struck a balance between history and reason, or, between
nature and morality. To Smith, "the idea of the progress of society did
not abolish naturrechtlich (natural law) thinking . . . but perfected it"
(ibid., p. 645). Millar described Smith as "the 'Newton' of the history
of civil society because, unlike Montesquieu, he had discovered, or
systematically applied, the 'law' of progress" (ibid., p. 646). But if
Smith's and the other Scottish figures' notions of the idea of progress
went beyond Montesquieu, their ideas of the laws of sociological evolution
differed markedly from those of the associationists Hartley, Priestly,
Godwin and Condorcet. The latter school's ideas of progress were "more
propagandist than scientific" (ibid., p. 649). Smith, Millar, Ferguson.
et al. were not "'moral Newtonians'" (idem), but assumed the reality of a
complex or heterogeneous historical development, a development which
could be made sense of, but a reality which was not distorted by over-
simplified Whiggish and/or positivist "laws" of history. (For the Whig

interpretation of history, see Herbert Butterfield's classic, The
Whig Interpretation of History [London: G. Bell and Sons, 1963, 1931];
for the positivists, see Maurice Mandelbaum, History, Man and Reason.
A Study in Nineteenth-Century Thought [Baltimore, Maryland: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1974, 1971], pp. 10-11, 13-18, 171-174; and Frank Manuel,
The Prophets of Paris [Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1962.)
Duncan Forbes wrote: "John Millar, though a militant Whig, was as much
of a social scientist as a reformer, equally concerned to explain as to
change the world, and like Adam Smith he distrusted perfectability.
Progress for the school of Adam Smith was a 'law' of history and not an
article in a new religion. . . . their conception of progress did not
jilt history, but on the contrary rested on the deepest insight into
historical process that the rationalist eighteenth century ever attained.
. . ." (ibid., p. 651). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, German scholars were concerned with "das Adam Smith Problem
(the relation of the sympathy in the Theory of Moral Sentiments to the
selfishness in the Wealth of Nations . . ."(ibid., p. 152). Forbes cited
the words of one German of that controversy (H. Huth's Soziale und Individ-
ualistische Auffassung im 18. Jahrhundert, 1907) who held that "Adam Smith
only appeared to put individual interests before those of society" (ibid.,
p. 152). By going beyond the empirical generalizations of Montesquieu
and avoiding the immanentism of the rationalists as propagandists (Turgot,
Condorcet, Hartley and Priestly), the Scottish historians as sociological
evolutionists, Forbes seemed to be saying, laid the groundwork for a more
permanent sociological explanation, or justification, of the events of
the French Revolutionary period, than did the pre-Revolutionary French
philosophes, whose writings served as merely the immediate catalyst or
immediate justification of those events. Forbes wrote: "Just as Gibbon's
philosophic calm and elegant scholarship were more deadly to Christianity
than anything in the whole battle array of the philosophes in France, so
in the deep political slumber that prevailed in Scotland before the French
Revolution, there was constructed a far more powerful weapon than anything
hurled against the old order by the school of Voltaire" (ibid., pp. 652-653).
        It might be suggested here, in reference to recent work on American
whiggism in the (American) Revolutionary period, that it is perhaps a
failure to seriously consider the possible influence of the thought of the
Scottish sociological historians upon Americans' thinking, that is one of
the reasons for (1) the one-sided equation by some historians (such as
R. R. Palmer, Bernard Bailyn and Gordon S. Wood) of American whiggism with
'the doctrine of numerical democracy" and/or with the ascendancy of the
legislative branch as constituted by direct representation of "the people,"
and (2), for the perplexity and/or refusal by these historians to recog-
nize the two-sided aspect of American whiggism. J. R. Pole asked in his
review-essay of Bailyn's long introduction to his collection of the Pam-
phlets of the American Revolution 1750-1776 (1965): "What, then, was an
American Whig? One whose colonial experience enabled him to continue to
combine the interests of a Tory with the opinions of a Radical!" (J. R.
Pole, "An Anatomy of the American Whig," The Historical Journal, Vol. IX,
No. 2 [1966], p. 233.) Pole noted Bailyn's "great stress on the importance
to the American revolutionaries of the English tradition of radical dissent"
and of a Locke as exemplar of a Whiggish tradition which saw "ultimate
authority and 'constituent power' [(Palmer's phrase) as residing] exclusively

in the people" (J. R. Pole, "The Creation of the American Republic,"
Review of The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, by Gordon
S. Wood [1969] . . . in The Historical Journal, Vol. XIII, No. 4
[1970], p. 799). Pole argued that such a view as Bailyn's and Wood's
only succeeds in avoiding the true historical "perplexity" in which
the "theorists of American whiggism" found themselves in regard, for
instance, to the problem of political representation (see J. R. Pole,
"Anatomy of the American Whig," ibid., p. 232; see also William E.
Nelson on the "ambiguous arguments against legislative power" common
in revolutionary America--Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law.
The Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts Society, 1760-1830 [Cambridge,
Mass., and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1975], p. 13).
That is, there seemed to be an anomaly between Whig theories of direct
democracy and immediate representation (which would have been translated
into unicameral legislative bodies at the time of the drafting of state
constitutions during and after the Revolution) and the common retention
in fact by the colonies, of upper legislative chambers in their respec-
tive state constitutions. In his review of Bailyn's book, Pole mentioned
as an aside, that "perhaps (in regard to Bailyn's stress on the English
tradition of radical dissent as formative of American thought, a stress
taken by Bailyn upon the lead of Caroline Robbins' The Eighteenth-Century
Commonwealthmen [1959]) the Scottish sources deserve more credit than
they are given" (Pole, "Anatomy of the American Whig," ibid., p. 231).
Given the historical fact of Scottish influence as pervasive upon American
colleges before the Revolution, and upon American revolutionary literature
in general (see Henry May, The Enlightenment in America [New York: Oxford
University Press, 1976], pp. 341-351), Pole's off-hand suggestion assumes
the proportions of a significant historiographical imperative for any
serious student of the thought of pre-Revolutionary American whiggism.

[21]The Annual Register, or a View of the History, Politics, and
Literature for the Year 1777, 3rd Edition (London: J. Dodsley, 1785),
p. 214.

[22]Ibid., p. 215.

[23]Idem.

[24]Idem.

[25]The Annual Register, or a View of the History, Politics, and
Literature for the Year 1777, 3rd Edition(London: J. Dodsley, 1785),
pp. 215-216.

[26]Peter Hans Reill, "History and Hermeneutics in the Aufklärung:
The Thought of Johann Christoph Gatterer," Journal of Modern History,
Vol. 45, No. 1 (March, 1973), pp. 24-51.

[27]Ibid., p. 34.

[28]See "Burke's Bill for the Regulation of the Civil List Establishments," February 15, 1785, in Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1901), II, p. 213. In the "Reflections," Burke used prudence and foresight almost interchangably: see the "Reflections" (1790) in ibid., III, p. 455. By prudential statesmanship, Britain could form contingency plans so as to anticipate the future course of events regarding foreign relations, and thus shape events, and not have events--the actions and policies of foreign states--shape those of the British state. See ibid., II, pp. 229-230; II, p. 247; II, p. 382; and Speeches of Edmund Burke (London: 1816), I, p. 131. For Burke's talent of forecasting the course which the French Revolution would take, see Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law in 16 volumes (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd.; Sweet and Maxwell, 1966 [1938], X, pp. 95-96).

[29]Reill, ibid., p. 28.

[30]Reill, ibid., p. 29.

[31]Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The Historical Philosophy of the Enlightenment," Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (Institut et Musee Voltaire, Les Delices, Geneve), Vol. XXVII (1963), 1667-1687.

[32]Ibid., p. 1668.

[33]Ibid., p. 1669

[34]Ibid., p. 1670.

[35]Ibid., p. 1671.

[36]Idem.

[37]Trevor-Roper, ibid., p. 1668.

[38]Ibid., p. 1675.

[39]Ibid., p. 1676.

[40]Ibid., pp. 1677-1678.

[41]Ibid., p. 1678.

[42]Ibid., p. 1678.

[43]Ibid., p. 1679; see also pp. 1679-1687.

[44]Ibid., p. 1685.

[45]Ibid., pp. 1685-1686.

[46]Ibid., p. 1686.

[47]See: C.P. Courtney, Montesquieu and Burke, Modern Language
Studies (Oxford: Blackwell, 1963); Colm Kiernan, "The Enlightenment
and science in eighteenth-century France",Studies on Voltaire and the
Eighteenth Century (Banbury, Oxfordshire, England, The Voltaire Founda-
tion, Thorpe Mandeville House), Vol. LIXa (1973), 249pp.

[48]Ibid., p. 121.

[49]Idem.

[50]Kiernan, ibid., p. 137.

[51]One may see this as the case in a consideration of Montesquieu's
dinstinction between the "nature" and the "principle" of a particular
form of government. In this instance, the "nature" of a government would
correspond to the philosophical argument, while the "principle" of a
government would correspond to the historical argument. To Montesquieu,
the nature of a government is; that is, a government of a certain nature
creates itself and sets itself in motion. It is the ideal that can
exist apart from man and his history. The principle of a government must
assume the previous existence of the nature of a government; the former
is a human-motivated process which, as a philosophical inferior, serves
and fulfills the nature of a government. Since history is merely the
corruption of the principles of various types of governments (see Montes-
quieu, Spirit of the Laws [Montesquieu, Baron de, The Spirit of the Laws,
translated by Thomas Nugent, with an Introduction by Franz Newman, The
Hafner Library of Classics Series (N.Y.: Hafner Publishing Co., 1949),
Book VIII, i, p. 109]), Montesquieu's stated "design" in The Spirit of
the Laws was to discover the relation between the laws and the principles
of each government (see ibid., Book V, i, p. 40), a relation which acts
ideally to invigorate governments, but which occasionally becomes imbal-
anced because adversely affected by historical circumstance and human
passion.

[52]Idem.

[53]John Angus Campbell, "Edmund Burke: Argument from Circumstance
in 'Reflections on the Revolution in France,'" Studies in Burke and His
Time, Vol. XII, No. 2 (Whole No. 40) (Winter, 1970-71), p. 1765.

[54]Ibid., p. 1776.

[55]Ibid., p. 1777. Seamus Deane in his recent article summarizing
Lord Acton's views on Burke, pointed out that Burke opposed the course
of the French Revolution because it did not conform to Burke's specific
criteria of necessary revolution (as did the Revolution Settlement of
1688), and to Burke's special idea of the social compact. Burke condemned
the course of events in France on the basis of his own political experi-
ence and readings, and upon "the fixed moral realm" which he recognized.
Deane wrote that Acton ignored " . . . the fact that Burke [was] the
supporter of five revolutions," and so therefore was not opposed to

revolution qua revolution. (Seamus Deane, "Lord Acton and Edmund Burke," Journal of the History of Ideas, Volume XXXIII, Number 2 [April-June, 1972], p. 333.) Regarding Burke's support of five revolutions, Deane cited (idem) Alfred Cobban, "Edmund Burke and the Origin of the Theory of Nationality," Cambridge Historical Journal, Vol. II (1926), 40. Deane wrote that Burke " . . . regarded the French upheaval as unique precisely because it threatened the integrity of the European (and consequently the British) culture by introducing into it a virus which would have fatal results--the idea of individual rights anterior to the social compact and the assertion of this idea at the compact's expense. In Burke's opinion, the Revolution, like the Reformation, imported into the countries of Europe interests 'other than those which arose from their locality and natural circumstances'. . . . Burke was moving outside the limits of his environment and applying with an energy, which Acton never equalled, a standard of moral evaluation, of fixed principle [emphasis added], not dependent upon local conditions for its validity so much as local conditions were dependent upon it for their survival. To defend whatever is as right, Burke had to demonstrate that the French Revolution was wrong. He was not a dupe of history; he condemned the course it had taken. [Emphasis added.] In doing so, he preserved his moral position by positing two levels of experience, the volatile political level and the fixed moral realm [Deane cited the "Reflections":] 'There are some fundamental points in which nature never changes--but they are few and obvious, and belong rather to morals than to politics. But so far as regards political matter, the human mind and human affairs are susceptible of infinite modifications, and of combinations wholly new and unlooked for. . . .'" (Seamus Deane, loc. cit.). Burke was neither a "dupe of history" in the sense of being an historicist--of desiring "to preserve what actually was 'as it was'" (ibid., p. 331)--nor in the sense of being a skeptic. Acton was correct, said Deane, in his (Acton's) view of skepticism--Acton held that "skepticism and blank conservatism were allied. 'Whatever is right' leads to 'Refusal to admit wrong developments,' and skepticism is always chary of any attempt to improve the human situation" (ibid., p. 329). But Acton was at the same time incorrect in seeing Burke as such a skeptic who, in Weaver's words, bowed to the "pressures of facts standing around."

[56]Campbell, ibid., p. 1776.

[57]Ibid., p. 1782.

[58]Skinner, op. cit., p. 5.

[59]Ibid., p. 22.

[60]Idem.

[61]See above, Chapter IV, p. 79 et passim., for Burke's kinship, through his comments on the Scottish historians (Robertson), with the new critical "philosophical" history of the Enlightenment. For instance, after briefly describing the vast subject-matter of Robertson's volumes

on the History of America, Burke wrote of Robertson's mastery of the
material: "The number, variety, and richness of the materials, did
not, however, lessen the difficulty of the execution." Robertson
"was equal to the undertaking." (Burke), The Annual Register . . .
for the Year 1777, 3rd Edition (London: J. Dodsley, 1785), p. 215.

[62]A. Campbell Fraser concluded his short book on Reid with the
reminder that: " . . . the distinctive feature of Reidism is not vague
acknowledgement of the common sense, but acknowledgement of it as it is
to be found when steadfast reflection is applied to the final mental
experience of man. . . ." A. Campbell Fraser, Thomas Reid, Famous Scots
Series, (Edinburgh and London: Oliphant, Anderson and Ferrier, n.d.),
p. 142. The first mental experience, so to speak, is the assumption of
the "real existence of outward things, our own individual personal
existence; and the existence of God," (ibid., p. 138), or, in other
words, of the existence of objects, subject, and transcendent ideal
(see also, in the present study, Chapter V, p. 125).

[63]For the distinctions in the Common Sense philosophy, see:
Frederick Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy, Vol. V, Modern
Philosophy: The British Philosophers, Part II, Berkeley to Hume (Garden
City, N.Y.: Image Books, 1964), pp. 169-176.

[64]G. N. Cantor, "Henry Brougham and the Scottish Methodological
Tradition," Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, Vol. II,
No. 1 (May, 1971), pp. 69-89.

[65]Ibid., p. 78.

[66]Ibid., p. 71.

[67]Idem.

[68]Cantor, ibid., p. 72.

[69]Idem.

[70]Cantor, ibid., p. 73.

[71]Idem; see Burleigh Taylor Wilkins, The Problem of Burke's
Political Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 71, for his
description of Burke's similar use of Hume, i.e., accepting Hume up to
a point, then dropping him for other less exclusively sceptical thinkers.

[72]Ibid., p. 74.

[73]Ibid., p. 75.

[74]Ibid., p. 75. The notion of a "just induction" is not unlike
the blending of demonstrable fact and the extra-empirical content of what
Wilkins called Burke's value-laden "rule utilitarianism" (as distinguished

from Bentham's "act utilitarianism"). See Burleigh Taylor Wilkins, The Problem of Burke's Political Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 12-13; see also, J. J. C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics (London and N.Y.: Cambridge University Press; Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1961), pp. 4-5.

[75] Idem.

[76] Roger L. Emerson, "The Social composition of enlightened Scotland: the select society of Edinburgh, 1754-1764," Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, Vol. CXIV (1973), pp. 291-321.

[77] Ibid., p. 295.

[78] Ibid., p. 76.

[79] Ibid., p. 78.

[80] Richard Olson, "Scottish Philosophy and Mathematics 1750-1830," Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. XXXII, No. 1 (January-March, 1971), pp. 29-44.

[81] Ibid., p. 32.

[82] Idem.

[83] Olson, ibid., p. 33.

[84] Idem.

[85] Idem.

[86] Olson, ibid., p. 34.

[87] Idem.

[88] Olson, ibid., p. 41.

[89] Ibid., p. 35.

[90] Ibid., p. 42.

[91] Ibid., p. 38.

[92] David Daiches, The Paradox of Scottish Culture: The Eighteenth-Century Experience, The Whidden Lectures for 1964 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 82.

[93] For the extra-empirical a priori element of Stewart's thought, see G. N. Cantor, op. cit., p. 76, and Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. 5, Modern Philosophy: The British Philosophers, Part II, Berkeley to Hume (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, 1964), pp. 169-176.

[94]David Daiches, The Paradox of Scottish Culture: The
Eighteenth-Century Experience, The Whidden Lectures for 1964 (London:
Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 72. Roger L. Emerson wrote of the
Edinburgh "Select society" members' "qualified belief in progress"
which was manifested in their belief that: " . . . a Baconian ideal
of increasing knowledge and [they] expected it to be applied to control
their natural and social environment. In the arts and sciences, in
better farm management, in more expert mining, and manufacturing
practices, in improved communications and civic works, progress was
manifest and encouraged by them. . . ." (R. L. Emerson, op. cit.,
p. 322). See also, William C. Lehmann, Henry Home Lord Kames and the
Scottish Enlightenment (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. xii.
Dugald Stewart was the "spokesman" for the Scots' theory of moral
philosophy which "held that all specific subjects of study should serve
primarily to forward one's liberal education and to develop man's
intellectual powers." (Richard Olson, op. cit., p. 41), when he wrote:
"'It ought to be the leading object of any one to become an eminent
metaphysician, mathematician, or poet; but to render himself happy as
an individual, and an agreeable, a respectable, and a useful member of
society'. . . . The first consideration and object of all education
is 'to cultivate all the various principles of our nature, both specu-
lative and active, in such a manner as to bring them to the greatest
perfection of which they are susceptible. . . .'" (ibid., pp. 42, 43.).

[95]Charles E. Vaughn, Studies in the History of Political
Philosophy Before and After Rousseau, ed., E. G. Little (Manchester,
England: The University Press; London, New York: Longmans, Green
and Co., 1939) Vol. II, p. 59.

[96]MacCunn, Quoted by John C. Weston, "Edmund Burke's View of
History," The Review of Politics, Vol. XXIII, No. 2 (April, 1961), p. 203.

[97]Gerald W. Chapman, Edmund Burke. The Practical Imagination
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 121.

[98]Ibid., p. 161.

[99]Sir Ernest Barker, Essays on Government (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1965, 1945), p. 222.

[100]Idem.

[101]Barker, ibid., pp. 222-223. Elsewhere Barker maintains that
Burke does not merely impose the dead hand of the past on the present,
but also that Burke would wipe out the future by the act of making it
synonymous with the present:
"Nor again, should the hustle of the time hurry us into the sort of
planning, precocious and premature, which imposes the deadhand of
the present on the life and growth of the future. It is necessary
to plan for the future; it is also necessary to leave the future free
to plan for itself. Tom Paine, arguing against Burke's idolization

of the tradition of the past, contended that 'each present genera-
tion is competent to its own purposes.' There may also be an
idolization of the competence of the present; and it is also neces-
sary to contend that each future generation is competent to its
(Ernest Barker, ibid., p. 263). [And the traditions of the past are
visible to Burke, says Barker, in Burke's "vision of the total state":]
. . . There is a vision . . . of the one and only organization: the
vision of the total state which is all and everything, and includes
all and every purpose . . . it was the theory of the modern nation-
State, as it appeared to Burke . . ."(ibid., p. 20).
Here, Burke is locked into the past, which takes the form of what seems to
be a proto-fascist state; Barker seems to be to Burke what J. R. Talmon
was to Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the French Revolutionary state: that is,
we have a monolithic structure. (See J. L. Talmon, The Origins of Totali-
tarian Democracy [N.Y.: Praeger, 1960]). For our purposes, this means
passive acceptance of a fait accompli, with no discrimination between
subject, object or transcendental ideal--or rather, no recognition of these
three categories.

[102]Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth
Century (N.Y.: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1902 [1876]), II, p. 23.

[103]Ibid., pp. 23-24.

[104](Burke), "Thoughts on French Affairs," Writings and Speeches
of Edmund Burke (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1901), III, p. 372.

[105]P. H. Nowell-Smith says that writers of the intuitionist
school (represented in eighteenth-century England by the "Moral Sense"
school) deny any difference between the world of is and the world of
ought. Because they confuse is and ought, the intuitionists cannot
maintain the existence either of objective moral principles or of an
objective empirical order. According to the intuitionist position,
reality and our knowledge of reality have but one source--our immediate
intuition. Ends become means immediately perceived (or rather, felt).
Not only does "no gap exist" between is and ought, but the realms of is
and ought themselves do not exist as separate entities. The moral recog-
nition of is and ought, and the epistemological function of attempting
to reconcile the is and the ought, are both disregarded by the intuition-
ist position. Nowell-Smith is apparently referring to Francis Hutcheson
(see infra, p.96 et passim) when the former says
    ". . . I may know that a certain action will please God or maximize my
    own pleasure or produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number;
    but this is all knowledge of what is or will be the case [and knowledge
    of what the intuitionists wrongly take to be the ought, the end, not
    the means]. It still makes sense to ask whether I ought to do the
    action. As [I. A.] Prichard points out a 'link' is required to connect
    the statements of facts with an injunction to do or not to do something.
    . . . We must now see whether the intuitionist is in a [good] . . .
    position to provide this link, to bridge the gap between 'is' and
    'ought'. . . .
        At first sight it seems that he is; for he has so arranged matters

that no gap exists. Earlier moralists tried to derive obligation statements from statements of other kinds [i.e., from objective standards by which to measure the world of 'is']; but, for an intuitionist, obligations are immediately and underivatively known and require no deduction. The demand for a bridge, for an argument connecting 'ought' to 'is' is senseless because we are directly confronted by 'ought.' But a closer examination will show that this way out of the difficulty is a spurious one. . . . The intuitionist cannot both maintain the immediate and underivative character of moral knowledge [the 'ought'], and also the analogy with empirical discourse [i.e., an assumption of the objective reality of the empirical world] which justifies his use of such terms as 'see,' 'recognize,' 'true,' 'mistaken,' 'know,' 'fact,' and 'objective.'"
P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, London: Penguin Books, 1959, 1954), p. 38.

[106]"Burke's Table-Talk at Crewe-Hall," Publications of the Philobiblon Society (London: 1862/63), p. 34. Burke's animus toward the empiricist skepticism of Hume (for Hume, see Ernest Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment [Boston: Beacon Press, 1962, 1951, 1932], pp. 98-100) also stemmed from Burke's aversion to the empiricists' monism and reductionism (viz., the reduction of reality and of man's perception of reality to one origin--the world of sense), only in their case, Burke's aversion cited a confusion between subject and object, a psychological/epistemological confusion, rather than a teleological confusion between the world of ought and the world of is.

[107]Perhaps a more plainspoken example of this moral confusion resulting from an indiscriminate monism, are the words of the authors of a recent work on business management theory and techniques, The Theory and Management of Systems (Richard A. Johnson, Fremont E. Kast and James E. Rosenzweig, The Theory and Management of Systems [N.Y., San Francisco, Toronto, London: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1963], McGraw-Hill Series in Management, Keith Davis, Consulting Editor). Shortly after citing Pope's Essay on Man as the theme of their work:

> 'Observe how system into system runs,
> What other planets circle other suns'
> Alexander Pope, An Essay on Man . . .
> (ibid., p. x),

the authors equate Pope's harmonious universe with chaos:
". . . the antonym of systematic is chaotic. A chaotic situation might be described as one where 'everything depends on everything else' [sic]. Since two major goals of science and research in any subject area are explanation and prediction, such a condition cannot be tolerated. Therefore there is considerable incentive to develope bodies of knowledge that can be organized into a complex whole, within which subparts or subsystems can be interrelated. . . ."(ibid., p. 5).
See Appendix D for Burke's views on the relation of parts to their whole; Burke's views are based on a similar hostility as Johnson et al.'s toward the indiscriminate monism which confuses the real and the ideal, subject and object.

Shaftesbury's harmonious, and confused, universe coincides with Lucien Goldman's recent (1968) characterization of the ethical theory of the Enlightenment. The ethical theory of the period included the assumption of a neutral, natural morality, a harmony of interests, and a system Burke implicitly refuted (see [Burke], Review of "An Essay on the Genius and Writings of Pope," by Dr. Warton, in The Annual Register . . . for the Year 1782 [London: J. Dodsley, 1783], pp. 203-214). Perhaps what is more to the point here, the ethical system, or chaos and confusion, described by Goldman, assumes an individualism at odds with Burke's use of the term (see Francis P. Canavan, The Political Reason of Edmund Burke [Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1960], p. 31; and infra., p.104, for Burke's strictures against the passive individualism of, respectively, the moral intuitionists, and for Burke's own active, forming interpretations of the past). Goldman referred to
    " . . . a schema often repeated in the Enlightenment: the assertion that the private and the public interest coincide. . . . The inference . . . is that it suffices to act in one's own interest without paying any regard to the general interest. . . .
    . . . France's great individualist poet, Corneille . . . whose [two dramas, 'Rodogune' and 'Heraclius'] chief characteristic is that virtue and vice are treated as morally good.
    The argument is not that the individualist view is incompatible with any moral system, but, on the contrary, that it is compatible with all moralities, and thus entirely neutral between them. This is precisely why, on the basis of individualism, no system of values can be established as necessarily valid." (Lucien Goldman, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment. The Christian Burgess and the Enlightenment, translated by Henry Maas [Cambridge, Mass., The M.I.T. Press, 1973 (1968)], esp. Chapter I, part v, "Ethical Theory," pp. 24-31; pp. 27-28.)

    [108]Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthian (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 187.

    [109]Idem.

    [110]Frederick Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy: Volume 5, Modern Philosophy: The British Philosophers, Part I, Hobbes to Paley (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books [A Division of Doubleday and Co., Inc.], 1964 (1959]), pp. 191-193.

    [111]Ibid., p. 192.

    [112]Ibid., p. 193.

    [113]Father Copleston explains the broader assumptions of Hutcheson's narrow utilitarian formula. " . . . [Hutcheson] offers a criterion for judging between different possible courses of action. 'In comparing the moral quality of actions in order to regulate our elections among various actions proposed, or to find which of them has the greatest moral excellence, we are led by our moral sense of virtue to judge thus: that in

equal degrees of <u>happiness, expected to proceed from the action</u> [emphasis added], the virtue is in proportion to the number of persons to whom the happiness shall extend . . . so that action is best which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers' . . ." Copleston, <u>History of Philosophy</u>, V, i, p. 193.

[114]Edmund Burke, <u>Writings and Speeches</u> (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1901), I, p. 125.

[115]Burke, "Letter to a Member of the National Assembly" (1791), <u>Writings and Speeches</u> (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1901), IV, p. 31.

[116](Burke), "Extracts from Mr. Burke's Table-Talk at Crewe-Hall, Written down by Mrs. Crewe," <u>Miscellanies of the Philobiblon Society</u>, Volume VII (London: Whittingham and Wilkins, 1862/63), pp. 13-14. But six years before, Burke had written (letter of June 1, 1791), that an indulgence not balanced by a refinement led to over-indulgence and self-absorption in "our own desires" and to a subsequent moral confusion. The feelings, amorphous and contradictory and uninformed as they were, were certainly not to be passively accepted as morally correct merely because they existed in a harmonious or "benevolent" universe. Burke wrote:
". . . I question much whether moral policy will justify us in an endeavor to interest the heart in favour of immoral, irregular, and illegal actions, on account of particular touching circumstances that may happen to attend the commission or the punishment of them. I know Poets are apt enough to chase Such Subjects in order to excite the high relish arising from the mixed sensations which will arise in that anxious embarrassment of the mind whenever it finds itself in a <u>locality where vices and virtues meet</u> near their confines . . .
. . . the Philosophers, in order to insinuate their polluted Atheism into young minds, systematically flatter all their passions natural and unnatural. They explode or render odious or contemptible that class of virtues which restrain the appetite. These are at least nine out of ten of the virtues. In place of all these they substitute a virtue which they call humanity or benevolence. By these means, their morality has no idea in it of restraint, or indeed of a distinct settled principle of any kind. When their disciples are thus left free and guided only by present feeling, they are no longer to be depended on for good or evil. The men who today snatch the worst criminals from justice, will murder the most innocent persons tomorrow. . . . " ([Burke], <u>The Correspondence of Edmund Burke</u>, Eds., Alfred Cobban and Robert A. Smith [Cambridge, England and Chicago, Ill.: 1967], Vol. VI, pp. 269-270, "Letter to Claude-Francois De Rivarole, July 1, 1791.)
In the "Reflections," Burke spoke of the false tolerance of the French revolutionaries, arising from the same "species of benevolence" and requiring not any critical judgement or discrimination concerning the objects of toleration, but merely a passive and vague awareness of their existence in the same harmonious universe.
". . . we hear these new teachers continually boasting of their spirit of toleration. That those persons should tolerate all opinions, who

think none to be of estimation, is a matter of small merit. Equal
neglect is not impartial kindness. The species of benevolence
which arises from contempt is no true charity. There are in England
abundance of men who tolerate in the true spirit of toleration. They
think the dogmas of religions, though in different degrees [emphasis
added], are all of moment, and that amongst them, there is, as
amongst all things of value, a just ground of preference. They favor,
therefore [presumably after making some kind of critical judgement on
the merits of the respective sects], and they tolerate. They toler-
ate, not because they despise opinions, but because they respect
justice."([Burke] Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke [Boston:
Little, Brown & Co., 1901], Vol. III, p. 431, from the "Reflections.")

[117]Ibid., pp. 35-36.

[118]Burke, "Letter to a Member of the National Assembly" (1791)in
Writings and Speeches (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1901), Vol. IV, p. 32.

[119]See Ernest Cassirer's essay on "'Spirit' and 'Life' in
Contemporary Philosophy" (1930), Appendix D, p.279, in the present study.

[120](Burke) The Correspondence of Edmund Burke, Vol. VI (July,
1789-December, 1791), Eds., Alfred Cobban and Robert A. Smith (Cambridge,
England and Chicago, Ill.: 1967), pp. 148-149.

[121]Hans Barth, The Idea of Order. Contributions to a Philosophy
of Politics (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publ. Co., 1960), p. 36.

[122]Ibid., pp. 36-37. The reason why the views of Karl Barth are
distinguished from those of Canavan and others who similarly interpret
this phrase of Burke's--"the species is wise, the individual is foolish,"
etc.--is that while the others see their interpretation of Burke's phrase
as indicative of the natural law content of Burke's thought, Barth makes
no such emphasis upon such origins of Burke's thought.

[123]Constant Noble Stockton, "Three Enlightenment Variations of
Natural Law Theory," Enlightenment Essays, Vol. I, No. 2 (Summer, 1970),
p. 127.

CHAPTER V

THE KINSHIP BETWEEN SCOTTISH, BURKEAN AND KANTIAN

THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE

A crucial factor necessary to note in the equation which
would seek to suggest a similarity between the assumptions of the
Burkean position and the school of Scottish Common Sense realism,
is the independent reality of the subject. The subject is the active
human intellect working upon and shaping the empirical world, while
at the same time being guided by a partially known transcendent,
objective moral end. That philosophy which suggests the reality of
matter to the exclusion of all else is empiricism, or its offshoot,
nominalism. That philosophy which sees a transcendent (as opposed to
immanent) ideal--wherever placed--as representing exclusively reality
is called generally, idealism. The difference between a philosophy
of empiricism and one of realism is the presence of the reality of
the forming human reason; also, of the reality of the transcendent
ideal acting, or having a limited influence on, the human reason
which shapes the empirical world. Scottish realism (and Kantian
idealism) included all three of the above levels of reality. Empiri-
cism sees matter as real and all else as supplemental or derivative
from the reality of the empirical world. The Burke portrayed by
Gerald W. Chapman implicitly assumes the existence of all three real-
ities, as do the figures of the Scottish school, and this means the
separate reality of each of the three--empirical object, human subject,

and transcendent ideal (as distinguished from the immanent ideal of

the Leibniz-Wolff rationalism of the seventeenth and the Shaftesburian,

Moral Sense school of the eighteenth century).

Thomas Reid in <u>An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles</u>

<u>of Common Sense</u> (1764) and <u>Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man</u>

(1785) assumed the existence of all three philosophical realities, and

formed his system of Common Sense upon the interplay among the three

independent realities. Reid criticised Locke, Berkeley and Hume for

destroying the reality of the mind, the reality of matter and the

reality of the perceiving human intellect.

> . . . according to Locke, ideas are nothing by the immediate objects
> of the mind in thinking. Now [says Reid] 'Bishop Berkeley, proceed-
> ing upon this foundation, demonstrated very easily that there is no
> material world. . . . Mr. Hume shows us no partiality in favour
> of the world of spirits. He adopts the theory of ideas in its full
> extent; and, in consequence shows that there is neither matter nor
> mind in the universe; nothing but impressions and ideas.' 'In fact,
> Mr. Hume's system does not even leave him a self to claim the proper-
> ty of his impressions and ideas.' Ideas, therefore . . . have by
> degrees 'supplemented their constituents and undermined the existence
> of everything but themselves. . . .'[1]

Now Reid recognizes two levels of reality, subject and object, as repre-

sented in his famous distinction between sensation and perception, know-

ledge and reason working with the senses which interpret the empirical

world. Either the one or the other is destroyed by Berkeley (matter)

and Hume (mind). It is because Reid recognizes the independent reality

of both worlds--mind and matter, subject and object, that he sets him-

self against Berkeley and Hume.

Such a philosophy as Reid's would represent a reaction against

the development of philosophy during the previous century, as described

by Ernst Cassirer in his classic study of The Philosophy of the Enlight-

enment (1932). This development took the form of an empiricist reaction

against the rationalistic systems of the seventeenth century. However, both traditions in philosophy, seventeenth century rationalism with its "esprit systematique,"[2] and eighteenth century empiricism with its maxim of "Nothing is in the intellect which was not first in sense,"[3] are really, for the present purpose of contrasting them with Reid and his school, the opposite sides of the same general philosophical coin. For our purposes, there is not a new coinage in philosophy minted in the eighteenth century, but merely a flipping of the same coin onto its opposite side. That is to say, both systems assume that there is one plane or source of reality, from which all else derives. It is this derivation against which Reid (and Kant) stands, in whichever form it assumes--rationalist or empiricist. It is the point here to present the traditions to which Reid and the Common Sense school stood opposed. Reid's philosophy itself is not gone into here. In both rationalist and empiricist systems, subject and object mesh into one because of the exclusive source of realities assumed in each respective school. Dualism is absent in both systems, and, as a result, the independent reality of both subject and object suffers.

The exclusive and ultimate reality in seventeenth century rationalism consists of the "ideas which the mind finds within itself." Cassirer explains:

> The fundamental question of the truth of knowledge of the agreement between concepts [in the subject, the human mind] and objects, had been solved by the great rationalistic systems of the seventeenth century by reducing both the realm of concepts and that of objects to the same original stratum of being. In this stratum concepts and objects meet and from this original mingling is derived all their later correspondance. The nature of human knowledge can only be explained in terms of the ideas which the mind finds within itself. These innate ideas are the seal that is from the first stamped

upon the mind, assuring it once and for all of its origin and
destiny. . . . the 'primitive notions' in our minds [according
to Descartes, include the concepts of] . . . being, number, and
duration . . . extension, form and motion . . . and the concept
of thought. . . . These models and prototypes point forward to
empirical reality, but they can do so only because at the same
time they point backward to its origin. . . . Reason, as the
system of clear and distinct ideas, and the world, as the totality
of created being, can nowhere fail to harmonize; for they merely
represent different versions or different expressions of the same
essence. The 'archetypical intellect' of God thus becomes the
bond between thinking and being, between truth and reality, in
the philosophy of Descartes. . . . perception is possible only by
the procedure of relating the accidental to the necessary, the
merely factual to something rational, the temporal to the eternal.
We attain to knowledge of the physical world by reducing matter to
extension rather than by attributing to it any quality perceptible
to sense. . . .[4]

Ultimately, knowledge not merely comes from within ourselves, but pene-

trates more deeply and points back to the divine being. The end result

of Cartesian philosophy is that God underwrites the reasonable acts of

men. " . . . every genuine act of cognition, every act of reason,

brings about an immediate union between God and the human soul."[5]

The sensory world is merely an extension in the first instance from

the reason of man, and, in the second instance, from that reason, to

"the harmonious substance of our common master."[6] Although the eight-

eenth century empirical rebellion against the above mode of thought

involved a "secularization of thought,"[7] it was a secularization which

nevertheless constructed--with its apex at Hume--just as much a deriva-

tively enforced system as that of the rationalists of the preceding

century. The base of the philosophical pyramid is now merely upended,

and "the ground of experience," not divinely reflected reason, becomes

the base upon which all else is built.[8] When Cassirer is describing

the eighteenth-century answer to seventeenth-century rationalism, he

states that "flights into transcendent worlds must be avoided. No
foreign element may be permitted to come between knowledge and reality,
between subject and object,"[9] he is not referring to a transcendent
deity, but to the immanent God of the seventeenth-century rationalists,
a God ultimately and practically on the same stratum as the reason of
man, which sees the demonstrability of God in that reason of man--
I say practically because such a concept which sees an immanent rela-
tion of God to the reason of man, which sees the demonstrability of
God in that reason, considers any rationalistic construct weaved from
that reason underwritten by the divine hand, to have all the real force
carried as would be through any letter of instructions from a Creator
to his creatures with a Creator's signature on the bottom line of the
instructions. Now a transcendent Being is different from an immanent
Being--the latter, in its extreme instance, assumes a complete identity
with this world, with either human reason or nature, or both--"the
indwelling and inworking of the Deity in nature and man."[10] This
immanentization is opposed in the extreme by the doctrine of transcend-
ence:

> The doctrine that God, in his proper being and essential nature,
> is prior to and above the world; or that he has reality in him-
> self apart from his works.
>   Transcendence contrasts and correlates with Immanence. It
> may be asserted in such a sense as to isolate God from the world,
> in which case it excludes immanence. It was the character of
> Deism [pervasive in the eighteenth century] that it associated
> with a one-sided notion of transcendence that of an external
> and wholly mechanical relation of the deity to the world. Extreme
> assertion of immanence results in pantheism or naturalism. Extreme
> assertion of transcendence leads to deism, or else thrusts God out
> of all conceivable relation to the world. . . .[11]

In terms of the above definitions, Cassirer seems to be using "transcend-
ence" when he really means to use the concept of immanence while

describing the alternative which the empiricists offered to Cartesian rationalism. Cassirer has the empiricists ask rhetorically of the seventeenth-century system-builders: "For what relation remains between the ego and the external world, between subject and object, if we eliminate transcendence as our bridge?" The empiricist answer is "a direct influence of the one upon the other."[12] But it was the immanent God, not the transcendent God against which the empiricists were working; for transcendence is only in its extreme form associated with a deistic clock-maker God, a God who creates, but does not pre-serve. There is a middle ground between immanentism and deism, or harsh transcendence, which might be called a "soft transcendentism," in which God is neither completely set apart and above the universe and its history nor totally within it:

> Naturalistic and pantheistic conceptions of immanence are those which tend to identify the Deity completely with the inworking force of nature. This leaves no place for transcendence. It is possible, however, for God to work in nature, grounding its existence on phenomena, and yet to be something more in himself, to possess a being that is not identical with his operations. In this sense transcendence seems to be the presupposition of immanence. . . .[13]

This "soft transcendentalism" comes closer to representing the answer of Reid's school to the empiricists and would avoid what amounts to the immanence of the empiricist position itself; for the empiricists formu-late a basic maxim upon which they build the "bridge" between subject and object. But really, Cassirer uses an unfortunate analogy in the "bridge" case, for a bridge supposedly connects two separate and distinct banks across an otherwise dividing river. But the empiricists, in Cassirer's description, end up destroying any distinction between

between subject and object, the mind and matter. Cassirer describes

the development of empirical philosophy in the century preceding Hume,

beginning with the empiricists' reaction to the immanent Reason of

the Cartesians.

> For what relation remains between the ego and the external world,
> between subject and object, if we eliminate transcendence as our
> bridge? What conceivable connection is there between subject and
> object other than that of a direct influence of the one upon the
> other? If the ego and the physical world belong to different
> strata of reality, and if despite this fact they are to come into
> contact and establish a connection, then such a connection would
> seem possible only if external reality were to partake of conscious-
> ness. The only known empirical form [emphasis added] of such a
> participation is, however, that of a direct influence. This alone
> can bridge the gap between idea and object. The assertion that
> every idea that we find in our minds is based on a previous im-
> pression and can only be explained on this basis, is now exalted
> to the rank of an indubitable principle. . . . [in] Hume's skepti-
> cism . . . [Empiricism now bases its doctrine on the psychological
> axiom, or] maxim 'Nothing is in the intellect which was not first
> in sense. . . .'[14]

This new form of monism sees its task as doing away with the last ves-

tiges of any doctrine which in the least assumes derivation from any-

thing besides the "Nothing is in the intellect" dogma.

> Both [English and French psychologies] . . . attempt to go beyond
> Locke [considered anathema because of his distinction between
> sensation and reflection and his "critical" empiricism]. Both
> these psychologies want to get rid of the last remnants of dualism
> which had remained in Locke's psychological principles; they want
> to do away with the distinction between internal and external
> experience and reduce all human knowledge to a single source. The
> difference between sensation and reflection is only apparent and
> it vanishes upon further analysis. The development of empirical
> philosophy from Locke to Berkeley and from Berkeley to Hume
> represents a series of attempts to minimize the difference between
> sensation and reflection, and finally to wipe it out altogether.
> . . . and to eliminate the last vestige of independence which Locke
> had attributed to reflection. . . .[15]

Reid in Scotland and Kant in Germany wish not merely to declare the

independence of reflection and mind from the confines of a moral

Newtonian (or pseudo-Newtonian--see Appendix A) one-world order, but
to do so in a manner which would retain also the reality of the objec-
tive empirical world, and which would bring the two together in such a
complementary way as to avoid both a subjective idealism on the one
hand, a pyrrhonic scepticism and a radical empiricism (later, called
positivism), on the other. The former results in a naturalistic deistic
monism, which includes the fusing of subject and object so as to make
them indistinguishable. The latter results in a mechanical "interaction"
between subject and object somewhat as in Hartlean Associationism or
Humean scepticism (and leading to the political and moral calculus of
the utilitarianism of Hutcheson and Bentham); Hartley's Associationism
stems from a harmonious pseudo-Newtonian universe and Hume's view has
the similar effect as the harsh Cartesian dualism regarding the mechan-
ical-like relation between subject and object.[16]

Hans Reichenbach emphasized the difference between empiricism
and the transcendent position regarding the position of the independent
human intellect in the respective schools.

> The incorporation of the human observer into the physical world
> is one of the fundamental characteristics of an empiricist phil-
> osophy. The transcendental conception of knowledge makes a cut
> between physical reality and the human mind and thus arrives at
> unsolvable problems, like the problem of how we can infer reality
> from mental data. . . .[17]

The alternatives which Reichenbach described here of a complete aliena-
tion between subject and object on the one hand, and total fusion of
subject and object on the other hand, corresponds to the specious
alternatives which Leo Strauss offered between his Aquinas as repre-
sentative of "the" Natural Law tradition and his Hobbes, who represented

the "modern" natural rights tradition (see supra.). Reichenbach

continued with his presentation of this either/or situation in contem-

porary twentieth-century thought. In its modern form, the failing to

separate subject and object is seen in

> . . . Heisenberg's disturbance through the act of observation and
> Bohr's complementarity. According to these interpretations, Heisen-
> berg's indeterminacy leads to the conclusion that it is impossible
> to draw a line of separation between observer and physical object;
> as the observer changes the world through the act of observing, we
> cannot say what the world is, independent of the human observer. . . .[18]

That is, if it is impossible to draw a line between the observer and the

observed, and the transcendent ideal, one is forced in this situation to

"take sides" as to the exclusive reality of either one of the three

categories which one chooses to regard as the ultimate and one reality.

Such an exclusivist choice is called "reductionism" in philosophical

terminology.

According to Paul Hazard, the "philosophie des lumières"

represented what might be called the philosophical parallel of what

Reichenbach described as Heisenberg's principles of indeterminacy--

the hopeless confusion between subject and object, mind and matter

(or, past and present, that is, the impossibility of the present inter-

preting in any way the separate and removed past without at the same

time distorting that past).[19] In the chapter on "Nature and Reason"

in his book on eighteenth-century thought,[20] Hazard saw the philosophes

as adding to the confusion between nature and reason, and to this effect

cited Burke's phrase (although Hazard did not say or imply it was

Burke's famous phrase): "Nature never says one thing and wisdom anoth-

er."[21] So, Hazard concluded his chapter by supporting the opposite

extreme position. This position states the impossibility of human

reason applying any structure or logic to phenomena without distort-

ing those phenomena (including empirical and historical phenomena).

> 'Nature is not to be equated with reason. So say today our
> thinkers . . . among them an illustrious biologist, Charles
> Nicolle [who said, sounding like Reichenbach's Heisenber]
> . . . 'Nature . . . knows nothing about the logical and the
> illogical--nothing about reason. Nature is.' Of all the
> failings of Reason, the most widely met with is that of ascrib-
> ing its own attribute of rationation, its own reasoning faculty
> to the phenomena it is examining. ' . . . what we did was to
> invest things with laws which were merely those of our own
> mind. . . . The human mind distorts phenomena by subjecting
> them to the rule of logic. . . .'
>   In the very heart of the 'philosophie des lumieres,' there
> exists an essential disharmony, for has not this same philosophy
> melted together into a single doctrine, empiricism, Cartesianism,
> Leibnizianism, and finally Spinozaism? . . . That is why Europe,
> to put some order into the theory of knowledge, has need of Kant.
> . . .[22]

As Hazard had characterized the eclectic confusion of eighteenth-century

thought, Reichenbach similarly saw the "end of the story"[23] of post-

relativity and post-quantum physical theory, as the "dubious nature" of

"the substance of the universe;[24] "According to [Max Planck's quantum

theory] . . . energy consists of elementary units, the quanta, and

whenever energy is emitted or absorbed there will be one or two or one

hundred quanta transported, but never will there be a fraction of a

quantum. The quantum is the atom of energy."[25]

Reichenbach pointed to the recognized impossibility of separating

"observable" phenomena from "unobservable" phenomena, of being unable to

tell whether the action of atoms is characterized by a wave effect or

as particles, and "whether light and matter consists of particles or

waves."[26] These unobservable, and therefore, unknowable (in their sub-

stantial reality) phenomena are all part of the "world of small things"

(of microscopic relationships), as opposed to the "world of large
things" (macroscopic relationships), the latter of which are observable
and knowable.[27] This bifurcation of reality is the legacy of quantum
physics, according to Reichenbach.

Since we can no longer hope to discover the substance of reality
or matter (of, for instance, the internal structure, and therefore the
external motion or history) of that complex atom which post-quantum
physics has revealed in place of the unitary atom of classical physical
theories, physics can now merely describe perceived reality according
to whichever of the theories of reality (partially based on unobserv-
ables) one wishes to accept (matter as waves or as particles). Theories
of reality now become theories of our knowledge of that reality (or of
those realities). This is

> . . . the final outcome of the controversy between the adherents
> of waves and of corpuscles, which began with Huyghens and Newton,
> and, after a development of centuries climaxed in the quantum
> mechanics of de Broglie [who held that light consists both of
> particles and of waves.],[28] Shrodinger [whose views were similar
> to de Broglie's], Born [who saw waves as representing "probabilities"
> while the "elementary entities were assumed to be particles"],[29]
> Heisenberg [similar to Born,[30] seemed to back into supporting the
> wave theory, for his principle of indeterminacy assumes we lack
> the knowledge to predict the path of microscopic (bounding on the
> unobservable phenomena) particles] and Bohr [whose "principle of
> complementarity" or of correspondance assumed it possible that Born's
> problematical waves were physically real, and, to that extent, rele-
> gating particles to somewhat less a real status than in Born's
> idea];[31] the question: what is matter cannot be answered by physical
> experiments alone, but requires a philosophical analysis of physics.
> Its answer is seen to be dependent on the question: what is know-
> ledge? [Reichenbach's emphases].[32]

Reichenbach referred to "polarities"[33] and "the principle of anomaly
which can be derived from the foundations of quantum mechanics,"[34]
whereas the above-mentioned physicists did use less harsh language to

to demark the limits of our knowledge of this class of (observable) phenomena from that class (of unobservables). But Reichenbach remained obstinate in his pessimistic attitude and declared that the softer language of the physicists whom he has cited--the "complementarity of quantum mechanics"[35]--cannot be employed in describing the bifurcated polarized reality that does in fact exist in post-quantum physical theory.

Heisenberg himself assumed a more optimistic attitude (regarding our knowledge of reality) in the face of the split in reality between the unknowable, unobservable microscopic "world of little things," and the knowable, observable "world of big things," than did the pessimistic Reichenbach. In a 1962 article on "Planck's Discovery and the Philosophical Problems of Atomic Physics,"[36] Heisenberg denied any subjective element in natural science as long as we remember that that science is our knowledge and elaborate description of the workings of nature and not an exposition of nature in its entirety as apart from the observations of man. Given this assumption, the observations of man will now avoid subjectivity and will not distort the observed objects, because it is assumed we are incapable of distorting them.

> 'In atomic physics, the observations can no longer be objectified in such a simple manner: that is, they cannot be referred to something that takes place objectively or in a describable manner in space and time. Here it remains still to be added that the science of nature does not deal with nature itself but in fact with the science [Heisenberg's emphasis] of nature as man thinks and describes it.
> This does not introduce an element of subjectivity into natural science. We do not by any means pretend that occurrences in the universe depend on our observations, but we point out that natural science stands between nature and man and that we cannot renounce the use of man's intuition or innate conceptions.[37]

Heisenberg is here merely denying what Nicholas Capaldi called the
"abortive Copernican revolution in philosophy" which represented the
post-Kantian attempt of subjective idealism to do away with the
substantiality of the objects of reality and to consider only the
perceiving subjects and the experienced or perceived objects as con-
stituting reality (which was synonymous with our knowledge of reality).[38]
While Hume and Kant accepted as part of the real world both objects and
experience and both realized that "there is no metaphysical justification
for the distinction between objects and experience,"[39] Hume's "meta-
physics" will not allow him "to make the distinction between self and
experience."[40] Hume's problem is with the reality of the subject (see
below, p.150), not (and more to the point here) with the relation
between experience and objects. Kant's Copernican revolution recog-
nizes, of course, the reality of the subject, and this is his "great-
ness," for he showed that "a non-empirical self with a priori apparatus
is a necessary condition for knowledge, even scientific knowledge."[41]
But, and to the point here, Kant's Copernican revolution replaced the
rigid Cartesian dualism. Cartesian dualism had attempted to explain
the relationship between objects and experiences, but could not explain
how, in its bifurcated dualistic world, subjects came to traffic with
experiences, let alone with objects (which the subject could know
only through the mediatory experiences). Capaldi's schematization of
the world of Cartesian dualism was as follows:[42]

subject(s)   experience(s)   object(s)

The Copernican revolution of Kant would avoid both Cartesian dualism and the later subjective idealism of the post-Kantian during the early nineteenth century. At the same time, though, the more recon- ciliatory Kantian dualism (a "natural" dualism) assumed subject could traffic with object through experiences, or, through the subject's reconciliation of its a priori categories of knowledge with the independent objects as filtered through experiences. Subjects meet objects halfway, and "experiences" are just as much the language so to speak, of objects, as they are of the subject's a priori categories of understanding. Capaldi illustrated the Kantian scheme[43] as follows:

```
  ( S )  ──────→  ( E )  ←──────  ( O )
(subjects)    (experiences)    (objects)
```

But Capaldi seemed to think this scheme as a precursor of the modern "sophisticated subjectivism" in which "E" is the "world of phenomenology" and "S" is the "rules of language" which merely express or describe phenomenological reality.[44] A "complete Copernican Revolution" would consist, said Capaldi, of the "negation of (E), and a universe consist- ing solely of (S) and (O) interacting without intermediaries,"[45] or, as follows:

```
  S ⇄ O
```

The Kantian Copernican revolution, as distinguished from the "complete Copernican Revolution," recognized a three-tiered reality of subjects/ experiences/objects (and, Capaldi noted, Kant is here one with James Beattie, the Scottish Enlightenment Common-Sense realist,[46] who was

favorably reviewed by Burke in the 1773 issue of the Annual Register.
Kant attempted to reconcile the three realms (or, rather, the two
realms, for "experiences" are merely the by-products of the interaction
between subject and object).

It seems that Capaldi's attitude--his wish for a complete
Copernican revolution--is similar to Reichenbach's view that the
substantiality of matter is hopelessly beyond the knowledge of man,
so that the question of "What is matter," necessarily becomes dependent
on the answer to the question, "What is knowledge?" In other words,
Capaldi's "complete" revolution in philosophy--the immediate interaction
between subject and object--seems to invite a repetition of the epistemo-
logical consequences of the rigid, bifurcating Cartesian dualism. That
is, in a rigid dualism, either mind (Descartes) or matter (Hume) is
exclusively equated with reality (our knowledge of reality) and all
else is derivative.

But Kant's limited revolution in philosophy would view know-
ledge as consisting of the questions both of "What is matter" and
"What is knowledge?". In this sense, Kant is closer to the untroubled
quantum mechanics of say, de Broglie, who could accept matter (light)
as of both particles and of waves. Or, Kant is closer to Born's
attitude of the "complementarity of quantum mechanics," which would
accept the unobservability of the "world of small things," while avoid-
ing, at the same time, shoving that realm off into a remote corner of
reality, as Cartesian dualism might, and equating the observable "world
of large things" with the totality of reality, and equating our know-
ledge of this reality with a knowledge of final things.

Ernst Cassirer explained, in terms more optimistic than Reichenbach, and more in line with the Kantian conciliatory attitude, the philosophical significance of post-quantum mechanics.[47] Cassirer saw the attitude of Keats' "negative capability" (or what Burke called Newton's "patient Thought"--see Appendix A) as common among many of the earlier theorists of quantum mechanics. That is, those holding to the inexact quantum theory were capable of living with the ambiguities and uncertainties which inhabited the grey area between the assumptions of classical (Newtonian) physics and those of quantum theory.

Cassirer saw Bohr's correspondence principle as an attempt to bridge classical and quantum concepts of reality:

> The correspondence principle, as Bohr emphasizes, is an expression for the endeavour, despite the basic opposition between the postulates of quantum theory and classical theories, to utilize by suitable reinterpretation every feature of the classical theories in the development of the quantum theory.
> Accordingly, the contrast between the classical viewpoint and that of quantum theory was not to be obliterated, nor could the chasm between the two be properly bridged. But by means of the correspondence principle a methodological, heuristic maxim was set up which was to guide the course of research and instruct it to use the different types of laws in such a manner as to lead to a unified description of natural events.[48]

Heisenberg, continued Cassirer, would use the "laws of classical physics" in order to shape the observer's approach to knowledge of the empirical world.[49]

> . . . So little do Heisenberg's uncertainty relations (including his principle of indeterminacy) waive the assumption of strict laws of nature that they actually give directions as to how to arrive at, and how to formulate, these laws in order to make them conform to the conditions of our empirical knowledge. [He says that] . . . all statements in physics have a relative character in that they can express the state of the observed object never 'in itself' but merely in relation to the means of observation used.[50]

This sets limitations to our knowledge of experience, including our "formulation of physical concepts."[51] For example, we know that in order to plot the positions of an electron, the electron must be illuminated, but also that this illumination changes the course of the electron from its original path. This is called the "Compton effect." But if we take into account the Compton effect, together with, for instance, the fact that "the shorter the wave length of the light used, the more precise will be the determination of position,"[52] we recognize both the limitations of our knowledge and yet arrive at ever more precise calculations of the behavior of matter.[53] Heisenberg's uncertainty relations still apply to the observable world of "big things," but they also conform to law, which is the "general requirement of causality."[54] The uncertainty relations "may correct the formulation of the causal principle [of reality] but they cannot simply deny or overthrow its content."[55]

The introduction of limiting conditions of our knowledge of matter merely requires that we give a "fresh determination and interpretation"[56] to our observations and knowledge of matter, not that we deny determination or causality. For example, Cassirer wrote that the "causal realtion, if interpreted in a critical rather than a metaphysical sense," should be seen to contain "a statement not immediately about things, but about experience. . . . It expresses something about the structure of empirical knowledge. . . ."[57] This doesn't involve any distortion of the observed events, but enhances and makes ever more precise our knowledge of the observable events. When experience shows that there are "limits to our observation," we

only have more "respect" for the new phenomenal matrix in which we
may apply the old "causal thinking." Cassirer refers here to "the
newly discovered _factual_ realm"[58] (emphasis added). This process of
discovery "by no means renounced the requirement of determination;
but it had to arrive at a new conceptual means in order to do justice
to it. . . ."[59] This is the sense in which "Heisenberg established a
causal law of quantum mechanics."[60] "Determination is thus re-estab-
lished," but only for "those measurements which, according to the
principles of quantum mechanics, are not capable of any increase in
precision,"[61] or, those measurements of the observable phenomena.

Cassirer concluded his chapter on the "Foundations of Quantum
Theory" with a summary of the "general epistemological situation"
left in the wake of quantum physical theories. The post-quantum (and
quasi-classical) epitemological situation is similar to the "limited"
Kantian Copernican Revolution (supra, p.136). The "strict dualism"
(as Cassirer called it) of the post-quantum epistemology, is akin to
Kant's natural dualism in that both schools of though maintain the
separateness of questions or reality and of questions of knowledge,
by offering a theory of our intermediate knowledge, involving what
Capaldi called "experiences." In post-quantum epistemology, Cassirer
wrote,

> . . . a firm connection between knowledge and reality is estab-
> lished, as well as a thoroughgoing correspondence between the
> two, in which, however, a strict dualism is contained. For
> however much we may extend and refine the sign system of our
> concepts, it always remains merely a mediate expression of
> reality. The objectively real is presupposed as something
> persisting and substantial, but in its substantial existence
> it cannot fit into the sign language of our concepts of
> nature. . . .[62]

Cassirer rejected the epistemology of "'naive realism.'"[63] Naive

realism assumes the existence of "absolute, completely determined

entities from which we can immediately read off the laws and to which

we can attach them as their attributes."[64] Such assumed givens of

man's experience would be similar to what Kant called, and denied,

the "intellectual intuition" of things-in-themselves (see supra, p.

sources of our knowledge of reality.

The process of knowledge involves first, limiting our knowledge

to a certain realm of reality--a realm beyond which the quark search,

for example, would take us, or the search for the "essence" of matter,

the indivisible atom of classical physics--and determining the inter-

mediate character of our knowledge of reality in general. We thereby

arrive at a more precise knowledge, including the formulation of laws,

of the reality which a priori, the mind is determined capable of appre-

hending.

Our knowledge attains objectivity without distorting reality,

or rather, our knowledge is objective because we have taken great pains

to see that that reality is not distorted.[66] Cassirer wrote:

. . . What in fact constitutes the content of our empirical
knowledge is rather the totality of observations which we
group together in definite orders and which, in accordance
with this process of ordering, we can represent by theoretical
laws. The extent of the dominance of these laws marks the
extent of our objective knowledge. Objectivity or objective
reality is attained only because and insofar as there is con-
formity to law--not vice versa. Thus it follows that we cannot
speak of physical entities except under the conditions of physical
cognition. . . . We do not simply read off the laws from the
object [as the pseudo-Newtonians did when they equated "Nature"
with a machine-like rationalism (see Appendix A), or as the
Shaftesburian Moral Sense school did when they divinized "Nature"
(see Chapter III)]--we condense its laws, and thus into objective
statements, the empirical data available through observation and

measurement. Apart from this reality there exists for us no
other objective reality to be investigated or sought after.[67]

Kant and Cassirer seem to be saying that since naive realism rejects

an intermediate theory of knowledge, any objective knowledge is then

impossible.

The moral implications of naive realism include a passive, non-

critical, non-discriminating approach to the (supposed) immediate

objects of experience. Nature and man, object and subject, become

confused. All "'moral appraisal'" or the choosing to act according

to objective standards, is lost.[68]

One may see in Burke's kinship with the eighteenth-century

"philosophical historians" the similarity of his thought with that of

the "limited" Kantian Copernican Revolution and the assumptions of

post-quantum epistemological theory. Burke and the new philosophical

historians rejected the naive realism of the naked facts of history

--and sought to bring these facts into some kind of coherent system--

without distorting the substantiality of the givens of history (see

Appendix D). In Cassirer's terminology, the philosophical historians

sought to discover the laws of historical experience, while maintaining

the independent reality of the objects of history. Heisenberg's words

are remembered here: "'natural science stands between nature and man.'"[69]

The book from which this citation from Heisenberg was taken, is titled

The Imagination of an insurrection. Dublin Easter, 1916, by William

Irwin Thompson.

Thompson's book is an attempt to trace the origins, direct and

indirect, of a significant historical event to, in a great degree, its

literary origins. It is an attempt to trace these origins to
thoughts in the minds of participants of the historical action,
thoughts which impelled the making of history. Just as the attitude
of genuine Newtonianism, of the "limited" Kantian Copernican Revolu-
tion, of Burke and the new "philosophical historians," and of the
post-quantum theories of physics and knowledge--just as these combine
a complex view of the givens of reality with an active, dynamic
subject shaping the givens of reality into the more coherent "experiences"
of reality--so Thompson described the literary works of William Butler
Yeats, AE, Sean O'Casey, etc., which "intensified the nationalistic
consciousness of a generation of Irishmen" prior to 1916,[70] and put
them in a favorable "frame of mind" to shape history. Otherwise, the
vast complexity of the historical/phenomenal realm would overawe and
shape men's lives and actions. Thompson certainly did not deny this
complexity when he said:

> In the causality of the cultural process, A does not simply
> cause B: A affects B; B reaffects A; AB conditions the emergence
> of C, and before C is fully appeared, D is already coming forth
> with an effect that will entirely transform the completed ABCD.
> And even in such a grossly oversimplified four-term sequence,
> the greatest oversimplification is A, for the alpha that interests
> us may be the omega of a sequence that is absolutely necessary to
> the understanding of it.[71]

The (philosophical) historian is not frustrated by this complexity, but
is only made aware of the need to shape it according to the a priori
conditions of his knowledge of reality, so that that reality will not
envelope him. Thompson continued:

> The historian is thus forced to select, but since everything is
> related, [as it is both as regarding theories of reality and theories
> of knowledge in the Moral Sense Shaftesburian/Pope/Hutchesonian
> school], he must be able to select the relevant from the related-
> ness of all things. In short, the historian must already possess

the knowledge he is seeking to acquire. To understand history, one must stand outside history, not just to avoid bias, but to be able to perceive distinctness and relation. This separation of subject and object was a difficulty in classical theories of perception. . . .[72]

Thompson then cited (as a parallel in physical theory to the above historical theory) Heisenberg's confident separation of subject and object, observer and observed, which yet avoids any subjectivity. This is one of the problems which the eighteenth-century "philosophical historians" had attempted to solve. Peter Hans Reill wrote that

By the sixth and seventh decade of the eighteenth century, the problem of the relationship between the observed and the observer, and the influences upon a thinker due to social, historical, and intellectual forces . . . became vital.[73]

As shown elsewhere (see Appendix D), the eighteenth-century "philosophical historians" believed the problem to be solvable.

The Scottish writers also, as sociological historians or as "limited primitivists (see Chapter III), implicitly assumed they could discern structure and form in the evolutionary processes stretching from the primitive to the civilized state, without at the same time distorting that perceived historical/phenomenal process. The past was considered to be, in the language of quantum theory, part of the observable world of "big things," not the unobservable world of "little things." A modern sociological historian has perhaps defined more concisely the benefits to be derived from the study of a structural past, a past which need not be distorted because of any applied analysis, but, on the contrary, made more evident to present historians. Philip Abrams recently wrote:

. . . Many current accounts of the historians' past, requiring as they do a wholesale rejection of any form of structural analysis,

strike me as no better suited than the normal version of the
sociologist's past to deal with these issues. . . . What I
have tried to do is to show how one could begin to move
towards a more penetrating historical sociology. The essen-
tial step is not to abandon the structural typing of past and
present but rather to recognize that the function of structural
types is not to allow us to by-pass history by inferring logically
necessary tendencies, but on the contrary to direct attention to
those kinds of historical inquiry which we should expect, theoreti-
cally, to explain phenomena of structural transformation.[74]

Translated into eighteenth-century thought, Carlyle's mad

Mahometan Caliph dipping his head in the enchanted water, would have

done better to dip his head into one of the Leibnizian monads. He could

then have beaten out, not one minute into seven long years, but an

infinity out from any one of the self-sufficient monads which individually

reflected the universe in its entirety, and which together, formed a con-

tinuum throughout the Leibnizian plenum. The form and structure of time

and space (or place, or, of an historical setting) is nonexistent in

the monodology of Leibniz. Therefore, any knowledge of observed phenom-

ena (historical as well as empirical) is destined to be frustrated in

its attempts to discern structure in the wrongly-assumed observables,

because confronted with infinity directly before its very nose. Leibniz

held that,

If a person were able to cognize distinctly all that is happening
in or appearing to him at the present moment, he could foresee all
that will happen to him or appear to him forever.[75]

In this monism, the subject and object are not merely confused as to the

space they occupy, but also as to the time they are about (or--past and

present, and future, are confused with one another in this continuum).

From the epistemological standpoint, or, from the perceiving

subject's view, and, in the language of quantum physics, the monads are

of the "world of small things" and therefore properly outside the realm of human knowledge. It was in order to avoid the inevitable frustration of the attempt to know or feel (the structure or form of historical/phenomenal) "unobservables" that Kant opposed the popular eighteenth-century "physico-theological proof."[76] This was also why Burke opposed the "fatalism and necessity" (as he puts it) and "rationalism" of the school of Leibniz/Pope/Shaftesbury/Bolingbroke.[77] Specifically, Kant's "empirical realism" corresponds to the methodology of the Scottish sociological historians of two centuries and/or to Philip Abram's "historical sociologists" of the twentieth century. Kant's empirical realism is an instance of his natural dualism in which subject and object (present and past) are separate, yet traffic with each other somehow, and, to a certain extent, form one another. Although, as Copleston said, Kant's argument is "somewhat involved," it is clear that if an historian followed Kant's methodology, the historian could successfully discover a structure in historical phenomena without confusing or subjectivizing those phenomena. Copleston described Kant's position in this respect:

Kant argues that internal experience is possible only through external experience. [Kant's argument was that] . . . I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time [the historian of his present setting]. But all determination in time, in respect, that is, of succession [of pattern, of cause and effect relationships], presupposes the existence of something permanent in perception. But this something permanent cannot be something within myself. For it is the condition of my existence in time. It follows, therefore, that the perception of my own existence in time is possible only through the existence of something real outside me. Consciousness in time is thus necessarily connected with the existence of external things; that is, not merely with the representations [Copleston's emphasis] of things external to me.
The point made by Kant is thus that I cannot be conscious of myself except mediately, that is to say, through the immediate consciousness of external things. . . .[78]

For the historian or philosopher to be conscious of himself as exist-
ing in a certain setting is not, or should not, infer that this reali-
zation sets him hopelessly against the notion of investigating the
empirical or historical objects of his enquiry. On the contrary,
"armed" with this realization of an intimate relation with his external
setting, he will not internalize the independent, external reality
which he is investigating, such as the Leibnizian rationalists and
other physico-theologists did.

Needless to say, the historian or philosopher following Kant's
words, would not be liable to infer the absolutes (invoked in the
physico-theological argument) from his own experience. The laws which
the people of the eighteenth century—the correct Newtonians, the
sociological historians—attempted to discover in natural or historical
phenomena—would more likely come out of a genuinely objective phenom-
enal order.

Arthur O. Lovejoy's "critical realism," like Kant's "empirical
realism," assumed that one of the reasons for the decline of the
"Great Chain of Being" concept (a form of the physico-theological
argument) toward the end of the eighteenth century was

. . . due to the fallacy of transcribing the temporal terms of
concrete existence into the eternal [absolute] forms of the
Platonic essences. The temporal [phenomenal/historical] world
is a contingent one, . . . 'its magnitude, its pattern, its
habits, which we call laws, have something arbitrary and idio-
syncratic about them. . . .'[79]

The historian need not, though, become one of Lovejoy's "anti-intel-
lectual rationalists" whose " . . . rationality when considered as
complete, as excluding all arbitrariness, becomes itself a kind of

irrationality. . . ."[80] Any "irrational" arbitrariness does not

result from the search for structures or laws of natural and histori-

cal phenomena, but from a wrong-headed theory of reality (such as the

monism of Leibniz or Cartesian continuum, and of the physico-theologi-

cal arguments), and its mate, a facile theory of knowledge of this

ill-perceived reality. The natural dualism of Kant, of the Scottish

writers, of Newton and his non-impetuous followers--and of Burke--

avoids, in regard to theories of reality, the kind of irrational arbi-

trariness of which Lovejoy spoke. But the latter group may at the

same time seek patterns and laws in an a priori-recognized independent

and objective nature and/or history.

Chapman's Burke seemed to assume the independent reality of

all three categories--transcendent ideal, perceiving subject, and the

reality of the phenomenal world, whether perceived or not--as did the

Scottish Common-Sense school of realism. Chapman's Burke may be

distinguished from the Burke portrayed by Strauss and Stanlis, who

place him within a rigid, hierarchical natural law tradition, a

tradition which considers the human subject and the phenomenal world

in general as derivative.

Leslie Stephen's criticism of Hume's scepticism warned of the

deficiencies inherent in such a position as Hume's which denies the

possibility of drawing a line between the subjective and the objective,

without distorting either realm. To Hume, perception and sensation

are synonymous; every perception depends on the defective sensations,

and therefore "cannot have that reality which is to be found in the

transcendental world alone, where it is assumed we might see things

unaffected by the character of our eyes [our senses]." But our senses
are our exclusive way to interpreting reality.

> . . . If we take an object to pieces in our imagination, we find
> that, when we have removed all the qualities known to us by our
> senses, we have removed everything. The supposed 'abstract idea,'
> which remains behind, is, as Berkeley has shown, a mere empty word.
> A thing is the sum of its qualities; and what we call the abstract
> idea of a triangle is but the idea of a particular triangle regarded
> as representative of an indefinite multitude of other triangles.
> Thus, whenever an idea is suggested as corresponding to some inde-
> pendent reality, Hume challenges it to give an account of itself.
> Can we trace the derivation to some previous impression? If we
> cannot, it is an empty word. If we can, it must share the unreality
> of the impression which it represents. . . .[81]

There remains no distinction between the external and the internal; there
is nothing outside of us for "every object of thought is either a sensa-
tion or the representative of a sensation, an actual or a decaying impres-
sion. . . ."[82] Stephen is next to contemptuous of Reid as a philosopher,
seeing the Scotsman as seeking merely a "justification of the ordinary
beliefs of mankind;"[83] Reid does not even justify his principles, but
takes them for granted, because any "attempt to advance beyond our
premises can only lead us into hopeless scepticism [therefore], we may
as well stay where we are."[84] The influence of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson
and the early Moral Sense school is direct upon Reid, according to
Stephen (and when a number of commentators have seen an influence of
the Moral Sense philosophy on the thought of Burke who viewed--or
reviewed, in the Annual Register--Reid's philosophy favorably, Stephen's
correlation between the Moral Sense school and Reid's affects our view
of Burke), and is reflected in Reid's falling back upon the support
of the Deity when Reid comes upon a principle which cannot be proved.
"As with Hume we can only observe the sequence of phenomena, but now we

assume that a divine power causes the sequence to be invariable,"[85] rather than that cunning or feigning of the mind that Hume says is responsible for making it appear the atomistic sensations, "pitifully naked and destitute"[86] are part of a system larger or more profound than the sum of themselves. Stephen forgets that Reid was the first philosopher to articulate the distinction between sensation and perception (a partial use of the reason), and many other distinctions as a result of this primary distinction within his comprehensive system. That such is a true representation of Reid's philosophy is shown elsewhere in this study. Nonetheless, Stephen does help us to understand the general intellectual climate in Britain in which Reid and his school flourished. Stephen sees two lines of escape from the radical individualism of Hume, who held that the "single method of discovering truth was to examine the furniture supposed to be stored in that receptacle."[87] One line was the philosophy of Kant, and the other line was the "introduction of the Social element"[88] onto the nominalistic scepticism of Hume and the English empirical tradition.

CHAPTER V

NOTES

[1]Frederick Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, 1964, 1957), Vol. V., Part II, p. 169.

[2]Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, translated by Fritz C. A. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962, 1955; originally published by T. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen, 1932), p. 8.

[3]Ibid., p. 99.

[4]Ibid., pp. 94-96.

[5]Ibid., p. 96.

[6]Ibid., p. 99.

[7]Ibid., p. 97.

[8]Idem.

[9]Idem.

[10]Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Etc., Ed., James Mark Baldwin, 3 volumes (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1911), Vol. I, p. 520.

[11]Ibid., Vol. II, p. 710.

[12]Cassirer, Philosophy of the Enlightenment, p. 98.

[13]Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1911), Vol. I, p. 520.

[14]Cassirer, Philosophy of the Enlightenment, pp. 98-99.

[15]Ibid., pp. 99-100.

[16]For Reid on the relation of mind to matter, see D. Daiches Raphael, The Moral Sense (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 146-147.

[17]Hans Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (Berkeley, Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1962), p. 269.

[18]Ibid., p. 269.

[19]The discussion here of some of the assumptions of Heisenberg's principles as paralleling certain views of the content of eighteenth-century thought, is carried on in an attitude similar to that of Stuart Hampshire, when he said recently in a symposium on eighteenth-century thought: "' . . . There is the danger of picking individual quotations and then finding parallels, say, to the indeterminacy principle, in something the Greeks said. This obviously misjudges the nature of the natural sciences, but in philosophy and in general cultural stylistic issues which are associated with a philosophical idea, I do think you get genuine recurrences of the kind that he (Ronald Paulsen) talks about. . . .'" "Discussion," following article by Lester G. Crocker, "What is modern about the Eighteenth Century?" (pp. 87-96), in Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture. Proceedings. The American Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies, Vol. I, The Modernity of the Enlightenment, Ed., Louis T. Milac (Cleveland and London: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1971), p. 94. See immediately below for the significance of Heisenberg's uncertainty principles and the subject/object problem of theories of (historical) knowledge.

[20]Paul Hazard, European Thought in the Eighteenth Century. From Montesquieu to Lessing (Cleveland and N.Y.: Meridian Books, The World Publishing Company, 1967, 1946), Part III, "Disaggregation," Book 1, chapter ii, pp. 284-308.

[21]Ibid., p. 286.

[22]Ibid., pp. 307-308.

[23]Reichenbach, op. cit., p. 186; see Reichenbach's chapter on quantum physics, Chapter Eleven, "Are There Atoms?", pp. 166-190.

[24]Ibid., p. 189.

[25]Ibid., p. 170.

[26]Ibid., p. 177.

[27]Ibid., p. 186.

[28]Ibid., p. 173.

[29]Ibid., p. 174.

[30]Ibid., p. 175.

[31]The Table of Contents of an elementary physics textbook indicates the present state of quantum mechanics. Section 2 or Part I is headed, "The Particle Properties of Waves," while Section 3 of Part I is headed, "The Wave Properties of Particles," Arthur Beiser, Concepts of Modern Physics (N.Y., Toronto, London: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1963).

[32]Reichenbach, ibid., p. 176.

[33]Ibid., p. 188.

[34]Ibid., p. 184.

[35]Ibid., p. 188.

[36]W. Heisenberg, "Planck's Discovery and the Philosophical Problems of Atomic Physics" in On Modern Physics (N.Y.: 1962), p. 20.

[37]William Irwin Thompson, The Imagination of an Insurrection. Dublin, Easter, 1916 (N.Y.: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1972, 1967), p. 234.

[38]Nicholas Capaldi, "The Copernican Revolution in Hume and Kant" in Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress, held at the University of Rochester, March 30-April 4, 1970, Ed., Lewis White Beck (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1970), pp. 234-240, esp. 238-239.

[39]Ibid., pp. 236, 238.

[40]Idem.

[41]Capaldi, ibid., p. 238.

[42]Ibid., p. 235.

[43]Ibid., p. 238.

[44]Ibid., p. 239.

[45]Idem.

[46]Capaldi, ibid., pp. 236, 240.

[47]Ernst Cassirer, Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics. Historical and Systematic Studies of the Problem of Causality, translated by O. Theodor Benfrey, with a Preface by Henry Margenau (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press; London: Geoffrey Gumberlage, Oxford University Press, 1956).

[48]Ibid., p. 112. In his chapter on Newton's distinction between theory and hypothesis (see Appendix A), Trenchard More wrote that " . . . it is fortunate that, on the whole, the Newtonian method has prevailed and has made possible the growth of physics into the most nearly exact of the sciences. But it is unfortunate that the hypothetical method in science still confuses the issue and prevents us from distinguishing between the objective and the subjective worlds--between science and humanism," (Louis Trenchard More, Isaac Newton, A Biography [N.Y.: Dorer

Publications, Inc., 1962, 1934], P. 103.) or, in the terms used here, between theories of reality and theories of knowledge. When one realized the similar dualism of the classical formulation and approach to the "unified description of natural events," one may more easily understand Heisenberg's attempt at reconciliation between classical and quantum physical theories.

[49]Ibid., p. 121.

[50]Ibid., p. 122.

[51]Idem. Cassirer later pointed out (Chapter 13, "Concluding Remarks and implications for Ethics," ibid., pp. 197-213, esp. p. 201), that Kant's "doctrine of morality rests entirely on that distinction . . . the division of all objects whatsoever into phenomena and noumena." But this distinction is "carried through . . . only in a 'transcendental' sense. The 'sensuous world' (nature) and the 'intellectual world' (freedom, morality) are thus not posited as two opposing absolute forms of being and for that reason the necessity for this opposition must be derived from principles of knowledge" (emphases added) (ibid., p. 201).

[52]Idem.

[53]Or again, by limiting our knowledge as in the above example, we acquire in the process a "renewed analysis" of the causal principle of classical physics--we can "prevent the stealthy introduction in the formulation of the causal principle of elements which are in principle unobservable" (ibid., p. 127), elements of the "world of little things," as Reichenbach put it. Heisenberg recently (1973) applauded the idea of limits in quantum mechanics, and saw such a methodology as prologue to the discovery of new laws of matter. At a symposium on Copernicus, held at the National Academy of Sciences in Washington, D.C., Heisenberg warned of the wrong-headed philosophical assumptions behind the futile search for unobservables. " . . . the mechanical views after Newton have been rather Democritan, especially atomic physics in the last century . . . the Platonic view is (rather) really the deepest of the views . . .

"Plato was right and Democritus was wrong. . . . We should not look for the smallest particles, as Democritus did . . . this ever-continued search for the quark (sub-quanta) particles is a consequence of the wrong philosophy. . . . You are just close to an essential point in philosophy, merely, the ontological question of whether mathematical structures are forms in the mind, or whether they are there before the human mind ever was created.

"There is a very great difference between this kind of objective idealism of Plato and, let us say, the more subjective idealism of the nineteenth century. I would definitely be in favor of the objective idealism of Plato." Heisenberg is convinced that such fruitless search, as a science, has come to an end. He seems to be implying that unless the search is not declared closed, the laws which have hitherto guided the search after quarks and their behavior will possibly begin to arrive

at distorted results, that is, crossing the line between observable and unobservable phenomena without knowing it, without being aware of the distorting effect of observer on observed, or of the unknowable qualities of the phenomena itself. "I am rather convinced that such a field as elementary as particle physics can come to a close like thermodynamics, or like optical atomic spectra, which has come to a close. . . ." (The Nature of Scientific Discovery. A Symposium Commemorating the 500th Anniversary of the Birth of Nicholas Copernicus, Ed., Owen Gingerich [Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Press, 1975] ["The Fifth International Symposium of the Smithsonian Institution organized jointly with the National Academy of Science in Cooperation with the Copernicus Society of America] "Discussion with Professor Heisenberg," pp. 556-573, p. 566.) This does not infringe or delimit our knowledge of phenomena, because now, declared Heisenberg, with as fine a line as possible drawn between observable and non-observables, we can proceed to "look for symmetries instead of entities" in the former world (ibid., p. 565). Burke had a similar attitude toward the "quiet happiness" of a wisdom which accepted human limitations, as a corollary of, not passively following nature, but of rather accepting the reality of nature (see supra., p. 46). This is Burke's realism. The acceptance of man's limitations involves another corollary besides those of safeguarding the substantiality and independence of observable nature, and of the resultant greater ability of man to more precisely shape and synthesize that nature. Man now avoids seeking "lost causes," so to speak, and avoids the inevitable frustration which results from such activity. In Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics, Cassirer wrote:

"The entities of physics, its empirical objects, are of course never completely given, because they are never completely determined; but on the other hand they no longer threaten us as a mysterious impenetrable absolute to whose last roots we cannot reach. For the attributes of their empirical and theoretical determinability is now included in their definition; this determinability constitutes physical entities, instead of merely expressing an accidental and individual feature of them. . . ." (Cassirer, Determinism and Indeterminism, p. 132.)

Both the independent reality of the phenomenal world and man's more perfect knowledge of this world were safeguarded by limiting man's knowledge in the above fashion. This is the effect of Cassirer's denial of man's knowledge of the "completely given" empirical objects of physics (corresponding to Kant's unknowable noumena--see immediately above), and, one might say, the effect of Newton's denial of the Aristotelian occult qualities (see Appendix A) which some writers of Newton's day would still assign to the objects of nature. Such Aristotelian notions of nature would onlys serve to frustrate man's would-be knowledge of that never-to-be-known nature.

[54]Ibid., p. 123.

[55]Ibid., p. 124. See Stephen G. Brush, "Irreversibility and Indeterminism: Fourier to Heisenberg," Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. XXXVII, Number 4 (October-December, 1976), pp. 603-630. Brush

emphasized the fact that prominent post-quantum physicists did not
deny the existence of the absolute determinism of classical physical
laws, but merely questioned the certainty of our knowledge of such
laws. The "transition from determinism to indeterminism" was really
a transition from determinism to uncertainty. This involves the
formulation of new theories of knowledge, rather than the overturning
of previously-held theories of reality. Brush wrote that post-quantum
physicists such as,

> ". . . Rutherford . . . Maxwell, Boltzmann, Planck, and Einstein,
> would find it inconceivable that anything in nature could happen
> 'by chance' without any cause at all. Hence, whenever we find them
> using the words 'probability,' 'chance,' 'statistical,' or 'sponta-
> neous,' we must assume that such terms only refer to our lack of
> knowledge of causes, not to the absence of causes [Brush's emphases].
> The fallacy of that interpretation is that it could apply equally
> well to Born and Heisenberg, or to anyone who believes in an 'uncer-
> tainty principle' as distinct from an 'indeterminancy principle.'
> Heisenberg himself emphasized that his principle applies to our
> knowledge about the world [Brush's emphasis]. . . .
>
>   . . .the transition from determinism to indeterminism is linked
> with the positivistic-pragmatic-operationist-instrumentalist-phenom-
> enalist attitude that many physicists adopted in the early twentieth
> century. . . . Positivism . . . is a retreat from the aspiration
> to know and understand [emphasis added] everything, an admonition
> to be content with the partial knowledge that can be attained at a
> particular stage in the development of theory and experiment. A
> positivist may call himself an indeterminist, meaning that his
> science cannot determine that which lies beyond present observation;
> indeterminism is then the same as uncertainty [emphasis added; this
> was the position of Bohr, Heisenberg and Eddington]. Or he may
> call himself a determinist meaning that his theory correlates all
> known or knowable facts [emphasis added] about the observable world,
> and that anything beyond that is not his concern anyway (this was
> Planck's position) . . ."(Brush, ibid., pp. 626-627).

For the continuity between classical and quantum physical (or, epistemo-
logical) theories, see also Joseph Agassi, "Continuity and Discontinuity
in the History of Science," Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. XXXIV,
No. 4 (October-December, 1973), pp. 609-626, and Margaret J. Osler,
"John Locke and the Changing Ideal of Scientific Knowledge," Journal of
the History of Ideas, Vol. XXXI, No. 1 (January-March, 1970), pp. 3-16.
These three articles represent what may be called the post-Kuhnian
historiography of science--Thomas S. Kuhn of M.I.T. stressed the discon-
tinuity of scientific knowledge in his seminal 1962 work, The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions.

[56]Ibid., p. 127.

[57]Ibid., p. 114.

[58]Ibid., pp. 127-128.

59Ibid., p. 127.

60Ibid., p. 128.

61Ibid., p. 128.

62Ibid., p. 130. Cassirer wrote of Newton's thought that it maintained a dualism while still deriving a coherent interpretation of the empirical world, so coherent in fact, that "definite religious tendencies seized upon Newton's work and took it into their service." But "Newton's gravitational theory" itself, for instance, distinguished between theories of reality and theories of our knowledge of reality. "Not only as regards to its substance [theories of reality], but also on the authority of its "form" [literally, usage or method of procedure, and, in the present context, representing the theories of knowledge] it belongs for us purely and exclusively to natural and scientific thought; and if one removes it from this its ground and floor, it seems to lose its meaning. . . ." (Ernst Cassirer, "Die Philosophie im XVII. und XVIII. Jahrhundert," Actualités Scientifiques et Industrielles 841. Philosophie Chronique Annuelle [publiee par L'Institut International de Collaboration Philosophique], Vol. V [1939], p. 60, [Trans. par R.R.H.].

63Ibid., p. 131.

64Ibid., pp. 131-132.

65Reid's realism was not a naive realism in this sense (see Arthur R. Greenberg, "Hamilton and Reid's Realism," The Modern Schoolman, Volume LIV, Number 1 [November, 1976], pp. 15-32, esp. pp. 15-17.

66The late Lionel Trilling seemed to have been anwering the reductive, pessimistic argument of Reichenbach's description of Heisenberg's views, when Trilling described "objectivity" as both the state of the mind's fullest expansion, and the "respect" for the independence of the objects of perception.
". . . Objectivity is by no means an invention of science. It is by no means a limitation upon the range of perception. It does not imply the devaluation of the object that is preceived, its characteristic purpose is not reductive.
Actually the opposite is so. The aim of what we properly call objectivity is the fullest possible recognition of the integral and entire existence of the object . . . objectivity is the effort 'to see the object, as in itself it really is.' The object, whether it be a phenomena of nature, or a work of art, or an idea or a system of ideas, or a social problem, or, indeed, a person (or an historical event[s]), is not to be seen as it, or he or she, appears to our limited thought, to our predilections and prejudices, to our casual or hasty inspection, but as it really is in itself, in its own terms, in these alone. . . .
It is an effort which can never wholly succeed. That it must at least partially fail, that the object as in itself it really is can never finally be known, is guaranteed by the nature of individual

persons, by the nature of society, even, the philsophers tell us,
by the nature of the mind itself.   In the face of the certainty
that the effort of objectivity will fall short of what it aims
at, those who undertake to make the effort do so out of something
like a sense of intellectual honor, and out of the faith that in
the practical life, which includes the moral life, some good must
follow from even the relative success of the endeavor." (Lionel
Trilling,Mind in the Modern World ["The 1972 Jefferson Lecture in
the Humanities"] [N.Y.: The Viking Press, 1973], pp. 33-34.)
What might be called the objective limitation of the human mind's inves-
tigation and analysis of objects (in the broadest sense), was for
Trilling, as it was for Cassirer and for Heisenberg, a process which
led, not to pessimism and frustration, but rather to precision and
confidence in our knowledge of reality.

[67]Ibid., p. 132, p. 137.

[68]See Cassirer, Determinism and Indeterminism, Chapter 13,
passim.   For "moral appraising," see P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (London:
Penguin Books, 1954), pp. 176-182.

[69]See Maurice Mandelbaum, History, Man & Reason (Baltimore &
London: 1974, 1971), p. 46.

[70]William Irwin Thompson, op. cit., p. 233.

[71]Idem.

[72]Thompson, ibid., p. 234.   This is not unlike what Harriet
Gilliam recently called the " . . . empirical [Gilliam's emphasis]
impulse" of the idealist historiography by R. G. Collingwood and Michael
Oakeshott.   The representative (subjective) idealist F. H. Bradley had
" . . . conceived mental life as an 'immediate flow of feelings and
sensations, devoid of all reflection and self-knowledge.'   But, as the
idealists of the twentieth century--Collingwood and Oakeshott especially
--were to realize, this description of experience is such as to make all
knowledge of self and other beings impossible.   Collingwood and Oake-
shott, consequently, conceived experience no longer as immediate but
as a 'concrete whole' containing mediation or thought within itself:
'There is no sensation which is not also thought, no intuition which
is not also judgement, no volition which is not also recognition.'
This thesis can be considered another product of an empirical impulse:
it seeks to leave whole what 'analysis divided into experience and what
is experienced. . . ." (Harriet Gilliam, "The Dialectics of Realism and
Idealism in Modern Historiographic Theory," History and Theory, Vol. XV,
No. 3 [1976], p. 235.)

[73]Reill, op. cit., pp. 42, 46.

[74]Philip Abrams, "The Sense of the Past and Origins of Sociology,"
Past and Present, Number 55 (May, 1972), pp. 18-37, esp. p. 32.   In more

colorful language, Thomas Carlyle wrote in his essay, "On History Again" (1833), of the necessity for the historian to "compress" the givens of history into understandable structures (or, to use the fashionable word, paradigms) in order to attain "Universal History," or, objective history. Carlyle wrote: " . . . History, then, before it can become Universal History, needs of all things to be compressed. Were there no epitomizing of History, one could not remember beyond a week. Nay, go to that with it, and exclude compression altogether, we could not remember an hour, or at all; for Time, like Space, is infinitely divisible; and an hour with its events, with its sensations and emotions, might be diffused to such expansion as should cover the whole field of memory, and push all else over the limits. Habit, how-ever, and the natural constitution of man, do themselves prescribe serviceable rules for remembering; and keep at a safe distance from us all such fantastic possibilities;--into which only some foolish Mahometan Caliph, ducking his head in a bucket of enchanted water, and so beating out one wet minute into seven long years of servitude and hardship could fall. The rudest peasant has his complete set of Annual Registers legibly printed in his brain; and, without the smallest training in Muemonics, the proper pauses, subdivisions, and subordinations of the little to the great, all introduced there. Memory and Oblivion, like Day and Night, and indeed like all other Contradictions in this strange dualistic Life of ours, are necessary for each other's existence; Oblivion is the dark page, whereon Memory writes her light-beam characters, and makes them legible; were it all light, nothing could be read there, any more than if it were all darkness. . . ." ([Thomas Carlyle] Carlyle's Complete Works [The Sterling Edition], Vol. III Critical and Miscellaneous Essays, Collected and Republished [Boston: Estes and Lauriat, 1869], p. 79.)

[75]Leibniz. A Collection of Critical Essays, Ed., Harry G. Frankfort (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday Co., Inc., "A Doubleday Anchor Original," 1972), p. 3.

[76]Wolfgang Philipp cited Kant: "'Physicotheology is the attempt of reason to conclude from the purposes of nature to the highest cause of nature and its qualities.'" Wolfgang Philipp, "Physicotheology in the age of Enlightenment: appearance and history," Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (Transactions of the second international congress on the Enlightenment III), Volume LVII (1967), p. 1233. See also Frederick Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy, Volume 6, Modern Philosophy, Part II, Kant (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books [A Division of Doubleday and Co., Inc.], 1964, 1960), p. 168.

[77]See Burke, review of "An Essay on the Genius and Writings of Pope," by Dr. Warton in The Annual Register . . . for the Year 1782 (London: J. Dodsley, 1783), pp. 213-217.

[78]Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. IV, Modern Philosophy, Part II, Kant (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, 1964), p. 67; see also S. Korner, Kant (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, 1964, 1955), p. 93.

[79]Philip P. Wiener, "Towards Commemorating the Centenary of Arthur O. Lovejoy's Birthday (October 10, 1873)," Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. XXXIV, No. 4 (October-December, 1973), p. 597. See also, Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being. A Study of the History of an Idea (N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1965, 1936), espec., Chapter IX, "The Temporalizing of the Chain of Being," pp. 242-287. For Lovejoy's critical realism, see his The Revolt Against Dualism (Chicago: Open Court, 1930), and F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, VIII, ii, pp. 150-153. See also, in the present study, infra., pp.   et passim, and   et passim.

[80]Wiener, "Commemorating the Centenary of A. O. Lovejoy," idem.

[81]Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century (N.Y.: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1902), Vol. I, p. 38.

[82]Leslie Stephen, Thought, Vol. I, p. 39. Also see: David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Ed., Intro. by Ernest C. Mossner (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, 1969), Part IV, Sect. ii, Book I, pp. 238 et passim.

[83]Stephen, ibid., I, p. 51.

[84]Stephen, ibid., I, pp. 52-53.

[85]Stephen, ibid., I, p. 53.

[86]This is Reid's phrase: see Andrew Seth, op. cit., p. 67.

[87]Stephen, ibid., I, p. 50.

[88]Idem, the eighteenth-century Scottish inquiry into the science of society.

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APPENDIX A

A Note on Newtonianism and Pseudo-Newtonianism

in Reid and Burke

The supposed Newtonian immanentization of Nature with the ab-
solutes of the laws of physics has been seen as the distinguishing
characteristic of the Age of Reason. Ernest Barker suggested a general
similarity between the Moral Sense school and Butler in the sense that
both worshipped "Nature" which "was the divinity of the century" and
which had been unravelled by Newton. "'Nature and Nature's laws lay
hid in night:/ God said, Let Newton be! and all was light'." (Pope's
epitaph on Newton).[1] Newton had brought man and God close together
by revealing God's rational design in Nature.

> Newton had supplied a clue to the mighty maze of things, and
> shown the universe to be not mysterious, but gloriously
> rational and comprehensible, moving majestically 'according
> to the ordainer of order and mystical mathematicks of the
> city of God! . . . In the deistical writers of the time (such
> as Collins, Togland, Tindal, or Shaftesbury), religion is
> represented as 'natural,' resting upon the evidence of God's
> wisdom in the creation, and upon the natural moral sense of
> man, which inclines him to love the highest when he sees it.
> In the social and ethical spheres, too, what has been called
> 'moral Newtonianism' became the vogue; gravitation preserved
> the stars from wrong, and in human affairs 'self-love and
> social,' which were ultimately the same, maintained a natural
> equilibrium. Metaphysical or divine sanctions in morality
> were at a discount. . . Even Bishop Butler. . . labours to
> show that 'conscience,' a principle above mere impulse, is
> yet a past of human nature, and derives its authority from
> its 'naturally' commanding position amongst the component
> faculties of man. (Ernest Barker. The Character of England)[2]

So, even Butler succumbed somewhat to what Basil Willey calls the
famous eighteenth century alliance between Nature and Reason."[3]

The upshot here for Burke studies would have Burke a moral Newtonian

of the Shaftesburian (not the mechanistic) variety in which "Nature"

is identified with history, and which in turn the feelings reflect,

but, to which reason must conform. Willey takes Burke at Burke's

most extreme instances of optimistic, monistic "Newtonianism":

> The perfections of our Constitution (Burke) writes, are 'the
> happy effect of following nature, which is wisdom without
> reflection, and above it. . . . By a constitutional policy,
> working after the pattern of nature, we receive, we hold, we
> transmit our government and our privileges, in the same manner
> in which we enjoy and transmit our property and our lives. . . .
> Our political system is placed in a just correspondence and
> symmetry with the order of the world. . .' (Willey says:) All
> this has been achieved by a 'conformity to nature in our arti-
> ficial institutions,' and by calling in the aid of her unerring
> and powerful instincts, to fortify the fallible and feeble con-
> trivances of our reason.[4]

J. H. Plumb has traced more explicitly, if not as precisely, as Willey

did, the development of the "widespread acceptance of Newtonianism

broadly interpreted (my emphasis).[5] Plumb described the dovetailing

of this pervasive climate of faith in the eventual triumph of reason

and observation of external reality to reveal the Design of Nature,

into the strident "anti-intellectualism" of Burke who "made a mystique

of tradition" and whose distrust of empiricism[6] and distrust of critical

reason[7] made him an early representative of a new age (of romanticism)

in which

> . . . the growing forces of occultism and credulity (are
> prominent, and in which). . . the social transference. . .
> was taking place in 'enlightened' attitudes (from the
> governing elite and socially dominant classes to the lower
> orders of society.[8]

Plumb characterized the Enlightenment attitude generally as

> . . . a heightened consciousness of the need for logical and
> experimental processes (and a). . . faith in, and reliance on,

man's capacity to study himself, his institutions, his history, and his social relationships through his intellectual capacities working on the observable.[9]

Locke, more than any one individual, represents the critical rationalists, the critical empiricists, the "sceptical, Baconian, materialist" tone of the Enlightenment, which characterized the Augustan Age in England (1688-1715). But after 1720, Plumb argues, this critical attitude gave way in England to a fear of intellectual, scientific, social and political inquiry until, in the period after 1760, we can see, when contrasted with the Augustan Age, "remarkable" changes in the intellectual climate.[10] Such inquiry as existed in the Augustan Age existed now in the second half of the century only among the dissenters, the rising commercial and industrial classes, and "above all, across the border in Edinburgh and Glasgow."[11] Burke, "whose beliefs were anything but critical and materialist,"[12] and which coincided with the beliefs of Pope,[13] represented the "steady drift away from the principles of criticism"[14] and toward the principles of occultism, credulity, and "rationalization rather than empiricism"[15] of the English governing classes during the period, 1760-1800. Burke's political, constitutional, epistemological theories, or the relative weight he gives to the various faculties of the mind in interpreting reality, and his views of reality itself, and of the universal order of things - all these serve as instruments of rationalizing - or accepting with "credulity" - "Newtonianism broadly interpreted," i.e., the immanentization of the physical order of the Newtonian world through the moral order of human freedom resulting in a reductionist epistemology and ethics. In this case, such reductionism takes the form of a passive,

non-forming faith in the ability of man's observation or "justifica-
tion"[16] of an already-formed physical order of nature. Man's "reason"
will reveal the Reason in Nature--this is what Plumb means when he
says the "step from Newton (or Newtonianism) to rational theology was
easily made"[17]--and since the moral order and the physical order become
synonomous in "Newtonianism broadly interpreted," the mind is passively
affected by sensible or moral objects in either realm. Further, the
reality and independence of objects in the empirical physical world
suffers, because the world of sense objects (or, the course of history,
as a succession of sense-objects) becomes a blank tablet which not so
much justifies as simply displays the a priori rules of action of the
Divine Plan (this is what Plumb presumably means when he says the Divine
Plan of Newtonianism would be revealed by the perceptive intellect).
The substance and spirit of this rational theology which comprises
both the reality of mind and of matter by infusing each within an
immanent pervasive divinely-originated Reason, was captured by Pope's
"Essay on Man."

All Nature is but Art, unknown to thee;
All Chance, Direction, which thou canst see;
All Discord, Harmony, not understood;
All partial Evil, universal Good:
And spite of Pride, in erring Reason's spite,
One truth is clear, 'Whatever is, is right.'[18]

Such a philosophy resulted in a "hardening of tradition (and) a growing
indifference to scientific speculation."[19] Burke's philosophy is in
the line from Newtonianism and the naive rationalistic theological
optimism of Pope:

. . .The rationalization of prejudice, the sanctification of
the status quo, the attribution of historical inevitability

and Divine Providence to inequality and human suffering certainly acquired its most persuasive apologist in Burke. . . .[20]

Burke's reductionist eqistemology and ethics are part of his rational theology.

In a 1965 review of Carl B. Cone's two-volume biography of Burke, Plumb assumed as correct the portrait of Burke in Russell Kirk's The Conservative Mind (1953), a book which gave great impetus, if it did not originate, the post-World War II American Conservative "Cult of Burke."

> . . . Burke believed that wisdom was instinctive and religious rather than rational or intellectual. Time and Providence, the slow revelation of moral law and moral purpose, human wisdom gradually accreted over the centuries like a geological sediment, the poverty of reason compared with the Divine Plan which mysteriously binds past, present and future together, the idea that there is an order, sanctified by God and History, that keep things (and men) fast in their place--these concepts litter Burke's words and speeches.[21]

In this deterministic world in which the physical order overwhelms (or is synonomous with) the moral world (moral law as "accreted over the centuries like a geological sediment"), "reason, or enlightenment. . . are figments of dreams, delusions, fairy lights."[22] We will leave aside for the moment the fact that Burke's writings, and especially his earlier writings [his "Vindication of Natural Society" (1756) and his "Essay on the Sublime and the Beautiful" (1757)][23] which are more philosophically explicit than his later works, --that these earlier efforts are distinct and direct contradictions of any immanent determinism and of any reductionist psychology or ethics; and Burke's writings especially represent philosophical assumptions opposed to a reductionism which takes the form of a vague intuitional ethics internalizing both the principles of ethical action. In this case, the fulcrum, the

center of all thought and action becomes the internal sense, the moral sense, which is passive, non-forming, and derivitive of both the physical and the moral realms. This is the intellectual implication and the historical development (the Moral Sense school) of a misinterpretation of Newton, of a "Newtonianism broadly interpreted" which contributes to "the growing forces of occultism and credulity." Burke, on the contrary, believes in a transcendent ideal; he does not believe in an immanent ideal (in Kantian terminology, Burke could be said to believe in a regulative, heuristic more than in a constitutive ideal), and thus Burke can assume the possibility, and the actuality, of human judgment to freely obey the moral laws and shape, to that extent, the real natural physical world.

Burke's assumptions are not unlike Ira Wade's recent and sympathetic precis of Ernst Cassirer's view of Enlightenment thought. Although to Enlightenment thinkers, wrote Wade,

> Nature. . . is a closed system of causes and effects, of reasons and implications; there is nothing accidential or arbitrary therein.[24]

still, man's awareness of this reality is not synonomous with his knowledge of it. That is to say, Enlightenment theories of knowledge and their theories of reality overlapped, but were not completely coincident with one another. What Cassiere called the seventeenth-century "spirit of systems" had confused theories of reality and theories of knowledge.[25] Wade wrote of the seventeenth-century confusion, and of the eighteenth-century separation of the two realms of reality and knowledge.

> . . . there was in the period 1670-1730 a confusion in the uses of philosophy, theology, and morality. . . . Metaphysics had

> understood that it was its duty to prove the existence of God,
> the immortality of the soul, the nature of the material uni-
> verse, and the rules of right action. When difficulties had
> thrown into question the ability of philosophers to prove these
> things, there arose two attitudes. On the one hand, some pro-
> claimed that religious truths could not be proved by reason
> and must, as always, be accepted on faith. . . . On the other
> hand, some sought to discredit metaphysics as a subject useful
> to man, holding that only physics was the proper sphere of
> philosophy. Very quickly, physics was thought to provide
> knowledge not only of the physical world but of man's place
> and his role in its organization. Hence, philosophy was now
> concerned primarily with science [the outside universe] and
> morality [the inside world of man]. It was this attitude
> which accounted for the tendency to trust what the human mind
> could know and the corresponding tendency to distrust what
> appeared mysterious. . . .[26]

The important point is that the eighteenth century made the distinction

between science and morality, between nature and man, or, between theories

of reality and theories of knowledge. Cassirer wrote: ". . . Nature

and knowledge are to be placed [according to the assumptions of eigh-

teenth-century thought] on their own foundations and explained in

terms of their own conditions."[27] Yet the eighteenth century believed

that thought was capable of shaping that separate reality: as opposed

to the internalizing, deductive spirit of systems of the seventh-century,

the eighteenth century

> . . . wants to enter into the activity of the spirit. Its
> task is not to reflect but to shape life [The "compotence"
> of thought to shape life]. . . involved both the limits of
> thought and its capabilities as a dynamic force.[28]

The notion that thought could be both limited and expanded by partially

shaping the independent phenomenal realm, was the epistemological

corollary of the recognition, in the first place, that there were

indeed two separate and independent realms of reality. Knowledge

and the accumulation of knowledge was the result of the ever-defining

and redefining, and refining, of the relationship between the two

realms of reality. Wade wrote:

> . . . knowledge of the world does not stop with knowledge of
> external objects; it is the means whereby one sees reflected
> the possibilities of the inner reality. Since the cosmos is
> limitless both in time and space, knowledge tends to become a
> neverending series of relationships between the self and the
> phenomena of life, in which the correlation between the uni-
> verse and the self guarantees the validity of thought [that
> is, the objectivity of thought] and the legality [or, reality]
> of the external world. Knowledge thus involves both thinking
> and feeling, sensibility and thought, experience and rational
> awareness. . . . [emphases added][29]

The idea of a limitation of human knowledge is tied up with the idea

of the very existence of a separate, independent of reality. The idea

of the expansion of human knowledge follows upon the ideas that man

is capable of an intermediate perception, or, of perceiving objects

removed in time and place from the perceiving subject. The expansion

of human knowledge is partially induced by man's awareness of, as

Cassirer wrote,

> This transcendence beyond that which is immediately given in
> the sense impressions [including, one might add, empirical and
> historical givens]. . . It appears equally clearly in the
> formation of our concepts of experience [as in our theories
> of mathematics], for the concepts which theoretical physics
> is based cannot be explained in terms of a combination of
> perceptual ideas. To be sure, they begin with such ideas,
> but they do not end there; they use these ideas of sense as
> a starting point but they transform them by means of the inner
> autonomous activity of the understanding. This autonomous
> activity, not the mere habit that comes from the regularity of
> the perceptions, is what constitutes the real core and sub-
> stance of the first laws of motion. . . .[30]

The point is that the epistemological notion of intermediate perception

is based upon a dualistic theory of reality, of the actualities and

possibilities of the external and internal realms of science and morality,

nature (empirical and historical) and man.[31] The assumed givens of

nature or science are shaped and "transformed," but not distorted by man's understanding. Newton's great achievement lay in "the intellectual transformation of empirical material," not the disintegration of matter. The difference between the two attitudes, is the difference between genuine Newtonianism and what Alexandre Koyre called "pseudo-Newtonianism" (see Appendix A). The natural dualism upon which an intermediate epistemology is based, limits reason on the one hand, and, on the other hand, both enlarges the scope and play of reason and simultaneously gives that reason an objectivity which it would not otherwise have had in the confused world of seventeenth-century cosmology (see infra., Chapter III).

The Newtonianism from which derived the rationalistic theological optimism, and which, according to Plumb, was the groundwork of Burke's thought--this Newtonianism was only one possible interpretation (or misinterpretation) of Newton's thought itself. Perhaps it is significant that the moral (and political) Newtonianism which Willey and Plumb see as the origins of Burke's thought is more evident in Burke's later, more polemical works (Willey's citation above is from the "Reflections") than in the earlier works mentioned above (the "Vindication" and the "Essay on the Sublime and the Beautiful"). Just as, according to Plumb, the critical spirit in all disciplines evaporated in England (though not in Scotland) during the last half of the eighteenth century into the mists of the romanticist occult and credulous, and into an ascendency of feeling and sentiment over reason (critical or dogmatic), Burke's emphasis or tactics changed from an early concern with the front facing against an unexamined and unrestrained trust or faith

in internal feeling and sentiment considered as a touchstone of the
state and of the constitution (unquestioned prescription) and certainly
as a touchstone of individual ethics and morality and of epistemology,
to a front facing against an equally unexamined, unrestrained use of
dogmatic reason. Perhaps this change of emphasis, or change of front
(note, that it is not being suggested that Burke was inconsistent, or
reductionist/determinist, for he never stressed as an ideal either
the exclusiveness of reason or of sense and feeling as a source of
knowledge representing some perfect immanent ideal--Burke merely changed
fronts, but his general strategy and his instruments of warfare remained
the same in the struggle against the different forms of determinism
and reductionism) is gotten by Burke as a result of the surfeit of the
pervasive moral Newtonianism in England represented by Shaftesbury,
Pope, Hutcheson and others and which included an indulgent, self-
confident rationalizing of the perfect Newtonian order of the world
(a world indistinguishable from the perfect plenitude of the Leibnizian/
Wolffian world) and an internalization of moral law and ethical action.
This branch of Newtonianism is distinguished from the other branch in
which determinism and reductionism merely takes a different form--the
deterministic materialism of Hartley in England and of Helvetius, d'Hol-
bach, LaMettrie, etc., in France; this second branch of Newtonianism
reduced all reality to the empirical world, and knowledge as consisting
of received sense-data which, not so much re-formed or re-shaped as
redistributed, according to the external criteria of the good (rather
than the more objective true), constitutes judgement and ethical cor-
rectness. It is merely suggested here that Burke did not accept either

of the two branches of Newtonianism, but rather correctly interpreted Newton's philosophy as a critical, more open-ended and certainly not reductionist or deterministic, philosophy and methodology as was assumed by many eighteenth-century commentators and popularizers of "Newtonianism." Burke, therefore, by going back to Newton, rather than accepting Newtonianism, would to that extent prove an exception to J. H. Plumb's schemata of the eighteenth century as changing from an earlier critical approach to reality, epistemology, ethical and moral problems (and political thought) in the time of Newton, to a later-- in the period in which Burke flourished--non-critical credulity and occultism. A brief review of the views of Newton himself and of the eighteenth-century popularizer of Newton, the Scotsman Colin Maclaurin, will hopefully give the reader a clear understanding of the intellectual climate--one stressing the critical, analytical use of reason--of England and Scotland in Burke's time.

Plumb had said that the "sceptical, Baconian, materialist" attitude toward human affairs, an attitude "very much in tune with the Enlightenment," was "for reasons that still need to be sought, more common in Scotland" than in England. Perhaps a correct interpretation of Newton by Maclaurin was one of the reasons for the more critical attitude in Scotland, or, perhaps, Maclaurin reflected the critical attitude of the Scottish Enlightenment in general.[32] Maclaurin was almost alone among eighteenth-century Newtonian popularizers in correctly interpreting Newton (and was most probably the one most likely to have been read by Burke. A review of Newton and Maclaurin will aid in an understanding of the possible origins of Burke's philosophical assumptions.

Alexandre Koyre, a pre-eminent scholar of 17th/18th century intellectual history until his death a decade ago, mentions the two forms which Newtonianism, deviating from Newton, took in the course of eighteenth-century thought. An "unholy alliance" between Newton and Descartes (the Shaftesburian/Pope/Hutcheson Moral Sense view), and between Newton and Locke (the mechanistic views of the French materialists and Hartley) was forged by their respective followers out of the "pseudo-imitation" of Newton himself. This pseudo-imitation involved a mis-interpretation of the meaning which Newton gave to the forces of gravi-tation and attraction, and Newton's methodology in general.

Newton and his most famous British popularizer among the British, Colin Maclaurin, denied that attraction was merely another changeless property of matter such as mass, which could be wholly explained as to its substance and its origin or original impetus. It had an inde-pendent reality of its own which could be described, but not explained by the language of mathematics in the Cartesian fashion, and which could be neither described nor explained by assigning to the objects of the independent reality of the empirical world the "occult qualities of the Aristotelians." Newton says in regard to the latter point, that to assign occult qualities to objects in nature amounts to a meaningless redundancy; Copleston describes Newton's attitude: ". . . to say that a specific type of thing is endowed with a specific occult quality in virtue of which it acts and produces its observable effects is to say nothing at all."[33] Attraction could not, on the other hand, be explained by the language of mathematics, the language Descartes had used to describe and explain reality; Copleston explains this side of Newton's aversion to dogmatic thinking:

. . . mathematics is regarded by Newton as an instrument or tool which the mind is forced to use rather than, as with Galileo, an infallible key to reality. . . . It is doubtless right to stress the importance which Newton attached to mathematics, but one must also emphasize the empiricist aspect of his thought. Galileo and Descartes believed that the structure of the cosmos is mathematical in the sense that by the use of the mathematical method we can discover its secrets. But Newton was unwilling to make any such presupposition.[34]

Marie Boas Hall emphasized Newton's genuine empiricism or realism

in the Principia:

[The Principia was]. . . presented in mathematical language, but every effort was taken to ensure that it described the real world as it really existed and was no romance or dream, however enticingly rational. This is the Newtonian triumph. . . . Though Newton's world was 'eminently rational, mechanical world, it was not a wholly mechanistic one.[35]

Henry Guerlac explained Newton's distinction between the use of mathe-

matics as a language to describe our limited knowledge of reality,

as distinguished from the assumption that mathematical laws describe

the substance of that reality itself.

The springs and wheels operating [Newton's universe] are left undescribed. It was enough that mysterious forces like universal gravitation or attraction were shown by his investigations to work their wonders. . . . It was enough for Newton that such forces could be measured and the laws of their action determined. . . content to set forth the quantitative laws of motion and their consequences, Newton was offering an abstract mathematical description in place of the pictorial type of 'explication' favored by the Mechanical Philosophers. This explains why the first criticism elicited by the Principia, when it became known on the Continent [where Cartesian philosophy held sway], was that it was a brilliant display of mathematics, but that it was not physics at all. . . . Newton was setting forth the mathematical principles [Guerlac's emphasis] of natural philosophy, not a natural philosophy in the accepted sense" [that is, not as reason's revelation of the causes and substance of reality, and the movement of bodies themselves. Nevertheless, what] "Newton had carefully described as the mathematical principles [Guerlac's emphasis] of natural philosophy, became for many--though Newton could hardly have agreed--the ideal of physics itself.[36]

E. W. Strong referred to this treatment of mathematics as a tool, a
means of explaining the efficient, as opposed to final causes of the
movement of bodies as part of Newton's "mathematical conceptualism."
The mathematical conceptualist ". . . affirms that we cannot conclude
properties of existing things from mathematical evidence, for such
evidence does not extend beyond logical relations in comparison of
the mind's ideas."[37] In an earlier article, Strong wrote of the balance
in Newtonian methodology between empiricism and reason, of Newton's
awareness of the distinction between theories of reality and theories
of knowledge.[38] Newton is thus opposed to both metaphysical and to
mechanical a priori hypotheses which attempt to interpret the real
empirical world deductively. In his standard history of scientific
theory and method or "attitude," A. Rupert Hall wrote:

> In Newton's eyes, scientific comprehension was not limited to
> vague qualitative theories on the one hand (of the occult
> qualities which Aristotelianism would assign to bodies, or of
> the Leibnizian/Wolffian cosmology which confused metaphysics
> and physics), or definite statements about a state of affairs
> much simpler than that which is actually experienced on the
> other (Cartesian rationalism); it could proceed, by due tech-
> niques, to definite ideas about all that is physical, down to
> the properties of each constituent corpuscule. To illustrate
> this conception of science is the purpose of the 'Principia.'[39]

Newton said in the Principia of 1687 that he sought neither the final,
metaphysical causes, "or what the Scholastics called 'formal causes,'
namely, natures or essences," nor "the ultimate efficient cause" of
gravity.

> When [Newton] says that he has been unable to discover the
> causes of the properties of gravity inductively and that he
> frames no hypotheses, he means that he is concerned only with
> the descriptive laws which state how gravity acts, and not with
> the nature or essence of gravity. This is made clear by a
> statement in the Principia mathematica. 'Whatever is not

deduced from the phenomena is to be called a hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. . . .[40]

When Newton had thus explicitly denied the fallow, unproductive and redundant occult qualities within objects of the empirical realm, whether that occultism take the form of Aristotelian essences or of mechanical formulas," . . . nobody with the single exception of Colin Maclaurin--followed [Newton] in that point."[41] Both Newton and Maclaurin realized that a genuinely "experimental philosophy" must "purify" the physical sciences from metaphysics and mechanical determinism in order to derive any general principles from phenomena; such an attitude is a major step in the development from, to use the title of Koyre's most famous book, The Closed World to the Infinite Universe (1957). True Newtonianism is a coherent, yet open-ended system.

Caroline Robbins wrote that "Though some commentators misunderstood his writing, Newton did not even make gravity a dogmatic principle, and was careful to notice the difficulty of explaining its nature as an attraction, or force, or a property of some sort."[42] Colin Maclaurin was one of these few who did not misinterpret Newton, when the former "described the groundwork of his master's philosophy":

'. . .' tho all sorts and degrees are equally the object of philosophical speculation; yet it is from those which are proportioned to sense that a philosopher must set out in his enquiries, ascending or descending afterwards as his pursuits may require. He does well indeed, to take his views from many points of sight, and supply the defects of sense by a well regulated imagination; nor is he to be confined by any limit in space or time; but as his knowledge of nature is founded on the observation of sensible things, he must begin with these, and must often return to them, to examine his progress by them. . .'[43]

Maclaurin's words could have easily been taken as rules of philosophizing by the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment whose "methodological thinking" similarly combined empirical observation and an extra-empirical use of the intellect. Reid's notion of "suggestion," for instance, would require a "well-regulated imagination" in order to abstract from experience certain mathematical ideas (see Chapter III). Burke spoke and wrote as if he were following Maclaurin's and Newton's rules of philosophizing. For instance, see Burke's arguments against the speculative rationalism of Bolingbroke, Chapter III, p.6 of this study, in which Burke not only defends the critical use of the reason, but defends the critical use of the individual reason. Robbins wrote that Newton's thought helped in establishing that "faith in individual reason and the likelihood of right action developing from its unhampered exercise [without which faith], no movement for widespread political rights and privileges could gain many adherents."[44]

The following explication of Newton or, rather of Newtonianism, should serve the purpose of distinguishing between the vulgarized Newton of Hartley's Associationism, which built exclusively upon Newton as sensationalist, and the equally one-sided view of Newton of the "Moral Sense" intuitionists. This latter group of prominent English thinkers internalized into an unanalyzable ethical intuitionism the Newtonian world order; by doing so, the English intuitionists did, in a sense, bring back those "occult qualities of the Aristotelians" which Newton had excluded from physical nature--now those "occult qualities" were considered by this group to be the substance of moral nature. Newton and Maclaurin denied any occult or mechanistic explanations

of attraction. It was wrongly assumed that attraction was a physical
property of matter than a "mathematical force" as Newton had described
it. The upshot was the argument from design--the clockwork implies
the Clockmaker, Who had set the clock in motion, and let it run on its
own, according to immutable, and eventually demonstrable, laws of
nature (although Newton had believed in the continual presence of the
Deity--a necessary presence in a less than perfect universe--but not
the knowability of Nature and Nature's God, for Newton, to repeat,
did not presume to explain attraction).

> Thus the Newtonian science, though as mathematical philosophy of
> nature it expressly renounced the search for causes [both
> physical and metaphysical], appears in history as based on a
> dynamic conception of physical causality and as linked together
> with theistic or deistic metaphysics. . . .[45]

As will be shown below, Burke also renounced the search for causes,
both physical and metaphysical, whether in the form of Hartlian mechani-
cal associationism and the mechanical sensationalism of the French
materialists (Helvetius, d'Holbach, LaMettrie, etc.), or, in the form
of the teleological arguments of the English Moral Sense school of
Shaftesbury/Pope/Hutcheson. Koyre described

> . . . the particular and emotional structure [of the eighteenth
> century] as its optimism, its divinization of nature, and so
> forth. Nature and nature's laws were known and felt to be the
> embodiment of God's will and reason. Could they, therefore, be
> anything but good?[46]

To conform to the laws of nature was to obey the will of God. Now,
it was but a short step to interpret nature as so perfect as to require
no divine presence or intervention; in short, the success of Newtonian
science in revealing such order and symmetry in the world, eventually
transformed the original Newtonian Deity Who had been Creator and

active Preserver,[47] into a merely distant Creator. "Like the God of
Descartes and Leibniz--so bitterly opposed by the Newtonians--he had
nothing more to do in the world." This idea of the perfection of the
world--i.e., if God had withdrawn from being a continuing ruling
presence over the world, the world that operates according to His laws
did not require His continual superintending which imperfect creations
and creatures require of their creators--together with the corpuscular
theory of Newton, resulted in the second major strain which Newtonianism
assumed in the eighteenth century--what might be called a moral teleo-
logical atomism. Koyre wrote in his Newtonian Studies:

> . . . as strong was the belief in 'nature,' so overwhelming
> the prestige of the Newtonian [or pseudo-Newtonian] pattern of
> order arising automatically from interaction of isolated and
> self-contained atoms, that nobody dared to doubt that order
> and harmony would in some way be produced by human atoms
> acting according to their nature, whatever this might be. . . .
> The enthusiastic [or pseudo-imitation] of the Newtonian [or
> pseudo-Newtonian] pattern of atomic analysis and reconstruc-
> tion. . . led to rather bad results. Thus the unholy alliance
> of Newton and Locke produced in atomic psychology, which
> explained [or explained away] mind as a mosaic of 'sensations'
> and 'ideas' linked together by laws of association [attraction]
> [and]. . . atomic sociology, which reduced society to a
> cluster of human atoms, complete and self-contained each in
> itself and only mutually attracting and repelling each other.
> Newton, of course, is by no means responsible for these
> and other monstra engendered by the overextension--or aping--
> of his method.[48]

The seeming paradox of eighteenth century thought is, that, although
it developed from the one philosophy of Newton, "Newtonianism" split
the century in two. On the English scene, there emerged, on the one
hand, the complacent optimism of the Moral Sense philosophers; this
school saw in the orderliness and Reason which Newtonianism had sup-
posedly revealed, and translated it into an immediately felt moral
intuition which reflected the harmonious order of the universe. Such

a cosmology, of course, disregarded or minimized both the inductive
empirical methodology of Newtonian physics, and Newton's balanced and
critical use of reason as distinguished from his wrongly supposed
dogmatic use of reason. It was assumed by the figures of this school
that the critical use of reason was redundant in a pre-established
harmony of the universe characterized by a natural identity of interests.
On the other hand, there emerged the ideal of the positive restruc-
turing of society according to the "atomic sociology" expressed in the
associationism of Hartley, and in the utilitarian formula, starting
with Hutcheson, and, on the continent, in the dogmatic materialism
of Helvetius, d'Holbach, LaMettrie, etc.

Thomas Reid chose to oppose Hartley on the grounds that Hartley
was a perversion of Newton's methodology and physics, that, in other
words, Hartley was a "pseudo-Newtonian" in Reid's eyes. Peter Gay
described Hartley's explanation of his mechanical methodology, an ex-
planation consciously aping the Newtonian, or pseudo-Newtonian,
method. Gay cites Hartley and Reid's motives for opposing Hartley:

 . . . 'The proper method of philosophizing [is]. . . to discover
and establish the general rules of action, affecting the subject
under consideration, from certain select, well-defined, and well-
attested phenomena, and then to explain and predict the other
phenomena by these laws. This,' Hartley concluded, 'is the method
of analysis and synthesis recommended and followed by Sir Isaac
Newton.' It is significant [Gay continues] that when Thomas Reid
criticized Hartley, he criticized him not simply for being wrong,
but for being a bad Newtonian. It was, in an indisputably New-
tonian universe, the most telling Schimpfwort Reid could find.
. . .[49]

Reid's "correct" Newtonianism is made more clear in his disagreement
with Henry Home, Lord Kames, over the nature of physical theory.
Kames, although a preeminent philosopher, jurist, essayist, etc. of

the Scottish Enlightenment, merely dabbled in physical science. His

misinterpretation of Newton reflected his amateur approach to physical

theory, of which he thought the aim should be:

> . . . to explain empirically established laws, in the sense of
> uncovering the hidden reality behind the veil of appearances.
> Reid's views here resembled those of Hume, who held that such
> aspirations were doomed to failure. . . .[50] . . . According to
> Reid, physical theory seeks to represent a set of experimental
> laws by means of a system of mathematical propositions deduced
> from a small number of principles. . . . While Kames urged that
> it was necessary to borrow elements from a specific metaphysical
> system to complete a physical theory, Reid allowed physics and
> metaphysics to be autonomous. . . .[51]

Reid explained his Newtonianism to Kames in a letter of October, 1782:

> . . . 'I am apt to think that yor Lordship. . . has mixed too
> much Metaphysicks with Physicks. It is a common way of speaking
> but inaccurate, that the province of physicks is to discover the
> Causes of natural Phenomena. Physicks, as I think, has nothing
> to do with Causes properly so called. Its province is to dis-
> cover the general Laws according to which the phenomena of
> Nature are produced; and these can only be discovered by induc-
> tion from Facts observed by our Senses. Abstract Reasoning
> about Causes has nothing to do here.[52] . . . That Bodies do
> actually gravitate according to the Law discovered by Newton,
> is a Fact, which I think is acknowledged by all Parties. But
> whether this Gravitation be the Effect of a Power originally
> given to Body by the Creator, or the Action of an Active Soul
> united to the Body, or an impression continually made upon it
> from without, either by a Subtile Ether or by some Spiritual
> Being, or by the first Cause; these are Questions beyond the
> Region of Physicks, because they are not to be determined by an
> Appeal to facts observed by the Senses, but by abstract Reason-
> ing, if they can be at all determined. . . .[53]

As what Burke called the "Patient thinking"[54] of Newton applied to

theories of reality, it also applied to theories of knowledge. Reid,

in his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1789), seconded New-

ton's animus toward the use of "hypotheses" as a method of investiga-

ting nature. For instance, on the topic of discoveries made of "the

internal structure of the human body," Reid wrote:

Such discoveries have always been made by patient observation, by accurate experiments, or by conclusions drawn by strict reasoning from observations and experiments; and such discoveries have always tended to refute, but not to confirm, the theories and hypotheses which ingenious men have invented.[55]

Rather, follow Newton's way, advised Reid:

The first rule of philosophizing, laid down by the great Newton is this:. . . 'No more causes, nor any other causes of natural effects ought to be admitted but such as are both true, and are sufficient for explaining their appearances.' This is a golden rule. . . .[56]

Neither the causes of the laws of nature nor of how we come to know the operations of the laws of nature, are proper subjects for speculation. Reid wrote:

. . . it is evidently in the nature of conjecture to be uncertain. In every case the assent ought to be proportioned to the evidence. . . though we may, in many cases, form very probable conjectures concerning the works of man, every conjecture we can form with regard to the works of God, has as little probability as the conjectures of a child with regard to the works of a man.
The wisdom of God exceeds that of the wisest man, more than his wisdom exceeds that of a child. [A wise man, as a child, has little chance of genuine knowledge]. . . when he pretends to conjecture how the planets move in their course (which conjecture would be a hypothetical theory of reality), how the sea ebbs and flows, and how our minds act upon our bodies [and vice versa,-- a conjecture which would merely be a hypothetical theory of knowledge].[57]

The very foundations of Reid's Common Sense realism are based upon the distinction between metaphysics and physics, a distinction preparing the way, so to speak, for Reid's rejection of the use of hypotheses, which do in fact confuse physics and metaphysics.

Burke was also aware of the good and the bad uses to which Newton could be recruited, as is seen in his interpretation of Newton, an interpretation differing from most of his contemporaries, in his "Inquiry into the Sublime and Beautiful."[58]

Burke perhaps underestimated the use to which Newtonianism could be put--of mechanico-rationalistic system-building of the human mind (Hartley's associationism) or of human society (the Jacobins)--Burke attended rather to undermining the pseudo-Newtonianism of the Moral Sense school. This is suggested in Burke's essay on the "Sublime and the Beautiful." In his long introduction to the bicentennial edition of the "Enquiry," J. T. Boulton wrote that Burke was a genuine Newtonian here because he was "the first writer on aesthetics in English to take up the uncompromising sensationist viewpoint."[59] The idea of Burke and Hume that "sense-experience is the ground of all"[60] the workings of the mind, together with Burke's belief, contrary to Hume, that a fixed standard of taste among all men could be determined,"[61] cast Burke in the Newtonian methodological mold. Boulton put Burke in his place:

> The 'Essay' [on Taste, part of the introduction to the 2nd
> edition of the 'Enquiry']. . . The conclusion that Burke
> reaches--that taste operates by fixed principles in all men--
> illustrates the eighteenth-century inclination to discover
> immutable laws governing human life and activities.[62]

Corresponding to Newtonian methodology, Burke assumes the existence of immutable laws governing taste. Burke believed with Hume that, in Hume's words,". . .'in the production and conduct of the passions, there is a certain regular mechanism, which is susceptible of as accurate a disquisition as the laws of motion, optics, hydrostatics, or any other part of natural philosophy."[63] In criticising the aesthetics of Francis Hutcheson, Burke nevertheless "curiously acknowledges the validity of associationism"[64] as a weapon against the intuitionist ethics of Hutcheson.

But Boulton is quick to add that Burke's sensationalist aesthet-
ics reject associationism. For Burke, the "'natural properties of
things' [of the sense-data] remain. . . the source of aesthetic ex-
perience," rather than what might be called the natural propensity among
things. By the "natural propensity of things," Burke's meaning was
closer to Montesquieu's meaning than either to the "organicist" notion
of natural,[65] or to the associationist notion of the strictly quanti-
fiable "agreement" and "disagreement" among objects and/or among
(aesthetic) ideas. Burke's thought was also closer to Reid's notion
of suggestion (see than to the materialist-mechanistic notion of
agreement and disagreement as criteria upon which to base our knowledge
and judgement of the reality and the relations among objects of per-
ception.[66] Reid explicitly denied the exclusively sensationalist/
materialist criteria of agreement/disagreement as the basis of de-
riving any theories of reality and of knowledge.[67] Since the world
of experience is complex, our knowledge of it must be complex, or
heterogeneous, also. S. A. Grave described Reid's position:

> (We do not). . . begin with simple qualities and build up
> complex objects out of them. As we realize when we reflect
> on experience, we begin with what is complex and reach what
> is simple by analytic abstraction. 'Nature presents no
> object to the senses, or to consciousness, that is not com-
> plex.' And if we had only our senses and not the superior
> powers of understanding, by which we can analyse the complex
> object, abstract every particular attribute from the rest,
> and form a distinct conception of it, 'every object in our
> experience would be the 'confused' totality it probably is
> to the lower animals. 'So that it is not by the senses im-
> mediately, but rather by the powers of analysing and abstrac-
> tion, that we get the most simple and the most distinct notions
> even of the objects of sense'. . . .[68]

Even simple sensation requires a judgement capable of bringing a struc-
ture and unity into knowledge in a more subtle and complex way than

that of merely comparing isolated sensations and "discerning their agreement and disagreement."[69] Phillip D. Cummins recently denied that Reid was a "naive" or "direct realist."[70] Reid denied that perception involved simply the direct and immediate perception of material objects. Perception was not, for Reid, an "E-relation," or the simple and direct contact or impression of object on subject. Reid was rather an "indirect realist" as in the case of memory, "in which the material thing which is perceived does not exist."[71] This position is compatible with that of the "critical realists" in America at the beginning of the twentieth century; these critical realists--among them Arthur Onken Lovejoy (1873-1962), who wrote The Revolt Against Dualism (1930), --stood against both "representationalism [which held that the objects of perception are "ideas" and really not the objects themselves] and direct or naive realism. The critical realism position could better explain, for example, "our perception of a distant star [or, a distant historical epoch or event] when the star has ceased to exist."[72] Although the critical realists were involved in the "considerable difficulties"[73] which are a part of any genuine dualism, they were, nevertheless, all "agreed in maintaining that what we directly perceive is some character-complex or immediate datum which functions as a sign of or guide to an independently existing thing." The critical realists believed that ". . . from the very start and by their very nature the immediate data of perception point to physical objects beyond themselves."[74] Returning to Cummins's article, it is evident that in Reid's thought as in Burke's and Kant's (see infra., Chapter III), knowledge is a relation as much as it is the simple perceiving of an immediately

given material object. As an indirect (and critical) realist, Reid
holds "that in a judgement (of perception) such as 'I see a coin'
the phrase 'a coin' refers to a material thing which is not perceived,
but which stands in one or more specific relations to the presented
object."[75] The relations constituting knowledge include the relation
between perceiving subject and perceived object and the relations among
the objects.[76] Reid is so much the indirect realist, that Cummins
referred to Reid's dualism as "almost. . . Cartesian."[77] "For Reid,
as for Descartes, the characteristics of things are of two sorts.
On the one hand, there are mental activities (acts, operations); on
the other, there are physical properties. There is a corresponding
division among substances."[78] Reid's dualistic theory of reality
corresponds to his heterogeneous or intermediate theory of knowledge,
which assumes the capability of perceiving and judging of objects re-
moved from the immediate spatio/temporal proximity of the subject.

Gerald W. Chapman in describing Burke's epistemology, could
have been describing Reid's. Chapman wrote:

> It is simply a fact, whether one likes it or not, that large
> masses of judgement, partiality, attachment, and affection,
> have to operate without reflective analysis: nobody in politics
> or elsewhere can affort to epistemologize before the taking
> of every toast and tea. . . . It is this refined perception,
> not a brash chauvinism, which moves Burke to panegyrize English
> character. . .'[79] and to panegyrize "'all our old prejudices'"
> which are in fact "implicitly ratiocinative" and embody "prior
> efforts of judgement, grasp, and appropriation. . . ."[80]

The following observations by Burke made toward the end of
his life, amount to a paraphrase of Reid's philosophical assumptions.
Burke said in a conversation with Mrs. Crewe that the imagination could
only be used properly in later life, not in youth (and perhaps this

partially explains his earlier flirtation with associationism), because
the imagination, ". . . however ready it was to come forward could not
be exercised without a Stock of Knowledge and that the active faculties
of Man were at first employed in selecting and rejecting materials
for that Stock."[81] Here Burke was warning against putting too quick
and too literal a trust in one's immediate sentiments or imagination,
as reflecting some lofty transcendent truth, before acquiring a stock
of knowledge gained or sifted from the empirical world. In his 1756
essay on the "Sublime and the Beautiful. . .," Burke stressed the
limitations of the imagination, rather than speaking of it as any kind
of an intuitive moral sense to be taken passively and immediately at
face value as reflecting some moral imperative. Burke wrote:

> . . . the imagination while it produces works of art and affects
> greatly the passions of man is restricted first to the senses
> and finally (this is where the aesthetic judgements enter) by
> the understanding itself. The senses provide the materials upon
> which the imagination must work, and the understanding provides
> the evaluation of the works of the imagination. The dependence
> of the imagination upon the senses. . . .[82]

Of course the whole purpose of what Burke had in mind when writing his
essay on aesthetic theory, was to make his readers realize the com-
plexity of heterogeneity of its origins--as in the senses, the judge-
ment and understanding, and the imagination, rather than exclusively
upon a vague intuitionist sentiment as the contemporary Shaftesburian
"Moral Sense" school would have it, or, exclusively upon the associ-
ationist quantification of the process by which we come to know reality
(agreement and disagreement among the material objects of perception).

Boulton pointed out that Burke's successors (James Beattie,
Archibald Alison, Payne Knight, Dugald Stewart, Hugh Blair) all

dissented from Burke, and favored associationism in aesthetic experiences. "Sensationalism is not favored by any one of them: for all of them, in varying degrees, association is the important factor in aesthetic experience."[83] In spite of the associationist theory prevalent in Burke's contemporaries, Burke could stand opposed both to the external, mechanistic associationism of Hartley et al., and to the internalizing ethical intuitionism of Hutcheson and Alexander Gerard.

Now Hutcheson was as much affected by the pervasive Newtonianism as was Burke and the associationists, but in Hutcheson, "clearly influenced by Shaftesbury,"[84] the Newtonianism took a different form. Gerard and Hutcheson saw the origins of aesthetic experience in the "internal sense" which in turn reflected the "general laws" ordained by the "'Author of Nature.'" Hutcheson believed that,

> God works methodically, evidenced by the regularity and uniformity apparent in the universe; God's creations are, by His wisdom, designed to achieve desirable ends--consequently it is natural for man to take a delight in objects which are regular and uniform. It is equally natural for him to respond through the internal sense. . . .[85]

Burke labelled it "'unphilosophical to a high degree'" that Hutcheson took his faith in the internal sense to the extreme position of creating "a special faculty (of the "senses") to deal with every separate phase of (aesthetic) experience,"[86] and then seeing this internal moral sense as reflecting a divine origin.

However, Boulton seems to have overlooked the fact that Burke was really not a "pseudo-Newtonian" (Alexander Koyre's phrase), not even in the "Enquiry," where Burke does appear to be arguing from design. Burke only said he can give the cause of our aesthetic experiences, which are the sensational "'natural properties of things,'"

not the cause of the cause. Burke's argument is not teleological

(or, physico-theological). In the "Enquiry into. . . the Sublime and

the Beautiful," (Section IV,i), Burke said that "'Newton first dis-

covered the property of attraction,' and calling it gravitation, was

able to work out its laws, without ever being able to say exactly what

gravitation was."[87] Or, we have directly from Burke the following:

> When Newton first discovered the property of attraction, and
> settled its laws, he found it served very well to explain
> several of the most remarkable phenomena in nature; but yet,
> with reference to the general system of things, he could
> consider attraction but as an effect, whose cause at that
> time he did not attempt to trace. But when he afterwards
> began to account for it by a subtle ether, this great man. . .
> seemed to have quitted his usual cautious manner of philoso-[88]
> phizing. . . .

Burke was not a pseudo-Newtonian, or one of Newton's "impetuous" pupils.

His argument is not teleological, but deontological. Burke's Newtoni-

anism is not one of explaining God's way to man, but of attempting

to partially reveal man's place in God's universe, a universe which

must always remain partially incomprehensible.

When one becomes aware of the content and course of eighteenth-

century Newtonianism, the similarity between Reid and Burke is under-

scored against this background. Perhaps Burke had read the famous

"General Scholium" of the 2nd edition of the Principia (or he surely

had access to the edition of Newton's works published by Samuel Horsley

in London during 1779-1785). Here, Newton had said that he was unable

to find the causes of gravity and therefore does not presume to form

any hypothesis based upon gravity other than the description of gravity

as a universal natural phenomenon. Newton wrote in the "Scholium":

'Hitherto I have not been able to discover the cause of the
properties of gravity from phenomena and I frame no hypotheses.
For whatever is not deduced from phenomena is to be called a
hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical
(for metaphysical in Newton's sense, see below), whether of occult
qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philoso-
phy.'[89]

Perhaps Burke's statement of the ambiguous element in Newton (as dis-

tinguished from the eighteenth-century "pseudo-Newtonianism") struck

in Burke that same responsive chord as did the "natural dualism" of

the late eighteenth-century Scottish school of Common Sense realism.

This dualism included, generally, a combining of continuity and uni-

formity with uncertainty and unpredictability, into a whole which was

neither completely mysterious (for instance, a talismanic whole made

inevitable upon the assumption of the occult qualities with which the

Aristotelians would have invested matter, or the mystery following

upon the naturalistic theism of Shaftesbury, Pope and the English "Moral

Sense" school), nor exclusively knowable and predictable (as would be

the case of the English associationists, Locke to a certain extent[90]

and Hartley, and the French materialists, d'Holbach, Helvetius and

Condillac, and, finally, the English utilitarians). But these are the

two extremes which Newton's "impetuous" followers represented in the

eighteenth century. The divergent paths which Newtonianism took in

the eighteenth century are similar to the earlier and later stages of

historicism which Maurice Mandelbaum has recently described.[91] Mandel-

baum was writing of the later brand of historicism which was "prevalent"

in the writings of

. . . nineteenth-century social theorists [who held] that there
are laws which determine the direction in which any society or
institution will tend to move over the course of time. . . there

are interesting and compelling parallels between this sort of
scientific necessitarianism and that earlier phase of histori-
cism in which teleological conceptions had been favored, and no
attempt was made to establish societal laws.[92]

If we take the earlier phase of historicism as comparable to the

eighteenth century teleological "physico-theological" argument and the

English "Moral Sense" school of ethical intuitionism, and see the later

phase of historicism as comparable to the associationist/utilitarian

argument, then the divergent paths which historicism took in the nine-

teenth century are not unlike the divergent paths which Newtonianism

took in the eighteenth century.

In terms of strictly epitemological theory, Scottish Common

Sense realism represented a complementarity between sensation and re-

flection, object and subject, a relation in which the characteristics

of the terms are evident, but which is itself (the relation) unknowable

in the reasons of its being what it is and in the entirety of its

operations. This describes the "Significance of the Newtonian Syn-

thesis," described by Alexandre Koyre, as distinguished from the monism

of "pseudo-Newtonianism," the latter of which was fashioned by Newton's

truant and impetuous followers. Koyre's descriptions of Newton's views

makes Burke's interpretation of Newton's work in Burke's "Enquiry"

more understandable (including Burke's epistemological ideas, and,

thereby, to a certain extent, his views on historical knowledge).

Burleigh Taylor Wilkins said of Burke in this instance: "What Burke

is doing is pointing to the incompleteness of his own causal explana-

tions."[93] This is done by Burke with the aid of the analogous, to

Burke, Newtonian methodology. Koyre's exposition of Newton's metho-

dology includes a consideration of Descartes, as Newton's main

protagonist in eighteenth-century thought; in fact, the struggle between Cartesianism and Newtonianism is largely the story of eighteenth-century thought (although Koyre did not paint a black-and-white picture of this confrontation of systems, and therefore, for this, did not stand entirely opposed to Colm Kiernan's view of the thought of the century in this respect.)[94] Koyre approvingly cited Fontenelle's "Eloge de M. Newton":

> 'These two great men, whose Systems are so opposite, resembled each other in several aspects. . . . Being excellent Geometricians, they both saw the necessity of introducing Geometry into Physicks; For both founded their Physicks upon discoveries in Geometry, which may almost be said of none but themselves. But one of them taking a bold flight, thought at once to reach the Fountain of all things, and by clear and fundamental ideas, to make himself master of the first principles; that he might have nothing more left to do, but to descend to the phenomena of Natures as to necessary consequences; the other (Newton) more cautious, or rather more modest, began by taking hold of the known phenomena to climb to unknown principles; resolved to admit them only in such manner as they could be produced by a chain of consequences. The former sets out from what he clearly understands, to find out the causes of what he sees; the latter sets out from what he sees, in order to find out the cause, whether it be clear or obscure. . . .'[95]

APPENDIX C

NOTES

[1]Pope was cited in D. J. Greene, "Smart, Berkeley, The Scientists and the Poets--A Note on Eighteenth-Century Anti-Newtonianism." Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. XIV, No. 3 (June, 1953), p. 328.

[2]Ernest Barker, The Character of England (Oxford, At the Clarendon Press, 1947), 331-332.

[3]Willey, The Eighteenth Century Background (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966. 1940), p. 249.

[4]Ibid.,p. 246.

[5]J. H. Plumb, In the Light of History, "Reason and Unreason in the Eighteenth Century: The English Experience" (New York: Delta Books (Dell), 1974), p. 9.

[6]Ibid., p. 10.

[7]"Edmund Burke and His Cult" (1965), ibid., p. 95.

[8]Ibid., p. 6.

[9]Ibid., p. 4.

[10]Ibid., p. 9.

[11]Ibid., pp. 8, 22.

[12]Ibid., p. 6.

[13]Ibid., p. 23.

[14]Idem.

[15]Ibid., p. 20.

[16]Ibid., p. 9.

[17]Idem.

[18]Ibid., p. 10.

[19]Idem.

[20]Ibid., p. 100.

[21]Idem.

[22]Idem.

[23]See Murray N. Rothbard, "A Note on Burke's 'Vindication of Natural Society.'"Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (January, 1958), pp. 114-118; and John C. Weston, Jr., "The Ironic Purpose of Burke's 'Vindication' Vindicated." Ibid., Vol. XIX, No. 3 (June, 1958), pp. 435-441. See also, in the present study, supra.

[24]Ira Wade, The Intellectual Origins of the French Enlightenment (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 21-22.

[25]See Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment. Trans., Fritz C. A. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962 (1951; 1932)), pp. 6-7.

[26]Ira Wade, The Intellectual Development of Voltaire (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1969), p. 581.

The philosophes of the Scottish Enlightenment distinguished between metaphysics, or religion, and physics, while at the same time avoiding a completely negative attitude toward the supernatural. This critical and balanced distinction helped serve as a propaedeutic to the distinction between the natural (physical) and the moral realm (the latter of which, if not corresponding exactly to the metaphysical as the natural corresponds to the physical, at least corresponds to what might be called the "other-natural"). Arthur Donovan recently wrote that the "enlightened philosophers" of the Scottish Enlightenment,

. . . no longer believed that the acquisition of natural knowledge depends upon the existence of a supernatural realm. They were not atheists, at least not in Scotland, and few of them even followed Hume into. . . agnosticism. . . . They had no reason or desire to suppress their beliefs. . . . As scientists they simply set their religious heritage and convictions aside. [See Appendix C]. By and large they agreed with Thomas Reid's assertion that there are three fundamentally different branches of philosophy and that religious considerations have a place only in the third of these: 'Whether you call this [third] branch of philosophy Natural Theology or Metaphysics, I care not; but I think it ought not to be confounded with Natural Philosophy; and neither of them with Mathematics. Let the mathematician demonstrate the relation of abstract quantity; the natural philosopher investigate the laws of the material system by induction; and the metaphysician, the final causes, and the efficient causes of what we see, and what natural philosophy discovers in the world we live in.' Arthur Donavan, "Chemistry and philosophy in the Scottish Enlightenment." Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, Vol. CLII (1976), 593; see infra., p. 27 et passim., for Reid's "correct" Newtonianism.

[27]Ernst Cassirer, Philosophy of the Enlightenment, p. 97.

[28]Ira Wade, Intellectual Origins of the French Enlightenment, p. 23.

[29]Idem.

[30]Cassirer, Philosophy of the Enlightenment, p. 129.

[31]Regarding the relation between intermediate knowledge and moral
obligation, Burke said in the trial of Hastings, that our moral obli-
gations can and must extend in time and place. That is, both our aware-
ness of our moral obligations and our knowledge of the correct moral
conduct must neither be constricted by geography, time, or person.
We are both morally obligated to bring Hastings to justice for his ar-
bitrary rule in India, and to understand Indian culture and custom.
Justice demands both our obligation and our understanding. Gerald
W. Chapman cited Burke's "Speech on the Nabob of Arcot's Debts" (1785),
to this effect: "'But if we make ourselves too little for the sphere
of our duty; if, on the contrary, we do not stretch and expand our minds
to the compass of their object; be well assured, that everything about
us will dwindle by degrees, until at length our concerns are shrunk
to the dimensions of our minds.'" Gerald W. Chapman, Edmund Burke.
The Practical Imagination (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1967),
pp. 246-247. (Burke's idea of "virtual representation" might almost
be seen in this light, of intermediate knowledge as the prerequisite
for moral obligation; see Francis P. Canaman, The Political Reason
of Edmund Burke (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1960), pp. 158-162.)
Since Burke saw distance of place as synonomous with distance of time,
he sought to study the history of India as preparation for his role as
manager of Hastings' impeachment trial. Chapman continued: "Knowing
that 'distance of place and absence from management, operate as re-
moteness of time,'--that is, operate as history--Burke struggled for
a historical means 'by which India might be approximated to our under-
standings, and if possible to our feelings; in order to waken something
of sympathy for the unfortunate natives, of which I am afraid we are
not perfectly susceptible, whilst we look at this very remote object
through a false and cloudy medium'" (Ibid., p. 246). Chapman said that
although the historian Macaulay was correct in remarking that Burke
had "'. . . that noble faculty whereby man is able to live in the past,
in the future, in the distant, and in the unreal, that 'India and its
inhabitants were not to him, as to most Englishmen, mere names and
abstractions, but a real country and a real people,'" (Ibid., p. 249),
the purpose of Burke's "neoclassic imagination" was here "not to fas-
cinate (as Macaulay implied), but to familiarize; not to paint thrilling
pictures, but to grasp and draw in the actual relations of things. . ."
(idem.). By enlarging our minds and understanding now, Burke argued,
we can better "acquit and justify" ourselves "'to those few persons,
and to those distant times [emphasis added]', which may take a concern
in these affairs and in the actors in them.' He would join battle on
principles. The trial would state a kind of minority report in history:
it would explicate general principles and bring them into the public

eye. . ." emphasis added . Ibid., p. 268. Earlier in the same work, Chapman had referred to the "one irony in Burke's life is that in the greatest crises of his career--America, India, France--he was driven to apply his principle that 'political thinking must be concrete' within the semi-abstract vacuum which distance imposes.

This was partially true even with Ireland, his birthplace, whose ferment Burke had to construct in imagination from a reflective distance, as one revolutionizing change followed another. . . . As with distance of place, so with time, which, as Hobbes once remarked, is like a distance in its effects. Burke turned a historical imagination upon the present." Ibid, p. 69. See Chapter V of the present study.

[32]See Plumb, In the Light of History (1974), p. 22.

[33]Copleston, History of Philosophy, Vol. V, Pt. i, p. 163. Kenneth MacLean referred to Burke as "an anti-Aristotelian of the new schools of experience and impressions and ideas." Kenneth MacLean, "Edmund Burke: His Letters and Critics." University of Toronto Quarterly, Vol. XXXI, No. 2 (January, 1962), p. 254.

[34]Copleston, ibid., p. 160.

[35]Nature and Nature's Law. Documents of the Scientific Revolution. Ed., Marie Boas Hall (The "Documentary History of Western Civilization" Series). (New York: Walker and Co., 1970), pp. 11-12.

[36]Henry Guerlac, "Where the Statue Stood: Divergent Loyalties to Newton in the Eighteenth Century," in Aspects of the Eighteenth Century. Ed., Earl R. Wasserman. (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), pp. 328-330.

[37]E. W. Strong, "Newtonian Explications of Natural Philosophy." Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. XVIII, No. 1 (January, 1957), p. 83.

[38]See E. W. Strong, "Newton's 'Mathematical Way.'" Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. XII, No. 1 (January, 1951), pp. 90-110.

[39]A. Rupert Hall, The Scientific Revolution 1500-1800. The Foundation of the Modern Scientific Attitude (London: Longmans, Green & Co., Ltd., 1962 (1954), 272; 275.

[40]Copleston, History of Philosophy, Vol. V, Pt. 1, p. 162. See also Louis Trenchard More, Isaac Newton. A Biography (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1962 (1934)), pp. 104-105; 331. See also ibid., p. 78, for Newton's distinction between "theory" and "hypothesis." Trenchard More wrote: ". . . Newton. . . denied that we have any a priori knowledge of the constitution of nature; the world is as it is, and it is the business of the man of science to find the facts. A theory, to Newton, was a law based on indisputable facts, expressed in mathematical terms, which could be overthrown only by discovering

new facts or by proving others to be false. An hypothesis was merely a speculation as to the cause or the method of phenomena. As all hypotheses ultimately, in his opinion, introduced occult forces or substances, they were not only incapable of verification, but many entirely different hypotheses could be imagined to explain any set of phenomena." (Ibid., p. 78). In many cases, then, of the investigation of phenomena, the use of hypotheses as explanations of these phenomena, was, to repeat Copleston's description of the Aristotelian occult qualities' effect-- was to say nothing at all.

[41]Alexandre Koyré, Newtonian Studies, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press ("Phoenix Books"): 1968 (1965), p. 16.

[42]Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman. Studies in the Transmission, Development and Circumstance of English Liberal Thought from the Restoration of Charles II until the War with the Thirteen Colonies (New York: Atheneum, 1968 (1959)), p. 72.

[43]Ibid., p. 71. Lewis Trenchard More referred in 1934 to Maclaurin as "probably the most brilliant of Scotch mathematicians, and certainly the ablest contemporary expositor of the Newtonian philosophy," Trenchard More, op. cit., p. 657. More declared that Maclaurin's Account of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophical Discoveries (London, 1748) "is probably still the best survey of the Principia" (Idem.). Maclaurin was appointed professor of mathematics in Marischel College, Aberdeen, at the age of nineteen years, and while serving in that position, travelled to London, where he met and became friends with Newton, Clarke and others, and was made a Fellow of the Royal Society. (Idem.). He was elected to succeed James Gregory, the friend of Newton and brilliant expositor of Newton's views in Scotland (and the uncle of Thomas Reid--on this last point see: (Reid) Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind. Intro. by Bernard A. Brody. Cambridge, Mass., and London, M.I.T. Press, 1969. P. vii) in the mathematics chair at Edinburgh, which he held from 1725-1745 (Ibid., pp. 657-659). Maclaurin saw that part of Newton's greatness lay in the latter's philosophical modesty in not pretending to describe the "why" of celestial mechanics, but merely the "how." In his Account, Maclaurin wrote of the proper method of scientific investigation of nature:
'. . . We may also learn at length. . . to be less fond of perfect and finished systems of natural philosophy; to be willing to stop when we are not in a position to proceed farther. . . . A compleat system indeed was not to be expected from one man, or one age, or perhaps from the greatest number of ages; could we have expected it from the abilities of any one man, we surely should have had it from Sir Isaac Newton; but he saw too far into nature to attempt. . .' (E. R. Strong, "Newtonian Explications," ibid., p. 69.).
Maclaurin was a "mathematical conceptualist" (see supra., p. 17) who, like Newton, warned against confusing subject and object, perceiver and perceived, and against "the hypothesizing which discovers analogies between the objects of abstracted speculation and the constitution of nature." (Ibid., p. 74). See also L. Laudan's introduction to the

reprint of Maclaurin's Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophical Discoveries, 1748 (cited in David Knight. Sources for the History of Science 1660-1914 ("The Sources of History: Studies in the Uses of Historical Evidence" Series). Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1975, p. 154.

[44]Robbins, op. cit., p. 72.

[45]Alexandre Koyré, Newtonian Studies (Chicago: 1968. 1965), p. 20. For Newton's "impetuous followers," see Peter Gay, The Enlightenment. An Interpretation. Vol. II The Science of Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), Chapter Two, Part 1., "The Enlightenment's Newton," pp. 128-140, and Chapter Two, Part 2., "Newton's Physics Without Newton's God," pp. 140-150.   wrote: ". . . while Newton's disciples honored Newton's modesty. . . some of his more impetuous followers used Newton's very triumphs as an argument against Newton's self-restraint and revived the age-old claim for universal knowledge. . . . The history of eighteenth-century science is far more than the history of assimilating Newton's ideas, confirming Newton's guesses, generalizing Newton's conceptions beyond his expectations. . . (Ibid., p. 134). See also G. Buchdahl, The Image of Newton and Locke in The Age of Reason (London: 1961), and Henry Guerlac, "Where the Statue Stood," ibid., pp. 317-334.

[46]Idem.

[47]Copleston, History of Philosophy, Vol. V, pt. i, p. 165. "The God of Newton. . . was not a vague First Cause, a divine watchmaker who first wound up the celestial mechanism, or the prisoner of his own laws, as Leibniz implied. He was a free agent, whose periodic intervention was necessary if the 'laws of nature' were to function at all. . . . While the Cartesian philosophy. . . encouraged a mechanistic view of the physical universe, the Newtonians stressed the impossibility of man's attaining to an understanding of final causes, and the dependence of the material world on regulation. (Newton assumed many defects in those laws of nature already made evident to man, and) . . . such defects could be remedied only by the direct intervention of God. If God said 'Let Newton be,' from Pope's famous couplet on Newton , Sir Isaac returned the compliment." Norman Hampson, A Cultural History of the Enlightenment (New York: Pantheon Books, A Division of Random House, 1968), 77-78. See also Peter Gay, The Enlightenment, II, 141.

[48]Alexandre Koyre, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

[49]Peter Gay, The Enlightenment. An Interpretation. Volume II The Science of Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), 4-181.

[50]Hume wrote in his History of Newton: ". . . Cautious in admitting no principles but such as were founded on experiment, but resolute to adopt every such principle, however new or unusual; from modesty, ignorant of his superiority above the rest of mankind, and thence less

careful to accomodate his reasonings to common apprehension. . . .
While Newton seemed to draw off the veil from some of the mysteries
of nature, he showed at the same time the imperfections of the
mechanical philosophy; and thereby restored her ultimate secrets to
that obscurity, in which they ever did and ever will remain. . . .
David Hume. The History of England from the Invasion of Julius
Caesar to the Abdication of James the Second. A New Edition, with
the Author's last Corrections & Improvements. Boston, Crosby, Nichols,
Lee and Company, 1861. Volume VI, p. 374.

[51]Ian Simpson Ross, Lord Kames and the Scotland of His Day
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 359-360.

[52]Trenchard More, in speaking of Newton's use of the term
"metaphysics," wrote: "The word metaphysics, as used here, must not be
confused with philosophy. It refers to those speculations on natural
phenomena which cannot be put to the test of experimental observation."
Louis Trenchard More. Isaac Newton. A Biography (N.Y.: Dover Publi-
cations, Inc., 1962 (1934), p. 78.

[53]Ibid., pp. 361-362.

[54]Ca. Burke to Sir Lawrence Parsons, (March, 1793), in (Burke).
The Correspondence of Edmund Burke. Vol. VII Jan., 1792-August, 1794.
(Cambridge, England; Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 359.

[55]Thomas Reid, Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man. (Dublin:
L. White, 1786), I, 49.

[56]Ibid., p. 51.

[57]Ibid., p. 48.

[58]Besides a correct interpretation of Newton per se, another
contemporary source could serve in the arsenal against Hartley's as-
sociationism and the mechanistic reconstruction of society; this other
source was the Scottish school of proto-sociologists which attempted
a "scientific study of society" (Peter Gay, op. cit., II, p. 332)
through the observation of human nature in various settings, past and
present, a methodology closer to that of Montesquieu rather than to
that pseudo-Newtonianism--this latter would apply Newtonian laws of
physics to assumed laws of human moral nature. The mechanism of pseudo-
Newtonianism is a genetic rather than a generic, or historical, approach
to human nature and explaining its motivations and actions. Harry
Prosch referred to "the later degeneration of Newtonian dualism into
pure and simple materialism" (Harry Prosch. The Genesis of Twentieth
Century Philosophy. The Evolution of Thought from Copernicus to the
Present. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books Doubleday and Co., Inc.,
1966. 1964, p. 64). Part of this degeneration involved the fact that
"everywhere the general tendency was to give mechanical or anyhow quasi-
mechanical explanations of events and things. (ibid., p. 68). "These

'mechanical' explanations have often been called 'genetic' explanations, because they are historical or growth patterns analyses which tacitly assume that larger wholes develope or generate from combinations of smaller parts according to certain laws of combinations. This means that no event is 'explained' through reference to 'final causes' or to purposes and aims. . . (ibid., p. 68). In fact, there exists no purpose nor even any purposiveness to the movements of the isolated atoms, which are assumed by the post-Newtonians to constitute the ultimate and only reality. The "genetic hypothesis" of Condillac, the French Materialist, is related to the dualism of Locke as the genetic explanations of the monism of the pseudo-Newtonians is related to the dualism of Newton. M. W. Beal pointed out Condillac's opposition to Locke's dualism. "Condillac takes the empirical dictum, 'Nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu,' to be the foundation of any science of the mind. . . . But Locke had failed to remain true to this genetic account of our knowledge and understanding, because he spoke of the understanding as distinct and independent of sensation. . . . Condillac's philosophy attempts to remain true to the genetic hypothesis by showing that the intellect itself is a result of or ultimately traceable to sensation. In carrying out this endeavour, Condillac wants to reduce metaphysics to a seul principe. This principe is the view that all faculties of the mind are nothing more than 'transformed sensation'." M. W. Beal. "Condillac as precursor of Kant." Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (The Voltaire Foundation, Banbury, Oxfordshire), Vol. CII (1973), 194. Condillac's monism and reductionism does not correspond to the general thought of the Enlightenment as interpreted by Wade and others (see p. 9) as a quite complex and heterogeneous mix. Condillac's genetic argument especially runs counter to the thought of the Scottish Enlightenment. Condillac's perversion of the dualistic Locke (See Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (Boston: Beacon Press: 1962 (1932), pp. 99-100) like the pseudo-Newtonians's perversion of Newton, and the genetic argument he used was shown by Maurice Mandelbaum to be an offshoot of associationism (see Maurice Mandelbaum. History, Man and Reason. A Study in Nineteenth-Century Thought (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1974; 1971), p. 143). Both associationism and geneticism, wrote Mandelbaum, claimed that "Experience [played]. . . a dominant role in all [Mandelbaum's emphasis] aspects of thought, that in the course of his experience an individual acquires wholly new capacities which become, quite literally, a second nature to him" (idem.). This seems to border on Lamarkianism. However that may be, it is helpful in order to understand more clearly the contrast between the genetic view and the assumptions of the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment,--to read the late Arnold Toynbee's words on the "genetic" and the "comparative" approaches as they apply to historical study. Toynbee's description of the "comparative" approach in historical studies corresponds to the assumptions of the "sociological historians" of the Scottish Enlightenment. Toynbee said that a strictly narrative, descriptive history corresponds to the genetic approach. But even separate narrative histories, when combined with one another, are more than the sum of their parts. "To link them together we have to compare them, and then to

analyse their likenesses and differences" [emphases added] (Arnold Toynbee. Change and Habit. The Challenge of Our Time, Chapter IV "Annex: The Genetic and the Comparative Approach," London, N.Y.: Oxford Univ. Press: 1966, p. 88). But because historical study requires an historical object, as part of a complex and continuously changing "flow of life and the plurality of its flowing streams," "both an historian's and a sociologist's eyes" are needed [emphasis added] so as not "to forfeit the possibility of seeing life whole" (idem.). This double-barrelled use by the historian of the "comparative" and the "genetic approach is similar to Philip Abrams's recent appeal for a "more penetrating" "historical sociology" (see infra., Chapter V), and to the eighteenth-century "sociological historians" of the Scottish Enlightenment (for the Scots, see infra., Chapter III), and lastly, to the "new Philosophical historians" of the Enlightenment in general (see infra., Chapter IV).

[59] Burke . A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful. Edited, with an introduction and notes by J. T. Boulton (London: Routledge, and Paul; N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. xxxvi

[60] Ibid., p. xxxv.

[61] Ibid., p. xxix.

[62] Ibid., p. xxviii. Burke's confidence in this respect is not unlike the general Enlightenment optimism and, in particular, to that of the methodology of the sociological historians of the Scottish Enlightenment, who sought laws of human behavior in society, and of society itself. For the general Enlightenment thought, see Appendix C; for the Scottish school, Chapter IV.

[63] Idem.

[64] Ibid., p. xxxiv.

[65] For Montesquieu's and the "organicist" meaning of natural, see Chapter III.

[66] For instance, "Helvetius reduces to sensation or sense-perception all the powers of the human understanding. . . . To judge is to perceive similarities and dissimilarities between individual ideas. . . . To judge. . . is simply to perceive." Frederick Copleston. A History of Philosophy (Garden City, New York: 1964 (1960), Vol. VI, Pt. i, p. 50. For the other like-minded French materialists, see ibid., VI, i, Chapter Two "The French Enlightenment (2)," pp. 53-74, espec. re: the Baron Paul von Holbach (1723-1790), pp. 63-64, and re: Pierre Jean Georges Cabinis (1757-1808), pp. 65-66.

[67] Ibid.

[68] S. A. Grave. The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1960), p. 80. See also James McCosh. The Scottish Philosophy (New York: Robert Carter Bros., 1875), p. 211. For Kant's similar views, ibid.

[69] See Henry Laurie. Scottish Philosophy in Its National Development. (Glasgow, James MacLehose & Sons, 1902),p. 132; see also Andrew Seth. Scottish Philosophy (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1894), pp. 78; 84-85; and James McCosh. The Scottish Philosophy (New York, N.Y.: Robert Carter Bros., 1875), p. 211).

[70] Phillip D. Cummins, "Reid's Realism." Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. XII, No. 3 (July, 1974), 318; See also Arthur R. Greenberg, "Hamilton and Reid's Realism." The Modern Schoolman, Vol. LIV, No. 1 (November, 1976), 15-17, and, more generally, Andrew Ward, "Direct and Indirect Realism." American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 4 (October, 1976), 287-294.

[71] Ibid., p. 323.

[72] Frederick Copleston, S.J. A History of Philosophy (Garden City, N.Y.:1967; 1966), Vol. VIII, Pt. ii, p. 150.

[73] Ibid., p. 151.

[74] Idem.

[75] P. D. Cummins, op. cit., p. 321.

[76] Idem.

[77] Idem.

[78] Idem.

[79] Gerald W. Chapman. Edmund Burke. The Practical Imagination (Cambridge, Mass.:1967), p. 208.

[80] Ibid., p. 209.

[81] "Crewe's Table-Talk. . .," Philobiblon Society, VII (1862/63), 25-26.

[82] Burleigh Taylor Wilkins. The Problem of Burke's Political Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 129

[83] Boulton, op. cit., p. lxxxiii.

[84] Ibid., p. xxxii.

[85] Ibid., p. xxxii.

[86] Ibid.

[87] R. W. Harris. Reason and Nature in the Eighteenth Century (N.Y.: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1969), p. 283. See also Burleigh Taylor Wilkins, op. cit., p. 125.

[88] (Burke) Writings & Speeches of Edmund Burke (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1901), I, 208-209.

[89] Alexandre Koyre, "Concept and Experience in Newton's Scientific Thought," in Koyre, Newtonian Studies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1968 (1965)), p. 25.

[90] See Maurice Mandelbaum. History, Man, and Reason (Baltimore, Maryland, London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1974 (1971)), p. 152.

[91] For Historicism and Mandelbaum's discussion of the theory and history of historicism see Maurice Mandelbaum, History, Man and Reason Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1974 (1971), pp. 43-48.

[92] Maurice Mandelbaum. History, Man and Reason. A Study in Nineteenth-Century Thought. Baltimore, Maryland: London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1974 (1971), p. 113.

[93] Wilkins, op. cit., p. 125.

[94] See Colin Kiernan, "The Enlightenment and Science in Eighteenth-Century France." Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, Vol. LIXa (1973), pp. 139-149 et passim.

[95] Alexandre Koyre, op. cit., p. 53.

APPENDIX B

Kant: Shaping the Phenomenal World[1]

Kant had in his earliest writings accepted the validity of
Newtonian physics - he considered the Newtonian world order as a
necessary pre-condition of his own Copernican Revolution. Kant's
Copernican Revolution was a new metaphysics of knowledge and ex-
perience involving a theoretical justification of Newtonian science,
and at the same time replacing the older Continental rationalism -
the metaphysics of the Cartesian and the Leibnizian/Wolffian
schools.[2]   Even in Kant's pre-Critical days, when lecturing as an
"ordinary" professor of logic and metaphysics at Konigsberg (1755-
1770), and using Wolffian text-books in philosophy, he nevertheless
stressed to his students the importance which experience played in
our knowledge of reality.   "Philosophical theorizing in the void was
by no means a Kantian ideal."[3]   Kant's new "metaphysics of knowledge or
of experience" - including his Copernican Revolution - was, unlike the
older metaphysics, limited by the inherent qualifications of Newtonian
physics itself, and by Kant's own conception of the noumenal realm and
of the pure reason. Kant's position is distinguished from all previous
metaphysical systems because Kant excludes a monistic view of reality
and with it, its necessary corollary, a reductionist theory of knowledge.
An epistemology assuming one ultimate source of reality from which
everything else derives would assume all knowledge of this reality to
be "objective" knowledge - whether "evident" or demonstrable (that is,

evident to some internal sense - in eighteenth century terms, the English "Moral Sense" school - or demonstrable by precise charting of some assumed given mechanical law of physical nature onto human nature and behavior). Such a reductionist epsitemology reflected either a higher truth (the Leibnizian/Wolffian view) or a wider good (Hutcheson) or actually being in itself (the view of Cartesian rationalism) the highest truth or the broadest good.

Kant's new metaphysics was "limited" by his "correct" Newtonianism and the concept of the noumenal realm in the following way. Kant's position is distinguished from all previous metaphysical systems because Kant excludes any monistic interpretation of reality and reductionist theories of knowledge. Kant rejects any ethical theory which presupposes any form of monism or reductionism; and historically, such ethical theories have taken the naturalistic form. Lewis White Beck uses a military metaphor to describe "Kant's Strategy" against both dogmatic rationalists and sceptical empiricists.[4] (Beck is speaking of the "historical and epistemological citidel" of Kant's philosophy rather than Kant's moral theories, or his theory of freedom.[5] Beck sees Kant as engaged in a two-front war. Kant's opponents belong to one of three different categories of philosophy, each of which is distinguished by its concern for a particular philosophical problem. These three categories historically developed into "two great coalitions," opposed to each other and both opposed by Kant's new philosophy. Beck lists the "three great perennial divisions in metaphysics" which Kant set forth as the initial (the broadest) framework of "the theory of the scope and function of reason."[6] The three divisions are

concerned respectively with problems dealing with what Beck calls (1)
the object of knowledge (or the term used throughout the present
study, problems of reality, (2) the origins of knowledge (or problems
of the theory of knowledge, epistemological theories), and (3) the
methods of knowledge (or, ethical problems). Kant gives the content
of the above three "dichotomies" as follows:

(1) re: the object of knowledge (reality
          intellectualists v. sensualists.

(2) re: the origin of knowledge (epis.):
          noologists (rationalists) vs. empiricists

(3) re: methods of knowledge (ethics):
          Scientists (systematic "scholastic philosophers) v. naturalists[7]

The "certain family affiliations" (as indicated by the arrows) among the
above divisions conclude a system of alliances forming "two great coali-
tions" - on the one hand, formed from the axis of the rationalistic
Leibnizian/Wolffian school and, on the other hand, the "entente founded
in modern times by Locke,"[8] descended from the sensationalist/empiricist/
naturalistic axis. The mature Kant was not committed to either coalition.[9]
The position of the Lockian entente regarding the three divisions of
philosophical problems was reflected in its basic assumption that "all
our knowledge came from experience." Hume is the best example of the
entente's "skepticism in metaphysics" (the problem of reality), "natural-
ism in ethics," and "skepticism tempered with naturalism" in epistemol-
ogy."[10] Although Kant agreed with the Lockians' skepticism in metaphysics,
he could not accept the latter two positions. In the face of the first
coalition, Kant's strategic question was: "How could he give up a
supernatural metaphysics (after Hume had awakened Kant from his Wolffian
dogmatic slumber) without making a metaphysics out of naturalism?" -

whether the naturalism took the form of the empiricist-based ethics of Hume or the eudaemonistic ethics of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson.[11] How could he avoid both particularizing the universal and universalizing - or at least generalizing - the particular? The second coalition which Kant opposed Leibnizian/Wolffian dogmatic rationalism, did not consider any "problem" of reality to exist, because everything, including epistemology and ethics, was derivative in a monistic, pre-established universal harmony.[12] Kant's task was to find a common denominator - "a common but false" assumption - among the two coalitions, and to destroy that common assumption: ". . . here (for Kant) a victory on either front will be a victory on both . . ."[13] Kant believed he had found such a false common denominator among the empiricist and rationalists in their common belief that "There is but one ultimate sense source (the epistemological problem) or faculty (the ethical problem) of knowledge."[14] "Leibniz, he tells us intellectualized [sense-based] appearances while Locke [and Hume] sensualized all the concepts of intellect."[15]

> [Kant's] question was: How not to be a dogmatist in metaphysics without being a skeptic in our [subjective] knowledge of nature. Hume's skepticism was all of a piece: no objective necessary knowledge of matter of fact either in or beyond experience. Leibniz's dogmatism was all of one piece: a priori knowledge of both what is in and what is beyond experience. Kant wanted to break these two continuities; and he saw that each was based on a theory of one source and one kind of knowledge [Kant's straegy became one of] . . . how to save the rational features of science from Hume's attack and the irreducibility irreducibly empirical features from Leibniz's and Wolff's . . . .[16]

Kant's strategy is best expressed, Beck believes, in the following citation from the Critique of Pure Reason:

> 'Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible.'[17]

This is said by Kant in connection with his distinction between analytic
and synthetic judgment. Analytic judgments represent, so to speak, the
rationalistic coalition, because such judgments have no empirical con-
tent; rather, they "relate concepts to each other by finding one con-
tained in the intension of the other" in a manner similar to the sub-
ject/predicate rationalism of the Leibnizian view.[18] Synthetic judgments
use the "given" of the empirical world as a fulcrum (not the "given" of
a noumenon, but the given object subsumed under one or another of the
categories and principles of the sensibility and the understanding.[19]
"Synthetic judgements are syntheses of concepts which are held together
by their common reference to something given . . . ."[20] Kant's strategy
is to deny any epistemological reductionism. Beck continues:

> . . . Notice Kant's strategy here. There are two factors involved
> in knowing: sensibility and understanding. Neither alone can
> give us knowledge; either alone is blind or empty (Empiricism is
> blind; rationalism is empty). Knowledge comes from the application
> of one to the other . . . .[21]

This Kantian balance of rationalism (a priori concept) and empiricism
is the concluding reminder which Norman Kemp Smith in his standard
Commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason wishes to leave his reader
of the essential heritage of the Critical philosophy. Kant's concept
of the possibility of experience reflects his reliance on the empiricism
of Hume and the a priori rationalism of Wolff. The actual crude "givens"
of empirical data are transformed into the possible experiential reality,
a reality made knowable through its position in the universal and
necessary spatio-temporal order - the reality is made yet more precise
when subsumed under the a priori rules, principles, categories of the
sensibility and the understanding. While Kant agrees with Wolff's

definition of philosophy as "lying wholly in the sphere of pure a priori

thought," Kant "radically transfers" the problem transforms the problem

of the possibility of the experience from a rationalistic base onto an

empiricist base.

> . . . [Philosophy's] function is to determine prior to specific ex-
> perience what experience must be; and obviously that is only possible
> by means of an a priori, purely conceptual method. . . . The prob-
> lem of the 'possibility of experience' is the problem of discovering
> the conditions which necessarily determine experience to be what it
> is. Kant, of course, radically transforms the whole problem, in
> method of treatment as well as in results, when in defining the sub-
> ject-matter of inquiry he substitutes experience for things abso-
> lutely existent [emphasis added]. This modification is primarily
> due to the influence of Hume. But the constant occurrance in Kant's
> philosophy of the term 'possibility' marks his continued belief in
> the Idealist view of thought. Though pure thought never by itself
> amounts to knowledge - therein Kant departs from the extreme ration-
> alist position - only through it is any knowledge, empirical or a
> priori, possible at all. Philosophy, in order to exist, must be a
> system of a priori rational principles. Nothing empirical or hypo-
> thetical can find any place in it. Yet at the same time it is the
> system of the a priori conditions only of experience, not of ultimate
> reality. Such is the twofold relation of agreement and difference
> in which Kant stands to his rationalist predecessors.[22]

In historical terms, of Kant's correct Newtonianism and his con-

cept of the noumena, it might be said that Kant's disavowal of Hume's

skepticism in regard to epistemology and ethics represents a reaffirma-

tion by Kant of Newtonian physics and Newtonian methodology, of the

possibility of a knowledge of an objective world of experience. On the

other hand, Kant as a Newtonian could not accept Leibniz's dogmatism

which denied knowledge of an objective experiential world and which

asserted a direct a priori knowledge of that which lies beyond experience.

In Kantian terms, Leibnizian dogmatic rationalism asserted an intellec-

tual intuition of noumena, or supersensual reality. The monism and the

reductionism of the two coalitions of Leibniz/Wolff/Shaftesbury/Hutche-

son on the one hand, and of the Lockean/Humean school on the other, were

anathema to Kant on the ground of Kant's positive belief in the objective

reality of Newtonian physics; in other words, Kant would have perhaps

awoken from his pre-Critical rationalistic "dogmatic slumber" without

the prodding of Hume, who, although a skeptic regarding metaphysics,

was also a skeptical empiricist.

> . . . Hume awoke him from his 'dogmatic slumber' - Kant's term for
> his early faith in the power of reason to give metaphysical know-
> ledge. Yet even if he had not accepted Hume's argument against
> the possibility of metaphysics, it is probable that Hume's stric-
> tures on natural science would have aroused him. For both rational-
> ism and empiricism, if carried to the ultimate (monism) deny the
> necessity and universality of natural science, and Kant's conviction
> of the certainty of Newtonian mechanics was too deep to be shaken by
> any negative conclusions drawn from speculations concerning the
> human mind. . . .[23]

Kant's "metaphysics" would not imagine systems, as Newton had warned

against, but would seek to justify the uniformity and objectivity of

that same law-governed world Newton had described. This justification

would rest upon the assumed reality of the matter of the empirical world

from which Newton had derived his laws of physics, and the reality of

those laws themselves, and the mind that had discovered and recited

those laws. Kant stood opposed to rationalistic and/or teleological

"justifications" of the Newtonian system, justifications which reduced

reality and man's knowledge of reality to one origin and one meaning.

> Kant did not abandon Newtonian physics for any other kind of physics.
> But he did abandon the Wolffian philosophical tradition in favour
> of an original philosophy.[24]

Kant not only accepted Newtonian physical laws per se, but he also would

look to Newtonian methodology[25] as an aid to replace the old metaphysics

and gain new knowledge of what amounted to a new reality. For Kant, the

term knowledge is limited to sense-experience of the Newtonian world, -

and, following Newtonian laws of physics and of methodology, Kant's

Critical philosophy distinguishes between the subjective and objective

on the one hand, and between the ideal and the real (noumenal and

phenomenal) on the other. These Newtonian and Kantian discriminations

avoid monistic views of reality and reductionist views of knowledge,

and therefore, the indeterminancy described by Heisenberg (see Chapter

V) of any knowledge of reality. In viewing knowledge as limited to sense

experience,

> . . . Kant is, of course, a child of his time. The absolute
> sufficiency of the Newtonian physics is a presupposition of
> all his utterances on this theme. Newton, he believes, has
> determined in a quite final manner the principles, methods and
> limits of scientific investigation [emphasis added]. For though
> Kant himself imposes upon science a further limitation, namely,
> to appearances (of the noumenal realm, as distinguished from
> the "reality" of the phenomenal realm), he conceives himself,
> in so doing, not as weakening Newton's natural philosophy, but
> as securing it against all possible objects. . . .[26]

But Theodore M. Greene's description of Kant's faith in the "finality

and perfection"[27] of the Newtonian system resembles the harmonious,

and closed, Leibnizian universe, characterized by that "fulness," that

plenitude described by Arthur O. Lovejoy.[28] Neither Newton nor Kant

assumes scientific investigation to be capable of revealing laws in

nature which are to be considered as final or perfect. The results of

scientific investigation should rather be characterized as fruitful than

as final.

Greene does describe the parallel methodology among Kant's three

Critiques - an analytic methodology proceeding from the particular

given of experience (physical, moral and aesthetic experience, respec-

tively) to the general or the universal.

> His starting-point invariably is concrete human experience in one or
> another of its characteristic forms. This experience he regards a a
> datum, the material for philosophical investigation. Thus, in the

Critique of Pure Reason his starting-point is man's ordinary know-
ledge of so-called physical objects; in his ethical writings (the
Critique of (Pure) Practical Reason) it is man's moral sense of
duty; and in his doctrine of aesthetics (Critique of Judgement)
it is the appreciation and creation of beauty. If the factual
reality of any one of these experiences be denied, Kant's analysis
of it loses at once all point and meaning; if, on the other hand,
it be admitted as an existential fact, the importance of his sub-
sequent investigation is apparent.[29]

Scientific and/or philosophical investigation should always begin with

the particular or ordinary givens of the phenomenal and/or moral realms.

Kant in his early "Enquiry into the Distinction of the Principles

of Natural Theology and Morals" (1764) writes, in the same spirit as his

later mature writings, of the need for a change of method from previous

barren metaphysics: "The genuine method of metaphysics is fundamentally

of the same kind as that which Newton introduced into natural science

and which was there so fruitful."[30] Kant warns the metaphysicians that

if we are to increase our knowledge of reality, of human nature, we

must ". . . turn rather to a method analogous to that which was employed

so successfully by Newton in natural science. (The metaphysician) should,

indeed, begin by clarifying the confused concepts of experience and giving

them adequate and abstract expression. . . ."[31] It was because ". . . Kant

never doubted the general validity of Newtonian physics within its own

field [that Kant's] . . . later problems [the application of a priori

concepts to a posteriori empirical phenomena] arose on the basis of this

conviction. . . ."[32] Nathan Rotenstreich says that what he calls Kant's

Schematism is an attempt by Kant to solve the "problem of (the objectivity

of) empirical knowledge," that is, how the "subsumability" of the sense

data of the empirical world under a priori concepts is possible (the other

half of the problem of reconciling a priori concepts and a posteriori

matter is taken up by the Transcendental Deduction the function of which is "to establish the validity of the a priori concepts for a posteriori datum."[33] But the salient point here is Rotenstreich's statement that Kant's philosophy was nothing but the sum of the problems Kant faced subsequent to declaring the two realms of reality - of a posteriori matter and of a priori mind.

> The starting point of Kant's analysis is the heterogeneity of the elements composing knowledge; i.e., the datum and the concept. Once this heterogeneity is established, there is no way of solving the problem of knowledge by denying the heterogeneity, as for instance Leibniz tried to do in assuming that, in the last analysis, the difference between empirical knowledge and truths of facts on the one hand, and rational knowledge and truths of reason on the other, disappears. The problem Kant faced is an outcome of the emphasis placed on heterogeneity: is knowledge possible altogether once there are different elements composing knowledge . . .[34]

The same heterogeneity which characterizes epistemological problems also characterizes ethical problems. Kant says that morality is impossible without a heterogeneous concept of the good. The will of the moral agent strives too freely to maintain his moral obligation of resolving the "tension between the natrual and moral aspects of the good." The universality of the moral law tells the moral agent what he ought to do as a free sensible being, not what he must do. This striving by the moral agent to always make the correct choice is what constitutes happiness, not static, a priori concepts of virtue, self-interest or desire.[35]

Newtonian physics postulates and Kant accepts, the uniformity and objectivity of Nature, but since experience and the fragmenting empiricism of Hume cannot explain, except subjectively, or psychologically, the uniformity of Nature, the possibility of mathematical and scientific knowledge, - Kant proposes his Copernican Revolution, "the theory that objects conform to the mind rather than the other way around."[36]

Because the structure of human sensibility of the human mind is
constant, objects will always appear to us in certain ways. . . .[37]
A pure science of Nature is possible because objects of experience,
to be objects of experience, must of necessity conform to certain
a priori conditions (the categories and principles of the under-
standing).[38] [In Kant's words:] . . .'the principles of possible
experience [possible, because subsumed under one or another of the
a priori categories and principles of the understanding - the
"schematized" categories and principles now, since they have con-
tributed to the shaping of experience] are then at the same time
[as each other] universal laws of Nature, which can be known a
priori. And thus to the problem . . . . How is the pure science
of Nature possible? has been solved' . . . Without synthesis there
is for us no Nature; and the a priori synthesis gives laws to
Nature. These necessary laws are in a real sense imposed by the
human subject; but they are at the same time objective laws
[emphasis added], because they are valid, and necessarily valid,
for the whole range of possible experience, that is, for Nature
as the complex of possible objects of experience. . . .[emphasis
added].[39]

Kant's analysis of the subjective conditions of experience, of the empiri-

cal world governed by Newtonian laws of physics, is carried through by

our "ascending process of synthesis whereby empirical reality is con-

stituted."[40] The process begins at the two sources of human knowledge

- sensibility and the understanding. "Through the former objects are

given to us; through the latter they are thought."[41] The knowledge of

objects gained by the sensibility, through sense - experience, is similar

to the knowledge the empiricists would say we obtain from raw sense-

datum of experience; but the objects of sensibility represent merely

the first step in the a priori synthesis of knowledge - "thought can

(the categories of the understanding) get to work on objects only when

they are given to sense."[42] Further, the objects of sensibility,

although "given" to us, are nevertheless not "things-in themselves,

things as they exist independently of the synthesizing activity of the

human subject." "Sense-experience itself involves such an activity namely

snythesis in the a priori sense intuitions of space and time. Things-

in-themselves are never given to us as objects: that which the under-
standing finds before it . . . as the given is already a synthesis of
form and matter."[43] Synthesis of the objects of sensibility is the
work of the understanding and without it there can be no knowledge what-
soever. The gaining of any knowledge is synonomous with the knowledge
of the _possible_ objects of experience. First, the understanding has
synthesized the data (or "manifold") of sense experience through appli-
cation of the a priori categories and principles (this process is called
sense intuition). These categories allow the lone subject to gain know-
ledge of reality beyond his immediate experience and setting. The rela-
tion between "the one perceiving and thinking subject"[44] and the mani-
fold of (sense) intuition or experience (what might be called perception)
is called pure apperception. "Unless the manifold of (sense) intuition
could be brought . . . to the unity of apperception, there would be no
experience, no knowledge . . . no objects."[45] Knowledge of reality is
objective in the sense that the human subject has applied to the natural,
physical world a priori categories of sensibility and understanding which
synthesize natural phenomena and thus take the subject beyond the immedi-
ate range of simple non-synthesizing, strictly empirical perception.[46]
But knowledge of reality is subjective[47] in the sense that the schematized
categories of understanding which enables us to know of the data of
sense intuition, do not enable us to know of supersensible or noumenal
reality. In fact, Kant denies the epistemological validity of un-
schematized categories.[48] To believe that such unschematized categories
give us knowledge of phenomenal objects if to wipe away the objective
empirical world, as seen through the categories of the understanding

playing upon sense-intuited experience. The unschematized categories would substitute for the sense or phenomenal objects an "intellectual intuition" of supersensible or noumenal objects. But, Kants says, "all intuition is sense intuition,"[49] and denies "the notion that human beings enjoy or can enjoy an intellectual intuition of noumena. . . ."[50] Not to deny an intellectual intuition of noumena would force Kant to accept the positive reality and direct apprehension of noumenal objects by the intellectual intuition - the function of noumenon in this scheme would be to act as a vehicle, transforming "completely indeterminate, unknowable something" called the transcendental object into a form acceptable for the intellectual intuition to grasp.[51] But, Kant says that we do not have a faculty of intellectual intuition; on the other hand are neither noumena objects of sense-intuitions nor capable of being subsumed within any categories of the understanding. Thus the existence of noumena remains problematical, and does not yield knowledge. But the idea of the noumenon does serve as a limiting, a   real limiting concept of the[52] operation of the understanding upon the possible objects of sensibility, and serves as a limiting concept on the understanding itself, or, what noumenal objects the understanding chooses to consider as lying outside the range of its [the understanding's] synthesizing categories and principles.

> The understanding limits sensibility 'by giving the name noumena to things considered in themselves and not as phenomena. But it at the same time sets limits to itself, that is, of not knowing them (noumenon) by means of any categories and of thinking them simply as an unknown something.[53]

Or, again, Kant says in the concluding sentence of his chapter on
phenomena and noumena in The Critique of Pure Reason (2nd ed.) that
the noumenon in its negative, regulative (limiting) use is indis-
tinguishable from the unknown thing-in-itself (the object of the would-
be intellectual non-sensuous intuition). ". . . the problematic
thought which leaves open a place for (intelligible objects) serves
only, like an empty space, for the limitation of empirical principles,
without itself containing or revealing any other object of knowledge
beyond their sphere."[54] The noumena performs what might be called
its negative epistemological function by serving as a brake upon the
understanding, which, "overestimating its powers and prerogatives,
proceeds to transform the notion of the transcendental object (the
object of the impossible intellectual intuition) . . . into the con-
cept of a noumenon."[55] The noumenon serves as a mediator, so to speak,
between the unknown transcendental object and the understanding, a
relation loosely analogous to the mediating function of the imagination
between the concepts of the understanding and the manifolds of (sense)
intuition.[56] The relation is loosely analogous because while the imagi-
nation mediates between two modes of judgment, sensibility and under-
standing,[57] which are grounded on the appearances of the objective
world - and leaves no "empty spaces," - the noumenon does leave "empty
spaces" in the region between it and the schematization thought performs
on objects of experience. So, even in the realm of Nature, for Kant, the
world of Newtonian physics, there is an unknown factor (analogous, one
might say, to the Newtonian void, see Appendix A) which performs the
negative function of theoretically placing limitations upon the science
of Nature.

However, the highest application to which Kant extends the cognitive judgments of the mind is expressed in his concept of the transcendental Ideas (including the Antinomies") of the pure reason. The pure reason is a cognitive faculty of the mind which, although it cannot be used to increase our scientific knowledge of objects, still does have a proper positive "regulative" function to perform (as distinguished from the negative function of the noumenon vis-a-vis the phenomenal world.[58] Given Kant's grand design to ". . . reconcile the world of Newtonian physics, the world of empiricist (phenomenal) reality governed by causal laws which exclude freedom, with the world of the moral consciousness, the world of freedom. . . ."[59] -still the concept of the pure theoretical reason (as distinguished from the pure practical reason which gives laws for the moral realm) affect activity in the phenomenal world to the extent that the regulative Idea prods one into action (somewhat like the function of the metal rabbit in a dog race) not a word moral action certainly, but then again, not a wholly phenomenally-based action. Pure reason gives to the phenomenal world an open-endedness, thereby saving it from being completely subsumed under deterministic phenomenal laws of Nature, while at the same time not detracting from that world's objectivity.

> The theoretical reason, of itself, can tell us only that it sees no impossibility in the concept of freedom and in the idea of supra-empirical noumenal reality. The concept of the moral law (schematized in the Critique of Practical Reason), through its inseparable connection with the idea of freedom, gives us a practical (moral) assurance of the existence of such a reality and of our belonging to it as rational beings. And theoretical reason, on the basis of this assurance, can attempt to think noumenal reality so far as the practical reason warrents our assuming it. . . .[60]

The Ideas of the pure reason allow room for expansion, or at least exposure, of the phenomenally-originated judgments of the mind, to the unconditioned (by any phenomenal considerations). The "unconditioned" is "a concept which stands for something which is always subject and never predicate."[61] Kemp Smith reminds us that Kant had eliminated the doctrine of the transcendental object (and the possibility of an "intellectual intuition") from his teaching and had assigned the categories as means to an understanding of empirical objects; now, the "function of mediating the reference of phenomenal nature to a noumenal basis falls to the Ideas of Reason.[62] Copleston explains the mediating role of reason:

> The understanding (Verstand) is concerned directly with phenomena, unifying them in its judgements. The reason (Vernunft) is not directly concerned with phenomena in this way, but only indirectly or mediately (emphasis added). That is to say, it accepts the concepts and judgements of the understanding and seeks to unify them in the light of a higher principle.[63]

This higher principle of unification is an unconditioned reality, not given in experience. If the ideas of the pure reason do not attempt to "fill in" the empty spaces, so to speak, between reality, noumenal reality and the phenomenally-based judgments of the mind, the Ideas do at least attempt to explain the outlines of the relations between the active judgments of the understanding and sense-based objects, but objects limited in their extent by noumenal notions. Again, the doctrine of the noumenon assumes the empty spaces resulting from a limited empirical knowledge eventually will be partially taken up by objects other than those exclusively proximate and dependent upon the understanding's immediate judgments. Kant expresses the negative/potential aspects of the noumenal concept:

> The concept of the noumena is . . . not the concept of an object,
> but is a problem unavoidably bound up with the limitation of our
> sensibility - the problem, namely as to whether there may not be
> objects entirely disengaged from our sensuous species of intuition.
> This is a question which can only be answered in an indeterminate
> manner, by saying that, as sense intuition does not extend to all
> things without distinction, <u>a place remains open for other different
> objects</u> [emphasis added].[64]

The space which the uncertainty of the negative concept of the noumenon

leaves open, for possible extension of the objects and judgments of the

understanding is not a totally unconditioned space. But a totally un-

conditioned reality is what the Ideas of the reason demand for their

"satisfaction."[65] It is merely unconditional in the sense that the

understanding cannot possibly synthesize in one setting the totality

of phenomenal objects. A recent commentator, Lewis White Beck, says

that the <u>Critique of Pure Reason</u> requires the formal unity of the a

priori laws of nature, but it does not establish the idea of an equally

inclusive system of individual objects. Nature, says Kant, (in the

first Introduction to the <u>Critique of Judgement</u> (1790) constitutes a

system by its transcendental laws (of the pure reason), but

> . . . there is such an infinite multitude of empirical laws and so
> great a heterogeneity of forms of nature . . . that the concept of
> a system according to these empirical laws must be wholly alien to
> the understanding, and neither the possibility nor even less the
> necessity of such a whole can be conceived . . . . [66]

The understanding synthesizes nature through synthetic a priori categories-

i.e., they do not represent a posteriori Baconian generalizations con-

structed from actual received empirical data. Such a formulation of a

posteriori empirical generalizations is only one of the functions the

judgment performs as its role in Kant's <u>Critique of Judgement</u> as

mediator or bridge between the phenomenal realm of nature and the

noumenal realm of freedom (morality). The judgement proper accepts the

judgments (a priori) of the understanding and those of the reason and
the regulative concept of the empirical whole which these two faculties,
taken together, have assumed. But the charting of the actual "relation-
ships among the phenomena of nature," to which the regulative concepts
have given "sense and direction,"[67] are provided by the faculty of
judgment.[68] Judgment (i.e., the meaning of the term as used in the
third Critique, as mediator between nature and freedom, as distinguished
from its generic use - judgment as synonomous with thought in general -
in the first and second Critiques) accepts both the positive causality
(reality) of nature and the positive causality (duty) of freedom (the
freely chosen duty by the individual to obey transcendent moral laws).
These two positive realities were expressed as an antithesis of the
pure reason, but here the judgment can solve the antinomy between
Nature and Freedom "only when the relationships between the two worlds
is developed affirmatively."[69] The judgment attempts to develop this
affirmative relationship by expanding particulars (in the phenomenal
world) under the given universals (of the moral world), and of particu-
larizing universals according to the given particulars. In eighteenth-
century terms, we must assume a positive causality of the physical
laws which Newton described, but we must avoid the vulgarization of
Newton, or that pseudo-Newtonianism which would create a mechanistic,
deterministic universe by universalizing particulars without particulars.

We are never excused from searching for a mechanical explanation of
any simple fact (including human actions), yet at the same time we can-
not anticipate a "Newton of a blade of grass." The mechanistic theory
does not lead us from the parts which it investigates to the whole of
its organization. This limitation is particularly relevant to human
action. . . .[70]

In order that the judgment reconcile Nature and Freedom by universalizing particulars and by particularizing universals, it assumes a "formal design" or order throughout nature (including man in nature). This idea by the judgment of a formal design or purpose in nature does not impinge upon the reality of a mechanistic Newtonian nature; in fact, it supports this nature, while at the same time, the idea allows man to step outside himself in order to gain a certain degree of objective perspective on his character without recourse to any notion of final Causes or Purposes or to any exclusive consideration of his position in the free moral realm, apart from nature. Kant's thesis that "'Purposiveness can be without purpose,'"71 (elaborated in the first part of the Critique of Judgement, the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgement") allows an objective Newtonian nature and a mind capable of shaping this experience according to certain a priori concepts - without at the same time succombing to a fruitless search for final causes inevitably ending in that Philistine wisdom satirized by Voltaire (see infra) and historically stemming from the Leibnizzian/Wolffian rationalism which Newton did not represent. S. Korner describes Kant's thesis which allows a systemitization of experience according to apriori concepts, while avoiding that certainty which demands to know the causes of causes until the final unconditioned reality is reached.

> We often find particulars, whether man-made or not, whose parts are so intimately interrelated and so harmoniously fitted together and to the whole of which they are parts, that we speak of the whole as having a design without relating it either to a design or to a purpose for which it is designed. Indeed it often does not even occur to us to look for either. . . . (Korner's emphases) The distinction between purposive whole and purpose in a teleological judgement, corresponds to the distinction between particular and concept in an ordinary (non-teleological) empirical judgement. . . .72

Kant uses the distinction between purposeful and purpose to describe the natural world and the moral world respectively.

Man as a noumenal (moral) being must act according to a purpose, while nature (or, man as located in nature) is merely purposeful in the sense indicated directly above. "Man's moral conduct understood as conformity with his own internal law (reflecting a higher objective law) transcends mechanical causality in which causes are external to the acting character."[73] That is, man's moral conduct is autonomous, all of a piece; such conduct - including thought and action - is, in the terminology of logic, is subject and not predicate. On the other hand, mechanical causality as a purposeful whole is not autonomous - any unconditioned unifying purpose it has is expressed only negatively through the concept of the noumena. Nevertheless, the moral purpose of man can be judged "without prejudice to a (purposeful) mechanistic explanation of nature." "Because both of these ideas, purposive design and mechanism, function methodologically without interference with each other, we see how the ends of freedom may be thought of as possible within the system of nature. . . ."[74] Even when set against the autonomous moral realm, the phenomenal world more than holds its own positive purposiveness against any subsumption within the purpose of the moral realm. The moral realm described in the second Critique transcends the phenomenal realm, it does not detract from the positive reality of the phenomenal realm.

From the view point of the powers of the judgment, of the understanding, it might be said that the concept of the noumenon performs an act of omission while the Ideas of the pure reason perform an act of commission. That is, the noumenon limit the expansion of the faculties of

the judgment for the most part to the phenomenal realm (for the most part, because there seems to be an unfulfilled phenomenal grey area which "other different objects" may occupy (see supra) but are not themselves (noumenon) actively engaged in the faculties' probing. But the Ideas of the pure reason do actively seek to expand, not limit, the judgments of the understanding to some unconditioned state beyond the noumena, and to reunify these judgments according to the Ideas of the unconditioned.

This unconditioned state which is never a predicate of any yet higher subject, does not itself stand as a subject of which all lower levels of reality are derivitive predicates. On the contrary, the unconditioned Ideas of reason serve the lower phenomenal world, so to speak, in a "regulative" rather than a "constitutive" (of reality) capacity. The transcendent Ideas of the reason originate of course in the mind, and "pass beyond experience" to the unconditioned. But the Ideas have no separate reality apart from the reason that uses them as a catalyst, as a means to gain knowledge of that phenomenal reality bounded by the concept of the noumenon. In other words, the concept of the noumenon involves a theory of reality. The concepts of the Ideas of the reason involves a theory of knowledge. The Ideas "pass beyond experience" but they do so through the mind's reason. The transcendent Ideas do not pass to any loftier reality corresponding to the phenomenal world, but merely attempt to more precisely define our knowledge of the relation of phenomenal man to noumenal reality.[75] The Ideas go beyond experience, but they do step into the realm of noumenal reality (though such a step does take place in Kant's <u>Critique of (Pure) Practical Reason</u>).

Copleston summarizes the three Ideas of the pure reason and their

characteristics as cognitive faculties of the mind and their regula-

tive reality:

> . . .the soul as permanent substantial subject, the world as totality
> of causally related phenomena, and God as absolute perfection, as the
> unity of the conditions of objects of thought in general. These three
> Ideas are not innate. At the same time they are not derived empirical-
> ly. They arise as a result of the pure reason's natural drive toward
> completely completing the synthesis achieved by the understanding.
> This does not mean . . . that the pure reason carries further the
> synthesizing activity of the understanding considered as constituting
> objects by imposing the apriori conditions of experience known as the
> categories. The Ideas of pure reason are not "constitutive" . . .[76]
> (they) do not give us knowledge of corresponding objects.[77]

But the Ideas are regulative and as such, exert great value as a kind of

heuristic principle.[78]

> For example, the Idea of the world as a totality (the second Idea
> of the pure reason) the total system of causally related phenomena,
> constantly spurs us on to develope even wider scientific explanatory
> hypotheses, ever wider conceptual syntheses of phenomena. It serves,
> in other words, as a kind of ideal goal, the notion of which stimu-
> lates the mind to renewed effort. . . .[79]

The regulative function of the transcendent Ideas of reason coincide with

Ernst Cassirer's explanation of what an ideal means in Kantian terms -

an explanation which stresses the Kantian ideal as not divorced from

empirical reality or experience, but necessary for the "completion" of

experience to the extent the principles and categories of the understand-

ing can carry it.

> . . . in Kant's system an ideal is not, as with Plato, something
> opposed to experience - something lying outside it and elevated
> above it. It is rather a moment, a factor in the process of ex-
> perience itself. It has no independent isolated ontological exist-
> ence; it is a regulative principle that is necessary for the use
> of experience itself, completing it and giving it a systematic
> unity.[80]

APPENDIX B

NOTES

[1]Although published too late to have been used in the present study, a recent study guide to Kant's philosophy is T.E. Wilkerson, <u>Kant's Critique of Pure Reason</u>. A Commentary for Students. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976.

[2]Frederick Copleston, S.J., <u>A History of Philosophy</u>, Vol. 6 <u>Modern Philosophy</u>. Part I. <u>The French Enlightenment to Kant</u> (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, a Division of Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1964, 1960).

[3]Copleston, op. cit., VI, 1, pp. 210-211.

[4]Lewis White Beck, "Kant's Strategy." <u>Journal of the History of Ideas</u>, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2 (Ap.-June, 1967), 224-236.

[5]Copleston, op. cit., VI, ii, 224.

[6]Lewis White Beck, op. cit., 225.

[7]Ibid., pp. 226-227.

[8]Ibid., p. 225.

[9]<u>Idem</u>.

[10]<u>Idem</u>.

[11]Ibid., p. 225.

[12]Ibid., pp. 226-227.

[13]Ibid., p. 231.

[14]<u>Idem</u>.

[15]<u>Idem</u>.

[16]Ibid., p. 233.

[17] Ibid., p. 234.

[18] For Leibniz, see F. Copleston, _A History of Philosophy_. Vol. 4 _Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Leibniz_. (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, A division of Doubleday and Co., Inc. , 1963 1960), pp. 279, 291-293.

[19] See Copleston, op. cit., VI, ii, p. 25.

[20] Lewis White Beck, "Kant's Strategy," p. 234. See also T. M. Greene, ed., _Kant Selections_, p. 33.

[21] _Idem_.

[22] Norman Kemp Smith, _Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason_ (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), p. 606.

[23] Lewis White Beck, _Studies in the Philosophy of Kant_ (New York, Indianapolis, Kansas City: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc.,)1965. Chapter in Kant's _Theoretical and Practical Philosophy_, pp. 3-53, esp. p. 12.

[24] Copleston, op. cit., VI, i, p. 215.

[25] Ibid., ii, p. 241.

[26] Norman Kemp Smith, _Commentary_, pp. lv-lvi. For Kant, physics very naturally meant the Newtonian phys cs - given the historical context, it could hardly mean anything else. And it is evident that there is a connection between Kant's principles, as listed in the Analytic of Principles (in the _Critique of Pure Reason_), with the Newtonian conception of the physical world. For instance, a principle asserting that all changes take place according to necessary causal relations, would not fit in with a physics which admitted the concept of indeterminacy (See Copleston, ibid., VI, ii, 241), and see supra., p.   .

[27] Theodore Greene, ed., _Kant Selections_ (New York, 1929), p. xxvi.

[28] See _America Philosophy in the Twentieth Century From Pragmatism to Philosophical Analysis_. Ed., with an introduction,survey, notes and bibliographies by Paul Kuntz (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966), p. 355, and Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being. A Study in the History of an Idea (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1965, 1936), pp. 52; 59.

[29] Theodore Greene, ed., _Kant Selections_ (New York, 1929), p. xxii.

[30]F. Copleston, History of Philosophy (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, 1964), Vol. VI, i, p. 221.

[31]Ibid., VI, i, p. 223.

[32]Ibid., p. 215.

[33]Nathan Rotehstreich, Experience and Its Systemitization (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), p. 27.

[34]Ibid.

[35]See John R. Silber, "The Copernican Revolution in Ethics: The Good Reexamined," esp. Pt. II, "The Heterogeneity of the Good" in Robert Paul Wolff, ed., Kant S A Collection of Critical Essays (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 266-290.

[36]Copleston, VI, i, p. 237.

[37]Ibid.

[38]Ibid., pp. 44-45.

[39]Ibid., p. 59. Theodore M. Greene describes the "corollary" of the Copernican Revolution as the concept of the possibility of objects - or those "capable" of being revealed to us - of experience, that is, of the objects of knowledge. Such objects must be "capable of being revealed to us in and through our sensuous experience," thus allowing us "a priori knowability of the essential character of 'all possible objects of experience'"; and of the "possibility that other (noumenal) phases of reality" may reveal themselves to man in non-sensuous fashion, e.g., in the moral experience of goodness [Critique of Judgement] Theodore M. Greene, ed., Kant Selections (New York: 1929), p. xxxvii.

[40]Copleston, History of Philosophy, VI, i, p. 236.

[41]Ibid., VI, ii, p. 24. The "ascending process of synthesis" reaches its apex at the task of the reason (see infra) which "is to give systematic arrangement to our cognitions." "We can say, therefore, that 'the understanding is an object for reason, as sensibility is for the understanding. To produce a systematic unity in all possible empirical operations of the understanding is the business of reason, just as the understanding unites the manifold of phenomena by means of concepts and brings them under empirical laws.'" p. 95.

[42]Ibid., p. 25.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid., p. 45.

[45] Ibid., p. 49.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid., VI, i, p. 236.

[48] "While Kant certainly says that the unschematized categories have no sufficient meaning to give as the concept of an object, and that they are only functions of the understanding for the production of concepts, '. . . some meaning or content is attributed by Kant to the unschematized category. This meaning is not sufficiently determinate to give knowledge . . ." Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. VI, Pt. ii, p. 54.

[49] Ibid., p. 61.

[50] Idem.

[51] Norman Kemp Smith says this of the transcendental object: ". . . It is . . . a combination of subjectivism and of dogmatic rationalism." Norman Kemp Smith, Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (New York: Humanities Press, 1962, 1923), pp. 406-407.

[52] The noumenon is as real, though not perceptible, and independent an entity as the phenomena - neither is derivative of the other, yet such affects the other's idea of itself, so to speak. Copleston says:
. . . the idea of the noumenon is represented (by Kant) as arising, not through inference to a cause of sensation, but as an inescapable correlate of the idea of the phenomena. We are not presented with subjective representations on the one hand and the external causes on the other. Rather are we presented with the idea of an object which appears and corresponds to the idea we have, as a surely limiting concept, the idea of the object apart from its appearance ("regarding Kantian terminology, "we must remember that to appear means being subjected to the a priori forms of sensibility." Copleston, Ibid., p. 240. It is as though the neumenon were the other side of the picture, a side which we do not and cannot see but the indeterminate notion of which necessarily accompanies the idea of the side which we do see. See Copleston, ibid., p. 65.

[53] Ibid., p. 64.

[54]Norman Kemp Smith, _Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason_, p. 409.

[55]Ibid., p. 407.

[56]"The imagination (is conceived) . . . as a mediating power or faculty between understanding and sensibility. The imagination is said to produce, and to be the bearer, as it were, of schemata. A schema is, in general, a rule or procedure for the production of images which schematize or delimit, so to speak, a category so as to permit its application to appearances. . . ." Copleston, ibid., p. 54.

[57]For Kant, judgment was synonomous with thought. See Copleston, Ibid.

[58]Ibid., p. 72.

[59]Ibid., p. 139.

[60]_Idem._

[61]Copleston, op. cit., Vol. VI, ii, p. 75.

[62]Norman Kemp Smith, _Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason_, p. 415. ". . . transcendental Ideas (are) . . . just as natural (to reason) as are the categories to the understanding.'" Copleston, ibid., VI, ii, p. 95.

[63]Ibid., p. 73.

[64]Smith, _Commentary_, p. 411.

[65]Ibid., p. 416.

[66]Lewis White Beck, "Kant's Theoretical and Practical Philosophy" in _Studies in the Philosophy of Kant_ (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1965), p. 38.

[67]Lewis White Beck, ibid., p. 38.

[68]_Idem._

[69]Ibid.

[70]Ibid., p. 39.

[71]S. Korner. Kant (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, 1964), p. 181.

[72]Ibid., pp. 181-182.

[73]Ibid.

[74]Alexandre Koyre, Newtonian Studies (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 6.

[75]Just as the "Copernican Revolution explains phenomena, not denies them," [Copleston, ibid., p. 36] and does so by using the super-sensible concept of the noumenon, so similarly the transcendental Ideas of the pure reason attempt to explain phenomena, not deny or subsume them within some larger or loftier Idea or Ideal. In the spirit of a casual aside, it can be said that the same reconciliatory method between reason and phenomena can be found in a work by the popular Luthern pastor, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, martyred by the anti-rational Hiterlites during the last war. Bonhoeffer finds there is no substantial etymological difference in the German language between reason and perception.

> . . . man's 'reason' is the organ if knowledge of the natural. Reason is not a divine principle of knowledge and order [made immanent] in man [and] which is raised above the natural, but it is itself a part of this preserved for of life, namely that part which is adapted to the function of introducing into the consciousness of 'perceiving,' [The noun 'Vernunft' (reason) is derived from the verb 'vernehmen' (perceive, p. 146], as a unity whatever is entire and general in the real. Reason, then, is wholly embedded in the natural; it is the conscious perception of the natural as it, in fact, presents itself.

Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1969), p. 146. For Bonhoeffer, the "natural," as distinguished from the "creaturely," resembles the Kantian schematization of nature as distinguished from the raw sense-datum of experience; if we substitute for the theological concept of the Fall of man from God's grace (or from His direct intervention in human affairs) the Kantian schematization of nature, the above parallels will appear to be not totally irrelevant. Bonhoeffer says, "The concept of the natural . . . differs from the concept of the creaturely . . . in that it implies an element of independence and self-development which is entirely appropriate to what it denotes. Through the Fall the 'creature' becomes 'nature.' The direct dependence of the creature on God is replaced by the relative freedom of natural life." Bonhoeffer, ibid., p. 145. Just as in Kantian philosophy, the a priori concepts of the faculties of the mind serve to give us more precise knowledge of the phenomenal world and not destroy or deny that world, so the "natural" synthesizes "life" to a certain extent without destroying or substantially compromising that life. Bonhoeffer says, "Natural life is formed life. The natural is form, immanent in life and serving it. If life detaches itself from this form, if it seeks to break free and to assert itself in isolation from this form, if it is unwilling to allow

itself to be served by the form of the nåtural, then it destroys itself
to the very roots. Life which posits itself as an absolute, as an end
in itself ("Vitalism"), is its own destroyer" (Bonhoeffer, ibid., p. 149)
For a similar reconciling attitude regarding the relation of "life" and
that which transcends life without being either isolated from or ascendent
over life, see supra., Ernst Cassirer, "Life and Spirit," in connection
with a discussion of the thought of Burke.

[76]Ibid., p. 76.

[77]Ibid., p. 94.

[78]Ibid., p. 95.

[79]Ibid., p. 26.

[80]Ernst Cassirer, Rousseau, Kant and Goethe (New York: Harper and
Row, 1954), pp. 74-75. Or, Cassirer again: "Kant was always the philoso-
pher of the a priori. But for him a priori knowledge disclosed a dis-
tinctive and independent realm beyond experience. The a priori is rather
a moment in the structure of empirical knowledge itself; it is bound to
experience in its significance and use." (Cassirer, ibid., p. 93). This
could be interpreted as a secularization of a maxim of St. Thomas
Aquina, the figure who represents the apex of "the" classical/medieval
natural law tradition, a tradition in which Stanlis, Parkin, Canavan,
etc. place Burke. Aquinas' maxim representing his view is: "'Grace
does not abolish nature, but perfects it.'" In citing this phrase A. P.
d'Entreves refers to Aquinas' "Christian humanism." A. P. d'Entreves,
Natural Law (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 14.

APPENDIX C

The Scottish Philosophes: At Home in Their Society and

in Their Century or, the Prince Street (Edinburgh)/

Argyle Street (Glasgow) Philosophes vs. the

Grub Street (London) Philosophes[1]

Roger L. Emerson wrote that the thinkers of the Scottish En-

lightenment held, for instance, to a rational Christianity which was

neither anti-religious nor anti-clerical,[2] who held a "qualified be-

lief in progress,"[3] and who

> . . . would be that portion of the social elite which chose to
> be concerned with ideas for the delights and pleasures of con-
> templation or for the usefulness they might find in them. . . .
> Not utopian dreams but an understanding of their historic rights
> and privileges of their regions or corporations would be most
> likely to come from their discussions and pens. . . . While be-
> lieving in natural laws, they believed the social order specified
> by these laws to be hierarchical."[4]

But it was precisely because such "conservative intellectuals"[5] were

not alienated from their society as, Emerson noted, the French philo-

sophes in their salons, or the London "Grub Street" radical writers

were, that the Scots had such a great impact on their countrymen.

Emerson seems to suggest that this gave a greater cohesiveness

to the Scottish Enlightenment than existed among the English, and even,

among the more disaffected French.

> . . . in no other part of Europe were the powerful so interested in
> ideas and so free to act upon them. Their ideas were mainly prac-
> tical and resulted no in a heavenly city, but in the Athens of the
> north, filled with learned men and scholars, situated in an improved
> country-side and populated by a prospering, well-governed people.
> This should not make us regard the Scots as less enlightened but
> should make us aware of the differences in Enlightenment.[6]

Emerson's (1973) view of Scottish Enlightenment thought seems

almost a paraphrase of Peter Gay's characterization (1972) of the

Enlightenment philosophes as moderate "agents of modernization." Gay

had written of the philosophes in general (as Emerson did of the Scots)

--that "the philosophes from Edinburgh to Vienna, Philadelphia to Milan"

were committed in their minds to a continual improvement in their

respective societies. They therefore worked for day-to-day reforms

within their societies.[7] The philosophes, Gay wrote,

> . . . wanted to retain their place, or improve their place, in
> existing society, and to enact their reforms gradually. True,
> the 'low' Enlightenment - the Grub Streets of Paris and other
> publishing centers - pushed the revolutionary possibilities of
> the Old Regimes much further. But the efforts of these true
> radicals did not make themselves visible until events overtook
> them in the 1790's. There were few Revolutionaries before the
> fact: the philosophes were reformers within the system.
>   In the second place [not articulated by Emerson], since the
> philosophes spread their ideas before the emergence of 'mass
> culture,' their relations with their public, actual and poten-
> tial,were essentially cordial. . . . the philosophes were not
> an avant-garde . . . .[8]

Arthur Donovan referred to the fact that,

> The Scottish Enlightenment was a national movement in the sense
> that it was supported by the dominent members of society. The
> Edinburgh philosophers . . . were not an embattled little flock
> of outrageous philosophes. Quite the opposite . . . . Intellec-
> tually Scottish philosophy was innovative, even revolutionary,
> but socially it was quite secure.[9]

To Arthur M. Wilson himself the philosophes in general enjoyed

the same double-edged status of reformers and realists, of "citizens"

and as good "subjects"[10] as did the Scottish figures in Emerson's

description.

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Gay wrote:

> The philosophes' sense of ease [a sense fortified by the assumption that the "scientific world view was continually advancing against the various forms of fanaticism and superstition[11] gave them the confident conviction that realistic proposals for change had a chance of realization; the philosophes' sense of tension underscored their conviction that there was much work to be done. The late eighteenth century . . . was a time when philosophes were not simply the spokesmen, but also the goads of their time. Thus the Enlightenment represents a conjunction rare in human affairs, a time when reformers were close enough to the core of events to think their efforts worthwhile, yet far enough from that core to think their efforts necessary. . . .[12]

As the Scottish thinkers sought not "utopian dreams," but an "understanding of their historic rights and privileges of their regions or corporations," so Gay's philosophes practiced a political realism in which they "adjusted their aspirations to their estimates of local possibilities."[13] They

> . . . practiced the [philosophical] modesty they so prized in their hero, Newton, by offering proposals adapted to a single time and a single place. Even Rousseau, speculative Platonist that he was, found it possible to differentiate among Corsica, Poland and Geneva [for which he wrote constitutions].
> This principled realism, this modesty, and this flexibility explain yet another distinctive characteristic of the Enlightenment . . . .[14]

At first glance, perhaps the "differences in Enlightenment" which Emerson said existed between Scotland and the Continent would be the greater willingness on the part of the French philosophes to speculate, for instance, on a science of man. It is this last characteristic with which Gay concludes his short review of the Enlightenment. Gay wrote:

> . . . They [the philosophes] believed that a science of man is possible, and that such a science will lead through and beyond relativism to truths on which reasonable men can agree. It is perhaps in the force of this idea that the final answer to my question, Why was the Enlightenment?, may be found, in the very

vigor of the philosophes' conviction that man, freed from the
trammels of superstition, could devise a social science that
would lead from interminable squabbles over phantoms to firm
consensus of realities. . . . [15]

If one remembers, with Gladys Bryson and Douglass Adair, that the

Scottish universities in the Eighteenth century had "developed the

chief centers of eighteenth-century social science research and pub-

lication in all the world," (see supra., Chapter III), then Gay's

concluding words apply especially to the Scottish Enlightenment.

A recent historiographical trend on the general tone of Con-

tinental (French/German) Enlightenment thought, serves to bring

Scottish Enlightenment thought, as described here, into a less hostile

position vis-a-vis the intellectual assumptions of thought on the

Continent. In a recent review-essay of "Peter Gay's Enlightenment,"

James Leith criticised Gay for characterizing Enlightenment thought

as free of the encumbrances of "Christian fanaticism" and "mysticism"

and of a priori ideals in general.[16] Rather, the age was characterized

by a "secular humanism," or, in Gay's phrase, by a "'modern paganism,'"

and was inhabited by that "'little flock'" of philosophes who were

"moderate, hard-headed and practical, certainly not carried away by a

new faith,"[17] as they were so portrayed in Carl Becker's classic study

of The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century (Princeton, 1932). Leith

comments that

. . . the philosophes' reasoning often remained deductive and
definitional rather than empirical . . . Nor were the philosophes
as relativistic as Gay would have them.[18]

This is reflected in the philosophes'

. . . [attitude toward moral philosophy, politics, aesthetics,
and especially in the] . . . realm of ethics [and] . . . the
philosophes' avoidance of unrestrained relativism."[19]

and in the figures of, among others, Voltaire, Hume, Kant and Diderot.[20]
Leith cited Gay's own words, that "'. . . the philosophes were relativists
about their relativism'"[21] Hume and Diderot, for example, both held to
a transcendent morality.[22] A last, but lengthy citation from Leith
hopefully will be excuseable because it not only explains the Continen-
tal position, but also that of the Scottish Enlightenment(and, of the
"moderate" Enlightenment in Berlin, from the mid-century debate over
Newtonianism,[23] as being more in step with the mainstream of thought
during the period.

> Recognition in the thought of the philosophes of the persistance
> of rationalistic habits, of the survival of providential notions,
> and of the limitations of their relativism is vital to determining
> more precisely one of the major questions which concerns Gay -
> the nature and extent of the modernity of the Enlightenment. Take
> the case of relativism. The introduction of a certain degree of
> relativism into their thought allowed the philosophes to appreci-
> ate a greater variety of historical epochs, political practices,
> artistic forms, and even moral customs. Their partial relativism
> distinguishes them from medieval Schoolmen, Renaissance classicists,
> and seventeenth-century rationalists. But their instinctive
> rejection of complete relativism, their sometimes deparate reten-
> tion of universals also marks them off from the historicists of
> the nineteenth century and the protean men of the twentieth. To
> exaggerate the relativism of the philosophes is to dislocate them
> historically [emphasis added].[24]

"Moral customs" and "partial relativism" are only oxymoronic terms
with a pure philosophical, definitional context. But the Kantian notion
of freedom and its reconciliation through the judgement with the natural
realm, has the effect of a system of "moral customs" and resembles the
natural dualism of Scottish critical realism.

APPENDIX C

NOTES

[1] See Historic Towns. Maps and Plans of Towns and Cities in the British Isles, with Historical Commentaries, from Earliest Times to 1800. Gen. ed., M. D. Lobel. Vol. I (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), Pp. D11-D13.

[2] Roger L. Emerson, "The Social Composition of Enlightened Scotland: the select Society of Edinburgh, 1754-1764." Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, Vol. 119 (1973), 291-327.
Gavin Ardley recently wrote of the liberal-mind Common Sense realists - Campbell, Reid, Oswals - as belonging to the "Moderate Party" of the established Church (or Kirk) of Scotland, as opposed to the "Popular ministers of the Church of Scotland (who) raged against Hume as an infidel. But the Moderate ministers remained on friendly terms with him." Gavin Ardley, "Hume's Common Sense Critics." Revue Internationale de Philosophie (Commemorative Issue:) David Hume 1776-1976, Vols. 115-116, fasc. 1-2 (1976), p. 109. See also Henry F. May. The Enlightenment in America, New York, Oxford University Press, 1976. Pp. 342-43. This "equanimity" (Ardley, idem.) on the part of the Common Sense Moderates toward the sceptic Hume only reflected "the common sense tradition in philosophy (which) . . . accorded well with the temper of the Moderate party of the Kirk; and it had much influence on Scottish education, preserving a sense of the inelectable truth-attaining constants of human nature, and hence upholding humane education, against the dissolving forces of a specialising and positivist turn which came from the south (that is, from the materialism of the French philosophes and/or the associationism of Hartley in England) . . ." Ibid., p. 104. See also a work cited by Ardley on this point, G. E. Davie. The Social Significance of the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense. Dundee: University of Dundee Press, 1973.

[3] Ibid., p. 322.

[4] Ibid., p. 321.

[5] Ibid., p. 322.

[6]Ibid., p. 291; see also: R. G. Cant, "The Scottish Universities and Scottish society in the Eighteenth Century." Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (Transactions of the Second International Congress on the Enlightenment IV), Vol. 58 (1967), Pp. 1953 et passim.: 1962-1964. See also: John Clive, "The Social Background of the Scottish Renaissance," in Scotland in the Age of Improvement. Eds., N.T. Phillipson and Rosalind Mitchison (Edinburgh: 1970), Pp. 225-244; Nicholas Phillipson, "Culture and society in the Eighteenth-Century Province: The Case of Edinburgh and the Scottish Enlightenment," in The University in Society. Ed., L. Stone (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), II, Pp. 407-448. See also Arthur Donovan, who cited the above works in his article, "Chemistry and Philosophy in the Scottish Enlightenment," Pp. 595-598.

[7]Peter Gay, "Why was the Enlightenment?" in Eighteenth Century Studies. Presented to Arthur M. Wilson. Edited by Peter Gay. Hanover N. H.: The University Press of New England, 1972. Pp. 59-71, esp. p. 65.

[8]Ibid., p. 67.

[9]Arthur Donovan, "Chemistry and Philosophy in the Scottish Enlightenment." Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (Transactions of the Fourth International Congress on the Enlightenment, II), Vol. 152 (1976), 595.

[10]See Arthur M. Wilson, "The Philosophes in the Light of present-day theories of modernization." Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (Transactions of the Second International Congress on the Enlightenment, IV), Vol. 57 (1967), 1893-1913, esp. p. 1902.

[11]Gay, p. 68.

[12]Ibid., p. 69.

[13]Ibid., p. 70.

[14]Idem. Giorgio Tonelli perhaps went too far when he seemed to be updating or repeating Carl Becker's notions of The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers. Tonelli wrote in 1973, that the philosophes identified the "triumvirate" of Bacon, Newton and Locke with Reason itself - therefore its disciples could state in perfect good faith that they were following Reason, and not prejudice or authority." Giorgio Tonelli, "The 'Weakness' of Reason in the Age of Enlightenment." Diderot Studies, Vol. 14 (1971), pp. 222-223). This obescience to the famous triumvirate involved an "attitude of intellectual humility" by which "Reason's self-confidence became, paradoxically, a limit of reason." (idem.). Tonelli then repeated Becker's

old argument: ". . . in fact, Enlightenment intellectuals, while pre-
tending to substitute the rule of Reason for tradition and authority,
were simply substituting for other traditions and authorities some
traditions and some authorities which they considered as the true
ones . . . 'Proud Reason' again, discloses itself in its intentions
as a rather obsequious reason" (idem.). Arthur M. Wilson could have
been describing Tonelli's above words rather than the interpretation
of Enlightenment thought which he was in fact summarizing - that of
Carl Becker's Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers
(lectures delivered at Yale in 1931, and published in 1932). Wilson
wrote: "Becker's lectures argued that the reasoning of the philosophes
was as scholastic in its own way as that of the thirteenth century had
been and that the philosophes had merely, naively and ingenuously,
substituted one faither for another." Arthur M. Wilson, "Unfinished
Business in Enlightenment Studies." Diderot Studies, Vol. 8 (1966),
p. 319.

[15]Ibid., p. 17.

[16]James A. Leith, Peter Gay's Enlightenment," Eighteenth-Century
Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Fall, 1971), 157-171.

[17]Ibid., pp. 160-161.

[18]Ibid., p. 163.

[19]Ibid., p. 164.

[20]Ibid., pp. 163-165.

[21]Ibid., p. 164.

[22]Idem.

[23]See Ronald S. Calinger, "The Newtonian-Wolffian Controversy
(1740-1759)." Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 30, No. 3 (July-
September, 1969), 319-330, and also see Calinger, "The Newtonian-
Wolffian Confrontation in the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences (1725-
1746)." Journal of World History, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1968), 417-435, and
by Calinger again, "Frederick the Great and the Berlin Academy of
Sciences (1740-1766)," Annals of Science, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1968), 239-
251. See also Harcourt Brown, "Maupertuis Philosophe: Enlightenment
and the Berlin Academy." Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century
Transactions of the First International Congress on the Enlightenment,
I), Vol. 24 (1963), 256-57.

[24]Ibid., p. 165. Other recent authors have recognized this
balanced view of Enlightenment thought. They include: Hans Kohn,
"The Multidimensional Enlightenment." Journal of the History of
Ideas, Vol. 31, No. 3 (July-September, 1970), 465-474; Roger Emerson,
"Peter Gay and the Heavenly City." Journal of the History of Ideas,
Vol. 28, No. 3 (July-September, 1967), 383-402. In his 1973 essay
on the eighteenth-century representative German historian, Johann
Christoph Gaterer, Peter Hans Reill (see supra., Chapter IV) noted
that "Contemporary inquiries into the nature of the eighteenth-
century historiography have challenged the traditional view that the
Enlightenment was either a historical or antihistorical (Reill, p.
24). R[E]ill listed those writers representing the traditional view
of Enlightenment thought: Wilhelm Dilthey's 1901 classic, "Das
achtzehnte Jahrhundert und die geschictliche Welt" in Gesammelte
Schriften, 12 vols. (Stuttgart, 1962), 3:210-268; Ernst Cassirer,
The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (1951; 1932), and Joachim Wach,
Das Verstehen: Grundzuge einer Geschichte der hermeneutischen
Theorie im neunzehnten Jahrhundert (Hildesheim, 1966; 1925-1932).
More recently, the traditionalists have been represented by: Friedrich
Meinecke (died, 1952), author of Die Eatstehungdes Historismus (Munich,
1953; 1936) and Andreas Kraus, author of Vernunft und Geschichte: Die
Bedeutung der deutschen Akademien fur die Entwicklung der Geschicht-
swissenschaft im spaten achzehnten Jahrhundert (Freiburg, 1963). See
Reill, pp. 24-25. More recent revisionist works have been "more
sympathetic to the historical consciousness of the Enlightenment"
(Reill, idem.). They are: Johann Huizinga. Im Bann der Geschichten:
Betrachtungen and Gestaltungen (Basel, 1943); Emery Neff. The Poetry
of History (New York, 1947); Herbert Butterfield. Man on His Past:
The Study of Historical Scholarship (Cambridge, England, 1955);
A. P. Momigliano, "Gibbon's Contribution to Historical Method" in
his Studies in Historiography (London, 1966), 40-55; Lastly, Reill
lists . . . Peter Gay's earlier article, "The Enlightenment in the
History of Political Theory," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 69
(1954), 374-390, and thus underscores Leith's view of Gay as being
not wholly the representative of the "modernist" view of the Enlighten-
ment.

See also: Arthur M. Wilson, "Unfinished Business in Enlightenment
Studies," Diderot Studies, Vol. 8 (1966), 319-329. Wilson, referred to
the philosophes' "tragic humanism." They were ". . . poignantly conscious
to the limitations of human effort, the brevity of human life, the per-
vasiveness of human suffering, men's disappointed hopes, wasted lives,
and undeserved misfortunes." (ibid., p. 326). The thought of the
philosophes was "subtle and complex, rather than naive and simple. . . ."
(idem.).

Two years later Wilson, in his review-essay of Gay's later book,
Volume I of The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, echoed Leith's and
Reill's view of the Enlightenment as a critical, yet historically-
minded period. Wilson wrote: "The heart of Peter Gay's 'interpreta-
tion' is that the Age of Enlightenment substituted critical thinking
for myth-making." Arthur M. Wilson, "Peter Gay's The Enlightenment:

An Interpretation," Diderot Studies, Vol. X (1968), 303-313. Especially
p. 304. The philosophes' thought was characterized by a "sustained
critical thinking" (ibid., p. 306), or even "a philosophy (Wilson's
emphasis) that equated itself with criticism . . ." (ibid., p. 308).
Gay believes that what is "the philosophy that made philosophers out
of the philosophes is . . . the philosophy of history" (ibid., p.
309). Such a philosophy developed in the works of "Voltaire, Montes-
quieu, Condoreet, Robertson, Hume, Giannone, Raynal, and, most of all,
Gibbon (into) a coherent world view, one that was critical and secular"
(idem.). But, although "logically" the "most critical of all" the
philosophes and the logical "end-point of the philosophy of the En-
lightenment" (idem.) would be Hume, - "unless it be said that Kan
was" (idem.) - Gay notes that the philosophes did not follow Hume
to his logical end-point. Rather, the philosophes as Gay wrote, saw
that Hume's "epistemology was extremely disturbing in its implications
and therefore hard to assimilate" (ibid., pp. 309-310), and they "simply
refused to face up to Hume's rigor" (idem.). The philosophes "blandly
insisted upon being more complacent about human reason than his philosophy
would warrent them in doing" (idem.). To the extent the philosophes did
not totally identify with Hume's scepticism, they were not ahistorically-
minded or anti-historically minded. Given the fact that one of Gay's
"mentorstand masters' was Cassirer (ibid., p. 307), it is not surprising
that Gay seems to identify with Kant rather than with Hume as the cul-
mination of Enlightenment thought. Wilson saw Kant in Gay's closing
words of Gay's book. Gay had declared that his book

> . . . decides between the Christian millennium, with its
> ideal of dependence, and the Enlightenment, with its
> ideal of autonomy, in favor of autonomy' (pp. 496-496).
> Now, this is very much like Kant's declaring that enlight-
> ment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage.
> (ibid., p. 310).

Further, given Gay's view of the critical/moderate vein of Enlighten-
ment thought and Gay's kinship with Cassirer, Reill's categorizing of
Cassirer in the traditionalist school of Enlightenment historiography
(the Enlightenment as ahistorical) demands qualification. Robert Darn-
ton (Yale University), who, in the 1971 review-essay of the second
volume of Gay's The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, saw Gay as
"exaggerating the Enlightenment's radicalism" and the influence of
the philosophes over the general public (in the light of the quantita-
tive and sociointellectual history of the period as practiced by
"Les Annales" school in France, and especially as represented in the
2-volume Annales product, Livre et societe (Paris, 1970). But even
Darnton saw that Gay's

> . . . philosophes are not desiccated rationalists, naive prophets
> of progress, or narrow-minded village atheists. They are compli-
> cated individuals with complicated problems, irrational in their
> calculations of pleasure and pain, and pessimistic in their dedi-
> cation to the advancement of civilization. Gay does justice to
> these complexities. . . . (Robert Darnton, "In Search of the En-
> lightenment: Recent Attempts to Create a Social History of Ideas,"
> Journal of Modern History, Vol. 43, No. 1 (March, 1971), p. 114.

APPENDIX D

A Note on <u>Burke</u> and the Problem of Intermediate Knowledge

and the Complex Act of (Historical Perception)

Gerald Chapman sees Burke as the inheritor of a long tradition
in British philosophy going back to Francis Bacon, a tradition which
Chapman calls one of "rational empiricism." What this amounts to is
a kind of law of change, a rule which articulates Burke's ". . . almost
obsessive awareness of the interrelatedness of things in actual life,"[1]
before Burke himself articulated it, and acted it, and upon it. The
interconnectedness of experience, or rational empiricism, was translated
by Burke into what Chapman calls the "practical imagination." It is
this "practical imagination" together with what Chapman calls Burke's
"organicism" or the objective content in Burke, which largely defines
Burke's thought. Chapman's view of Burke merits consideration here
because it seems to be what might have been for Burke a translation,
into political from strictly philosophical terms, of the Scottish Com-
mon Sense school. There seems, at the least, to be a verisimilitude
between the Burke portrayed by Chapman and the only <u>school</u> of philosophi-
cal thought contemporary with Burke, the Scottish school of Common Sense
realism.

Chapman sees that although Bacon had not any overriding, trans-
cendent, objective moral yardsticks by which to measure the empirical
world, the empirical world itself could be made sense of, given the

recognition of the reality of the nominalistic individual and the

charting of the complex changes and actions among these individual

atoms. Within his nominalistic-empirical framework, Bacon is a

systemitizer.

> True [says Chapman, quoting Bacon], 'in nature nothing really
> exists beside individual bodies,' but within the acts and changes
> [Chapman's emphasis] of individual bodies, there is a 'latent
> process' which is 'perfectly continuous' though invisible in
> its causal texture, and this causal texture 'embraces the unity
> of nature in substances the most unlike.' Thus, the causal
> texture [rational unity] of concrete change is the true object
> of philosophy, and hence the name 'rational empiricism.'
> Rational empiricism is the fath that all concrete particulars
> are generated by interlocking principles which, though very
> intricate and obscure, can nevertheless be inferred from their
> 'effects.'[2]

But if Burke were left here, his appeal would remain somewhat like

what Cassirer called the "vulgar appeal to what is called adverse

experience," or to that view which sees, according to Pope's credo,

"universal good in partial evil," and which characterizes the early

Moral Sense school in Britain in the eighteenth century. But Chapman

carries Burke further. Burke is placed as one of the "inheritors of

empiricism"; another legatee of the inheritance was John Home, Lord

Kames, one of the leading lights of the Scottish Enlightenment. But

Burke and Kames and the others build upon this empiricism of Bacon.

These later inheritors of empiricism

> . . . came to experience more than they could rationally account
> for. Thus they wrestled with insistent dualisms of permanence
> and change, unity and multeity, generality and particularity,
> abstraction and circumstance, ideality and fact. Facts had
> penumbras and fringe areas of meaning that defied classification
> and experimental rule, and unfolded vistas of startling complexity
> and nuance. One thinks of Lord Kames' being haunted by 'relations':

'Cause and effect, continguity in time or in place, high and low, prior and posterior, resemblance, contrast, and a thousand other relations connect things together without end. Not a single thing appears solitary and altogether devoid of connection: the only difference is, that some are intimately connected, some more slightly, some near, some at a distance' . . . .[3]

The important point is that Burke recognized and "wrestled with the

insistent dualisms" mentioned. And this wrestling served to channel,

in Burke's thought, the premises of experience into the promises of

experience, the actuality into the possibility.

The premise of experience flowed - and transformed an atomistic,

nominalistic fund of empirical data into an experiential philosophy,

a philosophy in which the givens are the complexities of the empirical

world crisscrossed with a priori ideals.

[In Francis Bacon's] 'love quarrel of the rational and empirical faculties . . . 'organicism' is born. The texture of enduring causes too subtle for sense and a priori reason is a haunting certainty which must somehow be reconciled with fleeting fact and value. The practical empiricist, like Burke, discovers his need for a self-legislated restraint of reason in order to continue 'empirical.' He resists the threat of mental inflation he stops the dangerous spiral of his thinking, so as not to break his moorings in experience and perish in the thin air of conceptual abstraction. Thus, though he may not escape believing in a universal order of causes, he shies from it with reverent caution. He is committed to the theory of a strict, overarching rational order, but also to an exploration of actual existence for its latent and emergent circumstances. Nature yields something to History, and the chain of causes is submerged in the chain of events. . . .[4]

This attitude or, if you will, methodology, becomes less diffuse and

less tenuous when steered by the active, forming human intellect. Chap-

man's description of the process of the reality of the human mind work-

ing on the reality of not merely the empirical facts themselves, but on

the continually emerging pattern of facts, i.e., on the experiential

world--Chapman's description is as eloquent as anything Burke ever wrote:

> . . . reality presents itself as a fabric of actualizing possi-
> bilities requiring the human mind to make endless reconciliations
> of possession and emergence, each emergent as it is assimilated,
> modifying the whole tenor of the possessed, by an endless feeling
> attention to incursions of novelty, like showers of meteoric
> light within the atmosphere of the familiar. . . .[5]

When Chapman comes down to marking Burke's most distinguishing charac-

teristic, chapman balances the complex empirical and the forming,

organizing intellect.   Chapman calls this process in Burke the use

of the "practical imagination," which Chapman defines as

> . . . the power to experience the life of a thing in its concrete
> complexity, discriminate its relations, and act upon [or reverence]
> its latent good. Such an imagination as discerns answers to the
> questions, 'How is it actually?' and 'What is its meaningful rele-
> vance?' . . .[6]

If Burke reverenced an emerging empirical fact or events, he reverenced

it for its relation to the changing whole it had recently joined - the

whole defined by empirical data, transcendent a priori ideals and the

active human intellect. The form of the relation remains stable - its

content merely changes after the human intelligence has received and

interpreted "actualizing possibilities" and transformed them into an

". . . increase [of] one's intelligence of probabilities."[7]

Chapman equates the above process, which Burke uses to reform

through a happy harmony of permanence and change with a process of

"common sense."

> Confronted with a novel occasion, Burke searches its texture of
> necessities, its correlation of component factors, for the course
> of action latently most effective, and for the 'principles' or
> fruitful generalities which may be applied in future [my emphasis]
> occasions to produce, or avoid, like effects, or which at least
> increase one's intelligence of probabilities. Hence his emphasis
> on 'common sense.' . . . Common sense, restrained by the actual,
> is often blind to hypothetical goods and obstinate within the
> familiar, but it is also capable of great delicacy of adjustment
> to novel occasions. . . .[8]

Chapman seems to be unaware, by his use of the phrase, common sense - he places it within quotation marks, and makes no mention of Reid or the formal school itself - of the fact that he is describing indeed a formal school of thought which flourished in a setting contemporary with Burke is ascendency in British public life.

David K. Weiser's recent (1975) description of the correspondence, "central to all Burke's writings" between nature and culture, faintly echoes Chapman's earlier portrait of Burke's thought. Weiser cited Burke's "Reflections":

> 'Our political order is placed in a just correspondence and symmetry with the order of the world, and with the mode of existence decreed to a permanent body composed of transitory parts; wherein by the disposition of stupendous wisdom, moulding together the great mysterious incorporation of the human race, the whole, at one time, is never old, or middle-aged, or young, but in a condition of <u>unchangeable constancy</u>, moves on through the varied tenor of perpetual decay, fall, renovation, and progression.[9]

As in Chapman's Burke, the Burke here recognizes a constant relation between the constant whole and the changing parts which have joined it in the past and are constantly joining the whole.[10] While Chapman seems to emphasize the modifications which the transitory parts play on the whole, Weiser emphasizes the modifications which the constant whole imprints upon the parts. Weiser continued, after the above citation:

> The argument here, central to all Burke's writings, is the analogy [expressing Burke's own values, and not merely used for the rhetorical purposes of eliciting a desired response from his readers][11] between nature and culture. In both entities, the 'whole' continues constantly while the 'transitory parts' come and go. Government, he claims, must emulate this two-fold process, rather than fall into turmoil.[12]

Or again, Chapman's Burke corresponds to a recent description of the eighteenth century German historian, Johann Christoph Gatterer.

Gatterer 's thought was representative of the new critical history of the Enlightenment, and, as we have seen (see chapter IV), not unlike the assumptions of the Scottish Enlightenment (and of Burke). P. H. Reill characterized Gatterer's historical thought as a mean between the extremes of the seventeenth century erudites, the hewers and gatherers of raw data who had almost blindly amassed "the seeming chaotic collection of facts" on the one hand, and, on the other hand, Gatterer's thought as "abstract speculation."[13]

> The brunt of Gatterer's argument is that a synthetic history, a history that would be more than a mere chronological arrangement of atomic facts, requires a flexible, ordering and treatment of historical material. Problem, evidence, and presentation were, he believed, inseparably intertwined. . . .[14][Gatterer] . . . cautioned his readers and students to remember that everything was part of a larger whole. No event was to be considered radically particulate or totally unique. Each was tied to a complex set of preceding and contemporary events and could not be understood without reference to them. Every history had to be related to a larger set of questions and was a function of larger processes of universal history.[15]

To the extent that Gatterer was in fact representative of Enlightenment thought - Reill sees Gatterer's essay as challenging "the traditional view that the Enlightenment was either ahistorical or antihistorical," a view exemplified in Wilhelm Dilthey and Ernst Cassirer[16]and that Chapman's and Weiser's interpretations of Burke's thought are correct, then, Burke's thought is not wholly alien to his age.

Burke's review in the "Annual Register" (1769) of William Robertson's The History and Reign of the Emperor Charles V . . ., took the same attitude to the erudites as that of the later German historian

Gatterer. Burke thought, as Gatterer, that particular facts must be interpreted in the context of the "whole system" of which they were a part. Yet, at the same time, Burke respected the particular parts of the whole to the extent that these parts could never be wholly comprehended by the historian. Burke wrote of the predecessors of Robertson:

> Since the revival of letters (in the sixteenth century), through an indefatigible spirit of disquisition was exerted upon other subjects; yet men of genius were, in general, deterred from entering far into this [". . . the subversion of the Roman Empire]. The subject, from its importance, was indeed inviting: but the chaos of rubbish in which it was buried, and the patient drudgery to be submitted to in making the search, were too discouraging. Thus, enquiries into the most dark and interesting subjects, which required the acutest descernment, under the direction of the best formal judgement, to be applied to their investigation, were abandoned to the indiscriminate zeal of antiquaries, or to the undistinguishing labor of compilers. It is true that Muratori and some other late writers have, with equal industry and ingenuity, developed many valuable monuments of those dark periods; but their energies were directed to particular parts, and did not take in the whole system.[17]

On the other hand, the particular facts had a reality of their own, a reality which precluded their total subsumption within the whole - Burke continued:

> . . . Men of genius are apt to think that they comprehend every part of a subject at first view; and it is no wonder if in this opinion they sometimes overlook, during the tiresome task of searching and comparing a great number of authorities, some that it might have been wished they had considered.[18]

This respect for the separate reality and identity of historical facts and the use of the critical- analytical faculties of the mind to shape these facts into a coherent whole is, again, characteristic of the new "philosophical history" of the Enlightenment, and is represented in Gaterer. Reill wrote:

> While retaining much of the vocabulary and apparatus of the [17th century erudites] polyhistorians, the Aufklarer put them to a different use. Where the polyhistorians saw the establishment of the chain of historical events as the end of their task, the historians of the Aufklarung saw it as only a necessary preliminary to genuine historical thinking. The next step, and the vital one, was to bring everything into a 'system of events.' This required the use of the philosophical spirit, or critical analysis, to see some events as causative, others as contingent.[19]

The "system of events," the whole into which the naked facts of the historical phenomenal realm must be brought by the philosophical historian, is not totally alien, as to the effects such as "system" has in the mind of the perceiving and questioning historian, from Kant's "systemitization of experience" which he demonstrated in his Critique of Pure Reason (see Appendix B).

Further, Reill cited Ralph Cudworth's The True Intellectual System as an example of the balance in the "philosophical history" between sense and the critical reason, between purely descriptive and critical/analytical methodology. As Cudworth, the Cambridge Platonist, has been compared with Kant, and to Reid (see Chapter IV), it is not inappropriate here to note his resemblance to Burke or Robertson. Reill wrote that Gatterer

> . . . was neither a Lockean nor a follower of Muratori. . . . He came close to the view propounded by Cudworth in his The True Intellectual System, which said that mechanical explanations of existence were inadequate. This did not mean that Gatterer rejected the importance of the senses. For him, the only immediately 'evident' event is that which we experience with our own senses. In actuality, then, only present things are evident. Theoretically, however, there are two other types of individual experience: past and future . . . .[20]

An "evident" event or "evident history" combined in Gatterer's "philosophical history" sense and the critical reason. This gave the historian that "intermediate knowledge" which set him free from

his immediate setting and from his direct line of perception, allow-
ing full play for the critical faculties to develop.

The philosophical historian of the Enlightenment inhabited and
roamed over the realm of the possible as well as describing the realm
of the actual.

According to Gatterer, both fiction and history provided a type
of truth. Fiction described and made evident the realm of the
possible; history sought to deal with the realm of the actual
individual moment. An evident history had to combine both.[21]

This was also Kant's domain(s), for he had described reality and our
knowledge of it as touching both the world of the actual and the
world of the possible (see Appendix B).

Bacon's and Burke's "organicism" which rejects both "mental
inflation" and a crude empiricism, and sees knowledge as consisting
of a continually emerging pattern or fabric of "actualizing possi-
bilities," and of endless reconciliations, - this organicism, or
what Chapman called Burke's "practical imagination," is similar to
Ira Wade's view of the general assumptions of Enlightenment thought
Wade wrote that in the eighteenth century, knowledge assumed a
"never-ending series of relationships between the self and the phenomena
of life . . ." (see Appendix A).[22] The self, to use Chapman's language
had the creative imagination to see the potentialities with which the
actualities of the phenomenal world must be reconciled. Chapman's des-
cription of Burke's "creative imagination" is not unlike what Cassirer
called Kant's "productive imagination."[23] Ira Wade had said of eighteenth
century thought, that it wanted to enter into the "activity of the
spirit" of life, and shape life, while at the same time respecting the

"legality" or independent objectivity of both thought and the objects of thought (For Wade, See Appendix A).

Burke's "creative imagination" and Kant's "productive imagination" assume a like relationship exists between spirit and life, or between the possible and the actual. Cassirer called the relationship "one of the deepest and most fruitful sections of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason," for it shows that,

> . . . the function of pure reason, if it is not to remain empty, has need of a further function as its completion and necessary correlative - a function which Kant designates by the name of 'productive imagination.' And he went on to infer that everything we are accustomed to call sensory 'perception' is most closely bound up with this function - that the productive imagination also forms an 'ingredient of every possible perception.' If this is so, then what we call the intuition of the 'actual' does not occur without the outlook and prospective glance into the 'possible' - then, furthermore, the construction of the 'objective' world of experience is dependent upon the original formative powers of the Spirit and upon the fundamental laws according to which they act.[24]

Because the worlds of the possible and of the actual, of Life and Spirit, of morality and nature, are not estranged from one another, because Life is not defined as the 'wholly other,' as the contradictory opposite of Spirit,' as is the case of the harsh manichean-like dualism of Descartes,[25] - the natural dualism of Kant allows the two realms to traffic with each other without becoming confused with one another. The problem was stated by Cassirer in the form of a question: "How is the Spirit able to exert any influence on a world to which it does not belong; - how can the transcendence of the Ideas be reconciled with the immanence of Life?[26] Like Burke's morality "insinuating" itself into the phenomenal/historical realm,[27] Kant's schema assumes that,

. . . the human spirit does not directly turn against its objects,
but rather <u>weaves itself</u> [emphasis added] into a world of its own,
a world of signs, of symbols, and of meanings [see Appendix A for
Reid's similar "critical" and indirect realism]. And herewith
it really forfeits that immediate oneness which, in the lower ani-
mals, unites 'observing' and 'effecting' [a oneness which Reid
also denied in his famous distinction between sensation and per-
ception, and his idea of the complex act of perception; see
Appendix A]. This is perhaps one of the most characteristic
traits of the animal world, of its organic firmness and its
inner organic health, that in it this unity is not strictly per-
ceived.[28] The world of the Spirit, on the contrary, does not
come into existence until the stream of Life no longer flows
freely, but is held back at certain points [see the discussion
on the "Art vs. Nature" problem in eighteenth-century thought,
infra., Chapter III, passim] - until Life, instead of unceasingly
giving birth to new Life and consuming itself in these very births
(much like Hobbesian "felecity,") gathers itself together into
enduring forms, and projects these forms out of and in front of
itself by no mere quantitative increase, enhancement or intensi-
fication of Life can we ever attain the realm of the Spirit.
. . .[29]

The "spirit" (or morality, the possible) may traffic with "Life"

(nature, the actual) only if "Life" has a substantial form of its

own and is not cowed, so to speak, by the Spirit.[30]

Kant's "productive imagination," by further substantiating the

independent reality of subject and (especially) object, would thereby

give more substance to the terms of the relations (between the "self

and the phenomena of Life") which Ira Wade saw as central to the

assumptions of eighteenth-century Enlightenment thought. Cassirer

wrote (1907) that such relations were not merely between the self or

ego and external subjects, but between the self and,

. . . the principles and the logical structure of <u>experience</u>
[emphasis added, see Chapter V].[31] Neither 'internal' or
'external' objects exist in- and for- themselves; they are
given under the conditions of experience. Accordingly, we
have to develop the norms and rules of experience before we
make statements about the nature of things. . . . What is
now sought (in the Kantian philosophy) is the fundamental

logical form of experience as such, which must apply to 'internal' (morality) as well as 'external' [science, for Wade's distinction, see supra, Appendix A].[32] Knowledge with respect to objects cannot be entirely different from knowledge with respect to our ego; both kinds of knowledge should be united by an all-embracing principle. . . .[33]

Part of the "logical structure of experience" is the recognition that even the most simple perceptions involve complex, structural assumptions, that

. . . scientific (and even pre-scientific) concepts are not random aggregates of qualities, but are established with a purpose. We do not . . . form a class of reddish, juicy, edible things, under which cherries and meat might be subsumed.[34]

We do not form such classes because this is part of the common, yet complex, baggage we carry into our everyday perceptions which are only apparently simple. The complex act of perception which is part of the objectification of experience, was one of Reid's central doctrines.[35] Andrew Seth (Pringle-Pattison) showed that Reid and Kant thought the concepts of space and time were not Cartesian "separate and distinct ideas"[36] but were the real and absolute "conditions of the possibility of objects to be carefully distinguished from the prick of sense."[37] What might be called the actuality of objects was the "sensation" of them produced in the perceiving faculties. "In other words, we have an immediate perception of a certain quality of matter which has to be carefully distinguished from the sensation on occasion of which the perception takes place."[38] The rules of common sense (one of the first of which is to recognize the existence of the objects of perception) order sensations and perceptions into a cohesive and workable whole.[39] Since the sensations are endless, knowledge represents, rather than generalizations based upon an

accumulation of data, a relation or ongoing process of fitting sensa-
tions into one or another of the qualities of matter of which percep-
tion is the articulator. Here again, knowledge is like Chapman's
notion of it as an "emerging fabric of actualizing possibilities"[40]
Felix Kaufmann described the Kantian epistemology in terms of relations.

> What is required is rather a <u>relation</u> (Kaufmann's emphasis) in
> terms of which the variety of (actually or potentially) given
> objects may be ordered. Such a relation does not dispose of
> the qualities of the individual objects concerned - if it did,
> it would not be of any aid in investigating specific objects;-
> but it replaces fixed qualities by general rules which enable us
> to grasp 'uno actu' a total series of possible qualitative
> determination.[41]

The following description by Kaufmann of Cassirer's Kantian notion of
knowledge as the ordering of the relations between the actual and the
possible objects of perception (the possibilities of objects as
representing the relations between subject and object), - Kaufmann's
description resembles Chapman's and Burke's "practical imagination"
which includes reality as presenting itself as a fabric of actualizing
possibilities requiring the human mind to make "endless reconciliations
of possession and emergence."[42] Kaufmann wrote of the epistemology of
Cassirer as a "Marburg" Kantian."[43] "The totality of experience as it
represents itself on any given stage of knowledge is not a mere aggre-
gate of data of perception; it has a complete and intricate structure
which constitutes its unity."[44] Dimitry Gawronsky, again sounding like
Chapman on Burke, described the dynamic and comprehensive qualities of
Cassirer's epistemology which gave it its definite classicist bent.

> . . . Cassirer's memory was not just a passive capacity, a sort of
> storage for acquired knowledge - it was rather an 'er-innern' in
> Goethe's sense, a process of repeated and creative mental absorp-
> tion, combined with a keen ability to see all essential elements
> of a problem and its organic relation to other problems.[45]

But the classicist organicism of Cassirer is directly opposed to the
organicism of the romanticists, for the latter

> . . . consists in the transformation of a single event or in-
> dividual fact into an absolute and general principle of the
> whole. . . . (in which) one principle, one function, one special
> power dominates and determines the whole. Classicism, on the
> contrary, always recognizes several principles as quite indepen-
> dent of each other, although closely connected and organically
> related and capable only in their organic interrelatedness of
> creating and forming the spiritual world of man. . . . [Cassirer's]
> mental associations were amazingly rich, colorful, and always quite
> exact. He possessed in high degree the gift which Goethe called
> 'imagination for the truth of reality,' or 'exact sensory imagina-
> tion.' . . . his thinking . . . always remained measured, objec-
> tive, realistic.[46]

Like Burke's "organicism" or "practical imagination" and Kant's
"productive imagination," Cassirer's classicism was both compre-
hensive and critical; it embodied that natural dualism which could
not only "live with" the different realms of reality (subject, object;
the moral and the natural; the possible and the actual), but which
would bring them together somehow in a creative active and progressive
relation neither ignoring nor distorting one another.

APPENDIX D

NOTES

[1]Gerald W. Chapman, Edmund Burke, The Practical Imagination, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 161.

[2]Ibid., p. 8.

[3]Ibid., p. 9.

[4]Ibid., p. 10.

[5]Ibid., p. 11.

[6]Ibid., p. 18.

[7]Ibid., p. 5.

[8]Ibid.

[9]David K. Weiser, "The Imagery of Burke's 'Reflections,'" Studies in Burke and His Time, Vol. 16, No. 3, (Whole No. 53), Spring 1975, p. 217.

[10]This is reminiscent of A. Skinner's description of the assumptions of the socialogical historians of the Scottish Enlightenment; Skinner wrote that the ". . . peculiar native of their history lies in the link which it establishes between the constant principles of human nature and the changing environment of man." A. Skinner, "Economics and History--The Scottish Enlightenment," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, (February 1965), p. 5.

[11]Ibid., p. 215.

[12]Idem.

[13]Peter Hans Reill, "History and Hermeneutics in the Aufklarung: The Thought of Johann Christoph Gatterer," Journal of Modern History, Vol. 45, No. 1 (March 1973), p. 28.

[14]Ibid., p. 31.

[15]Ibid., p. 33.

[16]Ibid., p. 24.

[17]The Annual Register, or A View of the History, Politics and Literature for the Year 1769. 4th ed.,(London: J. Dodsley, 1786), p. 254.

[18]Ibid., p. 256.

[19]Reill, op. cit., 40.

[20]Ibid., p. 44.

[21]Ibid., p. 45.

[22]See Appendix A

[23]Ernst Cassirer, "'Spirit' and 'Life' in Contemporary Philosophy," (orig., 1930), in The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer ("The Library of Living Philosophers" Series. Ed., Paul Arthur Schilpp, LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court Pub. Col., 1973), p. 871.

[24]Idem.

[25]Ibid., pp. 867-868.

[26]Ibid., pp. 865-866.

[27]See infra., Chapter IV.

[28]See also Cassirer's Essay on Man (1944), where he wrote: "Man has . . . discovered a new method of adapting himself to his environment. Between the receptor system and the effector system, which are to be found in all animal species, we find in man a third link which we may describe as the symbolic system (Cassirer's emphasis). This new acquisition transforms the whole of human life. As compared with the other animals man lives not merely in a broader reality; he lives, so to speak, in a new dimension of reality (Cassirer's emphasis). There is an unmistakeable difference between organic reactions and human responses. In the first case a direct and immediate answer is given to an outward stimulus; in the second case the answer is delayed. It is interrupted and retarded by a slow and complicated process of

thought. At first sight such a delay may appear to be a very question-
able gain. Many philosophers' have warned man against this pretended
progress. 'L'homme qui medite,' says Rousseau, 'est un animaal
deprave' . . . .

Yet there is no remedy against this reversal of the natural order.
Man cannot escape from his own achievement. He cannot but adopt the
conditions of his own life. No longer in a merely physical universe,
man lives in a symbolic universe. Language, myth, art and religion
are parts of this universe. They are the varied threads which weave
the symbolic act, the tangled web of human experience. All human
progress in thought and experience refines upon and strengthens this
net. No longer can man confront reality immediately; he cannot see
it, as it were, face to face. Physical reality seems to recede in
proportion as man's symbolic activity advances. Instead of dealing
with the things themselves man is in a sense constantly conversing
with himself . . . . (Ernst Cassirer. _An Essay on Man. An Introduc-
tion to a Philosophy of Human Culture_ (Toronto, N.Y., London: Bantam
Books (A National General Co.), 1970, pp. 26-27). The Burke described
by Chapman read as if he had subscribed to the above dualism.

[29]Ibid., p. 869.

[30]For instance, C. Douglas Atkins recently wrote of the common
eighteenth-century opposition to the assumptions behind the ancient
Christian heresy of Gnosticism. Atkins concentrated on the major
literary figures (Dryden, Swift, Pope) in England during the period,
1660-1750, in order to show the "Augustan distance from Gnosticism"
[C. Douglas Atkins, "The Ancients, the moderns, and gnosticism."
Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (Transactions of the
Fourth international congress on the Enlightenment, I), Vol. CLI (1976),
155] Gnosticism represented to the 18th-century literary figures whom
Atkins considers, the same unacceptable radical dualism in theology
which Descartess dualism represented in philosophy. Atkins wrote that,
. . . the 'cardinal feature of gnostic thought is the _radical dualism_
(emphasis added) that governs the relation of God and the world and
correspondingly that of man and world. The deity is absolutely
transmundane, its nature alien to that of the universe . . . to
which it is the complete antithesis . . . . With Gnosticism . . .
'for the first time there arose the notion that matter, the world
in terms of its physical substance, is the enemy of God'. . .
(Ibid., p. 151).

Gnosticism, in its turning away from the matter, the world or "Life,"
and its view that "the soul is imprisoned in the body" and "all that is
visible and finite [is] . . . illusion," thereby gives its adherents
a sense of superiority over the reality which does not conform" (Ibid,
page 153). The Kantian Cassirer's claim that "Man escape from his
own achievement" of reconciling himself as a member of the physical
and sumbolic universe, runs counter to Gnostic assumptions. As such
human responses, unlike organic reactions, must give a "delayed answer"

to the reality of the universe. But the Gnostic addict's answer to the
universe is not delayed because his universe is exclusively of the
"Spirit" and of the transmundane, of which all else (Cassirer's "Life"
included) is, not even merely derivitive from, but totally in opposi-
tion to. The Gnostic is thus free to construct "systems which contain
the ultimate truth and must be imposed on recalcitrant reality by means
of violence . . ., the addict is dispensed from the responsibilities of
experience in the cosmos.' (Idem.). Part of this responsibility is the
capability of "live with," as Cassirer said, the "tangled web of human
experience." But Gnosticism represents a refusal to accept the In-Be-
tween, the tension of existence, recognized by the Greek philosophers
and embodied in Christian thought" (Ibid., p. 154). The classical/
Christian natural law tradition and the natural dualism of that tradi-
tion would side with the Kantian view of Cassirer against the radicalism
of Gnosticism. Burke was speaking as if he saw the ideology of the
French revolutionaries as the secular equivalent of Gnosticism, when he
saw the Revolution as one of "doctrine and theoretic dogma" and as the
first "complete revolution in the history of mankind." (Leo Strauss
Natural Right and History, Chicago and London: University of Chicago
Press, 1974 (1953), p. 302.

[31]See Chapter V of the present study.

[32]Science, for Wade's distinction, see Supra., Appendix A.

[33]Ibid., p. 187.

[34]Ibid., p. 222.

[35]See infra., Appendix A.

[36]Seth, Pringle-Pattison, op. cit., p. 56, For the history of the
term "ideas," see Robert McRae, "'Idea' as a Philosophical Term in the
Seventeenth Century." Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. XXVI, No. 2
(April-June, 1965), 175-190.

[37]Andrew Seth, Scottish Philosophy. A Comparison of the Scottish
and German Answers to Hume (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwell and
Sons, 1894), 132.

[38]Ibid., p. 84.

[39]Reid separated and verified sensations (object) and perception
(subject). Reid was "quite emphatic about maintaining the separation
between perception and consciousness [of the objects of sensations]";
but, on the other hand, Reid saw the mind as having a "tendency to pass
from the sign [the "idea" of the object of perception] to the thing
signified [the object of sensation]." R. L. Caldwell, "Another Look

at Thomas Reid." <u>Journal of the History of Ideas</u>, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (October-December, 1962), 549; see Chapter IV, p. 5 of the present study for Reid's notion of "suggestion" as a bridge between object and subject]. R. L. Caldwell wrote: "Despite this clear distinction between perception and consciousness, and the object appropriate to each power, there is still an intimate connection between perceiving and having sensations . . ." [idem.]. The objects of each respective realm are neither sacrificed nor do they subsume the objects of one another.

[40]See supra., Chapter IV of the present study.

[41]Felix Kaufmann, "Cassirer's Theory of Scientific Knowledge," in Paul Arthur Schilpp, ed., <u>The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer</u>, LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1973 (1949), p. 190.

[42]See supra, p. 272.

[43]Ibid., p. 186.

[44]<u>Idem</u>.

[45]Dimitry Gawronsky, "Ernst Cassirer: His Life and His Work," in ibid., p. 9.

[46]Ibid., pp. 34-35.