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CURRICULUM AND COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS: SPECULATIONS ON
INDIVIDUALISM, COMMUNITY AND COSMOS

The University of North Carolina at Greensboro

Ed.D. 1985

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CURRICULUM AND COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS:
SPECULATIONS ON INDIVIDUALISM,
COMMUNITY AND COSMOS

by

Richard C. Pipan

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the Faculty of the Graduate School at
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Doctor of Education

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Approved by

David E. Ruppel

APPROVAL PAGE

This dissertation has been approved by the following committee of the Faculty of the Graduate School at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro.

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This study joins the work of a number of contemporary curriculum theorists who are attempting to foster a "language of possibility" for education. The impetus for this study is derived from, and the first chapter addresses, the paradoxical modernist situation where both increasing technological innovation and individualist approaches to development and competence have resulted in a world poised on the brink of catastrophic nuclear war and social disintegration, alienation. This study, then, examines the emergence of modernist, technical rationality; social, political and philosophical frameworks which situate this present historical moment in incommensurable paradigms; and the curricular implications of modernist culture.

Curriculum theory, as it is approached in this study, is portrayed as **an interpretative science** -- a critical and expressive endeavor which attempts to promote human understanding and meaningful action in both practical and liberative intents. The second chapter draws upon the recent re-emergence of philosophical hermeneutics as not only a research methodology, but as a sophisticated and systematic interpretation of the normative dimensions of human interests and knowledge.

The third chapter consists of a hermeneutic interpretation of five contemporary curriculum theorists (Henry Giroux, Maxine Greene, James B. Macdonald, Dwayne Huebner, and William Pinar) for their significant and divergent contributions to the expanding horizon of theory

development and praxis. Each of the five theorists is examined in light of their conceptual frameworks, interpretative methodologies, and impact upon the public discourse of the emerging field of curriculum theory as well as this author's understanding.

The last chapter of this dissertation examines contemporary philosophical developments which point beyond objectivity and relativism, beyond epistemological constructs, to a new rapprochement occurring in human science. Human agency and consciousness are situated within an ontological condition which offers an ecological view of not only human behavior, but human being. A normative framework of **communitarian ethics** combined with strategic considerations of **behavioral ecology** are suggested as a curriculum orientation to **distributive social justice**. Implications for curriculum research and practice are discussed particularly as they consider contexts beyond school-based practice and focus on the human possibility for affiliation and community.

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DEDICATION:

This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of James B. Macdonald.

IN MEMORIUM

During our time together we did not have occasion to lead a very regular life: even at the abbey we remained up at night and collapsed wearily during the day, nor did we take part regularly in the holy offices. On our journey, however, he seldom stayed awake after compline, and his habits were frugal. Sometimes, also at the abbey, he would spend the whole day walking in the vegetable garden, examining the plants as if they were chrysoprases or emeralds; and I saw him roaming about the treasure crypt, looking at a coffer studded with emeralds and chrysoprases as if it were a clump of thorn apple. At other times he would pass an entire day in the great hall of the library, leafing through manuscripts as if seeking nothing but his own enjoyment (while, around us, the corpses of monks, horribly murdered, were multiplying). One day I found him strolling in the flower garden without any apparent aim, as if he did not have to account to God for his works. In my order they taught me quite a different way of expending my time, and I said so to him. And he answered that the beauty of the cosmos derives not only from unity in variety, but also from variety in unity. This seemed to me an answer dictated by crude common sense, but I learned subsequently that the men of his land often define things in ways in which it seems that the enlightening power of reason has scant function.

Umberto Eco, The Name of the Rose

The world today is divided into ideological camps. The adherents of each tell us with great assurance where we're at and what we should do about it. We should not believe any of them.

Peter Berger, Pyramids of Sacrifice

Three miles above, a jet converts the refined residue of generations
of plants and animals to thunder and linear clouds,
swift movement, transportation.
And in the space above and below,
the human threads of meaning are cast:
connecting molecules to morality,
reason to rhythm,
speech to silence.

And so it is, this thread is spun from the stuff of the world,
woven into a fabric or macrame of myriad designs,
entangling some, supporting others who cling
to precipice and promontory in search of insight
beyond reason, beyond expectation, elusive, grand.
And these lines drawn from yet another wool gatherer,
seek to convey the transfer of craft,
and the regeneration of promise,
that wraps us in funeral shroud and swaddling clothes alike.

Ah, the MEANING of the world:
mean as brutal,
mean as of humble antecedents,
mean as intermediate value,
mean as no count,
mean as instrumental medium,
mean as a purpose or intent.
All these and all homophones, antonyms, roots and negations,
adverbial and adjectival forms,
connected in semantic and semiotic systems
thick in resonance, counterpoint and harmonic.
And the tracker reads the signs left by a fellow tribesman
who is wise to his being wise to his tricks
(leaves tied to ankles, brushing sand in print,
aging the trail but not obliterating it),
and the best we can do
is be wise and awake.

The MEANING of the world:
all the cast off and collected meanings,
the associations,
institutions,
cells,
forgotten correspondences,
half-illuminated shapes as well as sun and moon shadows,
whispers and overheard conversations,
pronouncements,
pregnant silences,
moments and intervals,
tides and timelessness.
The stretch of impatience,
the sublime and macabre,
the letting go while loving.

And so it is that the passing from this world
to the next,
borderless and binary at the same time,
shuttles the thread through infinite warp and woof,
curving back upon itself,
like nervousness in a funhouse,
until we too find trail and design
in this cosmic memory
residing in the quotidian.

Richard C. Pipan, 22 November 1983

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INTRODUCTION

The currents coursing through the field of education in the United States during the past thirty years have ebbed and flowed with tidal force, but perhaps without a regularity that the metaphor implies. The Fifties swelled with curricular reforms drawn by twin moons: the grotesque moon of McCarthyism and the glittering beacon called Sputnik. Blacklists, technological shopping lists, nationalism, and corporatism converged to set a powerful agenda for a unified approach to a new educational mandate: American education must organize, systematize and administer its intellectual and physical resources if it was to remain dominant and presumably free in the arena of international affairs. Leadership was to be achieved through an unholy alliance of technological innovation, political conservatism, and moral fervor. Thus, a culture of control emerged where political demagogues conducted an American Inquisition, industry and labor turned its back on the women who "manned" its machines during the Second World War, racial segregation was more deeply entrenched through the legislative process, and the American Dream scattered suburbs across the landscape. A curricular response combined a concern for administration and control with a renewed vigor in traditional subject disciplines.

The Sixties plunged ahead in the chill of Cold War, the surge of Civil Rights Movements (and liberation movements throughout the Third World), and emerging descriptions of developmental psychology, moral development, social and political theory. The voices of protest, of

humanism, of "alternatives" sparked dramatic social, political and cultural revolutions. Open schools, free universities, students' rights, desegregation all blossomed in a gush of possibility. But the surge left many stranded on the beach of change, and while some newly won freedoms took root in the sand (especially the offshoots of civil rights and national liberation movements), others withered on the vine. The Seventies tested this uprooting, and the culture of narcissism, the "me-generation," emerged as hothouse flowers whose roots grew in an artificial medium and whose fragility we are just coming to recognize: alienation, escapism, anomie, and suicide attest to the stunted roots grown in such a contrived environment.

This dissertation is a response to these various currents in American culture; it is a response to the contrived and superficial environment of individual change, the atomization of collective interests and collective consciousness into hyperbolic self-interest; it is a response to the triumph of scientism over science and a response to the hegemonic quality of instrumentalism and normative relativism. More than a response, this dissertation offers an affirmative argument for affiliation, community, ecological strategies for change, and social justice.

In Chapter I, "Individuation and Alienation," I trace two streams which converge to form a perilous environment: the first stream named "Modernist Culture and Pedagogy" examines the social, political and cultural conditions which have given rise to the presence of alienation and exaggerated self-interest in curriculum designs. I explore the

emergence of curriculum frameworks which situate the individual as the primary unit of analysis and practice and examine this emergence in light of the human needs for **community, engagement and dependence**. The second stream, "Conceptual Logic," traces the historical development of conceptual frameworks which have influenced the formation and legitimation of various forms of human knowledge. The section examines the rise of positivist science, the connection between human interests (variously defined) and knowledge, and the normative ambivalence of technical rationality. These conceptual and cultural developments have led to what some theorists have termed the contemporary **crisis of understanding**.

Chapter II entitled "Hermeneutics: The Recovery of Meaning in Human Science" explores this contemporary crisis of understanding in terms of the philosophical approach of ontological hermeneutics which both counters the pervasive monomethodological approach of scientism and introduces a revisioned possibility for interpreting human knowledge as a dynamic, historical continuity. Philosophical hermeneutics is examined for its metaphysical representations of reality, its normative dimensions, and its contribution to increasing the emancipatory possibility of human inquiry and collective consciousness. Curriculum theory is examined as an interpretive science which, consistent with hermeneutic philosophy, seeks improved communication, the transcendent possibility of **truth, meaning, and understanding**.

In Chapter III entitled "Curriculum Theorizing: Reflections on Aims, Purposes and Praxis -- A Hermeneutic Interpretation of Selected Texts," I examine five contemporary curriculum theorists who have made important contributions to the field and have been most influential in my own development as a theorist. Each is interpreted specifically with regard to what he or she has to say on the selected issues of **alienation, individualism, and collective interests**. Henry Giroux's work is examined as it contributes to a revisioning of Marxist analysis and attempts to locate a new language of possibility which recognizes the collective nature of social, political and cultural forms in terms other than classical Marxist categories of class, economy and labor. Maxine Greene's existential philosophy emphasizing the agency of the individual as project-maker is examined especially in light of her more recent comments regarding the importance of the "public domain." James B. Macdonald's work, with all its breadth and depth, is examined as it specifically has identified the central importance of **interpretation** in curriculum theorizing. Macdonald has clearly been the formative influence on my own theorizing, and I attempt to trace his emergence as an influential presence in the field as well as my own consciousness. Dwayne Huebner's sensitive portrayal of temporality, the ontological condition of human being, and his powerfully evocative depiction of "structures of care" are examined as important concepts contributing to a counter-alienating pedagogy. Huebner's attention to religious traditions and spirituality offer a distinctive perspective on historical continuity and consciousness. William Pinar's theorizing is

the last to be interpreted because some of the more vexing problems concerning liberative pedagogy, self-interest, and alienation may be found there. Pinar, whose concept of reconceptualization has emphasized the importance of freeing oneself from both personally and socially distorted meanings, applies literary critical and psychoanalytic approaches to interpretation. His passionate attacks against oppression in all its forms, has provided the field with a pyrotechnic intellectual figure. Pinar's work is examined especially for his concept of "currere" which discusses a possibility of "transbiographic" meaning.

Chapter IV entitled "Rapprochement: Transcending Methodological Solipsism -- Speculations on Democratic Pedagogy," traces the contemporary philosophical assaults on the concept of epistemology, a renewed discussion of metaphysics, expanded units of identity and practice which might attend more fully to the behavioral ecology of human choice and change, and a discussion of normative dimensions of communitarian ethics and social justice. Self-interest is juxtaposed against social and collective interests to provide both a critique of individualism and an appeal for a renewed commitment to social justice and community.

I. PROBLEM STATEMENT: INDIVIDUATION AND ALIENATION

A. MODERNIST CULTURE AND PEDAGOGY

One can say almost anything about human culture now and it will be true, for everything is going on at once: from the test-tube disappearance of sexuality in procreation to the new explosion of sexuality in creativity; from the disappearance of the nation-state to the explosion of nationalism in Quebec, Wales, Scotland, and the land of the Basques; from the appearance of a new radicalism to the resurgence of a new conservatism; from a planetary miscegenation to a new tribal racism. Yet one thing is not happening in America: we are not growing together, but are polarizing every conceivable condition to its extremes. It is as if only the energy created by the violent polarization of the old had sufficient power to drive the new evolution of man.

William Irwin Thompson

When Shakespeare's Hamlet stated that "Something is rotten in the state of Denmark," he alluded to a pervasive sense of malaise, a sensed perception not easily grounded upon facts, but rather an intuited understanding that something was not "right" with the world. While it may be vague and tenuous to begin a dissertation based upon such an intuited uneasiness, there is a sense that, to be honest about my concern for the "state of the curriculum field," I too am operating under the apprehension that "something is not right in the world"-- in this case the world is not only the bracketed domain of curriculum

theory, but the cultures which for lack of a better, more definitive term, constitute the the modern world. My inquiry into the nature of speculation and discourse within the field of educational theory springs from an uneasiness and dissatisfaction with prominent themes, motifs and conceptual frameworks. I wish to state explicitly and at the outset of this study that my research and inquiry emerges from accumulated years of experience in a number of educative environments. The problem which I am framing for consideration in this dissertation is one which is personally meaningful, debated to some extent, but just as often, submerged under other preoccupations -- usually technical or of a particular "disciplinary" nature -- in curriculum literature and which, to be frank, remains a perennial problem. I seek not to come to a once-and-for-all resolution of the debate, but simply to engage my energies in the effort to increase understanding in complex issues of intellectual and social change.

This dissertation has become a somewhat terrifying intellectual challenge. A significant part of the challenge, and the terror, comes from reading articulate and penetrating philosophers, historians, political scientists, social and cultural critics and theologians. This challenge calls for the integration of rich and fertile expressiveness. I take some solace in a comment made by Professor John Grote (in McDermott, 1967, 1977) of Cambridge:

Thought is not a professional matter, not something for so-called philosophers only or for professed thinkers. The best philosopher is the man who can think most simply.... I wish that people would consider that thought -- and philosophy is no more than good and methodical

thought -- is a matter intimate to them, a portion of their real selves...that they would value that they think, and be interested in it In my own opinion there is something depressing in this weight of learning, with nothing that can come into one's mind but one is told, Oh, that is the opinion of such and such a person long ago.... I can conceive of nothing more noxious for students than to get into the habit of saying to themselves about their ordinary philosophic thought, Oh, Somebody must have thought it all before (p.487).

So it is that I am driven to reconcile two somewhat contradictory (and ironically complementary) processes in this study: the first being the desire to examine, in intimate retrospection, my educational experience; and the second, the felt need -- that required of "good and methodical thought" -- to examine an expansive literary heritage in order to document the intellectual foundations, conceptual frameworks and arguments informing curriculum theorizing. Thus, the selection of motifs such as "individuation," "alienation" and eventually "community," comes from the resonance of these motifs as they are found in the discourse among curriculum scholars, and with my own sensibilities and experience.

To begin with, then, by juxtaposing individuation and alienation, I am not implying that these concepts are diametrically opposed to one another; rather, that these are processes and states of being which, when examined for their potentially dialectical relationships, reveal important dimensions of personal growth, socialization, and collective experience. This juxtaposition, however, as it appears in a critique of educational activity, and specifically the discourse within the field of curriculum theorizing, is an attempt to uncover assumptions,

implied and expressed beliefs, and conceptualizations which may be better understood by the pairing of these motifs.

When William Irwin Thompson (1971) suggested that "It is as if only the energy created by the violent polarization of the old had sufficient power to drive the new evolution of man" (p.x), he is touching upon the basis for this critique of educational theorizing: it is from a perspective of the world in extremis that the more subtle gradations of change, the nuances of meaning, and the slight though influential shifts in direction of human culture may best be perceived. Taking Thompson's cue that it is, perhaps, only when we face catalytic limit situations that the energy for radical revisioning occurs, I will then seek to convey the salience of these "limit situations" as I am and others are (or are not as they case may be) perceiving them. While it is my intention to portray the extreme polarization affecting and reflected in curriculum theorizing (and my engagement in this process), I have found it difficult, as Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur have suggested it is necessary to do when engaging in phenomenological research, to "bracket" the study and take a "distanced" point of view. I fear that this "distancing" may lead to the inadvertant situation where, as Thompson has suggested, "the expatriot can only achieve identity at the cost of self-distorting excess." With this caveat in mind, I hope to examine not only intellectual and ideological distortions in curriculum discourse -- distortions which entrap rather than emancipate -- but my own, if inadvertant, participation in this distortion.

The impetus for this critique springs from personal interest in liberative pedagogy. As mentioned previously in the "Introduction," it was James B. Macdonald who introduced me to the possibilities of critique within curriculum theorizing, critique which, drawing from a tradition of the humanities and the political and philosophical thought of the Frankfurt School, was to focus on the importance of human interests in the generation of knowledge. The catalytic role of the work of Jurgen Habermas (1971, 1973) on the ideological nature of human knowledge, the philosophical contributions of Hans-Georg Gadamer (1976, 1983) in the area of hermeneutic interpretation, combine to offer new perspectives on both the kinds of questions and the scope of inquiry into social, political, philosophical and epistemological dimensions of education and human culture. In a sense, then, I am inquiring into the ideological hegemony which situates the individual at the center of a Ptolemaic universe of educational activity... a universe which is quintessentially conceptual and metaphoric, and is as such yet another "useful fiction" to convey a sense of place in the world.

By "ideological hegemony," I refer to Boggs's (1976) succinct definition:

...the permeation throughout civil society -- including a whole range of structures and activities like trade unions, schools, the churches, and the family -- of an entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs, morality, etc., that is in one way or another supportive of the established order and the class interests that dominate it. To the extent that this prevailing consciousness is internalized by the broad masses, it becomes part of 'common sense'.... For hegemony to assert itself successfully in any society, therefore, it must operate in

a dualistic manner: **as a general conception of life for the masses, and as a scholastic program or set of principles which is advanced by a sector of the intellectuals** (this author's emphasis, p. 39).

I shall be exploring in this dissertation the dualistic pattern of individualism in curriculum principles and alienation, both in a broader cultural sense.

Perhaps one of the most penetrating (if arcane) critiques of hegemony is to be found in William Burroughs' (1959) novel Naked Lunch. The title, suggested to Burroughs by Jack Kerouac, "...means exactly what the words say: NAKED Lunch-- a frozen moment when everyone sees what is at the end of every fork"(p.xxxvii). This arresting juxtaposition reveals a stark moment where every morsel is illuminated, outlined against the murkiness of, as Gramsci (in Hoare and Smith, 1971) defines hegemony, "the lived systems of meanings and values... which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming." Burroughs writes of the development and exploitation of human needs. In his introduction to Naked Lunch, (entitled "Deposition: Testimony Concerning a Sickness"), Burroughs claims that "The face of 'evil' is always the face of total need" (p.xxxix). Total need demands all; it is out of control; it can be bought off only temporarily -- it has been and is being sold.

Burroughs offers as a vivid metaphor of modernist, corporate/bureaucratic society, the pyramid distribution system of "junk" (narrowly defined as opiates, broadly seen as any controlling, exploitive, oppressive system). "Junk" for Burroughs typifies the

distorted power relationships pervading modernist cultures:

I have seen the exact manner in which the junk virus operates through fifteen years of addiction. The pyramid of junk, one level eating the level below (it is no accident that junk higher-ups are always fat and the addict in the street is always thin) right up to the top or tops since there are many junk pyramids feeding on peoples of the world and all built on basic principles of monopoly:

- 1--Never give anything away for nothing.
- 2--Never give more than you have to give
(always catch the buyer hungry and
always make him wait).
- 3--Always take everything back if you
possibly can.

The Pusher always gets it all back. The addict needs more and more junk to maintain a human form...buy off the Monkey. Junk is the mold of monopoly and possession. The addict stands by while his junk legs carry him straight in on the junk beam to relapse. Junk is quantitative and accurately measurable. The more junk you use the less you have and the more you have the more you use (p. xxxvii and xxxix).

In the junk culture, the need is defined by the producer and provided along with the product. The lived system of meanings and values are essentially outside the control of the junk addict -- "The junk merchant does not sell his product to the consumer, he sells the consumer to his product" (p.xxxix). Social relations in junk cultures are oppressive, manipulative, and based on the principle that the system works best when addicts are isolated. Their "needs" pit them against each other in a desperate struggle. Powerlessness underlies all personal identity.

While Burroughs' grotesque depiction of addiction in modern society is cited here for its Boschian graphic clarity and revelation

of grossly distorted human interactions, I feel that it points to the alienation and grotesqueness of aspects of American life which are often concealed under a veneer of attractiveness: designer jeans but inadequate health care for the poor, national defense secured by a strategy of mutually assured destruction. Just as Burroughs has attempted to depict the concept of "need" in an extreme and shocking manner, I find it necessary to search for a portrayal of American modernist culture which can break through the deeply embedded optimism which is so pervasive a part of American culture. Certainly in the Seventies and now the Eighties, I have been struck by the caricaturing emphasis on individual growth and development while, at the same time, the experience of alienation, anomie, and loneliness pervades American culture. This ironic interplay between increased and increasing person-centered educational frameworks and social agendas, and the increasing sense of personal powerlessness and disfunctionalism has been astutely critiqued by Philip Slater (1970) in The Pursuit of Loneliness: American Culture at the Breaking Point. In it Slater states:

I would like to suggest three human desires that are deeply and uniquely frustrated by American culture:

- 1) The desire for community-- the wish to live in trust and fraternal cooperation with one's fellows in a total and visible collective entity.
- 2) The desire for engagement-- the wish to come directly to grips with social and interpersonal problems and to confront on equal terms an environment which is not composed of ego-extensions.
- 3) The desire for dependence-- the wish to share responsibility for the control of one's impulses and the direction of one's life.

When I say that these three desires are frustrated by American culture, this need not conjure up romantic images of the individual struggling against society. In every case it is fair to say that we participate eagerly in producing the frustration we endure -- it is not something merely done to us. For these desires are in each case subordinate to their opposites in that vague entity called the American Character (p.5).

Slater's suggestion that the primary human yearnings for community, engagement and dependence are distorted within a culture which fosters competition, privatism, autonomy and greed, I believe, is central to my critique of the dominant themes and practices in American education. When the curriculum invites educators to develop and perpetuate meritocratic reward systems, competence defined by and applied to "individual achievement," and the development of independent, egotistical pursuit of success, we are confronted with what I believe to be a distorted perception of and prescription for human competence and educational activity.

These three motifs -- **community, engagement and dependence** -- along with the concepts of individuation, collective consciousness, participation, competence, and others, will recur frequently in this critique. They serve as the "touchstones" upon which I will return to integrate the commentary and speculation on curriculum issues. It is ironic that this paper, written in the eighties, relies so much on the effusive writings of the late sixties and seventies. It is as though the flash of brilliant, incisive critique offered by such writers as Slater, Lasch, Marin, Sennet, Berger and Young, has been distanced by a renewed preoccupation with the rhetoric and mechanisms of progress,

authority, efficiency and reform. This ten going on twenty year lag, I hope is not attributable to the memory span of conscionable adults... though the history of social awareness as it relates to or, more accurately seeks to avoid, eras of heightened conflict and social change such as the civil rights movement, the Viet Nam War, student protests, urban riots, and Watergate, probably is worth recalling for its fickleness.

What appear to be conspicuously absent in curriculum literature are statements about the transpersonal or collective consciousness -- the affiliative dimension -- from which questions about moral and ethical behavior, social competence and justice are derived. I have chosen, then, to attempt the task of recapturing the ferment and dissatisfaction with a direction of human events which, by the actions and inactions of a significant part of the population -- including scholars -- are treated as though they are better left unremembered.

It was a comment made by Suzanne Langer (1962) that helped focus my attention on the pervasive and questionable emphasis modern cultures place on individualism. According to Langer:

...what has happened to society, and is still happening, is that the individuation of its parts has all but reached its limit. Society is breaking up into its ultimate units -- single individuals, persons (p.120).

Langer goes on to say that "The emotional effect on people as individuals is that the holiness goes out of all institutions." And this is, perhaps, the cul de sac which has trapped so much of the vital

energy and scarce resources available within the curriculum movement.

Langer draws the distinction, and I believe that it is worth noting here, between individualism and **individuation**, and between individuation and **involvement**. She finds it more appropriate to focus not on individualism as a reified social condition, the individual as discrete and separate from others, but upon individuation as the process and tendency within which uniqueness, self-interest, and autonomy are counterposed against **integration** which allows for the range and directions of human growth and development. What makes individualism and its focal unit, the individual, so problematic, according to Langer, is that such emphases deny or at least discount the essential **involvement** of each of us in species-wide processes. Thus, whether I refer to "individualism" or "individuation," I will maintain in mind the distinction between individuation and involvement that Langer has identified. I shall try to examine both the impact of the concept of individualism on curricular thought, and the processes and conceptual orientations which may lead in the directions of individuation and/or involvement.

A prevailing attitude present within modernist cultures, and especially liberal reform ideology, is that individualism and autonomy are consonant with freedom -- by increasing one's autonomy and fostering the pursuit of self-interest, it is presumed that social relations will be less constraining. Langer, Lasch, Sennet, among others, have called this attitude into question. Another view of the

interplay between individualism and freedom is offered by the cross-cultural perspective cited by Dr. Francis L.K. Hsu (1974), a Chinese anthropologist. Dr. Hsu maintains that:

From the Chinese point of view, freedom is not the first concern. The importance of personal freedom is a Western premise -- it has been from the time of the Greeks. On that premise, people always work for individual aggrandizement, individual sensuality, individual satisfaction. The Chinese have never felt that way. In the old days, the Chinese were supposed to submit themselves to the family and to the kinship group; nowadays they are supposed to submit themselves to a larger group -- a political group. In either case, they consider individualism to be selfishness (p.34).

In their sensitively written article "Revolutionary Optimism: Models for Commitment to Community from Other Societies," Ruth and Victor Sidel (1981) elaborate upon and further qualify the point that Dr. Hsu was making. Instead of the Western preoccupation with autonomy, freedom and individualism (or individuation as Langer has expressed it), the Sidels point to a characteristically different ethic prominent in Chinese society:

Wei ren-min fu-wu ("to serve the people"), to work for the good of the society, seems to be the prevailing ethic, expressed in countless signs and posters and in the conversation of all with whom we spoke in China. In order to understand more fully the role of the individual within the context of this ethical framework, it is helpful to distinguish between individuality and individualism as they seem to be viewed in China. Individual talents are carefully nourished and developed. The excellent Ping-Pong player is given extra help and plays on a local or national team; the scientist receives further training and is provided with facilities for research; the dancer and musician have the opportunity to employ their skills; and the person who exhibits special qualities of "caring" is recruited for medical school or into other helping roles. But these individuals are encouraged to utilize their talents not for their own sake, not for the sake of

individual development and fulfillment, but for the good of the larger society. Thus individuality is encouraged, particularly when it meets the needs of the larger society; individualism is not (p.306-307).

In part, the critique attempted in this dissertation will examine the issue of service and the concomitant value frameworks which frustrate or foster this experience with regard to educational activity, social justice and community.

Conceptual frameworks which situate individual interests over social and communitarian interests (which will be examined more thoroughly in Chapter IV) have been adopted by many who have played important roles in the development of contemporary educational thought. Carl Rogers, for an example, at an ASCD meeting in 1972 made the following statement: "The degree to which I can create relationships which facilitate the growth of others as separate persons is a measure of the growth I have achieved in myself." Rogers, whose work along with Maslow and Allport in developmental psychology has certainly had an impact on the education of teachers in the United States, typifies the tendency of placing individualist, existential growth ahead of communal or collective values. Despite Rogers' use of the word "relationships," his is not an orientation toward humanism in a collectivist sense; rather, relationships serve as a means toward the end of "separate persons" and "growth I have achieved in myself." Humanist psychologists have, in general, placed "needs to belong" -- affiliation needs -- developmentally prior to self-actualization needs. What remains to be explored in this critique is the degree to

which self-actualization is a means and/or end; and if it is largely a means toward some other end, is it an appropriate or effective means; and lastly, what ends other than self-actualization may be considered by curriculum practitioners?

But this emphasis on individual growth and self-actualization can be critiqued on yet another level, on a level which again calls attention to the social and cultural milieu within which developmental psychology and pedagogy are situated. In his penetrating critique of contemporary psychology entitled Social Amnesia, Russell Jacoby (1975) states that:

The shift in social attention toward psychology is no accident; it testifies to a shift in the social structure itself. In baldest terms, the individual psyche commands attention exactly because it is undergoing fragmentation and petrification; the living substance known as the individual is hardening. The autonomous ego -- always problematic -- proves to be no match for the social collectivity, which has at its call alternatively brute force, jobs, television, or the local newspaper. This is no conspiracy; rather it is ingrained in social relations which both nourish and poison human relations. What haunts the living is the specter of individual and psychic suffocation.... (p.xvii).

Thus the shift toward existential, humanist psychology, in part a shift precipitated by increasingly alienating social relations, addresses not so much the fragmenting and oppressive conditions present within these social relations, but offers instead a coping mechanism to bolster the individual against external threats, to redefine the criteria by which one's behavior is to be evaluated and one's sense of competence is to be achieved.

In The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in An Age of Diminishing Expectations, Christopher Lasch (1979) comments on this individualist, inward shift:

After the political turmoil of the sixties, Americans have retreated to purely personal preoccupations. Having no hope of improving their lives in any of the ways that matter, people have convinced themselves that what matters is psychic self-improvement: getting in touch with their feelings, eating health food, taking lessons in ballet or belly-dancing, immersing themselves in the wisdom of the East, jogging, learning how to "relate," overcoming the "fear of pleasure." Harmless in themselves, these pursuits, elevated to a program and wrapped in the rhetoric of authenticity and awareness, signify a retreat from politics and a repudiation of the recent past (p.29-30).

But this ahistoricism, as Lasch has pointed out, is central to the malaise which threatens social consciousness. While I have the intention to engage in an hermeneutic interpretation of the writings of selected curriculum theorists, I shall draw upon theorists (such as Bateson, Lasch, Langer, Slater, and Sennet) outside the curriculum field to assist in this interpretive process. I shall attempt a critique which, as Marcuse has suggested is its role, "re-presents reality while accusing it."

Freire (1970, 1973) has pointed to the task that educators must face if they are to be held accountable for the role they play in the reproduction of a pervasive oppressive ideological hegemony. Freire's use of the term "praxis" refers to the "self-reflective critique of action." It is this self-reflexivity that underlies the entire process of this study. It is this self-reflexivity which has given rise to my sense of there being a distorted conceptualization of human competence

and educational activity which contributes, if inadvertantly, to the ideology of control and manipulation. It is this self-reflexivity which has prompted me to examine the predominance of individual behavior change in curriculum frameworks. As Karl-Otto Apel (in Dallmayr and McCarthy, 1972) has said of pedagogy, it is not merely a conditioning technology, but a process of intersubjective understanding. According to Apel, the hermeneutic process is one which counters pedagogy seen as primarily a conditioning technology:

...pedagogy, for example, is considered to be applied psychology, primarily in the sense of conditioning technology. Since, however, the human object in this conditioning technology is also a co-subject of the educator, the question arises as to whether there must be a complementary method of critical-humanistic education to prevent splitting society into the manipulated and the manipulators. Such a split society would, of course, be the ideal presupposition of an objectifying social science and social technology. It could perform repeatable experiments without being disturbed by a feedback that turn controllable predictions into self-fulfilling or self-destroying prophecies. But the question remains as to whether the humanities, by their very method, should not presuppose a relation to social praxis that is complementary to the ideal objectification of human behavior, namely, unrestricted communication by way of intersubjective "understanding" (p.293).

Apel points to a need to restore and reinforce the "leading interest of knowledge" which has as its aim increased communication (and I might add here, an additional concern for emancipatory action) as opposed to greater prediction and control which are predominant interests of positivist science. By focusing on meaningful action as text in the interest of increasing understanding, an alternative to causal explanation is developed. Thus, to paraphrase Macdonald, if we

are to understand the meaning of curriculum theorizing we must search for the social meaning of the human activity which takes place in that discipline; and if we wish to examine the meaning implications of curriculum theorizing, we must look at the personal activities of those who are engaged in this endeavor. So the shift is away from simply what is presented as curriculum theorizing and toward an examination, explication and interpretation of meaning structures as they emerge from the activity of those engaged in the process. So the hermeneutic process becomes (especially as Cox (1973) suggests in his use of the term "participatory hermeneutics"), a critical-emancipatory social science -- a dialectical process which fosters personal understanding and a sense of participation and membership within a community of meaning.

Karl-Otto Apel has identified how pedagogy if developed as a "conditioning technology" contributes to the alienation of human agency. Apel's assessment of one possible orientation to pedagogy and its contribution to alienation leads us to consider just what is meant by the term "alienation." This dissertation is a study of the interpenetration of alienation and the "sense of powerlessness" which pervades modern American culture and the evolution of curriculum theorizing as it contributes to and/or counters this alienation. By "alienation" I refer to Fromm's sense of the term which he derived from Marx:

...that man does not experience himself as the acting agent in his grasp of the world, but that the world (nature, others, and himself) remain alien to him. They

stand above and against him as objects, even though they may be objects of his own creation (Coser, 1969, p.503).

Within modernist cultures, cultures typified by technocratic and bureaucratic tendencies, human beings are not only made "objects," they are further fragmented in that their social roles rarely call for their participation as whole human beings. Positivist science which separates the subject from object of study, "Taylorization" in the form of scientific management of workplace interactions and labor, the categorization of populations within a social welfare state, Tyleresque models of educational planning and practice, tend to exacerbate the fragmentation of personality into conflicting interests. These conflicting interests are not only to be understood in a political sense, for example as conflicting ideologies, but also in the sense of diverse human interests (such as those described by Habermas, Huebner, and Wolff) which guide personal knowledge and intersubjective understanding. Thus, the technical rationality of positivist science, Taylorism and the Tyler rationale, while serving well the interests of prediction and control, fail to address a more wholistic consideration of human interests which might include such interests as consensus, emancipation, aesthetics and ethics.

The American romantic philosopher Emerson anticipated this fragmentation when he described alienation as being "The state of society...in which the members have suffered amputation from the trunk and strut about so many walking monsters -- a good finger, a neck, a stomach, an elbow, but never a man" (in Becker, 1967, p.3). In like

manner, learning — especially learning "guided" by behavioral engineering, Tyleresque objectives and the press of minimum competency types of education as they are presently used, dissect not only the aggregate of learners into its individual constituent members, but the individual learner him or herself into a repertoire of discrete behaviors more easily modified and monitored.

A further example of this fragmentation is provided by an examination of the connection between pedagogy and therapy. Modernist culture, as described by Lasch, situates expertise and "professionalism" as socially sanctioned status. According to Lasch:

Recent studies of professionalism show that professionalism did not emerge, the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in response to clearly defined social needs. Instead, the new professions themselves invented many of the needs they claimed to satisfy... (p.385).

In a sense, I am referring to (as has Burroughs) an **iatrogenic condition**, a problem which emerges through both the definition of needs and the very processes and "treatments" of needs. The problem of alienation and an eroding sense of personal control, power and competence, causes me to examine the field of curriculum theorizing to see if the development of curriculum in the United States in contemporary times can be scrutinized for possible complicity in these ills. This critical perspective, then, prompts me to ask:

HOW HAVE CURRICULUM THEORISTS CONTRIBUTED TO OR COUNTERED THE PREVAILING CULTURE OF INDIVIDUALISM? MORE SPECIFICALLY, HAVE CURRICULUM THEORISTS CONTRIBUTED TO THE REIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL ACHIEVEMENT AS THE PREVAILING UNIT OF ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE?

I will be examining selected curriculum writings not only for conceptual frameworks and normative orientations which may have contributed to individualist concerns, but frameworks which specifically have tried to come to a consideration and definition of competence which goes beyond the individual as unit of analysis, which enhances our understanding of the intersubjective dimension central to critical theory, hermeneutics and phenomenological inquiry.

When I was trying to explain my interest in analyzing such frameworks to a friend of mine, I offered the following example using "minimum competency tests" as a case in point: Let us say we have a class of 30 individuals who have just taken a competency test. 25 passed the test; 5 did not. My friend commented that to him the results indicated that we had a "partially competent group." I maintained that the test results merely indicated who had and had not passed the test and said nothing whatsoever about the "competence" of the group. And therein lies a considerable problem. If educators are, and I suggest that some are and I like to count myself among those who are, interested in freeing ourselves and others from oppressive conditions; and if, as Buber suggests, "The opposite of compulsion and constraint is not freedom, but communion," then curriculum theorists need to develop more articulate discourse on the subjects of community,

PIPAN, RICHARD C., Ed.D. Curriculum and Collective Consciousness: Speculations on Individualism, Community and Cosmos. (1984) Directed by Dr. David E. Purpel. 335 pp.

This study joins the work of a number of contemporary curriculum theorists who are attempting to foster a "language of possibility" for education. The impetus for this study is derived from, and the first chapter addresses, the paradoxical modernist situation where both increasing technological innovation and individualist approaches to development and competence have resulted in a world poised on the brink of catastrophic nuclear war and social disintegration, alienation. This study, then, examines the emergence of modernist, technical rationality; social, political and philosophical frameworks which situate this present historical moment in incommensurable paradigms; and the curricular implications of modernist culture.

Curriculum theory, as it is approached in this study, is portrayed as **an interpretative science** -- a critical and expressive endeavor which attempts to promote human understanding and meaningful action in both practical and liberative intents. The second chapter draws upon the recent re-emergence of philosophical hermeneutics as not only a research methodology, but as a sophisticated and systematic interpretation of the normative dimensions of human interests and knowledge.

The third chapter consists of a hermeneutic interpretation of five contemporary curriculum theorists (Henry Giroux, Maxine Greene, James B. Macdonald, Dwayne Huebner, and William Pinar) for their significant and divergent contributions to the expanding horizon of theory

development and praxis. Each of the five theorists is examined in light of their conceptual frameworks, interpretative methodologies, and impact upon the public discourse of the emerging field of curriculum theory as well as this author's understanding.

The last chapter of this dissertation examines contemporary philosophical developments which point beyond objectivity and relativism, beyond epistemological constructs, to a new rapprochement occurring in human science. Human agency and consciousness are situated within an ontological condition which offers an ecological view of not only human behavior, but human being. A normative framework of **communitarian ethics** combined with strategic considerations of **behavioral ecology** are suggested as a curriculum orientation to **distributive social justice**. Implications for curriculum research and practice are discussed particularly as they consider contexts beyond school-based practice and focus on the human possibility for affiliation and community.

affiliation, collective and transpersonal competence. Through this revisioning of what the central unit of analysis and educational activity, we might be more in tune with questions of behavioral ecology, the sociology of knowledge, and philosophical and epistemological theories which are exploring the collective nature, potentials and possibilities of consciousness.

B. CONCEPTUAL LOGIC

1. THE RISE OF POSITIVISM

In simplicity or in sophistication man tends to think in metaphors, intuitively drawn from his social and personal experience.

J.H. Plumb

I will call metaphysical all those propositions which claim to represent knowledge about something which is over or beyond all experience, e.g. about the real Essence of things, about Things in themselves, the Absolute, and such like. I do not include in metaphysics those theories -- sometimes called metaphysical -- whose object is to arrange the most general propositions of the various regions of scientific knowledge in a well-ordered system; such theories belong actually to the field of empirical science, not of philosophy, however daring they may be. The sort of propositions I wish to denote as metaphysical may most easily be made clear by some examples: "The Essence and Principle of the world is Water," said Thales; "Fire," said Heraclitus; "the Infinite," said Anaximander; "Number," said Pythagoras. "All things are nothing but shadows of eternal ideas which themselves are in a spaceless and timeless sphere," is a doctrine of Plato. From the Monists we learn: "There is only one principle on which all that is, is founded;" but the Dualists tell us: "There are two principles." The Materialists say: "All that is, is in its essence material," but the Spiritualists say: "All that is, is spiritual...." Now let us examine this kind of proposition from the point of view of

verifiability. It is easy to realise that such propositions are not verifiable.... Metaphysicians cannot avoid making their propositions non-verifiable, because if they made them verifiable, the decision about the truth or falsehood of their doctrines would depend on experience and therefore belong to the region of empirical science. This consequence they wish to avoid, because they pretend to teach knowledge which is of a higher level than that of empirical science. Thus they are compelled to cut all connection between their propositions and experience; and precisely by this procedure they deprive them of any sense.

Rudolf Carnap

Break the pattern which connects the items of learning and you necessarily destroy all quality.

Gregory Bateson

The decline of speculative philosophy is one of the diseases of our culture.

Alfred North Whitehead

The search for knowledge and for precise as well as adequate explanations of human activity and consciousness, as the somewhat sarcastic quote of Carnap has depicted, has lead us a merry chase! The evolution of modern philosophical thought has reflected paradigmatic shifts from "Western Positivism" whose roots originate among the Greek materialists and later include theorists such as Hobbes, Darwin, Hall; to "European Subjectivism" of Rousseau and Spangler, to the more recent phenomenological and experientialist philosophies of Husserl, Heidegger, Ricoeur, and Merleau-Ponty. These later theories have provided a threshold across which contemporary philosophers and social theorists focus on dialectical and dialogic modes of inquiry. These theories not only unite the subject with the "object" of study, but

also unite subjects within communities of discourse and meaning. It is within this last transformation -- the shift from phenomenological and experientialist philosophy to the dialectical orientations characteristic of critical theory, that a renewed consideration of the social construction of reality and of ethical rationality emerge as central concerns and which offer, I believe, the most challenging discourse for curriculum theorizing. Just as Karl-Otto Apel has suggested rather pointedly that pedagogy is more than a technical, manipulative endeavor, so have other philosophical and social theorists addressed the role of technical rationality in human experience and social institutions -- education being a crossroads of all these considerations. In this section I wish to outline various philosophical frameworks which have contributed to the development of contrasting orientations, attitudes and values found in curriculum theory; it is my intention to depict these paradigms in light of the human interests they reflect and their currency among the conceptual frameworks employed by educational theorists.

In their "Introduction" to Understanding and Social Inquiry, Dallmayr and McCarthy (1977) state that:

While man's empirical knowledge in our century has expanded at an exponential rate, however, his sense of purpose or direction seems to have atrophied; although more knowledgeable about the world than any of his forebears, man today is more ignorant or at a loss as to what he and his accumulated knowledge are all about. Confronted with a rationally functioning but ultimately silent universe, he asks the question: what is the point? Viewed in this context contemporary methodological issues reveal their salience and underlying agony: the concern with "understanding" as a type of inquiry results from a crisis

of human understanding (p.1).

This crisis, metaphorically represented, can be seen as the turmoil human beings have entered in a post-Copernican era. Human beings, no longer represented as the occupants of the center of a divinely ordered universe, have been faced with the need to reconstruct teleological and ontological claims. The eclipsed order which had been protected and defended through the authority of the Church, became secularized and subject to an emerging scientific rationality which viewed with scepticism the cosmological model of the universe situating divine intelligence at the center of all relationships and the the earth as the center of God's attention. The introduction of scientific rationality into the descriptions and depictions of the world precipitated a crisis of authority and control. The full force of this conflict between scientific knowledge and religious authority can be witnessed in the Codex of 1616 drawn up by the College of Cardinals in Rome; the translation of which, in part reads:

Propositions to be forbidden:
 that the sun is immovable at the center of
 the heaven;
 that the earth is not at the centre of the
 heaven, and is not immovable, but moves by
 a double motion (in Bronowski, 1973, p.207).

The Church of Rome's response to De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium, (The Revolution of the Heavenly Orbs), by Copernicus was unequivocal and direct -- such a "revolutionary" departure from Church-sanctioned cosmology was to be treated as heretical. The emergence of scientific rationality may be seen as a challenge to

"conventional wisdom,' to an institutionalized world view, and the authority which enforced them. We shall see how the contemporary crisis of understanding results from the triumph of scientific rationality, and how this development which took more than three centuries, created and supported a pedagogy of individualism.

From the earliest roots of Western pedagogical thought we are offered a paradigm of educational activity which separates and potentially alienates the knowledgeable from the ignorant or uninitiated. In Plato's "Allegory of the Cave," the individual separates himself from his fellow men, attains enlightenment, returns to the unenlightened who are unable to comprehend his vision, is ostracized, and is left (as in The Republic) to find solace in his belief that not all men are capable of such knowledge. Some, due to individual talent, breeding, and innate ability, were destined to become philosopher-kings; others will serve the state as befits their autonomous potentials. The "Wheel of Fate," harkening back to Indo-European cosmology and graphically represented in the writings of Boethius for example, offered a cyclical representation of human endeavors which served to situate the individual and his or her suffering within a defined pattern of occurrence and justification. The medieval motif of "The Great Chain of Being," while linking all creatures to a divine order, was perhaps more importantly, a concept which justified hierarchical social arrangements and privilege, the status quo, as both ordained by God and necessarily reconstructed by human social and religious institutions. Medieval monastic pedagogy

(as the term derived from the Greek means the teaching of children) was, indeed, directed toward the training of young boys who were to become the scribes, the guardians of the Word which was complete and true prior to their membership in a monastic order. The Middle Ages and the grim office of the Inquisition reflected the powerful struggle between intellectual and political communities. During the Age of Enlightenment and the Protestant Reformation dissent and resistance to authoritarian control flourished, gained support and political power (or escaped by geographic distance), and offered alternative conceptions of human agency and intellectual inquiry. The Protestant Reformation brought about a new conception of the individual, a conception which combined individual conscience and personal agency through the offices of faith and good works, and placed personal salvation not at the divine threshold of grace, but faith and action. It might be said that the Reformation and Age of Enlightenment ushered in some of the earliest evidence of modernism: intellectual traditions were viewed as problematic, power and authority were seen in a political and historical light, and hermeneutics was developed as an interpretive methodology to recover or reconstruct the meaning of religious texts of previous eras. Becker (1967) suggests that:

With social mobility running rampant, with knowledge proceeding under its own momentum, religion as a common value could not maintain its hold. The Enlightenment that began around 1680 shattered the last pretense of social cement, and a new type of man was born out of the Renaissance: harder, sharper, more incisively rational and skeptical, devoted no longer to God and society, but to knowledge and discovery. By an odd coincidence, the same kind of man emerged after the American Renaissance, beginning in the 1880's (p.5).

The Novum Organum, (New System), of Francis Bacon, a system of "narrow inductionism" which situated experimentalism, systematic observation, and the accumulation of "facts" over subjective reason, intuition and tradition, launched a major assault against metaphysical thought. The scientific method of induction was described by Bacon in his Novum Organum as follows:

But then and then only, may we hope well of the sciences, when in a just scale of ascent, and by successive steps not interrupted or broken, we rise from particulars to lesser axioms; and then to middle axioms, one above the other; and last of all to the most general (in Harris, 1979, p.6).

Through this process of induction, then, theory was to emerge from the empirical evidence gathered by disciplined observation. Thus the roots of empiricism -- and the confusion between how theories and methodologies affect observations -- can be traced certainly to Bacon's influential work.

Somewhat diametrically opposed to the inductionism of Bacon was the deductive rationality of Descartes. While Bacon foreshadowed the empiricists and positivists, Descartes gave rise to the counterpoint of rationalism such as that of Leibnitz and Spinoza. The balance of these alternate methodological orientations, according to Michael Harris (1979) is critical to one's understanding of scientific inquiry:

Science has always consisted of an interplay between induction and deduction, between empiricism and rationalism; any attempt to draw the line on one side or the other conflicts with actual scientific practice. The main function of these alternatives -- besides giving jobs to philosophers -- has been to provide ammunition for

shooting down someone's theories or building up one's own. One's rivals have overindulged themselves with speculative, metaphysical assumptions or they have been obsessed with superficial empirical appearances, depending on which particular moment in the interplay one chooses to emphasize (p.8).

Harris's comment regarding the actual practice of scientific inquiry vis a vis the orientations of disparate philosophical and epistemological schools intimates the perennial problem which raises questions regarding the correspondence or copenetration of theory and practice. This problem is most squarely addressed by contemporary efforts (which will be soon discussed more fully) of self-reflective research methodologies. It is suggested here that educational theories, research and practice are just beginning to integrate these methodologies.

The theorizing of Locke represents one attempt to amalgamate empiricist and rationalist orientations into one perspective. While Locke saw that knowledge was to be derived from sense data and strove to represent this data using formal, mathematical logic, he also maintained that it was intuitive reason that enabled scientists to arrive at axioms which could explicate the relationships among data. Locke's rationalism was severely challenged by the strict empiricism of David Hume. Hume maintained that one must make a distinction between the relationship between logical propositions and the relationship between empirical facts. Formal logic provides meaningful knowledge only by reconciling the contradictions contained in propositional statements. That is, in formal logic, the opposite of a logical

statement is false or nonsense. Among empirical facts, however, no such conclusion can be drawn. The formal opposite of a fact may indeed be plausible. For example, the empirical statement that "all swans are white" may be borne out by repeated and extensive observation. The possibility that a black swan exists is neither excluded from consideration, nor can be disproved with certainty. It is presumed that the possibility always exists in empirical science that contradictory data may be found and, for that matter, must be sought. Thus, the inductive process employed by Hume and his empiricist followers, while emphasizing the necessity of observation and experience for understanding non-mathematical facts, cannot produce certainty. The advances in mathematical statistics at the turn of the 19th century served to slightly shift the attention away from the need for certainty and allow probability to take its place. With the increasing sophistication of both mathematical logic and statistics, empirical science strengthened its application to prediction and control. Its stridently anti-metaphysical stance gave rise to the evolution of positivist scientific rationality.

This break with metaphysics was advanced by the work of Auguste Comte. Comte maintained that "scientific knowledge" supercedes the theological and metaphysical eras. Anthony Giddens, (in Bottomore and Nisbet, 1978) in his article "Positivism and Its Critics," points to the normative neutrality which characterizes positivist science:

Although there are obvious contrasts between Comte's positivism and the "logical positivism" of the Vienna Circle, there are equally clear connections -- both

historical and intellectual -- between the two. However, the term may also be employed more broadly and diffusely to refer to the writings of philosophers who have adopted most or all of a series of connected perspectives: phenomenism -- the thesis, which can be expressed in various ways, that "reality" consists of sense impressions; and aversion to metaphysics, the latter being condemned as sophistry or illusion; the representation of philosophy as a method of analysis, clearly separable from, yet at the same time parasitic upon, the findings of science; the duality of fact and value -- the thesis that empirical knowledge is logically discrepant from the pursuit of moral aims or the implementation of ethical standards; and the notion of the "unity of science" -- the idea that the natural and social sciences share a common logical and perhaps even methodological foundation (p.237).

Thus, positivist science can be seen as a precursor of modern functionalism which presumed the subservience of society and social inquiry to "natural laws" of development. Comte coined the phrase "social physics" as the study of society and proceeded from the point of view that the study of social interactions would enable scientists to construct a theory of social order and progress.

2. A NEW ORDER, AND VESTIGAL TRACES OF THE OLD

The French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution as well breathed new life into a movement which broke with Plato's Republic, "The Great Chain of Being," and substituted in their place a new democratic social order characterized by a revisioning of human rights, and a reconstructed logic of individualism. Out of the ferment of the French Revolution came the belief that reason, not custom nor tradition, was the avenue along which human beings were to achieve responsibility and membership in society. One's status, power and authority were made significantly more mutable and problematic during

this era. This "revisioning of human rights" placed, if only in principle and however incompletely protected by the Republic, the destiny of the individual in his or her own hands. This breakthrough in political and social thought must, however, be juxtaposed against the triumph of positivist empiricism in scientific theories. While social and political theories presumed that human agency could bring about a "new order," the triumph of positivism seemed to usher in an immutable logic of the separation of human ideals, values and aspirations from the "natural order" of concrete reality. The laws of science (that is, "nature's laws") challenged and blunted the idealism of social and political thought by redefining (and eviscerating) factual knowledge. This assault on the normative dimension of human knowledge was to carry through to contemporary times. But the "stalling out" of positivist science in the late 19th and early 20th centuries provides us with a new point of departure for efforts to extend the fruits of this revolution.

Nowhere was the struggle between rationality and "natural order" more pronounced than in the discourse emerging from the Scientific Revolution. Darwin's theory of "natural selection" and its implications for social organization strike at the very foundations of philosophical thought and intellectual history, for what, indeed, is human nature and its social counterparts? How are minds and nature interrelated? What are the "natural constraints" against personal and social transformation? These and a host of other considerations continue into modernist thought where intellectual and social orders are

self-consciously rendered problematic. Dallmayr and McCarthy further elaborate on the epistemological and philosophical transformations occurring at this time in human history:

During the Enlightenment, logical calculation and empirical analysis began to gain ascendancy over and challenge the intrinsic value of cultural traditions; the attack was continued on a more pragmatic level by utilitarianism with its emphasis on measurable personal gain. An initial response to this challenge can be found in the writings of Giambattista Vico, whose thesis verum et factum convertuntur suggested that history and culture were more readily intelligible than nature since man was (at least in a loose sense) their author and thus could recapture himself in records of the past. Vico's lead was continued, in a speculative vein, by the idealist and romanticist movements with their stress on internal or spiritual experience; romanticism in particular presented the entire world of culture (if not of nature) as an emanation of human sensitivity and ingenuity, especially of the creative endeavors of leading individuals. Restricted from the outset to small philosophical or literary circles, however, these movements vanished with the rise of the industrial era committed to efficient production. By that time, utilitarianism has found a major ally in positivism -- a doctrine centering on the proposition that only empirical and scientifically useful knowledge deserves the title "knowledge" at all and that all competing types of cognition or inquiry belong to more primitive stages of civilization. Couched at first as a vague formula, positivism began to implement its program in the later part of the nineteenth century, with the result that all disciplines were soon faced with the alternative of either embracing scientific method or facing extinction (p.2).

As Polanyi was to later claim, this era demonstrated the beginning of the conquest of **scientism** over the scientific method. It is against this dramatic rise in empirical science and its accompanying "culture of positivism" that the contemporary crisis in understanding need be situated.

It is not as though empiricism and positivism was met with gracious acceptance in all quarters. The Romantic Movement in Europe (especially in Britain with the poets Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Shelley as prominent spokespersons) can be seen as a reaction against, and as a school apart from scientific thought. The combination of idealism and romanticism grew as a counter proposal to utilitarianism and empirical science. (Though it can also be argued that empiricism sought to undercut the unabashedly "spiritual" and "metaphysical" quality of the Romantic Movement.) The European romanticists maintained the Pauline ideal that "truth" was probably best recognized not by the sophisticated intellectual or technical scientist, but by children and "the common folk." The romantic preoccupation with pastoral life, as opposed to urban cosmopolitanism, reflected the mythical union of human sensibility and the natural order reflected in nature. Peter Berger (1976) underscores the importance of such mythic representations:

... a myth is any set of ideas that infuses transcendent meaning into the lives of men -- transcendent with regard to the routine and selfish concerns of ordinary life. It is through myths that men are lifted above their captivity in the ordinary, attain powerful visions of the future, and become capable of collective actions to realize such visions. In this understanding of myth, therefore, the old religious exaltation is retained, even if any specifically religious contents are discarded. Then as now, the figures of myth touch the lives of individuals with transforming power. Sorel understood socialism as such a myth and sharply criticized the Marxists in their rationalism, which, he felt, made them incapable of grasping the mythic potency of their own ideas. By definition, myth transcends both pragmatic and theoretical rationality, while at the same time it strongly affects them. Men live by myth. If their condition is one of relative comfort, the mythic themes are in the background of their lives and only become actualized in moments of

individual crisis. The same is true even for most people who live in a misery that is stable and to which no alternatives have been imagined. The power of myth is most likely to erupt with historic efficacy in situations of rapid change, especially when that change puts in question what has previously been taken for granted, and brings with it, or threatens to do so, a deterioration in the circumstances of life. With varying intensity, this has been the case with all societies undergoing transformations brought on in the wake of the industrial revolution (pp. 16-17).

The link between European and American romanticism is not difficult to discern. The distinction between "reason" and "understanding" (reason being, in this case, intuitive knowledge and insight; understanding being the knowledge gained through direct observation, i.e., scientific rationality), and between mystical comprehension and empirical evidence was not only expressed by the romantic philosophers and artists of Europe, but by American philosophers such as Jonathan Edwards and later Emerson and Thoreau. Edwards maintained that truly human existence was characterized by "a mystical sense of the heart." The moral ambiguity of scientific knowledge and practice was anticipated by the romantics because scientific rationality discounted the importance of human sentiment, emotion, passion and values. Morals, according to Edwards and later reflected in the thought of Pierce, James and Dewey, were based on "sentiment and affection." Both Pierce and James maintained that passionate belief was the route to religious truth. Thus, we are presented with, in the midst of an accelerating urban and technical milieu, a reaction to the one-dimensional depiction of human awareness. The Romantics sought valiantly to maintain a sense of

wonder and aesthetic experience, while the Transcendentalists sought organizing principles that relied heavily on metaphysical representations of reality.

3. INTIMATIONS OF THE POST-MODERN ERA

At the turn of the century William James directly confronted the rising interest and preoccupation with mathematics and formal logic. In his A Pluralistic Universe (1909), James attacks the "vicious intellectualism," the sophistry of conceptual theorists who effect "insulating cuts," taxonomic abstractions which, while developing more elegant and formal theoretical explanations, fail to adequately represent the seamless and "wild" nature of actual experience. James's use of the term "radical empiricism" sought to convey his focus on the phenomenistic qualities of not only sensation, but mystical, parapsychological and extrasensory perception. Much to the dismay of those exploring mathematical logic, linguistic analysis and more conventional empiricist research, James sought to highlight the shallowness of paradigm-bound inquiry, and posed a multidimensional approach which, in effect, suggested that reality was best approached by examining what various research orientations excluded from their considerations. James, I would suggest, represents a major advance, post-modern philosophy, to which curriculum theorists may turn for sophisticated conceptual frameworks. Despite Dewey's important and lasting contributions to curricular thought, I would suggest that James's philosophical contributions are perhaps more significant, if

underrepresented in the field.

James was intrigued, stimulated (and somewhat puzzled) by the work of Henri Bergson. James captures Bergson's iconoclastic perspective regarding formal logic and the "conceptual method" in the following:

In the first place, logic, giving primarily the relations between concepts as such, and the relations between natural facts only secondarily or so far as the facts have been already identified with concepts and defined by them, must of course stand or fall with the conceptual method. But the conceptual method is a transformation which the flux of life undergoes at our hands in the interests of practice essentially and only subordinately in the interests of theory. We live forward, we understand backward, said a Danish writer; and to understand life by concepts is to arrest its movement, cutting it up into bits as if with scissors, and immobilizing these in our logical herbarium where, comparing them as dried specimens, we can ascertain which of them statistically includes or excludes which other. This treatment supposes life to have already accomplished itself, for the concepts, being so many views taken after the fact, are retrospective and post mortem. Nevertheless, we can draw conclusions from them and project them into the future. We cannot learn from them how life made itself go, or how it will make itself go; but, on the supposition that its ways of making itself go are unchanging, we can calculate what positions of imagined arrest it will exhibit hereafter under given conditions (1909, 1977, p. 568).

James appears to anticipate the later development in quantum mechanics of the principle of indeterminacy. Additionally, he seems to foreshadow the "epistemological anarchism" of Feyerabend. **James treats as problematic the entire intellectual process of paradigm formation.** This radical perspective, one hardly appreciated by those seeking certainty or prediction, seemed to some to be a noteworthy anomaly in the course of philosophical evolution, but to those who pursue curriculum theory today, his insights should be welcome, indeed! James

called into question the practical and instrumental bias of conceptual (paradigm-bound) thought:

This is just what we mean by the stream's sensible continuity. No element there cuts itself off from any other element, as concepts cut themselves off from concepts. No part there is so small as not to be a place of conflux. No part there is not really next to its neighbor; which means that there is literally nothing between; which means no part absolutely excludes another, but that they compenetrate and are cohesive; that if you tear out one, its roots bring out more with them; that whatever is real is telescoped and diffused into other reals; that, in short, every minutest thing is already its Hegelian "own other," in the fullest sense of the term. Of course this sounds self-contradictory, but as the immediate facts don't sound at all, but simply are, until we conceptualize and name them vocally, the contradiction results only from the conceptual or discursive form being substituted for the real form. But if, as Bergson shows, that the form is super-imposed for practical ends only, in order to let us jump about over life instead of wading through it; and if it cannot even pretend to reveal anything of what life's inner nature is or ought to be; why then we can turn a deaf ear to its accusations. The resolve to turn the deaf ear is the inner crisis or "catastrophe" of which M. Bergson's disciple whom I lately quoted spoke. We are so subject to the philosophic tradition which treats logos or discursive thought generally as the sole avenue to truth, that to fall back on raw unverballed life as more a revealer, and to think of concepts as the merely practical things which Bergson calls them, comes very hard. It is putting off our proud maturity of mind and becoming again as foolish little children in the eyes of reason. But difficult as such a revolution is, there is no other way, I believe, to the possession of reality (p. 580-581).

James formulated a multi-dimensional representation of belief and seems to have integrated three distinct orientations to knowledge into his philosophy: one being conceptual analysis, a second being sensory perception, and the third being human sentiment or his "will to believe." Similar to this Jamesian integration, the naturalistic

strain in Santayana and Dewey recognized the importance of both empirical observation and religious belief and values by splitting the representational frames for each. While one form of knowledge was derived from scientific methods, yet another was to be achieved through the "poetic" or "aesthetic" experience. Santayana maintained that religion should not be reduced to a "false physics." A similar sentiment was expressed by Dewey when he maintained that the quest for certainty was as much a distortion of human inquiry as it was a clarification. Underlying the romantics, transcendentalists and naturalists was an important sentiment: that that which truly needed to be reflected in any sense of human progress is the democratization of inquiry and knowledge. This sentiment, clearly a reaction against scientism, technocratic and political elitism, was to reverberate through modernist social, political and philosophical thought.

James poses exceedingly difficult questions, questions which have prompted a reassessment of the very bases of conceptual frameworks used in psychology, the social sciences, and philosophy itself. From a vantage point that predated by more than fifty years the cultural enclosures that spawn our contemporary awareness, James could see the spiritual potentialities that were being suppressed. If there is any particular criticism of James that might be noted here, it is that he failed to adequately address the issue of social amelioration. James has been accused of "idealizing poverty" and emphasizing how individuals might make sense of their distorted or oppressive social realities. James neglects not the intersubjective dimension of social

reality (thereby he seems to be markedly beyond the narrower scope of mainstream empiricists), but the very social construction, the collectivist nature, of resistance to oppression. James's writing reflects "liberal doctrine" values, and while exposing the "instrumental rationality" of scientific methodologies, he offered only an individualist cultivation of sensibilities as an antidote to dehumanizing conditions. For all James contributed to the critique of scientism and its epistemological implications, we must turn to more pointedly socially conscious orientations in order to find a level of analysis beyond individual agency. Today we understand better, perhaps, the social and structural repercussions and the action imperatives James himself was only dimly aware of.

4. INTELLECTUAL FERMENT ON THE CONTINENT

Out of the Age of Enlightenment, utilitarianism and empiricist traditions, liberal individualism gained ascendancy as well. It is, perhaps, no accident that a dual stream of individualist thought emerged at that time: one being the perspective that personal freedom and initiative (as witnessed in the bourgeois lionizing of the heroes of both scientific rationalism and capitalist growth and expansion) was to be rewarded by material wealth and political power -- lending itself to the Great Man conception of leadership -- and the second being a dialectical perspective advanced by Marx that human beings were not only guided and influenced by material and cultural artifacts (including social institutions) but were capable of designing and

constructing new material and cultural configurations.

It is within this intellectual milieu of empirical science that an emerging shift in focus -- a shift to the German "Historical School" can be seen as a significant, if only partially successful, counterforce to empiricism. The "Historical School," of which Dilthey is a prominent spokesman, while still very much under the influence of individualist conceptions of human agency, also adopted the burgeoning interest in "psychologism." The split that ensued was again to call attention to the different methodologies or techniques that were seen to be appropriate to either mental phenomena (and their corresponding cultural manifestations) or natural phenomena. This split developed, then, into contrasting disciplines usually termed the "cultural sciences" and the "natural sciences." But there was no armistice between these alternate paradigms; the "cultural sciences" while focusing upon how human beings experience phenomena, how the inner psychic life of the individual can be better understood (verstehen), were confronted by an altered depiction of "mind" as psychology came to be explored and characterized through empirical research methodologies.

The empirical scientific paradigm had its effect on sociological theory as well. Max Weber, for example, translated this empirical orientation into a sociological theory emphasizing "instrumental-rational action." This orientation portrayed human behavior as a means-end relationship. Human action, then, was depicted

as an individual's instrumental behavior which sought what tended to be a rather unproblematically conceived end -- the satisfaction of individually perceived needs. According to Dallmayr and McCarthy:

...the gap between cultural understanding and causal analysis was narrowed, and sociology was treated more clearly as a general or systematic science. The study defined sociology as "a science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action" where the term "action" covered "all human behavior when and insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it," while "social" implied that the action "takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course." Meaningful action was segregated in the study from merely externally induced or "reactive behavior" unrelated to an "intended purpose"; but Weber cautioned that the dividing line could not "be sharply drawn empirically." ...Regarding the notion of action, one should add that it referred only to "the behavior of one or more individual human beings" -- a carry-over of Dilthey's (and Rickert's) individualism. **Social aggregates or groupings, in Weber's view, could never constitute genuine units of analysis: "For the subjective interpretation of action in sociological work these collectivities must be treated as solely the resultants and modes of organization of the particular acts of individual persons, since these alone can be treated as agents in a course of subjectively understandable action"**(this author's emphasis, p.4-5).

It was not until the theorizing of Marx, Hegel, and Parsons that individual behaviors were firmly situated within a concept of an underlying "social system." Thus the instrumentality of human behavior was explained by Parsons, for example, in terms of its contribution to an end (again unproblematically conceived) -- social stability. Behaviors of individuals could then be analysed for their "functional" or "dysfunctional" qualities. The adaptation of the individual to social and cultural institutions, became the focus of sociological research. The attention paid to social systems and the further

application of systems theory of human activity was to prompt a somewhat more reflexive development in philosophy and social inquiry.

It is not as though the emergence of the German "Historical School" neutralized positivist and empiricist theoretical frameworks; it did, however, direct attention to the need to develop conceptual, linguistic, and intersubjective frameworks that might explicate the underlying relational structures of cultural and social forms. This attention, still very much under the influence of the positivist and empiricist traditions, brought a renewed interest in the formal, structural and even "ideal" frameworks of language. The study of language, then, constituted a fertile domain within which individual membership within a rule-bound set of interactions could be explored. According to Dalmayr and McCarthy (1977), it was most notably Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus who attempted

to design a transparent (or "ideal") linguistic framework modeled on formal logic, a framework that would grant unobstructed access to reality, completely eluding the obscure domain of opinions, purposes, and intentions. Rigorously construed, the perspective of the Tractatus relegated the notions of "subject" and purposive "meaning" from the realm of concrete experience to the status of external "limits" or linguistic parameters of the world; in so doing, the study also eliminated the need for intersubjective clarification of meaning (and ultimately also the possibility of philosophical reflection).... The aversion to exegesis was continued by semanticists and linguistic pluralists dedicated to the construction of specialized language frameworks; despite the importance attached to meta-languages or meta-linguistic conventions for scientific inquiry, such conventions were treated either as simple factual premises or as arbitrary fiats of experts. The contours of a rapprochement emerged only in the writings of later Wittgenstein, especially in his emphasis on ordinary language and the notion of "language games" embedded in commonsense conventions; once linguistic

practices were seen as intimately "interwoven" with concrete "life-forms" and worldviews, the feasibility of a "cultural" interpretation became apparent. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein's own attitude in this matter remained ambivalent to the end, as he left open (or failed to block) the road to an empiricist treatment of language and the reduction of meaning to behavior (p.7).

Thus, despite Wittgenstein's later emphasis on ordinary language and his depiction of "language games" which conveyed the sense of "family resemblances" among language communities which was even later to be picked up by critical theorists (most notably Habermas) as they discussed the notion of "communicative competence," Wittgenstein's work did little to counter the positivist separation of subject from object and the reduction of meaning to linguistic behavior.

Throughout the 1920s and 30s, the tide of logical positivism advanced by the Vienna Circle was at full flow. In his book The Illusion of Technique, William Barrett (1979) describes the impact that empiricism and positivism had on philosophical discourse:

What the positivists did was to take over the empiricism of David Hume and annex to it the new technique of mathematical logic. In their actual philosophizing, however, it was the latter that provided the more potent and aggressive weapon. It appeared to give them a more exact and more "scientific" language in comparison with their adversaries. Only within the framework of this language -- or so it seemed then -- could philosophic problems be raised with any degree of precision at all. Otherwise you might be deluding yourself about pseudoproblems, thin and vaporous as mist. And the positivists, when they turned this weapon back upon the past, lay about with wholesale slaughter. The great philosophic problems of the past were to be declared pseudoproblems, and the great figures of the past were portrayed as men fighting with empty shadows. The resulting scheme that issued from positivism had at least the virtue of overwhelming simplicity. All problems were either questions of fact or questions of logic. The former

were to be dealt with by the sciences, and philosophy disappeared without residue into a certain kind of logical analysis. Thus when philosophy, which originally was supposed to question everything, turns to question itself, it finds that it has vanished (p.9-10).

Barrett cites the seminal work of Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead as a refinement of Hume's empiricism. Not only were these theorists to focus on the development of the human mind as it sensibly responds to the environment, but the task before them, as they saw it, was to formulate a symbolic logic which could precisely represent the process of cognition. Russell and Whitehead's (1910) work Principia Mathematica attempted even to "reduce" mathematics to logic. This "reductionist" tendency continued, and by 1914 when Russell published Our Knowledge of the Eternal World, he proclaims that "Logic is the essence of philosophy." Russell sought to build a bridge between the formerly separate worlds of mind and matter, between symbolic representation and sensation. By 1921 in his Analysis of Mind, Russell formulated a doctrine he called "neutral monism." Barrett describes this doctrine as follows:

There are now not two worlds, mental and material, but one world, which can be viewed alternately as mental or material, depending on the way in which we construct it from elementary constituents that in themselves are neither mental nor material -- therefore, to be called "neutral." Russell chose as these basic building blocks the elementary data of sensation. The table on which I write, for example, is an assemblage of data -- color, shape, hardness, and so on. My mind contemplating it is also another such assemblage, but of different data -- namely, all those data of sensation that make up the stuff of my personal biography. The doctrine is a baroque and spectacular effort, though of dubious success. But its success or failure is not our question here. We ask instead: Why did Russell choose sense data as the elementary building blocks of reality? Did the choice

follow logically from the new logic, which was supposed to be "the essence of philosophy?" If anything was "neutral" in this snarled situation, it was the logical technique itself, as between two rival views of experience. Thus Russell acknowledged his indebtedness to Whitehead for the particular technique, but in Whitehead's hands that technique issued in an altogether different philosophy. And it did so because both men started from an altogether different vision of experience. For Russell, experience comes to us partitioned into discrete atoms; for Whitehead, every sense perception is an immediate disclosure of the world, into which all the details of background enter, though in different degrees of relevance. Russell arrived at his sense data as the basic building blocks of the world through a process of thought -- or lack of thought, his critics say -- that did not in the least derive from mathematical logic. His choice of these elements came out of a particular grasp and elaboration of experience -- a peculiar phenomenology, to use the term of another school--that was anterior to the application of the technique (pp. 13-14).

It was this preoccupation with reductionism, abstraction, and the technique of logical method, that typifies the positivist paradigm. It was this fascination with technique, method, and factual data that fueled the development of scientific management, the Taylorization of human behavior (especially when perceived as "labor"), and reinforced the still prominent positivist and empiricist doctrines which separate subjectivity and objectivity and focus attention on discrete, observable, measurable phenomena. Its legacy is still to be found in behavioral psychology, management by objectives, and curricular orientations in the tradition of Bobbitt, Charters and later Tyler.

But the quote of Whitehead's cited at the beginning of this section, a statement he made shortly before his death, intimates the frustration that was engendered by the positivist search. According to Barrett:

Logic had not provided the key to traditional philosophical problems, like matter and mind, as Russell dreamed. It does not liquidate ethics, aesthetics, or metaphysics, as the more aggressive positivists once hoped. Its value had turned out once more limited and yet sweeping in its consequences. It is only one of the modern sciences that has produced its own critique, in the Kantian sense of that word -- that is to say, it has shown its own limits. And in showing the limits of its formal systems, it shows the limits of the techniques and the machines that man may design. For the prospects of a technical civilization that is a conclusion of major consequence (p.19).

Whitehead, while attempting to unite disparate "facts" under precise and uniform sets of principles, saw the limits of this artificially synthetic, integrative process.

The limits of positivism (and there have been many cited) hinge on the supposed "normative neutrality" of scientific method. The acritical nature of positivist science neither acknowledges its own ideology nor the relationship between knowledge and social control. But there were further developments in philosophical inquiry and scientific method which would begin to address the need to situate inquiry within a discourse comprised of social, epistemological and political contexts. At this stage, language still occupied an important place in the critical examination of communication, knowledge and human understanding.

Peter Winch (1958) in his The Idea of a Social Science reflects this burgeoning interest in communication and intersubjective understanding. According to Winch, social understanding involves "grasping the point or meaning of what is being done or said" and thus

an effort "far removed from the world of statistics and causal laws" and "closer to the realm of discourse." Winch's focus on the "different and competing ways of life, each offering a different account of the intelligibility of things" brought the very processes, methodologies and languages of science and logical analysis under the mantle of simply "another way of life." Thus it was in Winch's work that the concept of "the incommensurability" of different language communities (or paradigms) was thrust into the social and cultural analysis. The notion of "incommensurability" of language communities will be discussed later when referring to the work of Paul Feyerabend.

The analysis of meaningful statements, following from the work of Dilthey, was bolstered by Husserl and other "Continental European" scholars. Husserl's Logical Investigations, while attempting to reinforce the integrity and constancy of logical propositions, remained very much under the influence of the empiricists. According to Dallmayr and McCarthy,

Although reformulating and sharpening the insights of his predecessors, Husserl at least in one respect remained heir to their perspective: in the attachment to individualism or to an individual-egological "consciousness." The phenomenological method of "bracketing," or epoche, in his treatment signified basically an attempt to unravel the meaningful core, or "essence," of phenomena as disclosed in (or "constituted" by) a purified consciousness. At least in this respect his approach replicated the solipsistic dilemma of early language analysis and of much of traditional philosophy: to the extent that consciousness was presented as "transcendental limit" of the world, the domain of intersubjective understanding and clarification of meaning was obliterated. In his later writings Husserl sought to overcome this dilemma by introducing the notion of the "life-world," or world of mundane experience, but the

relationship between mundanity and consciousness was never fully clarified (p.9).

It was not until the pivotal work of Heidegger -- particularly his Being and Time that individual-egological consciousness was transcended. Heidegger's concepts of "hermeneutical phenomenology" or "existential ontology" brought the issue of meaning out of the narrow conception of individual consciousness or cognition and configured it in humanity's existential condition or Dasein -- "being-in-the-world." "Being-in-the-world," then, situated meaningful activity specifically within an intersubjective and cultural milieu. The work of Alfred Schutz, one of Husserl's students, further refined the concept of Dasein to include the "experiential form of common-sense knowledge of human affairs." Schutz saw the search for meaning to be "an epistemological problem," a problem requiring a new framework and methodology for examining behavior.

Contemporary ethnomethodology owes its emergence to the pioneering work of Heidegger, Husserl, Schutz, and later Garfinkle. Ethnomethodology, while focusing attention on the practical everyday activities of people in society as they make accountable, to themselves and others, their everyday affairs, has yet to resolve the debate over whether ordinary life reflects invariant or transcendental cognitive structures or whether cognition itself is shaped by cultural contexts. Thus the issues of individualism and intersubjectivity, of historical and cultural contingency against human agency, remain epistemological and philosophical questions unresolved. The agentic role of the

individual -- the individual as being master and in control of his or her destiny -- remains problematic.

Equally problematic have competing methodological and epistemological orientations become. According to Harris:

The obvious lack of correspondence between the conduct of research and Popper's view that science consists or should consist of an unremitting attempt to prove one's own beliefs false has helped to stimulate a healthy interest among historians of science concerning the actual psycho-social conditions of scientific discovery. It should come as no surprise that many of the most cherished scientific discoveries were made as a result of following either metaphysical or downright irrational beliefs. Nor should it surprise anyone that once made, many of these same would have been abandoned had the originators not stubbornly clung to the conviction that they were right, in the teeth of overwhelming evidence to the contrary (p.19).

This "healthy interest" was greatly enhanced by the work of Thomas Kuhn (1970) in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn brought into the vernacular the concept of "paradigm" -- a universally recognized scientific achievement that for a time provided model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners" (p.viii). According to Kuhn, paradigms provided "acceptable examples of scientific practice -- examples that include law, theory, application and instrumentation together -- provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research" (p.10). While the "coherent traditions" may have demonstrated coherence within a given tradition (or as Wittgenstein would have described it--"language games;" Habermas -- a "communication community"), these traditions fail to provide coherence among traditions. According to Kuhn:

The proponents of competing paradigms are always at least slightly at cross-purposes. Neither side will grant all the non-empirical assumptions that the other needs in order to make its case... they are bound partly to talk through each other. Though each may hope to convert the other to his way of seeing his science and its programs, neither may hope to prove his case. The competition between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can be resolved by proofs (p.148).

As if to add to the quandary that competing paradigms pose with regard to communication and understanding, Kuhn maintains that **paradigms provide an umbrella framework which helps to explain and critique theories within paradigms, but not the emergence of paradigms themselves nor comparisons across paradigm boundaries.** Additionally, according to Kuhn, the emergence of new paradigms does not reveal a progressive or developmental principle per se, rather, one can discern a "more recent" theory from an earlier one by way of several criteria: increased predictive ability, increasingly esoteric subject matter, and the number of problems "solved." Kuhn later (1977) modified his references to paradigmatic systems by describing them as "exemplars" or a "disciplinary matrix." What then becomes characteristic of the coherence within a community of practitioners is the shared pool of language, conventional meanings, and "cognitive styles." The work of Lakatos (1970) also contributes to this notion of "cognitive styles." According to Lakatos, "the history of science is the history of research programs rather than theories" (p.133). He goes on to say that:

Not an isolated theory but only a series of theories can be said to be scientific or unscientific: to apply the term "scientific" to one single theory is a categorical mistake.

The history of science has and should be the history of competing research programs (or if you wish, "paradigms") (p.119 and p.155).

The work of critical theorists, most notably Jurgen Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel and Hans-Georg Gadamer, represents a direct response to this problematic consideration of individualism and cultural critique. The Frankfurt School sought to juxtapose hermeneutics and scientific analysis to help situate the individual and his or her actions within an historical and critical assessment of cultural institutions and the ideological context of epistemological, philosophic and methodological traditions. Rather than separate understanding and scientific rationality, contemporary phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur seek to uncover the dialogic qualities of language communities and the symbiosis of understanding and scientific explanation. The boundaries of this type of critique remain permeable and indistinct. The work of critical theorists and phenomenologists, while seeking a "critically comprehensive normative rationality" are at the forefront of questions of meaningful activity. The emphasis on "communicative competence" and "reciprocal dialogue" have opened the door to a reconceptualization of methodological as well as epistemological issues.

The implications for curriculum theory of this critique and its diverse methodological offshoots should not be underestimated. Having raised the issue of control, power distortions, language communities, intentionality and competence, these paradigms of social science have

precipitated a more penetrating, self-reflexive analysis of ideology and social practices. Speculations about justice and meaningful activity continue apace. It is with this outline of the emergence of the phenomenological, hermeneutic and critical theory orientations against the empiricist and positivist traditions (again, this is not to discount the pervasive presence of both empiricist and positivist frameworks among present day educational researchers and theorists!) that yet another form of discourse may be portrayed. This emerging framework, which I shall call "The Communitarian Counter Proposal," will be presented in Chapter IV. It remains to be seen whether the orientations of critical theory -- "the reduction of unnecessary social constraints" -- and reciprocal awareness implied within the phenomenological tradition, or the process and ends of interpretation as found within hermeneutics, individually or as a combined set of perspectives and "programs" offer a truly liberating or meaningful alternative to psychic atomism and alienation. It is my belief that philosophical hermeneutics provides conceptual frameworks and insights which, drawing upon both phenomenology and critical theory, extends beyond them and offers to curriculum theory a normative and strategic response to both methodological solipsism and alienation. It is to this discussion I now turn.

II. HERMENEUTICS: THE RECOVERY OF MEANING IN HUMAN SCIENCE

The object of the understanding poses the
"endless task" of definition.

Hans-Georg Gadamer

Let $x = x$.

Laurie Anderson

A. "NO CODE" AS CODE: AN INTERLUDE

In order to introduce a philosophical hermeneutics orientation as an interpretive science, I wish to recount an incident which seemed to "crystalize" for me (just as the conversation with my friend Dan Goetz on the subject of "minimum competency tests" seemed to crystalize the issue of individualist vs. collective competence) the presence in day-to-day living of an hermeneutic process. This recognition -- that we each are makers of meaning and that meanings can be traced to disparate, sometimes contiguous, sometimes overlapping communities of meaning -- was "inspired" by the mundane act of discovering how that which is foreign, alien or unknown (in this case, a piece of graffiti) becomes understood through a process of "historical consciousness." But let us turn to the tale, for it in its playful teasing out of sense from nonsense, may afford the reader a glimpse of what is very often a transparent human activity and one which is integral to a curricular awareness.

The Power Center, a grey concrete and mirrored glass structure looms against the trees and dark brick of the Michigan League at the northeast corner of the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. While such an example of modernist architecture might well be perceived as

clashing against the weathered brick, slate roofs and hundred year old buildings which comprise the older sections of the campus, the closest building to The Power Center is another "power center" -- a stark, industrial physical plant complex complete with billowing stacks and partially masked steam pipes and grey oil storage tanks. The Power Center's anomalous architecture fares rather well given its setting. But then again, depending on what we understand to be the "setting," or more accurately, whatever context we construct within which both the physical plant and The Power Center are to be considered, the "anomalous architecture" of The Power Center may or may not "fare well" in comparison. For that matter, there are in theory limitless possibilities (or as Macdonald has suggested, "contexts") available to one who may choose to explore the phenomena of these structures. What is it about The Power Center that I think might serve as an introduction to a discussion of hermeneutic interpretation? Let us again consider The Power Center as a phenomenon that offers more than a few possibilities for human experience and reflection. We can be reasonably certain that The Power Center exists as a physical structure. One who has acquired some reasonable, or at least convincing, evidence of its existence can assert that The Power Center is known to, is real to them (that is, make a propositional statement of the truth of its existence). Having encountered this structure, been a member of audiences present for various functions, seen it represented on maps, in campus directories, had it as a topic of conversation among other people, and having an understanding of world views, epistemological and philosophical frameworks which offer more

intellectually satisfying orientations than say extreme subjectivism or skepticism which suggest that the entire world is actually a manifestation of our mind which is as much misinformed as it is informed by raw sense data and perception, then I can act upon the belief that The Power Center is real. You, as reader of this account, have perhaps somewhat different evidence to consider as you attempt to determine whether to accept, reject, or even withhold judgement (or as Coleridge defined "poetic faith" -- one may achieve a momentary "willing suspension of disbelief") as to the reality of The Power Center. In this account, you are presented a verbal claim, a text comprised of words and therefore subject to linguistic and semantic logics, a claim made in the historical context of your knowledge of me, and of course, any knowledge you might have of the existence of The Power Center from other accounts or personal experience. Following the "practical method of research" variously attributed to Casey Stengel or Muhammed Ali -- "You can look it up." But if the evidence you discern from this narrative does not meet with your personal criteria for truth or your epistemological conventions, then it is quite likely that The Power Center will remain unknown to you and this narrative will be discounted for its truth claims. Your doubt of the Center's existence signifies that the conversion to belief in the existence of the Center has not occurred. For you, the possibility of The Power Center being known to you has not yet been realized. Indeed, I may have constructed a fictive subject -- as Kafka constructed his "Castle" -- for your consideration. If you were to have come to the belief that The Power Center is real based upon my fictive representation of it in this text,

then, perhaps, you might be entitled to use the same claim (though without the sarcasm of its original use) Bogart made in the film Casablanca as to why he stated that he had come to Casablanca "for the waters" -- "I was misinformed."

I have wished to explore the nature of the process whereby the understanding of a phenomenon calls for a rather intricate and often almost transparent engagement of our critical faculties and the inherently collective nature of meaning. Our "being-in-the-world," to use the phrase employed by phenomenologists such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, is reflected in the myriad interactions among our physical, preconceptual, conceptual and intersubjective, among other dimensions. The process of hermeneutic interpretation has as its domain, the constructive process of making meaning and investigating how it is that the foreign, strange and alien becomes or does not become understood by us. Hermeneutics is an interpretive process which is responsive to human desire for and interest in understanding; through philosophical hermeneutics, not only is understanding sought, but the understandability of those engaged in discourse guided by hermeneutic principles and perspectives is likewise enhanced. Of this I will say more later.

But let us return to our earlier consideration of The Power Center, for I have yet to disclose a central, precipitating reason why it was made a subject for an introduction to hermeneutic inquiry.

On an east-facing concrete wall, a wall exposed to two busy lanes of west-bound traffic on Huron Boulevard, the words "No Code" were spray painted in bright red by some graffiti artist. It was perhaps the second or third time that I noticed the graffiti that I began trying to surmise the meaning of the expression. Ann Arbor is "graced" with various other spray painted slogans: "Workers Build a Lenin Engine," "End Racism," "No More War." The meanings of these slogans seemed to be more readily graspable. Their referents more distinctly discernible from the word choices, semantic content and the prominence of their themes in the conversations cycling some Ann Arbor communities, these graffiti were quickly deciphered for various meanings -- not only the meanings conveyed by the words themselves, but the social, political and cultural meanings associated generally with graffiti. But "No Code" remained strange, unfathomable, alien. In fact, there was an amusing absurdity about the expression that piqued my interest and added to the intriguing quality of a search for some understanding of the expression's as yet minimally disclosed possibilities. Having already observed that the expression "No Code" conformed to various "codes," that is, systematic or formulaic regularities such as morphological, linguistic and semantic orders, and even the "unwritten" proprieties peculiar to graffiti writing, the perhaps clever use of "No Code" suggested the propositional statement that "There is no code" or even "No code applies here." In either case, "No Code" seemed to provide a logical ju jitsu inversion of meaning and counter meaning. "This is fun," I thought. And to be

fair, hermeneutic interpretation can be.

"No Code" offered few clues to its referent, for I presumed it to have one, at least one. This graffiti seemed to fit another more arcane form of communication, not unlike the messages scrawled on subway cars, walls, and billboards throughout New York City. This form of "communication" is understood by a smaller, perhaps less widely known subculture. I assumed (or it was my "prejudice") that the sprayer of this message knew its meaning -- a meaning which as yet alluded me. The abrupt message, in addition to sharing some similarities with urban graffiti, also seemed to be of a type of guerrilla art which local performance art aficionados plastered, painted or carved in public spaces throughout this town. Local fans of music groups, video collectives, etc., seemed to also have the knack of delivering similar abrupt and pithy messages: "SLK," "Destroy All Monsters," "Joe's." Perhaps that was "it," I thought. The name of a New Wave group? Sort of catchy, to the point, nihilistic or at least anarchistic. Perfect. Names of groups seem to capture the arresting quality of sudden visual or emotional impact: "Black Flag," "The Dead Kennedies," "The Thompson Twins" (neither twins, nor Thompsons, actually a white male, black male and white female making up the trio named "Twins). "No Code," yes, that would "work."

But it was perhaps a week from the time I first sought to piece together this interpretation that an article in the local newspaper brought this graffiti and my experience of it into a new light. "No Code" it turns out, is the expression used by a dissident student group

which is attempting to block the adoption (or imposition as they see it) of a code of ethics for University of Michigan students. Aha, mystery solved! Meaning established... or so I thought. Further reflection on the interplay between my perception of the graffiti and the "explanation" provided by the newspaper article was provoked by my reading of Hans-Georg Gadamer's (1976) Philosophical Hermeneutics. My curiosity about the message was led by my **interest to understand** what was meant by the message. As best I can tell, I had no instrumental interest in knowing about the message. But my admittedly playful engagement in an attempt to decipher the "code" of "No Code" may be seen as a process of hermeneutical reflection. According to Gadamer, "hermeneutic reflection teaches us: that social community, with all its tensions and disruptions, ever and ever again leads back to a common area of social understanding through which it exists" (p.42). Having learned of the origin of the expression from the newspaper account, I was now cognizant of the social network or as Habermas describes it, the "communication community" within which the speech act is understood. Gadamer describes this generation of knowledge, this expansion of social understanding as "a fusion of horizons." By this Gadamer refers to Wittgenstein's sense of socially constructed, bounded communities represented as "language games." The expression "No Code" was now understood to be a meaningful expression among those who knew of its historically situated referent; my membership within the social group in a sense extends the possibility of the expression's significance. Not only have I gained some comprehension of the semantic or linguistic meaning of the expression, but I have also come

to know something about the issues which prompted its use and those who know its meaning.

Thus, the horizon of my understanding is both extended in some degree to include the formerly unknown and alien communication community from which the message emerged. Moreover, it can also be suggested that the communication community now includes the interpretations and possibilities that I assign to not only this single expression, but the historical context within which the community for whom "No Code" is a meaningful expression. The hermeneutic process of interpretation leads not to a final, static completion of meaning, nor to understanding as an end, but rather interpretation of a "text" leads to the recognition of the dynamic and multifaceted historical reality which the "text" makes accessible. Thus the meaning of the expression "No Code" is not an objective, reified thing, rather, its meanings (for there are many associated with it) are distributed among the various communication communities (including now those who are reading this dissertation) who encounter this expression. The multi-layered sediment of meaning -- meanings assigned by people interpreting this phenomenon from numerous, divergent prejudices and pre-conceptual orientations -- for example, maintenance people whose task it is to repair this "vandalism" may very well assign rather different meanings to the event than, say the victim of an assault by a student in a university dormitory or the student whose research projects are "expropriated" or plagiarized by a faculty member. The meaning, then, of the graffiti contains all these various standpoints as they, within

a fusion of their horizons, construct a socially lived experience of interpretive action. To repeat Gadamer's phrase, "the object of understanding poses the 'endless task' of definition" (1977, p.551). This "endless task" is nothing more or less than the quintessential human activity of making meaning -- a rather ironic task for a human being which Neitzsche suggested is itself a "not yet defined animal." Having attempted to convey to you the presence of hermeneutic interpretation in quotidian matters, I will develop and refine the description of philosophical hermeneutics and its implications for curriculum theorizing.

B. PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS

The term "hermeneutics" is derived from the name Hermes, the messenger to the gods of Greek mythology. While Hermes was indeed a messenger, the reader might also wish to recall that, as David Purpel brought to my attention, Hermes was not above playing tricks, practical jokes, even among the gods. So with such a philological nugget in mind, let us not become overly preoccupied with either the verifiability or the authenticity of messages extended in his name! Harvey Cox (1973) quite simply and directly states that "Hermeneutics is the study of messages or, more exactly how one interprets the meaning of texts. It is generally used in relation to documents stemming from a different historical period" (p.146). Cox goes on to elaborate that hermeneutics in its modern conception has broadened its

understanding of "text" to include human beings and phenomena not restricted to linguistic representation. Hermeneutic interpretation allows for the dialectical consideration of the whole and its constituent parts. That is to say, the construction of particular objects or "texts" which we choose to examine is guided by our preconceptual or prejudicial anticipation of the whole. Gadamer maintains that "Understanding always implies a pre-understanding which is in turn pre-figured by the determinate tradition in which the interpreter lives and which shapes his prejudice (1979, p.108). It is this grounding in the lived world, in Dasein or being-in-the-world according to the seminal work of Heidegger from whom, along with Schleiermacher, philosophical hermeneutics was introduced into modern thought, that typifies hermeneutic interpretation. Unlike positivist science which separates the knower from what is known, hermeneutic philosophy situates the knower through the emergence of historical consciousness in a dialectical relationship to the world: we are each shaped by the historical conditions in which we live and in turn shape these conditions through praxis -- self-reflective action.

Hermeneutic philosophy, as one might anticipate of any discipline, is not without variations of perspectives and emphases. Howard (1982) offers a typology of variants of hermeneutic philosophy which might serve to identify a range of orientations. Moreover, Howard's typology contributes to a rationale for the approach I have selected for use in this dissertation. In The Three Faces of Hermeneutics: An Introduction to Current Theories of Understanding, which I consider to be a valuable

historical and critical study of hermeneutic philosophy, Howard outlines three distinct branches: **analytic**, **psychosocial** and **ontological**. Each of these three branches shares the foundational concepts of hermeneutics: that understanding is its aim, that human purpose and intentionality is interwoven within the concrete environment in which we live, and that intersubjectivity is an essential prerequisite for communication. Hermeneutic philosophy, then, (though each of the branches to a greater or lesser degree) extends beyond the orientations in the natural sciences which traditionally and some would say rightfully excludes subjectivity from its purview; draws upon historical and philological research traditions in that events and the human (though generally not the researchers') interests interwoven within such events are interpreted; and includes, most importantly, contemporary social science orientations which consider the dialectical relationship between the subjectivity/interests of the researcher and the object of study. This latter development, of course, suggests the interpenetration of fact and value, knowledge and human interests.

Of the three orientations Howard identifies within the field of hermeneutic philosophy, I locate myself clearly within the ontological orientation. This is not to say that the remaining two do not contribute insights toward the aim of increasing understanding. The analytic branch, typified by the later work of Wittgenstein, Winch and von Wright clearly sought to counter the "monomethodological" approach of (positivist) natural science and is less concerned with causalist

and empiricist orientations to knowledge. Analytical hermeneutics is essentially anti-metaphysical, breaks with highly psychologized accounts of human communication, and while focusing upon mathematical logic, semantics and the truth of propositional statements, fails to adequately address the interests of the researcher in such interpretations. Analytical hermeneutics focuses upon **events** and language, is firmly rooted in historical and philological traditions, and according to Howard, reflects technical interests of prediction and control. Howard suggests that analytical hermeneutics offers a map but not a critique of human knowledge:

Analytic philosophers... are prone to constructing logical maps or "grammars" for a semantical process they already find in place. Continental philosophers, in contrast, are inclined to ask the genetic question, "How did the process come to be that way?" "What are the conditions for its occurring?" "Do these conditions contain clues to the legitimacy of the subsequent process?" This is both a more Kantian and a more phenomenological kind of approach.

Why do Continental philosophers have this preference? One of the main reasons, I think, is an essentially moral one: an impression that a logicizing kind of philosophy tends to leave the social landscape just as it was. Sometimes it seems to have a vested interest in keeping the landscape as it was. It may appear to be a style of philosophizing which is inherently accomodating to the status quo, since it does not seem to propose a guide for rationally changing the status quo. Even when it is mapping the logical network of purposive action in a nonpositivist way -- as is the case with von Wright and Winch -- it makes no judgment of the worth of such purposiveness. It seems to be, in short, a philosophy that draws a map but cannot offer a critique -- an impressive exercise, a Continental philosopher might say, for explaining the world but of little help for changing it (pp. 86-87).

Given these shortcomings, the analytical branch is of limited

usefulness for curriculum theory.

The psychosocial branch, typified by the work of Habermas and Ricoeur, focuses less on events and more on meanings -- more specifically, this orientation focuses attention on assessing the worth of such meanings and is therefore more than descriptive, but evaluative. Underlying such an orientation is a view called "universal pragmatics" which refers to the inherent human need to communicate. Understanding and interpretation, according to Habermas (1971, in Howard, 1982), necessarily must address, through self-reflexivity, the subject which is internal to experience:

Hermeneutics must assimilate the dialectic of the general and the individual that determines the relation of objectivation and experience and comes to expression as such in the medium of the "common." If this is so, then understanding itself is bound to a situation in which at least two subjects communicate in a language that allows them to share -- that is, to make communicable through intersubjectively valid symbols -- what is absolutely unsharable and individual. Hermeneutic understanding ties the interpreter to the role of a partner in dialogue. Only this model of participation in communication learned in interaction can explain the specific achievements of hermeneutics (p.108).

Habermas develops a psychosocial orientation which reflects his structuralist conceptual framework of cognitive and moral development. Habermas, like Piaget and Kohlberg, suggests in potentia developmental levels of competence. Central to Habermas's critique is the reduction of distortions in communication, the objective reliability of knowledge gained through empirical and comparative scientific methodologies, and the corresponding demystification of metaphysical or ontological descriptions of knowledge. The aim of Habermas's critical hermeneutics

is, of course, the emancipation of human beings from unnecessary constraints and the development of a self-reflexive methodology which is normative and evaluative. While the critical, psychosocial hermeneutics of Habermas shares certain features with an ontologically oriented approach (Gadamer being a prominent spokesperson) -- namely, that a subject-object split is untenable, that a dialectical epistemology is developed, that knowledge reflects practical interests, and that theory and practice are unified -- there are features which are not present in psychosocial hermeneutics but whose importance is recognized in ontological orientations.

While psychosocial hermeneutics relies on a self-reflexive methodology for uncovering human interests and distortions in communication, ontological hermeneutics leaps beyond method as it addresses human consciousness. Whereas psychosocial hermeneutics, through the process of self-reflective critique, attempts to construct truth by reducing distortions and illusions, ontological hermeneutics suggests that the initiative for finding truth in reality resides in our ontological condition of being-in-the-world. That is, truth happens to us as well as we make it happen. Gadamer links to the concept of semantic truth, which may be arrived at through self-critical reflection, a concept of **ontological truth** which is "not a side effect of what we do." For Gadamer, truth and reality are interwoven; the existence of truth precedes our recognition of it. Thus, "truth" in this light is seen as an ontological, transcendent reality which is transcendent precisely because it extends into the

past as historical reality and into the future as possibility. This temporality lends to truth and meaning a transcendent quality which links experience to both the immediacy of an event (which Habermas adroitly addresses) but also to its **totality**. The distinction being drawn here can be made analogously to the "meaning" of a text, an author's work. While the immediacy of an author's work may disclose the intentionality of the author, his or her purpose for a particular expression, it is only an appreciation of the totality of the expressive act which enables us to grasp its resonance with the past and its as yet unknown future possibilities. This ontological view is especially germane to curriculum theory for, as Macdonald has indicated, the "context" of an educational action implies both its immediacy and particularity as well as its expansive, aye, infinite reverberations in totality. To deny or be unaware of the specific implications of an action for those presently involved is to be culpably ignorant of our influence as human agents; to be inattentive to the as yet unforeseen (the unintended) consequences of curricular decisions is to disregard our participation in the essentially religious and ontological dimensions of educational activity. Ontological hermeneutics can afford educators the possibility of considering human relationships and our existence in the world as being more than the result of various methodologies and actions. Such a view can offer a profound sense of intimacy with the world and others and thereby counter the potential alienation of "methodological solipsism."

Hermeneutic philosophy offers a means and opportunity for reducing alienation -- alienation as both experienced by those who are confronted by the facticity of the world and its attendant determinism within materialist or realist conceptions of reality, as well as by those who fall victim to extreme subjectivism or paradigm-bound interpretation -- as Dallmayr and McCarthy have described it "methodological solipsism" of individualist consciousness and methodological preoccupation. Hermeneutics offers a transcendent possibility of liberating interpreters from their determinate tradition and the standpoint or platform upon which their being-in-the-world is grounded. According to Macdonald and Purpel (1981):

The importance of "platform" has been discussed at length by hermeneutic philosophers. The work of Hans Gadamer (1976) is especially instructive. Each situation represents a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision. Thus, the concept of "horizon" is an essential part of each situation. The word horizon has been used by many thinkers to characterize the way in which thought is tied to a platform. It is this platform which allows us to see beyond what is nearest to us. Without such a platform we are limited to and overvalue what seems to have a sense of immediacy to us (pp. 15-16).

Thus, it may be suggested that the traditions which we acknowledge and affirm, the world-views we construct and which enable us to cohere the events of our lived experience, at the same time they facilitate our making of meaning, impose limits and restrictions upon our ability to discern alternative possibilities. This limited vision is precisely the concern of philosophical hermeneutics. Hermeneutics in its broadest sense speaks to the interpreters' abilities to self-reflectively come to recognize the limits or horizons of their

understanding and transcend their present limits by attending to the possibilities contained within the present state.

C. HERMENEUTICS AND CURRICULUM

Philip Phenix (1971) referring to transcendence in curriculum states that we, drawn through our consciousness of our temporality, transcend our present state. This awareness of our temporality and its attendant transcendent qualities is similarly discussed -- under the rubric of developing a critical historical consciousness -- by such theorists as Apple, Freire, Gadamer, Giroux, Greene, Habermas, Huebner and Macdonald.

A distinction, however, must be made between "historical consciousness" as discussed by critical theorists such as Habermas, Apple and Giroux, and those theorists oriented toward a more encompassing hermeneutic understanding. Critical theory, according to Habermas, operates from a critical cognitive interest in emancipation. A critical historical consciousness, while utilizing self-reflective critique, seeks to overcome causes and redefine means-ends relationships. Thus, critical theory may be viewed, as Macdonald (1980) has suggested, as an instrumental activity, a practical, politically motivated praxis which proceeds -- not unlike the technical rationality of empirical science -- to construct an interpretive rationality which seeks to explain historical events and thereby point out historically and culturally situated moments where interventions may be made to transform the constitutive reality toward a preferred

alternative. Hermeneutically oriented interpretation, on the other hand, which Habermas describes as being guided by "a practical interest in consensus," is, according to Macdonald, less concerned with technical rationality associated with explanation, but instead is guided by a mytho-poetic interest (including, of course, an aesthetic appreciation) which directs hermeneutic interpretation toward a contemplation of the possible, an expressiveness valued for its own sake (as opposed to its instrumental value), and a desire to understand and not explain phenomena. Gadamer and Macdonald point to the central value of hermeneutic philosophy -- it is "a larger interpretive endeavor which includes intention and direction toward the recovery of meaning and the development of understanding" (Macdonald 1980, p.8). It is this recovery of meaning and the development of understanding that Macdonald perceived to be the significant contribution and transcendental possibility of hermeneutic philosophy to curriculum theorizing. The problematics of theory-practice considerations are, according to Macdonald, subsumed under the self-reflexive process Ricoeur and Gadamer describe as the hermeneutic circle. Since both theory and practice are embedded within social and cultural forms, hermeneutic interpretation may lead to the discovery of the historical roots of these forms.

Once again, it is necessary to depict this process of discovery by distinguishing between **calculative thinking** which seeks to explain or change the process and **contemplative thinking** "which is experienced as a participatory phenomenon, where the person engages in dialogue with

the theory, bringing each person's biography and values to the interpretation... to reinterpret in order to provide greater grounding for understanding" (Macdonald, 1980, p.8). But even this process of reinterpretation is not without somewhat conflicting aims. Ricoeur (1978) distinguishes between two divergent orientations of interpretation -- one being focused on the **reduction of illusion**, the second the **restoration of meaning**. The first, reduction of illusion, is typically employed by psychoanalytic and critical theorists. This orientation is directed toward reducing illusion, contradiction, distortion and mystification. While this aim is in no way contrary to the hermeneutic quest for understanding, Ricoeur maintains that interpretation aimed at demystification is based upon a "rude discipline of necessity." While the uncovering of illusion, our consideration of this illusory quality of our existence, and presumably the rejection of illusion, leads to greater understanding, this focus on the "givenness" of this illusion fails to achieve the greater possibility for understanding offered in the second orientation of hermeneutic interpretation, that of the restoration of meaning. Restoration of meaning relies more, according to Ricoeur, on the mytho-poetic core of imagination and a wider consideration of transcendent possibility than that achieved through the narrow focus upon demystification. Understanding as a restoration of meaning implies a revitalization of meaningful activity which has not only encountered distortion and conflicting meanings (for example, meanings conveyed through dominant ideologies and oppressive social and cultural forms), but restoration of meaning also implies the generative

transcendent process whereby meaning is extended into areas of emerging human potential. The field of understanding is thus broadened by this latter orientation. The discovery and restoration of meaning is not limited to the reduction of illusion (as for example, the deciphering of "No Code" was not prompted by its illusory quality, but by an underlying interest in understanding what was not understood), but instead entertains potential meaningful human experience.

Macdonald (1980) has astutely linked Ricoeur's distinction between reduction of illusion and restoration of meaning to Gadamer's (1976) discussion of the hermeneutic quest being guided either by a concern for mis-understanding or not understanding. Hermeneutic interpretation focusing on clearing up misunderstanding, as with seeking the reduction of illusion, distracts one from the greatest possibility that hermeneutic interpretation has to offer — that of reinterpreting the situation of the interpreter so that the boundaries or horizons of his or her understanding may be discovered and transcended. Thus, the distinctions Ricoeur and Gadamer offer serve to point out not only epistemological and methodological dimensions of hermeneutics, but its ontological nature as well. Gadamer (1977) points to this ontological quality of hermeneutics when he states that "The question is rather what men, with their know-how, want" (p.543). The full potential of hermeneutic activity, while certainly including the theoretical contributions of scientific rationality and critical theory, extends beyond these orientations and sharpens not only our ability to know, to generate data, but more fundamentally enables us to attend to and honor

the well-spring of our questions from which understanding emerges and the process through which one assigns significance to both the questions and the information one creates. Gadamer (1977) sensitively depicts this fundamental concern of hermeneutic interpretation when he states:

The concept of information as applied by information theory in no way does justice to the process of selection through which an item of information becomes significant. Even the information upon which the specialist builds up his know-how through the logic of research is achieved "hermeneutically." This means that it is already limited to what it must answer by its questions. This is a hermeneutic structural element of all research (p.558).

One of Gadamer's great contributions to interpretive science is his ability to uncover the ubiquitousness and seminal qualities of the hermeneutic process (however truncated or limited within various research programs and epistemologies). The mere fact that a given research methodology fails to recognize the presence of hermeneutic activity within its venue, does not discount the validity nor reality of the interpretive process; what does become the challenge facing those who apply hermeneutic principles to an understanding of social and cultural forms (e.g., research programs), is how this lack of understanding, in a sense, this un or minimally achieved possibility of self-reflexivity -- the humanization of inquiry -- may be made more prominent and understood. Gadamer (1977) goes on to say:

The old differentiation made by the theory of knowledge between explanation and understanding or between nomothetic and ideographic methods does not suffice to indicate the full dimensions of a science of man that is self-conscious of its being a human activity. For what is manifest in concrete detail and belongs as such to historical knowledge is of interest, however not as the

particular but as "the human" -- thought may always become visible only in particular occurrences. Everything human not only means the generally human in the sense of the characteristics of the human species in contrast to other types of living beings, especially animal, but also comprises the broad view of the variety of the human essence (pp.559-560).

This "human essence" is fundamentally a curricular concern, for as Macdonald (1980) has stated:

Curriculum theory... is a form of hermeneutic theory. Thus curriculum theory is an ever renewing attempt to interpret curricular reality and to develop greater understanding. Curriculum practice results from hermeneutic process which both lies within the three methods (epistemologies [science, critical theory, mytho-poetic]) and transcends them (pp. 16-17).

Curriculum theorists such as Macdonald, Huebner, Purpel, Greene, and Mooney have spoken eloquently about the transcendental nature of curriculum inquiry. These writers have unabashedly suggested, as have philosophers such as Gadamer, Berger, James, Polanyi, Barrett, and Bronowski, that the quintessential character of human inquiry is religious, poetic, aesthetic and social. Knowledge and understanding, despite the assault mustered by technical and methodological rationalities which through either or both vanity or well-intentioned oversimplification, preceeds and guides the concepts we seek to construct.

The hermeneutic possibility of curriculum theorizing can lead to a more critical and reverent regard for human possibility. Education, when seen as a revisioning of human potential, as an activity which grounds in personal, social and historical contexts the lived reality of each human being (especially as this reality holds within it the

aspirations and hopes however latent or not yet understood), invites and expresses the participation of each individual in the "Great Conversation" -- discourse which negates the negation and fuses horizons of each understanding within its emancipatory transcendence. Curriculum theorizing, then, of such a conception of education, can attend to not only the organizing principles and the conceptual frameworks from which we come to ask questions; but curriculum theorizing seen as part of a broader hermeneutic endeavor should return to, as James has suggested, the seamless web of human experience which precedes conceptual and methodological representation. Admittedly, this is an ungainly abstract description of the penetration of hermeneutics into curriculum theorizing. Perhaps if we return to previously mentioned comments made by William James (1909, in McDermott, 1977) and Gadamer (1977), this abstraction can at least be tolerated more gracefully despite the anticipated press for concreteness that, as part of the fabric of modernist thought, surrounds us.

James, when discussing the modern dilemma of conceptual logic separating sensible reality into fragmentary accounts, stated that "the contradiction results only from the conceptual or discursive form being substituted for the real form" (p.580). The "real form" which James refers to he depicted as "raw unverbilized life" or "the stream's sensible continuity." Likewise, Gadamer maintains that "social community, with all its tensions and disruptions, ever and ever again leads back to a common area of social understanding through which it

exists" (p.42). No doubt the terms "raw unverbilized life," "stream's sensible continuity," and "social understanding" are quite abstract, and for many, frustratingly vague. But, perhaps, this frustration and pervasive criticism of vagueness need be examined for their genesis. This examination, I suggest, is central to hermeneutics and curriculum theorizing. Frustration and lack of tolerance for vagueness may be just two signs of not understanding. This does not imply that that which frustrates or is considered vague is necessarily, inherently good, nor desirable, rather, to refer again to the quote of James: "The significance of a thing is more important than its tangibility." All too often, modernist thought (and by implication, curriculum theorizing under the sway of the hegemony of scientific rationality) substitutes tangibility — concreteness and precision, measurement and procedure — for significance. (An example of this substitution might be seen in the preoccupation in education research with experimental and quasi-experimental designs which, while perhaps disclosing "statistically significant differences," (that is, tangible ones) may contribute little meaningful significance). For James and Gadamer, the significance of the wholeness and ground of experience were more important than their tangibility which, due to modernist conceptual and epistemological schema, was overvalued.

Curriculum theorizing, when informed by hermeneutic philosophy, must, I suppose, face the struggle between logos and ontos as it is waged in our historical reality. If logos or discursive thought as James laments is "generally treated as the sole avenue to truth," then

the intellectual climate may be either ambivalent or hostile. The appeal, however, to ontological concerns may reemerge as the limits of the horizon of discourse, explanatory methodology are attained. Curriculum theorizing can, in one sense, hasten the recognition of these limits. Education can help to both highlight what is known, various avenues toward this knowledge (e.g., human interests), as well as what the limits of this knowledge reveal. We now know how to technically destroy the earth through nuclear means; we are only dimly aware of how to retreat from this capability and pose other more life enhancing alternatives for conflict resolution. Perhaps one of the ironies of modernist cultures and their technological "prowess" is that the ability to do outstrips the ability to undo. The ability to pollute (its relative low cost given current fiscal/profit motive accounting equations) outstrips the ability to reclaim polluted environments (the cost of "cleaning up" Three Mile Island is now estimated to cost more than the initial cost estimates of the reactor's construction). The tendency to achieve mobility as Illich has suggested (relocating for employment, urban renewal ("removal"), speed of transportation, etc.) outstrips our ability to cultivate a sense of community and membership and an ecological intimacy with the earth.

While curriculum theorizing may help to construct conceptual maps or "landscapes for learning" as Maxine Greene (1978) has termed them, it is hermeneutic interpretation which helps us to compare and contrast these various representations of experience and history. More importantly, curriculum theorizing in a hermeneutic light, may again

urge us to return to the topography which each cartographic orientation represents only partially. The poet Gary Snyder (1969) who seeks a mythic, geo-political deep structure, the structure of time and earth and consciousness states:

Almost had it last night: no identity. One thinks, "I emerged from some general, non-differentiated thing, I return to it." One has in reality never left it; there is no return (p.10).

Thus, a hermeneutics of curriculum and a curriculum of hermeneutics neither leads nor escapes, neither projects nor withdraws, but by being, by attending (French: "attendre" -- to wait), promotes the possibility of finding meaning not in method nor fully extant, but in imagination, creation and existence instead.

D. REPRESENTATION OF HERMENEUTICS

So many are the forms which emanate from the Form. I refer not to Platonic ideals, nor the archetypes, icons, symbols and signs we craft to capture or solidify/make tangible that which would otherwise elude us. But each representation (mimesis according to the ancient Greeks) is seen to be a **mediation**. We begin in media res -- in the middle of things. The continuity begins not with our birth, ends not with our death, but courses through us as once did ancient elements of Earth, Water, Fire and Air. A modern biochemist or physicist or theologian might each describe different elements, but the course they tend to converge upon. Curriculum is but one attempt to unify these discordant discourses within a comprehension of a course, or as Bateson has described it, "the pattern which connects." The conventional use of

the term "a course of study" seems to offer a slightly different implication than a specific content area being described as a "course" which in its Jamesian sense would be yet another fragmentary account of our being.

So how is it that hermeneutic philosophy escapes this artificiality, this fragmentary erosion of the whole, this alienation? As was previously mentioned, hermeneutics seeks not a reinforcement of the status quo, a stable state or finality. But neither may nuclear physics nor physical education. While Bateson suggests that we perceive according to differences we detect, and while these differences help us to chart "vectors" of change, hermeneutics invites us to examine not only the differences, but the commonality, the pre-differentiated starting point from which difference is discerned. Ah, this is quite the trick! Einstein stated that "the last thing the fish sees is the water." By implication, the first thing we see is the difference. But instead of being seduced into believing that it is the difference (because of its tangibility or perceptability) that is alone significant, hermeneutics offers instead an orientation which takes the socially and historically situated standpoint from which this difference is discerned as its area of examination. **It is this precursive, preunderstanding from which perception and meaning emerges that hermeneutics orients our awareness.** Polanyi (1958) has similarly oriented our attention in his discussion of personal knowledge. Personal knowledge, according to Polanyi, refers not to a solipsistic, egoistic form of knowing, but instead suggests that:

1. no knowledge exists without knowers (that is, knowledge isn't a reified thing).
2. knowledge emerges from personally experienced, historically grounded realities of the knower.
3. knowledge is understood to be multifaceted and **virtually incapable of being fully expressed.** ("we know more than we can say.")

This third point is not meant to be a coy way of saying that "I could have said this better." Rather, that the truth of this statement is contained in the idea that **we cannot fully explain or express all we know.** Once again, this is not meant to excuse sloppy thinking nor verbal obtuseness, rather, Polanyi suggests that **the grounding of our expression is more vast than any representational mode there is to represent it.** The extent of Isadora Duncan's knowledge can only be intimated by her reply to a question about what she meant to say in a certain dance -- she replied (as have artists when asked the meaning of their artistic expressions): "If I could have said it in words, I need not have danced it."

So it is we are faced with the challenge of representing, in a variety of forms (but admittedly, given the verbal nature of this form of discourse, in written form), the knowledge we have of a hermeneutic approach to curriculum theorizing.

We have earlier referred to the representation of interpretation as being part of a "hermeneutic circle." The circle has many archetypal associations, many occurrences in mythology and symbolic discourse. Life has been almost universally represented at one time or

other in circular form, the egg is circular, the path of seasons is circular, day and night and the solar system's orbits are circular (or at least elliptical). The television series "Ben Casey" opened each segment with Sam Jaffe's narrative (while he was scribing on a chalkboard the respective symbols) "Man, Woman, Birth, Death, Infinity" where infinity is represented by two circles joined at a point. Marx's conception of dialectical materialism proceeds in a circular path -- we are shaped by our material culture which we in turn shape through our praxis. Contrast these against the one-dimensionality of behaviorism's S-R model, and we may see the tremendous evocative symbolism of circular representations.

Hermeneutic interpretation begins with the understood (or even the primordial pre-understood) reality of our being embedded in the activity of the world. This being is essentially un-reflective. From action in the world, we proceed to the quintessentially human endeavor of self-reflection -- coming to know our existence as being-in-the-world. The third phase of this circle is the movement through this self-reflexive knowledge and understanding toward the application of this consciousness to not only our action, but our self-reflection. This is a critically important point of modern hermeneutic philosophy. Unlike earlier Platonic representations of action, reflection and application in circular but unidirectional movement, modern hermeneutics suggests that each phase of the circle dialectically influences its preceeding and subsequent stage. While Platonic self-reflexivity can be depicted as:




FIGURE 1: Platonic Self-Reflexivity

the modern hermeneutic circle (sharing elements of the yin-yang representation of Eastern mysticism, but this time configured to represent three modes), can be represented as:




FIGURE 2: The Modern Hermeneutic Circle

Each mode penetrates and is penetrated by its previous and succeeding moment. Luckily, this "representation" can, in this case, be made in some graphic form. The success of this representation is tenuous. But if it could not have been represented graphically, would it be any less significant? This question remains one of the haunting questions confronting any intellectual or theoretic activity. Those who

subscribe to hermeneutic principles strive to locate themselves at those very interstices between communities of understanding. Hermeneutics and curriculum theorizing, I suggest, stand not on the fence, but across the boundaries which separate communication communities. This is, in essence, an act of faith. For the attempt is not to find familiarity or security within what is certain and known, but to venture out to the limits of understanding, where uncertainty and ambiguity invite leaps of creativity, imagination and transcendence and where this synthetic process works upstream against entropy and dissolution.

In the Old Testament, Babel was the result of transgression. In some ironic (or profound) redemptive spirit, hermeneutic philosophy and curriculum theorizing allied with it, seek not a return to original obedience, but the reestablishment of the process of communication and the affiliation within a community which has been lost. The loss of this community is not taken lightly... nor is the pregnancy of its return.

Yet another graphic representation of the hermeneutic circle is offered by Mehan and Wood (1975). This representation helps, as Heidegger has suggested, to distinguish between **understanding** and **interpretation**. As was mentioned earlier, understanding refers to the undifferentiated, primordial ground from which human beings make meaning of their being-in-the-world. This concept may be compared favorably with Polanyi's sense of the "tacit" domain of personal knowledge. It is from this primordial aspect that hermeneutics derives

its ontological import. Interpretation, on the other hand, refers to one's response to new events and phenomena as this response is affected by one's tacit or prior understanding. The movement from understanding to interpretation and from interpretation to understanding may be represented by two transitional moments: **indexicality** and **reflexivity**, respectively. Indexicality refers to the application of prior understanding to specific events or phenomena; reflexivity considers specific events or phenomena as they reflect back on prior understanding.

The hermeneutic circle (or it is sometimes referred to as a spiral, that is, an uncoiling circle) thus contains the two moments of understanding and interpretation and the connecting, transitional processes of indexicality and reflexivity. The evocative symbolism of the coursing of night into day and day into night lends additional mytho-poetic expressiveness to this depiction. Mehan and Wood divide the circle into two hemispheres: the one representing understanding is depicted as "night," the second symbolizing interpretation as "day:"

People's meaningful lives spiral toward the unknown like the cycle of nights and days. Any particular day has an existence independent of the previous night. But at once it is dependent upon the substance of that previous night, and upon the totality of nights and days before the most recent night... interpretation has its independent meaning. It is an activity and stands apart from the stillness that preceeded it. Simultaneously, however, it is dependent upon the understood horizon that provided it with the here and now upon which the activity arose (p.193).




FIGURE 3: Reflexivity and Indexicality in Hermeneutics

Just as night provides a horizon — dawn which represents the process of indexicality where prior understanding is carried over into the process of interpretation — so does day provide a horizon — dusk which in turn represents the process of reflexivity where the phenomenal world is brought to reflective action which precedes understanding. This cyclical representation of day and night then conveys the ever-widening, constructive and reconstructive process of understanding and interpretation: from primordial understanding we encounter the events and actions in the world which are shaped and influenced by our weltanschauung and, upon reflective activity, the interpretation of these events and the meanings we assign return to subtly alter our world view which, by implication, reemerges as we encounter the world anew.

This circular process of hermeneutic inquiry is particularly useful for curriculum theorizing. It helps us to not only consider the

"events" and "texts" which reveal themselves to us, but additionally, it helps us uncover (in the name of "effective historical consciousness"), the ground within which these "events" and "texts" are situated. This ground includes the social and cultural traditions which are carried on through them, and our pre-understandings or, as Gadamer terms them, our "prejudices" which are the tacitly understood whole against which events and texts are juxtaposed in the process of interpretation. And this is precisely the circular process which I shall apply to a critique of significant texts which have appeared to me during my study of the curriculum field. This is not to suggest that these selections are the most important works in the field, rather, I can say that these selections have provoked a resonance with my own prejudices in ways that others have not. They have been, and are important to me... but why they are so remains a task of hermeneutic exploration. Chapter III will trace my encounter with the works of several curriculum theorists which have, for reasons which will be discussed in in the chapter, have expanded my understanding of alienation, the hegemony of individualist conceptual frameworks, and the call for new ways of forming communities of meaning.

III. CURRICULUM THEORIZING: REFLECTIONS ON AIMS, PURPOSES AND PRAXIS -- A HERMENEUTIC INTERPRETATION OF SELECTED TEXTS

We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.

T. S. Eliot, "Little Gidding."

A. INTRODUCTION

When James B. Macdonald suggested many years ago that one of the characteristics of human experience is that it is composed of "multiple realities," I wondered whether he meant that our lives (both in an individual and collective sense) must necessarily be fragmented, full of contradictions and cross-purposes, unresolvable conflicts and disjointedness. I wondered whether he meant that these "multiple realities" were what others described as cultural pluralism, idiosyncratic approaches to the world, etc. Over time -- or through time -- Jim Macdonald's exploration of human experience as it is disclosed in diverse experiences -- the lived reality of everyday life, the literature of philosophical speculation, aesthetics, mysticism, and theology -- was guided by a dual concern:

Looking back I can see that two major value themes have appeared and reappeared over the years. One has been expressed in a desire to construct intellectually satisfying conceptual maps of the human condition which were educationally meaningful and personally satisfying. The second has been expressed in a utopian hope that somehow people could improve the quality of their existence, specifically through educational processes and generally through broader social policy (in Pinar, 1975, p.3.

Macdonald goes on to say, in retrospect, that his own career contained periods of time which he characterized as reflecting differing interests -- cognitive professional development, empirical research, and technical developmental work. Those periods, he suggests, addressed specific educational needs he felt were compelling at the time. While it may be an oversimplification, wishful thinking or vanity to say that "we stand on the shoulders of those who came before us," there is a poignancy in Macdonald's retrospection which, like other erudite, synoptic visions derived from full lives of mindful activity, accordians or telescopes decades of experience so that others may, if they are so inclined, trace the emergence and development of consciousness. This "inclination," I am suggesting, is the very stance or hermeneutic attentiveness one can take in relation to the world. Macdonald in his later years -- informed by the phenomenology of Ricoeur and Merleau-Ponty, the ontological concerns of Heidegger, the speculative philosophy of William James and Henri Bergson, the critical theory of Habermas and Gramsci, and the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer, depicted this educational inclination in terms of a transcendental developmental pedagogy and curriculum theorizing as an hermeneutic activity. I can think of no more resonant, concise and articulate statement of the role of curricular thought -- and no more fitting text to begin a mapping of my horizon of understanding of the curriculum field than that expressed by Macdonald in the following quotation:

. . . life seems to move in circles and somewhere from my past the utopian impulse, perhaps best experienced and

later expressed in terms of justice, equality, fairness, etc., pressed into my professional consciousness. At this point education became a moral enterprise rather than simply a set of technical problems to be solved within a satisfying conceptual scheme. And with this shift a concern for quality became a dimension that was not the same as, though still related to, the quantity of problems "solved," or outputs measured.

It is clear to me now that when we speak of education we speak in the context of a microscopic paradigm of a macroscopic human condition, a paradigm that holds all of the complexities in microcosm of the larger condition.

Thus, the struggle for personal integration, educational integrity, and social justice go on, necessitating the constant reevaluation of oneself, one's work and one's world -- with the hope that whatever creative talent one may possess will lead toward something better that we may all share, each in his own way (in Pinar, 1975, p. 4).

Following Macdonald's example, this examination of curriculum texts is guided by a concern for moral, ethical and aesthetic dimensions of curricular thought -- a concern which likewise has slowly emerged from prior interests and needs which must be situated within personal biography and the social history of my lived experience -- and which, now understood as an hermeneutic interpretation of our being-in-the-world, apprehends and describes meaningful experience in characteristically and qualitatively different ways than were possible at the outset of this dissertation.

In a sense, this is the "apology" one must make for change and revisioned commitment; this is the renegotiated outline of a social contract among those who collaborate to bring about a project which can at best be only partially defined -- for the limit situations are disclosed only in process and the possibilities for new questions and

insights are only entertainable as these limit situations (or to use the hermeneutic term "horizons" are encountered, struggled with and played with in order to be transcended. Just as Macdonald in his retrospective writing has pointed to the developmental emergence of awareness (and the circular path which abandons neither our embeddedness in the world nor our utopian hope for yet continuing the self-reflexivity and recycling of experience), so this sketch of curricular topography attempts to describe not only the shifting intellectual and social landscapes, but also to identify the newly discovered features of the terrain which previously were unrecognized, devoid of meaning, and/or masked by maya of inexperience.

The "preunderstanding" from which this project emerged can be seen if we return to a statement made at the early stages of this research:

In a sense I am inquiring into the ideological hegemony which situates the individual being at the center of a Ptolomaic universe of educational activity . . . a universe which is quintessentially conceptual and metaphoric, and is as such yet another "useful fiction" to convey a sense of place in the world.

That I juxtaposed the concepts of "ideological hegemony" and "useful fiction" may now be seen as a rather fortuitous "accident." The term "ideological hegemony" -- derived from the critical theory of Habermas, Marcuse and Gramsci and currently employed by curriculum writers such as Apple, Giroux, and Popkewitz -- was an initial attempt to describe an outline of limit situations which our being-in-the-world encounters. Perhaps more accurately, the use of the concept of ideological hegemony indicated a particular mode of analysis and

discourse which was embraced for its ostensive explanatory power; critical rationality was employed to unmask (as was its potential anticipated at that time) the unproblematically conceived notion that the conceptual and metaphorical renderings of individualism were limit situations which unnecessarily constrained human possibility. That our use of metaphor, conceptual frameworks and the language through which they were depicted might somehow be "explained" through the analysis provided within a critical rationality is part of this preunderstanding. The juxtaposition against "useful fiction," however, now points to an understanding which was not present at the time the passage was first composed. Viewed hermeneutically, the passage now is understood to offer a possible interpretation that collapses the concept of "ideological hegemony" itself into the category of "useful fiction." That is to say, at the time the passage was written, the concept of ideological hegemony was itself not viewed problematically, not viewed as yet another expression of a critical ideology. Now, however, it is understood that "ideological hegemony" may be seen as yet another useful fiction.

This "insight" has only recently been arrived at; and it was comments made by Richard Rorty (1982) and Macdonald (1981) that helped make this perspective clear. Rorty, in his provocative work The Consequences of Pragmatism comments that:

The tradition we call "modern philosophy" asked itself "How is it that science has had so much success? What is the secret of this success?" The various bad answers to these bad questions have been variations on a single charming but uncashable metaphor: viz., the New Science discovered the language which nature itself uses. When

Galileo said that the Book of Nature was written in the language of mathematics, he meant that his new reductionistic, mathematical vocabulary didn't just happen to work, but that it worked because that was the way things really were. He meant that the vocabulary worked because it fitted the universe as a key fits a lock. Ever since, philosophers have been trying, and failing, to give sense to these notions of "working because," and "things as they really are."

They have done this because they thought that the idea that we can explain scientific success in terms of discovering Nature's Own Language must, somehow, be right -- even if the metaphor could not be cashed, even if neither realism nor idealism could explain just what the imagined "correspondence" between nature's language and current scientific jargon could consist in. Very few thinkers have suggested that maybe science doesn't have a secret of success -- that there is no metaphysical or epistemological or transcendental explanation of why Galileo's vocabulary has worked so well so far, any more than there is an explanation of why the vocabulary of liberal democracy has worked so well so far. Very few have been willing to abjure the notions that "the mind" or "reason" has a nature of its own, that discovery of this nature will give us a "method," and that following that method will enable us to penetrate beneath the appearances and see nature "in its own terms" (pp.191-192).

As I originally used them, the terms "ideology hegemony" and "the language of critical theory" were seen to be a set of keys for unlocking problems which liberal reform ideology and extreme subjectivism posed for educational discourse (see, Weingarten, 1979). In a sense it was not until the very bases of epistemology and discourse might be questioned (as ontological phenomenology and philosophical hermeneutics aid) that the "fit" between language, metaphor, conceptual frameworks and our being-in-the-world might be examined for its contrivance and/or limit situations. Just as critical theory drawing upon a Marxist dialectic helped to point out the limits of positivist science and the blurred distinction between "natural

science" and human sciences, so may ontological phenomenology and philosophical hermeneutics help to point out the limits of critical theory.

In this chapter I shall interpret and critique selected writings of five curriculum theorists who have profoundly influenced my own understanding of the range of issues one might include in a consideration of the field. The theorists included in this chapter are Henry Giroux, Maxine Greene, James B. Macdonald, Dwayne Huebner and William Pinar. Each has had, and continues to have, a major influence in the scope and emphases found in contemporary curriculum discourse. Given their current prominence and, it is my judgment, their continued importance among curriculum theorists, their work should be carefully and critically examined. Each of the theorists included in this study has, in his or her own way, opened new frontiers for curriculum theorizing. I shall examine their contributions in light of my concern for increasing understanding and directing attention to a counter-alienating possibility for education. It is my hope that my interpretation of their work, guided by an hermeneutic orientation, will both honor their contributions to the field and extend and open the dialogue to additional communities of meaning.

B. HENRY GIROUX: A CURRICULUM OF CONTESTATION

1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years Henry Giroux has emerged as an articulate, passionate and perhaps even visionary critic of curriculum and especially political theory. As a perceptive scholar of political thought, Giroux prolifically contributed penetrating analyses of ideology, pedagogy, resistance and cultural politics (1979, 1981a, 1981b, 1982, 1983a, 1983b, 1984). Giroux's work, along with that of Freire, 1970, 1973, forthcoming; Apple and King, 1977; Apple, 1979, 1982; Anyon, 1979; Cherryholmes, 1980; Popkewitz, 1980; Shapiro, 1980a, 1980b, 1982; and Wexler, 1983; represent significant contributions from the Left to the analysis of ideology and inequalities of power as they affect educational theories, practices and institutions. While Giroux's earlier work demonstrates his competence and thoughtfulness as a critical historian of leftist political theory, his more recent publications (particularly Theory and Resistance in Education: A Pedagogy for the Opposition, 1983; and "Marxism and Schooling: The Limits of Radical Discourse," 1984) represent courageous and insightful contributions to advancing the field. It is with this acknowledgment of his important work and with a full respect for his personal courage, commitment to human liberation, and his scope and sensitivity of political analysis that my critique of his work proceeds. Giroux, perhaps more than any other critical curriculum theorist, has influenced and informed my understanding of the political dimensions of curriculum theory, and for this I owe him a debt of gratitude.

Moreover, while he has challenged all of us in the field to consider the importance of critical consciousness and cultural politics, he has often done so in a manner which invites and remains open to dialogue. It is my hope that this critique reflects both my high regard for his work and a thoughtful reply in this expanding dialogue.

2. A CRITIQUE OF MARXIST CATEGORIES

Critical theory, with its emphasis on an epistemology based upon competing human interests (as, for example, Habermas' (1971) delineation of technical, practical and critical interests), views the production of knowledge as situated within arenas of contestation characterized by distortions in communication based primarily upon inequalities in power and authority relationships. Marxist and neo-marxist critiques of schooling (Katz, 1968; Greer, 1972; Feinberg, 1975; Bowles and Gintis, 1976, Apple, 1979; Shapiro, 1982; Giroux, 1983) seek to uncover the stratified social relations in schools which serve to reproduce "cultural capital" and its attendant class systems, status differentials, privilege and power concentrations. Issues of control and domination are at the forefront of such critiques and have made a significant contribution to the understanding of curricular design and the human interests, cultural and social forms, and power relationships which may have been unproblematically considered in such designs.

But as I have mentioned earlier, the limitations of critical theoretical analysis of curriculum and schooling are just beginning to

receive attention. Macdonald and Purpel (1931) for example, have astutely outlined some important limitations of Marxist analysis as it is focused on curricular issues:

The Marxist critique makes a decidedly deep cut in ordinary views of schooling. Nevertheless, it is not clear either historically as one views Marxist politics or critically as one reviews Marxist critiques whether the rejection of a Tyler-like model is based upon its essential character or upon the fact that it serves the wrong master. Historical examples and the materialistic basis of Marxist philosophy leads us to think that it is the latter. Marxism, we suspect, is embedded in the same general culture as Capitalism and the assumptive base of each allows them to use Tyler or Skinner's behaviorism with equal facility. We find the Marxist critique flawed on this basis, its acceptance of materialistic opportunism in the service of different ends. It is surely clear that Marx, like Machiavelli, searched for a base other than values for human action. If human beings are a random accidental occurrence in the cosmos, and create themselves and their own destiny through the obtaining and justification of power by small groups of elites, then the Tyler model is a useful control mechanism to bring about desired ends. It seems clear that both Capitalistic and Communistic ideology is embedded in the common dominant technological, materialistic culture (p. 8).

In a somewhat similar vein, a recent article by Henry Giroux (1984) draws upon Stanley Aronowitz's (1981) critique of Marxism's economic and class analysis features and suggests what I believe are significant departures from classical Marxist analyses of curriculum. According to Giroux:

What I am suggesting is that while the crisis in Marxism is not new, it is now confronted by a series of social, political, and economic events that not only indict its orthodox or classical strains that have always been dominated by a rigid economism, but also reveal the limitations of more recent Marxist developments that have produced a critical assessment of the original theory. The failure of the working class to assume the role of the historical agent of revolution, the failure of existing socialisms in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world

to provide and demonstrate an emancipatory vision, and the appearance of new social movements that have redefined the meaning of domination and emancipation appear to have dealt Marxism in all of its forms a mortal blow. Not only do the fundamental Marxist categories of class, history, and economy fail to address or change the new social antagonisms that exist in society, they also fail to interrogate critically Marxism's own implication with the rationality of domination. The task of radical theory, especially in the case of radical educational theory, is to see Marxism not as a doctrine valid for all times under all historical conditions, but as a critical "way of seeing." In this case, the primacy of universal categories is replaced by a discourse linked to the spirit of critical inquiry. This suggests creating a new discourse, one that is informed by the Marxist project of self- and social emancipation but not limited by its most fundamental categories. It is the legacy of this need to move beyond Marx, rather than rescue him from his critics and followers, that haunts the American left, and the radical educational American left in particular (p.114).

Giroux, I think, has recognized a threshold, a horizon, which Aronowitz has pointed to. (It should be noted here that this recent criticism of the narrowness of economic and class analysis is not without historical precedent: Bode (1927) has written eloquently on this subject, as have Dewey (1937), Huebner (1966), Gramsci (1971), Berger (1976), Wirth (1977), Feyerabend (1978), Macdonald (1978), Pinar (1978), and Riegel (1978). What, perhaps, is most noteworthy of this recent re-examination of Marxist analysis is that it is occurring among theorists who have relied upon orthodox Marxist categories in their previous important work. If indeed the "fundamental Marxist categories of class, history and economy fail to address or fail to provide a meaningful account of the new social antagonisms that exist in society," is Giroux suggesting that new categories will do this? I believe that he does . . . but before examining the new categories he suggests, I believe it is useful to examine the emerging rationale

employed by a select group of leftist critics to reject the categories of class, history and economy in favor of ones possessing greater explanatory or illuminative power.

Giroux highlights Aronowitz's thesis that

Marxism has been held captive by the formulation of theoretical and philosophical presuppositions developed almost entirely within a discourse that stresses the primacy of the economic sphere in shaping society, on the one hand, and the primacy of class as the exclusive referent for understanding history and the dynamics of domination and struggle, on the other. One consequence has been the devaluing of politics, ideology, and culture in both theoretical and practical terms. Another problem has centered on the inability of Marxist theory to free itself from forms of class and historical reductionism. Aronowitz argues that any approach to developing a critical theory of emancipation demands that the Marxist theory of class and history be discarded and that the theoretical terrain of culture and ideology be given primary importance as a constitutive force in the shaping of consciousness and historical agency (p. 115).

Aronowitz's (and Giroux's which elaborates upon Aronowitz's) claim that orthodox Marxism suffers from manifest reductionism is well-taken. That the etiology of **control** can be traced from its origin specifically in the relations between labor and capital configured within the context of **work**, points to a peculiar and convoluted ontological order. This order is reflected in Giroux's reference to the writing of Catherine MacKinnon (1982): ". . . Marxist theory is wedded to the notion that work is the central 'activity by which people become what they are. Class is its structure, production its consequence, capital its congealed form, and control its issue'" (p. 115). Giroux mentions that both Aronowitz and Lukacs (1971) point to how, in orthodox Marxism, the working class had "occupied a privileged

position as an a priori historical agent." That the logic of Marxism starts from this somewhat unproblematically conceived notion, introduces a flaw against which Giroux marshals a devastating critique, the basis of which is a reconceptualized problematic which focuses not on the flawed interpretation that the working class need be the historical accident of economic determinants from which resistance and contestation emerge, but instead that "working-class existence had to be seen as being produced not only in the economic sphere, but also on the terrains of culture and ideology" (p. 116). Thus, Giroux hastens the dethroning of economic determinism as an origin of domination and the "cause" of spheres of resistance and suggests that "classical Marxism has never taken seriously the categories of culture, ideology, and the lived experiences of every day life" (p. 120).

3. FROM ECONOMISM TO CULTURE

In place of **class** as a unit of analysis, Giroux suggests that **hegemony** provides a category which better explains the various spheres of resistance (e.g., race, ecology, feminism) which are not answerable to a reductionist, classist analysis. By examining the hegemony of Marxist ideology -- its technical and instrumental rationality (as pointed to by Macdonald and Purpel), its positivist epistemology, its economist and classist conceptual categories, and its eviscerated aesthetic sensibility -- Giroux identifies severe limitations Marxism offers as an interpretive framework.

As a critically-framed alternative to the limitations described above, Giroux suggests

. . . three major theoretical tasks that have to be addressed in the reconstruction of a radical theory of schooling. First, it is necessary to articulate a new critical view which recognizes the political and strategic relevance of distinguishing between education and schooling. Second, it is imperative to develop a discourse and set of concepts around which this distinction becomes theoretically operational for developing more viable forms of political pedagogy. Third, theoretical work which focuses on social and cultural reproduction has to be developed in conjunction with analyses of social and cultural production, particularly in relation to historical studies of oppositional public spheres and the emergence of critical social movements (pp. 130-131).

I wish not to respond to each of the three "theoretical tasks" Giroux outlines, rather, I wish to examine how these tasks which ostensibly point beyond orthodox Marxist analysis fail to reach escape velocity from the Marxist corpus of theorizing and how, while a courageous and scholarly effort to plot new directions for criticism and theorizing, Giroux's position remains firmly fixed within an aggressive, instrumental epistemology. I might add here, that these reactions to this new left analysis are quite tentative and groping — an attempt to approach the horizon of Giroux's understanding, and will constitute only a first round of interpretation.

Giroux candidly admits that

Jean Anyon, Michael Apple, myself, and others too often have viewed school knowledge either as a representation of specific class interests or as fulfilling the productive needs of the economic sector. Moreover, the transition from radical critiques of schooling to the development of radical educational strategies has often been marred by a similar form of class reductionism. For

example, the extremely important question of what constitutes "really useful knowledge" in radical pedagogy for many on the left is often reduced to what is useful exclusively in terms of working-class interests and culture. The notion that other social practices and forms of knowledge may prevail in constituting the lived experiences and cultural forms of both dominant and oppressed groups is often neglected in many Marxist accounts of schooling (p. 128).

This admission points to one encompassing criticism of Marxist analysis that I suggest helps one understand Giroux's latest piece as a historical moment. It is, then, against curriculum theory in a Marxist tradition that this particular text is situated. The "whole" of the text is not simply this piece, but the tradition and stream of writing from which it emerges.

Giroux's criticism of classical Marxist categories can and should be situated within his understanding of "social education." Giroux (1982) has stated that

...social education... is quite different from the way it appears in traditional literature on the subject. That is, traditionally social education takes as its primary concerns issues of citizenship education, moral education, global education, etc. with the express (sic) purpose of simplifying the social sciences for instructional use.... In my view, this perspective fails because of its atheoretical and apolitical stance toward the role that schools play as political but relatively autonomous institutions that serve in a somewhat contradictory fashion as agencies of social and cultural reproduction. Social education... points to the macro- and micro-issues that tie schools to the larger social order and affect their role as ideological institutions involved in the reproduction of class and gender (and racial) based relations (p.19).

Giroux has astutely broadened and focused a conception of education and cultural formation to include a larger unit, a "social

totality," considerably more complex and encompassing than class, gender or ethnicity:

Class formation is now viewed as an effect of various relations that are economic, ideological, and political in nature.... class formation is linked to the larger social totality with its many-faceted relations and practices. That is, social agents are formed through their activities in neighborhoods, religious institutions, various political organizations, and other cultural associations (1984, p.121).

Giroux's recognition of the importance of social and cultural contexts has provoked his incisive criticism of the relative failure of radical educators to generate an effective political opposition or alliance:

...radical educators have largely failed to develop an organic connection either to community people or to critical social movements. This is evident in both the theoretical work that characterizes educational theorizing and in the absence of major alliances between radical educators and other progressive social groups (p.129).

Giroux's analysis includes an understanding of two issues that directly speak to counter-alienating pedagogy: first, that education is a collectively produced set of experiences and therefore must attend to larger units of analysis and practice than individuals; and second, that the behavioral ecology of personal change links the individual inextricably to his or her social and cultural contexts. Pedagogy in this sense gives a collective voice to specific individuals, political and cultural groups, attends to social units of analysis, and has as its aim both self- and social empowerment:

...critical literacy interrogates the cultural capital of the oppressed in order to learn from it; it functions to confirm rather than (sic) disconfirm the presence and voices of the oppressed in institutions that are generally alienating and hostile to them. But the call to take the

cultural capital of the oppressed and oppositional groups seriously should not be mistaken for the traditional liberal argument for educational relevance. The latter makes an appeal to a pedagogy responsive to the individual interests of the student in order to motivate him or her. Critical literacy responds to the cultural capital of a specific group or class and looks at the way in which it can be confirmed and also at the way the dominant society disconfirms students by either ignoring or denigrating the knowledge and experiences that characterize their everyday lives. The unit of analysis here is social, and the key concern is not with individual interests but with individual and collective empowerment (p.132).

In this sense, Giroux identifies the organic connection of individuals to social, political and cultural affiliations. But despite this positive and important recognition of affiliation and membership, Giroux tends to sketch this collective identity in reactive terms against oppression and domination, and overlooks, I think, the proactive and affirmative possibilities of affiliation and community as ends in themselves (see, Wolff, 1968). It is to a critical examination of Giroux's somewhat one-sided view of the etiology of collective interests I now turn.

4. CRITICISM AND AGGRESSION: TOWARD A NEW STANCE

My reaction to Marxist analysis and critical theory has been significantly influenced by the theorizing of Huebner, Pinar, and Macdonald and Purpel. Recently, the work of Gadamer, Rorty, Feyerabend, Bernstein and Revel have called into question the methodological and epistemological orientations of Marxist analysis and critical theory.

I wish to comment on Giroux's critique by drawing upon Jean-Francois Revel's (1970) Without Marx or Jesus; Revel, in discussing the May uprisings in Paris in 1968 and the strike at the Renault automobile plant in France, introduces his account with a quote of Bernard Plossu, a French social historian:

Plossu says of those who were involved in these events that "their ideas of revolt were, in the long run, chains," and their "attempt at liberation, only a form of slavery."

Such words as Plossu's are guaranteed to strike a sour note among lovers of the revolutionary praxis. Nonetheless, this rejection of solutions that are too immediate and too concrete originates in a basic intuition that one of the foundations of revolution that we most need today is the elimination of pathological aggression. Unless that elimination is achieved, no revolution can do anything but lead to a new form of oppression. We do not need a political revolution so much as an antipolitical revolution; otherwise, the only result will be the creation of new police states. Human aggression is a determining factor in human behavior; and it is accepted even more gratuitously, and is even more murderous, than all of the sacred causes by which it justifies itself and on which it bases itself (p. 211).

Revel points to what I curiously see is a characteristic of critique in the Marxist tradition -- that being a thinly veiled "pathological aggression." This is a serious charge to level against Giroux, to whom I owe considerable emotional and intellectual support and for whom I feel great empathy for his personal struggle in academe. But despite these personal agendas, and in the spirit of constructive criticism and dialogue, I feel I must point out a rather troubling rhetorical tone and choice of metaphor. Giroux and several of his male Marxist curriculum theorist counterparts (e.g., Apple, Aronowitz, Popkewitz,) seem to be preoccupied with issues of power,

authority, contestation, struggle, opposition and resistance. A concordance of his (and their) writings would, I think, bear out this observation. This is not to deny that Giroux's most recent writing has shifted somewhat from its earlier strident confrontational rhetoric; this criticism is offered because I fear that, if Giroux is indeed searching for a new language of possibility, he is carrying with him the vestigial traces of an orthodoxy which describes personal and social transformation in almost exclusively quasi or subliminally violent metaphors. Giroux describes social reality as being characterized by "the terrain of power and struggle" "excluded majorities," "new social antagonisms," "the rationality of domination," "human struggle," "forms of resistance," "oppositional groups," "the emergence of oppositional cultures and spheres," and "autonomous social moments." The "calculus" which appears to operate in Giroux's descriptive categories is one of power and conflict. I wish to raise two issues regarding this calculus: first, that in trying to develop a renewed appreciation for and use of "a language of possibility," Giroux jettisons the orthodox Marxist categories of class, economy and history but not its "pathological aggressiveness." That is to say, while I am not denying the existence of conflict and oppression, I find Giroux's adherence to a language of "physicalism" to be unfortunate, severely limited, and problematic as a language of possibility diverging from a Marxist equation of power = emancipation. Second, I take issue with not only Giroux's, but also other leftist curriculum theorists', use of "power" as a unifying conception which links domination and empowerment as two moments in human history. Gregory Bateson (1979) points to what I believe is a

convincing clarification of the flawed logic that selects power (as manifested in hegemony as well as critical self-reflectivity) as a focus of analysis:

. . . adversarial systems are notoriously subject to irrelevant determinism. The relative "strength" of the adversaries is likely to rule the decision regardless of the relative strength of their arguments.

It is not so much "power" that corrupts as the myth of "power." It was noted above that "power," like "energy," "tension," and the rest of the quasi-physical metaphors are to be distrusted and, among them, "power" is one of the most dangerous. He who covets a mythical abstraction must always be insatiable! As teachers we should not promote that myth.

It is difficult for an adversary to see further than the dichotomy between winning and losing in the adversarial combat. Like a chess player, he is always tempted to make a tricky move, to get a quick victory. The discipline, always to look for the best move on the board, is hard to attain and hard to maintain. The player must have his eye always on a longer view, a larger gestalt (p. 223).

From the argument that Bateson has raised, Macdonald's critique of the instrumental rationality of Marxist analysis, Ricoeur's depiction of hermeneutic interpretations as being a demythologizing of human discourse, I believe it is possible to suggest that the limitations of post-Marxist analysis provide ample cause for examining other ways of not only describing the human condition, but also to anticipate and help bring into conscious apprehension non-adversarial, transformative possibilities. Philosophical hermeneutics -- particularly that genre of hermeneutics which aligns itself with ontological concerns -- focuses attention on "a longer view, a larger gestalt" within which instrumental rationality and preoccupations with hegemonic power distortions are seen as one of a number of perspectives which may be

applied to the analysis of human experience. That the new left's critique may contribute to the reification of conflict and an instrumental logic are serious limitations. As descriptions of the world, critical theory and neo-Marxist accounts do not exhaust the possible descriptions nor do they describe the world, but a world — one of many realities. Others whose maps trace other features of the topography remain to be examined for their curricular implications. I turn now to Maxine Greene for quite a different depiction of a world of possibility.

C. MAXINE GREENE: THE FAMILIAR MADE STRANGE

A man said to the Universe:
 "Sir, I exist!"
 "However," replied the universe,
 "The fact has not created in me
 A sense of obligation."
 Stephen Crane

How can one act on one's commitment
 and at once set others free to be?
 This seems to us to be one of the crucial
 questions confronting the self-conscious teacher;
 it is the crucial question confronting the writer.
 Perhaps the responsibility, after all, belongs
 to the reader. He must launch himself on his own
 journey; he must choose to see through his own eyes.
 Maxine Greene, Teacher as Stranger

1. INTRODUCTION

Maxine Greene has, through the years, represented to me -- and I am sure many others -- a scholar steeped in the liberal arts tradition. Her encyclopaedic knowledge, her penetrating criticism of classical as well as popular cultures, and her breadth of historical, philosophical, and aesthetic sources is staggering. She appears to me

to be "an intellectual's intellectual." Her contributions to curriculum discourse has enriched the field immensely. If Maxine Greene did not exist, perhaps the field of curriculum would have to have invented her. While it is not my intention to deify Professor Greene, given my own background in the liberal arts, I feel compelled to pay homage to her erudition and sensitivity.

Greene describes herself as "a phenomenological existentialist with considerable sympathy for aspects of pragmatism" (1973, Preface). That she was elected president of AERA in this era of "hard-nosed science" is remarkable for two reasons: first, that her philosophical inquiry has been recognized as a legitimate mode of research in an otherwise empirical science dominated institution is noteworthy; and second, that her leadership in the field of education attests to the possibility of multiple interpretive communities informing educational theory.

My first exposure to Maxine Greene's writing occurred in 1974. At that time I was awestruck by her penetrating thought and, to mention it again, the breadth of her sources. Virtually no expressive art or cultural phenomenon was outside the scope of her consideration; she possesses a rare talent to link practically any human expression in any medium to a discussion of emerging consciousness. This she did, and continues to do with grace and no hint of contrivance. That James B. Macdonald, whose own powerfully synoptic vision of human experience attracted me to the study of curriculum, suggested that we explore Maxine Greene's work seemed to add additional resonance to the texts

under consideration. It appeared that window after window, horizon after horizon were opened and disclosed for our consideration. Having recently completed a seminar on Philosophy and Literature (including the writing of Sartre and Camus), and trying to find some "legitimation" or at least intellectual support for my 60's fueled iconoclasm and rebelliousness (having protested against mandatory ROTC at the undergraduate school I attended, the Viet Nam War, and autocratic authority figures in intercollegiate athletic programs), Maxine Greene's existentialism was a welcome articulation of the **responsibility of the individual to choose** his or her own project: "Each person is 'the author' of the situation in which he lives; he gives meaning to his world, but through action, through his project, not by well-meaning thought" (1973, p.280).

Professor Greene has long expressed that her interest is in "arousing individuals to wide-awakeness, to 'thinking' in Arendt's sense about their own commitments and actions wherever they work and make their lives" (1973, p.6). Greene has sought to counter, through her work, not "false-consciousness" per se, but "thoughtlessness" to again use Arendt's term; her preoccupation, throughout her varied career, has been to study and disclose the emergence of consciousness; her focus has been on looking at the individual actor and exploring how self-transcendence -- "going beyond where he has been" -- can be encouraged and facilitated. Greene's great contribution to the discourse of curriculum theory has been her integration of existential and phenomenological perspectives and interpretive frameworks.

While there are a myriad of themes and motifs within Greene's extensive writing which speak directly to a theory of curriculum, I wish to focus upon her examination of the individual as agent, the phenomenal world within which the individual is situated, her assessment of the decline of the public realm, and her advocacy of a restoration of "public space." While it is my perception that Greene continues in the existential and phenomenological traditions, I believe that a shift has occurred in her more recent thinking and writing -- a shift which directly speaks to my interest in affiliation and community and a counter-alienating pedagogy.

2. THE PHENOMENAL WORLD AND AN EXISTENTIAL PERSPECTIVE

According to Greene, "The individual must continually struggle to clarify, to pattern (without losing sight of 'the chaos against which that pattern was conceived')" (1973, p. 21). The plight of human beings, from Greene's perspective, is that of meaning-maker and action-taker in essentially a chaotic universe:

We take the term chaos to signify not only the remembered inchoateness of what has seemed incomprehensible in earlier days, not only the teacher's uncertainty respecting who he is and what he can do. We take it also to mean the huge disorder of our day where values, beliefs, aspirations, and ideals are concerned (1973, p.8).

Greene describes the individual consciousness situated within the phenomenal world in terms of a figure-ground relationship -- the ground being the prereflective human awareness, awareness which is prior to codification; the figure being the individual **project** which helps to

establish meaning and identify patterns within lived reality -- in fact, according to Greene, human consciousness is the source of order and meaning. For Greene, meanings, truths, facts, ideals, objective reality, do not exist "out there" as they might be construed in positivist thought. Instead, Greene suggests that knowledge of the world is to be arrived at through quite a different process than scientific rationality. Citing Merleau-Ponty, Greene points to a characteristically different starting point for the generation of human knowledge:

Psychology, like physics and the other sciences of nature, uses the method of induction, which starts from facts and then assembles them. But it is very evident that this induction will remain blind if we do not know in some other way, and indeed from the inside of consciousness itself, what this induction is dealing with (1973, p.304).

Thus, for Greene, an existential phenomenological orientation to the world begins within the awareness of the individual knower. It is this "inside view" which serves as the figure against, as Freire terms it, "background awareness." The existential project of all those who seek to educate and be educated is to return to each person's unique emergence from primordial consciousness, from unreflective background awareness:

There is no solace today in being told that man is a rational being or the son of God, for the person lashing out against invisibility, for the person suffering from feelings of powerlessness, for the person feeling obliterated by institutions or city crowds. Such a person must ask, 'Who am I? What am I? What can I make of myself?' If he grants the existence of the free will Vico spoke of, he may find it as much a burden as a blessing because he knows that his world has no encompassing design, no Plan, no guarantees (1973, p.44).

Greene depicts the world as chaotic, not fully formed nor realized, full of contradiction, paradox and confusion. Faced with this chaos, this "given" world, existential human beings are "condemned to give meaning to life." The quintessential project for each human being is to struggle against an entropic tendency of this world -- a tendency which reduces the individual to a cipher, a tendency exacerbated by abstraction (as was discussed in the section on Conceptual Logic), the "givenness" of conventional associations, and the "blindness" of everyday existence.

Greene counters this entropic tendency by stressing that we must make sense of this inchoate world; we must create new ways of seeing reality:

Preoccupied with priorities, purposes, programs of 'intended learning' and intended (or unintended) manipulation, we pay too little attention to the individual in quest of his own future, bent on surpassing what is merely 'given,' on breaking through the everyday. We are still too prone to dichotomize: to think of 'disciplines' or 'public traditions' or 'accumulated wisdom' or 'common culture' (individualization despite) as objectively existent, external to the knower -- there to be discovered, mastered, learned (in Pinar 1975, p.299).

Greene's response to the "givenness" of the world is characteristically existential: "To develop a fundamental project, to go beyond the situations one confronts and refuse reality as given in the name of a reality to be produced" (p. 7). For Greene, this refusal is a great affirmation -- an affirmation which "takes action to pattern the world" in ways not yet known. This new knowledge is a "moment of praxis," and as Sartre has stated, a moment of praxis opening into "what has not yet

been." This refusal is a form of self-transcendence as Phenix (1964) has described it; it is a moment when the individual feels a sense of **agency**, feels that he or she is a knower. This self-transcendence appears to be one significant aim of meaningful activity.

While the selections so far from Greene's extensive writing have focused primarily on her concern for an individual's existential project, she suggests that meaningful existence is not to be confused with solipsistic or egocentric absorption:

To speak of existential meaning is to relate the attainment of meaning to an individual's particular project and standpoint, to conceive it in terms of concrete, human relations to others and to the world (1973, p. 173).

Greene is well aware of the self as a **social self**, and this awareness prompts her to recognize and describe the interconnectedness of individuals to others. Citing Merleau-Ponty again, Greene states that he "points out that we witness at every moment 'the miracles of related experiences, and yet nobody knows better than we do how this miracle is worked, for we are ourselves this network of relationships'" (1975, pp. 314-315). While recognizing "this network of relationships" as integral to human existence, Greene is careful not to simply reify them; these relationships are to be disclosed, reconstructed and generated through social praxis -- praxis which helps to bring about the freedom to form these relationships. Thus, relationships are to be existentially viewed as choices one makes to help fulfill one's project and liberate others so they can do likewise.

Greene further elaborates upon this notion of interrelatedness by calling upon Dewey's description of the **continuum of experience**:

According to Dewey, the individual exists within a continuum of experience, a vital matrix in which all things are interrelated -- the individual and society; mind and matter; thought and the phenomena of the world. 'Experience is of as well as in nature. It is not experience which experienced, but nature. . . . Things interacting in certain ways are experience.' Caught up in these relationships, man moves from one transactional situation to another as he pursues his fulfillments and tries to bring elements of his environment under human control (1973, p. 127).

Meaningful experience, then, is not something we seek to find (as if it were "out there" to be found), but it is a condition which we bring into being through praxis. The interrelatedness of the "natural world" as well as the world of socially constructed realities such as belief systems, conventions, traditions, etc., is rendered problematic within an existential perspective. That is, the "givenness" of these interrelationships is to be struggled against so that each human actor, caught within a web of relationships, chooses a meaningful course which discloses the relationships, reconstructs these relationships in the interest of freedom, and generates through social praxis a reality which hitherto was unrealized. The role of the conscious actor/agent is not to be underestimated in Greene's depiction of transformative action. But given Greene's emphasis on the agentic potential of the individual, we must examine how individual agency escapes the trap of narcissism, alienation and privatism.

3. AUTONOMY, FREEDOM AND SOCIAL PRAXIS

Maxine Greene's existential orientation to the role of the teacher is clearly conveyed when she states that

As aware of his students' incompleteness as he must be of his own, the teacher can only strain to encounter his students without objectifying them; he can only act to help them, as autonomous beings, to choose (1973, p.275).

Greene believes not in teaching to an aggregate of students, to some least common denominator, but instead to each person as an authentic self. By honoring the autonomy of the individual, Greene believes that each individual is therefore encouraged to take action against constraints on his or her freedom. The conscious teacher, then, takes care not to impose unnecessary constraints upon students, not to depersonalize or objectify them by separating mere behaviors from their integrative thread which is their project or existential choice. To debase the "other" to a mere respondent or subordinate is, for Greene, a heinous offense against the dignity of the individual. Moreover, Greene has forcefully commented upon this reductionism to **behavior** (as opposed to action) which is so prominent in "competency-based" educational programs:

I am quite aware that this is at odds with prevalent notions of what we are about. Behavior is the preoccupation today, not action in the sense implied. Behavior, unlike action, conforms to certain statistical laws. Considering it, we think in terms of tendencies, of probabilities; we aggregate; we compute, measure, and predict. We focus attention on end points, on quantifiable objectives, because these are what the influential ones appear to demand. We are compelled, we say pragmatically, to respond to expectations; and present expectations are

for measurable achievement, for efficiency, for discipline, not for risks and process and open possibility. So we orient ourselves to outputs; we concentrate on productivity, on market demand. It is no wonder that the matter of freedom so seldom arises. Freedom interrupts determinisms and orderly cause and effect sequences, as choosing cuts across necessity. But, once again, without the thought of such interruption, there can be no polity. There can be no consideration of what is common, of something audible and visible that is in between (1973, pp. 16-17).

This is an exceedingly important point in Greene's logic, and one which must be understood in order to see how agency and freedom are necessary preconditions for civic responsibility and social praxis. Just as freedom to choose "cuts across necessity," so is freedom necessary in order for an individual to achieve a sense of agency. As David Purpel has suggested, a sense of agency is required if one is to act morally. Without this sense of agency, the individual is reduced to a fonctionnaire, a servant of whatever dominant ideology or institution under which the individual is subordinated. Without this freedom, there can be no real sense of responsibility, no "ownership" of the consequences of one's actions, no standpoint from which values are to be projected into the world:

To realize values or to bring them into being, the individual must not allow himself to be dominated by his group or community or give up his subjective 'need' for wholeness and completion. For Martin Heidegger, values seem to be fragments of Being, disintegrated through human forgetfulness. As remains or residues, they are evocative of oneness or unity; and men yearn after them, finding them to be desirable objects of choice. Fundamental to this is the notion of 'care,' of concern, the realization that the individual is the source of meaning and that, for all his finitude and consequent 'nothingness,' he is wholly responsible for introducing values in the world (1973, p. 262).

That the individual achieves autonomy enables, in Greene's logic, the individual to freely choose the associations which are an integral part of social praxis. The individual escapes privatism and alienation through his or her choice to ally with others in action: "[an] individual can choose himself and authenticate himself (without 'good reasons'), even when he is one among many, when he affirms his engagement with humanity" (1973, p.257). Greene is critical (as is Sennett (1977)) of an individual seeking membership in exclusive and "private" groups; private, personal relationships do not constitute true civic responsibility, rather, they imply an escape from engagement in its fullest sense:

When we consider the unlikelihood of a modern individual's spending most of his life in small, warm groups of people, we see the implicit problems. What implications for education do we find in the privatism of young radicals, in their refusal to play the culture's 'game'? How can we reconcile this idea of private personal relationships with such views as John Dewey's -- of the individual as a basically social organism becoming a full and responsible self as he participates more and more fully in social life? (1973, p. 50).

For Greene, civic courage is to be seen not in relationships within a homogeneous or consensual group, but rather in the individual's involvement in the arenas of contestation and struggle among heterogeneous interests and values. The important work of interpretation and meaning making must, by its very nature of contending with alternative choices and values, be conducted within the public, not private or exclusive realm.

Given Greene's understanding of the phenomenal world, the importance of existential choice and a pragmatic orientation to social life, it is no surprise that she recognizes the influence of one's "sedimented history" on one's perspective. Interpretation and knowledge (as Polanyi and Schutz have articulately described) is not only of the world in which we live, but from our standpoint within this world:

I want to emphasize the fact, however, that what we conceive to be real is interpreted experience; we can be sure of nothing beyond the grasp of human consciousness, beyond what some human consciousness intends. Too many disciplinary specialists and teachers, like the media and government agencies, obscure (either through neglect or by design) the contingency of what is thought to be real. Minimal attention is paid to the significance of standpoint and perspective, to the influence (say) of class membership on perspective, or to the effect of work or project on what is seen (1973, p. 13).

Thus, despite Greene's overall emphasis on individual choice and autonomy, she is cognizant of the influence of the social realities one confronts.

Nowhere is this "sedimented history" more apparent (and pernicious) than in the configuration of power and authority associated with diverse interpretive communities within the university. Greene, citing Edward Said, maintains that the struggle for new values and perspectives is ill-served by research as it is predominantly carried out in discipline and paradigm-bound communities within the university:

The privatization, the alienation are coupled with a separation of intellectual guilds within the university, the kind of separation that has been encouraging patterns of exclusive solidarity within a number of fields. Edward Said, focusing on literature and on 'the politics of interpretation,' writes about how what is happening 'atomizes, privatizes, and reifies the untidy realm of

secular history and creates a peculiar configuration of constituencies and interpretive communities ' He is concerned, as others are, about affiliation and about 'noninterference.' He talks about the need to break out of 'the disciplinary ghettos in which as intellectuals we have been confined, to reopen the blocked social processes ceding objective representation (hence power) of the world to a small coterie of experts and their clients, to consider that the audience for literacy is not a closed circle of three thousand professional critics but the community of human beings living in society' This does not mean that interpretive approaches are by definition anti-social or indifferent; it is simply a call to connect interpretation to social praxis (1973, pp. 9-10).

Interpretation then, as has been suggested in the earlier review of the principles of hermeneutic inquiry, seeks not conformism to "accepted canons" of research communities, but instead should struggle against this givenness and work to bring about new orientations and language to transcend these private realms. To move from private concerns to social praxis requires a shift not only in individual project, but a restructuring of arenas of discourse. It is this shift to a reexamination of the "public space" to which we now turn.

4. THE PUBLIC SPACE: FROM ALIENATION TO COMMUNITY

As mentioned earlier, there appears to be a shift in Professor Greene's later writing -- a shift which, while consonant with her existential and phenomenological orientations, begins to offer a renewed interest in the **public domain**. As if to counter the "sedimented history" of private interests, the "narcissism" of the 70's, and the "peculiar configurations of constituencies and

interpretive communities," Greene returns (as had Sennet, Aronowitz, Arendt, Langer, Marin, and Slater) to the notion of a public space -- **a space where civic responsibility is coupled with social meaning.** Greene attributes much of the alienation and stasis of present social life to an evisceration of the issues and discourse which may be seen as constituting a public interest. Part of this problem can be attributed to a form of cultural imperialism on the part of technical "experts;" part may be due to a withdrawal of individuals from arenas of contestation; part may be attributed to "the public's" exclusion from the political and economic centers of power:

The problem of constituting a public space today is of a different order, and not solely because of increased fragmentation. Richard Sennet (1976), like a number of other social scientists, is convincing when he points to the deadness and emptiness in the public domain, and when he speaks of today's pursuit of intimacy as a sign of narcissism and escape. To cherish close community for its own sake, Sennet suggests, is to be a refugee. People are withdrawing from a public culture perceived as meaningless; they are building barricades around their private spaces rather than engaging in the expanding associated relationships Dewey described. If this is the case, it is exacerbated by the distance from the centers of power people experience in these times, by their alienation from the context-free, technical language presently in use. Ordinary, contextual language -- the language of face-to-face interchange -- now sounds ineffectual against the clicking of simulation games and the whirring of computerized projections. Many persons find themselves in a strange, almost unrecognizable new world. This has intensified the alien quality, the perceived impersonality of what lies outside the private realm. It has drained ordinary meanings from the public domain (1973, p.5).

This withering of the public space is not unexpected, given the shrinking of a sense of a locus of control one faces in a technological society. This shrinking of a sense of a locus of control is certainly

reflected in bureaucratized and test-driven schools. As "accountability" becomes more and more defined by behavioral measures, hierarchical governance and "standardized," uniform practices, individual autonomy and social responsibility are eroded:

Alienation and fixity come to mind again, along with the essence of a public space. There is no space where human beings, speaking and acting in their plurality, can appear before one another and realize the power they have simply in being together. And there surely is no such space in most of the schools. Nor is there the freedom experienced when young persons discover that they have the capacity to reach out and attain feelings, thoughts, and ways of being, hitherto unimagined -- and even, perhaps, ways of acting on what they believe to be deficient, ways of transcending and going beyond (1973, p.6).

Teachers and students, as well as the vast majority of workers in workplaces, are continually placed in reactive positions vis-a-vis the authorities who exert control over their behavior. Greene points to the pervasiveness of this manipulation when she states that "We are all aware of a cacophony of demands, most of them focusing on individual achievement and on an assumed connection between achievement and mobility, acceptable performance and success" (1973, p.4). As I have previously mentioned, emphasis on individual behavior change, and achievement is, at best, a form of equal opportunity; what is moot, however, is whether this form of "equality" is an appropriate or adequate response to structural inequalities which have been empirically shown to be minimally affected by such "interventions." When the individual is taken as the sole unit of analysis for achievement and performance, we are not as likely to attend to broader issues such as distributive justice or the social good. Only rarely is

individual achievement, as it is reinforced by liberal reform ideology and technocratic management, linked to the perpetuation of social inequalities (see, Weingarten, 1979). It is against such a thoughtless agenda that Greene calls us to consider a more encompassing level of analysis:

The opposite of freedom is a type of alienation; it is stasis, petrification, fixity. It would seem to me that educators, on principle, would want to take a stand against what threatens our way of being in the world; yet the matter seldom enters educational discourse today. And with rare exceptions, nor does any notion of the social good (1973, p.4).

Greene's shift in her level of analysis calls attention to, as Dewey had many years ago, the importance of a mature individual broadening his or her involvement in social life. It is not privatistic achievement nor self-actualization that is the mark of a progressive society, rather, it is high regard for and participation in the public sphere that reflects democratic values. Greene challenges us to consider this when she asks:

Almost never is there an expressed concern about the public realm; there is silence about renewing the common world and about what that common world should be. What is it that lies in between, that holds us together, that we can cherish and try to keep alive? Where, when we ponder it, are we to turn? (1973, p.4).

Against this silence, Maxine Greene has raised an articulate, compassionate voice. Despite her repeated call for increased personal freedom and autonomy, she does not abandon the issue of affiliation and collective endeavor: "Private and subjective as existential choosing is, however, it does not entail the rejection of human brotherhood"

(1973, p.257). Greene unequivocally states that her struggle against all forms of oppression and dehumanization must be seen in light of its aim: "I want to see alienation and fixity give way to participation and movement, the free play of movement, the free play of thought, all for the sake of the common world" (1973, p. 9). Greene's existential approach to a rejuvenation of the public space and the social life which is attainable only within it, does no violence to either the dignity or uniqueness of the individual. In fact, it is precisely through her championing the freedom of the individual that the viability and value of such a public realm are protected:

As Arendt put it, 'the reality of the public realm relies on the simultaneous perception of innumerable perspectives and aspects in which the common world presents itself and for which no common measurement or denominator can ever be devised (pp.57-58)' (1973, p.7).

Perhaps some aspects of Greene's more recent attention to the public space can be traced to her recognition of an analysis Dewey made regarding our entry into what he calls "the modern era." Dewey suggested that the modern era lacked suitable symbolism to represent an advanced quality of life. Surely "the perfect machine," or insulating suburban residences, or technologically mediated communication lack the expressive quality of earlier symbols of advanced civilization. Greene, citing Dewey, maintains that with regard to the symbolism used to represent modern civilization:

There was a dissonance between them and existing socio-economic conditions, as there is a dissonance today between the privatist, voluntarist, laissez-faire ideas that now have such official sanction and the realities of a troubled mass society. . . . Dewey's remedy was the 'search for the great community,' something he saw as 'a life of

free and enriching communion' (1973, p.5).

It is this "life of free and enriching communion" which need be rescued from the grasp of profit-motivated entrepreneurs, self-serving politicians and managers, and the bankers of cultural capital. If education is to address this struggle, how might it interpret its mandate?

5. EDUCATORS AS CRITICS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Drawing upon her background in the liberal arts and its rich traditions of literary criticism, Maxine Greene applies a characteristically literary critical approach to the examination of human consciousness. Just as any work of art reflects imagination and intelligence, each human consciousness may be approached as an analogue of a creative intelligence. The critic, whether he or she is examining an art object or the lucid reality of another human being attempts, according to Greene, to place him or herself "within the interior space" of the creator -- to attend to the experience of aesthetic appreciation:

For the critic of consciousness, literature is viewed as a genesis, a conscious effort on the part of an individual artist to understand his own experience by framing it in language. The reader who encounters the work must recreate it in terms of his consciousness. In order to penetrate it, to experience it existentially and empathetically, he must try to place himself within the 'interior space' of the writer's mind as it is slowly revealed in the course of his work. Clearly, the reader requires a variety of clues if he is to situate himself in this way; and these are ostensibly provided by the

expressions and attitudes he finds in the book, devices which he must accept as orientations and indications -- 'norms,' perhaps, to govern his reaction. His subjectivity is the substance of literary object; but if he is to perceive the identity emerging through the enactments of the book, he must subordinate his own personality as he brackets out his everyday, 'natural' world. His objective in doing so, however, is not to analyze or explicate or evaluate; it is to extract the experience made manifest by means of the work (1973, pp.300-301).

It is, perhaps, this search for "orientations and indications" which characterizes the type of inquiry Maxine Greene best represents. Unlike the American "new critics" of the 50's who, not unlike the logical positivists and philosophers of language before them, preoccupied themselves with a decontextualized examination of a literary work (that is, promoted a view of a literary work as an artifact with its own coherence, internal order and structure, a view which deemphasized the biographic and cultural situation of the author), the "continental critics" with whom Maxine Greene allies herself preferred to examine a work as a unique expression embedded within an historical, cultural and biographic contexts. Continental criticism, while acknowledging the structural properties of a work, recognizes wider frames of reference -- frames of reference which include both artist and critic in the "disclosure, reconstruction and generation" of new experience and meanings. This compact between critic and subject calls for a "continual decentering" without which the individual subject cannot become free from his or her intellectual egocentricity. It is this deeper penetration into the intersubjective "content" of criticism that serves two major functions: the first being that the **intentionality** of the creative act (both the act of artistic

expression and the act of artistic criticism) is examined as a project "thrown" outward into the world; and the second being that the critic attending to this intentionality as expressed through both the artist's and critics' "orientations and indications" seeks to become aware of the patterns and meanings being generated at a given moment -- to focus on this "figure" against the ground of background awareness. This is the essence of critical consciousness in Greene's generative schema. In her powerfully written book Teacher as Stranger: Educational Philosophy for the Modern Age (1973), Maxine Greene points to the connection she makes between art and teaching:

There is a sense in which this book ought to function as art functions: to confront the individual with himself; to stimulate a personal search for patterning and meaning; to open perspectives beyond the everyday -- most particularly where teaching is concerned (Preface).

Art and criticism, then, are to be viewed as a confrontation against the given, against complacency, against thoughtlessness. As mentioned earlier, the critic's objective "is not to analyze or explicate or evaluate; it is to extract the experience made manifest by means of the work." Greene goes on to say that

Therefore, more explicitly than the analytically inclined teacher, the existential educator would underline the inescapability of responsibility. Each person is 'the author' of the situation in which he lives; he gives meaning to his world, but through action, through his project, not by well-meaning thought (1973, p.280).

While Greene's championing of an existential perspective and its reliance upon the responsibility of each person to become "the author of the situation in which he lives" has been linked to her more recent

discussion of the public realm, I believe that there remain some, as yet, unexamined questions regarding the fundamental logic within which she operates. It is to these questions I wish to turn at this time.

6. A CRITICISM OF CRITICISM

Maxine Greene has struggled valiantly to restore a sense of respect for individual autonomy, responsible action and a democratic promise. That I have tried to trace her interest in restoring the public space to a more vital place in human affairs is consonant with my bias against prescriptions for pedagogical change focusing on the individual as a unit of analysis. Greene has contributed much to calling to the attention of curriculum theorists the issues of responsibility and action. Her weakness, if we can call it that, is that, despite her phenomenological grounding, she fails, I believe to adequately address the behavioral ecology within which the individual is found.

Greene recognizes the risk she has chosen in selecting the humanities as a source for human edification:

I have been concerned with finding ways of arousing students from submergence, awakening them to critical consciousness and to the possibility of praxis in a world they share. There can be no guarantees that the humanities will 'improve' those who engage in them; nor can there be guarantees that wide-awakeness will increase. But there is an obligation, I think, on the part of all who educate to address themselves, as great artists do, to the freedom of their students, to make demands on them to form the pedagogy of their own liberation -- and to do so rigorously, passionately, and in good faith (1973, p.29).

That each individual is invited and, yes, demanded to "form a pedagogy of their own liberation" is noble, but questionable as either a strategy for change or as an accurate reflection of counter-hegemonic pedagogy. There is a normative and moral ambiguity in Greene's preoccupation which is not easily resolved if we pursue her logic to its conclusions. Partly, this is an ontological question; partly it is a strategic one.

Greene depicts the world as chaotic, "benignly indifferent" at best, more frequently depicted as malevolent. As the quote from Stephen Crane at the beginning of this section indicated, the Universe feels no "sense of obligation" to its human inhabitants. While it is a "pathetic fallacy" to ascribe to the non-human human qualities, it is a different ontological fallacy that I believe Maxine Greene falls victim to, a fallacy I might call the **fallacy of randomizing extant patterns**. Greene falls victim to a seductive form of hubris which places the human pattern-making faculty on the taxonomic throne. This is less her personal fault, more a fault of the existential ontology to which she subscribes. Within an existential perspective of the world, all patterns are devalued and gathered under the category of "the given." There is a peculiar sense of disrespect in this devaluation. Just as the human intellect is inflated to occupy the premier place in naming the patterns, so is the ecological order deflated to occupy a subordinate, subservient role in sustaining this critical intelligence. While I am not about to paste here a bumper sticker saying "Save the Whales," I do ask us to pause and consider the

particular cosmos within which Maxine Greene asks us to reside. I ask us to reconsider the qualitative dimensions of "the given" -- and even to question whether we should presume that we are recipients at all.

Maxine Greene appears to describe the "stuff" of the world as though it were a material (not even to give it the honor of calling it a "resource") to be acted upon, reconstructed into some more suitable form -- some cosmic version of Manifest Destiny. We each, through our individual projects are to leave our thumb print on the clay. Greene, I believe, confuses the role of the cartographer and the cosmos; she is not creating "Landscapes for Learning," but maps for our consideration. While we may be wise to come to recognize what action we may take to improve the world (e.g., reduce human suffering, learn to live ecologically), we must also, I believe, learn to recognize the "given" as infinitely valuable and worthy of profound respect. I would counter (and I refer the reader back to the discussion on Conceptual Logic in which the writings of Bergson, Fechner, James and Bateson, are discussed) that while the universe may not have an "obligation" to sustain us, the universe does offer landscapes for learning, patterns which are at least as instructive as those bearing the human thumbprint, and an order which human interventionism has only crudely and often grotesquely mimicked (e.g., nuclear energy, technological pollution and exploitation of the weak). While these criticisms are directed most at Greene's ontological understanding, there are a few other observations about her normative and strategic suggestions that I wish to make in conclusion.

Maxine Greene's call for a "restoration of public discourse" brings with it an anarchistic relativism. On one hand, she points to a need to open and expand the public space so that many more voices can participate:

Now I want to make clear, if I have not already done so, that I am not talking about politicizing the university in the old unhappy sense. Nor am I suggesting that the social and economic problems of our society can be solved by discussions on the campus and outside. I am saying, though, we have the capacity to tap what has been called the 'heteroglossia' or the multiple voices in the culture (women's voices, minority voices, critics' voices, teachers' voices, managers' voices and make them audible in an open space. I am saying that we might be able to make possible again dialogue about freedom and justice, human rights, social responsibility, public planning, welfare, health, the significance of the arts, and (centrally) education. Without the restoration of public discourse, I am saying, there is no hope of doing anything about what Wolin calls the 'structure of power, inequality, hopelessness, and growing repression' (1973, pp.15-16).

On the other hand, she implies that all voices are equal -- a radical democratic or anarchic ideal. The voice of battered women, or the Third World are to share this space with the voices of autocrats, and fascists. "Public discourse," while on the surface an attractive concept, is normatively ambivalent. Of course, Greene suggests a hoped for agenda for such discourse, but the strategy is questionable and the agenda implies values beyond mere openness to multiple voices.

Perhaps Greene's lack of understanding about "extant patterns" and normatively guided strategies of practice can best be seen in her touting "individualized community services":

In the areas of health, mental illness, retardation, correction, and rehabilitation, for example, large institutions, challenged for their impersonality and

inhumanity, are giving way to more individualized community services. Seldom has so much attention been paid to individual needs and demands; seldom has so much onus been placed on the system and the crowd (1973, p.61).

Given Greene's orientation to the individual as agent and unit of analysis, it is not surprising that programs focusing on "individual needs and demands" are seen to be appropriate. Greene falls victim, as did the very health professionals who developed such individually directed programs, to a rather ill-informed understanding of behavioral ecology. Recent literature in the areas of "health, mental illness, etc." (see Steuart, 1975; Hamburg and Killilea, 1979; Gottlieb, 1981; Israel, 1982; Broadhead et al., 1983) have pointed to the importance of the relationship between social support and social networks and health and well-being. Programs designed to "treat the individual" met with marginal success and had unintended consequences that are, for this discussion, extremely important. When programs were designed to provide interventions looking only at the individual, many individuals failed to respond "appropriately" to the intervention. Failure to comply with medical regimens, recitivism, and "revolving door clients," were more the rule than the exception. Programs are embedded within the social and interpersonal network of the individual. The factors of social support which could have been (and is now being) engaged in the intervention were often overlooked.

Perhaps even more importantly, the unintended consequences of individual change-oriented programs must be examined. A program such as Meals on Wheels, while clearly assisting those who are shut in receive food from some agency, often did two things which are of

doubtful benefit (even while "feeding" the individuals): first, those who may have been providing food and companionship to the shut-in are no longer "needed" and often cease to visit; second, the loss of this interpersonal social support brings with it an unintended dependence upon the agency to provide for the individual.

It is somewhat consistent with Greene's logic to likewise place the onus on "the system and the crowd." Seen from an existential perspective, the social network within which the individual is situated often appears to be full of constraints against individual autonomy; from a behavioral, ecological perspective, these systems and groupings while they may indeed constrain one, also offer facilitative and supportive qualities. To jettison this network, or even to disregard its importance is both a strategic and normative mistake. As I have expressed earlier, the competence of the individual (read: autonomy) is contingent upon the competence of the human and ecological community within which he or she resides. The synergistic effect of collective competence is rarely addressed by curriculum theorists; Maxine Greene is no exception here.

One last criticism I wish to make refers to Greene's latent elitism. In her Teacher as Stranger, Greene refers to Plato's "Allegory of the Cave" to depict the evolution of "a philosopher":

To contemplate it (the sun . . . that is reality and not appearance) is to be wholly fulfilled as a human being, to have achieved the highest degree of education. To contemplate it (as only a privileged few can do) is to be wise -- to be a philosopher (1973, p.28).

If I read Greene's comment correctly, she seems to be stating that "only a privileged few" can be wise. On a bad day, I tend to agree; but generally, I operate on the faith that each person, not only privileged few, not only have the potential for wisdom, but may indeed exhibit wisdom, strength, courage and compassion at any given moment. Furthermore, it is only the most depraved who lack any hint of this human and spiritual quality; and it is against these we must protect the fragile advances human civilization has been able to achieve.

Maxine Greene states that:

I have suggested that the individual, in our case the student, will only be in a position to learn when he is committed to act upon his world. If he is content to admire it or simply accept it as given, if he is incapable of breaking with egocentrism, he will remain alienated from himself and his own possibilities; he will wander lost and victimized upon the road; he will be unable to learn (1973, pp.312-313).

While it is indeed true that we may wander lost and become victimized upon the road, we may also be able to find exquisite journeys and hospitality upon it. While caution is prudent, paranoia is uncalled for and destructive to the germ of trust which we may, and I maintain should, carry along with us.

D. JAMES B. MACDONALD: CURRICULUM AND HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

We live as species and as individuals on a delicate balance point. Neither survival, holocaust, or poisoned death are assured or impossible -- we may ascend to the angels or descend to the apes, foxes, or crocodiles. It is all possible. It is a balance that takes all our concerted moral energy and will to maintain.

James B. Macdonald

1. INTRODUCTION

As was mentioned in the "Introduction" to this chapter on the hermeneutic interpretation of selected curriculum texts, James B. Macdonald represents an influential figure in the theoretical development of the field. Like the previously examined theorists, Macdonald had developed a distinctive voice and perspective; unlike the previously examined theorists, Macdonald has contributed significantly to the expansion of curriculum discourse to include sensitive analysis of social, political, epistemological, axiological, theological and practical concerns as they inform curriculum theorizing. Macdonald has pointed to many sources of intellectual speculation, sources which have only rarely if ever been drawn into a conceptualization of curriculum by one individual. He has avoided the trap of parochialism, of specialist preoccupation with any one perspective or orientation. I believe it is fair to say that James Macdonald has done as much to broaden the speculative possibilities of curriculum theorizing as any figure in the field. By situating curriculum theorizing within a broader scope of intellectual activity, by aligning himself with those

who explored the horizons of their disciplines -- whether these disciplines be philosophy, social theory, aesthetics, mysticism, or political science, -- he has enriched and ennobled the quest for systematic thought and helped to provide a context within which present curriculum issues could be framed:

It is important to note that although we have always had our own special set of complexities and problems, we also share a broader social and intellectual context that can be said to be experiencing considerable disillusionment, anxiety, and confusion (1977, p.1).

Macdonald's later theorizing frequently addressed what he termed "the Faustian overdrive of science," that is, to echo Nietzsche, the conquest of scientism over scientific method. For Macdonald, this led to an analysis of ideological and ontological questions. Just as the previously discussed theorists each contributed to a framing of a language of possibility, Macdonald's work likewise was concerned with how curriculum theory continued and developed conceptions of human nature: "What we can expect to achieve is grounded in our conceptions of the nature of human nature and the nature of change in society and culture" (1977, p.2). Macdonald approached this task of examining the "ground" of curriculum theorizing in ways not unlike (and it might be said, with a debt of gratitude to) Dwayne Huebner's work. Like Huebner, Macdonald pursued curriculum inquiry through the analysis of language and metaphor used in curriculum discourse; like Huebner, he focused on the important role of human interests in the formation of new knowledge; and like Huebner, he sought new ways of describing curricular thought so that a vigilant openness to new possibilities,

new meanings, might be achieved: "...human beings are animals suspended in webs of significance of their own spinning. Curriculum theory is one such web" (1980, p.15).

Macdonald directly countered the dominant ideology of scientific rationality, of scientism, by advocating that we turn to normative considerations of lived experience. That is to say, he turned his attention to the **quality of our everyday life** experiences as they revealed personal and collective interests, the orienting perspectives that human beings bring to their making sense of their lives, and the multiple realities (meanings) that we assign to everyday encounters:

The quality of lived experience resides in the relationships that exist in our lives. Thus, the way we relate to other people, the way we organize and administer power, the relationship of our work to our self esteem, how we feel about what we are doing, and what meaning our lives have in concrete contexts are all ways of thinking about the quality of our experience (1977, p.6).

Macdonald stated that curriculum theorizing reflects "the basic impulse to search for ultimate meaning and purpose that is common to us all." By linking the experience of the individual with the social and epistemological contexts within which he or she lives, Macdonald sought to not only explain the generation of knowledge as a human activity, but express how this generation need be considered as a creative, religious and moral enterprise. Education, according to Macdonald "is first and foremost a moral enterprise." Drawing upon the work of David Hume, Macdonald suggested that a significant problem inherent in so-called objective science approaches to educational problems (e.g., behavioral objectives, social engineering, quantitative measurement) is

that "You can't make an ought out of an is!" Being able to "objectively describe" human behaviors, according to Macdonald, does not inform us of the (normatively derived) directions toward which human action should be encouraged. Moreover, preoccupations with "objectivity" in themselves often evade the normative frameworks which operate in such practices.

While recognizing the various historical traditions from which curriculum theorizing emerges, Macdonald seemed to focus his energies upon integrating and systematizing (in non-mechanical ways) diverse points of view. He was never complacent, never satisfied with either his own understanding nor with the progress made in the field of theorizing. He candidly admitted "I, personally, have not yet lost my passion for continuing the quest for improvement." This passion was reflected in his continually pushing the frontiers of conceptualization and description of curricular issues. From Dewey, Macdonald understood curriculum to be "the study of how to have a world." While this exceedingly broad orientation points to a utopian quality of his theorizing (a topic which will be addressed in the next section), Macdonald believed that this utopian aim must be couched in terms of our "passion, our values and our justifications." Macdonald concisely outlines his passion, values and justifications when he stated that "To be moral in our own actions must mean among other things to be just, to be of service, to be authentic, to be vital, and to strive to create beauty in students' lives" (n.d.a, p.20). Macdonald unequivocally emphasized his "continuing commitment to education as an emancipatory

process." But he was quick to point out that, as important it is to make our intentions clear, we must not be deluded into thinking that our intentions are the sole criterion for assessing whether our actions are educative or miseducative. By continually focusing upon the relationship of our actions to those we encounter -- that is, how others experience our interactions with them -- Macdonald helped to bring to our attention the "myth of helpfulness" that is so pervasive in educational activities. In a sense, our "good intentions" may indeed be experienced as controlling and dehumanizing to those whom we "intend to help." This ethical and pedagogical problem is best seen in the situation where the ends of educational programs are presumed to justify their means. Macdonald saw this situation to be both dangerous and of questionable moral value. Like Huebner, Macdonald preferred to view educational encounters in ethical terms. The person must be treated as the end, not the "object" against whom our means are directed. Macdonald sought to continually make problematic the relationships and the roles that educators enter into. For him, "... there is no 'natural' teaching, like rocks or rainbows, only socially created contrivances inherited historically" (n.d.b, p.1). By making problematic these "socially created contrivances," he was able to focus upon the principles that guide such contrivances. For him, "The aim of education should be a centering of the person in the world" (in Gress and Purpel, 1973, p.112). Macdonald had a very special wisdom and humility which he brought to his discussion of this centering process. In discussing his seminal role in curriculum theorizing I wish to focus upon four specific areas he addressed: what he saw as the task of

curriculum theorizing, his discussion of knowledge and human interests, his conception of curriculum theorizing as an hermeneutic activity and his important work regarding curriculum and transcendence. It is to these concerns I now turn.

2. THE TASK OF CURRICULUM THEORIZING

It may be fair to say that in the making of social and intellectual histories there is an embedded drive to establish order and a seamless quality to such historical development. Rationalizations are offered to account for changes and shifts in perspective and conceptual frameworks -- resolutions are sought for contradictions, paradoxes are sometimes glossed over or forcibly united within some interpretive artifice. James Macdonald cannot be charged with such an indictment. Much to the chagrin of those who sought some linear progression from one stage of curricular development to another, Macdonald relates quite a different view of curricular evolution:

The development of the curriculum in the American public schools has been primarily a historical accident. Any description or statement of what the curriculum consists of is essentially a political and/or ethical document rather than a scientific or technical one. It is a statement which indicates the outcome of a very complex interaction of groups, pressures, and events which are most often socio-political in motivation and which result in decisions about what ought to be (n.d.c, p.1).

Macdonald goes on to say that the myth that curriculum development occurred as a scientific or technical endeavor, as "a result of some carefully engineered process," is one that dies hard. Thus, the tremendous infusion of resources into mathematics and science

curriculum projects in the early 60s was not so much the result of demonstrated advances in scientific or mathematical curriculum theory, but must be seen as an "historical accident" which we now recognize as having been triggered by nationalistic rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States in the arena of space exploration. We might also point to the significant role that high tech corporations played in fueling the "space race" and the resulting "response" of educational institutions to this strongly articulated value placed on "science education." Macdonald points out that "Curriculum designs are value oriented statements" and that these designs "project a theoretically based pattern of experiences as desirable" (1971, in Gress and Purpel, 1973, p.50). Thus, the new math and science curricula which emerged in the 60s were the result of a turbulent and heated contest of political and cultural ideologies. With Sputnik I as a graphic symbol of Soviet technical achievement and the cultural beliefs that American intellectual leadership was eroding, curriculum designs mirrored rather than led these changes. According to Macdonald,

The process of curriculum development is oriented toward the goal of a systematic organization of available cultural beliefs, expressive symbols, and values. It includes selection from the total culture and the creation of a pattern of encounter which will maximize the authenticity of the material and the probability of its being internalized by learners (n.d.c, p.2).

That the values of competition, science as highly valued cultural capital, and nationalism were reflected in curriculum designs is certainly no surprise given Macdonald's depiction of their emergence. But Macdonald's perspective on curriculum theorizing (as opposed to

simply curriculum design) lead us to quite a different orientation to the nature of curriculum. Macdonald's concern regarding curriculum theory is that it is not only an instrumental activity, an activity attempting to solve problems and define clearer objectives, but that curriculum theorizing is basically an **expressive activity**, an activity which participates in a dialectical process "which leads to the expression and interpretation of meaning; and the development of greater understanding" (1980, p.19). Macdonald's juxtaposition of instrumental and expressive curriculum orientations points to two qualitatively and epistemologically divergent ways of envisioning curriculum practice: on one hand we have the linking of instrumental concerns to calculative and quintessentially political practice; on the other, we have expressive orientations linked to "meditative" and speculative interests. According to Macdonald, "It is through theory that we see, think, know" (1980, p.17). Calculative thinking, according to Macdonald, is concerned more with strategies of action, explanation, and is usually guided by an interest in prediction and control. However,

Curriculum theory as a search for understanding, a meditative thinking, is an attempt to deal with unity rather than bits and parts additively. It is a theory which is experienced as a participatory phenomena, where the person engages in dialogue with the theory, bringing each person's biography and values to the interpretation. The intention is not to explain (flatten out) for control purposes, but to reinterpret in order to provide greater grounding for understanding (1980, p.8).

Drawing upon the work of Jurgen Habermas (1971), Macdonald clearly distinguishes between three basic intentions guiding human action:

control, understanding, or liberation. It is safe to say that Macdonald's theorizing directly countered the strong presence of controlling interests in educational theory and practice; what is less clear, however, is whether he consistently emphasized an orientation to understanding or emancipation. This issue will be discussed more fully in the next section dealing with Macdonald's examination of knowledge and leading human interests. It can be said, however, that he attempted to link the interests of emancipation and understanding to the development of new perspectives and educational opportunities. Thus, when he states that

The test of "good" theory in practice is thus, not centrally that it works (i.e. that we can control practice), but that in the engagement of theory and practice we are emancipated from previous misunderstandings and are then freed to reinterpret situations and reach greater understandings (1980, p.10).

he is indicating his dual concern for both understanding and human liberation. It is through theory guided by the interest in emancipation that understanding achieves its transcendent possibility, that is, helps to bring into reality some quality of existence that previously was unrealized.

Macdonald believed that the a central activity of curriculum theorizing was the generation of "new ways of talking " about educational experience:

So to talk about curriculum theory or theorizing means to organize it metaphorically. Out of the ordinary experience of our field we must project (spark) the imagination in the creation of an ordering pattern (1980, p.15).

Macdonald goes on to say that "we shall be talking about mediating symbols, not correspondence with reality. Theories do not correspond to anything, theories mediate human thought and experience (1980, p. 16). If we view curriculum theorizing, then, as a creative, expressive activity which generates metaphors for increasing our understanding of how thought and experience are organized, we may be able to escape the "trap" of linear and causal analysis: "It is, in other words, an interest in overcoming causes and (redefining means-ends relationships) as social conventions in the service of persons" (in Pinar, 1975, p.288). Thus, Macdonald adopts an ethical stance to his encounter with others; the fact that he sought to express his valuing of curriculum theorizing in terms of meditative vs. calculative orientations does not mean that he discounted the dialectical relationship between contemplation and praxis:

Concern for the nature of human "being," value theory, and the nature of knowledge are intricately interwoven in action contexts. But in many ways curriculum theorizing can be conveniently categorized as oriented toward statements about knowledge, statements about the curriculum realities, and statements about valued activity (1971, in Gress and Purpel, 1978, p.47).

Macdonald indicated that the central unit of curriculum theory is that of **"action."** It was clear to him that our actions -- including contemplative, speculative, creative -- must be seen as constitutive of human cultural content. It was not Macdonald's intention to withdraw from action in social and political dimensions; he approached this issue of social and political action, however, in characteristically and qualitatively different ways than an

instrumental orientation. He categorically stated that "we both can and should attempt to 'change' society." He stated that to change society "We begin with the need to choose those socio-cultural forces now operating in our society that we desire to maximize or perpetuate" (1973, p.4). For Macdonald, as with Huebner and Purpel, curriculum theorizing addresses the question "What is to be left to chance?" An analytical orientation does not necessarily go beyond the mapping of trends and relationships; an ethical, religious and aesthetic orientation concerns itself more with projecting normatively framed possibilities and preferences.

Macdonald has referred to an orientation in curriculum theorizing, reconceptualist theorizing, which neither focuses on theories as guiding frameworks nor on the scientific empirical validation of theoretical constructs. He describes this reconceptualist group as:

...individuals [who] look upon the task of theorizing as a creative intellectual task which they maintain should be neither used as a basis for prescription or as an empirically testable set of principles and relationships. The purpose of these persons is to develop and criticize the conceptual schema in the hope that new ways of talking about curriculum, which may in the future be far more fruitful than present orientations, will be forthcoming. At the present time, they maintain that a much more playful, free floating, process is called for by the state of the art (1971, in Gress and Purple, 1978, p.45).

Macdonald has made a connection between the work of Polanyi and Gramsci as it points to the double dialectic between personal knowledge and praxis. In many ways, reconceptualism operates within this double dialectic. Macdonald states that:

The importance I wish to attach to these views may be summarized quickly. First, the existence of a separate entity called human consciousness is apparent; and next, change in human social consciousness is necessary and a precondition of later political change. And, it is precisely in the realm of changing consciousness that I believe our expectations should reside (1977, p.5).

The double dialectic operates between the tacit dimension as described by Polanyi and the formation of new knowledge, and the structural conditions of everyday social reality as they contain the ideological content of human knowledge in all its myriad forms. As the above mentioned two quotations indicate, reconceptualists tend to focus on the emergence of consciousness and seek to diversify rather than homogenize perception and meaningful associations. Reconceptualism examines multiple ways of knowing in the world; Macdonald has attempted, and I believe that his attempt has significantly encouraged openness and curiosity, to expand our consideration of and participation in cultural transformation -- transformation that is both normatively guided (by the combined interests in emancipation and understanding) and receptive to as yet not understood possibilities for improving our quality of life.

The task of curriculum theorizing is to engage in praxis. Macdonald points out why this orientation is so critical to curriculum theorizing when he states:

The concept of praxis is a valuable one, especially when used as Paulo Freire does to mean action with reflection, in distinction from either reflection without action (intellectualism) or action without reflection (activism). Thus, curriculum development is seen as praxis or action with reflection (in Pinar, 1975, p.291).

When Macdonald draws the distinction between contemplative and calculative thinkings, he does not suggest that contemplative thinking has no practical intent. His emphasis on emancipatory interests should dismiss such a charge. What he does suggest, I believe, is that contemplative thinking is one moment in the circular process of action and reflection, a moment that is sorely lacking within instrumentally oriented curriculum theories. It is a moment in which individuals examine preconceptions, horizons of understanding, attitudes and values for the purpose of making problematic their participation in a broader cultural context so that they come to "sense the potential within themselves for change and growth, from powerlessness to power, and from alienation toward relationship and commitment" (1977, p.10). It is this essential recognition of human potential that Macdonald has long advocated. This search for human potential is a "search for meaning and a sense of unity and well being" (1980, p.12). As was mentioned earlier, Macdonald has championed the rights and responsibilities of individuals in their growth and change -- to "develop self-governance, autonomy, and independence." At the same time, he tries to strike a balance between personal change and social change orientations, always maintaining that it is through changing consciousness that social change is to be most morally and ethically brought about. He discusses this connection between personal and social change in the following manner:

I do not believe that there is any fundamental contradiction in the long run between those theorists who advocate a personal change position and those who advocate a social change orientation in terms of changing consciousness toward a liberating praxis. This assumes

that the social change approach does not involve a highly structured set of "new" meanings, nor the personal growth approach being restructured to a highly individualistic orientation without meaning for communal living. Neither approach need be exaggerated to the point of exclusion of the other (1977, p.10).

This is much the same point that Pinar makes in his discussion of "The Abstract and Concrete in Curriculum Theorizing." But Macdonald was aware of the difficulty of maintaining this balance. He anticipated that this balance was to be achieved within a community (albeit small) of reflective individuals who "prize such attributes as participation, pluralism, openness, seeking, searching, testing, experimenting, challenging, critiquing, controversy, commitment to people, and critical thinking" (1981, p.2). He strongly valued a sense of commitment, a sense he saw only narrowly developed within "neutral" research and scholarship. For him,

The act of theorizing is a act of faith, a religious act. It is the expression of belief, as William James (1917) clearly expounds in The Will to Believe, belief necessitates an act of the moral will based on faith. Curriculum theorizing is a prayerful act. It is an expression of the humanistic vision of life (1980, p.17).

Similar ideas have been expressed by theorists such as Purpel and Huebner. While Purpel and Huebner draw more directly from the literature and thought of religious communities of faith, Macdonald takes a somewhat different stance and draws upon a different tradition,

...that of the mytho-poetic imagination, particularly related to the use of insight, visualization and imagination, which is essentially separate from science and praxis. Its practical method is surely similar to Polanyi's (1972) indwelling, and most probably what Steiner (1979) credits Heidegger's life work to be -- that is, a process of "radical astonishment." The mytho-poetic deals with "why there is being rather than nothing," at the awe,

wonder, and anxiety of this puzzle (1980, p.12).

This "puzzle," then, is made up of pieces which are cut by the categories, the theories and conceptual frameworks, through which we come to view the world. It is the task of curriculum theorizing to examine the pieces of the puzzles we each carry with us in our consciousness... and to marvel at the pictures we create as the pieces are brought together, rearranged and fitted into a pattern we have helped to create, but which are ontologically prior to our creation. James Macdonald loved these puzzles; but it appears that while he loved the shape of the pieces, he was drawn to the visions they revealed as the pieces were brought together by creative intelligence. Since the pieces are cut by our categories and conceptual frameworks, it remains unclear whether we could assemble another's puzzle; and, if we were to assemble the puzzle whether we would be able to see the same picture another would have seen if he or she assembled it. Macdonald points to this dilemma when he writes:

It would appear then, that one central concern of theorists is identifying the fundamental unit of curriculum with which to build conceptual systems. Whether this be rational decisions, action processes, language patterns, or any other potential unit has not been agreed upon by the theorizers (1971, in Gress and Purpel, 1978, p.50).

Macdonald suggested that **"actions"** might be considered the fundamental unit of curriculum theory. But how we describe these actions and their interrelatedness may best be approached through how we come to know. Macdonald included in the curricular task the need to describe the creation of knowledge. He also concerned himself with the task of relating how knowledge is made meaningful. And finally, he

devoted his later years to exploring how another's meaningful experiences could be understood by another and why this transcendent possibility is so important. We will turn first to Macdonald's description of knowledge and human interests and the importance of this categorization for curriculum theorizing.

3. KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS

In his important article entitled "Potential Relationships of Human Interests, Language, and Orientations to Curriculum Thinking"(1973), Macdonald outlines in a remarkably concise and synoptic manner problems that plague curriculum theorizing and some potential avenues through which these problems might be addressed. Macdonald begins his discussion by stating:

The first problem I would like to call (after the work of Jurgen Habermas) a problem of clearly identifying the human interest base from which we construct curricular models and generate prescriptions. The second problem (related to the lack of clarity in the first) is a confusion of terminology which arises from a naive use of what we call mixed metaphors in curriculum talk. There is an assumption here that consistency in the use of a model is necessary, and that this consistency involved 1) identifying clearly the interests we wish to serve and promote; 2) selecting and using concepts and terms which are consistent with that interest; and 3) basing prescriptions upon those interests and expressing them in appropriate terminology (1973, p.1).

Habermas (1971) identifies three human interest bases from which knowledge forms derive: **technical cognitive interests, practical cognitive interests, and critical cognitive interests.** Macdonald points out that technical interests are most often associated with an interest in **control and prediction**, practical interests aim at

consensus, and critical interests aim at **emancipation**. Macdonald believed, from the work of Habermas, that knowledge is constructed in the service of these interests and that each interest leads to characteristicly different forms of knowledge and practice implications. Technical interests lead to linear-expert models of action; practical interests lead to circular-consensus models of action; and critical interests lead to dialogic models of action. Since Macdonald's orientation to curriculum theorizing focused on **actions** as units of analysis, his making the connection between human interest bases and action implications was extremely important. Thus, Macdonald's analysis of curriculum practice and the descriptions of such practice does not merely examine the language employed; he was quite cognizant of the discrepancy between curricular language and the design and implementation of these designs. It was clear to him that just because a curriculum "rhetoric" seemed to reflect a particular human interest there was no certainty that such an interest would be evident in practice. His focus, then, was on the interest reflected in prescriptions and practices:

One problem is the existence of a liberation rhetoric with a fundamental control interest. This is a common occurrence when curriculum persons are indoctrinated into a very person oriented and/or progressive ideology but fundamentally accept the technological ethos of our culture. Confusion then arises where prescriptions do not seem to follow from the rhetoric given (1973, p.6).

Given Macdonald's criticism of technical rationality and its dominant interest in predication and control, and given his expressed view that education should be guided by an emancipatory interest, it should come as no surprise that he very carefully scrutinized those curricular designs and theories that employed emancipatory rhetoric for imbedded interests in control. One telling characteristic of truly emancipatory curriculum theorizing and practice rested in the **"levels of concerns"** addressed by such activity. He indicates the shift in concern he experienced as he moved from technical to a humanistic-liberating stance:

In rejecting the implicit value position of the behavioral objectives approach (technical control) and explicating instead a humanistic-liberating stance, we found we had to deal with a different level of concerns. In addition to asking "What educational purposes should the school seek to attain?" we asked: "What are the value commitments, and what is our view of the nature of man?" (1973, p.3).

These are indeed quite different questions than one might ask if he or she were primarily interested in equating what is learned to what various tests reveal. In like manner, a preoccupation with more precise predictive measures of student "outcomes" in no way directly addresses whether such "outcomes" are morally or ethically correct. Moral, ethical and aesthetic concerns, as Huebner has pointed out, call for a different attentiveness to human being. Macdonald summarizes this attentiveness when he alludes to the fact that sometimes we are able to come to the conclusion that "what works is not always good." Thus, a different "rationality" and human interest is present when technical criteria are made problematic.

Macdonald has pointed out in his paper entitled "Myths about Schooling" (n.d.a) that a pervasive myth is the one that states that "the most efficient way is necessarily the best way." That he was able to counter the myth of efficiency by examining the human interest base from which such a preoccupation emerges is a great contribution to curriculum thought. So it may be said that Macdonald adopted the conceptual frameworks Huebner applied to the analysis of curricular language, and allied to these frameworks an additional concern for leading human interests which he found developed in the work of Habermas. Thus, he was able to develop a platform from which to interpret curriculum discourse which transcended language analysis and focused instead first on epistemological and later ontological issues.

As mentioned earlier, Macdonald found Polanyi's discussion of "personal knowledge" to be an illuminating concept. From it he derived an understanding of the importance of the "tacit dimension" and how we move from this preconceptual, preunderstood experiential base to knowledge -- all knowledge being, according to Polanyi, personal knowledge, that is requiring a knower. Polanyi's concept fit rather nicely with Macdonald's understanding of leading human interests, value theory, and phenomenology. He explicates this set of relationships when he states:

Values I would submit, as with knowledge, are personal, developed from a dual dialectical process that represents development in a hierarchical structure that surpasses one's biology, culture, or society. Psychological theory, if there must be such an adjunct to educational ideology, must also be seen as a focus upon the question of human being. That is, narrow empirical or

developmental views lead us away from our ontological ground of being rather than causing us to come to grips with human nature. They must also be grounded in something beyond their own conceptions. Thus, psychological theory must be grounded in existence and utilize the methods of phenomenology if it hopes to cope with being (1974, in Gress and Purpel, 1978, p.106-107).

It is precisely here that Macdonald makes a "leap of faith" (and a concomitant conceptual leap) to consider not only explicit curricular intentions and designs, but the implicit and tacit dimensions as well. Just as all knowledge emerges from a tacit dimension and is experienced personally, all curriculum stances emerge from a "tacit platform" and are framed in terms of language (which is public and exists in meaning communities), human interests (which are normatively oriented) and are transformable through praxis ("the collective practice of creating an environment"). By suggesting that we attend to the tacit dimension, Macdonald grounds emancipatory possibility not upon the "extant" conceived in terms of observable behavior, but on our ontological condition -- that of our being-in-the-world and how this being is not yet completed: "Without such a platform, we are limited to and overvalue what seems to have a sense of immediacy to us" (1981, p.16). He goes on to say that "It is in the realm of tacit knowledge that one provides for harmony and balance for decisions" (In Macdonald and Clark, 1973, p.2). It is from this recognition of the tacit dimension that the creative and moral agency of the person is honored. As Macdonald has indicated, "Most individualization is in the interest of control" (1973, p.5). If curriculum theorists are to serve the interests of emancipation and not control, then quite a different aim than individualism (and its attendant alienating separation) is to be

cultivated:

Liberation interest oriented programs talk more about ranges of alternative experiences from which emerging purposes which reflect and develop needs and interests are continually emerging. Student choice is central to these proposals. The organization of time, space, and resources is considered fluid and flexible with considerable emphasis upon self direction and self evaluation. The adults are talked about as guides, helpers and resource persons. Human relationships are seen as A with B rather than the more authority oriented A/B relationships in the other two [technical and practical]. This kind of program is often referred to as **personalized** (in comparison to group or individualized). **The basic distinction between personalized and individualized is the recognition of the student as a moral agent (i.e., chooser of goals and means to achieve them)** (this author's emphasis, 1973, p.5).

In his now classic article "A Transcendental Developmental Ideology of Education," (1974, in Gress and Purpel, 1978) Macdonald proposes two ideological orientations beyond the romantic, developmental and cultural transmission ideologies identified by Kohlberg and Mayer (1972). Macdonald states that "It is clear to me that there are at least two other potential ideologies that I am calling radical and transcendental developmental" (p.95). The importance of these two additional ideologies for educational thought and what they have to say about conceptions of human interests and knowledge may be seen if we examine what is left out if we confine ourselves to the three. Briefly, **romantic ideology** reflects a concern for human nature and the unfolding maturation of the individual; its emphasis can be either phenomenological or existential for emphasis is placed upon the inner experience of the individual. Embedded within this ideology is the tacit assumption (a la Rousseau) that persons, when free, are essentially good "unless society makes them otherwise."

The **cultural transmission** orientation employs a behavioral psychology approach and maintains that the individual is shaped largely by environmental factors. Knowledge is primarily viewed positivistically. At best, values are ethically neutral or reflect social relativism.

A **developmental ideology** reflects a dialectical understanding of inner and outer experience. The relationship between inner experience and outer phenomena becomes the source of knowledge. Ethical values are derived from philosophic principles and are rationally developed. Values are assumed to be universal, and individual and cultural values are situated within this universal framework as they are in Kohlberg's hierarchical framework of moral development.

The **radical ideology** is concisely indicated when Macdonald contrasts it against the developmental model:

The developmental and radical models look identical only on the surface, for the radical model is weighted on the side of social realities. The developmental model is weighted on the side of inner cognitive structures. The progressive position assumed that democracy was the ideal social reality and continued its analysis of the interaction process with that assumption in mind. The radical model, on the other hand, is essentially based upon the analysis of why democratic ideas are not realized, thus emphasizing environmental structures (p.96).

A radical ideology, then, emphasizes the social construction of reality and makes problematic the status quo (which is assumed to be democratic and progressively motivated in the developmental model):

The radical critique of this paradigm has come not because the values inherent in the liberal paradigm are not

necessarily progressive and potentially liberating. On the contrary the critique arises because the separation of private and public interest functionally fosters the development of private interests which make public policy; and the facilitation of private elites who do so (p.3).

The radical ideology serves to highlight the socially constructed constraints against personal freedom and possibility. While this critical perspective contributes greatly to our understanding of environmental constraints (and perhaps somewhat to our understanding of the necessity for collective praxis), it remains, according to Macdonald (and as was discussed in the section pertaining to the work of Giroux), prone to be "embedded in the common dominant technological, materialistic culture" (1981, p.8). While radical ideology and its emphasis on critical rationality has helped us become aware "that constitutive rules [must] be made cognitively accessible to all through analysis and discussion" (1977, p.13), it has inadequately developed an analysis of its own tacit cultural dimension and the implications for establishing a conceptual framework for analyzing the "preference rules" that are supposed to supercede constraining constitutive rules. It is precisely Macdonald's attentiveness to cultural phenomena that prompts his critique of radical ideology:

Culture, then, in its anthropological sense is the basis of all educational endeavors. It is the tradition and creative inheritance of society that is conserved, transmitted and developed through the agency of schooling (1980, p.21).

Macdonald quite pointedly indicates that radical ideology as a curricular perspective need be transcended if we are to address multiple cultural realities in the formation of human interests and

knowledge:

The radical-political perspective as a base for curriculum thinking does not adequately allow for the tacit dimension of culture: it is a hierarchical historical view that has outlived its usefulness both in terms of the emerging structure of the environment and of the psyches of people today (1974, In Gress and Purpel, 1978, p.99).

Macdonald proposes a **transcendental developmental** perspective because all four of the ideological orientations listed above are "unclear in their ontological and phenomenological grounding" (1974, in Gress and Purpel, 1978, p.103). Macdonald's combined emphasis on personalizing educational activity with the goal of "centering" the person within the world, and his suggestion that ethical and aesthetic interests in knowledge be called to our attention, prompts quite a different view of ontology and experience. Through a transcendental developmental perspective, Macdonald acknowledges that understanding proceeds from a dual dialectic: one being the encounter one has with the world, the other being a reflective transaction that occurs within the consciousness of the individual. Thus, Macdonald suggests that this "inward journey" is an indispensable part of the dialectical process of knowledge formation and understanding. It is through this centering process of the individual in the world, and in him or herself, that the utilitarianism and instrumentalism of these other ideologies may be transcended. By referring the curriculum person to ethically and aesthetically grounded sources of knowledge, Macdonald demonstrates his commitment to education as a liberative and religious act. The picture he portrays is edged with infinite openness, while the central figure, the person, is in sharp relief. From his

perspective which places personal knowledge as the point around which reflection and and action circle, Macdonald likewise situates human consciousness in the realm of tacit knowledge:

Thus, the realm called tacit knowledge could be the avenue through which "God" is known and enters human beings; or it could be what is called the source of our "collective consciousness;" or it could be the source of our creative ideas and insights; and where our early personality and temperment patterns reside. It could, of course be all of these things and much more (In Macdonald and Clark, 1973, p.2).

Macdonald does not presume to name the source of our ultimate values; but what he does do eloquently, is indicate how our internalized and engaged orientations, perspectives and values open or close us to transcendent possibilities. By recognizing and making more understandable the connections between human interests, knowledge, perspectives and experience, Macdonald conserves traditions of inquiry which have contributed to human (in its widest sense) achievement. In his later theorizing, Macdonald revisioned this process of centering and transcendental possibility by integrating technical, critical and emancipatory interests within a broader and more incisive process of inquiry -- a search not for human knowledge, per se, but a search for **understanding**. Each of the human interest bases are important because:

These methods provide us with technical and utilitarian control through technique, with emancipatory praxis through critical reflection, and with aesthetic, moral and metaphysical meaning through poetics. What has been missing, and what has caused antagonism in curriculum theory, is a failure to realize that all three methodologies participate in the larger hermeneutic circle (1980, p.18).

The importance of hermeneutic philosophy for curriculum theorizing is currently evident in contemporary writing. But it was Macdonald who brought this orientation prominently into the field, and some mention of his adopting this stance is noteworthy. It is to this discussion I now turn.

4. CURRICULUM THEORIZING AS AN HERMENEUTIC ACTIVITY

Given that a discussion of hermeneutics has already been presented in Chapter II, this section will explore specific implications for an hermeneutic orientation to curriculum theorizing that Macdonald has identified. It is my intention to avoid unnecessary reiteration of hermeneutic principles or methodological issues and concentrate on why Macdonald came to advocate an hermeneutic orientation for curriculum theorizing.

James B. Macdonald was not one to gloss over differences or duck a conflict when one was worth confronting, but he was also (as the last quotation in the previous section indicates) committed to confronting divisiveness and antagonism when they were spawned by lack of understanding and/or sectarian rivalry. I believe that he played, in the best sense of the term, the role of "elder statesman" within the curriculum movement in the late seventies and early eighties. His later exploration of hermeneutic philosophy was one such attempt to come to an orientation and methodology which would directly address the "sibling rivalries" and miscommunication that he saw occurring in the field. It is also fair to say that Macdonald saw that an hermeneutic

orientation might also be an appropriate stance to take beyond disciplinary matters.

Given his long expressed interest in the quality of our everyday lives, Macdonald directed his energies toward mapping existing and advocating for the formation of new meanings one could assign to social realities. He came to recognize that human beings do indeed function within everyday affairs with some sense of organizing principles. Hermeneutics enabled him to dialogue with others and himself about what these principles are, how they come to be, and how our very existence in the world is affected by our understanding of social reality:

The consciousness of everyday life is more tacit or pre-theoretical. It is as Berger says, "the web of meanings that allow the individual to navigate his way through the ordinary events and encounters of his life with others." In toto, they make up his social life-world (In Macdonald and Zaret, 1975, p.79).

Macdonald believed that even our everyday encounters with the world are characterized by the human capacity and proclivity to make sense of these encounters:

The fundamental human quest is the search for meaning and the basic human capacity for this search is experienced in the hermeneutic process, the process of interpretation of the text (whether artifact, natural world or human action). This is the search (or research) for greater understanding that motivates and satisfies us (1980, p.7).

Macdonald was able to explore how various human interests and epistemologies developed and shaped human interactions in the world. But from this exploration he came to also recognize that instrumental, practical and emancipatory ideologies shared a basic human activity

that was not really identified nor described within these ideologies. Moreover, curriculum theorizing, he suggests was in a sense a closed system if any or even all of these human interests were viewed as the basis for human inquiry. What linked these interests was a tacit orientation toward increasing human understanding in and of the world. Each methodology, even the most positivistic or critical, sought ways of describing, explaining and understanding phenomena. With this realization in mind, Macdonald reconceptualized the role of curriculum theorizing to more closely reflect his interest in increasing understanding and transcending the limits implicit in previously articulated orientations:

Curriculum theory, it is suggested here is a form of hermeneutic theory. Thus curriculum theory is an ever renewing attempt to interpret curricular reality and to develop greater understanding. Curricular practice results from hermeneutic process which both lies within the three methods (epistemologies) and transcends them (1980, p.16).

Macdonald goes on to say that:

Essentially, I shall propose that the problematics of theory-practice must be viewed in a larger framework. In a process which Paul Ricoeur and Hans Gadamer call the hermeneutic circle. Thus theory and practice are not only integrated through action and reflection, but are a part of a larger interpretive endeavor which includes intention and direction toward the recovery of meaning and development of understanding (1980, p.8)

For Macdonald, this "larger interpretive endeavor" is nothing less than the ontological platform from which all human beings attempt to make sense of the world. Whether we adopt a particular ideology, methodology, or culture, the essential ground of our being is that we attempt to organize our experience and define reality even if this

attempt is preconscious or pretheoretical. Macdonald sought to bring to the attention of curriculum theorists the thesis that **understanding** is our central concern because he believed that neither the ideologies of control nor emancipation had accurately realized the importance of this issue:

I have introduced this thesis because we, in curriculum, have experienced a heavy input of control and/or emancipation oriented ideas in the past thirty years. The search for understanding, the hermeneutic quest appears to have been relegated to a third neutral, non-action category of cultural consensus. **This, I suggest is a grave error on our part, for I believe the search for understanding is the basis in which scientific-technical and critical theory effects are grounded** (this author's emphasis, 1980, p.1).

Hermeneutic philosophy directly addresses the presence of different cultural life expressions, calls for examining their symbolic meanings, and suggests that, through circular and dialogic interaction, the "parts" which are represented by each culturally mediated experience may be made more understandable if we examine them in light of a **tacitly understood whole**. Thus, individuated experience and personal knowledge are essential and presumed to exist, but their "grammatical structure" can only be revealed through interpretation and the revisioning of a newly informed sense of the whole. Each system of meanings, each communication community, is seen as having something vital to say about how its experience (both in an individual and collective sense) describes, and helps bring into possibility emerging consciousness. Macdonald comments on both how Huebner pointed out important perspectives regarding language analysis and human interests, and yet had missed the "ground of talking:"

As Huebner pointed out, all ways of talking are legitimate in some way, or for some purpose, or at some time. What wasn't explicated in his work was the ground of talking, which it is proposed here (in terms of methods) is the frame or horizon of the hermeneutic circle of understanding (1980, p.19).

Given the ontological rather than methodological focus on hermeneutics that Macdonald derived from the thought of Gadamer, it is clear that understanding is not simply the result of a technical, linear process or a process of problem solving. Rather, just as knowledge is seen as being formed by diverse and non-rational ways of relating to the world (e.g., aesthetic, spiritual, mystical, and transcendental), understanding emerges from the whole of human experience. To presume that any one methodology or ideology has "a corner on the market" of understanding is hubris. What is needed (and it is an hermeneutic stance that provides some measure of this), is a willingness to recognize the limited nature of what we know as well as the very real difficulty of being able to translate what we know in terms that invite meaningful exchange with those we encounter. This I believe is the central concept that Gramsci proposes in his suggestion that we become "organic intellectuals" -- that is, persons who are self-reflectively aware, critically aware, and grounded in the lived realities of the world we share intimately with others. Hermeneutic interpretation is never closed, nor complete, for our horizons of understanding are ever-changing. What we were "certain" of a moment ago may change as new experience prompts us to reconceptualize this knowledge. The curricular implications Macdonald states as follows:

Curriculum theorizing is then creating, developing, and using metaphors to increase our ability to describe, explain, and understand. The process that takes place is a process of interpretation. We project our metaphor, interpret experience in light of it, and use them until they no longer help us to interpret or disclose reality (1980, p.16)

Hermeneutics calls for, as Huebner has intimated in his view of curriculum theorizing as a religious and ethical activity, a **relationship between persons based upon a sense of fraternity and sorority rather than equality.** We are each partners in this endeavor, contributing our own attributes and "faults" to the dialogue. It should be obvious that such a stance is anti-elitist and communal. Macdonald's role in articulating this position is of great importance with regard to the development of the field. From his understanding of hermeneutic philosophy and its important ontological implications, Macdonald's earlier thinking on the subject of transcendence may now be viewed as a tacit dimension from which new metaphors and interpretive frameworks emerged as he sought to examine hermeneutically why such an orientation was so meaningful to him.

5. CURRICULUM AND TRANSCENDENCE

As our earlier discussion of the curriculum theory of James Macdonald has indicated, Macdonald came to a formulation of a transcendental developmental perspective of educational activity because it was from this perspective he felt that questions regarding the "nature of man, the nature of knowledge, and the nature of values" could be best discussed. Macdonald referred to perennial themes such

as consciousness vs. materialism and idealism vs. realism within the literature of curriculum thought and demonstrated how any curricular orientation which focused on a specific theme to the exclusion of the others resulted in an artificially narrow conception of human existence. Macdonald has continually pointed out the intricate dialectic that links these themes to a more wholistic portrayal of human experience. Just as positivist epistemology failed to account for the tacit dimension of personal knowledge; technical and scientific rationalities failed to account for political, ethical and aesthetic dimensions of human knowledge; so do orientations which do not consider all of the four above mentioned themes fail to recognize the ontological ground which integrates these themes into an account of human possibility:

The epistemological components of a transcendental ideology are grounded in the concept of personal knowledge. Thus, knowledge is not simply things and relationships that are real in the outer world and waiting to be discovered, but it is a process of personalizing the outer world through the inner potential of the human being as it interacts with outer reality (1974, in Gress and Purpel, 1978, p.109).

Macdonald advocated, then, a rather unique and eclectic approach to theorizing -- an approach that drew upon the playful thought of James March (n.d.), the concept of "methodological anarchism" of Feyerabend (1978) (whose central premise was that "anything goes" when inquiry and theorizing is attempted), an aesthetic sensibility not unlike that of Valery as adopted by Huebner, and a religious orientation to education derived from William James, Peter Berger and John Dewey. Macdonald's linking of materialism and consciousness was

not only expressed in terms of a dialectic such as that suggested in Marxist analysis, but adopted a stance he located in the thought of Paulo Soleri: that one could view, through one's engagement in transformative action in the world, **"matter becoming spirit."** In like manner, Macdonald linked realist and idealist orientations by recognizing the interconnectedness of critical rationality to the practical intent of emancipatory praxis. This double linking, done without contrivance or violence, represents, I believe, the tremendous creative power and intellectual genius Macdonald devoted to curriculum theorizing. By highlighting the transcendent possibility of human existence, Macdonald helped to broaden both the scope and "measure" of human activity. Thus, curriculum theorists not only must attend to the technical, scientific, and political dimensions of their practice, but they must come to recognize their participation in a transcendent dimension as well:

In general, we would demand the satisfaction of one global criterion for every educational experience, activity, or interpersonal relationship: Does it promote, value, and support authentic personal responses by both teacher and student to the reality of the ongoing experience? (In Macdonald, Wolfson and Zaret, 1973, p.15).

This "ongoing experience" Macdonald conceived of in ontological terms; he saw that we are participants in creation as we are ourselves created within a "being" that is beyond our control and beyond our explanation. By broadening our sense of existence to a global or cosmic consideration, he neither reduces us to mere "bits" within the universe nor inflates us to some Ptolemaic center of the universe. We are part of the universe and this fact links us to the vastness of an

integrative whole which is often ignored or simply tacitly understood. If we are to escape dehumanization, fragmentation and alienation, we must attend to the transcendent:

... a global view of the interrelationships of human structures and activities must be a central aspect of any curriculum which purports to have a transcendent developmental view (in Gress and Purpel, 1978, p.116).

Much of Macdonald's work reflects the importance of how this "global view" -- not unlike, and perhaps allied to the Jungian supreme value of "integration" -- serves to center human beings within the infinite. By embracing this global view as a "religious attitude," Macdonald restores infinite value to human being and makes problematic each attempt to divide human activity along any prescriptive, interventionist orientation:

Thus, the conscious attitude of integration is one of acceptance, of ceasing to do violence to one's own nature by repressing or overdeveloping any part of it. This Jung called a "religious" attitude, although not necessarily related to any recognizable creed (1974, in Gress and Purpel, 1978, p.107).

With David Purpel, Macdonald suggests that such an "acceptance" does not imply the internalization of oppressive social conditions or human relationships, nor the denial of individual subjectivity:

We propose that curriculum planning must as process embody the transcendent, both in its cultural and spiritual meanings. The process must facilitate transcendence of the status quo through cultural consciousness and active subjectivity (art, play, etc.); and must embody the recognition of the essential spiritual qualities of human existence (1981, p.15).

Like Huebner, Macdonald and Purpel focus on the underlying **existential structure of care** as it is reflected in metaphors derived from religious cultural sources. Given the link between religious attitudes and the integration of human experience within unitary cosmological and ontological orders, the interpretation of such metaphors "can help to develop a model that goes beyond technology, control, and alienation" (1981, p.19). Macdonald and Purpel go on to say that "We choose to view the world as being part of a larger transcendent reality, and our task as humans to be that of being in harmony with it" (1981, p.19). An example of this "harmony" may be discerned in an observation Macdonald made regarding a difference between "intellect" as represented in Islamic thought and "reason" as it is represented in Western thought. Intellect, Macdonald relates, "knows immediately and totally, and reason whose Latin root (ratio) reveals its function by analysis and division" (1980, p.2). Likewise, within a transcendental developmental ideology of curriculum theory (especially as hermeneutic philosophy informs interpretation), a sense of the "whole" need unify and guide the perception of the parts. Thus, as Macdonald has alluded to the work of William Irwin Thompson, the "good is seen shining in the immediacy of the act itself" and our analysis, interpretation, reconceptualization, etc., need follow the apprehension of this good. That we tend to deny the immediate good for some more rationalized and logical calculus, causes us to discount and devalue aesthetic, ethical, intuitive, and religious avenues to knowing.

The transcendental developmental orientation to curriculum theorizing is a reconceptualization of the context within which human agency and relationships to others and the world are viewed. It is certainly a more metaphysical and cosmological perspective. How prevailing concepts employed by curriculum theorists fail to take account of this revisioned context may be seen in two specific foci -- individual behavior and learning theory. Pointing to the former and its implications for curriculum planning, Macdonald and Purpel state:

... individual behavior becomes the focus of the planning process which, of course, is a clear example of the philosophical liberal paradigm which sees each individual's acts as separate and autonomous from the world around them and more or less meritorious in terms of the general success criteria of school and society. Context is not seen to be relational, but merely facilitative of purpose (1981, p.7).

Of the latter, Macdonald points to a similar decontextualization, this time seen in the blurred ontological distinction between learning and living:

We have been seduced by learning theory in our teaching. We have apparently forgotten that a learning theory is only one small part of any living theory. The time spent between the goal and the consequence is just as much lived as the result is (n.d.a, p.4).

I believe that Macdonald's distinctions drawn in both of the above quotations are penetrating criticisms of educational theory and practice and speak to the very heart of a reconceptualized view of curriculum which might reduce alienation and promote integration and care. By reconceptualizing the centering of the person within an infinitely integrated whole (cosmos), we may be less prone to separate

ourselves from the other, ourselves from our selves and our being from extant patterns of "facilitation" and support. I believe that it is fair to suggest that such a reconceptualization will make us less prone to dichotomize school life from our "other" life; we might be less likely to inadvertently perpetuate a "banking" concept of education which Macdonald describes using a somewhat different term "consumption:"

Consumption then becomes in schools the substitute for production in real life.... This constant consumption has its corollary generalization in the consciousness of the modern person. The act of consumption becomes a good in and of itself, a criterion of worth and "living." What is lost is the consciousness of everyday life and its active, creative, and productive vitality (In Macdonald and Zaret, 1975, p.83).

By focusing upon disclosing and integrating ourselves within "meaningful wholeness" rather than fragmentary criteria such as what we own, how we are certified, or how self-assured we are, we may come to new principles or criteria for assessing human potential. Instead of being alienated from our self and from others, we might find our inner experience and engagement in the world reciprocal and confirming. As Macdonald has suggested, "Self- regulation strives toward unity, toward the integration of inner and outer realities in a meaningful wholeness" (1974, in Gress and Purpel, 1978, p.108).

We need not look far to find, as Peter Berger (1969) has suggested, "signals of transcendence" in our everyday experience in the world. Berger identifies five such "signals of transcendence" that point to human attempts at transcending present limitations: **order,**

play, hope, damnation and humor. Each of these phenomenon intimate ways we attempt to relate to the world in creative and affirmative ways. That flashes of humor amidst grim circumstances point to human resilience and "good nature," that consolation offered, in the hope for a better tomorrow, to those who may have suffered loss and grief, both indicate a quality of human intelligence and wisdom that transcends our merely responsive or reactive abilities -- we can project a preferred reality and sustain this preference even under seemingly overwhelming adversity. This creative capacity, and the capacity to respond to others in caring and supportive ways (even at "our own expense"), is also part of human nature. Macdonald remained ever optimistic, despite his awareness of the terrifying possibilities human ignorance has generated in the world. He suggested that

...humanity will eventually transcend technology by turning inward, the only viable alternative that allows a human being to continue to experience oneself in the world as a creative and vital element. Out of this will come the rediscovery of human potential (1974, in Gress and Purpel, 1978, p.101).

Out of this cycle of exploring, integrating and transcending, human beings will prevail... or so was the hope expressed by James Macdonald. While I fully share his hope, I have come to a different path through which I believe human potential may be realized. This "turning inward" certainly sets one scenario for a revisioning of human potential, but I believe that Macdonald has indicated others that, perhaps, should be highlighted. It is to this task I now turn.

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS: TRANSCENDING THE PERSONAL

My commitment is to the individual and
and to his development as a member of
society... to becoming the finest human
beings we can by having a variety of
worthwhile experiences.

James B. Macdonald

Against the tyranny of mass culture and hegemony, Macdonald has valiantly sought to bring to the attention of curriculum theorists the importance of personal experience and the emergence of consciousness. Individual experience and perception become the locus of change: social change can only be achieved if personal change precedes it. "Actions" as the unit of curriculum analysis are formed from personal knowledge and self-reflective, dialectical engagement in the world. By pointing out the importance of personal authenticity and integrity in praxis, Macdonald, as we have mentioned earlier, avoids both activism and intellectualism. Praxis that promotes diversity, liberation and understanding becomes an educational process. Macdonald has recognized the continuous nature of human experience, and this continuity calls for an attentiveness to not only objectives and outcomes but to processes which more sensitively regard the quality of lived experience:

It is in fact during the ongoing flow of activity which carries us from objective to outcome that the aesthetic, moral, and reflective thinking processes operate most forcefully. We are, in effect, teaching students what is noble and beautiful in human life, what is right and good in interpersonal relations, and what are appropriate processes and standards of thinking continuously. These qualities may perhaps decide the fate of the future in a way that the consequential information we purvey could

never hope to do. It is suggested that some attention be paid to them (n.d.a, p.4).

Macdonald paid attention to why aesthetic, moral and reflective thinking enrich personal experience, how these orientations speak more directly to personally meaningful experience. He preferred not to focus on demographic, sociometric, or psychological descriptions, but on how these factors are experienced by those whom these factors supposedly describe, and how these descriptions are interpreted by those who use them to research human being. Thus, Macdonald sought to understand the nature of schools in our society by their impact upon the persons who work and "live" within them:

If we are to understand the meaning of the schools we must search for the social meaning of the human activity that takes place there; and if we wish to examine the meaning implications of schooling we must look at the personal activity of people in the schools (In Macdonald and Zaret, 1975, p.85).

Given Macdonald's remarkable intellectual curiosity and breadth, it is somewhat surprising that he seems to have fallen victim to, as Huebner had pointed out many educators had done, seeing the schools as some privileged place where education and social transformation could expect to occur: "The schools are perhaps the only effective social force for the safeguarding of the potential growth of full human beings" (n.d.a, p.24). That he slightly qualifies his statement with a "perhaps," may indicate his uneasiness with this orientation. Like Huebner, I would choose to make this uneasiness more prominent in my conception of curriculum practice. Macdonald was ever the school-based theorist. This is not surprising given the prevailing constituencies

served by most schools of education, however, I believe that this "fact" may point out a social and political reality which must continually be questioned. While I will discuss this issue in the last chapter of this dissertation, let me just comment here that schools of education have, by and large, missed an opportunity to broaden their social and political support by ignoring or not attending to other units of analysis and practice beyond schools and school people. Education is taking place in far more settings than schools. That education too often is viewed in terms of formal instruction and individual learning is most unfortunate.

A related narrowing of scope, I believe occurs in Macdonald's focus on "consciousness" as the "moment" in which educators may "intervene." Drawing upon a dialectic Habermas describes composed of two moments, work and communication, Macdonald states that "it is at the "moment" of consciousness (sic) in this dialectic whereby we may expect to have any meaningful input in the change process" (1977, p.5). Two issues can be raised here: first, I believe that it is a mistake to assume that work and communication are really distinct moments in a dialectic. Work may indeed be communication and communication may indeed be work. It is unclear to me whether consciousness can be seen residing more in one moment or another. Second, that consciousness is depicted as somehow distinct from environmental conditions is an ontological error, but one that is understandable given Macdonald's adherence to a view expressed by Michael Polanyi: "Though rooted in the body, the mind is, therefore,

free in its actions from bodily determination -- exactly as our common sense knows it to be free" (In Polanyi and Prosch, 1975, p.51, in 1977, p.3). I am not suggesting here that we adopt a "rude determinism" linking mind or consciousness to material or environmental conditions, but that we maintain a dialectical view regarding the interplay between consciousness and cosmos and between "free will" and determinism. Oppression, whether it be class, race, ethnic, gender based, must, I believe, be seen in terms of both real environmental constraints and collective consciousness. Equating the "free actions" of the mind from its bio-physical host to the free will or self interest of the individual from his or her social and environmental setting is, I suggest, a confusion (as Bateson has defined it) of "logical typing." I would further suggest that (and I refer the reader to the discussion of Gustave Fechner in Chapter II) Macdonald's understanding of mind as a separate entity, separate from body and other minds, may in fact distance human consciousness unnecessarily from its participation within transpersonal and transcendental consciousness. While this issue will also be discussed further in the next chapter, I suggest that we need to consider a different paradigm of consciousness that makes the leap from individually conceived consciousness to cosmic consciousness as the leap from individually based psychology to social psychology has already been made.

That contemporary cybernetic culture suggests "a psychology of individuation, not individualism or socialism" (1974, in Gress and Purpel, 1978, p.102), led Macdonald, to be fair, to consider units of

analysis beyond individual behavior/consciousness change. Macdonald stated that "We propose that schooling be personalized, in contrast to standardized; that schools reflect and cherish pluralistic life styles and cultures" (In Macdonald, Wolfson and Zaret, 1973, p.6). Without full regard for personal meaning, membership within groups and cultures could be tyrannical or oppressive. Macdonald suggests that

The challenge ahead would appear to lie in the resolution of the conflict between mass curricula and the concomitant powerlessness, alienation, and potential irrelevance to individuals and groups which accompany it, and in the development of planning procedures which preserve the integrity of cultural growth as well as the personal and group participation which creates a specific motivational nexus for learning and living (n.d.c, p.11).

True participation is only possible if each member is valued by some measure of equality. Macdonald stated that "... if we are interested in equal opportunity, then we are interested in the individual, not a group" (n.d.a, p.12). On one hand, it is prudent to avoid stereotyping; on the other, it is questionable, as Huebner has pointed out, to seek "equal opportunity" as our goal. A sense of distributive justice might suggest that our interest in the individual be informed by both historical and social dimensions as well as biographic ones.

Macdonald has pointed to two directions educational activity may take:

It is my best guess that the next step, already begun, is an **inward journey** that will manifest itself by discovery, through perception and imagery, of human potential only slightly realized until now, and a **outward journey** for new communal life stages that are pluralistic and limited to small groups (tribes?) of people. **The new**

communities will, of necessity, not threaten the technological superstructure that supports life, but they will seek pluralistic life styles within the superstructure (this author's emphasis, 1974, in Gress and Purpel, 1978, p.103).

This statement has remained rather unfathomable to me. The "inward journey" has certainly been well represented among "post-critical reconceptualist" theorists. The "outward journey" may be occurring (as Huebner's, Purpel's, Giroux's, and lately Pinar's work may indicate). But Macdonald's suggestion that the superstructure is life supportive and that these new groups will exist within it is quite strange. Having at other times called for a "cultural revolution," Macdonald seems to be uncharacteristically tentative in his prescription for change. Perhaps his perspective of the field's limited resources causes him to adopt a "run silent, run deep" attitude. I would suggest that there are other avenues to explore, specifically, conceptualizing a more integrative conception of cosmic consciousness, building broader social, political, economic and cultural bases for curriculum and change movements, and developing wider units of analysis than personal experience.

Macdonald has, at various times, though without much emphasis, suggested ways these issues might be addressed. He has called into question traditional teacher roles and suggested a more network oriented educational approach. He has identified the importance of communities mediating the influence of technologically proliferated, expert-developed national curricula, he has drawn attention to the cultural aspects of student needs and resources. But perhaps the most

far reaching vision he had to offer was one he described as follows:

We have tried to argue that any model of curriculum planning is rooted in a cluster of visions -- a vision of humanity, of the universe, of human capacities and potential, and our relationship to the cosmos. These visions though dimly viewed and rarely articulated nonetheless have a profound impact on our day to day educational practices as well as our more theoretical formulations (1981, p.27).

The work of curriculum theorizing remains very much an unfinished project. James B. Macdonald has pointed to, and articulated, vibrant visions of what humanity and the universe are capable of. While his voice will be sorely missed, his writings will continue to provoke inquiry and discussion for years to come. I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to his inspiration and dedication to human liberation and understanding. His questions reverberate, his insights disclose ever-widening horizons, and his courage will always shine as a quality he imparted to those he loved... in his own way.

E. DWAYNE HUEBNER: CURRICULUM AND THE STRUCTURES OF CARE

1. INTRODUCTION

Dwayne Huebner's work in the field of curriculum theorizing reflects his abiding concern for preserving what he considered to be the importance of the past while maintaining, at the same time, an openness to the future. This he does, in part, by applying his sensitive understanding of phenomenological ontology as expressed in the thought of Heidegger -- the past and the future are not seen to be what has happened and what is yet to happen, rather, past and future

reside in, to use Heidegger's term, the "Eternal Present." It is within this Eternal Present that Dwayne Huebner retrieves both history and education from mere artifice (a separation from the lived moment) and restores them to an ethical consideration.

Huebner combines a profound regard for the human condition and its transcendent qualities with a discriminating eye for the continuities and discontinuities occurring within systems of meaning. Another way of saying this is that he combines the visionary qualities of a poet with the keen observation of a scientist. Curriculum theory, then, for Huebner, is a forum within which multiple modes of observation and expression can participate in the interpretation of shifts in the education world:

The curriculum worker is stuck, so to speak, with conventional wisdom, which yields only to the 'onslaught of circumstance.' The onslaught of educational circumstances is felt differently by various educators. The individual educator's professional sensory and cognitive system is a delicate instrument for detecting shifts in his educational world. His responsiveness takes the form of new actions and new speech. Fortunately, all educators have not been shaped by the same conditioning agents, their sensory and cognitive systems detect different shifts, and their responsiveness takes different forms (in Pinar, 1975, p. 218).

Huebner's view somewhat mirrors Greene's high regard for the "heteroglossia" of public discourse. Huebner's philosophical orientation, strongly influenced by both phenomenology and hermeneutics, prompts him to attend to the present and attempt a systematic construction of meanings from the diverse viewpoints offered by those who are likewise participating in the world. This systematic

"construction of meanings" is done, as Huebner is careful to explain, with not only a pragmatic or functional concern, but is guided by an aesthetic appreciation as well. Huebner cites the work of Valery as having been important to his understanding of aesthetic rationality. Theorizing, then, considered as an art as well as a science, reflects the "transition from disorder to order, from formless to form, or from impurity to purity, accident to necessity, confusion to clarity" (Valery, 1964, in Pinar, 1974, p. 232). This perspective is akin to Greene's existential concept of meaning emerging out of encounters with chaos, but, as we shall see later in this discussion, Huebner has come to a somewhat different appreciation of extant patterns and ontological order.

Huebner has attempted to restore to curriculum theorizing a concern for the transcendent and normative dimensions of human activity. He has been passionately opposed to reductionist tendencies of curricular workers who focus upon technical and instrumental concerns. According to Huebner, "...too often today, promise is replaced by demand, responsibility by expectations, and conversation by telling, asking, and answering" (in Pinar, 1975, p. 231). Huebner calls our attention to the shallowness of much of curricular thought. He suggests that most curricularists are simply not asking the kinds of questions which might yield important information regarding "shifts in the educational world." Most questions tend, instead, to respond to the "onslaught of circumstance." Huebner suggests that more penetrating and illuminating curricular questions might be asked if

curricular workers attended to the value framework from which their questions emerge:

The key curricular questions, rather neutral from most descriptive and value points of view, are "What can go on in the classroom?" and "How can this activity be valued?" The central notion of curricular thought can be that of "valued activity." All curricular workers attempt to identify and/or develop "valued educational activity." The most effective move from this central notion is the clarification of the value frameworks or systems which may be used to value educational activity (in Pinar, 1975, p. 222).

If education is to be viewed as "**valued activity**" (and I wholly support this view), what value frameworks can be seen operating in this process? In his brilliant and by now, classic, article "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings," (1966) Huebner states that

Five value frameworks or systems may be identified. The terms which identify them are not as precise as they might be, but discussion and criticism should aid in sharpening them. For purposes of discussion, and eventually criticism, they may be labeled **technical, political, scientific, esthetic and ethical values** (this author's emphasis, In Pinar, 1975, p. 223).

Huebner maintains that each of these value frameworks offers a logic, a set of expectations and possibilities, a rationality which dialectically reflects and guides inquiry and expression. For example, a technical value orientation is directed at change, instrumental action, and problem-solving. A political value orientation focuses upon issues of power, prestige, status, etc. Huebner is careful to explain that virtually all value frameworks are operating in any human activity; the emphasis, however, upon one or another framework will be reflected in the kinds of questions which tend to be asked most

frequently, the "information" which is considered legitimate, and the kind and quality of the relationships among those present. Huebner's work in this area of value frameworks, and later the work of Jurgen Habermas in his Knowledge and Human Interests (1971) are extremely important contributions to curriculum theory. Just as Habermas helped to raise the issues of "communicative competence," so has Huebner helped to raise the issue of competing and complementary rationalities within curriculum discourse. While Huebner maintains that the preponderance of curriculum theorizing is derived from technical, scientific, and to a lesser extent political value frameworks, he suggests that "The proposition may be put forth that educational activity in classrooms will be richer and more meaningful if all five categories are brought to bear" (in Pinar, 1975, p. 228). His own work has provided ample evidence that aesthetic and ethical value frameworks, combined with conscious awareness of the other three, do indeed inform educational activity of "higher and more meaningful" possibilities.

Huebner's attentiveness to value frameworks and the language which reflects their influence has also yielded important insights into the functions which language serves. Just as the five value frameworks reflect various rationalities, Huebner suggests that there are six tasks to which curricular language may be put. The six functions, according to Huebner, are: **descriptive, explanatory, controlling, legitimating, prescriptive, and affiliative**. Huebner has suggested in his article "The Tasks of the Curriculum Theorist" (in Pinar, 1975)

that, unlike the technician, or scientist, "...the curricularist must be concerned not only with description of scientific theory, but also with prescriptive or normative theory" (p. 251). "The valuing problem and the description problem are consequently intertwined, thus complicating curricular language" (in Pinar, 1975, p. 222). Given his aesthetic, but more importantly his ethical, value orientations, Huebner represents how legitimating and affiliative tasks of the curricularist are best addressed applying these value frameworks. The tasks of the curricular worker include drawing upon diverse sources of insight and authority (e.g., scientific, artistic, philosophical, and religious) to create new ways of looking at, speaking about, relating to and participating in the world. He laments, however, that

We have a tendency to search for the final solution, and to think that we can discover the one and only best way to talk about curricular phenomena. In so doing, we fail to operate as historical beings and shirk our responsibility for the continual criticism and creation of new language forms and new ways of speaking (in Pinar, 1975, p. 257).

Huebner goes on to say that "The theoretical problem is one of finding, creating, or borrowing a language that can be used to describe and explain human events in educative situations" (in Pinar, 1975, p. 265). By combining an awareness of the value frameworks our language reflects and the tasks to which we consciously address ourselves, Huebner believes that we can act more responsibly, critically and compassionately. By recognizing the sources of our meaning systems, the traditions within which these meanings have found legitimacy and have been a source of community, Huebner suggests that we might better

understand the continuities and discontinuities within human preoccupations. This comparative form of interpretation -- drawing upon insights and meaning systems of many disciplines -- is a hermeneutic activity. The horizons of each community of discourse may be bridged by the creative adoption of metaphor:

I understand metaphor to be an expression or word from one discourse system or life situation used in a situation of discourse system where it does not normally belong. This transfer of word or expression is from quite disparate or previously unrelated traditions or endeavors. The use of metaphor is a way of shedding new light on an already existing phenomena, by looking at and speaking about that phenomena from a totally different perspective. In this way we obtain a transfer of meaning, and thus an opening up of awareness (1982, p. 1).

Huebner has found, and continues to find, the symbolism and metaphors contained within religious communities to be enlightening for curricular theorizing. In fact, he has stated that he "...accept(s) Whitehead's statement that 'The essence of education is that it be religious'" (1982, p.3).

Huebner has found religious symbolism and metaphors that counter the "value neutrality" of scientism and technical rationality to be important contributions to curricular discourse. Huebner's concern for the transcendent, the possibility of new awareness, and the present limitations of curricular language and thought are quite evident when he states that

...present curricular language is much too limited to come to grips with the problems, or rather the mysteries, of language and meaning of the classroom. The educator must free himself from his self-confining schemas, in order that he may listen anew to the world pounding against his intellectual barriers. The present methodologies which

govern curricular thought must eventually give way (in Pinar, 1975, p.235).

This discussion of Huebner's work will focus on two of the "self-confining schemas" he identifies -- scientism and the failed vision, and individualism vs. the common. This discussion will conclude with an examination of Huebner's attraction to "Structures of Care" and his emphasis on transcendence and temporality as key motifs for understanding education as a religious activity.

2. CURRICULUM LANGUAGE: SCIENTISM AND FAILED VISION

The educator participates in the paradoxical structure of the universe. He wishes to talk about language, but must use language for his talk. He infers that meanings exist, but has only language, or other symbol systems, as a vehicle for his inference. Hemmed in by his language, he nevertheless has audacity to tackle problems on the edge of his awareness.

Dwayne Huebner, "Curriculum Language and Classroom Meanings."

While Dwayne Huebner refers to the "audacity" that educators must exhibit in order to "tackle problems on the edge of his awareness," he has also lamented the fact that, as he sees it, this audacity is a rare quality among curriculum theorists. Earlier he referred to the fact that it appears to require the "onslaught of circumstance" for most theorists to react to shifts in educational environments. Huebner's attentiveness to language and its connection to the environment within which it is found in use is evident when he states that

A reciprocal relationship exists between language and environment. Language can be used to create new

environmental conditions, and new environmental conditions can lead to the emergence of new language patterns. However, these are not dependent relationships, for both language and the various environmental conditions can evolve independently. It seems appropriate that the curriculum theorist should explicate this reciprocity between language and environment (in Pinar, 1975, p.265).

This reciprocal, though not dependent, relationship between language and environment has led to a form of "slippage" or cultural lag within the field of curriculum. While curricular language may, in some respects "mirror the world," it is a mirror which contains its own flaws, imperfections and colorations. That is to say, that even as curricular language attempts to describe the world, encounters resistance to changes in these descriptions, and exerts influence upon the world, the world (in terms of material conditions, social realities, etc.) is changing all along. Thus, Huebner suggests that the "language in use" of curricular discourse be constantly and adroitly examined for its adequacy and promise. That this is being done so minimally is a discredit to the field:

Today's curricular language seems filled with dangerous, non-recognized myths; dangerous not because they are myths, but because they remain nonrecognized and unchallenged. The educator accepts as given the language which has been passed down to him by his historical colleagues. He forgets that language was formed by man, for his purposes, out of his experience -- not by God with ultimate truth value. As a product of the educator's past and as a tool for his present, current curricular language must be put to the test of explaining existing phenomena and predicting or controlling future phenomena. Such curricular language must be continually questioned, its effectiveness challenged, its inconsistencies pointed out, its flaws exposed, and its presumed beauty denied. It must be doubted constantly, yet used humbly, with the recognition that that is all he has today. Perhaps tomorrow the educator will have better language, if he stays open to the world which speaks to him, and response

with the leap of the scientist, or the vision of the poet (in Pinar, 1975, p. 218).

Perhaps central to Huebner's criticism of curricular language is its reliance on technical and scientific frameworks. Given the dialectical relationship of language to environment, Huebner is particularly disturbed by the hegemonic nature of these rationalities. He maintains that this hegemony is apparent if one examines some of the myths operating within curricular language:

Two tyrannical myths are embedded deeply in curricular language. One is that of learning -- the other is that of purpose. These have become almost magical elements within curricular language. The curricular worker is afraid to ignore them, let alone question them, for fear of the wrath of the gods (in Pinar, 1975, p. 219).

The gods (in this case the lesser gods such as program administrators, funders, review and evaluation teams, technocrats, etc.) are in a position within most educational institutions at this time to exert considerable pressure and influence upon curriculum planners. Given this "state of affairs," it is fair to say (and Huebner, Greene and Giroux, have) that what is needed to struggle against such powers is not just audacity, but moral and civic courage.

Huebner reminds us that "It must be emphasized that 'learning' is a postulated concept. There is no such 'thing' as 'learning.' Learning theory is postulated as an explanation of how certain aspects of behavior are changed" (in Pinar, 1975, p.240). This "explanation" makes use of categories and systems of meaning which are directly traceable to technical and (at best) a scientific rationality. Huebner states that "Current curricular ideology reflects, almost completely, a

technical value system. It has a means-end rationality that approaches an economic model" (in Pinar, 1975, p.223). That as many curricularists have "bought into" a technical value system is noteworthy for two reasons: first, that by adopting a technical rationality curricularists tacitly or explicitly reinforce this way of viewing the world; and second, that this technical rationality does violence to historical, biographic, epistemological, and ontological sources of meaning. Techniques and concepts become reified within a technical rationality, thus contributing to alienation and fixity: "Curricularists responsible for given educational situations are often alienated from their own roots because of this concern for ideas to the exclusion of concern for the environment" (in Pinar, 1975, p.263).

Technical rationality, such as that found within the "Tyler Rationale," separates purposes and objectives from the moral and ethical environment which, according to Huebner, must be attended to in all human interactions. Huebner seeks to restore the connection between purposive action and the prescriptions of behavioral objectives to a normative frame: ". . . the so-called purpose or objective is not a specification of a determined future; it is a value category used in selecting the ready-at-hand and present-at-hand in the educational environment" (in Pinar, 1975, p.247). Huebner draws our attention not to behavior change nor to the techniques by which this change is brought about, but rather to "how to explain behavior patterning or fixation" (Pinar, 1975, p.241). It is the organization of behavior and the systematic use of influence and values which both help to define

what we see as our influence and toward what end this influence is directed. Thus Huebner makes a significant contribution to the descriptive and normative language of curriculum by linking technique to value and influence to political action:

It has almost been assumed that if the educator can clearly specify his goals, then he has fulfilled his responsibilities as an historical being. But historical responsibility is much too complex to be so easily dismissed. It is too easy to forget that debate about educational objectives is part of the continuous struggle of rival political ideologies, which has its consequences in who controls the educational environment. The problem of living historically, or at least of living as an historically aware person, is not resolved by pronouncements of goals or purposes, but by engaging in political action (in Pinar, 1975, p.239).

Historical responsibility links us to the sources (institutional, conceptual, and affiliative) of the value frameworks which inform our practice, as well as to a sense of agency which enables us to act to conserve and transform the traditions within which these value frameworks are advocated.

Seen in this light, technical and scientific "vision" is situated within a broader range of perspectives -- perspectives which offer alternative accounts and approaches to the practice of historical responsibility:

I am convinced that the curriculum person's dependency on scientific thought patterns, even though these have not yet found their way into practice as they should, has broken his linkage with other very great and important intellectual traditions of East and West which have profound bearing on the talking about the practice of education (in Pinar, 1975, p.215).

Technical and scientific rationalities, while necessary systems of

organization when examining educational practices, according to Huebner, offer narrow and insufficient language or promise for human achievement. Technical and scientific rationalities impose a severe reductionism upon both the description of and the forward vision of human possibilities, the not-yet-realized ways of "being-in-the-world:"

The educator confronts the human being and no language will ever do him in or do him justice. Yet the curricular worker seems unwilling to deal with mystery or doubts or unknowables. Mysteries are reduced to problems, doubts to error, and unknowables to yet-to-be-discoverables (in Pinar, 1975, p.220).

That Huebner, drawing upon religious and theological traditions and language, comes to a quite different appreciation for the "paradoxical structure of the universe" is noteworthy and important. That doubt is not reduced to error, mystery not reduced to problems, represents a different posture vis-a-vis the world. A similar qualitative shift is recognizable in the statement made by the scientist Niels Bohr. "The opposite of a correct statement is a false statement. But the opposite of a profound truth may well be another profound truth" (in Greene, 1973, p.93). Huebner suggests that by expanding our conception of the world beyond the instrumental and scientific, beyond objectives and learning to a "moment of vision" we may shift our attention from viewing educational activity as a smorgasbord where we simply range about a wide array of consumables, to a "Last Supper" which invites all participants -- the technician, scientist, politician, artist and philosopher -- in a communal, sacred, event. That we each, as participants in a universal order, rise beyond our individual pursuits to a sense of the collective, communal, and

affiliative is no small feat. It is to this qualitative shift from the individual to the human that I will now turn.

3. FROM INDIVIDUALISM TO THE COMMON

Dwayne Huebner's work has done much to refocus the attention of curriculum theorists upon the issues of historical responsibility and the descriptive and normative dimensions of curricular thought. One significant target of his writing has been the reductionism, at the hands of educators, technicians and scientists, of behavioral change. But according to Huebner, the response, even by those within curriculum theory, against the "value neutrality" of technical and scientific rationalities has been far from adequate. Huebner states that

During the past two decades questions of value have resurfaced, frequently cloaked in scientific and developmental language. The cognitive emphasis of the post sputnik era influenced this in two ways. By emphasizing individual intellectual achievement, the social and historical fabric of human life became an easily forgotten and often neglected background. A corrective for blatant individualism was a renewal of interest in personal responsibility for maintaining social standards and hence a concern for values and ethics (1984, p.2).

According to Huebner's critique, the interest in personal responsibility and for maintaining social standards did not represent an advance from laissez-faire individualism nor liberal reform ideology. This response maintained a perilous closeness to social engineering, social Darwinism and conservation of the status quo. A concern for the primacy of individual sovereignty and a stable society did little to address structural inequalities:

We have the utter gall to be concerned with the mundane destiny of individuals, ours and our students. Ours is not a power over individuals, but a power for individuals. An a power for the future of our public world (in Pinar, 1975, p.275).

Huebner maintains that issues of power and transformative action are rarely, if at all, able to be addressed within the language of developmental psychology or liberal reform ideology. Self-interest, self-actualization and autonomy fail to adequately recognize the social construction of knowledge nor the sense of historical responsibility as has been previously outlined. Huebner straightforwardly identifies the conservative values implied in contemporary schooling:

For if we use our power for the future of all young we may indeed be in a political conflict with our own self-interests. We are in that conflict, which is one reason that school people, although speaking a liberal political rhetoric, are essentially conservative in the political spectrum. Our individualism is a nineteenth-century individualism, aimed at the freedom of those who partake of the prevalent means of production and consumption (in Pinar, 1975, p.275).

Huebner points out, and I believe that he is quite accurate in his assessment, that the scientific rationality reflected in developmental psychology and the conservative values embedded in liberal reform ideology have serious implications for liberative social theory, epistemology and pedagogy:

Dependency upon "learning" as the major concept in curriculum thought leads one to one other problem. The very nature of such "learning" suggests abstraction and generalization. In so-called cognitive learning, certain patterns, assumed to exist within the object world, are abstracted by the individual and carried into new situations. In psychomotor learning, certain patterns within the individual are abstracted and carried into new situations. The learning process implies the possibility of abstracting certain patterns of events from a specific

situation or a series of like situations and transforming them to new situations. Thus, learning is assumed to be something that happens within the individual. Education is consequently conceived as doing something to an individual. This leads to the proposition that there is the individual and there is the world, and that the individual develops in such a way that he has power over the world or to act upon the world. Such thinking leads to consideration of the individual as something distinct. Obviously, this is not the case. The individual is not separated from the world, or apart from it -- he is part of it. The unit of study, as Heidegger, among others, points out, is a "being-in-the-world." Any system of thought dealing with human change as something that happens within the individual is likely to lead the educator astray. However, if a curricular language can be developed so that the educator looks at the individual and the situation together, not separately, then his powers of curricular design and educational responsibility might be increased (in Pinar, 1975, p.242).

Huebner's tracing of the copenetration of the logic of developmental psychological and liberal reform ideology is instructive. Much of contemporary educational theory and practice (e.g., competency-based instruction, individual achievement, the separation of "gifted and talented" programs from more democratic and egalitarian educational configurations, increasing numbers of private over public schools) may be linked to these traditions in social and pedagogic thought.

Huebner offers a counter proposal which, drawing upon phenomenological thought, ontological hermeneutics, and more radical social and educational criticism such as that of Ricoeur, Freire and Habermas, suggests more wholistic and normatively progressive alternatives to prevailing social and educational ideology.

An example of Huebner's high regard for individual freedom and historical responsibility can be seen when he suggests that the

language and perspectives of **biography** offer more illuminative insights into human agency and historical consciousness:

Retrospection about the threads of continuity and change composing an individual is the discipline of biography. These same threads projected into the future become the concern of the educator. Might it not be possible, then, that insights into curriculum planning for the individual are to be sought in the discipline of biography, as well as within the discipline of psychology? (in Pinar, 1975, p.242).

Huebner thus points to the dialectical nature of praxis, a quality which is superficially addressed, if not foreign to, psychological and social control orientations.

Huebner recognizes an important qualitative dimension of an individual's membership and participation in communities of meaning. Drawing upon his understanding derived from hermeneutic philosophy and the religious traditions of community, Huebner identifies the importance of **interpretive communities** within which social meaning arises:

Knowledge, as social meaning, is always constructed with another. Knowledge is a social construction, not an individual construction. New knowledge, that which comes from others, is a description of their comings and goings in the world. Hence knowledge which comes from others must always be interpreted (1984, p.16).

The individual, while seeking to transform self and others, inevitably draws upon meanings introduced to him or her from social and historical awareness. This "knowledge," then, is derived from one's relationship to the world, a world which offers not only chaos and disorder, but membership and communality: "It is important to remember that knowledge

is, first of all, a relationship with something that was, at one time, strange" (1984, p.14).

It is this participation within communities of meaning -- communities that one adopts through the very basic adoption of language -- that is overlooked or discounted in individualistically oriented learning. Moreover, the "adoption" of language must be viewed not only as a response to a socially-constructed world, but also must be seen as an act of conscience and initiative on the part of the individual (and community) and an attempt to participate in that construction. As we outlined earlier, Huebner refers to the various functions which language serves. Language, beyond its descriptive, explanatory and other functions, serves the function of **affiliation**:

...language used by curricularists frequently serves as a symbol of cohesiveness or of belonging to a particular community. It becomes, in some instances, the language of affiliation, which serves as a vehicle and token of cohesion. Mastering the language is frequently part of the initiation into the community, and proficiency with the language indicates one's belonging to the community (in Pinar, 1975, p.256).

According to Huebner, community need not be viewed as a homogeneous or closed society. Just as language changes and is modified to meet new conditions and norms, so do communities. Communities may be seen, then, as social configurations which are unified by a sense of brotherhood and sisterhood, a configuration whose very basis is a sense of caring and love. Rifts within communities of care, if approached with a concern for control and conformity and not care and love, fragment and isolate. But, Huebner, astutely comments:

Love and care, as reconciliation, provide the patience, trust, collective memories and hopes, and conversation to heal the social body -- to bring wholeness to the family, class, organization, or gathering which appeared to be disrupted by the newness (1984, p.13).

These qualities of love, care and reconciliation, have provided Dwayne Huebner with a threshold across which he sees great hope and possibilities for both historical responsibility and transcendent possibility. It is this linkage between curriculum and the "structures of care," particularly those Huebner finds within the religious traditions that will be examined next

4. CURRICULUM AND THE "STRUCTURES OF CARE

Dwayne Huebner states in his powerfully written "The Search for Religious Metaphors in the Language of Education" (1982), that his attention has more recently been focused upon the "interpenetration of religious and educational experience." This focus is not simply on the shared language (which is only minimally shared), nor on the insights which may be gained by transferring metaphors from one tradition to the other, rather Huebner is attempting to disclose the human experience that is shared in both realms of meaning. That Huebner understands the process of education to have a religious dimension has already been indicated. That knowledge is constructed within communities of meaning has likewise been mentioned. But Huebner's turn to religious traditions and the discourse addressing spirituality may be better understood if we examine the contexts within which he finds love and care most clearly evident -- that is, within faith communities

specifically, and more generally, "**the structures of care.**" Huebner points to "**faith communities**" as a manifestation of care and love:

Those who claim to be educators must care for, indeed love, those whom they would presume to educate. The source and renewal of that love is primarily within the faith communities, for they are the primary keepers of the traditions of love and care (1984, p.11).

Huebner has criticized educators for pandering to the ideologies of control and ahistoricism. Moreover, he anticipates that institutions which are characterized by these ideologies provide little intellectual, emotional or spiritual support for the caring, empathic attitude which, according to Huebner's logic, must precede a truly educative commitment. In his "Poetry and Power: the Politics of Curriculum Development" (in Pinar, 1975), Huebner passionately rails against the one-dimensionality of prevailing educational awareness:

Why are we lost? I think it is because we have let the school become our center and we have become an appendage, nothing but a role or functionary in someone else's institution. Institutions do not have memories, they cannot recall their past; who established them, under what circumstances, for what purposes. The people who started them disappear in the mindless routines. Only men and women have memories, an historical consciousness, and we can recall how things got started, why and by whom. If we forget or never knew that schools are a product of men and women who used their power to build or maintain a certain kind of public world, then we easily become bondsmen of those who live only in the routines. We do their things, maintain their world, distribute their awards. And they reward us by a humdrum comfortable life style, perhaps with tenure and retirement, access to the more common goods of our production lines, and permit us the privacy of sex and family life, but deprive us of public vitality and joy, clean air and water, safe, comfortable, exciting urban areas that support our well-being and sociality (p.272).

The charge that we may "easily become bondsmen" is serious. But

Huebner does not merely stop with this charge; he supports it with a chilling account of the "state of affairs" in which he sees educators widely participating. Though the quotation I have selected is long, I believe it need be quoted in its entirety for the full power of Huebner's indictment to be felt:

We do not talk about a more just public world; we talk about school, we think about school, and we see the world through the windows and doors of the school. The school has become our place. We have become school people, our language of learning, discipline, motivation, stimulus, individualization, is school language. Our images for generating new educational possibilities are school images. So we seek more diversified and smaller packages of instructional materials, not greater public access to information without federal control, or better development of cable television for neighborhood use. We seek open classrooms, not open societies. We seek alternative schools, not alternative public worlds. And because we are school people our public statements affirm the school, defined the present public school, and hide social injustice. Our propaganda of individualism is liberal cant that hides the basic conservatism of school people and permits those who control our public world to continue to control it. Our public statements are not socially or personally liberating. They do not excite us to imagine more just public worlds. They do not harness the power of people in the political struggle to reform our present inequitable institutions. They do not enable men or women to recognize and grasp their political right to share in the maintenance and reforming of our public world.

For instance, how much individuality can school people tolerate in an institution that is compulsory? The expression "curriculum for individuals" hides from our awareness that the school is a place of control; of socialization if you prefer this pseudoscientific term that hides political domination. We maintain that control by our power. Of course, with our goodwill and out of our good graces we grant reasonable power to students to be individuals, providing they are not too individualistic in their speech, their actions, their commitments (in Pinar, 1975, p.273).

Huebner's charge reverberates with great pain and moral indignation. It stands, I believe, as one of the most powerful voices in an eerily well-modulated discipline. His charges, I feel, must be continually raised lest we crumble into an oppressive silence.

Given the challenge that schools as a "socializing" or controlling institution must be confronted, how does Huebner suggest we attempt this? One way he suggests is that we alter our view that education is a conditioning technology: "Education is not something that we do to others, although it can only happen in community, education happens to us" (1984, p. 6). Huebner shifts our attention from the technique of manipulation and control, to the ethical quality of our encounters with the other. Educational activity occurs within community; in a sense, "none of us gets there unless all of us get there." The educator, and the student, despite their differences in maturity, knowledge, skills and/or awareness, must, if education is to be an ethical activity, join each other in mutual dialogue and encounter:

Ethical valuing demands that the human situation existing between student and teacher must be uppermost, and that content must be seen as an arena of that human confrontation. This human situation must be picked away at until the layers of the known are peeled back and the unknown in all of its mystery and awe strikes the educator in the face and heart, and he is left with the brute fact that he is but a man trying to influence another man (in Pinar, 1975, p.229).

The issues of power, authority and influence, while able to be discussed in terms of their political, and social dimensions, must, according to Huebner, be broached in terms of their ethical

dimensions. That the "eternal present" contains the sum of the past and the unfolding possibility of the future, our influence upon another becomes infinitely important and sacred. Without love and care, it is doubtful that this influence can achieve its infinite quality, can be extracted from manipulation or coercion.

While the religious traditions and communities of faith have provided Huebner a source for supporting what he considers to be a glimpse at the infinite within human intercourse, he broadens the concept of "faith communities" and coins the phrase "structures of care" to point us to their similar counterparts:

In words that are perhaps less loaded with specific religious affiliation, we could speak of the structures of care in our world society — who cares for whom and for what reasons. If we do not care for someone, why should we participate in their education — in their being led out to find new forms of life? (1984, p.10).

Structures of care may be seen as extant networks or communities within which ethical rationality is highly valued, in which the individual's well-being is held (if not as "infinitely valuable") at least as central to the concerns and cares of those who belong and participate in them. These are special places; these structures of care, while they can indeed be schools, may just as well be families (whether nuclear or alternative), neighborhoods (where neighbors attend to the needs of fellow neighbors), trade unions, advocacy groups, churches, and intentional communities.

Given the perilous times in which we all live, how may the threats against our planetary survival, the oppressiveness of economic and

political forces, the dehumanization of so many of work places be countered?:

How can we face the threat of the unknown and the threat of the stranger outside of us and inside of us? It is not easy. We need the assurance that we will not be destroyed, that life will indeed be enhanced rather than destroyed. Love is that assurance. We can face the threat of the unknown and of the stranger if we are not alone; if we are in the presence of love which affirms life (1984, p.9).

Structures of care rather than military, economic, political, personal or intellectual aggression are one avenue. By learning from and learning within these collective, communal environments we may find, as Bob Dylan has so aptly put it, "shelter from the storm." If curriculum theorists are able to broaden their units of analysis from the individual, their units of identity from other school people, and their units of solution from curricular discourse, schools or teachers, there may be cause for optimism. Unless this occurs, we may be faced with microscopic achievements and yet suffer global suffering and catastrophe. Huebner points out, from a broad perspective, that

Arguments over school purposes are not simply academic arguments, but efforts to shift the values determining the educational environment and, hence, influencing the continuity -- change tempos or rhythms or individuals and society (in Pinar, 1975, p.247).

That curricular thought must attend to a sense of human agency within the temporality of individuals and society, calls for revisioning of both our understanding of agency and temporality. It is with these last issues I will conclude this examination and interpretation of Dwayne Huebner's curricular thought.

5. TRANSCENDENCE AND TEMPORALITY: A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT

Dwayne Huebner's personal and intellectual development from engineer to a psycho-socially grounded researcher to elementary school teacher to educational philosopher to professor religious thought represents one man's search for conceptual frameworks and work settings which were more personally satisfying and meaningful. Huebner describes his inquiry in the later stages of his personal and professional development as follows:

Throughout this contact with the diverse philosophical and theological traditions, the basic operating assumptions of curriculum thought bothered me. How could one plan educational futures via behavioral objectives when the mystical literature emphasized the present moment and the need to let the future care for itself? The thread that ran through my questions and my searching was an intuition that an understanding of the nature of time was essential for understanding the nature of education. This intuition turned me to the literature on time and the criticism of learning theory as only one way of conceptualizing man's temporality (in Pinar, 1975, p.215).

That Huebner came to appreciate, particularly through the writing of Heidegger, that human beings are better understood as living in a present moment -- a moment filled with memories of the past, concerns about their present lived reality, and hopes and aspirations for the future: "Human life is not futural; nor is it past, but, rather, a present made up of a past and future brought into the moment" (in Pinar, 1975, p.244). Huebner translated his understanding of humanity's "being-in-the-world" into an educational principle:

...it does seem obvious that education must be concerned with man as a temporal being. The focus upon learning (as simply the change of behavior) has detracted

the educator from this larger and more complicated phenomenon of man's temporality (in Pinar, 1975, p.242).

Human temporality can be easily understood if we simply refer to life as "being-in-the-world" and death as not being-in-the-world. Temporality is recognized whenever we attend to one's existence -- the fact that they simply are -- rather than what they own, what they do, etc. This existential quality presents conceptual and philosophical problems for, for example, behavioral engineers, or technocrats, who separate discrete behaviors and intended outcomes from the continuity of one's existence. Huebner indicates his concern about how this type of thinking fails to acknowledge temporality in the following quotation:

Basically, the determination of objectives is the search for the bridge between the past and the future; it is argument over the degree of continuity necessary for change, or the amount of change that is necessary for continuity; it is concern for the balance between succession and duration. All of these categories are concerned with society's existence "in time" and refer to man's concern for the historical continuity which gives his social forms and institutions some kind of stability, yet vitality, as they emerge from yesterday into tomorrow. Unfortunately, the educator's too easy acceptance of the function of or the necessity for purposes or objectives has replaced the need for a basic awareness of his historicity (in Pinar, 1975, pp.238-239).

Objectives and purposes can do violence to one's sense of historicity. Change without regard to duration or continuity brings about chaos; continuity without regard to succession brings about stasis. Both chaos and stasis are, from the perspective of temporality, equally alienating. In order that curricularists not contribute to alienation, Huebner believes that it is their task "to

conceptualize man's temporality and to find means to express his concern for man's temporality" (in Pinar, 1975, p.243). By attending to human temporality, educators open themselves to the **transcendent** quality of time and participate in an historically grounded emergence of one's and society's future projected beyond the present moment. This creation of a new response to the world, when informed by an understanding of temporality, is not framed in terms of a response to some discrete stimulus, purpose or objective, rather, it draws upon the sum of the past (through historicity) and the projection into the future (as a promise or hope) and thus participates in the infinite. Indeed, Huebner states that educational encounters with an eye on the temporal nature of human beings invite us "to provoke infinite developments in someone." How different and more important this educational encounter is than exerting one's influence and power to bring about a discrete, convergent behavior!

This infinite quality is reflected in, to use two of Huebner's five value systems, aesthetic and ethical values. It is, I surmise, not prominent in the language and metaphors used in technical, scientific or political dimensions. It is, however, capable of being discerned within these three value systems when we simply look at how language and metaphors point to transcendent possibilities. Gadamer, Ricoeur, Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger all give us clues to this transcendent dimension of language and symbolism. What is remarkable is that aesthetic and ethical value systems, instead of just unconsciously borrowing from the transcendent, consciously direct our

attention to this possibility. Aesthetic values which, as Huebner drawing upon Valery has suggested, ask us to cultivate psychological distance (that is, "to remove the aesthetic object from the world of use"), appreciate wholeness and design, and explore symbolic meaning, focus our consciousness upon timelessness and thereby help us to better understand how our **temporality** is transcended through creative acts. Aesthetic experience is not only engagement with an artifact, a painting, a film; it is an experience which joins artist and audience in a conspiracy to redraw our horizon of awareness. Thus, while art objects may display texture, form, color, harmony, etc., the whole transcends the parts and quite possibly it is silly even to approach a work of art with a taxonomer's range of categories. What is not said is as important as what is said, what is concealed is as important as what is disclosed, what is unfinished is as important as what is finished. To approach art with the demand that it meet our expectations or conform to our tastes is violence. And this violence is no different than the violence one inflicts when one acts without ethical consideration:

For some, the encounter of man with man is seen as the essence of life, and the form that this encounter takes is the meaning of life. The encounter is not used to produce change, to enhance prestige, to identify new knowledge, or to be symbolic of something else. The encounter is. In it is the essence of life. In it life is revealed and lived. The student is not viewed as an object, an it; but as a fellow human being, another subject, a thou, who is to be lived with in the fullness of the present moment or the eternal present. From the ethical stance the educator meets the student, not as an embodied role, as a lesser category, but as a **fellow human being who demands to be accepted on the basis of fraternity not simply on the basis of equality**. No thing, no conceptual barrier, no purpose intrudes between educator and student when educational

activity is valued ethically. The fullness of the educational activity, as students encounter each other, the world around them, and the teacher, is all there is. The educational activity is life -- and life's meanings are witnessed and lived in the classroom (this author's emphasis, In Pinar, 1975, pp.227-228).

"A fellow human being who demands to be accepted on the basis of fraternity not simply equality." This to me is a brilliant ontological and epistemological insight. Equality is inferior to fraternity. How shallow rings the expression "equal opportunity under the law." Ethical valuing need not stop at equality, at justice, but may indeed involve a higher principle, that of compassion or mercy. This is how human communities differ from the Universe of Maxine Greene -- while the Universe may feel no obligation to us, we have the potential to feel an obligation to it. This sense of obligation involves us in the necessary -- in the "world of necessity." Dwayne Huebner states that:

A common theological description of man's nature is that he participates in both the conditioned and unconditioned, or in necessity and freedom. Man is conditioned to the world; he participates in the world's structures of necessity. But given this patterning, fixation, and conditioning, he also participates in the unconditioned -- in freedom, or (if you wish) in the continual creation of the world. The explanatory problem is not to explain the unconditioned, or freedom, but to explain those conditions which make man a part of the world of necessity. This, I believe, is the function of the "learning" category. It attempts to explain man's conditionedness, the patterning of his behavior. By raising questions about learning how to learn or be creative, man is probing the very nature of what it means to be a human being and hence delving into metaphysics and theology (in Pinar, 1975, p.241).

Huebner has delved into **metaphysics** and **theology** because it offers a domain in which he finds fraternity and through which he can most freely respond to the world. While the curricular theorists of the

left and critical theorists in general may struggle against what they see are "unnecessary social constraints," they provide few clues to what may be considered necessary social constraints. Dwayne Huebner, I suggest, only implicitly points to these clues. That he adopts the theological terms conditioned and unconditioned, necessity and freedom, gives us some intimations; that he places fraternity over equality points even more directly to a source. It is not altogether clear, in Huebner's thought, how we may move from freedom to necessity, from freedom to obligation. But the fault, if there is one, may lie not in his inability to explicate this, but more in the mystery in which our freedom resides. Freedom is our participation in "the continual creation of the world." No hubris here, he does not presume that we create the world; we are participants. This creation is an element of life, a transcendent dimension and the language Huebner uses to discuss this is derived from theological discussions of the spiritual: "Spirit refers to that which gives vitality, that which gives life, not to merely the forms of life. It indicates that life is more, can be more, than the forms in which it is currently lived" (1984, p. 8). "Life can be more," but how do we know this? Huebner answers this straightforwardly and unflinchingly: "Can spirit, which gives vitality, force, and transcending capability to human life, be known? These questions have only one answer. No." (1984, p.12). Huebner's move from Teacher's College to Yale Divinity School signifies his movement from one community of meaning to another; more importantly, his move may be seen as transition from a more school-based setting to a more diverse, extensive constituency. Huebner foreshadowed this transition,

when in 1975 he wrote:

If we really believe these words ('curriculum for individuality'), would we not be working with nonschool people who are trying to increase the educational possibilities that exist outside the school? (in Pinar, 1975, p.274).

That he now may focus his energies and awareness toward serving "structures of care" (for schools, as he had earlier indicated ill-serve this role), is a wonderful opportunity. His work may now more fully realize "a new form" he has long advocated: "To have new forms emerge, old forms must give way to relationship: love takes priority over knowledge. Love and care, however provide not certainty, but hope" (1984, p.24). From within his new community of faith he may better serve and keep Eden. From his new community of meaning he may better realize "an ethical rationality of educational activity: response-ability, conversation, influence, promise and forgiveness" (in Pinar, 1975, p.230). It is my hope that he can.

F. WILLIAM PINAR: RECONCEPTUALIZATION, YES; RECONCEPTUALISM, NO.

Old paint on canvas, as it ages, sometimes becomes transparent. When that happens it is possible, in some pictures, to see the original lines: a tree will show through a woman's dress, a child makes way for a dog, a large boat is no longer on an open sea. That is called pentimento because the painter "repented," changed his mind. Perhaps it would be as well to say that the old conception, replaced by a later choice, is a way of seeing and then seeing again.

Lillian Hellman, Pentimento

In his influential work entitled "Currere: Toward Reconceptualization" (Pinar, 1975) William Pinar boldly states: "The curriculum theory field has forgotten what existence is. It will remain moribund until it remembers" (p.396) Pinar's dedicated and creative project has been to remember what he claims had been forgotten, and restore the lived experience of the individual to the center of educational discourse. This he does by examining and portraying the "inner-centeredness" of the individual. Pinar's range of subjects is extensive and difficult to succinctly outline; he has written intelligent and provocative articles on interpretive frameworks, autobiography, gender issues, psychoanalytic portrayals of human development, and historical perspectives of curriculum theorizing. In this section I wish to examine Pinar's portrayal of the "world of personality," his concentration on autobiography as disclosure of educational experience, gender issues as a focus on oppressive social conditions and as avenues for revisioning personal development. While these subjects each could, and perhaps should, warrant a more comprehensive treatment, for the purpose of this study, I will try to link them to a conceptual logic Pinar seems to operate within -- that is, each of these topics will be discussed as they disclose various forms of alienation, offer suggestions for overcoming this alienation, and point to new ways of understanding educational experience. It can be mentioned here that Pinar's work has evolved over time and that, while his earlier emphasis on existential and phenomenological still is evident in his theorizing, he has adopted or generated other frames of reference that, from my reading of his work,

pose difficult "mixed metaphors" if not outright contradictions and paradoxes in his writing. I will reserve my discussion of these possible conflicts for the last section of my interpretation of Pinar's work.

Pinar expressed the view that neither the "pragmatic" orientation of traditional curriculum theorists (those preoccupied with providing "guidance" for those teaching in schools) nor the "conceptual empiricists" (those adhering to social science conceptual frameworks and research methods) have attended to the experiential or existential dimensions of education. Pinar identifies a third branch of curriculum theory, the reconceptualists, whose work more directly speaks to, "remembers" what existence is, and within which curriculum theorizing might be revitalized:

...the reconceptualists tend to concern themselves with the internal and existential experience of the public world. They tend to study not "change in behavior" or "decision making in the classroom," but matters of temporality, transcendence, consciousness, and politics. In brief, the reconceptualist attempts to understand the nature of educational experience (Pinar, 1975, p.xi).

Pinar's concept of **currere** bespeaks his personal approach to the examination of educational experience:

The study of currere, as the Latin infinitive suggests, involves the investigation of the nature of the individual experience of the public: of artifacts, actors, operations, of the educational journey or pilgrimage (1975, p.400).

Pinar's approach through the process of currere focuses on the experience of the individual as he or she encounters the world. Drawing upon existential, phenomenological, psychoanalytic and literary critical thought, Pinar synthesizes these perspectives to form a new orientation, "a discipline of its own," which emphasizes subjectivity and self-reflection. This emphasis, Pinar suggests, counters technical rationality, unreflective "scientism," and various pragmatic and materialist orientations to human action. Pinar was deeply concerned about, as Sartre had described it, "the loss of the self to the idea," that is, to use Pinar's words:

As ideas become more real than concrete human beings, the capacity to sacrifice the latter for the sake of the former is more likely expressed. Whether the conceptual idols be "master race" from the Right or "the people" from the Left, the fact of human sacrifice remains (,p.4)

To counter this oppressive, alienating state of affairs, Pinar suggested an "inward turning," a revisioning of both figure and ground, context and content of educational activity. But this he did with the critical eye of the historian and the aesthetic openness of the artist:

One surmises, however, that an intensive adherence to one's "within" forms the basis of renewal strategies. What configurations this loyalty to one's subjectivity must take and what such configurations mean for theorists of the process of education are not yet clear (1975, p.382).

Pinar cultivated and advocated for, not a stalwart commitment to prediction, control, or even prescription, but instead focused on the singularity of individual experience, "even its eccentricity." Despite his skillful and accomplished ability to categorize, generalize and

paint broad sweeps and currents within the curriculum field, he suggested that "What is necessary, in order to portray more accurately human activity and experience, is descriptions of particular individuals, on particular days, in particular circumstances" (n.d., p.5). This "particularity" is a keynote of Pinar's work; his theorizing reflects an ethical and aesthetic sensibility through which he strives ever to rescue himself and "the other" from abstraction and socially conditioned perception.

In Pinar's earlier writing, one can find a strong influence of phenomenological thought. Pinar draws upon Cooper's (1971) definition of phenomenology:

By "phenomenology," I mean the direct experience of a person or object without the intervention of preconceptions about that person or object. It is a matter of apprehending the person or object in its pristine reality rather than through the obscuring panes of glass that represent our preconcepts (In Pinar, 1975, p.360).

In order to extricate ourselves from the "taken-for-granted," the given, the world of social forms, Pinar suggests that we adopt the phenomenological attitude of "bracketing" one's experience from external conditions. The "historical moment" from this perspective is not our occupying some space in an abstract flow of events and circumstances, but rather our concrete lived reality to which we give "substance." Pinar reacted with passion against the reified forms of social reality, especially as they were formulated among Marxist revisionists, and maintained that our hope for renewal of human possibility lay not in attending to the "public," but the **psychic** state

of the individual:

...what is clearly ignored in the work of this group [politically oriented curricularists] is the inescapable fact that these dimensions are rooted in the lives of concrete individuals, and it is this biographic context that must take logical, as well as ontological precedence (n.d., p.6).

He follows with:

It is this "living through" this historical conjuncture that is the present time, this crystallization of the historical moment in individual lives, which holds the greatest promise of movement in the short-term. I am suggesting that it is not only that the person must be attended to in order to act effectively in the public domain, I am suggesting that for now the major arena for struggle, the "site" if you will, of the most intense struggle of conflicting historical forces, is in individual lives. It is not in the congealed and presently stagnant political, economic, and social realms (1984b, p.6-7).

While it is clear that Pinar's attention is focused on individual experience and his view of ontological issues is informed by such an orientation, I will address this ontological dimension in a later section of this examination of his work. At present, I wish to focus on Pinar's selection of the **psychic state** and especially his description of "the world of personality" which thematically unifies so much of his curriculum theorizing. Pinar states that:

... I will argue that the development of a sophisticated understanding of one's psychic state will probably result in more accurate and eventually more comprehensive social and educational observations, as well as having psychically and educationally beneficial consequences for the researcher himself (1975, p.385).

This, I believe is Pinar's touchstone, his own attempt at "pentimento." The canvas is not the frame of material reality, but the

fabric of an individual's life, the layer upon layer of experiential pigment applied by the individual as artist. As the paint ages, so does the artist -- revealing changes in life, changes in the choices one makes... and the fleeting images one once found noteworthy, but which subsequently have been altered, sometimes forgotten, now bleed through the surface as evidence of some prior transformation. Pinar sought not the accidental occurrence of this emerging image, but in a sense cultivated this aging process, this distancing from the superficial, the surface of lived reality.

That Pinar adopted the "world of personality" and the psychic state as his domain of exploration does not place him within the group of curricularists he termed conceptual empiricists. Pinar was less interested in the **explanations** or organizing principles that psychological theories provided, more interested in **person-centered** descriptions of experience. That he breaks from the epistemological foundations upon which psychology as a behavioral science is built, is noteworthy. Much of Pinar's thought is based upon a transcendental perspective, a perspective drawing upon an aesthetic sensibility and critical attitude found within the humanities. Thus, while the "world of personality" intimates developmental and social structures, Pinar examines this world as a text created by the individual. The coherence and orderliness/messiness of the text is approached through internal dialogue, through attentiveness to the particular details of one's concrete, lived experience, and through change in consciousness: "This turning inward, the process of individuation, is change of

consciousness. A shift in the source of behavior signals a shift in the behavior itself" (1975, p.413).

This shift in the **source of behavior** is of great concern for Pinar. Perhaps what typifies his thought, and distinguishes reconceptualist theorizing from prior orientations is exactly this attention to sources of behavior. Pinar chooses to focus on the being of the individual as the source, as opposed to the social, political or other contexts within which the individual is situated. This is as much an ontological issue as it is a methodological one. Pinar's advocacy of autobiographic research methods is derived from this existential ontology. By attending to how an individual makes sense (or doesn't make sense) of his or her experience rather than merely describing human behavior or social realities, Pinar directs our attention to the various, particular ways this experience is disclosed to the individual and conveyed to others. Autobiographic methods are one avenue along which this emphasis is discernable.

2. AUTOBIOGRAPHY AS CONCRETE HISTORY

Pinar has frequently employed the metaphor of "the student as traveler." Whether this journey is viewed as a forced march or a self-directed excursion is central to Pinar's interest. As I have quoted earlier, Pinar raises this issue in the following manner: "So one's reasons for traveling are often not one's own. So one is coerced into acquiring skills and information that one failed to request. What sense lies in this arrangement?" (1975, p.404). Pinar encourages the

individual to examine his or her journey through life so that both internal and external constraints or compulsions are disclosed. That the "journey" is not our own, but scheduled, directed and organized by another is anathema for Pinar. That we may be unaware of the external and internal controls operating in our lives is a central educational problem. For Pinar external control makes no sense, is oppressive and is essentially disintegrative.

Pinar's assessment of early school socialization experiences clearly reveals his existential orientation and his focus on the individual as the source for meaning:

To get them to desire to be like someone else, children must learn to be dissatisfied with themselves. Dissatisfaction with oneself is almost always the introjected nonacceptance by a significant other (1975, p.363).

That we do not accept the other, and more importantly for Pinar, that we do not accept ourselves, is a source of great dehumanization, oppression and misery. While schools often emphasize that students learn to "think," they rarely attend to the **feelings** of students. Pinar is not suggesting that we adhere to the contrived distinction between cognitive and affective dimensions of human development, rather he is drawing attention to the very foundational nature of feeling in human nature. That we are taught to become dissatisfied with ourselves, that we turn outward for legitimation and "knowledge" is pedagogically unsound. Quoting Arthur Janov, a radical psychologist, Pinar says: "Lack of feeling is what destroys the self, and it is lack of feeling which permits destruction of other selves" (1971, in Pinar,

1975, p.372). Schooling more often than not, according to Pinar, is characteristically bureaucratic, technocratic and controlling. Even when school curricula are guided by a "progressive philosophy," the day-to-day experiences of those (both students and teachers) in schools are often influenced by controlling and conditioning activities and circumstances. What is required, according to Pinar, is that we view education as a reflective activity which promotes our emergence from these circumstances of control and conditioning:

The fact that one can reflect and understand a matter that was misunderstood does not imply that one is understanding nothing, rather it suggests a certain evolution of one's powers of understanding. This evolution can be conceptualized as a slow, continued emergence from reality, a transcendence of self from circumstances. This process is tantamount to what is called humanization, and it is precisely that, a becoming of what we are, a bringing out what is there but obscured if not buried by conditioning. That sense of bringing out of course recalls another term: education (1975, p.394).

This "transcendence of self from circumstances" has been a constant preoccupation of Pinar, and one of the most problematic of all circumstances for him is that of **language**. Language as a socially constructed reality within which we become embedded at an early, essentially pre-reflective age, seems to Pinar to be one circumstance of conditioning which must be struggled against. Pinar sees language as a cultural phenomenon which obscures as much as it discloses reality. It, like any form of knowledge, must be made subject to personal direction. That language is seen to be a reified reality instead of a nexus of particularized meaning structures of individuals is a form of cultural imperialism. Moreover, language, whether it be

configured as "Standard American English," various dialects and regionalisms, or the "language" of science, politics, aesthetics, etc., conveys a sense of "congealed meanings" and embedded norms, values and expectations. Pinar cites Stern's comment that "The language of order, coherence, and continuity is thus seen to be inadequate, to be at odds with the true nature of experience" (in Pinar, 1984c, p.8). Pinar suggests that much of curriculum theorizing, drawing upon the meaning communities of behavioral and social science, has assumed or even imposed a mechanical and false sense of order and continuity on human experience. Pinar suggests that through autobiographical research methods, the individual is encouraged to develop an "interior monologue" which he or she then observes his or her use of language and distances oneself from the merely denotative meanings (or, perhaps to be more exact, the culturally conditioned sense of meanings) and returns to the experiential base from which these various expressions and descriptions emerge. This process presumably counters the tendency of one being lost to the idea, in this case the idea as manifested in social definitions and cultural forms. Through this process of interior monologue and autobiography, one attempts to construct

... an amplification of the self that exists outside the social and especially bureaucratic definitions of it. Autobiography as Grumet, I and others have practiced it can provide the device by which we find crevices in the wall of our self-estrangement, our self lost to social definition and role (1984b, p.8).

Autobiography provides an opportunity to reflect and construct personally meaningful definitions and descriptions of one's experience. The social is distanced; the personal is central.

Perhaps a comment made by Pinar might illuminate why he envisions autobiographic processes to be so crucial for education and the reduction of our alienation from ourselves and others. This comment is drawn from Pinar's article "The Abstract and the Concrete in Curriculum Theorizing" and represents observations Pinar makes employing autobiographic methods:

I was reacting against the social as habit, as [quoting from Virginia Woolf] "cows... draw together in a field." I distrust the social; it seems to function primarily as a way of forgetting oneself, a way of not paying attention to immediate experience, a way of playing tapes recorded long ago, and only vaguely appropriate now (n.d., p.25 manuscript copy)

Pinar's distrust of the social is evident in most of his writing. He has outlined numerous ways that the individual is "lost" -- lost to others, to roles, ideas, to reified social and political structures, to conventions and to constitutive rules. Autobiographic research methods can assist one to recover one's self, return to experience not as abstract or abstracted data, but as the **source** of data -- data that only the individual has access to. Pinar's valuable contribution to educational research is that he offers an orientation, through the process of currere, which brings personal experience back into the realm of consideration. What people feel, how they make sense of their day-to-day encounters with the world, is equally if not more important than socially prescribed norms, attitudes and practices. By placing the person at the center, consciousness in the forefront, Pinar attempts to show an ethical course toward social change.

Despite Pinar's focus on the individual and autobiographic research, he claims that this attention will have implications for how one may better understand social phenomena. The interpretation of the text of one's experience, currere, leads to a synthesis of these sources of information:

... it seems plausible that initial information generated by this method will be in fact idiosyncratic. However, later information derived by free association and information derived by critical analysis of the associative kind of information, will reveal aspects of a collective or transpersonal realm of educational experience. That is to say, once we get past the individualized details of an individual's biography, we may gain access to a transbiographic realm of currere (1975, p.411).

What the process of currere can make possible is the conscious awareness of personal agency in constructing reality. As one seeks integration of various episodes of lived experience, and as one becomes aware of one's ability to not only reconstruct meanings for various events, but to actively bring into reality possibilities that are personally important, one has learned to affect change in the world. One is no longer merely a product or object of the material world of forces, but becomes a creator and agent of change:

Self-reflexive examination of the biographic functions of one's intellectual work makes less likely its unconscious use. If its use is relatively unconscious, it is more likely that use will perpetuate dominant cultural themes, i.e. scholarship as economic investment. Further, one begins to glimpse how autobiographical work of this nature, as it transforms individual consciousness, must transform as well the material structures of the culture. While the linkage between specific individuals' work and material transformation cannot be explicit, we know, given the inseparable and dialectical relation between consciousness and matter, that self work has its material consequences. What is perhaps easier to comprehend is that individual work necessarily contributes, microscopically

although not negligibly, to the transformation of the cultural weltanschauung (n.d., p.9).

While Pinar recognizes the dialectical relationship between consciousness and material reality, he has dedicated himself to highlighting the consciousness side of the dialectic. In this regard his orientation is similar to Macdonald's and Greene's. Pinar identifies currere to be similar in function and aim as Freire's conscientization. Self-reflective thinking aims to reduce oppression, oppression from external constraints and internal, self-imposed false consciousness. Pinar quotes Freire when he discusses oppression and disintegration:

The central problem is this: How can the oppressed, as divided, unauthentic beings, participate in developing the pedagogy of their liberation? Only as they discover themselves to be 'hosts' of the oppressor can they contribute to the midwifery of their liberating pedagogy. As long as they live in the duality in which to be is to be like, and to be like is to be like the oppressor, this contribution is impossible (1970, in Pinar, 1975, p,365).

It can be said, then, that Pinar attempts to reduce oppression by making conscious the "internalization" of oppression, the passive conditioning of the unaware person, and by assisting the person to become aware of his or her participation in the perpetuation of oppression through their lack of awareness, misunderstanding and disintegration, the cycle of oppression can be broken. It is precisely this "Extrication from reality, from unconscious, conditioned participation in oppressive political reality to self-reflexive, active movement to alter that reality" (n.d., p.11), that autobiographic research serves a liberative function.

Recently, however, Pinar has himself commented on the limitations of autobiographic methods, limitations which may point to the need for yet another reconceptualization of the source of liberative pedagogy, personal support and social transformation. Pinar writes:

But the past three years have shown that autobiography, however practiced, supplies no insulation from the pain of living in bad times, times when the forces of what is dead-and-past triumph, when what is ugly mars the landscape, when death fouls the air, and we the living, cringe, cry and despair (1983, p.8).

That Pinar has come to this somewhat bitter realization is poignant and moving. That the malevolent and oppressive conditions of contemporary times seem to fail to yield to "microscopic" movement toward transformation does not come as a surprise given the nature of these conditions. While I will address this issue at a later time, I think it is worth noting that Pinar is opening the door for other conceptualizations of life-supporting and transformative educational agendas. That reconceptualization never truly evolved into a community or collective endeavor, I think, lies at the heart of this problem. Pinar consistently strove to deny that reconceptualization could or should have evolved into reconceptualism, that is, become a community of meaning and a collective effort and identity. There were other collective engagements he gravitated towards, and gender issues may well be one which may be better conceived of as lending itself to this kind of identification. It is to this agenda that I now turn.

3. GENDER ISSUES AS AN ARENA FOR CURRICULUM

William Pinar has long expressed the view that "socialization is roughly equivalent to going mad" (1975, p.359). Pinar's more recent examination of gender inequalities as a source of powerful and predominantly destructive socialization has suggested that nowhere is social conditioning more prominent, and more mad, than in the practice of sex role stereotyping. Gender specific social conditioning is not only pervasive in schools, but mass media, legislation (or the lack of legislation), family structures, and bureaucratic organizations all tend to manifest deep-seated and powerfully enforced norms and expectations regarding sexual identity and roles. Pinar has suggested that a basic human need is the need to be **perceived as an individual**, not as a "representative" of a particular class, group, or gender. Whenever we are categorized, classified and sorted according to superficial accidents of birth, we are violated, reduced to an object, and denied the fullness of our being. This, as was mentioned in the previous section, results in a "loss of self" to objects, others, roles, and the idea. In like manner, gender specific social roles convey or enforce particular human behaviors, attitudes and values that are made manifest in modeling and imitative behaviors. When "the other" is seen to be a set of conventional behaviors, when rewards and sanctions are employed to manipulate behavior toward some abstract standard of human development, the concrete individual is neglected, dehumanized and oppressed. Pinar has focused on gender issues because they offer a domain in which many uncontested assumptions are present,

and which affect the microcosm of personality formation as well as macrocosmic realities such as cultural beliefs and social practices.

Pinar, in adopting existential and psychoanalytic conceptual frameworks, has attempted to disclose how this oppression is internalized and this oppression is both consciously and unconsciously carried over in educational settings. Pinar's argument that gender issues disclose powerful determinants of personality is certainly well taken. He has marshalled considerable evidence for his illuminating critique of such issues. But in his discussion of gender-related educational issues, Pinar tends to reveal some inconsistencies that, while present in his earlier theorizing, were somewhat less extreme. I will comment briefly on some of these inconsistencies in this section, and will reserve my critical interpretation for a later one.

Pinar outlines the contributory role that industrialization and modern capitalist economic development in general has played in institutionalizing and perpetuating/exacerbating a division of labor and corresponding discrimination based on gender. Modern economic institutions have, according to Pinar, played an instrumental role in shaping the modern family structure, social relations, and hierarchical distribution of power and authority. The increasing marginalization of physical labor has ironically eroded many of the historical bases for male dominance in the working world. Replacing the criteria of physical strength with criteria of bureaucratically structured power and authority has only minimally affected the pervasive presence of male dominated social and economic organization. Technical

rationality, scientific management, and competition have sedimented a "male epistemology" deeply in Western societies. Changing the criteria has not changed the rules of the game -- male domination in work places, religious institutions, educational institutions, and government continues apace.

But Pinar points out that there are promising developments in social psychology, curriculum theorizing, and epistemology which promise a revolution in the way men and women will view themselves and each other. The human liberation movement has been dramatically enhanced by critical perspectives emerging in gender related analysis. This analysis, while focusing on psycho-social aspects of human development has clearly called for a more encompassing unit of analysis than individual choice and experience. Of course, individual experience remains the domain in which oppression is felt, but the conditions which perpetuate this oppression virtually all require a cultural and social critique. This critique has called upon a much more clearly articulated dialectical perspective, a perspective which draws ever more attention to the dialectic between individual consciousness and the psycho-social environment within which one lives. While reconceptualist analysis of culture and psycho-social dimensions is far from uniform or homogeneous, it is clear that a more cultural and collectivist perspective is being emphasized.

Pinar and Miller (1982) point to the work of Grumet as reflecting an awareness of the distinction between male and feminine epistemology: "Grumet establishes the basis for feminine epistemology as a

dialectical dependence of subject and object. Male epistemology is a subject-object dyad in terms of cause and effect" (p.13). Male epistemology with its emphasis on cause and effect reinforces the excesses of patriarchy, specifically the domination of women, the aggressive "ownership" of children, and preoccupation with control over "underclasses." Feminine (or perhaps more accurately, feminist) epistemology provides an alternative view not only of the relations between men and women, but offers an alternative view of any individual's relationship to another individual. Feminist epistemology recognizes the mutual dependence, complementarity and symbiosis of human relationship. This change in perspective has a concomitant change in research methodology and interpretive frameworks. Along these lines, Pinar writes:

It may be we men (men who refuse to participate in the reproduction of patriarchy, or at least attempt to refuse), joining with certain feminists (those who celebrate not contradict their matrisexuality) who might rediscover and reformulate hermeneutic research methods, methods which portray more fully, if more messily at first, the flux and multi-dimensionality of experience (1983, p.41).

Men (and women) who adhere to patriarchal beliefs and practices reduce this multi-dimensionality to one-dimensionality; role definitions are reified and, for the most part, quite restrictive. The result of social conditioning for men based on patriarchal values, according to Pinar is that "We men do exhibit '**stunted relational potential**'" (1983, p.28) (this author's emphasis). Pinar goes on to say that macho men, preoccupied with power and authority and repressive of maternal values are generally "clumsy interpersonally, primitive

intellectually, and neantherthal (sic) emotionally." Perhaps these "qualities" are consistent with male one-dimensionality, but Pinar fails to address female one-dimensionality, or if he does, tends to describe this one-dimensionality as the result of male dominance and not female initiated preferences. Thus, the "total woman" attitude is seen as the female counterpart of "stunted relational potential" among men. While the fit may be neat, the interpretation seems flawed by a rather cavalier acceptance of male domination being a priorily located at the center of this one-dimensionality. This is not unlike the situation where various Marxist categories such as work or economism were viewed as central social realities around which other Marxist concepts such as class and division of labor were clustered.

That the reproduction of patriarchy perpetuates hierarchical social relations is clear. What remains unclear, however, is whether some of the premises that Pinar adopts can be adequately defended. Pinar maintains that "Heterosexual sons become Fathers, and Fathers require sons, daughters and wives, all metaphors for underclasses" (1983, p.26). That patriarchy as an abstract concept contains such a system of social relations is not disputed here, rather, to return to Pinar's earlier concern for the concrete, it seems that we must consider that fatherhood offers other possibilities than requiring "underclasses" for its nature. Given Pinar's view that the over-developed ego of males within male dominated sets of social relations precipitates this desire to control wives and children, we must call into question the ontological order of this reality. Are men

so plastic and malleable that they simply conform passively to patriarchal cultures? Can we reduce patriarchy to either an outcome of relatively modern capitalist, bureaucratic structures, or male epistemology? I think not.

Pinar stretches the credibility of his argument when he attempts a psychoanalytic assessment of the anxiety men supposedly feel with regard to the "inferential character of paternity." To assume that men sought to control and master women (and subsequently children) due to the anxiety of not knowing with any certitude whose children one's wife was bearing is disturbing and somewhat paranoid. Why this issue is any more anxiety producing for the male than the female is most unclear. Furthermore, with recent technological incursions into reproductive processes, in vitro fertilization for example, this certitude becomes further complicated. In vitro fertilization of a female egg makes problematic not only the existential knowledge of whose sperm is used in conception, but whose egg is used as well. While technological interventions may indeed be seen as having the possibility of controlling the "match" of particular eggs and sperm, it also opens the possibility of doing away with negotiated participation in conception. If a woman desires fertilization, she requires no specific male for this choice; if a male desires to father children, he may now recruit the services of surrogate mothers. This is all quite complicated and ethically and morally tumultuous. But what this points out, I believe, is that biological reproduction seems to have transcended the very boundaries of either patriarchal or matriarchal structures. Individual

choice seems to have been greatly increased, while the issue of socially conditioned bases for reproduction (e.g., geneological lineage and family structure in general) are thrown open to as yet unknown new forms.

Yet another issue Pinar calls attention to in his discussion of gender-specific social conditioning is that of the oedipal stage of personality development. That mothers project "sameness to the female child" and "otherness to the male child" is perhaps a pervasive aspect of early conditioning. But it seems to contradict the feminine epistemology he so warmly regards where a woman may be more attentive to the dialectic between subject and object.

Perhaps the most compelling issue Pinar raises is the one he locates in the work of Adrienne Rich, that **heterosexuality is seen as compulsory in male-dominated cultures**. Why this is exclusive to male-dominated cultures is unclear, but that this compulsoriness is seen as a political institution is extremely important for curriculum theorizing. The mere fact that heterosexuality is seen as compulsory makes it an oppressive ideology. That sexual preference, which is essentially an individual choice, becomes highly politicized (while other preferences such as where one chooses to live, what "hobbies" one pursues, etc, may or may not be scrutinized for their political implications), reflects a strong gender-based dimension of power and authority, that is, patriarchal and feminist conflict as having both personal and political implications. But Pinar is quick to point out that

... the broad political project of which resistance is a historical, theoretical moment, is finally sabotaged by reducing feminist and gender issues to their political and economic concomitants (1975, p.26).

Thus, while Pinar identifies via Rich the political dimension of "compulsory heterosexuality," he refuses to embrace this political dimension fully. Pinar attempts to extricate himself from this, I would call real and concrete political agenda, by undercutting the validity of political action: "Political life is inevitably a lower order of existence than one need settle for" (1975, p.405). Resistance to the oppressiveness of patriarchy, for Pinar, while he admits is a political act, is yanked back to an individualist orientation:

With domination, concomitant dependence, loss of freedom, the development of autonomy is arrested. Autonomy means making one's own rules (Cooper, 1967), being one's own instructor in a sense, and making 'external laws conform to the internal laws of the soul, to deny all that is and create a new world according to the laws of one's own heart' (quoted in Hampton-Turner, 1970)" (in Pinar, 1975, p.366).

The abovementioned quotation points out a curious inconsistency and ambivalence present in Pinar's logic. Politically inspired acts are of a "lower order," because they address external, abstract social structures; resistance to gender inequalities is a political act, but must not be reduced to political or economic arenas. That economic and political structures are any more abstract than "internal laws of the soul" or "laws of one's own heart" is problematic. Until this ambivalence is resolved, I believe that reconceptualization as described by Pinar will continue to remain fragmented and despairing.

There remain just a couple of related issues I wish to address in this section, and they concern a basic conflict between an existential sense of autonomy and a diametrically opposed yearning for community. Pinar states that "Systems of knowledge production and distribution, such as curricula, are likewise systems, or in the present context, **codifications of desire**" (this author's emphasis, 1983, p.37). The term "codification of desire" is, I think, a most interesting and important concept. Referring back to Pinar's concern that schools teach thinking and do not attend to feeling, one may see the roots of this orientation. Autobiographic research is one attempt to refocus on how one feels about concrete, lived reality. The existential orientation of this type of research may be discerned in Pinar's reference to a quote from Kierkegaard: "The more consciousness, the more self, the more consciousness, the more will, and the more will, the more self" (in Pinar, 1975, p.390). That one becomes more aware and more conscious of oneself is tied with the emergence of will and autonomy. Drawing upon the existential thought of Sartre, one may remember that one's project should not be defined for another or by another, but for oneself. But the juxtaposition I wish to make is with an earlier discussion Pinar makes regarding the distinction between the attitude of the oppressor and the oppressed. Pinar quotes Hegel:

The one is independent, and its essential nature is to be for itself; the other is dependent and its essence is life or existence for another. The former is the Master, or Lord, the latter the Bondsman" (in Pinar, 1975, p.364).

There is a peculiar correlation between striving for increasing autonomy (existential "for oneself") and the nature of the oppressor.

If we are to encourage the development of autonomous individuals, how are we to avoid the gravitation toward the attitude of the Master? Increasing independence seems to imply a decreasing concern for the existence of the other. It appears to be dangerously close to the male epistemology Pinar finds so abhorrent, that is, that we become preoccupied with being the cause of our various projects/effects. How does Pinar escape this dilemma? One was his linking individuation to intimacy. Pinar states that

... it is only by an unconditional devotion to one's own process of individuation that one can experience genuine intimacy. A corollary follows: self-estrangement means other-estrangement. I cannot get in touch with you if I cannot get in touch with me (1975, p.373).

I fully agree that one who is estranged from oneself is alienated and risks dependence and/or isolation from others. But if we follow the course that Pinar's logic takes, we might see how his interpretation and mine differ. The devotion to self, self love, is presumed to be a prerequisite for intimacy. Pinar refers to H.S. Sullivan's concept of the "mature personality," that intimacy permits validation of all components of personal worth. Sullivan describes such intimacy as:

... the collaboration with at least one other, preferably more others, and in this collaboration there is the very striking feature of a very lively sensitivity to the needs of the other and to the interpersonal security or absence of anxiety in the other (in Pinar, 1975, p.369).

Thus, we are faced with a logic which requires interpersonal security and lack of anxiety between persons. But Pinar has indicated his distrust of the social. His distrust is, I believe reflected in

his preoccupation with decreasing one's anxiety regarding one's existence by increasing one's awareness of, knowledge of oneself. This turning inward seems to discount the qualitative human dimension, the human need according to Slater, for **human dependence**. That is, why should we assume that we each and alone must wrestle with our devils? I suggest that whether one adopts an individualistic unit of analysis and solution or a communal one is based upon a principle of faith. Pinar has clearly adopted the view and acts upon the belief that the individual is the agent for dealing with alienation and anxiety. I have chosen a somewhat broader view which recognizes the dimension of social support, affiliation and community which may **assist** one and **share** this sense of possible alienation as a **common** as opposed to an individual or isolated condition.

Pinar seems to have some fleeting insights into this possibility, but he more often than not fails to sustain this vision. Pinar's grasp of the ontological condition of individuation seems to preclude this vision from being sustained. One last example of this dilemma may be seen in his discussion of the etiology of collective action:

A sense of individual impotence short-circuits collective action. However, collective action is essential because we do not have democracy in this country; we have the contradiction between certain democratic rights and our subjection to racist, sexist, and economic exploitation. In these circumstances democracy can be extended only in the collective struggle to resolve this contradiction. Specifically this means a struggle between the classes of people whose interests are on opposite sides of the contradiction (1975, p.170).

I would suggest that might take a more dialectical view of Pinar's first sentence and invert the order to read: "A sense of collective action shortcircuits individual impotence." This, I believe is the crux of not only Pinar's alienation from the social, but of reconceptualism's degeneration into yet another moribund curriculum movement. I wish to conclude this section with a comment Pinar made which seems to point the way out of this situation. I wish he were only able or, perhaps more accurately, willing to honor what he himself has discovered:

Instead it is the intellect which portrays the simultaneity of thought, feeling, and action, not of atomized individuals (those with over-determined egos, characteristic of the modern male) but those still connected, co-mingling, [that is] capable of community (1983, p.41-42).

4. ONTOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF PINAR'S HORIZON OF UNDERSTANDING

Earlier, I had quoted Pinar as he chided curriculum theorists for "forgetting what existence is." It is my intention in this section to examine more closely Pinar's view of existence, of human being, and what he has urged us to remember... and what he himself has seemed to have forgotten or not yet come to remember. That Pinar has chosen to employ such a term as "remembering" is rather fortuitous, for our purposes. Remembering implies or suggests a **re-collecting of extant reality**, and I would extend this further to include **the possibilities for reality**. Pinar has described education as a process of "bringing out what is there already." Parallel to this we might recall Huebner's

description of curriculum -- that it is an "environment producing field." Pinar's relationship to the environment is of particular importance in this discussion, for it is here that we might identify the horizon of his understanding, and map the boundaries of our own.

Pinar has consistently vacillated in his stance regarding individual autonomy and community. Unlike Greene, Pinar has depicted the "public" in almost exclusively perjorative terms: for him the public is equated to bureaucratic and congealed forms. His view of psychological balance and stability is characterized by its "field-independent" quality, that is, the self must, if it is to be free, recognize its own sense of agency, immediacy, particularity, and existential uniqueness. One who has not come to this awareness is lost to others, and this loss precipitates anxiety and alienation:

... this nothingness and its attendant anxiety, prompts if not compels most to search for stability and being outside themselves. One form this search takes is what has been characterized as interpersonal collusion; another involves absorption in what Sartre termed one's project; yet another is the identification of self with role (1975, p.386).

That Pinar consistently highlights the negative possibilities of external realities and seeks to shore up the internal resources of the "world of personality" to contend with the possible dehumanizing aspects of the social and the public is reflective of his ontological view. Pinar describes this "**ontological vocation**" as follows:

The self turned against itself seeks to be like someone else. The seeking is dangerous; one's identity is constantly in question, since it resides outside oneself. One feels ontologically insecure (Laing, 1969), and such insecurity prevents and arrests man's ontological vocation

of becoming more human, more himself (Freire, 1970) (1975, p.364).

Pinar has pointed to early socialization and personality development as contributing to this insecurity. Citing David Cooper, Pinar states that "'One of the first lessons,' David Cooper writes, 'one is taught in the course of one's family conditioning is that one is not enough to exist in the world on one's own.' (Cooper, 1971a)" (in Pinar, 1975, p.365). This "lesson" presumably teaches us that we are essentially inadequate and must depend upon others for our existence. That Pinar paints this possibility as exclusively negative is, I believe, unfortunate. This situation may, if viewed in a more positive light, be both prudent and life enhancing. It is clear that, of all mammals, the human is one of the most **dependent** upon others during early stages of infancy. That this dependency must be transcended so that we achieve independence and autonomy is central to Pinar's conception of human development. But to portray dependency in totally negative terms is a form of hubris which sets up the aim of independence and autonomy as the only path for existential responsibility. Quoting from Cooper again, Pinar writes: "'Any meaning derived from a source outside our acts murders us' (Cooper, 1971a)" (in Pinar, 1975, p.374). That "our acts" become the exclusive domain of meaning is unnecessarily narrow and ontologically myopic. While Pinar has frequently commented on the transcendental possibility of our acts, he tends to deny this transcendental reality in much of his analysis of the human relationship to the world. The transcendent possibility for Pinar seems to lie only within the experiential domain of the

individual; we are only able to transcend our limited understanding, awareness and disintegration through acting upon our consciousness. This "inward turning" enables us to protect ourselves from an essentially hostile or benignly indifferent universe: "It is when we are unknown to ourselves, when our presence is not in our bodies but distended into the social space around us that we are manipulable, bullied, and fooled" (1984c, p.14-15). This is precisely the "ontological bind" Pinar sets up for himself. That "our presence" is limited to our bodies, and that our bodies are not allowed the possibility of being integrated into a wider, transcendent presence or order or being is a severe form of anthropocentrism, an essentially non-ecological perspective, and an extreme form of secularism. Pinar seems to assume that it is only through human meaning making and pattern making that the external world can be plumbed for any order or coherence. Perhaps more accurately, Pinar maintains that order and coherence are superimposed upon the world by human design. Human beings individually are the source of meaning and order. Pinar's "cosmological view" can be seen in the following comment he makes in "Teaching the Text":

The relations among language, reality and experience are taken up as well by Christopher Prendergast in his essay on Sartre's Nausea. He observes that embedded in this novel is the idea that the language of logic and order disguises the flux and fluidity of reality by creating the illusion of fixed states. Categories create such illusions; they are, in Nietzsche's words, "vital lies," illusions one creates for the sake of certainty and safety. With this safety and certainty, however, comes the hubris of the middle and upper classes, the self-righteousness accompanying the view that their position is, if not decreed by God or birth, is at least by talent and hard work. The reality is, of course,

considerably more arbitrary. This arbitrariness is hidden from children through textbooks and teaching which communicate that the world is by and large and orderly, sensible place. Particularly for academics and intellectuals, many of whom no longer see the world especially sensible or orderly, formal knowledge still functions as guides for thought and action (1984c, p.8-9).

That Pinar describes the "arbitrary" nature of one's position in the world, a world which he represents as being characterized by flux and fluidity, is emblematic of his ontological understanding. That the world is perceived as being not particularly "sensible or orderly" is, I suggest, not the "fault" or even necessarily the character or nature of the world; it may reflect the inversion of ontological categories which certain academics and intellectuals (not to mention the people who are neither academics nor intellectuals but who still seek ways of guiding their thought and action) have "imposed upon the world." While I am not suggesting that "certainty and safety" are to be achieved by simply substituting one set of categories for another, I believe that an armistice may be made between our egocentric projection of "vital lies" and our attentiveness to the transcendent, ontological pre-conditions which may be present beyond humanly projected designs. Curriculum theorizing as a "field preoccupied with design, development, instruction, and evaluation" must, as Pinar has suggested, go beyond the cause and effect orientation of male epistemology. But even feminist epistemology simply points to a dialectic which considers the dependence between subject and object, but seems to deny the interdependence of the objects. That is, neither the cause and effect orientation of male epistemology, nor the mutual dependence of feminist epistemology recognizes the possibility of pre-existing, ontologically

derived meaning and design. More about this in a moment.

I am suggesting that Pinar has fallen victim to a deconstructionist view which posits that "true reality" is where there is no reality. Pinar describes this formula in the following manner:

It is a formula for "revelation" and "insight" that requires distantiation from the everyday. Not the distance of alienation, when persons are unknowingly split off from social structure and events by their unquestioned belief in and fear of them. Revelation suggests a distancing that comes when social forms are seen as forms rather than timeless realities, when what is common is seen to be arbitrary rather than fixed or divinely decreed (1984c, p.6-7).

Pinar seems to set up a somewhat false dichotomy: "forms" need not be either arbitrary nor timeless. That forms may be seen as forms is important, but more important, I believe, is how we come to understand the source and ontological condition of such forms. As I have previously mentioned, Pinar's ontological view is essentially secular and transcendent in particularly transpersonal and aesthetic dimensions. He does not appear to be comfortable with a religious dimension such as that described by Berger, or an ontological view such as that described by Gadamer. Berger states that "In the religious view of reality, all phenomena point toward that which transcends them, and this transcendence actively impinges from all sides on the empirical sphere of human existence" (1969, p.94). Pinar begins, I believe, at the opposite side of this ontological order, that of

... the firm ground of lived experience, the truth of exceptional and marginal experience. Only by the experience of such firm ground -- what is irrational and hidden to the Many -- can one sense one's own path, a somewhat metaphysical conceptualization of the development

of individuality, or individuation" (1984c, p.4).

Pinar begins with an ontological order from which he asks "What place in one's psychic life do phenomena occupy?." Berger and Gadamer might ask, "What place does one's psychic life occupy in a continuing process of creation and meaning making?." Integration for Pinar begins with the individual's initiating this process. The source of this process is the existence of the individual. This, I believe, is reflected in Pinar's use of the phrase "codification of desire" to describe the process of curriculum theorizing. But to understand a deeper sense of ontological order, that is, to transcend the individual as the **source** of substance, I'd like to refer to Gadamer's depiction of this order. Gadamer approaches this issue by discussing the nature of "truth." Truth not only exists as a semantic reality, that is may be discerned as the result of experience and can be demonstrated in sentences which may be analysed as either being true or false. Truth in this semantic sense may proceed from the assumption that it is the result of arguments or experiments, something that we **do**. It is based on the assumption that "We find the truth." Gadamer describes another "version" of truth, that of an ontological truth, which may be understood in the claim that "Truth finds us." (Howard, 1982, p.123-124). Put another way,

"... the fundamental conditions for truth's coming to light [are] not simply as the result of a technique -- of something that the subject does -- but as a result of something that "happens to us over and above our wanting and doing" (Howard, 1982, p.122).

Thus, truth in this sense, refers not to the "re-production" or

"reconstruction" of meaning, but to the coming into being, of our **mediating** truth from one historical process to a future possibility. This is the ontological nature of truth; it exists as a historical pre-condition, as not only a "tacit dimension" as described by Polanyi, but as a an ontological reality which extends beyond the motives and intentions of the subject and contains possibilities which we in turn submit to. This is, needless to say, not a simple nor, I might add, unimportant concept. Perhaps if I refer to Gadamer's own description of this ontological quality of truth, the importance may be more readily grasped:

What I mean by truth here can best be determined again in terms of our concept of play.... Language games are where we, as learners -- and when do we cease to be that? -- rise to the understanding of the world.... [It is] the game itself that plays in that it draws the players into itself and thus becomes the actual subjectum of the playing. What corresponds to this in the present case is neither play with language nor with the contents of the experience of the world or of tradition that speaks to us, but the play of language itself, which addresses us, proposes, and withdraws, asks, and fulfills itself in the answer (TM, p.446) (in Howard, 1982, p.158).

Gadamer is suggesting that the ontological possibilities (truth) of a game resides in "it playing us," that is, submitting to its being in the world. Gadamer maintains that, ontologically speaking, we do not so much play chess for example as it **plays** us. To play chess, to experience the possibilities of the game is to submit to the order and rules inherent in its being, borne along by the tradition which is historical and futural. This submission is a form of passivity to the being of the game which extends before and beyond us and is not exhausted in our playing it. We cannot both play the game/have the

game play us and remain detached from it. Perhaps another way of describing this situation is to say that the figure-ground relationship is such that **the source of the figure is not our making but the living within the horizon of the game.** Thus, the horizon of the figure and the horizon of the ground merge. This refers precisely (if obliquely!) to the circular hermeneutic process of interpretation. Our process of interpretation does not merely reproduce or reconstruct extant meanings, but participates in an ongoing process which is both beyond our wanting it to occur, beyond our doing anything to make it happen. It **is** happening precisely because this process is inherent in being as opposed to nothing or non-being. This ontological condition proceeds "behind our back" so to speak, instead of at our hands.

Pinar's concept of ontology situates truth at the level of desire. He assumes, or to use the hermeneutic phrase, it is his prejudice, that meaning is to be created from the source of our particular, concrete, lived experience. Gadamer's concept of ontology suggests that individual agency does not account for the fact that the meaning of a text or object "goes beyond its author." Meaning happens to us as much as we desire or intend it to happen. This is the reason why this rather difficult topic of ontological order was broached in the first place. Given that it is neither technique, nor desire, nor motive, nor intentionality which exhausts the possibility for meaning to emerge, curriculum theorists must remain open to "codifications" of meaning that transcend individual desires. Moreover, the separation of individual consciousness from the external world of forms and order

must be reconceptualized in light of this ontological distinction. A new ecological and ontological awareness can be reflected in curriculum thought... but this awareness is not to be gained exclusively through what we know of ourselves but through what is beyond us and yet contains us. Pinar has occasionally grasped this ontological possibility as the following quotation in which he discusses "**transpersonal educational experience**" intimates:

Such structures would be somewhat analogous to Jung's notions of archetypes and the collective unconscious. Jung writes that 'a more-or-less superficial layer of the unconscious is undoubtedly personal. Yet this personal unconscious appears to rest upon a deeper layer that does not derive from personal experience and achievement but is inborn. This layer is the collective unconscious.' So, while it is true that each person's intellectual biography will be unique, it will eventually become possible to uncover the world of transpersonal educational experience and to disclose the most profound understanding of the educational process possible. Since this conceptual level will lie below the details of individual experience, the structures identified may also transcend historical circumstances and cultural milieu (1975, p.392).

I suggest that this concept of collective unconscious being **inborn** may be understood in Gadamer's ontological sense not so much that it resides within the individual, but rather that **we are born within an ontological order**. As the reference indicates, Pinar wrote this over nine years ago. His more recent theorizing has not seemed to reflect this insight. It remains unclear to me why he continues to explore in greater and greater detail the "details of individual experience" and has commented so rarely or penetratingly on the transpersonal. To demonstrate this claim, I wish to turn to Pinar's concept of the "biographic function" to disclose a moral and ethical cul-de-sac his

ontological and conceptual logic has taken him.

5. "BIOGRAPHIC FUNCTION" AND ITS ATTENDANT
MORAL AMBIVALENCE

Pinar, drawing upon the thought of Jung, notes two fundamental forms of thinking: the **associative** and the **directed**; the objectives of these forms of thinking are:

to render one's own educational experience ... into words.... The second is to use one's critical faculties to understand what principles and patterns have been operative in one's educational life, hence achieving a more profound understanding of one's own educational experience, as well as illuminating parts of the inner world and deepening one's self-understanding generally. The third task is to analyze others' experience to reveal what I call basic educational structures or processes that cross biographical lines.... This movement toward greater awareness of the present should make the researcher more existential in his lifetime, more detached from current roles and emotions, and more able to recognize the origin of those roles and selves and to form those public expressions, i.e., his personality, according to his (the genuine self) wishes (Pinar, 1975, p.389-390).

While Pinar has pointed out that "basic educational structures" may include the Heideggerian sense of "care" as one such structure, and the Jungian concept of "collective unconscious" as another, Pinar's focus on educational experience tends to focus on the personality of the individual and the "codifications of desire" that a genuine self initiates. The objective of associative thinking is to find language; the directed or critical form of thinking is to uncover one's existential sense of agency and initiative. Detachment, an ontological grounding of one's roles, and the formation of personality all seem to be the basic objectives of critical awareness. That the

meaningfulness of the experience of the individual becomes the sole criterion upon which actions are judged seems to be central to Pinar's critical perspective. His perspective is most clearly portrayed in his recent article entitled "Teaching the Text" (1984c). I wish to focus on one particular analysis Pinar makes in this article because I believe that it distills a central element of Pinar's ontological and moral understanding.

Pinar's discussion for this particular point focuses on the account, in a novel by Robert Musil entitled Young Torless, of a young boy's early school experience. Torless was involved in what apparently was a rather violent and sadistic rape of a fellow schoolmate, an act in which other boys participated and which resulted in his (and their) expulsion from the school. Pinar focuses on Torless' later reflection on the incident to frame his presentation of the "biographic function" of how one assigns meaning to events in life. Pinar states:

For instance, one would think that Torless' sadistic collaboration with his schoolmates would produce lasting shame and guilt. But,

... when asked whether, looking back on this episode of his adolescence, he (Torless) did not after all have a feeling of shame, he answered, with a smile, 'Of course, I don't deny that it was a degrading affair. And why not? The degradation passed off. And yet it left something behind -- that small admixture of poison which is needed to rid the soul of its overconfident, complacent happiness, and to give it instead a sort of health that is more acute, and subtler, and more understanding' (p.50).

One cannot predict the effect of one's actions upon others or upon oneself (in Pinar, 1984c, p.11).

Pinar seems to come to the conclusion that actions themselves are morally ambiguous. That we cannot predict the effect of one's actions upon others seems to imply that our actions are then only important as they relate to the meanings we assign to them. Pinar states this in the following manner:

Biographic function refers exactly to what Torless' comments suggest; namely that experience that might seem, from the point of view of safety and certainty, unhealthy or noneducational, might prove to be both educational and developmentally furthering. One cannot grasp the notion of biographic effect unless one situates educational experience individually, that is to say in individual lives, lives with histories, and lives with particular future paths, paths the discovery and rediscovery of which is a paramount calling for each of us, if we wish to be individuals.... Any action can function to shock one to such sight (1984c, p.11-12).

Pinar's analysis of Torless' comments presents for me an problem that is extremely disturbing, and perhaps, one which causes me the utmost difficulty in deciphering. Pinar's position in this discussion is so foreign to my orientation to human action that I scarcely know where to begin a critique. Pinar's sense of "biographic function" only seems to make sense to me if the individual is the sole unit of analysis of human activity. Pinar clearly identifies this to be the case in his discussion. What is particularly disturbing in his analysis of Torless' reflection is both his and Torless' lack of recognition that our actions do not merely concern us, are not solely for our gratification or benefit or peril. Neither Torless nor Pinar seem to be at all concerned about the "other" -- in this case the chap who was raped -- in their assessment of the incident. That that action

of rape, considered as simply "any action" that can "shock one into awareness," is not examined in light of the experience of others is a dreadful reductionism, a moral and ethical depravity which is hard to ignore. Pinar seems to excuse this amoral condition by maintaining that "reality does reveal frightening impulses and instincts which cannot always be sublimated or otherwise controlled" (1984c, p.7). I do not deny the reality of "frightening impulses" (I'm not quite so sure about whether or not to attribute human behavior to instinctual programs), nor do I deny the uncontrollable nature of human acts, but that this situation **excuses** one from any moral or ethical assessment of these actions is most doubtful. It appears to me to be somewhat ironic that Pinar, who has sought so valiantly against submission to "the given," seems to capitulate rather effortlessly to the givenness of violence, impulsive behavior, and instinct.

Pinar comments on the lack of control in the story of Young Torless: "It is this control that is absent in the sado-masochistic world of Young Torless, and it is this lack which in this novel permits extraordinary experience" (1984c, p.7). "Extraordinary" in a most macabre and brutal manner. While excessive control may lead to a "numbness" in our experience is undeniable, but a lack of control as manifested in the novel leads to a numbness of a different sort -- a moral and ethical numbness that is, I believe, hardly justifiable in any other than the most normatively relativistic of educational perspectives. Pinar seems to recognize this when he cites a comment made on Sartre's Nausea: "Nausea is akin to an experience of 'melting'

-- 'The veneer had melted, leaving soft, monstrous masses, in disorder -- naked, with a frightening, obscene nakedness.'" (in Pinar, 1984c, p.9). That the rubbing out of the "feeble landmarks" men have traced on the surface of things results in monstrosity and not beauty is central to my understanding of Pinar's (via Sartre's) view of the world. Pinar seems to include in the category of "feeble landmarks" all normative frameworks, all systems of social constraints (whether necessary or excessive), all institutions which have been historically developed to protect the weak or "underprivileged." Quoting from Pinar's own reflections in his autobiographic writing: "Does aspiration to become conscious necessarily involve such distain of the social?" (n.d., p.25). It may not "necessarily" require it, but Pinar seems to have adopted such distain, if inadvertantly. In order not to "reproduce" the social and all its grotesque inequalities and distortions, Pinar seems to jettison the noble and worthwhile as well.

This attitude is also evident in his "oedipal strategy" "whose aim is dissolution of the oedipal complex, of the familial, social, and economic structures which accompany it' (1983, p.33). Pinar goes on to state:

This strategy shares the interest in "non-reproduction." It is a male who loses interest in his ontological and political status as "first cause," as the locus and impetus of generation. He becomes degenerate (1983, p.33).

This degeneration has been intimated earlier. The "student as traveler" was, perhaps its earliest sign. This rather non-ecologic metaphor seemed to suggest that the student could undertake this

endless journey, seeking and consuming stimulation, heightening his or her awareness, justifying all actions by whether or not they met one's self-derived expectations and desires. And all the while, someone presumably kept the allowance coming, harvested the food, cared for the sick and the poor, and attended to the needs of the community at home. What Joseph Campbell in his Hero With a Thousand Faces points out, but Pinar fails to recognize, is that the journey out of one's cultural background and community, presumes a return -- a return anticipated by those who remain, a return to the responsibilities of community life, and a return which signals an initiation **into** the community, not an initiation by the individual. Pinar seems to be cognizant of the value of community, but he chafes under its needs and demands. He, himself, has stated that "Nor can we believe in the bourgeois abstraction 'the individual,' whose claimed independence was in effect a disguise for self-aggrandizement at the cost of community" (n.d., p.7). Pinar's most recent writing seems to blur the distinction between "biographic function" and this self-aggrandizement, for if one cannot even consider the consequences of one's actions upon the other, if we cannot anticipate the future possibilities residing in our ontological nature, then the community is, indeed, lost.

6. RECONCEPTUALISM: FAILURE TO THRIVE SYNDROME

In his gothic article "Death in a Tenured Position" (1984b), Pinar states "The Reconceptualization, as a social movement within curriculum studies, is dead" (p.5). That Pinar came to see Reconceptualization as

as social movement is noteworthy, given his earlier assessment that the term merely signified a loose aggregate of curriculum theorists who were in no way really linked in any collective endeavor. Pinar has resisted until the present the possibility that "the Reconceptualization" might become Reconceptualism. That it might become an "ism" like Marxism, Taylorism, or humanism, seemed to bode only a tendency toward dogmatism and parochialism. I respect his resistance to this tendency, but I suggest that this attitude may well have represented the very distance that prevented the Reconceptualization's transformation into a community of meaning. Pinar and Miller (1982) point to the fragility of this union:

These individuals [reconceptualists] represented disparate intellectual traditions but joined together in a fragile political coalition, uniting in opposition to traditional curriculum work, work they judged to be politically native (sic) [naive?] and theoretically primitive. This origin of the "Reconceptualization" meant that the bond united this group was as political as it was intellectual. The Reconceptualization was in this sense a social movement within an academic field. It is crucial to recognize that its collapse is as a social movement only; the intellectual work continues (p.5).

Just as "the economic and political basis of traditional curriculum work began to disappear" (1982, p.4), so have the economic and political **bases** of the Reconceptualization begun to disappear. Perhaps the same criticism Pinar leveled against the "social reconstructionists" can be made against Reconceptualization: "Social reconstructionists fail to recognize that oppression and exploitation are a fundamental characteristic of class structure in the United States and cannot be altered by tinkering with the schools" (1975,

p.170). A vast amount of the theorizing informing the Reconceptualization focused on school-related topics. A significant remainder of the theorizing focused on "tinkering" with the consciousness of the individual. Both failed to recognize the behavioral ecology of either the "movement" or the individual. Pinar attempted to address a rapprochement among collective and individual foci, but the "fragile political coalition" had already splintered: "The two orders of liberative work -- collective and individual, matter and consciousness -- are correlative. They are companion efforts which ought not to be at war with each other, attempting to reduce one to the other" (1982, p.13). But Pinar identifies the real malaise in another comment; the malaise was not internecine warfare, but a failure to thrive -- albeit a kind not threatening to an infant, but to the adult counterpart who responds identically to the conditions which constitute the "failure to thrive syndrome": inability to bond, sensual deprivation, isolation and withdrawal. Pinar describes the condition in the following manner:

The danger is not murder but suicide. The crisis of the present time is thus not only political and economic. It is a crisis of heart, of spirit. Whatever form our aspirations and our work takes, that form requires the strength and wariness that might come from a continuing realization that the defeat of our project is threatened not only from political events but from personal ones as well (1984b, p.6).

As is his mein, Pinar takes an individualistic view of the problem. **Personal** problems and events forestall the survival of the movement. I would suggest that while personal crises contribute to the threat, selecting the individual as unit of analysis cannot help to

save a collective victim. It is precisely this orientation that has failed to account for the social, political and cultural resources necessary to sustain a movement... or transform oppressive conditions within American society.

Pinar identifies various "competencies" which are called for if the individual (and organizations) are to achieve some semblance of viability:

... one must be able to participate in a variety of group processes, committees, research teams, sales teams, and so on, in ways that are sensitive to the feelings, perceptions, and even semi- and unconscious motives of others (1984b, p.4).

While Pinar's observation continues to emphasize the personal agency of the individual, he opens the door to collective endeavors which demand participatory competence, group identity and larger units of analysis. He misreads, however, as did Maxine Greene, the role of the individual in social, political and corporate settings. Pinar states that

From the corporate point of view, what is needed is literate but imaginative and self-reliant individuals, individuals who can conceptualize the series of tasks associated with a job, and imagine more effective ways to perform those tasks (1984b, p.2).

Unfortunately, Pinar plays right into the hands of bureaucratic and authoritarian forms of corporate management. The more workers focus on individual needs, the more the individual is oriented to the "tasks" of job performance, the less likely is the possibility that that individual will recognize his or her membership in the collective

identity of labor. Taylorism gained ascendancy and continues in the scientific management programs of today precisely because the individual was reduced to the individual, a cog in the machinery of production. The organized labor movement represents one attempt at helping to counter the distortion of power relationships in workplace organization. Autonomous work groups have addressed this alienating condition of the individual "stuck" (however imaginatively or self-reliantly) within a narrow range of action possibilities. Quality of Working Life programs have the potential of redefining work environments (as they have successfully done in Sweden) to include not only material conditions such as air, light, noise, but the psycho-social conditions as well. Thus, the liberation process must be directed at liberating ourselves not only from psychological, political and economic inequalities, but from the very ontological perspectives which assume that we each, and individually, are masters of our fate. This is not just a semantic argument or a debate over "starting points"; it is a profoundly crucial clarification of human possibility. When Pinar asks the question (to uncover the degree and kinds of "other-directedness" we manifest): "Whose am I?", I suggest that the reply might include "I am of the Universe, and we are One."

IV. RAPPROCHEMENT: TRANSCENDING METHODOLOGICAL SOLIPSISM --
SPECULATIONS ON DEMOCRATIC PEDAGOGY

But what's wrong with that man?
All afternoon (yesterday the day before yesterday and
today) he's been sitting there staring at a flame
he bumped into me at evening as he went downstairs
he said to me:
"The body dies the water clouds the soul
hesitates
and the wind forgets always forgets
but the flame doesn't change."
He also said to me:
"You know I love a woman who's gone away perhaps to the
nether world; that's not why I seem so deserted
I try to keep myself going with a flame
because it doesn't change."
Then he told me the story of his life.

George Seferis, "Mr. Stratis
Thalassinos Describes a Man"

A. THE ECLIPSE OF EPISTEMOLOGY

John Fowles begins his novel Daniel Martin with the line "WHOLE
SIGHT; OR ALL THE REST IS DESOLATION." This statement may well be the
leitmotif or motto of this dissertation. This dissertation grew out of
my perception that, despite pockets of affluence, scattered voices of
idealism, and oftentimes dazzling displays of technological innovation,
there is something grotesque and threatening afoot. I do not mean to
ressurrect the "Manichean Heresy" which divided the world into two
competing forces of good and evil (Reagan has done this recently when
he depicted the Soviet Union as "an evil empire"), but I wish to call
attention to an hegemonic myopia which has brought not only
"civilization as we know it" but all life forms to the brink of

extinction. E.F. Schumacher (1973) has pointed to this development, couched in terms of "production," in modern western cultures:

The arising of this error, so egregious and so firmly rooted, is closely connected with the philosophical, not to say religious, changes during the last three or four centuries in man's attitude to nature. I should perhaps say: western man's attitude to nature, but since the whole world is now in a process of westernization, the more generalized statement appears to be justified. Modern man does not experience himself as part of nature but as a outside force destined to dominate and conquer it. He even talks of a battle with nature, forgetting that, if he won the battle, he would find himself on the losing side. Until quite recently, the battle seemed to go well enough to give him the illusion of unlimited powers, but not so well as to bring the possibility of total victory into view. This has now come to view, and many people, albeit only a minority, are beginning to realize what this means for the continued existence of humanity (p.13).

It is not so much evil, but rather ignorance, blindness and a lack of understanding that has brought us to this perilous time. This is a painful admission to make, one which makes for unsociable "cocktail conversation," is a proverbial "wet blanket." I wish to make it clear that (echoing the "blanket" metaphor) this is not a blanket condemnation of human evolution -- for just people and institutions, loving relationships, compassion and beauty **are** present in this world. In the midst of plenty and poverty one may find, as Berger has suggested, "signals of transcendence." But just as there are signals of transcendence there are also **signals of abnegation** -- against hope we find despair, against play we find stultifying autonomism, counterposed against order we find chaos, against the moral act of condemnation there is relativism and ambivalence, and against humor we find grim resignation and hubris.

I have selected the pervasive presence of alienation in human experience as a focus for exploring an intersection of these **signals of abnegation**. The discourse of curriculum theorizing has been reviewed with an eye for its understanding or lack of understanding of this human condition. I wished to examine several curriculum theorists whom I believe are influential in the field, have resonated with my own theorizing and who have contributed to a widening of my own horizon of understanding. While these theorists may or may not have directly spoken to the issue of alienation, **I have read them with this "prejudice" in mind**. In like manner, I have attempted to explore conceptual frameworks, modes of research and language, and world views, which might assist me in orienting my awareness to counter-alienating possibilities for educational practice and which might, in turn, be reintroduced into the curriculum conversation. In part, this search has been an attempt to address my own feeling of alienation from intrapersonal, interpersonal and socio-political dimensions of being. In this regard, the research and creation of this dissertation has contained an element of personal therapy. This project has helped me transcend the "amputation from the trunk" of being by introducing me to ideas and perspectives which **reaffirmed** the existence of a trunk... not only a trunk, but roots and a firmament which support this metaphysical and physical form.

I have attempted to locate in the various traditions of speculation and discourse a community of meaning, not unlike the search Huebner made for "structures of care" and Purpel made for a "prophetic

tradition," which holds these questions and issues as not only interesting and stimulating, but **important**. And to my delight and comfort, such communities exist. It is my hope that my discussion of curriculum theorizing may help to bring about greater understanding -- a rapprochement -- between communities which have by and large, been speaking past one another.

So from an initial interest in the topic of alienation and counter-alienating praxis, my inquiry turned upon six dimensions: descriptions of constraints upon human possibility, an analysis of language and metaphor, human interests and knowledge, interpretation and meaning, which led eventually to a consideration of humanity's ontological condition and a normative approach to human action. What may have begun more as a concern for programatic ways of "improving educational practice" turned toward the ontological question James B. Macdonald asked: "Why is there being rather than nothing?". As Huebner has pointed out, no convincing or iron-clad answer can be formed for such a question. But in the entertaining of such a question, one may come to a more conscious awareness of the fragility **and** the resilience of being... as well as the value of being over non-being. Once again, the issue of alienation proved to be a catalytic focus for such an inquiry.

Schumacher again sheds light on this movement from non-being to being, from unconscionable oversimplification to an awareness of how complex and intricate our participation in the course of life is:

Estrangement breeds loneliness and despair, the 'encounter with nothingness', cynicism, empty gestures of defiance, as we can see in the greater part of existentialist philosophy and general literature today. Or it suddenly turns -- as I have mentioned before -- into the ardent adoption of a fanatical teaching which, by a monstrous simplification of reality, pretends to answer all questions. So, what is the cause of estrangement? Never has science been more triumphant; never has man's power over his environment been more complete nor his progress faster. It cannot be a lack of know-how that causes the despair not only of religious thinkers like Kierkegaard but also of leading mathematicians and scientists like Russell and Hoyle. We know how to do many things, but do we know what to do? Ortega y Gasset put it succinctly: "We cannot live on the human level without ideas. Upon them depends what we do. Living is nothing more or less than doing one thing instead of another." What, then, is education? It is the transmission of ideas which enable man to choose between one thing and another, or to quote Ortega again, "to live a life which is something above meaningless tragedy or inward disgrace" (p.79).

But this issue of "choice" brings us only part way from the powerlessness associated with alienation; Dostoevski has pointed to the problematic nature of choice and freedom. "Choice" itself offered no real clue to the escape from "meaningless tragedy or inward disgrace." A comment made by William Graham Sumner might indicate the inadequacy of such a notion:

if a chance (sic) is used one way it results in gain or advantage; if it is used the other way it issues in loss or disadvantage. A chance, therefore, has no moral quality or value; the moral question is what will be done with it?" (in Lewis, 1979, p.6).

Clearly, then, Sumner misrepresents the very essence of human and cosmic interpenetration. Sumner's blatant opportunism situates human agency at the center of an "accounting system." But the criteria, as well as the source of our "chances" and our "choices" remain quite

vague and shallowly understood. Unfortunately, much of educational theory and practice seems to be embedded within the same gain-loss calculus Sumner depicts. Little attention is paid to the conditions which permit, and invite the potentiality to choose. In other words, most educational theorizing is as topsy-turvy as the ontology depicted in Sumner's view: value is assigned only to what we do and not to (or to speak dialectically and with an ontological concern **from**) the very ground of our being in the world. Thus, it is not surprising that a morality based upon a simplistic utilitarian view has brought us to the environmental and moral crisis we are presently witnessing. That a "winnable nuclear war" is still talked about, that food is used as blackmail against political regimes in Third World countries, and that the earth is raped for monetary gain is evidence of this moral and intellectual depravity.

Having come to recognize the short-sightedness of technical rationality, and the need for more personally satisfying and meaningful conceptions of human possibility, it is perhaps not unexpected that my inquiry turned to an examination of meaning and understanding. In this regard, I started from a need to understand how meaning is arrived at, how it might be conveyed; therefore, language, symbols and metaphors were a "logical" step in this direction. But it soon became clear that meaning and representation call for more than a sense of literacy or syntactical structures. Meaning implies a grasp of some element of **truth**. And the "truths" we live by and through are as varied as the cultures and traditions present, past and future, distributed

throughout the world. How then might we ever arrive at some perspective that accounts for these disparate and at times discordant claims to truth?

Kuhn (1970), Feyerabend (1975) and Rorty (1979, 1982) have all discussed the "incommensurability" of discourse centered within diverse paradigms. Paradigms as cultures, or as part of cultures, help to organize and rationalize the meanings and conventions existing within these communities. Feyerabend has offered an iconoclastic and playful analysis of how these incommensurable meaning communities seek to maintain or expand their domain. It is not through a competition of reasoned argument and debate, of proving or disproving the "truths" found in different meaning systems, but rather "... an argument becomes effective only if supported by an appropriate attitude and has no effect when the attitude is missing" (p.8). It follows from Feyerabend's claim here, that we will change our comprehension of the "truth" only when we cultivate the attitude which allows for this to occur. Feyerabend refers to this change as "conversion" rather than simply modification. Macdonald and Huebner have referred to this "attitude" as one of **openness**. Feyerabend describes this possibility for change when he describes the exchange between cultures as "an open exchange, not a rational exchange" (p.85). This attitude of openness, then, must in a sense transcend the standards and conventions of our meaning structures. Feyerabend states this in a somewhat different manner: "We, on the other hand, retain the lesson that the validity, usefulness, adequacy of popular standards can be tested only by

research that violates them" (p.35). In other words, we cannot hope to expand our horizons by simply refining and purifying the logic and methods we deem almost unassailable. Feyerabend brashly maintains that "theoretical anarchism is more humanitarian and more likely to encourage progress than its law-and-order alternatives." Feyerabend's considerable wit and intelligence not only dethrone "scientific knowledge" and research paradigms, but they sketch a vision of human inquiry which radically democratizes and broadens participation in cultural exchange. Against methodological and epistemological constraints, Feyerabend proposes that the arena of discourse be widened, a "free society" be created where presently disciplinary and cultural ghettos exist:

A free society is a society in which all traditions have equal rights and equal access to the centres of power (this differs from the customary definition where individuals have equal rights of access to positions defined by a special tradition (p.9).

The excellence of any system of thought can only be asserted after it has faced all comers as equals in a social and political arena. Feyerabend would maintain, and I concur, that dogmatism is rampant and constrains alternative perspectives not merely by unintentionally limiting access to competing views, but by fundamentally denying the right of these alternative views to be heard (denying entry visas to leftist artists and politicians, expunging references to strikes and riots from school textbooks, etc.). The implications of this line of argument for research methods and educational practice will be discussed later. But suffice it to say here that Feyerabend

anticipated Rappaport's Rule: "When most people agree with you, worry" (1981, p.3). Feyerabend, then, counters "methodological solipsism" by calling attention to the presence of an "a priori of communication," as Gadamer likewise did, and broadens a configuration of "rights" to include not only individuals, but cultures and traditions as well. It is a significant leap to make -- from individual rights to cultural rights -- but the really difficult one, I believe, is to make the leap from ascribing rights to cultures and traditions to ontological conditions, to a right for the forms of life in the universe to not only exist, but to be a **source** of value as well as a "thing" we value. This revisioning of our ontological condition is aptly stated by Ruth Nanda Anshen in her eloquent prefatory remarks to Margaret Mead's Letters From The Field 1925-1975 (1977):

... that the sin of hubris may be avoided by showing that the creative process itself is not a free activity if by free we mean arbitrary, or unrelated to cosmic law. For the creative process in the human mind, the developmental process in organic nature and the basic laws of the inorganic realm may be varied expressions of a universal formative process (p.xix).

Thus, both personal and cultural values may be seen as fragments and residues of a unity which is not only "brought about" through human valuing, but which beckons to consciousness in all its myriad forms. But I am getting ahead of the story, and wish to return to the rationale, the attitude, from which an hermeneutic orientation to experience may be seen as a progression from the "theoretical anarchism" of Feyerabend.

In Richard J. Bernstein's lucid and synoptic book entitled Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (1983), Bernstein anticipates this "leap" that I have been intimating. He states that:

There has been a dramatic shift in what is taken to be the significant epistemological unit for coming to grips with problems of the rationality of science. In the philosophy of science, and more generally in contemporary analytic epistemology, we have witnessed an internal dialectic that has moved from the preoccupation (virtually an obsession) with the isolated individual term, to the sentence or proposition, to the conceptual scheme or framework, to an ongoing historical tradition constituted by social practices -- **a movement from logical atomism to historical dynamic continuity** (this author's emphasis, p.24).

Bernstein traces a development which, I believe, takes us well along the way to an ontological perspective. Bernstein points out that the shift from "logical atomism" or paradigm-bound theorizing can, and perhaps has, been transcended. While he stops short of advocating a consideration of "cosmic consciousness" such as that described by Fechner, he does open up the prospect of viewing knowledge and conceptual frameworks in terms of an "historical dynamic continuity." While this "continuity" is discussed in terms of social practices, it is not impossible to envision larger frames of reference (such as ecologic and spiritual) for such a continuity. But I believe that Bernstein's appreciation of the work of Habermas, Rorty, Gadamer and Arendt, contributes to a reassessment of epistemology as a focus for understanding. The shift from epistemological concerns to hermeneutic and ontological ones is, I believe, not widely understood. It is most

unfortunate that this "development" has not yet been widely grasped, for much of the antagonism and divisiveness which currently characterizes social and political (read: tradition and culture-based) confrontations might be ameliorated by this recognition. Bernstein points to the work of Rorty as being a significant clarification of recent philosophical insights:

Rorty argues that it is epistemology that has been the basis for and stands at the center of modern philosophy. But he portrays the death of epistemology or, more accurately, shows why it should be abandoned. It is in the aftermath of epistemology (and its successor disciplines) that hermeneutics becomes relevant -- not as leading to a new "constructive" foundational discipline but as "an expression of hope that the cultural space left by the demise of epistemology will not be filled -- that our culture should become one in which the demand for constraint and confrontation is no longer felt" (p.111).

It is hermeneutics, not epistemology, which Rorty (1979) suggests is an appropriate starting point for a revisioning of cultural pluralism and conversation, not confrontation:

Epistemology views the participants as united in what Oakeshott calls an universitas -- a group united by mutual interests in achieving a common end. Hermeneutics views them as united in what he calls societas -- persons whose paths through life have fallen together, united by civility rather than a common goal, much less a common ground (p.318).

That Rorty points to a different conceptual and normative logic than "common ends" is significant. What he suggests we must base our "conversation" upon is not the commensurability of what we each know, but upon the fact that we ontologically exist together and that a form of social hope and openness need transcend our preoccupation with certainty, uniformity and self-interest. Hermeneutics cultivates both

this openness and this hope for transcending our horizons of understanding. We are united not in our beliefs and values, but in our **being** together. Bernstein quotes Gadamer in this regard:

Once again we discover that the person with understanding (synesis) does not know and judge as one who stands apart and unaffected; but rather, as one united by a specific bond with the other, he thinks with the other and undergoes the situation with him (TM, p.288, in Bernstein, 1983, p.164).

Gadamer indicates a position which escapes both objectivism and relativism by formulating not a methodology which might save us from constraints and compulsion, but, to echo Buber, a communion which unites us in the spirit of both human relationships and ontological condition. Our "truths" however derived and expressed are a reflection of truth in our being, a truth which "transcends the world of facts." More will be said about this shortly.

But I wish to tie this discussion to two specific issues: the practical and political consequences which a philosophical orientation implies, and a metaphysical consideration after. I return to Bernstein for a discussion of the former issue. Bernstein (1983) states:

Throughout my discussion of Gadamer, Habermas, Rorty, and Arendt, I have sought to elicit the common concerns that they share, without denying the important differences among them. In all of them we have felt a current that keeps drawing us to the central themes of dialogue, conversation, undistorted communication, communal judgment, and the type of rational wooing that can take place when individuals confront each other as equals and participants. We have been made aware of the practical and political consequences of these concepts -- for as we explore their implications, they draw us toward the goal of cultivating the types of dialogic communities in which phronesis, judgment, and practical discourse become concretely embodied in our everyday practices (p.223).

Oakeshott has described education as an "invitation to participate in the 'Great Conversation'." In this light, dialogic communities, or communities of meaning, are units which, in part due to their historical continuity and synthetic quality, transcend personal agency. This does not deny the importance of personal agency nor praxis. But what this orientation provides that technical, psychologized or individualized frames of reference do not provide is a continuity which transcends self interest. Bernstein, referring to the practical and political dimension of hermeneutics, draws upon a dialectical understanding from Marx:

As Marx cautions us, it is not sufficient to try to come up with some new variations of arguments that will show, once and for all, what is wrong with objectivism and relativism, or even to open up a way of thinking that can move us beyond objectivism and relativism; such a movement gains "reality and power" only if we dedicate ourselves to the practical task of furthering the type of solidarity, participation, and mutual recognition that is founded in dialogical communities (p.231).

This dialogue provides the opportunity, affords the right, for diverse perspectives and truths to be raised and entertained. This, I would maintain is a liberative possibility, one which is quite different from the possibility promulgated by some rude (or even elegant) universal standard of truth. Thus, an hermeneutic approach to understanding counters privileged positions of power and authority, questions the "normal," and opens one to the alien, foreign and strange. It is a courageous perspective, and one which validates the experience of the other while not invalidating our own experience. Rorty (1979), I believe, has captured this possibility well when he

describes how this conversation and dialogue might be "edifying":

Since "education" sounds a bit too flat, and Bildung [self-formation] a bit too foreign, I shall use "edification" to stand for this project of finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking. The attempt to edify (ourselves or others) may consist in the hermeneutic activity of making connections between our own culture and some exotic culture or historical period, or between our own discipline and another discipline which seems to pursue incommensurable aims in an incommensurable vocabulary. But it may instead consist in the "poetic" activity of thinking up such new aims, new words, or new disciplines, followed by, so to speak, the inverse of hermeneutics: the attempt to reinterpret our familiar surroundings in the unfamiliar terms of our new inventions. In either case, the activity is (despite the etymological relation between the two words) edifying without being constructive -- at least if "constructive" means the sort of cooperation in the accomplishment of research programs which takes place in normal discourse. For edifying discourse is supposed to be abnormal, to take us out of our old selves by the power of strangeness, to aid us in becoming new beings (p.360).

While Rorty seems to discount hermeneutic understanding somewhat by denying its attention to the "horizon within," I would suggest that hermeneutic understanding precisely provides the opportunity for engaging in the "poetic" activity Rorty advocates. Ricoeur has pointed this out when he speaks to the "mytho-poetic core" of understanding which is central to any (but specifically an hermeneutic) approach to the expressions of meaning from any culture -- that of another or our own. But what Rorty has done, and his perspective shares many aspects of that of Feyerabend, is he advocates for openness and praxis: "Edifying philosophy is not only abnormal but reactive, having sense only as a protest against attempts to close off conversation by proposals for universal commensuration through hypostatization of some privileged set of descriptions" (p.377). Rorty's, and Feyerabend's

points are well taken and will be considered when I discuss practice implications in a later section. But at this point of the discussion let me conclude with the observation that the shift from epistemology to hermeneutics has contributed to broadening both the sense of **rights** from within a cultural context to **across** cultural horizons, and has opened up the possibility for expanding our repertoire of self-descriptions. By implication I mean that through hermeneutic understanding we may be less alienated by that which is not understood by us (whether this otherness be described in terms of abnormality, strangeness, foreignness, incommensurability, etc.). In this light, I would suggest that hermeneutic interpretation and understanding frees us to consider alternative rationalities, diverse traditions, and other cultures for their illuminative power. It is to this liberative potentiality that I now turn.

B. TRUTH, FAITH AND METAPHYSICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

William James described truth as "what it is better for us to believe" rather than "the accurate representation of reality." In this light, I would suggest that it is better for us to believe in the possibility of a "free society," of "openness," of intimacy, affiliation and moral and ethical behavior. I would also suggest that it is "better" to believe in truth as a living presence in the world rather than it being contingent upon our constructing it. I come to this conclusion, because this belief allows for greater possibility than its inverse; and because "what may be better" need not be what we

find represented in the "normal" course of our day-to-day experience in the world. I refer the reader back to an earlier quotation of James: "The significance of a thing is more important than its tangibility." That we have suffered and are suffering under the domination of scientific rationality and its eviscerated version of truth is regrettable... but it is also not immutable. As I have pointed out earlier, hermeneutic understanding can promote the affirmation of the other and oneself, the foreign and the familiar. It calls for a civic courage and an ontological attentiveness. I would suggest that it is by such courage and attentiveness that the evisceration of truth and its attendant alienation may be countered. I have referred earlier to the provocative philosophy of Fechner, and it is to him I return at this juncture. William James describes Fechner's contribution to this issue as follows:

The original sin, according to Fechner, of both our popular and our scientific thinking, is our inveterate habit of regarding the spiritual not as the rule but as an exception in the midst of nature. Instead of believing our life to be fed at the breasts of the greater life, our individuality to be sustained by the greater individuality, which must necessarily have more consciousness and more independence than all that it brings forth, we habitually treat what lies outside our life as so much slag and ashes of life only; or if we believe in a Divine Spirit, we fancy him on the one side as bodiless, and nature as soulless on the other. What comfort, or peace, Fechner asks, can come from such a doctrine? The flowers wither at its breath, the stars turn into stone; our own body grows unworthy of our spirit and sinks to a tenement for carnal senses only. The book of nature turns into a volume on mechanics, in which whatever has life is treated as a sort of anomaly; a great chasm of separation yawns between us and all that is higher than ourselves; and God becomes a thin nest of abstractions (1909, In McDermott, 1977, p.535).

It is my belief that an ontological awareness rescues us from not only a world depicted as "slag and ashes," spirituality as "a thin nest of abstractions," but from the very real danger that the world will be reduced to slag and ashes and that human beings alienated by abstractions and cut off from an intimate communion with the world will be the cause of it. Just as there is a pervasive sense of alienation and withdrawal from the world of nature as well as social and political domains, there have been some thinkers who maintain that this withdrawal is not to be fatalistically considered nor acceded to. One such thinker is Martin Lings who states:

If it can be said that man collectively shrinks back more and more from the Truth, it can also be said that on all sides the Truth is closing in more and more upon man. It might almost be said, in order to receive a touch of It, which in the past required a lifetime of effort, all that is asked of him now is not to shrink back. And yet how difficult this is! (1964, In Schumacher, 1973, p.278).

Thus, just as alienation and abstraction (and I would comment that the presence of competition, greed, violence and hatred are manifestations of alienation and grotesque individualism) are at crushing levels, there are reserves of hope and affirmation in the midst of this enervating condition. While this sense of hope and affirmation may not be prominent, there is no reason why curriculum theorizing cannot serve to make them more prominent. This qualitative and religious dimension, while perhaps not appearing as high-tech or sexy as modernist cultures are wont to appear, may contribute to a counter proposal against such superficiality. Ruth Nanda Anshen refers to this "counterforce" and its potentiality:

There is in mankind today a counterforce to the sterility and danger of a quantitative, anonymous mass culture; a new, if sometimes imperceptible, spiritual sense of convergence toward human and world unity on the basis of the sacredness of each human person and respect for the plurality of cultures. There is a growing awareness that equality may not be evaluated in mere numerical terms but is proportionate and analogical in its reality. For when equality is equated with interchangeability, individuality is negated and the human person transmuted into a faceless mask (In Mead, 1977, p.xix).

Few writers in the field of curriculum seem to have come to a recognition of this spiritual sense. Certainly Dwayne Huebner, James B. Macdonald, and David Purpel have. Others such as Ross Mooney, Florence Krall, Phillip Phenix, and Roger Simon also seem to have recognized this sense. But given the focus of this section so far on the topics of truth and faith, I believe that David Purpel's theorizing most directly and sensitively addresses these topics.

Purpel has long advocated that education be viewed as and **be** a moral endeavor. Drawing upon the work of Kohlberg, Gilligan, and his own theorizing about moral development, Purpel has contributed significantly to the conscience of curriculum theorizing. His most recent article entitled "Public Education and the American Heritage" (1984) represents to me the clearest articulation of his historical grounding, and speaks eloquently of education not only as a moral and ethical activity, but of education as participating in a **tradition** of spiritual attentiveness and being. Purpel's article

deals with the rhetoric of educational policy, with the major theme being that those of us who are fighting for fundamental reforms of our educational system, reforms that are rooted in the ideals of a more just, loving, and humane society have needlessly allowed and continue to allow

ourselves to be cheated of the use of our own powerful and enduring images (p.2).

The "powerful and enduring images" Purpel conveys, as similarly does Huebner, are drawn from the religious traditions, specifically the Judeo-Christian tradition (and more specifically the prophetic tradition within it). Purpel, like Fechner, resorts not to rationalistic arguments in a technical sense, but to mythic images which derive their power not from their slavish adherence to "accurately portraying" the world as it is, but by evoking hope for a better world and affirming the potentiality and power of human being to participate in the creation of this better world.

Santayana stated that "religion should not be reduced to a 'false physics.'" In a similar vein, I would suggest, and I believe that Purpel would concur, that neither should human being be reduced to material and behavioral descriptions. The descriptions of human existence should take into consideration an integration which transcends these domains:

For me, I am finding that my faith emerges from what is called the prophetic tradition. It is a tradition that is rooted in the biblical prophets and has found modern expression in such figures as Mahatma Ghandi and Martin Luther King. It is a tradition that speaks to the integration of the divine, the political, and the personal; a tradition that seeks to sensitize us to the obscenities of our time, to the disparities between our highest aspirations and vision and the realities of life. Prophets reveal the pain and agony of injustice, blasphemy, and broken covenants and also provide us with hope and energy (p.11).

This "integration of the divine, the political, and the personal" represents in Purpel's work, an interpretive effort quite consistent with hermeneutics. In fact, the earliest hermeneutic scholarship was directed at attempting to discover the meaning of religious texts. While the earliest scholarship often focused on trying to recapture the meaning of symbols, metaphors, expressions and stories contained in texts of another historical era, that is, recapturing what the text meant to the author of the text as well as those who were contemporaries of the writer of such texts, modern hermeneutic interpretation focuses less on a sense of convergence toward a finite and completed meaning existing at a specific historical moment and more upon the sense of meaning grounded in historical and ontological dimensions but transcending both the historical moment and the meaning community within which such texts were to be found. When Purpel speaks to the fact that his "faith emerges from what is called the prophetic tradition," he indicates that such a tradition had within it the potentiality or possibility to reach forward or across time and cultures, to new integration and understanding. That Purpel seeks to protect the rights of such traditions to speak to us today is quintessentially an hermeneutic position. Purpel is able to trace and reflect contemporary concerns for justice, community and love to the ongoing emergence of this concern throughout human experience. But that experience which "speaks to him" most powerfully, is the prophetic tradition expressed in the Bible. The mytho-poetic core of understanding is fed by the images and narrative of this tradition.

Such a tradition helps Purpel to orient himself to contemporary human experience. It helps him locate a normative framework and an ontological condition which unites the present world of human experience to both historical continuity and transcendental, transformative possibility.

Purpel, referring to an observation of Abraham Heschel states:

As Abraham Heschel points out, the God of the Bible is not the blind, even-handed balanced image of justice but is a God that is partial and biased toward the poor and the humble. The Sermon on the Mount does not speak to free enterprise, competition, and hierarchy but to a vision of community, love, and justice for all (1984, p.9).

This observation, I believe, points to a counter-alienating possibility. Justice is not reduced to "objective" and mechanical depictions, but to loving, compassionate and passionate commitment to a utopian impulse, an impulse which both condemns wrong doing and affirms the dignity of the "least among us." Without romanticizing the poverty or oppression of those who chafe under such conditions, Purpel grounds his advocacy in a commitment, a courage, to reject such conditions, to express outrage at them, and to (as the prophets did) remind us of covenants which promise a better world. That this promise has been eroded by pride, violence against ourselves, others and the world, and neglect is central to the call of the prophets. Purpel identifies one important manifestation of this promise when he states:

It is my belief that perhaps the most significant dimension in the conservative/progressive continuum revolves around the matter of faith in the educability of humanity (p.10).

This loss of faith may be cause for the preoccupation with control and legalistic conceptions of justice. Wherever there is doubt (or lack of faith) in this educability, in this ability of human beings to transform their consciousness from ignorance to awareness, from despair to hope, one may find a law in its place. Purpel's conception of the central importance of faith in the educability of humanity reflects an ontological awareness, an awareness which situates human being within a nexus of faith and ontological power, courage and community. Purpel refers to Tillich to clarify this issue:

Faith is the state of being grasped by the power of being — itself. The courage to be is an expression of faith and what "faith" means must be understood through the courage to be. We have defined courage as the self-affirmation of being in spite of non-being. The power of this self-affirmation is the power of being which is effective in every act of courage. Faith is the experience of this power (In Purpel, 1984, p.11).

Tillich reveals the intimate interrelationship among courage, faith and being, and I would like to suggest that this is an ontological condition of being, living in both the sublunary and spiritual worlds. Purpel seems to suggest, and I fully concur, that "faith in the educability of humanity" is understood when it is seen as an orientation toward being in the face of non-being. A human being is human **being** in spite of mortality, ignorance, in spite of oppression and constraints. When Rorty (1982) discusses education to be the cultivation of "social hope" he appears to point to this same ontological condition. Hope, as a signal of transcendence, affirms the power of being over non-being. In this light, then, oppression is seen as an immoral act which denies the right of self-affirmation, restricts

the potentiality of being, and substitutes non-being for being. The task of education, according to Purpel (quoting Brueggeman (19): "is to nurture, nourish, and evoke a consciousness and perception alternative to the dominant culture." And the alternatives Purpel conveys are drawn from the symbolism and stories expressed in the prophetic tradition, a tradition which clearly confronted the dominant cultures of its time and posed alternatives framed in the language and images of a more just, loving and affiliative society. While Purpel draws upon the prophetic tradition as it is expressed within a specific religious tradition, it appears that his understanding of prophetic consciousness suggests that this consciousness transcends any temporal insularity. Thus, Purpel in integrating the divine, the personal, and the political honors both the temporality of human existence and the timelessness of spirituality. For curriculum theorists such as Purpel, Huebner, and Macdonald (and I share this belief), the finitude of physical reality is nested within the infinite; matter and spirit are not separate, but whole. Ruth Nanda Anshen describes this relationship in the following manner:

...the conception of wholeness, unity, organism is a higher and more concrete conception than that of matter and energy. Thus [it is] an enlarged meaning of life, of biology, not as it is revealed in the test tube of the laboratory but as it is experienced within the organism of life itself.... For the principle of life consists in the tension which connects spirit with the realm of matter, symbiotically joined. The element of life is dominant in the very texture of nature, thus rendering life, biology, a transempirical science. The laws of life have their origin beyond mere physical manifestations and compel us to consider their spiritual source. In fact, the widening of the conceptual framework has not only served to restore order within the respective branches of knowledge, but has also disclosed analogies in man's position regarding the

analysis and synthesis of experience in apparently separated domains of knowledge, suggesting the possibility of an ever more embracing objective description of the meaning of life (In Mead, 1977, p.xvi).

Purpel's adoption of the prophetic tradition and its rich literary and interpretive communities helps to point the way to a view that, as Anshen has stated it, "the laws of life have their origin beyond mere physical manifestations." It is to this more wholistic representation, specifically in a **metaphysical** sense that I wish to turn at this point. I have attempted to depict how the abandonment of epistemology in favor of an hermeneutic approach to the ontological condition expands our conception of entitvity and rights -- from the individual, to traditions and cultures -- and eventually to the totality of being. Since metaphysics, in my understanding of it, anticipates an organizing framework which integrates the spiritual, the personal and the social/political dimensions of existence, I feel that it may well provide curriculum theorists with organizing principles that speak to each of the domains mentioned above.

That the personal, social and political dimensions of human experience reside within a larger non-material and transempirical reality has been alluded to before. Anshen (In Mead, 1977) directs our attention to two dimensions which transcend and help to situate the three mentioned above:

Mankind can finally place its trust not in a proletarian authoritarianism, nor in a secularized humanism, both of which have betrayed the spiritual property right of history, but in a sacramental brotherhood and in the unity of knowledge (p.xvii).

The issue of alienation has prompted me to examine **connective and associative** potentialities which may provide a counter-alienating response to human experience. The fragmentation that epistemological accounts of knowledge, the distortion in communication that results from inequality and disaffiliative practices, and the disregard of more encompassing frames of reference, all contribute to both an oppressive incoherence or silence. Anshen again brings this problem into high relief:

Incoherence is the result of the present disintegrative processes in education. Thus the need for [coherence] expresses itself in the recognition that natural and man-made ecological systems require as much study as isolated particles and elementary reactions. For there is a basic correlation of elements in nature as in man which cannot be separated, which compose each other and alter each other mutually. Thus we hope to widen appropriately our conceptual framework of reference. For our epistemological problem consists in our finding the proper balance between our lack of an all-embracing principle relevant to our way of evaluating life and in our power to express ourselves in a logically consistent manner (p.xx).

This widening of our conceptual frameworks demands (which Anshen leaves to be said at a later point) that both the principles and the "logic" we employ account for ways of knowing, modes of research and evaluation, and forms of expression which go beyond rationalities and logics which fail to account for the spiritual or metaphysical. Anshen articulates a perspective that was only tacitly understood by me at the outset of this dissertation, one which lends credence to the view that a metaphysical perspective is not to be confused with mere artifice, abstraction, or useful fiction. While metaphysics may attempt to describe and evoke order in the universe, it is suggested here that

metaphysics is no more abstract than conceptual frameworks which emerge from the disciplines focusing upon the physical sciences. I would suggest that where these orientations differ is in the limit situations or horizons that such theorizing set as their boundaries. Anshen describes this difference as follows:

Nature operates out of necessity; there is no alternative in nature, no will, no freedom, no choice as there is for man.... [Our] understanding will become weaker and rarer unless guidance is sought in metaphysics that transcends our historical and scientific views or in a religion that transcends and yet pervades the work we are carrying on in the light of day. For the nature of knowledge, whether scientific or ontological, consists in reconciling meaning and being. And being signifies nothing other than the actualization of potentiality, self-realization which keeps in tune with the transformation. This leads to experience in terms of the individual; and to organization and patterning in terms of the universe. Thus organism and the world actualize themselves simultaneously. And so we may conclude that organism is being enduring in time, in fact in eternal time, since it does not have its beginning with procreation, nor with birth, nor does it end with death. Energy and matter in whatever form they may manifest themselves are transtemporal and transspatial and are therefore metaphysical (p.xx-xxi).

While I concede that it is difficult for human beings to function or remain continually conscious of their metaphysical nature, this difficulty does not mean either that it is an unimportant nor contrived perspective. Fechner refers to this awareness as one which accounts for synthesis upon synthesis, the compounding of consciousness, and the perception of the whole. William James likewise describes this "potential form of consciousness":

...our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of

consciousness entirely different. We may go through life without suspecting their existence; but apply the requisite stimulus, and at a touch they are there in all their completeness, definite types of mentality which probably somewhere have their field of application and adaptation. No account of the universe in its totality can be final which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded. How to regard them is the question -- for they are so discontinuous with ordinary consciousness. Yet they may determine attitudes though they cannot furnish formulas, and open a region though they fail to give a map. At any rate, they forbid a premature closing of our accounts with reality. Looking back on my own experiences, they all converge towards a kind of insight to which I cannot help ascribing some metaphysical significance. The keynote of it is invariably reconciliation. It is as if the opposites of the world, whose contradictoriness and conflict make all our difficulties and troubles, were melted into unity. Not only do they, as contrasted species, belong to one and the same genus, but one of the species, the nobler and better one, is itself the genus, and so soaks up and absorbs its opposite into itself. This is a dark saying, I know, when thus expressed in terms of common logic, but I cannot wholly escape from its authority. I feel as if it must mean something, something like what the Hegelian philosophy means, if one could only lay hold of it more clearly (1902, In Brody, 1974, p.483).

In the abovementioned quotation, I find several important insights: first, that metaphysical consciousness "may determine attitudes though they cannot furnish formulas." This comment may intimate the emergence of "faith" in metaphysical thought, while prescriptions for discrete behaviors or practices remain quite problematic. Just as hermenutic understanding demands an attitude of respect for the rights of other cultures and truths, so may a metaphysical understanding require a belief in the as yet unfathomed, myriad ways of knowing. Second, that forms of metaphysical consciousness may "open a region though they fail to give a map" brings us again to the central concern of hermeneutic interpretation -- that we remain open to the alien and other despite the seeming

incommensurability of those cultures and systems of thought to our own. Thus the "hold" of Hegelian philosophy is, I believe, the paradoxical situation that there is really no separation between the self and other (refer to Chapter I, Section B. on "Conceptual Logic" for a more detailed treatment of this topic). The loss of a "map" in the conventional sense of the term does not imply that direction and order is lost; rather, the map merely represents agreed upon representations of a reality (e.g., cartographic symbols), but in this case, the terrain of metaphysics is real, the symbols lacking. This situation is often expressed as the "ineffability" of alternative, mystical or religious experience.

Hermeneutic interpretation grasps this ineffability and turns not to a rude instrumentalism which seeks to pin the butterfly of metaphysical experience to a taxonomer's table, but rather, seeks the "potentiality" of such experience. Prediction is abandoned and potentiality in its ontological sense is revived:

Virtually all of our disciplines have relied on conceptions which are now incompatible with the Cartesian axiom, and with the static world view we once derived from it. For underlying the new ideas, including those of modern physics, is a unifying order, but it is not causality; it is purpose, and not the purpose of the universe and of man, but the purpose in the universe and in man. In other words, we seem to inhabit a world of dynamic process and structure. Therefore we need a calculus of potentiality rather than one of probability, a dialectic of polarity, one in which unity and diversity are redefined as simultaneous and necessary poles of the same essence (In Mead, 1977, p.xiv).

Anshen's observation that potentiality might redefine our apprehension of the world is quite important. If the world is viewed

as dynamic process and structure, and if purpose is not just restricted to an anthropocentric depiction of the universe, then potentiality, like metaphysical consciousness, spirituality, and, it might be suggested all those "signals of transcendence" noted by Berger, "transcend the world of facts." Potentiality is, like ontological hermeneutics, an attitude toward truth which considers purpose not to be merely relativistic, but integral to being. Schumacher (1973) expresses this point in the following manner:

All subjects, no matter how specialized, are connected with a centre; they are like rays emanating from a sun. The centre is constituted by our most basic convictions, by those ideas which really have the power to move us. In other words, the centre consists of metaphysics and ethics, of ideas that -- whether we like it or not -- transcend the world of facts. Because they transcend the world of facts, they cannot be proved or disproved by ordinary scientific method. But that does not mean that they are purely 'subjective' or 'relative' or mere arbitrary conventions. They must be true to reality, although they transcend the world of facts -- an apparent paradox to our positivistic thinkers. If they are not true to reality, the adherence to such a set of ideas must inevitably lead to disaster (p.87).

To avoid this "disaster" Schumacher prescribes a new role for education:

Education cannot help us as long as it accords no place to metaphysics. Whether the subjects taught are subjects of science or of the humanities, if the teaching does not lead to a clarification of metaphysics, that is to say, of our fundamental convictions, it cannot educate a man and, consequently, cannot be of real value to society (p.86).

Education in this sense attends to both the real as physical and metaphysical. I find it interesting that Schumacher equates metaphysics and fundamental convictions. This adheres to the spirit of

hermeneutic understanding: convictions (read: faith and moral courage) derive from the integration of, to quote Purpel, the divine, the personal and the political. Thus, what may on the surface appear to be a confusion of logical typing, that is, comparing dissimilar levels of organization, is in actuality a recognition of the interpenetration of various orders and purposes forming a whole: "History is to be understood as concerned not only with the life of man on this planet but as including also such cosmic influences as interpenetrate our human world" (Anshen, In Mead, 1977, p.xviii). This awareness is rarely reflected in "history" as it is told as an account of discrete events leading in causal or quasi-causal sequence toward some present "situation." Ontological hermeneutics and metaphysical understanding/attitude is more readily discernible in mytho-poetic creation. This is so, I suggest, because metaphysics and hermeneutic interpretation rely more on, as Fechner anticipated, the imaginative use of analogy and metaphor for representation of truth. The writing of James, Bergson, Fechner, Bateson, Cox, Huebner, Purpel, Macdonald, Schumacher, and many others employ these mytho-poetic devices. This mytho-poetic orientation restores the metaphysical distance between literalness and figurativeness. If our educational practice is to remain open to the potentiality of being, I believe that we must cultivate evocative images and representations that do not merely attempt to "mirror" reality, but preserve the old insights and contribute new ways of seeing that emerge within diverse cultural settings. In this manner, the conversation widens and deepens, the images and associations cross horizons of understanding and intimate

frontiers for which maps are as yet unknown or are sketchy. But crucial to this entire project is the faith that such frontiers exist, that we are capable of responses other than colonization, and that without a metaphysical appreciation, all we will eventually bring forth in this new land is more slag and ashes. Lucia Lockert, a Mexican poet residing in Michigan, conveys this sense of attentiveness:

In my lucid moments I understand
that I have captured my existence just in time:
as in the atoms and in all
energy that flows in me as in the stars,
that is awake or dreaming.

I wish to turn one last corner around the course from alienation to a counter-alienating pedagogy. I have sought to explicate the restoration of rights not only to cultures and a cosmic sense of intimacy as intimated by metaphysical modes of representation, but also to an ontological condition which affirms our integration into the world in ways that epistemic modes of knowledge fail to account for. This has essentially been an attempt to counter idolatry of rationalist thought by suggesting a reverence for a metaecological consciousness, a consciousness that is collective, integrative, transtemporal, transspacial and religious. But there is a practical matter that I might point out which directly addresses the evisceration of competence which has been the "accident" of anthropocentric and self-interest-bound configurations of curriculum theorizing. I would like to suggest at this juncture two allied reconceptualizations: the first being a reconsideration of the units of practice curricularists might align themselves with, and the second is a normative framework

which directly speaks to a sense of hope and justice through collective identification.

C. EXPANDING UNITS OF PRACTICE: STRATEGIES
AND NORMATIVE FRAMEWORKS

In this dissertation I have attempted to portray the interconnectedness of conceptual frameworks, normative dimensions, and curriculum theories as they address or fail to address the experience of alienation in modern western cultures. Having come to appreciate the importance of ontological hermeneutics, an importance not widely recognized among theorists here in the United States, as both an interpretive endeavor and a practical philosophy, I have attempted to suggest how such an orientation might re-situate human agency and consciousness within an environment comprised of both material and transcendental qualities. At the base of such a portrayal is the belief that order and being are neither the result of human interventions alone, nor unaffected by human action. Thus, the dialectic I wish to suggest is an ontological one in which a cosmic environment both affects and is affected by being. In one sense, I am suggesting a radical democracy and a metaecologic rationality which regards the rights of being, and all being as sacred and necessarily and positively embedded within cosmic wholeness. What is advocated here is a cultural revolution, one which reassesses the hubris of anthropocentrized conceptions of agency and meaning and reconceptualizes the cosmos not only as being more facilitative than

the "benignly indifferent" or malevolent depictions offered by curriculum theorists such as Greene and Pinar, but also as being an entity entitled to its own transcendent purpose. Thus, personal, social, political and spiritual dimensions are depicted as threads in a seamless fabric of existence.

It has been my aim to evoke a renewed sense of responsibility, a responsibility which emerges from a moral sensibility grounded upon the infinite value of integration within cosmic consciousness. I have tried to avoid a rude reductionism or instrumentalism which attends only to our actions in and upon the world. By attending to meaning and understanding, I have sought a different curricular unit than "actions." Actions seem to imply, in most curriculum theories, an origin within the intentionality and motivation of the actor -- usually the individual agent. I have suggested that this emphasis on agency and power begs the ontological condition of being. I am of the belief that this distorted sense of agency has contributed to alienation and separation from the source of being. In order to counter this anthropocentric (and perhaps even more separated, egocentric) orientation to agency, I have attempted to situate human awareness and action within a metaphysical domain which calls for a revisioning of rationality and consciousness. While modern consciousness has perhaps brought self awareness into clearer focus, helped to sharpen the figure, the ground recedes ever further, becomes remote and eventually decontextualizes human consciousness. Unless human consciousness is reintegrated within cosmic consciousness, I fear that our collective

birthright will have been forfeited. While a philosophical and metaphysical approach to this human dilemma may seem wildly abstract and intangible, I believe that it is a necessary but not sufficient response to a crisis in human understanding. But I take some solace in the view that Gadamer advanced that philosophy can reflect a practical intent:

I think, then, that the chief task of philosophy is to justify this way or reason and to defend practical and political reason against the domination of technology based on science. That is the point of philosophical hermeneutic. It corrects the peculiar falsehood of modern consciousness: the idolatry of scientific method and of the anonymous authority of the sciences and it vindicates again the noblest task of the citizen -- decision-making according to one's own responsibility -- instead of conceding that task to the expert. In this respect, hermeneutic philosophy is the heir of the older tradition of practical philosophy (in Bernstein, 1983, p.40).

By suggesting a metaphysical and ontological orientation to human being in the world, I am attempting to reframe the human condition within a reality which is larger and more important than the sums of our individual self-interests. In a sense, I am flirting with the very problem that Pinar suggests an existential perspective is intended to counter: the loss of the individual to the idea. But my reply to Pinar, as well as other existentialists, critical theorists, and empiricists, is that the "individual" as they have depicted him or her is already lost to the cosmos. That is to say, the self is lost to the idea of the individual for the self has lost its essential ontological connection to greater units of identity. When Polanyi stated that "Thought can live only on grounds which we adopt in the service of a reality to which we submit," he was suggesting that it is the act of

submission, the perceived reality as well as the extant reality, which sustains the quality of the life reflected in thought. I have attempted to question or make problematic the thought and the reality manifested in curriculum theory -- especially because the quality of life within the curriculum field, though differing widely no doubt, seems to have lost this very basic vitality of service.

It is the combined issues of **service** and **identity** that have prompted me to seek a counter-alienating pedagogy. Alienation, I would like to suggest, may be seen in part as an iatrogenic condition introduced by the specialization and professionalization of curriculum theorists. To be sure, other factors have contributed to the experience of alienation; but since I have tried to examine the role to curriculum theory in posing more illuminating insights into the etiology of alienation, it should not be surprising that I have come to certain observations regarding its participation in as well as resistance to alienating conditions. I would like to propose, in a practical vein and with a liberative intent, a reconceptualization of praxis which focuses on non-adversarial and transformative possibilities of expanded units of analysis and practice. I wish to demonstrate that this process of self-reflective action, while being instrumental and facilitative, transcends instrumentality and normative relativism. The essence of this revisioning is a renewed sense of competence and agency and an expanded potentiality of identity.

I shall draw from important insights gained from my experience of a model of community organizing developed by Guy Steuart who is

presently the chairman of the Department of Health Education at the School of Public Health at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Dr. Steuart's work, while focusing upon health issues, issues which reflect a rather encompassing definition of health offered by the World Health Organization (WHO) which includes the physical, mental and social well-being of people, transcends medical, sociological, and political conditions to consider the cultural. Steuart's theorizing and pedagogy speak directly to curricular issues and offer, I believe, a fresh and little recognized understanding of behavioral ecology and environmental conditions. In his provocative article entitled "The People: Motivation, Education and Action," (1975) Steuart states:

The American faith in education as the great healer of human frustrations and as the mode d'entre to the better things in life, to health and happiness, seems to remain unshaken in spite of its relative failure to meet these expectations" (pp. 176-177).

As an educator (and a radical and iconoclastic one at that), Steuart asks the above-mentioned question and challenges the basic faith that the vast majority of educators have in the efficacy of their personal and institutionalized roles. This is an unsettling question, one which in similar spirit has been asked by curricularists such as those focused on in this study as well as critics such as Slater, Marin, Langer, Bateson, Bowles and Gintis. But by calling into question the durability of this faith, Steuart does not discount the importance of faith — he astutely points out that this faith is placed in an intellectually and strategically flawed sense of competence and agency. The ideology of American (and western) education remains

grounded in a naive view of behavioral ecology and environmental factors. Newmann and Oliver (in Purpel and Belanger, 1972) have described alienation as a "sense of powerlessness" and have proposed that, through education, students learn not only to change their behavior, adapt to environmental conditions, but learn how to affect change in the environment. This ability to affect environmental change they term "environmental competence." Newmann and Oliver are among the few curriculum oriented educators who directly address the participatory and democratic dimensions of competence. Their curriculum theory clearly situates the school within a broader context of social and political dimensions of community life. That is to say, while attempting to foster community and participation **within** the school itself, they have not ignored the extension of such qualities to the broader context outside the school nor have they discounted the influence of social and political environments **upon** the school.

But returning to the work of Steuart, it is possible to envision personal and social change from a somewhat different vantage point. Steuart suggests that

We need to return to the fundamental question, which is not "How can we educate in order to influence motivation and action?" but rather "By what means (any means) may health-related social and behavioral change be accomplished?" The latter question addresses itself, not to what people ought to know or how well they should be educated in health matters, but rather to issues of social and behavioral ecology -- therefore, to a broader range of determinants of change (p.177).

Among curriculum writers, Steuart's question is often posed as: "Under what conditions can people learn, grow and develop?" Steuart has

indicated that people base changes in their behavior not so much upon what they **know**, but how they **feel**. The graphic example he gives of this situation is that of the smoker: a smoker may well have the information which clearly presents the adverse health effects of smoking, he or she may fully understand the information, and he or she may even be totally against smoking -- for everybody else. But that the smoker continues to smoke is indicative that he or she has not felt that quitting is his or her highest priority. This feeling and attitude must, according to Steuart, be reckoned with. Educational programs which seek -- by increasing the extent and quality of the "information" one has -- behavior change, are destined to be minimally effective because they fail to account for other powerful determinants of behavior. But Steuart's approach to environmental health and health education differs significantly from most school-based curriculum models. The "conditions" within which classroom learning occurs rarely include the environmental contexts outside the classroom or school which both facilitate and constrain human development. Poverty, poor housing and health care, community resources and needs, and broader social contexts are often not seen to be within the purview of curricular interventions. They remain education-related, but not education-directed issues.

It was Huebner and Macdonald who noted that appropriate units of curriculum analysis and practice are very much up for grabs. I have found in Steuart's work a very fitting discription of conceptual units which have tremendous potential to inform curriculum deliberations.

Steuart proposes a typology which consists of "units of practice," "units of identity," and "units of solution" (pp.181-182). "Units of practice" are those social and political configurations a practitioner selects as his or her focus of interaction and intervention. Steuart states that "... the individual is the primary, usually exclusive, unit of practice" (p.181). I am in full agreement with his assessment, and I attribute a significant degree of educational failure and alienation to this exceedingly narrow frame of reference. Units of practice may, of course, be expanded to consider the family, school, neighborhood, or field as a unit of practice. **But each unit of practice poses different problems and requires different intervention strategies for program development.** But Steuart suggests that our envisioning units of practice is based upon the other two previously mentioned units: units of identity and units of solution. Steuart describes "units of identity" as:

"... units with which an individual feels himself to be associated. The individual -- with a sense of self, a personal identity -- is the smallest of such units. To the extent that members of a family feel united with each other, share needs and aspirations, and suffer similar fortunes, the family is also a unit of identity. One's circle of friends and associates and one's local neighborhood may each, to differing degrees, be units of identity (p.182).

Steuart's suggestion here (and I believe that this is an extremely important one) is that an understanding of a person's units of identity is a critical aspect of behavioral ecology. One's units of identity, as the description implies, reveal both the extant patterns of association and the integration one feels in one's interpersonal

network. Identity in this sense may be seen as the various affiliations and senses of belonging and membership one perceives as meaningful. Thus, to counter Pinar's (and existentialists' in general) concern that the individual may be "lost to the other," units of identity offer a more positive potentiality -- that of helping to **complete** and **integrate** the person into a larger lived reality. This sense of belonging and identification may be similar to Giroux's assessment of the importance of "sphere's of resistance" and other identifications based upon collective configurations or interest groups. Such collective entities may well afford the opportunity to engage in strategies and interventions beyond the scope of an individual agent. This collective sense of agency leads to Steuart's "units of solution." Of "units of solution," Steuart goes on to say:

In contrast to units of identity, we may also conceive of units of solution, which would be those units appropriate or essential for the solution of particular problems. For example, in changing nutritional behavior the individual is the primary unit of solution in that changing his or her food preferences would be essential. However, additional units of solution may include 1) the household, which acts as an economic unit and includes the person most responsible for the selection and preparation of food, 2) certain subcultural groups which attach social status to certain foods, and 3) the larger social and political units that determine the cost, distribution, and availability of food. In contrast to the units of identity, units of solution may best be defined by professionals because of the technical knowledge and strategic position they bring to the situation (p.182).

I have outlined Steuart's approach to practice because it offers not merely strategies for interventions, but operates from a normative base which is quintessentially democratic and ethically sophisticated. Such strategies recognize both the "indigenous expertise" of people

belonging to various cultures -- solicits and respects the "inside view" of collective experience -- and the enabling resources that such a collectivity may have at their disposal. The role of the educator and community organizer in Steuart's model is that of a process consultant; from this relationship to community groups, the consultant never can presume to know what is "best" for the community. Both the aims and the interventions remain within the control of community members. This issue will be discussed more fully later in this chapter. I believe that Steuart's model of community organizing offers important counter-alienating potential. In this regard, Steuart states that

A fundamental task, then, in strategies of social and behavioral change is to involve people in activities and services that benefit not only themselves and their immediate units of identity but which provide opportunities for them to widen and expand their units of identity to those larger social systems that have such an important effect upon their personal and private behavior.... We can begin by designing programs, not in categorical terms,... but in terms of individuals and social groups (p.183).

Perhaps some clarification of the previously mentioned quotation is in order. In curricular terms, Steuart is suggesting that the "content" of educational activity emerges from the felt needs of a constituency -- be it the individual or a social group. This in itself is hardly a new or radical idea. But an examination of present curriculum designs (especially school-based programs of instruction) would no doubt disclose that educational programs, individual courses, and departmental structures remain organized along the lines of "the structure of the disciplines." Courses are all too often based upon

predetermined content ("information to be conveyed") and individual mastery of the content is equated with competence. If an individual's identity is expanded to now include larger units of identity and solution, this results from an almost ancillary concern for strengthening whatever "discipline" such courses represent. Steuart's model conscientiously avoids such a "categorical" approach, and suggests that individual competence be linked to and enhanced by social or group competence.

As Greene has earlier suggested, the arena of the public must be reconsidered in educational practice. While Greene advocates this position, she does not articulate a strategy for achieving this aim, or if she does, it is almost exclusively couched in terms of individual consciousness change. Steuart points to a synergistic effect of expanded units of identity. The professional educator or community organizer is clearly allied to the interests of the constituency he or she serves. Despite technical expertise or status differentials which often separate an educator from his or her constituency, Steuart suggests that the educator use power not over individuals, but **for** individuals. He has stated this in somewhat different language when he advocates that we should work at the **behest of**, not in **behalf of** others. This distinction is not merely a semantic one, and I wish to point out its important implications: first, it is fully aware of real status and power differentials not only within a social configuration (e.g., unit of practice), but between an educator/organizer and the constituency he or she serves; second, the issue of **service** is directly

addressed; third, the social and political resources of a units of solution are drawn upon in the course of social action; and fourth, the ethical issue of shared responsibility for the consequences of any interventions is mutually recognized by both educator/organizer and the constituency he or she serves. It might also be noted here that, while "content" of group expertise is undoubtedly affected by the presence of an educator/organizer, the greatest attention is most likely to be paid to **process** considerations. (In a sense, content and process are not seen as separate, but process considerations enable the unit of practice to define and redefine its own content.)

To return to the ethical dimension, one must recognize that such a model of interventions regards the control and "ownership" of such interventions as serious issues. The people involved in such processes are not treated as means toward an end; a technical rationality is avoided (despite the introduction of technical skills into a constituency) because the involvement (at whatever level) of people in their own development supercedes any preoccupation with "outcomes" or efficiency. Steuart's model of education and organizing differs from the instrumental design of the Tyler Rationale in several key areas: first, the Tyler Rationale operates within a two tier system -- specialists research the educational needs, develop objectives, design interventions and formulate evaluation criteria and strategies which are, in turn, applied to a group of learners; second, educational needs are separated from other needs such as social or bio-physical; third, the locus of change is seen to be within the individual students;

fourth, evaluation and program redesign is seen largely as the task of specialists, not the group of learners. Steuart essentially inverts the hierarchy of control of the Tyler model. First, status and power differences between specialists and community members are reduced (the community maintains control of decisions and information); second, learners (in this case community members) are rightfully credited with knowledge and expertise of their own community of which the specialist at first is unaware -- the community is not viewed as a "deficit culture;" third, a cross-cultural perspective is maintained which regards the norms and values of the community as rightfully belonging to the community -- the specialist must choose to either work within those norms and values, or select another culture within which one can act consistent with one's personal beliefs; and fourth, all aspects of community life are seen as integral to community development -- no bifurcation or categorization separating "educational" from other needs is attempted. The participation of community members in the affairs of the community is foremost -- all planning, implementation and evaluation is conducted openly and collaboratively. Feyerabend echoes this concern when he states that, if a radical democracy is to be achieved, "Participation of laymen in fundamental decisions is therefore required even if it should lower the success rate of decisions" (1981, p.87).

Steuart's model of community organization and its implications for education, I believe, should be given careful consideration if we are exploring counter-alienating possibilities. Furthermore, if we are to

restore the social and political bases upon which educational programs and advocacy are built, this model is quite appropriate. But what has not yet been clearly articulated in my discussion of Steuart's model of organizing is a normative framework from which educators/organizers may guide their decisions about **which** constituencies they may seek to serve. While these decisions will no doubt be affected by one's biography, culture, talents and skills, I believe that a sense of social justice is an indispensable part of such a decision making process. It is to this topic I now turn.

D. IDENTITY AND SERVICE: A COMMUNITARIAN COUNTERPROPOSAL

Guy Steuart's model of community organizing, by describing the importance of units of identity, solution and practice, counters the atomization of individual identity and self-interest. By recognizing units of analysis beyond the individual, by engaging the collective interests of networks of people, Steuart directly addresses the "transpersonal" and "transbiographic" dimensions of understanding that Pinar has only minimally described. Steuart deftly avoids the hubris integral to the Tyler Rationale (that is, perpetuating a view of the educational constituency as being a deficit culture) by emphasizing the "**indigenous expertise**" and enabling resources present within communities of interest. And contrary to the "mistrust of the social" which Pinar (and many curriculum theorists seem to exhibit), Steuart suggests that educators and organizers must be sensitive to the "inside

view," the social meaning of events, behaviors and conditions, which are virtually **only** able to be arrived at through collaborative engagement and dialogue with members of any self-defined community. Community organizing, then, in Steuart's model, entails a hermeneutic process of interpreting the cultural meanings extant within a given community. Education and community organizing undertaken from such an orientation promotes, in the Hegelian sense of the term, "self-consciousness": the "struggle for recognition." It is this same struggle for recognition that Arendt, Dewey, Greene, and Giroux point to as underlying the importance of the public sphere. It is within this public sphere that the individual's identity and agency can be recognized and integrated. To be excluded from or to exclude oneself from the public sphere is to be cut off from the full development and potentiality of the self.

As Purpel has indicated in his discussion of religious traditions, communities of meaning strive not for assimilation within other communities, but strive to keep the distinctions and particularity of their beliefs intact. This centripetal tendency may be related to the ontological condition of identity. The existence of a cultural belief system, of a community of meaning, derives from a source of identity which transcends the ephemeral and subjective limitations of individual members, transcends and resists the erosion of distinctiveness as the culture encounters other cultures. Alan Watts (1964, 1967), quoting what an archbishop of Dublin was reported to have said of the Church, may help to make this struggle for identity more perceptible:

You may persecute us; we are quite used to that. You may argue with us and attack us; we know very well how to handle ourselves. But the one thing we will **not** tolerate is that you should explain us (p.11).

What the good archbishop wryly indicates is that the knowledge and explanations of a community of meaning must arise from within the culture and community. Perhaps the distinction that should be made here is one between explanation and interpretation. Explanation derives its authority from within a system of meaning that it attempts to disclose. It, in a sense, emerges from the "place" of coherence and shared meaning. Interpretation, on the other hand, makes no pretense about being "inside" the community of meaning it attempts to describe. Interpretation "fuses horizons" rather than occupies the ontological center of a meaning community. Thus, the expressions conveyed by explanations and interpretations are characteristically and qualitatively different communications. I am suggesting that one may distinguish explanation and interpretation by the manner in which one **identifies** with such expressions.

This ontological and collective sense of identity as it relates to communal meaning is addressed by Gadamer (1963, in Rabinow and Sullivan, 1979) in his article "The Problem of Historical Consciousness":

We must say that every expression of life implies a knowledge which shapes it from within. Is not expression this plastic milieu of the spirit -- Hegel's Objective Spirit -- whose realm encompasses every form of human life? In his language, in his moral values and juridical forms, the individual -- the isolated being -- is even then and always beyond his particularity. The ethical milieu, where he lives and in which he partakes, constitutes something "solid" that allows him to orient himself despite

the somewhat vague contingencies of his subjective impulses. Dedication to communal purposes, to action for the community, this is what frees man, says Dilthey, from his particularity and from his ephemeral existence (p.122).

It is this combined sense of ethical milieu and community that I believe needs to be brought into sharper focus in curriculum theorizing and practice. I have earlier quoted Heraclitus and suggest that his comment can be reintroduced here. He stated that "The waking have one world in common; sleepers have each a private world of his own." An ontological awareness can be seen as analogous to wakefulness; contrasted against this wakefulness one might pose the somnambulism of both extreme subjectivity and utilitarianism. I am using the term "extreme subjectivity" in the sense that the individual fails to recognize or discounts social interests and values while pursuing self interest.

At this point I wish to refer to Robert Paul Wolff's penetrating analysis of liberalism and social justice. In his The Poverty of Liberalism (1968), Wolff offers a tightly reasoned analysis of American political and social thought as reflected in John Stuart Mill's On Liberty and The Principles of Political Economy. The central reason I wish to bring Wolff's analysis into this discussion is its significant contribution to the articulation of the concepts of **social value**, **justice**, and ultimately a sophisticated definition of **community**. I believe that Wolff's analysis is critical to an understanding not only of social and political thought, but a moral consideration of human interests, particularly the moral and ethical consideration of frames of reference beyond self-interest. Wolff sets the stage for his

critique in the following manner:

Mill begins by distinguishing two spheres of activity and experience in each individual's life. The internal sphere includes the thoughts, feelings, and other experiences of private consciousness, together with those actions which affect -- in the first instance -- the individual alone. The external sphere is the arena of the individual's interactions with other persons, the social world in which we impinge upon others and influence their lives. On this distinction Mill builds his argument. Society, he claims, has no right whatsoever to interfere in any matter falling within the inner sphere of any individual's life, and it has only a conditional right to interfere in social affairs involving interactions between several persons. In the latter case, society's guiding rule must be the principle of utility or greatest happiness principle. Society is to take action only in order to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Where intervention will not serve that utilitarian purpose, society has no right to impose itself upon individuals (p.5).

Wolff points out that the utilitarian purpose, the Greatest Happiness Principle, is fundamentally flawed in that it "cannot deal consistently with the question of the relation between knowledge and happiness" (p.10). Wolff goes on to argue that the right to free speech, to dissent, freedom from censorship, and to the pursuit of knowledge, is based, not as Mill has suggested upon utilitarianism, but upon justice. The crux of Wolff's argument lies in Mill's inadequate treatment of inner and outer spheres of activity and the attendant confusion between self-regarding and other-regarding norms. Just as there is neither empirical evidence nor an adequate philosophical argument mustered to defend Mill's claim that increased knowledge (achieved through the "free market of ideas") leads to the utilitarian goal of increased happiness, there is likewise a fundamental discontinuity in Mill's rationale that utilitarianism justifies the

right of an individual to pursue self-regarding actions which were defined a priori as being exclusively within an inner sphere of action. Wolff attacks these problems in Mill's argument on two fronts: first, by defining "interest" in a manner which is logically consistent for both individual and collective contexts (inner and outer spheres); and second, (and this is a most clever turn) defines the concept of "value" in a purely descriptive, value-neutral manner! I would like to remind the reader here that my reason for tracing (albeit in an extremely abbreviated manner -- for Wolff's elegant analysis required two hundred pages for its development) the connection between human interests and values is to lead to a philosophically defensible position for the public good, social justice, and a renewed appreciation for a counter-alienating possibility of community.

Wolff defines "interest" as "the characteristic orientation of men toward the world insofar as they are active, rather than merely contemplative"(p. 168). In the vernacular, one might simply say that one takes an interest in some possible object or state of affairs which does or might motivate one to act for or against it. Wolff goes on to define a possible "value" as "any object of interest" (p.168). "Value," as Wolff defines it here, does in no way speak to the worthiness or evaluative meaning of such possible objects of interest. From these fundamental terms, Wolff goes on to define the following discrete possible values:

1. A Simple Private Value: "a possible object of interest whose definition makes essential reference to the occurrence of a state of

consciousness in exactly one person"

2. A Compound Private Value: "a possible object of interest whose definition is a truth functional construct of of definitions of simple private values"
3. An Interpersonal Value: "a possible object of interest whose definition makes essential reference to a thought about an actual state of consciousness in another person"
4. A Social Value: "any experience or state of affairs whose definition makes essential reference to reciprocal states of awareness among two or more persons" (pp. 170-181).

"A simple private value" refers to the possible object of interest of an individual to experience a particular thought or sensation such as the enjoyment of a brandy (to use Wolff's example). This value essentially does not nor need it regard someone else's awareness of one's experience; another's awareness of this possible object of interest is extraneous to the nature of this value. A "compound private value," refers to a summation or aggregate of simple private values; that is, if the possible object of interest is the experience of various states of affairs among two or more individuals, the result is a compound private value. Wolff maintains that the greatest happiness of the greatest number is exactly such a compound private value; moreover, he maintains that "utilitarianism in all of its varieties concerns itself only with simple and compound private values and can be called 'methodologically individualist'" (p.174). I would like to suggest that this individualist calculus is prominent in both conservative and liberal reform ideologies: in conservative ideologies, this individualism is expressed in laissez-faire attitudes advocating a

"free market of ideas;" in liberal ideologies, interventions are often rationalized by the argument that inequalities constrain the individual's right to the pursuit of happiness -- that is, the public good is conceived of as the sum or aggregate of individual goods (see Weingarten, 1979). Furthermore, even more radical emancipatory interests are often expressed in terms of maximizing individual freedom and autonomy, reducing social constraints, and presume that a "free society" is to be arrived at through the vigilant protection of individual rights. Education which seeks the "improvement" of an aggregate of individuals might be likened to this orientation to compound private interests.

Even a concern for interpersonal values, values which derive from a possible object of interest making reference to the actual states of consciousness of at least one other person, fails to achieve a sense of community or social interest. Simply attending to the experience of the other, the thoughts, feelings, and meanings extant or possible within the consciousness of another does not, according to Wolff's argument, constitute a social dimension or value. This distinction Wolff is making can perhaps be tied to the difference between knowledge and understanding -- knowledge may imply an awareness of the possible objects of interest in the other; understanding implies the confluence of our own possible objects of interest and those of others'. That is to say, social values reflect an understanding of "reciprocal states of awareness among two or more persons." It is this reciprocity of awareness (not necessarily shared aims or goals) that most

fundamentally grounds a sense of community. Wolff describes this qualitative shift in values as follows:

What exactly is it that conservatives and radicals alike miss in liberal society? Can we define more precisely the feelings, experiences, states of affairs, or sets of relationships that the conservative locates in a cherished past and the radical in a longed-for future? The answer lies in a certain class of what I have called social values, specifically in what I shall call **the social values of community**.

A social value, it will be recalled, is a value whose definition makes essential reference to reciprocal states of awareness among two or more persons. This reciprocity of awareness may be achieved through verbal communication, as in a conversation, or it may result directly from nonverbal interaction. Sometimes even a glance suffices to establish that reciprocity of awareness which, when the parties take an interest in it, becomes a social value. Most social values involve several persons at most, but sometimes large groups of people, even entire societies, enter into what can fairly be called a reciprocity of awareness. When this happens, I propose to call the states of affairs thus achieved a mode or instance of **community**. (Thus a **community** will be a group of persons who together experience a reciprocity of awareness, and thus **have community** (pp. 184-185).

With this sense of social value in mind, and the mode of community it indicates, we might look at how such a reciprocity of awareness differs from the reciprocity inherent in hegemony. While hegemony may be seen as a set of reciprocally confirming beliefs, attitudes and practices, what is distinctly absent in such reciprocity is an **interest** in collectively and critically discerning the awareness present among the participants. This is precisely what Giroux has pointed out as the evisceration of the public sphere due to a lack of historical consciousness. Unless the reciprocity of awareness is preserved and enhanced through critical reflection, dialogue and discourse, in place

of community we are faced with hegemony.

Wolff goes on to elaborate three major categories of community: affective, productive and rational. While I believe it is not necessary to elaborate upon each of these categories, it should be mentioned here that the interests one brings to this possibility of community reflect various reciprocal engagements. A sense of shared destiny, the collective nature of labor, and the "concerting of wills" through communication and deliberation to achieve collective goals, all contribute toward an expanded, integrated identity of community. The critical point that Wolff makes with regard to community and the possible social values it belies, is that because it can be a social value, it transcends private interests, beckons beyond mere utilitarianism or instrumentalism toward social justice, **and may be seen as an end in itself**. Thus, the possibility of community inverts the ontology of utilitarianism to offer the counter proposal to the utilitarian claim that social awareness and interactions are a means to the satisfaction of private interests. This counter proposal suggests that the existence of dialogue and community is not accounted for within a calculus of private interests; and that the public interest leading to social values does not supercede or eclipse private interests, but complements and completes them. To state this another way, communitarian and public interests offer the possibility of expanded units of identity for moral and political agency. If curriculum theory is to not only consider the human interests in an epistemological sense, as Huebner and Habermas have described, then an

ontological condition of both private and public interests might be attempted. What Wolff's philosophical argument seems to offer for curriculum theorizing is a basis for acknowledging the legitimacy of both personal and social values. By recognizing and affirming both private and public interests, Wolff has contributed significantly to an argument for democratic participation and transcending a methodology of individualism. I believe, however, that a comment should be made here regarding the critical importance of recognizing that the concept of social interests does not disregard conflict within communities; what social interests and democratic participation safeguard are the fundamental rights of individuals and groups to take part in public discourse. Self-interest can be transcended within such a social sphere if a reciprocity of awareness is cultivated and preserved.

At this point I wish to more explicitly link the concept of distributive justice and its normative framework as articulated by John Rawls (1971) to the possible public interest of community as developed by Wolff. I perceive this linkage as being important because, while Wolff situates "community" as an end in itself (and unabashedly avoids advocating "distributive justice" which he regards as an outgrowth of liberalism), one is left with a normative ambiguity regarding how private and social values may be evaluated for their "worthiness."

Rawls's argument for distributive justice is succinctly summarized by Blizek and Cederblom (1973) in their article entitled "Community Development and Social Justice." Given my interest in articulating curriculum orientations which transcend the individual as a unit of

analysis, I find the literature of community development to offer language and perspectives of larger units of analysis which are rarely present in contemporary curriculum discourse. Blizek and Cederblom state that:

As an example of the kind of principles we believe community development theorists should be considering, we wish to cite two principles of justice which have been proposed recently by Professor John Rawls, and which are receiving considerable attention in philosophical circles. Rawls argues that the principles of justice are those that would be derived by any rational self-interested person who did not know in advance what place he would occupy in the social system. The perspective from which these principles are chosen is what Rawls calls "the original position." This perspective is one from which principles are selected that would ensure satisfactory social conditions for the least advantaged of the social system. The principles which Rawls argues would be selected by those in the original position are:

1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged... and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.

The first principle provides a basic equality of liberty and has priority over the second principle such that no sacrifice of liberties can be made in favor of, for example, an increase in the general economic prosperity of the community. Any diminution of liberty must strengthen the total system of liberties shared in equally by all. The second principle provides a maximization of the minimum. That is, the least advantaged -- those with the minimum -- are to be improved by whatever inequalities of economic or social good (other than liberty) are allowed. At the same time, everyone must have an opportunity to attain the offices and positions which receive unequal shares of economic or social goods (pp. 50-51).

The principles of justice cited by Blizek and Cederblom, I would suggest, can provide curriculum practitioners with a normative framework for considering human interactions which both honors our ontological condition (as reflected in the "original position" from which such principles might be formulated by rational self-interested persons) and a moral commitment to restructure our social relationships in order to preserve democratic rights and redress unjust inequalities. In this manner, curriculum practice may serve not only the private interests of self-regarding individuals, but the public interest which includes an ethical regard for the other. Cultural inequalities which may both advertantly and inadvertantly be exacerbated by meritocratic or self-interest-based educational programs should, I would maintain, be a concern of curriculum practitioners. An individualist orientation to curriculum practice fails fundamentally to honor social and public interests for justice.

It, no doubt, can be expected that "Social efforts and political movements aimed at the redistribution of power immediately threaten the status quo and stir up resistance from those who have a stake in continuing things the way they are" (Albee, 1983, p.27). As Albee, citing Rawls, points out, a critique of social inequalities from the perspective of distributive social justice penetrates and disarms many of the most prevalent "rationales" for inequalities in our present society:

His [Rawls's] political philosophy does not let status and income be determined by the individual's ability and talent. He argues that 'there is no more reason to permit

distribution of income and wealth to be settled by the distribution of natural assets than by historical and social fortune' (p.74). So in the just society, every attempt must be made to counter-balance the social inequalities that have led to disadvantage. If justice is fairness, Rawls argues, it demands maximum social efforts to compensate for historical injustice (pp. 27-28).

Without an appreciation for the community of human existence (and I would suggest that we broaden this to the level of cosmic existence), without a comprehensive view of private and public interests, without a commitment to social justice, and without a sense of moral agency which transcends fairness and includes compassion as a moral value, we might be doomed to repeat and add to the atrocities already committed in the narrow contexts of egocentrism, private interests, or cultural imperialism. A broader, more encompassing context need be considered. Macdonald (1980) clearly has advocated for such an expanded context to be considered as integral to a curricular perspective:

The focus of curriculum is not simply a context where a curriculum is in operation. The focus of curriculum is a microcosm of the universe. Blake's grain of sand; to which we bring ourselves, our consciousness, and our cultural reality. We are in effect expressing this in a total context (p. 22)

In this chapter I have attempted to trace a revisioning of the "rights" afforded to and by our ontological condition, to re-situate human agency within an "historical dynamic continuity" which transcends egocentric and anthropocentric renderings of order, and a rapprochement which reflects an intimacy inherent in an ontological view of the universe. I have sought to depict an avenue toward identity which neither denies the anxiety of human uncertainty nor disregards the possibility of participating in and working toward the public good in

the context of infinite care. I have resorted to a discussion of metaphysics, behavioral ecology, and strategies for praxis because I believe that curriculum theorists can and should be able to recognize the universe in a grain of sand... as well as be able to remove the grain of sand, when it is an irritant, from one's own or the eye of another.

In this light, I ask all, in our various fields of practice, those who seek to educate, to organize, to work for social and cultural change, to listen to those with whom we work... and to ourselves: How do they/we define themselves/ourselves? To whom or what do their/our identities make reference? What are their/our aspirations? What criteria do they/we employ to assess the success of their/our endeavors? In whose interest do they/we work? What remains unspoken?

I do not presume to answer these questions for others nor even to predict what we might find if we were to conduct such inquiry. But as one who has sought to cultivate a love for the world, a curricular perspective which is open to possible meanings concealed under the mantle of meanings as presently understood and which fuses the horizons of hope and affiliation against the netherworld of despair and alienation, I listen to not only the cacaphony of voices, but the harmony, not only the forcefully articulated choruses, but the silence.

What I have expressed in this dissertation is not the "true nature" of curriculum theorizing, but an experience of it. This

dissertation is not for the reader to believe in, but to inquire within. Umberto Eco (1980, 1983), in his rich tapestry of a novel The Name of the Rose, may help me draw this distinction and lead to more humble demands:

"Then this description, passing from auctoritas to auctoritas, was transformed through successive imaginative exercises, and unicorns became fanciful animals, white and gentle. So if you hear there's a unicorn in a wood, don't go there with a virgin: the animal might resemble more closely the Venetian's account than the description in this book."

"But did the ancient masters happen to receive from God the revelation of the unicorn's true nature?"

"Not the revelation: the experience. They were fortunate enough to be born in lands where unicorns live, or in times when unicorns lived in our own lands."

"But then how can we trust ancient wisdom, whose traces you are always seeking, if it is handed down by lying books that have interpreted it with such license?"

"Books are not made to be believed, but to be subjected to inquiry. When we consider a book, we mustn't ask ourselves what it says but what it means, a precept that the commentators of the holy books had very clearly in mind. The unicorn, as these books speak of him, embodies a moral truth, or allegorical, or analogical, but one that remains true, as the idea that chastity is a noble virtue remains true. But as for the literal truth that sustains the other three truths, we have yet to see what original experience gave birth to the letter. The literal object must be discussed, even if its higher meaning remains good. In a book it is written that diamond can be cut only with a billy goat's blood. My great master Roger Bacon said it was not true, simply because he had tried and had failed. But if the relation between a diamond and goat's blood had had a nobler meaning, that would have remained intact."

"Then higher truths can be expressed while the letter is lying," I said. "Still, it grieves me to think this unicorn doesn't exist, or never existed, or cannot exist one day."

"It is not licit to impose confines on divine omnipotence, and if God so willed, unicorns could also exist. But console yourself, they exist in these books, which, if they do not speak of real existence, speak of possible existence."

"So must we then read books without faith, which is a theological virtue?"

"There are two other theological virtues as well. The hope

that the possible is. And charity, toward those who believed in good faith that the possible was" (pp. 315-317).

I have sought a cosmic, ontological curriculum reality with the hope that this possibility exists. I ask the reader to extend a charitable view that, if in good faith I have confused the possible with the actual, such a belief may have contributed to an ongoing tradition of hopeful speculation and inquiry.

I could not leave this dissertation until it could leave me. Now, in truth, it has (or is about to) take on an existence of its own. But an opposition remains, and this opposition will remain, even as this text remains the same and yet changes through time. Gadamer (1960, 1976) points to this inherent opposition when he states:

But precisely what is exhibited in the work of art ought to be the essence of being itself. The conflict between revealment and concealment is not the truth of the work of art alone, but the truth of every being, for as unhiddenness, truth is always such a opposition of revealment and concealment. The two belong necessarily together. This obviously means that truth is not simply the mere presence of a being, so it stands, as it were, over against its correct representation. Such a concept of being unhidden would presuppose the subjectivity of the Dasein that represents beings. But beings are not correctly defined in their being if they are defined merely as objects of possible representation. Rather, it belongs just as much to their being that they withhold themselves. As unhidden, truth has in itself an inner tension and ambiguity. Being contains something like a hostility to its own presentations, as Heidegger says. What Heidegger means can be confirmed by everyone: the existing thing does not simply offer us a recognizable and familiar surface contour; it also has an inner depth of self-sufficiency that Heidegger calls its "standing-in-itself." The complete unhiddenness of all beings, their total objectification (by means of a representation that conceives things in their perfect state) would negate this standing-in-itself of beings and lead to a total leveling of them. A complete objectification of this kind would no longer represent beings that stand in their own being. Rather, it would

represent nothing more than our opportunity for using beings, and what would be manifest would be the will that seizes upon and dominates things. In the work of art, we experience an absolute opposition to this will-to-control, not in the sense of a rigid resistance to the presumption of our will, which is bent on utilizing things, but in the sense of the superior and intrusive power of a being reposing in itself. Hence the closedness and concealment of the work of art is the guarantee of the universal thesis of Heidegger's philosophy, namely, that beings hold themselves back by coming forward into the openness of presence. The standing-in-itself of the work betokens at the same time the standing-in-itself of beings in general (pp. 226-227).

This dissertation, then, shares the ontological condition of all being: by standing-in-itself it holds back even while coming forward into the openness of presence. And we each may then take some solace in the faith that the opposition of revealment and concealment, of affiliation and alienation, bespeaks a transcendence of the will-to-control by a will-to-be. Curriculum theorizing, guided by the process of ontological hermeneutics, may transcend the imperious, egoic will-to-control and its attendant alienation by openness to cosmic integration. Such integration unites the chorus and the silence, synergy and entropy, community and alienation, within an ever-renewing order -- an order not of mechanical randomness, brute determinism or indifference, but **compassion** (Rudhyar, 1972).

So in our work and play, our rigorousness and humor, our criticalness and loving, we may come to realize that Blake's grain of sand: provokes the tears which flush it from our eye to the sea, to the oyster, to the pearl we or our progeny may regard. How this pearl is regarded is a curricular question... but let us leave it to remain yet another story for another time.

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