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The pragmatization of love: A study of the concepts of hierarchy, encounter, and epoche

Hinson, Anna Jane, Ed.D.

The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 1989



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THE PRAGMATIZATION OF LOVE: A STUDY OF THE CONCEPTS OF HIERARCHY, ENCOUNTER, AND EPOCHE

by

Anna Jane Hinson

A Dissertation Submitted to
the Faculty of the Graduate School at
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Education

Greensboro 1989

Approved by

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APPROVAL PAGE

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This study is presented in narrative form and develops perspectives upon the topic of love. The foundational implication of this research is that in acknowledging our common ground we experience the mutuality from which we may prosper human well-being. Experiences of mutuality and reciprocity will be regarded as unfolding the realms of I intend to describe, contrast, and integrate concepts of hierarchy, and dialogical encounter to pose the situation of love. Hierarchy denotes stratification with an uneven distribution of control. The impulse to control can be witnessed in technology; thus our culture, in its utilitarianism, supports an environment which is looked upon as increasingly technological in its concerns and hierarchical in its composition. Division, alienation, and dehumanization are pervasive descriptors and indicative of destructiveness. Analysis of the concepts of hierarchy and encounter allows for the discussion of factors dehumanizing and humanizing the world and are bound within the theme of the pragmatization of love. This theme contains a two-fold meaning. One is articulated in objectification which lessens human being; and the other, the utopian generative meaning, aspires toward bettering the world of shared living.

I believe that hierarchy (hier: sacred; archein: to

lead) has a fundamental connection with the concept of encounter and is integral to a conception of a loving, caring world. The connoting of sacred leading is both a response to the call for bettering the human condition and a responsibility achieved in relationship.

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I also include Dr. Barbara Stoodt as a companion in this process. Her interest, support, and willingness to encourage me were vital.

To my children, Lianna and John; my parents, Aaron and Lou Hinson; my brothers, Ronnie and Scott; and my grandmother, Ella Jane Garris, I am happy to enjoy you as my nucleus of family love.

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PREFACE

The "Pragmatization of Love" as the general theme of this dissertation develops two perspectives. The first and most apparent in my view is reflective of present societal influences which quest for heightened objectivity and performance within the culture. The immediate consequences of these influences effect a de-humanization of our individual and collective selves when interhuman involvement is couched in terms of efficiency, control, and manipulation——prime components of a technological agenda.

The second perspective---one which recedes with the advent of the purely technological view of humanity---avows the "pragmatization of love" as a generative function. That we intend global prosperity, the cultivation of life in our environment and experiential realms, is paramount to a non-restrictive intentionality of love.

The paradoxical nature of love embodies, then, a tension between the demands to confirm an object, yet not "objectify". The problem is manifested through a non-restrictive intentionality of love which seeks to promote utopian, generative concerns of human, kind yet not fall prey to the cultural trap of technologizing its consciousness: mastering the object. Formally the cultural tension resides

among the possibilities of losing love and humanity to technological determinism, with love mirroring a mode of performance via the technological context; or detechnologizing the culture via the spiritual-consciousness arising in human relationships of mutual care and regard.

The narrative form of the writing relies primarily on the philosophical positions of Plato and Martin Buber to develop an exploration of the general theme of the paper. Other readings have amplified and fed this work. Much of this material is quoted in the text of the paper yet much remains unaddressed but remains significant in its influence upon my thinking.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH

In order to confront the matter of the "pragmatization of love" one must entertain the question, "What is love?"

Love as a particular kind of experience may be of interest due to its acquired status as the special feeling we express toward the few we perceive "as special". To state the tautology, these few are special because they evoke the presence of that feeling. Love is also "a something" addressed as a human birthright: the expected experience of unconditional love granted from one's parents. It is "the something" characterized by the yearning for positive mutual regard and acceptance in the eyes of another; "the something" by which heartbreak, sadness and suffering is justified or through which we amplify our capacity to endure the unlovely, the unloving.

Through this writing I wish to explore the ways in which the notion of love has achieved concretion in our collective understandings as an object in or product of experience considered as a recognizable emotion, the source of human passion or as embodiment of spiritual passion or desire. This chapter will survey general conceptions regarding the topic and set the themes chosen to organize the writing.

The dissertion is narrative in form and will incorporate the literature of philosophy to discuss the dialectical and dialogical nature of love. Of interest, is the notion of what it entails to assume a perspectival review of love. The term perspectival is developed from readings on the "structures of consciousness" (Feuerstein). The term suggests that different descriptions of a phenomenon evolve according to observable "dimensions" of that phenomenon and the dimension from which the phenomenon is observed.

The selection of the concepts hierarchy, encounter, and epoche for structuring the review of the topic provides for elaboration of focusing characteristics within human experiencing. Those characteristics as capacities to value and evaluate are developed through the "modes" by which we attend to and intend "toward" the situations comprising our living. This assumes that our ability to value and evaluate has to do also to what exists as the unattended "to" and that explained as unintended. In the next chapter the concept of hierarchy will be offered as a way to see love as incorporating an intensity of values observable and expressible, in philosophies, as a set scale of values. The concepts of encounter and epoche presented as themes in later chapters are chosen to bring contrast to the developing analysis of hierarchical structuring by enabling consideration of how we may come to locate the common value

of the "in-common".

Each theme helps construct a general set of understandings about love. From these descriptions the nature of the special relation existing between subject and its object will be examined. Paramount to the building of perspectives is the intent to address the pragmatization or utility of love again with the concern for how this informs us of the nature of relationship and for its relevance in helping see the context of modern culture in its formative power to predetermine human relationships. What I am interested in is the location of thought within a general referencing to a cultural mapping of consciousness. While generating various perspectives as the content of this work the resulting form or structure may map with greater precision the stratification of thought.

The writings of Plato (429?-349?) and the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber (1878-1965) attest to the power of the dialogical relation as an experience of intersubjective encounter. The experience of mutuality seen through Plato and Buber and enabled dialectically and dialogically provides a look upon contrasts between the conditions and the unconditional nature of encounter.

I will discuss parallels in Plato and Buber for their strength in seeing the fragmentation and incongruity that is present within our collective human experience. It is this "breaking-down" and particularizing of the world that I wish

to focus upon in the next chapter.

The review of Buber's concepts of relationship are foundational for a critique of the pragmatization of love. A critical theme of this paper involves the notion that positioning oneself within experiences of hierarchy "conditions against" encounter in relation. The opportunity to research and describe various perspectives upon love enables an analysis of the nature of relationship---to consider the meaning of the condition and the uncondition of love.

Seeing the forms of love in classical, religious, feminist, and existentialist thought enables a look at love in its academic, theological and/or mystical considerations as a source and goal of human striving, a striving which seeks its perfectibility and/or knows its at-one-ness with the Creator/creation. Inherent in the idea of love as the goal of the struggle toward Perfection, the quest for perfectibility, lies the notion of love as the source of great travail and suffering. This particular mode of suffering in its association with love may be characterized at extremes as ennobling activity or as irrational behavior. In its ability to generate suffering, love can be noted as that toward which we are urged yet cannot possess, thus our struggle and conflict: the promise of fulfillment obscured by the knowledge of human limitation.

Each "view" of love offers understandings of primary

human experiences. As theories of love, each proffers insight into the nature of our human existence and addresses what may yet be thought of as inexplicable phenomenon, another segment of the everlasting mystery of our human being. Yet from the awareness of "the mystery of our being" we experience in degree an urgency to vest experience with significant explanations about our living. These explanations practiced and sustained in ritual and tradition create a common ground through which individuals participate and by which there is a rekindling of the special meanings of a culture.

Experiences in love and the concern for understanding something of those experiences to perhaps prolong or repeat them are primary ways for ensuing the meaning quest, for experiencing specialness, for naming the unique, for reclaiming the universal. Universally, love may promise a hold upon the unique. In love, the experience of uniqueness presents the ideal thus informing thinking upon the universal. As a kind of something, the something as universal, is the focus of interest but perhaps less visible to analysis. What is the concern for the universal? Perhaps that the unique particular one find relation among the universal. In the experience of love perhaps something akin to a "universalizing" reduction may be described as in the contrasts drawn by Dr. Ross Mooney's in "Integrating Opposites".

Unique-Universal - When we think of something unique, we are emphasizing the ways in which it differs from others in its class, and when we think of something universal, we think of the ways in which it is like others in its class. But it is impossible for us to focus on differences apart from a ground of likenesses in which differences are perceptible. (1980, p.109).

In classical thought wisdom, as a companion of knowledge, results from direct knowledge of the Good. work of Plato reconstructs dialogues which are models of inquiry into or the search for "the good". The form of the dialogues provides example of Socratic inquiry as well as a record of the speculative discourse. The dialectic of Platonic dialogues enables reflection upon the process engaged as the struggle toward or ascent to wisdom. ascent to wisdom, the "Ladder of Love", can be examined as well through parallel constructs drawn from mystical and religious traditions which are sustained through the impulse to seek the attainment or experience of mystical union, a state of nondifferentiating unity from which one ascertains an encompassing harmony of the whole, the One, a Universe binding the diversity of creation. From "mystical" experience one may attest to the truth, "all is one". This truth's inception informs us of a Self-creating order through which we are all participatory. We each are, in part, and a part of a cosmological ordering. The ordering creative principle, Logos, the spark of god, are ways this literature approaches a naming for the matrix of love.

The task and summit of mystical knowing may be

described as a reclamation of that which we have foregotten: to re-member what we have already known. Without this placement of knowledge which is displaced through birth (the Platonic teaching) and displaced by emphasis upon "the secular" (achieved by division in the life sphere), we could not dis-cover the origin of love, the source of our beginning: thus the struggle to return. Love as the object of the quest and its guiding force must be viewed, in this respect, as the ideal promoted by systems of thought in their institutionalizations into tradition and doctrine through the ages. As the ideal has not been achieved: the Peaceable Kingdom is yet to be realized, love resides in human thought and action as a primary force binding us singularly and perhaps collectively toward that goal.

An emphasis in feminist and existentialist literature describes love as a means of subordinating one to another thereby confining and controlling another's human possibility. From this view love as a source of suffering conditions and serves to separate, to alienate.

Quite generally, we have established a taken-for-grantedness about what it means to hear another s/he is "in love". To talk about <u>love</u> is to assume shared recognition of a concept addressing an expression of intense sustained feeling, desire or regard for another. Stating the condition one may say, "I am in love" or "I love you". Someone exists as the intended object in both expressions.

The latter statement, especially, illustrates diagrammatically the aspects of love as both a connection and a barrier between subject and object. To give expression in this manner to the feeling of love sets apart, or objectifies, persons and experience. The awareness of intersubjective separateness sets a field between. The "field" has metaphorical potential as common ground, the "openness" for shared experience, as well as for its recognition as the space needed for objective critique or as the unfathomable gap (nothing, void) represented in felt disunity with another/anything.

Love is love as it meets the conditions or criteria by which it is known. Correspondingly, that knowledge reforms those "conditions" and confirms the criteria of its experience. Yet the crucial nature of love may be that it performs acritically.

To recognize love as something or to isolate another as an object of exceptional focus conditions both experience and person making both extra-ordinary. Perhaps within the developing description of the pragmatization of love will come to bear the notion that the love relation is "less-conditioned" at its inception and proceeds as it develops conditionally. This sentence is bound in anachronism but follows the premise that in order to know one thing in relation to something else confirms a process of comparing/contrasting. Within the context of human

experience in pragmatic culture, the extraordinary must be "becoming" increasingly extra-ordinary to maintain its present status. Again, within this context routine and habit are anathema to love as an example of the extraordinary; and too the gracefulness of love and sex are typically forebidden.

Love as extraordinary experience contains its own demise if it must continually manifest something beyond the ordinary. Pragmatically, the extraordinary may be redressed and revalued within mainstream experience as that which endures. So, what was "extraordinary" as a heightening in experience can be expressed as undergoing an "axiological" shift becoming extraordinary through maintaining, keeping or continuing the relationship.

Love has its corollaries in and parallels with sex and death. In each instance we give description to these aspects of human existence as taking us "beyond".

In the nineteenth century there does occur the concept of Liebestod, love-death...though it is occasionally foreshadowed even in the ancient world, Liebestod as a fully developed concept of love is less than two hundred years old. (Singer, 1984, p. xi).

The Love-death concept is expressed in the "mutual possession" each lover desires with the other. Irving Singer (1984, p. 174) finds this concept in the work of Marsilio Ficino in his treatment of "reciprocity as a condition in which each lover dies in himself and is reborn in the other".

Death moves us from the temporal; sex may enable intimacy or at least function as a barrier between the mundane. Efforts toward a "heightening in experience" claim a release from ourselves. To be beyond ourselves, to be "more" than we are at present or less conscious of self, exists as a kind of liberation: a movement which may take us to and from the limits of awareness.

We exist as temporal beings and imagine the atemporal.

Love is a medium for thinking and imagining ourselves beyond
the limits of existence. "Sex seeking love" or "love
finding sex" or love until "death do us part" satisfy a
human impulse to embody experiences of the suprahuman.

This paragraph underscores the heart and soul of pragmatic thought. It is from a closer look at the assumptions of this paragraph that I wish to establish a critique of secular intentionality. To set the basis, an historical context for the concepts of Eros, Logos, Agape, Happiness, and Virtue, as the ethic of love, must be developed. The work of the next chapter, in constructing a Platonic view of love in its hierarchically imposed structure, provides a reference point for seeing that structure as it has come into a predominance in religious thought. Are there forms of loves forming the form of Love? The questions involves consideration of Platonic differentiation between appearances of and striving toward the Real. This relationship can be suggested as discovering

the Being of beings in Being. The epistemological thrust of this ontological condition is enabled by the "location" of beings. It makes symmetrical, thus possible in knowledge, a relationship of Being with Being.

The impulse to think about and describe the special nature of love has anchored religious thought and doctrine which, in turn, have provided direction for living. These traditions teach of <u>Love</u> as the creative energy of the cosmos with the hope for the human manifestation of "the spirit of love". Perhaps the desire to embody what is abstracted in religious thought as "spiritual" underlies a human urgency to establish <u>love</u> as a responsiveness to the Being of being---a longing for the primordial and the lasting, the Eternal. Primordial suggests an order of first things---that preceding (pre-seeding) the sequential Order of our present moment in history or as an order of the in(di)visible.

Ideally the nature of religious experience would be its binding quality. At best, "religious" experiences may express the birth or entry into a realm of participation from which we were previously uninitiated. Culturally, there are many "areas for participation" for which we encounter symbolic rites of passage and experience the rituals of a tradition all marking us as "belonging" to certain groups or circles. In contrast, barriers among groups support the conditions and experiences of separation

among human beings. To maintain our culturally rich, diverse traditions requires a certain degree of insularity from other traditions if the tradition is to sustain itself. The "American culture" has its strength in the commitment to pluralism.

Apart from an awareness of the universal pretext of human being and a desire toward enabling human life, the "collectives" are vulnerable in the diversity that cannot find its unity. Within the realm of human interaction, it is to identify less and less with more and more. We come to see ourselves as located within a hierarchically stratified world. Being so, is there the possibility for seeing human experience outside this dominating construct? Thus the danger of reifying what comes to be perceived as hierarchically stratified realms of human involvement---we experience the travail of one "strata" having greater claim to their human being than another, thus the human worth and dignity of "fellow human beings" is devalued.

Love as both an expression of commitment toward others and an experience of fellowship finds its kinship with the concern for the dignity of the individual. Human relationship is the specific interest to be developed in this writing.

Love is not, of course, a strictly religious topic but outside the bounds of the concern for the sacred or human experience with the Divine such an address would be

expressed as occurring in the realm of the profane, in a world denied the divine. This division within "the world" sets a dualism with the realm of the profane opposing the sacred. With the realms of the sacred in mind, human thought has conceived the notion of an absolute Eternal Perfection. Outside the realm of the holy it is suggested that the appearance of the ideals are experienced and expressed imperfectly. Material has been opposed to spiritual, body to soul. Desire for perfection can be typified from each realm.

Passion as the power of love has been described as reflective of a dualism between what is earthbound, corruptible, and what is perfectible---what is human and what is divine. With the clarification of different realms one becomes subordinated to another. Thoughtfully, such "dualisms" as absolute/relative, sacred/profane, body/mind have been constructed and religiously the differences between have been wondered after/abnegated, dogmatized/challenged.

Contrarily, the "secular" view may reveal "the divine" as engendering a code of ethics which suffers a restriction upon what we can live and think thus limiting the freedom to be humanly accountable for the consequences of our activities. Without the setting of absolutes, we are left to a metaphysics of ambiguity and pure possibility. Within this acknowledged realm of human becoming we each exist as

the sole bearer of what is means to be caring and uncaring and encounter the moral dilemma of love: as commitment to or restriction of our personal and shared freedoms and responsibilities.

The significance of dualisms upon the topic lies with viewing love as the medium, as that balancing and harmonizing "opposing" realms. The questions, "From which 'realm' is love drawn?" and "How may it be imaged?" then become especially significant to the inquiry. These points will be developed in a review of Platonic dialogues. In the discussion of the nature of human and spiritual passions the form and content of selected literature of philosophy will reveal something of the nature of our human interaction and the structure and teleology of reason. As well these dialogues, in review, will provide a basis for developing the concept of hierarchy. This concept is helpful in discovering the theme of the pragmatization of love as it implies the activity of purposive controlling.

Societally we speak to a belief in the interlocking ideals of a democracy: freedom, "brotherhood", and equality. We are learning, in a culture of pragmatism, to embody the principles of a scientific rationale. There is tremendous significance in our collective urgency to master, control, and manipulate our human environment. Within this rationale the necessity to formulate explanations of particular phenomenon requires selection of a problem---a

process of <u>isolating</u> and <u>focusing</u> toward the particular.

Reductivistically, this involves a perceptual narrowing which is achieved by eliminating the "extraneous". A pragmatic-scientific agentic as it selects-identifies and refines "its" truth reports a world from a tightly restricted or highly controlled analysis.

Pragmatizing love takes love as an object of thought which may remain an abstraction of analysis and critque--contained, but not embodied. Because our culture is utilitarian-minded our manner of addressing love as a phenomenon influences human experiencing. What we are told and taught about "love" shapes personal expectations. Setting the conditions for love is to have at hand its evaluation criteria as a commodity. We are likely to mirror "in experience" the technology which threatens to lose its dialogical umbilical with human science. Therefore as the culture names the requirements for love it is likely to center upon what we expect from others because we have afforded them our love and less upon enacting a deeper sense of responsiveness toward another. Certainly the word afforded treads upon the idea of the costliness of love within a materialistically-fixated society. The fact that we feel drawn toward someone or something characterizes love as an attractive (pulling/repelling) force. Platonically, the what of the attraction reveals the character (quality) of the loving.

This raises the interesting possibility that as we become more confirmed in a personal form or mode as a "love" response the more certain we are of what we will and will not love. This is to suggest that each of us sets a definition of love. The set as a bracketing mechanism or as an activity for framing the parameters of human interactivity in the world is expressible as a descriptive mode or manner within the world as "it" is known and encountered (the knowing and encountering is "set" in the framing). Even though a dynamic is suggested the activity in its determined status imposes a static conditioning. suggest that the manner of framing the world can be qualitatively constituted as a loving mode for engaging the world is incomplete. Framing describes the outer parameters, the boundedness of the edges of love; metaphorically, love is experienced dimensionally. outer reaches of the "move" contain the process of filtering or screening---the activity of selective attending. selection, the attending, "naming" the object comes to be identified with that we love. If love is a medium for setting and selecting, it is a classifying method yielding and producing perceptual and conceptual classifications upon the world in view. What does not reside within the class of objects is "objectionable" to the filtering construct.

The writing paradox I am creating lies in positing the notion of love as a release into the unconditioned. The

idea of love becomes qualified through comparison with a release from the conditoned. Rather than creating a polarizing dualism I hope to consider the dialectic of condition and uncondition. I believe that argument established through a synthetic comparative is not strengthened by the weight and force of its "opposing" elements but rather that the dialectic proceeds as a representation of a process which seeks to refine in awareness the power of relational potential. It is the power of relational potential that I wish to address through the concepts of encounter and epoche. These concepts are dialectical and integrative and function to recover the middle ground lost by a dualistic analysis of comparative study. While setting dualisms and dichotomies effects clarity, in degree, about what something is not through comparison with its opposite, the construct polarizes a field of thought into a congruity of opposition which may "rest" in its divisions of thesis, antithesis and fall short of generating an interactive synthesis. Further, as I understand the Hegelian dialectic, the construction of polarity is re-integrated within a transcending synthesis. Transcendence cannot figure in my thinking as the reestablishment of antithetical terms at a higher level of thought. It rather signfies what is held between the terms and lies immanent within the conscious construction of corelational terms.

Transcendence denotes a crossing. To bridge, to "go across" is to retrace what is prior to the construction of separateness. What exists as the pre-conditioning? classify the result of the synthetic as higher or more fundamental is to reify the effects of comparison. Of interest is the dialectical method for constructing a synthesis between a polarity of terms with the intent to refine the previous synthesis with each new creation of The notion of transcendence inheres within the terms. dialectical synthesis with the attendant consequence of encountering a dualism-absolving Absolute. The pyramiding of thought achieved through the dialectics of reason is a method or provides a logic for questing toward the Eternal. Commonly the Eternal is adressed as Love residing at the apex of this laddering. The idea of struggling to selectively construct and refine one's ability to employ the dialectical process implies an ultra-conditioning (upon the world). One's understandings are always aiming toward a final convergence in thought, or unity in being rather than defending a necessity for multiplicity of perspectives or divergence in thought reflective of a diversity in being.

The concern is how we may know our co-existence in relation in view of the potential ill-effect of comparison.

As well, by what method, logic, or rationale may I examine the thinking about love as a component within our collective awareness without further objectifying or relativizing its

status? The manner for circumventing this dilemma comes by discussing the dynamic of love rather than centering upon the experience or condition of love. The latter, the experience or condition of love, as "forms" of love speak to love as being static rather than emerging, coming-to-be.

The foregoing concepts are, yet, underdeveloped but frame "the pragmatization of love" as the research topic. The research itself will review the idea that as we continue to become vested in technique for the sake of technique and technical explanation of the world that our human qualities trade upon mechanical features of efficiency and effectiveness. The logic of mastery teaches the means for learning control, a process of objectification. Confluent with objectification is the rank and file organization of heierarchical structuring. Within our everyday experience the rational imperative compels us to keep proper perspective upon the world putting people and events at a distance. To maintain distance is to promote dis-engagement and alienation. If we are the ones distanced, by whatever authority, it is fair to associate the disengagement with a neutralization of our human being. As this occurs within politically hierarchical institutions (economic, religious, academic) a pyramidic system forms: authority ascends vertically effecting the potential for neutralizing (negating) the activity of an expanding base of support.

Why ought there be concern for the nature of human

experience within societal forms? To be the <u>material</u> of supportive structure our being is conformed. This contrasts powerfully with a personal forming (self-generating) in becoming. And too, to exist as the conforming material of another may produce an admirable molding---a thing of beauty which is no less a distorting of individual personhood, a misshaping in "thingness". I am here reminded of a piece spoken by Elie Wiesel. He says,

There is, in the encounter between child and executioner, something redeeming. Usually the child manages to change, or at least move, the killer. did not occur during the Holocaust. More than one million Jewish children prove that it did not. ancient religions primitive people would bring their children as offerings to their gods to appease them; and the gods would be appeased. Not so during the Holocaust. One million offerings did not appease God. There is a legend in the Midrash that disturbs me. When did God decide to liberate his people from Egyptian bondage? When Pharaoh ordered that living Jewish children be used as bricks for his pyramids, the Angel Michael caught one such child and brought it before God. And when God saw the child---already disfigured --- He was overcome by compassion and love and chose to redeem his people. And often I say to myself: Ribono shel olam, Master of the universe, one child was enough to move you---and one million children were not? (Art and Culture, p. 413).

To select a mechanistic paradigm governing our collective existence bears violent consequences for our humanity. From this sterilizing scope upon the world is relayed a story about ourselves in the world. As that self becomes less elusive by definition we stand to lose the self of being in a world of other beings. If as beings in and of the world we refuse to see who and what is before us,

the privilege to know a conjoining world reflective of "shared" powers to evaluate circumstances and experiences and to constitute the forming of answers which reference an activity of responses within that world is diminished.

I have read with much interest books offering an overview of the culture of religion as manifesting alternating cycles of feminine and masculine "orientations". Genia Pauli-Haddon's book, Body Metaphors, describes the early goddess religions as ritualizing the creative energy of the womb. Ritual was protective, wombing in nature. reproductive power of women was correlated with the phasing Moon was both symbol for and agent of women's fertility; and as such, goddess religions are thus described as moon cults. The moon, as cultic symbol for goddess, her lover, and the son she bears embodies a triadic form. Pauli-Haddon describes the goddess religions as the wombing environment for the birth of father-son religions. wonders whether the Trinity of Christianity is born from this relationship (the three-in-one) or is read onto these early forms of(as) human worship. At any rate the masculine-dominated religions in their age of prominence typify the removing of perfected cultural ideals of love and happiness, peace and harmony into a transcendent realm. They exist as what will come or are set outside the bounds of the temporal.

The contrast between these phases in religious history

are made distinct through the pejorative function of dualistic thought. "Goddess" religion cannot be depicted as separatist, as having been matriarchal, but rather as existing as other to what followed: the religions of male prophets and saviors. Matriarchy and patriarchy are dualistic interpretations, then. While there is more certainty regarding our contemporary analysis of patriarchy as the prominent structure framing human relationships, the designations "matriarchy"-patriarchy" reflect in the view of the theologian, Haddon, the dualistic perception of patriarchal mind.

Of interest is the contrast between the two for what it has meant historically to secure (love, protect, defend) "the earth". An immediate association with reproductive function is the significance of multiplying the species. Earth is womb and religion sanctifies fertility. I imagine the question of love has little relevance. Of importance, rather, is ritual which confirms the care and activity of the wombing earth. Ritual, perhaps, secured the conditions of what would latter become "transcendent". Ritual maintained the unknowing of and separation from "ideals", protecting the fusion of ideals within human experience. The masculine creator-maker image characterizes the generative outward movement; the feminine creator-protector image nurtures the protective-boundary of the generative. Yet the images are entwined.

It is later in our history---having been fruitful, that division gains collective prominence. To secure the earth is to set boundaries, not for a "wombing" earth, but as a collective of nationalities which have become territorially divisive and defensive. Given this condition, human ideals are expressed in confusion. These cycles of "dominance", dualistically constructed and dialectically critiqued, suggest to Haddon (et. al.) a "new age" where the transcendent ideals will be reintegrated within human experience: as the ideals are infused, there is transcending transcendence of masculine/feminine rule.

It is not routine or usual, we say, to encounter the love of another directed toward oneself. To be loved, to feel loved is special. Yet love is often met with reserve and indifference, if not distrust. Why? What is the concern for risking love? Is it because human love is imperfect and it is safer to idealize love? Does this suggest that love is characterized in knowledge by what is experienced as unloving, not-loving? Or rather, the existence of questions reflects the relative condition: philosophy seeks the deconceptualization of its conceptual activity: philosophy mediates what one can imagine and frame within the mind's eye and that which may be incorporated or embodied "in action". It is the difference between making concrete, in thought and action what love is apart from loving to know what living is. This brings to

mind the play of Dr. Ross Mooney's writing about 1(o)ving and 1(i)ving. An excerpt from his poem "I Would Demonstrate" reads,

I would demonstrate, if I could, how "love" and "live" are a one-spelled word, LOVE, joined not only in their initial vowel as words but, beyond all words in their initial origin, within the way life comes about. (1976, p.62).

What is being contrived is the "i" and the "o" give us different words from what is the same sequence of letters.

The "i" which forms living becomes loving with the other.

Love as a mode of human consciousness is a medium for seeing the world. This view counters the adage "love is blind". I do not intend to write of a sentimental emotion, particularly of the "love" of common religious interpretation admonishing us innocuously enough to love (everybody) and bears the equivalency of ignoring (everybody). "Painful as it is to give up romantic notions of loving everyone, we see that we must in order to care adequately for anyone." (Noddings, p. 153).

Love is conscience-bearing and generates the concern for other-recognition: seeing-you unfolds the realm for loving-you. If the organizations, understandings, and achievements of humankind are prospered through negation and exclusion then love, as such, is a mode forming and functioning within a environment which, by appearances, is fundamentally alien to its nature. Assuming the specific

and personal nature of individual experience, what I have stated as "a mode" is better classified as modes of love, diverse, yet characterizable in their similarity. In experiences of love, in matters of the heart, perhaps the limits of our being are touched, met and opened. This view forms the substance of monastic thought within which the meeting and receiving of the divine is a predominating concern. Jean Leclerge, who writes of medieval monastics provides a descriptive example drawn from that culture of the "reconditioning" experience of love. Citing St. Gregory, Leclerge says, "The soul hardened (durata) by egoism becomes tender (emollitur); the cold soul is warmed and cleansed of its rust." (Leclerge, 1961).

Love, in both its historical and recurrent significance, encompasses a literature which testifies to its power. This literature confirms that <u>love</u> and its absence represent experiences of a profound nature. The profoundness lies with making common by description what is primarily characterized as uncommon. Perhaps the risk is that to "commonize" the uncommon is to erase the extraordinary. Therefore, love as a topic maintains its mystery as it becomes the subject for manifold forms of expression. The forms evidence "the mystery" of the experience be it broken love, love reborn, or rekindled. They do not explain the power of love but do represent its power for generating forms of artful expressions. The

hoped-for perspective of this paper intends a focus toward artfulness in love. Art, for me, is a dimension of love--- in distinction from love's being a dimension of art.

Haridas Chaudhuri, an Indian philosopher, writes in The philosophy of love,

The word "art" is very significant because an art is something we have to master. It is a creative act. And the problem with us today is that we have forgotten that love is creative; it is something we have to cultivate. We just assume everyone knows what love is and trust it is something which naturally happens. (1987, p. 3).

Love <u>is love</u> as a feeling different from all others.

As a feeling which is exclusive by definition and exclusive as a selective activity within which "a few" are acknowledged as those I love, love's nature seems to be one opposed to inclusion. Yet it is the inclusive aspect of love which is addressed when love is conceived as the force, energy, or inner god binding humankind within a created order and a mode enabling the edification of the human good of mutual recognition and care which sets the substance of this discourse.

Love as a mode of human expression suggests a broadening of scope rather than a synthesizing dialectic which confronts its final target. It is love as a creative, regenerating, confirming bond which is complete through an ever-widening more encompassing diversity that I with to emphasize. What I hope to re-search and organize as a representation of an activity of thought is the notion that

each of us recognizes as fundamental those experiences which bear resemblance to what may be called the unconditioned encounter. And perhaps as we lessen the harshness or expectation, the evaluation of which is attendant upon consequences, we may broaden and enable human interaction--- the realm created from and encouraging dialogical encounter.

The third chapter examines the releasement from prejudices (selections which pre-figure our humaninvolvement with the world) which hold promise for restructuring the hierarchical composing of human relationships and for developing a collective ethical sensibility. The phenomenology of encounter as a releasement upon the constraints of what is perceived and reconstructed as superimposed inequities affecting human interaction can be developed throught the concept of the epoche. If love can be viewed apart from utilitarian function the idea of love may remain as the experience of relation which is lifesustaining; a mode for enriching and ennobling the situations of our human condition.

What serves as a semblance of the unconditioned is a meeting of those conditions which inhere within our human interaction. It is through addressing those conditions as expectations directed toward another which may be "suspended" that love as an experience of the unconditioned may enter a more genuinely shared environment reconditioned

through the realization of human co-existence. It is the nature of the "suspension" I hope to develop through the concept of the epoche and to pose the kinship of sustained love with Franklin Merrell-Wolff's philosophy of consciousness without an object, Plato's dialectic, J. A. Stewart's transcendental feeling, Buber's dialogical relation, Noddings's motivational displacement, and Novak's experience of nothingness.

To conclude this introduction I do not think at the outset that the concepts of hierarchy, encounter, and epoche are mutually exclusive constructs but rather are fundamentally linked. Nor do I want to establish one or the other as definitive products of a masculine versus feminine consciousness. I am interested in the idea of mutuality as the base for this discussion of love as it develops in the analysis of these three concepts. As well, I wish to pose the idea of hierarchy as embodying the notion of sacred arc (determined by hier: sacred; and archein: to lead) as an encircling, rather than reinforcing the vertical linearity of pragmatized presuppositioning. I present this as the research struggle of this writing.

CHAPTER 2

HIERARCHY AND RELATIONSHIP

Introduction

Contrasts between what love "is" and what love "does" is common in the literature about love. Love, purely abstracted, is seen to impart a significant quality to one's being. By example individuals may come to mind whose loving "character" (a sum of qualities) predominates their living. It is from what predominates as a dynamic of consciousness, the doing, that we come to expect to see "the behaving" of love in historic and contemporary models.

Description of such behavior postulates from a particular model as example of what love does, toward a universal sense of what love is, to be reconnected and realized in individual lives through following what is patterned by the model. The rhythm of realizing a primary universal suggests a focusing upon the particularization of the universal, in example, and seeking a correspondent identification with the particular as an experience of the universal which locates the universal in the particular. In connection with the quest to find the ideal, to recover the link with perfection, Bergmann says of Freudian thought, every love is a re-finding.

Discussing love in its ascribed status as an unconditional given, it is an apriori upon which causal

reality rests. As conditioned behavior, love characterizes a mode of being in becoming. In its connection with realms of being and becoming love is both generating and generated from a presentation of self in the world. As an aspect of ethical thought and action attending to one's capacity to act "in love" conveys the desire to form an increasingly intentional presentation of self in the world. I am here reminded of the Deweyean "habit of thought" as a reference for the religious sense of making the intentional conditioned behavior of "love" appear natural and unthought.

Love, set as an utopian condition, is an idealization and functions as a perfecting goal humankind both denies and struggles toward. In this view, the world divides. Resistance is experienced dually both in realizing and resisting the goal. The world becomes the place of the phenomenal which shadows the real and immutable. Or, too, the world becomes the "testing ground" caught between good and evil. Less drastically, romantically, the world is dreamscape for utopian images. Less idealistically but with an eye cast toward perfectibility, love as a condition characterizing human living is that which locates humankind between the ideal (that for which we hope) and the real (the present situation). Knowing the fallibility of our humanness, we may aspire "in part" for a better world. Keeping before ourselves the reality of the human condition of pain and suffering, the dream does not engulf and cloud

the present. As a dream of promise the world is held before us to be redeemed and not obscured with idle hope of a better day to come. Certainly the Platonic dialogues augment the concern for clarity in the object "ruling" passion. Thomas Gould, speaking of the direction of Socratic inquiry says, "It is a sting meant to awaken us from the dream of desire to the dream of the desirable." (1963, p. 57).

From a utopian position, love is related to both being and doing. As the foregoing paragraphs state, the point of emphasis or the locus of activity may be grounded, philosophically, in idealism or realism or romantic versions of both. The goal, a better world, may not differ between the two, but the groundwork of the project would be differently constructed.

The dialectic of love will be described as an emotional attribute of human being and as a character of being which generates a context for human life. Described as a way of being, "love" informs a way of living and denotes a "condition" of love. The condition, when defined through criteria, can be set against human behavior. Criteria and condition may be static and dynamic. Love's status given through the primary teachings of a culture may guide and alter human behavior. In conjunction, human behavior is the basis from which the "status" of love arises. Love's relative presence and absence, its status and criteria,

modulates among human societies. Robert Hazo in presenting the question, "What are the causes and consequences of human love?" writes,

(If) an author understands love as an inclination toward the beautiful, physical or spiritual beauty in the beloved obviously is the prime condition for the emergence of love. If...understood as an evolving process rather than a stable condition, then the condition of possibility for its continuance is change. If luxury, comfort and worldly pleasure are said to be the archenemies of a certain kind of love, then a degree of asceticism and renunciation of the world is required before that love can arise. If... associated with physical or mental health, such states are conditions for its emergence. If age is said to be unfavorable to love, then the prolongation of youth is what preserves love. If a certain kind of love is a function of a good moral character, then the cultivation of virtue is a condition of its existence. If utility is the measure of love, then love dies when the object ceases to be useful. If love feeds on admiration, then the loss of admiration for the object kills love. (1967, pp. 171-172).

We are always aligned, included within "something".

Broadly speaking this something is the social and cultural beliefs and understandings organized through our institutions and lived within our traditions. The understandings, beliefs and practices, orient us within particular relationships to the world of nature, to humankind, to realms of the known, the unknown, the unknown, the unknowable.

An agreement of beliefs and attitudes designates a common perspective upon existence as a "givenness" of reality. The power of convention presents a standardizing view of the world with a correlating perception of

expectations acting as guides for and creating boundaries upon behavior. The prominence of a perspective as a dominating view of the world does not imply, however, that "the view" has been generated by many. Many may be in service, compliant to, the structurings of living which maintain the support necessary for the constancy of "reality". These social and cultural holdings, as the shared meanings through which we make sense of the world and of our situation within it, may inspire feelings of deep belonging. As such, one's existence connects with the lives of others through an intimate circle of living.

It is from particular structurings of understandings about ourselves in the world that we learn and are taught of that world and its inhabitants. Consciousness, referring to awareness, is both consciousness of context therefore situational and particular, and consciousness within context suggesting variation among particular individuals, implying differentiation upon a standard. That we are aware implies the existence and effect of specific perceptual organizations suggesting "situation" and "person" as reflective of a consciousness in kind, generated dialectically.

If consciousness is the medium through which we selectively recognize a world and the mode or attending construct through which we interact within this environment, then it seems characteristic of this human capability that

it embodies a self-conditioning feature: we can only know what is not limited by present awareness. Paradoxically, what we "recognize" is a product of perceptual limiting (in order that it be attended to). Thus consciousness as self-conditioning is primarily self limiting.

Common within the activity of learning about one's environment is the recognition of a self in relation with a world comprised of not-self and self. Michael Novak in The experience of nothingness says there is no pure self, that we are two-poled beings which he describes as a self and its horizon. It is worth noting, here, the horizonality of this image. As questioning beings we have the capacity for dynamically enlarging our horizons. The dialectical workings of self and horizon as being struggles against the hidden assumptions supporting what we accept as real. the horizon is ever-shifting in the differentiating known through inquiry, the self undergoes perpetual reconstitution swelling the horizon of the undifferentiated. The "sifting and shifting" yields the dissolution and crystallization of new myths whereby we seek construct corroboration of self and world as personal reality.

In keeping with this notion of arrangement, Michael Novak refers to self as a network of relations one has with the world (1970, p. 55). Implicated is a static unchanging sense of self, something which remains at the core of being holding steady in the face of a changing world. Novak's

description of self as one's relations with the world suggests a self in constant flux, a self in movement with a moving, changing world. One definition of self perhaps emphasizes the "location" of love in the context of human relations and the other defends an a priori of love which can augment an either-or: either self is built in isolation, reductionistically, from " the world" to deepen an awareness of a primal ground of love or a community self develops which is attendant upon the expansion of the primal ground.

The theory suggests that prior to differentiating between self and not-self, "experience" (if the term can be rightly applied here) is oceanic. Moving from an absolute identification in the undifferentiated to the distinctness of an "I", the self becomes an identity which "identifies" distinctions in the world (particularities) in the capacity for separating and recognizing. The nexus of self and world arises in feeling a connectedness to the world. Certainly love may be imaged as spiritually connecting. This alludes to an apriori of ordering principles undergirding human existence. In spiriting the world "in love", the conscious activity leads toward creating a world with which it is desirable to identify.

This raises the issue of belonging. The mystical identification with Being (Creation, God-Love) which directly encounters its Love speaks on one hand for the

comeliness of a world order which transcends the broken spirits of its vanquished. However, to identify in personal being a transcendent love may not unfold in clarity the world-remainder that is yet to grasp, to experience a concrete reality of love. Quite literally, while the "pragmatization" of love will be articulated in the utilitarian value we put upon other beings in our world, another level of the study must broach the "pragmatization" as a directed effort to make the world better. Existentially, the question of how I may make love real speaks to a consciousness in living which may realize, deliver and unfold, a love "in common".

Engaging the world

Consciousness functions, as stated, as a term signifying awareness and understanding as "effect", or taking-for-granted, a particular arrangement of a self in the world. What is learned is dependent upon the utilization and substantiation of a perceptual structuring developed through the capability to compare. We solidify a surrounding world through understandings achieved through favorable comparisons and likewise "disregard", or discard, what is perceived (given to perception) as unfavorable. Conversely, our awareness of "a world " reflects the consequences of this screening and (e)valuation and presupposes the setting at a distance from which

consciousness arises.

This screening of the perceptual world which lends us a manageable environment reflects a selective organization which comes to us formed as "the taken-for-granted" environment. Less energetically, environment is given, therefore assumes, what-is status. Questions about the "conditions" of living are standardized from within that environment. What can be seen and known builds contrasts and relationships between my experiential self and my environmental situation (context) and the parallel enlargements of experiential selves (community) and environmental setting (cultures). The organization of objects and "static" conditions within that environment as they continually are recognized as "the way something is" reproduces itself through the perceptual structuring of the individual. Patterns of activity within the culture have to some extent become transformed (objectified) into conceptual understanding of implicit/explicit rules to which the patterns are conformed. With varying degree this network of relations constituting "self with the world" may rest as taken-for-granted, as "the way things are", or may be the context from which comparisons are exacted developing a discriminatory eye toward how things can/ought be. Perceptual discriminating, selecting/ordering and patterning of experience, provides a parallel for examining the phenomenon manifest as loving: many-feast.

Perhaps more personally yet without promise of alteration on either side of the investigation, to examine other ways of being in the world is to call into question what has become familiar. Ideas about love, for example, serve to influence behavior; "changing" or developing one's ideas about love is perhaps to experience a shift in perspective. One "sees" the world differently and taking the world as a construct of relations, experiences a different world.

Questioning what it means to see, thus compare, alternative ways of being in the world there may a "tightening" upon one's truth lest it be wrested away. Where love functions within an absolute model of truth and is identical with truth there is the liklihood of, if not necessity for, protectionism. Doctrine, as criteria, restricts love to the few within the fold only to unfold if doctrine and credo can be reciprocated by those presently excluded.

Recalling Novak, the capacity of human beings to question the apparent reality of "the world" and the circumstances characterizing the human environment is the principle through which we become attendant upon ethical reflection. That we can see possibility for acting in our human situation in ways which are directed toward an increase of well-being arises through the capacity to question. The questioning opens into what Novak terms the

experience of nothingness (the void, the unspeakable) which is both the fertile ground of meeting the moments of living intent upon the significance of how one ought to live; and also, the ground of despair set in meaninglessness should one be unable to posit meaninglessness as an opening into meaningfulness.

We each may come, then, to understand a self existing as a separate "entity" among other objects which collectively constitute the lived-space of a shared environment. Generated and functioning dialectically as an organizing principle, consciousness is both product and the means reflective of a particular perceptual structuring. It is an awareness we both take from the world and return to the world thus the double-dialectic of self-consciousness.

Knowing there are other many ways to be in the world, thus to explain "being" in the world, how or to what extent is being alterable? The powers to see and know a world are conjoined with the functions of bringing something "forward" in consciousness so that the something may be more closely observed and focused upon: a focusing in order to focus. The lifting out, narrowing, or separating from of something from a more generalized sense of the field of experience connotes extraction as well as incorporation. That we attend to something brings it into the context of my attending, altering it within the frame of this attending and lending significance or value to this thing over another

thing because it is the object meeting my focus. Nel Noddings alludes to the process in this excerpt from Caring. She writes,

The quest for structure is essentially an intuitive search. I must return again and again to confront, alternately, the object and its background features, to let first one and then the other be the focus of my attention. I put myself into the picture and allow myself to be moved about by what is there. When I think that I have discerned a structure, I pass into an analytic mode and impose that structure. If the object does not behave as I would have predicted, I withdraw my imposition and confront the situation again from another perspective. Again, I submit myself to the influence of the object. (1984, p.167).

Love as ethos and mythos is confounded into that which we have been given and look into as the taken-for-granted environment of our living. That perceptual screening delivers recognition (valuation) of some things and not other things in the environment perhaps parallels in the life-context the givens which permit and/or encourage recognition of some and exclusion of others.

Quite broadly I identify with or know sameness with those who have shared a mutual entry into the taken-for-granted environment. As sharers of "common" beliefs, values, and knowledge of the world we act from more a sense of sameness which lends a kind of security, a cohesiveness, in enlarging an identity in the world. Within this shared community, having the common ground of identity solidly in the background of experience and brought into the foreground in the practice of community rituals, the noting of

difference or uniqueness among individual community members is significantly a play upon a theme of commonality.

Conversely, that each is a unique person in the world may be the common bond of existence—or the fact of differences may be feared, hated and resisted to the extent that a pattern of conformity can be matched or resolved by excluding from a common world those who are unwanted or judged inferior by their differences. To shift from the context of the taken-for-granted environment, then, is to enter upon territory for which much less is known of the common bond. The threat of noting and confirming difference among others may stagnate in the reality of human prejudice.

As a screening upon the world, the activity of prejudice is first, I imagine, given to us as we are taught a world functioning necessarily as the taken-for-granted. Within this context its justification, in value and truth, lies. Perhaps were it not that other cultural contexts provide differing emphases which, as well, are formed into "traditions", our personal-community traditions as a holding together of the world would be left unchallenged. The value of comparative contrasting is in the multiplicity of responses which can be constructed from the communities of humankind to what is set or speculated upon as that which functions as the human condition. Particularly with the topic and/or experience of love at issue, varying

communities would incorporate love at different points along their respective scales of concern. With some certainty it can be said that by prioritizing or ordering concerns, "love" as a human concern is situated differently within or excluded from those hierarchies of concerns.

In acknowledging that love is experienced and grows within a context of human relationships and generates, too, a particular situation, the humanly constructed hierarchical "world order" of cultural organization will be assumed in contrast to an unfolding Divine order which is left to be inferred. These contrasts between "orders" are developed as the thesis of Kohanski's book, Martin Buber's Philosophy of the Interhuman Relation.

The next sections consider the significance of hierarchical form as symbol, the hierarchical context of human relationships forming the social "situation" of human experience, and the hierarchy of spatial perception. In the section on The Symposium the dialectical form is represented as a figure of hierarchy and a pattern of intellectual discernment. Perhaps it is not too bold to say that we encounter love through a hierarchy of persons and systems entrusted as the guardians and keepers of the truth whether that truth be politically or religiously determined or personally inspired and communally confirmed. And to greater and lesser degrees these truths teach us, silently or otherwise, of love.

Hierarchy Theory

Roger Lipsey in an article which addresses the significance of hierarchy in Scholastic thought, says that hierarchy comes from Greek roots meaning "holy and rule" (Parabola, p. 17). There is order governing a cosmos divided into good and evil. The sacred hierarchy rules the things above humankind and the demonic order the things below situating man at "the midpoint between two worlds". In the words of St. Thomas (Aquinas) quoted in this article, "Hierarchy means a sacred principality". Borrowing another phrase from St. Thomas, the design is for humankind to become "participators of sacred things". Implicated is the primacy for things above in humankind's response toward a higher authority. And in response to "the higher" is to be "likened" unto it.

Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz then Head of the Israel Institute for Talmudic Publications in Jerusalem gave an interview in 1982 on the subject of hierarchy. In his remarks Rabbi Steinsaltz says,

...hierarchy seems to me to be a given element; inherent in creation and in nature. This is nature---everything else is an attempt to change nature. (Parabola, p. 9).

Hierarchy in Symbol:

Hierarchy is generally symbolized in vertical form.

The apex of a hierarchy is typified as the consummate

feature (crown, summit) of a system (model, paradigm). The

path achieving the summit by stages, is symbolized in steps or rungs. The vertical-linear form is not the only image for hierarchical ordering. Interestingly Lipsey suggests the circle as one.

While there is Jacob's Ladder, there is also Ezekial's visionary Wheel. Whether an Asian mandala, a European rose-window, or an Islamic shamsa, the pattern of the circle has been able over the centuries to capture the intuition of hierarchy. (Parabola, pp. 20-21).

This mention of the circle as a counterpart image of hierarchical ordering compares with Matthew Fox's description of the two religious symbols. Emphasizing the cross as a "violent symbol of Christianity" he addresses the aggressive component of the symbol when seen on its side as a sword (1979, pp. 112-113). Building toward a comparison between the symbolic meanings of cross and circle, (one emblematic of death and the other of life, womb-like) Fox states that "in the name of the cross" all forms of destruction and oppression have prevailed. The suggestion is that the pervasiveness of structural symbolism affects the cultural and social teachings which inform us of an ontic status and determines the ways we approach relating to the otherness of a world of human being.

Procession, "...evil is that which separates...it parts the whole, being the Cross dividing the Circle." (1901, p. 125). The difference for Fox in the power of the images is that the circle-in-motion as spiral better represents a

renewed vision for revelation and "increase of love-justice in the world" (1979, p. 113). For Noddings the imagery of circles and chains pictures relationships of caring. Our most intimate relationships are central to "concentric circles of caring. In the inner, intimate circle, we care because we love." (1984, p. 46).

Haridas Chaudhuri writes in a chapter called "Love and the Centers of Consciousness" that there are "different spiritual forms of expression" of love which emerge through inner unfoldment.

The different centers of consciousness in the human being have been visualized as lotus flowers, for a lotus is the symbol of love. As we go through spiritual unfoldment in growth of consciousness, one after another the different centers open, so too the lotus opens its petals. This is a symbolical way of saying that the spirit of love blossoms within us. (1987, p. 61).

The symbol of ladder or pyramid does not elaborate the context of hierarchical ordering. Quoting Simon in Hierarchy Theory,

... "hierarchy" simply means a set of Chinese boxes of a particular kind. A set of Chinese boxes usually consists of a box enclosing a second box, which, in turn, encloses a third---the recursion continuing as long as the patience of the craftsman holds out. The Chinese boxes called "hierarchies" are a variant of that pattern. Opening any given box in a hierarchy discloses not just one new box within, but a whole small set of boxes; and opening any one of these component boxes discloses a new set in turn. (1973, p. 5).

This description is powerful for noting the significance of experiencing a shift in perspective

regarding one's view of "things". If a hierarchy of contexts is the situation of one's relationships to "the world", then to experience a perspectival shift in that view is to generate an unfolding of unfamiliarity "as" the world. Grobstein from the same book writes,

In its simplest sense hierarchical order refers to a complex of successively more encompassing sets. In hierarchies a given set must be described not only for itself but in terms both of what is within it and what it is within. (1973, p. 31).

figure one:





figure two:



(1973, p. 32).

The "nesting" of hierarchical relationships is represented by the three-dimensional figure of the Chinese boxes. Also shown is the two-dimensional figure of subdivided triangles suggesting the holographic nature of interrelating "hierarchies". While these symbols represent balanced, symmetrical hierarchical formations they do not

satisfactorally show the shift in experiencing many different hierarchies simultaneously. Commenting upon this variability Rabbi Steinsaltz says that it is "the problem of existence...that different hierarchies are not aligned, not compatible with each other" (Parabola, p. 15).

Hierarchy in social context:

This section reviews a basic assumption that the world of human relations is hierarchically constructed. Family, schools, government, the workplace, the marketplace, places of worship, reflect arrangements of hierarchy. Martin Lings in "Freedom and Equality" says the protective certainty of hierarchy is no longer present in the reality of contemporary society. He writes,

The world of today is a chaos of jostling opinions and aspirations: the so-called "free world" is a fluid chaos; the totalitarian part of the modern world is a rigid chaos. By contrast with both, the ancient world was always an order, that is, a hierarchy of concepts, each at the level that rightly belongs to it. chaos has been caused, as we have seen, by the humanistic "telescoping" of the hierarchy down to the psychic level and by the consequent intrusion into worldly considerations of frustrated and perverted other-worldly aspirations. Equipped as he is by his very nature for worship, man cannot worship; anbd if his outlook is cut off from the spiritual plane, he will find a "god" to worhip at some lower level, thus endowing something relative with what belongs only to the Absolute. (Parabola, p. 60).

The concept of hierarchy, then, indicates a valueordering. The conception addresses an order human constructed which contrasts with an ordering principle signified in the Logos. The comparative between the orders is that one is an imposing relative and the other is a governance in repose. Where this concerns "love" is in the realm of the human construction of reality which may, in its selective capability, restrict the possibilities for a nurturing and caring for its members.

As there are many examples of hierarchies it can be said that hierarchy is always situated within hierarchy and as such is self-replicating. Basic hierarchical systems forming a cosmogonic infrastructure are those used to discuss chemical and physical compositioning——from units forming human life and the human environment to units of collective human life forming human communities.

Hierarchical order is nowhere more striking than in biological systems. The living world as a first approximation consists of individual organisms. More sophisticated analysis show, however, that, depending upon our purposes, the living world may be viewed as populations of organisms in higher sets called communities or ecosystems and that individual organisms may be viewed as collectives or sets of units called cells. These, in turn, may be regarded as sets of systematically ordered macromolecular complexes and as an intricate flow of energy and materials. We are therefore strongly driven to regard, as essential to our understanding of life, notions of levels of order and of hierarchical systems. (Grobstein, p. 31).

The concept of hierarchy can be examined from two positions. From the position of the person the range of one's experiences reflects a difference in value. Some experiences are valued more than others, memorable because they were desirable and because they were not. Experiences

come to be classed good or bad, if noteworthy. Individually there is talk of setting one's priorities and knowing the value of attending to things of the "highest priority". Against the range and valuation of personal experience is the valuation of one's experience in the eyes of one's community and the consequent judgment of whether such "experience" contributes to one's becoming a "better" family member, community member, a more "faithful" worker. Secondary to making one's experience hierarchical in reflection is encountering the hierarchies of expectancies for "personal" experience that are constructed in the environments of one's experiencing. This can be referred to as confronting the "levels of achievement" existing through the culture from which one is measured in failure and in "degrees of success". If there are many hierarchies, there is some certainty that our lives are situated against multivalued scales purporting a particular kind of selfdevelopment indicating a broader social intent to set a hierarchy of expectation (goals) overlayed by a hierarchy of evaluation (merit).

From the complex of our bodies, then, to the complex of environment hierarchical ordering is identified. Centering upon the individual, a minimal hierarchy of experience can be constructed through the distinctions of one's having first and second order social relationships. Drawing upon distinctions given between the two in Van de Vate's Romantic

Love a relationship characterized as primary is one deemed "unique and essential; 'Love' names a certain primary relationship" (1981, p. 62), whereas a secondary relationship is "duplicatable and inessential" (p. 19). It is our primary relationships, says Van de Vate, which "define the individual. They locate him in the human landscape." (p. 65). Suggesting that "unique and essential" relationships are further distinguishable into a hierarchy, Van de Vate writes,

"Love" also names the mysterious power---as old as time, as wide as the starry sky, as near as one's innermost soul---which is said to cause that relationship, the entity around which romantic rhetoric is constructed. We know that, narrowly viewed, the function of the relationship is to crown our hierarchy of primary relations and the function of the rhetoric is to serve as bonding agent or social reason for the relationship. (1981, pp. 62-63).

While I wish to recall and develop these thoughts relating love and rhetoric in the section discussing Plato, the transition toward that discussion is better set with additional remarks regarding world order from Rabbi Steinsaltz,

I would say that hierarchy is an infinite number of order of laws, one above the other. Each order has an inner order; and with this interdependence, all in all, the whole hierarchical situation is a complete set in which different parts are working (pp. 14-15).
...the same hierarchy that exists in the body exists in the mind (p. 12).

Hierarchy and perspective:

Briefly a description of perspective (spatial perception) needs to be set to later draw upon its

perceptual and analytical features as a representation of hierarchical situatedness of the person-in-context. Metaphorically, one's perspective is a relative construct. Geometrical dimensions enable description of the performance of perspective capability and therefore set a hierarchical model. The reference and vantage point from which "the world" is observed is the person "in place" as observer functioning one-dimensionally. In locating objects within the observer's field of perception two-dimensions are set as the observer and the observed set a causal realm. The third dimension as a framing of context or situation, developing the field of interaction and involvement, is advanced from the distance set between observer and that focused upon as observed in conjunction with surrounding field. The fourth dimension as a seeing of observer and observed transitionally in situation is the dynamic upon which the frames play. The transitioning as movement is a metaphor for change.

If the world is "known" through the constucts of linear polarities then hate may be the reality opposed to love. And forcefully, the world may be ruled in hate. As a term in opposition, love "runs hot, then cold". If the opposite of love is indifference not hate, love is ambi-valent. Love exists for some and others and at other times, is not present. If love is the way, the path, it is the immanent-transcendent nexus, the coincidentia oppositorum. These

relations are set into dimensions constructed dialectically.

Perspective as a recognition of dimensions in relation sets a hierarchial pattern when described as an analytical construct. From the poles of setting oppositional conditions as what something "is" and "is not" (or "ought be") a two-point, linear relationship may be developed. set a "third" dimension and an intermediary of what something "ought be" between the thesis and its negation is to generate a field of possibility with the next dimension of realizing the oughts as the dynamic of "putting the oughts into practice". This is the form, I think, of the assumption for the actual concrete field of possibility articulated by Giroux, et.al., as they intend action for social justice through a Marxist dialectic. For the "reconstruction" of the human condition the ought is the direction of emphasis which replaces or suspends the negation of the antithesis. Thus the synthesis circumvents or salvages reality from nihilism.

An example of dimensionality as a image for the hierarchical structuring of consciousness is found in Jean Gebser's The Ever-Present Origin. He calls the immersion of pre-reflective experience "vital experiencing". The mode of experience is characterized by the prevailing presence of continuity with the nonseparation of the subject from his experience. Experience is an as-yet potential object of consciousness making the subject "univalent and one-

dimensional" in the stage prior to reflective experience. With the capacity for memory, experiencing is divided into experiencer and experiences. The polarity of reflective experiences is described as "ambivalent and two-dimensional". (1985, p. 251).

The capacity for conceptualization and ideation situates the third dimension of the "triangle". This hierarchical form is both vertically and horizontally constructed. Gebser calls this form perspectival (1985, p.256). Triangularity and pyramidal thought evidenced in Platonic dialectics and the form for synthesis is said by Gebser to be the predominant "form of our epoch's thinking". (p. 256). The emergence of perspectival thinking, he says, "began with the perspective of Leonardo da Vinci."

...the eyes form the base and complete the synthesis of their simultaneous perception at the perspectival vanishing point. This synthesis is possible because of the trivalent or triadic relationship of the triangle which not only "opens up" but also closes space at the vanishing point. (p. 256).

Spatially differentiated and variably distanced, the object-world is seen "hierarchically". This static, constructionist pattern of dimensionality is metaphor for an unfolding of relations positioned from the direction of point generating line, line--surface, surface--figure, figure--figural unfolding (development, change, growth). Further, the idea of dimensionality presents a parallel between the one-dimensional and the uni-dimensional. To be

crossed at all points (intimately related with environment is a feminine, mystical dynamic "paralleling" the view of the singular placement of one alone in the world (masculine agentic). Dr. Mooney pictures the figural unfolding of consciousness.

Adelbert Ames used to say that whatever we consciously know is based on what we are then unconsciously assuming, and that the direction of progress for the mind is from the consciously known into its unconscious sources so that those sources, then becoming consciously known, can offer ground for pushing one step more into the unconsciously assumed, and so on into ever more inclusive ground for the knowing and the The image here is like that of waves when one drops a pebble on the surface of a quiet pool; the waves move out and out to ever more encompassing wholes by rising to a crest, then descending into a trough, and pushing on and on into ever more inclusive encompassments until the energy of the original impaction is spent. By writing his "morning notes", Ames would deliberately try to bring his knowledge of what he knew up to a crest of form and security, which then meant his mind was free to move "on down below" where the assumptions lay so that they might be brought into another crest of consciousness, more inclusive than the last, and precursor, also, to still more inclusive crests that might be formed until the enrgy of the inital probe was spent. Research, so done, became a way for Ames to become more and more whole in what he came to know. (1980, p.11).

Philosophy of consciousness without an object:

The stratification of consciousness described in Merrell-Wolff sets consciousness in geometrical terms in inverse proportion to the unfolding of a perceptual field presented in the hierarchy section. The geometrical relations as a pattern complex express those relations as a whole as generating the inner and outer dialectical

realization of self-identity. From the levels analogized in the point-line-plane-figure-motion model, Merrell-Wolff emphasizes a difference in degrees of freedom particular to each "level" increasing with integration of numbers of dimension.

As a set of inverse relations Merrell-Wolff's philosophy of consciousness without an object counters the rigidity pictured in constructing expanding dimensional relations as in the thesis-antithesis-synthesis model and gives account of each dimensional relation as expanding degrees of freedom in consciousness which are not visible to those levels below but buttress the climb or entry to the "next level". This analysis figures as a geometrical comparison between human will (directed from below) and Divine grace (benevolence from above).

So, Merrell-Wolff's writing as it geometrically describes the structural complex of "consciousness" is another analogue, yet presents in dual motion the downward flow of consciousness which uplifts the upward striving. The mathematical imagery of Merrell-Wolff assumes a spiritual perspective making the realms or planes of consciousness interactive as in the "realms" of Time and Eternity. The lower is resistant to the higher or more encompassing as in the picturing of the rippling surface of the water which "unfolds" ad infinitum.

The present as the moment binding Time and Eternity is

the constructionist point of collapse and expansion. The present, as concept, participates in both and is exclusively neither. What is more fundamental? Presence.

Platonic love

"...but Socrates learnt of Diotima that the children of the brain of non-sexual love would be the true hostages of immortality" (Swiney, p. 138).

In present day usage the term <u>platonic love</u> has come to encompass a range of good feeling that one may have for another and the pleasant compatibility one experiences in the relation. From the commonly held notion of platonic love as nonsexual friendship, these relationships are furthered identified by the point of sexual omission. The Greek culture of the Athenians ackowledged that the beauty of the young male (erastai) inspired the passion of the older mature male (erastes). Dover, in <u>Greek Homosexuality</u>, writes of these friendships as altruistic in a higher sense and as a carnal obssession, at base. The higher sense had to be served if the carnal impulse were to be converted into the passionate search for good.

In <u>Platonic Love</u>, Thomas Gould says, "Platonic love is not a kind of love but a theory as to the nature of all love..."(p. 2). Platonic love is manifested in and embodied through desiring the Good. What is good is beautiful is true and is at once that desired as Eternal Perfection. How may one know the Good? It is a question advancing its attainment through properly directed powers of reasoning which attends the turning of the soul toward the Good. Given in this view toward the Good is the idea that there is something held in common with the Good. The kindred good is

the ground from each person may feel the spark of renewal.

The renewal builds from desire directed from "higher"

passion.

In Plato one reads that desire is differently determined if controlled by the body or from the soul. It is in balancing and refining the powerful passions from each sphere in order that neither potential harmony from one capacity or the other be lost, that the agent of reason finds focus as the mediator between sexual and spiritual passions. Reason and love lie at the nexus balancing this process, binding, and leading forth its activity. So the desire for happiness is the aspiration which enjoins the forces of rationality and love. Gould writes, "Love, according to Plato, is the universal longing for happiness". (p. 101).

If we think of rationality...in the Greek fashion, as enthusiasm based on an understanding of what is really important in life, then it follows that true love and true rationality are actually the same thing. Both turn out to mean "the most efficient possible pursuit of what is most worth having". (1963, p. 37).

Depending upon the perspective, the "love of reason" which unfolds toward the God of Love of the Scholastics or the "reason of love", enjoin an activity of body and soul seeking reunification with its Source. The Platonic premise of The Symposium is that love is the centripetal source for creating one's true self, turned toward the Good. The Eternal soul of perfection, so articulated, lies

accessible to each individual through stages of realization and integration, called stages in purification by J.A.

Stewart. These stages lead toward the Supreme Good.

Love exists not as separate goal from process but rather as bridge (crossing and connecting) between material and ideal realms. The Good as guide attracts and leads each when turned and directed toward that Good. Union is realized through attendant knowledge of self-consciousness-not self-annihilation or dissolution, or loss of being into Being. The process as a reclaiming of the eternal soul as a link of the Divine is a process of self-integration or becoming whole. Yet the emphasis is not upon completion.

To be complete is to be without desire for one is no longer "lacking" in any regard. Completion in this view suggests the goal of self-loss in the union experienced as self-annihilation in merging with an "absolute". It is interesting that some authors contrast the mystical union with the notion of the Hieros Gamos, sacred marriage, in which there is merging (identification) which does not break down the separate identities as opposed to the total loss of identity. I include this contrast between the notions of absolute union as wedding or merging as they provide another parallel for thinking about love-sex and love-death.

In the becoming, <u>wholeness</u> as a perspectival awareness is described and experienced differently at the levels of human passion, rational power, and spiritual desire.

Ultimately and necessarily the development in awareness of these levels requires a realization of the unity of purpose in being: to re-cognize the Divine. The thrust of Plato arises in purposive activity toward realizing good. It is the path inspiring happiness and the path of hope and striving which realizes the realm of love in longing toward the Good.

In the philosophy of Plato basic constrasts exist between the realms of appearances and the real. Recalling the "Allegory of the Cave", we are prisoners of images and shadows of the real and yearn, in degree, to see the natural state of perfection against its reflections.

Plato's famous ladder of love is, in effect, a spectrum of objects of acquisitive desire ranging from the most immediate and passing to the most permanent. The "fair-souled" who are capable of ascending this ladder must begin with the first objects of desire, and, pursuing a path of moral improvement or learning, gradually ascend from lower to higher loves. In this progression, the love of one human being for another is left behind at an early stage; in the proper ascent, love for another person is valuable only to the extent that it initiates and prepares the lover for the next step. (Hazo, 1967, pp. 183-184).

In addition Hazo writes,

A human being is loved, in Plato's theory, because of the qualitites he personifies, which remind the lover's soul of the real and permanent. (p. 462).

Despite the dualism of Platonic realms there exists a thematic emphasis upon the unity in harmony of a rightly ordered cosmos. The display of the forms of virtue was sought through the structure of dialectical inquiry

aspresented in the Socratic dialogues. Dorothea Krooks explains the distinction between the dialectics of the academy and the dialectical inquiry common to Socrates.

(Dialectics is) addressed to a type of person different in all important respects from the pupil of the academy. It is addressed to what we would call the ordinary man-in-the-street, the ordinary unreflective man, the man whose analytical powers in particular are conspicuously undeveloped, whose mind therefore will be particularly deficient in the qualities of coherence and consequentiality. This does not mean that he is unintelligent...But he is distinctly not an intellectual. (Krook, 1959, p. 304).

Dialectics, as a form of study, was a domain encountered late in the Platonic curriculum of The Republic. As a separate field of study, the science of dialectics sought the Form of Forms "a single unifying principle" (Krook, p. 329). As a means for discovering "the truth about any disputed matter" it is a means "of examining all hypotheses including its own". (p. 330). As a method of engaging philosophical dialogue, Krook describes the dialectic method as characteristic of Socrates' endeavor to engage the young men of Athens.

Comparing didactics and dialectics, Krook says didactics is a demonstration or presentation of a particular pedagogical intention proceeding from a taken-for-granted principle or "truth" which a teacher may amplify or expand in lecture form. Designed for the student, this kind of teaching structures a frame of reference or a "standard base" of information about something. Didactics became

standard to formal study and dialectics was informal being the "style" particular to Socrates' conversations about town. The forms, therefore, are compared as serving differing domains of inquiry.

The work of Socrates, Krook suggests, was with the common man whom he sought out with questions to lead him from a non-reflective stance. "Common" refers, at best here, to the wealthy male citizen as yet uncritical about the direction of his life. In refusing to "examine" the opinions setting a course of living, the common man lived in a fracture of chaos. Lest the powers of the soul be turned to reflect the Good, this existence could not show or represent an image of virtue. Without "the turning", the existence was shadowed in opinion drawn in ignorance.

To enlarge upon excellence is the cornerstone of filial love, friendship. If love were expressed as that which is desired one could only want for what one lacked. The double-bind leads to the conclusion that to be good is to have want of nothing, therefore to need no one or nothing else. This is the topic of The Lysis. Further discussed is the notion that to desire the good, if one already is good, is to desire that "that which one is" continue "in time". The dialogue does not lead into a cul-de-sac of selfsufficiency but into an expression of friendship, filial love, as a "congeniality of excellences" (Norton & Kille). In that none are excellent in all things we are each called

and are responsible to bring to bear our individual excellences and in so doing to recognize goodness, the particular excellences, in others. This idea is a reminiscence of the Hebrew legend of the Shekinah.

My readings of some portion of Plato's work and the consequent amplification of that understanding through Platonic interpretations suggests that the ideal of love is met as one disciplines the activities of mind and body through rational development and understanding and a correspondent control over or governance of sexual passion. Registering control over the impulses of one's "lesser" being was a necessity prior to a confluence in harmony within an ordered, orderly cosmos.

Love as the agent of the cosmos sets as "its" goal a return to harmony in Being of the world-soul and its human souls. The harmony has a priori existence and "was known" to each soul prior to its incarnation. The constituent knowledge is therefore imbedded as the design for or process of living which appears in the "presence in the moment". The "present" (while absent in actuality) adheres to the goal of Presence in potential. In the chain of being the consequent essential striving finds its linkage. "Love" as it inspires recollection of the harmony of a symphonic cosmos is the "binding matter" of the eternal and the temporal.

The Symposium and The Phaedrus

Through the realization of the truth of human existence as the goal of return to perfection, desire inspires the Divine re-forming. The Platonic construct of love given in The Symposium also known as The Banquet and The Ladder of Love and written between 385 and 371 b.c.e., (Jowett, p. 501) underscores the process as one of tension and struggle. To enter into the power of desire rightly turned is to experience re-lease from the controlling passion determined by undirected human passion.

As they relate to a theory of love, the content of the dialogues speak to "love of the good" and "love and rhetoric". The form and content of the Socratic conversations explore right speaking determined from love of virtue.

Passion seeks gratification and restoration.

Platonically speaking, what leads one through the human passion stirred by sexual longing is perhaps a kindling awareness of the eternal——one recognizes the beauty, the desirousness of another as aspects belonging or at—one with the eternal unchanging form of the Good. To satiate the longing inspired in this recognition in pursuit of the appetitive is to prolong absence from the Divine. Temporal divisions of the fleeting and the lasting are imaged in the condition of physical beauty which inspires sex yet is divorced from a complementary awareness of perennial beauty

of spirit.

The monitoring powers of reasoning when properly educated exist to employ critical control and ultimate harmony of intent among the elements of being. passion may impede or serve the "real" desires of the spirit, the desire of the Good. This contrast of loves is shown in The Phaedrus. Plato pictures the soul divided into three parts. Each "governs" essential characteristics of human nature. The soul is likened unto a team of horses, one black the other white, driven by a charioteer. black horse is symbol of the necessary appetive passions, which when unbalanced against the other passions, are unruly. The white horse is symbol of the desire for Quite naturally, then, there exists a division in virture. the soul. The agent of balance which restores order and enables response to the higher spiritual passion of the white horse is shown in the charioteer. His position is the control which functions to guide the "lower passions" which are necessary to the whole of the soul and to respond to the "higher" as it will enable virtuous living. Socrates, in his first speech of the Phaedrus says,

...in each of us there are two ruling and guiding principles which we follow wherever they may lead: one of them is an innate desire for pleasure, the other, an acquired opinion which strives for the best. And sometimes these forces within us are at harmony and sometimes at variance; now one gains the mastery, now the other.

The quote continues,

When opinion leads through reason to what is best and dominates the other, the name given to this dominance is self-control; but when desire irrationally drags us toward pleasures and gains the mastery within us, this mastery is called wantonness. (Helmbold, p.17).

"The Symposium" is a love-feast, a celebration. The participants agree rather than drinking themselves into a Dionysian frenzy that in honor of love--- they might all give speeches in his honor. All revelry is quieted and the speeches begin.

Phaedrus, who suggested the idea, gives the first oration. He glorifies love as the oldest of the gods and the one inspiring men to noble, patriotic deeds. Following Phaedrus, Pausanius praises the "two loves", the Heavenly and the Earthly Aphrodite. Eryximachus, the physician, speaks more comprehensively and authoritatively about the harmony bestowed in love which authors the well-being of body and soul in balancing their opposition.

Aristophanes entertains the magical to tell the story of loves's beginning among human beings. His story describes human beings as perfect beings, round in form, Janus-faced, with four arms and legs. In their precociousness, happiness, and independence from the gods Zeus decides to divide them. This ends the exclusive inclusiveness of the beings and gives them need of the other part of themselves from which they have each been cut. And so, each half-being lives in longing for its completion in the absent other. Shelley writes of this myth, "The desire

and the pursuit of integrity and union is that which we call love." (Banquet, p. 27).

Agathon, a professional rhetorician, has won an honor for his eloquence for which this "party" is being held. He gives a beautiful speech about love being the youngest and fairest of the gods and the one inspiring obedience and justice. The speech enthralls its hearers and leads Socrates, who is next to speak, to say the speech is flattering.

Alas, Socrates is confused about the nature of the speeches. Are the speeches for flattery (rhetorical) or to speak true praises? Socrates offers to tell what he has been told about love. He retells the conversation with Diotima who taught him when he had been similarly perplexed in his ideas about love as his fellow-speakers presently are. Diotima tells Socrates that love is not a god but the child of Plenty and Poverty, a daemon, a mean between the desirable and the undesirable.

Alcibiades is the last to speak. He calls Socrates an "enchanter" and realizes in kind that Socrates embodies the portrait that has been drawn and is, therefore, a figure of love in their midst.

Dividing the speeches they form a model of the divisions of the appetitive, the rational, and the spiritual in the objects of love given testimony to by each speaker. Surveying the speeches, love is honorable, valorous, turned

to heaven and earth, restorative, joyful and playful, poetic, beautiful, true, and present in giving. That one partakes of the good, love is the desire for the "everlasting possession". (Jowett, p. 486).

Situation of the Dialogue:

The dialectical form of Plato's dialogues has been described as generating a hierarchical pattern of thought. The focus and point for contrast in this chapter is our human capacity if not propensity for adopting behavioral patterns which manifest and reify a perception of hierarchy in human interaction. The form of the Platonic dialectic, as a hierarchical construct, is a mode of discourse intentionally setting the opinions of its participants into positions which can be explained, clarified and refuted in favor of better-supported, logically consistent argument. This form of discourse encourages an activity of thought and thoughtful participation upon the topic at hand, I believe, with the idea of forming a community of mutual learning. The dialectical networking of human thought proceeds in its dialogical situation. This is the character of hearing and the quest for truth, that it is dialogically delivered. Socrates, in this instance, performs not as a demagogue upon democratization of thought but an an agent of the democratic. Embodying this agentic he assists in the release from the telling of one to the many toward an

experience as demos-kratos (power of the people). Serving a central role in this process does not reduce the experience of others to one of service to the autocratic. Rather Socrates is a model for what the concept of hierarchy may suggest. The term simply divided as hier-archy suggests in the meaning "sacred leading".

The concern, of course, is to set right opinion. As opinion lies between ignorance and knowledge, opinion as such has a parallel relationship with love. Love or desire is that between good and evil. The aim of the Symposium discourse can be viewed hierarchically. As each speaker praises love the tributes can be ranked coordinately with the appetitive instincts at a lower position to the faculties of reason which set into awareness the rising spiritual passion.

For Socrates too, love is the pursuit of the whole-the whole universe seen as a totality and understood by reference to ideal form, its eternal value. (Singer 1984, p. 9).

It is critical that the dialectical unfolds in the dialogical situation and the dialogical shows the dialectic. The actual "moment" of the conversation mirrors what the discussion of an abstract ideal endeavors to promote in individual understanding.

...the concrete situation illustrates the abstract discussion: the dialogue is an example of what it is about".(Brumbaugh, Educational Theory, p. 220).

The Symposium as a Figure of Hierarchy: order of speakers:

Phaedrus, Pausanius, Eurixyamachus, Aristophanes, Agathon, Socrates, Alcibiades

Alcibiades: re-presents the figure of love

Socrates: dialectic and realm of love

Agathon: the poetic

4. Aristophanes: imaginative play

Eurixyamachus: health in balance and control

Pausanius: differing pleasures of two loves

> Phaedrus: idolatry and valor

...the ascent of the soul through the great abstract studies culminating in the study of dialectic at once illuminated the intelligence and purified the motive; the final vision of the supreme form of the Good was simultaneously a circumcision of the mind and of the heart. (Krook, 1959, p. 53).

The circular hierarchy leads from the concrete to the abstract. From the arc, the concrete figure of Socrates is shown as the representation of the images. Each description foreshadows the person of Socrates in his embodiment of higher pleasure. Taylor says in his essay, The Symposium, "We see with Plato's eyes the interior life of the soul of Socrates" (1985, p. 98). The heart of the Symposium poses the central source of our aspiration toward the Eternal, the Divine, as registered in our passion. The process of coming to know, the purpose of all learning, is the reclamation of

passion. Human passion alone "is deterministic"; spiritual passion "is".

Beyond the hierarchical pattern of the dialogue there is the characteristic of supplementing the exercise of logic with myth. J. A. Stewart explains the complementary features of constructed conversation as developing "scientific" understanding of transcendental ideals through the logic of dialectical discourse which permits the constructions of concepts. The concepts as akin to right opinion bear relationship to the Eternal and Immutable, but are not that toward which they aim. The conceptual truths thus constructed and understood, in dialectic, place one at the portal but not in view of the beatific vision of the Thus, says Stewart, Plato's use of myth within the dialogues hearkens what Stewart terms "Transcendental Feeling". Though the faculty of passion which cannot give testimony or justification for its knowing, the myth rekindles the awareness "in feeling" of virtue which lives in the soul. Its memory has been inspired from the visual representation of the myth yet the faculty of reason cannot reform the feeling into the logic of discourse. Stewart in

The sense of having seen or heard things belonging to a world in which "Time is not" needs for its immediate realisation the presence, in the world of waking consciousness, of things which shall "remind" us of the things of that other world in which "Time is not" without such things to "remind" us, there would be no "recollection" of our visit to the world in which "Time is not". (1960, pp. 58-59).

The Myths of Plato says,

Thus the dialectical thought constructed in dialogue is suspended into the moment of mythopoetic vision delivered in the allegorical interlude. Transcendental Feeling bears relationship to the concept of epoche as an experience "in kind". Writing of Transcendental Feeling Stewart says,

...it is a feeling which indeed appears in our ordinary object-distinguishing, time-marking consciousness, but does not originate in it. It is to be traced to the influence on consciousness of the presence in us of the "Part of the Soul" which holds on, in timeless sleep, to Life as worth living. Hence Transcendental Feeling is at once the solemn sense of Timeless Being---of "That which was, and is, and ever shall be" overshadowing us---and the conviction that Life is good...it is not an experience occasionally cropping up alongside of other experiences, but a feeling which accompanies all the experiences of our conscious life--that "sweet hope" (Plato quoting Pindar)...(1960, pp. 66-67).

Speaking of the myths in the $\underline{Phaedrus}$, the \underline{Meno} , and the Symposium, Stewart writes,

They are mainly concerned with showing how man, as knowing subject and moral agent, is conditioned by his past. Although the "Eschatological" outlook, with its hope of future salvation, is by no means absent from these three Myths, their chief interest lies in the way in which, as "Aetiological" Myths, they exhibit the function of the understanding and moral faculty as cases of recollection which, quickened by love, interprets the particular impressions, and recognises the particular duties, of the present life, in the light of the remembered vision of the Eternal Forms once seen in the Supercelestial Place. (1960, p.101).

The Phenomenology of Plato:

The "positions" taken on love by the speakers of "The Symposium" are each supplanted with a differing, but not necessarily, competing view. Rather the arching view

enlarges the perspectives among the hearers. Socrates is left, not at the pinnacle of the hierarchy as an abstraction, but resides in the midst of the concrete real situation, the event of human discourse promoting fellowship, respect, and learning.

Plato, without analytically crumbling the world of temporality points beyond the world of change toward the world of unchanging eternal perfection——a world imprinted upon all being. For humankind, as carriers of the imprint of Perfection, we embody the fullness of the eternal as we live from our higher, "wholer" nature——our spiritual being. Socrates holds open the door for inviting a multiplicity of thought. This is significant in its alluding to the epoche. What may be experienced as the unifying of thought through the dialogues are their resolutions with what is not known. The examination of what is known and the explication of this logic stimulate a dilation of thought but cannot seal away the limits of the discourse. The dialogues come to rest.

As "time is the moving image of eternity", says Plato, it seems fitting to express love as the moving image of the Good.

Mysticism

Since that first night when,

bath'd in hopeless tears,

I sank asleep,

and he I love did seem

To visit me, I welcome every dream,

Sure that they come as heav'n sent

messengers.

Ono no Komachi Heian Period (9th Century) Japanese Love Poems

If love is by nature inclusive, "it" must seek its parameters, its boundaries, thereby enfolding that restricted. Mystically, the union sought by the Divine inspires the unfolding of self releasing one into the loss of distinctness and boundedness. If love as a mode of being by description is situated in context and is primarily related to a parallel awareness of the selective construction of context, that love unfolds and by including infolds, can be illustrated as a hierarchical nesting.

Through the construct of the Platonic later clarified for emphasis by religious traditions comes the ideal signifying a purpose for and meaning of life: the pursuit of understanding or the acquisition of knowledge, encountering the Divine (Personal God). As platonic form,

the struggle exists within and is tempered by the soul. This metaphysical corollary resides within the goals of religious and mystical teaching. Yet the simplicity of the teaching imposes a difficult paradox which Christianity supersedes with the promise of an after-life. The paradox entertains the pursuit of the Divine which must be met unrestrained as an object in consciousness. The question of delivery: How may one meet the uncontainable through the containment of human thought? Christian teaching honors the rebirth through salvation which is a seal of the promise of reunion. The question if approached to fruition within the present suggests that one must intend the recognition of the Divine yet suspend the intention if one is to "experience" a knowing suspension within the chaos of being, a chaos describable as order unordered by human intervention and convention.

The conflict among religious traditions counters notions that 1) the knowing attainment is achievable within life and 2) death is the portal by which we confront what has been the destiny of living: the reward or bliss of after-life with the Divine. The task of the latter is to live the life of religious purity, a faith intent upon the Divine Mystery, that will reclaim its own.

Both notions speak in degree to the concept that we are that we seek. We embody an aspect of the Divine that has been divided yet exists as an indivisible unity. The latter

tradition (particularly the Christian) emphasizes with heightened distinction the idea of human existence as a mode alien to the Divine. Restoration with the Divine is an act of grace granted from the Divine and acceptable upon the personal basis of undetermined will and achievable by faithful living from one's selection by the Divine. The Christian credo: Each is chosen for the task: to re-member the Divine; few accept. Calvinism: Few are chosen; and those were pre-ordained.

The mystical tradition makes prominent notions of self-sacrifice (denial/annihilation) or self-sufficiency. The singular being awaits or struggles toward reconciliation with the Unique. The isolated "self" withdraws from or restricts the world. With "intent" this separation is to enable one's becoming less-worldly, less conditioned by the world, or to entreat the holy through a sanctity of living promoted in exclusion, denial.

Having "removed" oneself from the world and/or the worldly to seek unity in being (consolidation in experience?), the world is profaned. It is a "common" place which the solitary being seals away to achieve the uncommon, the extraordinary. The elevation in being for this one lies with the mystical union, the experience of oneness, the self-realization of being at-one-with.

Hierarchically, socio-economic and political, cultural and religious divisions divide humankind. The effects and

interests situtated in prejudice further stratify the "good" of those collective divisions unevenly. Seen in this way hierarchy "is perceived an an arbitrary imposition upon the freedom of man" (Parabola, p. 8). We are born into a divided, dividing world.

It is perhaps in the mystical-religious traditions that these reified divisions are eclipsed. Speaking to the connection between hierarchy and inequality versus freedom and equality, Rabbi Steinsaltz says that it is difficult to speak of (give evidence of) equality of humankind except through the religious "notion of receiving a divine soul that for everyone is more or less the same" (p. 9). Clarifying this point he says,

All forces everywhere, within and without, work against equality. People are so inherently different---not only different, but unequal---that it requires a constant struggle to accept the notion of some kind of equality. The only justification for the idea is what you may call a mystical one; even though people don't appear to be equal, there is something equal in them. (p. 9).

Romanticism

The concept of romantic love references "a plurality of Romanticisms" says A. O. Lovejoy. (Singer, 1984, p. 283). There are variations of romantic idealism which affirm the idealizing in love believing that the ideal can be achieved countered by a romantic realism which confirms the consequential yearning and suffering of idealizing a love which cannot be requited because it is "too perfect" and therefore strictly unrealizable. This latter idea is characterized in Medieval courtly love although that is not the only form of courtly love.

Romanticism "knows" the magical, perfecting power of love and cuts across the boundaries constructed by categories noting differences. As an example of an equalizing force, love between persons perhaps bridges, if not overcomes, the inequities of power structures (or human dis-empowering structures). This point is the primary reason radical feminists deny the existence of authentic love between men and women. That women are disadvantaged by their "status" in the culture is the condition which prevents equality in "love" relationships between men and women. Participating in a transmission of the traditional culture by conforming to the pattern of love puts a woman at risk in a two-fold manner. Following the expected standard, a woman subsumes herself within a system which devalues her in favor of her male counterpart. By complying with a

"devalued" role she recreates the pattern. Thus seen, love is a form of oppression which cannot exist, truly, until social conditions are just. In the Middle Ages, this suspension of the conditions separating "unequals" was a possibility with the advent of romantic love.

For the courtier, his mistress is a physical, tangible existence, an existence substantive in a sense quite different from a metaphysical idealization. Yet in one form of courtly love the object remains, poignantly, at a distance from the desiring lover. The courtier in being unable to consummate the love relation with the idealized, transformed the passionate desire into noble service in honor of the beloved. Love was the source of heroic action. The mystical ideal could be engaged or realized in one's servitude to the perceived good. The transforming of passion for good is a Platonic theme.

By means of this concept (of love), romanticism continues the idealistic tradition that sees a meaningfulness in nature, that treats this meaningfulness as basic to spiritual longings definitive of man, that finds love to be their greatest exemplar, and that considers the pursuit of love worthier than any other interest. (Singer 1984, pp. 284-285).

Signalling the value of individual freedom to choose,
Irving Singer says that courtly love was a response to the
lack of freedom which inhered in the institution of mariage
as an economic and political "tool" in the Middle Ages. The
institution protected property rights and property rights

created marriage arrangements. So the matter of selecting a "loved mate" was a counter movement within and outside the marriage institution prospered in the realms of courtly love. (Singer, p. 29).

Singer in his volume on "Courtly and Romantic Love" from the trilogy The Nature of Love speaks of both traditions a striving to "humanize the love" of religion and mysticism (p. 10). The ideal of the love of God and seeking unity with God becomes an "ideal erotic love" in Medieval courtly love and modern romanticism beginning in the 18th century. The concept of merging, the experience of one-ness with the ideal is the thrust of "idealism"; but the ideal in courtly love extending into later forms of romanticism permitted an ideal that was not suprahuman, that rather enabled the suprahuman in heroic deed.

Where love, love of Good and of God, had resided as properly the concern of men and love was appropriated in friendships among men, in Romanticism the feminine idealization is no longer concealed. In the possibilities afforded the love relation in the shifting of the ideal from the Platonic realm of the Good and the God of religions, Romantic love "permitted" women the participation of being "idealized" as the beloved and of choosing a lover-mate.

In courtly love, woman tends to take the place of God or the Good. In much of Romantic love she displaces the male as the one who is truly capable of loving. (Singer, 1966, p. 376).

With lightning retrograde speed Singer continues,

But what is a woman in love? Is she a Biblical Eve in league with the devil, as the church fathers thought, or a lovely angel through whom divinity expresses itself? (pp. 376-377).

Whether the male is the idealized love of the female or the reverse, the idealization creates the realm for "heroism and fidelity".

Romantic love presents itself as a search for equality betwen the sexes, each having access, jointly and reciprocally, to its own type of heroic action. (Singer, 1987, p. 4).

Commonly, the "romantic" notion of love portends the metaphor of starry-eyed confusion. The confusion, described as a blind of feeling, is a containing shield from which one awaits her "sport". The guiding concern within this notion is to prosper good feeling, to enlarge upon the sensate of experience. Gould says of the "Romantics",

We tend to think of the "Romantic" movement as best characterized by a rosy vision of a never-never land. But the far away and long ago were cherished by the "Romantics" not because they liked the world as it is, but because they hated it --- felt it was ugly and meaningless. It was inevitable, therefore, that a serious attempt to be honest would mean to the "Romantic" a recognition of the sordid, the petty, and the stupid. And so, in many tales the tragic couple is set down in a world picture "realistically" in a new sense, a world of brutal officials, vicious fathers, grim back alley, broken windows, refuse, and meaningless ill-tempered conversation. After all, the sentimentalro- mance set in an impossible fairyland and a realistic novel or film (in this new "Romantic" sense of realism) have this in common: both find that the old high seriousness and beauty do not exist in ordinary life as it is lived today, and both agree that the highest, most serious, most beautiful thing is still tragic love(p.11)

The Platonic tradition would confirm the confusion of

this form of romanticism as being due to the situatedness of desire or passion in "the body" rather than from the soul. Without the strength of reason to override the undiscerning desire of the body the person is ruled and doomed to the chaotic impulses. The significance of the object of desire is in its "endurability". Quoting Singer,

This assurance that pleasures of the flesh are vain and inconsequential because their objects do not last has always characterized Western moralists who desired oneness with some infinite and eternal being that would never change or disappoint. (1984, p. 263).

It is the dichotomy between reason and passion, mind and matter that Romanticism in its essence overcomes in this desire for merging.

In the Romantics as a whole, love is a metaphysical craving for unity, for oneness that eliminates all sense of separation between man and his environment, between one person and another, and within each individual. (Singer 1984, p. 288).

The Platonic voice would speak, I believe, to the qualitative distinctions in the unity of being---to a hierarchy of good---according to the level from which one selects the potential object for the subject-object merging. The "craving for unity" pictured in the Phaedrus in the conflict between the appetitive and the eternal emphasizes the necessity for the guide of reason which supplants "undiscerning feeling".

One facet of romanticism seeks to infuse all of life with pleasurable experiences of "the appetitive". An emphasis upon the physical in strong contradistinction with

the metaphysical of the previously discussed construct brings to bear the sensual, erotic focus given through this perspective. The concern for happiness expressed through accentuating the pleasurable defines those experiences not upon what one can expect, consequentially, but rather entertains the pleasurable immediacy. Suspending the consequentialism which overrides immediate impulse in considering the "record of the past" and the effects of this moment's decision into the future releases one from the rules of a hierarchy of concern for a higher good.

Consequentialism presupposes a hierarchy of good with the mediating power of reason as the agency for harnessing passion toward that which endures, is "worth-the-while".

Patterns of idealization developed from physical beauty and material wealth displayed in contemporary courtship center upon "apparent worth". Other characteristics which may contribute to the well-being of relationship are devalued in emphasizing the "apparent". Outer beauty, externalized wealth (possessions) signifiy a duality where the winning hierarchy satiates concern for inner qualities such as beauty of character (immaterial possession).

Cynically, then, romanticism may espouse a concern with surface "good", with the apparent. The duration of relationship is relative to the duration of appearance and artifact. Thus women, especially, and men, increasingly as we elevate cosmetic virtue in the culture, fear the loss of

youth. With it goes the loss of the lovely and hope for partners in love and/or sex. Lovelessness is nigh unto aloneness. Emphasizing the relative reductivism of a pragmatic culture Van de Vate says,

Romantic rhetoric is keyed to the drama of courtship. It celebrates youth, good health, and vitality. places the highest value on sexual attractivenes.. This quality is of course not universally possessed, and the aged conspicuously lack it. Americans tend to perceive one another as potential sexual partners and rivals and tovalue one another commensurately, a tendency unrelentingly reinforced by commercial advertising. Neglect of the aged is a direct consequence. The old man, the old woman cannot play the romantic hero or heroine. Ugliness and infirmity unfit them for the parts. Having no future worth speaking of, they cannot live happily ever after. Possibilities cling like lint to the young nd sexy, but the old are a bore. (1981, p. 74).

The romantic cynic "knows" the surface values of the material aesthete are slipshod. Time will not be outrun and the pretense is its own devastation. Perhaps from here the call to attend to what is real is heard. The responses are manifold. In the existential voice of Buber, "All real living is meeting".

A romantic existential view of love evolves from a pervading sense of meaningless. This sense is not one prompting anxiety and despair in the loss of life's purpose, but accepts and adopts a "present focus in feeling" so as not to offend the credibility of the claim that to live is to feel and takes feeling as the import for living. The strongest sense is that love is tragic. Gould says,

The Romantic...feels that unhappiness is probably an essential part even of love at its best. The lover seems to know that failure, misery, and death are themselvessomehow a part of his desire. (1963, p. 101).

If one is to live with good feeling then that is the awareness guiding one's life-moments. One entertains the good feeling in those moments. And those moments of "good-feeling" are not bound in the travail and suffering of enduring the hardships of waiting for the perfected object of one's desire. The value of the immediate reward has no captive power if the immediate is its own reward. For the romantic, there is "love for love's sake. When no thing is to be expected, to be gained in this experience of the moment the event is what it is now, to be made no more or no less in comparison with events lodged in the past.

Existentialism

With some abridgement of the romantic view the philosophy of existentialism speaks. Again the emphasis is upon the present moments as they constitute our lives. The concern for the authenticity of the individual arises from confronting the reality of life. Each faces death (alone?). With the inevitable in mind, the ever-present truth of being, one may ask, "How ought I live?" Yet the anxiety of confirming the chasm of one's life. I am alone. Nel Noddings in her book, Caring counters that the fundamental awareness is not existential anguish arising in knowing our

aloneness---the guilt (spatial disjuncture, out here all alone, forgotten), but a joyfulness arising in rekindling the basic fact of our interhuman relatedness. To extend ourselves "in time", to deposit ourselves in memory traces, children are born and communities are "serviced".

Confronting this truth of the brevity of personal existence one may engage those given moments as destiny. Herein lies possibility for loving to create an ethical reality.

The focus upon the authority, freedom, and responsibility of the individual set the existential themes. Buber's thought is the focus from which the themes will be considered. At the heart of the concern is the human address which delivers the present in presence. Yet, exclusive concern for "the present" destructs in nihilism or suspends the Eternal. In the dialogical relation arises the reality of holding open the present, a waiting upon the Eternal which is neither a hiding of the future or a killing of the past.

CHAPTER 3

ENCOUNTER: ARC OF RELATION

Introduction

This chapter will look at the role of love in contemporary culture. In attempting to set the experience of the dialogical as the unfolding realm of love, this section is based from the philosophy of Buber and draws example from Noddings' book, Caring.

A critical theme of this paper involves the notion that positioning oneself within experiences of hierarchy "conditions against" the encounter in relation. The essence of this contrast counters an emphasis upon a structural a priori hierarchy determining the forming of relationships. Rather the intersubjective realm of the dialogical supersedes humanly constructed divisions of power and unfolds the common ground of meeting. This suspension into "receptive openness" is explored through a form of epoche.

"...the future of man as man depends upon a rebirth of dialogue" (Pointing the Way, p.222).

Martin Buber's philosophy has been called a philosophy of the narrow ridge. His thought conceives the realm of the interhuman, the ontological sphere of the between. What we can say of reality is addressed from being in relation. This is in contrast to an orientation which conceives reality as held within each human being in his subjectivity or an orientation toward the independence of an "objective" reality with which one is at variance. "The between" is constituted in relation. It is the realm which is neither exclusively within or without.

Buber wrote that the potential for relation exists within realms of nature, persons, and God. Those relationships are shaped by the situation created as the subject's experiences in situatedness <u>against</u> another or with the other. Love, as it generates a particular kind of situation, may be experienced as developing one's ability for entering into relation.

Each human being lives within a world of personal endeavoring. In degree we each engage the task to make ourselves immortal, to achieve lasting contribution or recognition, to participate in the eternal. A sole concern for "immortalizing" achievements may restrict our involvement in the day-to-day, the everyday. It is a means for escaping perhaps the particularity of each day as a

numbering of our time here, a numbing against its fleeting passage. Focusing upon the future or minding the significance of the past takes us from the present. The impulse to live meaningfully, its source and resource, lies in the dialogical relation. It is the relation through which human being is sustained and from which human being extends itself in creating wholeness.

To deny the potential for a fullness of response is to persist in an attitude, a mode of participation against the world, which lessens humanity and restricts the humanly possible. It avows a separateness from the world which refuses reconciliation. In abstinence the potentiality of self is withdrawn leaving a self in partialness, in abstraction.

The Dialogical Principle

How is human life realized? Distance provides the human situation; relation provides man's becoming in that situation". (Knowledge of Man, p.64)

Buber's philosophy of dialogue is presented through contrasts of the I-It relationship and the I-Thou relation. The world of human existence does not harbor separate realms for the relations of the word pairs I-It and I-Thou; yet the world is twofold as man addresses an It, a Thou, as two modes of his being. The experiencing subject when regarded as object, a being purposed by another, exists as an object among the objects within the human environment. The

individual as a self which has realized an orientation from which she is both an experiencing subject and the subject of experience, hence self-objectified, forms an "identity" of self as both subject and object. But the subject-object polarity within the experiencing self, the individual as an objectifiable subjectivity, does not comprise the individual in the wholeness of being. The distinction addresses more specifically a directionality determining one's experience as it is centered on the concern for "objectivity" (control) against the more encompassing concerns as they enter through "experiencing the other side" as it exists for the other in the relation. The latter is characteristic of the "life of response".

Knowing a world in relation differs from the relationship of the subject-object distinction. Subject and object, in their distinction, are abstractions. Man as man sets the world at a distance, knows an environment in which and upon which he acts. Man, in his becoming, enters into relation with that which is set apart. Living in Thouness, living toward "genuine wholeness and unity" is the reality of presence as it enters through the relation.

Only the view of what is over against me in the world in its full presence, with which I have set myself, present in my whole person, in relation---only this view gives me the world truly as a whole and one. For only in such an opposition are the realm of man and what completes it in spirit, finally one. So it has always been, and so it is in this hour. (Buber, Knowledge of Man, p. 63).

The I's of Relationship:

As mentioned in chapter two, Kohanski contrasts the I's by describing the I of the I-It relation as intent upon the "ordering" of the world. The activity of setting apart and noting that which is apart for its utility, how it may be used or serve one's needs, is characteristic of this I.

Through Buber's construct of distance and relation I understand the I-It relation as consituted from the forming activity of an "I" which distances and brings to distinctness the "not-I". The concepts of distance and relation, for Buber, are bound together within an understanding of the twofold capability of humankind to know a world in the "distancing" and to enter into relation with what has been set apart. Maurice Friedman in The Life of Dialogue points out that the I-It relationship is not synonymous with distancing. Distancing presupposes both the I-It and I-Thou relations. "Maintaining" the distance eliminates the "turning toward" which is an accompaniment of pure relation. Friedman describes the I-It as resulting from a "thickening" of the distance from which the act of turning fails to occur.

The I-Thou, as it is given in the turning toward and entering into relation, is characterized by mutual presence of presence, each present in mutual exclusiveness. In coming to be, the I may exist as It for another or may be received "as Thou" becoming Thou for another.

The I of the I-It as a shaping force of a world of human experiencing contrasts against the I of the I-Thou which yields an orientation toward deepened relatedness expanding the realm of human encountering. The distinction in the "shaping force" of human encountering was intended in the illustration from Elie Wiesel cited in chapter one. Recalling the story, the children in bondage were used as material and means for building their captor's empire. The image bears the truth of the consequences of a strengthening mode of I-It conditioning. Utilitarian consciousness forgets its connection with "the whole" and will damage and destroy that and those excluded from its venue.

Positioned as subject one engages what is external with varying expectations. One observes the world. One acts upon or "toward" what is other. That the realm of human activity responds in small degree to the general expectations or intentions of the individual does not lessen the power for those projections to establish the situatedness of the individual as object rather than subject. By this I mean that the individual, in her power toward desired "results" and sought responses which may correspond to perceived needs and wants, may--if unable to attain or achieve those results--be lessened into "itness" against the strenghthening "I-ness" of one who more capably exercises her intention within the subject-object interaction. In the Buberian sense, how might the distance

separating subject and its object be met? To express this attitude as concern for the relation intends openness and actualizes vulnerability. Is love the agent that enables a strength yet effects a weakness, as well?

The relations of I-It and I-Thou, in their contrast, support the alienating effect of an impulse to maintain hierarchical systems and ways of relating. Buber's emphasis upon the dialogical principle helps us to see the inherent dehumanizing quality of our capacity for "objectification". Yet, our participation in the world if we are to authenticate the realm of our existence requires a process of setting apart, of differentiation, for a "self". Apart from the process of living which confirms a self in relation a concern for differentiation proceeds as a dividing and disconnecting of our being rather than the coming into wholeness as one enters into relation. Differentiation as a process of furthering the stages of separation "with the world" cannot refine a self-knowledge of one's uniqueness, one's difference.

Each relation characterizes participation in the world in a fundamentally distinctive manner. The I-Thou relation is a relation formed through mutual recognition between individuals, a relation "suspending" the time-conditions held within sets of preceding and proceeding expectations and requirements issued one to another. The I's of the I-It and I-Thou relations, then, represent a dual nature in

being of the individual and denote an attitude, an orientation "toward" the world. The duality exists through the address made in partialness, the <u>I</u> of the I-It relation and the address of wholeness, the <u>I</u> of the I-Thou relation.

The "immediacy" of the I-Thou moment, in the sustaining of Thouness, is manifested in deepening awareness of the present situation within which one exists with "what" exists in its independence. The "awareness" is held within the relation. The I of the I-Thou relation participates through that relation in exclusiveness and independence. separateness which makes possible an arising of the realm of the "between" is not the space of the I-It within which expectancies are mediated. In pure relation one comes to know participation within the "world order", an order that is not created "upon" the world but is delivered within or "correspondent" with man's being with other beings. In the subject-subject encounter, each exists as the creative void that in confronting, creates a world. "It is from one man to another that the heavenly bread of self-being is passed." (Buber, Knowledge of Man, p. 71).

What is Common:

Common within our experiences is the wish to be affirmed in our difference, in our singular uniqueness. To be noted, to be seen in our separateness is at once, for Buber, an including in relation. Recognition occurs in the

immediacy of seeing; hearing mediates the immediacy. In <a href="https://www.nc.nc/mowledge.com/

what we express through "meeting", in communion, may enter in silence---may reside at the threshold of dialogue, may be spoken. It is brought forward in the address of another, in the realm of the communal. It is essential, for Buber, that we prosper the communal. As the communal is born from the realm of "the between" it is dependent upon our openness to confront, to see and honor the other in their particular uniqueness in the particularity of the moment. Unity and uniqueness are bound within the common. They are held within the common and not within the single, isolated experiences of the solitary in situationlessness. It is within the common that we encounter the unconditioned, the ineffable, that which cannot be contained.

...out of the moment Gods there arises for us with a single identity the Lord of the voice, the One" (Buber, Between man and man, p.15)

Through our capacity for communication, we are reminded of and acknowledge the common ground of human being. Man, in his situation in dialogue, may then encounter the "moment gods".

As human beings, different from all else within creation, we can know a world in relation. This relation is the response, if yielded, for man's becoming. This impulse toward wholeness, becoming, is not to be won in a oneness of self-being. Buber's call is toward a realization of unity in being as it occurs in human encountering. The oneness in the mutuality of address and response between self <u>and</u> other is the bond of conection strengthening and redeeming the world of our human existence.

The "lived concrete", then, is a focal point for Buber's thought. This domain is not an isolated realm belonging to human beings in their separateness, individually and collectively, but arises between persons as they confront one another in the present moment of their situation. As we meet as thou for another, potential for relation exists in the realm of encounter. To be participatory in the world, to confirm relation, is a self-giving that is self-preserving. This cannot proceed otherwise, as I understand Buber. There is no self to contain, apart from the self that exists through openness in "meeting" another, the inclusive exclusiveness.

In Thouness toward another the dialogical principle unfolds. From this realm, which contains more than a composite of the "two", each in reciprocity makes actual in immediacy the being of the other.

...by the sphere of the interhuman I mean solely actual happenings between men, whether wholly mutual or tending to grow into mutual relations. For the participation of both partners is in principle indispensable. The sphere of the interhuman is one in which a person is confronted by the other. We call its unfolding the dialogical. (Buber, Knowledge of Man, p. 75).

Buber addresses how man, in his capability for the dialogical relation, may live more completely as who he is. As man, the category humanum, humankind is called to the genuinely human in "the longing for perfected relation or for perfection in the relation" (Knowledge of Man, p. 163). The dialogical relation, is the responsive realm through which humankind addresses the yearning for connectedness, for wholeness. What is to be said and must be spoken, as only "that one" can, accompanies man's fully entering into relation. Apart from this there is no real speaking and hearing as a unity of understanding and response.

There is the "activity" of saying and listening which in their alternating yield a construct of expectations, a set of commands, an ingenious plan, a wall of refusals. It is possible and likely that two or many, may discuss at great length and in grand detail a situation, a set of circumstances. Each may contribute to the forming conversation having in mind its course, a hopeful outcome. Skillfulness in directing the flow of conversation may achieve the expected results: Conversation has been used and functions to affect the thought and behavior of another.

As a tool it is applied to direct, encourage, coerce, persuade, convince, confound.

Without genuine dialogue, an exchange of information can occur, but without direct speaking, communication is partial. The conversation contains what has been withheld. In the withholding, the restriction of the ground of genuine meeting, there can be no relation of completion. And too, the withholding may entreat the ground for meeting which exists through the yet unspoken word. The word, that which is applied, that forming "in common", is the material (of the) world.

And too, there is the human necessity to retreat in order to renew the manner of one's involvements in the world. To extract oneself from the realm of encounter into the confines of a deepening interiority "lessens" the world apart from a return. The retreat, the exclusion, which denies an out-reaching inclusion takes or draws life from the world. We sustain an impulse to be held or bound in the singular, the exclusivity of an I, of a "we" which performs as an I. The conditions of solitude, monologue, and situationlessness lead to an entrapment in the I-It. These conditions are partial descriptions of the ways we further "our" disconnections among ourselves. If we cannot face one another then we have failed to meet the challenge of human existence: The hallowing of the everyday.

The calm urgency in Buber's writing rises in his call

to be present to life, present in living. This cannot occur in exclusion. The concreteness of the moment as it is given in our "meetings", the mutuality of presence, brings us into completion, wholeness.

The life lived dialogically is lived in communion. It does not know the profit of explanations as they limit the being and becoming of another. We cannot explain, nor understand, as fully as we may encounter.

The Ontology of the Interhuman

Buber's thought as it concerns the human condition does not utilize "the between" as a philosophical concept to "bridge" the divisions of self (subject) and world (object). "The between", for Buber, is an ontological sphere; it is the existential reality from which humankind deepens in trust and understanding its relation one with another, with nature, with the source of relation.

Buber reminds us that the I-Thou moment as it happens occurs in grace. The grace of that "moment", if preserved, opens us toward the realm of encounter. Memory cannot confine it; nor can one "expect" the moment. The I-Thou encounter as it occurs or enters within I-It experiencing is characterized through qualities of presence, directness (mutuality, reciprocity), and ineffability. Even though the moment of the I-Thou cannot be sustained within the time-conditions of I-It experiencing, Thouness---an openness

consciously realized in faith and trust---sustains the spirit of the I-Thou encounter. Turning toward another, and that movement in reciprocity, enables "the realm of the between", the sphere of the interhuman. It is generated in the mutual address and response of one with another. It is the realm through which the essential relation is delivered.

Buber, in the movement of his thought "beyond" the mystical tradition as it encourages exclusion, directs a turning toward the world. This world of human encountering is no less mystical. The "turning" emphasizes the potential for connection and completion as the turning is met within the shared situations of human living.

The primacy of the relational capacity for human beings lies in its import to forge through personally shared commitment a restoration of being. It is critical within our collective existence that we develop and promote an awareness of our separate being, our separateness as a species within the created order; yet more fundamental and where we are returned is the profound unity of human coexistence, if we are to exist. Buber in his essay "Distance and Relation" writes,

He who turns to the realm which he has removed from himself, and who turns to the world and looking upon it steps into relation with it, becomes aware of wholeness and unity in such a way that from then on he is able to grasp being as a wholeness and a unity; the single being has received the character of wholeness and the unity which are perceived in it from the wholeness and unity perceived in the world.

The quote continues,

But a man does not obtain this view simply from the "setting at a distance" and "making independent". These would offer him the world only as an object, as which it is only an aggregate of qualities that can be added to at will, not a genuine wholeness and unity. Only the view of what is over against me in the world in its full presence, with which I have set myself, present in my whole person, in relation---only this view gives me the world truly as whole and one. For only in such an opposition are the realm of man and what completes it in spirit, finally one. So it has always been, and so it is in this hour. (1965, p. 63).

Rather than a lapsing into self-sufficiency---the illusion of independence which hardens the distinction between self and others---the realm of the interhuman as it comes into being arises in the call of being and lives through the indwelling call. The embodiment of the call delivers us ever toward "meeting". The realm of the interhuman comes to life in a conscious attending to that existing beyond the bounds of the self. This positioning in the world---as living directed toward another recognized as an independent existence---is unsustained. There is openness that recedes in self-reclusion and openness enclosed in meeting. We experience moments of freedom or free ourselves from the restraints of our expectancies upon "the world", or another, as that hold upon the other is suspended and the opportunity for "meeting" is granted. The mutual turning toward discovers again the discontinuous. The saying of It apart from Thou confirms a world in spiritlessness. Spirit is denied or moved beyond the bounds of the real and itself becomes objectified as something, a

goal to be achieved or a realm to be "naturalized".

The brevity of the I-Thou moment as it occurs cannot be caught or contained but rather delivers <u>us</u> toward the dialogical life, a living that opens against the certitude of self-seeming, mine and yours, and awakens us to the actual being of another. It is characteristic of this mode of being that one "allows" an unfolding realm of possibilities as they exist and are drawn from the ground of meeting as it forms. It is a willingness to open "toward" another, to suspend the certitude of self-limits through which we construct a boundary between the possible and the impossible. Again quoting the Indian philospher Haridas,

...when we discover a spiritual truth, that the one we love is not an object but a subject with an intrinsic value of his or her own, we find love lifted to a higher level of consciousness. This is the genuine I-Thou relationship where both parties stand on a footing of equality, with respect for each other, with regard for the sanctity and freedom of each other. (1987, p. 64).

The "higher" realization is a leveling of "constructed" circumstance. Intensifying intentions, expectations, conditions magnifies the I-it realm as a reactive domain: one "thing" appears to set up or bear upon another. We are compelled to explain and understand. What we learn of conditionality within I-It experiencing may diminish our responsiveness, and heighten mistrust. Mistrust is a barrier to encounter.

That we perceive a self in relation with other selves

and existent objects reflects the continually transpiring effects of a conditioning awareness. The productive end of this awareness acquaints us with how we perceive a likeness with and a difference from something else. To attend to what we share "in common", and noting that this commonness contains the commonness of individual difference, lies at the heart of relational understanding. It directs us toward the concerns for mutual well-being which cannot be spoken from understandings drawn from a synthetic comparative. It is, I believe, more fundamental that our efforts to understand the world of ideas and experience through the dialectics of discourse, proceed from the connection "made" in the development or recognition of relation and that the condition of relation leads us toward the experience of the unconditioned.

To allow oneself really to be limited by the Thou is important, but is may be much more i portant to lay oneself open together with him before the Unlimited that limits us both. (Between man and man, pp. 218-219).

Disconnection is a connection in the gulf of the unspeakable abyss of human unknowing: an embeddedness in the fertile womb of life. Mooney writes,

We know we need a view of a life which is life-giving, we need again, to be creators of our future, we need to be growing perosns, we need transcendence of the separation, an integration, where we can find a core of union. We need God to be within us: We need the same for nature. We seek to realize this unitary structure. This is our underlying. (Journal of Creative Behavior, 1967, p. 268).

Caring:

Noddings' book, <u>Caring</u>, is a study of ethics written from a feminine perspective. Care, says Noddings, is basic to the species therefore a feminine ethics is founded upon it. "Human caring and the memory of caring and being cared for...form the foundation of ehtical response." (p. 1). The perspective posits the significance of a regard for relation in assuming a nurturant responsibility in the relationships of one's life. In discussing the ethic of caring, Noddings provides contrast to the masculine perspective which presents "ethics" within a hierarchical geometrical construct. In following mathematical form, the masculine ethic "has concentrated on the establishment of principles."

One might say that ethics has been discussed largely in the language of the father: in principles and propositions, in terms such as justification, fairness, justice. (1984, p. 1).

Referring to Logos, Noddings says ethics has been guided by the masculine spirit. She calls Eros the feminine spirit of psychic "relatedness, receptivity, and response." The terms she uses to indicate the directionality of responsibility within relationship are "one-caring" and the "cared-for". The pairs denote a feminine and masculine distinction but are not gender specific. The ethical relation of caring is presented through the characteristics of "engrossment and motivational displacement". These terms describe experiences of being related with another in a mode which

regards, considers, and responds to the situation with the other rather than egocentrically displacing the other. Engrossment signifies commitment and deepening responsiveness toward another. Motivational displacement signifies the non-impositional relation "space", the nonobjectified ground of human caring. The terms are not contradictory. To be both engrossed yet aware of sustaining the ground-space of relation is to be "totally and nonselectively present". (p. 180). Living in relation is the basis for human well-being. We long for the caring of relation. It is a longing that Noddings says we must acknowledge and further "we must commit ourselves to the openness that permits us to receive the other". (p. 104). Perceived as "good", we strive for it and in so doing are inclined toward that good which brings forth goodness in being.

Picturing the consciousness of love:

Love as an expression of feminine wholeness is not possible in the dark, as a merely unconscious process; an authentic encounter with another involves consciousness, hence also the aspect of suffering and separation. (Norton & Kille, p. 145).

This statement belongs to Erich Neumann. He wrote in reference to the Psyche and Eros myth. The story tells that Psyche was wounded by the arrow of the love god, Eros, as she prepared to kill him.

The story begins as the beautiful Psyche was to have

been wounded by Eros' arrow at the command of his mother Aphrodite to cause Psyche to fall in love with "the vilest creature" because Aphrodite was jealous of Psyche's beauty. It was an unseemly characteristic for a mortal to contest the venue of a goddess. Seeing her, Eros is captive to her beauty and rather than following the command of his mother takes her to live with him. He comes to her only at night; she as his beloved, and he, unknown to her. The secrecy of his identity is the vow she has made to gain his protection rather than live the loveless life Aphrodite destined.

Her sisters, lonely and mourning her death, eventually are heard by Psyche and are allowed to visit. They admire her "new life" but persuade her that her absent lover, a creature of darkness, must be horrible. She must, therefore, destroy her captor. Reluctantly Psyche conspires to see her lover. During the night she lights an oil lamp with the intent of killing him but instead sees the lovely Eros, pricks herself on his arrows at their bedside, awakens him with a splash of hot oil in her surprise, and loses him in breaking her vow. She is at once in love with love that is lost.

It is not until Psyche experiences Eros as more than the darkly ensnaring one, not until she sees him (he after all has always seen her), that she really encounters him. And in the very moment of loss and alienation, she loves him and consciously recognizes Eros. (Norton & Kille, p.143).

The Concept of Epoche

The concept of epoche will be presented through the notion of attending to the presuppositions of beliefs and prejudices which give us a world. Attending is both making aware the presuppositions and constructing from them the intentions to undergird or reconstruct the presuppositioning. Releasing the frame creates an opening for change or for conscious acting which furthers what may have otherwise been "accomplished" without examination.

Man is able to deal with the world because he is able to discriminate, to sort and typify his perceptions, to give meaning to his experience, to retain the epoche of the natural attitude in regard to past expreirnes, and to seaprate that which seems relevant to the immediate problem from that which is not. (Webb, 1976, p. 58).

The concern for seeing "the conditions" which set the environment of living assumes that humankind intends the world to become a world reflective of human interest in well-being.

The epoche as an "act" of suspension parallels the phenomena developed in Novak's book, The experience of nothingness. The experience of nothingness arises, he says, in the breakdown of our cultural myths collectively or when our personal experience can no longer be articulated through the culture's dominating myths which determine a consensual reality. The experience, the ontic "breakdown", can thus throw one into despair and anxiety if there can be no reckoning from the dissipation of one's prior accepted

reality into a reconstructing "processual" reality. Then too, the dismantling of the cultural veils is rendered a necessity for developing one's conscious, ethical action in the emerging-world.

Novak locates the experience of nothingness as the primal ground of ethical inquiry which generates a dynamic framework for moral living. From the nothingness an arising "moral" consciousness in its concern for increasing well-being informs our selections of a world. The moral consciousness arises from noting the possiblitities for choosing and exercising the capacity for discriminating an appropriate course of action. As reflexive process the examined choosings by which we structure our living become the field of inquiry from which we can "better" project and select an appropriate range of actions.

Cautiously this "attendant refining" is also the avenue perpetuating the urgency to achieve a better myth for the culture which in no way creates "the good life" but in the grandiose style of technological efficiency may earn the culture its demise. If an arising moral consciousness depends upon a developing capacity for critical reflection, perhaps memory will serve "us" too well and what I or someone else calls moral consciousness is just a pattern of behavior reinforcing the structure of prejudice, injustice, and other "social ills". The individual's capacity for reflection is not a private affair. What resides within my

consciousness must be informed against larger sets of alternatives that are constructing as living philosophies within our cultures and among our traditions.

Novak characterizes moral consciousness as dialectical. The experience of nothingness may reveal a breaking with "worn-out" or "ill-formed" dependencies upon common beliefs and practices but the experience of nothingness falls short of its creative dimension if it fails to lead us toward living in relation. This is the ground of renewal for human being. To live well, to know happiness within our relationships, may be a blessing bestowed upon many who would know nothing of the struggle to aspire toward a moral consciousness. In Novak's analysis the moral consciousness is exemplified in knowing the source of one's personal strength in a living that moves beyond the limitations of self-helplessness toward the strengthening of being in relation with---belonging among---in order that each human life is known as significant for its potential to reveal life's experience as only that life can.

Novak stresses the seeking after unity, aim, and purpose as that predominating our culture's life this century. He emphasizes that value is known of things and others according to their utility to the culture. Basing our "reality" upon technological achievement we are vested in notions of mastery. As we conquer nature, thus the world, we know hope as the pragmatic means for making

ourselves better and better, moving us beyond our source for becoming. Devoid of concern for why we must sit in control of the world, we plunge toward the void. Externalizing the mystery to an objectified unknown we focus our energies outward into the infinite abyss that we expect will yield its secrets to our restless conquering minds. We forget that each of us participates in the world as a world of being through the mystery of human existence. The meeting and sharing of lives, the awareness of presence that affirms being--mine through yours--is veiled by a cultural reality shaping lives to fit the scheme of technological progress. The aim as "uniting toward progress" diminishes the chances for an enlarging sense of unity. Rather than knowing ourselves as organically related with a world "apart" from us, be that individuals, nature, the eternal--Novak stresses that the popular myth of our day teaches us to know ourselves against ideals of efficiency, performance, and control. The busyness we must maintain to advance the "cause" serves us well. Through this myth we are shielded from our haunting souls that will remind us of the meaninglessness of existence gone mad in its betrayal of being for the sake of mindless doings that preserve the technological order.

Although Novak does not use the terms redemption and conversion as components of the experience of nothingess it is clear, I think, that he honors the experience in its

capacity for turning the individual toward an examination of his or her life. To note the taken-for-granted, to see it as humanly constructed myths by which we live, is to have an awareness that can plummet one deeper into the solitude of abiding. Here one can wait, can belabor the futility of choosing anthing, can merge into the void by avoiding.

Dwelling here, rootless yet bound, all is open to negation. Within these confines, the possibilties for negation as a avenue toward realizing something will not be allowed. In this position the declaration, "There is Nothing!" is left unspoken. To disengage "the world", reality, is to risk no return. The experience of nothingness is that upon which the return is sought.

Seen as the primal ground from which all cultural myths emerge and return, "nothingness" constitutes an experience positing the forming power held within each person that struggles toward the freedom to fashion a life. In the questioning, the outlining of choices, the informed choosing, the critical reflecting, the self of the individual emerges. I claim my existence. Through the fragility of my identity there can be authentic reaching into the world. This is the self that exhibits the freedom to consider its unknowable existence.

From this place, the ever-present nothingness, opens a world of meaning. Out of the bindings of myths that capture and constrain a reality, the experience of nothingness works

to overturn the captor and liberate its captive spirit.

Knowing the impermanence of our constructions reality is made fluid. Without conscious anchoring through the experience of nothingness the fluidity of reality breeds madness. Yet Novak, among many, says we have become mad through our technology divorced from a moral framework that sanctifies individual lives who know a community of spirit. Four values arise from the authentic experience of nothingness which lend renewal to its affirming presence.

These are honesty, freedom, courage, and community.

The experience of nothingness, says Novak, is the source from which there can be a steady visioning. quality of existence alters its focus from materialistic acquisitioning toward a concern for the nature of authentic being among other beings. The visioning is directed within the present rather than focused outside ourselves in order that we have the means to deny our human condition. credo of his text, "There is no better way to live than faithful to the experience of nothingness." In this attitude we grant the realness of existence that bears responsibility for its choosings. The boredom and anxiety that protect and scare us from this realization give way in the exercising of the freedom to choose with integrity; courage strengthens. The life of inquiry is a life of commitment. It belongs to the living that reveals a sacredness of shared commitment by which we communally stake the course of our lives. Echoing Dr. Mooney,

I would demonstrate, if I could how "love" and "live" are a one-spelled word, LOVE.

Love is borne in a commitment in openness to another.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS

Relationship is structure, is hierarchy---the family of man. And myth is the language of another level, the language of the sacred, the language in which are written messages from a higher world, calling us to that world and even indicating the way. It is a language we have almost forgotten, and we had better be careful not to lose it entirely if we want ever to learn how things really are. (Dooling, Parabola, p.46).

I have grown up, academically, in an environment where there is a fundamental concern for considering the ways we, the american culture(s), promote and defeat the dignity of being human. The voices of the departmental faculty, in their passion for enabling awarenesses of and critical responses to this concern, frequently re-ask the question "What does it mean to be human?" Enfolded in the meanings of culture, of human being, is the desire to love, to be loved.

The work of constructing this paper has given me the opportunity to consider the nature of forms and the structures of experience. Love is just one of the varieties of human experiencing. This study speaks supportively to the ideas conceiving love as our primal constitutive ground, the living "stuff" of the cosmos, the fiber of our beings.

Where I leave this work in terms of the interests in form and structure is with a degree of clarity for the consequences of our engagement with the world when we act

from a stratified consciousness upon a divided world. The world and human being is narrowed when the rule of competitive experience is played out. The range of human possibilties, the realm of hopes and dreams, is scaled asunder through comparative reasoning made mechanical in its "aim" toward human efficiencies. Therefore human experience breaks down as it is made "contestable" against another's. Human thought granulates reality when the form of priority is an analytical judgment disconnected from the unfathomable mystery. And spirit hides when quest becomes method for achieving a mystical moment.

What I have felt most alienated by and resisted in confusion is the setting apart or objectification of love as an extant absolute which continually escapes us within the temporal or exists momentarily as a Christian status quo experience one attains to safeguard personal existence beyond the temporal. Certainly this teaching feigns the importance of embodying the unconditioned as a turning toward another in recognition of his or her humanness within the temporal and sustains, rather, the adage that "love is blind". It "sees" according to its wants. What is wanting, thus wanted, may represent what is self-gratifying. This agentic fails to stimulate our individual concerns toward the collective body of humankind and its companion life-forms.

To separate "from the world" develops the

particularization of ego-consciousness. This movement, while necessary, must exist as a prelude to a personal awareness of universal concerns for a unity of human of well-being if we are to encourage a global concern for well-being in love rather than determining global suicide. This reflects a personal orientation that the Christian community, in particular, not lose the living essence of agape while racing toward the teleology of Armageddon. We have become acclimated to the language and action of offending and defending.

Strategy sets both rhetoric and a course for attending to conflict and its management. It is naive to assume that conflict will find its final resolution and absurd to think it won't. If we accept, as given, that the human dynamic proceeds through the dual aspects of tension and rest then we accept that tension and conflict may erupt into war and that war and peace are states unevenly punctuating the human sphere. It is interesting to think of human culture as moving in waves, in alternating phases of calm/stress, peace/war... Again, this gentle metaphor bears no promise other than a unity in final conflict as the final resolution. In the language of the imperative: We must consider how we may learn a course for living and embodying a middle ground of nonviolence and nonhate leading toward the prospering of a human realm of lived-love, Dr. Mooney's "LOVE".

David Loy speaks to the essence of the reconciliation of the oppositions. In his book Nonduality he writes,

When we rise above the dualities——the dualities of pain and pleasure, joy and sorrow, love and hatred, good and evil, we have a unified vision of reality, free from all dichotomies. This is nondualism. And nondualism is accompanied by the spirit of nonviolence. Then we have in the true sense of the word a revernece for all life. We completely eliminate from our nature any lingering vestige of violence and hatred. (1988, p. 66).

Love is a central concern both within the individual experience of a human being and for the developing integrity of human culture. As we give expression to our individual and collective commitment for caring we learn a deeper sense of responsiveness one to another which undergirds and emerges as the reality of community and the spirit of communion. Thus the common idea and hope for communion integrates forms of discourse upon love, joy, and peace.

Talk of war and hate will not be transformed with any significance to talk of peace and love until we speak of ourselves as people who fight, who seek control and want to possess, who hate the differences we see in others and will condemn our very souls with an arsenal of protection.

Unless our political discourse speaks for our common human spirit, it lacks constructive power.

John Dewey links what is <u>common</u> with what enables <u>community</u> and <u>communion</u>. Writing in <u>Democracy and Education</u> Dewey says, Men live in a community in virtue of the things which they have in common; and communication is the way in which they come to possess things in common. What they must have in common in order to form a community or society are aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge-a common understanding-like-mindedness as the sociologists say. (p. 4).

Dewey spoke forcefully to the import of an acknowledged interconnection among human beings. The lead sentence of "My Pedagogic Creed" resounds the credo of what education "I believe that---all education proceeds by the participation of the individual in the social consciousness of the race." "Participation" indicates inclusion and the individual is the exclusive being molded from the matrix of the culture and bringing to bear his or her actions within the forming of the culture. The relationships are dynamic and organic. Seen as a realm of "becoming", examination must discern the nature of that becoming. What are the consequences of the forms of becoming? For Dewey, this question must be met "in common" to discern the tendencies and intentions of human action to preserve and direct human progress. Without communication to inspire shared goals, to remind the culture of its interconnection in being and becoming, non-direction prevails.

For each of us to consider the nature of the social consciousness, the environment of human life, and the interiority of personal experience "in conjunction" for their desired coherences and necessary contradictions, then, is both privilege and responsibility. From the examination

of the private and public realms: dreams, hopes, aspirations (personal and collective goals) can be expressed. Constructing ideals "in common", giving and receiving the separate expressions, makes possible an attending to the direction of realization those goals will determine.

Yet, in practice there is little guarantee that an exercise of "conscious realization" of the culture will not become mechanized in form. "Pre-setting" intentions derives deterministic results. Ideally the attempt to direct toward desired outcomes protects against the "happenstance" of undesired probablilities. The danger of systematizing the response to being lies in falling captive to the method. This is certainly the condition of technological consciousness spawned from progressivism. The technological transmutation breaks from the essence of Dewey's emphasis on the primacy of communication which gives community and communion.

To think of the world in exclusively oppositional terms and to act within the world oppositionally is to forfeit a human privilege to endow the world with our human creative energy. To think of our relatedness to the collective history of humankind is to bear relationship to the good and evil it has embodied. It is good that we increase our responsibility for alleviating pain and suffering. How may this be done?

Conquer the world?! It has no conqueror.

The question becomes, "Who are we to be if we are to be? (as we ought)? This concern will not be met by political superstructure. It will be broached among individuals who are relational in thought and deed and who, in doing so, inspire our global well-being. This is the force of the dialogical. The dialogical is not the same as love, says Buber. But it is the unfolding realm for love and love, a movement unto well-being.

As we become mindful, thoughtful of another, human culture manifests a responsiveness which ennobles and enriches our shared living. Or, it selects our collective destruction when we become narrowed upon our ability to do without consideration upon why and the attendant consequences. To know and attend to the human environment consciousness divides, "prioritizes". The a priori of love is subsumed in the advance of human enterprising. If the culture is "de-spirited" then the encounters of spiritlessness are love-less.

The dialogical relationship is instructive for enabling a vision of a world which is strengthened through a developing sense of human involvement and shared commitment, vitalizing to the individual, his and her relationships, and a collective spirit of communion. What we accept as a special characteristic of love is the experience of unconditioned relation, its uncertainty and freedom. It is

the venue of self, revealing and growing.

So, the Peaceable Kingdom is prophesied, is due. Who are its deliverers? Communion transpires in the spirit of dialogue encouraging the voices and response of many. The effects of political hierarchy neutralize some: power functions to that end. Power is outer and intangible and beyond the personal grasp of the individual. This is the typical form and experience of the hierarchical. Power is transmuted by authority. The "powers that may" eclipse the enlarging domain for interhuman response-ability. Denied power, we are deadened.

We have come to believe that we can do as we please with everything we see, that we can change forms of life, including the human---and eliminate some of them, even human races, that we consider inferior or that get in our way. But this idea that we are alone on top of the heap is the worst, most dangerous superstition of all. We need to recover the knowledge that the universe is a structure of dimensions, like the family, and relationships within and between these dimensions; and beyond and above them all, a very powerful mystery. (Dooling, Parabola, 1984, p. 46).

The gradation and stratification of hierarchies cannot exalt the few of political, economic, spiritual (religious) elitisms and degrade the "rest" to lesser status. Any selection of empowerment must function to protect those for whom we shall and must be responsible as with the metaphor of the Good Shepherd. That responsibility extends to those for whom we share a mutually caring relation and others who must be cared-for in the culture and are established in that relation in mutual trust. Responsibility, the dialectical

relation of authority and freedom, is the generative possibility for linking the realms of hierarchy. Encounter reintegrates the power, the neutralizing is neutralized. The dialogical relation given in encounter is "the place" of the hierarchical in its sacred sense.

The mythology of pragmatism which prevails in The American Dream is to be successful, to "make it". Within the guise of a competitive framework, love is just another arena for "making it". The technological consciousness endangers human beingness when individuals serve in command to a greater cultural need for "progress". The command of the collective which ignores the vitality of individual lives, forces a utopian scheme, one that subverts interest in a present alive among the moments of shared living. When the collective focus is fed by the outcomes of materialistic production and consumption—outcomes disconnected from any viable realization of better living among the whole" of the collective——pragmatism bifurcates itself from "cultural ideals" which may guide and direct (humanize) its outcomes.

However love is constituted, it cannot emerge in reciprocity in a competitive, restrictive situation which diminishes human regard for one another. Shared ideals are necessary to developing characteristics reforming individual lives and the human environment. Thus the concluding return to Buber's philosophy of dialogue.

What is not solidly pronounced in my writing about

Buber is the situation of the dialogical as the realm for human conscience. In keeping with the concern for attending to the intentions and consequences of our individual and collective actions Buber, too, speaks of the significance of direction. To lose the connection between "what one is and what one should be" is to be without conscience (Friedman, 1976, p.111). It is, too, a loss of direction and a loss of relation.

It is entering into relation that makes man really man; it is the failure to enter into relation that in the last analysis constitutes evil, or non-existence; and it is the re-establishment of relation that leads to the redemption of evil and genuine human existence. Thus at the heart of Buber's philosophy the problem of evil and the problem of man merge into one in the recognition of relation as the fundamental reality of man's life. (1976, p.101).

Buber's philosophy reminds us of the necessary power in human "meetings" which counters the likely trap of mechanizing the human agentic into systems and methods of progress. Opposed to the forceful intentionality of technological progress---the surging to become---the meeting of "face to face" encounter keeps before us who we are. The poles of who we are and who we are to become must not be forfeited lest we succumb to evil.

Transposed to the social sphere, the pervasive loss of direction and relation dissolves culture. Writing of the dissolve, Friedman says,

Evil, for Buber, is both absence of direction and absence of relation, for relation and direction as he uses them are different aspects of the same reality. The quote continues,

The man who cannot say Thou with his whole being to God or man may have "the sublime illusion of detached thought that he is a self-contained self; as man he is lost". The clearest illustration of the ultimate identity, for Buber, of evil as absence of direction and evil as absence of relation is his treatment of "conscience". Conscience, to him, is the voice which calls a man to fulfil the personal intention of being for which he was created. It is "the individual's awareness of what he 'really' is, of what in his unique and non-repeatable created existence he is intended to be". Hence it implies both dialogue and direction --- the dialogue of the person with an "other" than he now is which gives him an intimation of the direction he is meant to take. This presentiment of purpose is "inherent in all men for the most part stifled by them". (1976, p. 103).

Dialogue is the human quality which endeavors to deliver us from an intensifying objectication of a distanced world. It is the reality constituting the dis-covering of the binding of being. Further clarified,

The absence of personal wholeness is a complement, therefore, to the absence of direction and the absence of relation. If one does not become what one is meant to be, if one does not set out in the direction of God, if one does not bring one's scattered passions under the transforming and unifying guidance of direction, then no wholeness of the person is possible. Conversely, without attaining personal wholeness, one can neither keep to direction nor enter into full relation. (1976, p. 106).

And too,

Man is the creature of possibility who needs confirmation by others and by himself in order that he may become the particular man that he is. (pp. 107-108).

The call to faith as a holding open for the recognition of who we are in our humanness can only be seen and acknowledged in the realm of encounter. This realm

magnifies its potential in patience and compassion as we hold open the realm of possibilities for what we, as humankind---the keepers of the human task to create, nurture, and know a world---can and ought become. The holding open, the faith, is inspired through the patience of love---a uptopian-realizing, generative consciousness. That we have the capacity for realizing what is life-giving, generative, is our most humanizing gift and is, at once, our creating link, the Hieros Gamos, to Creator/creation.

Dr. Mooney's poem "We Need A Nuclear Mind" inspires further thoughts regarding the generative, the reactivating life-engaging interplay with the world.

We need an all round nuclear mind, perceiving life in nuclear form in a universe born of a nuclear one to produce nuclei strong in countless array, as time moves on and composing is done to maintain the one in harmonious form as creation moves on through the moments that come as the time of the day.

It's a matter of patterns and waves that emanate from each nuclear core to give to each moment a place in a wave, and each position in space a locus to form by the vectoring force of radial rays of the waves as they come from their nuclear source and resonate then with others of kind to compose the ones that they make in the song of the whole of the one the universe makes. composing along, creating its way through the space and the time of each day.

The poem, too, suggests the notion of the epoche. The suggestion comes through reading "nuclear" as new-clear. It links with the Lockean "tabula rasa", the pristine mind, ever re-newing the interconnection of the unique and the universal which seems to me to be characterisitic of a love-consciousness. Perhaps "pristine" affects the imagery of a return to The Garden, into an unknowing. This hints upon the significance of the epoche in relation to dialogical experiences. To see before us what is other in it otherness and Thouness is to be mindful of that one's experience. The reality of the epoche is toward a firm awareness of the other as that awareness may be brought into the interhuman

relation rather than "projected upon" the other as a prior, confirming knowledge of who the other is. This seems the struggle: to engage the dialectical interplay between our forming categories (which makes experience meaningful) and suspending the limitations (inherent restrictions, prejudices) of those categories.

Recalling a section of chapter two: In that none are excellent in all things, we are each called and are responsible to bring to bear our individual excellences and in so doing to recognize goodness, the particular excellences, in others. The tenets of faith that support an ethical consciousness may be revealed through living which recognizes and reverences the dignity of being human.

Opening toward another in authentic meeting is perhaps the hopefulness within the world that carries us beyond "an insanity that is the sane response to a world gone mad". As critical reflection is the means for questioning the conditions and values of human existence, an ethical consciousness informs the valuing. Ought the consciousness in and of love be addressed as that revealed through the manifold dimensions of human well-being?

The concepts of the dialogical principle, encounter, and relation further pragmatized as sustaining the ground of the dual nonduality support a personal identification with the whole of being which preserves identity as a separate consciousness. Believing the "nonduality of being and

becoming" admits an openness, a receptiveness engaging the separate identities of "the other" and the mutually transforming interaction.

I close this piece with good feeling that the work of my doctoral committee and departmental faculty embody the concern for life-building. I have felt inspired and sustained through the course of my graduate program due to the departmental focus toward well-being in the human environment. This, I feel, is the sacred purpose of our becoming and one wholly situated in the struggle of being and becoming who we are to be.

What could be a higher purpose than "reflecting" the image of Good? The or an image"? Whose image? I image an image of myself as an image of god and I, and the world, suffer its distortioning. What could pose more problems and obstacles than cleaning "my mirror"?

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