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**VANHOY- TIMOTHY L.: Universal Military Training: Some  
Prevalent Ideas Behind the Post-World War II Debate.  
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One of the primary concerns of many Americans in the years immediately following World War II was the new international position of the United States. Prior to this time America had been able to remain somewhat aloof from many world problems. Secure in her isolated geographical position, the United States did not have to fear physical aggression without ample notice. The technology which produced guided missiles, radar, and the atomic bomb served to alter this air of complacency. Many individuals pointed to traditional American unreadiness for war and proposed a plan of universal military training as protection for America. This plan, it was argued, would provide the United States with enough military potential that aggression would be deterred. In addition, such a program would enable America to maintain her dominant position of world power and encourage peace through police action.

Opponents of UMT favored national defense and world peace; but, not through a system which they argued would lead to militarism in America. Various liberal oriented groups presented arguments against UMT, many of them based upon ideological grounds. The doubt most often expressed in regard to the usefulness of a universal military training program was its ability to provide defense without creating a militaristic nation. Many individuals also argued that the adoption of UMT would defeat the purposes of the newly

created United Nations by appearing to challenge its effectiveness. From a practical standpoint, a major argument was the need for improved technology, not great masses of men, for defense in the future.

The ideas expressed during the course of this debate are related to the new American role in world affairs. Primary consideration has been given to the ideas themselves, rather than a detailed examination of those individuals presenting them. The nature of the postwar world, especially the uncertainty about the future, resulted in a compromise on this issue with neither side achieving complete satisfaction. It is, however, an interesting example of American ability to adopt ideals to practical needs and somehow retain a balanced and workable structure of national defense.

A Thesis Submitted to  
the Faculty of the Graduate School at  
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro  
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Master of Arts

Greensboro  
May 1957

Approved by

  
Director

APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis has been approved by the following  
committee of the Faculty of the Graduate School at  
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro.  
**Universal Military Training:  
Some prevalent ideas behind the post-World War II debate**

by

Thesis  
by **Timothy L. Vanhoy**

Oral Examination  
Committee Members

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Universal Military Training  
Some prevalent ideas behind the post-World War II debate.

The post-World War II debate over the adoption of a universal military training system in America was replete with controversy and complexity. This debate was only a segment of the overall general discussion of America's role in the postwar world. Various groups expressed opinions upon this topic and the result was an overlapping of ideas among organized pressure groups. Due to considerations of time and space, no attempt has been made to present a detailed discussion of each organization's reasons for favoring or opposing UMT. The primary concern of the paper is to differentiate between the basic arguments and attempt to determine the general support for these opinions. What is offered, therefore, is a study of the most prevalent ideas which were expressed in regard to UMT, with primary emphasis upon the content of the major arguments.

**Universal Military Training:**  
**Some prevalent ideas behind the post-World War II debate.**

A. UMT: Nothing New

Universal Military Training is the practice of requiring every able-bodied male citizen of a nation Page

**Preface**

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## INTRODUCTION

### A. UMT: Nothing New

Universal Military Training is fundamentally the practice of requiring every able-bodied male citizen of a nation to undergo a fixed period of basic military instruction, usually beginning when he reaches a certain age. The training is not designed to convert the youth into a soldier, but is intended to teach him the elements of military discipline and procedure. It is also designed to introduce the fundamental aspects of soldiering so that any subsequent training can concentrate on advanced techniques after a brief "refresher" period. This differs from conscription in that UMT contemplates the training of the youth of an entire nation; conscription merely selects a certain number of those youth to serve in the military forces. In addition, the conscript must serve a full term of duty (for a specified period of time) and is released from his military obligation; the UMT trainee, on the other hand, receives basic training and remains subject to service at a later date.

UMT is, of course, for all practical purposes a form of conscription. It is universal rather than selective and is intended only for training purposes, not for service. It is not intended to replace selective conscription for service; the latter would be necessary if a sufficient number of volunteers could not be obtained. Conscription, universal



and selective, is the method utilized most often to obtain military personnel. There have been advocates of UMT as the basis of American military policy since the nation came into being.

It may be laid down as a primary position, and the basis of our system, that every Citizen who enjoys the protection of a free government, owes not only a proportion of his property, but even of his personal services to the defence of it, and consequently that the Citizens of America (with a few legal and official exceptions) from 18 to 50 years of age should be borne on the Militia Rolls, provided with uniform Arms, and so far accustomed to the use of them, that the total strength of the Country might be called forth at a Short Notice on any very interesting Emergency.....

This concept, advanced by George Washington, was prefaced by reference to the Swiss system and the usage of ancient Greece and Rome.<sup>2</sup> Since 1783 the primary advocates of this type of military system have not strayed from the basic premise that a universally trained and equipped citizenry is the best means of protection for the United States. This viewpoint was, however, partially submerged for over a century. Even though selective conscription was employed by both sides during the American Civil War, UMT was not seriously considered as a solution to American military problems. This is probably due to the lack of concern about world problems during the Nineteenth Century and the preoccupation with political and economic changes within the country. Except for the first quarter of the century, America did not have to worry about defending herself against a major foreign power.

Lack of concern over national defense was a reflection of the general population's desire to remain aloof from Europe's problems, an attitude which resulted in America's being unprepared for every major war in which she became engaged from 1812 through 1950. The situation was relieved somewhat in 1917 and 1941 because the United States had, in a sense, been given advance notice of her probable participation in the conflicts and ample opportunity to achieve enough basic preparation to accomplish her objectives. In both instances, even with some measure of warning, this lack of preparation and the subsequent need to hurry and to improvise in order to fight led many responsible people to think in terms of constant preparedness.

Immediately after World War I the arguments for UMT and national readiness were lost among the more insistent issues of Prohibition, Prosperity, and finally, Depression. Also, a strong deterrent to cries for military preparation was the idea that World War I would be the "War to end War". America fought only when forced to fight and many felt that it could not happen again, at least not in the foreseeable future. To support this opinion it was pointed out that Germany had been reduced to a pauper nation, devoid of any aggressive capability. A minority, principally military personnel, were concerned with America's retreat behind the walls of isolationism and the nation's domestic interests. This earlier concern, and the destruction of the idea that another great war would not occur, prompted

a resurgence of interest in UMT and national defense in the period following that second great war of the Twentieth Century. After seeing their hopes for peace shattered by the marching of Hitler's legions, many resolved to work toward keeping America in a state of constant preparedness in order to deter any future aggressor nation from repeating the actions of 1914 and 1939.

#### B. America after World War II

The period 1945 to 1950 is crucial in any study of American world politics and military attitudes and accomplishments during the second half of the Twentieth Century. It was an era of discussion, analysis, and formulation of American military policy. Decisions made during these years have influenced all subsequent military and diplomatic thinking not only within the United States but throughout the world. America, as the world's greatest military power in 1945, was a determining force in the world. Whether one likes it or not, armed force in being is a powerful influence. Suggestions of mighty military nations are more readily followed than those advanced by weaker powers. At the same time a single, strong nation poses a threat to its neighbors and its strength influences its attitude toward other nations and their reaction. The basic problem now, as then, is to achieve a balance; a nation needs strength so that it cannot be dominated yet must remain not so strong that it appears to threaten

other nations. The key to achieving and maintaining this balance is latent power--the ability to mobilize, organize, and utilize all of a nation's potential strength in as short a time as possible. This must be done without maintaining the military at its full capacity, for then militarism replaces democracy and safety becomes only a word.

Americans in the late 1940's were deeply concerned with being secure from aggression. Two world wars had been fought in less than fifty years, what was to prevent a third? In addition, the United States was no longer one of the world's powers, it was the world power. To the foremost military leaders of America, Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower and George C. Marshall, this meant that the United States had to live up to its responsibility by enforcing the peace. Preparation, the ability to respond to any aggression immediately, was the primary factor in their considerations. They remembered the rapid demobilization of 1918-1919 and the resulting weak America. One of their chief points was the need for strong leadership by America or, at the very least, military strength.

It is not enough that we devise every kind of international machinery to keep the peace. We must also be strong ourselves. Weakness cannot co-operate with anything. Only strength can co-operate....<sup>3</sup>

Eisenhower's words, spoken before the end of World War II, concisely illustrate the viewpoint of the military, the national administration, and, to a certain degree, the public. In general, almost everyone wanted America to be

strong, but could not reach agreement as to the means of achieving and maintaining this strength. One of the key disputes centered upon the professional versus the amateur soldier.

American tradition held that military professionalism was not the best solution. Bunker Hill, the Alamo, Gettysburg, Belleau Wood, and the Bulge were fought by amateurs, not professionals. America had always sought the answer to her military problems by turning to the part-time volunteer and the conscript. With the exception of naval operations, all American wars were fought by the citizen-soldier, and dependence upon the conscripted citizen-soldier was necessary for the bigger wars. That this created problems can be seen by the following opinion, expressed prior to American entry into World War I, of one student of military history:

"But what did conscription really signify?... It meant substituting the ordinary citizen for the professional soldier; it meant sending up to the firing line not men ready and willing to face the supreme risk but men for the most part with no such disposition, ordinary citizens, professional men, lawyers, merchants, artists, even in one country today, priests."<sup>4</sup>

Yet, no other solution was offered, for the alternative seemed to be surrender. In a modern war a nation utilizes all of its resources in order to fight. Millions of men and women are needed by the armed forces in order to carry on the conflict. If past experience was indicative of the future then the next great war would see practically every

American in uniform. To the pro-UMT faction this situation made it mandatory for the nation to protect itself by training its entire population to be ready for the next war.

This was the position adopted by the military: universal military training was imperative and the sooner it was instituted the better. Following the same basic argument, the national administration chose to temper its plan by calling for universal training. This latter concept was intended to go beyond purely military training and would serve to improve the entire population. It was also designed to have wider public appeal since it was aimed at some of the nation's educational and health problems also; however, the military would be responsible for administering the program. Universal Training was merely a more palatable term for UMT. This then was the basic position of the military and Administration: UMT was vital and must be adopted immediately.

UMT as the solution to the nation's problems was unacceptable to many people. Although they, of course, also favored a strong America, they did not feel that UMT would serve the purpose for which it was intended. Opposing the plan were many religious groups, clergymen, public school teachers and officials, organized labor groups, the Socialist party, and civilian experts (including scientific and technical as well as military). These groups argued

that UMT was not morally justifiable in view of Americans beliefs and practices, that in any case it was unlikely either to prevent war or provide the United States with adequate preparation for war, and it was not worth the cost, either in money or the reversal of cherished traditions. Their basic contention, that UMT was against American ideals, is best advocated by the argument against peacetime conscription advanced by President Woodrow Wilson in 1914.

It is said in some quarters that we are not prepared for war. What is meant by being prepared? Is it meant that we are not ready upon brief notice to put a nation in the field, a nation of men trained to arms? Of course we are not ready to do that; and we shall never be in time of peace so long as we retain our present political principles and institutions.....

The solution to America's post-war manpower problem was, therefore, anything but simple, and the fact that so many different plans of training were introduced adds still further to the complexity. Basically, the problem remained the same: some means of assuring American strength in the post-war world was needed and it was necessary to determine if the best method was UMT. Arguments that were advanced for and against such a program will be presented and evaluated in terms of their appeal to the public, and their influence upon the decisions; and this writer's judgment of their validity or invalidity will be expressed. No attempt will be made to differentiate between the various plans that were offered as they principally involve differences in detail

and organization, the basic reason remains the same. Primary emphasis will be placed upon the following questions: (1) Was UMT really needed and, if so, why was it not adopted? (2) Did the United States make a mistake by not adopting UMT in the late 1940's? (3) What influence did the UMT controversy have upon the development of American military policy?

No definite answers can be given, for the effects of the 1945-1950 debate over universal military training are still being felt. It is hoped that some small insight into the significance of this debate will result from this study. Since selective service (the draft) is still in effect and, seemingly, more necessary now than at any other "peacetime" period in American history, it is highly probable that UMT as a solution to the United States' defense problems is not yet a thing of the past. In case it is not, the following arguments, pro and con, will probably be heard again, presented by the same groups, and possibly with the same result.



## II. UMT: Necessity for Survival

### A. The National Administration

From 1945 to 1950 the Chief Executive of the United States government was in complete accord with proposals for universal military training. President Harry S. Truman continually referred to the necessity of UMT as a basis for postwar military planning. There was some mention of universal military training in every one of Truman's State of the Union messages; each one followed the same theme:

A further step which I consider of even greater importance is the early provision for universal training. There are many elements in a balanced national-security program, all interrelated and necessary, but universal training should be the foundation for them all. A favorable decision by Congress at an early date is of world importance. I am convinced that such action is vital to the security of this Nation and to the maintenance of its leadership.<sup>1</sup>

Truman, on several occasions, pointed out that UMT was not a new approach for him; his positions in the past were predecessors of his current program calling for universal training.<sup>2</sup>

It becomes necessary here to distinguish between the terms "universal military training" and "universal training". The former designation was preferred and used extensively by the military and the public. It also served as the

focal point of the attack on the program. UMT was designed solely to provide a mass, trained reserve of manpower for the Armed Forces, specifically the Army. Conceived as a defense measure, its only intent was to provide for the rapid mobilization of men to be used in case of a sudden attack upon the United States or in case the need for a large army to fight elsewhere in the world should arise. Universal training was a more ambitious program designed primarily to increase the vigor and stamina of America by providing its youth with discipline, organized physical development, and some measure of medical and educational improvement. Its basic purpose was much like that which the Job Corps of the 1960's is attempting to accomplish on a plan of voluntary participation. Both programs were to be administered by military authorities with an eye to providing basic military training. The latter term, universal training, seemed to be more palatable to the administration although the primary purpose was no different from UMT.

This was what was unique about the plan I contemplated--it was a universal training program, not just a military program. The educational and special training benefits were strong arguments in themselves for immediate legislation setting up the ... program. But the basic reason for my proposed plan was still to guarantee the safety and freedom of the United States against any potential aggressor."<sup>3</sup>

President Truman had very able help in presenting this program to the American people. Both the Secretary

of War, Robert P. Patterson, and the Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal favored UMT and worked for its adoption from 1945 to 1947. After the reorganization of 1947 which consolidated the military establishment under Forrestal as the Secretary of Defense, their support weakened, primarily because of the complex problems of reorganization and the opposition of the new created Air Force to UMT proposals. Forrestal became involved in the interservice dispute over the effectiveness of air superiority and mass bombing, and the result was less active support for UMT due to the need to achieve overall stability. After 1947 the chief administration official urging the adopting of UMT was Secretary of State George C. Marshall. Earlier, as General of the Army and Chief of Staff, Marshall wholeheartedly endorsed the program of universal military training. As Secretary of State he continued to urge adoption of the proposal arguing that it was indispensable to the defense planning of America.

To Marshall, the United States after World War II was charged with the responsibility of maintaining world peace and stability. In addition, the United States could no longer rely on a time lapse in which could begin preparations to fight. In the future the safety of America and the world depended upon the speed with which the country could react to overt aggression.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, it was necessary for America to demonstrate to the world that she was both ready and capable of resisting aggression. As Marshall expressed it:

The weakness in our position is the international fear that we will insist on too idealistic a solution and at the same time decline to maintain the power to back up what we may demand of others in an agreement.<sup>5</sup>

Diplomacy, without sufficient strength or the will to utilize it if necessary, was wasted, according to Marshall's thinking. "Diplomatic action", he said, "without the backing of military strength in the present world can lead only to appeasement".<sup>6</sup>

Power was the key to diplomacy and without the power to encourage or enforce a nation's wishes it was useless even to attempt a diplomatic solution to any problem. Harsh as it seems, this candid view was shared by other influential members of the administration. Secretaries of State Edward R. Stettinius (1944-1945) and James F. Byrnes (1945-1947) supported the idea of power diplomacy in the sense of "good" power being necessary for the preservation of world freedom.<sup>7</sup>

...if we are going to do our part to maintain peace under law, we must maintain in relation to other states, the military strength necessary to discharge our obligations.

Force does not make right, but we must realize that in this imperfect world power as well as reason does affect international decisions.

If the United States were to avoid the mistakes it made between 1918 and 1941 it was necessary to move in a new direction. No longer could America sit idly by and let Europe play power politics with the world as a testing

ground. It was imperative to abandon isolation and take an active part in formulating policy for the rest of the world.

This abandonment of isolation must be complete in order to insure America's survival as well as live up to her responsibility. Airplane design and atomic bombs would keep any future war from being isolated to any particular location. History showed that sudden and unsuspected attack was the favorite device of aggressors and now this attack could be worldwide and infinitely more destructive than ever before. Technology advanced so rapidly that this destructive capability was an increasing potential, eventually able to destroy an entire continent with virtually no warning. To the advocates of UMT this circumstance required an immense reserve manpower pool so that any emergency, especially a world-wide one, would be dealt with swiftly. A large reserve of basically trained men would be able to act for internal security in case of a surprise attack against the United States. Their training would enable them to organize and help direct survival efforts throughout the country.

The "Buck Rogers" type of warfare possible in the 1960's was foreseen by many individuals in World War II weapons systems. An important consideration of this new warfare was its ability to reach anyone anywhere.

The addition of the atomic bomb to the incalculable horrors of modern war has eliminated the concept of zones of safety in a future attack devastating and

immediate in its impact, new developments in warfare have created a need for trained men in every city and town--men who would be available at once in an emergency.

If this were really the case, as it turned out to be, then why not keep the military continually on a wartime basis? There were two chief objections: first, it would be contrary to all American tradition of not keeping large peacetime armies; and, second, it would cost entirely too much. This latter reason, from the practical standpoint the most important, was conditioned by the American reaction to war. Once fought and won it was time to forget about it and return to "normal" peacetime activity. Any money spent for defense should be spent on research and development anyway since modern weapons were so powerful and soon obsolete.

Pro-UMT rebuttal pointed out that research, while necessary, was useless without a supply of weapons and men trained to handle them. Trained manpower was the most essential ingredient, especially in view of the shorter and shorter time periods available for such training. Basic training given early, and to everyone, would allow advanced training to be given in less time and in conjunction with refresher physical training. In addition, UMT would force the professional military personnel continually to re-educate themselves in order that they too would keep abreast of scientific developments. Leadership qualities of the armed services would benefit both through constant

use and the early development of potential leaders for later service.<sup>10</sup> The military establishment was to be the administrator of any program and receive the greatest benefit. The military favored a program of universal military training, but for slightly different reasons.

#### B. The Military Thought

Because of intra-service pressure against debating military differences in public, professional military attitudes are difficult to ascertain. The true military opinion of UMT proposals can perhaps never be determined with finality, but it is significant that the two most important military leaders favored the adoption of UMT. George C. Marshall, as Chief of Staff and later as Secretary of State, was its foremost advocate. His position and basic arguments never changed during the 1945-1950 period. UMT was the sine qua non of America's post-war defense planning; without it all else was doomed to failure. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commanding General of the Army in 1945-6 and Chief of Staff 1946-7, also remained firm in his conviction that universal military training was vital to American and world safety. Past experience was the basis for both men's arguments, and especially the time factor.

The dangers of forgetting the lessons of our past increase tremendously. We have seen the frightening speed with which the mechanics of military force become more complicated. The great mobilization of 1917 seems leisurely compared to the efforts we have just been through.

And yet, in this last war, we took two and a half years to begin the offensive in Western Europe and more than that to bring our first forces back to the Philippines. Should future threats arise, no one will contend that we shall have time for comparable preparations.<sup>11</sup>

After American procrastination in two previous wars, both Marshall and Eisenhower feared that she would not be allowed the luxury of Europe's initiating the conflict and allowing America to join in whenever she wanted. The ability rapidly and efficiently to mobilize the entire nation for defense was essential. In order to achieve this potential for mobilization it was necessary to maintain reserve forces sufficient to fight in a world conflict.<sup>12</sup>

A primary goal of the Army was to insure that needed reserve forces would be available if needed. In the category of reserves were the National Guard, the organized Army Reserve, and the inactive reserve. This latter group was a "paper reserve", almost wholly comprised of veterans. Prior to World War II the National Guard and the organized Army Reserve were the main forces relied upon for additions to the standing army. These groups were volunteer organizations and, while experience showed that volunteers made better soldiers, not enough men were willing to volunteer. The President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training in 1947 found that,

On the basis of its present analysis of emergency military needs, the Army considers a National Guard of 723,000 essential. Before the last war, through



reliance on voluntary methods of enlistment, the Guard had a peak strength of less than 200,000.

.....  
Nearly 2 years after the conclusion of World War II, the Guard has about one-ninth of its 723,000 quota, and few of these are enlisted men. Although one-third of the 6,000 contemplated Guard units have been organized and federally inspected, these units are mostly on paper or consist only of top officers with a small cadre of non-commissioned officers and specialists.<sup>13</sup>

The regular Army of postwar America was in no better condition. From a peak of 8,300,000 in May 1945 the Army was down to 3,300,000 by January 1946. At that time, Eisenhower estimated that the minimum number of personnel necessary to the Army's effectiveness was 1,500,000. The then current plans of Congress called for an Army of only 550,000 by July 1946, most of these being professionals. According to Eisenhower, the only way of meeting the Army's manpower needs was to draft 50,000 men a month, more than twice the number drafted in December of 1945.<sup>14</sup> By 1948 it appeared that the Army had lost its battle to increase the number of regular troops. The regular Army remained at 500,000 until the Korean crisis required far greater numbers.<sup>15</sup> Even in 1950, as earlier crises foretold, it was impossible to fill the ranks with volunteers.

No real explanation is available for the inability of American governments to induce enough young men to volunteer for military service in times of enduring crisis. The problem existed in 1776 and persists today; military

manpower procurement problems in the 1960's are basically the same as in the Eighteenth Century. When no crisis exists, the inducements to volunteer for military service are noticeably lacking. The outbreak of crisis generally produces an enthusiasm to "join up" and "get it over with"; but, as the conflict is prolonged this attitude rapidly disappears. Resort to conscription becomes necessary and the conscripts soon outnumber the volunteers. Prior to 1940 it was not as serious a problem since the country was not encumbered with foreign obligations and worldwide responsibility. World War II ended this complacency, but the problem had been recognized much earlier.

American military leaders of World War I seemed to recognize this fundamental unwillingness to volunteer and its resulting effect upon the military needs of America.<sup>16</sup> General Peyton C. March, Chief of Staff in 1919, felt that UMT was essential because, "... a 1914-18 type mass army could not be prepared without peacetime conscription".<sup>17</sup> This idea is further supported by the later comments of Walter Millis, the noted military historian,

Our statesmen and soldiers have rarely been willing frankly to face up to it; but the fact is that the vision of a 'small regular Army supported by a great reserve of citizens trained to arms' is a vision only, requiring universal peacetime conscription to infuse it with reality.<sup>18</sup>

Efforts to institute UMT immediately after World War I were lost in the return to prosperity. All the elements were present for a decision in favor of UMT: trained men, masses

of equipment, a fully productive economy, and evidence of need.<sup>19</sup> Most of the basic arguments of 1945 were exactly the same; and, once again, the leading generals were at the forefront of the agitation for UMT.

General Eisenhower argued against the apparent lack of need for a mass army. Even though the advent of nuclear weapons and advanced techniques of delivering them to a target seemed to belie the necessity of a large army, Eisenhower felt that, "...we cannot permit complacency or an 'atomic bomb mentality' - a possible modern counterpart of the 'Maginot Line Mentality' - to lull us into another postwar apathy."<sup>20</sup> This viewpoint was shared by one of America's technological leaders, Karl T. Compton, President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and later chairman of the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training. Compton stated unequivocally that UMT was even more necessary in the modern world. In 1945 he declared:

Technological developments have greatly changed the conception of an effective citizens' army...a much longer period of training is necessary...The training itself must be largely technical. More important still, the speed of transportation and the development of methods for making powerful attacks with great suddenness and at a great distance mean that it is no longer safe to wait until war breaks out to begin the intensive training of our armies.<sup>21</sup>

Longer, more highly specialized technical training was definitely needed for the future soldier. The question was whether it would be effective for the citizen soldier.

To this the military answered with an emphatic affirmative; if nothing else it would help the individual prepare for civilian work. Even more important was the contention that, at the very least, some prewar training is better than none at all.

...since most of us over the years have been amateurs in war, we have tended to accept two persistent fallacies characteristic of superficial students of military policy: the first, that by a process of improvisation military victory can be achieved cheaply by the employment of some particular arm, doctrine, or policy.<sup>22</sup>

Furthermore, this prewar training would enable the military better to decide exactly what function a man could perform best. It would also allow the military to be better informed about their own needs and capabilities. By preparing everyone in peace time, any subsequent conflict would require less effort in organization of the nation's forces. General Tompkins went on to say:

The military history of the past three years has proved once again that in modern warfare between first-class powers, every resource, human and material, of the nations will be mobilized for the battle.

...The problem is not one of decision on limited employment of armed forces, but one rather of the selective allocation of the entire manpower of the nation to the direct needs of the military, the requirements of material production, and the minimum essential maintenance of the civilian economy.<sup>23</sup>

The military continually urged that prewar training be provided for every able-bodied male citizen. There would be no chance for preparation the next time. "Discipline

and training--wide-spread discipline and training--will be necessary from the outset of any new world tragedy",<sup>24</sup> said General Eisenhower, for the safety of America depended upon the immediate instillation of these traits into every American male so that he would not be caught unaware when the first blow fell.<sup>25</sup>

It would appear, then, that the United States military establishment was more concerned with when the next war would start rather than if it would start. It is somewhat unfair to portray these men as unduly warlike, for they undoubtedly were not. The military attitude was characterized by a strong current of fatalism (or realism), based upon the preceding events of the Twentieth Century. To American military leaders the following assumptions were the basis of their postwar defense plans: first, the United States would be the first nation attacked; second, the aggressor would strike suddenly and powerfully from a great distance; third, immediate reaction and retaliation were necessary for survival; and finally, "there will be no time in which to prepare for the successful defense of our country if we wait until we are in danger".<sup>26</sup> Technology, which was one of the chief arguments against UMT, provided any aggressor with "...a capability of sudden attack that cannot be safely ignored in military planning".<sup>27</sup>

To meet the ever constant threat of surprise attack it would be "necessary to maintain a large reserve over and above the forces constituting strength in being".<sup>28</sup>

Voluntary enlistments were not even sufficient to maintain an adequate force in readiness, therefore the only logical conclusion was to adopt UMT in order to provide for the defense and safety of the country. This could be done without violating either the traditional precepts of the United States or the tenets of democracy. It must be adopted quickly; the longer America waited the poorer her defense structure became. The American people must be convinced quickly that UMT was vital to national defense. Walter Millis describes the urgency of the United States' military position in the later 1940's in these words:

There were not enough ground troops to implement even the existing emergency war plan; to send anything more than a division anywhere would necessitate partial mobilization, while even the small authorized strengths were wasting away for lack of recruits... "Up to the present time, 'as Forrestal had already written February 10 to Chan Gurney, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 'we have not found any feasible alternative to UMT as a means of providing the necessary trained personnel for the National Guard and the Reserve.' ...."

The American public seemed to be aware of the problem; but, evidently not concerned enough to act. It must be remembered, however, that once again America had just completed a total war effort. Many people were not able seriously to consider such a radical departure from tradition as UMT.

### C. Public Opinion

The shock of Pearl Harbor appears to be the key to understanding public reaction to UMT. Japan's swift and

devastating attack brought a real sense of fear to the American people and is probably one of the most important single reasons contributing to the abandonment of isolation. Advanced technology made it imperative for the United States defense system to cope with the possibility of surprise attack. Mark Sullivan, a Washington Post writer, summed up this attitude in 1945:

One thing we should have learned from the suddenness of the attack on Pearl Harbor. As Under Secretary of State Grew put it in the hearing this week, "Latent power is not enough". Our power should be trained and ready for instant action.....<sup>30</sup>

Obvious to everyone, this situation created a real need for some method which would assure the United States of protection. The United Nations was the hope of those searching for permanent peace and stability. To Sullivan, and many others, the United Nations organization was definitely needed, but, "at the same time, by permanent universal military training, and by other means, we must be prepared for war in case the peace organization should fail to work".<sup>31</sup>

American faith in world peace was not shattered, even though strained. The primary goal was still co-operation of nations achieved through an organization such as the U.N. Past experience indicated that something more was needed, "...as insurance against contingencies such as those many of us doubted could happen in the 1930's".<sup>32</sup> To be respected it was necessary to also be strong. "It is to forget realities to say that human nature has changed

so much within the past few years that a strong nation, bent upon aggression, respects anything less than equal or superior strength", said one Congressional commentator.<sup>33</sup> This attitude was not confined to the military and diplomatic sphere; sharing this viewpoint were many educators, authors, and historians. Among those desiring that the United States maintain its military strength was Virginia C. Gildersleeve, Dean of Barnard College and a delegate to the 1945 San Francisco Conference. This need to remain strong militarily was essential, at least until the U. N. proved itself capable of maintaining world peace. As she expressed it, "Unless we have force behind us, our opinion in the world of today will not carry much weight. That is an unpleasant fact, but it is a fact."<sup>34</sup>

In the war of words over the merits of UMT civilian "experts" on military affairs were fairly evenly divided. Two prominent military historians, Douglas Southall Freeman and Fletcher Pratt, favored UMT. To the House Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy, Freeman stated that, "...our military policy prior to the Second World War was a negation, in whole or in part of every principle that should have been applied".<sup>35</sup> According to Freeman, the only reason American forces managed to keep from being completely destroyed in the early days of World War II was that Selective Service had been instituted prior to active combat. He went on to say that, "...compulsory



military service, properly administered, has been proved to be the surest, most democratic, and most economical system of essential national defense".<sup>36</sup>

The economy referred to by Freeman was not only found in savings of money, but, even more important, in lives. One of the failures of the previous system was a lack of command training for officers, and UMT would provide this critical training in peacetime.<sup>37</sup> Pratt also highlighted the benefits of prewar training to the modern soldier. In 1951 he wrote,

The modern infantryman is required to have a thorough familiarity with at least three weapons that existed only in the experimental stage in 1945, besides knowing all the 1945 soldier had to know about the older weapons and such purely tactical matters as scouting, patrolling, camouflage and communications. More new weapons are coming.<sup>38</sup>

He also emphasized the need for recognizing and developing leadership qualities prior to actual combat. Additional long term benefits would be increased technical knowledge for use in civilian life, as well as better physical health.<sup>39</sup>

In addition to Karl Compton, some other prominent educators favoring UMT were Charles Seymour, diplomatic historian and President of Yale University, and James Bryant Conant, Harvard President. Primarily educators, these men cannot, perhaps, be characterized as technical experts, but neither can they be accused of being warmongers. Their positions as heads of two of America's greatest liberal

arts institutions and their backgrounds, Seymour in history and Conant in chemistry, indicate that they could not be grouped with the generally conservative supporters of UMT. Both felt it absolutely necessary that the nation adopt some form of universal training or service in order to meet American defense needs. Conant's viewpoint, expressed in Look magazine, December 19, 1950, was admittedly based upon the need for manpower in Korea. His argument affirmed that universal military service was the only way to meet current manpower needs, especially in view of America's worldwide responsibilities.<sup>40</sup>

Charles Seymour, basing his argument on past history and current needs, asserted in 1945: "I am in favor of compulsory military training for all able-bodied American young men as an essential basis for the protection of American interests and international peace in a confused postwar world..."<sup>41</sup> Concerned about another possible retreat into isolation, Seymour strongly advocated that America play an active role in world affairs. As the most powerful nation in the world, "The United States cannot divest itself of responsibility for the settlement of international problems, and this responsibility cannot be fulfilled except the nation dispose of organized force".<sup>42</sup> There was a catch to this position; even though Seymour favored the abolition of aggression and armed conflict, he argued:

...the history of the past twenty-five years makes clear that men are far from eliminating force or the threat of force

from their social relations...Underlying any machinery for the prevention of war there must be organized power and the more effective that power the greater is the chance that it will not have to be used... if the United States is actually going to assume a role of responsibility in protecting the peace of the world, it must have at its disposal an adequate military establishment to serve as the authority upon which our policy and our actions shall be based.<sup>43</sup>

Seymour's argument seemed to restate the proposition that "might makes right". To Seymour, this was not the case, but America needed power in order to survive and prevent the world's aggressor nations from usurping the rights of others.

Congress and the general public were by no means apart and aloof from the debate over universal military training. Representative Andrew J. May (D., Ky.), on January 3, 1945, introduced a bill to institute universal military training. House Resolution 515, in the 79th Congress, 1st Session, was designed to provide either army or navy training for all able-bodied male citizens of the United States as soon after their eighteenth birthday as possible.<sup>44</sup> Introduction of this bill prior to the end of World War II reinforces the viewpoint that UMT was not a sudden innovation to deal with postwar problems. Concern that America would retreat into her isolationist shell following the war and allow her military system to become stagnant is reflected in the opening line of House Resolution 515:

Be it enacted...the Congress hereby declares that the reservoir of trained manpower built up at such enormous expense during the present war should not be permitted to become empty again as after World War I, but should be perpetuated for the peace and security of future generations.<sup>45</sup>

The House Committee on Military Affairs hearings on the May Bill, in November and December, 1945, was the second of four official studies involving the question of UMT.

In 1945, two House Committees examined the question of United States postwar policy, both diplomatic and military. The House Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy, meeting in June, 1945, was more concerned with the overall American position in the world. Although the Committee took more than 600 pages of testimony from interested and informed individuals, it never released a clearcut summary or statement of position. A similar result occurred when the House Committee on Military Affairs, after two months and over 800 pages of hearings, failed to report the May Bill in any form. Again, in 1948, the Senate Armed Services Committee held a month-long series of hearings specifically on UMT. More than 1100 pages later the committee issued no positive statement in regard to its findings or opinion.

Lack of clearly delineated Congressional opinion on UMT is one of the difficult aspects of the UMT controversy. It is relatively easy to point out some proponents of the plan. Senators Chan Gurney (D., S. Dakota), Henry Cabot

Lodge (R., Mass.) and Lyndon B. Johnson (D., Texas) favored the adoption of some form of UMT. In the House of Representatives, Andrew J. May (D., Ky.), John J. Sparkman (D., Ala.), Carl Vinson (D., Ga.) and J. Buell Snyder (D., Pa.) were in favor of UMT at the earliest possible time.<sup>46</sup> But there are not enough expressions of opinion to enable the investigator to trace a pattern. In general, conservatives tended to favor UMT, but this assertion is based only upon the "high visibility" of the more outspoken advocates of the plan, and the generalization cannot be readily verified. The failure to give forthright statements may be explained by the nature of the 1948 election situation and by the uncertain state of the world in 1945, causing Congress to wait before committing itself too deeply.

President Truman definitely favored universal military training, and, since he appeared to be out of favor with the American electorate in 1948, most representatives at least felt it better to wait. One explanation for UMT's not being adopted is found in the nature of American politics in 1946 and 1948. No real postwar direction was evident in 1946 and many elective officials were not going to risk their political careers upon so controversial an issue as UMT. Again, in 1948, the identification of universal training with President Truman's policies probably kept many officials from advocating its acceptance. The question then arises, did the American electorate favor UMT?

Polls cannot be considered as absolutely reflecting the true situation, but they can reflect trends, especially over several years. A series of public opinion polls from 1945 to 1950 included questions on UMT specifically, and the role and strength of the United States and its military organization in general. Results of these polls show that a majority of Americans favored UMT in the later 1940's and that most were not convinced that the U. N. was the panacea for the world's problems. Throughout World War II opinion favored UMT as a postwar project, with 60 per cent or more Americans for this idea.<sup>47</sup> During the last year of the war this figure jumped to over 70 per cent.<sup>48</sup> From 1945 through 1947 the percentage of Americans favoring UMT ranged from 65 to 76, with most polls showing about 70 per cent in favor.<sup>49</sup>

In regard to public opinion about UMT, the critical year was 1948, the first postwar year in which the electorate could make a decision. For this year results of the polls show that UMT was favored by more than 70 per cent of the population.<sup>50</sup> In addition to the questions about UMT the pollsters also asked if the United States would have to fight another war within the next ten years. In June, 1947, about one-half thought that America would fight again in ten years.<sup>51</sup> One year later that figure went up to 58 per cent, and rose to 67 per cent in July, 1948.<sup>52</sup>

One wonders that the population of the United States, overwhelmingly favoring UMT, was not given an opportunity to decide the issue. Even then it is not at all certain that the question would be resolved in favor of UMT.

Public attitude was such that, in the words of one student of the issue, "on specific issues of military policy... the public tended to favor measures which symbolized or could be interpreted as meaning greater military preparedness";<sup>53</sup> but, favoring a policy and voting for it do not necessarily coincide.

It is possible that cooler and wiser heads prevailed and that the lack of decision regarding UMT was for the good of the country. Then again, it may have been due to the nature of UMT's opponents. The issue was most definitely not a one-sided debate; the anti-UMT faction was small, but decidedly vociferous.

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 at the same time...  
 for pacifist...  
 in a democratic society...  
 a year of military service...  
 inordinately...  
 indoctrinated... in the military viewpoint.

Further castigating the military approach to UMT the writers  
 went on to say:

It is foolish, therefore, to look to the  
 generals to formulate the national  
 policy which will be expected to prove  
 such this true security. The general  
 has not of late been habituated to the word  
 of command. But a nation habituated  
 to the word of command is not a democracy.

### III. UMT: Not Really Needed

#### A. Moral Opposition

Many opponents of Universal Military Training based their opposition upon the argument that such a system was not morally right. Christian and democratic ideals prevented the adoption of universal conscription. This segment of the opposition to UMT-comprising churches, Christian and other religious groups, church affiliated individuals, and Socialists-was the most outspoken. The basis for their argument was the militarization which would result from a program of universal military training. The editors of the Christian Century attacked the program proposed by Eisenhower in 1945.<sup>1</sup> Conceding the logic and candor of the General's position, they continued:

Here is one of the most revealing and at the same time frightening arguments for peacetime conscription ever advanced in a democratic society...the one thing a year of military service can do ineradicably is to provide 'psychological <sup>2</sup> indoctrination' in the military viewpoint.

Further castigating the military approach to UMT the editors went on to say:

It is foolish, therefore, to look to the generals to formulate the national policy which will be expected to produce this true security. The generals seek a nation habituated to the word of command. But a nation habituated to the word of command is not a democracy.



On the contrary, it is a nation that is most in danger, when crisis comes, of submitting to the tyranny of a dictator.

UMT to many was militarism, plain and simple, regardless of any protection it might provide.

Protection of the United States against foreign enemies was not the main concern of the "moralist" groups. Their primary concern was protection of America against itself; against the somewhat reactionary and cynical elements in her society who preached military strength as a cure-all for war. Of course, these groups wanted the United States to be strong; but, strength was not reflected by conscription. "Our national strength and world power lie not only in our magnificent natural and human resources but also in (1) a productive economy and (2) a vigorous moral sense and devotion to worthy ideals."<sup>4</sup> In addition, America already had a reservoir of trained manpower, more than ten million veterans of World War II. It was considered highly unlikely that if another war broke out in the near future this group would be exempt from service. For at least five years the United States was perfectly safe and in the early 1950's it would be in a better position to determine its true military manpower needs.

One of the most effective arguments against the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training's wholehearted support of UMT was the time factor. As

stated by Norman Thomas, leader of the Socialist Party and chairman of the Postwar World Council, the argument ran like this:

The last definite date that it mentions is 1955 by which time it believes that other nations--it means Russia--will be able to wage atomic warfare effectively. Within that period, the Commission argues that the United States cannot conquer, much less police, Europe without mass armies. This, despite our enormous naval superiority which the Commission conveniently overlooks and our monopoly of atomic bombs. Obviously what we cannot do within that period in Europe, Russia cannot even begin to do against us in this hemisphere.<sup>5</sup>

UMT would also "...tend to determine a foreign policy which contemplates war against Russia begun in Europe or Asia within the next ten years."<sup>6</sup> Conceding Thomas's feeling of friendship for Russia, he underscores another prevalent question: whom was America planning to fight with this proposed army? Russia was the only country then in a position to challenge the United States for world leadership in military affairs and America was vastly superior to Russia in technology.

Effect upon foreign policy was not treated superficially, but was considered along with the impact of UMT on American tradition. In the first place, America led the way to the San Francisco Conference and adoption of UMT would appear to reject the idea of world peace altogether. As soon as America began to arm herself it would be only natural for the rest of the world to follow, if only for

self protection. Of course America was a peaceful nation and her allies had nothing to fear, but:

...as long as nations seek security in their own armed forces, they are doomed to total preparation for total war. It is becoming clear that even so, they cannot attain security, because each effort to increase a nation's security thereby decreases the security of some other. Total preparedness merely gives the hope of victory, it does not give the hope of security.

This idea is strongly supported by the European experience, especially that of France, Germany, and Russia, from 1870 to 1914. That period saw almost continual total preparedness for war and very little security. (Even armed police are occasionally attacked by unarmed thugs.) Security then was not necessarily a good argument in favor of UMT.

A significant factor in post World War II international relations was the presence of nuclear warfare. The diplomacy of a country could be greatly influenced by its ability to cope with this atomic weaponry. Many people believed that the traditional foreign policy of America would be drastically altered by the adoption of UMT. It was argued that American generations, growing up under a system of universal military training, might react in the same manner as the diplomats were reacting to the atom bomb. This latter innovation forced men to give it primary consideration in policy formulation. UMT would create a similar situation; American youth, infused with the concept of constant preparedness for war, would become militaristic in their

thinking. This would result in an unduly aggressive approach to world problems, a very undesirable situation in view of the world's unsettled state. In addition, UMT would not even provide a strengthened citizenry for America. The Army, basically an authoritarian structure requiring discipline and blind obedience, was certainly not an ideal vehicle for citizenship training.<sup>8</sup> The most that could be gained by UMT, in this respect, would be a chance for many American youths to broaden their experience in interpersonal living. Even this would have undesirable effects, according to many educators, since the Army was not designed to treat its members as individuals, and most Americans at age eighteen need some individual guidance. To these observers, the long term effects of UMT upon American life were not worth any additional protection which might be derived.

Even though they cannot be considered expert in the fields of diplomacy, politics or military science the "moralists" could point to America's dominant position of power in the world. It did not take an expert to know that the American Air Force and Navy were the most powerful in the world, and that they were the chief reasons for victory in World War II. Since these two branches of the service were the most powerful and influential in wartime and, in case of surprise attack, would bear the brunt of defending America, it seemed reasonable to spend time and money to improve them. The Navy and Air Force were

primarily volunteer organizations; they did not depend upon conscription to any great extent, and preferred to recruit their numbers without it. Pointing to this and other facts, the National Council against Conscription presented a strong argument against UMT. This group, organized near the end of World War II, included a number of prominent and influential Americans. Drawing support from such distinguished private citizens as Albert Einstein, William Faulkner, Harry E. Fosdick, Louis Bromfield, Pearl Buck, Charles S. Johnson (President of Fisk University), Victor Reuther, and several others, including many educators, labor leaders, and agricultural organizations, this faction provided strong organized opposition to universal military training. The duration and kind of training was the key to the Council's opposition. In a pamphlet released in the early 1950's evidence was presented showing that extensive training of ground combat troops was not really vital to their chances for survival in war. The authors maintained that, "where lack of training is a factor, it is not individual training that is important, but training of various units to fight as a team."<sup>9</sup> Quoting from the October, 1950 issue of Combat Forces Journal, the pamphlet emphasizes that: "'Those who have had UMT would have to be retrained in the event of war. Even the combat veterans of World War II would require retraining if they were to be used...'"<sup>10</sup>

Necessary training time for combat readiness could be as short as seventeen weeks according to statements by

military authorities. Furthermore, only 11 per cent (1.5 million out of 14 million inducted) of the World War II American military force ever went into combat.<sup>11</sup> Since the great majority of military personnel served in a "civilian" capacity during wartime, it would appear that the military only needed a better system of classification for recruits. The Council argued that even if time were needed to train men for those support jobs, that time could be provided by a small, well-trained professional force. This group would be capable of large scale retaliation in case of an all-out surprise attack (the Air Force's job in the atomic age), or fighting a holding action while the entire population was mobilized. This latter function would be best served by a strong Navy and a smaller professional Army based outside the continental United States where it could be more effective at the outbreak of a war.

This basic plan was the forerunner of the 1952-60 Republican Administration's defense proposals. "More bang for the buck" was the theory followed in the mid-1950's, and one result was American unpreparedness for the 1960's Viet Nam conflict. The moralists were not alone in overlooking the impact of guerrilla warfare; almost everyone after World War II was concerned with a large scale conflict, not brush-fire wars. All America wanted to be ready if and when the next big war began. Robert M. Hutchins, President of the University of Chicago, was not against national defense,

but he wanted people to understand this basic point: "The argument that our military experts insist upon is that peacetime conscription gives a country a head start in military encounters with other nations. What kind of country is it that wants a headstart?"<sup>12</sup> This was the primary consideration of the moralists, if America were to be fully prepared for war, it would no longer be America.

#### B. Education and Labor Opinions

One of the sources of America's great strength is technological advance. This ability to advance is founded upon a system of universal education and the desire constantly to improve the mechanical artifacts of our culture. Rightly or wrongly, America seems to be possessed by the urge for bigger and better things, especially in production of goods. To achieve this goal it is necessary for the youth of the country to receive more and better technical (scientific and mechanical) training at an earlier age. This situation is in direct conflict with any system of universal military training. The ideal age for a soldier is 18-20 years, the time when most American males are either entering upon their advanced education or beginning to learn a trade by working full time. According to many educators, the loss of six months, or one or two years at this stage would be critical. The loss of time would, of course, be influential in the decisions and educational development

of many. College plans might be shattered, and job opportunities lost because of forced military service. Even though a UMT system would theoretically affect all males of that age range, there would be many who would not serve because of physical defects (not necessarily serious but enough to preclude military service), and they would benefit from their peers' loss of time.

The loss-of-time argument, while substantially valid, was weakened somewhat by a counter-affirmation. To be sure, many individuals' plans would be disrupted, but an unknown number, aided by one or two years of thought, exposure to life, and maturity, would be altered for the good of the individual, and the country. While in the Armed Forces, it would be possible for an individual to obtain basic technical training for a civilian occupation. It would also be possible to further one's education even while serving in the Armed Forces; an individual with the desire for knowledge or training could receive it just as well from the Army. Robert J. Havighurst, University of Chicago Professor of Education, did not agree.

The thing would happen that always happens when a society of men only is created by putting all kinds of men together at random and placing them under the authority of other men who have no interest in, or preparation for, the tasks of intellectual and moral education: the lowest common denominator of intellectual cultural, and moral life would prevail.<sup>13</sup>



This idea was also expressed by the editors of the National Education Association Journal and reiterated by many other prominent educators.<sup>14</sup>

Effect upon higher education would be difficult to measure, but enrollment figures were offered as an indication of the impact of compulsory military service. An article by the New York Times education writer, Benjamin Fine, cited a decrease in the number of graduate students in the 1951-52 and 1952-53 school years. The decline from 11,300 in the former period to 8,000 in the latter was attributed to local draft board's classification of those students as 1-A and their subsequent selection for military service prior to completing their studies.<sup>15</sup> The implication is not only that these students would have benefited more by completion of their graduate work but that the country would benefit also. Implied, too, is the possibility that many of these students, interrupted as they were, would not continue their advanced studies upon completion of military service.

Educators argued that the military influence could so alter the conscript's way of life that academic initiative would be weakened drastically. This possibility would influence the post-military attitude toward education and its chief purpose, intellectual stimulation. Coming as it would, between high school and college, UMT would create an air of docile, obedient scholars, willing to obey,

rather than question, their teachers. This potential effect is dramatically illustrated by the following opinion of August B. Hollingshead:

The perfectly trained soldier is one who has had his civilian initiative reduced to zero. In the process the self becomes identified with the institution and dependent upon it for direction and stimulation. The ideally adjusted soldier would be a military dependent who looked to the institution for all his personal, social, and emotional satisfactions. Unlike the dependent child, who normally matures and strives to break the bonds of dependency that tie him to his parents, the adjusted soldier is encouraged to be a dependent of the institution. In psychiatric terms, the military institution becomes a substitute parent for an adult who has been reduced to infancy by the training it has given him.<sup>16</sup>

Outside observers have often remarked that it is surprising to note how many adult "children" there are in the Armed Forces. There is a tendency among career soldiers, once their promotional peak is achieved, to adopt an attitude of semi-retirement, merely awaiting the day that retirement becomes official. This situation is found primarily in the administrative branch of the Armed Forces, but this branch tends to be the most influential when changes are considered. These individuals are described by Hollingshead as,

...men conditioned to institutional requirements, defined situations, and explicit expectancies who will neither think for themselves nor make demands on the institution for needs that are not identified with institutional ends. (sic)...For these reasons the recruit must be remade; as any old sergeant knows, 'a recruit is not worth a damn until he has been broken.' 17

Commenting on Hollingshead's statement, the National Council Against Conscription observed that: "If this is not disruptive to 'human plans', 'normal living habits' and individual dignity, the word disruptive has lost its meaning."<sup>18</sup>

A third, seemingly valid, argument against UMT on the grounds that it unnecessarily interrupted the educational process was presented by Charles W. Cole, President of Amherst College. Writing in Look magazine, Cole pointed out that the United States could not possibly match Russian or Chinese manpower. The answer to defense problems therefore lay in vastly superior technology. Education and research were the paths to this front-rank position. In the initial phase of any UMT program America would create a gap in the development of her future scientists and engineers which could prove fatal. Any period of UMT could not hope to match the comparable period of civilian training thus creating the gap. Although conceding compulsory military service to be a necessity, he was against any program to universalize such service. To strengthen his argument, Cole reminded readers that the winners of World War II, America and Great Britain, were the only major powers without a universal military system prior to the war.<sup>19</sup> Though his position seemed to some readers to have about it the odor of intellectual snobbishness, Cole presented this interesting and provocative observation:

Almost all great scientific discoveries, basic new ideas, from those of Newton to Einstein, have been developed by very young men, usually men under 30, often under 25... Today, science is so complex that it takes five or ten years after high school to get out to the scientific frontiers where advances can be made. To add two years to the time required to get to the point where such contributions are possible might slow our scientific progress...<sup>20</sup>

It is evident that widespread concern about the damage to education and progress which might result from a system of UMT was not without a substantial basis for fear.

This fear was not the sole concern of educators; organized labor also saw in UMT a threat to the continued expansion of the American economy. Every major labor organization was against the idea of universal military service. Labor leaders preferred that the country's educational establishment rather than the Army train industry's future leaders and employees. Their reasons were many and varied but they basically echoed those of the moralists and educators. Labor felt that the United States' industrial strength and capacity for change was its greatest asset. To deny industry the opportunity to develop fully was criminal, and a period of UMT would create a gap in industrial growth. Furthermore, this gap would come at a time when American industry was beginning to recover fully from the effects of the Depression. Industry had proven its capability to produce vast quantities of war material, so there was no need to worry about its ability to provide the equipment if war came again.<sup>21</sup>

Labor leaders were also concerned with the effects of regimentation on American youth. Perhaps their concern lay not in the necessary discipline which the army required, and which industry also requires, but in the possible anti-labor attitudes which this Army service might engender. Military leaders were an influential section of the conservative opposition to labor's attempts to organize and to improve the condition of the working man. Forced military service at an early age could easily result in an unfavorable attitude toward organized labor. This attitude would be a result of the military's indoctrination which demanded obedience to one's superiors. Labor's fear, not openly expressed, but implied in arguments against the undemocratic structure of the military, are not to be considered lightly. It is entirely possible that UMT would result in a gradual shift of support from organized labor to the more conservative elements in America. After all, the loudest proponents of UMT were basically conservative in outlook, conceiving such a program to be primarily for protection.

The fears expressed by educators and labor leaders were based primarily upon moral, economic, and intellectual arguments. Soundly presented and containing substantial validity, they appealed to the educated and liberal elements of American society. To the "man in the street" many of these arguments were not convincing. He was concerned principally with keeping America safe and strong. Turning now to the expert opinions offered, we find that every issue has two sides, and even three or more.

### C. The Civilian Experts

Even though the polls reflected approval of UMT by the man in the street, many experienced voices belittled the value of such a program. Among the most highly informed and outspoken critics of UMT were Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times military editor, and Josephus Daniels, former Secretary of the Navy and editor of the Raleigh (N. C.) News and Observer. Both men based their opposition on technological aspects of modern warfare. Air power, especially nuclear air power, was the key to future security. As long as the United States had the capacity to wage total atomic war throughout the world, she need not fear sudden attack. As Daniels put it: "The outstanding lesson taught by World War II is that the nation which commands the air is the nation that can rule the world."<sup>22</sup> He went on to say that peacetime conscription was certainly not needed for the Air Force since it was rapidly filling its ranks with volunteers.<sup>23</sup>

Hanson Baldwin presented a plan of defense for the United States which totally eliminated the need for a large peacetime Army. Baldwin based his plan upon geography and technology: "...our geographical position is still our greatest defensive asset...No great land army is needed for the defense of the continental United States, at least not in the initial year of war."<sup>24</sup> America's military

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Hanson Baldwin presented a plan of defense for the United States which totally eliminated the need for a large peacetime Army. Baldwin based his plan upon geography and technology: "...our geographical position is still our greatest defensive asset...No great land army is needed for the defense of the continental United States, at least not in the initial year of war."<sup>24</sup> America's military

commitments were not confined to the continental United States, and Baldwin realized and approved the postwar shift towards world responsibility. These commitments could best be upheld, "by small but well equipped and highly trained land garrisons and small amphibious forces."<sup>25</sup> The large army would be needed to conclude successfully any conflict, but the outlying bases would provide enough time to train and equip a mass army.<sup>26</sup> This plan, of course, is also one of the basic tenets of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the idea that American forces are in Europe primarily to fight a delaying action until mass mobilization can be effected.

Delving further into Baldwin's proposal, one finds an almost irreconcilable dilemma. He argues, rightly, that America has, in her veterans, enough trained men for the near future. Furthermore, the distant future will be radically altered by technological advances so that it is really impossible to plan for it. The United States can only be attacked by air or sea and as long as she controls both there can be no surprise attack. This control would also be necessary before any large army could be transported overseas, therefore it is vital irrespective of the army's size. A future war will be characterized by reliance upon airpower in the initial stages and will develop into total conflict based upon the accomplishments of airpower. One of three results will probably occur: a stalemate, giving the United States enough time to gather a mass army;



United States superiority, also granting time; or, total nuclear war, in which case the airplanes will be the only participants. Along these lines, Baldwin felt that the only true defense was retaliatory capability.<sup>27</sup> To prevent attack it was imperative that one maintain the ability totally to destroy any and all aggressors.

Apparently conflicting with this approach was Baldwin's further disparagement of the need for UMT to provide a world wide "police" force. The United Nations was not really based upon enforcement of its policies, although enforcement action would be necessary at times. Rather, it depended "...upon the agreements, political, economic, and military, arrived at among the three great powers outside the framework of Dumbarton Oaks."<sup>28</sup> Unable to match Russian manpower, the United States was forced to depend upon technology as a means of negotiating with Russia. This concept was carried further by the statements of Grayson Kirk, at that time Columbia University Associate Professor of Government. Kirk maintained that national defense was a matter of concern only in two situations; if America's present enemies (Germany and Japan) were to regain their military strength, or in case of a disagreement with current allies. The former instance could be prevented by good leadership and an adequate air force and navy. In regard to the latter possibility, he presented two basic arguments against UMT: (1) it would foster isolationism

by strengthening the idea that another war was inevitable, and (2) such an idea would encourage regionalism (especially Western hemispheric defense planning) and eliminate the worldwide influence of the United Nations.<sup>29</sup>

Professor Kirk offered his thoughts on the policies which America should follow. Considering the alternative to his plan (war, and probably nuclear war), students of the issue felt that one must weigh carefully the concept presented by Kirk. Although it has been advanced throughout the history of mankind as the only true solution to international conflict, it bears repeating. To Kirk,

...the fundamentals of our future security are essentially political rather than military. Skillful statesmanship, supported by a reasonably strong force in being and backed by the immense military potential of the United States, gives us the maximum likelihood of future security. For this combination the strongest standing military force alone is not a satisfactory substitute.<sup>30</sup>

This idea worked for Great Britain in the Nineteenth Century and resulted in the Pax Britannica. This idea has also been abused by Germany and France in the Twentieth Century, one of the results being World War I. It is an ideal, but in this day and time of nuclear weaponry, many have pointed out that it is also the only practical solution.

The best statesmen in the world could not "negotiate" one simple fact, the size and significance of a Universal Military Training program in America. Regardless of the United States' intentions, the adoption of UMT following

World War II would be viewed primarily as an announcement of defeat because no one really knew yet whether military strength would be the key factor in postwar international relations. Certainly an effort to solve world problems without resorting to force should be made. Adoption of UMT would indicate that America was not serious about collective security and the United Nations, and would create fear because, "The only other great armed nations remaining are Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China--our allies who have vowed with us to establish collective security."<sup>31</sup>

Great nations were not saved by UMT and smaller ones were defeated in spite of it. With its poor record of success since 1800, UMT was not considered effective. Senator Robert A. Taft (R., Ohio) believed that UMT might help if another world war occurred, but organization would still require as much time. The best solution was to improve the condition and effectiveness of volunteers in order to create a smaller, well-trained, and efficient armed forces. In addition, Taft said that American adoption of UMT would greatly influence the world attitude toward militarism by making it more attractive to other nations.<sup>32</sup> In agreement with Taft's viewpoint was an earlier observation by the Dean of Lehigh University's College of Business Administration, Neil Carothers. Mr. Carothers argued:

The truth is that wars are fought by the current generation after brief training in the operation of the latest scientific equipment. And they are won by superiority

of equipment, industrial resources and manpower...There is no way to 'prepare' a nation for modern war except to keep the entire manpower constantly in uniform, with the latest equipment.<sup>33</sup>

This point of view has been proven by experiences ranging from those of militiamen in frontier America through those of the Wermacht of Adolph Hitler. Most observers agreed that constant preparedness was the only true defense, but the United States could not afford to keep everyone in uniform constantly. It was necessary to achieve another, equally effective, solution to the problem.

Much of the experts' argument against UMT was not "anti-defense". The major point of conflict centered upon the best means for achieving national defense. Vast manpower reserves were no longer necessary according to many. One opponent of UMT put it this way:

In an era when a nation's power and weight in world affairs are measured, not primarily by the number of its potential soldiers, but by the size of its heavy industry, the United States will hold a military advantage out of all proportion of its population.<sup>34</sup>

This unique situation, created by World War II developments, gave the key to industry and research. No longer was it mandatory that a highly developed industrial nation maintain a large army or reserve strength solely in terms of manpower.

Today the weapon carries the soldier... Without such equipment an army is helpless, no matter how brave, well trained, and numerous its soldiers may be...Generalship...<sup>35</sup> has become a problem in industrial engineering.

The idea then was to rely upon American industrial strength to maintain so much technological superiority that manpower needs could be minimized. This idea did not apply solely in the realm of defense as the computer and other machines began to affect the civilian occupations as well.

Opposition to UMT in the 1945-50 period was perhaps based upon sound and valid premises. No one really knew what the world would be like in ten or twenty years, but all indications were that change would be rapid and widespread. Technology was advancing so fast that many new developments were outmoded almost overnight. It was ridiculous to assert that the answer to America's defense needs could be a concept taken from the past and reintroduced. The United States did not need old ideas which had not proven themselves before; she needed a new approach. Sound foreign policy, industry, technology, and, above all else, quality rather than mere quantity. The way to peace, or at least worldwide stabilization, was not universal conscription, but universal progress.

## CONGRESS: THE TRUE TEST

Congress, of course, holds the key to legislation. The Supreme Court can interpret law and the President influences the administration of the law, but only Congress can formalize a concept such as Universal Military Training. One of the significant aspects of the UMT debate was not Congress's opinion, but rather its lack of opinion. There was no clearcut expression either of favor or disfavor by that body. Individuals fought for or against the proposal with great vigor and along the same lines as those that marked the popular debate. Several committees held hearings and heard the same arguments and opinions which the general public heard.<sup>1</sup> The end result was several volumes of testimony and no official pronouncements. Although four separate committees in three years investigated the question of UMT, no group opinion was ever given.

There was no lack of individual opinion. Seldom expressed in floor debate or committee hearings, it was evidenced by agreement with others' expressed opinions. This concurrence frequently took the form of articles reprinted in the Congressional Record at the request of a Senator or Representative. Usually based upon emotion or intention to persuade rather than upon specific facts, these articles reflect in a general way the attitudes of

the press and local veterans and civic organizations. The majority of the material reflects opposition to UMT and much was put forth during the latter half of 1945, immediately after the nation's victory in war. This singular fact must be remembered when these arguments are perused, for it exerted a direct influence upon the reasoning involved.

A natural first reaction to the proposals for UMT was based upon the impact of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Representative Louis Ludlow of Indiana was against Universal Military Training because, said he:

...it is plain that the wars of the future, should there be any, will be decided by these amazing and horrifying inventions... Competition in military armament simply must not be allowed to happen, for another war...would mean the mass destruction of the life of our planet and the complete annihilation of civilization.<sup>2</sup>

Carrying this line of thinking even further Senator Clyde Hoey (D., N. C.) felt that the military was old-fashioned in its thinking, relying upon an idea that history had proved obsolete and unworkable:

In advocating universal military training, the military leaders are following the same out-moded policy that they followed after the last war when they clamored for big battleships and large armies and refused to build airplanes and adopt modern weapons and methods of defense.<sup>3</sup>

Representative Emanuel Celler (D., N. Y.) also employed this argument and advocated a purely volunteer professional army to utilize American technology.<sup>4</sup>

In conjunction with arguments on technological and democratic grounds, there was strong opposition constructed upon foreign policy considerations. One of the chief pro-UMT points was the need for protection in the postwar world. Since technology shortened the time for preparation and response it was vitally necessary to be constantly ready to mobilize. This concept was strengthened by the American withdrawal from world involvement following World War I. An Indianapolis, Indiana, editor and publisher, Eugene C. Pulliam, did not agree with this view and Representative Ludlow concurred in the opposition. Said Pulliam:

After this war the American people are not going to become apathetic. The war, the peace, the threats to our security, our economic survival will keep the American people vitally concerned for years to come. We couldn't be apathetic if we wanted to be. We will be living in a world of social and political chaos, and apathy--as far as national defense<sup>5</sup> is concerned--will be out the window.

What they seemed to imply was that UMT would tend to make the people apathetic by presenting a false sense of security. (Others were quick to point out that this was exactly what the U. N. did, without UMT.) This idea was also expressed by an organization of veterans, the Military Order of the Liberty Bell, comprised of ex-servicemen. It was opposed to UMT for the reason that the further the country got from war or thoughts of war, the more likely it would be that people would decide that a system based on UMT was too costly and ineffective and the more likely they would be to repeal it, thereby destroying America's defense system.<sup>6</sup>



Foreign policy and military policy should be directed towards world unity, not destruction: so ran the argument. Most important, foreign policy should control and must be formulated prior to the adoption of any military plans.<sup>7</sup>

Joseph Martin, calling for world disarmament, warned:

Remember, the very least we can achieve... is to find out where the other world powers stand and how sincere is their desire for peace. Either the governments of the world want peace and do not need the regiments and the hardware of war, or we must conclude they want hugh armaments because they expect to use them. In either event, now is the time to find out.<sup>8</sup>

This idea seemed to many to represent the best general concept of government in regard to vital issues "Make haste slowly". It was not an isolated opinion; it reflected the core of "liberal" thinking on the topic of defense in general and UMT in particular. As previously noted, Congressional division on UMT was not partisan; the basic issue was conservative versus liberal and the latter were undoubtedly more coherent. Representative Walter Judd of Minnesota endorsed the viewpoint that American adoption of UMT would only generate a rapidly escalating worldwide armaments race. This race would result in only one thing, another war in which no victor could emerge. It would be far better to depend on collective security, enforced by the United Nations, than to initiate anew the old tactic of "every man for himself and the Devil take the hindmost". Immediately after World War II was the ideal time for a new approach to international relations and it must be taken.<sup>9</sup>

The focus of liberal thought on UMT as an unnecessary and damaging factor in foreign policy was upon world opinion. According to J. H. Scattergood, of the Friends Committee on National Legislation, the issue was not preparation for war but prevention of war.

The old military preparedness way is based on the theory that each nation must be stronger than any other, either in its own strength alone or with others to give it the advantage in the balance of power. We know by bitter experience... that this theory has not worked... it has started more wars than it has stopped... it is based on a psychology of war, that instead of there being safety in this policy of military preparedness, there is almost certain danger of a third world war.<sup>10</sup>

This goes straight to the basis of the pro-UMT arguments, necessity for protection. If America is to be safe, she must be stronger than any other single nation or combination of countries. A logical result, according to the liberals, would be another arms race. That this would be inescapable if the United States adopted a strong military policy, based upon UMT, was shown by the highly respected Norman Thomas, the nation's most famous Socialist leader, in a statement before the House Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy, Thomas expressed himself in these words:

There is no such thing as shaping a military policy in a vacuum or as a thing in itself. Clausewitz and other theorists in the arts of war were entirely right in arguing that war is the extension of diplomacy or of the foreign policy of nations. No matter how sincere advocates of conscription or any other military policy for the United States may be in claiming that they are not thinking of particular

potential enemies but are merely advocating a general policy of insurance against war, nothing of the sort is possible. No nation has ever practiced conscription and competitive militarism except with a view to specific potential enemies...Other nations assume, as a matter of course, that a competitive military policy is an expression of a competitive imperialistic policy and act accordingly...<sup>11</sup>

Perhaps history tends to support this idea, for, even in the 1960's, the spectre of imperialism is raised by all parties to a conflict. Communism belabors the "capitalistic imperialism" of America, and the United States fights the "imperialistic encroachment" of Communist China. There are a great number of "imperialistic" attitudes in Viet Nam, on both sides.

Another significant argument against UMT was advanced by Representative Albert Engel of Michigan, Chairman of the War Department subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, Engel felt that "...compulsory peacetime universal military conscription will not only fail to give us adequate national defense but will be a detriment rather than a help to national defense."<sup>12</sup> According to Engel the basic need of America was force in readiness to meet an attack. This force could not be maintained by UMT. A strong regular Army, manned by Selective Service if necessary, was the only solution. Citing the experience of the Army Air Corps in World War II, Engel agrees with General H. H. ("Hap") Arnold that, "'You can, however, train personnel faster than you can build equipment...back of everything must be production;

the personnel is normally ahead of the equipment.'"<sup>13</sup> The only solution was to rely on technology, production, and volunteers for the core of United States defense, supplemented by Selective Service if needed. In no case should dependence upon UMT be considered, the world was beyond that point.

\* \* \* \* \*

Favorable Congressional reaction to UMT depended upon two basic propositions. First, it would be necessary to maintain American defenses against possible attack and, second, the only way to maintain the Armed Forces strength was by the adoption of universal military training. As previously mentioned, the basic argument was the necessity of UMT as insurance in case of future involvement in war.<sup>14</sup> This was the primary viewpoint underlying the arguments of the UMT advocates. It had happened before and it was certain to happen again unless the United States made a positive, firm effort to prevent it. Using Germany and Japan as examples, proponents of UMT attempted to show that it would be effective. Two Louisiana Representatives, Henry Larcade, Jr. and Overton Brooks, quoted administration personnel to support the deterrent potential of UMT.

Let us remember that bullies do not attack the strong; they attack the weak. Let us remember the boasts of Hitler and Goering and Ribbentrop that Germany would bring England to her knees in short order, because England had allowed her military strength to disintegrate...The Japanese boasted that the United States, being militarily weak, could never survive the knockout blow that was to be given at Pearl Harbor... If another war comes, potential strength

and bull-dog tenacity and moral staying power may not mean very much. Unless we are militarily prepared to act immediately, the play may be over before the curtain is half up.<sup>15</sup>

Deterrence could only be accomplished by constant preparedness. Germany's attitude in 1939 was again cited as an example of the need for readiness. In a statement before the House Armed Services Committee, James Forrestal, Secretary of Defense, referred to that attitude.

Finding himself unchecked, except by the efforts of appeasement at Munich, Hitler grew convinced that the Western democracies were without courage and without the will to remain free. On August 22, 1939, he told his commanders in chief; 'We have nothing to lose; we can only gain.... Our enemies are little worms...I saw them in Munich!' Nine days later the Nazis marched in open war against Poland.<sup>16</sup>

Short-term protection against another such occurrence could be secured by Selective Service and the veterans of World War II; long-term protection could only be obtained with UMT or an enormous standing army. Forrestal commented that, "....not in our lifetime or in that of the next generation do I foresee the time when a strong military potential will not be needed to back up our diplomacy."<sup>17</sup> The primary concern was that of maintaining a posture of readiness as a deterrent to any future aggressor.

The secondary consideration was the means of attaining and maintaining readiness. Technology was one answer, but warfare with machines alone is not yet possible. Manpower is still a vital element and was especially so in the

1940's. In comparison with the approximately eight million individuals in uniform in 1945 the postwar military establishment was quite small, fewer than one million in the Army and Air Force combined. The authorized combined strength in 1947 was 926,638 (591,000 Army; 335,638 Air Force), but the actual strength was 764,330 (498,974 Army; 285,356 Air Force). Both services stood at about 85 per cent of their authorized strength. The Air Force relied exclusively on volunteers and was no closer to full strength than the Army. Recruiting figures for September, October, and November, 1947 show that almost equal numbers were entering each branch. A monthly enlistment figure of about 9,000 or 10,000 was maintained. This figure was adequate for the Air Force but represented only one-half of the Army's required numbers.<sup>18</sup> It was fairly obvious to many observers that Lewis Hershey was correct in his judgment that, "The experience of this Nation indicates that when relatively large numbers are needed in the armed forces some form of compulsion must be provided."<sup>19</sup>

Congressional opinion was not as definite on the subject of universal military training as was private opinion. For the most part, Congressmen and Senators merely indicated or hinted at support of popular statements by proponents and opponents of UMT, rather than make forthright declarations of their own. This lack of official expression contributed to the ultimate failure of UMT advocates to push their program through Congress. The basic conflict never

achieved the proportions of a direct confrontation of the two political parties; the issue was primarily, if loosely, liberal versus conservation with little regard to partisan distinctions. Whether this resulted in a victory for the American people or a dangerous delay can only be determined by an examination of the battle's results.

...to the pressing need, which was for some readily available forces, not to fight a possible future third world war on the ground of the 'various potential explosive areas', as Forrestal put it, but to secure the peace of the world.<sup>2</sup>

The idea of commitment, small-scale opposition throughout the world's trouble areas, seems almost a direct result of the preparation for World War III.

## THE RESULTS

Controversy over the adoption of a universal military training program reached a climax in 1947 and 1948. The results of a study by Thomas K. Finletter in late 1947 supported the concept of total war by airpower. According to this report, the Air Force, because of its retaliatory capabilities, was the primary means of defense and should be greatly expanded. When this impressive report was added to the objections previously voiced by liberal groups, the result was the virtual death of UMT.<sup>1</sup> Forrestal, Secretary of Defense, now had to balance the demands of the Army and the Air Force. In order to achieve stability and harmony it was necessary to retreat in both issues. As a result, the Air Force was expanded slightly and UMT was sacrificed for Selective Service. Although neither group was entirely satisfied, the compromise appeared suited

...to the pressing immediate need, which was for some readily available forces, not to fight a possible future third world war but to deal on the ground at that time with the 'various potentially explosive areas', as Forrestal put it, out of which alone the danger of a future world war could come.<sup>2</sup>

The idea of containment, small-scale opposition throughout the world's trouble areas, appeared more sensible and less costly than continual, complete preparation for World War III.



UMT was not completely forgotten after 1948; in fact, it is still advanced in the 1960's as a solution to problems of American military policy. Less than two years after the compromise which removed UMT from the Army's necessary list it appeared that a drastic mistake had been made. The outbreak of the Korean conflict in June, 1950, pointed out the need for a readily available, trained reserve of manpower. The United States did not have it. Representative James Wadsworth of New York criticized this situation in the following way:

Now, we have relied up to this point... upon the volunteer system to maintain the reserve, and it has failed. Make no mistake about it, it has failed. Our Reserve strength ought to be three or four times the strength of our first-line forces. And it should be a well-trained Reserve.<sup>3</sup>

The Reserves' strength was pitifully inadequate for the purpose of supporting the Regular forces. Manpower in the Reserves was 520,000 in the Army (250,000 in an active training status), 1,103,000 Navy (204,000 in active training), and 354,000 Air Force (only 68,000 receiving active training). In addition, the regular forces were greatly undermanned. Budget-appropriated strength, probably greater than actual strength, was much lower than Congressionally authorized maximums. The Army was at 75 per cent full strength (620,000 of 837,000), the Navy, 69 per cent (461,000 of 666,682), and the Air Force at 83 per cent (416,000 of 502,000) of authorized full-strength.<sup>4</sup>

What a difference it would have made if UMT had been adopted, the critics exclaimed. As Wadsworth put it:

Suppose that in 1947 we had passed the UMT bill...and suppose that it had gone into effect immediately or within a reasonable period thereafter. Here we are in 1950. We would have had in our trained reserve by this time two complete classes, each having had 1 year of training and composed of 800,000 men each, available for service when a great military mobilization might come along, and completely adequate.<sup>5</sup>

This attitude was shared by Senators Tydings (Md.), Thye (Minn.), and Lodge (Mass.). The former characterized the American military dilemma in 1950 in this way:

Strange and paradoxical as it may seem, this nation is prepared primarily to fight a major power.....a nation of big cities, of great expanse...a nation that lives more or less on level ground. It is not prepared for guerrilla warfare 6,000 or 7,000 miles from home.<sup>6</sup>

It would appear that the United States military leaders learned absolutely nothing from the 1947-8 experience in Greece and Palestine. Obviously these guerrilla actions had more influence on Far Eastern military thought than American. Senator Tydings gives an explanation for such an oversight by America's military.

We have always looked in one direction toward the country we thought we would have to fight, and our defenses have not been built without primary consideration of the fact that we would have to meet that problem perhaps eventually with atomic bombs, with airplanes, with guided missiles, and with other modern weapons which are not useable in many instances in the kind of guerilla (sic) warfare we are fighting in Korea.<sup>7</sup>

Dependence upon one primary defense system was a definite handicap in Korea; the future would certainly need to see this situation altered.

Hindsight observers soon emphasized that Korea had brought out a glaring failure in the current reserve organization. First called were the World War II veterans, not the more recently trained reservists. The theory was that these men would require only physical training and, because of their previous combat experience, be more effective than trained but untested troops. True, perhaps, but eminently unfair, in the opinions of many. Senator Lodge proposed the immediate adoption of a universal military service program "under which every able-bodied man would serve for a period of 18 months", as a means of equalizing the burden of service.<sup>8</sup> This was also necessary because,

We are faltering and are failing to put our manpower into the military service in significant numbers--which would provide the sole reliable basis upon which peace can be built and without which we could not win the war if, in spite of our efforts, it should come. We must have more combat units and that takes manpower.<sup>9</sup>

Lodge admitted that UMT would do disservice to the American cause in Korea, because it would require too many valuable Regular troops for training purposes. In the long run, however, "It would give us the best civilian peacetime reserve we have ever had in all our history."<sup>10</sup>

Evidence suggests that UMT would have contributed very little to the American efforts in Korea. After the initial

shock of attack, United States troops based in Japan were rushed to the peninsula. Greatly under strength, poorly equipped and ill-trained, these troops, under the leadership of General Douglas McArthur, drove the North Korean Army out of its own home territory by the end of 1950. This seemed to prove rather conclusively that the peacetime army was capable of fighting a guerrilla action far from the United States. Then, in December, 1950, disaster struck in the form of the Red Chinese Regular Army. Calling themselves volunteers of the North Korean Peoples' Republic, this well-trained and sizable force almost pushed the United Nations troops (primarily American forces) out of Korea completely by the Spring of 1951. To the casual observer this drastic situation emphasized the failure of Congress to adopt UMT in 1947--as it was certainly needed in 1951. This was not the true picture; UMT would have made little if any difference in the progression of the Korean conflict. Korea proved only that the peacetime American Army was not capable of matching the manpower of the Red Chinese regular army, a fact that had been conceded by almost everyone. The United States decisions not to attack the Chinese mainland or employ atomic weapons in Korea were the significant military effects of this conflict. These decisions were based more upon the anticipated reaction of world opinion than upon pure military strategy. Strategically, the full utilization of American airpower would have wrought havoc in China; the end result would probably have been World War III.

Again the paradoxical dilemma raised itself. The only way that America had of defending herself against World War III was to start it. Reliance upon airpower and nuclear weapons for defense meant that they were also the only available weapons for offense. When a sustained offensive effort became necessary in Korea, America was forced to fight with its outmoded weapons from World War II's inventories. Unfortunately, from a developmental standpoint, the Korean episode did not last long enough (nor was there much danger of losing after that disastrous Spring of 1951) for effective, new weapons to be designed and tested for that type of warfare. The United States continued to rely upon the concept of total retaliatory warfare---especially since Russia now had the Bomb, and was working on a missile to deliver it.

The remaining years of the 1950's saw fantastic developments in nuclear weaponry and delivery systems. By 1960 it was evident that any world conflict would indeed result in almost total destruction for all concerned. The Cuban Missile Crisis in October, 1962, showed the real fear which this situation was capable of creating. This fear was not so much a fear of death per se as it was a fear of failure. If the mid-Twentieth century were to witness a nuclear world war it would prove that democracy was an unworkable system of government. It would confirm the past experiences of other democracies that physical survival is not possible without an unacceptable political and philosophical reorienta-

tion. This possibility is still present, evidenced by the spread of a "Right-wing backlash" in current domestic politics on the state and local levels of government.

There is evidence also of a reevaluation in the area of the country's foreign policy. American experience since 1945, especially in Korea and Viet Nam as well as in the world at large, emphasizes that this country has a basic need for diplomats and statesmen. As Admiral William ("Bull") Halsey expressed it in 1945:

...the need for wise, trained men to administer the national policy. We need men who understand the causes of war and conflict, who understand the fundamentals of our aims and ideals, who understand the interrelation of international policies, trade, and finance and the true significance of military power.<sup>11</sup>

The best nuclear missile defense system in the world is useless without such men to decide when, where, how, and -most important- if it should be employed. All proposed plans for military organization are dependent upon this primary criterion. In this regard, Weigley comments:

Universal Military Training did not die dramatically as a victim of sudden political murder, but it drifted into oblivion gradually. It did so less because of political opposition than because Congress, the Defense Department, and the army itself lost interest in it. It did so because after 1945 it came to seem irrelevant to America's military needs.<sup>12</sup>

UMT appeared irrelevant the farther America moved from World War II. The reasons were many and included the development of nuclear weapons and the need for delivery systems to be

maintained by the Air Force, not the Army. The Army's role became that of a highly specialized force, basically volunteer professionals, to control the brush-fire conflicts of the Cold War era.<sup>13</sup>

Even though UMT became unsuited for American military needs it remained in the public eye as a possible solution.

It came close to adoption in 1948 and again in 1951-1952. In each case, however, it was presented as a 'long-term' program and was eventually sacrificed in favor of shorter-range proposals designed to meet immediate needs. Throughout the battles over UMT, the Army, the Administration, most veterans groups, and public opinion... were in favor of it. The opposition came from religious, educational, pacifist, farm, and some business groups. Ironically, the opposing civilian groups, generally unconcerned with strategy and hostile to military needs, helped prevent the country from adopting a popular policy, backed by the Army, which would have been ill-suited to the military needs of the nation.<sup>14</sup>

Once again the peculiar brand of American democracy operated to forestall the adoption of a plan which could damage it beyond repair. Undoubtedly the controversy over UMT was characterized by true democratic processes. Even though it never faced the test of a full Congressional debate or national election, the issue was candidly and fully presented to the American people. Public opinion favored it but popular will did not push for its adoption. Traditionally slow and spasmodic in progress, the controversy was resolved in the classic manner of the United States--it quietly disappeared from public view until another apparent military crisis

awakened it. It has, of course, been reintroduced several times since 1948 but never with the same vigor that the immediate postwar period produced. General Eisenhower even in 1967 is advocating UMT as a possible solution to current military manpower needs. Today, as yesterday, the solution is still not acceptable to America. It is not acceptable for the basic reason, perhaps, that the adoption of UMT would not be progress but retrogression, a denial of 200 years of history rather than the gateway to a safe and secure future.

One of the best explanations for the rejection of universal military training by America is found in the writings of Walter Millis. Referring to UMT in general, Millis presented this analysis of its basic purpose:

The essence of the 1914 European universal conscription systems was not that they permitted a small standing army to substitute for a big one. On the contrary, their purpose was to make it possible to expand the largest practicable standing army into something much larger still....(They) were in no sense substitutes for large standing armies; they were mechanisms for mobilizing on the first days of war---trained, fully officered and weaponed forces on a scale much larger than could be maintained in time of peace. But to do it, the peacetime establishment had to be maintained not on the smallest but on the greatest possible scale of strength.<sup>15</sup>

This observation reflects the crux of the issue; the paradox exposed to view. If this writer may hazard a judgment, Universal Military Training, although presented as the basis of a true citizen army, is in fact the antithesis of such an ideal. A system of UMT on the scale of American military



needs, is not suited to the philosophy or practice of democracy and a republican form of government. Preached as the only means to insure democracy and freedom, it does not meet the test. UMT places too great an emphasis upon the military aspects and obligations of democracy and would eventually cause those aspects to overshadow and destroy the true goals of every democracy. Equality under law is vital but when that law is a military chain of command, instilled from youth in the thoughts of the population, it contradicts all democratic purpose. Ideally, security is not obtained by armaments; practically, they are necessary evils in a world far from the ideal. As long as America can survive, utilizing her unique method of compromise and improvisation, by all means let her continue to do so. If mere survival becomes more important than the reason for surviving then it does not matter how she does it, for there will no longer really be any need.

<sup>1</sup>Harry S. Truman, State of the Union Message to Congress, 7 January 1948 in *U. S. Congressional Record*, 1948 Cong., 2nd Sess., 200, 201V, Part I, p. 21. See also State of the Union Message on 8 January 1949 (*Cong. Rec.*, Stat., 1st, 1949, XCV, Part I, p. 60) and 3 January 1950 (*Cong. Rec.*, Stat., 2nd, 1950, XCVI, Part I, p. 22). The latter is a change of emphasis from UMT to continuation of Selective Service.

<sup>2</sup>See Harry S. Truman, *Memories*, (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1956-6), 1, pp. 113, 215, and U. S. President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman, 1946-51*, 10 vols; Washington: U.S.G.P.O., 1951-5). Especially Truman's press conference statements.

<sup>3</sup>Truman, *Memories*, 1, p. 113.

## FOOTNOTES

### I. Introduction

<sup>1</sup>George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, 2 May 1783, John C. Fitzpatrick (ed.), The Writings of George Washington, (Washington: U.S.G.P.O., 1938), XXVI, p. 389.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 388.

<sup>3</sup>Dwight D. Eisenhower, (Rudolph L. Treuenfels, ed.), Eisenhower Speaks, (New York: Farrar, Straus & Co., 1948), p. 41. (Eisenhower made this statement on 19 June 1945.)

<sup>4</sup>R. M. Johnston, Arms and the Race, (New York: 1915), pp. 50-51, as quoted in Russel F. Weigley, Towards An American Army; Military Thought From Washington to Marshall, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 182.

<sup>5</sup>(Thomas) Woodrow Wilson, Annual Message to Congress, 8 December 1914 in U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 3rd Sess., 1914, LII, Part I, p. 20.

### II. UMT: Necessity for Survival

<sup>1</sup>Harry S. Truman, State of the Union Message to Congress, 7 January 1948 in U. S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, XCIV, Part I, p. 34. See also State of the Union Messages on 5 January 1949 (Cong. Rec., 81st, 1st, 1949, XCV, Part I, p. 66) and 4 January 1950 (Cong. Rec., 81st, 2nd, 1950, XCVI, Part I, p. 62). The latter is a change of emphasis from UMT to continuation of Selective Service.

<sup>2</sup>See Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1955-6), I, pp. 153, 225, and U. S. President, Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States, Harry S. Truman, 1945-51, (6 vols; Washington: U.S.G.P.O., 1961-5). Especially Truman's press conference statements.

<sup>3</sup>Truman, Memoirs, I, p. 511.

<sup>4</sup>U. S., Congress, House, Universal Military Training, Hearings Before the Select Committee On Postwar Military Policy, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, p. 571. (Hereafter cited as Select Committee.)

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 570. (See also statement on p. 569.)

<sup>6</sup>George Marshall to Senate Committee on Armed Services, 17 March 1948, in Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner (eds.), Documents On American Foreign Relations, (Norwood, Mass.: The Norwood Press, 1948-53), X, p. 283.

<sup>7</sup>Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. "Address on 1st Plenary Session of San Francisco Conference, 26 April 1945," in Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll (eds.), Documents On American Foreign Relations, (Norwood, Mass.: The Norwood Press, 1944-5), VII, pp. 426-31 and James F. Byrnes, "Address on U. N. and U. S. Foreign Policy, 28 February 1946," in Dennett and Turner, VIII, pp. 21-26.

<sup>8</sup>James F. Byrnes, "Address to Cleveland Council on World Affairs, 11 January 1947," in Dennett and Turner, IX, p. 3.

<sup>9</sup>U. S., Report of The President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training, A Program for National Security, (Washington: U.S.G.P.O., 1947), p. 90. See also pp. 34-5. (Hereafter cited as PACUT.)

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., pp. 30-35.

<sup>11</sup>Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Address to Bureau of Advertising of American Newspaper Publishers Association, 25 April 1946," in Eisenhower, pp. 89-90.

<sup>12</sup>Dwight D. Eisenhower, War Department Circular Number 119, 24 April 1946, in U. S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, XCVI, Part 18, p. A7307.

<sup>13</sup>PACUT, pp. 31-2.

<sup>14</sup>Dwight D. Eisenhower to Congress, 15 January 1946, in U. S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1946, XCII, Part 9, pp. A 91-7.

<sup>15</sup>James Forrestal, (Walter Millis, ed.), The Forrestal Diaries, (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 375 (In February, 1948 the Regular Army had 552,000 men of Congressional authorized strength of 669,000). See also Dennett and Turner, XII, p. 154. (In June, 1950 Army had 593,000 on active duty).

- <sup>16</sup> Millis, Arms and Men, pp. 208 & 216.
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 216.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 193.
- <sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 216.
- <sup>20</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Address to Industrial Associations, 17 January 1947," in Eisenhower, pp. 173-4.
- <sup>21</sup> Select Committee, pp. 191-2 (8 June 1945).
- <sup>22</sup> Major General William F. Tomkins, Annals of the American Academy, 238 (March, 1945), p. 56.
- <sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 57.
- <sup>24</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Address to American Legion Convention, 29 August 1947," in Eisenhower, p. 252.
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 253.
- <sup>26</sup> Robert Patterson, 8 November 1945, in U. S., Congress, House, Universal Military Training, Hearings Before The Committee On Military Affairs, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, p. 3.
- <sup>27</sup> Eisenhower, Circular Number 119.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>29</sup> Forrestal, p. 377 (Millis comment).
- <sup>30</sup> Mark Sullivan, "History's Lesson," Washington Post, June 7, 1945, reproduced in U. S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, XCI, Part II, p. A2720.
- <sup>31</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>32</sup> Mrs. Georgia L. Lusk (D., N. M.) in House of Representatives, 13 June 1947, in U. S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, XCIII, Part 6, p. 6960.
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. 6961.
- <sup>34</sup> The United States News, XX (10 May 1946), p. 39.
- <sup>35</sup> Select Committee, p. 434.
- <sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 436.
- <sup>37</sup> Ibid., pp. 433-4.

<sup>38</sup>Fletcher Pratt, "Should We Have Universal Military Training," Parents' Magazine, XXVI (January, 1951), p. 26, in The Reference Shelf, (Herbert L. Marx, Jr., ed.), Universal Conscription For Essential Service, XXIII, No. 3, (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1951), p. 74.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p. 75.

<sup>40</sup>Look, XIV (19 December 1950), pp. 33-5, in The Reference Shelf, XXIII, No. 3, pp. 89-90.

<sup>41</sup>Educational Record, XXVI (January, 1945), p. 9.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., p. 13.

<sup>44</sup>U. S., House Committee on Military Affairs, pp. 1-2.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>46</sup>U. S., Congress, Senate, Universal Military Training, Hearings Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948.

<sup>47</sup>Survey by the American Institute of Public Opinion, 15 January 1945, in Public Opinion Quarterly, IX (Spring 1945), p. 102. (Hereafter cited as P. O. Q.)

<sup>48</sup>Ibid. (79 per cent For; 17 per cent Against) and Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, 24 June 1945, in P. O. Q., IX (Summer, 1945) p. 251 (72 per cent For; 20 per cent Against).

<sup>49</sup>See following issues of P. O. Q.:

IX (Summer, 1945), p. 374.

IX (Winter, 1945-6), p. 521.

X (Spring, 1946), pp. 126-7.

X (Fall, 1946), p. 422.

XI (Spring, 1947), p. 153.

XI (Summer, 1947), p. 292.

XI (Fall, 1947), p. 486.

<sup>50</sup>P. O. Q., XII (Fall, 1948), pp. 555-6, AIPO, 9 April 1948 (77%) and Fortune, June, 1948 (79%).

<sup>51</sup>P. O. Q., XII (Spring, 1948), p. 164, NORC, June 1947 (49%).

<sup>52</sup>P. O. Q., XII (Winter, 1948-9), p. 766, NORC, June, 1948 (58%) and July, 1948 (67%).

<sup>53</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense; Strategic Programs In National Politics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 240.

### III. UMT: Not Really Needed

<sup>1</sup>Eisenhower's argument was basically that a man needs discipline above all else and the Army could provide it to all through UMT (similar to the slogan "The Marine Corps Builds Men").

<sup>2</sup>"Eisenhower on Conscription," Christian Century, LXII (25 July 1945), p. 845.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 855.

<sup>4</sup>Christian Century, LXIII (2 January 1946), p. 11.

<sup>5</sup>U. S., Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Full Committee Hearings on UMT, 1947, Report No. 178, Vol. II, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, p. 4386.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Richard R. Wood, Executive Secretary Friends Peace Committee, Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CLXI (18 January 1945), p. 277, in The Reference Shelf, Peacetime Conscription, compiled by Julia Johnsen, XVIII, No. 4, (New York: H. W. Wilson Co. 1945), pp. 272-3. See also A. J. Muste, Executive Secretary Fellowship of Reconciliation, Independent Woman, (April, 1945), pp. 98 & 112, in The Reference Shelf, XVIII, No. 4, p. 285.

<sup>8</sup>See Roger N. Baldwin, "Are We Being Fooled by a Cure-All?" Educational Leadership, II (October, 1944), pp. 26-8 and "Peacetime Conscription and Personal Standards," National Education Association Journal, XXXIV (April, 1945), p. 74.

<sup>9</sup>National Council Against Conscription, The Facts About Compulsory Military Service and Casualties, pamphlet privately printed, 1951 (?), p. 1.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., pp. 1-2 (Cites General H. H. Arnold, head of U. S. Army Air Corps during World War II, and John H. Martin, former consultant to Joint Chiefs of Staff, as authorities).

<sup>12</sup>Robert M. Hutchins, Colliers, CXV (9 June 1945), pp. 15 & 27, in The Reference Shelf, XVIII, No. 4, p. 253.

<sup>13</sup>Robert J. Havighurst, "Against Compulsory Military Training in Peacetime," School Review, LIII (February, 1945), pp. 63-7.

<sup>14</sup>"Peacetime Conscription and Personal Standards", N. E. A. Journal, p. 74. See also National Council Against Conscription, The Facts About the Pentagon's New Conscription Plans, pamphlet privately printed, February, 1955.

<sup>15</sup>The New York Times, January 10, 1954, as quoted in National Council Against Conscription, The Facts About the Pentagon's New Conscription Plans, p. 17.

<sup>16</sup>August B. Hollingshead, "Adjustment to Military Life", American Journal of Sociology, LI (March, 1946), pp. 441-2.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid. (This writer's experience with career military personnel, especially enlisted personnel and lower-ranking officers, corroborates this opinion.)

<sup>18</sup>National Council Against Conscription, The Facts About the Pentagon's New Conscription Plans, p. 18. For a provocative commentary on the same basic issue see Robert M. Hutchins, "Education in the Army," The Christian Century, (special pamphlet edition devoted to UMT, 1952 (?), pp. 14-15.

<sup>19</sup>Charles Woolsey Cole, Look, XV (2 January 1951), pp. 54-5, in The Reference Shelf, XVIII, No. 4, pp. 91-4.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid. (Look, p. 55; Reference Shelf, p. 94.)

<sup>21</sup>From various pieces of testimony before the House Military Affairs Committee, Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy, and House Committee on Armed Services, 1945-7.

<sup>22</sup>Josephus Daniels, "Statement to House Committee on Armed Services, June, 1947," in Congressional Digest, XXVI (October, 1947), p. 241.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 243.

<sup>24</sup>Hanson W. Baldwin, "Conscription For Peacetime," Harper's, CXC (March, 1945), p. 297.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 298.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Hanson W. Baldwin, The New York Times, May 4, 1947, in Congressional Digest, XXVI (October, 1947), p. 243. See also John Fischer, "The Future Defense of the U. S. A." Harper's, CXC (January, 1945), pp. 160-7.

<sup>28</sup>Baldwin, "Conscription For Peacetime," p. 296.

<sup>29</sup>Grayson, Kirk, "National Power and Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, XXIII (July, 1945), pp. 622-6.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 626. See also Baldwin, "Conscription For Peacetime," p. 295, and Frederick J. Libby, Executive Secretary National Council for the Prevention of War, Congressional Digest, XXIV (January, 1945), pp. 17 & 19.

<sup>31</sup>Thomas Woody, Social Studies, XXXVI (May, 1945), p. 196, in The Reference Shelf, XVIII, No. 4, p. 204.

<sup>32</sup>Robert A. Taft, Speech at Gettysburg, 30 May 1945, in U. S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, XCI, Part 12, pp. A2814-6.

<sup>33</sup>Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CLX (14 December 1944), p. 2612, in The Reference Shelf, XVIII, No. 4, p. 290. See also Baldwin, "Conscription for Peacetime," p. 295.

<sup>34</sup>Fischer, "The Future Defense of the U. S. A.," p. 161.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

#### IV. Congress: The True Test

<sup>1</sup>Committees were the House Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy (1945), House Committee on Military Affairs (1945, on H. R. 515 May Bill), House Committee on Armed Services (1947), and Senate Armed Services Committee (1948).

<sup>2</sup>U. S., Congress, Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, XCI, Part 7, p. 6573 (12 September 1945).

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., Part 8, p. 10416 (6 November 1945).

<sup>4</sup>Reprint of statement on "Congressional Record of the Air," 5 February 1945, in Congressional Record, XCI, Part 10, pp. A494-5.

<sup>5</sup>Statement before the House Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy, reprinted in Congressional Record, XCI, Part 12, p. A2877 (14 June 1945) at Ludlow's request.



<sup>6</sup>Statement of Walter Johnson, Chairman National Legislative Committee, Military Order of the Liberty Bell, in U. S., Congress, Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1946, XCII, Part 1, p. 1794 (1 March 1946).

<sup>7</sup>Representative Joseph W. Martin, Jr. (R., Mass.) in Congressional Record, XCII, Part 9, pp. A996-8 (27 February 1946).

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. A996.

<sup>9</sup>See Congressional Record, XCI, Part 12, pp. A2436-7 (13 July 1945).

<sup>10</sup>Statement before House Committee on Military Affairs, Universal Military Training, p. 402 (30 November 1945).

<sup>11</sup>Select Committee, p. 227.

<sup>12</sup>U. S., Congress, Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, XCIV, Part 10, p. A1473 (8 March 1948).

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. A1474. (Arnold's testimony before the House Appropriation's Committee in June, 1945 quoted by Engel.)

<sup>14</sup>Supra, p. 21 (Mrs. Lusk's opinion).

<sup>15</sup>Joseph C. Grew, former Ambassador to Japan, quoted by Representative Henry Larcade, Jr. (D., La.), in Congressional Record, XCIV, Part 9, p. A911 (16 February 1948).

<sup>16</sup>Quoted by Representative Overton Brooks (D., La.), in Congressional Record, XCIV, Part 10, p. A2229 (12 April 1948).

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. A2228.

<sup>18</sup>Senator Burnet R. Maybank (D., S. C.), in Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 9, p. 11623 (18 December 1947).

<sup>19</sup>General Lewis B. Hershey quoted by Representative Bertrand Gearhart (? , Cal.), in Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 10, p. A169 (14 January 1947).

## V. The Results

<sup>1</sup>See Forrestal, Diaries, p. 388.

<sup>2</sup>Forrestal, Diaries, p. 389 (Millis note). See also p. 432 (Millis note).

<sup>3</sup>U. S., Congress, Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, XCIV, Part 8, pp. 11000-11001 (25 July 1950).

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., pp. 10999-11000.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 11001.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., Part 9, p. 12710 (17 August 1950).

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., Vol. LII.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., Part 10, p. 13667 (29 August 1950).

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., House Committee on Services, Call Committee Hearings on U.S.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 13669.

<sup>11</sup>Letter from Admiral William F. Halsey to the Select Committee, p. 530 (June 1945).

<sup>12</sup>Weigley, Towards An American Army, p. 249.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., pp. 251-2.

<sup>14</sup>Huntington, The Common Defense, pp. 435-6.

<sup>15</sup>Millis, Arms and Men, p. 275.

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